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**THE REFORM PARTY OF CANADA:
A DISCOURSE ON RACE, ETHNICITY, AND EQUALITY**

by

DELLA KIRKHAM, B.A.

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Department of Sociology and Anthropology

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

September, 1994

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ETHNICITY, AND EQUALITY

submitted by Della Kirkham, B.A.
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September 22, 1994

ABSTRACT

Long considered by both academics and established political parties as merely a vessel for regional discontent, the Reform Party's success in the 1993 federal election indicates the need to subject its platform and underlying ideology to a more rigorous analysis. This is especially true of the party's race and ethnic-related policies which have garnered a significant amount of media attention. The racial-ethnic discourse of the Reform Party is discussed by examining its positions on: immigration; multiculturalism; Aboriginal issues; language rights and the Constitution; the family and women's issues. This examination is informed by the premise that we are witnessing the rise of new racial discourses and ideologies. In many instances, the meaning of race is being transformed or reinterpreted in a conservative direction. The link between the racial and ethnic discourse of the Reform Party, and the trend toward the *new right* rearticulation of racial ideologies is made throughout the thesis.

To Perry

*who continually challenges me to be a more rigorous intellectual,
but whom out of a different loyalty, I must now openly disagree*

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INTRODUCTION

A series of rather dramatic events has transpired in recent Canadian politics. These include the failure to deal with Quebec's constitutional demands, the ongoing attempts to define a new relationship with First Nations communities, and a recently negotiated continental free trade agreement. All these events have taken place within the context of an uncertain economic climate leading many Canadians to lose faith in the capacity of political leaders to guide them out of the current economic and political turmoil.

It is within this context that a new voice on the Canadian political landscape has emerged. The Reform Party of Canada had its founding assembly in October 1987 and has steadily increased in popularity culminating in its fifty-two seat victory in the October 1993 federal election. While the party has often been portrayed by both media and academic commentators as merely a vessel for regional discontent, its recent electoral success suggests that the party may have more staying power than previous movements born out of the politics of western alienation. Since Reform appears to have found a place on the main Canadian political stage, at least for the moment, it seems appropriate to subject its agenda to a more rigorous analysis than that offered in the recent past. This is the object of the present study.

This thesis examines the Reform Party's discourse on racial and ethnic issues. There has been significant interest in the Reform Party's position on issues of race and ethnicity and since its inception, the party and its members have been plagued by innuendos concerning their latent, if not overt racism. While Reform officials have

steadfastly maintained they are not advocating any hidden racist agenda, both media commentators and political opponents have been quick to suggest otherwise. Indeed, certain instances of extremist tendencies in the party have been brought to light, but to date no systematic analysis of the party's discourse relating to race and ethnicity has been undertaken. The purpose of this thesis, then, is to explore the discourse of the Reform Party as articulated in its race and ethnic-related policies including immigration, multiculturalism, and Aboriginal issues. Other policy areas that will also be examined for racial/ethnic meanings are Reform's positions on official languages, the Constitution, the family, and women's issues.

My analysis is informed by the premise that we are witnessing the rise of new racial discourses and ideologies in Canada (as elsewhere). This is occurring within the wider context of the re-emergence of "right-wing" politics since the seventies. The first part of my study locates the Reform Party within this wider context and argues that it represents the clearest expression of "new right" ideology in Canada at the federal level. With the rightward shift, a new era of racialized politics has also emerged. Indeed, I argue throughout this thesis that a part of the larger project of the new right is the *rearticulation* of racial meanings. My analysis demonstrates that this too is the project of the Reform Party. A review of the party's discourse on race and ethnic-related issues will show that through the use of "code words" - ie., non-racial rhetoric used to disguise racial issues - Reform attempts to *rearticulate* understandings of race and ethnicity from those that existed previous to the emergence of the new right. The party's most sophisticated attempt at rearticulation is found in the promotion of its "equality model"

which stresses equality of *individual* opportunity, while explicitly rejecting equality of outcome. As such, issues of racial and ethnic *inequality* are considered as matters of individual or private concern and not issues to be addressed by the state and public sphere.

The attempt to rearticulate meanings of race and ethnicity is best understood as a *reaction* to a number of social, economic and political events that have occurred in the post-war era. Like other western capitalist democracies, Canada experienced a post-war boom - the result of a consensus, or compromise negotiated between the state, capital, and labour. At the risk of over-simplification, the elements of this consensus included: an "open door" to foreign investment, particularly from the United States, in order to promote economic development; the introduction of social policies aimed at offsetting the negative effects of the market and industrial capitalism; and the use of Keynesian policy instruments for the macro-economic management of the economy. Precipitated by the world economic crisis in the 1970s, this consensus began to break down. Indeed, by the 1980s, each of its elements had been discredited and challenged. The breakdown of the post-war compromise led to renewed ideological conflict and a more apparent set of political struggles around (but not limited to) class, region, and language. In the absence of a consensus to frame the debate, new political agendas emerged in the 1980s (Cameron, 1989). The scene can be characterized as follows:

Canada entered the 1990s with a redesigned economic strategy and new political thinking about social questions, both of which reflected the abandonment of many of the post-war certainties. If the 1970s was a decade of hesitancy about future directions, by the end of the 1980s the country was well-launched on the path of more market-oriented mechanisms to distribute the economic pie. These involved a retrenchment of governmental responsibility for seeking or creating greater

social and economic equality.

(Clarke et al , 1991: 150)

Embedded within this new political thinking is a *racial* subtext. The efforts to diminish the state's role in off-setting the inequities caused by a capitalist free-market system have occurred as a reaction against the gains made by racial and ethnic minorities in the sixties. The civil rights movements redefined the meaning of equality by constructing a collective identity based on common oppression. These movements (including the women's movement) asserted that equal individual access to opportunity could not furnish equality, for some individuals are discriminated against by virtue of their membership in an identifiable group. The civil rights movement, therefore, made demands on the state to abolish forms of discrimination and to recognize *group*, as opposed to *individual* rights (Omi, 1987).

The new right views with much suspicion the (limited) victories won by these movements. I will argue this is also true of the Reform Party. The breakdown of the post-war consensus, and the social, political, and economic dislocations that accompanied it, were thus auspicious conditions for the rise of the Reform Party. Its discourse on race and ethnicity must be read in this context. The party's discourse must also be read against the backdrop of the growing hostilities toward visible minorities. This resentment is in and of itself a consequence of the disarticulation of the post-war compromise and should be understood as such. It is therefore worthwhile briefly to examine the manifestations of this backlash.

In 1971 prime minister Pierre Trudeau proclaimed a new vision for our country

when he announced the government's multicultural policy. Canada was to open a bold new frontier, setting an example to the rest of the world. People of different racial and ethnic backgrounds were to be encouraged to live together in harmony without losing their cultural distinctiveness. This image set Canada's cultural mosaic apart from the American "melting pot" south of the border and many Canadians embraced the vision wholeheartedly. But the Canadian reality has clearly fallen short of the ideal. In fact, recent opinion polls suggest that far from living up to the principle of racial and ethnic harmony, a growing number of Canadians express intolerance not only of identifiable minorities, but toward the ideal of racial and ethnic diversity itself. By the beginning of the nineties commentators were warning that the vision of a Canadian mosaic was "under siege."¹

The public perception of the changing racial, ethnocultural, and linguistic composition of Canadian society has been vigorously pursued by demographers and academic and political pollsters alike. Poll after poll reveal at best, a marked ambivalence toward immigration, refugee and multicultural issues, and at worst, growing hostility to members of visible minority communities. For example:

- in 1985 56% of those polled stated a preference for the multicultural mosaic over other models. This figure had declined to 47% by 1990;²
- a *Maclean's*/Decima Research poll in July 1989 found that 61% of all respondents (including a majority at every income and education level), felt that immigrants should change their culture in order to "blend in with the larger society";³
- a Gallup poll in July 1991 showed that 45% of all those surveyed favoured decreased immigration. This was the highest proportion of people in favour of a decrease since Gallup started polling on the subject in 1975, and was significantly higher than the 32% who favoured a

decrease when questioned in 1990.⁴ More recently, results of a survey released in July 1994 found 53 % of respondents believed that immigration levels were too high.⁵

- a poll commissioned by the federal government in July 1991 found strong support for multiculturalism; *however*, it also uncovered widespread discrimination and racial intolerance. That is, there was strong support for many multicultural policy principles such as recognizing diversity, eliminating racism, and ensuring equal job access. Yet at the same time, 46% agreed that people who come to Canada should change their behaviour "to become more like us"; 42% believed national unity was weakened by ethnic groups "sticking to their old ways"; 33 % said that recent immigrants should not have as much to say about the future of Canada as those people born and raised here; and 33 % reported they felt angry seeing recent immigrants on television demanding the same rights as Canadian citizens;⁶
- A Decima Research poll released in December 1993 found that 3 out of every 4 Canadians reject the notion of cultural diversity and think racial and ethnic minorities should try harder to fit into mainstream society. The same survey found that 54% of respondents believed that current immigration policy allows "too many people of different races and cultures" into Canada; 57% said they sometimes held negative views of minority groups; 50% agreed with the statement, "I am sick and tired of some groups complaining about racism being directed at them;" and 41 % said that "I'm sick and tired of ethnic minorities being given special treatment." Yet in spite of such findings, the survey also found that two-thirds of the respondents declared that one of the best things about Canada is its acceptance of people from all races and ethnic backgrounds.⁷

A series of classified documents prepared for immigration minister Sergio Marchi also revealed that half of the respondents to confidential surveys over the past year exhibited either intolerance or open hostility towards immigrants.⁸ The *Ottawa Citizen* reported that immigration was a "hidden issue" in the 1993 federal election which repeatedly cropped up as politicians canvassed door-to-door, and which boiled to the surface at all candidates meetings.⁹ More recently, tensions were inflamed when it was reported that two Toronto area murders came at the hands of immigrants illegally in Canada.¹⁰

The growing hostility toward racial and ethnic diversity coincides with changing immigration patterns. In 1957 Canada accepted approximately 280,000 immigrants, 95 percent of whom came from Europe and the United States. By 1987 76 percent of the just over 150,000 immigrants came from Asia, the Caribbean and elsewhere in the Third World. Fewer than one-quarter came from Europe and the US.¹¹ Even with immigration levels at around 250,000 per year for the last three years, this pattern has not changed. Clearly, the majority of Canada's immigrants are now non-white.

It is within this volatile mix of attitudes, perceptions, and changing immigration patterns that the Reform Party articulates its particular views on race and ethnic-related issues. Unlike the other three federal parties, Reform has shown quite a willingness to discuss immigration and multiculturalism and is quick to point out the failure of its political opponents to do so. Indeed, the party articulates what it asserts are pragmatic approaches to immigration, multiculturalism, official languages policy, Aboriginal rights, as well as women's issues. According to Reformers, these "common sense" expressions or understandings of policy issues are in stark contrast to the approach of other political parties. For this reason Reform represents itself as the voice of the "common people" and as a challenge to the prevailing "status quo." As Reform MP Deborah Grey (1992: 34) suggests, the party's programs for constitutional, parliamentary, and economic reform are "certainly a departure from the days of old when the backroom boys would decide what was best for whom; and, of course, what was best for themselves. Today is a new day, however, and it brings with it an opportunity for significant, meaningful change."

Exactly what this "significant, meaningful change" would suggest for race and ethnic equality in this country is the larger goal of this inquiry. To that end, this thesis provides a detailed examination of the party's discourse on race and ethnic-related policies. The main source of data for the research was documentary sources obtained from the party's archives. These sources include policy documents, pamphlets and brochures, press release statements, texts of speeches, and *The Reformer* - the party paper. A search of media sources, including both periodicals and newspapers, was also undertaken. This documentary evidence was supplemented by a small number of strategic interviews in July 1993 with Reform Party officials. My interview subjects included Deborah Grey, who up until October 1993 was the party's only sitting Member of Parliament; Stephen Harper, the party's chief policy architect, and newly elected MP; Tom Flanagan, Reform's former Director of Policy, Strategy and Communications; and Dimitri Pantazopoulos, the then party Manager of Policy. An open-ended questionnaire was administered and can be found in the Appendix. Data collection covered the time period from the party's founding in 1987 to July 1993. This time frame was made purely for methodological convenience and should suggest no greater significance. Part of the difficulty in examining the discourse of an active political party is its on-going nature. Clearly, the Reform Party continues to make statements that reflect its race and ethnic-related policies. Nonetheless, a cut-off date had to be made. Since I completed my interviews in July 1993 I determined this would be an appropriate time. Of course the drawback of making such a closure is the possibility of missing potentially critical pieces of evidence. Given the party's performance in the last federal election this is

perhaps even more significant. However, as the party's policies did not change, except perhaps in tone, I am confident that further data collection would have only strengthened my arguments.

In the first chapter of the thesis I arrive at an understanding of racial and ethnic oppression by reviewing some of the current literature regarding the nature of racism as an ideology. Rather than attempt to cover all aspects of the many theoretical debates concerning racism, I focus instead on those that are of particular interest to my study. It is here that I make the important link between ideology, discourse, and power relations. An example of how such an understanding can be applied to an examination of the right-wing rearticulation of racial meanings is provided by drawing from the work of Michael Omi and Howard Winant.

Chapter 2 provides a brief historical sketch of the Reform Party including a profile of its supporters and an examination of its populism. The chapter also highlights some of the extremist tendencies evident in Reform that would perhaps allow us to treat the party as a "far right," or "extreme right" group. As I argue in Chapter 3, however, I believe Reform is best understood as an expression of "new right" ideology. This chapter provides my understanding of the term, and an examination of the party's new right ideological character.

The remaining chapters provide a description and analysis of Reform's race and ethnic-related discourse by examining its policy positions on immigration (Chapter 4); multiculturalism (Chapter 5); and official languages, the Constitution, and Aboriginal rights (Chapter 6). The final chapter of the thesis examines Reform's discourse on

women and the family. Ideological renderings of the new right project a particular vision - explicitly or implicitly racialized - of the family and the role of women in society. While Reform's discourse on the family and women's issues may not be overtly racialized, it clearly demonstrates the party's opposition to group identity. As such it reflects Reform's understandings of racial and ethnic equality. The questions that are explored in Chapters 4 to 7 include: what is the racial/ethnic discourse (or discourses) of the Reform Party? How does the overall picture of race-ethnicity reflect collectively in these policies? Finally, does Reform's race and ethnic-related discourse reflect new right ideologies?

My analysis concludes by examining the political implications of Reform's discourse and in particular, its influence on the agenda of other federal parties. Regardless of whether the party is able or unable to build on its recent electoral victories, I suggest that Reform's main achievement has been its ability to shift the "universe of political discourse." Jenson (1986: 25-26) defines this concept as:

... the universe of socially constructed meaning resulting from political struggle. Within this universe, the parameters of political action are established by the process of limiting the set of actors accorded the status of legitimate participants; the range of issues considered within the realm of political debate; the policy alternatives considered feasible for implementation; and, finally the alliance strategies available for achieving change.

At its simplest, the universe of political discourse comprises beliefs about the way politics should be conducted, the boundaries of political discussion, and the kinds of conflicts resolvable through the political process. In the vast array of tensions, differences, and inequalities characteristic of any society, only some are treated as

"political." Thus, whether a matter is considered a religious, economic, private or political question is set by the universe of political discourse (Bell, 1990).

Reform's significance, therefore, need not be measured solely in its success at the ballot box, but in its ability to (re-)politicize issues that in recent times have remained uncontested at the level of party politics. For many years discussions about immigration and multiculturalism have fallen outside of what was considered legitimate political debate. All three federal parties have supported increased immigration levels and the consolidation of multicultural policy, as well as the Official Languages Act. Likewise, they have all acknowledged the need for addressing the pressing problems of Aboriginal communities. The Reform Party enters the political arena and approaches these issues as if they were long-standing shibboleths which require dismantling. But in so doing, Reform *rearticulates* the very meaning of equality in a manner which *de*-politicizes the significance of racial and ethnic *inequality*. The degree to which the party succeeds in this project is a story that continues to unfold, and one that should be of interest to all Canadians.

CHAPTER 1

UNDERSTANDING RACIAL AND ETHNIC OPPRESSION: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

In 1965 sociologist John Porter released his study of social stratification in Canadian society. In *The Vertical Mosaic*, Porter convincingly argued that Canada's ethnic and racial groups were ordered in a rigid hierarchy of power and economic status with the dominant British charter group at the top (Porter, 1965). The over-representation of certain racial and ethnic groups at the lowest margins of society has been an issue that analysts have undertaken to theorize over the past number of decades. These efforts have produced a huge and varied body of literature. My focus here, however, will be quite narrow in scope and will only encompass that work which is particular to my task of examining the Reform Party's race and ethnic-related discourse. More specifically, in this chapter I aim to arrive at an understanding of racial and ethnic oppression by reviewing some of the current literature regarding the ideology of racism.

Those accounts deriving from a Marxist and neo-Marxist perspective have been highly influential in the study of racism. Marxist analyses view racist ideology as a manifestation of capitalist social relations which operate to (de)limit the opportunities of non-white racial groups. While orthodox Marxist theories conceptualize racism as a tool utilized by the bourgeoisie to exploit non-white labour and divide the working class, more recent work by neo-Marxists has tried to avoid the simple reduction of race to class. This has led to a rather protracted debate revolving around the "race-class" question. That is, which condition should be given analytic primacy - that of race, or

that of class - in theorizing the oppression experienced by racial minorities (Stasiulis, 1990).

In spite of their attempt to overcome the rigidity and reductionism of Marxist orthodoxy, these accounts of racial oppression were still found to be inadequate in a number of ways. As Stasiulis (1990) notes, much of the debate on race and class has overlooked the role of *ethnic communities* in fashioning social identities and in binding together individuals with either similar or contradictory class positions. More significantly, these debates have not adequately addressed the reality that racism - in the sense of exclusionary practices justified on the basis of assumed biological or immutable cultural differences - can be directed against ethnic groups, who may or may not be constituted as separate races from the dominant group.

Neither has the race-class debate produced satisfactory accounts of gender. Either gender is ignored altogether, or race, class, and gender are treated as separate analytic spheres. Classical Marxist analyses of racism frequently treated gender as *parallel* with race. For example, the concept 'reserve army of labour' was said to consist of either 'racial minorities' or 'women', without specifying the sex of the former or the race and ethnicity of the latter. Contemporary Marxist formulations achieved through the reworking of class concepts in their articulation with race, have been silent on gender (Stasiulis, 1990).

In spite of these shortcomings, what has emerged from the race-class debate is the growing consensus that race and racism are not irreducible to class, but have their own complex and historically specific modes (Stasiulis, 1990). While this should not suggest

that race and racism should be analytically separated from material relations, neither can racial and ethnic divisions be reduced to or seen as completely determined by the structural contradictions of capitalist societies (Solomos, 1986).

The theoretical analyses of racism have grown to encompass a rich and often controversial body of work which examines the ways in which economic exploitation, ideology, as well as political power create and in turn are created by race and its articulation with gender, ethnicity, and class (Amott and Matthaei, 1991). I certainly cannot do justice to the complexity of these issues here. Rather, in this chapter I strive to develop a basic conceptual framework for thinking about racial and ethnic oppression.

THE DECONSTRUCTIONS OF RACISM

The starting point for developing this framework is to briefly examine the more sophisticated theoretical treatments of racist ideology than that which is found in the race-class literature referred to above. Examples of these reformulations can be found in the work of Omi and Winant (1986) and Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992). Their "deconstructions" of racism are linked in their recognition of the historical specificity of racism, and in their avoidance of reductionism, economism and *a priorism* found elsewhere in Marxist and neo-Marxist theory. In their attempt to give historically-concrete and sociologically-specific accounts of the racial aspects of particular societies, these authors highlight the different forms of racial domination, and insist that racism is not a universal and unitary transhistorical phenomenon (West, 1987).

Omi and Winant for example, argue that any analysis of racism must be premised

on the understanding that race is both socially *and* historically constructed.¹ Racial meanings, therefore, vary tremendously over time, and between different social formations. Their position is encapsulated in the concept *racial formation*:

The meaning of race is defined and contested throughout society, in both collective action and personal practice. In the process, racial categories themselves are formed, transformed, destroyed and re-formed. We use the term *racial formation* to refer to the process by which social, economic and political forces determine the context and importance of racial categories, and by which they are in turn shaped by racial meanings. Crucial to this formulation is the treatment of race as a *central axis* of social relations which cannot be subsumed under or reduced to some broader category of conception.

(Omi and Winant, 1986: 61-62)

In this formulation, race is not reduced to a manifestation of some other "fundamental" phenomenon, but is theorized as a social category which serves as an organizing principle of social relations.² As such, it is instrumental in the formation of individual identity, and economic, political, and cultural/ideological structures (Omi and Winant, 1986).

While Omi and Winant explicitly reject the use of ethnicity as an analytic construct, Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992) attempt to theorize race and racism within the parameters of ethnic processes and in relation to other prime divisions such as class and gender. They argue that race categories and their specification need to be incorporated into the social ontology of collectivity and belongingness in order to be understood. In other words, the axis upon which phenomena of race depend can be found within constructs of collectivity and belongingness - ie., *ethnic* phenomena - and is conditioned through notions of common origin or identity not in terms of cultures of difference, but in terms of the specific positing of boundaries which involve mechanisms of both

inclusion and exclusion.

While race is one of the ways such boundaries can be constructed, Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992: 4) argue so too is ethnicity:

Ethnic groups involve the positing of boundaries in relation to who can and cannot belong according to certain parameters which are extremely heterogeneous, ranging from the credentials of birth to being born in the right place, conforming to cultural or other symbolic practices, language, and very centrally behaving in sexually appropriate ways.

For these authors, then, racism cannot be understood without considering its interconnections with ethnicity, as well as gender, and class.

Although Anthias and Yuval-Davis have not adopted the practice, some authors use the hyphenated term "race-ethnicity" in order to grasp the complexities of racist ideologies and practices. Amott and Matthaei (1991) suggest that the concept represents a theoretical advance for it reflects the understanding that those people seen as belonging to a particular 'race' often lack a shared set of distinct physical characteristics, but rather share a common ethnicity or culture. Similarly, Zinn (1990: 80) uses the term "racial ethnic" to refer to:

... groups labelled as races in the context of certain historical, social, and material conditions. Blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans are racial groups that are formed, defined, and given meaning by a variety of social forces in the wider society. ... Each group is also bound together by ethnicity, that is, common ancestry and emergent cultural characteristics that are often used for coping with racial oppression. The concept racial-ethnic underscores the social construction of race and ethnicity for people of colour in the United States.

Other theorists, however reject the conflation between race and ethnicity claiming that unlike ethnic criteria, phenotypical markers of racial boundaries such as skin colour

are not *merely* socially constructed, nor are they readily malleable and deconstructed (Stasiulis, 1990). The hostility to the use of ethnicity as a theoretical construct has also resulted from its usage within the ethnic studies approach found in American sociology. In its analysis of minority groups, this approach focuses on the degree to which minorities go through processes of cultural adaptation, maintenance, integration or assimilation. In this manner, ethnicity is treated as a voluntaristic, normative identification process or as a form of culture. Race, on the other hand, is equated (or reduced) to ethnicity. By treating racial differences as further expressions of differences in ethnicity, the ethnic studies approach disregards the role of *racism* in structuring the position of non-white minority groups (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992). It is for this reason that Omi and Winant reject the analytic validity of ethnicity.³ Anthias and Yuval-Davis also distance themselves from this narrow and limiting view of ethnicity, but instead of completely discarding the concept they attempt to retrieve it "from the conceptual baggage of the ethnic studies approach and deploy it in a more radical way" (1992: 6).

Clearly, a consensus does not exist regarding the relationship of ethnicity *vis-à-vis* race in the theoretical analyses of racist ideology. While I certainly will not attempt to resolve this debate, I do take the position that understandings of racism should be broad enough to include that which is experienced by ethnic as well as racial minorities. That is, ethnically constituted differences (language, religion, dress, etc.) can become the basis of exclusionary practices that are undoubtedly racist in their imputation of immutable differences and their inequitable outcomes (Stasiulis, 1990). Obviously the

manifestations of racial-ethnic oppression will vary considerably across time and space, and should not be treated as similar instances of racist practice. However, its racist implications are felt regardless of whether those who experience them belong to a specific racial and/or ethnic categories.

As we have seen, Anthias and Yuval-Davis expand the understanding of racism to account for the contiguity of race and ethnicity. These authors also underscore the need to theorize the manner in which racist *discourses* and racist *practices* inferiorize, exclude and subordinate racial and ethnic groups. The emphasis on both practice and discourse reflects a growing trend in the analyses of racism. A new paradigm, inspired by recent work in cultural theory and postmodernism, has emerged in the past decade. These new renderings no longer locate the genesis of racism within the objective conditions and structures of capitalist social relations. Instead, they seek the source of racist ideology in the realm of *culture*. By examining the work of David Theo Goldberg - one of the main proponents of the new framework - the following section highlights some of the main themes found in such analyses.⁴

A POSTMODERN ANALYSIS OF RACE: DISCOURSES, SUBJECTIVITY, AND RACISMS

The new problematic takes as its starting point a critique of prior treatments of race and racism. A number of approaches, including certain Marxist formulations, are singled out for attack and are criticized for treating racism as an ahistorical, unchanging social condition based on presuppositions of a biological nature and inherent superiority or ability. In so doing, these frameworks view racism as a singular and monolithic

phenomenon, and although it manifests itself differently in varying circumstances, it still shares the same constituent properties.

In contrast, the postmodern approach does not take as its subject matter the phenomenon of racism, but the phenomena of *racisms*. The presumption of a single monolithic racism is displaced by a "mapping of the multifarious historical formulations of *racisms*." This represents a shift from a "synchronic description of surface expressions reflecting 'race relations'," to more critical "anatomies of diachronic transformations between successive racist standpoints assumed and discarded since the sixteenth century" (Goldberg, 1990a: xiii).

The origins of racism, then, are to be sought, not within material social relations, but through *discursive practices* and in particular, the discourses of modernity.

Race is one of the central conceptual inventions of modernity. ... [T]he concept assumes specificity as modernity defines itself, redefining modernity's landscape of social relations as its own conceptual contours are mapped out. The significance of race transforms theoretically and materially as modernity is renewed, refined, and redefined.

(Goldberg, 1993: 3)

Goldberg's analysis should be understood as an attempt to demonstrate "how race emerged with and has served to define modernity by insinuating itself in various fashions into modernity's prevailing conceptions of moral personhood and subjectivity" (Goldberg, 1993: 10). He argues that in modernity, social subjects are conceived foremost in racial terms. However, social subjectivity has not always been racialized. In the classical Greek social formation, subject positions were constituted in terms of one's citizenship in the city-state. The principal distinction between subjects, therefore, was *political*.

Slaves and "barbarians" who were not entitled to citizenship were thus the prime objects of discrimination and exclusion. While Goldberg acknowledges that through claims of *cultural* superiority ethnophobic and xenophobic discrimination did occur, he argues that there is little evidence to suggest that these claimed inequalities were generally considered to be biologically determined. Accordingly, there were no racial exclusions in classical Greek society for there was no racial conception of social subjectivity (Goldberg, 1993).⁵

In medieval thought individuals and groups were constructed as the subjects of *theological* categories. Hence, medieval exclusion and discrimination (directed against non-Christians) was religious at root, not racial. It is only in the institutions of modernity that subjectivity comes increasingly to be defined by and through the prism of *race*. The transition to modernity, therefore, reflects the shift from a political or religious discourse, to a racially defined discourse of human identity and personhood. Medieval discourse and that of Greek antiquity had no catalogue of racial groupings, and no identification of individuals or groups in terms of racial membership. These are characteristics particular to modernity. As Goldberg writes (1993: 24):

The sixteenth century thus marks the divide in the rise of race consciousness. Not only does the concept of race become explicitly and consciously applied but one also begins to see racial characterization emerging in art as much as in politico-philosophical and economic debates.

Hodge's analysis also gives primacy to the discursive conditions of modernity. His work focuses specifically on the links between the emergence of racism and the Enlightenment emphasis on reason and rationality. In particular, he explicates the "dualism" between good and evil which he identifies as the structural framework through

which Western reason is defined. This framework enables, indeed, motivates forms of group oppression such as racism and sexism. As the "Other" becomes defined as "evil", Hodge (1990) argues, the duality of good/evil legitimizes the belief that oppression is *rational*, and hence acceptable.⁶

The ideology of racism, therefore, is constitutive of (and constituted in) the discourses of modernity and more generally, in the realm of *culture*. Based on this supposition, Goldberg (1993: 8) defines his project as follows:

In contrast to the prevailing picture of a singular and passing racism, I will be developing a conception of transforming racisms bound conceptually in terms of and sustained by an underlying culture. Like all cultures, that which I identify as racist grows and ebbs. My undertaking is to account for the emergence, transformation, and extension, in a word, the (continuing re-) invention of racist culture, and for the varying kinds of discursive expression that it prompts and supports. The significance of any prevailing racist expression and of social relations and institutions in a racialized formation must be read against this cultural background.⁷

This clearly suggests a new approach to the analysis of race and racism. Indeed, a whole new set of questions is being posed. These include:

In what ways does the language used in expressing racist attitudes and in making accusations and denials of racism alter through historical time? How do these changes in expression determine changes in the forms of racist attitudes and behaviour, or responses and resistance: What are the factors - scientific, economic, political, legal, cultural, literary, and so on - that effect such alterations in language, expression and attitude? What is the relation between changing presuppositions and changing interests? What relations of theory and practice may be identified between historically transforming conceptions of "race" and other changing categories of social inclusion or exclusion, such as "ethnicity," "nationality," "class," or "gender"?

(Goldberg, 1990a: xii)

The postmodern approach to the study of racism(s) thus prioritizes the analysis

of discourse, discursive practices, subjectivity, and the role of discourse in constituting subject positions. These issues are addressed within the framework of two different theoretical pursuits. The first deals with analyzing the history of *race formation*, that is, "the transformation over time in what gets to count as a race, how racial membership is determined, and what sorts of exclusion this entails." The second endeavour focuses on *racial subjectification* and *subjection*. Here, the aim is to demonstrate how social agents are defined or define themselves as racial subjects and what this entails for both the "racially formed" and the "racially forming producers" (Goldberg, 1990a: xii).

In his work Goldberg attempts to demonstrate how subjects become racialized through discourse. This process of "racial subjectivizing" occurs when "the power of racist expression conjoins with the power of other discursive expressions - notably, though not only, those of class, gender, nation, and capitalism - to determine the subjectivity of individuals at established times and places" (Goldberg, 1993: 59). Because individuals are hailed or called to subjectivity by others (the process of "interpellation"), Goldberg emphasizes the inherent *social* character of the formation of subjectivity. In other words, individuals are defined and define themselves as *subjects* by way of social discourses. The important link between discourse and subjectivity, and the subsequent significance of the analysis of discursive practices is thus rendered clear. As Goldberg (1993: 57) states, "discourses are the intermediary between self and society; they mediate the self as social subject." That is, discourse links subjectivity to the social realm.

While my discussion of the varied and complex literature on the ideology of

racism is by no means been comprehensive, I have derived a number of important insights that will assist me in my specific project. Omi and Winant's emphasis on the social construction of race helps us to understand the variability of both race and racism over time and in specific social formations. In the following section I discuss their analysis of the articulation (and *rearticulation*) of racial meanings further demonstrating the relevance of this premise. Anthias and Yuval-Davis' insistence that race, class, gender, and ethnicity are all interrelated axes of social relations suggests that the practices of exclusion, subordination, and exploitation cannot be fully understood unless they are theorized in all of their complexities. Together these analyses represent valuable efforts to overcome the reductionism and monolithic view of racism that appears in much of the neo-Marxist debate on race and class. On the other hand, Goldberg's work takes us beyond the realm of material social relations and highlights the contribution detailed examinations of discourse(s) can provide in arriving at broader understandings of racist ideologies and racist practices.

Collectively the work of these authors demonstrates the necessity to link discourse not only to ideology, but to *power relations* whereby some groups (racially and/or ethnically defined) become subordinated and others dominate. As Fairclough (1992: 87) suggests, if ideology is understood as -

... the significations/constructions of reality (the physical world, social relations, social identities), which are built into various dimensions of the forms/meanings of discursive practices, and which contribute to the production, reproduction or transformation of relations of domination;

- then discourse as "a mode of political and ideological practice" is inherently tied to the

creation and maintenance of power relations. That is:

Discourse as a political practice establishes, sustains and changes power relations, and the collective entities (classes, blocs, communities, groups) between which power relations obtain. Discourse as an ideological practice constitutes, naturalizes, sustains and changes significations of the world from diverse positions in power relations.

(Fairclough, 1992: 67)

In other words, social and political power, and the ideologies that sustain, legitimate, and defend such power are reproduced through discourse (van Dijk, 1989).

Bearing this in mind, the significance of an analysis of Reform's discourse on race and ethnicity becomes clearer. As Seidel (1986) argues, language and discourse create values and particular ways of thinking and speaking. In so doing, they channel our political behaviour and actions in certain directions. What the Reform Party's discourse on race and ethnicity suggests for racial and ethnic equality is what I mean to uncover in this present work.

While I acknowledge the role discursive conditions play in constituting social relations, I am also cognisant of the dangers of a "descent into discourse."⁸ Gilroy (1990: 264) provides a stern warning against conceptualizing race solely as a function of discourse:

The groups we learn to know as "races" are not, of course, formed simply and exclusively by the power of racial discourses. The intimate association between ideas about race and employment of unfree labour in plantation slavery, "debt peonage," apartheid, or the coercive use of migrant labour should be a constant warning against conceptualizing racial ideologies as if they are wholly autonomous. Race may provide literary critics with "the ultimate trope of difference,"⁹ but the brain-teasing perplexities of theorizing about race cannot be allowed to obscure the fact that the play of difference in which racial taxonomy appears has extradiscursive referents. At different times, economic, political, and

cultural factors all play a determining role in shaping the character of "races."

In this manner, the work of Wetherell and Potter offer a useful model in which an analysis of racial discourse can be undertaken. They define their position in the following manner:

We are not wanting to argue that racism is a simple matter of linguistic practice. Investigations of racism must also focus on institutional practices, on discriminatory actions and on social structures and social divisions. But the study of these things is intertwined with the study of discourse. Our emphasis will be on the ways in which a society gives voice to racism and how forms of discourse institute, solidify, change, create and reproduce social formations.

(Wetherell and Potter, 1992: 3)

I am in agreement with analyses such as these which locate the study of discourse within the context of wider extra-discursive relations. Following Valverde (1991), I view social structure and discourse as sets of interconnected relations. In the book *The Age of Light, Soap and Water*, Valverde examines how particular discourses of moral reform were constructed at the turn of the century in Canada. While she highlights the methodological value of discourse analysis, she also stresses the danger of assuming that social and economic relations are *created* by discourse.¹⁰ Her work, therefore, represents a recognition that the production of the text is embedded in social relations, and that language should not be prioritized at the expense of structural relations. In so doing, Valverde emphasizes the dialectic relationship between discursive relations and structural relations. With regard to her study, she writes (1991: 43), "the discourse of social purity on the one hand relied for its meaning on the structural relations of class, gender, and race/ethnicity existing in turn-of-the-century Canada, but on the other hand actively

contributed to shaping those relations in a specific way."

It is through the interconnections of both social structure and discursive relations that will enable us to achieve broader understandings of racial and ethnic oppression. My study of the Reform Party's race and ethnic-related discourse is framed within this theoretical context. The work of Michael Omi and Howard Winant provide a useful example of the insights gained in using such a conceptual framework. The remainder of the chapter briefly examines their analysis of the articulation (and *rearticulation*) of racial discourse in the United States.

RACE AND THE RIGHT: THE DISCURSIVE REARTICULATION OF EQUALITY

Helvacioğlu (1990) suggests that the 1970s and 1980s will be remembered as the era of the resurgence of the right. A number of governments in the West adopted policies in the economic, political and social realms which sought to establish an alternative hegemonic project opposing the more progressive legacies of the 1960s: expanded welfare; the politicization of race and gender issues around the civil rights and women's movements; and the gains of organized labour. In Chapter 3 I argue that the Reform Party is best understood within the context of this rightward shift. A number of analyses, particularly in relation to Thatcherite Britain and U.S. Reaganism, further suggest that the resurgence of the right has brought with it a new era of *racialized* politics.¹¹ It is to this body of literature that the work of Omi and Winant (1986) contributes.

According to these authors, behind the many objectives of the right (including the

resuscitation of economic and imperial power; containing the demands and political visions of the various new social movements that emerged in the 1960s; the restoration of "governability" to democracy; and the reconstruction of traditional cultural and social values) there exists an underlying *racial* character. However, this character remains partially hidden by the right's ability to appropriate previous democratic themes and language, and use them in an effort to reconstruct American life around its economic, political and moral principles.

Omi and Winant argue that the right attempts to achieve this agenda through the process of *rearticulation*. That is, "the practice of discursive reorganization or reinterpretation of ideological themes and interests such that these elements obtain new meanings or coherence" (Omi, 1987: 16). Rearticulation, then, occurs as a result of the *disorganization* of the dominant ideology and of the *construction* of an alternative, oppositional framework (Omi and Winant, 1986). In the 1960s the United States experienced a time of intense racial conflict. Civil rights struggles and ghetto revolts, as well as controversies over state policies of reform and repression highlighted a period where the very meaning of race was politicized and contested. As such, the civil rights movement of the 1960s rearticulated racial ideology, in part, by making new demands on the state to address racial inequality. As Omi (1987: 18) writes:

The black movement *redefined* the meaning of racial identity, and consequently of race itself, in American society. Drawing upon a legacy of political and cultural themes, people constructed a collective identity based on their common oppression. This identity found political expression in the demands to abolish forms of discrimination and recognize group, as opposed to individual rights. Racial identity and racial politics were radically transformed during the 1960s - transformed so profoundly that the racial meanings established during this period continue to shape politics, even in the current period of reaction.

In the 1960s, racial minority movements achieved real reforms (albeit limited in scope), in their struggles for racial justice and equality. But by the 1970s these movements experienced a sharp decline,¹² while at the same time the economic, political and cultural crises of the period deepened. Within this context, a space opened up for an attack made by the "counter-reformers" of the new right and neoconservatism. The rearticulation of racial ideologies that occurred in the 1960s was thus contested predominantly by the forces on the right. These currents on the right sought to reinterpret the meaning of race, that is, to *rearticulate* racial ideology once more, this time in a conservative direction:

The forces of racial reaction have seized on the notion of racial equality advanced by the racial minority movements and *rearticulated* its meaning for the contemporary period. Racial reaction has repackaged the earlier themes - infusing them with new political meaning and linking them to other key elements of conservative ideology.

(Omi and Winant, 1986: 114)

Issues of race and racial equality, then, had been dramatically revived by the 1980s, but this time in the form of a "backlash" to the political gains of racial minority movements of the past. Omi and Winant argue that the right is mobilized precisely in its desire to overturn these achievements. But in order to do so it needs to advance a new racial politics. The right accomplishes this by rearticulating (not merely reversing) the meaning of race and the fundamental issues arising from racial equality (Omi and Winant, 1986).

Omi (1987) extends the analysis found in his collaborative work with Winant by

doing a case study of the American right and its attempts to rearticulate racial ideologies. He examines four currents of the right: the far right, the new right, neoconservatism, and Reaganism. These are understood as racial projects which are thematically linked in their:

... attempts to rearticulate contemporary racial meanings and identities in new ways, to link race with more comprehensive political and cultural agendas, to interpret social structural phenomena (such as inequality or social policy) with regard to race. Each project involves a unique conception of racial difference, a theoretical approach - whether explicit or implicit - to the chief structural problem of racial inequality, a potential or actual political constituency, and a concrete political agenda.

(Winant, 1990: 125)

For the purposes of my analysis, I will only briefly describe the new right and neoconservatism.

In general terms, Omi defines the new right as, "a loose movement of conservative politicians and a collection of general-purpose political organizations which have developed independently of political parties" (Omi, 1987: 134). Here, he associates the new right with the grass-roots "Moral Majority" movement in the US, spearheaded by the likes of Christian evangelist Jerry Falwell. In contrast, neoconservatism is located in the realm of academia, the media, and elite policy-making circles. As such, they are a "party of intellectuals" (for example: Milton Friedmann, Nathan Glazer, Daniel Moynihan, Charles Murray, and Thomas Sowell) who are "trying to shape the tenor of intellectual life in order to consolidate a new politics" (Omi, 1987: 168). A significant aspect of this new politics for both the new right and neoconservatism is the rejection of the liberal state and its social policies that were forged in the sixties.

More specifically, Omi sees the new right project as a contemporary attempt to create an authoritarian, right-wing populism, which trades on a politics fuelled by resentment. This resentment is directed largely against the liberal state for promoting a "secular humanist" culture:

The new right wants to build a grass-roots, populist opposition to the liberal state - a new majoritarian block which would impose a unitary political culture. It has found a constituency among principally white, working-class and lower-middle-class Americans who feel their values and their perspectives have been ignored by the political process.

(Omi 1987: 130)

The new right attempts to rearticulate racial ideology through the use of "code words," that is, the use of non-racial rhetoric which is used to disguise racial issues. This enables the new right to avoid blatantly racist political ideology and discourse, while simultaneously capitalizing on a resentment over a wide range of social issues such as affirmative action and immigration. As Omi (1987: 146) suggests:

Rearticulation does not require an explicitly racial discourse, and would in fact be severely limited by any direct advocacy of racial inequality. The use of "coded" phrases and symbols, does not, therefore, directly challenge or contradict popular democratic or egalitarian ideals such as "justice" or "equal opportunity. And yet through the use of code words, the *racial dimensions* of particular social and political issues are effectively conveyed in an implicit subtext.

A more sophisticated effort to rearticulate racial ideology is found in neoconservatism. Neoconservatives object to the claims made by the civil rights movement, especially the demands it made on the state for reforms based on *collective* equality ("group rights"). The principle of equality based in group identity is viewed by neoconservatives as an anathema to the very ideals of democracy. By framing their

attack as a defense of such inviolable principles as individualism and equality. the proponents of neoconservatism are able to deflect criticism by accusing those who make such demands as engaging in "race-thinking." By the 1970s the opposition to minority demands for rights based on group identity became a centrepiece in the neoconservative perspective. Racial discrimination and racial equality, it claimed, are problems to be addressed only at the individual level once legal systems of discrimination have been eliminated. They certainly do not require intrusive state measures such as affirmative action. Neoconservatives therefore challenge the 1960s quest for social justice by sketching out an "egalitarian" society where racial considerations are no longer the concern of state policy.¹³

While I find Omi and Winant's analysis of the American right highly instructive, three qualifications are necessary. First, it is readily apparent that the Canadian context is markedly different from that of both the U.S. and Britain for a variety of reasons that neither time nor space allow me to discuss. My intent, therefore, is not to artificially impose or "fit" Omi and Winant's analysis on to my examination of Reform Party's discourse. I am merely using the work of these authors to suggest that there does exist an historic trend evident in many countries, of which Canada is just one. The trend is that firstly, there has been a resurgence of the right, and secondly, the right has often engaged in a specific racial discourse. I am arguing that the arrival of the Reform Party on the Canadian political scene is indicative of this wider trend. Accordingly, conservative views of race and racial equality are being more clearly enunciated in Canadian political discourse.¹⁴

A second point of clarification is required in light of Omi and Winant's distinction between the new right and neoconservatism. In the proceeding analysis it will become clear that while the Reform Party shares elements of both, it has more commonalities with neoconservatism as understood by Omi and Winant. However, for reasons outlined in Chapter 3, I have chosen to define the party as new right. Omi and Winant blur the distinctions between their analysis of the new right and neoconservatism, especially in that both ideologies attempt to *rearticulate* racial equality as a matter of *individual* rather than *group or collective* concern. It will be demonstrated throughout the remainder of this thesis that it is this characteristic that most clearly resonates in Reform's ideological discourse. As a matter of simplicity therefore, I have combined Omi and Winant's typology of neoconservatism and the new right, and will refer to it collectively as the new right.

Finally, based on the intersections of race and ethnicity as outlined above, I have extended Omi and Winant's analysis to incorporate the rearticulation of race as well as ethnicity. My examination of the Reform Party's discourse, then, will highlight how the party attempts to rearticulate understandings of racial and ethnic (or racial-ethnic) equality.

Before I begin a detailed analysis of Reform's race and ethnic-related discourse, I will establish why the party can be treated as a right-wing phenomenon. When Reform first gained national media attention it was initially described as an "extreme" or "far right" party. The next chapter provides a brief historical sketch of the party and examines some of the more extremist elements of Reform that have resulted in such

characterizations. However, as I argue in Chapter 3, the party is best understood not as an extreme right party, but as a Canadian version of the new right.

CHAPTER 2

PORTRAIT OF A NEW PARTY

Historically, Canada's two major federal political parties have been divided along regional and linguistic lines. The Liberal Party came to represent French Quebec, and later other ethnic minorities, while the Conservatives found their mainstay among Anglophone Canadians.¹ The political scene in the 1970s and early 1980s reflected this trend. The Liberals continued to draw much of their support from central Canada, while the Conservatives found a heartland in an "aggressively alienated" west which felt estranged from, and maltreated by the Trudeau Liberal government. Alberta in particular saw the Tories as both the organ for its discontent and the weapon for its future vindication. The departure of Trudeau, and the 1984 landslide Conservative victory, seemed to be the realization of both of these hopes (McCormick, 1991).²

This victory provided a brief respite from the politics of alienation in the west. However, the Tories' perceived preoccupation with Quebec (embodied in the awarding of the CF-18 contract to a Quebec company over one in Winnipeg); the furore, particularly in Alberta, over the Goods and Services Tax (GST); and a growing hostility to bilingualism brought federal-provincial conflict back with a vengeance (Gibbins, 1991).

Western alienation formed a significant part of the context out of which the Reform Party emerged. Because this was the moment of its arrival, it would be easy to characterize the party, and its successes, as merely engaging in the politics of regional discontent. However, caution should be exercised in taking this analysis too far. While

the Reform Party may have roots in the politics of regionalism, the dynamics underlying the growth of the party seem more national than regional in scope. The party's protests about the GST, the deficit, the Constitution, and the overall failings of Mulroney's Conservatives are by no means endemic only to the west, but are sentiments shared in quarters throughout the nation. Even the party's emphasis on Senate and Parliamentary reform, generally only a concern outside central Canada, has become more palatable since the demise of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown accords, and the boisterous GST debate in the Senate. Thus, while the Reform Party is a repository for traditional regional discontent, it also provides a protest vehicle through which Canadians in the west can air their *national* concerns about *national* issues, while other groups can potentially express their concern (and/or outrage) at patterns of social change - liberalized abortion, increased immigration, feminism - that are perceived as a threat to traditional social values. As a consequence, the party may have a broader national appeal than might originally have been suspected (Gibbins, 1991). The party's success in the 1993 federal election would seem to bear out this assessment. Although all but one of the party's fifty-two seats are in the four western provinces (one is in Ontario), Reform came in second in over fifty of ninety-nine ridings in Ontario. Clearly, the party's appeal goes beyond the Alberta border.

This chapter consists of a brief sketch of the history of the Reform Party. More specifically, the first section examines the foundations of the party including an exploration of its membership and supporters, as well as a review of Reform's populist appeal. The remainder of the chapter documents the extremist elements which can be

found within the party. In spite of such evidence, however, I argue in Chapter 3 that it is best to treat Reform not as a far right or ultra-right party, but as an expression of new right ideology in Canada.

THE ROOTS OF REFORM

The party laid its foundation in the spring of 1987 in the form of an association whose founding members included Preston Manning (the current party leader and son of former Alberta Social Credit premier Ernest Manning), John Muir (a Calgary lawyer), and Stan Roberts (a Vancouver investment counsellor and former Manitoba Liberal MLA).³ The association sponsored a western assembly on Canada's economic and political future and invited all interested persons, including MPs and MLAs of all political parties, to apply for delegate status. After several days of workshops and speeches, the assembly voted 76 percent in favour of forming a new political party. Its first official convention was held in Winnipeg in November 1987, and was attended by 306 delegates, mostly from Alberta and British Columbia. Reform's first electoral success came in March of 1989 with the election of Deborah Grey in a by-election in Beaver River, Alberta. Later that same year, party nominee Stan Waters was chosen by both the Alberta electorate and Prime Minister Mulroney to fill a vacant Senate seat.⁴ The party's greatest electoral success, however, came in October 1993, when, as mentioned above, it sent fifty-two members to the House of Commons.

Along with these electoral triumphs, Reform has experienced continued growth in its membership. The party conducted its own membership survey and reported the

results at its 1989 assembly. These findings were widely reported in the press and were the basis of a number of attacks against the party. Reform was characterized as a group of retired (white) businessmen who had become disenchanted with their first party of choice - the Progressive Conservatives. The party subsequently undertook another survey of its membership in the summer of 1991 when its membership had reached 75,000.⁵ The demographic data of this profile revealed findings similar to those of the earlier survey:

- membership was divided equally between urban and rural areas, but there were indications the party was slowly becoming more urban over time;
- the majority (70%) of members were residents of either British Columbia or Alberta;
- two-thirds were male, and members tended to be older and better educated (31% had at least one post-secondary degree) than the general population;
- only 58% of members were employed, the remainder were either retired (35%) or considered themselves homemakers (6%);
- average annual income was \$44,000 suggesting most members come from the "middle" class; and finally,
- one-third of the party had previously belonged to another political party (of this third, 73% formerly belonged to the PCs).⁶

This analysis was then compared to the membership of the three other major federal parties - the Tories, Liberals, and NDP. In defense of the Reform Party, the authors note:

Attacks from other parties, as well as journalistic commentaries, have often compared Reform Party members to the population at large and drawn the conclusion that the Party's membership is grossly atypical of Canadian society. But only a small proportion of Canadians ever join political parties, and there is no reason to think those who do are statistically representative of the population

at large.

(Flanagan and Ellis, 1992)

Flanagan and Ellis therefore conclude that there are no striking differences between the membership of the Reform Party and that of the other federal parties. Indeed, they suggest there are probably more similarities than differences amongst their respective memberships. But perhaps the important issue is not so much the actual *membership* of the party, but the *supporters* of Reform. Citing data from an Environics poll taken in the summer of 1991, Harrison and Krahn (1992:4) note that, "compared to other party supporters, Reform supporters tend to be disproportionately male, older (over 60), retired, home-owning, English-speaking, Protestant, and of European origin." In this sense, then, the party demonstrates a rather significant difference from the other federal parties. Therefore, it should be no surprise that Reform will want to appeal to this, its largest constituency, by articulating distinctive positions on issues such as immigration, multiculturalism and those other policy areas discussed in this thesis.

The Party's Populist Roots

Preston Manning and the Reform Party maintain they are following the path of previous movements in the west that have their roots in the tradition of populism.⁷ Descriptions in both the academic literature and the mainstream press tend to agree with this characterization. Writing in *Saturday Night* magazine, Ian Pearson suggests that the conditions that created other populist movements in the west are evident once more. However, in addition to appealing to the historic sense of western alienation, he argues that the party has expanded its populist appeal by feeding off a more general feeling of

frustration with politicians and the political system. Pearson suggests that while prior movements appealed to different sectors of the disenfranchised - the poor, farmers, labour - the Reform Party is speaking not only to a group of farmers and disgruntled businessmen, but also to a potentially huge group of individuals who felt abandoned by established political parties - the middle class.⁸

Flanagan and Lee (1992) provide an academic account of the party's populism. Following Margaret Canovan's seminal work on populist movements, these authors argue that Reform exhibits characteristics of both "agrarian" and "political" populism. Canovan identifies these as the two major categories of populist movements. Agrarian populism includes such forms as "farmers' radicalism," "peasants' movements," and "agrarian socialism." Agrarian populism is largely articulated through the radicalism of commodity producers. While it tends to be right-wing, it often demands government intervention into the economy. The category of political populism is likewise broken down into "populist dictatorship," "populist democracy," and "politicians' populism." Here, the emphasis is on political matters that result from tensions between the general population and the elite. Flanagan and Lee argue that Reform exhibits elements of both "farmers' radicalism," and "populist democracy." Unfortunately, their discussion of the party's populism is rather cursory. They provide no solid evidence as to why, or how the party exhibits elements of farmers' radicalism. Neither do they demonstrate why Reform can be considered as a movement advocating populist democracy. They also uncritically accept Canovan's typology, which has been shown to be inadequate in a number of ways.⁹

These analyses of Reform's populism have been mostly descriptive and largely atheoretical. Recent work by Harrison and Krahn (1992) attempts to address this gap. The authors examine two theories of populist mobilization: class-based and nativist.¹⁰ Nativist explanations of populism point to the ethnocultural backgrounds of supporters as a source of social orientation and political mobilization. On the other hand, Marxist-inspired explanations emphasize the class, particularly petit bourgeois, backgrounds of populist party supporters. Using demographic data on Reform supporters which was obtained from a 1991 Alberta survey, Harrison and Krahn test both models to determine which can best account for Reform's populist mobilization.¹¹ Their results suggest support for both nativist and class-based theories. However, they also found that attitudes toward a number of specific political and social issues also explained Reform's populist support. That is:

- those who felt more alienated from the government were more likely to identify with the party;
- those who were less supportive of the principles of multiculturalism were more likely to support Reform;
- those who demonstrated a disagreement with statements about gender equality stated they were more likely to vote Reform;
- those who disagreed with "distinct society" status for Quebec were more likely to support Reform.

Harrison and Krahn argue that populist movements arise during periods of crisis in defence of a people who are historically, culturally, and geographically constituted, and who feel their way of life is being threatened. Reform's populist appeal takes on new meaning when considered in this light. It is therefore important to view the party's

rise within the context of *reaction*. As discussed in the previous chapter, Omi and Winant (1986) suggest that the rise of the right must be understood as a reaction against the gains made by minorities as a result of the social movements of the 1960s. In recent years, Canada has faced a number of "crises" - constitutional conflict, unrest in Aboriginal communities, and a long and protracted recession which has included a "jobless recovery." Harrison and Krahn argue that for those supporters of Reform, however, this crisis began much earlier. Since the 1960s Canada has undergone significant changes in its social, economic, and ideological structures. These changes affect people in specific social locations in different ways. Those groups who have been negatively affected (ie., those who have seen some of their traditional power erode) by such changes include farmers, Anglo-Saxon Protestants, and men. Harrison and Krahn (1992: 20) therefore conclude:

Given these changes, it is not surprising that those groups which have lost some power and privilege should hold strong opinions on issues which they perceive to have led to the shift. It is also not surprising that they might be more likely to align with a new populist party taking a strong traditional position on many of these issues. Hence, farmers (and rural Albertans in general) tend to feel most politically alienated, nativist groups tend to react negatively towards multiculturalism policies and concessions for Quebec, and males react negatively to gender equality initiatives. All three groups are over-represented among Reform Party supporters.

It is somewhat ironic, then, that while a great deal of thought and analysis is going into the party's populism, and the party's connection to prior populist movements, there have been some commentators who question the validity of characterizing the party in such a manner. A profile of Preston Manning in the *Financial Times of Canada* noted that although populism and grassroots politics may be the cloak in which the party

wraps itself, we should not be fooled by this packaging. Reform insiders deferentially describe the rank and file's relationship with Manning as that of students in the presence of their teacher. As such, Manning's hold on his party is formidable. He patiently hears his members out for as long as it takes, then, once they have had their say, he masterfully articulates their concerns and guides them to a conclusion - often one he reached long ago. As party executive Cliff Fryer states, "Once people feel consulted, they'll often readily defer to the judgement of someone who can say: here are the facts and this is the reasonable course of action."¹²

Even party executives acknowledge the power the leader has over its members. Chief policy advisor Stephen Harper has admitted, "it's amazing what you can persuade [members] to do once you convince them that it's the leader who is telling them" (quoted in Dobbin, 1992: 116). The iron grip Manning has on the party, as well as the power of the party's policy committee, has been attacked by sources inside Reform as well. Internal memos were leaked to the media that indicated "in order to control and protect the party's agenda" from "unorthodox and most times extreme" opinions, all policy discussions were to be led by a member of the policy committee, which is headed by Manning. Thus, the Reform Party, instead of being embraced for its grassroots populism, suddenly found itself being accused of practising a "top-down" form of leadership.¹³

As it turned out, however, the party had good reason to want to protect itself from those supporters with extreme views. The remainder of this chapter explores some of the extremist tendencies evident in Reform, and what party leadership has done in

response.

"A BRIGHT LIGHT ATTRACTS A LOT OF BUGS": EXTREMISM AND THE REFORM PARTY

By 1991 the party was beginning to receive attention from the national media and federal politicians, much of which was negative. Southam News columnist Christopher Young accused the party of trying to institute a WASP Canada which would "freeze out the multi-hued, multi-tongued people who have enriched Canadian culture."¹⁴ Liberal MP Sheila Copps, repeatedly attacked what she viewed as the racist nature of the party's immigration and multicultural policies. In a now (in)famous statement Ms. Copps suggested a comparison between the policies of Preston Manning and those of the former Ku Klux Klan gubernatorial candidate in Louisiana, David Duke:

The policies of Preston Manning, which appeal to people's latent fears in a recessionary period, are the same kinds of policies that permit a David Duke to come forward in a state like Louisiana. The code words [Manning] uses to elicit support are the same kind of code words that appeal to people in the wrong circumstances and the same sort of masked message you get from David Duke.¹⁵

A group calling itself CARP (Coalition Against the Reform Party) protested well-attended party rallies in Toronto,¹⁶ while the "Coalition United to Fight Oppression" demonstrated at a Vancouver party function chanting "Aryan Nations, KKK, Reform Party go away!" In its report to the UN World Rights Conference on anti-Semitism, the research arm of the World Jewish Congress expressed concern about widespread racism and anti-Semitism in the party's rank and file.¹⁷

With this increased scrutiny, Reform officials were keen to project an image of

the party as one that did not tolerate extremism of any kind. In concluding his address to the party's assembly in Saskatoon in April 1991, chief policy analyst Stephen Harper warned delegates:

We will be asked whether the Reform Party's agenda is free from extremism, especially on issues like language and immigration. Later today you will be asked to reaffirm our positions on these issues. Preston Manning has stuck with those policies, under intense criticism, because they are sensible and defensible. When the Reform Party says a country cannot be built on policies of language, culture, race, and ethnic group, it is right. ... Do not back down on the Party's insistence that issues like language and immigration be addressed. Just the same, do not allow the Party to be shot in the foot on these issues by radical elements, as has happened far too often to new parties.

(Harper, 1991)

In a bid to become a truly legitimate national party, Reform's leadership was well aware they had to recast the party's image. As one official stated, this transformation would require "weeding out the radical members" of Reform's grass-roots movement. The party's vice-chair also noted, "We have radicals in this party, that's true. It's going to come out sooner or later and we'll have to deal with it."¹⁸

Evidence of Extremism

It is true that one need not look far to find evidence of extreme views within the Reform Party. In 1988, Doug Collins sought the party's nomination for the Capilano-Sound riding in west Vancouver. Mr. Collins is a well-known west coast broadcaster and columnist who holds strong right-wing views, particularly on immigration and language policy. The party was concerned about these views and requested that Collins sign a statement that he refused to support "any policy that discriminated against people on the basis of race." When Collins refused, Preston Manning revoked his nomination

(Manning, 1992a). The event received wide media attention and provoked strife within the party (Dobbin, 1991).

The media also seized upon the connection between William Gairdner and the Reform Party. Gairdner was a keynote speaker at Reform's 1991 assembly and addressed a number of party rallies in Ontario alongside Manning. The controversy stemmed from a book Gairdner wrote entitled *The Trouble with Canada*. The book, a strong libertarian critique of Canadian society, includes a chapter entitled "The Silent Destruction of English Canada: Multiculturalism, Bilingualism and Immigration." In it, Gairdner speaks of "invading cultures" and calls for the implementation of quotas on "non-traditional" immigrants.¹⁹ The chapter also includes a chart alleging that the percentage of Canadians claiming British origins will decline to zero by the year 2051 unless "this alarming trend is reversed"(quoted in Dobbin, 1991: 111-12).²⁰

For his part, Reform leader Preston Manning claimed no prior knowledge of Gairdner's more controversial views, and noted that although he agreed with his stand on economic and constitutional matters, he had not read Gairdner's book in its entirety.²¹ He was also quick to point out Gairdner was not an official or even a member of the Reform Party. After dogged criticism however, and after much debate within the upper reaches of the party, it was announced that Gairdner would no longer be a speaker at Reform Party functions.²²

Gairdner's views, however, are shared by some Reform Party members. Rex Welbourn, a former vice-president of the party's interim riding executive in Peterborough, suggested that Canada's immigration policy:

... must take into account the cultural heritage of this country. We are a derivative of white European culture. This is our identity, and immigration should not destroy it with excessive numbers of Asians and blacks. ... I admire the Japanese, but they have a very restrictive immigration policy. There's nothing wrong with that; we don't want all countries of the world to be the same, to be polyglot. But a larger number of black and Asian immigrants are entering Canada. For the first generation, their birth rate is higher and you don't have to be an expert to understand what could happen. Canada as we know it would disappear.²³

A further embarrassment to the party occurred in February 1992 when it was discovered that members of the neo-Nazi group, the Heritage Front, including their leader Wolfgang Droege, had become Reform Party members. Initial reports suggested that up to twenty members had joined the party in the Metro Toronto area. The party immediately responded by launching an internal investigation and Manning was found once more insisting his party was not a haven for racists.²⁴ Party president Cliff Fryer stated, "We are just flabbergasted and aghast to think that these people would think they have a home with us."²⁵ Two weeks later the party noisily expelled five members, including Droege and three others who were associated with the Heritage Front.²⁶ For his part, Manning insisted that the issue was not a significant one for his party:

We've said we'll put this perception in perspective. Out of a membership of more than 110,000 people, fewer than two dozen have been disciplined. Sure we've got rid of a few people. We've actually been fairly fortunate. We've had to get rid of a couple of dozen people. We hope it sends some signals to a few more. But in relation to the rate we're growing, it could be a lot worse."²⁷

In spite of these attempts to downplay the issue, the party has found itself expending a great deal of energy in addressing the problem of extremism in its ranks. They initially tried to discount the issue by suggesting, "usually the charges are so

extreme that people in their right mind tend to discount them."²⁸ They further reasoned that attacks against the party indicated Reform was beginning to take a "market share" away from its mainstream political rivals.²⁹

Once it became apparent however, that extremists were involved in the party, officials tried to explain their existence. They argued that because the party is a new political force on the scene, dedicated to a grass-roots membership, it makes it easy for an extremist element to infiltrate their ranks. Manning states, "There are certainly some weeds in the grass-roots. But you cannot deny them their say. You try to outnumber them with more moderate people, and to moderate their views. Many have a single-issue interest, and when that is not accepted by the party, they fall away."³⁰ In an address to the Jewish community in Toronto Manning stated the party is "vulnerable to infiltration" because they are "a young, western-based populist party experiencing rapid growth."³¹ According to this argument, as the party grows in strength and numbers, extremism will no longer be an issue.³²

The party also suggests that negative perceptions of the party are exaggerated due to the coverage Reform receives in the mainstream press which "often portrays any popular expression from the west as being on the fringe of Canadian politics."³³ Political opponents then seize on the misconceptions and foster them. After Heritage Front members were expelled from the party last spring, Manning noted "There have been irresponsible politicians like Sheila Copps who publicly say that the Reform Party is racist. And there are eccentric people and strange people out there who actually take that at face value."³⁴ Manning even hinted that in an attempt to discredit Reform, other

political parties were in some way behind recruiting extremists into the party and subsequently leaking the story to the press. He stated, "You could see some people with a vested interest in getting some bad names on our list."³⁵

In much the same manner, Stephen Harper also attempts to discount the party's detractors:

A good number of the people who claim the party is [extreme] have vested reasons for doing so. They are its political opponents. Either they actually are political opponents - people who organize the other parties - or they are hard-core ideological leftists who don't agree with what the party stands for and they believe that anybody who disagrees with them is in fact racist, sexist, etc.³⁶

The overall picture that emerges from Manning and other party officials' efforts to account for the presence of racists in the ranks of Reform is that of collusion between the media and the party's political opponents. The press inaccurately reports the party's policies and its political opponents foster these misconceptions in an attempt to discredit Reform. The party can thus explain away the existence of extremists in its ranks. The media and Reform's political opponents portray the party as a extreme party on the fringes of Canadian politics. Therefore it is natural that extremists would think the party represents their interests.

"Inoculating" the Reform Party

Notwithstanding its dismissive stance, the party is concerned about evidence of extremism in its ranks, and it claims it is taking serious measures to address the issue. In the spring of 1991 the party began utilizing a rather rigorous candidate questionnaire to screen its prospective applicants. According to an article in *British Columbia Report*, "new guidelines were adopted that closed the door to radicalism. From now on,

candidates have to be trustworthy, able, reform-minded and *electable*. Nominees must fill out questionnaires intended to root out any skeletons hiding in the closet."³⁷ According to Manning, the candidate questionnaire inquires into the views and past associations of potential candidates on "racially sensitive issues" (1992a: 25).³⁸ That same year, Manning addressed various Jewish communities and called on them to "help us inoculate ourselves against the virus of racism which would be absolutely fatal to a party like ourselves and to our country."³⁹

Manning has appealed to Jewish communities throughout the country on at least five occasions according to the *Canadian Jewish News*.⁴⁰ His efforts have, however, received mixed results. The party received praise from the Calgary chapter of B'nai Brith Canada which noted, "We are comfortable that the principles of equality, openness and freedom will continue to be reinforced by [Preston Manning] and the Reform Party leadership wherever possible."⁴¹ Yet after a Manning speech to the Jewish community in Toronto this year, Karen Mock, the national director of B'nai Brith Canada stated, "I'm worried about the white supremacists and known racists [involved in the party]. I think these people have an attraction to what might be behind the words and behind the phrases."⁴²

In addition to its appeal to minority communities, the party paper provides the following details of Reform's strategy for discouraging extremists from joining the party:

The Reform Party, which is new may be vulnerable to infiltration by people with extreme views, including racist views. We believe the following measures should be used to protect the Party against the threat of extremism and racism.

- Election and support of Party leaders who explicitly reject extremism and racism.

- An open invitation to members of racial minorities to examine the Party's policies and to consider active membership in the Party.
- Rejection by Party Assemblies and Constituency Associations of any proposal that would discriminate against people on the basis of race.
- Questioning of potential candidates for Party nominations to ensure that they support the Reform Party's aversions to policies that discriminate against people on the basis of race.
- The training of "moderators" at the constituency level to counter extreme or racist statements made by others at public meetings.⁴³

Officials in the Reform Party are confident that these measures have been effective. Harper suggests that the extreme right was merely "testing" the party to determine whether it would be receptive to joining forces, or whether Reform was vulnerable to infiltration. The expulsions in 1992 of Heritage Front members he believes, will send a clear signal that people who advocate extreme views are not welcome in the party.⁴⁴ In his view, "the issue is pretty much dead. We accomplished our essential objective which was not that we expel them, but that these people no longer want to be in the Reform Party."⁴⁵ As party president Cliff Fryer suggested, "We are not and have never endeavoured to attract these people. A bright light attracts a lot of bugs. Our light is burning rather brightly, and frankly when they come into the light they are going to strike the light and be burned up. It's that simple."⁴⁶

However, in spite of the party's insistence that it has successfully purged extremists from its ranks, incidents which would suggest otherwise continue to surface. As recently as April 1993 it was reported that Heritage Front leader Wolfgang Droege was still involved in the party. Droege and other members of his group attended a Reform meeting in the Toronto area riding of Don Valley West. When asked about their continued presence in the party, Droege responded, "Of course we still have many

members with the Reform party. We still feel even though we don't care for the leadership, it's still the party that most closely reflects the beliefs of our organization."⁴⁷ In addition, Reform's candidate in York Centre delivered a tirade against immigrants and Jews that was widely reported in the media during the 1993 federal election.⁴⁸

It would seem, then, that in spite of the party's protestations otherwise, and in spite of the measures it has taken to prevent people with extreme views from joining the party, it continues to draw support from that sector of the Canadian population. Indeed, Droege has no difficulty explaining his support: "Members of the Heritage Front support the Reform party because of its platform on multiculturalism, immigration and economics."⁴⁹ It is instructive to note that in the party's endeavour to determine why extremists are initially attracted to the party, it at no time suggests a thorough review of Reform's race-related policies.

This work represents such an attempt. The following chapters will examine the party's policies in the following areas: immigration; multiculturalism; language rights and the Constitution; Aboriginal rights; the family and women's issues. These will be examined in order to demonstrate their correspondence with the party's new right ideology and, in turn, their implications for race and ethnic equality in Canada. Prior to this, however, the grounds which will allow us to treat Reform as a new right phenomenon will be explored. This is the topic of Chapter 3.

CHAPTER 3

THE REFORM PARTY AND THE CULT OF THE FREE MARKET

Many have characterized the Reform Party as "right-wing" or "neoconservative," or even as an instance of far right extremism. To determine the appropriate characterization of the party, however, requires further analysis. In this chapter I argue that Reform is best understood as a Canadian version of the "new right." As will be demonstrated in later chapters, the new right character of the party is revealed in its discourse on race and ethnic-related policies. It is therefore crucial to have a clear understanding of what allows us to treat the party as a new right phenomenon. In order to do so, I will review some of the debates regarding the nature and definitions of the new right. In addition, I will provide a brief discussion of Canada's experience with the new right prior to the emergence of the Reform Party. But first, a clearer understanding of key concepts is required.

WHAT IS RIGHT-WING ANYWAY?: THE CONCEPTUAL QUAGMIRE

It is widely agreed that we have witnessed a resurgence of "right-wing" politics in most western capitalist states in the past two decades. While this resurgence has manifested itself differently in different nation-states, its roots are similar. It has been suggested that the rise of the right should be viewed within the context of the breakdown of the post-war consensus and the Keynesian welfare state. The post-war consensus is the body of social and economic ideas that ruled political thought and practice in most

western democracies from post-World War II to some time in the mid 1970s. In effect, this consensus represented an agreement about social ends and values among social classes with opposed interests: economic growth; low inflation; wide participation in politics; a more extensive social and economic equality; and a full range of civil liberties. More significantly, it represented the belief that the appropriate *means* by which to achieve these ends were political state actions (Barry, 1987). This consensus - often referred to as the "historic compromise" - provided the rationale for the creation of the Keynesian welfare state.

However, with the onset of the global economic crisis of the 1970s support for this consensus increasingly came into question. The post-war boom that resulted in unprecedented economic growth came to an end. This end was signalled by the gradual slowdown of growth rates and the oil crisis of 1973. The ensuing result was a world-wide capitalist recession and the restructuring of capital at a global level. In this sense, the history of the rise of right-wing politics is also the history of the disintegration of the post-war consensus (Gunn, 1989).

Traditional social democracy and American New Deal liberalism were increasingly challenged by voters who began to question the premises on which they were based. What came to be the accepted role of governments - fostering the redistribution of resources in society, promoting egalitarianism, harmonizing various interests, and guaranteeing basic provisions (such as housing, jobs, education, and health care) - suddenly came under attack. Fundamental tensions in these models emerged which governments were ill-equipped to resolve.¹

They could no longer consolidate a political base when an economic downturn exacerbated the differences of interest among their own constituencies and turned many nonaligned against trade unions - and when new industrial patterns reduced the size and fragmented the influence of their working-class support. Finally, schooled in welfare state traditions of public finance they had no economic nostrums with which to replace an increasingly discredited Keynesianism, and no national vision to buoy spirits and galvanize support.

(Krieger, 1986: 13-14)

This, then, was the moment of the right, or what is commonly referred to as the "new right".² Thompson (1990) suggests that the new right is an amalgam term which describes a particular constellation of discursive propositions and policy prescriptions, and that political movement which provides its articulation. The movement, however, cannot be viewed as a homogenous discursive or political entity. Indeed, as he suggests, there are probably as many variants of the new right, as there are new right authors. Out of the plethora of these analyses, it becomes difficult to pin down the precise characterization or elements to include under the rubric of the "new right".

For example, Marchak (1991: 3) defines the new right as:

... an ideology and a political agenda that became popular in the industrial democracies between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s. It rejects Keynesian consensus of the post-war era, and extols the virtues of free enterprise and entrepreneurship. It expresses dissatisfaction with democracy, equality, social welfare policies, collective bargaining, and other citizens' rights achieved throughout the previous three decades.

In other analyses, however, the new right is often conflated with the "Moral Majority" which rose in influence in the United States in the 1980s. Helvacioğlu (1991: 103) defines the new right as:

... a coalition of religious and pro-family groups, think-tanks, Political Action

Committees and lobbying groups which operate at both national and local levels. ... The NR presented an image of itself as a revolutionary movement aimed at restructuring American society following the fundamental principles of the Bible and traditional family and community values.

In analyzing the new right's road to power in the US however, Davis (1986) defines the NR in terms of its class location, and focuses on those sectors of the capitalist class that forged an alliance and won electoral victories with the administration of Ronald Reagan. He provides little acknowledgement of the politics of morality in his analysis.³

It is apparent then, there is little agreement about what constitutes the new right and indeed, if it is "new" at all.⁴ Some writers use the term to refer solely to a form of neoliberal, laissez-faire economism informed by such authors as Adam Smith, de Tocqueville, Schumpeter, Hayek, Milton Friedman and Keith Joseph. Others, however use the term "new right" to refer to this neoliberalism, combined with a form of authoritarian conservatism which has also enjoyed a resurgence, particularly in Thatcher's Britain (Levitas, 1986).

The confusion seems to spring from the lack of a theoretical understanding of the distinction between (neo)conservatism and (neo)liberalism, and from ignoring the specificity of the new right as it is manifested differently in different nation-states. Many authors fail to make explicit the distinction between liberalism and conservatism, or do so inadequately. In discussing the resurgence of conservatism in Britain, Canada, and the US, Cooper et al (1988: 2) stress the importance of making the distinction between the two:

Although the liberal tradition remains deeply rooted and very much alive, the tenor of recent political discourse as well as the direction of political events

suggest that the liberalism that has dominated and defined their public philosophies has been infused with important new conservative elements. Philosophically, these conservative elements are hard to define, although a rejection of political abstraction, a renewed emphasis on private enterprise and initiative in matters both economic and social are among them.

In the analyses of the new right, then, how is this 'conservatism' distinct from 'liberalism'? This question is never adequately answered in the literature. Nevitte and Gibbins acknowledge the disagreement regarding the precise boundaries of the conservative ideology, but suggest that there is a consensus that, "at a minimum, it involves a core set of beliefs which include a preference for down-sizing government, a belief in the efficacy of private enterprise and hence a preference for deregulating the economy" (1984: 385). Likewise, Thomas (1988: 96) defines conservatism as:

... first, a strong commitment to the free market in preference to the state as the means of economic allocations - second, an emphasis on individual and corporate freedom as the key to economic progress and social well-being; and third, a greatly reduced role for the state in the economy and society.

Simultaneously, *neoconservatism* has been referred to as that which:

... extols the private sector and denigrates the public sector. It condemns government for interfering with the ability of individuals to make and spend money as they please. Neo-conservatives reject all forms of collectivism, and thus have little or no use for trade unions, the social programs of the welfare state, government-owned companies, or state agencies to protect human rights. Their agenda implies not just tolerance for, but also acceptance of, social and economic inequality, justified on the grounds that this will lead to greater economic performance. ... Neo-conservatives minimize the role of government as an instrument of collective responsibility, co-operation, community interest, or social solidarity. These concepts simply have no place in the lexicon of neo-conservatives.

(Pitsula and Rasmussen, 1990: 8)

Once more, it is not clear how this is different from the principles of liberalism, when liberalism is generally referred to as that ideology which upholds:

... the superiority of market mechanisms as a promoter both of economic prosperity (because of the supposed greater efficiency of the market in the allocation and use of scarce resources); and of the maximisation of individual freedom through the limiting of state intervention.

(King. 1987: 9)

The emphasis here is on the individual, a limited role for the state , and a faith in untrammelled market forces - all of which are elements in the above definitions of (neo)conservatism!

Yet liberalism is often used to describe the philosophy behind the American "New Deal"/"Great Society" project. For example Jewell (1988: 1) defines liberalism as, "a belief system that embraces the precepts that the federal government has a responsibility to do all within its power to ensure that all its people receive equitable treatment and are given equal opportunities to participate fully in social, political, and economic institutions."

These differing conceptions have led Levitas (1986: 4) to make a distinction between liberalism and *neoliberalism*; as well as conservatism and *neoconservatism*:

It is necessary to refer to these two strands of neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism to distinguish them from what has passed as liberalism or conservatism during much of the twentieth century, especially the period of the so-called post-war consensus. For neo-liberalism wishes to separate itself sharply from the 'pseudo-liberalism', a social democratic liberalism corrupted by the welfare state and the New Deal; this neo-liberalism is not to be confused with a socially concerned liberalism. ... Neo-conservatism, too, must be distinguished from the conservatism of the post-war consensus, which included a commitment to welfare capitalism. Exponents of both strands of new Right thinking would claim, in fact, to be returning to their original nineteenth-century forms, prior to

contamination by the 'socialist' ideals of the welfare state.

(Levitas, 1986: 4)

In his analysis of the new right in Europe, Gunn (1989) also makes the distinction between what he terms the "old" versus "new" conservatism. He views "old" conservatism as that modern political ideology which emerged in the nineteenth century in response to the French Revolution. Its posture was thus defensive, intended to preserve the *ancien regime*, and against the principles of the revolution. As the forces of liberalism, and later socialism, extended ideals of democratic rights through the nineteenth century, conservatism adapted itself to the "task of containment, of maintaining established institutions and of limiting the effects of the mass politics on the social order" (Gunn, 1989: 2). The distinction between this, then, and the "new conservatism" is the merger of economic liberalism and social authoritarianism.

While I have highlighted some of the rather confusing aspects in the conceptualizations of the new right, I would not be so presumptuous as to conclude that all analyses of the NR have failed to make the distinction between (neo)conservatism and (neo)liberalism. Many have, and have done so successfully.⁵ Neither am I suggesting that these different analyses are incompatible with each other. Indeed, I would argue that regardless of the varying definitions of the new right, (neo)liberalism, and (neo)conservatism, they are all examining the same phenomenon, ie., the resurgence of right-wing ideology in western capitalist democracies. In this sense, the varied understandings of the new right are best understood as examinations of the different manifestations of this resurgence. And as Gollner and Salée (1990: 17) remind us:

Whether this is a neo-conservative or neo-liberal phenomenon may, in the end, be a problem of little relevance. It is almost commonplace to say that there is today in the dominant political discourse a growing commitment to a greater degree of economic laissez-faire, and to the enhancement of the individualization of the social sphere. A commitment which seems to translate, wherever it has been formulated with more or less success into policies of deregulation, privatization, de-welfarization and tighter management of human resources. This new commitment is really what is at the heart of the current political/ideological reorientation. It must be understood in itself, in its implications, and not with reference to some desire for terminological precision or taxonomic correctness.

Nonetheless, in the interests of wading out of the conceptual quagmire, for the purposes of my analysis, I understand the new right as the combination of neoliberal economic policy prescriptions, and a form of authoritarian conservatism. The neoliberal influence includes an emphasis on the individual freedoms and liberties, a limited role for the state, and a faith in unfettered market forces. The focus of authoritarian conservatism, on the other hand, is social order. Here, the primary concern is to uphold traditional authority and morality from what is regarded as the perils of cultural decline, the breakdown of law and order, and the excesses of the liberal democratic state (Gordon and Klug, 1986). While these two forces may seem oppositional, they coexist in a contradictory unity. As King (1987: 25) suggests, each strand gains something from joining with the other:

Liberalism is the source of the new right economic and political theories and policy objectives; conservatism provides a set of residual claims to cover the consequences of pursuing liberal policies. For example, the liberal objective of reducing public welfare provision implies a traditional role for women and the family; conservatism provides an ideology for justifying such outcomes from public policy.

The new right, then, represents not merely a change in policy emphasis, but a

comprehensive shift in the nature and direction of politics. Its objective is nothing less than the transformation of social *and* economic relations of modern society. It was in the moment of the breakdown of social democracy and New Deal liberalism in the 1970s and their failure to deal with the mounting crisis that the new right was forged. While questions of economic management were central to the crisis, issues such as the role of the state, the family, sexuality, race, and national identity became politicized and contested (Gunn, 1989). Based on this understanding, it can be demonstrated that the Reform Party shares many elements of the new right. The remainder of the chapter examines more specifically the party's new right character, but first, a brief discussion of Canada's experience with the new right prior to the emergence of Reform will be undertaken.

CANADA'S EXPERIENCE WITH THE NEW RIGHT

The drift toward neoliberalism in Canada began under the Liberal government of Pierre Trudeau when some of its tenets crept into Trudeau's economic and fiscal policies. In 1975 the Bank of Canada adopted a strategy of monetarist restraint - long held to be a credo of neoliberal policy prescriptions - and the federal government imposed a severe wage control program in an effort to curb spiralling inflation. The Keynesian preoccupation with propping up aggregate demand was given over to supply-side economics. After the failure of the Liberals' 'Third National Policy', the federal government mandated a commission to examine Canada's economic prospects. By the time the MacDonald Commission tabled its report, Brian Mulroney and the Conservatives

were elected and the shift to neoliberalism became more clearly articulated. This was evidenced in the repeal of the National Energy Program; the conversion of the Foreign Investment Review Agency into Investment Canada; the privatization of Crown Corporations; legislation deregulating the financial sector; and the passage of the Canada-United States free trade agreement. The Mulroney accumulation strategy, then, sought to combine an open-door policy on foreign investment, an over-riding concern with deficit reduction, and an active policy of deregulation (Carroll, 1989, 1990).

Such evidence highlights Canada's experience with *neoliberalism*, but our experience with the *new right*, or our own version of 'Reaganism' or 'Thatcherism' is not as obvious.⁶ Some argue that the articulation of a single, widely acknowledged Canadian manifesto of the new right has not occurred. Nor has there been any record of such legislation, or evidence which would suggest an attitudinal shift to the right has transpired (Nevitte and Gibbins, 1984). Yet others argue that the electoral victories of the Conservatives in the eighties have indicated a profound shift to the right.⁷

What is clear is that Canada exhibits a different political culture from those states where the new right has found a firmer hold. This may be due in part to the fact that Canada, at least in comparison to the US, has historically had a stronger labour movement, as well as a stronger and more left-wing women's movement. Gains made by these movements, as well as Canada's tradition of multiculturalism and bilingualism, represent a divergence from a new right agenda. It should be further noted that with respect to these particular policy areas, it was Mulroney's Conservative government that consolidated their principles and strengthened its legislation.⁸ As Gollner and Salée

(1990: 18) note, the behaviour of the Mulroney government does not lend itself to easy ideological interpretations and in spite of its rhetoric, has turned out to be "surprisingly non-doctrinaire." In this sense, they conclude that the likelihood of radical new right ideological designs being enforced upon Canadians by the now decimated Tories, by the ruling Liberals, or by anyone else, is highly improbable in the future.

The recent election may further suggest that whatever shift to the right Canada has experienced has halted with the victory of the Liberals. However, caution must be exercised here. There exists a growing perception that the Tories' obsession with deficit reduction and smaller government is still evident within the Chrétien Liberals, as all of Cabinet's key financial posts are currently held by what are considered to be fiscal conservatives.⁹ While my analysis will not serve to definitively establish the nature of Canada's experience with the new right, I will argue that the Reform Party embodies its clearest expression in Canada today.

THE REFORM PARTY: A CANADIAN VERSION OF THE NEW RIGHT

The Reform Party has clearly articulated a neoliberal stance on economic issues.

The party's 'Blue Book' states as one of its principles that:

... the creation of wealth and productive jobs for Canadians is best achieved through the operations of a responsible, broadly-based, free-enterprise economy in which private property, freedom of contract, and the operations of free markets are encouraged and respected.¹⁰

According to Gamble (1986) the four main propositions of the new right's neoliberal economics are: 1) state intervention does not work; 2) all alternatives to

markets are deeply flawed 3) government failure is more prevalent than market failure; and 4) government intervention is unjust. This sentiment is clearly evident in the party's literature as the following passage serves to demonstrate:

The Reform Party supports depoliticizing economic decision-making in Canada through the long-term elimination of grants, subsidies, and pricing policies and all federal taxes, direct or indirect, imposed on the natural resources of the provinces, other than income tax of general applications.

The Reform Party supports the long-term removal of measures which are designed to insulate industries, businesses, financial institutions, professions, and trade unions from domestic and foreign competition.

The Reform Party supports vigorous measures to ensure the successful operation of the marketplace, through such means as the promotion of competition and competitive pricing, and the strengthening and vigorous enforcement of Competition and Anti-Combines legislation with severe penalties for price-fixing.

The Reform Party opposes bureaucratic, politically motivated slush funds like the Western Diversification Initiative (WDI).¹¹

Based on these policy statements, it would seem the Reform Party would agree with the adage "markets good, governments bad" (Gamble, 1986). Stephen Harper, the chief policy advisor for the party states it is "foolish" to believe that government can do anything to improve the competitive position of business until it puts its own finances in order.¹² An article in the party paper states, "We seek a new economic order in Canada in which free market principles will prevail over arbitrary federal government interventions contrary to regional interest and in which jobs, incomes, and economic development will be efficiently and equitably distributed across the nation."¹³ Manning himself has stated:

We see New Canada as a country where real investment, real jobs, and real incomes - the real antidotes to recession - are provided not by the government but

by business, labour, union, scientific, and education leaders, in a free-market, free-trade environment. We therefore advocate public policies in which the primary role of government is to remove road blocks - high taxation, excessive interest rates, inter-provincial barriers to trade - that prevent the stimulus of our economy. We also advocate public policies which would bring fiscal policy, monetary policy, labour management policy, science policy, in line with our trade policy, rather than contradicting the direction of trade policy.¹⁴

A preoccupation with the debt provides the basis for the party's fiscal policy and its call for a dramatic reduction in government spending. On the need to cut the deficit, Manning has stated:

Anybody we talked to who has tried to make really serious attempts to balance their budget, their advice is you cannot go fast enough, you cannot create schedules short enough. What happens is that all the interest groups that you offend by making cuts get bigger and stronger and come after you so you never do it.¹⁵

Reform's policy book outlines, in order of priority, areas which should be targeted for expenditure reduction or elimination. This list is revealing:

- spending on Parliamentary institutions and party caucuses;
- thick layers of middle management in federal administration;
- federal "pet projects" such as official bilingualism, multiculturalism, and certain government advertising;
- grants to interest groups for the purposes of political lobbying;
- foreign aid;
- subsidies and tax concessions to businesses;
- selling of most Crown Corporations;
- any area of spending that fails to achieve a fair regional distribution; and
- universal and bureaucratic social policy in areas such as daycare.¹⁶

Like much of Reform's discourse, this passage is revealing in its *implicit* message. For example, "pet projects" are singled out as the greater burden on government expenditures than subsidies and tax concessions to business, even poorly funded ones such as multiculturalism. The statement also implies that a "universal and bureaucratic social policy" already exists in daycare services. Clearly, this is not the case.¹⁷

The party has also focused its attentions on reducing the debt by calling for dramatic cuts in the public service. Manning has called for the "down-sizing" of the federal civil service in order to slash spending - even if this means the loss of 45,000 to 100,000 jobs. Instead of dealing with the serious implications of this proposal, Manning has deflected criticism by saying he prefers to focus on money saved, not jobs lost.¹⁸

Based on their fervent belief in the free market, Reformers call for both privatization and decentralization. The party's position on privatization demonstrates a commitment to a free market economy without government interference. The 'Blue Book' states:

The Reform Party supports placing the ownership and control of corporations in the sector that can perform their function most cost-effectively, with greatest accountability to owners, and the least likelihood of incurring public debt. We believe that there is overwhelming evidence that this would be the private sector in the majority of cases.¹⁹

The party, therefore, calls for the complete privatization of Petro-Canada, and for free competition for all postal services. Chief policy analyst Stephen Harper sums up the philosophy: "if the private sector can deliver the services, let 'em."²⁰

The party even calls for the operation of the free market in its agricultural policy

- a somewhat risky position as Reform obtains a great deal of support from the rural sector. The goal of the policy is the "phased reduction and elimination of all subsidies, support programs, and trade restrictions, and the reform of supply/price controls in domestic and international agriculture."²¹ This kind of policy would have profound negative effects on the farming community which depends heavily on agricultural subsidies.

It is clear, then, that Reform's political agenda is "profoundly anti-government and anti-centralist".²² The goal is to absolve the federal government from many of its responsibilities, and shift the remainder from Ottawa to the provinces (Sharpe and Braid, 1992). Under the heading of "Provincialization," the party's 1988 policy manual states:

We are concerned about the increasing use of the spending powers of the federal government in areas of provincial jurisdiction. This is an affront to the constitutional rights of regional communities. Furthermore, it has blurred the responsibility and accountability of the two levels of government to their taxpayers.

We would prefer an agreement to provide unconditional transfers of the tax base from the federal government to the provinces, adjusted for differential provincial economic development. The content and particulars of provincial policy would then be set provincially by governments clearly accountable to the electors of each province. Particularly in areas of social policy, this would allow for more differentiated and creative responses to the crisis of the Welfare State.

This we call "provincialization" of clear provincial responsibilities. As a federal party this is our policy in such areas. We respect provincial rights and will keep our policy statements largely outside of areas such as medicine, education, and the like.²³

Under such an arrangement, Ottawa would lose any influence it had over current social policy, and its ability to foster new programs. More importantly, it suggests the abandonment of national programs.

The party's appeal for decentralization, however, is in keeping with the new right's project of dismantling the welfare state. Reform's discourse on the welfare state and its "bureaucratic" social policies clearly corresponds with neoliberal economic policy prescriptions, but a closer reading also reflects Reform's authoritarian conservatism, albeit not as clearly articulated. The following excerpt from their policy manual is instructive in this regard:

The Reform Party opposes the view that universal social programs run by bureaucrats are the best and only way to care for the poor, the sick, the old, and the young.

The Reform Party supports greater compassion in the delivery mechanisms for social policy. We would actively encourage families, communities, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector to reassume their duties and responsibilities in social service areas.

The Reform Party supports greater focusing of social policy benefits. We prefer to target benefits on those who need the help, and to do so in a rational and compassionate manner.²⁴

The last statements would seem to indicate the party's lack of commitment to the principle of universality. Party leader, Preston Manning himself has stated that social spending is best focused on those who need it most - "at looking after the most vulnerable people among us", not at ensuring "Peter Pocklington and Conrad Black are provided for in their old age."²⁵ As its policy on social programs states, "No citizen should be denied access by reason of financial status or inability to pay. Likewise, this does not necessitate the full subsidization of those able to pay all or part of the costs themselves."²⁶

Manning does seem to have an ambiguous and contradictory stance on the

principle of universality. While he certainly recognizes the political explosiveness an attack on these principles could generate, and indeed has attempted to avoid such controversies,²⁷ he has little difficulty in stating that a successful program of deficit reduction would entail "breaking universality in virtually all social spending areas."²⁸ Indeed, one of his projects seems to be the *redefinition* of universality. With regards to health care he writes:

Let's stop defining universality as meaning that taxpayers will pay 100% of the medical bills for 100% of the population 100% of the time regardless of income or need or available resources. Such a goal is unachievable, and any politician who says it is, is deceiving the people. Let's start defining universality as the goal of bringing medical care within the financial reach of every Canadian, a goal that IS achievable. This requires us to recognize that what must be done by governments to bring adequate health care within the financial reach of a millionaire is different from what must be done to bring adequate health care within the financial reach of the middle class or someone on social assistance.²⁹

The party's first policy manual clearly states Reform's intent:

The concept of universality is, at heart, counter to the idea of focusing benefits on the needy. It is also an invitation to unlimited spending rather than careful controls. We prefer to target benefits on those who need the help, and to do so in a rational and compassionate manner.³⁰

Manning explains this position:

Let me also emphasize the word "targeted." We are not talking about the elimination of social safety nets for those in need. We're talking about changing the present costly and wasteful universal programs into programs that are even more effective for those who actually need help.³¹

As McQuaig (1993) suggests, targeting those "most in need" may seem like a sensible approach. Rather than squandering funding on the middle and upper class (ie., the Conrad Blacks and Peter Pocklingtons referred to by Manning), the targeted approach

directs resources specifically to the needy with the assumption that the extra resources would be then freed up to better provide for the poor. She argues, however, that systems designed to accomplish such an objective actually provide poorer benefits to its designated recipients. Citing the American approach to social welfare McQuaig (1993: 32) notes:

The Americans have been surprisingly ungenerous to the poor. Despite claims that they are targeting the poor specifically, and presumably with extra cash saved by not providing benefits to all, benefit levels in the US still keep families well below the poverty line.³²

Reform's attack on the universality of social programs reveals a disregard for the responsibility the state has for providing social welfare to its citizens. That this responsibility should reside elsewhere seems to be what Reformers are advocating. The party suggests that the current system is being crushed under by its own weight and needs to be replaced with a less-costly, less-centralized system.³³ According to Manning, this new system should involve more corporate and private funding, and should be administered through municipalities, local boards and volunteers.³⁴ In other words, the party advocates a return to greater "social responsibility:" "We believe that Canadians have a personal and collective responsibility to care and provide for the basic needs of people who are unable to care and provide for themselves. The Reform Party believes Canadians urgently need social programs we can afford."³⁵

It seems clear that the party's focus on social policy is aimed at reducing the role of government in the lives of individuals and families. Indeed, this goal has led Manning to suggest that the government should require people who habitually receive

unemployment insurance to undergo training in another profession or lose their benefits;³⁶ and to have welfare recipients perform a community service or be trained in some skill that will enable them to become productive members of society.³⁷

These, then, are Reform's "alternatives to the welfare state". The party's first policy manual includes two pages of its prescriptions for "social reform." The material acts as a not-so-veiled attack on the welfare state. While acknowledging a social policy role for government, it states:

This role must be more effective and less expensive than the Welfare State approach of buying each group with its own money. Perhaps that approach is politically expedient. But despite the cries of 'sacred trust', we believe the current social policy approach is doomed unless seriously reexamined.³⁸

The only legitimate social policy role for the state is "to do for people whatever they need to have done, but cannot do at all, or do as well, for themselves individually or through non-governmental organizations."³⁹ It is obvious to Reformers that this objective is not being met in the current system according to Reform:

As the costs of social policy grow while the needy line up at food banks to eat, we become increasingly sceptical of the bureaucratic, universal, social policy approaches of the Welfare State.⁴⁰

Indeed, Manning himself suggests that the use of bureaucracies in delivering a variety of social services satisfies neither taxpayers, who bear the burden of paying the costs, nor the clients of the system who "protest its inhumanity, inflexibility, and inefficiency."⁴¹ Therefore, "if the welfare state is proving inadequate and unsustainable, we must develop more human, less bureaucratic and more efficient alternatives."⁴² The party repeatedly engages in this kind of discourse and uses the terms "bureaucracies" and

"bureaucrats" pejoratively to refer to both public service workers and agencies.

According to Shields (1990: 164), this is typical of the new right:

The provision of social welfare, according to this view, should be shifted back to the community where it can be provided without resort to an often ineffective and costly bureaucratic state. The traditional role of Church and family as providers of charity and counsel needs to be reestablished. The state's monopoly on welfare must be broken since, in the end, such "aid" only serves to harm the needy.

This viewpoint is readily discernible in Reform's discourse:

Bureaucracy is not always a compassionate delivery mechanism as anyone who has lined up at government office well knows. But the fault is not just that of the bureaucrats. We would actively encourage families, communities, non-government organizations, and the private sector to reassume their duties and responsibilities in social service areas. We believe this would create a healthier environment for both self-reliance and social responsibility.⁴³

Reform's attack on the welfare state is further evidenced in statements made by Stephen Harper at the inaugural gathering of the "Reform Association of Canada." The theme of his address was the "unfair treatment of western Canada" which he claimed resulted from such historical factors as MacDonald's National Policy of 1879, the "Quebec question," *and* the welfare state. His argument ran as follows:

If the National Policy was historically responsible for the centralizing of the Canadian economy, then the Welfare State has taken its logic to a modern extreme. The Welfare State has placed unprecedented power in the centralizing hands of the federal bureaucracy, both in terms of its new reaches into Canadian life and its insistence on standardizing all policies and practices on a national scale.⁴⁴

It is clear that Harper's attack on the welfare state is based on traditional notions of western alienation. His account of the effects of the welfare state, however, goes

beyond this familiar refrain:

... the Welfare State has witnessed the phenomenon of greedy pressure group politics reach unprecedented depths. Unlike other pressure groups, the vested interests of the Welfare State operate in the guts of government decision-making machinery. Thus, their networks have been highly successful in achieving constant growth for their programs and bureaucracies - a growth that seems to place more emphasis on the welfare of the Welfare State than it does on the welfare of human beings.

Harper asserts, then, that the welfare state should not only be smaller but should be "more effective." It should focus not only on "recipients", but also on "taxpayers." Indeed, he suggests that the welfare state places too much emphasis on the "middlemen" - ie., those bureaucrats who "administer and promote" the system.⁴⁵ He further insists that social spending "must focus on the greatest needs, not the loudest voices. Structures to address social problems must provide the appropriate incentives and opportunities, not encourage permanent dependency or mentalities of entitlement." He concludes his diatribe against the welfare state by declaring:

The crisis of the Welfare State is being tackled around the world by governments of various political stripes. It is time for Canada's federal government to significantly reduce its size and to decentralize power from bureaucrats to ordinary Canadians and from Ottawa to the regions. Whatever the merits of many government programs, they are not, and never were, acts of God. The Welfare State is not the politicians' "sacred trust"; it is the taxpayer's burden - a burden which has been disproportionately borne by Western Canadians.

This discussion of Reform's position on the welfare state has intended to demonstrate the party's new right character. While the call to "reduce the size and decentralize the power" of the state corresponds with the party's neoliberal economic policy prescriptions, the appeal to individuals and families to assume greater "social

responsibility" for their well-being, reveals Reform's conservative (or authoritarian conservative, in my definition) tendencies. An examination of its discourse on the welfare state uncovers the party's tacit defence of such traditional institutions as the family,⁴⁶ the inculcation of the work ethic, and an obvious objection to social welfare rights. The party's prescription for social programs indicates a shift away from the concept of social services as a citizen's right, to dependence on the provision of such services as charitable acts (Dobbin, 1991). But as McQuaig argues, the concerted attack on social programs is really an attack on *equality* in Canada - an attack lodged by those who disagree with the very cause of equality. As she states (1993: 3):

... there is no evidence that a strong welfare state interferes with economic growth and competitiveness. What a welfare state does do however, is divide up a society's resources more equitably. And it is this - not the welfare state's alleged impact on economic growth - that has led to the attack on the welfare state by those unsympathetic to the egalitarian cause.

Reform's attack on the welfare state clearly corresponds with the new right project to halt (and retrench) the expansion of citizenship rights, revive the role of market mechanisms, and put an end to "collectivist" state policies. In particular, the new right opposes the expansion of "social rights," - ie., those economic and welfare rights which provide a guarantee of a certain educational level, economic security, public welfare, health provision, etc. (King, 1987). As such, the new right should be viewed as a *reaction* against an understanding of equality that was expanded and broadened in scope in the 1960s through the efforts of various social movements. Reform's attack on the welfare state must be read in this context.

CONCLUSION: THE CULT OF THE FREE MARKET

Preston Manning (1992a: 298-99) states that "Old Canada" is:

... marked by economic signposts that say Government Protection, Government Intervention, More Government Spending, and Higher Taxation. Travellers on this route claim it is the road to economic security for Canadians. But Reformers believe that the road to a New Canada with a viable economy is marked by signs that say Free Trade, Free Markets, Spending Cuts, and Lower Taxes.

It is this cult of the free market that drives the agenda of the Reform Party. It assumes that the market will provide the most sound basis for society. As a powerful integrating force, the market produces social order, justice, economic growth and higher standards of living, even for the poorer members of society (Jacobs, 1992). Manning reflects this assumption himself:

We believe that an open, free-market economy, combined with a genuinely democratic political system, offers the best possible chances for individuals to pursue their goals in life. It is true that not everyone starts from the same positions, but these inequalities are not necessarily cumulative and inherited. A market economy, open society, and democratic polity are great engines for the destruction of privilege.

(1992: 314)

The problems of society, then, are not due to the inherent contradictions and conflicts of a capitalist economy, a patriarchal family, or an unequal international world order, but are the result of tampering with an otherwise harmonious, beneficent, self-sustaining, and *self-regulating* social system. The free market capitalist economy would function well if government had not grown too big and too powerful as a result of the Keynesian welfare state and over regulation (Himmelstein, 1990).

What is striking about the complete faith in the market is the assumption that it

is impersonal, and perfectly competitive. This view is characterized by a total absence of *power*. Each participant is seen as an atomized individual who simply responds to a variety of neutral market forces (Barry, 1987). But as Gamble (1986: 29) points out, these beliefs were based on a false assumption about the effects of Keynesianism:

The ideological ascendancy of Keynesianism and collectivist welfare policies was always much greater than their domination in practice. The market economy continued to function and, although the state played a much larger role, the basic institutions of the economy remained capitalist. ... Such qualifications are necessary to make a proper estimation of the rise of the New Right. The great collectivist tide which the ideologues of the New Right love to depict themselves swimming against was never as mighty as they pretend.

It is important to remember the neoliberal worship of the market is not the only ideological cornerstone for the Reform Party. While its faith in the market could lead us to conclude that Reform is a pure manifestation of neoliberalism, embedded within its rhetoric and its policies one can also find elements of authoritarian conservatism. This is especially evident in Reform's critique of the welfare state, and as will be demonstrated in later chapters, in its position on ethnic and race-related issues. It is this blend of neoliberal and conservative philosophical tenets which allows us to identify the Reform Party as Canada's clearest manifestation of the new right. It is also this intersection that allows the party to view the market simultaneously as "the agent of fantasy and of discipline, of freedom and of restraint",⁴⁷ and to articulate a "cult" of the free market.

The remainder of this thesis will demonstrate how Reform's new right ideological character is revealed in its race and ethnic-related policies. As I suggested in Chapter 1, one of the achievements of the new right has been the rearticulation of equality as a

matter of *individual* rather than *group* concern (Omi and Winant, 1986). An examination of Reform's discourse will show that this too is the project of Reform.

CHAPTER 4

REARTICULATING THE GOALS OF IMMIGRATION: REFORM'S USE OF "CODE WORDS"

Canada's immigration policy has operated in order to fulfil a number of objectives. These include meeting certain economic, social, humanitarian, and demographic needs. Immigration is seen as a tool of economic growth based on the assumption that immigrants, especially those in the independent class, enrich the labour market, and stimulate overall economic activity.¹ The policy's social objective is embodied in the family reunification program, while the entry of refugees - both those who fit the definition under the United Nations Convention, and those Canada considers to be refugees because they have been persecuted and/or displaced - reflects the humanitarian aim of the policy. Finally, in terms of demographic needs, the purpose of immigration is to stimulate population growth in order to reverse the trends of an aging population and a decreasing birth rate (Seward, 1990). Often these objectives are in conflict, as the demands of the economy may not correspond with the other goals the policy is designed to meet. As such, the above stated aims of immigration policy are often controversial and contested. The Reform Party's discourse on immigration must be considered with this in mind. As this chapter argues, the party has taken exception to the traditional objectives of immigration policy. In so doing, Reform provides a vehicle for the further articulation of growing anti-immigrant hostilities.

REFORM'S IMMIGRATION POLICY: ECONOMICS AND BORDER CONTROL

While a great deal of attention has been focused on the party's ethnic- and race-related policies - immigration and multiculturalism in particular - party officials have steadfastly maintained these policy areas are not the *raison d'être* of the party. In an interview, Tom Flanagan, former party Director of Policy, Strategy and Communications, noted Reform "was [not] founded to combat immigration policy." He also stressed that the perception that the party is concerned about non-white immigration was not "part of anything Preston [Manning] or Stephen [Harper] were interested in originally."² In fact, Flanagan insists immigration "was not part of the original project at all."³

Yet, the party has lodged a sustained critique of what it deems to be the inadequacies of immigration policy.⁴ Party officials view immigration as an issue that is highly problematic, and the party has demonstrated quite a willingness to address the issue. As one official suggested, "Although the adoption of controversial policies such as bilingualism and immigration is often viewed as politically dangerous, it is even more dangerous to ignore public opinion by supporting the status quo."⁵ The party's original policy book reflects this view:

There is perhaps no area of public policy where the views of Canadians have been more systematically ignored through the undemocratic structuring of political debate than the area of immigration. Despite the cries of "racism" and the invocation of legal fictions, political change can occur where political will exists and is articulated. Immigration abuse must be ended, and not just by legalizing it. All Canadians, not just the political and immigration establishment, must get a better handle on our long-term immigration goals and needs.⁶

As this suggests, the party wants to wrest control of immigration from the hands

of the "political and immigration establishment" and place it in the hands of Canadians. This is based on its belief that the policy as practised is politically motivated. Part of Reform's original policy statement reads:

IMMIGRATION POLICY MUST BE MORE SENSITIVE TO PUBLIC OPINION

Major changes to immigration, including sponsorship requirement and amnesties, should not be introduced but by referendum. Career politicians and immigration advocates have dominated discussion of immigration policy. These groups benefit from abuse of the system and improper selection of immigrants. Ghettoized minorities are a favourite pawn of both these groups. Recent directions of P[rogressive] C[onservative] immigration policy indicate a clear desire to use immigration to build political support groups. This amounts to the local nomination busing phenomenon on a national scale.⁷

Reform MP Deborah Grey, echoes this view when she suggests that the motive behind the increased immigration levels proposed by the Tories was a bid to obtain more votes. She stated, "Barbara McDougall [former Minister of Employment and Immigration] herself said, 'Well, let's face it. The people who come into the country always do vote for the government who brings them over.'"⁸ The party further asserts it is no longer government officials who oversee immigration, but those ethnic groups with the most political clout who then decide which countries the majority of immigrants will originate from. As one official noted, "federal immigration policy has drifted away from economic criteria to a racial element. It's a vote-buying scheme."⁹

While the party objects to the political motives underlying policy, much of its criticism is based on the belief that immigration policy does not adequately address our economic needs. Reform's original policy states:

Immigrants should possess the human capital necessary to adjust quickly and independently to the needs of Canadian society and the job market. Sponsorship privileges should be restricted to members of immediate families, that is, wives or husbands, minor dependent children and aged dependent parents. All others should apply for entry through the normal selective process. Immigration should not be based on race or creed, as it was in the past, nor should it be explicitly designed to radically or suddenly alter the ethnic makeup of Canada, as it increasingly seems to be.¹⁰

By implication, then, what the party takes strong exception to is the family reunification program. Flanagan has stated:

When you start a trend of having a lot of immigrants from a particular country, if you have a very lax family reunification system, that tends to amplify itself, because then they bring in their parents, their children, their brothers and sisters, and then the brothers and sisters bring in their children and in-laws, and so on - it keeps building. So, you get further and further away from evaluating each individual immigrant as a potential contributor to the economy.¹¹

That the independent class of immigrants is not given priority is seen as another manifestation of a system rife with abuse. As one party official writes:

Immigrants are allowed to enter Canada under three basic categories, Independent immigrants, Family Class and Refugees. The highest priority is given to family members and refugees, emphasizing the humanitarian nature of the system. The needs of immigrants take precedence over the needs of the country. Inevitably, in a world where generosity is often equated with foolishness, there have been massive abuses. Adult, non-dependent family members including cousins, nieces and nephews are commonly sponsored by newly naturalized citizens and are exempt from the selection process faced by self-starters seeking admission as independent immigrants.

(Morrison, 1990a)¹²

Reform would have us believe that a liberal family class definition has dire consequences for Canada's economy. Yet an Economic Council of Canada (ECC) research report concluded that the actual impact of immigration on the Canadian economy is very small,

but positive nonetheless.¹³ A just published report from Statistics Canada based on 1991 census data, goes even further than the ECC report. It has concluded that immigrants on average, are better educated and more likely to be working than those born in Canada.¹⁴

The party also takes issue with the demographic goal of policy. Dimitri Pantazopoulos, formerly the party's Manager of Policy, states:

One of the reasons for increasing the immigration quotas over the past number of years was that we wanted to ensure that as the baby boomers got older, there would be a sufficient number of people in place to take care of them. The problem with that idea is that people who are coming in tend to closely reflect our society in terms of age demographics. So, if that's what they're trying to do, they're not accomplishing it.¹⁵

According to Reform, then, increased levels represent a lame attempt to address the crisis of the welfare state:

It is more frequently asserted that Canada needs more immigrants to pay the pension costs of an aging population. This is one part of the crisis of the Welfare State and is neither caused nor cured by immigration policy. The aging of a healthy and affluent population need not be a catastrophe but a forced growth population policy could easily be. In any case, altering the demographic structure of Canada in order to deal with a badly managed old-age security system is a bit like turning the entire country to screw in a light bulb.¹⁶

In keeping with its perception that the current system is susceptible to abuse, the party has also demonstrated a concern regarding Canada's ability to control its own borders. This is evident in the following statement on refugee policy:

GENUINE REFUGEES SHOULD BE WELCOMED

Bogus refugees and other illegal entrants should be deported immediately, and any person who encourages or promotes such activities should be subject to severe penalties without exception. The Constitution may have to be amended to ensure that Parliament can ultimately control entry into Canada, and, in the

interim, the "notwithstanding" provision of the Charter should be used to ensure this is the case.¹⁷

From its inception, then, the party has engaged in a strong critique of immigration policy. Reform disregards the social, humanitarian, and demographic aims of immigration, and insists that the demands of the Canadian labour market should be the only legitimate goal of policy. A party pamphlet clearly articulates this focus: "Immigration should be based on economic needs, such as skilled labour where shortages exist, or to enhance the country's competitiveness in the international marketplace."¹⁸ But in addition to their emphasis on economic criteria, the party has also positioned itself to challenge those "vested interests" who may taint its attempts of 'reform' with racial motives. The party's original policy statement on immigration concludes:

The Reform Party remains convinced that immigration has been, and can be again, a positive source of economic growth, cultural diversity, and social renewal. No criticism of the problems of immigration policy should be construed as a failure to recognize either the contributions that thousands of immigrants make each year to Canadian society or the good fortune of having a society that people desire to move to. Likewise, the vested interests of bad immigration policy should not be so quick to label Canadians 'racist' for desiring positive changes and should be more humble and honest about their own motives.¹⁹

By 1991 the party was making a serious bid to be viewed as a legitimate force on the Canadian political landscape. Their immigration policy was reworked as part of this endeavour. What emerged was a less angry discourse that emphasized a policy which would be "balanced and positive" and "which rejected the use of racial criteria" (Manning, 1992a: 273). The party's current immigration policy reads as follows:

- A. The Reform Party supports an immigration policy that has as its focus Canada's economic needs and that welcomes genuine refugees. The Reform Party remains

convinced that immigration has been, and can be again, a positive source of economic growth, cultural diversity and social renewal.

- B. The Reform Party opposes any immigration policy based on race or creed.
- C. The Reform Party supports an immigration policy which would be essentially economic in nature. Immigrants should possess the human capital necessary to adjust quickly and independently to the needs of Canadian society and the job market.
- D. The Reform Party supports restricting sponsorship privileges to members of immediate families, that is, wives or husbands, minor dependent children, and aged dependent parents. All others should apply for entry through the normal selective process.
- E. The Reform Party supports a policy accepting the settlement of genuine refugees who find their way to Canada. A genuine refugee is one who has a well-founded fear of persecution and qualifies under the strict requirements of the United Nations Convention.
- F. The Reform Party supports a policy of immediate deportation of bogus refugees and other illegal entrants, and persons who encourage or promote such activities should be subject to severe penalties without exception. The Constitution may have to be amended to ensure that Parliament can ultimately control entry into Canada, and, in the interim, the "notwithstanding" provision of the Charter should be used to ensure that this is the case.
- G. The Reform Party opposes the use of immigration policy to solve the crisis of the welfare state through forced growth population policy. The problem of the pension costs of an aging population is neither caused nor cured by immigration policy.
- H. The Reform Party supports submitting all major changes to immigration, including sponsorship requirements and amnesties, to referendum.²⁰

As a reading of this revised policy demonstrates, much of the tone which left the impression of a corrupt system, prone to abuse, was dropped. The party's "Green Book" exhibits this more tempered discourse by outlining the policy's objectives:

- 1. To be a non-racist, non-discriminatory policy based on Canada's economic needs.

2. To create a positive source of economic growth, cultural diversity and social renewal for Canada.
3. To remain responsive to humanitarian needs through a legitimate refugee policy which adequately deters false refugees.
4. To provide a policy which is consistent with and supportive of the other social and economic policies of the Reform Party.²¹

In spite of the change in tone, party officials maintain their current policy still reflects the substantive issues addressed in their initial position on immigration. In an interview Stephen Harper acknowledged the changes made, but suggested these indicate only a difference in rhetoric. According to Harper, the party has consistently been advocating three things:

First of all, that fundamentally immigration policy should be based on the economic needs and priorities of Canada, as opposed to [being] based fundamentally on other considerations such as the social, family, humanitarian needs of the immigrant population. Second point we made, is that we were opposed to extending - we're not opposed to family reunification as a part of the immigration system - but we were opposed to extending the definition of that class beyond immediate family. And we were obviously opposed to making that the centrepiece of immigration policy. And thirdly, the party believes in the primacy of Canadian society in its collective right to determine its immigration priorities as opposed to some of the more extreme results of the "Singh decision" which essentially said Canadian society had no right to seal its borders.²²

This, then, reflects the core of Reform's position on immigration. The party continually articulates three interrelated themes. First, it wishes prioritize the economic needs of Canada. Second, Reform believes this can only be accomplished by limiting family class entrants, and increasing independent class levels. The expressed concern about the ability of the country to control its borders is the final element that rounds out Reform's policy on immigration.

Harper, like other officials in the party, steadfastly maintains that their policy does not have any racist overtones. In fact, what it is trying to accomplish is the elimination of any racial elements from current policy. He has argued, "All we are trying to do is state that those policies should not be designed with racial makeup in mind. How that can be construed as being racist is beyond me."²³

Should we accept, however, the party's benign assessment of its stance on immigration? To answer such a question, one must not only consider the *implications* of its policy, but the *assumptions* that lead Reform to adopt its particular position. This is the task of the following section.

THE AGENDA BEHIND THE DISCOURSE

It has been suggested that by focusing exclusively on economic criteria, Reform's policy would, in effect, bar non-white immigration into the country. The party bristles at this interpretation. Harper comments:

This [argument] is essentially saying that people who are non-white are universally stupid, uneducated and unable to adapt to Canada. [This] is not the Reform Party view, but anyone who will put that interpretation on it must believe it themselves to some degree to come up with an interpretation like that. I find some of these reactions quite amusing for what they say about the speaker as much as what they might potentially say about [our policy].²⁴

In effect what Harper is saying then, is that anyone who suggests Reform's policy is racist, is exhibiting negative racial stereotypes themselves. Manning has also defended their position:

Twenty years ago, you could have used economic-driven immigration as a euphemism for saying just immigrants from the developed world. We don't mean

that. ... If you determine that Canada had a deficiency in, say computer software people and that immigration ought to be looked at, as well as training as a possible source of workers, you probably in the world today could be attracted to India first.²⁵

He further points out that many of the people with entrepreneurial and "high-tech" professional skills needed by Canadian businesses today come from the non-white world, and he adds, they can adapt to Canada as easily as can any European.²⁶

Yet this may be a naive appraisal of Reform's position. An article in the party paper highlights Reform's call for an immigration policy that, "is based on non-racial criteria - ie., on Canada's economic needs and *adjustment potential* of the immigrant [emphasis added]."²⁷ The party's current policy echoes this by emphasizing the need for immigrants to "possess the *human capital* necessary to *adjust quickly and independently* to the needs of Canadian society and the job market [emphasis added]."²⁸ Do phrases such as these imply that immigrants must be English-speaking? Does adjusting quickly and independently suggest funding for language training programs will be cut? What cultural backgrounds are assumed to have the greatest or least potential for 'adjustment'? These are issues the party simply fails to address.²⁹

Focusing on the skills and education of immigrants also conveniently ignores the persistent difficulty with the issue of accreditation. Numerous studies show how educational training and job experience from the non-western world is devalued, and in many cases not even accepted as legitimate credentials.³⁰ Yet party documents on immigration show no recognition of this difficulty, nor do they suggest how a Reform Party immigration policy which emphasizes skills and training, would address itself to

this issue.³¹

Political sociologist John Conway provides the following assessment of Reform's position on immigration:

I think any Canadian reading their platform will know what they are talking about. They're talking about restricting immigration and encouraging only those who can fit in economically and those who are closer to our way of life. [The policy] is intended to appeal to the views of those who are concerned about the increase in Third World immigration. Of course, they can't say that, but they clearly imply that when they talk about the first criterion being an economic one - adjusting quickly to the Canadian economy - which will tend to give an advantage to those traditional European and North American cultures over Third World cultures.³²

Even people affiliated with the party are willing to accept this interpretation of the policy. John Abbot, who in the 1960s was an official for the Canadian Immigration Service, has addressed party functions on a number of occasions. When asked if he believed Reform's position would limit Third World immigration he stated, "I don't think there's any doubt about that. But that's a perfectly reasonable position for people to take, and it's accurate."³³ In this sense, the intent of the party's original statement which called for an end to immigration policy that is "explicitly designed to radically alter the ethnic makeup of Canada" becomes more clear, in spite of Reform's attempts at damage control.³⁴

The second theme in Reform's discourse on immigration is its objection to the family reunification program. As I will argue in Chapter 7, the "Reform family" is a *racialized* concept for it acknowledges only the reality of the traditional nuclear family (male bread-winner, financially dependent wife and children). By restricting sponsorship to the "immediate family" (wives or husbands, and minor dependent children and aged

parents"),³⁵ the party therefore disregards the reality of many immigrant families who fall outside this very westernized notion of "the family." The use of this model as the basis of reunification programs, therefore, results in discriminatory practices. For example, a female-led family of a Caribbean domestic worker would be unable to sponsor a relative other than her *dependent* children and *aged* parents. Child care for a family such as this is a serious issue and could be resolved by allowing a member of her extended family entrance into Canada. Under a Reform immigration policy, however, this woman's option to do that would be taken from her. And as discussed in Chapter 7, the party would not provide her access to any government-sponsored universal day care program.

Reform's discourse on refugee policy also reveals some interesting assumptions. The party emphasizes only the acceptance of *genuine* refugees. It calls for the immediate deportation of *bogus* refugees and stiff penalties for those who aid their entry into the country. As noted previously, the party has had an ongoing preoccupation with border control, or more appropriately in its view, the *lack* of border control. A restrictive immigration policy coupled with strict enforcement efforts to "regain control of our borders," is one of the new right's defining characteristics (Omi, 1987). This is particularly evident in early Reform discourse:

We cannot solve the problems of global overpopulation, starvation and political repression by trying to accommodate the dispossessed of the world. If we opened our doors wide to everyone who wished to come, the only predictable result would be our own economic and social collapse with no significant improvement of conditions in the countries from where the migrants came. Therefore, our immigration policies should be designed primarily in the national interest with priority given to Independent Immigrants - people whose skills, education, health and good character will enable them to make a positive contribution to our society

and economy.

(Morrison, 1990a)³⁶

What is implicit in this message, then, is the perception that the immigrants we are allowing in now are unskilled, unhealthy, and lack "good character."³⁷ This is due to our loss of border control resulting in a flood of illegal immigrants and refugees. As Morrison (1990a) writes:

Canada's immigration system is a mess. For more than a decade it has wandered aimlessly from crisis to crisis with periodic promises of reform and with amnesties to "solve" the problem of illegal residents. The views of ordinary Canadians have been largely ignored while immigration agents, lawyers and special interest pleaders have grown fat on our folly.

An article in the party paper describes Tory policy as a "deeply flawed policy, which is so full of loopholes that illegal immigrants and phony refugees are allowed to remain and work in Canada while many established Canadians must struggle for years to bring their loved ones into the country."³⁸ A common refrain in much of the party's literature is, "Close the door to illegal immigration. Establish a long-term immigration plan sensitive to Canada's needs and public opinion."³⁹

While the tone became less vitriolic as the party tried to find its place on the mainstream political stage, the perception of a system open to abuse is still a theme officials perpetuate. This is particularly evident in their discourse revolving around what is known as the "Singh decision". In 1985 the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the word "everyone" in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms should be interpreted to mean not only citizens or landed immigrants, but should include any individual who sets foot

on Canadian soil. This means that the liberty and security of any individual in Canada, regardless of his/her citizenship status is protected under the Canadian Constitution. The landmark ruling has allowed a number of refugee claimants to use a Charter defence to avoid deportation and remain in Canada. The Reform Party abhors this trend. Its policy calls for a constitutional amendment to reverse the Singh ruling, and failing that, the use of the notwithstanding clause to, "override, in our view, excessively liberal interpretations of the Charter."⁴⁰

Manning himself has stated his concern over the "illegal trade in refugees": "We don't think you can just throw open the doors and take unlimited numbers of refugees." When asked if that meant Reform advocated immediate deportation of anyone entering with false documents he suggested, "We would err more toward that side than the side the Singh decision takes you. .. We would err on the side of a shorter process. ... There must be due process, but there must something short of allowing a Charter defence to drag out for seven years."⁴¹ As recently as January 1993 Manning was telling the Metro Toronto Police Association that a Reform government would ensure illegal immigrants would not be permitted to hide behind the Charter to avoid deportation.⁴² Clearly, the unease over border control is a theme that continues to resonate in Reform discourse.

In the end, the party believes that this flawed refugee policy has made Canada an "international embarrassment." Party MP Deborah Grey states:

When I'm talking to people from other countries they say, "You Canadians are just the laughing stock of the international community because anybody can get into your country." And although I think we are the most humanitarian nation on the planet, I think that we are often viewed as people who are so unclear about whom we will let in or who we won't that it is almost a kind of international embarrassment sometimes.⁴³

The implications of Reform's position on refugee policy is therefore obvious. The guidelines for allowing refugees into the country would be severely restricted.⁴⁴ But the party does not seem at all troubled by the ramifications such a policy would cause. According to one official, many of those who claim refugee status are not really people escaping persecution anyway ("*genuine* refugees"), but are economic migrants posing as refugees ("*bogus* refugees").⁴⁵ And as Morrison stated above, Canada cannot be expected to accommodate the "dispossessed" of the world, and certainly holds no responsibility for them.

During a time of global economic crisis the image of borders being endangered by foreigners is one that is being rendered throughout the western developed world. It is evident in such diverse incidents as neo-Nazi extremism in Germany, and Margaret Thatcher's famous "swamping" speech.⁴⁶ While Reform's discourse is rarely this overt, it is clear that it appeals to people's insecurities in a rapidly changing world. In so doing, the party serves to foster growing hostility toward immigrants and the use of immigration as a scapegoat for the consequences of global capital restructuring and the social, political, and economic havoc it wreaks. But in addition to playing with these kinds of perceptions, Reform also uses immigration to address some of its more central concerns.

The party has repeatedly asserted that issues such as immigration do not hold much significance for its overall project of constitutional, parliamentary, and fiscal reform.⁴⁷ As Manning states, "Reform's appeal is based on talking about fundamental constitutional, economic and Parliamentary reforms. It did not get there by talking about

immigration or multiculturalism or turbans or issues of that type."⁴⁸

Yet the party does use immigration to articulate its central concerns. Regarding parliamentary reform, a continuing theme articulated by Reform officials is how politicians are unresponsive to the wishes of the Canadian public. Manning (1988) provides us with the following example:

A large number of western Canadians are exceedingly unhappy with the passive and reactionary nature of Canadian immigration policy, and the administration of that policy by federal bureaucrats. Notwithstanding the extent and depth of these concerns, the leaders of the three federal parties and the federal government have created an atmosphere where the frank discussion of opposing views on these subjects is immediately branded as "racist," un-Canadian, and contributing to national disunity.

In addition, party literature and statements from officials often criticize the use of immigration policy to preserve a French-English balance. Through a bilateral accord reached with the federal government, the province of Quebec has more jurisdiction over immigration than do the other provinces. One of the major aims of this accord was to raise the number of francophone immigrants settling in the province.⁴⁹ The party thus uses immigration as a means to articulate its grievances against the special provisions afforded to Quebec.⁵⁰ Manning notes that immigrants did not come to Canada to "get in on the French-English thing."⁵¹ He also warns:

If you take this business of Canada as this meeting of French and English, and you carry that into immigration, what you get is a slightly racially flavoured immigration policy. Despite all the euphemism, Quebec wants their immigration to support the French fact. Then you get this reaction in English Canada, that we ought to preserve the balance, preserve the English fact. ... If you drive that down to the street, and you drive it into areas like immigration, it's racist, it's got racist connotations. ... Our main reform on immigration was to say, get away from that, to base immigration on Canada's economic needs and requirements. ... Don't ask, "Now what does this do to the French-English balance?" ... We

argue that what we're talking about is less racially oriented than the current official version.

(Manning, quoted in Sharpe and Braid. 1992: 134-35)

The party, therefore, insists that its immigration policy is quite progressive. for unlike Tory policy, it has no racial character. Indeed, Harper asserts:

The overall intent [of the policy] cannot be construed as racial. It is clearly race neutral. One may disagree with the emphasis on economics, the emphasis on border control, the emphasis on narrow family classes, but none of those things are inherently racist. And certainly they are not overtly racist.⁵²

Claiming its positions are *race-neutral* is a standard defense used by the new right (Omi and Winant, 1986). But as my analysis demonstrates, Reform's policy certainly has racist and discriminatory *implications*. While it is not surprising the party refuses to acknowledge this, I suggest Reformers should not be so astonished when extremists such as Wolfgang Droege and his Heritage Front supporters find something quite appealing in Reform's stance on immigration. If the party is serious about "inoculating" itself against extremists, a good place to start would be a re-evaluation of its own discourse on immigration.

CONCLUSION

In 1992 then Minister of Employment and Immigration, Bernard Valcourt, announced proposed changes to Canada's Immigration Act. It was suggested that the shift in Tory policy was due, in part, to the influence of the Reform Party. Indeed, a cursory examination of the new policy highlights many of the themes echoed by Reform.

The emphasis is clearly on the independent class, while the number of people allowed to enter under the family reunification program has been restricted. The policy also makes some attempts to speed up the refugee determination system and provide more power to immigration officials.⁵³ Under the short-lived government of Conservative Kim Campbell, some of the responsibilities of Employment and Immigration Canada were shifted over to the newly created Ministry of Public Security. Although immigration advocates were quick to point out their concern over the link made between immigration and national security, this change was welcomed by those concerned about Canada's lack of border control. While there has since been a change in government, the Liberals have chosen neither to reverse any of the Tory amendments to the Immigration Act, nor overturn Campbell's realigning of the immigration department.

Officials in the Reform Party are quick to point out this shift in policy and the parallels it holds to their own position on immigration. Stephen Harper stated that, "existing policy has moved much, much closer to what the Reform Party has been advocating ... In fact, almost to the point where among many Reformers, at least the moderate wing of the party, there is no immigration issue."⁵⁴

While immigration may not be a significant issue for the party leadership, it clearly is one of importance for some Reform supporters.⁵⁵ At the party's 1991 convention, just three of nineteen proposed immigration resolutions were voted on by delegates, while the remaining were weeded out by the party's policy committee. Some of the radical proposals that did not make it to the convention floor included resolutions that would deny Charter rights to immigrants and refugees; encourage refugees to settle

in rural areas; and maintain Canada's current ethnic-cultural balance.⁵⁶ At the party's October 1992 convention, 83 per cent of delegates passed a resolution that promised to deport "non-Canadian citizens found guilty of indictable criminal offences."⁵⁷

It is somewhat ironic, then, that the party can suggest that immigration policy is not a significant issue for the party. Indeed, Manning claims:

I actually discourage our assemblies from getting too deep into this. I don't believe in a bunch of white guys making policy for Indians, a bunch of settled citizens who have never come near a refugee - however well-intended and all the rest - trying to come up with policy. On immigration we've hardly got very far, and on refugees even less.⁵⁸

The party's detailed eight point policy on immigration outlined above, however, would seem to belie this assessment. Omi (1987) suggests race plays a significant role in the consolidation, thinking, and strategic goals of the new right. This is clearly the case with the Reform Party. Reformers practice a specific discourse on refugee policy and border control, just as they use immigration to articulate their dissatisfaction with Quebec's continuing constitutional demands, and the political elites' disregard for the views of "ordinary Canadians."

Omi (1987) also argues that the new right attempts to rearticulate racial ideology through the use of "code words." My discussion has also shown this to be a strategy of Reform. Officials are able to assert that their position on immigration has no racial character by disguising its racialized assumptions and implications in non-racial rhetoric. Yet, when the party's discourse is scrutinized, the message behind such phrases as "adjustment potential," "human capital," "immediate family," and "genuine" versus "bogus" refugees is rendered clear. While the party may wish us to believe this message

is not anti-immigrant - that it views immigration as a "positive source of economic growth, cultural diversity and social renewal" - it is clearly against *particular* kinds of immigrants - family members, refugees, and all those who cannot "adjust quickly and independently to the needs of Canadian society and the job market."⁵⁹ The significance of the party's new right ideology and its implications for race and ethnic relations becomes even clearer upon an examination of Reform's multicultural policy. The next chapter addresses this issue.

CHAPTER 5

"HYPHENATED CANADIANISM": THE (MULTICULTURAL) TIES THAT DIVIDE

Even more than immigration, the Reform Party sees multiculturalism as an inherently flawed public policy arising out of dubious political motives. Indeed, Reformers maintain multicultural programs are designed more to curry favour with ethnic groups than to achieve other goals such as preserving cultural heritage.¹ Manning (1992a: 39) provides this account of multiculturalism in action:

... [this] manifested itself at the community level in Edmonton East in the belief of local Liberals that the entire Ukrainian vote of that area could be purchased simply by inviting Ukrainian dancers to perform at a Liberal convention and offering a few leaders a grant to form a cultural society or building a cultural centre. The superficiality of this speaker's remarks and the shallowness of his assumptions about the interests and capacities of the audience were insulting and demeaning. Here was an audience whose political culture and experience were far deeper and broader than the speaker's, yet he talked to them like children, as if his party could obtain their allegiance by throwing them a few baubles.

This chapter provides an overview of Reform's discourse on multiculturalism beginning with the party's criticisms of current policy, and its prescribed alternative. The remainder of the chapter demonstrates how the party's discourse on multicultural issues reflects its new right ideological character. This is most clearly evident in Reform's attempts to *rearticulate* understandings of racial and ethnic equality.

REFORM'S CRITIQUE OF MULTICULTURAL POLICY

Although it is suspect of the political motives that drive multicultural policy, Reform is even more critical of its *outcomes*. In the party's assessment, multiculturalism

acts as a divisive force on the Canadian landscape for it leads to "hyphenated Canadianism".² Party executive council member, and newly elected Reform MP, Lee Morrison (1990b) writes:

It is the Reform Party's position that the federal Department of Multiculturalism is a divisive agency that encourages ghettoization and wastes our tax dollars to do it. ... Thanks to the official federal policy of multiculturalism, Canada is being divided as never before along racial, linguistic and cultural lines. We have Anglo-Canadians, French-Canadians, Native-Canadians, Chinese-Canadians and a host of other hyphenated nationalities, but apparently no plain, ordinary *Canadians*.

That the Reform Party views such distinctions "with suspicion and fairly pejoratively" is quite clear.³ As a party position paper on multiculturalism warns, "in a pluralistic society, the politicization of ethnicity leads through envy to discord and, at the extreme, even to violent conflict" (Flanagan and Pantazopoulos, 1992). Officials therefore suggest multicultural legislation does not foster a Canadian identity, but only serves to pit different communities against one another as they compete for financial assistance. Rais Khan, who was instrumental in developing the party's position on multiculturalism, suggests that, "if Canadians are looking for cultural harmony, divisive multicultural legislation is not the way to go. The cultural mosaic is being threatened by the politicization of multiculturalism. ... We are ghettoizing the mosaic by creating walls between people over the few dollars this policy of multiculturalism tends to provide."⁴

Party leader Preston Manning often returns to the theme of hyphenated Canadianism, and like Morrison above, laments the lack of a "Canadian" identity.

It's been said that the symbol of this country is no longer the Maple Leaf, the symbol of the Old Canada is the hyphen. Its federal politicians insist on talking about English-Canadians, French-Canadians, aboriginal-Canadians, ethnic

Canadians. No one talks much about Canadians, period. And it is becoming patently obvious, as it has in some other countries, that you cannot hold a country together with hyphens.

(Manning, 1990b: 3)⁵

The party fundamentally opposes this vision of Canada based on a hyphenated Canadian identity and believes the Department of Multiculturalism was created to promote a vision that, "we should be looking at ourselves not as one country where different regions speak different languages, or different people have different backgrounds, but as in fact a country where there are distinctive blocks that ghettoize on some kind of racial or linguistic principle."⁶ A party document summarizes these criticisms:

The Reform Party of Canada welcomes Canadians of all origins into the party. We recognize that all Canadians are equal and should be treated equally. Unfortunately, the present multiculturalism policy does not live up to this ideal. It categorizes people on the basis of ethnic and racial origin, thus ghettoizing our society and promoting hyphenated Canadianism. It sets immigrant groups apart from their fellow Canadians rather than encouraging them to participate fully in society.⁷

Criticisms such as these have become increasingly salient as recent constitutional crises and unrest in Aboriginal communities have led to growing fears about the balkanization of Canada (Stasiulis, 1991). As one Reform official stated, "most Canadians are genuinely concerned about the tendency that many Canadians have to identify their ultimate political interest in some racial, linguistic, or even regional groups, as opposed to seeing an ultimate political loyalty to the overall polity."⁸

REFORM'S ALTERNATIVE VISION

Based on these criticisms, then, the party arrives at its own position. However, unlike immigration, which was an issue addressed from the beginning of the party's history, multiculturalism was not broached until the 1990 policy book. The section there reads:

- A. The Reform Party of Canada opposes the current concept of multiculturalism and hyphenated Canadianism pursued by the Government of Canada and would end funding of the multiculturalism program.
- B. The Reform Party supports the preservation of cultural background as a matter of personal choice. Whether or not an ethnic group preserves its cultural background is the group's choice.
- C. The Reform Party supports the responsibility of the state to promote, preserve and enhance national culture. The state may assist, and should encourage, ethnic cultures to integrate into the national culture.⁹

The party soon found that some of the rhetoric used in this policy left it open to criticism. In particular the call to encourage ethnic cultures to integrate into the "national culture" caused consternation in many quarters. When the policy was being attacked, Reformers were quick to point out the architect of their position was Rais Khan, who is a member of a visible minority community. The apparent assumption, then, is that since the position was initially articulated by a minority member, it could not be racially motivated. The objectionable phrase was generated at the party's 1989 assembly in a presentation made to delegates by Khan:

If I want to nurture my culture, speak my language, sing my songs, play my music, wear my traditional clothes, cook my traditional food and feed it to others, display the handicrafts from my former country, it is my business. I should not expect government grants for that purpose nor should I get them. But, at the same time, I should not be impeded from doing any or all of the above. Whether

or not I preserve my cultural background is my personal choice; whether or not an ethnic group preserves its cultural background is the group's choice. The state has no business in either. The responsibility of the state is to promote, preserve and enhance the national culture. When it comes to the ethnic components, the state may assist, and should encourage, ethnic cultures to integrate into the national culture. But it is not the state's business to promote, preserve and enhance them.

(quoted in Flanagan and Pantazopoulos, 1992)¹⁰

Stephen Harper maintains the phrase "national culture" was not based on any odious motives, and that it was interpreted to mean an Anglo-Saxon white culture did not "follow logically at all." Indeed, he stated, "my interpretation as the policy officer was always that this was referring to a national political consciousness - getting away from multiculturalism as a fundamental basis for defining ourselves."¹¹ In spite of these innocent intentions, Reform chose to drop the phrase. In a position statement on multiculturalism, the party wrote, "Although the phrase 'national culture' expressed no sinister intent, it may be better not to use it because it is easily misinterpreted. Hence the Reform Party excised the term when the 'Blue Book' was revised at the 1991 Saskatoon Assembly" (Flanagan and Pantazopoulos, 1992). The newly reworded policy reads as follows:

- A. The Reform Party stands for the acceptance and integration of immigrants to Canada into the mainstream of Canadian life.
- B. The Reform Party supports the principle that individuals or groups are free to preserve their cultural heritage using their own resources. The Party shall uphold their right to do so.
- C. The Reform Party of Canada opposes the current concept of multiculturalism and hyphenated Canadianism pursued by the Government of Canada. We would end funding of the multiculturalism program and support the abolition of the Department of Multiculturalism.¹²

The party maintains that this position does not mask some hidden racist agenda, but merely advocates a "new division of labour" for multiculturalism:

If Canadians wish to preserve and develop a Canadian mosaic, Reformers advocate a new division of responsibility for doing so. It should be the responsibility of individuals, private organizations, and if necessary, local levels of government to provide and polish the pieces of the mosaic. The federal government should be responsible for providing the common background and glue which keeps the mosaic together by upholding personal freedoms and enhancing common values.¹³

To summarize the essence of the party's position, Reformers believe government-sponsored multiculturalism perpetuates ghettoization and ethnic segregation, creates "hyphenated Canadians," and sets immigrants apart from other Canadians. Their prescription involves getting Ottawa out of the business of preserving ethnic groups and cultures. Individuals or groups should be left to pursue their cultural heritage as they choose. From a policy that seemed antagonistic to other cultures, Reform's reworked position on multiculturalism emerges transformed into a statement of apparent tolerance (Dobbin, 1991).

But like its discourse on immigration, the party's position on multiculturalism reveals certain assumptions and perceptions the party serves to perpetuate. Reform believes that the purpose of multicultural policy has been nothing more than the subsidization of ethnicity in a bid to curry favour with the voting ethnic minority population. Officials in the party have often referred to multiculturalism as a "pet project of the political priesthood" (Harper, 1991). Is this an accurate representation of federal multicultural policy? In fact it is not. Stasiulis (1988) notes that since 1971, the major

role of the policy has been to redress the absence of symbolic representation of non-dominant ethnic and racial groups within Canadian institutions. Writing in 1988, *before* multiculturalism had achieved status as its own department, she further notes:

... even a cursory examination of the stated priorities of the current policy, such as race relations and the problems faced by immigrant women, its new advocacy role with respect to business, labour, the police and other government agencies, and its enhanced legislative and administrative visibility are evidence that the policy has indeed advanced from its popular image of "ethnics dancing in church basements."

(Stasiulis, 1988: 83)

Such objectives were further reinforced with the passage of the *Multiculturalism Act* which came into effect July 21, 1988. The mandate of this new policy acknowledges multiculturalism as a fundamental characteristic of Canadian society. It seeks to enhance cultural and language preservation, to reduce discrimination, to foster intercultural awareness and understanding, and to promote culturally sensitive institutional change at federal levels. Fleras and Elliot (1992: 75-76) summarize the goals of the new multicultural policy:

In seeking a balance between cultural distinctiveness and equality, the act specified the right of all to identify with the cultural heritage of choice, yet retain "full and equal participation ... in all aspects of Canadian society." In effect, the act sought to preserve, enhance, and incorporate cultural differences into the functioning of Canadian society, while ensuring equal access and full participation for all Canadians in the social, political, and economic spheres. It also focused on the eradication of racism and removal of discriminatory barriers as incompatible with Canada's commitment to human rights. Policy goals, in brief, focused equally on cultural maintenance and social integration within a framework of equal opportunity.¹⁴

In 1991 then Minister of Multiculturalism and Citizenship, Gerry Weiner,

attacked Reform's position for its failure to recognize the policy's emphasis on ethnic/racial equality and pluralism:

If multiculturalism is a philosophy, then it is the philosophy that the future of Canada will be created from the full participation of all its citizens, no matter their colour, their religious beliefs, their origins. As long as racial discrimination and racism exist in our society, however, such participation is not possible and the federal government, for its part, is not going to apologize to Mr. Manning or anyone else for its initiatives and efforts to eliminate these evils from society.

Mr. Manning and his supporters should consider very carefully what it is they are preaching and advocating. The fact of the matter is that ghettoization and division do not occur in a society because people are different. They occur because the society in question makes such differences a reason to stay apart.¹⁵

It was only after criticism such as this, that the party began to acknowledge the role of anti-racist strategies in the department's mandate. Party documents reflected this change in discourse: "Citizenship programs would be returned to the Department of the Secretary of State, where they belong both logically and historically. Other worthwhile programs, such as those designed to combat racial prejudice, could be transferred to agencies such as the Canadian Human Rights Commission."¹⁶

A further questionable assumption that is revealed in Reform's discourse is the party's assertion that immigrants come to Canada in order to escape their culture. Indeed, this is the basis for much of their criticism of multicultural policy. One official suggests politicians wrongly tell immigrants, "here is money to preserve and promote the cultures which you or your ancestors wished to escape from" (Morrison, 1990b). A party nominee in a Vancouver riding, who herself immigrated to Canada, writes, "All immigrants know that the dominant culture in Canada is English, white and Christian. In Quebec it is French, white and Christian. If they do not intend to integrate into this

culture and become productive members of it, why bother coming?" She further stated. "If your people truly want to preserve aspects of your culture, then we are sure you can raise enough funds to do so. If you have difficulty raising those funds, maybe your people do not treasure your culture as much as you think."¹⁷

In many of his addresses Manning himself suggests that in a "new Canada," the federal government will be required to say something different to new Canadians: "And that is to say, frankly, 'look, we made a mistake in the past when our politicians and our bureaucrats met you at the plane or met you at the boat and offered you a grant to preserve the culture you were trying to get away from'" (Manning, 1990b: 6). The author of the party's policy on multiculturalism states:

People, regardless of their origin, do not emigrate to preserve their culture and nurture their ethnic distinctiveness. If they wished to do that, they would stay where they were because the environment is more conducive to the perpetuation of one's culture and ethnicity. Immigrants come here to become Canadians; to be productive and contributing members of their chosen society.

(Rais Khan, quoted in Manning, 1992a: 316-17)

While this may accurately reflect immigrants' expectations of participating fully in Canadian life, is it correct to assume immigrants, and especially refugees, come into this country to escape their culture? The opposite is just as likely to be true. Many of Canada's immigrants, be they Ukrainians at the turn of the century, Hungarians in the 1950s, or the Chinese after Tiananmen Square did not come to Canada to flee their culture, but to flee those geo-political aspects (including economic conditions, low mobility, poverty, natural disasters, political oppression, etc.) of their society they found both repressive and oppressive. Yet the Reform Party seems unwilling to recognize this

reality.¹⁸

MULTICULTURALISM AND THE NEW RIGHT

It should be readily apparent from the above analysis that the party has a very narrow understanding of multiculturalism as a *concept*. The party focuses solely on the operation of the department and its programs, while saying little about multiculturalism as the philosophical ideal of cultural pluralism. There continues to be an ongoing debate revolving around multiculturalism, as minorities - including ethnic and racial minorities - demand greater access to political, institutional, and economic power. While the party does not officially address itself to this larger debate, there is a subtext within party discourse that does reflect its position on a variety of equality issues.¹⁹ This can be uncovered by an examination of the party's criticisms of the state, and its position on employment equity, and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In the following discussion, I will argue that Reform's stance on these issues reflects its new right ideology. In turn, this ideological position has serious implications for race and ethnic relations in our society, as it articulates a particular vision of racial/ethnic equality, which in and of itself, entails a tacit acceptance of racial/ethnic *inequality*.

Such an analysis is informed by the work of Michael Omi and his colleague Howard Winant. Omi uncovers how racial meanings have been articulated throughout the last century in the United States. Prior to the civil rights movement in the 1960s, racism was viewed as the irrational prejudices of individuals, and dominant political institutions were regarded as "colour blind." Academic analyses subscribed to an

"assimilationist bias" which assumed a gradual and harmonious integration of various racial and ethnic groups. Such was the position of the ethnic studies approach as discussed in Chapter 1. Outlaw (1990: 60) summarizes the ethnicity paradigm as follows:

According to the logic of "ethnicity" as the paradigm for conceptualizing group differences and fashioning social policy to deal with them, the socially divisive effects of "ethnic" differences were to disappear in the social-cultural "melting pot" through assimilation, or, according to the pluralists, ethnic identity would be maintained across time but would be mediated by principles of the body politic: all *individuals*, "without regard to race, creed, color, or national origin," were to win their places in society on the basis of demonstrated achievement (ie. merit). For both assimilationists and pluralists, *group* characteristics (ethnicity) were to have no play in the determination of merit; their legitimacy was restricted to the private sphere of "culture."

This model was challenged by the black civil rights movement which redefined notions of race and racial equality. As Omi (1987: 18) writes, "people constructed a collective identity based on their common oppression. This identity found political expression in the demands to abolish forms of discrimination and recognize group, as opposed to individual rights." The civil rights movement, therefore, *rearticulated* ideas of equality and justice and made new demands on the state to recognize group rights (Omi, 1987). In this sense, race was used as the primary vehicle for conceptualizing and organizing around group differences with the demand that social justice be applied to *groups*, and that "justice" was measured by *results*, not just by opportunities (Outlaw, 1990).

The civil rights movement of the 1960s, however, gave way to a resurgence of the right in the 1970s. As discussed in Chapter 1, Omi (1987) suggests that the new

right is best understood as a reaction against minority gains, and an attempt to *rearticulate* the understandings of racial and ethnic equality forged by the civil rights movement. A more thorough reading of Reform's discourse on multiculturalism reveals a similar project.

To understand the Reform Party's position on racial and ethnic equality we must begin with its view of the modern state. It was noted in Chapter 3 that the new right is highly critical of the interventionist state. Such criticisms are readily evident in Reform discourse. As one official suggests, "The Reform Party takes its inspiration from American right-wing populism: get government out of the way and everything will be fine."²⁰ One of the principles of Reform's deficit-cutting strategy is:

Smaller federal government. Reduce the number of functions performed by the federal government. Reduce duplication and administrative red tape, to achieve greater efficiency and improved morale within the federal public civil service. *Eliminate unnecessary government intrusions into the daily lives of individuals and business. A function performed by the public or private-sector should be based on who can do the best job most cost-effectively* [emphasis added].²¹

According to the party's position paper on multiculturalism, eliminating multicultural funding and dismantling the department are part of Reform's larger concern with fiscal responsibility: "At a time when the federal debt is over \$400 billion and growing by more than \$30 billion a year, it is necessary to make some difficult decisions. In order to balance the budget, the Reform Party proposes a broad program of expenditure reductions, of which cuts to multiculturalism are only one aspect." However, the document further states, "even if the federal budget were in balance, we would not want to use public money to subsidize multiculturalism" (Flanagan and

Pantazopoulos, 1992).

Reform's criticism of multiculturalism, then, is based on a desire to reduce the role of government in the lives of Canadians. Rais Khan told Reform delegates at their annual convention, "the best system is one of minimalist state intervention in the protection of language, culture and heritage."²² Stephen Harper explains the party's view as follows:

Let me give you a difference in philosophy. On the one hand, the current federal government would say, we will have a Department of Multiculturalism to produce and promote group identity and to run tolerance or anti-racism programs. The Reform Party's approach would be to say get the government out of the business of culture - get politicians and bureaucrats out of the business of racial identity.²³

Manning (1992a: 317) himself suggests:

... cultural development and preservation ought to be the responsibility of individuals, groups, and if necessary in certain cases (for example, in the case of Quebec and Canadian aboriginals), of provincial and local governments. The role of the federal government should be neutral toward culture just as it is toward religion.

It is clear that the party's appeal to remove government from matters of language, culture, ethnicity, is based on more than its desire to reduce spending. It implies a certain ideological stance where these are matters of *individual* concern only, and should not be promoted in any fashion by the state. Tom Flanagan notes, "there is fairly wide [party] support for a 'melting pot' concept, in which ethnicity is a purely private concern, and the public sphere is simply Canadian period. What your ethnic background is [should] not have any political consequences."²⁴

What this ignores is the reality that in many instances one's racial/ethnic

background *does* have political consequences as a result of the structural barriers imposed by institutional and systemic racism. By discounting this reality the party, in effect, is saying that it is inappropriate to seek public, political solutions to issues and problems that are essentially private in nature. As Laycock (1993) notes, this redefinition of the public sphere:

... theoretically and practically privatises social problems that had been widely recognized as public in character until the beginning of a sequence of economic crises in the mid-1970s. It was their public character that required and legitimized redistributive and regulatory programs that characterize the welfare state.

Laycock concludes that unlike previous democratic populist movements which attempted to politicize or open up various aspects of social relations and institutional practices, the project of the Reform Party would lead to a shrinkage of the political domain.

Indeed, the party's understanding of democratic reform is viewed in rather narrow terms. According to Reformers, the existing political system is inadequate in a number of ways. Their strategies for addressing such inadequacies however, focus only on "loosening up the system of party discipline," and "bringing in direct democratic mechanisms" in order to achieve "some kind of on-going consultation and accountability." Reform certainly would not "ascribe to views that [democracy and freedom] require certain underlying social and economic arrangements." As one official stated, "distributive issues are not what this is about."²⁵

The party's prescriptions for democratic change clearly reflects the new right attempt to discredit demands for a redistributive or egalitarian social policy (Winant, 1990). As was discussed in Chapter 3, this lays at the root of the new right's attack on

the welfare state for one of the goals of the new right is to make people less dependent on public welfare provision and more self-reliant or dependent upon familial support and the vagaries of the free market (King, 1987).

This ideological stance, shared by the Reform Party, makes certain assumptions about equality in society, and more importantly, whether it is proper for the state to address itself to issues of equality. Harper provides a glimpse of the party's views:

The two [views of equality] that I think are most prevalent in our society are on the one hand, that government should pursue some kind of pattern of behaviour towards people that makes them more equal, or that government is prepared to provide different sets of rules and standards for people, for provinces, for groups, that would "enhance their equality." There's another view that people should be treated identically or equally regardless of the differences otherwise that they possess. More than any mainstream political party in Canada, the Reform Party subscribes to the second view.²⁶

That the party views state actions geared to address inequality as inappropriate can be seen from the following party document:

It is a fundamental Canadian belief that all persons should have the right to equality of opportunity, and the right not to be discriminated against in the workplace or society at large. The Reform Party believes that women and men, disabled persons, and persons of all ethnic origins, contribute to the enhancement and productivity of Canadian society. *Reformers also believe that government intrusions into a society of free individuals which attempt to impose a result rather than enhance equality of opportunity are undesirable* [emphasis added].²⁷

The Reform Party, therefore, reflects the new right objection to attempts made by the state to create conditions of equality and ameliorate social problems. While Stephen Harper did concede some role for the state in the promotion of tolerance and the elimination of racism, he further stipulated that the party's understanding of this role is fundamentally different than that which is conventionally understood. "The party sees

the fundamental role of government ... as first and foremost to treat people identically. And it sees systematic and repeated violations of that philosophy as a central cause of intolerance in society and not as a solution. The party believes in this fairly categorically."²⁸ Like new right advocates, then, the party suggests that state attempts to create conditions of equality, such as affirmative action, have been disastrous. Not only have they failed in aiding "target populations," but they have called into question such inviolable principles as fairness and individual rights (Omi, 1987).

An examination of Reform's discourse on employment equity echoes this ideological stance. A party document claims that, "equal employment opportunities for women, ethnic minorities and the disabled are best promoted by improving education, emphasizing individual achievement, and dismantling unfair systemic barriers to advancement." Although the party suggests an "ongoing review of employment practices to ensure they do not impose unfair barriers to women, the handicapped, ethnic minorities, etc.," it never states how institutions could be persuaded to stop engaging in discriminatory practices.²⁹

What emerges, then, is a "motherhood" statement that allows the party to leave the impression that employment equity is an important issue, while avoiding the potential controversy of stating a philosophical opposition to that very ideal. Yet the party *is* philosophically opposed to employment equity. Stephen Harper acknowledged that the party has no official position on issues like affirmative action, or pay equity. However:

... [Reform] would be absolutely opposed to affirmative action. The party does not believe in using the government as a tool of discrimination to achieve certain social objectives. It doesn't believe that that's an appropriate role for the government and it certainly doesn't believe in that kind of approach to people.

Pay equity is similar. The party believes in the concept that there should be equal pay for work of equal value and certainly for the same job. But the party would not believe that governments should decide which jobs are equal and which jobs aren't equal, contrary to any kind of consideration of the market.³⁰

Regarding the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, once more Reform has no clear statement which reflects its position, and party officials admit they have no consistent philosophy on the Charter.³¹ However, in an interview Stephen Harper speculated that:

... the party would acknowledge the need for a Charter but our views on what should be in [such a document] would be much narrower than is in the existing Charter. *Certainly the party would not support some of the language, multicultural, or affirmative action provisions as a legitimate right to be protected by the court system.* The party on the other hand would support the narrower more traditional rights - freedom of speech, association, right of being innocent until proven guilty, and so on [emphasis added].³²

For his part, Manning has stated that he would gladly engage in a wholesale "overhaul" of the Charter, were it not for the fact that Canadians are weary of constitutional debates. Instead he suggested Reform would make it a requirement that prospective appointees to the Supreme Court would be "grilled" by parliamentarians to "flush out any secret agendas they may have."³³ This reveals the assumptions the party makes about the operation of the Charter and how it has served to create a "tyranny of minorities." Manning (1992a: 320) writes:

In the twentieth century, fear of majority rule has become a liberal issue, and constitutional instruments like the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in Canada have been advocated as a way to protect minorities from oppressive majorities. These minorities are usually defined on the basis of race, language, culture, belief or gender. Political, economic, and cultural minorities have organized "special interest groups" to represent them and help them participate in the political process. Although Canadians need constitutional, institutional, and political safeguards against the tyranny of the majority, Reformers believe that safeguards are also needed to protect Canadians against "the tyranny of minorities." As

special interest groups are given more status, privileges and public funding, they use their bargaining power to exact concessions from governments that are both economically inefficient and politically undemocratic. ... Linguistic and cultural minorities have been able to secure federal language and cultural policies which, according to opinion polls, do not carry the endorsement of a majority of people in the country.³⁴

It is somewhat ironic, then, that the party sees itself as representing *all* Canadians, including non-anglo-/non francophone minority interests. Reform assumes this position because of its opposition to the "charter group" model of confederation based on the partnership of the French and the English. Manning suggests that this model, in effect, relegates twelve million Canadians who belong to neither group, to the status of "second-class citizens." As he writes:

To those of you who are of neither French nor English extraction, I especially say, "You are not only welcome in the Reform Party, your presence and support is essential to 'tip the balance' in Canada to a new constitutional and political order.

The leaders and spokespersons of the traditional federal parties will tell you the Reform Party is racist, that it stands for an all-white or English-only Canada and that it is anti-immigrant and anti-immigration. All of these statements are lies.

What those parties want to keep you from discovering is that *the Reform Party of Canada is the only federal party that stands for abandoning the definition of Canada as an "equal partnership between the French and English" - a definition that relegates you to the status of second-class citizens - and moving to a definition of Canada as a federation of equals, regardless of race, language and culture [emphasis in original].*

(Manning, 1992a: 354)

The party often warns of the dangers of defining the relationship between the citizenry and the state on the basis of race, language, and culture. To do so, "leads to a house divided against itself and divided along the most dangerous of lines."³⁵ Indeed,

Manning (1993a) insists that:

Canada must be a country where race is not a factor in determining the relationship between the citizen and the state or any of its institutions. Race should not determine any citizen's constitutional status. It should not determine any individual's immigration status. It should not determine any individual's cultural status. It should not determine any individual's employment status. It should not determine the relationship between an individual and the police. And race should not determine any individual's political status.

In this way, the party can justify its whole argument against multiculturalism. A party pamphlet states, "If elected a Reform government will abolish the Department of Multiculturalism, and focus the activities of the federal government on enhancing the citizenship of all Canadians regardless of race, language, or culture."³⁶

In the party's 'new Canada', then, "the politics of privilege and special status give way to the equality of all Canadians in federal law regardless of their race, culture, language, income, place of residence, or gender" (Manning, 1993e). The egalitarian nature of its vision, is a theme often addressed by the party. Manning writes about the discussions Reform has undertaken with "ordinary Canadians" about the kind of country in which they wish to live. He notes:

The one descriptive word we hear mentioned most often in these types of discussions is "equality" - treat all Canadians equally in federal law and the constitution, regardless of their race, language, or culture, rather than treating some Canadians specially because of their race, language, or culture.³⁷

In fact, the party insists its policies on immigration, multiculturalism, and the constitution are in no way racist but are actually *race neutral*. As Manning has stated, the party's positions, "are specifically aimed at removing racial considerations and criteria from these policy areas."³⁸ He further suggest that, "it will be necessary for

Canadians, who are sometimes very smug on the subject of racism, to admit there is latent racism" in Canada's immigration, constitutional, and cultural policies and that these "must be reformed to make them more racially neutral."³⁹ Because of Reform's willingness to discuss the inadequacies of these policies, Manning asserts. "we argue from a more racially-neutral, anti-racist position - at least on the constitution, immigration and culture - than any other federal party."⁴⁰

The party can therefore promote the idea that its policies are "colour-blind."

Responding to attacks of racism, Manning has stated:

The way to combat negative labelling is not to go about saying "No we are not racist, no we are not racist," but to constantly promote and affirm federal laws, positions, and policies that are neutral and colour-blind with respect to constitution or immigration or multiculturalism. And this will give the Canadian people a choice between the traditional parties that promote special status for some Canadians based on race, language, and culture, and the Reform position that federal law and the constitution should treat all Canadians equally regardless of race, language, and culture.

(quoted in Sharpe and Braid, 1992: 128)

He further suggests:

In our judgement, this colour-blind approach, abandoning ethnic criteria in defining relations between citizens and the state, is the only formula that will allow different racial groups to live together in peace in a pluralistic society.

(Manning, 1992a: 295)

However, Reform's call for "colour blindness," its opposition to affirmative action, and its claim that all that is required is equal *individual* access to opportunity does not in fact support an ideal of democratic pluralism. Rather, it serves to perpetuate present unequal status structures (Yinger, 1986). But the party appears to escape such

charges through its appeal to "equality." This represents the most sophisticated attempt at *rearticulation*. For in its promotion an "egalitarian" society, racial and ethnic considerations no longer need be the concern of state policy. As discussed in Chapter 1, this is the strategy of the new right. While past racial injustices are acknowledged, contemporary society is characterized by egalitarianism. Recent history is seen as a period of enlightened progress where minorities have been, and continue to be, incorporated into social, political, and economic life. Racial and/or ethnic considerations in the selection of leaders, hiring decisions, and the distribution of goods and services in general, therefore, need never be entertained. When such considerations are made, the new right argues "special status" is bestowed to specific groups. The result is a new form of racial injustice (Omi and Winant, 1986).

Reform's opposition to employment equity takes on new meaning in this light. The new right asserts that such programs are discriminatory for they confer *group rights* on racial minority groups granting them a new form of privilege - that of preferential treatment - which culminates in a new form of racism (Omi and Winant, 1986). This view is not only reflected in Reform's stance on employment equity, but is also evident when Preston Manning suggests that the pernicious nature of multicultural policy, "promotes the philosophy that some Canadians are more equal than others."⁴¹ Another party official suggests that current multicultural policy, in effect, *promotes* racism. He stated the policy, "divides people into ethnic blocs, and it's pretty easy to see what happens when you divide a country up into ethnic or religious blocs of people. We've seen it all over the world. ... You're inviting racism and prejudice in one sense, even

though they're trying to fight it."⁴²

One of the accomplishments of the new right has been its ability to rearticulate the meaning of racial and ethnic equality as a matter of individual rather than group concern (Omi and Winant, 1986). This too is the goal of the Reform Party. A Reform position paper on multiculturalism reads, "the elimination of official multiculturalism will save a significant, if not enormous, amount of taxpayers' money. Even more importantly, it will send a clear message that the Canadian polity is based on the rights of individual human beings, not on ethnic allegiances of group loyalties" (Flanagan and Pantazopoulos, 1992). Of central importance to the party is the absolute equality of all Canadians without reference to language, culture, race, religion, or any other group characteristic. In Reform's world view, individual rights must be paramount. There is no room for group or collective rights, as any form of group recognition ("special status") will infringe on the rights of individuals (Sharpe and Braid, 1992).

This view is informed by a firm belief in the equalizing effects of a free market economy advocated by such neoclassical economic theorists as Milton Friedmann. The "market relations" approach posits that the market itself, unhampered by an interventionist state will eliminate racial discrimination. However, it is not clear how the market would accomplish this given that the non-interventionist nineteenth century state did not facilitate this.⁴³ Yet the new right stands steadfast in its belief that racial and ethnic inequality and discrimination occur only at an individual level. As there is no acknowledgement of the iniquitous conditions imposed by racial/ethnic disadvantage presented in global inequities, colonialism, imperialism, slavery, indenture, etc., the only

role for the state is to remove legal systems of discrimination and to treat all people equally (Omi and Winant, 1986).

This is why Reform can treat ethnicity as "purely a private concern." Of course in theory this sounds more than fair. Ideally, one's ethnicity or race should not have any political consequences. This is what anti-racism is ostensibly about. Yet when the new right *rearticulates* themes of equality in terms of civil privatism - ie., equality is strictly a matter of individual actions of striving, merit, and deserved achievement - it disregards the realities of racism and discrimination (Winant, 1990). Equality without impediments could be achieved through the hard work of enterprising individuals. However, what this assessment ignores is that in the real world there *are* impediments such as systemic and institutional racism. Treating race and ethnicity as a private concern, therefore, denies that the state should have any role in prohibiting individuals or groups from acting out their discriminatory tendencies in such a way as to deny equal opportunity. Where discrimination is *not* punished by the state equality cannot come as a result of individual merit and deserved achievement.

Such acknowledgement is clearly absent in Reform's discourse. The Reform Party vision of Canada is one where citizens shed their hyphenated identities (which are fostered by a divisive multicultural policy) and everyone has equal opportunity. This opportunity is assured by the operation of a free market, and the removal of any legal barriers by the state. However, there will be no state guarantee of equality of outcomes (Sharpe and Braid, 1992). Manning states this himself:

Reformers support "equality of opportunity," not "equality of results." We believe that an open, free-market economy, combined with a genuinely

democratic political system, offers the best possible chances for individuals to pursue their goals in life. It is true that not everyone starts from the same position, but these inequalities are not necessarily cumulative and inherited. A market economy, open society, and democratic polity are great engines for the destruction of privilege.

(Manning, 1992a: 314)

He further states his belief that no amount of affirmative action or special status will accomplish much, "unless members of that disadvantaged minority are affirming themselves by their own efforts to achieve a better life." The role of the government is to ensure that "the economy and society are truly open and competitive, and that the means of self-improvement are available to all." He offers Reform's prescription for dealing with inequality: "diagnose the problem and devise specific measures to enable people to take greater control of their lives. Do not ghettoize society by putting people into legal categories of gender, race, ethnicity, language, or other characteristic" (Manning, 1992a: 315). In this sense, Reformers believe that at best, individuals should only expect that they be free to compete. They should not assume that equality should be a part of the competition (Eisenstein, 1987).

CONCLUSION

As Omi and Winant (1986) suggest, the idea of a "colour-blind" society where no special significance, rights or privileges are attached to one's "race" or "ethnicity" is very attractive when taken at face value. The colour-blind concept reaffirms values of "fair play" and "equal opportunity" - ideals that some would argue constitute the very essence of our democratic way of life. But an exclusive focus on individual equality of

opportunity prevents a thorough analysis of the root causes of racial and ethnic oppression, and how it is perpetuated in Canada today.

In this sense, Reform's discourse on multiculturalism trivializes the problems of racial and ethnic inequality, and inequality in general. However, "discrimination never derived its main strength from individual actions or prejudices, however great these might have been or still might be. Its most fundamental characteristic was always its roots in the racially organized *social* order" (Omi and Winant, 1986: 129). Reform's analysis thus renders opaque the forms of institutional and structural inequalities that continue to characterize our society. This presents the strongest indictment against the Reform Party, for in promoting the equality of all *individuals* regardless of "race, language and culture," it obscures racial and ethnic differences that still are the basis of discrimination. The focus on the individual and market mechanisms disregards the institutional nature and power relations of the market, as well as historical contingencies such as slavery, or second-class citizenship (West, 1987).

Despite its protestations otherwise, we must therefore view the Reform Party's position on multiculturalism as an attempt to maintain the political and cultural arrangements that systematically place racial and ethnic minorities at a disadvantage, both social-structurally and culturally (Winant, 1990). Furthermore, the role the party plays in the growing attack on multiculturalism cannot be overestimated. As Abu-Laban and Stasiulis (1992: 372) note:

... at best, what is left is a discourse emphasizing individual as opposed to group rights through the subsumption of the pluralist notion of multiculturalism under the individualist notion of citizenship. At worst, the doors have been opened for greater partisan representation and articulation of racist sentiment.

CHAPTER 6

"EQUALITY" VERSUS "SPECIAL STATUS": REFORM'S PRESCRIPTION FOR SOCIAL HARMONY

The focus of the next two chapters is the Reform Party's discourse on official languages policy, the Constitution, Aboriginal issues (Chapter 6), and the family and women's issues (Chapter 7). This may strike readers as a rather odd combination of policy areas to discuss simultaneously. However, my analysis reveals a common thread which runs throughout the party's statements on each of these topics. Together these chapters demonstrate Reform's objection to group identity ("special status") as it relates to linguistic minorities, Quebec, Aboriginal communities, and women's groups. The party rejects the claims these groups make on the state to recognize their unique historic character, and instead promotes the vision of an "egalitarian" or "colour-blind" society based on its own "equality model" where all individuals are equal regardless of any defining group characteristic. Just like its position on multiculturalism, I argue that Reform's discourse on special status further reflects the new right attempt to rearticulate racial and ethnic equality as a matter of *individual* concern only.

In Chapter 7, I conclude that the party's critique of special status leads logically to its repudiation of "special interest groups." All the collectivities discussed in these two chapters - advocates of bilingualism, Quebec independence, Aboriginal rights, and feminists - are defined by Reform as special interests. The party attacks these interests in its defense of the more common interests of "ordinary Canadians."

What I can not account for in this analysis is the varied histories of oppression

experienced by each of these groups. The claims made on the state by linguistic minorities, Quebec, Aboriginal peoples, and women's groups are varied and complex, and exhibit their own historical specificities which include particular definitions of group or collective identity, oppression and empowerment. What my analysis does establish is how the Reform Party has painted the collectivities corresponding to these distinct histories with the same new right brush as "special interests" thereby de-legitimizing their claims.

LANGUAGE RIGHTS, QUEBEC, AND THE CONSTITUTION: "A HOUSE DIVIDED AGAINST ITSELF"

Unlike their belated response to multiculturalism, the Reform Party demonstrated an early preoccupation with language issues. The very first edition of the party paper, *The Reformer*, included an attack on Bill C-72, the Conservative government's proposed amendments to the Official Languages Act.¹ The article suggested, "The projected economic and financial impacts of the bill are large and negative, and the bill makes linguistic criteria the primary qualification for federal employment." The party also stated, "We want to make clear that our criticism of this bill is *not* motivated in any way by ill-will or prejudice toward any linguistic group but by a sincere belief that the proposed administration of official language policy is unfair, discriminatory, and unacceptable to a majority of Canadians."² Another indication of Reform's early concern over language policy is a 1989 pamphlet which states the party's objective to engage in a media and public information campaign on such issues as "rethinking" official language policy.³

It is therefore evident that language policy was clearly a part of Reform's original project. The party's first policy manual states:

The conception of Canada as "a meeting of two founding races, cultures, and languages" was born in the political disunity of Central Canada prior to Confederation. Despite the inappropriateness of that as a description of the reality of Western Canada, [Liberal prime minister Pierre] Trudeau made it the foundation of his vision of the entire country. Westerners never shared, but at least respected his dedication to that vision.

Under the Mulroney Government, however, the power priorities of Official Languages policy have become blatant. Quebec will be encouraged to develop a unilingual French society (Bill 101). The status of French will be enhanced in English Canada (Bill C72). The architects and supporters of Quebec Nationalism will become the most powerful members of the Federal Cabinet, administering the policy and publicly stating their priorities (Lucien Bouchard, Marcel Masse). The Prime Minister's own position will depend on which language he is speaking in at the time. This is a policy that will collapse under the weight of its own hypocrisy.⁴

Party officials are quick to point out that recent polls substantiate Reform's opposition to language policy. In an interview the party's former Manager of Policy, Dimitri Pantazopoulos, cited the findings of a 1992 Gallup poll which showed two-thirds of Canadians, including 61 % of Quebecers, opposed the idea of official languages as a stated policy.⁵ In addition, the findings of the Spicer Commission seem to confirm a growing discontent with both official languages policy, as well as multiculturalism. With public opinion on its side, the party therefore confidently expresses its disapproval. The nature of the party's objections to language policy will be discussed in the following section.

Reform's Critique of Official Languages Policy

A 1991 party policy statement assesses current federal languages policy in the following manner:

According to this policy, Canada is (or should be) a bilingual nation from sea to sea. Implementation is aimed at the promotion of bilingualism in all aspects of public life and, where possible, in the private sector through comprehensive language legislation. But the policy turns a blind eye to contrary developments in Quebec, where the provincial government has responded by promoting French unilingualism, including the prohibition of basic civil liberties (Bill 178).⁶

Indeed, Reformers are quick to point out what they view as the blatant hypocrisies of the policy. Stephen Harper states:

[Federal] governments have turned a complete blind eye to a policy of regulated and encouraged unilingualism in the province of Quebec, while promoting a policy of official bilingualism in the rest of the country. ... Yes, there are bilingual services, but the promotion of [official bilingualism] is nonexistent in the province of Quebec, it's precisely the opposite. ... There's a clear double standard. The federal government recognizes in the case of Quebec that official bilingualism is merely theoretical and on a certain level unworkable. In the rest of the country, with really very little success, it in fact pursues the theoretical ideal [of bilingualism].⁷

Like the party's critique of multiculturalism, a recurring theme in its discourse on official languages policy focuses on, in the minds of Reformers, the divisiveness it creates. Reform Party MP Deborah Grey laments, "What does it focus on - what keeps us together or what keeps us apart? It has not unified the country, and it has not made Quebec happy."⁸ Reformers, then, view the Official Languages Act as a failed attempt to appease Quebec nationalists. The following passage provides a succinct summary of the party's position:

Not only has official bilingualism produced anger and frustration in English

Canada - especially in the West, where it has had little relationship to social reality - but it has proved unable to stem the tide of territorially-based nationalism and the introduction of government-sponsored unilingualism in Quebec. Separatists have not been impressed by "French on the cornflakes boxes" across the country. The only beneficiaries have been those, whether of French, English, or other extraction, who have parlayed their bilingual skills into higher-profile jobs.⁹

In essence, the party rejects official languages policy based on a difference in philosophy about the nature of the country. In an interview Stephen Harper states. "Canada is not a bilingual country. Canada is a country of two languages. There is a big difference." That is:

Current official languages policy is grounded in the belief about and conception of Canada as a partnership with two founding peoples, and that the country is this English-French duality in its basic conception. We obviously do not agree with that, and we claim that the consequences of that conception is that the policy has excesses. That the policy in fact, does attempt to promote bilingualism and the use of both languages even where the social and economic need for that is nonexistent; that the policy is very expensive; and that it does attempt, at the federal level, to provide bilingual people with excessive career advantages.¹⁰

Reformers, then, assert that the philosophy guiding official languages policy does not reflect the reality of Canada. Harper states:

Most of Canada is unilingual English. A large part of it is unilingual French. Very small parts of it are, in fact, a bilingual place. Official languages policy doesn't accept that as a description of the country. It believes that we are basically a bilingual country where in some part, it is more English and other parts more French, but it is fundamentally bilingual.¹¹

A party policy paper summarizes Reform's position on official languages: "Reform Party policy is not based on a language ideology. It is based on freedom of speech, the regional realities of the country, and a commitment to public service in

government."¹² The next section will discuss the party's position in more detail.

Reform's Alternative: "Territorial Bilingualism"

The party's position on official languages has been attacked as being hostile to Quebec and francophones across Canada. However, party officials are quick to reject this assessment. In an interview Stephen Harper (who is also bilingual), stated:

If one looks at the Reform Party's language policy it is absolutely impossible to assert that it is anti-French. ... I [have] had no problems defending our language policies or our related constitutional policies in Quebec or in the French media at all. ... Very few of the people who say [the policy is anti-French] are Quebecers, very few of them are French-Canadians. Most of them are bilingual anglophones in the Ottawa area. The resistance to our policy for obvious reasons comes from the spokesmen [*sic*] of the linguistic minority communities. It does not come from francophone Quebecers and it does not come from the vast majority of Canadians outside Quebec. In fact, I will put it to you that if you put our policy on a referendum against official languages policy, we would carry the day easily in every party of the country, [with the] possible exception of New Brunswick.¹³

Likewise Manning, himself has stated, "no fair-minded person who took the time to find out what our position was could characterize it as anti-French or anti-Quebec" (1992a: 190).¹⁴

The party's current official languages policy reads as follows:

- A. The Reform Party supports a language policy based on freedom of speech. We reject comprehensive language legislation, whether in the nature of enforced bilingualism or unilingualism, regardless of the level of government.¹⁵
- B. The Reform Party opposes the conception of Canada as "a meeting of two founding races, cultures, and languages" as an inappropriate description of the reality of the regions outside Central Canada, as unfair to the vast majority of unilingual Canadians, and as completely inconsistent in its own application.
- C. The Reform Party supports "asking the people," through a referendum, to create a language policy that reflects both the aspirations of Canadians and the demographic reality of the country.

- D. The Reform Party supports a recognition of French in Quebec and English elsewhere as the predominant language of work and society.
- E. The Reform Party supports official bilingualism in key federal institutions, such as Parliament and the Supreme Court, and critical federal services where need is sufficient to warrant provision of minority services on a cost-effective basis.
- F. The Reform Party supports protection of minority education rights, possibly by interprovincial agreement.
- G. The Reform Party in no way discourages personal bilingualism.
- H. The Reform Party supports removal of bilingual bonuses to civil servants as a federal cost-reduction measure.¹⁶

The underlying premise that drives this policy is what Reform refers to as "territorial bilingualism." Territorial bilingualism is based on the perception that language is a territorial phenomenon where one language generally dominates within one particular area. As such, a state like Canada may contain areas where different languages dominate.¹⁷ According to Reform, territorial bilingualism is the only workable language policy to adopt:

The only way to resolve language conflict is to territorialize it and recognize that. That is very different than the personality concept that pervades current official language thinking, which does not deny that there are English and French majorities, but ultimately tries to say that we can create a country where someone can in all aspects of their life, live comfortably in either language anywhere. Well, in our view, the country is not like that and it would take a great deal of social engineering and ultimately, in fact, it would be impossible to create such a country. We claim that our policy is fundamentally based on the way the country is ... whereas [official languages] policy is strictly an ideological policy that is trying to recreate society in an image that is completely false¹⁸

In essence, then, the party's position on language policy is motivated by its desire for *minimum* language legislation at a federal level, and an emphasis on "freedom of

speech" as a reaction against the Quebec sign law (Bill 178). These two premises are clearly evident in Reform Party literature:

We are opposed to any government legislation or regulations which restrict the voluntary use of any language by any person. In the same way, we are for minimal not comprehensive language legislation. Official language declarations by Ontario municipalities are as unnecessary as Quebec's restriction of language on signs.¹⁹

In the party's discourse however, it is the Quebec sign law we tend to hear more about rather than Ontario municipalities. In his address to the party's 1989 assembly Manning stated:

The Reform Party of Canada has absolutely no problem with French as the working, operating language of Quebec just as English is the working, operating language of the rest of the country. But we want the same freedom of expression in Quebec as elsewhere, so that if an individual or group or community wishes to communicate in any other language, be it English, French or Swahili, it may do so. And of course, that must apply to signage.²⁰

Reform also rejects any federal role in the legislation of language. As a party policy paper states, "The Reform Party would recommend a constitutional amendment that gives provinces authority over language and culture."²¹ In a Reform brochure Manning writes, "Make the preservation and development of language and cultural distinctiveness a provincial responsibility, as the original fathers of Confederation intended. Let the Quebec government, not the federal government, be the guardian of the French fact in a New Quebec."²²

The party's position on official languages not only reflects its concerns about free speech and minimum language legislation, it also constitutes a clear rejection of the bilingual vision of Canada. The vision of Canada based on two charter groups (the

French and the English) is repeatedly dismissed in Reform's discourse. Manning himself has stated, "We don't accept the model of Canada as an equal partnership between founding races, cultures, languages."²³

In much the same way, the party's position on the Constitution is a renunciation of the "two-founding nations" model of Canadian confederation. In a speech to the party's 1991 national assembly, Manning emphasized the divisive nature of this model which he believes "leads to a constitutional *cul de sac*. It leads to an 'us versus them,' to counter-productive actions and reactions" (Manning, 1991: 28). But embedded in its rejection of the current constitutional model is a discourse that will further reveal the party's understanding of equality. As I have argued previously, the Reform Party attempts to *rearticulate* the very meaning of racial and ethnic equality, and the role the state should play in achieving it.

The next section, therefore, consists of a more rigorous reading of the party's constitutional position, focusing primarily on Reform's promotion of its "equality model." My analysis continues in the following section where I suggest that the party's discourse on "equality" and "special status" represents a new right challenge to the broader understandings of equality that emerged in the 1960s as a result of the efforts of various social movements. In this sense, Reform's rearticulation of equality can be understood as a "backlash" against the rights gained by minorities since that period.

"Reform"-ing the Constitution: "Duality" versus "Equality"

According to Manning, the constitutional development of this country, "has been based on the premise that Canada should be defined and governed as a 'meeting of two

founding races, cultures, and languages, the English and the French'" (Manning, 1990a: 4). This philosophy bred the Official Languages Act, the Constitution Act of 1982, the Conservatives' language bill (C-72) and the ill-fated Meech Lake and Charlottetown constitutional proposals. In his assessment, "surely it is evident that the result has been to create a Canada divided against itself - a house divided along racial and linguistic lines" (Manning, 1990a: 4). At the party's 1989 assembly, Manning criticized past attempts to create constitutional harmony:

[L]eadership demands that we rise to our feet in the federal political arena, and say at least three things on behalf of Western Canadians. First, we do not want to live, nor do we want our children to live, in a house divided against itself, particularly one divided along racial and linguistic lines. Second, we do not want nor do we intend to leave this house ourselves (even though we have spent most of our constitutional lives on the back porch). We will, however, insist that it cease to be divided. Third, either all Canadians, including the people of Quebec, make a clear commitment to Canada as one nation, or Quebec, and the rest of Canada should explore whether there exists a better but more separate relationship between the two. In short, we say that living with a greater constitutional separation between Quebec and the rest of Canada, is preferable to living in a "house divided against itself."²⁴

The metaphor of a "house divided against itself" is an oft repeated phrase in Manning's discourse on the Constitution. As these passages suggest, the party is particularly concerned about divisions "along racial and linguistic lines." According to Reform, the government, "ought not to classify Canadians as anglo-Canadians, franco-Canadians, Aboriginal Canadians, ethnic Canadians. If Canadians want to put hyphens in, that's fine with us, but in terms of constitutional law or federal law, it ought not to distinguish between Canadians on a racial basis."²⁵ The party therefore demands the "fair treatment of all Canadians by their governments, regardless of race, culture, and

language, and which moves away from granting special status to any group of Canadians on the grounds of racial, cultural, or linguistic criteria."²⁶

This is the benchmark of Reform's "new Canada" - get rid of special constitutional status in favour of its "equality model." Reform's prescriptions for constitutional harmony, then, are not premised on "two charter groups," but on a "federation of equal provinces and citizens." As Manning (1992b) states:

By "federation of provinces," people in the rest of Canada are expressing a clear and unmistakable desire to move beyond the definition of Canada as a "federation of founding peoples or racial groups," which makes your race or your language or your culture a factor in determining the relationship between the citizen and the state, towards a federation in which the national government is more "neutral" toward race, language and culture in the same way that the national government is currently neutral toward religion.

Indeed, this "new Canada" would:

... define itself for constitutional purposes as a federation of equal provinces and citizens, in which all citizens are treated equally in federal law and the constitution regardless of race, language, and culture, rather than a country in which some citizens are granted special status because of race, language, and culture.

These are two fundamentally different ways of defining our country constitutionally and of defining the relationship between the citizen and the state. But Reformers will argue that what we propose - the equality model - as more racially neutral and less conducive to racially discriminatory policies than the old "founding races, special status" model supported by all three of the traditional parties.

(Manning, 1993a)

In its discourse, Reform therefore constructs a dichotomy between "special status" and "equality." A party pamphlet reads:

Reformers are Canadians who believe that we should all have equal rights regardless of our race, language, culture, religion, or gender. So let's make sure

our constitution is racially neutral, by treating all Canadians equally rather than by granting special status to people of English or French heritage as "founding races."²⁷

Its opposition to "special status" has been a part of Reform's project from the outset. The party's first policy manual includes a detailed fifteen point critique of the Meech Lake constitutional proposal. One of the reasons the party opposed the accord was Reform's belief that it granted "special status to any group or party within Canada."²⁸ In *The New Canada*, Manning (1992a: 240) poses the following question: "Will we achieve constitutional unity by insisting upon the *equality* of all Canadians and provinces in the constitution and in federal law, or by guaranteeing *special status* to racial, linguistic, cultural, or other groups" [emphasis in the original]. Manning uses the metaphor of "old Canada" versus "new Canada" to further articulate the party's position:

The traditional road is marked by constitutional signposts that say Founding Peoples, Official Bilingualism, Government-sponsored Multiculturalism, and Special Status. Advocates of these measures claim that this is the road to national identity, national unity, and constitutional peace. Reformers disagree, believing that this road leads in a circle back to Old Canada, a nation divided against itself. The Reformers' road, by contrast, is marked by signs that say Federation of Equal provinces, Freedom of Speech, Unhyphenated Canadianism, and Equality for all Canadians.

(Manning, 1992a: 298)

"New Canada," therefore, is:

... a place where the national government is dedicated to the proposition that all Canadians should be treated equally. By this, I mean treated equally in federal law and in the federal Constitution, without regard to race, language, or culture, rather than being treated specially in federal law and the Constitution *because* of race, language and culture.

(Manning, 1990b: 5-6)²⁹

In broad terms, the current Canadian constitution tries to maximize individual rights and freedoms while recognizing the role of group rights (Weinfeld, 1988: 601). The Charter of Rights and Freedoms includes the following section that prohibits discrimination on certain grounds, and explicitly permits programs such as employment equity based on preference for certain groups:

15.1. Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age, or mental or physical disability.

15.2. Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.³⁰

It is the constitutional recognition of such disadvantage that is at the heart of Reform's opposition to current constitutional arrangements. In essence, the party opposes special constitutional status based on *group identity* and instead, promotes a constitutional model based on the equality of all *individuals*. Manning (1993c) has stated that Canadians must choose between two models of constitutional arrangements:

There is the view that says the road to constitutional peace and unity lies in granting recognition in constitutional law to founding races, languages, and cultures, and granting special status to other groups considered to be constitutionally disadvantaged. This is the "founding races/special status" model supported by the three traditional parties. ... Whatever its historic merits, it has not brought constitutional peace in our time. Alternatively, there is the view that says the road to constitutional peace and unity lies in treating all provinces and citizens equally in constitutional and federal law regardless of race, language, culture, religion, or gender. This is the "equality" model and the basis of the Reform Party's constitutional positions. It does not preclude the state providing special help to disadvantaged minorities, but it insists that the entitlement to such help not be tied to the race, language, culture, religion, or gender of recipients.

Yet what if minorities are so disadvantaged because of their membership in identifiable groups such as race, language, culture, gender, and so on? Indeed, they are defined as "minorities" precisely because they share particular characteristics like race, culture, etc. Recognition of such disadvantage is simply never addressed by the party. But like my discussion on multiculturalism showed, this is a typical strategy of the new right which has embraced the principle of racial and ethnic equality in a vision of a "colour-blind" society. "Special status" is resoundingly rejected for it bestows "group rights" to minorities, granting them a new form of privilege ("preferential treatment"). The new right argues that this results in new forms of injustice and inequality (Omi and Winant, 1986). This, then, is reflected in Reform's constitutional position *vis-à-vis* Quebec:

Ever since the failed Meech Lake Accord, the phrase "distinct society" has summarized many of Quebec's constitutional demands. Reformers can accept the words "distinct society" if they mean "difference" but not if they mean "preference." It is obvious that Quebec differs from the other provinces in terms of language, culture, and the civil law, and Reformers are happy to continue the Canadian tradition of recognizing and accommodating those differences. We support the concept of making language and culture essentially a provincial responsibility rather than a federal responsibility. But such accommodation does not require that Quebec have special powers unavailable to the other provinces. We believe that a balanced federation of equal provinces can satisfy Quebec's legitimate aspirations to maintain the distinctiveness of its society, while an unbalanced federation with special status for Quebec will prove unworkable.³¹

That the recognition of group rights manifests itself in new forms of inequality and injustice is also evident in the party's objection to multiculturalism (as we saw in Chapter 5), and official languages policy - Bill C-72 in particular. Reform officials repeatedly voiced a concern that the bill would result in anglophones losing out in federal

civil service jobs because of a bias in favour of bilingual individuals. Manning stated, "Unilingual Canadians will become second-class citizens. In the West, only about two per cent of the population speak both official languages fluently and it means almost anyone wanting to rise in federal government ranks will be out of luck."³² Deborah Grey also reiterated this perception. She stated, "We think that it's unnecessary for federal government officers and people who work in the military and the RCMP to be stilted. They may have great abilities but their careers are stilted just because they are not fully French-English bilingual."³³ Party executive member has Henry Carroll stated, "[Bill C-72] is elitist and racist in character and possesses enormous potential for further dividing rather than uniting Canadians."³⁴ Yet according to government statistics, 80 per cent of all civil service jobs are open to people with no knowledge of French. In western Canada, this proportion increases to 98 per cent.³⁵

What are we to make of this discourse on "special status" and "preferential treatment?" Omi (1987) suggests that a new mood of "social meanness" has arisen as a reaction against the various social movements of the 1960s whose efforts resulted in gains (albeit limited in scope) made by minorities. While Omi's analysis is particular to the US, and that nation's distinct racial and ethnic politics, a similar "backlash" emerged in Canada in the 1970s.³⁶ Hill and Schiff (1988: 1-2) describe this phenomena as follows:

Concurrent with the undeniable advances that were being made in some areas of human rights, a pervasive mood of conservatism seemed to settle upon Canada. Perhaps it was fostered by the gradual deterioration of the economy. Perhaps it was the natural reaction of a traditionally conservative majority to a trend they felt threatened their own social and economic security. Whatever the reason, the influence of the new mood in the human rights arena was unmistakable. Even

where special programs to promote the rights of minorities or women were instituted, for example, they often turned out to be more show than substance, hampered by inadequate resources or a go-slow mentality. Hate-mongering, sometimes outright violence, against Asians, Jews, blacks, and others re-emerged after a period of comparative quiescence. Complaints from various groups of harassment by police and other authorities appeared to increase. Budgets of many public human rights agencies were cut or frozen. And governmental human rights workers began to fear for the very lives of their agencies in 1983 when, in the name of the economy, British Columbia trashed its human rights laws and administration and substituted inadequate remedies of earlier times.

Out of the prism of this "politics of backlash," the new right has consolidated a new "common sense" understanding of racial and ethnic equality. Minorities are no longer considered victims of deprivation, but are viewed as the recipients of some form of "preferential treatment" with respect to jobs, promotional opportunities, etc. (Omi, 1987). This is clearly the assumption behind Reform's objection to Bill C-72, and underpins its stance on the Constitution, as well as multiculturalism. In so doing, Reform has reopened debates about equality and has questioned once more (or *rearticulated* in Omi's words) its meaning for politics. Clearly, Reform's discourse on the Constitution and language policy is not speaking directly about matters of race and ethnicity. However, I will argue that the implications of the party's discourse on these issues does reflect Reform's attempt to rearticulate notions of racial and ethnic equality. Omi's analysis of the new right's rearticulation of race and racial equality, therefore, provides a powerful analytical tool with which to "unpack" Reform's "equality model."

Rearticulating Racial Equality: The New Right and the Politics of Backlash

After the civil rights movements of the 1960s, racial equality had to be acknowledged as a desirable goal. However, the *meaning* of equality, and the

appropriate means for achieving it, remained matters of considerable debate (Omi and Winant, 1986). A reading of Reform's discourse on "special status" and its "equality model" will highlight the party's role in this contested project, and will further reflect its new right character.

In Chapter 5, I suggested that the new right rearticulates understandings of racial and ethnic equality as a matter of *individual*, rather than *group* concern. In other words, the new right insists that equality must be understood only in terms of individual rights, and not in terms of rights bestowed to groups as a result of some common defining characteristic ("special status"). The opposition to minority demands for "group rights" is an important centrepiece in new right ideology. In its opposition to group rights, new right advocates focus on what they perceive to be the illegitimacy of state policies which engage in "race-thinking." The new right can thus deflect charges of racism by promoting its vision of a "colour-blind" or "egalitarian" society where racial considerations are no longer the concern of state policy (Omi and Winant, 1986).

This corresponds with the work of American author Nathan Glazer.³⁷ He argues that the state cannot and should not recognize any special status or rights for groups. By doing so, it countermands the intent of the civil rights movement, which in his analysis, embodied the consolidation of *individual* rights - ie., that specific individuals would not be denied access to goods and services as a result of their membership in identifiable groups. The problem, according to Glazer, was that even though legislation was worded so as not to confer status or rights to groups, various federal bureaucracies and judicial decisions subverted the spirit of the legislation and extended rights to particular groups

who were considered the victims of discrimination. This resulted in anti-discriminatory laws and policies being enforced in ways both unexpected and unanticipated:

What happened was the very rapid institution and steady expansion of methods of enforcement of the new array of civil rights legislation and the executive order that surprisingly enough required local, state and federal public authorities, major private employers, public and private institutions of higher education, and varied institutions that were recipients of federal aid or subject to government regulation, to pay an increasingly exact attention to race and ethnicity. The new measures ... made it necessary to count how many of each group were interviewed, promoted, hired, admitted, served, enrolled.

(Glazer quoted in Omi, 1987: 181)

Such "race-thinking" inevitably led to the institutionalization of "colour-conscious" remedies. When the state confers group rights it creates two groups or classes - those who are the objects of possible discrimination and those who are not. The formal and legal recognition of group rights, instead of leading to a "colour-blind" society, would only exacerbate the sense of "colour-consciousness", and would result in more racial and ethnic conflict. The only recourse, according to Glazer, is to deny the legitimacy of group rights (Omi, 1987).

It should be therefore no surprise to find in Glazer's work an opposition to affirmative action programs. His critique centres on their (perceived) ineffectiveness and their challenge to the fundamental civil ideals which comprise American culture: individualism, market-based opportunity, and the curtailment of excessive state interventionism. Glazer suggests affirmative action:

... has meant that we abandon the first principle of a liberal society, that the individual's interests and good and welfare are the test of a good society, for we now attach benefits and penalties to individuals simply on the basis of their race, colour, and national origins. The implications of this new course are increasing

consciousness of the significance of group membership, an increasing divisiveness on the basis of race, colour, and national origin, and a spreading of resentment among the disfavoured groups against the favoured ones. If the individual is the measure, however, our public concern is with the individual's capacity to work out an individual fate by means of education, work, and self-realization in the various spheres of life. Then how the figures add up on the basis of whatever measure of group we use may be interesting, but should be of no concern to public policy.

(quoted in Omi and Winant, 1986: 127-28)

This brief review of Glazer's work was intended to demonstrate the new right's opposition to the notion of "group rights." Its antagonism is based on the fear that attempts to formally identify and assign distinctive treatment to particular groups will become a pervasive and permanent aspect of social life. It will create "protected classes" and render us more conscious of group distinctions in clear opposition to the recognition of individual rights and merits regardless of race, ethnicity, gender and so on. Not only do arguments such as these enable the new right to deflect charges of racism, it allows its proponents to accuse those who support "colour conscious" remedies (such as affirmative action) as the *promoters* of racism (Omi, 1987).

This, then, is the strategy of the Reform Party when it espouses the view that the special status of Quebec (or of Aboriginal peoples and women as will be seen below) amounts to preferential treatment (read "reverse discrimination"), which in and of itself, is defined as racist. It is this reasoning that allows Reformers to call official languages policy "racist" and leads them to articulate their particular position on the constitution. For this is what is behind Reform's appeal for a constitution that treats all *individuals* equally "without regard to race, language, or culture rather than being treated specially

... *because* of race, language and culture.³⁸ Indeed, Manning has parlayed these sentiments into a rather provocative critique of Canada's constitutional arrangements:

A Canada built on a union of the French and the English is a country built on a union of Quebec and Ontario, in which the other provinces are little more than extensions of Ontario. Moreover, arrangements giving special constitutional status to the French and English as "founding peoples" relegate the twelve million Canadians who are of neither French nor English extraction (including Aboriginal peoples) to the status of second-class citizens.

I therefore submit to you as best I can, that when Mulroney, Chrétien, and McLaughlin - when the federal Conservatives, Liberals, and NDP, when Keith Spicer's Dead Poets' Society or any other task force or commission - ask you to affirm the racial, or linguistic, or cultural duality of Canada as a foundation for future constitutional developments or as a solution to our current national unity problem, they are asking you to affirm all the wrong things.

(1992a: 303-04)

One of the accomplishments of the new right has been its ability to refocus the debate on the question of what *means* are best for achieving equality. The Reform Party has engaged in this debate and has staked its ground. Clearly, the Reform view is that equality cannot come as a result of state recognition of "special status," or the "group rights" which would flow from such acknowledgement (eg. employment equity). For Reformers, equality can only be measured in terms of individual access to opportunity. Such an approach is attractive but misleading. Concepts such as "individual merit" allow employers, schools, and state agencies a legitimate means in which to allocate benefits to certain "favoured" constituencies, and deny the validity of competing claims. However, once we recognize that the attack on special status is not merely about "fairness," and "equality," but about the maintenance of existing social relations, it becomes easier to explain its enormous appeal (Omi and Winant, 1986).

Therefore, in spite of Manning's apparent openness to those 12 million Canadians who claim neither French nor English heritage, the party's refusal to acknowledge group identity suggests an unwillingness to recognize the growing ethnocultural and linguistic diversity of Canada that has been fostered by recent immigration patterns, the increasing demands of Quebec nationalists, and the efforts by Aboriginal peoples to rebuild their linguistic and cultural communities. Whether the party's refusal to recognize this diversity is intentional or not, is unclear. However, its *implications* are. In spite of the promotion of its "equality model" as the foundation for the "new Canada", my analysis demonstrates that Reform's vision would not promote anything new or progressive, but would indeed result in the continued maintenance of *unequal* social relations in Canadian society.

The following section on the party's discourse on Aboriginal issues reinforces this assessment. Reform's opposition to group rights ("special status") is especially significant within the context of Aboriginal rights. The aspirations of First Nations communities is intimately connected to their desire for state recognition of their unique historic character. This character is based precisely on those rights to which they claim entitlement by virtue of their common *group* identity.

REDEFINING ABORIGINAL RIGHTS

The Reform Party does not have a detailed policy on issues revolving around Aboriginal rights. Indeed, its official policy manuals say very little about them. Throughout party documents and speeches by leadership, however, a certain discourse

does emerge. As with many of its policies, at first glance what the Reform Party says about Aboriginal issues seems unobjectionable. For example, in explaining Reform's position on self-government a party document reads: "The Reform Party supports the desire of native people to gain control over their own lives. The new relationship must derive from aboriginals and must be acceptable to all Canadians."³⁹ On the issue of land claims, a party press release states, "The Reform Party has also called for reforms to the procedures and policies for settling land claims and preventing those processes from slipping into the pattern of open-ended and continuous negotiation."⁴⁰ A brochure further states the party's support for a "process leading to the early and mutually satisfactory conclusion of outstanding land-claim negotiations."⁴¹ In his own book, Manning focuses on the importance of forging a new relationship between Aboriginal peoples and the federal state:

My response to the Oka crisis and to the land claims issue in British Columbia ... was to categorize both as symptoms of a deeper problem, namely the unsatisfactory and deteriorating relationship between aboriginal peoples and the government of Canada. Until that relationship is fundamentally changed for the better, in our judgement there will be little progress in either resolving the land claims issue or improving the socio-economic status of aboriginal peoples.

(1992a: 248)

The need to forge a new relationship between First Nations and the state, expeditious resolution to land claims, and a wish for Aboriginal autonomy, are all principles Aboriginal leaders and communities would endorse. Does this suggest, then, that Aboriginal peoples in Canada have a political ally in the Reform Party? Before such a conclusion is warranted, a more thorough analysis of Reform's discourse regarding

Aboriginal issues is required.⁴²

Reform's leadership is the first to acknowledge that the party does not have a very well developed policy on Aboriginal issues. As a justification for this, officials often suggest that they will not formulate a policy until they obtain more input from the Aboriginal community. A party press release reads: "Manning has repeatedly said that the Reform Party will not be committing itself to a position on these issues until its membership includes more aboriginal people and others who will be directly affected by native land-claim settlements."⁴³ In an interview Reform MP Deborah Grey stated, "We think it is foolish for a bunch of white men to sit around and write up Indian policy."⁴⁴ Stephen Harper defended the party's lack of a coherent policy on Aboriginal issues as follows:

We're often tagged with not having a position on aboriginal self-government, but in all fairness, nobody does. The aboriginal peoples themselves whose organizations got a virtual free hand to write their own ticket on this in the Charlottetown Accord could not come up with a definition. ... So, to me aboriginal self-government is like [the concept] sustainable development - the more you hear the talk about it you become less and less certain what you are talking about.⁴⁵

Nonetheless, the party's 1991 policy manual does contain a the following statement on Aboriginal issues:

- A. The Reform Party supports the establishment of a new relationship with aboriginal peoples beginning with a constitutional convention of aboriginal representatives to consider their position on such matters as the nature of aboriginal rights, the relationship between aboriginal peoples and the various levels of government, and how to reduce the economic dependence of aboriginal peoples on the federal government and the Department of Indian Affairs.
- B. The Reform Party supports the federal government enabling aboriginal individuals, communities, and organizations to assume full responsibility for their

well-being by involving them in the development, delivery, and assessment of government policies affecting them. This would proceed with the goals of:

- the replacement of the Department of Indian Affairs with accountable agencies run by and responsible to aboriginal peoples; and
 - the replacement of the current economic state of aboriginal people by their full participation in Canada's economic life and achievement of a state of self-reliance.
- C. The Reform Party supports processes leading to the early and mutually satisfactory conclusion of outstanding land-claim negotiations.
- D. The Reform Party supports the principle that aboriginal individuals or groups are free to preserve their cultural heritage using their own resources. The Party shall uphold their right to do so.⁴⁶

At first glance this statement seems unobjectionable to First Nations supporters. It acknowledges the importance of input from Aboriginal communities in governmental negotiations; it recognizes the desire of Aboriginal communities to become more autonomous; and it calls for a more efficient land claims process. However, a more careful reading reveals a position that is more antithetical to the goals of Aboriginal peoples than it initially suggests.

Firstly, the party calls for constitutional conventions to determine the nature and scope of Aboriginal rights and to define their new relationship with governments. But as Laycock (1993) points out, Reform's prescriptions are rather vague regarding what stage Aboriginal voices would be heard in the constitutional reform process.⁴⁷ Furthermore, a party document suggests that this constitutional convention should also allow non-Aboriginals, "to express themselves on the character of the new proposed relationship."⁴⁸ As noted above, the party has stated that Reform will not take a position

on these issues until its membership includes not only Aboriginal people, but "others who will be directly affected." What "others" or "non-Aboriginal voices" does the party have in mind? Those who have the most to lose and who will be hostile to the equitable settlement of land claims? More significantly, whose interests will Reform represent?

Secondly, the party calls for the elimination of the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs (DIAND):

A general consensus already exists between aboriginals and non-aboriginals in favour of eliminating the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs. This would lead to a transfer of the majority of its functions, responsibilities and funding to the aboriginal governments and agencies, thus establishing a more responsive system of program implementation.⁴⁹

A party pamphlet further states, "We would gradually do away with the Department of Indian Affairs and transfer the majority of its functions, responsibilities, and funding to local aboriginal governments and agencies, provided this can be done democratically, cooperatively, equitably, and cost effectively."⁵⁰ The party will therefore support the desire of the First Nations to become autonomous in so far as it represents a cost-cutting measure that will reduce the onerous tax-burden on Canadian citizens. The party's 1990 policy manual states as much in rather matter of fact terms: "The Reform Party supports a revamping of the Department of Indian Affairs as a federal cost-reduction measure."⁵¹

Finally, while the party may appear to endorse the goal of Aboriginal self-government, its support is clearly conditional. A party document suggests that any self-government arrangement would only be satisfactory to Reformers if the following concerns were addressed:

1. How would aboriginal governments be held democratically accountable to

their own people?

2. Would aboriginal governments take a cooperative approach to resource management and environmental conservation?
3. How much would the new system of government cost, and who would bear the costs?
4. If self-government were introduced, would we be any closer to a Canada in which all Canadians are treated equally? Or would we be closer to a large number of semi-independent states whose relationship to government is based on race?⁵²

Indeed, the party demonstrates a great deal of concern over "racially-based" governments. As Harper stated, "The members themselves are generally fairly sceptical, and so am I, of racially-based governmental forms."⁵³ Reform's 1990 policy manual recognizes that while "innovations" are required to address Aboriginal issues "such innovations [should] not establish or reinforce racially-segregated societies or racially-based governmental structures."⁵⁴ The party has even gone as far to suggest that self-government "would raise problems similar to apartheid by having a racially segregated government."⁵⁵ For those knowledgeable about Aboriginal issues this seems a rather bizarre comparison. Apartheid was imposed on a non-white majority by a *white minority* to protect its position of power and privilege. This in no way resembles the efforts of a small non-white minority to empower themselves against an often hostile and oppressive *white majority*.

The party, therefore, may appear to support the principle of Aboriginal self-government, yet it simultaneously engages in a veiled attack against it. Deborah Grey has suggested self-government lacks a concrete definition and warns that, "Canadians are

wary of the broad parameters of the rights and jurisdictions that Aboriginal governments might exercise." She further states:

Many Canadians recognize the plight of the aboriginal peoples in their struggle for self-determination. They also recognize, however, that the politics of embedding specific cultural, ethnic, or racial groups in the fabric of the Constitution is a dangerous game. It may inevitably lead to a competitive antagonistic relationship between these different groups. In perpetually exacerbating the differences among Canadians, rather than outlining the similarities, many Canadians felt that the spiral of ethnic-based politics will surely lead to disunity.

(Grey, 1992: 35)

The party often expresses the theme that the recognition of group identity, and rights based on that identity, will inevitably lead to divisiveness and crisis. This is evident in Reform's discourse on multiculturalism, official languages, as well as the demands for constitutional recognition of "special status" - be it that of Quebec, racial and ethnic minorities, or Aboriginal peoples. This is characteristic of the new right which asserts that the formal recognition of rights based on group identity encourages the resentment of those who bear the costs of "preferential treatment" in terms of jobs, education, housing, higher taxes, etc. (Omi, 1987).

We thus have Preston Manning stating that Aboriginal peoples are welcome to seek "a completely new relationship" with the federal government, but that Aboriginal sovereignty cannot be a part of this new relationship. Indeed, he has declared, "the Canadian Constitution will recognize the existence of only one nation."⁵⁶ Clearly, the party exhibits a very narrow understanding of self-government. Manning suggests that the only workable constitutional formula that would be acceptable to most Canadians

would include the following elements: "a limited recognition of Quebec's distinctiveness, a Triple-E Senate, *a limited (defined) recognition of the right of aboriginals to self-government*, and provision for a national referendum on new constitutional arrangements [emphasis added]" (Manning, 1992a: 309). We must remember that Aboriginal leaders have always called for constitutional recognition of their right to self-government, which would then be followed by a series of discussions whose goal would be defining the nature and scope of self-government. Reform's demand for a definition before the provision is enshrined in the Constitution is not a position Aboriginal leaders would be willing to accept. Given the link Aboriginal leaders make between land claims and self-government, it is also difficult to assume Reformers would support Aboriginal land claims. This is particularly so in the West (British Columbia, in particular) where Reform draws much of its support, and where many claims remain outstanding. The party's call for a more expeditious land claims process thus rings hollow.

Another important subtext exists in the party's discourse on Aboriginal issues.

The following passage from a party press release statement serves to demonstrate:

While many interest groups and the traditional political parties have been emphasizing the "rights" of aboriginal peoples, the Reform Party wants to explore the "responsibilities" of aboriginal peoples for their own development as Canadians, and ways and means of reducing their dependence on both the federal government and native governments.⁵⁷

According to Manning (1992a: 274), the party endorses the move "toward greater acceptance of responsibility by aboriginals for their own well-being" He also writes that he hopes a constitutional convention of Aboriginal peoples will, "result in an expression of willingness on the part of aboriginal people to accept responsibility for

their own welfare and development ..." (Manning, 1992a: 248).

The party's emphasis on "responsibility" leaves the impression that all that is required is for Native peoples to *assume* this responsibility. There is no recognition of how the policies of a paternalistic British colonial state (and subsequent Canadian state) led to this dependence in the first place. Aboriginal communities did not move into a state of dependency of their own volition, yet this crucial aspect is totally absent in Reform's understanding of the issue. While First Nations' leaders have for years been demanding more autonomy, one must question whether the Reform Party's call for "responsibility" is made in the same spirit.

Of course the party has good reasons for thrusting this "responsibility" onto Aboriginal communities. By making Aboriginal communities responsible for their own affairs and by abolishing DIAND, the federal government will stand to save millions of dollars annually. As one party pamphlet reads: "Reformers believe that government policy should assist Aboriginal peoples to assume full responsibilities for the programs affecting them and to participate more fully in Canada's economic life."⁵⁸ It would seem apparent, then, that the party's prescription for Aboriginal communities, is to assimilate them into the "structure of Canadian life."⁵⁹ But it is precisely the "structure of Canadian life" or more specifically, the process of capitalist economic development, and latent racism in this country, that has led to the oppressed position of Aboriginal peoples today. However, it is into this system that Reform wants Aboriginal communities to integrate.

In keeping with the party's new right ideology, therefore, the Reform party could

never accept full Aboriginal sovereignty for it would confer *group* or *collective* rights onto an identifiable group in society. The party criticized the self-government provisions of the Charlottetown Accord on this basis.⁶⁰ The party maintained that these provisions would allow Aboriginal governments to fall outside the jurisdiction of the Charter and would allow Aboriginal governments to place *collective* rights relating to issues such as language and culture above *individual* rights. The party's criticisms are based on the belief that self-government as spelled out in the Accord, would have allowed native people to set up governments that could ignore the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and that in effect, would create sovereign islands inside Canada. Aboriginal governments, according to Reform, would not be obliged to hold democratic elections or raise taxes to support themselves. They would also have the power to block future constitutional changes that affect Aboriginal peoples. The Assembly of First Nations took great exception to Reform's interpretation and accused the party of inciting racism for political gain. Mary Ellen Turpel, law professor and the head of the AFN's constitutional team, suggested the party's criticism demonstrates a lack of understanding of what Aboriginal people mean by self-government.⁶¹

In spite of the party's acceptance of Aboriginal self-government, then, it is clear that the party's interpretation of this concept is at odds with the vision held by Aboriginal peoples. Noted Aboriginal activist Harold Cardinal assessed the party's position as follows:

If the party is against any recognition of Aboriginal self-government in the constitution, if that is the party's position, it seems that the initial openness indicated by Manning is meaningless. Unless there is specific recognition of Aboriginal self-government, there is no basis for Aboriginal government to

operate anywhere in the country. That negates any possibility of talking between native people and the Reform Party, because there'd be nothing to talk about.

(quoted in Sharpe and Braid, 1992: 136-37)

CHAPTER 7

DE-LEGITIMIZING GROUP IDENTITY: REARTICULATING EQUALITY AND REINFORCING INEQUALITY

This chapter continues the analysis of the Reform Party's rejection of group identity by examining the party's discourse on women's issues and the family. While this discourse is not overtly racialized, it serves to further demonstrate Reform's rearticulation of equality, and the role the state should play in addressing issues of inequality. As minorities, especially certain racial and ethnic minorities, continue to be over-represented in the lowest strata of society, Reform's approach to inequality - be it racial, ethnic, linguistic, or gender inequality - will reflect the party's understanding of racial and ethnic oppression. Indeed, as discussed in the latter part of the chapter, Reform's attack on "special interest groups" reveals the party's inability (or unwillingness) to account for the true bases of oppression in society - ie., the inequities wrought by a globalized free market economy, and institutional/systemic racism and sexism. In its rejection of group identity, and the rights the state could grant to collectivities in order to overcome the barriers imposed by such structural conditions, the Reform Party reinforces continued racial and ethnic oppression in Canada today.

THE "REFORM FAMILY" AND THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN SOCIETY

As Helvacioğlu (1991: 106) states:

To the N[ew] R[ight], the family is the basic unit of society and therefore any challenge to it implies a major threat to the entire social formation. Included in the NR's hit list of anti-family forces are homosexuals, feminists, secular

humanists, welfare bureaucrats, drug dealers, agents involved in pornography and the media.

There is not much evidence to show that the Reform Party engages in this kind of overt rhetoric, however, a review of its discourse on the family and women's issues will highlight the contradictions within Reform's new right ideology. While authoritarian conservatives are more apt to defend traditional institutions, the family in particular, neoliberal philosophy emphasizes the equality of all *individuals* (including women), and insists that "special rights," "privileges," or "status" not be accorded on the basis of group identity. This kind of tension is clearly evident in Reform's statements about the family and women's issues.

Eisenstein (1987) argues that the central focus of the new right is to re-establish the dominance of the traditional, white patriarchal family. The party has no explicit policy on the family, however, the following excerpt from Reform's "Statement of Principles" demonstrates its centrality in the Reform vision of a "new Canada": "We affirm the value and dignity of the *individual person*, and the importance of strengthening and protecting the *family unit* as essential to the well-being of individuals and society."¹

In Manning's own book (1992a: 110), he expresses his views on the importance of the family as follows:

If there is some place, no matter how modest, where you feel truly at home - accepted, secure in relationships, and free to be yourself - then you have a base from which to tackle and withstand all the challenges and vicissitudes of life. If there is no place where you feel at home - or if the security and freedom of home is shattered by violence or financial crisis or broken relationships - then meeting the challenges of life is infinitely more difficult.

Such statements beg the question, what kind of family form is the Reform Party speaking of? By referring to his own personal family, Manning (1992a: 113) attempts to address this uncertainty:

Our family unit would be classified by my social science friends as a traditional family, whereas the Reform Party must take into account many other definitions of the family unit in its approach to social policy. It would be a mistake, however, to consider the traditional family as linked only to the past. Through our children and their friends, my wife and I feel we have a direct and constant link with the future and the generation that will inhabit it.

Even though this statement suggests an openness to non-traditional family forms, Manning still emphasizes the centrality of the nuclear male-dominated family and its significance for the well-being of society. Furthermore, it is not clear that Manning's apparent openness is shared by other members and supporters of the party. One-time party official, Rex Welbourn, stated that the party's position on child-care policies called for "more mothering" instead of the feminist view which "is to put children in institutions." He continued by noting:

The most important thing [for an infant] is maternal love. This is not a matter of opinion, this is scientific fact. The father's role comes later, with role definition, particularly for the boy. The nurturing role is the mother's. The father's role is protective, he lays down the laws in a different way, creates a structure, provides stability and money.²

It would seem therefore that the party is making two rather significant assumptions: first, the family is the basic building block of society and "must be strengthened and protected" (by whom and how is not clear); and secondly, the Reform definition of the family, despite Manning's weak attempt to suggest otherwise, is the traditional nuclear family with a heterosexual male bread-winner and a financially

dependent wife and children.

Reform's position on the family strongly echoes the philosophy and world-view of Ernest Manning, Preston Manning's father and former premier of Alberta. In 1967 Ernest Manning published a book entitled *Political Realignment: A Challenge to Thoughtful Canadians*. This book served as a rallying cry for like-minded conservatives to come together and forge an alliance based on strong ideological principles Manning referred to as "social conservatism." In many respects the book acts as a manifesto for the Reform Party which arrived on the scene twenty years later.³ Just as the Reform Party focuses on the "importance of strengthening and protecting the family unit," the following was listed as one of the core principles of Ernest Manning's social conservative position:

The most fundamental unit of human association is the individual family and home. Strong and wholesome families and homes are essential to the progressive continuation of human life and the transfer of fundamental principles and values from one generation to another. Governments should strive to ensure the preservation and well-being of the family association.

(Manning, 1967: 65)

David (1986) argues that the focus on the family is central to the ideology of the new right. Its position on the family is intimately intertwined with its economic and social policies and cannot be easily disentangled from them. The new right's economic policy prescriptions assume a particular family form and a special place for the family in economic relationships. We can obtain a sense of what kind of policy prescriptions would flow from such assumptions by examining the Reform's position on childcare.

The party has always opposed any move toward universal daycare programs. Its

first policy book states:

The Reform Party goes on record as opposing the Mulroney Government's day care initiative⁴ as the worst kind of expensive, compromise social policy that alienates both social conservatives and socialists alike. In our view the program is not adequately targeted to those who need the help, is discriminatory towards parents who choose to raise their families at home, creates costly incentives for institutionalized child care, and could well be the first step toward universal, compulsory, state-run day care. ...

We believe that children are our most precious resource and parents, the most appropriate judges of their needs in upbringing. We believe that day care programs should subsidize financial need, not the method of child care chosen and should subsidize children and parents, not institutions and professionals. We are opposed to state-run day care. There is no room for bureaucrats in the raising of our children. There is a need for government regulation of day care standards - a job it can do most objectively if it is not a vested interest in service delivery.⁵

Reform's objection to a universal child care program is not surprising given its dislike for social programs in general. It was shown in Chapter 3 that the party engages in a rather robust critique of the welfare state. There it was suggested that this critique is not only based on the neoliberal call for a less interventionist state, but also reveals a veiled defense of traditional institutions that has more in common with the rhetoric of authoritarian conservatism. The new right couches this latter tendency in terms of the perceived negative consequences the welfare state has wrought on the traditional family. Its proponents believe that, "welfare state expenditures have raised taxes and added to inflation, pulled the married woman into the labour force and thereby destroyed the fabric of the traditional patriarchal family and hence the moral order of society" (Eisenstein, 1987: 240).

But by holding up the traditional family as the ideal, the new right ignores the

reality of the many different forms the modern family takes. This has serious policy implications, for those families who fall outside the new right definition (for example, single parent, same sex, extended families) are discriminated against in social welfare entitlement, immigration policy and so on. A clear example of this was given in my discussion of Reform's position on family reunification programs in Chapter 4.

Moreover, the new right family is a *racialized* family. As Eisenstein (1987) notes, because black women have always worked outside the home in disproportionate numbers to white women, whether in slave society or in the free labour market, the model of the traditional patriarchal family has never accurately described their family life. Therefore, the presentation of the traditional patriarchal family as the desired model denies the reality(ies) of many non-white families, and the reality of married wage earning women in both white and non-white families. In this sense, the attack on the welfare state acts as an assault on whatever gains have been made by women of colour, as well as non-white men (Eisenstein, 1987).

The Reform Party's refusal to acknowledge the need for a comprehensive child care initiative takes on new meaning when read in this light. Clearly, the party's rejection of government subsidized child care would have a differential impact on different families. For those "traditional" families, the lack of adequate and affordable child care would cause little hardship. In contrast, for female-led families of foreign domestic workers the problem of day care is very real.

Indeed, the goal to retrench any social policy is felt differently among distinct social classes and groups. This includes racial and ethnic minorities and Aboriginal

peoples who are often over-represented in lower class positions. These constituencies are more vulnerable to changes in social policy as a result of their economically depressed status, which in and of itself is related to the exclusion they face as a result of systemic and institutional racism (Jewell, 1988). Reform's defense of the traditional family as well as its attack on the welfare state must be understood in this racialized context.

The discussion thus far has demonstrated the racial character of Reform's position on the family which I have suggested is influenced by its authoritarian conservative tendencies. However, at the outset I also suggested that Reform's discourse on the family, and especially on women's issues, also reflects its neoliberal tenets. The party's opposition to universal day care not only stems from its perceived threat to the traditional family, Reformers also object to such an initiative because they believe it to be an infringement of *individual choice*:

Universal day care seriously restricts parents' ability to choose the day care option which best suits their family. With a universal day care system, parents who wish to opt for any form of day care other than that paid for through their tax dollars would be saddled with the implicit costs of the universal program, while having to pay for the private program. As a result, only high-income Canadians would be able to afford the luxury of choice.⁶

Here, the party shifts from a more conservative rhetoric embodied in a defense of tradition and order, to a standard neoliberal discourse emphasizing the *equality of all individuals*. Manning's celebration of the traditional family seems at odds with the following excerpt from a Reform Party policy paper on child care:

[The Reform Party] would support a system of parental leave which would treat both parents equally. By affording both parents equal parental leave, employers

would be less inclined to hire males over females, particularly in child-bearing years, while affording parents some flexibility in the time they spend with their newborn infants. This approach, we believe is equitable to society, non-discriminatory and acceptable to Canadians.⁷

Reform's neoliberalism becomes more clearly articulated in its response to women's issues. While this response may lack an *overt* racial character it is still worthwhile to examine for it further demonstrates the party's understanding of social equality and in particular, Reform's objection to rights based on group identity. In turn, this will influence the party's view on racial and ethnic inequality and the strategies it promotes to combat it.

Stephen Harper, the party's chief policy analyst, has suggested that "Reform Party women" probably have more in common with REAL Women, than radical feminists. Nevertheless, he emphasized, Reform "is an open party [where] the membership sets the agenda."⁸ As the party was vying to become a major player on the Canadian political stage, officials sought to attract more women into the Reform fold in order to counteract the perception it was "anti-women." A notice in the party paper reads, "Come on guys! Politics is a sport for everybody. Sell your wife a membership and encourage her to become active in the party. We need her voice."⁹ In addition, the party organized a task force in 1990 to define its stand on women's issues.¹⁰ The agenda of the task force, formed after consultations with a cross-section of female party members, featured presentations on employment equity and pay equity, family violence and women's health care.¹¹ According to the party's former Manager of Policy, Dimitri Pantazopoulos, the meetings of the task force entailed participants discussing "why they did not want to be

identified as, or have certain issues identified as 'women's issues.'" He further noted:

[The participants] didn't believe that these issues were their issues in isolation, but that things like daycare tend to relate more to the family. Even though it often affects women in terms of whether or not they can work, it is more of a societal issue at large. That is the approach that they took to a lot of these different issues - that they are societal issues, not just women's issues.¹²

While Reform is quite correct in saying that issues such as employment equity, pay equity, family violence, and child care are social issues, the party does not seem to acknowledge the varied gendered implications that accompanies them. And although Pantazopoulos admits that these issues "often affect women in terms of whether or not they can work," the task force concluded that there were no issues that the party need consider specifically as "women's issues." Deborah Grey, who at that time was the party's only MP in the House of Commons, was one of the participants of the task force. She noted, "I've always said a lot of these issues, while they may directly affect women, are really best discussed as family or human issues. I was pleased that the women at the meeting - and we had people from all over the political spectrum - seemed to agree with that." Ms. Grey also emphasized that the party would not be supporting a traditional feminist position, instead she asserted that, "men are often as capable as women in providing input on these issues."¹³

It does seem clear that the party is hostile to feminist ideals. Members of the task force on women's issues received a package of information that included a number of articles and position papers on feminism and feminist issues. This in and of itself, caused consternation among some participants. An *Alberta Report* article relates the reaction: "The very idea of the meeting was enough to alarm some party members; the

agenda and the mail-outs only compounded matters. Last week, however, critics were relieved to learn the work group's first meeting was probably also its last."¹⁴

So, while the party may want to dispel the perception that they are "anti-women," it does not seem interested in countering the view that it is "anti-feminist." At the party's 1991 convention, the delegates were addressed by William Gairdner, a portion of whose speech was dedicated to a critique of the concept of human rights and Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedom. Feminists were particularly singled out in this scathing attack. To continuous cheers from party delegates, Gairdner stated:

[W]e fund ... radical feminist groups all over the country ... that publicly support social revolution ... of the most utopian kind and they vow to abolish the traditional family. [Canada should] throw the Charter [of Rights and Freedoms] out and return to our common law heritage. ... [A]ny charter should only refer to citizens without distinction as to sex, colour, or religion. ... Women get special treatment but men do not. Such favouritism by ranking cannot lead to a happy nation.

(quoted in Dobbin, 1991: 147)

Reform Senator Stan Waters repeatedly singled out the National Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC) as typical of interest groups who should be cut off from government funding (Dobbin, 1992). After Deborah Grey was elected she stated to the press that although she is a woman, she will not be pushing any feminist causes in Ottawa. She noted, "I'm not a feminist. I'm a woman and I'm proud to be a woman, but I guess I'm old fashioned."¹⁵ On other occasions Ms Grey has also stated, "I'm not a feminist at all. I'm a regular country woman who believes all people are special."¹⁶ She is against affirmative action, and opposes laws that would enforce equal pay for equal value. In an interview, she stated:

Women are just trying to lift themselves up to the detriment and at the expense of men. We have different gifts. We are different biologically. I don't care how much the National Action Committee on the Status of Women tries to talk about equality, women are still the birthgivers, and I suspect it will go on that way for a long time. We just have to accept that and celebrate it, that that's the way it is.

(quoted in Sharpe and Braid, 1992: 137-38)

Because of its disavowal of "special status," Reform is unable to acknowledge the reality of specific women's issues. This in turn is linked to the party's view of "special interest groups." A Reform pamphlet reads:

Reformers are Canadians who believe that all provinces and citizens should be treated equally in federal law regardless of race, language, culture, religion, or gender. Let's: ensure that women are treated equally by removing barriers to advancement, *but not by labelling women as a special interest minority group ...* [emphasis added].¹⁷

When Reform received a request from the National Action Committee on the Status of Women to articulate the party's position on a variety of issues (violence against women, equal pay for work of equal value, and a constitutional provision to prevent discrimination against women, for example), party MP Deborah Grey refused to oblige, only responding that the party refuses to appeal to interest groups and therefore, would not answer NAC's request (Dobbin, 1991).¹⁸

A party statement (titled "What is the Reform Party position on issues affecting women?") states:

Reformers reject the traditional parties' method of treating issues such as child care, abortion, pay equity, and family abuse as women's issues. The Reform Party believes that these issues are of concern to the whole of society, and that this categorization implies that women are not equally concerned with the nation's fiscal, economic, and constitutional problems.

However, the traditional political parties have chosen to categorize many important issues in this manner, and set up women's groups to deal with them. This approach has led to the segregation of women into a special interest group, diminishing both the voice of women and the effectiveness of the traditional parties in dealing with many vital matters of public policy.¹⁹

The same party statement declares: "Women are not a minority 'interest group,' and should not be marginalized as such. They comprise half of the population, and the Reform Party prefers to address these issues in a manner consistent with that fact."²⁰ In this manner the party is able to denounce the "traditional" way in which women's issues are dealt with, while at the same time trying to position themselves as the party which is better equipped to deal with such matters.

A party document addressed "To the women of Canada" reads:

We very much oppose being told that, because of our gender, we require special consideration. Special treatment does not guarantee equality, but rather creates resentment and hostility toward qualified women who make advancements.

In the Reform Party we are looking forward to the day in which ALL Canadians are treated equally by the federal government and under the Constitution, and are able to strive toward their fullest potential regardless of race, language, culture, religion OR gender. Confident, able reform-minded women and men will play a major role in the Reform Party in evoking societal changes leading to the equality of all Canadians.²¹

In keeping with its "equality model" (versus "special status"), in Reform country women are simply considered equal. Yet as David (1986) points out, there exists a glaring contradiction in the new right's position on women's issues. Although it suggests women are "free to choose" whether or not to participate in paid employment, they are given little public or social support or encouragement to do so. Reform's prescription for the dismantling of the welfare state and its objection to universal child care, clearly

reflects such a stance. By adopting this posture, the party disregards the real structural barriers that delimit women's participation in the market place and the political process. The problem becomes especially acute for women of colour who simultaneously experience gender and racial and ethnic oppression.

The party's stand on women's issues, therefore, is consistent with its refusal to recognize special rights, or needs, for any group in society. Stephen Harper provides a summary of Reform's position:

The party's view is that we should not be looking at issues as women's issues, but as just issues - maybe social issues, maybe family issues, but very rarely are there strictly women's issues in the narrow sense. ... I think there is a fair consensus in the party that, as in race or language, the party has a lot of resistance to biologically categorizing issues and people in the political process.²²

Its resistance to "categorizing issues and people in the political process" is linked to the party's attack on the operation of special interest groups. As the next section demonstrates, Reformers are highly suspect of the role these groups play in the political process. The implications of such a stance are important to uncover, for they will reveal the party's reaction against the important gains that have been made in addressing racial and ethnic inequality, and inequality in general. As I have argued throughout this thesis, this is a typical strategy of the new right which engages in an attempt to *rearticulate* understandings of racial and ethnic equality in an effort to roll back the advances previously made by minority groups.

THE REFORM PARTY AND "SPECIAL INTERESTS": A DEFENSE OF "THE PEOPLE"

An examination of Reform's discourse on official languages policy, the Constitution, Aboriginal peoples, the family and women's issues clearly demonstrates the party's rejection of "special status." This kind of discourse is typical of the new right's "politics of backlash" for it assumes that previously disadvantaged groups (women, visible minorities, Aboriginals, and so on) are not merely seeking equal rights, but are demanding "preferential treatment." Proponents of the new right claim that granting special status to special interest groups goes beyond ensuring the equality of these constituencies by somehow making them *more* equal. Such a view is evidenced in the Reform Party's discourse on women's issues, as well as with regard to the Constitution and language issues, Aboriginal rights, and multiculturalism. Advocates for immigrants and refugees, supporters of multiculturalism and bilingualism, Aboriginal peoples, feminists, and even Quebec are all defined by Reform as "special interest groups". By calling for the equality of all *individuals*, the party is unwilling, or unable to acknowledge collectivities such as these. In so doing, the party disregards the underlying bases of oppression in society. Reform's discourse on special interest groups, then, is important to unpack, for it is this discourse which is strongly linked with the party's new right ideological stance. As such, it will reflect Reform's views on racial and ethnic equality.

The party claims that its criticism of special interest groups is borne out of its desire to reduce government spending. In its plan to eliminate the federal deficit, Reform proposes the reform of federal grants, subsidies, and tax concessions to business and

special interests. This, it says, is based on the principle of "fairness." Manning (1993d) states, "The principle of fairness means that while special-interest groups should have the freedom to lobby, they should get the funding for their lobbying activities from the people they purport to represent, rather than the public purse." The party newspaper cites as one of its deficit reduction principles: "Federal government should not subsidize business or special interests (a dollar left in the hands of an investor, lender, or taxpayer is more productive than that dollar in the hands of a bureaucrat, politician, or lobbyist)." Therefore, the party recommends the elimination of subsidies to "special interest lobby groups," and proposes that, "these groups should raise their own funding from the people they claim to represent."²³

Reform thus makes a link between the deficit problem and the operation of special interest groups who continue to demand funding from cash-strapped governments. This is why the federal government should be constitutionally limited "in its ability to spend beyond the means of the Canadian people." Such protection is necessary because:

... technological innovations have made it easier for lobby groups to organize campaigns for federal funds. Those special interest groups, many of them holding left-of-centre ideologies and many of them wealthy and influential, have an insatiable thirst for government funds.²⁴

While the party targets both business interests as well as other lobbies, the above quotation suggests which groups it has in mind. It is also easy to determine which "interests" would be the most negatively affected by Reform's policy. Is it true that Aboriginal organizations, or anti-poverty advocates, for example, are "wealthy and influential," or hold "left-of-centre" ideologies? How would such groups solicit funding

from the "people they purport to represent" when they are already over-represented in the lowest class categories? The party is conspicuously silent on this issue.

Murray Dobbin provides a cogent analysis of the party's attack on special interest groups. In his view, the party's call to eliminate subsidies to these groups is actually an attack on what he terms "participatory democracy." In the 1960s Aboriginal people, students, anti-war activists, women, and welfare rights advocates confronted the Canadian state, claiming democracy was a sham for it did not allow their voices to be heard in the political process. Increasingly, these groups demanded to be heard by the government, and governments subsequently acquiesced. By the 1970s, links between advocacy groups and governments became more formalized with the decision to fund a wide variety of community groups across the country. As Dobbin (1991: 202) writes:

There were real results from this new dimension of democracy. The acceptance of Aboriginal rights and land claims, the creation of human rights commissions, affirmative action programs, the breaking of many barriers for Aboriginal people and women - all of these were the result of social movements and the formal organizations which they created.

In other words, the state began to acknowledge group identity, and the rights required to ensure specific groups had equal access to both the political process and the market place. As we have discussed throughout, the increased articulation of new right ideology should be understood as a reaction against the achievements cited above. Reform's demand to reduce the funding of special interest groups takes on new meaning when read in this light. It is a great irony, therefore, that a party that prides itself on reforming the democratic process, will in many ways countermand the gains made in previous decades which allowed many sectors of society *increased* participation in both

the political and economic realms.

Yet the party insists it is not hostile to the operation of special interest groups. merely to the funding of these groups from the public treasury. According to Stephen Harper:

The party tends to use the phrase 'special interest group' frequently and uses it often pejoratively. That would imply, and maybe it does to some party members, that the party is inherently opposed to special interests or to certain interests. That is not my interpretation or I think, certainly not Mr. Manning's, and it is not our intent. The party actually views the operation of interest groups and the mobilization of political interests as a perfectly legitimate activity. The party happens to believe that the operation of the political system today has been too effectively controlled by interests at the expense of the general interest, or the common good. That is [the party's] concern, and it wants to see certain changes that would give the general interests or the broader interest a larger voice, or a more effective voice in the political arena. This is very different than denying the legitimacy of the other voice. ... The party is not against their right to spend money, or their right to promote a cause. What the party is against is a political system that really gives them the only effective avenue of expression .²⁵

The aim of the party, then, is to "create a political system where we value and express more vigorously our general interests and our general concerns as opposed to our special interests."²⁶ This is premised on the belief that the operation of special interest groups has subverted the democratic nature of the political process, and skewed it in their favour instead of the "general" or "common" interest. The party has published a pamphlet that reflects this belief. It begins:

You pay your taxes, struggle to balance the family budget and make meaningful choices at election time. And all the while you hope that the people running your country are operating on the same principles you follow every day. So why is it, when the country is at a crossroad requiring real leadership and democracy, the three established parties have stopped listening. That if you're not a special interest group, you have no voice in political matters. There is an alternative. The Reform Party of Canada, headed by Preston Manning, is a party dedicated to constitutional and economic change that puts Canadians back into the political

process.²⁷

Manning himself has stated (1990a: 5, 6), "Parliament doesn't work - its members often refuse to represent the wishes of the people who elect them, and it frequently endorses policies which reflect the agendas of minorities and elites rather than the will of the majority." He then poses the question, "what political instrument shall we use to get our constitutional and fiscal houses in order, and to tear Parliament out of the hands of elites and interest groups and place it once again in the hands of the Canadian people?"

The party, therefore, distinguishes itself from traditional parties by appealing to "ordinary Canadians" and soliciting "the people" to hear their concerns:

We have developed a habit of asking (simply asking) people to tell us what kind of country they want to live in, what issues concern them most, what public policies they are prepared to support. In other words, we do not just listen to vocal special interest groups; we make an effort to get to that silent majority whose rights and concern are so often overlooked.²⁸

(Manning, 1993b)

What is implicit in this kind of message, is that those in special interest groups - be they women, Aboriginal peoples, visible minorities, ethnic communities, and so on - are not "ordinary Canadians." The Reform Party thus constructs another dichotomy: "special interests" versus "the people." One of the party's principles reads:

We believe in the common sense of the common people, their right to be consulted on public policy matters before major decisions are made, their right to choose their own leaders and to govern themselves through truly representative and responsible institutions, and their right to directly initiate legislation for which substantial public support is demonstrated.²⁹

A party pamphlet further states, "We seek a definition of Canada which is more than an intellectual abstraction; a play-thing for academics and media commentators - rooted in the common sense and experiences of ordinary Canadians living today."³⁰ Manning (1992a: 25) in his own book writes that the strength of the "reform tradition" in Canada:

... lies in the fact that there is such a thing as 'the common sense of the common people,' and that if a politician, a party or a government can tap into it and harness that power to the formulation and implementation of public policy, there is no more potent political force on the face of the earth.³¹

The construction of an antagonism between "elites" and "the people" is characteristic of populist movements. As was discussed in Chapter 2, Reform positions itself within the tradition of western Canadian populism. Unlike previous populist movements born on the prairies, however, the Reform Party does not identify a particular segment of the capitalist class as the primary enemy of the people. Instead:

Reformers take the view that the elites denying average people control over their lives are now in two basic categories: the "special interests" who receive favours from a self-perpetuating bureaucratic class in government, and bureaucrats whose continued employment requires retention and expansion of programs to meet the demands of the former category.

(Laycock, 1993)

In this way, the populism of Reform is fundamentally different from that found on the prairies in the 1920s and the 1930s:

The West's early populism proposed to battle the big interests - the banks, grain companies and railways that were presumed to be responsible for the impoverished state of farmers. ... Today, [Reform's] populists have swung their guns around 180 degrees. Their target is not the big interests but what might be called the little interests - all those pressure groups that use the Charter of Rights

and Freedoms, provincial human rights legislation or political agitation to secure what they see as their rights and what some Canadians in the majority see as undue privileges.³²

By constructing the "elites" as those special interests who receive state subsidies to supplement or counteract the application of market principles in the social allocation of resources, the Reform Party thus gives a "new twist" to populism (Laycock, 1993).

What does this suggest, then, for Reform's understanding of racial and ethnic equality? By constructing the dichotomy between "special interests" and "the people" (just as it does with "special status"/"equality"), the party denies the legitimacy of group identity. So while its discourse on official languages policy, the Constitution, Aboriginal rights, the family, and women's issues may not be *overtly* racialized, it still reveals Reform's rearticulation of racial and ethnic equality. For in the party's refusal to acknowledge any identity other than that of atomized individuals in the market place, it dismisses the notion that oppression can occur precisely as the result of group identity - be it that identity which is based on race, ethnicity, or gender.³³ This corresponds with the new right's attempt to rearticulate understandings of *equality* as a matter of *individual* concern only.

As I have stated throughout this thesis, the new right calls for all individuals to be treated equally, but in so doing it treats society as a homogenous entity and assumes that all its members begin at the same starting place. New right advocates, therefore, are unable, or unwilling to take account of the fact that some individuals, by virtue of their membership in an identifiable group, are unable to take advantage of opportunities because of the oppression they have experienced in the past and continue to experience

in the present moment (Hill and Schiff, 1988).

By refusing to acknowledge such oppression, the Reform Party denies the realities of racial and ethnic inequality. Such is the strategy of the new right. Inequality in its institutional forms, and in its lived everyday material practices, is either trivialized or defined out of existence (Seidel, 1987). It is important to see this as a part of the larger project of the new right, both in and out of power.

This study has served to demonstrate that this too is the goal of Reform. In the final analysis, what the party's discourse reveals is an attempt to undo decades of progress on a number of initiatives that sought to redress racial and ethnic inequality. This includes advances in employment equity; the formulation of multicultural policies that (albeit minimally) provide legitimacy for non-French, non-English groups; Aboriginal gains in land claims and self-government; the rights of linguistic minorities; as well as the trend to a more liberalized immigration policy. In other words, the Reform Party would not lead us to a society that is based on the equality of all citizens, but would continue to reinforce those conditions that continue to disadvantage racial and ethnic minorities in Canada.

CONCLUSION

"The literal meaning of the word prejudice is to 'pre-judge,' to arrive at conclusions concerning the worth of individuals or groups without even knowing who or what they really are. Reformers understand that kind of prejudice because we have been the object of it ourselves. Thus we are more than prepared to unite with others to see that prejudice of every kind is removed from our politics and from this society."¹

With this statement, Reform Party leader Preston Manning attempts to quell a prevailing perception about his party. Since Reform's inception, it has been plagued by allegations of racism, prejudice, and bigotry. While the party suggests it has taken steps to "inoculate" itself from extremists, it has never engaged in a fundamental review of its discourse on race and ethnic-related issues and the underlying messages it may hold. This was the purpose of the present study - to analyze and explore the implications of the Reform Party's race and ethnic related policies.

Based on the party's populist roots, Reformers like to point out that their approach to immigration, multiculturalism, the Constitution and official languages policy, Aboriginal rights, women issues and the family, all reflect the party's commitment to represent the "common sense" of the "common people." Its pragmatic approach to immigration focuses on the economic needs of Canada, and emphasizes the skills and training held by potential migrants. Ordinary Canadians, according to Reform, are becoming more concerned by high levels of immigration, and the flood of illegal migrants ("bogus refugees"), and the inability of the government to control its borders. It makes sense, therefore, to reduce the flow of all immigrants except those whose "adjustment potential" is high, and who will adapt "quickly and independently to the

needs of the Canadian job market."

Regarding multiculturalism, the party bemoans a policy that promotes our differences and distinctions instead of focusing on those characteristics "which unite us." It is patently obvious to Reformers that such a policy will only lead to "hyphenated Canadianism," and inevitably, hostilities and divisions. This is because multiculturalism mistakenly encourages citizens to identify more with some group or collective distinction, rather than with that national character we all share in common. The same wariness of group identity is reflected in the party's approach to Aboriginal issues. While Reform appears to endorse the goal of Aboriginal self-government, it also expresses concern over "racially-based" government forms. Any sensible state policy should not "ghettoize" its citizens on the basis of race, culture, or language. Reform's focus, then, is on the "responsibilities" that Aboriginal communities need to assume in order to "participate more fully in Canada's economic life." Once this is achieved, First Nations communities will no longer need the administrations of the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, nor will they require special constitutional recognition.

Similar "common sense" arguments are found in the party's approach to official languages policy and the constitution. It is obvious to Reformers that bilingualism was an ill-gotten plan to appease Quebec. It has not only failed in that effort, but has alienated English Canada in the process. Current policy is inherently flawed because it is not based on the reality of the country, and instead attempts to engineer the creation of a bilingual populace. In its attempts to do so, official languages policy serves to discriminate against unilingual anglophones.

The party's constitutional position is also framed within the repudiation of the bilingual vision of Canada. Reformers emphatically reject the "two-founding nations" framework of Canadian federalism for it inevitably leads to a "house divided against itself." Furthermore, these divisions are based on "the most dangerous of lines - race, language and culture." The only practical solution is to remove the racial and ethnic character of the constitution by ensuring that no "special status" is bestowed to any cultural or linguistic groups who may consider themselves to be "constitutionally disadvantaged." Accordingly, Reformers advocate a constitution that is premised on its "equality model." Here in Reform country, all individuals would be considered "equal" - period. No special status or recognition can be conferred by the state, for its relationship to the citizenry should not be based on race, culture, language, or gender. For that reason, the party sees no apparent reason to take a position on so-called "women's issues." In a society based on Reform's "equality model," women - just like linguistic minorities, Aboriginal peoples, immigrants, refugees, and visible minorities - would be treated *equally*, as are all other individuals.

In articulating these "common sense" approaches, Reform distinguishes itself from the other political parties. Indeed, the party often positions itself as something that is alternative, progressive - that in effect challenges the prevailing "status quo."² Reform can then defend itself against its detractors by suggesting that, "a party that challenges the status quo [on] immigration, language policy, the Constitution automatically risks accusations of racism and extremism."³

However, the emphasis on "common sense" and the pragmatic responses to the

concerns of ordinary Canadians operates to mask the party's true ideological character. As I have argued throughout this thesis, an analysis of Reform's discourse clearly reveals the party's new right posture. Furthermore, this ideological stance is imbued with a racial subtext. My investigation has shown that the Reform Party reflects its new right character by engaging in a process of the *rearticulation* of racial and ethnic meanings. How does Reform accomplish this reinterpretation and transformation? My research has pointed to two interconnected strategies.

First, the party utilizes "code words" which work to disguise its underlying racialized assumptions and implications. Reform's discourse on immigration is littered with such tropes. The party recommends the acceptance of only those immigrants who possess the "human capital" that will enable them to "adjust quickly and independently to the needs of Canadian society and the job market." A Reform immigration policy would be based on "Canada's economic needs and adjustment potential of the immigrant." While the party's discourse does not overtly spell out a rejection of non-white immigration, one must go beyond the face-value of such rhetoric and examine its implications. Reform officials insist that their policy would not have the effect of barring non-white immigration into this country, yet it is clear those who are non-white, i.e., those who have less "adjustment potential" as a result of linguistic and cultural differences, and whose "human capital" is devalued and delegitimized, would undoubtedly be disadvantaged. Similarly, the party's discourse on "*bogus* refugees" and its preoccupation with border control leaves the impression that there are really very few "*genuine* refugees" that require Canada's humanitarian assistance. I argued in Chapter

4 that a restrictive immigration policy, coupled with strict enforcement efforts to "regain control of our borders," is one of the new right's defining characteristics.

The second strategy in the process of rearticulation is the manner in which Reform attempts to transform or reinterpret the meaning of *racial and ethnic equality*. Through the promotion of its "equality model" Reform engages in its most sophisticated attempt at rearticulation and practices its most effective use of code words. It is through this discourse that the party evokes images of an "egalitarian" or "colour-blind" society and is thus able to deflect charges of racism. The party's "equality model" is premised on the equality of all *individuals* regardless of race, language, culture, or any other defining characteristic. The state is obliged to provide individuals equal access to opportunity, but any other measures to ensure equality are not required. Such an approach certainly sounds fair. After all, the principles of individual liberty, universal franchise, and equal opportunity are the cornerstones of liberal democracy. However, my examination of the party's discourse on equality reveals its distinctive racial character, in spite of its appeal to "colour-blindness."

In order to uncover the underlying nature of this character it is important to locate the Reform Party's rearticulation of racial and ethnic equality within the moment of the breakdown of the post-war consensus, and the social, economic, and political dislocations that accompanied it. This period brought with it the resurgence of the right whose project consisted of the retrenchment of the more progressive legacies of the 1960s, including expanded welfare rights and the politicization of race and gender issues around the civil rights and women's movements (Helvacioğlu, 1990). It was through the efforts

of such movements that broader understandings of equality began to gain acceptance. The new right viewed this with great suspicion, and lamented what it perceived to be the growing trend to recognize "group rights." Opposition to such rights, thus became an important cornerstone in the politics of the new right (Omi, 1987). My analysis of the Reform Party's discourse on its race and ethnic-related policies has clearly shown the party shares such concerns. Any state recognition of group identity will not unite this country, but in fact will only lead to "hyphenated Canadianism," divisiveness, and even worse, discrimination and new forms of racial injustice. This is the basis of the party's whole argument against "special status" as discussed in Chapter 6. Reform treats all those who challenge the state for recognition of their group identity (including Aboriginal peoples, women, immigrants and refugees, and linguistic minorities) as "special interest groups" who are not merely seeking equality, but are demanding "preferential treatment" in the form of "special status."

What, then, are the implications of such a stance? The Reform Party believes that race, culture, and ethnicity should be matters of private concern. As long as the state has ensured equal *individual* access to opportunity no other measures need be taken in the public sphere to bring about equality. Programs such as affirmative action, or pay equity, therefore, need never be entertained by the state. The logical extension of such an argument, then, is that *racism* is also a private matter and involves only the attitudes and behaviour of individuals. But as was discussed in Chapter 1, the ideology of racism, and its manifestations in the real, lived experiences of those who are subjected to it (and by it) is hardly a private matter, but is very much a *social* practice embedded in both

structural and discursive relations. Reform's rearticulation of equality, therefore, disregards those conditions that contribute to the continued oppression of racial and ethnic minorities. Disadvantaged groups according to Reformers, are not seeking redress for the inequities brought about as the result of capitalist social relations, and the legacies of systemic and institutional racism. These collectivities are simply dismissed as "special interest groups" who are seeking "preferential treatment" from the state which of course will come at the expense of "ordinary Canadians." There is no recognition in Reform's world view that minorities can experience oppression precisely because of their racial, ethnic, as well as gendered identity, so the party can dismiss out of hand the need for "group rights" and the "special status" which would flow from them.

Clearly, the party's "equality model" would not lead us to a colour-blind, and egalitarian society. In fact, as I have argued throughout this study, Reform's prescriptions would in reality, foster the maintenance of existing *unequal* social relations that continue to disadvantage racial and ethnic minorities in this country. The true implications of the party's discourse on race and ethnic-related policies can not be fully understood unless we appreciate how profoundly its followers reject any policies or practices that might partially redress structural inequalities in the distribution of power and resources (Laycock, 1993). In so doing, Reform's project corresponds with that of the new right and acts as an aggressive stand against any attempt to change the existing power structure based on racial, ethnic, as well as gender oppression (Helvacioğlu, 1990).

To what extent has Reform been successful in promoting its agenda? If we are

to believe both Reform officials and media accounts, the party's impact on policy has been profound, particularly on the past Conservative governments of Brian Mulroney and his successor, Kim Campbell. A report in *Maclean's* magazine suggested that the federal Tories, "adopted the spirit, if not the substance, of several Reform initiatives, including tightening immigration procedures, getting tougher on criminals, and setting a schedule for eliminating the deficit."⁴ In his profile of Manning for *Saturday Night*, Kenneth Whyte also points out the impact of the party:

The current vogue for parliamentary and democratic reform, the proliferation of law-and-order planks (even the Liberals have one), the rage for three-year, four-year, and five-year deficit-elimination plans at both the federal and provincial levels - all of these have come in Manning's wake. Many of his positions that were initially considered extreme are now common: for instance, his arguments that multiculturalism and universality are respectively dividing and bankrupting the nation. More remarkably, the essentials of Manning's much maligned immigration policy were recently enshrined in federal law with the Mulroney government's Bill C-86.⁵

Tom Flanagan, the party's former Director of Policy, Strategy and Communications, has also pointed out how other parties have "pirated" Reform's policies:

Since its founding in 1987, the Reform Party of Canada has had a remarkable effect upon public policy in Canada. Many ideas that were originally condemned for being outside the conventional wisdom of Canadian politics have now been adopted by the federal government or provincial governments or other political parties.⁶

It would seem that the party's influence has been the greatest on the federal Tories culminating in Reform's role in the Conservatives' dramatic election loss in October 1993. While the downfall of the Tories is the result of a number of factors -

not the least of which was the strong negative attitudes Canadians held about Brian Mulroney - the fact that voters seeking a right-of-centre party found an alternative to the Tories in Reform cannot be overstated.

However, Reform's influence not only reverberates in the ranks of the Progressive Conservative Party, but is also felt in the ruling government of Jean Chrétien. Once in power, the Liberal government elected not to reverse any of the Conservative initiatives Mulroney and Campbell adopted to counter the growing support of the Reform Party. This includes not only the dismantling of the Department of Multiculturalism and Citizenship (one of the original planks of Reform's multicultural policy), but also the realigning of Employment and Immigration Canada which entailed a shift of some of its departmental responsibilities to the recently created Ministry of Public Security.

More recently, Immigration minister Sergio Marchi announced the Liberals' intention to enforce the deportation of non-citizens who have been indicted of criminal offenses, as well as failed refugee claimants. He stated, "I will not allow people to make a mockery of our laws and I will not put Canadians at risk."⁷ Marchi has also stated his government's desire to redirect the flow of immigrants and refugees away from the three major Canadian cities where most choose to settle. Leading up to its 1991 national assembly, the Reform Party's policy committee actually rejected a constituency resolution that would have encouraged refugees to settle in rural areas. Officials rejected the proposal because they were concerned it would make the party sound too extreme. Three years later we have Marchi stating, "the 60 per cent plus of immigrants and refugees go to three cities - Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver - and each of those cities

probably has 85 to 90 per cent of all the immigrants in the province. What people are saying is, 'Hey, we've got to have a fairer distribution'."8

While I am not suggesting that the Reform Party has been the only influence on both Tory and Liberal policy, it does seem clear that Reform's presence has been felt on the Canadian political landscape. Indeed, the party's biggest successes may not be measured tangibly through the ballot box, but to the degree that certain political discourses - such as Marchi's on immigration - have become legitimized. Prior to the arrival of the party, there was very little political debate about immigration, multiculturalism, or official languages. These are all policy areas the party has taken head on and in so doing has made it difficult for other political actors to ignore. The party has in effect re-politicized these issues thereby altering the "universe of political discourse."

At the beginning of this thesis I noted that Jenson (1986) uses this concept to theorize the manner in which our understanding of issues are socially constructed through a process of political struggle. As a consequence of this struggle, the parameters of political action are established. The universe of political discourse constitutes these boundaries by limiting the set of actors accorded the status of legitimate participants. In the eyes of the Reform Party, the only legitimate participants in the political process should be "ordinary Canadians" whose voices have gone unheeded by all the other parties who are too interested in appeasing the insatiable demands of "special interest groups." But if special interest groups are defined by Reform to include immigrants; refugees; racial, ethnic, and linguistic minorities; Aboriginal peoples; and women, who then are

"ordinary Canadians?" Clearly, the ideological discourse of the Reform Party constructs an *exclusive* definition of ordinary Canadians to encompass only white, English-speaking men (Patten, 1993).

In addition to defining who the political players are going to be, the universe of political discourse determines political action by setting the range of issues considered within the realm of political debate and the policy alternatives considered feasible for implementation. My analysis has shown how the party has engaged in the process of defining the issues considered worthy of political discussion. While Reform has re-politicized issues of immigration, multiculturalism, and official languages, it has also *de*-politicized issues of racial and ethnic equality, and equality in general. Since Reform sees no role for the state in addressing inequality, the policy alternatives considered by the party are very narrow in scope. The state need only treat all *individuals* equally, and the free market will take care of the rest.

Of course the degree to which the Reform Party succeeds in its rearticulation of racial and ethnic understandings remains to be seen. Indeed, it would be naive to assume its project has attained hegemonic status. The party's attempt to transform the meaning of racial and ethnic equality is obviously a contested project, and involves a number of social actors, both within and outside the institutions of party politics. Debates revolving around what are considered to be the most appropriate means for achieving equality have been ongoing for some time and will likely continue unabated. As such, Reformers are sure to have vocal opponents who do not share in their vision of a "new Canada." It is to this larger goal that I hope this research will contribute.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

¹ *Maclean's*, July 10, 1989: 14.

² quoted in Abu-Laban and Stasiulis, 1992.

³ *Maclean's*, July 10, 1989: 15.

⁴ *Halifax Chronicle Herald*, July 18, 1991: A4.

⁵ *Maclean's*, July 24, 1994: 16.

⁶ *Vancouver Sun*, December 24, 1991: A4.

⁷ *Ottawa Citizen*, December 31, 1993: B1; *Maclean's*, December 27, 1993: 42.

⁸ *Maclean's*, December 27, 1993: 42.

⁹ *Ottawa Citizen*, October 23, 1993: B6.

¹⁰ In separate incidents Georgina Leimonas was killed in a Toronto restaurant, and Toronto police constable Todd Baylis was shot on duty. Both of the individuals charged with the murders are illegal immigrants that had previously been served deportation orders (*Maclean's*, July 25, 1994: 16).

¹¹ *Maclean's*, July 10, 1989: 14-15.

1: UNDERSTANDING RACIAL AND ETHNIC OPPRESSION

¹ I have forgone the common practice of placing 'race' within quotation marks. Although I am in full agreement with Seidel (1986: 131, note 7) that race is "a social construct, which cannot be shown to have any basis in genetic discontinuities in the human population," I also concur with Stasiulis' (1990: 295) assessment that:

... race, like gender, has biological referents and is most commonly associated with physiognomically based difference such as skin colour. Moreover, the emphasis that is rightly placed on the social nature of the constitution of races is also applicable to gender, ethnicity, and class, all of which have specific and intermeshed material and ideological modes of production.

² It should be noted that Omi and Winant do not suggest that race assumes a privileged status over other categories such as class or gender, merely that race is "a fundamental organizing principle of social relations, one of which is capable of independently interacting with other variables" (Omi, 1987: 288).

³ See Omi and Winant (1986), Chapter 1 for their critique of the ethnic studies approach as found in American sociology.

⁴ Goldberg's *Anatomy of Racism* (1990) gathers many of the main contributors working within this new framework. Gates (1986) represents an earlier effort, and could also be considered a seminal text.

⁵ Goldberg's position here seems to suggest that racism ("racial exclusions") presupposes specifically a *racial* subjectivity. It therefore represents a disagreement with the assertion made above that it is not only racial, but ethnic groups as well that can experience racism. I do not wish to debate Goldberg on this point. I am merely using his analysis to demonstrate the significance of discourse in racist ideology.

⁶ In contrast to the formulations of both Goldberg and Hodge, Delacampagne (1990: 83) suggests the roots of racist ideology actually predate modernity, and can be traced back to Greek antiquity, and the monasticism of the Middle Ages. In arguing against those accounts which suggest that racism is merely a manifestation of irrational prejudices, he traces the rational emergence of racist discourses and practices:

[R]acist discourse, as we have known it in Europe since the nineteenth century, did not appear *ex nihilo*. It is the fruit - or the inheritor - of other, older discourses, whose first elements can be located in the philosophers of antiquity and whose course can be charted through the theologians and scholars of the Middle Ages. Ancient or medieval, this premodern racism was therefore not born in an irrational or pathological atmosphere. On the contrary, it developed in the midst of a system of thought that strove to be rational: it progressed hand in hand with the very foundations of Western rationalism.

⁷ Goldberg (1993: 8) defines culture as:

... ideas, attitudes and dispositions, norms and rules, linguistic, literary, and artistic expression, architectural forms and media representations, practices and institutions. These cultural expressions and objects embed meanings and values that frame articulations, undertakings, and projects, that constitute a way of life. In this sense a culture is both, and interrelatedly, a signifying system of material production. ... Culture in the sense intended here consists in knowing and doing. It is made up by the totality of created knowledge - in this case, concerning race(s) - and it involves a set of rules or conventions, a logic or grammar of their relations, and a vocabulary of expression and expressibility.

⁸ see Palmer (1990).

⁹ Gilroy's reference here is to Gates (1986: 5) who suggests that, "race has become a trope of ultimate, irreducible difference between cultures, linguistic groups, or adherents of specific belief systems which - more often than not - also have fundamentally opposed economic interests. Race is the ultimate trope of difference because it is so very arbitrary in its application."

¹⁰ Valverde (1991: 10-11) notes:

... the practical institutional and even physical organization of class, race, and gender has been always articulated in and through discourse, with "articulation" meaning not only "expression" but also, in the structuralist usage, joining and organization. ... This is not to suggest that verbal signs or pictures *create* certain social relations; it is rather to demonstrate that practical social relations are always mediated and articulated through linguistic and non-linguistic signifying practices.

¹¹ In the British context see for example Barker (1981), Gordon and Klug (1986), Levitas, (1986), and Husbands (1988).

¹² See Omi and Winant, 1986: 102-108 for the reasons behind this decline.

¹³ A good example of the neoconservative reaction against the civil rights movement can be seen in Horowitz (1991: 129):

... there is a new racism rampant in American today. It is politically inspired and seeks the enactment of laws that are racially specific and tailored to the requirements of selected groups: it attributes the economic, social and moral problems of designated minorities to their alleged "oppression" by a rigged system; and it seeks to solve their problems by the exaction of public ransoms in the form of government benefits and special privilege for ethnic grievance. This new racism has sprung up and spread like a poisonous weed to choke the civility that the civil rights movement established. It has given the old racism a new lease on life.

¹⁴ For an extended analysis of the context in which right-wing racial discourse emerged in the US., see Omi, 1987 (specifically chapter 2); in the British context see Solomos et al, 1982.

2: PORTRAIT OF A NEW PARTY

¹ Of course the history of Canadian party politics is not quite as simple as this suggests. Brodie and Jenson (1988, 1989) provide a thorough and insightful analysis of the underlying causes for this configuration in Canadian politics, and its subsequent effect on the party system in Canada.

² For a brief and concise history of politics on the Canadian prairies, see Gibbins (1990). Here, he discusses the "regional mythology of political discontent" evident throughout the history of the west. This mythology, rooted in western alienation, "expresses a sense of political economic, and cultural estrangement from the Canadian heartland" (1990: 61).

³ My main source for this history of the party is McCormick (1991). For more detailed information regarding the formation of the party see Dobbin (1992); Sharpe and Braid (1992); and Manning (1992a).

⁴ The appointment of Stan Waters was perhaps not as straightforward as I have made it sound. He was elected in Alberta, however Prime Minister Mulroney refused to appoint him for a number of months. It is widely believed that Waters' appointment came only after Mulroney had secured Alberta premier Don Getty's endorsement of the Meech Lake constitutional accord.

⁵ This information obtained in Flanagan and Ellis (1992). Mr. Flanagan in addition to being on faculty at the University of Calgary, was the former Director of Policy, Strategy and Communications for the Reform Party.

⁶ It is interesting to note that the survey did not question members on ethnic origin. According to the authors of the research, "[w]e did not attempt to ask a question on ethnicity because we knew it would be offensive to many respondents and might jeopardize the success of the study. The party is philosophically opposed to government subsidies for multiculturalism, and experience of members suggests that most simply wish to be identified as 'Canadian'" (Flanagan and Ellis, 1992). The party's discourse on multiculturalism is the subject of Chapter 5.

⁷ In Manning's own account of the party's history, he spends a great deal of time evoking the images of past populist "reformers" in the west. In particular, he cites Louis Riel, the "first western Reformer," Sir Fredrick Haultain, and of course those involved in the Progressive Party of Canada, the Social Credit movement, and the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation. For an extension of his discussion see Manning (1992a), especially pp.6-27.

⁸ *Saturday Night*, December, 1990: 37-8. Patten (1994) provides an interesting analysis of the growing middle class support for the Reform Party. Following other political scientists use of regulation theory, he examines the role political parties play in forging the necessary consensus required to establish and legitimize a "mode of regulation" and "societal paradigm". He utilizes these concepts and other contributions of regulation theory to explicate the economic, political and social restructuring that has occurred in post-war Canada. It is within this context that Patten locates the rising popularity of Reform. While his theoretical approach has much to offer, an examination of the sophisticated analytic constructs of regulation theory would be beyond the parameters of my present study.

⁹ See Patton, 1993 for a review and critique of Canovan's work on populism.

¹⁰ Harrison and Krahn (1992: 2) define nativism as:

... a belief system combining nationalism with prejudicial attitudes based on ethnicity, religion and/or race. Nativist attitudes are most often found among social groups which hold the same status characteristics, but not the economic or political power of the dominant class. Nativism emerges most frequently during periods of social, political, and/or economic crisis, reflecting the feelings of said groups that they must defend the country against internal threats posed by various minority groups.

¹¹ Harrison and Krahn qualify their results by pointing out the limitations of the data they utilized. Since the time the data was collected the support for the party has grown, especially with the party's expansion into Ontario after 1991. Nonetheless, I still believe their analysis offers some interesting insights.

¹² *Financial Times of Canada*, August 26/September 1, 1991: 8-10.

¹³ *Maclean's*, 16 December 1991: 13-14. For more information following this line of thought see *Saturday Night*, December 1990; *Briarpatch*, June 1991; and Sharpe and Braid, 1992. Dobbin (1992: 116-155) provides an account of how the party policy committee has "sanitized" many of Reform's policy positions, as well as how officials "manage" the membership. For a more academic accounting of the contradictions found within Reform's populism see Patten (1993) and Laycock (1993).

¹⁴ *Alberta Report*, April 29, 1991: 15.

¹⁵ *Vancouver Sun*, November 21, 1991: A4. It is interesting to note the media response to Copps' charges. A number of editorials were written chastising her (for example, *Vancouver Sun*, November 27, 1991: A4), while Reform's MP Deb Grey promptly dismissed her as "paranoid and hysterical" (*Globe and Mail*, November 20, 1991: A2). And although Liberal Party leader Jean Chrétien refused to repudiate Copps, he did try to temper the controversy. He claimed he would not use the word racist to describe Reform policies as "it's not a word that we use in Canada often" (*Vancouver Sun*, November 21, 1991: A4).

¹⁶ *Financial Post Daily*, June 13, 1991: 46.

¹⁷ *Montreal Gazette*, June 16, 1993: B1. The report also expressed concern that in June 1992 the highest-ranking Jew in the party, Michael Lublin, resigned charging widespread racism and anti-Semitism in Reform's rank and file, and even among some high-placed officials. Mr. Lublin cited "routine" racist and anti-Semitic remarks by members and organizers. His participation in the party was initially heralded by Reform officials as an example of the party's openness to minorities. When he quit the party, they dismissed Lublin's charges as "sour grapes" for he was denied a paid position within the party that he had been seeking. See *Canadian Jewish News*, July 9, 1992: 4; and *Toronto Star*, June 17, 1992: A16 for further particulars of Lublin's history with the party.

¹⁸ quoted in *Globe and Mail*, April 4, 1991: A7. As early as February 1990 the party was concerned about extremists in the party. An article in *Alberta Report* discusses Manning's attempt to appeal to people with "strong social concerns" as an attempt to ward off infiltration by extremists. An official of the party was quoted in the article as stating, "We're at a stage now where we're attractive to a lot of people on the fringes. There are elements outside the Reform Party, very right-wing, sitting on the sidelines, who are anxious to jump in and swing the party to the right. This is the critical period for us" (February 19, 1990: 18). The article also notes how this appeal to people on the left of the ideological spectrum angered many of the right-wing supporters of the party.

¹⁹ Gairdner defines "traditional" immigrants as whites from the United States, the U.K., New Zealand, Australia, and South Africa.

²⁰ Gairdner further suggests that in 250 years "Canada could be a Chinese nation." He writes, "surely any nation has the right to defend itself against demographic capture, or, if you prefer, against passive racial or cultural takeover." He suggests, "immigrants should be instructed in the core heritage and culture of the nation which is Judeo-Christian, Greco-Roman and Anglo-European. And they should be expected to assimilate to that culture." He also speaks at length on the conspiracy against English Canada in a section entitled "Master Plan for the Francization of Canada" (quoted in Dobbin, 1991: 111-112).

²¹ *Calgary Herald*, June 13, 1991: A1; *Halifax Chronicle Herald*, June 24, 1991: A2. This may be a rather weak defense however. While Manning claims he had no prior knowledge of Gairdner's views, it would be difficult to believe no one in the upper echelons of the party was aware of his more controversial positions. Indeed, the party paper (Reform Party of Canada, 1990b) discusses Gairdner's book by noting:

[It] describes the way in which our nation is caught between irreconcilable styles of government: collectivism and individualism. He cites, among Canada's maladies, the excesses in its welfare programs and foreign aid, radical feminism's attack on the family, our failing health care system, our indulgent criminal justice system, the politicization of the church, the state takeover of sport, *the threat to unity posed by our bilingual and multicultural policies* and our badly flawed constitution [emphasis added].

²² *British Columbia Report*, June 24, 1991: 20.

²³ *Toronto Star*, December 9, 1990: B7.

²⁴ *Toronto Star*, February 29, 1992: A9.

²⁵ *Calgary Herald*, February 29, 1992: A2.

²⁶ In a separate incident that occurred approximately one month prior to the Heritage Front story, the media reported that Gordon LeGrand was also a member of the party. Mr. LeGrand garnered national media attention as the Brockville, Ontario resident who trampled on a burning Quebec flag in 1990. Not only

was Mr. LeGrand a member of the party, but was elected secretary of the party's riding executive in December 1991. After learning of his activities, the party also expelled LeGrand (*Toronto Star*, January 19, 1992: A10). It is rather interesting to note that in an interview Stephen Harper, the party's chief policy analyst, insisted that the individuals expelled were only members of the party. He stated, they had "no role or influence anywhere in the party. ... There was just no evidence these people have ever played any role in the association" (author interview with Stephen Harper, July 15, 1993). However, as stated above Mr. LeGrand was on the riding executive. Further media reports suggest that one of the individuals expelled in Toronto had also found his way onto the party's riding executive (*Alberta Report*, March 23, 1992: 12).

²⁷ *Winnipeg Free Press*, March 11, 1992: A3. While 17 people have been expelled from the party, not all have been done so due to their racist or extremist associations. Seven members were expelled in British Columbia for attempting to form a Reform provincial wing which contravenes the current party constitution. Another four were removed from Manitoba for defying party organizational structures. The remaining expulsions occurred in Ontario for their "unacceptable affiliations" (*Vancouver Sun*, March 11, 1992: A4.).

²⁸ Manning quoted in *Vancouver Sun*, July 9, 1992: A11. In an interview with the author (July 15, 1993) Stephen Harper echoed this sentiment: "You would have to be pretty segregated to actually believe that this [image of extremism] is the Reform Party, and that Preston Manning goes home, takes off his toupee and he's a skinhead. It's like calling an NDP a communist. It's almost so extreme that it begins to refute the charge to some degree." It is also interesting to note how people have come to the personal defense of Mr. Manning. In a letter to the editor, Phillip Stuffco, Manning's Metis brother-in-law, went to great lengths to demonstrate the "egalitarian" nature of Manning's character and how he has "befriended minorities all of his life" (*Western Report*, December 9, 1992: 3).

²⁹ *Maclean's*, December 16, 1992. An article in *Alberta Report* suggests the same thing. "Ms Copps terms the party as 'racist, sexist, and elitist.' Reformers say that's a translation for 'Quit stealing our members'" (April 1, 1991: 16). A somewhat more vitriolic defense comes in the party paper (*The Reformer*, 5,2 (April), 1992: 2) which had this to say about the protestors who showed up to demonstrate at Reform functions:

This is an increasingly common hit-and-run strategy of the left. Relax. Don't let the unfairness of it all get to you. Name-calling is the last resort of those who can no longer reason. These people are totally unable to deal intelligently and logically with political ideas, so they try to win by smearing. They're like obscene phone-callers, who get their jollies by trying to get a knee-jerk reaction of shock and revulsion from those they contact.

³⁰ *Maclean's*, October 29, 1990: 31.

³¹ *Canadian Jewish News*, January 21, 1993: 1; *Toronto Star*, January 14, 1993: A9.

³² Manning notes:

With a new party there's always a danger of people who hold extreme views of all kinds, including racial views, being attracted. We're taking some steps. We find the best protection against that is just our growth. The more we broaden out, the more these extreme people start to tail off. They're attracted to small open groups where a couple of strong people [can be influential]. But if you have a riding association of 1,500 or 2,000 members, well, these guys know they can't influence that so they tail off. So we're endeavouring to protect ourselves and the best way we can is through growth. And we're making sure our policy statements ... are not coloured by those types of people.

(quoted in Sharpe and Braid, 1992: 104)

³³ Manning, quoted in *Toronto Star*, March 18, 1990: A18. He argues, "Central Canadian media label western Canadian movements in terms such as separatist, extreme, and eccentric. Social Credit was called fascist, the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation communist" (*Maclean's*, October 29, 1990: 31). Manning does raise an interesting point. While it is true the media has often portrayed the party as another example of an extreme western-based political party, all *reported* incidences of extremism in the party - with the exception of Collins in Vancouver - have been connected to Reform's Ontario membership.

³⁴ *Winnipeg Free Press*, March 13, 1992: A8.

³⁵ *Toronto Star*, February 29, 1992: A9. Ron Wood, the party's director of communications told the *Globe and Mail* that their investigation of Heritage Front members in Toronto turned up a number of irregularities. When party officials began contacting people they had received membership applications from and who were associated with undesirable groups, the party found at least five who were not aware the applications had been made, and further claimed no interest in joining the party. This, Wood suggests, could indicate someone was trying to deliberately embarrass the party (February 29, 1992: A7).

³⁶ Author interview with Stephen Harper, July 15, 1993.

³⁷ *British Columbia Report*, June 24, 1991: 17.

³⁸ It is somewhat ironic, then, that party president Cliff Fryer admitted weeding out racists would prove difficult for it would be impossible to give members a "political correctness" test (*Calgary Herald*, March 11, 1992: A3.)

³⁹ *Winnipeg Free Press*, January 14, 1993: A3.

⁴⁰ January 21, 1993: 1.

⁴¹ quoted in *Canadian Jewish News*, July 25, 1991: 3.

⁴² quoted in *Toronto Star*, January 14, 1993: A9

⁴³ Reform Party of Canada, 1992o; also Reform Party of Canada, 1991g. The party has also formulated a committee from their executive council to investigate extremists in the party after the Heritage Front story broke. Through various sources the committee sought to obtain names of known extremist groups and their members. It then compared this list to that of their members and purged those names that were common to both (author interview with Tom Flanagan, July 13, 1993). In my interviews, party officials were hesitant to disclose much information about the operation of the committee and its findings, including giving an exact number of people that were expelled.

⁴⁴ *Alberta Report*, March 23, 1992: 13.

⁴⁵ Author interview with Stephen Harper, July 15, 1993. Tom Flanagan contradicts this assessment. In an interview with the author (July 13, 1993) he discussed what he viewed as the party's "lack of pre-emptive action" regarding infiltration by extremists. While he acknowledged the party did expel members of the Heritage Front once their association was known, he suggests:

... the reality is that the administration of all that was very sluggish and the kicking out has only

been done when the presence of these people were brought to light by reporters, and then they were kicked out immediately. But in fact, preemptive measures were not taken. Manning has talked about inoculating the party against extremists and he sent out memos. But on the ground, organizational measures were not taken to make sure that the right-wing fringe didn't get in ... We did become preemptive for a few months after the Heritage Front fiasco, and I think we did some good. But it's probably not permanent.

⁴⁶ *Winnipeg Free Press*, March 11, 1992: A3.

⁴⁷ *Winnipeg Free Press* April 2, 1993: A2. Officials tried to counter Droege's allegation that his organization was still involved in the party by suggesting that the Heritage Front was seeking to humiliate Reform. Ron Wood, press secretary for Manning stated, "These guys are out to embarrass the party in whatever way they can because they've all been thrown out." Mr. Wood stressed that contrary to Droege's statements, all known members of his organization had been "ferreted out" from the party (*Winnipeg Free Press* April 2, 1993: A2).

⁴⁸ *Maclean's*, October 25, 1993: 14. One of the many rather colourful statements made by the candidate, John Beck include: "I feel we have lost control of our country. It seems to be predominantly Jewish people who are running this country." It would seem that the party's rigorous candidate survey was not able to screen out Mr. Beck. Manning acted quickly and dropped him as a Reform candidate in the Toronto area riding.

⁴⁹ *Canadian Jewish News*, April 8, 1993: 3.

3: THE REFORM PARTY AND THE CULT OF THE FREE MARKET

¹ The reasons for the breakdown of the Keynesian compromise are varied and complex, and specific to different nation-states. Its contradictions were also experienced differently by the various social classes and interests. For example, the working class began to resist the bureaucratic and insensitive nature of the provision of social services; governments were increasingly pressured by declining resources and burgeoning deficits; capital, somewhat contradictorily, demanded more government subsidies, greater disciplining of workers through the retrenchment of labour legislation, while simultaneously calling for a less interventionist state. A review of the rich body of literature that highlights the contested project of the Keynesian welfare state and its ensuing decline will not be provided here. For an examination of the process in the Canadian context see McBride (1992), and Haiven et al (1991).

² It should be noted that there is wide disagreement about what the electoral successes of the right indicates. While Krieger's, and to a lesser extent Gunn's analyses would have us believe there is wide spread support for the right from various sectors of the general population, there are a number of authors who question this assumption. For example, Smith et al (1988) suggest that the conservative resurgence should be understood as the result of extensive citizen disaffection with the incumbent establishment. As such, voters identify with the *failures* but not the *ideals* and *purposes* of the welfare state. There is no evidence, therefore, to conclude a massive conversion to conservative ideals and goals has occurred. (See also Mishler et al (1988) for a similar argument, and Whitaker, 1987 for the US context.) For a summary of the theoretical nuances involved in the debate regarding the right's hegemonic status see Levitas, 1986: pp. 5-17.

³ Marchak (1991) also positions the NR along the terrain of class and the politics of production. She locates the roots of its ascendancy in the restructuring of the global economy that began in the mid-1960s. The rise of the right, then, is seen as a response to the decline in American hegemony and the concomitant rise of Japan and a united Europe as the location of global economic power; to the rapid technological changes that were occurring; and to the international mobility of capital. However, it should be noted other authors choose instead to stress the role of "new politics" or "new social movements" that emerged in the 1960s. The demands made by feminist, ecology, civil rights, and peace movements opened up a space in which the right could construe these movements as symptoms of widespread social breakdown. In this space, the right was able to forge its own moral agenda, based on the family, the maintenance of law and order, and the upholding of "traditional" values (Gunn, 1989). Helvacioğlu's analysis should be understood in this context.

⁴ In fact there is often disagreement or a lack of clarity about the usage of the term "right" and the validity of the "left"/"right" dichotomy. See Eatwell and O'Sullivan (1989) for a discussion, especially Eatwell's chapter, "The Rise of 'Left-Right' Terminology: The Confusions of Social Science," pp. 32-46.

⁵ See for instance Jacobs (1992), Thompson (1990), Gunn (1989), Langille (1987), to name a few.

⁶ It has been argued that Canada's experience with the new right has been more clearly articulated at the *provincial* (citing Saskatchewan and British Columbia as examples) rather than federal level. For an analysis of this phenomenon in Saskatchewan see Pitsula and Rasmussen (1990); for the case of British Columbia see Carroll and Ratner (1989) and Marchak (1990).

⁷ For more views arguing that the Mulroney government represents a significant rightward shift in Canadian politics see Lightman and Irving (1991); Irving and Rose (1989); Prince (1986). For an opposing view see Gibbins (1988). Jenson (1989) provides an insightful analysis of why Canada has experienced the post-war crisis differently. This experience she argues, has effected the Canadian articulation of new right ideology.

⁸ The Mulroney government's position on multiculturalism and immigration is explored in Stasiulis (1991 and 1988) where she discusses its somewhat ambiguous and tentative nature.

⁹ I am referring here to Paul Martin, Jr. (Minister of Finance), John Manley (Minister of Industry), Roy MacLaren (Minister for International Trade), and Arthur Eggleton (President of the Treasury Board).

¹⁰ Reform Party of Canada, 1991a: 2. Another of the party's principles listed here is, "We believe in the value of enterprise and initiative, and that governments have a responsibility to foster and protect an environment in which initiative and enterprise can be exercised by individuals and groups."

¹¹ Reform Party of Canada, 1991a, pp. 13-14.

¹² *Financial Times of Canada*, April 15/21, 1991: 9.

¹³ Reform Party of Canada, n.d. [a].

¹⁴ Manning, 1990a: 5.

¹⁵ quoted in *Calgary Herald*, October 26, 1992: A7. Manning therefore makes the interesting connection to interest groups and the deficit - ie., that the latter is a result of the actions of the former. The party's discourse on special interest groups is very revealing and will be discussed in Chapter 7.

¹⁶ Reform Party of Canada, 1991a: 20.

¹⁷ It must be remembered that after seven years of promising a national child care program, the Tories reneged on this promise.

¹⁸ *Montreal Gazette*, November 10, 1992: B1. The focus on deficit reduction was one of the party's main planks in its recent election platform. The party's plan to eliminate the federal deficit in three years was summed up in the slogan, "Zero in Three: The Reform Party of Canada's plan to stop digging and start building." This plan is summarized in Reform Party of Canada, 1993d.

¹⁹ Reform Party of Canada, 1991a: p. 22.

²⁰ *Financial Times of Canada*, April 15/21, 1991: 9.

²¹ Reform Party of Canada, 1991a: 16-17. It should be noted that the party advocates this stance "if other domestic sectors and countries will do the same".

²² *Saturday Night*, December, 1990: 38.

²³ Reform Party of Canada, 1988a: 21-22. Yet by the time the party published its 1991 manual it *had* decided to say something specifically about medicare:

The Reform Party recognizes the importance of ensuring that adequate health-care insurance and services are available to every Canadian, that it is the Provinces which currently possess the legal and constitutional responsibility to provide such insurance and services, and that federal funding in support of such insurance and services should be unconditional and recognize different levels of economic development in the provinces.

(Reform Party of Canada, 1991a: 30)

²⁴ Reform party of Canada, 1991a: 28.

²⁵ *Alberta Report*, October 8, 1990: 17.

²⁶ Reform Party of Canada, 1991a: 29.

²⁷ At the Reform Party assembly in April 1991, Manning demonstrated his deftness at diffusing the potentially divisive issue of universality. A delegate proposed an amendment that the party make a clear commitment to universality in health care while still allowing user fees in some instances. Manning was able to diffuse this debate by suggesting that the party's position on health care already reflected Reform's commitment to universality, by "ensuring adequate health care for every Canadian." Manning states "that is a way of saying what other people would say was 'universal'. But it's a non-Liberal, non-NDP way of saying it." By saying that health is provincial responsibility it would suggest, according to Manning, that provinces could control costs as they choose. "It could include user fees, but it doesn't say so. It doesn't have the catch-phrases 'universal' and 'user-fee'" (*Globe and Mail*, April 6, 1991: A4).

²⁸ quoted in *Globe and Mail*, January 13, 1993: A6.

²⁹ Manning, n.d.

³⁰ Reform Party of Canada, 1988a: 20.

³¹ Reform Party of Canada, 1992a.

³² see McQuaig, 1993: 32-37 for an extended discussion.

³³ It is interesting to note that the party suggests that the greatest threat to Canada's social service safety network (which includes health care, pensions, and social assistance, but *not* unemployment insurance), "is not attacks on these programs by fiscal conservatives; it is uncontrolled federal spending, the ever-increasing national debt, and rising interest payments which leave fewer dollars available for the provision of essential services" (Reform Party of Canada, 1992m).

³⁴ *Winnipeg Free Press*, June 10, 1990: 5.

³⁵ Reform Party of Canada, n.d.[e].

³⁶ *Globe and Mail*, June 8, 1992: A1, A2. Regarding unemployment insurance, the party's first policy manual (Reform Party of Canada, 1988a: 21) states:

Unemployment Insurance has become one of the most costly, abused, and ineffective of all social policy measures. ...

Unemployment Insurance should be returned to its original function - an employee-employer funded and administered program to provide temporary income in the event of unexpected job loss. The program has been wrongly used to address regional underdevelopment, job restraining, and comprehensive social security (welfare) considerations that would be better addressed in other ways.

³⁷ *Globe and Mail*, June 12, 1992: A7.

³⁸ Reform Party of Canada, 1988a: 19.

³⁹ Reform Party of Canada, 1988a: 19.

⁴⁰ Reform Party of Canada, 1988a: 19.

⁴¹ *Alberta Report*, October 8, 1990: 17.

⁴² Reform Party of Canada, 1990c.

⁴³ Reform Party of Canada, 1988: 19-20.

⁴⁴ Information and direct quotes attributed to Stephen Harper in this section are found in Harper, 1987.

⁴⁵ The party's first policy manual echoes Harper's concern about "middlemen":

... a system with true 'social conscience' concentrates its help on those who cannot help themselves and, where possible, enables them to help themselves in the future. Today too much of the resources of social policy are ultimately directed to those who do not require help - bureaucrats, social activists, researchers, political professionals, pressure groups, high and middle income earners. The focus on the middlemen has been detrimental both in terms of cost-effectiveness and humanitarianism.

(Reform Party of Canada, 1988a: 19)

⁴⁶ Eisenstein (1987) notes that the new right holds the welfare state responsible for undermining the traditional patriarchal family by taking over family functions. In this view, then, the health, welfare, and education of individuals should be the purview of the family. The Reform Party's discourse on the family and women's issues is discussed in Chapter 7.

⁴⁷ This phrase is borrowed from Gamble, 1989: 15

4: REARTICULATING THE GOALS OF IMMIGRATION

¹ Under current policy, there are three basic classes of immigrants. They include: *independent class* who enter under a point system on the basis of their skills and education; *family class* who come into the country under the family reunification program; and thirdly, *refugees*. A business immigration program was initially launched in 1978, and was strongly encouraged by the Tory government of Brian Mulroney (see for example *Report on Business Magazine*, April, 1990: 94). The breakdown of immigration by class during the 1980s was: family class 48%; business class 7%; and independents 27% (White and Samuel, 1991).

² Stephen Harper, has been the party's chief policy architect and is now a sitting member for Reform in the House of Commons. He is widely considered to wield a significant influence within the party, and as implied here by Flanagan, was instrumental, along with Preston Manning, in the founding of the party.

³ Author interview with Tom Flanagan, July 13, 1993. Flanagan did however admit that "as people got attracted to the party, they wanted it to start talking about things like immigration and multiculturalism." This suggests a distinction between the views of Reform supporters and those of their leadership. The significance of this is addressed later in the chapter.

⁴ Bill C-86, which substantially amended the Immigration Act, was passed by Parliament in the spring of 1993. The Reform Party's criticism of immigration is based largely on the policy *prior* to these amendments. Indeed, as will be discussed below, it has been suggested the party played a significant role in influencing the Tory government to introduce changes to immigration policy.

⁵ *Calgary Herald*, August 13, 1988: B2.

⁶ Reform Party of Canada, 1988a: 23. The concern over the "legalization" of "immigration abuses" likely refers to the amnesty provided to refugees as a result of the huge back-log of cases before the Immigration and Refugee Board in the late 1980s. The party's discourse on refugees is important, and is discussed below.

⁷ Reform Party of Canada, 1988a: 24.

⁸ Author interview with Deborah Grey, July 23, 1993. Taking into account economic and demographic needs of the country, the Minister responsible for immigration is required to determine in advance the levels it has set for the different classes and to report those annually to Parliament (Proudfoot, 1989). When the Mulroney government entered office, it began to increase immigration levels. By 1989 total immigration (189,200) was more than double that of 1985 (84,302). In October 1990 then Minister, Barbara McDougall announced a five year immigration plan that was to continue this policy of increased growth. The proposal set the following targets for total immigration: 200,000 in 1990; 220,000 in 1991; and 250,000 per year from 1992-95 (Stasiulis, 1991). The Liberal government elected in the fall of 1993 has expressed its intention to maintain these levels.

- ⁹ Stephen Harper, quoted in *Halifax Chronicle Herald*, June 24, 1991: A1.
- ¹⁰ Reform Party of Canada, 1988a: 23.
- ¹¹ Author interview with Tom Flanagan, July 13, 1993.
- ¹² In the past, Lee Morrison has served as a member of the party's executive council, and is now a Reform MP. Quotes attributed to him are from a number of editorial pieces Morrison wrote that the party submitted to various daily newspapers.
- ¹³ Economic Council of Canada, 1991: 5.
- ¹⁴ *Maclean's*, July 25, 1994: 16. Just as most studies on the impact of immigration, the Stats Canada study has its share of critics. For a counter to such positive accounts of immigration see Stoffman, 1993. My aim is not to resolve the debates revolving around the effects of immigration on host countries, but merely to point to the Reform Party's role in the discussion.
- ¹⁵ Author interview with Dimitri Pantazopoulos, July 14, 1993. After the federal election in October 1993, Pantazopoulos was transferred from the party's head office in Calgary, and appointed to a new position in Ottawa.
- ¹⁶ Reform Party of Canada, 1988a: 24.
- ¹⁷ Reform Party of Canada, 1988a: 23. The call to use the notwithstanding clause of the Charter is a reference to what is known as the "Singh decision" - a landmark Supreme Court ruling that has enabled a number of failed refugees to use a Charter defense to avoid deportation. As such, it has had a significant impact on the refugee determination system. The party's discourse on this particular issue is raised below.
- ¹⁸ Reform Party of Canada, n.d.[e].
- ¹⁹ Reform Party of Canada, 1988a: 24.
- ²⁰ Reform Party of Canada, 1991a: 33-35.
- ²¹ Reform Party of Canada, 1992n.
- ²² Author interview with Stephen Harper, July 15, 1993.
- ²³ *Halifax Chronicle Herald*, June 24, 1991: A1.
- ²⁴ Author interview with Stephen Harper, July 15, 1993.
- ²⁵ *Globe and Mail*, July 15, 1991: A6. Deborah Grey also uses this line of defense. She stated, "We're not fussy about what colour somebody is when they come in. You know, we are always accused of wanting to bring in white Anglo-Saxon Protestants, but that is not true. We think that [immigration policy] should be economic in nature. In other words, if we are short of plumbers here, we don't care what colour the plumbers are that are coming in" (interview with author, July 23, 1993).
- ²⁶ *Viewpoints: The Canadian Jewish Periodical*, September 3, 1992: 1-2.
- ²⁷ Reform Party of Canada, 1992o.

²⁸ Reform Party of Canada, 1991a: 34.

²⁹ One party document did offer the following: "The Reform Party recognizes the economic, social and cultural contributions that immigrants make to Canadian society and recognizes the need for the support they initially require to adjust to Canadian society" (Reform Party of Canada, 1992n). Yet it is not clear from this what commitment the party would have to language training programs. This is especially significant for spouses of independent immigrants, who enter as dependents and who are mostly female. Until recently dependent immigrants were not eligible for government-funded language training programs, and still do not have full access to all subsidies attached to such programs.

³⁰ Bolaria (1988: 218) cites the example of an immigrant who had obtained a Bachelor's degree from India with first-class standing, but was only qualified for admission to the first year of a Canadian university's undergraduate degree program.

³¹ The party's manager of policy, Dimitri Pantazopoulos, did discuss the difficulty with accreditation (interview with author, July 14, 1993). However, his concern was not reflected by any other party officials interviewed, or in any other party documents obtained throughout my research. In addition, Pantazopoulos offered no indication of how the party would address the issue.

³² Quoted in *Globe and Mail*, July 15, 1991: A6. Therese Arsenault, a political scientist at St Mary's University in Halifax, suggests that "they want immigrants who assimilate as quick as possible into the Canadian fabric. Does that mean white people assimilate quicker or do you just have to be wealthy? In that case, wealthy Asians would be just as acceptable" (*Vancouver Sun*, March 7, 1992: B3).

³³ *Globe and Mail*, July 15, 1991: A6. At the time the article was written, Mr. Abbot was director of an association which is highly critical of immigration/refugee policy.

³⁴ Based on this phrasing, the party has repeatedly been called upon to defend its immigration policy. Its original statement on the issue received attacks from many quarters, particularly from Liberal MP Sheila Copps. The wording of the original policy was also deemed to be problematic by some party officials. In an interview Stephen Harper admitted that the phrase regarding the "ethnic makeup of Canada" troubled him as a "piece of political rhetoric." As he stated, "awkward pieces of rhetoric are dangerous especially on that issue." However, Harper insisted that the phrase was not designed with any racial overtones, but was "all part of a statement saying that immigration policy should not have any racial or ethnic qualifications" (author interview with Stephen Harper, July 15, 1993). This phrasing was subsequently dropped when the policy was sanitized at the party's 1991 convention.

³⁵ Reform Party of Canada, 1991a: 34.

³⁶ Just as Morrison connects immigration with our "economic and social collapse, the party's original policy book (1988a: 11) states,

We believe that [referenda] is most applicable to public policy that involves the most deeply held values of Canadians. Issues like capital punishment and abortion require a directly democratic process without partisanship or suppression. We would also recommend consulting the people on matters that alter the basic social fabric such as immigration, language, and measurement.

This suggests that from the outset, the party was linking immigration (and language) with "deeply held values" and our "basic social fabric."

³⁷ Morrison (1990a) also writes,

Historically, immigrants were allowed into Canada to fill Canadian economic needs and were, admittedly, often exploited by those who had arrived ahead of them. The Irish in the 1850's, the Chinese in the 1880's, the Ukrainians at the turn of the century and Central Europeans brought here in the 1920's to maintain railway lines were notable examples. They made a go of it in their new country and their descendants now occupy the Canadian mainstream. Even in the "kinder, gentler" society that followed World War II, thousands of displaced persons *earned* their right to stay by working for at least a year as badly needed agricultural labourers.

This passage seems to imply that recent immigrants are not *earning* their right to stay in Canada.

³⁸ Reform Party of Canada, 1988c.

³⁹ Reform Party of Canada, 1989c. Also Reform Party of Canada, 1988b. A number of party pamphlets also reiterate this same theme.

⁴⁰ Author interview with Stephen Harper, July 15, 1993. In our interview Harper contended that the Singh decision essentially said Canadian society had no right to seal its borders. It is this perception that leads to the party's insistence on allowing the people to decide immigration priorities via referendum.

⁴¹ *Globe and Mail*, July 15, 1991: A6.

⁴² *Globe and Mail*, January 13, 1993: A6.

⁴³ Author interview with Deborah Grey, July 23, 1993.

⁴⁴ Deborah Grey discussed the party's desire to have "very, very crisp set of criteria about what constitutes or defines a refugee." She suggested some refugees "try to talk their way in" for wanting to flee "a personal marriage situation." She seemed to take exception to current practice which according to her assessment, defines a refugee as "somebody who is in danger of going back to their homeland" (Interview with author, July 23, 1993).

⁴⁵ Author interview with Tom Flanagan, July 13, 1993. A party document reads: "The Reform Party believes in the legitimacy of a refugee immigration component. However, the refugee status is often used as a mechanism for expediency and exception to non-genuine refugees" (Reform Party of Canada, 1992n).

⁴⁶ In 1978, Thatcher suggested it was perfectly natural for people to fear being swamped by people of a different culture when immigration levels were set too high (Krieger, 1986). For an extended discussion of the increasing hostility against foreigners, see *The Economist*, February 15, 1992: 21-5; as well as the special issue on racism in Europe in *Race and Class*, 1991: 32, 3.

⁴⁷ *Globe and Mail*, July 15, 1991: A6.

⁴⁸ *Calgary Herald*, June 13, 1991: A1. Manning's reference to turbans alludes to the RCMP dress code which was amended to allow for turbans worn by orthodox Sikhs. Reform's stated policy on the issue is (Reform Party of Canada, 1991a: 31):

The Reform Party supports the preservation of the distinctive heritage and tradition of the RCMP by retaining the uniformity of dress code. Changes should not be made for religious or ethnic reasons.

Stasiulis (1991: 250-52) discusses how the image of the RCMP became a touchstone for racial and religious intolerance in Canada.

⁴⁹ *Globe and Mail*, July 15, 1991: A6.

⁵⁰ It should be noted that immigration is a shared jurisdiction under the BNA Act, 1867. Other provinces could have more input into immigration in their provinces if they chose to, but up to now, Quebec is the only province who has systematically exercised its option. Reform's discourse on Quebec and language policy is addressed in Chapter 6, and will be discussed in greater detail there.

⁵¹ Reform Party of Canada, 1990c.

⁵² Author interview with Stephen Harper, July 15, 1993.

⁵³ Government of Canada, "Bill C-86: An Act to Amend the Immigration Act (Legislative Summary)," 1992a.

⁵⁴ Author interview with Stephen Harper, July 15, 1993.

⁵⁵ Some party officials are willing to admit that in certain quarters of the party, immigration is a significant issue. Flanagan (interview with author, July 13, 1993) stated, "I know there are members of the Reform Party whose objection is essentially to non-white immigrants and they think the party is opposed to non-white immigration."

⁵⁶ *Calgary Herald*, March 24, 1991: A4; *Halifax Chronicle Herald*, June 24, 1991: A2. Diane Ablonczy, who at that time was party chair, was quoted in the *Calgary Herald* as saying "There was no support for those [resolutions] so they weren't brought forward." Dobbin (1991) provides an interesting glimpse of the machinations of the party's executive and their attempts to ensure these resolutions were never brought to the party assembly. See 135-36, 169-70 for more information.

⁵⁷ *Winnipeg Free Press*, October 24, 1992: A1. This was passed even though Stephen Harper spoke against the motion. He stated to delegates, "It does not make our party look good to focus its immigration plank on criminals." It is interesting to note that while delegates debated this resolution, Manning simultaneously held a press conference, likely hoping it would draw the media out of the convention hall. It would seem that the party leadership was nervous about this resolution and the perceptions of the party it would leave. It is instructive to note that the policy manual (Reform Party of Canada, 1993a) that came out after the assembly where this resolution was adopted did not reflect this resolution. The party's position on immigration remained unchanged from the 1991 "Blue Book."

⁵⁸ *Globe and Mail*, July 15, 1991: A6.

⁵⁹ Reform Party of Canada, 1991a: 34.

5: HYPHENATED CANADIANISM

¹ *Halifax Chronicle Herald*, June 24, 1991: A2.

² A party pamphlet reads, "We oppose the concept of hyphenated Canadianism which tends to alienate and isolate individuals and groups by setting them apart from their fellow Canadians" (Reform Party of Canada, n.d.[f]).

³ Author interview with Stephen Harper, July 15, 1993.

⁴ quoted in Reform Party of Canada, 1992b. According to Reform officials, Professor Khan has been the party's chief author for multicultural policy.

⁵ Lee Morrison (1990b) provides a somewhat more vitriolic critique of multiculturalism. He writes:

... after twenty years of this nonsense [multiculturalism], we are now confronted by Indian bands claiming that they should be treated as sovereign nations within our national boundaries. (In South Africa this is called the "homelands Policy" of *apartheid*). It has been declared that Sikh-Canadians have the exclusive right to wear turbans with RCMP uniforms, and one supposes that eventually the Scots will be able to perform the musical ride clad in kilts. This raises a question. "If a Sikh and a Scot marry and have a child who grows up to be a mountie, will the child be able to wear both a turban and a kilt?"

⁶ Author interview with Stephen Harper, July 15, 1993.

⁷ Reform Party of Canada, 1991e.

⁸ Author interview with Stephen Harper, July 15, 1993.

⁹ Reform Party of Canada, 1990a: 23.

¹⁰ Rais Khan came to Canada from South Asia, and is a professor of political science at the University of Winnipeg. According to a *Winnipeg Free Press* article (June 13, 1991: 17), Manning asked Professor Khan how the issue of multiculturalism could be raised while avoiding charges of racism. Khan is quoted in the article: "I told Mr. Manning he has to bite the bullet and do this. They'll be accused of racism. I was accused of racism for saying this. If I can be called a racist with my skin being brown, people with white skin would be called racist."

¹¹ Author interview with Stephen Harper, July 15, 1993.

¹² Reform Party of Canada, 1991a: 35.

¹³ Reform Party of Canada, 1991d, 1991f.

¹⁴ None of this, of course, negates the manipulation of ethnic loyalties and the provision of support to multiculturalism by politicians of the three major political parties for electoral support (as documented in Stasiulis and Abu-Laban, 1991). My point here is not that Reform is incorrect in pointing out such uses of multicultural policy. It is merely that in projecting that as its *raison d'être*, the party de-legitimizes the policy's otherwise laudable goals.

¹⁵ *Financial Post Daily*, June 18, 1991: 12.

¹⁶ Reform Party of Canada, 1991e. (See also Manning, 1993a; Flanagan and Pantazopoulos, 1992.) In an interview Flanagan noted that Manning has never spoken out against "the need for anti-discrimination machinery like the existence of the Human Rights Commission." However, he further suggested that the

membership of the party may not concur with Manning on this point. Flanagan himself does not "accept the need for official anti-discrimination machinery other than the normal courts" (author interview with Tom Flanagan, July 13, 1993). Indeed, Flanagan himself is quite critical of the role played by such "machinery." This is evidenced in an article in which both provincial and federal Human Rights Commissions are castigated for what he terms "the legal manufacture of minorities." There he argues that "mere statistical categories, such as left-handed people, can become genuine minority groups if they become aware of their powerlessness and mistreatment at the hands of the statistical majority, and if they can gain a degree of public recognition of their group trait" (Flanagan, 1985). The position taken by Flanagan is characteristic of the new right's stance on equality issues as will be discussed below.

¹⁷ Diane Hu quoted in *Vancouver Sun*, July 22, 1991: A9. Ms. Hu, who was vying for the party's candidacy in Vancouver, often attended party functions with Manning in order to demonstrate the openness of the party to minorities - both to women and to people of colour. However, she never did obtain the party's nomination, and won only 43 of 445 potential votes. According to the *Alberta Report* (April 27, 1992: 16) she had mistakenly staked her candidacy on the fact she was so "politically correct." It states, "Observers concluded that in so blatantly touting her ethnic background and gender, a politically naive Ms. Hu insulted many of the party faithful who cannot countenance special treatment for minorities."

¹⁸ The motivations for immigrating to Canada are of course more varied than even this suggests, and certainly differ according to whether the migrants are voluntary or refugees fleeing war, persecution, etc. Indeed, some of that persecution *may* be culturally-based (for eg., the concerns feminists have expressed about female genital mutilation practiced in some African countries). The point I wish to make here, is merely that in Reform's disavowal of the significance of cultural retention, the party, in many ways, ignores the wishes, desires, and realities of many immigrant and refugee groups.

¹⁹ Interestingly enough, in our interview Flanagan was actually rather critical of Manning's understanding of multiculturalism. According to Flanagan, their leader focuses exclusively on the operation of the department and offers no recognition of the other debates. Flanagan stated, "There's all kinds of legal stuff going on through the Charter, through the Canadian Human Rights Act, through litigation, through various kinds of government supported educational activities. Preston never deals with any of that. He focuses only on the department and the federal Multiculturalism Act. So it is a very narrow critique" (interview with author, July 13, 1993). Flanagan lamented the fact that the party followed its leader in ignoring these larger issues. My argument, however, is that while the party may have no *official* position, it does engage in a particular discourse on these issues, which is indicative of its new right ideology.

²⁰ *Winnipeg Free Press*, May 29, 1991: 7. The official quoted was constituency president for a Winnipeg riding, Lloyd Kirkham (no relation to author). In a phrase reminiscent of Margaret Thatcher's discourse on the "nanny state", he also claimed that Canadians must be weaned away from their dependence on "womb to tomb" government.

²¹ Reform Party of Canada, 1993d.

²² Reform Party of Canada, 1992b. It is somewhat contradictory that Professor Kahn calls for minimalist state intervention in language, culture and heritage, while simultaneously calling on the state to "promote, preserve, and enhance the national culture." I would suggest this reflects the contradiction between Reform's neoliberal and authoritarian conservative tendencies. While neoliberalism calls for a less interventionist state, conservatives want the state to intervene in the realm of culture to maintain traditional authority and order, including racial/ethnic/gender "traditions." It is obvious that in my discussion of the party's position on multiculturalism I am focusing more on its neoliberal discourse. This is more for methodological than conceptual reasons. I suspect that many supporters of Reform would take no exception to the state promoting a "national culture." In fact one could argue that such supporters desire the

articulation a white, English-speaking, male Canadian national identity. However, once the policy was sanitized in 1991, the party's official discourse demonstrates no clear evidence that would reveal its authoritarian conservatism on the issue of multiculturalism. Following Omi and Winant, I would further suggest that the party's neoliberal articulation of multiculturalism perhaps poses a bigger challenge to the ideals of cultural pluralism than would a more overt racial discourse embedded in the kind of rhetoric reminiscent of Thatcherite Conservatives in the UK. As we will see, this is due to its insidious nature by appealing to notions of individualism and equality.

²³ Author interview with Stephen Harper, July 15, 1993.

²⁴ Author interview with Tom Flanagan, July 13, 1993.

²⁵ Author interview with Stephen Harper, July 15, 1993. The significance of Reform's position on democratic and institutional reform are out of the scope of this present work. For such an analysis see Laycock (1993).

²⁶ Author interview with Stephen Harper, July 15, 1993.

²⁷ Reform Party of Canada, 1992f. It should be observed that sexual orientation is notably absent in the list of groups that "contribute to Canadian society." In an interview Flanagan admitted that the issue of gay rights is a source of unresolved conflict within the party (interview with author, July 13, 1993).

²⁸ Author interview with Stephen Harper, July 15, 1993.

²⁹ Reform Party of Canada, 1992f.

³⁰ Author interview with Stephen Harper, July 15, 1993. Manning avoids making strong statements such as this. In a *Globe and Mail* article he stopped just short of opposing pay equity, but did stress that equal conditions of employment should be achieved by "persuasion, not legislation" (January 13, 1993: A6).

³¹ Stephen Harper admitted, "when the party finds the Charter being used in ways it disagrees with it will tend to talk about why shouldn't Parliament have this kind of control instead of the courts. And when it finds itself in positions where it agrees with the charter then it will say we should have a Charter" (interview with author, July 15, 1993).

³² Author interview with Stephen Harper, July 15, 1993.

³³ quoted in *Globe and Mail*, January 13, 1993: A6.

³⁴ In Manning's defense, he does also single out business lobby groups as another "special interest group." The significance of the party's attack on special interest groups will be addressed in Chapter 7.

³⁵ Manning quoted in *Vancouver Sun*, February 15, 1991: A12.

³⁶ Reform Party of Canada, n.d.[d]. This statement was also added to the party's 1993 policy statement on multiculturalism (Reform Party of Canada, 1993a: 6).

³⁷ Reform Party of Canada, 1992a.

³⁸ *Financial Post Daily*, June 13, 1991: 46.

³⁹ Manning, quoted in *Canadian Jewish News*, January 21, 1993: 1.

⁴⁰ Manning, quoted in *Canadian Business Life*, fall, 1992: 17.

⁴¹ *Toronto Star*, June 13, 1991: A1. The party's discourse on preferential treatment (special status in Reform's usage) is discussed in the following chapter.

⁴² Author interview with Dimitri Pantazopoulos, July 14, 1993.

⁴³ The market version, as exemplified by Friedmann's *Capitalism and Freedom*, argues that imperatives within the free market lend itself to the elimination of discrimination. Friedmann argues that it is not in the economic interests of white employers and workers to oppose non-white employment opportunities, for such racist behaviour or "bad taste" mitigates against market rationality and the maximization of profits. These "racist tastes" are thus viewed as irrational responses on the part of white workers and employers that interfere with market rationality and the best economic outcomes (West, 1987). Of course what this approach ignores, as stated in Chapter 3, is the very real power dynamics embodied in the market itself. This imposes structural barriers outside and above individual attitudes, however racist they may or may not be. For a strong critique of the market relations account of racial and ethnic inequality see Boston (1988).

6: "EQUALITY" VERSUS "SPECIAL STATUS"

¹ Bill C-72 was introduced by the Mulroney government in June 1987 and was passed the following year. It updated the Official Languages Act in order to reflect the provisions provided in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The new Act guarantees the right of all Canadians to plead before all Federal courts in English or French, thereby guaranteeing the availability of a bilingual judge. It also guarantees the right to bilingual service from federal institutions in the national capital region, and in regions "where there is a significant demand" (*Macleans*, February 22, 1988: 24; April 25, 1988: 15).

² Party executive member, Henry Carroll quoted in Reform Party of Canada, 1988d.

³ Reform Party of Canada, n.d.[h].

⁴ Reform Party of Canada, 1988a: 22. Quebec's Bill 101, the Charter of the French Language, was adopted by that province in 1977. It declares French to be the official language of Quebec, for the courts, and the legislatures. French is compulsory in the public service, in all government-related organizations, in labour relations, commerce, and business. It also limits access to English schools to those children who have had one parent educated in English in Quebec (Denis, 1990).

⁵ Author interview with Dimitri Pantazopoulos, July 14, 1993.

⁶ Reform Party of Canada, 1991d. Bill 178, Quebec's sign law, maintains French only signage on places of business, as required by Bill 101 (Denis, 1990).

⁷ Author interview with Stephen Harper, July 15, 1993.

⁸ Author interview with Deborah Grey, July 23, 1993.

⁹ *Viewpoints: The Canadian Jewish Periodical*, September 3, 1992: 1. The Reform Party likes to foster this perception of "cereal box bilingualism." Deborah Grey stated, "You're not anti-French, anti-Quebec if you say this thing is costing untold billions of dollars by the time every single company pays for full translation on their containers and manuals, etc., etc." (interview with author July 23, 1993).

¹⁰ Author interview with Stephen Harper, July 15, 1993.

¹¹ Author interview with Stephen Harper, July 15, 1993. Harper (1991) stated in an address to delegates at the party's 1991 assembly:

It is the sacred creed of all three major parties for a quarter-century that Canada is defined by federal policies such as bilingualism and multiculturalism. The Spicer Commission has provided increasing evidence of what Reformers, and ordinary Canadians, have been saying all along. These are the pet projects of a political priesthood. Will all three major political parties admit that their linguistic and cultural policies are not the essence of Canada?

The party's rejection of this vision of the country is also reflected in their constitutional position *vis-à-vis* Quebec, and will be discussed below.

¹² Reform Party of Canada, 1991d.

¹³ Author interview with Stephen Harper, July 15, 1993.

¹⁴ In it is interesting to note, the party has refused overtures from the Confederation of Regions party whose position on official languages is much more hostile to francophones. Gordon Shaw, one-time vice-chair of the Reform Party has stated that while both Reform and COR share an opposition to "enforced bilingualism." Reform views COR as, "a single issue party, dealing largely with the language issue. We haven't had anything to do with them in the West, nor do we expect to have anything to do with the movement that's occurring [in New Brunswick]. We just don't have the same agenda" (quoted in *Winnipeg Free Press*, February 13, 1990: 8). Manning has also tried to distance the party from COR. In his book he takes great pains to describe his party's language policy, and its distinction from "COR's more strident call for English-only language legislation" (Manning, 1992a: 232).

¹⁵ In the party's 1990 policy manual this statement actually reads: "The Reform Party supports a removal of enforced bilingualism from the provincial level and of any forced language policy from private-sector institutions and personal lives" (Reform Party of Canada, 1990a: 22). This is another example of how the party, as it sought to reach a wider audience, began to temper its discourse in more moderate terms.

¹⁶ Reform Party of Canada, 1991a: 32-33. This policy remains unchanged in the party's 1993 policy statement (Reform Party of Canada, 1993a: 6).

¹⁷ Reform Party of Canada, 1992p.

¹⁸ Author interview with Stephen Harper, July 15, 1993.

¹⁹ Reform Party of Canada, 1991d.

²⁰ Reform Party of Canada, 1989b.

²¹ Reform Party of Canada, 1992p.

²² Reform Party of Canada, 1992a. As noted in Chapter 3, the provincialization of many social issues is clearly a part of the Reform Party's project, and further demonstrates its new right ideological stance.

²³ quoted in *Winnipeg Free Press*, February 25, 1992: A4.

²⁴ *Alberta Report*, November 6, 1989: 7.

²⁵ Manning quoted in, *Canadian Business Life*, fall, 1992: 17.

²⁶ Reform Party of Canada, 1989d.

²⁷ Reform Party of Canada, n.d.[c].

²⁸ Reform Party of Canada, 1988a: 8.

²⁹ The objection to special status was a theme that the party continued to echo in the debate leading up to the October 1992 referendum on the Charlottetown Accord. Manning repeatedly emphasized in the press the reason for the party's criticism of the deal was because of the special status it afforded to different groups on the basis of race, language, culture and gender. See for example *Winnipeg Free Press*, October 25, 1992: A1.

³⁰ Section 15, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, quoted in Weinfeld, 1988: 601.

³¹ Reform Party of Canada, 1991g. I am not willing to enter the fractious debate about whether Quebec represents a disadvantaged minority in Canadian confederation. As I stated at the beginning of the chapter, the histories of Quebec's grievances with the Canadian state are certainly distinct from those of Aboriginal communities, and should not be treated as similar instances of oppression. My point here is merely that Reform's rejection of "special status" be it that of Quebec, or that of the First Nations (as we will see below), is indicative of the new right's attempt to rearticulate understandings of racial and ethnic equality.

³² *Winnipeg Free Press*, March 3, 1988: 13.

³³ Author interview with Deborah Grey, July 23, 1993.

³⁴ Reform Party of Canada, 1988(d).

³⁵ *Maclean's*, April 25, 1988: 15.

³⁶ The historical specificities of racial and ethnic politics in the US and Canada cannot be over-exaggerated. The presence of a population who has inherited the legacy of slavery, in and of itself makes the American situation unique. This coupled with Canada's French/English history, the two countries distinct immigration patterns and varied relations with Aboriginal peoples, suggests a direct comparison between the US and Canadian context would be artificial to say the least. My intention is not to do that. I am merely using Omi's analysis to demonstrate that first, there has been an increased articulation of new right ideology in both Canada and the United States. The reasons for this, and the new right's manifestation is of course, specific to each country. Nonetheless, its presence is felt in both nation states. I have argued throughout this thesis that the Reform Party has presented itself as the clearest articulation of new right ideology at the federal level in Canada. Secondly, Omi's analysis is used to demonstrate that new right ideology includes a significant *racial character*. The constellation of forces that the new right is reacting to is different in both the US and Canada. My analysis of Reform's discourse represents an attempt to examine the *outcomes* of such a reaction within the Canadian framework.

³⁷ While the following discussion highlights only the work of Glazer, Omi (1987) provides a critique of two additional writers who have written substantively on race and ethnicity - Thomas Sowell and Charles Murray. See Boston (1988) for another rebuttal of the core arguments of contemporary theorists on the right in relation to race and racial equality.

³⁸ as quoted above, in Manning, 1990b: 6.

³⁹ Reform Party of Canada, 1991e.

⁴⁰ Reform Party of Canada, 1989d.

⁴¹ Reform Party of Canada, n.d.[f].

⁴² In interviews with party officials, I learned of the internal conflict that existed regarding Reform's position on Aboriginal issues. Tom Flanagan (interview with author, July 13, 1993) suggested:

[A] lot of people in the party, including myself, would have a far more robust critique of Indian self-government. I see this as a dead end for Native people. I see it as marginalizing them even further, getting them out of employment opportunities and condemning them to live forever in rural ghettos. But Preston [Manning], I don't think, would go along with that at all, and he certainly has no interest in making that kind of point.

Stephen Harper (interview with author July 15, 1993) reiterated this same view. In his estimation:

... the rank and file of the party is fairly serious in its conviction that race should not be a criterion in one's rights or in one's relationship to the Constitution, or the law. [However] Preston Manning has hedged. He has been absolutely clear he does not believe that in the case of Quebec or in the case of multiculturalism in general. But Preston Manning is much more liberal on Aboriginal rights than the average rank and file member of the party.

It is important to remember that in general, political parties tend to have different "wings" or factions (ie. the "red Tories"). It should be no surprise, therefore, to find internal disagreement over policy issues within the Reform Party, and indeed my interviews bore this out on a number of issues. However, the purpose of this work is not to discuss the internal ideological debates within Reform. The aim is to examine the ideological discourse that results from those debates, and is present in party literature and statements from Reform officials.

⁴³ Reform Party of Canada, 1989d.

⁴⁴ Author interview with Deborah Grey, July 23, 1993.

⁴⁵ Author interview with Stephen Harper, July 15, 1993.

⁴⁶ Reform Party of Canada, 1991a: 32. This policy remains unchanged in the party's 1993 policy manual (Reform Party of Canada, 1993a: 6).

⁴⁷ Laycock's work provides a critical assessment of the party's appeal for better democratic representation. Regarding Reform's call for constitutional conventions Laycock (1993) notes:

... do Aboriginal organizations have representatives in this bargaining process? At what stages - the initial conventions, the post election negotiations, or both? ... Other calls for constitutional conventions or constituent assemblies have included some discussion of the criteria for including

representatives of different organized groups or communities of interest. On this crucial issue, Reform is conspicuously silent.

⁴⁸ Reform Party of Canada, 1991e.

⁴⁹ Reform Party of Canada, 1991e.

⁵⁰ Reform Party of Canada, 1992a.

⁵¹ Reform Party of Canada, 1990a: 23.

⁵² Reform Party of Canada, 1991e.

⁵³ Author interview with Stephen Harper, July 15, 1993.

⁵⁴ Reform Party of Canada, 1990a: 23.

⁵⁵ Stephen Harper, quoted in *Halifax Chronicle Herald*, May 8, 1991: A4.

⁵⁶ *Alberta Report*, September 3, 1990: 10.

⁵⁷ Reform Party of Canada, 1989d. The party's first policy book (Reform Party of Canada, 1988a: 24) also includes the following statement:

The Reform Party views with alarm the continuing economic and social underdevelopment of the descendants of the original peoples of the West and of Canada. This national disappointment requires innovative solutions, not the assignment of blame.

⁵⁸ Reform Party of Canada, n.d.[f].

⁵⁹ The party's 1990 policy manual states, "The Reform Party believes that native people should have rights and responsibilities for their lives and destiny within the structure of Canadian life" (Reform Party of Canada, 1990a: 23).

⁶⁰ Of the party's constitutional position, Harper stated:

The Reform Party, with minor exceptions, basically does not believe in a communal orientation of people towards government. It believes in a relationship of individuals towards governments. Now, that doesn't mean that it opposes free group identity or association, but it doesn't believe that those things should be the basis of a legal and constitutional structure. The Charlottetown Accord was very much in the latter kind of philosophy, and in our view quite aberrant with constitutional development in liberal democracy for a long, long time.

That the party does not believe in the "communal concept of the country" went to the heart of the party's objections to the Accord, for as Harper noted "all kinds of group equalities were thrown in there" (interview with author, July 15, 1993).

⁶¹ *Globe and Mail*, October 5, 1992: A4. In my interview with Tom Flanagan, he stated that he was the source of the above criticisms, and felt he had achieved something significant in getting it on the front page of the *Globe and Mail*. However, Manning was not pleased with the story, and disagreed with its hard-edged stance. He therefore issued a repudiation of the story, and according to Flanagan claimed that

the *Globe's* reporter had misunderstood the party's position, which was that it was merely raising questions about the self-government provisions, not criticizing them (author interview with Tom Flanagan, July 13, 1993).

7: DE-LEGITIMIZING GROUP IDENTITY

¹ Reform Party of Canada, 1988a: 26.

² quoted in *Toronto Star*, December 9, 1990: B7. At the time the article was written, Mr. Welbourn was the vice-president of the party's interim riding executive in Peterborough, Ontario.

³ There is a striking resemblance to the political ideals and principles as articulated by Manning, Sr (see 1967: 64-68) to those found in the Reform Party's 'Blue Book'. See Dobbin (1992) especially pages 33-34 for a description of the similarities. It is of further interest to note that Preston Manning is acknowledged as providing much of the research for *Political Realignment*. Indeed, in the *New Canada*, Preston readily acknowledges the major influence his father has had on his views. See Manning (1992a) especially pp. 11 ff.

⁴ As part of an announced National Child Care Strategy, Bill C-144, The Canada Child Care Act, was introduced in Parliament in July 1988. The bill was delayed during a Senate review and died on the table when the September 1988 federal election was called. Although the Conservative government included a commitment for national child care legislation in both their 1984 and 1988 election campaigns, in February 1992 Minister of National Health and Welfare Benôit Bouchard announced that the government would not proceed with child care legislation (Pence et al, 1993).

⁵ Reform Party of Canada, 1988a: 20-21. The wording of the party's position on child care in subsequent policy manuals was much more tempered in tone. As has been discussed throughout this thesis, this is typical of much of the party's discourse which changed in tone significantly as the party attempted to appear more legitimate. We must remember, however, this is merely a change in *tone*, and not necessarily in *meaning*. The party's current policy on child care (Reform Party of Canada, 1993a: 6) reads:

- A. The Reform Party supports child-care programs that subsidize financial need, not the method of child care chosen, and that subsidize children and parents, not institutions and professionals.
- B. The Reform Party opposes any expenditure-increasing child-care initiative in light of the current fiscal situation of the Government of Canada.
- C. The Reform Party supports the government regulation of day-care standards.
- D. The Reform Party opposes state-run day care.

⁶ The Reform Party of Canada, 1991i.

⁷ The Reform Party of Canada, 1991i. The party's only other official statement on the family is found in their 1991 policy manual (Reform Party of Canada 1991a: 31) under the rubric of "Family Law":

The Reform Party recognizes child abuse and family violence as acts which attack the very foundations of organized society, and the Party supports the enactment, communication, and

enforcement of laws designed to protect family members against such acts and to provide a program of assistance to both victims and abusers through therapy. Effective programs aimed at prevention of family violence will be a priority in this area.

⁸ *Alberta Report*, December 10, 1990: 18. REAL Women (*Realistic, Equal, and Active for Life*) is an anti-feminist, pro-life organization which claims that organizations such as the National Action Committee on the Status of Women do not really represent the voices of women in Canada.

⁹ quoted in *Chatelaine*, March, 1992: 132. The assumption behind such an appeal is that only men read the party paper, and that women are naturally apolitical and need the urging of their husbands to become politically involved. In other words, this is deeply offensive to feminists. But as I discuss below, while the party may want to combat its anti-women image, it does not seem concerned about being dubbed as anti-feminist.

¹⁰ In my interview with party officials, it became clear the task force was initiated in order to respond to attacks that the party was perceived as anti-women, or as sexist. (Author interview with Stephen Harper, July 15, 1993; and Dimitri Pantazopoulos, July 14, 1993)

¹¹ *Alberta Report*, December 10, 1990: 18. Interestingly, the task force was chaired by Sandra Manning, Preston Manning's wife.

¹² Author interview with Dimitri Pantazopoulos, July 14, 1993.

¹³ Deborah Grey, quoted in *Alberta Report*, December 10, 1990: 18

¹⁴ *Alberta Report*, December 10, 1990: 18. The article discusses the reactions from various participants who were horrified that feminist literature was sent out to members of the task force. One party member, who belongs to REAL Women was quoted in the article as stating.

I've been involved in the Reform party from the start and I've always thought of it as a strong conservative party. I thought it stood for a different approach. I expected it would do more on these family issues than give us feminist slogans, attitudes, and agendas. The feminists get enough attention from the other parties.

¹⁵ *Montreal Gazette*, March 16, 1989: B1.

¹⁶ *Chatelaine*, March 1992: 134.

¹⁷ Reform Party of Canada, n.d.[c].

¹⁸ Flanagan and Ellis (1992) also make a point of stating Reform does not cater to special interests. In their survey of party membership, they note that the party has no "special interest groups within the party such as women's, youth, or Aboriginal wing."

¹⁹ Reform Party of Canada, 1992g.

²⁰ Reform Party of Canada, 1992g.

²¹ Reform Party of Canada, 1992e. This party statement was endorsed by ten women involved in the party, including Deborah Grey, other female candidates for the party, and prominent female members. The statement begins by trying to reassure women that there is a place for them in the party, and warns not to

be misled by their political opponents who "do not speak on our behalf." They write:

It is true that women in the Reform Party approach the issue of "women's rights" differently. You see, we feel that ALL Canadians, men and women alike, are entitled to "equal rights." Singling out any group for special treatment, including women, will only stigmatize that group and diminish their true potential. Furthermore, as women we are just as concerned with issues such as the economy, the deficit and the Constitution, and we wish to participate as Canadians in finding solutions to all these issues.

²² Author interview with Stephen Harper, July 15, 1993. A discussion of the party's views on "women's issues" would not be complete without noting its position on abortion.

- A. The Reform Party commits its Members of Parliament to stating clearly and publicly their personal views and moral beliefs on the question of abortion; to asking their constituents to develop, to express, and to debate their own views on the matter; and to seeking the consensus of the constituency on the issue.
- B. In the absence of a national referendum, the Reform Party expects its Members of Parliament to faithfully vote the consensus of the constituency in the appropriate divisions of the House of Commons if such a consensus exists. If such a consensus does not exist or is unclear, Members of Parliament shall vote in accordance with the publicly-recorded statements on the issue.

(Reform Party of Canada, 1991a: 39)

While the party uses this policy to suggest it is not specifically taking a position *against* abortion, that it is included in its policy manual under the heading "Moral-Decision Making" clearly indicates that Reformers do not see the issue as a question of women's reproductive rights.

²³ Reform Party of Canada, 1993d.

²⁴ Herb Gruebel, quoted in Reform Party of Canada, 1992. Gruebel, an economist at Simon Fraser University, successfully ran for the party in the past federal election.

²⁵ Author interview with Stephen Harper, July 15, 1993.

²⁶ Author interview with Stephen Harper, July 15, 1993.

²⁷ Reform Party of Canada, n.d.[e].

²⁸ Laycock (1993) reports on the party's "Task Force on Democratic Populism" which found that the party's rank and file were annoyed by the way the party had used quasi-referenda questionnaires in their mail-outs to members to obtain rigged answers. The Task Force reported a general perception that the questionnaires had been structured to ensure particular results. It would seem the party's habit of *simply asking* the people, is not without its difficulties.

²⁹ Reform Party of Canada, 1991a: 3.

³⁰ Reform Party of Canada, n.d.[a].

³¹ Indeed, this is what motivated Manning to enter politics. He writes (1992a: 26):

One of the reasons behind my own decision to become directly involved in federal politics in the 1990s was my own personal conviction that there is a need to restore "the common sense of the common people" to a more central position in federal politics. This will involve the promotion and implementation of reforms designed to allow the public to have more say in the development of public policy through direct consultation, constitutional conventions, constituent assemblies, national referenda, and citizens' initiatives.

³² editorial by John Dafoe in the *Globe and Mail*, January 16, 1993: D2.

³³ Laycock's (1993) analysis points out that although the Reform Party considers all group identities as illegitimate, it does seem to make certain allowances for acknowledging *regional* identity. For example, two of the party's principles read as follows:

We believe that every individual, group, province, and region in Canada is entitled to fundamental justice, and that fundamental justice entitles the people of each region to benefit equally, without discrimination, from participation in Confederation and from the programs and expenditures of the Government of Canada.

We believe that the interests of minorities and the people of the underpopulated regions of Canada should be safeguarded by constitutional guarantees and parliamentary institutions which effectively balance representation by population and regional representation.

(Reform Party of Canada, 1991a: 2, 3)

CONCLUSION

¹ Manning, 1992a: 295.

² This comes up frequently in party literature. For example, an article in the party paper states, Reform's ideas "may sound radical to Canadians who have become accustomed to the status quo" (Reform Party of Canada, 1992c). In his analysis of the party's influence on the agenda of other political parties, Flanagan (1992) even claims that Reform has proven to be "avant-garde."

³ Manning, quoted in *Maclean's*, December 16, 1991: 13.

⁴ *Maclean's*, August 9, 1993: 15.

⁵ *Saturday Night*, July/August, 1993: 62.

⁶ Flanagan, 1992. He also suggests:

... it is worth making the point that, even while the Reform Party has been showered with abuse by the old parties and their spear-carriers in the media, it is we who are setting the agenda. If our ideas are so outlandish, why are other parties trying to steal them?

⁷ *Ottawa Citizen*, July 8, 1994: A4. Marchi announced new measures to the government's immigration policy in the wake of revelations about that department's mishandling of the Clinton Gayle case, a Jamaican immigrant charged in the June 1993 murder of a Toronto police officer. While Gayle had been ordered deported in 1991, his file was not pursued by immigration officers. In Marchi's defense, alongside the tougher guidelines on deportation enforcement, he also announced that thousands of rejected refugees would be given a second chance to stay in Canada provided they could meet certain conditions.

⁸ *Ottawa Citizen*, July 9, 1994: A4.

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APPENDIX: INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Could you discuss your understanding of the party's philosophy on freedom and democracy?
2. a.) Do you see inequality as a problem in Canadian society?
b.) What do you believe is the root of (social) inequality?
3. a.) Does the federal government have a role to play in the encouragement of racial and ethnic tolerance?
b.) What about the protection against certain forms of inequality such as those based on race and gender? If so, how best could it perform this role?
4. Your party paper *The Reformer* (n.d.) advocates social policies that "rely heavily on such building-blocks as personal responsibility, family, church, community, volunteerism, and social entrepreneurship, with government as a supportive partner." Could you elaborate on this - in particular, what you understand as social entrepreneurship?
5. Principle 9 in the 1991 "Blue Book" affirms the importance of a "responsible, broadly-based, free-enterprise economy." Could you discuss what the party understands as a "responsible" free market economy?
6. Mr. Manning was quoted in the *Globe and Mail* (13 January 1993: A6) as saying he would "gladly engage in a wholesale overhaul of the Charter were it not for the fact that Canadians cannot stomach any more constitutional wrangling." What are the flaws of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms as seen by the party?
7. The party has connected the operation of special interest groups to many issues in Canada today - from our Constitutional problems to our burgeoning debt load. What special interest groups are you referring to, and why do you think their operation has caused so much damage?
8. Could you discuss your party's criticisms of federal immigration and refugee policy?
9. In the January 1992 edition of *The Reformer*, it states that your party calls for "immigration to be based on non-racial criteria - i.e., on Canada's economic needs and adjustment potential of the immigrant." What would this policy mean in practice? PROBE: What would you change about current policy - i.e. categories, levels or criteria? How do you respond to critics who suggest this policy in effect would bar non-white immigration?

10. Your multicultural policy (according to the "Blue Book", 1991) states the party's "acceptance and integration of immigrants to Canada into the mainstream of Canadian life." Could you elaborate on this policy position? PROBE: What does the party mean by "the mainstream of Canadian life?"
11. Mr. Manning was quoted in *Alberta Report* (03 September 1990: 10) as stating "hyphenated Canadianism has troubled this country for the past 50 years." Could you discuss in what way it has troubled Canada?
12. Mr. Manning has also been quoted as saying current multicultural policy "promotes the philosophy that some Canadians are more equal than others" (*Toronto Star*, 13 June 1991: A1). What is it about the policy that leads to this result?
13. Certain elements of your original immigration and multicultural policies were subsequently dropped, and certain constituency resolutions were rejected before they were brought to an assembly. For example, opposing immigration "designed to radically or suddenly alter the ethnic makeup of Canada" was dropped in your 1991 "Blue Book" as was your multicultural policy that stated your party would promote a "national culture." Why were these aspects of your original immigration and multiculturalism policies subsequently altered?
14. What is your party's position on the desire of Canada's aboriginal peoples to entrench their right to self-government in any new constitutional agreement?
15. a.) Could you discuss the party's criticism of the official languages policy?
b.) Would you describe your "fair language policy"?
16. How do you respond to some criticism that suggests the party's policy on Quebec and language rights are anti-French?
17. What is your party's position on women's issues - for example, pay equity or affirmative action programs?
18. The party has tried to position itself, not along the spectrum of right-left party politics, but as your former national chair Diane Ablonczy has said, you are a "reform party, a populist party [that] wants to represent real views of real people, not to enlist one side or the other" (*Alberta Report*, 10 December 1990: 18). Why do you think so many people, including some of your own supporters continue to view you as a right-wing or conservative party?
19. Many attacks have been lodged against the party - labels such as homophobic, sexist, racist. Mr. Manning has suggested that this is due to public misconception. Why do you think some sectors of the public still misunderstand

your party's policy positions?

20. Why do you think the party has been "vulnerable to infiltration by people with extreme views"? (*The Reformer* January 1992: 2). For instance, why are certain people, such as Wolfgang Droege attracted to the Reform Party?
21. After the party expelled five members (including Droege) from the Beaches-Woodbine constituency a special committee of the party's executive council was set up to study the issue of infiltration by extremists. What have been the findings of this committee, and is it still in operation?
22. The party has been introducing its "law and order" platform in the past number of months. Mr. Manning has stated (*Globe and Mail*, 13 January 1993: A6), "There is no doubt in my mind that criminal-justice reform and safer streets and communities should be on of the top three issues in the 1993 election - and we intend to make it so." Could you discuss why has the party chosen this as one of the issues you will focus on in the upcoming election?

IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (QA-3)

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