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AN UNCOMMON CONSERVATIVE: THE POLITICAL CAREER OF JOHN HILLYARD CAMERON, 1846-1862

by

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ABSTRACT

John Hillyard Cameron was a leading lawyer and politician of Upper Canada. Early in his career he became associated with the Boultons, Sir J. B. Robinson, Bishop Strachan and others of the Toronto Compact group, which assisted his economic and social well-being.

In 1846 when William Draper, the moderate Conservative leader of the government, wanted to strengthen the ministry's position, he brought the twenty-nine-year-old Cameron into politics as Solicitor-General West. One year later on Draper's retirement, Cameron refused the office of Attorney-General West, which implied the leadership of the government and the Conservative party. He did, however, retain his portfolio and pursued Draper's policy of seeking French-Canadian support. This was especially true in 1850 and 1851 when the Conservatives were in opposition. As a High Anglican, Cameron attempted to take advantage of the similarity of views with the French-Canadian Roman Catholics on church-state relations, separate schools, economic interests and opposition to the Grits. Although unsuccessful, the attempt to form an alliance did point towards the coalition which developed in 1854.

Cameron retired from politics for personal reasons in 1851, but returned to the political scene in 1854. He supported the Conservative-Bleu-Hincksite coalition which was formed in the fall of 1854, but he asserted his independence

by opposing two major legislative programmes of the government: the secularization of the reserves and the elective Legislative Council.

By 1856 the Hincksite members of the coalition made it clear that they wanted MacNab removed from the leadership of the government. Cameron, who was friendly with MacNab, was attacked by the Leader and the Patriot, Hincksite and Orange news journals respectively. The attacks became more violent after Cameron requested a copy of an irregular charge made by Judge Duval to a jury in a murder trial. Cameron, a leading criminal lawyer who was concerned about the legal aspects of the presentment, was charged with being anti-French Canadian, anti-Roman Catholic and a threat to the ministry. Yet he supported measures desired by Roman Catholics and French Canadians; but he also introduced measures desired by Orangemen. When the government was threatened with defeat, he supported it. However, he was opposed to the method being employed to oust MacNab and withdrew his support of the government. Only Edmund Murney moved into opposition with him. Cameron made no attempt to seek the leadership of the Conservative party or the government.

Cameron's successful business ventures failed in the depression of 1857 and he was forced to retire from politics. He briefly returned to the political fray to be defeated by George Brown in the 1858 by-election in Toronto. The election, in which Cameron maintained his moderate policies, illustrated the difficulties faced by a moderate independent

Conservative.

Cameron's prominence as a Crown Counsel was undiminished. He was also elected as Grand Master of the Orange Order. His leadership, as exemplified during the visit of the Prince of Wales, was based on the rejection of extremism. He returned to politics in 1861 when the cry of 'rep by pop' was reaching a crescendo. Cameron, although one of the leading advocates of legislative reform, was unwilling to force it upon Lower Canada and in the Assembly proposed a compromise motion to adopt 'rep by pop'. The support which this received from fellow Conservatives aroused the ire of the Conservative leader, John A. Macdonald, but this was quickly smoothed over. Cameron supported the government, but he refused to surrender his independence, and opposed the party decision to "wait and see" regarding the newly formed Reform ministry which had succeeded the Liberal-Conservative coalition. Throughout the remainder of Cameron's political career, he periodically demonstrated his independent, moderate and principled stand, but this was done increasingly from within the confines of the Conservative party.

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CHAPTER I

A TASTE OF POLITICS

I Early Life

John Hillyard Cameron was a man of first-rate abilities, who never occupied the first rank in public life. His ambitions were too divided, his private affairs too complex and pressing, his ideas on public questions too open to misunderstanding, his course too independent. He was an uncommon rather than an unsuccessful politician. It is symbolic, although unimportant, that he should have been the only prominent Upper Canadian Conservative born in France. After the Napoleonic Wars the 79th Highlanders, his father's regiment, was stationed at Blandecques, near St. Omar, Pas de Calais and it was here that Cameron was born.[1] In 1825, the 79th was transferred to Kingston, Upper Canada. Quite likely young Cameron, as befitted the eight-year-old son of an army officer, attended the Midland District Grammar School; and when the Reverend John Cruickshank opened his co-educational school for "classical and general knowledge" Hillyard Cameron was one of the students enrolled. John Alexander Macdonald, who was a little more than two years Cameron's senior and Oliver Mowat, Cameron's junior, were classmates. Cameron, who always had a facility for narrating stories and telling jokes, was one of

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1. W. Stewart Wallace, A Dictionary of Canadian Biography (3rd ed.; Toronto, 1963), p. 105 and letter from D. W. King, Chief Librarian, Ministry of Defence Library (Central and Army), London, England, 21 July 1965.

the younger student's favourites.[2] He already displayed an appetite for reading and a capacity for memorizing, which would later prove most useful. The stay in Kingston was interrupted when the troops were moved to York (Toronto). Cameron was enrolled in Upper Canada College, Sir John Colborne's newly created grammar school for the Family Compact élite. Here he displayed his academic abilities and his developing skill in debating and eloqution. He graduated near the top of his class.[3]

It was natural that after such a successful scholastic career he would follow the practice of law, for this was the most likely channel through which social, material and perhaps political success might be achieved. After fulfilling the requirements to become a student of law, Cameron entered the law office of Henry John Boulton, the recently deposed Attorney General for Upper Canada. Cameron, however, was only indirectly influenced by the head of the firm as Boulton was soon appointed Chief Justice of Newfoundland. The appointment greatly angered the Reformers, who were trying to break the monopoly which the Compact seemed to hold on office. Boulton, son of the late D'Arcy Boulton, a Compact leader into the early 1820's, still had the proper connections--socially, financially

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2. D. G. Creighton, John A. Macdonald: The Young Politician (Toronto, 1956), vol. I, p. 18 from J. Carnochan, Centennial, St. Andrews 1794-1894 (Toronto, 1895), pp. 48-49.

3. Information supplied, on the telephone, by the U.C.C. Old Boys' Association and Principal's secretary, 22 June 1965. Henry Scadding, later an Anglican Minister, was Head Boy.

and politically--to assist eager students. It was only after being dismissed from his post in Newfoundland in 1838 that Boulton, a disgruntled Compact Tory, became a pronounced radical Reformer. There is no evidence that young Cameron had any specific political commitments. He must have been aware of, and was probably influenced by, the chronic running battle between Reformers and Compact Tories during the middle 1830's. It is most likely that he sided with the apparent representatives of law and order, the Compact.

Articling consumed most of the budding lawyer's time. Cameron was a diligent and efficient workman, who quickly mastered the intricacies of the legal profession. Although such mundane technicalities as conveyancing would never hold the attraction for him that a courtroom did, he was fascinated by legal work. To him it was the "one great tie which connects earth with heaven".[4] However, before his apprenticeship was over, other activity took precedence.

The political conflict had erupted into rebellion. The Reformers had been defeated in the election of 1836. W. L. Mackenzie, the radical extremist, thwarted in the Assembly by his fellow Reformers and his avowed enemies, the members of the Compact, had decided that revolution was the only means of rectifying the wrongs in the colony. The people of Toronto were aware of the danger that confronted them, but the majority

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4. Toronto Public Reference Library (hereafter cited as T.P.R.L.), J. H. Cameron Papers (n.d.); hereafter cited as Cameron Papers. This was probably from J. H. Cameron's inaugural lecture as Professor of Law in 1852.

seemed to discount the potential threat. The action of Sir Francis Bond Head, the Lieutenant Governor of the province, was indicative of this attitude; he despatched the bulk of his regulars to the Lower Province to assist Sir John Colborne. If anything did occur, the militia would have to carry the burden of defending the city.

Colonel James Fitzgibbon, recently appointed acting Adjutant General of the Militia, was responsible for the defense of Toronto against Mackenzie's attack. On December 4, 1837, when word arrived of Mackenzie's march on the city, he sent Cameron to warn the townfolk of the impending danger by ringing the church bells. As Captain of the 3rd Regiment of the Queen's Rangers, Toronto Militia, Cameron marched with the rest of the force to fend off the attackers. It is uncertain to what degree Cameron took part in the tragi-comic battle which unfolded. He was sent to the Niagara border to defend it against the possible threat of support which Mackenzie, who had escaped to the United States, might receive from the Americans.[5]

The episode was a significant event in the life of the twenty-year-old Cameron. The rebellion, his role in it, and his close association with Compact Tories[6] probably coloured

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5. It was quite likely at this time that he became acquainted personally with Colonel Allan Napier MacNab, if they had not met previously.

6. The term Compact Tories is used to designate those who were acceptable to and a part of the Family Compact Group. The term is used throughout, but it is modified so that an ultra Tory is a young member who has some Compact ideas, while an old Compact is one of the old guard. In the 1850's, the term most frequently employed seems to be Conservative so that ultra Conservative replaces ultra Tory. The other Conservatives are categorized by the appropriate prefixes ultra, moderate.

his attitude towards Canadian politics. His antipathy towards radical Reformers was either initiated or reinforced. Reformers, it appeared, were opposed to law and order. They also favoured severing the umbilical cord with the mother country--the country which still held Cameron's grandparents and the country for which his father had fought. The established hierarchical system, if radical Reformers were allowed to go unchecked, would be demolished. Even if Reformers' ideas might of necessity have to be tolerated, it was necessary to protect society against the recurrence of rebellion.

Cameron returned to Toronto in order to prepare for his bar examinations, and after being admitted to the bar on August 6, 1838, he set up practice in partnership with J. Godfrey Spragge,[7] an acceptable member of Compact society. Cameron did not drop his relationship with the Boultons; on the contrary, he cemented it by marriage in May, 1843 to H. J. Boulton's daughter, Elizabeth.

II Meteoric Rise

On circuit the fledgling lawyer demonstrated his capabilities. He was highly articulate and fluent. The courtroom

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7. Spragge was educated by John Strachan and later became Treasurer of the Law Society, Vice Chancellor of Upper Canada, Chancellor, Chief Justice of Ontario and President of the Supreme Court. W. Stewart Wallace, A Dictionary of Canadian Biography, p. 709.

style that he developed made little appeal to emotion but was hard-hitting, factual, logical and exact. His purpose was to win his client's case and rarely did humour appear in his presentation. It was not that Cameron was devoid of humour, but he felt that he had too great a responsibility to indulge in it in court. Laughter belonged in the atmosphere of the drawing-room.

The practice of law was nectar for Cameron. In 1840 he compiled a book of legal decisions, primarily for use among country lawyers who would be unable to check previous court decisions.[8] Undoubtedly this influenced the moderate Reformer, Samuel B. Harrison, a fellow lawyer and secretary to Charles Poulett Thompson, the Governor of the Canadas, to write asking if Cameron would become a member of the committee to revise the Statutes of Upper Canada. The other members of the committee were to be Judge James Macauley, W. H. Draper, the Attorney General, and Harrison.[9] It was a signal honour for the twenty-three-year-old lawyer.

Cameron's work on this committee necessitated frequent visits to Kingston, which became the capital of the United Province. His acceptance of the position also meant that he would have to travel on circuit in the eastern section of

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8. J. Hillyard Cameron, A Digest of Cases Determined in the Court of Queen's Bench from Michaelmas Term 10 George IV to Hilary Term 3rd Victoria (Toronto, 1840).

9. Cameron Papers, S. B. Harrison to Cameron, 6 June 1840.

Upper Canada in order to maintain his income from practising law. Perhaps most significant, his new employment placed him where he could be a spectator to the political struggles of the new government.

It was amusing to observe politics as one who "has no stake in the game". He could watch the "vehicles of every description [which] have been in requisition to convey the motley multitude to the Parliament house, and there 'lords, ladies, captains, councillors and jurists' have been intermingled in strange confusion to hear that important political thing, the speech from the throne." He commented on the interest in politics shown by the people:

> There is nothing spoken here but politics and the stability or downfall of the Colonial [W. H. Draper] ministry...you would imagine from looking at the people that some terrible [catastrophe?] of nature was expected; men are seen at the corners of the street in whispered conversation and passers-by can hear strong words such as 'want of confidence', 'weak cabinet', 'vacillating policy' and a thousand others.[10]

This letter shows that politics was taken seriously in the Canadas, but Cameron was experiencing a distaste for politics. He found it dull to be in "the company of men whose whole conversation is upon the political events of the day repeating in parrot fashion the same thing over and over again, exhibiting no new ideas and only awakening up one's conservative feelings to an uncomfortable degree of sensitiveness as [sic] not much good can be done now by their being awakened at

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10. Cameron Papers, Cameron to Lizzie [Elizabeth Boulton], 8 September 1847.

...all."[11] Further, a political career compared unfavourably with law. He wrote:

> Politics might be enough to stagnate the existence; if it were only the excitement of an assize, there would be something in it, for in court there are a thousand things to make the blood flow rapidly through the brains, the interest of your client, your own position, your desire to triumph,...the eyes of those in the courtroom,...your knowledge that you are watched and commented on, and the necessity that you feel for a cool and self/-/possessed look before the eager and enquiring eyes that are glaring on you, all these keep your mind alive and your spirits up.[12]

Politics would never offer the sense of fulfilment experienced from law.

Nevertheless it was difficult to disassociate oneself completely from the political turmoil. Cameron realized that "the /newly formed Reform Baldwin-LaFontaine/ cabinet have not their path strewed with flowers just now and if some of them have consciences I should say that their dreams are rather troubled at night and that horrid nightmares/,/ new ugly visions sit heavily upon them." Cameron showed some compassion for Draper's difficult position, which he did not entirely understand; but he also hinted at the dislike he felt towards politics:

> Mr. Draper /who resigned/ makes a /undecipherable/ of having left them /the newly formed ministry/, whether because he thinks now 'the post of honor /sic/ is a private station' or

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11. Cameron Papers, Cameron to Elizabeth Boulton, 22 September 1842.

12. Ibid., same to same, 19 September 1842.

> because he could not stay any longer, if he would, is a matter which time perhaps will unravel, but as he still seems a humble friend of the officials it may be that he is not to be entirely cast off, but that some crumb of comfort will be given to him bye and bye as a reward for past services.

As to the formation of the Reform government, Cameron voiced his displeasure when he asked, "Have you heard the new definition of loyalty, catching a rebel to put him into office,...?"[13] Politics was a confusing affair.

Robert Baldwin, the Reform Attorney General for Upper Canada, was more impressed with Cameron's legal ability than with his party affiliation. He did not hesitate to call on Cameron for legal advice[14] and had him handle some personal legal work.[15] Moreover, Baldwin may have been angling for Cameron's conversion to Reformism when in a surprising move the Crown cases of the Niagara Assizes were assigned to Cameron.[16] The connection between the two men was close enough for Cameron to seek Baldwin's assistance in order to receive a fair remuneration for the work he had done on the Statute revisions.[17]

Cameron's practice was bringing him more than satisfaction and recognition: he was becoming prosperous. He compiled

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13. Cameron Papers, same to same, 22 September 1842.

14. T.P.R.L., Baldwin Papers, F. Baby to Baldwin, (n.d.) October 1842; Adam Wilson to Baldwin, 5 April 1843; 5 October 1843, 24 November 1843.

15. Ibid., Larratt W. Smith to Baldwin, 25 August 1843.

16. Ibid., C. Fitzgerald to Baldwin, 30 September 1843.

17. Ibid., Cameron to Baldwin, 7 September 1843.

another legal text[18] and his Toronto lands, which were probably obtained from his father and the result of opportune purchases, were being rented and realizing satisfactory returns.[19] His business prospects were assisted by his Compact connection. The firm of which Cameron was a partner handled all the legal work in Upper Canada for the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel,[20] the Anglican Missionary Service. His law practice led him into taking a public stand on a religious issue.

Bishop Strachan and the Diocese of Toronto retained Cameron in 1845 to defend the Anglican church's position against the University Bill of W. H. Draper, the Conservative party leader and Attorney General West. It was not difficult for Cameron to defend the church, for he was a staunch High Anglican, who firmly believed that religion and education should be intermingled and that King's College was a right of the Church of England, as was the land which it held. Cameron appeared before the bar of the Assembly and in a brilliant defence elaborated upon and reinforced the arguments which Draper had propounded in 1843 when he defended King's against Baldwin's University Bill. Cameron stressed the unconstitutionality of such a Bill: the Assembly was usurping the

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18. J. H. Cameron, The Rules of Court, and Statutes Relating to Practice and Pleading in the Queen's Bench (Toronto, 1843).

19. See below Chapter III, part I.

20. Cameron Papers, E. Hawkins to Bishop Strachan, 3 July 1844. The firm was composed of Cameron, James Strachan (the Bishop's son) and Haddock.

Crown's prerogative since King's was a Crown corporation and made such by the Crown.[21] Cameron's forceful, learned argument contributed to the eventual outcome of the Bill, but its fate was more the result of political opposition within Conservative ranks.

Draper acknowledged Cameron's excellent presentation of his case, and congratulated him on "an argument that would have done honour to any advocate and which he was proud to hear delivered by a gentleman from Upper Canada."[22] On the other hand, Draper was furious with the action of his colleagues, W. B. Robinson, the Inspector General, and Henry Sherwood, the Solicitor General, two High Anglican old Compact Tories whose opposition to the University Bill resulted in its being dropped after its second reading. King's was temporarily saved. Robinson was forced to resign, and was replaced by W. Cayley, a young Compact Tory. Draper needed replacements who would support government policies and would strengthen a shaky government.

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21. J. S. Moir, Church and State in Canada West, 1841-1867 (Toronto, 1959), p. 89.

22. G. Metcalf, The Political Career of William Henry Draper (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Toronto, 1959), p. 171.

III Entry into Politics

The difficulties of Draper's ministry exemplified many of the problems of the United Canadas. The administration had been consolidated in the election of 1844 by the increased number of Conservatives returned, especially from Upper Canada. The government, however, was not truly representative of the united province, for it lacked the support of the French Canadians, the second largest group in the Assembly.[23] The French Canadians, led by LaFontaine, were unwilling to work with the "British" members from Canada East and the Compact Tories or Upper Canadian Conservatives. LaFontaine, moreover, was reluctant to break his convenant with Baldwin to gain responsible government. Among French Canadians, the representatives from the Quebec City region were jealous of the control over the party exercised by Montreal. Draper hoped to take advantage of the resulting friction. In his search for French-Canadian allies, Draper was successful in splintering D. B. Viger and D. B. Papineau away from the French-Canadian bloc. They were brought into the government as President of the Council and Commissioner of Crown Lands respectively. They did not bring any French Canadian supporters with them and they were considered as "vendus" by the other French Canadians.

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23. P. G. Cornell, The Alignment of Political Groups in Canada 1841-1867 (Toronto, 1962), p. 98, table 6. In a House of 84 the Tories and Conservatives of Upper Canada totalled 28, the French Canadians, 20.

Compounding this problem was the bitter internecine strife within Conservative ranks, which had in part brought about a search for French-Canadian allies. Rather than crystallizing, the "party" was rent with personal animosities and splits. There was Draper, a moderate who did not have a large personal following, who attempted to educate the Compact Tories about the need for compromise. Sir Allan MacNab, the Speaker in the Assembly who seemed interested only in placating his own needs, had his own small group of followers, while Henry Sherwood, a fellow Compact Tory, was willing to do almost anything for office[24] with whatever support he could muster. MacNab and Sherwood were avowed enemies; both disliked Draper and sought to replace him. Draper strongly reciprocated Sherwood's dislike, although he was not hostile towards MacNab. Draper's government was Conservative, and therefore supported by the largest group in the Assembly as the least of evils, but any particular crisis might result in the withdrawal of that support.

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24. D. Beer, The Political Career of Sir Allan Napier MacNab 1839-1849 (unpublished M.A. thesis, Queen's University, 1963), p. 113, footnote 36 from the Patriot, 4 October 1842 and C.O. 537, vol. 143, Sir Charles Metcalfe to Lord Stanley, 26 September 1844, gives far too generous an assessment of H. Sherwood as "a moderate." H. Sherwood seems to have been a political opportunist in the highest sense and if this is equated to a moderate, this assessment is correct. In 1842 he had been Solicitor General and the Patriot refers to him as a moderate. Metcalf's assessment was made just after Sherwood was brought in as Solicitor General and it is probable that Metcalfe was justifying Draper's choice of Solicitor General. Sherwood was to become a quasi-convert to reform policies.

In order to minimize the possibility of the defeat of his government through the defection of Compact Tories, Draper in the summer of 1845 again sought an alliance with the French Canadians, this time through R. E. Caron of Quebec City. If successful, he could broaden the basis of the party and might entrench the Conservatives in power. Draper did bring in A. Taschereau, who was appointed Solicitor General Canada East, but again no followers came with him. This action did not have the approval of the old guard Compact group and the British Tories from Lower Canada, who objected to working with the "disloyal" French Canadians. Draper broke off seeking French support because of the feud between the Sherwood and MacNab followers.[25] After the session of 1846, other means of strengthening the ministry were sought. Draper decided not to fall back on the old Compact Tory group who were resentful of him, but rather to infuse new blood into the ministry.

Draper, who wanted to unload the chronic schemer Sherwood, informed Governor General Cathcart on June 10 that he had an excellent replacement--Cameron--"a gentleman of great legal eminence, considerable talent, and irreproachable character, who could readily obtain a seat in Parliament."[26] The acquisition might give some strength and stability to

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25. Metcalf, p. 194.

26. Creighton, p. 116, quoted from J. Pope, Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. John A. Macdonald (Ottawa, 1894), pp. 244-5, W. Draper to Governor General Cathcart, 10 June 1846.

the ministry. Draper sounded out Cameron. Would he accept the portfolio of Solicitor General West? If he accepted, he would be ousting the thoroughly ambitious incumbent Sherwood. The Toronto Tories, who were represented by Sherwood, would disapprove of such action. On the other hand, the MacNab faction might offer more effective support because of Sherwood's ouster. Cameron had, in the past, plagiarized Shakespeare's Hamlet to express his dislike of the abandonment of principle when he declared that "a truce to politics they /sic/ are to me as bad as hen bane or deadly night shade, for they /sic/ are dull, stale, flat and unprofitable, tending to coil rather than /ford?/"[27], but there was no principle that would require him to refuse the offer. Cameron, it seems, overcame his distaste for politics on the first temptation because of his high regard for Draper. Moreover, he was rallying to the Conservative cause out of dislike for the Reformers. It is also quite likely that the position appealed to him. On June 12, D. Daly, the security-minded Provincial Secretary, sent a letter to Sherwood which left him no alternative but to resign.[28] The next day Cameron received his letter asking if he would accept the position. Five days later Sherwood, somewhat embittered, sent off his letter of resignation, which included a parting slap at the

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27. Cameron Papers, Cameron to Lizzie /Elizabeth Boulton/, 22 September 1842.

28. Ibid., Copy D. Daly to H. Sherwood, 12 June 1842.

Draper administration,[29] and opened the way for Cameron's appointment. Cameron officially became Solicitor General and Queen's Counsel on July 3, 1846, and he paid his £14 for his new positions.[30] There was another consideration: since Cameron was not a member of the Assembly, a safe seat would have to be found for him. Draper immediately put his new colleague to work preparing bills for contested elections and for the better administration of justice.[31]

Cameron soon became embroiled in the Draper-MacNab dispute over the question of executive control of patronage and the possibility of increasing the ministry's strength over the choice of the Deputy Adjutant General.[32] Cameron was to be the liaison between Draper and MacNab. Draper asked Cameron to use his influence and friendship with MacNab to point out the difficulties that his threatened resignation

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29. Cameron Papers, copy H. Sherwood to Daly, 17 June 1842. The egotistical Sherwood implied that he was responsible for the Draper ministry's being in power.

30. Ibid., D. Daly to J. Hillyard Cameron, 27 June 1846 and P.A.C., Provincial Secretaries Correspondence Canada West Letterbook 1846, same to same, 3 July 1846. There is an outside possibility that Cameron and Sherwood were working together by the inclusion of the words "and to those with whom I act" in his letter of resignation; and Cameron sent his letter of acceptance the next day. There seems to be no means of discovering the relationship between the two. Until further evidence can be obtained, it would have to be discounted. The contents of the letters, the dates of writing point to a Draper-Cameron understanding.

31. Cameron Papers, W. H. Draper to Cameron, 22 June 1842.

32. See D. Beer, pp. 144-157 for a more complete discussion of this dispute. The relevant points here are the split in Conservative ranks and Cameron's ability to reach across it.

as Adjutant General of the Militia would cause for the ministry. He was to emphasize that failure to support the government would only strengthen H. Sherwood's position, which would be disastrous for the ministry and the Conservatives.[33] Solicitor General Cameron had an interest in the argument even though he was not a member of the Executive Council. Probably he was sympathetic towards MacNab, but his agreement to be the middleman between Draper and MacNab was an acceptance of Draper's opinion that the Executive Council was responsible for patronage.[34] The attempt to salve MacNab's hurt pride failed. MacNab adamantly rejected Cameron's plea for the withdrawal of his resignation, which would have indicated tacit support of the government.

Another difficulty confronted Cameron: he was faced with the prospect of his first provincial election. A mixed reaction had greeted the appointment of a Solicitor General who did not sit in the Assembly. It prompted "some indignation among the supporters of the government as being contrary to the principle of responsible government."[35] Moreover, the appointment of Cameron at the age of twenty-nine aroused jealousy among "his brethren of the long robe who are his

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33. Cameron Papers, Draper to Cameron, 8 July 1846.

34. See especially the Cameron Papers, Draper to Cameron, 8 July 1846, and the complete understanding between the two concerning MacNab's position.

35. The Cornwall Observer and Eastern and Ottawa Advertiser, hereafter referred to as the Cornwall Observer, 16 July 1846.

seniors"[36] and led to attacks on the government for passing over other "eminent" Conservative lawyers.[37] The Toronto Patriot and the Cornwall Observer both welcomed the appointment. Rolland Macdonald, the sitting member for Cornwall, vacated his seat in favour of the Solicitor General. The choice of riding was not without significance. Cameron, while on circuit in Cornwall had commented, "...my name seems to be quite a password to all their best affections.../for/ the name of Cameron is held in great esteem".[38] He was impressed with the friendliness which his fellow Scots showed towards him and the town populace was predominantly Scottish. It was a factor in his favour.

The election had serious implications: if he lost, it could damage the government's already weak position and retard Cameron's future political prospects. W. Mattice came forward as the Reform candidate, but first it was necessary to eliminate George McDonell, a Conservative who threatened to contest the election and who had "...just about brains eno'/sic/ to be a tool of Sherwood's."[39] McDonell withdrew: the struggle would be contested between Reformer and Conservative. While admitting that he was a political novice,

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36. Toronto Patriot, 4 August 1846.

37. Cornwall Observer, 16 July 1846, from the Kingston News, (n.d.): possibly they had John A. Macdonald in mind. The Montreal Gazette said nothing: from succeeding copies of the Gazette, it is apparent that it was not a Cameron supporter.

38. Cameron Papers, Cameron to Lizzie, 27 September 1843.

39. Ibid., W. H. Boulton to Cameron, 11 August 1846.

Cameron advanced a vigorous platform. He expressed his faith in Canada's economic prospects as an integral part of the Empire, despite the British government's repeal of the Corn Laws. Responsible government, as Cameron understood it, was also explained: Canada would modify the existing laws but they had to be sanctioned by the Imperial Government. Further, it was necessary for him as a minister to possess the confidence of the people. Local interests would also be attended to. Cameron included what was to be his guiding principle throughout his political career: he would hold office only as long as he could "act according to his conscientious convictions of right."[40] Indeed, he had in the past looked with disfavour on politicians

> who have bartered principle for place and who feel fortune's power; all sliding from under their feet, their feelings must be like those of the Alpine traveller, who as he climbs up some ice-barred barrier, feels the ancient snowdrift shaking beneath his tread and with but one glance of agony at the distant sky is plunged with the avalanche a thousand fathoms down, lost, lost forever.[41]

It was the adherence to "his conscientious convictions of right" which led to the misinterpretation and misunderstandings of Cameron's political actions throughout his political career. The press and public seemed reluctant to accept Cameron's words and actions for what they were. Cameron's

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40. Cornwall Observer, 13 August 1846.

41. Cameron Papers, Cameron to Lizzie, 8 September 1842.

understanding of compromise would become apparent later.[42] The election appeal was successful, as Cameron was easily returned.

IV A Taste of Office

Ministerial problems continued. Draper, in late July and August, still sought French-Canadian allies to strengthen the government's basis of support. Cameron apparently did not oppose such a move. Conversely, "the Montreal people /British Tories/ seem/ed/ to look upon a French Canadian with the same favour as they would a rattlesnake" and they hoped that MacNab would support them in opposing Draper's actions.[43] If MacNab would not offer this support, W. H. Boulton, the representative for Toronto, would. Draper's attempt was again unsuccessful; nevertheless, in the winter of 1846, the dissident Conservatives were scheming to oust him. Hoping to bring about Draper's downfall, MacNab, through H. J. Boulton, approached the Reformers.[44] At the same time, H. Sherwood sought the aid of the former Orange Grand Master, Ogle R. Gowan. He also moved to Montreal, which was

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42. See below Chapter IV, part I.

43. Toronto Patriot, 8 December 1846.

44. P.A.C., L. H. LaFontaine Papers, vol. 7, Baldwin to LaFontaine, 22 December 1846.

interpreted as an attempt to gain French Canadian support.[45]

Draper, sickened by politics, wished to resign, but he wanted to strengthen the Conservative ministry and to keep out the old Compact group led by Sherwood. Lord Elgin, the new Governor General who had taken up the task of attempting to gain French-Canadian support early in 1847 had also failed. Had either he or Draper been successful, it is quite probable that Draper would have remained in politics. In the event, he finally resigned on May 28, 1847 and accepted a judgeship.

Before his leaving, ministerial reshuffling was already in progress. John A. Macdonald entered the ministry as Receiver General, and W. Cayley became Inspector General. It seems that Draper favoured Cameron as a successor; it would be promotion by merit, a route through which Draper himself had progressed. A letter from D. Daly offered Cameron the Attorney Generalship West[46] which implied that Cameron would be the leader of the Conservative government. Could he accept the post? He had not yet been in the Assembly or in politics for a year. He must have realized that his inexperience and newness to politics was a drawback. If he was not aware of this limitation, the Globe was quick to remind

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45. L. H. LaFontaine Papers, same to same, 17 December 1846.

46. P.A.C., Provincial Secretaries Correspondence, Canada West, Letterbook 1847, D. Daly to J. Hillyard Cameron, 18 May 1847.

the "boy of yesterday" of it.[47] It did, however, acknowledge that Cameron had the potential to become a party leader. Neither of the ultra Tories, MacNab[48] nor Sherwood, would ever have acceded to Cameron's leadership; they had just seen the end of one upstart.

Cameron refused. There seems to have been no principle involved in the refusal and he explained his action thus:

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47. Toronto Globe, 12 May 1847.

48. D. Beer in The Political Career of Sir Allan MacNab, pp. 160-2, places a great deal of emphasis on a scheme to overthrow the Draper ministry with the help of the Reformers and to establish a Reform government. The plan miscarried on MacNab's request that Cameron enter the prospective government as Solicitor General. Most of the support given this argument rests on an article in the Hamilton Gazette of 12 December 1847 from the Examiner, which was Francis Hincks' newspaper. There are a number of factors which Beer has failed to consider: a) the timing of the publication, 16 December 1847, which undoubtedly was an attempt to widen the breach within a splintered Conservative party and ministry facing an election. b) Cameron was Solicitor General in Draper's administration; what could he gain from being a party to the MacNab scheme? He could gain nothing from the Reformers. Further, his "conversion" from the Conservatives to the Reformers would have been a serious blow to the Conservative ranks and a 'coup', because of his abilities, for the Reformers. Baldwin would certainly have realized this. It might, however, cause some dissension among Reformers. More significant, to take such a step, Cameron would have had to swallow his principles, which he would never have done. c) The uncertain date of the meeting, "sometime during the session." The session did not begin until June, after Draper had been succeeded by H. Sherwood. By this time, Cameron had rejected the Attorney Generalship of Canada West. Had he wanted, he could have accepted and attempted to bring in MacNab as actual leader while he (Cameron) remained the titular head, thereby giving MacNab what he wanted--power--but not the revenge he desired against Draper. Moreover, in Hincks' Reminiscences of His Public Life (Montreal, 1884) he does not even mention the episode, and there is nothing of this "plan" in the Baldwin Papers or the LaFontaine Papers. In view of these considerations and the lack of evidence, the 'plot' must be discounted.

"by declining promotion under existing circumstances I believe that I shall be best enabled to support His Excellency's government and assist in promoting the general welfare and prosperity of the Province."[49] The underlined section indicates that his refusal was conditioned by the split in Conservative ranks, and quite likely by Sherwood's insistence on the position of Attorney General. Cameron's request that he might retain the Solicitor Generalship was granted and he was also appointed an Executive Councillor.[50] Draper's hope to have Cameron become leader of the Conservative government failed.

Henry Sherwood quickly accepted the position of Attorney General when it was offered to him by Lord Elgin. The old Compact group, whose influence in the Conservative government Draper had tried to minimize, appeared to be in the ascendant. Its success was illusory, as was the semblance of unity. In the new government, Sherwood's following consisted mainly of the old Compact group. The other "loose fish" Conservatives wanted to see the Conservatives remain in power. MacNab, too, still had a small following, whereas Cameron, who was referred to by the Globe as the leader of "the respectable portion of the Conservative party",[51] lacked a personal

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49. Cameron Papers, draft reply, Cameron to Daly, 22 May, 1847.

50. Provincial Secretaries Office Correspondence, Canada West Letterbook 1847, Daly to Cameron, 22 May, 1847.

51. Globe, 19 June, 1847.

following. It is conceivable that he might have been able to gain the support of the moderates, but he made no play for this group. The differences still existing among the Conservatives boded ill for the government.

Cameron and Draper left together from Toronto for Montreal to meet the session,[52] each to face a new experience: the latter to bid adieu to politics,[53] the former to take part in his first Assembly debate.

Cameron sat to the right of the Attorney General's desk in the front benches. He was a striking figure, above average in height, his sharp eyes prominent in a rather long face, topped by a dark shock of hair. His manner carried an air of accomplishment and confidence. Cameron was a leading government speaker in fending off Baldwin's amendment to the throne speech which was narrowly defeated. Although one member of the Assembly might try to belittle his performance, insisting on his "silly affectation of manner, his pompous tone, 'the demnitionfoin' clipping of his words...., a most flute-like voice and /used/ in the attitude of a dancing master"[54], Cameron already showed the skill which was later to merit the comment that he was second only to D'Arcy McGee as an orator.[55] His "neat, flowing pretty speeches" with

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52. Cornwall Observer, 31 May 1847.

53. Draper, in his farewell speech, paid a parting tribute to Cameron's ability and to his support during the brief period in which the two had worked together, Globe, 19 June 1847.

54. Globe, 16 June 1847.

55. The Toronto Mail, 15 November 1876.

their "deep and learned phrases" earned a comparison with the younger Pitt.[56]

Fully cognizant of the ministry's vulnerable position, Cameron sought to carry out the Draper tradition of seeking French-Canadian support; "...[Il] fit un discours eloquent,.... Il accorda des éloges aux Canadiens-Francais; mais it declara qu'ils avaient tort de s'attacher à M. Baldwin." He also claimed that Baldwin differed from his Upper Canadian colleagues on the Jesuit question and the manner of dispensing justice in Lower Canada.[57] Further, there was "a greater community of feeling between the Conservatives of Upper Canada and the Radicals [Reformers] of Lower Canada" than between the Reformers of the two sections of the united province.[58] Cameron then employed Draper's example of 1842, enumerating what the Conservatives had offered to the French Canadians, but it had no effect; he failed to realize that the French-Canadian group were fully aware of the contents of the offer. It was, however, an astute political move, for it was an attempt to arouse the indignation of the Upper Canada Reformers and thus undermine the structure of the solid Baldwin-LaFontaine alliance, as well as to initiate a break in the French-Canadian bloc.

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56. Globe, 16 June 1847, 19 June 1847.

57. L. P. Turcotte, Canada Sous L'Union (2nd ed., Quebec, 1882), part II, p. 19.

58. Cornwall Observer, 17 June 1847.

With its call for allies unheeded, the government was made painfully aware of its weakened state. It successfully staved off amendments that could almost be considered want of confidence motions. Besides Baldwin's amendment to the speech from the throne, the ministry had warded off another motion requesting "a strong and efficient administration", which was defeated by four votes.[59] They were also sustained on other close divisions, some of which were won by only one vote.[60] Government support shredded away as the session progressed, and contentious issues could not be avoided.

The clergy reserves question was revived. The solution enacted by the British government in 1840 was unsatisfactory to the opponents of state-churchism. Baldwin attempted to deal with this question. He introduced motions to end the sale of the reserves or to initiate a more profitable means of selling them. He claimed that not enough money was derived from the present method of their sale. Baldwin's contention was denied by Cameron, who defended the reserves as the source of income for the clergy of the Churches of England and Scotland. The members of the Assembly were not prepared at this time to destroy the reserves, and Baldwin's motions were defeated by identical votes of thirty-two to twenty-six.[61]

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59. P.A.C., Journals of the Legislative Assembly of the Province of Canada 1847 (hereafter cited as Journals, p. 68.

60. Ibid., pp. 163-4.

61. Ibid., pp. 124-5.

It was the Receiver-General's responsibility to propose a solution to the recurrent University problem. J. A. Macdonald's bill concerning King's College was a compromise,[62] but biased in favour of the Anglicans and their supporters. Cameron, who advised Strachan of the contents of the bill, felt that "this division will be most acceptable to the country" and requested that Strachan inform the College Council of its contents and seek their support for the bill.[63] The bill was seconded by Cameron[64] who publicly reaffirmed his belief that the bill was "just and he was prepared to accede to it."[65] Macdonald presented a sound argument in defence of his bill, but Strachan did not push for its acceptance as strongly as he could have and the College Council rejected the attempted compromise. Nor did the Reformers find it acceptable. Baldwin led their attack on the bill, as a measure too favourable to the Church of England and as an attempt to destroy secular education. The bulk of the Conservatives supported Macdonald, but W. H. Dickson and John Wilson gave

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62. The bill, which actually consisted of two parts, was proposed to restore the charter to King's College and allow all colleges to remain under sectarian control; and to apportion £3,000 to King's and £1,500 to the other colleges and the balance for other educational purposes. King's would retain its buildings, books and educational apparatus.

63. Cameron Papers, J. Hillyard Cameron to John Strachan, 7 July 1847.

64. Journals 1847, p. 125.

65. Creighton, p. 123, n. 44 from the Christian Guardian, 17 July 1847.

strong opposition. The bill was dropped on its second reading.

Rather than face another session and risk defeat, the Conservative government decided to go to the polls in an attempt to establish a dependable majority. To strengthen the Lower Canadian section of the government, F. P. Bruneau and J. E. Turcotte were induced to enter the ministry as Receiver and Solicitor General East respectively. (The Solicitor General East was not an Executive Councillor.) Both men were out of the Assembly and neither brought a following with him. The election was called for the winter of 1847-48.

V The Taste of Defeat

In Upper Canada the election centred on the unsolved university question. Sectionalism also appeared in the election. Some Conservatives, such as the extremist W. H. Boulton, played upon the fear of French-Canadian domination invited by Draper's and Cameron's overtures. In many contests, however, local issues predominated and it was this type of election which confronted Cameron.

The Solicitor General ran for Cornwall. He also accepted the petition of one hundred Kent voters and, although he had refused their solicitations in the past, he now agreed

to contest their constituency.[66] Kent, located in the far end of southwestern Ontario bordering on Lake Huron and Lake Erie, was an outlier of radicalism, represented by Malcolm Cameron, a future Grit leader.[67] The decision to run in Kent was the more surprising in view of a struggle developing in Cornwall. Indicative of the split in Conservative ranks was S. Y. Chesley's announcement that he would contest the seat.[68] Chesley, who had formerly sat for the riding, was eventually convinced to withdraw his candidacy, but he refused to support Cameron. The Reformers massed their strength in an effort to defeat the Solicitor General. John Sandfield Macdonald, a member of the Reform hierarchy and the leading Reformer of Central Canada, informed Baldwin that he was certain that their candidate, Dr. Macdonald, "the most powerful adversary in the District to contend against", with the support of W. Mattice, the Mayor of Cornwall, would oust Cameron.[69] Cameron was struggling for his political life. Aid came from his

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66. I was unable to discover when this offer was made, but Cameron, in his election poster, mentions the fact.

67. M. Cameron, going full cycle, later became a follower of John A. Macdonald and the Liberal Conservatives. Contestants were allowed to contest two ridings up until the 1917 election.

68. In Upper Canada, Wentworth, Carleton and Peterborough saw two Conservatives contesting against a Reformer, and in Toronto all were Conservative candidates. In contrast, only one seat, Lanark, saw two Reformers running against a Conservative. Cornell, p. 23.

69. Baldwin Papers, J. Sandfield Macdonald to R. Baldwin, 13 November 1847.

Kingston colleague, John A. Macdonald, who travelled to Cornwall to speak on Cameron's behalf.[70] Cameron had to spend his time electioneering in Cornwall, where he was returned by a small majority.[71] In Kent, he was not so fortunate: he went down to a resounding defeat.

The election proved disastrous for the Conservatives. Their ranks were drastically cut, in part because of their failure to solve the university question. The Reformers, not yet handicapped by internal feuds, were better organized than the Conservatives; and they made good use of the claim that in holding on to office the ministry had violated the principles of responsible government. Although the Upper Canadian ministers were successfully returned, many of their supporters were not. In Lower Canada, the British Tory group was decimated and no substitute for their support was found. Only five ministerialists were returned from Lower Canada, none of them French Canadians: the recently appointed French-Canadian colleagues had been defeated. The government was in a minority in both sections of the province.[72]

Despite its minority position, the ministry decided to meet the Assembly. The government quickly realized its fate.

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70. Baldwin Papers, same to same, 13 November 1847.

71. Stephen Leacock, Mackenzie, Baldwin, LaFontaine, Hincks, Papineau, Cartier, The Makers of Canada Series (London and Toronto, 1926), vol. V, p. 303, claims he lost his seat, which is not so. The election was contested but upheld.

72. Cornell, p. 100, table 8.

Sir Allan MacNab, the ministerial candidate for the Speakership, was defeated and A. N. Morin, the Reformers' choice, was elected. After two further defeats, the ministry resigned on March 10. 1848. Cameron was bedridden[73] and had been unable to support the government on these crucial votes, but his vote would not have changed matters. Lord Elgin, implementing the principle of responsible government, called on LaFontaine, the leader with the largest following in the Assembly, to form a ministry. Three days after the Conservatives' resignation the LaFontaine-Baldwin ministry was formed. After a month of routine business with little in the way of serious opposition to the new government's proposals, the session came to a close. Cameron had experienced the bittersweet taste of politics from his position of office; he was now to taste it as a member of the opposition.

The results of the elections of 1847-48 and the anticipated defeat in the Assembly outlined several pertinent facts for the Conservatives. Their policies were not acceptable to the majority of the electorate; they would have to be modified and attuned to the popular consensus if the party hoped to return to political power. The Conservatives could no longer expect to have exclusive support from the Governor General and the Colonial Office, a fact which was difficult

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73. Cameron, despite his rather robust appearance, suffered numerous serious illnesses, such as in 1844-5 when he had to go to England for his health, in 1849 and again in 1863-4. The author was unable to determine the cause of these frequent illnesses.

to accept. The old Compact ideology was on the wane, although the old Compact constituted almost one-half of the Conservative survivors in the House.[74] Even with its numbers reduced, the party was divided. Further, it was not yet sufficiently impressed upon all Conservatives that the lack of French-Canadian support was a bar to their chances of political success. It was necessary to find a basis of agreement between the two; Draper had tried, as had Cameron, and both had failed. The Conservatives needed a programme, or at least some agreed lines of policy; they needed unity; and above all they needed allies.

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74. Cornell, p. 100, table 8. It consisted of W. H. Boulton, W. H. Dickson, A. N. MacNab, W. B. Robinson, H. Sherwood, G. Sherwood, E. Malloch; W. Cayley and Cameron were of the new Compact mould; they held some of the Compact ideas.

CHAPTER II

Seeking an Alliance

I Heightened Sectionalism

The country faced a serious test in 1849, when economic problems and sectional differences erupted in the Canadas. An economic depression, the effects of which were beginning to be felt as early as 1846, had become severe. The tariff changes introduced by Cameron in the session of 1847 had little effect towards alleviating the economic distress. The situation was most seriously felt by the trading centres, especially Montreal. The "loyal" British "commercial" Tories of Montreal blamed the mother country for their plight, since the occurrence of the depression coincided with the British government's adoption of free trade. The repeal of the remaining segments of the Navigation Acts, while welcome, did not offer an immediate solution to the difficulties. Various panaceas, including retaliatory protection, independence and even annexation with the United States, were proposed. The Montreal "commercial" Tories also thought it was an appropriate time to attack the French Canadians as being a detriment to the economic growth of the Canadas.[1] This attitude could readily gain acceptance from some Upper Canadians.

The attacks on the French Canadians and on the Reform

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1. Samuel Thompson, Reminiscences of a Canadian Pioneer for the Last Fifty Years (Toronto, 1884), p. 210.

ministry reached a height of abuse when the principle of responsible government, acknowledged on the formation of the LaFontaine-Baldwin ministry, faced its practical application in the signing of the Rebellion Losses Bill by Lord Elgin. The tension built up by the unruly debates in the Assembly broke out in public disorder: the Parliament Buildings were burned, a week of rioting ensued, and Lord Elgin was attacked both physically and verbally. Conservatives felt they had a monopoly on loyalty and it was given their special interpretation: loyalty included the mother country's acceptance of Conservative demands. The loyalty professed by Reformers was, to Conservatives, questionable; Reformers' activities during the trying period of the rebellions needed only be recalled. On the other hand, Conservatives had stood by the government as the representatives of law and order to quell the insurrection. Consequently, it was more than a question of loyalty; it was unthinkable to consider that insurgents merited compensation from a government which they had attempted to overthrow. It was more than contradictory to countenance such thoughts; it was an injustice to pay rebels. Meetings, either supporting or denouncing Elgin, were held in Montreal and in Upper Canada.

Cameron, who had been deathly ill,[2] was not in the House during the session and he was freed from association

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2. Public Records and Archives of Ontario, hereafter referred to as O.A., Samuel Street Papers, J. B. Robinson to T. C. Street, 5 March, 1849, hereafter cited as Street Papers.

with the wild outbursts against the law, Lord Elgin and the French Canadians. Nor did he take part in the mass meetings in Toronto attacking Elgin's action. It seems certain that he would have opposed the passing of the Rebellion Losses Bill because it compensated the "rebels". He would have preferred Elgin to reserve the bill for royal assent. At a meeting in Toronto of the St. Andrew's Society, of which he was a member and past president, Cameron opposed the Society's participation in politics because it contained both Reformers and Conservatives. He did not want the Society to send a vote of confidence in Lord Elgin's political action; he did, however, favour retaining the Governor as the Society's patron, and he "reprobated in strong terms the burning of the Parliament Buildings and the attacks on Lord Elgin."[3] Perhaps it was this statement which prompted the omission of his name from the list of Tories opposed to the bill whom the Globe denounced.[4]

The Conservative lobbyists, Sir Allan MacNab and W. Cayley, unsuccessfully sought some action on the part of Lord John Russell's government to reject the bill. In the province the agitation aroused resulted in the formation of the British American League, which suggested solutions to Canada's problems. The attacks on the French Canadians were maintained, especially by Ogle R. Gowan, the demagogicly-

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3. Globe, 23 May 1849.

4. Ibid., 21 June 1849.

inclined former Orange leader. When the League met in Kingston in July, 1849, Cameron was not present;[5] neither was he present at its Toronto meeting in November, 1849.[6]

During the interval between these meetings, the economic agitation directed from Montreal favoured annexation in preference to independence. The Montreal Tories published their manifesto professing this belief. The leading Upper Canadian Tories, who had been undecided as to their actions, reacted against the manifesto. Most of the Toronto Tory leaders strenuously opposed it. A petition denouncing it and stressing belief and satisfaction in the British connection was formulated and signed. Cameron, with his moderation and his almost obsessive respect for law and order, disapproved of the radicalism of the manifesto. He took no part in the meetings that produced the petition, although he did sign it. When W. H. Boulton refused to sign, Cameron used his moderating influence to advantage. "One of his /Boulton's/ most prominent constituents", he and other leading Conservatives called on the angry extremist and induced him to sign a slightly modified petition.[7]

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5. Creighton, p. 143.

6. The British American League Convention 1849: Minutes of the Proceedings of the Second Convention of Delegates of the British American League held at Toronto C.W. (Toronto, 1849).

7. C. D. Allin and G. M. Jones, Annexation, Preferential Trade and Reciprocity, an Outline of the Canadian Annexation Movement of 1849-50, with Special Reference to the Questions of Preferential Trade and Reciprocity (Toronto, 1912), p. 210.

II The Prospects of Co-operation

Although the agitation aroused by the passing of the Rebellion Losses Bill had abated, resentment was still harboured by some Conservatives who directed their frustration against the Reformers and the French Canadians. Fortunately, the economic situation was improving. Would Conservative attacks be as violent as those in the past session? W. H. Boulton, H. Sherwood and MacNab, who was establishing his hold as leader of the Conservative party, had led the attacks, but other Conservatives such as Macdonald and Cayley had joined them.[8] The attacks by the Conservatives did continue sporadically throughout this period, but the most violent and sustained attacks, until the vision of office appeared, were made by the Reform offshoots--the Clear Grits. They also attacked the conservative element of the Reform party. The prospect was opened up that the Conservatives might take advantage of these two situations in order to strengthen their own position.

Toronto in the spring of 1850 was a hive of activity as the city prepared for the opening of the provincial Assembly. Because of the unfortunate incidents in Montreal, the seat of government was returning to Toronto, "the most British and Tory Town in North America."[9] A choice of a permanent

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8. L. P. Turcotte, Canada Sous L'Union, Part II, pp. 106-7.

9. A. G. Doughty, ed., Elgin-Grey Papers (Ottawa, 1937), vol. I, p. 525, Elgin to Grey, 25 October, 1849. Hereafter referred to as Elgin-Grey Papers.

seat, which in 1856 and 1857 was to cause comic activity in the House, was not made; until it was, the capital would alternate between Toronto and Quebec City. Cameron was in his seat when the session got under way on May 15, 1850. The session, like the following one in 1851, was to prove a lengthy affair lasting from May to August. During this period, various facets of Cameron's political character would be displayed. In the momentous session of 1849, Baldwin had established the non-sectarian University of Toronto, which had aroused the churches because of its irreligious bent.[10] Baldwin proposed a motion to clarify the contents of the cumbersome bill and to allay the religious discontent it had provoked. Cameron, upon accepting the appointment of Councillor of the university, had displayed his constitutionalism, when he informed Baldwin that "I regret much that it was placed on the statute books and entirely dissent from its principles, yet now that it is the law of the land I am ready to assist in carrying out its provisions."[11] Nonetheless, he felt that Baldwin's motion to introduce a minor religious test on students was inadequate. In the belief that religion and education should be intermingled, he proposed an amendment to ensure that students would be given religious instruction by ministers of their own faith. The amendment was lost, fifteen to

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10. Moir, Church and State in Canada West 1841-1867, p. 106.

11. Baldwin Papers, Cameron to Baldwin, 5 January, 1850.

thirty-seven,[12] and Baldwin's motion passed. Despite Cameron's willingness to accede to the law in accepting the University of Toronto, he still sought to maintain a connection between the Anglican religion and university education. It was only right that the Anglicans should have a college if other religions had one. He had introduced a bill to incorporate Trinity College, but it was dropped,[13] as Bishop Strachan was in England seeking a charter for his new university college. The question was reconsidered in 1851 when MacNab introduced a bill for Trinity's incorporation, which passed with minor opposition. The bill received royal assent and the Anglicans again had their own university.

The unique feature of the sessions of 1850 and 1851 was the fact that Cameron, in spite of the hostilities engendered by the Rebellion Losses Bill between Conservatives and French Canadians, did attempt to solicit French-Canadian support for the Conservatives. The idea of reciprocal support suffered a setback late in 1850 with the publication in England of Cardinal Wiseman's Manifesto and the resultant scare about "papal aggression" in the Canadas. Nevertheless, the attempt to make common cause was still pursued by Cameron in 1851. It is conceivable that Cameron, because of his absence from the session of 1849 and the subsequent results, was the only

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12. Journals 1850, p. 197.

13. Ibid., p. 190.

Conservative of ability who was persona grata to the French Canadians; therefore it was he who made overtures for Bleu support. Moreover, Cameron and other High Anglicans, like the majority of Roman Catholics, favoured separate schools, which might result in the two groups working together. Similarly, Cameron and the High Anglicans and the Church of Scotland believed, as did the French-Canadian Roman Catholics, in church endowments; therefore they might offer one another reciprocal support.

The first opportunity to work together in the Assembly arose on the contentious issue of state-church relations--the clergy reserves. The Reformers wanted the reserves secularized, primarily to eliminate the Church of England's privileged position. The Reformers, however, were split on the method of solution: both moderates and Grits favoured secularization, but the latter favoured immediate action disregarding those benefiting from the sales, the former wanted as little disruption as possible.[14] Conservatives opposed secularization; they were satisfied with the status quo. These attitudes were well defined and were manifest in the Anti-Clergy and Clergy Reserve Associations formed as sounding boards for their respective propagandists. There was another facet to this perplexing problem: the French-Canadian Roman Catholics believed in principle in church

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14. See Moir, Chapter III, especially pp. 52-63 for a breakdown of the religious groups' attitudes toward secularization.

endowments, although they were excluded from a share in the clergy reserves. As a result, the reserves were left an open question by the government. Even Lord Elgin had commented on the difficult position of the government because of the reserves: "The best friends of the Bishop and the Church. [sic] are LaFontaine and his adherents, the very people who have been the objects of their unmeasured abuse. They will vote against any attempts to disturb the Clergy Reserves Settlement."[15] If handled properly, possibilities existed of taking advantage of the division in Reform ranks.

On June 18, 1850, James H, Price, the Commissioner of Crown lands, privately introduced thirty-one resolutions dealing with the reserves. The most significant resolution proposed an address to the imperial government requesting enabling legislation to allow the Assembly to legislate on the reserves. Malcolm Cameron, the Clear Grit, proposed an amendment which suggested that the Assembly secularize the reserves by legislation which would become effective upon re-enactment by the British government, but the motion was easily defeated.[16] Cayley's motion to leave the reserves alone was also decisively rejected.[17]

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15. Moir, p. 54 from A. G. Doughty, ed., Elgin-Grey Papers, p. 623.

16. J. M. S. Careless, Brown of the Globe: The Voice of Upper Canada 1818-1859 (Toronto, 1959, 1963), vol. I, p. 118. Since the British government in 1840 had legislated on the reserves, constitutionally the colonial Assembly had to get authority from Westminster before it could legislate on the reserves; or it could request the British government to legislate for the colonial Assembly.

17. Journals 1850, p. 85.

There was no question of Cameron's position. As he had previously stated, he did not believe that the Assembly had the right to interfere with the reserves because they were church lands entrusted to the church by the Crown. The reserves were vested rights; to accept Price's resolutions would mark the commencement of the desecration of church lands.[18] It was on these principles that Cameron appealed to LaFontaine and his followers. Cameron pointed out the similarity of views between those in Upper Canada who opposed secularization and the French-Canadian Roman Catholics, and then drew a parallel between the reserves and the Roman Catholic church lands. If one were despoiled, the other could suffer the same fate. He had told the French Canadians that "he desired to see the people of Lower Canada continue to enjoy their religious institutions",[19] and now he promised to "stand side by side with them for the maintenance of right, for the maintenance of justice and he would battle as strongly for their sacred rights as he did now for the rights of his own church" if the Roman Catholic church lands were threatened.[20] LaFontaine agreed with Cameron that:

> The rectories were granted by the same power as the Reserves, and were entitled to the same respect...; he could not support the

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18. Cameron's arguments are from the Globe, 22 June 1850 unless otherwise cited.

19. Toronto North American, 31 May 1850.

20. Globe, 22 June 1850.

> resolutions in the shape in which they were presented to the House, but he would vote for a petition to the Queen praying that the Reserves might be placed on the same basis as the Act of 1791 or to place them again at the disposal of the House.[21]

Common action, while possible, depended upon how the resolutions were put to the Assembly. On the several resolutions, from four to twelve ministerialists, including LaFontaine, voted side by side with Cameron.[22] When the final vote on the adoption of the address occurred only J. Chabot, L. M. Viger, M. P. de Laterriere and D. M. Armstrong broke ministerial ranks and supported Cameron's position.[23] His appeal for support had been unsuccessful.

In July, 1851, the question again came up in the House. The Conservatives, with Cameron as one of the leaders, continued their obstructionist tactics by opposing the formation of a committee to investigate the means of solving the problem[24] and by opposing a vote of thanks for the British government's acceptance of the previous session's address.[25] The call also went out again to the French-Canadian Roman Catholics for support. LaFontaine, although sympathetic to Cameron's attitude towards the reserves, made it clear that

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21. Globe, 22 June 1850.
22. Journals 1850, pp. 84, 86, 88.
23. Ibid., p. 105.
24. Elgin-Grey Papers, vol. IV, p. 1599.
25. Moir, p. 62.

he saw through Cameron's appeal. The French-Canadian leader pointed out that the Anglican Church only planned to use the Roman Catholic Church to fend off the aggression of the other Protestant churches, and he refused to be an accomplice to this.[26] Further, he felt that the Roman Catholic Church need not fear legislation against its endowments. Only if Roman Catholic Church lands were also threatened would the alliance that Cameron sought materialize.

Cameron could, however, hope for another opportunity on the question of separate schools. The religious struggle, which was basically located in Upper Canada, took on cultural overtones with serious implications for the united province. For Upper Canadians, it marked the beginning of the protracted struggle between Roman Catholics and other religious communities. In June, 1850, Francis Hincks, the Inspector General, introduced an amendment to the Common School Act, which, except for section 19, seemed satisfactory to most Protestants. This section, as originally introduced, allowed municipal authorities within each township to establish separate schools. Its vagueness did not satisfy the Roman Catholics or the High Anglicans. Both favoured an easier means of establishing separate schools and, in order to gain their end, they agreed to work together to achieve a common goal. Hincks learned of the scheme and checkmated the embryonic "alliance". Egerton Ryerson, the

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26. Globe, 17 July 1851 from the Examiner, (n.d.).

Superintendent of Education, on Hincks suggestion, modified section 19 so as nearly to meet the demands of the Roman Catholics while excluding the High Anglicans. Hincks could never have succeeded in getting his fellow Reformers to accept the exclusiveness implied in the principle of separate schools per se. The amendment was to apply to "Protestant, Roman Catholic or Coloured People".[27] Much to their chagrin, the High Anglicans were lumped together with other Protestants. The Roman Catholics jettisoned their prospective allies, whose support had become unnecessary.

Cameron, somewhat embittered and rightfully indignant, impugned the French-Canadian Roman Catholics for their desertion. After pointing out the weaknesses of Hincks' amendment, Cameron attacked it because it had been forced on Hincks by "a large body of a particular creed,"[28] a point which Hincks admitted. Cameron's arguments were based on equality and belief. As he and his fellow High Anglicans believed in principle in separate schools for the education of their children, just as the Roman Catholics did, why not allow Anglicans to have them? Hincks' amendment was "absurd and unjust".[29] Cameron, it seems, refused to realize that he spoke for only a portion of the Anglicans, for the Low Anglicans were satisfied with the national school system

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27. Moir, p. 143.

28. Globe, 9 July, 1850.

29. F. A. Walker, Catholic Education and Politics in Upper Canada (Toronto, 1955), p. 87 from the Canadian Free Press, 18 July, 1850.

which was being established. Nevertheless, Cameron proposed a motion of complete equality: all religious sects, if they so desired, could establish separate schools.[30] The acceptance of such a proposal meant the disastrous fragmentation of Egerton Ryerson's school system. The secularists ridiculed and rejected the proposal,[31] as did the Roman Catholics. It was defeated. Hincks' amendment was accepted.

In August of the following year the separate school question recurred in the Legislature when John Ross introduced, in the Legislative Council, a Common School Bill to correct the flaws in the Act of the previous session. The Bill was the result of Roman Catholic agitation led by Bishop Charbonnel, of a legal decision which suggested that section 19 be clarified, and perhaps a fear of High Anglican-Roman Catholic co-operation for separate schools, which had almost been consummated in 1850.[32] In the Assembly W. L. Mackenzie, the repatriated rebel, proposed a motion, which was defeated, to eliminate separate schools. Cameron voted against Mackenzie's motion, but this did not influence the Roman Catholics who still rejected his plea for support. In Upper Canada, the Protestant public's anger with and antipathy towards separate schools increased, but the Bill passed. The High Anglicans, who have been somewhat unfairly called "extremists" by Professor J. S. Moir,[33] were still without

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30. Globe, 9 July, 1850.

31. See the speeches reported in the Globe, July, 1850.

32. Walker, p. 98; Globe, 21 January, 1851, from the Mirror (n.d.); 17 July, 1851; North American, 17 July, 1851.

33. Moir, p. 147.

separate schools.

Despite the rebuffs, Cameron continued to seek French-Canadian Roman Catholic support. In June, 1851, J. C. Morrison introduced a bill to suspend payment to rectory incumbents and to abolish rectories. Cameron agreed that no new rectories should be established, but he contended that the existing ones should be left intact, and he wanted the respective churches to administer the payments. Although Cameron and Hincks disagreed over the type of committee to be formed to consider the matter, the latter agreed with Cameron's initial premises as did Baldwin and LaFontaine and their adherents.[34] Cameron also procured the desired select committee which consisted of himself, Baldwin, Morrison, John Wilson and James Smith. The committee formulated an act based on Cameron's principle, and it passed with minor opposition. There were additional problems in the legal aspect of the rectories and the bill was reserved while judicial advice was sought.[35] The bill received royal assent the following year. On this measure, Cameron had gained the French-Canadian Roman Catholic support that his party needed. More, the support of conservative Reformers from Upper Canada demonstrated that the Conservatives, although still disunited themselves, could hope to benefit

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34. Globe, 29 June 1851.

35. For an excellent summary of the rectories' problem, see J. S. Moir, Church and State in Canada West 1841-1857, Appendix VI, pp. 190-1. The major point here is Cameron's achievement in obtaining support.

from the disunion of the Reformers. Cameron's success, however, was confined to the occasion. No alliance was formed, nor had the prospects of finding wider common ground for it been significantly improved.

Cameron's task of seeking aid from the French Canadians was not made any easier by the actions of his fellow Conservatives and on occasion by his own. H. Sherwood, supported by W. H. Boulton, partly as a protest against being out of office and in part because the French Canadians held so much power, claimed that the union had failed. Late in the session of 1851, Sherwood, who had been promoting this idea since 1850, proposed a motion seeking a dissolution of the union and the establishment by convention of a union, which he described as neither federative nor legislative, of all the British North American colonies. This half-baked idea received little support except from radicals such as J. J. Boulton. W. H. Merritt's proposal for a legislative union suffered a similar fate. The bulk of the Conservatives were opposed to any change.[36] This subject would increase in importance as the sectional rift widened in the late 1850's and into the sixties. Another aspect was the desire for representation by population. The motions for 'rep by pop' were primarily protest motions, which were de-emphasized and then later retrieved and re-incorporated into the Conservative platform. During these sessions, the Conservative

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36. North American, 8 August, 1851.

party supported 'rep by pop' proposals.

The attempt to gain support had been fruitless. Perhaps it would never materialize, unless the Conservatives scuttled some of their principles or policies, but in a political atmosphere of changing complexity it did not appear to be an impossibility. Each situation would be taken on its merits, conditioned by the Conservatives' actions and the actions of the two groups of Reformers.

III A Lesson in Political Tactics

The Reformers particularly felt the strains of party fragmentation, which was encouraged by the growth of radicalism in Upper Canada during this period. Increasing these tensions were the religious problems of the reserves and separate schools which, compounded with the internal strife, prompted rumours of ministerial changes. The rumours occurred early in 1850[37] and again in the fall of the same year[38] and hinted at a Conservative-Bleu alignment. Was it possible that events might develop to make the rumours a reality? The rumours gained momentum during the lengthy session of 1851. It is necessary to study the Conservative-Reform-Radical relationship in order to establish the foundation of

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37. Globe, 5 February, 1850.

38. Careless, vol. I, p. 125 from the Globe, 8 October 1850.

the frequent rumours.

The Conservatives, who were in such a distinct minority in the Assembly, could offer only token resistence or attempt to take advantage of the Reform-Radical split. Conservatives might vote with the Grits on some issues but they could never become political partners for, as Cameron expressed it, the Grits had "...revolutionary, anarchical designs".[39] Nor could the Compact ever accept the Grits as social equals. On the other hand, in some instances, Cameron's views were similar to those of the more conservative elements within Reform ranks. It had been rumoured that Baldwin was about to offer Cameron a judgeship.[40] Could Baldwin make such an offer? His fellow Reformers would have had great difficulty in swallowing such a bitter pill, even though it would eliminate a strong opponent. The rumour does indicate the esteem in which Cameron was held by his fellow lawyers, but it is unlikely that he would have accepted the offer had it been made. To Cameron, the acceptance of such an offer would have limited his freedom of action, and it is quite likely that he preferred the life of a lawyer to that of a judge. Cameron gave qualified support to various judicial changes made by Baldwin and Blake, such as the improvement in 1850 of the Court of Chancery.[41]

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39. North American, 1 August, 1851.

40. Baldwin Papers, W. B. Richards to Baldwin, 5 January, 1850.

41. North American, 26 July, 1850.

The following year, W. L. Mackenzie's motion to abolish the Court of Chancery, which brought about Baldwin's resignation, was defeated but was supported by Cameron and the Conservatives. This action initiated queries as to Cameron's personal motives: "Is there any amongst the Tories who would wish to see the Court /of Chancery/ abolished./sic/ Is J. H. Cameron one or is the miserable truckler Sherwood another, no sir neither the one or /sic/ the other is sincere."[42] Cameron's support of Mackenzie's motion was qualified:

> he objected to the idea of abolishing the Court of Chancery without giving it a further trial. He was not prepared to support the motion unless the committee be empowered to report in such a way as to induce the government to appoint a commissioner to enquire into the propriety of giving equal jurisdiction to Courts of Common Law...He could not vote for a committee with instructions to report by bill, but he would support the motion if the words 'or otherwise' were added. The committee would then report by bill or otherwise as they might deem desirable.[43]

This speech indicates that Cameron did not consider his amended wording, which was accepted, as a pledge for the Assembly to abolish the Court: the purpose of the motion as he saw it was to seek an improvement of the Court. Thus the vote was consistent with his interpretation and his conscience. Cameron, however, either failed to realize that his modification did not change the intent of Mackenzie's

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42. P.A.C., J. Sandfield Macdonald Papers, vol. I, D. G. McIntyre to Macdonald, 1 July, 1851.

43. Globe, 28 June, 1851.

motion but only provided an alternative, or he was terribly naïve. In other legal matters, the North American, the Clear Grit organ edited by W. McDougall, attacked Cameron's excessive interest in law, especially when supported by Baldwin.[44] On tariff questions, "the Hinckses, MacNabs, and Hillyard Camerons" were bunched together as protectionists.[45] But Cameron was often held up for special treatment. The Grit mouthpiece acknowledged that he would be "an acquisition to a Ministry [the LaFontaine-Baldwin administration] which had lost its eloquence" for "he [was] a man of some talent".[46] Furthermore, the Grits felt that Cameron was attempting to be "a brightly coloured Liberal-Conservative... bound by predilection, interest and antecedents for the harbor [sic] of Baldwinism".[47] Intentionally or not, the Grit propaganda sheet, by pointing out the similar views held by the moderate Reformers and Conservatives, was gently nudging the two together. It was not to last.

In the atmosphere of political and ministerial flux of late July and early August, 1851, Hincks, who with Baldwin's blessing had succeeded to the leadership of the Upper Canadian Reformers, wanted to re-inforce his position. The Conservatives, too, wished to strengthen their position.

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44. North American, 18 June, 1850, 30 May, 1851.

45. Ibid., 2 May, 1851.

46. Ibid., 4 July, 1851.

47. Ibid.

To whom could either turn? Grit vituperation against the Reformers had characterized the past session and was continued during the early part of the 1851 session. Grits and Conservatives voted together on numerous occasions, but only as a political expedient to embarrass and possibly defeat the government. The Grits realized that the fruits of office might be offered them by Hincks. His approach to them was the opportunity to eliminate the possibility of a broad Conservative-moderate Reform-Bleu coalition. Hincks arranged a secret agreement with the Grits, and successfully reassimilated the recalcitrant Radicals into Reform ranks.

Cameron's hopes of a French-Canadian alliance, although so far unsuccessful, were still alive; and other Conservatives shared them.[48] The North American had mockingly chided the Conservatives on the "soft phrases /and/ respectful terms /which were/ applied to the French Party and Father Père",[49] and some time during mid-or late July the Conservatives put out feelers to the French Canadians.[50] Lord Elgin realized that the French Canadians and Conservatives might unite.[51] Cameron had demonstrated that they held identical views on church endowments and separate schools, and it was

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48. P.A.C., Brown Chamberlain Papers, J. Lowe to Brown Chamberlain, 1 August, 1851.

49. North American, 18 July, 1851.

50. Creighton, vol. I, p. 169; Careless, vol. I, p. 139.

51. Moir, p. 54, from the Elgin-Grey Papers, p. 623.

these similar ideologies which were proposed as the basis for an alliance. Probably the desire for economic progress was also included. There was another point of agreement: both detested the political ideas of the Grits. The suggestion must have been tempting to the French Canadians, but it would mean throwing over allies who had treated them well. A Conservative-Bleu alliance would probably require French Canadian disillusionment with Hincks.

Hincks, the epitome of the practical politician, was able to woo the French Canadian supporters until he got LaFontaine to hand over the leadership to A. N. Morin. The Conservative leaders, it seems, did not press as strongly as they might have for an alliance. Further, their proposed basis for an alliance was too narrow; they had to be willing to make more concessions and suggest other points on which agreement might have been reached. Cameron and the other Conservatives were not prepared to compromise sufficiently to attract the French Canadians. The French Canadians were achieving what the Conservatives offered as a basis for an alliance; they had nothing to gain from accepting Conservative overtures. Thus the appeals were unsuccessful. Throughout the balance of the session the Grits stopped their abusive attacks on the French Canadians. With LaFontaine's resignation in October, a Grit-Reform-Bleu combination was effected and the Hincks-Morin ministry was formed. The Conservatives had mishandled a political opportunity and were taught a lesson in political legerdemain.

The election which was due was called for December. It would test the strength of the newly formed ministry. The results proved to be interesting. In spite of the increasing support for more radical reform, the Conservatives increased their numerical strength. They held almost as many seats as the various shades of Reformers.[52] The radical Reformers increased in strength at the expense of the moderate Reformers, while within the Conservative party, the old Compact group diminished in size.[53]

Cameron, "a man of some sort of political prominence, thought it advisable not to come forward as a candidate at this election."[54] With the incorporation of Trinity College,

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52. Cornell, The Alignment of Political Groups in Canada 1841-1867, pp. 102-3, tables 10-11; The Conservatives won 20 seats, advanced and moderate Reformers, 19, independent Reformers, 2.

53. Careless, vol. I, p. 153; Creighton, p. 175.

54. North American, 12 December, 1851. Some confusion, which needs clarification, exists regarding Cameron's candidacy in this election. Professor Creighton, Macdonald, vol. I, pp. 175-6 claims that Cameron was defeated but gives no source for his information; neither does Creighton give the constituency in which he was defeated. C. B. Sissons, Egerton Ryerson: His Life and Letters, vol. II, p. 289 also mentions his defeat, and offers no documentation. Neither does W. J. S. Mood, The Orange Order in Canadian Politics: 1841-1867 (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Toronto, 1950), p. 80. This perpetuates the errors in J. Young's Public Men and Public Life in Canada: The Story of the Canadian Confederacy (Toronto, 1912), vol. I, p. 191, J. C. Dent's, The Last Forty Years (Toronto, 1881), vol. II, p. 253, and L. P. Turcotte, Canada Sous L'Union, p. 183, which claim he was defeated. All these, like Professor Creighton's work, offer no source for their information nor do they mention the riding in which he was defeated. Professor Moir, Church and State in Canada West 1841-1857, p. 64, somewhat carelessly lumps together Reform and Conservative adherents who were defeated or retired from politics, but makes no attempt to

the university question was settled to the satisfaction of the Anglicans. On other matters, Cameron may well have felt some disillusionment with politics. Cameron's unsuccessful requests for separate schools and his stand on the reserves had provoked a ridiculing attack on The Church's Darling Son [55] and a private apology from Bishop Strachan for the inadequate support he had given Cameron in the past session.[56] In view of the other Protestants' attitudes, it appeared that High Anglican demands for separate schools would always be thwarted. The reserves controversy was far from settled but for the time being was in a state of suspended animation. The Conservative party showed signs of coalescing around MacNab, the recognized leader, but the party was, as in the previous decade, still divided. The amalgam needed the skilful handiwork which John A. Macdonald

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54. (cont'd) distinguish between the defeated and retiring candidates. Baldwin, LaFontaine, Price, Notman, Cameron and George Sherwood are mentioned. Only Cameron and LaFontaine retired. W. R. Riddell, The Legal Profession in Upper Canada (Toronto, 1916), p. 121, footnote 6, states erroneously that Cameron was in the Assembly from 1846-1857. On the other hand, H. J. Morgan, Celebrated Canadians (Quebec, 1862), p. 775, W. Notman and Fennings Taylor, Portraits of British North Americans (Montreal, 1868), vol. III, p. 117, and W. J. Rattray, The Scot in British North America (Toronto 1881), vol. II, p. 362, claim he did not run. Professor Careless' Brown, vol. I, p. 153, does not mention him; neither does Professor Cornell in his Alignment of Political Groups in Canada, pp. 30-2, have Cameron listed as a candidate. A close scrutiny of the newspapers of the period failed to unearth Cameron's candidacy or his defeat. There is little doubt that he did not run.

55. North American, 2 July, 1850.

56. Cameron Papers, Strachan to Cameron, 27 December, 1851.

was later able to employ. The party might achieve greater unification now that H. Sherwood, the chronic intriguer, had suffered political defeat. In order to regain office, a complete re-alignment vis-à-vis other parties was still required. If this were to be with the French Canadians, as Draper and Cameron intended, it was clear that the issues of church and state on which Cameron had relied did not provide broad enough ground for an alliance. More interest had to be paid to French-Canadian demands, although to do so would strain the loyalty of some Conservatives. Sectional differences, if they did not yet paralyze the public life of the province, complicated and embittered provincial politics.

Cameron's business pressures had increased substantially and, as an alderman of Toronto, he was also interested in the growth of the city as the commercial, financial and industrial metropolis of the Canadas. Compounded with this was the pressure of family life: he was involved in assisting his brother Allan to get established in business,[57] and Cameron's immediate family had recently doubled.[58] It seems that his family took precedence over politics, especially as the parliamentary session was moving to Quebec City.

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57. Cameron Papers, Angus Cameron to Cameron, 25 May, 1844, 21 May, 1845, Cameron to Ellie, 2 November, 1869.

58. Cameron's first wife, Elizabeth, died in childbirth in 1844, leaving him a son, Hillyard Angus Henry. In 1849, Cameron married Ellen Mallet de Bernier, the twenty-year-old daughter of General Mallet of Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A. A year later she gave birth to their first child.

Although written nine years earlier, there is a letter to his future wife in which he expressed his attitude to marital life and politics:

> ...woman's love is often swallowed up by man's master passion ambition, and yet it is inexplicable to me why it should be so... why we, the lords of the world as we are proudly called, would give up home, with all the thousand stirring heartfelt memories attached to its name,...for political strife and discord, quarrels and contentions with those, with whom apart from political life, we might have lived on terms of intimacy...[59]

Cameron had been asked to enter politics; he had not sought political place. He had suffered abuse for upholding his beliefs, and he may have incurred the displeasure of the Toronto Compact Tories for his attitude towards Roman Catholics and French Canadians. He was probably disgusted with the thankless task of politics, of struggling and intriguing for power. Cameron resigned from politics to concentrate on his private life.

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59. Cameron Papers, Cameron to Lizzie, 8 September, 1842.

CHAPTER III

The Outs and Ins of Politics

I The Businessman in Local Politics

The era of railways, of economic boom had begun in the united province. The various municipalities in Upper Canada planned to take advantage of government aid in order to invest in railroads, bridges and canals which would be of benefit to the community. Toronto, in its struggle with Kingston and Hamilton in Upper Canada and with Montreal in Lower Canada, attempted to strengthen its position in relation to the other cities and as a potential metropolis by building railroads which, it was believed, would guarantee her position as the foremost city in Upper Canada and possibly in the united province. Toronto was geographically well situated and other transportation links to exploit the hinterland were needed to complement her excellent harbour facilities. Also, secondary industry might develop from Toronto's importance as a transhipment point.

Cameron, who had been an alderman of the city the previous year and was re-elected in 1852,[1] also had a personal interest in Toronto's growth. He had large land holdings in Toronto, (the present site of the T. Eaton Company on Yonge and Queen Street includes land which he had owned)

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1. He was also an alderman in 1845, 1847, 1854-5, 1857.

and in other parts of the province.[2] Buildings to accommodate the increasing population[3] and the number of establishments required to supply Toronto and its environs were constructed on his Toronto property. One can understand Cameron's desire to see the Ontario, Simcoe and Lake Huron or the Toronto and Guelph railway lines radiating from Toronto. The Toronto and Geulph line, of which Cameron was a director and stockholder, was amalgamated with the Grand Trunk as was the other line.[4] Similarly, the Northern and the Toronto, Grey and Bruce were also vigorously promoted. When the opening of the Great Western took place late in 1853, Cameron was present,[5] for he had more than a passing interest in the line. He was one of the company's solicitors and he had also invested money in the suspension bridge over the Niagara River which would link American trade with Toronto via the Great Western.[6]

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2. Cameron Papers, Cameron to Lizzie, 27 September, 1842; Angus Cameron to Cameron, 25 May, 1844. Street Papers, Cameron to T. C. Street, 10 January, 1849. Cameron was also purchasing land being sold for unpaid taxes.

3. D. C. Masters, The Rise of Toronto 1850-1890 (Toronto, 1947), p. 11. The population was over 30,000 in 1851 and three years later was approximately 40,000.

4. North American, 4 August, 1853.

5. Globe, 4 November, 1853.

6. Street Papers, MacNab to T. C. Street, 5 March, 1849; Cameron to Street, 18 March, 1849. At some time in Cameron's career he became a bondholder of the Great Western.

Political leanings were often forgotten in the mutual desire to realize material benefits from investments. Cameron, who helped found the Canada Mutual Insurance Company, the present Canada Life, in 1847 became one of its directors. He along with fellow Conservative W. Gooderham (of Gooderham and Worts fame) and J. McMurrich (a Reformer) were directors of the Provincial Mutual and General Insurance Company. Throughout his life, Cameron had a hand in almost all Canadian insurance companies.[7] He later displayed his economic nationalism when he proposed a bill to legislate against the ease with which foreign insurance companies could establish branch offices in the colony.[8] The lobbying of other companies' interests defeated his proposal. It was probably during this period that Cameron began to speculate in foreign bond and stock markets, because of the increased capital which flowed into Canada from the United States and, more particularly, from Great Britain.

Cameron's law practice was not neglected. His prominence as a lawyer did not diminish. He still went on circuit as well as appearing at the Toronto Assizes. His most publicized case in 1852 was the Smiley vs. McDougall libel and slander suit. Cameron, on behalf of R. Smiley, the editor of the Hamilton Gazette, prosecuted W. McDougall, the

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7. D. C. Masters, The Rise of Toronto: 1850-1890, p. 19; (other companies of which he later became a director were the Beaver Mutual & Fire Insurance Company, and the Edinburgh Assurance Company.)

8. Patriot, 3 April, 1855.

editor of the North American and also a lawyer. He had little difficulty in winning a verdict for his client.[9] Earlier, Cameron's proficiency as a lawyer was recognized by his appointment as Professor of Law at the newly founded Trinity College.[10] It was a position from which he could make good use of his knowledge of the practice of law and help to shape and mould the minds of the students.

Provincial politics was not completely forgotten. In 1853, W. H. Boulton, one of the two members for Toronto, did not have his property qualification upheld and was forced to resign his seat.[11] Cameron, who was suggested as a prospective candidate,[12] did not run; rather he supported the candidacy of H. Sherwood, in preference to Ogle R. Gowan, the other contestant for the vacancy.[13] Sherwood as "the least of evils" was returned.[14] The rejection of the

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9. North American, 8 June, 1852.

10. Cameron Papers, J. Strachan to Cameron, 27 December, 1851.

11. Candidates required a £500 sterling and property qualification.

12. Globe, 29 March, 1853.

13. Ibid., 26 April, 1853. C. B. Sissons, Egerton Ryerson: His Life and Letters (Toronto, 1947), vol. II, p. 289, claims that Cameron twice tried unsuccessfully to re-enter politics between 1851-54. Sissons offers no source for this information, nor does he mention the constituencies for which Cameron presented himself. Further, Sissons claims that Cameron was a leading Orangeman, but there is some dispute on this point (see below, Chapter IV, part I.) In the 1851 election, the two Orange candidates for Toronto had been W. H. Boulton and G. P. Ridout, (Globe, 4 November, 1851).

14. North American, 12 April 1853.

"talkative and theatrical Gowan",[15] with his blustering, bold manner and mercurial temperament, was not surprising. The Toronto Conservative leaders would have associated his characteristics with demagoguery, which would have made them antipathetic to Gowan. As the election demonstrated, the old guard Compact adherents and the new Compact followers represented by Cameron still wielded a good deal of influence in Toronto.

II Re-entering Provincial Politics

By 1854, the contentious issues of the previous sessions--clergy reserves, seignorial tenure and elective Legislative Council--were on the point of being resolved. An election had been called over these issues and Cameron, who was aware of the impending danger to the reserves and the possibility of increased radical influence in the Reform ministry, announced his candidacy for a Toronto seat. The election was contested primarily on the reserves and on the record of the "corruptionist" government led by Hincks. These questions were of especial interest to Toronto, as J. G. Bowes, the Mayor of Toronto, who with Hincks was involved in a transaction which became known as the "£10,000

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15. Creighton, p. 143.

job" because Hincks and Bowes supposedly made £5,000 each on the sale of Toronto railway stock, presented himself as a candidate. In Toronto the election was reminiscent of an earlier era in Canadian politics, when it had been common to find only Conservative candidates contesting the riding.[16] The electors had the difficult task of selecting their representatives on merit, ability, previous actions, standing in the community and the candidates' attitudes toward outstanding issues. Three other Conservatives contested the seat. The incumbents, G. P. Ridout and H. Sherwood, announced their decision to seek re-election. W. H. Boulton, who had been unseated in 1853, decided to run as a protest against the Conservative "convention" which had selected the candidates.[17] This action indicated the individualism of the Conservative candidates. The election was illustrative of the transition from individualism in politics, which was practised in the earlier decades of the century but now was on the wane. In what appeared to be a contradictory position, the candidates attempted in their election posters and speeches to stress individualism and freedom of action,

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16. Professor Sidney Wise, in a paper presented to the Ontario Historical Association, June, 1965, used Christopher Hagerman: First Member for Kingston as an example of such elections based primarily on local interests and individuals rather than contests between Reform and Conservative candidates and ideology. For Toronto, this was the last election to be contested exclusively by Conservative candidates.

17. It proved impossible to uncover sufficient information regarding the convention, its organizers, organization or the manner of selecting candidates.

while retaining a Conservative party affiliation. The number of Conservatives, ranging from "liberal" to old guard Compact men, demonstrated the incohesiveness of the Conservative party.[18] Further, the number of Conservative aspirants for the honour of representing Toronto was characteristic of the relative strength and weakness of the Conservatives and Reformers in Toronto. The Reformers also had internal problems: apart from the independence of such Reformers as the rising Reform leader, George Brown, the coalescence of radicals and moderates under Hincks in 1851 was proving unstable. In Toronto, the Reformers failed to select a candidate. Baldwin was approached, but he refused. So did an unknown, F. F. Whitmore, who was suggested.[19] The Conservatives had an open field.

The platforms of the several candidates contributed to their acceptance or rejection by the voters. All candidates favoured progress for Toronto but varied in their degree of emphasis. Cameron and Bowes were the special exponents of economic progress. The latter designated himself, in probably the first occasion of its use in an election, as "a progressive Conservative", who appealed as a businessman for

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18. There were other constituencies which offered only Conservative candidates (Carleton), or varying degrees of Conservatism (Brockville and Hastings North), or two Conservatives versus a Reformer (Kent, Leeds and Grenville North, Ontario North and possibly Russell). Cornell, The Alignment of Political Groups in the Canadas 1841-1867, p. 37.

19. Toronto Leader, 13 July, 1854.

"the right to represent Toronto rather than two gentlemen of the Legal Profession".[20] He sought "the voice of the businessmen, mechanics and labourers", because he wanted to represent the working classes and the trading and business community of Toronto.[21] Cameron also sought the support of these groups. He advocated a decrease in the assessment law, in order to allow the people to have more money, and he felt that mechanics, when prevented from working through illness, shouldn't be taxed.[22] Cameron also stated that he helped contribute to Toronto's growth, as he "made money in Toronto and he spent it there."[23] All candidates favoured Toronto as a seat of government if a permanent seat were to be established, but it was not in the forefront of the campaign issues. The most significant question was the clergy reserves. Sherwood, Bowes and Ridout favoured the satisfactory settlement of the reserves, but did not clarify how this was to occur.[24] On the other hand, Cameron opposed secularization, because he did not want the reserves funds "diverted to purely secular purposes" and he wanted it recognized that his church had rights.[25] Indirectly connected

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20. Leader, 5 July, 1854.

21. Ibid., 21 July, 1854; Globe, 13 July, 1854.

22. Leader, 20 July, 1854.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid., 5 July, 12 July, 20 July, 1854; North American, 26 July, 1854. Bowes voted against secularization.

25. Globe, 27 July, 1854.

with this was the separate school question. Sherwood and Ridout asked for a free hand to deal with issues as they arose.[26] Bowes appealed to Roman Catholic voters: he promised to support sectarian schools and to look after Roman Catholic demands.[27] Cameron appealed to both Protestants and Roman Catholics: "...Everyone should be allowed to have his sons educated in the religion he professed. He /Cameron/ could not see what justice there was in making a man pay for the education of those whose faith he did not believe in."[28] Cameron did not attack the French Canadians or the Roman Catholics, although attacks of this nature were not uncommon because of Bishop Charbonnel's demand for separate schools and the Upper Canadian cry of French-Canadian domination. Judging from the newspaper reports, it appears that Cameron and Bowes offered the fullest statements of their views to the electors.

The newspapers, too, attempted to use their influence in the election. The Mirror, the publication of the Roman Catholics, supported Bowes and Ridout, whom they termed a "liberal" Conservative.[29] The North American, although it had feared the prospects of an Orange-Roman Catholic alliance,[30] in a surprising move promoted a Sherwood-Ridout

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26. Leader, 20 July, 1854.
27. Globe, 13 July, 1854.
28. Leader, 20 July, 1854.
29. North American, 5 July, 1854 from the Mirror, (n.d.)
30. Ibid., 24 May, 1854.

ticket.[31] Brown's Globe, an independent Reform sheet which supported any opponents of the "corruptionist" ministry, advocated Sherwood and Cameron as the best of a poor crop of candidates.[32] The Leader, a moderate Reform paper, was uncommitted, but from its reports, it seemed to favour Bowes and Cameron.[33] After the first day's polling, it was apparent that the election was a battle between Cameron and Bowes; the second-day results confirmed their election, as both polled over 1,000 votes; Bowes was elected the senior member by fifty votes.[34] Old guard Compactism, personified by Sherwood and Boulton despite their attempts to appear in an enlightened guise, was rejected in favour of the modified Compactism exemplified by Cameron.

The electoral changes of 1853 may have had some effect upon the election results.[35] The situation changed somewhat as the moderate Reformers made the greatest gain proportionate to the increased size of the Assembly. The Grits and the Conservatives, although increasing numerically, decreased

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31. North American, 12 July, 1854.

32. Globe, 27 July, 1854.

33. See the Leader, June, July, 1854.

34. Leader, 31 July, 1854.

35. The changes were as follows: the number of seats in the Assembly increased from eighty-four to one hundred and thirty; the electoral boundaries changed and there was a redistribution of seats to accommodate the increased number of members.

proportionately to the increased representation.[36] As the results became known, there still existed some uncertainty as to the relative strength between the groups. The split within Reform ranks was now unmistakable; Hincks led one section, while the other fragment sought a leader from among Brown, Sandfield Macdonald, A. J. Ferguson and J. Hartman. Although the Conservatives were also split, MacNab was the recognized party leader and Macdonald, because of his ability and the lack of other Conservatives of ability in the Assembly, was acknowledged as MacNab's right-hand man.[37] The assistance of Gowan's Patriot and Brown Chamberlain's Montreal Gazette did not harm Macdonald's chances of ascendancy,[38] as long as he did not blatantly display his desire for leadership. If the Conservatives could retain this semblance of unity, they might be able so to manipulate the situation as to project themselves into office.

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36. The following expresses the percentage of seats to the nearest per cent:

		Moderate Reform	Grits	Conservative
1851	%	21	30	49
1854		39	22	39

Percentages computed from figures in Cornell, pp. 103-5, tables 11, 12, 13. One seat, Oxford South, was vacant (1854).

37. Careless, vol. I, p. 157; North American, 7 April, 1853.

38. Creighton, p. 177.

III Cameron and a Coalition Government

The ministerial difficulties which had brought on the election still existed and would only be clarified when the Assembly met. The increased number of moderate ministerial supporters from Upper Canada suggested a re-alignment of parties. In May and June, 1853, rumours of the occurrence of such an event abounded.[39] The re-alignment might consist of Reformers and Grits if Hincks were willing to try to re-assimilate the seceding Reformers. A suggestion had been made of a Tory-Brown agreement[40] and it was also rumoured that MacNab, Sandfield Macdonald and Brown were meeting to discuss a coalition.[41] Brown had proposed a union of all liberals--Reform, French Canadian and Conservative.[42] Further, as in 1851, the possibility of a Conservative-Hincksite-Bleu combination could not be discounted.[43] The major question was what would the re-alignment be?

The session got under way on September 5. Three days later the government had resigned, having been unable to secure the election of their candidate for the Speakership,

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39. Careless, vol. I, pp. 179-80; Globe, 13, 14 May, 1853, 18 June, 1853; North American, 19 April, 1853, from the Huron Signal, (n.d.)

40. North American, 9 March, 1854.

41. Leader, 25 August, 1854.

42. Careless, vol. I, p. 183, from the Globe, 14 May, 1854.

43. Ibid., p. 184, and North American, 2 February, 1854.

G. E. Cartier, and having suffered two other minor defeats. Lord Elgin then called on MacNab to form a ministry. While it appeared to Brown and some Conservatives that a new ministry would consist of Brown's adherents, the Rouges of Lower Canada and the "advanced Conservatives" led by John A. Macdonald,[44] it was not surprising that MacNab sounded out the Morin-Bleu group. This was the alliance mooted in 1850, in 1851, early in 1853 and again early in 1854. The price of Bleu co-operation had been clearly stated. In June 1854, Cartier stipulated: "If the Upper Canadian Conservatives desire to form a coalition with us liberals, they must give up many of their principles."[45] In order to gain French-Canadian support, the Conservatives would have to agree to a resolution of the seigneurial tenure question, offer support for Roman Catholic separate schools, and probably accept an elective Legislative Council. With the exception of the clergy reserves and the elective upper chamber, these were all "principles" not too difficult to swallow for the sake of office. In order firmly to entrench themselves in power the Conservatives, however, might also require the support of fellow Upper Canadians. As the behind-the-scene dealings unfolded, MacNab approached Hincks for support.[46]

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44. Creighton, p. 207, from the Montreal Gazette, 7 September, 1854.

45. A. D. Decelles, George Etienne Cartier, Makers of Canada Series (London and Toronto, 1926), vol. V, p. 33, 26 June, 1854.

46. Sir Francis Hincks, Reminiscences of His Public Life, p. 330.

It became apparent that the Conservative-Hincksite-Bleu coalition so much dreaded by the radical Reformers would be formed. Hincks repeated the French-Canadian demands for entering the ministry; he also stipulated that ex-ministerialists from Upper Canada form part of the new Council.[47] This agreed to, the Conservatives were back in power;[48] MacNab had succeeded in forming the new coalition[49] much to the consternation of the Montreal Gazette and of Brown.

Cameron, it seems, did not take part in the negotiations nor was he included in the new Council. His stand on the clergy reserves and the elective Legislative Council made this an impossibility and these factors would have made him unacceptable to the Hincksites. Also, Cameron was returning to politics after an absence of three years and there were others such as Macdonald who had prior claim. Further, it is possible that Macdonald would never have accepted Cameron's inclusion as a minister of the Crown. Professor Creighton suggests that Cameron was "dangerous to the French Canadian alliance, because he represented the old

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47. Hincks, Reminiscences, p. 335.

48. The Lower Canadian section of the ministry remained intact; J. Ross as Speaker of the Legislative Council and R. Spence as Postmaster General represented the Hincksites in the Upper Canadian section of the ministry. MacNab as President of the Council, Macdonald as Attorney General and Cayley as Inspector General constituted the Conservative element in the ministry.

49. Creighton, vol. I, p. 207. Professor Creighton claims that this was all the work of Macdonald and gives little, if any, credit to MacNab for his handling of the situation.

tradition of concern for Upper Canada Protestantism and Upper Canada sectional interests."[50] This contention seems unlikely. Cameron was at one with the French Canadians on separate schools, although he would have accepted greater support for Anglican separate schools. It was unlikely that many Upper Canada Protestants would support this. Also, the French Canadians did agree that the clergy reserves should be retained by the church, or at least that the solution should be satisfactory to the church.

Despite being outside the ministry, Cameron offered the coalition his "generous and cordial support."[51] He defended MacNab, who was not in the House, against the attacks hurled at the party leader for his actions in forming the government.[52] Cameron thought that "the present administration was the best for the country."[53] Some Reformers hopefully predicted that the new ministry "would not last a month",[54] and Cameron, who realized the difficult position of the government, felt he could not leave the session because of the political uncertainty of the situation.[55] There

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50. Creighton, p. 213.

51. Globe, 16 September, 1854.

52. Ibid., 11 September, 1854.

53. North American, 27 September, 1854.

54. J. S. Macdonald Papers, vol. II, A. M. Mackenzie to Macdonald, 12 September, 1854; D. L. McIntyre to Macdonald, 24 September, 1854.

55. Cameron Papers, Cameron to Ellie, 11 November 1854. Undoubtedly he meant the reserves, seigneurial tenure and the opposition to the coalition government. By November 10 he had already recognized that "the principle of secularization had been confirmed." Globe, 10 November, 1854.

were, however, some differences between the ministry and Cameron. He informed the administration of his opposition to an elective Legislative Council and to secularization of the reserves.[56] Cameron believed that the reserves were an open question for Conservatives, although fellow Conservative, E. Murney angrily repudiated the caucus decision and wanted the government to take no action on the reserves.[57] The Attorney General West was given the task of finding a solution that would molify Cameron and other High Anglicans and reserve supporters as well as the secularizationists.

On October 17, Macdonald introduced his Clergy Reserves Bill, which was a compromise.[58] The commutation clause was attacked by the Reformers, and Cameron and other High Anglicans defended the church lands. There were, however, some differences among the High Anglicans. E. Murney, W. F. Powell, J. Gamble and W. B. Robinson offered more angered than able arguments rejecting secularization. Cameron, who had earlier twitted the "Reformers /who/ would be lost without a battle cry" if the reserves were secularized,[59] rose

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56. North American, 20 September, 1854.

57. Ibid., 20, 27 September, 1854.

58. The bill left an adequate compensation for the church and clergy. The stipends were paid until the incumbent died, or the amount could be commuted and invested. The balance remaining would form a municipalities fund distributed to the municipalities on a per capita basis.

59. Globe, 23 September, 1854.

to speak. He had waited till the end of the debate, probably gathering ammunition, looking for weaknesses in the government's arguments, and feeling the pulse of the Assembly on the question. Using arguments employed in the past, he presented his usual lucid, extremely well-reasoned and legally-oriented defense of the reserves. Cartier had earlier remarked that he did not see any analogy between the Roman Catholic church land situation in Lower Canada and the reserves in Upper Canada.[60] Cameron either failed to realize or ignored the fact that the clergy reserves settlement was a quid pro quo for seigneurial tenure, agreed to by the coalition ministry. He entreated the French-Canadian Roman Catholics for support, "hop/ing/ that there are gentleman /sic/ from Lower Canada who can vote with me" and he went on to warn them of the fate their lands might suffer at the hands of Grits or from other legislation if the bill passed.[61] He also offered his support to the French Canadians if such an eventuality occurred. Cameron's appeal to the French Canadians was repudiated by W. F. Powell who noted: "The French Canadians had been frequently appealed to by the learned member for Toronto /Mr. Cameron who/ had stated that the next attack would be on Lower Canada church property but he would not join that attack, but he /Mr. Powell/ would

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60. Globe, 3 November, 1854.

61. Ibid., 10 November, 1854.

acknowledge the member for Lambton's /Brown's/ leadership" in attacking Lower Canadian church lands.[62] Cameron had introduced an amendment to restrict the application of the Act to lands still unsold and, even in this instance, the people would decide whether or not the money from lands sold would be applied to the church.[63] This idea of a form of referendum was not novel to Cameron, who had earlier expressed a desire to see this employed.[64] Nevertheless, "Sweet Hilliard /sic/" who because of his debating skill had fallen heir to Draper's nickname,[65] was unsuccessful in gaining support; his amendment was easily defeated. Cameron was not present for the second and final divisions.[66] He probably realized that it was best to work within the framework of the law with Bishop Strachan in order to salvage as much as possible from the Act.[67]

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62. Globe, 24 November, 1854.

63. Journals 1854, p. 268.

64. When the Toronto Council was unable to decide to build the Ontario, Simcoe and Lake Huron Railway, (Patriot, 23 December, 1851) he suggested a referendum, and in a similar situation on the building of the esplanade and granting the contract to Gzowski and Company (Patriot, 10 July, 1855) and again on Confederation. The referendum, it seems, was acceptable to Cameron because it would not change the constitutional basis of the government. The author is convinced that Cameron did not fully realize what a referendum could do other than solve a problem.

65. J. S. Macdonald Papers, vol. II, A. M. Mackenzie to Macdonald, 10 November, 1854.

66. Journals 1854-5, p. 385.

67. Moir, p. 80, and P.A.C., John Strachan Letterbooks 1854-62, p. 65, J. Toronto to Cameron, 30 March, 1855.

The seigneurial tenure problem was also marked out for solution. Unlike a good number of Conservatives, Cameron, as early as 1850, had favoured finding an answer to this difficulty.[68] He still felt that the relationship of censitaires to seigneurs should be placed on a different footing.[69] The proposed Tenure Bill had serious implications for the residents of Upper Canada, because the money to compensate the seigneurs would come from the combined provincial fund. As the Upper Canadians would gain no benefit, the Reformers strenuously opposed the bill, although some such as Brown did favour a final settlement with Lower Canadian funds.[70] The bill passed, but some of the Toronto electors wanted Bowes and Cameron to explain the tax implications of the bill for Upper Canadians.[71] The solution of 1859 was intended to be final, but in the 1860's minor revisions of the indemnity occurred.

Cameron in the sessions of 1854 and 1855 had recorded both opposition and support of the coalition government. His actions perhaps demonstrated his alocfness from the administration, yet he supported and defended the coalition ministry against the attacks of the Reform opposition. The next session was to make it clear that even Conservative ministers could expect his support only when they agreed

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68. Journals 1850, p. 96 and Turcotte, Part II, p. 160.

69. Globe, 23 September, 1854.

70. Careless, vol. I, pp. 198-9.

71. Globe, 7 December, 1854, letter to editor.

with him.

IV The Elective Principle and Sectionalism

In order to strengthen the ministry, the Lower Canadian section was reconstructed. E. P. Taché became the new leader and George E. Cartier, who was soon to become a prominent figure in Canadian politics, was appointed to the Executive Council. The revamped ministry met the session which reconvened on February 23, 1855. Meanwhile, the North American had failed to initiate a split in Conservative ranks when it claimed that the Chief Justiceship of the Court of Common Pleas was "a scrub race between the first legal adviser of the Crown and John Hillyard Cameron", that the incumbent was being pressed unsuccessfully to resign and that Macdonald was annoyed because the lawyers favoured Cameron.[72] It had also hinted at a re-alignment of "Toryism, Grand Trunk speculation and Priestcraft" which was supposed to occur.[73] The administration still had some work ahead of it.

The demand for an elective Legislative Council had increased. Early in the session, J. Cauchon introduced an elective Legislative Council Bill similar to that introduced

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72. North American, 13 December, 1854.

73. Ibid., 31 January, 1855.

by A. N. Morin in 1854. Some of Cameron's Conservative colleagues favoured an elective Legislative Council because sufficiently high property qualifications might eliminate some Reform aspirants from the Council.[74] Cameron opposed the proposed bill because of its probable unworkability. He felt that with two elected Houses, both would have equal power. In the event of differences between the two elected bodies, who would have the final say? Would both Houses or one be dissolved when the administration's policy was opposed?[75] It might be the Gordian knot of Canadian politics and Canadian politics was difficult enough without including more problems. Further, Cameron opposed the bill because it smacked of Americanization and republicanism. The adoption of an elective Upper House was contrary to British constitutional practice; to accept it could introduce the dreaded "elective paraphernalia of the United States and /then/ every semblance of the British Constitution would be swept away."[76] To accept the bill might set a precedent which would result in elected judges; it might even result in an elected Governor General! Cameron's arguments were ones which even Macdonald had accepted in the past.[77] The latter's

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74. Creighton, p. 181.

75. North American, 4 June, 1850; Patriot, 3 April, 1855.

76. Patriot, 3 April, 1855.

77. Creighton, p. 181. Elgin-Grey Papers, vol. I, p. 282, Elgin to Grey, 6 June, 1850.

rather lame defence that it would be "a court of revision" indicated the luke-warm support which he offered,[78] and which he was to throw over at Confederation. Cameron had not changed his mind since he had first voiced his opposition to the elective Legislative Council in 1850. He was in unique company; he along with George Brown were among the nine who voted against the bill.[79] The bill passed only to be thrown out by the Legislative Council. Cameron repeated similar arguments in 1856 when the bill finally became law.

Late in May most of the Upper Canadian representatives, aware that the session would soon end, and thinking that no major legislation would be presented so late in the session, had left for home. In an unexpected move, on May 22, Macdonald introduced into the Assembly E. P. Taché's Separate School Bill to permit greater facility for instituting separate schools. It was passed, although the majority of the Upper Canadian members present opposed the bill. How would Cameron have voted on the bill? He did favour separate schools in principle, but his sense of fair play must have been jarred by the timing and manner in which the bill was introduced and thrust through the House. Quite likely, he would have opposed it. Had he supported the bill, he would have been cheered by his Roman Catholic constituents

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78. Patriot, 3 April, 1855.

79. Journals 1854-5, Part II, p. 1095.

and jeered by outraged Protestant constituents. The timing, which saw him returning to Toronto from the seat of government, saved him some embarrassment.

The passing of the Act triggered a violent reaction in Upper Canada. Being a measure imposed on the upper province by Lower Canadian votes, it re-activated the 'rep by pop' demands amid cries of French-Canadian domination. Demands for dissolution of the union were also heard.[80] As in 1853, over the Gavazzi riots,[81] suggestions were made of banding together in a Protestant Union to protect against Roman Catholic aggression.[82] Did the High Anglicans consider themselves a part of this front? Perhaps, but not much later, Bishop Strachan, who fluctuated between threatening and cajoling the Roman Catholics, was suggesting a union of Roman Catholics and High Anglicans, in order to repeal the secularization of the reserves.[83] He had also favoured a union between the two for Anglican separate schools. While the secularization of the reserves was law and therefore accepted by Cameron, the secularization of all education was not and he would have agreed with John Toronto. In so far as Taché's Act further diminished the possibility of Roman Catholic support for Anglican separate schools, Cameron

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80. Patriot, 29 June, 1855.

81. Globe, 13 June, 1853, 10 October, 1853.

82. Patriot, 29 June, 1855.

83. Leader, 27 January, 1856.

must have deplored the result as well as the tactics of its passage. Cauchon's Legislative Council Bill had no doubt increased his aloofness from the ministry, yet the coalition had so far fulfilled its function rather well. Cameron took no public part in the reaction to Taché's Act, nor in the increasingly explicit sectional dissatisfaction to which that reaction contributed.

CHAPTER IV

A Question of Leadership

I Cameron's Political Ideas

The Taché Separate School Bill had serious repercussions for the Conservative party. Whereas the Grit Reformers could unite against the bill, the Conservative-centred coalition might splinter. Perhaps the Grits could wheedle and embarrass moderate Reformers away from the coalition and into supporting them. It was also possible that Conservative reactionaries might be prompted to reject their newly-found allies, which would destroy the coalition and damage the Conservative party. For Cameron the difficulties that might arise could give an opportunity to express his political ideology and to demonstrate his position within the Conservative party.

The popular clamour that arose prompted rumours of ministerial changes.[1] The supposed changes would see Macdonald replace MacNab, and then Cameron replace Macdonald. In 1854, Ogle R. Gowan, Macdonald's political cohort, offered this opinion regarding Cameron and Macdonald: "I don't think you will be likely to give way to [J.J] H. C. What service has he done the party, or what claim upon it to pass

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1. P.A.C., Sir John A. Macdonald Papers, vol. 336. A. Gillespie to Macdonald, 15 January, 1856; also the Globe, Patriot, Leader and Colonist for January, 1856 and Toronto Mirror, 8 June, 1855.

over the Attorney-General./sic/"[2] Macdonald may have had a grudging respect for Cameron and perhaps a personal jealousy which dated back to Cameron's rapid projection into a position of influence. It was Cameron who in 1847 had been offered the post of Attorney-General West and virtual leader of the Conservative party, although Macdonald was his senior in politics. Macdonald had belittled Cameron's abilities, perhaps in an attempt to make himself look more attractive. At the same time he questioned Cameron's sincerity in returning to politics.[3] It seems that the Attorney-General West preferred to keep Hillyard Cameron in his place--in the Conservative party, but secondary to Macdonald in the scheme of things.

What credentials of Cameron's merited his name being suggested as a successor to MacNab or Macdonald? Cameron was one of the Assembly's ablest debaters. He was a highly successful lawyer with excellent business and social connections. His friends included the Conservative millionaire from Niagara, T. C. Street, MacNab, the Robinsons, the Boultons and others of the Family Compact coterie, especially from Toronto. He was influential in the Church of England, as a member of St. George the Martyr and as a trustee and

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2. Sir John A. Macdonald Papers, vol. 336. Gowan to Macdonald, 13 December, 1854.

3. Creighton, p. 212, note 15, from J. Pope, Memoirs of the Rt. Honourable Sir John Alexander Macdonald, vol. I, Macdonald to Captain James Strachan, 9 February, 1854.

solicitor for the Diocese of Toronto. Even Strachan had acknowledged that Cameron's work on the clergy reserves commutation made him "the Master Spirit of the whole business".[4] And Cameron had connections with Toronto commercial interests and individuals. His wealth, which was accumulating rapidly during this boom period, allowed him to patronize the Colonist, one of the three Toronto dailies and a ministerialist paper. Moreover, the seat of government was returning to Toronto, the location of Cameron's potential strength.

This background and the rumours of ministerial change were sufficient for the Patriot and Leader, Orange and Hincksite ministerialist organs respectively, to begin a violent smear campaign directed against Cameron. Perhaps there were reasons other than Cameron's position in the community and his background for the attack. Was it a calculated move on the part of the Hincksites to warn Cameron that they would have no part of him as leader of a coalition government? Was it a diversion, designed to cover the behind-the-scene discussions regarding the ousting of MacNab? Perhaps it was a scheme to try to show Cameron as "a designing intriguer"[5] and thus arouse sympathy for Macdonald.

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4. Cameron Papers, Bishop Strachan to Cameron, 7 March 1855.

5. Leader, 9 January, 1856, 12 January, 1856, and Patriot, 16 January, 1856. For some reason James Beaty, the owner of these papers, opposed Cameron. Only in the 1858 election (see Chapter V, part II) did Beaty support Cameron, and then reluctantly. Also Gowan, who edited the Patriot, was a staunch Macdonald supporter and Cameron, it seems, did not place his relationship with Gowan on a basis of friendship.

Possibly its object was the degradation of Cameron to the status of a politician and not a statesman,[6] so as to undermine any potential support he might gain. It seems that it was a combination of all these factors which prompted the attack. At any rate, the government did need his support and the campaign eased off, to recur sporadically throughout the session which began in February.

Did Cameron in fact seek the leadership of the party? He had taken a prominent role in the past session. Also, there were some High Anglicans who were dissatisfied with their inability to get separate schools, and this dissatisfaction would have been increased by the passing of the Taché Bill. Perhaps some means might be found to have their demands acceded to, but someone was needed to direct their activities. In view of Cameron's capabilities, it was natural that they would turn to him. Could he or would he offer that leadership? On February 20, 1856, it was reported that twelve Conservatives closeted together in Cameron's office with the purpose of forming a separate party.[7] This allegation was quickly repudiated by Cameron. The next day in the House he explained that the meeting discussed the Conservatives' educational policies, and he then went on to record his support of the government, a statement which was

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6. Leader, 16 January, 1856.

7. Ibid., 20 February, 1856. The group was supposed to include E. Larwill, E. Murney, J. Gamble, W. F. Powell, W. McCann, A. Yielding and W. B. Robinson.

greeted with cheers.[8]

Professor Creighton suggests that Cameron "was dangerous to Liberal-Conservatism and the French alliance, because he represented the old tradition of concern for Upper Canadian Protestantism and Upper Canadian sectional interests."[9] Professor Careless, by implication, clarifies Cameron's Protestantism as being Anglican state-church Protestantism,[10] which was only a portion of Upper Canadian Protestantism. Cameron's High Anglicanism was not an Upper Canadian sectional interest. While it is possible to associate Upper Canadian sectionalism with Anglicanism in the 1820's and 1830's, by the late 1840's and certainly in the 1850's this was not the case. The Anglican church was splitting into High and Low factions and Cameron only represented the former group. The Low section was led by Bishop Cronyn, who attacked the Puseyism and Romanism of the High church.[11] The differences between the two factions required constant patching, especially during the 1850's. The peak period of division was between 1857 and 1863, when a schism occurred with the establishment in 1863 of Huron College in London by the Low Anglicans. It must be clear, from Cameron's overtures to LaFontaine in 1850 and 1851, that his High Anglicanism was

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8. Leader, 22 February, 23 February, 1856.

9. Creighton, p. 213; Careless, vol. I, p. 219.

10. Careless, vol. I, p. 215.

11. Moir, Church and State in Canada West, 1841-1867, pp. 4-5.

not a danger to the French-Canadian alliance.

It seems that his religious beliefs were a greater danger to an alliance with moderate Reformers, who opposed any semblance of the state-churchism which the High Anglicans favoured. Cameron was willing to reciprocate Roman Catholic support for the fulfilment of religious aims. This was indicated by his actions in the Assembly. Cameron opposed the initial proposal to incorporate St. Michael's College, but he seconded and supported the amended version which became law.[12] A bill to incorporate the Sisters of St. Joseph was also introduced by Cameron and he staved off Brown's attempt to give it a three months' hoist.[13] This action merited the thanks of the Mirror and the Roman Catholic community.[14] Conversely, he was furiously denounced by a fellow Protestant and an influential Orangeman, John Holland,[15] for not being a good enough Protestant.[16] Despite the attack, Cameron introduced a bill to incorporate the Sisters of Saint Mary's. He also advised the Assembly that "the Catholics were the best friends of the Anglican church in this section of the

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12. Journals 1854-5, Part II, pp. 836, 842. Cameron's initial opposition was directed against the land being given to the Bishop rather than to the College.

13. Patriot, 21 April, 1855.

14. Mirror, 8 June, 1855.

15. W. J. S. Mood, The Orange Order in Canadian Politics 1841-1867, p. 134.

16. Colonist, 15 February, 1856, John Holland's letter to the Colonist, (n.d.)

province.[17] Cameron then informed the House that he would look after the needs of his Roman Catholic constituents.[18]

Cameron's connection with the Orange Order, it is true, may have been a danger to the French-Canadian alliance. Orangeism was despised and feared by the French Canadians and Roman Catholics, although orange and green could on occasion work together.[19] What was Cameron's position? He had in the early 1850's appeared sympathetic to the Order.[20] On January 31, 1855, speaking to a gathering of Orangemen, he admitted that "he was not an Orangeman" and he went on to admonish them for their lack of support: "he could never ascertain why it was that the Orangemen of this country did not look upon him with more favour. He hoped that in the future Orangemen would look upon him with more kindness and that if he should offer himself as a candidate at another election that they would be inclined to give him 'a shove in rather than a shove out'."[21] In 1856 Cameron, probably after

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17. Colonist, 22 February, 1856.

18. Ibid., 26 February, 1856.

19. In the elections of 1836 and 1844 they had supported 'loyal' candidates. In 1851, Roman Catholics had supported the repeal of the Party Processions Act and both orange and green were strongly antagonistic towards the Grits. The Orange leaders, it seems, were willing to acquiesce in Roman Catholic demands if they were not too extreme, in return for Catholic support which would maintain the Conservatives in power.

20. W. J. S. Mood, pp. 73, 77.

21. Patriot, 31 January, 1855.

a good deal of introspection, joined the Order.[22] This, in itself, would be a minor problem, as most of the leading Conservatives of Upper Canada were members. However, it was Cameron who introduced the Orange Order Incorporation Bill to have the Order recognized as a benevolent institution. Yet, following his understanding of a politician's responsibility, he agreed to Cartier's request to drop the Bill and support L. T. Drummond's Ecclesiastical Corporation Act, which would allow the Orange Order incorporation along with Roman Catholic institutions.[23] It was action such as this which confused and perplexed Cameron's supporters and opponents. The rabid Orangemen would not have condoned

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22. P. Bull, From the Boyne to the Brampton (Toronto, 1936), p. 168. W. J. S. Mood, p. 113, accepts this date but he automatically designates Cameron as the spokesman for the Order in the Assembly because he introduced a bill to have the Order incorporated. Professor Creighton, p. 213, claims Cameron was "a growing force in the Orange Association" in 1854. Professor Careless, vol. I, p. 215, places the date at which Cameron was "a rising power in the Orange Order as 1856. Violet Nelson, The Orange Order in Canadian Life, (unpublished M.A. thesis, Queen's, 1950), p. 87, assumes that Cameron was an Orangeman in 1847 when he became Solicitor General, (she forgets he received the appointment in 1846) and on p. 103 claims that Cameron was Grand Master in 1856 (she offers no sources for this information). This latter idea seems to be perpetuated by Professor Moir, p. 20, who states that Cameron's action in the session of 1856 "failed to gain his re-election as Grand Master" but also fails to offer a source for this statement. Because of the secrecy of the Order, it is difficult to establish precisely Cameron's date of entry as a member. It seems certain that, if he had become a member earlier than 1856, the Orangemen would have claimed him as of that date, because it would have increased their prestige. I was unable to get any replies from letters sent to Leslie H. Saunders, a past Grand Master of the Order.

23. Leader, 20 February, 1856.

such action; and as one exasperated Reformer commented: "we see /Cameron/ one day introducing Nunnery Bills, the next an Orange Bill & addressing Orange meetings."[24] To Cameron, the Ecclesiastical Incorporation Bill, which would include the incorporation of the Orange Order was, it seems, his interpretation of compromise.

This concern for both Roman Catholic and Orange constituents, while no doubt astute, was more than the result of a desire for their votes or of sympathy for some of their beliefs. It was a version of the Compact principle of looking after the needs of all the people, in no matter how patronizing a manner. Cameron's actions were not incompatible with his concept of a politician: "He considered it to be his duty as the representative of Catholics as well as Protestants to introduce a measure for the advantage of his Catholic constituents."[25] He elaborated upon his position as a politician:

> He had never solicited and never would solicit the votes to carry out some narrow views chalked out for him. /He believed/ his constituents elected him because he would serve them honestly and they would think none the less of him because he desired to do justice to every class of his constituents and held in respect opinions of prejudices opposed to his own.[26]

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24. J. S. Macdonald Papers, vol. II, A. M. Mackenzie to Macdonald, 11 April, 1856. Cameron's agreement on the Orange Order and Ecclesiastical Incorporation could have been interpreted as angling for support for his claims to leadership from diametrical sources but this seems unlikely.

25. Patriot, 25 April, 1855.

26. Ibid. (my underscore)

This speech and particularly the underscored sections indicates two cardinal principles of Cameron's political career: his perpetuation of Compact individualism or independence, and the responsibility to all constituents. He re-emphasized them in 1858:

> He liked a man to have a free and open exercise of his religion. He had his own views, and would not bate an iota to any man but he had always been ready to give justice to all classes irrespectively; and amongst his strongest friends his greatest difficulty had been that he had not known parties or creeds and had not been the representative of one body of men but of the whole of his constituents.[27]

The latter part of Cameron's statement indicates the reason for the picture of him painted by contemporaries who could not understand such action being followed by a politician. The adherence to this principle would cause Cameron a great deal of difficulty in 1858 and 1861 and again in 1863.[28] Cameron wanted to retain his independence; yet it seems that he did realize that his individualism had to be exercised from within the party structure, as he had supported the Conservative government whenever it was threatened with defeat. His individualism did not rule out being a reliable enough party follower, but it was only later in his career that the individualism became submerged in the party proper.

Further, I would suggest that the picture of Cameron as

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27. Toronto Daily Atlas, 16 August, 1858. (my underscore)

28. See Chapter V, part II for 1858; Chapter VI, part II for 1861 and Conclusion, part I for 1863.

a danger to the government and the French alliance because he represented Upper Canadian sectional interests also needs modification. It was a difficult task to support the Roman Catholics while being a threat to French Canadians, but this was the dilemma Cameron faced when he incorporated "rep by pop" into his election platform. In 1850 and 1851 he had, along with all the other Conservatives, supported "rep by pop". Cameron had mentioned it in his election advertisement of 1854, but not in his speeches. Why did Cameron espouse "rep by pop" and then offer tepid support? With the formation of the coalition government, he admitted that the alliance that occurred "between the Lower Canadian ministerialists and the Upper Canadian Conservatives was a natural one and one more likely to strengthen Conservatives' positions than any other that could have taken place".[29] His attitude did not appear to have changed, although he may have been shaken by the manner in which the Taché Bill was passed. Cameron did not support Brown's "rep by pop" proposal in 1855.[30] Neither did he vote for Mackenzie's motion to dissolve the union and adopt "rep by pop",[31] and he later voiced his objection to the dissolution of the union.[32] Perhaps his failure to support Mackenzie's proposal prompted

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29. Globe, 23 September, 1854.

30. Journals, 1854-5, part II, p. 1093. He may have been paired or abstained as he did vote against the elective Legislative Council proposal, p. 1095.

31. Ibid., p. 53.

32. See below Chapter V, part II.

the Globe to omit his name from its list of "rep by pop" supporters.[33] In 1856 and thereafter it was the radical Reformers who took up the cudgel of "rep by pop" in order to protect Upper Canada's sectional interests. When Brown moved that a census be taken for 1857 for the purpose of implementing legislative reform, Cameron opposed it.[34] He did on occasion support "rep by pop" proposals,[35] although his support was given to amendments to suggestions which he opposed such as the elective Legislative Council. Probably Cameron advocated legislative reform because he believed in it. He did favour some solution to the sectional discord, and it seems that he considered "rep by pop" was the solution but, at this stage, he appears to have been uncertain as to how or in what manner to apply it. Cameron did request that the government investigate the representation question and see what action could be taken to eliminate the antagonism aroused between the two sections of the province.[36] It appears to have been this antagonism that aroused his concern, not the interests of Canada West. He was not stigmatized as a staunch "rep by pop" advocate until 1861.

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33. Globe, 8 March, 1856.

34. Journals 1856, pp. 496-7.

35. Ibid., p. 193, and Leader, 15 March, 1856.

36. Patriot, 21 May, 1856.

II Implications of the Duval Charge

On March 7, 1856, Cameron, in a move that has been interpreted as the primary example of his threat to the MacNab-Taché government,[37] requested in the Assembly a copy of Judge Duval's charge to the jury in the Corrigan case. Judge Duval, a Roman Catholic French Canadian, had presided at the murder trial of Kelly and others vs. Edward Corrigan in Lower Canada. Corrigan, an Irish convert to Protestantism from Roman Catholicism, was beaten to death on his way home from St. Sylvester by Thomas Kelly and his cohorts, all Irish Roman Catholics. They were tried by an Irish and French-Canadian Roman Catholic jury and after an apparently irregular presentment by Judge Duval to the jury, they were acquitted. The decision aroused a violent reaction among Protestants of the colony especially Upper Canada.

Was the purpose of the motion to embarrass the Hincksites of the ministry who were attempting to oust MacNab? Was the request an attempt to disentangle the Conservatives

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37. Creighton, p. 231; Careless, vol. I, p. 219; W. J. S. Mood, pp. 122-3, claims "Cameron's campaign in the Corrigan case...heightened by the subsequent stand of Aikins [a Reformer], Cameron and W. B. Robinson against separate schools, so weakened the MacNab coalition ministry that it was forced (my underscore) to resign..." which is a rather superficial interpretation of the resignation. Aikins was always opposed to separate schools, W. B. Robinson fluctuated, and Cameron supported in principle separate schools for those who wanted them. If these three men brought about the resignation of the ministry, they had an overwhelming amount of political influence. Also, Cameron's "campaign" consisted of one speech in the Assembly.

from the French Canadians and to have Cameron replace Macdonald[38] or was Cameron's move directed at the French-Canadian Roman Catholics?[39] Perhaps it was a manoeuvre to help Cameron find his niche in the Conservative party. If it was a request for more information, why hadn't Cameron moved for a committee of enquiry, rather than a copy of the charge? Was Cameron reflecting the Upper Canadian bewilderment over the apparent perversion of the law? It may have been a combination of these factors, but Cameron's major public concern was with the legal aspects of the case: he mentioned the racial and religious features only to disclaim concern for them. He probably considered them to be no more than incidental to the whole case.

The newspapers, however, reflecting their own bias, interpreted Cameron's action in their own manner. The Leader and Patriot attacked Cameron's motives and claimed that he was either seeking Protestant support or had selfish aims. The Mirror, which had admitted that "if they /the defendants/ committed the crime, regardless of their religious beliefs, they had to be tried and convicted,"[41] deduced from the request that "Mr. Cameron has lately mounted the

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38. Careless, vol I, p. 219.

39. Creighton, p. 231.

40. See the Leader, 13, 14 March; Patriot, 26 March; Globe and Colonist for March, 1856 especially 10 March, 1856.

41. Mirror, 18 January, 1856.

same [no Popery] steed [with Brown and the others]."[42] The Globe, regardless of what Cameron's motives were, supported his action and Brown undoubtedly gloated over the embarrassment caused the government. The Colonist, too, supported Cameron and repudiated the charges that he was leading a Protestant front, or attacking the French Canadians or Roman Catholics. The most likely attack, it seems, if it was on anyone was on the competence of the judge who could present such a charge to a jury.

Cameron, the foremost criminal lawyer in Upper Canada, was concerned about the reports received regarding the case,[43] and in an eloquent argument made the following points. He felt it was necessary to clear up the doubts that had arisen because of the need for confidence in the law. The seriousness of the case and of the judge's charge lay in the fact that it could establish a precedent in court procedure. Further, Cameron claimed that it was illegal, because it was contrary to English and Canadian law and practice for a judge to instruct the jury that when a group killed a man, it was necessary to establish who actually struck the killing blow. Cameron, fully aware of the significance of his request, quoted English precedent for a copy of the charge or other information being presented and then went on to

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42. Ibid., 14 March, 1856. (my underscore)

43. J. C. Dent, The Last Forty Years, vol. II, p.334 "perhaps the ablest criminal lawyer ever known to the Canadian Bar." The following unless otherwise cited is from various newspaper reports of the Assembly debates, especially the Globe and Leader for March, 1856.

point out the restrictions that existed in requesting a copy of the charge and the possible infringement upon the independence of judges inherent in such a request. These latter statements were employed by Macdonald and Drummond in order to deny the Assembly's right to a copy of the charge. Cameron's motion was upheld by forty-eight to forty-four, the division being along sectional lines. Drummond, the Attorney-General Canada East, acknowledged that Cameron's request was motivated "from a laudable desire to see what was the true cause of this woeful failure of justice",[44] and he then asked that the motion be rescinded. In reply to Drummond, Cameron suggested to the members of the Assembly who had supported the motion for a copy of the judge's charge, that they should agree to Drummond's request.[45] Before it could be voted on, Sandfield Macdonald moved the previous question and Macdonald, the Attorney-General, in a virtuoso display of political agility and parliamentary footwork, announced the vote would be considered one of want of confidence. Apparently Cameron and his 'supporters' had held their caucus and decided that the government shouldn't consider the motion as a want of confidence.[46] Prior to the vote, Cameron again denied in the House a charge that he was intriguing against the government, and

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44. Patriot, 19 March, 1856.

45. Ibid.

46. Leader, 11 March, 1856.

when the division occurred, he supported the government.[47] His actions were not those of a man scheming to split the party and assume the party leadership.

The Duval episode renewed rumours of ministerial changes. The government coalition still faced internal difficulties: in particular, Hincksites reasserted their pressure on Macdonald to oust MacNab. The Mirror proposed a most fantastic array of ministerial timber ranging from Dr. J. Rolph, T. J. J. Loranger, J. Young, A. S. Dorion, J. Papin and Brown, to Sandfield Macdonald, all to be led by Cameron![48] It did, however, mention that wide differences existed between them. The Patriot suggested a ministry which Sandfield Macdonald or a relative unknown, J. Gould, would lead.[49] In conjunction with these rumours, the Leader's attacks on Cameron recurred, albeit sporadically. It was a question of who would succeed MacNab. It had been claimed that Cameron was not opposed to succeeding MacNab,[50]

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47. Journals 1856, p. 133. cf. W. J. S. Mood, p. 122, who forgets that Cameron supported the government. Also in an incorrect assessment of the situation states that "more Conservative Orangemen returned to the leader who had kept his head /Macdonald/ and as good Orangemen had abided faithfully by the British Constitution in maintaining the principle of the independence of judges". The government was supported not because of Macdonald's actions but because a lack of support would have presented the possibility of a Grit ministry replacing a Conservative government if defeated on a 'no confidence' motion.

48. Mirror, 14 March, 1856.

49. Patriot, 26 March, 1856.

50. J. C. Dent, p. 333.

and there were some who were supposed to favour such a move.[51] Macdonald, too, did not discourage the movement to replace MacNab with himself.[52]

In their aspirations for the leadership of the party it appears that Macdonald, who carried the bulk of the load for the Conservatives in the ministry, wanted the position far more than Cameron did. A good deal of prestige went with the government and party leadership. The post could have aided either's business interests. It could, however, be disastrous financially to become too entangled in politics, as W. H. Boulton's bankruptcy in 1850 had illustrated. Further, Cameron's financial success was already assured; he can hardly have been much impressed by the financial connections that would be attached to a ministerial position. Cameron probably was unwilling to give up the time which his thriving law practice, his successful business ventures and his family required. Another factor placed Cameron at a disadvantage if he sought the leadership: he was not a minister of the Crown. Moreover, he lacked the essential ingredient which might have projected him to political leadership of the Conservative party--a popular following inside and outside the House. His personal characteristics, his

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51. W. J. Rattray, The Scot in British North America, vol. II, p. 561; J. E. Collins, The Life and Times of the Rt. Honourable Sir John A. Macdonald, vol. I, p. 144 claims, "MacNab pressed for Cameron to succeed him," but he offers no source for his information.

52. Careless, vol. I, pp. 215-6; Leader, 19 April, 1856.

aloofness, his preference for books rather than people,[53] his self-esteem, his difficulty in making close friends easily, all weighed against him. Within the administration, the French Canadians might have accepted him, but it would have meant the rejection of Macdonald, from whom they had received yeoman service. It was unlikely that the Hincksites would accept Cameron, because of his stand on the clergy reserves and Anglican separate schools, and his connection with the Tory 'old guard'. On the other hand, Cameron could hardly swallow the platforms of the moderate Reformers, who had instigated the desecration of his church and were avowed opponents of Anglican separate schools. If Cameron couldn't accept the moderate Reformers, how could he ever hope to work in harness with such radicals as Brown, Mackenzie and Dorion, whom he had combated every step of the way on rectories, reserves commutation and the elective Upper House?[54] A political breakup and realignment with reshaped policies and ideas was necessary before Cameron could head a new party. No such thorough-going change was in progress; and the evidence that Cameron was interested in promoting it comes only from speculative newspapers reports. Between him and the Hincksites or moderate Reformers whose allegiance he would have had to attain there was disagreement

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53. Cameron Papers, Cameron to Lizzie, 8 September, 1842; Cameron to Ellie, 11 May, 1863.

54. Brown and Cameron opposed an elective Legislative Council.

on issues which he believed to involve principle. His position, as always, invited misconstruction. He proceeded to invite it further by withdrawing his support from the ministry against which he had not been intriguing.

III Opposing a Conservative Government

In April, the final act of MacNab's ousting was in progress. As late as April 9, Cameron still supported the administration and informed the House that he "did not think the conduct of the government was open to the censures of the honourable members for Lambton /George Brown/ and Glengary /Sandfield Macdonald/."[55] However, the strain was too much. On April 21, his British sense of fair play revolted because of the underhanded method being employed to oust the bed-ridden MacNab, Cameron informed the House that he would vote against the government when he disagreed with their motions.[56] Cameron's 'following' into independent opposition consisted of Edmund Murney, who was to resign his seat of Hastings North in the fall of 1856. Even Cameron's

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55. Patriot, 16 April, 1856. W. J. S. Mood, p. 122, claims that in late March "Cameron's phalanx" still existed but he fails to establish the following facts: a) who supported Cameron; b) who the "seven of the twelve" were who returned to supporting the government.

56. Leader, 23 April, 1856.

"faithful lieutenant", Gamble,[57] did not adhere to Cameron's coat-tails; he later went over to the Reformers.[58] If there had been a definite move under way to project Cameron into the position of leadership, it seems that more of his "caucus", with whom he had met in the past, would have moved in behind Cameron, or he might have tried to whip them into line if he sought the leadership. Yet neither of these things occurred. Perhaps the uncertainty of the whole episode, the position of the Conservatives and in particular of MacNab and Cameron prompted his action.

At any rate, he was now in opposition, but he did not lead a concerted attack on the government. When the irritating separate school question again arose in the Assembly, Cameron opposed R. Spence's motion to abolish them.[59] But he did feel that the Roman Catholics were getting privileges which were denied to Anglicans, and repeated his claim to parity. He now attempted a compromise that would achieve parity, not by giving Anglicans what Roman Catholics had, but by depriving Roman Catholics of what Anglicans had not. He introduced a motion to place education somewhere between a separate school and common school

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57. Creighton, p. 230; W. J. S. Mood, p. 122.

58. See Cornell, p. 107, table 15.

59. Leader, 7 May, 1856, cf. W. J. S. Mood, p. 118, who suggests that Cameron was opposed to separate schools. The separate school issue was so tension-packed that at 4 a. m. the Assembly only reluctantly consented to let the Speaker go to the washroom; the House adjourned at 6:10 a. m., (Patriot, 14 May, 1856.)

system. He suggested that the common school system be integrated with "one day's religious instruction /per week/... according to their respective creeds...under the superintendence of the clergy of the denomination to which they respectively belong;"[60] this might be an acceptable substitute for separate schools. It was defeated. This attempted compromise was a feeble tirade for a rebel.

Meanwhile, the ministerial crisis reached a climax. On Tuesday, May 20, the government was upheld on the choice of Quebec as the seat of government but was defeated in Upper Canada. The following day, the ministers of Upper Canada, with the exceptions of Cayley (who was soon convinced to follow suit) and of MacNab, invoked the principle of the "double majority"[61] and resigned. The timing, if specifically directed against Cameron, would have been superb. He was leaving for England via New York to look after his business interests early in the following week.[62] If he planned to stay and help MacNab, or if he was interested in the leadership, he would have to cancel his arrangements. It was unlikely that MacNab could reconstruct a ministry, as he would be unable to get any support from the Hincksites

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60. Patriot, 14 May, 1856.

61. The "double majority" was a principle first advanced by the French Canadians which became J. Sandfield Macdonald's hobby-horse as a solution to the sectional problem. The "double majority" in theory meant that the government would have the support of both sections of the province.

62. Toronto Daily Colonist, 28 May, 1856.

or French Canadians.[63] Despite rumours of ministerial realignment,[64] MacNab finally resigned.

A new ministry, led by Taché and Macdonald in Lower and Upper Canada respectively and excluding MacNab, was formed. In the House, which was not graced with the "new" ministers' presence, MacNab categorically denied the rumours that he and Cameron were planning to form a new government. There was no collusion on their part and he tabled Cameron's letter, which stated that he and MacNab had not been in close communication during the time of troubles.[65] Cameron did not change his travel plans; he was on his way to England, which seems strange for a man attempting to capture control of the Conservative party and the leadership of the government. There is no evidence that Cameron sought the leadership of the Conservatives or that he had any substantial support from his fellow Conservatives. Moreover, Cameron's political activity in the session of 1856 did not indicate an attempt to pursue the leadership of the party.

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63. Leader, 23 May, 1856; Patriot, 28 May, 1856.

64. Professor Careless, vol. I, p. 222, footnote 61, has raised sufficient doubt regarding the authenticity of Samuel Thompson's comments in his Reminiscences, p. 339, of Brown and MacNab scheming to form a ministry. Professor Careless mentions, but fails to emphasize sufficiently Thompson's "I think" which implies uncertainty; yet Thompson knew Cameron quite well, for he was patronizing the Colonist, Thompson's newspaper. Had it been Cameron at the meeting, it is certain that Thompson would have had no doubts.

65. Leader, 28 May, 1856.

CHAPTER V

The Price of Independence

I Rebel or Independent

Late in 1856, Cameron, who had missed the latter part of the session, returned to the Canadas from his business trip abroad. While out of the country, he continued to be attacked by the Patriot and by Gowan, who feared that Cameron's influence might increase if he became a director of the Grand Trunk.[1] During the past sitting the Leader had advocated reading him out of the party,[2] even though he still thought of himself as a Conservative. No action was taken on the Leader's suggestion, nor is it likely that it received serious consideration. The danger to the government from the independent Cameron, who had lost his lone 'tail', was simply from the uncertainty of his future actions. Would he attempt to siphon off Conservative coalition supporters and form a new party or would he consider joining with the radical Reformers? He would now have the opportunity to record his opinion of the Macdonald-led Upper Canadian ministry. It was unlikely that Cameron's anger with these men had cooled sufficiently for him to offer consistent support of the government; his position in relation to

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1. Patriot, 29 October, 1856.
2. Leader, 9 April, 1856.

the administration and opposition would be demonstrated when the Assembly met in February, 1857.

In Upper Canada some dissatisfaction was felt over the administration's appointment of Chief Justice Draper as the government's representative with little more authority than to discuss the fate of the Hudson's Bay Territories with the British government.[3] When the session got under way, Cameron expressed his reaction to the appointment. He agreed that if such an appointment was to be made, Draper was "the right man in the right place" and because of his ability "the people of this country...were entitled to his services".[4] Cameron questioned whether a judge should be appointed for a political task; might not such an appointment hinder the independence of judges? Would it not be difficult for a judge who had represented the ministry to adjudicate the issue if called upon? He admitted that the appointment was not unprecedented but stated that it was wrong because it was a negation of responsible government. He gave his interpretation of this vague but useful term in relation to Draper's appointment: "Surely the proper person to have gone to England on a mission of this nature would have been some one of the gentlemen who are charged with the Executive duties in this country and who would have been directly

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3. The Hudson's Bay Company's charter was coming up for renewal and there was a popular clamour in Upper Canada for the absorbtion of this territory into the united province. The agitation was led by George Brown and the Globe.

4. Globe, 28 February, 1857.

responsible to the House and the country."[5] This statement emphasized his belief in responsible government. The ministers were shirking their duty, individually and as a body, by placing the onus on an appointee who could not defend himself from political attack. In the present situation, Cameron believed that Draper, perhaps because of the lack of definite instructions, would bear the odium of any failure, while the government would take credit for any success which he might achieve. The ministers should shoulder the responsibility for their actions. Cameron had stated this interpretation in the past[6] and he was soon to express it again.

In March, the session reached a new height of political confusion over the choice of a permanent seat of government. Since its removal from Montreal after the fiasco of 1849, the capital had alternated between Toronto and Quebec City. In subsequent debates, regional and local interests were stressed and magnified in presenting arguments favouring various sites; and the debates on this question were characterized by divisions among the Upper Canadian members of the Assembly. They could not agree upon a choice from among locations such as Kingston, London, Hamilton, Ottawa and Toronto. Probably reflecting the jealousy of and antagonism towards the largest city of Upper Canada, they refused to support Toronto. The Lower Canadians' choice rested with

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5. Globe, 28 February, 1857.

6. North American, 28 May, 1850; Globe, July, 1854.

either Quebec City or Montreal. The inability to decide upon a permanent site prompted an exasperated Drummond in 1855 to request that any choice be made as long as a capital was named; this led Cameron to retort jocularly that Drummond would perhaps "favour the island of Anticosti...enjoying all the luxury and brilliance with which he.../would be/ surrounded".[7] In the session of 1856 Cameron proposed that the question be deferred until the estimates for the buildings of a permanent capital were prepared and submitted, which was agreed upon. Later the appropriations were presented and after much rancorous and petty debate a decision had been reached when the French-Canadian bloc supported Quebec City as the site of the future capital. This issue was serious enough to be used, ostensibly, as the cause of the resignations of Macdonald et al in May, even though the ministry considered the choice of the seat of government an open question. The Legislative Council, however, rejected the estimates, which returned the problem of a permanent capital to the Assembly.

The ministry still faced salvos from the Upper Canadian members. As a representative and resident of Toronto, Cameron was one of the major proponents of his home town, if a permanent capital had to be established. Indeed, in 1856, the municipal corporation had given him permission to press Toronto's claims to the honour while he was in England,[8]

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7. Patriot, 30 March, 1855.

8. Globe, 6 August, 1858.

but his lobbying had been unsuccessful. Cameron opposed the suggestions of Ottawa or Quebec City because he did not believe they would ever possess population commensurate with the importance of a capital.[9]

Macdonald, in an adroit political move, decided to ask the monarch to perform the difficult task of selecting the capital of the Canadas. Cameron denounced the government's action. He charged them with attempting to evade ministerial responsibility and declared that they might exert an influence which they feared to acknowledge.[10] Macdonald, who "jovially twitted" Cameron's apparent conversion to responsible government,[11] was attempting to place the government on the offensive rather than defend it against Cameron's charge, which rung true. Furthermore, Cameron had offered an interpretation of responsible government in 1846 when he first entered politics which had the same tenor as this contention.[12] He offered, as an alternative, an argument which should have received greater consideration. In view of the existing sectionalism, might not the two sections of the province benefit from the continual interchange brought about by an alternating capital? Perhaps it would be worth the additional expense of an ambulating capital to try to

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9. Globe, 19 March, 1857.

10. Creighton, p. 249, from the Globe, 20 March, 1857.

11. Creighton, p. 249.

12. See above Chapter I, part IV.

develop a better relationship between the two sections of the province. The perambulating parliament, despite its faults, had not precipitated the sectional strife; in time the discord might be minimized and possibly erased by the continued alternations. Conversely, the attempt to decide upon a permanent site could promote dissension. He then proposed an amendment to perpetuate the existing system because of the "present feeling of the people of Canada, differing as they do in language and religion."[13] His motion demonstrated his awareness of the difficulties existing in the Canadas and his compromise proposal attempted to satisfy both peoples. It was defeated thirty-three to eighty.[14] Although Cameron's proposal was based on sound theory, the alternating capital had not, in its brief tenure, alleviated the differences between the two sections of the province. The government's policy was upheld; it would be the Queen's choice.

Throughout the balance of the sitting, Cameron fluctuated between supporting the government[15] against Grit proposals such as the attempt to change British constitutional practice and in opposing it as demonstrated above. He had supported the tariff increases of 1856 and aid to the Grand Trunk; however, when the latter came up for additional aid in 1857, he qualified his support because of the sum being

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13. Globe, 21 March, 1857.

14. Ibid.

15. Journals 1857, pp. 232, 514-6, 623-4; Globe, 11 March, 1857, 21 April, 1857.

expended and because he felt that shareholders should abstain from voting for government assistance.[16] During the session it seems there was no attempt by Cameron to woo Conservatives away from the government. Although occasionally voting with the radical Reformers, he apparently made no attempt to work in concert with them.

II The Depression of 1857

In the fall of 1857, the Canadas experienced the force of an international depression. The crop failures of 1857 in the province, the over-speculation in land and over-spending on railroads proved disastrous. Compounded with these was the failure of the New York and London exchanges upon which the colony depended so greatly for investment. This restricted the amount of real money in circulation in the Canadas. The depression affected many in Upper Canada: Brown felt its effects,[17] as did the Mayor of Toronto, who resigned in order to devote his efforts to repaying his creditors.[18] Cameron's financial position was shattered; he

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16. Journals 1857, pp. 311-16.
17. Careless, vol. I, p. 241.
18. Colonist, 3 November, 1857. (John Hutchison)

lost approximately £100,000.[19] His speculative ventures were wiped out, as the New York and London stock brokers went bankrupt and, in an attempt to save themselves, sold his securities at fantastic losses.[20] His paper securities were gone and he was forced to turn over some of his land holdings to his creditors. Other Toronto possessions were mortgaged to the Anglican Church Society for £30,163 and from the same group he borrowed an additional £10,000, with other land holdings and business investments held as security.[21] He promised to make restitution by repaying "twenty shillings on the pound".[22] His overwhelming repayment scheme consisted of £320 per month to the Church Society and £1,100 quarterly to the Commercial Bank.[23] To help meet these oppressive payments he still received rent from his remaining possessions and other monies from investments which he held.[24] Battling vainly against being swamped by debt, Cameron was forced to concentrate on his law practice;

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19. S. Thompson, Reminiscences, p. 339. This would have been in excess of $500,000.

20. Strachan, Pamphlets (Toronto, n.d.), p. 13.

21. Ibid., pp. 13-14, 16; Professor Moir, Church and State in Canada West 1841-1867, p. 80, claims "Cameron was unable to account for the money /from the Clergy Reserves Fund/" but in Strachan, Pamphlets, p. 23, Cameron was exonerated twice on charges of mismanagement of funds laid against him and others by W. H. Boulton.

22. Creighton, p. 259.

23. Strachan, Pamphlets, p. 17. It should be pointed out that this was what he was repaying in 1865. It seems safe to assume that the payments had not increased since 1857; rather it is likely they remained the same or decreased.

24. Ibid., p. 16.

these pressing matters took precedence over his political career.

Meanwhile, with the resignation of Taché, the coalition government was re-vamped under the leadership of Macdonald and Cartier. The administration faced an election based, in Upper Canada, on the sectional issues of race and religion. In Toronto the election campaign displayed a degree of lethargy, probably the result of the effects of the depression. In contrast to the 1854 election, the Reformers successfully presented a candidate--George Brown--while the Conservatives offered only two candidates.[22] Cameron was not one of them; his financial position prescribed his decision. He did not run, but he did hint that some time in the future he might return to politics.[23]

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22. They were J. B. Robinson Jr. and W. H. Boulton. J. G. Bowes had presented himself for re-election but withdrew in favour of Robinson.

23. Leader, 2 December, 1857; W. J. S. Mood, p. 132 incorrectly claims that "John Hillyard Cameron was returned for Victoria." John Cameron was returned for this riding, but it was not the same person as the subject of this thesis. Throughout the period from 1857 till the 1861 election, in Chapters IX and X, Mood confuses the two names and men and consequently is led to erroneous conclusions regarding John Hillyard Cameron. (see especially pp. 139, 147, 186.)

III Election Problems of an Independent

By the summer of 1858 Cameron's financial situation was unchanged: arrangements had been made to meet the obligations to his creditors and he diligently toiled to alleviate the burden of debt; politics he could read about. In July, he was approached to run for the Legislative Council but he refused.[24] The political scene, however, did attract interest. The Macdonald-Cartier ministry resigned when defeated on the choice of Ottawa as the provincial capital, and was replaced by the Brown-Dorion administration. It in turn was defeated after a two-day reign and resigned, to be replaced by the Cartier-Macdonald government, which saved its members from facing re-election by implementing the famous "double shuffle".[25] Brown, upon accepting a ministerial position, had been forced to seek re-election in Toronto. Brown thought he might be returned unopposed,[26] and Conservative ministerialists had difficulty

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24. Globe, 6 August, 1858.

25. The Cartier-Macdonald administration consisted of the same members as the Macdonald-Cartier ministry, with the addition of George Sherwood and A. T. Galt. They invoked the Independence of Parliament Act of 1857, which allowed a minister to be appointed to another executive position within a month of resigning his previous office and not having to face re-election. The use of this act was of special interest to Cameron. He had in the past introduced bills of a similar nature; and the act in force was a modification of a bill he had introduced in 1857.

26. Globe, 3 August, 1858.

in selecting an opponent who might unseat him. Cameron was offered another opportunity to return to the political arena. He was reluctant to re-enter politics,[27] but the persistence of the government and of his local supporters bore fruit; by August 6 he had agreed to contest the seat.[28]

The by-election was not only a contest between Brown and Cameron, but a struggle between Conservative and Reform party organizations. Further, the election was used as a sounding board for Conservative and Reform platforms and for the candidates' opinions on the various issues facing the united province. Charge and counter-charge were hurled with abandon. The campaign demonstrated again Cameron's perplexing position of attempting to accept the concept of political "parties", yet expressing his own ideas.

Brown was taken aback by Cameron's decision to run and expressed his disapproval in the Globe: "The people of Toronto know full well that Mr. Cameron has approved of Mr. Brown's course, that he /Cameron/ co-operated with him /Brown/ on most subjects in parliament for two years and took no active part against him in the last election."[29] Brown was attempting to put Cameron in the worst possible light by falsely claiming that they had been political allies; Cameron's personal problems had not allowed him to

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27. Globe, 3, 4, 6 August, 1858; Colonist, 10 August, 1858.

28. Globe, 6 August, 1858.

29. Ibid.

take part in the general election of 1857-8. Had he done so, it seems unlikely that he would have supported Brown. The Globe denounced Cameron as "the tool of the dishonest /Macdonald-Cayley/ clique".[30] Cameron answered the charges of dishonesty by admitting that election irregularities had been committed in the last election, but he explained that they were under investigation and he hoped that a means of eliminating fraudulent elections might be devised.[31] He then turned to the offensive, rebuking Brown for having included in the Canada East ministry Drummond and Lemieux, two men whom Brown formerly had labelled as "corruptionists".[32] Further, Brown's complaint that the Governor-General should have granted him a dissolution for the brief Reform ministry was unfounded: Sir Edmund Head had been constitutionally correct in refusing a dissolution to Brown. The leader of the "two-day" ministry had been informed that this might occur before accepting office.[33] Cameron also explained his position as a quasi-ministerialist: he would support a Conservative government, but he could be an independent if he disagreed with its legislation.[34] As to the new ministry

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30. Globe, 6 August, 1858.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Colonist, 14 August, 1858.
34. Ibid., 11 August, 1858.

led by Cartier, Cameron stated that "he would give the Government a fair trial."[35] Cameron favoured the Conservative protection policy which he had supported in the past; he believed protection would encourage native industry and promote trade, and would stimulate the economic growth of the Canadas. Conversely, Brown contended that protection would hinder Canada's economy and attacked it as a threat to the agricultural interests. The choice of the seat of government was also debated. Both candidates named Toronto as the logical site. Cameron, however, was willing to display his loyalty and accept the Queen's choice--Ottawa.[36] To oppose it was disloyal. Brown repudiated the choice; Toronto should be the new capital. Further, Brown was also on record as opposing Ottawa because "it was inhabited by a particular class of Her Majesty's subjects", by which the Mirror assumed that he meant Roman Catholics.[37] Cameron attempted to utilize the Compact device which had been employed to advantage in the past of stamping Brown with the disloyalty label because of his opposition to the Queen's choice. The red herring had little effect on this occasion.

Both candidates offered "rep by pop" as their solution to the sectional discord, but there was a difference.

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35. Atlas, 11 August, 1858; Globe, 11 August, 1858.

36. Globe, 10 August, 1858.

37. Mirror, 13 August, 1858.

Cameron proposed "rep by pop" within the federal union suggested by A. T. Galt.[38] He opposed the theoretical and unworkable "double majority" and he expressed his opinion on dissolution: "/when in 1857/ Mr. Mackenzie made a motion to dissolve the Union, Mr. Brown voted for it--I say that was a wrong vote...He /Cameron/ supposed /that those who favoured dissolution/...were batchelors /sic/ who had not got married like Upper Canada had to Lower Canada."[39] Brown reproached Cameron for his stand on "rep by pop", on federal union and on dissolution of the union, and he charged that:

> /Cameron/ is willing that Upper Canada shall remain in a position of inferiority to Lower Canada, until the far distant Colonies of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia can be incorporated with this Province. Is it thus that Mr. Cameron meets the demand of Upper Canada for justice? Is he prepared to remain in a state of vassalage for so many years?"[40]

It was Brown who wanted to be the standard bearer of Upper Canadian sectionalism.

Like sectional difficulties, the religious question never seemed to be absent, and it played a significant role in the election. Brown, the avowed opponent of separate schools and Roman Catholics, attempted to dress himself in the uncomfortable and unfamiliar garb of a defender of

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38. Globe, 10 August, 1858.

39. Ibid., 6 August, 1858.

40. Ibid., 10 August, 1858.

Roman Catholics. Cameron was revolted by Brown's duplicity, In the heat of the last election Brown had vehemently attacked the "Romish priestcraft" and all their demands.[41] Cameron pointed out that Brown hoped "his decent silence now will make them forget his years of violent abuse."[42] On August 6 the Mirror, which at this point was antagonistic to both candidates, advised its co-religionists that "if the contest...is to be between John Hillyard Cameron and Mr. Brown, it will be the duty of every Catholic who respects himself or his religion to stay at home and let the bigots fight it out."[43] Two weeks earlier the Mirror had expressed shocked amazement at Brown's "conversion" and solemnly warned fellow Roman Catholics that to expect Brown to change his attitude towards the Catholic religion, one "might as well expect a leopard to change his spots."[44] Also, during the election it warned the Catholic community to turn a deaf ear to the blandishments of McGee, who was supporting Brown. By the last week of the campaign, the newspaper had finally swung in behind Cameron[45] because of "his intention not only to maintain the rights and privileges of the separate schools,

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41. Leader, 3 December, 1857; Colonist, 2 December, 1857; Globe, 21 December, 1857; Atlas, 16 August, 1858, from the Globe (n.d.)

42. Atlas, 16 August, 1858.

43. Mirror, 6 August, 1858; underscore in the original.

44. Ibid., 23 July, 1858.

45. Ibid., see copies for 20 to 27 August, 1858.

but he declares every denomination of Christians should be allowed the right to have them," and "in this contest stands pledged to every legislative measure which will be for our benefit. The Catholic, therefore, who votes for him will vote for obtaining or maintaining any positive good which we can draw at present from the confused heap of Provincial politics."[46] However, not all Roman Catholics followed this suggestion. John Elmsley, a leading Roman Catholic in the community, proposed that the Catholic electors should abstain from recording their votes. In a letter of August 16 to the newspapers, Elmsley, after acknowledging that Cameron was "a gentleman in thought, word and deed, an accomplished scholar, a brilliant orator, an able statesman and jurisconsult", admitted that he "has advocated and supported measures in Parliament which Catholics much desired to be enacted"; but Brutus-like, Elmsley feared Cameron more for what he might do than for what he had done.[47] Two days later an English Catholic wrote to the Leader and the Mirror to refute Elmsley's arguments and used Elmsley's admissions of Cameron's activities as reasons for supporting the candidate. The writer went on to point out the difficult position that "a Protestant gentleman, a member of the Legislature for Upper Canada who has been serviceable in

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46. Mirror, 27 August, 1858.

47. Ibid., 17 August, 1858; Leader, 17 August, 1858, J. Elmsley to the Catholic electors of the city of Toronto.

obtaining Parliamentary enactments much desired by Catholics--has done no very easy or agreeable or popular legislative work [from the standpoint of Upper Canadian Protestantism] and Catholics methinks should not lightly esteem such a one."[48] The Catholic community, which apparently included eighteen hundred electors,[49] was split in its support of the candidates.[50]

Just as the Roman Catholics were divided, so too were the Orangemen. While Brown relied on McGee, his "Man Friday", to woo Roman Catholic support[51] with the cry that Catholics need fear Orangemen rather than Reformers, he also had working for him the Grand Secretary of the Orange Order, John Holland. He had successfully assisted Brown in the 1857 election and now attacked Cameron's leniency towards Catholic demands.[52] Holland appealed to the rank-and-file Orangemen and played upon their fears of further Roman Catholic encroachment. Some lodges openly advised their Orange brethren to support Brown.[53] Gowan, the former Orange leader, late in

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48. Mirror, 20 August, 1850; Leader, 20 August, 1858, an English Catholic to the editor, 19 August, 1858.

49. Mirror, 6 August, 1858.

50. Ibid., 13 August, 1858. The Freeman, a Catholic newspaper, supported Brown. The Catholic Tribune supported Cameron.

51. Ibid., 20 August, 1858.

52. W. J. S. Mood, p. 134; see also above Chapter IV, part I.

53. Mirror, 13 August, 1858, W. F. Newton Orange Lodge #338 to fellow Orangemen.

the campaign sent a missive to all Orangemen advising them to support Cameron or face expulsion from the Order.[54] This action, which occurred only a few days before polling day, probably had little effect in swinging wavering Orange supporters over to Cameron.

On August 18, nine days before polling began, Cameron, in a letter to his wife, offered a graphic commentary on the campaign:

> I have been going on very well with my canvass and my friends seem as certain of success as Mr. Brown's. For myself, I am not at all sanguine about it, although I feel that I have been gaining ground every day, but the constituency is so large, between 5,000 & 6,000 votes, that it will be impossible to prognosticate the results in this contest, when the parties are so equally balanced, without the assistance of the poll book and I think the first day's polling will tell the tale.
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> I had another successful meeting in St. John's ward last night and as that ward and the ward of St. James are Brown's strongholds, I am devoting most of /my/ time & attention personally to them. The Roman Catholics had a large meeting last night, but I believe it terminated in a row, and that the proceedings were rather favourable to me than otherwise, although the Globe of course puts the best color on it in favour of Brown.[55]

This letter, especially the underscored sections of it, indicate a perceptive and realistic appraisal of the situation.

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54. Globe, 26 August, 1858; Leader, 27 August, 1858.

55. Cameron Papers, Cameron to Ellie, (n.d.), my underscore. From the internal contents and the date of the meetings, the date of the letter is definitely 18 August, 1858.

Cameron realized that the by-election was fraught with difficulties and he displayed a characteristic of a good politician: to attempt to crack the position of an opponent's strength. He did, however, underestimate the persuasive power of McGee, for he still hoped the Catholic voters might support him.

Professor Careless claims that "the ministerial press in the city backed Cameron warmly."[56] With the campaign almost one week old, the Leader on August 11 admitted that it had no confidence in either candidate.[57] The 'conversion' of the Leader proceeded slowly: by the last two weeks of the campaign it supported Cameron, but it seems to have accepted him only as the least of evils. On the other hand, the Atlas, a ministerialist organ recently founded to present the government's views, supported Cameron throughout the contest,[58] as did the Colonist. Professor Careless also states that "the Leader and the Colonist rode the 'High Protestant horse' during the election".[59] This may have been the case; but Cameron was scoffed at by the Globe because he admitted, as he did throughout the campaign, that some arrangements might be made with the French Canadians and

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56. Careless, vol. I, p. 282, from the Leader, 11 August, 1858; Weekly Colonist, 13 August, 1858.

57. Leader, 11 August, 1858.

58. See the Atlas, August, 1858. This paper ceased publication at the end of 1858.

59. Careless, vol. I, p. 282.

Roman Catholics.[60] The "no popery effusions" of the ministerial press, like the support of W. H. Boulton, a Conservative Orangeman,[61] were probably more harmful than beneficial to Cameron and his moderate stand. Moreover, no ministerialist came to speak on Cameron's behalf.

Cameron was unable to cope with the election machinery of the Reform organization which had contributed to Brown's return in 1857. Brown, perhaps fearful of Cameron's debating skill, held separate meetings;[62] this seems to have been detrimental to Cameron's campaign. The Reform leader apparently followed a fellow Reformer's advice to

> neglect..no precaution, have good and true men at the polls who will be ready to stand up for their rights, no flinching for the least flinching will ruin all, keep in mind your meeting at the St. Lawrence hall /Cameron had moved into the meeting and bested Brown in this encounter/, let your men be prepared to face men or devils..., don't let the enemy take possession of polls but maintain your rights tho' heads are scattered on the green.[63]

On the first day's polling, Cameron had a deficit of one hundred and seventy-four votes, and had made little dent in the St. John's-St. James stronghold; he led in only two of

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60. Globe, 6 August, 1858.

61. W. J. S. Mood, pp. 186-7; Mr. Mood claims that Boulton supported Cameron, which may have been the case; but the kind of support he offered is questionable, for shortly afterwards Boulton laid the first of his two charges against Cameron for mismanagement of church funds.

62. Mirror, 20 August, 1858. Brown issued tickets to Catholics to attend his meetings.

63. P.A.C., George Brown Papers, vol. II 1854-1858, A. Thibado to Brown, 9 August, 1858.

the seven wards.[64] A factor contributing to this situation was his moderate attitude towards the French Canadians and Roman Catholics, which must have alienated some of the Compact 'old guard' as well as the rabid Orangemen who supported Brown. Cameron did have some Orange support, but it was insufficient to turn the tide.[65] Also, McGee's advice to his co-religionists did not go unheeded.[66] The Holland-McGee combination, drawing support from diametrically opposite sources, was extremely effective. On the second day's polling, Cameron mustered his forces, but was able to cut Brown's lead by only twenty-four votes. Brown was re-elected.

Cameron had paid the price of political independence and his political future appeared cloudy. Would he be content to be a successful lawyer, attempting to regain his business stature and liquidate his debts? Whereas he had been returned by a wide majority, he now went down to defeat to a Reformer. However, it had not been an ignominous defeat; Brown, the Reform leader, had found it necessary to exert a maximum effort to defeat his opponent. Cameron's political career had not necessarily ended.

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64. Globe, 28 August, 1858.

65. V. Nelson, pp. 110-111; Mood, pp. 136-7.

66. F. A. Walker, Catholic Education and Politics in Upper Canada, pp. 231, 233, 243.

CHAPTER VI

Recovery and Return

I A Personal Revival

Cameron's public and political resuscitation proceeded rather quickly after the depression. He handled the Crown cases in 1858 and 1859 at the Toronto Assizes. When a test case, dubbed the "State Trials", was made of the "double shuffle", the three ministers charged, Macdonald, Sydney Smith and Philip Vankougnet, retained Cameron to defend them. More than a year earlier when Cameron, in a scintillating defence, had won an acquital for Brown in the Workman vs. Brown libel suit,[1] Brown had offered eulogies to Cameron's capabilities.[2] The Globe's attitude towards Cameron for his defence of the men responsible for the defeat of the Reform ministry was in marked contrast to its praise in the spring of 1857. When the test case began on November 19, 1858, and throughout the lengthy trial, Brown attempted to belittle Cameron's tightly-knit legal arguments. It was to no avail; in a sparkling display of legal agility before Chief Justice Draper and Judge Richards Cameron "shone for the defence"[3] in winning a verdict on

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1. Dr. Workman was the Superintendent of Asylums who was dismissed because of mismanagement. He charged that the Globe's expose had led to his dismissal.

2. Globe, 23, 24, 25 April, 1857.

3. Careless, vol. I, p. 289.

behalf of his clients. Indeed, his arguments were reiterated by the Chief Justice in handing down a decision on behalf of the defendants.[4]

The government's decision to retain Cameron to lead the defence in the "double shuffle" lawsuit and for handling Crown cases, as well as being a tribute to Cameron's legal ability may have been an attempt to win over the former independent Conservative. His return to the party had been suggested in the recent by-election and by giving him government work, Macdonald probably hoped to increase the dispatch with which he would return. Whatever the case, in Cameron's present financial plight, the fee was most welcome.

Other significant events contributed to Cameron's return to prominence. In 1859, he became President of the Provincial Insurance Company[5] and he was elected as Treasurer of the Law Society of Upper Canada, the highest position of the society.[6] The same year, when the Orangemen were electing a new Grand Master of British North America, Cameron's name was suggested as a compromise candidate, in

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4. It is interesting to note that Judge W. B. Richards, a former Reformer, indicated that he too agreed with the legality of the "double shuffle" (see Globe, 23 November, 1858), whereas Professor Careless, vol. I, p. 289, implies that the "political judges (all good Conservatives...)" and especially Draper, the foster father of Macdonald and Cameron, were responsible for the decision.

5. D. C. Masters, The Rise of Toronto, 1850-1891, p. 72.

6. Information received by telephone from the Chief Librarian of the Law Society of Upper Canada, June 14, 1965.

an attempt to unite the Benjaminite and Gowanite factions of the Order, because he was not closely associated with either group.[7] Cameron decided to accept the office. This presented him with a perplexing difficulty, which would be an acute test of his skill: could he continue his moderate policies towards Roman Catholics and French Canadians from such a position?

In the summer of 1860 the visit of the youthful Prince of Wales presented Cameron with his first test. Aware that the Order was outlawed in England, Cameron corresponded with the Duke of Newcastle, who accompanied the Prince, in order to gather information regarding the limitations placed on the Orange effusions of loyalty. The Grand Master was instructed that Orange petitions, insignia or ribbons could not be presented to the Prince.[8] Although Cameron felt that the Duke's decision was tampering with responsible government, he advised the lodges to adhere to Newcastle's dictum.[9]

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7. P. Bull, From the Boyne to the Brampton, p. 175. The Orange Order in 1853 underwent a split, the two factions being led by George Benjamin and Gowan, both former Orange Grand Masters. The sections had not completely re-assimilated by 1859. An attempt by the author to gather information about this election from Leslie H. Saunders, a former Grand Master and writer for the Order, proved fruitless.

8. The Duke contended that since the body was outlawed in England, the Prince should not receive anything from the Order which might be construed as tacit acceptance of the Society. However, the Society was legal in the British North American colonies which made Newcastle's logic untenable.

9. Globe, 8 October, 1860.

However, some Orangemen and other Protestants[10] believed that since the Order was legal and the Prince had visited and thus tacitly acknowledged Roman Catholic institutions, he should receive a "loyal Orange welcome" when he visited Upper Canada. Cameron's advice to his fellow Orangemen to follow the Duke's wishes went unheeded.[11] Disturbances occurred in Belleville and in Kingston, where Orangemen paid no attention to Cameron's telegram to take down the Orange arch and banners.[12] As a result, the Prince did not grace these places with his presence.

It was feared that a similar occurrence would develop in Toronto, the home of zealous Orangeism. Cameron had to act quickly to dispel any thoughts of causing trouble. A meeting was held on September 7, and there Cameron counselled moderation. He explained that although he disagreed with the Duke's advice and actions, the Grand Master threatened to resign unless the Orangemen did not follow the Duke's wishes.[13] The threat appears to have carried some weight. Only two minor incidents, which saw the Royal entourage re-routed because of a hastily erected Orange Arch, and the Prince's flight through the vestry of St. James

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10. Creighton, p. 302; see also the Globe and Leader for September, 1860, especially 10, 13, 14, 18 September, 1860.

11. Leader, 4 August, 1860.

12. Ibid., The Globe and Hamilton Spectator accused Cameron of not using enough influence to put down the disturbances.

13. Ibid., 8 September, 1860.

Cathedral because of an Orange banner over the entrance, marred an otherwise enthusiastic reception for the Royal visit. Cameron's influence seems to have been responsible for the moderation shown by the Toronto Orangemen and their Orange brethren throughout the balance of the Royal tour.

For Cameron and his wife, one of the most unforgettable and pleasant interludes of the Royal tour was the levée for the Prince sponsored by the Law Society of Upper Canada. A spectator at the affair would have observed Cameron and his wife share the spotlight with the Prince. Cameron, sitting at the head table with the Prince and other notables, proposed a toast to the Prince and made him an honourary member of the Law Society. One would also have noted Ellen Cameron, the attractive thirty-year old wife of the Treasurer, being escorted from the head table by the Prince for the first dance and again having the honour of dancing the last dance with him, while Cameron beamed with pleasure.[14]

The Duke's actions, however, were condemned by Protestants, Orange and non-Orange alike. The Orangemen, anxious to erase Newcastle's slight and to emphasize their loyalty to the Queen, authorized Cameron to accept petitions to convey to the Crown. After gathering and sifting the petitions,[15] the Grand Master went to England and presented

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14. Leader, 8 September, 1860.

15. Some of the rejected petitions with rather candid comments affixed by the scrutineers exist in the Cameron Papers. One petition bears George Benjamin's comments refuting the number of Orangemen, supposedly 150,000; another bore Cameron's pointed comment that the preamble "sounds too much like bunkum."

the petitions to Queen Victoria. The presentation was a truimph for the Order and for Cameron. It appeared that more could be gained from moderation as propounded by Cameron than from the dogmatic uncompromising Orangeism that a Grand Master might have been expected to support. His success gained him the acclaim of the Protestants of Upper Canada.

II The Election of 1861

Parliament was dissolved and a general election was called for July, 1861. In Upper Canada the election centred on the sectional controversies of race and religion and on the government's record. Prominent in the campaigns was the demand for legislative reform, and the publication of the decennial census intensified the agitation. Whereas the census for 1851 had recorded 60,000 more people in Upper Canada than in Lower Canada, the disparity in favour of Upper Canada in 1861 was approximately 285,000. In the last session, the ministry had left "rep by pop" an open question,[16] and it was to remain an open question in the election.

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16. A Conservative Orangeman, T. R. Ferguson, proposed a "rep by pop" motion which was supported by Sydney Smith and George Sherwood, two Upper Canadian ministers. W. J. S. Mood, The Orange Order in Canadian Politics 1840-1867, p. 147 claims that Cameron, who was not a member of the Assembly, voted for the motion as well as for Ferguson's motion denouncing the Duke's treatment of the Orange Order. Mr. Mood then concludes that the Orangemen "had discovered a natural leader in John Hillyard Cameron."

Realizing that it would contribute to their election, some Conservatives reclaimed this platform from the Reformers and included it in their own. By this means, Conservative representation might increase in Upper Canada. Conversely, because "rep by pop" was promoted in Upper Canada, Conservative candidates in Lower Canada were suspect; thus it appeared that their strength would diminish. While government supporters in Upper Canada were advocating "rep by pop", the French-Canadian adherents of the ministry based their campaigns on the denial of legislative reform. This difference in election platforms between the coalition ministers might produce a difficult situation.

Cameron was approached by the constituents of Peel: would he be a candidate for their riding?[17] Peel was not a 'safe' riding. The incumbent J. C. Aikins, an Orangeman and a Reformer, had held the seat since 1854.[18] Cameron's financial position was improving;[19] he might be able to spend some time away from his law practice, and prosperity was returning to the Canadas. He accepted the nomination.

Aikins attempted to blight Cameron with charges of inconsistency and anti-Roman Catholicism. Cameron repudiated the charge of being anti-Catholic. He admitted he had

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17. Leader, 14 June, 1860.

18. P. G. Cornell, The Alignment of Political Groups in Canada 1841-1867, pp. 105-108, tables 13, 16.

19. By 1865 Cameron had repaid £15,000 to the Church Society, Strachan Pamphlets, p. 14.

supported "rep by pop" earlier and that he still supported it; the question hinged upon the propitiousness of introducing this legislative reform. The Canadian Freeman, a Catholic newspaper, openly declared war on Cameron's decision to run for the Assembly. It advised its co-religionists:

> If there is no other choice but between an open and avowed Orange leader of the John Hillyard Cameron or Tom Ferguson stamp to obey the voice of conscience rather than the voice of party AND /sic/ STAY AT HOME.[20]

On the other hand, the Globe attacked Cameron as being a "straddle of the fence man...throwing bait to the Orangemen and to the Roman Catholics".[21] He did in fact court Roman Catholic votes, promising to support separate schools and the incorporation of religious bodies. This was consistent with his earlier interpretation of a politician's function: to work for all his constituents regardless of religious belief, race or class. Thus Cameron could later advise the Orangemen that he would look after their needs and Upper Canada's rights. He informed an audience that:

> he hoped to see the best interests of the country carried out.../he/ would demand that Justice to which she /Upper Canada/ was entitled...At the same time he would give the Lower Canadians everything to which they were entitled but not one whit more.[22]

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20. F. A. Walker, Catholic Education and Politics in Upper Canada, p. 257, from the Canadian Freeman, 20 June, 1861.

21. Globe, 25 June, 1861, 17 July, 1861.

22. Ibid., 29 August, 1861.

The majority of electors of Toronto who owned land in Peel did not support the Orange leader, who only polled 218 out of their 500 votes.[23] Cameron's compromising attitude towards the Roman Catholics, while it must have alienated the rabid Orangemen, defeated Aikins' attempt to win Catholic votes. Cameron, who employed the practical expedient of "straddling the fence", gained enough support from Orange and Roman Catholic electors[24] to be returned with a majority of 138 votes.[25]

The Conservative party in Upper Canada was also successful. It had increased its representation from twenty-three to twenty-nine, equalling the number of Reformers who were returned.[26] In contrast, the Lower Canadian Conservatives lost seven seats. This situation could in part be attributed to the disturbing issue of "rep by pop". The election had not, however, changed the total political situation; the Liberal-Conservative coalition which had been formed in 1854 was still in power. Its strength or weakness would be demonstrated when the legislature reassembled in 1862.

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23. Leader, 6 July, 1861.

24. Walker, p. 259, from the Globe, 18 July, 1861, and Sir John A. Macdonald Papers, vol. 228, Bishop Lynch to Macdonald, 17 September, 1861.

25. Leader, 6 July, 1861. The election was contested but was later withdrawn. (Globe, 3 May, 1862) Aikins later left the Orange Order.

26. Cornell, pp. 108-9, tables 16, 17.

III Independent Conservative

The achievement of returning from the edge of the political abyss and recapturing public acclaim prompted rumours of ministerial re-adjustments which involved Cameron. The Globe, attempting to split its opponents by sowing seeds of dissension in Conservative ranks, was prominent in proposing the changes. Cameron would succeed the defeated Post-Master-General Sidney Smith;[27] no, the Roman Catholic Bishop Beaty disliked him.[28] Cameron would enter the ministry; no, the moderate Reformers (Hincksites) and the French Canadians were opposed to such a move.[29] Cameron would replace Macdonald, claimed the gossip-mongers;[30] but "we are not aware that Mr. Cameron either desires or would accept the post", replied the British Herald.[31] Generally Cameron ignored the gossip, but when the Globe charged the Conservatives with dissension in their ranks and Cameron with opposing Sidney Smith's re-election,[32] he denied both charges and exerted his influence on Smith's behalf in the by-

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27. Globe, 8 July, 16 July, 24 July, 1861.

28. Ibid., 20 July, 1861.

29. Ibid., 20 November, 1861.

30. Ibid., 17 July, 24 July, 1861; 28 October, 1861.

31. Ibid., 29 October, 1861, from the British Herald, (n.d.)

32. Leader, 29 August, 1861.

election,[33] which in part contributed to the minister's return.

Professor Creighton has charged that Cameron in 1861-2, as in 1856, was a threat to Macdonald and the coalition government.[34] He also states that during the Royal visit of 1860 Cameron "was virtually leading an anti-ministerialist wing of Conservative Orangemen",[35] because he rebuked the administration for readily accepting the Duke's dictates. But Cameron had also admonished the Orangemen because he admitted that he could not agree with some of their actions.[36] In any case, the attacks by Cameron, W. H. Boulton and O. R. Gowan, for the treatment of the Order were directed at Newcastle rather than the government. In fact, Cameron's action led the Globe to acknowledge him as a government supporter.[37] There was, as Professor Creighton points out, in the fall of 1861, correspondence to Macdonald which warned of rumoured intrigue and gave Brown's assessment of Cameron's

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33. Ibid., 7 September, 10 September, 14 September, 1861, from the Belleville Intelligencer (n.d.); Globe, 7 September, 1861.

34. Creighton, pp. 316-17.

35. Ibid., p. 304; W. J. S. Mood, p. 147 incorrectly states that Cameron was in the Assembly in 1860 and offering leadership from this position as well.

36. Globe, 12 September, 6 October, 1860; Leader, 6 October, 1860.

37. Ibid., 15 October, 1860.

probable actions.[38] It appears that Cameron's actions did not merit as much consideration as the rumours.

Cameron, whose successful return to politics indicated he was far from "politically dead",[39] had a number of positions which he could take towards the government. If he desired, he might have been able to dislodge Conservative followers from supporting Macdonald, and it was primarily over the issue of "rep by pop" that Macdonald's overthrow might be possible. But such action would have been disastrous to the Conservative party. It would leave a Conservative "rump" which, in order to gain office, would have to join in a mariage de convenance with the Reformers to seek office. There was little likelihood of this occurring, because the ideas of radical Reformers and Cameron differed violently on other issues, and it would be difficult to bury past feuds. Perhaps Cameron would utilize the threat of opposition to get the government to incorporate "rep by pop" into the ministerial program, but this seemed unlikely because "rep by pop" was an open question. On the other hand, he might accept legislative reform as a non-ministerial platform but employ the threat of opposition to foist

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38. Creighton, pp. 317-18; he twice employs the same letter, D. K. Feebar's, to establish the point that Brown thought Cameron was seeking power. What is not emphasized is that Feebar admits that Brown only knew "a few political phantoms...his rumours in the Globe about the doubtful members and about cabinet changes...and..his articles are mere guesses". Macdonald Papers, vol. 337, Feebar to Macdonald, 29 July, 1861; my underscore.

39. Ibid., p. 316.

himself upon the party as titular head. But was Cameron acceptable as a leader? He must have realized that former Hincksites would not accept his leadership, and the French Canadians would not support him, even though he promised to support separate schools and ecclesiastical corporations; he was a "rep by pop" supporter. Macdonald, who was not, would get their support. One needed a following before one could lead, and Cameron's potential following consisted only of fellow "rep by pop" Conservatives. On other critical issues, Cameron advocated Conservative policies. As electoral reform was an open question, potential supporters could already fulfill election promises and satisfy their consciences. The issue of "rep by pop" really presented little prospect for Cameron to gain the leadership if he wanted it; furthermore, he was still burdened with debt and the demands of the leadership would have been too taxing on his time.

Cameron's relationship with Macdonald also requires consideration. Publicly they were friendly towards one another.[40] Indeed, in 1856 the Camerons had cared for young Hugh John while Macdonald's wife was ill.[41] Their friendship was temporarily shaken in 1856 when Cameron had disapproved of Macdonald's blatant desire for power in the

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40. Sir John A. Macdonald Papers, vol. 337, George Allan to Macdonald, 5 September, 1861.

41. Creighton, p. 224.

ousting of MacNab. The anger, however, was being softened by time. Moreover, Macdonald, hoping to remove the displeasure and to assist a fellow Scot in a financial plight, designated Cameron for Crown work in the 1860 Assizes. Although his relation with Macdonald was not based on close friendship, Cameron had no personal motive for staging a "palace revolt". Further, Macdonald, holding the leadership of the party and government, had a number of distinct advantages. He was an experienced politician and there was no condemnation of his leadership except from some Conservatives who looked askance at the French-Canadian influence in the government and from some Orangemen who remembered the Duke's treatment of the Order. And during the royal tour, it was Cameron who had helped smooth over the agitation. Furthermore, Cameron was returning to politics after an absence of almost five years, and he had not held a cabinet post since 1848. He was unable to offer patronage in return for support, while Macdonald could tantalize recalcitrant Conservatives with the prospect of ministerial appointments and patronage. Also, the two men had different attitudes towards politics. For Cameron, business took precedence and politics was an interesting sideline; Macdonald revelled in the intrigue and in-fighting of politics, with business ventures being important but secondary.

Macdonald realized that his own position and that of the government needed to be strengthened. Because of his refusal to accept "rep by pop" as a solution to sectional

problems, his position might be in jeopardy. Was it necessary to adopt this principle within the union before he could gain a majority of Upper Canadian support? The failure of Conservative "rep by pop" adherents to support the coalition government might result in government defeat. It was in this atmosphere of uncertainty, with the session fast approaching, that the game of ministerial musical chairs began.

The reconstructed ministry had to allay "rep by pop" agitation and reinforce its strength in Upper Canada. Alexander Campbell, Macdonald's former law partner, had been offered a position but he refused because Cameron and T. C. Street were not to be included.[42] On December 1, 1861, J. C. Morrison, who apparently was sent on Macdonald's request to feel out Cameron's position, informed the Conservative leader that Cameron, because of his financail obligations, would be unable to accept a ministerial position.[43] Twelve days later, Gowan suggested Cameron as Solicitor-General in the government, but expressed the opinion that he did not think Cameron would accept the position.[44] By mid-March Macdonald was desperate. He approached Cameron:

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42. Creighton, p. 326, from the Macdonald Papers, vol. 194, Campbell to Macdonald, 13 December, 1861. Macdonald had apparently promised they would be included.

43. Ibid., p. 318, from the Macdonald Papers, vol. 235, Morrison to Macdonald, 1 December, 1861.

44. Sir John A. Macdonald Papers, vol. 337, Gowan to Macdonald, 13 December, 1861.

would he accept an executive position?[45] Cameron, who perhaps was tempted, refused, as Macdonald was unwilling to include "rep by pop" in the ministerial platform.[46] If Cameron's aim was to oust Macdonald, he would have had a much better opportunity to undermine the Conservative leader's position from within. Cameron did, however, agree to assist the government and act as a liaison between Macdonald and Street when the Conservative leader sought the latter as a ministerial associate. Macdonald was advised by Cameron that he believed Street could be brought into the ministry.[47] However, the ministerial vacancies were filled by J. B. Robinson Jr., John Carling and James Patton, all "rep by pop" supporters. Cameron did not attack the new ministers or the government.[48] Cameron's actions were not those of a

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45. Joseph Pope, The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon, Sir John A. Macdonald, vol. I, p. 235. In a footnote, Pope claims that Macdonald's offer was only a gesture because he felt the inclusion of Cameron in the ministry would not have strengthened it. This explanation sounds too superficial, and it seems to be an excuse for Cameron's rejection of the offer. Macdonald may have breathed a sigh of relief with Cameron's refusal because the Conservative leader did work better with mediocrities whom he could control. On the other hand, to have gained Cameron would have cemented the Orange and ultra-Conservative support of the ministry.

46. Globe, 28 March, 1862.

47. Sir John A. Macdonald Papers, vol. 337, Cameron to Macdonald, 22 March, 1862.

48. W. J. S. Mood, p. 155, from the Leader, 28 May, 1862; Mr. Mood incorrectly states that "Cameron lashed out against the inconsistency of the Orangemen, Robinson, John Carling and James Patton, for having accepted office without first settling the representation problem...The Grand Master strongly condemned his Orange brethren for deserting their

conspirator or of a man seeking to overthrow the government or oust Macdonald.

On March 22, prior to the introduction of the explosive "rep by pop" amendments in the Assembly, Cameron advised Macdonald that he would support them. He also warned Macdonald that the "Sicotte French" might support the amendments.[49] On March 27, W. McDougall in the reply to the Address moved that "rep by pop", which would eliminate Upper Canada's inequities, be included in the Throne speech. Cameron's warning to Macdonald regarding Sicotte proved unfounded; he countered with an amendment which claimed that equality of representation was essential to the union. Macdonald made the Sicotte proposal a want of confidence motion and it was easily defeated.[50] The next day, Cameron offered to the House first in French and then in English as his proposal for solving sectional difficulties:

> ...some measure which while providing for such an increased representation in the House as is demanded by the increased

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48. (cont'd) principles for the sake of office". Mr. Mood forgets a) that the Sandfield Macdonald-Sicotte government was in office when the attack was made and b) Cameron's attack was upon the new ministry which included former "rep by pop" advocates who had abandoned this for the double majority. See the Leader, 28 May, 1862 and 31 May, 1862 for the complete speech in the Assembly debates.

49. Sir John A. Macdonald Papers, vol. 337, Cameron to Macdonald, 22 March, 1862. The "Sicotte French" were the French Canadian Rouge group led by L. V. Sicotte.

50. Globe, 2 April, 1862.

> population of Upper Canada would also preserve the Federal character of the existing union by maintaining an equality in the number of elective representatives from each section of the province in the Legislative Council.[51]

Cameron hoped that this compromise would be acceptable to the French Canadians and the Upper Canadians. The demand of the former for representative equality might be satisfied, the latter would have "rep by pop" and the union would remain intact. Cameron, in a speech which was considered by one French Canadian historian as "un habile discours pour engager les Bas-Canadiens à voter en faveur de son amendment",[52] asserted that the present coalition government offered the greater prospect of fulfulling "rep by pop" than any Reform administration, and went on to explain his attitude towards the French Canadians and "rep by pop":

> ...He was not..one of those who claimed "rep by pop" with one hand and held out the threat of dissolution with the other. He... hoped to get this measure by constitutional means...if they did not get it this year or next year or in the next four or five years.. they were not on that account to declare to their fellow subjects in Lower Canada that they must have this or a dissolution of the union. They [the Upper Canadians] hoped to get this like every other constitutional change by time."[53]

This speech demonstrated, as in 1858, Cameron's unwillingness

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51. Globe, 1 April, 1862.

52. L. P. Turcotte, Canada Sous L'Union, part II, p. 436.

53. Globe, 3 April, 1864.

to force his ideas on others. It also showed Cameron's conservative, patient nature. Nevertheless, when the unacceptability of the motion became apparent, he suggested that the principle of "rep by pop" be modified. Perhaps the newly settled areas of Bruce and Huron counties could have representatives. If this was unsatisfactory, Upper Canada could receive an additional representative to represent the 285,000 unrepresented people. This proposal was ridiculed and rejected by Reformers and the French Canadians refused to accept this bastardized "rep by pop". When the vote came on Cameron's amendment, twelve Conservatives supported it;[54] the amendment received two more votes than McDougall's but was easily defeated, forty-four to seventy-five.[55] Electoral reform was shelved for another year.

Although "rep by pop" was, on Macdonald's own admission, an open question, his reaction to the Conservative votes for these amendments was violent enough to prompt a gathering of Upper Canadian Conservatives supposedly "headed by John Hillyard Cameron".[56] The result of the meeting was an

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54. Globe, 1 April, 1862. The Conservative supporters were W. Anderson, John Hillyard Cameron, M. C. Cameron, W. Clarke, J. Crawford, T. R. Ferguson, F. W. Haultain, A. F. Hooper, A. Morris, W. Ryerson, T. C. Street and A. Walsh. The two newly appointed ministers of the Assembly were busy seeking re-election and thus did not record their vote.

55. W. L. Morton, The Critical Years: The Union of British North America 1857-1873 (Toronto, 1964), p. 105.

56. Creighton, p. 328 from Pope, vol. I, pp. 234-5.

explanatory letter which was forwarded to Macdonald. It reaffirmed their loyalty to the party leader and it explained that their vote for "rep by pop" was a matter of principle and was not to be considered as a motion of censure. The letter went on to inform Macdonald that they felt certain the government would be upheld, and that they supported the government.[57] This letter must have put Macdonald's mind at ease regarding his Conservative supporters of "rep by pop".

Cameron, the danger to the French-Canadian alliance, the supporter of Upper Canada Protestantism and Conservative Protestantism, the proponent of Upper Canadian sectionalism,[58] supported the government in the balance of the session. This incurred the wrath of the Globe, which rebuked him for failing to support no-confidence motions.[59] Earlier, he had received slashing attacks from the Globe for "trying to serve Cartier and Upper Canada at the same time"[60] and attempting to satisfy Protestants and Catholics.[61] Although unaware of it, the Globe had accurately described Cameron the politician: looking to the needs of his constituents,

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57. Creighton, from Pope, vol I, p. 235. Professor Creighton overplays the attitude pervading this meeting when he implies ("perhaps a slightly frightened group of men") that Cameron and the others were cowering like a group of school boys before the wrath of Professor Creighton's political hero.

58. Creighton, pp. 316-17.

59. Globe, 11 April, 1862.

60. Ibid., 24 September, 1861.

61. Ibid., 16 July, 24 July, 1861, 11 February, 1862.

yet realizing that others had demands that had to be met. Cameron offered an amendment to the Scott Bill which sought parity with the Catholics, in the right for Anglicans to establish separate schools; it was defeated.[62] However, he voted against the proposed six months' hoist,[63] and supported Egerton Ryerson's stand on the Scott proposal against the attacks of the Reformers.[64] These attacks annoyed rabid Orangemen who assailed the Grand Master's moderate attitude.[65] Cameron, the independent, demonstrated a growing awareness of his responsibilities to the Conservative party.[66]

Cameron had not, however, abandoned his independent action when he felt the Conservative policy was wrong. In opposition, after the Cartier-Macdonald government had been replaced by the Sandfield Macdonald-L. V. Sicotte ministry, John A. Macdonald offered his "cordial" support to the new government. Such a suggestion was anathema to Cameron, who let loose a blistering attack upon the Reform administration

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62. F. A. Walker, p. 280.

63. Globe, 2 May, 1862.

64. Ibid., 3 May, 1862.

65. W. J. S. Mood, p. 156.

66. cf. W. J. S. Mood, p. 155 who after assuming that Cameron attacked Carling, Robinson and Patton for accepting office and not carrying out legislative reforms, concludes that "a contributing factor to the downfall and resignation of the first ministry after the 1861 election had been the continued opposition of Cameron, Ferguson and other anti-ministerialist Orangemen to the go-slow policy of Macdonald". He offers no example of this opposition.

for their perversion of principles and the incongruity of the new ministry.[67] His views were too antithetical to the Reformers for him to offer them support.[68]

Cameron's career had revived considerably between 1859 and 1862. From 1862 onward, the projection of Cameron as a potential replacement of Macdonald as the leader of the Conservative party rather abruptly declined. Perhaps this was indicated when Lord Monck, the Governor-General, called on Sandfield Macdonald, a moderate Reformer, rather than Cameron, to try to form a ministry after Cartier and Macdonald resigned (the Governor-General may have been acting on their advice). Using Cameron's actions as a criterion, there appears to be no evidence to substantiate the charge that he sought the leadership of the party. The temporary breach of 1856-7 was cemented over. In 1863, when the session got under way, at a dinner held on behalf of the Conservative leader, Cameron made an open disavowal of any conflict between them. He informed the audience that "the hatchet...if it had ever been lifted between Macdonald and himself...was now solemnly buried".[69] A year later when the

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67. Leader, 31 May, 1862.

68. cf. Creighton, p. 318, from the Macdonald Papers, vol. 337, D. K. Feebar to Macdonald, 19 July, 1861. He quotes Feebar's statement that it was "only too natural for Cameron to allay himself with the remainder and more numerous body of Grits"; my underscore.

69. Creighton, p. 339, from the Globe, 20 February, 1863.

Liberal-Conservative government replaced the Reform ministry, Cameron presented to the Assembly the new administration's policy.[70]

In the game of politics, Cameron had again demonstrated that he was above the ordinary. His ability led others to turn to him, which in turn was misconstrued in rumour that Cameron was plotting against someone. Cameron in 1856 and 1862 did not take advantage of the opportunity to de-throne Macdonald. Lacking Macdonald's abilities as a politician, Cameron was willing to accept Macdonald's leadership. But he could never be a docile supporter of Conservative programmes which he did not think were in the best interests of the country.

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70. Globe, 31 March, 1864.

EPILOGUE AND CONCLUSION

I The End of a Career

Cameron's political career did not enter a state of eclipse after 1862. He never again was a minister of the Crown, nor did he accept offers of elevation to the bench; he was mired in debt for the rest of his life. However, he did remain in politics wielding increased influence, even though in 1870 he was not re-elected Grand Master of the Orange Order. The remainder of his career it seems was patterned on the ideas he had expressed in the past. This moderate and practical approach to politics often made him suspect.

In 1863 Cameron again supported the principle of separate schools inherent in the Scott Bill and although he voted against the final reading because Anglicans were not allowed to have separate schools, his support triggered a violent reaction among Orangemen. Letters of condemnation were written to the Globe, which were interpreted as indications that the Grand Master was now persona non grata to Orangemen and should be repudiated by defeat in the general election in progress.[1] The Globe suggested that Cameron could be beaten "by a sound friend of Upper Canadian principles",[2] and as the election campaign got under way in

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1. Globe, 8 June, 9 June, 1863.
2. Ibid., 2 June, 1863.

June the Reform news-sheet charged that Cameron was a middle of the road man, attempting to satisfy Roman Catholics and Orangemen.[3] His adherence to this practical expedient contributed to his successful re-election for Peel. As proof that his moderate policy was acceptable to the Orange leaders, they re-elected him as Grand Master of the Order in 1863.

In March of the following year, the Sandfield Macdonald-Dorion government was defeated, and was finally succeeded by the Taché-Macdonald Liberal-Conservative ministry. It had been rumoured that Cameron would be the new Upper Canadian leader, but it also was acknowledged that his recent serious illness and his financial problems would probably not allow him to accept the position.[4] As a front bencher, Cameron offered his support of the newly-formed government. In June when the Great Coalition including George Brown was formed, Cameron, who opposed coalition of opposites, nonetheless realized the difficult situation which had necessitated such action and expressed the hope that confederation which "would make the colony a great nation" would be accomplished and agreed to support the government.[5] Although he favoured a referendum prior to initiating confederation, he was a staunch advocate of the confederation principle.

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3. Globe, 11 June, 1863.
4. Ibid., 30 March, 31 March, 1864.
5. Ibid., 24 June, 1864.

A serious problem plagued the colonies in 1866. In March it was believed that the Fenians from the United States would invade and might be supported by the Irishmen of the North American colonies. Nothing occurred at that time, but in late May and early June events took a more serious turn. On June 1 the Fenians, approximately 1,000 strong, crossed into the Niagara peninsula as the initial move towards emancipating the British colonists from British rule. Regulars and volunteers were hurriedly despatched to the area in order to repulse the invaders. The next day, a number of defenders were killed and wounded in a skirmish with the Fenians, but the action was sufficient to prompt the Fenians to retreat to the safety of American soil. Later that month there was a possibility that, because of the Fenian threat, a conflict between Protestant and Irish Roman Catholics might erupt. Lord Monck sought Cameron's aid in order to prevent such an occurrence. On June 27, the Governor-General, in a confidential letter to Cameron, expressed his thoughts on the threat, on the Fenian situation and on how Cameron could be of assistance:

> I hear--and I am sorry to say on good authority--that there is a certain amount of bad feeling beginning to exhibit itself between Protestants and Roman Catholics--as such--in connection with the late Fenian raids.
>
> Now one of the most satisfactory incidents of the events of the last winter was the total absence of all evidence of any sympathy with Fenianism on the part of any portion of the inhabitants of Canada.

> I have strong reason for believing that no other circumstance connected with the affair exercised a more depressing influence on the spirits of the Fenians than the fact that they found no adherents in the province.
>
> I should look with very great apprehension to any portion of the community which wd [sic] lead outsiders to think that the satisfactory state of affairs to which I have already alluded does not really exist.
>
> Such an effect might I am sure be produced by any appearance at present of hostility against Roman Catholics on religious grounds.
>
> I know the weight which your words will carry with the Orangemen and I would ask you on public grounds to exert your influence to prevent any expression of feeling such as that to which I have pointed....[6]

No outbreak occurred, although there is nothing to indicate that Cameron was responsible for preventing it. Monck's letter does, however, show the respect that he had for Cameron's influence.

Cameron remained an important figure in the community in the 1860's in spite of his financial problems. In 1863 he was elected Chancellor of Trinity College and he retained his positions as Chancellor of the Diocese of Toronto and Treasurer of the Law Society. He became a member of the Bar of Lower Canada but it was not until 1869 that he appeared, not without a thrill of anticipation, for the first time before the Lower Canadian courts.[7] A year earlier

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6. Cameron Papers, Confidential, Monck to Cameron, 27 June, 1866.

7. Ibid., Cameron to Ellen, 12 September, 1869.

D'Arcy McGee had been assassinated by the Fenian, J. P. Whelan. No lawyer was willing to appear on the murderer's behalf, but Cameron agreed to handle the case, not because he believed in the man's innocence, but because of his strong belief that all should have a fair trial. His defense did not save Whelan from the gallows. Later Cameron was retained by the Globe to defend it against W. McDougall's charge of libel.[8] Because of his need for money, court cases took precedence over proffered social engagements. He declined a dinner offer with Lord Monck because of an important court case which he had to present the next day.[9] On the request of the Premier of Ontario, Sandfield Macdonald, Cameron agreed to handle the Crown cases at the Cornwall assizes.[10] By 1869 he had become quite friendly with Sandfield Macdonald, who often invited Cameron to dine.[11] His relationship with John A. Macdonald had also become closer. He frequently dined with Lady Macdonald and the Prime Minister, and they even discussed the Macdonald family problems.[12] Cameron also displayed his compassion for the Conservative leader's "sick fits".[13] Cameron was well versed in the

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8. Cameron Papers, 29 November, 1875.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., 21 September, 1869.
11. Ibid., 9, 22 September, 1869.
12. Ibid., 26 October, 5 December, 1869.
13. Ibid., 13 September, 1869.

Conservative political strategy and patronage and often his suggestions regarding appointments were accepted.[14]

The years from 1870 to 1876 were difficult for Cameron. His brother, Allan, who was a chronic failure despite Cameron's attempts to assist him, continued to be a problem, and Sophia MacNab, the late Sir Allan's daughter, was burdening him with her personal difficulties. Her request for money prompted an exasperated Cameron to point out to his wife, "how much work they all expect me to do for them".[15]

In 1871 Cameron had defended Macdonald's handling of the negotiations preceding the Washington Treaty and the subsequent agreement. He then explained to the House his position vis à vis the Conservative leader:

> Probably there was no member of the House better entitled to speak of that gentleman /Macdonald/ than he. They had been friends for more than half the term of life alloted to man; they had been at school together, and had been in the government of Canada in the freshness of their youth more than a quarter of a century ago, and from that year to this, although their positions had been very different, he had always been his /Macdonald's/ political follower, and had endeavoured to be his faithful friend;...[16]

Cameron believed that Macdonald had done his best under the circumstances. After much stormy debate the bill passed the House.

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14. A. T. Galt's brother, Thomas, was indebted to Cameron for a judgeship.

15. Cameron Papers, Cameron to Ellie, 7 December, 1869.

16. J. E. Collins, The Life and Times of the Rt. Honourable Sir John A. Macdonald (Toronto, 1883), pp. 374-5.

On the expiration of the parliamentary term, a general election was held in the summer of 1872. The Conservatives retained office, but with a reduced majority. Cameron was one of the Conservatives who was defeated. Another seat was found for him in Cardwell and he easily won the by-election.[17] In the House when the Pacific scandal broke, Cameron, who suggested that a select committee be formed to investigate the charges, was elected as a member and then chairman of the select committee that was established. The charges of corruption led to the resignation of the Liberal-Conservative government in 1873. The Conservatives were to spend the next five years in opposition.

Late in 1875, Cameron in a letter to his wife admitted that it "has been a sad & troublous year for me--your illness, Allan's difficulties,...have strained me greatly, and I have found the pressure upon me very hard to bear".[18] His wife had been sent to the Bermudas for reasons of health but, as the assizes were in session, he was unable to meet her because the pecuniary loss would have been too great.[19]

In August of the following year, Cameron suffered a prolonged illness. Despite the doctor's advice to rest,

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17. The sitting member for Cardwell was also a member of the provincial Assembly and as the provincial government passed a law which disallowed a member from sitting in both Houses, he resigned his federal seat.

18. Cameron Papers, Cameron to Ellie, 27 December, 1875.

19. Ibid., 29 December, 1875.

Cameron returned to his profession. Three months later the blow fell; he had overworked and exhausted himself. After rushing to Barrie to defend a client and spending two sleepless nights travelling between Ottawa and Toronto, he suffered a heart attack. For two weeks, daily bulletins on his condition were sent from 'The Meadows' to the newspapers. On November 14, the end came. In the Queen City, flags were lowered to half-mast, stores were closed, and dignitaries flocked to Toronto[20] to pay respect to one of Toronto's prominent sons--John Hillyard Cameron.

II Conclusion

The political arena in the two decades before Confederation was characterized by the confusion inherent in transition to a party system of government. Before the period of union, Upper Canadian politics centered about the individual, although a common ideology held by several members of the Assembly did generally result in a loosely knit conservative group uniting to retain political power. The achievement of responsible government, however, implied the acceptance of party government, which required that the individual give precedence to the party. Thus a psychological adjustment

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20. The Mail, 15, 18 November, 1876; Globe, 15, 18 November, 1876; Leader, 15, 18 November, 1876.

had to be made by politicians. Voting habits, if judged by adherence to party affiliation, were still erratic in the 1840's, but decreasingly so in the 1850's. The party structure was still fluid, although it showed signs of crystallizing. The fluidity assisted the formation of the shifting alliances that developed during the period.

In Upper Canada both Conservatives and Reform parties underwent periods of fragmentation and re-assimilation. The Reformers splintered in the 1850's, while the Conservatives who were divided in the 1840's had coalesced. The process of union was not easily achieved. Old guard Compact followers of the Conservative party were eased out of the leadership of the group. Their ideas and platforms were no longer acceptable and their positions in the vanguard of Conservatism had been succeeded to by younger and more adaptable men such as Macdonald, Cayley and Cameron. These men had to discover a mean which would retain old line supporters and also attract the other electors' support. While it was Macdonald who offered the guiding light to moderate Conservatism, it was Cameron who gave the old Compactism a moderate hue.

Cameron, although a practical politician, had no knack for the finesse of politics; indeed he disliked it. His forthright and direct manner was a hindrance to him. He made no attempt to gloss over his actions or his opinions. His aloofness and self-assurance, which bordered on egotism, also constituted a drawback. He was moreover insistent

that a politician should be governed by principle, and his own principles, while unmistakably conservative, were not always convenient for his party. Cameron was a staunch constitutionalist and a supporter of the British connection. By the late 1850's these were not the exclusive preserve of the Conservative group. Cameron's attitude towards church-state relations illustrates his Compactism, but it was a part of his religious belief and therefore on this issue it was difficult for him to modify his principles. It was his adherence to principle which led to the misunderstandings and misinterpretations of his political conduct. Cameron encountered the difficulties inherent, for a man of stern conscience and independent ideas, in trying to cope with the expedient compromise of party politics.

Cameron thought that a politician should be more concerned with the needs of his constituents and of the colony than with the fortunes or cohesiveness of his party. His sectional interests were not as pronounced as those of some Reformers or some other Conservatives. He was no more biased in favour of Canada West than were French Canadians in favour of their part of the province. He wanted to allay the sectional discord in the united province and he hoped to see this accomplished by having two factions achieving their ends as long as they were not extreme. Thus, while insistent upon principle and contemptuous of compromise based merely upon expediency, Cameron did propose and support compromise and moderation. To his contemporaries,

Cameron's practical approach to politics was paradoxical: they expected him either to oppose or to support Protestants, Orangemen, French Canadians or Roman Catholics, whereas his object was to satisfy the legitimate demands of them all. Party men did not believe that it could be done; Cameron thought that it could. He was not anti-Roman Catholic, nor anti-French Canadian; neither was he the proponent of Upper Canadian sectionalism that some historians have described him as being.

Not only was Cameron a man of conscience, principle and moderation; he was also a man of ability. Despite his many offences as a "party faithful", he was important enough to merit careful handling in order to keep him within the Conservative party. As the period was characterized by attempted and rumoured coups, Cameron, because of his ability and influence, was naturally looked upon as a potential leader and as a threat to other potential party leaders such as Macdonald. The charges that he sought the leadership of the party and government are however unfounded. On the contrary, those who looked to him for leadership found frustration; those who sought to destroy him as a rival were never certain that he was in fact a rival. His opinions and his arguments were always clear, but his position was almost always ambiguous. Yet there was nothing of the misunderstood visionary about him. In his passionate attention to detail, his willingness to make concessions or accept compromise, his search for allies on specific measures, even

in his recogntion that legislative reform was not enough to bridge the gap between him and Reformers, he was intensely practical. The principles to which he so consistently and vocally adhered, and which so limited his effectiveness, related less to his opinions on public measures than to his concept of a legislator's duty. Attention to the interests of all his constituents and the obligation to exercise his own best judgement in their service forbade partisanship; and in forbidding partisanship they hobbled ambition. Adhering to his beliefs in the responsibilities of a politician, Cameron was an uncommon breed in politics--a principled practical politician.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

A variety of sources, which have been used for the purposes of this thesis, include secondary sources, newspapers, public records and private papers. At first it appeared that no Cameron papers existed, but upon checking with Mr. Benjamin Boulton of Toronto, who owned the residence in which Cameron's grand-daughter died in 1951, it was found that in 1959 or 1960 (he wasn't certain of the year) he donated the existing Cameron collection to the Baldwin Room of the Toronto Public Reference Library, where it remained as an uncatalogued collection. The papers were accidentally discovered as subsequent lessors of the house had thrown out indiscriminately the papers which were in the attic. In 1960 the new occupants, who were considering renovating the house, located the remaining papers and informed Mr. Boulton. The correspondence has gaps in the 1850's and 1860's. There are a few letters in this period but there are numerous letters for 1869 and some correspondence exists for 1875. There is a possibility that other letters may still exist but no reply was received from Cameron's great grandson, General Foster (retired from Canadian Army). The handwriting, which was poor during Cameron's early years, became very shaky in the latter stages of his life and thus was more difficult to read. Most of the papers are personal letters to his wife with whom he had an extremely close relationship as demonstrated

by almost daily telegrams, notes or letters to her when he was away. Although they were of a personal nature, Cameron also included comments on social and political events (the financial situations were infrequently mentioned). The papers were used as much as possible and were indispensible to the author in helping to gain an understanding of Cameron, his ideas and his actions.

A few Cameron letters are found in other private papers, but it is apparent that his correspondence with his fellow politicians was sporadic. The Baldwin and John A. Macdonald collections contain some of these letters, as well as letters referring to Cameron. The Baldwin Papers need to be recatalogued as they are now maintained in a mixture of chronological and alphabetical order. It is hoped that a chronological reclassification will soon occur. These papers, like the LaFontaine Papers, were important for the early period of Cameron's career and contained some interesting comments on him. The Sandfield Macdonald and George Brown collections contain letters mentioning Cameron, which provided glimpses of him as seen by some Reformers. Of the Conservatives, the Samuel Street Papers, which include T. C. Street's correspondence, provided information on Cameron's social and legal prominence, as well as his business interests and accomplishments. The Brown Chamberlain Papers, like the John Strachan Letterbooks, were of limited value. Sir John A. Macdonald's Papers supplied considerable information on Cameron. There were few Cameron letters but other Conservatives wrote to Macdonald about Cameron; this collection is

very important, particularly for the years 1861-62, as it illustrates Macdonald's jealous fear of Cameron. The Isaac Buchanan Papers in the Public Archives, which were brought to the attention of the author after the paper was completed, contain some Cameron letters. They have since been investigated and, while they do contain some information on Cameron's financial activities, they do not change to any degree the picture of Cameron presented here.

Of the government publications the Journals of the Legislative Province of Canada were valuable for investigating Cameron's activities in the Assembly. Occasionally it was necessary to check the newspapers for a particular vote which was not recorded in the Journals. For Cameron's entry into politics and the Draper resignation, the Provincial Secretaries correspondence contains important letters. The Elgin-Grey correspondence supplies a good deal of background information on the issues of responsible government, state-church relations and the French-Canadian-English-Canadian, Upper-Lower Canada relationship from the viewpoint of an interested observer.

The newspapers of the period proved to be most useful, interesting and important. The Reform journals, moderate (the Leader, which later supported the Liberal-Conservative coalition) and radical (the North American and the Globe) were closely examined because it was believed that if Cameron was anti-Roman Catholic and anti-French Canadian, these journals which supported such attitudes would applaud Cameron for speeches and actions which were in line with this policy.

It became clear that this did not occur, as Cameron was constantly attacked for almost all his political activities (his request for a copy of the Duval charge was an exception). The Globe was the most valuable newspaper. With the exception of some issues missing in the late 1840's, copies remain for the whole period. The paper must be used with care because of the Brown Reform bias, which pervades the reporting and the rumours which it initiated regarding the Conservatives. The North American, until its assimilation by the Globe, was useful for the first half of the 1850's. The Leader, a supporter of moderate governments, provided another view of the period. J. Beaty, who seems to have neither understood nor trusted Cameron and probably disliked him, owned the Leader which would account for the frequent attacks directed at him. The Conservative organ, the Patriot, gave another assessment of the period. Cameron, however, usually suffered the same fate at the hands of this newspaper. Edited by Gowan, it was an Orange journal and a consistent supporter of John A. Macdonald. It was outspoken in its opposition to Cameron. The Colonist of the middle 1850's did not denounce Cameron, but it should be remembered that for part of Cameron's affluent years, he patronized the paper. Samuel Thompson, the editor, claimed that Cameron gave him a free hand regarding the editing of the newspaper, which probably was true; yet Thompson would have been reluctant to attack Cameron. However, when the Atlas was founded in 1858 by the Liberal-Conservative coalition, Thompson as the editor supported Cameron. The Atlas was of value for the 1858

election. Another newspaper, the Cornwall Observer, whose existing copies are in the Ontario Archives, was useful for the period 1846-48. Two other newspapers were also consulted: the Roman Catholic Mirror and the Montreal Gazette. The latter was only examined for the late 1840's and early 1850's. The editor was anti-Cameron. The Mirror proved useful for displaying the pro-Roman Catholic attitude and its distrust of individuals such as Cameron whom it did not understand. It did, however, provide valuable information for the 1858 election.

Another important source of material located in the newspapers was the only record of the Assembly debates. Often several newspapers had to be consulted in order to get the most complete version of the Cameron speeches. This might be facilitated by the National Library Association which could collate and edit the reports of the debates. In order to secure a well-rounded report, the best newspapers to consult would be the Globe, Leader and Patriot. The latter does give more emphasis to Conservative speeches in the House, which offsets the Globe's partiality for speeches of Reform representatives.

In a different category of sources are unpublished theses produced by graduate students. For the 1840's, Donald Beer's The Political Career of Sir Allan MacNab 1839-49 and George Metcalf's study of Draper's political career provided valuable information. Beer's work presents a picture of MacNab and shows how he fits into the framework of the Conservative party. Metcalf's thesis aptly redresses

the past abuse heaped upon Draper and demonstrates the direction in which Conservatism was to move in the next two decades. The Beer thesis contains minor errors regarding Cameron as pointed out in the first chapter of this thesis. (see Chapter I, part IV). The conclusion provided an excellent summary of MacNab's position and the Conservative party in 1849. Paul F. W. Rutherford's study of John Sandfield Macdonald and the Reform party, while an excellent study, was of limited value for this thesis because of its emphasis on Reformism. The works on the Orange Order, especially W. J. S. Mood's localized study, provide information on a subject which is difficult because of the secrecy of the Order. Violet Nelson's thesis was too general, as it covered Orangeism from its beginning to the 1930's. Both works, as pointed out in this paper, contain factual errors (for the Nelson thesis inaccuracies see above Chapter II, part III, Chapter IV, part I). The Mood thesis is especially at fault as it draws misleading conclusions from its inaccuracies (see above Chapter V, part II, Chapter VI, parts II and III).

The other sources are categorized into general works, autobiographies and biographies, articles and pamphlets. Bishop Strachan's pamphlet contains important information on Cameron's financial difficulties. The Provincial Insurance Company's Report and the report of the second convention of the British American League were of very limited value. The articles consulted provided background material for the study. Professor Underhill's article on radical Reformism

provided an easy means of contrasting Reform and Conservative ideas and J. I. Cooper's article on Cartier was valuable for presenting a French Canadian's attitude to the politics of the period.

Some of the most interesting reading and the most informative books are the autobiographies and biographies. Unquestionably, the studies of Macdonald and Brown by Professors Creighton and Careless respectively are far superior to the others. For the purpose of this thesis, Professor Creighton's book, because it deals primarily with the Conservative party and Macdonald, is the more important of the two. Professor Creighton has concentrated too greatly on Macdonald; consequently other figures such as Brown, Cameron and Alexander Campbell suffer from being incidental to the study. Professor Careless' two volumes on Brown stand out not only because of the work on Brown and Reformism, but also because they present a comprehensive picture of Torontonian and Upper Canadian society and the part which Brown played in this scene. Professor Careless makes an effort to be objective towards Brown and only rarely is his impartiality lost or forgotten. While this paper takes issue on a number of points with Professors Creighton and Careless, the two studies juxtaposed give the period a startling reality.

The older biographies vary in degree of value. Sir Joseph Pope's Macdonald is too biased to present a true picture of the situation. Collin's study of Macdonald is a poor attempt at a literary history and it becomes confused

regarding the ministries in the 1850's. E. R. Cameron's work on Vansittart was of little value as it degenerated into a eulogy on D'Arcy McGee. Merritt's biography did provide information on the economic problems of the 1850's. Of the more recent works, Wilson's study of Baldwin is important for the period of the 1840's. However, the Conservatives become little more than the bete noir of the Reformers. Cameron does not even merit mention in the study. The Makers of Canada biographies provided background information but as pointed out, whenever Cameron is mentioned, inaccuracies occur. The other biographies of Ryerson and Galt were of limited value and both have errors regarding Cameron. Skelton's is a matter of interpretation concerning 1862. He claims that Cameron opposed the Liberal-Conservative government but he gives no examples to back up his claims.

In contrast to the numerous autobiographies of Reformers, there is a serious lack of such records by Conservatives. S. Thompson's Reminiscences is an exception. It contains some interesting material but it should be remembered that Thompson was on the fringe of the Compact coterie of Toronto and was not privy to the plans and ideas of this group. The Reformers' autobiographies were of limited value; they only deal with the significant political problems of the 1850's in a cursory fashion (Clarke, Weir) or become an "apologia" (Hincks, who never once suggests he might have erred). Charles Durand's work is a fantastic record, because it is of such poor quality. Not only is it

factually incorrect (he claims the Hincks government was in office in 1856-7; he gives the incorrect date of Brown's entry into the coalition ministry) but it is also repetitive, falling back to the Rebellion of 1837. Durand displays a violent hatred of MacNab, who is blamed for all Durand's troubles and the problems of the Canadas.

Of the general works consulted, two older works were of particular value: L. P. Turcotte Canada Sous L'Union, and J. C. Dent's The Last Forty Years. Both books suffer from a lack of documentation and have a number of minor errors of fact regarding Cameron. Dent's study contains some errors of interpretation which have been perpetuated, such as Cameron opposing separate schools and Sandfield Macdonald being a supporter of separate schools and a radical Reformer. Turcotte's study presents a fair appraisal of Cameron. The book is a political history with social and economic aspects relegated to a secondary position. Nevertheless, it does present the French-Canadian attitude towards Upper Canadians. Turcotte favours the moderates--the Baldwinites, Hincksites and Liberal Conservatives--and opposes the radicals. There are some events such as the Taché School Bill, which are omitted, but these omissions are few and do not detract from the value of the book. Other works were of less value. While the reader should be cautious of Lower's idiosyncrasies, his Canadians in the Making is a good study of the social background of the period. Hodgett's Pioneer Public Service was consulted in

order to clarify the relative importance of the various offices of the Crown (there was a minor error in that he claims that Sir John A. Macdonald was still Minister of the Militia in July, 1862, but the Sandfield Macdonald-Sicotte government was in office at this time). Langstone's study of Responsible Government is a good work but she becomes confused regarding the ministries when she deals with the internal politics of the colony. D. C. Master's The Rise of Toronto offers an interesting background of Toronto's growth and the influence of the different religious, political and racial groups in this growth. However, as a study in metropolitanism, it is a disappointment. It fails to enter into the means by which Toronto was controlling the hinterland of Canada West. Professor Morton's The Critical Years, except for introducing an emphasis on the central Canada section of the united province, provided little in the way of new interpretation; for this thesis it was useful as a source of background information. Of the specialized works, Professor Cornell's Alignment of Political Groups in Canada is an excellent description of the fluidity of the developing party structure. It also provides a most valuable analysis of the elections. Professor Moir's Church and State and Professor Walker's Catholic Education must be consulted because of the religious controversy which prevailed throughout the period of the union. On occasion, Professor Moir has difficulty when he deals with Cameron in politics (see above Chapter II, part III and Chapter IV, part I). Professor Walker, although he does attempt to be

unbiased, fails to give credit to the High Anglicans for their part in helping the Roman Catholics to attain separate schools. On the troubled year of 1849 and the subsequent events, C. D. Allin and G. M. Jones, Annexation, Preferential Trade and Reciprocity, have done an outstanding job. The authors used the newspapers to advantage to demonstrate the changing attitudes on annexation. As Chapter V dealt with Upper Canada, it was the most important part of the book for this thesis. The Journal of the Prince of Wales' visit in 1861 by G. D. Engleheart, like J. Young's Public Men and Public Life in Canada were of very restricted value. Of works which present a brief summary of Cameron's career, W. S. Wallace's Dictionary is adequate except for his statement that Cameron was a threat to the MacNab-Morin ministry in 1854. Most of Wallace's material is derived from W. J. Rattray's The Scot in British North America. The W. Notman and Fennings Taylor Portraits and H. J. Morgan's Sketches for earlier attempts at biographical outlines are satisfactory, although on occasion they commit minor errors. A most incredible study needs commenting upon. Perkins Bull, From the Boyne to the Brampton, a study of the Orange Order, contains numerous historical inaccuracies and attributes almost everything worth while in Canadian politics to the Orange Order. Never once is it suggested that the Orangemen were at fault or wrong. The book is poorly written and disjointed. It must be used with extreme care.

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