1

52767

0-315-04873-5

National Library
of CanadaBibliothèque nationale
du CanadaCANADIAN THESES
ON MICROFICHETHÈSES CANADIENNES
SUR MICROFICHE

NAME OF AUTHOR/NOM DE L'AUTEUR

WILLIAM BLAIR DIMOCK

TITLE OF THESIS/TITRE DE LA THÈSE

THE INVOLVEMENT AND INFLUENCE OF DOMESTIC INTEREST

GROUPS IN CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY MAKING

UNIVERSITY/UNIVERSITÉ

CARLETON UNIVERSITY

DEGREE FOR WHICH THESIS WAS PRESENTED/

GRADE POUR LEQUEL CETTE THÈSE FUT PRÉSENTÉE

M.A.

YEAR THIS DEGREE CONFERRED/ANNÉE D'OBTENTION DE CE DEGRÉ

1981

NAME OF SUPERVISOR/NOM DU DIRECTEUR DE THÈSE

DR PEYTON V LYON

Permission is hereby granted to the NATIONAL LIBRARY OF
CANADA to microfilm this thesis and to lend or sell copies
of the film.

The author reserves other publication rights, and neither this
thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or other-
wise reproduced without the author's written permission.

L'autorisation est, par la présente, accordée à la BIBLIOTHÈ-
QUE NATIONALE DU CANADA de microfilmer cette thèse et
de prêter ou de vendre des exemplaires du film.

L'auteur se réserve les autres droits de publication; ni la
thèse ni de longs extraits de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés
ou autrement reproduits sans l'autorisation écrite de l'auteur.

DATED/DATE

19 December, 1980

SIGNED/SIGNÉ

W. Blair Dimock

PERMANENT ADDRESS/RÉSIDENCE FIXE

421 CARMICHAEL STREET

NEW GLASGOW, NOVA SCOTIA

B2H 1P8

National Library of Canada
Collections Development Branch

Canadian Theses on
Microfiche Service

Bibliothèque nationale du Canada
Direction du développement des collections

Service des thèses canadiennes
sur microfiche

NOTICE

The quality of this microfiche is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us a poor photocopy.

Previously copyrighted materials (journal articles, published tests, etc.) are not filmed.

Reproduction in full or in part of this film is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30. Please read the authorization forms which accompany this thesis.

THIS DISSERTATION
HAS BEEN MICROFILMED
EXACTLY AS RECEIVED

AVIS

La qualité de cette microfiche dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de mauvaise qualité.

Les documents qui font déjà l'objet d'un droit d'auteur (articles de revue, examens publiés, etc.) ne sont pas microfilmés.

La reproduction, même partielle, de ce microfilm est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30. Veuillez prendre connaissance des formules d'autorisation qui accompagnent cette thèse.

LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ
MICROFILMÉE TELLE QUE
NOUS L'AVONS REÇUE

THE INVOLVEMENT AND INFLUENCE OF DOMESTIC
INTEREST GROUPS IN CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY MAKING

BY

W. Blair Dimock, B.A. (Honours)

(C) (1980) by W. Blair Dimock

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies and Research in partial
fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
in International Affairs

The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs
Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
Canada

13 December, 1980

The undersigned recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies acceptance of the thesis, "The Involvement and Influence of Domestic Interest Groups in Canadian Foreign Policy Making", submitted by W. Blair Dimock, B.A. Hons., in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Peyton V. Lyon", written over a horizontal line.

Peyton V. Lyon,
Supervisor.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "John H. Sigler", written over a horizontal line.

John H. Sigler, Director,
The Norman Paterson School
of International Affairs.

Carleton University

January 28, 1981

III

ABSTRACT

This thesis is an attempt to break open new ground in the study of the domestic sources of Canadian foreign policy. It begins with an examination of domestic interest groups within the Canadian political system. Secondly, it looks at the relevant literature dealing with interest groups and foreign policy. Together, these overviews provide a theoretical and empirical foundation for the study. Given this background, the thesis goes on to examine within a typological framework the involvement and influence of interest groups in Canadian foreign policy making, highlighting the discussion with examples and illustrations. Ultimately, this thesis attempts to uncover the main types of groups involved in Canadian foreign policy making, as well as the reasons for their relative degrees of influence, in the hope that it will prepare the way for future, more definitive, studies in this important area within the overall study of Canadian foreign policy.

IV

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>PAGE</u>
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER I - Domestic Interest Groups in the Canadian Political System	6
CHAPTER II- Interest Groups and Foreign Policy	31
CHAPTER III- Domestic Interest Groups involved in Canadian Foreign Policy Making	63
CHAPTER IV- Domestic Interest Groups and Influence in Canadian Foreign Policy Making	98
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS	136
TABLE I - Group Involvement and Influence in Canadian Foreign Policy Making	146
TABLE II - The Main Determinants of Group Involvement and Influence in Canadian Foreign Policy Making	148
BIBLIOGRAPHY	
LIST OF INTERVIEWEES	

Introduction

There has been very little concern with the various domestic sources of Canadian foreign policy, despite the consensus that they are vital clues to a full understanding of it (Rosenau, 1967; Stairs, 1977-78; Trice, 1978). Given that internal variables do condition the external behaviour of states, this thesis proposes to examine one of them in the context of Canadian foreign policy.

History suggests that domestic interest groups can play a significant role in shaping Canadian foreign policy.¹ In the 20th century there has been in Canada unprecedented social and economic differentiation which "has been associated with an enormous proliferation of interest groups" (Protheroe, 1979:58). In the 1970s, mass media analyses have shown a dramatic increase of activities and policy positions of Canadian interest groups. Today, when approximately 60% of voting Canadians are members of some group, interest group activity "is a growth industry in the capital. Special interest groups multiply unchecked, and almost unnoticed, despite the cut-backs and belt-tightening within the government itself..." (Blaikie, 1979:C4). Whenever government is involved, "there it will find some kind of organized group operating" (Van Loon and Whittington,

¹For a good example, see Litvak and Mauke, 1974.

1976:286). Foreign policy is no exception, but to date no comprehensive explanation of interest group involvement therein has been attempted. This thesis will be a first step in that direction, preparing, it is hoped, the way for future endeavours of a more empirical nature. Its objective is to examine and explain the relative involvement and influence of domestic interest groups over the broad spectrum of Canadian foreign policy. Its scope is, therefore, very general in nature. In doing so, use will be made of a typological framework of analysis, as well as existing literature, theoretical or otherwise, on the subject of interest groups and foreign policy.

For the purpose of this thesis, foreign policy will be defined in a broad sense, as the official attempts of the federal government to elicit desired behaviour from external actors. Thus foreign policy will encompass all federal acts which have purposive international intentions, and will include everything from tariff structure and immigration quotas to fisheries licenses and military commitments.

Interest groups will also be defined broadly: "identifiable segments of the general population who share common attitudes and orientation toward the political process, generally because some aspect of that process affects the

members in a similar fashion" (Hughes, 1978:153), and who join together in some form of organization to protect and/or promote their common interests. Interest groups will be treated as a separate, intermediate structure of government, situated within the policy process between government officials (elected, appointed or bureaucratic) and the rank and file or mass population. As an intermediate structure, interest groups do not necessarily dominate other participants in the governmental process; they simply intervene at times, for any number of reasons (Truman, 1951). Interest groups will be treated as intermediaries in the communication process between citizens and government as the latter make foreign policy decisions. It will be assumed that relatively few groups form solely to influence foreign policy, most having a broad purpose for existing which incorporates one or more components of it; and that there exist significant differences of opinion between those involved in most, if not all, foreign policy issues.

This thesis follows the lines of traditional social science methodology, and its data have been collected from two main sources. First, a comprehensive study of all relevant printed material was undertaken. This was supplemented with personal observation and intuition, and the gathering of expert opinions and the remaining requisite

factual information through numerous interviews with group leaders and government officials at various levels. The data were collected so as to identify the types of domestic interest groups that are involved in Canadian foreign policy-making, how and to what extent they are involved, the positions they adopt, how influential they are, and why. The presentation and analysis of the data also are traditional in orientation; that is, empirical but non-quantitative. The nature of the study, given the breadth of the subject, is necessarily a general overview.

Chapter I lays the foundation for the study, examining in general the role played by domestic interest groups in the Canadian political system as a whole. It provides the reader with an overall perspective with which to interpret the remaining chapters. Chapter II surveys the existing literature on interest groups and foreign policy in the USA and Canada. Together, Chapters I and II introduce the theoretical concepts to be used in analyzing the data, and comprise the background to the study. At the end of Chapter II will be found the hypothetical expectations arrived at by the author following completion of the secondary source research.

Chapter III provides substantive information regarding the involvement of domestic groups in foreign policy, and

develops a typological framework to simplify the overall analysis. While following the typology approach, it attempts to illustrate whenever possible, through interesting and/or important cases, the nature of the involvement.

Chapter IV, following the same lines of presentation, analyzes the influence of groups, drawing on the theoretical concepts developed in Chapters I and II to enhance the explanation. The chapter entitled "Summary and Conclusions" complements this explanation by drawing together the various theoretical, factual and analytical findings of the study as a whole.

CHAPTER I

Domestic Interest Groups in the Canadian Political System

An examination of the involvement and influence of domestic interest groups in making Canadian foreign policy can not be divorced from the general characteristics and activities of those groups. Before reviewing the literature available on the role of interest groups in foreign policy, which will be the purpose of Chapter II, this chapter will lay the foundation for the study with a general discussion of domestic interest groups in the Canadian political system.

It is a widely accepted observation that the behaviour of interest groups, in Canada as elsewhere, is largely a function of the political system in which they are found (Pross, 1975:5). The systemic effects upon interest group behaviour in Canada can be traced to two primary sources: political culture and governmental institutions.

As Manzer (1969) has argued, in confirmation of Eckstein's work (1960), interest group activity is a function of political culture. Presthus has identified important elements of the Canadian political culture which positively affect interest group behaviour. The "mosaic philosophy of acculturation" which pervades our political culture reinforces the social and cultural cleavages which have characterized

Canadian society since colonial days. This phenomenon limits the integrative process in society. Some, like Whitaker (1978), argue that the result is that the political system provides no broad basis of legitimacy for the federal government. Similarly, our colonial origins have been used to account in part for the absence of a national identity or a national purpose apart from economic growth pure and simple. There has been a popular tradition of preference on the part of successive Canadian governments for private enterprise, with state ownership accepted only in moderation. A pragmatic, nonideological view of government has prevailed. These phenomena have combined to produce a system of brokerage politics which has led to much public funding of interest groups. The Canadian political culture has encouraged the federal government to foster the development of interest groups in all sectors of society in which it is involved. The deferential and quasi-participative nature of our political culture in fact necessitates groups acting as "middle-men", in a representative sense, within our political system. Since Mackenzie King's time a corporatist theory of society has prevailed, providing a legal and rational legitimization of interest groups as part of an organic system, with a functional role to perform as a kind of third level of government (Presthus, 1974).

Other aspects of our political culture negatively affect interest group activity. The most prominent of these is the

"old Tory" tradition in Canadian politics: the conventional acceptance of elitism, hierarchical structures and authority in general. As Presthus astutely observes, "the Canadian national character tends to honour hierarchy, political conservatism, and generally structured interpersonal relations, which reflect the essentially anti-egalitarian and bureaucratic heritage of the country"

(1974:11). Concomitant with this limitation on the approval of interest group activity, indeed the perception of them as functionally essential in our political system, is the traditional willingness to permit a government involvement in all aspects of society and life. Reflecting once again the Tory tradition, this characteristic of our political culture is based on the prevalent view of government; that it is responsible and not in need of public direction between elections.

A majority of Canadians, it could be argued, believe that "political leaders, including the higher bureaucracy, can and do define and seek the 'public interest' without much need for explanation of their actions or for participation by the general public". Ultimately, then, there is "a culturally determined orientation...which attempts to sublimate a process that seems functionally essential in any political system"--the public defining and voluntarily expressing its own interest to government (Presthus, 1971: 446).

- 9 -

Despite these cultural barriers interest groups do try to influence government. Indeed, in general, our political culture is favourable to them. Their continued existence supports this observation. Or, as Presthus concludes, "cultural factors thus...provide a generally sympathetic milieu for...group influence" (1974:37).

As Professor Odegard stated at the 1958 meeting of the International Political Science Association, in any country,

The interest group system is affected by the structure of government. Whether the government is parliamentary or presidential, mayor or city manager, federal or unitary, will have an impact on the role of interest groups in society (cited in Ehrmann, 1958:235-236).

The concentration of political power in our parliamentary system of government is important in this respect, since the distribution of real legislative power within a political system will determine the structure of interest groups as well as their political behaviour; including emphases, tactics, and points of access for political pressure (Almond and Powell, 1966). The distribution of political power can even influence the very existence of interest groups (Kwavnick, 1972).

Our system of government may be seen, as in Arthur Lower's famous analogy, as one

- 10 -

in which the ordinary citizen "gives full power of attorney to a small committee each four years or so, well knowing that virtually nothing he can do in the interval will have much effect on the group to whom he has given his blank check (cited in Presthus, 1974:6).

The policy process in Canada operates primarily through two relatively closed structures -- the party system and the bureaucracy -- which are disciplined, hierarchically organized, and which reach an apex in the Cabinet. The effect of such a closed structure of government is a "limited capacity of the system to absorb and act upon demands generated by the public..." (Pross, 1975:18). Further, the Canadian political system is based only minimally on a pluralistic or competitive approach to decision-making. Since in a parliamentary system of government the executive works within a cabinet, groups cannot easily exploit rivalries between legislators. The tradition of decision by consensus is another function of the structured properties of our political system that has negative ramifications for interest groups. This observation is true in terms of access -- the problem of determining who to attempt to influence -- as well as in gaining a voice in decisions. A final characteristic of the Canadian political system which affects the behaviour of interest groups is clearly stated by Pross:

The Canadian political system...tends to favour elite groups, making functional accommodative, consensus-seeking techniques of political communication, rather than conflict-oriented techniques that are directed towards the achievement of objectives through arousing public opinion (1975:19).

The Canadian political system thus influences interest groups in several ways. They must maintain close connections with one of the principal policy structures, the bureaucracy or the party. At the same time, interest groups must avoid any type of action, be it initiative or response, which might place those connections in jeopardy. For example, as a result of the tendency toward elite interaction mentioned above, interest groups are discouraged from appealing to the public at large on questions of concern to them. The systemic realities of Canadian parliamentary government determine that interest group activity is generally an elite activity.

In order to be effective, groups must cultivate access to the elite structure of decision making and "accept short-term defeats of specific proposals in the interest of continuing favorable relations over the long run" (Pross, 1975:19). Interest groups are encouraged to institutionalize, and generally to conform to these elite accommodation procedures if they are to be successful in the protection of their interests. Interest groups are encouraged to focus their efforts directly at government and not to seek to influence it in an indirect fashion. The policy system promotes consultative -- as opposed to conflictual -- activity on the part of interest groups. They are encouraged to be "supportive of public bureaucracies rather than openly critical" (Pross, 1975:23).

The result of these systemic pressures on interest group behaviour is the existence of a real process of interest group accommodation. As Presthus has argued, there no longer should be

any artificial separation between "political" leaders in the formal apparatus of government and "private" elites...The web between so-called private and public elites is...virtually seamless (1973:10).

Let us move from this general view of the systemic effects of Canadian political structures on interest groups to a more specific look at the impact on them of each of the main components of the federal decision making system: Cabinet, Parliament and the bureaucracy.

Several operational features of our Cabinet system of government affect interest group activities. The Cabinet is the fulcrum of our whole governmental system. It maintains functional control over Parliament, the legislative program, legislation, finance, and so on. The Cabinet has an effective grip over government party members and the disbursement of patronage. Secondly, the entire system is tightly knit with the Cabinet second only to the Prime Minister in hegemonic control over it. The Cabinet, thirdly, cannot effectively be limited in its activities by Parliament. Fourthly, the representative nature of Cabinet membership, especially regionally, opens access routes for certain groups. Finally, the Cabinet has

formal control over the bureaucracy. Both as a collective body and in terms of the individuals which comprise it, it is thus the principal target of interest groups in Canada.

The Cabinet as an entity, as well as the Prime Minister and individual ministers, have been relatively accessible to interest groups. However, some points of access have become less penetrable in recent years. The Prime Minister's Office has grown to shelter the Prime Minister, and has made him relatively inaccessible. The proliferation of executive and administrative assistants around ministers, and the expanded use of task forces have obscured the traditional routes of access. The locale of decision-making is harder to find. Nevertheless, the Cabinet, as the final source of policy decisions, is clearly still the key target for groups hoping to exert influence. As Dawson argues, since

once the government's bills are introduced into parliament, they are generally ensured of passage with only minor changes in detail. ...~~(I)~~t becomes apparent that it is necessary for organizations which hope to shape government policies in general to make their views known to Cabinet members long before the parliamentary stage is reached (1973:35).

The impact of the structure of the governmental process in Canada on interest group behaviour can be seen clearly from this characteristic.

A corollary is that there is little significant contact between interest groups and political parties. Indeed, the role of political parties in interest group politics is minor. They are insignificant between elections and/or leadership conventions. Although a party may be used as a point of access by an interest group (e.g., some unions align themselves with the New Democratic Party), "the party structures are of practically no value in directly influencing an output of the political system" (Van Loon and Whittington, 1976:295).

Backbenchers play a minimal role in influencing legislation. What influence they do have is directly linked to the strength of the committee system (see below). As a result of party solidarity in our political system, there is little advantage for interest groups in attempting to influence MPs.

It follows that Parliament itself is of little use as a route of access for interest groups. Although its role can at times be crucial, especially if backed by the public on a sufficiently broad scale, its significance is limited. The same may be said of parliamentary committees, the role of which in policy-making is rarely effective. In recent years, there has been renewed interest in the legislature and its committees, especially on the part of the Pro-

gressive Conservative Party. However, party discipline, and the power structure within the government, weaken parliamentary influence on policy-making and constitute further structural or systemic restraints on interest groups.

Interest groups have access in some cases to "Crown corporations, independent, and semi-independent boards and commissions" (Dawson, 1975:48). They can build up important relationships with such bodies, for

Not only are they subject to pressure, but they themselves also make recommendations to government which in many cases reflect the submissions which they receive (Dawson, 1975:48).

A key goal for interest groups, often is to obtain official representation on such bodies.

The reliance of ministers on departmental experts, with their substantive expertise as well as procedural and political know-how, has enhanced the role of the bureaucracy. The bureaucratic elite is itself an important part of the overall federal decision making elite. Its role is reinforced by the tradition of appointing ministers "who know little about the technical aspects of a department's major function" (Presthus, 1974:21). The position of the bureaucracy, enhanced by its constant expansion, is such that it has become one of the most important targets of interest group activity. This has

been reflected in interest group behavioural patterns over the years:

(The expansion of government, especially since World war II, has brought about a considerable shift in the focus of interest group attention from legislative to bureaucratic centers of power (Presthus, 1974:23).

The nature of the bureaucracy has implications for interest group activity. Since it is a fundamentally closed society, there are real limits on the extent to which groups may influence it. Nevertheless, because of its significant role of providing expert advice to political decision makers, the bureaucracy is a focal point for interest groups in Canada. "The main focus for input activities of interest groups is neither parliament nor cabinet but the bureaucracy" (Van Loon and Whittington, 1976:295). Although each year large organizations such as the Canadian Labour Congress, the Canadian Manufacturers' Association and the Canadian Chamber of Commerce present briefs to Cabinet, "the main contact between government and interest groups is at the middle and upper levels of bureaucracy" (Van Loon and Whittington, 1976:295). Relationships with administrators are, therefore, extremely important to interest groups, and "the number of times that groups are deliberately consulted or may take an opportunity to exercise influence is considerable" (Dawson, 1975:46).

In summary, given the manner in which our system of government limits interest group power, it is understandable that interest groups concentrate on gaining access to the Cabinet and the bureaucracy. Bureaucrats can be very useful as a long-term route of influence. The growth in recent years of the bureaucracy has been accompanied by a growth in the staffs of both MPs and ministers, ~~perhaps~~ to watch over the bureaucracy. Similarly, the Prime Minister has expanded his staff to keep track of the ministerial staffs. The overall cost has been a loss in ministerial control over ideas, and hence the content of legislation, to the bureaucracy. If Parliament and legislative committees increase in importance within the policy process, so will interest group activity directed at them. But, given our system of government, "it is inevitable that Canadian organizations find it essential to influence policy and legislation before the parliamentary stage is reached" (Dawson, 1969:107). The concentration of policy making power within Cabinet and the bureaucracy relegates Parliament and its committees, as well as political caucuses and parties, to lower levels of priority for interest groups. For, once the Cabinet has approved legislation, and the cogwheels of the bureaucracy have become enmeshed, there is little that can be done except under extraordinary circumstances;

"if a government is really committed to a piece of legislation, it will be a rare pressure campaign that will stop its passage" (Van Loon and Whittington, 1976:204). Interest groups, therefore, in order to succeed, must influence Cabinet and its advisors before they have drafted legislation; and/or the bureaucracy before it has been operationalized to deliver or administer a piece of legislation.

Interest groups in Canada are best conceptualized as "pervasive and necessary links in the process of communication that bind government and people" (Pross, 1975:1). They are necessary as forms of public representation in giving a democratic basis to our parliamentary system.

Canadian interest groups are, for the most part, politically non-partisan. They

try to avoid any discernable leaning toward a political party for fear of encountering difficulties when their favoured party is not in power. The groups almost universally say that a minister's party label is not important to them (Dawson, 1975:48).

The main concern is stability; avoiding conflict, seeking accommodation and maintenance of themselves and the system within which they have gained legitimacy (Kwavnick, 1972).

Interest groups in Canada are reactive, possessing a notably adaptive capacity. Thus Pross has labelled them

"adaptable instruments of political communication"
(1975:2).

It is generally accepted that interest groups are essential in our political system. They provide a day-to-day connection between officials and citizens, giving advice on or support for policy proposals. "Their presence makes for a dynamic and healthy political system", according to Pross (1975:1). He is not alone. Indeed, Presthus has shown that, despite what most people might think, federal legislators themselves "regard interest groups and their agents as functionally necessary and normatively legitimate elements in the political process", although this sentiment is more strongly felt by opposition than government MPs (1971:459).

At least some senior bureaucrats share this positive attitude towards interest groups. A case in point is Peter Thompson, executive assistant to former federal Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce, Jack Horner, who at that time reportedly received up to one hundred calls a day from lobbyists. He considered interest groups "an important information source, greatly appreciated in many cases" (cited in Blaikie, 1979:44).

The acceptance of interest groups in our political system arises out of their two main functions: the aggregation of opinions and information; and their articulation. They also can be valuable sources of support to decision makers in their representative function: they help inform government of community interests and public attitudes. They are, furthermore, important analysts of policy proposals, often acting as research and information advisors to government. That is not to say that they derive great influence from these functions; however, in many cases they could be merely filling in gaps within the federal bureaucracy. Nevertheless, communications from interest groups are often used by government to gauge public opinion.

Interest groups have functions not only in making policy but also in its implementation. They often become agents of the state, applying new rules to, and generally disseminating information among, their members.

The output functions of interest groups are: the dissemination of information, the maintenance of communication, research and publicity. The first is the most important. Groups, as well, have administrative

functions such as self-regulation and the administration of some government programs. Groups are often left to perform the persuasion function of Burke's representatives, as part of what can amount to their provision of valuable policy support.

Interest groups in Canada influence political decisions, buttress the political system and generally support it by applying pressure through legitimate channels and means. They help to integrate the individual into the political system. Ultimately, they provide two-way communication, legitimation and regulation of policies, and supplementation of government administration.

Interest groups in Canada are best seen as either institutional or issue-oriented. Institutional groups are those organizations of which people normally think when talking about interest groups. They exhibit characteristics of organizational continuity and cohesion, and stable membership and resources. They generally have a great deal of knowledge as to what sectors of government most affect their membership. They normally pursue concrete, immediate operational objectives. The organization, itself, for these groups, is usually considered more important than any particular objective. This type of group

is, in Canada, by far the most consistently successful.

Issue-oriented groups, on the other hand, are often loosely referred to as "pressure groups". They have limited continuity and cohesion, are generally naive about government and are poorly organized, with a fluid membership. They have difficulty in sticking with any short-range objectives, which are usually ill-defined. They have limited resources, a limited institutional base and a low regard for organizational mechanisms for carrying out their goals. They orient themselves around a particular issue or series of linked issues. Issue-oriented groups usually emerge spontaneously in response to a particular event. Their continued existence depends upon the climate of opinion into which they emerge. They normally promote broad, difficult-to-define causes, and are dependent upon the media for public exposure. They often form on the basis of an attitude rather than an interest. They must aim at the top level of government, since they can enjoy no institutional grounding in the administrative arm of government. They are not concerned about their future, giving their best effort on the particular issue with which they are concerned. Their existence usually terminates with the issue to which they have attached themselves.

A second important distinction among interest groups is that between self-interested and public-minded groups. There exists a spectrum among groups in Canada ranging from extreme private self-interestedness to public do-goodism. The former is self-explanatory. The latter constitutes those groups which Goldstein refers to as "public-interest" groups,

organizations which seek to promote particular social or political policies in the name of some general good....They are organized around a status or role which virtually all members of society share, or might share, in common -- consumer, taxpayer or citizen (1979:138).

- * Public interest groups are often, but not necessarily issue-oriented. Both share the inherent disadvantages of limited resources (especially financial) and political legitimacy, as well as ill-defined priorities.

One final point regarding the nature of interest groups in Canada remains to be made. They can be either self-created or government stimulated (Van Loon and Whittington, 1976). The government often creates special interest groups to fill gaps in expertise and advice in and for the bureaucracy. As well, many existing groups receive funding from the federal and provincial government (s). It should be noted that each category of groups to be discussed in succeeding chapters potentially includes groups with any combination of these characteristics.

We have seen already the effects of the governmental system on interest group behaviour. The success of interest groups is dependent on "their willingness or ability to adapt their techniques to changing institutions and centres of decision-making" (Dawson, 1975:50). At best, access to government may be institutionalized, through, for example, official representation on such bodies as advisory committees. This arrangement can help maintain access, which can nevertheless further the success of the group. However, tempered demands and compromised positions often result from such arrangements. At worst, the results can mean the complete co-opting of the group. As Kwavnick warns,

membership on a representative advisory board merely serves to tie an interest group to government policy without giving the leaders of the group much opportunity to participate in the formulation of that policy (1972:221).

A second element in interest group success is personality. The personalities of decision makers are themselves very important. Equally significant is personal representation of the group's interests within the decision making elite. Access via personal connections can be very beneficial; the absence of such representatives may very well be detrimental. At the least, an interest group should seek, if not direct representation, influence over a parti-

cular member or group of members of the decision making elite. Mutual trust and respect is very important in a relationship between interest group leaders and decision makers. Informal relationships are often more useful to that end than formal ones (Dawson, 1969:107-108).

The actual size of interest groups generally is not decisive in determining success, unless it can be translated into political power (e.g. votes). As well, high prestige of a group in the eyes of government can be beneficial; the reputation a group enjoys in the eyes of government officials is important (Van Loon and Whittington, 1976:301-305). Finally, the ability of a group to identify its particular interests with those of the general public can also help in its success.

By far the most important factor in determining the success of an interest group is its perceived legitimacy. In essence, this can mean "the transformation of power and influence into authority" (Presthus, 1971:444-445). It was best developed by Kwavnick (1972) who specified three conditions: socially acceptable standards of organization, support for the system of government, and conformity to socially acceptable rules of conduct. If groups are to be viewed as legitimate spokesmen for segments of society, these demands must be adhered to. Their effect on group

behaviour is stabilizing. Since groups owe their existence to certain legitimating conditions, they must conform to acceptable standards in order to maintain the legitimacy earned through that conformity. Thus interest groups tend to support the system in which they are working; indeed they must if they are to be regarded as legitimate.

Similarly, legitimacy refers to the acceptability of the interest represented by a particular group, in the perception of both society and government decision makers. Groups must also appear as legitimate spokesmen for a sector of society; they must appear to have a mandate. This can itself aid in a group's success, as it binds the group to government, given the need of the latter for the representation of the viewpoints of all sectors of society. Legitimacy, ultimately, involves the acceptability of the interest being represented, the way it is represented, and by whom it is put forward. Groups tend to be most legitimate and hence, successful, when their contentions concur with government intentions.

In the end society itself, most often through its elected leaders and their agents, will determine the role, activity and eventual success or failure of interest groups, just as it does the political system. It has been the case in Canada that interest groups "have had to adapt their

activities to the expectations of the Canadian people or face the prospect of unpleasant consequences" (Kwavnick, 1972:220). The ultimate effect of these truths on interest group behaviour in Canada has been neatly summarized in the following passage from Kwavnick:

Interest group activities in Canada are largely confined to attempts to influence government policy in a direction sanctioned by the underlying climate of opinion, and low-keyed attempts to obtain small favours which lie within the limits set by established government policy. The most effective means of influencing government policy are activities which purport to mobilize public opinion, particularly broadly representative inter-group activities such as national conferences. The most effective means of obtaining favours within the limits of government policy is the development of close day-to-day working relations with civil servants and ministers. Frantic pressure campaigns are rarely mounted, and then only as a last resort (1972:222).

Groups seeking to influence government can do so either directly or indirectly, through what Schattschneider (1960) has aptly described as the privatization of the socialization of their efforts. Socialization -- essentially making an issue public -- broadens the scope of a conflict, and is usually the thrust of issue-oriented groups. Most interest groups tend to keep an issue limited in size, and to preserve its private nature, in order to maintain control over the events of that issue. Interest groups that can gain representation in or direct access to the decision making elite can then use privatized techniques. More vociferous groups

usually appeal to public opinion through the exposure of issues, decisions, modes of policy making, and so on.

The most common interest group communications with decision makers in Canada are: informal group meetings, appointments, social affairs, telephone calls, letters, formal committee hearings, presentation of briefs, and chance meetings. There are two levels of interaction between interest groups and decision makers; the policy level and the individual level. The former usually involves support, advice, and the provision of information from interest groups; the latter is based more on friendship, including campaign support for politicians or parties and personal services for contacts in government (Presthus, 1971:246). Interest groups can also: mobilize public opinion; make personal contact with Cabinet ministers, or Cabinet as a whole; appear before committees; lobby jointly with other groups; submit formal briefs; and contact members of the bureaucracy. The second and last of these tactics appear to be the most important:

the most effective presentations of interest group views...involve direct and informal contact between the bureaucracy and interest groups during the process of policy formulation and, occasionally, between group leaders and Cabinet minister (Van Loon and Whittington, 1976:298-299).

Interest groups can best gain influence once direct access to decision making circles has been established. Access can be assured via the recruitment and placement

of a sympathizer (group member or otherwise) in the decision making elite. Influence can then come from getting power allocated to those sympathizers. In general, pressing for the adoption of their own values and goals by decision makers is fundamental to group influence (Deutsch and Edinger, 1959:89). An excellent example of an interest group achieving direct representation to a decision making body was the appointment, in 1970, to the Canadian Wheat Board, of the President of the Alberta Wheat Pool.

Groups in Canada are generally not very active in the public sphere. The press is used at times to help in indirect influence, but not extensively. Radio and television are becoming popular as media of communication for group opinions, but only to a limited extent. Public relations are not important, mostly due to the relative insignificance of Parliament, especially the majority of MPs, in foreign policy making. The elite decision structure of our parliamentary system of government necessitates a different approach. Thus public efforts (socialization) are last-ditch, crisis manoeuvres, or are employed by groups having difficulty gaining access to decision makers. Parliamentary concern, like media coverage, can add to the momentum of an issue, and can sometimes be crucial if public support has been aroused on a large enough scale. However, there are few examples of interest group influence of this type.

The chief methods of influence are as follows: direct and continuous contact with the decision makers, getting to know them and making friends; presentation of briefs and other direct but sporadic contact; influencing advisory committees and the advisors to decision makers (through interviews, formal hearings, visits and such), and attempting to achieve "interlocking membership" (getting your man on the committee); influencing public opinion; submissions to Cabinet; representations to MPs and Ministers; informal meetings, social affairs, telephone calls, letters, and chance meetings with decision makers. To succeed, groups probably should employ more than one tactic at a time since a combination of efforts provides a better coverage of all the possible angles.

CHAPTER II:

Interest Groups and Foreign Policy

The academic study of the role of interest groups in the Canadian foreign policy process is relatively new. Much work has been done in the USA, however. This is especially true in terms of the conceptual theory on which any thesis on this topic necessarily relies. Before assessing the Canadian literature on the subject, considerable use can be made of existing American findings and theory, as background to this study. What follows is an overview of the contributions made by American scholars, especially in conceptual theory, but also in empirical observations.

Interest groups, like private individuals, can be seen as having at their disposal two fundamental approaches to influencing foreign policy decision makers. As Kenneth P. Adler and Davis Bobrow have explained, influence may be achieved either by directly affecting the thinking of and/or behaviour of policy makers, or indirectly by affecting the thinking of the attentive public, which in turn applies pressure on the policy maker (1956:90). The methods available to influence policy decisions are likewise fundamentally two-fold.

Direct methods include communication via letters, telephone calls, personal contacts and appearances before

legislative committees. Indirect methods include actions by the interest group most concerned such as advertising in the media; and interventions by group members, affiliates, or other citizens or publics (including other interest groups), on behalf of that interest group. The success of an indirect strategy thus depends largely on relationships built up with other domestic actors; the direct approach depends on relationships fostered with the policy makers themselves (Gable, 1958:90). "The major difference between the methods", writes Professor Trice,

is that indirect efforts involve at least a two-stage process whereas direct methods involve only a single stage process. Thus, instead of attempting to gain support from other domestic elements who in turn try to influence governmental actors as is characteristic of indirect methods, direct techniques are aimed specifically at policy makers (1978:239).

Although the goal of both direct and indirect strategies is a shared one -- "getting the consideration and support of policy makers" (Trice, 1978:239) -- the methods are different. In indirect methods, interest groups can seek the aid of other nongovernmental actors such as the media, particularly the press, and opinionated publics. Normally, such an approach takes one of two forms: additional support for a group's attempts at direct influence; or replacement for a channel of direct access in the event that the group has insufficient.

Problems also arise with indirect methods of influence. First, to turn to public opinion as a source of pressure on government is expensive. It is, too, as risky as direct lobbying in terms of success. In order to respond supportively, the public must be convinced of the case, plight or cause of the group involved. Thirdly, it places an interest group in a vulnerable position in terms of its credibility with government, which in many cases opposes such tactics. Fourthly, an interest group when entering a public forum must be able to match the expertise of the bureaucrats even more than when confronting them directly, since the general public in most cases attributes proficiency in foreign policy almost entirely to government officials and politicians. Furthermore, the public is not overly concerned with foreign affairs, and a group would therefore face a difficult task in rallying support on a particular issue. Indeed, a group's leaders would experience a difficult time in their efforts to arouse the support of even their own group members unless the issue in question was extremely serious. Interest groups, to illustrate further, can rarely use as a pressuring tactic mass opposition at the polls. There is virtually no real influence over membership votes unless the very existence of the group is perceived to be at stake in an issue, or if the values around which the group organized are brought into question. Most people, having more than one interest to which they attach themselves, decide their voting pattern on a

broader basis than one interest or one group membership (Hilsman, 1971:105-106). As a result of these and other obstacles, "few interest groups attempt to mount large grass roots campaigns on foreign policy questions" (Milbrath, 1967:243). On the whole, having opted for the indirect route (for whatever reasons) a group would be better off to solicit the support of other groups and/or public officials. Then, however, the groups risk losing control of the involvement in the issue of its allies, and consequently the protection of its particular interests, including the credit for successful efforts which may be an important organizational concern of a group's leaders. The entire direct approach may be summarily clarified with reference once again to Trice:

Relative to the direct approach, there is likely to be considerably more diffusion and distortion when an indirect strategy is employed and a group's policy preferences are forced to follow a circuitous route from the initiating group through various filters in the domestic environment to relevant policy-makers. Moreover, the effects of a "successfully" implemented indirect strategy are often difficult to attribute to the one interest group that employs it, owing to the fact that the policy preferences and effects of other domestic actors necessarily become intertwined with those of the initiating group (1978:239).

It should be noted, finally, that in many cases interest groups need be neither vocal nor active in order to be effective. They

may have important effects on foreign policy even when they remain silent. In some cases the silence of major interest groups that are ordinarily quick to take a policy stand may be construed as acquiescence in the course of policy being pursued by the government...Or words may not be required to make clear the feelings of a group: its position on a particular area of policy may be so well known and so important to the policy makers that they are constrained to take it into account in their first formulation of policy (Cohen, 1959:5).

Essentially, then, an interest group is left with a choice of approaches in its attempts to influence foreign policy decisions. It can rely on any one of the methods mentioned above, or a mix. Which approach is adopted by a group ultimately depends on its "perceptions of the receptivity of governmental actors and the relative friendliness of hostility of the political environment within which it operates" (Trice, 1978:239).

The role which interest groups play in the formulation of foreign policy has been seen rightfully by American scholars as inextricably linked to the political system of a country, "since the political system defines the opportunities, the constraints, the channels, the mechanisms that are available to non-governmental actors to participate in foreign policy making" (Cohen, 1977-78:196). Interest groups are merely auxiliary actors standing between the government and the mass public, "tied to the governmental decision-making system by channels of communication" (Trice, 1978:238). They must, therefore, work within these channels

of communication, where influence will take place if it is going to. Interest groups, having no formal policy-making authority, are reliant upon individuals within the government who do have the right or power to make or influence decisions, and thus to translate group policy preferences into decisional outputs. Interest groups seeking influence, then, must determine where, when and by whom decisions are reached before they are able to choose the strategy with the most potential for effectively communicating with decision makers. Groups must know the actors and the states of their deliberations on any given issue if they are to be able to open a channel of access to the proper target at the proper time. Once the route and the timing are determined, it remains only to adopt the proper method of access -- the one through which a message will become the least distorted -- and the most suitable type of communication for a group to maximize its potential to influence a policy decision (Milbrath, 1967:238-240).

To a very great extent, the ability of interest groups to influence foreign policy decisions, especially in a direct fashion, is determined by the policy process itself. There are two general manners in which decisions are made which can help determine the level of influence which interest groups can have: intellectual and social processes.

Intellective decisions are those based on task-oriented deliberations among the decision makers. The dominant factors in social decisions are the personal relations among the decision makers. In the latter process, the size of the decision making group is an important factor, as is the collective perception of the decision makers as to the importance of their task in the former. Where these two factors overlap, the process has a tendency to be a social one. It has been concluded that,

interest groups are likely to find it easier to gain access to social process decisions than to those involving the intellective process. The latter do not foreclose group access, but...they represent many more difficulties in this respect than do social process decisions (Milbrath, 1967:238).

Thus the nature of an issue or a decision helps to determine the process by which it will be made, as well as the groups which can legitimately intervene; both have implications for interest group activity and influence.

When an interest group attempts to influence directly a policy decision, its messages must pass through the "organizational and perceptual screen" of the decision making process (Milbrath, 1967:236). Nearly all messages or communications from the intermediate structure thus are screened, and for two requisite characteristics, legitimacy and credibility. In order for a message to move along the policy process to the level where its influence will be maximum, its source must be perceived by the recipient as

as having the right to comment. This legitimacy is normally linked to the effects a policy will have on a group -- the stake it has in an issue -- as well as the normative social acceptability of the group itself and its particular participation in the particular policy in question. It is important that an interest group be able to point out how a policy would affect its members if adopted and implemented, within a message that is consistent with the group's overall purpose. Another important factor is the ability of a group to present itself as the legitimate spokesman for the segment of society being represented.

Credibility, which is closely related conceptually to legitimacy, refers to the reputation a group must establish in policy making circles; preferably one of honesty, rationality, knowledgeability, accuracy and integrity. This can be achieved through the inclusion in any communication of unique facts, including those dealing with the possible consequences of a policy, thereby enhancing the groups' credibility as a source of valuable information for the policy makers. As well, the sheer force of an argument can be useful. In reality, however, these last two suggestions are difficult to achieve, given the level of bureaucratic expertise in general relative to most interest groups, especially on matters of foreign policy. Finally, the style of presentation is of the essence in establishing

credibility: a group's message must create an image of importance if it is to command the serious attention of its recipients.

Officials tend to pay the closest attention to messages they want to hear or read. This observation is part of what Milbrath has termed the "highly individualistic characteristic of message reception by officials" (1967:240). In most cases, other communications either tend to be ignored or to become distorted to conform with the officials' preconceptions. Unless they are promoting the same action, the more messages sent his way, the more freedom an official has to follow his own dispositions. Furthermore, Cohen has argued that

policy makers are not often persuaded to act (or not to act) in favour of persons or groups with whom they are in basic ideological or political conflict. Put more positively, there generally appears to be a close affinity between the policy maker and the individual or group whose position he is persuaded to support (1959:14).

More specific is Cupp's similar observation regarding bureaucratic agencies and interest groups. He contends that

All bureaucratic agencies have their "client" groups -- those organized interests affected by the agency's responsibilities who have established access to agency officials and exert significant influence over policy formulation and administration by working closely with agency decision-makers (1976:1).

Thus it can be seen that "To a very great extent, officials determine the nature and amount of messages they will allow through their perceptual screen" within the policy process (Milbrath, 1967:240).

Finally, it is clear that the scope and location of decision makers shifts from issue to issue according to the nature of the question, as do the groups involved in trying to influence the decision makers. This factor adds to the already complex nature of the process within which interest groups must work in order to affect directly foreign policy decisions. All in all, attempts to influence policy makers directly within such a process is extremely difficult and the results are highly unpredictable (Milbrath, 1967: 243-244).

An American scholar, Barry B. Hughes, has put together a comprehensive typology of interest groups involved in foreign policy in the USA. He first breaks up groups into two main categories -- economic and non-economic -- and then looks at the main types of groups within each category, their concerns and relative levels of influence over foreign policy decisions. A brief look at what Hughes has observed and recorded will serve well as a guide for the typology of Canadian groups to be presented later in the study.

Under the category of economic interest groups, business groups were found to be the most influential, despite the existence of intrabusiness divisions (e.g. free traders versus protectionists). They are most concerned with trade and tariff issues, including trade with communist states, foreign aid, and the activity of multinational corporations in the international economy.

Hughes' findings are well worth quoting:

the business community as a whole does not participate in setting the general internationalist framework within which American foreign policy is made. It has been an especially powerful force underlying U.S. determination to move toward lower tariffs and freer trade. Yet neither the general business community nor specific industries can dictate the details of foreign policy, even foreign economic policy on trade and aid. There is insufficient consensus among industries to do so. Some individual corporations or industries do influence U.S. policy toward countries in which they have a major interest and can even be powerful international political actors in their own right (1978:164).

Organized labour in the USA has been internationalist in approach on most issues, but by no means in a monolithic sense. The unions' primary concern is with employment for their members. Immigration is therefore a major concern. They are also highly interested in the free trade protectionism debate. As well, they have shown concern for the role played by MNCs and foreign investment in general, particularly as American workers have to compete for jobs

with pools of cheap labour elsewhere in the world. Finally, American unions have long exhibited a strong anticommunist strain. On the whole, labour is not as active in foreign policy lobbying as are business groups, taken collectively.

Organized agriculture in the USA, fundamentally a big business, has been chiefly interested in the volume of exports and the condition of world markets. It generally opposes foreign aid, although the main agricultural groups (the American Farm Bureau Federation, the National Grange and the National Farmers' Union) rarely agree wholeheartedly with each other. As Hughes summarizes:

They all favour what is in their economic interests: expanded exports of agricultural products. In general, they oppose restrictions in international trading, although with differing fervour and alternative suggestions concerning the most effective procedures for expanding exports. Beyond this narrow (albeit important) ground of agreement, their international policy positions differ remarkably (1978:171).

Hughes includes professional groups -- those groups that form on the basis of the shared profession of its members -- in the economic category. Such organizations are plentiful, for example, bar associations, scientific groups and education societies, but are seldom involved in foreign policy matters, despite their relatively well-informed membership.

The first type of non-economic groups at which Hughes looks are veterans' groups. These groups, of which the American Legion is the largest, tend to be nationalistic, strongly militaristic, opposed to large scale immigration, anticommunist, and pro-armed forces. The highest degree of influence enjoyed by this category of groups comes over matters such as veterans' benefits. Complementary to these groups are the military support associations such as the Navy League, the Air Force Association and the Association for the US Army. They often ally with business groups such as the American Ordnance Association, the National Security Industrial Association and the Aerospace Industries Association, who share common goals. These include the maintenance of a strong military posture and the purchase of new weapons systems. The provision of experts to government for consultative purposes is a major function for them.

Women's groups in the USA are characterized by a concern for internationalism, the strengthening of the UN, peace, the liberalization of trade, increased development assistance, including preferential trade treatment for LDCs, and increased relations with mainland China. Religious groups, too, are usually liberal and internationalist in orientation, presumably a function of religious pacifism and humanitarianism.

Hughes sees the influence of groups based on ethnic origin as largely a function of population. Groups of this type include: the Irish and the Germans, both of which exhibit anti-British sentiment; the central and eastern Europeans, characterized by strong anticommunism and support for liberal immigration quotas; nationalist (hence anti-communist) Chinese; Arabs, Jews and other Near Eastern peoples. Ethnic groups in the USA are very often concerned with immigration, displaced persons, human rights, foreign aid, and the general interests of their particular homeland.

Oftentimes groups of individuals sharing beliefs, usually of a liberal or internationalist strain, join together for the exclusive purpose of influencing foreign policy. These "foreign policy" groups are often peace-oriented bodies, usually with strong academic ties, which aim at public education and study in the field of international relations. They tend not to be active lobbyists and concentrate on such internationalist issues as food, resources, trade, development, and arms control, for example. So-called "citizens' groups" are often ad hoc, issue-oriented groups similar to foreign policy groups but with a more ideological bias.

Many US scholars in the past have drawn conclusions concerning interest group influence over American foreign

policy. Bernard Cohen has been the leader in this field since he expressed in a short monograph in 1959 conclusions which remain accepted today. First, he saw "direct and significant influence" largely as a function of protection or advancement of particular group interests; "the *raison d'etre* of the interest groups". Groups were more influential, he observed, when pursuing what was "essentially private rather than public interest". Thus economic and ethnic or other minority groups, due to the specific nature of their interests, enjoyed the greatest influence over foreign policy (11).

Secondly, Cohen concluded that "particular groups are perhaps most effective on an individual basis when the policy issue in which they are interested is, for whatever reason, not in the public eye" (11). Public lack of interest may occur on any public question for a number of reasons: a narrow subject matter, the technical nature of an issue, an unspectacular, undramatic question. When the attentive public is very small, "it is much easier for specific interest groups to establish their position as the representatives of the only sectors of the public that are vitally concerned about the policy in hand" (12). As well, when public interest is low, an interest group can draw the attention of the press and the public to an issue, in order to influence the government's behaviour on the question.

Cohen also concluded that although interest groups may be active on a wide range of foreign policy issues, their span of influence is generally limited "to the area of their special policy interest" (12). Business groups formed an exception to this rule:

While their influence may be regarded as highest when it comes to matters of international economic policy, in our contemporary society the businessman is frequently called upon for his advice and administrative experience in a wider range of foreign policy matters (12).

Cohen, then, saw what he labelled "an easily identifiable... division of influence" among interest groups in the foreign policy field, with business groups on top. This division was based upon: the legitimacy of a group's interest in any particular foreign policy matter; the specificity of the interest being represented; the traditional sympathy of decision makers with business groups; the balancing of opposing interests in non-economic groups; and the excessive demands of non-economic groups in terms of what they often ask "for the public good" (15).

Cohen saw civic, professional, women's, ideological and religious groups as the least effective in their attempts to influence American foreign policy. Economic groups he considered the most effective, just as they are in the realm of domestic policy. Because foreign economic policy was the aspect of foreign policy most susceptible to

pressure by nongovernmental organizations, business groups, trade associations and organized labour enjoyed the most influence (6-8). Similarly, Burdette and Cupps have concluded that economic groups, particularly organized farmers, shippers, labour and trade associations are the most effective (1953:92-93; 1976:1). Freeman and Showel had suggested in their earlier study that "Business, political and veterans associations appear to exert the widest...influence" (1951-52:713). Finally, it has been accepted that, as Cohen concluded, "interest groups seem to have considerably less effect on foreign policy than they do in the domestic realm" (1959:6).

Hughes has drawn the most recent and comprehensive conclusions about the influence of domestic interest groups over foreign policy in the USA, some of which concur with the earlier findings mentioned above. He has found that economic groups are the most effective, especially on economic issues. Having a greater stake in such issues, they put more effort into and employ more resources in dealing with them. Secondly, their expertise on economic issues breeds greater legitimacy, hence government receptivity of their views on them. Hughes also contends that the longer the decision-making period, and the smaller the attentive public involved in a particular question, the greater is the potential for an economic interest group to influence a foreign policy decision. Finally, he adds that the more strictly economic an issue, the

greater the opportunity for economic interest groups to influence that issue. Overall, economic groups gain their potential to influence first and foremost from the resources they can commit to an issue, Hughes concludes; since these are generally great, they have been effective in influencing policy over a long period of time (1978:211-215).

Non-economic interest groups are also most influential when their particular interest is at stake, a condition which Hughes sees as a rarity. But, assuming expertise in their area of greatest legitimacy, non-economic groups derive potential influence from a long decision-making period, the non-economic nature of an issue, a small attentive public, and the possibility of a group coalition (a "united front"). When they appear to represent wide public sentiment, these groups are the most effective. Hughes concludes that "rapidly growing and large ad hoc groups can be especially effective" (1978:218). In general, however, non-economic interest groups have had a low level of impact on American foreign policy.

Hughes explains this phenomenon using the conceptual tool of "comparative disadvantage". First, non-economic groups have a comparative disadvantage vis-a-vis economic groups since economic questions are the easiest to influence; and because the impact of decisions in this area can be gauged

more easily. Furthermore, non-economic groups lack legitimacy and expertise on such questions, especially relative to economic groups; there exists a bias in the American political culture on the part of decision makers toward business groups; and economic arguments are better received by decision makers. Secondly, non-economic groups suffer from a comparative disadvantage with the general public on the broader policy issues over which they have the greatest potential to enjoy influence. Hughes argues that it takes a "massive coalition" of non-economic groups to influence policy through being perceived as representative of general public opinion. It is clear that non-economic groups acting alone are the least likely to be effective on most policy questions. They are, in general, "not particularly effective" due to competition from counter-interests and a frequent absence of legitimacy.

The nature of non-economic issues also works to the comparative disadvantage of non-economic groups. Domestic factors are not as important in non-economic issues as they are in economic ones. It is usually the case, as well, that non-economic questions have a limited decision time. The impact of non-economic decisions is often difficult to gauge. As a result, little if any influence can be exerted over such issues by interest groups: there is very little public input,

and little time for decision makers to consider outside opinion.

In summary, Hughes sees interest groups as more active on economic issues, which are usually easier to influence. There is a greater direct impact on the part of interest groups (especially economic ones and particularly business organizations) in the economic area of foreign policy. On the other side of the coin, interest groups are least effective over non-economic issues, although non-economic groups have the best chance of influencing those non-economic questions which are characterized by a long decision period. Group activity and influence in foreign policy remains a function of the "identifiability of impact" of any particular question (1978:199). The three most important factors determining the extent and nature of interest group activity and influence in the foreign policy field are the nature of the issue, the nature of the decision-making process for that issue, and the time period involved.

Hughes' description does not, of course, apply in its entirety to the Canadian setting. The details of how it differs will become apparent in the course of the thesis, and need not be dealt with at this point. We can see that a number of US scholars have contributed significantly to the study of interest groups and foreign policy over the

last three decades. Let us now move on to consider the state of the literature on this subject in Canada. Any such review must make reference to the existing information on the Canadian foreign policy process as a whole. As already noted, decision-making structures have a significant impact on the role played therein by interest groups.

The Canadian parliamentary system "tends to shelter the foreign policy process behind a unified legislative-executive structure" (McNaught, 1954:17), coordinating the instruments of national policy and protecting them from "capture by special interests" (Eayrs, 1961:200). Our unified electoral process and the powerful control which the executive exerts over the legislature permits much to be done in the foreign policy field without arousing public interest. As well, there is little disagreement on most foreign policy questions among our major political parties. This bipartisanship in foreign policy results in less discussion of it in the legislature, especially of its fundamental premises (McNaught, 1954:15). In consequence, the point of access most susceptible to interest group pressure activity is removed, thereby limiting group behaviour within the policy process. As McNaught concluded twenty-five years ago, the overall effect of the characteristic of the foreign policy process in Canada is that of "integrating the work of agencies charged with formulation and implementation, rather than securing any real influence

over foreign policy for the legislative branch. The system provides a unified and powerful control of foreign policy... " (1954:15). This remains true today, but to a somewhat lesser extent.

Aside from Cabinet, Eayrs found that this control is also concentrated in what he labelled the "foreign policy under cabinet" made up of deputy ministers, and occasionally associate and assistant deputy ministers, from the Departments of External Affairs, National Defence, Industry Trade and Commerce, Finance and Transport. The under cabinet included senior officials from the Bank of Canada and the Prime Minister's Office. It is supported in turn by a bureaucratic elite comprised of assistant deputy ministers or heads of branches or divisions (1961:89-90). Eayrs' general observation was that

at the summit of the civil service the divisions between foreign and domestic affairs all but disappear. At this exalted level the gaze of the civil servant sweeps across the whole horizon of public policy...(and) key members from ...(many) departments and agencies of government bring their experience to bear upon problems of external policy (1961:89).

This conclusion concurs with a similar one reached much later by Mitchell Sharp that

the leading advisors of the government do not work in watertight compartments within their departments jealously guarding their priorities; they make a practice of consultation (1969:84).

Furthermore, this cross-departmental decision-making elite has certain advantages which appear to limit further the possibility of effective interest group participation in foreign policy making. The generally permissive apathy of the public at large greatly weakens the ability of groups to influence government indirectly. Further, the ability of groups to influence policy or policy makers directly can also be seen as limited by structural characteristics of the Canadian foreign policy process. The decision elite can claim possession of privileged information and expertise, which in turn is strengthened by power of concealment. The longer attention span and superior staying power of the bureaucracy is another advantage. Related to those two preceding points is the larger and more fertile store of communication and other resources at the disposal of the decision elite. This advantage is most effective when using the media to elicit public support for policies, through leaks, for example. There is also the omnipresent ability and opportunity to play off against each other countervailing group pressures.

Denis Stairs, the foremost scholar on the domestic factors of Canadian foreign policy making, has argued that Canadian decision makers have traditionally disliked expressions of public opinion on foreign policy issues. They have felt that there is already an overload of constraints

on their freedom to act, and that further limits to their manoeuvrability are entirely unnecessary and undesirable. Secondly, they have viewed the game of statecraft as too complex and delicate for the general public to understand. Thirdly, public interventions generally have been seen as inconvenient at best, and dangerously destructive at worst (1977-78: 141-142). Finally, as Protheroe has concluded in a similar vein,

One thing is at once clear; groups which are perceived as not being understanding of the policy-maker's delicate position and who are seen as attempting to embarrass policy-makers or enter into partisan politics are at a distinct disadvantage (1979:75).

Excepting the last observation, these traditional views would probably be qualified considerably by today's foreign policy decision makers. Interest groups now are seen frequently as helpful, if not essential. In fact, much of their activity has been fostered by the federal government. Such support as might be forthcoming can be useful in enhancing, for example, the government's bargaining position on an issue, such as during multinational negotiations, or in a diplomatic controversy like the Norman Affair. The general consensus in the literature to date, however, is that group opinion is for the most part still regarded by policy makers as "an unnecessary complication in circumstances already difficult enough" (Stairs, 1977-78:142).

This description could lead one to expect, at first glance, the existence of very little opportunity for interest groups to play an effective role in the Canadian foreign policy process. However, a closer look reveals a few particular conditions which lead to a significantly different conclusion. Indeed, present trends in decision making at the federal level in Canada point to the very real possibility that interest groups are becoming an increasingly important element in the foreign policy process, in terms of both legitimacy and opportunity. The foreign policy issues of interest to groups are more relevant -- hence their activity on those issues appears as more legitimate -- than ever before, because of the constantly increasing identifiable domestic effects of foreign affairs. Stairs explains this phenomenon as follows:

As the world becomes functionally more interdependent...and as developments abroad come in consequence to have unexpected side effects at home, the Canadian policy community may become increasingly reliant on constituent reaction as an indicator of what the government's foreign policy problems really are (1977-78:130).

There are many examples which substantiate Stairs' observation: positions on human rights by ethnic minorities in Canada, for example in the case of our stance at the CSCE; reports and reactions to pollution in transborder lakes and

rivers (as in the Garrison controversy) or of American "acid rain" (e.g. in Nova Scotia), by environmental groups; organized fishermen complaining about the destruction of Canadian lobster traps by Soviet trawlers; or Canadian media lamentations arising from the loss of Canadian advertising contracts to the American mass media (Stairs, 1977-78:130). The foreign policy agenda has been broadened, thereby opening new routes of access to groups, as well as increasing the need for constituent opinions. The legitimacy of group involvement in the foreign policy process has been enhanced. Since Trudeau first came to power, the over-riding philosophy has been that foreign policy is the extension of domestic interests. He, in effect, sent out an invitation to the public to enter the act of foreign policy making. Similarly, the Clark government issued a challenge to the public to demonstrate its interest in foreign policy, as illustrated in the case of the "boat people".

Secondly, the bureaucratic politics which have emerged in Ottawa have led to greater departmental, even personal reliance on support in the policy process. The "array of de facto alliances between the other ministries of government and their client publics" has affected those sectors of government involved in the foreign policy process (Stairs, 1977-78:145). In particular, the role of the Department of External Affairs in domestic federal decisions

has increased in recent years (although Alan Gottlieb's "central agency" doctrine has not been achieved), enhancing interest groups' roles and influence within the decision-making system. Increased interdepartmental interaction and conflict, resulting from the increasingly interdepartmental nature of foreign policy, has aided interest groups.¹ Their opportunity to participate in the foreign policy process has thus been enhanced by the more numerous routes of access now open in that area -- routes which have been well cultivated in "domestic" departments, but which previously did not lead into the realm of foreign policy decisions (Stairs, 1977-78:145). It is apparent, then, that interest groups can be important to the Canadian foreign policy process, and probably will be increasingly so, as a result of changing circumstances within that process.

Stairs has also contributed by studying interest group activity in Canadian foreign policy-making in a manner quite similar to that of many of the American scholars discussed earlier. Within the two broad approaches to influence, he has illuminated three particular outcomes of interest group activity in the Canadian foreign policy process.

The first is "agenda-setting", where a group, "without necessarily controlling the policy-maker's response, can

¹For example, DEA's 1968-69 review of Canada's relations with Europe involved consulting eleven other departments and agencies.

serve to place an issue on his desk and can influence his perception of its urgency and importance" (1977-78:130). That is to say that they "can help...to determine his agenda and rank his priorities" (1977-78:130). Secondly, influence can be achieved in the manner of "parameter-setting". In this instance, policy makers are limited in what they can really do on a given subject by a group's having outlined the costs (political or otherwise) of any particular decision. Politically workable choices are thereby confined and the decision maker's freedom of manoeuvre restricted. This result is enhanced especially when group positions are well articulated. Parameter-setting can also result from a policy maker's anticipatory perception of group interests in his effort to "determine in advance of taking a major policy risk what lies within, and what without, the range of domestically acceptable policy options" (1977-78:133).

Finally, and ideally from a group's perspective, choices may be determined by limiting the range of workable alternatives to one. This phenomenon, "policy-setting", occurs when the policy maker obeys the directive to "do X" as opposed to "do anything as long as you don't do Y". This leaves no leeway for the policy maker and hence lessens his freedom to manoeuvre. In essence, this type of influence normally results in a government agreement to "try X" in order to satisfy domestic opinion. Influence in this sense

depends highly on effective articulation of opinion
(1977-78:134-135).

Stairs concludes that, excluding questions of moral principle, "the greater the diversity of the citizens who are expressing the opinion, the looser will be their belief, and the more like 'parameter-setting' (the less like 'policy-setting') will their impact...be" (1977-78:135-136). However, he is quick to acknowledge that

what an opinion gains by being specific it may lose...by being sectoral, partly because it runs a greater risk of being countervailed by an opposing view, and partly because the policy community may feel under less pressure to take it seriously (1977-78:136).

Specific interests can enjoy special access to the policy process, especially if they represent a geographically concentrated constituency, for example the Ukrainian community, fishermen, or representatives of the textile industry in Quebec. This characteristic is one which broader, more public opinions often lack. Finally, a legitimate representation from a specific interest group cannot be disregarded by the government; hence the growing tendency to include interest group representatives among the advisors to Canadian delegations attending international conferences. Such was the case, to cite an example, at the Stockholm Conference on the International Environment (June, 1972), where the Canadian delegation included representatives from

the Canadian Labour Congress, the National Indian Brotherhood, the National Youth Conference, the Canadian Federation of Agriculture and the Mining Association of Canada (Stairs, 1978:36, fns. 11, 12).

From this review of the literature, some general propositions suggest themselves. The following hypothetical generalizations will serve as initial suggestions as to what one would expect the realities of the situation in Canada to be. The remainder of the thesis will lead to a final assessment of the actualities of the activity and influence of domestic interest groups in Canadian foreign policy.

First, it seems clear that influence may come indirectly or directly, according to the methods utilized by the groups. Secondly, the policy process itself probably has a substantial role in determining the form and success of group efforts to influence policy making directly. The type of decision, the nature of the particular decision process, the ideosyncracies of the decision makers (individually and collectively), and the approach of a group itself all appear to have implications for the success enjoyed by groups. In Canada, the policy process is largely out of the public eye as a result of the minor role played therein by the legislature. Political bipartisanship in

foreign policy, among other characteristics of the Canadian foreign policy process, has led to a lack of polarization in this area of decision-making. There appears to be elite resistance to public involvement in foreign policy, at least on a wide scale, and the policy process seems to be fundamentally one of elite accommodation. If so, this would necessitate that groups become a part of the elite decision making structure if they are to achieve influence. All of these characteristics of the policy making process help determine group behaviour as well as success. All indications are that the prospects for group involvement and influence in foreign policy in the future are greater than in the past, both as a result of bureaucratic politics in the federal public service and the policy process as a whole, and the changing nature of foreign policy.

Additionally, legitimacy and credibility appear to be the keys to direct influence for interest groups. As a result, economic groups, especially business groups, are likely to be the most influential on a broad range of foreign policy issues. Of the non-economic groups, it is expected that ethnic organizations are the most successful in exerting direct influence. Occasionally, ad hoc or issue-oriented groups, or alliances of groups (especially citizens' groups) on a particular issue, may well be influential in an indirect fashion. Both direct and indirect influence are likely to be

enhanced by a long decision making period and a small attentive public. The nature of an issue seems particularly important in determining the ability of any one group or group of organizations to influence a policy decision. It is expected that specific interests will normally enjoy a greater degree of influence as a result of their higher level of legitimacy on particular issues. Finally, it is anticipated that groups generally are less active in foreign policy as a whole than in domestic issues, but that those groups that influence the former will not differ substantially from those that have an impact on the latter.

CHAPTER III:

Domestic Interest Groups Involved in Canadian Foreign Policy

Canadian interest groups may be categorized to simplify analyzing their activities and behaviour. Englemann and Schwartz have pieced together the most comprehensive typology (1967:95-96). They use two main categories, economic and non-economic. Within the economic classification are found business, labour, agricultural and consumer groups. By far the greatest diversity comes in the non-economic category, where nine different types of non-economic groups are listed: professional, public administration, communications, education, veterans, ethnic, religious, women and ideological or social action groups. For the purposes of this study of foreign policy-making, this typology will be altered slightly, along the lines of the Hughes model presented in Chapter II. Professional groups will be shifted to the economic category because of the nature of the interests of these most involved in foreign policy; education groups will also be included in that classification. Public administration, communications and social action groups will all be included under the heading of "citizens groups", and the categories of "military support" and special "foreign policy" groups will be added, all in the interests of simplicity and practicality. All categories are based on, and are indicators of, the fundamental nature of the interests or membership of the groups.

This typology has been selected due to its practicality and suitability for the subject in question. Alternatives exist: for example, classifying groups as having vested interests or not, being private interest or public interest groups, institutionalized or issue-oriented, interest or pressure groups, or by using different categories than have been selected within the same basic framework. The typology chosen is workably comprehensive for the purposes of this thesis, incorporating the alternative distinctions mentioned above, yet sufficiently flexible to permit an easy classification of groups. Certain groups which may appear as fitting into more than one category have been placed at the author's discretion in the interests of practicality. It should be noted that the typology is only a mechanism for simplifying analysis, which accounts for its flexibility. It is but a structural means of organizing data, and an effort has been made, therefore, to select a "neutral" typology in order to avoid bias through any linkage between it, the facts presented, and the conclusions reached in the course of the analysis.

It should be noted that the cases used to illustrate each category do not represent the full range of groups therein; they are employed for exemplary and illustrative purposes alone. Finally, the descriptions of group positions refer to their official written or stated positions, and not

the perception or interpretation of them by officials, myself or others. An effort has been made to reduce the rhetoric to basic ideas, but this in no way can account for all tactical phraseologies on the part of the groups. Lastly, group motives and objectives will not be spelled out except where they are not self-evident or where they provide valuable or interesting highlights.

Economic Groups

Historically, the interests most involved in making Canadian foreign policy have been economic groups. Motivated primarily by economic growth, capital accumulation, and the strength of their respective sectors of the economy, their concerns have been, first and foremost, with trade policy, but foreign aid also has been of significant interest. Before examining the most important of these groups and their interests and positions, it should be noted that reference to a group's "stand" does not necessarily imply group solidarity. Each group or type of group is by no means monolithic, except under unusual circumstances.

Business

Tariffs have long been of utmost concern to business organizations. Pressure has been placed on the federal government by groups representing divergent interests to move toward either freer trade or increased protection. For example, the federal government has been encouraged by

business groups to participate more extensively in multi-lateral trade negotiations, such as the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs talks (Winham, 1978-79:65). The Canadian Trade and Tariffs Committee was established concurrently with the holding of the Tokyo round of GATT in 1973 for the explicit purpose of receiving the views of, and maintaining contacts with, interested parties (Winham, 1978-79:73). Furthermore, it has been documented recently that trade issues in general are often initiated by interest groups in Canada, either directly, or indirectly through provincial governments, Members of Parliament, or other routes of access (Protheroe, 1979:234).

There exists a protectionist bias among the most powerful business groups in Canada, notably the vested manufacturing interests in Ontario and Quebec, which represent large numbers of voters. These production-oriented groups have strongly opposed lower tariffs. They intervene more frequently, and with more sophisticated information, than groups which might oppose them, such as consumer organizations (Protheroe, 1979:60). Within the Canadian manufacturing sector, the problem industries such as producers of textiles, clothing, footwear, furniture and some electrical items are "the vanguard of protectionist tendencies" (Protheroe, 1979:67). Groups representing these producers -- apparel manufacturers associations and the Canadian Textiles

Institute, for example -- are opposed by representatives of industries which are either highly competitive (telecommunications, automobiles, pulp and paper, agricultural machinery) or potentially competitive (those requiring rationalization of industry and the development of more dynamic indigenous research and development practices).

The Canadian Manufacturers' Association provides a classic illustration of this type of group. It is a powerful umbrella organization representing seventy-five per cent of both Canadian manufacturing firms and manufacturing production. It has approximately 9,000 members, seventy per cent of which come from Ontario. Although its membership includes large corporations such as INCO and ALCAN, seventy per cent of its member-firms have less than one hundred employees. Its stand on tariffs reflects the domination of the group by members of the less competitive Canadian industries. The CMA supports Canada's existing tariff structure and resists the general tariff-cutting formulae pursued in multilateral trade negotiations (Protheroe, 1979:66-68). It has been worried about the impact of Third World development on Canada's manufacturing industry. The CMA supports increasing the proportion of Canadian aid that is tied, as well as increased Canadian direct foreign investment abroad (Deschamps Interview). Aside from trade and tariff questions, the CMA has been very interested in energy, where it has opposed, because

of its inflationary implications, the bringing closer to world prices of Canadian domestic oil.

The Canadian Export Association is another good example. Generally supportive of the liberalization of trade, it is stronger than its natural counterpart, the Canadian Imports Association, despite the intensity of its commitment being lessened by the diverse composition of its membership. The umbrella organization represents more than four hundred companies which exhibit differing biases on the tariff question. As a result, the CEA, while pressing for the reduction of foreign barriers to Canadian exports, de-emphasizes concomitant decreases in Canada's tariff structure. The Canadian Importers Association, on the other hand, has freer trade as its clearest and most vital interest. Representing approximately eight hundred firms, a minority of Canadian importers, it is in conflict with the federal government more often than the CEA, particularly over quantitative restrictions on textile imports, and Revenue Canada's export control programs (anti-dumping, customs administration) (Protheroe, 1979:69).

Other import groups also play a role in foreign policy. The Retail Council of Canada, for example, represents the major department stores. Another example is the Canadian Textile Importers Association. Both of these groups quite clearly would benefit from lower tariffs, and therefore

encourage their reduction.

Primary resource industries also involve themselves in international economic questions. The Canadian Pulp and Paper Association and the Council of Forest Industries of British Columbia, are the two most representative organizations within the forest productions industry. Both are regionally based -- the former in Ontario, Quebec and New Brunswick -- and export oriented. Representing competitive industries, both support trade liberalization as a means to improve access to foreign markets. The CPPA is particularly strong because the industry is the largest single manufacturing employer in the country.

Over ninety-five per cent of the total Canadian production in the minerals sector is represented by the Mining Association of Canada (Bonus interview). Its three major foreign policy objectives are: greater access to major export markets, particularly in the EEC, Japan and the USA; resistance to preferential treatment of developing producer countries (e.g. Japan has an eight per cent tariff on imported Canadian copper, but none on copper from LDCs); and opposition to commodity agreements with market intervention provisions. Normally, this group presents no official briefs to government, and involves itself in specific commodity-related questions such as the law of the sea, GATT and UNCTAD

negotiations, albeit to a limited and specialized extent.

Canada's fishing industry also has produced interest groups which voice concerns on the foreign policies affecting their memberships. The major group, the Fisheries Council of Canada, is comprised of fishermen's cooperatives and fish processors' organizations from both coasts as well as inland waters. Sixty-five per cent of the production of this one hundred thousand member industry is exported, primarily to the EEC, Japan and the USA. The major goals of the FCC are: foreign tariff reductions on canned fish, especially in the USA and the EEC; domestic tariff reductions on tin and aluminum cans; changes in the escalating tariff in the USA which discourages processing in Canada, restriction and enforcement of permits for foreign fishing within the two hundred mile economic zone, and greater access to overseas markets for fish (Protheroe, 1979:62-64).

A plethora of other fisheries groups also have been highly involved in foreign policy matters ranging from the law of the sea and ICNAF to bilateral relations, particularly with the USA. The Canadian Association of Fish Exporters is very important in this respect, along with the official representatives of business within the industry, and fishermen's unions. The Fisheries Association of British Columbia, the Pacific Trawlers Association, the

United Fishermen and Allied Workers Union, the British Columbia Fishing Vessel Owners, the Atlantic Fisheries Association, the Atlantic Groundfish Advisory Committee, the Fisheries Association of Newfoundland and Labrador, the Atlantic Fisheries By-products Association, the New Brunswick Fish Packers Association, the Atlantic Fishing Vessel Owners' Association and other smaller groups and fishermen's unions are further examples of these highly involved interest groups. An illustration of their participation was the Canadian delegation at the Georges Banks boundaries negotiations with the USA. Included among the official Canadian delegates were "the head of the Nova Scotia Fishermen's Association, a fleet captain with National Sea Products, a union representative, a fishing boat skipper, and an official of the Atlantic Fishing Vessel Owners' Association" (Stairs, 1977-78:149). Romeo Leblanc, then the federal minister responsible for fisheries, commented that during the negotiations these representatives were involved at every stage (see Stairs, 1977-78:140, n.19).

International development issues in general are of keen interest to Canadian business. Although divided on this subject, as on most others, a majority seems to favour strong adherence to the classical liberal economic theory of the free market. There is a "strong belief that the free market system is the reality and that proposals for change, in-

cluding the (NIEO) proposals...are generally idealistic and utopian - interfering with the real, natural forces" (O'Manique, 35-36). Particular attitudes range from outright rejection of "tampering with the system of free enterprise" to the acceptance of the need for humanitarian change and a NIEO", but within a free market system" (O'Manique, 37).

The Canadian Business and Industry International Advisory Committee is representative because it has consolidated the views and policy positions of Canadian business active in this area. Their attitudes toward international development are marked by economic realism and concern for Canadian short-term economic interests. The CBIAC propounds, to illustrate, bilateral aid (emphasizing our LDC trade partners), limited renegotiation of LDC debts (albeit with a write-off for the poorest debtors), conditional tariff reductions and industrial rationalization, no indexing of LDC export prices or other price supports, joint ventures for technology transfers, a limited voluntary code of conduct for MNCS, support for OECD positions and regional integration for LDCs.

The Automotive Industries Association of Canada and the Air Industries Association of Canada are also active, being consulted from time to time on foreign policy matters

directly related to their special interests (e.g. the Auto Pact, more plants in Canada; NORAD, aircraft production). The Canadian Nuclear Association, representing the firms and organizations involved in nuclear energy development, is now the major pro-nuclear lobby, participating in discussions chiefly with the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources. It is active also on export discussions and safeguards policy. The Canada-Japan Trade Council, typical of bilateral relations support groups, coordinates information and promotes relations between those two countries. Its biggest contribution comes through its specialization and expertise, which leads occasionally to inputs such as its briefing of Prime Minister Clark on nuclear reactor sales to Japan before his visit to that country. The Canadian Chamber of Commerce also becomes involved in international economic questions, although this study failed to uncover precisely which ones and when. No doubt there are other business groups, not covered by this section, which are involved from time to time on various issues. However, the groups described above appear to be the most active, and are at least illustrative of the business participants in Canadian foreign policy making.

Agriculture

Organized agriculture, another source of significant input, has four main sectors with conflicting trade interests. The cereal and feed grains sector, competitively strong and

highly export-oriented, seeks price and reserve stabilization and liberalized trade, particularly with the EEC and Japan. The competitively weak dairy and fruit and vegetables sectors feel a need for tariff protection and seasonal quotas because of their vulnerability to foreign competition. The cyclical nature of the livestock industry places it between these two extremes. Agriculture is politically very sensitive in Canada, especially when taking into consideration the regional concentration of production: the prairie provinces for grains, Quebec and Ontario for dairying, Ontario and British Columbia for fruits and vegetables. Also significant are the newly organized consumer and social interests within the agricultural field.

The Canadian Federation of Agriculture is an umbrella organization of provincial agricultural organizations and national commodity producers which represents the varied sectoral interests to the federal government. Illustrative member associations of the CFA are the Canadian Cattlemen's Association, the Canadian Horticultural Council, the Canadian Pork Council and the Dairy Farmers of Canada.

The CFA becomes involved through the FAO's advisor, the International Federation of Agricultural Producers; for example, with UNCTAD and international agencies. The Department of Agriculture in Canada recognizes this role, and

its contact with the CFA "has been very good...on things that happen in the FAO", as elsewhere (Hamilton interview).

Commodity trade is the primary concern of the CFA, with international development coming a distant second. Efforts to influence Canada's international policies in these areas are pursued, in most cases, directly through the Canadian government. The group conducts annual presentations to the Prime Minister, and held meetings with the Cabinet annually until 1977. Direct contact with the government is formally through annual briefs, correspondence, and contact with MPs and public servants. Indirect contact is through IFAP, as well as such national committees and agencies as the Economic Council of Canada, and the C.D. Howe Research Institute.

The general policy position of the CFA on trade has been that it should be freer. However, it recognizes the need, in a world where protectionism still prevails, to protect Canadian producers moderately and reasonably where necessary. In brief, the group advocates "reasonable" protection of weak Canadian sectors, especially from American competition; the opening up of, or expansion of, markets in the major industrialized nations; lower domestic tariffs on many farm production input goods; and international mar-

keting arrangements. On development policy, the CFA is active through the Canadian Hunger Foundation, and has established a "pretty good rapport" with CIDA's NGO Division. It has provided experts for agricultural projects ahead. (Hamilton interview). In general, the group supports: IHAP's views that human development through self-help is essential to development, and that agriculture is the first step in it; most NIEO proposals; substantial food aid; and Canada's achieving a 1% of GNP contribution to international development, 20% of which is expected to come from Canadian agriculture.

Labour

The Canadian Labour Congress is the only labour organization very active in foreign policy. It is an umbrella organization which represents 2.3 million workers (67% of organized labour, 26% of the non-agricultural work force). Through its international affairs division, it is involved in a wide range of issues, only the most important of which will be mentioned.

In general, the CLC favours trade liberalization. Divisions within the organization, however, reflecting those within organized labour in Canada as a whole, have tempered this position. Ultimately, CLC stands take into account the effects of policies on its membership, such as employment levels: for example, the dislocation of labour

which would result from lowered domestic tariffs, the rationalization of domestic industry and competition from developing countries with pools of cheap labour. The CLC supports GATT as a mechanism for achieving freer trade, although it is often critical of Canadian concessions.

The CLC supports the proposals for an NIEO conditional upon the effects on Canadian workers. Increased untied aid dispersed by NGOs, the achievement of 0.7% of GNP contribution now and 1.0% later, "basic needs" assistance, and a code of conduct for MNCs are emphasized. Human rights, especially workers rights, are a third area of concern. Fair working conditions and general humanitarian standards are advocated.

The CLC is opposed to Canada's membership in NORAD, and criticizes NATO on non-economic grounds; it supports disarmament efforts; and favours increased relations with communist bloc countries, especially through the international trade union movement.

Domestically, the CLC devotes most of its time and resources to tasks other than lobbying government. Since 1975, the nature of its activity has led to an evolution from conflictual to cooperative relations with government; this has led to consistent inclusion on Canadian delegations (e.g. to UNCSTED). Equally important has been the change

in strategy stimulated by the unsuccessful efforts to influence the management of wage and price controls after 1975. Personal relations have been built up in the effort to institutionalize access. This is seen by the group as a key to greater direct involvement and influence in policy-making.

The CLC occupies two seats on the executive of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, through which it contributes in the field of education and human rights. It is involved as well in the ILO; regional labour bodies in Africa, Asia and the Americas, and other nongovernmental organizations with common interests (e.g. Amnesty International). The focus of CLC efforts in the near future will be on setting fair international labour standards and the free development of trade unions, aspects of a broader altruistic concern for political democracy, human rights and social justice. (Harker interview)

Consumers

Despite its small size, approximately 100,000 members, the Consumers' Association of Canada is the most important spokesman for that universal economic interest. The CAC focusses its rather altruistic efforts on achieving benefits

for Canadians within the lower income brackets. Its foreign policy interests and activities are limited. Indeed, its involvement is confined to certain tariff questions (Jelly interview). The CAC has a strong commitment to trade liberalization in the interest of lower prices for Canadian consumers. Efforts have been concentrated on high profile import issues such as quantitative controls on textiles and agricultural products (e.g. eggs and turkeys), and tariffs on sugar, fruits and vegetables. The CAC attempts to influence policies primarily through the Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, which subsidizes it and with which it has close ties on domestic issues.

Professionals

Organizations formed on the basis of a shared profession (and, usually, related economic interests) abound in Canada. There is very little evidence that suggests significant involvement by such professional groups in making foreign policy. A few are involved, however, in certain specialized areas which relate directly to their specific self-interests.

The Canadian Association of Broadcasters, to illustrate, has had very great input into Canadian-American border broadcasting issues through constant consultation

at a very high level, for example directly with former Secretary of State for External Affairs, Don Jamieson, whose office actively solicited their views (Elder interview). The Canadian Education Association, similarly, has been active on questions in the education field, as has the Canadian Book Publishers' Council on such matters as the Time/Reader's Digest issue. The involvement of the Canadian Council of Professional Engineers illustrates further roles for professional groups. It is part of the national organization of provincial licensing bodies, a centralizing agency which sets out the qualifications standards, in cooperation with the Department of Employment and Immigration, for the licensing of immigrant engineers. In effect, this is a type of administrative help which most other professional groups also do. The CCPE also promotes its immediate self-interests, such as opposing the import of technology, which it sees as discouraging the development of indigenous technologies (Lajeunesse interview).

It is interesting to note that the more prestigious professional groups have fewer self-interests (i.e. economic) and hence are less active in foreign policy making. The Canadian Bar Association, for example, has no continuing involvement. It is consulted, if at all, on the legal implementation of policies already arrived at; or participates when invited in international legal

bodies. Similarly, doctors and academics have little organized collective input (re. academics see Thordarson:1972).

Non-Economic Groups

Non-economic groups are more varied than their economic counterparts, and there is very little documentation of their role in Canadian foreign policy making. The available evidence suggests that their interests normally focus on the non-trade areas of human rights, disarmament and international development, as well as certain special concerns related to the specific interests of their members. Normally they are motivated by other than economic interests, some representing other types of vested interest, some characterized by a high degree of altruism, and some reflecting emotional bias.

Veterans/Military Support

Several veterans or military support groups are active in Canadian foreign policy, although the Royal Canadian Legion, the second largest of all organizations in Canada (next to the churches) is not (Johnson interview). Similarly, the Canadian Veterans Association, although occasionally a source of input, concentrates its efforts on achieving increased benefits for veterans. The Navy League of Canada, perhaps the most active group of this type, is a good example of a military support group active in foreign policy. It represents over 40,000 Canadians and participates through traditional channels in all areas

of maritime interest from shipping to defence. Its ultimate objective is "to develop within Canada the awareness, the will and the capability to protect and control the use of...waters so as to bring about a maximum contribution to our national aims". (NLC Declaration of Purpose: 1) Similarly, its positions suggest most comprehensive attention to ocean-related foreign policies: the encouragement of increased Canadian naval and commercial sea power, including expanded fishing fleets and the building of a merchant marine; extended sovereign jurisdiction, including a 200-mile exclusive economic zone and all marine resources on or in the seabed; full participation in NATO and strengthened military structure in Canada.

Other military related groups have a more institutional involvement. For example, the Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies, with an overlapping membership from military and business circles, and with close ties to the military establishment, has a role more directly supportive of the Department of National Defence. Its involvement is based more on providing support which officials need, less on policy input. Similarly, the Conference of Defence Associations, representing Canada's militia, naval and air force reserves associations, is an advisory body to the Minister and Department of National Defence, especially on questions relating to the reserves; but is not so important in terms of actual foreign policy input.

Women

Women's groups have expanded rapidly in number, scope and activity in this time of female liberation, and Canadian foreign policy has not escaped their attention. Examples of active women's groups are the Imperial Order of the Daughters of the Empire, the Canadian Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs, the National Action Committee on the Status of Women, and National Council of Women and the Voice of Women. Representatives of this type of organization have been particularly active since the 1940's when they first began attending the UN Commission on the Status of Women. Direct involvement peaked in 1975 when 350 women's representatives met with Prime Minister Trudeau and Marc Lalonde (the minister responsible for women's affairs) for a conference on the international status of women. This stimulated an increase in communications on the subject with other countries, and ultimately affected CIDA's policies and work in aiding developing countries in that field (Bird, 1978).

In general, women's groups are characterized by an altruistic orientation toward peace, internationalism, increased development assistance, positive action on human rights and strengthening of the UN, along with a narrower emphasis on issues of exclusive consequence to women. They are normally not involved directly in policy-making, a

function of their disinterested nature as well as their often issue-oriented concerns.

Over the years the most active of women's groups in foreign policy matters has been the Voice of Women. Representing several thousand women across Canada, it grew out of a "ban the bomb" appeal to mothers. Its altruistic and humanitarian objectives emphasize peaceful resolution of conflicts, human rights, disarmament, and a condemnation of war. These have been promoted through channels of indirect influence, by appealing directly to the general public and by focussing on tension spots in the world. The V of W is issue-oriented but differs from most issue-oriented groups in that it focusses on several issues. Specifically, it conducted a crusade against nuclear weapons, and promoted increased negotiation and peace-making powers for the UN, anti-American nationalism, and self-determination of peoples, especially in Southeast Asia and Palestine. Input has been continuous, although it peaked during the Vietnam war. Recently the group was part of a select advisory body on Canada's disarmament policies, and formed part of the Canadian delegation to the UN General Assembly's Special Session on Disarmament (Williamson interview).

Religious

Religious groups, particularly Christian churches and groups within them, have been active in recent decades,

especially in the area of international development. The United, Anglican, Lutheran, Presbyterian, Roman Catholic denominations have co-sponsored several important programs and have joined in related activities by other churches. The major projects have been: Ten Days for World Development, sponsored by the Inter-Church Committee for World Development Education which attempts to mobilize public opinion to influence policy-making indirectly; GATT-Fly, which sponsors research and seminars on the economic side of development, promoting global economic justice; the Task Force on Churches and Corporate Responsibility, which attempts to relate domestic development problems to those of other countries.

The basic positions of the churches are humanitarian. Emphasis has been placed on human rights, human exploitation, food aid, sharing and corporate responsibility, (especially of Canadian MNCs operating in South Africa). The long run aims include the NIEO. There is a notable division within the churches regarding international development, ranging from harsh, politically left, criticism of the existing order to a conservative respect for the status quo. For example, the Confederation of Churches and Business People has taken a strong stand supporting Canada's involvement in South Africa, opposing others, such as the Churches' Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, who have

supported a code of conduct and the general phasing out of Canadian commerce with South Africa. The latter also briefed Secretary of State for External Affairs Flora Macdonald on the Zimbabwe/Rhodesia question prior to the 1979 Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka (Elder interview). It is interesting to note that church groups have supported the use of economic levers to promote human rights, for example through the manipulation of aid, Export Development Corporation funds and voting rights in international financial institutions (Crowe interview).

A few more examples will illustrate the high level of input of church groups. The Presbyterian Church was very active during the Nigerian civil war in support of Biafra. Project Plowshares, an inter-church body, has been active, not only on development issues but also on disarmament, as one of four groups represented in the Canadian delegation at the UN General Assembly's Special Session on Disarmament in 1978 (Williamson interview). The Canadian Council of Churches focusses on human rights, and works through such groups as the Inter-Church Group on Latin America. It has also emphasized corporate responsibility in that region. The Canadian Council of Catholic Bishops is directly involved in Canada's preparations for the UN Commission on Human Rights.

These groups are very respected in the eyes of officials as legitimate, credible spokesmen, potentially

commanding the support of large segments of the population (despite inter-church divisions) and characterized by uncontested moral authority. They also have resources (financial, research and manpower), and, despite the public nature of their concerns, enjoy direct access to officials. They normally follow the conventional quiet methods of expressing their views, rarely adopting loud, public, indirect devices to influence policy-makers.

Ethnic

Many ethnic interest groups are involved in shaping Canadian foreign policy. The best known at present are those involved in the Middle East debate. Jewish minority interests are well represented by such groups as the Canadian Jewish Congress, the Zionist Organization of Canada, the Jewish Defence League, the Toronto Jewish Congress, the Federation of Jewish Women's Organizations, the National Council of Jewish Women in Canada¹, B'nai Brith and the Canada-Israel Committee. They are concerned with international rights, individual and collective freedoms and equality of opportunity. Understandably, they are concerned especially with anti-semitism. They now oppose all forms of terrorism, particularly that of the PLO. This was manifested unequivocally, along with their opposition to the legitimization

¹These two might have been listed under women's groups. They are placed here at the discretion of the author since the nature of their interests, especially in foreign policy, is essentially ethnic in orientation.

of the PLO, during the mini-crisis in Canada prior to the federal government's decision to postpone (in effect cancel) the holding in 1975 in Toronto of the scheduled UN Conference on International Crime and the Treatment of Offenders. All forms of totalitarianism are opposed. A fourth concern is the preservation and strengthening of Jewish life -- physical and spiritual -- in Canada and abroad. An extrapolation of this position is their ardent support of the state of Israel. Canada's relations with Israel are also important to them. The Jewish groups' natural counterpart are groups representing the Arab minority in Canada. Although fewer, their involvement in foreign policy has become increasingly significant. The Arab-Palestine Association ~~is~~ the most important. Their foremost concern is with human rights, especially those of the Palestinian people. Aside from these humanitarian and political concerns, they have an ongoing interest in the cultivation of closer ties between Canada and the Arab world, particularly in terms of trade. In fact, the economic lever can be effective, as was shown by the reaction of the Arab world to the Clark government's original announcement of intent to move the Canadian embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Like all ethnic groups, these understandably concentrate on issues directly involving their members either in Canada or the homeland.

Many other ethnic minority groups have organized in Canada and take part in varying degrees in foreign policy. The Ukrainians are particularly involved through groups such as the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, the Ukrainian National Association, the Ukrainian National Federation, the Ukrainian World Congress, the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians and the League for the Liberation of Ukraine. They are joined by other east and central European national groups; for example, the Canadian Polish Congress, the Czechoslovak National Association of Canada, the Hungarian Canadian Federation and the Latvian National Federation in Canada. In fact, most, if not every national or regional group one can think of -- German, Russian, Armenian, Vietnamese, Finnish, Chinese, Japanese, Jamaican, Italian, Macedonian, Greek, Irish, Belgian, Polish, African, Latin American, and so on -- are organized in differing extents. In general, these groups are primarily concerned with human rights, liberal immigration levels and the status and welfare of displaced persons. Each has a specific interest in Canada's relations with their homeland, and in some cases with the status of the nation to which they relate their heritage. The latter may be illustrated by the Canadian Baltic Association, a group which registers its concerns very well (Elder interview), and the Association of Captive Nations, a group similarly made up of peoples of Soviet-controlled states, which makes very frequent contact with foreign policy

officials (Crowe interview).

The tactics of ethnic groups vary depending upon the issue and the receptivity of their views by officials. Normally direct access is attempted, although there is little hesitation to go public if the situation demands it. Access is enhanced by the legitimate role these groups play as representatives of minorities within the political system. Their views are usually well received by officials, making possible significant input by ethnic organizations.

Citizens

Citizens groups are those that form on bases other than occupation, vested interest, religion, ethnicity or sex. The category covers a wide range of interests, motives and approaches to government, from very ideological and issue-oriented groups to more institutionalized, and less "interested" organizations.

Standard issue-oriented group characteristics and behaviour have been laid out in Chapter I, and therefore will not be restated. Examples of these generally outspoken, publicly demonstrative groups within this category are Canadians Concerned About South Africa, Canadians Against PLO Terror, the National Citizens Coalition¹, the

¹The group which formed in opposition to Canada admitting as immigrants refugees from Vietnam; the "boat people" -- and campaigned notably through Globe and Mail full-page advertisements, against Canadian policies.

Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa and the Canadian Coalition for a Just Economic Order (an umbrella organization of groups interested in international development, including churches, whose sole purpose is to move Canada towards the NIEO). Such groups emerge temporarily from time to time as the international agenda dictates; for example, the civil war in Nigeria gave rise to the Canadian Union for the Rights of Biafra.

Other more institutional and permanent citizens' groups exist, for example the Royal Society of Canada, the Canadian Human Rights Foundation, the Canadian Hunger Foundation, the Greenpeace Foundation, the Monarchist League of Canada, and the Association of Canadian Clubs. Within this sub-category, groups involved in environmental issues have stolen the limelight in recent years, especially through efforts at indirect influence. Few Canadians cannot have heard of the Greenpeace Foundation, for instance. The rise to significance of environmental groups is partly a result of the generally increased public awareness of the effects of international events -- especially in the USA -- on the Canadian environment. Thus Canadian environmental groups played a significant role in the Garrison Diversion Project controversy and in resisting the American decision to build Trident submarines near the border in Washington state. In fact, the local or-

22
OF / DE

The Canadian Human Rights Foundation maintains intensive and extensive contacts with DEA, focussing on building support for global human rights principles (Crowe interview). Also active is the Canadian section of the Pugwash Group; it too provided input into Canada's position at the UN Special Session on Disarmament (Williamson interview). However, few other institutional citizens' groups are involved in making Canadian foreign policy.

Special Foreign Policy

Special foreign policy groups usually have no vested interests and strong academic ties. They aim at studying and promoting public education in international affairs. Traditionally, they have not been active in lobbying. The Canadian Institute of International Affairs is an extreme example. Its task over the years has been only "to educate ourselves, the electorate", to raise the level of discussion in the belief that "policy is likely to be more intelligent if it is formulated in a country where there is a climate of critical but well-informed debate" (Holmes: 1978: 5,6). The CIIA has worked to provide a forum for the conflicting views which comprise that critical and well-informed dialogue. Since its charter forbids it taking public stand, it is directly involved only when

The Canadian Human Rights Foundation maintains intensive and extensive contacts with DEA, focussing on building support for global human rights principles (Crowe interview). Also active is the Canadian section of the Pugwash Group; it too provided input into Canada's position at the UN Special Session on Disarmament (Williamson interview). However, few other institutional citizens' groups are involved in making Canadian foreign policy.

Special Foreign Policy

Special foreign policy groups usually have no vested interests and strong academic ties. They aim at studying and promoting public education in international affairs. Traditionally, they have not been active in lobbying. The Canadian Institute of International Affairs is an extreme example. Its task over the years has been only "to educate ourselves, the electorate", to raise the level of discussion in the belief that "policy is likely to be more intelligent if it is formulated in a country where there is a climate of critical but well-informed debate" (Holmes: 1978: 5,6). The CIIA has worked to provide a forum for the conflicting views which comprise that critical and well-informed dialogue. Since its charter forbids it taking public stand, it is directly involved only when

consulted, as it was on Canada's disarmament position prior to the UN Special Session (Williamson interview).

The United Nations Association is another good illustration. First and foremost, it is an information service, a role which is enhanced by the absence in Canada of a UN Information Center. Like the CIIA, its focus is on educating and creating awareness in the general public, particularly, in this case, on UN matters. It is also similar in being subsidized by the government. Overall, it maintains a close liaison with the UN bureau at DEA while maintaining close contact with sixty Canadian NGOs with similar objectives.

A change in approach worth noting has been developing in the UNA. Although it has always advocated a more active Canadian foreign policy, only recently has it begun to respond to issues with unsolicited criticism of government policies. An example was its strong attack of the Clark government's initial decision to move the Canadian embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. This action is indicative of the UNA's effort to increase its public image and influence, and its abandonment of its traditional approach of applying subtle pressure, if any; another indicator of this was the recent election of George Ignatieff, a prominent and outspoken "elder statesman", as the group's president (Doneit interview).

Amnesty International is another example of a special foreign policy group. It has more specific concerns: to oppose imprisonment on political grounds and the use of torture, and to promote human rights. The well known group has cultivated contacts with the federal government at three organizations levels; from its executives, its select committees and its local chapters. AI is very active in its area of special concern, and is taken seriously as a source of information.

Canadian University Services Overseas is best known for its volunteer service projects conducted throughout the Third World. It has a good deal of policy input, enjoying direct access to all ministers and officials with which it must do business especially CIDA, and has a reputation of being extremely well organized. Its interests lie, naturally, in the development field. A recent illustration of its contribution has been its considerable input into Canada's position on the Zimbabwe/Rhodesia issue, notably in conflict with the stand adopted by the Canadian Labour Congress.¹ CUSO officials met with Secretary of State for External Affairs Macdonald at Lusaka at the time of the Commonwealth Conference in 1979 (Elder interview). Like OXFAM (a similar but less important group), CUSO also has operational input into policies; their

¹CUSO came out in strong support of ZAPU, while the CLC took a more moderate position based on workers' rights under any new regime.

activities abroad affect the making of Canadian international development policies (Halpin interview). CUSO is funded almost entirely by government, but often takes radical stands which arouse fierce attack from conservative elements in Canada, including many in government.

One further foreign policy group meriting mention is the Canadian Council for International Cooperation. CCIC actively lobbies Parliament and its Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence. It has close contact with the NGO Division of CIDA. CCIC is an active umbrella organization representing approximately eighty-five non-governmental groups interested in Canada's international development policies. Its membership includes some very prominent collective citizens of Canada, some of which have already been discussed. An example of its input was the 16 March, 1979 discussion with CIDA and DEA of its Initial Recommendations for Action on Canada's International Development Policies in the 1980s, a paper which reveals positions developed through consultation with both members and non-members. It emphasizes increased quantity and quality of aid (untied and dispersed through NGOs) to the most needy, the divorcing of aid policy from domestic economic considerations, the linking of it to human rights and disarmament, and progress towards a NIEO and a 0.7%

of GNP contribution to aid.

This chapter, besides presenting a typology of domestic interest groups active in Canadian foreign policy making, has described some of the groups involved. Through examples, it has illustrated their interests and involvement. The next chapter will examine their influence.

CHAPTER IV:

Domestic Interest Groups and Influence in Canadian Foreign Policy Making

Influence is a part of a process of communication in which "a decision-maker considers the content of a message as he makes his decision" (Milbrath, 1967:232). That message need not be the decisive factor in his decision, nor the only consideration; but it must have some impact therein. Influence, further, is "the ability to elicit desired behaviour from others" (Hughes, 1978:202). It ought not to be equated with activity or participation in the policy process, as Cohen warns (1959). Rather, influence involves the consideration of a message (written, oral, or otherwise) plus a corresponding action on the part of the recipient of it.

Given this understanding of influence, and the relative inputs of domestic interest groups presented in Chapter III, this chapter will examine their influence in Canadian foreign policy making, following the same typology. Specific examples will be drawn from the groups within each category which enjoy the most influence or best illustrate the points being explained. Employing the theoretical concepts laid out in Chapters I and II, the chapter will close with a summary of the principal determinants of group influence in Canadian foreign policy making.

Economic Groups

Economic groups enjoy much influence on particular aspects of foreign policy, particularly trade policy, but not over foreign policy in general. Their concentration on specific issue areas accounts for much of their influence (Sharp interview). The level of knowledge and organization among business groups, for example, particularly on commercial matters, has made them the most influential in both trade and international development. Most economic groups enjoy a high degree of legitimacy and credibility within their specialized fields of interest. Their stake in particular issues is easily identified by officials. They normally conform to acceptable standards of conduct. They are usually highly institutionalized and very competent and sophisticated in the representation of their interests. They face few opponents of comparable strength, and in many cases share objectives with government. The resources which these groups may bring to bear on issues enhance their influence. Expertise is an important resource, given the increasingly technical nature of foreign policy. They also enjoy the advantages of financial resources. As well, they are normally large and cohesive, which provides electoral strength. All of these attributes lead to a high level of legitimacy, and access to officials. The continuing dialogue and interaction between these groups and government, and the close ties developed with specific

departments, enhance further their influence.

The specialized interests of most economic groups permits the privatization of efforts to influence. They normally do not need to make an issue public or rely on the press. Similarly, they need not work in alliance with other groups. They benefit, therefore, under ordinary circumstances, from a small attentive public and generally permissive apathy within the public as a whole. Much more than non-economic groups, they approach "policy-setting" influence within their specialized fields of interest, a function of their ability to deal directly with officials.

Business

The Canadian Manufacturers' Association is perhaps the most influential business group in Canadian foreign policy. This should not be surprising, given the CMA's reputation as the most powerful interest group in Canada on domestic issues. It enjoys extremely close contact with both the Cabinet as a whole and the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce in particular. It is recognized as a legitimate spokesman for a very important constituency. For example, it expertly promotes manufacturing and jobs in Canada, vital concerns which it shares with government. Its expertise is extremely well-developed, and includes superior knowledge of the decision making process. In fact, a booklet prepared by the CMA on the internal workings of the federal government has been utilized by the

Public Service Commission of Canada for instructing its new employees (Deschamps interview). Furthermore, the CMA is very sophisticated in pressing for its interests. One recent example of CMA success was the reduction in duty-free technology imports by Canada.

The Canadian Export Association also is extremely influential in matters of trade policy. It, too, has gained a very favourable reputation in official circles. Protheroe has explained why:

The CEA is considered a highly competent and effective lobby..., and this is not surprising, given the importance of these generally dynamic companies (which it represents) to the Canadian economy.¹ The relationship between governmental elites and the association has, for this reason, been one based more on partnership and close connection than adversary behaviour (1979:69).

In contrast, the Canadian Importers' Association is relatively weak. This is partly due to its small size relative to its chief competitor, the CEA, as well as its tendency "to be rather shrill in...argumentation and publicly critical of trade policy decisions" (Protheroe, 1979:69). That is,

Its credibility in government circles has probably been limited by these tactics, by the knowledge that it represents only a few thousand people, and by the generalized perception among trade officials that importers are in many cases a somewhat parasitic group (Protheroe, 1979:69-70).

¹They are vital to the main thrust of Canadian foreign policies: exports.

No other business groups exert comparable influence, reflecting the predominance of the CMA and the CEA. However, some of the others mentioned in Chapter III can have limited influence within their areas of interest; for example, the automobile industry, through the Automotive Industries Association, is very influential on particular auto industry questions that loom large in Canadian-American relations (Hall interview). On the other hand, the Canadian Nuclear Association, the major pro-nuclear lobby, has little influence over what is a well-developed policy in the minds of decision makers (Elder interview). The Chamber of Commerce, to illustrate further, has little influence over foreign policy decisions, despite its very important role in domestic economic policy.

Most primary resource groups have little, if any influence, unless they are to be directly affected by a particular decision. The Mining Association of Canada, for example, has very limited influence, despite the fact that it represents 95% of the total value of Canadian mine production. This is a direct reflection of its level of involvement, which is limited to specific commodity-related issues and an insignificant contribution on certain questions within the Law of the Sea, GATT and UNCTAD (Bonus interview).

Fisheries is one area in which interest groups have been both highly involved and influential. Regular dis-

cussions are held between the Department of Fisheries and the Canadian Association of Fish Exporters and the Fisheries Council of Canada. Both groups enjoy much influence through this advisory status. They provide expertise in the sense of both input and feedback, serving as well as voices to explain government decisions to the fishing community (Applebaum interview). Representatives from the fishing industry also have enjoyed influence in law of the sea issues, particularly at UNCLOS. There had been between three and five representatives present from both primary and secondary sectors of the industry at all UNCLOS sessions up to mid-1979, when their presence became no longer necessary. These representatives provided advice and feedback, as well as talking directly to their counterparts from other countries (Applebaum interview). Furthermore, fishermen have been involved in almost every Canadian international negotiation affecting the fisheries in the past years (at least), although some agreements have been reached without private sector input (e.g. those on bilateral extensions of jurisdiction). Nevertheless, the very high level of access for these groups has enhanced their influence (Roberts interview). An illustrative case was the bilateral negotiations between Canada and the USA over the boundary in the Georges Bank fishing zone. Romeo Leblanc, the Minister responsible for fisheries at the time, believably stated that interest

group representatives had "strongly influenced the (Canadian position" (Halifax Chronicle-Herald, 1 November, 1977; Stairs, 1977-78). This was to continue until an agreement was reached. In particular, the Newfoundland Fishermen and Allied Workers' Union, through the work of its President, Richard Cashin, had a great deal of influence on then Minister of External Affairs, Don Jamieson, a fellow Newfoundlander (Elder interview). The influence of the fisheries groups in this instance was exercised in the advisory council they comprised, and to which Canada's chief negotiator, Marcel Cadieux, reported between negotiating sessions (Elder interview).

Along with the regional concentration, and general importance of the fishing industry, politically as well as economically, expertise is clearly a key to the influence of fisheries groups. They provide on-the-spot facts and expert judgements about the industry, which otherwise might not be available, such as where particular species of fish are, in what quantities, and related technical information. Secondly, they help formulate negotiation priorities, which are based for the most part on objectives shared with government. Finally, they provide helpful support through sympathetic feedback to the general fishing community (Roberts interview). Thus fisheries groups are both expert sources of, and reliable testing grounds for, ideas. This also holds true in the vital area of marketing (Applebaum interview).

Agriculture

Protheroe has concluded with reason that "the political weight of farmers is out of all proportion to their numbers" (1979:61-62; 289). Like the preceding case, this is due in part to the way agriculture is cherished as an industry, and its regional concentration. The Canadian Federation of Agriculture does influence foreign policies relating to agriculture. It is often consulted for advice by the Department of Agriculture, and has enjoyed significant success in having its suggestions adopted. An example was the removal of Canada's pork tariff in the late 1970s. It was also responsible for acquiring \$4 million from the government to establish the Farmers' Export Development Corporation, and to have it placed under the control of agricultural producers rather than bureaucrats (Hamilton interview). It is not without setbacks, however. For example, despite providing substantial data in meetings with officials, it was unsuccessful in attempting to have Canada and other countries enter agricultural commodity marketing agreements in GATT.

Labour

The Canadian Labour Congress, the largest single representative of organized labour in Canada, and the only one significantly involved in foreign policy, has developed into one of the most influential groups in the field. It shares most of the advantages of its business counterparts. In terms of trade policy, however, it does not enjoy their

influence. Much of labour's influence in trade matters operates at the local union level, through pressure applied on individual MPs. At times this pressure is applied in alliance with management, as in the cooperation between management and unions in weak industries opposing import competition. On their own, the textile and clothing unions in Quebec and Ontario have had an important impact on Canadian textile import policies. Similarly, the United Auto Workers have played a significant role in the evolution of the Auto Pact and other agreements within the automotive industry involving US parent corporations. On the whole, however, organized labour does not appear to have been particularly effective in matters of Canadian trade policy. Divisions within the CLC have weakened its impact as well as the definition of its mandate in that area. Its influence also has been weakened

by the political partisanship of the CLC and its adversary tactics which, for example, led the Congress to withdraw from many government-private sector consultations during the period of wage and price controls (Protheroe, 1979:71).

Since then the CLC has developed its position vis-a-vis government to the point where it is now one of the most important domestic interest groups involved in foreign policy, especially outside the area of trade policy. A good working relationship with officials has been achieved despite CLC

criticism of some policies. The CLC's influence has been increased, in fact, through the purposive tempering of criticism. Friendly collaboration has cultivated good links with the Minister's Office at the Department of External Affairs. This was illustrated in the granting of substantial funds, as well as aircraft and personnel, to a CLC-proposed Nicaraguan relief campaign in 1978; and in the personal assistance forthcoming from External Affairs Minister Jamieson in establishing the Working Party on Commonwealth Trade Union Cooperation (Harker interview).

The CLC now maintains very systematic contacts, and when not brought into discussions directly, is included in representational bodies. Its high level of influence has been a function of its expertise, legitimacy and access, which have resulted in close consultation with government. The consistency of CLC positions, for example in favour of the development and maintenance of free trade unions and concomitant rights throughout the world, has enhanced its influence. Important as well as interesting in explaining that influence is the personal connection between John Harker, Director of the International Affairs Division at the CLC, and officials at DEA, where, prior to joining the CLC, he was Executive President of the Professional Association of Foreign Service Officers.

The CLC has been especially influential over Canada's international human rights positions, in particular with regards to trade union rights and unionists imprisoned abroad (Crowe interview); and over development policies, for example in its push for a code of conduct for Canadian companies operating in South Africa (Halpin interview). Examples illustrate the influential position of the CLC: a one hour briefing of then Prime Minister Clark, by Harker, on Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, held in Africa just prior to the Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka; a similar briefing before Clark's department for the OECD Tokyo summit; and the constant invitations received to attend meetings, sit on delegations, give advice and generally contribute to policy making. Although, as we have noted, input is not equivalent to influence, such soliciting on the part of the government would be unlikely if the group's views were not to some degree influential.

Consumers

Consumer groups are insignificant in foreign policy. Although it works directly through the Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, the Consumers' Association of Canada, the most involved group of this type, has very little impact (Elder interview). Despite government funding, it is limited in terms of financial and research resources, which limits both its ability to promote access

(in most cases a prerequisite to influence) as well as the number of occasions on which it can seek to intervene. This limitation is especially significant relative to the resources of most business groups, with whom the CAC often must compete. The CAC is also a very young group, which has consequences for the impact of its efforts. It must concentrate on issues more directly related to the interests of its membership in order to maintain its viability and build up its organizational strength. The general result is that the group relegates "the international aspects of consumer protection to second place behind the domestic questions of competition policy and product standards" (Protheroe, 1979:70).

The CAC also suffers from periodic internal divisions, which weakens further its ability to influence. For example,

On many of the issues involving imports from development "cheap labour" countries, the Quebec wing of the association and many individuals in the...movement in other parts of the country have proven sympathetic to local labour and business appeals for protection, and the position of the...organization has thus been undermined (Protheroe, 1979:70).

Consumerism is often secondary among competing interests for individual members of the CAC. The group has been most influential "on the side of health and safety, standards, packaging and labelling regulations" (Protheroe, 1979:71). It is a paradox that whereas those regulations are by nature to everyone's benefit, they may be viewed as

non-tariff barriers to imports and therefore to the consumer in terms of price. Thus Protheroe concludes that

Perhaps the most important role of consumer organizations arises out of the simple fact that they are there to be alluded to by policy makers wishing to resist protectionist demands (1979:71).

Professionals

On the whole, professional groups in Canada play an insignificant role in foreign policy. A few exceptions have been found which seem to prove rather than discredit that rule. The Canadian Association of Broadcasters enjoys very great influence on Canada-USA border broadcasting issues, primarily because of its expertise and clear self-interest in that field. Similarly, the Canadian Education Association is highly influential over its specialty in its international context (e.g. at UNESCO). It was especially influential over Don Jamieson during his term as Secretary of State for External Affairs (Elder interview). Finally, there is a frequent practice of bringing in groups of academics or other professionals (e.g. international lawyers¹) for expert advice and information; but their influence is normally limited.

¹Such was the case in the development of the Arctic Waters Pollution Act, where valuable support for unilateral action was received from a newly-formed organization of Canadian international lawyers, on an issue which had seriously split Cabinet.

Non-Economic Groups

Non-economic groups as a whole do not enjoy advantages comparable to those of their economic counterparts. They do not possess the same legitimacy, except on very special issues. These groups tend to be more public-minded than self-interested, which limits the extent to which they may identify a specific stake in any issue for a particular constituency for whom they may claim to speak. Secondly, their resources are not as extensive, especially in terms of electoral and financial strength; the former limits their political power, the latter their level of organization and research capability. They often must rely on expertise and moral force to achieve influence; this leaves them subservient to officials' predispositions and expert knowledge in an increasingly technical field. For all of these reasons, many non-economic groups must attempt indirect influence, through the socialization of their efforts. Reliance on the press, possible group alliances, and general public opinion thus becomes important to their influence. All in all, these groups rarely achieve "policy-setting" influence unless approached by government specifically for that purpose. Of course, there are exceptions to these generalizations, as we shall see in the following discussion.

Veterans/Military Support

The influence of veterans and military support groups is also very limited. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the largest of these groups, the Royal Canadian Legion, has no involvement in foreign policy making. More specialized groups such as the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies and the Conference of Defence Associations, have some influence over defence policy due to their expertise, but the well-established nature of Canadian defence policies and entrenched public attitudes on them limits the extent to which these groups can have an impact. Their contributions are generally welcomed by defence officials for the support given both to policies and other departmental objectives (e.g. increased budgets). Probably the most active of these groups is the Navy League of Canada, for the same reasons. Its strengths lie in its flexibility, conscientiousness, reputation and legitimacy, as manifested in its generally positive approach toward policy analysis. The NLC's influence is generally limited to specific requests for advice (Caldwell interview).

Women

In general, the few women's groups active in the field have had little influence. Again, exceptions may be noted. We have alluded in the preceding chapter to the influential role of the National Action Committee on the Status of Women

concerning the international dimension of their cause. .
As a result of the 1975 conference between women's representatives and government leaders, and subsequent activity on the subject, CIDA sent Florence Bird, President of NACSW to Jamaica, and in 1976 to both Jamaica and Barbados to assist in programs aimed at improving the female condition; and CIDA "is now making a special effort to meet requests from the governments of developing countries that ask for aid in their efforts to improve the status of women" (Bird, 1978:25).

The Voice of Women has been influential at times, particularly during the Viet Nam war, and remains the most active women's group in foreign policy matters. The expertise in certain areas which it has accumulated over the years, for example on the question of nuclear power, is perhaps its most important strength, next to the dedication of some of its leaders. This group suffers from the disadvantages mentioned earlier of being public-minded, and has also experienced internal problems not uncommon to such groups. In the past three years, a split has developed between the national headquarters in Toronto and the very active Ottawa branch over the question of action on Middle East policy positions.¹ (MacEwen interview).

¹The Ottawa branch has pressed unsuccessfully for an active role in support of Palestinian rights. The conflict has resulted in the refusal of membership in the national organization for Ottawa members, who subsequently affiliated themselves with the American-based Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (MacEwen interview).

As well, it has suffered by becoming shrill in both its continuing efforts to change policies and its anti-American nationalism, and because of the communistic tendencies of some of its leaders.

Among women's groups as a whole, there has been to date a significant degree of competition among countervailing opinions. Jewish women, to illustrate, have strongly opposed some of the stands of the VofW on the Palestinian question and related Middle East issues (MacEwen interview). This competition limits the ability of either to influence government. As we saw with consumers, conflict between overlapping interests within public-minded groups can be a hindrance to influence.

Religious

Chapter III indicated that religious organizations in Canada are highly involved in matters of foreign policy, especially within the fields of human rights and international development. Assessing their influence, however, requires caution. These groups have been influential in the sense that they have been directly involved in the development of existing policies; GATT-Fly, for example, a highly organized and successful group, significantly influenced Canada's decision to increase her pledged contribution of relief assistance at the 1974 World Food Conference in Rome (Page interview; Tucker, 1980:41-42), and the decision to contribute to a Common Fund as proposed

at UNCTAD IV in Nairobi. But they have failed to have a great impact over the altering of general policy lines (Crowe interview). Nevertheless, relative to the non-economic groups already discussed, these organizations can be very influential in their special areas of concern. They provide direction, manpower, expertise and often strong support to officials, and are viewed as very valuable in that role (Elder interview). Moral force and public support are perhaps the most important sources of strength for such public interest groups. In general, religious organizations can be very effective in preventing regressive steps such as cutbacks in aid expenditures, especially in times of austerity; and in stimulating action in particular areas of the world where they are active. This was the case with the Presbyterian Church in the Biafra issue, and is at least part of the explanation for the influence achieved by church groups on the issue of liberation in South Africa, as illustrated in the government's qualification of its support to firms investing in or trading with South Africa (Tucker, 1980:42). As well, interest in Latin America at DEA has been stimulated primarily by the Inter-Church Group on Latin America (Crowe interview). A large part of this type of influence is due to the desires of officials to move in certain directions, and their need for support in doing so.

Nevertheless, there has been a general decline over the years in the influence of these groups, as in the case

of the other non-economic groups, because of the increasingly technical nature of foreign policy. Some church groups suffer as well from a lack of legitimacy. For example, the United Church's involvement in foreign policy has been managed to a great extent by left-wing elements within the church, whose positions are not viewed by officials as truly representative of the majority of the church's congregation.

Ethnic

Ethnic groups are continuously communicating with government on all sorts of foreign policy issues. Among them, a few are particularly influential. The Ukrainians are "a strong powerful lobby" on matters of human rights and Canada's relations with the USSR (Sharp interview). For example, they were very influential in determining the human rights positions taken by Canada at the CSCE and its follow-up in Belgrade. Moreover, some of them have been highly influential in having their homeland recognized de jure as independent, a concern in which they are joined by other groups mentioned in the preceding chapter. This concern, similarly, is reflected in Canada's policy of not recognizing, de jure, the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states, and of recognizing honorary consults from them. The Ukrainian community is "a powerful political force in this country" because of its size, regional concentration and cohesion, which

enhance its ability to influence foreign policy (Sharp interview).

Jewish organizations are without a doubt the most powerful and influential ethnic group in Canada. In terms of foreign policy, one need look no further than the 1975 decision on the part of the Trudeau government to postpone indefinitely (in effect to cancel) the scheduled UN Conference on International Crime and the Treatment of Offenders planned for Toronto; and the more recent, albeit temporary, decision on the part of the Clark government to move the Canadian embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem¹. These groups, headed by the Canadian Jewish Congress, are "the most effective of all...ethnic groups" (Sharp interview). The Canadian International Image Study surveys rated them as **among** the most influential of all non-governmental groups involved in foreign policy. The CJC, in fact, has had the most effective and longlasting effect on DEA of any non-economic group. To illustrate, September 1979 was only the first time no representative of the group was present during the UN General Assembly in New York. The CJC is highly informed, and therefore is able to partake greatly in the two-way flow of information which can help legitimize a group (Page interview). Its expertise and wealth, the political concentration of its membership (especially in strategic constituencies), and its highly specific and intense interests are important factors in the influence it enjoys.

1. The former involved direct group activity, the latter anticipated political benefits from the Jewish community.

No other minority groups approach the level of influence of the Ukrainian and Jewish communities.

Although Arab organizations have increased their activity in recent years, they have yet to achieve a significant degree of influence in competition with their powerful opponents. They are smaller in number, less affluent, and must overcome the longstanding access and influence of the Jewish community whose interests counter their own, as well as the traditional pro-Israel bias of most Canadians. In fact, the primary source of strength of the Arab groups lies outside their hands in the economic power of their homelands.

Most other ethnic groups in Canada are much less active on foreign policies; they have been much more complacent and accommodating, as were the Taiwanese over Canada's establishment of diplomatic relations with mainland China (Sharp interview). The influence of these groups in general is a function of several variables already alluded to: population size and concentration; degree of unity, organization and commitment; legitimacy and stake on particular issues; and the nature of general public opinion at any given time.

Citizens

Although most citizens' groups involved in foreign policy have very little influence, in certain cases significant impact occurs. One area in which this has been parti-

cularly true in the last two decades is the environment, especially in the context of Canadian-American relations. The Greenpeace Foundation has been a leader on environmental issues, including such ones as the "Save the Whales" campaign. Other groups, some ad hoc, also have been influential to varying degrees in such controversies as the Garrison Diversion project and the American decisions to build Trident submarines in northern Washington, and to transport oil by tanker through Canadian waters from Alaska to points south in the USA.

Citizens groups involved in these and similar issues are usually issue-oriented. This being the case like issue-oriented groups in any category, their impact is normally indirect, a function of the seriousness of the issue, general public opinion, media coverage, and the political consequences which might arise from the impact of any particular governmental decision. Success hinges on the degree to which they can foster support by influencing public opinion, or convince government that they represent a broad basis of opinion. Indeed, it is as catalysts that these groups can make their biggest mark, especially by socializing issues. Their success, though infrequent, often amounts to the establishment of policy where theretofore none existed (policy-setting), although they usually only succeed in placing an issue on the agenda of policy makers (agenda-setting).

The Biafra crisis exemplified the extent to which issue-oriented groups, through public opinion and collaboration, could influence government. On that issue, the Canadian Union for the Rights of Biafra (CURB) led a united front of organizations which, through the most influential media campaign in recent foreign policy making history, stimulated a substantial short-term response from the federal government. CURB was allied with several institutional groups, notably the Presbyterian Church, which buttressed its efforts by purposively publicizing the issue, for example through an invitation to two MPs¹ and a reporter for a 36-hour visit to Biafra. The support of the Church died out in the long run, however, because the group feared a threat to its legitimacy from its alliance with CURB, and disagreed with the activist tactics of the latter. In similar cases, like that of the Vietnamese refugees, success also hinges on the ability to generate publicity and solicit widely-based support. Lack of success, relatedly, stems from the inability to influence public opinion. Thus Canadians Concerned About Southern Africa and similar groups face a difficult obstacle in their efforts to change policy.

The role of the press is critical in attempts at indirect influence. When socializing an issue, a group's biggest challenge is "the struggle to have it discussed"; second is getting accurate and extensive media coverage

¹Andrew Brewin, an active Anglican, and David MacDonald, a United Church Minister.

(MacEwen interview). Indeed, indirect influence is inextricably linked to some type of media support, from which broader support might be forthcoming. The preparation for the UN General Assembly's Special Session on Disarmament is a case in point. There was much opposition to existing policies, and many groups took advantage of the government's effort to solicit opinion through public meetings. Many of those turned out to be designed by groups to publicize their criticisms. However, very few people attended most meetings, and even fewer reporters. The lack of public interest, enhanced by the absence of media coverage, "disarmed" the disarmament groups (Williamson interview).

Finally, for issue-oriented groups advocating help to oppressed peoples and other humanitarian concerns, especially where well-developed policies are not in effect, appeals to the common morality of officials and/or the general public can affect decisions (Sharp interview). Thus a citizens' group such as the Canadian Coalition for a Just Economic Order was able to help stimulate Canada's decision to contribute to a Common Fund as proposed at UNCTAD IV in Nairobi (Pollack, 1976:18).

Institutionalized citizens' groups have a great deal more difficulty influencing foreign policy. The Royal Society of Canada, one of the most important in this category, has had very little influence because its members have tended

to work through other institutions with which they are involved (e.g. church, university, business). The multiplicity of interests and views among members hinders its ability to be influential (Garneau interview). Expertise is one of the most important characteristics of these groups, as is clearly the case with the Canadian Hunger Foundation and the Canadian Human Rights Foundation (CHRF). For the same reason, the participants in the Pugwash Conferences, a think-tank, have enjoyed a degree of influence over disarmament policy. A related reason is the reputation of its membership. Its influence of late has been due in part to George Ignatieff, one of Canada's "elder statesmen" (Williamson interview). Similarly, John Humphrey, President of CHRF, has been singularly responsible for that group's influence, through his personal ties with DEA; he was formerly responsible for human rights in the UN Division of DEA.

Special Foreign Policy

The influence of special foreign policy groups varies a great deal from case to case.

The Canadian Council for International Cooperation, the UNA, the World Federalists and the Canadian Institute of International Affairs are not particularly effective in directly influencing policy decisions (the CIIA, as noted earlier, is even forbidden by its charter to advocate any

particular position), although their activities and publications are from time to time influential with some departmental officials (Sharp interview). They enjoy offering lots of input, but exert limited policy influence. DEA treats them largely as target groups, and is repeatedly in communication with them. Their value to decision makers lies largely in their expertise, and their input is enhanced through direct contacts with the decision making elite. The UNA's specific interest in UN activities and concerns can enhance its influence in that area, but only to a limited extent, given Canada's well-established policies toward the UN.

Others among these groups have a more operational influence over policy, as alluded to in Chapter III, for example OXFAM, CUSO and Amnesty International, through their activities abroad, affect policy making in Ottawa. CUSO is the most important, and is influential primarily because of its level of organization and intimate connection, through funding, with the government, although this could have the opposite effect. CUSO has enjoyed good access for some years (Elder interview).

At times these groups can have a very strong impact on officials, as with CUSO's determined argument at the time of the overthrow of Allende in Chile (Page interview). But that impact rarely translates into actual policy changes.

In general, the special foreign policy groups influence mostly through support for existing policies and the promotion of an active, dynamic, internationalist approach. Although their influence over the details of policies appears limited in most cases, they do enjoy very considerable influence in terms of the climate in which foreign policies are discussed, and this is important in the foreign policy process (Sharp interview).

Given the substantive information in the foregoing typological review of group influence in making Canadian foreign policy, a broader analysis of the factors affecting this influence provide a more complete explanation. The relevant variables may be divided roughly into three categories: environmental factors; group tactics; and group characteristics. The first includes the characteristics of the domestic and international political environments which affect interest group behaviour generally, and in terms of foreign policy in particular. The other two categories are self-explanatory.

The domestic political environment at any given time has a major impact on interest group influence. Similarly, Canadian political culture affects interest group behaviour, including their input in the foreign policy process.

A few aspects of these systemic factors which affect group influence should illustrate the more general effects which the political system as a whole may have on foreign policy. For example, normally there exists no serious fear of electoral punishment on the part of political leaders for decisions on foreign policy. The generally permissive apathy towards foreign policy in Canada has limited the influence of interest groups in that area (Stairs, 1970-71:244). This is linked to other characteristics of our foreign policy process discussed earlier, such as the minimal role of parliament and political bipartisanship. Votes alone have not been consistently the key to group influence, although command over a large bloc of voters (itself both extremely difficult and rare for groups), and strategic location and concentration, can make the political strength of a group a primary concern of decision makers, and thus advantageous in terms of group influence. Protheroe concludes that "politicians are clearly more sensitive to potential lost jobs due to import competition than they are to groups like the Consumers Association which claims to represent all Canadians, but which in the end represents very few, since decision makers know that very few people vote in terms of their roles as consumers, at least in normal circumstances" (1979:75-76).

Secondly, strong public support of a group's position is almost necessary in order to influence policy makers, especially in cases where indirect influence becomes necessary, as for example, on non-economic issues such as disarmament policy and Biafra, or where entrenched policies already exist, as in Canada's nuclear export policy. Thus the domestic political environment in the disarmament policy debate was particularly important: the absence of a strong public involvement was a significant deterrent to group influence, as was also the existence of a well-established policy. Permissive apathy on the part of the general public (e.g. very low attendance at public hearings, minimal press coverage was interpreted by officials as tacit approval of existing policies (Williamson interview). Relatedly, expansion of Canada's development assistance policies has been restricted by the influence of strong manufacturing interests despite the encouraging efforts of less influential groups, such as church groups and the CCIC, because general public opinion has not been sufficiently aroused to stimulate policy changes, or permit officials to develop the policies in the direction they might wish to take. The existence of a strong public opinion, on the other hand, enhanced the success of groups during the Biafra controversy.

Similarly, the international environment has a very important impact on group influence. Indeed, it is perhaps

the most important determinant of Canada's foreign policy as a whole, which tends to be reactive in nature. Despite group efforts to amend our disarmament policies, for example, it was unlikely that policies could have been altered, unless backed by a strong public consensus, because of the nature of the international environment at the time on that issue (Williamson interview). Likewise, what might seem to be logical moves in support of the NIEO have been discouraged by the anticipated negative consequences they would have on Canada's relations with fellow OECD members, particularly the USA. In both the domestic and international contexts, then, the political environment helps determine the decision costs--the domestic and international consequences (political, economic, diplomatic or otherwise) of policy choices--and constitute foremost systemic constraints on group influence.

The characteristics of the foreign policy process identified at the outset of the study, and alluded to above, comprise further constraints on group influence. The context of decision making is especially important. The nature of a decision has been seen to be a key factor: social process decisions normally are much more easily influenced than intellectual ones. Where policies are well established, little, if any, influence can be achieved, as is the case with Canada's defence, UN, disarmament and nuclear

safeguards policies (Elder interview). The length of time over which a particular decision is made can be very important. In drawn out cases such as Garrison, generally less influential groups can build up much public support and influence government. Similarly, a prolonged weapons procurement decision provides interests with much-needed lobbying time; the Biafra case illustrates how a short decision period can result in, little time to organize and plan strategies, and limited continuous impact despite the heightened public awareness. Although in that case groups continued long after October, 1968, to be "vociferous in their demands", the government's response after that date was limited because its final position on the issue had been arrived at (Barry, 1970). Similarly, the size of the attentive public, and the degree of permissive apathy, have significant effects on group influence. As well, the existence or absence of countervailing group or public pressures helps determine group influence. The lack of them at the outset of the Biafra crisis permitted the groups involved to face the government with a clear, united front, presumably representative of general public opinion. By the end of the controversy, however, major differences appeared among groups over humanitarian and political objectives as well as tactics and strategies, thereby weakening the position of groups on both sides. Similarly, countervailing pressures within the women's

movement has affected the influence of groups representative of sections within it.

The traditional patterns of elite interaction and accommodation within the decision making process is also relevant, for example, the close departmental ties enjoyed by some groups such as the CFA, some military groups, the CMA and other strong economic groups. As outlined in Chapter II, other systemic characteristics, such as the collective responsibility of Cabinet, and a limited role for Parliament, as well as the increasingly technical nature of foreign policy, limits group influence. The ideosyncratic behaviour of officials is also an important variable. For example, upon entering office as Secretary of State for External Affairs, Don Jamieson had no intention of becoming "subject to buffeting by a variety of pressure groups, however well intentioned and however deserving those may be". (cited in Tucker, 1980:43). Subsequently, he met with very few representatives of interest groups, and those he did see were primarily contacts he had made while Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce. In contrast, Flora Macdonald, from the outset of her term in the External Affairs portfolio, met systematically with a wide variety of groups (Elder interview).

Equally well established as determinants of influence during the course of this thesis are tactics.

Whether a group attempts to influence decision makers directly or indirectly, and how it proceeds, can affect its ability to influence. Probably the most significant aspect is the socialization of an issue by a group. Issue-oriented groups have their most significant impact on stimulants or catalysts, through the use of public routes and indirect influence tactics. In fact, one of the biggest challenges for groups which rely on indirect influence on any issue is the "struggle to have it discussed" (MacEwen interview). In most cases where groups must go public, for whatever reason, they seek to convince officials that they represent general public opinion, or at least enlightened opinion.

The role of the press in a policy debate is crucial. The groups involved in the disarmament policy discussions, for example, sought but did not receive significant press coverage, which, in combination with the small public interest in the issue, seriously limited the groups' potential influence. In the Biafra case, however, the role of the press was very significant in supporting group demands. The impact of photographs of starving Biafran children, and editorials critical of Canada's inaction, was such that the groups pressing for government action received the much-needed public backing. Thus one of the big problems for groups who seek to influence government indirectly is to receive extensive media coverage

favourable to its point of view (MacEwen interview).

Two tactical variables which can have an important impact on group influence are the use of coalitions and the intensity of group efforts. The latter is obvious: the more intense a group's pressure is, the more likely it will affect changes, at least under normal circumstances involving more or less legitimate or reasonable demands. The usefulness of coalitions is also rather self-evident as a means of convincing government that a broad section of the public desires action of some sort. For example, the joint lobbying which was focussed on Ivan Head prior to UNCTAD IV resulted in significant action on Canada's part at that conference.

Many group characteristics that are highly inter-related have significant impact on their influence. Legitimacy, a key element explained in Chapter I, is probably the most important in group influence. One aspect of it which can have significant implications for groups, is the normative attitude of officials towards them. Groups often are viewed as not being legitimate representatives with a right to a hearing. Many, especially issue-oriented or altruistic groups, are dismissed as agitators who don't appreciate the problems facing diplomats and other officials, as was the case during the gathering of opinion on Canada's disarmament policies prior to the UN Special Session (Williamson interview) ; groups are criticized for lack of appreci-

ation of quiet diplomacy, and their insensitivity of international conditions which bind government (Crowe interview , Roberts interview)

Competence and sophistication also are important sources of legitimacy (Grandy interview). Groups that have competent permanent staffs, personable and reasonable leaders, internal cohesion and sophisticated means of expressing their views, have a high potential for legitimacy. Such is the case with groups like the Canadian Exporters Association, in contrast with the Consumers Association of Canada which has an incompetent staff in terms of foreign policy (Grandy interview). These factors are closely linked to the level of resources a group enjoys and its level of organization; the more financial, **manpower** and research resources a group possesses, the better it can express its views and impress them upon officials. A sophisticated organization can use resources efficiently and produce effective positions. Furthermore, access is more likely when a group is highly organized and resourceful. In terms of these characteristics, business groups are at an advantage, as are organized agriculture and labour, over most non-economic groups.

Other resources which can be important are a group's capacity to command electoral votes, especially in concentrated areas of key constituencies, and expertise,

especially the ability to furnish sophisticated technical information or political advice. The former is best illustrated with reference to ethnic groups; the latter to business organizations and fisheries groups. A last important resource is moral force, although it is rarely a dominant factor in influence; a possible exception are church groups on certain human rights or international development questions.

Credibility, as described in Chapters I and II, is also a key element in legitimacy, and is often achieved through the provision of quality research and hard facts to officials (Halpin interview). Consistency in views and approaches is also important. Other contributors to legitimacy are a group's ability to delineate a stake in an issue; the identification of a definite potential impact is a key element. Also, conformity to traditional or conventional standards of ideology, organization, composition and conduct, as suggested in Chapter I, is a crucial factor in group legitimacy. Lastly, a group is likely to be viewed as legitimate if its views or objectives conform with government policies, intentions, or desired goals. Certain groups have been influential in the areas of fisheries, law of the sea, defence and human rights, for example, because they share objectives with officials, although this does not necessarily imply agreement on means. Relatedly, the support a group can give officials on any

particular issue can enhance its influence in future decisions (Crowe interview).

A very important factor in influence, also linked to legitimacy, is the degree of specificity of interest, vested or otherwise, which a group represents. This is another important reason for the influence of ethnic groups and business groups, as well as some of the other groups described earlier. On the other hand, most citizens groups, consumers and other groups seeking widely-shared, collective benefits, represent interests that are too large, diffuse and heterogeneous to serve as a basis for effective organization and advocacy. These groups are faced with a distinct political disadvantage relative to business, ethnic and other more narrowly based groups. Thus, because of their specific concerns, the more self-interested groups have been found on the whole to be most influential. Closely related to this factor is the fact that influence is normally achieved only on specific issues by groups with a specialized concern, or contribution to make on them.

Access is another key element in influence and a prerequisite to direct influence. Continued dialogue and interaction of the right sort can cultivate valuable elite contacts, possibly leading to the advisory status enjoyed by some groups within particular departments, as described

in the preceding chapter (e.g. fisheries, agriculture, defence). Finally, close departmental ties are important, especially for groups who wish to influence policy making in a direct fashion.

Summary and Conclusions

This thesis has been an attempt at an objective overview of the involvement and influence of domestic interest groups in making Canadian foreign policy, to lay the groundwork for future studies of a more empirical, or even normative, nature. Before presenting the final conclusions of the study, this chapter will review the main findings presented in the body of the text.

Chapter I laid the first part of the foundation of the study with an examination of the role played by domestic interest groups in the Canadian political process as a whole. Canadian political culture was found to provide a generally sympathetic milieu for groups, one which fosters and encourages their growth and participation in the policy process. The other major systemic influence on groups behaviour, governmental structure, was found to make potential group influence difficult to attain, given the concentration of political power in a parliamentary system, and the concomitant closed policy structures centred in Cabinet and the bureaucracy. The discouragement of public participation in policy making on the whole, which is a result of these systemic arrangements, necessitates accommodative elite interaction within those closed structures, if influence is to be achieved by private groups. As well, consultative activity prior to the legislative stage of policy making was found to be essential for groups hoping to influence policy.

These factors combine to make Cabinet the main target of interest group activity, along with the bureaucracy, which, due to its rapid expansion in recent years, has come to shield somewhat the former. Concomitantly, the role of Parliament and parties largely has become insignificant in policy making.

Chapter I then turned to examine the literature on interest group characteristics and activities in Canada, noting the acceptance of them as legitimate representatives and expressors of the views of opinionated publics. The key distinctions between institutional and issue-oriented groups, those motivated by self-interest as opposed to public interest, were also discussed. Further, the chapter introduced the main elements in group success heretofore recorded: e.g. access, electoral strength, personality, and legitimacy. The last was emphasized and developed because of its key role in allowing groups to enter the accommodation process.

Finally, the chapter concluded by drawing the distinction between direct and indirect tactics employed by groups, suggesting that groups in Canada achieve the most success through direct efforts, the privatization rather than the socialization of their concerns. In combination with the systemic factors discussed earlier in the chapter,

this further limits the already small role of the public, Parliament and the press in interest group politics in Canada.

Chapter II completed the foundation of the study with its review of the literature on interest groups and foreign policy, providing a theoretical background to the thesis as well as preparing the way for the attempt at breaking ground in this area of inquiry in Canada. The findings of this chapter combined with those of Chapter I to develop the author's analytical expectations for the remainder of the study.

First, Chapter II introduced the theoretical concepts which have underlain the analysis of interest group activity in foreign policy making: direct versus indirect influence, the differing tactics, including alliances and the knowledge of the policy process in efforts at direct influence, with particular reference to access; the effects of the process itself, the context of decision making, on group influence, e.g. intellectual versus social processes; the organizational and perceptual screen of the process and the policy makers, which make legitimacy, credibility, stake and expertise prime currencies for interest groups; and relatedly, the often-found bias of officials, ideological or otherwise. It then went on to introduce the most developed typology found on the subject, and to illustrate the findings of Professor Hughes in the USA.

Thirdly, the chapter reviewed the conclusions of the main authors on interest groups and foreign policy, with particular reference to their influence. Because the bulk of the relevant literature comes from American authors, they were dealt with before turning to Canadian findings. The earlier American studies, beginning with Cohen's 1959 monograph, suggested that specific, particular interests expressing a concern related to the "raison d'etre" of a group were the most likely to achieve influence. Thus economic groups, especially business organizations, as well as ethnic interests, were seen as the most influential. Their stake and legitimacy on specific issues gave them an advantage over more broadly-based public interest groups. Also found important were the existence of private issues, and the traditional sympathy of officials towards business groups. Overall, the interest groups involved in the USA were found to have less effect on making foreign than domestic policy.

The conclusions of Hughes' more recent empirical study were then added. He concurred that economic groups, especially business groups, held the greatest potential influence. This he attributed to their advantages in terms of resources, legitimacy, and expertise, as well as the existing bias in their favour on the part of officials. Also, he found that the nature of economic issues made

them more susceptible to group involvement, because they provided a greater short-term identifiability of impact of policy choices, related to the concept of stake. Thus he introduced the importance of the nature of particular issues, and the specific nature of the decision process for each one. Relatedly, he concluded that long decision periods enhance the potential for all groups to influence, as well as small attentive publics. Finally, with regard to non-economic groups, he found that although they rarely influence foreign policy, especially on economic issues, their most important currency is stake, which is highly inter-related with legitimacy.

Fourthly, Chapter II turned to examine the state of the literature on this subject in Canada. Reflecting back to the systemic factors introduced in Chapter I, an examination of the characteristics of the Canadian foreign policy process which affect group behaviour therein was undertaken. The important findings were the sheltered cross-departmental elite which characterizes the process, the unimportance of Parliament, the bipartisanship of the major political parties, the generally permissive apathy of the public, the advantages of the bureaucracy over groups attempting to change directions of policy, especially in terms of expertise and resources, and the official bias against open discussion of, hence interest group activity in, foreign policy making. Despite these findings, it became apparent that interest group

activity, within certain bounds of legitimacy, is encouraged and welcomed in policy making circles, which is consistent with the more general findings of Chapter I. Also, recent developments in the nature of foreign policy making in Canada have expanded the potential of groups to influence; for example, the identifiable domestic effects of external politics, the broadening of the foreign policy agenda, and the bureaucratic politics which has developed within the foreign policy process.

Finally, the chapter made note of the theoretical contributions of Denis Stairs, the foremost authority and main source of the literature in Canada on this subject. His concepts of "agenda-setting", "parameter-setting" and "policy-setting", and his conclusions that specific interests and regional concentration were key attributes of influential Canadian groups, complemented those of the American scholars and thus added to the background of this thesis.

Chapter II closed with a summary of the main expectations arrived at by the author in the course of the literature review. Regarding the main thrust of the project, the influence of groups, it was anticipated that

1. Influence would vary according to the approaches adopted by groups, i.e. indirect versus direct tactics, the latter leading to greater success;

2. The policy process would have a substantial effect on the form and degree of group involvement and success;
3. The necessity for groups to become part of the elite accommodation process, makes legitimacy, credibility and related group attributes the most important;
4. Long decision periods and small attentive publics enhance influence;
5. Ad hoc or issue-oriented groups can have occasional success, primarily through indirect tactics;
6. The nature of an issue to a great extent determines the ability of groups to influence;
7. Specific interests enjoy greater influence, because of their legitimacy and stake;
8. The most influential groups would be business groups and other economic groups, as well as ethnic organizations;
9. Groups are less active and influential in foreign than in domestic policy;
10. The groups found to be influential in foreign policy will not diverge greatly from those known to be influential in domestic policy.

Chapter III examined the relative levels of involvement of domestic groups in Canadian foreign policy making as well as the substance and nature of that involvement. It did so with the aid of a typology inspired by Englemann

and Schwartz' of Canadian interest groups and Hughes' of groups involved in American foreign policy decisions. Chapter III thus identified the types of groups involved, and made particular reference to groups having important or illustrative involvement. The last chapter examined the relative levels of influence of the groups most involved in Canadian foreign policy and suggested the main reasons for those findings.

Table I provides a summary of the most important groups discussed in Chapters III and IV. Table II, on the other hand, provides a summary of the reasons for group influence. These should suffice as summaries of the main findings of the last two chapters, and their details, therefore, will not be reiterated.

Given these summaries, and the findings of the thesis as a whole, the following final conclusions may be drawn regarding the involvement and influence of domestic interest groups in Canadian foreign policy making:

1. Direct tactics are potentially far more successful than indirect ones;
2. Systemic factors are very important in shaping the arena in which groups must operate, from the international and domestic political conditions to the particulars of the context of decision making;

3. Legitimacy and credibility appear to be essential to group influence, especially given the highly interrelated nature of the factors which determine levels of involvement and influence; these two seem to comprise the necessary conditions (if any exist) upon which other crucial factors such as expertise, specificity of interest, electoral strength, level of resources and organization, and stake can build a strong foundation for successful group activity;
4. Economic groups, especially business groups, are the most important, particularly the CMA and the CEA, along with the CLC; the non-economic groups play a much less significant role, with the exception of the ethnic, religious and special foreign policy groups; the explanation for this lies in 3 above;
5. The impact of issue-oriented groups is very limited;
6. Long decision periods and small attentive publics can enhance group efforts;
7. There is much less group activity on the part of groups in the area of foreign than domestic policy;
8. Most of the groups found to be influential in foreign policy are reputed to be influential domestically;
9. Concomitantly, interest group behaviour in the foreign policy realm does not appear to diverge significantly from that in domestic areas.

In closing, it is important to add that these findings, although of modest significance in themselves, would achieve greater importance should the ultimate objective of this study be realized: the conducting of more detailed studies, empirical or normative, on this important subject within the study of the making of Canadian foreign policy.

TABLE I - Group Involvement and Influence in Canadian Foreign Policy Making

Type	Important Examples	Main Issue Areas
Economic	Business	Canadian Manufacturers' Association, Fisheries, Canadian Export Association; Fisheries Groups
Agriculture	Canadian Federation of Agriculture	Agricultural trade
Labour	Canadian Labour Congress	Human rights, Development
Consumers	Consumers Association of Canada	Trade
Professionals	Canadian Association of Broadcasters, Canadian Book Publishers Association	Variety
Non-Economic	Veterans/Military Support	Defence
	Women	Human Rights, Development
	Religious	GAFT-FLY, Project Plowshares, Human Rights, Development

(continued)

TABLE I - continued

Type	Important Examples	Main Issue Areas
Non- Economic	Canadian Jewish Congress, Ukrainians	Bilateral relations, Human rights
Ethnic	Issue- oriented Institutional	Variety
Citizens	Special Foreign Policy Canadian Institute of Int'l. Affairs, United Nations Association	Variety

TABLE II - The Main Determinants of Group Involvement
and Influence in Canadian Foreign Policy Making

Type	Determinants
<u>Environmental</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- International Environment- Domestic Political Environment- Context of Decision Making (nature of issue, nature of decision process, time, absence of countervailing pressure, size of attentive public, etc.)- Traditional Patterns of Elite Interaction- Technical Nature of Foreign Policy
<u>Tactical</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Direct Tactics (Privatization)- Indirect Tactics (Socialization including alliances, press, Parliament, parties)- Intensity of efforts
<u>Group Characteristics</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Resources- Expertise- Moral Force- Electoral Strength (size, unity, concentration, strategic location)- Level of organization (stability, continuity, institutional or issue-oriented)- Specificity of Interest- Access (elite contacts, departmental ties)- Legitimacy (credibility)- Stake- Proximity to established policies or desired policy direction

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

Adler, Kenneth P., and Bobrow, Davis, "Interest and Influence in Foreign Affairs", Public Opinion Quarterly, XX 1:89-102 (Spring, 1956).

Almond, Gabriel A., and G. Bingham Powell Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach, Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown & Co., 1966 (especially pp. 73-127)

Barry, Donald J., Interest Groups in the Canadian Foreign Policy Formulation Process: the Case of Biafra, unpublished M.A. thesis, Dalhousie University, 1970.

Bentley, Arthur F., The Process of Government, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1908.

Bird, Florence, "National and international experience with women's rights" in International Perspectives (January - February, 1978), 20-26.

Blaikie, David, "Hard Sell on the Hill is a \$100 million business" Toronto Star (Saturday 20 January, 1979) C4.

Blaisdell, Donald C., "Pressure Groups, Foreign Policies, and International Politics", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 319:49-157, (September, 1958)

Burdette, Franklin L., "Influence of Noncongressional Pressures on Foreign Policy", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 314:92-99, (September, 1953).

Castles, F.G., "Towards a Theoretical Analysis of Pressure Politics", Political Studies (1966), 339-348.

Cohen, Bernard C., "Political systems, public opinion, and foreign policy: The United States and the Netherlands". International Journal, 33:1:195-216 (Winter, 1977-78).

Clark, S.D., "Group Interests in Canadian Politics" in J.H. Aitchison, ed., The Political Process in Canada, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963.

Cupps, D. Stephen, The Impact of Public Interest Groups and Citizen Organizations on Bureaucratic Behaviour: Lessons from the Experience of the Federal Trade Commission. International Political Science Association Paper (August, 1976).

BIBLIOGRAPHY - Page 2

Dawson, Helen Jones, "Pressure Groups and the Canadian Bureaucracy: Farm Organizations in Canada" in W.D.K. Kernaghan, ed., Bureaucracy in Canadian Government, Toronto: Methuen, 1969. 105-111.

Deutsch, Karl W., and Edinger, Lewis J., Germany Rejoins the Powers: Mass Opinion, Interest Groups, and Elites in Contemporary German Foreign Policy, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959.

Dobell, Peter C., "The Management of a Foreign Policy for Canadians", International Journal, 26:1:202-220, (Winter, 1970-71).

Doern, G. Bruce, "Recent Changes in the Philosophy of Policy Making in Canada", Canadian Journal of Political Science, 4:243-264. (1971).

Doern, G. Bruce, and Aucoin, Peter, The Structures of Policy-Making in Canada, Toronto: MacMillan, 1971.

Eayrs, James, The Art of the Possible: Government and Foreign Policy in Canada, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961.

Eayrs, James, "The Bureaucratic Elite and Formation of Canadian Foreign Policy" in W.D.K. Kernaghan, ed., Bureaucracy in Canadian Government, Toronto: Methuen, 1969, 88-94.

Eckstein, Harry, Pressure Group Politics, London: Allen and Unwin, 1960.

Ehrmann, Henry W., ed., Interest Groups on Four Continents, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958.

Englemann, Frederick C., and Schwartz, Mildred A., Political Parties and the Canadian Social Structure, Toronto: Prentice Hall, 1967.

Farrell, R. Barry, The Making of Canadian Foreign Policy, Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall, 1969.

Fox, Douglas M., The Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy Making: A Reader, Pacific Palisades, Calif.: Goodyear, 1971.

Freeman, Howard E., and Showel, Morris, "Differential Political Influence Voluntary Associations", Public Opinion Quarterly, 15:4:703-714 (Winter, 1951-52).

Gable, Richard W., "Political Interests as Policy Shapers", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 319:84-93 (September, 1958).

BIBLIOGRAPHY - Page 3

Goldstein, Jonah, "Public Interest Groups and Public Policy: The Case of the Consumers' Association of Canada", Canadian Journal of Political Science, 12:1: 137-155 (March, 1979.)

Hertzman, Lewis, Warnock, John W. and Harkin, Thomas A. Alliances and Illusions, Edmonton: M.G. Hurtig, 1969.

Hero, Alfred O. Jr., "Non-profit organizations, public opinion, and United States foreign policy", International Journal, 33:1:150-176 (Winter, 1977-78).

Hilsman, Roger, The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs, New York: Harper & Row, 1971.

Holmes, John W., "The CIIA and Canadian Foreign Policy", address to the CIIA, Toronto, June 1978).

Hughes, Barry B., The Domestic Context of American Foreign Policy, San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1978.

Kay, Zachariah, Canada and Palestine: The Politics of Non-Commitment, Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1978.

Keenleyside, Terence A., LeDuc, Lawrence, and Murray, J. Alex. "Public Opinion and Canada-United States Economic Relations". Behind the Headlines, 35:4 (1976).

Kissinger, Henry A., "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy" in Douglas M. Fox, ed., The Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy Making, Pacific Palisades, Calif.: Goodyear, 1971, 11-24.

Kwavnick, David, Organized Labour and Pressure Politics: The Canadian Labour Congress 1956-1968, Montreal and London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972.

Lamontagne, Maurice, "New Centres of Policy-Making Influence" in W.D.K. Kernaghan, ed., Bureaucracy in Canadian Government, Toronto: Methuen, 1969, 129-137.

Litvak, Isaiah A., and Maule, Christopher J., "Interest Group Tactics and the Politics of Foreign Investment: The Time - Reader's Digest Case Study", Canadian Journal of Political Science, 7:4:616-629 (December 1974).

London, Kurt, The Making of Foreign Policy East and West, Philadelphia and New York: J.B. Lippincott, 1965.

BIBLIOGRAPHY - Page 4

McNaught, Kenneth, "Who Controls Foreign Policy? American and Canadian Contrasts", Behind the Headlines, 14:3 (September, 1954).

Madar, Daniel, "Planners, influence and bureaucracy" International Journal, 30:1:57-79 (Winter 1974-75).

Mahood, H.R., ed., Pressure Groups in American Politics, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967.

Manzer, R., "Selective Inducements and the Development of Pressure Groups", Canadian Journal of Political Science, Volume II (March, 1969), pp. 103-116.

Masland, John W., "Pressure Groups and American Foreign Policy", Public Opinion Quarterly, 6:1:115-122 (Spring, 1942).

Milbrath, Lester W., "Interest Groups and Foreign Policy", in James N. Rosenau, ed., Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy, New York: The Free Press, 1967. 231-251.

Munton, Don., and Poel, Dale H., "Electoral Accountability and Canadian Foreign Policy: The Case of Foreign Investment", International Journal, 33:1:217-247 (Winter, 1977-78).

Nossal, Kim Richard, "The Unmaking of Garrison: United States Politics and the Management of Canadian-American Boundary Waters", Behind the Headlines, 37:1 (1978).

O'Manique, John, Progress in the Establishment of a New International Economic Order: Obstacles and Opportunities in Canada, unpublished UNITAR paper (March 1979).

Passaris, Constantine, "'Input' of Foreign Policy to Immigration Equation", International Perspectives, (November-December, 1976), 23-28.

Pearson, Geoffrey, "What does the academic have to contribute to policymaking?" International Perspectives (November-December, 1973), 43-46.

Pollack, Dave, "Canada's Electronic Pressure", The New Internationalist, 45:18-19, (November, 1976).

"Pressure Groups in Canada", Parliamentarian, 51:1:11-20, (January, 1970).

BIBLIOGRAPHY - Page 5

Presthus, Robert, Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics, Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1973.

Presthus, Robert, Elites in the Policy Process, London: Cambridge University Press, 1974.

Presthus, Robert, "Interest Groups and the Canadian Parliament: Activities, Interaction, Legitimacy and Influence", Canadian Journal of Political Science, 4:444-460 (1971).

Pross, A. Paul, ed., Pressure Group Behaviour in Canadian Politics, Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1975.

Protheroe, David R., "Making Trade Decisions in Canada (1968-1978)", unpublished M.A. thesis, Ottawa: The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, January, 1979.

Rendel, A.M., "Policy-Makers and Opinion", International Journal 30:1:80-91 (Winter, 1974-75).

Rosenau, James N., ed., Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy, New York: The Free Press, 1967.

Schattschneider, E.E., The Semi-Sovereign People, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960.

Schilling, Warner E., "The American Foreign Policy Process", Douglas M. Fox, ed., The Politics of US Foreign Policy Making, Palisades, Calif.: Goodyear, 1971, 38-46.

Sharp, Mitchell, "The Bureaucratic Elite and Policy Formation" in W.D.K. Kernaghan, ed., Bureaucracy in Canadian Government, Toronto: Methuen, 1969, 82-87.

Stairs, Denis, "Public Opinion and External Affairs: Reflections on the Domestication of Canadian Foreign Policy", International Journal, 33:1:128-49 (Winter, 1977-78).

Stairs, Denis, "Publics and Policy-Makers: The Domestic Environment of Canada's Foreign Policy Community", International Journal, 26:1:221-248, (Winter, 1970-71).

Stanbury, W.T., Business Interests and the Reform of Canadian Competition Policy, 1971-1975, Toronto, Methuen, 1977.

BIBLIOGRAPHY - Page 6

Thorburn, H.G., "Pressure Groups in Canadian Politics: Recent Revisions of the Anti-Combines Legislation", Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 30:2:157-74 (May, 1964).

Thordarson, Bruce, "Posture and Policy: Leadership in Canada's External Affairs", International Affairs, 31:4:666-691, (Autumn, 1976).

Thordarson, Bruce, Trudeau and Foreign Policy: A Study in Decision-Making, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1972.

Trice, Robert H., "Foreign Policy Interest Groups, Mass Public Opinion and the Arab-Israeli Dispute", Western Political Quarterly, 31:2:238-252 (June, 1978).

Truman, David B., The Governmental Process, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951.

Tucker, Michael, Canadian Foreign Policy: Contemporary Issues and Themes, Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1980.

Turner, Henry A., "How Pressure Groups Operate", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 319:63-72 (September, 1958).

Van Loon, Richard J., and Whittington, Michael S., The Canadian Political System, Environment, Structure and Process, Second Edition, Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1976.

Whitaker, Reg., "Images of the State in Canada", in Panitch, Leo, The Canadian State: Political Economy and Political Power, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977, pp. 28-68.

Winham, Gilbert R., "Bureaucratic Politics and Canadian Trade Negotiations", International Journal, 34:1:64-89 (Winter, 1978-79).

Winham, Gilbert R., "Negotiation as a Management Process", World Politics, 30:1:87-114 (October, 1979).

Ziegler, L. Harmon, and Peak, G. Wayne, Interest Groups in American Society, Second Edition, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972.

LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

Mr. Bob Applebaum, International Division,
Department of Fisheries and Oceans

Ms. Sharon Balick, National Council of Jewish
Women of Canada

Mr. John Bonus, Mining Association of Canada

Mr. F.B. Caldwell, Navy League of Canada

Mr. Jim Crowe, UN Division, Department of External Affairs

Mr. G. Deschamps, Canadian Manufacturers' Association

Ms. Margite Doneit, United Nations Association in Canada

Mr. W. Dowsell, Commodities Division, Department of
~~External Affairs~~

Mr. David Elder, Minister's Office, Department of
External Affairs

Mr. P. Garneau, Royal Society of Canada

Mr. Y. Gauthier, Canadian Bar Association

Mr. N. Gregor Guthrie, Canada-Japan Trade Council

Mr. Dal Hall, Canadian Forestry Association

Mr. Ron Halpin, Africa and Middle East Division,
Department of External Affairs

Mr. Bill Hamilton, Canadian Federation of Agriculture

Mr. John Harker, International Affairs Section,
Canadian Labour Congress

Ms. Min Harris, Federation of Jewish Women's Organizations

Mr. E. Michael Howarth, Association of Canadian Clubs

Mr. P. Jelly, Consumers' Association of Canada

Mr. K. Johnston, Royal Canadian Legion

Mr. F. Lapeer, Royal Canadian Air Force Association

Mr. J. Matthews, Canadian Council of Professional Engineers

INTERVIEWEES - continued

Mr. D. McArthur, Canadian Nuclear Association

Ms. Charlotte McEwen, Voice of Women

Mr. Dick Roberts, International Division, Department
of Fisheries and Oceans

Mr. Gary Sciroca, Academic Relations Division, Department
of External Affairs

Mr. Philip Slyfield, US Division, Department of External
Affairs

Mr. John Tackaberry, Canadian Council on International
Cooperation.

Mr. Bruce Thordarson, Cooperative Union of Canada

Mr. D.R. Whelan, Department of External Affairs

Mr. Kenneth Williamson, Bureau of Information, Department
of External Affairs.

END

3	1	H	0	8	H	8	2
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

FIN