From Fragility to Stability: A Novel Transition Model for Third-Party Interventions in Fragile and Conflict Affected States

by

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Dissertation Abstract

Policymakers and scholars alike have wrestled with the question of why some third-party interventions in fragile and conflict affected states (FCAS) are successful while others are not. For example, countries such as Cambodia, Rwanda, and Uzbekistan have been pulled out of extreme fragility, whereas countries such as Libya, Mali, and Zimbabwe remain mired in extreme fragility despite numerous attempts at spurring economic, social, and political development. This dissertation examines post-intervention variations in the development and security outcomes in otherwise similar fragile countries, in order to explain why some Western interventions have failed while others have succeeded. By documenting key cases of third-party intervention in FCAS and examining them systematically this research program tests structural aspects of each country situation while at the same time accounting for agency and leadership roles, both domestically and internationally. Using a theoretical framework based on the evolutionary principles of alternative stable states and positive feedback loops, the findings indicate that there is some evidence that—perhaps counter intuitively—outside interventions should focus initially not on the weakest state fragility dimension (authority, legitimacy, and capacity) but rather on the strongest. For states stuck in extreme fragility for long periods of time, the level of each of the three dimensions is so low that focusing on the weakest dimension only leads to premature load bearing and isomorphic mimicry problems (Andrews, Pritchett and Woolcock 2017). Rather, interventions which target the strongest dimension of fragility lead to improvement by establishing self-reinforcing, ‘runaway’ positive feedback loops. At the same time, the findings indicate that intervention on the strongest dimension may be a necessary but not sufficient factor in catalyzing recovery, and that certain preconditions or concurrent conditions may be needed to ensure that these ‘virtuous cycles’ have a positive feedback effect on the other two dimensions of fragility, improving development and security outcomes and catalyzing long-term recovery in state authority, legitimacy, and capacity.
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# Table of Contents

Dissertation Abstract ................................................................................................................. II

Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................... III

List of Figures ........................................................................................................................... X

List of Appendices: .................................................................................................................... XII

Chapter 1  Statehood, Fragility, and Third-Party Intervention...................................................... 1

1.1 Motivation and Background .................................................................................................. 3

1.2 What Makes a State? ............................................................................................................ 10

1.3 Key Concepts: Defining State Fragility .............................................................................. 11

1.4 Scholarly Contribution and Goals ...................................................................................... 16

1.5 Escaping Extreme Fragility ............................................................................................... 23

1.6 Organization of this Document .......................................................................................... 31

Chapter 2  Review of the Literature ............................................................................................ 33

2.1 Existing Empirical Studies of Fragility: Selected Models and Indices ............................... 33

2.2 Third-Party Intervention in Fragile States .......................................................................... 37

2.3 Peacebuilding and Statebuilding in Fragile Situations ..................................................... 50

2.4 Backsliding and Civil War Recurrence ............................................................................. 53

2.5 Importance of Power-Sharing in Preventing Backsliding .................................................. 58

Chapter 3  Escaping Extreme Fragility: Theoretical Framework, Argument and Hypotheses .... 61

3.1 Argument: Focus on the Strongest Dimension of Statehood ........................................... 65

3.2 A Proposed Theoretical Model to Study Extreme Fragility Transitions ........................... 71

3.3 Theoretical Lens: Mechanisms at Play ............................................................................. 74

3.3.1 Authority and Legitimacy Interactive Dynamics ............................................................... 74

3.3.2 Legitimacy and Capacity Interactive Dynamics .............................................................. 75
7.3.3 The Triggers of the Civil War: Timeline of the Intervention ........................................ 262

7.3.4 Understanding Backsliding: Four Mechanisms .......................................................... 268

7.3.5 Foreign Aid: Did it Play a Role in the Conflict Onset? .............................................. 273

7.4 Analysis of the Intervention: Halting of Stabilization Progress and Backsliding ............ 277

7.4.1 The Decision to Intervene ......................................................................................... 277

7.4.2 Implementation of the Intervention ............................................................................. 279

7.4.3 Effect on Capacity and Legitimacy .............................................................................. 280

7.4.4 Failure of the Intervention ......................................................................................... 282

7.5 Conclusions and Next Steps .......................................................................................... 285

CHAPTER 8 Capacity Interventions ....................................................................................... 287

8.1 Intervention Success: Uzbekistan Overview ................................................................. 289

8.1.1 A Nation Born .............................................................................................................. 291

8.1.2 Strongman Politics ..................................................................................................... 295

8.1.3 The Role of the IMF in Transforming Uzbekistan ..................................................... 299

8.1.4 Karimov’s Might ........................................................................................................ 304

8.1.5 A Seismic Shift .......................................................................................................... 307

8.2 Analysis of the Intervention: Building Capacity After Communism ............................. 310

8.2.1 The Decision to Intervene ......................................................................................... 310

8.2.2 Implementation of the Intervention ............................................................................. 311

8.2.3 Effect on Authority and Legitimacy ............................................................................ 312

8.2.4 Success of the Intervention ......................................................................................... 313

8.3 Intervention Failure: Zimbabwe Overview .................................................................... 315

8.3.1 A Colonial Past .......................................................................................................... 316

8.3.2 Independence and Beyond ......................................................................................... 318

8.3.3 Tensions Rise and Cracks Form .................................................................................. 322

8.3.4 The Road to a Crisis of Legitimacy ............................................................................ 326
8.4 ANALYSIS OF THE INTERVENTION: CAPACITY BEFORE LAW AND ORDER BEGETS CHAOS ........................................ 334

8.4.1 The Decision to Intervene .................................................................................................................. 334

8.4.2 Implementation of the Intervention .................................................................................................. 335

8.4.3 Effect on Authority and Legitimacy ................................................................................................. 337

8.4.4 Failure of the Intervention .............................................................................................................. 338

8.5 CONCLUSIONS AND NEXT STEPS .................................................................................................. 341

CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSIONS FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE: A NOVEL TRANSITION MODEL FOR FRAGILE AND
CONFLICT AFFECTED STATES .................................................................................................................. 343

9.1 CONCLUSIONS FROM THE CASE STUDIES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS .................................... 344

9.2 A REFINED MODEL ............................................................................................................................. 356

9.3 SUMMARY OF THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ........................................................................... 360

9.4 ADDRESSING OUTSTANDING ISSUES .............................................................................................. 363

9.5 DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ......................................................................................... 369

9.6 FINAL WORDS ..................................................................................................................................... 372

APPENDIX A: ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS .................................................................................. 374

LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................. 380
List of Figures

Figure 1. Pathways to State Failure ........................................................................................................28
Figure 2. Simplified example of intervention effect at a specific point in time .................................63
Figure 3. Simplified Example of State Transition ..................................................................................65
Figure 4. Fragility Recovery Model .......................................................................................................72
Figure 5. Intervention Failure Model with Backsliding ........................................................................73
Figure 6. Common Third-Party Interventions and Corresponding ALC Dimensions .......89
Figure 7. Steps in the Research Cycle (reproduced from Brady and Collier (2010)) .................98
Figure 8. Visual Model of Mixed-Methods Sequential Exploratory Research Design ....100
Figure 9. Trajectory of State Transitions ...............................................................................................115
Figure 10. Map of Selected Cases and Intervention Types .................................................................119
Figure 11. CIPA Clusters and Policies ..................................................................................................122
Figure 12. CPIA Overall Rankings, Colour-Coded (Red = Extreme Fragility, Yellow = Moderate Fragility, Green = Not Fragile) .............................................................. 124
Figure 13. Distribution of average ALC Strength ...............................................................................128
Figure 14. Venn Diagram of Cases .....................................................................................................134
Figure 15. CIFP Fragility Data from CPIA Pools ..............................................................................136
Figure 16. Total Development Aid (USD) to Bangladesh (World Bank 2016) .............................141
Figure 17. Bangladesh ALC and Fragility Profile .............................................................................143
Figure 18. Mozambique ALC and Fragility Profile .........................................................................146
Figure 19. Guatemala ALC and Fragility Profile ..............................................................................151
Figure 20. Cambodia ALC and Fragility Profile ...............................................................................171
Figure 21. Libya State Fragility: 2006 to 2017 (Fund for Peace 2017) ...........................................180
Figure 22. Libya ALC and Fragility Profile ................................................................. 181
Figure 23. Role of NATO Allies in the Libya Mission .............................................. 199
Figure 24. Rwanda ALC and Fragility Profile .......................................................... 240
Figure 25. CIFP Fragility Ranking for Mali .............................................................. 251
Figure 26. Mali Fragility Trend: 2006-2107 (Fund for Peace 2017) ......................... 254
Figure 27. Mali ALC and Fragility Profile ............................................................... 255
Figure 28. Causal Mechanisms Leading to Conflict After an Economic Shock ....... 260
Figure 29. Mali Government Spending Data (percent of GDP) (World Bank 2016) .... 269
Figure 30 Mali Government Tax Revenue (percent of GDP) (World Bank 2016) ...... 269
Figure 31. Mali GDP per Capita (Current USD) (World Bank 2014) ....................... 271
Figure 32. Global Cotton Prices (Red line indicates conflict onset) (Teft 2004) ....... 273
Figure 33. Total Development Aid Flows to Mali (Aid Data 2013) ......................... 276
Figure 34. Total Development Aid Flows Ranked Highest Year to Lowest Year (Aid Data 2013) ......................................................................................................................... 276
Figure 35. Global Humanitarian Aid Flows to Mali (UNOCHA Financial Tracking System 2014) ..................................................................................................................... 277
Figure 36. Review of Causal Factors from this Chapter ........................................... 281
Figure 37. Uzbekistan ALC and Fragility Profile ..................................................... 309
Figure 38. Zimbabwe ALC and Fragility Profile .................................................... 333
Figure 39. Case Comparison Table ........................................................................ 345
List of Appendices:

Appendix A. Abbreviations and Acronyms
Chapter 1  Statehood, Fragility, and Third-Party Intervention

Why do some third-party interventions in fragile and conflict affected states aid transitions out of extreme fragility towards greater stability while others do not? For example, countries such as Rwanda, Cambodia, and Uzbekistan have been spurred out of extremely fragile situations with the aid of third-party interventions, whereas countries such as Mali, Zimbabwe, and Libya remain mired in extreme fragility for decades despite numerous attempts by external actors to improve conditions and institutions in these challenging environments. These countries are “left behind” after multiple international interventions; they have been ranked among the most fragile states for years by various indices tracking fragility and conflict across the globe. This dissertation explains why there are variations in the development and security outcomes between otherwise similar fragile countries after third-party interventions have been implemented. That is, what are the defining factors and characteristics of a third-party intervention in an extremely fragile state that will help determine the probability of improvement? Or is the phenomenon primarily endogenous and impossible to disentangle? I argue that while it is difficult to extricate these factors, there are some key features of an intervention and its relationship to the state’s authority, legitimacy and capacity (ALC) profile that inherently affect the probability of success.¹

¹ The ALC model of state fragility is part of the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) framework and is explained in greater depth in chapter two of this study. Full details of the methodology can be found at www.carleton.ca/cifp.
In this research program, four interrelated questions are addressed: First, why do some interventions have a positive effect while others do not? Second, what intervention types contribute to the different pathways out of extreme fragility, given the multidimensional nature of state fragility? Third, in what way do external actors interact with local institutions and contexts to affect improvements or backsliding in security and development outcomes? And fourth, what decisions can international, third-party policy makers take that will propel a state onto a successful pathway out of extreme fragility most rapidly and efficiently?

More specifically, this dissertation focusses on how third-party interventions can either help or inhibit the improvement of structurally similar countries in each of the three dimensions of statehood: authority, legitimacy, and capacity. In other words, given that a country does improve in the post-intervention period, what specific aspects of the intervention helped it do so? To the contrary, given that a country did not improve after an international intervention, which type of interventions failed to help it do so? Which factors and conditions led to backsliding and reversal? What exactly has worked to support peacebuilding in fragile situations? By documenting the known cases of international interventions in our methodically selected pool of cases of states in long term, extreme fragility and examining them systematically, this dissertation dissects and parses structural elements of each country situation while at the same time accounting for agency and leadership roles in intervention related policymaking, both sub-nationally and internationally.
1.1 Motivation and Background

Escaping extreme fragility is undeniably the most critical goal for developing countries caught in ongoing situations of conflict and unrest. In fact, there has been a worrying trend reversal in recent years with an increase in armed conflict and violence in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States (FCAS) around the world, amplified by a rise in populism and unrest in both the global north and the global south (Carment et al. 2017; OECD 2016; OECD 2018). To be sure, the phenomenon of state fragility is not leaving the international policy agenda any time soon (Carment and Samy 2017; Andrews, Pritchett and Woolcock 2017; Gisselquist 2017). In fact, in recent years fragility has increased globally, and the migration crisis in Europe, among other issues including the spread of civil war and conflict have resulted in Western governments refocusing on fragile states (OECD 2018). These facts mean that research on state fragility and the best way to engage in these environments is needed now more than ever.

This section introduces the research program and situates it within the existing literature on state fragility, aid, peacebuilding, and development. Fragility negatively affects physical and human capital, degrades institutions, distorts economic incentives, lowers incomes, and suppresses growth (Rotberg 2004; World Bank 2011; Carment, Landry and Samy 2014). Currently, over one quarter of the world’s population lives in countries affected by fragility (OECD 2013). Moreover, recent research has demonstrated that fragility and conflict can spread beyond national borders (Iqbal and Star 2008; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; Landry 2013) and policymakers have emphasized how fragile states often pose a threat to international security (Zoellick 2008; White House 2002). Research is getting to the point where individual riots and
protests can be pinpointed to the predictions borne out by fragility indices, and as the technology evolves, these predictions will only become more accurate (Natalini, Jones and Bravo 2015). These concerns become even more pressing when we see that most states that are considered extremely fragile are not expected to improve for many years or even decades, despite the best efforts of development and aid agencies as well as national governments in fragile states (Tikuisis et al 2015; Cilliers and Sisk 2013).

During the early 2000s a great deal of research was conducted into how and why states failed and aimed to figure out what—if anything—policymakers could do about it. In order to determine the best policy solutions for dealing with fragile states, it was necessary to better understand why states became fragile in the first place. Several prominent theories are highlighted in this section. First, Bates (2008) argues—with a focus on Africa— that in the developing world coercion is used by rulers to protect the creation of wealth for a small group of elites. When these goals do not line up with internationally imposed borders, we see conflict and strife, which led to dozens of brutal civil wars and the fracturing of societies along tribal and economic lines throughout the 20th century (Bates 2008). Civil war as a phenomenon has become a subject of great interest to scholars in recent years; this is unsurprising given the disastrous results of such conflicts: since the end of world war two there have been over 140 civil wars resulting in an estimated 20 million fatalities and over 67 million people forced into displacement (Doyle and Sambanis 2003). Collier and Hoefler (2003) also examine the failed states problem and stress the importance of so-called “opportunities” which are essentially rent-seeking behaviours on the part of elites. Empirical researchers and economists also turned their attention to the disastrous performance of many countries
in the developing world, with Easterly and Levine (1997) pointing to ethnic divisions as a key factor in poor policy choice leading conflict.

Later, “failed states” became a common buzzword, with the Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy Magazine making a splash every year with a feature story naming and shaming the “worst of the worst.” Needless to say, leaders and citizens of these countries did not often take kindly to their nations being portrayed as “failed” and the term was often derided by more critical scholars and analysts (Ferreira 2017; Feeny, Posso and Regan-Beasley 2015). Eventually, as debates continued over causes of the problems faced by the global south, the less politically charged terminology of “fragile states” was introduced and adopted over time by nearly every major international aid and development agency. Additionally, the security-development nexus began to emerge among analysts, scholars and practitioners as a hot topic at this time.

For instance, the 2011 World Bank World Development Report (WDR) encapsulated the international interest in the intersection of conflict, development and fragility. While some critical scholars are not fond of the terminology adopted by the policy community and positivist empirical researchers, the concept of state fragility is now firmly entrenched in the international policy discourse as well as the academic literature (Ferreira 2017; Feeny, Posso and Regan-Beasley 2015). Fragility as a research topic only continues to grow, especially now despite “the better angels of our nature” having supposedly resulted in a decrease of overall global conflict, from 2014 onward the world again began to see flashpoints flare up in places like Ukraine, Myanmar, Central and Southern Africa, and the ongoing tumult in the Middle East, just to name a few (Pinker 2011; Tikuisis and Mandel 2015). Moreover, as public figures like Richard
Haass (2017) and Ian Bremmer (2018) sound the alarm bells over global instability and the unraveling of the liberal democratic project, the West’s response to countries in turmoil around the world is only becoming more salient. On the whole, “fragility” is a useful concept for understanding political (dis)order in the developing world, despite its limitations (Feeny, Posso and Regan-Beasley 2015). This study further delves into how our understanding of fragility can illuminate the real-world situations that it is meant to represent conceptually, and hopefully can provide if not a guide, a sign post to policymakers and practitioners dealing with these problems on a day to day basis.

The international community has also recognized the importance of better understanding why states become fragile, how they improve their fragility, and what steps can be taken both domestically and by international actors to promote the achievement of development goals in such countries (World Bank 2011; OECD 2013). Indeed, every major aid donor has issued policy papers on state fragility, with most having entire units dedicated to understanding and engaging with fragile states (Faust, Grävingholt, and Ziaja 2013). There has also been a vast outpouring of development and aid dollars towards fragile states over the past few decades, with the torrent of cash continuing despite having only a marginal history of success (Browne 2012). In 2011 aid flows to fragile states reached a high of 53 billion United States Dollars (USD), representing about 38% of total development aid globally (OECD 2014). Since then, aid flows have continued to grow, “[t]otal financial flows to fragile contexts including Official Development Assistance (ODA), Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and remittances increased approximately 206% between 2002 and 2014 in constant terms” and “[t]he total value of financial flows received over this period totalled more than 2.04
trillion [USD] (2014 constant prices)” (OECD 2016). Of that amount, more than 32% was under the ODA umbrella, with 64% of total global ODA from 2011 to 2014 going to fragile contexts (ibid.). With the emergence of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the principles of selectivity in the policy community, fragile states have received even more material aid in recent years but with little improvement to show for it aside from certain niche cases (Gisselquist 2015a). At the same time, some countries have seen marked improvement in development outcomes, typically these are referred to as “aid darlings” and tend to be held up as examples of how aid can and should work in practice. At the same time, just because a country is an aid darling, does not mean that its lot will have improved. For example, Haiti and Afghanistan seem to be never ending money-pits for donors while showing little improvement and even worsening.

Donors like Canada have taken notice of this “wicked” problem of low absorptive capacity and are looking to move their programming interests elsewhere where they may have more tangible effects. Gisselquist (2015a) identifies three main principles that account for why some interventions are more successful in delivering desired outcomes than others: “1) the area of intervention and the related degree of engagement with domestic state institutions; 2) local contextual factors, in particular windows of opportunity, capacity, and the existence of local supporters; and 3) program design and management.” With all of this in mind, we are still surprisingly far away from understanding what makes an intervention successful or not. There is a gap in that the connection between the type of intervention and the nuanced country fragility profile (i.e. the ALC profile) is not well understood. On a practical level, as bilateral and multilateral agencies try to determine the best way to spend their development and
humanitarian dollars, shedding light on how to better respond to specific country circumstances is critical. By examining what has worked (and what has not) in practice, academics and policy makers can design more effective interventions to be implemented in current and future cases.

The question of how best to help countries which are chronically unstable has been examined through many different lenses over the past few decades. It has become clear from Western experiences in statebuilding and peacebuilding that there is no “one size fits all” solution to these incredibly complex problems. At the same time, social science implores us to consistently and systematically attempt to better understand complex social phenomena (King, Keohane and Verba 1994; Neuman 2013). In this spirit it is crucial to examine Western third-party interventions in fragile states. Third-party intervention has become “arguably the most frequent type of military force in use and under debate today” and is seen as “one of today’s most pressing security issues” (Hermann and Kegley 1996). Even the casual observer can see that often dogmatic practices in the policy world prove to be ineffective or even harmful when applied to real life situations. So why do some interventions work well, improving social, economic, and political outcomes in the target state, while others fail abysmally?

My argument, presented in full later in this chapter, is that interventions in fragile states should target the strongest dimension of statehood in a given country, building on what that state does best and utilize institutional capacity where it already exists. This “simple” argument has the advantage of being both parsimonious and of being drawn from existing theoretical knowledge, however it cannot be thought of as being “obvious” if only for one glaring reason: states do not follow it in practice. From
the data presented in this study it becomes evident that many intervenors simply ignore the relative strengths of the targets states institutions and political culture, and instead rush to intervene with whichever tool is most readily available. As one example, in many cases this means a military or security related intervention into countries which may be unstable on the surface but in reality, have a highly developed and efficient underlying economic system or “black market” as well as existing complex systems of patron-client relationships within society, lending to a non-traditional but effective form of legitimacy. This argument also fits with current fragile context and peacebuilding policy prescriptions which aim to improve local ownership over projects and to ensure that ODA remains as un-tied as possible. By focusing on what the country already does best, interventions can leverage local strengths and comparative advantages as well as give a sense of ownership and agency to the local populace (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013). Local ownership is not the only factor in terms of competence of a state, but it can be an important aspect and must not be ignored. In “Localising Aid” (2012), Glennie et al. illustrate that there are trade-offs between providing aid directly to local actors and having it run by a larger international Non-Governmental Organization (NGO). These trade-offs are important to consider and following the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (2011) bilateral and multilateral agencies have been open to assuming more risk by working with local organizations and actors, however it is not as far along as it could be. Booth (2012) is skeptical of the ability for aid agencies to bring local ownership into the forefront as they are currently operating, however he does note that its possible for interventions to re-wire their current modus operandi and give more ownership to local experts and practitioners, still, such a shift will require a great deal of education and improved understanding of local contexts and realities. Because of the
large attention paid fragile contexts as well as the astronomical sums of money being spent on interventions meant to help economic, social and political development, a well-researched inquiry into intervention effectiveness is highly informative and warrants further investigation.

1.2 What Makes a State?

To properly analyze intervention in extremely fragile states, I lay the theoretical groundwork by providing a brief summary of past literature examining state formation and collapse. At the heart of this literature is the idea that there is an ideal version of the state versus what it constitutes in reality. The classic Weberian definition of the state was “a human community that claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber 1946, p. 78). Since Weber, scholars have continually debated on what factors make up the state, with each definition highlighting different aspects of statehood as key. For instance, Nettl (1968) first introduced the idea of the state as a conceptual variable in social science, arguing that sovereignty and autonomy levels contribute to the level of “stateness” of a country. He also outlines the various functions of a state, such as providing administration, law making, law enforcement etc. This was very much the first step towards treating the state as a measurable variable. Later in the 20th century came seminal works on state formation which built the foundation for how scholars understood the functions of the state in both the developing and developed world (Tilly 1985; Migdal 1988; Desch 1996; Holsti 1996; Luttwak 1999). In the mid-1990s familiar terms such as weak state and failed state began to appear in the scholarly lexicon, with some attempting to build a new taxonomy of levels of statehood (Khan 1995; Gros 1996). Not surprisingly the 9/11 terrorist attacks
on the United States brought a huge renewal to the study of weak and failing states, along with large sums of federal funding in many Western nations being put to use to better understand these “hotbeds of terrorism” as some hawks would not so delicately put it (Ogata 2002). The logic here held that failed states represented foci of lawlessness ripe for criminal activity and terrorism to take root and spread internationally and there is some evidence for such a “problématique” In any case, this increase in funding to security agencies and academic institutions led to a great deal of research on fragile states and their associated ills over the past two decades, however we seem to be no less confused when it comes to understanding “what works” in FCAS.

1.3 Key Concepts: Defining State Fragility

State fragility is built on a holistic understanding of statehood; it is more than simply measuring gross levels of violence. Nevertheless, as an academic concept it remains troublesome to pin down and even more difficult to coherently define, due to the “interdependent nature of reality behind these labels” (Brinkerhoff 2014). Fragility centres on the idea that there are multiple dimensions of statehood; because of the many different research projects which have attempted to quantify state fragility, there exist several overlapping definitions of the phenomenon. Sometimes these definitions are complementary, and other times they are in opposition with one another, competing for intellectual space. In addition, some critical scholars have urged policy makers to get rid of the term altogether and rather use another such as “Hybrid Political Orders”; however, this movement does not seem to have caught on in the mainstream, especially in the policymaking community (Boege, Brown and Clements 2009). Despite the definitional differences, there is no denying that the concept has been firmly established
in both the policy and academic discourses (OECD 2018; OECD 2013; World Bank 2011; Gisselquist 2015; Debiel et al. 2005). For the purposes of this study it is crucial to define clearly what is meant by the concept of state fragility, as well as how it is being measured. One of the most commonly used definitions is provided by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and reads as follows: “a state with weak capacity to carry out the basic state functions of governing a population and its territory and that lacks the ability or political will to develop mutually constructive and reinforcing relations with society” (OECD 2007). By using this definition as a general starting point, we can examine the contemporary debate on what is meant by fragility both the academic and policy realms, as well as carve out our own, clearly defined framework from which this study will operate.

In a 2014 special issue of Third World Quarterly, contributors debate the underlying conception of state fragility; with most arguing that it represents a political concept which has been used by governments and multilateral organizations in order to further their policy goals in developing countries (Grimm, Lemay-Hébert and Nay 2014). The contributors look at the emergence of the term among Western donors as well as how the concept has been received and utilized in those countries which have been labeled as fragile. The special issue comes to three main conclusions (Grimm, Lemay-Hébert and Nay 2014). First, that state fragility as concept is positive in that it attempts to quantify and understand the difficulties faced by developing countries facing differing levels of (potential) conflict. At the same time, the authors argue that the concept is utilized by western countries to legitimize foreign policy interventions and often these come from a specific way of looking at the world. The second conclusion is
that the definition of “fragile states” itself is fragile, in that each organization tends to have its own definition and there is little agreement on what constitutes a fragile state (Brinkerhoff 2014). The third conclusion that the special issue authors come to is that local actors in fragile states have manipulated the concept, often for their own gain. This idea is related to the concept of “isomorphic mimicry” in which state institutions appear to follow western prescriptions on how they should look and operate, but in reality, it is merely a surface level change that has been made and there is a low threshold of resilience to shocks and other challenges (Pritchett 2013). Overall there are six main criticisms of the fragility concept and for the purposes of this dissertation one can refer to Marshall and Cole (2013) who provide a thorough summary of each as well as counter arguments outlining why scholarly research on fragile states is still both viable and useful.

It is indicative of how deep seated this debate is that the very same journal, *Third World Quarterly*, released another special issue focused on fragility just months later, but this time taking a more positivist, empirical approach to the concept. “Aid to Support Fragile States: The Challenge of Chronic Weakness” examines how “unpacking fragility and studying its dimensions and forms can help to develop policy-relevant understandings of how states become more resilient and the role of aid therein” (Gisselquist 2015). Through this approach, fragility indices and their corresponding analytical tools are used to develop strategies for effective engagement in fragile states,

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2 The six major criticisms are as follows: 1) Excessively aggregate diverse states; (2) Lead to cookie-cutter prescriptions for interventions by stronger states; (3) “Dodge” contested issues of democracy and democratization by focusing on technical and institutional aspects of governance; (4) Conflate peace and statehood; (5) Are based in a West-centric, value-based notion of the state, with underlying teleological assumptions about the proper direction of state progress; (6) Obfuscate the role of the West in contributing to fragility and failure in the first place.
including strategies for outside intervenors on all aspects of statehood. Indeed, this type of positivist approach has been used for the last two to three decades by policymakers and has evolved considerably over this period, with lessons learnt being incorporated into new strategies and methods of engagement.

Specifically, donor countries have now shifted towards the approach of taking local context into consideration when designing intervention strategies; for example, the ten “Fragile States Principles” adopted in Busan in 2007 began to build the framework for guidance on how to ethically and effectively “do” development and security interventions in fragile states (OECD 2007). Accordingly, the g7+ group of fragile states has been formed with the objectives of preventing conflict, facilitating state building, and reducing poverty through innovative development strategies, including those to be prioritized in the post-2015 development agenda. In 2011, the landmark “New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States” was adopted by the g7+ and signed by 40 countries including Canada (Nussbaum, Zorbas, and Koros 2012).

The “New Deal” comprises five Peacebuilding and State-building goals (OECD 2012):

1. Legitimate and inclusive politics: Foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution

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3 The Fragile States Principles: 1. Take context as the starting point. 2. Ensure all activities do no harm. 3. Focus on statebuilding as the central objective. 4. Prioritize prevention. 5. Recognize the links between political, security and development objectives. 6. Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies. 7. Align with local priorities in different ways and in different contexts. 8. Agree on practical co-ordination mechanisms between international actors. 9. Act fast ... but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance. 10. Avoid pockets of exclusion (‘aid orphans’).
2. Security: Establish and strengthen people’s security

3. Justice: Address injustices and increase people’s access to justice

4. Economic foundations: Generate employment and improve livelihoods

5. Revenues and services: Manage revenue and build capacity for accountable and fair service delivery

While these goals may be well intended, it remains to be seen whether they can and will be implemented in practice, as data availability remains thin even years after the policies have begun to be put into place. Poor data availability unfortunately is a feature of working with fragile states, as collection and processing of data can run into many barriers on the ground and throughout the validation and reporting process. This is especially true in the most vulnerable countries which lack institutions to collect such information thoroughly and accurately. Understanding when and where these principles have been implemented in the past, and the effect that each intervention has had is one goal of this dissertation. My argument that donors should focus their intervention efforts on the strongest dimension of statehood directly flows from the thrust of the New Deal principles, in that it shifts the focus to a country’s strengths rather than its weaknesses. Finally, understanding the “state of the art” when it comes to interventions in fragile states is imperative in this analysis because it allows for a comparison of previous interventions to more recent ones, as well as provides a lens through which to evaluate these “New Deal” principles in light of the available empirical evidence.
1.4 Scholarly Contribution and Goals

The theory surrounding fragile states embodies the intersection of three research streams: state building (with peacebuilding as a subset of this stream), development economics, and security studies (Gros 1996; Carment, Prest and Samy 2009). The fragility paradigm represents a shift in ideology that took hold primarily after 9/11. At that time fragile, weak, and failing states became a prominent feature of the international relations discourse and academics began to focus research on producing policy recommendations to donors that would strengthen weak countries (Chauvet and Collier 2004; Ghani and Lockhart 2009; Fukuyama 2004). However, during this period, the vast majority of existing research on fragility and conflict has primarily focused on the causes and consequences of fragility (Bertocchi and Guerzoni 2012; Rotberg 2004; Chesterman, Ignatieff, and Thakur 2005; Zartman 1995; Gros 1996; Bates 1998). Closely related to fragility is the prediction of conflict before it occurs, which has also caught the attention of scholars and practitioners, with several models showing impressive predictive power usually by combining structural and events data to determine probabilities of unrest and civil war onset (Tikuisis, Carment and Samy 2013; Goldstone et al. 2010; Hegre et al. 2013). Buhaug, Cederman and Gleditsch (2014) however show that using state level indicators does not sufficiently capture the complexity and only has limited predictive power, arguing instead that “group-level” research (i.e. at the sub-state level) can better reflect local conditions of inequalities, political discrimination, and wealth differentials, leading to a more robust predictive model for conflict. Aas Rustad et al. (2011) take a similar approach and lay the groundwork for the previous study taking a spatial resolution approach to conflict analysis, that is, the investigators
here use country-specific sub-national data to apply a localized analysis to conflict prediction.

The focus on understanding the determining factors of fragility assumes that if the causes of such situations are known that perhaps they can be both entirely prevented in the first place or nipped in the bud before the situation is exacerbated. At the same time, it must be recognized that there are multiple (often overlapping) dimensions of fragility. Therefore, potential remedies may be complementary, but attempting to implement them can also be counterproductive. Pouring aid and financial support into a sector which has neither the capacity nor know-how to put the funding or material goods to use can result in issues like rent-seeking, premature load bearing, and isomorphic mimicry. Understanding the multifaceted nature of fragility is therefore critical to developing effective engagement strategies (Baliamoune-Lutz and McGillivray 2011; Naudé, Santos-Paulino and McGillivray 2009; Grävingholt, Ziaja, and Kreibaum 2012). For example, it is not enough to implement a Security Sector Reform (SSR) program and broker a ceasefire without understanding the underlying issues that led to—and continue to fuel—a conflict or otherwise fragile political, economic or social situation. Rather, resources must be carefully allocated to the area of need where they are going to result in the best outcome for all parties. One of the main goals of this dissertation is to better explain in what situations particular types of third-party

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4 Pritchett and de Weijer (2011) define isomorphic mimicry as follows: “adopting the camouflage of organizational forms that are deemed successful elsewhere to hide their actual dysfunction. When isomorphic mimicry is a sustainable, if not optimal, organizational strategy it can result in what we call a ‘capability trap’, in which the appearance of development activity masks the lack of functional development activity. Such a trap emerges when agents of development inadvertently promote and solidify isomorphic mimicry by rewarding organizations that adopt ‘modern’ or ‘best practice’ forms or notional policies, even when these are not followed up by, or are even consistent with, actual functional performance in the context of a given organization’s actual capability for policy implementation.”
interventions should be used, while taking into consideration the sequential and
temporal aspects of an evolving set of state or sub-state circumstances.

In fact, there is a paucity of research on why some interventions help countries to
successfully improve their status while other FCAS languish for decades even after large
outpourings of resources and activities which aim to prevent conflict and build
institutional capacity. This is both a theoretical puzzle and a policy problem: it is a
theoretical puzzle because countries may begin with a very similar set of circumstances
and subsequently have similar third-party interventions enacted, yet there are very
different outcomes over time. It is a policy problem because of the humanitarian
implications as well as the international security issues that arise from failed and
extremely fragile states. Moreover, current guidelines espoused by policymakers and
think tanks fail to provide insight into which interventions, projects and programs
donors should support (Gisselquist 2015a). It is certainly in every states interest to
achieve regional stability, and having any country stuck in extreme fragility will
undermine that goal to a large degree, with research illustrating the contagion effects of
civil war and ethnic strife (Kathman 2010; Gledistch 2007; Buhaug and Gleditsch
2008). Some of the pathways to becoming a fragile country may be known although
there is a research gap with regards to two important aspects of the phenomenon, 1)
which specific interventions actually help to propel the state out of extreme fragility,
given each country’s unique set of characteristics and 2) the sequence by which
interventions help states emerge from the extreme fragility (i.e. which aspects of
statehood are the first to improve, followed on by improvements in others). Many
current explanations do not account for differences in local contexts nor do they explain
why some interventions worked while others did not, rather existing research
“[includes] considerable discussion of how external interventions have contributed to,
or failed to stop, these processes” (Gisselquist 2015a). There is an assumption in this
research that peacebuilding will come about if the factors that led to failure are
addressed, however as Gisselquist (2015a) notes these insights are important but
incomplete because “processes that lead to peace are not necessarily the converse of
those leading to conflict.”

Research that focuses only on how interventions fail suffers from the basic
methodological flaw of selecting on the dependent variable, in this case by using a
binary measure of failed versus not failed, and therefore is unable to account for
variation on the dependant variable or test hypothesized causal mechanisms. Moreover,
currently research on successful interventions often focuses only on country-specific
situations, whereas this model will contribute a more generalizable, externally valid
framework for understanding why states are able or unable to improve their fragility
score after an intervention. For these reasons, it is key to examine the different types of
fragile and conflict affected countries stuck and develop a typology so that any action
taken can be supported by empirical evidence showing how and why the intervention
was—or would be—beneficial. This study is partially deductive and partially inductive. It
is deductive because a model of intervention leading to an improvement in fragility is
proposed based on logical reasoning and inference through careful examination of
previous literature. It is inductive because the specific results of the statistical and case
study analyses are yet unknown, and modifications to the proposed model may be
necessary as evidence comes to light (Gerring 2006). This dissertation represents a
contribution to the literature because intervention failures and successes in extremely fragile countries have not been explicitly theorized about through a multidimensional lens.

There are key differences in the analytical framework between this and other similar research programs. First, this dissertation focuses on the effect of third-party interventions on FCAS countries stuck in extreme fragility only – these situations may differ from countries that are only moderately fragile. Second, by using more than one major index to define fragility, this dissertation helps to build theory through additional empirical evidence provided by sources including key international institutions like the World Bank, as well as research centres, think tanks, and national bilateral development agencies, adding to the overall validity of the results through triangulation and improving the policy relevance of the findings. Third, while the quantitative exercise that the study begins with is useful as a plausibility probe for theory development, the in-depth and rigorous qualitative analysis in the structured, focused case studies sets this dissertation apart from other studies in terms of richness of evidence and level of detail. Therefore, even if the main hypotheses are not backed up unequivocally by the data and case analysis, the study still holds weight in the field because it examines the key factors for success of third-party intervention via a more holistic approach. It also tests the theory that interventions should focus on the strongest ALC dimensions to provide the best outcomes, and highlights how a country’s standing capacities can influence intervention success. Moreover, when compared to traditional evaluations of intervention success, this study provides greater generalizability, transferability and scalability of its conclusions because of the rigorous standards of social inquiry that are
used for theory-building and model testing. In other words, my findings are better able to speak to the “why” questions surrounding intervention best practices. Hence, by examining the transition process after a successful intervention, that leads a state out of extreme fragility, this dissertation helps to extend the peacebuilding and intervention literature.

Another aim of this study is to gain a better understanding of why states—especially middle-power states like Canada—decide to act internationally or not in certain crises situations. For example, think of Canada’s sudden foray into the

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5 One useful framework for understanding the interactions between domestic and international actors—especially when it comes to analyzing reasons state intervene—is to look through the lens of Robert Putnam’s “Two-Level Games” (Putnam 1988). The basic premise underpinning this theory is that all international policy decisions have two levels of interaction at any given time, the domestic level and the international level. The below quote sums up the idea: At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments. Neither of the two games can be ignored by central decision-makers, so long as their countries remain independent, yet sovereign (Putnam 1988, 434). Hence, this framework allows for a clearer understanding of how domestic policies influence international policies and vice versa. In the case of a military intervention, the domestic political situations of the states acting must allow for them to do so. At the same time, the international community, often via the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), must come to some consensus on what the best course of action is. Only when these two dimensions line up will a policy decision take hold and be put into practice, noting that both dimensions influence one another and evolve over time. Throughout this study I refer back to Putnam’s two-level games to help explain why governments behave the way they do internationally.
Myanmar-Bangladesh-Rohingya crisis we have seen over the first quarter of 2018. Canada was nowhere to be found on this issue for the past few decades, and cynics see our sudden leadership role as an opportunistic political play. Throughout the study I touch on the Canadian role in FCAS and how it evolved through different governments. In this vein, the study has an intermediate level focus, balancing theoretical generalization with context-specific policy discussion (Takeuchi, Murotani and Tsunekawa 2011).

The findings of this dissertation have implications for both theory and policy. In our current theoretical understanding of fragility, it is unclear how each of the hypothesized pathways specifically operate in different contexts. Furthermore, the findings help to determine which specific policy choices (i.e. interventions aimed at improving authority, legitimacy, or capacity at a given time in the sequence) should be taken by leaders in order to direct their countries on a pathway towards stability. Future research will apply the lessons learned from the previous analysis to conduct mini case studies of current fragile and conflict affected countries, demonstrating how potential interventions could be sequenced and targeted for the country to improve its standing in specific areas that present challenges. Valuable insights into the mechanics of state transitions are made by combining formal theory building with empirical testing. In turn these insights can be utilized by policy makers to improve outcomes; ideally, they help uncover which factors are most at play in the complex political dynamics present in post-conflict societies, along with the related policy decisions that can aid in preventing recurrence of conflict and backsliding into extreme fragility.
1.5 Escaping Extreme Fragility

Shifting from peacebuilding back to fragility theory, the more direct focus of this study, I now examine what it means to be stuck in extreme fragility. The idea of countries being “trapped” began with the economic literature on the “poverty trap” (Azariadis 1996; Carter and Barrett 2006). This literature examined the relationship of poverty and economic growth, indicating that some states were unable to escape the poverty trap due to chronic institutional failure which in turn led to market failure (Azariadis and Stachurski 2005). The poverty trap concept eventually led to the concept of a “conflict trap” as the correlation between repeated civil wars and poverty became of interest to scholars (Collier 2003; Hegre, Nygård and Ræder 2017).

While it is true that fragile states are much more likely to experience conflict, it is important not to conflate the two concepts; that is, not all fragile states are experiencing or have experienced conflict. States with extremely low capacity and little hope of improving economically may be stuck in a so-called “fragility trap” but not a conflict trap, for example. On the other hand, “extremely fragile” countries generally do have some form of conflict present or at least simmering. Collier’s (2003) conflict trap deals with similar issues yet there are several states which would not necessarily be included in this categorization yet would be considered to be stuck in the “fragility trap.” The conflict trap occurs when a country has repeat civil wars, with the first instance of war seemingly increasing the likelihood of further instances (Collier and Sambanis 2002; Hegre, Nygård and Ræder 2017). Scholars have identified two main reasons for this phenomenon: the initial civil war exacerbates the poor conditions (both economic and social) that may have motivated the rebels to fight in the first place, thereby having a
positive feedback or knock on effect resulting in more war (Walter 2015); secondly, some argue that certain kinds of conflict are more prone to relapse, specifically “[c]ombatants who are unable to defeat each other, who are engaged in long and intense battles, and who fight over stakes that are perceived to be particularly valuable have been viewed as being especially susceptible to repeat civil war” (Walter 2015). While these explanations offer insight into the fragility trap, focusing exclusively on civil conflict is an analytical problem because there are several other factors which are left unaccounted for. This approach tends to be myopic in scope, in that dimensions such as legitimacy and capacity are completely left out, not to mention factors like environment, gender, social services etc. The fragility trap conceptualization therefore captures a more nuanced view of what is happening in each situation rather than focusing only on security (Carment and Samy 2017).

The basic intuition behind the fragility trap concept is that certain countries are chronically fragile; that is, they are unable to fulfill any of the three main dimensions of statehood to any recognizable capacity, for an extended period (Carment and Samy 2017). For example, the OECD (2015) identifies 26 “chronically fragile” countries which have appeared on every OECD fragility list since it began in 2005, noting “this smaller group of chronically fragile countries demands particular effort, as its members face more persistent institutional and development challenges and recurrent patterns of violence.” Studies have shown that states undergoing this type of long-term underdevelopment and insecurity are typologically different from those that are closer to the median. Bertocchi and Guerzoni (2010) demonstrate that only countries in “extreme fragility”—those appearing in the bottom quintile of the Country Policy and
Institutional Assessment (CPIA) rankings or that are unrated—experience negative economic growth patterns once other endogenous factors are controlled for. This study is interesting; however, it only uses countries from Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), meaning that this finding may be only be true in SSA and due to some unique factor or combination of factors present on the continent. Another flaw is that focusing only on economic growth and fragility misses several other important variables, hence this study’s results should be used with caution. Other quantitative studies using regression analysis have pointed to political interference, rent seeking, and lobbying as the main factors that keep states in the fragility trap yet again here data quality is questionable and disentangling endogeneity is problematic (Asongu and Kodila-Tedika 2013).

To be sure, there is no universal definition of extreme fragility; most studies using the term skirt around the definitional issue and simply point to conflict traps as a precursor. Yet there is a basis for the concept – for example Andrimihaja, Cinyabuguma and Devarajan (2011) found that a state in the fragility trap in 2001 was 95% likely to remain there in 2009. So, although it is evident that the “trap” itself exists, the concept is certainly undertheorized; this dissertation acts as a theory building exercise using empirical evidence to support the hypotheses. In this dissertation a technical definition of the fragility trap is used, which defines is as a country with a CPIA score of less than 3.2 for a period of five years or more. This threshold is chosen because in the policy literature 3.2 is generally recognized as fragile – therefore if a country is “stuck” below it can be considered trapped; other studies in this field have used the same definition so continuity and cross-comparability is another reason why this was chosen (Harttgen and Klasen 2010).
Some scholars have shifted their focus to investigate what makes for a successful recovery out of long-term extreme fragility. In doing so they have begun to uncover the processes through which states fail or succeed (Goldstone 2008; Carment, Samy, and Landry 2013; Tikuisis et al 2015). Yet this research remains preliminary and the process is still far from being understood; this fact is not surprising given the complexity and multifaceted nature of the issue. Untangling problems of endogeneity is a major hurdle to studies of intervention policy in trapped countries; data availability is often poor and yearly data is insufficient to tease out events that happen on a month by month or even week by week basis. Moreover, many of the concepts measured are overlapping as opposed to orthogonal and this can make discernment challenging. For these reasons this study uses both a statistical approach as well as a qualitative approach to trace the processes which led to a successful exit or not.

Economic models that explain the fragility trap and its persistence have also been proposed and tested. McGillivray (2006) found that economic aid can have beneficial effects in fragile states, although these are not as pronounced as they would be in more stable countries. Similarly, Andrimihaja, Cinyabuguma, and Devarajan (2011) of the World Bank propose a model that accounts for corruption, property rights enforcement, and political violence. In the same vein as Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), this explanation relies largely on the institutional argument. In their model the economy is represented along an S-shaped curve, wherein the midpoint of the “S” represents the inflection point for whether the country will fall into a poverty trap or not. The authors argue that by increasing foreign aid to the most fragile countries, there is more wiggle room in case of a shock event that could propel the country down the curve and into the
fragility trap (using the same definition as above, a CPIA ranking below 3.2). Using several key tests, they show that foreign aid would indeed have this effect and using regression analysis they demonstrate that the most fragile states benefit more from aid than those closer to the median. This study went against popular belief in the donor community that more aid should be given to countries with better policy environments, instead arguing that the most fragile states should be treated differently, with aid focused on reducing corruption, preventing political violence, and improving property rights enforcement. The problem with this study is that the economic model is novel, untested and relies on many assumptions which may not hold true. Moreover, other studies have not replicated these findings.

For example, Jones, Elgin-Cossart, and Esberg (2012a) argue that ‘inclusive enough’ political settlements are the key variable in exiting fragility and provide evidence from a number of studies to support their claim (Call 2012; World Bank 2011; Goldstone et al. 2005). The UN-World Bank landmark study, *Pathways for Peace (2018)* reached a similar conclusion, arguing that prevention work is best conducted through inclusive processes and “requires a shift in the policies and practices of all actors ... to prevent human suffering and avoid the exorbitant costs of conflict.” (UN 2018) However, it is unlikely that there is only one pathway out of the fragility trap and the causal mechanisms that lead some countries to languish and others to prosper have been theorized about but not tested explicitly. Taking this idea further, Goldstone (2008) proposes that there are five pathways to state failure. State failure can be conceptualized as an extreme case of fragility, or in other words, how states may precipitously fall into the fragility trap (although “failure” itself does not account for the
duration of time spent in extreme fragility). If conceptualized in this way one can test if and how the reversal of such pathways may contribute to a state being able to exit the fragility trap later. The five pathways identified shown in figure 1.

**Figure 1. Pathways to State Failure**

| 1. Escalation of communal group (ethnic or religious) conflicts | **Examples:** Rwanda, Liberia, Yugoslavia, Lebanon |
| 2. State predation (corrupt or crony corralling of resources at the expense of other groups) | **Examples:** Nicaragua, Philippines, Iran |
| 3. Regional or guerrilla rebellion | **Examples:** Colombia, Vietnam |
| 4. Democratic collapse (leading to civil war or coup d’état) | **Examples:** Nigeria, Madagascar, Nepal |
| 5. Succession or reform crisis in authoritarian states | **Examples:** Indonesia under Suharto, Iran under the Shah, the Soviet Union under Gorbachev |

Through this logic, it holds that reversing the pathways should decrease state fragility, and in the literature, these have been theorized about explicitly, but usually on an individual basis rather than systematically or temporally.6 These pathways are taken from the broader literature on peacebuilding and intervention and correspond to the opposite of the pathways to failure. One shortfall of this approach is that none of the five

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6 Five hypothesized pathways out of the fragility trap are being indirectly tested in this study: 1) de-escalation of communal group conflict (Wolff 2006), 2) improvements in horizontal inequality (Stewart 2008), 3) ending of a rebellion through victory or a peace agreement (Walter 2002; Duffy-Toft 2010), 4) democratic reform including power-sharing arrangements (Call 2012), and 5) harnessing of political power by a capable leader or political party (Rotberg 2012).
pathways correspond to economic development. In this study I examine whether capacity improvements can also lead to an exit from state fragility thorough a sixth pathway, however the data will have to bear this out before it is explicitly theorized on.

All of this is not to say that reversal of these pathways will necessarily lead to exit, as there is the possibility of asymmetric causation, a one-way process whereby once event A occurs and causes event B, the situation becomes irreversible and permanent (Lieberson 1985). These pathways may be mutually independent, or they may rely on one another via a domino effect. For instance, initial research suggests that in Mozambique the end of the guerilla campaign and the signing of the 1992 Rome Peace Accord led to an improvement in state authority which was subsequently followed by an improvement in legitimacy; capacity did not play a major role. At the same time some authors have theorized that fragility is an asymmetric variable, in that interventions which simply reverse “causes” may not have the equal and opposite effect (Woolcock 2014; Goertz and Mahoney 2012). This is where the phenomena of isomorphic mimicry and premature load-bearing come in and may negate these assumptions about reversal (Andrews, Pritchett and Woolcock 2013). Isomorphic mimicry occurs when state institutions supported by third-parties only emulate well-functioning institutions but are in fact weak under the surface. The concept is borrowed from evolutionary biology in that certain organisms will develop traits that mimic another in order to gain an evolutionary advantage. Instead of serving functional needs, these institutions adopt externally visible traits which appear as though they are well functioning (for example new uniforms for a police force, renovations to visible buildings etc.). This phenomenon leaves fragility trap countries stuck with hollow institutions that are ineffective in the
long run. Pre-mature load bearing is a similar phenomenon present in fragile states – here countries receive large amounts of aid yet because of their fledgling institutional capacity they are unable to distribute or utilize it effectively, resulting in stresses exceeding capability, ultimately leading to failure (Pritchett, Woolcock and Andrews 2013). James and Goetze (2001) delve further into applying evolutionary theory to ethnic conflict, first caveating their text stating “Clearly the evolutionary psychology paradigm, in its current elaboration, is incapable of supplying an off-the-rack explanation of a particular event or class of events where multiple sources of causation are involved” but then going on to note that “Evolutionary psychology rarely precludes the influence of environment. What it claims is that many specialized mental mechanisms have evolved as part of our psychological architecture and that these mechanisms react to specific stimuli among the infinite array of stimuli encountered, filter the stimuli to be processed, and prepare appropriate behavioural responses.” In this passage we see that James and Goetze are referring more to how evolutionary outcomes act as a medium through which all humans interact with and understand the world on a daily basis. And further reading of the text illustrates the fact that “any complete explanation [of human behaviour and events] will necessarily involve a discussion of environmental stimuli and activated mental mechanisms. Psychological mechanisms may always be involved in generating conflict-related behaviours.” This approach to understanding ethnic conflict on the individual behavioural level may seem like common sense now, but in the past such an approach was novel. From the individual we can expand outwards to group behaviour in that some models of the evolution of multicellularity can also be applied to human behaviour (Michod and Roze 2001; West et al 2006). Moreover, researchers have shown how warfare between groups
actually affected the development of human social behaviours over millennia (Bowles 2009), and this finding is just one of a myriad of findings that apply evolutionary theory to human social phenomena, through sociobiology, human behavioural ecology, evolutionary psychology, cultural evolution, and gene-culture co-evolution, with some fields showing greater promise than others in terms of their explanatory power (Laland and Brown 2011). Hence in this study I build off the insights and works of evolutionary theorists as applied to state fragility and conflict; this approach is only used insofar as it has explanatory power to better understand why some interventions succeed while others fail. I do not claim that this is the only way to examine these phenomena though, only that it is one way that can provide insight to a particular problem in a particular way. However, this is an area that has been underexplored in the extant literature—despite its practicality and policy relevance—and therefore deserves greater scrutiny.

1.6 Organization of this Document

In the following chapter, I review the fundamental literature surrounding my research questions and the associated selected variables. Next, in chapter three, the ideas and definitions discussed in this introduction and the literature review are assembled into an analytical framework, which serves to situate my project within broader theoretical debates. I use a sociohistorical and multidisciplinary approach in the case studies, and employ an analytic multifocality spanning Sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, and Eurasia, aiming for a holistic understanding of state fragility and related intervention policies. In addition, chapter three presents my main argument, my proposed model, and the hypotheses being tested. Chapter four lays out my research design and methodology including the criteria being used to select cases. Next, chapter five presents
the initial statistical analysis and results, along with a plausibility probe using three “mini” case studies which examine how countries of interest were able to exit their situation of extreme fragility, testing the proposed fragility recovery model. Chapter six presents the first two of six in-depth case studies, using process tracing and narrative analysis of the successful UN peacekeeping mission in Cambodia followed by an examination of the 2011 Libya intervention, where the international intervention focused on security and neglected to build upon the country’s current strengths (including leadership); this case demonstrates the veracity of the “intervention failure” model presented in chapter three. Chapter seven examines the case of Rwanda and the power-sharing peace agreement before the genocide, followed by the case of Mali, where several external shocks led to backsliding and intervention failure, lending further credence to the intervention failure model. Chapter eight examines capacity interventions in Uzbekistan and Zimbabwe, a success and failure respectively. Finally, in chapter nine a summary of the theoretical insights—flowing from the comparisons across case types—is presented along with the refined fragility recovery model based on the findings of the case studies and statistical work, closing the dissertation with policy implications and conclusions of the study.
Chapter 2  Review of the Literature

The previous chapter presented the motivation and background for this study and outlined conceptual definitions. Before diving into a deeper discussion of the model and argument proposed, in this section I explain existing theoretical models of fragility more generally and lay the groundwork for my proposed theoretical models of intervention failure and success. Moreover, I explore the literature on third-party interventions, peacebuilding, civil war recurrence/backsliding, the importance of power-sharing in peace settlements and finally on escaping from extreme fragility. Each of these topics relate directly to my thesis; only by first understanding the key literature can we identify where greater clarity is needed in explaining the success or failure of third-party interventions in FCAS.

2.1  Existing Empirical Studies of Fragility: Selected Models and Indices

While there are many models and indices of fragility and other similar concepts, for the purposes of this study I will focus on several main indices in order to provide conceptual clarity. I introduce these frameworks, their associated indices and their underlying methodologies in this section in order to refine and build on them with my own research findings. First, I turn to the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) framework, wherein there are three main dimensions of statehood, termed authority, legitimacy, and capacity (Carment 2003). Authority is defined as the extent to which a state can enforce the rule of law, exercise monopoly over the use of force, and provide a stable and secure environment to its citizens. Legitimacy denotes the extent to which a state commands public loyalty; in other words, it can be thought of as state-society relations.
Weatherford (1992) defines it based on democratic participation through voting, leading to accountable governments that represent the population. Capacity refers to the potential for a state to mobilize and employ resources towards productive ends.\textsuperscript{7} The CIFP framework conceptualizes state fragility as a relative measure. That is, all states are fragile to some degree in relation to one another and can be placed along a continuous scale of measurement relative to one another over time (Carment, Prest and Samy 2009). The relative nature of the CIFP methodology has been contested as apparent changes may be due to the performance of other countries as opposed to an absolute change in state fragility; some see this as a weakness in methodology or conceptualization but for the purposes of my research program this is not an issue because multiple data sources are used to triangulate the findings. It is notable that many other projects have adopted and modified the ALC framework for the measurement of fragility. Another way of calculating ALC scores for countries is through the minimalist construct presented in Tikuisis \textit{et al} (2015) and it is useful because it simplifies the methodology and uses indicators which are orthogonal to one another, working to reduce the problem of endogeneity and overlapping data sources. It also helps to inform the understanding of fragility in this study as it shows how various sources can be triangulated with a similar result, and broadly informs my understanding of state transitions.

Turning next to the World Bank’s CPIA index, countries are scored from a range from one to six on several policy dimensions by country experts with in-depth

\footnote{Further details on the CIFP project methodology including the conceptualization and construction of the ALC framework are found at www.carleton.ca/CIFP and in Carment, Prest and Samy (2009).}
knowledge of the environment on the ground. In 2004 an external panel was commissioned to review the effectiveness and accuracy of the CPIA methodology, and some fundamental recommendations were implemented that remain to this day which has improved the quality of the data collected. There are currently 16 criteria evaluated under four clusters (economic management, structural policies, policies for social inclusion/equity, and public-sector management and institutions). The CPIA rating process is undertaken in two phases: first there is a benchmarking phase wherein a representative sample of countries from each of the six regions is chosen and evaluated (World Bank 2010). Country teams are tasked with rating their country in each of the criteria; these ratings are then vetted by the regional chief economist as well as several other officials and experts. Once the benchmarked scores have been established and approved, the second phase of the rating procedure begins. Again, the individual country teams are tasked with evaluating the 16 criteria in their given situation; the accuracy of this process is improved because the benchmark countries are available for comparative analysis (i.e. the benchmarks act as “guideposts” for the assessors to look to) (World Bank 2010). In addition, the host country authorities are involved in assessing and corroborating the ratings which are provided by the World Bank team, further improving the accuracy of the final assessment. Finally, the regional chief economist along with other officials and experts are consulted before the final scores are determined. Overall, CPIA scores are probably the most important in terms of actual policy implementation by both multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and UN bodies, as well as through bilateral development agencies and increasingly NGOs. With that said, the methodology is far from perfect and suffers from a number of flaws which have been detailed by scholars and suggestions made for improvement, some of
which have been taken onboard by the bank in years since (Cage 2014; McGillivray 2004).

Finally, I examine the German Development Institute (DIE) model which has conducted a number of in-depth empirical analyses looking at fragility. The most recent and arguably one of the most cutting-edge projects deals with the oft-levelled criticism that lumping states into a single category causes a loss of valuable analytical capacity; in response DIE investigators present a methodology to establish a multidimensional empirical typology (Kreibaum, M., Ziaja, S., and Grävingholt, J. 2017; Grävingholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum 2015). While this is similar to the CIFP approach and uses the same terminology for the three dimensions, the statistical methods used are novel and provide insight into the different types of fragility which exist. In the DIE framework, authority and legitimacy are conceptualized as the state acting on society, whereas legitimacy involves society acting towards the state. Slightly different sets of indicators are used in this approach, but generally the concepts being examined are quite similar; the researchers use a “mixture-model” method to obtain clustering patterns in a three-dimensional space, and in doing so were able to map out states according to their characteristics in each dimension. This research is still at an early stage in terms of what it may mean for policy, however overall it is a step in the right direction in terms of building nuance into the analysis of fragility. The DIE research team has recently set up an impressive visual interface on their website “Constellations of State Fragility” which allows the user to interact with the fragility data and examine country by country and

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dimension by dimension each category of state. In DIE’s conceptualization there are six types of states: dysfunctional, low-authority, low-capacity, low-legitimacy, semi-functional, and well-functioning. This user-friendly tool allows for the visualization, manipulation and parsing of complex data and therefore is an excellent tool for researchers to examine fragility evolution over time. Indeed, my research program builds on the research of both the CIFP and DIE research groups, in that it takes as a starting point that fragility is multidimensional and cannot be understood just as one linear index but rather needs to be broken down and analyzed via typologies, and recommending that donors take these analyses into account when choosing what type of support to provide to FCAS. As is explained in more detail in chapter four, my study utilizes a framework which takes into consideration more than one fragility index (in fact, each of the three above is utilized in my analytical research strategy). The rationale for this multi-dataset approach is that such a method will aid in triangulating data points resulting in a more robust analysis of the phenomenon under consideration. At the same time, these models do not explain the causal mechanism for the positive-feedback cycle that leads to state recovery, also known as a “virtuous cycle”, which is critical to better understand how and why certain interventions work in particular FCAS (DFID 2010; Carment and Samy 2017).

2.2 Third-Party Intervention in Fragile States

In the extant political science and international relations literature, the term “intervention” usually refers to military and peacekeeping interventions into states experiencing a civil war, and in more critical circles it has been described as “dictatorial interference” in that no consent is typically sought nor necessary (i.e. a loss of
sovereignty) (Wright 1957; Beres 1985). In this dissertation I take a broader view of the concept, looking at interventions on each of the three dimensions of statehood. I use the classic definition of intervention as “action taken to intentionally become involved in a difficult situation in order to improve it or prevent it from getting worse.” (Cambridge 2019). In this study I focus on third-party intervention which means that the actor or actors are international in relation to the country being targeted. This category includes other nations, multilateral international organizations, NGOs, corporations and more. However, despite taking this broader view of intervention with the goal of integrating disparate literatures, it is worthwhile to take a brief tour through the more traditional concept of intervention as a starting point for understanding the terminology. Indeed, as far back as ancient Greece, intervention has been an important political tool of states (Morgenthau 1967). These types of activities on the part of third-party actors would mostly fall into the category of “authority” interventions under my rubric. That is because they generally use military force to impose the rule of law over a given territory or region. Balch-Lindsay, Enterline and Joyce (2008) provide a good overview of the intervention literature in their study showing that third-party interventions have a decisive effect on both the duration and outcome of civil wars.

Drawing on both their summaries and the original works, I do note that these theoretical debates are longstanding, with authors like Rosenau (1964) arguing that civil wars should always be recognized as international events; the type and longevity of the war both bear influence on and are influenced by international events simultaneously. Modelski (1964) in the same volume uses the theory of international systems to explain how civil strife can sometimes be used as a technique to prevent a larger interstate
conflict from breaking out, thereby rendering it useful and morally acceptable under given circumstances. Pearson (1974) showed that larger powers were more likely to intervene far from home and smaller powers closer to home, as well as that hostile military interventions far from home were rare. Falk (1964) deftly argues that international law should be able to control civil wars, and if it fails to do so, sees third-party intervention as a "lawful duty" for the international community must partake in. Interestingly, this sentiment foreshadows the much later development of the responsibility to protect doctrine which emerged in the late 20th century. Also emerging in recent decades is the notion of humanitarian intervention, wherein states are motivated (or at least claim to be) by the ongoing or potential humanitarian suffering occurring in the target country (Western 2002; Voeten 2001).

Still, scholars such as Kisangani and Pickering (2009) see intervention on the part of mature democracies to be used as a diversionary tactic to gain the attention of the domestic populace, sometimes in advance of elections (analogous to the so-called "rally round the flag effect"). Of course, there are also many detractors of the intervention norm who argue that interventions are usually either illegal, immoral, or both (Adams 2000; Atack 2002 Gibbs 2008; Bentley 2017). The issue of moral hazard as it pertains to third-party intervention is another interesting and pertinent topic in the literature; not only are intervenors acting in their own interests, but they are also under multiple competing pressures from domestic and international forces (Carment and Rowlands 1998a; Carment and Rowlands 1998b; Carment and Rowlands 2003; Carment and Rowlands 2004; Carment and Rowlands 2006). Another salient argument is forward by Mueller (2003) who states that most of the war in the world today are
just “left-overs” or “dregs” of past wars in that countries which weren’t brought under the umbrella of good governance still deal with internal conflict and strife, but rather than the West acting as a global police force it is much more productive for domestic actors to improve governance and improve stability; illustrating his thesis, he declares “Over the course of the last few decades, there seems to have been an increase in the developing world in the number of countries that are led by effective people who, instead of looting and dissipating their country’s resources like Zaire’s Mobutu, seem to be dedicated to adopting policies that will further its orderly development - something Rotberg (2002) labels 'positive leadership.’” The notion here is that bad actors are slowly but surely being brought under control or aptly coopeted by domestic leaders who have better designs for their nations as productive global players. Rwanda’s Kagame comes to mind when thinking about this concept. In any case, whether intervention is a global “good” or “bad” is not a debate that will likely be resolved anytime soon, however understanding some of the key thrusts helps to situate ourselves in the broader literature.

The earlier works on intervention spawned a cascade of research efforts, mainly focused on three aspects of intervention: (1) the causes of third-party intervention in civil wars, (2) the effect of third-party intervention on civil war outcomes, and (3) the effect of third-party intervention on the duration of civil wars (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce 2008). Unsurprisingly, research in the first category often finds that intervenors do not act based on altruistic motives but rather on self-interest (Suhrke and Noble 1977; Holl 1993; Regan 1996; Regan 2000; Gent 2007; Gent 2008). Turning to the effect on civil-war outcomes and duration, there are salient debates over whether
interventions lead to a shortening or a lengthening of civil wars, as well as whether interventions help or harm rebels (Carment and James 1998; Walter 2002; Regan 2000; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000; Mason, Weingarten and Fett 1999; Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom 2004; de Rouen Jr and Sobek 2004). A conclusive answer has not yet been reached on either of these big questions and the nuances of the debate are beyond the scope of this dissertation, but suffice it to say, “it depends.” In evaluating the results of their comprehensive analysis of 152 civil wars from 1820-1992, Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2000) emphasize “the importance of modeling the interdependent and dynamic aspects of third-party intervention as well as the world politics of civil wars when forecasting their duration and formulating policy.” I highlight this pointed directive not to say that there is no answer to these complex inquiries into the nature of intervention, but rather to demonstrate that gaps in our understanding still exist and moreover to highlight that the advent and increased popularity of large-N quantitative analyses has not removed the need for nuance and detailed case analysis in studies of intervention.

After interventions occur and a conflict comes to an end, via victory by one party or a negotiated peace settlement, the remains the question of postwar social development. How do societies return to normality after war? Large numbers of refugees and casualties are a given, comparatively less attention has been paid to how institutions and infrastructure for the provision of public goods is affected by civil war and intervention (Ghobarah, Huth and Russett 2003; Lai and Thyne 2007; Hoddie and Smith 2009; Iqbal 2010; Kim 2017). Postwar recovery is affected my many different variables, and diverse outcomes have been seen throughout the historical record.
Quality of life (QOL) will generally gradually improve after a war has been settled (Chen, Loayza and Reynal-Querol 2008). However, as Kim (2017) notes, “the degree of improvement differs by country” and points to the examples of infant mortality (IM) rate in Mozambique which went from “137 per 1000 live births to 111 during the ten years after civil war (1993-2003)” whereas “Chad’s IM rate only slightly decreased from 109 to 102 during a post-war decade (1988-1998).” So what factors determine whether a country improves its citizens QOL after a civil-war / intervention? There are various theories and some evidence on intrinsic elements of the state including cost of war, ethnic fractionalization, population size etc. (Ghobarah, Huth and Russet 2003; Lai and Thyne 2007; Kim 2017). Horowitz (2001a, 2001b) provides his seminal cross-national comparisons combined with paradigmatic case studies of ethnic conflict to present a unified theory that helps explain the factors that lead to ethnic conflict in disparate societies; he points to several dimensions as being critical in understanding ethnic conflict outbreak: 1) the severity of division between groups, 2) the hierarchical nature of group relationships, 2) the centralization of groups and 4) ascriptive differences identifying groups. While examining these categories in detail is beyond the scope of my study, understanding ethnic fractionalization and its relationship to state fragility is important, especially in the case studies tested in greater depth later in the dissertation. Another perspective comes from Toft (2005) who argues that if a given territory is indivisible, that ethnic conflicts can breakout due to the group’s perceptions of their ancestral homeland’s intrinsic value; that is, territorial integrity and ownership can be the difference maker in whether or not conflict erupts. Other research has shown that foreign actors change government policy and affect stability through their influence and intervention policy (Paris 2004; Pugh 2004; Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Bueno de
Mesquita and Downs 2006; Fortna 2008; Howard 2008; Gent 2008; Kim 2017). All these factors come into play when examining the case studies later in this study, yet, for my purposes it is also critical to look at what effect interventions had on post-war development recovery.

Kim (2017) explicitly examines how interventions affect the recovery of social services after interventions take place, finding that UN backed and run interventions have a faster and more robust recovery rate than interventions by a single party. The logic here is that when the UN intervenes there is a multilateral force in-country which has the support of multiple nations and all permanent members of the UN Security Council. On the other hand, when a single entity intervenes it usually does so with more “selfish” purposes in mind, aiming to capture influence and rents, and paying considerably less attention to the well-being of the population through service delivery (Kim 2017). To determine how different types of intervention affect post-war and post-intervention recovery, Kim (2017) focuses on QOL as “a broader concept of development.” This approach is of interest because most investigators use GDP as a proxy for development, but by doing so they only narrowly capture economic growth outputs which do not necessarily translate to a better life for the citizenry. Pourgerami (1992) defined development rather as “growth plus gradual and sustained improvements in the social system.” This definition has become widely recognized in the literature—it marries the two concepts of economic development and social development so that to understand one you must also understand and include the other.

By shifting our understanding of development to include social services and well-being of citizens, implications for the nature of intervention also emerge. Krasner
(2004), Doyle and Sambanis (2006), and Finnemore (2003) argue that the UN should be the key player in international intervention and peacekeeping missions (more on this in the following section). Whereas authors like Pugh (2004) and Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2006) are more cautious when it comes to UN involvement in sovereign matters. Kim (2017) argues that UN interventions have a better record of providing basic services and therefore increase legitimacy in post-war situations; in contrast, unilateral interventions without UN authorization do not have the same accountability structures and result in poor recovery efforts.

This study sets some important foundations for this dissertation, since Kim (2017) looks at QOL as an indicator of intervention success. While I am less interested in the type of intervention in terms of whether it was UN sanctioned or unilaterally imposed, the QOL metric developed here is useful to measure whether an authority, legitimacy or capacity intervention was successful in a given FCAS. Kim (2017) uses baseline prospects to estimate expected QOL improvement after war. He then uses Morris’s (1979) QOL index which is a composite measure of life expectancy, IM rate, and adult literacy rate. This index is then augmented by collecting data from the World Bank Development Indicators, the UN Demographic Yearbooks, World Population Ageing, and UNESCO statistical yearbooks. He scales QOL on an index from 1 to 100 and plots the cases across time. Using intervention data from Regan (2002) and Doyle and Sambanis (2006) he then constructs the model finding strong evidence that UN interventions improve outcomes while unilateral interventions do not (Kim 2017). Overall this methodological approach is of interest because of its relevance to my research questions surrounding the effects of various intervention types.
There are a number of studies which aim to evaluate different peacekeeping interventions and plan for future intervention strategies in fragile states; yet there remains a great deal of disagreement on which are the most effective and why (Paffenholz and Reychler 2007; Sandole 2010; Manor 2007). Most of the intervention methods above refer to the concept of dictatorial interference which fit along the authority dimension of state fragility however I also wish to examine interventions along the legitimacy and capacity dimensions of fragility. Turning first to legitimacy interventions in the literature we see de-escalation of communal group conflict and improvements in horizontal inequality pointed to most often, with positive results potentially achieved through several different mechanisms (Stewart 2008; Østby 2008). Stewart (2008) identifies direct, indirect, and integrationist policies for reduction of horizontal inequality. For the purposes of this study only the direct policies are relevant because the time frame for indirect policy outcomes is too long to be tested statistically, although they may appear as complementary explanatory variables in the case study stage (Gerring 2006; Simons 2009). Direct political reforms include the implementation of group quotas, seat reservations, a consociational constitution, and 'list' based proportional representation (Stewart 2011). The next category is socioeconomic reforms such as quotas for employment or education, special investment or credit programmes for specific groups (Stewart 2011). Finally, minority language recognition and education along with symbolic minority recognition in public holidays and at state functions are identified as “cultural status” interventions (Stewart 2011). All these types of interventions, being political in nature would fall under the legitimacy category of state fragility.
Legitimacy interventions appear to be key in catalyzing states to emerge from the fragility trap (Carment and Samy 2017; Carment, Samy and Landry 2013; Walter 2015). Indeed, Zakaria (2007) refers to classic writings by Rousseau on this point, “Legitimacy is the elixir of political power. "The strongest is never strong enough to be the master", Jean-Jaques Rousseau observed, "unless he translates strength into right and obedience into duty". Only democracy has that authority in the world today.” Legitimacy interventions aim to bring trust back between the citizens and the government; as one would think, this is more easily said than done. External actors, no matter how virtuous their intentions, are most always looked at with suspicion. Hence “intervening” in legitimacy may be both the most difficult and the most effective form of action in fragile states. As mentioned above, scholars have pointed to political power-sharing as being key to ensuring peace, stability, and sustained economic development in fragile and conflict affected states (Elgin-Cossart, Jones, and Esberg 2012; Papagianni 2009).

Arrangements in this category include power-sharing deals, constitutional conferences, peace agreements, and the like (Elgin-Cossart, Jones, and Esberg 2012). These types of arrangements tend to occur during “formative events” which consist of “the activities marking the end of an armed conflict, and the activities surrounding a political crisis” (ibid.). Political settlements certainly vary from case to case, however most of the current literature agrees that power-sharing is a critical step towards positive change. For this reason, this study uses a political settlement variable which tests whether there was a power-sharing agreement, similar to the framework outlined in Elgin-Cossart, Jones, and Esberg (2012). At the same time, because not all states in the fragility trap underwent conflict, this variable category may not be as relevant as it is in the civil war
literature; nevertheless because of the current scholarly attention it merits inclusion (Lindemann 2008; Call 2012).

Shifting back to authority interventions, focusing on the end of a conflict through military victory by one side or through international intervention, it can be seen that poor authority scores would theoretically experience a turn around after such events. That is, a country in civil war or another type of internal or mixed conflict should become more stable once the conflict has come to an end. Balch-Lindsay, Enterline and Joyce (2008) found that third-party intervention on one side led to a more decisive victory; in theory such a victory would allow the victor to better monopolize the use of force and enforce security laws. In this study third-party military intervention and a decisive military victory by one party are taken as authority interventions. On the other hand, the presence of a UN Peacekeeping mission made a negotiated settlement more likely, which would fall into the category of the above-mentioned legitimacy interventions, therefore careful discernment of what occurred in each case is critical (Karl and Sobek 2004; Walter 2015). Outcomes of civil wars can have different effects on fragility. For example, in the case of Rwanda, the large-scale genocide devastated the Tutsi population but then had the reverse effect of bringing to power a Tutsi government with a strong international backing, leading to improvements in fragility. On the other hand, low level conflicts can continue to simmer, and political repression can be used as a blunt weapon against dissent, such has been the case in Zimbabwe.

Security Sector Reform (SSR) is another important authority intervention that is often employed by international partners; SSR is often the first step in the attempt to stabilize a state (Anderlini and Conaway 2004; Chanaa 2002; Schnabel and Ehrhart
This intervention involves international assistance on modernizing areas linked to security provision such as militaries, police, intelligence services, the judiciary, ministries of justice etc. Its aim is to improve the state’s authority structures and institutions, and SSR has quickly become a staple in the statebuilding paradigm used by Western and multilateral actors, although in recent years its effectiveness and credibility as a peacebuilding tool has been brought into question (Rivard Piché 2017; Rivard Piché 2018). In terms of data availability, Pickering and Kisangani (2009) construct an updated data set of all military interventions from 1989 to 2005, and conduct preliminary analyses showing that the analyzed outcomes track well with conventional knowledge of the cold war period intervention events. Sullivan and Koch (2009) subsequently build on the data set and develop a measure of “the effectiveness of military force as a policy instrument,” capturing the political objectives strong states use in their intervention strategies—and whether those objectives were achieved—as well as accounting for the material and human costs of the intervention(s). Both datasets are useful in examining whether an intervention occurred in a given country-year as well as in determining how successful the intervention was in practice.

Perhaps the most overlooked category of intervention is those which act on the dimension of capacity. This probably occurs because most scholars and policymakers focus on the immediate security threat which is often found in fragility trap states. Nevertheless, given that some trapped countries do relatively well in authority and legitimacy but not in capacity—as well as vice versa—this is a category of interest for

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9 Most SSR studies are done on a wide-range of states, not only FCAS, so nuance in the analysis is needed.
In this dissertation I tend to examine operational and immediate interventions, so humanitarian and security interventions including peacekeeping but also peace agreements and some longer-term capacity interventions such as International Monetary Fund (IMF) programming. In the State Transition Model (STM) (Tikiusis et al 2013) these are termed “Impoverished” countries. They may not be technically stuck in extreme fragility but often they oscillate in and out. In order to deal with these types of situations, clear cut offs for what constitutes a “trapped” country versus an “in and out” country must be outlined. Capacity interventions focus on the economic well-being of a country and could take the form of an IMF structural adjustment program or another multilateral organization such as the World Bank taking a more direct investment into the financial management and service delivery programming in a fragile state. On the other hand, there are some countries which do well capacity wise and poorly in authority and/or legitimacy. These states would still be low capacity when compared to developed countries, however developing their areas of strength may be a way to improve their situations. There are also numerous cases of economic interventions and trade liberalization policies having a positive effect on growth in Africa, many of these deserve closer examination in terms of the causal chain that allowed for substantive growth to appear in otherwise fragile countries (Chuwang-Pole and Angwafo 2011; Landry 2014).

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10 Mainly Sub-Saharan African countries fit into this category.
11 For example, Bangladesh arguably escaped the extreme fragility in this very way, utilizing its large labour force to boost its textile industry and capture enormous rents, funneling this money back into development and eventually moving towards a more stable situation. Prior to this capacity improvement, Bangladesh had poor showings in all three dimensions, authority, legitimacy and capacity; in particular, political violence and corruption plagued the country. While things are far from perfect as it stands, the rise of the textile and other industries helped to improve both authority and legitimacy over the last two decades.
International actors can provide aid and large-scale technical assistance in order to spur growth in the most fragile countries, and such interventions need to be distinctively tailored when it comes to post-conflict countries, keeping in mind the institutional limitations present (Collier 2006; Collier 2009). Opportunities may also present themselves after conflict with access to commodities suddenly opening up, booms are possible (Collier 2009) Another economic intervention is the opening of the country to free trade, with some studies showing that trade openness is very important for economic development in fragile states (David, Bastos, and Mills 2011). For the purposes of my statistical analysis I examine whether the FCAS had an IMF intervention and use this as a proxy for capacity interventions, in the case studies I also examine further economic aspects related directly to capacity including trade policy and openness etc. The economic experiences of the most fragile countries are extremely heterogeneous; this study helps to shed light on why that is the case. The important takeaway here is that intervention has been of interest to scholars and policymakers for many decades if not centuries, albeit defined in a narrower way than I employ in this study.

2.3 Peacebuilding and Statebuilding in Fragile Situations

Intervention and peacebuilding are inextricably linked and exhibit large overlaps in the literature. Because of this close theoretical and analytical relationship, here I provide a brief overview of the peacekeeping and peacebuilding literature, for the numerous scholarly debates that have rapidly evolved in the past few decades surrounding this topic cannot be taken for granted. Nor can studies of fragility and intervention claim to be the first to explore these key subjects, and to ignore the peacebuilding and
statebuilding literature would be leaving a massive blind spot in terms of scholarly duty. To be sure, there is overlap between the fragility literature and peacekeeping literature, however the two do have distinctions that separate them. This section aims to draw out some of those distinctions while not discarding the importance theoretical insights provided by the peacebuilding literature. Without a doubt, the puzzle that underlies this dissertation hinges on the fact that despite all of the “lessons learned” from peace operations in the 1990s and the 2000s, the West’s current success rate for its myriad of interventions is, for the most part, abysmal (Werner 1999; Werner and Yuen 2005).

There are three dominant approaches to peacebuilding addressed here. Perhaps the most prolific of the three is termed “liberal peacebuilding” - the label itself is contentious but remains useful. This approach is characterized by a two-pronged strategy of economic and political liberalism. Free elections, a supportive social environment, promotion of a vibrant civil society and economic policies of marketization are all major aspects of liberal peacebuilding. In support of this approach, Doyle and Sambanis (2000) found that international peacekeeping missions supported by strong local capacities, with the ultimate trajectory of transforming the society into a western-modeled democracy, significantly increased the chances of successful, lasting peace.

There are also those who see the facets of liberal peacebuilding as more western idealism and cultural ignorance than as viable strategies for building a fruitful society. Barnett (2007) criticizes the aforementioned approach stating, “In their effort to radically transform all aspects of the state, society, and economy in a matter of months (and thus expecting conflict-ridden societies to achieve what took Western states decades), peacebuilders are subjecting these fragile societies to tremendous stress” (p.
Instead he proposes an alternative approach: this “republican peacebuilding” is built on three pillars, namely deliberation, representation, and constitutionalism. He feels that constituents need to become a part of the process through more than just casting votes, and advocates for constitutional constraints that serve to regulate politicians through checks and balances.

State Building is the third and final approach to peacebuilding relevant to this dissertation. The creation of institutions that are self-sustaining and self-governing underpins this idea and represents a shift in ideology which took hold primarily after 9/11. Fragile, failing, and weak states became a new and prolific feature of the international affairs lexicon, and academics focused their research on producing practical policy recommendations that would aid in strengthening countries in dire circumstances (Carment, Samy and Prest 2009; Chauvet and Collier 2004; Ghani and Lockhart 2008). This approach is marked by a focus on improving the legitimacy and capacity of institutions in fragile states; generally, it is seen as being more holistic and less ideologically based. More recent treatments of this topic have harkened back to Tilly’s thesis of war being central to state building, applying the predatory model of the state to contemporary Central America, Africa and other fragile situations (Thies 2006; Theis 2007; Thies and Sobek 2010). This state predation approach is examined as a rival explanation as to why some interventions succeed in the cases later in the study. In addition, recently some scholars have argued that statebuilding and peacebuilding are conceptually separate processes with goals that can contradict and undermine one another in a competitive manner (Barma, Levy and Piombo 2017). This unique conceptualization is of interest in the study of fragile states and is considered in my later analysis of the cases.
Finally, aid to FCAS is an important aspect of the peacebuilding process; this includes the Peacebuilding and Statebuilding goals (PSGs) brought to the forefront primarily by the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (2011): legitimate politics, security, justice, economic foundations and revenues and services (Gisselquist 2015a). Clearly each of these goals is worthy in its own right and together make up a holistic picture of what it means to be a state in the modern day. Each type of weak state can further be targeted for improvement by different types of third-party interventions on each dimension of fragility; this idea is discussed further in the following sections.

2.4 Backsliding and Civil War Recurrence

Ending an acrimonious civil war and bringing about a transition to peace and stability is no easy task. Once peace is widespread—refugees returning, combatants leaving behind their weapons and becoming productive members of society, and life returning to normal—it is difficult to imagine ever going back to a time of war. Yet, time and time again, countries that make it to this stage end up embroiled back in widespread conflict, violence, and disarray. In fact, more than half of the conflicts that transition to peace and remain there for at least one year revert to hostilities.\textsuperscript{12} One important question to better understand fragility backsliding is “why do some conflicts recur after a considerable period of peace while others do not?”

This puzzle has drawn the attention of scholars; indeed, quantitative work on this question has resulted in researchers pointing to several different variables as primary

\textsuperscript{12}These values are obtained from a consolidated data set of civil wars, produced by Charles Call (2012) which combines Fearon and Latin’s (2003) data set (documenting cases between 1945 and 1999) and the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) / Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s data set (documenting cases between 1999 and 2007) of internal armed conflicts.
risk-factors. Examples of these include whether the conflict was decisively won (Licklider 1995; Luttwak 1999), where the political leadership originated from (Werner 1996; Peic and Reiter 2011), whether there was a third party present to guarantee the peace (Regan 2002; Balch-Lindsay et al. 2008), the strength of the military (Hendrix 2010; Stedman 2002), quality of life (Walter 2004) and the level economic development (Chauvet and Collier 2008). All of these have also been cited as factors in ensuring that peace “sticks.” More recently, theories have been built to address issues such as political inclusion and power-sharing (Call 2012; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007), leadership by ethnic minorities (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Fearon et al. 2007), and the relationship of the governing party coalition and the populace (Joshi and Mason 2011a; Mason et al. 2011).

While the latter group of studies is built on a rich literature and presents compelling arguments, it is apparent that each theory still points to one variable as the “key” to understanding the problem. With the complex political, economic and social dynamics playing out in any given society, it is unsatisfactory to point to one factor as being the chief cause of instability. To be sure, studies examining leader-related variables have been fruitful; however, they fail to address how these characteristics relate to one another. Moreover, with closer inspection, each of these theories have outliers which cannot be explained by their specific paradigm, indicating that more work needs to be done to understand the exact mechanisms of recurrence.

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13 Throughout this dissertation, leadership refers to the leader as defined in the Archigos data set: “Archigos specifically identifies the effective leader of each independent state, as coded by Gleditsch and Ward (1999), between 1875 and 2004. By effective leader, we mean the person that de facto exercised power in a country. We relied upon primary and secondary sources, as well as our knowledge of the particulars of each state, to inform our coding decisions.” (Goemans et al. 2009: 271)
There has been a burgeoning of academic research on peacebuilding in the past few decades. In particular, there has been a shift to the analysis of civil war – this trend is most likely due to the fact that traditional interstate war is in decline, and that “new” forms of warfare are now becoming more prolific (Human Security Centre 2005). Indeed, countless articles and books have been written that dissect and analyze post-war conditions – of particular interest has been the question of why peace endures in some cases and not others. To answer this question, dominant paradigms have emerged, each purporting to provide sound advice regarding which policy options will result in the consolidation of peace agreements and the permanent end of civil wars. Why then has the implementation of such policies in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, following the guidelines of dominant peacebuilding paradigms, failed to enact lasting peace in countries which have experienced civil war? More specifically, why do countries that have emerged from civil war, which exhibit every sign of peace, fall back into conflict?\textsuperscript{14}

The literature on civil war recurrence is not as developed nor as extensive as that on civil war onset. Recurrence and backsliding into extreme fragility are also related but distinct concepts, therefore understanding each is necessary for analytical clarity. To be sure, if there is no difference between the causes of onset and recurrence then researchers are better off focusing on civil war onset only. Fortunately, some scholars have taken the time to differentiate between the two and there are a number of studies that identify these differences (Quackenbush and Venteicher 2008; Walter 2004;\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{14} Indeed, out of 64 civil wars between 1945 and 2007, 20 saw civil war recurrence after at least one calendar year of peace, 17 saw new civil wars break out in the same country or territory, and 27 remained at peace after fighting ended. In other words, nearly 58% of the civil conflicts in this time period, which were widely perceived to have ended, had a resurgence of wide-scale violence. Therefore, the current understanding of what makes peace last after civil war is insufficient;
Mansfield and Snyder 2004; Call and Cousens 2008; Call 2012). Walter (2004) emphasizes that structural factors, in particular quality of life indicators such as adult literacy, infant mortality, and life expectancy, have the largest role to play in recurrence. She claims that the factors usually cited as primary indictors for onset, such as ethnic heterogeneity, economic grievance etc., are not important when it comes to recurrence (Walter 2004).

Other variables identified as being significant for recurrence include the role of third parties in guaranteeing settlements are adhered to by all parties (Walter and Snyder 1999; Quinn et al. 2007), the size of a state’s armed forces (Fortna 2004), and the existence of disarmament and reintegration programs (Collier and Hoeffler 2003). Certain political conditions such as the level of democracy (Mansfield and Snyder 2005), and the nature of power-sharing arrangements (Hoddie and Hartzell 2005) have also been cited as contributing to lasting peace. Likewise, there are debates on if and how the characteristics of a particular war affect the chances of recurrence, with some claiming that the longer the period of war, the longer the period of peace (Fortna 2004; Walter 1999), and yet others arguing that there is no significant relationship between the two (Doyle and Sambanis 2000). Continuing on, weak state institutions (Fearon and Laitin 2003), meagre local capacity (Doyle and Sambanis 2010), and whether the war ended in a decisive victory (Collier and Hoeffler 2003; Hartzell et al. 2001) are some of the other factors that have been cited as increasing the likelihood of recurrence. Finally, another argument holds that there is no single path to peace or war, but rather that “features which constrain or encourage violence stack up in ways to create distinct and different types of post-war environments” (Berdal and Suhrke 2012). In addition, Savun and Tirone (2012) provide evidence that foreign aid can prevent backsliding after exogenous
shocks. Needless to say, there is no shortage of theories as to why peace sticks or fails, or why fragile states cannot seem to escape their fate. Overall there is a great deal of disparity among scholars concerning whether certain variables are important or not, and if so to what degree.

One thorough treatment of this phenomenon is presented by Charles Call (2012) who’s main argument states that “political exclusion acts as a trigger for renewed armed conflict.” By Call’s definition, political exclusion refers to “the perceived or actual deprivation of an expected opportunity for former warring parties, or the social groups associated with them, to participate in state administration, through either appointed posts or elective office.” While this finding is plausible, it does not provide a full solution to the conflict recurrence and fragility trap puzzle. Pointedly, by Call’s own admission cases such as Mali, Lebanon, Peru and Nicaragua defy the argument. In Mali and Lebanon, inclusionary behaviour was adopted, yet war still recurred. In Peru and Nicaragua, the influence of external actors and the drive for obtaining resource rents clearly superseded the role of exclusionary political behaviour. These are only a few examples of cases that do not fit into Call’s theory - multiple others exist. One critique of Call’s argument is that it takes a Western liberal set of assumptions and applies them to state with no such history, meaning that there will be a failure to adopt and institutionalize these policies. The fact that one factor cannot account for such a phenomenon is not surprising, and it points to the need for a more nuanced theory to better aid in explaining instances of recurrence and backsliding (Calleja et al 2017).
2.5 Importance of Power-Sharing in Preventing Backsliding

The current state of the art in understanding stabilization and peacebuilding shows that inclusive political settlements are key to reducing fragility and to improving effectiveness in FCAS. In my model I present one of the key interventions on the legitimacy dimension as being political settlements that include power-sharing arrangements. For this reason, it is important to provide a bit of background on power-sharing and its link with preventing backsliding in FCAS. First, it has been demonstrated that civil wars last longer and are more difficult to negotiate settlement agreements for when there are more actors involved (Cunningham 2011). Certain scholars point to power-sharing as the solution to these problems, however there is debate on the effectiveness of power-sharing arrangements in keeping peace after civil war. Some authors have questioned the ability of power-sharing to contribute to peace (Jarstad 2008; Rothchild and Roeder 2005). Others have demonstrated that power-sharing can at times be used for coercion in wartime or that it can even incentivize conflict (Binningsbø and Dupuy 2009; Tull and Mehler 2005). On the other hand, for their book Crafting Peace Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) undertook an extensive quantitative and case-study examination of negotiated peace settlements after civil wars. They found that diverse power-sharing agreements, which integrated former adversaries in the political, economic, military and territorial dimensions, produced the strongest settlements for the consolidation of lasting peace. In fragility terms, this action would fall under the legitimacy intervention category, and is examined in more depth later in this dissertation when case studies of power-sharing arrangements are analyzed.
These positive empirical results for power-sharing and its relation to peace and prosperity have been backed up by a number of other studies (Lijphart 2002; Lijphart 2007; Norris 2008; Mattes and Savun 2009, 2010; Lie et al. 2005; Call 2012). After civil war, power-sharing agreements work as a form of checks on the government’s ability to exploit the rebel group once it has demobilized (Mattes and Savun 2010). Guarantees are made through institutional arrangements and aim to “ensure that no group comes to dominate the political arena, has exclusive control over the military or territory, or receives a disproportionate share of economic resources” (Mattes and Savun 2010). If the former belligerents feel that the power-sharing arrangement does its job in protecting their interests, peace is one step closer to reality. It is also interesting to note that Mattes and Savun (2010) did not find evidence that power-sharing for territorial (federal or autonomy arrangements) or economic (embed redistributive or wealth-sharing provisions in favour of the disadvantaged) power-sharing had any effect on the likelihood of civil war recurrence. For international policymakers this may suggest that political power-sharing measures are more fruitful for peace promotion than the others listed above. Hence despite claims to the contrary, intuition and the bulk of evidence indicate that power-sharing does contribute to lasting peace, and consequently it is included by this rationale as a key variable in the theory proposed by this study (i.e. legitimacy interventions as key to preventing backsliding, especially where there is already higher legitimacy than authority or capacity). As McEvoy and O’Leary (2013) conclude, “we can be confident that power-sharing matters, in making democracies perform better and in reducing the likelihood of civil war recurrence” and at the same time intelligently hedge noting “the results come with no guarantees or simple recipes
and are subject to future scholarly revision. Power-sharing is not a panacea, but it is a political formula with some proven success in our times.”
Chapter 3  Escaping Extreme Fragility: Theoretical Framework, Argument and Hypotheses

In the introductory chapters, I outlined the broad conceptual framework and goals of this study, namely the puzzle of why interventions in FCAS are at times successful and at other times are not? How do those third-party interventions help to propel a FCAS to exit from extreme fragility and get back on the path to positive development? In this chapter these ideas are further elaborated upon, as well as situated within the theoretical debates touched upon already in the literature review. In this study I take an interactive approach, examining both structure and agency as factors in fragility recovery.

Studies that focus only on structural factors of fragility and conflict emphasize macro-level characteristics such as economic indicators, institutional performance, and national policies, whereas agency-based research looks at individuals and groups of elites as playing the main causal roles in conflict onset through manipulation in pursuit of power and influence (Newman et al. 2006). I argue that each approach is too quick to neglect the other, and the best way to understand these social phenomena is through a relational, interactive approach. By highlighting the interactions between agency choices and structural factors, as well as by examining the process of these interactions, greater clarity can be gained in terms of causal mechanisms. In summary, if we think of state fragility as depending both on broad structural factors as well as on agency through decisions by leaders, a model can be developed wherein depending on the dimension of

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15 This relationship is detailed further in Carment, Langlois-Bertrand, and Samy (2016).
fragility that is strongest or weakest in a given country, interventions targeting a specific dimension can be seen as the first step in driving the recovery sequence out of extreme fragility towards a low to middle income, stable economy.

For example, if a given country is deficient in the authority dimension and an intervention is then targeted at strengthening that dimension, theoretically speaking we would see the move towards stability occurring during and after the intervention. This notion—that interventions can improve the standing of a fragile country—is grounded in theory and supported by the literature on third-party military intervention (Regan 1996; Regan 2000), on aid and development (Chauvet and Guillaumont 2004; Cross, Felter and Johnston 2014) and on diplomatic interventions in conflict (Regan, Frank and Aydin 2009; Fierke 2005). Figure 2 below provides a simple visual representation of this phenomenon. It is important to remember that because of the scaling of the dimensions in the CIFP framework, lower scores are better (i.e. less fragile). In figure 2 below, as the triangle gets smaller on authority, the country is improving overall. In addition, this model accounts for agency and leadership by seeing an additional factor for positive transition as a pivotal move or decision by the person or group in power at the time, or by an outside force. This type of action would fit into one of the hypothetical categories being tested. In this study, the hypotheses are examined temporally, and related directly to the ALC sequence at that given time. In this manner, it can be determined which interventions were the most critical in moving the country out of fragility, which interventions had knock-on effects on the other dimensions, and which interventions had little to no effect overall.
Next, figure 3 shows another simplified representation of a country that, in this case, is stuck in extreme fragility, which then undergoes a specific third-party intervention (often it is difficult to disentangle if an intervention is completely third-party imposed because hybrid arrangements—for example with domestic actors being supported peripherally by international donors—are becoming the norm\textsuperscript{16}), and subsequently improves its overall fragility. The blue triangle represents the hypothetical country stuck in extreme fragility. For this illustration assume that this hypothetical FCAS has authority problems which presumably have contributed to keeping the country stuck in extreme fragility. The black arrow indicates some type of authority intervention (for example: security sector reform, peacekeeping mission etc.). This intervention then leads to an improvement in the country’s authority scores which can propel the state out

\textsuperscript{16} The implications of these hybrid arrangements are myriad, for the purposes of this study it is key to note that understanding intervention and fragility is “more art than science” – the purpose of the case studies is to try and disentangle such hybrid arrangements through process tracing and by using structured, focused comparisons that unpack relevant context and detail the links which underlie the causal mechanisms.
of extreme fragility by catalyzing improvements in the other two dimensions (the causal mechanism for this process is outlined in the more detailed model below). There is also a dip in stability for the short term due to the J-Curve pathway, which postulates that countries in transition will be placed under significant stress factors and undergo an initial period of instability as they move along the curve (Bremmer 2007; Calleja et al. 2017). At the same time there can also be positive changes, therefore this study allows for an open-ended possibility of state dimensional changes whether positive or negative. Defining what level of change will result in a given FCAS improving enough to avoid backsliding and for the other dimensions to follow suit is detailed in the next section.

This is an oversimplified representation, yet it demonstrates how the analysis in this dissertation can capture changes over time. In a more complex figure one would also see the changes in capacity and legitimacy which have occurred subsequently as well as how and why they occur. Leadership decisions and external factors (i.e. exogenous shocks) could theoretically have a positive or negative effect on the trajectory as well; these factors are accounted for in the case studies presented after the initial statistical analysis.
The basic figures above provide a visual representation of how FCAS face major challenges in emerging to a more stable position. The instability predicted by the J-curve along with the extremely low level of overall authority, legitimacy and capacity, means that any substantive transitions made will need significant support both from inside capabilities and external intervention (Bremmer 2007; Calleja et al. 2017).

3.1 Argument: Focus on the Strongest Dimension of Statehood

My argument is simple - extremely fragile states must be treated differently than other countries in need of development and humanitarian assistance. Third-party interventions work best when they focus on what the target FCAS already does well, therefore any intervention should be aimed at bolstering the dimension of statehood that is already the strongest. The theoretical basis for this argument comes from
evolutionary theory, specifically from the theory of positive feedback and alternate stable states (Lehtonen and Kokko 2012; López-Caamal, Middleton and Huber 2014). This theory outlines how a stable state can be reached after one specific factor of an organism’s fitness is bolstered to the point that a positive feedback loop begins to take hold. Next, the positive feedback stimulates a change and it is eventually responsible for the sudden appearance of rapid changes within ecosystems that depend on a delicate ecological balance, however when the strongest aspect of an organism’s fitness is developed more quickly than others, sometimes through outside interference, you end up with a cycle of effects that are self-reinforcing. When one part of the system improves, another part of the system also shifts in a way that makes the first part improve even more so. In evolution, positive feedback is a source of instability and strong force of differentiation as it can drive the entire system outside of its normal operating parameters.

In evolutionary theory an example is exponential population growth, which occurs when there is a surplus of resources, or lack of predators, this allows a certain population to grow without any limit. Henceforth, more population growth leads to more births, and more births lead to an increasing population creating a compounding effect over time. The same thing can happen in FCAS, where a certain dimension of statehood can reach a stable state and create a positive feedback loop over time. For example, to achieve the same effect in the world of statebuilding, one can look at the following situation: if the FCAS has a lower CIFP authority score than the other two dimensions—that is, security and rule of law are better off than state-society relations and economic development—then the international community should first focus on
building up that security and use of force monopoly before working on the other two. The same logic holds for each of the two other dimensions. If the state is already showing promise in economic outcomes and service delivery, then an IMF loan and robust aid program should be the first step taken to improve the overall situation. On the other hand, if the population already respects its countries leaders and political institutions, but capacity and authority are foundering, then democratic support and power-sharing arrangements may be the most appropriate first step in pulling the FCAS out of the fragility trap.¹⁷ This argument has the advantage of parsimony, which in Jefferys’ (1961) words is best stated as “[s]imple theories have higher prior probabilities.” Alternative arguments are insufficient as they do not explain why certain interventions work while others do not. Conventional development and peacebuilding wisdom hold that interventions should be targeted at the areas of weakness for a state, with most analysts saying that security (authority) needs to be at a base level before anything else can be achieved. However, I disagree and find that mindset to be somewhat reductionist because it proposes a one size fits all solution and ignores local capabilities, strengths and context. For example, such analysts would argue that states that are strong in authority but weak in capacity require assistance in building up their wealth (tax base, natural resources, export levels etc.) and service delivery capability (education, health, and civil services). But these types of interventions sometimes work in states that are ready to withstand such changes and already have a modicum of

¹⁷ At the same time, capacity and legitimacy traps remain a threat, as “Capacity trap countries” are subject to “geographic and social divisiveness that enables the penetration across porous borders of weapons, people, armed militias, and drugs” and “[b]oth capacity and legitimacy trap countries are generally critical of the external imposition of values and prefer working with regional peer countries to establish standards suitable for local contexts.” (Takeuchi, Murotani and Tsunekawa 2011). These considerations illustrate the complexity of engagement in FCAS and the need for a multidimensional approach taking local context into account.
stability. Nevertheless, for states in the fragility trap, the level of each of the three dimensions is so low that focusing on the weakest one only leads to premature load bearing and isomorphic mimicry problems.\textsuperscript{18} Rather, I argue that interventions should target the dimension that is strongest and build it up to the point where it will have a positive feedback effect on the other two dimensions. Aside from deducing the previous point through simple logical reasoning, there is an analogous pathway in biological systems, wherein positive-feedback loops are used as a flexible biological module in order to achieve bistability, or the ability for a system to reach two different equilibrium states (Ingolia and Murray 2007). If applied to state fragility, the same logic can explain why one feedback cycle can lead to recovery while the other leads to extreme fragility, as mentioned earlier. The other major advantage of this approach is that it puts local expertise and ownership first, a key tenet of our current fragile context policymaking guidelines. Rather than bringing in Westerners to impose our own ideas of what should work, by focusing on what the country and locals already do well it flips the relationship on its head, in that the main goal of Western intervention should be to assist and help build capacity rather than simply using a “plug and play” approach (or in other words, do what we do because it works for us). The local context needs to be taken into account, and as seen in the case studies in this dissertation, approaches which worked best were those that capitalized on strengths that were already present on the ground.\textsuperscript{19}

For example, for the state mentioned above that is strong in authority but weak in capacity, interventions should focus on authority first and foremost. This may mean

\textsuperscript{18} A typical case would be Afghanistan and the rise of the three-block war (Krulak 1997; Collins 2006)
\textsuperscript{19} There are linkages between local context and state strength, with one usually reinforcing the other, however hybrid regimes can exhibit hidden behaviours, which can exacerbate isomorphic mimicry issues. See Debiel and Lambach (2009) and Debiel \textit{et al.} (2009) for theory and examples.
strengthening the current political leadership and its related institutions, building inclusive political orders, and investing in rule of law (policing, judicial system etc.). Once these reach a certain threshold, knock on effects will begin to be felt in the other dimensions. This type of positive feedback is noted by Gisselquist (2015) “To a large extent, this is a chicken and egg problem: the success of interventions in supporting better state institutions is affected by the underlying quality of public institutions themselves.” If her assertion is true then interventions targeting the strongest dimension in a fragility trap state are more likely to result in successful implementation, greater local ownership, and eventual overall improvement. There is existing theoretical and empirical support for this proposed positive feedback mechanism in the sense that different types of interventions can build off of one another to achieve better results. For instance, Bell et al. (2017) demonstrate that “[m]ilitary interventions with a humanitarian mandate, by setting stakeholder meetings and providing logistical support that enable communications, encourage NGOs to coordinate among themselves, ultimately allowing organizations to draw on the public good of the NGO network in ways that improve human security outcomes.” At the same time others have argued against the idea of humanitarian “force multipliers” actually working in practice based on both theoretical propositions and empirical evidence from various conflict situations including Yugoslavia in the 1990s (Lischer 2007; Belloni 2007). This mixed evidence, however, simply adds to the justification on why this theory should be investigated.

The UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) (2010) identifies the positive feedback loop I explore in this dissertation as a “virtuous circle” wherein four key objectives work together in a non-sequential manner to strengthen state-society
relations and “build effective, legitimate states and durable, positive peace.” The four objectives are: 1) Address the causes and consequences of state fragility, and build conflict resolution mechanisms, 2) support inclusive political settlements and processes, 3) develop core state functions, and 4) respond to public expectations (DFID 2010). Brinkerhoff, Wetterberg and Dunn (2012) do an excellent job of summarizing this process:

Initially, demonstrated delivery of services, security and protection, and administrative competence to be responsive and accountable to citizens establishes government’s trustworthiness. When citizens have confidence in fair and just legal-rational procedures and institutions, value-based legitimacy emerges. [T]his involves a sense of obligation and willingness to obey state authority, signalling citizens’ acceptance of the State as the highest authority. At the third stage, the sense of obligation prompts behavioural legitimacy, actual compliance with state rules and demands. At this point, the State’s legitimacy has tangible expression through such actions on the part of citizens as payment of taxes, obedience to laws and respect for property rights without the direct use of force.

This depiction of the virtuous cycle illustrates how each of the fragility dimensions can interact dynamically with one another. Moreover, Carment and Samy (2017) find evidence for similar “virtuous feedback loops” which are spurred on by “the right mix of policy decisions to support political and economic reform, support from the international community and reasonably independent political institutions” leading to “[e]xceptional export-driven economic growth” in states that have exited the fragility trap. However, we still do not know what initially spurs these types of feedback loops, that is, whether they are internally driven or whether third-parties can play a pivotal
role in their origination. By testing whether the relative dimension strength being matched to the intervention type matters, I shed light on this gap.

Of course, there are bound to be some counterfactual cases, yet if a general rule can be shown to exist, then such outlier cases may represent outliers and the research findings will constitute a valuable contribution to our understanding of intervention policy in fragility trapped states by providing insight into probabilistic (as opposed to deterministic) policy recommendations for engagement in fragile states. A general theory of fragility transitions must be able to explain how and why a state shifts from one status to another, and it must analyze third-party interventions as part of that dynamic process. The case studies later in this dissertation allow for an examination of the dynamic interactions between processes of improvement or backsliding on each dimension, helping to uncover mechanisms and key explanatory variables that then, in turn, allow this basic theory to be refined and updated based on the findings.

3.2 A Proposed Theoretical Model to Study Extreme Fragility Transitions

The general hypothetical process and causal pathways of the proposed model can be traced through the schematic presented below in figure 4. A state stuck in the fragility trap has an intervention on its strongest dimension (for example, authority). This then causes a knock-on improvement in the authority scores, which subsequently has knock-on positive effects on legitimacy and/or capacity, as per the theory of positive feedback and alternative stable states in inbreeding, cooperation, sex roles and other evolutionary processes as described in the previous section. In a positive feedback cycle the state structures begin to build up and the state shows an overall improvement in fragility. At
the next stage, the state may be able to bear the load of the shifts, or it may experience some type of exogenous shock event and fall into instability. If the state falls into instability and there is no response from domestic or international stakeholders, the country will fall back into the fragility trap. If there is an adequate response to the crisis, through problem driven iterative adaptation, for example, then backsliding can be avoided, and the country can exit the fragility trap. In contrast, figure 5 illustrates what happens when the intervention is focused on the weakest ALC dimension. In this case because the country is so weak in all three dimensions it is unable to handle the sudden changes and slips into the issues of premature loadbearing and/or isomorphic mimicry, resulting in a backsliding process.

*Figure 4. Fragility Recovery Model*
Using these two proposed models it is possible to formulate hypotheses for preliminary statistical testing and later for in-depth examination through both quantitative and qualitative analytical methods. These models are tested throughout the entire study and referred to extensively; for reference in the text I refer to them as the “fragility recovery model” and the “intervention failure model.” The key inflection points in each model are used to develop the investigative questions that guide the in-depth case studies which make up the bulk of the research program, as well as to guide theoretical considerations and policy implications. In the final chapter suggestions to improve the models based on the findings are provided. Note that because of the nature of the below hypotheses and the quality of data available, there are limitations to the quantitative analysis and what can be answered using econometric techniques. Nevertheless, an overall statistical testing procedure is useful, with the structured focused comparison case studies filling in the gaps and teasing out causal inferences later in the dissertation.
3.3 Theoretical Lens: Mechanisms at Play

3.3.1 Authority and Legitimacy Interactive Dynamics

Authority and legitimacy are caught in a constant balancing act; if the values and goals of powerful groups within a state—like the military brass or the business community—do not line up with the government’s, then even a highly effective state could be rejected and seen as illegitimate despite its competence. At the same time, improvements in authority do lead to improvements in legitimacy. As a government is able to secure its territory, enact the rule of law, and dispense equitable justice, citizens will see the government as competent and their respect for the leadership will rise. On the negative side, if a government is unable to secure its borders or protect its population from terrorism, is unable to bring criminals to justice and keep the streets safe at night, and generally showcases a lack of power over local and regional events, citizens begin to question whether or not the leadership can handle the job of running the country, leading to a lowering of legitimacy. There is a fine balance here though. There are cases of military rule, authoritarianism and police states that have a firm grasp over the rule of law and use of force but are at the same time seen as highly illegitimate, perhaps due to the way in which they gained power, a lack of democratic participation and institutions, or myriad other factors. Indeed, when it comes to legitimacy in peacebuilding, Zanker (2018) argues that “the active role of the population needs to be strengthened” and finds that “encouraging additional ways to express grievances, reflections and thoughts ... helps to further legitimise the peace negotiations and make advances in the overall peacebuilding process.” By allowing for a higher level of local ownership and
participation over peacebuilding activities, improvements in base legitimacy levels will follow.

With respect to the effect of legitimacy on authority, improvements in legitimacy should in turn lead to similar scale improvements on authority. The mechanism here is that as the national government improves its political institutions, enhances accountability, increases political participation, reaches compromises and has policy debates in public, the populace will tolerate more from that government, for instance higher spending on security related institution building, will participate in the military and police forces, and generally will work to keep the country safe and stable. At the same time, there are trade-offs between stability in one area versus another that come from focusing on one dimension, and it is a delicate dance to ensure that resources are being spent in a way that balances those trade-offs (Takeuchi, Murotani and Tsunekawa 2011). Indeed, as Brinkerhoff, Wetterberg and Dunn (2012) point out, “Legitimate states can reasonably expect that citizens will voluntarily accept state authority and obey laws and regulations. Popular support and acceptance enable the exercise of state power through consent rather than coercion.” On the flip side, states exhibiting low legitimacy lack the support and acceptance of citizens, use coercion and repression tactics, and are at-risk of political violence and conflict outbreaks.

3.3.2 Legitimacy and Capacity Interactive Dynamics

Legitimacy has gained prominence in the literature as a core component of state-building, and the causal link between service delivery (i.e. capacity) and legitimacy has been identified in both the academic and policy literature becoming almost received
wisdom by now (Carpenter, Slater and Mallet 2012). Service delivery is a highly tangible and visible link that cements the social contract between the state and its citizens. Government leadership in capacity interventions is vital for better outcomes to be reached, and local ownership of aid projects has the dual benefit of not only providing a service but also improving legitimacy. The logic here is straightforward, as citizens witness improvements in service delivery their respect and reverence for the implementing government also improves – in short, the leadership is seen as being more competent and responsive to citizen needs. The main insight is that local ownership of capacity projects is key. If international NGOs are seen as doing the work, the national government will not get credit for the results even if they are working behind the scenes.

This idea does not mean that NGOs and the private sector should not be involved at all, *au contraire*, their presence and support are oftentimes critical for intervention success, rather the national government must play a leadership role and be highly visible to the served population in order for legitimacy to improve based on a capacity intervention. Basic service delivery (health care, education, water and sanitation, and social protection) also improves legitimacy by making the government accountable to the people; once a certain level of service is provided, they continue to be expected as time goes on. Moreover, positive encounters with frontline service officials can be a source of legitimacy for the state, especially when there may have been distrust previously due to upheaval (Brinkerhoff, Wetterberg, and Dunn 2012). Indeed, illustrative examples demonstrate a causal link between declining service performance and legitimacy crises in developing countries (Alexander 2010; Ferguson 2015). In other
words, as capacity goes, so does legitimacy. There are of course debates over how linear this linkage is, with McLoughlin (2015) arguing that to affect legitimacy positively service delivery has to be in line with cultural norms and perceptions, namely “impartiality and distributive justice, the relational aspects of provision, how easy it is to attribute (credit or blame) performance to the state, and the technical and political characteristics of the service.” These considerations notwithstanding, there is still ample evidence for the positive feedback causal mechanism between legitimacy and capacity.20 Therefore, restoration of critical services is a key component of statebuilding in FCAS. The case studies analyzed and compared in this study allow for the specific characteristics of the state’s service delivery model to be examined in greater depth.

Turning now to the opposite relationship, it is known that improvements in legitimacy have been demonstrated to enhance capacity. Englebert (2002) illustrates that historical state legitimacy is positively associated with capacity development. The logic of this relationship rests on the notion that “it makes citizens more likely to defer to decisions and it rules out of a sense of obligation, rather than through the threat (or exercise) of punishment or reward ... simply put, it makes ruling more efficient” (McLoughlin 2015). There is a symbiotic relationship between respect for political leaders and the system that placed them there, and compliance with government decision making. In FCAS, citizens are much more likely to engage in productive

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20 In summary: “Besides fulfilling citizens’ basic livelihood needs, provision of services contributes to building trust in government that can lead to increased state legitimacy. This process of legitimation is an iterative one, where cycles of citizen experience and engagement with government around service delivery, security and political participation and accountability promote increases in legitimacy when that experience and engagement are positive and decreases when they are negative. Thus, the relationship between citizens and the State is not static or linear, but a dynamic interaction continually subject to renegotiation based on empirics, expectations and perceptions.” (Brinkerhoff, Wetterberg and Dunn 2012)
economic activity when they believe their leaders have their best wishes at heart. Political inclusiveness therefore can have a rather direct influence on state capacity in terms of GDP growth via private sector activity. Moreover, people tend to give more leeway to states that they trust; if service delivery is not up to par it is much less likely to result in large scale protests and rebellion in a democratic system than in an authoritarian one, simply because individuals feel they have a voice and can affect change via peaceful means.

3.3.3 Capacity and Authority Interactive Dynamics

Next, I turn to the relationship between authority and capacity. “To maintain a dominion by force, certain material goods are required, just as with an economic organization” notes Weber (1946). Maintaining a monopoly over the use of force requires material wealth: purchasing weapons, paying police and soldiers, erecting barriers along borders, running prisons and the like; all of these activities can only be undertaken if a government has the financial backing to support them. As a state’s economic fortunes improve, so too will its capability of enforcing the law and protecting its borders. The most powerful country in the world today, the United States, boasts a military budget exceeding three times the budget of its closest rival, China, and accounts for 36% of global military spending despite having only 4.4% of the world’s population (SIPRI 2017). Nevertheless, just because a state has a strong economy it does not automatically follow that its authority levels will be high. There are trade-offs and decisions made that determine how resources are allocated, and leadership plays a large role in how these choices are made. Expenditure on military training in fragile states can contribute to the building of human capital and enhance the labour force. It can also
improve the enforcement of property rights, encouraging investment and growth. There is certainly a correlation between the two dimensions, as one may expect. For a country in a region with hostile neighbours, spending on hard power is more pertinent. Whereas in a country with few enemies, surrounded by coastline and large geographic distances between its geopolitical rivals, its resource allocation calculation may not require such a bias towards such ends. Indeed, Knight, Loayza and Villanueva (1996) demonstrate that lower military spending results in better economic growth, however this finding is based on developed nations that already have an acceptable base level of peace. Dunne, Smith, and Willenbockel (2005) find that “military expenditure has a positive effect on output when the threat is high and a negative effect when threat is low” meaning that capacity does depend on the authority environment a given country finds itself in. Thinking of capacity’s effect on authority in the negative, a state with less economic resources will be unable to project power, protect its borders, enforce the rule of law, and distribute justice. This can lead to political or military crises which then devolve into violence and instability, acting as a catalyst for backsliding and increases in fragility; indeed, this is how many civil wars start or recur (Call 2012).

Authority also can have a constructive or destructive effect on capacity. Countries which cannot manage their territorial integrity, that are subjected to constant terrorism and political violence, and that lack the rule of law are unable to build up their economic foundations. Trade relationships and investment attraction are only going to be forged if there is peace and security in a state. When conflict breaks out, businesses shutter and investment flows dry up, as instability is anathema to commerce. Collier (1999) identified the five ways conflict can hinder economic performance: through the
destruction of resources, through disruption of social and economic activity, through
diversion of resources to the war effort, through dissaving, and through portfolio
substitution or divestment. Politicians must be able to promise peace and security for
investors’ confidence to return (Flores and Nooruddin 2009). Conflict can even have
regional effects on spatially associated economies, Murdoch and Sandler (2002) show
that states bordering others experiencing civil war are more prone to experience poor
economic performance in the short term. Moreover, civil war (and its associated
negative effects on fragility) can result in long term negative prospects for economic
growth, although it depends heavily on factors like how much material support is
received from foreign aid afterwards and the country’s economic fundamentals before
the war (Kang and Meernik 2005). All of this evidence points to the linkages between
authority and capacity being critical to our understanding of fragility. As authority
improves, economic development and service delivery should follow in tandem, however
as authority dissipates, we can see the corresponding results in key commercial
processes including trade, investment, and financial activities more broadly. The
international community can play an important role through injections of capital at
opportunity times via an IMF program or large-scale aid and development program. The
hope is that these types of interventions can help to quell the instability so often
observed in fragile and conflict affected states in the modern era.

3.4 Instability during Transitions

Another aspect of this argument is that there will be some instability involved with
essentially all these types of interventions. Along the theoretical lines of Bremmer’s
(2007) J-Curve theory, as the country begins to ascend out of the fragility trap, it is
expected that some turmoil will occur (Calleja et al. 2017). This happens for two reasons: First, because the state is already so weak in all three dimensions, it will struggle to absorb and utilize any assistance. This is due both to weak institutional capacity and to the fact any assistance that is provided will act as a honey-pot and encourage rent seeking and corruption. For example, terrorism can arise as a rapid rate of political change may favour one ethnic group or class over another. Tikuisis (2009) shows that weak states have a 50% rate of fatal terrorist attacks and were more likely to contain major terrorist groups as their economic and Human Development Index (HDI) performance improved, lending some credence to the J-curve theory. Second, as the state emerges from the fragility trap it will also become more open (not only in terms of communications but also transportation, movements of peoples, trade and economic market disruptions, political ideas, civil society groups, foreign NGOs and transnational crime – basically anything that connects it to the outside world). This increase in openness will act as an external shock and will destabilize the current societal status quo. Because of these factors any outside or inside forces may be tempted to call off the intervention, however what needs to be done is to continue to see it through, using problem driven iterative adaptation (PDIA)\(^\text{21}\) to deal with issues that arise. The New Deal for Engagement in fragile states adopts a number of these principles and encodes them in recent frameworks. At the same time, there are not only mutually reinforcing positive feedback loops when intervening and engaging in FCAS. There are also trade-

\(^{21}\) PDIA is based on four principles: (1) addressing locally identified problems; (2) creating an authorizing environment for experimentation; (3) supporting iterative and rapid experiential learning through tight feedback loops; and (4) engaging broad sets of local agents to promote viable, legitimate interventions (Andrews, Pritchett and Woolcock 2013).
offs that can lead to capacity traps and legitimacy traps. One cannot only rely on small, grass-roots, local organizations to implement programs as you will end up with a piece-meal approach without a coherent overarching strategy, but at the same time a top-down, donor driven approach without respect for local context can have just as disastrous of an effect (Takeuchi, Murotani and Tsunekawa 2011). By this argument, before contemplating intervening in a fragility trap country, donors and stakeholders must be prepared for unexpected circumstances to arise and plan accordingly in order to build resilience. Indeed, Lemay-Hébert (2019) wants scholars and practitioners to reimagine fragility through the resilience lens so that instability is not seen as necessarily a bad thing but rather as something that can help to build state’s capacity for absorbing shocks, much in the same manner as described in Taleb’s (2012) concept of antifragility.

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22 According to Takeuchi, Murotani and Tsunekawa (2011): “Capacity trap countries are those that have failed to improve state capacity to provide security and social services and that consequently have failed also to establish state legitimacy. Legitimacy trap countries are those that have demonstrated a high capacity to provide security and services to the population but that suffer from shaky legitimacy due to expanding inequalities and authoritarian management.”
3.5 Hypotheses

**Hypothesis 1**

If the main intervention is directed at the top performing ALC dimension, then countries stuck in extreme fragility will be more likely to improve their fragility.

**Sub-hypothesis 1a**

FCAS with authority as the top performing dimension will be more likely to improve if there is an authority intervention.

**Sub-hypothesis 1b**

FCAS with legitimacy as the top performing dimension will be more likely to improve if there is a legitimacy intervention.

**Sub-hypothesis 1c**

FCAS with capacity as the top performing dimension will be more likely to improve if there is a capacity intervention.

**Hypothesis 2:**

Countries recovering from extreme fragility are more likely to experience short term instability due to shock events. If isomorphic mimicry and pre-mature load bearing are present, then backsliding will occur. Shock events are associated with this instability.

**Hypothesis 3:**

If PDIA intervention techniques are used, then instability and backsliding in FCAS will be effectively reduced.

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23 This can be positively or negatively induced.
Chapter 4  Research Design and Methodology

In this chapter, I provide an overview of the methodological approach taken in this research program. This dissertation employs a three-stage, mixed methods research strategy; this approach balances the goals of generalizability (large-N) and the advantages of individualized, comparative case studies (small-N), providing increased internal and external validity, with each stage building upon the results of the last (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; Ragin 1987). This mixed methods approach has been identified as a reasonable compromise between the generality of the former and the specificity of the latter. Sambanis (2004) argues that studies that look only at macro-level data suffer the problem of lack of rigorous theoretical connection between macro-level data and micro-level theories, with these studies “often overlook[ing] information about the causal pathways that link individual or group behaviour with the outbreak of civil war.” In studies that only examine structural drivers of fragility and conflict, agency is ignored, and in studies that examine leadership, underlying structural factors can also be minimized. Political processes are therefore better understood through the combination of statistical data and case study work. Hence the method of focused, structured comparisons was determined to be the best tool for examining this puzzle since 1) the universe of cases is relatively small and is made up of fewer observations than would be useful for a larger quantitative study, and 2) large-N studies do not separate cases based on the causal process that led to a violent event. In this study I focus on the differences between the effects on extreme fragility after an intervention by a third-party actor. Sambanis (2004) illustrates “how a comparative case study design can be combined with a formal-quantitative approach to build a better-specified theory.”
I take a similar approach, drawing on both large-N datasets and in-depth qualitative research to build and refine my theory on fragility recovery through third-party intervention.

Highly cited, large-N studies of civil war, peacekeeping, and fragility have, of course, contributed a great deal to our understanding of these phenomena while also showing that there is considerable unit heterogeneity in the data in that causal mechanisms differ substantively across countries and case types (Sambanis 2004; Weinstein 2006). The structured, focused comparison case comparison approach aims to complement existing theory, help refine empirical measures, discover interactions between variables, identify endogenous and exogenous factors of the proposed model, and unpack causal processes for each case. As Sambanis (2004) points out, “[c]ase studies can identify interactions between variables and establish a chronological sequence of events that helps map out the pathways linking the independent variables to the dependent variable. This also makes it easier to deal with the problems of endogeneity and selection [bias].” Therefore, in this study add new theoretical contributions to the understanding of third-party interventions in fragile states by observing the links between the intervention and each of the three fragility dimensions and analyzing the dynamics of fragility recovery and/or backsliding as states transition into or out of extreme fragility.

4.1 Stage 1: Statistical Theory Testing and Empirical Analysis

The first stage of this study involved creating a dataset that includes all countries that have been categorized as extremely fragile (1996-2016), as well as identifying and
differentiating instances in which a country improved its condition for a period of at least 3-5 years. In order to technically define the countries stuck in extreme fragility and identify which countries have exited it (i.e. produce the universe of cases), a multi-step procedure is followed. The three-stage process of determining the trajectory each case roughly follows the guidelines outlined in Woolcock (2014). The first stage of this method involves using the World Bank CPIA rankings range for determining levels of fragility. States with a CPIA score of below 3.2 are considered fragile, above 3.2 and below 3.5 marginally fragile, and above 3.5 not fragile. This categorization is used because it is widely recognized in the policy community and other studies of fragility, moreover it is consistently used as a reference point in numerous studies, and given that this research aims to be as policy relevant as possible, it makes perfect sense to use the same framework as the world’s major multilateral donor institutions and bilateral donors.\textsuperscript{24} This first stage serves to create four pools of cases for further analysis. The World Bank CPIA dataset is used because it is the most widely recognized and used in the development policy community and any recommendations stemming from the dissertation will be framed within the universe of World Bank sanctioned analysis and data collection (Woolcock 2014). This approach means that policy recommendations can be made to be easily understood by a wide-ranging audience, without the need of explaining a complicated model to stakeholders.\textsuperscript{25} Another issue is the availability of data for the CPIA rankings; the dataset will also consider the findings of other well-\textsuperscript{注释}

\textsuperscript{24} For further information on the justification for the selection of the 3.2 CPIA cut-off see: Feeny, Posso, and Regan-Beasley (2015) and Alexander (2010). For arguments against using these types of data indicators for policy decisions see Rocha De Seiqueria (2014) and Rocha De Seiqueria (2017).

\textsuperscript{25} On the other hand, CPIA rankings have also been criticized as too subjective and some authors have argued for the use of “fuzzy set theory” to analyze state fragility as it accounts for the transitional phases that fragile states find themselves in (Guillaumont and Jeanneney 2009; Baliamoune-Lutz and McGillivray 2008).
known fragility measuring projects to triangulate the data and results. ²⁶ By using the CPIA dataset and triangulating individual cases with other indices a robust set of cases from which to conduct the next steps of the study was developed.

By using the World Bank CPIA data and establishing cut offs suggested by Woolcock (2014)²⁷ the sample of cases was derived, details of the results are detailed in section 5.1. Using this cut off makes logical sense because the average CPIA of all the LDCs and heavily indebted poor countries is almost consistently 3.2 or slightly below. There is also significant variation within the cases because not all improvements are simply a result of the end of a conflict; this finding is promising in that it allows for analysis of the unique characteristics of each case and for the building of a typology (Tikuisis et al. 2015). The CPIA data was used to build the universe of cases, whereas the CFIP data is the primary focus for the remainder of the analysis including measuring which dimension of fragility was strongest in each country-year. One main reason why the CIFP data is used for the bulk of my analysis is its multi-dimensional nature; this allows for a teasing out of causal connections that a single index cannot provide. Because of the small sample size, the results of this exercise will have to be considered with caution and not taken as definite; at the same time the statistical results will provide a lens through which the model can be examined more closely. In planning my research design, I estimate that the statistical analysis should account for about 50% of the evidentiary weight in this study, with the other 50% coming from the structured, focused comparison case studies. There is the possibility that the statistical analysis will

²⁶ I check the pool of cases against three other fragility indices—PITF, DIE, and FFP—to triangulate results of the initial categorization of states and ensure that the lists are relatively consistent across the indices.
²⁷ Less than 3.5 CPIA score from 2005-2016.
not support the primary hypothesis (even with a larger number of cases), unless perhaps the theory and/or concepts are modified. For this reason, an iterative mixed methods approach is used, wherein the quantitative section is acting as a suggestive form of analysis.\textsuperscript{28} Even though the case studies constitute the major portion of the analyses, the statistical analyses provide objective credibility and therefore deserve equal weighting to the qualitative case analyses.\textsuperscript{29} Moving now to the potential universe of independent variables to be tested, figure 6 below shows examples of the types of interventions that will be quantified and their corresponding ALC categories.

\textsuperscript{28} Take, for example, certain authoritative states that are considered to be stable. Under the current definition of Legitimacy used in this dissertation, similar weight is given to regime acceptance by the population (internal) and by the world at large (external). Yet, what acceptance really matters for state stability – internal? Other authoritative states? This query raises the question of how might the working definition of Legitimacy change, which could then lead to a different hierarchy of strengths among the A, L, and C components of statehood, and thus a different target for intervention?

\textsuperscript{29} I present a detailed discussion on the limitations of quantitative analysis and the necessity of in-depth qualitative analysis in section 4.4 and 4.5. Please refer to these sections for clarity on this 50/50 split.
### Figure 6. Common Third-Party Interventions and Corresponding ALC Dimensions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authority Interventions</th>
<th>Legitimacy Interventions</th>
<th>Capacity Interventions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security Sector Reform(^{30})</td>
<td>Political Transition Assistance(^{31})</td>
<td>Public Sector Support(^{32})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping Mission(^{33})</td>
<td>Power-Sharing Arrangement(^{34})</td>
<td>Free trade(^{35})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Victory(^{36})</td>
<td>Peace Agreement(^{37})</td>
<td>Foreign Development and Humanitarian Aid(^{38})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third-party Military Intervention(^{39})</td>
<td>Horizontal Equality Measure(^{40})</td>
<td>IMF Program(^{41})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^{33}\) IPI Peacekeeping Database: “Drawing from archival UN records, the International Peace Institute Peacekeeping Database presents the first publicly available database of total uniformed personnel contributions of each contributing country by month, by type (troop, police, or expert/observer) and by mission, from November 1990 to present.”


\(^{36}\) UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset v.2-2015, 1946 – 2013. Content: This dataset provides information on specific start- and end- dates for conflict activity and means of termination for each conflict episode. The data is available as a conflict-level dataset which correspond with the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v4 – 2015, and a dyad-level dataset which correspond with the UCDP Dyadic Dataset v1 – 2015.

\(^{37}\) UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset v. 2.0, 1975-2011

Content: The new Peace Agreement dataset, that covers peace agreements signed between at least two opposing primary warring parties in an armed conflict 1975-2011.

\(^{38}\) Foreign Aid Data. [http://aiddata.org/](http://aiddata.org/)


\(^{41}\) World Economic Outlook Databases (www.imf.org/data/en)
For the main dataset all cases of countries trapped, escaped, and oscillating (in and out) are included along with specifically identified independent variables from the categories listed above in figure 6. By undergoing this process for each case, patterns of improvement are discerned, and the hypotheses detailed in chapter three are probed for plausibility through simple statistical analyses including chi-square testing and Venn diagraming as a “first cut”. Here it is possible to see whether interventions on the strongest dimension are indeed more effective at mobilizing state transitions than those which occur on the weaker dimensions.

It is important to note that determining the “strongest dimension” is a difficult task; because this study is focusing on fragility as holistic concept, I contend that the dimension that is strongest over the average period of analysis before, during and after a crisis event should take priority. Because fragility rankings are susceptible to data collection and reporting errors, it is more robust to use an average score over the period in question so that such errors and anomalies will “come out in the wash.” So, when looking at a given country we should observe that either A, L or C has the lowest (best) score for an extended period before, during and after any observed event, crisis, or intervention on average. On a similar note, the countries examined will not always have gone through a crisis event so in these cases it should be easier to discern whether the data is reliable. For countries that have gone through a shock event, of course it makes more sense to intervene on whichever dimension is immediately affected by the event. For example, in Tunisia, up until the Arab spring, authority was the best dimension, however after the uprising there was a sharp rise (worsening) in authority. In a case like this there must be some semblance of security to intervene on any other dimension. My
argument is that for long term, sustained military, political, and economic interventions the international community should focus on the area where a state already can take on an aid package or other forms of material support; only in this way will a new steady state be found which will lead to a positive feedback cycle. In light of this tenet, my analysis focuses on longer term development strategies and military intervention as opposed to one-off humanitarian emergencies.

To tease out causality surrounding hypothesis two, the structured, focused comparison case studies are used and have an explicit analytical question focusing on shock events. Exogenous shocks have been shown to cause precipitous drops back into extreme fragility and could be a main factor in cases of backsliding (Landry 2015). Moreover, theoretical insights into how premature load bearing and isomorphic mimicry are involved are explored using systematic, analytical questions.

Certainly, the results from the data analysis and case studies must be guided by theory; in current practice Western donors attempt to transplant best practices in order to accelerate modernization (Woolcock 2014). Nevertheless, these interventions have often resulted in capability traps or situations of isomorphic mimicry occurring (Pritchett et al 2013). Hence the next step in the dissertation looks past the notion of simply transplanting cookie-cutter interventions by systematically examining what has worked and what hasn’t in key cases (Gisselquist 2015a). Initially this quantitative exercise combined with the use of structured, focused comparison case studies acts to test the plausibility of the proposed fragility recovery model (Eckstein 1975).
4.2 Stage 2: Case Studies

The second stage of the dissertation builds upon the first by using structured, focused comparison case studies based on matched sets of countries/regions with similar characteristics (George and Bennet 2005). One limitation of case studies is that countries may not be directly comparable due to excessive variation between contexts. Therefore, it is necessary to match the countries being compared on key characteristics so that a quasi-experimental research design can be established. The main characteristic is the intervention type; is the type of intervention is most closely linked to the causal mechanisms and will provide the best opportunity to draw inferences (“inference” refers to the ability to draw larger conclusions through specific observations). Other characteristics considered in the case selection process include capability trajectory, level of economic development, level of human development, level of ethnic homogeneity and fractionalization, colonial history, political freedom, and starting fragility (Stewart and Brown 2009; Baliamoune-Lutz 2009; Collier 2003). The logic of using case studies to study interventions is that detailed cases allow for lessons to be drawn from examining the causal mechanisms that link each type of intervention with the development and recovery of a particular state under examination (Flyvbjerg 2006).

42 As a very preliminary plausibility probe I first examined, on the surface level, several cases which fit these criteria and some evidence became apparent, however statistical tests later in the study added further evidence for the proposed causal relationship. Pakistan: Best in capacity dimension; Most aid goes to security sector (authority); Little action on economic dimension; No improvement. DRC: Best in legitimacy dimension; Most aid going to security sector (authority); Still stuck in fragility trap. Guatemala: Best dimension was legitimacy; Interventions were focused on power-sharing and addressing grievances of minorities (Horizontal Inequality); Pulled out of fragility trap. Mozambique: Best dimension was capacity during war; True that peace agreement happened but what was it spurred by? Economic need on both sides of civil war and rural / urban divide; Authority and legitimacy followed after capacity improvements. Mali: Highest in authority; Before current civil war most action was focused on capacity; Rebellion breaks out and send back to fragility trap. Senegal: Highest in authority; No intervention on authority (very independent in this regard); Action on capacity from aid community, but little improvement and now political problems (on “watch list” for conflict).
These cases then contribute collectively to comprehensive theory building, and cases are also chosen to maximize generalizability through regional variation. Eisenhardt and Graebner (2017) illustrate the link between case studies and theory building, “[a] major reason for the popularity and relevance of theory building from case studies is that it is one of the best (if not the best) of the bridges from rich qualitative evidence to mainstream deductive research.”

Development of theory is one of the central goals of this study; as Eisenhardt (1989) states “[t]he process of building theory from case study research is a strikingly iterative one. While an investigator may focus on one part of the process at a time, the process itself involves constant iteration backward and forward between steps.” She notes that generation of novel theories is one strength of theory building from case research, and that the “constant juxtaposition of conflicting realities tends to ‘unfreeze’ thinking, and so the process has the potential to generate theory with less researcher bias than theory built from incremental studies or armchair, axiomatic deduction” (ibid.). I tend to agree with Eisenhardt on this point, while I see the value in deductive, logical theory building I also come from a natural sciences background and my own biases towards experimental research design tend to lead me to look to the evidence as it unfolds for my theory building.

A second strength of case studies for theory building that she identifies “is that the emergent theory is likely to be testable with constructs that can be readily measured and hypotheses that can be proven false” (Eisenhardt 1989). The idea here is that the case studies are conducted by measuring constructs and collecting data, so during the process of researching my cases I can identify patterns and causal connections that
either support or reject my theory, simultaneously allowing me to uncover the *why* of what is going on in each case; in the final stage of research I then combine by deductive and inductive theory to elaborate a stronger case for the phenomenon of fragility trap recovery. Finally, Eisenhardt (1989) points out a third strength of this method, which states “that the resultant theory is likely to be empirically valid. The likelihood of valid theory is high because the theory-building process is so intimately tied with evidence that it is very likely that the resultant theory will be consistent with empirical observation.” In this statement the author holds up the notion that as a researcher immerses him or herself in the data and empirical evidence, the theory that arises will be inextricably linked to reality, rather than merely being based on theoretical assumptions one may rely on in more deductive exercises. I would be remiss though to only include here the positives of theory building from case studies. One negative is that due to the “staggering volume of rich data” investigators have access to, “there is a temptation to build theory which tries to capture everything” (Eisenhardt 1989). Another problem with this method is that it “may result in narrow and idiosyncratic theory” because of its bottom-up nature, a specific case might inform the theorist more than it should and result in modest theories that explain a few cases well but are not very generalizable overall (*ibid*). In my study I avoid these two pitfalls, first by using a deductive approach to develop my initial model, and second by using quantitative analysis of 50 cases across a 20-year period. This wider sampling range and mix of inductive and deductive methods helps to improve the validity of my theory building exercise as a whole and to avoid selection bias (Collier 1995).
I move now back to the case selection process itself. As Pettigrew (1990) notes, due to limitations in the numbers of cases any researcher can choose for inquiry, it makes sense to select cases in which the process under observation is “transparently observable”; these cases can be thought of sometimes as “polar” types or “extreme” cases in that they are selected precisely because they replicate or extend the theory being tested. Consideration in my case selection is therefore given to examining cases that exemplify the phenomenon under consideration. This matching exercise is based on a most similar systems design wherein case studies share a number of critical similarities yet differ on the dependent variable (Sartori 1994). Two of each type of case (authority, legitimacy and capacity) is selected for in-depth testing of each hypothesis; in addition, three “mini” case studies were conducted as a qualitative plausibility probe (Mozambique, Guatemala, and Bangladesh to test the plausibility of the recovery model). The variation on the dependent variable will be whether the intervention on the strongest dimension was successful in helping the country exit extreme fragility or instead if it failed to do so. Cases are compared before and after the interventions were implemented to improve the assessment of the impact and outcomes. Care is taken to consider the baseline counterfactual scenario and to isolate the intervention effects from other potential factors that could change the trajectory of the state in question.

Process tracing and narrative analysis are then used to reveal the causal mechanisms by which each pathway operates. Process tracing is a standard qualitative tool that helps to unpack causal hypotheses (Vennesson 2008). Bennett (2010) describes process tracing as “involv[ing] the examination of “diagnostic” pieces of evidence within a case that contribute to supporting or overturning alternative
explanatory hypotheses” noting “[a] central concern is with sequences and mechanisms in the unfolding of hypothesized causal processes.” The authors also point out that process tracing can be used both within cases and between comparative cases, “to assess whether a variable whose value differs in two most similar cases is related to the difference in their outcomes” (ibid.). This method is hereafter being used because it allows the researcher to map out one or more potential causal pathways consistent with the observed outcome (Bennett and George 1997).

I should note that process tracing does not attempt to provide any guarantee that researchers have chosen the right variable to explain the phenomenon, but by tracing backwards from the observed outcome to the causes and vice versa it allows the investigator to uncover and unpack novel variables they may not have considered in their original theory (Bennett 2010). Moreover, in process tracing it is crucial to point out that “not all information is of equal probative value in discriminating between alternative explanations, and a researcher does not need to examine every line of evidence in equal detail” (Bennett 2010). For this reason, in my case studies I do my utmost to narrow in on the analytical questions that best address my causal mechanisms from the proposed model. I try to keep the cases short and to maximize analytical content and minimize descriptive content, because I see the value added of my research as coming from the testing of causal inferences rather than describing “what happened.” Finally, in my study, the variable being examined is whether the intervention was on the strongest dimension or not, and in each case, I examine why the intervention was successful or was not, directly holding up the empirical evidence against the proposed model. The causal relationships outlined in the fragility recovery model and the
intervention failure model can thereby be supported or negated through the answering of analytical questions in each case. Correspondingly the case studies help to confirm the causal relationships between the IVs and account for underlying endogeneity which may not have been accounted for with control variables in the first stage of the analysis. Finally, the second stage shifts from quantitative analysis and is critical because it provides more detailed context to the cases examined thus far.

4.3 Stage 3: Refining the Model

From the empirical results in the first stage and the detailed case studies in the second stage, a refined fragility recovery model is presented in chapter nine, based on the typology of exits, backsliding, and trapped country examples discovered in chapters four through seven. This can also be thought of as building criteria for inclusion in the refined model. Ideally there will be variation on multiple variables resulting in a wider set of cases which can fit into each category. Each case exhibits sequencing patterns in which different types of interventions came first, second, third and so on (see the “Directions for Future Research” section 9.4 for more details on this concept). For example, if the state was strong in the authority dimension, was a specific intervention towards improving authority what caused it to propel upwards, or was the intervention in fact aimed at improving legitimacy, and authority improvements followed? (Tikuisis et al 2015). The typology will therefore allow for a separation of sequencing patterns for different countries facing different problems. The typology is broken into categories roughly along the lines of the ALC constructs, indicating which cluster was affected and in which order. For example, if a state is strongest in the legitimacy dimension then interventions along that dimension will be most effective. Established typology
construction principles are followed in order to ensure the typology follows logically from the initial results and that the categories are representative and balanced (Kluge 2000). These results add to the refinement of the fragility recovery model; the goal here is to see if the theory of change explained in the models above fits the findings or whether alternative explanations are more appropriate. To illustrate my thinking in designing this research program I refer the reader to figure 7 below, from Brady and Collier (2010) outlining the steps in the research cycle as a summary of King, Keohane and Verba’s (1994) *Designing Social Inquiry*. Solid arrows indicate the main links between steps, and it must be noted that choices made at one step can and will affect another. First the research problem is defined, and then a theory is proposed based on theoretical propositions identified in the literature and augmented by logical reasoning. Next the theory/model is tested, in my case statistically (descriptive inference) and then through case studies (causal inference) and finally the theory and model are refined and reformulated based on the research findings.

*Figure 7. Steps in the Research Cycle (reproduced from Brady and Collier (2010))*
Below I present a schematic diagram of my overall research strategy, which in methodological terms can be characterized as a “mixed-methods sequential explanatory design” (Creswell 1998; Cresswell 1999; Creswell 2003; Creswell and Miller 2000; Ivankova, Cresswell and Stick 2006). This method is being adopted because “quantitative and qualitative methods complement each other and allow for a more robust analysis, taking advantage of the strengths of each (Ivankova, Cresswell and Stick 2006; Green, Caracelli and Graham 1989; Green and Caracelli 1997; Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998; Huberman and Miles 2002). The rationale for conducting the quantitative analysis first is that the quantitative stage provides a “general understanding of the research problem” while the subsequent qualitative stage “refine[s] and explain[s] those statistical results by exploring [the cases] in more depth” (Ivankova, Cresswell and Stick 2006). The advantages of this design are the ability to explore quantitative results in more detail when unexpected findings arise, as well as the method’s straightforwardness and method of triangulation from multiple data sources (ibid.). The final stage of the study is to integrate the outcomes of both phases of the research program. The graphical representation of my research design presented here helps both the researcher and reviewers to visualize the research approach designed for my study.
From the diagram above one can follow the logic used in this explanatory mixed methods research design. In my study I rely on the quantitative stage for initial evidence of a relationship for my theoretical variables, I then conduct a qualitative plausibility probe before diving into structured, focused comparison case studies and process tracing. Finally, I integrate the results with a refined model of fragility recovery and hypothesize how my resulting findings can be applied to current day intervention situations faced by middle-power countries including, in particular, Canada.
4.4 Limitations of Quantitative Analysis

There are several limitations to using a quantitative approach to answer the main questions examined in this study. These include, but are not limited to, poor data quality, a low number of observations, a lack of country context, and the fact that many of these rankings are based on subjective evaluations by country experts who exhibit their own personal biases. King, Keohane and Verba (1994) exalt the application of quantitative analytical principles to qualitative social inquiry, and their reasons for doing so are sound, in that there is a quest for social science research to become more methodical and rigorous; all investigators of social phenomenon hope for a shared set of principles to guide research moving forward. However, as Brady and Collier (2010) point out, there are a number of problems with applying a rigid “quantitative” method to all social inquiry. First, there has been criticism of the standard quantitative template in recent years, including the fact that regression models rely heavily on assumptions that “often are not only untested, but largely [are] untestable”; moreover the authors point out a common fallacy of using regression models to explain the variance in the data but do not identify the relevant causal inferences (Brady and Collier 2010).43 The second major issue with the King, Keohane and Verba (1994) orthodoxy is the insistence on the importance of estimating uncertainty while at the same time appearing to ignore the challenges in accurately measuring it (Brady and Collier 2010). Bartels (2004), Berk and

Freedman (2003), Schrodt (2006) and others cast doubt on the veracity and reliability of significance tests as employed in the social sciences; common issues include assuming a random sample when it is anything but, running numerous “versions” of the regression model until the desired level of significance comes forward from the data, missing data, data “snooping” and not taking into account sample size. Ho et al. (2007) summarize this common problem as follows:

This [regression] run typically takes only a few seconds and, according to some textbooks, it would be time to write up the results. Of course, this never happens. Instead, we do a second run with different control variables, a third with a different functional form, a fourth with a different measure of our key causal variable, one with different sample periods or observation subsets, and then each of these and others are repeated with slight variations over and over again. Although this usual procedure produces hundreds or thousands of alternative estimates of our single causal effect, we typically only choose one, and rarely more than 5–10, to present in a paper. Yet, we know that our estimates depend on their corresponding modeling assumptions and that different specifications can yield very different causal inferences.

Ho et al. (2007) propose to solve this issue by “pre-processing” raw data using matching principles described in rich detail in their text and provide an open source software package which conducts the matching procedure automatically. The crux of the issue remains, though, that parametric statistical analysis techniques are model dependant, or in other words, “[r]egression analysis depends on the model, and if the model is wrong, so is the analysis” (Brady and Collier 2010). With this brief stock-taking of the limitations of quantitative analysis, I hope to convey that while statistical tools have
become exceedingly popular in designing social research programs, they also have major restrictions in terms of their usefulness in making causal inferences.

For all these reasons, it is important to use a rigorous case selection methodology that ensures there is flexibility to choose cases that exemplify the phenomena under study, while at the same time meeting the goals outlined by the original research question. One way to do this is to manually determine the trajectory of each country using the Woolcock method and following on from there cases can be selected for further examination. Moreover, to test the hypotheses presented in chapter two, the strongest dimension of each country needs to be identified. While it would be preferable to use the rankings and quantitative data to do this step, the fact that each sector is only separated by a marginal amount means that this evaluation also needs to be backed up using qualitative analysis and set criteria. The CIFP dataset is used in later chapters to determine which dimension was the strongest at the time of measurement, and structured, focused comparison case studies are then employed confirm these observations. Since the statistical analysis is strictly correlational, the subsequent case study based structured focus comparisons must specify why these deviations occurred as well as why the given interventions succeeded. In other words, the case studies will help to tease out the direction of causality and to explain the mechanism(s) of improvement (Simons 2009).

4.5 Case Inquiry as Essential to a Fulsome Research Design

The framework presented in chapters one, two and three provides a lens through which third party interventions in fragile states can be analyzed and examined in more depth.
From the statistical evidence presented in chapter five, there is some indication that intervening on the dimension in which a given country is strongest will have a greater effect than if the intervention is directed at the dimension where the country is lacking capability. The purpose of the case studies is therefore to untangle some of the potentially endogenous effects and to identify why building on the strongest dimension works better than the alternative(s). In other words, the cases serve as a way to consider causal processes and isolate drivers of intervention success. Mixed methods are useful in this case as the qualitative empirical work acts to bolster the statistical findings and elucidate what is really happening on the ground in a particular fragile context.

The primary method I use in this study is structured, focused comparisons guided by the methodology presented in George and Bennett (2005). This method is used to examine instances of a certain class or subclass of events, using standardized analytical, investigative questions directly related to the research objective. The purpose of the questions is to discover the processes that lead the state to escape extreme fragility or to remain trapped. The questions drive the systematic inquiry and allow for cross comparisons to take place. Another objective of the analytical, investigative questions is to unpack the presence and influence of key variables and actors as identified in the theoretical framework underpinning this study.

The case studies are focused in that they use a specific theoretical lens to emphasize the aspects of the cases which are most pertinent to the research question, simultaneously discarding any extraneous data that can remove from the main thrust of inquiry being aimed for. The stated goal of case studies is to “uncover the manifest interaction of significant factors characteristic of [a] phenomenon” while allowing the
researcher to at the same time “capture various nuances, patterns, and more latent elements that other research approaches might overlook” (Berg 2007). The structured, focused comparisons used in this study fall into the category of “instrumental” case studies, in that the cases provide a supportive role in better understanding the broader phenomenon of intervention success in fragile states, as opposed to being selected for their intrinsic characteristics (Stake 1994). In other words, the cases are selected and examined for their ability to “refine a theoretical explanation” and can also be considered “collective case studies” since the dissertation is made up of several instrumental case studies aiming to shed light on a broader global context of third-party intervention in fragile states (ibid.).

In this study, the class of events examined is fragile states that underwent a third-party intervention. The sub-class of events is divided up into those where the intervention failed, those where it succeeded, and those where the line cannot be clearly drawn as the country ended up sliding in and out of extreme fragility after the intervention. By comparing instances where the countries started out in similar situations and had interventions that are comparable but not both on the strongest dimension, it is possible to make systematic comparisons and pull lessons from the analysis. The main research objective of the mixed methods approach undertaken is to understand the processes and mechanisms leading from the onset of the intervention, both on the strongest and the less strong of the dimensions, illustrating how the positive feedback mechanism proposed in the model works in practice. Moreover, the goal of the study is to determine what specific policy decisions on the part of the third-party
intervener led to the optimal outcome. Both goals need to be kept in mind as the analytical questions which will be used to examine the cases are developed below.

This study is neither completely deductive in its approach nor completely inductive. As it stands, I argue that there is no theory that provides a comprehensive understanding of how third-party interventions in fragile states should be targeted based on a given ALC pattern. Therefore, this study is somewhat inductive since it is proposing a new model with unique causal mechanisms and testing that model with previously untested variables and hypotheses. With that said, the hypotheses and variables chosen are not coming from out of the blue but are rather guided by existing theory and rely heavily on the extant literature. The theoretical framework presented in chapters one and two as well as the additional theory discussed in chapter three all come from existing literature on fragile states, peacebuilding, and third-party interventions, so the study is indeed partially deductive. Case studies are the most appropriate tool in this study for several key reasons. First, they allow for cross comparative analysis of like countries, a commonly used approach in political science and international relations. Second, they allow for the testing of novel hypotheses and experimental analysis of a proposed model for third party intervention in fragile states. Since we cannot run real experiments in international relations, this pseudo-experimental approach is the best tool we have to understand puzzles and interesting phenomena. Third, case studies allow for causal mechanisms to be unpacked and explored, therefore going beyond simple correlational relationships between variables. It is well understood and accepted that “context matters” in social inquiry, and case studies as a method embody that ethos.
Of course, like any research method, case studies have advantages and disadvantages. One mistake though is to look at different research methods in a hierarchical fashion. Yin (1994) points out that in the past case studies were thought to be appropriate only for the exploratory phase of a research program; however, this “common misconception” ignores advances in case research wherein using a systematic methodological approach allows researchers to test propositions using detailed, granular empirical evidence. In fact, case study research can be exploratory, explanatory, or descriptive, and which of these options are chosen depends much more on 1) the research question being asked, 2) the extent of control of the researcher over events and 3) the degree of focus on historical versus contemporary events (Yin 1994).

In this study, I am examining a “why” question – why do some interventions in fragile states succeed while others fail? This is an explanatory question, dealing with “operational links needing to be traced over time, rather than mere frequencies or incidence” and hence case studies, histories, and experiments are the best strategies (Yin 1994). Since a true experiment is not possible, and the events I am examining are more contemporaneous than strictly historical (primary source materials such as news clippings, policy papers, interview transcripts of participants etc. are available because of the more recent time frame under examination) case study methodology remains as the most appropriate method to test my theoretical framework and understand my research question.

Another common criticism of case studies is that the case selection method or evidence is often biased. In designing case research, it is critical that the evidence is presented fairly, minimizing biases as much as possible. This objection is where the
“structured, focused” method becomes so important, in that by asking analytical questions in a systematic manner the investigator minimizes the amount of personal bias that can seep into the analysis. Building on this critique is the notion that a single case cannot be representative of a general phenomenon. Yin (1994) answers this objection by noting “case studies, like experiments, are generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes” and “does not represent a ‘sample,’ ... the investigator’s goal is to expand an generalize theories (analytic generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization).” Put in another way, Lipset, Trow, and Coleman (1956) emphasize that their goal is to do a “generalizing” analysis as opposed to a “particularizing” analysis, extrapolating learned principles from their single case study analysis to a broader picture. These principles are kept in mind throughout this study, with the goal of presenting the different country case studies as accurately as possible so that they can be directly compared and analyzed, with key agency and structural factors being identified.

The theory being examined in this study is still in its infancy and has not been systematically tested, so new and complex causalities may be at play in the subclass of events under examination. Only by asking structured and focused analytical questions that explicitly address the proposed causalities can we say with confidence that the theoretical lens being applied makes sense. Finally, there is the possibility that complex causal relationships are at play including “equifinality, complex interactions effects and path dependency” (George and Bennett, p. 22). Only case studies can tease out these types of relationships between variables, as statistical methods are not granular enough to identify them in practice.
In thinking about why case inquiry is not only appropriate but preferred in this research program, refer to Yin’s (1994) principles of case inquiry directly. Case inquiry:

- “copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points, and as one result
- relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result
- benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis”

From examining these three principles it is clear that systematic case studies can be used to triangulate otherwise disparate data sources resulting in a more robust understanding of causal pathways in social phenomena. The case study is “not either a data collection tactic or merely a design feature alone ... but a comprehensive research strategy” (Yin 1994). It is also important not to conflate case study inquiry and “qualitative research” as being one and the same. In this research design, the cases are selected through the analysis and parsing of quantitative data, and each country-case is profiled and elucidated through the extensive use of measurable empirical data as well. Examining primary and secondary source qualitative therefore serves to augment the understanding and unpacking of each case, rather than supplant the value that quantitative data brings to the picture. The case study is a research strategy, like any other, that follows a set of prescribed procedures in order to investigate an empirical topic (Yin 1994).

The unit of analysis in this research program is the modern-day nation state. The state is a common unit of analysis in political science and economic research; it is best
suited to answer the research questions and test propositions of the fragility recovery model. Since my research question looks at whether an intervention in a fragile state was successful, it follows that a country itself would be the unit of analysis. At the same time, it should be noted that modern nation states—especially those considered extremely fragile—are not necessarily discrete units of analysis as we may think of them when looking at a map for instance (Hoffman 1995). Borders are often fuzzy and porous, neighbouring countries may hold undue influence over a range of political, social and economic activities in a given country, and regional differences can oftentimes be so vast that it’s hard to see how one region really can be grouped in with another. Moreover, some researchers have begun to examine state fragility at the city level or regional level, arguing that the state as we normally conceive of it is too disparate and heterogenous to make any causal inferences on (Bryceson and Potts 2005; Muggah 2014; De Boer 2015). While I applaud these novel approaches to understanding fragility, for the purposes of understanding third party interventions, the state still holds the most promise as a unit of analysis, if only for the reason that other states—those doing the intervening—still deal with fragile situations on a country by country basis. From a policy perspective, any UNSC resolution will target a given country, and the Weberian concept of statehood remains the way we understand international relations more broadly, although some astute scholars make convincing arguments that this is changing (Miller and Rose 2017; Ferguson 2014). Another reason why the state works best as the unit of analysis is that it allows for “pattern matching” to be conducted. This technique simply refers to the process of matching several pieces of information to some theoretical proposition; this can be done both within a particular case and between cases being compared (first illustrated explicitly in Campbell (1969)). The pattern matching technique looks at two
or more potential patterns and then illustrates that one or the other is a better match to the data; the technique is useful in that it allows the researcher to link the assumptions and propositions coming from the model being tested back to the data collected, strengthening the value of the case research design. By explicitly considering each of the elements of a case study research program as outlined above, the investigator is forced to begin constructing a preliminary theory relating to the questions of the study (Yin 1994).

Theory development is an essential part of the research design process, as alluded to earlier when discussing the partially inductive and partially deductive nature of this study. In this research program, the theory flows from both the extant literature, and from the design of the case inquiry process itself. My argument, that third party interventions are more effective when targeting the elements of statehood that are the strongest, could also be put up against a rival theory, that interventions need to focus on the weaker dimensions of statehood in order to allow for any sort of development to occur. On this notion, Yin (1994) provides sharp insight:

You can see that as these two initial ingredients are elaborated, the stated ideas will increasingly cover the questions, propositions, units of analysis, logic connecting data to propositions, and criteria for interpreting the findings—that is, the five components of the needed research design. In this sense, the complete research design embodies a “theory” of what is being studied.

By this logic, the research design itself helps to contribute to theory development. In the case of this research program however it is not only reliant on case studies for theory development and empirical evidence, because of the mixed methods nature of the
research program. There is more weight being put on the evidence emanating from the cases, but the model is further bolstered by the presence of the statistical analysis presented earlier in this chapter. Therefore, this research program uses both statistical generalization and analytic generalization techniques to better triangulate the causal inferences that are made. Multiple cases are used in the same way multiple experiments are used in traditional scientific inquiry—as the results of each experiment amalgamate, a clearer picture of the phenomenon under examination begins to emerge—this technique is also referred to as “replication logic” (Yin 1994). Indeed, the evidence from multiple cases is often considered to be more compelling than evidence from a single case. In my multiple case research design, I predict contrasting results between cases where the intervention occurred on the strongest dimension versus when it occurs on the weakest dimension—that is, we see “contrasting results but for predictable reasons” (Yin 1994). At the same time, I predict analogous results in cases where the intervention takes place on the strongest dimension (replication logic). Consequently, by testing both “versions” of the hypotheses, the empirical results are more robust than if I had only tested one type of case.

The careful selection and development of the analytical, investigative questions is hence paramount as their inquiry form the crux of the investigation into the phenomenon of recovery. I follow best practices in devising my investigative questions, using the hypothesized causal mechanisms being tested to guide the development of each question (Berg 2004; Blatter and Bloom 2008). Consider the model of fragility recovery after interventions laid out earlier. For each step of the hypothesized process, I wish to construct an investigative question that will uncover both the how and why of
the causal pathway. From the statistical analysis we already know whether there was or was not intervention on the strongest or one of the weaker dimensions, hence the next logical question is 1) Why was the policy decision made to intervene, and then 2) How was the intervention implemented? Following the causal pathway in figure 4 brings us to the next two questions, 3) How and why did the intervention on the strongest dimension affect the other two dimensions? Finally, 4) Why was the intervention successful or not?

I use these four theoretically derived investigative questions to frame each case study example and to guide the analysis throughout the study. This approach serves to focus the analysis and discussion, linking the exploratory hypotheses and their associated causal mechanisms to the explanatory framework I propose with my model. In addition to the four main investigative questions I also have several sub-questions that fit under each. These sub-questions are linked directly to the causal mechanisms outlined in figure 4 and figure 5. I list a few key example sub-questions here: Was there local country ownership of the intervention? What problems occurred in the implementation of the intervention? Was there isomorphic mimicry and/or premature load bearing leading to backsliding? Were PDIA techniques used? The next section explains how the cases in this study were selected and the logic model underpinning the case selection process.

4.6 Case Selection Procedure

To move forward in the case analysis each country needs to be evaluated regarding its “Capability Trajectory” using the method suggested in Woolcock (2014). This
categorization is done on a case by case basis. Qualitative analyses are then utilized and the interpretation of somewhat arbitrary cut-offs such as 3.2 and 3.5 is taken less rigorously, especially when CPIA values are within 5% of a cut-off value, or when other indices identify the country-case as falling into a different category. For this second stage of the research design I look at the type of fragility and the trajectory the country was on, categorizing each accordingly in my data set. The capability trajectory measures the change in CPIA score over time and can account for a number of different “types” of fragility: 1) recently fragile, 2) inexorable decline, 3) oscillating (or “in and out”), 4) steady state low fragile, 5) seriously fragile with steady improvement, and 6) seriously fragile with sudden improvement (Woolcock 2014). See figure 9 below for a diagram of these trajectories. This categorization is similar to that utilized in Tikuisis, Carment, Samy and Landry (2015) which uses the idea of the “State Transition Model” (STM) with a minimalist construction of ALC to categorize country trajectory over time. In practice both models are used for this analysis to further bolster the validity of the results in the second stage, meaning that the pool of fragility trap countries in the STM paper is cross referenced with the list generated via the CPIA scores. Overall this results in a more robust universe of cases for analysis. The capability trajectory for each case is utilized in the case selection methodology outlined in detail below, and I aim to have one of each type for my case analysis in order to cover as much theoretical ground as possible.
To select cases, a multi stage process was followed: first, using the dataset I constructed from CPIA and CIFP data along with the three independent intervention variables, I look first at the countries which have recovered. To avoid selecting on the dependant variable, cases of intervention failure and intervention success both are examined. This was done because without doing so causal hypotheses on the influences of factors on variation would not be examined (Gisselquist 2015a). For each dimension of fragility, A, L, and C, one case where the intervention was successful is first chosen for analysis. Cases were selected through a process of elimination. First, by examining the “recovered” countries, it was seen that each of them had an intervention on the strongest dimension. In terms of strongest dimensions there were three in the authority category (Cambodia, Tonga, and Mozambique). From here Tonga was dropped because of its small island status – with such a minute population and economy the case will not meet the goal of being generalizable. In looking at Mozambique and Cambodia,
Mozambique had all three interventions (A, L and C) which makes it harder to disentangle endogenous effects that led to recovery. Moreover, I am mostly interested in the period from 1996-2016 because of the improved data availability and Cambodia had the authority intervention by Australia in 1997, whereas the civil war in Mozambique ended in 1992. Through examining the fragility scores, I also note that Cambodia has a more robust recovery than Mozambique, making it a stronger example case for the frailty recovery model. Finally, I am interested in middle-power intervenor policy making and Australia is similarly sized and historically analogous to Canada in terms of its political system, culture, values, economic capacity and more. For all these reasons, Cambodia is chosen for further examination as a case study.

Next, I moved to legitimacy interventions, with three cases being available (Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Bangladesh) for scrutiny. Using the same criteria described above, I dropped Bangladesh from the possible cases (also of note is that Bangladesh and Mozambique were not drawn from the original CPIA data but rather from the fragility literature). Sierra Leone had an authority intervention as well as a legitimacy intervention, whereas Rwanda had only a legitimacy intervention, making the causal connections easier to study and lowering possibilities of endogeneity. In addition, Rwanda showed a stronger recovery path (fragile with steady improvement), so overall Rwanda is the best choice for further examination. Lastly in the recovery category I was left with Laos, Uzbekistan and Nigeria that recovered based on capacity interventions. Of the three, Nigeria was dropped first because it also underwent a military intervention in 1998. Between Laos and Uzbekistan, the CPIA data shows both with a strong recovery (“steady improvement”), and CIFP data has Uzbekistan starting worse off but ending
slightly better than Laos. For this reason, plus the fact that Cambodia is a neighbour to Laos (aiming for regional variation to improve generalizability), Uzbekistan was chosen as the case study for capacity intervention. So, the three recovery cases are Cambodia (A), Rwanda (L) and Uzbekistan (C).

Shifting now to the cases of intervention failure, there are 18 cases total to choose from. For the authority intervention failure there are 10 cases, however by dropping those which had also L and C interventions I am left with only two cases, Libya and Eritrea. As noted, this research program hopes to better understand why Canada participates in international interventions, and this consideration influences my decision on this case selection. Adding to the fact that Canada was involved in the 2011 intervention is the widespread media attention and availability of source material for the case study. Moreover, the Eritrea “intervention” refers to Ethiopian aggression and does not really fit the definition we are looking for in this study. The Libya intervention was framed as being done for humanitarian reasons ostensibly to help the citizens of Libya. In reality, the plan backfired spectacularly, and this failure has wider implications for Western policymakers. Libya would be considered steady state, as it was one of the more well-off countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, despite Ghaddafi’s poor reputation; the 2011 protests and intervention led its trajectory to a precipitous drop in stability. For all of these reasons I chose Libya as the A failure case study. Moving now to legitimacy failures, I wish to highlight Mali. While Mali falls into the “in and out” category, it meets several of the criteria outlined above. First, extensive power-sharing arrangements were made in the 1990s under the Tamanrasset Agreements, yet these agreements failed, and the knock-on effects of the Libyan
intervention led to further unrest in Mali. This case is of interest because Canada is shortly commencing a peacekeeping mission there and my analysis hopes to shed light on possible policy choices for this mission. Furthermore, the fact that Mali became a donor-darling and then was beset by price shocks and other exogenous factors makes it a very interesting case to study (oscillating trajectory). Turning now to capacity interventions that did not pan out and were not directed at countries strong in capacity, I examine my dataset and find several options: Central African Republic, Comoros, Djibouti, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Sao Tome, Solomon Islands, Togo, and Zimbabwe. Out of these cases Guinea, Zimbabwe, and Sao Tome had only capacity interventions, so I drop the rest. From these three, Sao Tome is dropped because of its small island state status. Between Guinea and Zimbabwe, I examine the CPIA and CIFP fragility trajectory and find that Zimbabwe has a more extreme trajectory which can be considered to be a case of “inexorable decline.” There is also news that Zimbabwe is willing to restructure its economic policy post-Mugabe, so this case is interesting for current and potential future study. Therefore, my intervention “failure” cases are Libya, Mali and Zimbabwe. Overall these 6 cases provide a good mix of geographical variety and intervention type, while direct comparisons can be made between those that are structurally similar ahead of intervention(s) occurring; a map is presented below in figure 10 to provide a visual representation of the global distribution of cases.
Figure 10. Map of Selected Cases and Intervention Types
Chapter 5  Plausibility Probe: Statistical Analysis and “Mini” Case Studies

5.1  A Statistical Analysis of Third-Party Interventions in Fragile States

To examine the question of how countries can improve their fragility situations after an intervention, it is necessary to first determine if there is a measurable difference between categories of countries. Intuitively one would deduce that there are certain countries that languish for decades while others are able to show marked improvement over time. Moreover, there should be measurable variables which apply to each of these cases. The goal of this chapter is to answer the question of whether fragility improvements exhibit key factors that are distinguishable from cases of non-improvement. I explore this question first through a simplified quantitative analysis of well-known data sets, namely the World Bank’s CPIA rankings, and the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy Fragility Index, with informal triangulation conducted through the Political Instability Task Force’s fragility index and the Fund for Peace Fragility Index. After explaining the pools of cases and separating the cases into categories, I explain the variables relating to third-party intervention and its effects on fragility. At the same time, I outline the limits of quantitative inquiry for answering my central research questions. Because the pool of cases is quite limited numerically (50 countries) and the cases are extremely diverse in terms of context, it is important to note that the quantitative section is not definitive but is instead suggestive. The quantitative findings act to justify deeper case study work in which I tease out causality. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate the cases using proven qualitative methods, which is found in chapter six through chapter eight of this dissertation.
Several databases examining fragility are utilized frequently in the existing literature. To begin, I look at the World Bank CPIA index, which was originally developed in the 1970s, and has been periodically updated to reflect changes in our understanding of development effectiveness. The World Bank is one of largest providers of development assistance and financial reform packages on the planet and is generally regarded as an excellent data source by policymakers, researchers, and economists. Another key reason for examining the World Bank data is that CPIA scores are more often than not used for reporting on the substantive effects of development projects in fragile countries and is used by the World Bank for determinations of international development assistance allocations. The CPIA framework is also used extensively by the World Bank for research, to help guide interventions, and to assess risk. In order to make policy-relevant conclusions and for this research program to have the widest possible generalizability, examining the CPIA scores is a key avenue to explore.

The CPIA is intended to capture the quality of a country’s policy environment and political decision making as related to institutional behaviour. It measures aspects of the policy environment that are within the control of the state government as opposed to external factors such as commodity prices, growth rates, exogenous shocks etc. That is, they differ from indicators used in the MDGs/SDGs (the usual poverty reduction variables and proxy outcome variables). For this reason, the average CPIA score is a useful indicator because any intervention would certainly affect these types of policy decisions. Moreover, the CPIA scores are often used to determine the concessional lending and grant sizes given to low income countries (these are loans with low interest rates, significant grace periods and long repayment periods) and therefore attaining a positive CPIA ranking is a key goal for many developing nations (World Bank 2015).
Some countries also use the CPIA scores to help determine levels of bilateral aid funding, as well as the African and Asian development banks. Therefore, in practice the CPIA rankings are often used by policymakers to make substantive funding decisions on development aid, a further justification for using them in this study. A Country Performance Rating is established based on the country’s overall CPIA score, referred to as the IDA Resource Allocation Index (IRAI) The indicators making up the CPIA rankings are shown in Figure 11 below:

*Figure 11. CPIA Clusters and Policies*

| A. Economic Management | 1. Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies  
|                        | 2. Fiscal Policy  
|                        | 3. Debt Policy and Management |
| B. Structural Policies | 4. Trade  
|                        | 5. Financial Sector  
|                        | 6. Business Regulatory Environment |
| C. Policies for Social Inclusion/Equity | 7. Gender Equality  
|                                      | 8. Equity of Public Resource Use  
|                                      | 9. Building Human Resources  
|                                      | 10. Social Protection and Labor  
|                                      | 11. Policies and Institutions for Environmental Sustainability |
| D. Public Sector Management and Institutions | 12. Property Rights and Rule-based Governance  
|                                                      | 13. Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management  
|                                                      | 14. Efficiency of Revenue Mobilization  
|                                                      | 15. Quality of Public Administration  
|                                                      | 16. Transparency, Accountability, and Corruption in the Public Sector |

Each country is given a rating between 1 (weak performance) and 6 (strong performance) for each of the 16 dimensions. Unfortunately, the publicly available database only extends back to 2005\textsuperscript{44} so for the purposes of the wider research project the data must be triangulated with other sources. When the CPIA methodology was reviewed in 2004 the panel urged that the rankings be made based on \textit{implemented} rather than \textit{intended} policy actions to better capture the policy reality rather than unfulfilled promises (World Bank 2015). Therefore, the CPIA rankings provide a good starting point for identifying the pool of cases and isolating the countries which will provide useful for further empirical inquiry. Here the data range from 2005 to 2016 inclusive and cover 86 countries.\textsuperscript{45} Also, as per the World Bank methodology countries which do not have CPIA data for some years are also considered fragile as this usually indicates that the environment is too unstable for accurate data collection to take place. One example of this case is Libya, where data availability is low, nevertheless, by triangulating using additional resources it can be deemed as a country that was deteriorating, especially after the 2011 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention (Kuperman 2013). Although in some cases the country was taken out of the CPIA sample because it improved beyond the need for IDA. Hence these must be evaluated on a case by case basis. The CPIA dataset is unbalanced because countries may enter in and out of it over time, and some indicators have missing values. The first step in this analysis is to examine the cases where countries have remained in extreme fragility, moved in and out of fragility, and exited fragility. Moreover, upon analyzing the data it becomes clear that there are a number of “edge” cases where the country is not

\textsuperscript{44} Speaking in terms of the more granular data; summary statistics are available further back in time. 
\textsuperscript{45} States with a CPIA score of below 3.2 are considered fragile, above 3.2 and below 3.5 marginally fragile, and above 3.5 not fragile.
clearly in one category or another, or the values are too close to say definitively where it should be placed. There is also a group of countries that are present in the sample but that consistently score above the 3.5 threshold. I have termed these cases “Not Fragile / Stable” but it does not presuppose that these countries may have not been fragile in the past; these countries are excluded from both tables. The results of this initial analysis are presented below in Figure 12.

**Figure 12. CPIA Overall Rankings, Colour-Coded (Red = Extreme Fragility, Yellow = Moderate Fragility, Green = Not Fragile)**

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From a cursory comparison with other indices including the CIFP, PITF and FFP there is a good degree of overlap between these findings, which is encouraging; each case selected for further study is examined in depth using multiple indices and indicators to confirm this hunch. Now we have a universe of cases which can be subjected to further analysis.

To get a better picture of what is occurring in each of the cases, and overall across the sample, a dataset was constructed of all cases and their interventions, as well as the outcome of the intervention after its implementation. To achieve this goal, I used the CIFP dataset and pulled the ALC and fragility profiles for all cases from the above list one by one. I then took the average of A, L, C and fragility for each country to create a country profile for each state. The period examined was 1996-2016 as this period has the
most reliable data. For each country I identified the strongest ALC dimension (i.e. the lowest) over the 20-year period and added this as a column variable to the panel dataset. I then extracted the fragility score and transposed it as a row variable to more easily track the evolution of each case through time. To the sample I also moved two countries identified in the literature as having exited fragility (Mozambique and Bangladesh) from the “in and out” category to the recovered category for further examination and comparison (Carment and Samy 2017). Finally, Libya was also added to the sample because it represents a politically important case for Canada as it is the only military intervention Canada has been involved in this decade (Domansky, Jensen, and Bryson 2013). Canada’s foreign policy is of particular interest because of its middle power status, complex relationship with peacekeeping, as well as because it is the funding government of this research through the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (Murray 2013). The interesting knock-on and spillover effects of the Libya intervention which indirectly led to the Malian civil war, another case in this study, also make it worthy of examination in greater depth. Moreover, the Libya intervention represents a “typical” case of an authority intervention which ended up leading to state failure, meriting further examination because of the implications for the theory developed in this dissertation (Kuperman 2015). Kosovo was removed from the sample because of missing data, the CIFP database only has 2011-2016 ALC data for Kosovo and this could bias the sample. Interestingly the sample ended up being quite balanced in terms of the strongest dimension across type. For three of the types, recovered, in and out, and trapped, the ALC patterns were equitably distributed. For the edge cases, only authority and legitimacy showed up as the strongest dimension. Capacity was not present, perhaps indicating that having strong capacity can lead a state to one of the
more discrete categories, however this evidence is still preliminary. Figure 13 below shows the distribution of strongest dimensions by country type:

*Figure 13. Distribution of average ALC Strength*

![Bar chart showing the distribution of strongest dimensions by country category.](image)

This dataset with the aforementioned additions and subtractions now constitutes 50 countries over a 20-year period for a total of 1000 observations. From here, I added columns for each type of intervention, A, L, and C, coding a 1 in the cell if there was an intervention during the period and a 0 if there was none. I then track the developments examining how fragility evolves after the year the intervention took place.\(^{46}\) Outputs from this dataset are presented below and help to provide a comprehensive picture of what has happened; I also utilize this dataset for case selection later in this dissertation.

In the previous chapter I outlined several types of intervention that could be considered under each dimension of fragility, with four or five potential variable sources listed under each category. While it is important to acknowledge that there are several

\(^{46}\) For each intervention examined in the case studies the year of the intervention was verified against the “strongest” dimension for that year to ensure that the average rating was consistent with the yearly rating.
different ways intervention can be understood in a technical sense, for the sake of parsimony I follow the principle outlined by Little, Lindenberger and Nesselroade (1999) which states that researchers should aim to choose manifest indicators that best exemplify the principle or phenomenon under consideration directly. What this means in practice is that using one indicator that captures the essence of the independent variable under examination is better than trying to test a myriad of sometimes overlapping and abstract concepts with numerous indicators of varying quality.

With the above principle in mind, for documenting authority interventions I use “The International Military Intervention Dataset” (IMI) assembled and coded by Pickering and Kisangani (2009). This dataset is well regarded and has been used widely in the intervention literature. It was initially constructed by Pearson and Baumann (1993) and “documents all cases of military intervention across international boundaries by regular armed forces of independent states” as well as cases of national forces under multilateral command including UN missions. The dataset was updated in 2009 to cover interventions ranging from 1989 to 2005. “Military interventions are defined operationally in this collection as the movement of regular troops or forces (airborne, seaborne, shelling, etc) of one country inside another, in the context of some political issue or dispute” (Pearson and Baumann, 1993). The authority interventions coded in this dataset are “also delimited by temporal guidelines. Interventions are considered continuous if repeated acts occur within six months of one another” (Pickering and Kisangani 2009). In my analysis I manually searched the updated IMI dataset for each of the 54 fragile states in my newly constructed dataset using the Correlates of War Country Code guidebook for matching each state to all entries in which it appeared. I
then used the information from each entry that matched to code for authority interventions from 1996-2005. In some cases where the “intervention” was minor and/or a response to aggression, I did not count the incident. In addition, for countries that had “no intervention” I checked primary literature from the years from 2005-2016 to see if there had been any foreign military incursion using the same criteria as the data set so that my analysis would be as up to date and reliable as possible, adding a 1 and details on the incident where needed. While the initial coding was as a dummy variable, I also entered another parallel column to record the date of intervention and some identifying details (country that intervened, how many times etc.) in the case that further analysis would be conducted down the line. Out of the 50 cases, approximately half (26) of them underwent authority interventions over the period.

I now move to legitimacy interventions. To code for legitimacy interventions I used the Power-Sharing Event Dataset (PSED) constructed by Ottmann and Vullers (2015). Power-sharing is identified in the literature as a key variable for durable peace (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Call 2012; Binningsbo 2013; Haass and Ottmann 2017). The definition of power-sharing used in this dataset was conceptualized “as any arrangement between the government of a state and a rebel group which establishes institutions that mandate joint control in a political, economic, military and/or territorial dimension of government (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007).” The goal of power-sharing is to explicitly improve political legitimacy, or trust between the people and the rulers. Grievances on

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47 For example, the 1996 DRC intervention into Rwanda was only 2 days and was launched in response to attacks made on then Zaire by Rwandan forces, so this should not be counted as an intervention aiming to improve authority in Rwanda. Another example is the 2001 Burmese clashes at the border with Bangladesh. While the IMI codes this as an intervention, in fact it was an isolated incident lasting only a day, and therefore cannot count as a longer-term intervention. All of these discrepancies are noted in the dataset which can be found as an appendix to this dissertation.
legitimacy usually stem from under-representation or political repression of minority ethnoreligious groups. Therefore, by systematically examining instances of power-sharing agreements being implemented one can document concrete efforts to improve political legitimacy by an intervening nation or multi-lateral coalition. This dataset “systematically collects information on the promises and practices of power-sharing between governments and rebels in an event data format for a five-year period after the conclusion of a peace agreement” (Ottmann and Vullers 2015). The dataset contains information on 41 countries which have undergone some type of power-sharing arrangement or agreement, and covers four dimensions: 1) political, 2) military, 3) economic and 4) territorial. Ottmann and Vullers (2015) also take care to distinguish between the promise of power-sharing and the actual implementation, in that the coding differentiates the two. In my analysis I only code for a legitimacy intervention if there was evidence of power-sharing implemented in practice, not if it was only promised in an agreement but not acted upon. In terms of summary statistics, 17 legitimacy interventions were coded out of 50 country cases.

For the third dimension, capacity, I use the signing of an IMF agreement as a proxy for capacity interventions. Capacity primarily deals with economic indicators and service delivery, and IMF programs provide large loans to governments that have balance of payments issues. IMF agreements are conditional on structural adjustment policies which are aimed at getting a state’s financial status in order. Bird and Rowlands (2017) show that concessional IMF programs increase economic growth in low income countries, especially in the period two years after the agreement is signed. Loans can be used to fund delivery of social services and spend on infrastructure, with the aim of
jump starting the economy. The IMF also links their programming to the MDGs and the new SDGs, noting that IMF programs can help to catalyze sustainable economic growth and development in low income and fragile countries (IMF 2015). The idea here is that concessional lending facilities provided by the IMF can help nations struggling with debt, balance of payments issues, and other fiduciary obligations to meet those obligations and even to kick-start spending that will have a positive feedback effect on economic growth. These programs are more fulsome than ODA spending which is often programmed by NGOs and can have low levels of local ownership and accountability. For these reasons, the implementation of IMF agreements acts as a good proxy for international intervention on state capacity. In the dataset, therefore, I code a 1 if the state signed an IMF agreement (counting Extended Credit Facilities, Standby Agreements and Exogenous Shock Facilities). If no agreement was signed, then I code a 0. Data was obtained from the official IMF (2018) Data Website.

Taking an initial look at the resulting dataset provides some evidence for the hypothesis that an intervention on the strongest dimension is associated with fragility recovery. In fact, all the recovered cases had an intervention on the strongest dimension of statehood, without exception. However, at the same time, one third of the trapped countries also had an intervention on the strongest dimension, so having the intervention on the “correct” dimension may be a necessary, but not sufficient, criteria to prompt a significant improvement. To properly examine the resulting data set, an unambiguous separation of cases is required. Only cases where there was one intervention can be examined, otherwise it is impossible to know which intervention was the dominant one. Below I sort the interventions for all cases and illustrate their
status in contingency tables overlaid with a Venn diagram for clearer visualization of the data. The Venn diagram in figure 14 shows the number of cases of single, double, and triple interventions that were recorded in the newly created dataset. If a case appears in only one circle it is a single intervention case on one dimension; if it appears in two overlapping circles it is a double intervention on two dimensions; and if it appears in the centre it was a case with all three interventions. The contingency table then separates the cases to show whether there was a recovery from extreme fragility or not. There are seven possible combinations of single interventions (A, L, and C; n = 20), double interventions (A+C, A+L, and L+C; n = 21), and triple (A+L+C; n = 9) interventions. For this total sample the n=50.
From the illustrative diagram above it can be noted that only the single capacity interventions are significant. If capacity is the top performing dimension a state is highly unlikely to exit extreme fragility if the sole intervention does not involve capacity. Even in cases where all three interventions took place, covering the top performing dimension, only two states exited extreme fragility, and seven did not. Unfortunately, the hypothesis that “If the main intervention is directed at the top performing ALC dimension, then countries stuck in extreme fragility will be more likely to improve their fragility” cannot be statistically supported from this dataset. With that said, the sample size is quite low, and the results may say more about the rarity of a state recovering from
fragility than about the effectiveness of certain interventions. The small sample size means that the cases are examining and explaining a process, as opposed to a population/universe of cases per se (Lamont and White 2008). In other words, my analysis of cases allows for the isolation of the mechanisms that might be driving the process of recovery or failure after an intervention, keeping in mind that, “[a]lthough larger scale qualitative projects may endeavor to generalize to large populations such as nation states or entire ethnic groups, many more seek to inform us about smaller groups or patterns of interaction that can have great significance for our understanding of social processes” (Lamont and White 2008). Therefore, the results of this analysis are generalizable to the phenomena of fragility recovery due to intervention or of intervention failure, but not necessarily to all cases that exist. Because of this inconclusive result, further empirical research is required to test the hypotheses in full. Other explanations for the discrepancy include an inappropriate testing procedure, misidentified cases or variable proxies, low conceptual clarity, or inadequate theorizing, such as an underdeveloped model or causal explanation.\(^4^8\) Through an iterative process the model can be refined to better explain why the statistical analysis did not bear out positive support for the hypotheses whereas some of the cases do show evidence for the causal links outlined by the model.

There are several other interesting analyses that can be done with the dataset; first, I take the average CIFP fragility of all trapped and all recovered countries and plot them on the same chart. Remember, these categories were determined using CPIA data and there is no guarantee that CPIA and CIFP data will line up. The chart below shows

\(^{48}\) These potential causes of the non-affirmation of the hypotheses are discussed further in chapter nine.
how trapped versus recovered states stack up in terms of fragility evolution from 1996-2016.

*Figure 15. CIFP Fragility Data from CPIA Pools*

Interestingly the recovered countries began at a higher average fragility than the trapped countries, indicating that the sample drawn from the CPIA data works well for a quasi-experimental analysis due to the similar beginning characteristics and sharp departure in outcomes. This finding combined with the above chart lends further credence to the puzzle itself: why do some interventions work while others do not? The case studies in the following chapters will help to answer this question. In the cases care is taken to apply a defensible criterion on state improvement (type of improvement and over what period of time). The same methodology is then applied to test the remaining hypotheses. To decide what is meant by state improvement, the extant literature has some existing accepted definitions which drive my selection of criteria examined. First, for operational authority type interventions, 2-5 years without a return to civil war is
sufficient (a stable peace is typically 5 years in quant lit), for legitimacy interventions where elections might be central, it is two consecutive free and fair elections (for consolidated democracy). For capacity interventions it can range from 1-30 years before we see economic sustainability GDP/capita. Here I also use the millennium development goals (MDGs) and sustainable development goals (SDGs) as well as IMF criteria as a lens to guide what is meant by a capacity improvement or success.

5.2 Mini Case Studies: Probing the Fragility Recovery Model

Before diving into my in-depth structured focused comparisons, I wanted to test whether there was initial support for the fragility recovery model. This plausibility probe exercise was undertaken to bolster the findings of the initial statistical analysis and to provide further evidence either supporting or denying my hypotheses. To do so, I examined three of the “recovered” cases that came from the extant literature and previous work which has been conducted on these countries (Carment and Samy 2017; Carment, Samy and Landry 2013; Perez Nino and Le Billion 2014; Renee 2008; Hilker 2012; Batley and Mcloughlin 2010). In other words, the cases were selected using purposive sampling because of their shorter nature and because of they represent a first cut plausibility probe rather than a more systematic theory building exercise (Teddlie and Yu 2007; Oliver and Jupp 2006). This exercise was a much less formal process of model testing and involved examining the CIFP ALC profile for each country, the fragility trajectory over time, and the overall development, economic, and social interventions that were undertaken in these states. I find that there is support for my model in that each case had inventions on the strongest dimension leading to recovery. This evidence is preliminary since I only examined positive outcomes and because of the
small sample size; I present these mini-case studies ahead of my structured focused comparison case studies which are more rigorously tested against the fragility recovery model using structured analytical questions derived from my theoretical hypotheses.

5.3 Bangladesh: Focus on Economic Growth Leads to Exit

The first of the “exited” cases to be examined in this plausibility probe is Bangladesh. The CPIA data itself doesn’t clearly identify Bangladesh as having exited the fragility trap, but there are several contemporary studies which do point to this case as an ideal example of an exit from the fragility trap and make it worth exploring here through purposive sampling (Carment and Samy 2017; Carment et al. 2015). After famously being called a “basket case” country by Henry Kissinger in the 1970s, Bangladesh has fared well among otherwise similarly placed countries. Social indicators such as infant mortality and lifespan have drastically improved over the past several decades, despite having a relatively low per capita GDP compared to its neighbours. Indeed, in the 70s after the liberation war against Pakistan the country endured famines, floods and repeated military coups, yet now has become a development darling, a model for other developing nations to live up to. What explains the striding progress Bangladesh has made in escaping the fragility trap? And why has the country fared so much better than its neighbours in social welfare indicators?

There are several factors at play here. First, although most Western media accounts paint the Bangladeshi textile industry as an evil behemoth taking advantage of cheap labour, it is in fact this industry that has played a major role in reversing the economic fortunes of the country’s 160 million plus. As the most densely populated
country in the world, labour was and is the primary competitive advantage on offer. The textile industry boomed through the 90s and more than four fifths of its workers were women. This “female factor” meant that women were granted greater autonomy over the household and were more likely to reinvest earnings in education, food, shelter and healthcare for the family.

Moreover, Bangladesh is the birthplace of microcredit, a much-heralded model for development interventions that has seen widespread adoption and mixed results globally. Microfinance projects most often target women, further building on the advantages of empowerment of women and girls in Bangladeshi society which includes increased household decision making, greater financial resources, wider social networks and expanded mobility (Pitt, Khandker, and Cartwright 2006). There are of course other economic factors contributing to Bangladeshi success. One of these is the “green revolution,” which more than doubled the country’s food production capacity and remains a key economic sector in Bangladesh. Another is the proliferation of remittance culture which has also drastically improved the economic position of Bangladesh, whereby one of the world’s largest populations of migrant workers have played an ever more important role in increasing cash flow which can in turn be used for microenterprise development in-country (Hoissein 1989; Maimbo and Ratha 2005). High government spending on social programs has also been a persistent feature of Bangladeshi politics, even though the major parties have a deep-seated hatred and a history of violence towards one another. This investment in public goods may be related to the strong nationalism that is seen, which originates from the hard-fought independence movement from Pakistan.
In this case I argue that large NGOs, funded by Western bi- and multi-lateral assistance agencies, played a crucial role in ensuring that government spending was not squandered and forced the government of the day to live up to a certain standard of service provision. This action in turn led to the development of a large middle class and had a positive feedback effect on the political and social fabric of the country. Hence Bangladesh was able to escape the fragility trap through a combination of both innate structural factors and third-party intervention, by focusing on the countries competitive advantage and strongest dimension, capacity, which took the form of labour in this case.

Bangladesh has been the recipient of a staggering amount of development aid since its founding. Figure 16 below shows the total amount of aid received year by year. While it is not possible to point to aid dollars as being the only factor in helping Bangladesh escape fragility, it does appear to have assisted the country in building up its export base which ultimately helped to build a robust middle class and pull millions out of poverty. At the same time, some experts point to the high level of remittances that are sent back to the country each year as being critical to the development of Bangladesh over the past few decades (Barai 2012; Azad 2005; Lum at al 2013). Both of these hypotheses can be true at the same time, as it is plausible that aid and remittances worked in tandem to help develop the country’s capacity and spur a positive feedback loop to begin.
Mair and Marti (2009) illustrated that when there is an institutional void in Bangladesh, entrepreneurship can help to fill it. The Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) used several unique strategies to help the poorest in rural areas participate in markets. By building collectives and providing business opportunities in a variety of market areas, BRAC’s programs were able to spur a process of resource and institutional “bricolage” which allowed those formerly excluded to instead participate and gain material and social benefits by using a variety of different sources of financial and knowledge-based resources (Mair and Marti, 2009). Once these platforms for economic and social engagement are in place, there is a knock-on effect for further business and market participation opportunities.

The textile industry is an interesting microcosm of the comparative advantage of developing countries can be leveraged to improve the livelihood of a broad swath of the
population. In this case, the process of textile manufacturing provides a large number of low skill jobs, entry-level jobs which were ideal for women in poorer countries who otherwise would not be able to enter the labour market. Moreover, this sector takes advantage of the widespread adoption of modern technology with a low initial investment level (Nordas 2004). In Bangladesh, along with other countries such as Sri Lanka, Mauritius and Vietnam, this adoption has resulted in an impressively high output growth over the past couple of decades (Nordas 2004). In addition to support for the sector provided by assistance, the liberalization of trade regimes including the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) at the multilateral level and increasing numbers of bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) that were established over the years (the “spaghetti bowl” effect) also acted as major drivers of sectoral development and expansion. Indeed, both factors were necessary for Bangladesh to achieve the success it did. The increased trade liberalization opened key markets to Bangladeshi products, while initial investments by companies were often bolstered and catalyzed by public private partnerships via multi-lateral, national and local government cooperation.
This type of development model has been called “the catalyst model,” which is described as “a model for initiating development in an outward oriented direction, based on the pioneering efforts of foreign and local catalysts” (Rhee 1990). Arguably this type of development model was utilized in South Korea, which went from one of the poorest countries in Asia to a top 15 global economy in a few short decades. This model is in some ways analogous to the fragility exit model I propose, in that both rely on a positive feedback cycle and knock-on effect for positive growth and development. In the case of the garment industry in Bangladesh, Rhee (1990) sees the catalyst model as “a model for sequencing realistic policy reforms” in this case focusing on export growth. Bangladesh started in the fragility trap, with some of the lowest per capita incomes in the world compounded by ongoing political violence. Moreover, prior to the development of this sector in the 1980s and 1990s, women were kept out of the workforce, yet they now make up more than 90% of the labour force in this sector (Rhee 1990). The inclusion of women in the workforce has had a transformative effect on this society, and the results
have not gone unnoticed. To be sure, development agencies around the world have made gender a key platform of their assistance programs, with countries such as Sweden and most recently Canada adopting a “feminist” humanitarian assistance policy. This shift in branding may appear to be new, but as demonstrated here it has been in vogue for some time, if not as explicitly heralded as such.

In the case of the garment and textile industry in Bangladesh, the catalyst model of development demonstrates how a “spark” can initiate a positive feedback cycle wherein the comparative advantage of a fragile state can be leveraged effectively to drive growth. In the case of Bangladesh there were both foreign and domestic inputs which drove the initial growth of the sector. Technology and know-how from developed countries like South Korea, combined with local knowledge of how to navigate the immature institutions, resulted in success which grew rapidly and spread to other sectors (Rhee 1990). In some ways, it is difficult to parse out exactly how much of an effect was had by private enterprise versus public investment, suffice it to say, however, that the two worked in tandem, albeit sometimes disproportionately. For the purposes of this analysis the key factor is that Bangladesh went from a completely dysfunctional policy environment to one that eventually helped catalyze growth. External pressures by the World Bank and IMF, and conditions on loans were able to spur growth and investment as they were implemented. Rhee (1990) puts this well, noting that “[g]iven initial conditions of extremely high policy distortions and under developed institutions, a developing country can rarely afford to wait until perfectly rational policy environments are achieved to promote development in an outward oriented direction.” This notion of putting resources into the sectors where a fragility trap country is already
showing signs of strength supports the hypothesis that focusing on the strongest, dimension, will lead to the strengthening of the others. Over time and as Bangladesh’s economic fortunes improved, so too did government institutions and public trust in them.

5.4 Mozambique: Third-party Intervention Builds Legitimacy

The second of the exited cases is Mozambique; in the same vein as the Bangladesh case, the more recent CPIA data belies the longer history of the country in that it escaped a brutal civil war which lasted several decades and is now one of the donor darlings in Africa (Walter 1999). After independence in 1975 the country was plunged into a deep recession. This happened partly because of the outflow of Portuguese settlers who had previously run the country’s economic and social affairs (and along with them, international investment and capital), and partly because of natural shock events including excessively heavy rains in the late 70s and drought in the early 80s. While blessed with an extensive and resource abundant coastline, Mozambique is also prone to natural calamities such as cyclones, flooding, and droughts. This fact means that the population can at times be in a struggle for scarce resources and the lack of a strong central government able to access the rugged and isolated areas rural areas of the country effectively can lead to pockets of discontent and grievance. Many of the main large corporate bodies that managed public services were nationalized by the new government, but due to mismanagement and inexperience there were major problems that affected the provision of services and the development of institutions. Just two years after achieving independence, a long and vicious civil war broke out between two main factions. Renamo represented the rural, provincial areas of the country which,
although resource rich, were generally cut off from service provision by the central authorities. South Africa also supported Renamo with supplies, logistics and military assistance. Frelimo represented the government that took power after the departure of the Portuguese, and mainly consisted of the populations closer to the urban centres. The doctrine of Frelimo was a socialist paradigm based on a Marxist-Leninist interpretation of domestic and international politics. Economic programs inspired by the soviet model were put into place, and this action created a number of problems and economic distortions which ultimately led to the civil war (Weinstein 2006). The set pricing caused the black market to swell, government resettlement programs upset rural populations who had lived in areas for hundreds if not thousands of years, limitation of imported goods caused shortages in rural areas of key products, and limits on foreign currency availability further exacerbated these issues.

*Figure 18. Mozambique ALC and Fragility Profile*

All of these factors meant that recruitment efforts for Renamo became easier over time, and with the help of the South African government the movement was able to build up
its forces and gain control of a number of vital regions (Weinstein and Francisco 2002). The Frelimo government did fight back however, leading to a bloody and protracted conflict that led to an unknown number of casualties; it is estimated that at least one million were killed, which includes those that died due to concurrent famine (Cabrita 2001). The war lasted more than 15 years and finally came to a head in 1992. Most domestic and international observers agree that the peace agreement between Renamo and Frelimo was undertaken with a great deal of success given the immense pressure and bloody history between the two parties. The civil war began as a failure of government authority, as the ability of Frelimo to enforce the rule of law in far flung provincial areas of the country was extremely limited. This led to a loss of legitimacy for the government. Nevertheless, the peace agreement was able to reaffirm its legitimacy by providing guarantees by international actors, thus undergirding the tenets of the agreement despite there being no love lost between the two parties. Moreover, Renamo was able to improve its own legitimacy by adopting a more principled political stance, developing a policy platform and making promises to the populations that supported it (Cabrita 2001). Mozambique’s culture had then shifted from one that was prone to political violence to one of peace and democracy. How was this shift achieved? And how did Mozambique go from one of the most politically and economically fragile countries in Africa to an aid donor darling, with moderately mature institutions and a large potential for growth in several key sectors?

The international peace agreement negotiated in Rome was largely facilitated and guaranteed by the UN and the international community. This third-party involvement was necessary to overcome the deep mistrust that had understandably developed over
the course of hostilities. Along with the third-party guarantee, the role of power-sharing was key to the success of the agreement. Renamo was adamant that it be treated as a political entity and that assurances of influence would be built into the agreement, as well as methods of dispute resolution and policy engagement (Weinstein and Francisco 2002). The power-sharing arrangements built into the agreement were not only focused on the political, but also on economic and military aspects. Therefore, the third-party presence, exemplified clearly by the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), was at its heart a legitimacy intervention, which was also the highest dimension the country scored in terms of fragility clusters.

The presence of power-sharing in the Rome agreement had two pillars, first it included two warring parties on equal footing in future political arrangements and eventual elections, and second it promised representation within the political realm even if the opposing party was to win power in the subsequent election(s). Moreover, the agreement aimed to build a national identity, similar to that seen in Tanzania, where country comes first, and tribe comes second, if at all. This unity was a crucial goal because during the war, much of the country saw the governing South as the enemy and did not identify with the urban elites seen to be running the political affairs of the country. National holiday celebrations and an emphasis on Portuguese as the national language are just two ways Frelimo aimed to achieve this goal. Another key part of the agreement were the economic reforms that it would entail, which served to move Mozambique away from socialist policies towards the Washington consensus policies, supported by IMF and World Bank structural adjustment reforms and loans on which the country would come to rely for decades to come. This shift was key because many
opposing Frelimo wanted the country to move towards a liberal, capitalist economic system, especially after the fall of the Berlin wall and the end of the cold war (Hanlon and Mosse 2010). At the end of the day both parties were exhausted by the ongoing war, and geopolitical events forced them to the bargaining table.

What makes Mozambique unique is the fact that the peace agreement has, for the most part, held up to its promise. Historically speaking this is no easy feat, with 67% of postwar countries experiencing resurgence of conflict in the 1990s and 90% for the first decade of the 2000s (Call 2012). As per the fragility improvement hypothesis presented earlier, in this case the intervention by the international community was primarily focused on the dimension in which Mozambique was already the strongest – legitimacy. From the ALC graph, legitimacy was the single most robust dimension in the years leading up to the peace agreement. The international community involved in the negotiations focused on improving state society relations and rebuilding trust between Renamo and Frelimo and their respective population support bases. This focus on trust and improved legitimacy through power-sharing arrangements gave the country enough stability to begin improvements in other areas, for example economic reforms led to capacity improvements and investment in institutions led to authority improvements. Although in 2013 there was renewed violence, it was mostly isolated, localized and a ceasefire has now been in place for several years. Mozambique has continued to improve in all three dimensions and is no longer considered to be stuck in extreme fragility. At the same time, 2019 will be a crucial year for Mozambique – renewed peace negotiations between Renamo and Frelimo continue to develop, there is heightened demand for accountability in several recent corruption scandals, there are necessary ongoing fiscal
restraints and subdued growth, compounded by key deals to be made with multinational companies interested in Mozambique’s natural resources (including the management of expected revenues); and finally the 2019 general elections.

5.5 Guatemala: Focus on Authority Leads to Robust Peace Agreement

The third case study in this chapter is on Guatemala, a country that also underwent a vicious civil war lasting 36 years, coming to an end in 1996. Guatemala has been identified in studies as an exit case since the civil war ended and peace was achieved alongside rapid and robust economic development (Carment, Samy and Landry 2013; Fund for Peace 2017). It was, at the time, the largest and richest country in Central America, endowed with fertile lands and plentiful natural resources. More than 60% of its population were indigenous peoples, most of whom were illiterate and undernourished, surviving on subsistence farming. The most intense period of the war began in 1979 and ran through to 1984, with 90% of the human rights violations and deaths occurring during this period (Chamarbagwala and Moran 2011). It is estimated that over 200,000 people lost their lives and a further 500,000 were displaced throughout the civil war period (Jonas 2013). The civil war was fought primarily between the government of Guatemala and a coalition of leftist militias mainly made up of indigenous Maya people and Ladino peasants. The war had a devastating effect on the country, economically, politically and socially. For example, it is estimated that “the total direct quantifiable costs were equivalent to zero production in Guatemala for almost 15 months, equal to 121% of the country’s 1990 GDP” (Chamarbagwala and Moran 2011). Public resources were diverted away from education, health and other social spending towards military and police institutions and support (Chamarbagwala
and Moran 2011). Because of the government’s relative power in comparison to the rebel groups, the majority of atrocities were committed by one side, although reprisals did occur from time to time. The Commission for Historical Clarification estimates 93% of the extrajudicial killings and rights abuses were enacted by the state (Tomuschat 2001). These campaigns were aimed at preventing indigenous peoples from joining the rebel ranks, and numerous massacres took place over several decades, many of which were still being investigated well into the 2000s.

Figure 19. Guatemala ALC and Fragility Profile

In 1985, despite the continuation of state killings and disappearances of “subversives” the government implemented democratic reforms with the support of the United States. The elections in the 80s were considered to be procedurally fair, but repression and silencing of left leaning opponents prevented any serious challenge to the political establishment. Glebbeek (2001) notes that “Guatemala stands out for the duration of low-intensity civil war ... the number of civilian victims of repression, and the degree of tutelary powers wielded by the military throughout the protracted period of
democratisation and peace negotiations.” In this case, even as peace was progressing the
government continued to wield its extrajudicial authority in remote areas of the country,
with the aim of cutting off the social basis of the guerilla movement.

One of the key reasons why the conflict was brought to a close was the
implementation of security sector reforms implemented and supported by third-parties. A great deal of international pressure was exerted on the Guatemalan government to stop the extrajudicial killings and brutality, and these pressures aided the peace process in moving forward with the government reluctantly implementing reforms to the military and police forces within Guatemala. Despite this pressure, reforms attempted between 1986 and 1996 mostly failed, due to excess military involvement in policing as well as pervasive dysfunction and corruption in the ranks. During this time violence against foreigners was common, with some speculating the military stoked such attacks in order to punish the US ambassador who had criticized the use of violence by the government and military. Moreover, it was suspected that the violence was also used to limit the numbers of international observers and journalists willing to enter the country and monitor government activities especially during the first democratic elections (Glebbeek 2001). The military held onto control of internal security, subverting attempts to create a civilian police force for many years. However, over time this approach was no longer tenable due to international pressures and economic realities.

In December 1996, a peace agreement was reached between the government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) (Glebbeek 2001). One of the key provisions in the peace agreement was the separation of the police and military roles. A national civilian police force was established, bolstered by
constitutional amendments which aimed to restore faith in the rule of law and the *modus operandi* of the national security services. The key player here was the *United Nations Verification Commission* (MINUGUA) supported by the international community more broadly. Hence this shift represented an intervention on the authority dimension, which was also Guatemala’s strongest dimension of statehood heading into the peace agreement. MINUGUA consequently provided the third-party guarantee to constrain the military through the rule of law and to reform the political system to open to free and fair multi-party elections. These reforms then allowed Guatemala to revamp its economic policies and to reengage with the global trade regime, building on its rich natural resource base and agricultural products. The state began to recruit police from the civilian population and signed an agreement with the EU for a $32 million USD grant from 1998 to 2003 to provide equipment, training, administration, infrastructure etc. to modernize the police force (Glebbeek 2001). The new force is better paid and better trained and as a result they have been able to rebuild trust (legitimacy) with the population at large. The positive feedback loop between the initial investment in authority structures and legitimacy can clearly be demonstrated through this example. Some critics argue that a more long-term view needs to be taken in Guatemala with regard to security sector reform (Neild 1999). It is true that the government was preoccupied with preventing and fighting a crime wave after the military and police institutions were separated, however from a problem-driven iterative adaptation (PDIA) perspective this allows for minor adjustments to be made based on different complex situations as they arise. At the same time, there are ongoing, unresolved structural issues after the 36-year civil war and a lack of a full and complete implementation of the Peace Accords, including distribution of property rights via land ownership, as well as a
poor record on Indigenous rights. There has been a documented lack of transitional justice for victims; all of these factors combined have led to high degrees of inequality and poverty (59% live in poverty and 24% in extreme poverty) and simmering tensions that sometimes escalate into violent episodes, in particular in relation to the extractive industries and multinational companies. While far from perfect today, the police force has come a long way in developing its professionalism and effectiveness, as well as in regaining public trust after decades of hostile relations. Overall the intervention on the authority dimension resulted in Guatemala being able to exit the extreme fragility in a bi-stable manner, with knock-on effects that led to an improvement in legitimacy and capacity. Guatemala has once again becoming one of the most successful Central American countries, with middle class growth continuing via several important sectors such as tourism, exports (textiles, coffee, sugar etc.) and services.

5.6 Conclusion: Comparing the Three Cases and Weighing the Evidence

This section combined a straightforward statistical analysis with three “mini case studies” to probe for initial support for the hypotheses being tested. The quantitative analysis showed weak statistical correlation between interventions on the strongest dimension and extreme fragility recovery when isolated to the seven different “types” of intervention combinations, except in the case of capacity interventions. At the same time, all of the states which were extricated from extreme fragility had an intervention on the strongest dimension, indicating that perhaps having such a targeted initiative represents a necessary but not sufficient condition for fragility recovery. As for the mini case studies, the Bangladesh case showed only mixed evidence, as capacity interventions through aid and IMF programs seem to be the most important factor, but legitimacy was
the strongest dimension, albeit not by much. There were also power-sharing arrangements made in the Bangladeshi political system, so those actions could also be related to its improvement in fragility. Without doing a deep dive it’s impossible to know whether legitimacy and capacity improvements built on each other through these interventions or if they were caused by endogenous factors. In the Mozambique case, authority was the strongest dimension followed closely by legitimacy. However here again it was hard to disentangle the interventions since there was a peacekeeping intervention and a power-sharing arrangement occurring at the same time. In any case, the UN operation certainly helped to stabilize the country and provides some evidence for the fragility recovery model in the sense that authority created a positive-feedback mechanism leading to a virtuous cycle of improvement. Finally, for Guatemala, the intervention was primarily authority-based, which corresponded to its strongest dimension, with positive results. I would note that each of these three cases did not appear in my main dataset using CPIA recovered countries and CIFP data in tandem, so the fact that the evidence wasn’t clear cut may just mean that there is a difference between countries which are only marginally fragile and those stuck in the fragility trap, which was specified in the theory section presented earlier. Another insight from these mini cases is that in choosing my structured, focused comparisons I was careful to choose states that had one type of intervention as much as was possible in order to better disentangle any endogeneity through their analysis, although that choice could not be made in all cases due to the rarity of such events.
Chapter 6  Authority Interventions

“[W]ar is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.” – Carl Von Clausewitz, On War (1940)

With the recent rise of non-traditional conflicts and civil wars globally, the international community has shifted from adhering to the once sacred norm of non-intervention in the sovereign affairs of another country, to a new paradigm where this rule has been softened dramatically. Intervention, in fact, appears to have become the new norm with the practice often branded under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) conceptual umbrella (Bellamy 2010; Carment and Landry 2014; Hehir 2013). Humanitarian interests are now often cited by the great powers when military intervention is brought to the table as an option for dealing with international issues in FCAS. The fear of terrorist groups nesting in so-called ‘failed states’ along with greater awareness of the repercussions civil wars can have on regional stability have added fuel to this fire. Limited humanitarian intervention under Article VII has become a viable and sometimes necessary task; still, different motivations are cited by analysts studying intervention. Commonly identified motivations include the severity of the humanitarian exigencies, domestic political influences, and broader geopolitical concerns. Two-level games can also come into play, with multiple competing or coalescing forces acting on a unilateral actor or multilateral coalition. Moreover, although in my statistical analysis I
used military intervention as a proxy to quantify authority interventions, there are several other endeavours that fall under this rubric, namely security sector reform, military victory by one side with foreign assistance, and externally imposed peacekeeping missions, to name a few examples. As a reminder, authority generally refers to the monopoly over the use of force and imposition of the rules of law and can be broadly thought of as falling under security concerns. Authority interventions therefore fit most closely with what the literature identifies as “humanitarian intervention” per se. Highly visible setbacks in situations like Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda, Afghanistan, Iraq and most recently, Libya, have captured the world’s attention and brought fresh, ongoing, and oft deserved critical commentary of intervenors. For these reasons, alongside examining positive outcomes of interventions, for this dissertation it is instrumental to also examine cases of intervention failure: in this instance I examine the 2011 Libya intervention in greater depth. But first I turn to the case of Cambodia, where a country that experienced decades of brutal conflict managed to recover from extreme fragility and attain impressive levels of economic, political, and social development over the past 25 years.

6.1 Intervention Success: Cambodia Overview

To most Westerners, by the late 1980s Cambodia had become a byword for tragedy. The small Southeast Asian country had suffered a multifaceted, brutal civil war, followed by a genocide from 1975 to 1978 that resulted in the deaths of an estimated 1.7 million people—or about 20% of the country’s population—through forced labour, execution, torture, starvation, and disease (Paris 2004). Another 600,000 fled Cambodia to seek refuge in other countries including those in the Western world, resulting in a large
diaspora population (Um 2015). Those murderous efforts were led by the communist despot, Pol Pot, who was eventually deposed by the 1978 invasion by Vietnamese forces, leading to a second civil war throughout most of the 1980s (Connor 2010). The misguided economic policies of the Khmer Rouge regime were backstopped by a draconian security apparatus and a fanatical belief in the creation of a utopian communist society (Chandler 1979; Chandler 2008; Tyner 2017). The connections between Cambodia’s turmoil and the Vietnam War remained for many years after the conflict ended; during the war both sides carried fighting over the border and bombing campaigns knew no boundaries (Ollier and Winter 2006). Although I am focusing on the 1990s and 2000s in this study, it is important for the analysis to remember that Cambodia underwent a tremendous amount of war and suffering in the late 20th century. As Yu (2015) eloquently puts it, “The pathology of power—genocidal and implosive—in turn leaves deep and enduring traces on the Cambodian individual, community, and nation that defy temporality.” The history of genocide and strife casts a shadow over political competition and international intervention efforts to the present day.

In this section I provide a brief summary of the events surrounding the international intervention that the UN undertook. The Khmer Rouge have been described as “the most thorough mass murders since Hitler,” and for good reason (Pilger 1979). After the Vietnamese invasion and occupation in the late 80s ousted Pol Pot, a peace conference between the four Cambodian factions failed to bring about an agreement but led to considerations of the first UN peacekeeping mission in that country as civil war raged on (Connor 2010). An Australian proposal for a UN
transitional authority aided the resumption of the Cambodian peace process and eventually became the basis for the peace agreement signed in 1991. The UN Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) prepared the way for the deployment of a larger contingent of peacekeepers in the main mission, the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) (Connor 2010). As a consent-based multidimensional peace operation, UNTAC worked to organize the Cambodian elections in 1993 and had a long list of duties and responsibilities that went beyond a traditional peacekeeping role (Doyle 1995). These tasks made UNTAC the largest UN peacekeeping operation in history, requiring more than 15,000 troops and 7000 civilian personnel; the operation cost more than $1.5 billion over 18 months (Doyle 1995). Three main factors determined the success and failure of UNTAC as a mission, 1) “the fierce political contest among the factions,” 2) “the weariness and will to peace of the mass of Cambodians” and 3) “the ability of UNTAC to tread a narrow path through civil war to a legitimizing election” (Doyle 1995). On the whole, UNTAC can be considered a success of UN-led, multidimensional peacekeeping as it allowed for the first time a pathway of national self-determination for Cambodia. The UNTAC presence also served as an important signal of the end of the civil war period, with outright violence all but coming to an end (Doyle 1995). The over 370,000 refugees returned, successful, non-violent elections were held, and the country made a relatively smooth transition from civil war to liberal

49 Traditional responsibilities of UNTAC included: “monitor the cease-fire and the withdrawal of all foreign forces and to supervise the cantonment and demobilization of Cambodian military forces” but UNTAC was also asked “to control and supervise crucial aspects of civil administration; to organize and monitor the elections as a first step towards a ‘system of liberal democracy, on the basis of pluralism.’” Furthermore, the operation had “[t]o coordinate with the UNHCR repatriation of more than 370,000 refugees living in camps on the Thai side of the border; [t]o foster an environment ensuring respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; and [t]o help plan and raise funds for the social and economic rehabilitation of Cambodia.” (Doyle 1995)
democracy. However, things were far from perfect; the military factions were reticent to
canton themselves off and disarm, as both sides were doubtful that the other would comply. It was also a challenge for UNTAC to assume control over the civil
administration due to deep seated politically biased elites within the governing structure of the public service (Doyle 1995). Moreover, despite promises to enact power-sharing
and other democratic reforms, the newly elected government “immediately backed away from their commitments to democracy and reverted to more autocratic forms of rule,”
demonstrating the difficulty of enacting democratic governance in societies without it built into their historical power structures and institutions (Paris 2004).

6.1.1 From Chaos to Order: The First Elections After War’s End

In the 1993 elections, “Front uni national pour un Cambodge indépendant, neutre, pacifique et coopératif” (FUNCINPEC) \(^{50}\) won 58 seats, the Cambodian People’s Party
(CPP) \(^{51}\) won 51 seats, and two less prominent parties won 10 and 1 seats respectively in
the 120-seat legislature. FUNCINPEC (non-communist) was led by Prince Ranariddh
and the CPP (communist) was led by Hun Sen, wherein a coalition government was
formed with Prince Sihanouk (shortly thereafter King Sihanouk) taking charge as head
of state. Despite a spout of political violence, mostly perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge in rural areas, \(^{52}\) the coalition government worked reasonably well for a short time, with
mixed results emerging on the political scene in Cambodia for the first few years after
the elections (Jeldres 1996). Some analysts noted that both FUNCINPEC and the CPP

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\(^{50}\) Started as a liberation front in the early 1980s to mount political and military opposition to Vietnam’s conquest of Cambodia (Jeldres 1996).

\(^{51}\) Founded “by the communist regime in Vietnam to serve as its proxy in running Cambodia, the CPP is tightly disciplined along classic Stalinist lines—a structure that it has used to its advantage.” (Jeldres 1996)

\(^{52}\) Records indicate at least 176 killed, 316 injured, and 67 abducted (Plunkett 1994).
showed an aversion to democratic, open, and liberal notions of political activity, preferring instead backroom deal making and unreasonable levels of corruption (Jeldres 1996). Nevertheless, the country enjoyed a relatively peaceful transition to liberal democracy even if the shift wasn’t made overnight with a single ‘successful’ election. While the UN agreement and mandate for the UNTAC explicitly avoided making recommendations for economic policy, the international financial institutions pressured the coalition to adopt liberal economic reforms based on free market principles (Paris 2004). Indeed, an IMF structural adjustment loan was put into place in 1993 along with the usual conditionalities, “deep cuts in capital and social spending, along with wage and salary limits for public employees, in order to restore balance to the government’s finances,” in addition further reforms were implemented under UNTAC tutelage (ibid.). These policies were not imposed on the Cambodians but were rather incentivized using loans and technical advice as rewards, unsurprisingly given the decidedly “Western” make-up of the UNTAC bureaucracy.

All of this political, economic, and social reform set the stage for a country coming out of civil war to embrace liberal democratic values, accept development aid capital flows and set itself up on the world stage as a newly engaged political entity – or at least that was the hope. The mid-1990s saw a global economic boom with the so-called Asian tigers, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan making strides toward having fully developed market economies. Moreover, the fall of the USSR and the Berlin wall had taken the wind out of the sails of communist ideological influence and the vast majority of leaders saw Western liberalism as a preferable pathway to development. These sentiments found inroads in Cambodian political culture as well, although the
CPP still held onto its communistic foundational identity, the socialist principles of centralized economic planning did not seem to have a strong foothold over politicians, who tended to lean towards a “whatever works, works” attitude to economic development moving forward. While the UN peacekeeping mission had its share of problems, the stated goal of promotion democracy, civil liberties and market-oriented economic reforms had a measure of success. Relations between the CPP and FUNCINPEC remained peaceful for several years, even though tension simmered under the surface. The UNSC declared UNTAC a success and ordered its withdrawal from Cambodia in late 1993. Even countries like China, who had in the past been negatively associated with their support of the Khmer Rouge regime, were able to put on a “charm offensive” through their participation in UNTAC and sway perceptions by projecting “an image of Chinese neutrality with respect to all parties in a civil war” (Hirono 2011; Lanteigne and Hirono 2013). This goal was achieved using a two-pronged approach, the obvious first prong being the supportive efforts for Cambodian state-building and economic development, and secondly also by aggressively courting King Sianouk as a partner in the success of his country (Hirono 2011; Lanteigne and Hirono 2013). I state this as an example of the multiple competing interests that come into play during an international, multilateral intervention. However, as Paris (2004) notes “the [political] situation was fundamentally unstable” in that “the quick departure of the UN mission and the precarious power-sharing arrangement” precipitated the unravelling of the shaky democratic foundations that had been put in place so rapidly. The country had a new constitution and new coalition government, but there was still a form of isomorphic mimicry occurring here as the norms and values that came to a confluence before the war still had not abated. The reason for this discrepancy is that Hun Sen and his CPP
still remained in control of the use of force through his command of the military and police forces, while giving only nominal consideration to the wishes of FUNIPEC. Some analysts argue that Sen only allowed FUNIPEC to remain in the seat of power as long as he did for its more favourable international reputation, allowing the Cambodian state to continue to collect aid money and obtain concessional loans from international financial institutions (Jeldres 1993; Jeldres 1996; Thayer 1995). An underlying brittleness therefore understandably characterized the oft factitious relations between the two main parties. If one considers the success of a peacekeeping operation to be based on its ability “to leave behind a legitimate and independently viable political sovereign” then insofar as attaining success, part of its duty before leaving the region must be to “help transform the political landscape by building a new basis for domestic peace” (Doyle 1995). Based on the events after UNTAC departed, it is questionable as to whether this was categorically achieved.

6.1.2 Backsliding: Legitimacy Takes a Back Seat

The relations between the two prime ministers began to decline precipitously in 1997 as the leaders anticipated the upcoming elections wherein only one Prime Minister would be successfully elected (Paris 2004). In advance of the elections, Ranariddh began to put together his competing, novel political movement christened as the National United Front (NUF), the goal of which was to build an alliance that could credibly compete against the CPP under a big tent approach. Fearing another electoral defeat and dismayed at the political capital such a win would provide his opponent, Sen orchestrated a coup in 1997 led by the CPP against its non-communist coalition government “allies” (Yu 2015; Paris 2004). This drastic development made “1997 ...
indeed post-U.N. Cambodia's most dramatic year” (Peou 1998). Downie (2000) argues that the following election was not free and fair because of the political violence leading up to it, for instance a grenade attack that killed 16 people and injured 100 more. CPP military units attacked FUNCINPEC forces in 36 hours of fierce fighting in and around Phnom Penh in the months prior to the election (Downie 2000). More than 100 FUNCINPEC officials “were summarily executed in the bloody aftermath of the fighting” and these “events were to have a profound impact on the role and meaning attached to the 1998 elections for all national and international groups” (Sullivan 2016). These attacks forced Ranariddh and his top aides to flee into exile and left their positions in government and parliament which were then surreptitiously taken over by FUNCINPEC members who crossed the aisle to the CPP. Both sides also tried to attract former Khmer Rouge units to join them respectively, and once the violence began it was not a one-sided affair, meaning that both factions were to blame for the decline in peaceful conduct. Downie (2000) succinctly summarizes the chilling effect the violence had on the political climate in Cambodia in 1997:

Politically, it split an already factionalised FUNCINPEC, and physically it scattered FUNCINPEC supporters, turning them into refugees (in Thailand) or sending them into hiding, thus temporarily dismantling the party network as well as FUNCINPEC's military and intelligence structures. Second, it effectively suspended any opposition, silenced the pro-opposition media, and severely reduced confidence in freedom of expression and opposition party activity, which in turn sent underground many FUNCINPEC provincial officials and supporters who had not defected to Thailand. Third, in the international arena, the legitimacy of a government without Ranariddh was questionable; hence, the
UN declared Cambodia’s seat at the General Assembly vacant and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations postponed Cambodia’s membership.

The CPP still had control of most of the state apparatus including the radio and television networks, meaning that opposition parties could not get their message heard prior to the elections (Heder and Ledgerwood 2016). Rannariddh returned 10 months after the coup, yet despite being a top international news story, none of the state-owned media reported it and consequently neither did most smaller local media outlets (Downie 2010). At this time economic growth was relatively stagnant despite predictions of a 7.5% growth rate in 1997 – this stagnation may have contributed to the general malaise of the population toward the status quo (power-sharing). However, if the CPP coup was aiming to improve things, that goal was left unmet as the inflation rate more than doubled, most foreigners left the country along with their investment dollars and up to 40,000 service workers were said to have lost their jobs (Peou 1998). Nevertheless, Sen had essentially eliminated the political competition and international observers and donors seemed resigned to allow the CPP to win power in 1998 in a coalition government. Pol Pot also died in 1998 while being held prisoner on the Cambodian frontier, awaiting trials for crimes against humanity (Sandler 2018).

Corresponding to the fragility recovery model’s proposed, steady-state resulting in a positive feedback mechanism, from here Cambodia “entered a period of relative peace and stability, but ultimately at the cost of the democratization process” (Sullivan 2016). From 1999 onward, the government was able to turn its attention to some of the deep-seated socioeconomic problems that remained a legacy of decades of civil war (Lizée 1999). Part of this effort included elections to decentralize some of the government’s authority to local “commune councils” that would be democratically elected in 2002
These efforts were lauded by international development agencies who benefited in their mandate for rural development assistance projects. These local elections were followed by another round of parliamentary elections in 2003, unfortunately bolstered by all too common tactics of “politically motivated violence, intimidation, coercion, and partisan politics” which also marred the local elections the year prior (Sullivan 2016). Again the 2003 elections resulted in a split, with none of the parties winning enough seats to form a majority government. Many accusations of tampering and misdeeds came out during and after the process but on the whole people accepted the results peacefully, marking the third set of national level elections to proceed without major violence since the UN intervention even though it took a year for the government to form in this instance (Sullivan 2016). Hun Sen remained Prime Minister, proving that his power would be difficult if not impossible to topple in the foreseeable future. The “Alliance of Democrats” tried and failed to curb the power of the CPP, and FUNCINPEC became more and more marginalized over time, with both falling into disarray in part due to “CPP intimidation and violence directed at opponents” (Sullivan 2016). This repressive political culture continued into the 2007 commune and 2008 parliamentary election cycles while the CPP benefited from an improved national image in part due to impressive economic growth and development of critical infrastructure in rural and urban areas alike. Patronage networks of the CPP hence flourished and wealth attained from growth in tourism and other key industries was brought to bear on ensuring election campaigns would be heavily titled towards the CPP. During this period, it must also be noted that justice for the war crimes throughout the civil war period was being doled out and gained a great deal of public attention. Kaing Guek Eav (known as Duch), head of the extermination centre S-21 was arrested in
In 2003, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia was formed for the Khmer Rouge Tribunal. In 2007 Duch was charged with war crimes, in 2010 he was sentenced to 35 years in prison and then given a life sentence. More trials of perpetrators of war crimes began in 2011 (Um 2015). These retributive events provided some level of solace to Cambodian families who had undergone suffering and plight at the hands of the Khmer Rouge.

6.1.3 Bridge Building or Democratic Deficit? Authority Improves While Legitimacy Stagnates

Most observers of the 2007 and 2008 elections saw their successful implementation as a progress marker, with improvements in technical aspects like polling and counting, as well as a marked reduction in violent incidents. At the same time critical analysts see the elections as somewhat of an authoritarian sham; given recent events it is getting more and more difficult to argue with those sentiments (Springer 2010; Kurlantzick 2017). In the late aughts, election monitoring organizations “had to tread a fine line between legitimate criticism of flawed elections and presenting a radical challenge to the dominance of the CPP” (Sullivan 2016). The political legitimacy that was gained after the initial 1993 elections therefore seemed to slowly improve over time, linked with the continued development of capacity and authority markers in Cambodia in a knock-on manner as predicted by the fragility recovery model. At the same time there was tension building in the country, with the 2007/2008 elections having gone ahead with similar discrepancies as were seen in the past, some opposition groups and their civil society backers began to show signs of “shifts within the body politic” and the 2013 elections resulted in “Cambodians [using] the polls as the only means they had to register their
dissatisfaction collectively and en masse” (Sullivan 2016). July 2013 was the fifth election since the UNTAC elections in 1993, and the CPP had seemingly discovered a winning combination of political repression and favouritism through patronage networks that left them in control of the country for the 20 years prior. However, in 2013 the CPP lost 22 National Assembly seats, sending “shockwaves throughout the CPP, and took many analysts and long-time commentators on Cambodian politics by surprise” (Sullivan 2016). The new “Cambodian National Rescue Party” (CNRP) had combined two previous rival parties to win 55 seats in the 123-seat legislature, this time without international observers there to oversee the technical aspects of the election, partly in a bid to avoid rubber stamping a foregone conclusion (McCargo 2014).

Economic growth at the time was strong, 7.5% in 2012 and domestic consumption rates were correspondingly up as well (McCargo 2014). Urban dwellers tended to turn out for the CNRP with rural voters preferring the CPP; CNRP supporters were more active and had a large youth representation within their party caucus (McCargo 2014). CNRP legislative members ended up having to boycott the National Assembly for over a year in order to have their concerns addressed about irregularities in the election specifically on voter lists and disenfranchisement of an estimated 1.3 million voters (Sullivan 2016).53

Given the past outcomes of elections, the most surprising part of the 2013 bout was the massive shift in support for the rival CNRP. At the same time, the CPP still had a majority with 68 seats and was able to appease the CNRP mainly by making false promises about election reform. There were several violent incidents following the elections as well, with one group of protestors fired upon with at least one dead and

53 The popular vote was won by about 4% or 289,000 votes in favour of the CPP, a decidedly close result, further vindicating concerns over tampering.
multiple injuries (Sullivan 2016). Approximately a year after the elections with the CNRP party on its back foot, Sen and the CNRP leaders agreed to form a “culture of dialogue” and enact election and institutional reforms (Sullivan 2016). The reforms were not implemented—bar a few anomalous and contentious ones—like the CPP-favouring ability for security service members and public servants to participate in political activities outside of work hours, just as one example (Sullivan 2016). CNRP members were forcefully targeted for arrest, intimidation, harassment and other tactics meant to weaken the resolve of the coalition members. Arrest warrants were brazenly adopted for CNRP president Sam Rainsy who had to flee the country, harkening back to the analogous situation with Sen and Ranariddh decades prior. Rainsy wanted to return and gained EU support to return without fear of arrest, however he could not gain the same reassurance from the CPP. Instead, he announced his resignation as President of the CNRP, and was replaced by his deputy Kem Sokha in 2017. Sokha was arrested a few months later and charged on trumped up “treason” accounts, raising serious questions about the leadership of the CNRP heading into 2018 (New York Times 2017). The spectre of civil unrest and violence in the event of a CNRP victory over the CPP in upcoming 2018 elections was well developed and understood as fact by the general public and civil society election monitoring groups such as the Election Reform Alliance (Sullivan 2016). Sen began speaking in increasingly inflammatory ways, threatening civil war for instance, as rumors of a “Cambodian Spring” and “Colour Revolution” began to gain traction in the popular dialogue (Radio Free Asia 2017). It appears that the CPP has legitimate fears that they could be ousted in the 2018 election, and things have been deteriorating in the lead up. The CPP forced the closure of the Cambodia Daily newspaper was also enacted by the CPP, and the CNRP dissolved by decree of the
supreme court, with its seats distributed to three other parties; the court claimed that
the CNRP was planning to overthrow the government with US help, pointing to obscure
statements made by the leaders in the past, evidence that most observers agree is
baseless (Reuters 2018). In May 2018 the CPP crack down on the free press continued,
with the buying out of the Phnom Penh Post by a Sen ally based in Malaysia and the
subsequent resignation of the editorial team and foreign staff members (Economist
2018). Downie and Kingsbury (2001) predicted much of this while looking back at the
1990s, highlighting many of the insidious structural issues that malign the country still
today: “[t]he obstacles to a more wholesome political development were considerable.
The legacies of Cambodia's political traditions were not conducive to a participatory and
representative process, especially with power centred on the person of the ruler. This
continued to have implications for attempts at reducing patron-client relations and for
the separation between political institutions and the nominally non-political institutions
of state, in particular, the judiciary.” All of this bodes poorly for Cambodian democratic
culture, clearly there are major hurdles still to be overcome in terms of legitimacy
improvements in this country, and prospects of third-party interventions are far from a
panacea.

This historical vignette sets the stage for my analysis of the 1997 violence prior to
the elections in 1998. Presented below is the ALC and fragility profile for Cambodia
from 1996-2016. Over the period examined, authority was the best performing
dimension on average, and it saw a sharp improvement after the events of 1997.
Fragility overall improved significantly, moving Cambodia from extreme fragility
following its decades of civil war and occupation, to a donor darling for aid in Southeast
Asia, and a positive example oft envied by its neighbouring Myanmar and Laos. Legitimacy remained the country’s worst performing dimension, fluctuating only slightly throughout the 20 years since the peacekeeping operation ended. Capacity improved over time although it did plateau for most of the early 2000s with little improvement until recently. Overall improvements in authority after 2000 created a stable-state and lead the way for a virtuous cycle on the three dimensions, while at the same time acting as a leading indicator for Cambodia’s recovery from extreme fragility. In the next section I examine the causal pathways for this evolution, using the United Nations intervention as a focal point to better understand why Cambodia was able to prevent another onset of civil war recurrence.

*Figure 20. Cambodia ALC and Fragility Profile*
6.2 Analysis of the Intervention: Building Authority

6.2.1 The Decision to Intervene

The international community—via the UN—intervened in 1992 to bring an end to the fighting and aid in reconstruction of the country (Coughlan 2009). The intervention was agreed upon by the conflict parties and as such can be considered a voluntary or consenting intervention case. The intervention consisted of more than 16,000 troops and 7,000 civilians from over 100 countries and cost over $3 billion—indeed the operation was thought of by some as difficult if not impossible to achieve as well as overly ambitious (Ramsbotham, Miall and Woodhouse 2011). Nevertheless, Cambodia has been highly reliant on external aid since its independence in 1954 and today foreign aid accounts for about 40% of the country’s national budget (Cock 2010; Kurlanzick 2017). One of the main reasons that Australia decided to get involved was the strong linkages and history of Australian engagement with Cambodia including people to people ties. This reality led to a domestic political rent that was possible to capture by inserting the country into Cambodian affairs under a humanitarian guise, which may or may not have been sincere depending on who’s motivations you are examining (Connor 2010). In my estimation there was a widespread political will to end the violence in Cambodia compounded by guilt over allowing it to continue for so long. The fact that the intervention was taken on the authority dimension made sense given the militaristic nature of the conflicts that had marred the country for the last half of the 20th century; peace and stability had to be implemented in order to bring about political change and eventually democratic norms. In summarizing the state of the country after the intervention, Sodhy (2004) shows that Cambodia has reached a significant juncture in its history: “With massive international donor aid, it has been lifted up from the depths
of misery and despair and given a better footing as a developing nation and as ASEAN's latest member. Without this assistance, Cambodia would not have reached its present state, spurred on by the authority intervention which then had positive effects on legitimacy and capacity. Modernization has been mainly economic and socio-cultural rather than political because Hun Sen has remained in power.” This passage shows the general feeling about the country: it has achieved relative prosperity when it comes to authority and capacity, but legitimacy is lagging.

6.2.2 Implementation of the Intervention

The UNTAC intervention in Cambodia makes for an interesting case study of how the West responded to fragile and conflict affected states after Cold War ideological battles began to give way to a neoliberal democratic global order. It represented one of the first instances where a massive and multi-pronged peacekeeping mission was implemented in a fragile context while having a relatively successful outcome without a return to mass violence. Sullivan (2016) notes “[w]ith the arrival of UNTAC, Cambodia became a crucible within which post-Cold War international ideas about democracy, democratization and development were fused with the stark political and social realities of a country desperately struggling to come to terms with the devastation caused by its recent violent past.” The resources used in the intervention dwarfed past UN responses to conflict and opened the door to a new global understanding of the UN’s role in peacekeeping and statebuilding. Most analysts consider the implementation of UNTAC to have been a success, despite some small hiccups. Interestingly, the fact that so many resources were funneled to Cambodia at this time actually contributed to the American resistance to send a larger peacekeeping force to Rwanda a few years later. UNTAC can
be considered a textbook authority intervention, with the rule of law instantly reinforced and factional fighting being brought to a halt without any significant resurgence or danger to UN peacekeepers. It allowed the country to gain a sense of peace and security after many years of the opposite, which provided the space needed to enhance economic development and political reform. The resulting improvements in authority created self-reinforcing processes where the improvement in the dimension “selected” for further improvements, in a manner analogous to a coevolutionary feedback loop in biological systems. However it is worth mentioning that critical scholars have been unsure if the intervention represented the best path forward, for instance Lizee (2000) notes “When the international community put together during the 1991-3 period what Boutros Boutros-Ghali later called a ‘vision of peace’ for Cambodia, this vision did indeed correspond … to an attempt to marginalize violence in Cambodian society by reengineering it so that a very specific configuration of state, capitalist, and bureaucratic forces could unfold there.”

6.2.3 The Effect on Legitimacy and Capacity

The authority intervention by the West definitely had a positive knock-on effect and launched Cambodia into a virtuous cycle of development and recovery as per the fragility recovery model. Self-reinforcing mechanisms came into play whereby the improvements in authority led to better capacity and legitimacy outcomes as outlined in the overview above. But at the same time elections in Cambodia “simultaneously display both an inherent democratic impulse within the body politic and a yoke of a powerful entrenched authoritarian tendency within the state” (Sullivan 2016). Norén-Nilsson (2016) describes this conundrum in the following way (emphasis added):
Many international policymakers continue to assume that holding elections with proper procedures of electioneering is the hallmark of internal legitimacy. *Cambodia proves this assumption to be wrong:* elections alone were not sufficient to settle questions of internal legitimacy. All competing political party actors within the electoral framework turned to strategies of establishing unique bonds with the nation as the ultimate means of legitimation. While this served to mobilize votes and thereby ensure success within the electoral framework, it also served as an alternative basis of legitimation that went beyond the electoral process per se.

While the authority intervention did open up political space for capacity development, it has not necessarily had the same effect on legitimacy, with strongman tactics still utilized. From the CIFP ALC profile however we see that authority continues to lead the recovery with legitimacy falling behind. This finding coupled with similar situations in other cases in this study (Uzbekistan and Rwanda) has given me pause on what exactly the path to recovery needs to look like. As a Western scholar I place the usual faith in democracy as providing necessary cathartic outlets for discontent among the populace, but in some cases, it seems that capacity and authority can build on one another more effectively without political pluralism and contentious politics threatening to light a tinderbox, especially in societies that are not familiar with democratic norms. In Cambodia there has been some progress on legitimacy and building a pluralistic political culture, but not as much as one would hope for on this front.

### 6.2.4 Success of the Intervention

When looking at whether the UN mission was successful, some analysts see the Khmer Rouge as the quintessential spoiler of the peace process, noting that they never agreed to abide by the peace process in the first place (Peou 2010; Stedman 1997). Wesely (1995)
points out the reliance on Maoist tactics including political mobilization, guerilla warfare, and waiting to exhaust enemies and destabilize the regimes of their adversaries. Some scholars argue that the imposed neoliberal order placed on Cambodia only allowed for an entrenchment of a “neo-authoritarianism” on the part of CPP elites, as that party remains in control of the use of force and often imposes top down violence on those who would oppose their power; at the same time, international actors accept this type of disdainful behaviour as they see stability as an overarching good and goal above all else (Springer 2009; Springer 2010). I contend this argument insofar as it seems to imply that there is only one path forward leading to a democratic society. I see instead elections and the development of capacity and legitimacy to be an evolutionary process, rife with difficulties and imperfect as it may be. This type of anti-colonialist critique is common in certain segments of the political science literature, but the problem with it is that it offers no concrete solutions to the problems it identifies. Rather than working within the system created by a flawed but “successful” intervention, for instance, these scholars are inclined to either “tear it all down” or go back in time and revert the intervention. Unfortunately, neither is possible and even if they were, other negative externalities would present themselves. For all these reasons I cannot accept the notion, from a scholarly perspective, that whatever the West has done is either too much or not enough, as it rests on a worldview that does not correlate with the reality of living in a messy world.

With that said, there are certainly elements of isomorphic mimicry taking place in Cambodian political culture. Legitimacy is arguably the worst dimension because of this veneer of democratic institutionalism which in reality is underpinned and
manipulated by political elites with long standing patronage networks. Roberts (2001) puts this notion clearly, “In a very real sense, elite politics in Cambodia can be interpreted as a charade crafted by politicians who have been forced to embrace democracy under external tutelage and surveillance. That supervision, observation and punishment when the stated line is transcended or ignored is an ongoing process, dominated by governments who firmly believe, for right or wrong, that Cambodia’s transition to Western Democracy is a necessary precursor to development, globalization and political economic integration.” This argument echoes Pritchett, Woolcock and Andrews (2013) notion of isomorphic mimicry wherein the CPP basically puts on a cloak of legitimacy in order to keep international donors happy with the political “pluralism” and status of the “free” press in Cambodia, while working behind the scenes to ensure power was kept intractably in their crucible. At the same time, I would note that this is not wholly unexpected nor is it overly unalike that which happened in the history of “developed” Western nations either, albeit this form may be a bit cruder given that the country so recently came out of war time. The political culture in the West took hundreds—if not thousands—of years to develop so perhaps we are asking too much if one expects the patronage and clientelism systems that undergird power networks to disappear overnight. Corresponding to this argument, Paris (2004) sees folly in pursuing democratization and marketization so oft thrusted onto fledgling societies before they have the institutional capacity to handle these major transitions. This viewpoint sees neo-liberal order as inherently destabilizing through its reliance on competition. Paris (2004) points to Cambodia as a textbook example of democratic ideals being pushed onto a nation that is just barely out of wartime, with tenuous relations between political factions ready to explode at the slightest provocation. Peou (2010) notes “this is a fair
argument, but Cambodian history also shows that authoritarian rule is not the best system of government, either, when assessed in terms of promoting and maintaining political legitimacy or regime stability.” I tend to come down on Peou’s side in this debate. I argue that it is precisely because of the destabilizing nature of foreign intervention that Cambodia’s civil society was allowed to come out and begin to flourish.

Downie and Kingsbury (2001) put this well:

Cambodia is a "developing" country in the classical sense of the term "development", in that it is a post-colonial state with a low level of economic growth, poor infrastructure, limited efficacy of state institutions, low level of education, and so on. Like many, perhaps most, other developing countries, its level of political development has not reached "developed" status. We believe, however, and the evidence ... suggests that in spite of the many problems, it appears that the process of political development in Cambodia has taken root. It is too early to determine whether it will survive, much less thrive.

Indeed, it takes time for Western ideas to become more popular and accepted with the fall of communism and its associated regimes, values like universal human rights, freedom of the press, equality of the genders and the like were suddenly allowed to be taken seriously, and pluralism in politics was not only allowed but encouraged, at least by international donors and NGOs, which had a trickle-down effect alongside increased consumption of Western media and cultural influencers. I argue that Western presence allowed for a base level of peace, law, and order to be established, which had knock-on effects for legitimacy and capacity to catch up with the progress attained through the removal of a heavy-handed state apparatus. Peou (2007) terms this transitory phase “complex realist institutionalism” arguing that “one hindrance to the process of
democratic consolidation is that the system of checks and balances has not become sufficiently institutionalized.” Here the idea is that peacebuilding efforts by the international community were unable to take root because democratic ideals require “a high level of institutionalization at three levels: state, political, and civil society.” From my perspective, Cambodia was spurred onto a path to recovery wherein these institutions have had the necessary time and space to evolve with society, which has been altered over time through the advance and adoption of technology and mass media, especially the internet. Moreover, Chinese economic progress has acted as an inspiring force to Southeast Asia, wherein members of societies can “see themselves” reflected in the high-octane progress that Asia as a whole is making. There is simply no way that Cambodia would have been able to escape its fragile nature and develop as quickly as it has without the foundational level of peace that was enforced by the UN and bilateral actors like Australia. Sodhy (2004) continues with strategies for post intervention development, “While donor aid and ASEAN assistance have been the lifelines, Cambodia cannot always rely on outside aid as some of the donor nations are experiencing economic problems themselves…Instead of always looking for handouts, Cambodia should start planning how it can become more self-reliant. Perhaps it would help if Cambodia could shed its victim mentality. While it is true that it has been a colony, a pawn in superpower rivalry, and an occupied state, it is now time to move on, to concentrate on the present, and to build for the future instead of dwelling on the past.” This quote summarizes the steps needed for Cambodia to pull itself up and continue on the fragility recovery path, while the West can help, it will require local leadership and ownership with less focus on political repression and demobilization.
6.3 Intervention Failure: Libya Overview

The NATO 2011 foray into Libya fits loosely into the “Intervention Failure Model” outlined in chapter three of this dissertation. While there is no CPIA data because of the extremely fragile nature of Libya, Fund for Peace tracks the dimensions of statehood from 2006 to 2017; Figure 21 below demonstrates the worsening of Libya’s situation especially after the 2011 intervention. Moreover, CIFP data is available and is also presented below, demarcating authority, legitimacy and fragility for further analysis.

*Figure 21. Libya State Fragility: 2006 to 2017 (Fund for Peace 2017)*

Using process tracing and narrative analysis in this in-depth case study, I illustrate that NATO focused on the security side of statehood (authority) without taking into account legitimacy or capacity aspects of the state’s fragility profile either before or after the fact; capacity was the strongest dimension and according to my theory intervention should
have been targeted at the economic system and state-society relations using “carrots” rather than through the “pointy end of the stick” of forced regime change. This action then led to a feedback loop and backsliding as per the intervention failure model in figure 5. By examining what went wrong in Libya we can learn valuable lessons for future international intervention strategies.

Figure 22. Libya ALC and Fragility Profile

Accordingly, it is through a two-level lens that this case study examines the 2011 UNSC authorized NATO intervention in Libya. The first stage of the case study elucidates the interests that were at play both internationally and domestically, focusing on the major powers involved, namely France, the UK, and the USA. It aims to answer the following questions: Why did NATO intervene in Libya of all countries? Many other civil conflicts have taken place both before and after the Libyan conflict, yet NATO did not get involved in these. What makes the Libyan case unique and how were the policy decisions crafted and implemented? In particular I examine how the intervention was justified and staged with little regard for current knowledge of the fragility of Libya.
including the disaggregated ALC profile of the country. I show that Libya already had strong capacity, mainly due to its rich bounty of natural resources (especially oil) and Ghaddafi’s management of those resources. I argue that rather than intervening and forcing regime change, the international community would have been much better off working with Ghaddafi to improve legitimacy and authority in the Eastern regions of the country. This action would have resulted in a much more favourable outcome both in terms of humanitarian results and regional security results.

Additionally, this chapter examines whether the intervention was successful in its stated mission, which was preventing civilian casualties and promoting a better living environment for the Libyan people. Along with the three big powers, in the second stage of the case study I take a closer look at Canada’s role in the international intervention, and aim to answer the question: Why did Canada decide to play such a large role given its relatively small size? A detailed examination of the Canadian policy making process during the run up and execution of the Libya intervention is therefore conducted. Finally, consideration will be taken as to whether Canada’s involvement in the operation was beneficial or detrimental to Libya overall. In sum, the key goals of this case study are to help explain: 1) why modern Western countries behave the way they do towards fragile states, 2) what domestic political constraints they face, and 3) how international military interventions are justified and undertaken in today’s international community looking specifically at the myopic focus on authority (security) as an intervention target.
6.3.1 Gaddafi’s House of Cards: A People’s Leader or Universally Hated?

Muammar Gaddafi gained political control of the country of Libya in 1969 after his revolutionary group, the “Free Officers,” deposed the Western-aligned leader, King Idris, in a bloodless coup.\textsuperscript{54} Ethnic diversity and tribal lineages ensured that Gaddafi’s philosophy of Arab nationalism was well received, where he acted as a unifying force across tribal lines and downplayed the differences between the groups. The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) was set up with Gaddafi acting as leader, and actions were taken to ensure his reign on power would not easily be challenged. This goal was achieved by purging those loyal to the former monarchy from both the political and military realms. Moreover, the ban on political parties imposed by the former rulers was kept in place and the RCC hence ruled by decree.

On the economic front, Gaddafi and the RCC were keen to keep a tight grip on oil revenues and aimed to maximize their profit margin. The strategy employed to achieve this goal had three principal dimensions. First, the RCC was able to raise the global price of crude oil by threatening to reduce production. Second, the RCC negotiated with the oil companies, using its leverage to secure various benefits including a tax tied to the income of the companies and related back-payments. Finally, nationalization of oil extraction operations was a key policy goal of the RCC, and it was eventually announced that all foreign oil producers would be put under state control in September of 1973.

\textsuperscript{54} The circumstances leading up to this event were primarily characterized by the unpopularity of the Idris government; in particular this was due to the perceived rent-seeking behaviour it had engaged in after the discovery of oil in the country (Vandewalle 2012, p.74). Thus, Gaddafi and his men took advantage of the popular sentiment, motivated and supported by tensions within the deeply-divided country.
These social changes were matched with the creation of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), which acted as the de facto political party in Libya and was led by the RCC. Sharia law was implemented under the ASU; this change included the banning of alcohol, the shuttering of night clubs and Christian churches, along with the promotion of traditional Arab values and style of dress.

On the whole, it can be said that Gaddafi stood for anti-Western, pro-Arab policies. He advocated that there should be one pan-African, pan-Middle Eastern Arab state, and was especially critical of the US and its support for Israel. The funding of rebel groups that furthered these ideologies was paramount to Gaddafi, and many acts of terrorism around the world, perpetrated by both domestic and trans-national belligerents, were tied to him (John 2011). Over time, he pushed Libya through several self-defined “revolutions,” with each attempting to further unify his countrymen under a single banner and ideology. Many in Libya, though, saw these radical ideas and involvement in foreign causes as unnecessary and even damaging to the country. As a result, political infighting caused the RCC to disband in 1977. At the same time, Gaddafi was working to cement his hold on power by promoting those in his tribe and family to

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55 Some of the revenue from these operations was used to implement social programs such as house-building and improved healthcare, leading to the expansion of the public sector, which provided steady employment for many thousands.

56 Foreign relations were another area where Gaddafi and the RCC made their mark. American and British authorities were forced to close their military bases in the country, a relic of their close relations with the previous government. Furthermore, Gaddafi expelled the Italian community and expropriated all Italian-owned assets, and perhaps emblematic of Gaddafi’s penchant for rhetoric, made the day it occurred a national holiday (Wright 1982). Indeed, Italy’s colonial history in the region made it a particular target of Gaddafi’s wrath. Another primary goal of the RCC was, perhaps ironically, to decrease the influence and power of NATO in the region. A key example of this policy was manifested in Libya’s request to Malta to discontinue allowing NATO to operate its bases out of that country (Rossi 1986). In exchange for compliance Gaddafi offered large grants of oil money. In the end, the Maltese did not comply, however they did agree that no Arab country was to be attacked from those bases on their watch.

57 The “Green Book” which articulated his vision for a pan-Arab state working against the forces of imperialism acted as the foundation of these pushes for nationalism.
senior positions within the government and military; these actions were viewed by many with disdain and served to further isolate Libya from its peers.58

Through the end of the 1970s and into the 1980s, Gaddafi further pushed socialist policies, including provisions against private ownership, seized assets of those who owned real estate and selling them to the renters at highly subsidized prices. In addition, the state seized private companies and turned them into so-called “workers cooperatives.” These actions caused many to leave the country, and those who had lost their wealth formed exile groups dedicated to removing Gaddafi. At least nine African states had cut off relations with Libya, primarily due to Gaddafi’s seemingly ubiquitous policies of interference in their affairs (John 2011). The incoming Regan administration took a hard-line stance with Libya, and an already tumultuous relationship soured further, culminating in a series of domino events. American aircraft shot down two Libyan planes monitoring their training exercises, Libya shut down its embassy in Washington, the US ordered an embargo of Libyan oil and finally launched an aerial assault on a number of Libyan military installations in 1986 (Vandewalle 2012). This attack appeared to give Gaddafi pause, and further actions targeting the West became more indirect, the 1988 Lockerbie bombing perpetrated by two Libyan nationals serving

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58 In addition to his enemies in the West, Gaddafi also burned bridges with leaders in the Middle East and Africa. Tensions over the handling of Egypt-Israeli relations in the aftermath of a Libyan airlines flight being shot down by Israel in February 1973 led to a very public shouting match between Gaddafi and then Egyptian president Anwar Sadat (Vandewalle 2012, p.129). This also eventually led to souring of relations between Libya and Sudanese Islamist President Gaafar Nimeiry, as Nimeiry developed closer ties with both the US and Egypt, and in response Gaddafi sponsored mercenaries to attempt to overthrow the Sudanese government (John 2011, p.124). Indeed, throughout the 1970s Gaddafi was busy building alliances and undermining enemies. In his passionate attempts to expand Islam and degrade Israel’s status in the region he was able to convince at least two leaders in Africa (those of Chad and Central African Republic) to convert to the religion, and eight countries to cut off diplomatic ties with Israel, offering strong financial incentives to do so (John 2011, pp.120–121).
as an example of such.\textsuperscript{59} To be sure, Gaddafi drew international ire when he refused to extradite the suspects of the bombing, and subsequent UN sanctions served to heavily damage the Libyan economy, to the point where Gaddafi eventually gave in to the pressure and allowed the suspect to be sent to the Scottish Court in the Netherlands (Vandewalle 2012).

At the turn of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, Gaddafi seemed buoyed by the prospects of the new African Union (AU), which was designed to replace the former Organization of African Unity (OAU). He embraced Libya’s identity as an African nation and implored other leaders to do the same. As an advocate for a so-called “United States of Africa,” he brought forward bold ideas including a common passport and currency for the continent, as well as an amalgamated defense system and a thrashing off of Western conditional aid (John 2011). At the same time, Gaddafi’s witness to the pre-emptive US invasion of Iraq caused his regime to vow the end of its chemical and nuclear weapons programs. Normalization of diplomatic relations with Western powers became a goal for Gaddafi, and economically the country opened itself up, liberalizing trade activities and allowing for greater private investment and ownership within the country.\textsuperscript{60} Political liberalization, however, did not follow. Although Gaddafi technically held only a “ceremonial position” it has been noted by observers that he was extremely adept at


\textsuperscript{60} Indicative of these reforms, foreign direct investment into Libya increased to more than 4 billion USD, a six-fold increase from 2003 to 2004. This trend continued with an 8 billion increase on top of that between 2005-8 (John 2011). While there was some backlash to the reforms, generally liberalization continued, albeit at a slower pace for the remainder of the decade.
positioning himself; he achieved this throughout his tenure by keeping those most loyal to him in critical positions in both the government and military apparatuses. The military itself was kept relatively weak and uncoordinated, with its most capable and well-trained units consisting of those loyal to Gaddafi. Many speculate this underequipping and undertraining of the military was a deliberate attempt on Gaddafi’s part to avoid a military coup (John 2011). In the end, all of these precautions and strategic manoeuvres would prove insufficient to quell the tide of those opposing him.

Although things seemed to be in equilibrium for Gaddafi, with economic reforms progressing and a seemingly docile populace at his behest, the Arab spring took him wholly by surprise.61 Vandewalle (2012) sums up Gaddafi’s complacency and satisfaction with the status quo prior to the unrest:

[His revolution] had become self-reverential, beyond criticism, focused exclusively around Gaddafi and his supporters, protected by its highly effective coercive institutions. It had been able to suppress all opposition for more than four decades, eviscerating systematically any expression of organized social, political, or economic interests. It had successfully maintained the fiction of popular participation while its political system made any real participation impossible.

61 The “Arab Spring,” which due to its longevity, has some observers advocating a name change – suggestions include the “Arab Decade,” the “Arab Turn” and the “Arab Awakening.” Regardless of what it should be called, most analysts agree that it began with protests breaking out in Tunisia in December of 2010. These events and their success served to catalyze further protests in neighbouring states, the majority of which are located in North Africa and the Middle East. Former rulers have been ousted from power in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya. Further, civil uprisings have persisted in Syria and Bahrain and at least 11 other countries have seen either major or minor protests as well. While each country involved has its own unique set of circumstances, several factors are common to the majority of cases. Civil resistance in the form of protests, strikes, rallies, marches and demonstrations have been utilized by citizens of these countries. Moreover, social media has been a major driving force and critical in the ability of the movements to organize and plan their disruptive actions. The repercussions are still being felt from these events, and only time will tell where they will ultimately lead.
The above passage illustrates the mentality of Gaddafi and his insiders in the years and months leading up to the events of February 2011; even the population of Libya did not foresee the changes that were to occur. Indeed, with the economy picking up and the country reintegration into the international community, Gaddafi looked as entrenched in power as ever before, but this was all about to change. The fall of President Mubarak in Egypt on February 11th, 2011 invigorated the eastern tribes and imbued them with a sense of hope; the resulting uprisings that began on the 15th of February illustrated the deep-seated resentment toward the regime. Benghaz, along with the vast majority of the country’s East, had been ostensibly ignored by the government for many decades resulting in high unemployment and widespread underdevelopment despite the state’s high level of nationalized oil revenues – in the end it was this neglect which fostered the voracity and tenacity of the uprisings.

A national day of protest was orchestrated, by both domestically based and expatriate Libyans, for the 17th of February - these protests rapidly escalated into conflict. Western media accounts of the events broadly portrayed the protestors as peaceful, and the security forces as committing atrocities against these unarmed civilians. The suppression of the protests began with tear gas and batons, and steadily greater force was used, from small arms to heavy weapons such as machine guns and anti-tank guns (Independent Civil Society Fact Finding Report 2012). However, the severity of the actions of Gaddafi’s security forces have been debated, with some

62 The initial revolt itself was triggered by the arrest of Fathi Tarbil, who was a human rights lawyer representing prisoners killed in prison by Gaddafi forces (Vandewalle 2012). Prior to his arrest there had also been smaller demonstrations over the provision of affordable housing in January, so tensions were running high in the eastern provinces of Libya.
claiming that only armed militants were being targeted (Kuperman 2011) while others argue that attack helicopters were used to shoot protestors (CNN 2011). The differing accounts of the events are due to both misinformation, such as medical workers making inaccurate estimates of deaths across the country based on their local clinical experience, and disinformation, including deliberate attempts by the rebel groups to spread propaganda that would further demonize Gaddafi. Evidence from relatively neutral groups such as Human Rights Watch (2011) and International Crisis Group (2011) indicates that Gaddafi forces were initially measured in their response to the protests, shooting to injure rather than to kill, and targeting only armed factions of the demonstrations. Regardless of the initial conditions of the unrest, armed rebel factions quickly took up arms against the government forces. On the 2nd of March the “National Transitional Council” (NTC) made up of rebel group leaders emerged and declared itself the “sole representative of all Libya.” During this time coastal towns in the east were taken by anti-government forces who easily cleared Gaddafi loyalists out due to their small numbers in these areas.

6.3.2 Cockroaches and Rats: The Making of the “Perfect Storm”

While Gaddafi’s armed forces were disorganized for a modern army, they were still an army, and a formidable one compared to the loose knit, untrained groups of rebels. Thus, in the early weeks of March Gaddafi was able to muster his armed forces and push back the poorly trained rebels, reversing many of their earlier gains. It is paramount to note that Gaddafi retook many of the cities previously held by the rebels, and in none

did he slaughter innocent civilians. But it was not his actions so much as his words that caught the attention of the international community. Gaddafi pledged to chase down and eliminate the “cockroaches” and “rats” who had taken up arms against him “inch by inch, room by room, home by home, alleyway by alleyway, person by person” (BBC 2011; Human Rights Watch 2012; New York Times 2011). It was predominantly these statements, with their use of language reminiscent of the 1994 Rwanda genocide examined in the following chapter, which prompted the UNSC to act in favour of the rebels.

The initial interventions taken by the UNSC were three-fold and specifically targeted Gaddafi, his family, and his government. These measures included 1) sanctions, 2) arms embargos, and 3) travel bans (Vandewalle 2012). After the inflammatory rhetoric by Gaddafi, the UNSC along with other major international alliances including the EU, the Arab league, the AU, and numerous individual countries rallied in support of the NTC. Foreshadowing the French desire to be in a position of leadership was the fact that France was the first country to officially recognize the NTC on March 10. Shortly thereafter, on March 17th Resolution 1973 was adopted by the UNSC amid a “perfect storm” of circumstances which included Libyan government forces pushing back the rebels and being poised to retake Benghazi, the nearly universal recognition of the NTC as the legitimate representatives of Libya, and a strong case for a humanitarian intervention operation, often referred to under the doctrine of “The Responsibility to Protect” or R2P. Resolution 1973 was proposed at the behest of the Arab league and passed with a “vote of 10 in favour to none against, with 5 abstentions (Brazil, China, Germany, India, Russian Federation)” (UNSC 2011). The resolution stated, “the Security
Council this evening imposed a ban on all flights in the country’s airspace — a no-fly zone — and tightened sanctions on the Gaddafi regime and its supporters” (UNSC 2011). Moreover, the resolution allowed member states, “to take all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack in the country, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory” (UNSC 2011). Accordingly, there were to be no foreign troops on Libyan soil and there was no mention of regime change in the resolution itself. The primary goals were establishment of a no-fly zone and the protection of civilians. However, the vagueness of the clause — there was no mention of how civilians were to be protected, or what the specific mandate of the protecting force was to be — allowed for expansion of the military mission later.

The French were particularly eager to get involved militarily in Libya, while the US was more cautious in doing so. The British were also willing to assistance, and the initial military operation beginning on the 19th of March consisted of a coalition of the willing, headed by the French and British and backed by the Americans. There is debate as to which factors played the most prominent role in motivating Sarkozy to

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64 The Obama Doctrine or “Leading from Behind”: Some analysts were surprised at US President Obama’s strong stance on not getting overly involved in Libya. Certainly, those who had seen the American eagerness to intervene in Iraq and Afghanistan, among others, assumed that the Libya case would be another venture the US would sink its teeth into. Obama, however, was elected on the promise of ending two wars, not starting a third. He cited the lack of American interests in Libya and did not want to alienate his base by heading up another cowboy campaign in the Middle East/North Africa region. These dynamics and the US policy to pitch in only where it needed to, meant that other NATO allies had to lend a greater helping hand. It also exposed the weaknesses of NATO and its reliance on US command. From this the US learned that it can involve itself in military campaigns without drawing too much public ire provided that: 1) there is a low risk of American casualties, 2) there is a definite timeline for withdrawal and 3) reliable partners are involved.

65 The missions of each country were individually branded as Operation Ellamy by the British, Operation Odyssey Dawn by the United States and Operation Harmattan by the French (Auerswald and Saideman 2013).
embrace this cause so wholeheartedly. To be sure, presidential systems of governance put greater policy making power in the hands of the executive, and in this case, it appears that Sarkozy was the key driver of French policy in terms of the intervention strategy. Outwardly, at least, Sarkozy appeared to be chiefly motivated by the peril of the people of Benghazi and the associated R2P implications. Time and time again he emphasized this aspect of the motivation, and in the early days of the campaign his actions caused a row when French airstrikes hit Gaddafi’s forces pre-emptively, without consultation with the British and American partners. Despite his public posturing, though, there are several other significant reasons why Sarkozy took on this cause, not the least of which was a close personal relationship with the French academic and philosopher Bernard-Henri Lévy.66-67 Many of Sarkozy’s allies and even members of his own government were shocked by the news that France was taking such quick measures to recognize the NTC; many observers noted that Lévy seemed to have a disproportionate influence on Sarkozy. In addition, analysts since have pointed to the numerous pull factors that contributed to this policy decision, including the upcoming election and the need to look strong in comparison to the opposition parties, the affirmation of France as a security leader both within the EU and beyond, and finally its role as a rebuke to Gaddafi who has previously opposed many French policies in Africa (Auerswald and Saideman 2013). Overall, the perfect storm analogy works well in

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66 This bizarre connection was corroborated by others and the phone conversation they had after Lévy had spent time in Benghazi with the rebel leaders was later referenced in a published interview. He said to Sarkozy of the NTC leaders: “There are people here, good people; these people hold the same values as we do, and they’re going to die to the last one if we allow Gadhafi to go on to the conclusion of his criminal logic. Would you accept to receive them in Paris and thus send a strong signal to the butcher?” (Lévy 2011). The following Monday, Sarkozy accepted Lévy and three of the NTC leaders to join in a meeting in France to discuss the future of Libya and France’s role in the operation.

relation to France’s decision to lead the mission. Unfortunately for Sarkozy, it did not take long for the cracks to show in the Franco-Anglo alliance.

6.3.3 Quarrels Amongst Allies and NATO Takes Over

The bold nature of the French desire to lead and its sudden military action surprised both its coalition allies and many in the international policy community. A military coalition led by the French and backed by British and American air power was the most desirable course of action on the part of France, and it had been negotiated that US and UK strikes would take out the Libyan air defenses and French and British air strikes would target ground forces thereafter (Auerswald and Saideman 2013). When French aircraft began striking Libyan tanks stationed outside of Benghazi before the official start of the campaign, the UK policy makers were appalled, and a rift developed between the British and the French.68

Truly, without NATOs command and control framework, troublesome instances like this would become commonplace throughout the intervention. Moreover, the US hoped to take on a smaller role after the initial air defenses had been taken out, and without NATO to lead, the operation would have to rely on US regional command structures.69 It was quickly realized by both the US and UK that a NATO led and coordinated operation was much more suited to the circumstances. Some within NATO objected to this on the very valid premise that this was a conflict of choice – no NATO

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68 In his argument against making it a NATO operation, Sarkozy had noted that NATO was seen as an imperialist tool in the Middle East; despite this declaration, most observers agree that he wanted to avoid the political compromises necessary to implement a NATO mission, as well as keep leadership firmly in French hands. Unfortunately for Sarkozy, his zealous behaviour was what cost him this reality.

69 Even within the US structures problems were arising; these included unclear command hierarchies, lack of adequate bandwidth for communications and inability to get clearance for intelligence sharing among allies (Quartararo et al. 2012).
member state had been attacked, so why go to war? The French also posed strong objections, but despite these contentions, on March 31st the operation finally became Operation Unified Protector fully under the command of NATO.

One key difference between this operation and previous humanitarian interventions was that while NATO would deal with the day to day procedures, political control of the operation was instead ceded to coalition members, including members of the Arab League and the AU, along with smaller countries such as Qatar and the UAE.\(^7\) What is more, the operation had to be initially approved by all 28 NATO members via the North Atlantic Council (NAC). In order for this to occur Turkey insisted that the French not lead the mission, a sentiment the UK, and even the US, agreed with; in turn the French would not allow for the mission to be led by the UK. Italy and Turkey both agreed only on the condition that NATO was not to provide close air support for the rebels. Germany, who had abstained from the vote at the UN, was not willing to be involved in the mission. Chancellor Angela Merkel, it is generally believed, miscalculated the German populace’s level of war exhaustion and hoped to gain popularity at home by not participating in the mission, in a move akin to her predecessor’s stance on the Iraq war. However, the German populace did not want to be so out of step with its allies and she received arguably more criticism for not participating than she would have had Germany taken a minor role in the operation (Berenkoetter 2012). Nevertheless, despite these important political compromises and abstentions, all parties eventually agreed to the various conditions, the NAC passed the motion. The next step was to find a leader they could all agree on.

Canada was not a major player in the initial coalition, nor did it hold a seat in the UNSC at the time, so the country’s involvement up until the NATO transition was relatively limited. It began with public statements condemning Gaddafi and highlighting its support for the rebel movement.\(^7\) One significant move that Canada did make came on the 2\(^{nd}\) of March, with the Governor General, on the advice of the PM, approving the deployment of the Royal Canadian Navy frigate HMCS Charlottetown to the Mediterranean, off the coast of Libya, in what the defense minister, Peter MacKay called a “precautionary and staged measure.”\(^8\) Canada also sent signals to NATO of its readiness to participate by preparing a group of CF-18 fighters for deployment.\(^9\) These actions may have helped the NATO leadership in securing its choice of commander for the mission. At the time of the unrest, Canadian Lieutenant General Charles Bouchard was the Deputy-Commander for NATO’s Southern Command based out of Naples, second in command to U.S. Admiral Samuel Locklear. In many ways Bouchard was the obvious choice to lead the mission, as the Americans did not want to be seen as playing a leading role, thus ruling out Locklear. Moreover, due to the rift in their alliance, the British would not stand to see a French commander take the lead and vice versa. After Bouchard was chosen to lead the effort, Canada played a more active role in the intervention.

From both a practical standpoint and a political standpoint, moving from a general coalition to a mission under the wing of NATO was a welcome shift in the eyes of

\(^7\) For example, then Foreign Affairs Minister Lawrence Cannon spoke at the UN Human Rights Council, stating that the world should focus on the developing humanitarian situation and that Canada was willing to assist.

\(^8\) ibid.

the Canadian government which was headed by a Conservative minority at the time. The major decisions happened at the highest levels of office, with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and the Department of National Defense (DND) engaging themselves in a responsive mode, ready to act once word came down from above. Once it had been agreed that NATO was taking over with Bouchard at the helm, strong signals were sent from the Prime Minister’s Office and Cabinet that Canada would be heavily involved in the NATO mission, and the departments readied themselves accordingly. Alternate policies were apparently not seriously entertained – it was a given that Canada would be involved from the get-go. With that said, this operation was different from past operations in the sense that it was a very particular confluence of events which had broad support from all sides of the political spectrum. Hence there was not a great deal of opposition from the agency staff, or from the other political parties. The pros seemed to outweigh the cons, although in hindsight – one official noted – the very real negative consequences and aftermath of the intervention were never carefully considered.

74 Information in this section was drawn from informal interviews with senior officials from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT; now Global Affairs Canada).
75 According one senior official at DFAIT, the policy making process in this case was very one directional. Apparently in similar situations in the past, such as Kosovo and Afghanistan, ministers would consult in official, high level meetings with senior officials at both DFAIT and DND; here the departments would present the different policy options, weigh the pros and cons, and make recommendations with the minister and cabinet having the final say. In the Libya case, however, the push was coming from the top down and there was very little input to be had from DFAIT and DND officials and staff.
76 The senior official emphasized that agency staff are always able to provide advice and input, which may at times be quite vigorous – yet in the end, as long as the decisions the ministers make are within the bounds of Canadian law, that decision is what goes.
77 On the political front, Stephen Harper and the Conservatives recognized that the mission would be supported by the other parties and brought the issue to debate in parliament even though this was not required by law. According to one source, this was seen as a way of “getting everyone’s hand in the bucket of blood.” In the sense that once all parties had given their approval, it would be difficult to criticize the government should something go wrong. On March 20th, the opposition parties endorsed a three-month mission. Indeed, Harper calculated correctly and there was broad support of the mission from all major parties including the Liberals, the NDP and the Bloc Quebecois. The Liberals saw this as the
6.3.4 Gaddafi Pushes Back

Although NATO’s airstrikes were having a profound destabilizing effect on Gaddafi’s military, the poorly organized rebels were still unable to make and hold significant gains against the better trained government forces. Over the course of the next few months, although NATO stepped up its military campaign, and countries such as Qatar had group troops (illegally) in the country, training and arming rebels as well as fighting alongside them, a military solution was looking more and more unlikely. The western part of Libya had recurring gains and losses by the rebel forces with western support over this period. Three policy paths were considered by the Western powers at this time. No one had budgeted (both literally and figuratively) for the war to last well into the summer. By July 2011 NATO allies and the Europeans in particular, were beginning to waver on their support for the mission. Back in Ottawa, by this time the Conservatives had won a majority government and John Baird had taken over as foreign minister. In parliament, the mission had to go to vote to be renewed, by this time the New Democratic Party (NDP) were more nuanced in their support, yet the motion to extend for another 3 months still passed by an overwhelming 294 to 1, with Green Party leader implementation of their heavily touted R2P doctrine, while the NDP and the Bloc were obliged to support a mission that was purported to prevent the “inevitable” slaughter of thousands of civilians. To be sure, the Conservative government did not once invoke the term R2P, yet as one journalist noted, “The Liberals called the idea Responsibility to Protect. The Conservatives gave it teeth.” It also helped that all parties were aware that there was minimal, if any, risk of Canadian casualties. In sum, once the plan was endorsed, Canada was set to become one of the key allies in the intervention and would prove to punch above its weight as a middle power country.

Moreover, the fact that a great deal of the fighting was taking place in cities where NATO could not attack meant that often the rebels were left fighting man-to-man with conventional small arms.

According to one anonymous senior official, these shifts were notable within DFAIT and DND, with the new minister pushing for Canadian involvement to continue to expand.
Elizabeth May providing the loan “nay” voice. Clearly Canadians were still committed to the intervention, yet NATO members debated how to move forward.

There were three primary policy options on the table for implementing a Libya without Gaddafi: 1) more intense support for the rebels, allowing them to move west and take Tripoli, though deep seated divisions between the west and the east made the sustainability of this option questionable, 2) allow and support the splitting of Libya into two states, one in the east and one in the west, however this would require a commitment to keep a peacekeeping force in place, and 3) gradually undermine the Gaddafi government’s credibility and prospects for future success by cutting off their economic capacity and waging psychological warfare, but this would likely result in an even longer conflict (Vandewalle 2012). With no end in sight for the seemingly intractable stalemate, there were whispers on both sides about a negotiated settlement being the only way forward (Vandewalle 2012). The most sensitive issue in implementing such an agreement was centred on the ultimate fate of Gaddafi and his inner circle. During this time Gaddafi and members of his family had also been indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes against humanity, making

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81 Breaking the Resolution: Covert Forces on the Ground. As noted, UNSCR 1973 clearly stated that there were to be no foreign armed troops on the ground in Libya. However, from the early days of the battles, Western and allied troops were caught on film in Libya. Not only were small teams of special forces witnessed and identified, but also large contingents of military as well. Qatar in particular played a large role in this technically illegal maneuver. The gulf state has admitted that it had thousands of soldiers in Libya, training and equipping the rebels. Now Qatari military forces are taking the lead in training the new Libyan army. Sources from inside diplomatic circles also corroborated the stories and confirmed to the media that various other states had teams on the ground including the French, the British and the Italians. One anonymous US official noted that special forces were there not only to assist the rebels, but also to gather intelligence on possible infiltrations by Al-Qaeda and related groups.
a deal between Tripoli and Benghazi ever more unlikely. Speculations about such a scenario were finally brought to an end on August 21\textsuperscript{st} when rebels launched a massive assault on Tripoli with the support of NATO. It is clear that this final decision was driven partly by the rebel’s desire to make this their last war and take advantage of the presence of NATO support, and partly by the frustration of the allied forces at the length of time the conflict had dragged on. It seemed that policy number one, disposal of the dictator by force, had won out based on the dynamics of two-level games not only in Libya but also in the West.

Although the name of the NATO mission was “Unified Protector,” the actual role played by the allies varied greatly from state to state. Figure 23 lists the NATO countries and their maximum contribution to the mission. A number of countries “played it safe” by either not participating or by participating only in low-risk operations such as enforcing the navel blockade.\footnote{Some allies stepped up one level and helped to enforce the no-fly zone, still a low risk activity since the US and UK airstrikes had removed Gaddafi’s ability to take down aircraft. Finally, eight members engaged in airstrikes, either on pre-determined targets or in a dynamic fashion with pilots able to make on-the-fly decisions (Auerswald and Saideman 2013).}

\textit{Figure 23. Role of NATO Allies in the Libya Mission}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Maximum Effort</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Air Strikes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Air Strikes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Air Strikes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Air Strikes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\footnote{Gaddafi and his sons had publicly voiced their intentions to fight to the bitter end, further compounding the difficulty of a ceasefire and power-sharing agreement being made.}

\footnote{Table partially adapted from Auerswald and Saideman (2013).}
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Air Strikes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Air Strikes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Air Strikes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Air Strikes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>No Fly Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>No Fly Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>No Fly Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Naval Embargo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Naval Embargo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Naval Embargo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Naval Embargo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Canada participated in more than 10% of total airstrike missions, and arguably took on a larger role than would have been expected given its size. By the end of the campaign 446 missions had been flown, and up to 14.5 million pounds of jet-fuel had been exhausted.\(^{85}\) The strong mandate provided by parliament, Canada’s desire to demonstrate its utility as a NATO ally, and the presence of a Canadian commander, were all factors that contributed to it taking on such an outsized role.

Within the first two weeks of the operation, all of Gaddafi’s air defense systems and his entire air force had been taken out by precision airstrikes. This speed was due to the fact that NATO’s procedures and structures made the operation run much more smoothly than the initial coalition attacks had. The alliance continuously stated that its airstrikes were about protecting civilians as per United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973, however over time the lines between protecting civilians and destroying Gaddafi’s forces whether they were a direct threat or not became fuzzy. This shift in objective came to a head on April 13 in Doha when the Libya Contact Group (LCG), which was made up of twenty one countries, the Arab league, the EU, NATO and more, met to discuss the future of the country (Laity 2012). Here, the contact group endorsed the idea that Gaddafi must leave power, and this was followed up the next day by NATO’s foreign ministers making a public statement reaffirming the same notion.

It only took the rebels a few days to conquer Tripoli with the support of NATO’s coastal weaponry, and the city officially fell on August 28th. The operation apparently caught Gaddafi’s forces by surprise (though apparently not Gaddafi himself for he had already fled to his hometown), with rebel vehicles loaded with fighters driving into the main square unscathed. The sleeper cells set up road blocks and defended against the

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86 While NATO wanted to arrange a ceasefire, this was difficult for three core reasons. First, Gaddafi had his army bases close to population centres, so if he were to withdraw, there was very little stopping him from simply waiting NATO out and resuming attacks after they had left (Laity 2012). Second, with their confidence buoyed by Western support, the rebels saw this as their chance to finally oust Gaddafi. They refused to accept his many offers of a ceasefire and instead pushed forward to take more territory. Third, Gaddafi had to be demonized extensively in the West in order for the domestic political constituents to allow their countries to go to war; if they then turned around and cut a deal with Gaddafi, the operation would look like a farce, a failure, or both.


88 The operation used a combination of rebel advances, rebel “sleeper cells,” covert foreign special force teams and NATO coastal forces. It was named Operation Mermaid Dawn and was planned secretly by the ad-hoc alliance over the course of three months.
remains of Gaddafi’s army. To give credit, Gaddafi and his convey stayed in Tripoli until the end, fleeing on the 28th of August with hope for greener pastures in his hometown of Sirte. Reports note that there were various conveys heading in different directions, assumedly to up their chances of escape. Gaddafi and the loyalists still with him took shelter in Sirte, but with the rebels advancing on the city they were plagued by constant artillery and mortar fire and had to move repeatedly. No one knew that Gaddafi had taken shelter in Sirte until much later. For nearly two months, the once powerful dictator survived by eating food from houses abandoned by those who had fled the fighting, with little to no contact with the outside world.

District 2 in Sirte was the last loyalist held area, and as the rebel militias moved in, eventually Gaddafi and his men decided their situation was unsustainable. They put together a plan to escape in a convoy, taking those who remained along with some civilians. Trucks loaded with heavy weaponry and other supplies were organized, and the convoy planned to leave in the early hours of the morning on October 20th, however it was delayed to nearly 8 am. About 250 people were in the convoy, and it was not long before militias spotted them and attacked, with the convoy fighting back and NATO jets flying overhead. In due course NATO air-burst bombs hit the convoy and many were killed. Gaddafi and several others survived, nevertheless, and took shelter in a nearby compound. The group then ran across an open road and ducked into a drainage pipe,

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89 The success of the raid was also assisted by one of the commanders, Mohammed Eshkal, who was tasked with protecting Tripoli (Laity 2012). According to interviews, Gaddafi had executed Eshkal’s cousin 20 years earlier and he still harboured a grudge. As revenge, when the time came, he struck a deal to let the rebels take the city virtually without a fight.
91 Some of his family members, mostly female, made it safely to Algeria, and their presence was noted by the Algerian government who vowed to keep them safe.
but rebel militias spotted them, and grenades were thrown, disabling Gaddafi. He was picked up and immediately beaten, abused, and stabbed; the evidence is documented on camera. The fighters carried him to a truck loaded him in - by the time an ambulance was reached, he had died. It is still unclear exactly how Gaddafi met his end; however, the video depicts the brutal nature of his final capture.

6.4 Analysis of the Intervention: Ignoring the Fundamentals Leads to Failure

6.4.1 The Decision to Intervene

The policy decisions required to implement a large military intervention are extraordinarily complex. The decision-making process involves numerous actors and institutional settings and has consequences far beyond that of the specific situation. Once precedents for intervention are set, it is difficult to return to the previous norm. In the vignette above I detailed extensively the factors that led to the intervention decision. In this case there was a confluence of factors that led NATO to conduct a military intervention. However, I also show that the intervention was foolhardy and did not respect the rule of law in many ways. It also resulted in a great deal of unintended consequences. Libya’s ALC profile shows that capacity would have been a much better way to have a meaningful and positive impact on the country. An IMF structural adjustment program could have been implemented, especially if incentives were put in place for Ghaddafi to continue to reap some of the benefits, for instance through a sovereign wealth fund. The “cutting off of the head of the snake” strategy may sound good in theory, but we have seen time and time again that a power vacuum never leads to good outcomes. The deleterious effects precipitated by this operation, through
unintended consequences, cannot be understated, as the current situation in Libya will attest.

6.4.2 Implementation of the Intervention

From a military standpoint the intervention was implemented successfully, but from a more holistic view it was disastrous; it has drastically worsened the fragility situation in the country and the Sahel region as a whole. In addition, after Gaddafí’s capture and death, many atrocities were committed by the various rebel militias. Towns seen to be loyal to Gaddafí were razed, and instances of rape, mass execution and ethnic cleansing were reported. Black Africans were targeted because it had been reported that there were African mercenaries fighting on the side of Gaddafí, therefore any black individuals in towns once loyal to Gaddafí were tortured and summarily executed. The NTC has not investigated any of these instances, despite widespread evidence and reporting of such atrocities. To be sure, the atrocities committed by Gaddafí and his regime during the civil war were often equally terrible, however prior to the war, such activities were rare. Indeed, many have reported that human rights in Libya are now worse off than they were under the Gaddafí regime. There are open slave markets across the country and lawlessness abounds; the scale of widespread human rights abuses, irregular migration including human trafficking, arms and drug trafficking, tribalism and general

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chaos that now thrives in Libya cannot be overstated (Teimouri and Subedi 2018)
Overall, Libya now has terrible authority measurements, with porous borders, militia rule, an active slave trade, and not a modicum of stability. This authority intervention did not achieve its goals other than to depose a single dictator with little regard for the repercussions to the Libyan people and pushed the country down the path to state failure.

6.4.3 Effect on Legitimacy and Capacity
Since the intervention political life in Libya has been marred by instability and upheaval, and free and fair elections have not yet been conducted. Certainly, Libya has gone down the intervention failure pathway, with the authority intervention leading to a massive and self-reinforcing deterioration in all three dimensions of statehood. Radical Islamist parties have come to the forefront and threaten to return Libya to an undesirable state. Western countries have seemingly turned their backs on the country, and there is no talk of a UN peacekeeping mission, a vital ingredient in so many other post-conflict situations, being established in Libya. Perhaps this can be best explained by a statement made by the aforementioned senior DFAIT official, who noted that, “Nothing happens in a vacuum, when the war ended countries have their resources tied up in Afghanistan and elsewhere, and couldn’t commit any more resources to Libya, especially after the mission went so much longer than expected.” It seems that despite the initial interest in taking part in the more kinetic aspects of the intervention, the political will for involvement in effective state building is non-existent. As for capacity, the economy has also been devastated as can be seen in the ALC profile above.
The negative repercussions of the war have been acutely felt beyond the borders of Libya. The most serious case can be found in Mali, the next case study examined in chapter seven, where small arms and seasoned fighters readily made their way through porous borders to influence the events in the north of the country. Tuareg separatist fighters in Mali, who were once kept on a short leash by their ally Gaddafi, received an influx of weaponry and reinforcements after the Libyan civil war drove out many sympathetic to their cause with nothing left to lose. Evidence shows that Gaddafi had his men store both light arms and heavy weapons in ad-hoc caches and secret locations around the country in order to thwart NATO’s attacks. These weapons are valuable and have boosted the arms trafficking trade in the Sahel region. Furthermore, large influxes of refugees have been shown to contribute to increased state fragility and a higher propensity for conflict onset (Gleditsch 2003). The long-term effects of this crisis on economic and social development in Mali and the greater Sahel have been devastating. Just a year after the intervention there were over 20,000 registered IDPs in Mali and over 200,000 in neighbouring countries (UNHCR 2012). This did not even account for unregistered persons, for which there are currently no accurate estimates. Along with the extraordinary hardships faced by those who have been forced into migration, the situation is deteriorating as aid agencies and NGOs similarly flee unsafe areas. Overall, there is evidence that the civil war in Libya and the NATO intervention itself contributed to the eruption of the subsequent conflict in Mali, which will be examined in the next chapter.

6.4.4 Failure of the Intervention

The dominant narrative that now surrounds the NATO intervention in Libya, at least in the West, is predominantly positive. It goes something like this: an evil dictator
oppresses his people, protests erupt, dictator kills his own people and threatens to massacre an entire city, the UN and NATO come to the rescue, the dictator is killed, and everyone lives happily ever after. Unfortunately, this is not an accurate representation of the reality of the situation. In order to determine whether the intervention was a success as a humanitarian mission, it must be examined as a counterfactual. What would have happened had NATO not intervened? Or if they had intervened in a more productive way such as providing economic aid towards trade development (capacity building) or assistance with political representation and power-sharing for minorities (legitimacy building). At the time that UNSCR 1973 was passed, Gaddafi’s armed forces had driven the rebels back to their last stronghold in Benghazi. During that time, many cities were captured, and no mass revenge killings had been perpetrated. Gaddafi’s son stated publicly that the uprising would be over in two days, and Gaddafi himself had said that his security forces would only target those who continued to fight them, giving free passage east to rebels who wished to flee. Based on the previous time it took for Gaddafi to take back the cities the rebels had captured, his son was most likely correct. Indeed, during this push-back, hundreds were killed, however as reported by Human Rights Watch, the vast majority of them were men, indicating that the killing was targeted, not indiscriminate. In sum, had NATO not intervened, a generous estimate for the number of total deaths caused by the civil war is between 1000 and 1500 (Kuperman 2013). While this number is still large and nothing to balk at, when compared to the 25,000 to 35,000 estimated by the NTC, or even the 8000 – 15,000 estimated by the US government, it is but a small fraction. If NATO had not intervened, the war would have

been over in a matter of weeks, instead it stretched on for more than seven months, cost billions of dollars, and countless lives. The social fabric of the country has been torn, the infrastructure will take decades to rebuild and the previous quality of life provided through government provided housing, education, healthcare and other social services will not return. Overall the lives of those in Libya are worse off, not better and as discussed, further repercussions are still being felt in the greater Sahel region. With all of this in mind, it is difficult to characterize the intervention as a “success.” Still, supposing that Gaddafi did need to go, and that NATO was the only force that could break his entrenched control over the country, was this a good policy choice for Canada?

Philip Zelikow’s model of successful foreign policy engineering has seven steps and is a useful framework by which to judge whether the policy to go to Libya was, on sum, beneficial to Canada. This framework is designed to be used to “appraise the analytical components of a public policy” (Zeliokow 1994: p.144). The components of the framework are as follows: 1) national interest, 2) objectives, 3) strategy, 4) design, 5) implementation, 6) maintenance and 7) review. Firstly, “national interest” is a non-operational goal. It underpins the policy and acts to promote and “sell” it to the public, yet at the same time whether or not the policy is in the national interest of the country is not always intuitively clear. It is true that Canada expended a significant amount of money and military resources in order to take part in the mission. However, on the plus side, the intervention improved Canada’s standing amongst its allies by taking on a large role relative to its size was certainly a benefit of the policy. So, on this it can be said that the policy was neutral – some good and some bad came of it. In regard to “objectives,” the stated objective was to protect civilians who were in harm’s way. The fact that the intervention ended with more civilian deaths than would have been seen without it has
not been brought to bear in the aftermath – that is, most Canadians still feel that the country did “a good thing” in Libya. To the contrary, from the analysis in this paper it is clear that the mission failed in this aspect – a negative result. “Strategy” and “design” are tied up with one another. Libya’s fragility is now worse than it ever has been, and it has even destabilized neighbouring countries including Mali and other North Western African nations such as Chad and Central African Republic. Canada did make a big contribution in this regard not only by having a Canadian NATO commander but also through extensive preparations and involvement in the strategic targeting at NATO. A former legal advisor to general Bouchard indicated that Canada played a large role in determining the location of viable targets and justifying the legal underpinnings of hitting said targets. Indeed, the civilian death toll by direct NATO bombings was relatively low, with at least 77 confirmed kills as reported by Human Rights Watch. With over 11,500 airstrikes by the end of the campaign, this number is remarkable. This can be chalked up as a positive. In terms of “implementation,” “maintenance” and “review,” it is critical to note that policies as designed are nearly always different from those implemented. Constraints on resources, unforeseen issues, and unexpected events all contribute to this phenomenon. Therefore, once a policy is implemented, it must be maintained and reviewed to ensure it is still meeting the initial objectives. On this front, the Libyan intervention gets a failing grade. The war ended up dragging on two to three times as long as expected, resulting in many more deaths than initially thought. Moreover, the political and human rights situation in the country deteriorated quickly after the intervention, and no systematic review of the effects of the NATO campaign on the infrastructure and living conditions of Libyans was ever conducted. Additionally, the lack of commitment of Western powers after the war ended further exacerbated the dire
conditions of the Libyan populace. On the whole, this policy served to improve the image of the Canadian government domestically due to lack of awareness of the reality on the ground in Libya, and at the same time it also bolstered Canada’s relationship with and standing in the eyes of its allies. Consequently, domestically and among allies, the policy can be viewed as a success. On the other hand, for the people of Libya and the greater Sahel region, the policy did them more harm than good.

6.5 Conclusions and Next Steps

In conclusion, the Libya and Cambodia case studies both illustrated that two-level games are always at play when it comes to international policy making. And when it comes to fragility, only focusing on security (authority) as so many interventions do, ultimately leads to negative outcomes. To be sure, what may be a good choice domestically is not always a good choice internationally, and vice versa. Turning to Cambodia, the country remains a deeply unequal society despite its improvements in fragility and particularly capacity indicators, with tourism making up a large portion of the economy, but the rents are not captured equally across societal stratifications (Brickell 2008). If democratic norms can be built up, there may be a possibility for Cambodia to continue on its recovery path, but if the West abandons it and the China-model becomes more appealing, there is no telling what will result. Moreover, the study demonstrates how domestic politics play out in the international arena – without the perfect storm created by Gaddafi’s self-isolation and maniacal statements, the French desire to appear strong, and the international community buying into a narrative based on rebel propaganda, the intervention would have never been seen a legitimate policy choice. In Canada, group-think and eagerness to “do good” led to a situation where the
country was contributing to a destructive mission in the name of lofty ideals. Unfortunately, unless the popular narrative of the intervention and its consequences is adapted to fit reality, Canada is poised to repeat the same behaviour in the future (the upcoming 2018 mission to Mali comes to mind here). The lessons learned by this mission are critical to understanding what keeps countries stuck in extreme fragility, and the policy making community would do well to heed them in making similar decisions in the future. The next step is to examine the cases of legitimacy intervention failure and success.
Chapter 7  Legitimacy Interventions

Organization is the road to political power, but it is also the foundation of political liberty. The vacuum of power and authority which exists in so many modernizing countries may be filled temporality by charismatic leadership or by military force. But it can be filled permanently only by political organization. Either the established elites compete among themselves to organize the masses through the existing political system, or dissident elites organize themselves to overthrow that system. In the modernizing world he controls the future who organizes its politics.

-  Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (1968)

Legitimacy can be thought of as the relationship between a government and its people, or in other words, state-society relations. Legitimate states have the respect and hopefully even the admiration of their people; elections and institutional processes are thought of as being free, fair, and representative of the overall population’s wishes and interests. When there are debates and interests at odds, the body politic believes that rational discourse can provide compromises and lead to policies reflecting those compromises. On the other hand, when a state is seen as illegitimate, people perceive rulers as working in their—or their elite faction’s—own interests only, they do not put faith in the ability of government to ‘get things done’ and when debates arise there can be a fair expectation that political violence and other forms of outright conflict can occur. Therefore, legitimacy is key to a stable society and fruitful economy, wherein trust
between disparate groups goes beyond mere rhetoric and instead runs deep based on faith in the institutions that moderate societal interactions amongst these groups. Liberal democracy provides answers to the age-old questions of ‘how do people get along in society?’ and ‘how do we moderate competing interests?’ in that same society. The individual is seen as the primary unit of independent decision making with his or her group identity coming second. At the same time, democracy leaves room for groups to compete in the public decision-making space by allowing free speech and open dialogue to shine light on the best ideas and rid our discourse of respect for the worst ideas. This concept may seem rudimentary to those of us living in the West, having been brought up with these basic freedoms being taken for granted, however in many societies the idea that one can have an open dialogue that proposes ideas going against a ruler or the status quo comes across as far-fetched at best and dangerous at worst. Understanding how societies can transition then from a closed posture to an open posture is paramount if we are examining state fragility through a Weberian lens. Can “interventions” into political culture of states therefore be imposed from the outside? Or do such changes have to be imbued through grass-roots movements from inside a country or society? These are the questions I examine in the following cases.

In the statistical analysis presented earlier I proxied legitimacy interventions using a power-sharing event database. I identify power-sharing as one of the clearest forms of externally imposed intervention on political legitimacy, precisely because it is so difficult a concept to measure. McCovoy and O’Leary (2013) put this idea as so:

The powerless lack the capacity to do things they might want to do. The powerful are in the opposite situation. Power sharing, therefore, suggests spreading the capacity to get
things done ... [it] broadens membership of ‘the powers that be.’ It also requires that the included parties have access to key and observable ‘decision making.’ There must be no important ‘non-decision making’ taking place off stage, that is, no hidden possessor of power who control the agenda or exclude some issues from being addressed. There must instead be an open and negotiable public agenda among the power-sharers or at least among their leaders. Any suppression of (controversial) issues must be mutually agreed upon by those who share power.

From this definition of power-sharing one can discern why it is such a vital concept. The exercise of power will allow an individual or group to benefit from its implementation. This idea is especially powerful in zero-sum situations where one groups win is another’s loss, for example when there is competition for access to resources. The idea of the ‘tyranny of the majority’ has troubled philosophers for a long time, and it remains a challenge to modern day governments at all levels. Though, conditions of tyranny can also be imposed by a minority, and we see this arrangement crop up surprisingly often (Mr. Assad’s Alawites in Syria come to mind as a particularly brutal example). This is a broad definition, still, it exemplifies why it is useful to examine specific power-sharing agreements in particular locales to better understand what happens when they are implemented in practice. When we examine such arrangements, it is easy to point to specific peace agreements with articles detailing the numbers of each factions mandated to x number of seats in a legislative body, for example. I also identified a number of alternative power-sharing interventions, including broader peace agreements and political transition assistance measures. I also note that horizontal (in)equality measures such as the Gini coefficient can be used to better understand how power is distributed (un)equally across a particular society. However, I have to reiterate the
notion that measuring and explaining a concept as abstract as political legitimacy remains a methodological challenge. It is for this reason I chose the implementation of discrete power-sharing agreements as one way to attain insight into how third-parties intervene in fragile states. In the cases presented in this chapter, I examine such arrangements and use process tracing to understand better the causal connections between the promise of power-sharing and the broader political and economic outcomes that flow from these agreements. There are lengthy debates on both sides as to whether power-sharing works; here I present modest evidence that when legitimacy is the strongest dimension in a state, power-sharing arrangements can help to drive both capacity and authority to more desirable outcomes. The mechanisms on how this occurs relate to the notion that externally imposed power guarantees can help to build trust amongst populations that previously had conflict and low levels of trust between them. This third-party guarantee, especially when geared toward protecting minority rights (or a politically weaker majority such as the Rwanda case), can be just the catalyst needed to improve state society relations enough so that economic growth and instantiation of the rule of law can develop more organically. This knock-on effect highlights the positive feedback mechanism proposed in the fragility recovery model. Now I turn to the cases to explicate this process more fully.

7.1 Intervention Success: Rwanda Overview

Rwanda has been hailed as a remarkable success story in recent years, with some labeling it “Africa’s Singapore” – an astounding shift considering it was the poster child of the international community’s failure to act in the face of genocide and ostensibly resulted in the development of the R2P doctrine globally. Today Rwanda is one of the
fastest growing economies in the world, with an average GDP growth rate of 9% since the year 2000. It exports more than 22,000 tons of coffee each year worth a total of, on average, $60 million USD. Foreign direct investment flows have increased 100-fold since the genocide, and have tripled in the last three years, a remarkable feat for any nation let alone one that began its rise out of such tragedy. The leadership of the country has instantiated a clear vision for the future, with their plan called Vision 2020 which aims to make Rwanda a middle-income country by the end of this decade, through development of its service sector offerings including information technology, medical tourism, renewable energy and more. Rwanda is ranked 41st in the world for ease of doing business, jumping a staggering 15 places up the list in 2018 from the year before and ranking 2nd in Africa only behind Mauritius. The government has chosen to focus on private sector development to encourage investment and attract businesses. The country has been strikingly resilient even after the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008, and its capital, Kigali, is quickly turning into a regional hub known for hosting conferences, medical tourism, and start-ups. Transparency international has ranked Rwanda 48th globally on its Corruption Perceptions Index, higher than countries like Greece and Italy.

Still the country faces major challenges and relies on budgetary support to the tune of about one billion dollars in aid per year. Of its 12-million-person population about 83% live in rural areas and about 70% work in subsistence farming. Moreover, it is a de facto one-party state, and in recent years the president Paul Kagame held a referendum on whether he should be able to stay longer than the 2-term limit, which passed with flying colours and cemented his grip on power for the indefinite future.
Moreover, there have been credible reports of human rights abuses, crackdowns on freedom of speech, and persecution of journalists, raising important questions about the political direction the country is heading in. In this chapter I provide a brief overview of the situation leading up to Rwanda’s modern incarnation as a fast growing, donor darling in Eastern Africa. Much ink has been spilled on the causes and consequences of the genocide and I refer the reader to the many useful sources that explore the topic in greater depth than I could ever do justice to in this dissertation. Instead, I focus on the power-sharing arrangements that were implemented after the war period, namely from the late 1990s and the following 20 year period wherein the country saw excellent GDP growth and rising economic freedom, arguably unlike we have witnessed in Africa prior. At the same time, the historical trauma inflicted by the genocide still permeates society today in ways that are far-reaching and consequential for development (Eltringham 2004; Rieder and Elbert 2013). In order to better understand the Rwandan recovery, it is necessary to understand the ethnic composition and background behind the conflict between the two main groups.

7.1.1 Background and Lead Up to the Atrocity

Rwanda is made up of two main ethnic groups, the larger of the two being the Hutu, which—according to pre-genocide figures—made up about 90% of the population, and the smaller being the Tutsi, making up about 8% of the population (Sellström and

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95 For excellent overviews of the genocide and resultant peace agreement see: Taylor 1999; Melvern 2006; Shaw 2015; Prunier 1997.

96 I strive to keep the descriptive portion of this study as straightforward and succint as possible, and in doing so please note that I do simplify certain concepts and even downplay some of the historical record, however this is a conscious decision made to better focus in on the most important variables in the analysis rather than a dismissal of what are of course incredibly salient factors that play into ethic conflict and identity relations in a given state.
Wohlgemuth 1996). During the genocide in 1994—which killed about 1 million people in a span of three months—more than 10% of the country’s population was murdered and over 75% of the Tutsi minority population is included in that figure (Rieder and Elbert 2013). Over two million people fled the country as refugees to neighbouring states, with the majority not re-entering the country until after 1996; many who re-entered were immediately incarcerated (Rieder and Elbert 2013). Unimaginable suffering, loss, and tension resulted from the genocide and reverberates throughout the region still to this day. Colonial legacies of German and Belgian rule have been associated with the root causes of the war/genocide; for example, the Tutsi chiefs were once used by the colonial governments to subjugate the Hutu population (Mutwol 2009). Moreover, “administrators racialized differences between the two groups and restricted access to education, mainly to Tutsi. This alienated the Hutus who became disaffected with what they termed ‘dual colonialism’ of the Belgians and Tutsis” (Mutwol 2009). Tensions built up over time and exploded in violence in 1959 when the Belgians granted self-governance to Rwanda, as the long-embedded favouritism had led to widespread distrust and resentment between the two groups. Without going into overt detail, killings of Tutsi by Hutus involved with the main political party, PARMEHUTU (Party of the Hutu Emancipation Movement) came in waves over the next few decades with one of the worst instances occurring in 1963 when 20,000 Tutsis were murdered and over 130,000 fleeing into neighbouring countries (Mutwol 2009). Over 364,000 Rwandans were living as refugees in nearby states by the mid-1960s, and this number includes bases of militarized Tutsi fighters which at times tried to overthrow the Hutu majority government without avail. However, by 1973 there was internal strife in the Hutu
government, in which Major General Habyarimana—then secretary of defense—overthrew Rwanda’s first president, Gregoire Kayibanda in a coup (Mutwol 2009).

The country was relatively peaceful for about a decade, until 1982 when Rwandan refugees attempted to invade from Uganda; Rwanda responded by closing its borders with that country. At that time there were large numbers of Tutsi refugees in Uganda, with an estimate of more than 200,000 by the early 1990s (Watson 1991). Some factions which formed out of the refugee population ended up fighting in the civil wars and being involved in the violent transitions of power which occurred through the late 1970s and early 1980s; moreover, many of them learned skills in the military including intelligence gathering, strategy, and guerilla tactics which would later be used to regain control of Rwanda for the Tutsi minority (Mutwol 2009). Two of these men would be future leaders of the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF): Paul Kagame and Fred Rwigyema. The latter was killed shortly after the incursion from Uganda into Rwanda in 1990 began. That 2500 troop attack had initial success over the Rwandan Armed Forces (RAF) but was not possible to sustain, in part due to the support the Rwandan government received from France, Belgium, and Zaire shortly after the attack commenced (Mutwol 2009). In Rwanda, scores of Tutsis and some Hutu intellectuals were rounded up, arrested and interrogated as suspected accomplices of the RPF. This group ended up being larger than 13,000 people, and the minister of justice at the time declared that “prepar[ing] an act of that scale required trusted people [on the inside]. Rwandans of the same ethnic group offered that possibility better than did others” essentially creating a fait accompli blanketed over the entire Tutsi population (Des Forges 1999).
The French were instrumental in halting the attack, as the RAF was inexperienced and undermanned. It took about a month of fighting to repel the RPF back into Uganda. Major Paul Kagame returned from a course in the United States to lead and reorganize the force (Mutwol 2009). There were numerous attempts to make peace between the RPF and the Rwandan government, directed in part by the Belgians and supported by regional partners including Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda and Zaire. The UNHCR and OAU also played a role in trying to broker peace. Eventually the US and France were also involved and a great deal of back and forth led to the Arusha Peace Negotiations in 1992, representing the start of the international intervention on legitimacy. While the negotiations were ongoing the RPF broke the ceasefire and gained more territory and weapons, coming within 25 km of Kigali before stopping once French troops had arrived as reinforcements (Mutwol 2009). Large parts of the Hutu population in regions that the RPF had taken over also were forced to flee southward into government-controlled territory; these events also led to a general malaise on whether the peace talks were valuable and legitimate. Nevertheless, the negotiations continued, and the Rwandan government made several major concessions to Kagame and the RPF. There are a few key articles imposed that are worth examining in more detail: 1) establishment of a unified army created from the two sides forces, 2) a creation of a buffer zone between the government forces and the RPF positions and 3) the return and resettlement of the 650,000 displaced persons (Mutwol 2009; Jones 2017). The key feature here is the establishment of the joint army as there were forceful disagreements over how it would be run. Finally, it was concluded that the government would provide 60 percent of the troops and the RPF the other 40 percent, and leadership positions would be split 50-50.
Representatives of the UN, the OAU, USA, France, Germany, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe all were present for the signing of the accords on August 4th, 1993 (Khadiagala 2002; Jones 2017). The military superiority of the RPF over the RAF, the economic decline of Rwanda (in part due to the falling price of coffee – an exogenous shock), and the reluctance of the new French president for long term adventurism in Africa all were contributing factors to the agreement being signed. In addition, the RPF had incentives to sign, one being that a UN force was being prepared to be deployed on the Rwanda-Uganda border and that would cut off their supply lines indefinitely. While Western governments hailed the accords, there was a lot of domestic political opposition to their signature and ratification; the opposition came mainly from the Hutu-dominated military and was bolstered by the majority Hutu population at large. The signing represented a humiliating concession to what was seen as a hostile invading force; civil servants and government officials feared loss of important positions to Tutsi replacements, one that turned out to be well-founded. As a condition of the accords, the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was established with Canadian Lieutenant General Romeo Dallaire at its command. Dallaire first asked for a force of 5500 troops but it was scaled down at US demands for a smaller force based on budgetary concerns. One UN expert had recommended a minimum force size of 8000, an ignored proposition that ultimately foreshadowed the disastrous events to come (Des Forges 1999).

UNAMIR was hence drastically under equipped – for example, Dallaire had asked for 22 armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and 8 military helicopters for a fast reaction force, neither of which were granted; instead only 5 APCs out of the 8 that
arrived from Mozambique were serviceable (Melvern 2006). Specialized troops such as a motorized infantry battalion, logistical units, medical specialists, and engineers were also left off the final force roster; compounding its problems were lack of bottled water and food, incompatible communications equipment, and poorly trained battalions that were generally unprepared for the unique on-the-ground situation in Rwanda (Melvern 2006). Needless to say, the UNAMIR mission did not have a great start. Perhaps part of this sentiment comes from the benefit of hindsight, however the fact that warnings about the potential volatility and risk of the mission came from so many different quarters belies this notion. One reason for the overall ineffectiveness of the mission was that the Security Council resolution mandating UNAMIR did not line up with the Arusha agreements on key provisions. For instance, there was no reference in the UNSC resolution to the responsibility of the UN force to complete key tasks including “ensuring overall security in the country, providing security for civilians, tracking arms flows, and neutralizing armed gangs” (Jones 2017). The force commander was directed that the force could only act in self-defence, instructing: “The use of force for deterrence or retaliation is forbidden” (Jones 2017). In addition to its lack of teeth, the mission was also hampered by the “torturous budget procedure” with the UNAMIR budget only being “approved two days before the start of the genocide, and the first funds were received one month after its completion” resulting in the mission “operating hand-to-mouth” and even borrowing cash from UNICEF to remain operational (Jones 2017).

Further exacerbating tensions in Rwanda was the assassination of Burundi’s newly elected Hutu president in October 1993 which led to rioting and insurrection; over 150,000 Burundians died in the aftermath (Jones 2017). Burundi has a similar
ethnic population makeup as Rwanda, and this event was used by extremists in Rwanda, pointing to the violence and bloodshed in its neighbouring Burundi as a foreshadowing of things to come, wherein they claimed, “the Tutsis of the RPF were returning to Rwanda to re-establish their historic dominance over the Hutu” (Jones 2017). The assassination and associated violence also led to an influx of refugees from Burundi entering Rwanda, with some UNAMIR troops being deployed to the border to monitor ongoing instability. By December 1993, UNAMIR had a force of 2548 troops in country (Jones 2017).

There is interestingly a link between the happenings in Rwanda and the previously examined Cambodia case, in that UNTAC as well as UN missions in Haiti and elsewhere were drawing large proportions of UN peacekeeping funding at the time, thereby limiting the resources that were able to be brought to Rwanda; specifically, the US and Russia objected to spending more resources in a small African country with a small civil war. France led the backing of UNAMIR, using political leverage at the UNSC to make an agreement with the US—who wanted support for a mission in Haiti—and Russia—seeking support for a mission in Georgia—to all agree to support one another’s missions in the coming votes (Jones 2017). Rwanda was touted as being an easily achievable mission that could bring back some of the UN’s lost credibility from the Somalia and Bosnia debacles earlier that decade. However, the political reluctance that characterized the start of the UNAMIR mission “would place serious limitations on UNAMIR’s ability to interpret is mandate broadly, communicate effectively with its political masters, respond to events and information on the ground, and in other ways
help shape the implementation phase in Rwanda” (Jones 2017). Seen in hindsight, there was a confluence of interwoven factors that built up the tinder box prior to the genocide.

The Arusha agreement mandated that a transitional government (called the Broad-Based Transitional Government or BBTG) be put into place. Yet from the beginning there were spoilers working to undermine the success of the BBTG. Jones (2017) characterizes these efforts under three responses: demonization, mobilization, and polarization. With respect to demonization, there was a substantial increase in propaganda efforts directed against the RPF and aiming to sway the Hutu population. Newspaper articles, pamphlets, and radio broadcasts were all utilized to sew fear and hatred – they declared the RPF to be a threat to the country and instilled a sense of foreboding on the true intentions of the BBTG. Discrediting the Arusha accords was another favourite tactic at the time, depicting it as “a sellout” and “those who supported it, traitors” (Jones 2017). In terms of mobilization, Hutu extremists armed the population and built up militias. Finally, polarization tactics were adopted with the more extreme elements managing to shift the political landscape to push moderates into the same camp as the RPF and anyone siding with them became seen as turncoats (Jones 2017). There was massive fracturing of the political parties and this upset the entire process of implementing the BBTG. There was both a “general deterioration” and a “growing sense of chaos and impending catastrophe” pervading Rwanda, one that

97 From Lemarchand (2006): “The power-sharing formula agreed upon at Arusha would have given the ruling pro-Hutu Mouvement révolutionnaire national pour le développement et la Démocratie (MRNDD) and the Tutsi-dominated Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) five cabinet positions each, the Mouvement démocratique républicain (MDR) four, the Parti social démocrate (PSD) and the Parti libéral (PL) three each, and the Parti démocrate chrétien (PDC) one. Excluded from the BBTG — and indeed from the negotiations — was the pro-Hutu extremist Convention pour la défense de la république (CDR). The armed forces were to be divided on a fifty-fifty basis for the troops, with Hutu elements retaining a slight edge in the upper ranks (60 percent).”
UNAMIR was little prepared for and ill-equipped to prevent (Jones 2017). Some analysts argue that there was early warning for the genocide, while others argue that only hindsight allows us to pick out such evidence (Eltringham 2004). In any case, nothing concrete was done to prepare for the coming onslaught, despite warnings from the Belgians and others with accurate insight into Rwandan politics. The UN security rating for Rwanda was even downgraded the month before the killings began, indicating that UN officials had little to no knowledge of what was brewing (Jones 2017).

7.1.2 The Genocide Heard Round the World

On the 6th of April 1994, the genocide plan was put in motion. The triggering event was the killing of Hutu leader Habyarimana; his private jet was brought down near the Kigali airport by ground to air missiles. The new Burundian president as well as the Rwandan Army chief of staff also perished (Mutwol 2009). Hutu members of the presidential guard began to kill Tutsis and those suspected of supporting them. The first targets were moderate members of the Hutu political parties, not surprising insofar as they were those who may have been most likely to prevent the violence by convincing peers to take an alternative path. Hardliners were committed to the program of genocide and next targeted UNAMIR, with ten Belgian peacekeepers detained by the FAR and forced to lay down their arms, with little to no guidance from superiors. The ten were detained by the FAR and forced to lay down their arms, with little to no guidance from superiors. The ten were

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98 Jones (2001) notes: “By early January ... there was new evidence that the rhetoric reflected a plan for violent opposition. In what has become the most infamous moment of pregenocide Rwanda, an informant reached UNAMIR and revealed the existence of a plan of opposition to Arusha. The informant revealed the existence of arms caches, of plans to attack members of the transitional government as well as UNAMIR in order to force its withdrawal, and of plans to disrupt efforts to implement the BBTG. The informant also revealed that the architects of this plan had compiled lists of Tutsi throughout the country and had the capacity to kill 1000 Tutsi every twenty minutes. As we have already seen, this conformed precisely to the genocide plan as it was implemented, although the rate was exaggerated somewhat.”

99 Interestingly the CIA conducted a desk report that had a worst-case scenario of 500,000 dead; the report was never shared outside of the bureau however (Jones 2001: confidential author interview with multiple confirmations).
eventually killed. UNAMIR was weak, scattered and had been under rules of engagement that prevented the use of force (Jones 2017). This attack was purposely designed to force the withdrawal of international troops, and it worked according to plan, with Belgium withdrawing its UNAMIR contingent only five days after the attack. Through a counterfactual analysis, Jones (2017) argues that a stronger UNAMIR response would have only slowed the progress of the genocide, as the plan was already in motion and far too entrenched across the country—in both urban and rural areas—to be completely stopped or even significantly slowed. Nevertheless, had the force been “mandated as an enforcement operation” from the outset with “the muscle to respond to attacks” then the outcome may have been very different (Jones 2017). The UNSC had a wide ranging and fierce debate on what to do with the remainder of the UNAMIR contingent, in the end it was decided that the force would be drawn down to symbolic levels, and this was completed by 21 April, just over two weeks after the violence began (UNSC 1994). This withdrawal left the population extremely vulnerable; reports of genocide and graphic pictures began coming out of Rwanda. By late April a quarter million Rwandans had crossed into Tanzania and the UN put out estimates of 200,000 killed in country, sparking the beginning of a global uproar over the UN’s failure to protect the population and with fresh calls to action (Jones 2017).

As the genocide continued into May, the UNSC voted forward another resolution, this time seeking to rebuild UNAMIR up to a troop strength of 5500. At the same time the US continued to downplay the genocide and dispute the need for resources, a disappointing decision that President Clinton later apologized for after the fact (Jones 2017). No new troops entered Rwanda for several months, and by that time the genocide
had, for the most part, run its course. The French sent a unilateral force with the blessing of the UNSC, deemed operation Turquoise; the operation was said to be for the purpose of stopping the genocide, but the forces only deployed in the Western part of the country where “the genocide in that territory was virtually complete” and the operation “occupied the only section of Rwanda in which there was no RPF presence and no ongoing killings” (Jones 2017). The success of the French effort is oft debated, as there is documentation indicating they saved perhaps 10,000 lives, yet at the same time critics see it as a kind of public relations exercise allowing the French government to “wash its hands in public” (Suhrke and Jones 2000). At the end of the day, both UNAMIR and Operation Turquoise failed to prevent the vast majority of the genocidal killing. Indeed, as Jones (2017) notes, “[t]he larger failure, however, was a moral failure on the part of the member states of the United Nations to respond to genocide, given the international legal right, clear moral responsibility, and ample military capacity to do so ... Rwanda was abandoned to its bloody fate.” In examining the overall dynamic this case of a failed authority intervention, but an ultimately successful legitimacy intervention, makes for an interesting case study exhibiting the results that occur when there is weakness in international institutions and a lack of coordination between, especially during critical times.

The motivations for the mass killings in 1994 have been identified by scholars through careful consideration of the empirical evidence and examination of those involved and include factors such as economic motivation, personal rivalries, a culture of fear and obedience to authority (Cook 2017). An interesting parallel between Rwanda and the Libya case examined in Chapter 5 was the use of the term “cockroaches” in
describing the victims or potential victims of the genocide, in one sense it is surprising that Ghaddafi did not realize the term could perk the ears of the international community with it harking back to the Rwandan catastrophe. “Seen in retrospect, the decision to send a small, weak mission to Rwanda seems absurd” yet that decision was made based on two-level games at play globally and locally (Jones 2001). Other UN operations in Yugoslavia, Somalia, Cambodia and Haiti garnered the attention of the world at the time, and Rwanda was seen as a country that had already reached a peace agreement and only in need of nominal international support. It is important to note that some critical voices see the RPF takeover of the country as a foreign backed invasion, supported by the US and the French who had ulterior motives including designs on controlling natural resources and gaining a military foothold in central Africa (Philpot 2013). Moreover, bilateral donor demands, and IMF structural adjustment programs are identified by some scholars as a form of neo-colonialism (Philpot 2013).

From my analysis of the evidence I believe that this interpretation of what happened is taking it a bit far and given the number of mainstream international analysts and observers who come to similar conclusions on what happened in Rwanda, we are getting a mostly accurate picture of events. To be sure, the feeling that the world abandoned Rwanda and the guilt that comes along with that notion pervade the national consciousness still today. Pottier (2002) describes this thinking in lucid detail:

> Central to this broad participation is the international guilt the government of Rwanda continues to nurture. The argument goes, and there is much truth in this, that the international community over the past century has been guilty of interference when it should have abstained, and guilty of abstaining when it should have intervened. Concretely, Rwandan authorities claim that early European colonists interfered to
destroy the harmony of an ancient Greater Rwanda; that independence under Hutu-
majority rule was engineered by subversive outsiders who sided with ‘the Hutu’; that
international scholars interfered after independence to challenge the perception of
history under which Alexis Kagame and his Belgian collaborator, the anthropologist
Jacques Maquet, had recorded once and for all. And when the international community
should have intervened, as at the start of the 1994 genocide, it had decided, through the
UN, to reduce its presence. The later observation, irrefutable, is today the starting point
from which other, more contestable claims are made.

In my estimation, there is certainly truth to the idea that the West failed Rwanda in
some critical ways. At the same time, the Arusha accords allowed for ancient rivalries
between ethnic populations to be played out in a semi-constructive manner, given that
the accords eventually led to a new constitution and the formalization of a power-
sharing leadership arrangement. The RPF claimed military victory in early July after the
genocide and reaffirmed its commitment to the spirit of the agreement (Reyntjens
2015). The more extremist elements involved with the genocide were banned from
political participation, but the mainstream parties were allotted seats in the government
as per the power-sharing arrangements that were agreed upon during the negotiations
in Tanzania. A Hutu prime minister was put in place as the new government was being
set up; from there however some unilateral decisions were made by the RPF which built
in a stronger executive presidency and redrew the composition of parliament, setting up
the RPF for a grip on power for the next two decades (Reyntjens 2015). The
international community accepted this development though, because the situation
called for trade-offs between freedom and control, based on the fact that there were real
and present security concerns still pervading Rwandan society in the aftermath of the genocide.

7.1.3 After the Genocide: Rwanda on the Rise

After gaining control the RPF “seemed to waiver between, on the one hand, political openness and inclusiveness ... and, on the other, a violent mode of management and discriminatory practices” (Reyntjens 2015). The international community, partly out of guilt, built up a heavy presence in terms of international development NGOs and bilateral development agency offices throughout the country. International development aid aimed at reconstruction and reconciliation poured in, providing massive levels of budgetary support for the new government – for instance a donors meeting in Geneva in 1995 netted close to $600 million USD in bi- and multi-lateral aid monies (Reyntjens 2015). This ongoing aid can be considered a third-party capacity intervention following on the original legitimacy intervention that was first enacted, with the former being viable as a result of the stability provided by the latter. Some scholars see Rwanda as having evolved over the next decade into a pattern of increasing authoritarianism undergirded by a return to structural violence, while others point enthusiastically towards the economic miracle that President Kagame has presided over, sweeping the lack of political plurality and human rights abuses under the rug. Ingelaere (2010) captures the difficulty of parsing these competing narratives:

There is a problem in Rwanda of taking the “mise-en-scène,” or stage-setting, for granted, instead of searching for and capturing the meaning and overall direction of life. Such difficulties in interpretation are widespread, as the literature on Rwanda shows; in a society in which daily life itself is politicized, it is difficult for an observer to interpret or gain a balanced understanding of the social milieu. An active interference in the
scientific construction of knowledge, the cultivation of an aesthetics of progress, and a culturally specific ethics of communication all lie at the heart of difficulties in understanding life after genocide.

I tend to take a middle of the road approach in understanding post-genocide Rwanda, in that it is possible for trade-offs to be made in terms of economic development and democratic freedoms. I am generally a proponent of enacting democratic institutions with promotion of a competitive political sphere as soon as possible after a conflict, however examining the Rwanda case has made me question whether such an approach is feasible or necessary in certain cases. The donor community has, for the most part, agreed in that it continues to hold Rwanda as a donor darling and Mr. Kagame has been on the receiving end of countless awards touting his commitment to a peaceful, productive, and prosperous Rwandan state.

However, any auspices of post-genocide efforts to build a broadly-based coalition government were quickly dashed once waves of forced resignations of Hutu government officials began to occur. In August 1995 Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu, Interior Minister Seth Sendashonga, and Justice Minister Alphonse Nkubito—key players in the new administration and the highest-ranking Hutu officials—left their positions (two of the three went into exile out of fear) partly due to abuse of power, harassment from the army and intelligence services, human rights violations, intimidation and general insecurity of person (Reyntjens 2015). In addition, numerous government ministers, judges, senior civil servants, diplomats, military leaders, journalists and more societal figures of Hutu ethnic background departed with many going abroad for safety and to speak out against RPF abuse of power. Another major wave of high-profile emigration
occurred in 2000, with the speaker of parliament (Joseph Sebarenzi), the prime minister (Célestin Rwigema), and the president (Pasteur Bizimungu) all resigning and heading into exile (Lemarchand 2006). Shortly thereafter the MDR was banned as a political party having been accused of “divisionism”; all of these events taken together represented somewhat of a political crisis, especially to external observers. The country had in effect become “a single-party state” with “mutual fears and distrust [being] all-pervasive, making mockery of pro-forma gestures toward national reconciliation” (Lemarchand 2006). In 2001 the regime began to see more serious challenges from within, with newspapers becoming increasingly critical of the government, which subsequently led to those papers being threatened with fines and closure. Many high-ranking Tutsi government officials ostensibly from the RPF-side even began to desert the party and leave the country for safer pastures.

In response to growing criticism the government set out to begin a democratization process, holding local elections in March 2001; yet these elections were widely criticized as well because they had a number of oddly non-democratic constraints: the voting system was opaque and gratuitously complex, candidates were not allowed to run under any political party, the voting process was not private or anonymous as a thumb print was used (equivalent to a signature) to mark ballots, the national election commission was not independent but rather controlled by the RPF, and observers like the International Crisis Group and Human Rights Watch noted that, “this election has been flawed from the beginning, and these flaws far outweigh the few election day irregularities that have been reported” (Human Rights Watch 2001; Reyntjens 2015). I cite this early election because these dynamics have continued to play
out in post-genocide Rwanda for the last two decades. In 2003 as the country was heading to national elections the main opposition party, MDR, was banned from participation on the charge of sewing “divisionism.” Reyntjens (2015) points out the glaring issues with this politically charged move stating, “divisionism was defined as being in opposition to or even simply expressing disagreement with government policies” and “in addition to political parties, every forum where dissidence could be voiced was now openly targeted.” Indeed, civil society groups towed the line of the RPF, and if they did not, they became political targets subject to a myriad of suppression tactics. In 2003 a constitutional commission put together consultations that were managed from the top down and lacking and real input from the public; the draft was voted on by referendum and 93 percent of the electorate voted for its instantiation as law. The EU noted its concern that the constitution restricted freedom of expression and association, along with political activities, essentially cementing the one-party rule of the RPF (European Union 2003). There have been other concerns surrounding political freedom and legitimacy including “the banning of the MDR, arrests and disappearances of opponents, and the intimidation of civil society” (Reyntjens 2015). In the presidential and parliamentary elections Kagame won 95 percent of the vote, and there were numerous instances of fraud and other vote manipulation tactics. All parties that participated in the vote supported Kagame’s re-election bid and independent candidates were disqualified on the eve of the vote (Reyntjens 2015).

To some observers and analysts, the elections have essentially become a cosmetic procedure at this point—or using another term—isomorphic mimicry, wherein the government knows exactly what it has to do to keep Western donor support while
putting up a façade of democratic institutions. At the same time, proponents of the RPF note that the government has made steps towards including more political opposition and critical voices in the last few years (Kizner 2008). Rwanda’s donors require evidence of commitment to good governance and liberal democratic values – I find it hard to believe that the government has completely hoodwinked the EU, DFID, USAID and other major bilateral donors. The answer is probably somewhere in between—RPF policies can at times be overly draconian, while at the same time being genuine in striving towards greater political pluralism, perhaps with an exaggerated emphasis on preventing discord and identity politics due to the events that mar the country’s history. Beswick (2010) elucidates this idea convincingly, using the concept of a battle over perceived zero-sum “political space” as key to understanding the RPF’s tactics:

Despite its dependence on aid, the RPF has shown a determination to proceed with policies it considers important in spite of pressure from donors (Hayman 2009). This is reflected in the regime’s approach to actively managing political space, which routinely results in the closing down of sensitive political debate and a culture of self-censorship and fear. It may well be argued that as a state recovering from the trauma of genocide Rwanda cannot yet afford to cultivate a more vibrant and critical civil society. However, the tightly managed political environment in place, particularly since 2003, will inevitably shape political development in the longer term ... the lack of a level electoral playing field, individual attacks on critics, and the exile of key opposition figures, all affect perceptions of what is possible in terms of political debate in Rwanda. Consequently, after a decade as the dominant force in Rwandan politics the RPF may be reaching a point where overt repression and active management of political activity is less necessary.
Indeed, the RPF were remarkably successful in ensuring that Tutsi domination of the upper echelons of the political class continued unabated, with the majority of MPs, Supreme Court judges, mayors, permanent secretaries, professors and military brass all hailing from the Tutsi minority (Reyntjens 2015). To counter this saturation there have been several opposition groups formed mainly by previously prominent individuals in exile; these organizations make an effort to reach out to members of both ethnicities and have had measurable success in doing so. The bi-ethnic nature of such opposition parties poses a challenge to the ruling RPF because it was easy to discredit past movements as “nurturing an ethnically oriented project” or even accuse them of promoting so-called “genocide ideology” (Reyntjens 2015). These newer platforms for political expression represent progress in terms of building a culture of political pluralism in the Rwandan political discourse, especially because of the poor human rights record of the RPF government. Reyntjens (2015) argues that the Rwandan government has opportunistically utilized the “genocide credit” as a dividend providing political legitimacy “astutely exploited to escape condemnation” and uses the genocide as “an ideological weapon allowing the RPF to acquire and maintain victim status.” Whether this is really the case remains up for debate, however it does shed light on the complex interplay of legitimacy, authority and capacity after an intervention occurs.

The international community seems to have provided a great deal of leeway to the RPF government because of the genocide suffered by the Tutsi minority, but at the same
time there are both villains and victims on both sides with neither being 100% culpable nor 100% to blame. Unraveling the complex interaction and tension between how to build authority while at the same time not trampling on human rights and political expression in a post-conflict society is one of the key questions of this study, and the Rwanda case provides some insight into walking this delicate line. The RPF government is seen as a saviour by some and as an authoritarian monster by others. I want to focus on the process through which the policymakers in Rwanda, in partnership with its international donors, were able to lead the country out of fragility to become one of the top growing nations in the world, economically speaking. Interestingly, democracy itself has not played the instrumental role that some donors would have hoped it would.

To the contrary, the leadership of the country tends to be enacted from the top down and there is somewhat of a cult of personality around President Kagame. There is a small inner circle surrounding the president and they are responsible for most decision making; Kagame famously visited many of the smaller countries that ended up pulling out of fragility through virtuous cycles despite having little natural resources and territory, taking copious notes and using the same model when designing Rwanda’s policies and global posture. For the time being this approach has appeared to pay off, although each time another election is won by an impossible landslide there grows a chorus of critical voices denouncing the lack of competition. In 2015 for example, a referendum was held that approved constitutional amendments allowing Kagame to run for a third term. In 2017 Kagame won 98.8% of the vote compared to 0.5% for the rival Democratic Green Party candidate and 0.7% for another independent candidate; obviously these numbers alone indicate that something is afoul. Diane Rwigara was
supposed to be the main rival to Kagame but was disqualified on technical grounds with the government claiming she had not collected enough valid signatures and she has since been charged with tax evasion and forgery (Reuters 2017). Phoney manipulated “nude” photos also surfaced of Rwigara just days after she announced her campaign, in a particularly heinous attempt to discredit her as a serious candidate. There are certainly parallels between this case and the Cambodia case, wherein a former military strongman has successfully seized power and led the country to success, while at the same time limiting dissent and using sometimes brutal tactics of political repression. At the same time, the country is experiencing unprecedented economic growth and social development, which columnist Gourevitch (2009) opines on during a recent visit:

On the fifteenth anniversary of the genocide, Rwanda is one of the safest and the most orderly countries in Africa. Since 1994, per-capita gross domestic product has nearly tripled, even as the population has increased by nearly twenty-five per cent, to more than ten million. There is national health insurance, and a steadily improving education system. Tourism is a boom industry and a strong draw for foreign capital investment. In Kigali, the capital, whisk-broom-wielding women in frocks and gloves sweep the streets at dawn. Plastic bags are outlawed, to keep litter under control and to protect the environment. Broadband Internet service is widespread in the cities, and networks are being extended into the countryside. Cell phones work nearly everywhere. Traffic police enforce speed limits and the mandatory use of seat belts and motorbike helmets. Government officials are required to be at their desks by seven in the morning. It is the only government on earth in which the majority of parliamentarians are women. Soldiers are almost nowhere to be seen. Kigali is now home to nearly a million people—roughly double the number ten years ago—and there is incessant construction of new homes, office blocks, medical facilities, shopping centers, hotels, schools, transport depots,
foreign embassies, and roads. A billboard used to stand beside one of the main traffic circles, riddled by machine-gun fire and advertising Guinness stout with the slogan “The Power of Love”; today, a new billboard across the street says, “Pay Taxes—Build Rwanda—Be Proud.” Most of the prisoners accused or convicted of genocide have been released. The death penalty has been abolished. And Rwanda is the only nation where hundreds of thousands of people who took part in mass murder live intermingled at every level of society with the families of their victims.

I quote Gourevitch at length because of the contrast between accounts of the country’s progress. If one listens only to critical scholars, Rwanda is portrayed as having devolved into an authoritarian nightmare. Reyntjens (2015) describes this view, “most Rwandans, who are excluded and know full well they have been robbed of their civil and political rights are frustrated, angry and even desperate. Such conditions constitute a fertile breeding ground for more structural violence, which creates ‘anger, resentment and frustration, and may well eventually again lead to acute violence ... it is frustrating to wonder whether ... the international community, again after the facts, will have to explain why Rwanda descended into hell once more.” Along the same vein, Solberg (2012) uses two separate conflict prediction models to demonstrate that the statistical likelihood of another civil war is significant as risk levels are about where they were in 1994; this is especially the case if ethnic cleavages continue to be exacerbated by political exclusion and exogenous shocks. On the flip side of this dim prediction, there are international donors who applaud the ongoing recovery; by examining the fragility indices including in the ALC and fragility profile below, one can see the progress made since the genocide. Legitimacy was the best performing dimension for most of the period, reaching a steady-state as predicted by the fragility recovery model; only in the
last three or four years has there been somewhat of a legitimacy crisis, spurred by Kagame’s constitutional reforms and overstaying the two-term limit. At the same time there have been tremendous improvement in authority measures, indicating that the country remains stable and peaceful, a not so minor accomplishment given its history and high level of ethnic fractionalization. The positive-feedback cycle led capacity to improve steadily throughout the aughts, although it has worsened in recent years with GDP growth slowing due partly to lower mining exports. The poverty rate declined from 57% in 2005, to 45% in 2010, and now is as low as 39% - an indication that quality of life has seen marked improvement in recent years as predicted by the model also (UNDP 2018). Interestingly, according to the CIFP data, capacity is now the worst performing dimension, however given the growth and stability of the country’s economic system this is difficult to reconcile other than to say that authority and legitimacy appear to have improved significantly, driving the overall positive ranking of the country relative to others. In the next section I examine more specifically the dynamics of the causal mechanisms presented in the fragility recovery model which are driving this post-war development.
7.2 Analysis of the Intervention: A Textbook Case of Power-sharing Failure or Economic Miracle?

7.2.1 The Decision to Intervene

International pressure for Western countries to act, especially in cases where the R2P doctrine applied, followed the end of the cold war and the associated wave of democratization that occurred around the world. France expressly put pressure on Habyarimana to hold multiparty elections which led to the legalization of new political parties and eventually led to the RPF invasion and subsequent peace process. Regional and international factors both played into the decision to intervene, and refugee communities in neighbouring Uganda and elsewhere also acted as a source of pressure. In a sense, the political exclusion felt by the Tutsi population both in Rwanda and by those in exile helped garner international pressure and added strain on the Hutu government’s negotiating position. The international community was taken aback by the events in Rwanda, even before the genocide; this was partly because of long-standing
European involvement in the country, which helped to force a third-party intervention in the early stages of the power-struggle. The implemented power-sharing arrangement, however, was not favourable to either side and some argue that it directly led to the genocide. On the other hand, legitimacy improvements did ultimately stem from building a more inclusive society, as would be expected by the theoretical propositions borne out by the model. Rwanda, in spite of, or perhaps even because of the events that unfolded there, could not afford to become another FCAS falling behind. Rather the leadership exhibited by its president, however imperfect, has led the country to a better situation via the fragility recovery model. A new steady-state with a runaway positive feedback loop was found through mimicking the policy decisions made by the so-called Asian tigers during their explosive development in the late 80s and through the 90s.

### 7.2.2 Implementation of the Intervention

The peace agreement was implemented after both parties found themselves in a mutually hurting stalemate. Third-party pressure also played a significant part, in that the agreement was initiated by and resulted from third-party intervention. That is, Western governments pressured the government of Rwanda to sign the peace accord and threatened consequences if they did not cooperate. The agreement included broad-based power-sharing with the transitional government clauses. The idea was to make it impossible for any one group to dominate in the political realm, and to help develop a pluralistic, robust democratic political system in the future Rwandan state. But the looming threat of demobilization made the agreement less stable because soldiers stood to lose their jobs, and many had only known war as a source of income. Threats of prosecution for past crimes and injustices also hampered the agreement. The third-
parties involved needed to commit more resources and lack of support from regional states, the OAU, and the UN also caused the agreement to disintegrate in the lead up to the genocide. Finally, we saw how US (in)action in the UNSC also contributed to the failure of the accord.

This case study shows a few interesting knock-on effects stemming from the legitimacy intervention. The genocide was certainly an earth-shattering event and its importance cannot be overstated in creating the Rwanda we see today. Counter factual analyses and the benefit of hindsight have analysts pointing to all the risk factors leading up to the events, yet at the same time such an event can also be thought of as a black swan, an event so rare that no one can see it coming. Ultimately the power-sharing arrangement was deeply flawed and was rushed to completion, making an argument for a more nuanced approach that brings in non-traditional voices to the mediation table. The society that came out of the conflict has, in its own way, a characteristic of isomorphic mimicry, in that the ruling party and president claim that it is open and free, that political debate and opposition are tolerated, while in reality things are much different behind the scenes. Some of those issues are directly related to the intervention while others may be more societal and cultural, but in any case, Rwanda represents a deeply interesting and nuanced case study of the fragility recovery model, one that was surprising in terms of its complexity and through the dashing of many of my expectations around how open and democratic societies need to function in order to succeed economically after conflict.
7.2.3 Effect on Authority and Capacity

One can think of UNAMIR not as a robust or effective authority intervention because it was a small, poorly equipped, and reactive mission that withdrew shortly after the violence flared up. Rather for this analysis more important was the power-sharing peace deal put into place after the cessation of the civil war, allowing for compromise between ethnic factions. The Arusha agreements are often thought of as the textbook example of power-sharing failure because of the violence that followed the accord. However, based on my analysis I see this result differently, in that the provisions outlined in the agreement and the guiding philosophy behind it led to a society wherein ethnic identity was no longer seen as a distinctive or legitimate marker of identity. Indeed, government records no longer have any marker other than the national identity of all as being Rwandan. There are specific laws that prevent the usage and promulgation of ethnic identities in any aspect of civil life, to prevent divisionism, “ethnic ideology” and a “genocide mentality” from coming to the surface (Hintjens 2008). There are analysts who are critical of this government policy arguing that people need to be able to build their identities from the “bottom-up” and to advocate within their identity group (i.e. engage in identity politics). Nevertheless, from my read of the situation the Rwandan government seems to be legitimately concerned with building a national identity that surpasses and overrides ethnic identity and tribalism. Kagame specifically quotes Julius Nyrere of Tanzania who is famed for building that same sense of Tanzanian identity which many agree has resulted in the stability and safety of that country. I would also note that had the government not enacted policies limiting the use of ethnic identity markers, the same crowd would be crowing about how Kagame wasn’t sensitive enough to the history of the genocide, further entrenching divisions along ethnic lines. To be
sure, there is a balance to be had, and it is a fine line to walk between erasing negative aspects of history and looking to the positive possibilities of the future.

Irrespective of the above, the power-sharing intervention allowed for both sides of the political divide to work together in a consociational manner, which then opened up space for positive feedbacks mechanisms to kick in on both capacity and authority measures, aligning with the fragility recovery model. In terms of capacity, the World Bank and IMF included Rwanda in their “Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan” which began in 1999, in part due to the country’s strong performance in peacebuilding and service delivery since the end of the war. Three major investments emanated from this plan: 1) tertiary education: improvement in post-secondary colleges and universities which led to human capital development, 2) the agricultural sector – since most of the Rwandan population still made a living from agricultural activities, investment in this sector was paramount to reducing poverty, and 3) security and peacebuilding efforts – in order to ensure another conflict is avoided, investments in these sectors were also identified as key. Indeed, this strategy fits with the fragility recovery model in that the legitimacy intervention allowed a peaceful enough situation to come about so that injections in authority and capacity related sectors could occur. Moreover, there is a positive relationship between economic growth and poverty reduction, with average incomes of the poorest fifth of a country population rising and falling at the same rate as average incomes, although this result has been debated extensively (Dollar and Kraay 2002a). The evidence for the relationship between economic growth and poverty reduction has continued to pile up in the literature, and logically it makes sense.
One of the main constraints in the Rwandan context is scarcity of land, and Kagame’s desire to transform the economy to a knowledge and skills based one rests on this factor. Indeed, political stability and economic development are deeply interconnected, with a stable environment fostering economic growth – in a multidimensional understanding of fragility this means that improved authority creates a favourable capacity building environment wherein investment and infrastructure development are encouraged, and we can see this positive feedback mechanism occurring in the Rwanda post-genocide atmosphere; this recovery is even more impressive when one considers the loss of human capital that the events resulted in. At the same time, it is important to note that inequality remains deeply-entrenched and the gap seems to be widening between rich and poor in Rwanda with the rural poor continuing to fall behind the rapidly advancing urban elite (Ansoms 2009; Ansoms, Verdoodt and Van Ranst 2008). The creation of greater employment accessibility outside of the agricultural sector, as well as freedom of movement to neighbouring countries would help to mitigate some of Rwanda’s structural inequality issues (Ansoms and Marysse 2005). Diversification of the economy is also key to alleviating the inequality caused by population pressures and scarcity of natural resources in rural areas, and truly pro-poor policies need to take these factors into consideration.

7.2.4 Success of the Intervention

Rwanda is a very interesting case because it still fits the theory despite most mainstream analysts seeing the Arusha Accord as a textbook case of power-sharing failure. One reason identified for the failure is the exclusion of the CDR (extremist Hutu political faction) from the negotiations, making them a spoiler almost by default. The lesson here
then may be that legitimacy interventions need to be politically inclusive even to groups that are on the fringes. Another factor that stymied the agreement was the presidential assassination of both the Burundian and Rwandan leaders acted as an extremely potent exogenous shock, in effect “pull[ing] the rug from under the feet of the moderates, leaving only radicals at the negotiating table” (Lemarchand 2006). Next, there is the argument that the main parties to the agreement, the Hutu Rwandan government at the time (the MRNDD) and the RPF never fully trusted one another enough to negotiate in good faith. I find this line of reasoning less convincing because there are myriad examples of bitter rivals coming to the table and passing a consociational agreement that later was implemented to effect. Finally—and often pointed to as the “obvious” reason—was the context the agreement was being negotiated under, namely under a contentious environment wherein the “intense fears and anxieties felt by most Hutu in the face of the RPF invasion, the mutual hatreds born of atrocities committed by invaders and defenders, and the climate of all-pervasive suspicion surrounding the Arusha talks” (Lemarchand 2006).

Cooperating under those circumstances was difficult if not impossible, however I would point out that the agreement was signed, mainly due to strong international pressure, and its clauses and spirit were relied upon when the new government was finally put into place. In my estimation, the fact that the power-sharing intervention began in fits and starts, failing and then ultimately allowing for authority and capacity to improve the overall fate of the country, shows that states can take radically different paths out of fragility. Democracy is not necessarily a panacea, and, in some cases, the third-party intervention will first act on one dimension, then onto the next, finally
opening space for the third and final one to catch up. In the case of Rwanda, legitimacy improvements first allowed for a transitional government to take hold, that government then used capacity interventions (aid and IMF programming) to build up its economic development and service delivery facilities/capabilities, with each of these factors pulling the country out of extreme fragility. From 1996 to 2016 authority went from the worst performing dimension to the best, with government control over the use of force and the rule of law developing in a positive direction as crime dropped and peace continued. With respect to legitimacy, the spike into dangerous territory in recent years is a bit worrying, and perhaps there are some aspects of isomorphic mimicry at play in the sense that the political parties that exist are all approved by the government. In any case, Kagame does not look to be giving up power anytime soon, yet from my vantage point it does seem that the government is sincere in its efforts to prevent another catastrophe from happening and that political pluralism is a project that will take time, perhaps another decade or more, to really take root.

Insofar as Kagame has illustrated his ability to lead on the global stage, he has, for his part, “acquired a reputation for follow-up throughout the various levels of government. Consequently ... when Kagame makes an [international] agreement, all the relevant ministers are informed of the decision and understand their responsibilities for fulfillment of those promises” (Ghani and Lockhart 2009). I can understand the criticisms of the government’s heavy handedness, yet I almost see the Rwanda case as replicating the Chinese model in important ways, wherein free market capitalism drives economic growth, even if political freedom sometimes takes a backseat to economic progress. Time will tell, but I take guidance from theory and the fragility recovery model
in thinking about what may occur next in Rwanda – as the country continues its
economic miracle and pushes to be one of the most stable countries in Africa, political
groups and civil society will gradually grow, develop and find their legs in society.
Adversarial politics remains a contentious issue given the minority status of the Tutsi
leadership, and for true consociationalism to take root it is going to require the
“principles of pacification and proportionality” to be implemented, which requires “the
behaviour of political elites ... to be inspired by coalescence rather than by adversarial
behaviour,” which is indeed a tough nut to crack given the country’s history
(Vandenginste and Huyse 2005). The current regime, to some, still operates under the
spectre of a “victors justice” model which leaves a great deal of the population out in the
cold when it comes to self-expression and autonomy. Hopefully President Kagame will
recognize that the authoritarian path is not one that ends well for any of the
stakeholders involved, and in this vein, Western donors can use their aid dollars and
stabilization programming as a pressure point to push the government of Rwanda to
continue to develop its democratic political culture.

7.3 Intervention Failure: Mali Overview

Just two years before Mali went from being a donor darling to a backsliding basket case
in need of international military support, the first World Bank World Development
Report to focus specifically on the relationship between security and development was
released; this landmark document marked, perhaps most prominently, the growing
public awareness of the linkages between these two critical fields. Mali is a textbook
example of an FCAS which shows exactly how interlinked development and security
truly are. More specifically, the connection between exogenous economic shocks, civil
war and foreign aid are also apparent in the Malian case, which has become of special interest to policy makers and scholars. Indeed, evidence that economic shocks can lead to the onset of conflict has mounted in recent years. Adding another layer to this concept is the fact that some research has suggested that foreign aid may have a pacifying effect on the outbreak of conflict immediately following an exogenous economic shock (Savun and Tirone 2012). For example, the sudden decline of primary commodity prices on the global marketplace can adversely affect the economy of countries reliant on that good, which in turn puts budgetary pressure on the government. This pressure can manifest itself in a number of ways, including—for example—the lowering of government spending ability and lowering of the general population’s income levels. These effects may then lead to increased grievances on the part of the population and as some scholars argue eventually to the onset of civil war. The link between exogenous shocks and civil war is relevant to the fragility recovery model and the intervention failure model I propose in this dissertation, because of the risk of backsliding and the role of PDIA in preventing it. In this chapter I use the country of Mali as a detailed case study of what happens when external shocks impede the stabilization process of a fragile country while the international community ignores the country’s strengths (legitimacy in this case) and allows military intervention to take over as the main form of engagement on the ground. Here I argue that the initial legitimacy intervention slowly warped away from being focused on power-sharing and good governance, towards authority as its main target. We see an example of how a disaffected group, the Tuaregs in the north, bolstered by Jihadists travelling south from the crisis that unfolded in Libya, were able to overthrow Malian government control in the northern part of the country, in particular because their demands for further
autonomy and power-sharing were not being met. Another interesting angle to this case is that which Henke (2017) calls “intervention entrepreneurs” wherein specific factions and leaders in the French government were able to steer France’s policy towards Mali into being primarily a military one.

Turning now to the ALC profile in Mali, below the overall fragility trend as well as its constituent dimensions can be seen; I have also included the FFP fragility score diagram since it covers the period of the intervention. External shocks were arguably responsible for the outbreak of conflict in the north and the subsequent Western intervention. Here I argue that intervention on both the legitimacy and capacity dimensions through power-sharing and foreign aid could have prevented the backsliding that occurred after these shocks came into effect. Better understanding how the West can implement effective aid policies in Africa is critical, especially as China and other geopolitical rivals continue to pour development resources into the continent and exact their influence over fragile states (Samy 2010; Eisenman and Kurlantzick 2006).

Before examining the effect of foreign aid on reducing the impact of economic shocks, it is necessary to note which factors are capable of influencing a country’s vulnerability to such shocks. There are three primary factors which influence how vulnerable a given state is to global price shocks, namely “the size of the shock, its exposure to the shock, and its resilience” (Combes and Guillaumont 2002). One way to understand how resilient a country is to these types of shocks is through a multidimensional fragility lens. For example, the CIFP framework categorizes Mali as an “in and out” country meaning that it has moved in and out of the top 40 most fragile countries multiple times in the past thirty years, indicating a high level of volatility in
the country’s ability to successfully manage and regulate itself along the three aforementioned dimensions. Figure 25 highlights this trend, with the orange line serving to delineate the “top 40” most fragile countries from the remainder. From this figure it is possible to ascertain just how fickle the situation in Mali has been over the past few decades, although one can note that leading into 2011 the country had seen marked improvement in its fragility ranking. As we saw earlier from the CIFP ALC profile, the FFP profile, and given the coup and resulting civil war along with the many security-based indicators used by the CIFP ranking system, Mali now finds itself again in the top 40 most fragile countries in the world. Whether increased foreign aid would have been able to quell this negative development remains to be answered using empirical evidence later in this chapter.

Figure 25. CIFP Fragility Ranking for Mali

In the CIFP ALC profile for Mali we saw that its worst performing dimension was capacity, yet the international interventions by development agencies, and subsequently
by the French government, mainly focused on authority and capacity rather than the stronger legitimacy dimension through power-sharing. The subsequent backsliding therefore fits with the intervention failure model proposed in this dissertation. Mali’s fragility appears to have been getting worse over time although not being overly volatile, but after 2011 all three dimensions saw major spikes into dangerous territory for any fragile state, putting it into the extremely fragile category for the last several years. This trend indicates that Mali, while performing rather well in comparison to others, on its own may not be quite as much of a success story. Authority is the most volatile of the three dimensions; this is as would be expected because of the political turmoil the country has faced over the past 30 years. Events such as coups, civil wars, and other forms of political opposition or uprising tend to degrade the state’s ability to exercise a monopoly of force over its population and territory.

Currently with the civil conflict present in Mali the authority scores should be driving the increased fragility and hence exacerbating its susceptibility to exogenous shocks. As noted earlier, legitimacy is the best performing of the three dimensions for Mali. This is somewhat surprising as the political upheaval in Mali—combined with its large territory and ethnically fractionalized population—would indicate that the government does not receive strong support from the population at large. However, it is important to remember two things: first, that the majority of Mali’s population resides in the southern part of the country and is relatively well off in comparison to those in the north, and second, that up until 2011 the country was seen as a “donor darling” of the international community and this provided legitimacy in the sense that international partnerships served to indicate competence on the part of the ruling party. Indeed, in
defining legitimacy Carment, Prest and Samy (2009) note that “such support must be created through a voluntary and reciprocal arrangement of effective governance and citizenship founded upon broadly accepted principles of government selection and succession that is recognized both locally and internationally.” The international dimension, of being unable to uphold a stable government and have normalized relations with its neighbours, certainly played a major role in Mali through its history and perhaps still did leading into the French led intervention in 2012. As a reminder, capacity “refers to the potential for a state to mobilize and employ resources towards productive ends. States lacking in capacity are generally unable to provide services to their citizens and cannot respond effectively to sudden shocks such as natural disasters, epidemics, food shortages, or refugee flows” (Carment, Samy and Prest 2009).

Capacity is vital in the Malian case because it is one of the key dimensions by which governments can weather shocks, particularly in terms of the economy. Indeed, from the ALC profile, capacity was the dimension dragging the country down into extreme fragility and it needed support from the international community in order to get Mali into a virtuous positive feedback cycle and catalyze growth. Also, it is apparent that capacity issues are the biggest hurdle for Mali to overcome. The high and consistent trend seen in the ALC profile indicates that the economic situation is in extremely poor condition with little chance of improving. This builds into the causal mechanisms enumerated earlier in this chapter which specifically look at shocks and backsliding, in that poor economic performance, exacerbated by economic price shocks, can sometimes lead to civil war. According to my model, power-sharing and foreign aid could have potentially helped Mali to improve its capacity, thereby improving its ability to prevent
civil war. Yet from the ALC profile it appears that the country’s capacity scores were only becoming worse over time. As I discuss in the next section, the drop in foreign aid may have contributed to this phenomenon. Overall, this analysis of Mali’s fragility yields interesting insights into the resilience of the country along the three CIFP dimensions.

*Figure 26. Mali Fragility Trend: 2006-2017 (Fund for Peace 2017)*
Based on our understanding of the causal mechanisms for backsliding presented in the intervention failure model, this chapter aims to answer the question: could a foreign aid intervention (capacity) or legitimacy intervention through power-sharing—including sharing of the aid rents—have prevented the outbreak of civil war in Mali? First, I briefly review some of the literature on the relationship between economic shocks, foreign aid and civil war. I then give more background on the Mali situation, looking at resilience through the lens of state fragility and the intervention failure model. Next, I examine how the hypotheses from chapter three fit into this case and whether they are upheld, using the analytical questions from the structured, focused comparison method outlined in chapter four. The fourth section outlines the causal mechanisms for this relationship and presents evidence for each; the fifth section proposes three policy recommendations that follow from the intervention failure model and finally the last section provides a brief conclusion.
7.3.1 Exploring the Relationship between Exogenous Shocks, Aid and Conflict

The recent civil war literature has cited negative economic shocks as a major risk factor for civil war onset and backsliding (Fearon 2008; Miguel and Satyanath 2011). For example, Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti (2004) demonstrate that a negative growth shock of five percentage points can increase the risk of conflict onset by one half the following year. Their study is unique as it disaggregates the potential endogenous variables by using rainfall as an instrumental variable to measure the impact of economic growth shocks. What is more, Hegre and Sambanis (2006) conducted a thorough sensitivity analysis of these findings and determined that the relationship between economic growth shocks and civil war onset was indeed robust. In addition, more recent studies have built upon these findings by using different measures of economic shocks. Brückner and Ciccone (2010) illustrate that drops in a country’s primary commodity export prices have a significant effect on the likelihood of civil war outbreak (for example a 20% drop in primary commodity export prices doubled the risk of that country experiencing a civil war in a given year). If the idea that economic shocks do indeed increase the risk of civil war onset is taken as fact, how can governments and multilateral organizations hope to combat such effects? This question leads to the concept of foreign aid working as a “buffer” which can act to prevent the outbreak of civil war in developing countries which are experiencing these exogenous economic pressures.

Using the above-mentioned literature as the basis from which to build their argument, Savun and Tirone (2012) contend that negative economic shocks increase the risk of civil war by temporarily decreasing the opportunity cost of fighting, as well as at
the same time increasing the level of economic grievances in society. From here, the researchers note that because low income countries are heavily dependent on primary commodity exports, the logic holds that declines in export prices should disproportionately affect them. In light of such an exogenous shock, can foreign aid act as a tool to prevent deleterious effects including conflict and backsliding? In order to test this proposition, the authors first identify the dependant variable as “conflict onset” using the Uppsala/PRIO data set of civil wars. They identify foreign aid and negative economic shocks as the independent variables and apply the theory to a sample of official development assistance receiving countries. Exogenous shocks are then operationalized as global agricultural raw materials prices. The rationale here is based on the fact that many developing countries are primarily agricultural; therefore, their economic well-being is closely tied to the performance of agricultural exports. Furthermore, this operationalization strategy serves to separate the potential endogeneity caused by the “resource curse” which is generally associated with “point” resources such as oil and diamonds. The next step is to construct a new measure of agricultural shocks using IMF raw material prices; they do so by calculating whether the difference in prices from one year to the next is in the bottom 10 percentile, if so then countries are coded as experiencing a shock. While this cut-off may be arbitrarily chosen, it is at a high enough threshold that we can be relatively certain that the situation is quite rare and extreme. In addition to the newly constructed economic shock variable, the authors also developed another independent variable which illustrates how dependant a given country is on agricultural exports as part of a greater whole of the economy. In order to differentiate those countries that may be more or less vulnerable they then interact these two terms, providing a convincing analysis of a countries
propensity for conflict after experiencing an economic shock event. Finally, Savun and Tirone also include controls for measures of democracy, per capita GDP, population, and peace years.

The results of their analysis demonstrated that aid indeed has a conflict supressing effect in the wake of a major economic shock in fragile states. The finding here is consistent with the models presented in chapter three in that an intervention on the strongest dimension of fragility can prevent backsliding during a recovery. In their own results, the authors present the marginal effects of total aid on conflict in graphical format in order to visualize the effects; from these diagrams it is clear that as countries economic reliance on agricultural exports increases (and thus exposure to price volatility shocks), so too will they be better able to supress the likelihood of conflict by bolstering their foreign aid budget. For example, a one unit increase in total aid (representing a $1 increase for 1000 citizens) reduces conflict onset chances by 1%. In addition, the results indicate that agricultural shocks do indeed increase the chances of conflict, as would have been expected. In order to ensure that the results of the empirical analysis were valid, many robustness checks were performed along with the inclusion of controls for variables such as the presence of IMF programs etc. As each of these control variables were checked, the authors found that their results held firm. Another robustness check was to lag total aid by several years in order to test for endogeneity, still the authors found a strong correlation between foreign aid levels and the reduction of conflict onset after an exogenous shock. Overall the study illustrates that even modest increases in aid can significantly help reduce the chances of conflict after an economic shock.
In light of these results, it is critical to ask what the causal mechanisms for these relationships are. The authors identify four main mechanisms. First, when low-income countries are faced with economic shocks, they do not have the resources to expand government spending. Instead the government must contract their spending budget due to limited supply of credit. These cuts further exacerbate the economic plight of the developing country which was already under major pressure due to the price shock. Second, economic shocks negatively affect domestic political stability. This occurs because of deceased incomes, which in turn decreases the opportunity cost that is normally associated with protesting or fighting in a civil war. Another aspect of this relationship is the idea because the shock is temporary the “spoils” will still be available to whoever happens to end up as victor. That is, rebel groups still see the country’s economic resources as a valuable prize to be captured despite the current state of economic affairs.

The third mechanism for the relationship is based upon the idea of “quasi-voluntary compliance” (Levi 1989). In this scenario the government can no longer buy the support of the populace by providing services and social transfers as it may have done in the past. This in turn leads to increased grievance on the part of the population who may have been placated because of government handouts and other forms of government-provided benefits. Finally, the fourth mechanism identified is the fact that even if one economic sector (for example a particular export industry) is hit the hardest, because government budget support relies so heavily on certain industries in developing nations it means that the broader populace can and will also be affected by such shocks. The notion here is that as government revenues from one sector decline, so too will spending
on other, diffuse areas of the budget generally. Therefore, a shock in a developed country may only affect one specific segment of the population, in this scenario the diffuse nature of government spending means that the entire population will feel the burden of the shock. It is clear that all four of these mechanisms can be countered by foreign aid increases; hence, the higher the amount of foreign aid a country receives, the lower the risk of experiencing a civil conflict following an economic shock. The key logic here is that foreign aid provides a cushion by which governments can absorb such shocks by mitigating the causal chains presented in these four mechanistic processes. Furthermore, the more fungible the foreign aid, the more likely that it will act as a buffer to such shocks as governments have the freedom to shift resources to where they are most needed which usually represent those which are most likely to experience a crisis initiation. I argue that this aid, plus legitimacy building through power-sharing with the Tuareg population could have prevented the onset of the civil war in 2011/2012.

*Figure 28. Causal Mechanisms Leading to Conflict After an Economic Shock*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect of Economic Shock</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government reduces spending</td>
<td>Exacerbates economic downturn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incomes are lowered</td>
<td>Increases level of economic grievance of population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Quasi Voluntary Compliance” decreases (i.e. government can no longer</td>
<td>Increases level of political grievance of population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>longer buy off population with goods and services)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic shock occurs in one or more specific sectors</td>
<td>Decreases government fiscal space and thus affects larger portion of population</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
tested here is that of Savun and Tirone’s as applied specifically to Mali which holds that the higher the amount of foreign aid a country receives, the lower is its risk of experiencing a civil war following an economic shock.

7.3.3 The Triggers of the Civil War: Timeline of the Intervention

Mali experienced the onset of a major civil uprising based in the northern region of the country in 2011. Certainly, some policy analysts and researchers have contended that severe economic conditions contributed to the outbreak of civil conflict in Mali both now and in the past (Keita 1998; Benjaminsin 2008). At the time, Mali was considered a donor darling, but it quickly devolved into chaos. Why did this occur? From the above discussion it is demonstrable that such exogenous economic shocks have a positive correlation with conflict onset generally. Therefore, it is useful to examine whether this has been the case in Mali specifically. Regarding the 2011 conflict onset one contributing factor that has been cited was the 2011 drought in the northeastern region. This drought led to more than 40% of the total cattle dying and put extreme pressure on the people of the northern region economically, socially, and politically (BTI 2012). Aside from the naturally occurring problems, human induced activities including “a high population growth rate, intensive cultivation (agriculture and farming) methods and an increasing demand for resources, such as firewood, land and water” further exacerbated the already dire conditions in the region (Holthuijzen and Maximillian 2011).

The second potential factor is the massive drop in global cotton prices which was seen immediately prior to the conflict onset. Interestingly this is similar to the case of Uzbekistan, which went into a political and economic crisis, shunning IMF policy after cotton prices dropped in the mid-1990s. In the Malian case, one study found,
“Vertically integrated into an export value chain, cotton farmers have suffered from stagnating yields, slow organisational reform, and rising input-to-output ratios over the past decade” (Smale, Diakité, and Keita 2011). The fact that cotton is Mali’s primary agricultural export indicates that these factors combined with the sudden drop in cotton prices in 2011 may have also exacerbated the potential for civil war to break out as per the causal mechanisms indicated earlier in this chapter. If one accepts that these two economic shocks had a precipitating effect on the 2011 conflict, the next query is: was the level of foreign aid partially responsible for conflict onset?

Mali was a powder keg after the Libyan Civil war, beset by drought, falling prices on key export goods, terrorist and illicit network expansion, a complex and contentious political situation, and the French posture towards their former colonial regions in Africa. Interim President Dioncounda Traoré requested France’s help in retaking the country’s far flung regions and President Hollande of France justified his country’s participation in the fight by pointing to the external terrorist threat posed especially by fighters moving into the North after the Libyan conflict in 2011. The coup faced by Mali showed how weak it was as a state and helped to attract French support and the attention of the international community at large. Indeed, many analysts saw Mali strictly as a security situation, and in my view, ignored the potential for political peacemaking through negotiations and power-sharing arrangements. Previous Malian governments had agreed to such power-sharing arrangements with the peoples of the Northern regions but with each subsequent shock event these arrangements fell apart over time. The pervasive nature of jihadist and Islamist militant militias and networks meant that the UN—with the French at the helm—saw Mali mainly as a security threat to be fixed by authority intervention first and foremost. Yet Mali failed to build up its
authority structures and failed to compose a hegemonic national identity, which could perhaps have been done if consociationalism had been practiced and supported by the West. Surprisingly Mali underwent a period of relative peace from 1992 to 2007, wherein the government was able to rule from the Southern capital and keep the Northern population at least somewhat appeased.

In January 2012, the *Mouvement national de libération de l'Azawad* (MNLA) began attacking Malian positions in the vast and sparsely population north of the country. The rebellion was joined by several Islamist groups including Ansar Eddine and the *Mouvement pour l'unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest* (MUJAO), both of which had connections to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQMI). From January to March these groups gained in strength and there was infighting between the Islamists and the MNLA; from July 2012 to January 2013 the three groups controlled different territories in the north including Kidal, Timbuktu and Gao, interchanging possession through battle often. During this time, in Bamako a coup was undertaken by Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo, unseating the current president Amadou Toumani Touré. The coup was justified by Sanogo who argued that the regime’s response to the crisis was ineffective and weak, and the poor condition of the Malian army gave further support to this viewpoint. After the coup Sanogo promised that the Malian army would take back the lost ground in the north and restore order. Yet, most analysts agree that the coup served to exacerbate the deleterious effects of the crisis. Political maneuvering in the capital resulted in Interim President Dioncounda Traoré taking over, but not without a great deal of back and forth between the deeply divided political factions, compounded by a rise in corruption, an erosion of democracy, an increase in criminality, and ongoing impunity for state officials (Wing 2013). Legitimacy took a hard hit during this time.
Moreover, the uncertainty of who was really in power in Bamako as well as the ever-shifting alliances of the Northern rebels meant that the international community had a hard time getting a hold on what could be done to help.

When Hollande was elected in France, he put the Malian crisis at the top of his to-do list, but French diplomats at the UN had a hard time persuading their colleagues that this was a worthwhile cause for a larger scale peacekeeping operation. Eventually a cautious UN resolution was passed, taking note of the Economic Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS) and African Union (AU) request to deploy a stabilization force. It also mandated that the UN put together an integrated strategy for the Sahel region that dealt with security, governance, development, human rights and humanitarian issues. The ECOWAS force was delayed in its deployment partly due to Sandago’s resistance to an international force and partly due to members of the UNSC including the United States reluctance, doubting the ability and objectives of the mission; this hesitance to send a robust peacekeeping force has parallels to US resistance in the Rwanda case as well. France and the US eventually negotiated to adopt resolution 2085 that authorized the deployment of AFISMA, an “African-led International Support Mission in Mali” for one year, with the plan being to train the Malian army and re-conquer the North (Marchal 2013). The operation only began much later however, after the French had come in and “done the dirty work,” so to speak; AFISMA later was made up of about 8000 troops that largely watched over the south of the country (Harmon 2016).

The French became increasingly frustrated with the lack of movement by the UNSC and resistance by key Western allies. But it did have some partners to work with,
for instance the governments of Niger, Senegal, and Guinea all favoured a peacekeeping mission with the goal of preventing the conflict from spreading across borders into the broader region. Once the rebel groups began to move towards the south, the French had both the will and impetus to act. In 2013, using rhetoric around counter terrorism and France’s reliability to its African partners, Hollande began to transform his policy towards the Sahel. The urgency of the situation was buoyed by the political situation playing itself out in Bamako, with multiple political movements calling for a national plan for change in Mali, including that President Traoré leave office, with another coup becoming more likely by the day. With rebels advancing, the Malian government request for aid was seen as de facto legal approval for the French to intervene in January 2013. The MNLA were seen as potential political partners and the legitimate stakeholders in the north, with the Islamists as the main enemy to be destroyed. Planes and troops were deployed immediately, and the effort was very popular in Mali and internationally, with the French perceived as liberators by the locals (Harmon 2016). French bombing campaigns were followed by convoys of French special forces and larger cities like Gao were quickly taken under French control, with battles here and there over the months following. The conflict rapidly turned into a guerilla warfare style engagement, with IEDs, suicide bombings and ambush attacks becoming the norm. ECOWAS also supported the French with about 2000 troops, and France had about 1800 in-country by late January (Harmon 2016). The southern offensive was in tatters and Malian troops had been integrated into French ranks for the retaking of Gao and Timbuktu. President Hollande even made a surprise visit to Timbuktu in February to speak to the people and troops.
The French were willing to negotiate with the MNLA, a position that was derided by many in Bamako, nevertheless the French saw discussions with the rebels as necessary as there was little feasibility of the Malian army being able to hold the Northern regions without political compromise and accommodations being made. As Harmon (2016) notes, “When the Malians talked about fighting terrorists, they included the MNLA, whose rebellion, they believe, started the war. When the French talked about fighting terrorists, they meant the [Islamists], who were still holding French hostages as the war raged far north.” To support the stabilization efforts after the main conflict had ended, the EU pledged 12.3 million euro for a 500-strong training force (the European Training Mission to Mali – EUTM) that would assist the AFISMA. A 15,000-strong UN force was later created under Chapter VII, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) with the goal of supporting the transitional government of Mali to stabilize the country, protect civilians, re-establish state authority, support a national political dialogue, and protect human rights. Burkina Faso, Chad, Bangladesh, Senegal and Togo are the top 5 troop contributors for MINUSMA. Since the conflict, Mali can now be characterized as a hybrid regime, with the military still holding significant sway in its politics. Mali had a presidential election in 2013, with Ibraheem Boubacar Keita winning and the election going better than expected with a turnout of 53.5% and little violence; western observers characterized the election as free and fair with few irregularities (Harmon 2016). Since then, elections have remained on hold and have been postponed several times, but they were scheduled for 29 July 2018; there ended up being a run-off between the top two candidates, with incumbent president Keïta having been subsequently re-elected with 67% of the vote. It was also the first instance in Malian history that a presidential election was pushed into
an obligatory runoff between an incumbent and a challenger, which may indicate that the political realm is becoming more competitive and democratic. At the same time the UN force has had a great deal of trouble keeping the peace and still has casualties occurring relatively frequently, with the extremists using IEDs and other asymmetric warfare tactics against MINUSMA and the 4000 French forces still on the ground. In the next section I turn to the role exogenous shocks played in precipitating the Malian conflict.

7.3.4 Understanding Backsliding: Four Mechanisms

*Government spending reduced*

When countries are overly reliant on primary commodity exports, volatility in price levels can have a substantive effect on the government’s ability to collect revenue. In turn, the spending regime of the government must necessarily be cut, especially in developing countries where access to credit is often negligible. Unless the developing country is a party to certain IMF or World Bank rules—which in themselves can often impose strict restraints on spending and other essential government services—there is often no other option but to cut spending in light of an economic shock emanating from global market forces. In Mali, the duel shocks of the 2011 drought and the 2010-2011 cotton price shock served to negatively affect both the tax revenue base and the spending capability of the Malian government. Evidence of these trends is visible in the figures below. In terms of government spending in figure 29 the curve is beginning to enter a downward trend, of which the 2011 conflict aggravated. Mali’s economic indicators such as GDP and economic growth were stagnant from 2010 - 2011 and took a significant hit after the conflict in the northern region became a full-scale civil war.
Due to this development it is possible to infer that spending has also been negatively affected since 2011. Turning now to figure 30 it is also apparent that the government tax revenue base has declined relatively since 2005. In support of this contention a recent IMF report indicated that since the crisis in 2012 the tax revenue base has been irrevocably hurt, “reflected [by] a 25 percent decline in government resources and negative growth of -1.2 percent” (IMF 2013). This evidence shows the linkages between capacity and legitimacy, and how tenuous they can be when faced with shock events.

*Figure 29. Mali Government Spending Data (percent of GDP) (World Bank 2016)*

*Figure 30. Mali Government Tax Revenue (percent of GDP) (World Bank 2016)*
**Lowered Incomes**

Exogenous economic shocks, especially those related to agricultural primary commodity exports, are expected to result in lower income generation levels for the populace. Those individuals and groups who are employed by the sector in question are expected to be hit the hardest. As agriculturalists are unable to sell their goods at the market price, they are accustomed to, their welfare decreases and at the same time the opportunity cost associated with rebellion is decreased. In addition, loss of assets such as livestock may increase the level of criminality and violence as basic needs are unable to be met. In Mali the level of grievance in the northern region after the drought certainly increased, as evidenced by the ramping up of protests and the organization of a resistance force aiming to secede from the country (BTI 2012). In addition, lowered income can exacerbate tensions along ethnic and/or social lines. Income levels generally are some of the lowest in the world, with a per capita income in 2012 of $693.28 USD, or 155th out of 174 countries ranked (World Bank 2014). In figure 31 it is seen that while Mali’s GDP per capita has improved over the long term, in the short term it has stagnated and began to fall. This trend is troublesome because individuals are sensitive to changes in their relative income and even modest reductions can make it difficult to live on an already tight budget, leading to risk factors associated with the outbreak of violence. Therefore, Savun and Tirone’s second causal mechanism also appears to have reasonably strong evidence supporting it in the Mali case.
Reduction in “Quasi-voluntary compliance”

When governments of developing countries are faced with the prospect of political instability or potential uprisings, one strategy first outlined by Levi (1989) is termed “quasi-voluntary compliance.” This tactic “depends on two conditions: the perception that there is a bargain between the government and citizens in which the government provides public goods that are positively valued in exchange for tax payment, and the existence of assurances that the government and other taxpayers will keep their sides of the bargain” (Cheibub 1998). When these conditions hold, compliance with taxation laws would be expected to increase as the population begins to trust the government more. In turn the revenue of the government increases because less resources are wasted enforcing tax laws and collecting taxes. In the case of Mali this concept is most salient when it comes to the relationship of Bamako and the northern region of the country (and the Tuaregs in particular). For some time, Bamako was able to keep the Tuaregs placated with promises of greater regional development and political representation (BTI 2012). However as exogenous shocks—including the drought—hit the region, sentiment turned against the southern-based government resulting in the
renewal of the uprising and demands for an independent state grew. Here, foreign aid allocated to the northern population through some form of autonomous decision making and power-sharing would have been a tool by which to satisfy some of the material demands of the Tuaregs. For instance, acting on promises to build infrastructure or providing temporary food aid may have prevented the northern peoples from acting out in violence. Moreover, one of the key grievances of the northerners was the misappropriation of aid funds earmarked for the north by the Bamako government. Indeed, while corruption ranks as one of the highest priorities throughout the country with Mali ranking 105th out 176 countries on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, it is even more pronounced as a grievance in the north. Often development aid promised to the Northern region would be squandered by corrupt officials or cancelled outright, leading to protests and other forms of political resistance. From all of this it is demonstrable that the “quasi-voluntary compliance” regime that was previously keeping peace relatively stable between the north and south has now all but disintegrated.

**Economic shock to a specific sector**

It is not only individuals and groups associated with those specific sectors which are affected by the economic shocks. Rather, government revenues as a whole are impacted and as a downstream effect government spending programs generally may take a significant hit. Therefore, instead of a small minority of the population feeling the brunt of the shock, the pain gets spread across a larger proportion of the population. As previously alluded to, Mali experienced several economic shocks in the lead up to the outbreak of violence. Cotton is Mali’s largest agricultural export and figure 32 below
indicates the global price of cotton over time. It also shows the regional concentration of cotton production geographically; the southern part of the country is much more fertile and acts as the key region for cotton production. Note that the dip in price occurs shortly before the onset of the conflict. It may seem counter intuitive then to conclude that this price shock would have deleterious effects on the conflict given that the rebellion started in the north, however many northerners migrate to the south for employment and if they lose their employment or suddenly have lower wages, grievances can build up as they are forced to return home. It is also critical to remember that government revenue is affected by the decrease in primary commodity prices and through this mechanism the entire population may be affected by the decrease in government spending.

*Figure 32. Global Cotton Prices (Red line indicates conflict onset) (Teft 2004)*

7.3.5 Foreign Aid: Did it Play a Role in the Conflict Onset?

Along with violent conflict, another integral feature of Mali’s history has been the role of foreign aid. Since the mid-1990s Mali was considered by western donors to be a model
African democracy and hence has been on the receiving end of a great deal of development aid funding. This reliance on external actors for budgetary support has served to create a rent seeking relationship between Mali’s politicians and western donors. In addition, politicians partner with the implementing organizations (mainly local and international NGOs) in order to influence where aid money is spent. Overall these types of relationships create distortions in the economy and political system. First, instead of taxing a productive activity as is the case in developed countries, politicians are required to cater to donors wishes to consistently secure funding. This means that politicians are not accountable to the population but rather to external actors, which puts the country at risk economically if those external actors do not provide the same level of funding from year to year. Mali is known for its high reliance on foreign aid, which ebbs and flows over the years resulting in several “foreign aid shocks.” Nielson et al. (2011) provide compelling evidence via their large-N quantitative analysis that sudden decreases in levels of foreign aid are positively associated with conflict onset. Indeed, to understand the role of foreign aid in Mali it is useful to briefly recap the recent history of the country. Nielson et al. eloquently summarize the relationship of foreign and conflict in Mali as such,

In the spring of 1990, Tuareg fighters in the North African Sahel launched a rebellion against the government of Mali. Although there were many underlying causes, foreign aid played a proximate role in the outbreak of violence. Desertification and severe droughts in the 1970s and 1980s impoverished Mali, especially the livestock-reliant Tuareg. During this period, Mali became heavily dependent on foreign aid; for many years Mali received more than 30% of its budget from international assistance, which at times was the largest source of government revenue. Flush with international aid, the government successfully managed a
1984 drought that threatened the Tuareg (Imperato 1989). The tenuous peace unraveled in 1989, however, when aid flows to Mali were drastically reduced, substantially weakening the government and preventing it from providing the same level of assistance to Tuareg communities then or into the future. In the following year, the Tuareg initiated their rebellion against the Malian government.

From this passage it becomes clear the Malian governments over reliance on foreign aid represented a major challenge to peace in the country. Later, in the first decade of the 2000s, as Mali again became a donor darling a similar situation developed again. In this case, the government again became overly reliant on foreign aid for budgetary support; as the country experienced the economic shocks, foreign aid flows also began to dry up, partly because of the global financial crisis and partly because of the volatile nature of the economic and security situation in the country. This exacerbated an already fragile situation in terms of legitimacy, with the population having become essentially dependant on foreign aid rather than on localized economic activity. We can see that development aid and humanitarian aid dropped prior to conflict onset with a cursory look at the data. Figure 33 below tracks the development aid that was received by Mali over the last 30 years. While there is a general upwards trend, the level of spending is also marked by a number of ups and downs. Notably after 2010 the trend line begins to slope downwards, indicating that development spending began to decrease after 2010 and into 2011. Figure 34 further illustrates this point, with 2011 being the 6th lowest development aid receiving year out of the previous 9 years. In addition to regular development aid, emergency humanitarian aid flows also dried up starting after the global financial crisis in 2008. Figure 35 demonstrates the stark decline in humanitarian assistance, with 2011 representing the lowest level of funding over the decade. These
trends all indicate that the government of Mali was under significant financial stress in the lead up to the conflict onset. This shift then resulted in the inability of Bamako to provide incentives to the peoples of the Northern region, further exacerbating the level of grievance.

Figure 33. Total Development Aid Flows to Mali (Aid Data 2013)

Figure 34. Total Development Aid Flows Ranked Highest Year to Lowest Year (Aid Data 2013)
7.4 Analysis of the Intervention: Halting of Stabilization Progress and Backsliding

7.4.1 The Decision to Intervene

In the sections above we saw that there was a decision-making role for so called “intervention entrepreneurs,” namely the French president and diplomats who were instrumental in pushing for a military solution to the Malian conflict (Henke 2017). The decision to intervene was like the Libyan case in that there were justifications made on humanitarian grounds and there were rebel groups moving toward a specific, highly populated region of the country, threatening more bloodshed. Rather than broker a political solution that focused on legitimacy, which Mali was strongest in because of its donor darling status and client-patron networks in the south, the UN—and the French
more specifically—decided to take a military approach. So here we see a two-pronged intervention, through foreign aid and military intervention, both of which focused on the weaker dimensions of statehood. Some may argue that with the confluence of negative factors including the economic shocks, militant attacks, and political instability there was no choice but to intervene on the authority dimension, however as I have argued based on the fragility recovery model, I believe that power-sharing could have achieved the goals of stabilizing the state, given the demands of the MNLA in the north. As a counterfactual, if the French or another Western ally like Canada had worked to mediate the conflict between Mali and the MNLA, there would have been the possibility of working together to rid the Islamist elements, and then broker a deal for greater autonomy for the north as well as rent-sharing of foreign aid that in the past was dominated solely by Bamako. This focus on legitimacy would have been more fruitful in pushing Mali down the fragility recovery pathway and could have led to the creation of a virtuous cycle. For example, Canada is currently funding more than 18 peacebuilding and stabilization projects in the central and northern regions of Mali, with positive effects on the local political dynamics. These efforts are a drop in the bucket but provide excellent examples of constructive engagement on the legitimacy dimension. But in any case, the decision to intervene on authority was made in a hasty manner without strong consideration of the potential unintended consequences; the position of MINUSMA today along with the ALC profile illustrated in figure 27 indicates that Mali has fallen back into extreme fragility with little hope of recovery in the near to medium term.
7.4.2 Implementation of the Intervention

In thinking about the implementation of the intervention, and its warping from a legitimacy focused to an authority focused intervention, I would like to point to the writing of Marchal (2013) who notes “The French government has focused mainly on the military dimension of the current crisis, but a more comprehensive approach is needed – one that recognizes the need for a more inclusive political settlement that could provide a model of how to build a more inclusive political system for the whole region.” As seen in the vignette presented in this chapter, the intervention was implemented swiftly and somewhat successfully if analyzed only through a military-centric (authority) lens. While eliminating terrorist threats is a worthwhile aim, it seems that the French and UN forces still only have tenuous control over the north, in part due to its difficult geography and massive size. The MNLA also have been appeased for the time being, but they are also facing continuing, dogged attacks and are further promoting conflict with Bamako in the political realm. Mali’s border remains porous and the enactment of law and order is virtually negligible, so both through the case study and through the analysis of the CIFP and FFP data it can be seen that this authority intervention did not have a stabilizing effect on the country, nor did it have the predicted knock-on effects on capacity and legitimacy as would be predicted had it been on the strongest dimension. In order to catalyze Mali via the fragility recovery pathway, a much stronger focus needs to be put on legitimacy interventions. Only by promoting a more inclusive society through peacebuilding and stabilization efforts will the long-term viability of Mali be secured. It may come as a surprise that legitimacy is the strongest dimension in Mali but that says more about how poor the overall country situation is than about the quality of state-society relations. To be sure, if Mali was only looking to
control the southern region of the country this may be an easier task, but in order to maintain any semblance of control over the north, political solutions—*a la* those exalted in *Pathways for Peace*—are paramount. The international community has to recognize the primacy of bringing the warring factions to the table and negotiating a durable deal. Furthermore, it is necessary for local civil society and NGOs need to be engaged so that the populace feels that there are benefits to be gained from participating in the framework and institutions of a Malian state. Stabilization efforts need to focus on building legitimacy and trust before dumping more blood and treasure into a hopeless situation in Mali’s north which can deteriorate and backslide at a moment’s notice.

### 7.4.3 Effect on Capacity and Legitimacy

The evidence presented in this chapter indicates that exogenous shocks played a role in exacerbating the fragility of Mali and may have prevented the country from making improvements in authority, legitimacy and capacity. Additionally, by examining the Malian case with attention to the intervention failure model and backsliding, we can see how this case fits into broader fragility theory including the hypotheses that shocks can cause instability to return, even once a country is on the path to recovery for a short time. The four causal mechanisms examined all have at least moderate evidence of having occurred in the lead up to and during the 2011 onset of civil conflict. Here we can see that as Nielson *et al.* (2012) have demonstrated, “aid can affect the likelihood of violent armed conflict by influencing a state’s ability to credibly commit to an agreement that averts war at present and into the future.” Figure 36 below summarizes the causal mechanisms discussed in the chapter along with the lines of evidence presented in support of the theory on exogenous shocks, foreign aid and civil war.
This figure shows how the exogenous shocks precipitated deleterious effects that eventually led to the civil war and authority intervention. The military foray did stabilize the political realm somewhat in that Mali was able to have elections and prevent another coup. Yet from the CIFP data we see that capacity and legitimacy both worsened along with authority, with the French intervention only providing a modicum of improvement down the line in 2015-2016. This structured, focused case study showed how the intervention(s) did not address most of the root causes including longstanding grievances of the population which are particularly isolated from the comparatively minor issues of the elites. Because of this fact, there was little improvement in legitimacy and Mali remains a brittle state to this day, reliant on international forces to keep the militant groups from overrunning Bamako and other critical cities; this task is increasingly difficult, with clashes, ambushes and deaths occurring nearly every day. The implementation of the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement has stalled and the
situation in northern Mali is not improving. Additionally, insecurity has dramatically increased in central Mali, Menaka, and the adjoining tri-border area (Liptako-Gourma triangle) with Niger and Burkina Faso. Furthermore, central Mali is three times more populated than the north and the region was not covered by the 2012 peace agreement, making insecurity more complicated to address by authorities. The evolving situation has an important impact on already extremely vulnerable populations in Mali and the region, as this area is also a major agricultural hub and transit route. Insecurity in Mali also has implications for regional security, with the current situation allowing terrorist groups with cross-border reach to entrench themselves in northern and central Mali. AT the same time, an overreliance on military expenditures could turn Mali into more of a money-pit than it already is, instead donors must provide funding to programs that build governance structures, engage local stakeholders in meaningful ways, and that have the explicit goal of stabilization through political solutions. Such an approach has the chance to build up Mali’s legitimacy and improve state-society relations which have been badly scarred over time through neglect.

7.4.4 Failure of the Intervention

Mali is a textbook case of intervention failure, wherein over dependence on foreign aid and rejection of inclusive political solutions led to a deterioration first in capacity and then in authority and legitimacy. Mali was overly vulnerable to both economic and foreign aid shocks, and its large territory with dichotomous ethnic group rivalries made it a tinder box, ripe for the breakout of violence even after being stable for some time. What actions can be taken practically then by both states and their international partners in order to curb the deleterious effect of foreign aid shocks? In the short term
there are three primary policy recommendations which flow from the overall argument. First, levels of foreign aid should as much as possible be kept consistent in order to avoid the unnecessary stress which a sudden decrease in aid can have on the government’s ability to respond to an economic crisis. Otherwise the country risks backsliding and cannot use the PDIA method for dealing with various crises. In practice this is easier said than done, as foreign donors will always make changes to their aid funding practices based on strategic interests and economic performance over time. Perhaps more practically then is the notion of making sure that the aid that is dispersed is as fungible as possible. That is, donors need to develop strong relationships with host governments whereby the aid regime is transparent enough to prevent corruption but also flexible enough to allow the host government to respond appropriately in the case of an economic shock or other crisis. Fungibility also must be built into the government’s own budgetary framework as well in order to allow for emergency responses to crises to happen as swiftly as possible. The Millennium Challenge Corporation is one example of a donor that is doing better in providing untied aid which can be used to nip shocks in the bud. Second, the Malian government along with its international partners must reassess the relationship between aid money and state fragility. The evidence marshalled in this chapter indicates that an over-reliance on aid money can foster instability by distorting power-relationships through an abnormal economic incentive structure. In the case of Mali aid revenue is acting as a “rent” resource. Some authors have argued that overreliance on such rent resources can exacerbate the likelihood of conflict onset, and it can push countries down the intervention failure pathway outlined in this dissertation (Collier and Hoeffler 2005).
For Mali, it appears that local economic distortions have indeed played a role in motivating rebel groups. Being aware of these phenomena is the first step to understanding the problem, while practical steps forward—such as lowering reliance on aid—are more difficult to implement due to the many complex restrictions on the government’s economic capacity. In the long term, economic diversification and development are key to solving this issue; as such development would lower the reliance on foreign support. Furthermore, the continued development of the taxation system is also a key way in which the government can broaden its revenue base. The third recommendation is that the Malian government and its partners need to actively manage the peace and stability of the country in order to prevent the situation from repeating. This may seem obvious, though, because Mali has dipped in and out of the top 40 most fragile states it needs to be paid attention to. For example, from 1996 to 2006 the country experienced ten years of peace after a comprehensive peace agreement was brokered by the democratically elected government. This is a noticeable success and the elements that led to it are going to be key if Mali is going to escape from fragility once again and remain stable. Military support by the international community is one thing, but it is also fickle and most-likely short lived.

The international community needs to recognize Mali’s longer-term needs and invest in scalable solutions for authority improvements, which will have knock on effects on legitimacy and capacity down the line. This notion relates closely to the idea of resilience and a regional approach may be the only way to help quell the violence. Indeed, the Sahel faces interrelated security, governance and development challenges. A number of countries in the region are subject to political instability and insecurity, weak
governance and contested state authority. Armed groups and terrorists operate with impunity across the region, and the trafficking of migrants, drugs, weapons and other goods by criminal networks is a concern. The conflict has now expanded to other Sahel countries such as Burkina Faso and Niger; countries including Côte d’Ivoire have also been targeted by terrorist attacks and threat levels have risen. These terrorist groups have been undermining the peace process in Mali and fueling internal conflicts, including those related to land use. Some of these groups also operate across the region’s porous borders and have contributed to deteriorating security in Burkina Faso and Niger. These terrorist groups remain the main threat against Western efforts to support the peace process in Mali, while the impacts of climate change and conflicts between nomadic herders and farmers pose additional threats to security and stability in the country. In this type of extreme environment, exogenous shocks are much more likely to precipitate conflict, therefore the more actively the stability of a country—or region—is managed, the higher the chance of weathering such shocks.

7.5 Conclusions and Next Steps

This chapter’s case study of intervention failure examined the relationship between exogenous economic shocks, foreign aid and the onset of civil war using Mali as a test case. It demonstrated how a country can be pushed back into extreme fragility even after a significant recovery. To prevent such a situation from occurring again in Mali, the government and the international partners engaged in the country must address these concerns. This can be achieved namely through better management of the foreign aid-government spending regime, improved fungibility of foreign aid rents, economic diversification, development of the taxation system and finally consistent management
of the peace process, especially the implementation of legitimacy building proposals including power-sharing through consociationalism. However, the Mali case also raised questions on whether intervention on the strongest dimension is necessary and sufficient, in that this case was confounded by having interventions in all three dimensions, yet still failed to recover. This shows that targeting legitimacy in the Mali case may have been necessary but not sufficient as a requirement for improvement. The Rwanda case study in the first half of the chapter demonstrated how such a goal could be achieved; here, robust power-sharing was implemented, although there are debates on how successful it was; but the fact remains that Rwanda is now much better off on all fronts than is Mali. Even though there is some centralization of political power, Rwanda was able to build a solid international reputation and make itself a business, commerce and trade friendly country. It is possible for Mali to chart a similar path with strong internal leadership and with support from its Western allies, look to the Group of “Partenaires techniques et financiers (PTF)” for an excellent example of donor coordination in Mali that could be replicated elsewhere. In the next section I look at capacity failure and successes in Uzbekistan and Zimbabwe.
“We have achieved political freedom, but our revolution is not yet complete and is still in progress, for political freedom without the assurance of the right to live and to pursue happiness, which economic progress alone can bring, can never satisfy a people.” - Jawaharlal Nehru, Speech to the US Congress (1949)

Economic development through industry, commerce and trade represents the most effective way for countries to pull themselves out of fragility and eliminate poverty. The economic miracles witnessed in China and India over the past few decades have demonstrated to the world what trillions of dollars in aid money could not, that the power of free markets and capitalism along with smart policy measures can create opportunities never before seen in developing nations. Traditionally the West has implemented capacity interventions through its international institutions including the World Bank and IMF, as well as by facilitating trade through the WTO and multilateral free trade agreements, which have proliferated in the 21st century linking together far flung nations in trading relationships with minimal barriers. Certainly, the global trend in economic development moved towards the Washington consensus after the end of the cold war and collapse of the Soviet Union, but China’s ascendency has brought a new model to the forefront which has intrigued developing nations and their leaders, especially with the promise of long-term political power unchecked by the limitations imposed by democratic systems.
This trend is worrying for Western liberal democracies, as it threatens the rules based international order carefully built up by US dominance of the global system. Of course, IMF programs are not the only types of capacity intervention, large scale development projects and untied security related partnerships also fall into this category, just to name a couple of examples. For the purposes of my study I focused on IMF programs because they are easy to identify, there is a significant level of information and data available to examine, and they are constrained by discrete time limitations. I first turn to Uzbekistan which has been characterized by my methodology as an intervention success. The IMF implemented its structural adjustment and lending program shortly after independence, albeit with some resistance as will be seen later in the chapter. This intervention was on the capacity dimension which was also the countries strongest average performing dimension over the period under scrutiny. I then shift to the case of Zimbabwe, where the IMF program was implemented on capacity which was not the strongest dimension, and the country ended up experiencing a great deal of instability, conflict and strife related directly to its poor economic performance. The failure of the intervention is analyzed against this background and with the fragility recovery model in mind, testing for the causal mechanisms that led to failure through narrative analysis and process tracing. The two cases have a lot of similarities: presence of a strongman leader, resistance to Western intervention efforts, repression of political opponents, a reliance on commodity exports, control of the media and extensive patronage networks. The main difference is the starting conditions, wherein Uzbekistan was strongest in capacity and Zimbabwe was strongest in authority, which I argue was key to how one country prospered while the other became a “basket case.”
8.1 Intervention Success: Uzbekistan Overview

A small central Asian nation of 32 million people, previously part of the USSR before the cold war came to an end, Uzbekistan gained independence in 1991. It is ironically almost famous for its obscurity, with one reference to the country in the 2011 US presidential campaign coming to mind. When questioned on his foreign policy prowess, Herman Cain, one of the main candidates for the Republican ticket, had the following exchange with interviewer David Brody:

BRODY: Are you ready for the ‘gotcha’ questions that are coming from the media and others on foreign policy? Like, who’s the president of Uzbekistan? ...

CAIN: I’m ready for the ‘gotcha’ questions and they’re already starting to come. And when they ask me who is the president of Ubeki-beki-beki-beki-stan-stan I’m going to say, you know, I don’t know. Do you know? And then I’m going to say how’s that going to create one job?

Cain went on to add that Uzbekistan is “insignificant” to US foreign policy interests:

“Knowing who is the head of some of these small insignificant states around the world—I don’t think that is something that is critical to focusing on national security and getting this economy going. When I get ready to go visit that country, I’ll know who it is. But until then, I want to focus on the big issues that we need to solve” (Politico 2011).

Cain can’t really be blamed for his ignorance of a country that is often lost in debates on more pressing issues between larger geopolitical rivals, however Uzbekistan does play an important role in the region with its proximity to US military interests in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Middle East as a whole. Important supply routes run through the country and American companies like Boeing and Case New Holland have
significant business operations there. In addition, Uzbekistan is one of the fastest growing economies in the world, with an average rate of 7.9% GDP growth from 2006 to 2017 (UNDP 2018). The economy was closed and centrally planned for many years after independence, with reforms being brought in slowly over the past two decades. With the death of the long-time President Islam Karimov in 2016, the newly elected President Shavkat Mirziyoyev recognised the need to shift to a market-oriented economy underpinned by private sector growth. In support of this goal, in February 2017, the Mirziyoyev government announced a broad market-oriented reform program which included five priority areas: 1) improving public administration and state-building, 2) ensuring the rule of law and judiciary reform, 3) maintaining economic growth and liberalizing the economy, 4) enhancing social safety nets, and 5) ensuring security and implementing a constructive foreign policy (World Bank 2018). Substantive steps have been taken to liberalize the economy including “opening the foreign exchange market; abolishing the mandatory sale of part of firms’ export revenues at the official exchange rate; cutting the average import tariff in half; increasing prices on energy to reduce fiscal transfers and preferential lending to energy state-owned enterprises; promoting market price determination; improving banking sector regulations to comply with international standards; and amending the labor code to expand formal contracts to part-time and temporary workers” (World Bank 2018). All of these steps are critical in improving and maintaining economic stability as well as in improving the business climate in Uzbekistan.\textsuperscript{101} The authorities are also working on cultivating the tax system and tax

\textsuperscript{101} Uzbekistan didn’t have much of a national identity before the Soviet period, so one topic of interest to scholars is how successful the Soviets were—and later Karimov’s government was—at forging national myths and creating a single economic unit of what was once disparate and tribal affinities across a large geographic area. In fact, the Uzbek state identity was concocted only in the 1920s. A national group
administration procedures as well as on making economic data more transparent, for instance by joining the General Data Dissemination Standard (GDDS) of the International Monetary Fund. These recent developments signal an exciting time ahead for the country; given its economic success before all of these reforms were implemented, the next decade could continue to see improvements in authority, legitimacy, and capacity for the Uzbek people.

8.1.1 A Nation Born

In 1991 as the final declaration of the dissolution of the Soviet Union rung out, five nations in Central Asia re-emerged on the global scene as sovereign republics: Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan. These states were not “built from scratch” but rather “these nascent states were already imbued with a well-developed set of formal institutions that were created and reinforced by their common experience under Soviet rule” (Luong 2004). Still, a power vacuum characterized this new reality, and a number of geopolitical players were interested in these new republics, partly for their unexplored mineral wealth, and partly for their geostrategic position as the lynchpin between Asia and the Middle East (Sengupta 2003). There were many predictions at the time that ethnic conflict and civil war would break out because of the fractionalization that characterized the region, with Fuller (1994) noting “[t]he most urgent problem confronting the new Muslim states is to survive the shock of total independence and to establish the fundamentals of a new national policy.” Yet all of the countries except one (Tajikistan) survived their first decade of independence with no overt wars or civil strife. Economic reforms towards

identity was not clearly defined or cohesive, but Karimov made it a personal mission to make it a politically salient concept that he could benefit from (Frye 2010).
market economies with international assistance were instrumental in improving the fragility of the region. In addition, there was an overall “appeal to democratic norms evident in the frequency of the consultative exercises, which legitimize elites in varying degrees” with the goal of economic development and nation building going hand-in-hand, however, “[p]aradoxically this fails to take into account the tensions between economic modernization and political freedom that exist in the phase of transition” (Sengupta 2003). Characteristic of the J-curve theory, Uzbekistan and its neighbours were seen as needing to pass through a period of instability as their societies began to open after the loss of Russian control over the state.

Uzbekistan itself had relative continuity through the transition, with Karimov moving quickly to adapt to the new realities faced by his state. Indeed, prior to its collapse, the USSR was providing significant subsidies to the Uzbek leadership, and new sources of economic growth—that is, through markets and investment—would need to be found. Trade promotion and foreign investment attraction were suddenly high on the list of priorities for Karimov’s government. His Uzbek Communist Party (UCP) renamed itself to the People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan (PDP). After the declaration of sovereignty following the coup attempt against Gorbachev in Moscow, elections were slated for the newly independent Uzbekistan. In the December 1991 presidential election, 86 percent of the vote was captured by Karimov and 12 percent for his opposing rival Muhammad Salih, chairman of the Erk (Freedom) Party (Sengupta 2003; Critchlow 2018). There was hence “no break in the political leadership of the state” as “[i]t has been pointed out time and again that the Uzbek Communist Party has changed merely in name” (Sengupta 2003). The form of government chosen is constitutional,
with the president as head of state and a unicameral legislative body. The president is chairman of the cabinet of ministers and de facto commander-in-chief, similar to many other republics yet providing a great deal of central authority which, along with human rights abuses, opened the government up to some criticism. Nevertheless, economic reorganization was the key move necessary given the geopolitical reality facing the “new” nation. Karimov declared at the time, “[i]ndependent Uzbekistan is traveling along the road chosen by the nation along the road of open and free market relations and along the road of building a just society and strong law governed democratic state” and “[t]he final objective is the construction of a strong democratic law governed state and secular society with a stable socially oriented market economy” (Karimov 1995).

Achieving both economic growth and building political legitimacy simultaneously is a difficult task indeed. Karimov focused primarily on economic issues in the years following independence, with an “effort to move out of the administered economic structures of the soviet system” seeing a confluence between the need to ensure economic stability and the positive welfare of society as a whole (Sengupta 2003).

Karimov recognized as well that “there can be no universal model of economic development which can be followed. The Uzbek model would have to take note of concrete historical, socioeconomical, national-psychological, and demographic aspects” (Sengupta 2003). What this meant in practice was a steady hand at the tiller, allowing for moderate economic reforms to be implemented slowly so as to prevent large scale shocks that had affected other post-Soviet societies. Karimov constantly emphasized stability (authority) as the basis on which reform must be built, implementing policies that met the following four goals enumerated by Melvin (2004): “First, the creation of a
single system of power based around the institution of the presidency and the person of Islam Karimov. Second, a set of initiatives designed to forge a strong centralized state and to assert Tashkent’s control over the regions. Third, the Uzbeki leadership has promoted Uzbek nationalism as a means to unite society. Fourth, the government has been careful to suppress the development of all potential sources of opposition, particularly Islam.” Correspondingly, the Uzbekistan government was cautious in its approach to liberalization, at first maintaining control over trade activities and only partially allowing prices to fluctuate according to free-market principles.102 Patron-client relationships—first established under Soviet rule in order to counter and manage demands for higher production rates and kick-backs—still underpin the economy in many ways and such “clanism” is one of the most important aspects of political life in the Uzbek state; these newer clans represent geographically based factions among the elite as opposed to kinship ties that would have bound them in the past (Sengupta 2003). At the same time the Uzbek government has done its utmost to promote a unifying nationalist policy, depicting the country as a free and fair society unburdened by religious, linguistic and regional divisions; if this sounds familiar to you, you would not be alone. There are many parallels between the ruling strategy illustrated in this case and the Rwanda and Cambodia cases, a finding that has important policy implications for how states recover from fragility and move towards open, market-driven economic systems.

102 Spechler (2000) describes the “stability at all costs” modus operandi pursued by Karimov: “Stability, the prime economic goal, is to be guaranteed indefinitely by child allowances, public educations, allotments to neighborhood associations (the mahallah) run by elders, and pro-employment economic policies. Growth will be sought by developing backward linkages into textiles, food processing, and agricultural machinery-first as import substitutes, perhaps later as export items.”
8.1.2 Strongman Politics

To be sure, Karimov was widely derided not only by political rivals but also by scholars, analysts and activists, for his “ruthless use of security forces to crush opposition” and his tight control over state media (Melvin 2004). Again, in parallel to the Rwanda and Cambodia cases there are patterns of isomorphic mimicry in terms of putting on a democratic veneer that covers up the wielding of power in ways more suited to an authoritarian state. Potential rivals were periodically reined in through cyclical purges as they rose in stature and influence. Melvin (2004) describes this phenomenon:

To achieve [political dominance and eradication of rivals], political institutions other than the presidency have been weakened and subordinated to Karimov. A set of pseudo-democratic institutions has been established, but behind this façade the president has de facto almost unlimited powers. Since independence the coercive activities of the Uzbekistani state have been considerably enhanced, opposition parties and leaders eradicated, and the media have been placed under tight government control and censorship. Many of these actions have attracted criticism from international human rights organizations. Alongside the relentless concentration of power in the hands of Karimov and the expansion of coercion and the activity of the security services, there have been constant efforts to prevent the development of powerful individuals or coalitions within the ruling elite capable of challenging Karimov’s position. Thus while society has been held in check by the state, the political elite has been kept in a state of constant flux, except for the president himself.

This strongman leadership after a crisis continues to rear its head when examining fragility recovery. The civil war in Tajikistan in conjunction with student demonstrations provided the pretext for suppression of all political opposition parties,
with the authorities creating its own pseudo-democratic institutions and labeling anything else as “unofficial” and subject to ban and repression (Melvin 2004). By using “informants, infiltration, and other means, the police and security services have established extensive control on all aspects of public life, especially within the Islamic community” argues Melvin (2004). A series of bombings in the capital in 1999 led the security forces to crack down on all political opposition organizations, with hundreds of individuals arrested, tortured and disappeared (Melvin 2004). But in comparing the Uzbekistani peace to the Tajikistan civil-war situation, Tunçer-Kılavuz (2014) shows that the tactics used by Karimov actually helped to prevent a similar war from breaking out in Uzbekistan; such analysis begs the question—one I struggle to grapple with as an analyst—how much authoritarianism and use (or abuse) of power are we willing to put up with in the name of the greater good? In the case of Uzbekistan, the country saw unprecedented growth and poverty reduction, as well as a peaceful transition from communism to capitalism, not in spite of but perhaps even because of tactics involving political repression and jingoism. I wrestle more with such critical queries in the discussion and conclusion of this dissertation; however it is useful to highlight such moral and ethical dilemmas ahead of time as I trace the process of fragility recovery.

There are other competing political parties in Uzbekistan; still, similar to the other cases we have seen there is a distinctive lack of organizational capacity, a culture of fear, and a stark limit on what is achievable by them before the ruling party begins to crack down. Parties based on religious or ethnic affiliations have been banned, mainly as an effort to clamp down on the fomenting of extremism through political Islam. In 1995, the parliament voted for a referendum to be held to extend the five-year term of
Karimov; unsurprisingly it was announced that 99% of the electorate voted in favour of extension. He then was able to run again for another term after the legislature passed a motion allowing it. In the year 2000 he won 91% of the vote and international observers including the US said that the election was neither free nor fair and espoused that it did not allow Uzbeks any semblance of choice. Even the opponent running against Karimov, Abdulhafiz Jalalov, tacitly acknowledged that he entered the race only to give it the appearance of being democratic, publicly stating that he voted for Karimov as well (Economist 2000). In the December 2007 election, Karimov was nominated by the Uzbekistan Liberal Democratic Party and through a—very transparent—loophole was able to run again and win 88% of the vote. The election was widely considered a sham especially considering that all of the rivals consistently praised the President.

In 2015 a similar result was attained, with Western monitoring organizations condemning the lack of political pluralism and competition, although observers from Russia and China deemed the election open and democratic. Widespread criticism did not seem to deter Karimov however, even in his fourth term in office. A theme of nationalism continued to be thrust on the Uzbek population, with the state promoting Uzbek cultural achievements and a shared national history rife with claims of questionable authenticity; this appeal to tradition and a shared history is one way that Karimov builds legitimacy with his population, while at the same time masking modern forms of authoritarian rule (Luong 2004; Melvin 2004; Dadabaev 2016). At the same time, Karimov did recognize that a poor international reputation could hurt him in the long run and in the mid-1990s he made vows to enact democratic reforms and support pluralism efforts in addition to continuing economic reforms through application of the
Washington consensus albeit at his own pace and selectively. Another way Karimov engaged the West was by allowing the US to establish military bases in his territory after 11 September 2001, from which military strikes could be launched into Afghanistan, in exchange for large concessional grants (Luong and Weinthal 2002). Kamirov understood the potential threat of Islamist extremism to his country’s stability, especially given what had happened in Tajikistan. The simmering tension between the secular Uzbek government and Islamist groups came to a head in 2005; about 400 to 500 protesters staged an anti-government demonstration at Bobur square in the city of Andijan. Security forces blocked exits with armoured personnel carriers, trapping the protestors and—apparently with orders from the top—shot to kill somewhere between 180 and several hundred people. There are a number of varying theories on what fomented the incident, but in any case, it represented a stark use of force against what were primarily peaceful demonstrators. Poor economic regional conditions and popular resentment played a role in the uprising. Western governments responded with a call for an investigation, causing tension in Karimov’s relations with the EU and United States (Spechler and Spechler 2010). There was a strong spike in authority corresponding to these events, however Karimov was able to quell the resultant tensions and prevent a serious conflict from occurring. Shifting from authority concerns to the question of

103 Luong and Weinthal (2002) provide more details on this arrangement: “To wage its war on al Qaeda and the Taliban, the United States has enlisted the support of Uzbekistan and its authoritarian ruler, Islam Karimov. This new relationship involves a direct exchange of strategic resources. Uzbekistan, which has the best transport facilities, air bases, and military capabilities in the region, has allowed the United States to station troops, airplanes, and helicopters at an Uzbek air base and to use Uzbek territory to launch offensive strikes on Afghanistan. The United States, in return, promptly inserted into the emergency appropriations bill passed by Congress in September 2001 a $25 million grant to Uzbekistan for weapons and other military purchases. Then, in January, Washington announced that Uzbekistan will receive $100 million of the $4 billion Congress has allocated for fighting terrorism. That aid is supposed to eventually extend beyond military and security purposes to help Karimov’s government resuscitate its economy, which has been strangled by drought, falling cotton prices, and the lowest level of foreign investment per capita in Central Asia.”
capacity interventions imposed by the West, I now examine the role the IMF played in modernizing the newly emerged capitalist economic system in Uzbekistan.

8.1.3 The Role of the IMF in Transforming Uzbekistan

The IMF first entered discussions with Uzbekistan in 1991 shortly after independence. The convoluted role of the IMF and its effect on the fantastic growth of the country’s economy has been designated as the “Uzbek Growth Puzzle” and the “Uzbek Growth Paradox” in the literature. To understand why its success is considered a paradox, it is necessary to first lay out some basic features of the economic situation. The country primarily relies on cotton and gold exports for its economic resource base (Luong 2004). Uzbekistan boasts the sixth-largest reserves of gold in the world and is the world’s ninth-largest gold producer on an annual basis (Ruziev, Gosh and Dow 2007). In terms of labour demarcated by economic activities, before independence about 40% of people worked in agriculture, 44% in services, and 16% in industry; agriculture dominated the economy and cotton (referred to by some was “white gold”) was—and remains today—the top export with the entire economy being based around its production (Ruziev, Gosh and Dow 2007). After independence and denying most economists’ expectations, the economic output fell the least of any of the USSR umbrella nations after Soviet collapse. By 1997 Uzbek output stood at a robust 85% compared to an average of 60% among Russia, the Baltics and its Central Asian neighbours (Zettlemeyer 1999). Immediately after independence, cotton comprised around 84% of Uzbekistan’s foreign export total and by 1992 it made up more than three quarters of Uzbekistan’s total export revenue; today Uzbekistan is the world’s fifth largest producer of cotton and second largest exporter after the United States (Luong and Weinthal 2001;
Ruziev, Gosh and Dow (2007). Uzbekistan is also rich in natural resources such as oil and gas, however those industries remain underdeveloped partly because of investor fear and partly because of past state control over these industries. Ruziev, Gosh and Dow (2007) identify two contrasting but defining features of the Uzbek economy that help to explain why the country did well in its transition away from communism and central planning:

There were two major implications of the type of industrial organisation which was the product of the country's Soviet legacy, when Uzbekistan considered its transition process towards a market economy. On the one hand, it made the country heavily reliant on the importation of consumption goods, which proved to be costly for the economy during the initial years of transition. On the other hand, the natural resource endowment and industry geared to the production of goods mainly for domestic use meant that, unlike many other union republics, Uzbekistan was potentially less vulnerable to outside shocks. Indeed ... these two features, combined with centralised management of the economy and a relatively low level of industrialisation, not only dictated the choice of the reform policy but also explained the relatively better performance of the Uzbek economy during transition.

This quotation illustrates the paradox of the Uzbek economic situation, in that Karimov accepted some IMF reforms while rejecting others, a move that most mainstream economists pin as a mistake. The IMF and Uzbekistan first entered Article IV consultations in 1993, with fund staff encouraging the government to restrain domestic credit expansion, because it amounted to an extremely high interest rate subsidy that could not be safely sustained for long without some type of crisis fomenting (Broome 2010). Fund staff members were unable to get the government to comply fully with
conditions though, as the Uzbek state leadership was much more focused on maintaining employment and production levels than on following guidelines they saw as potentially damaging to the economy and society (Broome 2010). A short time later Fund staff were able to convince the government to introduce credit auctions to help ease the fiscal strain caused by the soft budget constraints being utilized at the time; this move was seen as a signal that the authorities were ready to begin a policy shift, but it turned out to be more of a symbolic gesture in the end as the credit auctions made up less than 5% of total credit expansion (Broome 2010). As much as the Fund tried to bend the will of the authorities, interests of elite groups took precedence as they “were accustomed to extracting rents from the financial system and from the foreign exchange earned by the country’s cotton exports, which complicated the IMF’s efforts to use material incentives to prevail in a series of strategic games over policy efficacy with Uzbek decision makers” (Boone 2010).

In many ways, however, the growth record of the country speaks for itself, especially in recent years. Back in the 1990s and early 2000s, Uzbekistan relied heavily on buoyant gold and cotton prices, but when prices fell it was difficult to keep up spending on services to the public (Fryes 2010). Even though they became IMF members shortly after independence, it wasn’t until 1996 and these price shocks that Karimov began to get serious about reforming the economy and implementing structural adjustment policies. Karimov created a “State Privatization Committee” in 1992, first focusing on the easier reforms including small privatization and housing privatization that did not affect the larger cash cow commodities (Frye 2010). By 1996 the government commenced a mass privatization program, which split most state-
owned companies into 25% shares for the state, 26% for the workers collective, and kept 49% open to public sale (Frye 2010). State-owned banks and sectorial ministries also purchased some of the public shares though, and hence state bodies still controlled them for the most part. There was always a focus on self-reliance; underpinning this philosophy was the view that if the country was overly reliant on external factors that it would be open to exogenous shocks, which could serve to create chaos in the transitioning economy.

One of the ways this reliance was realized was through the transfer of resources from the agricultural sector where the country was doing very well globally, to sectors that needed more propping up to compete with imported goods (Frye 2010). To do this, the state would tax cotton exports and used that tax money to fund the manufacturing industry. They also used the strategy of forcing farms to sell their cotton to the state at below market rates, then turning around and selling it at higher prices on the global market; as one would expect, this distorts the market for cotton and skews incentive structures for farmers (Frye 2010). On the other hand, the Uzbek government did push some reforms towards a market economy, namely the prices on most goods were liberalized in 1994, small business privatization was rather extensive and housing privatization was basically complete by the mid-1990s (Frye 2010). Foreign direct investment was low for many years; yet, it has started to pick up in recent times as the country has continued to grow in a stable manner. IMF reforms and pressure have, I would argue, played a pivotal role in steering the Uzbek economy from a 1.1% average growth rate from 1990-2004, to the 7-8% rate it has enjoyed since then. IMF analysts “placed greater emphasis on initial conditions, such as the relatively rich resource
endowment, the dominance of agriculture in the economy, the low level of industrialization, and low level of energy imports” in explaining the success of Uzbekistan after the end of the Cold War (Frye 2010). However, the subsequent growth remains a puzzle to mainstream economists, as the slow implementation of reforms did not correspond to the “shock therapy” the Washington Consensus tends to prescribe to every developing state. My view is somewhere in the middle, in that Karimov made wise choices in bringing reforms in slowly despite IMF pressure to move more quickly, his experiment showed that at least for Uzbekistan, growth could be achieved gradually without upsetting the status quo to a large degree. The economic reforms that were brought in definitely still corresponded to Western ideals, the only difference being the rate and sequence in which they were implemented; some economists characterized this as a “gradualist” approach to reform. The IMF estimated that Uzbekistan’s rate of gross investment to GDP was at an impressive rate of 23% in 1994, by 1997 it dipped to 16% when there was a balance of payments crisis, but by 1999 it had gone back up to 31%. Today it stands at a healthy 24% using the most recent 2016 data from the World Bank (2018). During the transition period, Karimov had expressed his desire to learn from South Korea, Turkey, and China and to emulate their top down modernization strategies, pouring investment back into the state rather than relying on foreign aid; this may be a cultural phenomenon as he openly admired the “collective mindedness” and traditions that respect elders and authority, a feature of many Central Asian cultures (Spechler 2000).
8.1.4 Karimov’s Might

However, the supposed cultural deference to authority did not seem to translate well to Karimov’s acceptance of IMF directives though. The Fund staff continued to try to persuade him that the faster reforms were implemented, the faster benefits would be realized, but these pleadings seemed to fall on deaf ears (or stubborn ears, at least). Overall the IMF did achieve a “high degree of policy coordination” with the government, specifically under the “systemic transformation facility loan” program (Broome 2010). Under this scheme the IMF had the Uzbek authorities agree to pay back any interest on funds borrowed from the central bank at the same rate the central bank applied to refinancing on other loans; this “performatif act” served to “formally put the government’s credit relationship with the central bank on the same footing as commercial banks” (Broome 2010). The parliament passed a new law that governed the central bank in a manner conforming to international best practice, much to the satisfaction of IMF staff in country. Part of this law would require the central bank to improve its supervision of the banking system including taking care of commercial bank’s non-performing loans as guided by IMF technical assistance mission standards (Broome 2010). The stand-by arrangement only made up 62.5% of the allowed quota that Uzbekistan was eligible for, and staff of the Fund were pleased at the country’s promises to reduce the state’s role in the economy over time.

The conditions of the loan arrangement implied that the government had to work closely with fund staff and to meet specific structural adjustment policy goals.104

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104 Ruziev, Gosh and Dow (2007) detail the primary reforms undertaken during this period: “Consumer prices and trade were further liberalised. More importantly, centralised planning of agricultural production, except for cotton and wheat, was eliminated. The process of institution building in the
However, by 1996 these goals had not been met as credit ceilings continued to be busted through by government borrowing from the banking system, in addition the government failed to abide by its promise to not introduce account restrictions which controlled access to foreign exchange markets (Broome 2010). These broken promises indicated reluctance of the government to reduce its hand in the market, but the refusal to comply led Fund staff to show lenience and remove the requirement to go ahead with the first stand-by agreement review (Broome 2010). IMF staff stressed the strict need for future policy targets to be met while at the same time restructuring the loan so that the payment schedule would be moved later into 1997 (Broome 2010). Staff were directed by the Executive Board to work more closely with the Uzbek government to ensure that policy decisions by the state lined up with what was being promised. Karimov was playing a game here, wherein he would see just how much control he could retain while still reaping the benefits of the IMF presence and loans.

After the second review, things began to go downhill between the IMF and the government; more targets were not met and as cotton prices declined the government faced a balance of payments crisis. The current account deficit went from 4.6% projected to 7.7% in the last quarter of 1996 (Broome 2010). The budget deficit also rose substantially as the government paid out inter-enterprise, wage, and pension arrears. A confluence of factors combined meaning that there was a failure to meet quantitative targets and benchmarks for structural reform, and also revoked access of several commercial banks to the exchange auction; but what really pushed the relationship over financial sector was re-emphasised. A Stock Exchange and a National Share Depositary were established. An innovative programme of privatising state-owned enterprises through private investment funds was initiated.”
the edge was the lack of consultation and planning in concordance with IMF staff, who wanted to help address the issues but were shut out of decision-making processes (Broome 2010). There were several other policy decisions made that went counter to IMF advice. Overall IMF staff saw that the state was deliberately uncooperative and only wanted to implement reforms in a selective manner. Once Karimov announced a new “Multiple Exchange Rates” system which functioned as a rent-seeking mechanism to capture cotton, gold and other export earnings, all bets were off, and the IMF withdrew its support and canceled the stand-by agreement (Broome 2010).

This period from 1997-1999 was marked by reversals in the previous reforms. A softening of monetary policy and the introduction of foreign currency rationing were contrary to what the IMF had so painstakingly tried to achieve earlier in the decade. The import substitution policy consisted of channelling substantial directed credits into large import substitution projects, and certain so-called priority importers were given extra subsidies by manipulating the exchange rates to be artificially low (Akimov and Dollery 2009). Moreover, the progress seen on the privatization front was stalled. For example, one program had 30 possible state-owned companies yet only one was sold to private investors during the program’s lifespan (Akimov and Dollery 2009). By the end of 1999, exacerbated by the cotton and gold price shocks as well as restricted access to the foreign exchange market, “a parallel market premium over the official exchange rate reached about 500 per cent” (Ruziev, Gosh and Dow 2007). By 2001 the IMF refused to replace its country representative as the relationship between the authorities and the Fund reached its nastiest point. Although the gradualist approach to reform was successful in keeping the economy—and more importantly to Karimov, the population—
stable and docile, the need for further reforms and international engagement continued to press on the leadership as the economy began to stagnate in the early aughts. The post 9/11 partnership with the US spurred Karimov back into reengagement with the international community. Instead of using the stand-by agreement from the IMF which requires close consultation and the giving up of some autonomy, this time Karimov only signed a “staff monitored program” which doesn’t provide financial support but rather policy suggestions only. Untied cash from the US helped to make this arrangement possible because Karimov no longer had to rely on IMF coffers for extra cash. For this program the Uzbek government agreed to the following items: “(i) in the foreign exchange market they promised to unify multiple exchange rates and gradually introduce current account convertibility, (ii) in the agricultural sector, promises were made to improve the state procurement prices for raw cotton and wheat, (iii) in the banking sector, they promised to abolish centralised and directed credits to the economy, (iv) it was also promised that the price system would be further liberalised” (Ruziev, Gosh and Dow 2007). Not all of the recommended reforms were fully implemented and some only with limited success. Rather the economy kept some of its centrally planned features up until 2018, as old habits apparently die hard. In any case, the IMF was back in business and pushing Uzbekistan towards modernization and liberalization, albeit in an unhurried manner.

8.1.5 A Seismic Shift

In 2015 the Uzbek parliament passed legislation that lowered the number of signatures required to have a presidential candidate stand for election, with Karimov accepting the law. Even then there were rumours of his poor health and some believe this was put into
place to make it easier for powerful groups to have their preferred candidate attempt to take the leadership position after his departure. Undeniably, there was a great deal of political jockeying and deal making after Karimov died; previous Prime Minister Shavkat Mirziyoyev came out on top, winning a popular vote but that vote has been criticized by some observers as being a choice between Mirziyoyev, chaos or Islamic radicalism (Economist 2016). Since the political system is still quite opaque it is difficult to know exactly what happened behind closed doors, what deals were made, and which promises were broken or kept. Challenges remain, including shortages of electricity, gasoline, and most importantly, jobs. And many pundits and scholars decry rampant rent-seeking, asset grabbing, and corruption for which Uzbekistan has become somewhat infamous. At the same time, I find it hard to characterize the decisions made by Karimov and his successor as being all negative, given their overall outcomes and the positive trajectory of the country’s development. Not all analysts share my optimism however: “Uzbekistan is clearly a dictatorship and far from a benign one at that. The government’s penchant for gradual reform and import-substitution policies brought significant distortions in the economy that may be difficult to undo. Highly opaque state-owned firms dominate the economy, while the state bureaucracy does little to promote the private sector” (Frye 2010). Yet, the quality of life indicator improvements and economic growth the country has undergone—moving into the upper-middle income status category within a generation—have been nothing short of remarkable, and Mirziyoyev seems to be serious about reform, going as far to have the IMF come in for an Article IV mission in the first quarter of 2018 and finally liberalizing the foreign exchange market. The main challenge to be addressed through these meetings and subsequent reforms is high unemployment; the authorities have taken steps already in
the right direction, reforming state-owned enterprises, initiating total price liberalization, granting the Central Bank of Uzbekistan more independence and joining the IMF’s statistics program. As the geopolitical and economic lynchpin of the region, a liberalized Uzbekistan should have positive regional effects as well including increasing trade, improving transportation links and resolving longstanding conflicts over resources. To my eye it appears that Uzbekistan is poised for robust growth and continued recovery from extreme fragility as per the fragility recovery model, however only time will tell - there are many factors at play that could have either positive or negative influences. In the next section I examine the IMF capacity intervention through the lens of the analytical questions identified previously, showing that the Karimov regime’s careful and gradual approach may have been the key factor which guided this transitioning economy towards stability and modernity.

*Figure 37. Uzbekistan ALC and Fragility Profile*
8.2 Analysis of the Intervention: Building Capacity After Communism

8.2.1 The Decision to Intervene

Widespread optimism marked the fall of the USSR and the international community found itself in the unique position of guiding the remaining satellite regions into the realm of statehood and democracy and away from a centralized economic master and planned economy. Such a process had never been undertaken before on such a large scale. Some countries and their leaders were more open to change than others, and Karimov in Uzbekistan was a leader who was reticent to adopting Western recommendations. Indeed, the strongman leader was fond of the saying “We don’t throw down the old house until the new one is built” and the limited, gradual acceptance of Western interventionism marked this attitude. The IMF and World Bank nevertheless saw Uzbekistan and its Central Asian neighbours as ideal partners for implementation of the Washington Consensus through structural adjustment to lead the region out of communism and into the modern liberal democratic global economic system. Because Uzbekistan remained stable and President Karimov did a reasonable job of at least appearing to be moving toward democratic reforms, only a capacity intervention was considered. This deft maneuvering put Uzbekistan on the fragility recovery pathway, by creating a new-steady state where economic reforms slowly but surely opened the economy and allowed for the comparative advantages to be utilized in a productive manner, without causing any major shocks that could result in a popular revolt. There was no appetite to begin statebuilding in the former USSR as long as the countries were able to avoid the outbreak of major violent conflict. The IMF program was primarily concerned with economic matters and the international community held off on any significant pressure for legitimacy and authority interventions.
8.2.2 Implementation of the Intervention

In the historical narrative earlier in the chapter we saw how the West’s efforts to reform Uzbekistan’s economic policies worked on some level but was thwarted on others. Karimov, in contrast to what was expected in a “success” story of fragility recovery, remained surprisingly resilient to IMF efforts to dictate policy decisions, instead putting into place only those policies which he thought would have a positive effect, while at the same time leaning away from harder choices that may have resulted in short term instability but longer-term progress. One success of the capacity intervention was to allow for the development of a robust social safety net in the form of local communes—termed mahallas—which targeted low and lower-middle income communities for basic assistance needs. These local communes acted as a safety net and allowed for problems to be dealt with in an iterative manner as they arose, in a PDIA-like method. Local judges and community leaders were able to adjudicate problems as they arose and to organize and push for better solutions from the municipal and national government.

Health and education spending continued unabated despite some of the crises the economy went through, as Karimov realized his legitimacy depended on the services provided and placating the population at large. Quality of life measures continue to improve; education spending, for instance, is higher than any of the OECD countries, sitting around 10% of GDP (Ruziev, Gosh and Dow 2007). Remittance flows further contribute to the economic stability seen, especially in recent years; indeed, one effect of the centralized economy and the relatively small “inner circle” of the population that benefits from it, is that millions of Uzbeks have left their country in search of work, sending money home in the form of remittances to their families. Russia absorbed most of these migrants; however, with new sanctions and a falling oil price, their linkages into
the Russian economy remain tenuous. Renewed Russian aggression could also pose a problem down the line for Uzbekistan, although in the near to medium term it does not seem that there are any conflicts beginning to percolate. Moreover, China is currently experiencing an economic slowdown, as the massive growth percentages seen over the past decade or two could not have continued apace; this slowdown could have repercussions for Uzbekistan since China is a major investor and leading trade partner. Overall, despite being an inconsistent reformer, the economic situation in Uzbekistan remains positive, with the unorthodox style of the government’s fiscal management having a surprisingly robust success rate, speaking to the importance of local knowledge and context dependence of intervention success. The central control ensured that commodity production continued even through the transition period away from the Soviet Union and into independence, allowing for improvements in legitimacy and authority to foment their knock-on effects.

8.2.3 Effect on Authority and Legitimacy

Karimov’s clever geopolitical maneuvering allowed Uzbekistan to continue to use IMF subsidies and credit to build up its economy and trading prowess, while at the same time weathering the challenges posed in the authority and legitimacy realms. This reality created a new steady-state where capacity improvements had knock-on effects on authority and legitimacy, spurring Uzbekistan onto the fragility recovery pathway. Indeed, Karimov’s political longevity provided a degree of legitimacy in and of itself, resulting in a parallel situation to the Lindy effect, which states that some non-perishable thing—for instance, an idea, or a technology—becomes increasingly more likely to continue to exist with every additional period of survival. As Karimov continued
to build his patronage networks and improve the country’s authority standing, the positive feedback mechanism from the fragility recovery model kicked in. Moreover, major capital flows including large concessional loans from the US after its support for the war on terror allowed Karimov to reinvest in the military and police, resulting in the most capable regional security apparatus, which is able to project authority both within the country and beyond its borders regionally. Karimov carefully crafted an alliance of local leaders, clans and special interest groups through both the carrot (monetary incentives) and the stick (repression and demobilization of opponents).

8.2.4 Success of the Intervention

President Karimov met the goal of securing Uzbekistan’s independence from Russia, building his country up to be one of the strongest states in Central Asia and shielding it from instability for more than 25 years. Part of this success certainly came from Western assistance through the IMF and World Bank programs, as flawed as they may have been. Karimov’s approach to governance is what made his country stable and secure, however it may prove to have repercussions on civil society development and economic capacity building now and into the future. The capacity intervention undertaken helped the state to build up its resource base and trading partnerships around the world, and it could be argued that Karimov used a type of problem driven iterative adaptation. As I outlined in the previous sections, Karimov took an iterative approach to implementation of IMF reforms and adjusted his countries policies as he saw fit, and as he perceived to be in his country’s best interests. Without a metaphorical crystal ball its impossible to know what may have happened had those last-minute adjustments to government fiscal policy not been introduced when exogenous shocks occurred such as the drop in cotton prices,
nevertheless, in spite of Western protests the country was able to weather its crises without significant backsliding occurring in any of the three state dimensions. From my analysis it appears that conditions of at least partial autarky were a net positive in allowing Uzbekistan to deal with its geopolitical and economic challenges. Fyre (2010) describes the Uzbek state under Karimov’s strategy:

Ironically, in non-polarized democracies, incumbent politicians can bolster state institutions by conducting economic and institutional reforms that induce economic activity and allow the government to reap more revenue through taxation. Doing so helps incumbents stay in power. Indeed, the expansion of economic and institutional reform in nonpolarized democracies goes hand in hand with more consistent reform, more generous transfer payments to the dependent sector, and more capable state institutions. In this case, economic reform does not advance by pitting the state against the market, but, rather, under these conditions markets and states develop hand in hand. Here the attention paid to social welfare comes from less from a popular backlash by groups harmed by the expansion of markets than by a cold calculation about how to best buy political support.

This passage encapsulates a trend that we see time and again in recovering fragile states, wherein centralized leadership decisions, as long as they are made with the larger goal of stability and growth in mind, serve as a moderating force in the face of exogenous shocks. This observed action ties in with the fragility recovery model structure in. In the case of Uzbekistan, the strongest dimension of statehood, capacity, was bolstered by access to IMF credit, which in turn allowed the leadership to build and nurture patron-client relationships with a wide range of elite groups in disparate areas of the country. By buying off the potential opposition and repressing those who dared to oppose him,
Karimov transformed the country into Central Asia’s geopolitical center of gravity with strong linkages with powerful states like Russia and China, while at the same time currying favour—or at least not inviting conflict—with Western donor countries by constantly making promises to move policy in their desired direction while allowing only the bare minimum of pragmatic political control to slip from his grasp. At the same time, the country faces numerous challenges and an uncertain future, with new reforms coming this year—including a comprehensive nation-wide tax reform—and an imminent possible power struggle which could upset the delicate balance that was built up over the past 25 years.

8.3 Intervention Failure: Zimbabwe Overview

After an astonishing 37 years of rule, President of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, finally stepped down in November of 2017, just as impeachment proceedings against him were heating up. This sudden departure shocked observers, as many assumed that Mugabe would die in office, especially considering his advanced age of 94 years. Widespread celebrations broke out across the country at the news of his resignation. His Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party had begun to place intense pressure on him to step down, with a military takeover of the government finally providing the last push; the military ousting was first triggered by a personal conflict between President Mugabe and his right-hand-man vice-president Emmerson Mnangagwa, who had joined the chorus of those calling for Mugabe’s ouster. Mnangagwa took over as the third President of Zimbabwe shortly after the coup, being sworn in in front of a 60,000 strong crowd in a ceremony complete with entertainment and foreign dignitaries. Mnangagwa has distanced himself from Mugabe and stated that
he will lead Zimbabwe in its quest to re-engage with the world after decades of failed isolationist policies. A first step toward this goal was an invitation for the UN, the EU and the US to monitor the 2018 election, set to be held before the end of the parliamentary session which closed in the fall of 2018. Nelson Chamisa is heading up the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) which has been successfully attracting large crowds to its rural rallies, casting doubt on whether the ZANU-PF will be able to maintain its grip on power that it has held since independence. In any case, 2018 was a remarkable year for Zimbabwe, given that its long-time freedom fighter turned dictator had finally lost his grasp on power. A relatively peaceful, albeit fiercely contested election with the presence of international observers marked a minor positive shift for the country, although the ZANU victory was unsurprising. On the other hand, there was instability caused in part by the gradual opening to the world and in part by losing their long serving strongman leader. So far Zimbabwe has not experienced widespread political instability and violence in the current period. Indeed, Zimbabwe has been stuck in extreme fragility for several decades and according to CIFP data it has only worsened over the years, with legitimacy as the poorest performing dimension and authority being the strongest. In this chapter I examine the IMF program and development aid interventions targeting capacity development in this troubled Southern African nation, starting with a historical vignette from independence from British rule to present day.

8.3.1 A Colonial Past

From its colonial days to its independence Zimbabwe followed a well-trodden path familiar to many African states that underwent European rule. British authorities ruled
the country under the name Southern Rhodesia from the late 1800s to independence in 1980. It became a self-governing British colony in 1923, and in 1953 it was joined with Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) and Nyasaland (now Malawi) into a single federation. Just ten years later however, the growing strength of African independence movements and international pressure for the end of colonialism caused the UK to dissolve the union back into its three constituent parts. Southern Rhodesia then made a unilateral declaration of independence from Britain in 1965 as neighbouring countries were moved under African-majority control; in 1970 the white minority government declared itself a republic and dropped the “southern” clause from its name, labeling itself the Republic of Rhodesia. A civil war broke out shortly thereafter, with Robert Mugabe and his ZANU-PF party coming to power through the liberation war. In 1980 the country gained official, internationally recognized independence under the name Zimbabwe. This transition was the product of a negotiated ceasefire which led to talks and eventual majority rule elections. Dorman (2016) highlights the long-term effects the liberation war had on Zimbabwean political life and conceptualizations of society:

The politics of post liberation societies are shaped by the experience of warfare, by the transformation of relations between guerillas and civilians, and by the organization and power relations within the movement. In Zimbabwe, as in other African states which underwent negotiated transitions rather than victories through ‘the barrel of the gun’, the pressures on nationalist movements generated forms of coalition-building that translated into demobilized and quiescent political cultures after independence. The limited form of pluralism which typifies these political systems helps explain the peculiarity of the durable authoritarian—but not totalitarian—rule that follows.
The notion expressed here is that the history of the liberation war and its remnant effects on political, economic and cultural life help to inform the fragility profile of the country today. Indeed, there are still unspoken, informal rules couched around the idea that leaders should have fought in the war directly in order to have credibility in Zimbabwean politics. The political norms “valorize unity” and “challenge democratic movements” which happen to lie outside of the liberation movement itself. Nationalist ideologies and foundation myths helped to keep Mugabe in power for multiple decades, cementing his party’s resistance to intervention by the West, so often thought of and derided as a mere purveyor of neocolonialistic tendencies. Legitimacy was Zimbabwe’s worst performing dimension over the period, however in the mid-1990s it was showing indications of improvement until a legitimacy crisis in the year 2000 saw a rapid deterioration of state-society relations. In order to limit political opposition, the ZANU-PF used nationalist rhetoric, implying or outright claiming that other parties or mass organizations represented a threat to national unity, and hence a threat to the state itself. This demobilization tactic is familiar and was seen in several of the other cases examined in this dissertation. By understanding the nationalist, liberation ideology we can examine more precisely the tensions that arise in post-independence states that have to balance authority and legitimacy while at the same time providing enough stability for economic development to move forward unimpeded.

8.3.2 Independence and Beyond

The ZANU party won an overwhelming majority in the 1980 election and moved quickly to “develop hegemony” over the new nation (Dorman 2016). It pursued this goal by taking over many key apparatuses that would allow its ideological position to be
broadcast and consumed by as wide a swath of the citizenry as possible. Initially the party built a broad coalition of allies which included Western donors, white farmers, and former Rhodesian politicians (Dorman 2016). It also gained a foothold in the media and the military-security complex, using coercive force to crush smaller opposition parties that could have challenged its authority. Top-down decision making remained the norm, inherited from the vestiges of the previous Rhodesian state; the ZANU government was adept at using nationalistic rhetoric and valorization of its own ideology with appeals to “unity, development and nationalism” (Dorman 2016). At the same time, progress was certainly made on improving access to education and services in rural areas, building up the healthcare infrastructure, and developing a professional civil service. The party used this progress as evidence of its positive directionality for the country and brought in civil society organizations including churches and unions under its political umbrella. Over time the government’s message of unity, development and nationalism became the main themes present in public discourse, while under the surface the government was ruthlessly efficient at utilizing the authoritarian structures of the state to quell dissenting voices. One of the key policies was “deracialization,” which served to remove segregation and discriminatory practices put in place under the previous white minority government. To achieve this, the civil service and lower levels of industry and commerce were quickly “indigenized,” a process that was helped along by the large-scale white emigration that occurred after the liberation war. Caucasians remained entrenched in the top levels of industry, banking and other sectors however, as the state tried to avoid the “white flight” that had been seen after Mozambique’s independence from Portugal and its subsequent devolution into civil war (Weiss 1994). Overall, the government used tactics similar to those utilized in post-genocide Rwanda, in that the ruling party was to
be seen as inseparable from the citizens and the state itself, with one deputy minister describing it as being analogous to the Holy Trinity in the relationship between the three elements (Dorman 2016). International donors focused more on the economic and developmental aspects as opposed to human rights violations that were consistently occurring against perceived opposition members. Reflecting this, the only opposition political party—the ZAPU—was dismantled and incorporated into ZANU in 1987, effectively creating a one-party system (Dorman 2016).

In terms of economic progress, the growth expected shortly after independence did not materialize; instead, the IMF and World Bank pressured the government to scale back some of the social programs it has implemented, because the repayments from monies borrowed in the early 1980s were jumping as a percentage of export earnings, reaching up to 37% when it was projected they would be closer to 4% (Bourne 2011). By the mid-1980s over 100,000 students were graduating secondary schools per year but only a tenth of those would find jobs waiting for them; moreover, GDP growth had stagnated at 1.3% per year (Bourne 2011). Some analysts argue that this created a youth bulge that later fueled the unrest that hit the country at the turn of the century (Murithi and Mawadza 2011; Cincotta 2008). Indeed, the failure of the government to provide basic services as well as the state’s often violent responses to protest and grievance airing led to a great deal of instability, demonstrated aptly by the following reflection in Murithi and Mawadza (2011): “The authoritarian nature of the Zimbabwean state has repeatedly provided incentives for the youth to riot against the establishment and to mobilise dissent and discontent against government policies and programs.” The reason for such discontent was simple: poor economic performance
plagued the country in the 1990s and onward. In 1991 Zimbabwe adopted a Structural Adjustment Program via the IMF and World Bank model, with the program “designed to strip overblown public-sector and parastatal payrolls, introduce ‘cost recovery’ in social services fields such as schooling and health, and promote private sector growth” (Bourne 2011). But in the first year the policy was implemented, growth fell from 4% to 0.9%, only going as high as 2.9% by the end of the decade, partly due to droughts and poor export growth (Bourne 2011).

Unemployment went as high as 44% in 1993, and hard-fought social gains from the 1980s began to reverse, with twice as many women dying in childbirth as was recorded just a few years earlier. Moreover, unemployment forced people out of the cities back to rural areas to try their luck with subsistence farming. Underpaid health care professionals went on strike throughout the 1990s and in 1996 over 70,000 civil servants followed, demonstrating the rising tide of discontent among the citizenry (Bourne 2011). In 1997 another wave of strikes “articulated widespread popular discontent” with the government; some of the involved included “bank employees, railway workers, petrol attendants, telecommunications workers and security guards all striking concurrently” (Dorman 2016). The Zimbabwe Confederation of Trade Unions (ZCTU) became increasingly aggressive in its demands and independent posture, building links between private- and public-sector unions and swelling in membership. Morgan Tsvangirai—who would eventually lead the main opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)—was the secretary general of the ZCTU at the time. He led mass actions that had increasingly succeeded despite government efforts to split and stifle them. In 1997 a two-day strike against rising electricity and food prices
resulted in violence, and in 1998 food riots emanated out from urban to rural areas across the country (Dorman 2016). In a particularly politically salient move, liberation war veterans began their own civil disobedience campaign, holding regular protests, occupying and looting the ZANU headquarters, disrupted Hero’s Day celebrations, and coerced meetings with top officials wherein concessions were granted for payouts to the disgruntled war veterans, shocking many at the high cost to the taxpayer (Dorman 2016).

8.3.3 Tensions Rise and Cracks Form

Indeed, the tension between the ZANU government and society at large started to rise mainly because the veneer of the government’s benevolence began to slip away as the government continued to find itself embroiled in corruption scandals and as repression tactics became more widely recognized for what they were. Economic weaknesses including shortages of foreign exchange, a currency that was overvalued, and intermittent shortages in key commodities like cement, paper, and vehicles belied the fragile economic situation (Dorman 2016). The structural adjustment program had some immediate benefits, for example increased imported goods, removal of price subsidies and the ending of price controls. But these pluses were balanced out by losses of urban manufacturing jobs since local industry couldn’t compete with cheaper foreign goods. Moreover, HIV and AIDS was having a devastating effect on the country’s population, with 1.5 million individuals infected by 1999, especially concentrated in the productive age group of 15 to 49 years old – aside from the obviously dreadful human costs, the economy felt the burden as well (Dorman 2016). Life therefore got harder for the average family, with high unemployment, an increased cost of living, and the added
burden of caring for the sick which acted as an additional cause of stress on the family unit. The government had set a target of housing for all by the year 2000, but by the late 1990s it was clear the effort would fall short. In 1994 it was estimated up to 1.5 million individuals lived without adequate housing, as a confluence of factors caused a shortage: not enough professional surveyors, too little funding for construction, and overbearing government regulations and standards that couldn’t be met with available resources (Dorman 2016). One of the ways the ZANU government dealt with these shortcomings was to relax its policies towards the informal economy, for example they slashed controls on urban agriculture, deregulated public transport, and relaxed regulations on informal trade. In one sense they must have realized that a market economy would provide further optimization, even if some control over commerce and its associated taxation revenue would be sacrificed.

Escalating economic troubles marred Zimbabwe’s development prospects throughout the 1990s and eventually led to a major crisis unfolding in the year 2000. The idea of national unity built around a developmentalist agenda began to be seen in a negative light, as reality on the ground did not match high-flung rhetoric spouted by the authorities. The ZCTU was adept in linking broad economic problems with the political legitimacy gap which existed due to lack of democratic institutions and choices; this unrest eventually led to the establishment of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) in 1998, the goal of which was to reform the constitution and promote a plurality

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105 Raftopolous and Phimister (2004) enumerate some of the economic indicators detailing evidence of the country’s poor performance: “a decline in real wages from an index of 122 in 1982 to 88 in 1997; a drop in the share of real wages in the gross national income from 54 per cent in 1987 to 39 per cent in 1997; the figure of households living in poverty increased from 61 per cent in 1995 to 75 per cent in 2000; and employment growth decreased from an average of 2.4 per cent between 1985–90 to 1.55 per cent between the years 1991–7.”
of voices from society into the political sphere (Raftopolous and Phimister 2004). This renewal of political discourse resulted in the founding of the MDC in 1999, a watershed moment in a country that had really only had one political party; a strong opposition party had been born out of the social movements of the 1990s. Heading into the new millennium the ZANU government was facing a host of problems including widespread poverty, economic stagnation, and potent political opposition that had been continually gaining traction. The referendum to bring in a new constitution was lost by the government, with opponents unhappy with the process that led to its development and finalization because of lack of consultation and for its failure to consider concerns brought forward by the NCA (Raftopolous and Phimister 2004).

The defeat precipitated the birth of a mass opposition with powerful backers including white farmers and Western powers. Land seizures and occupations began against this background with the government creating a black and white political dichotomy framing white farmers and populist supporters of the MDC as agents of imperialism, harkening back to the liberation struggle and casting opponents as mere puppets of the West (Raftopolous and Phimister 2004). Forcible occupation of white-owned farms showed the state’s willingness to resort to violence to achieve its aims and to use white farmers as political scapegoats. About 10.5 million hectares of land—or 90 percent of their total holdings—were seized from white farmers by the state during this period and the results have been disastrous for the economic viability of the country, including for black farm workers who lost their jobs after massive drops in production – over a million people had been affected by 2002 alone (Raftopolous and Phimister 2004).
In addition, intimidation, repression and demobilization of MDC supporters also marked the period around the turn of the century. Raftopolous and Phimister (2004) note this action, “[f]rom the evidence at hand, it is clear that the central role of state organs in the violence had the greatest impact on farm workers and other ordinary citizens, leading to a closure of democratic spaces and the reconfigured authoritarianism of the ruling élite” and highlight the ZANU government’s strategy “to drive the opposition out of the rural areas and to re-assert proprietary political claims over these spaces.” Features of this effort include the re-shaping of the judicial branch to favour ruling-party directives and actions, targeting of populations seen to be supporters of the MDC, such as teachers and healthcare professionals, and implementing legislation with repressive powers used to silence and divide opposition groups (Raftopolous and Phimister 2004). MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai was arrested several times on trumped-up charges of “treason,” and widespread intimidation and harassment of other MDC leaders and associates has been documented extensively. Food security has also been a major issue over the past decade, poor harvests, inflation, poverty, bias in accessibility and the flow of public funds into private hands have all been factors in the ongoing crises. The government has proposed and attempted to enact several economic action plans since, but they have one by one failed to materialize or to have any recognizable impact on capacity development.106

106 Raftopolous and Phimister (2004) detail the failure of these plans as follows: “In 1998, the government announced the short-lived Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST), and, when this failed to materialise, the state launched its Millennium Economic Recovery Programme in 2000. Both programmes sought to refine the sequencing of adjustment policies, rather than rework the fundamental design of the structural adjustment policy itself. In the event, the Millennium Programme quickly followed the ZIMPREST document on to the shelf. In 2001, Mugabe announced a ten-point plan that was supposed to tie the land occupations into a broader economic framework. This plan was based on
8.3.4 The Road to a Crisis of Legitimacy

Economic liberalization including IMF loans and policy pressure failed to help the poorest in society, but it did bring about a notable expansion in the elites and middle class; businesses expanded in the period leading up to 2000 and the ZANU government did its best to appease veterans. Nevertheless, it was not enough to quell the many grievances that were percolating under the surface and threatening to upset the fragile equilibrium which has been established post-independence. The NCA debacle, forced land grabs, numerous corruption scandals and the like all came together to polarize the country’s political scene like had never been seen previously. Capacity was the worst of the three dimensions in the year 1999-2000 and legitimacy was about to undergo an inflection point into crisis levels. Moreover, Zimbabwe’s support of Laurent Kabila’s government in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) against rebel groups in that country put further strain on economic and human resources. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) an organization Mugabe wished to present himself leader of, does oblige members to come to each other’s assistance in case of civil war – by the height of the war Zimbabwe was spending upwards of $3 million USD per month on its war support activities, burdening both the national balance sheet and the families of soldiers caught up in the civil war (Dorman 2016).

A leaked government memo detailing illegal incentives for participation in the war and deep-seated corruption amongst government officials led the World Bank to cancel a $140 million USD loan, as well as to several key bilateral donors canceling aid and development projects in response. The unpopular war, corruption scandals, and

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agriculture-led economic growth and indigenous capital accumulation. To date, though, there is little indication of how such plans are to be linked to comprehensive budgetary and policy decisions.”
regional human rights abuses being exposed in South African newspapers all exacerbated the division and polarization of the population. After the constitutional crisis Mugabe’s government continued down the road of exclusionary politicking, “accus[ing] those who rejected it of having forgotten their history and of being influence by foreign interests” (Dorman 2016). This dangerous and divisive political posturing occasioned a slippery slope and ultimately led to the country backsliding into extreme fragility over the next 15 years; coercion, political repression, human rights abuses, and exclusion of opponents real and perceived became the norm, causing legitimacy to spike into critical territory and having negative effects on authority and capacity in-turn.

The elections of the year 2000 saw over 18,000 civilians affected by human rights violations including assault, property damage, displacement, detentions and abductions, death threats, assault threats, and interference with normal election processes; of these accounts, credible estimates put over 90% of them perpetrated by ZANU government and its associated security personnel, both official and unofficial, with Mugabe granting clemency to those caught (Dorman 2016). Violence continued over the next few years, with systemic torture being used against MDC supporters, and 150 people killed between April 2001 and March 2002 (Dorman 2016). The atmosphere overall was one of fear and intimidation, with youth squads trained in National Service Camps operating road blocks and intimidating supporters of the MDC.

The lead up to the 2005 elections was relatively peaceful, but the period shortly after was marred by violence yet again. The ZANU-PF remained in control of both the presidency and parliament, although the MDC had won a significant number of seats by this time. The ZANU government continued to control most of the apparatuses of state
including electoral institutions, so fairness and freedom were low to put it mildly. From the CIFP data the legitimacy trend is extremely negative from 2000 to 2015, and capacity follows along, lagging only a couple of years, with authority somewhere in between. This was matched by a period of eroding state-society relations as Mugabe became ever-more authoritarian in nature and rejected Western intervention with an increasing perniciousness as the opposition continued to grow in strength and numbers. The country’s capacity collapse followed, with electrical grid penetration and reliability declining, water treatment issues, and infrastructure like schools and hospitals falling apart due to neglect. Massive inflation essentially bankrupted most of the population, and exclusionary politics took over the civil society landscape. Needless to say, any gains after independence were dashed through mismanagement and backsliding as well as no attempt to adapt to issues as they arose in a constructive manner a la problem-driven iterative adaptation. Rejection of Western assistance certainly played a role in Zimbabwe’s failure, however poor, misguided leadership decisions played an even more paramount role, a fact that becomes increasingly clear when comparing this case to the Uzbekistan, Rwanda or Cambodia cases.

The ZANU government finally experienced its first electoral defeat in 2008 with the MDC winning more seats in parliament, but this period was far from a joyful one. The health crisis, rampant inflation, and infrastructural collapse all reached their peaks around this time, and violence associated with the presidential runoff was also unprecedented. In order for the ZANU-PF to stave off political defeat, the Global Political Agreement (GPA) was constructed as a power-sharing government of national unity in the wake of widespread violence following the presidential runoff. The purpose
of the GPA was ostensibly to allow for political reconfiguration which would open the political system to a more equitable form of party politics. Yet, in practice the GPA ended up allowing the ZANU-PF to “regain the political high ground” leading to an exacerbation of “tensions and factionalization ... intensif[y]ing] the high stakes of spoils politics play[ing] out across the sectors...Rather than diminishing tensions and accommodating demands from contesting groups, as per the theories that shaped its adoption in post-war European democracies, Zimbabwe’s power-sharing ratcheted up friction and intensified demands for representation, recognition, and access to state power,” resulting in the legitimacy and authority crises to continue unabated (Dorman 2016). The GPA essentially ended up being a playground for the battle over the state itself. Zimbabwe managed to return to a sense of economic stability after passing the zenith of the crisis in 2008— inflation was in the millions of percentage points, and unemployment rates reached an astronomical high of 80%—this crisis was compounded by a cholera outbreak which stressed the badly broken health and basic services infrastructure (Dorman 2016). Brain drain was another problem for the country, with an estimated 1 to 3 million having left for greener pastures elsewhere, especially South Africa and Botswana. As the crises diffused into its neighbours, international pressure began to build and—combined with the violence around the presidential run-off—helped create the necessary impetus for political reform through power-sharing (Dorman 2016). The GPA as a beacon of hope was dashed quickly however, as the ZANU wing moved quickly to capture the security sector as well as control over mining operations and their associated rents; for the weakened and divided MDC the GPA turned out to be a disaster as ZANU’s political experience and patronage networks were successful in undermining the MDC’s leadership efforts in a multiple pronged effort (Dorman 2016).
The elections that followed, in 2013, demonstrated ZANU’s resurgence as they won 158 out of 210 seats in parliament and Mugabe captured 61 percent of the vote. This was achieved by keeping focused on a strategy of linking patriotic history directly to the ZANU-PF, implementing fast-track land reform, and indigenizing the economy towards its benefactors; this clear message, linked to tangible actions, and control over the media allowed Mugabe’s party to waltz to victory in 2013, with promises of a return to greatness and stability (Dorman 2016). The ZANU-PF continued to promote itself as the arbiter of freedom through a “a pan-African redemptive ideology opposed to all forms of imperialism and colonialism and dedicated to a radical redistributive project predicated on redress of colonial injustices” while painting the MDC as a colonial force of oppression (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009). Dorman (2016) sees this political reorientation post-GPA as a move to “winner takes all” politics, in that it is characterized by “a strong leader, able to control political and economic resources and prevent a downward spiral into spoils politics.” For a moment then, ZANU was united in its determination and successful effort to defeat the opposition handily in 2013. Certainly, the ZANU government seems to be able to keep hold of the population’s hopes for a revitalized economy and aspirations to become a regional African power, a feeling that gains traction every time that new reforms of the political, economic, and social systems are not only pontificated on but also promised by its leaders. Its new president, Mr. Mnangagwa, is promising that economics will be the absolute focus of his government and that Zimbabwe is now open for business; he has a strong “future-orientation” and disavows the brutal realities of the past, which has impressed many Zimbabweans, not only ZANU supporters (Rutherford 2018). This shift is reflected in the CIFP fragility rankings, with authority, legitimacy and capacity all making a sharp downward
improvement in 2014-2017 as ZANU reasserted itself and the economic situation improved.

In conclusion, I point to the work of Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Muzondidya (2011) who see the reification of a particular ideology of nationalism in Zimbabwe as a slippery slope which led to abuse of power and a novel form of authoritarianism developing, noting that, “the roots of Zimbabwe’s ambivalent nationalism thus lay in a combination of unresolved long-term historical grievances and undemocratic post-colonial practices that produced a particular strain of authoritarian politics marked by Afro-radicalism, nativism and heighten racialized discourse. Unsurprisingly, at the centre of this ambivalent nationalism of the last decade was the rhetoric of decolonisation, anti-imperialism, black economic emancipation and mass justice, all intertwined with ZANU-PF’s politics of hegemony, regime survival, authoritarianism, violence and patronage.” This passage encapsulates much of the sentiment seen across the literature.

The Mugabe government used various tactics of repression, racial discord, nativism and conspiracy peddling to keep its powerful allies close and its perceived enemies on the back foot. As cracks in the nation-building project began to reveal themselves, and structural adjustment failed to prove itself a panacea, there was an increasing distance and an increasingly hostile posture fomenting between Mugabe and the West. The EU and United States have been involved in the country since independence and have played varying roles over the past two or three decades. Pressure has been placed on the ZANU government which has resulted in some reforms being enacted as well as to engage the MDC in a democratic fashion in order to keep receiving aid dollars and to prevent further sanctions from being applied (Murithi and Mawadza 2011).
The Western powers have also provided support to Zimbabwean organizations pushing for change; however, there is also the argument that Western antagonism has allowed the government to “project itself as a victim of Western imperialism” while at the same time serving to internationalize the crisis, dividing global opinion “on the basis of race and geographic location” (Murithi and Mawadza 2011; Phimister and Raftopoulos 2004; Raftopoulos and Phimister 2004). This perception of hegemonic control and race as a factor in Zimbabwe’s international affairs means that regional organizations such as the SADC, the AU, and other developing nations are heavily sympathetic and provide political and material backing to the ZANU government; South Africa has been particularly sensitive to attempts by the West to impose its will on Zimbabwe (Murithi and Mawadza 2011). When it comes to domestic politics, a hostile US and EU posture only serves to enhance the hardliners within the ZANU party, who argue that the West is out to get them and to suppress their country’s growth and development. Moreover, the refusal to recognize and support the coalition government lowers Zimbabwe’s international credibility and makes it harder to access international credit and to promote essential economic activities including international trade (Murithi and Mawadza 2011).

Another unforeseen consequence of the West’s disengagement from Zimbabwe is the ever-increasing influence imposed by Russia, China, Iran, and India who sense Mugabe’s desperation for economic aid and in turn exploit Zimbabwe’s resources and strengthen their influence in the region (Murithi and Mawadza 2011). After Western sanctions in 2000, China began providing military and economic aid and is now the second largest investor after South Africa; this fact should be troubling to Western
political leaders and policymakers as it signifies a competitive loss in the “new” scramble for Africa we are witnessing play out. Overreliance on our geopolitical rivals will allow the ZANU government to continue abusing human rights and fostering instability which can spread elsewhere in the region as has been observed already (Murithi and Mawadza 2011). For all of these reasons it is critical that the West re-engage with Zimbabwe as much as possible and in a constructive manner. Perhaps further intervention should have happened earlier on in tandem with IMF programming, however I’d argue it’s better late than never, given the influence of China and its ilk in this region which will becoming strategically more important in years and decades to come.

*Figure 38. Zimbabwe ALC and Fragility Profile*
8.4 Analysis of the Intervention: Capacity Before Law and Order Begets Chaos

8.4.1 The Decision to Intervene

The first instance of structural adjustment was enacted in 1991 through a $484 million IMF loan. The idea here was that guidance and resources from the IMF could jump start economic development after a few years of stagnation, as it had in other countries around the world. In parallel to the other cases I have examined, there was an international mood for capacity assistance after the fall of the USSR and with so many African nations having come through independence, some with wars and others without. The IMF and World Bank were hence seen as viable partners for promoting economic development and technological progress. At the same time, the ZANU government was fiercely independently-minded and most likely would have seen any attempt to reform their security sector or political system as interference rather than as helpful intervention, so it is understandable as to why the Western nations only made inroads in Zimbabwe through the IMF facility. The structural adjustment program “required reducing trade tariffs and import duties, eliminating foreign currency controls, removing protections for the manufacturing sector, deregulating the labour market, lowering the minimum wage, ending employment security, cutting the fiscal deficit, reducing the tax rate and deregulating financial markets” (Ismi 2004). These efforts had somewhat of a shock effect, and its been debated as to how much of a role they played in the drop in real GDP by 8% the following year and the increasing unemployment and poverty rates that followed.
Critical scholars point the blame at the IMF, whereas most mainstream economists signal the role of the government on two fronts, firstly the reforms were not fully or evenly implemented, and secondly the political repression and demobilization, as well as corruption, were the real culprit in the economic and social crisis that followed. There is room for a middle-ground position however, in that the reforms do have a shock effect in the short term but have been proven as long-term growth strategies elsewhere, yet at the same time this short-term shock took Mugabe by surprise and caused him to walk back from some the key reforms. The ZANU government’s reprehensible behaviour can not be excluded from this analysis, and I stand by the notion that its authority structures needed reform with international standard and guidelines in order to prevent the state from entering its inexorable decline. In other words, its easy to point the finger at Western IFIs and absolve the local authorities of blame if one is only looking at the case through a lens of critical theory and therefore seeing everything as neo-colonialism; but the facts and empirical data illustrate that the failure of Zimbabwe was much more complex and merits a nuanced, carefully considered explanation as opposed to one that points to a single variable.

8.4.2 Implementation of the Intervention

The government’s Economic Structural Adjustment Policy was Western-backed and modeled after a typical IMF program, but it was implemented with more control by the ZANU government then most other cases of IMF action in Africa. In some ways its implementation can be compared to the Uzbekistan case, as Mugabe showed his reticence to apply any reforms that could disrupt his patronage networks and destabilize the economy. Deregulation and financial incentives such as access to international
credit helped the commercial farming sector diversify into a range of successful tourism and export-oriented enterprises (Rutherford 2018). Farming stood out as an anomaly as one of the few successful sectors, since social services and manufacturing performed poorly over the same period.

Corruption was one reason for the economic troubles, although corruption was also rampant in the Uzbekistan case, therefore it is difficult to pin the failure squarely on that phenomenon. Mugabe’s ZANU government was especially resistant to Western intervention, given the country and continent’s colonial history, meaning that efforts by Western countries to implement fiscal reform and large-scale Western managed development programs met with a great deal of political opposition and artificial barriers. Moreover, exogenous shocks including the DRC civil war and commodity price fluctuations, as well as endogenous shocks such as civil disobedience and demands from war veterans also impacted the budget in a negative way. Western responses to the violence of the early aughts further isolated Mugabe and made the country an international pariah unable to get support from its traditional donors. There was a lack of flexibility on the part of the IMF and international community. As much as Mugabe was behaving as a tyrant, international donors left the country rather than attempt to adapt to the reality of the local situation. One solution would have been to work more closely with local partners that did not have ties to the ZANU-PF in a bid to circumvent the negative aspects of the ruling party’s way of doing business. With current modalities that include partnering closely with smaller local NGOs and scaling up economic livelihoods through initiatives like microfinance programs, economic development could have still been supported. Unique partners such as universities also could play a key role.
in empowering non-traditional populations to explore business development. Unfortunately, there was rigidity on the part of both the government and the international community in this intervention case. What is more, poor natural resource management further exacerbated the capacity issues, and overall a confluence of factors, worsened more by state repression and political exclusion led the country to backslide and descend back into extreme fragility.

8.4.3 Effect on Authority and Legitimacy

The failure to accept international economic assistance and revamp fiscal policy had several effects on legitimacy and authority. For one, the rule of law collapsed as the security apparatus became the main tool of control and coercion with which ZANU dealt with its political opponents. A disregard for the sanctity of property rights, evidenced by land grabs from white farmers, and rampant corruption and funnelling away of resources from intuitions at all levels including the public service, healthcare, education, the police, the judiciary, and others, led to the precipitous decline in authority and legitimacy after the failed intervention, if it can even be called that considering the lack of cooperation and uptake of policy recommendations. Instead Mugabe relied on the backing of key allies such as South Africa, China and Malaysia to keep his budget afloat and remain in power.

Moreover, a complex and multifaceted strategy of political repression and demobilization served to undercut the opposition parties but also to sew discord and distrust throughout society. Top-down decision-making remains the norm and civil society engagement is seen as a threat to stability. In this way the intervention failure model played out, backsliding led to the deterioration of all three dimensions of fragility
and no creative attempts to spur capacity growth were made. Instead the state kept, and still has control of the media and the electoral institutions, and international involvement in either is actively supressed and looked upon with disdain and chagrin. The IMF has warned that Zimbabwe needs to reduce government spending and pay down its foreign debt, as well as to reform its fiscal policy more broadly, less yet another economic crisis come about and result in additional violence. Seen as a regional basket case, its economy has contracted to less than half the size it was at the turn of the century, and its default on its international debt in 1999 has it under borrowing sanctions that squeeze credit availability.

8.4.4 Failure of the Intervention

IMF programming and international development aid programs were unable to improve Zimbabwe’s capacity dimension enough to pull the country out of extreme fragility. Part of the reason for this was that the interventions were targeting the weakest dimension instead of the strongest, authority. After the independence war the country has a relatively robust security apparatus, but it was still far from perfect. If the international community had, instead of, or in addition to providing development money and credit, helped Zimbabwe to modernize its police and military, ensuring that property rights, the rule of law, and justice were reached a level of stability including not using security forces against its own population as it did, then the country may have fared better in the years to come and the pathway seen in the fragility recovery model could have been achieved Instead, by focusing only on capacity, the international community encouraged the strongman leader and his cronies to capture rents in a corrupt patron-client system,
as well as to continue to have a militaristic and nationalistic mindset when dealing with political opponents.

This sequence of events resulted in the weakening of legitimacy and authority related institutions and broke down societal trust in the government. Economic and political uncertainty led to confusion over who was subject to the law, and even to what the law was, given the rampant nature of graft and corruption. Raftopolous and Phimister (2004) highlight the tension between mainstream interpretations of what has happened in Zimbabwe:

[The] resonance of the Zimbabwean debate lies in the ways in which the crisis has laid open the recurring challenges of moving beyond the imperatives of neoliberal capitalism, in forms that do not repeat the historic failures of the international Left on the question of democratic alternatives. This challenge and the contending demands it continues to pose have, not surprisingly, divided the ranks of African radicals. The historic demands for redistributive economic policies on the continent have allowed Mugabe’s rhetoric and policies to resonate at a populist level on the African continent and, indeed, in the diaspora. A number of African intellectuals on the Left have leapt to the defence of ZANU PF, asserting the right of African states to push through the often-duplicitious international discourse on democratisation and human rights to ‘more fundamental’ issues of economic rights. Yet this defence has often been based on both a very narrow economistic reading of the legacy of anticolonial struggles, and an evasion of the continuing difficulties of attempting to build alternative economic structures on the basis of authoritarian politics. For the assumption of such a political position is often that democratic questions will be dealt with at a later stage, once the economic kingdom has been conquered. The history of the Left is littered with the casualties of such reasoning.
From this passage it is clearly illustrated that the militaristic attitude towards the West needed to be checked. I argue that an authority intervention in the form of a peacekeeping mission, security sector reform, or both would have been appropriate after the civil war that led to independence; this approach could have created a new steady-state and pushed the country onto the fragility recovery model pathway.

Such interventions would have tampered the security forces instincts that were developed during the conflict and which pervaded Zimbabwean politics for the years and decades to follow. Legacies of torture, killings, abuse, harassment and intimidation of political rivals have enacted a heavy toll on trust in society. The politicization of the security apparatus combined with the major crises such as the collapse in life expectancy, shrinkage of the economy, high levels of emigration, and the deterioration of basic service provision led Zimbabwe into failed state territory by the late aughts (Bourne 2011). Dorman (2016) identifies nationalism, demobilization, and spoiler politics as the three main factors that led to the state’s decline in the early 21st century. I would add to this list of factors a lack of responsiveness on the part of Western countries to address what ended up being a major regional destabilizing force, and the leadership’s many poor decisions when it comes to accepting Western assistance partly because of the distrust sewed by its pervious colonial history. Moreover, this case allows us to see the linkages between economic decline and political instability, through legitimacy crises that were born out of citizen’s legitimate grievances with government competence. Western admiration and support of the MDC is potent but probably is not the correct channel through which a true impact can be attained, as the ZANU government remains firmly in control and only views the MDC with suspicion and
derision. With that said, the country’s fate is certainly not in the hands of outsiders, but rather of Zimbabweans who will have to rebuild a society that respects the individual and allows for open and honest debate in the political arena, with a view to compromising with fellow citizens on equal footing.

8.5 Conclusions and Next Steps

Challenges for the future include Uzbekistan’s and Zimbabwe’s youth bulges and high unemployment rates, which, combined with a continuous lack of meaningful political and economic reforms, could spell trouble as more and more of their citizens reach working age – if there are no jobs, Uzbekistan could backslide, and Zimbabwe may even erupt into another war. At the same time, these cases demonstrate how intervention on the strongest dimension can make all the difference in fragility outcomes. In Uzbekistan, a post-communist country, IMF reforms guided by strong leadership helped to keep the country stable while allowing for record-breaking growth levels. With a new, forward-thinking president, the country seems poised to reap the economic benefits provided by an open economy and an improved international trade architecture. In Zimbabwe, the government tried to enact its own quasi-communist system and redistribute land, eroding property rights and distorting incentive structures. Such activities were compounded by the West’s failure to intervene on the optimal dimension just when it was needed the most, and poor leadership decisions including isolationism by Mugabe precipitated unfathomable crises. Zimbabwe illustrates a classic case of the intervention failure model, which is unfortunately a path which many of the world’s most fragile states have gone down. Rather than partner with the international community in a relationship of mutual respect, Mugabe and the ZANU-PF continued to see the West as
an enemy, looking at its offers of assistance through a lens of paranoia and distrust. But it was not only the national government that was at fault. Tired thinking and rigid rules characterized the IMF’s one-size-fits-all policies and did not allow for the cultural context to play out. Moreover, many of the reforms attempted were done too soon and were too extreme, rather than being implemented in an incremental fashion. This led to a sentiment of distaste for the West among the population and further served to build up walls between social groups, turning Zimbabwe back towards its tribal past rather than uniting it under a single tent. With modern understandings of how to nudge group behaviours in a positive direction, as well as how to adapt to local contexts, perhaps this intervention would have succeeded instead of spiraling into failure. Time will tell whether either country will succeed over the longer term as they continue to take IMF advice and implement reforms; Western partners should stand at the ready and be willing to engage even if the political reality is far from perfect. If we are unwilling to do so, other geopolitical players will have their way with these strategically important countries and regions, and their people may suffer as a result.
Chapter 9  Conclusions for Policy and Practice: A Novel Transition Model for Fragile and Conflict Affected States

This dissertation offers a novel framework with which to answer the following questions: How can policymakers and practitioners wrestle with the choices and processes involved in intervention in fragile states? Why do some modalities of intervention succeed while others fail? What characteristics and features of a fragile state should be considered before launching an intervention effort? And how can we deal with backsliding and reversals once they begin, whether due to corruption and incompetence, or as a result of exogenous shock events like terrorism, commodity price spikes, and natural disasters? In a period where non-state actors can promote and disseminate transnational crime, cyber-attacks, terrorism, drug peddling, human trafficking, and disease, how can the West act as a stabilizing force rather than as a catalyst for groups like ISIS to continue appearing on the global scene?

To answer these questions, I created a new dataset of 50 countries over a 20-year period and tracked authority, legitimacy, and capacity interventions using key proxy variables. My quantitative analysis demonstrated that when third parties intervene on the strongest state dimension there is a much higher likelihood that the target state will recover from extreme fragility. I then proposed a model of fragility recovery based on successful interventions, and another model for intervention failure; I subsequently used in-depth structured focused comparisons to gain analytical leverage and make causal inferences on each case. In the next section I presented the findings of the comparative case studies, as well as a refined model, one for intervention success and one for intervention failure. The results of this study offer tools and policy
recommendations to decision makers to help achieve desired outcomes including aiding citizens of fragile states in building dynamic, open, and productive societies attuned to the realities of the 21st century.

9.1 Conclusions from the Case Studies and Policy Implications

In this study I examined three primary hypotheses. The first theorized that countries stuck in extreme fragility are more likely to improve when the main intervention is directed at the top performing ALC dimension. In the statistical analysis I demonstrated that there is some evidence, albeit weak, of correlation between the intervention type and the strength of the dimension relative to the other two. For each of the intervention types, if directed at the strongest dimension the country did not exhibit a markedly higher probability of escaping from extreme fragility. Although not strongly supported by the quantitative analysis for reasons outlined in section 5.1 and below in section 9.4, the fragility recovery model aims to explain why the phenomenon of recovery occurs: when a state is stuck in extreme fragility, each of the dimensions is too poor to support a recovery on their own.

From the theory and model proposed, and with some evidence supported through the case studies, it was seen that to gain enough momentum, third-party interventions need to focus on the strongest fragility dimension, in order to build on local strengths and gain buy-in from the national leadership in an area where isomorphic mimicry and pre-mature load bearing are less likely to occur. This process mimics the evolutionary process of positive feedback cycles through finding new steady state equilibria with the strongest dimension leading the way for further improvements.
in security and development outcomes. Through the case studies I demonstrated how this causal chain occurs after an intervention on the strongest performing dimension is put in place. In the three mini case studies and the six structured, focused comparisons a pattern of exit emerged which corresponded to the fragility recovery model with some slight modifications. First, the primary intervention bolstered the dimension targeted whether legitimacy, capacity, or authority, enough so that a baseline level of authority could be achieved. Once there was a level of stability wherein normal societal functions could resume, leaders chose to accept Western assistance, whether through an IMF program, a power-sharing agreement, or a peacekeeping operation.

*Figure 39. Case Comparison Table*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Intervention on Strongest Dimension</th>
<th>Escaped Extreme Fragility</th>
<th>Positive Feedback Mechanism</th>
<th>Backsliding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Authority</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legitimacy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capacity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 39 above compares all cases and the main findings relating to the models proposed in this study. Keeping in mind there were cases that did not fit the criteria, such as Tajikistan and Eritrea (see section 9.4 for details on these outliers), there still
appears to be some correlation supporting the theory.\textsuperscript{107} The fact that all of the cases that exited fragility also had an intervention on the strongest dimension, while only one third of those that remained trapped did, points to the need for further empirical work for the purpose of hypothesis testing. According to the model, during the intervention implementation a period of instability corresponding to the bottom of the J-curve emerged. This is where the relative strength of the dimension mattered. If the leadership was able to weather the period of instability through this time, then space opened for capacity development. In all three major cases of recovery—Rwanda, Cambodia and Uzbekistan—leaders used somewhat harsh measures within the authority dimension to make space for capacity development. This strategy was marked by the leader gathering political support for his inner circle, building patron-client relationships, demobilizing and supressing opposition movements, and generally consolidating executive power for decision making. The spurring of each of those three countries onto the recovery path was through a variation on the following sequence: base level of stability (improvement in fragility) through third-party intervention $\Longrightarrow$ improvement on the strongest dimension, whether A, L or C, $\Longrightarrow$ authority consolidation $\Longrightarrow$ capacity improvement $\Longrightarrow$ legitimacy improvement $\Longrightarrow$ fragility recovery. In some cases, the legitimacy improvement did not come and is still in progress. But contrary to my expectations, legitimacy was the dimension that came last in the sequence, with authority coming first and then authority and capacity building off one another to pull the country into the range of lower-middle income.

\textsuperscript{107} Further studies should examine these two cases qualitatively to glean important insights into failure, with respect to not meeting the hypothesized preconditions or concurrent conditions necessary for recovery.
In all three cases of recovery we saw a degree of centralized control exerted over the economy, at least more so than would be seen in a developed liberal democracy, as well as less political freedom and pluralism. Overall, I did not expect this result as I had predicted that legitimacy would have been necessary for recovery as much as or even more than the other two dimensions. From my cases, which admittedly are a small sample size, it appears that one strategy for recovering from extreme fragility is to gain enough political power to enforce the rule of law and enact binding legislation, and then use that power to impose targeted economic reforms that are pro-business and that attract foreign direct investment. It is also critical to open up trade for export development. A recent World Bank report “Trading Away from Conflict” supports this finding, noting that promoting trade with a country’s neighbours reduces the risk of conflict, reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers helps to promote such relations, and supporting labour intensive exports can provide many jobs for the general population, which helps to deal with the youth bulge and grievance issues (Cali 2015). As a country improves its economic standing and builds a middle-class, the leaders can direct their resource rents towards different means. In cases of recovery, those resources went to higher-education, developing a professional civil service, building up infrastructure, and decentralizing the political system. These allocations helped to build authority and legitimacy over time. Legitimacy seems to be the last dimension that the recovered countries focused on, with Kagame, Karimov, and Sen all clinging onto power as long as they possible could, with only external forces trying to claw it away from them.

In these cases, its important to realize that fragility recoveries are messier than we in the West would like to think. This finding harkens back to Tilley’s argument about
war making the state and the state making war in Europe, and Herbst (2014) has further elucidated how this process has played out in Africa. Pulling a country out of conflict is going to take time and power vacuums will lead to political battles for control and power. Western countries must do what they can to allow for this battle to occur in a democratic fashion but should also resist the urge to force democracy on a society which is not yet ready for it. What my case examinations show is that the path to a functioning economy and political pluralism marked by contentious politics between parties is longer than one would expect; these institutions and norms take decades to develop, as opposed to years.

The second part of hypothesis one was the converse: countries stuck in extreme fragility should be less likely to recover when the initial intervention is not directed at the top performing ALC dimension. In my three intervention failure case studies we saw this pattern play out in the same manner as the fragility backsliding model proposed, in that when the intervention is targeted at a dimension that is weaker relative to the others isomorphic mimicry and premature load bearing take over, ultimately leading to a downward spiral. In Zimbabwe, Libya and Mali we saw well-intentioned Western interventions fall apart during or shortly after the engagement. In the case of Zimbabwe, the IMF could not put its program in place while the leader saw it as a tool of Western imperialism. In Libya, rather than focus on normalizing Ghaddafi’s economy and help decentralize his political control, which would have quelled the rebellion in the Eastern part of the country, NATO moved directly into a military confrontation and forced a regime change, which has been a complete and utter catastrophe which negative repercussions to this day without an end in sight. In Mali, again rather than attempting
to build on the government’s success in building its legitimacy through the last decade of the 20th century, the legitimacy interventions including power-sharing were turned upside down by French authority intervention. An inclusive power-sharing intervention and peace agreement between the Tuaregs and Bamako, which involved Malian civil society and marginalized populations, would have been more effective in stabilizing Mali. In each of these cases the main difference was the dimension strength.

My second hypothesis was that countries recovering from extreme fragility are more likely to experience short term instability. This was examined mainly through the CIFP data and the structured focused comparisons and indeed in each case where an intervention occurred there were shock events shortly thereafter. As noted, the ability to successfully weather these shock events were what characterized countries that recovered from those that did not. This brings me to my third hypothesis, which postulated that PDIA techniques effectively reduce instability and backsliding in FCAS on the path to recovery. Here I also had unexpected results, in that I predicted the third-party would be the one to use PDIA, yet in the cases of Uzbekistan, Cambodia and Rwanda I found that the leaders were very flexible in their approach to shocks and to dealing with the West. This flexibility allowed for slight policy changes to be made on the fly as crises emerged, ultimately reducing their impact on the fragility of the country. While this is not exactly what PDIA was first envisioned as (it was theorized on a lower unit of analysis, mainly smaller development projects), I believe that the lessons for leaders and policymakers remain, in that flexibility and adaptability are key for dealing with exogenous shocks which are bound to arise when opening a society that was previously closed. On the other hand, backsliding did occur when the intervention was
not supported through the period of instability. Looking at each of the cases which fell back into extreme fragility, we saw cases of isomorphic mimicry and pre-mature load bearing. For example, in Zimbabwe, Libya and Mali, each of their leaders could not control the political opposition despite their extensive security apparatus and use of political demobilization and repression techniques. In each case, large scale protests devolved into mass violence, and the interventions were unhelpful because they were only propping up hollow institutions with low capability to deal with insurrection.

From this discussion we can see that three main theoretical implications flow from my analysis. First, there is a significant level of importance of conducting your intervention on the strongest dimension. Although this study provides only preliminary support, it illustrates that states must pay attention to the dimensions of statehood when looking to intervene. This means not only using one-dimensional, subjective and flawed fragility indices like the CPIA index but also using multi-dimensional, nuanced and data-rich ones like CIFP, FFP, PITF and the DIE index, and using the sub dimensions to better understand how and why a state is fragile, as well as its current trajectory. By looking at states with the legitimacy, capacity and authority dimensions relative strength in mind, third-parties can better plan a course of action which focuses on what the state is already doing well rather than what it is doing poorly. Sometimes, however, only certain policy tools are available. If the political reality is that military intervention is seen as the only option, then it should at the very least be turned into a multi-pronged approach with complementarity on the strongest dimension, whichever it may be. We are already seeing governments starting to do this, but a more explicit link
between why they do it and the theory behind fragile state engagement would be helpful in guiding practical policy decisions, especially those considering resource allocations.

The second insight is realizing the inherent messiness of fragility transitions and importance of local ownership of interventions. As per the *Principles for Engagement in Fragile States*, Western intervenors must, as much as possible, be willing to tolerate instability and upheaval after the intervention. This may mean not pulling out as soon as things get messy, as was done in some of the intervention failure examples in this dissertation, but rather stick it through, working closely with local authorities to respond to shocks as they come. This also means approaching with a longer time-horizon which may stretch from years to decades. Moreover, it means that democracy may need to be put on the back burner while space is built for authority to develop. Indeed, it does seem that authority may be the most important dimension for *initially* pulling states out of the fragility trap once the intervention on the strongest dimension has gotten it to a base level which allows for improvements in the other two to flow from it; without at least a modicum of authority we cannot encourage the development of either economic infrastructure or political pluralism. Such a reality is not ideal by Western standards and we should do as much as possible to prevent the demobilization of political rivals but still, we also have to realize that legitimacy takes a significant amount of time to build up and it cannot be gained merely through one or two elections.

Rwanda, Cambodia, and Uzbekistan all demonstrated this principle; their strongman leaders used their authority structures to make capacity reforms which led to capacity advances, and only now, years later are they beginning to slowly open the political system to dissenting parties with differing policy goals. Therefore, it is
important to remember that democracy can be gradually implemented; this is not to say there aren’t some success stories with strong pluralism, but usually those have been governed by robust power-sharing agreements enforced by third parties. The failure to realize this insight is what led to Mali, Libya, and Zimbabwe where we saw social collapse after failed elections. Bremmer (2007) puts this recommendation well, and my research supports his insight: “The developed world should neither shelter nor militarily destabilize authoritarian regimes—unless those regimes represent an imminent threat to the national security of other states. Developed states should instead work to create the conditions most favorable for a closed regime’s safe passage through the least stable segment of the J-curve — however and whenever the slide toward instability comes. And developed states should minimize the risk these states pose the rest of the world as their transition toward modernity begins.” Former enemies will find it difficult to commit to peace after extreme fragility has been overcome. Elections make this even harder, because winners can break their commitments after the fact and can even punish their enemies with their newfound power, resulting in mistrust and the potential for backsliding. Constraints on the government’s power therefore need to be put in place through checks and balances and sometimes guaranteed by the third-party partner if the situation merits. If the society has been a democracy in the past, this problem will be less likely, and as time goes on, we should see democratic norms develop as we are seeing in Cambodia, Rwanda, and less so in Uzbekistan. The literature agrees with this finding, showing that “holding timing constant, elections in new democracies are more dangerous than those held in more established democracies. Election timing does matter, though that effect itself depends on previous democratic experience; in new democracies at least two years are needed for elections to be beneficial, while in more
established democracies only one is needed” (Flores and Nooruddin 2012). Finally, we should realize the allure that the China model is currently exhibiting to up-and-coming developing nations, and do our utmost to counter it, by making the benefits of open, capitalist democratic systems more apparent than those of authoritarian systems, and by continuing to compete for influence and stay engaged in key regions.

The third theoretical insight is on the importance of capacity in pulling a country away from extreme fragility. In other words, “It’s the economy, stupid!” in terms of the cases examined both in case studies and in my broader dataset, those that escaped fragility were the ones that opened their economies to liberal policies, removing distortions and trade barriers, and developing their export sector for maximum engagement in the world system, capitalizing on the country’s comparative advantages. Kang and Meernik (2005) put this argument powerfully:

Considering that poverty was often at the heart of civil wars, substantial reforms in macroeconomic policies and the policymaking process are crucial to capitalizing on opportunities provided by the end of civil wars. And while the affected country may stand ready to begin the reform and reconstruction of its society, without the proper tools little can be done. In other words, since immediately usable, local resources will have already been depleted during the war, the capital investment required to rehabilitate the economy desperately needs foreign transfusion. Although civil wars have domestic origins, the burden of cleaning up the mess in the aftermath of civil wars seems to be shared with the international community.

This insight is not new, but the fact that it holds true in extremely fragile states demonstrates that western countries should do more to improve their trade and investment in fragile states. One way of doing this is to build up political risk insurance
programs, for example like those offered by Export Development Canada, that ensure businesses working with the private sector in fragile states or newly recovered states in the case that there is some kind of shock including political violence and civil war. By developing insurance programs, it would reduce the risk for the private sector and allow FDI flows and economic infrastructure including capital markets and commercial banking to improve (Mayer 2018). Such capacity developments have proven to instigate amazingly positive, transformative effects in the states I looked at in my study, Rwanda (coffee), Uzbekistan (cotton and gold), and Cambodia (textiles and tourism), which all relied heavily on exports for GDP growth and recovery of key sectors. This is detailed further in Trading Away from Conflict which illustrates that economic reforms also need to be gradually implemented and take local context into account while building up trading relationships. Another key is to avoid aid amnesia—where donors rush large amounts of foreign aid to fragile states immediately after a humanitarian disaster, only to rapidly withdraw it as the next funding cycles come up and the crisis has left public consciousness—and learn lessons from the past where aid has failed, due to its truncated application or for other reasons, rather than trying the same solutions over and over again without a measurable impact (Ball 1996).

In closing, those who object to third-party intervention may maintain that intervention only prolongs conflict, or that it creates worse outcomes than just leaving a situation alone. Proponents of smart, targeted interventions, on the other hand, consider these arguments unconvincing and argue that the alternative to intervention is much worse, a la Rwanda and its analogs. To simply assert that the West should stay away and mind its own business when it comes to states stuck in extreme fragility is to
willfully ignore the intense and immense interconnectedness that globalization has wrought, for better or for worse. Certainly, this does not mean states should blindly foray into every situation, to be sure I argue precisely against Western adventurism in situations like Libya, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Instead we should look to technology advances and scholarly insights such as those outlined in *Pathways for Peace*, the landmark UN-World Bank Report on prevention and stabilization, to guide Western policymaking when it comes to the most intractable fragile situations. In other words, interventions can never be imagined as a one size fits all endeavour.

Power-sharing, for instance, can act as a reasonable response to conflict, before, during or after its onset. It can lead to improved stability and human rights promotion through more inclusive forms of democratic governance and can engage ‘virtuous’ positive feedback cycles that improve the rule of law and economic capacity building. Opponents of intervention may think that it’s best to let a conflict run its course and allow state-building to occur organically as detailed in Charles Tilly’s argument for war, letting factions fight it out and simply having the winners reign. But this misguided argument also ignores historical realities on how messy war, conflict and fragility always have been, with a multiplicity of actors and interests competing for preferred outcomes. Even if “the West” stays away, other actors will take charge—look at the Russian involvement in Syria for a contemporary example—and they will act on their own regional and global hegemonic interests. In a sense then, my argument for smart intervention that examines a target state’s strengths and works in tandem with local actors to provide support and resources toward the goal of improvement of all three state dimensions can even be considered a realist proposition. Not in the sense that the
winner should capture all of the benefits, but rather that the West—including middle powers like Canada—has a positive and productive role to play in fragile and conflict affected states, not only in a humanitarian or faux altruistic sense, but also in the interest of advancing our own agenda and global influence.

9.2 A Refined Model

From the statistical analyses and case studies I conclude that my proposed models make fundamentally sound propositions, however their scope could be expanded and their fit to the data improved by refining them based on the evidence presented in this study. By examining the interplay between the micro-level qualitative data and the macro-level theory presented earlier, I find that the link between intervention type and strength of the dimension do indeed influence fragility recovery. Both the statistical analysis and the case studies showed evidence that intervening on the strongest dimension improves the eventual outcome of the country trajectory. At the same time, the case studies demonstrate that the knock-on effects are not as straight forward as I initially envisioned, in that there is not necessarily an equal impact on each dimension after an intervention. By examining historical narratives focusing on dynamic interactions between states and sub-national actors, the process of improvement or backsliding was explained in a process-driven manner. For example, we see that one key finding of the research is that there are trade-offs between democracy and stability. That is, regardless of the intervention type, countries that were successful in building their capacity and authority dimensions also lagged on legitimacy, in that there was an observed democratic deficit during the period of high economic growth.
In the case of Cambodia, Uzbekistan, and Rwanda, despite different interventions after bloody conflict, all demonstrate that some political stability is required to develop capacity. Moreover, I contend that the fragility recovery model should be brought into line to reflect the realities of the J-curve. The case study examples all demonstrated how significant changes in the organization of politics, economics, and society can create a short-term period of instability. Whether a state was able to bear through the storm and ultimately end up on a path to recovery depended both on decisions made by leaders as well as on the type of intervention undertaken by international actors. As the state moves through the bottom of the J-curve, from my cases it appears that strong authority is required to quell instability and make space for capacity development. So in refining the model I propose that it be moved into a J-curve type configuration, wherein the first stage of recovery coincides with a temporary drop in stability, moreover it should follow the sequence described above, namely: third-party intervention ➔ improvement on the strongest dimension ➔ authority consolidation ➔ capacity improvement ➔ legitimacy improvement ➔ fragility recovery, so that it takes into account the key role of the authority as a first step toward recovery, followed by economic development, and finally allowing space for democracy, with all three dimensions building on one another in a positive feedback, virtuous recovery cycle similar to those seen in runaway sexual selection in evolutionary biology. From the weak support of the model quantitatively, it seems that having an intervention on the strongest dimension may be a necessary but not sufficient condition; certain other preconditions or concurrent conditions may be needed for a recovery to be achieved Future research will have to determine exactly what these preconditions could be and add them to the theoretical model in order to test them for congruity. One investigative hunch that I have surrounds the model’s
approach to inclusive political solutions, as outlined in *Pathways for Peace*; the findings from that report demonstrate the importance of inclusive political solutions and diplomacy that uses incentives (both carrot and stick) to compel parties to come to the bargaining table. Middle powers such as Canada can play an important role in building trust and confidence in these solutions between parties with a high level of skepticism of one another’s intentions and trustworthiness. Indeed, technical solutions are simply not going to work if factions cannot come to a ceasefire and negotiate proactively. In these cases, diplomacy still has a role to play, and throwing money at the problem will only result in more rents for belligerents to fight over. Moreover, governance plays a key role in how political power is wielded, and donors can nudge behaviour in the right direction through enhanced cooperation with local organizations and actors. This does not mean that it always must be a major peace deal or power-sharing arrangement, but even through gradually opening channels for cooperation and allowing disparate voices to enter the policy development space, a difference can be made.

Moreover, given the weak findings of the statistical analysis, there may be more emphasis on capacity as a necessary intervention when the country has high capacity to begin with. Given the cases of Bangladesh, Uzbekistan, and even the giants of China and India, it would seem that intensive, state supported economic development is a well-trodden path to escaping from fragility. A larger middle class leads to increased resilience and stronger political participation, which means that complex risks become easier to deal with as they arise. This line of thought corresponds to newer strategies of promoting resilience promulgated by the literature. Indeed, the OECD has redefined fragility along structural resilience terms, urging leaders to think of potential risks and
society wide coping capacities as being key for development. *Pathways for Peace* (2018) also touts this approach, noting that improved social capital and inclusive societies are core drivers in building resilience to conflict. Bonding, bridging and linking within, across and between communities supports efforts for peace and stabilization. Open societies with free markets that use comparative advantage principles to build their exports and tax bases seem to be able to best mitigate complex risks and shock events. These types of societies also tend to be more gender equal, directly involving women in markets and political processes, which leads to reduced conflict – in fact in states where women make up only 10% of the workforce as compared to societies where they make up 40%, there is a 30 times greater likelihood of internal conflict (UN 2018). Hence capacity interventions are extremely important, especially in countries with the potential for such deep-seated reforms to be put into place (i.e. picking the “low hanging fruit”).

The intervention failure model presented in this thesis was shown to be quite accurate in predicting effects when interventions used inflexible and linear programming models that were simply transplanted into countries. They ignore the reality of the local context and are unable to adapt to changing circumstances. The fragility recovery model I presented did have an element of adaptive development included, but ultimately more emphasis should have been placed on this principle. Rapid, catalytic interventions that focus on the problem at hand and respond to challenges as they arise, are necessary for stabilization efforts to succeed. Technical solutions and management styles that are able to adapt to the unexpected situations that are sure to arise in FCAS, through PDIA, strategy testing, and results-based
management, are now being recognized and are gathering evidence for their positive impacts. The US Millennium Challenge Corporation and the Government of Canada’s Peace and Stabilization Operations Program are two examples of programs that do not tie aid and programming dollars, and even have specific budgets set aside to take on high-stakes, high risk interventions in fragile situations in need of stabilization on the ground. In addition, international fora are increasingly focusing on shared learning communities and promoting adaptive learning for engagement in fragile states, and the Busan New Deal principles are slowly but surely being implemented, albeit unevenly. By slowly improving efforts in an iterative manner, development and security policy dogmas can be nudged in the right direction.

9.3 Summary of the Theoretical Framework

This dissertation set out to achieve several goals. The first goal was to improve our understanding of state transitions out of extreme fragility, using cases where countries began in a similar situation yet had radically different outcomes based on diverse policy decisions by external and internal actors. The second goal was to shed light on which type of interventions work best, examining cases where the intervention targeted the weakest dimension of state fragility versus those that targeted the strongest dimension, and comparing the outcomes of these interventions. And the third goal was to provide insight to policymakers dealing with states stuck in ongoing crises and experiencing extreme fragility, using the lessons learned from successes and failures from the past. In this chapter, I return to some of the key themes that emerge from the results of the case studies and empirical analysis. Here I begin with a summary of the theoretical
framework and then draw out the main policy insights touched upon throughout the previous chapters.

In this study I presented a novel way of examining third-party interventions in fragile states, with illustrations from a variety of case examples as well as evidence from quantitative analysis. In my framework, interventions are examined through their effect on legitimacy, capacity, and authority depending on their key characteristics. The value-added of my analysis was to demonstrate that third-parties should undertake interventions that target the strongest dimension of the three in order to have the best possible chances of success in pulling the target state out of extreme fragility. This theoretical insight is based on the complex dynamics between authority, legitimacy and capacity, wherein developments on one dimension unleashed a causal chain of events that can lead to overall fragility improvement or to state failure. As a result of my analysis we see some evidence that targeting the strongest dimension provides the intervenor and the government of the target FCAS with more policy options in terms of improving and building on what that state is already doing well. I also show that authority improvements, coming after all three dimensions are viable, are key to fragility recovery, while legitimacy improvements can come later in the sequence and still be successful. This finding was somewhat counter-intuitive as I have always believed the neoliberal doctrine that the implementation of democracy at an early stage leads to better political, economic, and social outcomes. However, in case after case I observed that strongman leaders were actually able to provide enough political space for capacity interventions to develop and, in turn, improve the country’s overall fragility, and only later on opened up the political realm for improvements in political participation and pluralism.
Yet more research is needed to determine if this finding holds on a broader scale, or if it was due to sampling bias or another methodological issue. In any case, the partial refutation of an orthodoxy oft spouted by Western policymakers and academics makes for an interesting point of study and reflection when examining present day situations around the globe. Decisions by local leaders as well as structural factors also turned out to be important, with full cooperation between leaders and instructions like the IMF not necessarily being key to recovery; leaders may find Western recommendations to be at odds with their policy goals, and in some cases their local knowledge did seem to prevail over the countervailing wisdom of the IFIs. Finally, for descriptive purposes, this transition model of fragility recovery, when viewed in tandem with the theoretical insights detailed in section 9.1 and 9.2, allow us to develop a better overarching assessment of state fragility and intervention strategies. Local contextual factors are taken into account, and interventions need to be owned by national level leadership and supported by Western actors on the periphery. Moreover, we saw that history matters, as does upcoming events such as elections or potential unforeseen exogenous shocks. With all of this in mind we can see that the goals of the project, to shed light on what interventions work best in which fragile and conflict affected situations, and to delve in to pragmatic policy solutions to improve outcomes, have been satisfactorily met. I move now to address outstanding issues surrounding the methodological choice made in this study, and finally I provide key conclusions and policy recommendations for some of the potent fragile situations countries like Canada is helping to tackle today.
9.4 Addressing Outstanding Issues

No single explanation or argument can claim to account for all variations of complex phenomena such as those examined in this research program. Despite my making a strong case for the causal role of interventions in fragility recovery and state failure, there remain outstanding issues concerning the lack of statistical support when the cases are separated out into the seven different combinations of intervention types as opposed to just examining whether there was an intervention on the strongest dimension and whether there was a recovery. As noted in the methodology section, the choice of variables plays a key role in the outcome of the statistical analysis. While I believe there are good reasons to instrumentalize the IVs and DV in the manner chosen, there are many other ways this goal could have been achieved. For instance, instead of using CPIA score I could have used only CIFP data and set a cut off on the CIFP scale to measure improvement or decline over time. Or I could have use the FFP, DIE, PITF, or any other fragility index to define cases of intervention failure or recovery. Furthermore, each of the three proxy variables could have been replaced with different variables falling under the same category, by choosing data from the variables and datasets listed in figure 6. By taking one of these other paths in designing my statistical analysis it may have had a major effect on the outcome of the quantitative results, and in the next section I discuss future research I would like to conduct to better specify my model and further explore the proposed causal links. In this vein, there is a difference between the internal logic of a proposed model and whether it holds up in reality. As Bueno de Mesquita (1985) notes, “a trade-off generally exists between the achievement of internal validity and the attainment of external validity. As the quality of explanation of a few
events increases, the quality of generalization to other events typically decreases. This is because the quality of explanation is enhanced by the inclusion of factors unique to the few cases studied in nonquantitative depth. But, such unique factors, by definition, cannot contribute to a general understanding or explanation of the event-class studied.” Hence this study tends to lean more towards the examination of fewer events—partially because of the rarity of said events—and aims to explain the observed phenomena with a proposed model, which contains internal assumptions which must be tested. In doing so it makes a trade-off in terms of generalizability to a larger universe of cases, however at the same time, this initial step provides insight necessary to reach such a generalizable theory in the future.

Moreover, there are several specific cases that defy the argument itself, showing that intervening on the strongest dimension may be a necessary but insufficient condition for recovery. From the dataset, two prominent examples appear: Eritrea and Tajikistan, where sole interventions took place that targeted the strongest dimension (A and C, respectively) and yet both states failed to exit fragility. The question of why this is the case suggests that there may be preconditions or concurrent conditions necessary to ensure a successful exit in some cases. Therefore, this finding suggests that my hypothesis is incomplete; that is, targeting the strongest dimension may be necessary, but perhaps insufficient as a condition that will ensure fragility recovery. The Tajikistan case is an excellent foil for examination as it contrasts to the Uzbekistan case identified earlier. Both countries had very similar initial conditions, yet one recovered from extreme fragility while the other did not (Tajikistan was classified as an “in and out”, oscillating case through my methodology) despite having an intervention on the
appropriate dimension, capacity. The IMF program that was implemented in Tajikistan
was unable to catalyze a virtuous circle as described in the fragility recovery model, even
though it met the conditions of the model. Several studies have done comparative
examinations of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, precisely because they are so similar but had
differing outcomes. Most of these studies find that macro-structural explanations
cannot account for the instance of civil war in one country and the absence in the other.
Rather, it is “interactions between structures, processes, networks and actor choices that
influence different outcomes,” meaning that leadership and agency decisions are key to
understanding why violent conflict ends up occurring or not (Tuncer-Kilavuz 2011;
Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994). The decisions by political actors to go to war in order to
consolidate their political power within the state looks to be influenced by their
perceptions of the extent of that power and the prospects for success (Tuncer-Kilavuz
2011). Hence, I postulate that one of the preconditions for fragility recovery may be the
presence of a dynamic and charismatic leader who has a level of political power that
cannot be credibly challenged by political rivals (Miller and Toritsyn 2005). This idea is
not new, for instance Rotberg (2012) notes “it is precisely in those less privileged places
that political leadership is more rather than less essential. In such surroundings,
leadership quality matters severely and matters intensely. Who leads makes a bigger
difference in the fractured, scrabbling nation states than it does in settled, stable ones...
demonstrate[ing] once more that in countries where institutions are young and
democratic political cultures are still being created, leadership quality is an independent
variable that matters greatly to human outcomes.” If leadership is a necessary
precondition or concurrent condition, as identified in the Tajikistan versus Uzbekistan
case, can we also see evidence of this hypothesis in Eritrea?
Abraha (2010; 2012) argues precisely this point, that Eritrea’s failure to recover from fragility was due to a lack of leadership on the part of the political elite in that country. The main political party in Eritrea, the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice, has been harshly critiqued for its role in propagating “a militarist culture of liquidation, terror, intimidation, silence, blind obedience, unaccountability, secrecy, mendacity, large power distance, time mismanagement, uncertainty, distrust, division and ambivalence to secure the illegal and unconstitutional one man rule” (Abraha 2012). Following the war with Ethiopia from 1998 to 2000, there was an authority intervention in the form of a UN peacekeeping mission in Eritrea. However, there was no fragility recovery as outlined in the model in this study. Examining the case through the lens of leadership as a critical independent variable, as hypothesized above, it does appear that political leaders in Eritrea failed to capture the benefits provided by the international intervention and improved stability it created (Hedru 2003). Scholars pinpoint the attempted creation of a new constitution that was ratified but never implemented as a turning point from an aspirational democracy to an authoritarian dictatorship (Hedru 2003; Magnet 2015). Since then, Eritrea has become arguably the most repressive state in Africa and although there was a peace agreement reached with Ethiopia in 2018, its prospects for recovery still look to be weak in the near term (Yohannes 2017). To be sure, further research is needed on whether leadership as a necessary precondition or concurrent condition can explain the divergent outcomes experienced by Tajikistan and Eritrea, however it does make for an interesting jumping-off point for a future study.
These two cases that defy my argument exemplify that there is no single factor or approach that can fully account for recovery or failure; while I have followed guidelines for empirical research to minimize for endogeneity and isolate causal mechanisms, there remain questions around the country context that could be unseen or unaccounted for in this analysis. In other words, what if a country would have improved regardless of the intervention, or deteriorates regardless of the intervention? The presence of an intervention on the strongest dimension may be necessary but not sufficient to spur a country to recovery. It is possible that available theories explored in this study omit relevant variables, and that there is an oversensitivity to hypothesized variables as well. Although I have sought to avoid falling into this trap, a skewed interpretation of the origins of recovery or failure is possible. Another related issue to be addressed is competing hypotheses and alternative explanations. In some cases, violence may interact with fragility to create a dynamic to certain cases, making it harder to generalize a broader theory of fragility recovery after intervention. Interventions also vary in terms of transitional phases and sequencing, as opposed to focusing on the most important structural component (i.e. virtuous feedback loops versus stages). While both points are valid to some degree, there are three reasons why the argument in this dissertation retains its explanatory power. First, the quantitative results are only used as a way of justifying deeper case work – this decision speaks directly to the concerns around the particularity of certain contexts and more broadly highlights the tension between qualitative and quantitative research. The case studies allow for a teasing out of causality as it relates to the fragility recovery model and intervention failure models. Second, interventions do vary over time, I do not claim otherwise. Studying social phenomenon is inherently messy, and categorizations, typologies, and general theories
are all designed as tools to better understand such phenomena, but no social scientist can claim that his/her argument covers all cases and situations. My explanation for why some interventions work better than others is a probabilistic argument (i.e. there is a higher chance of success if the strongest dimension is targeted) and does not claim to paint all cases with the same brush, especially those with complex, layered, multi-pronged interventions. Third and lastly, the work of a researcher is never done; with the dawn of artificial intelligence, machine learning, and big data, many if not much of human knowledge is going to come into question. There are innumerable reasons why a good portion of our social science research is flawed; it often misses the bigger picture, relies on faulty data, uses outdated models and methods, and stands on a foundation of myriad misguided and misspecified assumptions. All of this means that there are opportunities for fruitful future research using advanced methodological techniques (far beyond the scope of this project) which can identify conditions that should be met when choosing the appropriate intervention.

In summary, the relatively weak findings stemming from the quantitative analysis brings about the need for further exploration of the proposed causal mechanisms in this study. Through close consideration and conceptual refinement an improved model with greater specification could be proposed which can then be subsequently revised and retested. Rather than simply comparing differences between large and small studies and assuming the model and/or argument are wrong, an iterative process can be taken as an alternative approach. Such an approach will lead to a better understanding of the phenomenon under study while also illustrating the value of rigorous mixed methods research.
9.5 Directions for Future Research

While this research program met its goals given the resources and time limitations, there are several next steps that would help to augment, confirm, and clarify the findings. First of all, it would be useful to better triangulate the results of this study and further test the model by using the method of the simplified CIFP index with the indicators most orthogonal to one another, just as Tikuisis et al. (2015) used to determine which countries were stuck in the fragility trap, which exited, and which oscillated in and out, going back as far as 1980. Also, running a sensitivity analysis to show the percentage difference between the different cases (exited versus not exited) would help to bolster the analysis as some of the values are very close to one another and may not have been sufficiently differentiated to justify moving into one category or another.

Secondly, case studies offer texture, context and theoretical inspiration; however, they cannot measure frequency very well, and in building a scientific theory, reliability and replicability matter. If too many factors are changing at the same time it becomes impossible to isolate variables, and even if we do, the small universe of cases still makes the results tenuous at best. Multivariate regression analysis on the full universe of country-year data, would be a logical next step in the research program, and could be used to draw conclusions on which intervention pathways are the most robust for exiting the fragility trap. In most cases this would be achieved by coding for each independent variable (intervention type) a 1 or 0 for each year that the country was going through a transition from the fragility trap into a more stable state according to the data. To test hypothesis two, future studies can include a dummy variable for
exogenous shocks, as well as to check the statistical likelihood that a state experiences a drop in stability following a specific intervention. To be clear, categorical variables should be used only when appropriate; if continuous variables are available for a given indicator then those should be used as it will provide more nuanced measurements and robust findings. Each type of intervention would be coded for each year, allowing for patterns to be teased out. That is, the sequence by which pathways occur in relation to one another will be examined temporally, not just at a single point in time. In any case, a large-N regression would be very helpful in validating my findings.

Next, in future research it would be beneficial to incorporate the insights of in-country experts in order to create a near “real time” report of the on the ground situation (Woolcock 2014). This would be very resource-intensive, but for prediction of conflict it might be necessitous. Such a granular and topical level of information gathering would allow decision makers in-country to have their input heard and further would provide a greater level of detail for the analysis of what went wrong (or right) in a given case of intervention or proposed intervention. In addition, sub-national level observations could of course be included here to account for the phenomenon of fragile cities or regions, a new area of study that is garnering ever-more attention by scholars.

Another shortcoming of this analysis is that our definition of fragility remains fuzzy and differs across the many research groups and policymaking organizations. As difficult as it sounds to achieve, a definition of fragility that could be universally agreed upon and used would go a long way in better coordinating analytical research programs and field experiments to build our knowledge base on fragile and conflict affected situations and their corresponding interventions. Moreover, I define authority,
legitimacy, and capacity interventions using a narrow proxy variable for the statistical analysis, along with a wider definition and more variables for the cases, however these definitions still reflect a rather narrow understanding of such abstract concepts and may not capture the many overlapping and interplaying factors which could act on social, political and economic systems. Therefore, refining our understanding and defining what we mean by intervention would also improve future research efforts. Ultimately, state fragility can not only be defined on a micro or macro level but rather needs to transcend different units of analysis, which I did attempt to do with my regional analysis chapter, albeit a somewhat early and relatively crude attempt it may be.

Finally, social scientists must continue to work in a historical context, even as large-N studies continue to gain in their significance, number, and sophistication. There is no replacement for detailed, context heavy knowledge of why some interventions work in fragile states while others do not. Histories of intervention success and failure need to continue to be systematically compared, as some cases remain over studied while others fly under the radar of scholars, especially in the English-language literature; instances of current violent activities attract an inordinate amount of attention, whereas cases where peace prevails tend to get written off as ‘boring’ and unworthy of inquiry. In this sense, comparative historical analysis remains a robust tool for finding applicable and pragmatic generalizations in terms of what works and what doesn’t; more work needs to be done in this vein.
9.6 Final Words

This study examined the role of third parties in fragile states, demonstrating how different political calculations come into play during the construction of policy decisions on when and how a state will intervene in another’s internal affairs. This topic is pertinent as we currently see seismic shifts in global power, and so many cases of “unthinkable” events coming to pass (Gowing 2015). The days where Western leaders can assume that the international community is on an inexorable march towards adopting a shared set of Western values and following the presumed liberal democratic order have passed. Indeed, democracy has evidently begun to take a backseat to more authoritarian forms of governance, and the success of certain nations under this model has exacerbated its decline (Kurlantzick 2013). Now we are faced with the task of “adapting to a world that is polycentric in design and increasingly volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous in nature” (Burrows and Gnad 2018). The crises in Ukraine, Myanmar, Syria, and the ongoing tumult in Sub-Saharan Africa and other developing regions indicate that leaders require novel paradigms and strategies for dealing with global unrest and uncertainty. The sophistication of forecasting models has advanced, but they are still a long way from being pragmatically effective in the real world (Hegre et al. 2017). Indeed, state fragility has proven itself to be a wicked problem and the importance of early-warning systems and harnessing the political will to act are as important now as ever. By adopting the simple principles of taking into consideration what a state is already doing well, encouraging local ownership of solutions, and dealing with problems in a flexible and adaptive manner, policymakers and practitioners can reduce chaos and uncertainty in fragile situations by helping build institutional
robustness and encouraging the adoption of novel problem-solving modalities, ultimately leading to better outcomes for the local population and the assisting organizations alike.
### Appendix A: Abbreviations and Acronyms

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFISMA</td>
<td>African International Support Mission in Mali</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALC</td>
<td>Authority, Legitimacy, and Capacity</td>
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<td>AQMI</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb</td>
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<td>ASU</td>
<td>Arab Socialist Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATC</td>
<td>Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (Bangladesh)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBTG</td>
<td>Broad-Based Transitional Government (Rwanda)</td>
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<td>BRAC</td>
<td>Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee</td>
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<td>CIFP</td>
<td>Country Indicators for Foreign Policy</td>
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<td>CNRP</td>
<td>Cambodian National Rescue Party</td>
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<td>CPIA</td>
<td>Country Policy and Institutional Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>Cambodian People’s Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPR</td>
<td>Country Performance Rating</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFAIT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Canada)</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
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108 Now “Global Affairs Canada” or GAC
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DIE</td>
<td>German Development Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>DND</td>
<td>Department of National Defence (Canada)</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUTM</td>
<td>European Training Mission to Mali</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCAS</td>
<td>Fragile and Conflict Affected States</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<td>FFP</td>
<td>Fund for Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRM</td>
<td>Fragility Recovery Model</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>FUNCINPEC</td>
<td>Front uni national pour un Cambodge indépendant, neutre, pacifique et coopératif</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDDS</td>
<td>General Data Dissemination Standard</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GPA</td>
<td>Global Political Agreement (Zimbabwe)</td>
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<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>PARMEHUTU</td>
<td>Party of the Hutu Emancipation Movement (Rwanda)</td>
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<td>PDIA</td>
<td>Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDR</td>
<td>People’s Democratic Republic</td>
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<td>PITF</td>
<td>Political Instability Task Force</td>
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<td>PRIO</td>
<td>Peace Research Institute Oslo</td>
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<td>PSED</td>
<td>Power Sharing Event Database</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Assistance</td>
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<td>IM</td>
<td>Infant Mortality</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IMI</td>
<td>International Military Intervention Dataset</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPI</td>
<td>International Peacekeeping Institute</td>
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<td>IRIA</td>
<td>IDA Resource Allocation Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State in Iraq and Syria</td>
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<td>LA</td>
<td>Latin America</td>
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<td>LCG</td>
<td>Libya Contact Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>LSE</td>
<td>London School of Economics</td>
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<td>MCC</td>
<td>Millennium Challenge Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDC</td>
<td>Movement for Democratic Change (Zimbabwe)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDR</td>
<td>Mouvement démocratique républicain (Rwanda)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINUGUA</td>
<td>United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNLA</td>
<td>Mouvement national de libération de l'Azawad (Mali)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MUJAO</td>
<td>Mouvement pour l'unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Constitutional Assembly</td>
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<td>NDP</td>
<td>New Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPSIA</td>
<td>Norman Paterson School of International Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>NTC</td>
<td>National Transitional Council (Libya)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NUF</td>
<td>National United Front (Cambodia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDP</td>
<td>People's Democratic Party of Uzbekistan</td>
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</table>
PSED  Power Sharing Event Dataset
QOL  Quality of Life
RAF  Rwandan Armed Forces
RCC  Revolutionary Command Council
RPF  Rwandan Patriotic Front
SADC  Southern African Development Community
SSA  Sub-Saharan Africa
SSHRC  Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council
SSR  Security Sector Reform
STM  State Transition Model
UCP  Uzbek Communist Party
UCDP  Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UN  United Nations
UNAMIC  UN Advance Mission in Cambodia
UNAMIR  UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNHCR  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF  United Nations Children’s Education Fund
UNSC  United Nations Security Council
<table>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
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<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNU-WIDER</td>
<td>United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research</td>
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<td>URNG</td>
<td>Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca</td>
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<td>USD</td>
<td>United States Dollars</td>
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<td>WDR</td>
<td>World Development Report</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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<td>ZANU-PF</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZCTU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Confederation of Trade Unions</td>
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