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Soviet Ukrainian Political Dissidents in the West:
Their Politics, Interaction, and Impact
After Exile to the West, 1965-1983

by

Nestor I. L. Woychyshyn

A thesis submitted to Carleton University in fulfillment of the requirements for the course Soviet Studies 55.599, as two credits towards the degree of Master of Arts in Soviet and East European Studies.

Institute of Soviet and East European Studies
Carleton University

Ottawa, Canada

May 28, 1986

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"SOVIET UKRAINIAN POLITICAL DISSIDENTS IN THE WEST:

THEIR POLITICS, INTERACTION AND IMPACT

AFTER EXILE TO THE WEST, 1965-1983"

submitted by Nestor I. L. Woychyshyn, B.A., Honours

in partial fulfilment of the requirements for

the degree of Master of Arts

Thesis Supervisor

Director, Institute of Soviet and East European Studies

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August 13, 1986

Abstract

The birth and growth of dissent in the Soviet Union in the wake of Joseph Stalin's death became a development of unexpected importance from the mid-1960's to the end of the 1970's. The initial Soviet attempts to deal with the dissident phenomenon by arrests, pressure to recant, and imprisonment were not entirely successful, provoking protests at home and eventually abroad. Partially as a result of these shortcomings the Kremlin began to use forced emigration of dissidents, and prisoner exchanges in a highly selective fashion. The human rights campaign which developed in the West, initially played a highly positive role within the Ukrainian diaspora, bringing a rather unusual appearance of unity to a highly politicized and divided community. However, later the pressures of the internal dynamics within that community absorbed the newly arrived exiles into symbolic roles which were attacked and manipulated in the struggle for control within the community. The most important role in this power struggle came to be played by Valentyn Moroz, whose near-mythical prestige in the Ukrainian community, ideological beliefs, and personality made him a natural symbol for manipulation in the struggle for political control of the Ukrainian diaspora. Much of the conflict which arose with the arrival of the dissenters in the West however, was not entirely the result of Ukrainian emigre politics but of the freer environment in which the dissidents found themselves. The resultant conflict between various dissidents and segments of the Ukrainian diaspora helped to destroy the tenuous cooperation which had existed in the diaspora since the mid-1960's, and undermined its commitment to human rights efforts.

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SYSTEM OF TRANSLITERATION

The Library of Congress system of transliteration, from Ukrainian and Russian, without diacritical marks and ligatures, has been used throughout this thesis, except for those proper names which have adopted different spellings that are more familiar in the West (for example, Plyushch).

Glossary of Acronyms

AUUC	Association of United Ukrainian Canadians
BUK	Bratstvo Ukraintsiv Katolykiv (Ukrainian Catholic Brotherhood)
CeSUS	Tsentralnyi Soiuz Ukrainskoho Studentstva (Central Union of Ukrainian Students).
CPU	Communist Party of Ukraine
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
KGB	Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
ODUM	Orhanizatsiia Demokratychnoi Ukrainskoi Molodi (Ukrainian Democratic Youth Association)
OUN-B	Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists - Bandera faction (ZCh OUN - Foreign Units of OUN)
OUN-M	Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists - Melnyk faction (Self-designation - OUN)
OUN-Z	Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists - UHVR faction (OUN-Z - OUN Abroad)
OURDP	Orhanizatsiia Ukraintsiv Revoliutsino-Demokratychnykh Perekonan (Association of Ukrainians of Revolutionary-Democratic Convictions)
SUAST	Soiuz Ukrainskykh-Amerykanskykh Sportovykh Tovarystv (Union of Ukrainian-American Sports Clubs)
SUM	Spilka Ukrainskoi Molodi (Ukrainian Youth Association of Canada)
SUMA	Spilka Ukrainskoi Molodi Ameryky (Ukrainian Youth Association of America)
SUSK	Soiuz Ukrainskykh Studentiv Kanady (Ukrainian Canadian Students' Union)

1

SUS	Soiuz Ukraintsiv Samostynykiiv (Ukrainian Self-Reliance League of Canada)
SUSTA	Soiuz Ukrainskykh Tovarystv Ameryky (Federation of Ukrainian Students Organizations of America)
TUSM	Tovarystvo Ukrainskykh Studentiv im. M. Mikhnovskoho (M. Mikhnovsky Ukrainian Student Association)
UCC	Ukrainian Canadian Committee (KUK - Komitet Ukraintsiv, Kanady)
UCCA	Ukrainian Congress Committee of America
UHVR	Ukrainska Holovna Vyzvolna Rada (Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council)
UNQ	Ukrainske Natsionalne Obiednannia (Ukrainian National Federation)
URDP	Ukrainska Revoliutsiino-Demokratychna Partiia (Ukrainian Revolutionary Democratic Party)
UWPU	Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Union
WCFU	World Congress of Free Ukrainians
ZUADK	Zluchenyi Ukrainskyi Amerykanskyi Dopomohovyi Komitet (United Ukrainian American Relief Committee)

Soviet Ukrainian Political Dissidents in the West:

Their Politics, Interaction, and Impact

After Exile to the West, 1965-1983.

Chapter One

Introduction

Since public, non-violent protest first developed in the U.S.S.R., the Soviet government has employed a variety of legal and illegal means to discourage, discredit and silence the dissident movement.

As the dissidents' tactics and organization improved, and as superpower tensions eased during the period of detente, the campaign mounted against the dissenting individuals by the Soviet Union's chief internal security agency, the KGB, and also by the propaganda apparatus, became increasingly refined, and coordinated with foreign policy considerations. The practice of exiling important dissidents beyond the borders of the Soviet Union during the period of detente was applied in a more cautious and calculated fashion than in the past. Since the exile of Valery Tarsis on February 26, 1966, this highly selective process, has placed significant numbers of both prominent and lesser known dissenters in the West.¹ A second, still smaller group of dissidents represented by figures such as Vladimir Bukovsky and Valentyn Moroz, have left the Soviet Union as a result of

1. For a partial list of political dissenters who have been exiled or forced to emigrate to the West see Appendix No. 1.

infrequent exchanges of prisoners.² This thesis has focused its attention specifically on those Soviet Ukrainian political dissidents who have left the Soviet Union by either of the above mentioned routes.

The main objective of this thesis has been to detail and assess the impact of the rise of dissent in Ukraine and of the exiled Soviet Ukrainian dissidents on the Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian organizations and communities, including governments, which supported them. The thesis also examines the conflicts which developed among the exiled Soviet Ukrainian dissidents thereby weakening their influence, and assesses the factors which played a role in promoting the conflict. This thesis has been particularly concerned with the political impact on the Ukrainian communities in the West and their various human rights organizations.

The thesis tests a hypothesis that the exile or release of these dissidents to the West has not been as beneficial for the U.S.S.R. as it may have planned, nor as positive as hoped for by the Ukrainian emigre community, its leading organizations and representatives. More specifically, the thesis speculates that the Soviet government may have hoped that the appearance of Ukrainian political dissidents in the West would further divide the Ukrainian emigre community and seriously weaken or destroy an increasingly effective Ukrainian human rights campaign.

2. The only Soviet dissenters to have been exchanged for Western prisoners are: Vladimir Bukovsky (January 1976); Valentyn Moroz, Georgii Vins, Edvard Kuznetsov, Aleksandr Ginzburg; Mark Dymshits (April 1979); and Anatoli Shcharansky (February 1986).

Furthermore, Soviet authorities may have expected that a negative relationship would develop between the dissidents in the West which would further damage the Ukrainian human rights campaign. In contrast, the thesis speculates that there existed in the most powerful Ukrainian political organizations of the post-World War Two emigration the hope that the dissidents could be manipulated for their own purposes, first to confirm their own continuing importance for the Ukrainian communities, and second, to have an effective tool which increased Ukrainian influence in the escalating propaganda battle between the West and the Soviet Union in the late 1970's. It will be shown that neither of these outcomes developed as fully as their proponents may have expected.

The thesis has been organized into six chapters, including an introductory chapter, a chapter on the political structure of the Ukrainian community in North America and elsewhere in the diaspora, a chapter on the development of an Ukrainian human rights campaign in the West, a chapter on Ukrainian dissident-emigre relations; and a chapter on the relations between the dissidents. It closes with a concluding chapter which summarizes and assesses the authors findings.

The first stirrings of dissent, that is open, non-violent protest, appeared in the Soviet Union in 1956 with protests over the invasion of Hungary.³ These protests were scattered and

3. Among those known to have protested and been punished severely for this act are Revolt Pimenov and Boris Vail, as well as a large number of students at Leningrad University. See Frederick Barghoorn, "Dissent in the USSR and Soviet Foreign Relations", in Roger Kanet, ed., Soviet Foreign Policy in the 1980's (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), p. 82.

unknown to most people in the Soviet Union and abroad. Their rapid suppression however did not deter the formation of new clandestine political groups encouraged by an awareness that complete control was not as feasible as it had been earlier prior to Khrushchev's de-Stalinization speech. More importantly, the relaxation of control following Stalin's death had also spawned a slow rebirth of the traditional literary opposition. More, and less veiled criticism began appearing as the works of authors started to multiply in the atmosphere of eased censorship in the late 1950's and early 1960's. The moral lessons issuing from this literary opposition formed the basis for the convictions held by those early dissidents who confronted the Soviet government's move to increase its societal control in mid-1965.

In Ukraine, the situation differed significantly from that in much of the rest of the U.S.S.R.. In 1956, Ukraine entered the period of de-Stalinization with an intelligentsia that was more thoroughly destroyed than in most republics. As a result of a perceived threat from Ukrainian nationalism, a more restrictive and suspicious atmosphere than from that existing in Moscow or Leningrad served to further retard the growth of independent thought and writing.

In the territory of the Ukrainian S.S.R. before World War Two a determined campaign had been started by Stalin to destroy all vestiges of Ukrainian nationalism which had arisen during the revolution and any autonomist tendencies within the Ukrainian Communist Party. Beginning with a show trial against a group of intellectuals said to be members of an underground group called the 'League for the Liberation of Ukraine', a purge swept through

the Ukrainian intelligentsia and the Ukrainian Communist Party.⁴ Collectivization in Ukraine, the U.S.S.R.'s primary agricultural area, took a special turn and was pressed with unparalleled determination and ruthlessness breaking the backbone of the Ukrainian nation, the peasants. The intelligentsia of Ukraine was purged.⁵ The promotion of Russian nationalism during the Second World War and after did not aid the rebuilding of a literary and cultural elite for Ukraine. By 1956, the Ukrainian intelligentsia still had not fully recovered from the physical and psychological damage done to it during the 1930's. As a result, the renaissance of literary activity which occurred in the R.S.F.S.R. following Khrushchev's famous 20th Congress speech was not paralleled by a similar process in Ukraine, but one could begin to see a slow rejuvenation which would lead to the emergence of the Shestydesiatnyky or 'People of the Sixties'.

However, the problem of Ukrainian nationalism in the U.S.S.R. had not been solved by Stalin but rather aggravated by his annexation of Volyn, Galicia, and Bukovyna during World War Two, areas whose population possessed a sense of Ukrainian nationalism which was more highly developed than that found in the population of Soviet Ukraine. It was in these areas and largely on the basis of the Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO)

4. John Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 17.

5. James Mace, "Famine in Ukraine", Problems of Communism Vol. 33 No. 3 (May-June 1984), pp. 47-49. For a more detailed account, see James E. Mace, Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1918-1933 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute and the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S., 1983).

that the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) was formed in 1929. OUN played a major role during the World War Two and immediately after, in a valiant but virtually suicidal attempt to create an independent Ukrainian state. Conscious of continuing strength and potential of the nationalist feeling in Western Ukraine, and despite Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign, Soviet authorities treated every real or suspected display of Ukrainian national sentiment throughout the Republic, even when found in apolitical literary works, with the greatest concern, and serious consequences usually followed for those individuals responsible. As a result of these misfortunes, the intelligentsia in Soviet Ukraine was unable to take full advantage of the less restrictive atmosphere during Khrushchev's de-Stalinization drive unlike its counterpart in the Russia.

The rebirth of dissenting forces in Ukraine followed two roads, an underground political stream and a cultural, literary stream. The political stream motivated by Ukrainian nationalism, the memory of recent persecution, and the nationality policy being followed by the Soviet government, led to the creation of underground opposition groups. While not fitting into the classical definition of dissent which requires open, non-violent protest activity, at least one of the groups, the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Union (UWPU), claimed that it had planned to emerge publicly and agitate for a referendum on the question of the secession of Ukraine from the Soviet Union. Had they done this before their arrest, they would certainly be considered to be dissidents.

The Ukrainian Workers and Peasant Union was founded in

1959 by two lawyers, Levko Lukianenko and Ivan Kandyba, who were to become two of the most important Ukrainian dissidents. The UWPU was penetrated by the KGB while still in its formative stage, and destroyed in 1961 before it was able to publicize its ideas. Its members received extremely heavy sentences for their part in attempting to take advantage of a right guaranteed in the Soviet constitution, with Lukianenko being originally sentenced to death.⁶ However, the UPWU should be seen as more than attempt at opposition: the formation of this underground group had significant meaning in a number of areas. First, the group probably represents one of the first moves toward open political protest or dissent. Secondly, this initiative while unsuccessful, appears considerably advanced, involving an organized group not separate individuals, basing its argument on legal principles embodied in the Soviet Constitution. For the Soviet government this development had ominous implications, proving the staying power of the national idea, the ability of the struggle for this idea to adapt itself to changed circumstances adopting legalistic, non-violent means which could attract many supporters and provide the Soviet government with much less justification

6. Levko Lukianenko's sentence was originally death by shooting with confiscation of property under Ukrainian S.S.R. Criminal Code Art. 56 (1), and 15 years labour camp (Art. 64). His death sentence was commuted to 15 years of labour camp on appeal. Co-founder Ivan Kandyba received 15 years labour camp with confiscation of property under Art. 56 (1) and 12 years labour camp (Art. 64). Group member Stepan Virun received 11 years labour camp with confiscation of property (Art. 56-1) and 10 years labour camp under Art. 64. Group member Vasyl Lutskiv received 10 years labour camp with confiscation of property under Articles 56 (1) and 64. Group member Oleksandr Libovych received 10 years labour camp and confiscation of property on both articles 56 (1) and 64. See Michael Browne, ed., Ferment in the Ukraine (Woodhaven, N.Y.: Crisis Press, 1971), p. 58.

for its suppression? Finally, for the Ukrainian community in the West, the new, growing dissident phenomenon in Ukraine would be an inspiration, since the Ukrainian dissident intellectuals soon began pursuing many commonly held goals, such as the preservation of Ukrainian language, culture and national identity, and in some cases, an independent Ukrainian state. The moral and democratic nature of their position, and the legalistic tactics adopted by the dissidents provided the opportunity for Ukrainians in the West to lobby and call upon their governments to support not the long abandoned concept of a rollback of communism but rather the respect for individual liberty, and political and civil rights.

It should be noted before passing that the underground political opposition included both groups such as undiscovered OUN cells, as well as other groups similar in nature to the UWPU in tactics and philosophy, such as the Initiative Committee of Ukrainian Communists formed around 1964; the Ukrainian National Front active from 1964 to 1967; and the Ukrainian National Committee, a group which also pursued the object of the legal secession of Ukraine from the U.S.S.R. during the early 1960's, and two of whose members were executed in 1961.⁷

However, it was the cultural, literary stream which initially attracted the most attention. The rebirth of Ukrainian

7. Kenneth C. Farmer, Ukrainian Nationalism in the Post-Stalin Era (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1980), pp. 156, 158-160. Farmer also provides a information on eight other underground political groups in Ukraine in the 1950's and 1960's. For a work exclusively on the Ukrainian National Front, one of the more interesting and long lasting of the groups, see Nina Strokata's article "Ukrainskyi natsionalnyi front, 1962-1967", in Suchasnist, No. 6(290), (June 1985), pp. 67-75.

literature and protest began in 1958 with the publication of Litera, za iakoiu tuzhat (The Letter Which is Longed For) by Boris Antonenko-Davydovych.⁸ His widely read book was a thinly disguised criticism of Khrushchev's nationality policy, the elimination of a letter from the Ukrainian alphabet not found in the Russian alphabet and protest over the dropping of the requirement that students in Ukraine take courses in Ukrainian. Antonenko-Davydovych, the role model, was followed by a stream of young Ukrainian writers and poets who became known as the Shestydesiatnyky. The writers who rose above all others in political significance at this time were Vasyl Symonenko and Ivan Dzyuba. Symonenko, a young poet, became the hero for the young, growing and increasingly restless Ukrainian intelligentsia. His poetry, written mostly for his desk drawer was smuggled to and published in the West in the collection Bereh chekan (The Shore of Expectations) creating a sensation and prompting the Soviet government to mount a campaign involving even his mother to discredit those who had transmitted Symonenko's work to the West.⁹ Symonenko, who had died earlier at the age of 28 from tuberculosis, was unscathed by the controversy and became a martyr for the Ukrainian cultural renaissance.

Ivan Dzyuba became the next symbol for the Ukrainian

8. Boris Antonenko-Davydovych, Iak my hovorymo (The Way We Speak): Litera, za iakoiu tuzhat (The Letter that is Longed For) (Baltimore: V. Symonenko Smoloskyp Publishers and Ukrainian Writers' Association in Exile, 1979), pp. 237-245.

9. Vasyl Symonenko, Bereh chekan (The Shore of Expectations) (New York: Prolog, 1965). For more information on this episode, See Michael Browne, pp. 2-3.

intelligentsia involved in the Ukrainian cultural revival. Dzyuba's book Internationalism or Russification?, a scholarly Marxist critique of the Soviet nationality policy under Khrushchev was devastating.¹⁰ Reportedly commissioned by the Ukrainian Communist Party First Secretary, Petro Shelest, the document was subsequently circulated among other Party Presidium members and all provincial Party secretaries in Ukraine.¹¹ It then entered the samvydav network and spread quickly.¹² His work convinced and increased the awareness of numerous individuals of the discriminatory nature of the Soviet nationality policy. Though benefitting from some probable protection from Shelest until his fall in 1972, Dzyuba was eventually forced to recant the thoughts expressed in Internationalism or Russification?, but his work remained a powerful critique of Soviet nationality policy.

The existence of dissent in the Soviet Union became acknowledged in the West only with the arrest of Yuli Daniel and Andrei Siniavskii in the autumn of 1965. Western correspondents were not allowed to attend the 'open' trial held from February 10 to 14, 1966, but based their reports on information related by the defendants' wives to supporters who maintained a vigil

10. Ivan Dzyuba, Internationalism or Russification? (New York: Monad Press, 1974).

11. Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, "Soviet Nationalities Policy and Dissent in the Ukraine," The World Today Vol. 30, No. 5 (May 1974), p. 221.

12. Samvydav is the Ukrainian language equivalent of samizdat. Both terms mean self-published, and refer to uncensored materials circulated without government authorization.

outside the court.¹³ The trial which had been intended by the Soviet government to have internal and external propaganda effects failed miserably when neither defendant admitted guilt and insisted on the legality of their actions. In the Soviet Union, this trial galvanized disaffected individuals into action. The struggle being waged by Daniel and Siniavskii for literary freedom was popular among the intelligentsia, and the governments attempt to stifle the authors by claiming that their actions were dangerous agitation against the Soviet state was widely perceived as a move backwards in the direction of Stalinism. The conviction of the two authors and their heavy sentences, prompted widely circulating letters of protest over the reversal of de-Stalinization in the U.S.S.R.¹⁴ The protest movement had been born.

The Soviet government responded by conducting a campaign of escalating pressures against individuals who signed petitions and openly sympathized with the dissidents. The relatively low level but still serious pressures applied discouraged some individuals from continuing their activity, but did not yet become so threatening as to deter the majority of those individuals already committed to the defence of civil liberties in the U.S.S.R. from acting, or new supporters from joining the movement in Moscow and Leningrad.

The arrest, and trial of Aleksandr Ginzburg, Iurii Galanskov, Aleksii Dobrovol'skii, and Vera Lashkova in January,

13. Ladmilla Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent; Contemporary Movements for National, Religious, and Human Rights (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1985), p. 276.

14. Ibid., p. 277.

1968, however, signalled an escalation in the government's struggle against dissenters. Ginzburg and Galanskov, two major figures in the emerging dissident movement, had compiled and sent abroad with the assistance of the other defendants, The White Book, a study on the violations of judicial norms in the Siniavskii-Daniel trial.¹⁵ Despite international protests, Ginzburg and Galanskov were convicted of anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda and sentenced to five, and seven years respectively. This event and the introduction of the new tactic of packing the courtroom so as to close the trial to possible sympathizers of those being tried, signalled a new determination by the authorities to silence extra-party criticism and comment.

The Soviet government's unresponsiveness and hostility to the protest movement's appeals, led directly to an expansion of the target audience for the dissenters. Larisa Bogoraz's and Pavel Litvinov's 'Appeal to All People of the World and to the Soviet Public' initiated a trend which increasingly saw individuals begin to address their appeals to foreign audiences, usually foreign communist or socialist organizations, and occasionally to world bodies or the public at large. The developments prompted a negative reaction from the Soviet government.

Faced with the unacceptable growth of the dissident movement, its failure to heed more subtle warnings, and its growing tendency to address external audiences thereby hurting the U.S.S.R.'s image internationally, the Soviet government began a systematic crackdown against the dissident movement in 1968,

15. Ibid.

ironically the year designated as International Human Rights Year. Numerous threats, searches and arrests seriously weakened the Moscow-centered dissident movement in Russia. In Ukraine, the persecution of 'nationalism' intensified and public expression of Ukrainian sentiments became rare. Yet curiously, as Peter Reddaway notes, the regime did not go far enough to destroy the movement completely which it could have done easily.¹⁶ One can speculate that they left the net open to catch additional fish. As a result, the dissident movement survived and began to pursue its goals in a number of manners both open and covert, ultimately making control of the movement more difficult for the regime.

In Ukraine, the protest movement was generated by a series of arrests in August and September, 1965. The perception that the political content of the literature and actions of the shestydesiatnyky had gone beyond the permissible was strong among the russophile members of the ideological apparatus of the Communist Party of Ukraine.¹⁷ When combined with the pressure from Moscow, the warning and arrest of numerous intellectuals and trials of twenty of the leading activists of the movement was inevitable. As in Russia, the arrests in Ukraine brought into view individuals who would become the main figures in the Ukrainian dissident movement in the coming decade. Among the most important was Valentyn Moroz, the dissenter who would become the

16. Peter Reddaway, "Dissent in the Soviet Union," Problems of Communism Vol. 32, No. 6 (November-December 1983), pp. 5-6.

17. Boris Lewytzkyj, Politics and Society in Soviet Ukraine, 1953-1980 (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1984), pp. 97-99.

principal focus of the Ukrainian community in the West.

The trial of Valentyn Moroz and Dmytro Ivashchenko in late January 1966, was the first to be held in connection with the arrests made during the previous summer. The trial of the two lecturers from Lutsk Pedagogical Institute was notable as a number of students and fellow lecturers were admitted to the trial hearings. However, any 'educational' value of the trial was reportedly nullified by Moroz's unwillingness to repent and his strong attack on Russification, and the unequal status of the Ukrainian S.S.R. within the Soviet Union.¹⁸ Promises of wide press coverage of the show trial made by Petro Shelest, CPU First Secretary went unfulfilled as a result.¹⁹

The fates of Moroz and 19 other individuals would have perhaps been forgotten but for the work of the journalist Vyacheslav Chornovil. Chornovil had been sent to cover the trials, but had been surprised by the violations of socialist justice he saw and in response produced Lykho z rozumu, a book detailing the crimes and fates of the 20 'criminals'.²⁰ Spread through samvydav, the work precipitated numerous protests to the authorities, both internal and external, and stimulated the circular flow of events which produces dissidents.

Official hostility and poor efficacy in their relations with the authorities led to a diversification of tactics employed

18. Michael Browne, p. 7.

19. Ibid., pp. 7-8.

20. Vyacheslav Chornovil, Lykho z rozumu - portrety dvadtsiaty zlochyntsiiv (The Misfortune of Intellect - Portraits of Twenty Criminals) (Paris: P.I.U.F., 1967).

by individuals involved with the protest movement in the U.S.S.R. by mid-1968. The move towards greater inter-movement communication and unity, and the striding for greater publicity for the movement manifested itself in the creation in April, 1968 of the underground journal Chronicle of Current Events initially edited by Nadia Gorbanévskaya.²¹ In January 1970, the Ukrainian Herald, a journal patterned after the Chronicle of Current Events was founded.²² Its editor, ~~was reported~~ to be the then recently freed Vyacheslav Chornovil. Chornovil had developed the first Ukrainian links to Moscow dissident circles, an essential for the success dissemination of the journal. However, he has denied that he served as the editor for the journal.²³ The Chronicle of Current Events, and to a lesser degree the Ukrainian Herald, became vitally important conduits of information for Western journalists based in the Soviet Union, and interested observers abroad. Their importance was testified to by the serious KGB campaigns mounted to destroy the journals. Production of the Chronicle was first delayed in September 1972, with issue no. 27 coming out a month and a half late. Then a threat by the KGB, relayed through the broken dissident Pyotr Yakir, to imprison people unconnected with the journal for its continued appearance forced the editors to cease publication. Western correspondents were informed of the suspension of

21. Mark Hopkins, Russia's Underground Press (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983), p. 11.

22. Alexeyeva, p. 41.

23. Vyacheslav Chornovil, "My Trial," Index on Censorship Vol. 7, No. 2 (1978), p. 26.

publication on February 28, 1973.²⁴ The Chronicle would remain silent for eighteen months, reappearing only on May 7, 1974.²⁵ The Ukrainian Herald suffered a similar fate falling silent with Chornovil's second arrest and the seizure of the fifth issue before it was put into circulation. The Ukrainian Herald would manage to reappear only sporadically in the future.²⁶

The other notable development in Soviet dissent after 1968 was, as noted earlier, the move towards the establishment of formal public organizations. Though this phenomenon did not manifest itself in Ukraine, a number of Ukrainians did find themselves in these organizations. Leonid Plyushch, officially belonged to the Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights in the U.S.S.R. founded in May 1969.²⁷ Later, Mykola Rudenko,

24. Hopkins, p. 64.

25. Ibid., p. 85.

26. The Ukrainian Herald briefly reappeared in 1974 with the publication of issues Nos. 7-8 under a new, more radical group of editors. In the spring of 1980, three hitherto unknown activists, Stepan Khmara, the main author, Vitalii Shevchenko, and Oleksander Shevchenko, were charged with being the editors of issues Nos. 6, 7-8, and a yet undistributed No. 9. See Bohdan Nahaylo, "Ukrainian Dissent and Opposition After Shelest," in Ukraine After Shelest, ed. Bohdan Krawchenko (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1983), pp. 38-40. A group numbering 40 people calling itself the Ukrainian National Front was uncovered in Ivano-Frankivsk in 1979 and also charged with having produced a journal entitled the Ukrainian Herald and a number of other works. However, this second journal was unrelated to the original Ukrainian Herald journal or its editors. The names of three members of the group are known Nikolay Kraynik (Mykola Krainyk), its leader, Nikolay Zvarich (Mykola Zvarych), and Ivan Mandrik (Ivan Mandryk). Mandrik died a mysterious, violent death after being taken into custody by KGB agents. See Alexeyeva, p. 56.

27. Peter Reddaway, ed., Uncensored Russia (London: Jonathan Cape, 1972), p. 151.

the future founder of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group would become a member of the Soviet Chapter of Amnesty International. However, the move towards formal, declared organizations was in its infancy. In 1969, at a time of heavy KGB pressure, it was only a few of the best known dissidents living in areas in which there was contact with foreign journalists that took the extremely provocative step of announcing the creation of formal independent organizations in the Soviet Union. However, even these dissidents were not exempt from repercussions for their actions.²⁸ Much larger, but steadily declining numbers of individuals, still continued the risky practice of adding their names to collective letters of protest.

In Ukraine, the escalating growth of samvydav publishing, the increasing number of dissenters, and the inability or lack of desire to undertake stern actions to suppress the dissidents by Petro Shelest, head of the Communist Party of Ukraine, was to become a factor in the political power struggle involving Shelest and his patron at the Politburo level, Nikolai Podgorny.²⁹ On July 20, 1970, the Ukrainian KGB chief, Vitalii Nikitichenko, was replaced by Vitalii V. Fedorchuk, signalling a drop in Shelest's

28. For example, of those individuals who became founders of the Initiative Group for the Defense of Civil Rights in the U.S.S.R. on May 20, 1969, five had been arrested or placed in psychiatric hospitals (PH) by the end of September, 1969. They were: June - Vladimir Borisov (PH), Genrikh Altunian; September - A. E. Levitin-Krasnov, Mustafa Dzhemilev, and Oleg Vorob'ev (PH). See Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, "Political Dissent in the Soviet Union," Studies in Comparative Communism Vol. 3, No. 2 (April 1970), pp. 82-83.

29. Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, "Soviet Nationalities Policy and Dissent in the Ukraine," The World Today Vol. 30, No. 5 (May 1974), p. 222.

ability to control events in Ukraine. Shelest and individuals around him soon began to speak of the "anti-Soviet activities of bourgeois nationalists" as a defensive tactic but their position continued to weaken.³⁰ Valentyn Moroz who had been arrested for a second time on June 1, 1970, was sentenced on November 18, 1970 to nine years prison and camp plus five years exile, an indication of the assertion of a new, harder line against dissenters, and indictment of the earlier 'leniency' under Nikitichenko. During the next twelve months, the KGB would mount an intensified effort to intimidate and infiltrate dissident circles in Ukraine, and "in particular, to seize control of their channels of communication with the West."³¹

By December, 1971, a decision had been made by the CPSU Politburo to move forcefully against the dissident movement throughout the Soviet Union, and especially in Ukraine. On January 4, 1972, the KGB arrested Iaroslav Dobosh, a Belgian student who had been recruited by OUN-B to make contact with Ukrainian dissidents, collect information and pass on money to help support them. The Dobosh arrest led to a purge of dissenters, with arrests beginning on January 12, 1972. In the following weeks, over 100 dissident intellectuals were arrested, among them: Ivan Dzyuba, Ivan Svitlychnyi, Vyacheslav Chornovil, Danylo Shumuk, Iurii Shukhevych, and Leonid Plyushch. Many more

30. Lewytzkyj, p. 136.

31. Bociurkiw, "Soviet Nationalities Policy and Dissent in the Ukraine," p. 223. Bociurkiw notes that at least two Soviet academics specializing in the struggle against 'Ukrainian nationalism' were sent abroad in 1971 to study their connections to the opposition in Ukraine, and their influence upon policy-makers and the public in their new homelands.

dissidents and sympathizers were questioned or had their homes searched.³² Severely hurt and intimidated by the wave of arrests, the movement survived primarily because action against it again ceased before the movement had been fully destroyed. On the other hand, Shelest's fate had been determined. Whatever the underlying factors behind announcement of Shelest's demotion to deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers on May 20, 1972, it is almost certain that reported accusations of provincialism and national narrow-mindedness at that time were decisive in his fall from power.³³ A massive re-education campaign was launched among the intelligentsia in the wake of arrests aimed at reindoctrinating them in the spirit of 'Soviet patriotism'.³⁴ A purge of the CPU then followed, in which large numbers of Shelest's supporters and sympathizers were removed from their posts and expelled from the Party.³⁵ Attacks on Shelest and his book Ukraina, nasha Radianska (Our Soviet Ukraine) continued throughout 1972 and until Shelest's removal from the Politburo in 1973.³⁶

The relaxation of tensions between the United States and

32. Maksym Sahaydak, comp. The Ukrainian Herald - Ethnocide of Ukrainians in the U.S.S.R., eds. Olena Saciuk and Bohdan Yasen (Baltimore: Smoloskyp, 1976), pp. 138-140.

33. Ibid., p. 127.

34. Bociurkiw, "Soviet Nationalities Policy and Dissent in the Ukraine," p. 225.

35. Yaroslav Bilinsky, "The Communist Party of Ukraine After 1966," in Ukraine in the Seventies, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj (Oakville, Ont.: Mosaic Press, 1975), pp. 242, 247, 252-253.

36. Lewytzkyj, pp. 149-151. The most serious attack on Shelest's book can be found in an editorial entitled "Pro seriozni nedoliky ta pomylky odnei knyhy" (About the Serious Shortcomings and Errors of One Book) in Komunist Ukrainy, No. 4 (1973), pp. 77-82.

the Soviet Union in the 1970's popularly referred to as detente in the West and peaceful coexistence by Soviet writers and officials, provided an improved but inconsistent atmosphere for Soviet dissenters. Beginning with Nixon's trip to the Soviet Union in May 1972 and ending with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, detente provided an environment which boosted the strength and importance of the liberal democratic dissidents within the Soviet Union, who looked to the West for support and models to emulate. This was particularly true after the election of Jimmy Carter as President whose administration would make the observance of human rights an important consideration in U.S. foreign policy. Therefore, to a far greater degree than the left and the right, liberal dissidents sought contact with Western journalists and organizations in order to address an external audience. Similarly, Western journalists favored contact with these dissidents because of the ease of contact, and similarity in political and social values, especially the Western orientation of their political beliefs. Furthermore, the Soviet desire for Most Favored Nation status, technology transfers, grain sales, and a SALT treaty, on the one hand, and Congressional and interest group's attempts to create a linkage between these items and Soviet human rights practices, on the other hand, meant the liberal democratic element remained largely immune to severe punishment until long after the beginning of the decline of detente following the signing of the Helsinki Final Act.

The signing of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe on August 1, 1975, in Helsinki was of fundamental importance to the human rights movement in the

U.S.S.R.. Although not legally binding, the Helsinki Accords as the "Final Act" came to be known, gave dissenters a new international human rights document with which to shield themselves. More importantly, the text of the Final Act legitimized the review of the internal policies of other states. Furthermore, the Soviet government's publication of the Helsinki Accord in both Izvestiia and Pravda raised the Soviet public's awareness of international human rights guarantees which their government had agreed to. The opportunities created by the Soviet government's ratification of the Helsinki Final Act were quickly capitalized upon by the disparate dissident forces.

On May 12, 1976, despite repeated warnings by KGB, the formation of the Moscow Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords was formally announced in Andrei Sakharov's apartment. Among the founders was former Major-General Petro Grigorenko, who had been released from a psychiatric asylum after considerable international pressure. On November 16, 1976, the Ukrainian Helsinki Group declared its formation. Initially, the group was composed of most of the leading figures of the Ukrainian dissident movement who were not then imprisoned. Led by writer Mykola Rudenko, the other members of the group were: writer Oles Berdnyk, teacher Oleksa Tykhyi, Major-General Petro Grigorenko, micro-biologist Nina Strokata, historian Mykola Matusevych, lawyers Levko Lukianenko and Ivan Kandyba, engineer Myroslav Marynovych and pensioner Oksana Meshko. Other noteworthy groups which sprang into existence included the Lithuanian, Armenian and Georgian Helsinki groups, the Christian Committee

37. Lesia Verba and Bohdan Yasen, eds. The Human Rights Movement in Ukraine - Documents of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, 1976-1980. (Baltimore: Smoloskyp Publishers, 1980), pp. 251-255.

for the Defense of Believers' Rights, and the Working Commission on the Abuse of Psychiatry for Political Purposes. Later, other groups such as SMOT -- the Free Interprofession Trade Union and Vladimir Klebanov's independent trade union would appear.

The Soviet government responded harshly to the emergence of formal dissident organizations in the post-Helsinki environment, imprisoning many of the members of these groups and exiling others abroad. The practice of exiling dissidents beyond the borders of the U.S.S.R. began with the expulsion of Valery Tarsis on February 26, 1966, and then sputtered, the Kremlin exiling others only occasionally until 1976 when the outflux of dissidents became remarkable. It appears that at that critical point, when detente was increasingly being strained by new tensions which reduced the chances for a successful conclusion of the SALT treaty desired by the Soviet Union, a decision was made to mitigate some of the tension by releasing a number of secondary dissidents. For a variety of factors, more important dissenters were not subjected to this relatively mild punishment.

In the late 1960's, the impact of Ukrainian dissent on Soviet-Western relations was relatively small. At that time support for dissident causes was hampered by the lack of an organized campaign, financial resources, prominent spokesmen in the United States and Canada, as well as having a paucity of information on events in Ukraine. Ukrainian questions received only sporadic coverage in the press, and had little effect on the foreign policies of Canada and the United States towards the Soviet Union. The success of a divided Ukrainian lobby, was

hindered still further by the officeholders of the day. In the United States, the Nixon administration strongly influenced by Henry Kissinger, who first served as National Security Advisor, and later as Secretary of State, stressed quiet diplomacy in its relations with the Soviet Union, which showed little visible effect. It was only after the emergence of a strong pro-human rights support in the Congress did matters improve for the Ukrainian human rights lobbyists. The situation improved still further with the signing of the Helsinki Final Act and the election of Jimmy Carter. However, with the decline and collapse of detente in 1980, following the Afghan invasion and the election of Ronald Reagan, the human rights lobbies found themselves in seriously weaker positions, having lost both presidential support and a favorable environment in which to operate. In 1986, after Ronald Reagan's re-election, the human rights issue has still not received the kind of hearing it experienced a decade earlier. While there has been some increase in the understanding of human rights issues by the Reagan administration from its first year in power, the human rights lobby now must function in an atmosphere which uncannily resembles that of the late 1960's, where quiet diplomacy and efforts to open a new period of detente are increasingly evident.

In Canada, the atmosphere was still less hospitable as the unsympathetic Trudeau government dominated the Canadian political scene during the 1970's. Pierre Trudeau - a firm advocate of dialogue and arms control, a wariness of the United States and a desire to promote an independent Canada, and threatened by the internal specter of Quebec separatism - was to return from a trip

to the Soviet Union and Ukraine, and in reference to the arrested dissidents in Ukraine equate Ukrainian nationalists with FLO terrorists.³⁸ As a result of its belief that the raising of human rights matters with the U.S.S.R. would only serve to unnecessarily strain relations, the Canadian government remained inactive in the favourable environment created by detente, avoiding the question of the internal policies of the Soviet government except when forced to by pressure from the ethnic communities concerned. Ironically, the performance of the Canadian government would improve somewhat after detente had collapsed.

Throughout the Soviet Union, and especially in Ukraine, the period following the founding of the Helsinki Groups saw the existing level of internal repression begin to escalate into a determined attack of proportions and scope unseen before, aimed at destroying the growing human rights movement. The Ukrainian Helsinki Group, the largest of the five established, suffered particularly harsh punishment with all its 39 members being imprisoned or exiled abroad.³⁹ Its numerous supporters in Ukraine as well as individuals unconnected to the Group were jailed.⁴⁰ The result has been that most dissidents have been driven underground. Despite the recent changes in the

38. Globe and Mail, June 1, 1971, p. 3.

39. For a comprehensive list of the fate of the Helsinki Group members as of 1980, see Verba and Yasen, pp. 251-265.

40. For examples, see Ibid., pp. 92-97.

leadership of the Soviet government there has been little evidence of any substantial shift in domestic policy. Therefore, it appears that with perhaps the occasional exception, the exchange or exile of political dissidents beyond the borders of the Soviet Union is a practice of the past,, and the present pool of dissidents in the West will constitute the bulk of subjects for such studies in the foreseeable future.

This thesis has as its main focus nine Soviet Ukrainian political dissidents: Leonid Plyushch, Petro Grigorenko, Valentyn Moroz, Nadia Svitlychna, Nina Strokata-Karavanska, Sviatoslav Karavanskyi, Victor Borovsky, Petro Vins, and Volodymyr Malynkovych. Though Ukrainian dissidents are said to account for a major part of the dissidents held within camps in the U.S.S.R., this small sample embraces all Ukrainian political dissidents in the West. Basic biographical information on the eight dissidents is contained in an appendix at the end of the study. Considerably more information will be given on the dissenters in the body of the study.

While there has been a great deal of study on the subject of dissent in the U.S.S.R., the area of post-emigration dissident activity has as of yet not been studied. At present, to the authors knowledge, there exist virtually no books or major articles on the subject. As a result, this thesis has relied in great part on primary materials, including memoirs, and, especially, on journal and newspaper articles on and by the dissidents themselves. The articles have been drawn from both the ethnic press, the principal sources being the Ukrainian daily Svoboda and the English language Ukrainian Weekly, both published

in Jersey City, N.J.. Further reference has been made to two Ukrainian weeklies in Toronto, Homin Ukrainy and Novyi Shliakh, the bilingual Ukrainian-English Student, the Ukrainian journal Suchasnist, and a number of English-language newspapers. Additional information has been gathered from collections of documents such as: Ferment in the Ukraine (Michael Browne, ed.), In Quest of Justice: Protest and Dissent in the Soviet Union Today (Abraham Brumberg, ed.), The Chornovil Papers, Boomerang: The Works of Valentyn Moroz (Yaroslav Bihun, ed.), and Uncensored Russia - The Human Rights Movement in the Soviet Union (Peter Reddaway, ed.). In addition, the samizdat periodicals Ukrainian Herald, Chronicle of Current Events have been consulted. Where possible interviews have been conducted with the dissidents who are the focus of this study. Background information for the thesis was collected from a number of books, the most important being the recently published and exceptionally detailed study of the opposition movements in the U.S.S.R. by Ludmilla Alexeyeva entitled Soviet Dissent; Contemporary Movements for National, Religious, and Human Rights.

The principal difficulties which the thesis has encountered have been due to the sheer scope of the work, which precluded a detailed analysis of some questions that may arise. A second difficulty arose from the lack of previous work in this area. Finally, the author did not have personal access to the principal exiled dissidents and had to contend with limited information on the actors and the reasons behind their decisions. As a result some of the conclusions reached by this thesis will

be of a speculative nature, impossible to prove conclusively in either the affirmative or negative.

Having surveyed the history of opposition in Ukraine including the emergence and development of dissent in Ukraine, and having introduced the dissidents who will be highlighted, the thesis will now turn to an examination of the structure of the Ukrainian community in the West.

Chapter Two

The Ukrainian Diaspora

Throughout history, there have been emigrants, refugees, and exile communities who have sought to exercise political influence in their former homelands. The Soviet Ukrainian political dissidents who were allowed abroad in the 1970's, met, and became involved with a large, extremely diverse Ukrainian diaspora, part of which continued to be highly politically mobilized and active. A survey of the principal organizations of this diaspora is the focus of the following chapter.

The Ukrainian diaspora in the West is wholly the product of three waves of emigration in the 19th and 20th centuries. The first wave composed primarily of poorly educated, financially strapped peasants in search of better economic opportunities for themselves began leaving the Western Ukrainian territories in the 1870's.¹ In most cases their desires had been only to stay in their new land for a period of time, and then return home with new wealth, however, two World Wars made this impossible. This first wave of emigrants settled primarily in the United States,

1. Volodymyr Kubiiovyc, "Movement of Population" in Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia eds. Volodymyr Kubiiovyc et al., Vol. 1 (Toronto: Ukrainian National Association, 1963), p. 196. The first emigration came from the Transcarpathian and the Galician parts of Lemkivshchyna. Later the emigration expanded to all of Transcarpathia, eastern Galicia and Bukovyna.

Canada and Brazil.² With time, assimilation drained some of the strength of this wave, the information possessed by the group about the fate of their homeland became clouded, and most, in the face of a new waves of more politicized refugees, shifted their political priorities in favor of more local concerns.

The second major wave of Ukrainians to arrive in the West consisted of refugees displaced at first by the fighting during the First World War, then later by the civil war in the disintegrating Russian empire and the last war for Ukrainian independence, and finally those taking advantage of the resultant boundary shifts of those years. The second wave consisted of highly politicized Ukrainian refugees, many of them intelligentsia who foresaw a poor future for them in a Soviet controlled Ukraine or in the newly created Polish state. They possessed a more acute awareness of their Ukrainian national identity than did emigrants in the first wave, a result of both a longer exposure to the Ukrainian renaissance experienced by the Ukrainian minority under the Austro-Hungarian empire, as well as the short-lived but intense and costly experiment with Ukrainian independence in Central and Western Ukraine. The members of this new wave settled principally in the Canada and the United States, but also created new areas of Ukrainian settlement within South America and Europe, especially in Czechoslovakia, France and

2. Ibid., p. 196-197. Between 1890 and 1913, 700,000 to 800,000 individuals emigrated from these territories. Between 1890 and 1917, 500,000 Ukrainians emigrated to the United States, Canada, and Brazil - 350,000, 100,000, and 50,000 respectively.

Germany.³

The second wave was responsible for the creation of a large number of political parties and organizations across the right/left spectrum. While a number, such as United Hetman Organization (Soiuz Hetmantsiv Derzhavnykiv) founded in 1924, have declined in strength and importance, others continue to function and remain very important for the Ukrainian diaspora and the dissenters interacting with it.⁴ Among the most important of the pre-World War Two organizations still active are two denominationally-based organizations. The Ukrainian Self-Reliance League of Canada (Souiz Ukraintsiv Samostiinykiv) (SUS) was founded in 1927 by Ukrainians adhering to the Orthodox faith. SUS and its component organizations, the Ukrainian Women's Association of Canada, Association of Ukrainian Youth of Canada, and the Association of Ukrainian National Homes of Canada, hold considerable financial resources, as well as a sizeable membership. The official press organ of the Ukrainian Self-Reliance League of Canada is the weekly Ukrainskyi Holos (The Ukrainian Voice).⁵ The Ukrainian Catholic Brotherhood (Bratstvo Ukraintsiv Katolykiv) (BUK) is the Ukrainian Catholic equivalent of SUS founded in 1932. The Ukrainian Catholic Women's

3. Ibid., p. 1097; and V. Kubijovyc and V. Markus, "Ukrainians Abroad: General Characteristics" in Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia, Vol. 2 (Toronto: Ukrainian National Association, 1971), p. 1094. Between 1919 and 1935, 170,000 Ukrainians emigrated from the Western Ukrainian territories. Of these 68,800 went to Canada, 12,000 went to the United States, 44,000 to Argentina, 36,000 to France, and 7,000 to Brazil.

4. V. Kysilevsky, "In Canada: Social and Political Life" in Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia, Vol. 2, p. 1169.

5. Ibid., p. 1168.

League of Canada and the Ukrainian Catholic Youth of Canada organizations are BUK affiliates.⁶

Of the pre-World War Two political organizations in existence in Canada, UNO, the Ukrainian National Federation (Ukrainske Natsionalne Ob'iednannia), deserves special mention. Formed by former Ukrainian officers and soldiers in 1932, UNO possessed a firmly Ukrainian nationalist ideology and was supportive of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) prior to World War Two.⁷ Following the war, UNO would serve as an ally of the Melnyk faction of OUN with an already established infrastructure and membership in Canada.

The third and latest wave of Ukrainian refugees to the West, consisted of persons displaced by the Second World War, who remaining in Western zones of Germany, and Austria after that war were not repatriated back to the Soviet Union. This wave was considerably diminished by the allied effort to return these individuals to the U.S.S.R. (codenamed Operation Keelhaul). When Operation Keelhaul was finally terminated in 1946 only an estimated 150,000 Ukrainian refugees remained in West Germany.⁸ However, among those remaining were many members of the intelligentsia, as well as numerous persons associated with UPA - the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the wartime OUN underground, and other military units who had fought for an independent Ukraine

6. Ibid., p. 1168.

7. Ibid., pp. 1168-1169.

8. Mark R. Elliott, Pawns of Yalta: Soviet Refugees and America's Role in Their Repatriation (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1982), p. 174.

during and, in the case of UPA, also after the Second World War. The level of political awareness and activity of the third wave surpassed that of earlier waves. The level of factional strife was also greater. Upon arriving in their new homelands, principally Canada and the United States, the organizations of the third wave soon came to dominate the Ukrainian political scene.⁹

The two largest and most powerful Ukrainian communities in the diaspora are to be found in Canada and the United States.¹⁰ The organizations which have been developed by these two communities parallel each other in structure, possess similar ideologies and goals, and often work together.

In Canada, the central coordinating and representative body for Ukrainians is the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC) or Komitet Ukraintsiv Kanady (KUK). Formed in 1940 with the

9. V. Kubijovyc and V. Markus, p. 1094. This third wave of Ukrainian emigration briefly settled in the Western European states and starting in 1947 began to move to third countries. From 1947 to 1955 approximately 80,000 Ukrainians arrived in the United States, 30,000 to Canada, 20,000 to Great Britain, and 20,000 to Australia and New Zealand. Later shifts in migration reduced the Ukrainian populations of Belgium, Venezuela and the other South American states. Since the 1960's, there has been only negligible migration among the Ukrainian diaspora.

10. The Ukrainian population of the United States is approximately 1,500,000 (1965). The Ukrainian population of Canada was 580,655 in 1971 and 529,515 in 1981. It should be noted that the decrease in the Canadian figure from 1971 to 1981 was a result of a change in the method of computation for ethnic origin in the Canadian census in 1981. See V. Markus, "In the United States" in Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia, Vol. 2, p. 1100; Statistics Canada, 1971 Census of Canada - Population, Vol. 1 - Part 4 (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1974), p. 4.1; Statistics Canada, 1981 Census of Canada - Ethnic Origin, Vol. 1 - Part 5 (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1984), p. 1.2. For the changes to the method of computation ethnic origin, see p. XII.

encouragement of the Canadian government, it represents every major Ukrainian organization in Canada except the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians, the pro-Soviet Ukrainian Communist Organization. As such the UCC represents the vast majority of politically active Ukrainians in Canada. In 1983, 27 national Ukrainian organizations were members of the UCC.¹¹ The member organizations represent a near complete spectrum of political philosophies with the exception of far left socialist and communist organizations. Within this spectrum, the groups to the right of center are undeniably the most powerful. There are also a number of non-partisan organizations within the UCC, such as the Ukrainian Self-Reliance League of Canada and the Ukrainian Catholic Brotherhood, denominationally based organizations referred to above.

OUN-B, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists-Bandera faction is probably the single most powerful party in Ukrainian politics in North America.¹² The organization is a representative of the far right in Ukrainian politics. Its parent body, OUN, was officially formed in Vienna at the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists between January 28 and February 3, 1929, during the heyday of integral nationalism.¹³ OUN-B - one of its factional successors retains elements of the original ideology

11. Michael H. Marunchak, Ukrainian Canadians: A History (Winnipeg: The Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences - [UVAN], 1982), p. 805.

12. OUN-B strength lies both in the numbers of its supporters, and the financial assets supporters of the organization control.

13. Kubijovyc, ed., Entsyklopediia Ukrainoznavstva, Vol. 5 (Paris and New York: Shevchenko Scientific Society, 1966), p. 1863.

though in modified form.¹⁴ It is represented in Canada by a number of political organizations, under a self-designated umbrella "Organizations of the Liberation Front," including LVU - the League for the Liberation of Ukraine (Liga Vyzvolennia Ukrainy); SUM, the Ukrainian Youth Association (Spilka Ukrainskoi Molodi), its youth wing; TUSM, the M. Mikhnovsky Ukrainian Student Association (Tovarystvo Ukrainskykh Studentiv im. M. Mikhnovskoho), an organization for Ukrainian university students of nationalist persuasion; and the Toronto newspaper Homin Ukrainy (Echo of Ukraine). In addition, Shliakh Peremohy (Pathway to Victory), OUN-B's European organ, published weekly in Munich, is distributed throughout North America. OUN-B was formed in 1940 as a result of a struggle involving tactical, psychological and personal divisions between the more youthful radicals from then Soviet-occupied Galicia and the older, more conservative leadership abroad, in Western Europe.¹⁵ The radicals were led by Stepan Bandera from whom they derived their popular name "banderivtsi". Among Bandera's aides was Iaroslav Stetsko who heads the

14. OUN's variant of integral nationalism in the 1930's was based on the writings of Dmytro Dontsov. Elements of this philosophy included an emphasis on force expressed as an advocacy of armed struggle against the dominant group; an enormous stress on absolute adherence to the national language and culture as a substitute for a lacking state as the bearer of the national ideal; an glorification of illegality as such due to a traditional lack of a state with institutional and legal structures supportive of national aspirations; irrationalism expressed through fantastic but genuine romanticism; and finally, an emphasis on youth as a rejection of past failures and shortcomings. See John Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism (New York: Columbia University, 1963), pp. 22.

15. Kubiiovyc, ed., Entsyklopediia Ukrainoznavstva, Vol. 5, p. 1865.

organization today. On June 30, 1941, Bandera's followers independently declared a sovereign Ukrainian state in Lviv and declared themselves its provisional government. Bandera and most leaders of this new government were soon arrested by the Germans and imprisoned.¹⁶ As a result, the organization which had had pro-German sympathies at the beginning of the Second World War, by July, 1941, began to include the Germans among its list of enemies. Its members fought in the ranks of UPA and after the Second World War were well represented among those Ukrainians who had found refuge in West Germany as displaced persons, and later came to Canada and the United States.

The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-M) originally headed by Andrei Melnyk against whom the Bandera faction rebelled in 1940, is another of the very powerful third wave organizations to dominate the Canadian political scene. Followers of OUN-M, most conservative of the three OUN factions, were or are prominent in several Ukrainian organizations in Canada including UNO, the Ukrainian National Federation (Ukrainske Natsionalne Ob'iednannia); the Ukrainian Women's Organization (Orhanizatsia Ukraïnok Kanady imeny O. Basarab) (OUK), its women's organization; UNYF, the Ukrainian National Youth Federation (Molod Ukraïnskoho Natsionalnoho Ob'ednannia) (MUNO), its youth wing; as well as Zaretor an ideological

16. The action by the Bandera faction was unilateral and caused considerable anger among the Melnyk faction of OUN. Many of the OUN-M members were not overly distressed at the fate of the banderivtsi at the hands of the Germans. Stepan Bandera was himself arrested on July 12, 1941 and was only released on September 25, 1944. See Alexander Dallin, German Rule in Russia 1941-1945 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981), pp. 120, 624.

students' organization which was especially active in the 1950's-60's. The OUN-M political philosophy, a right-of-centre moderate nationalist philosophy which also contains deep concern for events in Ukraine, is disseminated through a number of press organs including the newspapers Novyi Shlyakh (Toronto), and Ukrainske Slovo (Paris), and the journal Samostiina Ukraina (Chicago), the group's international press organ.

A split within the OUN-B group in 1948 led to the creation of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists Abroad or OUN-Z.¹⁷ Led originally by Mykola Lebed and Rev. Ivan Hryniokh, this group saw themselves as the foreign representation of UHVR, the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council which was established in Ukraine in 1944. This somewhat heterogenous group occupies a left-of-centre democratic position to the left of OUN-M on the political spectrum. The grouping is weaker than both the OUN-B and OUN-M organizations but still has considerable influence among Ukrainian intellectuals, especially through its publication Suchasnist, probably the best Ukrainian journal in the West.

17. OUN-Z or the Dviikari, as they came to be popularly called, were largely the moderates within OUN-B who were loyal to leader of UPA General Roman Shukhevych, and UHVR, the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council, the supra-party national coordinating body formed at the last major conference of OUN in Eastern Galicia in June or July 1944. When conflicts developed within the Ukrainian National Rada, a supra-party national coordinating body to be formed by emigre Ukrainians, it was this group who insisted that UN Rada act only as the foreign representation of the UHVR. This group also rejected Bandera's continued insistence on authoritarian leadership. These tensions led to the OUN-Z group splitting off from OUN-B and their regarding themselves as the "foreign representation" of UHVR. They were later strengthened when joined by former members of the UNDP, the Ukrainian People's Democratic Party, a left-democratic party formed in 1942 by OUN members in Volyn. See Armstrong, pp. 160, 315-317.

The democratic center of Ukrainian politics is occupied by the Ukrainian Revolutionary Democratic Party (Ukrainska Revoliutsiino-Demokratychna Partiiia) (URDP). The party was formed in 1947 under the leadership of the East Ukrainian writer Ivan Bahrianyi and was almost wholly East Ukrainian in its membership.¹⁸ Its ideology insisted on individual civil liberties and a democratic form of government with some nationalization of the economy, though, for historical reasons, it specifically rejected the nationalization of agriculture.¹⁹ In Canada, the URDP formally operates under its own name. Associated with this organization is the Ukrainian Democratic Youth Association (Ob'iednanniiia Demokratychnoi Ukrainskoi Molodi) (ODUM) which publishes the journal Moloda Ukraina (Young Ukraine). The URDP press organ is the paper Ukrains'ki Visti (Ukrainian News), presently published in Detroit.

Also connected with the URDP is SUZHERO, the Ukrainian Association of Victims of Russian Communist Terror (Soiuz Ukraintsiv - Zherty Rosiisko-Komunistychnoho Teroru) founded in 1950 in Toronto.²⁰ The organization had some 15 chapters scattered across Canada in 1966 and engaged in the publication of its own books, notably The Black Deeds of the Kremlin, and translations of Ukrainian works. Since that time the organization has experienced a significant drop in its membership, and today it only exists in a seriously weakened condition. Some of the

18. Ibid., p. 315.

19. Ibid.

20. Kubiiovyc, ed., Entsyklopediia Ukrainoznavstva, Vol. 8, 1976, p. 2993.

other remnants of emigre organizations that can be found in North America include: the far right Spilka Vyzvolennia Ukrainy (Association for the Liberation of Ukraine) (SVU), founded in Germany in 1952; and UNDO, the Ukrainian National Democratic Union (Ukrainske Natsionalno-Demokratychne Ob'iednannia), founded in West Ukraine on July 7, 1925.²¹

All these national third wave organizations are committed to the concept of an independent Ukraine, and devote a majority of their efforts to activities which are either directly or indirectly concerned with Ukraine. The coordinating forum for much of their efforts has been the Ukrainian National Rada (UN Rada) which was created in June 1948 through the efforts of and despite the conflict between Ukrainian political parties represented in the Displaced Persons camps in West Germany. The UN Rada became the provisional parliament for the 1917 government of the Ukrainian National Republic in exile with equal representation from the six major political parties in the emigration. Conflict within the organization, especially with OUN-B over equal representation among the six parties in the UN Rada (the Bandera group had desired an unequal share to reflect their strength), led the OUN-B group to leave the Rada in mid-1950 and devote its efforts more fully to building its own international network of 'Liberation Front' organizations, as

21. Kubijovyc, ed., Entsyklopediia Ukrainoznavstva, Vol. 8, 1976, pp. 3000-3001; and Vol. 9, 1980, pp. 3411-3412.

well as to the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations.²² The Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations, an organization which OUN-B has dominated from its formation in 1946, is a coalition of right wing nationalist organizations from countries controlled by the Soviet Union or its ideological allies.²³ As a result of this disunity, the strength of the UN Rada, and the third wave organizations in general was weakened.²⁴

The nature of the differences among the third wave national political organizations lie in the methods with which they advocate to pursue the goal of Ukrainian independence, the ultimate political situation which they are prepared to see in Ukraine, their tolerance of other groups, and willingness to join with them in a democratically run umbrella organization (UCC/UCCA, WCFU, etc.). In regard to these latter two points, the relations between OUN-B and the other organizations, in

22. Full blame for the weakness of the UN Rada cannot be solely attributed to the OUN-B faction. It should be noted that the OUN-M faction also withdrew from the organization for a time. As well the poor health of Andrii Livytskyi, head of the government in exile, impaired the strength of forces striving for unity. As well splits occurred within OUN-B itself, with the less authoritarian group seceding from the UN Rada. Apart from OUN-M and OUN-B, the other parties represented in the Rada were the Ukrainian Revolutionary Democratic Party (URDP), the Ukrainian National State Union, the (West) Ukrainian Socialist Party, and UNDO. See Armstrong, p. 315.

23. Ibid., p. 317.

24. In 1978, however, a dramatic reversal of the orientation of the UN Rada occurred. M. Livytskyi, the President-in-exile, under the influence of Iaroslav Stetsko, unilaterally issued new bylaws which reorganized the structure of the UN Rada and excluded half of its former membership. In protest, many of those excluded left the Rada and formed a new organization in 1979, the Council of Supporters of the UNR. Kubijovyc, ed., Entsyklopediia Ukrainoznavstva, Vol. 9, 1980, pp. 3372-3373.

particular OUN-M, can at best be described as strained and suspicious.

The list of Ukrainian organizations in Canada is by no means complete with the organizations mentioned above. There are many others which have specific areas of interest, including various scholarly, professional, cultural, youth and women's concerns. It should be noted that these organizations have periodically participated in activities in support of Ukrainian dissidents both in Ukraine and abroad. The principal Ukrainian churches in the emigration, the Ukrainian Catholic and Ukrainian Orthodox, as well as other religious movements have invariably also supported the principles of the dissidents.

Of this list of special interest organizations, SUSK, the Ukrainian Canadian Students Union (Soiuz Ukrainskoho Studentsva Kanady), a federation of Ukrainian university students groups across Canada, has shown the considerable interest and involvement with the dissident question. The organization which was formed in 1953 deals with issues of interest to Ukrainian students.²⁵ With its membership composed purely of university students and with many of these students actively involved in the national Ukrainian political organizations, the political orientation of SUSK and in particular, that of the local clubs can shift dramatically from year to year. However, it can be said that in general, SUSK is committed to the ideas of Ukrainian independence, and has supported the concept of human rights and political dissidence in the Soviet Union. In

25. Kysilevsky, p. 1170.

1965, perhaps its numerical highpoint, SUSK had approximately 800 members.²⁶

Plast Ukrainian Youth Organization is a strong non-partisan youth organization operating in most countries where there are Ukrainians. Founded in 1911, it was modeled on Baden Powell's boy scouts, but with a much greater emphasis on developing a healthy and knowledgeable awareness of one's own national identity. The first Plast organizations were founded in Canada in 1948, and since then the organization has grown in size to become the main rival to SUM.²⁷ Though underplaying any loyalty to any political persuasion, Plast ideology does propagate the idea of an independent and democratic Ukraine. Until the early 1980's, the organization had attempted to concern itself primarily, if not exclusively, with the education and socialization of young Ukrainians. However, since the late 1960's there has been increasing pressure within the organization for it to pursue political activity within the Ukrainian diaspora. One aspect of this was the growing encouragement given to Plast members to become aware of and participate in Ukrainian human rights support activities, especially since January, 1972. In mid-1969, Plast had 1,667 members in Canada.²⁸

As mentioned above, SUM, the Spilka Ukrainskoi Molodi, is the youth wing of OUN-B in Canada. Founded in 1946 in West

26. Ibid., p. 1170.

27. Marunchak, p. 559. In 1967, Plast had approximately 1,500 members in Canada.

28. Kubijovyc, ed., Entsyklopediia Ukrainoznavstva, Vol. 6, 1970, p. 2106.

Germany, the organization spread with the emigration of Ukrainians to their present countries of settlement.²⁹ SUM's political philosophy is drawn from its OUN-B parent and thus it espouses a more pungent type of political patriotism than does Plast.³⁰ SUM's strength in Canada in the late 1960's was approximately 3,000 members.³¹

ODUM, the Ob'iednannia Demokratychnoi Ukrainskoi Molodi, the final major Ukrainian third wave organization to have a major presence in Canada, was founded in 1950 in New York.³² As stated above, ODUM is the youth arm of the URDP, and thus possesses a liberal/social democratic philosophy. In 1966, ODUM had a membership of over 2,000 which was scattered throughout a number of countries, but primarily concentrated in the United States and Canada.³³

In addition to the youth organizations mentioned above, there are a number of 'older' Ukrainian youth organizations in Canada which have absorbed sizeable numbers of third emigration youth. These include SUMK, the Association of Ukrainian Youth of Canada (Soiuz Ukrainskoi Molodi Kanady), the organization established in 1931 for Ukrainian youth of Orthodox faith

29. Ibid., Vol. 8, p. 3003.

30. Marunchak, p. 600.

31. Ibid. SUM's numerical strength has been variously been stated to be 1969 worldwide 13,700. Of this total Canada had 750 elders and 2,500 youth. In 1973 the worldwide total was said to be approximately 12,350 (Ibid., p. 3004). Marunchak gives 3,000 as the number of SUM members in Canada in 1967.

32. Kubiiovyc, ed., Entsyklopediia Ukrainoznavstva, Vol. 5, p. 1798.

33. Ibid.

referred to earlier; UKIu, the Ukrainian Catholic Youth League (Ukrainske Katolytske Iunatstvo) organized in 1938 for Ukrainian Catholic youths; and MUNO, the Ukrainian National Youth Federation (Molod Ukrainskoho Natsionalnoho Ob'iednannia), a more recent name for the organization formed in 1933 for youth of UNO members.³⁴

The Association of Ukrainian Canadians, AUUC, the pro-Moscow Communist organization of Ukrainians in Canada has consistently been at odds with the vast majority of Ukrainians in Canada. On June 4, 1940, membership in the Ukrainian Labour-Farmer Temple Association, the predecessor of this organization, was declared illegal by the Canadian government, its leaders arrested and assets of the members of the organization were confiscated.³⁵ After the invasion of the Soviet Union by Nazi Germany on June 22, 1941, the organization came to support the allied war effort and was later decriminalized. It has consistently rejected the idea of an independent Ukrainian state other than the 'sovereign' Ukrainian S.S.R.. In the late 1960's, amid continuing samizdat reports from Ukraine of arrests of Ukrainian intellectuals and of a policy of Russification aimed at destroying the Ukrainian language and culture, the AUUC persuaded the Communist Party of Canada to send a delegation in 1967 to examine the validity of these reports. After spending 22 days in

34. Kubijovyc, ed., Entsyklopediia Ukrainoznavstva, Vol. 8, p. 2992; Vol. 9, p. 3409; and Vol. 5, p. 1643.

35. Volodymyr Kubijovyc, ed., Encyclopedia of Ukraine, Vol. 1 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), p. 352. For a more detailed account, see Jars Balan, Salt and Braided Bread: Ukrainian Life in Canada (Toronto: University of Oxford Press, 1984), pp. 54-56.

Kiev and Moscow talking to various high Party and government officials, the delegation confirmed the existence of a policy of russification in Ukraine in their report. The report which was written in language meant to be as conciliatory as possible was condemned vehemently by the Soviet Communist Party which demanded that the report be rejected. At a 1969 Central Committee plenum of the CPC, the report was quietly overruled and dropped.³⁶ The incident led to a further outflow of Ukrainians from the AUUC, which already was far weaker than it had been at the height of its popularity in 1945 to 1951.³⁷ Today, the organization serves as an important base for Soviet propaganda and counter-propaganda activities and basically follows the official Soviet line on the dissident question. The AUUC controls the Worker's Benevolent Association, a fraternal assurance association set up in 1922.³⁸ It also maintains strong ties to the Communist Party of Canada. The principal press organs of the AUUC presently are the English language journal the Ukrainian Canadian, and the Ukrainian language newspaper Zhyttia i slovo.³⁹

As mentioned earlier, the waves of immigration into the United States and the political profile of Ukrainians residing there closely parallel those of Ukrainians living in Canada.

36. Balan, p. 56.

37. Michael H. Marunchak, p. 819. For a more detailed examination of this crisis for the AUUC and the Canadian Communist Party, see John Kolasky, The Shattered Illusion: The History of Ukrainian Pro-Communist Organizations in Canada (Toronto: Peter Martin Associates, 1979), pp. 155-176. See also below, pp. 56-58.

38. Ibid., p. 4.

39. Kubijovyc ed., Encyclopedia of Ukraine, p. 353. Zhyttia i slovo translated means Life and the Word.

Similarly, the concern for and knowledge of their former homeland is strongest among those of the most recent immigration wave. As in Canada, the highly motivated Ukrainians of the third wave and their organizations came to dominate the national Ukrainian American umbrella organization, the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (Ukrainskii Kongresovii Komitet Ameryky) (UCCA), which was founded on May 24, 1940.⁴⁰ Again most of the same actors were involved in the U.S. as in Canada, though the numbers of individuals and consequently, the strengths of the organizations were greater. In October, 1980, OUN-B, which earlier had taken over the Ukrainian National Aid Association, a Ukrainian fraternal assurance association, seized control of UCCA prompting a general walkout of the non-OUN-B members. The groups who left eventually formed a new competing umbrella organization for Ukrainian Americans called the Committee for Law and Order in UCCA.

In the United States, as in Canada and other Western countries, the OUN-B far right of the Ukrainian spectrum is formally united under the Ukrainian Liberation Front. The Front is composed of the Organization of the Defense of the Four Freedoms of Ukraine (Orhanizatsiia Oborony Chotyriokh Svobid Ukrainy (OOChSU), and its various offshoots. OUN-B's main press organ in the United States is the Visnyk OOChSU (The Herald of the Organization of the Defense of the Four Freedoms of Ukraine). The youth wing of the OUN-B grouping is divided into two complementary, highly politicized organizations; SUM-A, the Union-

40. V. Markus, "Ukrainians Abroad: In the United States", in Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia, Vol. 2, pp. 1126-1127.

of Ukrainian Youth-America (Spilka Ukrainskoi Molodi Ameryky) - the sister organization of SUM in Canada, and TUSM, the M. Mikhnovsky Ukrainian Student Association, the organization for university students of nationalist political persuasion.

In contrast to the single formal hierarchical structure of OUN-B in North America, OUN-M maintains its influence in Ukrainian political life much more by way of two routes. First, OUN-M maintains an umbrella organization, Ideologically Related Nationalist Organizations (Ideolohichno Sporidneni Natsionalistychni Orhanizatsii) (ISNO), through which its subordinate organizations such as the Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine (Orhanizatsia Derzhavnoho Vidrodzhennia Ukrainy) (ODVU) formed in the inter-war period and a well of support for OUN-M when the organization first arrived in North America, the Ukrainian Gold Cross (Ukrainskyi Zoloty Khrest), UNYF, and Zarevo are coordinated. Operationally, ISNO is similar to its rival, the Organizations of the Ukrainian Liberation Front. Complementary to this first route of influence is the power derived by the organization through the presence of many OUN-M sympathizers within many other Ukrainian political and social organizations. ODVU is seeking to perpetuate its philosophy and organizations in the U.S. through UNYF, the Ukrainian National Youth Federation (Molod Ukrainskoi Natsionalnosta) (MUN), its youth organization for the United States.⁴¹

The membership of the OUN groupings, the strongest

41. Kubiiovyc ed., Entsyklopediia Ukrainoznavstva, Vol. 5, p. 1643.

factions within the third wave of Ukrainian emigration to North America, is composed primarily of Western Ukrainians from Galicia, Volyn, Bukovyna, and Trans-Carpathia. Central and Eastern Ukrainians, a group with far greater exposure to Soviet theory and practice and far less understanding of pre-war Western Ukrainian integral nationalism and its successive modifications, have not felt comfortable within the various OUN organizations and therefore, have created their own organizations in the United States. The principal such organization is the Association of Ukrainians of Revolutionary-Democratic Convictions (Orhanizatsiia Ukrainsiv Revoliutsino-Demokratychnych Perekonan) (OURDP) founded in 1950.⁴² This group is ideologically associated with the Ukrainian Revolutionary Democratic Party and firmly stands behind the government of the Ukrainian National Republic in exile. Its youth are united in ODUM, the Association of American Youth of Ukrainian Descent (Orhanizatsiia Demokratychnoi Ukrainskoi Molodi), referred to above.

The Ukrainian far left in the United States peaked in popularity during the Second World War and has since fallen to its very weak position today. It is represented by the pro-Soviet organization, the League of American Ukrainians, which does not cooperate in activities with the other Ukrainian American organizations and is not a member of Ukrainian Congress Committee of America.⁴³ Its political philosophy is fundamentally hostile

42. Ibid., p. 1801. The English translation being the Association of Ukrainians of Revolutionary-Democratic Convictions.

43. V. Markus, "Ukrainians Abroad: In the United States", p. 1126.

to the concept of Ukrainian independence other than the 'sovereign' Ukrainian S.S.R. and follows the Soviet government's critical stand toward political dissidence in the U.S.S.R..

As in Canada, there is a multitude of Ukrainian organizations and actors who have had some connection to the dissident question in the last two decades. Among the most important of these groups in the United States have been the Ukrainian Churches. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of America under Archbishop Mstyslav probably offered the most vocal support to human rights campaign mounted by the Ukrainian diaspora in the early 1970's. The Ukrainian Catholic Church in America was also quite supportive of dissidents within Ukraine, as was its hierarchy. After the election of Pope John Paul II, Vatican support for the Ukrainian Catholic church's concerns improved markedly. Finally, there has been significant involvement by the Ukrainian Evangelical Alliance of America in the dissident question.

Until recently, Ukrainian university students in the United States were organized under the umbrella Federation of Ukrainian Students Organizations in America (SUSTA) founded in 1953.⁴⁴ However, the factionalism evident among the third wave organizations has penetrated down to the student level, and as a result SUSTA has become inactive. Ukrainian American university students may belong to any one of four student organizations, if they are represented in their locale.⁴⁵ Student clubs at various

44. Ibid., p. 1129.

45. Ibid.

universities present the first possibility. These groups are in principle unaligned with any political faction. TUSM, the M. Mikhnovsky Ukrainian Students Association, functions as the student organization for students of OUN-B political persuasion, while the Zarevo Association of Ukrainian Academic Societies is composed of sympathizers of OUN-M. Finally, the Ukrainian Catholic church supports the Obnova Society of Ukrainian Catholic Students. These organizations would play a significant role in the early mobilization of support for imprisoned Ukrainian intellectuals.

Finally, it is necessary to mention the powerful Ukrainian cooperative and fraternal associations in the United States. The largest of these organizations, the Ukrainian National Association, operates both within Canada and the United States, and provided important financial and community backing to the campaign that was to develop in support of Ukrainian dissent. As well, the Ukrainian National Association publishes daily Svoboda (Freedom) and the Ukrainian Weekly, papers of record for the Ukrainian community.

The structure of the Ukrainian community in North America is to a great extent simply a larger version of that community structure which could be found among the Ukrainian diaspora wherever it has congregated. Thus, though names of organizations may vary from country to country, the political beliefs and divisions within those communities will largely parallel those found on this continent. Therefore, this thesis will not outline the structures of those communities or their principal actors, but rather, where in the course of the discussion they are

mentioned their characteristics and importance will be briefly summarized in a footnote.

On the supra-national level, emigre Ukrainians succeeded in creating an international umbrella organization, the World Congress of Free Ukrainians (WCFU) or Svitovyi Kongres Vilnykh Ukraintsiv (SKVU) in November, 1967.⁴⁶ The WCFU has representation from most, if not all, major emigre Ukrainian political and civic organizations except from Ukrainian communist and pro-Soviet organizations. The World Congress of Free Ukrainians is organized as a central congress which meets every five years with a permanent presidium and secretariat with six commissions.⁴⁷ The most active of them, the WCFU Human Rights Commission was established in 1967 under the leadership of Senator Paul Yuzyk and Khrystyna Isaiv. It quickly brought the WCFU into the centre of an escalating effort by emigre Ukrainians to affect Soviet domestic policy vis-a-vis dissenters. The emigre Ukrainian human rights campaign, its manifestations, effectiveness, and consequences; the influences upon it; and the role of the WCFU and other Ukrainian emigre organizations are the focus of the following chapter.

46. The First World Congress of Free Ukrainians was held from November 12-19, 1967 in New York. The first WCFU president was Monsignor Basil Kushnir who was also president of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee at the time.

47. The six permanent commissions of the secretariat of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians are: the World Coordinating Educational Council; the Executive Board of the World Social Services Council; the World Coordinating Council of Women's Organizations; the Cultural Affairs Committee; the World Youth Conference; and the Human Rights Commission. Svoboda, February 5, 1972, Section 2, p. 1.

Chapter Three

The Development of the Ukrainian Human Rights Campaign

The First Years:

In the early and middle 1960's, the focus of emigre Ukrainian communities was divided between two equally important concerns. The first concern centered on the communities they had built in the diaspora, on both their development and on the factional struggles for power within them. The second focus of emigre Ukrainians concerns was the liberation of Ukraine and its establishment as an independent state. This goal was envisioned almost exclusively as only possible through means of armed struggle, the possibility of a gradual liberalization of the Soviet Union generally being dismissed as unrealistic. The concerns were, in fact, a reflection of the Ukrainian diaspora's powerlessness at the time vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Unable to see any political benefits for them arising from Western diplomatic interaction with the Soviet Union, they glorified the not too distant past where the military actions of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army had offered them a chance, however unlikely, at statehood. OUN-B and OUN-Z engaged in inter-factional conflict, and each strove to link themselves to and disassociate other factions from the powerful legitimizing symbol of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. As a result the active Ukrainian community turned inwards upon itself for the most part building and alternatively bickering, a result not atypical for a dissatisfied and largely powerless exile group. The firm anti-Soviet views held by almost

all members of the third wave of emigration insured that the most active Ukrainians in North America tended to support the most conservative positions in relation to the U.S.S.R. espoused by Canadian and American political parties, thus often placing their support behind political groupings within the Conservative Party in Canada, and the Republican Party in the United States whose influence in the politics of the state was minor, further increasing the sense of powerlessness in the Ukrainian diaspora.

Within the U.S.S.R., Khrushchev's de-Stalinization measures relaxed controls over Ukrainian cultural activities in the late 1950's and the early 1960's which in turn stimulated stronger national consciousness among the Ukrainian population. The dangers this posed were perceived fairly quickly by Soviet authorities but countermeasures were slow to appear. Officially, the Soviet government claimed that the nationality problem had been solved, but behind the facade it resumed a russification campaign in the Ukrainian S.S.R. under the guise of educational reform. Accompanying this policy, there remained the policy of suppressing groups advocating nationalist positions. However, the combined effects of heavy censorship, travel restrictions and the absence of Western journalists in Ukraine, severely retarded the flow of information from Ukraine. Therefore, to most observers, Ukraine appeared to have settled into a docile, subdued state.

Emigre Ukrainians, though possessing somewhat better information than Western news agencies, were grudgingly aware of the somber realities in Ukraine. Though occasionally encouraged

by reports of another nationalist organization being found, the emigre communities were cognizant that the real opportunity for independence had passed at least momentarily. Therefore, Ukrainian emigre political action in regard to the U.S.S.R. focused on the Soviet denial of national sovereignty, the continued imprisonment after 1956 of many former UPA soldiers, OUN members and sympathizers, Soviet obstacles to the reunification of families, the persecution of the Ukrainian national churches, and beginning in the early 1960's, the Russification of Ukraine. Particular importance was laid on the successful lobbying effort led by UCCA President Prof. Lev Dobrianskyi to have Captive Nations Week enacted in the United States. The range of tactics employed by the emigre community was diverse and included both passive symbolic forms, such as marking memorial days and religious services, and more aggressive tactics, such as active lobbying efforts by the U.C.C., U.C.C.A. and other organizations, and political demonstrations. In February 1963, after interventions from Pope John XXIII and the President of the United States, John F. Kennedy, Soviet authorities unexpectedly released Metropolitan Josyf Slipyj, head of the Ukrainian Catholic Church after nearly 18 years of imprisonment and exile and allowed him to proceed to Rome. Slipyj's release invigorated the emigre community and helped stimulate the belief that non-violent pressure could at times be effective in dealing with the Soviet Union. However, at this time there was not yet any significant human rights activity being

1. Svoboda, 2 January, 1964, p. 2.

mounted by Ukrainian emigre groups. Indeed, the terms dissident and human rights still had not been popularized.

The emergence of concern about Soviet human rights violations among emigre Ukrainians arose early in 1966 following reports from Ukraine of the arrest of approximately 100 Ukrainian intellectuals late in 1965.² Ukrainian dissenters, not having access to the Western journalists present in Moscow, channelled their information through official Ukrainian organizations in Poland and Czechoslovakia, and through Ukrainian Communists in Canada and the United States.³ This information, in particular, news of the arrest of Ivan Svitlychnyi provided emigre Ukrainians with the necessary stimulus to begin their first efforts at human rights campaigning.⁴ The sentencing of Svitlychnyi following a closed trial however, was the decisive event which convinced Ukrainian emigres that they must respond to the Soviet action. The feeling was widespread, and encompassed the entire spectrum of the Ukrainian community including even the Ukrainian Communists who eventually forced the Communist Party of Canada to send a delegation to investigate the events in Ukraine. Homin Ukrainy, the OUN-B organ, reacting to the arrests wrote:

There is a new wave of terror in Ukraine, that is being carried out by the present clique of moscovite chauvinists and its servants, and which demands from the emigration not pity and sighs but decisive action. When in the fatherland a

2. Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, "Political Dissent in the Soviet Union," Studies in Comparative Communism Vol. 3 No. 2 (April 1970): p. 85.

3. Ibid.

4. The new arrests in Ukraine were first mentioned in Novyi Shliakh on February 5, 1966. Homin Ukrainy carried news of the arrests on February 12.

battle is in progress the large Ukrainian community in countries of the free world must fulfill its tasks and duties.⁵

Ukrainian central organizations also reacted strongly to the arrests. At its executive meeting on April 22, 1966, the U.C.C. condemned the new arrests and declared that it would contact governments about the matter, and seek to inform public opinion. It also called for "public protest actions" by the Ukrainian community in Canada.⁶ On the same day, the U.C.C.A. condemned the persecution as "the most pronounced trampling of the rights of the Ukrainian nation, and civilization", and promised to take action.⁷

Ukrainian communities in both the United States and Canada responded to the calls of their central organizations. In Ottawa, 4,000 protestors gathered on Parliament Hill to hear the Canadian Minister of External Affairs Mitchell Sharp speak about the arrests, and later march to the Soviet embassy.⁸ The first Ukrainian human rights demonstration in the United States was organized jointly by SUSTA and SUMA and held on June 11, 1966 in front of the United Nations in New York.⁹ The various protest actions surprisingly produced some positive results. Ivan Svitlychnyi was released, and Soviet authorities denied charges that either Svitlychnyi or Ivan Dzyuba, a leading writer and

5. Homin Ukrainy, April 16, 1966, p. 1.

6. Ibid., April 30, 1966, pp. 1, 8.

7. Ibid., May 14, 1966, pp. 1, 8.

8. Ibid., June 4, 1966, p. 1.

9. Ibid., June 25, 1966, p. 1.

literary critic, had been arrested. However, sixteen lesser known individuals were convicted and sentenced to camp terms.¹⁰ However, the lack of information about events in Ukraine soon led to a decrease in protest activity by the Ukrainian community.¹¹ Emigre Ukrainians had acquired a greater awareness of the persecution of intellectuals in Ukraine, but as yet had not been so moved as to create a long running human rights campaign.

A unique attempt at Ukrainian lobbying during this time was the trip of a mixed AUUC and CPC delegation to Ukraine referred to in Chapter Two. Russification in Ukraine, long a principal complaint of non-Communist Ukrainians, and an issue which had troubled various individuals in the AUUC during the 1950's, became a serious problem for the organization following the Twenty-Second CPSU Congress in October, 1961. The Congress had proclaimed a new program which foresaw the nations of the U.S.S.R. steadily drawing closer together until complete unity was achieved. Some members of the AUUC soon concluded that unless the language question was satisfactorily addressed, the AUUC would have no future.¹² The problem was highlighted at the Twelfth AUUC Convention in Winnipeg on March 21, 1966 by Nicholas

10. Bociurkiw, p. 85.

11. Some effort continued to be made on behalf of those arrested in August, 1965 in Ukraine. For example, contact was made with the International League for the Defence of the Rights of Man, and that organization did issue an appeal on December 14, 1966 for the release of those arrested. See Homin Ukrainy, January 14, 1967, p. 1.

12. John Kolasky, The Shattered Illusion: The History of Ukrainian Pro-Communist Organizations in Canada (Toronto: Peter Martin Associates, 1979), p. 163.

Oleniuk, a delegate to the Convention.¹³ Oleniuk had been studying in Kiev before his arrest and was expelled for involvement with opponents of Russification in Ukraine. Oleniuk's denunciations of russification in Ukraine and calls for AUUC action heightened concerns among AUUC members. Faced with a festering problem and their own concerns, AUUC leaders requested, and after prolonged negotiations with the CPSU and the national executive committee of the CPC, received permission for a delegation to travel to Ukraine "on a mission of inquiry and discussion concerning the policy and experience of the Communist Party and the Government of Ukraine in dealing with the national question."¹⁴ The delegation left for Ukraine on March 30, 1967, and spent twenty-two days visiting various enterprises and interviewing various officials.¹⁵ The delegation not only concerned itself with Russification in Ukraine, but also raised the question of recent arrests of intellectuals in Ukraine. On their return from Ukraine, a serious dispute erupted between members of delegation as to wording of their report. Eventually a compromise report was issued which was highly critical of Soviet nationality policy in Ukraine and the denunciations of writers as 'enemies of the people'. However, the report avoided blaming the government in Moscow for the problems and gave the impression

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid., p. 164.

15. The delegation was composed of Tim Buck, the national CPC leader; William Ross, the party leader in Manitoba; Anthony Bilecki, president of the WBA, George Solomon, secretary of the AUUC in Alberta; William Harasym, the national president of the AUUC; and Peter Krawchuk, editor of Zhyttia i slovo. See Ibid.

that the solutions lay at the republic level and were being pursued.¹⁶

The delegation's report had been intended to diffuse the situation within the AUUC, blunt nationalist charges, and lobby the CPSU for change. However, soon after its publication, the delegation's report was challenged by a book entitled Education in Soviet Ukraine: A Study in Discrimination and Russification.¹⁷ The book written by John Kolasky, a disillusioned CPC member, undid the report's work, and renewed concerns among AUUC members. Although Kolasky was expelled from the Party, AUUC leaders refused to withdraw the report as both Soviet Party authorities and a majority of CPC executive members demanded. After various attempts to have the report voluntarily withdrawn, the report was withdrawn at a CPC Central Committee plenum held on October 4-6, 1969, despite the protests of the majority of the delegation's members.¹⁸

Emigre Ukrainian anti-Soviet protests and demonstrations in the year following the short upswelling of concern over human rights largely returned to concentrate on their traditional interest, the colonial status of Ukraine. The fates of individuals arrested during August and September of 1965 would have gone mostly unnoticed in the West but for Lykho z rozumu (The Misfortune of Intellect - Portrait of Twenty 'Criminals'), a book by the Soviet Ukrainian journalist Vyacheslav Chornovil

16. Ibid., pp. 166-167.

17. John Kolasky, Education in Soviet Ukraine: A Study in Discrimination and Russification (Toronto: Peter Martin Associates, 1968).

18. Kolasky, The Shattered Illusion: The History Ukrainian Pro-Communist Organizations in Canada, p. 171.

detailing the 'crimes' and fates of the 20 'criminals'. Chornovil's book was smuggled abroad and first published in Ukrainian by OUN-M in 1967.¹⁹ Lykho z rozumu and another document by Chornovil, his lengthy declaration to the authorities Ia nichoho u vas ne proshu (I am not Asking You for Anything) were subsequently published in English and French, and instantly brought the issue of Ukrainian dissent before a greatly increased audience; an audience with a growing interest in the phenomena of dissent within the Soviet Union.²⁰ The Chornovil Papers, as the book was titled in English, sparked a major effort by Ukrainian scholars and community leaders to make the defence of Ukrainian political prisoners an issue of prime importance.²¹ However, the level of awareness and concern in the Ukrainian diaspora at this time did not yet favor the emergence of a general campaign in the West for the support of Ukrainian and other Soviet dissidents.

The First World Congress of Free Ukrainians was held in New York from November 12 to 19, 1967. Although the status of Ukraine continued to dominate many of the discussions, and OUN-B delegates were reluctant to consider the subject, the issue of the abuse of human rights in Ukraine was considered because of pressure by OUN-M and OUN-Z supporters at the Congress. In addition, to a paper given on the subject, and a resolution

19. Vyacheslav Chornovil, comp. Lykho z rozumu - portety vadvadtsiaty "zlochyntsyv" (Paris: P.I.U.F., 1967).

20. Vyacheslav Chornovil, Ia nichoho u vas ne proshu: lyst V. Chornovola do sekretaria TsK KPU P. Iu. Shelesta. (Toronto: New Pathway Publishers, 1968).

21. Vyacheslav Chornovil, The Chornovil Papers (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1968).

condemning the persecution of intellectuals in Ukraine, Congress delegates took part in a mass demonstration on November 18, 1967 for the liberation of Ukraine, in which concern over human rights was also expressed.²²

The first manifestations of the renewed concern surfaced on March 9, 1968, when approximately 750 to 800 persons heeded a call by the Ukrainian Liberation Front to protest "against illegal Muscovite-Bolshevik trials of Ukrainian intellectuals in colonial Ukraine".²³ The demonstrators carried signs and handed out some 10,000 pamphlets dealing with the persecution of Chornovil, Svitlychnyi, Zalyvakha and others. The Presidium of the WCFU reacting to the renewed interest sought to strengthen what it saw as a favorable development and declared April 28 to be a day of solidarity with imprisoned Ukrainian intellectuals. The Presidium also launched a general appeal to the Ukrainian organizations calling on them to support the dissenters:

Using appropriate paths and demonstrations by the Ukrainian community, and issuing well-timed telegrams to the governments of their countries, the U.N., and the Conference on the Defence of Human Rights in Teheran with a reminder of the trampling of human rights in Ukraine and an appeal to use appropriate means to halt the illegalities.²⁴

The result was an increase in concern and action on the part of Ukrainian organizations but at levels far lower than would later

22. Svoboda, November 14, 1967, p. 1.

23. Homin Ukrainy, March 23, 1968, p. 1.

24. Ibid., April 13, 1968, p. 1.

be the norm in the Ukrainian community.²⁵ Once again, traditional concerns slowly came to reassert their dominance over the concerns of human rights.

The Community Becomes Involved

Significant Ukrainian human rights activity only began appearing again in late 1970. By October 1970, the samvydav writings of Valentyn Moroz and news of his closed trial had reached the West prompting articles in his defence in the Ukrainian press.²⁶ In addition, John Kolasky's book Two Years in Soviet Ukraine had appeared and added valuable information on the opposition among the Ukrainian cultural intelligentsia.²⁷ Ukrainian student groups, taking a cue from their turbulent era, began taking the lead in the emerging human rights defense campaign by organizing protest marches and demonstrations. On October 24, 1970, Ukrainian students at the University of Manitoba held the first demonstration in support of Valentyn Moroz in front of the U.N. Association's offices in Winnipeg.²⁸ However, it was news of the severe sentence imposed on Moroz which really made human rights a dominant concern of emigre

25. For example, the UCC responded to the WCFU call by lobbying the U.N.. See Homin Ukrainy, May 11, 1968, p. 1. Ukrainian American youth organizations responded by staging a joint demonstration in defence of Yuriy Shukhevich on April 28, 1968. See Homin Ukrainy, June 1, 1968, p. 1.

26. Homin Ukrainy, November 4, 1970, p. 1.

27. John Kolasky, Two Years in Soviet Ukraine: A Canadian's personal account of Russian oppression and the growing opposition (Toronto: Peter Martin Associates, 1970).

28. Homin Ukrainy, November 18, 1970, pp. 1, 4.

Ukrainians.

In January 1971, emigre Ukrainians learned that Valentyn Moroz had been sentenced to a total of fourteen years imprisonment and exile. The impact of the harshness of the sentence given was enormous. Non-communist organizations across the Ukrainian political spectrum unanimously condemned the trial and sentence. CeSUS, the Central Union of Ukrainian Students, issued an appeal to all students to participate in ten days of continuous demonstrations from January 21 to 31, 1971 to call attention to Moroz's sentence.²⁹ Responding to the CeSUS appeal, more than 1,000 persons, 90% of them students rioted in front of the Soviet embassy in Ottawa throwing eggs, rocks, paint and firecrackers at police and at the embassy building itself breaking numerous windows.³⁰ The violent demonstration encouraged action on the political front. On February 3, 1971, Steve Paproski, M.P., asked the Prime Minister whether he would raise the issue of the imprisonment of Valentyn Moroz and Sviatoslav Karavanskyi during his then imminent meeting with Soviet leaders. Trudeau's reply was evasive.³¹

SUSK, the Ukrainian Canadian Students Union, in addition to organizing the demonstration at the Soviet embassy, launched a general human rights campaign. The organization began the printing and distribution of numerous pamphlets, posters, stickers and petitions in support of imprisoned Ukrainian intellectuals.

29. Ibid., January 30, 1971, p. 1.

30. Ibid., February 6, 1971, p. 1.

31. Ibid.

On January 30, 1971, the organization created the first emigre Ukrainian human rights organization and named it the Student Commission for the Release of Moroz.³²

As the date of the Canadian Prime Minister's trip to the Soviet Union approached, pressure was being increased by the Ukrainian community for a meaningful intervention by Trudeau. On April 22, 1971, SUSK issued a call for nation-wide demonstrations on May 9, 1971:

The students propose that the action in defense of Valentyn Moroz which they have until now led, should become a general community wide action, that the entire Ukrainian community become actively involved in it.... No one should dare to be missing from the front of struggle for the right of the Ukrainian nation in the fatherland, for the release of V. Moroz and all Ukrainian political prisoners.³³

In response to the call, more than 5,000 Ukrainians demonstrated in Toronto. In a separate action, more than 1,500 protestors demonstrated in New York.³⁴

Despite the intense lobbying by the Ukrainian Canadian community activists at this time, Prime Minister Trudeau did not raise the issue of Ukrainian political prisoners in his meetings with Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgornyi. His reasons for not doing so were published in a newspaper interview. In response to a reporter's query, Trudeau replied:

My position in the Soviet Union or in Canada is that anyone who breaks the law to assert his nationalism doesn't get too much sympathy with me.

I didn't particularly feel like bringing up any cases which would have caused Mr. Brezhnev or Kosygin to say, 'Well, you know, why did you put in jail certain FLQ leaders?

32. Ibid., February 20, 1971, p. 1.

33. Ibid., May 1, 1971, p. 1.

34. Ibid., May 15, 1971, p. 1.

After all, they think they are only fighting for the independence of the Ukraine. Why should you put your revolutionaries in jail and we shouldn't put ours?'³⁵

The reaction of the Ukrainian community to the Prime Minister's comparison of imprisoned Ukrainian intellectuals with members of the FLQ was one of extreme anger. Numerous organizations protested to the Prime Minister. Homin Ukrainy printed a protest letter to be cut out and signed by its readers which called Trudeau's position "irresponsible and anti-Canadian".³⁶ The pressure became such that by June 7 Trudeau was persuaded to meet with a delegation from the Ukrainian Canadian Committee in a conciliation attempt.

The frustration and anger in the Ukrainian community created by Pierre Trudeau upon his return from Moscow found expression during the state visit of Soviet Foreign Minister Alexei Kosygin to Canada from October 18 to 30, 1971. The turbulent stay of Kosygin and the level of emotion it aroused was foreshadowed a week before his arrival, when Prime Minister Trudeau while in Winnipeg for the Tenth U.C.C. Congress was pressured by events to meet with a delegation from the Set-Them-Free Committee, a group of students who had been on a hunger strike in front of the provincial legislature over the Soviet treatment of political prisoners in Ukraine. The students were able to extract a promise from Trudeau to intervene on a humanitarian basis and pass on the students' representations to Kosygin during his visit. During his stay in Canada, Kosygin was

35. Globe and Mail, June 1, 1971, p. 3.

36. Ibid., June 12, 1971, p. 1.

constantly plagued by demonstrators addressing the whole ambit of Ukrainian concerns wherever he went. This state of affairs prompted complaints from Kosygin to Trudeau, however, the Prime Minister recognizing the constitutional traditions of free speech in Canada refused to take action against the demonstrators. The incident is noteworthy since it can be seen as indicating to some degree the Prime Minister's growing awareness of the strength of the Ukrainian lobby in Canada after his faux pas in June. Instead of treating the matter in confidence between the two men, a method by which the potential for harm to Soviet-Canadian relations would have been minimized, Trudeau used a state dinner held in Kosygin's honour to point out that the demonstrators' right to protest was a factor which underlay Canada's strength as a free country.³⁷ The assault on the Soviet foreign Minister continued even in Parliament when answering questions at a special joint session of the Senate national defence and external affairs committees. Kosygin's response to a question on the persecution of Ukrainian writers by Senator Paul Yuzyk was met with laughter.³⁸ Nevertheless, Soviet-Canadian relations did not appear to suffer, and growing mutuality of interests led to the signing of the General Exchanges Agreement during the visit which established a Mixed Commission to facilitate scientific, technical, cultural, academic and sports exchanges.³⁹

Autumn, 1971 was also significant for a number of other

37. Svoboda, October 23, 1971, Section 2, p. 2.

38. Ibid., November 9, 1971, Section 2, p. 1.

39. Aloysius Balawyder, ed., Canadian-Soviet Relations, 1939-1980 (Oakville: Mosaic Press, 1981), p. 217.

developments. The first was Cardinal Josyf Slipyj's speech before the World Synod of Bishops on October 23, 1971. With visible emotion after years of restraint, the head of the Ukrainian Catholic Church publicly attacked the Soviet Union for its persecution of approximately four and a half million Ukrainian Catholics and the Vatican for impeding him from speaking out more strongly in the past for "diplomatic reasons".⁴⁰ While not speaking specifically of dissidents, the Cardinal's speech drew worldwide attention to the restriction of liberties within Soviet Ukraine. On the same day, climaxing a year of growing agitation, a well coordinated demonstration in New York by the organizations of the Ukrainian Liberation Front, CeSUS, and the Captive Nations Committee brought out 1,500 protesters, mostly young people, demanding an end to the persecution of Valentyn Moroz and other Ukrainian intellectuals.⁴¹ Finally, the 13th Congress of the Federation of Ukrainian Student Organizations of America (SUSTA) following serious conflicts between the TUSM clubs and the Hromadas (SUSTA clubs) was able to select a new executive and agree on a number of resolutions including an appeal by the Society in Aid of Soviet Jewry for help in a planned worldwide demonstration and one day hunger strike in protest of Soviet persecution of all prisoners within the U.S.S.R.. This agreement was an important first step in inter-

40. Svoboda, October 30, 1971, Section 2, p. 1.

41. CeSUS is the Central Union of Ukrainian Youth Students, a component of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America. It is composed of Plast, SUMA, ODUM, SUSTA, Zarevo, TUSM, and SUAST. Ibid.

community cooperation on matters of Soviet human rights violations.⁴²

The timely coincidence of a renewed Soviet offensive of repression and emigre Ukrainian tactical planning in winter 1971-72 served to weld what was theretofore various individual Ukrainian protests into a single, more persistent, active, and effective general protest campaign. In January, 1972, following the KGB arrest of the OUN-B emissary, Iaroslav Dobosh, the circumstances of which were discussed in Chapter 1, the Soviet government opened a determined drive to destroy the dissident movement in Ukraine. On January 12, the KGB arrested Vyacheslav Chornovil and six other individuals in Lviv, and Ivan Svitlychnyi and three others in Kiev.⁴³

The years of activity by Ukrainian scholars and others publicizing the violation of human rights in Ukraine with articles in leading scholarly journals, and conferences on dissent such as the McMaster Conference on Dissent in the Soviet Union, had by 1972 created a sizable group of non-Ukrainian scholars who were sympathetic to the plight of intellectuals in Soviet Ukraine.⁴⁴

The arrests grabbed the attention of the Ukrainian emigre community for two reasons. Firstly, the intensity of the new repressions in themselves posed a challenge for the emigres.

42. Ibid., November 26, 1971, Section 2, pp. 1, 3.

43. Ibid., January 15, 1972, p. 1.

44. See Peter J. Potichnyj, ed., McMaster Conference on Dissent in the Soviet Union (Hamilton: McMaster University, 1972).

Secondly, the dissidents then under fire, especially Vyacheslav Chornovil, had been associated by the Ukrainian press with Moroz, and thereby his position on national rights, who by now was becoming a symbol for Ukrainians.⁴⁵ Thus, it would not have been unexpected by the Soviet government that the arrests would prompt a strong response from the Ukrainian diaspora. However, it is probable that the arrests actually provoked events unforeseen in their intensity and duration. The catalyst for the events then unfolding within the Ukrainian community was the TUSM organization in the United States.

Shortly before December 20, 1971, the TUSM executive, probably encouraged by the growing level of popular support for Moroz and other dissenters, decided to take a leading role in supporting dissident Ukrainian intellectuals. On that date, TUSM executives informed Svoboda of plans for a series of demonstrations and protest activities across North America to highlight the persecution of Ukrainian intellectuals for the week of January 22 to January 29, 1972.⁴⁶ The dates marking the beginning and end of the week are in themselves symbolic, being Ukrainian independence day and the day commemorating the Battle of Kruty.⁴⁷ It would seem that the TUSM executive had hoped to

45. Moroz had become the most important dissenter for most Ukrainian emigres because of his militant defense of the traditional values of a Ukrainian state, with its own unique language and culture. For the buildup of Moroz and the linkage of Chornovil and others to him see Svoboda, January 8, 1972, p. 1; January 12, 1972, p. 1; January 15, 1972, p. 1.

46. Ibid., December 29, 1971, p. 1.

47. The Battle of Kruty occurred on the night of January 29, 1918 when Ukrainian units including an untrained auxiliary student

swell the number of demonstrators by choosing these significant dates. A side effect of this, perhaps unintentional, was to strengthen a growing linkage in the eyes of many emigre Ukrainians between the protesting intellectuals in Ukraine and their traditional heroes, men who had fought for Ukrainian independence. In fact, it appears that the Ukrainian political organizations had begun to appreciate the powerful symbols the dissidents represented by this time and had begun to compete among themselves as to who could properly claim a bond between themselves and the dissenters.⁴⁸ The TUSM executive formally issued its appeal on January 15, 1972 to "all youth and student groups and the entire Ukrainian community":

to take part in the demonstrations intended as a protest against the killing of Alla Horsky (sic) and Mykhailo Soroka, against the incarceration of Archbishop Vasyl Velychkowskyi, writers-revolutionaries Valentyn Moroz, Sviatoslav Karavanskyi, and many others".⁴⁹

47. (continued) battalion and an officer candidate battalion were annihilated while attempting to prevent a Bolshevik drive on Kiev. The bravery of students who were killed in the fighting turned the battle into a symbol of the youth struggle for an independent Ukraine.

48. For examples of this growing phenomenon, see Svoboda, January 15, 1972, Section 2, p. 4 where Plast prominently displays a photograph of Mykhailo Soroka, a dissenter who had then recently perished, in a Plast uniform; Svoboda, February 5, 1972, Section 2, p. 4 where MUN in a resolution from its national congress warns against tying the new forms of struggle in Ukraine to the any of the emigration political factions but on the same page claims the youth of Ukraine, specifically Moroz, Plakhotniuk, Kulchynskyi and Karavanskyi, are speaking to them "with the eternal fire of faith" and calls on its followers to maintain that faith; and Svoboda, February 11, 1972, Section 2, p. 4 where SUMA claims Valentyn Moroz as a brother and ties him in with the liberation struggles of SUMA and TUSM.

49. Ibid., January 15, 1972, Section 2, p. 1.

swell the number of demonstrators by choosing these significant dates. A side effect of this, perhaps unintentional, was to strengthen a growing linkage in the eyes of many emigre Ukrainians between the protesting intellectuals in Ukraine and their traditional heroes, men who had fought for Ukrainian independence. In fact, it appears that the Ukrainian political organizations had begun to appreciate the powerful symbols the dissidents represented by this time and had begun to compete among themselves as to who could properly claim a bond between themselves and the dissenters.⁴⁸ The TUSM executive formally issued its appeal on January 15, 1972 to "all youth and student groups and the entire Ukrainian community":

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49. Ibid., January 15, 1972, Section 2, p. 1.

The rapidly escalating number of arrests in Soviet Ukraine, promptly reported by the emigre Ukrainian press, as well as the fame of those arrested, invigorated the support for the TUSM organized demonstrations as well as other ongoing projects, and provoked responses from Ukrainian communities worldwide.⁵⁰

On January 18, 1972, the presidium of the WCFU held an extraordinary session on the arrests in Ukraine, where it was decided to call on all Ukrainian representative bodies and national organizations in all countries of Ukrainian settlement to "begin immediately representations before their governments in defense of the arrested". The presidium also called on all Ukrainian citizenry "to take part in the defence action, taking advantage of all admissible methods and paths for the incitement of public opinion in the world with the goal of condemning the anti-human and anti-national policy of the Soviet regime and the freeing of our countrymen".⁵¹ The appeal concluded:

The demand of the day is, that the Ukrainian churches, all political, community, professional, academic, youth organizations and institutions, and also all our public in various countries arise in defence of persecuted Ukrainian patriots in Ukraine and that the occupier of Ukraine - Soviet Russia - feel the presence and activity of Ukrainian settlements beyond the borders of Ukraine in the Western world.⁵²

The first protest to the new wave of arrests was an effort independent of the major Ukrainian organizations. On January 19,

50. Included among the arrested were individuals well known to emigre Ukrainians because of their various publications. These included Ivan Dzyuba (Internationalism or Russification), Vyacheslav Chornovil (The Chornovil Papers), and Ivan Svitlychnyi.

51. Svoboda, January 21, 1972, p. 1.

52. Ibid.

a group of twelve women accompanied by their children, some 40 people in all, inconspicuously entered the public gallery of the United Nations Economic and Security Council's Subcommittee charged with the investigation of human rights violations. Once there, they began shouting demanding the release of those arrested and scattered leaflets describing the recent events in Ukraine and their demands. Though they were forcibly removed, they were assured by U.N. officials that their concerns would be communicated to the U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim.⁵³ The demonstration received mention in a number of papers including the New York Times.

Ukrainian central political organizations quickly heeded the WCFU's appeal. On January 21, 1972 UCCA held an extraordinary session to plan strategy.⁵⁴ It was decided that the organization would begin its activities by addressing its concerns in letters to President Nixon; to Rita Hauser, the U.S. representative to the United Nations Human Rights Commission; and to the Commission itself. In addition, the UCCA presidium decided to distribute documentation on those arrested to the press and urged Ukrainians to write their congressmen about their concerns and otherwise support the actions of their community.

The WCFU Presidium and especially its Human Rights Commission became quite active as well. Relevant information was sent to a variety of non-governmental organizations (NGO's) including Amnesty International, the International Commission of

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid., January 25, 1972, p. 1.

Jurists and the World Council of Churches.⁵⁵ A delegation from the Presidium visited the U.S. and Canadian U.N. missions, while members of the Human Rights Commission lobbied the U.N. Human Rights Commission.⁵⁶

Interestingly, a Svoboda editorial of January 21, 1972, noted that though searches were conducted in Moscow during the latest wave of arrests and although numerous documents were seized at that time, arrests were made only in Ukraine. The editorial writer concluded that one had to think that the "differentiation" of Russian and Jewish dissidents was consciously achieved, so as not to "provoke a too wide reaction in the world, with the obvious goal, that the world not arise in defence of Ukrainian 'nationalists'".⁵⁷

Initially, however, despite these looming difficulties, the emigre Ukrainian communities were buoyed in their drives by a sense of purpose, by the considerable success they achieved in mobilizing support within their own communities, and the exotic newness of their actions. Protest activities were extremely popular and widespread. For example, it was reported that on January 22, Ukrainian churches were full, and activities

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid., January 25, 1972, p. 1 and, February 5, 1972, Section 2, p. 1.

57. Ibid., January 21, 1972, p. 2.

meant to commemorate Ukrainian independence day had been transformed into massive protests against the persecution in Ukraine.⁵⁸ On January 27, Archbishop Ambrose Senyshyn of the Ukrainian Catholic Eparchy of Philadelphia was moved to declare that February 6, 1972, would be a 'Day of Prayer' for the arrested dissidents in Ukraine.⁵⁹ A day earlier, acute concern among Ukrainian American students had led to the formation of the Committee for the Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners, the first of a number of new Ukrainian NGO's dealing specifically with human rights violations by the U.S.S.R.⁶⁰ In addition, local protest actions, too numerous to mention, took place across North America.⁶¹

Early Ukrainian protest efforts culminated in the TUSM sponsored demonstration of January 28, 1972. The candlelight

58. Ibid., January 29, 1972, Section 2, p. 1.

59. Ibid., January 27, 1972, p. 1.

60. The Committee for the Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners was formed by Ukrainian students around January 25, 1972. The Committee's initial activities included the distribution of pamphlets protesting the persecutions and urging individuals to phone various Soviet governmental agencies in the U.S.S.R. to voice their concerns. About the same time, the Washington student hromada formed Students for Civil Rights in the Soviet Union. Ibid., January 26, 1972, p.1, and January 29, 1972, Section 2, p. 4.

61. Among the smaller scale actions, the most notable effort was a campaign by Ukrainian student groups, especially TUSM branches, to follow and publicly raise the issue of the injustice of the arrests at evenings where the recent Soviet Nobel prize winner in literature, Yevgeny Yevtushenko was speaking. The most noteworthy confrontation occurred on January 25, 1972 during the David Frost show when a group of nine students rushed onto the stage disrupting the telecast and broadcast their demands for the release of the imprisoned Ukrainian dissenters. Ibid., January 28, 1972, p. 1, and January 29, 1972, Section 2, p. 4.

rally at the United Nations attracted approximately 3,000 demonstrators who heard a number of distinguished speakers, including Metropolitan Mstyslav of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of America, attack the Soviet government's domestic policies.⁶² The protesters then marched to within a block of the Soviet embassy where a wall of police prevented further progress. After a small delegation was let through to place leaflets at the door of the Soviet Mission, the marchers chanted slogans and sang songs as Soviet flags and a coffin were burned. The event was an important success for the Ukrainian organizers, effectively communicating their message across the three major U.S. television networks and a number of independent t.v. and radio stations, as well as in the print media.⁶³

By February, 1972, the Ukrainian lobbying effort was displaying increasing cohesion and effectiveness. On February 5, 1972, the Ukrainian National Association established a fund to assist the WCFU's Human Rights Commission in its lobbying efforts, and contributed \$5,000 towards that goal.⁶⁴ CeSUS, the executive body for Ukrainian student organizations, declared February to be a month of protest and urged its members to

62. The other speakers at the demonstration were Pastor Volodymyr Borovsky of the Ukrainian Evangelical Alliance of North America, Msgr. Basil Kushnir, president of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, Mrs. Slava Stetsko of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations, Rev. Chrystophoros of St. George's Ukrainian Catholic Church in New York, and Inia Hikawyj, SUSTA president. Ibid., February 5, 1972, Section 2, p. 1.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid., February 11, 1972, Section 2, p. 1.

action.⁶⁵ In Canada, the Ukrainian Canadian Committee urged Prime Minister Trudeau in a memorandum to lodge a protest about events in Ukraine.⁶⁶ More importantly, on February 18, 1972, the UCC announced the formation of the International Human Rights Defence Committee under the chairmanship of the Right Honourable John G. Diefenbaker, former Prime Minister of Canada.⁶⁷ Formed at the behest of the WCFU, the Committee was to be composed of invited lawyers who would "review political arrests and court sentences issued in Ukraine and other Soviet-dominated countries", and make public their legal opinions.⁶⁸ However despite the considerable protest, arrests continued in Ukraine topping 100 by mid to late February.⁶⁹

In the West, governmental reaction to Ukrainian lobbying efforts was generally sympathetic but unwilling to take meaningful action. In the United States, replies to the UCCA memoranda from the White House, George Bush, the American U.N. ambassador, and Rita Hauser were nearly identical in style and form, indicating agreement in the administration on the Ukrainian problem. The letters all referred to unsuccessful American attempts at intervention in the past, condemned the arrests, and urged Ukrainians to press on with their public efforts.⁷⁰ Support

65. Ibid., January 29, 1972, Section 2, p. 4.

66. Ibid., February 11, 1972, Section 2, p. 1.

67. Ibid., February 26, 1972, Section 2, p. 1.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid., February 14, 1972, Section 2, p. 1.

70. The letters are published in full in this issue. Ibid., March 11, 1972, Section 2, p. 1.

in the Congress was more evident. Particularly encouraging was a very positive speech by the House Minority leader Gerald Ford on February 29. In it he called on members of both houses of Congress "to add their voices to voices of the Ukrainian Americans who are protesting the trampling of human rights in Ukraine".⁷¹ However, Ford too, directed the Ukrainians towards the U.N. Human Rights Committee, and away from unilateral U.S. action.

In Canada, Ukrainian efforts were more successful. On February 27, a group of some 150 individuals conducted a demonstration on Parliament Hill. A delegation from the group was able to meet with Mitchell Sharp, the external affairs minister and receive a pledge for a non-public Canadian intervention on behalf of the dissenters.⁷² The demonstrators were certainly aided in their success by the prominence of the supporters who marched with them. These included Senators Paul Yuzyk, Muriel Fergusson, Rheal Belisle and Eugene Forsey and M.P. Allan Sulatysky.⁷³

In early April 1972, the UCCA, aware of the relative ease with which Ukrainians in Canada acquired a pledge of governmental action, and conscious of the lack of similar success, began planning new ways to gain support and action from President

71. Ibid., March 25, 1972, Section 2, p. 1.

72. Ibid., March 11, 1972, Section 2, p. 1.

73. Ibid.

Nixon.74 Meeting on April 15, 1972, the UCCA executive after a long and heated discussion agreed to hold a mass demonstration in front of the White House.75 Great concerns about possible negative effects, especially about being associated with anti-Vietnam protesters, were evident at the meeting. As a result, the organizing body, CeSUS, publicly announced that the Ukrainian protesters were to make themselves distinctive by either wearing traditional Ukrainian shirts or yellow arm bands. Furthermore, it declared that no protest signs were to be displayed in front of the White House.76

In the week before the Washington protest, Ukrainian

74. Concerns about the apparent lack of effectiveness were becoming widespread by mid March. On March 17, the UCCA executive met to discuss various problems connected with Ukrainian lobbying and protest efforts, especially their coordination. Particular criticism was levelled at Ukrainian youth organizations which tended to organize demonstrations without consulting other groups. Further and more wide ranging discussions were held on March 26 between representatives of UCCA, the Ukrainian National Association and members of Students for the Defense of Human Rights in the Soviet Union. See Svoboda, April 1, 1972, Section 2, p. 1-2. Soon after, an excellent analysis of the Ukrainian strategy and its difficulties with recommendations for improvements was published by Dr. Odajnyk. ("Lessons of Recent Demonstrations", Svoboda, April 1, 1972, Section 2, p. 2). It should be noted that the efforts of Ukrainian Americans were not totally unsuccessful in prompting some administration action. However, the response was disappointing. Having pointed the Ukrainians in the direction of the United Nations Human Rights Commission, the administration then raised the issue of the recent Ukrainian arrests there on April 6. (Svoboda, April 15, 1972, Section 2, p. 1). While pleasing many Ukrainians, the action was clearly a diversionary attempt aimed at satisfying Ukrainian demands at the lowest possible level and allowing the President to avoid the issue during his upcoming visit to the U.S.S.R.

75. Ibid., April 22, 1972, Section 2, pp. 1-2.

76. Ibid., May 6, 1972, Section 2, p. 1.

groups mounted a number of large demonstrations in hopes of attracting publicity and preparing the ground for the Washington effort. The Washington demonstration itself turned out to be a mixture of what was both desired and feared most by the organizers. On May 13, under considerable media attention, approximately 3,000 demonstrators marched to the White House in orderly fashion where a presidential staff assistant accepted the demonstrators' petition to the President.⁷⁷ The marchers then began to move toward the Soviet embassy. As they neared the embassy they encountered police barricades which prevented further progress. At this point, at least 300 of the more youthful demonstrators joined by anti-Vietnam protestors broke from the main body and tried to reach the embassy by way of side streets. As police rushed units to block the protestors fighting developed. In the considerable melee that followed, tear gas and mounted police were employed. The final result of the day of protest was 59 arrested, one hospitalized, and new tensions and divisions between the organizers of the event. TUSM chairman Bohdan Kulchytsky was particularly unapologetic while older members considered the days events a terribly costly fiasco.⁷⁸ However, despite the personal antagonisms resulting from the event, UCCA's continuing lobbying effort remained substantially

77. Ibid., May 20, 1972, Section 2, p. 1.

78. For comments by Kulchytsky and Oleh Saciuk, spokesmen for SUSTA, following the demonstration, see Svoboda, May 20, 1972, Section 2, p. 3. For details of the heated UCCA executive meeting held on June 9, see ibid., June 17, 1972, Section 2, pp. 1, 4.

unaffected.⁷⁹

The public awareness campaign in Canada was having a greater degree of success. On June 25, the Rt. Hon. John Diefenbaker addressed over 10,000 Ukrainians at a public rally in Toronto sponsored by the Canadian League for the Liberation of Ukraine. At an earlier press conference, Diefenbaker had outlined and promised those gathered to make public "almost unbelievable invasions of human rights".⁸⁰ Clearly, the participation of the former Canadian Prime Minister, the high profile of Ukrainians in Canada and such large turnouts of demonstrators were effectively making the persecutions in Ukraine an item on the agenda in Ottawa.

As the summer of 1972 drew to a close, the frequency of public demonstrations by Ukrainian organizations declined noticeably. Petitions and memoranda were still being sent by various committees and organization executives, speeches continued to be made on the situation in Ukraine, but traditional concerns and other events began to reassert their dominance on the agendas of the organizations. A number of explanations exist for the changing priorities. Firstly, significant amounts of effort were being expended in Canada and the U.S. on special

79. The UCCA executive continued its attempts to have President Nixon raise the issue of the arrests in Ukraine during his trip to the U.S.S.R. The executive sent telegrams to Nixon in Moscow on May 15 and May 23. New efforts were begun to have the trials in Ukraine held publicly. Special efforts were devoted to creating pressure to allow U.S. journalists to cover the events. In addition, UCCA published its second pamphlet on the arrests in Ukraine, Ukrainian Intellectuals in Shackles: Violations of Human Rights in Ukraine.

80. Ibid., July 15, 1972, Section 2, p. 1.

projects such as the Harvard Ukrainian Studies Fund Drive. Secondly, and more importantly, the feeling of urgency among Ukrainians was evaporating. Despite the tremendous efforts of many individuals and solid support of the Ukrainian emigre community there had been little visible benefit.⁸¹ Arrests in Ukraine had escalated and topped out at some 200.⁸² The trials and sentences, extensively reported by the Ukrainian media, went ahead despite the protests. Furthermore, there was remarkably little help from the American and Canadian governments other than sympathetic words. Finally, in this poor atmosphere, long-standing disputes were further aggravated by specific problems such as those surrounding the May 13 demonstration, which led to serious conflicts developing within the Ukrainian community, particularly between supporters of UCCA and the youthful members of TUSM.⁸³

In November 1972, the Soviet government startled many observers of the U.S.S.R. by allowing the well known dissenter and member of the Human Rights Committee, Valery Chalidze, to go abroad for a lecture tour. Chalidze was only the second dissident

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81. The publishers of Svoboda noted these developments in a special appeal to their readers and the wider Ukrainian community on September 23, 1972. Entitled "If We Don't, The Stones Will Cry Out", the publishers called on Ukrainians to maintain and make more drastic their protests and demands. Svoboda, September 23, 1972, Section 2, p. 1.
82. Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, "Soviet Nationalities Policy and Dissent in the Ukraine," The World Today Vol. 30 No. 5 (May 1974), p. 223.
83. At the Fifteenth World Congress of TUSM, harsh attacks were made against UCCA, especially for its hesitancy in the organization of the May 13 demonstration in Washington. Svoboda, September 23, 1972, Section 2, p. 1.

to deserve such a fate in the post-war period, the first being Valery Tarsis in 1966. One may only speculate as to the reasons behind the action, however, it is fair to say that at least by allowing Chalidze abroad and then stripping him of his citizenship the Soviet government probably hoped to remove one of the most important and best known dissenters in the U.S.S.R. in the least offensive manner possible. Considerations such as an attempt to foster improved relations between themselves and the West, and particularly the United States, were surely relevant. Such an improvement was more easily accomplished and more likely to occur if steps were taken to avoid unnecessarily antagonizing Western governments and providing more ammunition for the still active Ukrainian campaign of protest and lobbying.⁸⁴

By January 1973, the Ukrainian defence effort on behalf of human rights had become visibly weaker. In contrast to events only a year ago, the anniversaries of Ukrainian Independence Day and the Battle of Kruty saw no demonstrations on behalf of dissidents in Ukraine, though they were not forgotten in the many

84. The campaign was still quite powerful and effective, especially in Canada. For example, On November 11, over 2,000 Ukrainians had marched on Toronto City Hall, where they heard a number of speeches, including a highly emotional speech by Avraam Shifrin, a former Jewish prisoner, who called for the release of Yuriy Shukhevych, son of the former commander of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. The crowd also heard messages of support from Prime Minister Trudeau and Robert Stanfield, leader of the official opposition. Svoboda, November 24, 1972, Section 24 pp. 1, 3. In addition, a very active and influential role was continued to be played by Senator Paul Yuzyk who was able to raise the question of Soviet human rights violations in many forums otherwise inaccessible for Ukrainian NGO's. Witness his statement as a member in the Committee on Education, Culture and Communication of the Atlantic Assembly at its meeting in Bonn from November 20 to 24, 1972 Svoboda, December 9, 1972, Section 2, p. 1.

addresses given on these days and in some minor protest actions.⁸⁵

The confinement of Leonid Plyushch, a fairly well known member of the Action Group for the Defense for Human Rights in the U.S.S.R., to a mental asylum stirred a new flurry of activity by Ukrainian organizations. A delegation of the WCFU Human Rights Commission delivered memoranda in connection with his incarceration to the U.N. Human Rights Committee but openly stated that because of bureaucratic response they had initially met with, they did not expect any meaningful reaction from the U.N. Committee. As a result, the delegation also visited the Canadian U.N. mission where they met with the ambassador who was reported to be well acquainted with the political situation in Ukraine.⁸⁶ The Metropolitan Council of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the USA sent extensive memoranda to the heads of a number of international organizations, including Kurt Waldheim.⁸⁷ The Ukrainian Canadian Committee also announced its attention to bring the matter to the attention of its own government and the

85. SUMA and TUSM members from New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania pasted slogans demanding the release of Moroz and Shukhevych; and the withdrawal of the "Russian imperialists" from Ukraine, on the gates of the Soviet mission's residence in Glen Cove, Long Island. They also distributed literature about the arrested dissidents outside a number of Soviet offices in the New York area. Svoboda, February 10, 1973, Section 2, p. 1.

86. Svoboda, February 24, 1973, Section 2, p. 1.

87. Other recipients of the information packages included John Scali, the newly appointed American ambassador to the U.N.; Neil McDermott, Secretary General of the International Commission of Jurists; Zafrullah Khan, President of the International Court of Justice; and Marc Schreiber, Director of the United Nations Human Rights Division. Ibid.

U.N..88 The Plyushch case also attracted quick international attention. In its February 3 edition, The London Times carried an open letter of noted authors and scholars protesting the violations of judicial norms in Ukraine.89

Surprisingly, the new burst of activity and the continuing persecution in Ukraine did result in some notable developments. Most important of these was an acknowledgement by Jacob Mueller, communications officer of the U.N. Human Rights Commission, that summaries of the memoranda of the WCFU Human Rights Committee and the Metropolitan Council of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the USA would be included in a confidential list of communications that would be submitted to the Commission at its upcoming session.90 Noteworthy also was the verbal attack launched by an angry John Diefenbaker while addressing the Manitoba Law School Foundation on February 26, 1972. Without any qualification, Diefenbaker heaped scorn on the U.N. Human Rights Commission for doing "little or nothing" to protect human rights, especially in the Soviet Union.91 He also chastized the Canadian government for not placing a motion condemning Soviet human rights violations in the U.N. General Assembly and noted that

not since September 1960 has any Canadian chief representative or national leader spoken out against the

88. Ibid.

89. The London Times, February 3, 1973.

90. Commission rules also require that the complete communication be delivered to the interested state, in this case the U.S.S.R.. Svoboda, March 10, 1973, Section 2, p. 1.

91. Ibid.

wrongs that are being perpetrated by the USSR and the violations of human rights that have become epidemic.⁹²

Though while not completely accurate, the statement did increase the pressure on the Canadian government for significant action on this question.

Ukrainian lobbying efforts in the following months primarily were in the form of private communications urging governmental and other notable individuals to voice their disapproval of Soviet government's repressive policies. Several petitions were also being circulated in hopes of increasing public pressure on the Soviets. Especially valuable was a petition signed by 279 members of the American Society of Microbiology representing eleven countries in defence of Nina Strokata. The petition addressed to Kurt Waldheim was presented to the U.N. Human Rights Committee on May 17, 1973, and called for a review of Strokata's case at an open trial attended by members of the Society, journalists and representatives of the U.N.⁹³

On June 16, 1973, Leonid Brezhnev, the C.P.S.U. Secretary-General, arrived on a state visit to the United States. His invitation had provoked a strong reaction and a new outpouring of activity among all East European nationalities. Ukrainian papers published on June 16 took militant stands against the presence of Brezhnev in the United States. The Svoboda Weekly Section's lead

92. Ibid.

93. Svoboda, May 26, 1973, Section 2, p. 1. The microbiologists' petition to the U.N. Commission was successful in prompting a review of Strokata's case by the Commission. It was presented to the Commission by society members Dr. A. Zwarun and George Karpinsky. See Svoboda, June 23, 1973, Section 2, p. 1.

page was covered with photographs of imprisoned Ukrainian intellectuals under the banner "Ukrainian Victims of Brezhnev".⁹⁴ In a break with tradition, Svoboda printed its editorial on the lead page under the caption "Watch Out - Tyrant at the Door!".⁹⁵ In it, the paper warned that the Soviet interest in 'peaceful coexistence' was principally motivated by a desire for their economy's salvation and that the technological aid received would be used to increase the U.S.S.R.'s military power. More interestingly, the editorial noted:

This "friendship" between Washington and Moscow will destroy the hopes of the best allies that America has - the captive nations that suffer under the rule of Moscow. It will destroy the hopes of those millions of people who look to the West for help, even if that help is only moral support for their aspirations, when they see that the West is trading with Moscow, which tramples upon every principle of freedom and consistently violates the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the cornerstone of the United Nations Organization.⁹⁶

The analysis was certainly true, however, meaningful options other than working through the administration were very limited for the ethnic lobbyists. Consequently, it was not surprising to find that Ukrainian central organizations continued to lobby Washington but with much less optimism and more aggressiveness than in the past. This more combative approach is evident in the plea written by the executive committee of the UCCA to President Nixon on June 8, 1973. Highly critical in tone, the call for presidential intervention in the name of humanity and justice in

94. Svoboda, June 16, 1973, Section 2, p. 1.

95. Ibid. For the same editorial in the Ukrainian language version, see Svoboda, June 13, 1973, p. 1.

96. Ibid., p. 2.

the matter of the continuing crackdown in Ukraine stated in part:

We have written and appealed to you on numerous occasions, the last being prior to your historic journey to the Soviet Union in May, 1972. We regret to state that we have never received any (reply on these) "internal matters" (sic). Presumably, the matter of the Kremlin's repression of the Ukrainian people is an "internal matter" of the Soviet government and the United States cannot and should not interfere in such "internal matters." Yet, we are fully cognizant that our government has intervened and presently does intervene in the internal matters of many nations, including the USSR in the case of crass discrimination of certain groups in the Soviet Union that are fortunate have strong advocates and spokesman in the United States.

Why then is there discrimination against the Ukrainians?⁹⁷

Not unexpectedly, East European groups having concluded that real support would not be coming from the White House once more turned to their now familiar pattern of organizing protest marches in hopes of embarrassing the Soviet government and arousing public and congressional opinion.⁹⁸ In addition, open letters in defence of Ukrainian dissidents were placed in the New York Times and the New York Review of Books.⁹⁹ The letters were said to result in a considerable number of letters on the subject to President Nixon from American academicians.¹⁰⁰ However, generally, Ukrainian and other East European protests went unheard, drowned out in the wave of publicity which focused itself almost exclusively on American Jewish protest activities

97. Ibid.

98. For a description of Ukrainian sponsored demonstrations in New York and Washington, see Svoboda, June 23, 1973, Section 2, pp. 1-2.

99. UCCA's advertisement can be found in the New York Times, June 17, 1973, p. E 16. The advertisement of the Committee for the Defence of Soviet Political Prisoners can be found in the New York Review of Books, June, 1973.

100. Svoboda, June 23, 1973, Section 2, p. 1.

2

MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS
STANDARD REFERENCE MATERIAL 1010a
(ANSI and ISO TEST CHART No. 2)

The Second World Congress of Free Ukrainians opened in Toronto on November 1, 1973, with 1,012 registered participants.¹⁰³ A major theme of the Congress was to be the tasks of Ukrainians in light of the current situation in Ukraine. The following morning, prominent scholars and activists met to discuss the development of Ukrainian dissent and the human rights problem in Ukraine in a series of seminars and committee meetings.¹⁰⁴ Later, attention was brought to the human rights situation in Ukraine by both the Hon. Marc Lalonde and William Davis during their speeches to the delegates during the

102. (continued) defeated at the Congress. Svoboda, September 8, 1973, Section 2, p. 3. National liberation was also a main theme of the Third World Congress of Ukrainian Students (CeSUS) held at the University of Toronto from August 24 to 26, 1973. The Congress approved a resolution which declared: "The III World Congress of Ukrainian Students greets all national revolutionary movements in the world, especially those in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union". Svoboda, September 1, 1973, Section 2, p. 1.

103. Ibid., November 10, 1973, Section 2, p. 1.

104. Ibid., October 31, 1973, Section 2, p. 1. The list of seminars and speakers for Friday, November 2 included:

8:30 a.m. Address by Ivan Wowchuk: "Situation in Ukraine and Tasks of the Ukrainian Community in the Free World."

9:30 a.m. Seminars and Committees:

1. "Defence of Human Rights in Ukraine at the Forums of International Organizations."

Speaker - Sen. Paul Yuzyk

Chairman - Denys Kwitkowsky

2. "Dissident Movement in Ukraine - An Analysis."

Speaker - Prof. Petro Potichnyj

Chairman - Osyp Zinkewych

3. "Problems of Church and Religion in Ukraine."

Speaker - Prof. Bohdan Bociurkiw

Chairman - Ivan Bazarko

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convention banquet.¹⁰⁵ However, the highpoint of the Congress was a mass rally held at Maple Leaf Gardens on the Congress's final day. As an attempt to demonstrate the power and importance of the Ukrainian community in Canada the event was a great success.¹⁰⁶ More importantly, the Ukrainian message demanding Western governmental action on flagrant human rights violations in the Soviet Union was dramatically and forcefully communicated by the rally's main speaker, the Rt. Hon. John G. Diefenbaker. In the aftermath of the Congress, it was clear that some positive influence had been achieved by the Ukrainians.

On November 18, 1973, Mitchell Sharp, the Canadian External Affairs Minister, arrived in the Soviet Union. Sharp subsequently held meetings with a number of Soviet leaders including Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, President Nikolai Podgornyi and Premier Alexei Kosygin. It was during his discussion with Andrei Gromyko that Sharp raised the question of the Soviet governments treatment of Ukrainian and Jewish political dissidents. Sharp first expressed his desire not to interfere in Soviet domestic matters, but then went on to inform the foreign minister that there was considerable concern in Canada over the fate of these groups. Despite the diplomatic

104. (continued)

4. "The Role of Youth in the Dissident Movement in Ukraine and Its Influence in the Free World."

Speaker - Prof. Konstantin Sawczuk

Chairman - Dr. Volodymyr Yanishevsky

105. Svoboda, November 10, 1973, Section 2, p. 1.

106. Ibid. More than 13,000 people attended the rally at Maple Leaf Gardens on November 4.

handling of the issue by Sharp, Gromyko's response was reported to be entirely unconciliatory.¹⁰⁷

As 1973 drew to a close, Ukrainians could look back to a mixed record with a number of definite gains and some substantial failures. Significant positive developments during the year included the long-awaited consideration of the 1972 Ukrainian arrests by the United Nations Human Rights Commission. Other notable developments included increasing governmental support from Canada, and from a variety of international non-governmental organizations and concerned individuals. On the negative side, there was the continuing lack of support from the American administration and the failure to get adequate press coverage.

The 1974 Moroz Defence Campaign and its Aftermath

A new phase in the Ukrainian campaign for the release of imprisoned Ukrainian intellectuals began in early February 1974. Prompted by troubling reports of the failing health of Valentyn Moroz, the acknowledged leading Ukrainian dissident, CeSUS, the Central Union of Ukrainian Students, initiated a new series of defence actions which had as their goal the defence and release

¹⁰⁷. Ibid., November 23, 1973, Section 2, p. 1. Mitchell Sharp's inquiry was most likely the result of his discussion with members of the WCFU at a reception for its Secretariat on Parliament Hill on October 31, and a meeting with Ukrainian students shortly before his departure for the U.S.S.R.. See also Svoboda, November 17, 1973, Section 2, p. 1.

of Moroz.108 CeSUS advocated that youth, and student organizations take the initiative in the action. It called on the members of these organizations to study the works of Moroz and other samvydav authors, and then communicate information about his health and conditions of imprisonment to the media worldwide. It called on the WCFU and other Ukrainian organizations to morally support these actions. CeSUS also organized the International Committee in Defense of Valentyn Moroz to spearhead the drive.

The new offensive was unique, as it represented the first attempt by the Ukrainians to single out and defend just one particular dissident. It can be noted that having witnessed the death of Yuri Galanskov in November, 1972 after spending some six years in camps, the organizers' fears as to the well-being of Moroz, then in his seventh year of imprisonment, seem to have been well founded. However, an effect of this decision was to elevate the importance of Moroz for the emigres still further and to reduce support for other, less well known but important dissenters.

The new offensive was spurred on at its inception by reports of serious developments in the Soviet Union. Svoboda and other Ukrainian papers carried news of a second serious criminal

108. Ibid., February 16, 1974, Section 2, p. 1. The mandate of the International Committee in Defense of Valentyn Moroz was to publish information about the illegal trial of Moroz, investigate through credible international organizations the state of Moroz's health, press the United Nations to place the persecution of Ukrainian intellectuals on its agenda, and ultimately to seek the release of Moroz.

assault on the weakened Moroz in his cell.¹⁰⁹ Almost simultaneously, a new and widely publicized appeal by Andrei Sakharov to the International League for the Rights of Man appeared.¹¹⁰ The appeal called for urgent action to help save the life of Leonid Plyushch. A Ukrainian response was not long in coming. On February 24, over 1,000 demonstrators appeared at the gates of the Soviet embassy in Ottawa calling for an end to the torture of Moroz.¹¹¹ The event sponsored by the newly formed Moroz Defense Committee was particularly successful in receiving extensive media coverage, while the Soviet embassy personnel present compounded the damage by refusing to answer reporters' questions. In the United States, as a result of a decision taken on February 22, the Ukrainian National Association communicated an offer to finance the emigration and medical care of both Moroz and Plyushch to the U.N. Human Rights Commission, the International League for the Rights of Man and the International Red Cross.¹¹² Additional pressure for action came from an UCCA delegation which met with American U.N. ambassador John Scali and received assurances that their concerns about the treatment of Moroz and Plyushch would be raised at the meeting of the U.N.

109. Svoboda, February 23, 1974, Section 2, p. 1. Moroz had been assaulted and knifed approximately one and a half years earlier as well.

110. Ibid. Sakharov's appeal was dated February 12, 1974, and was carried by the New York Times on February 20. It was subsequently given to both Kurt Waldheim and the International Red Cross. Co-signers of the appeal included Sakharov's wife, Yelena Bonner, Tatiana Deliknova, Sergei Kovalev, Andrei Tverdokhlebov and Tatiana Khodorovich.

111. Svoboda, March 2, 1974, Section 2, p. 1.

112. Ibid.

Human Rights Committee.113 Numerous other appeals also appeared in the weeks immediately following the call to action.114

Early in April, 1974, new information filtering in from the U.S.S.R. intensified the Ukrainian concerns about Moroz and Plyushch. Among the samvydav being received were new appeals in defence of the two prisoners from a number of prominent Soviet dissenters, including Tatiana Khodorovich and Malva Landa.115 They reinforced new statements in their defence made by the recently exiled dissenters, Pavel Litvinov and Anatolii Radygin.116 Of more concern, were indications from Litvinov that the weakened Moroz would begin a hunger strike in July to gain his transfer from Vladimir Prison to a special-regime camp.117 The combined effect was to redouble Ukrainian protest efforts.

The direct beneficiary of the concern was the newly constituted and expanding Moroz Defense Committee Network. In the United States, the Valentyn Moroz Defense Committee benefitted from significant infusions of funds from SUSTA, TUSM and the by then defunct Washington based Students in Defense of Soviet

113. Ibid., March 9, 1974, Section 2, p. 1.

114. A partial list of organizations issuing appeals included the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, the Ukrainian Medical Association of North America, the American Council for World Freedom.

115. Svoboda, April 20, 1974, Section 2, p. 1.

116. Ibid., p. 2.

117. Ibid.

Political Prisoners organization.¹¹⁸ The transfers of funds were made easier by the significant overlap of leadership between all the forementioned organizations.¹¹⁹ However, it should be noted that such transfers of funds were quite popular at the time and would likely have occurred without the overlapping leaderships. In Canada, the Toronto based Moroz Defence Committee was headed by a respected jurist, Professor Walter Tarnopolsky, and thus exuded a more professional image which eased its efforts in gaining considerable support.

The various Moroz Defense Committees quickly initiated new actions on behalf of Ukrainian political prisoners. On April 20, the SUSTA and TUSM presidents reported that Ukrainian student organizations throughout the U.S. would begin to lobby for an amendment to both the House and Senate Bills which sought to extend trade credits to the Soviet Union. The amendment proposed to bar the extension of credits until such time as Moroz was released and placed under international medical supervision.¹²⁰ While chances of such an amendment passing were remote the tactic

118. Ibid., April 27, 1974, Section 2, p. 1. The executive board of SUSTA voted to contribute \$1,200 or 90% of its current funds to Moroz defense actions. These funds had only been recently acquired as a result of a fund raising drive to help the financially strapped organization. The TUSM (U.S.) also voted \$1,200 to the effort, while a further \$700 was taken from the bank accounts of Students in Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners.

119. Ibid. At the time of the allocations, Eugene Iwanciw was SUSTA president as well as head of the then defunct Students in Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners Committee. Askold Lozynsky was the TUSM U.S. national executive board president. Both men were co-chairmen of the Valentyń Moroz Defense Committee in the U.S.

120. Ibid.

had a positive propaganda value. SUSTA also began to circulate petitions with the aim of collecting 10,000 signatures which would be forwarded to senators and congressmen with large Ukrainian populations in their constituencies. The initial response of the Canadian Moroz Defense Committee to the developing crisis in Ukraine was the publication of a petition signed by 199 Canadian professors, writers and editors in Toronto dailies, the Sun, and the nationally distributed Globe and Mail.¹²¹ The increasing effectiveness and intensity of the Ukrainian effort soon began to show its effects.

By May 8, 1974, the renewed Ukrainian offensive proved worrying enough to the Soviet government for its Canadian embassy to release its first official statement on Moroz and the reasons for his incarceration. Written by V. Tkachenko, the statement denied entirely the rumours about Moroz's health. It then went on to claim that Moroz had been properly tried and sentenced because of his activities:

he taught hatred of Russians. He was awakening national antagonisms and justifying the terror of nationalist bands from the destroyed underground OUN.¹²²

The embassy also began to send a similar response to all letters submitted to it as a result of the petitions printed in the Sun and in The Globe and Mail.¹²³

On June 1, 1974, the Committee for the Defence of Valentyn

121. Ibid., May 11, 1974, Section 2, p. 1.

122. Ibid., May 23, 1974, p. 1.

123. Ibid. June 8, 1974, Section 2, p. 1. It was later learned that Moroz had not begun his hunger strike until July 1. Ibid., June 2, 1974, Section 2, p. 1.

Moroz began its most serious escalation of pressure on the Soviet government to date. Based on unconfirmed (and as it turned out later, erroneous) reports that Moroz had begun his planned hunger strike to the death, the organization began daily demonstration in front of the Soviet embassy in Ottawa, Canada.¹²⁴ The action signalled the beginning of an unexpected and lengthy test of wills between Moroz supporters and the Soviet government.

During the next month, public demonstrations were organized on an international scale in an effort to increase pressure on the Soviet government.¹²⁵ On June 22, 1974, the 10th anniversary of the unveiling of the Taras Shevchenko monument in Washington, some 10,000 Ukrainians gathered in the capital and heard speeches which traced a continuity of national values from Shevchenko to Moroz and Plyushch. The excited demonstrators then marched on the Soviet embassy where eventually 1,500 of the protestors clashed with police.¹²⁶ As a result of the protest, the Soviet government sent a stern letter of protest claiming U.S. authorities knew of the potential for violence and damage to Soviet property and nevertheless allowed the demonstration to be held, "thus conniving with offensive actions of rabid anti-Soviet elements."¹²⁷ Any strain in relations between Ukrainian Americans and American authorities as a result of the incident was however, more than offset by a letter publicized shortly thereafter, from

124. Ibid.

125. Apart from actions held in various North American cities, demonstrations were held in Belgium, Great Britain, etc.

126. Svoboda, July 2, 1974, Section 2, p. 1.

127. Ibid.

Andrei Sakharov to Leonid Brezhnev appealing for his intervention to save Moroz's life.¹²⁸

The 'Free Moroz' campaign intensified considerably after the confirmation of the beginning of Moroz's own hunger strike on July 1. The frequency and diversity of appeals concerning Moroz and other Soviet non-Jewish political prisoners grew visibly. Beginning on July 15, 1974, the Moroz Defence Committees unveiled a new tactic which rapidly escalated what had been a problem for the various governments involved to the level of a crisis. On that date, five Ukrainian students outside the embassy in Ottawa began sympathy hunger strikes.¹²⁹ Community protest actions and visible support from many M.P.'s and Senators complemented the hunger striker's protest.¹³⁰ The dramatic action immediately attracted wide media attention. The mounting political pressure prompted a meeting between a Liberal delegation headed by Mark MacGuigan and the Moroz Committee. Soon after the Liberal Party Caucus met to discuss its response to this forced crisis.¹³¹

In the days that followed, the crisis caused by the hunger strike became more acute. Moroz continued maintaining his strike

128. Ibid., June 26, 1974, p. 1.

129. Ibid., July 27, 1974, Section 2, p. 1.

130. Ibid. Among those issuing appeals for intervention on Moroz's behalf were Rev. Volodymyr Borowskyi, executive secretary of the Ukrainian Evangelical Alliance of North America, Archbishop Metropolitan Maxim Hermaniuk of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Canada, Archbishop Metropolitan Mstyslav Skrypnyk of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the U.S.A., Nobel Prize Winner and World Pen Club President, Heinrich Boell, Alexander Yesenin-Volpin, Pavel Litvinov, Andrei Sakharov, the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, and the Canadian Jewish Congress.

131. Ibid.

in Vladimir prison prompting serious concern about his fate. In Canada, as the first protestors were hospitalized, new students took their places. Furthermore, the action appeared to be spreading like a contagion. Soon hunger strikers appeared in front of the Legislature in Manitoba, in front of the United Nations and the Soviet mission in New York, and in front of both the White House and the Soviet embassy in Washington.¹³² On July 25, in response to the increasing pressure, a group of government ministers met with the strikers led by Dr. Tarnopolsky to negotiate the drafts of a letter to be sent to the Soviet government by the Canadian government protesting the imprisonment of Moroz.¹³³ The strikers were assured by External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp that the Canadian intervention would not be long in coming. On July 27 and 28 mass demonstrations of 1,000 and 3,000 people respectively were held in front of the Ottawa embassy in support of the strikers.¹³⁴ On the 17th day of the hunger strike, the Canadian government intervened with a letter personally sent by Prime Minister Trudeau to Ambassador Yakovlev and the hunger strikers partially satisfied were transported to hospital for treatment.¹³⁵ In the United States, the hunger strikers were unable to get similar commitments, although

132. Ibid., and Svoboda, August 17, 1974, Section 2, p. 1.

133. The Liberal delegation consisted of Mitchell Sharp, External Affairs Minister; Paul Martin, leader of the Senate; John Munro, Minister of Labour; Stanley Haidasz, Minister for Multiculturalism; and Herb Gray, Minister of Corporate and Consumer Affairs. Svoboda, August 17, 1974, Section 2, p. 1.

134. Ibid., p. 4.

135. Ibid., p. 1.

Congressional concern was increased.¹³⁶

As the hunger strikes came to an end, Ukrainian organizations sought to maintain the high level of pressure on the Soviet government. Demonstrations and appeals continued to be sent to various governments and NGO's. Incremental gains were observable. On September 12, 1974, Ukrainian activists were visibly cheered by the New York Times adoption after years of hesitation, of an editorial position in support of the freeing of Moroz, Plyushch and other Ukrainian dissenters.¹³⁷ However, all feelings of progress after September 7 were undermined by persistent rumours that Moroz had died. Nevertheless, the various Ukrainian human rights committees pressed for continued action until it could be determined with certainty that Moroz had perished. On September 18, 1974, the New York Times correspondent in Moscow reported the startling news that Moroz, by then in the 80th day of his hunger strike, was still alive and being kept in the Vladimir Prison hospital.¹³⁸ Almost instantly, a renewed sense of inspiration and determination stimulated the Ukrainian diaspora and new and wide-ranging human rights actions were begun.¹³⁹

136. Among U.S. Congressman indicating their concerns for the first time during the hunger strikes were Dominic Daniels and Edward Koch. Svoboda, August 20, 1974, p. 1.

137. Svoboda, September 24, 1974, p. 1.

138. Ibid.

139. For example, from September 25 to 29, 1974, a new group of women hungerstrikers appeared outside the U.N.. On September 29, 1974, some 10,000 demonstrators stood in a driving rain in front of the U.N. to hear a number of speakers including Congressman Edward Koch. Koch declared that the Moroz issue and that of other Soviet political prisoners were within

The newly invigorated campaign produced more tactical successes for the Ukrainian emigre community, but their strategic goals such as freeing Ukrainian political prisoners already imprisoned and ending the persecution of those still free remained unfulfilled.¹⁴⁰ The test of wills between Moroz and the Soviet authorities daily increased the costs of inaction for all sides, however, movement among governmental organizations remained painfully slow. In an effort to displace the Soviet regime from its entrenched position, Moroz precipitously increased the crisis in the 128th day of his hunger strike by declaring his intention to commit suicide on January 1, 1975 if his conditions were not improved.¹⁴¹ The terrible state of his health combined with the threat to end his life resulted in new demonstrations and desperate appeals from his wife Raisa, Andrei

139. (continued) the internal affairs of the Soviet Union; see Svoboda, October 1, 1974, p. 1. In Canada, new groups of hunger strikers appeared at the University of Waterloo and at York University on September 16. Their protests lasted 10 days. see Svoboda, October 12, 1974, Section 2, p. 1. On September 30, 14 students began a hunger strike at the University of Alberta. Svoboda, October 19, 1974, Section 2, p. 1.

140. The record of tactical successes includes ever growing congressional support including the tabling of House and Senate resolutions on the persecution of Ukrainian intellectuals. As well, growing pressure from both houses of Congress was gradually making probable presidential intervention on behalf of Ukrainian dissidents, especially Moroz. See Svoboda, September 19, 1974, p. 1. and October 26, Section 2, p. 1. Unqualified support was also increasingly coming from important non-governmental actors and their representatives. Examples include intervention by Amnesty International (Svoboda, October 30, 1974, p. 1.), International P.E.N. (Ibid., November 16, 1974, Section 2, p. 2.), and George Meany, head of the AFL-CIO.

141. Ibid., November 7, 1974, p. 1.

Sakharov and numerous other groups and individuals. The intense pressure finally produced some governmental intervention. In Canada, the new External Affairs Minister Allen MacEachen met with Dr. Tarnopolsky on November 14, and promised to raise the matter with the Soviet ambassador in the next few days.¹⁴² The pressure also produced the first meaningful response from the American administration. Within days of the Canadian response, it was disclosed that the Moroz issue had been placed on the agenda of matters to be discussed between President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev at their summit meeting in Vladivostok.¹⁴³

It would appear that these last developments forced the Soviet government to reassess its position in the Moroz affair. On November 22, 1974, Valentyn Moroz ended his 145 day hunger strike after being informed that the conditions of his imprisonment would be improved.¹⁴⁴ Therefore, as the year 1974 drew to an end, the Ukrainian diaspora had registered its first significant success against the Soviet government in many years. The intention to continue the action on behalf of other imprisoned Ukrainians was firmly entrenched in the minds of most Ukrainian emigres. Ukrainian human rights groups were well established within most Western democracies and public opinion had begun to become aware of the dimensions of the Ukrainian problem within the Soviet Union. The prospects for a still more influential Ukrainian effort were clear.

142. Ibid., November 19, 1974, p. 1.

143. Ibid., November 20, 1974, p. 1.

144. New York Times, December 11, 1974, Section 1, p. 17, Svoboda, February 22, 1975, Section 2, p. 1.

The year 1975 began with an atmosphere permeated by continuing reports of arrests and persecutions in the Soviet Union. Ukrainian lobbying and public information efforts were being continued from the previous year and escalated during the week of January 22, Ukrainian Independence Day. Almost without exception, the various Independence Day celebrations integrated the struggle for human rights in Ukraine and the repression of dissidents generally into the larger theme of a continuous and ongoing struggle for Ukrainian national rights and independence. An effect of this was to reconfirm to the Ukrainians themselves the correctness of the strategy and goals they were pursuing. However, the key to the accomplishment of Ukrainian strategic goals remained successful coalition-building with non-Ukrainian organizations for support and, as was becoming more clear, for the imposition of political, economic, cultural or scientific sanctions against the Soviet Union.

Non-governmental support continued to be the area of greatest positive progress for Ukrainian campaigners. Increasingly, international federations of professionals and academics were being approached for declarations of support and responding favorably. Among the most important of developments in this area was the declaration of March 29, 1975, as International Moroz-Bukovsky Day by the Bertrand Russel Peace Foundation, Pavel Litvinov, Andrei Sakharov, and Jiri Pelikan.¹⁴⁵ The day of protest, only the third such event ever staged, had broad international support among scholars, writers and human rights

145. Svoboda, February 1, 1975, Section 2, p. 3.

activists.146

Actions in the political arena were not as rewarding. Much effort had been expended by Ukrainian organizations in the United States in efforts to place the Moroz issue in the Congressional Record, both to force the Administration's intervention and to tie future credit arrangements with the Soviet Union to relaxed treatment of non-conformist individuals. Approximately 60 members of the House and Senate had been convinced to submit 25 various resolutions on these matters to the relevant Congressional committees. However, none of the resolutions moved out of the committee stage by year's end, and thus all died at the end of the term.¹⁴⁷ Therefore, Ukrainian activists in the U.S. faced the upsetting prospect of having to repeat much of the work done the previous year. Ukrainian Canadian lobbying efforts had as yet not imitated the American thrust of denial of economic benefits to the U.S.S.R but suggestions of similar tactics had begun appearing.¹⁴⁸ Another effort for international intervention was the Ukrainian National, Rada's communication on January 22, 1975, to the embassies of 61 states calling for intervention on behalf

146. Ibid... The first such day of protest had been held in March, 1974 for Major-General Petro Grigorenko, however, it appears that the Ukrainian community did not play a significant role in its creation. Among the over 200 noted individuals endorsing the Moroz-Bukovsky day were Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Zhores Medvedev, Erich Fromm, Nobel Prize Winner Salvador Luria, Noam Chomsky, Svetozar Stojanovic, and several members of the British Parliament.

147. Svoboda, February 15, 1975, Section 2, p. 1. The first to be reintroduced was Representative Joseph Minish's H. Resolution 87 calling on the American government to intercede on behalf of Valentyn Moroz.

148. Ibid., p. 2.

of Moroz, Plyushch and other Ukrainian political prisoners.¹⁴⁹

In early February 1975, important structural changes began to occur to the environment in which the Ukrainian human rights activists operated. These changes, in large part the product of interest group pressure, would serve to ease the work and enhance the effectiveness of Ukrainian and other human rights organizations. In Canada, pressure from various human rights organizations had successfully encouraged the creation of the Canadian Parliamentary Group of Amnesty International which began its work on February 12. Ukrainian Canadian interests in the seventy member group were well represented as the chairman of the group's steering committee was the WCFU's Human Rights Commission Head, Senator Paul Yuzyk.¹⁵⁰ Indeed, the first meeting of the group saw discussion of the possible actions on the cases of Moroz, Plyushch and other Ukrainian intellectuals. However, Ukrainian Canadian lobbying efforts continued to be hampered by the distant location of UCC headoffices.¹⁵¹

Emphasis was beginning to be drawn to the need for an improved presence within the American capital as well. On February 22, 1975, Svoboda published an article by Joseph Iwaniw which demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the existing situation and the first steps required for reducing Ukrainian lobbying difficulties. Iwaniw, in giving his reasons for advocating the

149. Ibid., February 15, 1972, Section 2, p. 2.

150. Ibid., February 22, 1975, Section 2, p. 4.

151. The Ukrainian Canadian Committee's offices continue to be located in Winnipeg, Manitoba, and as of the date of this writing no lobbying office has been established in Ottawa, though there has been discussion of this matter.

establishment of a Ukrainian bureau in Washington, wrote:

True, there are individual lawmakers who do speak out on behalf of Moroz, introduce resolutions to that effect, which are promptly buried in the various committees and never see the light of day. They insert statements in the Congressional Record, favorable to us, which in reality does not mean thing in terms of help for our dissidents or in our struggle for freedom from Moscow. It should not be presumed that Ukrainians are not grateful for these acts of support, but in the final analysis our need for positive action far outstrikes these acts of charity.

... All our marches, meetings, slogans, protests and fund raisings have their place, but such action will not budge one inch (sic). To a degree it only serves, to boost our own morale, and it placates our own conscience, because frustrated, we feel that at least we must "do something" to help our brothers. But that "something" is far short of what we could really do....152

However, as this option was still an open question, and no action could be immediately expected, Ukrainian Americans continued to follow their previous pattern of actions.

On March 1, 1975, the U.S. Committee for the Defense of Valentyn Moroz, began a national campaign aimed at drawing the attention of the American public to the case of Valentyn Moroz.¹⁵³ The campaign was the first Ukrainian action to concentrate almost exclusively on advertising, both print and electronic. However, the general thrust behind the effort remained consistent with earlier Ukrainian strategies, that is, to influence U.S. Congressmen and Senators to support and pass the newly tabled Moroz resolutions.¹⁵⁴

The Moroz Defence Committee in Canada, an organizationally independent body, had concentrated its efforts in two different

152. Svoboda, February 22, 1975, Section 2, p. 2.

153. Ibid., March 8, 1975, Section 2, p. 1.

154. Ibid.

areas. The first objective of the Canadian Committee was the collection and circulation of accurate information on Moroz, Plyushch and other lesser dissenters. The Committee also began an effort to build public awareness of the Moroz case and the question of imprisoned Ukrainian intellectuals in general, however, the method chosen was quite unique. The Committee approached Father Phillip Berrigan, former Jesuit and anti-Vietnam activist, and inquired about his willingness to conduct a speaking tour. On February 3rd, backed by SUSK and Moroz Defence Committee sponsorship, Berrigan began a speaking tour of Canadian university campuses which generated considerable press coverage.¹⁵⁵

Despite the impression created by the high profile of the Moroz Defence Committees, numerous other Ukrainian organizations continued to participate in human rights activities. On March 8, 1975, the WCFU, in commemoration of 1975 as International Women's Year, placed an ad in the New York Times calling for support for Ukrainian women incarcerated in Soviet concentration camps. Under the dramatic headlines "Will These Women be Alive in 1976?" the desperate plight of Nadia Svitlychna, Nina Strokata, Iryna Kalynets, Stephania Shabatura and Iryna Senyk was described.¹⁵⁶ In mid-March, the Committee for the Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners sponsored the rally held during International Moroz-Bukovsky Day. Among the many other lower profile organizations participating in human rights activities were the Ukrainian

155. Ibid., March 1, 1975, Section 2, p. 3.

156. Ibid., March 15, 1975, Section 2, p. 1.

Medical Association of North America, the Ukrainian Writers Association "Slovo", and the Ukrainian American Association of University Professors.¹⁵⁷

Positive response to the various public awareness initiatives was not long in coming. The Moroz Defence Committee's poster campaign had the most visible response. Approximately 450 calls a day began pouring into the Washington office of the Committee.¹⁵⁸ In addition, some success was also achieved in the Committee's drive to have greetings sent by legislators to Moroz on his date of birth.¹⁵⁹ Whether the demonstrated growing public concern could be related to increased governmental intervention was not yet discernable.

On the international level, the International Committee of Mathematicians for the Defense of Leonid Plyushch and Amnesty International responding to continually worsening reports of the state of Leonid Plyushch's health and mental condition, set April 23, 1975, as International Plyushch Day.¹⁶⁰ On that day, hundreds of mathematicians in the West contacted Soviet embassies to express their concerns over Plyushch's continued incarceration.¹⁶¹ In Canada, the UCC took the opportunity to plead once more for Prime Minister Trudeau's intervention in the

157. Ibid., and April 5, 1975, Section 2, p. 1.

158. Ibid., April 5, 1975, Section 2, p. 1.

159. Ibid., April 26, 1975, Section 2, p. 1. By April 26, nine senators and sixty five representatives had sent birthday greetings to Moroz.

160. Ibid., April 5, 1975, Section 2, p. 1.

161. Ibid., April May 3, 1975, Section 2, p. 1

case, and reminded him of the UCC continuing commitment to cover all the costs of Plyushch's emigration and settlement in Canada.¹⁶²

In another significant international development, the arrival in England of a delegation of trade officials headed by Alexander Shelepin, former head of the KGB from 1958 to 1961, provided a focal point for demonstrations against past and present KGB abuses. On April 1, the day of the delegation's arrival, a crowd of over 2,000 highly agitated Ukrainians and Jews protested outside the Trade Union Council headquarters where the delegation was meeting with trade union officials. As the demonstrations continued into the second day, the delegation was forced to cut short its stay and depart.¹⁶³

However, all the news for Ukrainian human rights activists was not positive. Even among those international associations favourable to participating in human rights lobbying, there was considerable hesitation in addressing strong appeals to the Soviet government.¹⁶⁴ Despite a growth in their frequency and militancy, the impact of Western protests on behalf of Soviet Ukrainian prisoners was not discernable. Other than the hard fought battle that improved the conditions of Valentyn Moroz's

162. Ibid.

163. Ibid., April 12, 1975, Section 2, pp. 1-2.

164. For example, witness events at the 1975 annual convention of the American Society of Microbiologists. Despite the determined and persistent efforts of the Ukrainian delegates to get a resolution adopted by the convention's 9,000 participants there was considerable resistance to this step. Eventually a protest letter, which was signed by most of the convention participants, was agreed to as a compromise. Svoboda, May 17, 1975, Section 2, p. 1.

imprisonment, Ukrainians could point to no victories in the Soviet Union. The exile of troublesome dissenters to the West was becoming more frequent by the mid 1970's, but Ukrainians were not among them.¹⁶⁵ Even the release of Major-General Petro Grigorenko, a Ukrainian, from a psychiatric asylum could not be counted as a Ukrainian achievement, as this result was largely the work of non-Ukrainian organizations, especially national psychiatric associations. In the Grigorenko case, Grigorenko's personal history, his lack of involvement in Ukrainian national cause and his service in the Red Army, had prevented many third-wave Ukrainian emigres from participating in the campaigns for his release.

The first attempt to increase coordination among American Ukrainian groups working in the human rights area came on May 21, 1975. Initiated by the New Jersey Commission for the Defense of Human Rights in Ukraine, the suggestion for a more coordinated, systematic and far ranging approach, was widely applauded. The meeting was well attended by representatives of the various interested Ukrainian organizations and plans for future joint action were agreed to.¹⁶⁶

165. See Appendix No. 1 for a list of Soviet dissidents exiled to the West.

166. Svoboda, May 31, 1975, Section 2, p. 1. Among the organizations represented at the meeting were: the Ukrainian Student Hromada, SUMA, Plast, the local Ukrainian National Women's League of America, the Commission for the Defense of Human Rights in Ukraine, the various UCCA branches, the New Jersey Coordinating Committee, the Washington-based Committee for the Defense of Valentyn Moroz and its Newark branch, the coordinator for New Jersey Committees for the Defense of Valentyn Moroz, the New York-based Committee for the Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners, and Svoboda.

During the summer of 1975, emigre Ukrainians continued to concentrate their efforts on public education and information collection. Ukrainian delegates to the World Conference of International Women's Year worked to have the body consider a memorandum detailing the arrests of Ukrainian women for seeking to enforce internationally guaranteed human rights.¹⁶⁷ "Smoloskyp", the Ukrainian Information Service, began publication of three new pamphlets on Ukrainian political prisoners: Trials in Ukraine 1973; Imprisoned Scientists; and Ukrainian Women in Soviet Prisons.¹⁶⁸ In addition, Suchasnist Publishers released a collection of documents entitled Voices from Beyond.¹⁶⁹ On July 4-6, SUSK, the Ukrainian Canadian Students Union sponsored a symposium entitled 'Dissent in Ukraine'.¹⁷⁰ UCCA's specific human rights project during the summer of 1975 was to press Senators and Congressmen to sponsor resolutions in their respective committees and in the House and Senate.¹⁷¹ Finally, in late spring 1975, the idea had been put forward to nominate Valentyn Moroz for the Nobel Peace Prize. By mid-summer substantial lobbying had been carried out in this regard.¹⁷² The

167. Svoboda, June 21, 1975, Section 2, p. 1. Ten of the delegates conducted a 48 hour hunger strike to bring attention to the persecution of Ukrainian women in the U.S.S.R. The hunger strike attracted wide press coverage. The Ukrainian delegates also circulated petitions among the congress participants. See Svoboda, July 5, 1975, Section 2, p. 1.

168. Ibid., p. 2.

169. Ibid., p. 1.

170. Ibid., p. 3.

171. Ibid., June 7, 1975, Section 2, p. 1.

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consequences of the improved lobbying campaign began to show quickly.

In response to questions raised at the Women's Conference of International Women's Year, U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim hinted that unsuccessful diplomatic initiatives had been made by him in the Ukrainian women's cases.¹⁷³ The Ontario Students' Federation at its fourth annual conference adopted, after some debate, a resolution calling on the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia to immediately release Moroz, Plyushch and Jiri Muller and asking for the Canadian government to intervene on their behalf. The Federation also agreed to publish articles on the three in its newspapers.¹⁷⁴ Furthermore, greater awareness and concern was demonstrated on the part of American legislators as the number of resolutions dealing with persecution of Ukrainian dissenters kept increasing. Finally, the best indicator of the growing irritation the Ukrainian campaign was causing to Soviet government, was displayed by the Soviet governments response to communications with Soviet dissident spokesmen. In early summer, Soviet authorities made the acquisition of phonelines and contact with dissenters more difficult for Western groups. The effort was an attempt to cut off groups, such as the Canadian Moroz Defence Committee, which were specializing in information gathering and distribution from the unofficial information sources within the USSR. The action caused

172. Ibid., July 19, 1975, Section 2, p. 1.

173. Ibid., June 28, 1975, Section 2, p. 1

174. Ibid., pp. 1, 4.

considerable difficulties for a time, but was vigorously protested by the Ukrainians' champion in the House of Commons, the Rt. Hon. John Diefenbaker, and eventually led to inquiries by the External Affairs Minister into the matter.¹⁷⁵

The situation in Ukraine by the summer of 1975 saw, in addition to the by now frequent appeals by Soviet dissenters in support of their imprisoned friends and collaborators, the development of two interesting phenomena. The first development was a growing feeling among the dissidents that meaningful change in the Soviet system was unlikely or impossible to come. Thus, individuals who had previously been fighting for political prisoner status, began to renounce their citizenship. Among the first dissenters to resort to this tactic were the Ukrainians Danylo Shumuk and Vyacheslav Chornovil.¹⁷⁶

The other particularly troubling news from the Soviet Union in the summer of 1975 concerned reports of the transfers of healthy political prisoners to mental hospitals. Such information specifically in relation to Moroz and Levko Lukianenko, another high profile Ukrainian dissenter, gained wide currency among emigre Ukrainians that summer and spawned vigorous protests.¹⁷⁷ In both aforementioned cases, Western attention and

175. Ibid., June 21, 1975, Section 2, p. 2.

176. Danylo Shumuk renounced his Soviet citizenship on December 10, 1974, and Vyacheslav Chornovil on March 1, 1975. Emigre Ukrainians learned about these developments only in the summer of 1975. See Svoboda, September 20, 1975, Section 2, pp. 1-2.

177. Ibid., July 26, 1975, Section 2, p. 4. For example, 800 Ukrainians took part in a march in Toronto on July 8 to protest Moroz's suspected psychiatric incarceration.

expressions of concern discouraged such moves, if they had been truly planned.

The signing of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe on August 1, 1975, was an event of unparalleled importance for the promotion of human rights within the Soviet Union. The initial response to Helsinki process from Ukrainian organizations in Canada and the U.S. had been wholly negative. This attitude continued throughout the negotiation period and even after the signing. At a meeting with the Canadian Prime Minister on September 13, a U.C.C delegation headed by its President Serge Radchuk emphasized the problems it foresaw in the interpretation of the provisions of the agreement and called on the government to aggressively pursue a liberal interpretation of the document.¹⁷⁸ It would only be later that the agreement's value in providing a legal basis for the review of the domestic conduct of governments would be realized.

On October 16, 1975, the Andrei Sakharov International Commission on Human Rights began hearings in Copenhagen on the persecution of intellectuals acting in the defense of civil and national rights in the U.S.S.R. The three day hearings provided an important international forum in which to publicize the persecution of Ukrainian dissidents, something that Time Magazine had noted as still sorely lacking only three days earlier.¹⁷⁹ Though not without difficulties, the Ukrainian activists were represented by Dr. Zvarun of the Smoloskyp organization. However,

178. Ibid., September 27, 1975, Section 2, pp. 1-2.

179. Ibid., October 11, 1975, Section 2, p. 1.

the hearings also provoked the first serious conflict between the representatives of various ethnic groups and various dissenters. On October 6, the Sakharov Hearing Organizing Committee informed Mrs. Slava Stetsko of the ABN organization that her previous invitation to testify on the situation in Ukraine had been revoked as the "Committee had been threatened with a boycott, both from the side of witnesses, but especially from the side of interpreters,..."¹⁸⁰ When pressed at the first news conference held during the hearings, the organizers explained that fears that the ABN presence at the hearings would discredit the hearings had prompted them to revoke Mrs. Stetsko's invitation. There was likely some truth in the statement as the Soviet government and the Danish Communist Party, which was boycotting the event, had staged a conference earlier in the week as part of their disinformation strategy.¹⁸¹ However, the more truthful and serious reason for the withdrawal of the invitation was the refusal of a number of Russian dissenters and interpreters to participate in the hearings if Mrs. Stetsko was allowed to speak. Motives for the Russian boycott probably included some antipathy to national rights, something the Ukrainians immediately fixed on and publicly complained about, and an aversion to the OUN-B dominated ABN organization, which Western liberals perceived as an authoritarian, right-wing organization.

Late in October, 1975 a highly important but as yet unappreciated development was the introduction in the U.S. House

¹⁸⁰. Ibid., October 18, 1975, Section 2, p. 4.

¹⁸¹. Ibid., p. 1.

of Representatives on October 20 of a resolution to establish a Congressional Committee to oversee the implementation of the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act.¹⁸² The resolution's sponsor, Repr. Millicent Fenwick had been a long time supporter of Ukrainian human rights actions and had only recently returned from a visit to the U.S.S.R. where her unsuccessful demands to see Moroz and other dissenters had caused considerable friction and increased her motivation to give substance to the Helsinki human rights guarantees. Representative Fenwick's close ties to the New Jersey based group of Moroz Defence Committees assured her resolution an early and substantial public support and would improve the chances of its later adoption. Soon after, in what was to become a decisive move, the French Communist Party in a unprecedented tactical shift broke away from the CPSU's line on the human rights situation in the U.S.S.R.. In an editorial carried on October 25 in L'Humanite, the official organ of the French CP, the party demanded the immediate release of Leonid Plyushch. Coming after a successful 5,000 person rally sponsored by the International Committee of Mathematicians in Defense of Leonid Plyushch and the French Socialist party held on October 23, 1975, it had become obvious that the position of siding with the Soviets had become too costly even for the French CP to afford.¹⁸³ The shift signalled the beginning of the last days of Leonid Plyushch's

182. Ibid., November 8, 1975, Section 2, p. 1.

183. Ibid. In fact the editor of L'Humanite, Rene Andrieu, criticized the rally organizer's for not asking the French CP to help with the rally's preparations.

imprisonment.

On November 28, 1975, Associated Press dispatches from Moscow reported that Kremlin officials had told Tatiana Zhitnikova, Leonid Plyushch's wife, to apply for exit visas for her husband and the family.¹⁸⁴ On December 10, dissident sources reported that emigration officials in Kiev had informed Tatiana Zhitnikova, that her husband's fate would be "resolved in the positive".¹⁸⁵ However, the situation reversed itself in dramatic fashion by December 15, when Zhitnikova reported that Soviet officials had refused to release her husband and had once again began administering powerful drugs to Plyushch.¹⁸⁶ The situation changed once more by December 27, and Plyushch's liberation appeared likely after new pressures appeared on his behalf.¹⁸⁷ As the year ended, Plyushch's ultimate fate still remained undecided but stood out as the highlight of the year which had been ironically designated as International Women's Year but in which progress in easing the plight of Soviet women prisoners had been unapparent.¹⁸⁸

184. Ibid., December 2, 1975, p. 1.

185. Ibid., December 12, 1975, p. 1.

186. Ibid., December 17, 1975, p. 1.

187. Ibid., December 30, 1975, p. 1.

188. On December 1, 1975, representatives of Ukrainian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Estonian, and Byelorussian women's organizations after three months of delaying tactics by the government, called on Allan MacEachen, the Canadian External Affairs Minister, to demand Canadian action on behalf of women prisoners in the USSR. MacEachen's reply was sobering. In refusing public actions, he pledged that the Canadian government would continue private interventions as it had done in the past. Svoboda, January 3, 1975, Section 2, p. 1. Simultaneously with the MacEachen meeting, the Committee for

The Plyushch affair approached its ultimate conclusion on December 31, 1975. On that date, Tatiana Zhitnikova received word that her request for emigration visas had been approved. On January 9, 1975 Leonid Plyushch finally gained his freedom and left the U.S.S.R. After a short stop-over in Austria, where he was examined by Dr. Low-Beer of Amnesty International and pronounced a perfectly sane but medically abused person, he travelled to Paris at the personal invitation of French President Valery Giscard D'Estaing.¹⁸⁹ A new era for the emigre Ukrainian community's human rights campaign had begun.

188. (continued) the Defence of Valentyn Moroz and various Ukrainian women's organizations mounted an intensive campaign in the final month of International Women's Year to bring attention to the plight of Soviet Ukrainian women prisoners. A continuous month-long demonstration was staged in front of the Soviet embassy prompting much aggravation among Soviet officials. The Soviet ambassador Aleksandr Yakovlev vociferously complained about the demonstration both to the Canadian government and to the Canadian public in a front-page interview to the Ottawa Citizen on December 22, however his complaints were to no avail. Svoboda, December 26, 1975, Section 2, pp. 1, 4.

189. Svoboda, January 10, 1976, Section 2, pp. 1, 4.

Chapter Four

Dissident-Emigre Relations

The arrival of Leonid Plyushch, the first major Ukrainian dissident to be exiled to the West, was a development of great importance for emigre Ukrainians. While not a mythical figure as Valentyn Moroz had become, Plyushch did represent the first opportunity for emigre Ukrainians to match the person of a living Ukrainian dissident against their beliefs of what present-day Ukrainian patriots in the U.S.S.R. were. As is now apparent, his arrival would place the firmly held myth in conflict with a dramatic and unexpected reality, with highly unpredictable and, often damaging results.

Upon his arrival in Marchegg, Austria, Leonid Plyushch, was met by a large contingent of newsmen and supporters among which several Ukrainian organizations were represented.¹ While her husband was undergoing a medical and psychiatric examination, Tatiana Zhitnikova-Plyushch briefly answered reporters' questions. The family was then driven to Vienna. During the stopover in Vienna, Tatiana Plyushch gave her first interview to a Radio Liberty correspondent, promptly acknowledging the family's gratefulness for the moral and material support Ukrainians had given the family. In turn, she was told of the continuing desire of Ukrainian organizations to provide the

1. "Ukrainian Dissident Leonid Plyushch Released, Allowed to Leave U.S.S.R.; Tatyana Plyushch Pleads for Help for Others Still Imprisoned," Smoloskyp Information Service Press Release, No. AI-27, January 19, 1976, p. 2. Among those awaiting Leonid Plyushch's arrival in Marchegg was Andrei Grigorenko.

family with assistance.² Before concluding the interview, Mrs. Plyushch called for continued Ukrainian action to help free other political prisoners, including Valentyn Moroz, Vyacheslav Chornovil, Ivan Svitlychnyi, Sviatoslav Karavanskyi, Mykola Plakhotniuk and other imprisoned Ukrainians.³ These points were repeated and expanded, and accounts of the acute nationality problem in Ukraine were given in several interviews conducted by Tatiana Plyushch in the days that immediately followed, her husband having been told that he was still too weak to participate in interviews. The result of these interviews was to create first assessments among emigre Ukrainians which initially confirmed their earlier beliefs about the dissidents, and endeared the Plyushch family with the vast majority of emigre Ukrainians.

However, the true test for the newly arrived dissidents lay in the realm of politics. In the Radio Liberty interview, Tatiana Plyushch faced the potentially troublesome questions of Ukrainian nationalism and the beliefs of its adherents. In her replies, Tatiana Plyushch outlined a position which could not have but occupied the centre of Ukrainian emigre politics:

The nationality question in Ukraine is very important. And those who are now in the camps as Ukrainian nationalists - and this includes Sverstiuk, Svitlychnyi, and those I mentioned before - suffer because of the fact that they are

2. Tatiana Plyushch was informed about offers of assistance for the family coming from Metropolitan Mstyslav of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of America, the World Congress of Free Ukrainians, the Ukrainian Medical Association of North America, and the Ukrainian National Association. See Svoboda, January 17, 1976, Section 2, p. 4.

3. Ibid., pp. 1, 4.

true Ukrainians. I consider this issue to be very important and relevant, and the mere fact that the government keeps the better sons of Ukraine behind bars shows that this problem exists and that it is critically in need of a solution.

Q: Do you agree at all with the label "Ukrainian nationalist" for the people you mentioned?

A: I believe that this is a term that should be allowed to exist because only in the Soviet press does it carry an insulting connotation. But a nationalist is, to my mind, a person who, first of all, loves his nation and is deeply concerned for the fate of his people. This does not mean at all that he does not respect other nations. And this is exactly how this word is treated in the Soviet press - that a nationalist is a person who shows disrespect for others and that is why it is bad. It is simply a question of a person's relationship to his country, to his people.⁴

Philosophically, I am closer to Solzhenitsyn, but not completely.... People who share the views of my husband refuse to live in lies. I also refuse to live in lies and that is why I did what I did.⁵

In her final comments, Tatiana Plyushch was cautiously referring to Leonid Plyushch's earlier admission to a Le Monde reporter that he was a Marxist, and rumours that he wished to meet with the Ukrainian socialists.⁶ She was both well aware of the continuing effects of her husband's long isolation and abuse, and more cognizant than he of the nature of their new environment. Nevertheless, the rumours had already created an air of uncertainty among many exiles, and began to arouse hostility among members of OUN-B. When pressed by the Radio Liberty reporter, Tatiana Plyushch, did nothing to dispel the fog, and

4. "Ukrainian Dissident Leonid Plyushch Allowed to Leave U.S.S.R.; Tatyana Plyushch Pleads for Help for Others Still Imprisoned," pp. 3-4.

5. Svoboda, January 24, 1976, Section 2, pp. 1, 4.

6. "Ukrainian Dissident Leonid Plyushch Allowed to Leave U.S.S.R.; Tatyana Plyushch Pleads for Help for Others Still Imprisoned," p. 4.

would only say "that is his opinion" and elaborated no further.⁷

By January 19, 1976, Leonid Plyushch had begun to conduct his own interviews. In a telephone interview with Committee for the Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners, Plyushch again admitted that he considered himself to be a Marxist, something his wife, aware of the strength of feelings held by various Ukrainian emigre groups, again tried to minimize.⁸ He went on to specifically stress the need for immediate action to save Mykola Plakhotniuk and Vasyl Lisovyi, two fellow inmates virtually unmentioned in the West, a suggestion readily accepted by Ukrainian human rights groups. However, Plyushch also called for Ukrainians to defend all political prisoners around the world: "We must fight for human rights around the world, and we, Ukrainians, must not only fight for ourselves, but actively defend the rights of all peoples in the Soviet Union."⁹ While appearing to be a reasonable statement, Plyushch's position tested the tolerance the sizeable segment of Ukrainian society on the far right, which considered the defence of the rights of Ukrainians to be first and foremost in importance.¹⁰

Leonid Plyushch added to the growing confusion felt by the emigre Ukrainians by his remarks in a Le Monde interview of

7. Ibid., p. 4.

8. Svoboda, January 31, 1976, Section 2, p. 4.

9. Ibid., p. 1.

10. Homin Ukrainy, January 31, 1976, p. 5. The newspaper clearly referred to Plyushch's belief that all nationalities must be defended, with the implication that OUN-B did not share his viewpoint.

February 3, 1975.¹¹ In the interview, Plyushch stressed many of the points traditionally of great concern to Ukrainians: the falsification of Ukrainian history, Russification, the Ukrainian famine of 1932-33, and the persecution of Ukrainian patriots. In calling for an independent Ukraine, Plyushch touched the cornerstone of emigre ambitions, however, unlike most emigres he ventured to outline his view of the future Ukrainian state. The state he stressed would have to be a truly socialist one. While accepting the label of Communist, he permitted himself to qualify its definition to mean:

...fighting for a society in which there is no Darwinian style tooth-and-nail struggle for material well-being.

It means fighting for a society where the mind would be freed from the primacy of the belly to the advantage of creativity. For all human beings are talented in the innermost being. But that talent must be discovered and they must be allowed to express it.¹²

To many Ukrainian emigres, the comments seemed to lack a realism which they had been forced to accept long ago. In addition, Marxism and its various permutations had been long dismissed by most emigres as camouflage for an active, expanding Russian imperialist state. Further tension was generated by Plyushch's comments criticizing the presence of anti-semitism "both in the government and among the people (of the Soviet Union)".¹³ Finally, in an interesting and what would become an ironic aside, Leonid Plyushch named Valentyn Moroz, the emigre's hero and an individual at the other end of the political spectrum, as

11. Svoboda, February 7, 1976, Section 2, p. 1.

12. Ibid., p. 4.

13. Ibid. ✱

a friend for whose release the Ukrainian emigre community had to keep on working.¹⁴

OUN-B, through its Canadian weekly Homin Ukrainy, reacted to the Le Monde interview with its first open, direct criticism of Plyushch. In particular, it faulted Leonid Plyushch for failing to raise the question of Ukraine during the press conference. It also noted Leonid Plyushch's adherence to neo-Marxism. The paper concluded its criticism by remarking that there were questions about Leonid Plyushch which had to be "openly and clearly ascertained by not only the Ukrainian community, but also by the whole free world."¹⁵

While the release of Leonid Plyushch diverted much of their attention during January 1976, Ukrainian organizations continued staging numerous protest actions during this time, often with joint Ukrainian/Jewish participation.¹⁶ The WCFU responded to the grave situation of Rev. Vasyl Romaniuk and the persecution of the Ukrainian churches and their adherents by designating 1976 as the Year of Defense of Ukrainian Religion and Church.¹⁷ Community defense efforts were further encouraged by the joint renunciation of Soviet citizenship by 23 Ukrainian political prisoners in January 1976, among them Ivan Svitlychnyi

14. Ibid. However, Plyushch would later admit to having "three chauvinists" among his Ukrainian patriot friends, though he would not elaborate further.

15. Homin Ukrainy, February 14, 1976, p. 1.

16. Svoboda, February 14, 1976, Section 2, p. 4

17. Ibid., p. 1.

and Ihor Kalynets.¹⁸ In an indication of its continuing strength and increasing awareness of the permanence of the human rights campaign, the Washington-based Moroz Defence Committee incorporated itself as Human Rights Research, Inc.¹⁹ Finally, the important Fenwick resolution, H.R. 9466, calling for the creation of a Congressional Committee on Security and Cooperation in Europe and its Senate counterpart, were reintroduced early in the new session with the support of all members from the state of New Jersey where the powerful Moroz Defence Committee network had been at work.²⁰

The first real interaction between emigre Ukrainians and Leonid Plyushch began with the arrival of the Plyushch family in New York on March 21, 1976, as part of a three-week tour of Canada and the United States.²¹ On March 23, 1976, Leonid Plyushch in his most important encounter with Ukrainians to date, met with 200 leaders of the Ukrainian American Community.²² The bulk of Plyushch's speech of the evening was devoted to renaissance of Ukraine in the 1960's, the individuals involved, and the rise and suppression of the dissident movement. Plyushch stressed the need to help these brave individuals and advocated once again "the creation of an international committee that would include all individuals and groups concerned with the violations

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid., February 28, 1976, Section 2, p. 4.

20. Ibid., March 6, 1976, Section 2, p. 1.

21. Ibid., March 27, 1976, Section 2, p. 1.

22. Ibid.

of human rights to fight for democracy, for freedom, for human rights and for the right of free religious worship,".²³ While explaining that all his friends dealt with Ukraine on socialist assumptions, Plyushch sidestepped the tricky pitfalls of the issue, by noting that economic system of a future independent Ukraine was for the people to decide.²⁴ In the highly popular conclusions of his speech, Plyushch had only the greatest praises for Valentyn Moroz and harshest criticisms for Ivan Dzyuba.²⁵ The basic themes of this first speech were repeated in the subsequent speeches given by Plyushch in the following days.

However, dissatisfaction with some comments made by Plyushch surfaced rather quickly. On March 27, 1976, in his first address to a large group of the Ukrainian public, Plyushch made an erratic and controversial speech which left the audience, in the words of one reporter, with "mixed feelings and somewhat disheartened".²⁶ Some of Plyushch's comments, especially those telling the audience that Ukrainians should protest the jailing of Chilean communists, and help the Rosenbergs' children, drew

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid., p. 4.

25. Ibid. Plyushch's comments about Moroz included naming him as a "magnetic, colossal figure," and stating that "he does not know how to lie - everything he has said thus far is true." Plyushch's remarks about Ivan Dzyuba were dramatically different. While acknowledging that Dzyuba's book Internationalism or Russification? was an extremely important document, Plyushch referred to Dzyuba as a "traitor" and cited his "political opportunism, ideological oscillations and illness...".

26. Svoboda, April 3, 1976, Section 2, p. 1.

hissing and shouts from the crowd of 3,000.²⁷ While Tatiana Plyushch remained a favorite, strains had appeared in the relationship between the first major Ukrainian dissident to be exiled and the community, while the relationship was not yet fully three months old.²⁸

Freedom for Rev. Vasyl Romaniuk, a firm supporter of Valentyn Moroz, was to become the new focus for Ukrainian protest efforts in 1976. Responding to the WCFU appeal, SUSTA and the Washington-based Committee for the Defence of Valentyn Moroz, joined forces to launch a wide scale campaign of letter writing, lobbying, and public information.²⁹ The organizations also encouraged other groups to join the effort.

During his first North American tour in March 1976, Leonid Plyushch delivered numerous lectures and addresses to large audiences. However, Plyushch's ignorance of the West, of the true history of the Ukrainian nationalist movement and its emigre branches, and the after-effects of his traumatic imprisonment often helped turn his remarks into unqualified criticism which encountered negative public reception. On April 3, Leonid

27. Ibid. Svoboda quoted one of the hecklers, a recently arrived Jewish immigrant, as shouting "Talk about Moroz, Bukovsky, Chornovil, not about Rosenbergs and Chileans." Many of Plyushch's remarks were made directly and pointedly at Senator Henry Jackson, a champion of the Ukrainian cause within the Senate, and further antagonized many in the audience.

28. Homin Ukrainy, April 3, 1976, pp. 1, 4. The paper continued to harden its attitude toward Plyushch, publishing a lengthy and highly critical letter on Plyushch's conduct to date. The letter was prominently printed across a major part of the front page of the paper.

29. Ibid., p. 1.

Plyushch addressed a rally of American leftists chastising them for their subservience to the Soviet Communist Party, for their indifference to cries for help from the U.S.S.R., and for their excessive criticism of the United States.³⁰ Earlier on March 30, Plyushch had testified before the House International Relations Sub-Committee on International Organizations and with open candor told his hosts that he considered himself a neo-Marxist. He informed them that the U.S. government was superior to the Soviet government, but that he preferred a third form, "a government of workers, peasants and working intelligentsia."³¹ Plyushch would later apologize for remarks he made concerning the Rosenbergs at the hearings explaining that they were the result of misinformation. On March 31, while attending a fund-raising dinner in Livingston, N.J., Leonid Plyushch received an introduction which both supported his general stand and harshly criticized some of his comments of March 27.³² In the ensuing discussion, Plyushch defended his comments of March 27 and sought to explain what he had meant. After the late arrival to the dinner of Tatiana Plyushch, who defended her husband, tensions were diffused by Metropolitan Mstyslav who candidly admitted that he considered the Plyushch's arrival in the U.S. premature. Continuing, the Orthodox prelate commented:

We must come to know each other better. We must recognize and understand the man who clearly admitted to his Ukrainianism, and called for an independent Ukraine in which

30. Svoboda, April 10, 1976, Section 2, p. 1.

31. Ibid., pp. 1, 4.

32. Ibid., p. 1.

a nation can live freely and develop its creative and cultural life.³³

The Canadian leg of the Plyushch visit was marked by considerably less controversy than had been his tour of the U.S.. For six days, the Plyushch family toured Ottawa, Toronto, and Montreal attracting large crowds and wide press coverage.³⁴ Ukrainian activists in Ottawa noted that Plyushch was beginning to understand the mentality of emigre Ukrainians and western politics, and consequently handling himself better.³⁵ However, this was insufficient to prevent new criticism of Plyushch coming from some Soviet dissidents still within the Soviet Union. For example, Tatiana Khodorovich, his most ardent supporter during his imprisonment, attacked him harshly on May 19 for attaching humane principles to Marxism, which she characterized as a "brutal ideology".³⁶

On May 19, 1976, the news that Valentyn Moroz had been transferred to the notorious Serbsky Institute shocked emigre Ukrainians.³⁷ The international response was swift. In Canada, the Ukrainian Canadian Committee asked that Prime Minister Trudeau personally intervene on behalf of Moroz to secure his unconditional release from prison and his emigration abroad in a manner similar to that which had freed Leonid Plyushch only

33. Ibid.

34. Homin Ukrainy, April 10, 1976, p. 1. Homin Ukrainy reported that over 5,000 people had come to hear him speak in Toronto.

35. Svoboda, April 17, 1976, Section 2, p. 1.

36. Ibid., June 5, 1976, p. 1.

37. Ibid., May 19, 1976, p. 1.

shortly before.³⁸ The Moroz Defence Committee reported the beginning of a three-pronged campaign, with a number of individuals and groups preparing to make statements on Moroz's behalf. It described steps being made to discuss the new development with governmental officials, and efforts being made to organize an international committee of historians in defence of Moroz, along the lines of the International Committee of Mathematicians in Defense of Leonid Plyushch.³⁹ Leonid Plyushch himself responded from Paris by issuing a statement calling for worldwide action in defence of Moroz and directing his own, recently formed human rights organization, the International Committee in Defence of Political Prisoners, to begin publication of leaflets and brochures about Moroz. French psychiatrists urged Plyushch to appear on T.V. to spur action in Moroz's defence.⁴⁰

The escalation of Soviet pressure on Moroz also provoked governmental responses. In the United States, a campaign in the U.S. Congress was undertaken by Senator Buckley to secure the release of Moroz and allow his emigration to the United States.⁴¹ Twenty-three Senators responded to the Senator Buckley's call to send protests to Secretary-General Brezhnev. A similar letter in the House had the support of 78 members.⁴² In addition, while tangential to the issue, the Moroz transfer was a factor

38. Ibid., May 29, 1976, Section 2, p. 1.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid., June 12, 1976, Section 2, p. 1.

influencing the June 3 signing by President Ford of a bill creating the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.⁴³ Adding further pressure to the situation, was Moroz's renunciation of Soviet citizenship in early June, and a bill introduced in Congress on July 2, which sought to make him an honorary U.S. citizen.⁴⁴ In Canada, the House of Commons unanimously adopted a resolution on June 4 calling on the Prime Minister to intervene in the matter.⁴⁵ Protests also began to be heard from members of the British House of Commons.⁴⁶

The results of the massive pressure campaign were telling. On June 21, Soviet doctors informed Raisa Moroz that her husband was sane and that he would be transferred to a camp in the near future.⁴⁷ Despite the transfer, Ukrainian organizations maintained a strong presence at international conferences, such as Habitat, the U.N. Conference on Human Settlements and elsewhere during the summer of 1976.⁴⁸

By late summer, events had begun to develop a momentum of

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid., June 19, 1976, Section 2, p. 1, 4. House resolutions 1019, 1020 and 1021 were introduced on July 1, 1976 by Representatives Fenwick, Koch and Dodd, with the co-sponsorship of 66 additional members. Ukrainian Weekly, July 11, 1976, p. 1.

45. Svoboda, June 12, 1976, Section 2, p. 1

46. Ibid., June 5, 1976, p. 2.

47. Ibid., June 26, 1976, Section 2, p. 1. Dissident sources believed that it was largely due to American pressure. See Ukrainian Weekly, September 5, 1976, p. 13. Valentyn Moroz was transferred to Mordovian Camp No. 1, near Barashevo, in late summer 1976. Ukrainian Weekly, August 22, 1976, p. 1.

48. Ukrainian Weekly, July 4, 1976, p. 10.

their own. The effects of the Ukrainian lobbying and the continuing distressing reports of the fate of Moroz and others in Soviet camps contributed to the passage of S. Res. 67 calling for Presidential intervention in the Moroz affair.⁴⁹ A development independent of Ukrainian lobbying but highly favourable to Ukrainians in the area of human rights was the appointment of Dr. Walter Tarnopolsky as Canada's representative to the U.N. Human Rights Commission which was formed to oversee adherence to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

On October 18, 1976, President Ford finally signed into law the bill which approved funding for the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.⁵⁰ Although the President appeared hesitant because of the expected Soviet reaction, a militant response by the American East European community to his political gaffe on the nationally televised debate with Presidential candidate Jimmy Carter, helped force the President's hand.

The victory of Jimmy Carter in the 1976 presidential elections provided Ukrainian Americans with hope for a dramatic increase in White House support for their political claims. This was particularly broadly felt in the aftermath of Henry Kissinger's negative comments in early October. Kissinger, while commenting on Ford's reversal of position during the debates, stated that the American government felt that Ukraine was not within Eastern Europe, thereby implying that it also did not

49. Ibid., September 19, 1976, p. 1.

50. Ibid., October 17, 1976, p. 1.

enjoy the same American commitment to its eventual liberation and independence.⁵¹ Further evidence as to Henry Kissinger's position on human rights questions in the international arena was provided on November 1, 1976, when he forbid three members of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, who were governmental officials, from travelling with the Commission to Eastern Europe to observe compliance with the Final Act.⁵² Kissinger's unequivocal ranking of strategic issues above questions of human rights had meant that Ukrainian lobbying efforts, and now the efforts of the newly constituted Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe had been impeded within the President's inner circle. With the change in American administration, expectations of a dramatic reversal in the fortunes of the human rights lobby were largely fulfilled.

Efforts at organizing prisoner defence groups and securing resolutions condemning abuses of human rights in Ukraine continued to be the main focus of Ukrainian lobbying efforts in late 1976. Among the more notable developments was the successful passage of a special resolution by the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies which, after listing the names of 26 imprisoned Ukrainian and Jewish intellectuals, condemned the persecution of individuals "for protesting against the lawlessness of the state and the suppression of their national cultures."⁵³ Significant also were highly successful attempts by

51. Ibid., October 31, 1976, p. 1, 2.

52. Svoboda, November 4, 1976, p. 1.

53. Ukrainian Weekly, October 24, 1976, p. 3. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 467 to 98.

Leonid Plyushch to organize a campaign to help Mykola Plakhotniuk, a fellow inmate of the Dnipropetrovsk SPH. Considerable progress was made by Plyushch in this regard at the International Congress of Psychotherapy, where over 250 of the participants signed a letter in support of Plakhotniuk, Semyon Gluzman and Mikhail Shtern. Leonid Plyushch also referred to Plakhotniuk during his speech at a rally on October 21, the anniversary of the demonstration which helped free him. He was joined by a number of speakers including Pierre Juquin, a member of the French Communist Party, who in an important allusion attacked countries who in the name of socialism "violate the rights of the individual".⁵⁴

News of the establishment of the Ukrainian Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords on November 9, 1976 was rapidly disseminated among emigre Ukrainians. Soon after, a number of Ukrainian American activists involved in the Moroz Defence Committee movement created the American Committee to Monitor Compliance with the Helsinki Accords. The Committee's stated goal, like the Ukrainian group's, was to monitor compliance with the Helsinki Final Act and report violations to the signatory states.⁵⁵ It was not long before the group began reporting violations of rights of the members of the Ukrainian

54. Ibid., November 21, 1976, pp. 4-5.

55. Svoboda, November 23, 1976, p. 1. The founders of the new committee included Dr. Ihor Koszman, Dr. Andrew Zwarun, Ulana Mazurkevich, Ihor Olshaniwsky, Andrew Fedynskyj and Bohdan Yasen.

group itself.⁵⁶

On November 20, 1976, representatives of the UCCA, the UCC and the WCFU met in Winnipeg to discuss joint projects, strategy and problems among these organizations. Among the topics of discussion were aid to political emigres from Ukraine, and disagreements between the UCCA and the WCFU over sponsorship and coordination of activities in the U.S., specifically problems encountered during Leonid Plyushch's visit to the U.S..⁵⁷ As the year drew to a close, it was clear that the Ukrainian lobbying effort had achieved its greatest level of success ever. Though it had lost its dominance of the Ukrainian political agenda much earlier, the persistent efforts of human rights activists and better campaign organization as a result of several years of work, generated a momentum which resulted in a number of notable accomplishments including indirectly, the release of Leonid Plyushch and the establishment of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Plyushch, as a newly arrived figure in a highly politicized and opinionated diaspora had shocked many, destroying some fervently held beliefs, and given individuals within OUN-B critical of the dissident movement in general, the evidence with which to confirm their opinions. However, the over-all human rights campaign had still not been greatly damaged. Symbols such as Moroz still remained untainted. Plyushch while damaging his own position within the community, underwent a

56. Within days of its creation, the Committee reported an attack on Mykola Rudenko's home in which brick-throwing thugs injured Oksana Meshko, a committee member. (Ukrainian Weekly, December 5, 1976, p. 1).

57. Ukrainian Weekly, December 5, 1976, p. 1.

tremendous learning experience, gaining a measure of understanding of emigre community and its politics. His political beliefs had originally led to his disassociation with factions of the Ukrainian right and center in general. With the passage of time his aversion came to be limited to organizations of the far right. The far right, represented by OUN-B, in turn matched Plyushch's aspersions and shortly after set about to destroy his influence in the Ukrainian diaspora.

As 1977 began, Soviet authorities began mounting increasing pressure against the Moscow and Ukrainian Helsinki Groups. The increasing level of repression and brutality within the Soviet penal system prompted still more renunciations of Soviet citizenship by Ukrainian political prisoners.⁵⁸ In response, many small demonstrations and protest actions were undertaken in the West in the first days of the new year, primarily by local youth and Moroz Defence Groups.⁵⁹ On January 17, the Paris-based Committee for the Defense of Soviet Political

58. Ibid., January 23, 1977, p. 3. For example, in Philadelphia, TUSM, Plast, SUMA, ODUM and the local Moroz Defense Committee conducted demonstrations and a vigil. CeSUS declared that Ukrainian students would consider January 12 to be a day of solidarity with Ukrainian political prisoners and would hold symbolic fasts on that day. See Ukrainian Weekly, January 2, 1977, p. 3.

59. The Moscow Helsinki Group reported in its Memorandum No. 12 that 26 Soviet political prisoners, among them 19 Ukrainians, renounced their citizenship in 1976. See Svoboda, January 18, 1977, p. 1. For a complete list of the 22 Ukrainians known to have renounced their Soviet citizenship by January, 1977 see Ukrainian Weekly, January 30, 1977, pp. 1-2. That there was a general increase in violence against Soviet political prisoners after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act was corroborated by Vladimir Bukovsky's comments at a press conference on December 19, 1976, a day after his exchange. See Ukrainian Weekly, December 26, 1976, p. 2.

Prisoners sponsored a press conference on the fifth anniversary of the 1972 arrests, at which Leonid Plyushch was the central speaker. Plyushch commented on the fear that Moscow possesses of Ukrainian nationalism and defined the nexus between that fear and the decision to eliminate the budding Ukrainian dissident movement that was taken in December, 1971.⁶⁰ Plyushch went on to outline the Committee's future plans aimed at securing the release of a number of Soviet prisoners, including among them Moroz, Plakhotniuk, Vasyl Lisovyi, and Oleksandr Serhiienko. Other speakers at the press conference included Natalia Gorbanevskaya, Marcel Broue, Avgust Shtern and Danylo Haniak, President of the Organization of Ukrainian Youth of France, an organization which had played an important early part in creating the pressure in France for the release of Leonid Plyushch.⁶¹

The goal of increasing the effectiveness of the Ukrainian lobbying efforts continued to be a top priority for Ukrainian human rights activists. On January 29, 1977, the first major conference of Ukrainian human rights organizations was held in Philadelphia. At the conference were representatives of the Moroz Defence Committees from Philadelphia, Toronto, Montreal, Washington, and New Jersey, as well as members of the Newark Committee in Defense of Ukrainian Political Prisoners, the 'Smoloskyp' Organization in the Defense of Human Rights (Baltimore/Cleveland), and New York Committee for the Defense of

⁶⁰. Svoboda, January 21, 1977, p. 1, 3. This Committee, apparently the fourth to possess the name Committee for the Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners, was created in May, 1976, and worked very closely with Leonid Plyushch.

⁶¹. Ukrainian Weekly, January 30, 1977, p. 2.

Soviet Political Prisoners.⁶² The representatives decided to create a conference which would meet twice yearly to lay future plans and a permanent coordinating committee which would serve as a contact point between conferences. Finally, the newly-founded conference pledged support for the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, for all actions in defence of human and national rights in Ukraine and for the initiative to establish a Ukrainian Anti-Discrimination League in the U.S.⁶³

On February 5, 1977, KGB agents raided the homes of the members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group and arrested Mykola Rudenko and Oleksa Tykhyi. The arrests and searches immediately provoked renewed calls for action from the Ukrainian diaspora world wide. In the U.S., the newly formed Helsinki Guarantees for Ukraine Committee began a letter and telegram blitz addressed to the heads of the signatory nations to the Final Act, and to U.S. Congressmen and Senators, and Canadian Parliamentarians, calling for urgent intervention to save the newly arrested dissidents.⁶⁴ Numerous other organizations began lobbying efforts on behalf of these dissidents with some positive effects.⁶⁵ On February 15, 1977, the Canadian Parliament unanimously passed a resolution introduced by Mitchell Sharp, expressing "disappointment and deep

62. Ibid., February 6, 1977, p. 1.

63. Ibid. It should be noted that the issue of alleged Ukrainian collaboration with the Nazis was beginning to become a major Ukrainian concern in the U.S. at this time, and divert resources from the human rights campaign.

64. Svoboda, February 9, 1977, p. 1.

65. For a sample of the protest activities that were triggered, see the Ukrainian Weekly, February 20, 1977, pp. 1-3.

concern" over the recent arrests.⁶⁶ Many expressions of concern also emanated from various officials in the U.S., including President Carter.⁶⁷

It was at this time, that Andrei Grigorenko finally first spoke to an Ukrainian audience. Speaking to an overflow crowd of more than 500, Grigorenko called on Ukrainians "to think about freedom for Ukraine", but as Plyushch earlier, Grigorenko also called on Ukrainians to show concern about the freedom of other nationalities in the U.S.S.R. including that of the Russians.⁶⁸ Andrei Grigorenko was not the only Ukrainian dissident to urge emigre Ukrainians to action. A desperate plea for support was telephoned to the Helsinki Guarantees for Ukraine Committee on February 16 by Nina Karavanska-Strokata. Speaking also for Stefaniia Shabatura, Strokata stated:

M. Rudenko and O. Tykhy will remain behind bars unless Ukrainians do not(sic) find in themselves the strength and courage to stand up in their defense.

All of us, who were and remain political prisoners in the Soviet Union, hope that our countrymen will energetically defend all Ukrainian patriots.⁶⁹

In this atmosphere of continuing protests and arrest, the first hearing before the newly constituted Commission on Security

66. Ibid., p. 1.

67. Svoboda, February 19, 1977, p. 1, 3. President Carter's comments were included in his second letter to Andrei Sakharov. In addition, 49 Congressmen co-signed a letter written by representatives Koch, Fenwick and Dodd to ambassador Dobrynin, complaining about the new arrests. See Ukrainian Weekly, March 13, 1977, p. 1. Twenty-five Senators followed with a similar letter (Ukrainian Weekly, April 10, 1977, pp. 1, 12).

68. Svoboda, February 8, 1977, p. 1.

69. Ukrainian Weekly, February 27, 1977, p. 1.

and Cooperation in Europe was held. The first witness, Vladimir Bukovsky raised his intense concern about recently arrested members of the Moscow and Ukrainian groups. Later, at the same hearing, Dr. Zwarun of the Helsinki Guarantees for Ukraine Committee raised numerous other concerns of emigre Ukrainians, including the question of Ukraine's absence at the Helsinki Conference.⁷⁰

In the following weeks, a massive campaign of protests, letter-writing, and visits with legislators in the U.S. and Canada developed. The new repressions in Ukraine and the atmosphere of escalating militancy among emigre Ukrainians, encouraged the WCFU to proclaim May as "Defense of the Persecuted in Ukraine Month".⁷¹ The level of concern was such that virtually all emigre Ukrainian organizations participated in the call for action, a development unrivalled since the 1972 wave of arrests.⁷² The Ukrainian lobbying effort climaxed in a week of UNA-organized protests beginning May 16. However, the newly-imprisoned dissidents had become pawns in the U.S.-Soviet relationship, and their fates were sealed by an apparent Soviet decision that the importance of demonstrating strength before the forthcoming Belgrade Review Conference, had come to exceed the value of the dissidents being released.

70. Ibid., March 6, 1977, pp. 1-2.

71. Ibid., April 24, 1977, p. 1.

72. The UCCA specifically asked President Carter to intervene in Rudenko/Tykhyy matter on July 2, 1977 (Ukrainian Weekly, July 10, 1977, p. 2). The UCC's appeal for intervention by Prime Minister Trudeau in Rudenko/Tykhyy case was sent on July 5, 1977. See Ukrainian Weekly, July 17, 1977, p. 4.

The Belgrade Review Conference was to become the important first step in measuring the value of the Helsinki process. On April 22, 1977, the Committee for the Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners (N.Y) disclosed that among the various NGO's which hoped to influence the proceedings at Belgrade would be a new organization of exiled dissidents which would represent the Moscow, Kiev, and Lithuanian Helsinki Groups.⁷³ Leonid Plyushch had been chosen to head the Committee, while the four other members were Ludmilla Alexeyeva, Vladimir Bukovsky, Valeri Chalidzhe and Andrei Amalrik. Given the composition of the Committee, considerable cooperation with the various Ukrainian organizations was assured.

Ukrainian attempts to secure effective representation of Ukrainian interests at the Review Conference were initiated in early May, 1977 with a lobbying campaign among the Helsinki signatories. In an unprecedented development, largely the result of the change in the U.S. administration, the U.S. State Department held a special conference on May 17-18 with representatives of nationalities under Soviet domination and control.⁷⁴ The meeting was to brief those attending on the U.S. preparations for the upcoming Conference and to sound out ethnic communities' views and opinions on the Conference. Efforts of emigre Ukrainians to influence the discussions were enhanced by an appeal from the Kiev group on the eve of the Conference calling for governments to speak out in defense of human and

73. Svoboda, April 22, 1977, p. 1.

74. Ukrainian Weekly, May 22, 1977, p. 1.

national rights in Ukraine.⁷⁵ Still more attention was focused on the human rights situation in Ukraine by the proclamation of symbolic 100 day hunger strikes by Valentyn Moroz, Vyacheslav Chornovil and a number of other Ukrainians held in the Mordovian camp system.⁷⁶ Additional pressure for a firm stand also came in the form of an open letter to the London Times from a group of exiled dissenters including Leonid Plyushch.⁷⁷

Despite their best efforts, the Belgrade Review Conference turned out to be a great disappointment to Ukrainian lobbyists. Not only was governmental follow-up on the human rights treatment poor, but the work of Ukrainian human rights lobbyists was seriously disrupted after four of the eight Ukrainians accredited to the Conference were arrested and expelled from Yugoslavia.⁷⁸ In the wake of the convictions of Rudenko and Tykhyi to long terms of imprisonment, Ukrainian leaders continued their attempts to secure governmental intervention on their behalf. In a special effort to create an impact, the UCCA prepared to hold a mass rally in New York in support of human rights. A dramatic appeal for support by the rally's chairman Eugene Iwanciw reveals the size of the demonstration the UCCA had

75. Ibid., June 5, 1977, p. 1.

76. Ibid., June 12, 1977, p. 1.

77. Ibid., July 3, 1977, p. 3. The other signatories to the letter included Ludmilla Alexeyeva, Andrei Amalrik, Vladimir Bukovsky, Natalia Gorbanevskaya, Jan Kavan, Mariia Siniavskaya, and Leszek Kolakowski.

78. Ibid., July 10, 1977, p. 3. The four lobbyists expelled on June 28 were Andriy Fedynsky and Adam Misztal of the Helsinki Guarantees for Ukraine Committee; and Andriy Karkoc and Konstantyn Huytan of 'Smoloskyp' Ukrainian Information Service.

hoped to organize. Mr. Iwanciw said:

We are urging every Ukrainian American within 300-400 miles of New York City to devote 14 hours of his life to the cause of human rights in Ukraine and attend the rally.⁷⁹

On September 18, 20,000 demonstrators heeded the UCCA call for protest. During the course of the three hour rally Dr. Mikhail Shtern, a recently released Jewish dissident with close ties to Ukrainians, acted as main speaker. Following speeches by a number of other individuals including Andrei Grigorenko and Ludmilla Alexeyeva, the demonstrators marched to the Soviet embassy and then on to the U.N. Again as in the past some 2,000 to 3,000 youthful demonstrators clashed with police, with several arrests and some injuries reported. The real value of this display of power is hard to estimate but without question the demonstration received wide press coverage, one of the desires of the organizers.⁸⁰ Soon after the New York demonstration, Republican presidential hopeful Ronald Reagan, chastized the states participating in the Belgrade Review for ignoring cases of injustice like those of Rudenko and Tykhyi, and in general ignoring the Ukrainian problem within the Soviet Union.

Pressure for more visibly effective action existed in Canada as well. Having used the protest weapon successfully in the past, the UCC sponsored a major demonstration in Toronto on October 2. Over 3,000 Ukrainians turned out in the rain to hear what were some of the strongest speeches made by non-Ukrainians

79. Ibid., July 24, 1977, p. 1.

80. Ibid., September 25, 1977, pp. 1, 3, 15.

in recent years, including references to trade sanctions.⁸¹

The new North American protest campaign had two important effects. Firstly, the campaign led to creation of new supporters and sympathizers within the Canadian government. Secondly, the concerns of the Ukrainian community on human rights issues were emphasized, and made the necessity of a real, meaningful response keenly felt among Parliamentarians. As a result, on July 14, the Canadian Parliamentary Helsinki Group was born, initially with fifty members.⁸²

Despite the ineffectiveness of NGO lobbying at the Belgrade Review meeting, Ukrainian lobbying efforts were continued in other areas and displayed greater effectiveness, especially when dealing with international associations of professionals.⁸³ Ukrainian lobbying played a part in the dramatic development on August 31, 1977, when the Fourth World Congress of the World Psychiatric Association meeting in Honolulu in a close vote resolved to censure the Soviet Union for its abuses of psychiatry and establish a committee to investigate psychiatric abuses throughout the world.⁸⁴ In addition, 304 of the attending psychiatrists signed a petition calling for the release of Ukrainian political prisoners within the Soviet

81. Ibid., October 23, 1977, p. 1.

82. Ibid., August 14, 1977, p. 3.

83. Ibid.

84. Ibid.

psychiatric prison system.⁸⁵

However, the fissures in the Ukrainian community had widened noticeably by late 1977. At the 12th Congress of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee held from October 7 to October 11, 1977, differences between the different UCC members became unmanageable. In May 1977, the UCC executive had accepted a SUSK proposal and invited Leonid Plyushch to be the head speaker at the Congress. Members of the League for the Liberation of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Liberation Front immediately objected to Plyushch being the principal speaker and vetoed the invitation. The UCC executive attempting to find a compromise settled on inviting Plyushch officially as a guest. The decision of the executive however, angered the SUSK executive, and at its Eighteenth National Congress that summer, Congress participants severely criticized the Ukrainian Liberation Front. A resolution passed by an overwhelming majority, indicated extreme distaste for the OUN-B:

Whereas the Ukrainian Canadian Committee is a cross-ideological umbrella organization coordinating Ukrainian Canadian organizations whose roots are founded in various political, social and cultural trends,

Whereas the Canadian League for the Liberation of Ukraine is seeking to impose an anti-socialist totalitarian and reactionary posture to the Ukrainian Canadian Committee by

85. Though the vote was the result of a long term lobbying campaign, there was an increased push at the Conference because of the large group of activists present. Those present included Dr. Taras Zakydalskyi, Andrii Hrushkevych, and Arkadii Zinkevych of the Helsinki Guarantees for Ukraine Committee; Peter Fedynskyi and Oksana Ilshchuk of Smoloskyp; and Roman Kupchynsky and Oksana Skubiak of the Moroz Defence Committee. See Ukrainian Weekly, September 4, 1977, p. 1. The activists were greatly helped in their task by the presence and efforts of Leonid Plyushch, Marina Voikhanskaia and Sidney Bloch. See Svoboda, September 3, 1977, p. 1.

exercising its veto power against the the invitation extended to Leonid Plyushch to address the 12th Ukrainian Canadian Congress on the pretext of his holding democratic, humanitarian Marxist, and atheist convictions, and

Whereas Leonid Plyushch is an outspoken advocate of the Ukrainian nation's right to self-determination, proponent of an independent Ukrainian state as the only vehicle to realizing national and social justice for the Ukrainian people, and official representative of the current oppositionist struggle in the Ukraine today.

Be it moved that this Congress condemns the leadership of the Canadian League for the Liberation of Ukraine for playing into the hands of the KGB by slandering the official representative of the struggle in Ukraine and by obstructing defense work on behalf of this same struggle.⁸⁶

The UCC executives action, and the fact that Leonid Plyushch was engaged to speak in Winnipeg during the Congress led to a formal boycott of the Congress by the Organizations of the Ukrainian Liberation Front.⁸⁷ However, as the OUN-B faction was not about to lose its votes and influence in the proceedings, and virtually all of its delegates attended the Congress as members of other organizations, the damaging effects to Ukrainian unity from this dispute were minimized.⁸⁸ The confrontation continued into the last day of the conference when resolutions were to be adopted. The OUN-B faction proposed that the Ukrainian and Professional Businessmen's Association and SUSK be sanctioned for organizing lectures for Plyushch elsewhere in Winnipeg during the Congress. However, the chair would not accept the motion and

86. Student, October 1977, Vol. 10, No. 39, p. 5. It should be noted that the SUSK executive at this time contained a number of neo-Marxists who had an antipathy towards OUN-B and regarded Leonid Plyushch as an authentic Ukrainian national communist leader.

87. Ukrainian Weekly, September 4, 1977, p. 1.

88. Svoboda, September 9, 1977, p. 1.

the Congress ended on a decidedly divided note.⁸⁹

The new conflict surfaced as Leonid Plyushch was conducting an extensive lecture tour of the United States and Canada. However, it was primarily a disagreement based on events by then more than a year old. Plyushch's political position had undergone considerable change since that time, though his fundamental neo-Marxist beliefs had apparently remained steadfast. On October 7, speaking at the University of Manitoba, where he had been offered a teaching position, Plyushch expressed his fear of a new purge of dissidents in Ukraine still larger than anything before. He noted that "The way this purge turns out will depend in large measure on the Belgrade Conference".⁹⁰ Calling on Western governments to take a principled stand at Belgrade, he openly worried about those same governments colluding at Belgrade, choosing between human rights and peace. Plyushch called the logic of the choice flawed because "totalitarianism is increasing, chauvinism is increasing, and all this is a threat to peace".⁹¹ Adopting a worst case scenario, he concluded that perhaps a parallel conference of human rights organizations, trade unions and others would have to be arranged.

On October 31, 1976, the House of Representatives passed a second Congressional resolution dealing with human rights. House Concurrent Resolution 387 came about because of determined lobbying by the New Jersey Moroz Committees. The resolution urged

89. Ukrainian Weekly, October 16, 1977, p. 1.

90. Ibid., October 23, 1977, p. 4.

91. Ibid.

the President to inform other nations, that "the United States in evaluating its relationship with other nations, will take cognizance of the extent to which they accord protection to human rights within their nation".⁹² The resolution specifically mentioned seven Soviet intellectuals being denied their human rights, among them Moroz, Shukhevych, Rudenko and Tykhyi.

Indications of a change in Soviet policy towards Ukrainian dissenters began to appear in late 1977. Prior to this date only Leonid Plyushch had been exiled to the West. Leonid Plyushch's release appears to have occurred primarily on account of the damage being done to Soviet prestige and its relations with the Euro-Communist parties, especially the French CP.⁹³ However, some credence should be given to the possibility that a Soviet assumption had been made that Plyushch's unswerving neo-Marxist beliefs would cause havoc and damage within the increasingly bothersome Ukrainian community.

The indications of a possible change in Soviet policy grew when Petro Grigorenko disclosed to reporters in Moscow that on November 10, 1977, he had secured a six month visa for medical attention in the U.S..⁹⁴ Among possible reasons for the Kremlin's approval of Grigorenko's visa could have been a real concern among Soviet authorities that his death would prompt undesirable publicity, however, it is far more likely that this

92. Ibid., November 13, 1977, p. 1.

93. For a more detailed analysis of the relationship between Plyushch and the European Communist parties, see Student, Vol. 9, No. 35-36, February-April 1976, pp. 4-5.

94. Svoboda, November 15, 1977, p. 1.

was part of a general strategy of getting rid of key high profile dissidents with contacts to Western journalists so that a purge of the remainder of the dissident movement could be undertaken in a quiet and thorough manner.⁹⁵

A Second Dissident Arrives

Petro Grigorenko, accompanied by his wife Zinaida and one of his sons, arrived in New York via Frankfurt on November 30, 1977. Greeted at the airport by some 150 Ukrainians and representatives of the Crimean Tatar community, Grigorenko conducted his press conference in Russian and made clear his gratitude for being allowed out and his desire to return. As a result, Grigorenko asked that no political questions be asked. However, the former Major-General did comment favorably on President Carter's human rights policy. After his initial statement, Grigorenko answered a number of questions in Ukrainian thereby satisfying the Ukrainians present. The nature of Grigorenko's illness necessarily meant that further meetings with the Ukrainian emigre community could not be held until a much later date.

As the Helsinki Review Meeting dragged on at Belgrade it became obvious that there would be little of concrete value coming from the Conference. American attempts to discuss human rights violations were harshly criticized and Soviet delegates often responded with violent counter-accusations. As a result, the Belgrade forum lost much of its importance to Ukrainian

95. See Appendix No. 1 for the dates of exile of political dissidents from the U.S.S.R..

activists, and efforts were redirected to other areas, principally to the building of public awareness through symbolic actions such as small demonstrations and minor hungerstrikes.

Ukrainian activists continued to score many tactical victories in the post-Belgrade atmosphere. In late December 1977, the American Philosophical Association adopted a resolution in defense of three Ukrainian philosophers Ievhen Proniuk, Vasyl Lisovyi, and Mykola Bondar.⁹⁶ On January 30, 1978, members of the U.S. Congress Commission on Security and Cooperation wrote the Nobel Institute nominating the Public Groups for the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords in the USSR for the 1978 Nobel Peace Prize. Among those cited by the Commission, imprisoned members of the Ukrainian group received first mention.⁹⁷ A similar campaign was soon initiated in Canada by the Ukrainian Professional and Businessmen's Association.⁹⁸

In spite of the unexpected irritation evoked by the initial preformance of Leonid Plyushch, a situation which was exacerbated by members of the OUN-B faction, it was precisely from the youth wings of this faction that efforts for the defense of Soviet political prisoners, albeit usually firmly nationalist ones, appeared most often. In spring 1978, TUSM began a new campaign aimed at the liberation of Iurii Shukhevych, son of the former commander of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Roman Shukhevych, TUSM began the new effort by creating the Iurii

96. Ukrainian Weekly, February 12, 1978, pp. 1-2.

97. Ibid., February 19, 1978, pp. 1, 11.

98. Ibid., p. 2.

Shukhevych Defense Fund, a move calculated to enable the organization to widen the scope of its defense actions, particularly those related to Shukhevych. The organization also made plans for the publication of new literature on the dissident question and for the sponsorship of demonstrations across the United States on April 22 to highlight the persecution of Shukhevych and bring about his release.⁹⁹ Similar concerns, though of lesser importance, led to the creation of a new independent human rights lobby group in Denver, Colorado, named the Ukrainian Research Foundation.¹⁰⁰

The sudden revocation of Petro Grigorenko's citizenship brought about a new phase in Ukrainian emigre-dissident relations. The previously silent former Major-General immediately engaged in what he had earlier feared would cause his permanent exile. Within a short period of time following his exile, Grigorenko held a number of press conferences severely attacking the Soviet government for its human rights abuses and challenging it to allow him to return to fight the issue of his disloyalty out in the Soviet courts with international observers present. Grigorenko confirmed the views expressed by earlier Soviet exiles and those fervently held by Ukrainian emigres that the "Ukrainian rights movement is the most ruthlessly smothered."¹⁰¹ Grigorenko explained that the reasons for this were both the size of the nation and its greater degree of organization in comparison with

99. Ibid., March 5, 1977, p. 3, and March 12, 1978, p. 1.

100. Ibid., March 5, 1977, p. 4.

101. Ibid., March 19, 1977, p. 4.

other Soviet minority nationalities. However, Grigorenko repeated a point which had earlier been stressed by Plyushch much to his detriment, and which would harm him as well:

There are quarrels between the several groups - the Russians and the Ukrainians - and they weaken the movement to the benefit of the KGB. It is the KGB's special assignment to weaken the movement.¹⁰²

Grigorenko was also forced to clarify remarks made at a press conference on March 13 that Ukrainians were not allowed to emigrate "because the KGB does not want to strengthen the progressive wing of the Ukrainian emigration in the West".¹⁰³ Grigorenko was forced to explain that by "progressive wing" he had meant the Ukrainian national movement in the West. He continued by disclosing for the first time that he, Nina Strokata, and Vyacheslav Chornovil had agreed in 1968 to support the separation of Ukraine from the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁴ The former Soviet Major-General was also forced to immediately address the question of his war record, a matter of crucial importance in a diaspora dominated by a emigrants sympathetic to the ideals of OUN and UPA. Grigorenko denied that he had ever fought UPA troops, or units of the Ukrainian "Galicia" Division. Blaming his earlier conduct on his unquestioning belief in the Soviet system, he openly stated:

This is not true....God spared me that. however, if I had been sent there I would have fought them - in accordance with my political beliefs at the time.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Ibid., pp. 1, 10.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 10.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

Finally, Grigorenko declared without any malice that he did not wish to officially belong to the Committee for the Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners, something that had been earlier attributed to him rather:

I would be ready to join a united Ukrainian organization, but I will not join any one organization - I belonged to one party too long.¹⁰⁶

Grigorenko began to enmesh himself in human rights activities almost from the moment of his deprivation of citizenship. He quickly agreed to give lectures on behalf of the International League for the Rights of Man, the Committee for the Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners, the Crimea Foundation, and Amnesty International.¹⁰⁷ On March 30, 1975, Petro Grigorenko held a news conference where he bitterly attacked the sentencing of Mykola Matusevych and Myroslav Marynovych.¹⁰⁸ Remarkably, there was considerable support for Grigorenko's desire for a return to his homeland, perhaps because of his justifications for the desire. Senators Fenwick, Heinz and others called for a restoration of Grigorenko's citizenship.¹⁰⁹ As well over 300 demonstrators turned out to protest the Soviet government's action on March 25. However, it should be noted that it is difficult to judge what the level of support for this ambition there was among emigre Ukrainians. The rally was sponsored by only one organization having links to the Ukrainian

¹⁰⁶. Ibid.

¹⁰⁷. Ibid.

¹⁰⁸. Svoboda, April 5, 1978, p. 1.

¹⁰⁹. Ukrainian Weekly, April 9, 1978, p. 10.

community, the liberal/social-democratic oriented Committee for the Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners.¹¹⁰

Grigorenko quickly embarked on a platform of urging greater involvement of emigre Ukrainians in human rights activities, as well as the necessity for greater cooperation and openness in activity and openness of mind. Speaking in San Francisco on April 2, he stated:

the party is only internal life, but the nation stands above everything. I had wanted to join the Ukrainian national movement here, but the national one, not the partisan one. I am now with you! Unity and only unity is the guarantee of a future for our Ukrainian nation and, therefore, I once again call all Ukrainians to unity.¹¹¹

On April 9, in a speech before some 400 people in New York, he again returned to the theme of unity and action. He dismissed his use of Russian as unimportant, and defended Leonid Plyushch in light of the larger goal facing Ukrainians:

[He is] an honest, knowledgeable person and one of my closest friends, who was not accepted because of the label "communist."¹¹²

Grigorenko went on to tell those present that they should not attach importance to labels but to people's opinions.

The themes of Grigorenko did not change appreciably as he finally began his first tour of speaking appearances under the sponsorship of the UCC and UCCA on April 23, 1978. At Grigorenko's first stop in Irvington, New Jersey, he was greeted with a standing ovation upon entering the hall. After calling for

110. Ibid., p. 3. The other organizations sponsoring the event were the Committee for the Return of Exiled Crimean Tatars to their Homeland, and the Crimean Foundation.

111. Svoboda, April 12, 1978, p. 3.

112. Ukrainian Weekly, April 30, 1978, p. 14.

united action and noting that he believed the national movement was getting stronger in Ukraine, he attacked the vices he saw within the Ukrainian community. He mentioned the "excessive anti-Russian sentiments" within the community, noting that "except for the absence of violation of their national rights, the Russian people are subject to the same oppression as others".¹¹³ Grigorenko also attacked OUN-B without specifically naming it for having scoffed at support for Heli Snehiriov and reacting uncaringly to his alleged recantation.¹¹⁴ Earlier that day, Grigorenko had taken part in a TUSM demonstration in which over 400 students had participated.¹¹⁵

Grigorenko improved his reputation among Ukrainians while attending the "Cultural Opposition in the East" Conference in Turin, Italy. During the two-week conference, Grigorenko had the opportunity of travelling both in West Germany and Italy to expound his views on repression within the Soviet Union, which increasingly focused on Ukraine. On returning and being informed that Bild had written about him as a Russian general, he issued the following public declaration:

1. I never was a Russian general. I was a Soviet general.
2. By nationality, I am a Ukrainian. Like every patriot I ardently love my native country - Ukraine - and my native people, and consider myself bound to render all my strength, above all to my people.
3. Serving in the Soviet army and living in Moscow for many years, I became close to all peoples under the Soviets, came to love them and together with the finest sons of these peoples took part [in] the struggle for human rights in the USSR, and along with them I suffered cruel repressions.

113. Ibid.

114. Ibid.

115. Ibid., p. 3.

And I can never betray my friends. In rendering my strength and my life to my own people, I will at the same time struggle for the freedom and national sovereignty of all other peoples of the USSR.116

On June 14, 1978, Grigorenko touched another concern emerging within the Ukrainian community which would eventually swallow substantial resources of time, money and manpower, and cause deep divisions between the Ukrainian and Jewish communities making cooperation in human rights actions increasingly difficult. Speaking to an AFL-CIO gathering, Grigorenko denied that general anti-semitism was prevalent in Ukraine, noting that such a portrayal of Ukrainians was a distortion of the truth. He added:

anti-Semitism does not come from the hearts and souls of the people but from the Soviet government itself, and I myself am very hurt to hear this accusation pointed at Ukrainians as a nation of anti-Semites.117

The political situation in Ukraine in 1978 was extremely perplexing for most observers. Despite having signed the Helsinki Accords, Soviet arrests of human rights campaigners, particularly high-profile individuals previously spared arrest, escalated at an alarming rate. Most members of the five Helsinki monitoring groups had been imprisoned, seemingly regardless of the level of activity on their behalf. This was particularly true of Ukrainian political prisoners.

Up to the time of Petro Grigorenko's arrival, the presence of former Ukrainian political prisoners had had a moderately positive, though mixed effect. Andrei Grigorenko had had a very minor impact on the Ukrainian community in the West having not

116. Ibid., May 28, 1978, p. 3.

117. Ibid., July 9, 1978, pp. 3, 11.

interacted with it for the first two years of his stay. Even after his emergence, he confined his comments largely to the persecution of his father, and it was not long before the elder Grigorenko arrived in the West, thereby overshadowing his son.

The impact of Leonid Plyushch, a major figure, well-known to Ukrainians abroad and one on whose behalf they had protested with considerable energy, was another matter. Plyushch, a person who hated labels, had despite his wife's concerns about misinterpretation, declared himself to be a neo-Marxist. The effect of this declaration, and his highly critical comments of March 27, 1977, had combined to damage his reputation in the eyes of a large section of the Ukrainian community, particularly among OUN-B supporters. Subsequent moderation of Plyushch's views was not matched by any appreciable change in the attitude of this element of the Ukrainian political spectrum. In fact, the organizations of OUN-B persuasion increasingly began to take a more critical attitude towards Soviet dissenters in general, attacking those perceived to be weak in their commitment to the national cause, and supporting the few they were convinced were firmly dedicated to the cause of Ukrainian nationalism, principally Valentyn Moroz and Iurii Shukhevych.

The arrival of Petro Grigorenko was an event with significant initial potential which in fact failed to materialize primarily because of Grigorenko's attempt to avoid public involvement with emigre politics until after he had been deprived of Soviet citizenship. Once he did begin to participate, his criticism of the Soviet system was fierce and heavy, and outweighed his early statements that were questionable in the

eyes of many Ukrainians. Grigorenko was also partially protected from his comments by the fact that the Ukrainian community had come to accept that there were some Russian and Jewish dissidents who were not chauvinistic or Ukrainophobes and who supported the concept of Ukrainian independence. Thus Grigorenko's friendship with Leonid Plyushch and certain Russian dissidents did not taint him significantly. Finally, Grigorenko had sufficiently disposed of concerns about his wartime involvement with the Red Army that only the most extreme of Ukrainians on the right considered this to be of more than trivial importance.¹¹⁸

Severe difficulties arose for Ukrainians knowledgeable of events in their homeland with the emergence of a dispute between Valentyn Moroz and Danylo Shumuk, both long-serving political prisoners.¹¹⁹ Shumuk had helped in the creation of an unofficial dissident committee within Mordovian Camp No. 1-6 in 1976, which

118. Grigorenko, had not lost the support of the OUN-B faction rather he seems to have gained their respect. He was the principal speaker at SUMA's 27th annual rally on the Labour Day weekend in 1978. The event was attended by 14,500 adults and youth (see Ukrainian Weekly, September 10, 1978, p. 1). In addition, Grigorenko was the keynote speaker at the annual meeting of the Ukrainian Veterans on September 2-3, 1978. The former General's attendance at the event was sponsored by members of the 1st Ukrainian Division; the Ukrainian American Veterans; the Association of Former Ukrainian Soldiers in America; the Association of Former Soldiers of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA); and the Society of Former Soldiers of the UPA. (Ukrainian Weekly, September 17, 1978, p. 3).

119. Danylo Shumuk, Life Sentence (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1984), p. 365. Shumuk had been in the forefront of many actions including the campaign for political prisoner status. He had also generated considerable support in the West for his courageous stands despite his long imprisonment and precarious health, particularly in Canada where his relatives had settled.

had among its stated purposes the "promotion of a friendly climate among political prisoners, unity among different nationalities, mutual respect and recognition of the humanitarian rights of individual prisoners of all ideological persuasions who have been convicted because of their political beliefs, and also the condemnation of anti-Semitism".¹²⁰ After the transfer of Valentyn Moroz to the camp, Moroz by his actions and attitudes had offended Shumuk and other members of the Committee, principally Fr. Vasyl Romaniuk and Edward Kuznetsov. In turn, the Committee, except for Kuznetsov (who judged it to be a matter for the Ukrainians to decide, and a poor response from political prisoners), had reprimanded Moroz and another prisoner, Ivan Hel, for conduct "inappropriate for a political prisoner".¹²¹ In particular, the members of the committee charged Moroz with "attempting to gain a position of primacy for himself among Ukrainian dissidents," with egocentrism, and with "exacerbating national antagonisms, particularly in relation to Russians and Jews."¹²² Shumuk had written about these problems in a number of letters which the KGB for its own reasons had permitted to reach their destinations in the West while quoting Shumuk's criticism of Moroz in its propaganda abroad. Subsequently, the information had appeared in Chronicle of Current Events, No. 47, and became too widely disseminated to hide.

The conflict between Moroz and Shumuk forced a number of

120. Chronicle of Current Events, No. 47 (dated November 30, 1977), pp. 107-108.

121. Svoboda, July 12, 1978, p. 1.

122. Ibid.

Ukrainians into the difficult position of choosing whom to believe and whom to support. In an attempt to heal the growing divisions, Svoboda published on July 12, 1978, a letter from Levko Lukianenko, also a highly respected, long-serving political prisoner. In the letter, Lukianenko divided the judgement of individuals into two different and independent halves, the personal and another side which captures "national interests, art, strategy, where a general among other strategists occupies a significant place: he [is] - the bright intellect, the talented one, who leads the army to conquer and save the fatherland".¹²³ Calling misunderstandings of individuals, such as those between Moroz and Shumuk, an eternal problem, Lukianenko went on to say that the conflict which time would heal, should have been confined between the two men and not spread afar to the detriment of all prisoners. He concluded by adding:

And when I would turn to friends who are in freedom, I would still even add: do not hurry to judge them, applying criteria of your conditions to conduct in totally different conditions.¹²⁴

Shortly after the publication of the letter, Levko Lukianenko was himself sentenced to 10 years special regime camp and 5 years exile, the maximum penalty possible. The sentencing prompted a flurry of Ukrainian activity in defence of Lukianenko. The primate of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, Cardinal Josyf Slipyj, reacted with a widely publicized appeal.¹²⁵ In North America, the UCCA and UCC immediately approached their respective

123. Ibid., p. 4.

124. Ibid.

125. Ukrainian Weekly, August 27, 1978, p. 3.

governments demanding governmental intervention to secure his release, and, in Canada, the UCC requested the government to propose Lukianenko's emigration to Canada.¹²⁶ In the U.S. Senate, thirty-three Senators immediately signed a letter urging Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi, the First Secretary of the Ukrainian CP, to release Lukianenko.¹²⁷ The WCFU also initiated a broad campaign, distributing information packages on Lukianenko to U.N. missions, accredited NGO's and the U.N. press corps.¹²⁸ Numerous demonstrations and sit-ins were organized in an effort to bring attention to the latest victim of the Soviet injustice.¹²⁹

Having high-profile former prisoners among them, both of Ukrainian origin and sympathetic non-Ukrainians, gave the Ukrainian human rights activities a higher profile, more media attention, and increased access to high officials in government. The prestige of individuals such as Grigorenko, combined with a highly sympathetic attitude shown by President Carter, allowed Ukrainians through Grigorenko to have — effective, and individualized contact with the American president, something virtually unattainable before. Dramatic illustration of the Ukrainian activists' increased influence occurred on September 20 when Petro Grigorenko was allowed to meet and speak privately with Jimmy Carter, only the second dissident to do so, and the

126. Ibid., August 15, 1978, p. 2.

127. Ibid.

128. Ibid.

129. For examples, see Ukrainian Weekly, August 20, 1978, p. 3.

first to be photographed with the president.¹³⁰

On October 5, 1978, the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America and the Ukrainian National Association, in a follow-up action to the Human Rights Week held a year earlier, organized a Ukrainian Human Rights Day on the Capitol Hill. The effort centered around a day-long drive by members of the organizations to acquaint U.S. legislators with the current situation in Ukraine and the fates of the principal Ukrainian dissidents in the U.S.S.R.. Some 150 legislators were visited during the course of the day, and over 50 attended the evening reception, where Petro Grigorenko and Lev Dobriansky, the UCCA president, were principal speakers.¹³¹ After describing the plight of Ukraine in startling terms and calling on the legislators present to press for U.N. resolutions condemning Soviet "colonialism", Grigorenko went on to say that the Ukrainian Helsinki Group had delegated him and Leonid Plyushch to establish a Western affiliate, which would become the External Representation of the Ukrainian Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, and called for Ukrainians to support the group.¹³²

On October 12, 1978, the community of exiled Ukrainian

130. Ukrainian Weekly, September 24, 1978, p. 1.

131. Ibid., October 15, 1978, p. 1.

132. Ibid. Grigorenko's speech that evening included the following commentary:

[The Ukrainian nation is today facing] complete national oppression....The consequence of this terrible physical blow, which was to break the spirit of the nation, is now being used to destroy the nation in its weakened state,...

All this can only be described as genocide under the false cover of creating a single, unified socialist nation.

dissidents increased by one, as Nadia Svitlychna, a former political prisoner and sister of the long-imprisoned literary critic Ivan Svitlychny, arrived in Rome with her two young sons.¹³³ Svitlychna was universally welcomed and immediately received offers of support from the Ukrainian National Women's League of America (Souiz Ukrainok Ameryky) and the United Ukrainian American Relief Committee (ZUADK), and quickly made her plans to settle in the U.S.¹³⁴ On October 25, Nadia Svitlychna was given an audience with Cardinal Josyf Slipyj, the atmosphere of which was described as "very warm".¹³⁵ On November 8, Nadia Svitlychna arrived at New York's Kennedy Airport to emotional welcome. Among the 100 well-wishers was Petro Grigorenko, who having never met her in Ukraine because of their imprisonments, struck up an immediate friendship and briefed her on the newly established external Helsinki Group representation.¹³⁶

The Third World Congress of Free Ukrainians opened its four days of meetings in New York on November 23, 1978. The Congress once more brought together Ukrainians from 20 countries to discuss issues of importance to Ukrainians, among which the defense of human rights occupied a high position. On November 22, the WCFU Human Rights Commission sponsored a conference on the human and national rights struggle in Ukraine, with Petro

133. Ukrainian Weekly, October 22, 1978, pp. 1-2.

134. Svoboda, October 19, 1978, p. 1, and October 20, 1978, p. 1.

135. Ibid., October 31, 1978, p. 1.

136. Ukrainian Weekly, November 12, 1978, pp. 1-2.

Grigorenko and Leonid Plyushch as principal speaker.¹³⁷ On November 23, a demonstration and march to the Soviet embassy and the U.N. were held. Four former dissidents, Leonid Plyushch, Petro Grigorenko, Simas Kudirka and Nadia Svitlychna spoke at the demonstration. The Congressional Banquet which was held the same day featured Petro Grigorenko as special guest speaker with the newly arrived Nadia Svitlychna adding some comments. The major part of Grigorenko's speech contained highly critical remarks on the emigre organizations and their handling of the human rights issue. Grigorenko chastized the emigre organizations for using the human rights issue to further their own political goals. He heavily criticized the factional bickering prevalent within the Ukrainian community and the inability of the various political groupings to compromise. In order to counter these defects he suggested that:

the new leadership of the WCFU resign their party allegiances, that only a politically neutral executive will embody any hope for the future of the WCFU.¹³⁸

Then turning to the question of political convictions, he attacked the inability of Ukrainian organizations to adapt to changed circumstances and made clear his ideological stand: "We will bring to Ukraine neither fascism nor communism. I am against both. We will bring to Ukraine democracy."¹³⁹ Grigorenko's comments evoked attacks on the former Major-General, particularly from OUN-B members. In his rebuttal, an antagonized Grigorenko

137. Ibid., p. 3.

138. Student, December 1978, vol. 11, No. 51, cover page.

139. Ibid.

countered with a remark with offended many in the hall: "all of you do not have a correct image of the Soviet Union."¹⁴⁰ The conflict at the Congress ensured that a major new initiative in the human rights area would not be adopted. Rather, a new priority emerged which in scope overshadowed the earlier human rights campaigns, a campaign for the decolonization of the U.S.S.R.¹⁴¹

As the new year began, the distressing news was received, that Heli Snehiriov, the dissident who had caused substantial infighting within the emigre community because of his recantation, had died.¹⁴² The reaction to the death of Snehiriov was considerable but did not approach in intensity the feelings that were expressed shortly after by Nadia Svitlychna and the Grigorenkos who blamed the secret police for his death.¹⁴³

As in earlier years, January 12, Solidarity Day, and January 22, Ukrainian Independence Day, prompted numerous smaller demonstrations and displays of concern in countries of Ukrainian diaspora. Nadia Svitlychna taking part in her first Solidarity Day protest chose to join a group of New York Plast members, a symbolic act, which to label-conscious observers indicated the direction of her political affiliations in the West.¹⁴⁴ Somewhat ironically, earlier that day Nadia Svitlychna had stressed to the

140. Ibid., p. 11.

141. Ukrainian Weekly, December 3, 1978, p. 1.

142. Ibid., January 7, 1979, p. 2.

143. Ibid., January 14, 1979, pp. 2, 5.

144. Ibid., January 28, 1979, p. 3.

publishers of Svoboda, the necessity of refraining from attaching labels to dissidents still within the Soviet Union as an undesirable aid to the KGB's persecution of the individuals, and pointed out the power of such statements.¹⁴⁵

On February 8, 1979, the Ukrainian National Association began a campaign which was to have unexpected results. In September, 1975, three Canadian Members of Parliament while touring Soviet Ukraine had met with I. Hrushetsky, chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium of the Ukrainian S.S.R. and raised their concerns about the welfare and treatment of Valentyn Moroz. In response to their probing questions, the Soviet official had stated:

After his second arrest, he refused to recant his views and was sentenced to nine years incarceration instead of five and will therefore be released in 1979. If the Americans still want him, then they can have him.¹⁴⁶

Bearing this in mind and unaware of the ongoing US-Soviet negotiations on the subject of a possible exchange, the UNA wrote the U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, informing him of the offer and stressing willingness of the Ukrainian American community "to do everything possible to bring Valentyn Moroz to the United States after his release."¹⁴⁷ In addition, the UNA

145. Ibid., January 21, 1979, p. 1. She cited the belief held by many Soviet citizens that UPA was composed of 'Banderite cutthroats'. She admitted that she herself had believed this until she had learned the truth.

146. Ibid., February 11, 1979, p. 1.

147. Ibid.

through its newspaper Svoboda, began a drive urging Ukrainians to write their elected representatives and request their intervention in the matter.

Negotiations for a possible exchange of the spies for a group of dissidents had, in fact, begun the previous summer. Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's National Security Adviser, was well aware of the need for at least some partial success in the human rights area, both to satisfy Carter's own concerns with human rights, and to improve the atmosphere in which the SALT II treaty was being negotiated. Brzezinski, therefore, approached Carter in July 1978 and received permission to initiate discussions on a possible prisoner exchange. The list of prisoners sought by Brzezinski in fact reflected his concern with domestic politics as much as with Soviet human rights abuses, and included leading Jewish refuseniks, some of the principal Russian figures in the civil liberties movement, Ukrainian dissidents, and victims of religious persecution. Numerous, lengthy meetings between Brzezinski and Soviet ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin in the following months would lead to agreement in April, 1979. 148

148. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle - Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977-1981 (new York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983), pp. 338-340.

The Ukrainian Community Meets Valentyn Moroz

Ukrainian human rights activity in early 1979 most often took the form of public awareness campaigns and political lobbying. Nadia Svitlychna, at the invitation of the UCC, conducted a speaking tour of Canada, which received wide media coverage.¹⁴⁹ The WCFU once again submitted detailed briefs to the members of the United Nations Human Rights Commission in hopes of having the Ukrainian problem raised during the Commission's short five week period of operations. These latest memoranda were particularly comprehensive, citing the situations of 134 Ukrainian political prisoners and quoting extensively the opinions of non-Ukrainian dissidents, in particular, those of Ludmilla Alexeyeva and Andrei Amalrik.¹⁵⁰ Actions by individual organizations continued as well. TUSM executives met on March 3-4, to assess the success of their year-old Shukhevych defence campaign and decided to broaden the scope of their actions in an effort to elicit presidential intervention on his behalf.¹⁵¹ As the campaign for the release of Shukhevych dragged on, and rumours of the impending arrival of Petro Vins circulated, the unexpected—occured - the largest release and transfer of Soviet

149. Ukrainian Weekly, March 4, 1979, p. 3.

150. Ibid., March 18, 1979, p. 3.

151. Ibid., March 25, 1979, p. 3.

political prisoners to date, Valentyn Moroz among them.¹⁵²

On April 27, 1979, Valentyn Moroz, unquestionably the dissident most respected and sought after by Ukrainians, was exchanged along with Pastor Georgii Vins, Alesandr Ginzburg, Edvard Kuznetsov, and Mark Dymshits for two Soviet spies. The negotiations which resulted in this trade had been kept in utmost secrecy from their initiation in the fall of 1978 until their conclusion on April 27, and therefore, were an immense but joyous surprise to the Ukrainian diaspora. Following a brief period of preliminary isolation and a compulsory joint press conference organized by American authorities on April 28, Valentyn Moroz was released into the hands of Ukrainian community leaders. Moroz from these first moments of contact was subjected to intense lobbying from several factions within the Ukrainian political spectrum for his allegiance. Representatives of OUN-B were especially active in this regard.¹⁵³ However, Moroz's temporary guardians managed to separate him from his suitors and at Moroz's request, drove him to Philadelphia, where a walkathon which had been originally organized to lobby for his release was being held. Moroz's presence at the walkathon was unexpected, however, news of his arrival in the West had by itself already transformed the character of the event into a celebration. When Valentyn Moroz finally arrived at the site of the event, over 2,000 Ukrainians had gathered. Moroz spoke to the emotional crowd with conviction and skill, confirming and expanding his reputation as

152. The Ukrainian Weekly reported news of Vins's impending emigration in its April 15, 1978 edition. See p. 2.

153. Student, Vol. 12, No. 61 (February 1980), p. 9.

a Ukrainian nationalist. He thanked those present as well as various youth groups and Jewish organizations for supporting the effort which ultimately freed him, and called for their continued efforts to help Levko Lukianenko become the next Ukrainian political prisoner to be released to the West. Finally, in series of comments strikingly dissimilar from those uttered by Leonid Plyushch, but favored by the majority of Ukrainian emigres, Moroz tackled the question of the Soviet system. In a revealing statement, Moroz told the crowd: "All empires are terrible, but the Russian empire is the worst. Not only must we fight against it, but we must destroy it."¹⁵⁴ Moroz's lack of distinction between the Soviet system and the Russian people, was no error on his part but rather an indication of his firm beliefs which would reveal themselves more fully in the near future.

Moroz's presence was magnetic and the pace of his first appearances blistering despite the poor state of his health. On April 29, only two days after his release, some 5,000 turned out for a Sunday memorial service which Moroz was to attend.¹⁵⁵ He drew more attention on April 30, when he gave a press conference which covered an extensive list of subjects.¹⁵⁶ One could certainly say that Moroz's initial comments may have pleased a vast majority of non-communist Ukrainians, save some elements on the social-democratic left. Moroz inspired the Ukrainian community in general and the human rights lobbyists in particular

154. Ukrainian Weekly, May 6, 1979, p. 4

155. Ibid.

156. Ibid., p. 3.

by attributing his release largely to the strength of the emigre Ukrainian community. Moroz attacked those who put their trust in with the Soviet government:

The West should understand that until a climate of trust exists, it is impossible to sign any agreements....Moscow plays on the failure of the West to understand its underhandedness.157

In regard to Western governments:

I do not want to seem ungrateful, but the United States could be more energetic in demanding the decolonization of Ukraine, the Baltic States, Georgia, Armenia, and others.158

In regard to his political beliefs, after stating he was a Ukrainian nationalist, Moroz elaborated:

Every person should take a stand for the independence of his nation....I understand nationalism in the same manner it was understood by Taras Shevchenko, who, for me, is the highest authority and a Ukrainian prophet. For him, a factor such as Ukraine, the nation, was the highest reality. He said: 'I love the Ukraine so strongly that I would lose my soul for it.'

In my opinion, nationalism is not something that should be placed alongside other tendencies. Nationalism should run like a thread through every meaningful ideology. Religion becomes a meaningful religion when it becomes a national religion. Every political and spiritual phenomena becomes meaningful when it grows into concrete national ground, is penetrated by its juices and becomes a concrete national phenomenon. As an example one could cite Catholicism in Poland.159

Moroz praised the work of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group:

It is difficult for us here to imagine the kind of heroic work the Kiev group is pursuing....To become a member today may mean arrest the next day.160

He admitted that he did not know of the work of the Western

157. Ibid., p. 10.

158. Ibid.

159. Ibid.

160. Ibid.

Representation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group and had not been asked to join it, however, he welcomed its establishment.¹⁶¹ Moroz also stressed the existence of cooperation among the various nationalities in the U.S.S.R., especially among the Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Georgians, and Jews. He agreed that there were contacts between the Ukrainian and Moscow Helsinki groups but remarked that there were differences as well.¹⁶² Moroz concluded his comments on international cooperation by stating:

I do not want to insult the Russian movement, but I believe that it will be the non-Russian movements which will bring down the empire.¹⁶³

The first days of Valentyn Moroz's presence in North America gave no indication of difficulties between himself and the other Ukrainian dissenters. Nadia Svitlychna, for example, upon learning of his arrival immediately telephoned her congratulations and soon after travelled to meet the newly released dissident.¹⁶⁴ However, there were individuals familiar with the Moroz-Shumuk dispute who already had cautious reservations about Valentyn Moroz in these early days.

The reaction of the major Ukrainian political groupings to the release of Valentyn Moroz is noteworthy. While having supported the dissidents in general, the arrival of Moroz, an unrepentant nationalist, inspired the hopes of Ukrainian organizations of the right. In its editorial of May 12, 1979,

161. Ibid., p. 11.

162. Ibid.

163. Ibid.

164. Novyi Shliakh, May 12, 1979, p. 1.

Novyi Shliakh, the organ of OUN-M in Canada, wrote:

Moscow does not do anything without the aim of provocation, calculation and foulness.

To tell the truth, there remain in her paws many dissidents like Vyacheslav Chornovil, Karavanskyi, Berdnyk, Sverstiuk and others, but evicting Valentyn Moroz from the U.S.S.R., deprives the Ukrainian nation of one of the strongest fighters for the self-reliance and independence of Ukraine. Moscow expects that his expulsion will weaken the resistance movement in Ukraine.

The hitherto arrived Ukrainian exiles-dissidents have coalesced around the Group for the Promotion of the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords and advance before the Western free world first and foremost the demand to bring back human rights trampled by Soviet Union with the not too clear emphasis on the national and political liberation of nations under the yoke of Russian chauvinism and imperialism. We hope, that Valentyn Moroz will join them and with his patriotic-ethical merits will strengthen their protests and pour more national motifs into their work. We believe, that Valentyn Moroz will be sincere with himself and will courageously, like in the Mordovian concentration camp, take a Morozian attitude, uncompromising and exacting. 165

The position of the OUN-B was similar to the OUN-M position. In a letter to Moroz, the executive of the Ukrainian Liberation Front wrote:

We welcome you, - nationalist champion-hero, who stood up to the worst enemy of Ukraine, which also threatens the entire world - Moscow, for Ukrainian truth, for the independent Ukrainian state of 1918 and 1941. 166

The statements reveal the thoughts of the two most powerful organizations within the Ukrainian emigre community. While assessments of individual dissidents had varied, there was a general feeling that national rights, though evident in many of the dissidents' writings and speeches, had been denied their rightful primacy in the order of concerns among Ukrainians. Moroz, it was hoped, would redress the balance.

165. Ibid., p. 4.

166. Svoboda, May 19, 1979, p. 3.

Moroz quickly became enmeshed in the Ukrainian American community. An offer of a position as a visiting scholar at the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute was accepted by Moroz on May 8, 1979, thereby assuring his financial security for the coming year.¹⁶⁷ However, Moroz's finances were improving rapidly as he was showered with donations from the Ukrainian community which by some estimates were said to have amounted to \$350,000 within the months of his arrival.¹⁶⁸ His sponsorship had originally been taken up by the Ukrainian National Association, but that role was transferred to the UCCA on May 7, which also agreed to coordinate all his future appearances.¹⁶⁹

Initially, there was some quick cooperation between Valentyn Moroz and the other exiled Ukrainian dissidents. On May 1, 1979, Moroz, Petro and Zinaida Grigorenko, and Nadia Svitlychna issued a joint appeal in support of Oleksa Tykhyi, whose health and life were in serious jeopardy.¹⁷⁰ However, Moroz rapidly separated himself from the earlier exiles. The reasons were as much personal as political. They included an unwillingness to play what he perceived to be a lesser role within the group of exiles, while personally being the most popular dissident within the Ukrainian community, and an unwillingness to compromise his values for what he perceived as

167. Ukrainian Weekly, May 13, 1979, p. 1. The President of Harvard University, Dr. Derek Bok, had initially made the offer in 1974 and it had been renewed in each subsequent year only due to continuous Ukrainian pressure.

168. Student, Vol. 12, No. 61, (February 1980), p. 10.

169. Ibid., p. 3.

170. Ibid., p. 5.

the weak and even foolish ideas held by the other dissenters.

His early alienation from the other dissenters was more than made up by many demands made upon him for personal appearances. Among the highlights of these early appearances was a rally organized by Plast, SUMA, and ODUM in New York on May 12. Some 3,000 people showed up in a rainstorm to hear Moroz call for the defense of the Ukrainian nation in a fashion reminiscent of the ideas of integral nationalism of the 1930's. Moroz told the crowd

...times changed, and some people are already ashamed and say: it is not necessary to irritate others, it is not necessary to call oneself a nationalist. I am proud to state I am a nationalist.

Do not be afraid of calling yourselves nationalists. Never adapt and you will win. Let the non-nationalist hide his non-nationalism, I shall not hide mine....We should not hide, but destroy stereotypes, which Moscow has thrown on America. We should teach America that nationalism is not nazism. Let Moscow look for Nazis in its own house....

Don't be afraid when they tell you of your narrow mindedness, when they tell you that you value your nation the most in the world. Yes, I know that all people are equal. My reasoning tells me so. Yet, at the same time, I know that my nation is the greatest. My nation - the world's ornament. Only a nation which firmly believes in its superiority, in its mission, can step into its future, as the victor, can be the builder and not the material, not the clay.

...Everyone has the right to choose his own path,... but in choosing that path, we must remember that in taking a path we must carry with us three important objects: the blue and yellow Ukrainian flag, the holy trident and our great sacred slogan - Death to the empire; freedom for Ukraine.171

It was this unqualified and sweeping nature of many of his remarks that produced confusion almost immediately within the Ukrainian community. While agreeing with many of the concepts underlying Moroz's beliefs, some sectors of the community were unable to accept his non-discriminating comments which sometimes

insulted those present. Nevertheless, to most Ukrainians in the West, Moroz still remained a mythical hero figure. As with the earlier exiles, Moroz quickly embarked a speaking tour involving both Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian communities and organizations.¹⁷²

On June 6, Valentyn Moroz arrived in Toronto to begin a speaking tour of the larger Ukrainian communities of Canada.¹⁷³ Moroz began the tour in Ottawa, meeting with the newly-elected Prime Minister of Canada, Joe Clark, and other government leaders, an indication of the importance of the symbol he had become. During the meeting, Clark assured Moroz that he could receive landed immigrant status if he so desired.¹⁷⁴ On June 9, a demonstration in defense of Levko Lukianenko and Iurii Shukhevych saw over 30,000 show to hear Moroz speak.¹⁷⁵ A host of dignitaries awaited his arrival at Queen's Park, including the Rt. Hon. John Diefenbaker, Ed Broadbent, Stuart Smith, and David Crombie. In his speech he praised the Ukrainian community but called on it to unite in the struggle for Ukrainian independence. Moroz then went on to compliment the Ukrainian Canadians present

172. A sample of his early speaking engagements include: the New York Youth organized rally of May 12, a reception with members of Congress on May 17, a speech to the National Press Club on May 18, a meeting with the leadership of the 1st Division of the Ukrainian National Army on May 19, a speech at New York's Ukrainian Festival on May 20, a lecture at the fourth meeting of the HURI Permanent Conference of Ukrainian Studies on May 26, and the acceptance of an honorary doctorate from Jersey City State College on June 3.

173. Student, Vol. 11, No. 56 (June-July-August, 1979), p. 1.

174. Svoboda, June 16, 1979, p. 1.

175. Ibid.

in a manner that trivialized the Ukrainian American community and guaranteed its anger. Reacting to the size and importance of his audience Moroz said:

When I arrived in New York, I saw signs of 'black power', 'white power', and 'Ukrainian power'. Here I don't see signs - I see real Ukrainian power.¹⁷⁶

...as a Ukrainian American I am jealous of the Ukrainian Canadians and their achievements.

Canada is the calling card of Ukrainian power and strength. It is from here that we must rally to demonstrate at Soviet embassies everywhere.¹⁷⁷

Moroz, also created an uproar in the community when he demanded that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church should merge with the Ukrainian Catholic Church, saying "we must have a monolith, not fragments."¹⁷⁸ Moroz's speeches at the other stops of the tour, Winnipeg and Montreal, reiterated the same basic themes of earlier speeches. His intense commitment to the goal of an independent Ukraine was matched by his advocacy of more radical methods, including both the Moscow Olympics boycott and a grain embargo, to free jailed dissenters.¹⁷⁹ The tour was widely covered by the Canadian press and provided Moroz with access to a huge audience.

The arrival on April 27 of the family of Georgii Vins, an individual who had been acclaimed by the Ukrainian community as one of its own, was surrounded in secrecy. Georgi Vins himself was unable to meet the family on its arrival, however, a number of prominent Ukrainians did meet the plane. These included the

176. Ibid.

177. Ukrainian Weekly, June 24, 1979, p. 1.

178. Ibid.

179. Ibid., pp.-1, 8.

leader of the Ukrainian American Baptist community, Pastor Oleksa Harbuziuk, president of the All-Ukrainian Evangelical Baptist Fellowship; Roman Kupchinsky of the Committee for the Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners; Roman Kudela of the WCFU Human Rights Bureau in New York; and Nadia Svitlychna, Petro Grigorenko, Victor Borovsky, Aleksandr Ginzburg, and Arkadii Polishchuk. Grigorenko who spoke to the accompanying press, addressed the meaning of the release: "We are all pleased that these people are in freedom, but we want Americans to know that there is no thaw in the Soviet Union".¹⁸⁰ Grigorenko's special goal during the arrival however, was not to speak to reporters but rather meet Petro Vins who was to have met members of the Monitoring Group in Kiev shortly before leaving.

As first among equals, Valentyn Moroz was privy to a number of meetings not merited by other Ukrainian dissenters. Among these was the meeting with the Canadian Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. Joe Clark. On June 27, Valentyn Moroz met both Cardinal Josyf Slipyj, the primate of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, and Pope John Paul II in private audiences.¹⁸¹ At an earlier press conference in the British Parliament, Moroz had been highly supportive of the new Pope, and expressed his hope that the Pope would take a tough line in dealing with Moscow, which he believed would force the Kremlin to recognize the Ukrainian Catholic Church.¹⁸² Subsequent denials of the meetings and their confidential contents, which Moroz made public, produced no anger

¹⁸⁰. Ibid., p. 3.

¹⁸¹. Svoboda, June 30, 1979, p. 1.

¹⁸². Ibid.

in Moroz who seemed to enjoy the controversy created.

Ukrainian activists soon renewed their general campaign for the release of Ukrainian political prisoners, encouraged by their perception of their recent successes in releasing Ukrainian dissenters. The New Jersey Committee for the Defense of Valentyn Moroz began a petition drive demanding a general amnesty for Ukrainian and other political prisoners in the Soviet Union.

Of all the exiled dissenters as of early 1979, none had maintained as balanced, consistent and positive a relationship with the emigre community as had Nadia Svitlychna. Constantly popular, her low-key appearances before Ukrainian audiences remained frequent even with the arrival of the immensely popular, nearly mythical Valentyn Moroz. Her moderation, her unwillingness to become involved in inter-factional disputes and the continuing primacy of her desire to help those left behind in Ukraine, protected her from making the mistakes made by other Ukrainian dissident exiles. With her honorary enrollment in Plast on June 25, 1979, Nadia Svitlychna became firmly established within the mainstream of Ukrainian community and political life.¹⁸³

Raisa Moroz and her son Valentyn arrived in New York on July 5, 1979.¹⁸⁴ An apparently happy dissident accompanied by over 200 well-wishers greeted the newly arrived family members at Kennedy airport. Despite the public display of affection and an appreciation of the difficulties his family had endured during his imprisonment, Valentyn Moroz's behaviour had already set the

183. Ibid., July 6, 1979, p. 1. Her son Yarema had already been enrolled in Plast for a number of months.

184. Ukrainian Weekly, July 8, 1979, p. 1.

stage for personal problems which would lead to his eventual separation from his wife and seriously damage the reputation of the Ukrainian dissident turned myth.

Tensions between Valentyn Moroz and the Ukrainian community erupted at the 30th annual Rally of Ukrainians from the U.S. and Canada held on July 7-8 at Ellenville, N.Y.. Moroz was the keynote speaker at the outdoor manifestation on July 8, 1979, and devoted the major portion of his comments that day to what Svoboda termed "a negativistic appraisal of Ukrainian community life in the free world and a criticism of some of the leading Ukrainian community, fraternal and charitable organizations."¹⁸⁵ Moroz's verbal attacks were aimed equally at the community establishment as well as other dissenters:

I took for my motto the words of Sviatoslav "I am marching on you", I took for my ethics, the ethics of Sviatoslav - uncompromising. And therefore, I am always ready to speak about practical matters, about that, how we can build up ourselves, how we can repair that which we have.

... there stands a question direct and immediate, are any expenditures and efforts on that which I do worthwhile?

I said, at the beginning, that I harbour the ethics of Sviatoslav - directly and uncompromisingly to turn to the community - let the community decide, if the efforts are worth what I do, if the costs are worth what I do.

This, what I do, these are not individual efforts, these are not individual ambitions, this is a colossal opportunity to raise the Ukrainian issue, to interest in it foreigners, This is a wonderful opportunity, the first in many decades, to place the Ukrainian issue on the international forum.

...And there after that, our leading politicians discuss - is that matter worth 1200 dollars. Let the community decide, if they are worth the efforts of the community. Are our leaders so frugal everywhere? As is known to me, every month they waste money on a dissident who has still not decided if he is a Ukrainian dissident, who is a honorary member of the veterans of the Red Army. This dissident is given a monthly salary as a paid correspondent of UCCA - interesting, let these people say before the community what they wish to spend Ukrainian money on, on the Ukrainian issue or on the Red

185. Ibid., July 15, 1979, p. 3.

Army?...

Does it (the newspaper Svoboda which published the UCCA discussions about the cost of Moroz's trip to Washington) not have any others to fight with? I will give you examples - I have with me a brochure - this is the interview with Plyushch. I grabbed myself by my head when I read this interview. A Ukrainian dissident, a person, who calls himself a Ukrainian dissident says, that Ukraine is the center of anti-semitism. We do everything we can to unite our forces with the Jews because we know what kind of cooperation there can be with them. A person who calls himself a Ukrainian dissident is ruining all our efforts. This person talks of some kind of fascist group in Lviv....We do everything possible, to prove that nationalism is not nazism or even fascism, but this person gives testimony to the whole world from the mouth of an Ukrainian that in Ukraine there is some kind of fascism. Neither Svoboda nor Ukrainske slovo once raised their voices against this person. Svoboda does not have the courage to fight him who spits on the Ukrainian shrine.¹⁸⁶

The unexpected attack by Moroz caught the audience by surprise. A number of speakers did their best to conceal their feelings and avoid a confrontation. However, not all did. Dr. Michael Snihurowych of UCCA defended the "establishment" and the prestige of UCCA in his speech.¹⁸⁷ The stage was complete for a dramatic reversal in the fortunes of Moroz and a difficult period for Ukrainian human rights activists.

The community response was swift and at times vitriolic. Svoboda in an editorial lectured the community about Moroz remarking that he is now a man in the West and not a myth in the East. It asked Moroz a sole question "For what are you beating me, brother?!"¹⁸⁸ Noting that everyone has a right to make a mistake, it called for time in which Moroz would recognize his

186. Svoboda, July 13, 1979, pp. 2-3.

187. Ibid., July 11, 1979, p. 6

188. Ibid., July 13, 1979, p. 2.

mistakes.¹⁸⁹ It then called on its readers to continue action in defence of those in Soviet camps despite the recent turn of events.

Novyi Shliakh, the organ of OUN-M, in Canada in a critical response to Moroz's comments answered Svoboda's question. In a perceptive article written by Osyp Zinkevych, entitled "Apropos Moroz: Why Everything Has Not Been Said", the author asks how Moroz, an individual only recently released from the Soviet camp system, could know in detail, with important factual inaccuracies, so much about the Ukrainian emigre community in North America and its institutions. The author then answered his own question noting that:

... today it has undoubtedly happened, that those party people who have the greatest access to him and who are in his entourage - in an extraordinary way lie to him about various institutions and individuals they dislike.¹⁹⁰

After the noting the importance of preventing the development of hostilities between Moroz and the Ukrainian community, Zinkevych concluded his article by rejecting Svoboda's advice about letting Moroz come to understand the community by himself over time:

When the organized Ukrainian community leaves him alone, then there will be the danger, that party speculators will appear, who in the name of unity will try to use the Moroz-human against the community which for long years defended him and suffered his pain. And then that would occur which the KGB and Moscow themselves most desire.¹⁹¹

All Zinkevych had left out was the name of the organization manipulating Moroz, which any observer could discern by simply

189. Ibid.

190. Novyi Shliakh, August 4-11, 1979, p. 7.

191. Ibid., p. 9.

eliminating the organizations attacked in his sweeping generalizations. The organization was OUN-B.

Despite the beginnings of a wholesale community reassessment of Moroz, his reputation and initial popularity continued to assure him of new forums in which to speak. Thus, on July 15, Valentyn Moroz and Petro Vins testified before the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.¹⁹² Vins spoke eloquently both about the fate of the members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group and the virtual bar to emigration existing in Ukraine. Moroz's speech covered many similar themes but took a more strident tone. In particular, he placed the problem of human rights violations in a political context and advocated their use as a political weapon. Moroz also directly criticized the American president for not being forceful enough in his dealing with the Soviet government over the human rights question.

On July 13, 1979, Moroz arrived at Harvard University to give a series of special lectures to the students of the Harvard Ukrainian summer school.¹⁹³ The series of four lectures conducted by Moroz were an apparent success, with a variety of non-conformist views of history being expounded by Moroz but being accepted by the audience. Generally, the tour was a positive experience.

Despite the damage that had occurred to relations between sections of the Ukrainian community and Valentyn Moroz, dissenters continued to be a priority in many Ukrainians eyes. On

192. Ukrainian Weekly, July 29, 1979, p. 3.

193. Ibid., p. 4.

July 19, the still active Philadelphia Moroz Defence Committee demonstrated at the Soviet embassy in Washington to protest the sentencing of Levko Lukianenko.¹⁹⁴ On July 31, Helsinki group members held simultaneous news conferences in New York and Moscow. The press conferences yet again provided a forum for the Ukrainian problem to be mentioned by Grigorenko.¹⁹⁵ Also present was Victor Borowsky. On August 9, Nadia Svitlychna took her turn as a lecturer in Harvard's special lecture series.¹⁹⁶

Despite the furor, that her husband had created, Raisa Moroz, conducted a series of lectures in the United States and Europe in the summer of 1979.¹⁹⁷ Though not a widely-known dissident in the West, she had suffered persecution for the actions of her husband and was of immense interest to the Ukrainian community. During her European visit, Raisa Moroz's fluency in German allowed her to offer interviews to the German and Austrian news media. Finally, Raisa Moroz also gave interviews for the Ukrainian and Russian services of Radio Liberty for broadcasting to the Soviet Union.¹⁹⁸

In reaction to Valentyn Moroz's criticism of it on July 8, 1979, the executive committee of the ZAUDK on August 15, 1979 decided to publish the amounts of funds that had come into the

194. Ibid., August 5, 1979, p. 3.

195. Ibid., p. 2.

196. Ibid., August 26, 1979, p. 4.

197. Svoboda, September 1, 1979, p. 1.

198. Ukrainian Weekly, September 9, 1979, p. 4.

3

MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS
STANDARD REFERENCE MATERIAL 1010a
(ANSI and ISO TEST CHART No. 2)

various funds which had been set up in the dissidents' names.¹⁹⁹ A decision was also taken to publish the contributions to a newly established fund for Ukrainian political prisoners. The decision would have interesting consequences, in fact placing the dissidents in a popularity contest; as results would be distorted as Moroz had less than a month earlier asked the community to send donations directly to him, rather than through any central Ukrainian organizations.²⁰⁰

From August 23 to 26, 1979, SUSK held its 20th annual Congress. For a variety of reasons, from curiosity to fairness, the organizing committee for the Congress invited Valentyn Moroz to be a keynote speaker at the Congress despite the absence of human rights on the agenda.²⁰¹ Moroz's speech at the Congress retraced many of his earlier themes, including his attacks on Grigorenko and Plyushch. Moroz also attacked traits which he saw as serious problems within the Ukrainian diaspora and the student community in particular. He assailed the community for growing fat and lazy, and the students for their susceptibility to liberal, pacifist and internationalist ideologies. He was especially critical of David Lupul, the SUSK vice-president in charge of human rights, -for an article which he had written shortly before the Congress in Student, which analyzed Moroz's

199. Svoboda, September 8, 1979, p. 3.

200. Ibid., September 9, 1979, p. 4.

201. Ukrainian Weekly, September 9, 1979, p. 3.

behaviour in a somewhat negative manner.²⁰² Homin Ukrainy supported Moroz's condemnation of the Lupul article, and published a harshly worded on attack on the newspaper and SUSK itself in its September 5 issue.²⁰³

After his criticism of the "establishment" on July 8, 1979, Valentyn Moroz's dependence on and contacts with the OUN-B organizations grew stronger. Moroz was invited to be the key speaker at the 28th annual SUMA Rally at Ellenville, N.Y., on September 2. Moroz, by then an honorary member of SUM, spoke at length to a partisan crowd on the role and meaning of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, the activities of the WCFU and Ukrainian youth organizations.²⁰⁴

Throughout 1979, new repressions in Ukraine, especially those against individuals connected to the Ukrainian Helsinki Group received broad coverage in the Ukrainian emigre press. As a result, the Ukrainian human rights groups remained active, redirecting their defence efforts to new individuals. Some groups such as the New Jersey Moroz Defense Committee retained their names. Other groups simply changed their names to reflect the reality of Moroz's release and continued their activities under new titles, such as the Montreal group which became the Committee for the Defense of Ukrainian Political Prisoners in the USSR, and the Philadelphia Committee which was renamed the Human Rights for

202. Student, Vol. 12, No. 57 (September-October, 1979), pp. 3, 11. Lupul's article can be found in Student, Vol. 11 No. 56, June-July-August, 1979, pp. 1, 10.

203. Ibid., pp. 3, 10.

204. Ukrainian Weekly, September 16, 1979, p. 4; September 23, 1979, p. 3; and September 30, 1979, p. 5.

Ukraine Committee.²⁰⁵ However, despite the appearance of strength, the momentum in the Ukrainian community in the West behind the human rights campaigns had begun to fade.

On September 19, after long delay, the UCCA executive committee having met on September 15, issued a statement concerning Valentyn Moroz's remarks of July 8, 1979. They maintained that Moroz's comments on that day were not based on facts. Further, they specifically noted errors in Moroz's comments relating to Petro Grigorenko and George Meany.²⁰⁶ Finally, the UCCA executive admitted that their group had written the editorial criticizing Moroz's conduct in the July 13 Svoboda.²⁰⁷

On September 26, 1979, the Third International Sakharov Hearings began in Washington. Those gathered heard 60 witnesses, among the Petro Grigorenko, Nadia Svitlychna, Raisa Moroz, Petro Vins, and Mykola Buduliak-Sharyhin.²⁰⁸ Grigorenko surprised those assembled by devoting his address to national rights, something not on the agenda. He specifically dealt with the deceptiveness of Soviet nationality policy and went on to demonstrate the greater severity of persecution facing those operating in the

²⁰⁵. Svoboda, October 2, 1979, p. 1.

²⁰⁶. Moroz had severely criticized the UCCA executive for having withheld an invitation by George Meany, head of the AFL-CIO, to meet with him. In fact, the invitation was intercepted by Boris Potapenko a UCCA functionary and OUN-B follower, who served as Moroz's secretary. It was Potapenko who withheld the invitation probably in order to damage Moroz's opinion of the UCCA. If such was the plan, it clearly worked.

²⁰⁷. Svoboda, October 2, 1979, p. 1.

²⁰⁸. Mykola Buduliak-Sharyhin is a British subject of Ukrainian descent who was arrested in 1968 during a business trip to the USSR and spent ten years in Soviet camps before his release in 1978.

non-Russian republics. He especially stressed the difference in fate for members of the Moscow Helsinki Group and the Ukrainian Helsinki Group. Grigorenko pointed out that though that the Moscow Group had lost thirteen individuals and the Ukrainian had lost twelve, only one member of the Ukrainian Group, Petro Vina, had been forced abroad, whereas the Moscow Group members received lighter sentences than the Ukrainian members and five of their number were forced abroad, with himself being deprived of citizenship.²⁰⁹

The failure of the Third Sakharov Hearings to consider national rights, apart from Grigorenko's unscheduled interjection, caused considerable anger among a number of East European groups, especially the Ukrainians. A meeting to discuss the Hearings and their shortcomings between the Ukrainian community and a large group of dissenters on September 30, did not reduce the level of bitterness.²¹⁰ On October 5, 1979, Svoboda published an open attack on the proceedings by a coalition of groups, including Americans for the Liberation of Captive Nations, the League for the Liberation of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Hetman Organization of America, the Belorussian American Association, and the Executive Committee of the Baltic Union. They wrote:

The International Sakharov Tribunal which portrays itself as the defender of legality and legal norms in the USSR, stubbornly refuses to investigate the question of the mass destruction of Ukrainians and other non-Russians during the times of genocide - with the help of an artificial famine;

209. Smoloskyp Vol. 1, No. 5 (Fall 1979), pp. 1, 3. Solzhenitsyn used the conference to call for the release of Igor Ogurtsov, a Russian neo-Slavophile.

210. Ukrainian Weekly, October 14, 1979, p. 3.

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executions by the creation of such frightening conditions in the prisons, camps, and exiles that people died on a massive scale....

By refusing to investigate this question and condemn those guilty in the killing of millions, the International Sakharov Tribunal loses all moral and juridical right to be indignant over the illegal arrests and other persecutions of individual persons....

Discussion of the question of the violation of the rights of individual nations at the International Sakharov Hearings without the discussion of the violation of the rights of another nations, and also the discussion of the crimes in connection with very small nations which do not demand independence, without discussion of the crimes in connection with the large nations which demand independence...is demagoguery.

When the International Sakharov Tribunal will not change its relationship to the nations of the national republics, enslaved by Moscovite leaders, it shall have to deal with a boycott from the side of these nations.211

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The declaration is of considerable interest because of its outline of the attitude these groups and national federations towards those dissenters and groups who strove principally or exclusively for an improvement in the scope of civil liberties in the U.S.S.R. and ignored the national question. The statement shows the bitterness within these groups about the dominance of Russians among exiled dissenters and their antipathy or indifference towards national independence. The declaration also indirectly attacks Petro Grigorenko, who continued to speak out for the rights of the Crimean Tatars to return to their ancestral homeland. OUN-B saw Grigorenko's commitment to these people as an unnecessary emphasis on a minor problem to the detriment of the Ukrainian problem.

By mid-1979, two tendencies became clearly discernible within the Ukrainian community. The first trend continued the old

211. Svoboda, October 5, 1979, p. 2, and October 10, 1979, p. 6.

practice of defending Ukrainian political prisoners in general without distinguishing among the dissenters as to their politics. Groups, such as the Ukrainian American Bar Association (UBA), represented the first tendency. On October 7, 1979, the UBA established a special Lukianenko Defense Committee, with Myroslav Smorodsky as chairman.²¹² The Lukianenko Defence effort had by then become a new general campaign with some tactical successes being reported, such as the signing of letters by American legislators calling for the release of Lukianenko. The UBA and similar groups were encouraged by the continued struggle for the observance of legality by Soviet dissenters in Ukraine.²¹³ They were particularly encouraged by highly courageous but dangerous acts such as the formation of a Prisoners Helsinki Watch Group in Mordovian Camp in Sosnovka.²¹⁴ The other tendency evident within the Ukrainian community was that principally held by individuals associated with OUN-B. OUN-B throughout the 1970's considered the struggle for Ukrainian independence and national rights to be separate from the human rights campaign. By the late 1970's, independence question had asserted its primacy decisively and virtually exclusively within this organization and much of the Ukrainian right. The growing dominance of these ideas were already in evidence in the outcome of the Third WCFU Congress. Thus, it is not surprising that the OUN-B and its allies reserved

212. Ukrainian Weekly, October 28, 1979, p. 3.

213. Ibid., November 4, 1979, p. 2. Thirty-five Senators had signed a letter initiated by Senator H. John Heinz, calling for the release of Lukianenko by November 7, 1979.

214. Ibid., October 28, 1979, p. 2.

their support to those dissidents who could be definitely linked to the concept of Ukrainian independence, such as Iurii Shukhevych, son of the former commander-in-chief of the UPA, General Roman Shukhevych, and Valentyn Moroz.²¹⁵

The 25th annual meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly began its work on October 22, 1979, in Ottawa, Canada. The scheduling of the testimony of dissidents before the Subcommittee on the Free Flow of Information and People, attested to the deep divisions which had developed between Ukrainian dissidents in the West, particularly between Petro Grigorenko and Valentyn Moroz. On October 22, a panel of dissidents composed of Petro and Zinaida Grigorenko, Raisa Moroz, Victor Borovsky, Mykola Buduliak-Sharyhin, Ludmilla Alexeyeva, Tomas Venclova, Ambartsum Khlgatyan, and Aishe Seitmuratova, held a lively discussion with the subcommittee chaired by Senator Yuzyk. On October 23, 1979, by then an isolated Valentyn Moroz appeared as the sole witness and presented a paper entitled "Ukraine: Statehood and Its Implications for the West", which prompted an unprecedented discussion of the ramifications of the dismemberment of the Soviet Union.²¹⁶

On November 30, 1979, the Ukrainian diaspora appears to have gained another victory with the emigration of Sviatoslav Karavanskyi and his wife, Nina Strokata. Karavanskyi, a victim of lengthy persecution, was not the subject of intense international

215. On November 7, 1979, 800 New Yorkers protested Soviet oppression of the non-Russian nationalities of the U.S.S.R.. The key addresses were given by Slava Stetsko and Valentyn Moroz. See Ukrainian Weekly, November 18, 1979, p. 3.

216. Ukrainian Weekly, November 11, 1979, p. 7.

pressure and thus it was more likely that Ukrainian efforts were influential in his release, though one should not underestimate the important support of scientists for his wife, Nina Strokata. Nina Strokata had played an important role as a founding member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, and later as its link to the Moscow Group. Her name appeared prominently at demonstrations in defence of Ukrainian political prisoners during the last half of the 1970's.

Sviatoslav Karavanskyi's emigration had been foreshadowed by a number of developments in the preceding days which, in hindsight, foretold of his eventual release. Harvard University's department of Slavic languages and literatures had invited Karavanskyi to give two guest lectures on translation at the university in early summer, however, Karavanskyi had not received the letters until September 20, 1979. He had immediately communicated his acceptance.²¹⁷ It now appears likely that by the point where the decision to forward the invitation to Karavanskyi was taken, the decision had been made to release Karavanskyi to the West. On November 22, it was reported that Karavanskyi had received permission to leave the U.S.S.R..²¹⁸

By late 1979, the various controversies which had surrounded most of the exiled Ukrainian dissenters, and the conduct of Valenty Moroz in particular, had caused serious damage to the Ukrainian emigres' support of human rights efforts. For emigre Ukrainians, the dissenters had by this time lost the

217. Ibid., p. 1.

218. Ibid., December 2, 1979, p. 1.

mythical qualities they earlier possessed and were now often approached with feelings of suspicion and doubt. Svoboda, in an effort to counter these attitudes, ran an editorial on December 5. It wrote:

The approach of the free Ukrainian community to these former members of the Ukrainian resistance movement is the same as that to all others.... This approach is such that we are aware that not all members of the resistance movement in Ukraine are identical in their worldview - [we are aware that] they are united by the general worldview of conscious patriotic Ukrainians, but, in fact, they differ as to tactics, how to approach the liberation of the fatherland, they differ on questions of religious, and social customs. And this phenomenon is normal, natural, and cannot be different. Free Ukrainian people, as all people in the free world, do not look in the socio-political palate of anyone, but look at his national face and individual integrity. In fact, none of the Ukrainian dissidents was tried or condemned for his socio-political worldview, but for being Ukrainian and by his pursuit of freedom - personal and national. And, therefore finding themselves here, in the free world,... each can distinguish himself as is to his liking, because in the free Ukrainian community there is a whole spectrum of socio-political and supra-party but constructive Ukrainian institutions and organizations. All of them are captured within the general structure of the organized free Ukrainian community and it welcomes every former Ukrainian political prisoner.219

From the moment of their appearance in Vienna to their arrival at Dulles airport in Washington, D.C., on December 11, 1979, the interviews given by the Karavanskyis reflected a blend of concerns which would please all factions of the Ukrainian political spectrum, except those of the pro-socialist, communist left. The Karavanskyis praised the work of the Ukrainian community and stressed their concerns over both friends left behind, and the fate of Ukraine at the hands of Soviet

219. Svoboda, December 5, 1979, p. 2.

government.²²⁰ Within days, the Karavanskyis would enter the speakers' circuit, as had those dissidents who had arrived before them.

On December 13, 1979, members of the Western Representation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group issued an appeal to the Ukrainian community and public at large to begin an action called "Human Rights Ukraine". Fearing that the Soviet propaganda apparatus would make the forthcoming Helsinki review conference in Madrid repeat of Belgrade, they called on the Ukrainian community to inform the world public about repressions in Ukraine, strive to have the hearings held in public, and call for the release of Ukrainian political prisoners. To strengthen the new campaign they called for the formation of specialized groups to promote these goals.²²¹

The response to the External Representation's appeal were was immediate. On December 15-16, 1979, 35 representatives from eleven human rights organizations based in Canada and the United States met in Valley Forge, Pa., to review past defence actions and plan future strategy.²²² The main topic on the agenda was the

220. For a sampling of their interviews, see the Ukrainian Weekly, December 16, 1979.

221. Svoboda, December 16, 1979, pp. 2-3. The dissenters signing the appeal were Petro Grigorenko, Leonid Plyushch, Petro Vins, Victor Borovsky, Zinaida Grigorenko, Raisa moroz, Aishe Seitmurova, Nadia Svitlychna, Mykola Buduliak-Sharyhin.

222. Ukrainian Weekly, January 6, 1980, p. 3. The groups attending the conference were the Bridgeport Connecticut Rights Committee; the Ukrainian American Bar Association; the Committee for the Defence of National and Human Rights in Ukraine (Detroit); the Council on Human Rights (Cleveland); the Committee for the Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners (New York); the Committee for the

forthcoming Madrid Conference. Resolutions adopted included one stressing the necessity of assuring participation of the External Representation in the Madrid Conference. Other resolutions aimed at securing an amnesty for Ukrainian political prisoners before the forthcoming Olympic games in Moscow, and a public information drive were also planned. The Conference participants received a message of support from the newly arrived Karavanskyis and heard Nadia Svitlychna and Raisa Moroz speak. Both Svitlychna and Moroz stressed the need for financial, moral and informational aid to the dissenters as well as the need for more effective propagation of the nationality issue in North America.

As 1979 ended, Ukrainians looked back at a year in which they had had the largest influx of new dissenters into their ranks, and at the same time suffered their greatest disappointments at the hands of Valentyn Moroz. However, the community's human rights efforts remained considerable and interest in Ukrainian dissent remained high. The constant flow of information from Ukraine in itself did much to keep the drive alive; where this needed to be supplemented the newly arrived dissidents did much by delivering dozens of lectures and speeches, and writing numerous appeals.

As the new year began, emigre Ukrainians began a renewal of their human rights defence actions. On December 27, 1979, the WCFU had finally reacted to the new wave of repressions which had

222. (continued) Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners (Philadelphia); Americans for Human Rights in Ukraine (Newark N.J.); the Organization for the Defence of Human Rights in Ukraine (Rochester); Smoloskyp; the University of Toronto Ukrainian Students' Club; and the Human Rights for Ukraine Committee.

swept Ukraine and resulted in the imprisonment of virtually the entire complement of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group by issuing an appeal for a strengthened action on the traditional day of solidarity with Soviet political prisoners. The WCFU itself was sending appeals in defense of those arrested in the most recent wave of repression, to the U.N. Human Rights Commission, U.N. member states, and Helsinki signatories.²²³

The invasion of Afghanistan in late December 1979, was to have profound effects on the dissident movement in Ukraine and the U.S.S.R., in general. Where the Soviet government had previously felt some constraints, it now acted with seeming impunity. Andrei Sakharov, the dean of the Soviet human rights movement - previously a virtually untouchable individual - was arrested and exiled to the closed city of Gorky on January 22, 1979. The new developments would also mean a drastic decrease in whatever possible influence human rights lobbies had had earlier. However, as the earliest events unfolded in Afghanistan and as the door of opportunity for emigration closed for Soviet dissenters, emigre Ukrainians were rewarded by the unexpected emigration of Volodymyr Malynkovych on December 30, 1979, a Helsinki Group member, and Pavlo Stokotelny, husband of Nadia Svitlychna on January 15, 1980.²²⁴

Early in January 1980, tension which had been building up in the Ukrainian community exploded in a struggle involving Petro

223. Ibid.

224. Svoboda, January 26, 1979, p. 1. Pavlo Stokotelnyi arrived in the United States on February 10, 1979 (see Svoboda, February 12, 1979, p. 1).

Grigorenko, the External Representation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, OUN-B and the other groups represented in UCCA. Degrees of dissatisfaction with Grigorenko had been present among groups of the Ukrainian right since his arrival in the West. Grigorenko's unwillingness to categorically lay blame on the Russian nation for excesses and crimes committed in the Soviet Union, his careful distinction between the Communist "partocracy" and the Russian people, and his continuing preoccupation with the Crimean Tatar cause had generated considerable hostility. The stimulus which precipitated a major crisis was Grigorenko's acceptance of membership on the editorial board of the Russian emigre journal Kontinent and his initial article in this "journal". Grigorenko's comments in the article, in particular his refusal to accept the thesis of Russian dominance within the Soviet Union and his assertion that ~~the~~ "greatest barriers to the creation of one front of all the nations of the U.S.S.R. are the remnants of the Russian great power chauvinism and anti-Russian provincial nationalism" provoked a virulent reaction.²²⁵ The Ukrainian OUN-B right and its sympathizers took exceptional offence at the implication that Ukrainian nationalism was "provincial", that is inferior. In the heat of the crisis on December 15, 1979, the UCCA executive met for its regular year-end meeting. As the meeting approached its conclusion, OUN-B members of UCCA forced an immediate vote on the question of Grigorenko's conduct. In the bitter debate that followed, contradictory resolutions were advanced, with the final victory going to a resolution that

225. Ibid., February 2, 1980, p. 2.

confirmed the erroneousess of Grigorenko's political conception and deprived the External Representation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group of the UCCA support for its activities.²²⁶ Not only were those dissidents associated with Grigorenko in the External group unjustly penalized for Grigorenko's statements, but the conflict split the Ukrainian American community. A far greater battle was initiated with OUN-B attempting to remove the president of WCFU, Mykola Plaviuk, and other individuals who condemned the final resolution. On February 4, 1980, 17 Ukrainian organizations who were members of UCCA issued a statement which rejected the resolution and called for a rethinking of the situation.²²⁷ The Presidium of the External Representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UHVSR) also issued a statement criticising the developments in the UCCA; it condemned those who had launched a campaign similar to the KGB's own, which

226. Ibid.

227. Ibid., February 14, 1980, p. 2., and the Ukrainian Weekly, February 17, 1980, pp. 1-2, 14. The organizations signing were: the Association of Ukrainians of America; the Brotherhood of Veterans of the First Division of the Ukrainian National Army; the Brotherhood of Ukrainian "Sichovi Striltsi"; the Democratic Association of Formerly Repressed Ukrainians in the Soviet Union; the Coordinating Committee of Ukrainian and Ukrainian American Veterans' Organizations; the Association of Ukrainian Veterans in America; the Association of Supporters of the Liberation Struggle of Ukraine; the Self-Reliance Association of Ukrainians in America; the Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine; the Association of American Youth of Ukrainian Descent (ODUM); the National Plast Command and National Plast Council; the Association of Lands of Sovereign Ukraine - Ukrainian Farmers Party; the Association of Soldiers of the Ukrainian Resistance; the Association of Soldiers of the Ukrainian Resistance; the Association of Ukrainian Journalists of America; the Zarevo Ukrainian Academic Society; the Ukrainian Gold Cross; and the Association of Ukrainian Sports Clubs in North America.

sought to "employ methods of moral destruction against General Grigorenko and simultaneously devalue the whole human rights movement as one of the forms of liberation struggle in the contemporary period." 228 UHVR went on to stress the need for the creation of a united front, rising above factional conflicts. However, the battlelines had been drawn which would eventually devastate UCCA and undermine its ability to support the human rights campaign.

Ukrainian protests at the 1980 Winter Olympics vividly illustrated the new gulf in concerns between emigre Ukrainian organizations. At Lake Placid, members of the Ukrainian Liberation Front conducted wide-ranging actions and demonstrations aimed at depicting Ukraine's colonial status and promoting a boycott of the summer Olympics for this reason. Smoloskyp, the other major presence at the games, had brought Nina Stokata and was actively engaged in propagating information about Soviet violations of human rights. Smoloskyp also called for a boycott of the summer Olympics, but in response to the Soviet human rights violations. 229

From February 28 to March 1, 1980, the UCCA Executive Committee and National Council met to discuss a number of resolutions, especially the UCCA resolution of December 15, 1979. After lengthy discussions on March 1, a small majority of those present but not of those qualified to vote, voted to accept a compromise resolution which maintained that the December 15

228. Svoboda, February 14, 1980, p. 3.

229. See the Ukrainian Weekly, March 2, 1980, p. 1, for a summary of the differing protest actions.

resolution had not been directed against anyone or any group, but rather affirmed the unchallengeable supremacy of the principle that Ukraine is a victim of Russian imperialism. In a second vote, those present rejected a resolution by the Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine (ODVU), which would have completely excused Grigorenko for any remarks he would have made.²³⁰

Nevertheless, a majority of the Ukrainian emigre organizations, except for OUN-B, continued to show interest in and support for the External Representation and other dissidents associated with it. At the same time, this majority for the most part had cut its ties with Valentyn Moroz. When officers of the WCFU met with members of the External Representation on March 23, 1980, that they adopted a number of joint resolutions, including a pledge by the WCFU executive to support the External Representation, and an appeal to the Ukrainian community:

The participants of this meeting appeal to the Ukrainian community to give its support to the Ukrainian Helsinki Group and its Western representation in actions in defense of the enslaved Ukrainian people, and not to waste energy on internal conflicts and polemics, which are not conducive to the formation of a united front of all Ukrainians in the fight against the colonial regime, which enslaves the Ukrainian people on its native land.²³¹

In return, the External Representation acknowledged its support "for the efforts of the WCFU for the decolonization of the USSR and the separation of Ukraine into a sovereign, democratic state

230. Ukrainian Weekly, March 23, 1980, pp. 1-2. Of the 132 members eligible to vote at the meeting, only 100 attended. The Ukrainian Weekly reported that of those attending, 49 voted for the clarification, 32 voted against it, and 10 abstained.

231. Ukrainian Weekly, April 6, 1980, p. 15.

of the Ukrainian people."232 Continuing public support for human rights campaign was demonstrated on March 24, 1980, when the four members of the External Representation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, Petro Grigorenko, Nadia Svitlychna, Nina Strokata and Leonid Plyushch, together with Raisa Moroz, Victor Borovsky and Zinaida Grigorenko conducted the first mass meeting of their new campaign to elevate in importance the human rights component at Madrid. The session was very well attended, and despite some disagreement between members of the audience and the speakers, it proved a considerable success.233 Some further evidence of continuing support for general human rights protest actions can be seen in the TUSM sponsored demonstration in defence of Shukhevych and other Ukrainian political prisoners on March 29, 1980, which attracted approximately 500 people.234

The hostile relationship between Grigorenko and OUN-B was greatly exacerbated in April 1980 when Petro Grigorenko, Leonid Plyushch, Nadia Svitlychna, and Raisa Moroz, along with a number of Russian dissidents, signed a penintence for the Katyn massacre, which was published in the Russian language press. The incident reflected the dissidents' inability to comprehend the emigre community's sensibilities and the unwillingness of the emigres to show flexibility on certain issues they considered fundamental, principally the question of the degree of control exercised by Russians in the Soviet Union, and the responsibility

232. Ibid., p: 3.

233. Svoboda, March 27, 1980, pp. 1, 4.

234. Ibid., April 4, 1980, p. 1.

they were thus expected to accept for Soviet actions. The publication of the penitence created a storm in the Ukrainian community and was referred to the UCCA executive. The UCCA executive having failed to gain contact with all the signatories to the letter, Plyushch and Grigorenko both being in Europe, and a Raisa Moroz having already published an somewhat apologetic, explanatory open letter in a number of Ukrainian papers, delayed action on the matter until June 14, the date of the UCCA National Congress. Two resolutions condemning the signers' action were proposed, with the somewhat milder but immediately effective resolution being adopted. The resolution expressed dismay that the dissidents by their action were placing equal blame for the Katyn massacre on the Ukrainian nation, that by this action they were harming the Ukrainian cause, and called on the signers to publicly withdraw their signatures to the confession.²³⁵ The incident once more served to embroil members of the Ukrainian

235. Svoboda, June 27, 1980, pp. 1, 4. The full text of the resolution adopted reads:

In connection with the penitent declaration published in the Russian press in April 1980 by Soviet dissidents for the criminal killing of Polish soldiers and officers in Katyn, which was signed by Russian human rights activists, and also some Ukrainian human rights activists, in particular, members of the External Representation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group - Petro Grigorenko, Leonid Plyushch and Nadia SVitlychna, and Raisa Moroz, who along with the Russians confess for the crimes of "our country" and "our nation", accepting in this way Moscow's blame for the Katyn crimes on themselves, and in this way on the Ukrainian nation, - the Executive of the UCCA regards the signing of this confessional document by Ukrainian human rights activists as harmful to the Ukrainian cause and calls on those Ukrainians who signed the declaration to publicly withdraw their signatures.

community in a self-destructive dispute.²³⁶ Particular damage occurred within UCCA itself, as once again the organization was

236. In an interview shortly after the Katyn declaration incident, Leonid Plyushch outlined the difficult state of relations within the community at the time:

One can say that the more active the Ukrainian emigration has become in its struggle for human rights in Ukraine and in the Soviet Union in general, the more the attacks against former dissidents have been stepped up. These attacks take the form of blatant lies - counting on uninformed readers - or of half-truths, which are purposely misleading in their information.

...The actual mistakes which each of us makes are frequently exploited with this in mind. Clearly it is always possible to find fault with us. Each of us makes mistakes. He who errs not, acts not.

Those mistakes or, frequently, verbal misunderstandings, are exploited and exaggerated with the result that the attention of the entire Ukrainian diaspora is turned against us, either personally or against our work, thereby losing sight of something far more essential for the Ukrainian diaspora, as well as Ukraine itself.

If at least some of the energy which is expended on the slanderous campaign against (the External Representation of) the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, would be redirected towards working for the human rights movement, then the Ukrainian emigration could achieve substantial results.

Under the circumstances, we deem it best to ignore the attacks against us and not let ourselves be drawn into futile or often petty discussion.

Of course, during interviews or at public appearances we can fail to formulate some of our thoughts precisely. The latest instance of this is the Katyn declaration. If we let ourselves be drawn into a discussion about this matter, however, we will become embroiled in endless controversy which will only prevent us from doing constructive work. Before Katyn there was the so-called political conception of Gen. Petro Grigorenko; prior to this, there were still other issues. Even when the critics are correct, and this is not often, such discussion does not have a constructive character....

There remains a lot of constructive work to be done in all areas: cultural, educational, political, social and religious.

Unfortunately, the Ukrainian emigration after the awful experience which Ukraine underwent in the twentieth century, has un-learned, or never learned, how to conduct discussions on an appropriately high level, as is customary in the West, so that such discussions do not impede constructive work (Ukrainian Weekly, August 17, 1980, p. 3).

basically split between the OUN-B followers and all others, only furthering the OUN-B belief in the weakness and fundamentally wrong orientation of the UCCA executive. As a result of the dissident's political error, relations between the dissidents and the diaspora were to become more strained, in general and make mutual cooperation more difficult, just as the External Representation's effort for the Madrid Conference and the launching of the journal Herald of Repression in Ukraine were coming about.²³⁷

By summer 1980, the Ukrainian diaspora, including the dissidents within it, was irreconcilably divided between two blocs. On the one side was the traditional far right of Ukrainian politics, the OUN-B grouping and its allies, who unrelentingly stressed the supremacy of concept of Ukrainian independence, national rights above all others, and who most vigorously supported those dissenters who saw the creation of the future Ukraine, as they did, through force of arms. While they increasingly saw Iurii Shukhevych as the true embodiment of their beliefs, they still accepted Valentyn Moroz within their ranks, though his personal indiscretions and misstatements caused them considerable anguish. It was becoming clear, that a dissident in the Soviet Union was in many ways more useful than in one in exile.

The numerical majority of the Ukrainian emigration dominated by the OUN-M and OUN-Z factions continued to support

237. Svoboda, June 28, 1980, p. 1. Though printed in January, the first volume of the Herald was only officially available for distribution to the public in June 1980.

Petro Grigorenko and the External Representation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group. Although these dissidents had considerable support in principle within the Ukrainian community, their actions often alienated that community, particularly when their cooperation with Russian dissidents took on what to the highly nationalistic emigres had the appearance of servility. However, while Petro Grigorenko often frustrated emigre Ukrainians of the moderate right and center by his cooperating with Russians, they saw him as an individual with access to power which they found hard to dispense with.²³⁸ Thus continued cooperation between the bulk of exiled dissenters and this segment of the Ukrainian community was virtually assured.

By fall 1980, Ukrainian human rights activity had become focused on the Helsinki Review Conference beginning in Madrid. Up to the opening of the review conference, activity in the emigre community had been primarily restricted to lectures and seminars by individual dissidents to Ukrainian audiences. By this time, demonstrations, such as those which had been organized by various youth groups in the past, had almost ceased to occur, a reflection of the anger of many at the conflict between the dissidents and their community organizations, and frustration, as it became increasingly obvious that these tactics which had produced only minor tactical successes in the past, had lost their potency in the current dynamic of Western relations with

238. For instance, Grigorenko returned from a nine-nation European visit early in the summer. During the tour, not only did Grigorenko have enormous access to radio and T.V. audiences, but also met with Prime Minister Thatcher of England and Franz Josef Strauss, the President of the West German state of Bavaria. See Svoboda, July 8, 1980, p. 1.

In this difficult atmosphere, tensions between the dissidents festered and remained a point of conflict.

On September 30, 1980, the External Representation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group publicly issued what was first thought to be a statement to the participants of the Madrid Conference in the name of the Ukrainian Group, calling for a declaration from the Conference recognizing the right of the citizenry of member states to monitor the implementation of the Final Act, to do so without persecution, and for the Conference to investigate earlier reports of abuses.²³⁹ However, controversy eventually surrounded even this document.²⁴⁰ This call was preceded by a memorandum issued by the Helsinki Guarantees for Ukraine Committee, which called for a much broader range of concessions from the governments at the Conference, including the consideration of national rights and participation of Ukraine in the conference.²⁴¹ These efforts were matched by the WCFU and its Human Rights Commission, which also undertook to bring a new compendium of Soviet human rights violations entitled "The Helsinki Accords - Soviet Violations in Ukraine 1975-1980", to the attention of the conference participants and the wider public.²⁴² The WCFU also called on Ukrainian organizations to approach their various governments to express their concerns over the violation of human and national rights in Ukraine, and stage

239. Svoboda, September 30, 1980, p. 1.

240. Ibid., October 11, 1980, p. 2.

241. Ukrainian Weekly, September 28, 1980, pp. 1, 15.

242. Svoboda, October 8, 1980, p. 1

demonstrations and other promotional activities.²⁴³

As the Thirteenth Congress of the UCCA approached, divisions within the Ukrainian community had become a serious problem. Moderate elements castigated those UCCA members who had engineered its condemnatory resolution on Grigorenko, noting that if such inquiries were carried out into the personal comments of the members of UCCA and such sanctions applied, they could very soon bury organized Ukrainian life in the United States. For their part, organizations of the Ukrainian right had not willingly modified their position on Grigorenko in UCCA's clarification of February 2, and resented what they perceived as unjustified attacks on Moroz. As a result, these organizations had issued instructions to their memberships to boycott UCCA endorsed fund-raising drives in support of the Entsyklopediia ukrainoznavstva (Encyclopedia of Ukrainian Studies), and the Ukrainian National Association's 1980 almanac.²⁴⁴

The Thirteenth UCCA National Congress was held from October 10 to 12, 1980, and developed into the disaster foretold in some quarters. The Congress did have a number of positive features, including presentations by Sviatoslav Karavanskyi and Nina Strokata. Karavanskyi's presentation covered his dissident experiences and the growth of dissidence in the U.S.S.R., its stages and characteristics. Nina Strokata surprised many by speaking on the need to do more to help persecuted Ukrainian intellectuals and to that end, announcing the formation of a new

243. Ibid., October 1, 1980, p. 1.

244. Ibid., October 4, 1980, p. 3.

Ukrainian human rights alliance, called the Ukrainian Committee of Solidarity Actions.²⁴⁵ On October 11, 1200 Congress participants and community members took part in a three-hour demonstration in support of Ukrainian human and national rights.²⁴⁶ Finally, the Congress featured a successful Congressional banquet at which Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski and General Alexander Haig served as principal speakers. However, the real story of the Congress was a struggle for power within the UCCA, one which OUN-B eventually won.

On the very first day of the Congress, non-OUN-B participants were shocked by contraventions of the procedural formalities of the Congress which allowed representatives from organizations of the Organization for the Four Freedoms for Ukraine, the OUN-B umbrella organization in the United States, to secure a majority of all votes at the Congress. The OUN-B group then secured control of the Presidium for the Congress and adopted new rules of order which greatly limited the minority's rights of discussion. OUN-B also dominated the nomination committee which, by nine to seven votes on all issues, moved to change the composition and number of certain positions on the executive, as well as drop certain organizations from permanent representation on the body. Finding a compromise unattainable in the discussion that followed, a large number of organizations including the Ukrainian National Association, left Congress stating that they would not recognize the Congress's decisions

245. Ibid., October 25, 1980, p. 3.

246. Ibid.

and declarations.²⁴⁷ What had occurred was a deep split within the Ukrainian American community which would seriously undermine the work of UCCA for the foreseeable future. The split was not the result of sudden developments within the emigre community, including the various difficulties between the dissident community and the emigres. Rather, the dissidents for the most part had been caught up and used in a wider long-running campaign orchestrated by OUN-B and sympathetic organizations and individuals, to gain control of UCCA, and thus community life in the United States.

The political situation in Canada was markedly better. The Thirteenth Ukrainian Canadian Congress was held from October 11 to 13, 1980, and cognizant of the split in UCCA and the reasons for it, and mindful of their own difficulties with the UCC Twelfth Congress, managed to avoid major problems between the OUN-B and other factions. The Thirteenth Congress featured Nina and Sviatoslav Karavanskyi as representatives of the dissident community. By selecting the Karavanskyis, fairly central figures within the dissident community in the West, and by placing them on the last day of the Congress, organizers safeguarded the conference from any major disputes involving the dissidents. However, the Congress was not able to escape all potential disputes as a serious conflict surfaced between the six founding organizations of the UCC who possessed special privileges including vetoes, and SUSK. The bitter fight served

247. For a detailed account of the Congress, see Svoboda, October 15, 1980, pp. 1, 3.

to tarnish the results of an otherwise successful Congress.²⁴⁸

After recovering from the shocking events of the Thirteenth UCCA Congress, the Ukrainian organizations in the United States began a reassessment of the situation and the possible solutions to the now disputed Congress. To that end meetings of 17 organizations which joined the walkout were held on October 22 and 29, to inform the public about the situation in the UCCA and plan further action.²⁴⁹ On November 15, the defectors issued a declaration decrying the Ukrainian Liberation Front's violations of the statutes and customs of the UCCA, and its attempt at the transformation of the UCCA into a "partisan representation of its movement, while usurping the name of UCCA for itself."²⁵⁰ The Group called for the immediate cancellation of the results of the Thirteenth Congress, the temporary return of the 1976 executive to their former positions, and the convening of a Fourteenth extraordinary Congress to address any

248. Ukrainian Weekly, October 26, 1980, pp. 1, 4-5.

249. Svoboda, November 12, 1980, p. 1.

250. Ibid., November 15, 1980, p. 1. The 17 organizations signing were the Brotherhood of Ukrainian "Sichovi Striltsi", Ukrainian American Veterans, the Brotherhood of Veterans of the First Division of the Ukrainian National Army, the Association of Former Veterans of the Ukrainian Army, the Union of Veterans of the Ukrainian Resistance, the Association of UPA Veterans, Plast, the Ukrainian Gold Cross, the Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine, the Association of Ukrainians of America, the Association of Supporter's of Ukraine's Liberation Struggle, Zarevo, the Ukrainian Liberation Fund, the Association of Ukrainians of Revolutionary-Democratic Convictions, the Union of Ukrainian Journalists of America, the Ukrainian Peasant Party, the Association of Persons Formerly Repressed in the Soviet Union, MUN - Youth of Ukrainian Nationality, and the Council of Friends of the Ukrainian National Republic. In addition, several other groups had walked out but had not signed the declaration for a variety of reasons.

changes to be made to UCCA's statutes and new elections of its officers.²⁵¹ The dissenting faction continued to grow in strength and by November 22 included 27 organizations.²⁵² The split also began to increasingly take on appearances of permanence. At a meeting of the dissenting organizations on November 22, a new central representation for the dissenting organizations, the Committee for Law and Order in UCCA, was created and a ten-person executive elected.²⁵³ Furthermore, more and more individual local communities were publicly declaring their allegiance to one or the other of the sides in the dispute.

The Madrid Review Conference opened on November 11, 1980, and quickly agreed to allow the speeches by representatives of the 35 signatories to be open to the public. For Ukrainian human rights activists, the review conference would be a significant test of their effectiveness and impact on national conferences where human rights were an important and explicit element. The Conference opened with strong attacks by the Canadian, Dutch, and Belgian delegates on the U.S.S.R. for its invasion of Afghanistan and its human rights abuses.²⁵⁴ In the following days, the American and British delegations launched

251. Ibid., p. 6.

252. Svoboda, November 29, 1980, p. 1. The new organizations opposing the OUN-B takeover of the UCCA included the Organization of Democratic Ukrainian Youth (ODUM), the Ukrainian Medical Association of North America, the Association of Ukrainian Veterinary Doctors, the Ukrainian Sports Association "The Black Sea Sich", the Ukrainian Democratic Movement, and the Council of Supporters of the UN Rada.

253. Ibid.

254. Ukrainian Weekly, November 16, 1980, p. 1.

still stronger attacks on the Soviet Union for its violations of Basket Three and began for the first time citing the individuals who they believed were being persecuted by the Soviet government.²⁵⁵ The performance of Western delegations had improved qualitatively as well as quantitatively from their performance at the Belgrade Review. However, despite the improvement over the Belgrade meeting, the conference still attracted considerable criticism, especially from Petro Grigorenko, who faulted it both for the West's lack of identifiable goals and for the weakness of its response, which did not go beyond the level of verbal condemnations of the U.S.S.R.²⁵⁶

Ukrainian interests at the Madrid Conference were represented by two competing factions. The first group, led by Iaroslav Stetsko (head of OUN-B), his wife - Slava Stetsko, and Valentyn Moroz, and composed of members of OUN-B and the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN), sought to achieve two things during the Conference. First, the OUN-B delegation wished to raise the profile of the national question during the Conference, something they believed was particularly lacking. With this in mind, they sponsored a small but effective demonstration during the early days of the Conference. Of the other dissidents, only Nina Strokata, whose own politics has become more conservative and nationalistic, chose to join the demonstrators.²⁵⁷ The

255. Ibid., November 30, 1980, p. 3.

256. Svoboda, November 26, 1980, p. 1.

257. Ibid., December 13, 1980, pp. 2, 8.

principal goal of the OUN-B delegation at the Madrid Conference, however, was to lobby for the cancelation of the Helsinki Accords. The OUN-B justification for this posture was based on the belief that the Accords were simply a smokescreen, behind which the Soviets were hiding and continuing their traditional policies of expansion and colonization.

The second group representing Ukrainian interests at the Madrid Review meeting, consisted of the Helsinki Guarantees for Ukraine Committee, the External Representation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, and the WCFU Human Rights Commission, which cooperated in holding press conferences outside the meetings of the CSCE states, and in lobbying the various delegations.²⁵⁸ An evening organized for the delegations and other participants in the conference was particularly rewarding.²⁵⁹ These non-governmental participants were also able to achieve an important goal, the organization on September 23, 1980, of an International Association for the Support of Helsinki Groups. The creation of the group was in large part due to the efforts of Grigorenko, who was one of the prime movers behind the group. The first president was designated to be Andrei Sakharov, and Mykola Rudenko was named as one of the vice-presidents. The acting president was

258. Ibid., November 22, 1980, p. 1. Among the Ukrainian dissidents present at the conference were Nina Strokata, Gen. Petro Grigorenko, Leonid Plyushch, and Volodymyr Malynkovich.

259. Ibid., November 26, 1980, p. 1. Representatives were present from the Committee for the Defense of Human and National Rights in Ukraine (Philadelphia); the Ukrainian Information Centre (Detroit); the Ukrainian American Bar Association; Smoloskyp (Baltimore); and the Ukrainian Liberation Front.

designated to be Swedish professor Dr. Hoffer.²⁶⁰

In December 1980, activity could be seen on a number of fronts within the Ukrainian diaspora. The Ukrainian Liberation Front in Canada wishing to capitalize on the lack of visible progress at Madrid, sponsored demonstrations in Ottawa on December 6-7, to protest the existence of the Helsinki Accords, the colonization of Ukraine, and the incarceration of Ukrainian political activists, singling out Lukianenko, Stus, and Shukhevych.²⁶¹ In New York, the first attempt to solve differences between the two UCCA factions ended in failure on December 12; however, the two sides were able to find it in their interest to agree to a further meeting.²⁶² As events stood at the end of 1980, the Ukrainian emigre-dissident human rights campaign had continued to produce tactical victories but the momentum had clearly faded and the future of many of the smaller human rights groups appeared to be in doubt.

The WCFU and its Human Rights Commission held meetings on January 17, 1981, in Toronto to assess, among other matters, the value of the first session of the Madrid Review Conference, and

260. Ibid., December 2, 1980, p. 1.

261. Ukrainian Weekly, December 28, 1980, p. 1. That the attack at the Ottawa demonstrations on the Helsinki Act itself was part of a general OUN-B campaign against the Helsinki Accords, is attested to by the fact that this theme was also the subject of an ABN evening in New York on December 1, 1980. See Svoboda, January 3, 1981, p. 7.

262. Svoboda, December 27, 1980, p. 1.

the effectiveness of the Ukrainian delegation at the review.²⁶³ Among speakers at the meeting who commented on the human rights actions were Mykola Plawiuk, WCFU president; Senator Paul Yuzyk, long-standing head of the Commission; Christine Isajiw, the coordinator for WCFU efforts at Madrid, and Myroslaw Smorodsky, a member of the U.S. delegation at Madrid. Opinions of the outcome of the first session of the review conference were positive, and stressed the feeling that the Ukrainian presence had made a difference. As a result, Senator Yuzyk recommended that a WCFU delegation be present in Madrid at the round of talks that were to begin on the January 27. By far one of the greatest concerns of those present was the attitude of the new Reagan administration to human rights and the Helsinki process. The indications from Secretary of State Alexander Haig during his confirmation hearings that human rights would be down-played, were not encouraging. In response to questioning on the subject, Haig had informed those present that: "International terrorism will take the place of human rights in our concern because it is the ultimate abuse of human rights."²⁶⁴ Indeed, the Reagan administration did tend to see their relationship with the Soviet Union as a struggle of good against evil in which Soviet human rights violations were not a problem to be solved, but a weapon

263. Ukrainian Weekly, January 25, 1981, p. 3. For a more detailed account of Ukrainian lobbying activities see Christine Isajiw's article "Dialnist biura SKVU u Madrydi" in Svoboda, March 12, 1981, pp. 5-6.

264. Seyom Brown, The Faces of Power - Constancy and Change In United States Foreign Policy From Truman to Reagan. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983, p. 576.

with which to blacken the image of the U.S.S.R..265

The decline in public activities of Ukrainian human rights supporters in the West became strikingly manifest by spring 1981. Demonstrations, previously almost too numerous to mention, were almost completely absent after 1980. What human rights activity was undertaken was in the form of petition and letter writing campaigns.266 The factors behind the disastrous falling off of activity included the break-up of detente and meaningful U.S.-U.S.S.R. dialogue, the disappointment which the Ukrainian community had gone through, mainly with the principal figure of Moroz, and finally, the dissolution of UCCA into warring parties which both diverted efforts away from the human rights scene and made any coordinated action more difficult. There was also a growing realization that the Soviet treatment of Ukrainian dissenters could not be now even indirectly influenced by any emigre activity.

Nevertheless, the momentum which had been generated by the Ukrainian, Jewish, and non-ethnic human rights lobbies was not lost in terms of influencing actions of the U.S. government. Signs of this influence were evident in the selection of the cases of dissidents which the U.S. government would specifically name at the second session of the Madrid Review. Similarly, influence could be seen in the State Department's annual survey

265. Ibid., p. 577.

266. For instance, the Americans for Human Rights in Ukraine group began a campaign to encourage Congressional support for Senator Millicent Fenwick's letter urging the release of Mykola Rudenko, issued March 12, 1981 (Ukrainian Weekly, March 22, 1981, p. 1).

of human rights which was issued on February 9, 1981. The report which was prepared under the Carter administration, was highly critical of the Soviet government in a variety of areas, including the persecution of dissenters.²⁶⁷ In addition, the Congressional Committee on Security and Cooperation in Europe once again nominated a number of Soviet dissenters for the Nobel Prize, among them - Mykola Rudenko.²⁶⁸

The External Representation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group continued to be one of the most active centres of Ukrainian human rights activity, constantly providing information, and issuing new appeals, including public letters on behalf of Oksana Meshko, Anna Mykhailenko, Iosyp Terelia, Mykola Plakhotniuk, A. Lupynis, and Vasyl Stus.²⁶⁹ The WCFU Human Rights Commission also showed signs of continued life and, interestingly, supported a highly unusual offer by Michael Pidradnyi, a Ukrainian living in France, to exchange himself for Iurii Shukhevych and sit out the latter's sentence.²⁷⁰

Despite the considerable time for reassessment, conflict between the OUN-B group and Petro Grigorenko continued to intrude and disrupt discussion in other matters. At the meeting of the

267. Ukrainian Weekly, February 15, 1981, p. 1.

268. Ibid.

269. The public letters were signed by Nadia Svitlychna, Nina Strokata, Petro Vins and Sviatoslav Karavanskyi (Ukrainian Weekly, March 15, 1981, p. 1). The Ukrainian appeal was issued on January 25, 1981, and forwarded to representatives at the Madrid Review Conference, to Amnesty International, the PEN Club, and to a variety of literary associations and prominent individuals (Ukrainian Weekly, February 15, 1981, p. 1).

270. Ukrainian Weekly, February 15, 1981, p. 2.

WCFU presidium on February 7, 1981, a discussion of the Madrid action was interrupted by attack by Ignatius Bilinsky, an OUN-B spokesman and UCCA representative, on the WCFU's continued cooperation with Grigorenko, despite his refusal to withdraw his signature from the Katyn Declaration. While WCFU President Mykola Plawiuk avoided the question, Metropolitan Msytyslav met the attack squarely, declaring that Grigorenko had done nothing to prejudice the Ukrainian cause in any way at Madrid and, in fact, strengthened that action.²⁷¹ In so doing, the Metropolitan revealed the attitude of most emigre Ukrainians in relation to Grigorenko, supporting him in general though differing on some specifics.

One of the few cases of public protest in 1981 was a TUSM-sponsored week of events in defence of Iurii Shukhevych. The week began on March 20 with public information meetings. On March 27, 1981, Sviatoslav Karavanskyi, Nina Strokata, and Lithuanian dissident Vladas Sakalys participated in a public discussion on Shukhevych and the dissident movement in the Soviet Union. On March 28, 200 demonstrators, a small number by standards of a few years earlier and fewer than the organizers had hoped, protested in front of the United Nations in defense of

271. Ukrainian Weekly, February 22, 1981, p. 4, and Svoboda, February 14, 1981, pp. 1, 3. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church and Metropolitan Mystyslav himself were also attacked during the OUN-B campaign for dominance in the Ukrainian community. See Ukrainian Weekly, February 22, 1981, p. 6.

Iurii Shukhevych.272

Early in May 1981, the WCFU presidium, following an annual practice, declared May to be WCFU month. In its declaration, the WCFU called for a broad campaign among Ukrainians to focus attention on a number of concerns including the goal of freeing all Ukrainian political prisoners, especially members of the Ukrainian Helsinki group.²⁷³ However, the public response to the call was virtually unnoticeable, an indication of the greatly weakened state the campaign was in by that time.

One of the greatest factors behind the decline of Ukrainian political lobbying activity was the deepening split in the Ukrainian-American Community. In May, 1981, after months of division and fruitless efforts aimed at achieving a reconciliation between the warring groupings, the Committee for Law and Order in the UCCA issued a communique noting the past failures and lack of prospects for future negotiations, and called for the convening of a conference "to establish a new center of organized Ukrainian community life".²⁷⁴ The initial conference would establish the rules and elect the various committees necessary for a second conference which would bring the Ukrainian American Coordination Council into existence.

272. Ukrainian Weekly, March 15, 1981, p. 4, and April 5, 1981, pp. 1, 4, 11. The TUSM protest week was not the only event in March which deserves mention. From March 6 to 8, Ukrainian human rights groups picketed the Soviet embassy in Washington in connection with International Women's Day and the imprisonment of women dissidents in the Soviet Union. See Svoboda, March 18, 1981, p. 1.

273. Ukrainian Weekly, May 10, 1981, p. 3.

274. Ibid., May 24, 1981, p. 3.

By the summer of 1981, Valentyn Moroz had almost completely isolated himself within the Ukrainian community, maintaining only small vestiges of support from those on the far right and those tolerant and open enough to listen to his views.²⁷⁵ Even OUN-B, because of Moroz's growing criticism of that organization and his attempts to attract OUN-B youth to his own independent youth organization, Lytsari Sviatoslava, had sought to distance itself from Moroz, issuing secret instructions to its leading members to prevent Moroz from attending its events and ordering a complete boycott of his speeches and publications.²⁷⁶

The second session of the Madrid Helsinki Review continued and increased the state of conflict which had developed between participants at the end of the first review session. Having been subjected to strong criticism at the first session, the Soviet representatives responded at the second session with criticisms of their own and a call for an immediate disarmament conference, a strategy which NATO members saw as designed to divert the focus of the conference.²⁷⁷ An inability to agree on the subject matter to be discussed at the future disarmament conference led to the demise of the proposal. The feuding between the Eastern and

275. Moroz still maintained some contact with Ukrainian student circles. On March 16, 1981, he spoke to Ukrainian students at the University of Manitoba, stressing his belief that a new Ukrainian resistance movement was arising in Ukraine which was already struggling in Ukraine, and with force of arms would eventually liberate the country. See Ukrainian Weekly, April 12, 1981, p. 5.

276. Secret OUN-B orders were reproduced by Moroz in Anabasis, No. 3(6) (July-September 1981), pp. 27-28.

277. Ukrainian Weekly, August 2, 1981, pp. 1, 10.

Western delegates extended to the very text of the final communique, and the second session of the Madrid Review adjourned on July 28, 1981, in confusion.

Though fewer and fewer Ukrainian demonstrations were now being staged in defence of Ukrainian political prisoners, major achievements of the Ukrainian human rights advocates in the U.S. during 1981 should be noted. These included the passage of resolutions urging administration intervention in the cases of Iurii Shukhevych and Iurii Badzio, and the U.S. Congress's commemoration of the fifth anniversary of the founding of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group. Activities included the introduction of H. Res. 205, the first resolution in the U.S. Congress ever honouring a Helsinki Group and calling for the establishment of November 9 as a day commemorating the founding of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group; and the holding of a special hearing by the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe on the Ukrainian Helsinki group, in which Gen. Grigorenko, Nina Strokata and Volodymyr Malynkovych were invited to testify.²⁷⁸ However, despite these actions and a number of similarly encouraging community celebrations of the fifth anniversary of the founding of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, and despite the calls by Grigorenko, Strokata and other dissenters for renewed community defence actions, Ukrainian activists had begun to

278. Ukrainian Weekly, October 18, 1981, p. 2, and Ukrainian Weekly, October 25, 1981, p. 1. The record of the hearing was published by the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. See U.S. Congress, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Fifth Anniversary of the Formation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, 97th Cong., 1st sess., November 16, 1981.

seriously question the viability of their campaign by late 1981.279

At the fifth annual meeting of the Ukrainian American Bar Association from November 20 to 22, 1981, the human rights question was a focus of discussion. A presentation on the problem entitled "Where are we and where are we going?" was given by Myroslav Smorodsky. Smorodsky argued that human rights and nationalities issues were still viable topics but that they must be carefully packaged. Though agreeing with Smorodsky, the lawyers group expressed concern over the lack of coordination among the various Ukrainian human rights organizations and, more worrying, the visible indifference of the Ukrainian American community in general towards the human rights situation in Ukraine. The meetings concluded with the Association resolving to fully support and continue activities on behalf of the Ukrainian human rights movement.280

The decline of Ukrainian human rights activity continued

279. Examples of the efforts by the Ukrainian dissenters to restart the defence campaign can be found in a series of articles by Petro Grigorenko in Svoboda from December 15 to December 17, 1981; and in Nina Strokata's speech to Ukrainian university students in Philadelphia on December 6, 1981 (see Svoboda, December 29, 1981, p. 1). The difficulty of finding active support within the Ukrainian community can be illustrated by the strenuous lobbying effort mounted by the Committee for the Defense of National and Human Rights in Ukraine (Philadelphia) during the fifth anniversary of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group. Despite highly productive meetings with Congressmen over a period of three days, their efforts in organizing the Ukrainian community of Washington for a demonstration in front of the Soviet embassy, drew only a total of 60 protesters. See Ukrainian Weekly, December 1, 1981, pp. 1, 5.

280. Ukrainian Weekly, December 13, 1981, p. 1.

into 1982. The January 12 Solidarity Day with Ukrainian political prisoners passed without the controversy of the prior year, but there were few other signs of activity within the Ukrainian diaspora.²⁸¹ By this point, Ukrainian human rights activity had been firmly displaced as a priority by newer concerns, including by then an irrevocable split between the democratic opponents of the OUN-B takeover of UCCA; the growing concern with attacks on the community as allegedly harbouring 'war criminals'; increasing attention to the problems of the coming millenium of Christianity in Ukraine; and a pressing concern with the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the catastrophic famine in Ukraine.²⁸²

From March 22 to 27, TUSM sponsored what had by then become an annual week of protest and demonstration in defense of Iurii Shukhevich. Though clearly a major effort at protest across the United States, the organizers were influenced much more by knowledge that Shukhevych was the unrepentant son of the former commander of UPA, rather than by his role as a dissident.²⁸³

In mid-April 1982, new concerns began appear in the Ukrainian diaspora. By then, the WCFU had announced the plan to hold the Fourth World Congress in November 1983. The WCFU had

281. Even activities on Solidarity Day were evidently not highly supported. In Philadelphia, the well organized human rights organization succeeded in drawing out 50 individuals for a protest. See Svoboda, January 29, 1982, p. 1.

282. At a meeting on December 19, 1981, the Committee for Law and Order in UCCA had come to the conclusion that further discussion with the OUN-B controlled UCCA was fruitless and resolved to hold a conference for the creation of a new supra-party national coordinating organization to be called the Ukrainian Coordination Council in America.

283. Svoboda, March 24, 1982, p. 1.

been a success story for Ukrainian emigres presenting a united front against Moscow's rule. However, by mid-1982, the pronounced divisions within the Ukrainian American community threatened the possibility of holding any further World Congresses.²⁸⁴ At issue was which faction would represent the Ukrainian American community at the forthcoming World Congress. The topic would soon become hotly disputed within the diaspora.²⁸⁵

The petition and lobbying campaign mounted by the organization of Americans in Defence of Human Rights in Ukraine and supported by a variety of organizations for the proclamation of November 9, 1982, as a day in honour of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, began to show results in the summer of 1982.²⁸⁶ On May 4, 1982, the House of Representatives adopted the resolution calling on President Reagan to proclaim a day in honour of the group and to make all efforts to free its imprisoned members. The U.S. Senate followed with its own endorsement of the bill on June 21,

284. One of the earliest references to this new area of concern for Ukrainian emigres came in Ivan Kedryn's article in Svoboda, April 28, 1982, p. 2, entitled "Chy mozhe vldbutysia IV SKVU?".

285. By September 18, 1982, there was agreement within the UCCA to disregard the WCFU's attempts to mend the split by having joint representation on the preparatory committee for the Fourth World Congress, and to attempt to engage the UCC in their dispute with the Committee for Law and Order in UCCA. For a detailed account of the development of the dispute, see Novyi Shliakh, October 16, 1982, pp. 4-5.

286. Other organizations involved in the campaign included the Association of Ukrainian Americans of New England; the Ukrainian Orthodox League in the USA; the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights in Ukraine (Chicago); the Committee for the Liberation of Iurii Shukhevych (California); the Ukrainian Evangelical Association of North America; Ukrainian American Veterans; and Plast. See Novyi Shliakh, August 28, 1982, p. 1.

1982.287 In response to continuous lobbying on the subject, President Reagan formally proclaimed a day honour for the Ukrainian Group on October 16, 1982.288 The event was greeted with great appreciation by various Ukrainian human rights activists and organizations, among them the WCFU Human Rights Commission which in its statement of appreciation called upon the Ukrainian diaspora to actively support the activities being held on November 9, 1982.289 Sincere appreciation was also expressed by Petro Grigorenko on behalf of the External Representation, who emphasized the valuable moral support President Reagan's proclamation would have.290

The focus of Ukrainian public activity continued however, to shift away from contemporary human rights situation in Ukraine. In early 1983, the sole notable activity in the community was the annual appeal for the observance of Solidarity with Prisoners Day on January 12. The dissidents, while continuing to have grave concerns about their homeland, were by then confining their activities to the writing of letters to governmental agencies and the occasional lecture. Many if not most Ukrainian human rights organizations had disbanded by January 1983. The Ukrainian human rights campaign had virtually ceased to exist, and its sole remnants were embodied in a small number of local human rights organizations which appear to have

287. Ibid.

288. Novyi Shliakh, October 16, 1982, p. 1.

289. Ibid., November 6, 1982, p. 1.

290. Ibid., November 20, 1979, p. 5.

been ineffective and largely confined to a reporting function during 1983; the Smoloskyp organization; the journal Suchasnist and the Human Rights Commission of the WCFU which was beginning to become affected by the divisions within its parent organization.

Debate over the shape of the Fourth World Congress continued throughout spring and summer 1983, and intensified as the date of the conference approached. However, by early November, consensus had been achieved on the basic outline of the Congress and its main speakers.

The seeming calm within the Ukrainian diaspora was shattered on the first day of the Congress when the OUN-B organization managed to place a resolution on the agenda of the Congress which called for the expulsion of OUN-M from the organization. A memorandum entitled For the People's Judgement outlining OUN-B's charges against OUN-M and supplying evidence of OUN-M's alleged unpatriotic conduct was distributed to each delegate of the Congress.²⁹¹ The very existence of World Congress of Free Ukrainians was being threatened with a fate similar to that of UCCA in the U.S.. The OUN-B resolution was eventually undermined and a crisis averted both by intervention of the surprisingly strong moderate centre at the Congress, and by Soviet revelations that the OUN-B had attempted to secure a monopoly on samvydav coming from Ukraine.²⁹² Ironically, Soviet

291. Ukrainska Tsentralna Informatsiina Sluzhba, Pid osud hromadskosty - motyvatsiia orhanizatsii Ukrainskoho vyzvolnoho frontu shchodo vymohy vyklyuchyty iz chlenstva SKVU orhanizatsii ISNO-ODVU-UNO (n.p.: Ukrainska Tsentralna Informatsiina Sluzhba, 1983).

292. Izvestiia, November 23, 1983, p. 6.

authorities probably had hoped that the story of Irene Zelena, an OUN-B courier to Ukraine seized in Poland during the summer of 1983, and public confession by an alleged OUN-B contact in Ukraine (timed to coincide with the Congress) would provide the OUN-M group with evidence to call for the expulsion OUN-B from the WCFU. However, OUN-M group did not pursue this option, and the WCFU was able to survive. Valentyn Moroz, venting his frustration at his isolation in the emigre community, provided some relief from the tension at the Congress by agitating for a resolution which would have expelled both OUN-M and OUN-B.²⁹³ Needless to say it did not proceed very far.

Evidence of the diminished status of the dissidents within the Ukrainian emigration in general, and the total rejection of the bulk of the exiled dissenters by the organizations of the Ukrainian Liberation Front in particular, was especially pronounced in the planning of the Congress. In contrast to the Third World Congress, not one of the exiled dissidents was invited to participate as a speaker or guest at the Fourth World Congress. Moreover, the specific topic of civil liberties dissent was not even scheduled for discussion under the panel on the Current Situation in Ukraine. By the time of the holding of the Fourth World Congress Of Free Ukrainians, the phenomenon of dissent for the Ukrainian community had almost come full circle. Rising from obscurity, it had generated hope and created unity within the Ukrainian emigration where there had been none before.

293. Vira Moroz, "Resolution proposed at the Fourth World Congress of Free Ukrainians", Anabasis, No. 4(15) (Winter 1983), p. 11.

Revival of Leninism on November 7, 1963.⁶ The distribution of samizdat prepared by the group calling for a return to "pure Leninism" led to the arrest of Grigorenko on February 1, 1964. After being declared insane at the Serbskii Institute, he was placed in Leningrad Special Psychiatric Hospital on August 14, 1964. In addition, he was soon demoted to the rank of a private and expelled from the Party. The arbitrary measures taken against him and others in the mental asylum, became the immediate focus of his protests upon his release from Leningrad SPH on May 23, 1965.

Grigorenko's actions and samizdat writings during the period from his release and up until May 7, 1969, the date of his second arrest, were almost exclusively concerned with the repressions directed against himself and others, and the violations of Soviet legal norms. The sole exception to this general theme in his work was his lengthy letter in October, 1967, to the journal Voprosy istorii KPSS, entitled "The Concealment of Historical Truth - A Crime Before the People", a sharply condemnatory account of Stalin's responsibility for the calamities experienced by the Soviet Army during the early stages of World War Two.⁷ However, it should be noted that the major

6. S. P. de Boer, et al., Biographical Dictionary of Dissidents in the Soviet Union, 1956-1975 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982), p. 178.

7. Petro G. Grigorenko, Sokrytie istoricheskoi pravdy - prestuplenie pered narodom; pismo v redaktsiiu zhurnala "Voprosy istorii KPSS" (London, Ont.: Souiz Borby za Osvobozhdenie Narodov Rossii, 1970). The article can be found in English translation in a collection of articles under his name, entitled The Grigorenko Papers: Writings by General P. G. Grigorenko and Documents on his Case (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1976).

Chapter Five

Relations Among Ukrainian Dissidents

Of the factors bearing on the impact of exiled Ukrainian dissidents on the Ukrainian emigre community, certainly one of the most important were the personal relationships among those very dissenters. These relationships were profoundly influenced by a combination of the political views and the personalities of individual dissidents. This chapter examines those relationships by first probing the articulated political beliefs of the dissidents while still in the U.S.S.R., and the degree of cooperation among them there; and then comparing these findings with the situation of the dissidents once in exile in the West. It also explores the evolution of their beliefs while in the West. The chapter focuses its attention primarily on the relationships among Leonid Plyushch, Petro Grigorenko, and Valentyn Moroz, as it was their relationships which were to cause the greatest difficulties for the Ukrainian emigre community.

In the Soviet Union, an individual dissident's political beliefs are determined by a variety of factors, including his/her circle of friends and supporters, and - if unorthodox and articulated publicly too often - the state's administrative and penal sanctions. Despite the Soviet government's attempts to propagate Marxism-Leninism to the exclusion of all other ideologies, the range of political ideologies among Soviet dissidents is wide, ranging from neo-fascism to forms of Marxism

and anarchism.¹ This generalized spectrum of views is largely applicable to the Ukrainian dissident movement, and to the group of dissidents at the core of this study.

The group of Ukrainian dissenters who were forced or traded into exile during the 1970's is best analyzed along a traditional right/left continuum, ranging from conservative nationalist to Marxist. Division along such an axis is justified, being both the most familiar to the Western reader, and the most valid in that it roughly corresponds to ideological division within Soviet intelligentsia, which ranges from status quo to fundamental change orientations. On one end of this continuum we can place those who adhere to the official ideology or make only modest qualifications in the application of the ideology; on the other end we find those who reject the ideology completely, possess an alternative non-Marxist-Leninist ideology and would seek a return to a more traditional political system, perhaps accompanied by a variety of competing ideologies, or complete political independence for their nations. However, the groupings we describe should not be seen as rigid and dictating a particular position on every issue. Rather, opinions on any particular issue may vary considerably within each grouping. Among those issues which evoke wide disagreement within Soviet society, the nationality question is particularly important, with positions from assimilation to independence for individual nationalities being advocated. Clearly, there is also a range of opinions held which fall between these two poles.

1. Andrei Amalrik, "Ideologies in Soviet Society," Survey, No. 2(99) (Spring 1976), pp. 1-11.

Focusing on the pool of future exiles as they were in 1965, we find a similar division possible with Leonid Plyushch and Petro Grigorenko initially occupying the left end of the axis on our schema, and Valentyn Moroz on its right end. The remaining members of the pool can be placed between these two poles with Sviatoslav Karavanskyi, the only wartime OUN member among the dissidents in the West, ideologically closest to Moroz, then Nina Strokata close to the nationalist conservative position, and then Nadia Svitlychna and Volodymyr Malynkovych, a Russian and member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, occupying the liberal democratic center. As to other dissenters covered by this study, but, clearly, figures of secondary importance, it can be said, that at that time, Zinaida Grigorenko, a Russian, and Andrei Grigorenko, her Russian-born, son held views very similar to those of Petro Grigorenko.² However, Tatiana Zhitnikova (Plyushch), of Jewish origin, held views strikingly different from those of her husband and relatively similar to those maintained by Nina Strokata.³ The political beliefs of Raisa, Moroz were also largely

2. The likelihood that Zinaida Grigorenko's views approximated those of her husband on most issues is very strong. They were both subject to the same influence of Alexei Kosterin, and she was a member of the C.P.S.U. until her expulsion in 1969. However, she appears to hold differing views on national questions.

3. Tatyana Zhitnikova (Plyushch) did not engage in the writing of protests until after the arrest of her husband in January, 1972. She first began sending legalistic protests to various Soviet officials and institutions about the treatment of her husband on June 4, 1972. She continued this pattern of activity until June 27, 1975 when she wrote her first appeal to a group of foreign individuals, in this case the American astronauts. Almost immediately upon arriving in Austria she declared that her views approximated those of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. See Svoboda, January 24, 1976, Section 2, pp. 1, 4.

largely conservative. Both Petro Vins and Victor Borovsky did not become politically active until shortly before their expulsions from the Soviet Union, and, judging from their interaction with the Ukrainian Helsinki Group at that time, it is certain that their views tended to occupy the middle of the political spectrum we have drawn.⁴

Among the three most important dissidents for this study, Petro Grigorenko was the most senior. Born in Borisovka, Zaporizhzhia Oblast, Ukrainian S.S.R., on October 16, 1907, he was a devout believer in the Marxism-Leninism and the Soviet leadership's implementation of that ideology until 1941.⁵ Until that time, a combination of good fortune and timeliness, had allowed Grigorenko's rather naive criticism of individuals and governmental activity go unpunished. However in late 1941, having witnessed the disastrous performance of the Red Army and being convinced that it was Stalin's fault, he became openly critical of Stalin's purge of the Red Army leadership, which, he concluded, was the cause of the tragedy. The result was a severe party reprimand, which followed him through his career and prevented his promotion beyond colonel's rank until well after Stalin's death.

4. Volodymyr Malynkovych's refusal to participate in the invasion of Czechoslovakia was certainly a political act, and anticipated his later political activism. Petro Vin's political activity began with his joining the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, but was interrupted shortly thereafter by his arrest and sentencing to one year of imprisonment. Victor Borovsky's early contacts with Mykola Rudenko were quickly broken up by Borovsky's confinement to a mental hospital and his subsequent forced emigration.

5. Petro G. Grigorenko, Memoirs (New York: W. W. Norton and Co. 1982), p. 3.

Grigorenko's political beliefs were firmly set by the late 1940's. Having seen the destruction caused by the German forces in Ukraine where he served, Grigorenko was convinced of the fundamental evil of fascism. However, his commitment to Marxism-Leninism would come to be matched by a conviction that Stalin had perverted those ideals. An especially important role in this transformation was played by Zinaida Grigorenko, his second wife whom he married in 1943. His views were reinforced by Khrushchev's revelations at the Twentieth Party Congress. However, the strength of Grigorenko's political convictions prevented him from recognizing that many elements in the system which he criticized were more than simply the results of Stalin's perversions. The continued existence of these flaws in the system, well after Stalin's death, moved Grigorenko to oppose the existing order.

On September 7, 1961, Grigorenko addressed a local party meeting in Moscow warning against the revival of a personality cult and calling for more democracy within the party. His speech was interrupted and an unsuccessful effort was made to remove him from the floor. Soon after, Grigorenko was given a strict party reprimand, dismissed from his job, demoted and transferred to Ussuriisk, Primorskii Krai, in the Far East.

The treatment received by Grigorenko convinced him that the Soviet Union had ceased to be a Leninist state, and had modelled itself on authoritarian lines. This he considered to be Stalin's perversion of the ideals of the revolution. Having lost his right to lecture or address party meetings, Grigorenko took the radical step of forming the League of Struggle for the

Revival of Leninism on November 7, 1963.⁶ The distribution of samizdat prepared by the group calling for a return to "pure Leninism" led to the arrest of Grigorenko on February 1, 1964. After being declared insane at the Serbskii Institute, he was placed in Leningrad Special Psychiatric Hospital on August 14, 1964. In addition, he was soon demoted to the rank of a private and expelled from the Party. The arbitrary measures taken against him and others in the mental asylum, became the immediate focus of his protests upon his release from Leningrad SPH on May 23, 1965.

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6. S. P. de Boer, et al., Biographical Dictionary of Dissidents in the Soviet Union, 1956-1975 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982), p. 178.

7. Petro G. Grigorenko, Sokrytie istoricheskoi pravdy - prestuplenie pered narodom; pismo v redaktsiiu zhurnala "Voprosy istorii KPSS" (London, Ont.: Souiz Borby za Osvobozhdenie Narodov Rossii, 1970). The article can be found in English translation in a collection of articles under his name, entitled The Grigorenko Papers: Writings by General P. G. Grigorenko and Documents on his Case (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1976).

motive behind the writing of even this work was a legalistic one, the defence of A.M. Nekrich's proscribed book June 22, 1941.⁸ His writing of legalistic petitions peaked with his concern about the trials of Aleksandr Ginzburg and Iurii Galanskov on January 8-12, 1968; and those of Pavel Litvinov and the other Red Square demonstrators in October 1968.⁹

Petro Grigorenko was almost unbelievably oblivious to problems of minority nationalities within the Soviet Union, including problems of his own Ukrainian nation, for the first sixty years of his life. Despite his first-hand experience with the Ukrainian famine, and his presence in Western Ukraine in 1945 where he claims not to have fought against any Ukrainian military or insurgent units in the area, Grigorenko did not draw any linkages between the problems in these areas and the national question.

The deportation of the Crimean Tatars and other small nationalities during the Second World War as 'enemies of the people' and their continued persecution surfaced as a second major concern in Petro Grigorenko's activities early in 1968. The dramatic change in his awareness of the problems of national minorities in the Soviet Union was the product of his friendship with Alexei Kosterin, a Russian who had championed the cause of the Crimean Tatars for many years.¹⁰ Grigorenko at first aided

8. A. M. Nekrich, "22 June 1941," in June 22, 1941: Soviet Historians and the German Invasion, trans. by Vladimir Petrov (Columbia S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1968).

9. de Boer, et al., Biographic Dictionary, pp. 178-179. The volume provides a comprehensive catalogue of Grigorenko's writings.

10. Grigorenko, Memoirs, pp. 320-321.

Kosterin, and then after his death took over his role of chief spokesman for the Tatars among the mainstream dissidents. The association with Kosterin "transformed a rebel into a fighter", in Grigorenko's own words.¹¹ On March 17, 1968, Petro Grigorenko spoke on the Crimean Tatar issue at a banquet to celebrate the seventy-second birthday of Alexei Kosterin:

In your fight, don't lock yourselves into a narrow nationalist shell. Form contacts with all progressive persons of other nationalities in the Soviet Union, first of all those nationalities among whom you live - Russians, Ukrainians, the nationalities that have been and continue to be subjected to the same indignities as your people.

Don't consider your case to be intergovernmental. Seek help from the whole of progressive society and from international organizations.¹²

In a his eulogy at the funeral of Alexei Kosterin on November 14, 1968, Grigorenko spoke about the nature of the Soviet state and the need for change:

...the destruction of the bureaucratic machine is above all a revolution in the minds and consciousness of people. This is inconceivable under conditions of totalitarianism. Therefore, the most important task at present is the development of a genuine Leninist democracy, and a uncompromising struggle against totalitarianism, which hides behind the mask of so-called 'socialist democracy'.¹³

By 1969, Grigorenko had clearly abandoned the belief that the violations of legal norms that he encountered were isolated acts carried out without knowledge of the Party leadership, but still remained a committed Leninist who believed that although errors had been committed in the past, the Leninist system could

11. Rozмова z Leonidom Pliushchem - eksliuzyvne interviu redaktsii Dialohu (Toronto: Dialoh, 1976), p. 21.

12. Grigorenko, The Grigorenko Papers, p. 65.

13. Abraham Brumberg, ed., In Quest of Justice: Protest and Dissent in the Soviet Union Today (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p. 208.

be realized if only the corrupt bureaucrats were removed.

On the national problem, Grigorenko's knowledge of the violation of Ukrainian rights had been very limited due to his isolation from Ukraine, and the virtual absence of Ukrainians and sources of information about Ukraine within his circle of friends.¹⁴ Grigorenko made an attempt to correct this situation in early 1967, meeting with Nina Strokata and Vyacheslav Chornovil more than once before contact was broken.¹⁵

Petro Grigorenko's arrest in Tashkent on May 7, 1969, and the eventual "diagnosis" of insanity by the psychiatrists at Serbskii Institute of Forensic Psychiatry virtually silenced him until his release on June 26, 1974.¹⁶ After his release, Grigorenko's return to political activity was slowed down by illness and fatigue. However, in May, 1976, Grigorenko became a founding member of the Moscow Helsinki Group. Early in the summer of 1976, Mykola Rudenko initiated a contact with Grigorenko through Iurii Orlov, founder of the Moscow Helsinki Group.¹⁷ An instant friendship between Mykola Rudenko and Petro Grigorenko provided the latter with increased exposure to the nationality problem in Ukraine, and led to Grigorenko's agreement to become a member of the planned Ukrainian Helsinki

14. The only person within Grigorenko's circle of friends in Moscow who had any contact with Ukrainians and good knowledge about the dissident movement in Ukraine, was Ludmilla Alexeyeva.

15. Grigorenko, Memoirs, p. 343.

16. Ibid., pp. 403-404.

17. Petro Grigorenko, "My Friend Mykola Rudenko," Index on Censorship, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Spring 1979), p. 38.

Group, of which Rudenko would be leader. Participation in the group significantly increased Grigorenko's exposure to the national question, especially since he was a personal link between the Moscow and Ukrainian Helsinki groups, which better prepared him for his arrival in the West.¹⁸

Zinaida Mikhailovna, Petro Grigorenko's wife, had become a dissident during her husband's incarceration in Cherniakhovsk Special Psychiatric Hospital. As Grigorenko's wife, she gained valuable contacts with major figures in the democratic movement in Moscow, and soon became active in the support of other mainstream dissenters who were facing increased pressure from the KGB. It was because of their involvement with the democratic movement in Moscow that Petro and Zinaida Grigorenko met Leonid Plyushch. On July 6, 1968, Plyushch travelled to Moscow to attend the birthday party for Pavel Litvinov. It was at this party, that Leonid Plyushch first met Petro Grigorenko. Their interest in one another was immediate, and before Leonid Plyushch left for Kiev a week later, he spent a whole day in discussion with Grigorenko. He came away from the encounter with a very high opinion of Grigorenko: "I realized then that Grigorenko was the most energetic, courageous, and politically intelligent man I had met."¹⁹ Subsequently, Leonid Plyushch and Petro Grigorenko

18. For a reasonably complete set of the documents of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, see Osyk Zinkewych, comp., Ukrainskyi pravozakhysnyi rukh (Toronto: Smoloskyp Publishers, 1978); and Lesya Verba and Bohdan Yasen, eds., The Human Rights Movement in Ukraine - Documents of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, 1976-1980 (Baltimore: Smoloskyp Publishers, 1980).

19. Leonid Plyushch, History's Carnival (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977), pp. 135-137.

cooperated in signing a letter of protest simply entitled "To Comrade Brezhnev, L.I." (October 9, 1968), which protested against the hooliganism that had occurred outside the courtroom where Pavel Litvinov's trial was held.²⁰ Their names also appeared among the twenty-five signatures on the letter entitled "Stand Up in Defence of Ivan Iakhimovich!" (April 2, 1968).²¹ On May 20, 1969, Plyushch's relationship with Petro Grigorenko was cut short by the arrest of Grigorenko. However, the ties between Plyushch and Zinaida Grigorenko now grew closer as Zinaida increasingly worked with members of the Action Group for the Promotion of Human Rights in the U.S.S.R., which had been formed on the day of Petro Grigorenko's arrest, and of which Leonid Plyushch was a member. Her ties to Leonid Plyushch continued until his arrest on January 14, 1972. On December 16, 1974, Zinaida signed a letter requesting permission for Leonid Plyushch and his family to leave the Soviet Union.²² Neither of the elder Grigorenkos would see Leonid Plyushch again until their arrival in West in late 1977.

Leonid Ivanovich Plyushch was born in 1939 in Naryn, Tien Shan Oblast, Kirghiz S.S.R. Leonid Plyushch was fundamentally affected by his extremely unfortunate childhood. His family lived in poverty, his father being killed at the front in 1941. At the age of eight, he contracted tuberculosis and spent the next five

20. Leonid Plyushch, Petr Grigorenko, K. Velikanov, and Genrikh Altunian, "Tovarishchu Brezhnevu, L. I.", Dokumenty po delu Leonida Pliushcha (Special Issue of Volnoe slovo [Samizdat-Izbrannoe. Dokumental'naia seriia, No. 11], 1974, pp. 41-42.

21. Leonid Plyushch, Petro Grigorenko and Twenty-Three Others, "Vystupaite v zashchitu Ivana Iakhimovicha!" Arkhiv Samizdata, No. 103 (April 2, 1969), 2 p.

22. de Boer et al., Biographic Dictionary, p. 181.

years in a sanatorium. Both experiences led to a deep sense of social responsibility, and to the belief that Marxism-Leninism was the vehicle for solving social problems. Throughout his teens he displayed the idealism of a true believer. His early encounters with economic crimes, as a member of special Komsomol anti-corruption squads, did nothing but convince him that any problems with the Soviet system were the result of corruption.

Prior to his enrollment in Odessa university, Plyushch had been largely unconcerned with nationality questions and had supported the CPSU's nationality policy. However, a verbal clash with a Jewish student over the subject of anti-Semitism in the U.S.S.R. and his later research convinced him that he had been guilty of Russian chauvinism and that problems existed in Soviet nationality policy. However, he did not follow up his realization with any public activity, but rather concentrated on correcting his biases. After three years at Odessa, Plyushch went to teach in a village school. Disturbed by the poor quality of the school and corruption in the Ministry of Education, he returned to Kiev, and entered the university there, graduating from the Mechanics and Mathematics faculty in 1962.

Troubled by corruption and anti-semitism in Soviet society, but still unaware of its diversity and strength, Plyushch wrote his first letter to the Central Committee of the CPSU in late 1964, condemning voluntarism and anti-semitism and demanding a more egalitarian pay structure.²³ The result was a conversation with the KGB. He followed this meeting, with a

23. Plyushch, History's Carnival, p. 58.

samizdat work entitled "Letters to a Friend" under the pseudonym "Loza". The work was a lengthy political commentary which revealed his political thought at the time. In the letter, Plyushch reveals his continuing, strong belief in Marxism-Leninism, but insists that democracy is essential to socialism. He claims that the Soviet system is a perversion of Marxism known as "state capitalism", with the Soviet state serving as an impersonal capitalist.²⁴ The KGB was able to determine Plyushch's authorship of the letter, and Plyushch was told to remain quiet for two years or face confinement in a psychiatric institution. Plyushch would follow the directive and remain silent for the next two years.

Plyushch's commitment to his Marxist ideals was reinforced during the period of his enforced silence by a comprehensive study of the classics of Marxism and Leninism. However, having witnessed the arrests of Ukrainian intellectuals in 1965, he gained an increased appreciation of national cultures and, what he would later term, national patriotism.²⁵ Plyushch broke his silence on March 8, 1968, with a letter entitled "To the Editors of Komsomolskaia pravda", analyzing the slanderous accusations in connection with the trials of Aleksandr Ginzburg and Iuri

24. Ibid., p. 64.

25. In fact, Plyushch was criticized severely for not using Ukrainian by other intellectuals at the trials of Alexander Martynenko, Ivan Rusyn, and Ievheniia Kuznetsova on March 23 1966. While there was no immediate effect, incidents such as these served to encourage Plyushch's consciousness and eventual his mastering of the language. See History's Carnival, pp. 82-84.

Galanskov.²⁶ Despite the seeming corruption throughout the system, Plyushch retained his firm conviction about the superiority of Marxism-Leninism, up to his arrest on January 14, 1972.

In May 1969, Leonid Plyushch became a founding member of the Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights in the U.S.S.R. and became involved in the mainstream democratic movement centered in Moscow, a relationship which would continue until his arrest. His own personal tactics and fortunes paralleled those of the movement. His protest letters became increasingly legalistic and, gradually, began to be addressed, first, to other socialist and communist parties and, then, to international organizations, most notably the U. N. Human Rights Commission.²⁷

The question of ethnicity and, specifically, Ukrainian national identity, initially not a concern for Leonid Plyushch, became increasingly important for him after 1965. Sometime after his return to activity in 1968, he wrote "To Rossinant", an open letter in reaction to a samizdat essay entitled a "Letter From a Great-Power Chauvinist", authored by a russified Ukrainian, about the nationalities question in the USSR. In September 1968, he wrote "There Is No Monument at Babyn Iar".²⁸ In both pieces Plyushch demonstrates an awareness of the injustices which are

26. George Saunders, ed., Samizdat - The Voices of Soviet Opposition, New York: Monad Press, 1974, pp. 268-272.

27. Plyushch unconsciously alluded to this progression in his samvydav writings, when he exploded in an argument with the assistant secretary of the Party Committee at his workplace on May 20, 1968. See History's Carnival, p. 132.

28. Plyushch, History's Carnival, pp. 179, 192.

perpetrated at expressions of national consciousness. He argues that it is Russian chauvinism that is the cause of other chauvinisms in the U.S.S.R.

Ironically, another subject of concern for Plyushch before his incarceration was the abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union. Beginning in January, 1972, Plyushch wrote a number of petitions to Western psychiatrists dealing with specific cases of political prisoners in asylums, and particularly defending Vladimir Bukovsky. It was after the confiscation of an essay, during a search of Ivan Dzyuba's home, by Plyushch, entitled "The Heirs of Stalin", about the psychology of Fascism and Stalinism that Plyushch was arrested.²⁹ Declared insane in October, 1972, he was sent to Dnipropetrovsk Special Psychiatric Hospital. Until his release and exile in January 1976, his silence was compensated for by an active campaign in his defence by his wife Tatiana Zhitnikova, and several others.

Valentyn Moroz, the leading dissident in the eyes of the Ukrainian emigre community, was born on April 15, 1936, in Kholoniv, Volyn Oblast. The combination of a highly nationalistic environment, and his particular area of study - history, ensured that Moroz's political beliefs were highly developed by the time he graduated from Lviv University in 1964.³⁰ Within a short time of graduation, Valentyn Moroz had already come into serious conflict with authorities over the political content of classes he taught in Lutsk and Ivano-Frankivsk Pedagogical Institutes;

29. Ibid., p. 229.

30. Confirmed in a telephone interview with Nadia Svitlychna on May 5, 1986. Svitlychna first met Moroz in May 1964.

certain poems he had written, and the candidate thesis he was preparing.³¹ Valentyn Moroz was arrested on September 1, 1965, and sentenced to four years in January 1966.³² It was while in a camp, that Moroz wrote his important critical analysis of the KGB's role in the Soviet system, A Report from the Beria Reserve.³³ A criminal investigation was begun in early 1968 in connection with the Report but was unable to find enough evidence to make a case for the imposition of a new sentence while Moroz was still in camp. After his release from Vladimir Prison on April 1, 1969, Moroz was able to write three more political essays before his arrest on June 1, 1970: Amidst the Snows; A Chronicle of Resistance; and Moses and Dathan. It is within this trilogy of essays that the elements of Valentyn Moroz's integral nationalist position and character are revealed. In Moses and Dathan, Moroz writes about national consciousness, using Byelorussian national consciousness as an example, and Soviet attempts to destroy it:

Truth is concrete as are the concepts of good and beauty.

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31. Valentyn Moroz, Report From the Beria Reserve: The Protest Writings of Valentyn Moroz, trans. and ed. by John Kolasky (Toronto: Peter Martin Associates Ltd., 1974), p. xviii.
 32. Nadia Svitlychna has another theory as to the motivation behind the arrest of Ukrainian intellectuals in August and September 1965. She believes that the KGB did not select individuals because of the nature of their writings and activities but because of their potential for repenting and thus discrediting the dissident movement in Ukraine. Though some individuals did repent, the majority remained steadfast in their beliefs. Valentyn Moroz himself admitted that during this first investigation he "did not conduct himself in the best manner". See Ludmilla Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1985), p. 36.
 33. Valentyn Moroz, Report From the Beria Reserve: The Protest Writings of Valentyn Moroz, pp. xix.

Truth is also national. It is the same for all, but it is reflected through one of these unique facets. The mission of each nation is to recognize its own facet, which only it can discover, and thus enrich mankind.

...Why is there a Byelorussia? There is no answer to that question. When one speaks of that which is sacred, logic does not apply. The most sacred is the nation. The nation is the synthesis of all the spiritual values acquired by a people.

There is no future which will automatically guarantee a nation's right to exist. A nation can exist only when there are people who are prepared to die for it, only when there are Byelorussians for whom the question: "Why is there a Byelorussia?" does not arise; only when her sons believe that their nation is chosen by God and regard their people as His highest creation. I know all people are equal. My reason tells me so. But at the same time I know my nation is unique....

Love and friendship are possible between equals. But is what you call love, really love? Love between whom? Between the hunter and the hound? I can love Russia. But I do not feel inferior to a Russian. You cannot love Russia, because you look up to Russia.³⁴

Moroz continues his defence of the nation and its identity in A Chronicle of Resistance, his account of the struggle of the villagers of Kosmach in the Carpathians against the pressures of Russification. Moroz attacks Russification hiding under the guise of 'Soviet patriotism':

'Culture' and 'revolution' are incompatible concepts, opposites. Culture means a centuries-long ripening - a process which is impossible to accelerate. Any revolutionary intervention is destructive here: traditions are not created. They create themselves in the course of centuries. It is possible to assemble people in a club and to proclaim some crazy Day of Swine-Breeders or Milkmaids instead of Easter, but it will not be a holy day.³⁵

Finally, in addition to addressing the national question,

34. Ibid., pp. 53-54.

35. Kostantyn Sawczuk, "Valentyn Moroz: A Voice of the Ukrainian National Renaissance", in Nationalities Papers, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Summer 1973), p. 4. A different translation can be found in Report From the Beria Reserve: The Protest Writings of Valentyn Moroz, p. 78. The author preferred Sawczuk's translation.

Moroz reveals his uncompromising character in his polemical essay Amidst the Snows. The essay chastizes Ivan Dzyuba, author of Internationalism or Russification?, an immensely important Marxist-Leninist analysis of Soviet nationalities policy, for his subsequent recantation of his views in prison, after he had become a symbol for others to follow. It is Moroz's belief that the individual must place the welfare of the nation above his own:

Apostles! That is what Ukraine needs today, and not the contented time-serving "realists" with their arguments. There has yet to be a spiritual revolution without apostles, and without them the rebirth of Ukraine is impossible.

The importance of Dzyuba and his kind lies in their burning apostolic zeal. Without it they fade, become nothing. For them to languish is to die. Let us not lose the sacred flame of obsession!....

Ukraine hungers for those who renounce nothing and make excuses before no one.³⁶

It is clear, that as he faced his second trial for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, Valentyn Moroz saw himself as the apostle he describes in Amidst the Snows. In his Instead of a Last Word, an address he managed to write and smuggle out from his cell during or just after his trial, he also reveals a growing sense of his own importance, something which would later bring him into conflict with other dissenters both inside and outside the Soviet Union:

You [the Soviet regime] have given the reawakening Ukrainian movement of the post-Stalinist period the element without which the movement would never really mature - the element of sacrifice. Faith is born where there are martyrs, and you have given them to us.

You hurled a stone at every spark of life on the Ukrainian horizon, and every stone became a boomerang; it returned and struck...you! The times have changed... From now on every act of repression will boomerang.

36. Valentyn Moroz, Boomerang: The Works of Valentyn Moroz, ed. by Yaroslav Bihun (Baltimore: Smoloskyp Publishers, 1974), pp. 73, 81.

By throwing me behind bars on June 1, 1970, you launched another boomerang...Only this time the boomerang will return with greater force. Moroz was an unknown history instructor in 1965; today he is widely known....

There will be a trial, and all will begin anew; protests, petitions, world-wide press and radio coverage. Interest in Moroz's writings will increase tenfold. In short, more fuel will be added to the very same fire you are trying to extinguish.³⁷

Valentyn Moroz was tried in a closed court on November 17 and 18, 1970, under article 62.2 Ukrainian Criminal Code, and was sentenced to an exceptionally harsh sentence of six years prison, three years special regime camp and five years exile. With his conviction, Moroz was effectively silenced until his release in 1979. The first years of his imprisonment were spent in Vladimir Prison in the company of common criminals, which made further dissemination of his views outside the prison impossible. However, as a result of his lengthy hunger strike begun on June 1, 1974, Moroz was separated from other prisoners. Shortly thereafter, he underwent two months of psychiatric assessment at Serbskii Institute of Forensic Psychiatry, and after an outcry in the West, was transferred to the Mordovian camp system. Although Moroz, would not meet any of the other future Ukrainian exiles while in Mordovia, he did have the opportunity to interact with principal Ukrainian dissidents, many of whom had close ties to individuals who would later be forced abroad. Therefore, it is not surprising to find that the Ukrainian dissidents who arrived in the West before Moroz, were well aware of the controversial

37. Ibid., pp. 2-3, 7.

reputation Moroz had developed in the camp system.³⁸ Nevertheless, Petro Grigorenko and Nadia Svitlychna extended a very warm greeting to Moroz on his arrival, and met with him during the first days of his stay in the West.³⁹

Upon his arrival in the border town of Marchegg, Austria, on January 9, 1976, Leonid Plyushch was met by Andrei Grigorenko, the exiled son of Petro Grigorenko. Despite having been fairly active in the dissident movement within the U.S.S.R., especially in the defence of his father, the younger Grigorenko had been less vocal after his emigration to the West.⁴⁰ In addition, Andrei Grigorenko had not established any important contacts with the Ukrainian community. As a result, Andrei Grigorenko would not be an important factor in familiarizing Leonid Plyushch with his

38. Moroz's controversial behaviour is described in Chapter 4. A very damaging report on Moroz's behaviour by Edvard Kuznetsov, a fellow prisoner, appeared in Student, Vol. 12, No.62 (March-April 1980), pp. 4-5.

39. Confirmed in a telephone interview with Nadia Svitlychna, May 5, 1986.

40. Andrei Grigorenko, though overshadowed by the dissident activity of his famous father, engaged in considerable dissident activity himself. Andrei Grigorenko first participated in the growing protest movement in the U.S.S.R. by signing a critical letter requesting a review of the Ginzburg/Galanskov trial on January 27, 1968. In November 1968, he wrote "Requiem", a poem in honor of A. E. Kosterin, and later spoke at his funeral. He signed many of the letters of the Action Group in Defense of Human Rights in the U.S.S.R.. He began to diversify from simple petitions, and began to write lengthier philosophical articles, including "Today for Today" in 1974; "Criminal Persecution on Ideological Grounds and the Moral Problems Arising from It," and "National Egoism and National-Democratic Pluralism (On the National Question in the USSR)" in 1975. Called in for questioning by the KGB in 1975, Andrei Grigorenko was given the choice of leaving the Soviet Union or being sent to a psychiatric asylum. Andrei Grigorenko left the Soviet Union on July 20, 1975.

new environment, or in briefing the dissidents who left the U.S.S.R. after him.

As was seen in Chapter Four, Leonid Plyushch's initial comments in the West quickly created a troubled relationship between the Ukrainian community and himself. On February 12, 1976, Leonid Plyushch gave his first extensive interview to the Ukrainian socialist editors of the journal Dialoh. This interview which elaborately outlined Plyushch's beliefs at the time, would eventually be used by Valentyn Moroz in an attempt to discredit Plyushch. Plyushch's responses clearly indicate his continued belief in the superiority of a neo-Marxist political system:

I considered and consider that today humanity stands on the edge of a catastrophe and that it is necessary to rescue humanity from this catastrophe....that the way out of this difficult situation lies in the building of a new society, in which there will be no class, national or other antagonisms. However, I cannot call my views pure Marxism, classical Marxism, because I consider that during our century there have been big changes in the world and it is necessary to further develop classical Marxism today. On one hand, this development should go along those streams which are already outlined by Marxism, and, on the other hand, I considered and consider that Marxism should enrich and fertilize, taking as its weaponry that which is the best that has been made in this century by bourgeois philosophy and science. This further development of Marxism, this dialogue with all humanistic ideologies, I call neo-Marxism.⁴¹

Plyushch continued his interview by discussing nationalism in a manner which many would see as demeaning:

I have in mind three viewpoints: patriots, nationalists, and chauvinists. Patriots, in my view, are people who love their nation, their culture, but simultaneously care about the fate of other nations, because they understand, that the fate of every nation depends on the fate of humanity in general. Nationalists concentrate only on the national question; they completely do not examine, for example, social questions, which are very important - in my opinion, the most

41. Rozmova z Leonidom Pliushchem, p. 6.

important. Chauvinists not only repeat the mistakes of the nationalists, but also hate other nations.⁴²

Plyushch also addressed the delicate question of anti-semitism, but lacking an adequate grounding in the subject, he made a number of highly questionable and offensive remarks:

In the Soviet Union today, anti-semitism is growing more and more. In particular, this is visible in Ukraine. Why in Ukraine? In Ukraine anti-semitism is a historical phenomenon. This is ongoing from very ancient times, for example the pogroms of Bohdan Khmelnytsky....⁴³

Finally, in his perspectives on the future of the Soviet Union, and Ukraine, Plyushch painted a picture, at which members of the Ukrainian far right, who believed that change was possible only by violent revolution, and Valentyn Moroz, especially, would take particular offence:

In Ukraine at the moment, as far as I know, after 1972 the defence movement was very much suffocated but not destroyed. In Russia the matter appears somewhat better. I consider that the defence movement is impossible to suffocate and that it will be reborn still stronger. Support from the humanistic forces in the West is of great importance for this movement and I think that the united influence of Western humanistic forces and internal contradictions in Soviet society, these two factors, will in the end lead to a democratization of Soviet rule.⁴⁴

The arrival of the Petro Grigorenko for medical treatment, and the subsequent revocation of his Soviet citizenship, activated a second major Ukrainian dissident in the Ukrainian community. The Plyushch-Grigorenko friendship has already been established and it suffices to say that it continued after the arrival of the Grigorenkos. Petro Grigorenko initially avoided

42. Ibid., p. 10.

43. Ibid., p. 17.

44. Ibid., p. 18.

extensive contacts with the community during first months of his stay, and not many things can be said about the transformation of his views with certainty. However, it is certain that Grigorenko's views had changed by this time, from the largely social-democratic position he once maintained, to a more liberal-democratic position shared by members of the Moscow Helsinki Group. As a result of both his increased awareness of the West and the moderation of his political views, Grigorenko avoided many of Plyushch's initial mistakes, and presented a more acceptable liberal-democratic face to the community. At a rally in Toronto sponsored by the Committee for the Defence of Soviet Political Prisoners and SUSK on May 19, 1978, Grigorenko revealed a suprisingly different position from that which he had taken in the Soviet Union in the late 1960's:

I want to start by disagreeing with the representative of the NDP who talked about socialism combined with democracy. My experience shows that there will be either socialism or democracy (applause). I cannot imagine democratic socialism (applause).

....There are many bad laws in the USSR. We want even these laws to be observed. At this stage, we are not ready to demand a change in these laws. We demand that you observe the laws you yourselves have made...the worst law is better than no law.⁴⁵

Needless to say, some of the left-wing students at the rally, were shocked and highly critical of Grigorenko's new face.⁴⁶ However, it should be said that their criticism was the result of their own intolerance which was considerably greater than Grigorenko's. Indeed, Grigorenko's changing beliefs did not cause any major problems in his relationship with Leonid Plyushch.

45. Student, June 1978, Vol. 10, No. 46, p. 9.

46. Ibid.

Their political priorities, mainly the defence of civil liberties in the Soviet Union, continued to coincide at this time, and thus there continued to be considerable cooperation between them.

The formation of the External Representation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, with Petro Grigorenko as head, Leonid Plyushch and, later, Nadia Svitlychna as members, confirms the identity of the priorities among these three dissenters, as well as their close personal friendships, despite the differences in their political views. This unity in goals found among Ukrainian dissenters in the West was to continue until the arrival of the main protagonist Valentyn Moroz.

Moroz emerged from the Soviet penal system with his declared political views intact, and if anything strengthened. His brand of integral nationalism was fundamentally different from, and clashed with many of the beliefs held by the other exiles. However, this did not prevent Petro Grigorenko and Nadia Svitlychna from meeting with Moroz on his arrival, with the former seeking an accommodation with him to cooperate with the External Representation of the Helsinki Group.⁴⁷ However, such factors as Moroz's pretensions to leadership, disinformation from members of OUN-B who had penetrated the immediate circle of people around him and on which he was heavily dependent for information, and Moroz's personal inability to seek accommodation and compromise, as well as arrogance, quickly led to major

47. Confirmed in a telephone interview with Nadia Svitlychna on May 5, 1986.

tensions developing between Grigorenko and Moroz.⁴⁸ Moroz's criticism quickly spread to Leonid Plyushch and Nadia Svitlychna, as well the other members of the External Representation from which he was now excluded, and who he saw as Grigorenko's natural allies.

On July 9, 1979, Valentyn Moroz attacked Grigorenko and Plyushch publicly at the celebrations of the 50th anniversary of OUN at Ellenville, N.Y.. The attacks which were unexpected and described Leonid Plyushch and Petro Grigorenko in highly offensive ways, destroyed the by then strained relations between members of the External Representation and Moroz. Moroz was supported in his attacks in the following months by a concerted campaign launched against Grigorenko by OUN-B-controlled organizations.⁴⁹

Moroz made permanent the divisions between himself, and Grigorenko and the other members of the External Representation with an open letter written in the late summer or early fall 1979. Entitled "The Dot Over the 'I'", it was a virulent attack on the members of the Helsinki Group, which completely destroyed any prospects of his cooperation with these dissidents. The letter was derogatory, factually incorrect on most points, and distorting on other points:

The Ukrainian community was very surprised by statements which Grigorenko made at the very beginning of his stay in the free world. It was surprised by his enrollment into an association of former soldiers of the Red Army, still more, - by his election to the leadership of this association and by

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48. That Moroz's character was the principal factor behind his subsequent disagreements with the exiled Ukrainian dissenters is a theory which is supported by Nina Strokata. Confirmed in a telephone interview with Nina Strokata on May 6, 1986.
49. Student, February 1980, Vol. 12, No. 61, p. 7.

the consent which he gave to this election - to be the honorary head of the veterans of the army of an occupier which until the present enslaves Ukraine....The most scandalous rumour sprung from his statement about "fascists" within the WCFU which, as it were, were supposed "to carry their fascism to Ukraine."

...These earlier statements by Grigorenko were scandalous, but the dot on the "i" was placed in his last statement to the press which is called "On the Question of State Sovereignty and Relations Between Nations of the Soviet Union". From this statement we come to understand strange things, we learn about real sensations: that the Russian empire...does not exist since 1917, that after 1917, there appeared a communist empire, and that the Muscovite nation is also...a "colonial slave"/12/. The most astonishing phrase is, where it is said, that there is at present not a Russian, but communist empire.

What can be said? First of all - this is not a concept, this is simply a version of a semi-literate person. The red colour of the Russian empire has not confused intelligent people...

...Pyotr Grigorenko has the right to create any kind of group and advocate that position which he represents. But he has no right to declare himself the representative of Ukraine, "the external representative" of the Ukrainian group. In fact, he plays a diversionary role because he creates the impression in foreigners that Ukraine does not want independence, but wants to fight together with Moscow against Communism within the context of one nation, one empire. His statement in Montreal that what is needed is a federation of Ukraine with Russia, is a revolting slander against the Ukrainian Helsinki Group which stands on a nationalist position.... He was regarded as a representative of the Ukrainian group, but the whole time, when documents with national content which raised the question of the defence of national rights came to him, he refused to pass them to the West and said that this was "nationalism"....In fact, Pyotr Grigorenko was formed spiritually in Moscow and always stood for Russian positions....

...Iurii Shukhevych, a conscious nationalist, son of General Shukhevych, is now a member of the Group, but he is "represented" in the West by a Russian general, who declares himself against nationalism. This is a Farce....we turn with a request to the Ukrainian Helsinki Group: state officially that Grigorenko is deprived of the status of the Group's representative...50

Although almost entirely devoted to Grigorenko, the letter also briefly attacked two other members of the External

50. Valentyn Moroz, "Krapka nad 'I'", unpublished open letter, May 1979, 9 p.

Representation, who, the letter claimed, had not been eager to join the Helsinki Group until they reached the safety of the West. It should be noted that the Helsinki Groups had not even been formed when Leonid Plyushch was exiled from the U.S.S.R., while Nadia Svitlychna, who had young children to care for, had only been recently freed after four years of imprisonment when the Group was formed.

The response to Moroz's assaults against the External Representation was a measured one. Grigorenko, Plyushch and Svitlychna chose a strategy of ignoring Moroz rather than launching a demeaning counterattack.⁵¹ In addition, Nadia Svitlychna chose also to publish an article which defended her position in the External Representation and the latter's right to act for the Helsinki Group in the West:

I immediately attached myself to this Representation, regarding it as the most direct link with my abandoned homeland....

...I feel it is my civil duty to clearly indicate that I am on the same side of the barricade on which my compatriots in the Ukrainian Helsinki Group are courageously defending human and national rights. I am in complete solidarity with them.⁵²

She also sought to support Petro Grigorenko in the letter:

Perhaps the most intolerant edge of this inquisition is currently directed towards the head of the Western Representation, Petro Hryhorovych Hryhorenko (Grigorenko) - a person of honest and consistent devotion to ideals of justice, a person who has earned himself authority and respect throughout the world, a person with an especially clearly defined position on the question of state independence for Ukraine.⁵³

51. Confirmed in a telephone interview with Nina Strokata on May 6, 1986.

52. Student, February 1980, Vol. 12, No. 61, p. 7.

53. Ibid.

Regardless of the strategy adopted by the External Representation, Moroz's behaviour and commentary soon attracted sufficient criticism from organizations other than OUN-B, to make an action on their part unnecessary. Student, the national organ of SUSK, attacked Moroz's letter with a point-by-point refutation of his accusations, in its February 1980 issue.⁵⁴ In relation to the most serious charges against Grigorenko, dealing with his unwillingness to recognize that the "USSR is a Russian colonial empire" and that Russian imperialism is an enemy of the Ukrainian people, Student printed the following refutation by citing Grigorenko's views:

The Soviet Union is the successor to the Russian colonial empire....[The Bolsheviks] built this empire on different foundations, strengthened and broadened it, and even turned the so-called 'imperial nation' into colonial slaves....
...[the Soviet partocracy] strives to dominate the entire world through a world-wide 'partocratic empire. Thus this empire is a hazard to the entire world and the fight for its decolonization is not the task of any one nation. It is the task of the entire world. To break free of the empire's clutches, to separate from it, is not possible for any one nation alone...[One must] decisively expose the attempts of Russian chauvinist circles in the USSR and abroad to identify the concept of "Russia" with all republics of the USSR and the concept of "Russian" with all peoples of the USSR.⁵⁵

With the arrival of Raisa Moroz in the West, Valentyn Moroz immediately developed problems with his marriage. Shortly thereafter, under extremely unpleasant circumstances, Valentyn Moroz abandoned Raisa Moroz. This act further strengthened the split between Moroz and the other dissidents, as Raisa Moroz naturally gravitated to her friends in the External Representation.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

The arrival of Nina Strokata and Sviatoslav Karavanskyi brought new individuals of considerable importance into the middle of this conflict. However, the Karavanskyis had missed the fury and wide scope of Moroz's initial assault, and subsequently were not subjected to any major attack from Moroz, in large measure because of their strong emphasis on the national question.⁵⁶ Nevertheless, the Karavanskyis naturally became associated with the External Representation because of their previous affiliations in Ukraine. As to Victor Borovsky, Volodymyr Malynkovych and Petro Vins, the contacts they developed were solely with the External Representation Group. Vins, shortly after arriving in the West, virtually ceased any collaboration with the Ukrainian emigre community. Borovsky, having undergone

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56. The Karavanskyis' political beliefs on arriving in the West can be found in interviews conducted by the Smoloskyp organization. See Smoloskyp, Vol. 2, No. 6, Winter 1980, pp. 1, 4-5.

Nina Strokata: ...I expect that the whole Ukrainian nation will succeed in preserving itself and that it will not be possible to transform it into a faceless Soviet nation. There will be no faceless Ukraine because it is impossible to strip her of her spirit....

As far as I am concerned, whenever the Soviet government drafts and signs an agreement, it does so with the obvious intention of either completely disregarding it or abiding by it as little as possible. With respect to the Helsinki Agreement, I don't feel that Soviet diplomats, government party officials had any intention of fulfilling its provisions.

Sviatoslav Karavanskyi:

Question: What do you consider the greatest threat to the existence of the various nationalities of the Soviet Union?

Answer: The growing strength of the Soviet state. The Soviet state and its system aligns all of the nationalities into one order through its Russification policy. It not only Russifies, it deprives them of their spirit....

a difficult period of readjustment to the West, was largely inactive during the years immediately after his arrival. His minor status kept him from becoming a target for Moroz's barbs. Finally, Malynkovych, a Russian (or Russified Serb) by nationality but a member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, initially also escaped a fate as a target of the Moroz's criticism.⁵⁷

Since their arrival in the West, the dissidents examined in this thesis have exhibited considerable change in their viewpoints. The greatest evolution may possibly be found in the views of General Grigorenko who has moved from a social democratic to a liberal democratic and pronouncedly Ukrainian position. Leonid Plyushch has moderated his categorical rejection of non-socialist groups in the West, and his Ukrainian patriotism has become more pronounced, but he has held to his social-democratic views, his neo-Marxism becoming increasingly vague, however.⁵⁸ Nadia Svitlychna has changed least of all the dissidents, and remained seemingly unaffected by the diverse world of emigre politics. It can be noted that the Sviatoslav Karavanskyi, the former OUN member, has become firmly entrenched in a conservative, nationalist position close to that held by OUN-B. Nina Strokata's views have drifted moderately to the right of position she had held earlier, however, they continue to remain closer to Nadia Svitlychna's than to her husband's. Finally, the impact of the Western experience on the views of

57. Smoloskyp, Vol. 3, No. 13, Fall 1981, pp. 1, 8.

58. Student, Vol. 12, No. 63, May-June 1980, p. 6.

Valentyn Moroz has been only marginal. It has not diminished his integral nationalism, but has somewhat moderated his formerly unqualified and often offensive manner of criticism. His ideological influence is clearly present within an organization he created in 1980 'Lytsari Sviatoslava' (the Knights of Sviatoslav).⁵⁹

The fiery conflict between Valentyn Moroz, on one side, and Petro Grigorenko and Leonid Plyushch, on the other side, was a major factor in the serious disruption of the support behind the human rights campaign in the West. The unyielding and often critical views expressed by the dissenters did much to tarnish their earlier idealized images. Yet, it was really the idealized images which were mistaken, as it was an important characteristic of a successful dissenter within the U.S.S.R. to be unbending in conditions of pressure - something which, to a differing degree, they continued in their new environment in the West. Thus it was the interaction of the dissidents in an atmosphere where demands for unity and an avoidance of conflict were less compelling than they have been in the Soviet Union, that made conflict almost inevitable. Political views and programs, the status of the human rights question vis-a-vis the nationalities question, on the other hand, were really of lesser importance in generating conflict and disunity among the dissidents. The level of tension and animosity between Moroz and the other dissidents, has not

59. Anabasis, No. 1, 1980, pp. 6-7.

decreased with the passage of time, and continues to be a cause of serious division in the ranks of the dissenters.⁶⁰ It seems certain that this situation will continue in the foreseeable future.

60. Moroz continued to attack Plyushch and Grigorenko whenever the opportunity presents itself. For instance, see his journal Anabasis, Vol. 4 No. 1, 1981, pp. 8-12; No. 5(8) (January-March 1982), p. 37; No. 1(12) (Spring 1983), pp. 28-34; and No. 2(13) (Summer 1983), pp. 25-26.

Chapter Six

Conclusions

The birth and growth of dissent in the Soviet Union in the wake of Joseph Stalin's death became a development of unexpected importance from the mid-1960's to the end of the 1970's. Its manifestations, particularly those in Ukraine, were seen as threatening to the stability of the existing structures, and therefore, had to be dealt with. The Soviet KGB's initial attempts to deal with dissident phenomenon by arrests, pressure to recant, and imprisonment were unsuccessful, producing protests at home and eventually abroad. It is with this latter aspect of the reaction, that this thesis is primarily concerned. In particular, the thesis has studied the impact of the birth, growth and suppression of dissent, and the effects of the arrival of Soviet Ukrainian political dissidents in the West on the Ukrainian emigre community.

It has been shown that the repression of dissident activities in the U.S.S.R. and the Soviet use of forced emigration and exile as a weapon to combat dissent has had a variety of consequences which evolved over the course of the period covered by the thesis. The human rights campaign initially played a highly positive role within the Ukrainian community in the West bringing about a rather unusual appearance of unity to a highly politicized and divided community. However, later the pressures of the internal dynamics within that community, in particular, the continuing drive for control by the powerful OUN-B organization over national and international Ukrainian

organizations, against OUN-M and OUN-Z, and their democratic allies, absorbed the newly arrived exiles into symbolic roles which were attacked and manipulated in the struggle for control within the community. Among the exiled Ukrainian dissidents, the most important role in this power struggle came to be played by Valentyn Moroz, whose near-mythical prestige in the Ukrainian community, ideological beliefs, and personality made him a natural symbol for manipulation by OUN-B in the ongoing campaign for political control of the Ukrainian diaspora. Moroz's pronouncements more than any others, helped to destroy the tenuous cooperation which had existed within the Ukrainian diaspora since the organization of the First World Congress of Free Ukrainians in 1967. As important was the OUN-B drive for the manipulation and eventual takeover of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, the umbrella structure for the Ukrainian American organizations. This development led to the severing of all ties between organizations of the OUN-B "Liberation Front" and virtually all others, and came to threaten the World Congress of Free Ukrainians with a similar fate.

The conflict which arose with the arrival of the dissenters in the West however, was not entirely the result of Ukrainian emigre politics. Much of the conflict was the result of the dissenters' exposure to a new environment which did not require their unanimity on issues, and which lacked the hostile state that by its threats had encouraged cooperation among the dissidents. Thus, a variety of political beliefs were expressed by dissidents, some more acceptable to the Ukrainian diaspora than others. In addition, there was now uninhibited, personal

contact over extended periods, something that had been impossible in the Soviet Union. Belated signals from Soviet political prisoners in the Mordovian camp system had indicated the potential for conflict between Valentyn Moroz and other dissenters. The predictions proved to be true, and the disagreements and even hatred which arose between Moroz and all the other Ukrainian dissidents in the West did much to undermine the Ukrainian community's commitment to human rights efforts.

Chapter One outlined the main hypothesis of the study, and the questions it sought to address. It then examined the development of the dissident movement in the U.S.S.R., and especially Ukraine. The chapter noted the effects of the existence of nationalism in Ukraine. It indicated that the first stirring of dissent appeared in 1956, following Khrushchev's speech. It showed briefly the effects of the shestydesiatnyky (People of the Sixties) Movement and the KGB efforts to destroy it. The chapter then introduced the dissidents who are the focus of this study. It concluded with an elaboration of the methodological problems this thesis faced, given the complete absence of previous work in this area, and the secretive nature of emigre politics which functions in many respects under a siege mentality that tends to suppress information embarrassing to the Ukrainian cause.

In Chapter Two, we analyzed the emigration of Ukrainians to the West, by far the most important streams of emigration going to the U.S. and Canada, and the organizational structures they had set up there. The continuing strength and dominance of

the OUN-derived political parties was particularly evident among the post-World War II Ukrainian emigration and it was especially noticeable in the most important diaspora institutions - the World Congress of Free Ukrainians, the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, and the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America. OUN-B, OUN-M, and OUN-Z were seen to show a continuing if varying ability to rejuvenate their organizations despite the passage of more than 50 years since the establishment of the OUN, combined with a greatly differing ability to adapt their politics to the changing situation in Ukraine, especially lacking in the OUN-B-dominated organizations. The analysis extended to the youth organizations which would be at the forefront of the Ukrainian human rights campaign during the 1970's: Plast, SUM and SUMA, TUSM, ODUM, as well as SUSK and SUSTA student federations and non-affiliated Ukrainian university student clubs in Canada and the United States respectively.

Chapter Three documented the rise of the Ukrainian human rights movement in the West. It is apparent, that the lack of information about the arrests in Ukraine in 1965, and a limited knowledge about developments in Ukraine within the Ukrainian emigre community at that time delayed the launching of a general human rights campaign in the West. The publication of The Chornovil Papers and, shortly thereafter, Ukrainian Jurists Under KGB Trial sparked a deep concern among the Ukrainian emigre intelligentsia which resulted in a dramatic rise in scholarly study, writing and lectures on the new political situation in Ukraine. By the time of Moroz's second arrest on June 1, 1970, the Ukrainian diaspora was well acquainted with dissident

movement in Ukraine, and his role in it, including his Report From the Beria Reserve. The already developing Ukrainian human rights campaign grew rapidly with the decision of OUN-B to become involved in support of persecuted Ukrainian dissidents, in particular Valentyn Moroz, whose pronounced political beliefs appeared virtually identical to their own. The campaign gained strength following Pierre Trudeau's highly offensive dismissal of persecuted Ukrainian dissidents as the equivalent of the FLQ terrorists. An explosion of activity occurred following the wave of arrests in January 1972. This enormous rise in concern and anger served to fuel the institutionalization of a widespread human rights campaign within the Ukrainian emigre community. Despite the new levels of awareness and commitment, it was not until Valentyn Moroz's hunger strike of 1974, that the dynamics of Ukrainian pro-dissident activity reached and even surpassed that of early 1972. The extreme emotionalism tied to the Moroz hunger strike sparked the creation of the long-lasting and highly active Moroz Defence Committee network. The community was by then effectively mobilized, from the more socialist oriented Committee for the Defence of Soviet Political Prisoners to the more nationalist Committee for the Defence of Valentyn Moroz, and the years of lobbying were beginning to show.

In Chapter Four, the impact of the arrival of Ukrainian dissidents in the West was described and examined. A sense of excitement and joy pervaded the Ukrainian diaspora following the release of Leonid Plyushch. However, Plyushch's staunch defence of neo-Marxism, uninformed criticism of the West, and personal

difficulties in adjusting to a normal life following years in a psychiatric asylum, left many in the Ukrainian community, particularly on its right wing, disappointed, and even bitter. The first cracks in a extremely positive image of dissenters in general were beginning to appear.

The effect of Petro Grigorenko's arrival in the West was delayed as he tried to safeguard the possibility of his return to the Soviet Union. The deprivation of his citizenship broke Petro Grigorenko's silence. His period of convalescence had allowed him to study the Ukrainian emigration before his active involvement with it, and therefore he avoided many of the errors Leonid Plyushch had made. However, Grigorenko's honesty, a newly found aversion to extremes, both left and right; and his strong ties to Russian dissidents would cause him problems, especially with the large Ukrainian right dominated by OUN-B, and even with the Ukrainian left, largely confined to Ukrainian students.

Nadia Svitlychna arrived in the United States in October 1978. Svitlychna was able to remain virtually unmarked by controversy, and brought the much needed moderate influence to the community. Ukrainian human rights activities continued at a steady pace during these months, as the community and its human rights activists felt they could at least accept partial credit for the release of the dissenters. In addition, the human rights activists benefitted greatly from the increased public influence they possessed because of the presence of the exiled dissenters in their ranks.

The Ukrainian diaspora exploded in celebration in 1979 with the arrival of Valentyn Moroz - the myth that it reinforced

by its own wishful thinking. Moroz's rapid involvement in conflict with the other dissenters and the majority of Ukrainian emigre organizations, political parties, and even the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, as well as his personal conduct, shocked the Ukrainian emigre community and had devastating effects on its human rights efforts. The OUN-B manipulation of Moroz as weapon for use against its own domestic opponents further damaged support for the human rights campaign by effectively splitting the Ukrainian emigre community in half. The walkout of virtually all non-OUN-B organizations from the Thirteenth UCCA Congress, and the establishment of the Committee for Law and Order in UCCA, a parallel umbrella organization for Ukrainians in the United States, disrupted community affairs still further. By the time the last Ukrainian dissenters arrived and the prospects of emigration of other Ukrainian dissenters disappeared, the rift between Petro Grigorenko, leader of the External Representation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group and its supporters, on the one hand, and Valentyn Moroz and OUN-B, on the other hand, became virtually unmendable. The combined effects of Moroz's behaviour, OUN-B's inability to control him as it wished, and his attempts to coopt members of SUM for his own youth organization, the Knights of Sviatoslav, led to a decisive break between Valentyn Moroz and OUN-B in summer 1981. Before long, Valentyn Moroz found himself virtually isolated in the community. Bitter divisions in the Ukrainian diaspora persisted and dominated the the Fourth World Congress of Free Ukrainians held in late 1983. The community leaders managed to avoid disaster at the Congress but human rights issues were all but ignored and not a single

dissident was invited to attend. The situation of the Ukrainian diaspora at the end of 1983 was extremely negative. The Ukrainian American community, the largest in the diaspora, became unyieldingly divided, while tensions in the Ukrainian Canadian community remained high. The community human rights campaign had ground to a halt by the early 1980's and only specialized human rights organizations remained operating with seriously depleted monetary and personnel resources. The dissidents, too, had lost much of their moral force within the Ukrainian community.

In the final chapter, we examined the relationships among the dissidents themselves, both before and after emigration. The conflict between Valentyn Moroz, on the one hand, and Leonid Plyushch and Petro Grigorenko, on the other hand, was particularly emphasized. We noted the diversity of political beliefs among the dissidents while still in the U.S.S.R. early in the chapter. However, despite these differences, we are able to witness willing cooperation among dissidents in the face of a common enemy. However, in the remarkable writings Valentyn Moroz produced during the late 1960's one could also see indications of intolerance. This trait would not become recognized by most Ukrainians in the West until after Moroz's arrival in the United States, but would cause great conflict between Moroz and other political prisoners held in the Mordovian camps, especially Danylo Shumuk. While intolerance was not a characteristic found among most other Ukrainian dissenters who came to the West, (Sviatoslav Karavanskyi is to a lesser degree another exception), their personal convictions and characters make them unyielding to attacks and criticism not based on logic. These traits made

conflict between the dissidents almost inevitable when they were brought together, in the West. Therefore, an opinion that the serious conflict which developed between Moroz and all other dissenters, was as much a product of personal character and OUN-B manipulation of Moroz, as of ideological differences between the two sides, was expressed. Finally, it was predicted that the conflict between Moroz and the other dissidents would remain a permanent fissure among the dissidents in the West in the future.

One can speculate as to the motivation behind the extreme selectivity and hesitation on the part of the Soviet Union in exiling Ukrainian political dissenters to the West. Whether the Soviets only release those dissidents that they expect to cause problems in the West or to break down and return to Soviet Union, is an open question. However, it is clear that Ukrainian political prisoners, who make up the largest share of the Soviet political prisoner population, are clearly underrepresented among those exiled to the West. It is also apparent that some Ukrainians dissidents released to the West, especially Valentyn Moroz, caused considerable damage in the Ukrainian community, although the community did benefit in other respects, in particular, from improved access to governmental decision-makers. Finally, there may be considerable truth in Nadia Svitlychna's belief that the Ukrainian dissidents who have been exiled to the West are really secondary figures, and the real stars of the movement, individuals such as Ivan Svitlychnyi, Levko Lukianenko and Vyacheslav Chornovil, who could serve as uniting forces in the Ukrainian diaspora, and cause devastating reassessment in the

West of Soviet nationality policy in Ukraine, remain imprisoned.¹ If disruption and embarrassment of the human rights effort were the Soviet goals behind the release of Ukrainian dissidents, they have only been partly successful. Significant damage has occurred to the community's desire to actively support dissenters in Ukraine, however, effective lobbying by specialized human rights groups still continues. If the undermining of the symbolic, unifying and mobilizing function of Ukrainian dissent within the diaspora had been the Soviet goal, the Kremlin has been more successful in this respect.

As to the Ukrainian hopes for the dissidents it is clear that the dissidents continue to retain some special influence in the community and this influence remains valuable to those Ukrainian human rights groups which still are functioning. The influence of the Ukrainian human rights groups in general, on the other hand, has not been so constant. The influence these groups have had, has largely been dependent on willingness of the U.S. and, to a lesser degree, Canadian governments to listen to them. During the Nixon and Ford presidencies, Henry Kissinger's concentration on international security prevented human rights lobbies from having real influence in the White House, and thus much of the effort to gain support was aimed at the American Congress. The Carter presidency, gave the human rights advocates unprecedented influence in American foreign policy temporarily, but Soviet unwillingness to be dictated to, and the general decline of detente by the late 1970's limited what could be

1. Telephone interview with Nadia Svitlychna, May 5, 1986.

achieved. The arrival of the Reagan administration, which sees human rights simply as a weapon to be used in the global contest with the Soviet Union, has further lessened the influence of the Ukrainian human rights lobbies, but has raised the influence and contacts of OUN-B, with its dated and uncomplicated approach to the Soviet polity.²

Until 1976, the symbol of Ukrainian dissent was used effectively by emigre organizations to bind and mobilize the Ukrainian community. Even after the arrival of Plyushch and Grigorenko but before the arrival of Valentyn Moroz, the symbol retained its positive value as a unifying force in the Ukrainian community. However, after Moroz's arrival and his sweeping criticism of the Ukrainian diaspora the unifying, motivating functions of this symbol rapidly disappeared. The OUN-B attempt to use the dissidents as weapons was relatively effective. Grigorenko and Plyushch were made the most important figures in this effort which sought to blacken the images of these dissidents, and indirectly, the various non-OUN-B organizations and individuals who continued to support them. The use of Valentyn Moroz as a weapon by OUN-B against its rivals was successful but only for a very short time, as Moroz's criticism quickly engulfed virtually every non-OUN-B organization and

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2. OUN-B's influence in Washington has risen due to a variety of factors including: the similarity of world views held by the President Reagan and OUN-B; their strong support for President Reagan's policies especially his denunciations of the Soviet government and system; and because of the personal friendship which exists between President Reagan and Prof. Lev Dobriansky, who favored OUN-B-controlled groups within the UCCA during his lengthy presidency of this umbrella organization.

destroyed his credibility. Thus, it could be fairly stated that the effect and impact of Ukrainian political dissidents in the West upon the Ukrainian diaspora has been at best mixed, with serious negative consequences to the tenuous unity which had existed in the emigre community prior to 1976.

It has become clear during the research for this thesis that virtually no study has been done in this area. As a result, opportunities for further scholarly study and investigation appear nearly unlimited. However, clearly one of the greatest difficulties is the problem of finding accurate, complete information. The Ukrainian diaspora operating with a siege mentality tends to present only the brightest picture it can. Furthermore, the fact that the diaspora is spread across several countries complicates any study. Thus while it is believed that further study in this area is vitally needed, and will be rewarding, it is hoped that our thesis will make this task just a little easier in the future.

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Andrei Amalrik and Gyusel Amalrik

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_____. By telephone. May 5, 1986.

Nina Strokata. Ottawa. May 15, 1985.

_____. By telephone. May 6, 1986.

Valentyn Moroz. Toronto. May 12, 1984.

Appendix No. 1

Forced Emigration of Dissidents from the Soviet Union

Partial List

Date, Name, Organizations of which a Member:

February 22, 1966	Valery Tarsis (Deprived of citizenship)
1969	Yulius Telesin
February 10, 1971	Girs Feigin
December, 1971	I. Rips
1972	Boris Zuckerman
May 22, 1972	Pjatrass Plumpas (Lithuanian Roman Catholic activist)
May 22, 1972	Y. Titov
May 22, 1972	E. Stroyeva (Committed suicide after becoming homesick and being refused to return without recantation).
May 30, 1972	Valeri Chalidze (Deprived of citizenship)
May 30, 1972	Alexander Yesenin-Volpin (chief legal advisor to Human Rights Committee)
December 27, 1972	Lev Kvatchevsky
January, 1973	Zhores Medvedev (Deprived of citizenship August 8, 1973)
February, 1973	Aleksei Tumnerman
February 4, 1973	A. Dubrov
August 10, 1973	Andrei Sinyavsky
September, 1973	Anatolii Yakobson (Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights in the U.S.S.R.. Committed suicide abroad)
December, 1973	Victor Balashov (founder of the Union for Intellectual Freedom)
January, 1974	Yevgeny Kushev
February 13, 1974	Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn
March 18, 1974	Pavel Litvinov
March, 1974	Boris Shragin
March, 1974	Naum Korzhavin (samizdat poet)
May/June, 1974	V. Grigas (Stasis?)
May/June, 1974	Vitautas Grigas (born Herbert Mickoleit)
June, 1974	Victor Fainberg
September 12, 1974	Anatoli Levitin (Krasnov) (Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights in the U.S.S.R.)

1975
February/March, 1975

April, 1975

May, 1975

July, 1975

July 20, 1975

November, 1975

December 17, 1975

January 9, 1976

July 15, 1976

September 29, 1976

December 18, 1976

February 21, 1977

April 22, 1977

June 14, 1977

June, 1977

October 14, 1977

October 14, 1977

October 14, 1977

October, 1977

November 6, 1977

November 6, 1977

November 30, 1977

October 12, 1978

April 27, 1979

April 27, 1979

April 27, 1979

April 27, 1979

April 27, 1979

June 14, 1979

November 30, 1979

November 30, 1979

December 30, 1979

Vitaly Rubin

Victor Krasin (Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights in the U.S.S.R.)

Nikolai Bokov (SMOG)

Vasili Kharitonov

Bronjus Naudziunas

Andrei Grigorenko

Irina Belogorodskaya and Vadim Delone

Natalya Gorbanevskaya

Leonid Plyushch (Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights in the U.S.S.R.) and wife Tatiana Zhitnikova

Andrei Amalrik and Gyusel Amalrik

Igor Sinyavin (artist - leader of U.S.S.R.'s unofficial art movement)

Vladimir Bukovsky (Exchanged for Luis Corvalan)

Ludmilla Alexeyeva (Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights in the U.S.S.R., Moscow Helsinki Group)

Dr. Mikhail Shtern

Yuriy Mnyukh (Moscow Helsinki Group)

Alexander Feldman

Kronid Lyubarsky (Amnesty International, Russian Social Fund)

Valentin Turchin (chairman of Soviet Amnesty International)

Boris Vail

Victor Borovsky

Tatiana Khodorovich (Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights in the U.S.S.R., Russian Social Fund)

Dina Kaminskaya

Petro Grigorenko (Deprived of citizenship March 1978) (Moscow Helsinki Group, Ukrainian Helsinki Group)

Nadia Svitlychna

Edvard Kuznetsov (Union for Intellectual Freedom)

Valentyn Moroz

Pastor Georgi Vins

Aleksandr Ginzburg (Russian Social Fund)

Mark Dymshits (Union for Intellectual Freedom)

Petro Vins (Ukrainian Helsinki Group)

Nina Strokata and Sviatoslav Karavansky (Ukrainian Helsinki Group)

Yuri Belov

Volodymyr Malynkovych (Ukrainian Helsinki Group)

February 7, 1980

May, 1980

June, 1980

July 8, 1980

Alexander Voloshanovich (psychiatrist for Working Commission)

Evgeny Nikolayev (had supported Working Commission and Free-Trade Union Movement)

Vladimir Borisov (founder of Free Inter-Professional Union of Workers)

Yuri Yarym-Agaev (Moscow Helsinki Group)

Emigres for whom dates of emigration could not be established:

I. Belau

M. Bernshtam

G. Kukarskikh

V. Sevruk

T. Shatalova

V. Ivanov (returned later)

R. Fin

E. Pargamanik

V. Borisov

O. Ioffe

P. Egides

L. Konin

V. Smirnov

J. Vishnevskaya

Y. Belov

O. Vorobyov

Y. Maltsev

S. Batovrin

V. Golikov

A. Plenainen

Marina Voikhanskaya (Fainberg).

Mikhail Meerson-Aksenov

Appendix No. 2

Biographies

Name: Victor Borovsky

Born: 1952

Place of birth: Sloviansk, Donetsk Oblast, Ukrainian S.S.R.

Nationality: Ukrainian

Marital status and number of children at time of departure from the U.S.S.R.: Single

Education or profession: student.

Time in psychiatric hospitals: Period in 1970 after anti-Soviet statement at lecture. Three months in 1976 for contacts with Mykola Rudenko and the Ukrainian Helsinki Group. Threatened with longer internment unless emigrated to the West.

Organizations of which a member: None.

Left the U.S.S.R.: October 1977.

Name: Petro Grigorenko (Hryhorenko)

Born: October 16, 1907

Place of birth: Borisovka, Zaporizhzhia Oblast, Ukrainian S.S.R..

Nationality: Ukrainian

Marital status and number of children at time of departure from the U.S.S.R.: Married to second wife (Zinaida) with two sons from second marriage (Andrei and Oleg), and three sons from first marriage (Anatoly, Georgy, and Vitya).

Education or profession: former Major-General Soviet Army.

Time in psychiatric hospitals: February 2, 1964 to April 22, 1965 for forming a Leninist opposition group; May 7, 1969 to September 26, 1974, for dissent activities.

Organizations of which a member: founder of the Union of Struggle for the Revival of Leninism; founding member of the Moscow Helsinki Group; founding member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group; and leading member of the External Representation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group.

Left the U.S.S.R.: November 30, 1977. Deprived of Soviet citizenship March 9, 1978.

Name: Sviatoslav Karavanskyi

Born: December 24, 1920

Place of birth: Odessa, Ukrainian S.S.R.

Nationality: Ukrainian

Marital status and number of children at time of departure from the U.S.S.R.: Married with no children.

Education or profession: poet and journalist.

Articles sentenced under: Art. 54.1(B), 54.2, 54.11 (1926 Ukrainian Criminal Code) Counterrevolutionary Crimes.

Time in prisons: February 7, 1945 to, December 19, 1960; November 13, 1965, to September, 1979.

Organizations of which a member: member of Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists; member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group.

Left the U.S.S.R.: November 1979.

Name: Nina Strokata Karavanskyi

Born: January 31, 1925

Place of birth: Odessa, Ukrainian S.S.R.

Nationality: Ukrainian

Marital status and number of children at time of departure from the U.S.S.R.: Married with no children.

Education or profession: physician, microbiologist.

Article sentenced under: Article 62.1, Ukrainian Criminal Code (Anti-Soviet Agitation and Propaganda).

Time in Prisons: May 1972 to May 1976.

Organizations of which member: founding member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, member of the External Representation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group.

Left the U.S.S.R.: November 1979.

Name: Volodymyr Malynkovych

Born: 1940

Place of birth: Kiev, Ukrainian S.S.R..

Nationality: Russian

Marital Status and number of children at time of departure from the U.S.S.R.: Married with two children.

Education or profession: physician.

Article sentenced under: Article 206.2, Ukrainian Criminal Code (Hooliganism).

Time incarcerated: Detained prior to court-martial.

Organizations of which a member: Ukrainian Helsinki Group

Left the U.S.S.R.: December 30, 1979.

Name: Valentyn Moroz

Born: April 15, 1936

Place of birth: Kholoniv, Volyn Oblast, Ukrainian S.S.R.

Nationality: Ukrainian

Marital status and number of children at time of departure from the U.S.S.R.: Married (Raisa) with one son (Valentyn).

Education: Interrupted graduate work in history.

Article sentenced under: Article 62, Ukrainian Criminal Code (Anti-Soviet Agitation and Propaganda).

Time in camps and prisons: August, 1965, to September, 1969; June, 1970, to April 26, 1979.

Organizations of which a member: None.

Left the U.S.S.R.: by way of prisoner exchange, April 27, 1979.

Name: Leonid Plyushch

Born: 1939

Place of birth: Naryn, Tien Shan Oblast, Kirghiz S.S.R.

Nationality: Ukrainian

Marital status and number of children at time of departure from the U.S.S.R.: Married (to Tatyana Zhitnikova), with one son.

Education or profession: cyberneticist, mathematician.

Article sentenced under: Article 62, Ukrainian Criminal Code (Anti-Soviet Agitation and Propaganda).

Time in psychiatric hospitals: January 29, 1972, to January 8, 1976.

Organizations of which a member: Initiative Group for the Defence of Human Rights in the U.S.S.R..

Left the U.S.S.R.: January 9, 1976.

Name: Nadia Svitlychna

Born: November 8, 1936

Place of birth:

Nationality: Ukrainian

Marital status and number of children at time of departure from the U.S.S.R.: Married (to Pavlo Strokotelny), with two sons (Ivan and Yarema).

Education or profession: philologist.

Article sentenced under: Article 62.1, Ukrainian Criminal Code (Anti-Soviet Agitation and Propaganda).

Time in prisons: April 2, 1973 to April 2, 1977.

Organizations of which a member: Undeclared member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group.

Left the U.S.S.R.: October 12, 1978.

Name: Petro Vins

Born: May 1, 1956

Place of birth: Kiev, Ukrainian S.S.R.

Nationality: German/Russian

Marital status and number of children at time of departure from the U.S.S.R.: Single

Education or profession: Student.

Article sentenced under: Article 214, Ukrainian Criminal Code (Parasitism).

Time in prisons: February 15, 1978, to February 15, 1979.

Organizations of which a member: Ukrainian Helsinki Group.

Left the U.S.S.R: June, 1979.

END

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