

NOTE TO USERS

This reproduction is the best copy available.

UMI[®]

**SOCIAL MOTIVES AND INTERPERSONAL EMOTIONS IN DYADIC
NEGOTIATIONS: A STRATEGIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVE**

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
Masters of Arts

By

Deborah I. Reid

Department of Psychology
Carleton University

April 2010
©2010 Deborah Reid



Library and Archives
Canada

Published Heritage
Branch

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

Bibliothèque et
Archives Canada

Direction du
Patrimoine de l'édition

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

Your file Votre référence
ISBN: 978-0-494-68697-3
Our file Notre référence
ISBN: 978-0-494-68697-3

NOTICE:

The author has granted a non-exclusive license allowing Library and Archives Canada to reproduce, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, communicate to the public by telecommunication or on the Internet, loan, distribute and sell theses worldwide, for commercial or non-commercial purposes, in microform, paper, electronic and/or any other formats.

The author retains copyright ownership and moral rights in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission.

In compliance with the Canadian Privacy Act some supporting forms may have been removed from this thesis.

While these forms may be included in the document page count, their removal does not represent any loss of content from the thesis.

AVIS:

L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque et Archives Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public par télécommunication ou par l'Internet, prêter, distribuer et vendre des thèses partout dans le monde, à des fins commerciales ou autres, sur support microforme, papier, électronique et/ou autres formats.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur et des droits moraux qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

Conformément à la loi canadienne sur la protection de la vie privée, quelques formulaires secondaires ont été enlevés de cette thèse.

Bien que ces formulaires aient inclus dans la pagination, il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant.



Canada

Abstract

Strategic negotiation behavior reflects the desire to obtain one's preferred outcome distribution, which is not always to maximize outcome for self (Carnevale, 2003; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986; Van Kleef & Van Lange, 2008). In a mixed, between-within-subjects design, this study examined the impact of social motives and interpersonal emotions on negotiation behavior in dyadic negotiations. Sixty participants were randomly assigned to prosocial or egoistic social motives and faced a happy or an angry confederate. Participants engaged in six negotiation rounds regarding terms of a hypothetical car lease with the confederate. In general, interpersonal emotion did not affect negotiation behaviour, but social motive did. Egoistics made greater demands on average and over time compared to prosocials. Egoistics (v. prosocials) reported significantly more forcing specifically when confronted with a happy counterpart. Prosocials reported significantly more problem-solving, compromising, and yielding than egoistics. Implications for a strategic choice perspective on negotiation behaviour are discussed.

Dedication

I would like to dedicate this master's thesis to my family, George and Marlee Workman and Philip Wedge, who have instilled in me the values and work ethic necessary to successfully complete my master's degree. Their love and support have encouraged me to continue pursuing my dreams and goals.

Acknowledgements

Completion of this master's thesis would not have been possible without the continued support and guidance of my thesis supervisor, Dr. Bernadette Campbell. Your help throughout the process has been invaluable. I am also grateful to Dr. Warren Thorngate for your encouragement and guidance whenever needed. I also would like to further thank Dr. Warren Thorngate, Dr. Janet Mantler, and Dr. Louise Heslop for sharing their knowledge and time as members of my master's thesis committee.

Table of Contents

Abstract.....	ii
Dedication.....	iii
Acknowledgments.....	iv
List of Tables.....	vii
List of Figures.....	viii
List of Appendices.....	ix
Introduction.....	1
Social motives in negotiation.....	2
Social motives and strategic choice.....	3
Emotions in negotiation	6
Interpersonal emotion and strategic choice.....	9
Emotion as social information.....	11
Social motives and emotion.....	13
Present Study.....	15
Hypotheses.....	16
Method.....	18
Participants.....	18
Design.....	19
Procedure.....	19
Measures.....	23
Demands.....	23
DUTCH scale.....	23

Participant emotion.....	24
Perceived threat or opportunity appraisal.....	24
Emotion manipulation	25
Social motive.....	25
Results	26
Preliminary Analyses.....	26
Data Screening	26
Manipulation check.....	26
Main Analyses.....	29
Discussion.....	39
Study Limitations.....	47
Practical Implications and Conclusions.....	50
References.....	52

List of Tables

Table

1. Inter-scale correlations, means, standard deviations, ranges and maximums.....28
2. Descriptive statistics for negotiation strategy and social motive.....36
3. Descriptive statistics for negotiation strategy and confederate emotion.....38

List of Figures

Figure 1a. Demands of prosocial and egoistic negotiators with angry confederate....	31
Figure 1b. Demands of prosocial and egoistic negotiators with happy confederate...	32
Figure 2. Social motive and confederate emotion interaction on round 1.....	33
Figure 3. Social motive, emotion and self-reported use of forcing.....	37

List of Appendices

Appendix A: Recruitment announcement.....	60
Appendix B: Informed consent.....	61
Appendix C: Prosocial motive guidelines	62
Appendix D: Egoistic motive guidelines.....	63
Appendix E: Demand payoff schedule.....	64
Appendix F: Emotional statements (confederate).....	65
Appendix G: Epistemic motivation guidelines.....	66
Appendix H: Bargaining pattern (confederate).....	67
Appendix I: Record of bargaining behaviour.....	68
Appendix J: Dutch Conflict Handling Inventory (DUTCH scale).....	69
Appendix K: Perceived threats and opportunities.....	71
Appendix L: Social motive manipulation check.....	73
Appendix M: Emotion manipulation check.....	74
Appendix N: Participant's emotion.....	75
Appendix O: Epistemic motive manipulation check.....	76
Appendix P: Debriefing.....	77

Social Motives and Interpersonal Emotions in Dyadic Negotiations:

A Strategic Choice Perspective

Social conflict arises when individuals, or groups of individuals perceive that they have different goals, desires or viewpoints from one another. Negotiation is often employed as a method for resolving social conflict. Negotiation is “a discussion between two or more parties with the apparent aim of resolving a divergence of interest and thus escaping social conflict” (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993, p.2). Negotiation is one of the most common and constructive methods used to resolve social conflict and it has been studied extensively in both the academic and the mainstream, popular literatures (Fisher & Ury, 1983; Ury, 1991; Van Kleef, De Dreu & Manstead, 2004a). Broadly speaking, this kind of research is focused on achieving a better understanding of the antecedents and consequences of negotiator behaviour, with the ultimate aim of improving the negotiation process in general. In this study I examined two specific antecedents of negotiator behaviour – a negotiator’s induced social motives and perceptions of interpersonal emotion. Although the effects of these factors on negotiation behaviours have been examined separately, there is scant empirical data to show how social motives and interpersonal emotions might work together to influence negotiator behaviour. One of the central aims of the present study was to examine the interplay of social motive and interpersonal emotions as they relate to a negotiator’s behaviour. I begin with an introduction to the general ideas surrounding the relationship between social motives and strategic choice in negotiation.

Social motives in negotiation

Negotiators have different social motives that influence how they assess outcomes for self and outcomes for others (Messick & McClintock, 1968). Interestingly, negotiators are not always looking to get the most for themselves while leaving the least for the other party. Different social motives lead to differences in the preferred distribution of outcomes between oneself and the counterpart negotiator (McClintock, 1977). Studies in social dilemmas, social conflict and negotiation have typically divided social motives into either prosocial or egoistic motivation (e.g., Beersma & De Dreu, 2002; De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995; Van Lange, 1999). Prosocial motives include cooperative goals whereas egoistic motives generally consist of individualistic goals (De Dreu, Beersma, Stroebe & Euwema, 2006). In general, prosocially motivated individuals desire a distribution of outcomes that provides the maximum gain for both themselves and their counterpart. Egoistically-oriented negotiators, on the other hand, have no concern (either positive or negative) for the outcomes of others and simply desire to maximize their own personal gain (De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003; Van Lange, 1999).

While social motives can reflect individual differences, like a “trait” variable (Beersma & De Dreu, 1999), they can also be ‘induced’ by situational cues and instructions. For example, team incentives may promote prosocial motivation and result in cooperative problem solving (Kramer & Brewer, 1984). Similarly, prosocial motives can be increased simply by giving negotiators instructions to behave cooperatively and to think of the other party as a partner rather than as an opponent (Mannix, Thompson,

& Bazerman, 1989; Messick & McClintock, 1968). Referred to as “motivational orientation” when a state-variable and “social value orientation” when a trait variable, research has shown that “state” and “trait” operationalizations of social motive are functionally equivalent and exert similar effects on negotiation behaviours and outcomes (De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000). In the present study, social motive was treated as a “state-variable” and was manipulated using different instructions for negotiators either to increase concern for their own outcomes or to increase concern for jointly acceptable outcomes in a negotiation. Hence, future references to prosocial and egoistic social motives are references to induced, state-based motives, and not trait-based individual differences in social motive orientation.

Social Motives and Negotiator Behaviours: Strategic Choice Models

Many negotiation theories build on the concept of *strategic choice* (De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003; Pruitt, 1983; Van Kleef et al., 2004a). Strategic choice models commonly assume that negotiators have particular strategies available to them (e.g., yielding, withdrawal, contending, problem-solving), and that which strategy is chosen depends on a variety of individual differences and situational factors. According to Dual Concern models (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986; Rahim, 1983; Thomas, 1976), the strategy a negotiator chooses to adopt at various points in the negotiation is a function of social motive, or the relative strength of concern for self and concern for the other party (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975). That is, negotiation strategies can be ‘predicted’ as a function of concern for self and concern for the other party (i.e., social motive) (Rahim,, Antoniono, D., Krum, K., & Ilieva, S., 2000). Five basic negotiation strategies flow from this premise (Rahim & Bonoma, 1979):

1. *Problem-solving Style* (also known as *Integrating Style*): When concern for self and concern for others is high, the desired outcome of the negotiation is a mutually agreeable solution. In an effort to reach this goal, negotiators typically adopt a problem-solving strategy which involves open collaboration, exchange of information, and thoughtful examination of differences.
2. *Yielding Style* (also known as *Accommodating or Obliging Style*): When concern for self is low and concern for others is high, negotiators typically try to minimize differences and emphasize similarities in order to satisfy the other party's concerns.
3. *Contending Style* (also known as *Dominating or Forcing Style*): When concern for self is high and concern for others is low, this style is associated with a win-lose scenario and competitive behaviours. A competing negotiator is typically determined to win his/her objective while ignoring the other party's expectations or concerns.
4. *Avoiding Style* (also known as *Suppression or Withdrawal*): When concern for self and for others is low, this style is associated with withdrawal and sidestepping.
5. *Compromising Style*: When concern for self and others is intermediate, negotiators typically adopt "give and take" or "splitting the difference" types of negotiation behaviours.

Previous research suggests that social motives not only influence the level of concern that one has for others and outcome preferences, but also influences how a negotiation is perceived and the type of information that is processed during a negotiation. For example, those adopting a prosocial orientation tend to perceive negotiation as a collaborative game and selectively attend to prosocial information. Cooperative approaches, such as "share and share alike" strategies tend to be used by

prosocially-motivated negotiators (De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000). Relative to their egoistic counterparts, prosocially- motivated negotiators tend to focus on cooperative cues, such as information about the effectiveness of cooperative tactics and a counterpart's trustworthiness, and tend to recall opportunities for joint gain better than they recall opportunities for personal gain (Camac, 1992). Prosocial motives activate an open, positive and information-sharing framework (Beersma & De Dreu, 1999). Egoistic negotiators, on the other hand, tend to adopt competitive strategies, have a closed and competitive view of negotiation (Beersma & De Dreu, 1999), adopt competitive viewpoints such as "never trust your opponent", and recall information regarding competitive tactics and their effectiveness, and the counterpart's lack of trustworthiness (De Dreu et al., 2006).

In summary, there is a vast amount of literature supporting the notion that social motives are important predictors of negotiation behavior. Social motives also affect the way the negotiation process is perceived, acting as a lens through which information about the negotiation process is filtered. In the next section, I briefly review some of the research on emotion and negotiation, including the role of emotions in negotiation behavior. Following that, I argue that a negotiator's social motive (prosocial state or egoistic state) may also affect the way in which the counterpart's emotions are perceived and processed, which in turn may further influence negotiation behaviour. For example, the happy or angry emotions of a negotiation partner may mean something quite different to a prosocially- motivated individual than to an egoistically- motivated individual. This may, in turn, impact an individual's preferred behaviour in a negotiation situation.

The Role of Emotions in Negotiation

Emotions are often the cause and the consequence of social conflict (Clark, Pataki, & Carver, 1996; Morris & Keltner, 2000; Parkinson, 1996). Because social conflict is inherently emotional, it is important to understand how, and the extent to which, emotions influence the negotiation process and negotiation outcomes. According to Barry (1999), mood is a central component to understanding how and why people negotiate or bargain.

From the mid-1980s to the 1990s, most empirical research on emotion and negotiation focused on *intrapersonal emotion*, most commonly negative and/or positive mood states (Allred, Mallozzi, Matusi, & Raia, 1997; Baron, 1990;Forgas, 1998). The influence of a negotiator's own emotional state on his or her negotiation behavior, cognitions, strategies, and perceptions was of primary concern (Van Kleef, Van Dijk, Steinel, Harinck, & Van Beest, 2008). This emotional state was thought to influence information processing (Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994), decision-making (Forgas, 1995), and social perceptions (Lerner & Keltner, 2000). Of specific interest during this period was the effect of positive emotional states on the negotiator, with many studies inducing a positive mood in participants prior to having them complete a negotiation task (Baron, 1990; Forgas, 1998; Isen, 1987). Much of this research showed that compared to sad or neutral negotiators, a negotiator in a positive emotional state increased concession-making (Baron, 1990; Carnevale & Isen, 1986), increased preference for co-operation and integrative negotiation strategies (Forgas, 1998), and increased the tendency to be more helpful (Baron, Fortin, Frei, Hauver, & Shack, 1990; Isen, 1987). Happy negotiators also demonstrated higher levels of confidence and

optimism (Kramer, Newton, & Pommerenke, 1993) than did non-emotional negotiators both prior to and following negotiations. Negotiators who were in a good mood exhibited more constructive and flexible styles of thinking than did negotiators who were in a neutral or sad mood (Bless, 2000;Forgas, 2000). Positive mood tends to result in an increase in joint gains overall (Allred et al., 1997; Carnevale & Isen, 1986).

Negative moods also influence a negotiator's cognitions and behaviors. Indeed, negative moods are associated with an increase in rational and systematic decision making behaviors (Forgas, 1995), the use of more competitive bargaining strategies (Baron et al., 1990;Forgas, 1998) and a decrease in bargaining offers (Baron et al., 1990). Positive moods, on the other hand, tend to increase creative problem solving (Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987), increase concession making (Baron, 1990), and increase joint gains (Allred, Mallozzi, Matusui, & Raia, 1997). Research consistently suggests that the presence of negative moods results in more competitive and non-conciliatory behaviour among negotiators (Kassinove, Roth, Owens, & Fuller, 2002; Knapp & Clark, 1991) that tends to result in a less mutually beneficial agreement (Allred et al., 1997). In summary, the presence of positive moods tends to promote co-operative negotiation behaviours, whereas negative mood typically results in more competitive and non-conciliatory negotiation behaviours (Kassinove et al., 2002; Knapp & Clark, 1991).

While a great deal of research has been done on the effects of *intrapersonal* emotional experiences, such as a negotiator's mood state on negotiation (e.g., Allred et al., 1997; Baron et al., 1990), few have examined the implications of *interpersonal* emotion on the negotiation process (Van Kleef et al., 2004a, 2004b). Because all

negotiations involve some degree of interaction between people, it is important to consider emotion not only as an internal state, but also how perceptions of the emotions of others impacts negotiation behaviour (Van Kleef & Van Lange, 2008). Some research supports a general *contagion hypothesis* (Friedman et al., 2004; Van Kleef et al., 2004a) that one negotiator's emotion 'rubs off' on the other negotiator. In other words, negotiators faced with a happy partner will tend to also be happy, and behave cooperatively, whereas those faced with an angry partner should take on that anger and behave more competitively. Viewed within a strategic choice framework, however, interpersonal emotions may influence a negotiator's behaviour quite differently (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, & Manstead, 2006). That is, rather than the emotion of the partner simply 'rubbing off' on an individual, a strategic choice perspective predicts that the emotions of the partner are actively interpreted in terms of their implications for the negotiator's desired end state. Negotiator behaviour, then, is determined by a combination of negotiator characteristics (i.e., social motive) and perceptions of the other party (i.e., emotion). For instance, when faced with a happy partner, one negotiator may interpret this happiness as a sign of contentment and respond by increasing demands to maximize his/her own personal gains. Another negotiator may interpret the same counterpart's happiness as an indication that a mutually beneficial outcome is possible through co-operation, and respond with a moderate, cooperative demand. Both behaviours are strategic in that they are intended to help the negotiator reach his/her preferred end state in the negotiation (i.e., maximize personal gain or maximize mutual gain).

Interpersonal Emotions and Negotiator Behaviours: Strategic Choices

When information regarding a counterpart's bargaining position is lacking, negotiators often use other cues to help them determine as much as possible about their partner's position (Steinel, Van Kleef, & Harinck, 2008). Emotional expressions can convey information about a negotiator's outcome preferences, intentions, and expectations (Druckman & Olekalns, 2008). This information can influence the negotiation process as a negotiator may determine his/her negotiation strategy on the basis of an interpretation of a counterpart's emotion. Evidence for this notion has been accumulating in the literature (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2006).

Emotions can convey information about an individual's intentions, social orientation, outcome preferences, and the significance or value assigned to the situation itself (Ekman, 1984, 1993; Knutson, 1996; Scherer, 1986). A counterpart's emotions often convey important information that has strategic implications. In a process referred to as *tracking*, negotiators tend to modify their own behavioural responses and negotiation strategies according to the perceived emotional state of their counterparts (Pruitt, 1981; Van Kleef et al., 2004a). In fact, it has been argued that emotions can act as "behavioural reinforcers". Specifically, the presence of negative emotions signals 'something is wrong' and encourages behavioural adjustments whereas the presence of positive emotion signals 'all is well' and encourages a continuation of current behaviour (Averill, 1982; Van Kleef et al., 2004a).

For example, a happy negotiator can convey the impression of being an "easy" negotiator who is satisfied with his/her share or situation and a willingness to accept 'less' in the negotiation (i.e., low demand limits). Displays of positive emotion can

suggest cooperativeness and trustworthiness (Thompson, Medvec, Seiden, & Kopelman, 2001). Indeed, when confronted with a happy counterpart, negotiators tend to make greater demands and fewer concessions than are made with a non-emotional or an angry counterpart (Van Kleef et al., 2004a). Conversely, an angry counterpart is seen as a tough negotiator, unwilling to make concessions, dissatisfied with his/her share of the situation, and unwilling to accept ‘less’ in the negotiation (i.e., high limits) (Wall, 1991). Perhaps not surprisingly, when confronted with an angry counterpart, negotiators tend to infer high limits, and to make fewer demands and greater concessions than are typically made with a non-emotional or happy opponent (Sinaceur & Tieden, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004a).

Van Kleef et al. (2004a) further examined the effects of interpersonal emotion on a negotiator’s strategic choice as manifested through negotiation behaviours. In this study, negotiation took place via computer with participants interacting with what they were led to believe was a live “negotiation partner” that was in fact, a computer program. Participants were presented with a “payoff” chart that reflected which outcomes were most beneficial to them (indicated by a point scale) and were instructed to earn as many points as possible. At three times throughout the negotiation, the computer program delivered a standard set of emotionally-charged statements (e.g., happy, angry, or non-emotion) reacting to the participant’s negotiation behaviour. Interpersonal emotion had an effect on negotiation outcomes. Participants who negotiated with an angry counterpart accumulated fewer points than those who negotiated with a happy partner. Individual outcomes for those participants who negotiated with a non-emotional counterpart fell somewhere in between those who

negotiated with angry and happy partners. Van Kleef et al. (2004a) suggest that these findings are reflective of a negotiator “giving in” to an angry counterpart in an effort to avoid jeopardizing the possibility of reaching an agreement. In other words, it was proposed that participants reacted *strategically* to the information provided by their partner’s emotion. With an angry partner, for example, rather than compete, as one might expect, participants strategically yielded so as to increase the chances of reaching a mutually beneficial agreement in the end (Van Kleef et al., 2004a).

Sinaceur and Tiedens (2006) found similar results in a face-to-face negotiation study. Participants in the study were assigned to either an angry or a non-emotional partner to determine whether or not angry negotiators attain higher personal gains. Replicating the findings of Van Kleef et al. (2004a), negotiators conceded more when confronted with an angry counterpart as opposed to a non-emotional counterpart. This suggests that negotiators use their counterpart’s emotional state as a source of information regarding the counterpart’s expectations and “toughness”. Those counterparts who expressed anger appeared “tougher” than those who were non-emotional and negotiators in the angry condition engaged in greater concession making as a result (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006). These findings, combined with those of Van Kleef et al. (2004a), suggest that interpersonal emotion has an effect on a negotiator’s bargaining behaviours as a result of the strategic consideration given to the information that is transmitted.

Emotions as Social Information

Van Kleef has recently attempted to bring together the negotiation literature related to the effects of interpersonal emotion on behaviour. According to the Emotions

as Social Information Model (Van Kleef, in press) displayed emotions exert interpersonal influence along two distinct pathways; affective reactions and strategic information. Which pathway is dominant depends on an individual's information processing capacity. When processing capacity is low, either because of distraction, or low epistemic motivation, the affective pathway is dominant. Interpersonal emotions affect a negotiator via the affective pathway through a process similar to *contagion* where the emotions of a partner are adopted by the negotiator. In other words, when the affective pathway is dominant, those faced with an angry counterpart also report negative feelings, low satisfaction and a reduced willingness to engage in future negotiations with this counterpart (Friedman et al., 2004; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, 2004b). This may result in an increase in competitive behaviours (Van Kleef, in press). With a happy partner, negotiators are more apt to report higher levels of interpersonal liking, higher satisfaction with the negotiation process, and a willingness to interact at a future time with the counterpart (Isen, 1987).

When information processing capacity is high, however, (e.g., high epistemic motivation) the strategic pathway is dominant. In such cases, a counterpart's display of emotion influences a negotiator's behaviour by providing strategic information about the counterpart. A counterpart's anger may suggest high expectations or goals (Sinaceur & Tieden, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, 2004b) which may signal to a negotiator that he/she needs to make few demands in order to reach an agreement with that counterpart (Van Kleef et al., 2008). Conversely, a counterpart's happiness suggests 'easy-going' which may encourage a negotiator to make more demands. It is important to note that the behavioural responses to anger and happiness predicted here are the opposite of what

would be expected when the affective pathway is dominant.

The interpretation of and response to a particular emotional display varies as a function of characteristics of the perceiver. To display the negotiation tactic of anger may be ineffective when the recipient perceives that he/she has good alternatives available to him/her. This may result in an impasse whereas in situations where the emotion-perceiving negotiator does not have good alternatives available, anger may result in inducing concessions (Sinaceur, Tiedens, 2006). For the purpose of the present study, I propose that individual appraisal or interpretation of happiness or anger depends on a negotiator's induced social motive. In other words, the negotiator's induced social motive (prosocial vs. egoistic) in a negotiation setting acts as a lens through which interpersonal emotion is filtered.

The Joint Effect of Social Motives and Emotion on Negotiation Behaviours

We have seen that in isolation both social motives and interpersonal emotions affect the strategic considerations of negotiators. How, then, might these variables work together to determine negotiation behaviour? This was the central question for the present study. At least one study has been conducted that sheds some light on the joint impact of social motives and interpersonal emotion on negotiation behaviour. Van Kleef and Van Lange (2008) examined the notion that individual differences in social value orientation moderate the effects of interpersonal expressions of disappointment. Given that prosocially- and egoistically-motivated people differ in their level of concern for others, Van Kleef and Van Lange argued that they may be differentially 'sensitive' to expressions of disappointment, with prosocially-motivated negotiators exhibiting higher levels of sensitivity to a partner's disappointment. Counter to their initial predictions,

however, egoistic negotiators made greater concessions to counterparts who expressed disappointment compared to anger or no emotion. Furthermore, prosocial negotiators were unaffected by a display of disappointment or anger. Van Kleef and Van Lange (2008) adopted a strategic choice explanation for their results, suggesting that, relative to prosocial negotiators, egoistic negotiators are more influenced by a counterpart's disappointment because it is perceived to be a threat to their own outcomes. In other words, this research suggests that egoistically-motivated negotiators are more conscious of the strategic implications of a counterpart's emotional state than are prosocial individuals and will act strategically on this information to increase opportunities for personal gain (Van Kleef & Van Lange; 2008).

We have seen that prosocially- and egoistically-motivated negotiators differ in their level of concern for self relative to the level of concern for others, as well as their outcome preferences in a negotiation. The information transmitted through a display of emotion will be interpreted or evaluated differently as a function of social motives. Differences in the interpretation of an emotion should further explain differences in negotiation behaviour by the emotion-perceiving negotiator (Sinaceur & Tieden, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004a; Van Kleef et al., 2008). The present study tested these propositions.

Specifically, it was predicted that prosocially-oriented negotiators would interpret and respond to a counterpart's happiness and anger differently than would egoistically-oriented negotiators. In general, anger was expected to elicit a 'backing off' response manifested in fewer demands. Happiness was expected to elicit a 'move forward' response manifested in more demands. Both of these responses were expected

to be more extreme for egoistically-motivated negotiators relative to prosocially-motivated negotiators. I initially argued that the behaviour of a negotiation counterpart tends to loom larger for egoistic negotiators who are focused on self-gain compared to prosocial negotiators who are focused on mutual gain. Ironically, the egoistic negotiator becomes more dependent on the other party, making him/her more sensitive to the other party's behaviour.

Because egoistically-motivated negotiators are focused exclusively on the goal of maximizing self gain, they were expected to perceive anger as a more severe threat to this goal than prosocially-motivated negotiators. Because prosocially-motivated negotiators are focused on mutual gain, and are likely to obtain this through more possible outcomes, the same expression of anger would not be perceived to be as much of a threat to their goals. Egoistically-motivated negotiators were expected to interpret happiness as more of an opportunity to maximize self-gain. Prosocially-motivated negotiators were expected see happiness as an opportunity to maximize joint-gain. Egoistically-motivated negotiators were expected to increase their demands more than prosocially-motivated negotiators as a result of this appraisal. The present study suggested that the same emotion was appraised differently (e.g., had different strategic implications) as a function of social motive, and that this appraisal (i.e., perceived severity of threat, perceived extent of opportunity) influenced negotiation behaviour.

Present Study

The present study was designed to examine the general notion that displays of happiness and anger have different effects on negotiation behaviour (i.e., demand

making behaviors and negotiation style) as a function of the emotion-perceiving negotiator's social motive (prosocial vs. egoistic).

Participants adopted the role of 'lessee' in negotiating the three terms of a hypothetical car lease (warranty, lease payment, kilometers/year) with another student (actually a confederate) who played the role of 'car dealer'. Prior to engaging in the negotiation, participants were randomly assigned to one of two social motive conditions (prosocial and egoistic). Those participants assigned to the egoistic conditions were instructed to obtain the best outcome as possible for themselves. Those assigned to the prosocial condition were instructed to obtain the highest mutually beneficial outcome, keeping in mind, that any points he/she gained came at a loss to the confederate 'car dealer'.

Each participant was also randomly assigned to one of two interpersonal emotion conditions (happy and angry). The student confederate made statements that either conveyed happiness or anger with the way that the negotiation was unfolding during the course of six negotiation rounds (offer –counteroffer series). Demand making behaviour was measured by converting the level of demands made for the three lease terms (warranty, lease payment, kilometres/year) into a single point score for each round. Negotiation strategies were assessed after the negotiation through the completion of the Dutch Conflict Handling Inventory (DUTCH) which is a self-report measure of negotiation behaviour.

Hypotheses

It was reasoned that induced social motives would affect participants' desired goals in the negotiation, and hence their behaviour to achieve those goals. Relative to

egoistically-motivated negotiators, prosocially-motivated negotiators were expected to make significantly smaller demands overall, and to report more compromising and problem-solving strategies and fewer forcing negotiation strategies.

Following the literature on emotion in negotiation, I predicted that negotiators faced with a happy confederate would make greater demands (e.g., high point values) than those faced with an angry confederate. Negotiators faced with an angry confederate were predicted to report more yielding, compromising, and problem-solving strategies, and fewer forcing negotiation strategies compared to those faced with a happy counterpart.

In addition to the separate effects of interpersonal emotion and social motive on negotiator behaviour, a key interaction effect was predicted. Specifically, I predicted that the influence of social motive on negotiator behaviour would *depend on* the interpersonal emotion confronted in the negotiation (i.e., happiness vs. anger). That is, egoistically motivated negotiators should generally demand more in the negotiation than their prosocially-motivated peers, but this difference should be especially apparent when faced with a happy confederate, and virtually non-existent when faced with an angry counterpart. In other words, while prosocially-motivated negotiators were expected to behave differently in the face of happiness and anger (more demands with happy vs. angry), egoistically-motivated negotiators were expected to alter their behaviours to a much greater extent, demanding much more with a happy confederate and much less with an angry confederate. Also, compared to a prosocially-motivated negotiator, egoistically-motivated negotiators will report more compromising and problem-solving strategies when confronted with an angry counterpart. Conversely, egoistically-

motivated negotiators will make greater demands overall and report more forcing and fewer yielding negotiation strategies than prosocially-motivated negotiators when confronted with a happy counterpart.

In order to explore the process behind the proposed social motive by interpersonal emotion interaction, negotiators' appraisal of the implications of anger and happiness was examined (e.g., degree of threat, or degree of opportunity to obtain ultimate goal). Here, I expected appraisal of opportunity to be positively related to demands made. Prosocially-motivated individuals should interpret a counterpart's happiness as an indication of opportunity to reach a mutually beneficial agreement, leading to higher demands. Egoistically-motivated individuals, on the other hand, were expected to interpret happiness as an opportunity to win more for the self and this should lead to even more demands from egoistically-motivated negotiators than those made by prosocial negotiators who focus on mutual gain.

Appraisal of threat should be negatively related to demands made. Here, I predicted that prosocially-motivated negotiators would make greater demands than egoistically-motivated negotiators when confronted with an angry counterpart. These differences were expect to result from prosocially-motivated negotiators interpreting anger as slight threat to their ability to obtain joint gain, whereas egoistically-motivated negotiators will interpret anger as a great threat to their goal of maximizing self-gain.

Methods

Participants

Sixty undergraduate psychology students were recruited via the Psychology department's online sign-up system (SONA) to participate in a study of '*small group discussions*' (See Appendix A for recruitment announcement). Each 45-minute

experimental session was carried out one participant at a time. To compensate for their participation, participants received a one percent increase to their final grade in a psychology course.

Design

In a mixed, between-within-subjects design, participants were randomly assigned to one of two social motive conditions (prosocial or egoistic) and to one of two interpersonal emotion conditions (happy or angry). Each participant made demands (or concessions) over a maximum of six negotiation rounds. Demands made over the six negotiation rounds was the within-subjects dependent variable.

Procedure

Upon arrival at the lab, participants indicated their informed consent to participate in the study (See Appendix B). Participants were told that they would be engaging in a 20-minute negotiation with a partner (actually a trained confederate) about the terms of a hypothetical car lease (monthly payments, warranty coverage and kilometres permitted year). Participants were told that they had been randomly assigned to the role of ‘customer’ while their partner had been assigned the role of ‘car dealer’.

Participants were randomly assigned to one of two levels of social motive (prosocial vs. egoistic) and were given specific instructions about how to conduct themselves throughout the negotiation. Participants assigned to the prosocial motive condition were given instructions to try to achieve mutual gain, and were told to “obtain the highest outcome that benefits both you and your negotiation partner”. These participants were instructed to think of the ‘car dealer’ as a “partner” and were told to attempt to reach an agreement benefitting both their “partner” and themselves. This

manipulation was expected to enhance cooperation and prosocial goals in the negotiation. Refer to Appendix C for a copy of the instructions.

Participants assigned to the egoistic condition were instructed to try to maximize self gain and were instructed “to obtain the highest outcome that benefits you ONLY.” These participants were instructed to think of their counterpart as an “opponent” and asked to consider only their own outcomes throughout the negotiation. This was expected to enhance the competitive nature of the interaction. Many other researchers have successfully used this method to induce meaningful group differences in established measures of prosocial and egoistic orientation (e.g., Beersma & DeDreu, 2003; De Dreu et al., 2006; Deutsch, 1958). See Appendix D for a copy of the instructions to participants.

Participants and confederates were given a bargaining payoff schedule which specified a point system for each demand level across the three negotiation issues (monthly payments, warranty coverage and kilometres permitted year). The number of points awarded varied by category, making some demands worth more points than others (see Appendix E for payoff schedule). In general, the more self-interested a demand from the customer’s perspective (e.g., lower payment, better warranty and more kilometres), the more points awarded. For example, the highest possible participant demand would be for a monthly price of \$200, an 8-month warranty, and 30,000 kilometres on the lease. This demand would earn the participant 440 points in the negotiation, leaving the ‘car dealer’ with zero points. By contrast, the lowest possible participant demand would result in a \$1000 monthly payment, no warranty and only 6,000 kilometres on the lease, earning him/her zero points in the negotiation and giving

the ‘car dealer’ 440 points. The most ‘equitable’ single demand would result in a \$600 payment, a 4-month warranty and 18,000 kilometres, earning both the participant and the dealer 220 points in the negotiation. Participants were asked to demonstrate that they understood the demand-point system by providing an example of both a “high demand” offer and a “low demand” offer prior to the negotiation session commencing.

Participants were assigned to one of two emotional conditions (anger or happiness). The confederate was trained to utter three statements over the course of the negotiation (after Rounds 1, 3, and 5) designed to express happiness or anger. For example, a phrase such as “This is going pretty well so far” was intended to convey happiness and “This is really getting on my nerves” was intended to convey anger. These statements have been used successfully in previous research (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, 2004b). See Appendix F for a copy of the emotion manipulation.

In order to encourage information processing using the ‘strategic pathway’ (VanKleef, in press), three procedures were implemented to promote maximum engagement in the research task. First, participants were instructed to record level of demand for each of the three negotiation items at the end of each negotiation round. Second, participants were also told to expect an interview with the experimenter immediately after the negotiation in order to discuss the rationale behind their specific demands and concessions. Lastly, participants were told that they have more time than needed to complete the task (no time pressure) in order to promote deep, systematic information processing. See Appendix G for instructions.

In all cases, the confederate car dealer initiated the first offer. The confederate

followed a specific predetermined and pre-tested pattern of neutral bargaining throughout the duration of the negotiation. Demands started moderately high (\$900 for monthly lease payment, 2 month warranty, 9 000 kms respectively). This translates into the a total of 375 points for the car dealer and 65 points for the participant. Demands were gradually reduced during the six negotiation rounds (final offer of \$700 monthly lease payment, 3 month warranty, 15 000 kms) totalling 275 points for the car dealer and 165 points for the participant. See Appendix H for description of confederate bargaining pattern.. This behavioural pattern has good face validity and reflects intermediate levels of cooperativeness and competitiveness (De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, 2004b). The negotiation session was ended after round six even if no agreement was obtained. To maintain and ensure consistency, the same 26 year-old female confederate was used throughout this study.

The participant's demand making behaviours (i.e, point totals) were recorded by the participant and by the confederate to ensure accuracy and to add realism (refer to Appendix I). In addition to demand-making behaviors, participants' self-reported negotiation strategies were also measured. After the negotiation, participants completed the Dutch Conflict Handling Inventory (DUTCH) which is a self-report measure of negotiation behaviour in terms of forcing, compromise, cooperation, avoidance, and yielding (see Appendix J). Participants also completed a measure of threat and opportunity to achieve one's goals (see Appendix K), as well manipulation check questionnaires for social motive (refer to Appendix L), and perceived interpersonal emotion (see Appendix M). Participants also completed a questionnaire testing for contagion (see Appendix N) and epistemic motivation (refer to Appendix O).

Thereafter, participants received both a verbal and written debriefing and were thanked and excused (See Appendix P).

Outcome Measures

Demands. In order to measure demand making behaviour, participants' demand levels across the three categories (warranty, yearly kilometres, monthly lease payment) were converted into points and summed across the three categories at the end of each negotiation round. Both the confederate and the participant recorded the point total for participant demands made after each round (See Appendix J). Higher scores reflect a higher outcome for self (e.g., greater demand)

In order to obtain single quantitative measures of negotiator demands across the entire negotiation, two additional indices were computed. *Average demands* is simply the average points demanded across the six negotiation rounds. Higher points indicate a higher level of demands overall. A '*distance travelled*' index was also computed by subtracting the demand point total for Round 1 from the demand point total for Round 6. A higher score on this measure reflects greater change in demand level from the beginning to the end of the negotiation. Positive distance travelled scores reflect increased demand over the course of the negotiation; negative scores reflect a decrease in demands from the first to the final negotiation round.

Self-reported Negotiation Behaviors. Participants completed the 20-Item DUTCH scale in order to evaluate their self-reported negotiation behaviours or strategies (See Appendix J for a copy of the DUTCH scale). This scale has shown acceptable levels of reliability ($\alpha = .63$ to $\alpha = .84$) and convergent and divergent validity in previous studies (De Dreu, Evers, Beersma, Kluwer, & Nauta, 2001) and had an

acceptable level of reliability in the present study ($\alpha = .76$). The DUTCH is made up of five subscales, measuring self-reported use of five different negotiation styles; forcing, problem solving, compromising, yielding, and avoiding (De Dreu et al., 2001). For each subscale, participants rated four statements on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 “not at all” to 5 “very much” to indicate the extent to which they engaged in a particular negotiation strategy. The scores in each of these subscales are then summed. Scores ranging from 4 to 8 inclusive indicate “low preference”, scores 9 to 13 inclusive represent “moderate preference” and scores 14 to 20 inclusive indicate a “high preference” for the particular negotiation style (see Appendix J). An acceptable level of reliability was found in all of the subscales ($\alpha = .75$ to $\alpha = .89$).

Participant Emotion. In order to test for possible effects of emotion contagion, two 3-item scales were developed to measure participants’ own anger and happiness following the negotiation. Participants rated their own emotions on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 “Strongly Disagree” to 7 “Strongly Agree”. Three statements were used to determine the extent to which participants felt anger and happiness, respectively. Ratings were averaged across the three items in order to construct a scale to measure participant anger and happiness, with higher scores reflecting higher levels of participant anger and happiness respectively. (See Appendix N). Overall, these scales had good reliability (Anger $\alpha = .81$; Happiness $\alpha = .91$).

Threat & Opportunity Appraisals. In order to measure participants’ appraisal of the confederate’s emotion in terms of threats and opportunities, two 3-item scales were developed. Participants rated on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 “Strongly Disagree” to 7 “Strongly Agree”, the extent to which they perceived threats to their

goals (3 items) or opportunities to achieve their goals (3 items) in the negotiation. For instance, a statement such as “My partner was an obstacle to my goals” was used to assess “threat”. A statement such as “I had many opportunities to achieve my goals” was used to assess “opportunity”. Ratings were averaged across the three items in order to construct a scale to measure participant’s appraisal of threats and opportunity, with higher scores reflecting higher levels of threat appraisal and higher appraisal of opportunity respectively. (See Appendix K). Overall, the scales had acceptable levels of internal-consistency reliability (Threat $\alpha = .67$; Opportunity $\alpha = .68$).

Manipulation Checks

Emotion Manipulation. Participants rated on a 7-point Likert-type scale, adapted from Van Kleef et al. (2004a, 2004b), how much they felt adjectives such as “*angry*, *irritated*, and *happy*” applied to the confederate (See Appendix M). Responses ranged from 1 “Strongly disagree” to 7 “Strongly agree”. The first three items measured anger and the last three items measured happiness. Scores were averaged over the respective items. If this manipulation was successful, participants would have rated the angry opponent significantly angrier than would participants in the happy condition. This scale has shown very high levels of internal consistency reliability (Anger $\alpha = .94$; Happiness $\alpha = .95$) in previous studies (Van Kleef et al., 2004a) and also had high levels of reliability in the present study (Anger $\alpha = .85$; Happiness $\alpha = .89$).

Social Motive Manipulation. To assess the success of the social motive manipulation, participants were asked to rate on a 7-point Likert-type scale, adapted from Van Kleef et al. (2004a, 2004b), the extent to which various statements applied to their behavior during the negotiation (See Appendix L). Two items were used to

measure prosocial motivation and three items were used to measure egoistic motivation. Statements such as "I was supposed to try to achieve many points for my group", measured prosocial motivation and "I was supposed to try to achieve many points for myself" measured egoistic motivation. Ratings ranged from 1 "Strongly disagree" to 7 "Strongly agree". Scores were averaged over the respective items to construct a scale for egoistic and prosocial motivation. These scales have shown excellent levels of reliability (Egoistic $\alpha = .92$; Prosocial $\alpha = .94$) in previous studies (Beersma & De Dreu, 2002) and were acceptable in the present study (Egoistic $\alpha = .91$; Prosocial $\alpha = .68$).

Results

Preliminary Analyses

Sixty undergraduate psychology students participated in the present study. There were no missing values, out-of-range values or outliers found within the data set. The assumptions of normality, homogeneity of variance, independence of errors, and sphericity were evaluated and met unless otherwise indicated. The relationship between the variables was overall, as expected with the exception of the prosocial and egoistic variables, which were positively correlated to one another. Refer to Table 1 for descriptive statistics.

Manipulation Checks

Social Motive Manipulation. In order to determine that participants were acting in accordance with their social motive behavioral instructions, a one-way ANOVA was conducted with social motive as assigned (e.g., prosocial or egoistic) as the factor, and self-reported social motives as the dependent variable. The results revealed that the social motive manipulation was effective, $F(1, 58) = 35.35, p <.05$. Those assigned to

the egoistic condition reported significantly more egoistic behaviors ($M = 5.69, SD = 1.35$) than those assigned to the prosocial condition ($M = 3.32, SD = 1.71$). The prosocial motive manipulation was also effective, $F(1, 58) = 14.70, p < .05$, with those assigned to the prosocial condition reporting more prosocial behaviors ($M = 5.54, SD = 1.46$) than those assigned to the egoistic condition, ($M = 4.01, SD = 1.47$).

Emotion Manipulation. In order to determine if the manipulation of interpersonal emotion was effective, one-way ANOVAs were conducted using confederate emotional state (angry vs. happy) as the independent variable and perceived confederate emotion as the outcome. The manipulation of interpersonal emotion was effective for the angry condition, $F(1, 58) = 85.31, p < .05$. Specifically, those participants who were exposed to the angry confederate perceived their negotiation counterpart as significantly more “angry” or “irritated” ($M = 4.47, SD = 1.32$) than those participants assigned to the happy condition ($M = 1.79, SD = .89$). Participants exposed to the happy confederate judged their negotiation counterpart as significantly happier ($M = 4.87, SD = 1.12$) than those participants assigned to the angry condition ($M = 2.52, SD = 1.18$), $F(1, 58) = 62.57, p < .05$.

Table I

Inter-scale Correlations, Mean, Standard Deviations, Ranges, Maximums

Var.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
1. Yielding	1.00												
2. Compromise	.52**	1.00											
3. Forcing	-.37*	-.27*	1.00										
4. Prob. Solve	.48**	.74**	-.18	1.00									
5. Avoidance	.27*	.27*	-.08	.27*	1.00								
6. Ave.Demand	-.63**	-.61**	.30*	-.51**	-.21	1.00							
7. Dist. Travel	-.20	.04	-.02	-.09	-.23	.03	1.00						
8. Happy	.30*	.14	-.15	.22	.05	-.19	.01	1.00					
9. Anger	-.07	-.05	.16	-.10	-.02	.08	-.10	-.75**	1.00				
10. Prosocial	-.43**	-.43**	.49**	-.45**	-.08	.45**	-.01	-.22	-.75**	1.00			
11. Egoistic	-.54**	-.57**	.60**	-.55**	-.14	.61**	.04	-.30*	.30*	.67**	1.00		
12. Threat	-.05	-.11	.09	-.18	.04	.06	-.15	-.29*	.28*	.11	.30*	1.00	
13. Opportunity	-.05	.00	-.05	.08	-.11	.14	.14	.41**	-.39**	.08	-.13	-.57**	1.00
Mean	10.4	12.1	12.7	12.0	11.8	293.2	-70.9	3.7	3.1	4.8	4.5	4.6	3.9
SD	3.2	4.3	2.8	3.6	4.14	78.0	65.7	1.7	1.8	1.6	1.9	1.3	1.2
Cronbach's α	.75	.78	.81	.82	.89	—	—	.91	.81	.68	.91	.67	.68
Range	13.0	15.0	12.0	14.0	16.0	295.8	355.0	6.0	5.3	6.0	6.0	5.7	5.5
Max	17.0	19.0	19.0	18.0	20.0	430.8	135.0	7.0	6.3	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0
Min	4.0	4.0	7.0	4.0	4.0	293.1	220.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.3	1.5

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Contagion. One-way ANOVAs were conducted to determine if participants' self-reported emotional state reflected the expressed emotion of the confederate (happy or angry). There were no significant differences in participants' self-reported happiness as a function of confederate emotion, $F(1,58) = .04, p > .05$. Participants exposed to a happy confederate reported just as much happiness ($M = 4.06, SD = 1.35$) as those participants who were with an angry confederate ($M = 4.16, SD = 1.16$). Significant differences were found, however, in participants' self-reported anger as a function of confederate emotion, $F(1,58) = 5.97, p < .05$. Participants paired with an angry confederate reported experiencing significantly more anger ($M = 3.31, SD = 1.28$) than those who were paired with a happy confederate ($M = 2.26, SD = 1.43$).

In order to determine that participants were paying attention to the overall instructions of the experiment, participants indicated their extent of agreement with seven statements such as "I thought deeply about the issue" and "I made quick decisions" (See Appendix P). Responses ranged from 1 "Strongly disagree" to 7 "Strongly agree". The seven scale items were averaged. This measure is based upon Van Kleef et al. (2004a, 2004b) and has shown acceptable levels of internal consistency reliability ($\alpha = .77$) however had low levels of reliability in the present study ($\alpha = .49$). Findings suggested that participants did slightly "agree" more than "neither agree nor disagree" that they kept in mind the instructions they were given ($M = 4.59, SD = .72$).

Main Analyses

In order to determine the effects of social motive and interpersonal emotion on negotiation demands over time, a 2 (social motive; prosocial v. egoistic) X 2 (emotion;

happy v. angry) ANOVA was conducted with the total demands made in each of three negotiation rounds as the within-subjects dependent variable¹. As expected, demands decreased significantly over time, $F(2,112) = 15.09, p < .05$. More specifically, post hoc analysis indicated that the demands made in Round 1 ($M = 332.50, SD = 9.08$) differed significantly when compared to demands made in Round 2 ($M = 308.92, SD = 9.99$), $t(59) = 3.35, p < .05$. Additionally, the demands made in Round 1 also differed significantly from the demands made in Round 3 ($M = 295.47, SD = 9.38$), $t(59) = 5.03, p < .05$.

There was also a significant main effect of social motive, $F(1,56) = 29.29, p < .05$, with egoistically-motivated negotiators making greater demands over the negotiation rounds ($M = 359.03, SD = 12.21$) compared to prosocially-motivated negotiators ($M = 265.56, SD = 12.21$). Interpersonal emotion did not have a significant effect on demands made over negotiation rounds, $F(1, 56) = .03, p > .05$. Negotiators faced with a happy counterpart made just as many demands ($M = 310.72, SD = 12.21$) as those faced with an angry partner ($M = 313.87, SD = 12.21$). Main effects were qualified by the presence of a significant 3-way interaction between social motive, interpersonal emotion and negotiation round, $F(2,122) = 3.70, p < .05$. Refer to Figures 1a and 1b for an illustration.

¹ Note. To avoid unequal sample sizes it was decided to use all cases and limit round level to that last completed by all (Rounds 1 – 3 inclusive) for the purpose of analysis. Results were also calculated with cases where an agreement had been negotiated removed from the data set, and findings were similar.

Figure 1a. Demands at Rounds One, Two, and Three: Prosocial and Egoistic Negotiators with an Angry Confederate





Figure 1b. Demands at Rounds One, Two, and Three: Prosocial and Egoistic Negotiators with a Happy Confederiate




Follow-up analyses were conducted to examine the two-way interactions between social motive and interpersonal emotion separately in each negotiation round. In Round 1 there was a marginally significant interaction between social motive and emotion, $F(1, 56) = 3.10, p = .08$. There was no significant interaction between social motive and emotion in either Round 2, $F(3, 56) = .04, p > .05$ nor Round 3, $F(3, 56) = .09, p > .05$.

Post hoc analysis on the Round 1 interaction, with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons revealed that egoistically-motivated negotiators made significantly higher demands ($M = 364.67, SD = 87.00$) than prosocially-motivated negotiators ($M = 304.33, SD = 57.72$) when confronted with an angry counterpart, $t(59) = 3.32, p <.05$. Similarly, when confronted with a happy counterpart, egoistically-motivated negotiators made significantly higher demands ($M = 392.67, SD = 73.41$) than prosocially-motivated negotiators ($M = 268.33, SD = 59.27$), $t(59) = 6.84, p <.05$. Although, in general, egoistically-motivated negotiators made higher demands than prosocially-motivated negotiators, the magnitude of the prosocial-egoistic difference was much greater when faced with a happy opponent. Refer to Figure 2 for an illustration of the social motive and emotion interaction on Round 1.

Figure 2. Social Motive and Interpersonal Emotion interaction Round 1

a,b Means with different subscripts are significantly different, $p <.05$.



A series of 2 (prosocial vs. egoistic) X 2 (anger vs. happiness) ANOVAs were conducted with average demands, distance-travelled, and self-reported negotiation strategies (DUTCH scale) as dependent variables. The results of these analyses are reported below.

Average Demands. Social motive had a significant effect on the average demands made in the negotiation, $F(1,56) = 29.63, p < .05$. Egoistically-motivated negotiators made greater demands overall ($M = 338.52, SD = 70.64$) compared to prosocially-motivated negotiators ($M = 247.79, SD = 55.86$). Interpersonal emotion did not have a significant effect on average demands, $F(1,56) = .10, p > .05$. Participants confronted with an angry opponent made just as many demands on average ($M = 290.53, SD = 70.90$) as those confronted with a happy opponent ($M = 295.78, SD = 85.60$). Moreover, the interpersonal emotion by social motivation interaction was not statistically significant, $F(1,56) = .34, p > .05$.

Distance travelled. Social motive did not have a significant effect on distance travelled, $F(1,56) = .22, p > .05$.² There were no significant differences found between egoistically-motivated negotiators ($M = -74.83, SD = 79.82$) and prosocially-motivated negotiators ($M = -67.0, SD = 48.77$) in their decrease in demands between the first and final round of negotiation. Similarly, interpersonal emotion did not have a significant effect on distance travelled, $F(1, 56) = 2.52, p > .05$. No significant differences were

² Since four participants ended negotiations prior to Round 6, distance travelled was calculated both with these cases included (using the last completed Round of negotiation to calculate the distance travelled score) and excluded. Analysis revealed no significant changes resulting in the inclusion or exclusion of these cases. To avoid complications due to unequal sample sizes, I chose to include all cases in analyses requiring a distance travelled score.

found in demands between the first and last round of negotiation when participants were confronted with a happy confederate ($M = -57.67$, $SD = 59.13$) or an angry confederate ($M = -84.17$, $SD = 70.16$). Lastly, there was no significant interaction between social motive and interpersonal emotion on distance travelled, $F(1,56) = 1.86$, $p > .05$.

Self-reported negotiation strategies (DUTCH Scale). Social motive had a significant effect on participants' self-reported use of four out of five negotiation strategies. Compared to egoistically-motivated negotiators, prosocially-motivated negotiators reported greater use of *problem-solving* strategies, $F(1,56) = 6.75$, $p < .01$ ³, *compromising* strategies, $F(1,56) = 18.73$, $p < .01$, and *yielding* strategies, $F(1,56) = 15.47$, $p < .05$ (refer to Table 4 for descriptive statistics). Egoistically-motivated negotiators, on the other hand, reported greater use of *forcing* strategies compared to their prosocially-motivated peers, $F(1,56) = 8.26$, $p < .05$. This main effect is qualified, however, by the presence of a significant 2-way interaction between confederate emotion and social motive on self-reported use of *Forcing* in the negotiation, $F(1,56) = 5.20$, $p < .05$. Follow-up analyses with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons revealed that those in the egoistic-happy condition ($M = 14.27$, $SD = 2.40$) reported significantly greater use of forcing than those in the prosocial -happy condition ($M = 10.80$, $SD = 2.34$), $t(14) = 3.65$, $p < .05$. See Figure 3 for an illustration of the 2-way interaction between confederate emotion and social motive on the self-reported use of forcing as a negotiation strategy.

³ The assumption of normality was violated for this analysis. As ANOVA is generally considered robust to this violation and there were no outliers and the dferror was over 20, I used the non-transformed data for the purpose of analysis.

There was no significant impact of social motive on reported use of *avoidance* as a negotiation strategy, $F(1,56) = 2.11, p > .05$. Egoistically and prosocially-motivated negotiators used this strategy with similarly frequency. See Table 2 for means and standard deviations.


Table 2.

Descriptive statistics for Negotiation Strategy and Social Motive

Negotiation Strategy	Egoistic	Prosocial		
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Avoidance	11.03	4.67	12.60	3.78
Problem Solving	10.87	3.71	13.20	3.10
Forcing	13.73	2.66	11.80	2.70
Compromise	10.07	4.35	14.27	2.95
Yeilding	9.00	2.92	11.93	2.75

Figure 3. Social Motive, Emotion and Self-reported use of Forcing.

a,b Means with different subscripts are significantly different, $p < .05$



Interpersonal emotion did not significantly impact participants' self-reported use of any negotiation strategies; *Avoiding*, $F(1,56) = .05, p > .05$, *problem-solving*, $F(1,56) = .01, p > .05$, *Forcing*, $F(1,56) = .48, p > .05$, *compromise*⁴, $F(1,56) = .30, p > .05$, or *Yielding*, $F(1,56) = .03, p > .05$. Refer to Table 3 for descriptive statistics.

⁴. The assumption of Homogeneity of Variance (HOV) was violated for this analysis, Levene's $F(3,56) = 5.45, p = .01$. In order to compensate for HOV violation, used a more stringent alpha (.01) was used to compensate for inflation of Type I error rate.

Table 3***Descriptive statistics for Negotiation Strategy and Confederate Emotion***

Negotiation Strategy	Happy		Angry	
	M	SD	M	SD
Avoidance	11.93	4.65	11.70	3.64
Problem Solving	12.07	3.64	12.00	3.60
Forcing	12.53	2.92	13.00	2.77
Compromise	11.90	4.42	12.43	4.13
Yielding	10.40	3.34	10.53	3.07

Appraisal of Threat and Opportunity.

A 2 (prosocial vs. egoistic) X 2 (anger vs. happiness) ANOVA was conducted on participants' *perception of threat* in the negotiation. Contrary to the study's initial hypothesis, emotion did not have a significant effect on threat perception, $F(1, 56) = 2.08, p > .05$ nor did social motive, $F(1, 56) = .77, p > .05$. The interaction between social motive and emotion on threat perception was also not significant, $F(1, 56) = 2.73, p > .05$. However, as initially predicted, emotion did have a significant effect on the perception of opportunity, $F(1, 56) = 6.75, p < .05$. A counterpart's happiness was appraised to indicate a greater opportunity to obtain high demands ($M=8.60, SD=2.53$) than possible with an angry counterpart ($M=7.00, SD=2.15$). Social motive did not have a significant effect on the perception of opportunity, $F(1, 56) = .10, p > .05$ nor did the interaction between social motive and emotion, $F(1, 56) = .01, p > .05$.

Correlational analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between demand making behaviour (e.g., average demands, distance travelled) and “threat” and “opportunity” appraisals. Findings revealed no significant correlation between perception of threat and average demands ($r = .06 p > .05$) and opportunity and average demands ($r = .14 p > .05$). Additionally, there was no significant correlation between perception of threat and distance travelled ($r = -.15 p > .05$) and perceived opportunity and distance travelled ($r = .14, p > .05$).

Discussion

This study’s primary goal was to extend research on the impact of social motives and interpersonal emotions on demand-making behavior in dyadic negotiations from a strategic choice perspective (Van Kleef, in press; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004a; Van Kleef & Van Lange, 2008). That is, what is ‘strategic’ for a particular negotiator depends partially on a negotiator’s social motive. Expressions of interpersonal emotion (e.g., happiness, anger) may be interpreted differently as a result of a negotiator’s social motive, and it is this interpretation that may impact a negotiator’s behavior. Within the present study, it was hypothesized that interpersonal happiness and anger would have different effects on negotiation behavior as a function of the negotiator’s induced social motive (prosocial vs. egoistic). It was further predicted that the different negotiation behaviors exhibited by prosocial and egoistic individuals arise from strategic considerations based on their interpretation of the counterpart’s emotions. There was only partial support for the original hypotheses.

While demands were shown to generally decrease over time, there was not a clear indication that this was specifically a result of social motive or the presence of

interpersonal emotion. In general, past research has indicated that prosocially-motivated individuals desire a fair distribution of outcomes that provides the maximum outcome for both themselves and their counterpart. Egoistically-oriented negotiators, on the other hand, have no concern (either positive or negative) for the outcomes of others and simply desire to maximize their own outcomes (De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003; Van Lange, 1999). Consistent with past research (De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003; Van Lange, 1999), social motive had a significant effect on demand making behavior in the present study. Egoistically-motivated negotiators tended to make greater demands both over time and on average when compared to prosocially-motivated negotiators. As expected, egoistically and prosocially-motivated negotiators displayed similar tendencies in their unwillingness to lower demands from Round 1 to Round 3 (i.e., "distance-travelled") although for potentially different reasons. Egoistically-motivated negotiators' desire to maximize "self-gain" (De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003; Van Lange, 1999) was reflected in the present study as egoistically-motivated negotiators remained unwilling to decrease demands significantly over several negotiation rounds. On the other hand, prosocially-motivated negotiators' unwillingness to greatly decrease demands may be explained as a result of the desire to maximize "joint gain" (De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003; Van Lange, 1999). Initial demands made by prosocially-motivated negotiators tend to be moderate in nature reflecting the preference for a high "joint" outcome and in turn, cannot be dramatically altered if the ultimate goal of joint gain is to be achieved. Overall, the present study's findings lend additional support to the effect of social motives on demand-making behavior in a negotiation scenario.

In regards to the hypotheses pertaining to the effect of interpersonal emotion on

demand making behaviors, results were surprising. Prior research on the effects of interpersonal emotion in a negotiation setting has suggested that a happy individual conveys the impression of being satisfied and willing to accept 'less' in the negotiation (i.e., low limits) (Van Kleef et al., 2004a) which tends to lead to an increase in demands by the emotion-perceiving negotiator. Conversely, an angry counterpart is seen to be dissatisfied and unwilling to accept 'less' in the negotiation (i.e., high limits) which tends to lead to a decrease in demands by the emotion-perceiving negotiator (Sinaceur & Tieden, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004a; Wall, 1991). However, in the present study interpersonal emotion had no significant effect on average demands or demands made over time. Similarly, interpersonal emotion had no effect on the levels of distance travelled (i.e., decrease in demands made between Round 1 and Round 3). A possible explanation that may account for these unexpected findings may be that one or both of the emotional manipulations (e.g., anger or happiness) in the present study lacked credibility and consequently, failed to influence participants' demand making behavior. If this were the case, this may also explain why there were also no significant differences or notable trends found in the present study in terms of negotiation behaviors either (e.g., yielding, forcing, problem-solving). Perhaps the face-to face nature of the present study makes it necessary to have the confederate act in a manner reflective of the emotion condition. For happiness, a confederate could smile or laugh and for anger, frown or scowl rather than simply making the emotionally charged statements. While not necessary for the computer-based experiments done previously, the lack of congruency between body language and emotion may account for the ineffectiveness of this manipulation in the present study. Additionally, there were times in which the

emotional statements were inappropriate both in terms of timing and nature. For instance, to indicate that “this is going pretty well so far” when a participant has increased their offer dramatically, may have resulted in a lack of realism and believability. A follow-up interview with participants in order to assess how serious the participant took the confederate’s emotional display may shed further insight into how this incongruity impacted the study’s findings.

Another factor that may have contributed to interpersonal emotion having little effect in the present study could stem from participants’ perception of the availability of “good” alternatives. In previous research (De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995; Van Kleef et al., 2004b), participants were told that only those participants who reached an agreement were to be awarded lottery tickets at the end of the negotiation task. By doing this, the perception of “good” alternatives was inadvertently reduced as failure to reach an agreement now comes with negative consequences for the participant. Research has found that perception of alternatives influences a negotiator’s demand-making behaviors (Sinaceur & Tieden, 2006). Prior research has found that negotiators who perceive that they have poor alternatives available tend to be more influenced by the negotiation tactics of a counterpart (Sinaceur & Tieden, 2006). In fact, negotiators who have been exposed to an angry counterpart and believe that they have poor alternatives available to them, are significantly impacted by this “toughness” and tend to concede more than negotiators in the same scenario with good alternatives (Sinaceur & Tieden, 2006). Good alternatives have been seen to decrease concessions (Mannix, Thompson, & Bazerman, 1989; Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994) and increase one’s lowest acceptable demand level. It has been suggested that perception of alternatives may even have a

more significant impact on negotiation behavior than other available information (White, Valley, Bazerman, Neale, & Peak, 1994). Given that in the present study, negotiators had many alternatives available including the possibility of no-agreement, the overall perception of many “good” alternatives may have contributed to the lack of significant findings in respect to interpersonal emotion.

In regards to the present study’s proposed interactions between social motivation and interpersonal emotion on demand making behaviours, findings were mixed. There was no significant interaction found between social motive and interpersonal emotion on distance-travelled or average demands. However, the present study found that the interaction between social motive and interpersonal emotion was modified by negotiation round. More specifically, a significant interaction between social motive and interpersonal emotion was found to exist in Round 1 of the negotiation however, this interaction was not as predicted. Given the desire to maximize self-gain, it was not surprising that egoistically-motivated negotiators made significantly greater demands compared to prosocially-motivated negotiators when confronted with either a happy or angry confederate. Contrary to expectations, there was little evidence that egoistically-motivated negotiators yielded more to an angry counterpart than to a happy counterpart. There were no significant differences found between demands made by egoistically-and prosocially-motivated negotiators with an angry counterpart. Egoistically-motivated negotiators did however, attempt to take advantage of a happy counterpart and made even greater demands than prosocially-motivated negotiators made with a happy counterpart. The present study’s findings with respect to egoistically-motivated negotiators and an angry counterpart may indicate that epistemic motivation was not

sufficiently high to generate strategic consideration reflective of the participant's social motive. The effects of social motive on strategic choice are only present when epistemic motivation is high (De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003) and while epistemic motivation was shown to be high in the study, perhaps the level obtained was not high enough to permit the effects of emotion to be displayed. Perhaps having participants record the rationale behind each offer as it relates to their assigned outcome preference during the negotiation would increase epistemic motivation sufficiently to result in a counterpart's anger being given strategic consideration.

Pruitt and Lewis (1975) suggest that the strategy a negotiator chooses to adopt at various points in the negotiation is a function of social motive, or the relative strength of concern for self and concern for the other party. More specifically, egoistically-motivated negotiators are likely to contend or compete whereas prosocially-motivated negotiators on the other hand, are likely to report cooperative or problem-solving strategies. In the present study as expected, egoistic individuals when compared to prosocial individuals, reported significantly greater use of forcing as a negotiation strategy and significantly less usage of problem-solving, and compromising negotiation strategies. Interestingly however, prosocially-motivated negotiators when compared to egoistically-motivated negotiators, reported significant use of yielding as a negotiation strategy that in past research has been more reflective of an individual with low self-concern and high other-concern (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975). One explanation for this finding may be the heavy emphasis placed on the need for those in the prosocial condition to co-operate with their counterpart. This may have inadvertently resulted in some individuals in the prosocial condition sacrificing their own interests (low self-

concern and high other-concern) in an effort to reach a negotiation agreement. In summary, while the present study lends support to the notion that social motivation has an influence on both demand making and negotiation behaviours, further research is required to better understand the extent of this influence.

In terms of the effects of social motive and interpersonal emotion on self-reported negotiation strategy, several unexpected trends were noted. In situations involving a happy counterpart, as hypothesized and consistent with past research (Van Kleef et al., 2004a), egoistic negotiators relied upon forcing as the primary negotiation strategy and yielding and compromise the least. In terms of prosocial negotiators, compromise was indicated to be the primary negotiation strategy when confronted with a happy counterpart. When confronted with an angry counterpart, both egoistic and prosocially-motivated negotiators used yielding the least as a negotiation strategy with egoistically-motivated negotiators relying on this strategy notably less than prosocially-motivated negotiators. Prosocially-motivated negotiators reported using compromise as a strategy the most. The effects of the social motive and emotion interaction on forcing were inconsistent. Interestingly, prosocially-motivated negotiators used forcing as a strategy more with an angry counterpart than prosocially-motivated negotiators with a happy counterpart. This was surprising for two reasons:

- 1) Negotiators strategically yield more to an angry counterpart in an effort to avoid jeopardizing the possibility of reaching a mutually beneficial agreement (Val Kleef et al., 2004).
- 2) Past research has indicated that prosocial negotiators are unaffected by the presence of anger (Van Kleef & Van Lange; 2008) and as such one would anticipate forcing

having been used as frequently in situations involving a happy or angry counterpart. These findings suggest that perhaps in the present study, prosocially-motivated negotiators, when confronted with an angry counterpart, may not have acted in a manner reflective of their social motive condition. That is, these participants may have independently adopted “low concern for others” unlike the “high concern for others” they had been instructed. There was some contagion of anger reported and this may have resulted in an increase in competitive behaviours. Possibly giving participants concrete examples of behavior that reflects high concern for self and high/low concern for other could add clarity to what behaviors are reflective of the two social motive conditions. As anticipated, egoistically-motivated negotiators reported significantly greater use of forcing than prosocially-motivated negotiators when confronted with a happy counterpart. This lends some additional support to the notion that relative to prosocials, egoistically-motivated negotiators tend to be more influenced by a counterpart’s emotional state strategically (Van Kleef & Van Lange, 2008).

With regards to the presents study’s hypothesis that different negotiation behaviors exhibited by prosocial and egoistic individuals arise from strategic considerations, resulting from different interpretations of the counterpart’s emotional state, findings were varied. Contrary to what was hypothesized, emotion did not have a significant effect on the perception of threat. An angry counterpart was not seen to represent a greater threat to obtaining one’s objectives any more than a happy counterpart. This was contrary to previous research that has argued that an angry counterpart is seen as a tough negotiator, unwilling to make concessions, dissatisfied with his/her share of the situation, and unwilling to accept ‘less’ in the negotiation (i.e.,

high limits) (Sinaceur & Tieden, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004a; Wall, 1991). Again, these unexpected findings may also be a result of the perception of good alternatives available to the negotiator. The “threat” of the angry counterpart may have been ineffective as participants had many good alternatives available to them in the present study.

On the other hand, as predicted and consistent with past research (Thompson, Medvec, Seiden, & Kopelman, 2001), emotion did have a significant effect on perception of opportunity. Happy confederates were perceived to be an indication of potential opportunity to obtain one’s goals. Interestingly however, was the lack of a social motive and interpersonal emotion interaction on perception of threat and opportunity in the present study. Although past research indicates that the interpretation of interpersonal emotion (e.g., happiness, anger) may differ as a result of social motive (Van Kleef & Van Lange; 2008), the present study’s findings are inconclusive. More specifically, the degree to which prosocial and egoistic negotiators differ in their interpretation/appraisal of anger and happiness is questionable and the influence this appraisal has on demand making behaviour remains unclear according to this study’s findings. This was further complicated by the presents study’s failure to find any significant relationship between appraisal of threat or opportunity and demand making behavior.

Limitations

There are a number of limitations that may have influenced the findings of the present study. One limitation may have been that although the participants were made aware of the different maximum point level allocation to each of the three “terms” (e.g.,

monthly lease payment, warranty, kilometers), the strategic implications of this was often forgotten. Several participants appeared to become more focused on “demand-levels” rather than the “point-scale” which results in all categories artificially appearing to be of the same value. Perhaps having participants simply record the “points” as opposed to “demand-level” would have avoided this situation while still stimulating the deep thought (i.e. promoting high epistemic motivation) necessary for the effects of social motive to be expressed. For example, instead of having participants offer ”level 1” for warranty, ”level 2” for kilometers, and ”level 3” for lease payment, participants simply could have indicated the “points” that corresponded with these levels (i.e., 80, 105, 180 respectively). This would have still generated deep thought while keeping the participant more aware of his/her “points” and how well he/she is meeting his/her ultimate goal. This would enhance the effect of the social motive condition which may contribute to different findings in terms of a social motive and interpersonal emotion interaction on negotiation strategy.

Another potential limitation within the present study may relate to the “personal” value some participants assigned to each of the three “negotiation terms” (e.g., warranty, kilometers, monthly payment). That is, while “point accumulation” was emphasized and explained both in writing and verbally to all participants, it is possible that this at times became overshadowed by what the topic meant to the participant in “real-life” terms. In fact, several participants provided lengthy explanations rationalizing their demand-making behaviors as it related to their personal life situation (e.g., “I’m a student and can’t afford that much”, “I live close to school so don’t drive many kilometers”) during the course of the negotiation. This tendency may have resulted in

the participant making some demands that were not reflective of their social condition. Additionally, this could also account for the similarities found between those participant's assigned to the prosocial condition and egocentric condition in terms of their self-reported negotiation interests (Appendix L). The difference between participants knowing what they are supposed to do and actually doing this during the course of the experiment became evident in this experiment. Participants in both social motive conditions often indicated behaving counter to their assigned condition while at the same time indicating that they knew how they had been instructed to behave. Future research should consider the role of personal preference on a participant's demand making behavior. Perhaps first having the participants individually rate the three negotiation items in terms of personal preference, and having the point scales reflective of this assessment, would ensure further that participants behaved in a manner reflective of their social motivate condition to the fullest.

While one of the goals of the present study was to make the emotional manipulation more "powerful" by having it delivered in person, additional limitations may have resulted from this. In the present experiment, interpersonal emotion was limited to simple verbal statements delivered in a standard Round 1, 3, 5 format. Although the emotional manipulations themselves were effective, the impact of these emotional statements may have been weakened by inconsistent body language and potential inappropriateness of statement delivery time. It is possible that participants used the confederate's body language in addition to verbal statements as an indication of the degree of anger or happiness the counterpart experienced. This in turn, may have had an influence on demand-making behaviors and weakened the effectiveness of the

present experiment. Perhaps it is necessary to have the confederate prepared to display facial expressions reflective of the emotional condition in order to add to the realism. Similarly, at times the confederate's emotion did not seem to be logical with respect to the participant's negotiation behavior. The standard delivery times of Round 1,3, and 5 then appeared artificial and unbelievable. For instance, happy statements were sometime uttered when the participant did not make any concessions and in fact, increased demands. Perhaps by lengthening the negotiation to twelve rounds and spreading the statements further apart, this problem could be avoided. Another option may be to train the confederate to deliver emotional statements that "fit" or "suit" the participant's demand-making behavior. While this would decrease standardization, it may be worth it in order to enhance realism.

Conclusions

Overall, this study offers a further examination of the relationship between social motivation, interpersonal emotion, and strategic choice in dyadic negotiations. That is, the present study predicted that social motivation, interpersonal emotion, and the interaction of social motivation and interpersonal emotion would influence demand making and negotiation behaviors. More specifically, the present study attempted to further examine how expressions of interpersonal emotion (e.g., happiness, anger) are interpreted as a result of a negotiator's social motive and how this interpretation influences a negotiator's behavior and negotiation strategy.

Prior research supports the notion that social motive influences demand and negotiation making behaviors (e.g., De Dreu, Beersma, Stroebe & Euwema, 2006; De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003; Van Lange, 1999). The present study has offered additional

support to these findings. However, while past research has indicated that negotiators tend to modify negotiation behaviour based upon the emotional state of their counterparts (Pruitt, 1981; Van Kleef et al., 2004a), the findings of the present study suggest that additional research is required to better understand under what conditions this happens. Additionally, the interplay between social motives and interpersonal emotion as they relate to negotiation behavior also remains inconclusive at this point in time.

Earlier research has revealed that social motives and interpersonal emotion are among several determinants of strategic choice (e.g., De Dreu et al., 2006; Sinaceur & Tieden, 2006; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004b). According to past research, differences in strategic decision-making by the emotion-perceiving negotiator can be explained by different interpretations given to the counterpart's emotion (Sinaceur & Tieden, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004a; Van Kleef et al., 2008). The present research has offered additional support regarding the impact interpersonal emotion has on strategic choice. However, the present study does not support the notion that a negotiator's social motive has an influence on strategic choice. As there is vast literature supporting the notion that social motives are important predictors of negotiation behavior and result in different strategic choices being made in a negotiation context, no definitive conclusions should be drawn from these findings. Future research is required to further understand to what degree social motive influences the appraisal of interpersonal emotion and how this appraisal influences negotiation behavior and strategic choice.

References

- Allred, K. G., Mallozzi, J. S., Matsui, F., & Raia, C. P. (1997). The influence of anger and compassion on negotiation performance. *Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Processes*, 70, 175-187.
- Averill, J. R. (1982). *Anger and aggression*. New York: Springer-Verlag.
- Baron, R. A. (1990). Environmentally induced positive affect: Its impact on self-efficacy, task performance, negotiation, and conflict. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 20, 368-384.
- Baron, R. A., Fortin, S. P., Frei, R. L., Hauver, L. A., & Shack, M. L. (1990). Reducing organizational conflict: The role of socially-induced positive affect. *International Journal of Conflict Management*, 1, 133-152.
- Barry, B. (1999). The tactical use of emotion in negotiation. *Research on Negotiation in Organizations*, 7, 93-121.
- Beersma, B., & De Dreu, C. K. W. (1999). Negotiation processes and outcomes in prosocially and egoistically motivated groups. *International Journal of Conflict Management*, 10, 385-402.
- Beersma, B., & De Dreu, C. K. W. (2002). Integrative and distributive negotiation in small groups: Effects of task structure, decision rule, and social motive. *Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Processes*, 87, 227-252.
- Beersma, B., & De Dreu, C.K.W. (2003). Social motives in integrative negotiation: The mediating influence of procedural fairness. *Social Justice Research*, 16(3), 217-239.
- Bless, H. (2000). The interplay of affect and cognition: The mediating role of general knowledge structures. In Joseph P. Forgas (Ed.), *Feeling and Thinking: The Role*

- of Affect in Social Cognition* (pp. 201–222). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Camac, C. (1992). Information preferences in a two-person social dilemma. In W, Liebrand, D. Messick, & H. Wilke (Eds.), *Social dilemmas: Theoretical issues and research findings* (pp. 147-161). Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
- Carnevale, P. J., & Isen, A. M. (1986). The influence of positive affect and visual access on the discovery of integrative solutions in bilateral negotiation. *Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Processes*, 37, 1-13.
- Clark, M. S., Pataki, S. P., & Carver, V. H. (1996). Some thoughts and findings on self-presentation of emotions in relationships. In G. J. O. Fletcher & J. Fitness (Eds.), *Knowledge structures in close relationships: A social psychological approach* (pp. 247-274). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Clore, G. I, Schwarz, N., & Conway, M. (1994). Affective cause and consequences of social information processing. In R. S. Wyder Jr., & T. K. Scrull (Eds.), *Handbook of social cognitions* (2nd ed., Vol.1, pp. 323-417). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- De Dreu, C. K. W., & Beersma, B., Stroebe, K., & Euwema, M. C. (2006). Motivated information processing, strategic choice, and the quality of negotiated agreement. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 90 (6), 927-943.
- De Dreu, C. K. W., & Carnevale, P. J. (2003). Motivated bases for information processing and strategic value orientation on the choice and recall of decision heuristics in negotiation. *Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Making Processes*, 76, 253-267.

- De Dreu, C. K. W., & Van Kleef, G. A. (2004). The influence of power on the information search, impression formation, and demands in negotiation. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 40*, 303-319.
- De Dreu, C. K.W., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (1995). The impact of social values orientation on negotiator cognition and behaviour. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 111*, 203-243.
- De Dreu, C. K.W., Weingart, L., & Kwon, S. (2000). Influence of social motives on integrative negotiation: A meta-analytic review and a test of two theories. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78*, 889-905.
- Deutsch, M. (1958). Trust and suspicion. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2*, 265-279.
- Druckman, D., & Olekalns, M. (2008). Emotions in negotiation. *Group Decision Negotiation, 17*, 1-11.
- Ekman, P. (1984). Expressions and the nature of emotions, In K. R. Scherer, P. Ekman (Eds.), *Approaches to emotions* (pp.319-343). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Fisher, R., & Ury, W. (1983). *Getting to yes: Negotiating agreement without giving in* (2nd edition). New York, New York: Penguin Press.
- Forgas, J. P. (1995). Mood and judgment: the affect infusion model (AIM). *Psychological Bulletin, 117*, 39-66.
- Forgas, J. P. (1998). On feeling good and getting your way: Mood effects on negotiator cognition and behaviour. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74*, 565-577.

- Forgas, J. P. (2000). Introduction: Affect and social cognition. In J. P. Forgas (Ed.), *Handbook of affect and social cognition* (pp. 1-24). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Friedman, R., Anderson, C., Brett, J., Olekalns, M., Goates, N., & Lisco, C. C. (2004). The positive and negative effects of anger on dispute resolution: Evidence from electronically mediated disputes. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 89, 369-376.
- Isen, A. M. (1987). Positive affect, cognitive processes, and social behaviour. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology*, Vol. 20 (pp. 203-253). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
- Isen, A. M., Daubman, K. A., & Nowicki, G. P. (1987). Positive affect facilitates creative problem solving. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 52, 1122-1131.
- Kassinove, H., Roth, D., Owens, S.G., & Fuller, J.R. (2002). Effects of trait anger and anger expression style on competitive attack responses in wartime prisoner's dilemma game. *Aggressive Behaviour*, 28, 117-125.
- Knapp, A., & Clark, M. S. (1991). Some detrimental effects of negative mood on individuals' ability to solve resource dilemmas. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 17, 678-688.
- Knudson, B. (1996). Facial expressions of emotion influence interpersonal trait inferences. *Journal of Nonverbal Behaviour*, 20, 165-182.
- Kramer, R. M., & Brewer, M. B. (1984). Effects of group identity on resource use in a simulated commons dilemma. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 46(5), 1044-1057.

- Kramer, R. M., Newton, E., & Pommerenke, P. L. (1993). Self-enhancement biases and negotiator judgment: Effects of self-esteem and mood. *Organization Behaviour and Human Decision Processes*, 56, 110-113.
- Lerner, J. S., & Keltner, D. (2000). Beyond valence: towards a model of emotion-specific influences on judgment and choice. *Cognition and Emotion*, 14, 473-493.
- Mannix, E. A., Thompson, L., & Bazerman, M. H. (1989). Negotiation in small groups. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 74, 508-517.
- Messick, D., & McClintock, C. G. (1968). Motivational bases of choice in experimental games. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 4 (1), 1-25.
- McClintock, C. (1977). Social motives in settings of outcome interdependence. In D. Druckman (Ed.), *Negotiations: Social-psychology perspective* (pp. 49-77). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Morris, M.W., & Keltner, D. (2000). How emotions work: An analysis of the social functions of emotional expression in negotiation. *Research in Organizational Behaviour*, 22, 1-50.
- Parkinson, B. (1996). Emotions are social. *British Journal of Psychology*, 5, 180-186.
- Pinkley, R.L., Neale, M.A., Bennet, R. J. (1994). The impact of alternatives to settlement in dyadic negotiations. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 57, 97-116.
- Pruitt, D. G. (1981). *Negotiation behaviour*. New York: Academic Press.
- Pruitt, D. G. (1983). Strategic choice in negotiation. *American Behavioural Scientist*, 27 (2), 167-194.

- Pruitt, D. G. & Carnevale, P. J. (1993). Negotiation in social conflict. Buckingham, England: Open University Press.
- Pruitt, D. G., & Lewis, S. A. (1975). Development of integrative solutions in bilateral negotiation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 31*, 621-633.
- Pruitt, D. G., & Rubin, J. (1986). *Social conflict: Escalation, stalemate, and settlement*. New York: Random House.
- Rahim, M. (1983). A measure of styles of handing interpersonal conflict. *Academy of Management Journal, 26*, 368-376.
- Rahim, M., Antoniono, D., Krum, K., & Ilieva, S. (2000). Power, conflict, and effectiveness, *European Journal, 5 (1)*, 28-33.
- Rahim, M., & Bonoma, T.V. (1979). Managing organizational conflict: A model for diagnosis and intervention. *Psychological Reports, 44*, 1323-1344.
- Scherer, K. R. (1986). Vocal affect expression: a review and a model for future research. *Psychological Bulletin, 99*, 143-165.
- Sinaceur, M., & Tiedens, L. Z. (2006). Get mad and get more than even: When and why anger expression is effective in negotiation. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42*, 314-322.
- Steinel, W., Van Kleef, G. A., & Harinck, F. (2008). Are you talking to me?! Separating the people from the problem when expressing emotion in negotiation. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44*, 362-369.
- Thomas, K. W. (1976). Conflict and conflict management. In M. D. Dunnette (Ed.), *Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology* (pp 889-935). Chicago: Rand McNally.

- Thompson, Leigh. (1990). Negotiation behaviour and outcomes: Empirical evidence and theoretical issues. *Psychological Bulletin*. 108, 515-532.
- Thompson, L., Medvec, V., Seiden, V., & Kopelman, S. (2001). Poker face, smiley face, and rant and rave: Myths and realities about emotion in negotiation. In M. A. Hogg & S. Tindale (Eds.), *Blackwell handbook in social psychology* (Vol. 3, pp. 139-163). Malden: Blackwell.
- Ury, W. (1991). *Getting past no, negotiating in difficult situations*. Dallas, TX: Leadership Crossroads.
- Van Kleef, G. A. (in press). Emotion in conflict and negotiation: Introducing the emotions as social information (EASI) model. *Current Directions in Psychology Science*.
- Van Kleef, G. A., De Dreu, C. K. W., & Manstead, R. (2004a). The interpersonal effects of anger and happiness in negotiation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 86 (1), 57-76.
- Van Kleef, G. A., De Dreu, C. K. W., & Manstead, R. (2004b). The interpersonal effects of emotion in negotiations: A motivated information processing approach. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 87 (4), 510-528.
- Van Kleef, G. A., De Dreu, C. K. W., Pietroni, D., & Manstead, A. S. R. (2006). Power and emotion in negotiation: Power moderates the interpersonal effects of anger and happiness on concession making. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 36, 557-581.

- Van Kleef, G. A., Van Dijk, E., Steinel, W., Harinck, F., & Van Beest, I. (2008). Anger in social conflict: Cross-situational comparisons and suggestions for the future. *Group Decision and Negotiation, 17*, 13-30.
- Van Kleef, G. A., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2008). What other's disappointment may do to selfish people: Emotion and social value orientation in a negotiation context. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34*, 1084-1095.
- Van Lange, P. A. M. (1999). The pursuit of joint outcomes and equality in outcomes: An integrative model of social values orientation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77* (2), 337-349.
- Wall, J. A., Jr. (1991). Impression management in negotiations. In R. A. Giacalone & P. Rosenfeld (Eds.), *Applied impression management: How image-making affects managerial decisions* (pp. 133-156). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- White, S.B., Valley, K., Bazerman, M.H., Neale, M.A.& Peck, S. (1994). Alternative models of price behavior in dyadic negotiations: Market prices, reservations prices, and negotiator aspirations. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 57*, 430-447.

Appendix A
Participant Recruitment (Sona System)

Study Name Small Group Discussions

Abstract This is a study about small group discussions.

Description The purpose of this study is to examine the negotiation process. In the laboratory, you and a partner will be asked to engage in a negotiation regarding the terms and conditions of a hypothetical car lease. Following the discussion, you will be asked to complete a few brief questionnaires. These questionnaires include a brief demographic information form and other questions regarding your discussion experience.

Duration 45 minutes

Percentage 1 Percentage

Researchers Debbie Reid
Phone: 613-520-2600 X1587
Email: dwedge@connect.carleton.ca

Appendix B
INFORMED CONSENT FORM

The purpose of an informed consent form is to ensure that you understand the purpose of a study and the nature of your involvement. The informed consent must provide sufficient information for you to determine whether or not you wish to participate in the study.

Title of Investigation: Small Group Discussions

Faculty Sponsor: Dr. Bernadette Campbell, Tel. 520-2600 X4080; Email:
Bernadette_Campbell@Carleton.ca

Principal Investigators: Debbie Reid Tel., 613-520-2600 X1587; Email:
dwedge@connect.carleton.ca

Should you have any questions or *concerns about this research*, please contact: Bernadette Campbell, Carleton University, 613-520-2600 ext. 4080.

Should you have any *ethical concerns* about this study, please contact Dr. Avi Parush, (Chair, Carleton University Ethics Committee for Psychological Research, 613-520-2600 ext.6026) or Dr. Janet Mantler (Chair, Dept. of Psychology, 613-520-2600, ext. 2648).

Purpose and Task Requirement:

The purpose of this study is to examine the negotiation process. In the laboratory, you and a partner will be asked to engage in a negotiation regarding the terms and conditions of a hypothetical car lease. Following the discussion, you will be asked to complete a few brief questionnaires. These questionnaires include a brief demographic information form and other questions regarding your discussion experience. The entire process will take up no more than 45 minutes.

Potential Risk and Discomfort: There is no expected discomfort in this study.

Confidentiality: The data collected in this study will be kept confidential. Only the researchers involved in this experiment will view your responses.

Right to Withdrawal: Your participation is entirely voluntary. At any point, you may withdraw from the study or refuse to complete all or part of a questionnaire at no consequence.

I have read the above description of the study concerning small group discussions. The data collected will be used in research publications and/or teaching purposes. My endorsement indicates that I agree to participate in the study. This endorsement in no way constitutes a waiver of my rights. I am at least 16 years of age.

I ACKNOWLEDGE THAT I HAVE READ AND UNDERSTOOD THIS AGREEMENT, and that I have executed this agreement voluntarily.

Signed this _____ day of _____, 200_____, at Ottawa Ontario.

Printed Name of Participant

Signature of Participant

Signature of Researcher

Appendix C Prosocial Motive Guidelines

You will be participating in a negotiation scenario with another participant. You are attempting to negotiate a lease of a new car. Your partner is the salesperson and he/she will initiate the negotiations with you. You are to attempt to reach an agreement on:

- 1) what your monthly payment will be
- 2) your warranty
- 3) how many kilometres you can drive the car/year.

Below you will see the pay-off scale for your demand/concession behaviour. The value of each of your negotiated outcome appears in **BOLD** in the bracket and all three categories will be combined for one total score at the end of the session.

We are interested in your ability to obtain the highest outcome that benefits both you and your negotiation partner. Keep in mind, the more points you gain in each column comes at your partner's expense. Act naturally.

Negotiation occurs in some form in every day life and we hope to better understand the way which people perceive each other in a negotiation situation.

Please do not discuss your instructions with other participant.

Appendix D Egoistic Motive Guidelines

You will be participating in a negotiation scenario with another participant. You are attempting to negotiate a lease of a new car. Your opponent is the salesperson and he/she will initiate the negotiations with you. You are to attempt to reach an agreement on:

- 1) what your monthly payment will be
- 2) your warranty
- 3) how many kilometres you can drive the car/year.

Below you will see the pay-off scale for your demand/concession behaviour. The value of each of your negotiated outcome appears in **BOLD** in the bracket and all three categories will be combined for one total score at the end of the session.

We are interested in your ability to obtain the highest outcome that benefits you **ONLY**. This means – try to get as many points possible in each of the three columns. Act naturally.

Negotiation occurs in some form in every day life and we hope to better understand the way which people perceive each other in a negotiation situation.

Please do not discuss your instructions with other participant

Appendix E
Participant's Payoff Table

NOTE : points are in brackets and each column has *different* point values. The point scale for your counterpart is the inverse (e.g., high points for you = low points for counterpart).

Level	Monthly lease payment (\$)	Warranty (in months)	Kilometres (kms)
1	\$200 (240 points)	8 months (80 points)	30 000 kms (120 points)
2	\$300 (210 points)	7 months (70 points)	27 000 kms (105 points)
3	\$400 (180 points)	6 months (60 points)	24 000 kms (90 points)
4	\$500 (150 points)	5 months (50 points)	21 000 kms (75 points)
5	\$600 (120 points)	4 months (40 points)	18 000 kms (60 points)
6	\$700 (90 points)	3 months (30 points)	15 000 kms (45 points)
7	\$800 (60 points)	2 months (20 points)	12 000 kms (30 points)
8	\$900 (30 points)	1 months (10 points)	9 000 kms (15 points)
9	\$1000 (0 points)	0 months (0 points)	6 000 kms (0 points)

(Adapted from Van Kleef et al., 2004a, 2004b; De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995)

Appendix F
Confederate's Emotional Statements

The confederate will make the following statements at the following times during negotiations to convey emotional experience.

Confederate's Emotion	Statement
	<i>After Round 1</i>
Angry	This offer makes me really angry, I think I will offer x-y-z.
Happy	I am happy with this offer, I think I will offer x-y-z.
Neutral	I think I will offer x-y-z.
	<i>After Round 3</i>
Angry	This is really getting on my nerves, I am going to offer x-y-z.
Happy	This is going pretty well so far. I am going to offer x-y-z.
Neutral	I am going to offer x-y-z.
	<i>After Round 5</i>
Angry	I am going to offer x-y-z, because this negotiation pisses me off.
Happy	I am going to offer x-y-z, because I feel good about this negotiation.
Neutral	I am going to offer x-y-z.

Note: Statements were pretested and have been translated from Dutch (Van Kleef et al., 2004a, 2004b).

Appendix G
High Epistemic Motivation Guidelines

The negotiation session you are about to participate in will last for approximately 20 minutes. This is more than enough time for you to complete this task. Please record all demand-concessions made at the end of each round.

Afterwards, you will be required to participate in a follow-up interview after having participated in the described negotiation scenario. The 5-minute follow-up interview will examine the rationale behind the judgements you made during the negotiation session.

Appendix H
Confederate's Pre-arranged Bargaining Pattern

The demand/concession pattern to be initiated and followed by the confederate is as follows:

Round 1	8 - 7 - 8
Round 2	8 - 7 - 7
Round 3	8 - 6- 7
Round 4	7 - 6 - 7
Round 5	7 - 6 - 6
Round 6	6 – 6 - 6

Note: a demand of a participant will be accepted if it is the same or equal to the demand the confederate is next to make.

Appendix I
Bargaining Behaviour Record

Please record offers, in levels (1-9), made during the negotiation rounds. No agreement is necessary at the end of the negotiation session.

Car sales person

Negotiation Round	Monthly payment Level (1-9)	Warranty Level (1-9)	Kilometres Level (1-9)
Round 1			
Round 2			
Round 3			
Round 4			
Round 5			
Round 6			
Round 7			
Round 8			
Round 9			
Round 10			

Purchaser

Negotiation Round	Monthly payment Level (1-9)	Warranty Level (1-9)	Kilometres Level (1-9)
Round 1			
Round 2			
Round 3			
Round 4			
Round 5			
Round 6			
Round 7			
Round 8			
Round 9			
Round 10			

Appendix J
Dutch Conflict Handling Inventory (DUTCH Scale)

For each of the following questions, provide an answer on a 5-point scale (1 = not at all, to 5 = very much) to describe the way *you behaved* during the discussion with your partner. During this discussion, I did the following:

YIELDING

1. I gave in to the wishes of the other party.
2. I concurred with the other party.
3. I tried to accommodate the other party.
4. I adapted to the other parties' goals and interests.

COMPROMISING

5. I tried to realize a middle-of-the-road solution.
6. I emphasized that we have to find a compromise solution.
7. I insisted we both give in a little.
8. I strived whenever possible towards a fifty-fifty compromise.

FORCING

9. I pushed my own point of view.
10. I searched for gains.
11. I fought for a good outcome for myself.
12. I did everything to win.

PROBLEM SOLVING

13. I examined issues until I found a solution that really satisfied me and the other party.
14. I stood for my own and other's goals and interests.
15. I examined ideas from both sides to find a mutually optimal solution.
16. I worked out a solution that served my own as well as other's interests as good as possible.

AVOIDING

- 17. I avoided a confrontation about our differences.
- 18. I avoided differences of opinion as much as possible.
- 19. I tried to make differences loom less severe.
- 12. I tried to avoid a confrontation with the other.

Appendix K
Participants' Perceptions of Threat / Opportunity in the Negotiation

Please circle the number that best describes *your thoughts and feelings during the negotiation.*

Perceived Threats in the Negotiation:

My goals were often threatened in the negotiation.:

Strongly Disagree		Neither Agree nor Disagree		Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

My partner was an obstacle to my goals.:

Strongly Disagree		Neither Agree nor Disagree		Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

My partner was a "tough" negotiator.:


Strongly Disagree		Neither Agree nor Disagree		Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

Perceived Opportunities in the Negotiation


I had many opportunities to achieve my goals in the negotiation.:

Strongly Disagree		Neither Agree nor Disagree		Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

My partner facilitated my goals.:



My partner was an “easy” negotiator.:



Appendix L
Participant's Negotiation Interests
(Social Motive Manipulation Check)

Please circle the number that best describes *your behaviour during the negotiation.*

Prosocial:

I was supposed to achieve as many points for my group as possible.:

Strongly Disagree			Neither Agree nor Disagree			Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

I was trying to achieve many points for my group.:

Strongly Disagree			Neither Agree nor Disagree			Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Egoistic:

I was supposed to try to achieve many points for myself regardless of the amount of points my opponent would receive.:

Strongly Disagree			Neither Agree nor Disagree			Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

I was particularly trying to achieve many points for myself.:

Strongly Disagree			Neither Agree nor Disagree			Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

I was particularly trying to win against my opponent.:

Strongly Disagree			Neither Agree nor Disagree			Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Appendix M
Participant's Assessment of Counterpart
(Emotion Manipulation Check)

Please circle the number that best describes *the other party* during the negotiation.

ANGER:

My counterpart seemed angry:

Strongly Disagree			Neither Agree nor Disagree			Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

My counterpart seemed irritated:

Strongly Disagree			Neither Agree nor Disagree			Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

My counterpart seemed bad tempered:

Strongly Disagree			Neither Agree nor Disagree			Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

HAPPINESS:

My counterpart seemed happy:

Strongly Disagree			Neither Agree nor Disagree			Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

My counterpart seemed satisfied:

Strongly Disagree			Neither Agree nor Disagree			Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

My counterpart seemed pleased:

Strongly Disagree			Neither Agree nor Disagree			Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Appendix N
Assessment of Participant Emotion

Please circle the number that best describes *your thoughts and feelings during the negotiation.*

ANGER:

To what extent did you experience anger?

Strongly Disagree			Neither Agree nor Disagree			Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

To what extent did you become irritated?

Strongly Disagree			Neither Agree nor Disagree			Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

To what extent did you become bad tempered?

Strongly Disagree			Neither Agree nor Disagree			Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

HAPPY :

To what extent did you experience happiness?

Strongly Disagree			Neither Agree nor Disagree			Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

To what extent did you experience satisfaction?

Strongly Disagree			Neither Agree nor Disagree			Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

To what extent were you pleased?

Strongly Disagree			Neither Agree nor Disagree			Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Appendix O
Participant's Behaviour
(Epistemic Motivation Manipulation Check)

Please circle the number that best describes *your behaviour during the negotiation.*

I thought deeply about the issues:

Strongly Disagree			Neither Agree nor Disagree			Strongly Agree
	1	2	3	4	5	6
						7

I tried hard to make balanced decisions:

Strongly Disagree			Neither Agree nor Disagree			Strongly Agree
	1	2	3	4	5	6
						7

I reflected on the rationale behind my opinions:

Strongly Disagree			Neither Agree nor Disagree			Strongly Agree
	1	2	3	4	5	6
						7

I didn't care about the issues being discussed (R):

Strongly Disagree			Neither Agree nor Disagree			Strongly Agree
	1	2	3	4	5	6
						7

I made quick decisions (R):

Strongly Disagree			Neither Agree nor Disagree			Strongly Agree
	1	2	3	4	5	6
						7

I listened carefully to the discussion:

Strongly Disagree			Neither Agree nor Disagree			Strongly Agree
	1	2	3	4	5	6
						7

I saw and understood my counterpart's concerns:

Strongly Disagree			Neither Agree nor Disagree			Strongly Agree
	1	2	3	4	5	6
						7

Appendix P

Debriefing Form

Thank you for participating in this study. Please be assured that all of your responses for this study will remain confidential. Any discussion of the results found will not be affiliated with your confidential information. You are free to deny us the use of your data, which you may do by indicating this to the researcher.

Why are we doing this research?

You have just participated in a study of how emotion affects negotiations. The main purpose of this study was to gain a better understanding of how interpersonal emotion (the emotional displays of your counterpart) influences the negotiation process. Specifically, we are interested in learning more about how one's social motivation interacts with interpersonal emotion. Your negotiation partner today was not another research participant, but was actually someone who is part of our research team who was following a script during the negotiation. Part of her script included the emotions she displayed through statements made three times during the negotiation. For some participants, the scripted emotion was happiness, for others it was anger, and for others it was a non-emotion. To manipulate social motivation, some participants were instructed to think of their counterpart as a "partner" and to have concern for this individual as well as for oneself. Others were asked to think of their negotiation partners as an "opponent" and to only have self-concern.

Why wasn't everything explained BEFORE the study began?

In this study we were primarily interested in how the emotional state of your negotiation counterpart influenced your negotiation behaviours. To assess this, it was felt that a minimal amount of deception was necessary to ensure that your counterpart's emotional state was reacted to naturally. Had you known about our hypotheses prior to the study, you may not have reacted as naturally to your negotiation partner.

Why is this research important?

This research will help to provide a better understanding of how emotion influences the negotiation process. Emotion can sometimes enhance or hinder negotiations depending on the context. If we can better understand when and how emotion can be used to encourage cooperative discussions and negotiations, we may be able to improve these kinds of interactions.

Where can I learn more?

Van Kleef, G., De Dreu, C., & Manstead, R. (2004b). The interpersonal effects of emotion in negotiations: A motivated information processing approach. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87* (4), 510-528.

What if I have questions later? If you have any remaining concerns, questions, or comments about the experiment please feel free to email Debbie Reid (dwedge@connect.carleton.ca) or to speak to Dr. Bernadette Campbell (613-520-2600 x 4080). If you have any ethical concerns you can also discuss them with Dr. Avi Parush, Chair, Carleton University Ethics Committee for Psychological Research, 520-2600, ext. 6026) or Dr. Janet Mantler (Chair, Dept. of Psychology, 520-2600, ext. 2648).

Because we are still collecting data we ask that you refrain from discussing your participation in this study, including the information contained in this form, with other students. Thank you for your cooperation.