

Carleton University

Citizenship and Violence in Antioquia, Colombia

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Master of Arts**

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by

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Abstract

This thesis explores violence and citizenship in the Colombian department of Antioquia during *La Violencia* (1946 to 1953). At that time the capital of the department, Medellín, was experiencing rapid industrialization and a booming economy while in peripheral areas there were extremely high levels of violence. The racialized regional identity of *antioqueñidad* makes these differences intelligible. Residents in Medellín saw themselves as sharing an imagined racial unity which emphasized hard work, morality, whiteness, capitalism, and civilization. *Antioqueñidad* provided the justification for interventions in the city to create workers and to strengthen the population. In the peripheral areas residents were imagined and constructed as violent deviant ‘others’. Mutilation, death, and dismemberment were all practiced on the bodies of landless peasants, Afro-descendants, and Indigenous people. I read the terror on the periphery and the programs of social hygiene in the city as part of the same governmentality, which targeted those who deviated from *antioqueñidad*.

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Introduction

The central theme of this thesis is violence and citizenship in the Colombian department¹ of Antioquia² between 1946 and 1953. These years were the height of a period of Colombian history known as *La Violencia* (The Violence)³ during which time more than 200,000 people lost their lives and two million more were forcibly displaced from their homes. Although the department experienced the third highest number of deaths related to *La Violencia*, with an estimated 26,115 people losing their lives between 1946 and 1957,⁴ violence did not have a uniform impact on the department. My thesis builds on the following paradox present in the department of Antioquia.⁵ In the core municipalities, located in the south-west and around the capital city of Medellín, there was little violence. Meanwhile, in the peripheral areas of the department—located to the north in the tropical region on the Caribbean coast of Urabá, in west in the region around the Bajo Cauca river valley and the city of Urrao, and in the east in the region of the Magdalena Medio river Valley around Puerto Berrio—violence was more severe.⁶

¹ A political administrative region roughly equivalent to a Canadian province.

² Antioquia is Colombia's second largest department by population and is located on the north western corner of the country. It borders on the north the Caribbean and the departments of Córdoba, Sucre, and Bolívar, on the east the Magdalena Medio river and the departments of Santander and Boyacá, on the south the department of Caldás, and on the west the department of Chocó. See *Figure 4: Map of Colombia*, p. 121. Medellín has long been Colombia's second largest city, as well as an economic, industrial, and cultural rival to Bogotá.

³ All words in italics are Spanish. Translations appear immediately after the first usage in parenthesis. All translations are my own unless noted otherwise. When I use Spanish words, *La Violencia*, *antioqueño*, and *antioqueñidad*, it is because the English translations do not capture the full meaning. Place names are not italicized, and generally I use the Spanish names, except for 'Western Antioquia.'

⁴ See *Table 1: Distribution of deaths by department (1946 to 1957)*, p. 117.

⁵ See *Figure 6: Regions of Antioquia*, p. 122.

⁶ Roldán, 1998, p. 7

The paradox was that while the capital city of Medellín underwent rapid industrialization in textile production, and the core coffee regions experienced a boom in coffee production, the newly settled departmental periphery experienced high levels of violence which made these regions among the bloodiest in the country. Violence was present in one area and yet not the other.

My thesis explores this paradox by examining the governance of citizenship and violence in the department. In Medellín, governmental programs focused on improving and disciplining the bodies workers, women, and the poor. In peripheral areas of the department the bodies of residents, often landless peasants, Afro-descendants, and Indigenous people, became objects of violence. I describe and link these two phenomena using a governmental-ity perspective. I explore how biological and political life was governed in the city of Medellín, which was imagined as a clean, hygienic, and civilized space, and in the colonial periphery, which was imagined as a dangerous, savage, dirty, and seductive other space. I suggest that the construction of a racialized regional identity of *antioqueñidad* makes the different practices of governance of the body intelligible.

In the Antioquian imagination the department was divided in two. The first Antioquia was located in the core areas around the city of Medellín. The second Antioquia was located in areas on the periphery of the department, where colonial relations of land ownership and an extraction economy predominated. Residents in the first Antioquia considered themselves *antioqueño* (Antioquian), with a shared imagined racial unity founded on a discourse of *la raza antioqueña* (the Antioquian race). This discourse was founded in the 19th century when

Antioquia was a centre of gold mining, the core municipalities developed a strong export, oriented coffee economy, and a booming textile industry grew in Medellín. The department gained a reputation as an economic and industrial centre. The discourse emphasized hard work, morality, whiteness, capitalism, and civilization. It provided the justifications for interventions in the city aimed at ensuring the creation of workers and the strengthening of the population using the tools of education, social hygiene, and industrial training. In the early 20th century a variety of organizations—Catholic charities, church-directed labour organizations, schools, universities, factories, and the city—began to develop initiatives designed to create a healthier, stronger, more hard-working, and purer *antioqueño* population using rational, scientific, and technocratic tools influenced by European thinking on eugenics and social hygiene.

The programs deployed in the core of the department to build *antioqueñidad* (in English, ‘Antioqueñity,’ the regional *antioqueño* identity) shed light on the ways in which violence occurred in the second Antioquia located in the departmental periphery. In this second Antioquia residents were imagined and constructed as the alterity to *antioqueñidad*—that is, everything *antioqueñidad* was not. Residents in these areas were imagined to be violent, colonial, and deviant others. Violence became a key technology of governance. Regions such as Puerto Berrio and Urabá were colonial spaces where practices of displacement, mutilation, dismemberment, and death were inflicted in particularly corporeal and gendered ways on the bodies of those who were not and could not become *antioqueño*. I argue that the imaginary of *antioqueñidad*, and the stories of revolutionaries, criminals, and

bandits that accompanied it, cast peripheral residents as a threat to the civilized, white, hard-working *antioqueño* being constructed at the core. Violence linked to citizenship was the result.

This violence mirrored the colonial fears of savagery that the civilized *antioqueño* held of the peripheral non-*antioqueño* other. The practices of colonial governance mirrored the *antioqueñidad* at the core and the programs of citizenship deployed in Medellín with the violence and control of the non-*antioqueño* in the peripheral areas. Rather than just creating a dichotomous relationship between citizenship at the core and violence on the periphery, I suggest a connection between the two through an analysis that focuses on the body.

The violence in the peripheral zones of the department and the programs of public hygiene and training in the city of Medellín are linked through the story of the regional identity of *antioqueñidad* which was at the heart of the civilizational program of governance in the city of Medellín. *Antioqueñidad* was also at the heart of colonial violence on the periphery. Terror and violence on the periphery and the programs of social hygiene and urban interventions in the core can be seen as part of the same governmentality, whose target was those who deviated from the norm and whose technologies were corporeal. Violence and citizenship were thus immanently and intrinsically articulated within the governmentalities in Antioquia.

The specific forms of *La Violencia* in Antioquia are intelligible in a way that most interpretations of *La Violencia* in Colombia miss. These explanations see the period as a partisan conflict, as a class conflict, as an incomplete, partial or contested process of state

building, or as the result of the question of political incorporation centred on the figure of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán. I contend that although these explanations provide useful lenses to understand elements of what occurred in Antioquia, it is the connection between citizenship and violence through *antioqueñidad* that allows for a regional understanding of the period which links violence to the civilizational process at the heart of Antioquian modernization.

Understanding citizenship at the core suggests how the lives of different people were valued differently, and how governmental practices of death and life were deployed on those who deviated from the norm. It is for this reason that I highlight the question of citizenship, not in the sense of rights and duties or liberal democracies, but in the sense of who counts as human and what that means. Drawing on Hannah Arendt's work, observations on *antioqueñidad*, and the immanence of citizenship and violence, my thesis suggests that the key components of the practices of governance in Antioquia during the period was the way in which whole populations in the department were constructed at best as *antioqueños* and at worst as violent, non-citizen, non-*antioqueños*. Along with Arendt, I argue that membership in a political community is the defining element of human existence, and thus these processes can be understood as a dehumanization and the reduction of many people to their status simply as biological life, having no political life.

My thesis has five chapters followed by a conclusion. *Chapter One: Governmentality and the Corporality of Citizenship* has three intentions. The first intention is to build a theoretical framework using Michel Foucault's work on governmentality to describe the corporality of violence and citizenship. I take from Foucault the three meanings of governmentality: a de-

stated notion of governance, the focus on the interventions and knowledge of governmental programs, and a language to discuss modes of politics. The second thrust continues with Foucault's third observation on governmentality to discuss the politicization of biological existence. The work of Hannah Arendt and Giorgio Agamben provides insight on the nature of the human condition. Their work allows me to contend that corporeal and political life, are fundamental to human existence. Engin Isin's work on citizenship makes the observation that concomitant to the creation of citizens and political life, is a process by which non-citizens and people who are non-political are constructed in relation to the citizen. The final intention of the first chapter is to discuss governance on the periphery. Neither Agamben nor Foucault discuss colonialism. Thus, I turn to Achille Mbembe's work on necro-politics, which builds on Agamben's work on the camp, for a perspective on governance on the Antioquian periphery. These theoretical observations allow me to describe the governmentalities in the colony and in the city, as well as the spaces on the frontier between the two. I contend that the particular intersection of the city and the colony, civilization and barbarism, normalized and deviant in Antioquia suggest a governmentality that is neither anatomo-political, necro-political, nor bio-political. Rather, I explore how governance can be understood as tanatomo-politics, described by Cristina Rojas and myself elsewhere,⁷ as the control of deviance.

Chapter Two: La Violencia in Colombia and Antioquia describes the period more broadly. My intention is to situate my analysis within the major interpretations of the period and

⁷ Rojas and Tubb, forthcoming

suggest what these approaches fail to address. First I outline a history of *La Violencia* and provide a brief overview of some of the events of the period, focusing on Colombia. Next, I describe the geographic and temporal specificity of violence in Antioquia. I then give an overview of various interpretations of *La Violencia*. I suggest most of these interpretations lack a regional analysis, fail to explain the corporality of citizenship and violence, and do not move beyond the state to explore governance in the school, church, labour organizations, and charities in either the city or colonial spaces. Furthermore, I argue that exploring the rationalities of *antioqueñidad* provides a useful understanding of the key rationality of how practices of governance focused on the body. Nonetheless, my intention is not to explain why *La Violencia* occurred in Antioquia, nor is it to discredit these other approaches; rather it is to describe the governmentalities of the period and to articulate the link between violence and citizenship.

Chapter Three: Antioqueñidad focuses on *antioqueño* exceptionalism as a way to explain violence. It explores the history of the regional identity of *antioqueñidad* suggesting that it provides a key rationality justifying both violence and citizenship. I outline how an exclusive racial imaginary was constructed by authors and academics from Medellín and Bogotá in the late 19th and early 20th century. My contention is that this form of knowledge provides a way of understanding the variety of programs that were deployed to improve the population in the core as well as the violence deployed on the bodies of those in the periphery who were seen as deviating from the norm of this imagined *antioqueñidad*. Following Foucault's observations on racism, I suggest this had a particularly racialized component. I then explore

how Urabá was imagined as a virgin empty land awaiting Antioqueño colonization and settlement.

Chapter Four: Social Hygiene and Catholic Paternalism in Medellín describes the corporality of citizenship programs in the city of Medellín in the first half of the 20th century. Specifically, I describe different governmental interventions that took place by exploring programs of social hygiene, anti-prostitution campaigns, education programs, and labour training. I explore how these interventions attempted to discipline residents of the city, as imagined through the discourses of *antioqueñidad*, into a hard-working labour force. These projects were undertaken in the school, the factory, the workhouse, and the city, by a diverse set of agents including educational, religious, charitable, industrial, and labour organizations, as well as the municipal government. I contend that there was a politicization of the biological elements of human existence. In spite of their sometimes philanthropic, educational, or charitable intentions, they did not in fact represent a strengthening of political life for the majority of residents in Medellín; rather, they were deployed on the citizen's alterity in a way that tried to create workers and the *antioqueño*, even as they were excluded from politics.

Chapter Five: Corporality of violence at the periphery explores in detail the particular manifestations of violence in Antioquia, focusing on the bodily and corporal practices of violence on the living and the dead. I locate the corporeality of Antioquian violence, which took the form of assassination, gendered violence, massacres, and corporeal mutilation, within the literature on *La Violencia* in Colombia. I trace the geographies of terror in the

region of Urabá and Western Antioquia located in the northwest of the department, drawing heavily on Mary Roldán's work.

In the conclusion I have two objectives. The first is to turn back to the governmentality literature in order to suggest that in Medellín there existed a mode of politics that was not simply anatomo-political in the sense of building hard-working individuals, nor bio-political in the sense that it was aimed at achieving population improvement. The periphery was not simply a colonial economy where necro-political power was deployed. Although elements of all these modes of politics were present. Violence in the form of corporeal re-configuration through technologies of death were the most explicit forms of a violence also found at the very core of *antioqueño* citizenship. Violence was not the paradoxical anomaly, nor the exceptional occurrence; rather it was deployed to control deviance in the department. In this tanatomo-political governmentality, technologies of violence and citizenship were deeply intertwined as they were deployed to control a racialized, de-politicized, non-*antioqueño*, non-citizen, even as they explicitly tried to create that citizen. I argue that violence on the periphery was thus immanent to the very technocratic, capitalist, and modernistic form of citizenship being created at the core. Violence was not the result of a contestation over the form of citizenship, but was part of its very construction. The relationship between citizenship and violence was not one of opposites, but rather one of close corporeal connection. My second objective in the conclusion is to reflect on parallels between these historical events and the present. I briefly explore violence and citizenship in Medellín today in order to identify areas for future research.

Chapter One: Governmentality and the Corporality of Citizenship

The purpose of this chapter is to outline an understanding of how the behaviour and conduct of individuals, groups, and populations—in their capacity as biological and political beings—were governed in Antioquia. I draw on Michel Foucault's work on governmentality to indicate what the approach adds to understanding Medellín. Hannah Arendt and Giorgio Agamben's work on the corporality and political nature of human existence is also useful as it allows me to explore the fundamental nature of citizenship, that is, its alterity. Georges Bataille's work on homogenous and heterogeneous society suggests an incommensurable relationship between the two, similar to the relation between the *antioqueño* and non-*antioqueño*. At the same time, I suggest that, like *le peuple* of Revolutionary France, the cardinal element of the imaginary of *antioqueñidad* was its simultaneous exclusion from politics. Giorgio Agamben's linkage of this inclusion/exclusion to the Nazi death camps is the ultimate expression of a relationship found also in Michel Foucault's work on bio-politics. From this observation, I step backwards to trace Foucault's work on the governmentalities of anatomo-politics and bio-politics. I suggest that they represent different technologies and rationalities of the body. Nonetheless, none of these authors bring a perspective on the unspoken dominant governmentality of European modernism: colonialism. Here, the insights of Achille Mbembe on necro-politics and Michael Taussig's work on colonial terror contribute to an understanding of the practices and imaginaries of violence and death in Antioquia's colonial periphery.

However, it is work by Cristina Rojas and myself on the control of deviance through violence in colonial spaces and the city during *La Violencia* in Colombia that is most useful in exploring how bodies may be acted upon. These practices are similar to anatomo and biopolitics but take on a form that is controlling, depoliticizing, and ultimately dehumanizing both to the non-*antioqueño* residents of the periphery and the *antioqueño* residents of the core.

In articulating violence and citizenship in Antioquia, I find Michel Foucault's concept of governmentality particularly helpful.⁸ There are three ways of interpreting governmentality. Foucault's first definition suggests attention be placed on the rationalities and technologies of government. On the one hand this means tracing the systems of knowledge—discourses, written work, reports, program designs, arguments, justifications, analyses, reflections, calculations, tactics, and statistics—that underpin and provide a rationale for governmental intervention. On the other it suggests a focus on the interventions of governance—that is, the programs as they are undertaken, the institutions, the procedures, the actions, their effects, the interventions, the policies, and the practices of governance—which, taken together, represent the technologies of governance. Governmentality as methodology suggests studying governmental actions and programs as they are

⁸ Foucault briefly developed the concept during his annual lecture series at the College de France in Paris between 1975 and 1979. The term itself is first mentioned in the fourth lecture of the 1978–1979 course. See Foucault, 2007, pp. 87-144. Other scholars have taken up Foucault's work around governmentality and different governmentalities and expanded it in a variety of ways (see Burchell, Gordon, & Miller, 1992; Lemke, 2001; Walters & Haahr, 2005; Walters & Haahr, 2006; Elden, 2007). The discussion of governmentality has been expanded and reframed in 2005 with the publication, in English, of Foucault's lecture series from 1977 to 1978 as *Security, Territory, and Population* (2007) and recent translation of *La naissance de la biopolitique* (2003a) in English. In the following discussion I draw on Foucault's work as well as insights of Walters and Haahr (2005) to bring attention to the triple meaning of the term *governmentality*.

conceptualized and how they are implemented.⁹

The second usage of governmentality focuses on governance outside of the most common English interpretation that centres on the state and government. The French roots of the word governmentality, *gouverner* and *mentalité*, make this distinction clearer. *Gouverner* has a variety of meanings that are not always clear in the English “to govern,” including to administer, to oversee, to regulate, to reign, to rule, and to conduct.¹⁰ *Mentalité* corresponds to the English word “mentality.”¹¹ Thus, the term “governmentality,” or *gouvernementalité*, focuses on the mentalities (collection of beliefs, mindsets, and attitudes) that allow for governance (in the sense of the regulation, administration, managing, ruling, and conducting). This suggests a de-stated notion of governance, which describes the political structures of states and the conduct of individuals and groups, “the government of children, of souls, of communities, of families, of the sick.”¹² Foucault describes this as exploring the “conduct of conduct.”¹³ It suggests a shift away from questions of why and favours analysis of how governance was undertaken within and more importantly beyond the state.

⁹ Foucault, 2007, p. 106

¹⁰ According to *Le Petit Robert* (2002) *gouverner* has three meanings. The first encompasses the sense of directing or piloting a boat, of leading, steering, or guiding an animal. The second involves directing the conduct of something or someone in the sense of administering, managing, instructing, educating, nurturing, and dominating. Finally, it is used in the sense of exercising political power over people, the meaning most commonly attributed to the English “to govern.”

¹¹ According to *Le Petit Robert* (2002) *mentalité* refers to the mental character and the collections of beliefs, mindsets, habits, and attitudes that inform and direct the thought of a collective, or that may be shared by members of a collective.

¹² Foucault, 1983, p. 221 in Walters & Haahr, 2005

¹³ Again, this phrase becomes clearer when the French is retained: “*conduire des conduits*.” *Conduire* is a verb and *conduits* are the objects on which the verb acts. Thus, governmentality becomes the study of the “conduction of conduct” or rather the study of the ‘management or direction of the conduct of the self and others.’

Finally, Foucault's work on governmentality represents an incomplete and partial genealogy of the rationalities and technologies of the European state from the early Christian period to the 20th century. Foucault develops this historicized understanding of governmentality in the European context, describing these modalities of politics as pastoral, disciplinary (*surveillance*)¹⁴, police, security, liberal, and neo-liberal.

Using elements of Foucault's three different descriptions of governmentality—an analysis of the rationalities and technologies of governance, a de-stated notion of governance, that explores the “conduct of conduct,” and the different modes of politics from the Greeks to the present—in the context of Antioquia provides a language through which to understand how the conduct and behaviour of individuals and groups was directed in Antioquia in the first part of the 20th century.

A governmentality perspective provides a framework to explore both governmental interventions and the systems of knowledge behind them—to explore, in other words, the governance of citizenship in the core regions of the department by paying particular attention to programs of social hygiene, education, and labour training, while considering how in rural areas violence was deployed as a technology of colonial control. The imagined regional identity of *antioqueñidad* provides the critical rationality behind both of these forms of governance. Foucault's work on the governmentalities of anatomo-politics and bio-politics

¹⁴ I retain the Foucault's original French for *surveillance* and *surveiller*, which is commonly translated as 'disciplinary' and 'to discipline,' again because the English translation fails to fully convey Foucault's usage. Specifically, in English we have no verb for 'surveillance', yet it is surveillance that seems to me is a key element of the Foucault's discussion of the panopticon in *Discipline and Punish*. Of course, *surveillance* also implies the English discipline in the sense of conduct, control, and direction (Robert, 2002).

helps to appreciate the shifts in the way that the human body became an object of governmental intervention in Antioquia.

It is the third usage of governmentality—as a perspective that explores the modes of politics from the Greeks to the present—on which I spend the remainder of this chapter. Specifically, I use Foucault’s work on two modalities of politics—*anatomo-politics* and *bio-politics*—to outline a theoretical perspective that provides a language to talk about citizenship and violence in relation to the body in the context of Antioquia. However, before turning to a discussion of these modes of politics, I want to step back to explore how citizenship itself is linked to the biological and political aspects of human existence, which will allow me to situate and describe the interventions that were deployed in Medellín.

Although citizenship has become an object of steady interest in many circles, I leave aside the debates on different forms of citizenship as particular combinations of rights, privileges, and duties. Instead, I am interested in citizenship as the fundamental element of human existence. Hannah Arendt describes *labour*, *work*, and *action* as the essence of the human condition.¹⁵ *Labour* relates to the “biological processes of the human body, whose spontaneous growth, metabolism, and eventual decay are bound to the vital necessities produced and fed into the life process.”¹⁶ It is that which is required to continue corporeal life: the repetitive biological process of eating, sleeping, reproduction, birth and death. *Work* is of the human hand, as opposed to the *labour* of the human body, and involves the creation of objects and things that are not directly related to biological survival but related to, for

¹⁵ Arendt, 1998

¹⁶ Arendt, 1998, p. 7

example, exchange, artistic pursuits, etc.¹⁷ *Action* refers to the social and political element of human existence: the fact that people live in conditions of plurality with other people.

I wish to highlight the distinction that Arendt makes between *labour* as what is required to continue corporeal existence and *action* as what is required for political life.¹⁸ Although *labour* and *work* are, along with everything else, related to politics, it is the plurality of individuals living among other individuals that Arendt describes as “the condition—not only the *conditio sine qua non*, but the *conditio per quam*—of all political life.”¹⁹

Men can live without labour, by forcing other to labour for them, they can live without work, never adding anything to the world, but a life without speech and without action ... is literally dead to the world; it has ceased to be a human life because it is no longer lived among men.²⁰

Arendt suggests that life as biological survival and life in a political environment created by human activity, human speech, and human interaction is the fundamental duality of the human experience.²¹

Arendt’s distinction between *labour* and *action* in the context of Medellín is useful because it suggests the ways that governmental interventions focused on both the body and also on the strengthening of the body as a biological entity. In the city there was no emphasis on fostering *action*, but rather on strengthening *labour* and of course *work* and the production of things. Technologies deployed by philanthropic and Catholic organizations worked to strengthen, to govern, and to conduct the biological elements of human existence. They created a productive, capitalist workforce, in contrast to the other forms of organizing

¹⁷ Arendt, 1998, p. 7

¹⁸ Arendt, 1998, p. 22

¹⁹ Arendt, 1998, p. 7

²⁰ Arendt, 1998, p. 176

²¹ Arendt, 1998, p. 23

that occurred in peripheral areas.

The Greeks described the biological existence of human life as *zoē*, and the uniquely political aspect of human existence as *bios*.²² Giorgio Agamben suggests that for the Greeks *zoē* “expressed the simple fact of living common to all living beings, animals, men, or gods.”²³ *Bios* “indicated the form or way of living proper to an individual or a group.”²⁴ Aristotle describes the requirement of a *bios politikos* (political life) as action and speech, the foundation of human existence from which “everything merely necessary or useful is strictly excluded.”²⁵ Arendt and Agamben draw on Aristotle to conclude that the fundamental aspect of human life is not only the biological, but also the political. Human death then can be political as well as biological.

The distinction between political death (*bios*) and biological death (*zoē*) allows me to explore how violence was deployed on the periphery and in the city. In some areas, the technologies of violence brought biological death; in other areas, a form of death in life—political death—occurred as people were forced from their homes through violence and terror. Even as bodies remained living, those whose families, homes, lands, and communities were destroyed experienced political death.

The distinction between *zoē* and *bios* suggests something fundamental to understanding citizenship. Engin Isin’s work on a genealogy of citizenship notes that the citizen and its alterity are fundamental to the construction of each. Political action in the *polis* of the Greek

²² Arendt, 1998, p. 24

²³ Agamben, 1998

²⁴ Agamben, 1998

²⁵ Arendt, 1998, p. 25

city-state by citizens required the simultaneous exclusion of those who could not act, who had no voice, and who possessed no political life. Isin contends that citizenship and its alterity “always emerged simultaneously in a dialogical manner and constituted each other.”²⁶

The alterity of citizenship was thus constituted in relation to the citizen. Isin contends that there can be no citizen without the non-citizen, and vice versa. This suggests that citizens, strangers, aliens, outsiders, slaves, children, and women do not exist in and of themselves, but exist only in relation to each other.²⁷ All but the citizen have no political life, no *bios*, and exist simply as *zoē*.²⁸ The useful component of Isin’s analysis is that it rejects a logic that focuses on the binary exclusion of the non-citizen, who is conceived as purely negative and irreconcilable with the citizen.²⁹ Isin’s focus on the alterities of citizenship is a reminder that as the sense of *antioqueñidad* was constructed, there were those who did not and could not conform. Indeed, simultaneous to the construction of an imagined regional identity of *antioqueñidad*, some residents of the department were cast into the role of the other, the alterity, the deviant.

Georges Bataille’s work on the social structures of Fascism provides insights on the relationship between citizenship and its alterity, which I contend indicates elements of the relationships between *antioqueñidad* and non-*antioqueñidad*. Bataille describes two elements of society, the homogenous and the heterogeneous sectors. Homogenous society represents elements of society that are bourgeois, in the sense that they own the means of production,

²⁶ Isin, 2002, p. 3

²⁷ Isin, 2002, p. 29

²⁸ Isin, 2002, p. 29

²⁹ Isin, 2002, p. 3

and are 'useful society'.³⁰ The heterogeneous sectors of society are connected to the homogenous sector through their exclusion.³¹ The alterity of homogenous society is thus not its opposite, but rather the whole rest of society.³² The sectors of society that cannot assimilate into the homogeneous sectors included "mobs, the warrior, the aristocrat, the impoverished classes, and different types of violent individuals."³³ It included other sectors of society who display "violence, excess, delirium, madness."³⁴ Bataille links the heterogeneous sectors of society to the sacred, to the taboo, and to mana. The Latin word *sacer* in the Middle Ages referred to the ill, making the sacred a form of the heterogeneous society.³⁵ Taboo referred to the sense of the social prohibition against touching and contact,³⁶ mana refers to mysterious and impersonal force possessed by a witch doctor.³⁷ The heterogeneous sectors of society include unproductive expenditures,³⁸ as well as everything that is rejected by homogenous society as waste, including bodily fluids and excrement, trash, vermin, body parts, and words and acts of a sexual nature.³⁹

Bataille describes two kinds of heterogeneous society, the *imperative form*⁴⁰ and the *impoverished form*. My interest is in the latter, the lowest strata of society "who generally

³⁰ Isin, 2002, p. 3

³¹ Isin, 2002, p. 3

³² Bataille, 1979, p. 67

³³ Bataille, 1979, p. 67

³⁴ Bataille, 1979, p. 66

³⁵ Bataille, 1979, p. 67

³⁶ Bataille, 1979, p. 67

³⁷ Bataille, 1979, p. 67

³⁸ Bataille described these elsewhere as the accursed share, see Bataille, 1992

³⁹ Bataille, 1979, p. 67

⁴⁰ In the former Bataille locates the sovereign power of Fascism, arguing that Mussolini and Hitler stood outside of homogenous society even as they worked for it.

provoke repulsion and can in no case be assimilated by the whole of mankind.”⁴¹ Bataille’s examples are the untouchables of India who were “characterized by the prohibition of contact analogous to that applied to sacred things.”⁴² He argues that in wealthy countries being “destitute is all it takes to create ... a nearly insuperable gap.”⁴³

Other examples that come to mind are *le peuple*, who during the French Revolution were more than simply those who did not participate in government; they were also the low people.⁴⁴ Arendt describes *le peuple* as “small businessmen, grocers, artisans, workers, employees, salesmen, servants, day labourers, *lumpenproletarian*, ... poor artists, play actors, penniless writers.”⁴⁵ It was a term that also became the “equivalent for misfortune and unhappiness—*le peuple, les malheureux*.”⁴⁶ Agamben notes that *le peuple* always indicated both those who participate in politics—that is, the people of the nation—and the excluded and poor who do not participate.⁴⁷ *Poplo, peuple, pueblo, poplare, poplaire, poplar, populus* and *popularis* thus designate this duality of constitutive political subject and its alterity.⁴⁸ Bataille argues that homogenous society excludes heterogeneous element identified with the taboo, the sacred, and mana’s mysterious force, which creates “nauseating forms of dejection [that] provoke a feeling of disgust so unbearable that it is improper to express or even to make allusion to.”⁴⁹

⁴¹ Bataille, 1979, p. 70

⁴² Bataille, 1979, p. 70

⁴³ Bataille, 1979, p. 70

⁴⁴ Arendt, 2006

⁴⁵ Arendt, 2006

⁴⁶ Arendt, 2006

⁴⁷ Agamben, 1998, p. 176

⁴⁸ Agamben, 1998, p. 176

⁴⁹ Bataille, 1979, p. 70

I turn in more detail in Chapter Three to the construction of *antioqueñidad*, but I wish to highlight two elements from Bataille's discussion. The first is the sense that the heterogeneous sectors were excluded from the homogenous sectors. Thus, the alterity, that which is not included, or the non-*antioqueño*, encompasses a whole series of people. Second, the way that Bataille describes the relationship between the homogenous and the heterogeneous as focusing on the sacred, the taboo, and the untouchable is relevant to the relationship between *antioqueñidad* and its alterity. It was not simply a relationship of otherness, but also of deviance where difference was seen as filthy, dangerous, licentious, untouchable, un-civilizable. All of these factors played out in the construction of an imagined regional identity. Similar to *le peuple*, *antioqueñidad* constructed the lower classes in and around Medellín as the foundation of politics, even as it excluded them.

Agamben argues that it was with the French Revolution that the foundation of law became men—and not the sovereign or god—and that *le peuple* “transformed into an embarrassing presence, and misery and exclusion appear for the first time as an altogether intolerable scandal.”⁵⁰ Agamben argues that misery and exclusion are not simply economic or social, but also political in the sense that a characteristic of modernity is “the implacable and methodical attempt to overcome the division dividing the people, to eliminate radically the people that [are] excluded ... [to produce] a single and undivided people.”⁵¹ Agamben identifies the Nazi death camp as a space outside (while inside) the juridical order, where this methodical attempt was put into practice. Agamben identifies bare life or *zoē*, drawing on an

⁵⁰ Agamben, 1998, p. 120

⁵¹ Agamben, 1998, p. 120

element of Roman law, as *homo sacer* (sacred man). *Homo sacer* is the man who “*may be killed and yet not ‘sacrificed.’*”⁵² Agamben’s insight was that it was on the body of the *homo sacer* that the very corporality of human existence—bare life—became the target of state power. Agamben describes the governmentalities of one of the most extreme examples of this politicization of the corporality of human existence as the camp.

My intention in raising Agamben’s camp is not to argue that the camp is the metaphor for what occurred in the peripheral zones. Rather, the key point I wish to draw from the camp is that it was the ultimate example of the politicization of biological existence and the instrumentalization of death. From this point, I step backwards and explore other governmentalities of the body in the city and the colony in order to shed light on governance in Medellín and the colonial periphery. Specifically, I look at Michel Foucault’s work on biopolitics and anatomic-politics and Achille Mbembe’s work on the governmentalities of the colony.

Michel Foucault describes a modality of politics that emerged in Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries as sovereign right, whose power was anatomic-politics focused on the individual body and whose techniques were disciplinary to render the body both “useful and docile.”⁵³ This form of disciplinary power was instituted in “schools, hospitals, barracks, workshops, and so on.”⁵⁴ It was a series of mechanisms and technologies to “ensure the spatial distribution of individual bodies (their separation, their alignment, their serialization, and

⁵² Agamben, 1998, p. 8

⁵³ Foucault, 2003b, p. 249

⁵⁴ Foucault, 2003b, p. 250

their surveillance) and the organization around those individuals.”⁵⁵ There were attempts to make the body more productive through “exercise, drill, and so on,” as well as whole “systems of surveillance, hierarchies, inspections, book keeping, and reports.”⁵⁶ In the context of Medellín, programs deployed by charities and labour organizations displayed elements of this anatomo-politics as they attempted to create a hard-working, self-disciplined, individual, *antioqueño* worker.

Foucault identifies the right of the sovereign as the right of life and death. The sovereign can “have people put to death or let them live”⁵⁷ The sovereign right is essentially the “right to take life or let live.”⁵⁸ Foucault argues that an important shift occurred with anatomo-politics and the right of sovereignty when a new right established the “power to make live and to let die.”⁵⁹ This new right was the key element of a second governmentality that emerged in the late 18th and 19th century. This governmentality was focused not on the individual body, but on the life of bodies as part of a population. This modality of politics focused on the population as its object of action rather than on the individual. It responded to the characteristics of humans living together in populations as “biological and bio-sociological processes,” which required “complex systems of co-ordination and centralization.”⁶⁰ Foucault labels this bio-politics. Bio-politics is the set of rationalities about and technologies to improve a specific population. It is concerned with statistics, birth rates,

⁵⁵ Foucault, 2003b, p. 242

⁵⁶ Foucault, 2003b, p. 242

⁵⁷ Foucault, 2003b, p. 239

⁵⁸ Foucault, 2003b, p. 240

⁵⁹ Foucault, 2003b, p. 249

⁶⁰ Foucault, 2003b, p. 249

death rates, health indicators, and “controlling relations between the human race, or human beings insofar as they are a species, insofar as they are living beings, and their environment, the milieu in which they live.”⁶¹

Unlike the corporeal focus of anatomo-politics, this modality focuses not on the body, but on “man-as-species.”⁶² Anatomo-politics focuses on “individual bodies that can be kept under surveillance, trained, used, and, if need be, punished.”⁶³ Bio-politics focuses on men in the plurality, not as bodies, but as a population “to the extent that they form ... a global mass that is affected by overall processes characteristic of birth, death, production, illness, and so on.”⁶⁴ Bio-politics involves the development of medicine whose main purpose is not to intercede on the body but “public hygiene, with institutions to co-ordinate medical care, centralize power, and normalize knowledge.”⁶⁵ There are campaigns to teach hygiene and medicalize the population that focus on “problems of reproduction, the birth rate, and the problem of the mortality rate.”⁶⁶ Its fields of intervention include “old-age, ... accidents, infirmities, and various anomalies.”⁶⁷ A bio-political perspective sheds light on other forms of interventions that took place in Medellín in the first half of the 20th century, particularly in the programs of social hygiene.

If bio-politics is the “power to make live and to let die,” the question remains of when

⁶¹ Foucault, 2003b, p. 245

⁶² Foucault, 2003b, p. 242

⁶³ Foucault, 2003b, p. 242

⁶⁴ Foucault, 2003b, p. 242

⁶⁵ Foucault, 2003b, p. 244

⁶⁶ Foucault, 2003b, p. 244

⁶⁷ Foucault, 2003b, p. 244

death is allowed.⁶⁸ Under what conditions “is it possible for political power to kill, to call for deaths, to demand deaths, to give the order to kill, and to expose not only its enemies but also its own citizens to the risk of death?”⁶⁹ Foucault’s answer is racism. Bio-politics was focused on man-as-species and the politicization of *zoē* in the sense of political interventions in biological existence. Its key rationalities were the creation of two kinds of people, those who had a political life (*bios*) and who were members of the population and those who were not. Bio-politics presumes there are two sorts of subjects: the first are the citizens, members of the population, whose lives is cherished, protected, and invested in; the second are the citizens’ alterity, the heterogeneous sectors of society, those who are not part of the population or the political community—a division created through racism.

Race became the dominant discourse in the 19th century and is key to understanding how the citizens’ alterity is constructed. Racism is the rationality that allows for breaking up populations into “what must live and what must die.”⁷⁰ It is this rationality that creates “the distinction among races, the hierarchy of races, the fact that certain races are described as good and others described as inferior.”⁷¹ It allows for the separation of groups as “a way of establishing a biological caesura within a population that appears to be a biological domain.”⁷² Racism allows for the establishment of a

relationship between my life and the death of the other ... ‘The more inferior species die out, the more abnormal individuals are eliminated, the fewer degenerates there will be in the species as a whole, and the more I—as species rather than individual—can live, the stronger I will be, the more

⁶⁸ Foucault, 2003b, p. 258

⁶⁹ Foucault, 2003b, p. 254

⁷⁰ Foucault, 2003b, p. 256

⁷¹ Foucault, 2003b, p. 256

⁷² Foucault, 2003b, p. 256

vigorous I will be. I will be able to proliferate.' The fact that the other dies does not mean simply that I live in the sense that his death guarantees my safety; the death of the other, the death of the bad race, of the inferior race (or the degenerate, or the abnormal) is something that will make life in general healthier: healthier and purer.⁷³

It is through racism that there is a connection between bio-politics and death. In a “normalizing society, race or racism is the precondition that makes killing acceptable.”⁷⁴ Killing both refers to physical murder and biological death, but also to “exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for some people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection, and so on.”⁷⁵

Foucault identifies Nazi society as a society where anatomy and bio-power undermined and permeated the regime.⁷⁶ Agamben argues that the elimination of Jews and other perceived undesirables was bio-political; their elimination and extermination was the destruction of bare life through bio-politics to improve the population.⁷⁷ Agamben describes the mechanisms by which death was deployed in Nazi Germany and the Fascist state's *juris prudencia* through the *homo sacer* and the camp. For example, one of the earliest laws issued by Hitler's Germany focused on the “prevention of the continuation of hereditary disease.” It stipulated that those who had a disease that was hereditary had to be sterilized if there was “medical evidence to suggest that their descendants would most likely be afflicted by serious hereditary disorders of the body or the mind.”⁷⁸ Experiments were conducted on “human guinea pigs,” many of whom were Jewish and who subsequently died. The Holocaust

⁷³ Foucault, 2003b, p. 256

⁷⁴ Foucault, 2003b, p. 256

⁷⁵ Foucault, 2003b, p. 256

⁷⁶ Foucault, 2003b, p. 260

⁷⁷ Agamben, 1998, p. 120

⁷⁸ Agamben, 1998, p. 149

occurred “precisely because they [those with hereditary disease, the “human guinea pigs”, Jews, Communists, homosexuals, Roma, etc.] were excluded from political life, because they were lacking almost all rights and expectations that we customarily attribute to human existence”⁷⁹ even if biologically speaking they remained very much alive.⁸⁰ Agamben argues that it is here that bio-politics shows its “thanato-political face,”⁸¹ where deviance and difference bring death.

Agamben describes the camp as the ultimate space of bio-politics, where the exception has become the norm, the exceptional space that is itself the norm in modernity; however neither Foucault nor Agamben discuss European colonialism, the dominant governmentality deployed on the rest of the world since the ‘discovery’ of the Americas. It is in the colonial spaces where the unexceptional exceptionality of the camp is unneeded, and death, not life, is politicized. Achille Mbembe’s short essay on necro-politics describes elements of colonialism.

Mbembe argues that the colonial space has its own particular modes of governance: racialization as a technology, the polymorphous organization of the state, and technologies of death. Necro-politics is not about the maximization of the population, but rather about the question of “under what practical conditions is the right to kill, to allow to live, or to expose to death exercised.”⁸² Mbembe’s concern is about the “*generalized instrumentalization of human existence and the material destruction of human bodies and populations.*”⁸³

⁷⁹ Agamben, 1998, p. 158

⁸⁰ Agamben, 1998, p. 158

⁸¹ Agamben, 1998, p. 152

⁸² Mbembe, 2003, p. 12

⁸³ Mbembe, 2003, p. 14

Foucault's work on linking biopolitics and race suggests that death becomes a means not only to kill, but also a way to strengthen the population.⁸⁴ Mbembe describes race as the ever-present shadow of "Western political thought and practice especially when it comes to imagining the inhumanity of, or rule over, foreign peoples."⁸⁵ Mbembe suggests that if the Nazi death camps were the most extreme extension of bio-politics, their history "found in colonial imperialism ... [and the] serialization of technical mechanisms for putting people to death."⁸⁶ Mbembe contends that the "selection of races, the prohibition of mixed marriages, forced sterilization, and even the extermination of vanquished peoples" were not initially deployed in Europe, but rather it was in World War II that the colonial mechanisms of control were extended to the "civilized" peoples of Europe the methods previously reserved for the [colonial] 'savages.'⁸⁷

In the colonial context, the colonizer understands the colonized as savages, as degenerates, as racialized others.⁸⁸ There is a denial of humanity as a common element between the "conqueror and the native," as the colonized becomes "part of nature" and the colonizer the "undisputed master."⁸⁹ That terror is the form of rule in the colonial space occurs because there is a "denial of any common bond between the conqueror and the native."⁹⁰ In the eyes of the conqueror "*savage life* is just another form of *animal life*, a

⁸⁴ Foucault, 2003b, p. 255

⁸⁵ Mbembe, 2003, p. 17

⁸⁶ Mbembe, 2003, p. 18

⁸⁷ Mbembe, 2003, p. 22

⁸⁸ Mbembe, 2003, p. 24

⁸⁹ Mbembe, 2003, p. 24

⁹⁰ Mbembe, 2003, p. 24

horrifying experience, something alien beyond imagination or comprehension.”⁹¹ The colonial savages were “‘natural’ human beings who lack[ed] the specifically human character, the specifically human reality” so that when the colonizer massacred them “they were somehow not aware that they had committed murder.”⁹² The colonial state becomes a “polymorphous and diffuse organization” as violence is perpetrated by paramilitary forces.⁹³ Colonialism consists of “seizing, delimiting, and asserting control over a physical geographical area; of writing on the ground a new set of social and spatial relations.”⁹⁴ Colonialism is a model of politics where “colonial terror constantly intertwines with colonially generated fantasies of wilderness and death.”⁹⁵

Michael Taussig, referring to the areas of the Putumayo in the southwest of Colombia⁹⁶ during the rubber boom at the turn of the 19th century, points out that terror was a key element in the construction of colonialism.⁹⁷ Taussig describes terror as both a physiological state of mind and a social fact—“a cultural construction whose baroque dimensions allow it to serve as the mediator *par excellence* of colonial hegemony.”⁹⁸ Terror was the key technology of European conquest and colonization in the new world.⁹⁹ Colonial terror is spread by fear and violence and fed “by silence and myth in which the fanatical stress on the mysterious side of the mysterious flourishes by means of rumour and fantasy woven in a dense web of

⁹¹ Mbembe, 2003, p. 24

⁹² Mbembe, 2003, p. 24

⁹³ Mbembe, 2003, p. 24

⁹⁴ Mbembe, 2003, p. 32

⁹⁵ Mbembe, 2003, p. 25

⁹⁶ See *Figure 4: Map of Colombia*, p. 121.

⁹⁷ Taussig, 1984

⁹⁸ Taussig, 1984. See also Rojas and Tubb, forthcoming, on this matter, as well as work by Mbembe, 2003.

⁹⁹ Taussig, 1984, p. 464

magical realism.”¹⁰⁰ Terror spread through stories, real or otherwise, with the purpose of large-scale economic reconfigurations and control of populations.¹⁰¹

Taussig examines a report written by Irish diplomat Roger Casement for the British Foreign Office on the corporality of terror inflicted by rubber companies along the banks of the Putumayo. For Taussig, the report marks the ordinariness of the extraordinary. For example how “employees at all the stations passed the time when not hunting Indians, either lying in their hammocks or in gambling.”¹⁰² Although Casement’s report argues that terror was a colonial tool—a form of labour coercion—for capitalist expansion in the rubber boom. Taussig points out that “to claim the rationality of business for this [terror] is to claim and sustain an illusory rationality, obscuring our understanding of the way business can transform the use of terror from the means into an end of itself.”¹⁰³ While colonial terror may have had an economic logic, it also had its own gruesome logic.

Taussig describes this logic as a “trade in terrifying mythologies and fictional realities ... whose storytelling bartered betrayal of Indian realities for the confirmation of colonial fantasies.”¹⁰⁴

[C]olonists and rubber company employees not only feared but also themselves created through narration fearful and confusing images of savagery—images which bound colonial society together through the epistemic murk of the space of death. The systems of torture they devised to secure rubber mirrored the horror of the savagery they so feared, condemned, and fictionalized.¹⁰⁵

Taussig describes this as the colonial mirror in which the colonists saw terror of their own

¹⁰⁰ Taussig, 1984, p. 464

¹⁰¹ Taussig, 1987, p. 53

¹⁰² Taussig, 1984, p. 477

¹⁰³ Taussig, 1984, p. 479

¹⁰⁴ Taussig, 1984, p. 494

¹⁰⁵ Taussig, 1984, p. 494

making. The metaphor of the colonial mirror describes the inscription onto the colonizers of the barbarity of their own social relations which they themselves impute as savagery and evil onto the figures they wish to colonize.¹⁰⁶ Thus terror deployed on the Indian by the colonizer was a reflection of the colonizer's own civilized imaginary of the Indian as cannibal and violent.

Mbembe's work on necro-politics and Taussig's work on colonial terror together point to elements of how governance occurred on the Antioquian periphery. First, Mbembe's description of the state, paramilitary forces, spatial reconfiguration, and death as tool of governance all resonate with events that occurred in areas of Antioquia, in particular Urabá and Western Antioquia. Although the deployment of terror in these areas was seen as a means of control for economic reasons, the explanation is wholly incomplete as terror also had its own terrifying logic seen clearly in the forms of corporeal reconfiguration. Second, the mediation of stories of the colonial other was a key part in the manifestation of violence on that colonial other through the mechanisms of the colonial mirror whereby fears of savagery produced by the civilized led to terror.

The limitation of Foucault's and Agamben's work is that they do not study or explore the politics of death in the colony. Although Mbembe takes up some elements of this in what he terms necro-politics in the period of late colonialism, none of these authors explore in any detail the intersections of the colony with the city. That is, they fail to describe the governmentalities at the edge of the city and the edge of the colony.¹⁰⁷ The key technology of

¹⁰⁶ Taussig, 1984, p. 495

¹⁰⁷ Agamben, 1998

governance in these liminal spaces involved violence and control, and they can be understood as what Rojas and I have described as tanatomo-politics.¹⁰⁸ Tanatomo-politics describes management neither through life (bio-politics) nor through death (necro-politics), but through violence on the body of the deviant. As opposed to anatomo-politics, which focuses on the creation of individuals through interventions that are aimed at creating productive bodies, and bio-politics which focuses on the life process of entire populations, tanatomo-politics focuses on the control of those who deviated from the norm—“criminals, vagrants, the irredeemable, the ill,”¹⁰⁹ the uncivilized, the dirty, and the sick.¹¹⁰ A particular characteristic of tanatomo-politics is that because it is a form of control it allows for a description of technologies similar to that offered by bio-politics, in which these technologies are in fact depoliticizing as they foster bare life without creating political life.¹¹¹ The deviant, even when incorporated into programs of governance, are seen as without dignity and lacking agency such that even their protests are seen as non-political. “The technologies and rationalities of government [have a] tendency to use repressive technologies of governance.”¹¹² The political mode of tanatomo-politics describes the governance in the spaces where the residents are imagined as deviant and where technologies of anatomo-politics, bio-politics,

¹⁰⁸ Agamben terms the intersection of the right of the sovereign to decide “on life that may be killed” and “the assumption of the care of the nation’s biological body” as euthanasia or “the point where biopolitics necessarily turns into thanato-politics.” Here, he refers to killing to protect the biological body. Agamben’s thanato-politics refers to the mechanization of death in the death camps of Nazi Germany where the mentally ill and the disabled were sent to die (Agamben, 1998). “Tanatomo-politics” is derived from a combination of Foucault’s anatomo-politics and *tanatos*, which comes from the Spanish word for the Greek *θάνατος* or destructive drive.

¹⁰⁹ Rojas & Tubb, Forthcoming, p. 4

¹¹⁰ Rojas & Tubb, Forthcoming, p. 3

¹¹¹ Rojas & Tubb, Forthcoming, p. 3

¹¹² Rojas & Tubb, Forthcoming, p. 15

and necro-politics combine and contradict one another to create a new modality of politics, which is none of them but combines elements of them all.

It is tanatomo-political technologies and rationalities that best describe the governmentalities that were deployed in Medellín and the colonial periphery. In the core areas of Antioquia, around Medellín and the southern coffee-producing areas, the technologies of anatomo-politics, focused on disciplining the individual body, and of biopolitics, focused on strengthening the population through the language of *antioqueñidad*. I argue that these technologies are best understood as tanatomo-political interventions because they were deployed by and beyond the state to control those who deviated from the ideal of *antioqueñidad*. Their focus was on those who were themselves excluded from politics, either through their own inclusion in *antioqueñidad* or their exclusion from it. It was on the bodies of the alterities of the *antioqueño*—the non-*antioqueño*, the deviant living on the colonial periphery, imagined as dangerous, erotic, and dirty—that tanatomo-politics took on its most extreme manifestation, as the practices of corporeal reconfiguration and corporeal annihilation were deployed along with civilizational fantasies of wildness and savagery to terrorize colonial spaces both with the logic of economic extraction and capitalist control as well as its own logic of terror. It was a process by which individuals' corporeal existence, bare life, became the object of political control—through technologies of life and death. Even when it did not bring about biological death, it brought political death.

Chapter Two: *La Violencia* in Colombia and Antioquia

This chapter describes the events and the geographic and temporal specificities of *La Violencia* in the context of Colombia as a whole and Antioquia in particular. My intention is to locate violence in Antioquia in the context of violence in Colombia and to demonstrate why a focus on the particular region of Antioquia is warranted. I also show why a focus on constructions of *antioqueñidad* and deviance in the core and the periphery is important. Following the discussion of *La Violencia* in Colombia and Antioquia, I give an overview of the variety of interpretations that have been offered to explain the period. Most of these perspectives use Colombia as their level of analysis. They explain *La Violencia* using theoretical frameworks that focus on partisan hatred, on class conflict, on the state—either as failed, disintegrating, or conflicted—and on the question of how to interpret the assassination of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán. I explore each of these interpretations, and propose that an additional nuanced interpretation of events in the department of Antioquia can be found by focusing on *antioqueñidad* and the intersections of violence and citizenship in the core and the periphery. Focusing on citizenship and violence and the governmentalities of control in the department offers additional insights. *La Violencia* can be broken into two periods. The first encompasses 1946 to 1953, during which time the largest number of people lost their lives. The second encompasses 1957 to 1964, a period that saw a lower mortality rate and is often characterized as a time of state terror and a military conflict.¹¹³

¹¹³ This chapter focuses on the initial period from 1946 to 1953 because it was during this first period that Antioquia experienced the most extreme manifestation of violence.

Violence in Colombia was sparked initially in 1946 during the presidential election fought between the Conservative Mariano Ospina Pérez and the Liberal candidates Gabriel Turbay and Jorge Eliécer Gaitán. Turbay and Gaitán ran on different tickets for the Liberal Party and consequently split the vote. This allowed Ospina Pérez to win the presidency and end sixteen years of Liberal rule.¹¹⁴ On April 9, 1948, Gaitán, by then the uncontested leader of the Liberal Party, was assassinated in downtown Bogotá.¹¹⁵ News of Gaitán's death spread quickly throughout the city and the countryside, with incendiary results. That afternoon and evening, Gaitán's supporters, who came from sectors of the urban poor and urban working class, rioted in what became known as the *bogotázo*—by some accounts the largest urban riots in Latin American history.¹¹⁶ Rioters destroyed much of Bogotá's downtown core, some of which had only recently been beautified in celebration of the ninth Pan-American Conference.

News of Gaitán's assassination arrived in many areas of the countryside via calls for insurrection on the public Radio Nacional, which had been temporarily seized by students calling for the overthrow of the government.¹¹⁷ Although the military quickly retook the station, in rural areas the insurrections lasted for weeks. Many towns and communities faced a “formidable inversion of the institutional order”¹¹⁸ as insurrections and revolutionary movements took control of entire communities: local police supported the insurrection,

¹¹⁴ Oquist, 1980, p. 3

¹¹⁵ Braun, 1985

¹¹⁶ LeGrand, 1997

¹¹⁷ Braun, 1985, pp. 173-175

¹¹⁸ Sánchez Gómez, 1992, p. 83

prisoners were released, priests were silenced or imprisoned, peasants occupied land, and the offices of foreign oil companies in Barrancabermeja were seized by their workers.¹¹⁹ Nonetheless, most of these insurrections were put down by the state after a few weeks.¹²⁰

In Antioquia, Gaitán was a less significant political leader. Only 5% of the population of Medellín voted for Gaitán in the 1946 elections, as compared with upwards of 50% of the population in other major cities.¹²¹ This may explain why the city did not experience increases of violence after his assassination.¹²² However, this does not mean that Gaitán was not important in the department. Although his presidential run resulted in a poor electoral showing, his movement did achieve electoral success. At the height of *La Violencia* the municipal council in Medellín was made up of a Liberal majority and many councillors identifying themselves as *gaitanistas*.¹²³

Nonetheless, the insurrections in Medellín never came close to the scale of those that occurred in other areas of the country. In Medellín, the violence peaked with the burning of the main Catholic press *La Defensa*.¹²⁴ However, the reaction of the regional elite to the violence that resulted from Gaitán's assassination was less measured: jails were filled to capacity and the authorities took over public schools and constructed a makeshift prison camp in the municipal bull ring in order to house the arrested *nueveabrileros* (those who

¹¹⁹ Sánchez Gómez, 1992, p. 83

¹²⁰ Sánchez Gómez, 1992, p. 83

¹²¹ Specifically, Roldán notes that in the 1946 elections in Medellín only 1,740 votes were cast for Gaitán, while 15,883 for the conservative Ospina Pérez, and 17,054 for Gaitán's competitor Gabriel Turbay. See Roldán, 2002, p. 69; Roldán, 2005, pp. 302, 307

¹²² Roldán, 2002, p. 69

¹²³ Roldán, 2005, p. 302

¹²⁴ Roldán, 2002, p. 69

participated in the insurrections on April 9) who had participated in the April 9 movement after Gaitán's assassination.¹²⁵ In 1949, police arrived in the *zona de tolerancia* (red light district) of Guayaquil—a neighbourhood in Medellín—and tried to capture insurgents by raiding cafes, bars, and brothels frequented by workers, intellectuals, and new arrivals to the city.¹²⁶ There were reports of ghostly cars with tinted windows driving through the streets at night and of corpses floating down the Medellín River.¹²⁷

In the peripheral areas of Antioquia it was only in towns where there was a significant presence of organized labour—miners and oil, road, railway, and port workers—that insurrections motivated by Gaitán's assassination occurred.¹²⁸ These towns were the same towns where Gaitán had received the most electoral support.¹²⁹ Insurrections occurred in the town of Puerto Berrio, the oil fields of Yondó, in the northeastern town of Remedios, the southwestern towns of Andes, Bolívar, Anzá, and Urrao, and the towns of Buriticá, Peque, and Turbo located in Urabá.¹³⁰ In these towns there were popular protests and the burning and looting of businesses and state offices including the courts, mayors' offices, and train stations.¹³¹ Road workers constructing the road between Santa Fé de Antioquia, Anzá, and Bolombolo insisted on reading excerpts from Gaitán's newspaper on the radio.¹³² Workers for the Shell oil company in the town of Anzá threatened to kill scabs and conservative

¹²⁵ Roldán, 2002, p. 51

¹²⁶ Jaramillo, 1996, p. 551

¹²⁷ Jaramillo, 1996, p. 551

¹²⁸ Roldán, 2002, p. 70; Roldán, 2005, p. 313

¹²⁹ Roldán, 2002, p. 70; Roldán, 2005, p. 313

¹³⁰ Roldán, 2002, p. 70. See *Figure 6: Regions of Antioquia*, p. 122.

¹³¹ Roldán, 2002, p. 70

¹³² Roldán, 2005, p. 315

engineers, identifying their struggle with *gaitanismo*.¹³³ Although in the most populated areas in Antioquia there was very little violence sparked by Gaitán's assassination,¹³⁴ the popular insurrections and the fears they generated were used to justify the deployment of public and paramilitary forces.¹³⁵

Prior to the scheduled presidential elections in 1949 and in response to an attempt by members of the Liberal-controlled house to impeach him, President Ospina Pérez shut down the National Congress.¹³⁶ In response members of the Liberal Party abstained from the presidential electoral race which allowed Laureano Gómez, the Conservative candidate, to win an uncontested victory. Gómez's presidency exacerbated violence in rural areas.¹³⁷ During Gómez's presidency, violence reached its peak, devastating the lands, communities, and bodies of rural peasants.¹³⁸ In 1953, Gómez was deposed by a military coup led by the commander of the armed forces Gustavo Rojas Pinilla.¹³⁹ On seizing power, Rojas Pinilla granted a general amnesty to the different armed groups and brought an end to the first wave of violence.¹⁴⁰

While national statistics are difficult to produce, Paul Oquist contends that based on the Colombian population figures from the 1951 census of 11.5 million people living in

¹³³ Roldán, 2005, p. 316

¹³⁴ Roldán, 2005, p. 302

¹³⁵ Roldán, 2002, p. 51

¹³⁶ Oquist, 1980, pp. 5, 15

¹³⁷ Oquist, 1980, pp. 5, 15

¹³⁸ See *Table 4: Reported deaths by year and subregion in Antioquia, 1949 to 1953*, p. 119.

¹³⁹ Oquist, 1980, p. 6

¹⁴⁰ The peace was short lived as military incursions into communist-controlled areas of Tolima brought a spike in deaths related to the violence. The second period continued until 1964, when, after an intense and bloody campaign, the military defeated guerrilla forces in the "independent republics" in the southern areas of Tolima (Oquist, 1980, pp. 6-8).

Colombia, at least 1.56% lost their lives between 1948 and 1966¹⁴¹—that is, between 200,000 and 300,000 people died. Nevertheless, the departmental and temporal breakdown of these statistics suggests that violence and death were far from uniform, having an uneven impact on the country over time and space.¹⁴²

Temporally, the period from 1946 to 1953 had the majority of violence-related fatalities. The amnesty granted by the Rojas Pinilla administration brought sharp declines in the homicide rates, which had peaked during the administration of Laureano Gómez. Although by 1955 deaths were once again on the rise, they never reached the levels of violence of the late 1940s and early 1950s and were isolated to a few areas.

Spatially, the departmental and annual statistics provide an incomplete understanding of how violence occurred in specific areas. For example, violence was only briefly focused on the southernmost department of Nariño, while it was more intense in the departments of Valle, Antioquia, Tolima, Western Caldas, the Norte de Santander, Santander, Boyacá, and Cundinamarca. In 1949, *La Violencia* encompassed all areas of Colombia except Nariño and the Caribbean Coast.¹⁴³ Generally, statistics suggest very high homicides rates in some areas,

¹⁴¹ For a detailed analysis of available statistics on *La Violencia* see Oquist, 1980, pp. 6-11. According to Oquist's often-cited figures, the lowest estimate for deaths that can be attributed to the violence from 1946 and 1966 was 193,603; with the actual death toll likely far higher as many deaths went unreported. For a temporal breakdown of Oquist's figures see See *Table 3: Temporal distribution of deaths in Colombia (1948 to 1966)*, p. 118 and see *Table 4: Reported deaths by year and subregion in Antioquia, 1949 to 1953*, p. 119. The estimate of 1.56% is based on deaths between 1948 and 1966 of 179,049. Figures for the years 1946 and 1947 are not provided by Oquist, although they seem to be included in his estimate of 193,603 deaths between 1946 and 1966. Oquist notes the difficulty in producing statistics related to death rates, and he describes his figures as minimal estimates.

¹⁴² See *Table 1: Distribution of deaths by department (1946 to 1957)*, p. 117.

¹⁴³ See *Figure 4: Map of Colombia*, p. 121 and *Table 1: Distribution of deaths by department (1946 to 1957)*, p. 117. Over the twenty year period from 1946 to 1966 violence affected 384 of Colombia's 842 municipalities. According to this analysis, of the total, 33.7% experienced violence at one point in the twenty-year period, 14.8% experienced violence only between 1946 and 1953, 6.7% experienced violence only between

since the violence was most extreme in specific periods and locations, and at the same time overemphasize the effects of *La Violencia* in other periods and locations.

Turning to the department of Antioquia,¹⁴⁴ Mary Roldán suggests that deaths related to *La Violencia* had a limited impact on the central coffee-producing regions of the department and on the city of Medellín.¹⁴⁵ Violent deaths attributed to *La Violencia* were focused in the peripheral areas of the department: Urabá, Bajo Cauca, the North East, and the Magdalena Medio. Although most deaths occurred in the west, northeast and southwest, it was in the regions of Magdalena, Occidente and the Bajo Cauca that violence reached its highest rates per capita. The areas around Medellín and the coffee-producing regions experienced only four deaths attributed to *La Violencia* over the same period. Although the department ranked third in terms of number of deaths, and eighth in terms of death rate per 100,000, it was also the second most populated department. Since the non-violent central regions were far more populous than the less populated peripheral zones, deaths related to the violence in peripheral areas were extremely common.¹⁴⁶

The temporal breakdown of the period is also important. After the electoral victory of Laureano Gómez in 1949 violence in Antioquia shifted.¹⁴⁷ Again using Roldán's figures, of all the officially reported deaths in Antioquia between 1946 and 1953, half occurred in 1952. Of these, more than a quarter occurred in the town of Puerto Berrio on the Magdalena Medio.

1958 and 1964, and a total of 12.2% experienced violence in both (Oquist, 1980, pp. 3, 10).

¹⁴⁴ See *Figure 6: Regions of Antioquia*, p. 122.

¹⁴⁵ Roldán, 2002 uses statistics produced by the governor's office which officially registered deaths attributed to *La Violencia*. Perhaps explaining the different between these estimates quoted above by Oquist. Prior to 1949, the regional government did not keep statistics, and these figures end in 1953. See Roldán, 2002, p. 8.

¹⁴⁶ Roldán, 2002, p. 8

¹⁴⁷ Roldán, 2002, p. 109

Another quarter took place in the Occident town of Dabeiba.¹⁴⁸ Thus, while at the departmental level only 0.25% of the population was killed in 1952, in the town of Puerto Berrio over 6% of the population died.¹⁴⁹

In spite of the difficulty in producing comprehensive statistics that reflect the heterogeneous and complicated temporal and spatial nature of *La Violencia*, outside of the events surrounding Gaitán's death it was by and large a rural phenomenon. Deaths occurred in isolated peasant hamlets and in the pathways between them. Broadly speaking, violence occurred in the form of selective assassinations and massacres perpetrated by different groups: sometimes by Liberal and Conservative bands roaming the countryside, sometimes by neighbours within the community, sometimes by the police or army fighting Liberal or Communist guerrillas, and sometimes by criminal groups. Although soldiers, police, leftist guerrillas, right-wing paramilitary groups, neighbours, wandering criminals, and bandits all perpetrated violence, the victims and the victimizers were almost always rural peasants. In some areas of Colombia, such as the Eastern Plains, the south of Tolima, and the peripheral zones of Antioquia in the Magdalena Medio and Western Antioquia, violence was best described as a guerrilla conflict. In other areas, paramilitary forces—known as *pájaros* (birds) or in Antioquia the *contrachusma* (counter rabble)—roamed the countryside with bloody consequences. In some cases the catalyst was rivalry between villages and neighbours, while in other cases violence was the result of conflict over the control of local politics. In some areas, although notably not in Antioquia, violence had a cyclical relationship to the coffee-

¹⁴⁸ Roldán, 2002, p. 8

¹⁴⁹ Roldán, 2002, p. 8

growing season, as murders, robberies, and assaults increased as the coffee ripened and conflicts ensued over who controlled the harvest. In other areas, *La Violencia* had the effect of re-configuring and concentrating property relations as terror forced hundreds of thousands of peasants, indigenous people, and Afro-descendants from their land and into Medellín and other cities.

La Violencia in Antioquia had similarities with and differences from events in the rest of Colombia. Unlike in the Eastern Plains and areas of Tolima, there were no guerrilla republics. Nonetheless, guerrilla violence, governmental violence, and paramilitary violence were common in some areas of Antioquia.¹⁵⁰ The *contrachusma* arrived in areas of Antioquia where they killed Liberal voters. The police “took revenge, planted terror, and destroyed lives and farms.”¹⁵¹ Guzman describes meeting peasants whose female family members had been raped by the police and Conservatives.¹⁵² Violence erupted over partisan disputes about patronage positions in government. In rural areas these conflicts transformed into a guerrilla conflict, and it was in the peripheral towns saw the greatest number of violent displacements.¹⁵³ However, unlike in other parts of Colombia, there was little conflict over the coffee harvest, and guerrilla bands often resorted to cattle rustling.¹⁵⁴

Interpreting *La Violencia*

Before turning to my own analysis of the *La Violencia* in Antioquia, I examine the wider

¹⁵⁰ Guzmán Campos, Fals Borda, & Umaña Luna, 2005, p. 112

¹⁵¹ Guzmán Campos et al., 2005, p. 112

¹⁵² Guzmán Campos et al., 2005, p. 112

¹⁵³ Roldán, 2002, p. 109

¹⁵⁴ Roldán, 2002, p. 109

body of literature that has been offered to explain the period. There have been a variety of interpretations that explain the violence in Colombia and in Antioquia.¹⁵⁵ There is no consensus in the literature, yet it does provide useful—if somewhat contradictory—perspectives that help to explain *La Violencia* in Antioquia. I outline the four major approaches and give a brief critique of each before developing my own approach to *La Violencia* in Antioquia.

The first major interpretation saw violence in the countryside as the outcome of a resurgence of long-held hatreds between members of the Liberal and the Conservative parties. Such hatred for members of the opposing party originated in 19th century civil wars.¹⁵⁶ The period is portrayed as a ‘fratricidal war’ between brothers.¹⁵⁷

The second interpretation saw violence as the result of class conflict, and *La Violencia* as a failed and frustrated social revolution. This perspective was initially put forth by Orlando Fals Borda,¹⁵⁸ and was later taken up and made famous by the British Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm. Hobsbawm saw the period as representing the biggest peasant movement in the West outside of the Mexican Revolution.¹⁵⁹ The result of the disintegration of peasant society brought on by economic development that opened up ultimately unrealized revolutionary

¹⁵⁵ My analysis relies on Catherine LeGrand’s excellent 1997 overview of the discussions that emerged in the 1980s. Sánchez and Bakewell, 1985, provide an outline of the interpretations from the 1960s. Oquist’s 1980 review is quite critical of some of these early analyses (1980, pp. 129-153). Roldán, 2002 has a more contemporary interpretation from the perspective of her own work (2002, pp. 22-29). See also Pécaut, 1987; Sánchez Gómez, 1990; Uribe A., 1990; Bergquist, 1992; Bergquist, Peñaranda, & Sánchez Gómez, 1992; Bushnell, 1992; Sánchez Gómez, 1992; Roldán, 1998.

¹⁵⁶ See Sánchez & Bakewell, 1985, p. 1.

¹⁵⁷ Sánchez Gómez, 1992, pp. 21, 23

¹⁵⁸ Guzmán Campos, Fals Borda, & Umaña Luna, 2005

¹⁵⁹ Hobsbawm, 1983, p. 26

possibilities.¹⁶⁰ The seeds for this revolution were laid during the social movements—labour, land, and Indigenous—of the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s. The un-coordinated mobilizations that occurred in rural and urban areas immediately following Gaitán’s assassination were part of a pre-revolutionary situation. However, Gaitán’s assassination left the movement without an ideology or coherent vision, making it incapable of orchestrating revolution on its own.¹⁶¹ In this light, the progressive reforms that were introduced in the 1930s were ultimately crushed by the brutal and violent counter-reform of the Conservatives Laureano Gómez.¹⁶²

The third approach emerged in the 1980s and brought in three different ways of seeing the state. The first state-oriented analysis was that of the American political scientist Paul Oquist.¹⁶³ Oquist explains *La Violencia* as the result of partisan conflict for access to state resources, which precipitated the collapse of the state and caused violence.¹⁶⁴ Oquist argues that during the early part of the 20th century Colombia underwent rapid social and economic changes which included an increase in foreign investment and foreign loans, land colonization, industrialization, the construction of government agencies and institutions, state spending on infrastructure, the construction of transportation links, and increased state

¹⁶⁰ Hobsbawm, 1983, p. 273

¹⁶¹ This critique is expressed by Cristina Rojas, see Rojas & Tubb, forthcoming.

¹⁶² On this point and for an historical overview of Colombia’s history of progressive social openings and state repression, see Hylton, 2003, 2006. Hylton makes the compelling case that Colombian history is marked by this oscillation between a progressive opening followed by a brutal repression. In the case of *La Violencia*, Hylton contends that this opening took place in the 1930s and was repressed by a Conservative counter-reform of the 1950s. Indeed, Hylton identifies this oscillation as the disturbing continuity of Colombian politics.

¹⁶³ Oquist’s PhD thesis from Berkley was published as *Violence, Conflict, and Politics in Colombia* (Oquist, 1980).

¹⁶⁴ Sánchez & Bakewell, 1985, p. 804

regulation.¹⁶⁵ The government of Alfonso López Pumarejo (1934 to 1938) supported the founding of the CTC (Colombian Confederation of Workers), expanded and supported the professionalization of the military, increased the regulation of finance and foreign trade, expanded the state bureaucracy, undertook reforms to electoral law that expanded political citizenship and voting rights for all men, and liberalized the education system.¹⁶⁶ Oquist argues that in the 1930s the state became the most important actor in social and economic life in Colombia. By 1946 control and access to state institutions was increasingly important for the social and economic success for individuals and for businesses. It was impossible for anyone to undertake a large business initiative in any sector of the economy without the protection, support, and acquiesce of the state.¹⁶⁷ To be excluded from access to government contracts, from input on regulations, from tax favours, from import privileges, and from other benefits was disastrous.¹⁶⁸ Thus, the divide between Liberals and Conservatives became violent as each side fought for control of the state. This initially led to a decrease in the state's efficiency and ultimately to its partial collapse, which led to *La Violencia*.¹⁶⁹

David Pécaut uses a different interpretation of the failed state analysis to explore the role the state played in violence. Pécaut, a French political scientist, explains violence as the result of a dissolution of the state and its inability to act as a social mediator or unifier for the ruling classes. Pécaut argues this occurred because in the 1940s economically and socially

¹⁶⁵ Oquist, 1980, p. 161

¹⁶⁶ Oquist, 1980, pp. 153-163

¹⁶⁷ Oquist, 1980, p. 152

¹⁶⁸ Oquist, 1980, p. 152

¹⁶⁹ Oquist, 1980, p. 195

liberal (not liberal as in Liberal Party, but liberal in the classical economic sense) policies were introduced, which left the economy and society to the market. This undid the progressive opening towards labour of the Liberal administrations of Enrique Olaya Herrera (1930 to 1934) and López Pumarejo (1934 to 1938 and 1942 to 1945). Pécaut sees partisan violence emerging as a result of the state's inability to mediate social conflicts, rather than partisan violence as the cause of the state's inability to mediate social conflicts. For Pécaut, the state in Colombia was never very strong, and in addition state intervention in the economy was never as important in Colombia as it was in other Latin American countries. The state itself was never under the exclusive control of the political parties and it was never mediated solely along partisan lines. Instead the state was permeable to other economic interests.¹⁷⁰ Pécaut suggests that state economic policies reflected bipartisan agreement. Although the state was never strong enough to arbitrate competing economic interests, these interests were never in fact divided along partisan lines in the first place.¹⁷¹

If Oquist's interpretation of *La Violencia* focuses on the economic—that is, conflict as the result of a struggle for control over state resources which resulted in state collapse and exacerbated social tensions—Pécaut's argument focuses on the social. Pécaut argues that in the 1930s the Liberal government sought to achieve a certain form of social legitimacy by protecting “the general interest against the particular interest.”¹⁷² This administration undertook a variety of modest reforms which brought a modicum of citizenship rights to the

¹⁷⁰ For example, the *Sociedad de Agricultores de Colombia* (SAC), the *Federación Nacional de Cafeteros de Colombia* (FEDECAFE), and the *Asociación Nacional de Industriales* (ANDI) See LeGrand, 1997, p. 3.

¹⁷¹ LeGrand, 1997, p. 3

¹⁷² LeGrand, 1997, p. 4

lower classes.¹⁷³ Although social and economic relations were not significantly altered, the particular language and legal reforms did allow the state to acquire a capacity of social mediation. By the 1940s, Pécaut identifies a return to an unregulated model of society and the economy by the 1940s,¹⁷⁴ suggesting that it was the return to liberalism that resulted in a political crisis because the institutional structures that might have allowed for a mediation of social conflict fell apart.¹⁷⁵ At the same time, elite politicians began to describe the Colombian nation as one that was “irrevocably divided—into two parties, into insiders and outsiders, into ‘civilized’ people and ‘barbarians.’”¹⁷⁶ By the late 1940s the state had dissolved to the extent that it was unable to play the role of social arbitrator or be seen as legitimate.¹⁷⁷ *La Violencia* resulted from the “profound disorganization of social actors and social movements who could not express themselves coherently in the absence of an organized state.”¹⁷⁸ In this climate of social disintegration, rural people returned to their old social groupings of the Liberal and Conservative parties, a reinforced party identification was not a cause of *La Violencia*, rather it was precipitated by *La Violencia*.¹⁷⁹

Mary Roldán offers the third state-oriented interpretation.¹⁸⁰ Taking up the question of the state in a regional context focusing on the department of Antioquia, she argues that although similar dynamics—partisan, class, and state, etc.—were important, it was their

¹⁷³ LeGrand, 1997, p. 4

¹⁷⁴ LeGrand, 1997, p. 4

¹⁷⁵ LeGrand, 1997, p. 4

¹⁷⁶ LeGrand, 1997, p. 4

¹⁷⁷ LeGrand, 1997, p. 4

¹⁷⁸ LeGrand, 1997, p. 4

¹⁷⁹ LeGrand, 1997, p. 4

¹⁸⁰ Roldán, 2002

interaction in the specific regional context of Antioquia, rather than the national level, that was significant.¹⁸¹ Indeed, she suggests that the national state “is a potentially problematic or even irrelevant category of analysis for understanding individual perceptions of authority or power on the ground.”¹⁸² Roldán shows that from 1946 to 1953, distinct areas of Antioquia experienced violence in markedly differently ways.¹⁸³ It was the composition of the state in these regions—rather than its mere presence or absence—that was the key factor. Violence in Antioquia thus resulted from conflict between the regional and the central states, as well as between the regional state and the inhabitants of the peripheral areas of the department over “political, social, economic, and cultural practices.”¹⁸⁴

The fourth major interpretation in the literature on *La Violencia* has focused on the question of how to understand the political movement of *gaitanismo* and what to make of the assassination of Gaitán.¹⁸⁵ These interpretations are useful in the context of Antioquia because although Gaitán’s electoral success was limited outside of a few peripheral towns, he did “inspire and shape political practice among sectors of society who felt politically, socially, and culturally marginalized by the elite-driven leadership style and agenda of Colombia’s two main parties.”¹⁸⁶ Gaitán resonated with the ambitions and political goals of many sectors of Antioquia, even if electorally his political movement never flourished outside of the peripheral zones colonized by settlers from neighbouring departments.¹⁸⁷ In particular Gaitán

¹⁸¹ Roldán, 2002, p. 134

¹⁸² Roldán, 2002, p. 296

¹⁸³ See *Figure 6: Regions of Antioquia*, p. 122.

¹⁸⁴ Roldán, 2002, p. 196

¹⁸⁵ LeGrand, 1997

¹⁸⁶ Roldán, 2005, p. 302

¹⁸⁷ Roldán, 2005, p. 302

found support in Urabá, Bajo Cauca, the Magdalena Medio, and Western Antioquia.¹⁸⁸

Herbert Braun, analyzing politics of the 1930s and 1940s, proposes two elements that are useful in understanding *La Violencia*. The first is the form of politics and the second is how the two parties were divided on the question of how to incorporate the lower classes into politics. Braun describes a form of politics that took place in the 1930s and 1940s in the rarified smoking rooms of Bogotá's social clubs, terming it *convivencia* (living together). He argues this form of politics stood in stark contrast to the emerging capitalist and individualistic society of the early 1930s.¹⁸⁹ For Braun, the elite of both parties had no real ideological differences and they rather shared a political culture based on.

an enduring public tradition with pre-capitalist and Catholic roots, conceived of as the embodiment of abstract reason, morality, and the collective good, and performed by selected political elites in Bogotá as the nation's nerve centre of high culture and civilized comportment.¹⁹⁰

In this perspective, the major controversy that divided the two parties was the question of how politics should be conceived in a society that was increasingly individualistic, competitive, and market oriented.¹⁹¹ The key question was of “political legitimacy and the place of the individual in society and politics.”¹⁹² The question “*who was and who was not to be a participating member of the emerging Colombian nation*”¹⁹³ divided the political elite. Both the Liberals and the Conservatives saw their role as making “individuals aware of the necessities of the spirit, and form in them the habit of adequately attending to them.”¹⁹⁴ It

¹⁸⁸ Roldán, 2005, p. 302

¹⁸⁹ LeGrand, 1997, p. 6

¹⁹⁰ Braun, 1985, pp. 7-8

¹⁹¹ Braun, 1985, pp. 7-8

¹⁹² Emphasis added, Braun, 1985, pp. 7-8

¹⁹³ Emphasis added, Braun, 1985, pp. 7-8

¹⁹⁴ Braun, 1985, p. 22

was a pedagogical or teaching approach where “the more backward people” should be shown through “example the seed of the ambition to better its life.”¹⁹⁵

Braun contends that Gaitán’s politics were not about the inclusion in the political of the working classes and the lower classes. Rather, Braun contends that Gaitán represented the aspirations of an emerging *petite-bourgeoisie*, which had steadily grown in the early years of the 20th century.¹⁹⁶ Gaitán’s master’s thesis was a re-interpretation and re-reading of Marx that focused on the class interests of the *petite-bourgeoisie* rather than the *proletariat*.¹⁹⁷ Gaitán was not emancipatory, nor did he represent the revolutionary interests of the lower classes; rather he “believed in social harmony and order and thought the lower classes needed to be led by the petty bourgeoisie.” Gaitán, “like his contemporaries, ... believed social change meant altering individual behaviour and attitudes, teaching his lower class followers to be clean, healthy, and ‘civilized.’”¹⁹⁸ Gaitán represented neither the poor nor the urban working class, but rather an emerging middle class. Gaitán’s class conflict was not between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, but rather between large property holders, financiers, and the *petite-bourgeoisie*.¹⁹⁹ If Gaitán brought a class “consciousness of workers and peasants,” it was not as workers and peasants, but rather a consciousness of themselves as “potential property-owners, as members of a society in which they would be treated as dignified individuals.”²⁰⁰

This explains why Gaitán’s politics was not class based, but rather focused on the individual,

¹⁹⁵ Braun, 1985, p. 22

¹⁹⁶ Braun, 1985, p. 9

¹⁹⁷ Braun, 1985, p. 9

¹⁹⁸ LeGrand, 1997, p. 6

¹⁹⁹ LeGrand, 1997, p. 18

²⁰⁰ LeGrand, 1997, p. 21

and on altering “individual behaviour and attitudes, teaching his lower class followers to be clean, healthy, and ‘civilized.’”²⁰¹ Political inclusion was limited, and took on certain symbolic forms.²⁰²

For Braun then the *bogotázo* and *La Violencia* were not a failed revolution, but an outpouring of grief. They did not have political goals, because there was no co-ordinated attempt to produce change; rather there was a “violation of the moral order” and an attempt to appeal to the government to restore that order.²⁰³ The violence after Gaitán’s assassination thus represented a break in the old system of civil politics,²⁰⁴ and was part of a subconscious elite effort to re-impose an old system of politics onto the spaces that Gaitán had opened up. The elite fought, blamed each other, and blamed “the feared and hated lower classes whom they perceived as barbarians.”²⁰⁵

Gonzaló Sánchez’s analysis of Gaitán is that of an aborted social revolution.²⁰⁶ LeGrand suggests that Sánchez’s analysis is somewhat contradictory to Braun’s. Sánchez would agree with Braun’s suggestion that the conflict between Liberals and Conservatives was neither economic nor social, but rather revolved around the question of how to incorporate the lower classes.²⁰⁷ However, for Sánchez, Gaitán was the first to attempt to incorporate and to mobilize the lower-middle and lower-working class in opposition to the “oligarchy,

²⁰¹ LeGrand, 1997, p. 6

²⁰² LeGrand, 1997, p. 6

²⁰³ LeGrand, 1997, p. 6

²⁰⁴ LeGrand, 1997, p. 18

²⁰⁵ LeGrand, 1997, p. 7

²⁰⁶ LeGrand, 1997, p. 5

²⁰⁷ LeGrand, 1997, p. 5

monopolies, and foreign capital.”²⁰⁸ Sánchez thus sees in Gaitán a movement, a democratic alternative, and a possibility for those who had “previously been excluded ... to exercise direct political influence and ... speak for themselves.”²⁰⁹ In opposition to Braun, Sánchez suggests the assassination of Gaitán meant his followers rose up in revolution, questioned the power of the state, and created a movement that contained within itself the possibility of a new social order.²¹⁰ This possibility was very quickly repressed and ultimately and definitively destroyed.

Finally, Pécaut sees in *gaitanismo* not so much a revolutionary movement, or a movement that expanded politics for the *petite-bourgeoisie*, but rather a reactionary movement against the political inclusions that López brought in, especially because Gaitán opposed the labour movement.²¹¹ In this perspective, Gaitán contributed to the closure of public space and the reduction of the poor’s access to politics.²¹² Pécaut sees Gaitán as medicalizing the poor, depriving them of the political, and classifying them as weak, sick, and in need of social direction.

To sum up, the major approaches to interpreting *La Violencia* focus on partisan rivalries, a class analysis that sees the conflict as frustrated social revolution, the question of the state, and the question of Gaitán. The first approach sees the violence as simply the result of deep-seated partisan hatreds. In spite of the commonsensical nature of this analysis, it is

²⁰⁸ LeGrand, 1997, p. 5

²⁰⁹ LeGrand, 1997, p. 5

²¹⁰ LeGrand, 1997, p. 5

²¹¹ LeGrand, 1997, p. 7

²¹² LeGrand, 1997, p. 7

unsatisfactory because, at least in Antioquia, *La Violencia* was far more complicated. Although the Liberal Party did predominate in some peripheral towns, it also dominated in the municipal government in Medellín. Furthermore, a partisan perspective does not provide insight into temporal and geographic particularities, nor does it consider the fact that the two parties had very little to distinguish them politically, economically, and culturally.²¹³ Although partisan membership was undoubtedly a factor, other perspectives are required to interpret the violence.

The second class based approach is useful to describe the phenomena of forced displacement, the reverse land reform, and the ways that coffee and other goods were redistributed.²¹⁴ However, Cristina Rojas points out that at least the early perspectives of Fals Borda and Hobsbawm are caught within “teleological interpretations of the transition to capitalism and socialism.”²¹⁵

The third analysis is state oriented. For Oquist, the state failed as conflicts occurred over economic benefits along partisan lines. For Pécaut, the state dissolved and conflict was the result of the state’s inability to act as a social mediator. For Roldán, the question is one of conflict over the very composition of the state. Oquist’s approach has been challenged because the state was never as strong as he contends, access to its benefits was never simply partisan, and he subsumes social questions to economic concerns. Nonetheless, Oquist’s

²¹³ On this point see Perea, 1996 who points out that in spite of the perception of profound differences in programs, platforms, and political campaigns, there was actually little to distinguish the programs of the two parties in the 1930s and 1940s.

²¹⁴ For a synthesis of some of these class based perspectives see Bergquist et al., 1992.

²¹⁵ Rojas & Tubb, forthcoming, p. 6

analysis has two important contributions. He introduces the state into the picture and calls for a regional analysis of *La Violencia*. Pécaut also sees a crisis in the state as the cause of *La Violencia*. For Pécaut violence resulted from a gradual liberalization, which partially dissolved the progressive infrastructure of the state, leading to *La Violencia*.²¹⁶ Roldán's analysis differs significantly from Pécaut and Oquist in that while her's is an analysis of state formation, she incorporates the geographical manifestation of imagined cultural and ethnic differences between the centre and periphery. She also considers the constructions of race, culture, and social differences especially the regional composition of the state and cultural factors. However, Roldán's analysis is still overly focused on the role of the composition of the state. She does not address other forms of governance. A focus on governance in a broad sense of the term is useful in investigating governance in the colonial spaces on the periphery and the urban spaces at the city.

The fourth approach focuses on the question of Gaitán. Braun suggests *La Violencia* was the result of the inclusion of *petite-bourgeoisie* into the politics; Sánchez, the inclusion of the lower and working class; and Pécaut it was the inclusion of the former and the exclusion of the latter. All three see Gaitán and his movement as crucial to understanding *La Violencia*. Of the interpretations, Braun's focus on Gaitán's sensibilities and politics as *petite-bourgeoisie* is useful to understand the forms of politics that were dominant in Medellín at the time and provides a useful contextualization for the medical and hygienic focus of these programs, although in Medellín it was Conservatives and Liberals who deployed these technologies and

²¹⁶ LeGrand, 1997, p. 4

not *gaitanistas*.

Taken together this literature contributes to understanding *La Violencia* both in Colombia and in Antioquia. However, there is no consensus on how to interpret the period, and indeed there is no one explanation that provides all the answers. Roldán's analysis is most useful to me as she explores the way that particular social constructions and identities were created and deployed and the ways that the state used these for violent ends on the periphery. I build on her analysis, rather than replacing it, to suggest that the particular governmentalities by which constructions of *antioqueñidad* were deployed in the region show how violence on the periphery was linked to the core. Roldán's analysis of *antioqueñidad*, while recognizing that it was an imaginary, still holds that it had a certain technocratic and merit-driven nature. My reading of *antioqueñidad* is less optimistic as I read at the core of its imaginary an exclusive character that depoliticized those living at the core and the periphery.

Braun's observations on the *petite-bourgeoisie* nature of Gaitán politics, and the moral, pedagogical, and civilizing nature of *convivencia*, provide insight on the forms of politics represented by the discourses of *antioqueñidad*. It would be incorrect to overemphasize the influence of Gaitán's politics in Antioquia; nonetheless, the programs deployed in Medellín shared a concern with hygiene, the body, civilized behaviour, appearances, whiteness, and certain values such as hard work. In Medellín there was no project of *gaitanismo*, yet the technologies inspired by *antioqueñidad* shared interventions with Gaitán's project. In Medellín, programs deployed by the state, the municipality, the church, labour organizations, and industry were important. These projects, as in other parts of Colombia, were targeted at

the poor, labourers, women, indigenous people, and Afro-descendants. In Antioquia these programs were a reflection of the regional ideal of *antioqueñidad*.

A class analysis is useful in an analytical sense to understand how violence was deployed in the colonial periphery of Antioquia. Here, processes of displacement combined with terror. Nonetheless, an overly class-based analysis does not explain the racialized and gendered ways that violence and citizenship were practised and understood in the department. Roldán provides a useful language to discuss the colonial nature of violence in the periphery. However, all authors fail to explore the corporeal manifestation of terror linked to the core.

My analysis takes up Oquist and Roldán's call for specificity by describing the department of Antioquia and understanding the rationalities and technologies of violence in the Antioquian periphery. The focus on Antioquia is warranted because the most common explanations do not provide a nuanced explanation of the paradox in the department: why in Medellín and the core regions there were almost no deaths related to *La Violencia*, while in certain periods and in certain peripheral towns and sub-regions violence reached extremely high levels. Although most of the interpretations discussed above have taken Colombia as a whole as their focus, I draw on Roldán's interpretations of Antioquia to suggest that the projects of governance in the core regions and the projects of governance on the periphery were deeply linked. My perspective is not focused on the state; rather I explore how governance occurred inside and outside the state. I do not hope to suggest these projects were unique to Antioquia; indeed the guerrilla, paramilitary and state conflicts and the forms of

mutilation were common in other areas of Colombia. Nonetheless, some elements, for example Medellín's booming economy, were unique. I next outline the key rationality of *antioqueñidad* before turning to the forms of governmental intervention on the body in the city and the periphery.

Chapter Three: *Antioqueñidad*

This chapter explores the regional identity of *antioqueñidad* and argues that it is key to understanding how citizenship was constructed in the core regions of Medellín and how violence was deployed on the periphery. Later chapters explore in greater detail the forms of governmental intervention in both the core and the periphery by focusing on the body. In Medellín, programs were designed to create an ideal citizen in line with discourses of *antioqueñidad*. In the periphery, technologies of governance focused on bodies that were valued differently because whole groups of people were seen as deviating from *antioqueñidad*.

I first describe the supposedly unique characteristics of residents in the core areas of the department. Next, I describe how this imagined regional identity was constructed in the 19th and early 20th century through a racist discourse produced by regional politicians and writers. This identity allowed for the creation of two Antioquias. Residents in central areas were imagined as *antioqueños*, whereas residents in peripheral areas of the department were constructed as an alterity. The peripheral non-*antioqueño* was imagined to be everything that the core was not. Like Baraille's observations on the untouchable, taboo, and sacred nature of the heterogeneous classes, residents in the periphery were imagined as dangerous, deviant and violent. Constructions of racism were key to how these divisions were constructed. Building on Roldán's work, I explore in detail how the region of Urabá was imagined as a virgin colonial space inhabited by non-*antioqueños* who were predominately Afro-descendent or Indigenous. I show that the identity of *antioqueñidad* provides the foundation of a regional political project and governmental interventions.

In 1966, Luis Fajardo, a sociologist from Cali, described the personality of the residents of Antioquia as one that allowed the department to “surge forward on the road toward development.”²¹⁷ Fajardo described the characteristics attributed to the image of *antioqueñidad* as

asceticism, positivism, activism, geographic mobility, common sense, reserve, frugality, industriousness, love of money, conjugal fidelity, democratic manners, success-orientation, optimism, independence, regionalism, love of games of chance, traditionalism, methodicism, affective neutrality, aggressiveness, sexual puritanism, belief in progress, egalitarianism, predominance of achieved over ascribed status, predominance of future orientation, interest in calculated risks, truculence, preference for sober colours, nervous temperament, expressive movements, loquacity, incongruence between believe and action, hyper sensitivity to time (punctuality).²¹⁸

Other authors comment on the Antioquian residents’ “economic abilities, but also ... the psycho-cultural characteristics that set them apart from other Colombians.”²¹⁹ *Antioqueños* were seen as having a strong work ethic, as well as qualities of civilization, education, whiteness, strength, economic prosperity, and industriousness.

The academic debates in the 1960s and 1970s, which attributed the regions economic growth to the *antioqueño* population, were reiterations of similar debates that had taken place in Colombia between intellectuals from Bogotá and Medellín since the mid-19th century.

In 1941, on the 400th anniversary of Antioquia’s founding, Ricardo Uribe Escobar began his history of *la raza antioqueña* by suggesting that the race could be traced directly to the early Spanish settlers who possessed an “uncommon energy and admirable fertility” as they spread across a large portion of what is now Colombian territory.²²⁰ Uribe saw *la raza*

²¹⁷ Fajardo, 1966, p. 67

²¹⁸ Fajardo, 1966, p. 6

²¹⁹ Fajardo, 1966, p. 21

²²⁰ Uribe Escobar, 1941, p. 1

antioqueña as “something special and vigorous in the incoherent and crossed biology of Spanish America.”²²¹ In the same publication, Roberto Jaramillo suggested that Antioquia was inhabited by “a vigorous race that was made up of men of letters, businessmen and peasants distributed in many areas of the republic whose racial, cultural and economic penetration ... [make] it the most positive ethnic group in Spanish America.”²²²

These racial arguments in the 1940s were based on literary constructions of the late 19th century, which described an *antioqueño* as someone who was

white, a bit rosy, thin, wiry, and strong, [with a] physiognomy [...] notably angular, with pronounced gestures, [a] nose [that is] straight and of fine profile, [...] with] eyes [that are] black, jesting, thoughtful and lustrous, [and with a] posture distinguished and [an] expression reserved.²²³

These explanations attributed the allegedly unique features of the Antioqueño population to supposed Jewish ancestry. The Colombian writer José Mariá Samper wrote that 200 Jews immigrated in the 16th century to Antioquia and that by the late 19th century racial mixing had produced the “most beautiful and vigorous race known in Hispano Colombia.”²²⁴

Ann Twinam dates the idea back to the 1809 *Compendio historial*, which concluded that since *antioqueños* “looked like Jews, and acted like Jews, they clearly were Jews.”²²⁵ In the 19th century, *antioqueño* authors were quick to refute charges of Jewish ancestry on anti-Semitic grounds,²²⁶ emphasizing instead the racial composition of the *antioqueño* as “Spanish [and] Castillian, with a little bit of Semitic blood [running] in their veins.”²²⁷ By the late 1940s,

²²¹ Uribe Escobar, 1941, p. 3

²²² Jaramillo, 1941

²²³ José Mariá Samper. *Ensayos sobre las revoluciones políticas*. Bogotá: Biblioteca Popular de Cultura Colombiana in Fajardo, 1966, p. 27

²²⁴ José Mariá Samper in Rojas, 2002, p. 153

²²⁵ Twinam, 1979, p. 86

²²⁶ Twinam, 1979, p. 94

some local authors had begun to embrace the idea of Jewish ancestry as a perhaps backhanded compliment.²²⁸

More recent academic work has rejected the thesis of racially unique origins as a factor in explaining *antioqueñidad*. Fajardo points out that late-19th-century authors invented the 200 Spanish Jews who supposedly settled the region.²²⁹ James Parsons, in his history of the colonization of Antioquia, calls the construction of *la raza antioqueña* an “ethnographic heresy.”²³⁰ Frank Safford suggests that the Jewish myth probably came about not as “the origin, but as *the result*” of economic success.²³¹ Escobar Villegas argues that the imagined identity of *antioqueñidad* was created by writers, scientists, intellectuals, and artists who worked both to produce a rationality of civilization and progress and to defend their own self-image.²³²

While there was little empirical support for the argument of a common racial ancestry, even these critics saw the department’s economic development as having a “psycho-social” explanation. Parsons argued it was poverty and harsh conditions that created a particular individualism and the distinctive character of the department.²³³ Fajardo contends that key to this difference was a unique economic structure during colonialism, in that in Antioquia forms of feudalism never existed.²³⁴ Whatever the explanation for Antioquia’s particular

²²⁷ Reyes Cárdenas, 1996, p. 426

²²⁸ Twinam, 1979, p. 94

²²⁹ Fajardo, 1966, p. 67

²³⁰ Parsons, 1968, p. 3

²³¹ Emphasis added, Safford in Rojas, 2002, p. 155

²³² Escobar Villegas, 2004, p. 137

²³³ Parsons, 1967; Parsons, 1968

²³⁴ Fajardo notes that the institution of serfdom, which affected the large majority of the population in Colombia, was absent in Antioquia. He goes on to suggest that this element helps to explain the cultural values that

economic success, likely questions of internal colonialism and the development of capitalism are somewhat underemphasized in these discussions. I argue that the imaginary of *antioqueño* exceptionality allows for an understanding of citizenship and violence in the department during *La Violencia*. The imaginary of *antioqueño* exceptionality was constructed in a manner that meant the inclusion of some and the exclusion of others. There were two Antioquias—one imagined to be inhabited by *antioqueños* and the other by non-*antioqueños*.²³⁵

Two Antioquias

The first Antioquia was located in the city of Medellín and in the areas around the central coffee producing regions of the department. These areas had been settled and colonized in the 19th and 20th centuries by settlers who had come from the central areas and who saw themselves as *antioqueños*.²³⁶ In the central areas the state provided elements of social and economic mobility and ensured the possibility of land ownership and fostered common beliefs and shared social norms.²³⁷ There was a belief in the Catholic Church, in whiteness, in capitalism, and in marriage.²³⁸ Residents of this area were understood and understood themselves to be representatives of *la raza antioqueña*. It was this identity that provided for a commonality among the population.

eventually became generalized among the inhabitants of the region, and that over time became internalized, so much so that “the incentive of profit and industriousness became congenital to people who judged individual’s positions in society according to his merits and not according to inexorable and unchangeable circumstances as as inheritance of a title or colour of the skin” (Fajardo, 1966). Rojas notes that in Antioquia there was no system of feudal labor, but rather, relatively free *aparcería* (sharecroppers) who where able to hire others and whose produce and whose costs were shared with the landowner (Rojas, 2002, p. 154).

²³⁵ Roldán, 2002, p. 291

²³⁶ Parsons, 1967; Parsons, 1968; Roldán, 1998, p. 236

²³⁷ Roldán, 2002, p. 291

²³⁸ Roldán, 1998, p. 5

Membership in the community of *antioqueñidad* implied an alterity. The other who was not *antioqueño*, who did not belong, and who deviated from the norm. Those who inhabited a second Antioquia, geographically and spatially located in the peripheral zones of the department in Urabá, western Antioquia, Bajo Cauca, and the Magdalena Medio were seen as non-*antioqueño*. These regions were settled predominantly by residents from the neighbouring departments of Bolívar, Chocó, Santander, and Boyacá, who were non-*antioqueño*.²³⁹

The second Antioquia was rarely acknowledged by residents of the former. Residents of Antioquia's core constructed a racial imaginary of residents in the peripheral areas as their opposite and as "everything they perceived themselves not to be."²⁴⁰ Like citizenship everywhere, those who saw themselves as *antioqueño* imagined others as different. If residents in the core were hard working, ordered, family oriented, religious, and honest, in the periphery they were lazy, unruly, promiscuous, irreligious, and shifty.²⁴¹ They were seen as deviating from *antioqueñidad* and in need of moral control by force if necessary.²⁴² If those in the centre saw the periphery as non-*antioqueño*, those in the periphery saw those at the core as "arrogant interlopers who considered themselves both whiter and more civilized than non-*antioqueño* migrants."²⁴³

These perceived cultural differences had a racialized linguistics that helped to create a

²³⁹ Roldán, 1998; Roldán, 2002, p. 291.

²⁴⁰ Roldán, 2002, p. 37

²⁴¹ Roldán, 2002, p. 37

²⁴² Roldán, 2002, p. 37

²⁴³ Roldán, 2002, p. 37

break between residents of the two regions. Most of the peripheral regions of the department had been colonized by people predominately of Afro descent or by Indigenous people from neighbouring departments.²⁴⁴ They were labelled as non-*antioqueño*, *costeño* (coastal), *negro* (black), and *cosmopolita* (non-white).²⁴⁵ They were characterized as *pillos* (cads), *perezosos* (lazy), *viciosos* (addicts), *bulliciosos* (noisy), *indisciplinados* (undisciplined), and *pobre* (poor).²⁴⁶ Imagined differences in sexual unions, labour relations, land ownership, political movements, and folk religion were also seen as threatening to and deviant from the regional identity.²⁴⁷ These people were seen simultaneously as untrustworthy and in deep contrast to the cultural ideal of *antioqueñidad*.²⁴⁸

Antioqueñidad was thus used by the authorities, the regional state, and inhabitants in the central areas to construct a racialized “other” on the periphery. This alterity was seen as threatening to the very core of the *antioqueño* identity, authority, and ultimately prosperity.²⁴⁹ Like the revulsion engendered by the heterogeneous classes as described by Bataille and the racism discussed by Foucault, residents in the peripheral areas were seen as lacking respectability, as not possessing a cultural identity, and as being a threat to the core areas.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁴ Roldán, 1998, p. 6. Indeed in Western Antioquia, afro-descendants, many from the Choco, a department on the Pacific Coast immediately to the west of Antioquia, had played a large part in the colonization of this region of Antioquia. For more on constructions of blackness in the Choco see Wade, 1993.

²⁴⁵ Roldán, 2002, p. 38

²⁴⁶ Reyes Cárdenas, 1996, p. 426

²⁴⁷ Reyes Cárdenas, 1996, p. 426

²⁴⁸ Roldán, 1998, p. 6

²⁴⁹ Roldán is careful to note that these were in fact imaginaries and that although inhabitants in the region identified themselves with *la raza antioqueña*, it was the “construction and manipulation of dynamic, profound, and widespread preconceptions of difference and identity” that had political and social repercussions (p. 373).

²⁵⁰ Roldán, 1998, p. 6

Core communities were described as healthy, pure, and clean, whereas peripheral communities were described as unhealthy places, populated by Afro-descendent, Indigenous peoples and other non-*antioqueños* who were characterized as “sick, lazy, and by nature inconsistent.”²⁵¹ These stereotypes, which were based on cultural differences, although imagined to be biological, had a profound influence on the region.²⁵²

Roldán interprets this influence as focusing on state building. For Roldán, violence occurred in the peripheral zones because in the 1930s and 1940s the central state from Bogotá attempted to impose a model of rule, not based on the imagined identity of being *antioqueño*, but rather one based on labour and social reforms. On the Antioquian periphery, the model of the central state allowed lower-class members of the society access to the central state as part of organized labour, and they began to identify themselves with the Liberal Party and the progressive opening of the López reforms in the 1930s.²⁵³ Simultaneously, residents in the periphery failed to conform to the underlying racial, cultural, and economic identities at the very core of the regional state’s ruling project.²⁵⁴ The failure to reflect a sense of *antioqueñidad* by residents in the periphery, even as they identified with the national state’s progressive opening, meant that inhabitants in the periphery were violently repressed.²⁵⁵ For Roldán, in areas where the regional state’s relationship with the local citizenry was hostile, irregular partisan-based clientalist networks and the central state from Bogotá clashed with

²⁵¹ Roldán, 1998, p. 7

²⁵² Roldán, 1998, p. 7

²⁵³ Roldán, 2002, p. 34

²⁵⁴ Roldán, 2002, p. 34

²⁵⁵ Roldán, 2002, p. 34

supra-partisan clientalism and the regional *antioqueño* ruling project with a violent “conflagration that precluded the possibility of mediation.”²⁵⁶

While I agree with Roldán that *antioqueñidad* is key to understanding *La Violencia* in the department, my interpretation does not focus on state building or the central state. Rather, I argue that the regional imaginary of *antioqueñidad* was one of the key technologies of governance in the region. The notion of a civilized, hard-working, *antioqueño* population in one area was used by a variety of institutions and organizations to deploy programs that focused on civilizing and engendering proper comportment in these residents. In the core, these programs were designed to strengthen the *antioqueño* population, to make it stronger, more civilized, and healthier. The rationality of *antioqueñidad* underlined investments in public planning in the city, projects of road building, and a whole series of institutions and organizations that acted on the bodies of *antioqueños* as individuals and as members of a collectivity.

At the same time, the forms of citizenship that were deployed in the central zones make clear the particular forms of violence that were deployed in the second Antioquia. In these peripheral regions violence and terror became technologies of governance deployed by paramilitary, by guerrillas, and by state forces. In the peripheral zones, colonial relations existed: land ownership was concentrated, agribusiness and cattle ranches dominant, landless migrants and seasonal workers common, and extractive industries prevalent.²⁵⁷ The particular

²⁵⁶ Roldán, 2002, p. 34

²⁵⁷ Roldán, 2002, p. 291. For further analysis of the spatial configurations of difference and colonization in the department see Roldán, 1998.

region of Urabá suggests how important colonial imaginaries related to *antioqueñidad* were in *La Violencia*.

Urabá and Western Antioquia

Urabá is a sub-region located in the northwest of the department.²⁵⁸ At the time of *La Violencia*, Urabá made up a significant proportion of the department's land mass by area, yet its population in the 1951 census was only 17,000 individuals.²⁵⁹ It is a region that Roldán describes as a “dark object of desire,” which captured the *antioqueño* imagination from the 19th century. Urabá entered the *antioqueño* imagination as an empty, virgin land awaiting the influence of the civilized *antioqueño* settlers. It was imagined to be “a rich unexplored region” waiting to be converted into a work camp by the region's youth.²⁶⁰ When the Spaniards arrived in the region during colonial times, they tried to subjugate Indigenous people in the region. These groups responded with war and mass suicide. The response of the Spanish crown was to make navigation on the region's main river illegal. This move limited immigration and colonization and turned the region into a key smuggling route, with gold and cloth being taken to Jamaica, Santo Domingo, and Panama.²⁶¹ As a result, in the 19th century the region became seen as Antioquia's route to the ocean and a key area for departmental prosperity. It was annexed by Antioquia in 1905.²⁶² The department began construction of a highway from Medellín through Western Antioquia to the sea in 1926,

²⁵⁸ See *Figure 6: Regions of Antioquia*, p. 122.

²⁵⁹ Roldán, 2002, p. 174

²⁶⁰ Roldán, 1998, p. 12

²⁶¹ Roldán, 1998, p. 8. Interestingly, today the region remains a key smuggling route for cocaine.

²⁶² Roldán, 1998, p. 8

although it was not completed the time of *La Violencia*.²⁶³ Urabá was seen as having almost unlimited resources of cotton; gold, oil, and bananas, which could be cultivated for departmental benefit.²⁶⁴ In the first part of the 20th century plans were laid to connect the region via train and to create ports from which the “future commercial shipping of Antioquia” could sail.²⁶⁵ Urabá entered the Antioquian imaginary both as a region that was key to future prosperity and as profoundly non-*antioqueño* and in dire need of civilization.²⁶⁶

Although the region was constructed in this imaginary as an empty land, awaiting colonization by energetic *antioqueño* colonists, it had already been settled by residents from other regions of Colombia, including Bolivar, the Magdalena Medio, and Chocó, as well as Panama.²⁶⁷ For example, along the coast families of Afro-descendants dominated.²⁶⁸ These colonists survived on fishing, subsistence farming, cattle farming, and lumber.²⁶⁹ Resource extraction was also an important economic activity, and a variety of natural resources were extracted.

In the core, *Antioqueño* settlers were seen as able to, “without turning to violence, seduce the frontier residents [in Urabá,] to convince them of the superiority of *antioqueño* values and to emulate the mode of being from Antioquia.”²⁷⁰ The problem of Urabá’s wildness was reduced to a problem of civilization, and it was argued in the core that “there

²⁶³ Roldán, 1998, p. 11

²⁶⁴ Roldán, 1998, p. 11

²⁶⁵ Roldán, 1998, p. 8

²⁶⁶ Roldán, 1998, p. 10

²⁶⁷ Roldán, 1998, p. 12

²⁶⁸ Roldán, 1998, p. 12

²⁶⁹ Roldán, 1998, p. 13

²⁷⁰ Roldán, 1998, p. 11

[was] a necessity of bringing to these regions the moral and civic aspects of the *antioqueño* people, that would help many residents these regions who live a very primitive life with moral and mental laxity.”²⁷¹ Residents in these regions were constructed and imagined to be non-*antioqueño*. Imaginations of racial difference, civilization and *antioqueñidad* became key ways of distinguishing between the civilized centre and the colonial periphery, and in constructing peripheral areas as empty and virgin lands awaiting Antioquian interventions and populating.

Michael Taussig’s observations on the Putumayo, in the southeast of Colombia, point to the linkage between the imagination of civilized and un-civilized and colonial violence. While I turn to the corporeal manifestations of terror and colonial violence in the peripheral regions in Chapter 5, here I note the importance that colonial regions such as Urabá had on the imagination of the core and how the imagination of un-civilized were important to colonial governmentality in the periphery. The point is that terror and violence were deployed on those who deviated from the norm of *antioqueñidad* and not on those in the centrally situated towns who were seen as the embodiment of the idealized regional identity. Racial constructions were used by the regional elite and by the state in the maintenance of a colonial order.

This chapter explores the heart of this identity and suggests that it created two Antioquias. As a consequence, not everyone who lived in Antioquia could lay claim to the *antioqueño* identity. This was an identity that was mediated along racial and classed lines to

²⁷¹ Roldán, 1998, p. 19

exclude the residents of peripheral areas. I see *antioqueñidad* as a form of knowledge, and suggest that it shaped the variety of programs that were deployed in the core focused on improving and disciplining the population. At the same time, I understand violence as deployed on the bodies of those in the periphery because they were seen as deviating from the norm. *Antioqueñidad* sheds light on the imagined racial unity of these areas and allows for an understanding of the corporality of citizenship and violence. The connection I draw is predicated on the notion that the governmentalities of the body in Medellín—the concern of ensuring the health of the *antioqueño* population using tools of social hygiene and Catholic paternalism—created a citizenship that was exclusionary of those who deviated from the imagined *antioqueñidad*. The corporality of building the citizen in the core was linked to the corporality of violence on the periphery.

Chapter Four: Social Hygiene and Catholic Paternalism in Medellín

This chapter describes the corporality of citizenship programming in Medellín in the 1930s and 1940s by exploring the local programs of social hygiene and Catholic paternalism. These programs demonstrate first a bio-political concern with betterment of human beings as a biological entities in a population and second an anatomo-political concern with disciplining individuals into productive capitalist workers. My interest is in governance as it occurred outside of a narrow focus of the state. I look at projects undertaken in the school, the university, the workplace, and the city by a diverse set of agents including educational, religious, charitable, industrial, labour, and municipal organizations. I suggest that these rationalities and technologies of governance in Medellín in the first half of the 20th century demonstrated a concern for moral, economic, and biological control of the deviant in the context of the imagined racial identity of *antioqueñidad*. I argue that these technologies of governance focused on the body and the corporality of existence, and represent a depoliticizing and exclusionary process rather than a political or emancipatory movement. In the first half of the 20th century, a variety of agents that emerged in Medellín played an important role in deploying the *antioqueño* identity. These agents targeted particular sectors of society in an attempt to create a rational, modern, capitalist individual who matched the imaginary of *antioqueñidad*.

The prestigious *Escuela Nacional de Minas* (National School of Mines) opened in Medellín in 1887.²⁷² It quickly became famous for its role in educating the region's elite, many of whom played key roles in the economic and public life of the country and the department.²⁷³ Modelled on the Mining College of the University of California at Berkley,²⁷⁴ the school educated some of Colombia's leading politicians. The school educated young middle-class men, many from rural areas throughout the first half of the 20th century. Students were trained both to be civil engineers and to possess a certain moral code of order, moderation, and economy.²⁷⁵ Their education emphasized a positivistic, technical, and rational curriculum, the epitome of the values the *antioqueño* elite saw themselves as possessing.²⁷⁶ The school "formed young men in the image of [the] elite, instilling in them the elite's ideals, and values, while grooming them to be sober, technocratic-style leaders."²⁷⁷ The ideals of utilitarianism, pragmatism, and rationality underpinned this education.

The phrase *Trabajo y Rectitud* (Work and Rectitude) was the school's motto. It encapsulated what the school hoped to instil in its students, expressing the bourgeois ideal of gentlemen, work, and morality.²⁷⁸ According to Murray, work was seen as a source of honour, the idea being that engineers were consummate organizers. As a consequence, the school stressed attendance at mass, punctuality, morality, hard work, dedication, and courage.²⁷⁹

²⁷² Mayor Mora, 1989; Murray, 1994; Murray, 1997

²⁷³ Mayor Mora, 1989; Murray, 1994; Álvarez M., 1996; Murray, 1997

²⁷⁴ Murray, 1997, p. 67

²⁷⁵ Mayor Mora, 1989, p. 37

²⁷⁶ Mayor Mora, 1989, p. 39; Murray, 1994, p. 63

²⁷⁷ Murray, 1994, p. 63

²⁷⁸ Murray, 1994, p. 76

²⁷⁹ Murray, 1994, p. 77

Rectitude meant possessing high moral standards; being trustworthy; not accepting bribes; obeying the Catholic Church; abstaining from drinking, gambling, and prostitution; and possessing the good manners to facilitate “harmonious relations between the classes.”²⁸⁰ Students were urged to use their capacity as engineers to solve social problems through the efficient application of technical solutions and to insert into politics the principles of scientific administration.²⁸¹ Few of the engineers who graduated from the school worked in mining. The majority worked as civil engineers on the railways, in transportation, in construction, and in manufacturing. While the school was one of the key ways in which ideas of *antioqueñidad* were expressed to the rising middle class, its graduates also played a role in how church, industry, municipal government, and labour shared the same ideas with the lower classes.

Around the same time, a variety of Catholic organizations became important in the city. *La Acción Social Católica* (Catholic Social Action) was the largest such organization. It got its direction from the Vatican in the late 19th century and among other things was charged with organizing the *antioqueño* worker.²⁸² The charity ran Sunday schools, worker centres, a Catholic press *El Obrero Católica* (The Catholic Worker), women’s committees, youth organizations, public lectures, and mutual aid societies. By the 1930s and 1940s a variety of weekly radio programs had been started.²⁸³ In 1910, workers of the *Congregación de Obreros de San José* (Congregation of Workers of San José) developed a variety of co-operatives,

²⁸⁰ Murray, 1994, p. 80

²⁸¹ Mayor Mora, 1989, p. 204

²⁸² Mayor Mora, 1989, p. 306

²⁸³ Mayor Mora, 1989, p. 311

experimental model schools, recreational activities, and spiritual activities.²⁸⁴ *La Sociedad de San Vicente de Paul* (Society of St. Vincent de Paul) ran schools, workshops, and institutions that helped to educate children into being good citizens.²⁸⁵

In the early 20th century, *La Sociedad de San Vicente de Paul* created organizations that hoped to “solve the problems of misery of the population” and “to combat the laziness of the poor and beggars by turning them into useful workers.”²⁸⁶ It targeted vices such as alcoholism. Its members paid house visits to teach morality to young women living alone.²⁸⁷ At the organization’s asylum, madness was seen as highest amongst peasants and servants and attributed to racial degeneration.²⁸⁸ Worker centres focused on poor families, education, and the training of children, youth, and adults. In 1887 a night school for workers was opened, where workers could learn to read, write, do basic math, and importantly most learn moral lessons.²⁸⁹ The society ran schools to train workers to teach women to type.²⁹⁰ Similarly, *La Escuela de Artes y Oficios* (The School of Arts and Crafts) had the purpose of aiding, educating, and instructing poor orphans who were taught carpentry, shoemaking, tailoring, bookbinding, and how to use a loom.²⁹¹

Medellín became famous for the paternalistic way in which factories intervened in the lives of their employees, particularly in the 1930s and 1940s.²⁹² Many factories in Medellín

²⁸⁴ Archila Neira, 1996, p. 401

²⁸⁵ Archila Neira, 1996, p. 401

²⁸⁶ Patricia, 1996, p. 412

²⁸⁷ Patricia, 1996, p. 412

²⁸⁸ Patricia, 1996, p. 412

²⁸⁹ Saavedra, 1996, p. 387

²⁹⁰ Saavedra, 1996, p. 387

²⁹¹ Saavedra, 1996, p. 387

²⁹² See Farnsworth Alvear, 2000 for an in depth discussion of labour relations in Medellín.

organized programs with the aim of creating the ideal *antioqueño* worker using techniques of scientific management, education, morality training, and education.²⁹³ The project was one both of discipline and of educating workers within the factory. In 1948 Fabricato, one of the largest textile companies, created a housing project for its workers, allowing them to rent houses near the factory. A worker's family welfare was seen as linked to the worker's productivity in the factory: a healthy, well-fed, well-housed worker would have a better work day.²⁹⁴ The company opened health clinics in 1948 providing free medical consolation, free drugs, and free check-ups for the pregnant wives of the workers.²⁹⁵ The company also created schools for workers' children.²⁹⁶

The municipal government, including *La Sociedad de Mejoras Públicas* (The Society of Civil Improvement) produced a variety of manuals, advice columns, and recommendations about morality that were published in magazines and newspapers and presented at workshops in schools and in neighbourhoods.²⁹⁷ It advocated policies focused on “food, hygiene, good sleep, physical and moral education, well organized and inclusive team sports, [...] selective educational programs” as well as vaccinations and modern medical exams all guaranteed to ensure the strength and health the *antioqueño*.²⁹⁸ It produced a moral discourse that ensured the stability and health of the population. Espinal Pérez describes them as the “tacticians” of government, who believed in the existence of the *la raza antioqueña* and who attempted to

²⁹³ See Arango, 1996.

²⁹⁴ Arango, 1996, p. 491

²⁹⁵ Female workers had no access because they were let go if they became pregnant Arango, 1996, p. 491.

²⁹⁶ Arango, 1996, p. 491

²⁹⁷ Progreso, September & November, 1952, p. 12 in Espinal Pérez, 2005, p. 121

²⁹⁸ Espinal Pérez, 2005, p. 25

create it.²⁹⁹ Doctors and public officials emphasized cleanliness and Catholicism in their programming.³⁰⁰

A common trend of these organizations was their focus on social hygiene and on creating an *antioqueño* workforce. I read both these interventions as focusing on the body; however, the modalities of politics they represented were different. On the one hand, some programs emphasized the larger *antioqueño* population using interventions of hygiene, public health, and reproduction. On the other, interventions targeted the body and disciplined it individually in schools, workhouses, prisons, and asylums in what Ann Farnsworth-Alvear calls Catholic paternalism.³⁰¹ I identify the former as instruments of bio-political control and the latter as anatomo-political.

Social Hygiene

Carlos Ernesto Noguera explores the wider development of medical discourses in Colombia using a Foucauldian biopolitical analysis.³⁰² His focus is on how politics was medicalized, and how medicine became politicized, as well as how this led to a redefinition and reorientation of politics and the exercise of power in the first half of the 20th century.³⁰³ Noguera's interest is bio-politics and the way that the "political and intellectual elite started to perceive, conceive, and govern the Colombian population."³⁰⁴ This included forms of intervention that focused on public space, on alcoholism, and on venereal disease which were

²⁹⁹ Espinal Pérez, 2005, p. 23

³⁰⁰ Reyes Cárdenas, 1996, p. 428. For a larger discussion of social hygiene in Colombia, see Noguera, 2003.

³⁰¹ Farnsworth Alvear, 2000

³⁰² Noguera, 2003

³⁰³ Noguera, 2003, p. 41

³⁰⁴ Noguera, 2003, p. 208

found particularly on the urban working class and the urban poor.³⁰⁵ Programs were deployed on the bodies and lives of workers and urban poor who were seen as savage, ignorant, uncivilized, barbarous, and rebellious. Hygiene was seen as a way to create and control a population of workers.³⁰⁶

In Medellín, these campaigns involved questions of social hygiene and training with the purpose of re-enforcing *antioqueño* identity. This led to programming that focused on cleanliness, on campaigns against alcohol, and on an anti-prostitution campaign. Hygiene manuals were published that recommend bathing daily, the cleaning of hands, prohibiting children from smoking, airing bedrooms well, and putting mattresses in the sun at least once a week in order to kill fleas and bedbugs.³⁰⁷ In the 1930s, plumbing was introduced to replace latrines, and toilet paper became more common, as did deodorant and dental care.³⁰⁸ There was a campaign orchestrated by teachers, doctors and hygienists against walking barefoot.³⁰⁹

Campaigns against alcoholism were important, even if laws combined with moral and religious condemnation were ineffectual.³¹⁰ The focus on questions of alcoholism by the elite was related to the question of labour and concern with the choices made by people in the working and the lower classes. The key question—what workers should do with their free time—was phrased in racialized terms. According to *El Obrero Católico*

³⁰⁵ Noguera, 2003, p. 207

³⁰⁶ Noguera, 2003, p. 33

³⁰⁷ Reyes Cárdenas, 1996, p. 432; Noguera, 2003, pp. 195-294

³⁰⁸ Reyes Cárdenas, 1996, p. 432

³⁰⁹ Reyes Cárdenas, 1996, p. 432

³¹⁰ Reyes Cárdenas, 1996, p. 434

It's not work that has diminished the race. It is the free time when workers and labours free of work go looking for fun, and left to their own ignorance, without caring about the state, the law, nor the employer, they go from tavern to tavern drinking and incapacitating themselves for the next day [of work].³¹¹

Anti-sex and anti-prostitution campaigns developed into an important area of intervention.³¹²

Accion Social Católica ran campaigns against prostitution, clinics for couples to go for to pre-marital tests for venereal diseases, and campaigns against immoral films, obscene signing, and vulgar theatre.³¹³ Anti-prostitution activists calculated that in 1930 in the city of Medellín there was one prostitute for every 50 men. By 1946 this figure had risen to one for every 30.³¹⁴ They described the city as one large brothel, with women working in the *zonas de tolerancia* (red light districts).³¹⁵ Much earlier, in 1898, the city council passed a regulation requiring the certification of the health of prostitutes, which had to be placed in a visible location and renewed on a monthly basis.³¹⁶ By 1935 this program was replaced by the *Instituto Profiláctico Central de Medellín* (Central Prophylactic Institution of Medellín).³¹⁷ Some medics proposed that a pre-nuptial medical examination be created as a way to protect women from syphilis.³¹⁸ *El Obrero Católico* warned workers against the strong pastimes on the weekend including “the indecent tavern, the *romeia desenvuelta* [indecent picnics], sensual dance, the gambling house, the orgy, licentious shows, ... and illegitimate affairs.”³¹⁹ It

³¹¹ Mayor Mora, 1989, p. 293

³¹² Mayor Mora, 1989, p. 295

³¹³ Mayor Mora, 1989, p. 302

³¹⁴ Mayor Mora, 1989, p. 296

³¹⁵ Reyes Cárdenas, 1996, pp. 434-435

³¹⁶ Noguera, 2003

³¹⁷ Noguera, 2003

³¹⁸ Reyes Cárdenas, 1996, p. 435

³¹⁹ Mayor Mora, 1989, p. 295

recommended instead more honest forms of recreation.³²⁰

Catholic Paternalism

If the social hygiene programs described above were also found in other Colombian, Latin American, and European cities, it is no surprise that the latest innovations in labour management found their way into Medellín. However, in Medellín these programs had the particular characteristic of company-led Catholic paternalism. The explicit purpose of many of the organizations and programs described above was to educate children, youth, and adults and train them for the labour market and to develop a sense of morality, self-control, and religious fervour. In the first half of the 20th century, a textile boom and a period of intense industrialization was centred on factories in Medellín such as *Fabricato*, *Tejicondor*, and *Coltejer*. As these companies expanded, they developed programs that focused on workers and introduced strict moral codes, systems of fines, education programs, medical programs, and housing programs. The purpose was to change the morality of the peasant worker and create disciplined workers.

In 1917 the *Patronato de Obreras* became a training school for women for work in factories and in the home. It offered free education every Sunday, where students could learn the skills for home life, including washing, ironing, cutting, sewing, stitching, embroidery, darning, cooking, and the making of cigarettes and cigars.³²¹ In some factories, owners hired religious orders to organize the educational programs which focused on the control,

³²⁰ Mayor Mora, 1989, p. 295

³²¹ Saavedra, 1996, p. 389

protection, and housing of young, single, and married women whose families did not reside in Medellín.³²² The *Casa de Menores* (Youth House) was opened near Bello in 1914. By 1941, it had courses in carpentry, typography, book binding, locksmithing, blacksmithing, knitting, shoe making, mechanics, hair cutting, bricklaying, and agriculture.³²³ The purpose was to rehabilitate youth and create productive workers.³²⁴ The construction of the sense of *antioqueñidad* took place in the workplace, as well as in the classroom. Industries in the region organized classes, workshops, and training sessions to control and construct a working class while calling it the *antioqueño* work ethic.

Ann Farnsworth Alvear identifies the gendered nature of this project,³²⁵ arguing that these processes in Medellín were complex interactions between “capitalist entrepreneurs, social reformers, managers, and working-class men women and men.”³²⁶ There was an important gendered dynamic in how male and female roles were constructed in Medellín, most notably in the ways that the “proper” and “improper” behaviour underlay a “moral code” that shaped working people. Farnsworth-Alvear argues that that by the 1930s had systems of paternalistic and moralistic control consolidated that had not been present earlier. Many of these processes focused on the body, particularly the female body. For example, prior to the 1930s chastity, pregnancy, flirtation, and foul language were not cause for immediate firing, but by the 1930s they were.³²⁷

³²² Saavedra, 1996, p. 389

³²³ Saavedra, 1996, p. 389

³²⁴ Saavedra, 1996, p. 389

³²⁵ Farnsworth Alvear, 1996, p. 391

³²⁶ Farnsworth Alvear, 2000, p. 4

³²⁷ Farnsworth Alvear, 1996, pp. 391-398

Farnsworth Alvear shows how the emerging industrialization centred on Medellín shared characteristics with both the Fordism that was developing in the United States at the time—wage benefits allowed workers to participate in the consumer economy, imported technologies were used, and loyalty programs through health, recreation, and other benefits were provided for workers³²⁸—and paternalism. Industrialists ran night schools, produced literature promoting bodily hygiene, provided free medical care, and required shoes.³²⁹ By the 1940s, most textile factories offered benefits, paid vacations, company-subsidized cafeterias, education, school for the children of male workers, and recreational activities.³³⁰ Antioquian industry tried to portray itself as civilizing.³³¹

By the 1930s these organizations had decayed so much so that factories began moral policing.³³² In the 1930s, illicit sex resulted in automatic firing, and flirtation between the sexes was banned.³³³ Women and their bodies became targets of educational campaigns in the workplace on issues such as health, hygiene, and venereal diseases. From 1935 to 1953, in what is described as a golden era of Antioquian paternalistic capitalism, a rigid moral discipline that focused on controlling behaviour flourished.³³⁴

Education programs also emerged in the early 20th century in Medellín. Elites were educated in the schools of *San Inancio* in Medellín, the *Universidad de Antioquia*, and the *Escuela Nacional de Minas* under Jesuits with an anti-communist discourse and the ideals of

³²⁸ Farnsworth Alvear, 2000, p. 18

³²⁹ Farnsworth Alvear, 2000, p. 18

³³⁰ Farnsworth Alvear, 2000, p. 53

³³¹ Farnsworth Alvear, 2000, p. 18

³³² Farnsworth Alvear, 1996, p. 397

³³³ Farnsworth Alvear, 1996, p. 397

³³⁴ Farnsworth Alvear, 2000, p. 7

social justice.³³⁵ A program was implemented by which a *madrina* (godmother) worked to link the community with the school. Each educational centre had a *madrina* whose role was to visit families to mediate conflict, and put right problems.³³⁶ The Week of the Child was organized, the Rotary Club and the Society of Public Work organized evening parties with music, comedies and one-act plays, competitions, and concourses and pig roasts.³³⁷ Radio programs were created which used the radio for social education.³³⁸ Civic centres were built in some *barrios*, and they campaigned against conditions in the education system.³³⁹ In the 1940s a model school was created by President Ospina Pérez, and it had six rooms, a pipe band with 15 instruments, a marching band with 31 instruments, a Red Cross, a hairdresser, a museum, a library, a newspaper written and illustrated by the children and a small zoo.³⁴⁰

Controlling the deviant, creating the *antioqueño*

By the 1940s and 1950s Medellín was a city that described in the popular magazine *Progreso*³⁴¹ as

undeniably a city efficiently endowed with water and sewage, with health centres and hospitals, with places of recreation and schools, with streets and avenues that facilitate adequate traffic, that is combating efficiently diseases and epidemics, rickets and alcoholism, violent crime and accidents. Planning as the solution of urban problems is related, in many cases, with problems of the social and economic kind.³⁴²

I argue that these programs in Medellín had at their core a deep sense of *antioqueño*

³³⁵ Roldán, 2002, p. 48

³³⁶ Jiménez, 1996, p. 575

³³⁷ Jiménez, 1996, p. 580

³³⁸ Jiménez, 1996, p. 580

³³⁹ Jiménez, 1996, p. 580

³⁴⁰ Jiménez, 1996, p. 580

³⁴¹ Espinal Pérez, 2005

³⁴² *Progreso*, September & November, 1952, p. 12 in Espinal Pérez, 2005, p. 121

exceptionality. Bio-political and anatomo-political programs were deployed in the city and the workplace that were based on discourses of hard work, moral strength, whiteness, civilization and capitalism. *Antioqueñidad* underlined interventions in the city by religious and industrial organizations that aimed at ensuring the creation of a hard-working, educated, efficient workers. By the 1940s Medellín's industry was experiencing a golden age, and industrialists deployed an Antioqueño brand of Catholic paternalism. At the same time, there was a whole variety of programs focused on social hygiene and the health of the population.

I argue that these programs were linked in the way that they promoted the body as healthy and hard-working. These programs focused on the corporeality of human existence, to strengthen the body's capacity to *work*, in Arendt's sense. Schools trained women, children and men, teaching them trades, and preparing them for the workplace. Industrialists also focused on their workers in the sense of the body, in particular women's bodies. By the 1950s, non-virgins—married or otherwise—were unable to work. None of these interventions were aimed at fostering political interaction. Philanthropic Catholic organizations and captains of industry deployed programs that were aimed at strengthening and controlling the populations and also the very biological element of individual human existence.

In Medellín the citizen was constructed along the lines of an imagined *antioqueñidad*. That is, the ideal citizen of the department was constructed in terms of a racialized bourgeoisie gendered identity. This had particularly violent consequences in the peripheral areas. This violence was linked to the programs deployed in the departmental core around Medellín on particular sectors of society—women, children, the working class, the urban

poor, Indigenous people, and Afro-descendants—to control the deviant. In Antioquia these programs were designed to protect a sense of *antioqueñidad*. In the periphery this process had an explicit coloniality and corporality.

Chapter Five: Corporality of violence at the periphery

This chapter outlines violence that occurred in the peripheral regions of Antioquia, focusing on Urabá and Western Antioquia.³⁴³ During the 1949 elections guerrilla forces emerged in the area of Urabá in response to electoral violence from Conservative Party, which led to increased violence in these areas. These forces were seen and imagined to be a threat to public order not simply because of their political objectives but because of their “uncivilized” nature. As a consequence, national police and military forces were deployed to the region to maintain public order. In Western Antioquia, local conservatives were unhappy because of the non-*antioqueño* origins of soldiers who came from the department of Bolívar and police who came from the department of Boyacá. As a consequence, the departmental government supported the creation of Conservative paramilitary forces called *contrachusma*. Based in Western Antioquia, the Conservative paramilitary forces were supposed to pacify the region and combat the guerillas; however they focused much of their energy on terrorizing residents, many of whom they considered as non-*antioqueño*. The corporeal forms of this terror was both (de)politicizing as well as a physical and metaphorical annihilation of the other.

³⁴³ Antioquia had the third highest number of violent deaths related to *La Violencia*. 26,115 people were reported killed. Western Antioquia and Urabá accounted for over 40% of officially counted deaths between 1949 and 1953 and over 41% of deaths in the worst months of *La Violencia* in 1952 (Roldán, 2002, p. 209). Of these, many occurred in three municipalities: Dabeiba accounted for 561 deaths, or 10% of all homicides, Cañasgordas accounted for 368 deaths (or 6%), and Anzá accounted for 4% (Roldán, 2002, p. 209). Although the region of Urabá was significantly less populated than Western Antioquia, and as a consequence experienced fewer homicides, residents were displaced from their lands in large numbers. In this chapter I focus on the regions of Urabá and the Western Antioquia because of the ways the former entered the regional imaginary as virgin colonial space while the latter was imagined as *antioqueño*. Roldán’s analysis follows a similar trajectory.

Violence in Urabá and Western Antioquia

In *Chapter Three: Antioqueñidad*, I discussed how the region of Urabá was constructed and imagined to be a non-*antioqueño* colonial space where the interactions of racial imaginaries, civilization, and *antioqueñidad* were linked to the creation of the idea of Urabá as an empty, uncivilized, virgin land awaiting civilized intervention and economic exploitation.³⁴⁴ In this section, I briefly explore the forms of resistance that emerged among residents of the region to the colonial project, before turning to how these were imagined within the rationality of *antioqueñidad* to be the result of the region's uncivilized nature. This in turn was seen as necessitating violent intervention.

Outside of a few insurrections in towns in Urabá, there was very little insurgency after the assassination of Gaitán in 1948. However, this changed during the elections of 1949 when members of the Conservative Party practised electoral intimidation.³⁴⁵ For example, in the town of Cañasgordas, Conservatives gathered up members of the Liberal Party, stripped them of their identity cards, and beat them with machetes.³⁴⁶ The Conservative Party won the election, in some areas they gained hundreds of votes over previous years.³⁴⁷ Liberal Guerrilla groups began to form in response.

By 1950 the guerrillas had consolidated control of areas of Urabá, using their knowledge of the region and old smuggling routes to orchestrate violence.³⁴⁸ Members of the guerrilla

³⁴⁴ See *Urabá and Western Antioquia*, p. 66.

³⁴⁵ Roldán, 2002, p. 175

³⁴⁶ Roldán, 2002, p. 175

³⁴⁷ Roldán, 2002, p. 175

³⁴⁸ Roldán, 1998, p. 22

forces worked simultaneously in the agricultural fields as day labourers and as road crews helping to build the *Carretera al Mar* (Highway to the Sea).³⁴⁹ They took control over whole regions of the countryside and threatened local business interests.³⁵⁰ For example, American and Colombian investors had poured more than \$1.2 million into a rubber plantation project in Villa Arteaga, but threatened to pull out because of a series of guerrilla attacks and fears of starvation among the workforce.³⁵¹ In the town of El Carmelo, guerrillas attacked and killed 50 Conservatives and forced surviving inhabitants to flee.³⁵² By 1951, Urabá was described in reports to the governor as the third most violent region in the country.³⁵³

Although the guerrillas based in Urabá undoubtedly had political motives, they also had economic interests. Liberal guerrillas became enforcers for local businesses, acted as private security forces, stole cattle, occupied settlements, and extorted money.³⁵⁴ Nonetheless, in Medellín, peripheral violence was described as being apolitical, the result of a lack of hygiene and a basic lack of civilization. Roldán describes reports sent back from Urabá by a military attaché Colonel Abadía to the government of Antioquia.³⁵⁵ One report described the community of El Carmelo as:

undergoing a state of abandonment [... due to] the of the absence of *antioqueño* authorities, the lack of 'civilization', and the *inculto* [uncultured] and immoral nature of the inhabitants, the majority of whom did not come from Antioquia but from the Caribbean or other Colombian departments.³⁵⁶

³⁴⁹ Roldán, 1998, p. 22

³⁵⁰ Roldán, 2002, p. 192

³⁵¹ Roldán, 2002, p. 192

³⁵² Roldán, 2002, p. 192

³⁵³ Roldán, 2002, p. 205

³⁵⁴ Roldán, 2002, p. 175

³⁵⁵ Roldán, 2002, p. 192

³⁵⁶ Roldán, 1998, p. 5

In August 1948, the Minister of Hygiene in Antioquia noted that the few towns in Urabá that had experienced rebellion after Gaitán's assassination were the same towns "where sanitary and health services were poorest and non-existent and where even the obligatory doctor normally appointed by the state was absent."³⁵⁷ Colonel Abadía described the community of Damaquiel as

painfully abandoned.... There is the greatest indolence.... The men don't work because of the state of abandonment [and] the hostile and suspicious climate.... I found all of them stretched out on their hammocks, the grimace of a defeated race tormented by laziness reflected in their faces.³⁵⁸

In the town of San Juan de Urabá, Colonel Abadía noted "multitudes of abandoned houses in the most horrifying state of filth."³⁵⁹ The *Caja de Crédito Agrario* (Agricultural Credit Bank), which had invested heavily in the US Colombian rubber plantation in Villa Arteaga, offered to pay for soldiers and for protection to for medical and humanitarian aid and services for settlers.³⁶⁰ Violence in the region was described in a military report to the regional government as the result of "an absence of authorities, the lack of roads, the indifference of *antioqueños*, and the lack of morality and civilization among the inhabitants."³⁶¹ Violence was understood by the Antioquian government and by *antioqueño* residents, not as the result of a political project, but rather as a reflection of the region's un-civilized, savage, and dirty nature. Reports suggested that the departmental government "need to extend to these areas moral and civic aspects of the Antioqueño people [*pueblo*], which will ensure the redemption

³⁵⁷ Roldán, 2002, p. 174

³⁵⁸ Roldán, 2002, p. 192

³⁵⁹ Roldán, 2002, p. 192

³⁶⁰ Roldán, 2002, p. 192

³⁶¹ Roldán, 1998, p. 18

of many men who in these distant regions live a primitive, morally and mentally lax life.”³⁶²

As a response to the fears of the guerrilla, in the early 1950s the government named the region a military zone and put it under control of the armed forces.³⁶³ However, locals in Western Antioquia were suspicious of the personnel that made up these forces as many were Afro-descendants from the department of Bolívar,³⁶⁴ while the police was made up of people of indigenous descent from Boyaca.³⁶⁵ Local Conservatives complained that with these forces there “was little hope or eradicating the guerrilla.”³⁶⁶ Governor Berrio went so far as to attribute the guerrillas’ reputed defeat of government forces in Western Antioquia to the “lamentable human material of many of the guardians of order.”³⁶⁷ In short, residents of Urabá were imagined as non-*antioqueño*, the national police and military were largely seen as non-*antioqueño*, and paramilitary forces who were armed were seen as *antioqueño*.

The Governor distributed two thousand .38 Smith and Wesson ‘Specials’ to Conservatives in Western Antioquia so that they could create a voluntary paramilitary force known locally as the *contrachusma*.³⁶⁸ Unable to defeat the guerrilla and with a limited presence, the state handed over control of Urabá to these paramilitary forces. Much of the violence that occurred in the Western Antioquia and Urabá was thus the result of a conscious government program in which the regional state, including the governor’s office, funded and

³⁶² Roldán, 1998, p. 18

³⁶³ Roldán, 1998, p. 5

³⁶⁴ Roldán, 1998, p. 5

³⁶⁵ Roldán, 1998, p. 197

³⁶⁶ Roldán, 1998, p. 197

³⁶⁷ Roldán, 1998, p. 197

³⁶⁸ Roldán, 2002, p. 178

deployed the paramilitary in the pursuit of economic and social goals.³⁶⁹

The *contrachusma* was as likely to conduct illegal activities as it was to attack the guerrilla. In February 1952 a parish priest reported that the *contrachusma* set about terrorizing the countryside “abusing women and stealing animals and money from innocent peasants.”³⁷⁰ The *contrachusma* was strong in Western Antioquia, and Dabeiba, the most violent town in the area, was its centre of operations.³⁷¹ The relationship between the paramilitary and the local political, economic, and church leaders was close. The *contrachusma* was more likely to conduct violence, massacres, and cattle rustling than were the Liberals, yet the violence it conducted was downplayed.³⁷² In Cañasgordas, the Conservatives and *contrachusma* blamed reports of violence against the Liberals as the result of a horrible persecution and “an implausible liberal conspiracy.”³⁷³ *Contrachusma* leaders were described as “civilized,” “principled and well mannered,” and as “paragon[s] of virtue,” even when they committed atrocities.³⁷⁴ The *contrachusma* exacted quotas and levied tithes against land owners in the regions of Dabeiba and Sabanalarga.³⁷⁵ Land was cleared of unwanted tenants through violence, local merchants were forced to leave, and others profited in new markets for stolen property.³⁷⁶ At the end of 1953, peace accords were signed between the Rojas Pinilla presidency and the guerrillas. Although the Liberal Guerrillas in Urabá accepted the peace

³⁶⁹ Roldán, 1998, p. 22; Roldán, 2002, p. 286

³⁷⁰ Roldán, 2002, p. 206

³⁷¹ Located in Western Antioquia.

³⁷² Roldán, 2002, p. 209

³⁷³ Roldán, 2002, p. 209

³⁷⁴ Roldán, 2002, p. 215

³⁷⁵ Roldán, 2002, p. 215

³⁷⁶ Roldán, 2002, p. 220

program and disarmed, violence in Western Antioquia continued at the hands of the *contrachusma*. “Homicides, cattle-rustling, and forced displacement of workers, squatters, and rural property owners grew rather than diminished.”³⁷⁷ Violence remained in the area long after the conflict was over.³⁷⁸

The conflicts in Urabá and Western Antioquia were never simply disputes between Liberals and Conservatives, rather *La Violencia* in the region can be read as a conflict both in colonial terms, and in terms of violence conducted between *contrachusma* forces and guerrilla forces. These forces did not confront each other, but rather focused on the bodies and the lands of the civilian population. Rumours of violence and the real or imagined atrocities committed by the guerrilla served as justification for the creation of the *contrachusma*. Violence occurred along partisan lines, along economic lines, as well through the logic of *antioqueñidad*. The *contrachusma* in the region operated as a form of control of those deviating from the norm of *antioqueñidad*. It was created because national police and military deployed in the region were seen as non-*antioqueño*. Urabá was imagined as a colonial, uncivilized space and violence perpetrated by the *contrachusma* was seen as civilizing and cleansing. Violence was not inchoate, but was shaped by the racist ways that populations were imagined at the local and regional level.³⁷⁹ The particular forms of violence in the department were determined not simply by affiliation to a particular party, but also a series of elements including the local economy, local patterns of land ownership, the racial and ethnic

³⁷⁷ Roldán, 2002, p. 224

³⁷⁸ Roldán, 2002, p. 224

³⁷⁹ Roldán, 2002, p. 286

identities of the residents, the degree of conformity to a regional ideal of political and social organization, the strength of local forms of organizing that linked labour and land, and the state's ability to exert its own authority.³⁸⁰

Corporality of violence

In this section, I turn in greater detail to the corporal practices of violence in the region and describe the particular ways that violence occurred. This suggests how death and dismemberment were both intensely depoliticizing and a form of political control. The massacres and assassinations, that occurred during *La Violencia*, had many similarities. Murders often took place at a peasant's home in the evening while the family was preparing to sleep. Armed men would arrive shouting "Open up. We're the law," calling the owner by name.³⁸¹ After opening the door, if the victim's name was confirmed, he was executed.³⁸² Sometimes days prior to their assassination, victims received advisories, bulletins, and death threats. Other times, rumours of a death were foretold.³⁸³ When the victim was unknown, there were no warnings.³⁸⁴

Death was accompanied by a corporeal reconfiguration involving a series of mutilations performed on the bodies of the dead. The *franela* (flannel shirt) cut was practised by the guerrillas. It required two people, one person to hold up the head of the victim and another to deliver a swift blow to the base of the neck with a sharpened machete. The resulting injury

³⁸⁰ Roldán, 2002, p. 286

³⁸¹ Roldán, 2002, pp. 163-164

³⁸² Uribe A., 2004, p. 86

³⁸³ Uribe A., 2004, p. 162

³⁸⁴ Uribe A., 2004, p. 162

consisted of a profound hole in the base of the neck which cut the muscles and tendons holding up the head and allowed it to fall backwards.³⁸⁵ The *corbata* (necktie) cut was the response of the paramilitary to the *franela* cut. An incision was made below the lower jaw in the victim's neck. Then, the victim's tongue was pulled through and left hanging from a hole in the neck.³⁸⁶ Decapitation involved first removing the head with swift blow of a machete, and then placing it in the hands of the victim, resting either on the pelvis or the chest. In some regions of Antioquia, the *francés* (French) cut was performed. The head was scalped so that the white skull of the still bleeding victim was visible.³⁸⁷ The *oreja* (ear) cut involved the removal of the victims ears with the purpose of keeping a body count. In some cases, bodies were diced as if preparing meat to make *tamales* (a popular local staple). Bodies mutilated in this way had to be collected with a shovel.³⁸⁸ Sometimes victims were flayed alive, as occurred in the case of Péque where a guerrilla flayed a women to death and hung children alive from meat hooks.³⁸⁹ The skin peeled off from back to front, thus extending the skin of the victim and leaving them with a gruesome form described by Guzman as a *vampiro* (a vampire).³⁹⁰ In some areas, quartering the body became a common practice. In the community of Espiritu Santo, Conocrida, Antioquia a couple was drawn and quartered after witnessing the rape and the murder of their fourteen-year old daughter.³⁹¹ Disembowelment involved cuts made in

³⁸⁵ Uribe A., 1990, p. 174; Guzmán Campos et al., 2005, p. 248

³⁸⁶ Uribe A., 1990, p. 174

³⁸⁷ Uribe A., 1990, p. 174

³⁸⁸ Guzmán Campos et al., 2005, p. 247

³⁸⁹ Roldán, 2002, p. 204

³⁹⁰ Guzmán Campos et al., 2005, p. 251

³⁹¹ Guzmán Campos et al., 2005, p. 247

the abdomen and the removal of the viscera.³⁹² A practice known as *bocachiquiar* consisted of making small cuts on the back of the victim so they bled to death. The practice got its name from the fine incisions that had to be made to small prickly freshwater fish known as the *bocachico* (small mouth) before it could be eaten.³⁹³

The day following the massacre and mutilation, the bodies were found by family members and by neighbours.³⁹⁴ The dead were not left in a chaotic, disorganized manner. Instead great care was taken in their physical arrangement. Bodies were laid out in rows in the courtyard with dismembered body parts scattered all over. Sometimes, they were placed on display at the crossroads of paths that connected communities while other times they were laid out in lines with the head placed on the stomach.³⁹⁵ There was a deliberate stage management of the scene of death designed to force the displacement of survivors.³⁹⁶ Often, messages were left on trees, on bodies, and on the walls of homes, so that survivors would know who had perpetrated the violence.³⁹⁷

Violence also had a gendered component. In many cases, men and young boys were castrated. The result was a terrorized population with no possibility of procreation. Women and young girls were raped and murdered. In Antioquia women's breasts were removed and placed in the mouths of the victim.³⁹⁸ It was also not uncommon that pregnant mothers were

³⁹² Uribe A., 1990, p. 197

³⁹³ Uribe A., 1990, p. 175; Guzmán Campos et al., 2005, p. 247

³⁹⁴ Uribe A., 1990, p. 169

³⁹⁵ Uribe A., 1990, p. 169

³⁹⁶ Uribe A., 1990, p. 169

³⁹⁷ Uribe A., 1990, p. 169

³⁹⁸ Uribe A., 1990, p. 175

murdered, a caesarian undertaken on the corpse to remove the fetus—sometimes replaced by a cockerel as in the case of Virginias, Antioquia—which was then torn into pieces in the presence of the father and sometimes still-living mother.³⁹⁹ In many cases, death was not a solitary affair instead, entire communities were destroyed. Guzman describes how the rivers ran with blood during *La Violencia* as they brought down from the mountains many thousands of corpses. Mutilated bodies, clothed or naked, hands tied or free, victims confused with victimizers, floated down Colombia's rivers.⁴⁰⁰

My intention in discussing the corporality of violence on the Antioquian periphery is not to argue that death and violence during *La Violencia* was in fact psychotic, or that it was an unexplainable manifestation of anger, or even a cultural characteristic of *antioqueño* society. Rather, my intention is to show how violence and citizenship were linked through the body. Before turning to this analysis, I briefly outline the other major interpretations of the corporality of *La Violencia*.

The corporality of violence was first described by Guzman who outlined how all sides castrated the living and the dead, mutilated, burnt, and disembowled, bodies raped, and killed. The chapter in *La Violencia en Colombia* entitled '*Tanatomanía* of *La Violencia*' describes these violent practices. The phrase *tanatomanía*, a contraction of the Spanish *tanato* with "manía", refers to an obsession with death, its physical and sexual nature, the ways that entire communities were liquidated, and the psychological practices of violence which Guzman claims make the period almost unique. Guzman emphasizes both the corporality of

³⁹⁹ Guzmán Campos et al., 2005, p. 247

⁴⁰⁰ Guzmán Campos et al., 2005, p. 252

violence as well as its psychological component.

The anthropologist Maria Victoria Uribe⁴⁰¹ focuses on the practices of mutilation described above. She suggests the semantic and political meanings of massacre and mutilation were related to the corporality of violence, which was more than the physical act of ending biological life or a series of violent processes of mutilation that reconfigured the corpse. Rather, it was a language by which politics was conducted as bodies themselves were metaphorically and physically dehumanized. Death was both a technology of annihilation, the destruction of the life as well as the body, but also an instrument of politics aimed at controlling survivors and their communities by instilling fear, generating terror, and forcing displacement. Butchery and dismemberment became public spectacles in which mutilated corpses were displayed in carefully constructed public spaces so that they could be seen by survivors, by passersby, and by neighbours.

The act of mutilating corpses became part of what Uribe calls the “semantic operations, permeated with enormous metaphorical force, that dehumanize the victims and their bodies.”⁴⁰² Bodies were mutilated in ways with specific meanings, including placing outside what was inside and exposing the most intimate. Heads were placed where the sexual organs belong, and the sexual organs in the mouth.⁴⁰³ In the linguistic sense, human death was discussed by perpetrators as the butchery and the hunting of animals. The victims were seen as prey and meat, while paramilitary groups in some regions were called birds of prey.⁴⁰⁴

⁴⁰¹ Uribe A., 1990, pp. 79-95

⁴⁰² Uribe A., 2004, p. 81

⁴⁰³ Uribe A., 1990, p. 187

⁴⁰⁴ Uribe A., 2004, p. 89

Peasants referred to body parts by the same names as butchered poultry, butchered pigs and butchered cows.⁴⁰⁵ For example, *el tuste*, the name used for the human head, was the name used to describe an animal's head. The human neck was referred to as the *guargüero* (gullet) or the *guacharaco* (craw). The human digestive tract and viscera were referred to in the same way as the entrails of an animal.⁴⁰⁶ The corporeality of violence had the result of a real and symbolic destruction of the body and its humanity, in the corporal and political sense.

For Sánchez, violence was the suppression of the political. He saw *La Violencia* as a period of "concentrated terror."⁴⁰⁷ Sánchez argues in the context of a society where political and social content was conceptualized not in terms of rivalries, but rather in terms of the total destruction of a truth. Victory could not be achieved by military action but rather only by the total physical annihilation of the other.⁴⁰⁸ "Difference became incompatible with order,"⁴⁰⁹ and terror became permanent, structured, and deeply integrated with politics.⁴¹⁰ Sánchez describes different elements of the linkage of terror and politics, which he summarized in the phrase of Laureano Gómez who said that "there are one million eight hundred thousand false identity cards,"⁴¹¹ a claim that stripped citizenship from members of the entire Liberal Party.⁴¹² In the context of the suppression of this form of politics. Sánchez suggests

⁴⁰⁵ Uribe A., 2004, p. 87

⁴⁰⁶ Uribe A., 2004, pp. 87-88

⁴⁰⁷ Sánchez Gómez, 1990, p. 21

⁴⁰⁸ Sánchez Gómez, 1990, p. 21

⁴⁰⁹ Sánchez Gómez, 1990, p. 21

⁴¹⁰ Sánchez Gómez, 1990, p. 21

⁴¹¹ Laureano Gómez in Sánchez Gómez, 1990, p. 21

⁴¹² Sánchez Gómez, 1990, p. 21

killing obeyed a sinister logic, one of calculated pain and terror. The despoilment, the mutilation, the profanation of the bodies were a prolongation of the business of conquest, pillage, and devastation of the territory of the enemy. The skinned and incinerated mutilated bodies became inscribed in the mental order of the landscape.⁴¹³

The variety of ways of mutilating the bodies became instruments of terror. Terror had its own chronology and “practices that suggested very complicated representations not just of politics, but also of the body, of death, and more.”⁴¹⁴ The variety of forms of violence had meaning. The cutting out of the tongue (*corbata* cut) was to remove the word of the other.⁴¹⁵ The evisceration of pregnant women and the castration of men became a way of destroying the possibility of reproduction. The stage management of death was a message made all the more terrifying “precisely in the way that it was in-decipherable,”⁴¹⁶ even as death became a public spectacle.⁴¹⁷ Death was a manifestation of terror and displays of violence had a geographic manifestation in which bodies and their locations took on meanings.⁴¹⁸ For Sánchez, terror was depoliticizing in the formal sense, although he also sees mutilation as a political operation.

My argument is that violence in the periphery was a depoliticizing violence as it was about the control of the deviant and the dangerous other. Residents in Urabá were seen as not exhibiting the characteristics of a clean, hygienic, civilized, *antioqueño* population. Even the most violent and dangerous *contrachusma* forces operating out of Western Antioquia were seen to exhibit the characteristics of civilization. The political representations of the Liberal

⁴¹³ Sánchez Gómez, 1990, pp. 21-22

⁴¹⁴ Sánchez Gómez, 1990, pp. 21-22

⁴¹⁵ Sánchez Gómez, 1990, pp. 21-22

⁴¹⁶ Sánchez Gómez, 1990, pp. 21-22

⁴¹⁷ Sánchez Gómez, 1990, pp. 21-22

⁴¹⁸ Sánchez Gómez, 1990, pp. 21-22

Party members in Urabá were seen as being non-political and dangerous. The only possible response was military occupation. However, even this proved un-satisfactory because of the very makeup of the military and police forces (which were seen as non-*antioqueño*). As a consequence local citizenry in Western Antioquia demanded, and received, support for the creation of paramilitary forces to ensure public order.

“Order” was achieved by paramilitary forces through violence, which had a particular corporeal manifestation. Just as control in the central regions focused on disciplining and controlling the bodies of workers, in the rural areas violence focused on the bodies of residents. This manifested itself in the ways that peasants were killed and in the corporeal modifications that took place after their death. Human death was a biological act as well as an act with deeply political ramifications. As bodies were depoliticized through violence, their political claims were muted. Governance conducted through the *contrachusma* became a form of politicization of death. The very practice of murder conducted through mutilation had its own meaning. Death was displayed in particularly gendered ways, through sexual violence, and through corporeal reconfiguration.

Local landowners’ fears of guerrilla attacks, the rumours that circulated throughout the region, the violence, and the danger all had the effect of justifying and creating the violence that was being perpetrated by the *contrachusma* and the state. The corporeal reconfiguration of terror was not only a manifestation of terror. I argue, but also shaped by the colonial situations in which it occurred. Urabá was imagined as a dangerous, dirty empty space in need of civilization and control through violence. I understand terror as the result of the fear

of the “other” in Antioquia, the fear of the non-*antioqueño*, the barbarian on the edge. The fear of the colonized was reflected in the violence that was inflicted on them, in a process captured metaphorically by Taussig’s concept of the colonial mirror. The corporality of violence was linked to economic imperatives, politics, and the technology of control, as it was also the result of a colonial fear. Fears of the savage and of the guerrilla were constructed in relation to *antioqueñidad*, which saw some residents in Western Antioquia and in the core as bourgeoisie, capitalist, exclusive, white, non-Indigenous, and of non-Afro descent. These fears explain both why the paramilitary was created by the Antioquian government and the practices of violence used by this paramilitary force. The colonial mirror in the centre reflects the coloniality, the corporality, and the politics of violence, but also the civilizing programs in the centre.

It is not just that these technologies were violent, but also that they were linked to practices of control of both the *antioqueño* and the non-*antioqueño*. The violence on the periphery was linked to citizenship in the core precisely because of the imagination of *antioqueñidad*. It was the politicization of the body—through programs of mutilation, hygiene, and corporeal reconfiguration—and the (de)politicization of politics—through both terror and technocracy—that made the colonial mirror’s mimetic property of reflecting civilization’s terror back on itself clear. The control of the deviant occurred both through social hygiene and Catholic paternalism, but also through the colonial mirror which explains colonial and corporeal violence. The results were the de-politicization of bodies in the periphery and the core and the linkage between citizenship and violence in Antioquia.

Conclusion

Catherine LeGrand notes that during *La Violencia* elites began to express their fears of the other in terms of the civilized/barbarian divide:

The lower groups were no longer seen as potential citizens, nor were they perceived as a competing social class. This vision of a savage underclass—perhaps a reflection of the elites' own aggressivity—became a self-fulfilling prophecy, to be acted out in *La Violencia*.⁴¹⁹

My thesis has made a similar connection in Antioquia, focusing on the colony and the city to articulate violence and citizenship in Antioquia during *La Violencia*. My intention has been to suggest the immanent connection between citizenship and violence. I have emphasized the forms of governance on the body during *La Violencia* by exploring the differences in the core and the periphery, in particular focusing on the capital city of Medellín and the regions of Urabá and Western Antioquia. The governmentality literature of Michel Foucault suggests a focus on a de-stated notion of governance as it occurred in the city in the form of schools, medical centres, and industry and in the periphery through guerrilla, paramilitary, state, and colonial violence. Governmentality provides a language with which to discuss *antioqueñidad* as one of the forms of knowledge that directed the conduct of individuals and groups in the 1930s and 1940s in both the core and the periphery.

⁴¹⁹ LeGrand, 1997, p. 4

In Medellín, residents were constructed as a racialized bourgeois gendered identity, which encouraged governmental interventions that were deployed on sectors of society—women, children, the working class, the urban poor, Indigenous people, and Afro-descendants. I read these programs of social hygiene, alcohol prohibition, anti-prostitution campaigns, and labour training as focused on certain bio-political interventions designed to make the population stronger and on anatomo-political interventions aimed at disciplining workers through a form of Catholic paternalism that predominated in Medellín.

Paradoxically, as the city experienced an economic boom, rural areas of the department suffered extremely high levels of violence. Drawing on examples from Urabá and Western Antioquia, I detailed the corporeal effects of *La Violencia* that occurred in these areas at the hands of the Liberal guerrilla and the Conservative *contrachusma* focusing on bodily reconfigurations and gendered violence. Bodily practices of violence were deployed on residents in the form of assassination, mutilation, gendered violence, and massacres, which (de)politicized and physically and metaphorically annihilated the other.

I suggest that the rationalities and technologies of governance in the core and the periphery during *La Violencia* are intelligible and mutually linked in the context of Antioquia through the imagined racial identity of *antioqueñidad*. This provides a key rationality behind the colonial forms of governance on the periphery and Catholic paternalism in the core. Since the 19th century Antioquia has become known as a department of hard-working citizens, the capitalist and industrial capital of Colombia. Many authors have tried to account for this reputation by focusing on the particular character of *antioqueño* society. This

was a reflection of a type of regional nationalism founded on the notion of Antioquian exceptionalism, or *antioqueñidad*. The departmental elite imagined the region to possess exceptional productivity and a unique industrious nature because it was made up of white, hard-working, Catholic, conservative, small-holding *antioqueños*.

However, like all forms of belonging, immanent to the construction of the imagined regional identity of *antioqueñidad* was the construction of its alterity, everything that did not fit this imaginary. Those who were *antioqueños* constructed a racial imaginary of the rest as everything they themselves were not. In the core, the programs of social hygiene and Catholic paternalism focused on the body to produce and strengthen *antioqueñidad*. In the periphery, violence was a technology of government that was deployed in particularly horrific ways on those who deviated from it.

In Antioquia, violence that was deployed in the peripheral areas was intimately linked to civilization through *antioqueñidad*. My thesis has described programs in Antioquia that placed violence at the very core of the citizenship project. The forms of citizenship deployed by a variety of agents in the city of Medellín were linked to the particular regional manifestations of violence in Antioquia through the body and the racialized construction of an imagined shared regional identity of *antioqueñidad*. Violence had its most devastating impact on the bodies of racialized inhabitants in specific peripheral municipalities. This is key to understanding the projects of education and social hygiene in the city of Medellín.

I argue that the forms citizenship and violence in these areas connected to a specific form of governmentality described as tanatomo-politics, where technologies of governance

are deployed to control the deviant. In the central regions of the department this focused on disciplining bodies through social hygiene and Catholic paternalism; in the periphery it was colonial terror. It is through racism and the imaginary of *antioqueñidad* that citizenship and violence were linked. Those who deviated from *antioqueñidad* did so in racial ways. In both cases, tanatomo-politics was a depoliticizing process. Violence in the periphery and education in the core were depoliticizing as the basic bodily aspects of human existence were politicized, voices silenced, and claims for politics stilled. It was not in all cases that biological death need occur; indeed although biological death and corporeal mutilation were common, a form of de-politicization and political death occurred as people were displaced or disciplined. Political projects and other forms of resistance were crushed, strikes broken, and mass displacement orchestrated.

Terror was never simply economic, in the sense of a reconfiguration of property ownership, the consolidation of export industries, and the assurance of labour. Rather, I read it through Taussig's metaphor of the colonial mirror, whereby violence in the Antioquian periphery was a reflection of the very violence within *antioqueñidad*. The practices of colonial governance mirrored the programs of citizenship deployed in Medellín. Both focused on the control of the deviant and the non-*antioqueño*.

Rather than suggesting a dichotomous relationship between violence and citizenship in the core and the periphery my thesis has outlined their connections through the body and how the practices focused on the bodies of those who deviated from an imagined *antioqueñidad* were connected to practices of social hygiene and Catholic paternalism in the

core. Violence and citizenship were immanently articulated within the governmentalities in Antioquia and the target, those who deviated from *antioqueñidad*, was the same in both the core and periphery.

The explanations that are generally offered for *La Violencia*—a partisan conflict, a class conflict, and the incomplete, partial, or contested process of state building, or the process of political incorporation—are not wrong. They all offer an understanding of particular elements of *La Violencia*. However, I contend that looking at tanatomo-politics and the articulation of citizenship and violence allows for an additional understanding. My analysis adds to the literature on *La Violencia* by outlining how the rationalities of terror explain the particular ways that violence was deployed in the corporeal sense. It builds on Roldán's work to understand *La Violencia* in Antioquia; however, it sees it as more than a process of unequal state building.

An analysis of citizenship and violence suggests why violence in certain areas of the department was far less intense than in other areas. I also propose that understanding citizenship suggests different values were attributed to the lives of certain people than others. My analysis raises a concern for the people on whose bodies the practices of life and death were deployed. I contend this comes back to questions of citizenship, raised in the introduction. Answers can be found if we return to Bataille's work on the heterogeneous class, Arendt's work on citizenship as membership in a political community, Foucault's work on biopolitics, and Agamben's work on *homo sacer*. Each expresses an element of the basic process of dehumanization of the non-citizen and the de-politicization of politics that

occurred in the core and the periphery.

In Antioquia corporeal violence occurred in colonial spaces and less so in the core because there the imaginary of *antioqueñidad* allowed for the possibility of control and of population improvement, while in the periphery colonial relations and a culture of terror meant that non-*antioqueños* were constructed as deviant, excluded, rejected, and in effect unable to participate in political life, or even biological life. At the core, there was also a de-politicization and a rejection of political life, albeit limited compared to the violence and terror of the periphery. Thus, in Medellín and Antioquia violence and citizenship were linked.

Directions for future research

Examining the relationship between citizenship and violence in Antioquia during the 1930s and 1940s was not the starting point of my thesis. Initially, I was concerned with contemporary Medellín. In this final section, I suggest there are parallels between the past and present to be examined in future research.

In the late 1980s, Medellín gained an international reputation as the murder and cocaine capital of the planet. Violence occurred all over the city, although most especially in the poorest neighbourhoods in the urban periphery, which had originally been settled by immigrants fleeing *La Violencia*. In spite of many government programs focusing on the issue of violence, gangs, and peace building, it was not until after a series of military and paramilitary occupations and the demobilization/legalization of the *Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia* (United Self Defence Forces of Colombia, AUC) in 2003 that homicide rates

began to decline rapidly in the city.⁴²⁰ The downward shift in homicide statistics was widely interpreted as indicative of an urban renaissance in Medellín.

The argument of an urban renaissance has been laid out in many domestic and foreign newspapers, television commercials, YouTube videos, and municipal publications. Medellín is described as the city that has moved *del miedo a la esperanza* (from fear to hope). The violence in Medellín in the early 1990 is, described so vividly in Fernando Vallejo's novel⁴²¹ and Alonso Salazar's reporting⁴²² has long since disappeared. Homicides are down, the violence over, the city re-born. Or, so it seems.

Initially, I was interested in more recent administrations that had focused on building the “most beautiful things” in the poorest neighbourhoods, setting up educational programs, creating a entrepreneurial culture, etc. In spite of the paramilitary peace, it is these programs that are credited with Medellín's declining homicides. As I continued my research, it became clear that violence never really left: the false positives scandal, the revelations of the *Parapolitica* (para-politics) scandal, the increases in homicides in Medellín in 2008, and the war for control of the city's illegal economy all suggested I re-consider the question of violence.

Upon returning to Canada, I proposed to my supervisory committee that I explore the paradoxical, contradictory, simultaneously reinforcing relationship between citizenship and violence in contemporary Medellín. After receiving approval for this project, I realized the needed to understand the complex period of Colombian history known as *La Violencia*. The

⁴²⁰ See Hylton, 2007a; 2007b; 2008.

⁴²¹ Vallejo, 2003

⁴²² Salazar Jaramillo, 1990; Salazar Jaramillo, 1993

more I read about *La Violencia*, the more obvious it became that the contemporary processes of building citizenship in Medellín were not nearly as novel as I had initially presumed. Just as violence had a history, so did citizenship. My thesis has focused on *La Violencia* future research will focus on the present.

Mary Roldán⁴²³ concludes her book on *La Violencia* in Antioquia by noting that during the period the areas of Antioquia that were most conflicted during the conflict, were the same areas that were most conflicted in the most recent periods of violence. In the epilogue she describes her participation in a research group that met at the *Universidad de Antioquia* in the early 1990s to explore these parallels. The corporeal mutilation and terror during *La Violencia* have parallels—although they are less widespread—in the violence of the paramilitary during the contemporary conflict.⁴²⁴

What I realized as I researched citizenship and violence during *La Violencia* was that not only did violence have parallels to the present, but that there were also parallels between citizenship in the first half of the 20th century in Medellín and the present. The focus has been similar, a concern with education, culture, libraries, schools, labour, productivity, training, rationalism, technocracy, and *antioqueñidad*. Since the early 1990s, non-governmental organizations and the municipal government have used the language of citizenship to formulate programs that are aimed at responding to violence. Programs have

⁴²³ Roldán, 2002

⁴²⁴ See for example an interview with paramilitary leader H.H. who describes playing football with the head of a victim in Urabá in the late 1990s (El Espectador, 2008). For more systematic descriptions of contemporary violence see numerous reports from *Human Rights Watch* and *Amnesty International*. For a wider discussion of contemporary paramilitaries in Colombia see Hristov, 2009a; Hristov, 2009b. In the introduction to the most recent edition of *La violencia en Colombia* Fals Borda makes the same point (Guzmán Campos et al., 2005).

focused on community planning, participatory budgeting, building neighbourhood assemblies, education, cultural programming, and investment in educational infrastructure projects such as *colegios de calidad* (model and quality schools), *ludotecas* (early childhood education centres), and *parques bibliotecas* (library parks). These programs and investments in infrastructure were undertaken in the poorest and most peripheral parts of the city.

Although these programs have the explicit intention of building a more participatory and inclusive form of urban citizenship, they are simultaneously part of a municipal program closely connected to colonialism. Medellín and Antioquia inaugurated a fifteen-year regional strategic development plan in 1997. The plan expressed aspirations for the department and the city by mapping out policies and strategies designed to make Medellín a successful player in a global marketplace of competing cities. These documents represent the formulation of Medellín's perceived urban problems focusing on seductive discourses of integrating into the knowledge economy, global competition, export orientation, tourism, health, and prestige projects, all aimed at promoting economic development without addressing the violence and exclusion immanent to all of these projects. These two processes—investment in the social programming and economic integration—are forms of citizenship and participation created along exclusive lines. As new spaces for participation and politics are created, spaces of exclusion are created, re-created, and re-enforced.

The linkage with violence is also clear. Although the peace was claimed to be a result of urban investments, it was really a *pax-paramilitar* that brought steep declines in homicide rates and gave the city the reputation of having undergone an urban renaissance. In

Medellín, a process of “Peace and Justice” led to the demobilization and reinsertion of paramilitary forces into the city with financial support and programming provided by the state. These “demobilized” forces have adopted the language of citizenship, democracy, and participation—in the form of civil society organizations such as the *Corporación Democracia* (Democratic Corporation). In spite of the adoption of an inclusive and progressive language forms of citizenship are created that are both exclusionary and deeply connected with violence.⁴²⁵

Take, for example, the wider security apparatus developed first within Antioquia, and later the rest of Colombia. In the 1990s the departmental, and later the national governments of Alvaro Uribe⁴²⁶ adopted security strategies that were particularly reminiscent of *La Violencia*. In the 1990s, Uribe promoted the CONVIVIR (an acronym which translates in English to “living together”) program, which armed self-defence groups throughout rural Antioquia, which later became, merged with, and/or were closely related to paramilitary groups. As president, Uribe adapted this model to the national level under the banner of the policy of *Seguridad Democrática* (democratic security). These programs have led to the military occupation of sectors of the Medellín, the repression of indigenous protests, an increase in extra-judicial killings, the increased displacement of those from rural Colombia, and a closure of the spaces for political participation.⁴²⁷ This suggests that in contemporary Medellín there are two citizenship projects—the first an increased deployment of social and

⁴²⁵ See Hylton, 2007a; 2007b; and 2008

⁴²⁶ The President of Colombia, Alvaro Uribe was governor of Antioquia from between 1995 to 1997. He was elected president of Colombia in 2002 and his term is set to expire in 2010.

⁴²⁷ Rojas, 2008

economic programs and an expansion of public space and the second an increase in state power and security.

Future research will explore Medellín's "renewal" as both incomplete and profoundly fragile. It will suggest that recent gains in building certain forms of citizenship may be somewhat illusionary. By exploring how citizenship and violence are linked it will provide a way to understand the connection between the projects. Although citizenship and violence still remain far more intimately linked than they might seem, that they must be so does not necessarily follow. Indeed, certain elements of citizenship both from the state as well as other movements in the region do suggest that citizenship can indeed play an emancipatory role..

Appendix 1: Notes on Method

Michael Taussig calls the role of an anthropologist the role of the translator. The task is “converting the genius of locale, into terms that people living outside the local can understand.”⁴²⁸ It is necessarily an imperfect process, for “there can be no ethnography just as there can be no ethnography that does not betray that which it seeks to translate and transmit.”⁴²⁹ I suspect my translation of historical events in this thesis is but a poor translation, unable to capture either the entirety or the minutiae, the nuances and complications of violence and citizenship during *La Violencia*. However, Taussig continues, “indeed, what is Anthropology but a species of translation made all the more honest, all the more truthful, and all the more interesting by showing showing—i.e. showing the means of its production.”⁴³⁰ The concern with the ‘showing of showing’ is not simply a mechanical exercise of locating myself and my research experiences within my thesis, but also showing my research process with its contradictions. A brief reflection on the issue of method is the purpose of this first Appendix.

⁴²⁸ Taussig, 2004, p. 201

⁴²⁹ Taussig, 2004, p. 201

⁴³⁰ Taussig, 2004, p. 313

Examining the relationship between citizenship and violence in Antioquia during the 1930s and 1940s was not the initial focus of my thesis. Initially, I was concerned with contemporary Medellín. The initial subtext of my interviews and research was the following question: How has *cultura ciudadana* (culture of citizenship or civic culture) been a successful response to violence in the city of Medellín? I saw my project as examining how *cultura ciudadana* had been transplanted from Bogotá to Medellín. *Cultura ciudadana* was a project of citizenship building that encompassed participatory budgeting, community planning, and social and cultural investments. In Colombia, *cultura ciudadana* refers to a collection of municipal policies and programs that were initially undertaken in Bogotá during the first mayorship of Antanus Mockus (1995–1997). By following the translation of these programs into the context of Medellín during the mayorship of Sergio Fajardo (2003–2007), I hoped to show how these “best practices” from Bogotá were discursively, institutionally, and programatically deployed in the city of Medellín.

As I re-read my early notes from my arrival in Medellín, it is clear I was looking for something that was not there. The project was misconceived. *Cultura ciudadana*, the specific projects undertaken in Bogotá—which included investments in citizenship cards for drivers, mimes on street corners to educate pedestrians on traffic laws, a ban on buying fireworks, and a prohibition on purchasing alcohol after certain hours—had been implemented in Medellín. However, it was really a very small component of Medellín’s municipal programming. More to the point, my interest was the most recent mayor, Sergio Fajardo who was supposed to have brought about a renaissance in Medellín. *Cultura ciudadana* was a

project of the previous administration of Luis Pérez (2001–2003).

Later, my thesis took a definitive historical turn as I began to research the complex period of Colombian history known as *La Violencia* with Prof. Cristina Rojas. The results of this project focused on the corporeality of *La Violencia* read through a governmentality perspective.

My research process thus had two phases. The first was undertaken in 2008 from mid-May to early September in Medellín. The second was conducted in the winter months on my return to Canada. In Medellín, I had three research strategies. First, I focused on reading the literature related to Medellín, paying particular attention to work on citizenship and planning. In this area academic work (*Estudios Políticos, Corporación Región*), newspapers (*El Colombiano, La Semana, El Tiempo, Cambio, El Espectador*) and fiction were all important. I read publicly available documents, development plans, strategic plans, CD-ROMs, publications, media reports, pamphlets, manuals, guides, posters, etc. Initially, my intention was to understand the shifts and changes in the debates over citizenship and urban planning in the city, focusing on the last five years but understanding that these were connected with longer trends. I hoped to read everything against itself, to read the literature—the production of knowledge and discourse, built and expressed in the city of Medellín about the particular administrations of Medellín—in relation to both the processes that were occurring in Medellín as well as the particular political economy of the city.

Second, I received ethics committee approval to conduct semi-structured open-ended interviews with representatives from civil society organizations, government secretariats,

politicians, and community members in Medellín. All in all, I interviewed over thirty people.⁴³¹ I hoped that conducting interviews with people in their official capacities and public roles would provide a rich set of background material to guide my research process. It did. In a sense the interviews were invaluable for simulating my thinking. However, although I received consent from each participant to record our conversations with the intention of producing transcripts, and I took extensive notes, I chose not to use this material in my thesis. The reason for this is threefold: I might have exposed the participants to unnecessary risks due to the continued conflict in Medellín; my questions were about the present, and this thesis is historical; the majority of my interviews focused on *cultura ciudadana*, whereas my thesis has a different focus.

Third, I used the anthropological tools of journaling. The journal provided me a reflexive space in which to account for my experiences doing fieldwork. It was a place to keep track of the questions that arose and the answers that developed during the research process, as well as a place for me to note the experiences of research. My purpose with the journal was not to replace structured notes, but to complement the research process. This sketching of impressions, brief thoughts, experiences, and conversations, first in a journal and later on index cards, gave me the opportunity to return to my notes. The notes allowed me to reflect and engage with my findings as I wrote this thesis. The journal allowed me to remain aware of the process, locate my research, and tease out a nuanced analysis.

⁴³¹ Three human rights lawyers, two journalists, two politicians, two priests, three community members, three academics, and representatives from nine different civil society groups as well as four government departments.

There are three weaknesses that became apparent during my research in Medellín. In order to conduct interviews my strategy was to ask each interviewees who else I should interview. This strategy meant that my interviews were not representative of all sectors of the city, but rather of the idiosyncrasies of the particular people I talked with. For example, while there are a variety of Afro-descendants and Indigenous communities and organizations in Medellín, I did not directly talk to representatives from these groups. The same can be said for groups working specifically with women in the city. The under-representation of these gendered and racialized communities in my interview process is unfortunate because there are particular constructions of race and gender that should have been better reflected in my research.

The second weakness that became clear is that much of my time in Medellín was spent in trying to understand Medellín as a city. I tried to unravel the complexities of the city, to find a coherent explanation, to clarify polarized language, and to smooth over contradictions. My line of questioning focused on broad questions that tried to simplify Medellín into something straightforward, something I could understand. Over time, it became clear that I had to accept that there were limitations to the knowable and accept contradictions as I found them, trying to translate them into something intelligible.

Upon my return to Canada, my research methodologies shifted into a second approach as I turned to historical work exploring *La Violencia*. Methodologically this analysis has been based on a secondary reading of the literature on *La Violencia* with the purpose of reading citizenship and violence into the history. Here, I drew heavily on the academic literature,

rather than primary research. Thus, my thesis builds heavily on previously published work. Nonetheless, I believe my theoretical insights are useful in that they suggest an alternative reading and theoretical framework. In this light, my thesis is a re-reading and a re-analysis of secondary documents and scholarly analysis. While I do believe my approach of reframing debates in the theoretical framework I constructed, and of looking for inconsistencies, has allowed me to sustain the argument that citizenship and violence are in fact intimately linked. I also recognize that there is space for further work in this area.

Appendix 2: Tables and Figures

*Table 1: Distribution of deaths by department (1946 to 1957)*⁴³²

Department	Deaths	per 100,000 (from 1946 to 1957)	per 100,000 (average per year)
Caldas Antiguo	44,255	4,175	380
Tolima	30,912	4,353	396
Antioquia	26,115	1,163	106
Norte de Santander	20,885	5,496	500
Santander	19,424	2,624	239
Valle	13,106	1,191	108
Meta	5,842	9,736	885
Boyacá	5,363	670	61
Huila	4,111	1,417	129
Cundinamarca	4,033	448	41
Bogotá	2,585	364	33
Cauca	1,236	281	26
Other departments	2,385	880	80
	180,252	(144,548 without Cauca, Bogotá, and Other departments)	

*Table 2: Regional distribution of deaths in Antioquia (1949 to 1953)*⁴³³

Region	Deaths	Population, 1951	per 100,000 (from 1949 to 1953)	per 100,000 (average per year)
Magdalena	608	25,077	2,425	485
Occidente	1,706	124,314	1,372	274
Bajo Cauca	232	19,530	1,188	238
Urabá	77	17,309	445	89
Nordeste	519	123,746	419	84
Suroeste	835	249,150	335	67
Norte	80	127,937	63	13
Oriente	141	269,126	52	10
Sur	3	77,562	4	0.8
Central	13	534,889	2	0.4
Antioquia	4,214	1,568,640	269	54

⁴³² Pécaut, 1987, p. 552

⁴³³ AGA, 1953, vol. 9, "Informe sobre la acción del bandolerismo, 1949-1953," Medellín, 11 May 1953 in Roldán, 2002, p. 303

Table 3: Temporal distribution of deaths in Colombia (1948 to 1966)⁴³⁴


Year	Deaths
1948	43,557
1949	18,519
1950	50,253
1951	10,319
1952	13,250
1953	8,650
1954	900
1955	1,013
1956	11,136
1957	2,877
1958	3,796
1959	2,550
1960	2,557
1961	3,173
1962	2,370
1963	1,711
1964	972
1965	950
1966	496
	144,548

⁴³⁴ See Oquist, 1980, p. 6. The figures on which this table and graph are based are from Oquist's data. Oquist bases his figures from 1948-57 on estimates made Dr. Carlos Lemoine, of the *Compañía Colombiana de Datos* (COLDATOS) who interpreted Oquist's own municipal level estimates. Figures are not available in Oquist for the years 1946 and 1947. In 1958, the Policía Nacional began to compile statistics on violent deaths which Oquist describes as the best minimal estimates.

Table 4: Reported deaths by year and subregion in Antioquia, 1949 to 1953⁴³⁵

Region	Number of deaths					Total
	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	
Bajo Cauca	1	0	0	159	72	232
Central	4	1	2	4	2	13
Magdalena	0	0	60	473	75	608
Nordeste	2	0	10	395	112	519
Norte	1	0	62	17	0	80
Occidente	0	30	545	706	425	1,706
Oriente	0	12	1	120	8	141
Sur	1	1	1	0	0	3
Suroeste	6	6	226	390	207	835
Urabá	1	0	63	4	9	77
Antioquia	16	50	970	2,268	819	4,214

Figure 1: Deaths attributed to the violence in Colombia (1948 to 1966)



⁴³⁵ AGA, 1953, vol. 9, "Informe sobre la acción del bandolerismo, 1949-1953," Medellín, 11 May 1953, in Roldán, 2002, p. 303

Figure 2: Regional distribution of deaths in Antioquia (1949 to 1953) per 100,000




Figure 3: Regional distribution of deaths in Antioquia by year




Figure 4: Map of Colombia⁴³⁶




⁴³⁶ Hylton, 2003@50

Figure 5: Map of Antioquia⁴³⁷



Figure 6: Regions of Antioquia⁴³⁸



⁴³⁷ Roldán, 2002, p. 4

⁴³⁸ Roldán, 2002, p. 6

Figure 7: Peripheral municipalities of Antioquia⁴³⁹





Figure 8: Deaths due to Violence, 1949 to 1953⁴⁴⁰



⁴³⁹ Roldán, 2002, p. 7

⁴⁴⁰ Roldán, 2002, p. 9

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