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**STATES, SOCIAL SYSTEMS, AND VIOLENCE:
A Socio-centric Conceptualization of Structural Violence**

by

Wayne S. Cox, B.A.

A thesis submitted to the
Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

Department of Political Science

Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
September 7, 1990

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STATES, SOCIAL SYSTEMS, AND VIOLENCE:
A SOCIO-CENTRIC CONCEPTUALIZATION OF STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE

submitted by Wayne Cox, B.A.
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Arts

Thesis Supervisor

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September 19, 1990

ABSTRACT

This thesis provides a critical evaluation of the state-centricity of theoretical approaches towards understanding 'war' within the international state-system. While the state based approach does describe some significant aspects of conflict within the global system, it has become a theoretical impediment towards fully understanding social conflict. As an alternative, this thesis provides a socio-centric model which defines the principal actors in the process of violence as those groups whose self identification and politicization is sufficient enough to utilize the collective use of violence as a means towards political ends. Moreover, all social groups exist within a set of power relationships with other social group(s) in a structural system of violence which transcends state boundaries. The Iran/Iraq war and the Vietnam conflict are used to fully display the merits of the socio-centric model.

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CHAPTER ONE
"Introduction"

INTRODUCTION

Fields, of course, are made. They require coherence and integrity in time because scholars devote themselves in different ways to what seems to be a commonly agreed-upon subject matter. Yet it goes without saying that a field of study is rarely as simply defined as even its most committed partisans - usually scholars, professors, experts, and the like - claim it is. Besides, a field can change so entirely, in even the most traditional disciplines like philology, history, or theology, as to make an all-purpose definition of the subject matter almost impossible. (Said, 1979:50)

Edward Said writes in context of the way in which scholars of the West (the Occident) view the non-Western world (the Orient). However, his observations should remind students of the study of international relations that the orthodoxy of commonly used theoretical constructions are merely a reflection of the basic assumptions, politics, as well as the preferred observations sought, by the individual scholar. A relatively new field of study, international relations scholars must immerse themselves in (meta)-theoretical discussions which examine the implicit political objectives of the discipline as a whole. Crucial to such discussions, is the basic role of the 'social scientist' in the formation of how we view the world.

The overall objective of this thesis is simple. It will be to examine the basic objectives and the theoretical tools

which students of international relations utilize in their understanding of global politics generally, and international conflict specifically. Essentially, a critical framework will be used to expose what is considered here to be our greatest theoretical limitation in fully understanding global politics - our notion of the state unit. While the deconstruction of the theoretical tools of international relations might tell us a great deal about the limitations of the field of study, it does not provide us with a basis upon which we might better conceptualize all aspects of global politics. A theoretical framework for understanding the social basis of conflict will be suggested. Therefore, this paper will essentially have two overall sections, theoretical deconstruction - and theoretical reconstruction.

This first chapter will simply state the purpose of the research and outline the basic utility of the role of the social scientist in peace research. As well, the need for theoretical reconstruction will be tabled as a crucial corollary to deconstructionist theory.

Chapter Two will provide a basic definition of terms as well as delineate the parameters of the theoretical discussion to follow. The socio-centric theoretical conception of structural violence which will be tabled in Chapter Four is

based upon several assumptions which need to be explicitly spelled out early in this thesis. The orthodoxy of theoretical approaches towards understanding conflict within global society (classical and neorealism) are based upon a division of international and domestic categories of conflict. Based upon a discussion of Morgenthau, the utility of such a theoretical division will be challenged and refuted.

The focus of Chapter Three will be to provide a literature review of several crucial critiques of classical and neorealist theory based upon their inability to successfully conceptualize the state unit. Such a critique is intended to expose what is considered here to be the central theoretical limitations of state-centric conceptualizations of conflict within global society. In essence, what will be argued is that conflict is socially based - while the dominant means of conceptualizing conflict is state based. The result is a theoretical mis-match between the theoretical tools of international relations, and the basis of the central problems which they attempt to understand.

Chapter Four will provide a theoretical alternative to the state based framework for understanding conflict. Moving forward from the critical approach in the earlier sections of this thesis, Chapter Four will utilize a social model for

identifying all principal groups involved in the process of structural violence. Such a theoretical framework is not intended to replace (or ignore) the existing international state system. A socio-centric conceptualization of structural violence will develop a model for understanding 'relations' of violence - rather than actions of violence. A notion of structural hegemony will be taken from the work of Robert Cox, and utilized in connection with some of the earlier structural theories of aggression of the Peace Research Movement. The resulting notion of structural violence will provide a theoretical link which can better understand the social basis of violence both within domestic and international society.

Finally, Chapter Five will link the proposed socio-centric conceptualization of structural violence into the existing international state system. Two central examples will be tabled in order to display the merits of a socio-centric model. An analysis of the Iran/Iraq War will demonstrate the socio-centric model in a contemporary example which involves two states as the principal participants. From here, an analysis of the Vietnam conflict will demonstrate the social model when looking at multi-state conflicts which involved one or more foreign power(s). Further to this, the Vietnam case provides an excellent modern example of a domestic dispute which became 'internationalized' by the involvement

of other state actors.

As well, a summary and conclusion section for the overall thesis will be tabled. A brief section of appendices has been added to reinforce some of the observations in the thesis. A table has been drawn up displaying the ethnic composition of state units based upon the observations of Gunnar Nielsson. As well, a table has been created based upon the Singer and Small conflict database which includes numbers of civilian and military conflict deaths in domestic and international disputes of over 10,000 fatalities since 1945. Neither of the included appendices is intended to be comprehensive empirical surveys of international conflict. However, they do roughly direct our attention towards to the unfortunate results of the use of violence as a means towards political ends.

THE ROLE OF THE SOCIAL SCIENTIST IN STUDIES OF CONFLICT

Thus framed, the goal of peace research can be stated. It is to contribute to the closing of the gap between the two visions of the human condition, the actual and the preferred. (Ashley, 1980:310)

It is towards this goal that Ashley identifies the five primary tasks of the peace research movement. All five are in total part of the process which Ashley identifies by a

changing reality where the vantage point always contains a 'problematic' and a 'theory kernel'. The dynamics of learning accounts for the emergence, reproduction, and possible passing of the problematic itself. The multidimensionality of the goal (and its tasks) make the process hard to gauge. Implicit in Ashley's arguments is the notion that progress in this process leads to more questions, and therefore problematiques, and the perceived gaps then appear to widen rather than narrow. Moreover, as the opening quote from Said reminds us, the subject matter of the research program itself is politically constructed reflecting (at times only implicitly) the theoretical preferences of those who claim to be objective. (Said, 1979:50)

Researchers in the peace research movement look towards competing theoretical traditions that allow for a plurality of insights toward the problematique and the theory kernel. All approaches combined, contribute towards the building blocks of the hard core empirical aspects of positivist research. However, Ashley notes that the selective nature of the empirical research, combined with the abstract nature of the problematic, create an inherent critical tension in the process leaving the problematique as simply a point of departure. This is the logic of the empirical process. (Ashley, 1980:314) The tension in the process can, and has,

led to limitations in the development of peace research.

The sources of critical tension lie in the ontological and epistemological commitments of any approach. With regards to the specific use of modelling, Ashley poses the serious question:

....is modelling founded upon the preconception that theory and models should serve in a technological capacity or a participatory capacity with regard to the reality addressed? (Ashley, 1980:291)

The basic role of the social sciences is seldomly, if ever, explicitly stated in most social sciences research. One must wonder if in fact the social sciences can effectively assume its role to be the narrowing of the gap between the problematic and the theory kernel. If so, the philosophy of science approach implicit in positivist methodology only furthers the gap by revealing new and more complex problematiques. The process leads towards the incorporation of more variables, need for more empirical data, and the statement of more problematiques expanding in an exponential fashion. In short, the scientific aspect of the research often takes on a life of its own in its unquenching thirst to build models which reflect reality, never fulfilling the widely shared critical aspirations of the social scientist.

1

While the comments of Ashley remind us of the difficulties of a positivist research project, more serious (meta)-theoretical considerations should be examined. The basic assumptions of any research project are merely the implicit expressions of the complex social environment from which they evolved. As Said tells us, the basic subject matter, the approaches taken, and the knowledge which results are political action. As such, it is the responsibility of the social scientist to engage in discourse which fully examines the subject matter and the political process which led to the discovery. Though many in the study of international relations claim to be 'objective' observers of social reality, this thesis argues that the individual is merely a practitioner in the social process. There is no effective division between subject and object - fact and value. Therefore metatheoretical discourse is not simply an interesting academic exercise, it is the basis of social learning. However, critical theory by itself must be accompanied by new theoretical constructions which seek to

¹ See, for example, Rapoport, A. (1956) & Galtung, J. (1968) for a discussion of the role of the social scientist in peace research. Initially, Rapoport and Galtung were of the opinion that peace research should engage in serious metatheoretical discourse regarding the basic assumptions and resulting theories of scholars of war and peace. However, the need for policy relevant research on the immediate events of international politics throughout the 1950s, 60s 70s and 80s pushed such research to the margins of the Peace Research Movement throughout its brief history.

learn from the critical project.

This thesis engages in the deconstruction of what is considered here to be the cornerstone of existing approaches to understanding conflict in the international environment - the state unit. Though it is not argued that states are insignificant actors in global politics, it is argued that the state is an 'assumed' entity by most scholars of international relations. As a result, the discipline can only vaguely describe international processes, rather than fully understand them. Moreover, the theoretical tools which are used by scholars of international conflict (namely the state unit), are shared by practitioners in the international political process. Equipped with poorly conceived theoretical tools, scholars and political practitioners alike make serious errors in their perception of the international environment often resulting in horrific wars of massive destruction.

The principal theoretical tools of the discipline are used by scholars to see what they want to see, understand what they want to understand. Therefore, theoretical deconstruction of the principal theoretical tools of the discipline is necessary towards escaping the dominant theoretical discourse (realism) of the study of global politics. Further to this, we must build upon the lessons of

the deconstruction and develop a means by which an effective understanding of the existing relations of social violence can be understood. Though it is acknowledged from the outset that such a model is itself politically constructed, it is clear that social violence continues in earnest. With over 30 million conflict related deaths since 1945, surely it is time to search for a more effective means of understanding social violence. (Sivard, 1988:10-50, Singer & Small 1981)

CHAPTER TWO
"The Problem Defined"

FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

The study of international relations has, from its outset, sought to understand conflict within the international system. In fact, it can be argued that the understanding of international conflict has maintained a prominent position as one of the central problematiques for much of the theoretical literature in the field of international relations throughout its development. Several of these theoretical approaches clearly state the need to develop an ability to understand, and thereby limit, international conflict. Though not all areas of the discipline (such as international political economy, development studies, strategic studies, area studies, foreign policy studies etc.) explicitly state that an understanding of conflict is the paramount objective of their respective theoretical approaches, they are in total necessary to gain a full understanding of the subject. The complexity of attempting to understand the full range of theories that deal with questions of international conflicts cannot be underestimated. The root of this complexity can be found in both the vastness of the body of literature that deals with all issues of international conflict at all levels of analysis, as well as the variety of approaches that contemporary scholars use to understand them.

Before we can continue however, we must define 'international conflict' for the purposes of this research. In his six principles of political realism, Hans Morgenthau implies that an understanding of war and peace is central towards his theory of international politics. (Morgenthau, 1973:4-15) In order to distinguish the subject matter of international politics, Morgenthau established a clear division between domestic and international politics. Such a distinction continues to be accepted throughout most theoretical approaches in the discipline. There is no doubt that Morgenthau's political realism attempted to understand the international conditions for peace at the state, or international, level. The assumptions behind the Morgenthau vision of the international system were based upon an anarchic international state system organized and controlled by a set of power relationships at the state level. (Morgenthau, 1973:4) International conflict was, for Morgenthau, conflict between states. While the need to understand conflict at the state level is unquestionably crucial, is it necessarily sufficient in an understanding of all international conflicts, even within a realist framework?

The answer to the above question is no. In political realism it is the state which is the divider between peace and order within states, and anarchy at the international level.

In other words, what factor making for peace and order exists within national societies which is lacking on the international scene? The answer seems obvious - it is the state itself. (Morgenthau, 1973:479)

While the division between domestic and international politics might assist the realist in the determination of what international relations is, it is not without problems. In the area of conflict, how does the realist deal with conflicts which are by a realist definition 'domestic', and yet have become internationalized by the involvement of other state actors? The Vietnam conflict provided an excellent example of the difficulties involved in dividing conflicts into domestic and international.

Morgenthau himself responded to the conflict in Indochina in his fifth edition (1973) of Politics Among Nations. His response to the Vietnam conflict is crucial towards this discussion for two basic reasons. First, is the overwhelming and undisputed impact that Morgenthau's political realism had upon the overall discipline of international relations. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, Morgenthau's reaction to the Vietnam War indicated serious problems in the effective division of conflict into domestic and international categories. As was just mentioned, this is of particular significance given the dominance of realist approaches over international relations theorizing. Morgenthau's basic criticisms of the American involvement in

Vietnam were based upon what he contended to be the 'irrational' foreign policy behaviour of the United States. (Morgenthau, 1973:7) He contended that where foreign policy is conducted under the conditions of democratic control, the need to legitimize the foreign policy actions of a state in the eyes of the electorate can impair the rationality of the foreign policy itself. This, he argues, led the United States into an erratic and irrational set of policies with regards to Vietnam. Moreover, statesmen will often 'stage' their diplomatic actions for domestic consumption, rather than act in the best interest of a state's foreign policy. If this is the case, and Morgenthau admits that it is, then the realist division between domestic and international factors affecting state behaviour is clearly unacceptable. Morgenthau's observations call into question many assumptions behind his original vision of political realism. As many states in the international system must respond to the constituents within their sovereign boundaries, we must assume that state actors often act irrationally according to Morgenthau's definition of the term.

Perhaps the greatest limitation of the ability of political realism to deal with questions of conflict comes out of the division of domestic and international itself. As has already been mentioned, Morgenthau attempted to address questions of war and peace from the international, or state,

level. For him, conflict within states was a question of domestic order and was not the central focus of his political realism. (Morgenthau, 1973:480-487) Again, the Vietnam conflict highlighted the weakness of such an assumption. While Morgenthau questioned the rationality of the American involvement in Southeast Asia, he admitted that the presence of American soldiers legitimized the North Vietnamese claim that this was an anti-colonial struggle. By supporting the South Vietnamese government, the United States had successfully internationalized a domestic conflict. (Morgenthau, 1973:333) In fact, the realist notion of an international order arranged by power relationships (Balance of Power) makes the division between domestic and international conflict difficult - even for Morgenthau. While realists are willing to concede that domestic politics affects the international behaviour of states, they assume this to be secondary to international considerations regardless of the evidence which might suggest otherwise (Vietnam included).² In short, realist notions state action in an international environment give theoretical primacy to the international context at the cost of crucial domestic considerations.

² This is the basic argument behind the criticisms of realist theory which label its notion of the state as ontologically primitive. Essentially this is based upon an assumption that the state unit is prior to the international state system. This will be discussed fully in chapter three.

In the post war era, the vast interests of the superpowers gives the potential for all conflicts to be internationalized - even within a realist theoretical framework. Though it was the Vietnam conflict which is most often sighted as an example of this potential, several other post-war examples can support the argument. Are we to assume that the United States does not play a role in the ongoing conflict in Central America? Clearly not. Was the Korean War simply a domestic dispute regardless of the mandate of those United Nations troops which were sent there? If states are the only legitimate actors in international conflicts, are we to assume that the P.L.O., Contras, Viet Cong, I.R.A., Mujahideen, Jews before the creation of the state of Israel, etc. are not international actors, or have only marginal impact upon international relations? Clearly, even within a realist conceptualization, the division between domestic and international conflict is not clear. Such a division narrows the focus of the study of international conflict to state actors only, and by doing so, fails to provide an analysis of many conflicts (or aspects of them) which clearly impact upon the international system.

The impact of the classical realist approach towards the study of international relations cannot be underestimated. Though an understanding of conflict has been central to the study of international relations, the state-centric nature

of theory has lead to what can only be termed a 'theoretical mis-match' between international relations theory, and the social reality which it seeks to understand. On the one hand, we have a state-centric approach towards international conflict at the level of theory. On the other hand, we have a plurality of social conflicts which cannot be aggregated to the state level. The purpose of this research will be to understand the development of this theoretical mis-match, and as well, suggest a means by which theory can better understand the social basis of international conflict. The general argument will be as follows. The analysis conducted within international relations theory generally, and conflict theory specifically, has been largely state-centric.

The state-centric nature of the field is the result of the manner in which the traditions from which it evolved, historical events which occurred during and conditioned the development of international relations theory, the development of a positivist methodology utilized in a selective and biased fashion, the perceived need to devise 'policy relevant' theory within the United States, and the flawed assumption that all social conflict can be aggregated to the state level. Despite this pattern of development, this essay will put forward the argument that the basis of conflict is social (most often ethnic, regional, religious,

economic, social-structural, or intercommunal), and that this fact has left us with a perfect mis-match between international relations theory and the social reality which it seeks to understand. In fact, the emphasis on understanding conflict at the state level can trivialize, or ignore altogether, crucial aspects of that very conflict. Focusing on this theoretical mis-match will lead us to suggest a more fruitful theoretical option for the study of international conflict. Therefore this paper does not accept a definition of 'international conflict' per say. Conflict will be treated as a process of structural violence which transcends state boundaries, state structures, or any other theoretical impediment which scholars impose upon the process in the construction of theoretical attempts to understand violence within the international system. (Galtung, 1964:96) Conflict then, is part of a broad holistic process which cannot be divided by state agency for reasons of theoretical convenience.

The explanation presented here for the theoretical mis-match raised above will focus upon two central themes. The first will be a historical developmental approach towards understanding the dominance of the state-centric nature of international relations theory. The second is an examination of the undertheorized nature of international relations's concept of the state, and its implications upon the

understanding of international conflict. The historical development of theory in the discipline might help us better understand the context within which the notion of state-centricity has managed to maintain its hegemony. The argument relating our two themes will be straightforward; while the state might be a theoretically 'easy' unit to operationalize in a state-centric model, (and such an assumption makes the discipline consistent with other disciplines such as the study of international law and diplomatic history), we must more fully understand what we mean by the term 'state' in order to develop a legitimate and coherent field of study. It will be argued, for example, that it is inappropriate to discuss state-actors acting 'as if' they are coherent, rational, power maximizers - or to discuss states without reference to the structural relations within or amongst them. The very fact of the ontologically primitive nature of the state assumed in much of international relations theory, which makes it impossible to discuss the state as an actor limited by a structural context, delegitimizes the validity of many of the traditional approaches to conflict.

THEORETICAL LIMITATIONS OF THIS ANALYSIS

There are several fundamental problems that must first be addressed in order to successfully study theories specific to conflict within the broader context of international relations theory. The first of these deals with the large diversity of approaches dealing with issues of conflict. While many scholars have attempted to understand the basic sources of conflict, others have looked towards understanding the conflict behaviour of actors within the international system. Others, still, focus upon the effective resolution or management of conflict. Moreover, a variety of theoretical perspectives have developed which take different (and often contending) approaches towards understanding many of the issues that face the student of international conflict. There is little agreement amongst scholars regarding the definition of terms, methodology, units of analysis, divisibility of subject matter, central problematique, and relative importance given to factors perceived to be crucial towards the full understanding of conflict. However, the state unit has maintained its prominence throughout most of these contending approaches. The study of international conflict is clearly a state-centric field of study. While it can be said that not all conflict theorists look at the same subject matter, and not always in the same way, nearly all share the same

assumptions with regards to the state as the central (often exclusive) actor in international politics.

A second major problem in understanding theoretical approaches towards conflict is what this writer refers to as the 'macro-micro' division of theory. Within the broader arena of international relations theory (macro), there are some theoretical approaches which explicitly state that a central problematique of international conflict³ is crucial towards their overall understanding of international politics (i.e. classic realism, idealism, Waltz's neo-realism). These theoretical perspectives should obviously be included in understanding the current state of the field as it relates to theoretical approaches of conflict. There are however, other broader theoretical perspectives in international relations whose central focus is not specifically directed towards the understanding of conflict (i.e. dependency theory, many world systems approaches, Gilpin's neorealism etc.). This does not mean, however, that

³ This depends, of course, upon how the term 'conflict' is defined. For the purposes of this thesis, conflict refers to the use of physical violence as a means towards political objectives. In this instance, the term conflict is synonymous with what is often referred to in the literature as war. Though marxist approaches focus upon 'conflict' between economic classes, such a definition is not similar in scope to the use of the term by state-centric realist scholars. In order to avoid the total realist appropriation of terms, conflict is defined here as the legitimate use of violence towards political objectives.

these theoretical perspectives have nothing to say about conflict. In fact, most do - though it is not the central focus or problematique of the approach. They too have affected the way many contemporary scholars approach the subject. Moreover, alternative theoretical approaches (not necessarily dealing with conflict) have caused many scholars to seriously examine several of their basic assumptions.

At the 'micro' level of theoretical approaches are those theoretical perspectives that fit into what has come to be defined as 'conflict studies' or 'conflict theory'. There has been a further division within this research into such areas as conflict resolution, mediation, institutional approaches etc. Some exclude non-state based theoretical approaches towards conflict (i.e. 'proto-theory', lateral pressure theory, or long-cycle structural state theory) as being 'fringe' and non-policy relevant. Professional schools have developed which study conflict management from the

state perspective exclusively. ⁴

The problems of effectively assessing all theories of conflict (both macro and micro) cannot be underestimated. At one level of analysis, the study of conflict experiences many of the similar debates which have arisen throughout the study of international relations theory. Paradigms, or perspectives, in conflict theory disagree over fundamental issues such as definition of terms, implicit assumptions, the role of the social scientist, ontological precepts, epistemology, and the methodology utilized. Moreover, many scholars assume that the overall study of international relations should be based around, and defined by, a central

⁴. As far as I am aware, the pre-fixes 'micro' and 'macro' have never been applied to conflict theories. For the purposes of this research I would like to define the terms as follows:

A) MACRO-THEORY Macro-theory will refer to those broader theoretical approaches towards international relations which focus upon a central problematique of war and peace. An excellent example of this theoretical perspective would be the classical realist approach. However, for the purposes of this research macro-theory will also include other non-realist perspectives which focus upon a similar problematique (ie. Waltz's scientific realism, or Modelski's long-cycle theory of conflict).

B) MICRO-THEORY Micro-theory will refer to specific taxonomies of theory which often deal with issues central towards an understanding of conflict, though limited by implicit parameters of subject matter. These theories may or may not share the basic assumptions, ontology epistemology, or methodology of broader macro-theories. Examples of these perspectives would be conflict management techniques, negotiation theory, decision-making theory, game theory, or crisis behaviour theory.

focus upon questions of war and peace. Other contending approaches disagree. Within theories which specifically deal with issues of conflict, there exists the aforementioned micro/macro problem.

While it might be invalid to compare broader theories such as the works of E.H. Carr with highly specific approaches of single factors contributing to an overall understanding of conflict (i.e. Allison's model of crisis decision making), it is possible to examine the assumptions behind the way international relations as a whole deals with questions of international conflict. Though both Carr and Allison might share similar assumptions about the international state-system, the comparative scope of the focus is clearly not similar. Moreover, one does not have to share the broader theoretical assumptions of a given paradigm in order to successfully utilize specific taxonomies of theory.

For example, a given scholar may reject the realist assumptions of an anarchic international state-system organized by power relationships at the state level. That scholar might favour the use of specific approaches towards negotiation. Yet another scholar who wholly accepts the basic assumptions of realism might also utilize the identical approaches of negotiation. The broader theoretical assumptions of a given scholar may affect the way

theoretical taxonomies are utilized. However, we cannot assume this to always be the case. Generally speaking, it cannot be assumed that theoretical taxonomies in the study of international conflict are holistic and exclusive. For that reason, it is essential to fully divorce notions of theory from taxonomy in order to critically examine the evolution of international theory. While the micro end of the theoretical spectrum constitutes a vast body of literature which deals with issues of international conflict, specific and specialized approaches cannot be considered theories. Thus, to reconsider the comparison of Carr and Allison in the context of this paper, Carr's contribution will be considered a theory (macro), and Allison will be considered part of a taxonomy (micro). This division has been made for reasons of clarity. More importantly however, the critical discourse in metatheoretical terms must address broad theoretical constructions as the basic assumptions of a given paradigm (or perspective) will inevitably affect the theoretical taxonomies which follow. While some might consider specific taxonomies theory, this paper does not. It is the assumptions behind the theory (or macro) which must be examined in order to effectively understand the potential flaws in the theoretical understandings of violence within the international system.

The aforementioned macro/micro question is dealt with here by locating generally defined taxonomies within the broader context of the implicit theoretical assumptions they are making. Therefore, the critical deconstruction of state-centricity is necessarily a metatheoretical exercise. A historical developmental argument must be put forward in an attempt to successfully understand how theoretical perspectives developed, and where their basic assumptions and problematiques came from. However, even a historical developmental approach is subject to certain limitations.

The theoretical development approach is limited by several factors, the first being the limited nature of literature that deals with the history of international relations theory. Many Western scholars have chosen the establishment of professional studies of international relations as the starting point of the discipline. This delineation, however, may not be valid particularly when we consider that theoretical debates about international relations predated the development of a professional discipline. Moreover, historical and theoretical evidence which predates the development of the discipline is often used in support of theoretical arguments. This becomes particularly problematic due to the fact that all contemporary scholars have some theoretical disposition with regards to the way they see the development of the discipline, as well as the present state

of the field. As well, the scholars who created the professional discipline of international relations were themselves trained in the related studies of political philosophy, diplomatic history, and international law. These related fields of study had basic assumptions of their own with regards to conceptualizing global politics. Moreover, all of these disciplines focused upon the study of international relations at the level of the nation-state. In order to fully understand international relations theory, we should also know a good deal about those traditions from which it evolved.

As was just stated, the historical developmental approach is limited by the contemporary bias of those who describe the development of international relations theory.⁵ Because little has been written on the history of international relations specifically, most treatments of the subject are done by contemporary scholars who, either explicitly or

⁵. Note: The limitations and assumptions behind a historical developmental approach towards understanding the current state of the discipline should not be confused with criticisms of the selective use of history. While the historical development of international relations theory is the only means by which we can understand the evolution of the field, an attempt will be made to describe all relevant aspects of theory development. This greatly differs from the tendency of positivist social scientists to use international history as a storehouse of data from which they can selectively choose those facts which conform to preselected 'categories' of data. This issue will be discussed in greater detail in chapter two.

implicitly, support a given approach towards the study of the field. Many selectively choose those historical facts which support their perspective as evidence of its validity. Though there is nothing wrong with a well researched and supported argument, it must be considered within the context of the predisposed theoretical preferences of those who are writing about the history of the discipline. In fact, an objective and balanced treatment of the development of the discipline might well be impossible to achieve. However, any treatment of the subject can only be expected to deal with the material which is available, regardless of its limitations. Accepting that all knowledge is socially constructed, and that there can be no effective division between subject and object - fact and value, the development of a critical historical analysis might be considered an exercise in futility. However, in a dialectic mode which follows from Hegel, a critical historical argument must be considered an anti-thesis of the dominant discourse in an unending process towards effectively understanding social truth.

As a result, our own observation of the history of the development of international relations theory is developed with explicit assumptions about the objectives sought. The historical development of the discipline which is offered here is one which explicitly focuses upon the state-centric

nature of international relations theory in its attempts to address questions of war and peace. The ability of state-centric approaches to fully understand international conflict is challenged. Rather, it is suggested that the state-centric approach is nothing more than a poorly conceived theoretical convenience which has resulted from the way in which the discipline evolved, as well as the contextual influences (both policy and historical) of perceived international environment largely, but not exclusively, from within the United States.

Another fundamental problem in dealing with this mis-match between theory and the social reality it seeks to understand arises at the empirical level. This problem is of course directly related to the theoretical assumptions made which affect the nature of the empirical work being done on conflict. The empirical research that exists is almost exclusively state based. While it does tell us something about international conflicts, there is also a great deal which it does not tell us. Almost all data that deals with the social basis of conflict (i.e. ethnic factions, civilian deaths, governments in exile, splits within militaries, elite interests of identifiable 'social groups' within state structures etc.) is aggregated to the state level and therefore very difficult to disseminate in a social model.

The problem faced by an attempt to examine the non-state aspects of international conflict is not that the categories for data are not broad enough, but rather that the basic assumptions (state-centric) do not allow for new categories which might include data which will better examine the social, rather than state, basis of international conflict. Given the immense limitations of the existing state-centric understandings of the international system, we must search for the 'best means' to provide an effective critical anti-thesis. In terms of the use of case studies to fully develop a theoretical construction, there are three alternatives which would allow an empirical analysis a better 'window' on the non-state aspects of international conflicts.

THE LIMITATIONS OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

The first possible means by which the limitations of the state-based approach can be examined, is an overview of the empirical data it provides. While this method does not necessarily contribute to the understanding of specific conflicts, it does provide an analysis with an empirical display of the limitations that the theoretical mis-match creates in fully understanding the social basis of international conflict. It also provides a basis from which we can understand some of the implications of the dominance

of a positivist methodology when looking at international conflict. A critique of the existing empirical data allows us to examine the problems of a state-centric approach which has not adequately theorized the state. The limitations of the empirical data should direct our attention towards the dangers of aggregating all conflict to the state level. Not only would it reinforce the argument that there exists a theoretical mis-match between theory and conflict, it might suggest a 'better' basis upon which our theories can be built. However, an empirical overview necessarily reflects the implicit assumptions of the dominate forms of theorization which exist in the study of international conflict. As such, nearly all are a reflection of, or a result of, state-based realistic visions of global politics (see, for example, Singer and Small 1981, Sivard, 1988). In the development of a theoretical alternative to the state-based approach, an empirical overview of existing data would be seriously limited by such implicit assumptions.

The second empirical option is the single case-study. In fact, it was a plurality of case studies throughout the 1960s and 1970s (particularly the Vietnam Conflict) that caused many to question the overall utility of state-based theories in International Relations. Like a multiple case comparative approach, the single case-study option allows for greater depth which can allow for the effective analysis

of those factors that might otherwise be ignored, or aggregated to the state level. The single case study also provides a better framework to examine the internal or domestic factors (especially those which affect change in the international system). However, the case-study method is limited by its inability to make broad observations about the limitations of macro theory in dealing with international conflict as a whole. While the case study can tell us a great deal about specific conflicts, this essay deals with the much broader question of the limitations of state-centric theories in understanding the social basis of international conflict.

The last approach examined here is the comparative case-study of conflicts. The comparative case-study method gives the analysis the scope required to adequately examine the multitude of non-state components which affect conflicts. Within predefined state boundaries, a comparative analysis could highlight the vast differences between entire classes of conflict. For example, a comparison of a conflict which greatly influenced the development of realist theory (WWI) could be made with a conflict whose ethnic and regional aspects cannot be ignored (the Lebanese Civil War). Though the realist might not consider the Lebanese Civil War an international conflict, we have already seen that the realist division between domestic and international conflict

is inadequate. Such an approach could allow the analyst to display the limitations of one theoretical tradition in explaining a totally different type and class of conflict.

The comparative case study method also provides a partial ability to adequately address the crucial notions of change, establishment of state actors, concepts of nationalism, ethnicity, religiosity, and class that might not be aggregated to the state level by the classical realist approach. However, the comparative approach also has severe limitations. With regards to this discussion, the greatest limitation of the comparative approach is the highly selective (and therefore limited) nature that this type analysis could provide towards a discussion of the overall state of theories of conflict. The number of international conflicts since 1945 alone is staggering. (see appendix II) In order to effectively display the aforementioned theoretical mis-match, the number of comparative studies that is required for our purposes would be immense. Regardless, such an approach does allow for a partial elaboration of a socio-centric conceptualization of structural violence. In terms of the aforementioned empirical alternatives, the comparative case-study framework is the most consistent with an explicitly dialectical approach towards theorization.

A NEW THEORETICAL DIRECTION

Though the above discussion does not exhaust the full spectrum of possible empirical approaches which could further an understanding of international conflict, it seems to suggest an overall problem with the use of empirical data in this subject area altogether. Moreover, as has been stated, existing data which might be considered relevant is merely the product of the epistemological assumptions as well as the methodological tools of those who 'created' the data in the first place.

The theoretical propositions which are suggested later are based upon the assumption that the collective use of violence by 'social groups' is a holistic social phenomena which is not the exclusive domain of state units. As such, the arbitrary division of conflicts into distinct categories is nothing more than a theoretical impediment towards a basis for the effective understanding of collective social violence. State-centricity (as opposed to the state unit specifically) is considered a theoretical hegemonic device which perpetuates the dominance of realist and neo-realist understandings of international conflict. Therefore, the need to theoretically desegregate the state and its relationship to social groups is a crucial component of a socio-centric framework.

While the understanding of the development of international relations theory (and the assumptions behind it) is extremely important, it does not address the crucial question of how we can better theorize conflict in the literature.⁶ The latter sections of this thesis develops an approach which, it is argued, can better understand the social basis of conflict in the international system. Because the work in this area is extremely limited, this paper makes a contribution by suggesting a theoretical framework from which a coherent taxonomy of theory can develop. Rather than state-based theories, there is a need to develop an 'socio-centric' theoretical approach that will successfully understand the entirety of conflict - something which the state-centric approach cannot do. Though the development of a 'socio-centric' theoretical taxonomy is by no means a comprehensive solution to the aforementioned theoretical mis-match, it is at least a first step in addressing the problem.

⁶ Note: The critiques of the empirical datums that results from the state-centricity of theory will be provided in chapter three. While the analysis will be empirical, it will be explicitly anti-positivist. The anti-positivist nature of the arguments will be based upon the implicit epistemological assumptions that positivist social sciences stress. The dangers of such an approach are highlighted by what will be considered the theoretical flaws of state-centric theory (largely dealing with an inability to theorize the state).

The need to develop a conceptual framework for a socio-centric theoretical taxonomy in conflict theory will, of course, imply preferences of its own. These preferences evolve out of the basic theoretical assumptions made in these chapters leading up to such an argument. Moreover, such an argument is based upon a hypothesis that state-actors do not adequately represent all of the social groups within their constituency. In fact, it is suggested here that this fact alone is often the basis of conflict within and amongst the international state-system. One must accept such a hypothesis in order to understand the need for the development of a socio-centric theoretical taxonomy.

The inability of state-actors to adequately represent the interests of the social constituents within states must be addressed within the context of theories of conflict. Because most theories of international conflict deal with the state unit as 'given', it is imperative that a successful critical analysis present a possible explanation of why this has occurred, and suggest a means by which it might be understood. Again, a historical developmental argument is the best means by which we can understand the way the state has been conceptualized (as opposed to fully theorized) in international relations theory. Because this research deals primarily with conflict, and the need to develop a socio-centric theoretical taxonomy, a social basis

of state evolution will be utilized. Though the theoretical roots of this type of notion of state development come from the work of Richard Ashley, John Burton, J. Galtung, Charles Tilly, as well as Chourcri & North, the overall argument is taken much further to include an explanation of the theoretical mis-match that exists within the context of a modern twentieth century international state-system.⁷

It is the state-system itself which defines the development of state-actors in the modern context, and that the structures of this state-system create and maintain these states based upon the needs of the system rather than the social needs of those social and ethnic cleavages within states. Therefore, the notion of theoretical agency must be an inherent part of the process to develop theoretical alternatives. Social groups, rather than states, are the proposed theoretical unit upon which we can better understand conflicts both within and amongst state agents. Such a theoretical notion of modern state development allows for an explanation for the theoretical mis-match which

⁷ Note: While the basic theoretical arguments for the development of states as the result of social group expansion will be drawn from the works of Choucri & North as well as Richard Ashley, an attempt will be made to 'tailor' these arguments into the context of this research. (See, Choucri & North: 1968, 1972, 1975, 1983 and Ashley: 1979) The end result will be a theory of state development vastly different from what lateral pressure would suggest. (See chapter four)

cannot understand the social and ethnic basis of many international conflicts. The preference for a structural theoretical analysis is based upon several basic assumptions.

BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

The first of these basic assumptions has to do with the persistent nature of social conflict throughout international history. Most accounts of international social history suggest that conflict has been a part of social collectives since their inception.⁸ Certainly the history of the international state-system has been one of near constant conflict both within and amongst states.

⁸ The term 'social' in this context must be fully understood. In Lateral Pressure Theory, Choucri, North and Ashley discuss the early development of states as social collectives emerging out of outwardly expanding societies who, at some point, come into contact with other social groups also expanding outwardly. The result is social group competition for resources. Lateral Pressure Theory suggests that these groups share a common language, culture, history, territory, and government. In the context of this research, social groups are those who share a similar language, culture, religion, sense of a common history, economic class, or ethnic identity. Not all of these distinguishing characteristics need be present at the same time for a group of people's to be considered a social group. However, they must be able to identify themselves as a socially distinguishable group. In this context, these groups do not require the characteristics of a state to be considered a social group. (i.e. population, territory, government etc.)

Furthermore, the persistence of given conflicts over long periods of time (often referred to as protracted social conflicts) suggests that state actors can only manage conflicts, rather than successfully resolve them. If, in fact, conflict in the international state-system is a result of the inability of the 'system' to successfully accommodate the needs of social groups within states, then it can be safely assumed that the problem is social-structural.

Secondly, the persistence of protracted social conflicts suggests that there are some social mechanisms which perpetuate conflicts regardless of adjustments (or imposed solutions) by the larger international order (or dis-order). The inability of the international state-system to successfully resolve conflicts suggests that the overall system is inherently unable to deal with the social basis of many types of conflict. Such an inability is clearly a structural problem. It is structural primarily due to the fact that it is the rigidity of the existing system structure which leads to the inability of the international state-system to successfully accommodate the needs of all social groups. The result is structural violence. Moreover, conflict within states suggests that the basic unit of analysis (the state) throughout most theories of conflict is itself inadequate as an analytical tool in the understanding of the social basis of conflict. It is for these basic

reasons that we must conclude that an alternative theoretical construction is needed.

Though existing structural notions of violence have been utilized to describe the development of nation-states in Europe at the time of the development of the state-system, such a notions are considered inadequate in providing a description of the development and utility of state-actors since that time. Moreover, it is the hegemony of the European state-system which imposed arbitrarily drawn state boundaries upon other 'peoples' or 'societies' as a result of the expansion of the perceived lateral pressure that resulted from the European state-system. (Ashley 1980:36) While many of these arbitrarily created states still function within the modern international state-system, most do not have the 'national' qualities that many assume provide states with social legitimacy (whatever meaning is given to the term). Moreover, social group relations often pre-existed the establishment of state units and continue to persist regardless of imposed solutions by state structures. These facts alone are often the source of conflicts within and amongst the international state-system. Over time, much of this tension has become institutionalized into many state structures (bureaucracies, military leadership, economic class structure etc.) resulting in the aforementioned structural components of conflict.

Lastly, the development of a socio-structural theory of violence must be utilized when looking at conflicts in order for its merits to be fully displayed. As has already been discussed, the comparative case study does suffer from some limitations in terms of its ability to fully explain all aspects of all international conflicts. However, such an approach must be considered at least partially effective in the development of a new theoretical approach. As such, two cases are brought into the discussion after the conceptual framework has been set out.

CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

All of the above arguments have been raised at this point in the discussion in order to illustrate the crucial need to seriously examine several fundamental questions inherent in theories of international conflict. First, it is crucial to delineate those theoretical approaches which can effectively assist in the understanding of international conflict. As we have seen, there are two levels of approaches in this regard: macro theory which attempts to understand all aspects of international relations by focusing upon the central problematique of questions of war and peace; and specific micro theoretical taxonomies which attempt to understand those issues which the analyst considers to be

central to an overall understanding of international conflict.

An argument has also been put forward that suggests a need to understand the development of theories of international relations in order to effectively understand the current state of the field. Such an approach would allow us to examine the basic assumptions which found their way into the professional study of international relations from existing disciplines. The historical developmental approach would also allow us to understand the hegemony of the state as the principal unit of analysis in the study of international relations generally, and conflict theory specifically. The hegemony of state-based theories provides this research with one of its central foci. It has been argued that the state is an inadequate unit of analysis in the understanding of the social basis of all conflicts. It is this inadequacy which results in the aforementioned theoretical mis-match between conflict theory, and the basis of conflict which it seeks to understand. Moreover, there are serious limitations in the study of international relations by virtue of its being primarily state-centric, and yet unable to adequately theorize the state.

The centrality of state agency in understanding violence within global society presents serious problems in an

effective empirical observation of collective social violence. The state, as an ontologically primitive unit, becomes one of the basic assumptions throughout theoretical understandings of violence within global society. As such, all data becomes perceptually defined in terms of its relationship to the state unit. In other words, all conflicts between states are international - and all conflicts within states are domestic. This paper does not accept such a division. Moreover, it is argued that state-centric understandings of global politics do not effectively conceptualize the 'state'. By the use of social group agency, the totality of state structures and their relationship to 'peoples' as identifiable groups is discussed.

CHAPTER THREE

"The history of the 'state' in International Theory"

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

Although individuals are the ultimate depository of insecurity, they do not, because of their limited powers, provide its most potent expression. That role falls to a great variety of organizations whose principal purpose is to aggregate individual insecurities up to a level at which sufficient resources become available to take remedial action.... The modern state is the highest form of such organization so far achieved. Because of the extent and totality of its command over the individuals within it, and also because of its primacy in the control of force, the state serves as the basis of a distinguishable system of relations on a global scale. (Buzan, 1984: 111-112)

These explicit assumptions made by Barry Buzan in 1984 are typical of the way much of the literature in the study of international relations has conceptualized the international state-system in its quest to understand issues of war and peace. Ontological primacy has been given to the state actor in the construction of most theoretical approaches directed towards a better understanding of violence within the global system. The state is assumed to be the only legitimate actor with the resources required to command control over the individuals within, and the capability to utilize its collective resources in its interactions with other states in the international system. As Buzan contends, the state is the basis upon which a global system of relations can be distinguished.

The objective of this chapter is to challenge the state-

centric approach towards understanding conflict within global society. It argues that collective human conflict is a social phenomenon which does not necessarily involve states as the principal actors in these conflicts. While states are clearly crucial actors, their very existence as well as their actions are the result of complex social phenomena - both within and amongst them. In fact, the emphasis upon understanding 'international conflict' through a state-centric framework distorts our understanding of the social basis of these conflicts. The insistence by scholars of international conflict that collective human violence be divided into categories of 'domestic' and 'international' (with the state unit as the dividing line between the two) is nothing more than a poorly conceived theoretical convenience which leaves many types of analysis scrambling to fully understand those social (as opposed to state) factors which are most often the basis of collective human violence. In short, the state-centric approach is struggling to escape the self-imposed definitional straightjacket which is reflected in its basic assumptions.⁹ Moreover, its

⁹ Note: For the purposes of this research, the terms 'state-centric' and 'realist' should not be considered synonymous. The term realism (political realism, classical realism, etc.) refers specifically to the state-centric theoretical approaches in international relations best exemplified by the works of Hans Morgenthau. State-centrism is but one of several core assumptions which identify political realism. State-centric refers to all theoretical traditions who utilize the state unit as the ontologically primitive unit in their theoretical construction. State-centric approaches would include

ability to fully grasp social phenomena within and amongst states is itself somewhat questionable.

As an alternative to the state-centric approach, a multiple social systems approach will be suggested. This type of theoretical analysis will not ignore the international state-system altogether. It is suggested that within the existing international state-system, a variety of social cleavages exist, which both affect the actions of states, and are affected by the actions of states themselves. Moreover, these social cleavages often interact with each other. While some states in the international state-system might be more 'socially representative' than others (i.e. nation-states), others are merely geographic political units who possess political sovereignty and yet are subject to extremely complex social relations within (i.e. multinational states). Furthermore, the complex and fluid social relations within and amongst states is the most important factor in an adequate understanding of collective human conflict.

political realism as well as neo-realism, long-cycle state approaches, state-structural approaches etc.

THE 'STATE' IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS RESEARCH

As much of the focus of this paper is based upon a critique of the state-centric nature of theoretical treatments of conflict within global society, it is inherently crucial to first determine what is meant here by the term 'state'. This is particularly problematic as theoretical traditions within the study of international relations have contending (and often incommensurable) notions of the state.

Perhaps the most common notion of the term state is the concept that is otherwise known simply as a country. In this sense a state possess population, territory, and government. A central aspect of this definition of the term state is the notion of political sovereignty. A legalistic term, sovereignty refers to the belief that only states can determine the social rules of conduct and political organizations within their respective sovereign boundaries. In this sense, only states possess political sovereignty - though various forms of internal political organization may choose to divide sovereignty into smaller political units within.

Beyond the basic definition of 'state', is the concept of the nation-state. The nation-state has both the characteristics of a state in legal terms, as well as the

notion of nationality. As such, the nation-state possess population, territory and government. However, the basic nation-state assumptions include a notion that the constituents within states have a relatively homogeneous 'national identity'. If this is not the case, many scholars contend that states often embark upon a process of national assimilation in an attempt to forge a national identity. The genesis of this concept of state can be found in the history of Europe at a time when powerful European states emerged and began a process of 'nation building'. The most powerful of these states (England and France) exported this now dominant concept in their world-wide colonial conquests. The basic results of this process will be discussed later in this chapter.¹⁰

The basic critiques levied against the state-centric nature of theory in understanding conflict here, are based upon the above notions of the term 'state'. Classical realist assumptions regarding the unitary actor in their theoretical constructions do not acknowledge the significance of ethnic and/or national fragmentation within states. As such, they can be said to have an implicit nation-state flavour to their use of the term 'state'. However, there is a more

¹⁰ See pages 84-86 for a discussion of the basic implications of the export of a European notion of nation-state.

complex and deeply implicit assumption in classical and neorealist theories that must be addressed. State-centric conceptualizations of global society are unable to theoretically divorce the concepts of 'state' and 'society'. First, by assuming that states are unitary actors in the international system, they are implying that 'society' is composed of all social relations within the geographic boundaries of state-units. As such, state-centric approaches will acknowledge a dynamic series of social relations (or divisions) within. However, theoretical primacy is given to the state in the international context.

These theoretical constructions contend that states are created by, and their behaviour is affected by, principally the international environment. The result is that realist scholars such as Morgenthau, Carr, and Aron discuss the importance of 'domestic' factors, but never make any attempt to fully theorize the principal agent of their understanding of global politics. They contend, that while social relations within states might be significant, they are not sufficient enough to consistently impact upon the actions of states at the international level. For realist and neorealist scholars alike, states are complex and dynamic, though in theoretical terms they are a 'given'. As such, state-centric approaches have great difficulty conceptualizing social groups, or social relations, which

transcend political sovereign boundaries.

The notion of state implied here will therefore be multidimensional. First, it is accepted that states do possess population, territory, government, and political sovereignty. However, at the level of nationality, it is not assumed that states in the international system are homogeneous. At one level, this thesis will address these limitations. However, the argument put forward in the latter sections of this thesis will be in favour of theoretically divorcing the concepts of 'state' and 'society' - in both the domestic and international context. Social groupings are both independent of, and conditioned by, the state. While many social groups (particularly those who use collective violence as a means towards political ends) exist within states, many transcend sovereign boundaries. At the same time, states themselves possess the collective interests and institutions which, by themselves, could be considered social groups. State elites, bureaucracies, militaries, policies etc., are all part of a complex dialectical relationship with the agents of other states, social groups and institutions. Moreover, social groups themselves are conditioned by inconsistent and often contending social and state environments.

INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND THE DISCIPLINE

The common consensus amongst 'western' scholars of international relations (American, British, Canadian etc.) is that the shock of the Great War (WWI) spawned the creation of a professional discipline for the study of international politics. As such, this newly formed discipline emerged with a common central problematique - namely to better understand questions of war and peace.¹¹ It should be noted early on that the new discipline was therefore responsive, or even reactive, to international events from its inception. Moreover, early scholars of international relations often came from the closely related

¹¹. For the purposes of this paper, there is a clear distinction between the terms 'international conflict' and 'social conflict'. International conflict refers solely to those inter-state conflicts which have been the focus of political realism and other state-centric approaches of international relations. Social conflict refers to all conflicts - both international and domestic. In this sense, social conflict is a much broader term. However, it is deemed necessary as many 'domestic' conflicts have been of a magnitude of enormous proportions and have had a great impact upon the relations and actions of states in the international community.

fields of international law and diplomatic history.¹²

While there is little doubt that a new professional discipline of international relations emerged following World War One, several important observations should be elaborated upon which have had a lasting impact upon the way the discipline understood violence within global society. First is the fact that the overall study of international relations developed in a quest to better understand questions of war and peace. As such, most of the broader theoretical debates (particularly in the earlier phases of the discipline) reflected this objective. For example, the Realist/Idealist debate of the 1920s and 1930s was simply an argument about the means by which states could control inter-state conflict within the global community of nation-states. The idealists (liberal internationalists) felt that state actors could control their aggressive actions towards each other by entering into a 'supranational' body (the League of Nations) which would somehow be able to collectively control the actions of individual members

¹² Most scholars agree that the professional discipline of international relations emerged immediately following WWI. Passing references have been made to this point in the following: Axelrod 1984, Banks 1984, Banks 1985, Beal & Misra 1980, Berki 1971, Brown 1987, Bull 1977, Buzan 1984, Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1981, Gilpin 1984, Holsti 1984, Holsti 1985, Jervis 1985, Keohane 1983, Light & Groom 1985, Little 1985, Mansback & Vasquez 1981, Mickindlay & Little 1986, Nye 1988, Smith 1985, Smith 1986, Vasquez 1979, and Wightman 1984.

through the notion of divided sovereignty. The realists on the other hand, felt that international anarchy was hierarchically arranged by a set of power relationships at the state level. Alliances and diplomatic moves by state managers would be able to keep the system stable - and therefore it was assumed, relatively free of violence. Without redrawing this entire argument, it must be noted that both the realist and idealist schools were principally concerned about conflict at the state level. On two crucial points they agreed. First, both agreed that the overall study of international relations was centrally concerned about understanding violence in global politics. Secondly, they also agreed that the state unit was the principal unit of analysis - presumably due to the memories of the horrific violence inflicted upon Europe by nation-states during the Great War. Idealists were however, confident in the use of collective security through international organizations (or a world government), though membership to these bodies was always by states.

Other crucial factors can be cited with regard to the state-centricity of early theories of international politics. The professional study of international relations evolved out of the closely related fields of international law, diplomatic and military history, and to a lesser degree political philosophy. As Steve Smith contends, the intellectual tools

which applied to these related disciplines were borrowed by students of international relations.

Yet there was another implication of the way international relations was studied: this was that the subject could be discussed using the same kinds of intellectual tools as applied to politics with the state, hence the close connections with law, history, and philosophy. (Smith, 1986:3)

This borrowing has had a lasting impact with regard to the way the discipline examines issues of conflict. While there may be a variety of reasons behind the continued state-centricity of approaches towards understanding conflict, one of the central reasons clearly revolves around the fact that the most aggressive critiques of political realism (and its state-centric nature) came out theoretical traditions which are not centrally concerned about conflict. (Nye, 1988:247) In other words, state-centricity seems to have become 'linked' to the central problematique of a quest to better understand global violence.

Though it is not the purpose of this essay to challenge the basic theoretical assumptions of international law and diplomatic history, we should be aware that early scholars of international relations 'assumed' the state actor to be the principal unit in their understanding of global politics. On the one hand, the reasons for this are fairly obvious. Based upon the horrendous memories of the First World War, (a conflict which was for the most part conducted

by the military might of European states), scholars felt confident that they could assume that states were the most important actors in understanding questions of war and peace. Moreover, the collapse of the League of Nations and the re-emergence of state nationalism culminating in the events of the Second World War seemed to validate state-based power assumptions.

In terms of the international contextual environment in which it emerged, the study of international relations was 'ripe' for the development of classical realist theories prior to World War Two. Clearly, political realism reflected (or was the embodiment of) the basic assumptions and central purpose of the discipline at the time. The intellectual tools of political realism can be directly traced to the those aforementioned related fields of study from which international relations evolved. Well before Morgenthau wrote his epic Politics Among Nations, scholars such as E.H. Carr and D.P. Heatly (not surprisingly historians) were providing theoretical explanations of international society which were considered cornerstone contributions in understanding global politics. Though many theoretical approaches now recognize the importance of non-state actors and transnational phenomena, for the above reasons the state-centric approach has managed to maintain its dominance throughout the discipline with regards to looking at issues

of conflict. (Meta)-theoretical discussions regarding the overall direction of the discipline or the epistemological preferences of various approaches were sparse in the earliest stages of the study of international relations.¹³

THE LIMITATIONS OF STATE-CENTRICITY

William Olson and Nicholas Onuf (1985) searched for a set of distinguishing characteristics that might prove useful in the successful definition of a separate discipline of international relations. (Olson & Onuf:1985:4) In their five overlapping phases of the development of theory in international relations, they suggest that the 1950s was a period of 'sanitized' realism.¹⁴

¹³ Based upon an overall examination of journals and texts in this area which seems to indicate that serious attempts to examine the epistemological traditions within theories of international relations did not come about until scholars began to question behavioural science and positivist methodologies in the 1960s and 1970s. Though some may have been sceptical all along, serious discourse in terms of (meta)-theory and epistemology did not become prominent in IR until this time.

¹⁴ By the use of the term 'sanitized' realism I assume that Olson and Onuf are suggesting the overwhelming dominance of realist theories at the time. Many agree that such clear theoretical dominance was not seriously challenged in mainstream theory until the late 1960s and 1970s when international events brought into light many of the theoretical limitations of political realism. (Nye, 1988:237)

Classic realist theory relied heavily upon the historical evidence of the European state-system of the 19th century. Again, by the 1950s, the experiences of the two World Wars as well as the Cold War seemed to reinforce the state-centric and anarchic power relations assumptions of this theoretical tradition. The perception of the Cold War seemed to validate the credibility of realist theory within the hegemon (The United States) throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s. Meanwhile, an ever more complex international political economy began to display many of the basic flaws of classic realist assumptions, as well as revealing its undisguised simplicity. By this time, the basic theoretical assumptions of classic realist theory had become firmly entrenched as the dominate theoretical approach by which IR scholars understood global politics. Moreover, many western IR scholars had claimed a realist monopoly on the history of international relations pointing out realist assumptions whenever they could be found. (For an modern example of a realist vision of the history of international relations, see: Holsti, K. 1985, The Dividing Discipline.)

Olson and Onuf argue that the mid to late 1950s marked a mergence of realist assumptions with a 'value neutral' positivist behavioural approach towards social sciences research.

The basic assumptions of realism - the autonomy of state actors, maximizing behaviour in the name of

national interest, necessary competition for scarce values, concern for stability in a conflict-prone system - were not only unchallenged at this time [mid to late 1950s], they were hidden from view amid claims that International Relations could have the value neutrality appropriate to the positivist frame then and (to a somewhat lesser degree) still prevalent in the social sciences. Value neutrality could obtain, that is, if the underlying concepts of International Relations could be rendered in a purely abstract form, if these abstractions were assembled into generalizations possessing the explanatory and predictive characteristics of powerful theories in natural science, and if suitable tests employing quantitative methods could be derived from the logical entailments of posited theoretical relationships. (Olson & Onuf, 1985:7)

The combination of a positivist methodology and realist assumptions proved to have an overpowering impact upon the way much of the literature in IR attempted to understand global politics. However, the 'positivist wave' was not exclusively the domain of International Relations. It was, and continues to be, a 'trend' of all of the social sciences (Economics, Political Science, Sociology, Psychology, etc.). Moreover, positivist methodology and epistemology exercised its greatest influence in the United States. (Olson and Onuf, 1985:7) Research in International Relations was merely swept up in a broader wave that occurred throughout the social sciences. While there was a trend towards positivism throughout the social sciences, it was particularly prominent in the study of international relations. Perhaps this was due to the fact that international relations had much less of an intellectual history than other disciplines

and it was therefore much less able to defend itself against the behavioural revolution. This occurred at a time of what Olson and Onuf refer to as 'sanitized realism'. However, the result of this positivist trend was what seemed to be the inseparable link between a positivist epistemology, the theoretical assumptions of political realism as well as a quest to understand global issues of war and peace.

Though positivist social science achieved some success in validating some realist assumptions, it was also successful at displaying many of its weaknesses. Challenges to the sanitized assumptions of the classical approach brought about the first serious theoretical attempts to challenge the centrality of the state-actor in international relations research. Transnationalism emerged as a credible alternative, though a coherent taxonomy of transnational and interdependence theoretical approaches failed to develop. Meanwhile, international contextual events (the Vietnam War, non-state use of violence, OPEC, etc.) seemed to reinforced the validity of liberal pluralist approaches towards international relations through the 1970's. (Nye, 1988:237)

Though many of the basic assumptions of realism were being challenged in the 1970s, the link between a central problematic of understanding war and peace and the use of state-centric theoretical approaches seemed to solidify. If

the realists were not going to maintain their hegemony in terms of the overall study of international relations, they were certainly intent in doing so in so far as it came to understanding international conflict. While pluralist and transnational theoretical developments seemed more appropriate in filling out the simplicity of political realism (particularly in non-conflict related issues), realism maintained its dominance in terms of a war and peace problematique. There were several theoretical developments in non-state explanations of international conflict (i.e. Galtung, Burton, Ashley etc.). However, these were for the most part ignored by realists and passed off as marginal or insignificant.

Perhaps the most serious of the challenges towards mainstream IR theory came out of an incommensurability of the epistemological underpinnings of positivist and dialectical approaches towards the social sciences in general - and International Relations theory specifically. Some positivists (i.e. Deutsch, early Keohane etc.) saw new methodologies as a means to escape from basic state-centric assumptions by using these new tools to focus upon social, rather than state, trends in international relations. However, for the most part, realist assumptions had merged with positivist methodology during the aforementioned positivist 'trend' in the social sciences. While some

positivists questioned the utility of realist assumptions empirically, others questioned the use of positivist methodology altogether. A marxist dialectical epistemology provided at least one alternative to positivistic realist theory. Marxist theoretical approaches seemed appropriate in the understanding of the growing inequality between developed and underdeveloped states, regions, and classes. Dependency theory, world systems approaches, and more traditional marxist approaches within industrialized states brought into IR theory a powerful refutation of positivist epistemology. While positivist social sciences stress complex methodology, (and use complex methodological tools to observe social reality), its philosophy attempts to gain predictive and explanatory knowledge of the world by the observation of variables constant through time, space, subject and object. The laws which they produce often ignore the complex interdependence of variables as well as the crucial notion of change paramount towards an understanding of a dialectical vision of social reality. In short, their epistemological precepts are totally incommensurable. (Heilbroner, 1980:49)

These comments regarding the epistemological incommensurability of positivism and dialectics is crucial in the development of theoretical approaches towards conflict. Dialectical approaches towards the study of war

and peace have developed, challenging realist assumptions while maintaining a similar central problematique. By the mid 1960s, the Peace Research movement introduced structural theories in an attempt to gain insights towards social conflict. Galtung's "A structural theory of Aggression" was the first in a series of structural approaches which maintained that the structural components within and amongst states were the single most important aspects driving violence in the international (or societal) system. (Galtung, 1964) Many of these approaches, (Richard Ashley's The Political Economy of War and Peace being an example), accepted a dialectical epistemology and succeeded in displaying several of the weaknesses of positivist social science while retaining a similar problematique. (Ashley, 1980)

However, the dialectical epistemology maintained an 'uneasy' relationship with positivist methodology as it was often the empirical findings of positivist approaches which pointed towards the weaknesses of classical realist theory in the first place. (For an overview of this uneasy relationship see: Heilbroner, R. (1980), "The Dialectical Approach to Philosophy", in Marxism: For and Against, pp.29-58) Moreover, many dialectical structural theorists, (Ashley being one), could not successfully escape a dependence upon positivist methodology in order to 'prove' the validity of

their theoretical hypothesis. It seems that many were sceptical about the validity of positivism, though not willing to abandon its methodology altogether. Far more importantly, however, positivist realist theory ignored many of the valid criticisms which structurally based understandings of international conflict levied towards them. Realists considered non-state approaches to be 'marginal' and insignificant as they could not concede that actors other than states were essential in understanding conflict within global society. (Holsti, 1985:13)

The theoretical response to the aforementioned challenges to the dominant approach in IR, Realism, was the development of what is now called neorealism (variously labelled neo-realism, structural-realism, or scientific-realism in the literature). Olson and Onuf see this development as the fifth phase in their overview of the development of the discipline. (Olson & Onuf, 1985:11) Because neorealism attempted to merge basic realist assumptions with larger state-based structural theories, it has highlighted a significant problem that is not unique to neorealism. Unlike other branches of political science, (specifically political theory and comparative politics), the study of international relations has never successfully attempted to establish an accepted theory of the state. This is particularly problematic as most theories of international relations and

international conflict are state-centric.

STATE-CENTRICITY AND THE NOTION OF THE STATE

Though realist and neorealist theory does have a 'notion' of the concept of state, many have argued that international relations theory has inadequately theorized the state. The agent structure debate deals with this theoretical inadequacy. Robert Keohane, Richard Ashley, Kenneth Waltz, Alexander Wendt, and David Dessler have become involved in this ongoing debate which deals with the theoretical significance of a 'fully theorized' state in political realism. Waltz (1979) attempted to combine the principal concerns of political realism (namely an anarchic world order organized by a set of power relationships at the state level) with a 'structural' mode of analysis at the state level.

We must search for the factors behind the re-emergence of the state-as-actor model. Joseph Nye suggests that the classic realist tradition was being seriously challenged by international events in the early 1970s. (Nye, 1988:236) He suggests that there was widespread repugnance to the Vietnam War, detente was perceived to reduce the importance of nuclear competition, international trade grew more rapidly

than world product, transnational corporations seemed to be developing patterns of international production, the 'Oil Crisis' gave the perception that 'weak states' could in fact be strong, and the U.S. decline in economic predominance, caused many to question the state-as-actor model. While several of these assertions are questionable (some having argued that these phenomena had been in existence all along, or at least for some time), there was clearly a response to these contextual perceptions within mainstream international relations theory - particularly in the United States. Nye argues that many analysts overstated the obsolescence of the nation-state, the decline of force, and the reduced significance of security concerns in the 1970s. (Nye, 1988:237)

Richard Little describes the re-emergence of the state-as-actor model in terms of an ongoing battle in theoretical traditions of international relations theory. Little contends that the realist forces withdrew in retreat in the 1970s, only to regroup and mount a counter-attack under the flag of neo-realism. (Little, 1985:74) Of course, neorealism, or scientific realism, had altered from the classical tradition namely by its attempt to incorporate a structural mode of analysis at the 'macro' level as Richard Ashley has pointed out. However, the basic explanatory goals of neorealism are shared with those of political realism.

(Dessler, 1989:442) Kenneth Waltz's Theory of International Politics has generally been regarded as the turning point in the re-emergence of the state-as-actor model. (Waltz, 1979) This may or may not be true - however, it clearly served as a theoretical basis for a wide range of international relations literature that proliferated in the 1980s, largely, but not exclusively, from the United States.

Some of the implications of the state-centric approach should be noted at this point. First, is that all sub and/or trans-state relations are inevitably reduced or imposed to state-level analysis, or ignored as having little impact upon conflict outcomes. Within or amongst states, notions of nationalism, ethnic self determination, revolution, economic classes, inter and intra-state trade, economic development, and regional disputes etc., are treated as sub-parts of a state-theory in which states are viewed as unitary power maximizing actors. Political realism and neorealism quite simply assume that states are unitary actors against any theoretical or methodological evidence that might suggest otherwise. As Waltz contends, "[they] are individualist in origin, spontaneously generated, and unintended." (Waltz, 1979:91). However, diaspora national groups, ethnic minorities within states, and multi-state nation-groups are skewed, or ignored, by neorealism's unitary state assumptions. Moreover, social divisions within states (such

as economic classes, elites, state managers, bureaucratic interests, political parties or affiliations etc.) are regarded as sub-parts of an all encompassing state-wide society. As such, the relationship and interaction between 'internal' social divisions are ignored by unitary state assumptions.

At the 'international' level, global collectivist actions are reduced to state-bounded relations:

In other words, global collectivist concepts - concepts of transnational class relations, say, or the interests of human-kind - can be granted an objective status only to the extent that they can be interpreted as aggregations of relations and interests having logically prior roots within state-bounded societies. (Ashley, 1986:270)

The implications of Ashley's comments suggest that the state is regarded as ontologically prior to the international system. It is statist before it is structuralist. Moreover, such a perspective blurs, or eliminates, any insights towards many of the transnational or sub-national phenomena that Nye suggests challenged the classical tradition. In short, neorealism is considered a response to the challenges of classical realism never having successfully responded to most of the valid criticisms launched against the classical tradition.

The structuralism of neorealism presents the agent-structure problem described by Alexander Wendt in 1987. Briefly

Wendt's observations were as follows. Neorealism considers the state agent an ontologically primitive unit. The result is a definition of system structures characterized by ontological reductionism. (Wendt, 1987:342) The basic understanding is that the larger system structures only constrain the agency of preexisting states. The overall result is that neorealist structuralist theory cannot explain the emergence of existing states or generate new agents. In short, neorealist theory can not develop an acceptable notion of change in the system (violent or non violent) or a social theory of the state:

The neorealist conceptualization of system structure is therefore too weak to support a social theory of the state: system structures cannot generate agents if they are defined exclusively in terms of those agents in the first place. (Wendt, 1987:343)

Waltz responds to the suggestion that neorealism requires a social theory of the state by questioning the need for such an explicit theory within the broader context of political realism as the basis of his work. (Waltz, 1986:341) He argues that his theory responds to the existing international system by the observation of state-actors who act 'as if' they maximize power and wealth. However, "as if" theory building is a clear indication that Waltz, (and others), have built their vision of social reality upon untheorized assumptions about the primitive terms of neorealist theory. (Wendt, 1987:343)

The undertheorized assumptions of political realism (specifically the state-actor) presents serious problems for this type of an approach, particularly with regards to protracted social conflicts of a multi-ethnic, intercommunal or social grouping nature. First is the inability to explain the emergence of nation-states themselves. The unitary state-actors are differentiated only by their state sovereignty. For the realist, the sovereignty of the state means that only the state itself will decide how to cope with its internal and external administration. (Morgenthau, 1973:479) While the concept of the sovereign state allows for some degree of legitimization regarding the state as a unit of analysis, it presupposes international society's creation of the state-system within which these autonomous variables interact. Many basic questions remained to be asked. How did these states come to be? By what means can new states be created? Why were they created in the first place; and who, or what, created them? What social factors within states lead towards the legitimization of the collective use of violence by some 'internal' social groups - and not others? Perhaps most importantly, why do states even exist?

While the need to effectively understand conflict at the state level has been considered unquestionably crucial, is it necessarily sufficient in an understanding of all global

violence? The opening quote by Barry Buzan is but one example of just how great an impact the Morgenthau division of conflict categories has had in terms of the way many attempt to understand conflict within global society (realist and neorealist alike). Based upon the discussion of the problems in the division of acts of collective violence into categories of 'domestic' and 'international' in chapter two, we must also consider the impact of the 'assumed rationality' that is inherent in the state centric conceptualization of global politics.

Morgenthau claims that states act rationally when they act in accordance with, or in response to, their international environment. As discussed in chapter two, Morgenthau claims that the United States acted irrationally in the Vietnam conflict by responding to the 'domestic' constituency rather than acting in the best interests of the United States as an international actor. In short, Morgenthau contends that states can only act effectively and rationally if they respond to their international environment (or the perception thereof) rather than acting in response to domestic considerations. As most states in the international system often claim to act in response to the constituents within their sovereign boundaries, we must assume that state actors often act 'irrationally', according to Morgenthau's definition of the term. Moreover, similar domestic linkage

arguments have been used to understand the actions of non-democratic societies as well (an example being Argentina's brief occupation of the Falkland Islands). Are we to assume that no state acts 'rationally' if they are compelled to respond to the desires of their domestic constituents? Is it even possible to assume that states can act rationally in the first place? Furthermore, these flaws in realist theory suggest that there are more complex factors than an anarchic international state-system arranged by power relationships that dictate the actions of states. In fact, it seems appropriate to question the utility of a theoretical construction which gives ontological primacy to the state unit.

The question of rationality in the state-centric model is highly problematic. For realists, the rational behaviour of states in the international context is a theoretically necessary corollary as it is assumed that states preexist the international state system. Waltz confirms that many neorealists accept this assumption. For them, there can be no other way to understand the behaviour of state actors. After all, for realists and neorealists, it is the state itself which defines the national interest. If the national interest were defined by social interests within, the realist would have to acknowledge that states are in fact the results of internal social interests rather than

exclusively defined by the international state system. This is due to the fact that the international state-system is defined by states only - they are an unproblematic unity. Based upon the assumption that states are monolithic unitary actors, realists can legitimize an individualistic notion of rationality. To respond to pluralistic domestic concerns would be an acknowledgement that states are internally pluralistic (a sort of multiple personality). Morgenthau defines the rationality of state behaviour in terms of a 'means/ends' analysis of state action. As such, he contends that when states respond to the international environment they are acting rationally (after all - they are considered defined by it). However, when they respond to domestic considerations they are acting irrationally. If states responded to a variety of internal social constituencies, they could not possibly possess an individualistic notion of rationality. If we consider the fact that most states are multinational based upon ethnic composition alone, one must ask if states can ever be considered rational according to Morgenthau's definition?¹⁵

¹⁵ Based upon the empirical observations of Gunnar Nielsson (1985). Of 161 sovereign state units identified, only 45 could be considered nation-states (those with 95% or greater of their population belonging to a single ethnic-national group). Another 62 had majorities of a single ethnic-national group. The remainder were multinational states with no clear ethnic-national majority. Furthermore, Neilsson identified 589 distinct ethnic groups within global society. In only 13 cases did most members of an ethnic group reside in a single state. 399 of 589 of these were minorities of less than 10% in their state of residence.

CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The above chapter has argued that the discipline of the study of international relations had emerged primarily as a response to the horrors of global conflict. Certainly the instances of global conflict in the first half of the twentieth century consolidated concerns which were already apparent in the studies of history and diplomacy. Though few scholars explicitly questioned the appropriate unit of analysis in the understanding of war, the theoretical tools which became associated with understanding global violence (principally the state actor) caused some to question the ability of scholars to effectively understand all aspects of conflict.

State-centricity was challenged at a variety of levels by the 1970s. However as political realists moved onto the defensive, the links between theories of conflict and the state unit seemed to solidify. Neorealist theory emerged as a response to the challenges of the state centricity of the classical tradition. This chapter displayed many of the theoretical flaws of both the classical realist and neorealist conceptualization of war. A literature review of the state-agent debate was tabled as a means by which the

limitations of neorealist theory could be effectively understood. The question of the assumed rationality of state actors was also described.

From here, a new theoretical framework will be developed. Surely the above arguments display the need to better understand all aspects of global society which contribute towards understanding violence within the international system. It has been displayed that the term 'international conflict' is merely a theoretical cut-off point which only effectively looks at part of the overall process of violence. It will be the objective of the following chapters to develop a social group conceptualization of violence within global society.

CHAPTER FOUR

"A Socio-centric Conceptualization of Structural Violence"

SOCIAL SYSTEMS, STATES & VIOLENCE

Based upon the discussion thus far, the need for a better theoretical understanding of collective human conflict should be clear. Surely the theoretical focus upon a state-centric understanding (both realist and non-realist) presents distortions in a full understanding of all aspects of all conflicts. While few (if any) would doubt that states possess the deadliest instruments of mass destruction we have created, we cannot assume that states alone are the only actors in this process of intimidation and destruction. The focus upon the state is much like looking at the weapons of destruction, rather than the problem itself. Surely there must be a series of social factors in the process of collective human violence. While violence is most often conducted within global society in the name of states, the unitary state-society assumptions implied by political realism tell us nothing about how states deal with social cleavages within and amongst these 'autonomous' actors.¹⁶

¹⁶ The term 'social' in this context must be fully understood. In the context of this paper, social groups are those who share a common language, culture, religion, sense of common history, economic class, or ethnic identity. Not all of these distinguishing characteristics need be present at the same time for a group of peoples to be considered a social group. However, they must be able to identify themselves as a distinguishable group. Their social consciousness does not always lead to political action or ideology. The legitimization of the use of collective acts of violence distinguishes social groups in conflict.

While the proposed theoretical framework for a socio-centric theoretical understanding of collective human violence put forth here will rely heavily upon examples of ethnic-national social groups, this does not imply that ethnic-national social groups are the only ones which this model attempts to understand.

Steve Ryan (1988) set out to understand the lack of attention that international relations scholars have paid to the ethnic basis of conflict. In doing so, he put forward four principal reasons behind the dominance of the state approach. First, Ryan contends, the immediate post-war period was dominated by the ideological battle (or at least the perception of an ideological battle) between liberalism and Soviet style socialism. (Ryan, 1988: 162) Ryan posits that neither of these ideological beliefs showed much concern for the rights of minorities (non-state). The liberal philosophy was wary of minority rights as the concept seemed to contradict a belief in individual equality and rationality. The socialist seemed to regard national identity (state or non-state) as a diversion along the road of the proletarian struggle. (Ryan, 1988: 162)

Ryan's second major factor in the dominance of state-centricity in terms of ethnic conflict deals with an assumption of the social sciences in general which believes

that as states modernize, minority groups would be assimilated into a homogeneous nation-state. Ryan contends that such an assumption has been particularly prevalent in the United States. Such beliefs were especially appealing in the United States, with its 'melting pot' history. These assimilationists held a particularly optimistic view of social development in multi-ethnic states, which rested on a belief that the process of economic development and modernization would lead to the creation of a single national identity out of the existing distinct cultural heritages. (Ryan, 1988: 162) However, such an assimilation process rarely (if ever) occurred regardless of the optimism of some scholars and politicians. The international state-system consists of only a minority of nation-states. Of the 161 sovereign states in the global community in 1985, only 45 could be considered truly nationally homogeneous (see footnote 15, pp.76-77).¹⁷

The third major factor that has lead to the hegemony of state approaches towards conflict results from what Ryan considers a devotion towards the study of integration between states in international theory. (Ryan, 1988: 163) An emphasis was placed on concepts of functionalism,

¹⁷ Based upon the observations here, this paper has made use of the term 'global society' as a means to discuss the relations of peoples (social groups) at the global level rather than solely the relations of states.

federalism, and transnationalism. While these concepts attempted to address the difficulties of managing socially diverse states, the perpetuation of regional conflicts and the Cold War seemed to reinforce the basic assumptions of realist notions of international relations. At this time (the 1950s and 60s), realists who resisted these ideas were wedded in a belief in the strength of the sovereign state and its durability as a political organization. (Ryan, 1988: 163)

If notions of domestic linkage politics could suffice the realist in partially understanding the domestic inputs to a state's international behaviour, then realist scholars would continue to insist that the international environment was crucial in understanding international relations - and that domestic politics was interesting, but much less significant. In any case, few considered the possibility that states could break up (or new states could be created) as a result of ethnic factionalism or nationalism. As was discussed in chapter three when looking at the argument of Alexander Wendt, the question of social agency presents serious problems for realist theory in terms of the creation of states, or their fractionalization. Essentially two separate notions of the state were developing. As Ryan contends, an emphasis on the concepts of functionalism, federalism and transnationalism was acceptable to realist

scholars, but these were relegated into what realists considered to be low, or domestic, politics. At the level of the international state system, realists continued to use the European notion of the nation-state developed mainly in the nineteenth century.

In the post-Napoleonic age, the concept of nation-states (modeled largely after England and France) became the dominant political concept in the organization of modern society. (Field, 1971:3) According to Field, this dominant mechanism of political organization resulted in great wars of 'national' unification and the defence of nationality in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Nation-states attempted to unify the subjects of their spacial sovereignty by conquest, assimilation, economic integration, institutionalized education, and the promotion of 'national' patriotism. Field contends that this flowering period in the development of nation-states was reinforced in Europe and North America by substantial economic advance. While the results of this process were impressive, the establishment of cohesive nation-states was not altogether successful: "Even in Europe, where it all began, some states were much more successfully 'sovereign' or 'national' than others, and the fortunes of even the most successful were soon to hazard." (Field, 1971:4)

A focus upon the ethnic-national divisions within existing states in the international system suggests that contrary to the realist assumption that the state unit is a means by which we can determine the subject matter of international politics, it is possible to examine several systems operating at the same time. While the relationship between state actors does constitute one means by which we can examine global politics, we must attempt to theoretically disaggregate the state in order to examine all inputs into state behaviour. This must be done as it now seems clear that the state-centric approach is unable to effectively conceptualize the social basis of collective human conflict. Though states might 'claim' to act in the name of the constituents within, the plurality of social groupings within and amongst states suggests that this is not always the case. Groups which identify themselves as being 'distinct' continue to have a preponderance towards the collective use of violence as a means to political objectives. Further, this suggests the persistence of a complex web of non-state social relationships which transcend political boundaries.

In order to better understand conflict within global society, an attempt must be made to identify all of the principal participants. Based upon earlier sections of this paper, we can see that the domestic/international division

is clearly limited. The state-centric approach tends to aggregate all conflict to the state level, or ignore it altogether. As Morgenthau's response to the Vietnam Conflict demonstrated, this is highly problematic. First we must acknowledge that all conflicts have at least the potential to become internationalized by the involvement of state actors. However, why is the state-agent necessarily so important in the identification of all conflicts which are deemed to be significant towards global politics? This, as has already been argued, is partially a result of the fact that scholars of international relations borrowed the tools of study from the related fields of diplomatic history and international law. It is also a result of the responsive nature of the discipline at the time of its inception. Based upon the observations of the First World War, scholars felt confident that state actors were the most important agents in the understanding of global conflict. However, the persistence of protracted social conflicts suggests that such an assumption may not be valid. It must be possible to suggest a better definition of conflict as a whole, as well as those who can be identified as the principal participants in it?

Conflict within global society can be defined as the collective use of violence by two or more socially identifiable groups as a means towards contending political

and/or social objectives. Specific to this notion, the actors (social groups) can be identified as groups whose self identification is sufficient enough to legitimize the use of violence in the name of the collective. Whilst other definitions of social groupings may apply to other political theories, the one tabled here is specific towards understanding violent conflict within global society. On the one hand, an argument can be put forward that this value based definition can be used to describe conflict between states which claim to effectively represent all constituents within. However, such a definition can also be applied to non-state social groups with a preponderance towards the use of violence. These social groups may coexist within a single state, may reside in two states, or can be found in a large number of separate sovereign political units. The above definition is a non-state/actor-based definition of conflict. As such, an attempt must be made to conceptualize the actors in this process.

THE ACTORS:

It is essential that any definition of conflict include those who are involved in the process of violence itself. While this may be true, the collective social interaction of individuals must also play a role as far as a concept of

collective, or social, violence is concerned. As such, 'agency' is an inherent factor in the definition process. Alexander Wendt's argument with regard to the ontologically primitive nature of the state-agent in realist and neo-realist theory examines the limitations of such a 'macro' theoretical approach. The need to disaggregate the state is crucial if we are in fact going to theoretically conceptualize those factors considered crucial towards understanding conflict below and across the state level. The basic question to be addressed is - at what level does any theory of conflict assign ontological primacy? In fact, is there even a basic (or primitive) agent in the process of conflict? The use of violence in the name of social groupings suggests more than individual self-interest. It does suggest however, the perceived need of social groups to maintain a group identity and ensure the collective interests of the social group itself. The ultimate expression of the collective interests of social groups is the legitimization of the collective use of violence. While scholars of international relations have been willing to acknowledge this fact since the inception of the discipline, the dominant theoretical means of analysis has been at the state level. It seems that social identification is perhaps a more inclusive means by which we can conceptualize the crucial actors in the process of violent conflict.

As was stated earlier, social groups is the term used here to identify distinguishable groups who potentially may utilize organized acts of violence as a means towards political ends. These groups will often share a common language, culture, religion, sense of common history, economic class, geographic location, or ethnic identity. While not all of these characteristics need be present for a group to be considered a social group, they must identify themselves as such. All groups who possess these characteristics have at least the potential to become politicized. However, this does not always occur, and it clearly does not always lead towards collective acts of organized violence.

To some degree, the use of collective violence by social groups depends upon the their own degree of politicization as well as the degree to which (or the perception thereof) existing political organizations and institutions can accommodate the needs and desires of these groups. Moreover, this definition of social groupings is based upon the perceived identity of its constituent members. As such, social groups will often transcend political boundaries, membership of political organizations and institutions, and perceived solutions towards the continued identity and survival of the groups themselves. This being the case, social groups can be conditioned and socialized by a variety

of different and inconsistent factors. Members of a single social group which transcends political sovereign boundaries may be subject to differing attitudes towards their respective relationship with a variety of state and social structures. They may also coexist with other social groups (and be conditioned by their respective relationships with them) within the context of different state units. Social groups are therefore complex and fluid. However, their desire for a continued identity as a collective is the means by which these groups can be conceptualized as distinguishable social groups.

THE PROCESS OF STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE

Further to the use of actual physical violence, structural violence is used here to describe a 'process' which might be best explained as an existing power struggle between social groups. While the orthodoxy in the study of 'international conflict' places the focus of its analysis upon the actual physical act of violence (usually the direct result of the use of military force in the name of states), the theoretical framework proposed here seeks to broaden the definition of the term violence to include structural relations of hegemony between social groups. In effect, the dominant means of theoretical analysis which suggests that

violence is the physical use of military force to achieve military ends severely limits such a theoretical construction's ability to fully understand all social aspects of violence. It is suggested here that the physical act of violence is merely an external expression of an ongoing structural relationship between social groupings which will be termed 'structural violence'. Therefore, a definition of conflict which focuses upon the physical act of violence can only 'describe' the result of the process of violence rather than understand the overall process itself.

Johan Galtung's "A Structural Theory of Aggression" provides a basis for the model of socio-structural violence presented here. Galtung argues:

Hostile aggression is no inseparable part of the innate structure of the 'minds of men', but added to it from the outside, e.g. through special socialization processes. (Galtung, 1964: 95)

Galtung posits that while the outward observation of aggression (in this case organized political acts of violence) are worthy of study in themselves, they are merely a reflection, or result of existing socio-structural relationships, which have become arranged by power relations. These relationships result in an "interaction system [which] is a multi-dimensional system of stratification...." (Galtung, 1964:96) From here, Galtung sets up a series of possible relationships in which a

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variety of group relationships are displayed. They are simply characterized as (T)opdog and (U)nderdog. Throughout Galtung's discussion, the notion of hegemonic relationships dictated by the topdog are described.

The result of Galtung's early work suggests that his notion of structural aggression can be translated into the relationship of social groups as defined earlier in this thesis. However, Galtung's simplification of groups into basic categories of topdog and underdog (as well as the resulting concept of hegemonic relations) are not sufficiently developed to be the sole theoretical basis of the socio-centric conceptualization of structural violence tabled here. Though it is clear that social groups can be categorized by their respective access to 'power resources', these resources are poorly defined by Galtung and not consistent throughout a social group's environment. Moreover, resources which might be an asset in one social environment may be of no use in another. Therefore, we must search beyond the basic theoretical foundation of Galtung in order to more fully theorize a notion of hegemony and social group power before we can continue. Robert Cox provides what is perhaps the best suited notion of social hegemony for such a purpose.

Based upon a notion of hegemony taken from Robert Cox, a

theoretical extension can be made which would suggest that a similar order of nature exists within the relationship of violence between social groups who identify themselves as being distinct. Cox argues that hegemony is the

...temporary universalization in thought of a particular power structure, conceived not as domination but as the necessary order of nature.
(Cox, 1982:38)

Basically, such a notion of hegemony can be incorporated into a socio-centric theoretical framework of structural violence in the following manner.¹⁸

Social groups exist by virtue of a collective self identification which is inherently based upon their relationship with individuals, or other social groups. As has been stated, the distinguishing characteristics of various groups may differ (ie. religious affiliation, economic class, race, language, gender, geographic location, common history, etc.). As such, all social groups exist within a set of relationships towards other social groups.

¹⁸ The term 'structural violence' used here is in part based upon the work of Johan Galtung's 1964 "A Structural Theory of Aggression". While Galtung suggests that structural aggression is the result of power relationships between Topdog and Underdog, it is suggested here that such relationships become 'normalized' or 'structuralized' by a hegemonic order similar to the one suggested by Robert Cox (1982) in "Production and Hegemony: Toward a Political Economy of World Order". The result of the hegemonic order imposed by social group relations is what is referred to here as a socio-centric conceptualization of structural violence.

As each social group is different (even if only by virtue of their very self identification), each can be located in terms of a distinct relationship towards their overall social environment. Within and amongst state units, a complex network of social group relations interact and interrelate. At the same time, all social groups have collective interests which may or may not coincide with the interests of other contending groups. The result is a set of structural relations between these groups.

The regularization of the relations between social groups is the 'order of nature' which is similar to the one referred to by Robert Cox. In many cases these relations can be interdependent relations of cooperation. However, the relations between social groups can easily be antagonistic, though not openly violent in the physical sense. In cases such as this, the ongoing relations can be structured to work to the advantage of one group over another. At the same time, each social grouping has a set of characteristics, or identifying features, from which the attainment of their collective interests can be achieved. These features are of such a diverse scope, with varying degrees of political utility, as to make the comparative 'resources' of social group power impossible to estimate. In some cases, the sheer persistence of a group's desire to remain unique (by language, culture, religion, location etc.) can be

sufficient enough to ensure its survival. In other cases, social groups may control state and non state organizations (such as militaries, economic institutions, multinational corporations, access to crucial services, educational institutions etc.) and utilize these resources to further their own social group interests. In the end, all social groups exists within a relationship of relationships with other social groups. Some may act to counter the interests of others. Some may act to further the interests of others. All have varying and inherently unmeasurable resources to further their collective interests.

The pluralism of social group divisions within global society becomes 'normalized' by an accepted order of nature which is structured by power relations between social groups. The result is structured relations of dominance between social groups. The successful relationship of dominance is such that both the exploited and the exploiter accept this arrangement as a natural order. In many instances, an exploited group is unaware of the hegemony of dominant groups. Through state mechanisms, assimilation tactics, economic relationships, and other structural means, the hegemon can regularize a relationship of structural violence. However, as long as the dominated social group maintains its perceived notion of a distinct identity, such tactics can only perpetuate a relationship of structural

violence rather than effectively dismantling or assimilating contending social groups. Should the legitimacy of the 'natural order' become challenged by a subordinate social group, the potential exists for the process of structural violence to move into the use of collective physical violence as a means towards political objectives. Though the level and magnitude of the violence have changed dramatically in such a situation, the process of violence remains consistent in terms of the groups involved and the objectives sought.

The above conceptualization of collective human conflict within global society is further complicated by the dynamics of social group relations and their respective relations with state structures. Dominant groups may use mechanisms within their control to 'forge' support for their objectives contrary to the interests of subordinant social groups. Elite state managers will utilize the accepted order of nature to further their interests against the wishes of all identifiable groups within their political sovereign boundaries. For example, elite state managers (as well as those whose individual interests depend upon the existing order of nature) may perceive the greatest threats to their interests to derive from contending social groups within the 'domestic society'. As a result, the dominant social group may utilize the powerful mechanisms of the state (education,

communications, media, etc.) to forge a 'national interest' as a means to deflect internal threats to their hegemony. Subordinant social groups will often accept the 'national interest' as legitimate as they have been successfully socialized to accept the national interest as the natural order. In other cases, hegemonic social groups will utilize the resources of state management to play off subordinant social groups against one another. Such tactics can prove effective in the maintenance of hegemony on behalf of dominant social groups. In extreme cases, hegemonic social groups can push the 'national interest' to a point of external (or international) war as a means to divert perceived internal social groups threats to their hegemony.

The outbreak of physical violence within the conceptualization of a socio-centric theoretical framework of structural violence can be viewed as the result of the breakdown of the order of nature that results from power relations between social groups. By the use of the above conceptualization of structural violence, we can see that a theoretical focus upon the outbreak of physical violence is a wholly inadequate understanding of the social basis of conflict. In essence, such a focus looks at the results of structural violence - rather than the source. Moreover, a state-centric conceptualization is further weakened by an assumption that the dynamics of social group relations can

be reduced or imposed solely to state defined relations. The result is that the dominant theoretical understanding of conflict within the study of international relations can only partially 'describe' conflict, as opposed to making any serious theoretical attempt to 'understand' it.

AGENCY AND EPISTEMOLOGY

State-centric conceptualizations of global politics make the implicit assumption that the assignment of agency at the state level allows for theoretically 'manageable' units upon which their theories can be constructed. (Morgenthau, 1973:270) This assumption has found its way into the now dominant categorization of theories known as neorealism. Such an assumption lends the state-centric approach useful with regards to a positivist epistemology. By assigning agency at the state level, realist and neorealist scholars have created a mechanism by which they can 'objectively' observe social reality. The social groupings is assigned by the state-centric scholar (rather than the individuals within these groups) under the assumption that all state units legitimately represent most constituents within their sovereign boundaries. It is from this basis that they can observe global relations. The quest (as reflected in their respective theoretical constructions) is to look for

regularities in the relations between state agents. By the very assumption that state agents are effectively socially representative, realists and neorealists claim to have a monopoly on the key to which they feel unlocks an effective understanding of global politics. However, a basic flaw in their theoretical construction lies in the fact that state units often do not effectively represent all constituents within. Moreover, the search for regularities seems futile if the complex web of social relations within and amongst states is a fundamental part of the overall process of collective human violence.

As we have seen, most states in the global community are socially diverse. While some may have developed the mechanisms by which they can manage social plurality within, others have not been as successful. In order to be able to effectively conceptualize conflict within global society, we must allow for the assignment of agency based upon the identification of those individuals to their respective social groupings. The use of social grouping agency in an attempt to better understand conflict within global society makes for units which are not nearly as theoretically 'manageable' as the state agent in the state-centric approach. As has been discussed, these groups are diverse and subject towards attitudinal changes based upon a variety of complex environmental influences which are often not

consistent throughout the group's membership and geographic location. As such, the social scientist can never fully understand the totality of factors which leads some groups towards the use of collective violence. However, the act of organized political violence itself must be the basis upon which we determine the actors involved. If a state legitimately acts in the collective social interests of its constituents, then the state-agent is perhaps the best unit upon which we can attempt to theoretically understand the collective use of violence. However, if the state uses violence against social groupings within, or against non-state social groups outside of its sovereign boundaries, then a state-centric theoretical focus will only distort or obscure an effective understanding of the process of violence.

A social group definition of collective violence also allows for another area of analysis which is ignored by the state approach. As has been stated, the domestic/international division of conflict tends to focus analysis upon violence conducted in the name of state actors. While the horrors of destruction inflicted by states upon each other has been obscene, collective acts of violence by social groups within states has also cost humanity dearly. Are we to assume that violent conflict within states is somehow less significant or important? Moreover, the use of violence within states

often affects the behaviour of states in their relations with other states - or can involve other state actors. As most states possess a great capacity for destruction in the name of self-defence, they have created and control the mechanisms of war. Military interests, bureaucratic interests, the interests of elite state managers, and the structures they control can be contrary to the interests of all social groups within states. As history has shown, these so called mechanisms of sovereign defence can be utilized against what is perceived to be threats from within. Furthermore, the perceived interests of those who claim to be in control of the mechanisms of states can also diverge. In some cases, this can lead to bloody conflict of enormous proportions within states. Are we to accept that these acts of organized violence are merely the result of social divisions within society? Surely there is a need to assign agency at the level by which all social groups who engage in acts of collective violence can be considered.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

The arguments put forward here are intended to provide a basis upon which students of global society can better conceptualize the use of collective acts of violence. As such, the limitations of the existing theoretical approaches

was examined. It has been argued that the continued dominance of the state-centric model has been a result of the era in which the study of international relations developed, the existing means by which attempts to understand global politics examined the issues, and the preponderance of the discipline to 'react' to international events throughout its brief history.

At the same time however, it now seems clear that while states have the capacity by which they can utilize violence as a means towards external political objectives, we must consider a broader conceptualization of violence within global society. Society within states is not a monolithic unity. At one level, social groupings within states are complex, diverse, and subject towards internal and external conditioning which can lead them towards the use of collective violence. States themselves represent a number of complex social interests and control the mechanisms by which social groups can be conditioned. State managers and the organizations they claim to control are themselves reflections of social group interests. At the same time, membership of other social groupings often transcend political sovereign boundaries and are subject to great divisions within.

At the international level, an international state system

clearly exists in which states interact with each other at the state level. Within such a system, a complex series of social group relations exist which do not follow the boundaries of state politics. As a whole, the state and non-state global relations of all social groups coexist in a complex dialectical relationship. Therefore, it is not valid to limit our understanding of conflict within global society solely at the state level. Collective acts of human violence are a reflection of the social interests and values of the groups in whose name they are acting. Though the examples of horrific acts of violence committed in the name of nation-states have greatly impacted upon the way in which scholars of international relations view conflict, we cannot assume the only crucial actors to be state units. If we continue to theoretically focus our attention at the state level only, scholars of global politics will hopelessly fail to be successful in our overall objective of establishing a better understanding of the conditions for global peace.

From here, an attempt must be made to reintegrate a socio-centric conceptualization of structural violence into the existing international state system. Such a task will be difficult at best. As has already been discussed, two basic theoretical divisions of global society have been tabled. First is the existing international state system which has been the focus of most theoretical conceptions of conflict

within global society. At the same time, it has been suggested here that a second theoretical framework of social group relations is also significant in developing a full understanding of the use of violence as a means towards political ends. The difficulty in integrating these two radically different concepts of global politics cannot be underestimated.

CHAPTER FIVE

"Social Groups within the International State System"

STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE AND STATE SYSTEMS

Though structural violence exists within relations of hegemony by a plurality of social groupings, such relations do not exist independently of the international state system. Moreover, the mechanisms of states include the deadliest instruments of violence in the name of 'national self defence' as well as the institutional structures which often reinforce relations of structural violence. While earlier sections of this paper were extremely critical of the tendency of state-centric theories of conflict, in terms of their domestic/international divisions as well as their focus upon the physical act of violence, we must now utilize a holistic notion of structural violence in looking at conflict within global society. Several examples will be brought into the discussion in order to illustrate the effectiveness of a socio-centric conceptualization of structural violence.

Perhaps the best examples can be found in those conflicts which involve a large number of social cleavages (state and non-state), in what the dominant literature refers to as 'protracted social conflicts'.¹⁹ However, the limitations of

¹⁹ For an overview on how state-centric notions of conflict have attempted to deal with theorizing non-state aspects of conflict see; Ben-Dor 1983, Ben-Dor & Dewitt 1987, Buzan 1987, Connor 1978, deReuck 1984, Frei 1985.

state-centric theories of conflict have at least been partially displayed when looking at protracted social conflicts at both the state and non-state level. In order to effectively display the full theoretical advantages of a socio-centric conceptualization of global violence, an analysis of state/state conflicts will be provided. Two central examples will be used. The Vietnam conflict will be brought in as an example of a 'modern multi-state' conflict. A even more contemporary example, the Iran/Iraq War, will be used as an example of what is generally referred to as a state/state conflict.

THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR

In terms of the number of military and civilian casualties incurred in a violent military conflict, the Iran/Iraq War ranks as one of the most serious 'wars' since the end of World War Two. Though there have been conflicting, and often contradictory, claims of the total number of deaths throughout the conflict, this war was clearly of immense magnitude. Ruth Leger Sivard estimated the total number of deaths incurred in the conflict to be 377,000 as of the end of 1988. (Sivard, 1988:30) These numbers do not include ongoing internal religious and ethnic disputes in both Iran and Iraq which had become crucial aspects of the overall war

by the end of the conflict in 1988. As well, numerous factions within Iran (who were variously associated with the former Shah) continued fighting until at least mid 1985. (Sivard, 1988:30)

A full understanding of all events during Iran/Iraq conflict is not necessary to gain an understanding of the relationship of violence which existed before, throughout, and after the conflict. A structural conceptualization of social violence allows for an expansion of the parameters of understanding to include crucial factors that otherwise could have been ignored by a focus solely upon the physical act of violent conflict itself. First, the Iran/Iraq war must be understood within the context of the 'domestic' social structures and relations within both Iran and Iraq. Within Iran, the war with Iraq can easily be viewed as a continuation of the process which led to the revolution in 1978.²⁰

Though the overall history of the Shah's tenure in Iran is

²⁰. The following description of events within Iran through the 1980s is based upon an overview of factors considered crucial to the Iran/Iraq War in the Strategic Survey produced by the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS). To gain a comprehensive overview, these observations were drawn from the 1978-79, 1980-81, 1981-82, 1982-83, 1983-84, 1984-85, 1985-86, 1986-87, 1987-88, & 1988-89 editions. For reasons unknown, no analysis of the Iran/Iraq conflict was provided in the 1979-80 edition of the Strategic Survey.

both interesting and significant, the political environment for the Shah within Iran had become extremely serious by 1976. While political corruption and a rash of high profile scandals rocked the government from 1973 through 1976, the domestic economic situation was deteriorating rapidly. Urban incomes had increased to five times the level of rural, massive unemployment was complicated by an influx of rural job seekers, inflation was running at 35%, \$2 billion dollars worth of food was imported in 1978 to avoid famine, and the gap between rich and poor was widening at a rapid pace. (Strategic Survey 1978:50). At the same time, the material excesses of the corrupt leadership seemed to exacerbate the frustrations of many Iranians.

Though essentially a less institutionalized form of religious organization than Western Christian churches, the Mosque became a significant political force in the rejection of the Shah's leadership and his support of western style modernization. Traditionally antagonistic factions of Islam became increasingly united under the mullahs in their opposition towards the Shah's regime. Moreover, middle class civil servants and industrial workers became offended by the excesses of the political leadership in Iran and joined into the movement of a fundamentalist Islamic rejection of westernization. (Strategic Survey 1978:51) An overthrow of the Shah became the objective which united traditionally

antagonistic factions of Islam. In structural terms, the relations of hegemony between the Shah's regime and the various Islamic factions within Iran was so complete as to unite traditionally fractionalized groups under a common cause. The social group identification had become one of community as all agreed that they shared a common exploitation by the Shah's regime. Fundamentalist Islamic values provided both the doctrine and the leadership for an emerging alliance of social groups which sought to address their exploitation by a hegemonic and corrupt regime.

The Ayatollah Khomeini (exiled to Iraq in 1963 as a potential threat to the Shah) gained credibility as a legitimate Islamic leader who wholly rejected the Shah and all his leadership came to represent in the eyes of most Iranian citizens. Attempts to resolve the growing crisis by moderate Islamic leaders in Qom (Ayatollah Shariatmadari) were rejected as unreasonable solutions to the situation. From his new base in Paris in 1977, Khomeini's calls for the establishment of an Islamic republic brought on cries for a return to the 1906 constitution which gave the full right of veto to a committee of five religious leaders. The uniting influence of Khomeini was sufficient enough to successfully organize a protest strike throughout the oil fields by December 1978. Oil production was reduced from over 6 million barrels per day, to less than half a million. As a

result, the Shah's regime lost over \$3 billion US in revenues financially destroying an already beleaguered regime.

Throughout 1978 the political situation in Iran had become increasingly violent. At least 2,000 were killed in an increasing number of clashes with government troops and police forces. In June 1978 the head of SAVAK (the secret police) was replaced in response to violent rioting in the city of Tabriz. The new head of SAVAK (a moderate) pushed for the adoption of martial law after further violent clashes in Isfahan in August 1978. After an attack on a cinema in Abadan which killed 430, the Shah was forced to replace Prime Minister Jamshid Amuzegar with Jafaar Sharif-Emami who's religious connections it was hoped would help resolve the crisis. However, the responses of the Shah's regime reflected its total inability to fully understand the changing social environment in Iran. As a hegemonic social regime, it responded by the use of political and military force which had successfully maintained the Shah's reign for years.

By 1978, however, social group factions within Iran had successfully forged a common objective to address the unequal power relations within the state. Factions within the new alliance (such as moderate Islamic oil workers, or

civil servants) were now willing to pay the perceived economic, social or political costs that would result in the attainment of their goals. In short, their self-identification as members of a political and religious movement towards an objective of Islamic leadership had surpassed their self-identification of industrial or civil workers whose principal interest was the maintenance of the status quo. The solidarity of social group identification within the Islamic Revolution was sufficient enough to render any structural adjustments by the hegemonic regime useless. The forging of a coherent social group identification by various opponents to the Shah's regime was a direct result of the persistent power relations that existed between a complex network of social cleavages. In short, subordinate social groups no longer accepted domination by the Shah as part of a 'natural order'. As such, the Shah's reign was destined to collapse.

Successive attempts by the Shah to appease the calls for political change (from a now seemingly united opposition) brought on a rapid series of concessions by the Shah - none of which were sufficient enough to satisfy an opposition which would settle for nothing less than the complete fall of the Shah. By late December 1978, the Shah appointed one of the leaders of the National Front (his primary opposition for over 25 years) as the new Prime Minister. However, the

newly appointed Prime Minister Bakhtiar was considered too moderate by followers of Khomeini and was unsuccessful in calling off the strike by civil servants and oilworkers. Bakhtiar was also unsuccessful in persuading fundamentalists to favour a more secularized form of political leadership. On January 16, 1979 the Shah left on an 'extended vacation' and never returned to Iran. Within days, the Regency Council, designed to preserve the monarchy, was dissolved. With the Shah officially the commander in chief of the armed forces, the loyalty of the powerful Iranian military was uncertain. Leaderless and unable to follow a political situation which changed from day to day, the military proclaimed itself neutral in the domestic power struggle on February 9, 1979. (Strategic Survey 1979:53) Within forty eight hours the Ayatollah Khomeini was back in Iran and his new Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan was forming a new government.

Though the Iranian Military proclaimed its neutrality in the conflict, the revolution in Iran was not without violence. The International Institute of Strategic Studies estimated that over 2,000 supporters of the Shah were killed in uprisings throughout 1978. (IISS, 1980:55) Moreover, about 1,000 civil servants and military police were killed in the week following the arrival of Khomeini in February 1979. Sivard estimates that about 20,000 Shah loyalists were

killed throughout the conflict with Iraq from bases far outside of Tehran. (Sivard, 1988:30) Perhaps more importantly for this analysis, the Revolution in Iran was instrumental in the outbreak of hostilities between Iran and Iraq that same year.

The domestic situation in Iran was met with great concern by the Ba'ath regime in Iraq. First, Iran was clearly a regional power and the pro-western policies of the Shah were part of a complex set of regional state relations which saw Iran and Saudi Arabia as Arab counterweights to Soviet and anti-Israel states in the region. Whilst superpower attempts to play states off against one another in the volatile Middle Eastern political environment were anything but successful, no one could ignore the massive military the Shah had built in Iran with the aid of the United States. Relations between the Shah and Iraq had been uneasy, but by comparison to other relations in the region, the Shah and Iraq could have been considered allies. In fact, in 1975 Iran and Iraq had signed a treaty which redefined their common border. The widespread hate of the Shah within Iran could only spell trouble for his friends in Iraq.

Secondly, and more importantly, the Ba'ath regime in Iraq was supported by the Sunni minority. This minority had successfully established itself as the dominant social

hegemon throughout the political, military, and social structures of Iraq. The Shi'ite majority had begrudgingly accepted Sunni political domination for decades. However, the new Khomeini regime in Iran was supported largely by Shi'ite fundamentalists in Iran and elsewhere. The Ba'ath regime in Iraq now saw great potential for this fundamentalist revolution to spread into Iraq and threaten the Ba'ath hold on power. Iraqi President Hussein felt threatened by the Iranian Revolution and seemed compelled to act.

A delineation between the Iranian Revolution and the Iran/Iraq war seems to be merely academic. While supporters of Khomeini were busy seeking out supporters of the Shah in Tehran in May 1979, Iraqi troops were attempting to take advantage by the turmoil caused by the revolution. The Iraqi government and military had assumed that the leadership of the powerful Iranian military (formerly loyal to the Shah) would be purged. Sporadic Iraqi raids on Iranian borders began as early as May 1979. (Strategic Survey, 1981:49) Iraqi President Hussein began to expel 30,000 Iranian workers fearing that they would instill Islamic revolutionary doctrine in the Iraqi Shi'ite majority. On September 17, 1980 President Hussein cancelled the 1975 border treaty with Iran and reclaimed sections of the Shatt al-Arab waterway which had been taken from Iraq during an

Iranian intervention into a 'domestic' dispute in November 1971. On September 20, 1980 Iranian President Bani-Sadr called up Iran's reserve forces in order to stop the advancing Iraqi incursions into Iranian territory. Initially Iraq made great advances taking the waterway as well as important oil refineries and several border cities. (Strategic Survey 1981:50)

In strategic terms, the war opened quickly and Iraqi military advances were extremely fluid due to the total disorganization of the Iranian military - a direct result of the Iranian Revolution. By early 1981 the oil production of both Iran and Iraq had been cut to less than 600,000 barrels per day as opposed to the pre-war totals of 3.5 million barrels for Iran and 1.4 million barrels for Iraq. Though initially a rapidly moving military conflict, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards had begun to successfully hold off Iraqi advances by October 1980. From that point on, the war became a bloody, stagnant, labour intensive war of attrition in which months of intensive fighting would result in the movement of the front by only several hundred yards.

While the war continued to remain stagnant throughout its duration, it did bring about serious internal social divisions in both Iran and Iraq. Challenges to the legitimacy of the Khomeini regime in Iran came almost

immediately after the Revolution. While most religious and ethnic factions in Iran agreed that the Shah must be deposed, there was no such agreement with regards to an Islamic Republic. Ethnic minorities compose nearly half of Iran's 36 million citizens. (IISS,1983:54) In January 1980, Turkish minorities and moderate Islamic clergymen engaged in bloody clashes with Khomeini supporters around the city of Tarbiz. Throughout the duration of the war with Iraq, ethnic unrest was widespread in Iran though Khomeini's Revolutionary Guards did gain legitimacy as the defenders of Iran against their primary adversary - Iraq. In any case, Iraq used every opportunity to exploit ethnic unrest in Iran by the supply of food, men, and arms to groups in Iran.

The stability of Iraq's President Hussein was also seriously challenged by the events of the war with Iran. Hussein, a Sunni Muslim, had to contend with an ethnically and religiously fractionalized state. In terms of ethnic identification, Iraq is composed of 75% Arab, 15% Kurd (most of whom are separatists)²¹, and 5% Turk (most of whom

²¹ Note: The Kurdish separatist movements in both Iran and Iraq have been active for decades. In fact, the 1975 boundary treaty between Iran and Iraq was a direct result of Iraqi Kurdish groups moving into support fighting between the Iranian Government and Kurds in Iran. During the Iran/Iraq War, Kurds were fighting both Iran and Iraq simultaneously from both sides of the border. At the same time, Kurds were fighting Kurds (both cross border and within each state) as both Iran and Iraq had made desperate pleas with each in an attempt to secure their support in the broader war. As well, Kurdish groups were fighting other

identify politically with Turks in neighbouring Turkey). Though 95% of the population is Moslem, 60% are Shi'ite and the remaining 35% are Sunni. (UN Statistical Yearbook, 1988) President Hussein had assumed power only in July 1979 and his hold on power was not secure by the time he cancelled the boundary treaty with Iran later the following year. In fact, Hussein used the conflict with Iran as an opportunity to eliminate KDP and Communist cells of his military. (IISS, 1981:56) For Hussein, the war with Iran was a serious political risk in which his political survival hung in the balance. By 1982, Khomeini had stated that Iran would not settle for anything less than the downfall of Iraq's Hussein as acceptable terms for a negotiated peace. Hussein responded in kind claiming that Iraq would never end the war as long as Khomeini was alive and in control of Iran. The duration of the war saw a series of moves by either side in attempts to play off the domestic instability of each regime as a means of political advantage in the conflict. Both Iran and Iraq spent huge resources fighting political and military threats from within their respective states.

ethnic minorities in both Iran and Iraq as other separatist and non-separatist groups saw the war as an attempt to settle long term disputes with Kurdish nationals.

IRAN/IRAQ IN A STRUCTURAL PERSPECTIVE

Though the Iran/Iraq War has been considered by realist (Buzan 1987, Frei 1985, Ray & Vural 1986) scholars of international relations to be another example of state/state war, we have seen that the complexities of this war suggest that such an approach is a serious over-simplification. To draw a theoretical line between the Iranian Revolution and the Iran/Iraq War is nothing more than a theoretical impediment towards gaining an understanding of the full process of structural violence. Relations of domination had become the normalized means of political organization in Iran which saw an alliance of political elites who controlled nearly all aspects and social structures within the state (education, the monarchy, industry, labour, the military, the civil service, etc.) Moreover, this political regime displayed excesses which reflected the 'western' values of the external powers which supported such a regime. Dominated social and religious groups in Iran were expected to accept this relationship of domination as the 'natural order'. In the end, subordinate social groups rejected the natural order and put aside their traditional differences in an alliance to overthrow a repressive elite. Islam became the common link which united these groups into a common front of the oppressed. So successful was the legitimization of their common goals that members of the Shah's elite (the

military, civil servants, labour, etc.) abandoned their traditional support of the status quo in favour of the objectives of the new social alliance. The response of the ruling elite was the use of physical military force and the relationship of structural violence had moved into the use of physical violence. However, without effective control over the mechanisms of physical force (the police and the military), the hegemon's control over subordinate social groups collapsed quickly.

The rapid collapse of the status quo in Iran became an immediate threat to the stability of the political hegemon in Iraq, which was still in the process of consolidating its hold over the social structures within that state. The response of the regime in Iraq was to exploit the political instability in Iran and divert internal social concerns to an external threat. Moreover, the Hussein regime in Iraq had an instinctive distrust for the new leadership in Iran as the interests of the former Shah included stable and friendly relations with Iraq. The alliance of hegemonic elites in Iran and Iraq dissolved with the Iranian Revolution, and the outbreak of hostilities between the two should be considered as an important aspect in the process of violence. The existing relationships of structural violence in both Iran and Iraq allows for a richer understanding of the social environment from which the

Iran/Iraq war started.

It is clear that the outbreak of hostilities between these two states was greatly affected by the domestic social considerations of each regime. Theoretical constructions which focus primarily upon the international factors must be considered insufficient. Realist scholars (22) seem puzzled when considering the internal social implications of Iraq's move to take land from the Islamic Republic of Iran and enter into a prolonged costly war. A socio-centric conceptualization of structural violence considers both the international/external threats perceived by Iraq (an unstable and powerful neighbour) as well as the potential for structural social adjustments in Iran to instill internal social threats to the hegemonic order within Iraq. As well, a socio-centric understanding brings to bear the full impact of the prolonged relationship of domination that elite regimes in this example had over religious, class, and ethnic minorities/majorities. The breakdown of the hegemonic order in the case of Iran (and the threat thereof in Iraq) was clearly a significant factor in the events which lead up to the physical use of force.

22 See, for example, Ray & Vural (1986) "Power Disparities and Paradoxical Conflict Outcomes", International Interactions, Vol.12:4 pp. 409-342.

THE CASE OF THE VIETNAM CONFLICT

While the Iran/Iraq war provides a contemporary example of a state-state conflict, it did not involve one of the superpowers as a principal combatant. The Vietnam conflict provides a complex protracted social conflict which involved several large and seemingly powerful states (France, the Soviet Union, China, and the United States). In terms of its socio-structural component, the Vietnam conflict displays the difficulties of imposed political regimes by 'other' actors in the international state system.

Vietnam is by definition a nation-state. With over 85% of the population ethnic Vietnamese, the impact of the state's homogeneous nature upon the role of nationalism as a legitimizing factor for the military is substantial. Though there are some ethnic and religious minorities in Vietnam (Chinese and Roman Catholics being the largest), the Vietnamese nation has a strong sense of a shared history, common language, culture, and social identification. The geographic boundaries of the state strongly coincide with the ethnic Vietnamese nation. As Gunnar Nielsson contends:

When the spatial boundaries of a nation-groups' membership coincide with the boundaries of a state, it comprises an ideal case of a nation-state." (Nielsson, 1985:28)

The ethnically homogeneous nature of the Vietnamese state played a crucial role as a mobilizing factor for this social movement, and provided the foundation for an ethnically based social group identification which was instrumental in forging a movement which persisted against foreign intervention - regardless of the perceived obstacles against them.

Other factors that are crucial towards a full understanding of the Vietnamese conflict is the long history of anti-colonialism in Vietnam. The history of the entire Indochinese Peninsula is one of near constant warfare seeing the rise and fall of various empires for thousands of years. Vietnam has been militarily occupied for more than half of its history in the past two thousand years. However, no conquering state has ever been able to culturally assimilate the Vietnamese people. The Chinese occupied from 111 B.C. until 944 A.D. and successive attempts to implement Chinese language and culture failed. The desire to maintain the Vietnamese identity remained strong throughout the Chinese occupation regardless of persistent attempts at cultural assimilation.

In the case of Vietnam the effort failed. Why this occurred is both a matter of intense pride to the Vietnamese and a source of dispute and fascination among historians. Whatever the reasons, several centuries of Chinese rule were not able to erase the memory of Vietnamese independence, and revolts broke out sporadically in abortive attempts to

drive out the foreign invader. (Duiker, 1983:16)

When the Chinese were finally driven out by successive uprisings they were to stay out of Vietnam for almost five hundred years. They occupied again in 1407, though this time it took only 20 years before the occupation forces surrendered to a largely based guerrilla force of Vietnamese. Early in the history of Vietnam a strong national identification developed which was based primarily upon a notion of anti-colonial struggle. Unlike the case of Iran, the greatest threats to social groups within Vietnam were foreign hegemonic regimes.

In 1427 Nguyen Trai (a Vietnamese military leader under Le Loi the successful general who overthrew the Chinese) wrote on the tactics required to overthrow Chinese forces. Nguyen Trai's works borrowed heavily from the writings of Sun Tzu²³ and were essentially an early Vietnamese version of the guerrilla tactics employed by Giap and the Communists in their struggles against the Japanese, French and Americans. (Duiker, 1983:19) Early in the development of Vietnamese society the military came to be the basis upon which

²³ Note: Sun Tzu was an ancient Chinese military philosopher whose writings are now considered the basis of 'unconventional' military strategy. His work became widely known in the West during the Vietnam War. His tactics were extremely effective against modern military forces even though his work was written 2,000 years before the advent of the modern nation-state in Europe.

dynasties were based. Being a primarily rural society in which the village is central to local administration, militaries in Vietnam were often fragmented and under control of local or regional leaders. Unlike European militaries which were often centrally administered and highly regimented, militaries in Vietnam were ad-hoc agitative forces used against regionally or globally hegemonic forces. The unconventional nature of Vietnamese military development was inextricably linked to strong nationalist motivations throughout the state at the village level. The French decision to invade Vietnam in 1857 further reinforced both the nationalist motivation of the ethnic Vietnamese, as well as the unconventional development of nationalist military forces.

The French conquest of Vietnam did not come easily. Fighting continued for a period of nearly thirty years, and once complete, French Administration was difficult due to the persistence of uncooperativeness at the village level. Throughout the French occupation, village, and at times province wide, uprisings persisted. When French colonial rule was replaced by the Japanese, low intensity anti-colonial struggles continued. It was during the Japanese occupation of Vietnam that the modern People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN), and the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) developed the momentum that would eventually lead to their

success. The role of the ethnically homogeneous nature of the Vietnamese state, the history of anti-colonial struggle, decentralized village level administration, and nationalist sentiment can not be stressed enough when looking specifically at the case of Vietnam. Decentralized village administration in Vietnam can be viewed as a social response to the persistence of external hegemonic orders imposed upon a social-national group persistent in its desire to remain politically and culturally distinct. Moreover, unlike the case in Iran, an organized social movement (Islam) was not required in the politicization of the Vietnamese as the population within Vietnam responded to foreign domination by independently based non-centralized administration. The social identity of the Vietnamese people remained solid regardless of successive attempts at cultural assimilation.

The basis of national survival in the case of Vietnam is translated into 'individual' social values. 'Dau tranh' is the Vietnamese term for struggle, though struggle by itself does not fully define the term. For the Vietnamese, dau tranh is a way of life, or an individual action, that contributes in part to an overall struggle towards the inevitable. (Pike, 1986:215) Derived from the ethnic struggle of the Vietnamese nation, the notion of dau tranh has been a powerful tool utilized by guerrilla leaders, village leaders, and powerful political figures alike in the

legitimization of their actions. Dau tranh and the marriage of Marxism-Leninism with Vietnamese nationalism were crucial in the popularization of Ho Chi Minh and the VCP (Vietnamese Communist Party). (For an overview of the introduction of Marxism-Leninism into the Vietnamese nationalist movement see: Kim Knahn; "The Grafting of Leninism" Vietnamese Communism 1982:35-89)

The modern Communist Party in Vietnam became the basis upon which the ethnic-national Vietnamese social movement resisted the hegemonic order imposed upon them by foreign powers. The Vietnamese Communist movement under Ho Chi Minh was established in the late 1930's inside China. Marxism-Leninism appealed to Ho Chi Minh (who was essentially a Vietnamese nationalist until his introduction to Marxist ideology in Paris in the early 1920's). The armed aspects of dau tranh were incorporated into Ho's Marxist nationalism early in its development. Ho and his followers were greatly influenced by Mao and the early Chinese Communist Party. Nguyen Ai Quoc, also a Vietnamese Marxist nationalist who was crucial to the early development of VCP doctrine, studied at the Whampoa military Academy as did Vo Nguyen Giap. Before the arrival of Ho Chi Minh, Nguyen Ai Quoc became the Chairman of the VCP in 1939. It was Nguyen Ai Quoc who took the Party away from the centralized Comintern vision of anti-colonial revolution.

Borrowing from the 'nation first' ideas of Thanh Nien (who had earlier been banished from the Party for his revisionist notions of the 'nation first') Nguyen Ai Quoc successfully moved the Party towards a 'tailor made' notion of Marxism that was able to use the notion of dau tranh.

In what appeared to be a 'revisionist' attempt to redefine the Comintern-designated 'two-stage revolution' for the colonial countries and at the same time a reversion to the line favoured by the much condemned Thanh Nien, the Eight Plenum resolved to 'employ an especially stirring method of appeal to awaken the traditional nationalism in the people.' (Huyhn, 1982:260)

By 1941 Ho Chi Minh had arrived back in Vietnam from China and quickly assumed the role of Chairman of the VCP. Also of great significance was the arrival of General Giap. General Giap was a Vietnamese nationalist who had studied military history at the University of Hanoi and later at the Whampoa Military Academy. During the Japanese occupation Giap established his own guerrilla forces in the hills north of Hanoi perfecting his notions of armed dau tranh and village guerrilla warfare. (Pike, 1986:339) In December 1944 Ho Chi Minh had also set up VCP bases in the same regions to fight the Japanese. By September 1945 Giap agreed to join Ho's forces as the military commander. Together they established Armed Propaganda Teams to recruit and indoctrinate locals for their cause.

The Armed Propaganda Team was the base level of the VCP in

its early stages and although different in structure, Armed Propaganda Teams continue to be an important part of the PAVN. In the early stages the Armed Propaganda Teams were little more than committed nationalists indoctrinated with Ho Chi Minh's notion of a Marxist united Vietnam. At the village level they were extremely effective in appeals for VCP support. In December 1944 VCP membership was little more than 1,000 concentrated in camps outside of Hanoi. By September 1945 however, membership increased to 60,000 and Giap's guerrilla forces had become well trained in the art of anti-colonial warfare. *Dau tranh* became synonymous with the VCP struggle and appeals to nationalist sentiment proved an effective method to increase VCP membership. By September 2, 1945 Ho had proclaimed an independent communist Vietnam and in doing so proclaimed war against the French who were attempting to reinstate colonial rule. Throughout the war with the French PAVN membership increased dramatically and by the end of the Battle of Dien Bien Phu membership was at 380,000 and was still increasing at a rate of 20,000 per month. (Pike, 1982:190)

While the struggle against foreign hegemonic orders continued within Vietnam, imposed solutions to this anti-colonial dispute succeeded ensuring foreign military opposition to the basic objective of national self-determination. The Geneva Conference (1954) allowed for a

300 day regroupment process in which 900,000 Vietnamese moved from North to South. Most of these refugees were Roman Catholics concerned about potential communist religious persecution or Vietnamese Chinese concerned about VCP xenophobic sentiment. 80,000 Viet Minh (communist) forces moved from South to North with 10,000 being left behind as a vanguard force in the event that Vietnam was not reunited. This group became the basis of the Viet Cong forces during the war with the United States. They too created Armed Propaganda Teams for recruitment. The American presence in the South again reinforced the unconventional development of the anti-colonial forces there.

The establishment of the state of South Vietnam, and the resulting American support of that state, can be viewed as merely an artificial attempt to impose a solution to the Vietnam problem which was acceptable to international hegemonic order (namely the United States). The division of the ethnically homogeneous state of Vietnam was never accepted by the government North Vietnam. Moreover, it was not accepted by a large number of citizens within the South. Successive attempts by the United States to forge an alliance between the American government and elites in South Vietnam failed. The objectives of the supporters of a united Vietnam (in both the North and the South) were to expose the artificiality of the claims of the South

Vietnamese government to successfully represent the legitimate interests of the Vietnamese people.

The persistence of the Vietnamese social group identification was seriously underestimated by the policies of the United States government and its puppet regimes in the South. Moreover, the process of structural violence had existed within Vietnam for thousands of years before the American presence. As has been discussed, this long-term violent struggle had successfully become a part of the 'normal' social environment within the Vietnamese culture. Village and family level resistance to foreign domination had become a basic part of the social values which identified the Vietnamese ethnic-national group. Moreover, even within the framework of a divided Vietnam, the various geographically fragmented sections of this social group had developed the ability to work autonomously towards a common goal.

Due to the existing fragmented nature of Vietnamese political and military administrations based at the village level, the PAVN never required the extensive infrastructure that their opponents did. The notion that 'time was on their side' was drilled into a recruit's head on a continuous basis. This gave each small military unit the mechanism to continue autonomously in the field. As dau tranh is not

exclusively a lifestyle, but all activity that contributes to the overall uprising, one did not have to be a soldier to contribute to the process. Village locals could contribute by providing food and information to the military. Viet Cong soldiers could often count on the support of villagers for needed supplies, information about the enemy, or simply a place to blend into the population. Dau tranh was the doctrine that made the struggle total.

The very presence of Japanese, French, and American forces in Vietnam succeeded in legitimizing nationalist movements within both North and South Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh's ability to marry the notions of communism, militarism, and nationalism gave him the basis of social group power that none of his adversaries could ever hope to obtain in Vietnam. The violent nature of foreign armies only reinforced his cause:

It was under French colonial rule that communism, an ideology originating in Europe, was imported to Vietnam. Colonist repression was unsuccessful. Instead, it exposed colonialism's violent character and advertised communism's political and social objectives. By forcing the Viet Minh government to lead national resistance against colonialism, the French inadvertently helped the Communists acquire much needed legitimacy. Communist success was also assisted by United States intervention (1955-75). While demonstrating the ineffectiveness, not to say the irrelevance, of noncommunist nationalism and revealing the true character of profiteering collaborationism, this intervention confirmed the Communist's claim to be the legitimate representatives of Vietnamese national interests. (Huynh, 1982:19-20)

VIETNAM IN A STRUCTURAL PERSPECTIVE

Though vastly different from the case of the Iran/Iraq War, the Vietnam conflict presents similar socio-structural inputs into a protracted social conflict. First, the Vietnam case cannot be considered exclusively within the context of the physical act of war. As has been demonstrated, an extremely long-term relationship of structural violence existed within the entire Indo-Chinese region for thousands of years. For the Vietnamese national, the enemy had come to mean all foreign hegemonic regimes. To classify this conflict as an American-Vietnamese, Chinese-Vietnamese, French-Vietnamese, Thai-Vietnamese, Burmese-Vietnamese, Japanese-Vietnamese, or Kamphuchian-Vietnamese would be a serious over simplification. It was, and continues to be, a conflict between ethnically based social groups within a structured set of power relations.

As had been discussed in chapter two, Vietnam also highlights the difficulties in dividing conflicts into categories of domestic and international. Though a realist might want to consider this case an international conflict on the basis of the French or American involvement, such a classification was merely academic to Vietnamese nationals. The enemy was the oppression of foreign hegemonic regimes. At times this was represented by the Chinese, Japanese,

French, Americans etc. Moreover, such a classification seriously distorts the internal social conflicts which existed within South Vietnam at the time of the American presence there. Though the former state of South Vietnam may have been considered a political ally of the United States in purely state-centric terms, its internal social divisions were so intense as to render such a statement false.

The American decision to stand up to 'the threat of world communism' in Vietnam suggests the extent to which basic assumptions can disguise social realities. Moreover, the horrific results of such actions should stand as a reminder of the pitfalls of social ignorance. The American disposition to intervene in this complex protracted social conflict seemed to have been based upon internal (American) domestic calculations of a perceived state-based international environment. While the threat of 'communist' regimes to the social values of the United States can itself be argued, the lives of thousands of American soldiers and millions of Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotian citizens were lost - in part due to incorrect assumptions about the international environment. Moreover, the re-emergence of state-based theoretical constructs of international relations seems to indicate that few have learned from the results of failing to fully understand the social basis of international conflict. Perhaps the greatest irony of the

entire Vietnam saga is the fact that it was internal domestic social pressures in the United States which convinced them to withdraw from a conflict that had become a nightmare for them largely due to a misunderstanding of the internal social pressures of Vietnam.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I:**ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF STATES (164 TOTAL)****SINGLE NATION-GROUP STATES (99.9% to 95.0% concentration)
(in order starting with highest)**

South Korea, North Korea, Portugal, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Haiti, Japan, East Germany, Hong Kong, Dominica, Kiribati, Puerto Rico, West Germany, Poland, Burundi, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Italy, South Yemen, Cape Verde, Norway, San Marino, Taiwan, Tonga, Bangladesh, Egypt (UAR), Jamaica, Ireland, Swaziland, Jordan, Denmark, Iceland, Saudi Arabia, Grenada, Colombia, Madagascar, Brazil, Costa Rica, Somalia, Tuvalu, Malta, Sweden, Albania, Barbados, Liechtenstein. (Total 45)

**ONE NATION-GROUP DOMINANT STATES (95.0% to 60.0% concentration)
(in order starting with highest)**

Greece, Hungary, Netherlands, Venezuela, China, Austria, Solomon Islands, Western Samoa, Lebanon, Rwanda, Chile, Paraguay, Luxemburg, Tunisia, Honduras, El Salvador, Finland, Nicaragua, Kuwait, Oman, Vanuatu, Yemen Arab Republic, Uruguay, Israel, Bulgaria, Syria, Lesotho, Libya, Vietnam, Romania, France, Turkey, Bahamas, Panama, Kampuchea, Argentina, Mexico, Australia, Great Britain, Mauritania, Bahrain, Cyprus, New Zealand, Mongolia, Iraq, Singapore, Papua New Guinea, Algeria, Spain, Burma, Qatar, United States, Sri Lanka, Botswana, Switzerland, Morocco, Czechoslovakia, Zimbabwe, Brunei, Laos, Andorra, Monaco. (Total 62)

**ONE NATION-GROUP DOMINANT STATES with FRAGMENTED MINORITIES
(60.0% to 40.0% concentration)
(in order starting with highest)**

Benin, Malawi, Guatemala, Pakistan, Soviet Union, Upper Volta, Afghanistan, Nepal, Sudan, Ghana, Namibia, Indonesia, Gambia, Iran, Niger, Philippines, Mali. (Total 17)

APPENDIX A: CON'T.

BINATIONAL STATES (when the two largest nation-groups
combine represent 96.0% to 65.0% total state population)
(in order starting with highest)

Ecuador, Fiji, Belgium, United Arab Emirates, Trinidad,
Guyana, Peru, Bhutan, Mauritius, Nauru, Congo, Gabon,
Mozambique, Central African Republic, Thailand, Belize,
Ethiopia, Togo, Senegal, Guinea, Yugoslavia. (Total 21)

MULTINATIONAL STATES
(Three largest nation-groups combined represent 97.0% to
34.0% total state population & between three and nineteen
additional minority groups)
(In order starting with highest)

Bolivia, Surinam, Malaysia, Sierra Leone, Canada, Angola,
Guinea-Bissau, Zambia, Kenya, Chad, Liberia, Nigeria, Ivory
Coast, Cameroon, South Africa, Zaire, India, Uganda,
Tanzania. (Total 19)

SOURCE: Nielsson, G.P. (1985) "States and Nation Groups: A
Global Taxonomy", in, Tiryakian, E.A. & Rogowski, R. (eds.),
New Nationalisms of the Developed West, pp. 27-56.

APPENDIX II

MAJOR CONFLICTS FROM 1945-1987

Appendix Preface:

This appendix has been compiled merely as an indication of the severity of violent military conflicts since World War Two. As this thesis does not accept the division of conflicts into 'domestic' and 'international' categories, all conflicts of over 10,000 battle deaths have been included. The basic sources of this table have been included at the end of the appendix. However, this table has been updated and massacres have also been added. The following sources were used to update the table:

Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars 1816-1980
(1980) Singer & Small (eds.)

SIPRI Yearbook 1989 (Armed Conflicts in 1988)

World Military and Social Expenditures 1989, William Eckhardt (ed.)

The Strategic Survey 1990, International Institute of Strategic Studies

MoJelski, G. & Morgan, P. (1985) "Understanding Global War", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.29 No.3, September 1985, 391-417.

Also: to the assistance of D. Keith Heintzman in securing these sources.

STATE & WAR	CIV DEATHS	MIL DEATHS	TOT DEATHS
STATE & WAR	CIVILIAN DEATHS	MILITARY DEATHS	TOTAL DEATHS
COLOMBIA Libs vs govt 1949-62	200,000	100,000	300,000
EL SALVADOR Dem Sal vs Govt 1979-87	50,000	15,000	65,000
GUATEMALA Govt inds US 1966-87	100,000	38,000	138,000
Nicaragua Sand vs Somoza 1978-79	25,000	10,000	35,000
Contra vs Sand 1981-87	15,000	15,000	30,000
PERU Sg Path vs Govt 1983-87	5,000	5,000	10,000
GREECE UK int civ war 1945-49			160,000
HUNGARY USSR int civ war 1956	0	10,000	10,000
EGYPT Six Day War Bcl 1967-70	50,000	25,000	75,000
IRAQ Kurds vs Govt 1961-70	100,000	5,000	105,000
IRAN-IRAQ 1980-87			377,000
ISRAEL Yom Kippur 1973		16,000	16,000
LEBANNON civ war 1975-76	75,000	25,000	100,000
Israel inv 1982-87	40,000	12,000	52,000
N YEMEN UK iny civ war 1962-69			101,000
S YEMEN Civ war 1986			10,000
AFGHANISTAN USSR int 1978-87	50,000	50,000	100,000
BANGALADESH India int fam 1971	1,000,000	500,000	1,500,000
INDIA Mus vs Hin UK 1946-48	800,000	0	800,000
Pak vs Kash Ind 1965	13,000	7,000	20,000
Pak vs Ind 1971		11,000	11,000

STATE & WAR	CIV DEATHS	MIL DEATHS	TOT DEATHS
CAMBODIA			
NV US int 1970-75			156,000
Pol Pot mass 1975-78	1,500,000	500,000	2,000,000
Viet vs Kamp 1978-87	14,000	10,000	24,000
CHINA			
Com vs KMT 1946-50			1,000,000
Cul Rev 1967-68			50,000
INDONESIA			
Com vs Govt 1965-60			30,000
Coup UK int 1965-66	500,000		500,000
Annex E Timor 1975-87	90,000	10,000	100,000
KOREA			
Ch UN int 1950-53	1,000,000	1,889,000	2,889,000
LAOS			
P Lao & US Bomb 1960-73	12,000	12,000	24,000
MALAYSIA			
Civ War UK int 1950-60			13,000
PHILIPPINES			
Mus vs Govt US 1972-80	20,000	15,000	35,000
Com vs Govt US 1972-87	20,000	15,000	35,000
TIBET			
Tibetan rev 1956-59	60,000	40,000	100,000
VIETNAM			
Ind Fr Ch US 1945-54	300,000	300,000	600,000
Civ war US 1960-65	200,000	100,000	300,000
US SV vs NV 1965-75	1,000,000	1,058,000	2,058,000
ANGOLA			
USSR S Af int 1961-75	30,000	25,000	55,000
Cub S Af int 1975-87	200,000	13,000	213,000
BURUNDI			
Hutus vs Govt 1972	80,000	20,000	100,000
CAMEROON			
Ind vs Fr UK 1955-60			32,000
ETHIOPIA			
Cub Somalia int 1972-80	15,000	21,000	36,000
Eritrean rev fam 1974-87	500,000	46,000	546,000
GUINEA-BISSAU			
Ind vs Port 1962-74	5,000	10,000	15,000
KENYA			
Ind vs UK 1952-63	3,000	12,000	15,000

STATE & WAR	CIV DEATHS	MIL DEATHS	TOT DEATHS
MOZAMBIQUE			
Civ war & fam 1981-87	350,000	51,000	401,000
NIGERIA			
Blaf vs Govt 1967-70	1,000,000	1,000,000	2,000,000
RWANDA			
Tutis vs Govt 1965-65	102,000	3,000	105,000
SUDAN			
Black vs Govt UK 1963-72	250,000	250,000	500,000
Black vs Islam 1984-87	5,000	5,000	10,000
UGANDA			
Army vs People 1981-87	100,000	2,000	102,000
WEST SAHARA			
Ind vs Morocco 1975-85	3,000	7,000	10,000
ZAIRE			
UK Bel int 1960-65			100,000
ZIMBABWE			
Pat Fr vs Rhod 1972-79			12,000
ALGERIA			
Civ War Fr int 1954-62	82,000	18,000	100,000

MASSACRES

STATE & MASSACRE	CIVILLIAN DEATHS	MILITARY DEATHS	TOTAL DEATHS
ARGENTINA			
Dissap 1976-79	12,000	3,000	15,000
CHILE			
govt exe 1974	20,000		20,000
IRAN			
Islam vs Shah 1978-85	20,000		20,000
SYRIA			

STATE & WAR	CIV DEATHS	MIL DEATHS	TOT DEATHS
Govt mass Mus 1982	10,000		10,000
CHINA			
Govt exe llords 1950-51	1,000,000		1,000,000
UGANDA			
Amin mass 1971-78	300,000		300,000
	CIVILIAN	MILITARY	TOTAL
TOTAL CONFLICT DEATHS	11,326,000	6,279,000	19,646,00

Note 1. This includes only conflicts of more than 10,000 total deaths from 1945 to 1988

Note 2. The overall total is greater than the combined totals for civilian and military as some conflicts were given in totals only.

Sources: The above table was compiled from the following sources;
 Sivard, R.L. World Military and Social Expenditures pp. 29-31
 Small, M. & Singer, D.J. Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars
 pp. 46-50, 78-98, 196-232
 SIPRI Yearbook 1988: World Armaments and Disarmament, pp. 285-298
 Harff, B. "Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and Politicides"

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