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**THE DYNAMICS OF DAILY LIFE:
A GRASSROOTS PERSPECTIVE ON RESILIENCE AND RESISTANCE
IN THE EMPOWERMENT OF THE WAPEMBA OF ZANZIBAR**

by

BEVERLY CARMICHAEL, B.A.

A thesis submitted to
The Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS
The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs**

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The undersigned hereby recommend to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies and Research acceptance of this thesis
submitted by Beverly Carmichael as partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Professor Maureen Molot, Director
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Abstract

This thesis breaks away from the dominant paradigm in development studies to explore human development – including social, cultural and spiritual aspects – experienced in the daily lives of the Wapemba of Zanzibar. In Pemba, where ingredients such as political representation, economic and industrial development are missing, the people experience development as an indigenous process, initiated from within the community through means which are intrinsic to their shared culture. By realising their own gains, the people of Pemba achieve a sense of empowerment which is argued to be the most fundamental aspect of development. Presented through the stories of Wapemba, the research challenges traditional notions of power and reveals the links between everyday forms of resistance and grassroots development. The resilience, determination and solidarity evident among the Wapemba is fuelled by a sense of injustice and contributes to their strength, while their culture provides the foundation for all that they achieve.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

This study is as an exploration of grassroots development as it is experienced through the everyday experiences of the people of Pemba. It is intended to challenge a typified and Westernized account of and approach to 'development' by re-examining development itself, defined through empowerment – the very essence and most fundamental aspect of development as experienced on the ground. The role of resistance in fuelling the struggle from within is also explored as it is recognised among the people of Pemba as a source of their energy, ingenuity and determination to succeed. Just as resistance is a key force in providing momentum to their struggles to overcome both poverty and oppression, the culture in Pemba provides the foundation for the people's daily activities including the everyday struggle to survive, resist and support one another. The factors which point to 'development' among the people of Pemba are of their own initiative and are intrinsic to their shared culture. It is through these elements that the nature of empowerment and other crucial aspects of human development will be explored among the people of Pemba.

Pemba itself is a part of Zanzibar, the islands which lie off the east coast and are included in the nation of Tanzania. Zanzibar retains a semi-autonomous state in its union with mainland Tanzania and the island of Pemba within Zanzibar is bestowed with a marginal position in the formalised areas of both politics and economics. Both historically and in modern times, the people of Pemba, or *Wapemba* in Kiswahili, have variously faced

discrimination and at times, the outright violation of their human rights in addition to economic and political marginalisation. In probing into the practices of daily life among Wapemba, it becomes increasingly apparent that political discussion and political life are in actuality entwined with and inseparable from the daily lives of regular people. Politics, and the people's shared position of repression within the isles' political structure, is a significant aspect of people's lives as lived on the ground as is the ensuing sense of solidarity among Wapemba.

The people's interactions with the constraints that are imposed upon them are based on various means drawn from their shared culture and reveal an intense determination to succeed in the face of oppression. Cooperation is bound up with the politics of resistance, basic survival, culturally and religiously based social networks and coping mechanisms. Politics infuses every discussion and the struggle for survival and resistance to oppression underlie people's action for development. Through human agency and their own social action, the people of Pemba influence the circumstances that surround them, resisting the oppression that they face. In the political and economic context of Zanzibar where an active effort is made by the State to repress Wapemba, the struggle for survival and development in itself is a form of resistance.

The Wapemba employ everyday forms of resistance both to counter the effects of repression and to influence the world around them. Daily forms of resistance and survival strategies, both culturally based and otherwise, are by their very nature, grassroots initiatives which are self-propelled and thus culturally appropriate. Daily forms of resistance can lead to a sense of empowerment, as by acting on one's own behalf and by

making one's own gains, people can come to realise their own power together with one another and their own development. This process is inherently empowering. Observing this indigenous process among the Wapemba, has led further into the examination of the contribution of resistance to empowerment in grassroots development. This thesis explores empowerment as a vision of development which differs radically in conception from modernisation and westernisation in that it encompasses all aspects of human development including the spiritual, social and cultural; it presents human development as described through the lives of Wapemba as a cooperative and community initiated process which is fuelled within the community by a sense of justice.

This thesis will examine the relationship between resistance and grassroots development among the Wapemba and will argue that through the commitment, cooperation and self-reliance of their active participants, grassroots forms of association have a great degree of potential for meeting their objectives. Grassroots development implies ownership as it is development which is conceived of and established by indigenous people in order to overcome the obstacles to their well-being. This thesis will argue that an alternative notion of development, emphasising non-western, non-modernisation-oriented concepts, can be seen as the foundation for empowerment. In Pemba, where an oppressive regime has turned its back on the people, resistance is a key force behind their efforts, their philosophy, their solidarity and their survival. Development takes place at the grassroots through people's own efforts, solidarity networks and cultural means. This study will assert that resistance can contribute to empowerment in grassroots development and in doing so, will bring to life some of the

fundamental aspects of development which are often overlooked in a typified account of third world development. In addition, the presentation will examine the other side of the same coin which reveals that in being resistant to oppression, people's development and empowerment is itself a form of resistance.

Other objectives of this exposition are to present a reminder that there are other ways of perceiving the world which reveal different value systems and point to alternative lifestyles. The stories of the Wapemba hint at some of the ways in which social actors assert their agency, impact the world and even make use of constraints to achieve what they want. As Maya Angelou has also noted, "anything that works against you can also work for you once you understand the Principle of Reverse" (1969:221). This thesis is both a testimony to the strength of the Wapemba and a tribute to their resilience and determination. The presentation itself is intended to challenge the tendency to conceive of development in macro-economic terms, by underlining the more humanistic features of a society. Cultural and social development are emphasized as a route towards empowerment, which is conceived of as the ultimate form of development. Grassroots forms of organisation and initiative are emphasised as having far greater potential for contributing to empowerment, the ultimate facet of human development, than development assistance or any outside intervention, whose positive impact often cannot be seen below the surface.

In the depiction of the situation for regular people under an oppressive regime, it is easy to assert simply that the dominant community develops itself at the expense of the subordinate. It is a mistake however to ignore those subtle and daily forms of resistance

which are the only forms of resistance that are accessible to people on a regular basis. The implicit forms of resistance which are found in the thoughts and actions of the people on a daily basis indicate that there is much more to the reality of their situation. Cultural forms are conveyed through everyday practice which is also the silent bearer of a symbolic scheme. It is through the silent struggles, the hidden transcripts and 'off stage' behaviour that people maintain pride, dignity and their human and resilient spirit. Despite outward appearances which may not reveal anything about the reality for the people, underneath it all, the Wapemba do not accept the injustices they face. With their strong religious background as a backbone of their culture, they believe that God, known as Allah in their culture, also does not accept the injustices; this enables them to find strength and righteousness in knowing that they are in God's favour, whereas their hypocritical oppressors are not.

In affirming human agency – that people shape and are shaped by their own circumstances through an interactive process – lies the seed for an appeal not to engage in victimisation by stripping agents of power through assigning the title 'victim'. Social actors demonstrate the ability to move despite and sometimes through the manipulation of their constraints. The portrayal of people as victims, if they share the same perception, can be discouraging and can lead to a type of inertia if people in fact believe that they are powerless 'victims'. We must observe the action on the ground where so-called 'victims' often become heroes with minds of their own variously influenced and influencing the uneven penetration of state repression and control into their lives. Angelou recognises a similar combination of human agency, resistance and solidarity in her depiction of survival

among members of a Black American culture in the United States:

... they used their intelligence to pry open the door of rejection and not only became wealthy but got some revenge in the bargain ... The needs of a society determine its ethics, and in the Black American ghettos the hero is the man who is offered only the crumbs from his country's table but by ingenuity and courage is able to take for himself a Lucullan feast ... Each single gain feeds into the gains of the body collective (Angelou 1969:224-225).

To depict Wapemba as an oppressed people in Zanzibar is to acknowledge the human rights abuses that have taken place in the isles, to question the lack of political representation for nearly half of Zanzibar's population, and to bring to the forefront some of the issues of social justice that have been suppressed by the Zanzibar Government. To demonstrate Wapemba resistance to oppression is to take the analysis to forbidden depths by demonstrating the powers of the 'victim' through examining the sometimes obscure ways in which social actors interact with the structures that constrain them. As both structures and actors are born of the same social fabric, they are part of one another. To explore local survival strategies and networks of support is to reject the label victim by revealing another facet of resistance, by realising the strength and resilience of local systems which may be materially poor and by developing a keen respect for alternative ways of living in the world. These observations throw into question many of our conceptions about power, resistance, the relationship between victim and oppressor, descriptions of the political, ideas of wealth and notions of development. The observations speak for a more inclusive notion of resistance while raising questions about the nature of domination and of power. They encourage us to look beyond traditional notions of power and resistance to look for the role of resistance in development.

The conceptual framework and theoretical underpinnings of this study are based on material found in literature regarding development, post-development, human agency, culture, indigenous knowledge and forms of association, power, empowerment and everyday forms of resistance. The material starts with a post- or anti-developmentalists' critique of development as westernisation and the ensuing argument for the need to look for alternatives to development. From their argument, the search for alternatives to development conceived as westernisation and the contention that other universes of knowledge have been undervalued, dismissed and ignored in a typical approach to development are central to the arguments of this thesis. However in as far as they fail to acknowledge that there are other ways of conceiving of development, anti-developmentalists continue to impart imperialist tendencies through a paternalistic outlook. Thus the search for alternatives to development is followed by an appeal to broaden our view of development, where development is viewed as empowerment and the objectives are defined and determined by the indigenous social actors themselves. It directs our attention from modernisation and westernisation to indigenous knowledge and local responses in suggesting that much can be learned from other cultures.

Throughout the literature surveyed, the authors have brought to light several tendencies underlining principles which are also fundamental to this thesis:

In their assessment, these authors share a number of features: a crucial stance with respect to established scientific knowledge; an interest in local autonomy, culture and knowledge; and the defence of localized, pluralistic grassroots movements with which some of them have worked intimately. For these authors, as the links between development and the marginalization of people's life and knowledge become more evident, the search for alternatives also deepens. The imagery of development and 'catching up' with the West is drained of its appeal. In sum, new

spaces are opening up in the vacuum left by the colonizing mechanisms of development, *either through innovation or the survival and resistance of popular practices* (emphasis added Escobar 1995:216).

As development has come to be equated with modernisation which is consistently linked to westernisation, smaller scale initiatives or movements which are based on alternative principles have not commonly been brought to public attention, or hailed as progressive, developmental or empowering. The daily lives and actions of individual people have been swept aside in the search for all-encompassing theories of development that can be applied cross-culturally. These theories do not recognise human agency or small yet significant details which are simply buried under a larger structure that is said to shape their lives. These theories have failed to consider the importance of the interplay between constraints and human action and that through their own action, social actors establish a distinct and unique presence on the world around them. This thesis is an appeal for us to abandon the search for generalisations which are not relevant to most cultures and to refocus our microscope to search for the value in smaller achievements where the community owns the struggle and where the people's motivation is strong.

People's own forms of organisation, association and initiative are drawn from their respective cultures and play a key role in all aspects of self-help, including everyday forms of resistance. Social ties and networks which also represent those 'sites of the hidden transcript', are the basis for community support and solidarity; these are often perceived as a threat and regarded with suspicion by government authorities. The State has engaged in efforts to co-opt and control forms of organisation but this has not stopped smaller informal networks and associations from accomplishing their own objectives. The smaller,

subtler and less visible forms of association or strategies for survival often have greater implications in a struggle over power. The State's endeavours to impose control on these smaller realms of everyday practice point to an acknowledgement of the power that lies therein and admits something of the nature of "the potential power of the periphery over the whole" (Swantz 1985:7).

The Wapemba have their own ideas about what development should entail and are ensuring that they take the matter into their own hands to ensure the survival and the strengthening of their own community in the face of oppression. Through resistance to state encroachment and also through people's common sense survival strategies, which are in accordance with their own cultural system and world view, social actors do counter what is not right for them. The Wapemba are active agents of history who exercise their will through a variety of implicit and explicit sets of actions. They create, transform, resist, and also embrace myriad initiatives and interventions.

This thesis concerns itself with alternative notions of development and forms of power as well as alternative methods of investigation. In the methodology section, the research process is described as having been an open-ended and interactive learning process. It followed a participatory model of investigation whereby the research unfolded through a fluid and dynamic process where the objectives, questions and answers were shaped jointly by the researcher and the informants. The research process is based on the contention that involving people in researching issues of central importance to them is one way of extending their own potential for development through helping to increase self-awareness.

The material collected through the stories of Wapemba is not presented through the format of individualised personal narratives as the themes cut across their lives. As much as possible however, direct quotations are left intact from individuals who have shared with me their perception of the situation in Pemba, how it has affected them and how they are managing to cope with the constraints they face. I have tried to incorporate stories by people who represent different life situations as Wapemba including people from various socio-economic backgrounds who live in either villages, towns or outside of Pemba. Each situation described sheds light on its own particular set of constraints as every situation is both unique and part of a larger pattern of resilience and resistance. I have chosen to put forth faces rather than figures as it is my hope that these Wapemba faces will bring to life the various lived experiences of people living and interacting with their experiences of oppression and/or poverty, as well as myriad coping mechanisms, skills, beliefs, opportunities, and difficulties. Every situation represents a different reality, a different set of lived experiences as social actors are immersed in their own sets of unique and intricate circumstances which set them apart from one another. The direct inclusion of human experience and perception emphasises the value of life as experienced on the ground and affirms human agency. As social actors interpret and shape their own experience, they are not reduced to being mere victims or faceless numbers involved in the same struggle to survive. Individual experiences are rich and together the details add up to form a more accurate view of what is happening on the ground.

The position of a social actor cannot be separated from the total cultural, historical, political, economic and social situation of which he or she is a part. Many

historical legacies continue to be played out, affecting everyday life in current day Zanzibar. The present day ethnic tensions, social groupings, cultural ties, economic relations and political turmoil have deep historical roots which must be unravelled in order to understand the situation of today. The context chapter is thus an attempt to provide the history of the ethnic relations which are later manifested in the political arena.

Additionally, the context chapter is intended to illustrate the modern day circumstances under which the Wapemba have been living in terms of the political climate, the instability facing people daily, the personal and economic insecurity, human rights abuses, etc., in order to set the framework for the stories of daily forms of resistance, survival strategies and self-driven initiatives that are to appear in the following chapter. The political socio-economic context reveals the pressure faced by Wapemba which helps them to build their defences while it simultaneously sets the stage for the recognition of the gains made by Wapemba in the absence of outside assistance.

The following chapter turns to the actual experiences, stories, responses, and reactions gathered from the people of Pemba, living in Zanzibar. This section contains examples of what has been taking place on the ground, amidst the political turmoil in Zanzibar. Grassroots development initiatives, support networks, the extent to which people have not allowed these problems to intrude on their lives and the strength that people have been deriving from their own culture are aspects of their lives which are brought forth through their descriptions of daily life.

The explanations of the Wapemba clearly demonstrate that political life is inseparable from the daily lives of regular people, and that resilience and determination are

bound up with everyday forms of resistance. Stories are presented of both difficulties and people starting with nothing yet not becoming defeated by circumstances. When asked why they never become discouraged, Wapemba have ultimately responded that they know that God will always help them. Their common adherence to Islam is a thread of unity that draws members of their community together and provides the principles by which people live. It also fuels within the community a sense of moral superiority over those in power in the formal arena of politics because they know that their struggle is just.

The perceived attempt to crush Wapemba through oppression and poor conditions has made them stronger. They have the reputation of being hardworking and actually excel, attributing their determination to the need to struggle harder than people who hold the official political power and do not need to exert much effort nor to be as resilient in their daily lives. People from Pemba work very hard and they do not give up easily: *"If you get problems when you start anything, this is good" (Madawa)*. They accept that *"life's not fair but what can you do?" (Nunu)*, which is not the same as being passive. Wapemba demonstrate resilience, flexibility and adaptability in discovering multiple means for survival. Members of the Wapemba society who are successful often have many different sources of income; they make use of many different resources and seek opportunities while being willing to switch to another activity anytime. They also support their fellow 'brothers' and 'sisters', finding dignity, power and a different type of wealth within their own culture. Wapemba solidarity is boosted through braving a common threat together and by being unified in their various efforts to tackle the problems facing their community. The Wapemba stories illustrate the ability of people to find their own

alternatives in an uncertain, politically volatile climate and in doing so point to their independent and indigenous efforts which chart the route to empowerment.

The case material is intended to underscore the value of everyday practices in shaping the world. The varied stories of resistance show that resistance operates on different levels as each encounter with oppression is differently situated and differently experienced. Each social actor brings a discrete set of circumstances, interests and strategies with which to navigate the course through oppression's obstacles. People work with what they have, coming from so many different angles that their efforts cannot possibly all be intersected. Like thousands of little pinpricks or red ants biting, the cumulative effect can be very painful. The protective efforts made by swatting here and there cannot be as effective as one direct hit after knowing exactly where to strike; therein lies the power of everyday forms of resistance.

The outcome of an effort to package the everyday stories of social actors into a cohesive, academic exposition is similar in effect to attempting to turn a gas into a solid. The varied accounts of the Wapemba are based on the open-ended and ongoing processes of their daily lives. On the ground, every individual's life is infused with meaning and is taking place in a specific and changing context, far greater and more encompassing than we can ever know or portray. The desire to avoid drawing concrete conclusions which make generalisations about complex and multiple situations, is manifested in the attempt to experience and emphasise the 'practice' of everyday life throughout this thesis. My objective has not been to undertake the futile task of seeking order and meaning where there really is no permanent order and where multiple meanings exist, emerge, evolve,

sometimes go unnoticed and disappear. In the study of the complex and multiple realities occurring in any culture,

nothing more can be attempted than to establish the beginning and the direction of an infinitely long road. The pretension of any systematic and definitive completeness would be, at least, a self-illusion. Perfection can here be obtained by the individual student only in the subjective sense that he communicates everything he has been able to see (Simmel in Castaneda 1968:11).

The very act of writing freezes a story. Once on paper, concluded and defended, my version of their story will be over, while their stories will continue to unfold and vary and maybe lead different researchers to entirely different conclusions based on their particular moment of contact and the interactions that they themselves will experience. My account is based on a snapshot of a particular moment in time with specific individuals. It is not intended to be representative nor am I alleging that it is replicable. This is what I learned through the experiences I sought and the personal encounters I had with the people of Pemba. Through their own stories, my intention is to challenge Western stereotypes as I honour the Wapemba and hope to portray their lives as meaningful, their resilience as strength, their joy as life, and what they accomplish through resistance as human development, which is fundamental to any conception of development, empowerment or success.

CHAPTER 2

Deconstructing Development

It has become increasingly difficult to work in the field of development studies. Michael Edwards (1989) has pointed out the “irrelevance” of development studies to development itself, based on the ever-widening gap between theories of development and the ways in which it is practised. Even throughout the struggle to determine methods which will render research more meaningful to the ways in which development is practised, the difficulties are compounded by the fact that development itself is such an elusive concept. In which other field can there be as little agreement among both theoreticians and practitioners as to the definition of what is, or should be constituted as the concept which is being studied or practised?

Esteva's (1992:10) review of the concept of development revealed that the concept itself has been transformed step by step, into one “with contours that are about as precise as those of an amoeba”. There have been so many failed development efforts that many people have tried to distance themselves from the term. When “development” is spoken of, it is now often qualified and used with caution. People employ the term “with caveats and restrictions as if they were walking in a minefield” (Ibid:7). In the wake of this crisis of development, it is clear that we must clarify our perspective as we invoke this loaded term, the significance of which varies and depends so heavily on the context in which it is employed.

Recently, the discourse of development and the power that development has to

define and shape reality has become central to scholarly debate. In acknowledging the role of discourse in the construction of power/knowledge systems, critics aim to examine the “foundations of an order of knowledge about the Third World, the ways in which the Third World is constituted in and through knowledge” (Escobar 1995:214). Western knowledge of the Third World, and the ensuing development discourse, has often been based on ethnocentric, reductionist and paternalistic assumptions that have served only to perpetuate neo-colonial hierarchies, dependency and failed development projects. The ‘Third World’ is itself a creation; it is a crudely-formed category which includes a vast number of countries which, rather than being distinguished from one another, are lumped together and are distinguished on the basis of being ‘other’ than and ‘underdeveloped’ in contrast to the West. “To represent the Third World as ‘underdeveloped’ is less a statement about the ‘facts’ than the setting up of a regime of truth through which the Third World is known, intervened on, and managed” (Escobar 1992:62).

Having been defined in relation to the West, rather than on the basis of their own individual conditions and qualities, these countries, their peoples and the issues that matter to them are denied their differences. Collectivities (groups, societies, territories, tribes, classes, communities) have been assigned sets of characteristics that are supposedly no longer found in ‘modern’ Westernized societies. By clinging to non-western traditions, it is asserted that these collectivities are likely to remain at “a low place in the hierarchy of achievement” and they are threatened with ‘a terminal condition of stasis, forever becalmed until the healing winds of modernity and development [begin] to blow” (Crush 1995:9). The types of solutions that are proffered by development ‘experts’ (who are

often Western-trained) involve emulating Western practices and looking to the West for an image of an ideal future. “The idea of the modern West as a model of achievement, and the rest of the world as an inferior derivative, remains integral to the concept of development” (Manzo 1995:237). This is both the result of and the reasoning behind the dominant discourse of development in the West, which discredits and delegitimises localized knowledge systems, techniques, practices and lifestyles.

The dominant paradigm in the West presumes that the object of development is to be involved in a process of never-ending growth. The capital accumulation process “..is based on a world view which never says “This is enough”. It is by its very nature, built on limitless growth” (Mies 1986:39). This perspective was clearly articulated by Laurence Summers, former Chief Economist and Vice-President for Development at the World Bank, when in 1991 he stated that: “There are no ... limits to the carrying capacity of the earth ... The idea that we should put limits on growth because of some natural limit, is a profound error and one that, if it were ever to prove influential, would have staggering social costs” (cited in George and Sabelli 1994:109). The dominant belief at the World Bank is that there need not be any trade-off between environmental protection and economic growth; the solutions do not lie in stopping growth, but in finding ways to render growth more sustainable.

Esteva points out that those who still believe that these types of development goals are “pertinent ideals for the so-called underdeveloped, should honestly recognize the present structural impossibilities for the universal materialization of such goals” (1992:22). The continued materialization of such ideals in the North is also a structural impossibility.

By re-examining some of the traditional indicators of development's success in the West, it becomes evident that Western success stories may be misleading at best. For example, by adjusting the US GNP to account for the depletions in natural capital, pollution effects and income distribution, Herman Daley has shown that "in the last twenty-five years there's been no growth whatsoever in the United States, just a running down of the inventory of natural capital" (in Waring 1994:156).

Mies describes the phenomenon that arises from the model of never-ending growth as "overdevelopment" which is "progressively destructive, not only for those who are exploited in this process but also for those who are apparently the beneficiaries of this exploitation" (Mies 1986:39). The apparent beneficiaries are supposed to be content with their high levels of material wealth. Their access to material commodities creates the illusion that they are free to make choices which will result in the fulfilment of their desires and needs. 'Catching up' with the undesirable situation of never-ending growth and mass consumption in the West is not considered to be an adequate goal for the Third World because it involves the stifling of human creativity and self-actualization.

Since the knowledge which has dominated and framed Western discourses of development has been deeply wedded to economism, it has also been distanced from human needs. Economism is frequently inconsistent with equality and justice and it has a tendency to polarise society. As the prevailing dominant knowledge, it has been inherently colonising and mystifying. As such, it has disqualified local, concrete knowledge and divorced knowledge from wisdom. In erasing diversity, it has left out a plurality of paths to knowing nature and the universe, while it has impeded the access of a plurality of

actors. It is becoming increasingly apparent however, that other ways of thinking and doing – ways that are compatible with local conditions and lifestyles – must be accepted as the dominant paradigm proves itself to be mistaken over and over again.

Criticizing development is not a new practice. Development has been criticized from a wide range of perspectives, for many different reasons. Approaches to development have been critiqued for making serious omissions, e.g. the analyses of gender relations, class differences, community participation, the existence and importance of cultural systems, etc. Each of these critiques, in pointing out what has been missing from the practice or theory of development, demonstrates that by incorporating certain themes or by learning to be sensitive to previously ignored or unnoticed issues, development can be improved. Fewer have questioned the very premises of development. The 1990s crisis of development is distinctive in that it is attached to a “growing sensitivity to the ecological consequences of unfettered growth coupled with unprecedented global inequalities” (Watts 1996:61). As the postulates of development are becoming less and less accepted, a number of Third World scholars have abandoned the search for development alternatives and are now speaking of ‘alternatives to development’, that is, a rejection of the entire paradigm.

Anti-development, reminiscent in some ways of the Fanonite assault on neo-colonialism in the 1960s, unequivocally rejects development. It is argued that through development, the colonial mind set continues to craft cultural values and behaviour in the post-imperial world. “Under the guise of development, the culture of imperialism is methodologically reproduced to maintain continued Western dominance” (Shrestha

1996:266-267). Modernization is equated with westernization and development everywhere is evaluated against Western realities. It is argued that “development’s hidden agenda was nothing else than the Westernization of the world” (Sachs 1992:3-4). As a hegemonic formation, “it is crucial that development not be seen solely as an economic and political project but as an overarching cultural discourse that has a profound impact on the fabric of the Third World” (Escobar 1992:63), and threatens to impose a single cultural model on the whole world.

As alternatives to Western development have been explored, the belief that Third World development and westernization/modernization are synonymous has been challenged (Parpart 1995). The ethnocentric assertion that ‘modernity’ is unproblematically associated with ‘western’ fails to acknowledge that ‘modernity’ is in existence in contemporary, non-western societies. The original and common sense of the term ‘modern’, is more accurately reflected in the term ‘current’ or conceived as being ‘of the present or recent times’. There is no reason to confine the concept of modernity to one specific type which is present in any particular place. Modernity exists, in its varied forms, in all parts of the world. To think otherwise is to imply that some people and places are locked in a kind of stasis, as though tradition has allowed them to remain somehow unchanged throughout history. It is a mistake to imagine that there is a continuum leading from a state of so-called traditionalism to a state of so-called modernism. Elements of tradition exist also in modern times. Watts concludes that:

the origins of development are within modernity but that modernity cannot be unproblematically located within the West. The modern (and developed) require the non-modern (and underdeveloped) ... alternative developments are dialectically

organized oppositions within the history of modernity, to be seen less as mutually exclusive but as oppositions that contain the other (Watts 1996:61).

The Western tendency to dichotomize, to hold one concept in distinct opposition to another, then to impose a hierarchy between the two categories, is referred to as “logocentrism” by Jacques Derrida. Through a logocentric description, one term is constituted in relation to the other, as opposite to that which is conceived of as rational and constituting a higher reality. It is thus an “inferior or derivative form in need of correction” (Manzo 1995:238). Simply to invert the existing dichotomies is not an adequate solution because it does not challenge dualisms. It merely imposes a new order of hierarchy on concepts that continue to be inextricably bound to one another, rather than being conceptualized on their own terms. Kate Manzo invokes a critique based on Derrida's concept of ‘logocentrism’, which demonstrates that the political and ethical duty of the critical intellectual is “not to invert dichotomies or classifications but to deconstruct them, to show how each category of identity has been constituted in relations with the other” (Manzo 1995a:5). There is a need to question both how these dichotomies came to be produced in the first place and to realize that analytic distinctions themselves are often false. There is a need to investigate “how the same global phenomena come to be articulated within, as well as transformed by, distinctively local contexts” (in Manzo 1995:244).

The discourses which are based on the notions of anti-development or “post-development” (Escobar 1995) are also in danger of falling into the trap of imposing solid distinctions and dichotomies between concepts. It is not realistic to presume the existence

of pristine counter-hegemonic discourses of anti-development which are unquestionably opposed to and completely untainted by the language of development itself. In thinking past the binary oppositions that we hold, Johnathon Crush invokes Foucault's notion of the "tactical polyvalence of discourses" (1990) which assert that:

we should not imagine a world of dominant and dominated, or accepted and excluded discourses. We should think instead of a 'complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy' (in Crush 1995:19-20).

Despite the power that development has had to speak and to control the terms of speaking, it "has never been impervious to challenge and resistance, nor, ... to reformulation and change" (Crush 1995:8). By uncritically accepting the hegemonic power of Westernization and by reducing development to this, its narrowest possible definition, development does assume an ominous form and appears as a powerful instrument of Western domination. However, the fact that the term 'development' has been so difficult to define indicates that the concept is complex and the term implies a diversity of meanings. Haripriya Rangan reminds us of the fluidity of development when he describes the concept as being "as dynamic as life's processes – coming into being as an idea, changing over time, diversifying in meaning, becoming a contested terrain, diffusing through translation and re-emerging in different forms in different regions" (1996:207). He further points out that imposing a reductionist definition of instrumental control on the term "not only denies its historicity but also ignores the diverse ways in which ideas of development, despite their origins in Western thought, have been translated, appropriated, refashioned, and reconfigured by local circumstances" (1996:207). To reduce

development to a tool for Western domination is to ignore the responses and deny the agency of actors understood to be at the receiving end.

Hegemonic Western feminist texts have all too often applied reductionist assumptions and depicted Third World women as “passive, frozen in history, and as being acted upon, rather than acting individually and collectively to improve their situations” (Wekker 1997:351). Marnia Lazreg (1988) lodged this same complaint against western and western-trained feminist scholars who had written about Algeria. She noted that their portrayals have tended uncritically to adopt Western stereotypes about Arab peoples and culture, which has resulted in the depiction of Arab women as ‘passive pawns’ who are ‘trapped’ in retrogressive religious traditions and practices. Feminist theory, when applied to Arab women, is rarely seen as an opportunity to explore alternative lifestyles and the variety of modes of experiencing life as a female. Lazreg appeals for a new approach that will recognize differences and accept the need to explore the concrete, lived experiences of women in different cultures. The new approach will require studies of Third World women which attempt to reveal “women’s lives as meaningful, coherent and understandable instead of being infused ‘by us’ with doom and sorrow” (in Parpart 1995:256). It is a call to explore and try to understand women’s lives from their perspective rather than always from our own western standpoint.

Ramphela (1992), from a South African perspective of “Black Consciousness”, lodged a similar complaint against the “dominant paradigms” which “projected blacks as victims of racism and exploitation, while little attention was paid to the creativity and resilience which underpinned the strategies of survival blacks had elaborated over the

years” (in Manzo 1995:244). While Blacks in general in South Africa have unquestionably been the victims of apartheid, they have also and, simultaneously, been engaged in the self-production of their reality in multifaceted and complex ways.

By ignoring the possibilities of reaction and resistance to the dominant discourse of development, “there is no place for the agents and victims of development to exert their explicit and implicit influence on the ways in which it is constructed, thought, planned and implemented” (Crush 1995:8). Those defined in development discourse as the objects of development are not simply homogenized, voiceless people who have fallen victim to outside forces. By stepping away from essentialism and through examining the ways in which development discourse and practice have been received, internalized and/or resisted on the ground, the so-called objects of development are revealed as “active agents who contest, resist and divert the will of the developer in greater or lesser ways” (Crush 1995:22).

Development is in people’s hands, for people make the decisions and contribute the labour that may or may not fit into the designs of the external ‘developers’. These same human agents who are conceived of and described as the object of development, are themselves the fundamental ‘developers’, whose will and action play a key role in determining what type of ‘development’ will take place. The paternalistic effort to protect the Third World from development falls into a trap whereby agents are denied a role and the strength of the imperialising force of development is reconfirmed. As development is a people’s own process, the concept which has come to be called development, in both development studies and development agencies, is sometimes insignificant in its effect,

while at other times it can be either a negative or a positive external influence on that process.

Haripraya Rangan's study of the Uttaranchal movement in India revealed that having equal access to appropriate development assistance was actually a central concern of the social protests he studied. He finds it "ironic that contemporary scholarly debates should clamour for a 'post-development' era, just when voices from the margins – so celebrated in discourses of difference and alternative culture – are demanding their rights to greater access to a more generous idea of development" (1996:222). Reductionist theories focus away from the actual social actors and their objectives in their concept of power.

In bringing back the voices from the margins, we often do hear them saying that they still do want development assistance. Is it fair of us to now tell them that they are wrong, to assume that they have been mystified by the tangled hegemonic web of development dreams? Even in the new post-development era, it is not uncommon for western scholars to continue to hear only selective voices. In acknowledging that these voices are spoken by active agents of history who live out their own alternatives and strive for their own dynamic notions of progress or success, we may ask ourselves why it is that we never consider, like Crush (1995:17) that "the fruits of development practice may flow *from* rather *to* the groups and areas 'targeted'"? This reciprocal view of the world has not been considered in designing the map of development.

"There is the growing struggle within post-colonial thought to loosen the power of Western knowledge and to reassert the value of alternative experiences and ways of

knowing” (Crush 1995:4). Claims for indigenous knowledge realize that locally-derived knowledges, which have existed for centuries, are based on experiments that have been tried and tested in local conditions and are integrated into local cultural systems. People and communities have sustained themselves for generations by meeting their own needs at the local level. Vandana Shiva points out that the dominant knowledge system makes alternatives disappear by erasing and destroying the reality which they attempt to represent. “Monocultures of the mind make diversity disappear from perception, ... the disappearance of diversity is also a disappearance of alternatives ... alternatives exist, but are excluded” (Shiva 1993:5).

In reintroducing diversity and seeking out alternative ways of organizing societies and economies, post-colonial studies acknowledge respect for other forms of knowledge within other cultural systems, other rationales including political reasoning, for different ways of doing, of perceiving, approaching, solving, helping, healing, living, measuring success, satisfying needs, etc. Perhaps a ‘post-development’ era will include a celebration of what we can learn from other cultures, not just about ourselves i.e. studying the ‘other’ to gain insight into ourselves, but what we can learn about alternatives to our own ways of thinking and living. Not only how we can expand our horizons by expanding our own fields of knowledge, but the lesson is that if we are receptive and open to the possibilities, we may learn new ways of doing, of interacting, “of looking at the world and [we may] get a glimpse of the riches and blessings which survive in non-Western cultures in spite of development” (Sachs 1992:5).

In cultures all over the world, people strive to improve their lives, but they may

strive to do so differently than we do in the West. Embedded in their own value structure, they may conceive of alternative ways of imagining success.

From people and their languages, we can sense other value dimensions that are difficult to count in development. What does it mean to be 'poor'? In parts of Africa, it is a 'lack of kin and friends'. Greetings in some Asian countries to a lone individual inquire about companionship. Water is so precious that one expresses gratitude and thanks in terms of bringing rain (Staudt 1991:27-28).

We must acknowledge that improvement may mean different things to different people.

"In spite of the economy, ..[people living in many places along].. the margins have been able to keep alive another logic, another set of rules ... this logic is embedded in the social fabric" (Esteva 1992:22). Escobar discovered when working 'at the margins', that:

social actors of various kinds take space away from capitalism and modernity, and they hint at different ways of seeing the relationships between capital, the state, culture, and the economy. They may well offer important insights for the redefinition of democracy and development. As these groups come together in networks or national arenas, they also foster the formation of public domains that are quite different from the social domain associated with the state (1992:68).

Autonomy from larger structures is maintained to a certain extent in that "relations of power exist outside the state, in a whole network of other relations (at the level of knowledge, the family, and so on)" (Escobar 1995:223). A different value system helps to form the foundation of this alternative public sphere. Value is placed "on social interaction and the servicing of social networks ... This is also a result of the culture of survival which depends on strong social networks of support" (Ramphela 1991:163). In a relationship defined by domination and subordination, mobilization can be more effectively achieved through horizontal rather than vertical integration.

De Certeau differentiates between domination which proceeds through 'strategies',

and popular production which operates through 'tactics', which he describes as "small procedures and ruses in the realm of everyday life". He indicates that:

strategies seek to discipline and manage people and institutions, whereas tactics constitute a sort of 'anti-discipline', an 'art of making' that proceeds by manipulating imposed knowledge and symbols at propitious moments. Tactics are 'weapons of the weak' ... they introduce a certain play into the system of power (in Escobar 1992:74).

Local tactics appearing in everyday practice allowed peasants and indigenous groups to maintain an important degree of control over their environment and worldview. The process of reflecting on daily life privileges the value of everyday practices in producing the world in which we live. For "if it is true that the majority of people live within structures of domination that are not of their own making, it is also true that they participate in these structures, adapting, resisting, transforming or subverting them through manifold tactics" (Escobar 1995:217). It is in the terrain of everyday life that the interests of the dominant culture are negotiated and contested. Through the 'hidden transcripts' and everyday forms of resistance among social actors, by "speaking our meanings with their language" (Fiske in Escobar 1992:75), the power of development "to remake the world according to the word is relentlessly contested" (Crush 1995:23).

Jelin found in her study of women's mobilisations that "the type of action in which women engage does not restrict itself to the traditional rules of politics but attempts to give a new meaning to politics" (in Escobar 1992:70). Parallel to the domain of elite politics exists another domain of politics in which the principal actors are not the dominant groups of the indigenous societies nor the colonial authorities but the 'subaltern classes and groups'. This is an autonomous domain, for it neither originates in elite politics nor

does its existence depend on the latter (Guha in Escobar 1992). Their common experience as subordinates has endowed them with experiences and values that hold them in a category far apart from elite politics. The subalterns themselves play a key role in shaping the political world in which they live, either through innovation or the survival and resistance of cultural practices.

Just as crucial in asserting agency as the reconstruction of both economies and politics is the reconstitution of meanings at all levels, from everyday life to national development. Escobar believes that social movements are privileged spaces in which to study the processes of mediation, because they involve situations of interrelations between daily life, political practice and social relations. Social movements must be seen equally and inseparably as “struggles over meanings as well as material conditions, that is, as cultural struggles” (Escobar 1992:69).

Collective action takes the form of networks submerged in everyday life. What nourishes collective action is the production of alternative frameworks of meaning. As Manzo (1995:249) indicates, “culture is always political, and cultural struggle [is] of vital political importance”. To live differently, to assert one’s difference, is to practice cultural innovation and to engage in political practice. An examination of the terrain of everyday life will reveal the dynamic of cultural politics, as “culture is not something that exists in the abstract; it is embedded in practices, in the everyday life of people. Culture *is* people’s practices” (Escobar 1992:70).

The collective identities that define a given movement are never given as fact or event, but are the result of a process of ‘articulation’. This process of articulation is

always discursive, to the extent that it always entails a plurality of orientations and subject positions. There is an intricate, delicate, and often shifting interplay between individuality and collectivity, or community. The process of negotiation is apprehended through meaning and gives rise to the possibility of counter-hegemonic formations. Collective identity is an interactive and shared definition produced by several individuals and concerned with the orientations of action and the fields of opportunities and constraints in which the action takes place constructed and negotiated.

Melucci contends that conflict takes place principally on symbolic grounds by challenging and upsetting the dominant codes. "The mere existence of a symbolic challenge is in itself a method of unmasking the dominant codes, a different way of perceiving and naming the world" (in Escobar 1992:73). The aim of producing an alternative set of meanings is to create definitions that are relevant to the subaltern's everyday experience. Part of this process takes the form of a sort of "semiotic resistance", which originates in "the desire of the subordinate to exert control over the meanings of their lives, a control that is typically denied them in the material social conditions" (Fiske in Escobar 1992:75). This alternative "semiotic power" is a form of social power, and hence it is actually or potentially political. "Those who dominate social relations also dominate the production of the meanings that underpin them: social power and semiotic power are different sides of the same coin" (Fiske in Escobar 1992:95).

Everyday life involves a collective act of creation, a collective signification, a culture. It is out of this reservoir of meanings ... that people actually give shape to their struggle ... daily life is located at the intersection of processes of articulating meaning through practices, on the one hand, and macro processes of domination, on the other. Struggles over meanings at the level of daily life ... are the basis of

contemporary social movements (Escobar 1992:71).

Symbolic resistances at the micro-level are necessary to produce the social conditions for larger, more widespread forms of resistance.

Jane Comaroff (1985) has created a model for the study of cultural resistance which focuses on the interplay of structural constraints, symbolic mediation and human practice. Both 'modernity' and 'tradition' are revealed as plural, contradictory, and uneven. As Escobar has noted, "cultural and economic forms of different temporal origins coexist, forming layers rather than stages, constituting at the same time simultaneity and sequence" (Escobar 1992:67).

Comaroff's study of Zionism among the Tshidi people of South Africa demonstrates that those who have been suppressed have exerted their agency through changing the cultural codes which have been imposed upon them according to the logic of existing local thought, in order to suit their own purposes. Denying that pre-colonial cultural systems were entirely displaced by colonialism, Comaroff's emphasis is placed on the importance of the reciprocal quality of the interaction between the two types of systems. Her analysis of the Tshidi, a peripheral society living within the borders of South Africa, focuses on the Zionist religious movement as it applies to the Tshidi people. The religion is a combination of orthodox Christianity and beliefs from 'traditional' Tshidi thought. It symbolizes a 'middle ground' between a supposedly displaced 'traditional' order and a modern world in which the Tshidi are marginalised. Zionism is viewed as a form of resistance because it is a case where a repressed people have taken what has been imposed upon them by a more powerful regime, and have subsequently used it in a way

that is different from what the dominating group had intended. The reconstruction of an imposed orthodoxy amounts to an act of defiance because the original objectives are undermined.

When expressions of dissent are prevented from attaining a level of open discourse, a subtle but systematic breach of authoritative cultural codes might make a statement of protest which, by virtue of being rooted in a shared structural predicament and experience of dispossession, conveys an unambiguous message (Comaroff 1985:196).

Modern religious movements such as Tshidi Zionism are understood by Comaroff as the outcome of a process of simultaneous reproduction and transformation, a process set in motion by the engagement of the particular indigenous system and a specific extension of European colonialism. Orthodox Christianity had been introduced to the Tshidi culture and through a conjuncture of reciprocal determination, had been adapted to fit their worldview. In examining the manner in which symbolic systems mediate structure and practice, she asserts that within systems whose parameters were themselves being redefined in the colonial context, there has been a complex interdependency of domination and resistance, change and perpetuation.

Comaroff (1985) emphasises the role of human agency and in doing so, she ensures that the so-called subordinate is provided with an active role in shaping the outcome of its confrontation with oppression, westernization, poverty, and so on. Her analysis demonstrates that those who have been constrained by oppressive structures have still found room to move and have continued to survive despite the pressure that has been mounted against them. Through tactics of resistance and strategies for survival, social actors assert their presence, restoring confidence and a sense of hope. As long as they can

prevent forms of domination from permeating every aspect of their 'natural world', there will be an opportunity for resistance and there will continue to be a will to resist.

The meaning and role of human agency has been explored in a variety of analyses. Gloria Wekker, in a feminist analysis, defines "agency" as a "crystallization of woman's subjectivities in conjunction with the possibility to act. From the nooks and crannies of a bleak landscape where constraining hegemonic realities systematically disadvantage women, women seek possibilities to enlarge their choices, to enhance their positions" (1997:332). Alexander and Mohanty indicate that in feminist formulations of democracy, agency is defined differently. They assert that women do not imagine themselves as victims or dependants of governing structures but as agents of their own lives. Agency here is understood as "the conscious and ongoing reproduction of terms of one's existence while taking responsibility for this process. And agency is anchored in the practice of thinking oneself as a part of feminist collectivities and organizations" (1997:xxviii).

Alexander and Mohanty's emphasis on the conscious and collective nature of agency excludes smaller scale, subtle and often unintended acts whereby identities are asserted. Human agency need not be construed in instrumental terms, as only being useful when it is specifically directed and purposeful. Even when people do imagine themselves as being victimized or consider themselves to be dependent to some extent on the structures that govern and constrain them, they are social actors who, through all their actions, exert human agency. People are active agents of history, influencing and acting upon both the structures that constrain them and the context in which they have been inserted, whether they are consciously aware of it and acting collectively, or not.

On the other hand, becoming aware of one's role and the impact that one has on larger processes, is empowering. Conscientization is key to realizing one's strength and developing confidence in the potency of one's actions. Also, when acting collectively, people often find a greater strength in numbers. The smaller, subtle acts unconsciously undertaken, should be seen as the first steps toward ultimate transformation. As Wilson and Ramphela have noted, "this whole process of battling for space within which to operate is complementary to the wider political struggle for a fundamental redistribution of power. It should not be ignored or dismissed as irrelevant. It is a vital component of the new nation struggling to be born" (1989:259).

In the next chapter, I will propose that human agency can be demonstrated through localized efforts to combat poverty and oppression. Whether manifested in culturally-based survival strategies or everyday forms of resistance, people demonstrate their agency and their power to control the circumstances that affect them to some extent. Through this, other ways of knowing and doing, alternatives to Western approaches are unassumingly articulated as they are lived out on the ground. Through resistance to encroachment and also through people's common sense survival strategies which are in accordance with their own cultural system/world view, 'Third World' peoples do counter what is not right for them. They are active agents of history who exercise their will through a variety of implicit and explicit sets of actions. They create, transform, resist, and also embrace a multitude of initiatives and interventions. In a word, they *develop*.

By documenting examples of human agency and what it often unassumedly achieves, the importance and significance of small-scale, subtle and often symbolic human

actions can be pointed out, perhaps leading to a greater awareness among people of their own strength and position as social actors. This research is a testimony to the strength and resilience of a wide range of social actors demonstrating that people can and do become agents of qualitative change.

CHAPTER 3

Re-examining Marginality – Social Organisation, Local Strategies and Resistance in Everyday Practice

The last chapter problematised the doctrine of ‘third world development’ as it has commonly been conceptualized by those involved in the practice or study of development assistance. Its content challenged the equation of development with modernity, introduced the power and the play of indigenous human agents, and encouraged the expansion of our own categories of thought to explore alternative notions of development based on ‘other’ existing worldviews, localized struggles and the voices from what has been confined to ‘the margins’. This chapter will look beyond traditional notions of power and resistance and in doing so, will point out the contribution of resistance to empowerment in grassroots development. In turning to acts of popular practice, human agency will be explored through the examination of everyday forms of resistance, culturally-based survival strategies and alternative forms of power. These examples will point back to an alternative conception of development by focussing on the strength and resilience apparent in a closer examination of the margins.

Post-structuralist and post-modernist arguments have challenged the received wisdom about Third World realities and the nature and goals of development. Escobar (1995) rejects the presumption that ‘the West’ provides a model of development that the rest of the world should emulate and has engaged in a search for “alternatives to development”. However, he does acknowledge that a number of Latin American scholars

have cautiously argued that through the rigours of postmodern critique, it may be possible to reappropriate some of modernity's principles, such as "social change, the commitment to justice, and the emancipation from poverty and oppression" (Escobar 1992:68).

Parpart (1995) argues that post-modern feminism accepts the importance of economic development and draws on local knowledge and culture while rejecting the adoption of 'mindless modernity'. Through the rejection of the equation between modernity and development, it is possible to return to a more authentic description of each concept.

Rahnema (1992) argues that as any social actor realizes that "the dominant Western form of modernity has, in fact, lost touch with the present it claims to represent, he [sic] becomes truly modern, in the original sense of the word, that is, one who is *of the present*" (1992:170).

Social actors, in making sense of their own circumstances, constantly refine their traditional ways of facing "the many waves threatening their lives. To the thousands of tricks each culture has developed in order to preserve itself from such passing waves, the new grassroots are adding the art of *surfing over and inside* the waves" (Rahnema 1992:170). An emphasis on human agency argues for a new form of development that is based on the knowledge and needs of peoples in the South. This approach asserts a people's right to their own culture, history and world view and seeks to understand "local knowledges, both as sites of resistance and power" (Parpart 1995:264).

A structuralist approach emphasises the constraints to social action which are imposed by the structures of society. This approach assumes that there are 'givens' which define much, but not all, of the situation that human actors face. Structural constraints

“place limits on the responses that are possible, imaginable. But those limits are wide and, within them, human actors fashion their own response” (Scott 1985:42). These individual responses are based on the experiences, interpretations and realities of different social actors who themselves embody a complexity of multiple identities. The position holds that both groups and individuals interact, produce meanings, express their needs, transform their relationships and even mobilize within the framework of possibilities and constraints presented them by the institutions of their societies.

Gooneratne and Mbilinyi have levelled the critique that most analyses have “erred in the past, by giving undue attention to macro-level economic and social parameters and ignoring the potential power and creativity of people organising themselves, on their own behalf, at the local level” (1992:2). These imposed parameters do not form inflexible categories, “the frontier ... is a zone of constant struggle between dominant and subordinate – not a solid wall” (Scott 1990:14). It is important to listen more carefully to the ‘subordinated’ human agents who are constantly engaged in negotiating the relations of domination and subordination, in order to realize the dynamic processes through which individuals simultaneously shape and are shaped by their environments. Through an examination of these processes, human agents will be observed as they work, struggle and live within and despite the structures which act to oppress or constrain. In doing so, they demonstrate an endless supply of resilience, creativity, adaptation, perseverance and determination in order to do what they need to do, in ways that may never have been conceived of by the ‘dominant’, thus could not be thwarted in advance. Social reality is the result of “powerful organizations which attempt to define the meaning of reality and

actors and networks of actors who use the resources of these same organizations to define reality in novel ways” (Melucci 1989:208-209).

While structuralist theories have failed to consider the importance of the interplay between structural constraints and human action, the analysis can be taken to a deeper level, to a post-structural position, where structure and agency are not set up as distinct categories, winning and losing spaces to the other, but are acknowledged as part of one another. Oftentimes, and paradoxically, such resistant action and the victories it wins for the marginalised is facilitated by the phenomenon of colonization or domination itself (Melucci 1989:196).

Terrence Ranger (1989) provides an example in the African context, whereby colonial structure which had been imported and imposed upon local populations was then manipulated and used by African people for their own ends. Europeans – whose own culture had grown around the notion of ‘traditions’ that were marked by inflexibility – set about to codify, or more appropriately ‘invent’, traditions for Africans. In so doing, they codified false models of colonial African ‘tradition’. Africans were not merely passive bystanders in this process. There was, of course, African participation and manipulation of invented tradition. Some “Africans sought to draw on European invented traditions, in a relatively autonomous way and without accepting the roles which Europeans assigned to Africans within them” (Ranger 1989:237), while others “sought to manipulate these symbols for themselves, without accepting the implications of subordination within a neo-tradition of governance” (Ranger 1989:237). John Iliffe provides one such example whereby African people made use of the structure imposed upon their culture. Where “the

British wrongly believed that Tanganyikans belonged to tribes; Tanganyikans created tribes to function within the colonial framework” (in Ranger 1989:252). However, in reality, far from claiming any single ‘tribal’ identity, most Africans moved in and out of multiple identities, defining themselves differently from one experience to another. Overlapping networks of association and exchange extended over wide areas. Thus “the boundaries of the ‘tribal’ polity and the hierarchies of authority within them did *not* define conceptual horizons of Africans” (Ranger 1989:248).

Rather than having had indigenous cultural formations displaced by the imposed system, people have been able to draw on the strength of their own systems. Ranger indicates that “the exploited groups ... *have* sometimes been able to tap the continued vitality of the mingled continuity and innovation which resides within indigenous cultures as they have continued to develop underneath the rigidities of codified colonial custom” (Ranger 1989:262).

Pile (1997:15) emphasises that, in resistance, there are “innumerable ways of playing and foiling the other’s game”. Through this process, “even the field of misfortune is refashioned by this combination of manipulation and enjoyment” (de Certeau in Pile 1997:15). According to de Certeau:

the central strategy of authority is to force people to play its game, to make sure that the game is played by its rules, then people find innumerable ways round this ... they continually seek to find their own places ... from this perspective, resistance is less about particular acts, than about the desire to find a place in a power-geography where space is denied, circumscribed and/or totally administered. The implication is that resistance comes from a place outside of the practices of domination (cited in Pile 1997:15).

While authority’s strategies “define a territory marked by an inside and outside,

resistances cross these spaces with other interests and desires that are neither determined nor captured by the systems in which they develop” (Pile 1997:15). Thus resistance’s tactics “have at least two ‘surfaces’: one facing towards the map of power, the other facing in another direction, towards intangible, invisible, unconscious desires, pleasures, enjoyments, fears, angers and hopes – the very stuff of politics” (Pile 1997:16). Through this analysis, the significance of resistance can be expanded. We realize that there is a “double sense of resistance: resistance to power, resistance for power” (Pile 1997:24).

Power is a dynamic process which is equally oppressive and enabling. An equation of power with control leads to a dichotomized, oversimplified and essentialized construction of the ‘powerful’ who stand in opposition to the ‘powerless’. Power, being dynamic and fluid, shifts at every moment through every relation while it is produced through every act and played out on many conscious and unconscious levels. Social agents derive power from their acts of resistance. Power is “steadfastly resisted while simultaneously feeding and enabling acts of defiance ... in seeking to challenge the legitimacy of their oppressors, [the defiant protestors] are themselves empowered in spirit, consciousness and ideology” (Parikh 1994:23).

Discussions of resistance have typically emphasised the public forms of rebellion and the revolutions which have been recorded by history. These large-scale, visible and publicly experienced forms of resistance represent those rare moments when power relationships are openly ruptured, overturned and radically altered. Throughout history, where there is oppression and injustice, it is more common for the ‘oppressed’ to lack the means to such obvious displays of power. In the absence of such enactments, however,

we would be mistaken in assuming that power is not constantly in a state of tension, being negotiated and renegotiated and that the so-called oppressed are not exerting their own forms of control and in different ways exerting their power. In areas where open insubordination will usually provoke a more “rapid and ferocious response” (Scott 1985:33), where protest leads to “censure, to imprisonment, to torture, and even to death, fear of retribution most often precludes overt struggle” (Parikh 1994:18). In studies of power and resistance then, it is revealing to examine what “the peasantry does ‘between revolts’ to defend its interests as best it can” (Scott 1985:29), and to ensure the “equally real imperative of daily survival” (Scott 1985:245). Scott’s focus on the more subtle and hidden forms of resistance is based on the premise that “the stubborn, persistent and irreducible forms of resistance ... may ... represent the truly durable weapons of the weak both before and after the revolution” (Scott 1990a:446).

An examination of other spheres of power takes us to the realm of daily life where ‘everyday forms of peasant resistance’ are played out on the ground. In the relatively constant struggle between the peasantry and those who seek to extract labour, food, taxes, rents, and interest from them, most of the forms this struggle takes stop well short of collective outright defiance. The struggle is often played out with the “ordinary weapons of relatively powerless groups [which include]: foot dragging, dissimulation, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage, and so forth” (Scott 1985:29). These forms of class action “require little or no coordination or planning; they often represent a form of individual self-help; and they typically avoid any direct symbolic confrontation with authority or with elite norms” (Scott 1985:29). The unarticulated

unorganised politics and forms of resistance are most difficult to detect or suppress. Such action is not simply defensive, for it is also the means through which actors experience personal growth and develop a sense of security. Melucci points out that “forward-looking and pro-active forms of resistance are at least as evident within these movements as backward-looking and reactive forms of action” (Melucci 1989:195).

A sceptical glance at stories documenting hidden and everyday forms of resistance might ask whether such subtle resistance is just a trivial coping mechanism that cannot materially affect the overall situation of domination. How can power be exhibited through the ‘weapons of the weak’? A deeper reading of these stories makes a convincing argument that resistance is inherently productive in nature. Pile demonstrates that even in mythology, evil is brought down by weapons of the weak: “what could be weaker than garlic, or a wooden stake or sunlight? – to strike death into [a] soulless heart” (1997:8). In Scott’s poetic words: “under the appropriate conditions, the accumulation of petty acts can, rather like snowflakes on a steep mountainside, set off an avalanche” (1990:192).

Scott refers to the low profile forms of resistance that are most often kept hidden from public view, as “infrapolitics”. The notion of infrapolitics conveys the impression of an unobtrusive realm of political struggle, “like infrared rays, beyond the visible end of the spectrum” (Scott 1990:183). It is a tactical choice born of an awareness of the existing balance of power. Scott contends that each realm of open resistance to domination is shadowed by an “infrapolitical twin sister who aims at the same strategic goals but whose low profile is better adapted to resisting an opponent who could probably win an open confrontation” (1990:184). He argues that “infrapolitics is, to be sure, real politics. In

many respects it is conducted in more earnest, for higher stakes, and against greater odds than political life in liberal democracies” (Scott 1990:200). Scott contends that infrapolitics is a condition of practical resistance rather than a substitute for it, thus may be thought of as one of the main foundational forms of politics. These political forms are viewed as “the building block[s] for the more elaborate institutionalized political action that could not exist without it. Under the conditions ... in which most historical subjects live, it is political life” (Scott 1990:201).

The strategic imperatives of infrapolitics impose a fundamentally different logic of political action; all actions are designed to be obscure or anonymous. The infrapolitical logic of disguise extends to its organizational forms as well as to its substance. In most respects the social coordination evident in its forms of organization is achieved by the informal networks of community that join members of the subordinate group. Such networks may work through kinship, labour exchange, neighbourhood, ritual practices, daily occupational links or other localized forms of association. “These networks are socially embedded within the subordinate community and are therefore often as opaque to the authorities as they are ‘indispensable to sustained collective action” (Scott 1990:151). Because open political activity is all but precluded, the form of organisation is as much a product of political necessity as of political choice. The informal assemblages of market, neighbours, family, and community have a possibly innocent meaning and are based on local cultures, thus provide both a structure and a cover for resistance. Since “resistance is conducted in small groups, individually, and, if on a larger scale, makes use of the anonymity of folk culture or actual disguises, it is well adapted to thwart surveillance”

(Scott 1990:200).

The significance of informal action, the hidden transcript that social actors produce and the social sites where they are located, “is best attested to ... by the unremitting efforts of elites to abolish, ... penetrate [or control] such sites and the corresponding efforts by subordinate groups to defend them” (Scott 1990:108). Scott has pointed out that there is “power in numbers” (1990:65-66), and from Foucault (1979), another side of the same argument is that “solitude is the primary condition of total submission” (in Scott 1990:83). Large, autonomous gatherings of subordinates provide the opportunity to share experiences which may be “the basis for a collective grievance, collective fantasy and even collective acts” (Scott 1985:44) through which a sense of solidarity may be built. Such gatherings and the activities that are possible in their midst, are thus threatening to domination.

A tactical reading of the hidden resistances of social action realises that the choice of fleeting, direct action by crowds is hardly a sign of some political handicap or incapacity for ‘more advanced’ forms of political action. More permanent, formally organised and farsighted movements with a strong leadership do not have the same types of impacts as informal action. “Spontaneity, anonymity, and a lack of formal organization then became enabling modes of protest rather than a reflection of the slender political talents of popular classes” (Scott 1990:151).

Infrapolitics, and its everyday forms of resistance, allow for a quiet evasion which accomplishes its objectives silently and successfully. An example of the quiet and ‘piecemeal’ process by which peasant squatters have often encroached on plantation and

state lands indicates the de facto gains made precisely by not engaging in open confrontation. “In terms of actual occupation and use, the encroachments by squatting may accomplish more than an openly defiant land invasion, though the de jure distribution of property rights is never publicly challenged” (Scott 1985:32).

There are numerous examples in the literature of policies and programmes which have been implemented by external agents, governments or anyone at all, which have mysteriously failed despite indicators that they should succeed. Scott points out that “even a casual reading of the literature on rural ‘development’ yields a rich harvest of unpopular government schemes and programs nibbled to extinction by passive resistance of the peasantry” (Scott 1985:31). Janet Bujra provides such an example of women’s resistance from Tanzania: In the years of Ujamaa, the Government of Tanzania implemented a ‘villagisation’ programme to encourage and support rural development. This was to be the most fundamental development policy to be enacted since Independence. From the perspective of Tanzanian women, this ‘development’ policy was a failure. It did nothing for women except to bring them together in new forms of oppression, which then gave rise to new forms of both individual and collect resistance. At least partially as a result of their refusal to cooperate, this policy failed from the state perspective as well. “This policy may also be said to have failed effectively to harness the energy of the majority of the rural population – women” (Bujra 1990:58), and as a result, it could not succeed. This example provides evidence of the small changes achieved almost imperceptibly by everyday and subtle forms of resistance. Pile makes a plea for us not to ignore “the micro strategies and tactics through which change is achieved, not as an

implausible celebration of the everyday but through the mutations of difference which in the movement of a butterfly's wing precipitate something else" (1997:283).

Definitions of resistance have become bound up with the ways that people are understood to have the capacity to change things, through finding their own tactics for avoiding, taunting, attacking, undermining, enduring, hindering, mocking the everyday exercise of power (Pile 1997). Routledge (1997) uses the term resistance to refer to intentional acts which are fashioned out of the materials and practices of everyday life and that attempt to challenge, change, or retain particular circumstances relating to societal relations, processes, and/or institutions. "These circumstances may involve domination, exploitation, subjection at the material, symbolic or psychological level" (Routledge 1997:69). They imply some form of contestation, some juxtaposition of forces which may involve all or any of the following:

symbolic meanings, communicative processes, political discourses, religious idioms, cultural practices, social networks, physical settings, bodily practices, and envisioned desires and hopes. These actions may be open and confrontational, or hidden and range from the individual to the collective. Their different forms of expression can be of short or long duration; metamorphic, interconnected, or hybrid; creative or self-destructive; challenging the status quo ... or conservative (Routledge 1997:69).

Routledge speaks of resistances as processes which take diverse forms, move in different dimensions, create unexpected networks, connections and possibilities. Through these processes, they may "invent new trajectories and forms of existence, articulate alternative futures and possibilities, create autonomous zones as a strategy against particular dominating power relations" (Routledge 1997:69). The logic of symbolic defiance is part of the logic of everyday forms of resistance.

Reflection on daily life and the resistances which are played out on the ground, has to be located at the “intersection of the micro-processes of meaning production, and the macro-processes of domination” (Escobar 1995:217). In looking at formal displays of power, we have already witnessed the dominant elite extracting material taxes. In addition however, power collects “symbolic taxes in the form of deference, demeanor, posture, verbal formulas, and acts of humility. In actual practice, of course, [both material and symbolic struggles] ... are joined inasmuch as every public act of appropriation is, figuratively, a ritual of subordination” (Scott 1990:188). As it is impossible to separate the ideas and symbolism of subordination from the process of material exploitation, it is also impossible to separate veiled symbolic resistance from materially practical struggles. Each of their stratagems is designed to minimize appropriation. “Resistance, like domination, fights a war on two fronts” (Scott 1990:188). Even seemingly small acts can signal a public breaking of the ritual of subordination. “So long as the elite treat such assaults on their dignity as tantamount to open rebellion, symbolic defiance and rebellion do amount to the same thing” (Scott 1990:196).

In relations of domination where there is a systematic frustration of reciprocal action, subordinates are forced to control their natural impulse to rage. They are able however, “to act out in fantasy and in secretive practice the aggression which cannot be outwardly expressed” (Scott 1990:37). Through the consciousness of actors, meanings are given to their acts and “the symbols, the norms, and the ideological forms” that comprise daily consciousness and everyday actions constitute the “indispensable background to their behaviour” (Scott 1985:38). Social acts are conditioned by the

intentions, values and purposefulness of actors which locates another space for resistance, in the everyday consciousness of the marginalised. Resistance then challenges ascribed meanings and asserts new truths, seeks to minimize the oppressive effect of the dominant ideology and affirms actors' own social reality. We will turn now to an analysis of the conflicts of meaning and value in which patterns of resistance arise and to which they contribute.

According to Scott (1985), "any act by a member of a subordinate group which either mitigates or denies claims made by the dominant class or group, or pushes an alternative vision of what the world should be like, constitutes resistance" (in Parikh 1994:56). Indigenous counter-hegemonic projects are critical of the prevailing patterns of thoughts and behaviour and attempt to assert alternative ideological discourses by "reformulating 'old' ideas" into new projects. Resistant subjects have "appropriated the language and concepts of the western liberal discourse and turned them into political tools by infusing them with new meanings" (Maignascha no date:62).

Comaroff's (1985) ethnographic example of the pre-colonial Tshidi cultural order demonstrates that everyday practice is the silent bearer of a symbolic scheme and that symbolic mediation is a form of resistance: Tshidi Zionism is a combination of orthodox Christianity which was imposed on the Tshidi people, and beliefs from 'traditional' Tshidi thought. Tshidi Zionism stands in contrast to colonial orthodoxy by creatively violating its symbolic order through utilizing values taken from Christianity to negate its own rationale. The Zionist teachings go beyond ritual to penetrate daily life experiences. Christianity unwittingly contributes a cluster of signs to the symbolic interplay which gives rise to a

coherent cultural identity. The logic that lies behind such responses by the oppressed resides in their attempt to impose some form of control over their world, giving them a degree of power. Resistance lies in the struggle to counteract the invasion of the formal system. Thus, in the domains of daily practice that escape direct control, a protest is mounted which defies the penetration of the hegemonic system into the natural world. Zionism as a form of resistance is largely unselfconscious and implicit; it allows for the mediation of contradictions. While social transformation must transcend the level of ideas to engage also in practice, “decolonization involves thinking oneself out of the spaces of domination” (Alexander and Mohanty 1997: xxviii). Thus, “the political struggle to impose a definition on an action and to make it stick is frequently at least as important as the action per se” (Scott 1990:206).

It has been asserted that power always lives in a state of tension. The ‘micro’ pushing and shoving involved in power relations is an indicator that domination is always being put to the test. Those with power in the public sphere are ceaselessly working to maintain power over their subordinates while the subordinate social actors are constantly finding new ways to thwart and reverse that power. If dominant power’s strength and limits are spread though the public domain, travelling loudly and proudly on the main streets of town, while subordinate’s alternative ways of exercising power are more private and silent, then the formal displays of power are more visible, thus more easily resisted than the oppressed’s subtle power which runs a stealthy course through unlit alleys. There are multiple and varied paths which cross through power’s domains and there is always an alternative route.

Actors come to understand the rules in any social relation, and by following them, by playing the game, they do not alert others to the fact that they may indeed be attempting to foil the game. They are thus in a better position to accomplish their objectives undisturbed. The appearance of conformity hides the active manipulation of rituals of subordination through which subordinates are able “to turn them to good personal advantage; it is an art form in which one can take some pride at having successfully misrepresented oneself” (Scott 1990:33). In addition, sometimes pretending to play the game makes a larger mockery of it than refusing to play at all. Social actors who are coerced into playing another’s game logically appropriate the performance for his or her own ends. Scott (1990) points out that the ‘myth of the peasant’, which is a portrayal of the non-elite as naive, backward, and easily misled, may work to the advantage of subordinates. Feigned ignorance is an everyday form of resistance which allows subordinates to escape the watchful eye of oppressors. History is full of ‘Brer Rabbit’ stories of slaves and ‘trickster tales’ that celebrate the cunning wiles and vengeful spirit of the weak as they triumph over the strong (Scott 1990). These tricks are effective in that ruling elites are often taken unaware by social eruptions after having been “lulled into a false sense of security by the normal posing of the powerless” (Scott 1990:224).

Scott (1990) refers to the “voice under domination” as a “veiled discourse of dignity and self-assertion within the public transcript” (1990:137) which is conducted while remaining in control of one’s anger and other emotions. The self-control and discretion required of the powerless stands in sharp contrast to the less inhibited directness of the powerful. The subordinate also require “an experimental spirit and a capacity to

test and exploit all the loopholes, ambiguities, silences, and lapses available to them” (Scott 1990:138), in order to find ways of getting their message across, while creating the appearance that they are continuing to play the game. The multiple modes of concealment are limited only by their own imaginative capacities and “the creation of disguises depends on an agile, firm grasp of the codes of meaning being manipulated. It is impossible to overestimate the subtlety of this manipulation” (Scott 1990:139) or the creativity involved in continuously discovering “new and more artful ways of looking at the world and themselves” (Rahnema 1992:170). Stories of resistance both reveal and celebrate the innovative and persistent spirit of the oppressed not only to prevent the worst from happening but also to promise something better (Scott 1985:349).

One of the seemingly insignificant or contradictory points from which the oppressed draw strength is that they have a unique collection of experiences that people who are not oppressed in the same way usually lack. These experiences equip subordinates with knowledge, and thus power, to which the dominant do not have much if any access. Without the information needed in order to understand the situation, the oppressors do not see their counterparts accurately (Alexander and Mohanty 1997); they have to work furiously to figure out who they are oppressing and what they need to suppress, while the weapons of the so-called weak remain largely hidden from their view (Pile 1997). To protect their own position, the oppressors must convey the impression that they are all-powerful, that there is no space to question authority. Thus in the various plays of power relations, it is evident that subordination and domination both require a performance. As Pile has articulated, “the map of resistance is not simply the underside of

the map of domination – if only because each is a lie to the other, and each gives the lie to the other” (1997:23).

Panjabi (1997) provides an example of the tense relationship between women prisoners and prison guards who had no real understanding of the women’s knowledge. The women had developed modes of personal interaction which drew upon the nurturing, sharing, and caring of the private sphere to forge a ‘horizontal comradeship’ and to develop strategies of collective resistance in the public sphere. The technical rules evoked by the guards failed to provide them with the means of dealing with the women’s tactics of resistance. The strategies which they could devise based upon their own rational choice were also unavailable to them because they were based on analytic or theoretical knowledge of women which, in itself, has consistently throughout history, suppressed women’s interests, desires, and values. In the absence of knowledge and understanding, the guards were at a loss for strategies to maintain the efficiency of the system. The women created a situation in which the oppressors were at least temporarily at a loss, by engaging in “communicative interactions” which were governed by “consensual norms and [were], at the same time, rational, as they [were] in the interest of their collective survival” (Panjabi 1997:168). They were able to forge meaningful social relations between themselves and in the process, they counteracted the naturalized patriarchal ones imposed upon them by the state. The women drew upon their own values to find strength and the value of intersubjectivity was restored to centre stage. From a feminist standpoint, the communicative interaction of women “challenged the ‘purposive rational action’ of a state apparatus that represses the very notion of ethics and egalitarianism as central categories

of life” (Panjabi 1997:169).

It is through these politics of everyday places that political identities constantly flow and fix as “identity is not simply a matter of choice or free will, but is rather a negotiation between what one has to work with, and where one takes it from there” (Moore 1997:103). Struggles to reassert meaning and the validity of one's values, draw our attention to the myriad spaces for resistance. “These struggles do not have to be glamorous and heroic, about fighting back and opposition, but may subsist in enduring, and refusing to be wiped off the map of history” (Pile and Keith 1997:xi).

Swantz introduces a point which contains a variety of implications for the analyses of power, resistance and development. She points out that people’s “inventiveness also increases with ... need”. This attests to the adaptability of actors, while it also suggests that “people can become dependent on outside support to the point that they lose their own initiative which is at present so very visible” (Swantz 1988:95). Mbilinyi provides an example from Tanzania where men were often privileged by the neo-colonial system. She holds that “this is why the consciousness of peasant men was often less developed than that of women, who adopted the most militant ‘unruly’ forms of anti-colonial protest and resistances” (Mbilinyi 1992:61). This leads to the conclusion that “the experience of repression can be, but is not necessarily, a catalyst for organizing” (Alexander and Mohanty 1997:xl). Individual actors maintain their pride, dignity and human spirit through a variety of innovative and resistant strategies for survival. The realization that their struggles are not necessarily solitary, can lead to a strengthened “sense of solidarity and [lead] to a flurry of activity” (Scott 1990:140).

While not denying the bases of inequality and the differential relations of power, Law (1997) introduces a different conception of both politics and power which sees even relationships of oppression as negotiated spaces of identity. She observes that in the realms of meaning and power, resistances play a role in defining the contested terrain of politics. It has already been noted that many different forms of power operate and are struggled over simultaneously in any interaction and the oppressed can sometimes use their 'disadvantaged' position to their advantage. Through an examination of the multiple realities of lived experience and by uncovering and understanding the voices and knowledges of social actors, their 'vulnerability' becomes neither so clear nor so pervasive.

Law's (1997) study of Filipina prostitutes in the Philippines, argues that the representation of the women as 'victims' emphasizes the determined character of prostitution and ironically tends to alienate its subject (1997:109). It denies agency, distorts the complexity of experience, and naturalises the feeling that the women are locked into fixed identities and subject positions. In so doing, it offers little room for the women to manoeuvre, to negotiate their identity or to participate in the construction and renegotiation of the complex power relations of which they are a part (Law 1997:107). "Elaborating a negotiated space in order to find contemporary sites of collaboration and contestation, and new perspectives on identity, power and resistance provides a means to imagine more ambivalent deployments of power" (Law 1997:109). Law interprets one of the women's assertions that she had "no choice" but to work as a prostitute as the woman's own appropriation of the structural determinants of her position, for her own

ends. By offering 'no choice' as her reasoning, the woman was not required to defend or explain herself any further. Law demonstrates that "the naturalness of the choice issue is appropriated by women themselves where having 'no choice' simultaneously becomes a source of agency, a resistance to moral judgements and justification for their employment" (Law 1997:114).

That people can create their own ways of living – their own meanings and capacities – through giving their own alternative and resistant meanings to things, "has forced a recognition that resistance can be found in everything" (Pile 1997:14).

Resistance has normally been conceived of as being located precisely in opposition to 'power'. Pile points out however, that resistant political subjectivities are constituted through positions taken up not only in relation to authority but also through "experiences which are not so quickly labelled 'power', such as desire and anger, capacity and ability, happiness and fear, dreaming and forgetting" (Pile 1997:3). Assumptions about the domination/resistance couplet become questionable when we begin to realize that

people are positioned differently in unequal and multiple power relationships ... more and less powerful people are active in the constitution of unfolding relationships of authority, meaning and identity ... these activities are contingent, ambiguous and awkwardly situated, but ... resistance seeks to occupy, deploy and create alternative spatialities from those defined through oppression and exploitation (Pile 1997:3).

From this perspective we realize that it is "no longer enough to begin stories of resistance with stories of so-called power ..[and that].. resistance becomes a mode through which the symptoms of different power relations are diagnosed and ways are sought to get round them, or live through them, or to change them" (Pile 1997:3). Indeed, resistance

does often take place as “a reaction against unfairness and injustice, as a desire to survive intolerable conditions, but it may also involve a sense of remembering and of dreaming of something better” (Pile 1997:30). Resistance should be analysed on its own terms. Law (1997) contends that Foucault’s premise that “where there is power, there is resistance” is no longer sufficient. She suggests that “one way forward is Abu-Lughod’s reformulation ‘where there is resistance, there is power’, and resistance is understood as a ‘diagnostic’ of changing relations of power” (Law 1997:112).

Pile suggests that “the sense that resistance might happen under authority’s nose or outside tightly controlled places implies that resistance might have its own distinct spatialities” (1997:2). The “geographies of resistance” contend that “place” has a politics and “is produced through myriad material and symbolic struggles. Places and people’s relationships to them, have histories woven into their very fabric” (Moore 1997:103). Resistances and geography are intertwined in that geography provides the spaces for resistance, while resistance also makes “other spaces – other geographies – possible or impossible” (Pile 1997:2). Different forms of control, power and resistance, work through and are spread unevenly throughout distinct geographies.

With the growing realisation that the social construction of dualisms can often detract from our knowledge, Pile (1997) outlines the notion of a “third space” where oppression and resistance are simultaneously located, in order to problematise binary oppositions. A perspective which takes into account a ‘third space’ acknowledges that dualisms are more fluid than their architecture would suggest. The “third space” serves to mediate between oppression and resistance by looking beyond the “grounds of

dissimilarity on which dualisms are based”; by acknowledging that “there are spaces beyond dualisms”; and by accepting that this third space itself “is continually fragmented, fractured, incomplete, uncertain, and the site of struggles for meaning and representation” (Law 1997:109). The third space is “situated betwixt and between the structural certainties of any fixed binary” (Moore 1997:102). In the border zones between margins it is a space that refuses to settle down, it is a sort of moving target and it is a place for similarities to have precedence.

Scott (1985, 1990) is critiqued for defining separate spaces for power and for resistance. Moore (1997) points out that Scott’s notion of the “intentional consciousness of a sovereign self is represented as a privileged locus of resistance, a site not colonized by power”. He contends that this understanding of “‘authentic’ insurgency and insubordination runs counter to Foucault’s insistence that ‘resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power’” (1997:91-92). This understanding also reflects the dualistic thinking that is overcome through a reformulated and expanded definition of resistance as that found in analyses of a politics of ‘third space’. Haynes and Prakesh underscore that “neither domination or resistance is autonomous” (in Moore 1997:92) and our focus should be placed on the articulation of these concepts rather than their autonomy. “Instead of conceiving of a space of subalternity, insurgency, and resistance outside of power, domination, or hegemony, the challenge becomes to understand their mutual imbrication” (Moore 1997:92). The contention is that there is no authentic popular culture which lies outside the field of cultural power and domination. Instead, popular culture is shot through with the histories of interaction with ‘external’ agents.

Another counterclaim focuses on Scott's emphasis on the intentional acts of resistance demonstrated by social actors. Moore (1997) contends that "consciousness" need not be absolutely essential to the constitution of resistance. Law (1997) reminds us not to run into "the problem of attributing people with consciousness which is not a part of their experience" (1997:112). There are countless conscious as well as unconscious acts of resistance, control and power that are enacted by individuals on a daily basis. Even when social actors know not what they do, they do successfully influence and impact the world around them. Thrift's non-representational theory, or theory of practices, provides a non-intentionalist account of the world. He contends that many things are in fact made sense of on the spot, rather than planned ahead and he attempts to articulate "how, moment by moment, we in fact conduct our practical everyday affairs – something we usually leave unacknowledged in the background to our lives" (Shotter, quoted in Thrift 1997:127). This is not a denial of resistance but yet a further claim to continue to expand the ways in which we define and confine resistance.

The concept of a 'third space' can be further demonstrated as it provides assistance in problematising the notion of civil society. Tripp (1994) has found that civil society has most commonly been defined not on its own terms but rather, in relation to the state. She argues that this overlooks the complexities of life "that do not fall easily into the state-society dualism that civil society implies" (Tripp 1994:24). She questions the accuracy of applying a notion such as civil society to the African context where the state was a colonial implant. In a context where state-society relations are often characterized by patronage networks, where personalistic rule and partimomial policies commonly cater to

particularistic interests, she calls attention to the difficulties in claiming that the state is distinct from civil society (Tripp 1994:24). Keith (1997) suggests that instead of holding one concept in opposition to the other, we might look more carefully at the histories and geographies through which popular forms and the state create, define and contest the borders between themselves. "The territories of the one and the cartographies of the other define a landscape of the political through which the social is rendered visible" (Keith 1997:282). Keith makes a plea for analyses which "bridge and transform the division between state and civil society; 'pluralizing' the former and 'publicising' the latter"(1997:283).

Escobar also urges an expansion of the political domain to encompass everyday practices (1995:219), however he places his faith in social movements as the best hope for "a more radical imagining of alternative futures" (1992,1995). Escobar believes that

daily life and social movements are privileged spaces in which to study ... processes of mediation, since social movements are situated, at least in theory, in the intermediate space between individualized, familiar, habitual, micro-climactic daily life, and socio-political processes ... of the State and the institutions, solemn and superior (Jelin in Escobar 1992:70).

Escobar contends that social movements are "somewhat exterior to the state" and although also inseparable from the state in many ways, their "logic cannot be reduced to the logic of the state" (1992:83). The nature and impact of social movements is not restricted to their most visible manifestations, in fact they often spread themselves thinly throughout a vast social domain. Their discourses are polyvalent, local, dispersed and fragmented. The analysis of 'new social movements' that has emerged from Latin America strives for an analysis based

not on structures but on social actors; the promotion of democratic, egalitarian and participatory styles of politics; and the search not for grand structural transformation but rather for the construction of identities and greater autonomy through modifications in everyday practices and beliefs (Watts 1996:59).

Escobar places in the foreground the cultural aspects of social movements which provide a conceptual tool for exploring the more “profound effects of social movements namely, those that operate at the level of life’s basic norms” (Escobar 1995:226). He contends that social movements are nourishing a crop of meanings that “could foster a renewal not only of the awareness of suffering but also of the awareness of forms of freedom and of life as a collective process” (Escobar 1992:83).

Escobar (1995) discusses social movements as self-producing and self-organizing entities. “Through their own action they establish a distinct presence in their social and cultural environment”. In producing themselves they affect the larger social order through their own organizing process. They interact with their environments to produce “the creation of life worlds and social orders”. Thus, movements are “not merely ... a reflection of the current crisis or any other principle, but ... have to be understood in terms of their own rationality and the organization they themselves produce” (Escobar 1995:224).

As with collective forms of everyday resistance, social movements normally consist of “invisible networks of small groups submerged in everyday life” (Melucci 1989:6). Pile points out that “there are tiny micro-movements of resistance, barely perceptible, even invisible or covert – quiet stealthy masquerades resistant to categorisation and definition” (Pile 1997:19). He also returns to the original sense of the word and reminds us that

‘movement’ implies a change in location. If, as we have indicated through the notion of ‘geographies of resistance’, locations of are multiple and defined through struggle as much as they are the grounds on which struggle takes place, then movement “will not be so much a question of origins and destinations as the paths which are adopted in the course of any struggle, without insisting on an origin and a final destination” (1997:29). He then follows with the argument that there is unlikely to be “one movement in any social movement”, or any single reason why people mobilise or become mobilised, “no single aim, no single demand, no one path of struggle – and, far from disabling resistance, this enables it to move strategically, tactically, resourcefully from place to place” (Pile 1997:29).

The types of movements that we have been discussing have been initiated by social actors, to achieve their own objectives. It follows that, having sprung from the grassroots rather than through some kind of intervention, the movements and their actions will be founded on culturally appropriate values and practices. Self-propelled struggles such as social action, movements, networks and other local initiatives may have a surprisingly great degree of force behind them, having been undertaken and committed to by the actors who are directly responsible for ensuring their success. The choices have been made and the methods have been selected by the people who will participate in the actions. The ideas behind the initiatives therefore have been created by their own design, and are thus based upon their own rationale. Bringing the discussion back to ‘development’ once again, this raises the issues of ownership and indigenous knowledge which are inherent to grassroots development. These factors have not been adequately considered in traditional

Western notions of development where even well-meaning outside interventions have unsurprisingly been met with resistance or a lack of interest.

The typical Western rationale of development has often followed a 'macro blueprint', a predefined idea of what should be done and how. In this approach, "the deciding factor is the dead data of an alien, often ideologically biased, knowledge system" (Rahnema 1992:171). It should not thus be surprising that development initiatives based on this external model, should be rejected on the ground. According to Rahnema, what matters for communities at the grassroots level, by contrast, is "what *is*, and life, as it designs its own course. What finally decides is the living 'nose' of the people directly concerned for what is appropriate and sensible to do" (1992:171). Nicholas Maxwell distinguishes between the different forms of rational thought:

Whereas for the philosophy of knowledge, the fundamental kind of rational learning is acquiring knowledge, for the philosophy of wisdom the fundamental kind of rational learning is learning how to live, how to see, to experience, to participate in and to create what is of value in existence (in Edwards 1989:119).

As such, people take pride in their skills which may have been self-taught or passed down from a previous generation. "The craftsmen and women who are 'self-taught' are proud of their skills and feel superior to college graduates whose skills are limited to theory and lack the flexibility to apply their skill in the real life difficulties" (Swantz 1988:96). Information is not always applicable, nor is it revered as wisdom.

Indigenous forms of knowledge have often been studied and then portrayed through partial and objectified representations. Rocheleau criticizes social scientists and ecologists alike for having often recast indigenous knowledge as an "ethnographic

artifact”, as “unconscious ecological wisdom”, or as part of the “environment” for the generation and introduction of new technology (Rocheleau 1991:157). In reality however, indigenous knowledge extends well beyond the confines of botany and agriculture, and well into the domains of “environmental history and practical political economy” (Rocheleau 1991:162). Rocheleau focuses on the often neglected dimensions of indigenous knowledge: the learning, storage, and transmission of knowledge about social, political, economic, and environmental change in the form of oral history, particularly in the naming of events. Her experience of learning about the most recent famine in Kathama counters the extent of westernization and its hegemonic impact. Despite knowledge of the cash economy and the desire to have money, people do carry an underlying wisdom about what really matters in their situation. In the case of Kathama, people “reckon time in famines, and remember them by name”. The name of the last famine captures the painful irony of the changing times and indicates that many people had acquired a healthy skepticism about over-reliance on cash income to offset the effects of famine. They had named it “I shall die with money in my hand”. Rocheleau contends that the codification of knowledge in the form of famine names records “the central surprise of the last famine, makes sense of the experience, pre-empt the surprise of similar incidents in subsequent years and informs practical popular planning measures to prevent future famines altogether” (1991:162).

Rocheleau points to the evidence that indigenous knowledge and strategies form part of a science of survival. She points out that Vandana Shiva posits survival as the ultimate criterion for verification of poor women’s knowledge. Others have also portrayed rural people’s combined social, economic, and ecological strategies as a science

of survival, “whether in the ebb and flow of seasonal adversity and opportunity, or in the periodic crises (social, economic, political, ecological) that effect their lives and livelihoods” (Rocheleau 1991:157). Social and political strategies also form part of the science of survival, as they cannot be separated from the practices of everyday life.

Rochleau’s examination of the ways in which actors were able to ensure their survival through the famine indicates that small-holders and the legally landless have every reason to focus on social strategies to secure and maintain access to shared lands and resources. Their current and future access to these shared resources depend upon the careful cultivation of social and political networks. Rural life of the materially poor in Kathama requires “the careful interweaving of social and ecological knowledge to survive in the cross-currents of erratic environmental conditions with uncertain terms of resource use, access, and control” (Rocheleau 1991:162).

Social insurance can take many forms and does provide a certain amount of subsistence security. Social arrangements such as reciprocity, work sharing, and communal land rights, “provide a minimal subsistence insurance” (Scott 1976:5), but they should not be overly romanticised or overemphasized. Even as social safety nets are being widely cast, peasants often take their own risks and make investments of a private nature. We should keep in mind the facts that forms of social insurance found in villages are often unstable, patron-client relationships are not necessarily beneficial because of the inherent power relations involved, and individualized, market involvement is not always harmful to peasants (Galli 1992). Social formations must be understood as shaped by dynamic processes which involve both local and global forces, collective and individual interests,

material and symbolic forms. “Notions of community and their geographies cannot be assumed, nor can their operativeness in resistance” (Pile 1997:4). Within communities, social actors often switch alliances due to the sometimes “messy reality of multiple identities [that] will continue to be the experience out of which social relations are conducted” (Scott 1985:43).

Having touched upon the notion of multiple identities and the ensuing dynamics within ‘community’ and having cautioned against a deterministic account of the ways in which people help one another, I would like now to return to local coping strategies which have been found within communities and to place an emphasis on their potential for success.

There are a multitude of stories in the literature on grassroots development which demonstrate that the objectives of local coping strategies are to meet subsistence needs and to prevent a drastic fall in living standards of the local population. “The strategies are implemented locally by means of small-scale activities which are geared to the capabilities of the individuals, groups and villages concerned” (Ndaro 1992:173). These strategies have mainly been discussed as they relate to the subsistence needs of the population; however, in the more recent past, this concern has broadened to include a multitude of self-help activities that have taken various forms. Wilson and Ramphela (1989) call for an emphasis on the role of human agency and the broadening of the struggle for survival to include forms of resistance. Many accounts of local strategies have demonstrated an admiration for the extraordinary capacity of poor people to cope with the most difficult circumstances, while at the same time, these accounts have represented the primary

occupation of the poor as daily survival. Wilson and Ramphele contend that the poor seldom see themselves as makers of history (1989:267) and that accounts of them and their lives should stress their capacity to be active agents of history. Taylor articulates the reasoning behind this appeal – “what is not regarded as possible thereby becomes impossible, at least through human agency. So it seems that people need to become aware of their situation and their ability to change it” (Taylor 1992:34). More transformative objectives than daily survival, such as liberation for example, can be achieved through a “process of empowering individuals to extend their horizons and perceive themselves as active agents in history” (Ramphele 1991:174). Daily survival on a material level cannot in fact be separated from strategies for transformation and empowerment. Both the condition and the position of social actors are integral to their situation and their struggle.

Gooneratne and Mbilinyi emphasize the contribution that local initiatives have made not only to local economic survival, but also in the areas of development and transformation. They are oriented towards survival on many levels and demonstrate the resilience and resourcefulness of local populations. “Local initiatives may contribute towards ensuring the long-term stability and development of local economies and/or their dynamic transformation” (Gooneratne and Mbilinyi 1992:260).

Mackenzie (1992) also argues that the case for local empowerment through local organization may be strong, even if the organization originates in response to crisis.

‘the spontaneous mobilisation of a powerless group to defend itself against destruction’, may yet contain ... the ‘latent seeds of organisation for multiple new developmental actions’. In this sense, the line drawn between that which may initially appear as a coping mechanism or action to meet a practical need and that which is of strategic significance may be blurred. And in the transfer of

consciousness from one to the other, the transition to the 'macro arena' ... will indeed challenge the interests of those in power both within the local community and at wider levels of social organization (Mackenzie 1992:31).

Mackenzie points out that "by nature" empowerment concerns political action.

"The realization of strategic needs which go beyond those of 'coping mechanisms' or 'practical needs', reorders social relations. And these may be perceived as a threat, not only to local interests but also to state power" (Mackenzie 1992:29). Localized strategies for survival and empowerment as seen through local initiatives and indigenous forms of organization, are located in the same spaces as everyday forms of resistance and accomplish many of the same goals.

It has been established that local initiatives are initiated by social actors and are based on their own rationale and world view. The current analysis emphasises alternatives to the most common notion of development as being equated with modernisation and westernization, by directing our attention to indigenous knowledge and local strategies. These local strategies can and do ensure local living standards at the same time as they bring about larger societal transformations. Everyday forms of resistance are local strategies or tactics which by their very nature originate from the grassroots and contribute to empowerment. Empowerment is arguably, the most fundamental aspect or condition of development.

The Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP 1993) has recommended a methodology for women's empowerment in Tanzania. They called for "strategies for *transformative action*, which do more than *improve* women's conditions and those of other disempowered people – they and we *liberate ourselves, through our own actions, on*

our own behalf – empowerment’ (TGNP 1993:17). As a fundamental aspect of empowerment, people act on their own behalf to create their own development. There is an awareness that the elevation of the human spirit cannot be brought about by anyone else. Black Consciousness exponents contend that development work is about the empowerment of people and they have identified community development as an important strategy for liberation. They have “defined development as a process of empowerment which enables participants to assume greater control over their lives as individuals and as members of society” (Manzo 1995:248).

Chuck Kleymeyer defines “grassroots development” as the “process by which disadvantaged people organize themselves to overcome the obstacles to their social, cultural and economic well-being” (1991:38). Through the commitment, cooperation and self-reliance of their active participants, grassroots organizations have a great degree of potential for meeting their objectives. The Tanzania Gender Networking Programme agrees that empowerment involves individual and collective action to change the power relations in each sector while they also stress the concept of conscientisation which links consciousness to action, individuality and collectivity (1994:29). “The concept of empowerment connotes a process of increasing power, by challenging structures of society which disempower, and removing the barriers to transformation” (TGNP 1993:29).

The following discussion of association, survival and resistance in Tanzania will demonstrate that every day, people are joining together and perhaps informally, without even calling themselves a group or an organization, they are working together to improve their lives and to transform the structures that oppress them. Even the smallest, seemingly

insignificant local initiative, which involves the people in controlling their own development may increase the solidarity and self-confidence of the mass of people, and contribute to the emergence of those pressures which will achieve development from below.

Ali Marie Tripp (1994) indicates that Tanzanian women have a rich history of associations that were, for the most part, unrecorded and unrecognised because they were small, informal and loosely organized. These associations are often interwoven with cultural forms. She explains that women historically came together to organize feasts, funerals, weddings and provide collective assistance during childbirth and illness. They formed savings clubs, beer clubs, loose associations of instructresses of young girls for puberty rights, ritual cult groups, informal social and religious groups, mutual support groups for cultivation and harvesting, and age and neighbourhood groups. Women's economic associations in Tanzania were characterized by "co-operation with a vast array of individuals who ranged from relatives and friends to neighbours and people from wider communities" (Tripp 1994:147).

Alice Nkhoma-Wamunza's (1992) case study provides an example of the numerous grassroots women's groups in Tanzania. She describes women as engaging in support networks to share daily tasks. In so doing, they create and become part of a support system which eases their workload (1992:203). On the other hand, women have also have formed informal associations an organizations in order to undertake economic ventures with the hopes of becoming more self-reliant. "By taking on income-generating activities, women are increasing their workload and stress but they are also becoming

innovative and are developing informal support systems as they struggle for the betterment of their families' livelihoods" (Nkhoma-Wamunza 1992:200).

Tripp's case study is a description of women's strategies for overcoming an economic crisis. In urban areas, as it had become increasingly difficult to support a household through wage earnings, the responsibility fell largely on women to sustain the household through informal-sector activities. There was a vast expansion in self-employment activities in the informal sector (Evans 1989) as enterprising women initiated small-business projects as part of their struggle to survive. "For low income women these projects ranged from making and selling pastries, beer, paper bags, and crafts, to tailoring, hair braiding and even urban farming" (Tripp 1994:143). The expansion of the informal sector was met with government policies which attempted to curtail such off-the-books activities. These policies which attempted to encroach on people's ability to pursue income-generating activities outside their formal jobs was in fact met with "fierce resistance, in the form of quiet day-to-day non-compliance ... Such resistance ultimately contributed to the greater legitimization and legislation of informal-sector activity and attempted to create a better environment for the pursuit of such small-scale private enterprises" (Tripp 1994:145). Omari reminds us that although the distinction between formal and informal activities may be a useful conceptual tool, it does not provide an entirely accurate depiction of life in Africa where actors have multiple roles and numerous ways of securing a living. "The activities carried out ... could not be termed 'formal' or 'informal' in the sense of the concept as we know it today. After all, such dichotomy of economies was very much unknown in the traditional African societies and rural areas in

general” (Omari 1995:26).

Tripp’s case study demonstrates that during the economic crisis, it was equally as difficult to sustain a household in rural areas. In addition to subsistence farming which sometimes yielded a surplus which could then be sold, women engaged in casual and seasonal labour and in non-farm petty commodity production and trade. They participated in many off the books activities while also ensuring that the needs of the household were fulfilled.

The survival strategies and other initiatives that were undertaken by both urban and rural women, were often accomplished in cooperation and collaboration with other women. Marjorie Mbilinyi’s (1992) case study of women in Tanzania revealed that women’s groups have increased in number and in visibility in Tanzania, and that they far outnumber other organized local initiatives in the country. Her research indicated that women have successfully organized themselves to fight discrimination and to advance their interests as women in the public arena, while engaging in “myriad silent resistances at home and in the local community” (1992:52). In the process, they ensured the survival of their households and communities during the economic crisis and introduced fundamental economic changes at the household, local and national levels (1992:52).

Margarethe Holm Anderson argued that despite their structural subordination, Tanzanian women have always had their own ways of exercising power. She emphasized the need to regard women more clearly as social and political actors; this can be facilitated by broadening the concept of power to include what she calls “informal” ways of exercising power. Anderson contends that “women’s ways of exercising power are very

often informal, hidden and deemed illegitimate” (Anderson 1991:269). As in Scott’s conception of everyday forms of resistance, Anderson acknowledges the more subtle yet effective ways that women manipulate the decisions taken by males and in the process resist repression (1991:272).

Oppressive gender relations and the economic crisis provoked “a variety of responses from women, including, multiple combinations of accommodations, resistances and outright struggles” (Mbilinyi 1988:572). Heightened rates of exploitation led inevitably to both organized and daily forms of resistance by women. Mbilinyi documents women’s responses which have included running away from oppressive household heads and shifting their labour out of the patriarchal farming system into legal or illegal activities over which they had more control. They undertook both individual and household actions which challenged the authority of governments, donors, company and private employers and household heads. They resisted policies and development programmes which undermined their interests. As has been noted above, “many development programmes failed because of female resistances, which has never been openly acknowledged” (Mbilinyi 1992:68).

In thinking about future development programmes, it may be useful to examine the types of organisations in which women have been involved. These associations often have been characterized by public spiritedness, active participatory involvement and inclusiveness. The participants in these types of associations have been committed to the realization of their goals because they have actively participated in the decision-making process. The women participants have felt a sense of empowerment due to a growing

awareness that through self-reliance they are able to meet their own goals.

The power and potential of people's organizations has not gone unnoticed by the government. In cases where organizations have been known to exist, the government has tried to either co-opt, absorb or eliminate them in an effort to control any potential threat to state-led development. At the same time, the inclination of both the government and assisting agencies has been to organize the people, even though development through institutionalized participation and top-down approaches has not been successful in the past. An example of such a failure can be seen in the attempt of the government to organize women throughout the Ujamaa years. The party affiliated national women's union Umoja wa Wanawake wa Tanzania (UWT) was expected to organise and mobilise Tanzanian women behind the country's socialist goals, and to encourage and stimulate women's political, economic, educational and cultural development. The UWT's top-down approach, bureaucratic nature and welfarist orientation, coupled with other difficulties and other constraints, prevented it from becoming truly effective and responsive to the needs of women. Furthermore, the UWT did not start from women's own associations as a basis for organization, but rather, superimposed its own notion of how women should be organised and what their concerns should be. Its linkage to the national party meant that all programs and policies had to conform to regional development plans (Rogers 1983).

Another form of often imposed organisation that has been common in Tanzania is that of cooperatives. Many people have joined and formed cooperatives in Tanzania, while resisting the external control that is implied and appropriating the organizational

forms for their own ends. Here, once again, we find resistance in compliance.

Communities under pressure to show progress towards collectivization often respond to that pressure by producing cooperatives for official consumption. Scott provides an example from Laos which is strikingly similar to experiences that can be found in Tanzania, particularly in Pemba. He describes the formation of agricultural cooperatives whereby the actual social organization of cultivation, apparently, remains essentially unchanged. "Cooperatives have been created by sleight of hand reinforced by ersatz account books, officeholders, and cooperative activities" (1990:60). What is more difficult to determine is how far the sleight of hand reaches.

People often choose to participate in cooperatives not as their primary source of subsistence, but because they have learned that they may be able to appropriate gains by playing by the rules of the game. "Women formed co-operatives mainly as a way of gaining access to credit or loans since foreign donors as well as government agencies would approve funds only for co-operatives" (Tripp 1994:152). In Tanzania, the public has come to regard cooperatives as an arm of the government and they do not consider cooperatives as their own institutions (Mporogomyi 1988:90). The lack of ownership implied by externally imposed organizations and the previous experiences of collectivisation in Tanzania have led people to mistrust formally organized groups (Swantz 1988:95). Thus in Tanzania, "practically all forms of collective action have been officially organized and controlled and, until recently, there seemed little space for autonomous, participatory, creative forms of expression of popular interest" (Stiefel & Wolfe 1994:120).

While the government may have inhibited or discouraged the growth of larger, more diverse women's organizations in the past, they were unable to prevent the growth of smaller informal organizations. The circumscribed character of women's organisations in a country like Tanzania makes it all the more imperative not simply to look at participation in formal or visible political and economic institutions for "it is in the realm of informal associations and networks that one begins to see more fully the scope of women's interactions" (Tripp 1994:148). In a situation where the government often tries to interfere, "local initiatives succeed because they remain invisible to those outside of the society" (Taylor 1992:34).

Women's groups and projects in Tanzania and elsewhere in the region, have usually been small and multi-purpose. Researchers have queried the reasons for their existence because most members often realize little or no income. In so doing, they discovered a variety of other advantages and benefits which were more substantive and potentially revolutionary than short term income earning goals, but had been overlooked and/or dismissed by governments and donor agencies as insignificant and inadequate. Female solidarity turned out to be the most frequently cited advantage of group membership, although it was rarely stated as a goal in project proposals. This is substantiated by Keane who articulates Melucci's argument that "collective actors are nomads of the present ... they focus on the present, and consequently their goals are temporary and replaceable, and their organizational means are valued as ends in themselves" (in Melucci 1989:6).

By organising to meet their everyday needs, women in self-help groups, voluntary

associations, savings associations and other such groups have responded to the fact that they have been excluded not only from formal economics but also from formal politics. Ultimately, they redefine politics by seeking tangible solutions to problems caused by the vagaries of the market, the failures of the state and the male-dominated sphere of formal politics. Ali Mari Tripp (1994a) emphasizes the importance of seeing the practically organized organizations as forming a part of a broader web of associations that as a whole can effect more basic change. She points out that even the economically oriented organisations have brought about transformations in the political consciousness of women which have in fact led to political change. Through participation in these organisations women have attempted to “reclaim the necessary space to define their own needs, formulate their own organisational strategies and rely on their own abilities, and this has brought about a change in consciousness” (Tripp 1994a:128).

The growth of women’s organisations was both a cause and effect of growing gender consciousness. Although women may have initially organized to provide support for one another in meeting their economic needs, there were political and social incentives for organising as well. Some of these incentives included solidarity, respect, dignity, resistance against patriarchal oppression (TGNP 1993). Through their increased participation in the market economy and their exposure to urban society, women have developed an increased level of awareness, gender/class consciousness, and growing networks with other women (TGNP 1993).

Not just conscientisation, but self-reliance is also a crucial component of empowerment. Through the processes of effecting change, realising their potential, and

making an impact, people become aware of their own power. Once small victories become visible, power is felt, confidence is renewed, and success builds momentum. The wheels are set into motion for further achievements and empowerment is beginning to be realised. As Ramphlele has proclaimed, “nothing succeeds like success” (1991:173).

The value of learning through participation and conflict resolution is well-known and is reflected in a statement made by the Tanzanian Team (1987):

There is an education process taking place as women learn how to organise; to seek and acquire different resources; to manipulate the bureaucracy; ... how to plan; how to combat undemocratic tendencies within the organization. Women are thus able to develop self-confidence and solidarity (1987:13).

By learning to organise through a process of trial and error, women can learn together how to overcome many of the constraints faced by their own groups. They can learn how to work together to improve their lives and eventually, to transform the structures that oppress them. In doing so, the political dimension of the contribution of local initiatives is underlined. “As local organising becomes increasingly widespread and involves an even broader segment of the population, local groups will be in a more powerful position to influence” (Gooneratne and Mbilinyi 1992:261) and to transform an ever expanding field of power, as can be witnessed through the geographies of resistance.

In this chapter, I have proposed that people reclaim power through participating in everyday forms of resistance to oppression and through realising their own strategies, both culturally based and otherwise, for survival and subsistence. Through multiple and often subtle means, they interact with and are active in the formulation of the economic, political and social structures which act upon them and set the penetrable boundaries on their

actions. Through an examination of local strategies and various forms of everyday resistance, the resilience, creativity and power displayed by Third World social actors is revealed. The positions of these social actors have been essentialized in the descriptions of them as poor, powerless, oppressed, victims who are unable to act for themselves or to effect change on the relations of power which act upon them. In challenging these assertions, the field of inquiry has been expanded to both look beyond traditional notions of power and resistance, and to commemorate alternative notions of development.

Now we will adjust the microscope to focus in on the experiences of resistance, local strategies and empowerment as they have been played out on the ground. The case study is based on the experiences of people from Pemba, an island off the coast of Tanzania. Before turning to the individual people and their lives, I will start with a description of the journey to and within Pemba, the research methods selected and the ways in which this study was transformed by the people and their stories encountered along the way.

CHAPTER 4

Methods – The Road Taken

In the literature on Zanzibar, there is information regarding macro-issues such as ethnicity, politics, economy, geography, culture and climate. It is even possible to find a few descriptions of various human rights abuses that have taken place. However, as is not uncommon, very little has been published which documents people's reactions, or more significantly, interactions with these influences in their lives. The descriptions of life in Zanzibar do not depict the extent to which these circumstances affect people's lives nor do they demonstrate the impact of human agency on these very circumstances. This study is an attempt to reduce the gap in the literature by offering a different perspective on life in Zanzibar, a perspective which comes from the grassroots and illustrates the dynamics of daily life. By exploring human agency and documenting the systems which are in place 'on the ground' to deal with both poverty and injustice, the survival strategies and the everyday forms of resistance, I hope to show the strength demonstrated, the power held and the empowerment experienced through taking control, being self-reliant and exploring one's own abilities.

The research approach was open-ended and relied on qualitative research methods. The process of conducting field research followed a participatory model of investigation, involving direct input from the participants as much as possible. It was an exercise in participatory research whereby the people I encountered along the way, who were willing, pointed out the issues, together we identified their constraints, then they showed me how

these issues and constraints influence their lives. The research unfolded through a fluid and dynamic process where the objectives and questions were almost as shaped by the informants as the answers and outcome.

There has been very little self-description or research designed together with local people in the literature on Zanzibar. Research designed outside of the area of study presumes a model of reality and is in danger of using data to support the preconceived model. In any type of research, as Swantz has observed, “an obstinate adherence to a theoretical conceptualisation in fixed categories anticipates results and hinders the use of the existing capacities that people have” (1985:7). An emphasis on qualitative research methods allows for ongoing revision of interview questions as the study progresses and as new issues are brought to light. My experience with the Wapemba was a process of learning. As new understandings emerged, some questions became irrelevant, others became central, and through this process emerged a view of what was important to the people around me at the given moment of their interaction with me.

As Escobar (1992) indicates, “theory must start with people’s self-understanding, with giving an account of people as agents whose practices are shaped by their self-understanding” (1992:63). This approach allows the researcher to step outside of pre-existing categories of thought in order to understand life as experienced by the people themselves. An attempt to classify field data in our own terms is virtually futile and stands at risk of distorting the messages we have received. In observing a scene as an outsider, we need an inside perspective to understand the nuances, the meanings behind what is presented. Regarding the rapid closing and opening of a single eyelid, “is it a twitch or a

wink? Mere observation of the physical act gives no clue. If it is a wink, what kind of wink is it: one of conspiracy, of ridicule, of seduction? Only a knowledge of the culture, the shared understandings, of the actor and his or her observers or confederates can begin to tell us" (Scott 1985:45). Our informants' knowledge must be examined in terms of how they themselves understand it; only in such terms can it be made "evident and convincing" (Castenada 1968:20), or truthful and relevant. An outside perspective, offering different knowledge is what an outside observer can often add to a description of a situation as a supplement to, not a substitute for, the description that human agents themselves provide. "For however partial or even mistaken the experienced reality of the human agents, it is that experienced reality that provides the basis for their understanding and their action" (Scott 1985:46).

Literature is also used to complement the stories and information provided by informants and to fill in any gaps. However, the tendency for the "documentary tradition" to elevate "things in print", giving a certain "hardness" to documents as sources (Goebel 1994:8) presents certain pitfalls. In Zanzibar, where documented evidence is usually one-sided, sometimes factually incorrect and often censored for fear of government retribution, the 'hardness' of documents as sources is questionable. The presence of uncensored documented material is sparse. Earlier authors have outlined some of the problems they have encountered in conducting research in and about Zanzibar:

There are literally scores of books available on Kenya, Uganda and mainland Tanzania which cover the period from the mid-1960s to the present on such subjects as politics, economics and wildlife; but there is not a single book on Zanzibar. There are a few articles, but these usually give a very sketchy and biased picture of contemporary Zanzibar. On account of the government's

xenophobic attitude towards journalists, writers and academics, the spice of Zanzibar's revolution is practically unknown to the public (Martin 1978:ix).

Kharusi asserts that "the almost complete silence which has been drawn over the events in Zanzibar since the revolution makes any valid assessment of the true situation there impossible" (Kharusi 1969:15). Martin complements this view with his discouraging finding: "Another problem is the apparent lack of availability of many of the older documents ... many of the documents in the Zanzibar archives are missing" (Martin 1978:18-19).

With this as a background, I have collected both contemporary and archival material in support of the oral accounts provided by Wapemba. However, the emphasis remains with their stories and descriptions. In the Zanzibar context, seeing and experiencing as much as I could for myself and establishing what my informants considered to be the facts was more valuable than engaging in a futile search for a complete written account. In an attempt to understand local level processes, the perceptions that people carry about the contexts in which they live provide the reasoning behind their behaviour. "The fact that memories of the past may not always be 'factual' does not represent a problem of validity or reliability ... the ways in which [the memories of the past are] transformed ... are in themselves significant" (Mbilinyi 1989:206). Different individuals provided different or elaborated on similar versions of their own and each other's stories. I tried to speak to a cross-section of people from Pemba to try to capture a relatively balanced overall picture and the pieces came together through the input of everybody involved. "The picture portrayed varies widely, but oftentimes a remarkable resilience in difficult circumstances shines forth" (Staudt 1991:20).

Participant observation allowed me to “concentrate at least as much on the experience of behaviour as on behaviour itself, as much as on history as carried in people’s heads as on the flow of events” (Scott 1985:46). Topic focussed interviews established a basic framework for the study, to identify trends and to determine issues for further investigation. The interviews, both formal and informal, were open-ended, information sharing, conversations with feedback sessions throughout and where possible, follow-up sessions to correct misunderstandings and ensure that we had agreed on the particulars and the perspective taken. The questions were an outcome of previous stages of research and the information was gathered through visits, organised meetings, in depth interviews, focus group discussions and the collection of personal narratives. In these ways, a variety of people were able to share their views, perceptions, experiences and offer explicit explanations for their behaviour and how they were affected by various circumstances. The selection of informants was based largely on whom was willing to speak with me and who I met through others who had taken me into their confidence. I was always conscious of the possibility that I would interfere with people’s routines and did not want to be intrusive. Also, in a politically charged climate such as Zanzibar, many people were afraid to speak openly about their lives because almost anything could be construed as “political”. I did try to speak with people who were immersed in different life situations in the hopes that their stories would reflect diverse view points. The stories, comments, beliefs and behaviours drawn from Wapemba narratives are complemented by literary evidence, news articles and other written reports where possible. The combination of documentary, with mostly observational and interview data, provides material which

outlines people's own voices from field research, literature, and ethnography.

As was discussed earlier in the theoretical foundation of this thesis, most historical, social, economic, cultural and political structures can serve to constrain and set limits to the nature of social life but they do not determine social life in any absolute manner. It is important to also examine how social life builds these structures and is part of them itself. Different actors react to the constraints of these structures in different ways, in different places, at different times and with different consequences. This thesis is concerned with exploring these processes in their full diversity through the collection of a variety of rich life stories. "Life stories are interesting precisely because of their uniqueness, their particularity, their failure to conform to patterns" (Goebel 1994:7).

Although the case material is not presented through separate life histories, the methodology was incorporated into the research approach. A life history approach requires that the social actors are seen as engaged in the meaningful creation of a life-world:

Rather than looking at social and cultural systems solely as they impinge on a life, and turn it into an object, a life history should allow one to see how an actor makes culturally meaningful theory, how history is produced in action and on the actor's retrospective reflections on that action. A life history narrative should allow one to see the subjective mapping of experience, the working out of a culture and a social system that is often obscured in a typified account (Behar 1990:225).

The presentation of stories and the direct understanding of the informants can speak to a set of theoretical concerns about the politics of representation. As Abu-Lughod (1993) has pointed out, usually anthropologists "use details and the particulars of individual lives to produce typifications" (Abu-Lughod 1993:7). Her concern about the tendency in social science to search for generalisations is not that it tends to reify and

make abstract, nor is she simply privileging micro- over macro- processes in a logocentric account of interactions. Rather, she reminds us that those who relay the stories are situated in their own perspective and that in writing about a culture, the researcher, to some extent contributes to the creation of that culture. She reminds us that the “degree to which people in the communities anthropologists study appear ‘other’ is in part a function of how we write about them” (Abu-Lughod 1993:27). In the quest to produce typifications, a general description is given which tends to “flatten out their differences” and fix their stories as though they are not fluid and ongoing. The effort to produce general ethnographic descriptions of people’s beliefs or actions “risks smoothing over contradictions, conflicts of interest, doubts, and arguments, not to mention changing motivations and historical circumstances” (1993:9). Likewise, if our attention is directed primarily at the imposition of order on the world, we expect our “understandings of the world clearly and neatly to specify values and actions, to expect some sort of deductive link between what is, what ought to be, and what must be done ... [This] expects theory to be too clean, too whole, too all of a piece” (Ferguson 1990:337). As such, many attempts to “theorize resistance have been fraught with an intellectual taming that transforms the poetry and intensity of resistance into the dull prose of rationality” (Routledge 1997:68-69). Thus I have presented the voices of the participants in this research by using their words where possible to keep the richness and diversity of their stories intact.

I have tried to present a humanising account, which would allow the reader to establish familiarity with the participants, not through presenting their life histories, but in presenting a combination of their stories, comments, explanations and behaviours. The

case material is predominantly presented through themes rather than on an individual basis. The stories are intended to provide real-life examples of many of the theoretical issues that have been drawn out of the theory chapters. Abu-Lughod points out that the life history approach can, in focussing on the story of one subject, create the impression of an individual living in isolation. She structures her chapters so that the “women’s continued reappearance in different chapters will bring the reader a sense of the networks and the closeness of family relations that are at work” (1993:31). The words of the various Wapemba participants have also been interwoven throughout the different themes which they brought to light.

In relaying the stories I learned, I have tried, like Abu-Lughod (1993) to place myself somewhere between the two extremes of erasing the ethnographer and imposing the ethnographer as an equal participant in the research process. The researcher, through a process of participant observation, establishes a relationship, in many cases a friendship, with the subjects and is part of the encounters from which the data is gathered. To present the stories without including any evidence of the interactions that were a part of them would be dishonest and would detract from what is revealed. “The outsider self never simply stands outside; he or she always stands in a definite relation with the ‘other’ of the study ... what we call the outside, or even the partial outside, is always a position within a larger political-historical complex” (Abu-Lughod 1993:40).

Langness and Frank (in Goebel 1994) “call on anthropologists to acknowledge the role of the ethnographer’s beliefs and biases, and to erase the notion of ‘objectivity’ in ethnography ... [as] constructing a life history is a collaborative act” (1994:30). An

anthropological representation can often reveal as much about the representer's world as it does about who or what is represented. In acknowledgement of my role in the research process, I will first situate myself by briefly mentioning my own conceptual foundation: A background in anthropology had underlined my interest in cultural heterogeneity and my commitment to cultural relativism. It taught me seek to understand the situations of social actors through their own lens for viewing reality, rather than my own. Anthropology had instilled in me the belief that understanding the cultural significance of events, behaviours and perceptions is key to understanding any social reality. It had also brought to the forefront my emphasis on indigenous knowledge and my interest in understanding alternatives to Western philosophies and perceptions of development. Throughout development studies, I had observed the process of westernization as Eurocentric and had been looking toward alternative notions of development. A discomfort with overarching and generalising theories of development had led to a desire to experience the 'practice' of daily life. Also, my own interest in participatory methods entailed a learning process based on interaction, mutual respect and sharing.

My sincere interest in understanding their world view and situation appealed to Wapemba, as did my efforts to be culturally sensitive which were manifested through small gestures such as covering my hair when it was appropriate to do so, using their expressions in conversation to show my understanding, employing local manners and participating in customary behaviour, helping out wherever I could, being willing to try new things, demonstrating an appreciation for what was taught to me and having a genuine respect for their ways of living. I tried to be as unintrusive as possible, asking that

people go about their business as usual and simply allow me to be a part of it. This was of course impossible at first, as the normal tendency was for the children to follow me and adults to treat me as an honoured guest. My novelty soon wore off however as people began to understand that although I appreciated their kindness, what I really wanted was to not be treated as a special guest. By the time I left, I had been given a Swahili name, had been instructed to name my firstborn child after 'Nunu', had been given much advice about my personal life, had shared some very touching moments and had been told that Pembeni is 'my village', in other words, my home.

In the cultural and political environment of Zanzibar where it has been impossible to conduct wide surveys about sensitive issues, it is very important to establish trust with people before being taken into their confidence. Martin (1978) outlines the difficulties he encountered in Zanzibar:

I have had many difficulties in writing this book. First and foremost has been the major problem of getting people to talk. Until my arrival in Zanzibar in 1975, no scholar had been allowed to travel all over Zanzibar and Pemba since the revolution. Although outside the towns I always had with me a security man, whose job was to report back to the authorities regarding my activities, I travelled where I wished and talked to whomsoever I wanted. However, I did not always get accurate replies, and for the first few months of my research most people were suspicious. Eventually, though, some Zanzibaris began to talk. Closely allied to the problem of obtaining oral information was the reluctance of many of my interviewees to allow me to use their names because they feared (rightly or wrongly) that the authorities would not approve of their remarks (Martin 1978:ix-x).

He also describes the difficulties he encountered in trying to conduct research in Pemba in particular. He had trouble getting people to talk to him. "No one ever dared to invite me to his house, and only during working hours in offices and shops did some individuals freely converse with me in hushed voices about life on Pemba and the severe

food shortages they experienced during Karume's reign. The fear of being seen in the presence of a foreigner was universal" (Martin 1978:118). Kharusi commented in 1967 that "a spy mania ... prevails in both Zanzibar and Pemba" (1967:16). Similarly, in 1996, the Business Times announced that "any visitor to Zanzibar will easily notice that Zanzibaris are a frightened lot, all official pronouncements to the contrary notwithstanding" (Business Times 1996:4).

The main factor which permitted me to overcome the secrecy and suspicion which pervaded discussions was that I established friendships with people. In being open to one another and staying together, I think it was inevitable. We enjoyed humour together while having a mutual interest and respect for one another. In a place where people do not tend to speak freely with people they don't trust, the formation of a personal relationship was necessary in order to permit a certain openness in discussions. "Only when the confidence of the people has been won through continuing communication between them and the researcher will a change of attitude come about. Then the research results are fundamentally affected, and the information is of a better quality" (Swantz 1985:9).

As the research methodology employed was qualitative, it was a fluid learning process whereby the study was formed jointly by informants and researcher. As there was no blueprint to follow, the first step was to learn to formulate the problems with the people and to perceive the research together with them. It was a learning process involving both researcher and actors equally. Even the research methodology was adjusted according to what was learned. This study could never be replicated and is not intended to be representative. It is intended to provide a view of life as lived on the

ground at a particular moment of interaction. The view of life encountered in turn, will shed light on the central issues of this thesis.

Initially, in trying to catch a glimpse of grassroots development, I set out to study different forms of association and collectivisation, believing that the very roots of development would be exposed in an examination of the collectivities which were culturally based. After first travelling all around Pemba and visiting different small-scale producers (some worked as cooperatives, others as informal groups, one was an individual), I wanted to study the different ways that people were working together. I was going to study group formation, organizational forms and at how people organise themselves. Through various local development initiatives, it was possible to see many people working together to improve their condition. I first focussed on the differences between formally registered cooperatives and unregistered groups working on the same sorts of activities (particularly small scale producers of handicrafts and/or agricultural goods). This began with a series of interviews with cooperatives. I accompanied a team of cooperative officers as they conducted a marketing survey. Through observing their survey, I was able to collect background information for my own group interviews; I learned about marketing problems encountered by the cooperatives, I began to acquire a greater understanding of the bureaucracy involved in cooperative formation, and also the lack of depth and the inefficiency of structured group interviews.

My own survey consisted of an open-ended, semi-structured group interview which allowed me to probe and explore new issues as they arose. This approach provided the space to challenge contradictions and often revealed answers that had not been

discovered, or had been misunderstood through the structured survey of the cooperative team. The cooperative team was looking for specific answers to specific questions which had been directed by their department, whereas I had more flexibility in my approach and was trying to come to an understanding of what was going on and what was important to the cooperative members. We had different purposes, justifying our different approaches. I asked cooperative members about their reasons for working together, their reasons for forming a cooperative, the benefits and drawbacks of working together and of being a formally registered cooperative if those were different (to determine any differences between spontaneous and 'suggested' or coerced cooperation) how they worked together (responsibilities divided, decisions made, benefits and sacrifices shared), the history of their activities (how did they learn), did they work together prior to forming a cooperative, what else do they do together, what do they understand by 'cooperation', how do they define success, how do they overcome difficulties and solve problems, etc.

My first selection for a more in-depth, qualitative study was Pembeni, a village with two women's pottery groups. Both were cooperatives, making the same products, working side-by-side, sharing the same market and the same source of raw materials. I thought that the relationship between the two groups might reveal something interesting about group dynamics. These women's groups had a certain vitality, their levels of production were high in relation to other cooperatives and they were constantly interested in devising and trying new ideas. Other cooperatives I had met with had been dragging along, producing very little and many had been collapsing. The vitality and creativity of these women intrigued me and when one of them, Nunu, a divorced woman, invited me to

stay with her, I was very pleased to accept the invitation. Nunu was convinced that if I stayed with her for just three months, I would be able to speak 'good Swahili'. She seemed to enjoy laughing at my efforts to communicate using rudimentary Kiswahili and body language, and she took me 'under her wing', determined to become my teacher.¹

While staying in Pembeni, I was able to develop an understanding through participant observation. The setting for conversational interviews varied depending upon whom I was speaking with and what they had to accomplish that day. When the women worked on pottery, I made pottery with them. On most other days at that time of year, agricultural activities predominated in their schedules, so we conducted interviews while weeding the rice fields or cutting clippings. Other conversations did take place through visits, or over regular daily events such as meal preparation and evening discussions.

The women responded to my interest in them and were also interested in me. In addition to teaching me how to speak 'good Swahili' (as the best kind is the version spoken on Pemba of course), they offered to teach me how to make pottery. I was very happy to have this opportunity to engage in participatory observation, to collect oral histories and through conversational interviews, come to a deeper understanding of how and why they worked together. I wondered what else (if anything) their groups represented; if they accomplished more than the production of pottery by working together; if and how it contributed to their empowerment. I quickly realized that their identity was not tied up in their cooperative group, it was not in fact even how they

1. Over a period of seven months I visited Pembeni five times. The preliminary and goodbye visits were short visits of 1-3 days while the other stays I had in Pembeni lasted for a duration of 10-14 days.

organized themselves to get work done.

I had begun by conducting the same group interview with them as I had conducted with the other cooperatives. I learned many of the same things from them and formed many of the same initial impressions as I had formed when I interviewed the other cooperative groups. Before long, the discrepancies between initial perceptions and an in depth understanding were evident. Only a day or two after staying in Pembeni, I began to realize that my initial impressions had not reflected a true understanding of the issues. What was actually going on under the surface was far more interesting than what their initial answers had indicated. I began to understand more about how people were making a living, how cooperatives were perceived and used. I saw that some ideas which had originated from outside of their social reality, had been transformed and incorporated into their lives. Interventions had been taken and made into their own, they had been altered and adapted to fit into their social reality. I began to look at the variety of ways in which they were making a living, and at the social networks and cultural ties through which the community members were assisting themselves and each other.

After having been in Pembeni and working with various women for about 10 days, I was challenged by the men who told me that they also had co-operatives and why wasn't I also asking them how they make a living? Following their recommendation, I began to include discussions with the men in an already expanding frame of reference for the study. In including both women and men, I began to see the inter- and intra-family networks where people were working together and supporting one another. This was contrary to many of the notions I had brought with me from feminist theories about women's work in

the African context. I observed and participated in the various activities that were part of their socio-economic lives and realized the multi-faceted and complementary ways that people worked to meet their subsistence needs.

In experiencing the ways that roles and responsibilities are worked out, it was clear that convention does not always prevail. Although customs permeate most aspects of life, survival takes precedence over tradition. In a place such as Zanzibar where adherence to traditional Islamic culture is an essential part of life, upon observing the dynamics lived out on the ground, it became one of my intentions to challenge the tendency to view tradition as “immutable and unitary” (Stamp 1989:6). Among the Wapemba, while their culture played such a prominent role in all aspects of life, “custom was loosely defined and infinitely flexible. Custom helped to maintain a sense of identity but it also allowed for an adaptation so spontaneous and natural that it was often unperceived” (Ranger 1989:247). One aim of this study is to open up the possibility of analysing “tradition as a contradictory, malleable instrument in the hands of contemporary people” (Stamp 1989:6).

Abu-Lughod begins each chapter of her study on the Bedouin with a quotation from the Qu’ran or a saying of Mohammed, “not only to draw a contrast between foreign general concepts and local terms in all their complexity, but also to point to the contrasts between simple religious prescription and complex practices and circumstances” (1993:23). I have also left intact many of the religious references as the use of standard religious phrases at appropriate moments was very common in Zanzibari discourse. The power of speech is evident in this habit, but so is the constancy of God’s presence in the everyday. Abu-Lughod (1993) found in the Bedouin context, as in Zanzibar, that “faith in

God and the importance of Muslim identity were constant elements in women's discourse, invoked in myriad contexts to justify, implore, reprimand, explain and comfort" (Abu-Lughod 1993:25). However, she also points out that piety "does not seem to preclude chuckling over a risqué folktale, enjoying a sexually explicit song, or energetically bad-mouthing a neighbour" (1993:24). Abu-Lughod suggests that although her informants, the women, "often affirm their acceptance of what happens with the phrase 'what God brings', which brings to mind Islam's notorious fatalism, the women's stories reveal that asserting this sentiment does not make women submissive" (1993:23). This sentiment is also very common in Pemba and again, is not perceived as resignation once a deeper understanding is reached. Many Muslims believe that they should indeed be guided by the ideals of Islamic faith and practice, however, "not all events or utterances can be explained by reference to Islam" (1993:23). Abu-Lughod's account, like the stories from Pemba, brings out the numerous tensions in their Moslem identities "between practices and their justifications, between ideals and behaviour, between simple prescriptions and multiple interpretations, between a sense of the universal and the complexity of local experience" (1993:25). It is a reminder of the differences between reference to and determination by social prescription.

Living in Pembeni and experiencing the interdependence of village life as lived by women, men and children, allowed me to reach an understanding of their activities. The study which had begun with a focus on women's associations, broadened to include both women and men in the examination of people working together to achieve common goals. Thus to the question "Is this a gender paper"? The answers are both "yes" and "no". It is

gender-sensitive; I have drawn from feminist research methods and have used many examples of women's initiatives and responses to oppression. The actual case study however, cannot be categorized as a 'gender study' insofar as the unit of analysis is less concerned with the specific relations between women and men, but is more specifically focussed on the community and people's interactions both with and within the community. My notions of gender relations and women's issues were indeed challenged as I learned more about Pemba and came to appreciate the fact that women and men did work together in a more socially cohesive manner than I had expected. Of course there are significant differences between women's and men's lives as power relations affect them differently and to some extent they exist in different social worlds. But in other respects, they do live in the same political and economic world with the same constraints and share many of the same values based on a common adherence to Islam. The people I met challenged me to look beyond women's responses, as the issues of survival and resistance apply to the male reality as well. As such, the case study is an examination of daily life as it is played out on the ground by both women and men within their communities.

In Pemba, I found that some people were almost as interested in learning about me as I was in learning about them. Occasionally the tables would turn and they would barrage me with questions about life in Canada. One of these incidents in particular stands out as particularly revealing as a challenge to the way we tend to form perceptions in the West. Several women and I were sitting around one night after the day's work had been completed; one of them began to question me about life in Canada. She asked how is it possible for people to survive in a place which is so cold? I told her that we just have to

wear many more articles of clothing in order to keep warm. She began to laugh and mockingly pretended to dress herself to go out into the cold. In an exaggerated manner, she pulled on an obviously oversized pair of imaginary boots, a hat, a coat, some mittens, and then wobbling clumsily around the room while pretending to be very overweight, she asked how is it possible for people to move around like this? Her impression was that this extra clothing would be particularly cumbersome and would surely impede people in Canada from leading normal lives. I thought to myself ironically, that this impression was coming from a Moslem woman, who covers herself up by wearing a *Buibui* (Higab), every time she goes into town. She had just voiced to me the very impression that we in non-Islamic parts of the world often hold of Moslem women who we perceive of as being somehow oppressed by the regulation that they should cover themselves from head to toe. In the perception of these women from Pembeni, wearing a *Buibui* was far more natural than having to cover up to avoid becoming frozen. In fact it prevented men from gawking at them and gave them a certain degree of freedom that we do not experience in the West. To the women in Pembeni, it is we in the West who are suffering from the need to wear oppressive clothing, not them. As Anderson has pointed out, it is often taken for granted that women are simply suppressed by a patriarchal system. She suggests "I do not suggest that suppression is not there – but I do believe that we have to look for 'the other side of the coin' as well" (Anderson 1991:284).

The need to challenge our perceptions, the observation that people take and adapt that which they can use from what is imposed upon them and most noticeably, the predominance of political discussion and the ensuing fear and solidarity among Wapemba

emerged as major themes from my initial stay in Pembeni. As I met and interviewed other small scale producers and came to know more about the political climate of Zanzibar, it became clear that solidarity, socioeconomic networks and cooperating with one another were about more than economic survival and culturally based coping mechanisms. They were also bound up with resistance to oppression. People were surviving, liaising and accomplishing their goals in spite of particular constraints afforded by the Government.

My group of informants expanded as I met and learned the stories of many other people from Pemba. Madawa, a spice producer and herbalist, also from Pemba but living in Unguja, became one of my closest allies. He joined the research project, accompanied me on two trips to Pemba and introduced me to many of his relatives and numerous other Wapemba. As the discussions revealed frequently that Wapemba had been singled out for retrenchment from government jobs and that they faced and overcame numerous problems directed purposely at Wapemba, their resistance to oppression and various survival strategies became increasingly evident. The direction of the research questions was modified accordingly as the things which were most relevant to the Wapemba I met, were revealed. Madawa wanted me to know about “the life on Pemba”, to discuss what people really need for development and to show me the Pemba that he himself believes in. Others were also happy to tell of the situation on Pemba, believing that the outside world should know the truth; the telling of the stories was in itself a way of resisting the Government’s rules. As it became so clear that political life was intertwined with the daily lives of regular people, and as Wapemba pride, solidarity, culture and support networks became constant themes throughout the study, I became very interested in how people were

surviving in spite of the oppression by the Government. Some of the participants in this research eventually introduced me to two different officials from the opposition party called CUF which was heavily supported by the people of Pemba. As a result, stories have been collected from a wide range of social actors from Pemba. Villagers, townspeople, emigrants and politicians offered different perspectives on similar issues and revealed that Wapemba were employing various tactics and survival strategies in their struggle to overcome obstacles.

As mentioned above, Islam plays an enormous role in the Wapemba culture, identity, philosophy and lifestyle. Although it permeated every aspect of life, there was not a blind adherence to religious prescription. Islam provided the foundation for a shared culture and provided a philosophy to live by which, in itself, contained the provision of a social safety net, rules for engaging in charity and other mechanisms for community survival. In the absence of a strong State, the people themselves in sharing a philosophy were able to ensure a social welfare system was in place. In living by this philosophy, the social networks, coping strategies, moral superiority were provided which served as the roots of pride and resistance. Their culture provided a basis for resistance. In presenting this theme through their stories, an important distinction is made by Fiske (in Escobar 1992) between ethnography and ethnosemiotics.

Ethnography is concerned to trace the specificities of the uses of a system, the ways that the various formations of the people have evolved of making do with the resources it provides. Ethnosemiotics [on the other hand,] is concerned with interpreting these uses and their politics and in tracing in them instances of the larger system through which culture (meanings) and politics (action) intersect (Escobar 1992:76).

In the struggle to survive economically, politically and socially, cultural forms are

invoked. Wapemba rely on the cultural means at their disposal in the process of their resistance and development. "The culture may become a determinant factor in development, then the cultural means in people's possession can be decisive in the process of development" (Swantz 1985:6). Swantz (1985) argues that the societies which have retained rich cultural forms, are of great importance in the development of the whole nation.

Culture is not, however, only a means of self-defence or self-affirmation. It is also a people's basic formal expression of the creativity and social communication through which it makes what I call 'space' around itself for its own life. By 'space' I mean the room for manoeuvre which an individual or group can create by using various mechanisms ... Because of the possibility for men and women to create space around themselves, there are also local solutions to people's problems. Even in situations in which the macro-analysis ... reveals an economic dependency, the people in their own experience have social and cultural space which makes it possible for them to become activated and to demand for themselves a larger share of the wider resources of the nation and, ultimately, of humanity. This creates the potential for the activation of counter-forces (Swantz 1985:6-7).

Swantz (1985:70) acknowledges that there is a "microcosmic level of experience" which allows space for development and that the unrecognised and unacknowledged talents and skills that are made use of in daily life can be lifted to the conscious level, thus extending people's potential for their own development. "A research approach which facilitates the participation of the people in researching issues of central importance to them is one way of extending their own potential for development" (Swantz 1985:8). It helps to raise the self-awareness of subjects and assists in creating more space around them for the conscious utilization of their own capabilities.

The inclusion of human experience in all its richest detail as revealed through the voices of those involved, emphasises the role of human agency in shaping experience.

Their narratives reveal that although marginalised and oppressed, the social actors are not merely victims, they are engaged in constant struggle. “Such an approach is a means then, not only of enhancing an understanding of social reality, but also of affirming human agency and decoding the nature of resistance” (Parikh 1994:6-7). Through affirming human agency, the ability of social actors to discover and create spaces to move despite structural constraints, there lies also an affirmation of people’s empowerment, the ability to act for themselves. The movements coming from the grassroots have their own competing and coexisting (fluid) codes and discourses. In the daily lives of social actors, their own values give meaning to their lives. In this domain it is their culture, their community and their lives which define power, knowledge, prestige and value. At the interface with the wider socioeconomic and political structures of the society, human beings fashion their individual responses. These responses are “based on their own experience, interpretations, histories and realities” (Scott 1985:42). It is through a dynamic process that individuals simultaneously shape and are shaped by their environment as they dance in and out of the confines of structure, shaping, resisting and creating their experiences. Only by capturing the richness, variety, complexity and dynamics of the qualities of life as lived in the community, can this “other” domain be revealed.

This examination takes place at the interface between the political socioeconomic context and what actually takes place on the ground. Adaptation at the grassroots level to circumstances that are beyond people’s control is observed, while at the same time, what is controlled to some extent, is how these circumstances affect the social actors. The

acknowledgement that people shape their own circumstances is often missing from the literature. Oppressed people play a role in shaping the relationship with their oppressors; for every action there is a reaction, just as there is mutual and reciprocal determination in the constant interaction and between actors and structures. As we speak of the negative aspects of poverty and oppression and make blanket statements about their effects, we should keep in mind that victimization also occurs by assigning the name 'victim'.

In Black Consciousness, research and publications were deemed to be an important area, because of the total monopoly white people had over this field. Blacks had been used mainly as objects of research, thus reinforcing their self-image as those 'acted upon' rather than as active agents of history.

The dominant paradigms projected blacks as victims of racism and exploitation, while little attention was paid to the creativity and resilience which underpinned the strategies of survival blacks had elaborated over the years ... There was no attempt made to include reports of positive efforts by blacks to cope with their social disabilities, and the impression given was that of a totally powerless and hopeless people, a view that had the potential of becoming a self-fulfilling prophesy by reinforcing a sense of powerlessness within the black community (Ramphela 1991:161).

This contributed in no small measure to the poor self-image Blacks had of themselves. Black Consciousness activists "thus felt that there was a strong need to conduct research which would take seriously the problems of the black community, their survival strategies, as well as their own efforts to transform their life circumstances" (Ramphela 1991:162).

Similarly, the anti-developmentalists argue that development has left 'underdeveloped' countries with an insecurity complex of sorts through providing an

image of a so-called ideal type which is presumed to exist elsewhere. The Wapemba stories speak to the 'development' issue as well by illustrating a type of development which occurs in a place where ingredients such as political representation, economic and industrial development are missing. These stories are a testimony of strength and a celebration of people's resilience and power of spirit. They've been undergoing 'development' of a kind that we have not grasped in the West. Development, or empowerment, is spoken of here as human, cultural, and social development, the confidence-inspiring actions of people initiated by them to combat their own problems. This is why a focus on agency, the actions of social actors and their meanings, is where this discussion will place its weight.

In the collection of life stories, personal narratives and information directly from the grassroots, a collection of experiences that deviate from the mainstream account is highlighted. "In the process, another 'story' gets told ... which was left out of the mainstream account" (Goebel 1994:10). This approach allows for the direct questioning of people about feelings and meanings while it relies on their interpretations and priorities in storytelling. The story is told through putting forth faces rather than figures and is intended to show social life as dynamic and interconnected. The diversity in actors' experiences challenges our perceptions while its rootedness gives it power and meaning. As the people whose situation is being studied become involved in the process of research, "the total research situation can be made a motivational tool for the development for all who are engaged in it" (Swantz 1975:1). The daily life encounters of the Wapemba point to the importance of everyday practice in both resistance to oppression and in initiatives

for empowerment. To comprehend and appreciate the nature of Wapemba resilience and resistance, it will first be necessary to describe the political and economic environment in which the Wapemba live. This discussion will now turn to the Zanzibar past and present context which will provide in part the background and in part the backdrop for the stories of people's lived experiences that will follow.

CHAPTER 5: ***Contextualising Wapemba Stories***

The word “Zanzibar” conjures up many images, whether they be of cultural richness, the architecture of stone town, tropical beaches and tourism, cloves and other spices, its historical role as a major port used by slaves traders, or even the Zanzibar Revolution. The world community, including the casual visitor to the isles, is far less likely or welcome to speak of Zanzibar politics, to hear about the human rights abuses which continue to take place or to understand the hidden tension which underlies the daily lives of many of the people living on the isles. There is little interest or knowledge about Pemba, the sister island to Unguja, which together, comprise the State of Zanzibar. The Government denies that there are any problems and has ensured that news of the isles is sparse and often censored. The people however, depending where they are from and where their political allegiances lie, tell a different story.

It is not within the scope of this thesis to prove the extent of the injustice in Zanzibar, particularly Pemba. However, giving the opportunity to Wapemba to spread awareness about the situations they face is one of the things I hope to accomplish. For the purpose of this thesis, even more important than the historical facts is the belief held by many Wapemba that a concerted effort is being made to repress the people of Pemba. People act according to what they believe; thus, their perceptions about the context in which they live are most integral to their daily lives and to this thesis. This is a fairly one-sided view of Zanzibar politics, partially because politics is such a sensitive issue in

Zanzibar that to even mention Pemba to supporters of the Government is perceived as a threat, but more importantly, because what is presented below is, without exception, the view of the people who spoke to me about life in Pemba. Their environment plus their viewpoint affect how they react, resist, struggle and survive. Documented sources are used throughout the text to supplement and support Wapemba oral histories. Their words bring the context to life.

The current context, or the period following the first multiparty election in Zanzibar which took place on October 22 1995, has been marked by political tension and fear among Wapemba who have been facing retribution for casting their votes for the opposition party - CUF.

The election in Tanzania was held to please the donors who wanted to see multiparty democracy. There was never any question about who would win. Losing power was never a possibility that the government was willing to face. But the Zanzibar government did not truly win the election. Now they are punishing Pemba with beatings, jail, intimidation, job dismissals and more ... in another village, they came and committed acts of sexual abuse. They tied up the father and raped his daughter, while making him watch. Do they think this will make us vote for them? (Nassour).

Human rights violations and other forms of punishment faced by Wapemba since the most recent election bear witness to legacies carried over from the past and follow similar historical patterns. Throughout history, differing patterns of ethnic relations on both Pemba and Unguja have given rise to social and economic differences which have in turn divided the isles politically. As the regions have become a primary source of identification and political loyalty, they have also been marked by striking patterns of unequal development. Pemba has been and remains politically marginalised and

economically neglected by the Zanzibar Government. The inequities between the isles and the discrimination faced by Wapemba continue to contribute to regional tension.

Despite the constraints they face, people from Pemba can be seen all over Unguja and coastal areas of the mainland involved in both informal sector and 'formal' businesses and in higher education. Wapemba have earned the reputation of being hardworking and successful. The strategies of those attempting to dominate have only led Wapemba to unify, to believe even more firmly in their own cause and has contributed to their determination to succeed. The pressures they face, combined with their own cultural means, have contributed to the strengthening of the Wapemba by forcing them to build their defences and to be diligent in their efforts. This thesis attempts to uncover the strategies the Wapemba are using to resist being dominated and this chapter is intended to provide the background for their struggle as well as the current context in which their lives are unfolding. In order to apprehend the context, "experience may reveal 'difference', but it does not in itself help us to understand it as constituted rationally. For that we need to attend to the historical processes that through discourse, position subjects and produce their experiences" (Scott in Goebel 1994:21).

At the outset, it is necessary to clarify the terms which are used to distinguish the isles and to present an overview of the extent of powers of the Zanzibar Government. Pemba is governed by the Zanzibar Revolutionary Government based in Unguja island. Formerly the two islands were called Zanzibar and Pemba. After the Revolution in 1964 the Swahili-word 'Unguja' came in use for the island of Zanzibar. "It is still often unclear whether an author is referring to Unguja or Zanzibar State when the word 'Zanzibar' is

used. A similar confusion occurs in the use of the word 'Tanzania', which is the name of the union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar. There is a government of Zanzibar but no government of Tanganyika" (Koenders 1992:13). When the government of mainland Tanganyika and the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar formed the United Republic of Tanzania in 1964, "the islands retained a semi-autonomous status, whereby with the exception of foreign affairs, defence, communications, currency and higher education, Zanzibar retained sovereign authority and independent ministries to implement domestic policies" (Rose 1994:21).

Despite being a partner in the Union, the Zanzibar Government does not welcome intervention from the Government of Tanzania. Africa Confidential (March 1996) contends that President Mkapa, of the mainland, is "embarrassed" (1996:8) over the current situation in Zanzibar, while simultaneously there is a sense that the Tanzanian Government has limited leverage over Zanzibar. Whether the President is either unwilling or unable to moderate Zanzibar's activities is not clear, however in view of the fragility of the Union due to the persistence of Zanzibar nationalism, it is likely that the government of the mainland will continue to stand in the sidelines and will be inclined to remain reticent over issues concerning politics and human rights in Zanzibar.

The population of Zanzibar by the 1988 census (a more recent census was planned for 1998 but is unfortunately still pending due to lack of funds) was 640,578 with the number of people in Unguja at 375,539 and in Pemba at 265,039. It is estimated that the population of Pemba, relative to the population of Unguja, has reduced since that time due to substantial out-migration. Pemba has an area of approximately 900 square kilometres

which is “about 40% of the total landsurface of Zanzibar state ...[but] the cultivated area is bigger in Pemba than in Unguja ... [and Pemba has] more farmers” (Koenders 1992:15).

Pemba is extremely lush and fertile, normally with plenty of *neema* (abundance or blessings from God) while at the same time, it remains largely undeveloped in the sense of westernisation; it is unindustrialized and hardly touched by tourism in comparison to Unguja.

The Arabs call Pemba El Huthera, or the Green Island: and indeed it is the Emerald Island of the Indian Ocean, not in a political sense, but in a spectacular one, for viewed from the sea it forms a charming picture of undulating hills covered with dense masses of vegetation, comprising forest trees, clove plantations, and orange and palm groves ... the green hills of Pemba rise abruptly from the sea, and this gives to the island an appearance of altitude and diversified scenery which is lacking in the sister island (Pearce 1920:306).

Most ‘developments’ have been confined to Unguja; while very little has been done on Pemba. “During the various Sultans’ reigns from 1840 to 1964, the only real efforts made at improvement were in expanding the clove and coconut plantations. It was not until 1972 that the Zanzibar government began to invest in Pemba, although by then Pemba was producing about 75 per cent of the country’s exports. According to Marxist thought, for over 130 years the people of Pemba were exploited by the government in Zanzibar town” (Martin 1978:46). In fact, “the main cash crop of Zanzibar is cloves for which Pemba produces 80% of all the cloves produced in the Republic” (Government publication in Masoud 1996:2). As I was told by a woman in Pembeni, “*so much in Zanzibar comes from Pemba, Pemba is rich*”(Aziza). According to popular belief, although Pemba has been the major producer of cloves and therefore of the state's revenue since the 1870s, the island has always received much less than its proportionate share for

development purposes. "The first secondary school was established in Pemba as late as 1963. Only 12 percent of the roads in Pemba are asphalted as opposed to 60 percent in Zanzibar. Pemba is almost entirely dependent on agriculture and more specifically, on one cash crop: cloves. There are very few industrial establishments" (Manase, Sheriff and Havnevik 1980:114). Unfortunately, much data has not been desegregated by region, which helps to mask the inequities between the two islands. Opposition supporters and party members have, however, been collecting and documenting as much data as possible.

For over 30 years the current regime is ruling the country and ignoring the development of Pemba ... Access to safe water supply is only 16% and to safe sanitary disposal only 24% compared to the national rates of 52% and 76% respectively. Knowledgeable of this discrepancy, the regime is struggling very hard to lower the Pemba contribution to GDP. There is a deliberate effort to increase the Unguja contribution through the port expansion, free trade zones and tourism. The development of these services in Pemba are on paper but no serious efforts to implement them (Masoud 1996:2).

The discrepancies in economic or industrial development and political representation between the two islands is a direct result of political-economic history from colonial times. The differing ethnic relations and patterns of ethnicity which arose from the African encounter with Arab colonialism, have come to play an important role in Zanzibar's political history. Essentially, "the extension of Arab paramountcy into Pemba did not generate latent political hostility towards Arab rule among the local African communities" (Lofchie 1965:47), whereas it did with the Hadimu in Zanzibar. The Omani Arab colonial regime did not initially establish its authority over the Pemba population by force, but by voluntary agreement with a group of local African rulers. This, of course, had enormous long term significance. "It endowed Arab hegemony with a basis in popular

consent which it did not enjoy in Zanzibar, and thereby made it unnecessary for the Pemba Arabs to employ harsh and autocratic methods to ensure political stability” (Lofchie 1965:48).

Omani relations with the aboriginals of Unguja and Pemba were at first remarkably tranquil. There was already a degree of fusion between the indigenous elite and the Arab newcomers because Omanis had been arriving in Zanzibar since the Portugese were ousted in the late seventeenth century, and had intermarried with local women. “The potential for Arab assimilation into Zanzibari society and, by the same token, native assimilation into Omani society, was promoted by two institutions sanctioned by Islamic law: polygyny and concubinage. The offspring of Omani-African unions ... were recognized as belonging to the lineages of their fathers” (Goldman 1996:66). As Ahmed and Zulfa explained in Pemba *“here Swahili and Arabs have been mixing and mixing”*. Regarding Arab and Swahili relations in Pemba:

All people are intermarried, every family member has more than two tribes ... historically there has been so much intermarriage with other Moslems of any tribe, we don't care if people are Arab or Swahili, we are one family. Now it's not possible to separate who's who, the only problem is that now people from the mainland are trying to put poison between Arab and Swahili. They are trying to cause disintegration (Suleiman).

Through indigenous leaders, the Omani Arabs extracted labour and taxes from Zanzibaris, maintaining a degree of distance from local people by operating through existing political systems of organization. Omani encroachment did affect the indigenes with respect to their settlement patterns. Arab settlers in Unguja planted cloves in the most fertile belt of land along the west side of the island, compelling indigenous farmers to

move eastward and southward. The Arab plantation owners in Unguja commonly took up residence in Zanzibar town, acting as absentee landlords while leaving the day to day operations in the care of overseers. Thus, in Unguja, there was a polarization of Arab and indigenous interests as Omani landowners were concentrated in town and indigenous groups were displaced from the most fertile land to other areas of the countryside.

In Pemba, the circumstances were very different. Though Pemba's land mass is smaller than Unguja's, its fertile land is very suitable for growing cloves, it has, in both relative and absolute terms, more clove trees than Unguja. Pemba became Zanzibar's, and the world's, primary producer of cloves in the nineteenth century: by the 1880's, Pemba was generating about 80 percent of Zanzibar's clove harvest. Unlike their counterparts in Unguja, indigenous Wapemba acquired a significant numbers of clove trees and were able to use fertile land to engage in subsistence farming. A survey in 1922 revealed that in Pemba, the number of trees owned by indigenes exceeded those owned by Arabs (Bennett 1978:199). Land relations between Arabs and Africans in Pemba actually became a basis for inter-ethnic solidarity rather than a source of intense racial friction. As arable land in Pemba is far more plentiful and widely distributed than in Zanzibar, "Arab land alienation" did not deprive the African community of nearly all the best land, nor did it result in a rigid pattern of racial segregation based on land ownership ... when the Arabs introduced cloves to Pemba, many African landowners, as well, prospered from this source of income" (Lofchie 1965:48).

The Wapemba lived side-by-side with Arabs who, in Pemba, where there were no major urban centres, generally lived in the countryside, often in mixed Arab-African

communities. Wapemba became linked to Omani settlers through many complex social webs: they shared common interests as clove producers and neighbours; there was intermarriage among them; and both Omanis and Wapemba (many of whom claimed descent from Arab or Shirazi forbears) saw themselves as eminently superior to mainlander slaves who populated the island's large plantations. Middleton and Campbell (1965) who equate the term 'Shirazi' with indigenous to Zanzibar, have uncovered that "formerly few people called themselves Shirazi, other than a few long-settled and powerful families, but today this term has strong political implications and is used with pride to refer to a supposed Persian cultural origin ... The use of the name also reflects a determination to differentiate themselves from recent immigrants from the mainland" (1965:16). In Pemba, "heterogeneous communities grew to shape a common religion (Islam) a common language (Swahili) and a pattern of social ties which grew out of intermarriage, geographical proximity and a mutual economy" (Lofchie 1965:38). The sense of alliance between Arabs and Wapemba contrasted sharply with the situation in Unguja, a discrepancy which was to become magnified in the years to come. In modern times there is social cohesion between Arabs and Africans in Pemba. They are held together by a common adherence to the principles of Islam and despite their many differences, there is unity in the face of a common threat.

The ethnic divisions and alliances shaped in the nineteenth century under Omani rule were later bolstered by the British who also played a significant role in Zanzibar's history. As the European powers were partitioning Africa, the British concluded a treaty in 1890 which allowed them to declare Zanzibar their protectorate to be administered

through indirect rule. Since the earliest days of the Protectorate, the British treated Zanzibar as an Arab state, dealing with Arabs on a political basis while paying little direct attention to Africans. Arabs thus had a monopoly over the political arena and African communities did not begin to become politically organized until relatively late. When anti-colonialist sentiments began to sweep Zanzibar, it was the Arabs who wanted independence, believing that the British Protectorate had subordinated an Arab nation. “Arab nationalism was fuelled by the Islamic principle that ‘all Muslims are brothers’ and the ensuing conviction that their leadership could unite all the people of Zanzibar in a common struggle against colonialism” (Lofchie 1965:130).

The Arab Association evolved into the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) which had a strong basis of support among the indigenes, propagating the notion that mainland Africans were intruders in Zanzibar. The ZNP was countered by a political body which came to be called the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP). The ASP was comprised of both mainlanders and indigenes in Unguja, who in turn countered that the Arabs were the aliens. The Pemba Shirazi Association then threw its weight behind a third party, the Zanzibar and Pemba People’s Party (ZPPP), which formed a coalition with the ZNP. The ZNP-ZPPP coalition accused the ASP of planning to “bring mainlanders into Zanzibar to dominate, spread Christianity, and to suppress the Muslim faith” (in Lofchie 1965:207). In Unguja, where indigenes had more reason to see their interests as opposed to Arabs, the ASP made successful efforts to stir up anti-Arab sentiments. Unsurprisingly, the ASP consistently fared poorly in Pemba, while the ZNP-ZPPP did well.

In December 1963, Zanzibar achieved independence under Sultan rule. Zanzibar

was launched onto the world stage under a coalition government comprising the ZNP and the ZPPP, with the aggrieved ASP in opposition. The ASP instigated the bloody Revolution of 1964 barely a month later. Revolution and violence swept Zanzibar Town in January 1964. Arab houses and shops were burned, women and girls were raped and estimates of the number of dead ranged between 3,000 to more than 11,000. All British civil servants were expelled (Kharusi 1967) while Asians and Arabs were deported arbitrarily (Goldman 1996). Karume was appointed President and the legacies of his regime have since shaped the political history which continues to unfold.

Mr. Juma Othman, a political activist and former prisoner of conscience whose case I later read about in Amnesty International Reports, explained the political history of Zanzibar through the Wapemba perspective to me.

Why Karume's party is so unpopular here? Arabs and African people live as one family, cannot separate them, only Wapemba. Zanzibar was different: Arabs stayed in groups, even among themselves, Africans did too. The Afro-Shirazi party was known as a party of Africans. ZNP was considered to be the Party for Arabs but of course it had Africans too. Pembans wanted leadership from the islands, Karume was not Zanzibari, he was from Malawi.

In 1963, even before the union with the mainland, the Afro-Shirazi Party got only one seat in Pemba. So, Karume saw that Wapemba were not loyal to his government, he punished and ignored Pemba. In a cabinet of 32, only one was Wapemba and even he was from Unguja. Many people fled. To Arabia, Europe, the Mainland. People were beaten, gathered and forced to do work: "voluntary" work. There was a high standard of humiliation; people were imprisoned. Even people with clove shambas left, only poor people remained here. The government did nothing to boost up economic activities of this island (Othman).

Kharusi (1967, 1969) called the Karume regime a reign of terror:

Anti-Arab racialism was, and still is deliberately incited. All Arab and some other citizen's property has been confiscated or 'nationalized' without compensation. A large number of Zanzibaris have fled or been expelled. The rule of law, civil liberties and other human freedoms have vanished. Arbitrary arrest, imprisonment

without trial, floggings and executions rule the day ... Enemies of the 'people's revolution' – the people – must be neutralized ... Zanzibar today is a police state in which 'justice' is meted out by Revolutionary Councillors and their strong arm squads as they think fit. Fear is an essential ingredient of their rule and it is administered by [the] secret police. Individuals and groups of people have been butchered both secretly and in public (Kharusi 1967:10).

Karume's security service, whose members were popularly referred to as *panya* (rats) were authorized to detain, torture, and imprison without trial. They sought out those who spoke out and criticized the government or complained about food and other shortages. Most noteworthy was the repression of the Zanzibaris' basic rights under Karume's capricious reign. He issued decrees stemming from his own prejudices and fears on how people were to live. "Karume began banning make-up, wigs, styles of dresses which showed the contours of the female body and revealed legs, shorts for men, and long hair. Offenders were tried in the People's Courts and often imprisoned for the way they looked or dressed" (Martin 1978:67). Members of the Revolutionary Council who disagreed with Karume on these or any other matters were soon dismissed. "Karume replaced them with less educated persons and claimed that the uneducated were the only real revolutionaries" (Martin 1978:68).

On January 1 1970, the Revolutionary Council abolished the legal system which had been based on British judicial principles. Minor criminal cases were to be heard in People's Courts by people who were essentially political appointees. Instead of having a judge and jury, the People's Courts each had a Chairman and two assistants; "the assistants may even be illiterate and not even the Chairmen have legal training for their appointments" (Martin 1978:64). The presence of lawyers at the People's Courts was

forbidden as “the work of the Court is to find and establish the truth and not to wrangle with legal jargon and confuse the issue by legal manoeuvres” (Martin 1978:64).

A despotic and repressive leader, Karume ruled the islands as a police state in which “Africans spied on other Africans ... Mail was opened, phones tapped, and people were followed. The radio station and the newspapers were taken over by the government which used them as their propaganda mouthpieces” (Martin 1978:63). The news that was permitted to flow to and from Zanzibar was strictly controlled. Western publications were subject to censorship and the media was strictly censored. Journalists were strongly discouraged from visiting Unguja and completely barred from Pemba which was declared a ‘prohibited area’.

Immediately following the Revolution in 1964, Pemba was closed to outsiders (Martin 1978:114). Likewise, Koenders notes that in the 1970s Pemba was almost completely sealed to foreigners (Koenders 1992). In the few instances when journalists did come to Zanzibar they were carefully watched and throughout this period, “few Zanzibaris dared to invite foreigners to their houses, for if they did they would later be interrogated by security men” (Martin 1978:64).

The Revolution had met with considerable opposition on Pemba. According to Ahmed of Pemba, “*people in Unguja held the Revolution, not here – it was not our Revolution*”. The people objected to the government’s nationalization policies. When the plantations were taken over for redistribution and businesses seized by the government without compensation, dissidents vehemently voiced their opposition. This infuriated Karume, who was already stinging with the memory of the Wapemba having given their

support to the Z.N.P. and the Z.P.P.P., essentially multi-racial though Arab-supported political parties. Despite efforts made by the A.S.P. politicians, on Pemba the pro-African party had received only 44 percent of the votes in the 1963 election.

Evidence indicates that Pemba may have been singled out for retribution on account of its lack of support for the ASP and the Revolution. Karume retaliated against Pemba by severely limiting food imports and withholding other forms of assistance. While Pemba's clove plantations were producing the bulk of the country's foreign exchange earnings, the people of the island were deprived of commodities they had come to regard as essential – rice, sugar, and spices. The merchants were prohibited from importing food either from Zanzibar or the mainland, and the resultant shortages were much more acute than any suffered on Zanzibar in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The food shortages meant that there was little alternative other than to turn to smuggling in order to obtain goods. "Karume issued a decree whereby anyone caught smuggling cloves would face a mandatory death sentence" (Martin 1978:116). The decree did not stop the Pemba people from "sneaking away with millions of shillings worth of cloves" (Martin 1978:116). As they had become desperate to get food, the Wapemba "not only smuggled out cloves but also peppers, seashells and coconuts. Hoping to reverse the trends, after Karume was shot the government began to invest in development projects for Pemba ... but smuggling has not stopped, and ... the government is rather embarrassed by Pemba and wary of the resentment still harboured by people there" (Martin 1978:117). Karume was assassinated in April 1972; following his assassination, hundreds of prisoners were arrested in Zanzibar and on the mainland. Amnesty International (1972) reported summary executions on the

island.

In 1977 the ASP merged with TANU, the ruling party on the mainland to form the current ruling party CCM (Chama cha Mapinduzi). From 1977, the Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM), the Party of the Revolution, became the only political party in Tanzania. All independent political activity and organization was prohibited. Many of the same incidents and human rights violations committed under Karume, have been repeated since that time and continue to be perpetuated even in the current context.

Amnesty International has documented many human rights violations in Zanzibar over the years. Throughout the 1970s, they have collected reports of various human rights abuses including: arbitrary arrest, summary executions, no right to defence lawyers at trials, torture during pre-trial investigations, death sentence by public firing squad, false confessions made under torture and death threats, imposition of harsh prison sentences, indefinite detention without trial (AI Reports 1972-1978).

In the 1980s, Amnesty International continued to report similar human rights violations in Zanzibar. They were concerned about the Preventative Detention Act of 1962 which continued to be enacted to detain indefinitely, without charge or trial, any person held to be “dangerous to peace and good order” (AI 1982:85). This meant that anyone, including journalists, could be detained for speaking out against the government or attending any demonstrations. It was reported that in May 1988 a BBC journalist was imprisoned after reporting an incident in which police shot dead two Muslim demonstrators in Zanzibar. “He was held for several weeks on a charge of riotous assembly, although he has been disabled since childhood and did not take part in the

demonstration" (AI 1989:92). Twenty-three people arrested after the same demonstration awaited trial at the end of the year. "A prisoner of conscience received a two-year jail sentence in Zanzibar for tearing up a photograph of a senior politician" (AI 1989:92).

According to Juma Othman:

In 1968, 69, 70, everything collapsed. Schools, hospitals, roads have collapsed since that time. From 1972-1984 there was no electricity in this island. Especially 75-76, there was none at all. Electricity was 100% during colonization. We'd rather have British colonialization than this type of independence. Where there was a telephone 40 years ago, now it's gone, schools too. Now we're going backwards. From my own point of view, British colonialism was better. Today nobody can guarantee the security of our lives from the government. People can be beaten as an animal, shot by police, who have no accountability.

In 1984, Jumbe stepped down. Mwinyi was president of Zanzibar. With Seif Shariff, they started to help Pemba people. Under Mwinyi, there was trade liberalization. We began to build again, people had hope. Wapemba began to come back from Europe too. Nyerere retired, Mwinyi went to mainland, things began to collapse again. People were not satisfied with the political system so they began to divide with the government. They started the opposition which was not permitted. I myself, was imprisoned for months without any trial.

The political parties started under difficult conditions. We have only moved to a multiparty system because of political pressure from the donors. Tanzania did not allow the multi-party system willingly, but that was a pressure from the donor countries. Throughout the process, the ruling party Chama Chama Mapinduzi (CCM) through using the radio and the television, they were publicising that multipartyism brings war, a lot of disobedience, like Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia, because they were not willing to accept it. But because they want money from the western countries, the donors, then they allowed it. So the political parties started, but under very difficult conditions.

The Civic United Front (CUF) was formed by the joining together of two political parties. Most of the Zanzibaris actually supported Civic United Front. Especially in Pemba. Though some, especially the CCM, they say that Wapemba support CUF because Seif Shariff Hamadi [opposition party leader] is coming from Pemba, but that is not the case. First of all, they're tired of the CCM, CCM has been here for several years, people of Pemba have not benefited anything except humiliation, that's all. Actually Pemba has become a testing ground for the CCM to use its force, you see. That was one reason, and second reason, is that people from Pemba they found out that CCM cannot bring any development for them. There was no time for the CCM to bring hope for the peoples of Pemba,

of course it has been here for several years, so it had a great time to do whatever it could do for the people of these islands. So, the people, they wanted a change. The other reason is that Mr. Seif Shariff Hamad, while he was a Chief Minister, in 1984, his performance was known to most of the people. The people who put their support, support a genuine leader. He does not mind upon himself, but he minds much to the people. That's why they supported the CUF and its policies of course (Othman).

Throughout the 1990s, human rights abuses have continued in both Pemba and Unguja along very similar lines. There have been numerous urgent action memos documenting cases where opponents of the Zanzibar Government (CCM) have been arrested and detained for the non-violent expression of their political views; detainees have continued to have no rights. Regarding public assembly, Zanzibar's laws require demonstrators to obtain local government authorization before organizing a demonstration or public assembly. Amnesty International (1990) was concerned that the authorities may have been using the occasions of demonstrations as an opportunity to imprison people known to be critics of the government and that the court was convicting people for political reasons on insufficient evidence (AI AFR 56/01/90). It became apparent that the bringing of political charges against people for such offenses as "behaviour likely to cause a breach of the peace, inciting others not to register on the electoral roll, attending illegal meetings, and possession and distribution of subversive documents has, since 1988, become a common way of dealing with political opponents" (AI AFR 56/13/90:3).

Mwalimu Bakari Ali for example, was arrested in July 1990 and charged with behaviour likely to cause a breach of the peace and uttering words which could incite others to endanger to public. "The charges arose from a meeting at which he publicly challenged the Regional Commissioner responsible for Chake Chake on Pemba to explain

remarks he allegedly made threatening ‘subversives’ with ‘disappearance’” (AI AFR 56/13/90:3). Another man was held “under the Area Commissioner’s powers of 24-hour detention, which were, however, abused. Every 24 hours he was formally released and then re-arrested before he could leave the police station” (AI AFR 56/01/90:2). It has also been reported that even a meeting of only three men has been construed as an offence in Zanzibar. Three men were brought to court in Pemba in November 1989 on charges of attending an illegal meeting. “Although police witnesses admitted that they had no way of knowing what the three men were discussing, the fact that they were ‘known inciters’ ... [meant that] they were presumed to have been talking about something illegal” (AI AFR 56/13/90:4). They were convicted despite the prosecution’s failure to prove that there was any unlawful purpose to the meeting (AI Report 1991).

The human rights violations throughout the 1990s documented by Amnesty International have included: cruel and unusual punishments in the form of flogging or caning imposed by courts; internal banishment; journalists have been arrested for reporting the news of Zanzibar; people have been arrested and/or dismissed or suspended from state employment for boycotting the 1990 local government election; others have been charged for belonging to an illegal political party. Despite the ending of a one party state, party activity was seriously constrained and permits to hold public meetings were repeatedly denied to opposition party members. The pattern of harassment of multi-party activists continued throughout both in the lead up and in the aftermath of the multi-party election in October 1995.

An external memo entitled “Urgent Action” was released for general distribution in

August 1990 by Amnesty International. It was regarding five prisoners of conscience, including “Juma Osman”[sic], who I have since interviewed and who is cited throughout this chapter. (Please refer to Appendix I for the story of his political history and imprisonment). The memo indicated that the men were being held under the Preventative Detention Decree on the grounds that they had been trying to disrupt the elections.

Opponents of the Union between Zanzibar and the mainland have called on people not to register and are instead calling for a referendum on the continuation of the Union. At least 60 other opponents of the government have been arrested, often for brief periods (in an effort to intimidate government opponents into abandoning the boycott), since mid-July. Those who have refused to register as voters have suffered reprisals: government servants have been dismissed or suspended; shopkeepers and students in higher education have had their trading licenses or scholarships withdrawn (AI Report 1990:1).

Suleiman, a teacher from Pemba, along with many others, did not register to vote in the 1990 election because his leader would not be participating. At that time more than one party existed but there was no multipartyism. Opposition parties had formed but were not permitted to participate in the election. Many people did not register and many, including him, were forced to take leave without pay. Suleiman received a letter saying he was “indulging himself in politics” which he claims was not true. Many more teachers were fired for the same reasons and a good number of them have since become very politically active. *“In 1990, some people didn’t bother to register – if there’s no unity anyway why bother? People were expelled from their jobs for not exercising their right to vote – then 1995 was the climax”* (Nassour).

In February 1992 a presidential commission recommended the ending of the one-party state. In May both Union and Zanzibar parliaments endorsed legislation amending

the Constitution to allow political parties in addition to the ruling CCM. However in reality, political activity continued to be restricted by regulations governing the registration of new political parties and the organization of meetings. New political parties were allowed to hold public meetings only if they were licensed by local government officials called Area Commissioners, the majority of whom were CCM members appointed by the central government. By the end of the year over 20 political parties had been registered.

In the lead up to the October 1995 multiparty election, the CCM was reportedly “in disarray” (Africa Confidential 1995:4). The President of Zanzibar, Salmin Amour was widely criticised. “No one outside the CCM leadership can explain how the man came to be President of the Islands of Zanzibar and Pemba” (Dotto 1994:9). It was widely acknowledged that the people in government did not owe their positions to the people. “In the run-up to the elections there were allegations of harassment by the authorities of members and supporters of opposition parties, notably in Zanzibar. The opposition ... CUF was repeatedly denied permits ... to hold public meetings (AI 1996:293). Election speculation, predictions and fears were as follows:

CCM faces its most serious challenge in Zanzibar where the opposition CUF has made great headway over the past three years. CUF vice-Chairman, Seif Sharif Hamad, is running for the Zanzibar Presidency. He is helped both by growing Zanzibari nationalism and by the virtual collapse of the CCM on the islands. Whoever wins the Zanzibar presidency, and the odds are it will be Hamad, the future of the islands will be the key post-election issue. If the elections in Zanzibar look rigged (many fear CCM will use its muscle to beat CUF in Unguja) the island could erupt (Africa Confidential 1995:5).

Sure enough, the presidential and parliamentary elections held in October were won by the ruling CCM party. “Dr. Salmin Amour was declared elected as President of

Zanzibar but the vast majority of his votes came from the main island Unguja. His CCM party was unable to win a single parliamentary seat in the island of Pemba. Mr. Seif Shariff Hamad's Civic United Front (CUF) won every seat in Pemba with ease" (Britain - Tanzania Society 1996:6). As could be expected, "the pattern of opposition support reflected specific regional and local grievances including ... a perception that financial inflows into Zanzibar like donor assistance and investment were disproportionate between the 2 Isles Pemba and Unguja in favour of the latter" (Cameron 1996:11).

Of course, this is the nature of any political party all over in the world, any political party must have a certain area which is heavy supported. This is very common actually. So the CUF in Pemba, was much, much, much supported by the people. You can almost say that it was more than 90% supported. So during the elections here. Of 21 constituencies, CCM did not gain a single seat here in Pemba. Even in Zanzibar, if the election had gone smoothly, very smoothly, with no manipulation at all, in Zanzibar CUF (would have) won about 15 seats, or more than that. Now we have three. In Unguja, we were confident of winning a minimum of 15 seats, we were sure of that. We have about 70% support in Unguja. Our presidential candidate, there in Zanzibar, actually he got more votes there than here (Othman).

The election results in Zanzibar were indeed questioned by election observers and opposition parties (AI 1996:293). The Joint International Observer Group issued an "Interim Statement on the Tanzania Electoral Process" and although veiled in cautious and diplomatic terminology, their statement did manage to convey some of the abnormalities encountered throughout the election period: "Since counting was delayed, observers were unable, where present, to certify the results of the elections. However, in Zanzibar, during the days after polling, observers witnessed recounts of votes, and a number of discrepancies in the counting was reported to the Zanzibar and National Electoral Commissions" (1995). A more popular rendition of the widely believed to be rigged

election process in Zanzibar is summed up in a brief description by Ahmed from Pemba:

"For them to count the votes, it took many days. One day it was announced on the radio that CUF had won the election ... another day they said 'no it's not true, we have counted again and now we know that Salmin Amour is the President. Oh, you should have seen all the people crying' (Ahmed).

What had happened was that on October 24, two days after the election, the Director of Elections supplied the two parties with unofficial returns for the presidential vote. The results left CCM absolutely thunderstruck.

... Seif Shariff Hamad, the CUF candidate, had narrowly edged out the CCM incumbent, Dr. Salmin Amour. This was a calamity CCM could not countenance. To do so, it contended, would amount to a reversal of the 1964 Revolution and a restoration of Arab domination. The following day, CCM wrote the ZEC [Zanzibar Electoral Commission] rejecting the outcome outright, arguing that the election was demonstrably 'not free and fair'. The letter concluded: 'We therefore insist that the results of the presidential election not be announced and that the whole election be nullified and done afresh in view of the many irregularities that occurred'.

Meanwhile, with the unexpected delay in the official announcement, tensions in the streets mounted, rumours ran rampant, and confusion reigned. Finally, on 26 October, the ZEC declared Amour re-elected with a slim majority of 50.2% of the valid votes, and promptly destroyed the ballots. CUF understandably was furious, many in the diplomatic community were equally dismayed, while CCM quietly dropped its call for cancellation of the election (Anglin 1998:6).

Within a day of the announcement of the official election results, Dr. Salmin Amour was sworn in as President of Zanzibar for a second term. The whispered rumours were that Nyerere had intervened with the Zanzibar Electoral Commission to influence the outcome of the election. "One account claims that Nyerere flew to Zanzibar to remind the ZEC chairman ... of his obligations as a CCM member" (Anglin 1998:23). Regardless of the final outcome, the opposition supporters remain convinced that "the evidence is

compelling, certainly ‘beyond all reasonable doubt’, that the CUF candidate won the presidential election” (Anglin 1998:6). In the final tally, CCM ended up with 26 seats against CUF’s 24 “but the narrow victory margin is not reflected in the composition of the Zanzibar legislature where in the House, CCM has 51 representatives compared to CUF’s 24 ... a reflection of the president’s power to appoint” (Mihayo and Kallaghe 1996:1).

So actually after what happened has happened, Salmin Amour and some men formed the government. Actually he started the operation as was conducted by Abeid Karume in 1964. I think you have heard, or sometimes you have seen, how or what has taken place under the leadership of Salmin Amour, especially for the peoples of Pemba. Civil servants have been kicked off, those who are originating from Pemba who are in Zanzibar there with high posts, they have been demoted. Even those who were in the CCM helping him, he has demoted them. Just because they are from Pemba – but they are CCM, and they helped him! He has dropped them just because they are Pembans. Because he says that since the colonization time, the peoples of Pemba have not been loyal to Afro-Shirazi and now to the CCM, the daughter of Afro-Shirazi.

Why has Salmin Amour taken such an aggressive tactic? Because he did not win a single vote. Isn't there a better way to try to prove that Wapemba should have voted for him? Well, I think he has some other reason behind him, more than what we know. It is only he who knows why he thinks 'I must punish Wapemba, I must make Pemba to go in this direction' (Othman).

Following the elections in Zanzibar, there were reports that CUF members and supporters in Zanzibar, particularly Pemba, were harassed and detained. “Over 100 supporters of the CUF were harassed, ill-treated and arrested during an apparent crack-down on opposition members after the election in Zanzibar” (AI Report 1996:294). Acts of violence, arson and sabotage were reported. About 3000 people of Pemba origin and who have been living in Unguja for many years (between 5 to 25 years) have been harassed or intimidated into leaving Unguja for Pemba, leaving their properties behind (CUF 1995:3). In Pemba itself the Daily News has also reported a “number of incidents”

(Britain-Tanzania Society 1996:7). According to the CUF reports, what happened after the announcement that Mr Salmin Amour had been declared winner of the election “was nothing but violations and abuse of basic Human Rights under the umbrella of CCM - Victory celebrations. Many CUF members particularly those of Pemba origin were beaten, had their houses and properties burnt or destroyed, humiliated, threatened, arrested by police, etc.” (CUF 1995:1). A large number of CUF members and particularly those with Pemba origin were either “arrested by police, remanded on framed false charges and others tortured in custody” (CUF 1995:2). People in Pemba, were automatically assumed to be CUF supporters and could be taken from their homes in the middle of the night to face interrogation or their houses would be searched without warrants.

CUF has recorded countless descriptions of acts of torture and humiliation perpetrated by CCM loyalists – particularly the security people and CCM zealots, known as Maskani youths. “A group of 300 police-men who were sent to Pemba to DESTABILISE the opposition by imposing acts of misconduct to the people which include harassing and torturing people now have turned wild. Pemba residents are now facing a critical situation due to brutality by these Police. The police engage in severely beating people, taking them in their vehicles for 10-15 km away from their villages at night and ask them to go back on foot” (CUF 1996b:1). According to similar reports, “the CCM Maskani youths in Zanzibar town have been given mandate by the Zanzibar Government to harass, intimidate and beat up officials of the opposition party CUF ... [these youth] ... have taken over the duties of the police” (CUF 1996b:2). Wapemba have been forced by the police and the Maskani youth into acts intended to degrade. For

instance, Wapemba under threat of torture would be forced to sing the President's praise, consume faeces, commit other humiliating acts such as jumping 'to and fro' like a frog for 30-45 minutes after being beaten. Wapemba were subject to scarring, stripping, caning, shaving with shards of broken glass, jailing, beatings resulting in a loss of consciousness, rape, jailing, etc. *"A lot of people have been shot dead by the police and no one has been sent to the court. The police are also the investigators. They lie and then the case is closed ... so here not only the beating is a problem, even you can be killed – This is a jungle"* (Othman).

No State of Emergency or any official order of curfew has been announced in Pemba. But surprisingly, in Pemba towns "nobody is supposed to be out of his house after 6:30 in the evening, otherwise the Police picks and beat him up and then forced to go 'to and fro' jumping like a frog for 30-45 minutes" (CUF 1996b:1). *"Here in Pemba actually, the government sent troops here, by local means they were to beat on them. The peoples are just sitting, during early periods after the evening prayer, even just playing cards and so on, just innocently and they can be beaten"* Othman. An excerpt from my own journal written on Sunday May 26 at approximately 10:15 describes a situation I witnessed one night:

About 15 people from the FFU (Field Force Unit) just walked by the house I'm staying at in Wete. They are wearing their full gear, shields, weapons, everything. They're going up and down the streets telling people to get inside their houses: "No more talking, go to sleep, we'll come back in 5 minutes and if you're still outside, we'll beat you". Madawa and I had been eating a late dinner at his sister's house, someone came to tell us we'd better get back to our homes because *"bakora* [literally "beatings", however also used to denote those who carry out the beatings] is here". We passed via the back way behind a row of houses as they passed in the front.

Another way of referring to the harassment missions was through the disguised term “melody”. It was explained that ‘melody’ is the word for travelling Tarab groups who go from town to town putting on shows. This was likened to the Maskan people who do the beatings. People who are afraid of speaking openly about anything to do with politics call them ‘melody’. *“Did you hear about melody? Yes they were in this town last night, they put on a big show” (Zulfa)*. Zulfa, in trying to describe the sense of fear that prevails in Pemba notes that *“There is no good guard. People do what they can but always wonder, maybe melody can come and beat me tonight” (Zulfa)*.

Regarding the security operations, Wapemba see through the tight measures and perceive the government’s weakness and fears: *“You know they are desperate, that is why they watch everything” (Masoud)*. They are also not being fooled by government propaganda which denies that any problems exist in the isles. Wapemba are very aware about the human rights abuses that have been taking place and although political discussion is often disguised, outside of the public transcript, they discuss politics everyday. Even small children sing songs about politics. There is no secret in Pemba about the human rights abuses which take place, nor about their perpetrators.

They come from Unguja. The FFU, the KMKM sometime they are just even these Maskanis, they are all together with the police harassment mission too. I have been working in the Government Office and it is not true that the government does not know what's happening on Pemba. What is the role of the intelligence system? What is the role of police? What is the role of the Area Commissioners, or the Regional Commissioners? Because if it's just a group of hooligans, what is the role of the Seat? It is not just a group of hooligans. That was a special task force, assigned by Salmin, he wanted to punish Wapemba because they didn't give him the post that's all. So like Karume did in 1964 for Wapemba, to humiliate them, to beat them and so on, that's what Salmin repeated. There is no particular secret. The oppression is there. The people who have been beaten are there

(Othman).

People in the villages have reported the same problems throughout Pemba. They are affected by politics and lead political lives even in the most remote villages. In Pembeni, which is about a 45 minute walk from the nearest road, *"we are scared because of politics here – Sana! [very much]"* (Aziza). In Pembeni, they explained to me that Salmin Amour had already been in power for 5 years. During those 5 years he had done nothing for Pemba and he had not been as angry as he is now. They again echoed the sentiment that Pemba was being punished because Salmin Amour had not won a single seat on the island and they also had firsthand information about the atrocities being committed:

They can take you, they can beat you. This woman's nephew was taken by the police for supposedly saying things about the president ... Numu's sister Hadija is a CUF party member. She has just returned from town with news of a man from Weshe who had been badly beaten. His arm was broken but the police refused to give him the form that he needed in order to go to the hospital ... The people are afraid of the beatings. People have taken down their political signs because of the stories of Maskan people coming and forcing them to eat the signs. Every time we hear a Land Rover at night we are afraid they could be coming to beat us. They come at night and they take people, they can beat anyone ... Many in this village are on the list – maybe they'll be beaten or taken (Fatuma).

Fatuma explained that the problems in Pemba are that there is no money, people are hungry, there's no business, and police people beat them on the road. *"We are afraid and just stay hiding in the forest"* (Fatuma). She provided the example that it had just been the time for celebrating *Sikuku*, a religious holiday, and normally some people would have joined the festivities in town. This time they didn't allow their children to go to town claiming that it was too dangerous at this time. *"Problems usually happen at night, so it*

is safer to stay here at night” (Fatuma).

In Unguja, Wapemba have also been facing serious threats from the CCM regime. The “Zanzibar Government is continuing to demolish houses in areas most dominated by Wapemba and CUF members” (CUF 1996a:2). About 700 families in Old Stone Town were ordered to vacate their houses within seven days. The reason given was that the houses were in bad condition and dangerous. The reality, according to many, is that the Stone Town is highly dominated by people from Pemba and CUF members whom they wish to get rid of. The local leaders have been directed to prevent anyone of Pemba origin whose house has been demolished or forced to vacate his premises in Stone Town from settling in any locality within the Urban/West Region. Even the relatives are not permitted to welcome such persons; they are forced to go back to Pemba leaving all their belongings in Unguja (CUF 1996a). “All these inhuman practices and orders given by the government are aimed at demolishing and weakening the opposition in Zanzibar. For a CUF member or person of Pemba origin living in Unguja now life is perilous” (CUF 1996a:3). According to Madawa, in Unguja, *“the Revolution there was a big problem – but only for few people: Arabs and Indians. Now is the biggest problem. Nowadays, the problems are not for Arabs, they are for Pemba people only. Just if you support CUF, you can get a problem”*.

Following the elections, it was widely assumed that most Wapemba were CUF supporters, thus enemies of the Government. In addition to the violent human rights abuses documented above, Wapemba have faced retribution in the areas of employment and education. As has been noted above, most of the people whose houses were

demolished in Zanzibar, were inhabited by Wapemba. According to popular thought, the Zanzibar Government intended to empty Unguja of its Wapemba inhabitants. Two theories about the government's reasoning behind this were explained to me by Suleih and Nassour as follows:

They want all the Wapemba to go back to Pemba before 2000 when there will be another election because Pemba has 21 seat and Unguja has 25. They think that the only support for CUF in Unguja comes from Wapemba, so they want them to leave.

1) Since Wapemba supports CUF, they are trying to dismantle CUF strongholds in Unguja, and send Wapemba back. The reason for getting rid of Wapemba is to minimize the population of Wapemba in Unguja so that they could win the next election (Suleih);

2) They are also trying to dismantle at the grassroots level. If a person is born in Zanzibar town instead of the shamba [countryside, village], they will have different knowledge. Because of their environment, their ideas will be wide. See, even a child born of a Mandazi seller could be a threat ... so they like to send us back to Pemba to constrict our view to be that of a [agricultural] producer and to keep us malnourished (Nassour).

As such, many Wapemba living in Unguja have been forcefully transferred to work in Pemba, have been given indefinite leave or have been forced to retire. Others have been demoted or have lost their opportunities for education. People operating in the informal sector have been as severely hit as civil servants, many whom have also lost their jobs. "A number of small-holder petty traders who are selling tomatoes, beans, mangoes, etc. have been forcefully removed from their small markets and have been asked to go back home. They all hail from Pemba" (CUF 1995:4).

People believe that structural adjustment policies are being implemented with political intentions. Government down-scaling has often translated to the loss of Wapemba jobs. Opportunities for retrenchment are taken as an opportunity just to reduce

the number of Wapemba. Suleiman, Madawa's brother-in-law had just been retrenched from the bank where he had been working for 25 years. *"In the People's Bank, just 4 months back, they released 48 workers there. Amongst them, 46 are Pembans and only two are Ungujans. If you ask them, what criteria did they use so as to see that they have dismissed 46 workers who originated from Pemba. They say 'oh, just we have done it in good faith' ... but that's not the truth (Othman).* The downscaling has done nothing but reinforce the levels of redundancy in government offices. *"If you go to the Ministry of Communication there, you will see that a lot of people have been transferred from Unguja to come to Pemba. Well, they have nothing to do. They just sit there on their desks"(Othman).*

In offices there is nothing to do, there is not good management. People employ to help relatives sometimes, not because there is a job to do. Many of the workers are redundant ... sometimes they have three typists, but only one letter to be typed. The retrenchment was supposed to reduce the number of support staff, messengers, typists ... In the first phase this was totally changed, in my department they were supposed to let 25 go at the office in Pemba and let 25 go at the office in Unguja. In Unguja, 23 of them were from Pemba. In my own office, there was a lawyer, two with Masters from the UK, the director, myself ... all were Wapemba ... It is very dangerous to talk. We have all been instructed not to go back to the [office] to mingle with workers there. We are seen as subversive, but we never did anything" (Suleiman).

People are not employed according to merit. *"If you want any type of employment now, you need a birth certificate" (Madawa).* Madawa's neighbour in Unguja is a CCM party member and he has a soap factory. After the election, he let everyone go and advertised "if you need a job, bring a birth certificate, no one from Pemba will get a job". According to Madawa, his business is going very slowly.

Education opportunities are also being limited for Wapemba. *"What Salmin*

Amour's Government believes is that Wapemba have much education when those from Unguja did not have an education at all. So they should mark time now" (Ali). It is true that many Wapemba have succeeded in higher education, however it has been through their efforts to overcome their obstacles not because they had been favoured with greater opportunities. The first secondary school in Pemba was only opened in 1963. Before that all the students who went to secondary school had to go to Zanzibar. However, "in 1973, of 48 students, 42 were from Pemba – because they took the first class students, in those days, people were chosen by merit, not because of influence" (Nassour). Despite the constraints they have faced, Wapemba have developed a reputation for being bright and successful in education. The perception currently held by opponents of the Wapemba is that their opportunities should now be limited in order to give the people of Unguja a better chance. It was reported that "more than 200 students (others in their final year of studies) were expelled and missed their final examinations for reasons that they registered for voting. All are from Pemba ...The court ruled to their favour, but the Ministry of Education in Zanzibar refused the court ruling" (CUF 1995:3).

We would like to believe that the qualified will get a post. Presently it is impossible to get further education with this government. The top hierarchy is against Wapemba. Wapemba are being blocked. It is not as easy for the government here to block, if you've been accepted, so they don't tackle things only from the top, they try to get them at the bottom. The lifespan is cut off, tackled at the grassroots at primary and secondary schools ... in 10 years to come there will be no university students from Pemba. The University cannot accept you if you are underqualified, so they have to make sure that Wapemba cannot become qualified. At Fidel Castro Secondary School, the chemicals are out of date, they are being taught the wrong things so that when they write their entrance exams they will not know the proper answers ... Experienced teachers have been expelled in Pemba, particularly since 1990. It has been done intentionally. The purpose is to lower the education standards here. There has

been a scarcity of teachers, the teachers have now been replaced by Maskan station party supporters (Nassour).

The political context has helped to shape the socio-economic conditions on Pemba.

The current political context, combined with Pemba's physical inaccessibility have meant that Pemba receives a very small percentage of Zanzibar's development assistance. *"90% of the budget is spent in Unguja and that is the reason that Pemba is left behind. Even investors don't come here. There is no infrastructure, electricity, communication, transportation, etc. In a tune, we are in a pause ... since 1964" (Ahmed).* Nassour does not agree that development has halted completely on Pemba, however he does point out many socio-economic problems which currently exist on the island:

Humans with a brain will develop ... but education is difficult to get ... life expectancy is low, there is poor nutrition, at 40 you're already old. The water supply is inconsistent and it is doubtful if it is sterile or not. For 30 days sometimes there is none, because we have to depend on electricity to pump it. Doctors have been expelled too for political reasons. People don't have purchasing power to go to dispensary. Go to a government hospital, you'll see there's nothing there (Nassour).

Before turning in the next chapter to the ways in which Wapemba are shaping, responding and living within the current development context, I will first go into further detail regarding the current context as the Wapemba have described it to me. In addition to the constant political tension and the discrimination faced by the people of Pemba, they have outlined countless other issues which are at least in part, the direct result of the political situation in the isles.

Ahmed and Zulfa compiled a long list of constraints faced by Wapemba, which is sometimes supplemented by other people's descriptions below. In Pemba, they first noted

that there is no industrialization and there is poor infrastructure. Regarding transportation, the roads are bad and few in number. Pemba can also experience fuel shortages. In terms of communication, there are no telephones and there is no newspaper. The Wapemba have access only to the government owned newspaper which is brought over from Unguja. Regarding lack of industry, they pointed out that food is expensive as processing is not done in Pemba. *"If you need any type of food goods, you need to import"* (Zulfa), which is of course very expensive. Inflation is a problem as prices have gone up while people have had fewer opportunities to earn money.

Electricity and subsequently water supply are limited (Masoud 1996, Obura 1994) which make it *"too difficult to make a business counting upon having these"* (Madawa). Because capital is difficult to get and bank loans are unreasonable, it is difficult to start a business. There are very few jobs in the formal sector; the jobs that do exist do not provide enough of a wage for people to survive on. In addition, the offices are empty of supplies and there is often no work to do. People have no incentive or motivation to spend 8 hours a day in such an office. According to Suleih, *"Everything is too expensive. The problem is that there's no industry and there are no companies. There's only government work where people do big work for few shillings. It's not worth it, to do your own work is better. Plus, they can't allow you to talk about politics, if they hear they can take you out of your job"* (Suleih). As there is no personal physical security, let alone security regarding employment or shelter, people realize that *"even people with a job can lose it with no reason. It means that people can't make good plans; the future is too uncertain"* (Madawa).

Most people are engaged in agriculture and work in the “informal sector”, however there is only a small market for producers thus the market gets saturated very easily. People copy each other’s good ideas and there is not enough business here for everyone.

In Pemba itself, everyone has the same problems and there's a very small market so the same kinds of things won't work. In Pemba, it's full of problems ... there's no money because there's no work: no companies, no hotels, no restaurants, no boats that are staying here and there full time. For the people of Pemba to satisfy themselves it is very difficult. Because all the people have the same problems and the same means, you can have a hundred bags of rice that you need to sell, but the ones who need to buy, they don't have money, it means you don't have any business. The people who could buy don't have any job (Madawa).

People who are able to find the capital to start businesses also face difficulties in keeping the business running. For example, a person who is able to get a *dala dala* (mini-bus) to run a public transportation service, will find that there are no spare parts available in Pemba, petrol is expensive, business is slow and profits are low. *“He can find that he can only afford maybe to make two trips in one week” (Ahmed)*. Or in another case of a man with a business, *“you can find that his shop is full but business may be very slow and profits in one day are not enough to feed one house” (Ahmed)*. Shopkeepers find that their customers often have no money.

Shop-keepers told me that their turnover is slow and has very insecure returns, being dependant on the ability of people to pay ... Most people buy on credit, with a shop-keeper finding refusal either impossible or extremely difficult where a community constitutes one’s kin, with many failing to pay back their debts on time, or at all, which in turn means the shop-keeper is unable to buy more or varied produce, or is himself forced to buy in credit from his private suppliers (Rose 1994:43).

There is bureaucracy which often impedes people’s initiatives as they need permits

and permission for so many things which are often not granted. Masoud told me of fabricated cases being in court for very long periods *“just to stop the people from doing anything – for example these fishermen in the village who are supposed to go to Mombasa, they have to report to the police once a week. If they don't, a truck full will come to the village, to conduct a search and then beat them. So they cannot go to work ... they are trying to make all the people poor”* (Masoud).

The difficulties in pursuing formal education have been mentioned above, however *“even when people are able to attain a high level of education, they find that there's nothing to do here, thus we have the phenomenon of brain drain”* (Nassour). The population of Pemba, according to Ahmed, always goes down. *“It seems that the government has no policy at all to develop this island, so actually the life is going darker and darker and darker”* (Ali). In one uncommon instance, a stranger on the *dala-dala* responded to my comment regarding the beauty of the landscape one day by informing me that *“this place is paradise but the people live in hell”*.

It is unusual for people to speak openly about anything which could be construed as political for fear of retribution. Most of the events and circumstances described above have not become popular knowledge in the rest of the world, largely because of the government's ability to censor and deny such reports. Following the 1995 election, in a similar trend as in days gone by, a well known Zanzibar journalist Salim Said Salim, was banned. He was completely prevented by the government from continuing to operate as a journalist in Zanzibar, for having written an article in a daily newspaper, in which he wrote of the President Amour's revenge against Pemba. He was said to have been writing anti-

government statements aimed at disrupting peace and national unity. Following the same trend, the Government banned the Dar es Salaam newspaper 'Majira' from Zanzibar for articles the paper had published which were said to have 'lowered the reputation of the Isles' government and its leaders and exposed them to ridicule'. One man was fined when he was found with a copy (Britain-Tanzania Society 1996).

CUF has not recognized Salmin Amour as legitimate president of Zanzibar since the election, nor has it recognised "his illegal government" (CUF 1996:1). The President is holding just as stubbornly to his position that the Zanzibar government will "never hold a dialogue with CUF and there [is] no need to form a government of national unity" (Britain-Tanzania Society 1996:7). As such, "the political crisis in Zanzibar arising from widespread scepticism about the recent election results, age-old differences between communities, economic factors and personality clashes between the main protagonists grows worse" (Britain-Tanzania Society 1996:6).

Salmin Amour's hand-picked Chief Minister, Mohamed Bilal, says the islands are "back in the old politics of hatred and confrontation, and has accused foreign embassies of fuelling the crisis" (Africa Confidential 1996:8). Following the political crisis and reports of human rights violations in the isles after the election most donors involved themselves by suspending their aid to the isles (Mihayo and Kallaghe 1996). *"Well, the donors have taken a responsibility to change the situation, to see that this political era will be corrected in Zanzibar. We have the hope that if they will be firm, there will be a change. This whole country of Tanzania, cannot survive even for a year without a donation from the outside" (Othman).*

Madawa, living in Unguja, points out that political problems affect everyone negatively because:

for the things that are depending for the whole people, it means that a punishment for the government hurts all the people ... if there is some problem for CUF or for CCM it means there is some problem for the whole of people. Now we are having the big problem of shortages. There's a shortage of everything: ships, containers, lorries and its not just for the government (Madawa).

In Pembeni on the other hand, the women told me that given the choice, they would rather have no outside assistance because this would punish the government. They told me that in Pemba, the money would just be spent on Maskan people anyway. *"We are like the tail here – they always take it first if any assistance comes"* (Numu). They described themselves as having been *"abandoned by the government"*. In Pemba, they have not become accustomed to receiving outside assistance and have therefore not become dependant on outside forces. *"We don't care, it is hard for the people but we'll just keep going"* (Hadija).

The Zanzibar Government has maintained a strong grip on power through force rather than through popular support. This has been interpreted as a weakness in that they remain all powerful 'de jure', because they know that they do not hold power over half of their population in a 'de facto' sense. People see through the ruling party and observe what has happened under their regime. *"We're not really independent. African people try to lead us like colonialism. In one week they can have a big house, they don't care about the majority of the people, they are just improving themselves"* (Ahmed). The CCM incumbents were overwhelmingly rejected by the Wapemba in the last election and "Pembans knew that the balance of national politics was forever altered and they could

take credit for a CCM weakened, in part, by earlier forms of resistance to the dominant party from the mid-1980s" (Cameron 1996:12).

From the Zanzibar Revolution to the present day regime, it is possible to observe the continuation or evolution, rather than the elimination of repressive policies enacted by the government against the people of Pemba. Decades ago, the government attempted to change people's behaviour through force and political indoctrination and even now, as preparations are being made to leave the twentieth century, the current regime is enacting the very same patterns and mistakes as its forbears. The government continues to "have a tendency of changing political cases into criminal charges" (CUF 1996c:2) as in the not so distant past. As Madawa points out, *"life is hard enough plus we have these additional problems caused by politics. In Zanzibar you can expect two strange things about life: you can be arrested at any time for no reason and also, your business and life is never secure"* (Madawa). Being aware of these possibilities and understanding how the government functions however, allow Wapemba to prepare themselves for difficulties and keep 'a step ahead' of the situation by relying on their own means.

The social, cultural, economic and political legacies which impacted differently on each of the two islands continue to feature prominently in the current day to day lives of the people inhabiting the isles. In examining the tumultuous history of Zanzibar politics and ethnic relations, it is evident that power has been abused and politics has been the arena for a vindictive game of spite waged between ethnic groups. Currently in Zanzibar, politics and ethnicity are entangled in an ugly web where the many of the same damaging historical patterns and problems are being re-played in the current political arena and

among members of civil society.

The following chapters will examine the ways in which Wapemba have resisted being subsumed by the difficulties described above. Despite the constraints afforded by the oppressive regime and their socio-economic environment, the Wapemba can be observed living their lives, struggling and succeeding. The gains they have made, in the absence of outside assistance, have been through their own efforts and learning processes, according to their own social and cultural values. They have been strengthened by supporting one another through these same cultural means. It is to the daily lives of Wapemba where we will now turn our focus and where we will be able to uncover and begin to understand the wealth of Pemba.

CHAPTER 6

Everyday Life Among the Wapemba

As has been observed in the previous chapter, the people of Pemba have reason to believe that there has been a concerted effort in Zanzibar to repress Wapemba. The government's strongarm tactics designed to crush the opposition party and its predominantly Wapemba supporters, however, have actually contributed to the strengthening of the opposition. The opponents of the CCM Government have now joined together in solidarity against a common threat; their sense of righteousness is fuelled by CCM extremism. According to Madawa, as the government has been trying to crush Wapemba, *"Now they're stronger. They are more alert, less trustful of the government"* (Madawa) which means that they cannot be controlled as effectively. Ali reiterates the view: *"if the snake has bit you, if you see a stick or coconut leaves you can think it is a snake, you are careful. Here everyone's been bitten, they have their eyes open and learn from mistakes"* (Ali).

The people of Pemba, against efforts to repress them, have needed to be innovative in devising survival strategies. New rules, barriers and worries have been met with new means of coping which have most often been drawn from the cultural means at their disposal. People have learned to react to potential threats and opportunities in their own ways, maximizing benefits according to their own design. Observing Wapemba reveals time and again that where there is a will, people find a way. Personal histories from Pemba illustrate the subtle movements of people refusing to be victimized. Wapemba

resistance reveals that the people of Pemba have learned to play the game of their oppressors which demonstrates the capacity of human agency to affect the outcome of both positive and negative experiences, hinting at wider implications for outside interventions in general. Constraints are not merely reacted to but are interacted with in the innovative creation of acts of resistance. This chapter aims to document the strength demonstrated by Wapemba and to reveal in the process that their culture has been key in sustaining their efforts both in resistance and in development. Their stories illustrate their flexibility and the ability of people to bounce back and find their own alternatives in an uncertain, volatile, potentially crushing political climate. Their words paint a picture of life on the ground which hint at the key principles of development as empowerment which will be expanded upon in the analysis section which will follow.

The Intrinsic Process of Cooperation versus the Imposition of Formalised Cooperatives

It is evident in working with both registered cooperatives and informal groups that cooperation as a way of life exists naturally in Zanzibar society. Cooperatives themselves however are often unnatural groupings that have come about as a result of the state's "tendency to monopolize and curb autonomous organizational initiatives" (Cameron 1995:13). Cooperatives in Zanzibar are a government form of organization rather than an initiative of the people. The formation of cooperatives has been imposed from the top as the recommended way of organising for development. "It would be quite appropriate to observe that these cooperatives were government initiated and not the people's voluntary

undertaking” (Shao 1992:81).

Various examinations of women’s cooperatives however have indicated that cooperatives rarely function according to the intentions of the government. Kirsten (1994), who set out to identify obstacles in the process of strengthening the cooperative movement in Zanzibar “soon found a very unfruitful pattern: Registration of a primary society was followed by some half-hearted activity for some time and then the society was slowly declining and finally dying” (Kirsten 1994:5). This pattern is boosted by the District leaders who “seem more concerned with getting women to buy membership cards than in initiating any projects which would really serve to develop the women and the village” (Manase, Sheriff and Havenik 1980:117). As a result, very few cooperatives in Zanzibar are commercially successful. This scenario was illustrated time and again with cooperatives interviewed. The members would admit that they had formed a cooperative because they had been advised that they would receive help from the government. In most cases the assistance had never materialised and the group members had carried on working in the same way as they always had despite being registered as a cooperative. *“It is like we never became a cooperative except that we had to buy a registration card which cost 20,000 shillings. It’s a tough life, but now it’s even worse” (Wahid).*

Linking Attitudes and Expectations: The Origins of Motivation

People formed cooperatives most commonly because they were instructed to and because they were under the impression that if they were to form a cooperative, they might be in a position to receive government assistance in the form of money, land, tools,

equipment, training, etc. “Material inducement – tractor services and agricultural inputs – together with exhortation and demonstrations by ‘activist’ farmers underlay a technocratic and non-participatory approach to co-operative development” (Cameron 1995:5). These cooperatives which were externally motivated and inspired merely by the expectation of receiving assistance were generally run by unenthusiastic members who had become discouraged upon the realisation that assistance was not forthcoming. A men’s cooperative in Pemba for example had formed after the members had heard a radio announcement by the government that there would be assistance: *“so now we’re waiting”*. They indicated that they were not working towards their objectives as they had not received any money from the government. Members were angry and indicated that they felt ignored by the Cooperatives Office. The members had become discouraged and unenthusiastic because they had seen no development and as such, many had dropped out of the cooperative. There was a 10 member minimum on cooperatives so the men who had remained with the cooperative asked their wives and mothers to become members. The women were not actually doing anything cooperative-related but they had been asked to join to increase the number of members so that the cooperative could remain alive on paper in the event that assistance might still be forthcoming.

The expectation of outside assistance fosters an attitude of dependency which stands in stark contrast with the attitude and enthusiasm of people who have been working for their own reasons and according to their own initiative. The Jambe Cooperative in Pemba for example has seen many benefits through their own efforts. The members had been students together at Qur’an school and had begun because they had wanted to raise

enough money for their village to have a good celebration for *Maulid* (Religious holiday). They had initially been urged to organize for production by their religious teacher. Their organization ended up satisfying social and cultural needs as well as physical and monetary needs. It was strengthened by being held together by cultural and social ties. Once the original objective had been met, the group members continued to work together having realised the benefits. They had worked together since 1983 and had finally registered as a cooperative in 1991. They currently work all together; some do agriculture, some fish and as such, every member has employment. They have a joint bank account and also try to keep about 100,000 shillings in hand, in case any of their members need it in an emergency in the middle of the night. They received a loan and have paid it back. They satisfy the village needs with their produce first before selling it in town. They have repaired the road to their village a bit so that they can goods transport more easily. Essentially, the Jambe Cooperative has taken on the role of development organisation for the entire village without expecting outside assistance or depending on anyone other than themselves for their own development.

But Have They Really Become a Cooperative? A Glimpse of Human Agency

The cooperatives interviewed in this study tended to be either unenthusiastic practically defunct cooperatives who had not formed of their own prior initiative, or they were pre-existing groups who merely kept up the facade of being a formally organised cooperative. The groups who were keeping up the facade of being a cooperative had their own motivation for working together and would appear to accept the bureaucratic rules

imposed by the government but then they would continue to work in the same way as they always had. They would appear to be organising as they had been instructed to in order to reap any possible gains, but they would also continue to act according to their own norms. They were opportunity seeking by continuing to do things in their own way while appearing to be doing what needed to be done in order to take advantage of possible benefits. This type of reaction to bureaucracy and government attempts to control (i.e. appropriation or opportunity seeking while resisting being told how to do it), is evident throughout many aspects of life among Wapemba.

In Pembeni, I met two women's cooperatives making pottery in the same village. They were filling orders for the same market and producing virtually the same goods. It turned out that the women in Pembeni had always made pottery, the girls had learned from the elders by watching and improving on their techniques. They have always worked together in informal and flexible groups but had not been working as formal cooperatives until they had been urged to by a local politician. After hearing that they might receive assistance, they agreed to form a cooperative and collected the names of all the women who wanted to be members. The list was sent in to the local Party branch where they said that the group was too big and it would be better for them to form two cooperatives. In asking how they chose to divide into two cooperatives, the women answered "*we just divided ourselves into two cooperatives. No wasi wasi [confusion]. We came together under the mango tree and said 'ok, we have to be two groups', so we just divided. Some went to one side, others went to the other – nobody cared which side they joined*" (Ghanime). The women were not particular about which side they joined as the formal

organisation of a registered cooperative was perceived as a mere formality. They continued to work in small groups as they had in the past with friends and relatives regardless of which cooperative they were registered in. People upheld the facade of being a cooperative when appropriate on the chance that they might be able to receive any benefits, while continuing to do things in the best way for themselves.

Playing and Winning the Game of Development Assistance

People have learned to play the game of development assistance so to speak. This is most clearly illustrated by a village which has both a men's and a women's cooperative which formed at the same time. The members of the women's cooperative were the wives, mothers and sisters of the members of the men's cooperative. One of the members of the men's cooperative helped the women to submit a proposal for funding. The women's group then received approximately four million shillings from a foreign donor which was spent on the whole village, not only on the women's cooperative initiatives. Their money was over half gone only two months after having received it and there was nothing related to the stated goals of the cooperative to show for it. *"We used it for eating"* they laughed. It was apparent again that cooperatives were not perceived as serious organizations and that the money received by one will inevitably be "eaten" by everyone. When the man was asked why he did not submit a proposal for his own cooperative, he responded *"because everyone knows that the money is only going to women's groups these days"* (Mr. Kondo). Both the men and the women, having learned the rules of the game, used the system to their advantage. The men ensured that the

women applied for funding, the women's group received funds and now both the men and the women are enjoying the benefits. Apparently the Cooperatives Officer, who had ensured that the application was processed, also received a percentage of the money. Thus the business relationships were mutually beneficial.

Adaptation and Adaptability, Principles Applying at All Levels

In working with people from Pemba, flexibility and adaptability became apparent in two senses. In one sense it could be observed that ideas, programmes and projects initiated or imposed from the outside, might be adopted but would then be adapted, to fit into local circumstances. Wapemba would take something from the outside and then make it their own, thus realising a sense of ownership and gaining their own benefits. Adaptation was also repeatedly demonstrated through the personal characteristics of being adaptable, flexible and resilient. Among cooperatives, the ones which were most motivated to work had often improved their condition through many different types of activities. Members of a Salt Cooperative indicated they had worked together before forming a cooperative because together they have strength. Their activities are flexible, some days they do one activity, other days they do another depending on what is most appropriate. *"Our members are very sharp, if salt collapses, we will shift to fish, or switch to agriculture, there are many things we can do"* (Chairman). Working as a group allows the members a degree of flexibility in that if one member has a problem at home and cannot work, the work will still get done.

Individuals in Pemba have also learned to be very flexible in earning a living. Ali

Amour, who works as a middle man in Pembeni, has a bicycle which bears the sign “*sina moja*” (not one). He does not rely on one type of work but does many things to earn a living. The people in Pembeni sell their produce to him and he takes it together with his own, on his bicycle to sell it in town. He sells fish, he catches fish, he sells pottery to be taken to Zanzibar Town and Tanga. After he finishes selling retail goods, he goes to the *shamba* (his plot of land) to grow food for his family too. He explained that most successful Wapemba rely on multiple forms of income generation in order to make ends meet. Everyone in the family, including small children are involved in many kinds of work in order to ensure the smooth running of the household.

Flexibility in Approach and Determination to Work Harder

The women in Pembeni demonstrated both flexibility and determination through explaining that due to rain, they could not easily make pottery at that particular time so they were doing other activities. “*We do whatever we can , whenever we can. Always Tukijaliwa [if God wishes], maybe tomorrow we can do this, if not we'll do it when we can*” (Hadija). Nunu outlines the attitude of the people of Pembeni with the following statement: “*Now life is harder so we just keep going. Life's not fair but what can you do? Our parents and grandparents had nothing, so we work hard. What else can we do? If we want anything we have to work for it. If we have problems, we work harder!*” (Nunu).

Madawa, an Mpemba living in Unguja knows the situation of cooperatives and also knows how the people of Pembeni are working. He offers his perspective:

In villages groups are disorganized. People come and promise but never deliver, people are disappointed. The people who are disappointed do nothing and get nothing. We have to work harder to fill our stomachs. Our life depends upon ourself. If you depend upon outside or wait for somebody – never, never. I know what the problem is, it is upon us. Its not only the government who causes problems. If we need to make Umoja [unity/cooperation] it is upon us. We can't wait, we just need to just do it ourselves" (Madawa).

He also observes that *"In Pembeni, they have already wake up. They are satisfied in the best way of living" (Madawa).*

Roles and Responsibilities: The Interrelations of Women and Men Within the Community

In observing that everyone has a role to play in ensuring the survival of the household and the community, the interdependence between women and men contributes to an atmosphere of mutual respect. Many of the common Western perceptions held about gender relations in developing countries were challenged as it became increasingly evident that subsistence and survival took precedence over convention on the ground. My initial impression that men and women worked separately from one another was challenged as I observed men helping their wives in some aspects of pottery making, in agricultural work and in several household tasks. They explained that there are some jobs that men and women can do together and some others that men never do. Socially, men and women normally stay separated but exceptions are also seen. For example, Nunu sometimes goes to the bandani, the place where men normally sit and talk about politics and listen to the radio. She says that she is welcome to relax there, unless her father is at the bandani, because she is a *bibi* – a middle aged woman with 5 children who is divorced.

She says that the men do not mind her being there even though their own wives would not normally sit at the bandani. Nunu is comfortable and confident in the presence of both women and men as though her status has gained her the right to be outspoken. She knows the men's problems as fishermen and they seem content to let her speak to me on their behalf. She knows enough about their working lives that she is able to represent them in the research process to their satisfaction. There is not the same degree of separation between men and women in the village as there is in towns. In Pembeni, my impression was that women and men are both respected for what they do. There is interdependency; the area they live in is small so people cannot help but know one another's problems. Men and women of a family can be seen working together on certain tasks and although there are social rules about how relationships should appear in public, it seems that men and women do know each other and have friendships with one another. Women are also involved in political life outside of the village. For example, Nunu's sister Hadija is an active CUF Party member which challenges the conception that Moslem women are passive and largely confined to the private sphere. Madawa echoes the above finding in speaking of the temperament of his wives and some of the difficulties they had been giving him recently: *"For men, the older you become the cooler you become [in terms of temperament]. For women, the older they become, the hotter they become!"*. He confessed that he was indeed having difficulty in managing his 30 person household and that he was having trouble keeping all 4 of his wives happy – *"they give me many problems"* (Madawa).

Madawa explained the male responsibility in a family. *"A man is responsible to*

look after the family and wife, this is what it says in the Qu'ran, so if a man is Moslem, he must follow this" (Madawa). Rose reiterates "the provision of food for the household is said to be the responsibility of men ... In practice there is nevertheless an important reciprocity in the exchange of labour for food between men and women" (Rose 1994:37). Having said this however, there is no doubt that women are in fact the primary household farmers with men variously involved. The men in the bandani in Pembeni were very quick to admit that women did more work than men on a daily basis.

Kinship Relations in Daily Survival and Support

Madawa is a small scale spice producer and herbalist who believes in working with his family. He has established a family business in Unguja which also serves to assist other people coming from Pemba. Madawa has an extensive family and extended social network. He has four wives and twenty children, his father has nineteen children (12 from his mother, 5 from his second mother [father's other wife] and 2 from a divorced mother). His own mother has five siblings. Madawa's father is Arabic and has no relatives living in Pemba. His mother's Swahili ties however, are very important. Her siblings and other relatives (uncles, grandmother etc.) added together make up about thirty people. Madawa also includes the approximately twenty relatives of his father's other wife, his own twenty children, and the extended families of each of his four wives in his calculation of number of relatives. All together his "family network" consists of approximately 200 people *"If you marry it means that you join the family. In Europe the family is very narrow" (Madawa).* Madawa's linkages through kin mean that he or any of his family members can go to one

another to ask for assistance. He explains how important it is to cultivate these family networks: *"Now my family can come to Pemba and choose any of these people to ask for help ... go to just relatives - but many, so many can help. We can go to any of them asking do you have work for me? Can come to any of these people. It is important to keep close with the whole family ... it is important to close the circle [as in getting closer, to bring together, not close as in close out]"*. Madawa describes marriages between cousins as the preferred type of marriage in the sense of *"bringing closer the circle"* to bring the family closer together and strengthen the ties between members.

Beyond the Notion of Family: Extended Helping Relationships Among Wapemba

In observing the various ways in which people were making a living in Pemba, it was impossible not to notice the key role played by social networks. People were making ends meet through working together and supporting one another, both in and outside of the immediate family network. Madawa explained that these days *"'brother' is just someone coming from Pemba. During this situation of politics, it means that all the Pambans are brothers and sisters. It means that if you see some people coming from Pemba have a problem, it means you must help"*. Among Wapemba, regardless of where they are living, there is now a renewed sense of unity. *"In Unguja, people help according to what place people come from, here we help all of Pemba"* (Ghassany). Wapemba solidarity has increased through necessity and the support networks they have formed have stemmed from age-old aspects of their culture and religion.

Suleih, who had lost his job as a teacher, described how his family overcame the

difficulties: *"We were living in a hard nut, helped by friends"*. He described the philosophy behind helping one another: *"live with people in a good way while you have the means, then they can help you later. Life is going up and down, when it's up, you never eat alone. Divide what you have ... you may be down, you may need help. It's the way we are, we help each other in good times ... also if someone is doing good things help them, don't help them in bad doings"* (Suleih). In Islam, begging is strictly prohibited. The people who have more help out by sharing what they have. *"According to the religion situation we must help them, we must seek them out. If you have money and you don't help anyone, you are out of [not following] the religion. Not everyone does it, it depends upon your faith"* (Saada). In the Qu'ran it is stipulated that "surely those who believes in Allah ... and does good deeds, on them shall come no fear, nor shall they grieve" (Al-Ma'ida, in Ahmad 1993:12).

Madawa's brother in law describes living as *"two households in one; next door are my mother and step-father who is retired. We share expenses, eat the same food, live as one ... sharing expenses is a more affordable way to live"* (Suleiman). It is very common to see families cooperating to share food in Pemba.

An important part of farming includes the relations of cooperation and help between people called ujima. Some forms of ujima constitute an exchange of labour, but others constitute an exchange of both labour and a proportion of any crop harvested ... so ujima spreads the workload over time and benefits women and their families by enabling them to receive a share of the rice which they have helped to harvest. This means that participating women have access to rice over slightly longer periods of time (Rose 1994:38).

"Ujima is trading one kind of food for another, it comes from the days of Socialism and they still do it. You've seen it, when people finish eating, they take a plate to their

neighbours. Now, whenever an Mpemba sees another, they are ready to help" (Zulfa).

According to Kimberly Rose who conducted an anthropological study in Pemba, "kinship on Pemba is not merely about biology, or the emotional relationships within immediate families. It involves the sharing of *substance* with others and being connected with others" (Rose 1994:23). A sense of community in Pemba is experienced as and through the web of relationships that people, sharing a common adherence to Islam, have with one another revolving around kinship, affinity and friendship. "Where there are good relations between people who are not already kin they become kin through the sharing of particular substance, and where there is already a kinship relationship between people it is reinforced by the sharing of substance which constitutes kinship" (Rose 1994:26). Kinship also influences to some extent who is approached as part of particular help-seeking behaviour.

[It] constitutes the relations and processes through which social organization and order is maintained, and is a specific scheme whereby persons perceive others as standing in a particular kind of relationship to themselves. It is a basic organizational process of relations where community is a community of kin, extended kin and affine constituting a *community of significant social relationships*" (Rose 1994:24).

Or, as Ghanime put it, "*charity begins at home but does not end there*".

Islam and Morality: The Basis for Support Systems

It is claimed that 99 percent of the population in Pemba is Moslem, thus they share a common religious philosophy. Islam reinforces the natural tendency to help one another and provides the basis for support systems. The phrase "God will help us" is repeated

regularly among Wapemba and is true insofar as the Qur'an has provided them with a philosophy to live by, which ensures that they help each other.

It is righteousness to believe in Allah, and the Last Day, and the Angels, and the Book, and the Messengers; To spend your subsistence out of love for Him, for your kin, for orphans, for the needy, for the wayfarer, for those who ask, and for the ransom of slaves; To be steadfast in prayer, and practice regular charity, to fulfill the contracts which ye have made; And to be firm and patient, in pain (or suffering) and adversity and throughout all periods of panic. Such are the people of Truth, the Godfearing (Qu'ran 1:177).

In Pemba, for individuals who live by the Qu'ran, there is a system in place which has been created by the people, for the people and for a higher purpose. The philosophy, which is socially and culturally prescribed, thus commonly adhered to, provides the way for people to help one another and to help themselves. Madawa explained that *"most important is the need to establish friendship with relatives and neighbours. If you make any problems for anyone, it is beyond the rule of Moslems. The only way we can live is on this – is by the Qu'ran, helping each other. Everything is upon God"*. Ali in Pemba asked me one day, *"you're studying how people make a living aren't you? Have you realized that it's only by the power of God?"*. The people from Pemba who are surviving despite their circumstances (of both politics and relative material poverty) are supporting one another. Outside of Pemba there is a sense of Wapemba unity; inside Pemba people also rely on networks of family, friends and neighbours. The Wapemba have various mechanisms for support such as remittances and the welfare or social security nets which they themselves provide for orphans, widows, the needy and their family members based on the principles from the Qur'an. The support networks are part of their religion and their culture. There is a social stigma attached to people who are Moslem yet do not act

accordingly (also to people who support the other political party). People do not always follow the rules; for example some people do choose to drink alcohol and others do not take the time to pray five times each day, but these are only the rules. How people behave or do not behave in accordance with all of the rules laid down by Islam is different from the ways in which people are guided by its principles. The moral codes are internalized and a rule breaker may be frowned upon by others but not to the same extent as someone who breaks tradition with acceptable moral standards. What is considered to be 'human' and 'natural' is generally unquestioned. A "sense of good manners and generosity, and abhorrence of any act of greed or meanness" (Rose 1994:50) prevails regardless of lifestyle choices.

Moral principles are both valued in themselves and give value to daily life in Pemba. *"Islam tells us everything: how to live, how to develop the family, that working is good, that begging is not good, people must work for a living and give charity"* (Suleh). In Islam, there is Sedaka which is the principle of charity. Every year, people count their belongings and calculate their profits, then give a certain percentage to the needy. *"For this year I have to take this amount of money for people who need it. We give to relatives poorer than ourselves. It is our religious duty to give charity. It can come from mainland or even Oman, especially during the month of Ramadan. People do this once a year. You should even give away your last 100 shillings. For everything you give, God will give you back 10 times that amount"* (Suleh). Madawa explained the principle of *Iman* as having a heart or being kind and sensitive which results in feelings of sympathy, empathy or a sense of brotherhood. *"The most important thing is if you're friendly. If*

you have Iman – help is to help – it's not only my habit, it's normal to help somebody”.

In referring to the people of Pembeni village and their lifestyle again, Madawa commented that they have Iman:

The most important thing is to be free. They're happy because they're free ... make your own decision ... There is no rich person here – some can afford their life and others can't, but rich is not from the cash – rich is in the heart of human beings. You can have lots of money, people can ask you for sedaka [charity, something needed] and you say 'no, I don't have enough, I have only 36, I can't give you one'. If you have Iman, you'll never be rich [materially]. For example Salmin [the CCM President] is not rich, he has lots of cash but no Iman (Madawa).

Even shopkeepers, the business people in Pemba, share the same cultural principles and conduct their businesses according to the values of helping one another. According to Ahmed, *“Maybe 90% need to buy on credit. Shopkeepers give credit to people they trust and who need it”*. Suleih explained how he is being helped through difficult times by the shopkeepers: *“I know the shopkeepers very well and they know me. They let me use anything. A relative who is also a shopkeeper gave me my own book of credit. During tough times, I take what I need and pay back later”*. At the time that I spoke with him he was owing 9,000 shillings and claimed that the shopkeepers did not mind; anytime he managed to get any money he would pay them a bit. When I asked Ahmed how the shopkeepers could afford the credit system, his response indicated that they could not afford not to allow people to buy on credit. *“People must repay, or pay what they can whenever they can or else credit might run out. A maximum can be set, it usually depends on the ability to pay. Businessmen need to operate this way because no one has enough money; if they want any business, they need to help people. They will be paid*

back". In addition, the shopkeepers gain loyal customers who will always remember them when times are good and will promote their business through word of mouth. A shopkeeper refusing to help anybody would not be widely respected by the community and would be considered by others to be "out of the religion".

Islam: Solidarity and the Role of Moral Justice in Resistance

Religion has provided the philosophy to live by and a sense of moral justice.

Resistance to oppression has fuelled the solidarity among Wapemba and has strengthened their resolve to help each other. Madawa explained that one of the reasons Wapemba are cooperating so much these days is because of the opposition from the Government.

You see, they [the CCM Government] don't want Pemba people to live in Unguja. Now, they want to divide the Pemba and Unguja but the Pemba people just together are very strong. If you say 'I am coming from Pemba' it means you are very powerful in this island now. So many people will help you if you have any problems. Maybe in a few days you can face the same problem, somebody else can help. Now we are helping each other. You know the government has created problems for people from Pemba, and then if you are from Pemba, it means you can face any problem at any time – no matter if you are rich or poor, the government can create a problem for you. So we are helping each other. Everybody from Pemba it means family now. The Pemba family – at this time, it means if you are in CUF, you are with Pemba. Even if you are born in Zanzibar, you can have the same problems if you are a CUF supporter ... They are crushing everyone. We hear about each other's problems because people are always talking. We know each other and we know that many from Pemba are suffering. We make donations, whatever we can ... even if you don't have, you try. We try our best to help each other, we also try to find the people who have the problems (Madawa).

The Business Times has also reported that a wide range of cooperative efforts have been observed among the people of Zanzibar in helping each other in times of need.

"When a natural disaster occurs in a part of our country, there is a spontaneous response

in kind and in money towards the victims” (Kivumbi: 1994). For example, in the case of the houses in Mtoni being demolished, *“so many people had their houses broken because of that incident, they got help from people from Pemba, without any agreement, just you stay here. We are living now with maybe even one house for 3 or 5 families” (Madawa).* This enhanced sense of Wapemba identity and solidarity, *“wasn’t the case before the Revolution, or even a few years ago, to the same extent as it is now. People used to distinguish themselves by the different area in Pemba that they came from, or because someone was an Arab ... but now we are only known as Wapemba” (Suleiman).*

Nassour also describes the sense of brotherhood and sisterhood which is considered to be natural among Moslems:

The greatest divide now is politics. In Islam, every Moslem is your sister or brother. Anyone who can be happy when another is suffering is outside of the religion. Anyone who supports CCM is inadvertently advocating the suffering of others because among other things, CCM is responsible for bakora [beatings]. There are actually some people who will report their neighbours for talking about politics, and they know the consequences. How can they be truly Moslem? (Nassour).

The principles of Islam, in providing a shared code of conduct and sense of moral justice, also fuel Wapemba pride through a sense of righteousness. Living by the Qu’ran gives people a sense of hope, faith and the will to keep struggling. *“The religious beliefs help them. Even by nightfall if people have no food they can say Allahamdulilah [Halleluiah]” (Nassour).* The Qu’ran encourages people to persevere and fight the good fight *“Ye shall certainly be tried and tested in your possessions and in your personal selves ... But if ye persevere patiently, and guard against evil – then that will be a determining factor in all affairs” (3:186).* Patience is encouraged in the face of oppression *“And do*

though be patient, for thy patience is but from Allah; nor grieve over them and distress not thyself because of their plots”(16:127), “For Allah is with those who restrain themselves, and those who do good” (16:128). Thus the Wapemba have a sense of moral superiority which fuels their resilience.

All good men must be patient with what seems to them evil around them. That does not mean that they should sit still and do nothing to destroy evil; for the fight against evil is one of the cardinal points of Islam. What they are told is that they must not be impatient: they must pray to Allah and commune with him, so that their patience and faith may be strengthened, and they may be able the better to grapple with evil. For they thus not only get strength but inward spiritual joy (‘Ali n.2654 20:130).

Wapemba do not resist their oppressors through violence but are more commonly seen shrugging off their constraints and saying “ok, God will help us”. It is important to note that demonstrating tolerance and acceptance while employing daily forms of resistance is not the same as being passive. In a situation where Wapemba cannot fight back openly or argue with their oppressors, they are resilient, knowing that they are the victors in what is supposed to be a shared moral sphere:

In his human wisdom it may sometimes have seemed questionable whether forbearance and self-restraint might not be human weakness: he had to defend his people as well as himself against the enemy’s persecutions. He is told here that he need not entertain any such fears. Patience (with constance) in those circumstances was according to Allah’s own command ... Nor was his heart to be troubled if they hatched secret plots against himself and his people. Allah would protect him (‘Ali 2164).

Islam: The Human Psyche and Principles in Wapemba Culture

People can ignore what anybody else says when they are righteous and maintain the faith that goodness will eventually win out. “The holy Qur’an repeatedly makes it

clear that Islam is a religion whose teachings are related to the human psyche. Islam emphasises that any religion which is rooted in the human psyche transcends time and space” (Ahmad 1993:29). Certain expressions or phrases are common in Wapemba speech and illustrate the psychological principles that underline their behaviour.

Allahamdulilah, which means praise be to God or Halleluiah, is often said in times of difficulty. For example *“our family is going to bed with empty stomachs tonight, Allahamdulilah – oh well, God will help us. Thanks be to God and remember that it’s all a part of His plan”* (Mariamu). Another interpretation came from Ahmed who indicates that *“the reason for Allahamdulilah is to stop people from oppressing you. You need to defend yourself too. Allahamdulilah stops people from being aggressive. If someone hits you and you say Allahamdulilah, maybe they will feel it in their heart, not be able to sleep and will come to you and apologize”*. It is a way of reminding people of the morals they should be upholding, a way of making people feel guilty. By saying thank you and giving praise no matter what, it that shows you are stronger, that your will won’t be broken and your temper won’t be lost. *Tukijaliwa* or *Mungu akipenda* (if God wishes), is another commonly repeated sentiment. It is both a symbol of acceptance and the willingness to be flexible. In Pemba, the response to “I’ll see you tomorrow” is “if God wishes”. This is a symbol of acceptance insofar as people accept uncertainty and accept that they do not always have control over the way that things turn out. It does not mean that people do not try, but it does mean that they accept that things may not come easily. They also accept that this is the ways things work. Their understanding contributes to their ability to cope with the multitudes of things that can go wrong. Rather than being

ruled by circumstances, or becoming unduly distressed over incidents which through experience, they simply expect to have happen, they function despite such constraints. Rather than risk making a promise they may not be able to keep, people would rather indicate that they will try their best and that if God wishes, then something will come to be. This method of coping and accepting difficulties and drawbacks is a way of diffusing distress and the reaction that it normally receives. The coping mechanisms employed and the ways that Wapemba interact with their constraints illustrate that “Whatever difficulties are experienced by men, Allah always provides a solution, a way out, a relief, a way to lead to ease and happiness, if we only follow his path and show our faith by patience and well-doing. The solution or relief does not merely come after the difficulty; it is provided with it” (‘Ali n. 6191).

Scott (1990) in a discussion regarding everyday forms of resistance, points out that “resistance to ideological domination requires a counter ideology – a negation – that will effectively provide a general normative form to the host of resistant practices invented in self-defence by any subordinate group” (Scott 1990:118). In Zanzibar, the material superiority of the dominating group is countered by their ethical inferiority. Through the gossip of the oppressed, which “represents a direct appeal by the poor to cultural and traditional norms of tenancy, generosity, charity, and human decency” (Scott:1985:282), the so-called oppressed are able to undercut the moral authority of their enemies resulting in status humiliation (Scott 1985:235). This is rendered even more effective in the isles by the fact that those in power are supposed to be sharing the same values through a common adherence to Islam. “Islam lays great emphasis on the character and qualities of the

individual”(Ahmad 1993:211). Thus, the attack on the reputation and social prestige of the oppressors through stories and embellishments documenting selfishness and religious impropriety, is a challenge to the dominance of those in power. “According to the Holy Qur’an, the survival and ultimate victory of a Message depends entirely upon the potency of its arguments and not on the material force it can employ” (Ahmad 1993:35).

The Moral Bankruptcy of the State Fuels Opposition

“Islam lays extraordinary stress on introducing absolute morality to all spheres of human activity – politics being no exception” (Ahmad 1993:181). The Government is expected to function according to the principle of absolute justice.

The second pillar of Islamic democracy is that whenever you make decisions, make them on the principle of absolute justice. Be the matter political, religious, social or economic, justice may never be compromised. After the formation of government, voting within the party should also always remain oriented towards justice. Hence no partisan interest or political consideration should be permitted to influence the process of decision-making. In the long run, every decision taken in this spirit is bound to be truly of the people, by the people and for the people (Ahmad 1993:187).

Yet in reality, the State was the embodiment of moral bankruptcy. “Any affiliation to the State naturally contaminated Islamic practice” (Watts 1997:58). Which in turn strengthened the opposition’s conviction that they were in fact the repository of justice and morality. *“If the government wanted to crush the opposition, they should give them some power ... this way the people only love them more” (Nassour).* The government’s strongarm tactics have served only to undermine their ability to rule. *“They want people to be submissive but even if people are submissive, do you think you’ll have real support?”*

The more they beat, the more we believe ... (in their corruption and in our justification for opposing them). Let them kill me but I am going to say this, this is the truth. There is a real spirit that cannot be crushed" (Ahmed).

Resistance to Bureaucracy and Protection of Livelihood – Avoidance of Compliance for a Just Cause

In addition to the strongarm tactics employed by representatives of the government, Wapemba are constrained through legislation and the introduction of new bureaucratic regulations such as the restriction of the informal economy in certain areas dominated by Wapemba. In Zanzibar, the impression described to me was that bureaucracy changes primarily to suit the current needs of the government and to repress Wapemba. The purpose of the new rules and bureaucracy is to impede the progress of Wapemba rather than to accomplish anything else. Rules seem to exist only for certain people as they are not applied across the board unless affecting only Wapemba. There are no laws to regulate the behaviour of political figures; those with power can do essentially anything. The legal system in Zanzibar allows that there is plenty of bureaucracy yet there is no accountability for the government who control the legal system. On the ground there is resistance to bureaucracy which involves the dodging of laws which do not make sense to people. The avoidance of compliance with the government's laws is not viewed in the same light as breaking moral codes of conduct. People have devised at least as many strategies for resisting bureaucracy as the government has attempted to implement.

Being Unlawful not the Same as Being Amoral

In terms of protecting “informal” sector activity after the government forbade people from selling outdoors, there was a sense that breaking the law for just and moral purposes was not wrong. *“Every sector of business is covered by Wapemba, they help each other... Maybe one has a shop; in one shop you can find maybe more than twenty, selling material etc. Now they're not allowed to sell on the streets, so they help each other. Someone with a small container shop can put many people's things together saying 'this areas is yours, this one mine'” (Ali).* People work together to find ways of overcoming these constraints and maintaining their livelihoods.

Tripp (1996) outlined the sentiment described by women she interviewed in Tanzania: “Men of politics are cheats. The big shots in the Party have three incomes themselves and they are telling us not to have projects” (Tripp 1996:62-63). Given the economic realities of the day, people themselves saw the matter in pragmatic terms, as a matter of survival rather than one of adhering to an abstract ideological principle. “Moreover, given the fact that most civil servants made so much more income from their sideline activities than from their jobs, it is a wonder that they chose to remain employed at all. Most people who engaged in sideline projects saw them as an honest way to earn a living.” (Tripp 1996:62). People felt justified in pursuing their right to earn an honest living through ‘informal’ sector activity. Tripp indicates that “distinctions are made between miradi (projects) and miipango (scams or schemes)” (Tripp 1996:64). Scams, normally involve one’s place of employment whereby people make a little *mchuzi* or “gravy” on the side.

Scams, like projects, were usually motivated by the need to make up the difference between the cost of living and one's paltry wage. However, increasing one's income by taking bribes - illicit informal activities - differs from augmenting it by farming, selling services, or making commodities to sell - licit informal activities. A ticket agent who, claiming a shortage of seats, inflates the price of a bus ticket, offers no service or product of his own, in contrast to the man who makes maps with his own inputs and sells them" (Tripp 1996:65).

In many people's minds, the 'hustle' was a way of claiming what they believed was owed them. *"The people can corrupt. If you are hungry, of course you will look for opportunity. Here, if you get a bank loan of 100,000, you have to leave 40,000 for the person who processes the loan and then you get only 60,000 but have to repay with interest. In offices, those with power can take it, whoever gets it first ... we are a poor Department ... the Chief Ministers Office is the umbrella organization, and they get it [any available funds] first. You can see, it is the accountants who have the fat stomachs"* (Ahmed). It is considered to be normal for people to take what they can get away with and as Ahmed has pointed out, "the higher the position one held, the greater the opportunities for such illicit scams" (Tripp 1996:66).

The emphasis on high positioned people involved in corruption is not meant to imply that low-ranking employees were not also culpable. However, unlike better positioned citizens, the poorest members of society were most victimized by these scams. Unlicensed street vendors frequently had to dole out bribe money to City Council militia who threatened them with arrest; applicants for business licenses often had to pay bribes to obtain the necessary forms and papers ... it is important to try to make some distinctions between the many ways in which people struggle to survive. It is similarly important to distinguish between ordinary citizens and higher ranking officials and government employees, who have varied opportunities to carry out both scams and corrupt practices and illegitimate projects. It should also be noted that the poor usually suffer disproportionately from corrupt practices, which means that low-income citizens generally experience more intensely the hypocrisy, double standards, and injustice of a value system where they are told to abide by rules not followed by those who make the rules. This leads to the belief among ordinary citizens that the leaders have not lived up to

their end of the bargain once having established the rules (Tripp 1996:66-67). Again, this serves to undermine the legitimacy of the government and to increase the solidarity of the people on the ground.

An ex-police officer from Pemba who sat beside me on the boat one day told me that *“everyone in Tanzania is a thief”*. He claimed that it is a waste of time to work for the government because the salary is so low. *“Everyone has to find their own tactics. The only way to make a living is to be always looking for opportunities. It is better to make these tactics your full time operation than to work for the government”*. He was currently involved in the import and export of motorbikes from Mozambique. It is seen as a less immoral way of thieving to be breaking the government’s laws than to be stealing from the people as the government does.

A Question of Survival: Livelihood Through Various Methods and Means

Others have reiterated the view that office jobs are few in number. Usually they are government-related and so low paying that people cannot earn a living off the salary. As formal employment is associated with government work where staff are redundant, most Wapemba make their living through informal employment. Ahmed, an Mpemba who does work for a Government Department, is forced to employ a subtle form of resistance just to keep his job. He is a CUF supporter with both a CCM and a CUF Party membership card. He has to keep his CUF card hidden. At his job he can be asked to present his card anytime and must be able to show that he is a card carrying member of the CCM Party. It has become difficult for Wapemba to rely on formal employment in this

political climate where people from Pemba are constantly being retrenched from their jobs.

“How do people survive without work? – It’s better not to have a job at all. If you want to live you have to have tricks. Not for stealing cash money, but for stealing time and work” (Nassour). Ahmed pointed out that people actually have less food security with a low wage job than they would if they were engaged full time in farming, nevertheless people normally made their living through a variety of projects. *“Swahilis with jobs have very low salary, somewhere along the way, they inherited some fields, have coconuts or cloves. In the crop season they hire people and get money from crops. With that you can buy a cow maybe, get more cows, some milk, finally some capital ... I can lose my job, then I would drive a dala dala or work in a garage, no problem”*

(Ahmed). Madawa on the other hand, complains of his brother-in-law who was retrenched from the bank after 25 years and now has nothing to do. *“My brother in law is very stupid for not having other business too. Everyone else who works at the bank has other work. Even if he was not able in terms of time, to have an outside job, he could get someone else to do it for him” (Madawa).* The principles of flexibility and adaptability are perceived as normal mechanisms for survival. When the market was shut down, the sellers simply decided to do something else because they had many ways and means for survival. It did not crush them, they either continued to do the same business somewhere else or adopted another activity in order to make money or bring home food and their other requirements.

How do the people survive actually? Even those who are not getting the minimum wage manage to. It’s not easy to say how the people survive. We have a joke that the people from Korea who built the stadium, they came here and they saw how

the people were living, how they were surviving with no salaries and they said 'in this place there is a real God and this God is helping them very much because in Korea you cannot survive this way. But here there is a God and you must honour, worship, pray to your God'. You know the life on this island, we go according to the situation. My wife is a teacher, I am a farmer, we are living. I've had no job since 1988, it's not enough, but we survive" (Othman).

Flexibility and Determination in Work as well as Life

According to Madawa *"work is to afford life. That is the most important thing. You start with tough work but you have a plan ... until you can afford an easier kind of work"*. However, he also pointed out the difficulties encountered in trying to follow set plans:

In Europe you make a plan – a straight line. You want to be a Doctor, you follow a certain plan then ... Here, plans go this way that way, up, down, crisscross, backwards ... if you live life like Africa, many people with education don't have practical work. Some people think that all of life depends on education only, cut off all other options to get a good education. After education, they think 'Ah, now I'm ok, I'll get a nice job, now I'm fine ... and they don't keep looking. But people can lose the job – here like Mr. Suleiman – just watching TV. For others as education standards go down, they look for practical education, real experience rather than waste of time at school (Madawa).

Regarding the choice to drop-out of school, "there are attractive short term gains to be made by dropping-in to a life of economic independence. There are doubtful long term gains, hardly discernable, 'bleak prospects' of success, in staying at school. Active, intellectually curious, creative children ... are likely to drop out" (Obura 1994:38).

Madawa points out that *"we all have the same brain, we just use it differently"*.

In explaining the secret of Wapemba success, Madawa explained that Wapemba had to go out and *"search for the life by any means – if you search you will find it"*.

When asked if by “life” he meant livelihood, i.e. a job, he responded *“No, life is life, not a job. You can have a job and a bad life, need to find a life”*.

Anyone can define the life in a different way. Everyone has different decisions, habits, Iman, culture. Life is not a job, maybe you have a job but salary is not enough to support your life. You need to decide 'your aim is what', then you need to have hard work, suffering, struggling, fighting, trying, you need to have effort. If you have these things you will find a life. Your work needs to be your mind, your time, your energy, your own heart. You just have to think – I'm coming from where? for what purpose? Now is the time to find life. Already had so many problems ... must cut off many things, only concentrate on finding the life ... When it gets hard, remember where you came from – I had so many problems, now I can do any work. After a bit of time life is started, step by step. Also we try to discuss with our family. All our family is to participate, to struggle with the life. Not this is man and this is wife, only one thing – life. If you want to live a good life, keep it simple, friendly, cooperative, not to rule over others (Madawa).

Madawa's own story of how he has etched out a life for himself by making a plan and trying anything to keep his life going, is a testimony to the resilience which he both values and promotes. He had once worked in a government office for a couple of months. His salary had been 288 shillings per month (in 1996, CDN \$1.00 was worth about 485 shillings) and he said to himself: *“if you don't have a brain to get even 10 shillings a day..”* so he quit to earn his own living and claims that *“it is better to find your own”*. He started a small business and within a month had earned enough money to move on to the next business. Madawa has trained many people, and has tried to help Wapemba through his various business endeavours. Some of Madawa's various means of employment throughout his life, have included: running a fishing boat, tailoring, being a mechanic, a welder, a painter, he has a certificate for cooking from Mombasa, he has been a taxi driver, a tour operator, a dala dala driver, a cook, he went to Nungwe to sell fish, he's been a shop-keeper: grinding, drying and selling spices ... *“just hunting for the life. When*

you're born in a poor country, with a poor family, you do many things" (Madawa). His struggle has been both tragic and triumphant. It is a story of ups and downs, of finally reaching a long struggled for goal only to have everything he owned go up in flames. It is truly a story of overcoming challenges and persevering despite difficulties. (Please see Appendix II for Madawa's story).

Overcoming Difficulties Through Religious Knowledge

Madawa explained that he has not become discouraged through the difficulties he has faced because God has helped him. *"No one has the power to do anything to anyone except God. So when terrible things happen, they hurt me but then I come back to God. I remember that nothing can happen to you without the force of God, then I get strong again. You can think this is bad for you, but God knows it's good for you. It is good to you that that happened – hari yako [your luck], it's best for you, it was meant to be"* (Madawa). In the Qu'ran, it states "But it is possible that ye dislike a thing which is good for you, and ye love a thing which is bad for you, But Allah knoweth, and ye know not" (Qur'an 2:216). Madawa told me a folktale which illustrates this passage and demonstrates the type of popular techniques which are used to spread religious lessons. Its message is central to this thesis thus the story must be told in its entirety.

This is a story of three friends who were staying in the woods to hunt for food. One of them, when skinning an animal, by mistake he cut off his finger. He was very upset but his other friend said "Ah, don't worry, that is good for you". This did not help to make him happy. Later, another accident with a tree branch caused the second friend to lose the sight from one eye. The third friend said again "ah, that is good for you". Accidents kept happening here and there, the first two kept getting hurt and the third one never had any problems yet he kept

saying “ah, these accidents are good for you, God planned it”. The first two started to get fed up. They decided that it was time for their friend to have an accident himself to see how he would feel. So they sent him to get water and while he was standing beside the well, they pushed him inside. “Haha, so now what do you think?” they said. “Oh, this is good for me”, he called up from the bottom of the well, “God will help me”. His two friends thought ‘oh he is really crazy’ and they left. That night the two friends were walking in the woods and by mistake, they walked into a place where the devils stay. They ended up fighting with the devils and were captured. They were taken to the main devil who inspected them and saw all of their injuries. He said “What is this? What have you brought me? One with no finger and one with no eye! These people are no good, they have too many injuries” and then he rejected them. When they got back out into the woods, the two friends looked at each other and they said “Oh, no! our poor friend who we put in the well! He was right, God was looking after us by giving us these injuries, and we put him in the well just for telling us this! We’d better go and find out if he’s alright”. It was dark and they were tired from their struggles but they made their way back through the woods and found the well. “Our friend,” they called down, “are you still alive?” “I am” he answered. They quickly lowered down a rope and pulled him up. They told him the whole story and said “You were right, these injuries were good for us. We are so sorry, you only told us what was true and we put you down the well. Can you ever forgive us?” He answered, “Ah, it was good for me. God knew it was best for me. As you can see, I have no injuries at all, so if I had been with you, the devil would not have rejected me. God knew that it was better for me to be down the well.” As you can see, sometimes what you might think is bad for you, is actually good for you and at other times what you might think is good for you, God actually knows is bad for you. Only God can know. Remember that it is according to God’s plan and then you will not have to worry (Madawa).

Despite the regular referrals to religious prescription in Wapemba conversation, it is important to note the difference between reference to and determination by any religious principle. Islam, which is a text based religion, is “made socially relevant through enunciation, performance, citation, reading and interpretation ... it is not a monolith but contains important institutional, ideological and social tensions within its circumference” (Watts 1996:56). The fatalism which is implied through believing that every event in life has already been written out in God’s plan does not prevent people from pursuing their

own objectives. *“Moslems know the plan's already written, but I plan to get out”* (Ahmed).

Resilience by Necessity, Success Through Determination: The Roots of Wapemba Pride

Both in Pemba and in Unguja, I collected stories of resilience among Wapemba who gave the impression of being complacent while in reality, they were very actively ensuring that they would manage to make ends meet or even to prosper despite the odds against them. Nunu explained to me that *“thinking positively gives you options”*. In Pemba, *“Life is so difficult but you don't give up, others might just complain in the same situation. We work hard because we have to. We are poor. My father was poor, my mother was poor, we had nothing so we had to struggle to survive”* (Nunu). According to many, through being forced to struggle, the people of Pemba have become stronger than their counterparts in Unguja who have become complacent. *“Wapemba see opportunity where others who are used to it, do not”* (Othman). Their coping skills have remained strong like muscles which are exercised each day. Wapemba are more prepared to live without amenities because they are accustomed to it and can more easily cope in a variety of settings. *“Now, there has been no electricity for days [following the explosion at the power plant which left Unguja without power] Wapemba are coping fine because they are used to it. Pass the house of any Mpemba and you'll see they always have a large barrel of water and a kerosine lamp. They are used to preparing themselves for difficulties”* (Ali).

Pemba is a small island with only 3 towns. It is an island made up of peasants, but they have thrived. In Dar es Salaam, Tanga, and Unguja many of the business-people and shop-keepers are from Pemba. In trying to comprehend the observable differences between Wapemba and Waunguja who share a common adherence to Islam, the Swahili culture and many common difficulties, the answer that was given time and again was that Waunguja have always been in a position of power, it is comforting on the top and that they have never had to learn to struggle as hard. *“Why are they more successful than Unguja people? Because Waunguja have always been in power. There's a kind of complacency, a contentedness when you're in a good position. Wapemba are seen all over Tanzania, the percentage of Wapemba outside Pemba is very high. They are known for being hardworking, they are business people. They are the shop-keepers in Dar, the sellers on the street ... The informal sector is largely made up of Wapemba” (Sheriff).*

Many people have testified that they have seen Wapemba starting with nothing and then going straight to the top. *“Ask any of them did you have lots of capital to begin with when you came to start your business? ‘no we had nothing, we came with nothing’ is what many of them will tell you. How did they manage? Through their many relations. Through helping out when possible and then it'll be your turn when you can” (Othman).*

Their success in the face of constraints, contributes to a sense of pride among Wapemba which is resented by their opponents. Even the CCM Tarab groups sing one popular song in Unguja with the line that “those without shyness or shame (in essence, those with too much pride) should go home”. They are referring to Wapemba. *“Because it is Wapemba who have big houses, money, who work the hardest, life is tough so they work harder.*

Zanzibaris are lazy according to Wapemba, so Wapemba have an attitude of thinking that they are better” (Zulfa).

It was commonly repeated that since the Revolution, Wapemba have been coming in first in both business and in education. *“The problem between Unguja and Pemba people, is that Pemba people have got an education, better than Unguja people” (Saada),* which in turn fosters resentment among Waunguja and has led to the policy of restricting the educational opportunities of Wapemba. *“We are educated, intelligent, the dropouts are usually from Unguja not Pemba. Even the President said that 75% of educated Zanzibaris are Wapemba. Why should they have such little representation in the government?” (Nassour).* Obura’s 1994 study confirms that, in terms of education, there is some difference between Unguja and Pemba islands, with the numbers of students in Pemba “falling slightly behind at initial enrolment and all other levels of schooling” (Obura 1994:21). However, in terms of performance, “Pemba Island achieves a higher pass rate ... than Unguja” (Obura 1984:26) and Pemba performed “considerably better than Unguja in the Form 2 examination” (Obura 1994:30).

Nassour contends that *“the suppressed are educated and they will come up”*. According to Ahmed and Zulfa, *“Wapemba are more educated, hardworking, intelligent, they (the CCM Government) know the potential but they don’t want to give up any power ... So, they are keeping power by force, they are not ready to adopt democracy. They know that their position is threatened by another one. People are afraid of Wapemba, they are well-educated” (Ahmed and Zulfa).* Wapemba know that searching for an education is blessed by the Qu’ran and they are proud of their exemplary record in

education which they have had to struggle to achieve. *"We are proud of that, it is a force in itself" (Nassour).*

After hearing about the government's efforts to keep Wapemba students from seeking their education, I asked "how, in a place such as Pemba where there are so few schools, can the government still be afraid that Wapemba are getting too much education?" Othman responded through outlining the determination of Wapemba:

They are not getting that education just by favour but due to their struggle. Because you know, education is ... there are only two principles in order to start to get an education. First of all, a personal commitment and then, each student must determine that he wants to learn. He wants to read, he wants to get an education, he must have that determination. If you want to be a doctor, then you must determine that you should be a doctor. You have that desire to be a doctor so you have to work hard in order to be a doctor; if you want to be a pilot you have to work hard in order to be a pilot. You see so first of all you must have a determination. Then, the capability, the material. So, most of the time actually Wapemba have that determination to get an education and most of the time the people from this island, Pemba, they don't want to be given a gift or to be helped all the time, they want to use their facilities, you just give them a chance don't disturb them. But, if you give them a chance and you show him the way, just in one or two years, he will make up his life. You see the people they are very poor here in Pemba because they are depressed, they are highly depressed. But if they go to the mainland, or any other place in the world, just after six months, you will see that he is changing in terms of – economically anyway. He will change himself through determination. A Pemba person has that determination because he understands that he has to settle himself (Othman).

There are poor people in every culture who do not simply work hard out of necessity, why do Wapemba work so hard to maintain their struggle? *"Anything needs a determination, self-determination. I think there is something more in Pemba actually, something which we can't see perhaps. We don't know, but this is their culture actually. They have great determination" (Othman).* Ahmed's search for sponsorship gives testimony to the strength of Wapemba determination. He has never given up his search

for an education outside of Pemba despite the fact that he has a file of rejection letters about 2-3 inches thick. *"Many people said 'we can take you, but you need sponsorship' and there were no sponsors. So I'm always hunting – trying to get an education outside"* (Ahmed).

Righteous Struggle and Disdain for Oppressors

There is a sense of righteousness which stems from the fact that Wapemba are not afraid to struggle to achieve their success. They continue to believe in employment by merit and have disdain for those from the Party in power who have arrived at their positions through patronage appointments.

You know, all the people under the government are from Unguja and ah, if you have an education or not, if you are from Unguja, it means that one day, you can be rich. You can be a Minister without an education, a manager or this or this, without a reason. Wapemba are becoming qualified. You know, even in any country, if you need to go to politics or to take any post under the government, you know you must have a qualification; for the post, you need one. But here because you are born from Unguja, there is no qualification. We need to move from this situation to another situation and we are trying, trying, trying, to get the multiparty system (Madawa).

Nassour reiterates a similar viewpoint with a greater degree of anger. *"It is our government, it is our right! We need fair representation! We need to see employment by merit and representation by capacity"* (Nassour). In democracy, people need to work together. *"Here, multi-partyism has created a divide. There was no difference between Unguja and Pemba ... the election separated them"* (Nassour).

"With one government and one ruler, it should be one place. If they need us to go, then it must mean that we should have our own government, but for this time no"

(Madawa). A common sentiment is that the CCM Government knows that if they give a chance to Wapemba they will develop, thus they will continue to fight to make sure that no person from Pemba gets in to power. *"We are waiting for changes. But, we know if you stay just waiting for changes, life can come to an end, or you can become too old ... we must do what we can"* (Aziza).

Remembering Pemba: Home is Home

"How do people cope with the lack of development? Dar es Salaam is our thicket. It is a thorny bush, you can get stuck there. We seek refuge, those with enough money to go elsewhere go and send money back" (Nassour). If abroad, people are obliged to send money back in the form of remittances. This is characteristic of many Wapemba who are in fact living outside of the island and are helping their relatives in Pemba. *"We are responsible to look after our parents. Children must help their parents, it is not human to do otherwise ... You can find rich families here with no job because they have good support from people away from this island"* (Ahmed and Zulfa).

Much as Ahmed himself is determined to leave Pemba, he indicates that *"home is home"* and that he's sure that when there are changes, the people who have left will want to come back.

My wife has her own money enough to go. She is ready to go. I can get a passport. I don't feel good myself to live as a refugee ... I was born in trouble, I don't want to die in trouble. I need an education, I know I could succeed – I could get a job and come back to Pemba afterward. After changes, after the music starts to play again. If you go away and get even a little money, can come back and build a house (Ahmed).

He has not given up the hope of living a peaceful and prosperous life one day in Pemba.

Unity Among Wapemba – Paving the Way for Grassroots Development

Madawa left Pemba as he did not see enough of an opportunity there to do what he wanted to do with his life. He has become a successful spice producer and herbalist in Unguja but has not forgotten where he has come from. He maintains economic and social links with Pemba people, believing that *“when you feel that the people have been oppressed, you have to help them”*. One of his major objectives is to help the local producers in Pemba. Madawa wants to encourage people from Pemba and to help in building unity among Wapemba. *“People here need unity in every way. There is no real union for Pemba with Unguja or with the mainland. Life is very, very tough so we need to build up our strength together” (Madawa)*. People effectively recover power by building trust through unity. Thus through all of his business transactions he works with Wapemba where possible. *“I try to help poor people . I don't want to ... I'm not political, you know, this is a business but um the problem is that we are fighting for ourself. All official things, like offices are in Zanzibar. Pemba is an island without any Bwana Mkubwa [big men], they just come and visit for a short time, but usually not. The power is kept in Unguja. It means that we need to promote the local people” (Madawa)*. He has learned through his own experiences that people need to be able to rely on themselves and that people create their own innovations and find their own solutions.

In Madawa's daily life, he likes to try to help others from Pemba as much as possible. He tries to place orders for any of his supplies from Wapemba to give them a

small market. At his own shop he sells spice baskets so he needs to purchase small baskets. The baskets normally have an ornament in the centre – for example, a basket of differently spiced coffees would have a small Arabic-style coffee cup made of pottery. He likes to get these products from local groups instead of ordering from Mombasa. He would rather support *Ndugu* (comrades) so he goes to Pemba to collect the orders himself and tries to work around their schedules, knowing the problems of the Pemba people. *“To help these people to live up to their potential, just give them an opportunity and of course they’ll show up” (Madawa).*

Now there are two or three ways of helping each other for Pemba people: one, for business. If you go to the market now, just you stay and look, if you are coming from Pemba, it means that you just choose to help the people of Pemba for business. You buy from Pemba, it means we are helping each other. We can tell the ones from Pemba, maybe 90% of people who sell are from Pemba; and the second way, is if you have any kind of business, like maybe the ones who make handicrafts, you can place orders from them when you are making your own products [have Pemban suppliers]; or if someone has a business, ‘please I can sell it for you, we can try it in my store’. There are different ways we are helping each other (Madawa).

Madawa tries to encourage farmers to diversify and supports the local market, knowing how difficult it is to find a market for products in Pemba. *“These people need a market. The demand is there but there are blocks. Without communication, accessibility – it is very difficult for knowledge about the producers to reach the buyers. Big buyers may not wait for the small producers” (Madawa)*

Madawa’s view of development is to work with what’s there and to strengthen it. *“Anyone who has an interest in helping the local people, they need just to look at maybe the area and see what’s going on there. Encourage the people rather than making*

another work. Development should promote what people are already doing" (Madawa). He is very sceptical of any *"big bwana coming here with a project in his pocket"* and feels that *"too much talking"* impedes development. As an Mpemba living in Unguja, he himself lacks security. He lives in fear knowing that *"Pemba people are prevented from anything and everything ... That is the problem we can only depend ourself, business, anywhere, immigration, anything under the government it is very difficult to get it"* (Madawa). He knows that people have more security if they have their own means for employment. *"For anyone to help the people is not to employ the people, it is to help them employ themselves"* (Madawa).

Madawa's and other people's stories show that if you help someone, you are usually helped in return. If you are willing to work hard, you will accomplish many things at once. You can prove yourself and maybe encourage others to go into business with you. Madawa, who believes so much in the importance of family, runs a family business where he works together with his family members in their home. He believes in working hard but also that *"it is important to have enough time to look with your family"*. By working in this way, he is accessible to his family and he is involved in their lives. He has found "the life" and enjoys helping other Wapemba. The type of development which he promotes is empowering for Wapemba in that it builds upon their cultural means, it boosts solidarity among Wapemba and it springs truly from the grassroots without depending on any outside intervention.

Pemba has been cut off from development assistance from the Zanzibar Government and has also been isolated from international NGOs. In asking about

development on the island, I questioned Othman about the presence of NGOs. He automatically thought of local organisations and said *“yes I hear they [CUF] are trying to start some NGOs here now”*. Without the presence of foreign or national development organisations on the island, people automatically think of what they themselves can do. The people of Pemba in general, through the absence of development assistance have not had the opportunity to develop a culture of dependency whereby local initiatives are smothered under the promise of outside assistance. In Pemba, the people rely on their own initiatives and they are confident, knowing that they can count on themselves.

Intervention and Non-intervention for Economic Development from Outside the Community

Ahmed indicated that *“some other rich people from Pemba want to invest in Pemba, and if you make one company here, you can employ more and more people and then maybe get more and more companies”* – if the government would allow it to happen, that is. *“There are two ways: one way is if they approve it under the government; it depends upon the project and then it has to be under the government's rule. But if it was private, then the other way is to do it just privately. Also, I hear that CUF has started to make an NGO”* (Ahmed).

As purchasing power has been decreasing, the approach of the Zanzibar Government has been to turn increasingly to tourism. *“Do the common people benefit? Supposedly they do through foreign exchange and employment. We attract tourism investors because we have cheap labour. How can this help local people? There is*

exploitation of local people to attract foreign investment, to have purchasing power, not for development. Development is for people, not for the government” (Othman).

Nassour pointed out that political representation should also take into account what the people themselves depend upon for development. People who are honest and dedicated can have development in spite of economic constraints.

There is a small land space here but it is evergreen, the population is not too high, why is there no development? Keeping in consideration the physical resources of this island, why should people go without food. Why should we consider radios to be a luxury? Why should infant mortality be so high? Why are Wapemba at age 40 to be thought of as 70? Why is the water supply only once a month, the hospital empty of medication and the education so difficult to get at the schools? In dismantling this system and having it run by experienced, honest people ... sure some of the problems are from the world system too, but let's give it a chance. Let's give it a chance to see if things would change (Nassour).

Nassour's indignance at the CCM Government's lack of attention for Pemba is echoed by many Wapemba. The people in Pembeni told me that normally they have *neema* (abundance, or blessings from God – i.e. when they have a good harvest, they live in comfort) but they claim that *“these days no neema – maybe because of politics. God is angry with Salmin Amour too. Everyone knows he's doing badly” (Fatuma).*

The Pemba people have all the reasons and facts to believe that this regime will not and does not intend to develop Pemba especially now that the regime has failed to secure any constituency representation. Pemba is a stronghold of the opposition. Experience elsewhere in Africa suggests that the ruling regimes do not invest in opposition stronghold areas. Ruling regimes in Africa would rather see opposition strongholds killed through deprivation than through investment promotion. It is with these facts and experience that the Pemba people through their representatives are putting up developmental proposals for funding through their Non-Governmental Organizations (Masoud 1996:3-4).

They are not clamouring for development projects, but are asking for assistance in accomplishing their own goals by means of the projects that they have devised in response

to their own priorities. It is only natural that *“whether oppressed or not any human society needs to develop”* (Nassour).

Resistance and Development Organisation Within the Wider Community

I spoke with Hamad Masoud, an elected member of the House of Representatives for the CUF Party, about how the people of Pemba are supporting themselves and what they are doing to survive and develop themselves as best as possible in a situation where “regular” means of support are not open to them. I had already observed that people on the ground were helping and supporting one another, yet in speaking with him and with others, I began to realise that there is also more going on in Pemba in terms of more widely organized support. He describes the Opposition Party’s role in assisting people to form NGOs as follows:

Yes, in Pemba we have tried to organize a commission of NGOs in every constituency – not as a political party but as leaders. Up to now about 6 of them have been officially registered by the government. What we are trying to do is to form some groups and all these formed under this organization are non-political, non-governmental, non-racial non-religious, so it is typically an NGO. We try to form groups to fund. For example this project here is small with about 15 groups of 10-15 women from different villages, they are trying to do vegetable growing – the special kinds that you can grow there in Ole, the eastern part of Pemba, and also we have groups who keep poultry, dairy, fish groups, seaweed farming, so we have a number depending upon the position of the villages. But now the problem is how to get funds for these people and this NGO. One of the main objectives is to prepare proposals, submit proposals for funding to other NGOs, or even to the embassies, and sometimes we get funds. We are trying now to get a mutual friendship between countries (Masoud).

I asked him to explain more about the organisation of the NGOs. As Ministers you are part of the Government? *“Yes we are part of the Government”*. So how is it that

support is coming from the government for non-government organizations? He laughs:

Well actually there are two ways: as a Minister, but also as an elected leader. Ok, myself I'm just an elected Member of the House of Representatives. I don't have any influence in the government, after all we don't recognize the CCM Government; so we say the government - to hell with the government. And that is why we form these NGOs because NGOs are non-governmental. Non-governmental in the sense that you can receive aid or assistance from other governments. We are not getting anything from the Government in power in Zanzibar. Others, for example the Netherlands, are giving some funds. We have a number of proposals submitted to them, we are waiting for the reply. If they are very serious on financing NGOs, then in Pemba, within a period of say one year, everybody will be busy – busy, busy for his own development” (Masoud).

I asked him a bit more about his role as a politician. “Ok, you are an elected leader, you won by 96%, right? “Yes”. “So you do work for the Government?” “No”. “Can you please explain that a bit further”.

Actually I am a political leader; people have voted for me because of the CUF policies. I am a Member of the House of Representatives, however, democracy in Zanzibar has not been respected and boycotting or not participating is one of the safest ways of showing that we don't like this and we don't like that. Otherwise we could fight, could go into violence – something which we can never try. So you are asking if we don't participate what will happen. Because if we participate, these people will feel as if they have won the election and they can do whatever they want. So it is better to show them that no, you have not won and we are not with you (Masoud).

“So you don't sit in the House of Representatives”? “No we do, but we don't participate. Because, the Law says, if you don't attend for three consecutive sessions, then automatically you lose your seat. So what we are trying to do is to make sure that we maintain the seating. So we go there and we sit. All of us, all the CUF, we are at a common state, so all of us are not participating” (Masoud). “But at the same time you are doing other things”?

Yes, we are doing other things to help. For example those students who

were expelled on the grounds that they have gone on strike (they had actually only gone to vote) ... we are trying to fill our own classes, we have about 340 students, from Form 4. We've got very good teachers, all the ones that were expelled from Pemba – we've got a private house where they get together, and ah, I think they are going to be the best students on the final exams.

Even the health assistance, there are so many nurses who've been expelled by the government, so they are just wondering what to do. What we are trying to do is ask them to form these first aid type of centres. There's so much bureaucracy in Pemba if you need to go to the hospital. You need a police report even to go to the hospital if you've been beaten. The police will never give you the form. But then, even in Pemba particularly, if you don't get treatment because the police didn't give you a form, then you have to go on and make sure you get treated. Not necessarily at a government hospital but in the private hospitals. So these places are set up to help those people (Masoud).

In terms of people's own support networks, the political activists pointed out the same mechanisms that are observed daily among Wapemba.

To a certain extent ... they live upon the Islamic culture. Though not those hardliners, you know even the Christians they live here not disturbed and so on. But the people they live on those very considerable readings from the Qur'an. They fuss about, they must be helpful, they should help each other, they should help anybody, even if he is not a Muslim. I who is a Muslim, have no permission from God to humiliate a non-Muslim ... and because he lives with me, peacefully, I should remain peaceful we should help him and leave it to the God (Othman).

There are so many informal ways of supporting each other "Now is the season of harvest, so even if you don't have rice, someone else will ... today I'll give you, tomorrow ... it just goes like that" (Masoud). The main occupations in Pemba are farming, fishing and livestock development.

Usually everybody has got a piece of land and he gets all of his earnings from that. Very few people are government employees and most of them who were have now been taken off, so they go back to their villages and do some farming. The life is very difficult because the people have not been prepared, they have not organized themselves. We are the people who go in and ask people to get together, they decide from their own ideas and of course we guide them, but we do not say do this or this is better, they know their situation very much. We want to get something that is acceptable to all people and then we can help (Masoud).

Government Repression Acknowledges the Power in Resistance

I asked Masoud if the CCM Government knows that CUF is behind the formation of NGOs in Pemba. He responded that yes they know because in Pemba everything is related to CUF.

There are no constituencies in Pemba where the leaders are CCM. But it has nothing to do with the politics, it is strictly for people's own development and this is according to our manifesto. When they come to Pemba they see it is all CUF, it causes them to be embarrassed. Now it is more difficult to register as an NGO, to be approved by the government. At first they didn't realize that CUF had anything to do with it ... so now we are looking for friends from overseas (Masoud).

The government will not allow people to register or to receive credit. *"The people have no purchasing power, no capital to start small projects. People have very good ideas to make the money, but no capital"* (Othman), which is one of the difficulties that the NGOs in Pemba are hoping to overcome. The government also continues to object to non-political public gatherings. *"The thing is they still do not allow people to get together, gatherings, public meetings ... for example people can be beaten by the police because they come to do any public meeting. If they ask permission, they are refused. I don't know what they think people do at these meetings. They just don't want us to speak to people. What Democracy!"* (Masoud). James Scott notes in the effort to counter resistance, the attempt "to remove any autonomous domain of conversation is encountered again and again" (1990:129). Madawa explained how people overcome this constraint:

Yes we need permission in order to have a gathering but we can just tell one family, and then another family, family, family, family, something like that, and all the people of Pemba, in short time have got the certain information. And now

we make like the secret meetings (there's no permission, all people are not allowed to make a meeting) but a meeting that we use, just in secret ways, to know what is going on (Madawa).

Scott (1990) indicates that social sites have often attracted official attention and repression. Among oppressive regimes there is often a “systematic attempt by the authorities to sever the autonomous circuits of folk discourse and to deny ... any social site where it could safely be retold and interpreted” (1990:126).

Subtle forms of everyday resistance are encountered much more frequently than outright defiance in the Wapemba's refusal to be subordinated by the CCM Government. They realise that the government is in fact weak on the ground in Pemba and that those in power are morally corrupt, thus neither enviable nor credible. *“The government is tightening, they squeeze the people. There is no government though without the people's support” (Saleh).* The government is not gaining any ground with Wapemba through their oppressive tactics. Wapemba know that “swords can win territories but not hearts. Force can bend heads but not minds” (Ahmad 1993:33).

Outright peasant resistance has been encountered by the CCM maskan people in some instances in Pemba. Two cases were described to me by the people in Pembeni. In Shengeju village, *“people from Zanzibar were caught going to the school with kerosene. The horn was blown and a lot of people came out to fight. There was a big fight and a gun was taken. Some Zanzibar people were injured. The next day the police came and people from Shengeju were arrested. The gun wasn't found. They've been searching for it ever since” (Hadija).* Government officials now search everyone coming from Pemba who takes a boat to Unguja in case they have a weapon. On the other hand, people

travelling to Pemba are never searched. Another instance of village resistance took place in Mbuzini:

They came with a Land Rover to Mbuzini. Mbuzini and three neighbouring villages had decided not to run. They had made a meeting and decided to get together to fight back. When they came in the night to Mbuzini, someone blew a cow horn and all the villagers came with pangas, stones, and hoes. Some ran away. They didn't even get out of the Rover to beat anyone. They said, 'we'll be back'. The next day they went to a very small village and just looked around. They did nothing so the villagers did nothing. If they had, the horn would have blown. They know now and if a horn blows, they leave (Fatuma).

A more common sentiment in villages and towns in Pemba is the fear that if they fight back they will then face greater retaliation. It is thus common for people to employ everyday forms of resistance and work together in subtle ways to slip around the obstacles they face. It is nonetheless repeated all over Pemba that “*people are just waiting for the word, we'll be prepared to do anything*” (Fatuma) – if they hear from CUF that they should fight, they will. Otherwise, the reality on the ground and the common stance on Pemba is “*we are not rough, we just depend upon religion*” (Madawa).

How are they responding what should they do? They are not taking up arms, after all, we are not encouraging such a thing. We know the problems in Rwanda and Burundi ... you know that if they are trying to do that they will lose their lives and so on. The island has no development at all, the situation would be even more severe, more and more (Masoud).

“*So, we are just waiting to see what will happen next year or next week or next month or next year. The people have been very disappointed but they have the hope that we will soon be leading*” (Othman). In the meantime, Wapemba are continue living their lives according to their culture of sharing and helping one another. Through their great determination, which has been enhanced by their need to try harder, Wapemba work

towards their own development and in doing so, resist the adverse intentions of the CCM Government.

CHAPTER 7

Analysis and Conclusion

In the previous chapter, it has been illustrated through the daily life stories among Wapemba that the people of Pemba draw upon aspects of their shared culture in order to propel themselves forward and to resist the oppressive tactics of the Zanzibar Government. This chapter will analyse this point and those contained therein, to a greater extent. The role of cultural forms and the various practices of social agents in the realization of human development and in the enactment of everyday forms of resistance will be analysed as central in working towards empowerment – the essence of development in its most relevant and appropriate sense. The case material has pointed to the relationship between resistance and grassroots development and in doing so has brought to life some of the fundamental aspects of development which are often disregarded in a typified account of third world development. This chapter will further explore those aspects which are fundamental to any ‘real’ notion of development.

Islam in Wapemba Culture: The Foundation for Resistance and Grassroots Development

Among Wapemba, there is a mixture of Kiswahili and Arabic culture, as well as a combination of more or less modern and more or less traditional values. Most individuals live their lives according to Islamic principles, although the extent to which these principles are adhered to does vary. As with any articulation of world views or systems

for living, some aspects are welcomed while others are resisted. The strategies or tactics which people devise and employ to both survive and resist oppression sometimes operate within the overarching cultural system, sometimes in spite of it, and other times because of it. Swantz (1996) has found that the analysis of cultural forms reveals that people, by the means of social convention, can be seen to maintain their own cultural mode of life in order to counter unwanted interventions into their lives. Through cultural and religious means, the Wapemba launch an ideological challenge and make very real gains in the spheres to which they assign the greatest value. In addition to their value as forms of resistance, cultural forms have also been seen to provide the philosophy which allows people to resist; cultural forms thereby become one of the means of resistance.

Social cohesion is maintained largely through a common adherence to Islam which is the foundation for their shared culture and provides a philosophy by which to live. The philosophy contains the provision of a social safety net, rules for charity and other mechanisms for community survival. In the absence of a strong State, the people themselves have been providing community services such as social welfare and they have come to realise that they do not need to depend upon the State. In living by a shared philosophy, the sense of independence and autonomy within the State, the social networks, the coping strategies, and a sense of moral superiority have been provided to and by Wapemba which have served as the roots of pride and resistance. By following the word of Islam, people cultivate a sense of moral justice and superiority which stands in sharp contrast to the decided ethical inferiority of Zanzibar politicians. The ethical inferiority which CCM Party members have displayed, undermines their legitimacy and increases the

solidarity of Wapemba while fuelling their resistance. The Wapemba remain both patient and righteous, knowing that in the moral arena, they are ones with power and integrity.

“The sense of sharing common spiritual ideals of a purifying nature can create new and contagious forms of enthusiasm and solidarity, which in turn greatly increase the operational effectiveness of the group” (Rahnema 1992:171).

Islam transforms the natural inclination to help one another into a requirement for humanity and a common threat serves to bind people together even more so in a common struggle. Both in and outside of Pemba, the sense of unity among Wapemba has increased while the social networks and support systems they have devised continue to remain key elements in ensuring their survival. The concepts drawn from Islam, which help to shape their world view (*Allhamdulillah, Tukijaliwa, Iman, Sedaka*) provide the basis for social continuity. For example, to have Iman is to be rich in the heart and spirit which stands in sharp contrast to being considered to be “out of the religion” for refusing to help one another.

Islam provides the philosophy, the culture, the social rules, norms and values which most people live by. Living according to the religion means that they do certain things and doing these things keeps them alive, prevents their spirits from being crushed and in many cases, allows them to be very successful. Their culture ensures community support networks, instills a sense of personal strength and the value of being hardworking; it also teaches them the ability to adapt and to do things on their own terms. Even when losing in one power arena materially, people are able to create their own forms of shared wealth. They do not reject economic and industrial development, nor are they content to

have no political representation, as Unguja has (in relative terms). However, they are drawing on elements of their culture and finding their own means to sustain themselves, to keep alive, to survive both physically and spiritually and to support one another, which is in itself empowering. Their struggle contributes to their empowerment.

Resistance Both For and Through Culture and Grassroots Development

The shared culture among the people of Pemba has been observed to play a key role in both survival and mutual support among community members. “The villagers ... have looked to their own strengths in facing these attempts at domination and have used what instruments they have at their disposal to resist and maintain social cohesion” (Swantz 1996:171). These means include supporting one another through social networks which are both culturally based and fuelled by an increased sense of solidarity bolstered by being faced with a common threat by the CCM Government.

Although poverty and economic hardship are part of everyday life for rural people on Pemba, social relations of household and village economy and its organization are rooted in kinship and in a sense and spirit of sharing, obligation, exchange, and cooperation. Relations of kin and friendship, agricultural, fishing and other economic activities, the daily cooking and bringing up of children, all constitute the nature and sense of community (Rose 1994:95).

In Pemba, kinship and the sense of community involve the sharing of substance; it is normal for people to help in terms of sharing food while they have the means. This, they believe, is to live according to God’s rule and is thus valued as morally correct. There is an interdependency among community members and an ensuing sense of respect for one another and the roles that each member plays in sustaining the community. The support

system consists of both family and wider social networks among Wapemba. The people work together and support one another while enjoying an increase in solidarity and sense of brother and sisterhood among Wapemba.

In the Zanzibar context where Wapemba have been surviving, liaising and accomplishing their goals in spite of the constraints of the Government, it became evident that solidarity, socio-economic networks and cooperation were about more than economic survival and culturally based coping mechanisms as they were also bound up with resistance to oppression. The common sentiment was that Pemba was being held back and this perception was a springboard for Wapemba responses. Despite the oppression they face, many pointed out that Wapemba were doing quite well; they were described as educated, successful and determined. In examining the different means by which Wapemba were surviving, I soon realised that the struggle to survive and develop in the Zanzibar political climate could be construed as resistance in itself and that their culture was providing the means to reach their objectives. Swantz (1996) cautions us that “looking at cultural features simply as economic strategies may overlook the aspect of purposeful resistance embedded in ritual and other forms of cultural association” (Swantz 1996:168). In working with Wapemba, their pride, solidarity, culture and support networks became constant themes throughout their daily survival strategies and in their ensuing resistance to oppression.

“The analyses of cultural spaces seen as forms of resistance reveal social situations in which people have, by means of social convention, maintained their own cultural mode of life in order to oppose unwanted interventions by their rulers. Even when losing

materially by resisting, people leave open the option of creating their own forms of shared wealth” (Swantz 1996:173). Rather than embracing the principles of modernisation, as defined by the Zanzibar Government or by the West, they have found mechanisms of their own for creating “space” for cultural continuity. The “space” they have created for themselves in a variety of ways, both obvious and subtle, ensures that their cultural values can be upheld.

Adherence and preservation of social customs, in this context, is not an atavistic backward looking response to the so-called “modernization” and “development” that the government and Party were attempting to bring. Rather, it is a way for people to create space, to maintain spheres of autonomous action in order to direct their own destiny. It is a way of resisting the imposition of policies which to them seem irrational and undermine their social order and means of sustaining themselves (Swantz 1996:168).

In the political content of Zanzibar, where every attempt is made to repress development among Wapemba, it has been possible to outline the concept of resistance for development. In Pemba, strength is found in local cultural practices and beliefs, while at the same time, the will to keep struggling is at least in part, drawn from the anger at injustices aimed at themselves and their community. This sense of injustice contributes to their determination to succeed which fuels a great deal of grassroots action. Local initiatives contribute to development while they challenge the interests of those in power; in so doing, they are political in nature. In daily forms of resistance, we can find the spaces being created for grassroots development. Characteristics which are intrinsic to daily forms of resistance such as internal motivation, creativity, ownership, initiative, adaptability and cultural appropriateness are also key principles in grassroots development and empowerment. Everyday forms of resistance are local strategies which originate from

the grassroots and contribute to empowerment. They involve people in controlling their own development while relying on their own abilities in order to succeed. Their active participation and the ensuing results lead to an increase in self-confidence, self-reliance and eventually, consciousness.

Challenging Perceptions About the Assignment of Value, Development, Oppression, Power and Resistance

Wapemba have learned to be adaptable and demonstrate resilience throughout daily life activities. "People have had a historically developed capacity to adjust their ritual life to their environmental conditions and to frequent interventions while retaining the capacity to reproduce their social group. Their social values also have shown great resiliency" (Swantz 1996:171). Throughout their struggle, "they have found ways to resist being subsumed by the wider society and thereby losing their own cultural and social identity. They have used the very same cultural means at their disposal in building their defences, thereby creating values which give meaning and continuity to life" (Swantz 1996:171). Their very survival and development has been depending upon and stimulated by aspects of their local culture rather than by the principles of "modernisation" which western models tend to recommend and pursue.

These insights suggest that we need to finally do away with 'developmentalist' approaches that place countries along a linear trajectory of evolutionary development in which societies 'progress' from tradition to modernity, or in the case of the informal economy, from small-scale production to large-scale production, from informal to formal systems, etc. Related to these assumptions is a disdain for local knowledge and knowledge embedded in work as typified in the skills of the artisan (Tripp and Swantz 1996:14).

Swantz contends that in the rural development sector, the “neglect of the analysis of the so-called ‘traditional sector’, i.e. the local social and cultural practice, leads to stagnation ... [and that] the value scale applied continues to be based solely on the concept of economic power” (Swantz 1985:8). In failing both to notice what else is taking place on the ground and to find out what is really of value to people, the State, or any external body, fails to harness the energy of the people. Other value dimensions hint at other dimensions of power available to those with shared values. “Peasants’ definitions of ‘needs’ are both monetarily and psychologically mediated by the economy and ideology of the nation in addition to inherited cultural values” (Bryceson and Kirimbai 1980:2). Different cultures have very different ways of perceiving the world and work towards their own objectives accordingly. For example, in Islamic economics we discover a way of conceptualising economics which is different from that in the West. The Islamic economies are governed by religious principles where different rules of conduct apply and standards other than personal accumulation are valued, rewarded, and expected. These principles of helping one another take precedence over goals of ambition, amassing wealth and survival of the fittest.

In conceiving of development and development assistance, the West has commonly been constrained in a typical approach to ‘development’. There are many alternatives to explore once overcoming the ‘doom and gloom’ outlook that often accompanies a western glance at the difficulties faced by countries labelled as ‘less developed’. Tripp and Swantz (1996) take an unconventional stance by choosing to look beyond the many analyses of Tanzania’s difficulties and beginning to ask “what might have gone right, rather than what

went wrong” (1996:2). They quickly point out that “in no way is this an attempt to sweep under the rug or minimize the difficulties people have confronted in their daily lives” (Tripp and Swantz 1996:2). However, they point out that “identifying strengths that can be built on is in the long run a much more daunting task than simply discovering what went wrong because it involves disentangling useful developments from those which have hindered progress ... these distinctions are often highly ambiguous” (Tripp and Swantz 1996:3). Similarly, in working with Wapemba, I did not set out to prove that domination and oppression have been beneficial to them in any way, nor have I wanted to minimise the injustice and difficulties that they have faced. What has become evident throughout the study, however, is that the oppressive tendencies of the Zanzibar Government have helped Wapemba to solidify their identity and the struggles they have encountered and overcome, are part of what has made them so strong.

As in Lisa Law’s (1997) study of the representation of prostitutes in the Philippines, relationships of oppression can be viewed as negotiated spaces of identity. Just as prostitution is not a desired position, neither are political oppression and the lack of material development desirable for Wapemba; however, we cannot assume that power is a one-way street or that the ‘subordinates’ themselves are not actually deriving power from their positions. In re-examining power relations and acknowledging the role of the ‘subordinate’ in influencing and making use of power relations, the tendency to cast people as ‘victim’ is thrown into question. Rather than portraying agents as passive victims, it should be acknowledged that they are engaged in constant struggle and have the abilities to move despite constraints and actually influence the circumstances themselves.

Agents interact with constraints to influence the world around them. The designation of 'victim' is victimising in itself as it erases the power and ability of agents; it denies their agency and in doing so fails to acknowledge their presence and accomplishments on the playing field. Theories concerning oppression often contain the alienating tendency to assign the term victim to those in a subordinate position, rather than struggling to look beyond oppression to determine what else may be going on. The tendency to equate development with Westernization or modernization contains drawbacks in that it equally tells people that they have not reached a desirable state of development, and is therefore in itself victimizing by striking a comparison and refusing to see beyond it. In this way, people's accomplishments are evaluated against another model rather than defined in their own terms. The stories of the Wapemba have been intended, however modestly, to challenge the tendencies to cast as victim and acknowledge only the development potential of westernising or modernising principles.

In Pemba, factors which are not perceived as conducive to Western style development (e.g. the oppression in Zanzibar society and Islamic cultural practices rather than Western style capitalism) are being examined from another perspective – a perspective which acknowledges that these un-Western forces are serving to motivate people in such a way that no outside intervention could hope to do. The Wapemba *own* their struggle; thus, it is self-propelled. They realise that it is they who must act on their own behalf because they have no choice; they have learned from experience that they can always hope for but never count on outside assistance. Through making their own gains they come to realize their own power. Responses from the grassroots are initiated

through necessity and are locally and culturally relevant and suitable. They demonstrate that there is space for human development even where other notions of development are lacking.

Culture serves as the basis for resistance and cultural means can as well become a determinant factor in development. As Wapemba continue to realise that they are indeed making use of their own strengths and abilities to overcome the effects of oppression, they can become increasingly conscious that refusing to be oppressed is empowering in itself. Wapemba are working towards an increased sense of empowerment – in many cases without even realizing it. They are in fact achieving their own goals through their own actions having learned not to rely on anyone else. They derive a certain power from the difficulties they have faced in that they have become largely self-sufficient. Wapemba take pride in building stronger foundations than those who have not had to learn how to dig a foundation but have instead been handed a ready-built structure. In Pemba, people cannot afford to take anything as a given therefore they must work harder and plan strategically.

When people are denied access to the dominant arena, whether for political or economic reasons, they choose to react in different ways. Social agents cannot be lumped into a homogeneous category and essentialized. It would be unfair and incorrect to define all Wapemba point blank as defiant resisters, as they are all shaped by their individual and collective experiences. Among Wapemba there is actually a mixture of resistance and tolerance. Different and the same people often demonstrate both the tendency to resist while at other times they display a fatalistic attitude or express feelings of helplessness. One way or another though, people inevitably do something. If one tactic does not work,

another method must be employed. Every time I asked “Why?”, people invariably responded by saying “We have no choice”. They would say this with a smile, a shrug and a sureness to their voice, as if to say that without any doubt, they know this is their answer. Out of necessity, people have learned that they need to be resilient.

The Qu’ran teaches people to be patient and as a result Wapemba behave as though they are relatively tolerant of the repression they face. Despite this though, “it was possible to strain the endurance of the people quite far, but when it no longer made sense to them, they began to question how far they should go in obeying orders” (Swantz 1996:146). Where the rules do not make sense to people, they will not be adhered to and everyday forms of resistance will be employed to counter the intolerable.

Pemba people may display an outward impression of tolerance; however, there is no mystification regarding the circumstances in which they live. In a place where ‘everything is politics’ and political discussion permeates everyday conversation, it is inconceivable that they are unaware of the oppression and thus even more implausible that their lives are devoid of any resistance to it. They don’t necessarily claim to be resisting; some people shrug it off and appear to do nothing, while others engage in daily forms of resistance or respond vocally to no avail. Their overall philosophy, or way of thinking and viewing the world, allows them to do nothing out of the ordinary on the surface yet not to be subjugated in reality. They mount a symbolic challenge which allows them to maintain their dignity and faith. The symbolic challenge which is played in the arena of humanity and on ethical grounds, speaks to a different kind of power. It is power which is derived from within human actors and their culture and it is both subtle and omnipresent. This

power is non-violent and finds its strength in the collective sense of ‘power with’ one another rather than the more common and violent notion of ‘power over’ someone else. Judith Stiehm (1972) describes nonviolent power as being powerful. She contends that one major source of its power is the depth, the sincerity, and the totality of the commitment of the resister. “Because his whole being – ‘body, mind, will and spirit – is integrated and at work with singleness of purpose’, he is said to command ‘immense and predictable resources of energy’” (Gregg in Stiehm 1972:42). Of course, incidents of direct and outright resistance do occur but they accomplish less than the daily struggle to deny oppression the opportunity to permeate every aspect of their lives. Outright expressions can fuel solidarity and boost a sense of pride but in their directness; they are visible and thus more easily countered by opposing forces.

Village and community level dynamics often remain veiled to the eyes of the Government authorities; thus they represent sites of alternative spheres of power and provide a basis for everyday forms of resistance. Maiguashca notes that in the formalised power arena “Indigenous peoples can be seen as a “powerless” social force to the extent that they have no significant economic or political resources of their own ...[that they are] living in peripheral regions in sub-standard living conditions ... systematically marginalised from sources of political power ...[and] devoid of material power” (Maiguashca [no date is given] 61-62). A re-examination of marginality and the so-called marginalised, however, reveals that there are forms of power other than those that exist in the formal sphere and that even in a marginal position, social actors play a key role in influencing what takes place and how far the powers of the dominant are able to extend. Mohanty (1991) argues

that “it is not the centre that determines the periphery, but the periphery that, in its boundedness, determines the centre” (Mohanty 1991:73-74). I would argue that they are mutually determining, neither is entirely determined by the other, nor are they part of exactly the same thing.

The challenge is then to search for alternative representations of power and daily forms of resistance amidst the subtleties of human action in hidden forms where the significance of an act may not be apparent on the surface but can nonetheless signify the negotiation of power relations. Throughout their daily life activities, Wapemba navigate through an intricate web of power relations, pushing forward their demands and working the system to their advantage. In the process their actions shape the world in which they live and their resistance affects social change.

Interactions With State Interference in Organisational Forms

The nature of the relationship between the Wapemba and the Zanzibar State has influenced both the world view and the resulting behaviours of the people of Pemba. In emphasising human agency in the face of government oppression, it has been interesting to note the various forms of interaction and the ways in which “government [has] touche[d] people, and vice versa” (Staudt 1991:18). Staudt has found that in countries where the State is seen as ‘predator’, peasants normally try to disengage themselves as far as possible from the State and capital dependency. “Even in regimes committed to the peasantry, people use whatever space and autonomy they have to gain advantages ... States interfere with peasants, who in pursuing their own interests, are frequently at odds with state

policies, conscription, and revenue generation” (Staudt 1991:20). Of course people’s experiences with the State are mixed, for they selectively derive resources and opportunities while at the same time they resist State policies.

States, regardless of their type, find in actuality that their effectiveness on the ground depends, at least in part, on their ability to get things done – on their managerial capacity. This is one place where one can find an opening for daily forms of resistance to have an impact on the power of the State in a *de facto* sense. Human agents affect the ability of the State to act insofar as they note the contradictory moves of the State and reject the State’s management of their affairs through various forms of everyday resistance. In Zanzibar, where the State is all powerful *de jure*, it has been nonetheless weakened by its own attempt to accept the appearance of “multiparty politics without quite accepting all the rules of the game” (Cameron 1996:13).

Cameron interprets the weakening of the State as an opening for non-governmental forms of organisation. “In the face of a greatly weakened State, both politically and economically, real political space exists for rural society to (re)organize itself” (Cameron 1996:14). However, having become accustomed to the norm in Zanzibar whereby official forms of autonomous organisation have been repeatedly usurped by the state, Cameron’s prognosis is not very optimistic. He outlines the difficulties as follows: “the daily precariousness of economic survival makes durable self-organization truly daunting. NGOs are few and totally donor dependent. The 50 year old cooperative movement, despite some growth in the 1990s, receded as the divisiveness of inter-party conflict imploded many village-level primary societies. Autonomous self-organization in

the short run is therefore problematic” (Cameron 1996:14). He overlooks something major in his analysis, however, by remaining attached to the most common notions of development and formal types of organisations for development. He takes only formal cooperatives and foreign NGOs into account as possibilities for autonomous organization. In doing so, he fails to consider that these organisations historically have been dominated by external forces, and that by definition they have not been the means for autonomous self-organization. As the various stories from Pemba have illustrated, the less formalized forms of association have been one of the primary mechanisms through which people have survived and thrived. In the wake of there being few international NGOs and in the spirit of upholding its anti-government stance plus its own mandate to help their constituents, CUF Party members who have been elected as representatives are creating their own NGOs for Pemba. Although they are boycotting the current Government, Opposition Party members are trying, with the means that are at their disposal, to uphold the promises they have made to help the people of Pemba, plus their supporters in Unguja.

People in Pemba are in fact so unaccustomed to receiving support from the outside that when asked “what is the presence of NGOs in Pemba”, they respond without referring to international NGOs, but automatically jump to the efforts of Wapemba Opposition Party MPs to form such organisations. Hamad Masoud, who explained the situation of NGOs to me, indicated that he believes that NGOs should be created by the people themselves, but that in Zanzibar they have normally been registered, appointed and given directives by the government. He explained that, typically, organisation in Zanzibar has been very top-down – *“that’s why here you see even the Trade Unions, you don’t see the*

workers boycotting, making demonstrations, because it's not workers who started from the grassroots. It's just a big body which has been put there by the ruling Party, by the government, it's not de facto at all. Of course it's a government attempt to control people's organisation – why not!" (Masoud).

'Cooperatives' have been one such form of organisation imposed by the government and inextricably bound up with the State.

No matter what point in time one examines in its 45 year history on Zanzibar, co-operative development has been a top-down affair whereby the state has sought to control small-scale producers, that is, those outside of state boundaries within civil society. Between the state and these small-scale producers – artisans, fishermen and peasants – stand co-operatives ... creations of the state, [which] were superimposed over civil society to the extent that governing bodies and laws were established before extant primary societies at the base (Cameron 1995:1).

The basis of these government registered cooperatives and cooperative formation has always been political. Krain documents that even "in the early 1960s the development of cooperatives along political and racial lines had intensified ... Followers of Afro-Shirazi Party did not buy food from Arab shops and vice-versa, Zanzibar Nationalist Party followers boycotted shop cooperatives founded by Afro-Shirazi members" (Krain 1994:4). Cameron reiterates that "ASP and ZNP leaders used co-operatives as potential political constituencies in the struggle for the post-uhuru state. The result for the movement: chaos and fratricide" (Cameron 1995:8).

The office of the Cooperative Union of Tanzania in Zanzibar had leaders who were political appointees at all levels. All cooperatives were expected to be politically affiliated to the main branch. "Even nominally elected representatives from within the societies had to be party members" (Cameron 1995:11). This of course alienated many people,

particularly on Pemba with its history of animosity towards the Zanzibar Government. According to Cameron, as could be expected, “cooperatives are more popular on Unguja. 10.2% of all adults of Unguja and only 6.8% of Pemba are members of a cooperative” (Cameron 1995:11). The difference is thought to be political. Many cooperatives are initiated by political leaders. As was clearly explained to me in Pemba, CUF and CCM party members do not make cooperatives together. Formally registered cooperatives were imposed upon the people and saturated with politics.

Despite the government’s promotion of ‘cooperatives’ as a form of organisation, “there appear to have been no attempts to guide peasants along co-operative lines. Rather, there appears to have been an element of coercion” (Cameron 1995:10). The principle of cooperation on the other hand, does exist naturally in society and people do choose to work together for their own reasons. Krain (1994) reminds us that “especially women’s cooperatives often have an additional function of indirectly lowering risks and reinforcing mutual help” (1994:1). People do benefit from working together and manage to escape the watchful eye of the State in order to organise themselves informally. Tripp and Swantz (1996) in their study of village development in Tanzania, found that the majority of people were indeed engaging in “high degrees of informal cooperation and networking while rejecting formal organization” (1996:10).

Real Cooperation versus State Imposed Intervention

In Pemba, I found high degrees of non-formalised and real cooperation while I also found people taking advantage of the possible opportunities which could arise through

organising themselves formally. Among the cooperatives that had been formed of people's own initiative, it was observed that many were strengthened by cultural and social ties and their activities were pursued with enthusiasm. The formal organisations which had the most highly motivated group members had begun with their own reasons for forming a cooperative. Many of these people had already been organised; they had a skill, were motivated enough to try and had already been working together prior to calling themselves a cooperative. Their organization had not really changed in any way, except that they had formalised their working relationship by registering as a cooperative. In many of these cases, 'cooperatives' were in actuality a facade whereby the system was used to the advantage of social actors in their attempt to seek opportunities. Most commonly however, imposed and artificial cooperatives had been formed due to the expectation of receiving assistance which led to a feeling of dependency. Almost all groups which had formed because they had expected to receive assistance were characterised by a sense of helplessness and an attitude of discouragement. In Pemba, I found that most of the formal cooperatives I met with had become registered because the members had expected to receive assistance. In interviewing 'cooperatives' in Pemba, patterns began to emerge whereby a possible promise of assistance had served to create expectations among the people. A clear link between attitudes and expectations was established in viewing that most of these half-hearted cooperative members were sitting idle awaiting their assistance and becoming more and more discouraged by the day. As Madawa has noted above, *"people who are disappointed do nothing and get nothing"*. Most of those 'cooperatives' which had received some form of assistance had not

translated the results into lasting changes.

People were seen to comply with bureaucracy in order to reap any possible benefits. The top down government approach had ensured that, among the population, a norm had developed whereby creating the impression of doing things by the book seemed to be more important than doing anything at all. Rules were modified where possible in order that people could follow their own and established ways of operating while appearing to comply. I discovered that groups of people will call themselves cooperatives but then they will continue to work in their own ways. In reality, the Wapemba do organize themselves for development. People do take what is potentially good out of State organised interventions and other outside interferences and they change it, adapt it to their circumstances and in doing so, they make it their own. Through this process, they interact with State intervention to seize ownership, seek opportunities and initiate their own sustainable development.

The Unpredictable Effects of Human Agency in Development Assistance

Resistance to government intervention such as the imposed formation of cooperatives has been observed while at the same time people have employed everyday tactics of resistance to ensure that they extract all possible benefits while still exerting some control over that which is imposed upon them. This observation of the process of claiming ownership has wider implications for any intervention introduced or imposed from the outside. In terms of development assistance, what is brought to a culture from outside will be taken by the people and adapted to fit into their own patterns, their

lifestyle, as well as that which is both culturally and personally appropriate and desirable. As this is defined differently by different actors, we must realise that innumerable factors enter into the picture; it is not possible to predict with any degree of certainty what the outcome of such initiatives will be. People learn through experience and ensure that development is a process of adaptation. Attitudes and practice are a reflection of what people understand and believe, and can only hint at the ways in which an intervention will be modified and adapted to a local situation.

Ferguson (1990) argues that “if the development interventions fail, as they usually do, that too is part of the process” (1990:268). Development assistance is often intrusive and even the failures have broader political implications. Plans that originate from the outside often fail to “transform the world in their own image – ‘failure’ here does not mean doing nothing; it means doing something else, and that something else always has its own logic” (1990:276). Human agency and the consciousness of social actors inevitably contain wider implications for development projects. Human agency is the unpredictable factor in development interventions; as people make the changes that they want to and take ownership over the process, the outcome of any plan is affected. Where the initiative is not originally of their own creation, people will appropriate what is introduced to gain a sense of ownership prior to fully committing themselves to a project.

In studying the human agency of social actors and the ways in which they struggle for their own development, appropriation can be a key component. “Planned interventions may produce unintended outcomes that end up, all the same, incorporated into anonymous constellations of control – authorless ‘strategies’ ... that turn out in the end to have a kind

of political intelligibility” (Ferguson 1990:20). Appropriation is tied in with everyday forms of resistance for development. “The most important political effects of a planned intervention may occur unconsciously, behind the backs or against the will of the ‘planners’ who may seem to be running the show” (Ferguson 1990:20). Ferguson argues that “intentional plans are always important but never in quite the way the planners imagined” (1990:20). Intended plans interact with unacknowledged structures and chance events to produce unintended outcomes which turn out to be intelligible not only as the unforeseen effects of an intended interventions but as part of the political plan of the social actors. It must be acknowledged that development is in people’s hands, for it is the people themselves who must do what is required for the development idea to be propelled forward. It is they who will determine the success, failure and direction of a project. Anything requiring a significant degree of effort must be embraced wholeheartedly. The belief in an effort’s truth and importance must be held in one’s heart in order to be followed through as the commitment to persevere is personal and cannot be imposed from outside. This is where grassroots initiatives and forms of organisation are built on a foundation of strength.

Lack of Development Intervention has Helped to Keep Indigenous Initiatives Alive in Pemba

In Pemba, where the people have become accustomed to receiving very little positive intervention from the outside, the term ‘NGO’ has come clearly to represent the development efforts instigated by CUF. The idea of foreign NGOs is not even considered.

In Pemba, which is essentially lacking an international NGO presence, the term NGO represents something local and not affiliated with the ruling Party. This stands in stark contrast with the culture of expectation which can otherwise be fostered in an atmosphere where external NGOs dominate. In Ferguson's (1990) study of development in Lesotho, he speaks of the need to "denaturalize" the development intervention (1990:258), which is something that has never become naturalized in Pemba. Among Wapemba, the discourse of Western development still holds strong but so does a spirit of dignity and self-confidence. There is a desire for development assistance; where there is an opportunity for a handout, hands are out. Most often in the case of Pemba however, the absence of such handouts has left people to their own devices. They find the means through their own cultural systems as they create initiatives that are appropriate and cohesive to their lives. The struggle that they are engaging in is sustainable because it is self-propelled and it is self-propelled partly because there is no one there to help them. They are unified in their own struggle having discovered that they have been left in a common position by virtue of their shared socio-political environment.

Grassroots Initiatives Within and From the Wapemba Culture

In comparing state organised intervention and externally driven development assistance with grassroots action and initiative, it is clear that the power to truly effect change and to achieve a sense of empowerment is generated from within. People do organise themselves and use the cultural means at their disposal in devising support systems and survival strategies. In Pemba, where the State has contributed nothing

purposely to the people's own development, there is grassroots organisation in the face of oppression. People are making ends meet informally through a range of flexible activities, often without access to formal employment. Wapemba are supporting one another by their own choice, through the means which they deem culturally appropriate. In Pemba, cultural forms are being invoked in the struggle to survive. The people have devised their own strategies to ease their workload and to make their lives easier, while simultaneously asserting their identities and hinting at an alternative world view.

Learning From Indigenous Knowledge

The knowledge and wisdom about what will be acceptable to the community comes from within the community. Maganga (1994) speaks of indigenous knowledge, a term which

best serves to distinguish this system, developed by a community, from the international knowledge systems called Western knowledge, generated through universities, government research centres and private industries. Those who have relied excessively on the latter address problems arising in different communities and would do well to remember that communities have been evolving knowledge systems for centuries. Systems are modified with the passing of years, enabling communities to live harmoniously with change. Indigenous should not be considered more effective than Western or international knowledge, but the two should complement each other (Maganga 1994:11).

Indigenous people are doing what they have already been doing for years; their knowledge is tried and tested. They have the knowledge about what works in their physical, social, cultural and political world and they have an established system or series of systems for accomplishing what needs to be accomplished. Their knowledge runs deeper than outsiders will ever grasp and remains a key aspect of their power. "The development

potential of indigenous knowledge is only now being recognized. There is no doubt that it constitutes a strategic national resource" (Maganga 1994:11).

Of course, "self-reliant development does not preclude creative and enriching interaction with other people in the same or allied fields of interest" (Ramphelie 1991:170). A two way exchange is most effective in enhancing the learning process. There is no doubt that people can and do learn from one another. Exchanging ideas, coming to understand a concept, method, form of technology, or different perspective that had previously remained unexplored or undetected can only be a growing and learning experience. The typical problem has been that development assistance or intervention has not been viewed in this way. It has more commonly been viewed as a one-way process with one side clearly giving and the other side clearly being on the receiving end. There has been only rare recognition of mutual exchange. There has been a specific and Western way of doing things which has not been respectful of alternative visions. "Development" as modernisation or westernisation has typically been the goal. Whether it has been "development" with a gender focus or with another well-intentioned, sensitive approach, the focus has always been progress, change and improvement. What if the conservation of an existing method is exactly what is key to holding the current social or economic system in place? What if not changing certain practices is what has allowed existing support systems and survival strategies to flourish? When the daily survival and resistance of a population springs from its cultural resources, maintaining that culture is key in sustaining the momentum towards empowerment. "Indeed, the only general answer to the question, 'What should they do?' is: 'They are doing it!'" (Ferguson 1990:281).

The West needs to recognise both the power and the value of alternatives and learn to listen and learn from other types of experiences which lead to different forms of enrichment. “In a fundamental sense, indigenous peoples preserve and embody alternative lifestyles that may provide models, inspiration, and guidance in the essential work of world-order redesign, an undertaking now primarily associated with overcoming self-destructive tendencies in the behaviour of modern societies” (Falk in Maiguaschca 62).

Conclusion

The dangers and problems of associating development with modernisation have been presented throughout the conceptual framework of this thesis and have been reinforced through the indigenous struggles illustrated by the Wapemba. The equation of development with westernisation has been demonstrated to be ethnocentric, one-sided and largely inapplicable. The understanding of this has given way to the search for alternatives to western approaches to development. The search has revealed different ways in which ideas of development have been reconfigured by local circumstances. Social actors have been seen to exert their influence and to reassert alternative experiences while demonstrating that the supposed subalterns play a key role in shaping the political world in which they live either through innovation or the survival and resistance of cultural practices. Their symbolic challenges reveal their social power and ensure that dominance does not permeate every aspect of their natural world. Exposing the role of human agency has underscored the premise that people are indeed the agents of qualitative change in the areas of both development and resistance.

This thesis has also been intended to expand our conceptions of resistance and power by showing that as agents draw on the strength of their own system there is constant negotiation in relations of dominance and subordination. Local coping strategies of the Wapemba community as they relate to self-help in the areas of both subsistence and resistance have been illustrated through their depictions of their culture. The Wapemba have exhibited both resistance to power and resistance for power. The very experience of repression has been seen to be a catalyst for organising and people's inventiveness has been seen to increase with need. The experiences the Wapemba have had as subordinates has equipped them with knowledge and thus power which is not available to those in power in the formalised arena.

It has been observed that as a person's socio-economic or political status improves, incentive and self-motivation drops off. Now in Pemba as life is harder, people are even more determined to "just keep going". People have accepted that they must live according to the situation and continue to cope because they cannot afford to be complacent. Madawa has reiterated the belief that people from Pemba can only depend upon themselves and has acted upon this through his own efforts at assisting the community. The form of development which he promotes builds upon cultural means, serves to boost solidarity among the people and springs from the grassroots. The sense of determination among Wapemba contributes to their high success rate and subsequent sense of pride.

The local culture in Pemba provides both a structure and a cover for resistance. As part of their cultural practice, Wapemba resist being impoverished by the conditions

they face by devising ways of helping one another. They resist being poor and struggle to support themselves through a variety of means. People who have been fired from their jobs because of the way they chose to cast their vote in the most recent election or simply for being from Pemba, generally resist the feelings of helplessness, hopelessness and the loss of control that often arise in situations of job loss by imposing a form of control in quickly switching to other possibilities for income generation. Some have since become very politically active whereas they had previously remained uninvolved in politics. Even people with jobs in the formal sector often do several types of work and a family typically derives income in numerous ways through multiple family members. This is done because it has been construed as a necessity for survival. The survival of Wapemba in this political economic context is based on the principles of resilience, adaptation, flexibility, cooperation and opportunity seeking.

The Wapemba resist status degradation through religious ethics and by taking pride in working hard and being clever. They realise that the powerful do not have to be so clever in order to survive, which results in their laziness. At the same time, the moral authority of the elites is undercut through their own behaviour in relation to the readings of the Qu'ran. There is also a sense that a degree of revenge can be taken by refusing to be suppressed. To even the minutest extent that it may be out of spite, or more arguably, that it is in spite of the constraints which have been unjustly placed upon them, people try to gain whatever they can. A great deal of pride is derived from successes that are achieved in the face of circumstances which restrain or attempt to frustrate their efforts. The belief that the situation is unjust contributes to their resistant spirit. This spirit, in

turn, adds to their momentum and provides them with additional determination. It is not just that they must survive, but they must be able to show those in Government that with or without their support, they will survive. There is no denying that having Government support would indeed make things easier, but they demonstrate that they do not need the Government's support and in doing so, they challenge the Government's power. Perhaps even more effective than boycotting the Parliament, this indicates that the Government is not in fact all powerful and demonstrates that they have taken their own spaces to create positive development.

This thesis has been concerned with uncovering some of the fundamental aspects of development which have been overlooked in the more typical Westernised accounts of development. The question of how people work together led to the examination of formally registered cooperatives in relation to more natural groupings and networks. The sections on cooperatives, illustrated through the stories of daily life among Wapemba, differentiated between real cooperation and imposed forms of organisation such as the formally registered cooperatives in Zanzibar. The analysis has pointed to the importance of the intrinsic motivation present in people's own initiatives and in doing so leaves open the question as to what type of outside intervention or development assistance, if any, can be relevant. This and other sections have also pointed out that communities and individuals rely on their cultural means in daily life and that these means are cohesive fully formed systems which, in their entirety and in the fact that they are so well established, offer more in terms of real development than the bits and pieces that are promoted by other cultures in the form of development assistance. Insofar as outside interventions are

able to disrupt or displace indigenous systems, they may well be destroying the very means of community survival and empowerment. It has been observed, however, that a remarkable resilience shines forth and that indigenous cultural systems are not so easily pushed aside in Pemba. The Wapemba value their culture and this fuels a sense of pride and solidarity which, in the face of repression, reinforces the community's desire to further their own development.

Despite the political-economic context in which these struggles take place, the point of emphasis lies less with oppression and more with empowerment. What has become evident is that despite the constraints that they face, the Wapemba are determined not to give up, but rather to succeed in the face of repression. This spirit is the basis of human development. Among Wapemba, people have identified the issues and found their own solutions. The questions which are raised are less concerned about the implications for development interventions and more concerned with the basic principles of human development. This thesis has been concerned with decoding development theory and basing it all on simple, complicated reality. The form of development which has emerged is encompassed by the principle of empowerment and assumes that the capacity of people to adapt and act on their own behalf is a key component of any notion of development. The emphasis lies with human development and in the recognition of empowerment as development. Many of the key elements of this indigenous process have been observed among the Wapemba who, unified and determined in their efforts through a resistant spirit, are engaged in their own struggle which is shaped according to their own shared religious principles and mutual cultural means. It is their initiated process; the gains they make are

their own and each and every achievement contributes to their greater sense of empowerment.

In Pemba, there is cultural and social development in the absence of economic development. In lieu of having political representation and economic or industrial development, which the people do aspire to, Wapemba have been seen to draw on elements of their culture such as: kinship, social networks, Islam, the values of patience, acceptance, tolerance, perseverance, being hard working and so on, as sources of power. They have created strategies for survival and have employed everyday forms of resistance to act on their own behalf and in the process have been successful in sustaining themselves. Despite the political and economic constraints that they face, their resilience and determination have allowed types of development other than westernisation and modernisation to occur. They may not even recognize the strength of their own initiatives and creative spirit, but these qualities are a great source of power. These characteristics are not exclusive to Wapemba culture and are likely to be great sources of strength for other cultural groups as well. The questions that remains are these: can these qualities propel them forward as they struggle to enter the arenas of formalized political and economic power? Is this the ultimate goal?

This account of the lives of the people of Pemba has been both a testimony of their strength and a celebration of their resilience and power. It has been based on the encounters I had with the people of Pemba which both pointed to and supported the hypothesis that grassroots action and initiative, and the principles encompassed therein, are among the principal conditions for community empowerment. The presentation of

the determined spirit and ensuing strength demonstrated by Wapemba through their daily life encounters has been intended to inspire and motivate us to continue to explore alternative notions of development and to continue to appreciate the meanings inherent in everyday practice. What sort of implications would there be for the future of development on our planet if each of us were to begin to realise and acknowledge the value of everyday practices in shaping the world? The Wapemba interact on a subtle and daily basis with the political and socio-economic conditions which surround them. In so doing, they assert their presence and influence the world around them, while hinting at alternative forms of power, and ways of perceiving and bringing value to the world. Their stories reveal the contribution of resistance to empowerment in grassroots development while their culture provides a steady foundation for all that they achieve.

Appendix I

The Political History and Imprisonment of Juma Othman

If people who do lead very political lives are beaten for their political affiliation, what about you who is openly political? Have you been arrested?

"I have been arrested so many times. First of all let me tell you my history ... in 1982, I was elected as a member of the National Executive Committee of the CCM. At that time, there was only one political party in the country according to the law and the political organization. I was a member of the National Electoral Commission (NEC) of the CCM and I was the Regional Party Secretary of the CCM in this region of this island. When I was a member of the NEC actually, I was not convinced with the political approach of the CCM especially regarding Zanzibar's relationship in the Union. Zanzibar was regarded as a subordinate not a counterpart in the Union. In 1987, I was kicked off, and in 1988 I was expelled, totally expelled from the Party because I was not supporting the Party's policy and I had the idea of breaking the Union. Then in 1989 I was arrested, the charges were that I had been holding a meeting and discussing to break the Union. But actually the Government was not able to establish that so I was not hard hit, it was just a mission. After one and a half years, then they thought that it was just rubbish then they kicked it off. In 1990, I was detained under the very maximum security in Zanzibar; I was taken to Unguja from here with some of my colleagues actually at first we were only five, and everyone was in his own room, 24 hours in his room, locked, not see the light, nothing more, just given your plate of food in your room. Then I was released after six months, from the detention. After the election on the first of November, I was arrested in Zanzibar there, by the police and on the third of November I was sent to the court to be charged with treason, but fortunately, the government failed to establish a treason case before the court. I remained in the jail actually, after 15 days. Even now, all the time we go to the court. They say there is not enough evidence here to investigate it, then they said this investigation is being conducted by the military themselves. All this while ... so actually up to the 13th of June, the government themselves finally said I think we should take off this case, if there will be any evidence in the future, we may call it again, so that's how things are" (Othman July 1996).

Appendix II

Madawa's story

"At first, in Pemba, I bought a house, opened a restaurant and opened a hut to keep poultry. The poultry business was very poor because there was no market and a low price for eggs. I was the chief cook at the restaurant myself and started everyday at 6:00am and closed at midnight. The restaurant was located close to the cinema so every night people came after the cinema. From the poultry business I ended up with 300 eggs which I took to the hospital. I started out by selling a few small things, with my wife Fatma. First we had only two tables, then two more, then two more (at the restaurant). We started lunch business as well. Ministers from mainland visited and said that they needed to eat late. I made no problems, and made them a nice full meal. I took their orders and the next time they brought another group. Then their boss came, the Minister, and they said 'he made nice food for us' so he had a big group here complete with everything. I fed all of them and they were very happy.

Then there were some family problems with my brother. My father, like a judge's rule, ruled in favour of my brother and I ended up saying 'fine, if you need this shop, you take it. I'll leave'. It is my father, I never go across his word. Near that shop, me and a friend set up another shop, which we then sold. With the money, I got a car for carrying cargo. I tried to fix it. The car was broken so many times; it gave me so many problems. One day the brakes failed. At the last minute it stopped and wouldn't move anymore. I said "I am very tired of this car" and just left it alone. I tried it later in maybe 4 or 5 years, it worked with some minor adjustments and so I sold it.

At that time there was completely no electricity in Pemba. People came from the boat from Unguja with three big batteries, which they needed to power the boat. They knew I had a battery charger, so they asked me. In just two hours, I got 1500 shillings which was a lot of money. I fixed another part for them. People started to come to me. Slowly, slowly, I got more and more tools. I rented a welding machine, welded, got money. This is how I ended up with a garage for welding and engineering. I made a very big workshop. In 1989 there was no electricity totally in Pemba. The generator takes 8 tanks of diesel each day. It started to have problems, up to today. By then, I had a welding machine, some tools and a battery charger so I came to Unguja to make a business. I got a workshop and put in electricity to make the welding machine work. I stayed for one year just sleeping there in the workshop, in a chair with my feet up on the welding machine. There were too many mosquitoes, we had to burn 3 mosquito coils every night. The whole family was still in Pemba, because I was waiting until I could make a nice life and bring them here.

I came to Unguja with my friend John from Pemba. We welded a table and John slept on that. Then another cousin came, and we slept there the three of us. We went for food at my sister's place. The brother of my cousin came too, he also slept there and ate at my sister's. Then a friend came to learn to be an accountant in school. Now we were

5 in one room and eating at my sister's. We knew that the food was too small, so we started to cook for ourselves. One of the friends taught Qur'an school, one went to school, one made small stools, tables, chairs, decorations and sold them at the auction. Then we were given three months notice by the owner. I tried to find a place in town but couldn't. I looked all over town and finally got the one we're in now (which is located on the outskirts of town). John got tired of it because there was no work and ended up asking for money for a ticket to Dar es Salaam. I had to ask someone else. I got 10,000 shillings and gave it to John who went with it to the mainland. John lives in Dar es Salaam and is now a cargo driver. The rest of us just stayed here, living with no work. The others left; there were no jobs, no food. They started to come back here only for sleeping. I had to ask for some money from people I knew well. It was a very bad time, with no work. I could just make porridge. I cried at night. Save the Children wanted to buy the welding machine. I told them 'if you want the machine, take everything, all the tools'. Since I didn't have a single cent, I negotiated a price of 600,000 shillings. Then I bought one bag of rice, sugar, and a bottle of cooking oil. I left 10,000 shillings and came back to Pemba. My plan was to bring my wife back with me. My father in law was very ill so I ended up staying in Pemba for a month. Then, we packed up everything. We put all the luggage from three houses (the houses of his different wives) in the boat. On the way to Unguja, someone on the boat who was smoking just threw the cigarette into the water. The boat was a Jitihada - an open boat especially for transporting cows. The wind brought the cigarette butt straight up to the luggage and it started to burn. The fire spread, everything was packed tightly all together. It took everything, even my wife's Buibui (Higab). We had to throw everything into the sea to keep the fire from burning the whole boat.

The man with the cigarette was put in jail for a week and then was never heard from again. I went to see Ministers, the Prime Minister, even the President face to face, to see if I could get assistance – nothing. I gave the police a list of my luggage and made a statement like I was supposed to. The political situation was just getting started then. Because I came from Pemba, I didn't get anything. A friend picked me and my wife up and took us to the house. No clothes, no Buibui ... nothing in the house but some food and the 10,000 shillings. That night we cooked food in the same old pot made from the engine of a refrigerator. We made a mattress out of boxes and cardboard – until today I have the same cardboard in my bed. We bought 3 plastic cups and plates and we had nothing to do. My father and mother came to give their condolences and they brought money: a donation from all of my brothers. I sold one of the houses in Pemba to get some money.

After the accident, some neighbours helped us. They brought us mats, cups, dishes, food. I tried to find work for maybe 6 months – life went badly, we were just depending upon help – some came from the mosque, also neighbours and other people who heard about the accident. I sold a house in Pemba, the garage and finally the shop. I brought the whole family to live here in Unguja because I knew that now we really need to work together ...

Even my father's workshop was broken down in Pemba. One day he was just given the notice – the new post office is going here. So he lost everything – they said "just you take a suitcase". So many people have problems, so many people have to start with nothing. They cannot get discouraged. People know that God will help ...

I got a job working at the house of spices. My grandfather and father were herbalists, so I know all the properties. Spices are used for medicinal purposes, as cures not just for cooking. I worked there very well. A European woman from the house of spices gave me her TV and VCR when she left the country. I sold them and a few other things and was able to raise the capital to buy a battery and grinding machine to start my own spice business. I started out in a very small way, just making small bags of spices which I took to the market, sometimes the port, and spread them out on a mat where I could sell them to tourists. Javed [a businessman with a large tourist shop] placed an order and this is when my business really began. I made a plan to buy the grinding machine. I got a grinding machine, a few spices, some plastic ... And then it took off".

Madawa (Madawa means medicine man) is a spice producer and also an herbalist . "I know the properties of many spices and have a list of about 88 patients. They come to me, I tell them what I think is wrong and what they should get checked if they go to the hospital. They go to the hospital for the appropriate tests and then come back to me for the treatment ...

"I am trying to encourage people from Pemba to grow spices that I can order. Right now I am negotiating with a teacher who has formed an association. He is trying to make an arrangement for me to buy chillies from him. They will have to be bought fresh and dried here.

I know that to sell for the export market, you need money; it can take years. Maybe they need 5 tonnes, it's always large quantities. Or they can say 'this coffee is nice coffee, I don't need the baskets (packaging), just the coffee, can you get it for me?' That is very difficult to get (large quantities). I need to satisfy the local market first. If the local market is good, then we can grow enough to export. If I can be a supplier to many places in town, then it's a good business. One thing is that it's good to be working with small producers, it's small projects that you don't need a lot of money for. I myself started with small capital, and maybe now I have a hundred times more. I still need running capital, and if I get that, my aim is to help small producers. I need to help small producers. Why? Because they have what I need and they need to be boosted. It means that I must have cash money. To help the people means to buy from cash not from credit. And the second thing is that if you want to make the business with small producers you need to have the cash money because most of the people don't have enough money. For this time it is a bit difficult to help because myself, I need somebody to help me, but I have enough money for this project. Now I already have so many people.

I'm promoting local people but here in Zanzibar the Government, they don't want

to listen. They need to know that to help the people is not to employ the people. Most of the people employ themselves, to make a way of living, to be free. Not all the people can be employed, how many people can get an education? How many people have knowledge of doing work? It means that just in town some people have maybe the time to go to work, but how many have time? Some stay outside, far from town, but this project, it can be started with local people, and let them employ themselves. I want to buy the materials I need from them, why should I get anything from outside when the people are here just crying for the market? Maybe we can start an association, just to help the people. So many people are asking me 'Madawa what about business? What can we do?' or they say 'You are a Medicine man, what can you do for us to help us with these problems?'. I want to have a branch of my business in Pemba, or maybe independent businesses around. I want to see if I can get my brother-in-law involved because he is very discouraged right now and a bit depressed because he lost his job. We must work together, to make unity with the people. We must depend upon ourself and help the people" (Madawa June-July 1996).

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