INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

**ProQuest Information and Learning
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA
800-521-0600**

UMI[®]

**A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF KANT AND DELEUZE: TOWARDS AN ETHICS OF
IMMANENCE**

by

Daniel J. Knezetic, B.A.

**A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate
Studies and Research in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of**

Master of Arts

Department of Philosophy

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

©2001, Daniel J. Knezetic

**National Library
of Canada**

**Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services**

**395 Wellington Street
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada**

**Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada**

**Acquisitions et
services bibliographiques**

**395, rue Wellington
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada**

Your file Votre référence

Our file Notre référence

The author has granted a non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of this thesis in microform, paper or electronic formats.

L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de cette thèse sous la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

0-612-66828-2

Canada

**The undersigned recommend to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
acceptance of the thesis**

**A Comparative Analysis of Kant and Deleuze: The Progression Towards an Ethics of
Immanence**

**Submitted by Daniel J. Knezetic, B.A.
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Arts**

Chair

Department

Thesis Supervisor

**CARLETON UNIVERSITY
May 30, 2001**

ABSTRACT

Though he was very critical of Kantian morality, it was Deleuze's point of view that an ethics of immanence could be argued for consistently, and thus, he certainly believed that moral theories that rely on a transcendental development of "good" and "evil," could be replaced with an immanent ethical distinction of "good" and "bad." In agreement with Deleuze, I argue that his immanent ethics offers a consistent philosophical framework, by which we can still make ethical evaluations without reliance on absolute or transcendent moral distinctions. In order to understand the concepts that Deleuze uses to articulate his immanent ethics, it is important to understand the Kantian framework to which he is replying. Along with Deleuze, I use, as a critique of Kant, Hegel's discussion of the Kantian morality. I argue that Deleuze, though vigorously opposed to Hegel on most philosophical points, shares with Hegel, a thin line of development, in the sense that both authors argue that morality requires a more concrete development than Kant offers.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author wishes to thank Dr. Bela Egyed for his thoughtful and helpful advice during the writing of this work. I would also like to thank Dr. Tom Darby, Dr. Rebecca Kukla, and Dr. Richard Manning for their suggestions. Furthermore my gratitude extends to Elizabeth Kim, Anna Blaszczyńska, Mark Foster, Marica, Joseph and Darlene Knezetic, for their support, assistance and encouragement.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Title Page	Page i
Acceptance Form	Page ii
Abstract	Page iii
Acknowledgments	Page iv
Table of Contents	Page v
Introduction	Page 1
Chapter One	Page 4
Section One: The “Canon of Pure Reason”	Page 4
and the Moral View of the World	
Section Two: The Problem of Freedom	Page 36
Chapter Two	Page 48
Section One: The Highest Good and the	Page 48
Postulates of Pure Practical Reason	
Section Two: Hegel’s Criticism of the Kantian Morality	Page 77
Chapter Three	Page 98
Section One: Deleuze’s Reaction to the Kantian Morality	Page 98
Section Two: Deleuze’s Conception of Immanent Ethics	Page 111
Section Three: Deleuze’s Model of the Body	Page 118
Section Four: The Typology of Immanent Forces	Page 130
Conclusion	Page 141
Bibliography	Page 143

INTRODUCTION

This essay will explore Deleuze's presentation of an immanent ethics in order to demonstrate, on one level, that it is directed against the transcendent values of morality in general, and on another level, Deleuze advances an ethical theory that is not moral, but ethical in the sense that it incorporates distinctions of "good,"/"bad" in favour of transcendental concepts such as duty, evil, and moral law that determine whether an action has moral worth. This, I believe, can be displayed through a careful comparative analysis of the Kantian morality, and Deleuze's subsequent development of an immanent ethics. Also, it is my contention that Deleuze's ethics is best understood as both a reply to the Kantian moral project, and a continuation of it by other means. The first chapter of this paper will deal with the main Kantian moral concepts, in order to trace a line of development between the arguments that Kant presents for his defence of morality. This chapter will present the Kantian morality from its earlier expressions in the "Canon of Pure Reason," in the First Critique, through parts of the *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals* and through the *Critique of Practical Reason*. By the end of this chapter, the line of development will establish some of the key connections between fundamental Kantian concepts, such as, the role of reason in determining morality, duty, and the categorical

imperative. This chapter will also focus Kant's employment of these concepts to highlight his key distinction between the law of freedom and the law of nature. The problem of freedom is taken up in section two of this chapter.

The second chapter is divided into two sections. The first section discusses Kant's presentation of the highest good. The argument here is that Kant believes that the highest good can have no empirical content. Moreover, this section deals extensively with the postulates of pure practical reason: Immortality of the soul, freedom, and the existence of God. The argument here is that Kant's transcendental development of morality is highly formalistic, making it impossible for a finite rational being to realize the highest good. It is argued, that this is primarily the reason why Kant requires the postulates as justified assumptions of reason, because the striving towards the highest good cannot be completed by a finite rational being. The second section discusses Hegel's criticism of Kant's position. Hegel's critique centers around four points: Kant's presentation of freedom, the formalism of duty, the highest good, and what Hegel terms the "beautiful soul." Moreover, through Hegel's criticisms, we come to understand an important tension present in the Kantian morality, the tension between willing a moral view of the world and attempting to put such a view into practice. Also, it is Hegel's view that the Kantian morality requires a more concrete development, which is presented in Hegel's discussion of ethical life.

The third chapter is divided into four sections. The first section outlines Deleuze's criticisms in regard to the Kantian idea of critique. It is argued here that Kant instituted a turn in philosophy by conceiving of an immanent critique, yet that critique is never fully realized, because he relied on the questionable assumption about the hegemony of reason. It is here that we can see Deleuze's continuation of Kant by carrying on the critical project through other means. The second section presents the idea of an immanent ethics in general terms, in the sense that a split between soul/mind and body is reformulated in an ethics of immanence into the doctrine of parallelism. Section three argues that an immanent ethics is a consistent alternative to transcendental moral structures, and that we can produce evaluative judgments from it. The two questions that form the cornerstones of Deleuze's ethics are: How are modes of existence determined, and how are modes of existence evaluated. Section four provides the model of the body as an answer to the first question, by drawing on Deleuze's reconstruction of Nietzsche's and Spinoza's views. This argues that the concepts Deleuze appropriates from Nietzsche provide an evaluative structure by which we can judge modes of existence, from an immanent point of view according to a typology of forces. Finally, a possible position of compromise between Kant and Deleuze is articulated.

Chapter 1

SECTION 1: THE “CANON OF PURE REASON” AND THE MORAL VIEW OF THE WORLD

The goal of this work is to offer a comparative evaluation of Kant’s moral philosophy and Deleuze’s reply to that philosophy. In order to achieve this goal, it is important to define the terms transcendent and transcendental. What is the difference between these terms? Transcendent refers to that which is absolute, external and superior, such as the Christian God. What is transcendental is both independent of experience and a condition of experience. These definitions are traditionally Kantian. One example of the transcendental, in Kantian thought, would be the a priori conditions of space and time as the conditions for the possibility of experience. The distinction between transcendent and transcendental is maintained throughout this work, but I am here concerned with Kant’s moral philosophy.

Among the earliest expressions of Kant’s mature views on morality is found in the “Canon of Pure Reason,” a section of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Kant’s concern is to present an elucidation of the structure of a theory by which, philosophy can be directed towards moral ends. For Kant, moral ends constitute the proper goal of philosophical

discourse. Kant's reasoning in the "Canon of Pure Reason" begins with a similar claim expressed in the dialectic chapter of the *Critique of Practical Reason*.

For Kant, speculative reason defines the boundaries of thought, and guards against errors that our thinking might commit; however, its employment does not present us with truth. Reason does not supply content to its objects in its speculative use. To illustrate, Kant draws the reader's attention to the example of formal logic. Logic, as the rules along which thought may proceed, abstracts all content from an argument, and is concerned only with its form. However, such a procedure of thinking does not give us a point from which we can argue that reason has a legitimate use in the real world. Thus, Kant states that reason, to be used legitimately in the world, must be practical. Determining the nature of this legitimate use is difficult, because reason, in its speculative use posits certain objects as final ends, for which no content can be given. In other words, reason is directed towards a final end in its speculative use. Speculative reason in its transcendental use is directed towards three objects. Kant presents his point in the following:

The final aim to which in the end the speculation of reason in its transcendental use is directed concerns these three objects: the freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of God. With regard to all three the merely speculative interest of reason is very small, and with respect to this an exhausting labor of transcendental research, hampered with unceasing hindrances, would be undertaken only with difficulty, since one would not be able to make any use of the

discoveries that might be made which would prove its utility in concerto, i.e., in the investigation of nature.¹

It is these postulates, Kant will argue in the dialectic, that reason is justified in assuming. Based on the premise that the highest good and the moral law require these postulates, Kant proceeds to give them, in this early work, a transcendental development, which, he admits, is riddled with difficulties.

The manifestations of the postulates, Kant continues, must be explained as all other appearances are explained under unalterable laws. However, this does not tell us what the postulates are in themselves. For our speculative reason the postulates remain transcendent and are of no immanent use. The objects that the postulates represent are transcendent, and are beyond our conditions of sensibility, in the sense that no intuition can be ascribed to the objects.

In a word, these three propositions always remain transcendent for speculative reason, and have no immanent use, i.e., one that is permissible for objects of experience and therefore useful in some way, but are rather, considered in themselves, entirely idle even though extremely difficult efforts of our reason. If, then, these three cardinal propositions are not at all necessary for our **knowing**, and yet are insistently recommended to us by our use of reason, their importance must really only concern the **practical**.²

¹ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, ed. and trans. Paul Guyer and Allen M. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998) 673.

² Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* 674.

The postulates, then, are necessary for our practical use. Reason posits the postulates, yet we can know nothing about them. The function that the postulates serve, then, is practical, for there is no other function that the postulates can serve, since mere speculation of the postulates is idle, yet the postulates are, nonetheless posited by reason for its purposes. Kant's argument, then, is that if the postulates are a necessary demand of reason, they must have a function within his theoretical framework. Therefore, the function of the postulates is practical. Kant argues for this point by distinguishing between the uses of reason, as directed towards empirical ends, and as directed towards intelligible ends.

In its empirical use, reason is regulative, and can only produce the unity of empirical laws: Such, for example, is the doctrine of prudence, which combines all our ends in the single use of happiness. This employment of reason discloses pragmatic laws of conduct towards a given end, but does not disclose laws that hold consistently *a priori*. In contrast, reason employed towards intelligible ends implies the moral law, for this stance implies reason in its practical use, and permits a canon, that will not be subject to empirical laws. In confirmation of this point, Kant states:

Pure practical laws, on the contrary, whose end is given by reason completely *a priori*, and which do not command under empirical conditions but absolutely, would be products of pure reason. Of this

sort, however, are the moral laws; thus these alone belong to the practical use of reason and permit a canon.³

Kant continues,

Thus the entire armament of reason, in the undertaking that one can call pure philosophy, is in fact directed only at the three problems that have been mentioned. These themselves, however, have in turn their more remote aim, namely, **what is to be done** if the will is free, if there is a God, and if there is a future world. Now since these concern our conduct in relation to the highest end, the ultimate aim of nature, which provides for us wisely in the disposition of reason is properly directed only to what is moral.⁴

The above quotation is suggestive, and highly important in the sense that Kant highlights what, in his view, is the proper end of philosophy. Philosophy has as its proper end morality, which necessitates the three postulates highlighted above. The argument here is that if philosophy is to be directed towards moral ends, then the proper domain of philosophy is to clarify and establish solutions to concrete problems of moral conduct in the world. The passage implies that morality will have an intricate connection to the highest end of nature, and to the postulates of practical reason. One can argue that Kant is at this point providing the framework for his subsequent discussions of morality. Moreover, one may pause for a moment and consider the rhetoric that Kant uses in this passage. The

³ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* 674.

⁴ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* 674-75.

question “what if” the postulates exist is suggestive, in the sense that at this point they are an assumption of reason, that will have to be given a development of some kind. Moral actions, of course, should take place in the real world. Kant’s argument is that if moral actions are to be possible the conditions for morality must be possible. Therefore, reason in its employment towards moral ends determines that the postulates are necessary conditions for morality. For Kant, however, the postulated objects are “foreign” to transcendental philosophy, but they require a transcendental development to avoid empirical or psychological development. Kant writes:

However, since we now cast our attention upon an object that is foreign to transcendental philosophy, caution is necessary in order not to digress into episodes and injure the unity of the same system, but on the other side also in order not to say too little about the new material, thus allowing it to fail in clarity or conviction. I hope to achieve both by being as close as possible to the transcendental and setting aside entirely what might here be psychological, i.e., empirical.⁵

The claim that Kant makes is the following: the development of morality must be free of any empirical determinations. The reason for this is that any theory based on empirical evidence will not be a priori, and universal, since the conditions for morality have to be binding on all rational agents. This argument becomes the guiding theme throughout

⁵ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* 675.

Kant's theoretical writing's on morality, since the morality that Kant argues for must, in his view, be transcendental for the above reason.

To begin this development Kant considers the status of the postulate of freedom, and claims that the sense of "freedom" that he will employ is practical, and that freedom in its transcendental sense is a problem of reason, for it cannot be fully elucidated as a foundation for empirical actions. This point however, does not compromise freedom in its practical use, and to make his case, Kant distinguishes between freedom as a rational decision and sensible choices of inclination. Kant distinguishes this point in the following:

A faculty of choice, that is, is merely **animal**...which cannot be determined other than through sensible impulses, i.e., **pathologically**. However, one which can be determined independently of sensory impulses, thus through motives that can be represented by reason, is called **free choice**...and everything that is connected with this, whether as a ground or a consequence, is called **practical**.⁶

He continues,

Practical freedom can be proved through experience. For it is not merely that which stimulates the senses, i.e., immediately affects them, that determines human choice, but we have a capacity to overcome impressions on our sensory faculty of desire by representations of that which is useful or injurious even in a more remote way; but these considerations about that which in regard to our whole condition is desirable, i.e., good and useful depend on reason. Hence this also yields laws that are imperatives, i.e., objective **laws of freedom**, and

⁶ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* 675.

that say **what ought to happen**, even though perhaps it never does happen, and that are thereby distinguished from **laws of nature**, which deal only with that **which does happen**, on which account the former are also called practical laws.⁷

Kant carefully distinguishes between laws of freedom and laws of nature. The proper understanding of morality is in its connection to the law of freedom. For Kant, the moral realm is not the product of determinations under the law of nature, but is rather that which has no determinations of nature present in it: The law of freedom. There is present here a key distinction between what ought to happen and what does happen. Morality, properly considered, is possible if rational beings are capable of the free choice that, according to Kant, they have. Morality can be defined as the following: Morality is a normative discourse, concerned with the establishment of rules which employ the opposition good and evil, as absolute and transcendent values. In addition, morality is concerned with the proper employment of duties and obligations. This is morality in its Kantian sense and in a more general sense. Morality, then, is concerned with what ought to happen in the world. Kant means that what ought to be the case has precedence over what is the case, in the sense that it is a rational beings disposition in regard to an action performed rather than the consequences of action that are important. Moral actions will, of course, have to be a part of decisions that are made in the world, but Kant is at this

⁷ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* 675-76.

stage concerned with the elucidation of a consistent moral view of the world. The premise for morality as a precursor to moral action is what ought to happen, not what does happen. The distinction is made to separate moral decision making from utilitarian ends. Kant argues that the premise of “what ought to be,” should be one of the starting points of our thoughts in regard to actions.

The question that can be posed to Kant is the following: Does freedom play a foundational role in determining the transcendental development of morality? The answer that Kant gives is subtle and provides a twofold structure. Kant argues, that we can set aside the question of freedom since the question properly belongs to the speculative use of reason. “We...cognize practical freedom through experience, as one of the natural causes, namely as a causality of reason in the determination of the will.”⁸ The question of whether a foundation for freedom can be articulated is not at issue, largely because the very question of foundation itself is a question for speculative reason to consider. The proof of freedom itself is practical. The argument, for Kant, is that we are already presented with the proof of freedom in its practical employment; speculative reason, however, demands that a foundational ground be articulated. For Kant, however, the debate is concerned with a foundation of a fact of practical reason that is already

⁸ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* 676.

established. Freedom cannot be given a permanently satisfactory speculative development, but this is deliberation about a proof whose existence is determined through the employment of practical reason, and is therefore, a fact of reason. The distinction can be made by reference to an example. Suppose that two people are sitting in a building debating the aspects of how the structure is made to stand without collapsing. Though they may be debating the speculative points of how a foundation could be constructed to stand for extended periods of time, their practical reason determines that they are in a building that is standing, and not collapsing as they debate the problems of speculative theory in regard to the methods used in its construction. Accordingly, it is a rational assumption to argue that the speculative theory that results in the construction of the building has shown that the foundation of the building is solid, though our two debaters have not yet determined what that foundation is, and if they are sufficiently ignorant of the subtleties of engineering and architectural theory, perhaps never will. This however, does not change the determination of their practical reason, but only encourages speculative reason to continue its search for answers.

For Kant, then, the distinction is the following: from the point of view of practical reason, freedom's proof is in the experience of the law of freedom's determination of our will. From the point of view of speculative reason, freedom is a rational assumption, which

speculative reason can continue to question, but speculative reason cannot dismiss freedom as a fact of reason from the point of view of practical freedom. This is not necessarily a favouring of practical over speculative reason without justificatory arguments if we remember the goal, which Kant set for philosophy in general. The purpose of philosophy is practical in the sense that it is seeking the moral, which is a concrete question in regard to how one should act in the world. Concrete questions of morality are practical questions, and, for Kant, philosophy is concerned with addressing these concrete problems directly. From the practical point of view freedom is a fact of reason, in that freedom is a necessary condition for the possibility of morality. If the end of philosophy is the moral, then practical reason posits necessary facts that are indispensable for that end. From the point of view of speculative reason this may be a rational assumption, but one whose proof is possible through practical reason, and therefore justified, from Kant's point of view. Kant in a later work argues that it is in the nature of reason to project fundamental antinomies, which, "all the metaphysical art of the most subtle distinction cannot prevent."⁹ Speculative reason will always question whether freedom has a foundation, and present the form of the question of freedom in an antinomy; The law of freedom as opposed to the law of nature.

⁹ Immanuel Kant, . *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, trans. Paul Carus. rev. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1977) 79.

Kant has argued that the general structure of philosophy should be directed towards the moral. If this is the case, there are three questions that are in the interests of practical and speculative reason: 1. What can I know? 2. What should I do? and 3. What may I hope?¹⁰ Kant believes he has exhausted the first question in the process of writing the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The second question is a practical moral question, yet not transcendental. This point is taken up in his later works on morality. For the moment Kant's primary concern in the "Canon of Pure Reason," is the third question, which implies the highest good, one of the cornerstones of Kant's presentation of morality.

Kant states that all hope concerns happiness. The distinction that he draws at this point is between pragmatic happiness and the worthiness to be happy:

Happiness is the satisfaction of all our inclinations...The practical law from the motive of **happiness** I call pragmatic (rule of prudence); but that which is such that it has no other motive than the **worthiness to be happy** I call moral (moral law). The first advises us what to do if we want to partake of happiness; the second commands how we should behave in order to even be worthy of happiness. The first is grounded on empirical principles, for except by means of experience I can know neither which inclinations there are that would be satisfied nor what the natural causes are that could satisfy them. The second abstracts from inclinations and natural means of satisfying them, and considers only the freedom of a rational being in general and the necessary conditions under which alone it is in agreement with the distribution of happiness

¹⁰ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* 677.

in accordance with principles, and thus **can** rest on mere ideas of pure reason and be cognized *a priori*.¹¹

Being moral does not imply that a rational agent will gain happiness. For Kant, the worthiness to be happy is not of itself a complete good, but implies that a moral disposition already exists by which the virtuous person becomes worthy of happiness. This implies both purposiveness in nature, and a wise author of the world, in the sense that there is nothing in nature alone that could account for this arrangement.

Now, belief in God is a doctrinal belief, which is subjective. Kant writes,

Now we must concede that the thesis of the existence of God is a doctrinal belief. For although with regard to theoretical knowledge of the world I have nothing **at my command** that necessarily presupposes this thought as the condition of my explanations of the appearances of the world, but am obliged to make use of my reason as if everything were mere nature, purposive unity is still so important a condition of the application of reason to nature that I cannot pass it by...I know of no other condition for this unity that could serve me as a clue for the investigation of nature except insofar as I presuppose that a highest intelligence has arranged everything in accordance with the wisest ends.¹²

The existence of God is established by a deductive argument based on an analogy. If reason is applicable in nature, then nature must have a purposive unity, if nature has a purposive unity then God exists. This deduction however, rests on the analogical

¹¹ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* 677-78.

¹² Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* 688.

assumption that purposive unity can only be the result of God ordering nature. This analogous assumption is doctrinal belief. Thus, purposive unity is analogous to God's existence. The point I wish to stress is that Kant's argument presupposes the importance of a transcendental development over nature, which relies on rational faith. This rational faith is a subjective aspect of our moral disposition. God in this earlier work on morality serves as the unifying factor between freedom and nature, and between happiness and virtue. These points will become increasingly important as we develop our discussion.

Kant continues his presentation in two major works dealing with moral and ethical philosophy. The *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*, and the *Critique of Practical Reason* lay out both the fundamentals of Kant's moral philosophy, and attempt to expand his philosophy into a more general position. The purpose in these works is to demarcate in more detail, what the requirements for morality are. Moral themes that are present in the "Canon of Pure Reason" are given a more extensive treatment. For Kant, moral law is the guide to the possibility of morality, or more accurately, the consciousness of the moral law serves as a differentiation between actions that have moral worth and actions that do not. Two main points concern Kant in his attempt to elucidate the nature of the moral law. First, the moral law must be free from any empirical determinations, and second, for the moral law to be a coherent idea in his moral philosophy, rational agents

cannot act otherwise than under the idea of freedom. Kant gives a number of reasons why the moral law must be free of any empirical determinations. He writes:

Since I am here primarily concerned with moral philosophy, the foregoing question will be limited to a consideration of whether or not there is the utmost necessity for working out once a pure moral philosophy that is wholly cleared of everything which can only be empirical and can only belong to anthropology. That there must be such a philosophy is evident from the common idea of duty and of moral laws. Everyone must admit that if a law is to be morally valid, i.e., is to be valid as a ground of obligation, then it must carry with it absolute necessity. He must admit the command, "Thou shalt not lie," does not hold only for men, as if other rational beings had no need to abide by it, and so with all other laws properly so called. And he must concede that the ground of all obligation here must therefore be sought not in the nature of man nor in the circumstances of the world in which man is placed, but must be sought a priori solely in the concepts of pure reason.¹³

The moral law is not the product of empirical determinations, largely because the motives and inclinations of rational beings change, depending on the circumstances within which they are placed. Since the moral law must hold equally in all cases, Kant argues that it must be determined a priori, since any a posteriori determination of the moral law would be subject to change in accordance with the empirical inclination of a rational being. If this were the case, the moral law could at best be only a subjective maxim. However, a subjective maxim is not binding objectively on the will of rational beings, as an absolute

¹³ Immanuel Kant, *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1993) 2.

law. Thus, rather than absolute laws, Kant defines subjective maxims as practical rules, which rational agents apply to themselves in order to determine courses of action. Kant writes:

A practical rule is always a product of reason because it prescribes action as a means to an effect, which is its purpose. But for a being in whom reason alone is not the determining ground of the will, this rule is an *imperative*, that is, a rule indicated by an “ought” which expresses objective necessitation to the action and signifies that if reason completely determined the will the action would without fail take place in accordance with this rule. Imperatives, therefore, hold objectively and are quite distinct from maxims, which are subjective principles.¹⁴

In the above passage, Kant distinguishes between practical principles and imperatives. Imperatives, for Kant, hold objectively. Practical principles that we prescribe for rational beings, are essentially utilitarian in practice, namely they are specific courses of action for maximizing specific effects. A rational being¹⁵ may, in this sense, adopt a specific maxim, and attempt to use it to guide actions; nevertheless, the maxim is always subject to change if circumstances arise which contradict the maxim. For example, if a rational agent determines that she/he desires wealth, that agent may reason out specific courses of action, which lead toward a desired goal and pursue them. The employment

¹⁴ Immanuel Kant, “Critique of Practical Reason,” *Practical Philosophy* ed. and trans. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999) 154.

¹⁵ I use the terms finite rational being and rational being synonymously. The only exception would be a rational being with a perfectly holy will, properly speaking, God.

of reason, in this case, is the pursuit of its goal based upon inclinations or desires which are always subject to changes of circumstance, and for this reason, Kant argues for the avoidance of arbitrariness in moral decision-making. In other words, any maxim that can have exceptions does not qualify as an imperative that has the absoluteness of moral law. For this reason, Kant also argues, that even if there were to be universal consent among individuals in regard to an empirically determined maxim, this universal consent would still be insufficient as a basis for a moral law, since consent could change due to the inclinations of individuals within the group.

Empirical grounds are not fit for any universal external legislation and are no more fit for internal lawgiving; for each puts at the basis of inclination his subject-another, another subject-and even within each subject now the influence of one inclination preponderates and now that of another. To discover a law that under this condition would govern them all-that is to say, with omnilateral concord-is quite impossible.¹⁶

Therefore, maxims based on empirical determination do not have the status of laws because such maxims are not determined a priori. However much consent a maxim can gain it is still insufficient for Kant's purposes. For example, one can envision examples of communities that may, through mutual agreement, live in accordance with a good moral code, and we can as observers, applaud such attempts. However, Kant's concern is that even a benevolent community of individuals is subject to changing empirical circumstances,

¹⁶ Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason," 161.

and without a universal reference point such as the moral law, which can be demonstrated a priori and absolutely necessary, even a good moral code is in danger of being arbitrarily changed if the need arises. Since, as humans, we are fallible, objective and necessary principles are needed to check the moral worth of our actions. Kant does, in fact, come close to arguing that it is in severity and suffering that moral worth may be identified.¹⁷ In regard to our hypothetical community, Kant might pose the question: How much suffering could a community endure, and still act out of a true sense of duty and in accordance with the moral law? Such questions are necessary, for, the only thing in the world that can be regarded as good in itself would be a good will. Kant writes:

There is no possibility of thinking of anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be regarded as good without qualification, except a *good will*...A good will is good not because of what it effects or accomplishes, nor because of its fitness to attain some proposed end; it is good only through its willing, i.e., it is good in itself.¹⁸

Only a perfectly good will would not require objective principles to determine its maxims. However, since a perfectly good will is not possible for finite rational beings who are subject to empirical inclinations, objective principles are needed to guide actions. The

¹⁷ In the "Critique of Practical Reason", Kant gives the example of an honest man who holds to his honesty in the face of overwhelming odds, and states that, "from this it follows that if the law of morals and the image of holiness and virtue are to are to exercise any influence at all on our soul, they can do so only insofar as they are laid to heart in their purity as incentives, unmixed with any view to ones own welfare, for it is in suffering that they show themselves most excellently." 265.

¹⁸ Kant, *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals* 7.

good will seems, for Kant, to assume the status of a postulate of pure practical reason, and it requires some discussion here to see exactly what Kant means by a good will. For Kant, a good will is a needed condition for the possibility of morality. Like the postulates of God, freedom, and the immortality of the soul, the possibility of a good will must be assumed if a universal moral law is to be possible. From the point of view of speculative reason, “the good will,” may be able to attain the status of a rational assumption that reason is justified in assuming, if philosophy is to be directed towards moral ends. On the other hand, the proof of the existence of a good will may be similar to the proof of freedom, namely that its proof lies in experiencing a good will, insofar as reason provides for this experience. Kant appears to suggest this move in the following:

Reason, however, is not competent enough to guide the will safely as regards its objects and the satisfaction of all our needs (which it in part even multiplies); to this end would an implanted natural instinct have led much more certainly. But inasmuch as reason has been imparted to us as a practical faculty, i.e., as one that is to have influence on the will, its true function must be to produce a will that is not merely good as a means to some further end, but is good in itself. To produce a will good in itself reason was absolutely necessary, inasmuch as nature in distributing her capacities has everywhere gone to work in a purposive manner.¹⁹

The existence of good will, for Kant, is the result of reason itself. The argument is similar in structure to the argument at the end of the “Canon of Pure Reason,” which

¹⁹ Kant, *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals* 9.

states, in lucid terms, that the only way in which our reason could be applicable to nature, is by supposing that an intelligent being has been responsible in structuring the universe in a way that makes the application of reason possible. Likewise, in the above passage, Kant suggests that the good will in itself may be the product of a purposive nature. The status of the good will is akin to the postulates of practical reason, in that Kant's development of the point comes very close to stating that the good will is a fact of reason. What is common to these two points is that Kant appears to be appealing to a posteriori argument, in order to make his case, for a postulate that is supposed to be determinable a priori. This is a complex issue, and it will be taken up again in context in the second chapter, when I discuss Kant's view of moral consciousness and of its origins. For the moment, however, it is sufficient to say that the idea of a good will leads Kant to the formulation of the categorical imperative.

The first formulation of the categorical imperative is "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become universal law."²⁰ This formulation of the categorical imperative is presented in a manner that makes it accessible to ordinary human reason, by which Kant means reason employed without the speculations of philosophy. Moreover, for Kant, ordinary human reason agrees with this law, for, on the basic level of daily interaction it is ordinary reason, not the speculations of philosophy

²⁰ Kant, *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals* 30.

that is discerning between possible courses of action. Moreover, the intention at this point is to present moral action as something that is accessible to all rational beings without the need for specialized training in philosophical matters. At this stage in his moral philosophy, Kant is concerned with ordinary human reason acting in accord with the categorical imperative. Kant writes,

Here mere conformity to law as such (without having as its basis any law determining particular actions) serves the will as principle and must so serve it if duty is not to be a vain delusion and chimerical concept. The ordinary reason of mankind in its practical judgments agrees completely with this, and always has in view the aforementioned principle.²¹

Moreover, the following passage applies well to the various formulations of the categorical imperative.²² The passage also serves to define subjective maxims and objective principles in their general form.

Practical *principles* are propositions that contain a general determination of the will, having under it several practical rules. They are subjective *maxims*, when the condition is regarded by the subject as holding only for his will; but they are objective, or practical *laws*, when the condition is cognized as objective, that is, as holding for the will of every rational being.²³

²¹ Kant, *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals* 14.

²² There are five formulations of the categorical imperative. I make reference to the first two explicitly in this chapter, and to the kingdom of ends formulation implicitly in the second chapter. For Kant's other formulations see, *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*.

²³ Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason," 153.

Here the subjective principle is the principle of volition, i.e., inclination to acquire a given object or end based on our desire to possess that object or that end. The objective principle, which would serve subjectively as a practical principle as well considers the relevance of an action in the light of duty, moral worth, and universality, i.e., whether a maxim can be universally determined as a principle for all rational beings. In the light of the above formulation of the categorical imperative Kant is concerned with following: Can the subjective maxim that we may choose for our actions hold consistently as universal law, and if so, can the maxim be considered as an imperative that we can act under? This concern stems from the attempt to make action accord with duty. For Kant, the attempt with this formulation of the categorical imperative, which may be referred to as the “Universal Law” formulation, is the endeavour to bring subjective maxims into accord with an objective principle that will hold universally for all rational beings. Very much like a skilled engineer attempting to balance a gyroscope, until the two ends form a perfect balance in the centre, Kant proceeds to balance the subjective maxims of rational beings with the objective principle, so that the two ends meet in the ethical considerations of rational beings. He writes:

Inexperienced in the course of the world and incapable of being prepared for all its contingencies, I only ask myself whether I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law. If not, then the maxim must be rejected, not because of any disadvantage accruing to

me or even to others, but because it cannot be fitting as a principle in a possible legislation of universal law, and reason exacts from me immediate respect for such legislation. Indeed I have as yet no insight into the grounds of such respect (which the philosopher may investigate).²⁴

The ground of our natural moral consciousness is not at this point brought into question, yet without grounding the “respect” for the universal law formulation of the categorical imperative, Kant still argues that people with ordinary human reason are aware that should they lie, cheat, steal, etc., such actions are done as an exception to a general rule. Further, such actions are not in accord with the concept of duty and the dictates of the objective principle.

It is important to note, that, at this point, the accessibility of morality to the ordinary person is vital for Kant’s theory. The philosopher may clarify concepts that make morality consistent, but if ordinary rational agents do not have access to morality in their daily actions, moral actions on a large scale would be difficult, since one would have to be a philosopher, to have the capability, or even the potential to act morally. Therefore, Kant presents an objective principle by which rational agents can test whether their actions are in accordance with duty.

²⁴ Kant, *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals* 15.

The objective principle that Kant presents is a logical test to discern whether a given course of action accords with duty. The uniqueness of the test is that the rational individual her/himself performs the logical test. Gilles Deleuze, though writing about the stronger sense of moral law presented in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, lucidly presents Kant's intention in presenting the universal law formulation. Deleuze states:

The moral law does not present itself as a comparative and psychological universal (for example: 'Do unto others! etc.). The moral law orders us to *think* the maxim of our will as 'the principle of a universal legislation'. An action that withstands this logical test, that is to say an action whose maxim can be thought without contradiction as universal law, is at least consistent with morality. The universal in this sense is a logical absolute.²⁵

What, then, are the implications of the Universal law formulation of the categorical imperative? Clearly, Kant's intention is to argue that subjective maxims alone are insufficient as guides to moral action that accords with duty. The subjective maxim alone is determined a posteriori and has as its goal an object. This is fine if we are only concerned with rational means directed towards utilitarian goals. However, the subjective maxim is inadequate for determining whether the pursuit of an object or end accords with duty. Kant writes:

²⁵ Gilles Deleuze, *Kant's Critical Philosophy*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999) 28.

An action done from duty has its moral worth, not in the purpose that is to be attained by it, but in the maxim according to which the action is determined. The moral worth depends, therefore, not on the realization of the object of the action, but merely on the principle of volition according to which, without regard to any objects of the faculty of desire, the action has been done.²⁶

The above quotation serves as an example, which highlights the distinction between rational being's actions and rational being's maxims. The subjective maxim does not take into account the concept of duty in this regard. By chance, the course of action may accord with duty, and conform to the objective principle, but this type of chance conformity is too weak for the type of moral idealism that Kant is presenting. Whether the effect of a given course of action happens to accord with duty is circumstantial, since the primary motive in the course of action was the desired effect, not the conscious accordance with duty as a primary motive regardless of the effect that is produced. Kant's primary concern is our mental disposition in regard to a course of action, regardless of the consequences that may occur as a result of a certain course of action. Therefore, duty cannot be derived from any empirical determination, or from any determination of the will that is produced by heteronomy, "namely dependence upon the natural law of following some impulse or inclination."²⁷ Consciousness of duty is a very specific form of mental

²⁶ Kant, *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals* 12-13.

²⁷ Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason" 166.

disposition that is present even to the most ordinary reason. Duty can in fact be a motive to action, but only in a unique sense, in that the motive cannot be derived from experience.

Kant emphasises the importance of duty in the following passage:

Now, one must first value the importance of what we call duty, the authority of the moral law, and the immediate worth that compliance with it gives a person in his own eyes, in order to feel that satisfaction in consciousness of one's conformity with and bitter remorse if one can reproach oneself with having transgressed it. Thus one cannot feel such satisfaction or mental unease prior to cognition of obligation and cannot make it the basis for the latter.²⁸

To act from duty is to act out of respect for the moral law, and "moral worth must be placed solely in this: that the action takes place from duty, that is, for the sake of the law alone."²⁹ Kant's juridical use of the term "law" is appropriate for his purposes. In transgressing a law, the subject is conscious, to itself, of wrongdoing, and the subject knows that it should have done otherwise. The court in Kant's case, however, is our own conscience. Likewise, duty is also the condition of a good will. A rational being's awareness of the moral law compels a respect for it, and acting in accord with the moral law confirms duty, as a motive, as long as the action is not based on any contingent principles. Kant recognizes the difficulties in deciding whether an action is done from duty or some contingent principle.

²⁸ Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason" 171.

²⁹ Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason" 205.

If we have so far drawn our concept of duty from the ordinary use of our practical reason, one is by no means to infer that we have treated it as a concept of experience. On the contrary, when we pay attention to our experience of the way human beings act, we meet frequent and- we ourselves admit- justified complaints that there cannot be cited a single certain example of the disposition to act from pure duty; and we meet complaints that although much may be done that is in accordance with what duty commands, yet there are always doubts as to whether what occurs has really been done from duty and so has moral worth.³⁰

For Kant the concept of duty is not based on any specific end. Or to be more precise, Kant does not argue that duty aims at a given object, i.e., success, happiness etc. Therefore, duty has no object, but must be considered either in conformity to, or as a result of, our natural moral consciousness. Respect for the moral law is wholly compatible with duty and is in fact the point where duty arises. Kant's exposition of what duty entails consists largely of practical anthropological examples, which put a strain on his point that duties must have a non-contingent status. Duty, Kant argues, is necessary if morality is to be possible at all, yet it is difficult to explicate how this is so. Kant provides us with various examples in an attempt to give a clear account of duty. For example, to tell the truth is a duty, and this duty is confirmed by the first formulation of the categorical imperative. Also, Kant distinguishes between perfect and imperfect duties, which are provided under the second formulation of the categorical imperative.

³⁰ Kant, *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals* 19.

The second formulation of the categorical imperative is “Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature.”³¹ This formulation of the imperative, which is referred to as the “law of nature” formulation, places the determination for a course of action through the will of the rational individual, and this formulation is intended to give a clear account of the concept of duty, which Kant believes is essential to promoting actions that will have moral worth. Kant draws a careful distinction between “perfect” and “imperfect” duties. A perfect duty, “permits no exception in the interest of inclination,”³² while an imperfect duty has vestiges of inclination for the rational being. For example, developing ones natural talents is an imperfect duty to oneself. Kant writes:

A third [man] finds in himself a talent whose cultivation could make him a man useful in many respects. But he finds himself in comfortable circumstances and prefers to indulge in pleasure rather than to bother himself about broadening and improving his fortunate natural aptitudes...He then sees that such a system of nature could indeed always subsist according to such a universal law...But he cannot possibly will that this should become a universal law of nature or be implanted in us as such a law by natural instinct. For as a rational being he necessarily wills that all his faculties should be developed, inasmuch as they are given him for all sorts of possible purposes.³³

³¹ Kant, *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals* 30.

³² Kant, *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals* 30.

³³ Kant, *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals* 31.

It is clear from the above, that Kant's explication of duty relies on anthropological assumptions about rational beings. The examples of perfect and imperfect duties are put to the test of the categorical imperative, yet how duty is judged is clearly discerned from examples. Kant recognizes this difficulty and argues that it is not the effect of a given course of action that is important. What is primarily of concern is the rational beings mental disposition in regard to the action. In other words, what counts is whether the action was performed from "pure" duty, i.e., out of respect for the moral law in the strictest sense. Undoubtedly, determining whether an action is performed from duty is extremely difficult, and this difficulty leads directly to the question: Is the concept of duty alone sufficient to motivate action? Since duty does not depend on the representation of an object to serve as the motive for action, what, then, is the motive for acting solely out of duty?

Kant's approach to this difficulty is to shift emphasis from effects of an action to the logical consistency of its maxim, that is, whether the maxim of the action conforms to the categorical imperative. Kant will argue that we recognize a conflict within ourselves as self-legislators if the moral law has been transgressed, and this conflict finds abstract expression as the categorical imperative. Korner, writing about the categorical imperative elucidates this point.:

First of all, it is not a maxim. It is a test, which is applicable to all maxims, without ambiguity. Every action conforms to or violates the

doer's maxims, and the maxims themselves conform to or violate the moral principle. An action can conform to the moral principle but only indirectly, i.e. *via* the maxim. If we are given a detailed description of a person's actions *without* being given the maxim, we are not in a position to pass moral judgment about it...Just as the formal principles of syllogistic reasoning divide all syllogisms clearly into two classes, the valid and the invalid, so, Kant believes, the formal principle of morality divides all maxims, and consequently all actions based on them, into those which are moral and those which are not.³⁴

This presentation of the categorical imperative is both clear and accurate. Also, the categorical imperative, conceived this way, emphasizes the move towards a strict logical test of rational beings actions. The logical test however, is not a maxim, it is the form by which maxims are judged, a form which shows us clearly whether a maxim will accord with duty, but not whether the maxim is motivated by the concept of duty itself, and therefore, this point focuses the problem in Kant's position all the more clearly. The need for a logical test, which determines whether an action is in accord with duty, suggests that duty alone is not of itself a sufficient motive for moral action.

Kant addresses the problem in the following manner: Only a wholly rational will that is absolutely good could act in all cases solely from the concept of duty. Such a will would in fact be a *holy* will, since it would need no imperatives to determine whether its

³⁴ Stephen Korner, *Kant* (London: Penguin Books, 1955) 135.

maxims were in accord with duty, and thus, such a will would act always from the concept of duty itself. In confirmation of this point, Kant writes:

The moral law is, in other words, for the will of a perfect being a law of *holiness*, but for the will of every finite rational being a law of *duty*, of moral necessitation and of the determinations of his actions through *respect* for this law and *reverence* for his duty. No other subjective principle must be assumed as incentive, for then the action can indeed turn out as the law prescribes, but since, though in conformity with duty it was not done from duty, the disposition to the action is not moral; and in this lawgiving it is really the disposition that matters.³⁵

This theme originating in the *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals* is reiterated here in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. Kant's argumentation is indeed valid in a strict logical sense, but the difficulty articulated above still remains. Given that we have a rational being's maxim, and the logical test of the categorical imperative, we can confirm whether an action is in accord with duty. However, Kant pushes the argument further, arguing that it is the moral disposition to act from the concept of duty itself that gives an action moral worth. Kant's concern is the moral disposition of rational beings. It is a rational beings moral disposition towards an action that makes the action moral. This point is to be distinguished from moral enthusiasm, which is a love of "moral" actions that is pathologically motivated, i.e., out of self-love or sympathy. This is not a true moral action motivated by duty. Therefore, to keep to the letter of the law is not enough. Kant states:

³⁵ Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason" 206.

We are indeed lawgiving members of a kingdom of morals possible through freedom and represented to us by practical reason for our respect; but we are at the same time subjects in it, not its sovereign, and fail to recognize our inferior position as creatures and to deny from self-conceit the authority of the holy law is already to defect from it in spirit, even though the letter of the law is fulfilled.³⁶

Kant has set the parameters for what qualifies as an action of moral worth. The categorical imperative serves to test the maxim of a rational being, and this we can grant Kant with consistency. Moreover, finite rational beings can only determine their actions in two ways, by their maxims, and by the categorical imperative. As self-legislators, rational beings balance these two concepts in order to produce an action that is in accord with duty. Kant's reasoning is intended to give an account of moral experience. This is why he focuses on the spirit of the moral law. The experience of morality lies in the moral disposition of rational beings. Kant's argument, then, is that if one is a rational being then one has a moral disposition. A moral disposition is one of the necessary aspects of being counted as a rational being. Moreover, a moral disposition implies that rational beings are free. The question of freedom is taken up in the next section.

³⁶ Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason" 206.

SECTION 2: THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM

The problem of freedom is at the centre of the question: Is moral law possible?

Essentially, to be capable of actions that have moral worth a rational being has to be able to choose to act in accordance with the moral law. In considering the criteria that are necessary for morality, Kant determines that freedom is the highest necessity for a being that has the capability to be moral. The law of causality demands that for every event there be another, antecedent event, from which it follows with necessity, and consequently it determines what happens to rational individuals as well, and so, it appears, on the surface, to be incompatible with freedom. Kant writes:

Since the mere form of the law can be represented only by reason and is therefore not an object of the senses and consequently does not belong among appearances, the representation of this form as the determining ground of the will is distinct from all the determining grounds of events in nature in accordance with the law of causality, because in their case the determining grounds must themselves be appearances. But if no determining ground of the will other than that universal lawgiving form can serve as a law for it, such a will must be thought as altogether independent of the natural law of appearances in their relations to one another, namely the law of causality. But such independence is called *freedom* in the strictest that is, in the transcendental sense. Therefore the will for which the mere lawgiving form of a maxim can alone serve as a law is a free will.³⁷

³⁷ Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason" 162.

Kant is in this passage reiterating the key points regarding freedom made earlier in the *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*. Freedom is necessary for a rational being that is capable of acting and legislating the moral law as a binding guide to action. The incompatibility of freedom with the law of causality places Kant into a unique position, in which, he presents freedom as a regulative ideal under which rational beings function. Kant writes:

And since morality must be derived solely from the property of freedom, one must show that freedom is also the property of the will of all rational beings. It is not enough to prove freedom from certain alleged experiences of human nature (such a proof is indeed absolutely impossible, and so freedom can be proved only a priori). Now I say that for such a being all the laws that are inseparably bound up with freedom are valid just as much as if the will of such a being could be declared free in itself for reasons that are valid for theoretical philosophy.³⁸

Kant continues,

I adopt this method of assuming as sufficient for our purpose that freedom is presupposed merely as an idea by rational beings in their actions in order that I may avoid the necessity of having to prove freedom from a theoretical point of view as well. For even if this later problem is left unresolved, the same laws that would bind a being who was really free are valid equally for a being who cannot act other wise than under the idea of its own freedom. Thus we can relieve ourselves of the burden, which presses on the theory.³⁹

³⁸ Kant, *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals* 30.

³⁹ Kant, *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals* 30.

Thus far, Kant is addressing the criteria that are necessary for the possibility of morality. Since it is impossible, from Kant's point of view, to give a theoretical proof of the reality of freedom, he adopts a unique position. Essentially, he claims that we cannot act except under the idea of our own freedom, and therefore, whether freedom is real does not matter, since from a practical point of view we act as if we were free. Because of this, Kant recognizes the limitations of his presentation of morality. He is only elaborating what would be needed for morality to be possible. However, two problems arise which force Kant extend his position in such a way that he is actually attempting to prove that freedom exists, not as a regulative ideal, but as a noumenal actuality.

The first problem that forces Kant into this position is the moral law itself, since for Kant, the moral law forces the concept of freedom upon us, "Freedom and the unconditioned practical law reciprocally imply each other."⁴⁰ The moral law allows us to know something about freedom, which essentially means that the moral law must then be the conceptual underpinning of freedom, yet we must be free for the moral law to be a possibility. Therefore, freedom must be in some sense the essence of the moral law. Kant poses the question, "I ask...from what [does] our *cognition* of the unconditionally practical *start*, whether from freedom, or from the practical law."⁴¹ Here we can draw a distinction

⁴⁰ Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason" 162.

⁴¹ Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason" 163.

between negative and positive freedom. Kant argues for positive freedom extensively, and since freedom is a needed condition of possibility for moral law, Kant's arguments will be considered in detail.

According to Kant, the third antinomy of the *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, establishes that freedom is possible if there is a noumenal world. Now we can consider the distinction between practical freedom and speculative freedom as a subset of the antinomy of law of nature and the law of freedom. Speculative reason may fall into this antinomy, but freedom is salvaged if considered from a certain point of view of practical reason. Kant argues for this in the following passage:

Now I may say without contradiction that all actions of rational beings, so far as they are appearances (encountered in some experience), are subject to the necessity of nature; but the same actions, as regards merely the rational subject and its faculty of acting according to mere reason, are free...the law of nature remains, whether the rational being is the cause of the effects in the sensuous world from reason, i.e., through freedom, or whether it does not determine them on grounds of reason. For if the former is the case, the action is performed according to maxims, the effect of which as appearance is always conformable to constant laws; if the latter is the case, and the action not performed on principles of reason, it is subject to the empirical laws of sensibility, and in both cases the effects are connected according to constant laws...in the former case reason is the cause of these laws of nature, and therefore free; in the latter, the effects following according to mere natural laws of sensibility, because reason does not influence it; but reason itself is not determined on that account by sensibility (which is impossible) and is therefore free in this case too.⁴²

⁴² Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics* 86.

He continues,

Thus practical freedom, viz., the freedom in which reason possesses causality according to objectively determining grounds, is rescued; and yet natural necessity is not in the least curtailed with regard to the very same effects, as appearances.⁴³

The proof of freedom is its practical expression within the subject. Freedom as a metaphysical problem only emerges when the subject is understood as being wholly under natural necessity. Thus, we can present Kant's arguments in the following way: 1. Consider moral experience and natural necessity as irreducible to one another, or 2. Consider them in tandem and accept the theoretically "unknown noumenal freedom" as an irreducible fact of reason, for progression past it is possible only in the sense that we have an experience of our own freedom. However, freedom for Kant has a law like structure and he argues for this in the third part of the *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*.

Kant writes:

The will is a kind of causality belonging to living beings insofar as they are rational; freedom would be the property of this causality that makes it effective independent of any determination by alien causes. Similarly, natural necessity is the property of the causality of all-non rational beings by which they are determined to activity through the influence of alien causes.⁴⁴

⁴³ Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics* 87.

⁴⁴ Kant, *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals* 49.

For Kant, then, this presentation of freedom is negative in the sense that arguing for freedom in this way does not tell us anything about the essence of freedom itself. However, out of this presentation of freedom arises a positive sense of freedom that is law like, and is, of itself, a type of causality. Kant writes:

Therefore freedom is certainly not lawless, even though it is not a property of the will in accordance with the laws of nature. It must, rather, be a causality in accordance with immutable laws, which, to be sure, is of a special kind; otherwise a free will would be something absurd...The proposition that the will is in every action a law to itself expresses, however, nothing but the principle of acting according to no other maxim than that which can at the same time have itself as a universal law for its object. Now this is precisely the formula of the categorical imperative and is the principle of morality. Thus a free will and a will subject to moral laws are one and the same.⁴⁵

Thus, for Kant, the law-likeness of this special kind of causality is revealed in its rational form by the categorical imperative. Now, to make the case for freedom, we have to consider, in more depth, the relation between freedom and the moral law as presented in the *Critique of Practical Reason*.

In this work, Kant places consciousness of *positive* freedom after consciousness of the moral law, of which we are immediately conscious even prior to our consciousness

⁴⁵ Kant, *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals* 49.

of positive freedom. Consciousness of the moral law, which is expressed in concrete form in the categorical imperative, necessarily implies positive freedom. Kant writes:

It is therefore *moral law*, of which we become immediately conscious (as soon as we draw up maxims of the will for ourselves), that *first* offers itself to us and, inasmuch as reason presents it as a determining ground not to be outweighed by any sensible conditions and indeed quite independently of them, leads directly to the concept of freedom.⁴⁶

This process allows us to have an “awareness” of freedom. To be actually free we have to be free in a transcendental sense, and such freedom could only have noumenal reality. It is the case that freedom cannot exist under phenomena, since as Kant has argued; phenomena are the progression of appearances under the law of causality. Further, how does consciousness of the moral law help us to cognize freedom in this sense? Moreover, freedom, if it exists, is noumenal. What then is the status of this noumenal freedom?

Kant has moved from arguing that freedom is a regulative ideal, to arguing that consciousness of the moral law proves not only the possibility of freedom, but its practical actuality as well. In terms of cognition, the rational being “cognizes” the moral law and has an awareness of freedom through that cognition. Moreover, this awareness is of a

⁴⁶ Kant, “Critique of Practical Reason” 163.

noumenal reality, which according to Kant's earlier writings rational beings have no access to. Kant writes:

But something quite different and paradoxical takes the place of this vainly sought deduction of the moral principle, namely that the moral principle, conversely itself serves as the principle of the deduction of an inscrutable faculty which no experience could prove but which speculative reason had to assume as at least possible (in order to find among its cosmological ideas what is unconditioned in its causality, so as not to contradict itself), namely the faculty of freedom, of which the moral law which itself has no need of justifying grounds, proves not only the possibility but the reality in beings who cognize this law as binding on upon them.⁴⁷

The argument is essentially following: The moral law does not need to be justified since even the most ordinary reason, as Kant has argued previously, is capable of discerning its presence as a guide to our action. Moreover, freedom and the moral law are interdependent, and therefore, cognition of the moral law which is cognition of a principle that is absolutely binding on our actions since it necessitates an awareness of freedom, not merely as a possibility, but as a reality. Thus, if the moral law is actually binding upon the will of a rational being, then freedom must be a reality as well, since it is inconsistent to argue that since moral law forces the concept upon us, moral law is actual yet freedom is only a regulative ideal. In other words, if rational beings are to be thought of as beings subject to their own self imposed moral law, then they must be free. Positive freedom,

⁴⁷ Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason" 178.

then, is in the strictest sense, a special kind of causality, which is independent of the law of natural causality that governs phenomena. Any argument less than this would simply be an indirect disputation concerning the role of natural necessity in determining the actions of rational beings. This position would offer no avenue open to the possibility of moral law since all actions could be represented as extensions of the natural causal order, and therefore, would be heteronomous.⁴⁸ Kant's position, then, must be to defend the idea of a freely acting cause that rests outside of the law of natural causality. Finite rational beings must, then, be considered in a dual manner: On the one side as phenomena, and therefore subject to the law of natural causality, and the other side as noumena, and therefore independent of the causal determination of the natural order. If rational beings can be thought as both phenomena and noumena, then, in this case, Kant has to defend the thought of a freely acting cause in order to account for the possibility of moral law. The only way for Kant to make this defence is to view rational beings from a dual perspective.

Kant writes:

We could defend the thought of a freely acting cause, when we apply this to a being in the sensible world, only insofar as that being is also regarded on the other side as noumenon, by showing that it is not self-contradictory to regard all actions as physically conditioned insofar as they are appearances and yet also regard their causality as

⁴⁸ Kant states in the *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*, "natural necessity is a heteronomy of efficient causes, inasmuch as every effect is possible only in accordance with the law that something else determines the efficient cause to exercise its causality." 49.

unconditioned insofar as the acting being is a being of the understanding, and thus making the concept of freedom a regulative principle of reason; by it I do not cognize at all the object to which the causality is attributed...I grant the mechanism of natural necessity the justice of going back from the conditioned to the condition ad infinitum, while on the other side I keep open for speculative reason the place which for it is vacant, namely the intelligible, in order to transfer the unconditioned into it.⁴⁹

By securing a place where unconditioned causality can be placed, namely the intelligible world, Kant believes he has found a position by which the reality of freedom can be maintained, however, a finite rational beings knowledge of freedom as an object of cognition is limited only to practical, not speculative reason. Kant continues:

But I could not *realize* this *thought*, that is, could not convert it into *cognition* of a being acting in this way, not even of its mere possibility. Pure practical reason now fills this vacant place with a determinable law of causality in an intelligible world (with freedom), namely the moral law. By this, speculative reason does not gain anything with respect to its insight but it still gains something only with respect to the *security* of its problematic concept of freedom, which is here afforded *objective* and, though only practical, undoubted *reality*.⁵⁰

Therefore, as we can see, given Kant's epistemological assumptions, the contradiction between the law of causality and freely acting cause, i.e. the will of a rational being conditioned by the moral law, is removed. As long as Kant maintains that finite

⁴⁹ Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason" 179.

⁵⁰ Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason" 179.

rational beings can be understood as phenomena and noumena, an assumption that carries through most of his major works, the *causa noumenon*, and natural necessity do not contradict one another. Kant makes this point by distinguishing between autonomy and heteronomy. Kant writes:

Now nature in the most general sense is the existence of things under laws. The sensible nature of the same beings in general is their existence under empirically conditioned laws and is thus, for reason, *heteronomy*. The supersensible nature of the same beings, on the other hand, is their existence in accordance with laws that are independent of any empirical condition and thus belong to the *autonomy* of pure reason.⁵¹

Kant has satisfied the conditions for morality if we consider the questions in terms of: What is needed if morality is to be consistent? However, the determining ground that is the freely acting causality of the will, remains theoretically unknowable to us. The implications of Kant's position then, are that in considering actions, the possibilities of determining whether an action is the result of the law of causality, or whether an action is the result of a noumenally unconditioned will which acts freely is unclear. However, Kant presents an argument that suggests, that knowing freedom is only a problem for speculative reason, and this should not affect our experience of freedom. For, "Here then is the limit of moral inquiry...reason should not flap its wings impotently...in a space that for it is

⁵¹ Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason" 174.

empty, namely, the space of transcendent concepts that is called the intelligible world...all knowledge ends at its boundary.”⁵²

Kant’s position in regard to freedom may be summarized in the following way: the third antinomy⁵³ tells us that there is a non-natural causality which is possible, and in this sense it is immutable. Theoretical reason, however, cannot tell us what it is, and in this sense only morality, in the strict sense of the moral law can tell us what it is. This “knowledge” of freedom is however, limited to practical, not theoretical reason. The assumption then, is that human freedom cannot be arbitrary, rather, it must be law like in some sense if it is to be reasonable, and therefore, our awareness of the moral law gives us an awareness of freedom, which is autonomy for the rational being.

⁵² Kant, *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals* 61.

⁵³ For a more extensive view of this point see *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, pages 80 and 85.

Chapter 2

SECTION 1: THE HIGHEST GOOD AND THE POSTULATES OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON.

Kant begins his discussion of virtue, of happiness, and of the highest good in the “Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason.” He is proceeding on the assumption that the reality of freedom and the moral law have been sufficiently established. The primary motive behind Kant’s discussion of the highest good is to argue that moral law, and therefore, morality, must be an actualizable. Deleuze writes:

It is still necessary that such a realization be possible. If it were not, the moral law would collapse of its own accord...Now the realization of moral good presupposes an accord between sensible nature (following its laws) and supersensible nature (following its law). This accord is presented in the idea of a proportion between happiness and morality.⁵⁴

As I have argued above, Kant has to posit a finite rational being’s existence as both noumena and phenomena, in order to account for the consciousness of duty, the moral law, and the possibility of freedom. Now this entails both the consciousness of a sensible world (under the law of causality) and of a supersensible world (under the law of autonomy). Kant, by maintaining the epistemological distinction between phenomena and noumena, was able to claim this without contradiction. However, even though the

⁵⁴ Deleuze, *Kant’s Critical Philosophy* 41-42.

contradiction has been removed, it has not been shown that morality is realizable in any concrete sense. The realization of morality has to depend on a connection between the supersensible and sensible worlds, not merely in the form of non-contradiction, but as an interaction that allows morality to be realized for the rational being. The success of Kant's moral philosophy depends on making this interaction clear, which could allow morality to be realized. For this possibility, virtue and happiness have to unite in a synthetic a priori proposition, determining what the highest good is. Happiness has its roots in the sensible world, and virtue has it in the supersensible. It is the possibility of a synthesis of these two concepts a priori that will determine whether Kant's morality is realizable. Kant gives his idea of the highest good in the following:

Virtue and happiness together constitute possession of the highest good in a person, and happiness distributed in exact proportion to morality (as the worth of a person and his worthiness to be happy) constitutes the *highest good* of a possible world, the latter means the whole, the complete good, in which however, virtue as the condition is always the supreme good, since it has no further condition above it, whereas happiness is something that, though always pleasant to the possessor of it, is not of itself absolutely and in all respects good but always presupposes morally lawful conduct as its condition.⁵⁵

The highest good, according to Kant, is the proper interaction of virtue and happiness that the rational being ought to strive for. Kant introduces the highest good

⁵⁵ Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason" 229.

because morality must be a realizable concept, in the sense that morality must be something concrete that is expressible in the real world. In other words, the highest good is Kant's attempt to construct a concrete ethics out of the moral theory that he has thus far presented. Ethics can be defined the following way: Ethics is concerned with how to live, and is in this sense, ethics is concerned with the opposition of relative values of good and bad. As such it is always confined to an individual or group. It will be remembered that in the "Canon of Pure Reason," Kant argued that what ought to be possible also must be possible, even if it does not conform with the world as it actually is. And, since, in Kant's view, moral conduct must be a possibility for the finite rational being, there must be some way in which this moral conduct can be realized. This, I believe, is the primary reason behind the introduction of the highest good in the second part of the *Critique of Practical Reason*. Kant states the following:

The moral law is the sole determining ground of the pure will. But since this is merely formal (that is to say, it requires only that the form of a maxim be universally lawgiving), it abstracts as determining ground from all matter and so from every object of volition. Hence, though the highest good may be the whole *object* of a pure practical reason, that is, of a pure will, it is not on that account to be taken as its *determining ground*, and the moral law alone must be viewed as the ground for making the highest good and its realization or promotion the object.⁵⁶

⁵⁶ Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason" 227- 28.

It is clear from this passage, that in Kant's view, the moral law alone abstracts from all empirical content the form of willing, and merely gives the finite rational being the form of his/her willing, which as was shown above, finds its logical expression in the categorical imperative. The moral law, then, is the determining ground of the highest good, but the highest good must be the object of pure practical reason, since, it is only through the promotion of an object that a finite rational being can give content to its willing of the moral law. Kant recognizes that his moral theory, which is embodied in the formal structure of the moral law, requires an object for its completion and application in the world, and this object is the highest good.

Moreover, Kant believes a discussion of the above three concepts, virtue, happiness, and the highest good can only strengthen his position concerning both the reality of freedom and the necessity of the moral law as a law for all rational beings. The entry point into the discussion of the highest good is a dialectical illusion that pure practical reason forces upon us. Pure practical reason seeks, as all reason does by its very nature, the unconditioned for its conditioned concepts. The unconditioned can never be found since it is by its very nature noumenal, and therefore, no object of intuition can be adequately ascribed to its concept, nevertheless, pure practical reason makes this demand. Speculative reason naturally extends to us questions that are beyond its own scope of

inquiry. The limits of speculative reason were demarcated in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In the *Critique of Practical Reason* Kant writes:

But reason in its practical use is no better off. As pure practical reason it likewise seeks the unconditioned for the practically conditioned (which rests on inclinations and natural needs), not indeed as the determining ground of the will, but even when this is given (in the moral law), it seeks the unconditioned totality of the object of pure practical reason, under the name of the *highest good*.⁵⁷

Pure practical reason leads us to seek the concept of the highest good. Therefore, it is necessary to examine what the highest good entails, since the moral law as the determining ground of the pure will, requires explication of this concept, that necessarily results from determination by moral law. The highest good is not the determining ground of the moral law. Kant stresses this point since any attempt to base the moral law upon the highest good is to slip into heteronomy, an error that was made frequently by the moderns and the ancients. Moreover, to avoid heteronomy the moral law leads to the highest good, in the sense that moral law cannot lead towards any contingent good in the empirical world.

Furthermore, the concept of the good is not merely an object, for included in the highest good is the supreme condition of the highest good itself: The moral law. In other words, the condition for the possible attainment of the highest good is acting in accordance

⁵⁷ Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason" 226-27.

with the moral law, and therefore, moral law and the principle of autonomy are already presupposed within the highest good. Kant writes:

It is, however, evident that if the moral law is already included as supreme condition in the concept of the highest good, the highest good is then not merely *object*: the concept of it and the representation of it is possible by our practical reason are at the same time the *determining ground* of the pure will because in that case the moral law, already included and thought in this concept, and no other object, in fact determines the will in accordance with the principle of autonomy. This order of concepts of the determination of the will must not be lost sight of, since otherwise we misunderstand ourselves and believe that we are contradicting ourselves even where everything stands together in perfect harmony.⁵⁸

Kant's concern, that the object of the highest good might be mistaken as the determining ground leading to moral law, is addressed in this passage. Thus far, Kant has been concerned with explicating the order of the highest good in relation to the moral law and has so far only considered its form. As stated above, the highest good consists of two parts, virtue and happiness. Both elements are different parts of the highest good, and cannot be cognized analytically, since the highest good cannot have present within it any contingent elements that might remove the moral law from its primary state as the ground of the highest good.

⁵⁸ Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason" 228.

Within this combination virtue has precedence over happiness, for to give precedence to happiness over virtue would be to make the highest good contingent on inclination, an error made by the Epicurean Greek schools of thought. Kant presents the problem this way:

The connection of virtue with happiness can therefore be understood in one of two ways: either the endeavour to be virtuous and the rational pursuit of happiness are not two different actions but quite identical, in which case no maxim need be made the ground of the former other than that which serves for the latter; or else that connection is found in virtue's producing happiness as something different from the consciousness of virtue, as a cause produces an effect.⁵⁹

Kant ascribes the idea, that our happiness is our virtue, to the Epicurean school of thought. By contrast, he takes the argument that our virtue is our happiness to be that of the Stoics. Neither position is sufficient for Kant's purposes. The Stoics based virtue on certain contingent ideals such as temperance, prudence, and honour. Kant considers these to be good traits, but only if based on strict adherence with duty and moral law. Both positions, Kant argues, are impossible if we are to determine the highest good as grounded by the moral law.

The first is *absolutely* impossible because (as was proved in the Analytic) maxims that put the determining ground of the will in the desire for one's happiness are not moral at all and can be the ground of no virtue. But the second is *also impossible* because any practical

⁵⁹ Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason" 229.

connection of causes and effects in the world, as a result of the determination of the will, does not depend upon the moral dispositions of the will but upon the knowledge of the laws of nature and the physical ability to use them for ones purposes; consequently, no necessary connection of happiness with virtue in the world, adequate to the highest good, can be expected from the most meticulous observance of moral laws.⁶⁰

Kant essentially rejects the formulations of the two Ancient Greek schools, since neither position appears to be free of contingent grounds for the highest good, however, out of the two schools Kant believes the Stoics are leaning in the right direction, but are inaccurate regarding the specifics that are necessary to constitute the highest good. Therefore, though the Epicurean school is absolutely false in its presentation, the Stoic school is only conditionally false. Kant argues in the following manner:

The first of the two propositions, that the endeavour after happiness produces a ground for virtuous disposition is *absolutely false*; but the second, that a virtuous disposition necessarily produces happiness, is false *not absolutely* but only insofar as this disposition is regarded as the form of causality in the sensible world, and consequently false only if I assume existence in the sensible world to be the only kind of existence of a rational being; it is thus only *conditionally false*.⁶¹

The presentation of this argument clearly connects the two books within the *Critique of Practical Reason*. Kant uses the same line of argument to justify the law of

⁶⁰ Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason" 231.

⁶¹ Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason" 232.

autonomy as freedom for the rational being whose will is conditioned by the moral law. The Stoic position is only conditionally false because the Stoics did not adequately consider that a rational being could be considered from two standpoints: 1. As a being under the law of nature and 2. As part of the intelligible world. Therefore, since a rational being can be considered as both phenomena and noumena, the position of the Stoics can be reformulated into Kant's moral philosophy. It is important to describe here Kant's reformulation of the Stoic position. Kant, like the Stoics, believes that there is a connection between happiness and the highest good, which is why, I think, he argues that the Stoic position is only conditionally false. Kant's reformulation of the Stoic position substitutes the worthiness to be happy for happiness itself. The Stoic argument is that happiness is the consequence of a virtuous life. Kant, on the other hand, believes that at most we can become worthy of happiness. This point will become important in the next section.

As argued above, the consistency of Kant's moral philosophy depends on the epistemological split between noumena and phenomena. Freedom as a reality, rather than as a regulative ideal, works consistently only if the rational being is perceived within this twofold structure. And, since the moral law necessarily implies freedom, freedom must be real, because the moral law is the formulaic expression of our natural moral consciousness, which is, in turn, based on actions performed strictly from the concept or "moral feeling"

that is duty. First, Kant argues that freedom is a regulative ideal that a rational being assumes when conducting their actions. Then he wants to make the stronger claim that a rational being cannot function except under the idea of its own freedom. The final formulation implies that the moral law necessitates an awareness of freedom, therefore, acting under the idea of our own freedom and actually being free is the same. However, since the law of causality determines all things in nature, Kant is placed into a position of having to rely on the existence of a noumenal freedom, which if it exists is transcendent. Freedom, in this sense, is a reality that is necessarily posited by pure practical reason. However, even though freedom can be thought of as real in this epistemological schema, it remains unknowable, for speculative reason can never connect the concept with an object of intuition.

Moreover, using the same structure of presentation, moral law necessitates the concept of the highest good. Kant posits the highest good as a goal, and for that reason he is somewhat sympathetic to the Stoic position: Its structure resembles his own. But, to make sense of his presentation of the moral law, Kant again has to assume that a rational being is to be considered under two aspects, the noumenal and the phenomenal. Kant writes:

Since I am not only warranted in thinking my existence also as a noumenon in a world of the understanding but even have in the moral

law a purely intellectual determining ground of my causality (in the sensible world), it is not possible that morality of disposition should have a connection, and indeed a necessary connection, 'as cause with happiness as effect in the sensible world, if not immediately yet mediately (by means of an intelligible author of nature) a connection which, in nature that is merely an object of the senses, can never occur except contingently and cannot suffice for the highest good.⁶²

Kant continues,

When we find ourselves compelled to go so far, namely to the connection with an intelligible world, to seek the possibility of the highest good which reason points out to all rational beings as the goal of all their moral wishes, it must seem strange that philosophers of both ancient and modern times could nevertheless have found happiness in precise proportion to virtue already in *this life* (in the sensible world), or persuaded themselves that they were conscious of it.⁶³

Kant solves the dialectical illusion by an appeal to the noumenal world. Happiness, even if it were the work of an intelligible author of the world, would still not suffice as part of the highest good. The apparent contradiction is only between appearances, but the contradiction disappears as soon as an appeal to noumena is made. In other words, the dialectical illusion presented by pure practical reason, which derives from the necessity of reason's positing an unconditioned for all conditioned, is solved by making a distinction between a sensible and an intelligible world. The dialectic is resolved in the above way.

⁶² Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason" 232.

⁶³ Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason" 232.

As Kant suggests there are two approaches to the highest good both emanating from the Greek schools. The first could not serve as a ground for the highest good because it is based on heteronomy. The second has the order of the syllogism correct but fails to recognize a world beyond the sensible, and is therefore unable to avoid contingency and heteronomy in the moral realm. However, the dialectical contradiction arises only if we cannot see beyond the phenomenal world, i.e., the world of natural necessity. By presenting a finite rational being as noumena, the dialectic disappears because an unconditioned ground is presented that can honour pure practical reason's request for an unconditioned ground for its conditioned grounds. Naturally, that ground is the moral law. Earlier, the problem of freedom was solved in the same way. A contradictory dialectic appears when rational beings are considered as both determined by the law of freedom and governed by natural necessity. However, this is only the case under phenomena. By appealing to the noumenal nature of rational beings, Kant demarcates an area where freedom can have reality, thus, the dialectic disappears, for freedom and natural necessity are no longer in conflict. Kant writes:

In the antinomy of pure speculative reason there is a similar conflict between natural necessity and freedom in the causality of events in the world. It was resolved by showing that there is no true conflict if the events and even the world in which they occur are regarded (and they should also be regarded) merely as appearances; for, one and the same acting being as *appearance* (even to his own inner sense) has a

causality in the world of sense that always conforms to the mechanism of nature, but with respect to the same event, insofar as the acting person regards himself at the same time as *noumenon* (as pure intelligence, in his existence that cannot be temporally determined), he can contain a determining ground of that causality in accordance with laws of nature which is itself free from all laws of nature.⁶⁴

It is by thinking a finite rational being in this way that makes it possible for the rational being to be subject to morality. As beings capable of moral choice, Kant determines that we must be capable of virtue, as a condition of morality. To be capable of moral choice, and to be conscious of one's virtue in this regard, produces contentment.

Kant identifies "contentment" with oneself as the satisfaction of being conscious of one's virtue. Furthermore, this contentment is the result of, "Freedom, and the consciousness of freedom as an ability to follow the moral law with an unyielding disposition, [this] is *independence from inclinations*."⁶⁵ However, this contentment is defined in the most abstract way, since no specific feeling can be ascribed to it. Moreover, contentment is not the result of pleasure or joy that would present itself when a rational being is conscious of performing his/her duty. Kant writes:

Even an inclination to conform to one's duty (e.g. to beneficence) can indeed greatly facilitate the effectiveness of moral maxims but cannot produce any. For in these everything must be directed to the representation of the law as determining ground if the action is to contain

⁶⁴ Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason" 232.

⁶⁵ Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason" 234.

not merely *legality* but also *morality*. Inclination is blind and servile, whether it is kindly or not; and when morality is in question, reason must not play the part of mere guardian to inclination but, disregarding it altogether, must attend solely to its own interest as pure practical reason.⁶⁶

Reason facilitates the moral disposition of individuals. Further, Kant has previously argued, and the point has been cited above, that the only true moral “feeling” is duty.⁶⁷ But such a feeling would by definition be a special type of inclination that is neither “blind nor servile;” since, it motivates us to act under the jurisdiction of the moral law, and it is not, therefore, an abstract concept that can be clearly identified. Moreover, the moral “feeling” and duty, if considered as separate entities would, nevertheless, complement one another in producing a moral action whose universal worth can be tested by the categorical imperative. The primacy of one over the other would be confusion, and Kant essentially presents them as identical concepts in a loose sense, i.e. one cannot be clearly distinguished from the other. Kant is burdened with this difficulty because of the way that he presents moral consciousness:

Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and reverence, the more often and more steadily one reflects on them: *the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me*. I do not need to search for them and merely conjecture them as though they

⁶⁶ Kant, “Critique of Practical Reason” 235.

⁶⁷ See my elucidation of moral “feeling” in chapter one for an expanded account of this point.

were veiled in obscurity or in the transcendent region beyond my horizon; I see them before me and connect them immediately with my existence...The second begins from my invisible self, my personality, and presents me in a world which has true infinity but which can be discovered only by the understanding and I cognize my connection with that world... as... universal and necessary⁶⁸

The above problem is a minor one, worth noting. However, it does not necessarily challenge Kant's position. Respect for the moral law is the motive for acting morally. To argue that it is difficult to identify an action done from duty, does not undermine the Kantian position. Since within Kant's framework, if we accept persons as rational, then we likewise accept that they have a moral disposition. This is why Kant argues that moral consciousness is accessible to even ordinary human reason. If this is Kant's position, then his concern is to articulate the conditions of possibility for morality, rather than to argue that a moral disposition exists.

To do this, Kant accords moral priority to pure practical reason over pure speculative reason. Reason, "as the faculty of principles, determines the interest of all the powers of the mind but itself determines its own."⁶⁹ Kant believes reason is an inherent faculty present in human beings can be taken for granted, and requires no defence here. What deserves careful consideration at this point is Kant's belief that reason postulates

⁶⁸ Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason" 269.

⁶⁹ Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason" 236.

determinations that are necessary for human beings, yet reason cannot provide intuitions as content to these concepts. Kant writes:

If pure reason of itself can be and really is practical, as the consciousness of the moral law proves it to be, it is still only one and the same reason which, whether from a theoretical or a practical perspective, judges according to a priori principles; and then it is clear that, even if from the first perspective its capacity does not extend to establishing certain propositions affirmatively, although they do not contradict it, *as soon as these same propositions belong inseparably to the practical interest* of pure reason it must accept them—indeed as something offered from another source, which has not grown on its own land but is yet sufficiently authenticated.⁷⁰

Kant continues,

Thus, in the union of pure speculative reason with pure practical reason in one cognition, the latter has primacy, assuming that this union is not *contingent* and discretionary but based a priori on reason itself and therefore *necessary*.⁷¹

Reason presents itself with concepts based on a priori principles, but it cannot of itself produce any content for these concepts, and moreover, recourse to empirical determinations is forbidden. Therefore, reason is a legislative faculty that cannot add empirical content to its determinations. Deleuze writes:

The form of universal legislation is a part of Reason. Indeed understanding itself cannot think anything determinate if its

⁷⁰ Kant, “Critique of Practical Reason” 237.

⁷¹ Kant, “Critique of Practical Reason” 237.

representations are not those of objects restricted to the conditions of sensibility. A representation that is not only independent of all feeling, but of all content and of every sensible condition, is necessarily rational. But here reason does not reason: the consciousness of the moral law is a fact, 'not an empirical fact, but the sole fact of pure reason, which by itself proclaims itself as originating law.'⁷²

Reason, in its practical legislation produces postulates, which, Kant argues, are absolutely necessary. Therefore, since duty, moral law, and freedom cannot be identified with any sensible conditions they must be postulated as "facts" of morality legislated by reason. By postulating these concepts as facts of morality Kant has, at the very least, established that these concepts are necessary determinations of reason, though beyond this not much can be said about their status, since these determinations only arise when a rational being is considered from the perspective of noumena. There are three postulates of pure practical reason: Immortality of the soul, freedom, and the existence of God. The second postulate freedom has been discussed above. The postulates are presented for three reasons 1. Pure practical reason legislates the postulates. 2. This legislation is necessary for the possibility of the highest good. 3. They are intended to provide a clear account of the possibility of morality, and are also intended, to discern whether a finite rational being can fulfill these qualifications.

⁷² Deleuze, *Kant's Critical Philosophy* 28.

The immortality of the soul is a necessary postulate since complete conformity with the moral law is the condition of a purely moral rational being. As argued above, such conformity would be *holiness* in the strictest sense. In addition, if such a case were possible, all the subjective maxims of a rational being would at all times emanate solely from duty and be in complete conformity with the moral law. Therefore, the categorical imperative would not be necessary as the logical test of our actions. In Kant's view, such a state of perfection is not possible for a finite being, since the inclinations form a powerful counterweight to the dictates of the moral law. Therefore, if pure morality is to be possible, the soul has to be thought immortal, so that the possibility of pure morality is not lost. If the possibility of a pure moral state, which is analogous to the highest good, were lost, pure practical reason would contradict itself since the "fact" of morality would be an impossibility. And, therefore, reason would postulate something that does not exist leaving only contingent grounds on which morality could be determined. Clearly, Kant cannot accept this, and therefore he argues for an "endless progress" towards a perfect state.

Kant writes:

This conformity must therefore be just as possible as its object is, since it is contained in the same command to promote the object. {highest good} Complete conformity with the moral law is, however, *holiness*, a perfection of which no rational being of the sensible world is capable at any moment of his existence. Since it is nevertheless required as practically necessary, it can only be found in an *endless progress*

toward that complete conformity, and in accordance with the principles of pure practical reason it is necessary to assume such a practical progress as the real object of our will. This endless progress is, however, possible only on the presupposition of the *existence* and personality of the same rational being continuing *endlessly* (which is called immortality of the soul, so that this, as inseparably connected with the moral law is a **postulate** of pure practical reason.⁷³

Kant continues,

For a rational but finite being only endless progress from lower to higher stages of moral perfection is possible. *The eternal being*, to whom the temporal condition is nothing, sees in what is to us an endless series the whole conformity with the moral law, and the holiness that his command inflexibly requires in order to be commensurable with his justice in the share he determines for each in the highest good is to be found whole in a single intellectual intuition of the existence of rational beings.⁷⁴

According to Kant, finite rational beings cannot achieve the highest good in this lifetime. These postulates divorce morality from a finite being's life and place its possible achievement in the immortality of the soul, since perfection, that is moral perfection, is only possible in conformity with God's will. At best, one can strive for the absolute good knowing that it cannot be achieved in this lifetime. The immortality of the soul has to be assumed for the sustainability of a moral life, and to be logically consistent Kant has to argue, that immortality can only be sustained by arguing for the existence of God as a

⁷³ Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason" 238.

⁷⁴ Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason" 239.

postulate of pure practical reason. Moreover, to promote the highest good as the object to which the moral law leads, the existence of God must be thought as possible. Kant writes:

The same law must also lead to the possibility of the second element of the highest good, namely **happiness** proportioned to that morality, and must do so as disinterestedly as before, solely from impartial reason; in other words, it must lead to the supposition of the existence of an cause adequate to its effect, that is it must postulate the *existence of God* as belonging necessarily to the possibility of the highest good (which object of our will is necessarily connected with the moral lawgiving of pure reason).⁷⁵

Happiness, as defined by Kant, is a rational being's existence in which everything goes according to that rational being's wishes. Under the law of causality or phenomena such happiness has no intrinsic connection to the moral law. However, since the highest good is legislated by pure practical reason as an "ought," happiness must have a connection with morality to complete the components of the highest good. Therefore:

The existence of a cause of all nature, which contains the ground of this connection, namely of the exact correspondence of happiness with morality, is also *postulated*. However, this supreme cause is to contain the ground of the correspondence of nature not merely with a law of the will of rational beings but with the representation of this *law*, so far as they make it the *supreme determining ground of the will*, and consequently not merely with morals in their form but also with their

⁷⁵ Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason" 240.

morality as their determining ground, that is, with their moral disposition.⁷⁶

The highest good is possible only under the assumption that there is an intelligent author of the world, which moreover, must also serve as a supreme cause of the natural order. The necessity of this assumption is dictated by pure practical reason as a need for the possibility of the highest good. Moreover, at this point, Kant accounts for the inconsistencies that have presented themselves concerning the status of duty. As argued above, duty has been described as both a moral feeling and an abstraction that motivates rational beings to act in accordance with the moral law. The last sentence of the passage quoted above places the ground of the moral disposition squarely as emanating from this supreme cause. In addition, only moral disposition can be the ground for the concept of duty, which until now has been unclearly defined. In other words, Kant compensates for duty, and moral consciousness, by arguing for the existence of God as a ground for this moral feeling that cannot be explained in any other way. No inclination can account for the concept, and reason cannot clearly define its presence primary to the categorical imperative, thus God accounts for this otherwise troublesome concept, in the sense that unless finite rational beings believe in God, they will not be capable of virtue, because nothing in the world guarantees that virtue leads to happiness.

⁷⁶ Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason" 240.

God's existence is further confirmed by the concept of the highest good and a clear connection with duty is established. Kant states:

Now, it was a duty for us to promote the highest good; hence there is in us not merely the warrant but also the necessity, as a need connected with duty, to presuppose the possibility of this highest good, which, since it is possible only under the condition of the existence of God, connects the presupposition of the existence of God inseparably with duty; that is, it is morally necessary to assume the existence of God.⁷⁷

Kant continues,

What belongs to duty here is only the striving to produce and promote the highest good in the world, the possibility of which can therefore be postulated, while our reason finds this thinkable only on the presupposition of a supreme intelligence; to assume the existence of this supreme intelligence is thus connected with the consciousness of our duty, although this assumption itself belongs to theoretical reason alone...and consequently if a need for practical purposes, it can be called a *belief*... and indeed a pure rational belief.⁷⁸

God's existence is presupposed by the exercise of duty by and the enactment of the moral law. Moreover, at the same time the very concepts of duty and of the moral law are rendered consistent for rational beings by the existence of God. In other words, finite rational beings have a duty to promote the highest good, and as self-legislators of the moral law, rational beings imply the existence of God. The postulate of God can perhaps be

⁷⁷ Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason" 241

⁷⁸ Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason" 241.

explained in the following terms: Kant, in arguing that we have a duty to strive to produce and promote the highest good has to admit at least that the highest good is possible in some way. Therefore, God's existence is assumed in order to promote the striving towards the highest good, for, since the highest good is not an achievable end in finite life, only by assuming the existence of God would it be consistent to strive for the highest good. There would be no point in striving for something that is absolutely unattainable.

Further, the postulation of the divine will also extends to making his argument for the synthetic a priori synthesis of the highest good thinkable as an assumption given the postulates, but this is still a very formalistic conception. Kant's formalism can be clearly understood if we consider his presentation of the Stoic position once more. Kant writes:

The Stoics, on the contrary had chosen their supreme practical principle quite correctly, namely virtue, as the condition of the highest good; but inasmuch as they represented the degree of virtue required by its pure law as fully attainable in this life, they not only strained the moral capacity of the *human being*, under the name of a *sage*, far beyond all the limits of his nature and assumed something that contradicts all cognition of the human being, but also and above all they would not let the second *component* of the highest good, namely happiness, hold as a special object of the human faculty of desire but made their *sage*, like a divinity in his consciousness of the excellence of his person, quite independent of nature...they really left out the second element of the highest good, namely one's own happiness, placing it solely in acting and in contentment with one's personal worth.⁷⁹

⁷⁹ Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason" 241.

One is only worthy of happiness if one is proceeding in a manner that is wholly in accord with duty and the moral law. This is the striving for the stage of moral perfection, which has been elucidated above. It is only after all the moral criteria that Kant has thus far been arguing for are fulfilled, that a doctrine of happiness, that can be considered as an ethical doctrine, emerges. Happiness has been drained of any contingent elements, and is only properly understood as a secondary element in the synthetic a priori cognition that results when a rational being acts in accordance with the moral law, and moreover, strives for the perfection that pure practical reason legislates. Therefore, what was considered a sensible contingent concept is drained of its contingency when a rational being properly seeks the highest good. Kant writes:

From this it can also be seen that if one asks about *God's final end* in creating the world, one must not name the *happiness* of the rational beings in it but the *highest good*, which adds a condition to that wish of such beings, namely the condition of being worthy of happiness, that is, the *morality* of these same rational beings, which condition alone contains the standard in accordance with which they can hope to participate in the former at the hands of the wise author.⁸⁰

Happiness is conditional upon morality and a rational being is only worthy of it if all the conditions of morality are met. However, these conditions are only possible, not actual. Happiness was originally thought to be the result of contingent inclinations, i.e., the

⁸⁰ Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason" 245.

gain of objects of representation in accordance with our empirically determined desires. By removing the main goal of the inclinations-happiness, and reformulating the concept of happiness in such a way that it is no longer contingent on the inclinations, Kant has at the same time removed the main goal of most inclinations of rational beings and made its attainment consistent with the moral law. The consequence, however, is that happiness can never be achieved in a finite beings lifetime. In the final analysis, the three postulates of pure practical reason are needed as rational assumptions to make the idea of the highest good thinkable, as a formal possibility. Kant writes:

These postulates are those of *immortality*, of *freedom* considered positively (as the causality of a being insofar as it belongs to the intelligible world), and of the *existence of God*. The *first* flows from the practically necessary condition of a duration befitting the complete fulfilment of the moral law; the *second* from the necessary presupposition of independence from the sensible world and of the capacity to determine one's will by the law of an intelligible world, that is the law of freedom; the *third* from the necessity of the condition for such an intelligible world to be the highest good, through the presupposition of the highest independent good, that is of the existence of God.⁸¹

These three essential concepts however, are not cognition's, and are justified only as assumptions of reason, since no content can ever be given to the three concepts; such a possibility remains beyond the scope of human knowledge. Thus,

⁸¹ Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason" 246.

Those concepts, otherwise problematic (merely thinkable) for it, are now declared assertorically to be concepts to which real objects belong, because practical reason unavoidably requires the existence of them for the possibility of its object, the highest good, which is absolutely necessary practically, and theoretical reason is justified in assuming them.⁸²

With these arguments, Kant solves the difficulties that plagued his philosophy by accounting for the discrepancies present in the first book of the *Critique of Pure Practical Reason*. But, in assuring consistency, Kant places the possibility of the highest good outside of a finite rational being's capability in worldly life. And, if we consider Kant's argument in this context, then we must accept that in the attempt to make morality realizable for finite beings, Kant is forced to place its completion in an afterlife, for if he does not, the moral law contradicts itself and can claim no absoluteness as a path to moral action. As long as Kant is content to elucidate his claims as abstract criteria only, the highest good is a formal object that is dependent on assuming the existence of the postulates. However, it could be argued in Kant's defence, that a rational faith in the postulates and the highest good make it possible to live a life of virtue in the world.

Given all that has been said, what are the difficulties present within Kant's position? The key criticism of Kant's moral philosophy centre around its formalism and the nature of its justification. Kant really only gives us the conditions of possibility for morality, rather

⁸² Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason" 248.

than conditions of actuality. How and why is this a problem? Kant places too much emphasis on moral disposition, as the factor that accounts for the possibility of morality. Granted the centrality of disposition in his moral view of the world, Kant does give us the conditions of possibility. But, by his own admission, the moral law must be a realizable concept or it collapses of its own accord. My own criticism borrows much from Deleuze's perspective. In the second critique there is a departure from Kant's earlier critical project. It was Kant's genius, Deleuze's states, to conceive of an immanent critique, a critique of reason by reason, not by passion, faith or any external criteria. The second critique, however, shifts from critique to justification, towards faith and moral common sense. Thus, Kant is uncritical in two respects, first, regarding the empirical facts of moral experience, and second in appealing to a transcendent God. As I have argued earlier, it is only by having rational faith in a transcendent God that reason itself is applicable to nature. Why does Kant make this appeal to the transcendent? Because only if God exists are rational beings in position of reason. If beings were not rational to some degree, there would be no moral disposition. If humans did not have reason, then the question of morality would be irrelevant, since we would be amoral, neither capable of good nor evil, and in Kant's view we would be mere animals, incapable of rising above animality. Thus, "nothing firmer or more certain can be thought in any science than our obligation to moral actions. Reason

would have to cease to be if we could deny this obligation in any way.”⁸³ Such a position is a shift, from critique to justification and moral common sense.

Before proceeding to explain this point, one should note that as foundationalism Kant’s position is unassailable, since reason in its practical function answers questions that speculative/theoretical reason can barely ask. This is why Kant emphasizes the moral consciousness of ordinary human reason untrained in philosophical disputation, and why he emphasizes moral disposition over the consequences of an action. “Moral actions do not depend on their consequences or circumstances. They are determined for men once and for all simply through their own nature.”⁸⁴ Practical reason in this sense goes beyond theoretical reason’s inquiry and formulates postulates, which are representations of noumenal objects. God could be nothing else but a transcendent, noumenal, object, underwriting the immortality of the soul, and the harmony of nature and the rational will. This move compromises the critical project, and shifts from critique to justification. An appeal to the transcendent compromises Kant’s critical project by implying that there are objects beyond criticism. The shift towards justification occurs in Kant’s appeal to rational faith. An appeal to faith, in this sense, is impervious to critique, and for that reason, Kant’s position is compromised. For it shows that the existence of God is required for making

⁸³ Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Philosophical Theology*, trans. Allen W. Wood and Gertrude M. Clark (London: Cornell UP, 1978) 40.

⁸⁴ Kant, *Lectures on Philosophical Theology* 40- 41.

morality actual, which in turn, even as Kant admits, is a condition for the possibility of morality. How is Kant's position to be approached? Hegel and Deleuze each approach Kant's position by arguing that he neglected the actual conditions for the realization of morality, and as a result, his position is too formalistic. In both authors there is a shift towards emphasizing ethics rather than the moral view of the world. Hegel and Deleuze will both argue that Kant should have focused on the actual conditions for the attainment of a good life, but instead he had only the formal possibility of one. For Hegel this necessitates an appeal to the fully realized State within which specific rights and duties serve to cultivate moral dispositions. Hegel's "ethical life" is a concrete realization of the Kantian morality. Deleuze, who is also concerned with ethics as the possibility of attaining the good life would not see it simply as a dialectical sublation of morality.

SECTION 2: HEGEL'S CRITICISM OF THE KANTIAN MORALITY AND THE ETHICAL VIEW OF THE WORLD.

Hegel's deep interest in the ramifications of Kant's theory find expression in the attention he devotes explicitly to the problems of Kantian moral philosophy in two works, the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, and the *Philosophy of Right*.⁸⁵ First, I will examine Hegel's position on Kantian morality in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Hegel's approach to Kant in this work carries a threefold criticism. 1. That to think oneself free and to actually be free are two distinct points. 2. That the subject is aware of duty and the highest good as objects of its own consciousness, and attempts to posit these objects in the real world deprive the objects of any external reality. 3. That Kant is positing a theory of the beautiful soul, which is too formalistic, in the sense that when a beautiful soul attempts to act in the world, it is acting from principles that are universal only subjectively. Hegel will argue, that the mere subjective willing of universal principles leads the beautiful soul, to act in ways which will conflict with the pure principles of morality.

⁸⁵ There are passages in Hegel's *Logic*, which, though not directly addressed to Kant still carry the overall Hegelian criticism of the Kantian position. For example Section 207-209 argue that a morality that is too subjective in its willing of the universal must be completed by an appeal to objective reality to progress towards action. Otherwise the subject is simply working out its own position, and its morality is not mediated through objective reality. See, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Logic*, trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975) 270-273.

Hegel was, in fact, one of Kant's most important philosophical critics. There are, however, several ways in which one can understand Hegel's criticism of Kant. On the one hand, it is possible to see in Hegel a reformulated, but failed Kantianism. On the other hand, it is possible to see Hegel's work as presenting an ethical and moral theory in its own right, which may derive its initial early influences from Kant's theory, but which stands distinctly apart from Kantianism. My approach gives more weight to the latter of these two positions, since in the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel presents a distinct ethical theory that understands the ethical subject as a more a concrete element of a community, rather than the somewhat isolated moral entity that Kant envisions. The critique can be framed in the following way: Hegel is presenting an ethical view of the world in contrast to Kant's moral view of the world.

Hegel criticizes Kant's conception of intelligible freedom. In Hegel's view, the intelligible world, by which one thinks oneself free of inclinations, is a freedom only in thought not in reality. By extension, thinking oneself as possibly performing one's duty absolutely in this context is only imagining oneself free, and furthermore, only imagining oneself moral. Hegel writes:

Its freedom is the freedom of pure thought, in contrast to which, therefore, Nature likewise has arisen as an existence that is equally free. Because both are equally present in it, i.e. the *freedom* of [mere] *being*, and the inclusion of this being within consciousness, its object becomes

one that has *being*, but at the same time exists only in *thought*; in the last stage of the moral view of the world, the content is explicitly such that its *being* is given to it by *thought*, and this conjunction of being and thought is pronounced to be what in fact it is-*imagining*.⁸⁶

Hegel's view, as expressed in this passage, is that Kant's unity of the two laws, the law of freedom and the law of nature, within the moral consciousness of the subject, produce a unity that is only a unity in the thought of the subject itself. This unity for which Kant argues, has in Hegel's view, no external existence. In other words, the law of nature that the subject assimilates into its own being, may bear little resemblance to the way the law of nature actually functions in the external world. The most important point of this passage is the following: Hegel acknowledges that freedom has being for the moral consciousness of the subject, but a being that exists only in thought. Thought, Hegel seems to suggest, has reality of this qualified type, however, the attempt to give external reality to the freedom that the subject thinks for itself is strained at best. For Hegel, there is no immediate connection, as there was for Kant, between thinking oneself free as an intelligible rational being and actual being free. The postulate of freedom, which, Kant argues, reason is justified in assuming, is for Hegel a freedom only in thought, and its

⁸⁶ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1977) 372.

connection to the world may, in fact, be only be imagined. In other words, it is possible to see in this account a critique of Kant's formalistic concept of rational freedom.

Hegel's second point uses the same line of argument but considers duty and the highest good as objects that only have an internal existence for the subject. Hegel states his point in the following:

In the moral view of the world we see, on the one hand, consciousness itself *consciously* produce its own object; we see that it neither encounters the object as something alien to it, nor does the object come before it in an unconscious manner. On the contrary, it proceeds in every case in accordance with a principle on the basis of which it posits *objective* being. It thus knows this latter to be its own self, for it knows itself to be the *active* agent that produces it. It seems, therefore, to attain here its peace and satisfaction, for this can only be found where it no longer needs to go beyond its object, because this no longer goes beyond *it*. On the other hand, however, consciousness itself really places the object *outside* itself as a beyond of itself. But this object with an intrinsic being of its own is equally posited as being, but as existing in the interests of, and by means of, it.⁸⁷

Hegel's critique at this point is that Kant's construction of the rational subject allows for the subject, through its own moral consciousness, to posit the objects of its morality as objective entities; yet nonetheless fully realizing in the process, that the objects of its moral pursuits are products of its own consciousness. Hegel argues, that the harmony of morality and nature that Kant envisions in the highest good is possible only if

⁸⁷ Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit* 374.

the subject posits that harmony through its own moral consciousness. In other words, Hegel argues it is not an actually external harmony existing in the world. Hegel sees in Kant's presentation of morality serious problems, and will attempt to distance himself from Kant through the development of his own ethical position.

A reconstruction of Hegel's thought might proceed along the following lines: Moral consciousness is an uncritical assumption, and in this sense the moral consciousness is not dependent on anything in the external or real world. If moral consciousness is dependent upon anything, it can only be dependent upon the postulates, which are the rational assumptions of reason. These, nonetheless, are subjective, in the sense that they are self legislated, and thus, the postulates that depend upon the subject's subjective willing of them. Hegel argues, that in Kant's conception, the harmony of the postulates is only achieved by the subject thinking them in harmony, "It is supposed to be an *implicit* harmony, not explicitly for consciousness, not present; on the contrary what is present is only the actual contradiction of the two."⁸⁸ The highest good which is to express the unity of morality and nature, in which the moral law commands us to seek it, falls into a difficult position, in the sense that morality is supposed to realize the highest good which, by Kant's own definition cannot be realized, since no connection of happiness and virtue

⁸⁸ Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit* 375.

is possible in the world that would be adequate to the highest good. Thus, Hegel argues the highest good is constantly displaced as a beyond as soon as an action is undertaken.

The performance of the action is a fact of which consciousness is aware, it is the *presence* of this unity of actuality and purpose, and because, in the accomplished deed, consciousness knows itself to be actualized as this particular consciousness, or beholds existence returned into itself, -and enjoyment consists in this-there is also contained in the actuality of moral purpose that form of actuality which is called enjoyment and happiness.⁸⁹

Hegel continues,

Action, therefore, in fact directly fulfills what was asserted could not take place, what was supposed to be merely a postulate, a merely beyond. Consciousness thus proclaims through its deed that it is not in earnest in making its postulate, because the meaning of the action is really this, to make into a present reality what was not supposed to exist in the present.⁹⁰

In Hegel's view, the harmony of the highest good is postulated for the sake of action; nonetheless, the harmony of the highest good is not possible in the attempt to act morally. One could argue, in Kant's defence, that realization of the highest good is not the issue, but rather the highest good as a regulative fiction can motivate people to moral actions. But, there is a problem with reading Kant in this manner, for he insists that the highest good must be realizable as the most important expression of the moral law. And,

⁸⁹ Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit* 375.

⁹⁰ Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit* 375.

since the highest good is not realizable in concrete moral action in this life, it must be realizable in a life beyond this one, and this perhaps is the main reason, why, for Kant, the postulates of pure practical reason have to be understood as justified assumptions for the subject. Hegel sees in this argument a key point; There is a movement towards a religious point of view in Kant's arguments, which depends more on faith than on reason. For Hegel, this places into question whether an action is performed from the motive of duty, or from the motive of achieving this contingent happiness. In Hegel's view, the highest good is maintained as a unity by the imagination, possibly to gain contingent happiness in adhering to it. This brings us to Hegel's concern about duty, and the problems inherent in considering duty as the sole motive of moral actions: "what we are in fact concerned with is *not* the fulfilment of pure duty, which is the whole purpose; for the fulfilment would really have as its purpose not pure duty, but its antithesis reality."⁹¹ Jonathan Robinson, an excellent and lucid commentator, explains Hegel's point clearly:

The moral agent gradually becomes aware that the object of his activity, the *summum bonum*, is nothing but a synthesis of elements held together by imagination rather than reason; he learns to recognize that the process leading up to this synthesis has involved a variety of conflicting moral stances and he is then faced with either abandoning the attempt to define his consciousness in terms of duty of principles or become a hypocrite. This hypocrisy will consist in recognizing that his moral stances conflict that he acts on different principles in different

⁹¹ Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit* 376.

circumstances but nonetheless persists in using a vocabulary that disguises this fact.⁹²

This is a penetrating criticism of Kant's position. Kant, by placing the highest good onto a level where it is unrealizable in concrete moral action, yet nonetheless persisting in arguing for its realization, at the very least as a guiding principle that will be realized in an afterlife, makes it impossible to be wholly dutiful in concrete moral action. In other words, since the highest good is not realizable in finite existence, our moral principles will shift according to circumstances in the attempt to maintain the highest good as the best possible goal. In addition, if the highest good were possible in finite existence, it would perhaps be possible to outline a specific course of action that would lead one to its realization. Unfortunately, in Hegel's view, the result, when an agent attempts to act solely from duty in accordance with the highest good, is an inevitable shifting of principles, couched in moral language. In Kant's defence, one could reply that a certain severity and dignity are still possible if we attempt to act out of duty, Hegel's point however is not to dismiss this possibility, but simply to argue that we cannot do so in all cases. This leads to my third point; Hegel's discussion of the beautiful soul:

⁹² Jonathan Robinson, *Duty and Hypocrisy in Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind: An Essay in the Real and Ideal* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977) 69.

When conscience is considered in relation to the single determinations of the antithesis manifest in action and its awareness of the nature of those determinations, its relation to the *actual* case in which it has to act is, in the first instance, that of the *knower*. In so far as this knowing has in it the moment of *universality*, conscientious action requires that the actual case before it should be viewed unrestrictedly in all its bearings, and therefore that all the circumstances of the case should be accurately known and taken into consideration. But this knowing, since it *knows* the universality as a *moment*, is at the same time aware that it does not know all the circumstances, or, in other words that it does not act conscientiously.⁹³

There is a certain tragic tone in Hegel's presentation of the dilemma in which the beautiful soul finds itself. There is, simultaneously, a desire to act morally, and a knowing full well that all the circumstances of a given action cannot be taken into account. This is the central difficulty with the moral point of view, as Hegel understands it. The moral subject understands universal action as a moment, and as such shifts its principles in order to account for changing circumstances. Hegel is arguing that an individual may want to act morally in all cases, but to do so it must account for the circumstances within which it is placed. This consideration, however, is a reliance on sensuous impulses and specific duties. Thus despite the abstract morality that the individual may legislate for itself, there is a certain shifting of principles, and the morality of specific duties may change from individual to individual. Hegel maintains this point in the following passage:

⁹³ Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit* 389.

Conscience, when it proceeds to action, enters into relation with the many aspects of the case. The case breaks up into various separate parts and so, too, does the relation of pure consciousness to it, with the result that the manifold nature of the case becomes a multiplicity of duties.⁹⁴

Hegel's point is that the subject will, inevitably, become mired in specific duties. Thus, specific duties must be defined, first within an ethical structure, such as the state, in order to cultivate the moral disposition of individuals. If this is not the case, in Hegel's view, multiplicity of duties between individuals will conflict, for they have only the consciousness of their own duty to tell them what is a dutiful action.

For Hegel, Kant's moral point of view is consistent taken in abstraction. But, Hegel believes that Kant's position requires a concrete development that does not appeal to abstract conceptions like the postulates of pure practical reason. In Hegel's view, Kant slides too far into a religious perspective that seems to rely more on faith than it does on grounding ethics in a social structure. Moreover, for Hegel, Kant's point of view is partial in that Kant did not present an ethics that could be concrete. Hegel credits Kant for recognizing the difficult tension between freedom and nature, nonetheless Hegel believes that Kant's development is incomplete. In *The Philosophy of Right*, Hegel addresses these problems and attempts to give a more concrete ethical development.

⁹⁴ Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit* 390.

Hegel centres his concern about the Kantian moral philosophy on the problem of morality and ethics, and argues that Kant has essentially created a moral theory that is too abstract to be of any real use to rational being's, which are, under this theory, seeking the elucidation of an ethics that can be applicable on a more concrete level. On an abstract level, Hegel argues that morality outlines the real aspects of freedom. Hegel states:

The second sphere, Morality, therefore throughout portrays the real aspect of the concept of freedom, and the movement of this sphere is as follows: the will, which at the start is aware only of its independence and which before it is mediated is only implicitly identical with the universal will, is raised beyond its (explicit) difference from the universal will, beyond this situation in which it sinks deeper and deeper into itself, and is established as explicitly identical with the principle of the will. This process is accordingly the cultivation of the ground in which freedom is now set, i.e., subjectivity. What happens is that subjectivity, which is abstract at the start, i.e., distinct from the concept, becomes likened to it, and thereby the idea acquires genuine realization. The result is that the subjective will determines itself as objective too and so truly concrete.⁹⁵

Hegel's point is that the will is not yet aware of itself as analogous to the universal will unless it has been mediated by society. Freedom is the formal aspect of the will, and Hegel realizes the necessity of its reality for the consistency of moral theory, for to think of oneself as a moral agent one must think of oneself as free. The moral agent, however, has moral actions mediated through society and in doing so has the capability of recognizing

⁹⁵ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. T.M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1971) 75.

those aspects of action as moral. The subjective will is at this stage only implicitly aware of its correspondence to the universal will. However, it is through the recognition of a social structure that ethical life becomes a possibility. Hegel believes that Kant does not adequately address this point, and therefore, his rational being does not actualize his/her morality through the recognition of the social structure in which the individual is placed. Even Kant's "Kingdom of Ends," in which rational beings function together under the dictates of moral law is too abstract, for Hegel, since in the kingdom of ends morality is still divorced from ethical application, due to the abstractness and lack of fixed content in the moral law. The self-legislators do not combine to form an ethical world, but remain individualistic and abstracted from the content that must come to characterize morality if it is to be applicable. For Hegel, the distinction between the "ought" command of the moral law and the "is" of concrete action is never bridged in Kant's theory. Hegel writes:

The subjective will, already aware of itself, and distinguished from the principle of the will is therefore abstract, restricted and formal. But not merely is subjectivity itself formal; in addition, as the infinite self-determination of the will, it constitutes the form of all willing. In this its first appearance in the single will, this form has not yet been established as identical with the concept of the will, and therefore the moral point of view is that of relation, of ought-to-be, or demand. And since the self-difference of subjectivity involves at the same time the character of being opposed to objectivity as external fact, it follows that the point of view of consciousness comes on the scene here too...the general point of view here is that of the will's self-difference, finitude, and appearance.⁹⁶

⁹⁶ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right* 76.

The single individual will, insofar as it is not established with the concept, remains an “ought” not an “is.” In formal terms, the individual will is conscious of its duty, as what it ought to do, but in actual circumstances duties become arbitrary and multiple. The single will opposes itself to the external fact of the “is” and has not yet bridged the gap between the two. The external fact can be a relation to the good or to the evil, and Hegel believes that this is in fact the case. The opposition of good and evil is how the one gives rise to the other through negation. Consciousness of the good that is something outside oneself is precisely the position that Kant has adopted. The good, or in Kant’s arguments, the highest good, is legislated by reason as something that is necessary for the possibility of morality, but, as has been argued above, its realization was external to oneself, external to the point that it could not be attained in finitude. Hegel’s response to Kant in this regard is that the good has to be achieved through a concrete synthesis of recognition that is mediated by society, and can, therefore, lead to ethical life. For Hegel, specific duties must be ascribed to the subject, through an educative social process. The subject must not see itself as something that is separate from its circumstances. In other words, the good life can be achieved through the social structure cultivating the moral disposition of its subjects.

In Kant's theory Hegel sees the demand of the "ought" as too formalistic and inadequate to determine any content that may fit the concept (moral law) satisfactorily. The implication, then, is that a rational being's willing may not be adequate to the concept, and hence, the concept is too formalistic. The moral sphere culminates in the "ought," demand that claims the status of absoluteness. However the "ought" cannot claim absoluteness without the "is," and as was argued above, Kant had to account for the relation between the sensible and the supersensible. The highest good was meant to achieve this, but left the sensible to function on its own. Kant relates the law of causality and the law of autonomy by arguing that the two laws can be considered independently, and at least on an abstract level, can be considered as distinct from one another. Kant's achievement was to present the distinction without contradiction. However, in Hegel's view, simple formal non-contradiction is not enough, the two do fold into each other, but the moral agent is unable to unite the two because of her/his own subjectivity. This is why an educative social process is required, to assign specific duties to the subject's consciousness of its formal duty. This requires the unity of the subjective will and of the universal will in concrete synthesis.

Hegel recognizes the attempt at a correspondence between the "ought" and the "is" in Kant's philosophy. Hegel's paraphrase states:

The particular subject is related to the good as to the essence of his will, and hence his will's obligation arises directly in this relation. Since particularity is distinct from the good and falls within the subjective will, the good is characterized to begin with only as the universal abstract essentially of the will, i.e., as duty. Since duty is thus abstract and universal in character, it should be done for duty's sake.⁹⁷

Hegel continues,

Because every action explicitly calls for a particular content and a specific end, while duty as an abstraction entails nothing of the kind, the question arises what is my duty? ... Specific duties, however, are not contained in the definition of duty itself; but since both of them are conditioned and restricted, they...bring about the transition to the higher sphere the unconditioned, the sphere of duty. Duty itself is moral self-consciousness is the essence or the universality of that consciousness, the way in which it is inwardly related to itself alone; all that is left to it, therefore is abstract universality, and for its determinate character it has identity without content, or the abstractly positive, the indeterminate.⁹⁸

This is one of Hegel's key criticisms of Kant: The concept of duty remains too abstract and formalistic to apply to specific duties. Moreover, Hegel argues, that this discrepancy between specific duties, and the concept of duty hinders the possibility of a concrete ethics for rational beings. Hegel believes that Kant has articulated a good case for morality but has failed to make the transition into ethics. Hegel writes,

To adhere to the exclusively moral position, without making the transition to the conception of ethics, is to reduce this gain to an empty

⁹⁷ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right* 89.

⁹⁸ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right* 89.

formalism, and the science of morals to the preaching of duty for duty's sake. From this point of view, no immanent doctrine of duties is possible; of course material may be brought in from outside and particular duties may be arrived at accordingly, but if the definition of duty is taken to be the absence of contradiction, formal correspondence with itself-which is nothing but abstract indeterminacy stabilized-then no transition is possible to the specification of particular duties nor, if some such particular content for acting comes under consideration, is there any criterion in that principle in for deciding whether it is a duty or not. On the contrary by this means any wrong or moral conduct may be justified.⁹⁹

Hegel continues,

Kant's further formulation, the possibility of visualizing an action as a *universal* maxim, does lead to the more concrete visualization of a situation, but in itself it contains no principle beyond abstract identity and the 'absence of contradiction' already mentioned...if duty is to be willed for duty's sake and not for the sake of some content, it is only a formal identity whose nature is to exclude all content and specification.¹⁰⁰

Pure duty in the formal state that Kant presents it is too devoid of content to be of any real application in ethical theory. The formalism in the concept of duty as Kant presents it, does not allow for any transition between the "ought" and the "is," and no resolution between these two moments presents itself if duty is this formal. The categorical imperative may help in visualizing the situation, but in the process of action, the concept of

⁹⁹ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right* 90.

¹⁰⁰ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right* 90.

duty in its formal character still contains no principle which can be identified clearly as an “is,” and therefore, be a part of practical moral action.

The pure concept of duty cannot serve as an adequate guide to the formulation of rational principles of ethics on a practical level. Moreover, duty in this abstract state can be filled with any content, so long as the content does not serve as a contradiction under the categorical imperative. Thus, part of Kant’s intention may be lost in the process, for Kant intended duty to be the motive to moral action, but the intent may be lost in the actualization of a motive so long as the categorical imperative serves only as a transcendental condition of the possibility of morality. Hegel’s concern is that the practical non-contradiction required by the categorical imperative is achieved only on a subjective level, and that this is not sufficient to avoid arbitrariness in moral decision making.

Hegel’s concern with the abstractness of Kant’s moral philosophy is spelled out further in the way Hegel presents the abstract conceptions of the good. When morality remains in the abstract state, any content can be used as the justification of a good action. Hegel sees the subjective willing of the good as insufficient for the purposes of ethical life. As argued above, Kant is more concerned with the moral disposition towards an action, rather than with the effect of the action itself, because for his purposes the justification of the necessity and actuality of the moral law is primary. In Hegel’s view, Kant relies too

heavily on the assumption of a good will and the postulates of pure practical reason to make his case for application, which consequently, is not achieved in the finite. For Hegel, the subjective legislation present in Kant's philosophy has to meet with practical ethical life.

Hegel writes:

If good and conscience are kept abstract and thereby elevated to independent totalities, then both become the indeterminate which ought to be determined. -But the integration of these two relative totalities into the absolute identity has already been implicitly achieved in that this very subjectivity of pure self-certainty, aware in its vacuity of its gradual evaporation, is identical with the abstract universality of that good. The identity of the good with the subjective will an identity which therefore is concrete and the truth of them both, is Ethical Life.¹⁰¹

Hegel's concern, then, is whether rational beings can live self-consciously in a state where the good is determined in a concrete form, in accordance with rational principles of governance. As Hegel sees it, this is essentially a continuation of Kant's project and the attempt to make it more concrete. In addition, Hegel sees in Kant a good starting point for the application of moral theory, and in a sense he completes Kant's intention by ascribing specific duties, and rights, to rational beings through which they can live as moral agents in a civil society. The subjective legislation of the moral law in Kant's argumentation is one side of the necessary union of the dialectic of subjective and objective will. Hegel adds the necessity of the individuals' recognition of him/herself as a moral agent in society,

¹⁰¹ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right* 103.

and adds, by extension, a moral agent capable of moral actions that are ratified due to one's self-consciousness through the consciousness of others, which is at its highest level the civil society or the State. The thing in itself of Kant's argumentation is made more concrete through this progression of consciousness, by placing the source of moral deeds in the world, and providing for the awareness of moral deeds through the awareness of social structures.

Having said this, I believe a tentative case can be made for a connection between Hegel's criticisms of Kant and Deleuze's response to the Kantian morality. Deleuze writes:

There is no possible compromise between Hegel and Nietzsche. Nietzsche's philosophy has a great polemical range; it forms an absolute anti-dialectics and sets out to expose all the mystification's that find a final refuge in the dialectic. What Schopenhauer dreamed of but did not carry out, caught as he was in the net of Kantianism...Nietzsche carries out at the price of his break with Schopenhauer, setting up a new image of thought, freeing thought from the burdens that are crushing it. Three ideas define the dialectic: the idea of a power of the negative as a theoretical principle manifested in opposition and contradiction; the idea that suffering and sadness have value...the idea of positivity as a theoretical and practical product of negation itself.¹⁰²

There is a thin line of development that can be articulated between Deleuze and Hegel, and the axis on which this development turns is both authors relationship to Kant. Both philosophers believe that Kantianism requires a concrete development. Hegel's

¹⁰² Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia UP, 1983) 195.

position on this has been articulated above. Further, both Deleuze and Hegel recognize the difficulty that Kant's morality has in terms of ethical application. As was seen, in Hegel's analysis, it is difficult to imagine that the Kantian individual will not fall into practical contradictions, if he/she is attempting at all times, to act in accordance with the promotion of the moral law and the highest good. Likewise, Deleuze will argue that ethics has to be less rigid in principle, and more fluid in practice, than Kant's moral theory allows. Despite the common focus on developmental and educative ethics, Deleuze and Hegel differ from one another greatly. Deleuze was, in fact, vigorously opposed to Hegel on most philosophical points. Primarily, Deleuze opposes the teleological assumptions present in Hegel. For Deleuze, the progress towards a perfected social structure is still a movement towards the realization of morality. For Deleuze, placing the cultivation of the moral disposition onto the level of the State does not advance the critical project, and according to Deleuze, Hegel still has a conception of finality, of a teleology which progresses towards an end. The goal of a universal morality is still imposed upon subjects, in Hegel's case from the perspective of the State. Deleuze will argue for the Nietzschean conception of will to power, which is anti-teleological in that it does not imply any progress to a final goal. For Deleuze, will to power is the core of pluralism, opposed to a universal and homogeneous State, which enshrines moral values in its specific institutions. The next

chapter will explore Deleuze's relation to the Kantian morality, and present Deleuze's philosophy in extensive detail

Chapter 3

SECTION 1: DELEUZE'S RELATION TO THE KANTIAN MORALITY

What is Deleuze's criticism of Kant's moral philosophy, or more exactly, how does Deleuze go beyond Kant in his philosophical project? The first point of contention between the two thinkers involves the notion of critique. The problem can be framed as: Total positive critique versus partial critique. Why does Deleuze think that Kant's critique is partial? Essentially, in Deleuze's view the second critique is not a critique at all, because there are protected ideals that are not criticized, because they are in the natural interests of reason. In this sense, morality, faith and religion are not criticized, but justified, with appeal to transcendent objects. Deleuze might be asked the following question? Why would we want to proceed beyond this point? There are two reasons: morality frames the problem of ethics as an opposition between good and evil, as transcendent values, which separate us from actual conditions needed to achieve the good life. Also, Deleuze associates the idea of total critique with the philosophical project itself. The goal of critique is not to reintroduce moral ideals in new forms, but to place the ideals themselves into question, as a problem of specific and individual experience. Deleuze writes:

What became of critique after Kant, from Hegel to Feuerbach via the famous “critical critique”?-It became an art by which mind, self-consciousness, the critic himself, adapted themselves to things and ideas; or an art by which man reappropriated determinations which he claimed to have been deprived of...this new critique carefully avoids asking the preliminary question: “*Who* must undertake critique, who is fit to undertake it?” They talk of reason, spirit, self-consciousness and man; but *to whom* do all these concepts refer? They do not tell us what man or spirit is. Spirit seems to hide forces which are ready to be reconciled with any kind of power, with Church or State.¹⁰³

Deleuze distances himself from Hegel whose project leads back to the State, which reintroduces morality in a new form. The crux of Deleuze’s opposition to morality stems from his argument that morality cannot be a critical force, because the moral view of the world appeals to transcendent objects, which are beyond criticism. God’s reality is assumed by the faith of the individual, and this is the final court of appeal. For Kant rational beings must contend with good and evil, “Kant always maintains that evil has a certain relationship to sensibility. But it is no less based on our intelligible character. A lie or a crime are sensible effects, but they also have a cause outside time.”¹⁰⁴ As intelligible beings we must contend with these absolutes, but the absolutes themselves are not questioned as values. Kant conceived of the idea of a total and positive critique, but the critique is incomplete, because it was never able to frame its appeal to the transcendent as

¹⁰³ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy* 88.

¹⁰⁴ Deleuze, *Kant’s Critical Philosophy* 32.

a question of values. Values are the sense of a thing or concept, the motive or force that appropriates a thing or concept. To pose a problem as a question of values is to invoke the art of pluralist interpretation. Kant's critique doesn't criticize good and evil as values. What is good: morality, faith, and reason as ideals, which facilitate human conduct. Kant takes the critical process far, by making these ideals stem from the individuals own legislation. It is not an external power that commands obedience to an ideal, it is the individual subject to its own reason that wills these ideals in a new form. Critique becomes justification by reintroducing the same values in a different form. Deleuze states:

Understanding and reason have a long history: they instances that still make us obey when we no longer want to obey anyone. When we stop obeying God, the State, our parents, reason appears and persuades us to continue being docile because it says to us: it is you who are giving the orders. Reason represents our slavery and our subjection as something superior which makes us reasonable beings. Under the name of practical reason Kant invented a reason expressly for those cases in which one has no need to bother about reason: namely when the needs of the heart, when morality, when duty speaks.¹⁰⁵

Practical reason, limits critical forces by reintroducing moral values through the subject. The argument is the following: By reintroducing existing values in new forms under the name of critique we are not criticizing or exploring new possibilities of thought or existence, but maintaining old subservience in new and different forms, "Religion often

¹⁰⁵ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy* 93.

needs free thinkers to survive and adapt. Morality is the continuation of Religion by other means."¹⁰⁶ Total critique would not recognize any protected concepts, or any ideal that is beyond question, "The aim of critique is not justification but a different way of feeling: another sensibility."¹⁰⁷ This type of critique is a type of empiricism, but not a simple appeal to lived experience. Deleuze writes:

This is the secret of empiricism. Empiricism is by no means a reaction against concepts, nor a simple appeal to lived experience. On the contrary, it undertakes the most insane creation of concepts ever seen or heard. Empiricism is a mysticism and a mathematicism of concepts, but precisely one which treats the object as an object of encounter, as a here and now...only an empiricist could say: concepts are indeed things, but things in their free and wild state, beyond anthropological predicates.¹⁰⁸

By framing the question of critique as a constant experimentation of the actual we free thought from the limits that press on it, the limits of the ideal. Ethics is in this sense procedural, and critical, a constant questioning of actual existence, rather than a critique of possibilities. It is accurate to say that Deleuze sees in Kant a valid project that requires completion. This is indicated by his suggestion that: "Nietzsche compares the thinker to an arrow shot by Nature that another thinker picks up where it has fallen so that he can

¹⁰⁶ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy* 98.

¹⁰⁷ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy* 94.

¹⁰⁸ Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. Paul Patton (New York, Columbia UP, 1997) Preface.

shoot it somewhere else.”¹⁰⁹ The analogy works in the sense that Deleuze’s immanent ethics can be thought of as a continuation of the Kantian critical project by other means.

Deleuze sees in Kant’s work a vital turn in philosophy:

Kant’s genius, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, was to conceive of an immanent critique. Critique must not be a critique of reason by feeling, by experiencing or by any kind of external instance. And what is criticized is no longer external to reason: we should not seek, in reason, errors which have come from elsewhere—from body, senses or passions—but illusions coming from reason as such. Now, caught between these two demands, Kant concludes that critique must be a critique *of* reason *by* reason itself.¹¹⁰

The premise on which Deleuze bases his project is taken from Kant’s conception of critique. Kant’s project has in its theoretical framework the premise by which an immanent critique can proceed, but with certain internal difficulties, which make the complete realization of an internal critique difficult. The difficulty, from Deleuze’s point of view is the role of reason as its own judge. In Deleuze’s view this position presents a problem. Reason in and of itself cannot complete the project of critique as Deleuze conceives it, because the critical force of the Kantian philosophy is not brought to bear upon the ideals of truth, morality and religion, but is rather only brought to bear upon claims to these ideals. The question of critique then is one of motives and desires, from an

¹⁰⁹ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy* preface.

¹¹⁰ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy* 91.

immanent point of view. What motives and desires lie behind the pursuit of truth, of morality and the desire to make reason supreme. The question of critique framed in this way, opposes conditions of actuality to conditions of possibility. Deleuze's own motives in criticizing the Kantian philosophy is to set a new course for philosophy itself. Reason, even according to Kant, still requires that external postulates exist to facilitate its operations, in the sense that reason requires these postulates to move philosophy towards its proper goal, the moral view of the world. What Kant lacked was a method, by which reason could also be judged, without being its own judge. Deleuze states:

And, in fact, Kant does not realize his project of immanent critique. Transcendental philosophy discovers conditions which still remain external to the conditioned. Transcendental principles are principles of external conditioning and not of internal genesis. We require a genesis of reason itself, and also a genesis of the understanding and its categories: what are the forces of reason and of the understanding? What is the will which hides and expresses itself in reason? What stands behind reason, in reason itself?¹¹¹

If Kant's approach is to be opposed as being a transcendental position, what then does Deleuze offer in its place? Deleuze's argument put succinctly proceeds along the following lines; Reason is the operative faculty of philosophy, indeed the most revered of all methods of philosophical inquiry. Reason's employment so brilliantly defined by Kant cannot proceed except according to certain assumptions. In moral theory it was Kant's

¹¹¹ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy* 91

position that if we are to rationally determine the requirements for acting morally certain assumptions are unavoidable, these assumptions were the postulates. In other words it is Kant's a position that we need rational faith in these postulates to be capable of morality. Morality would be impossible without them, therefore they must be assumed if we are to have a rational determination of reason. Deleuze argues that this is not critique, but justification of the conditions of possibility of morality. Why is Deleuze opposed so fundamentally to this position? Largely, because critique at the moment that it is conceived by Kant to liberate thought from dogma, reintroduces obedience to set values through the subject itself. Deleuze's position, then, is that Kant was unable to realize the full extent of his original critique because he had no method for its realization. Reason, as its own judge, necessarily requires certain transcendental assumptions for its proper function. For, example Kant has argued in the "Canon of Pure Reason," that for reason to be applicable in nature a purposive unity of nature is required. This purposive unity:

is still so important a condition of the application of reason to nature that I cannot pass it by, especially since experience liberally supplies examples of it...the presupposition of a wise author of the world is a condition of an aim which is, to be sure, contingent but not yet inconsiderable, namely that of having a guide for the investigation of nature.¹¹²

¹¹² Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* 688.

For Kant, application of reason in the world assumes that the world is ordered in such a way as to allow for reason to be applicable within it. Reason, as an investigate process of nature, is required, in Kant's view, to assume that the world is ordered by a wise author. Likewise, this assumption is present in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. Kant argues, as I have articulated in my second chapter, that reason demands an unconditioned for its conditioned propositions. The illusion, in this case, that of pure practical reason, is why the dialectic is necessary in the development of Kant's moral theory. It will be remembered that the solution of the dialectic required the postulates of pure practical reason, and moreover, it was through the existence of these postulates that the idea of moral law, and the highest good receive their proper fulfilment, in the sense that the highest good is the object to which the moral law leads us. The postulates were: Freedom, God and the immortality of the soul. Pure practical reason was justified in assuming these even though they could be given no theoretical deduction, nor could any intuition, properly speaking, be ascribed to their concepts. Therefore, the postulates could be thought, but not known, in the sense that our understanding can ascribe an intuition to the objects. Kant's success can be seen in the fact that he took reason to its limits, and identified where the proper application of reason rests, and thus demonstrating, where the

application of reason requires necessary assumptions. Perhaps, by making reason its own judge, he could go no further.

Deleuze asks two interrelated questions: 1. If reason is to be its own judge, then how can we escape the transcendent objects that it necessarily postulates? 2. What are the forces that permeate reason? To answer these questions Deleuze requires a method of critique that Kant lacked. In other words, a method of critique that does not rely on reason being the judge of its own activities. The Kantian position leaves three main points uncriticised by reason, since they are required for its application. Thus, for Deleuze, reason as its own judge leads to a position that he terms, “a politics of compromise.” Deleuze describes what he views as positive in Kant, and what the concept of immanent critique leaves unrealized. Deleuze writes:

Kant is the first philosopher who understood critique as having to be total and positive *as* critique. Total because “nothing must escape it”; positive, affirmative, because it cannot restrict the power of knowing without releasing other previously neglected powers. But what are the results of such a vast project...As for the *Critique of Practical Reason* does not Kant admit, from its opening pages, that it is not really a critique at all? He seems to have confused the positivity of critique with a humble recognition of the rights of the criticized. There has never been a more conciliatory or respectful total critique.¹¹³

And continues,

¹¹³ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy* 89.

The opposition between project and results (moreover between general project and the particular intentions) is easily explained. Kant merely pushed a very old conception of critique to its limit, a conception which saw critique as a force which should be brought to bear on all claims to knowledge and truth, but not on knowledge and truth themselves; a force which should be brought to bear on all claims to morality, but not on morality itself. Thus total critique turns into a politics of compromise: even before the battle the spheres of influence have already been shared out; what can I know? What should I do? What can I hope for? Limits are drawn to each one, misuse's and trespasses are denounced, but the uncritical character of each ideal remains at the heart of Kantianism...true knowledge, true morality and true religion.¹¹⁴

Deleuze's argument proceeds along the following lines: Kant initiated an important turn in the history of philosophy by conceiving the concept of critique as an immanent process. For this process to begin, Kant assigned reason the task of criticizing itself, and since Kant did not have a method by which reason could be criticized externally problems resulted, inevitably, from this process. The critique of reason, by reason, leaves areas where the concepts of true knowledge, true morality, and true religion are not criticized. Michael Hardt, a commentator on Deleuze's philosophy frames the point in the following way:

The principle fault of the Kantian critique is that of transcendental philosophy itself. In other words, Kant's discovery of a domain beyond the sensible is the creation of a region outside the bounds of critique that effectively functions as a refuge against critical forces, as a limitation on critical powers. A total critique, on the contrary, requires a materialistic,

¹¹⁴ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy* 89-90.

monistic perspective in which the entire unified horizon is open and vulnerable to the critique's destabilizing inquiry. Therefore it is the transcendental method itself that requires (or allows) that the critique remain partial. With the ideal values safely protected in the suprasensible, the Kantian critique can proceed to treat claims to truth and morality without endangering truth and morality themselves.¹¹⁵

Thus, the distinction between sensible and supersensible, which Kant relies on to make his case for morality, is the distinction that makes the project of immanent critique, in the final analysis, unrealizable. Kant argues, in a careful manner, that reason postulates objects that it cannot explain, and that because this is inherent in how reason functions, the option left to us is to demarcate the areas of thought and experience which reason can legitimately explore. Kant, by making reason its own judge, has to assume these protected concepts; truth, morality, and knowledge in order to allow for reason to perform its proper function. In other words, for morality to be given a rational basis, certain concepts, such as the postulates moral law, duty, and the highest good, have to be given the status of legitimate assumptions that reason requires to complete its task of rational articulation of morality. Therefore, Kant extends critique to its limit with the premise that reason will serve as its own judge; this however, leaves the original premise of a purely immanent critique unrealized, for the sake of articulating a moral theory. What are the specifics of

¹¹⁵ Michael Hardt, *An Apprenticeship in Philosophy: Gilles Deleuze* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995) 29.

immanent critique, in Deleuze's view? The critical perspective, for Deleuze is the perspective of the will to power, as a genetic and plastic principle, opposed to "transcendental principles which are simple conditions for so called facts."¹¹⁶ Will to power:

is an essentially *plastic* principle that is no wider than what it conditions, that changes itself with the conditioned and determines itself in each case along with what it determines. The will to power is, indeed, never separable from particular determined forces, from their quantities, qualities and directions...will to power cannot be separated from force without falling into metaphysical abstraction.¹¹⁷

The will to power is pluralistic critical force. When we interpret something through will to power, we criticize pluralistically. Will to power as a critical perspective, does not pose questions as universals. The question is not what is morality, or more exactly, what are the conditions of possibility for a moral view of the world. The question is who wills morality? What are the actual conditions that lead one to will a moral point of view? Will to power is immanent critique in that from this perspective one asks only what internal principles or forces of an object or concept produce its disposition. Will to power asks what affects a physical body, and what affections does it produce? The critical perspective

¹¹⁶ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy* 93.

¹¹⁷ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy* 50.

of will to power translates into a question of ethics, by interpreting and evaluating modes of existence. The next section will be concerned with the specifics of an ethics of immanence.

SECTION 2: DELEUZE'S CONCEPTION OF IMMANENT ETHICS .

Deleuze's presentation of an ethics of immanence argues for a new model from which to consider ethics. This new model is the body. For Kant, the model by which morality is to be articulated is transcendental in its development, for Deleuze, the model is purely immanent. It is by following Nietzsche and Spinoza that Deleuze articulates this ethics of pure immanence. Drawing freely on the concepts of Nietzsche and Spinoza, Deleuze articulates an ethics of immanence that does not depend on transcendental arguments. The axis on which my presentation of ethical immanence will turn are dependent on two points: 1. With the body as a model how can we determine modes of existence? 2. How can we evaluate these modes of existence?¹¹⁸ These two questions form a template by which we can understand Deleuze's ethics. In what follows, Deleuze's use of Spinozian and Nietzschean concepts will be brought to the forefront, and will be placed in their proper order, since they are required for bringing out the relations between the above two questions.

Deleuze argues that both Spinoza and Nietzsche take the body as their model for their analyses of modes of existence. What does it mean to take the body as the model

¹¹⁸ For the structure of these questions I am indebted to Daniel W. Smith's paper, "The Place of Ethics in Deleuze's Philosophy: Three Questions of Immanence."

of existence? To take the body as a model is to suggest an immanent standpoint from which to consider our most basic assumptions about what it is to be a subject. Deleuze writes:

Spinoza suggested a new direction for the sciences and philosophy. He said that we do not even know what a body *can do*, we talk about consciousness and spirit and chatter on about it all, but we do not know what a body is capable of, what forces belong to it or what they are preparing for.¹¹⁹

Morality places the laws and duties of the conscious mind above the body, and in doing so makes the body follow the commands of its consciousness. Deleuze inverts this traditional assumption by arguing that a mode of existence can be determined by taking the body as a model. This point highlights Deleuze's relation with Kant, for it is in Kant's moral philosophy that we find one of the best examples of this process of obedience. In Kant's moral theory, the subject is absolutely bound to the moral law in all moral and ethical decision making. Adhering to the moral law is a form of obedience that is self-legislated by the rational individual, but, nonetheless, is to be taken as a law that applies absolutely. Kant writes:

Principles must be built on concepts; on any other foundation there can be only seizures, which can give a person no moral worth and not even confidence in himself, without which the consciousness of one's moral disposition and of a character of this kind, the highest good in human

¹¹⁹ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy* 39

beings, cannot come to exist. Now, if these concepts are to become subjectively practical they must stop short with objective laws or morality, to be admired and esteemed with reference to humanity: the representation of them must be considered in relation to human beings and to the individual human being; for then this law appears in a form that, though indeed highly deserving of respect, is not so pleasing as if it belonged to the element in which he can maintain himself only with effort and with unceasing apprehension of relapsing. In a word, the moral law demands obedience from duty and not from a predilection that cannot and ought not to be presupposed at all.¹²⁰

Kant argues that we must follow the moral law not the laws of natural necessity in our decision-making. Such a law, it will be remembered, issued its commands without empirical considerations. The subject as legislator wills its own law and provides the content of its action in accordance with what the law deems necessary. However, when we think the moral law, and the duties that it subjects us to, we think of ourselves as intelligible beings, not subject to the influence of the inclination. For Kant, it is moral consciousness that is the arbiter of our actions. In this case, the relations and encounters of the body are determined by what the moral law dictates. The forces that constitute a body are understood as results of our actions according to how the moral law states that we should act. In contrast, Deleuze considers the body to be primary before duties and laws of conduct are ascribed to it. Consciousness in general, and our moral consciousness

¹²⁰ Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason" 266.

in particular, may be considered as a result of the body's orientation of forces. Deleuze's arguments for this point are extensive and I will reproduce them here in detail.

The relationship between soul¹²¹ and body has been considered in an asymmetrical fashion. The soul has had precedence over the body in traditional philosophy, and has been ascribed higher duties that the body is obligated to follow:

As long as we speak of a power of the soul over the body we are not really thinking of a capacity or power. What we really mean is that the soul, from its own immanent nature and special finality, has higher "duties": it must command the body's obedience, according to the laws to which itself is subject. As for the bodies' power, this is either the power of execution, or the power to lead the soul astray, and entice it from its duties. In all this we are thinking morally. The moral view of the world appears in a principle that dominates most theories of the union of soul and body: when one of these acts the, the other suffers.¹²²

In Deleuze's view this has been the dominant position of philosophy, historically speaking. The argument that Deleuze is making concerns the very nature of morality. The justificatory arguments of the moral view of the world consider the subject from a dual standpoint, that of the soul and of the body. The duties of morality have rested almost exclusively in the purview of the soul, which commands what the body should do.

¹²¹ The term soul here should be considered analogous to "mind" I retain Deleuze's use of the term in this section, occasionally using it interchangeably with mind.

¹²² Gilles Deleuze, *Expressionism and Philosophy: Spinoza*, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 1987) 255.

Conscience, and morality, have been considered from their own standpoint, not as products of a body, but as transcendent postulates that impose conditions upon what a body can do. A difficulty arises, in considering the subject from this dual position, in that we are left with a weak standard of comparison between the conditions of existence required by the soul and the conditions of existence required by the body. When we consider the soul and the body in this dichotomy we have no means of comparing the actions of the two entities because each entity, the soul, and the body, functions according to its own terms. The soul has higher duties ascribed to it which are considered superior to the demands of the body, likewise, the demands of the body, may at times conflict with the higher duties of the soul. Deleuze's argument is that an asymmetrical dichotomy between body and soul is a consequence of thinking from the moral point of view.

Another consequence of the moral point of view is the difficulty of a comparative study of the power of each of the two entities. If there are no direct means of comparison between the body and the soul, we are unable to assess adequately either of these entities, because each functions according to its own special conditions. Therefore, how the body and the soul interact is a mystery. Deleuze finds in Spinoza the concept of parallelism, which places the body and the soul into comparative terms:

If parallelism is a novel doctrine, this is not because it denies real action of soul on body. It is because it overturns the moral principle by which

the actions of one are the passions of the other. “The order of actions and passions of the body is, by nature, at one with the order of actions and passions on the mind.” What is a passion in the mind is *also* a passion in the body, what is an action in the mind is *also* a passion in the body. Parallelism thus excludes any eminence of the soul, any spiritual and moral finality, any transcendence of a God who might base one series on another.¹²³

Parallelism “overturns” the moral view of the world by considering the soul and the body from a comparative standpoint. As mentioned above, the “higher” duties of the soul, when the soul is considered above the body, are often in conflict with the demands of the body, because each functions under its own conditions. A comparative analysis of the powers of soul and of the body becomes possible from a materialist point of view, which does not require transcendental arguments to support its claims. Materialism is not to be understood as reductionism, but rather as *immanence*. By asking the question: What is a body capable of doing? We directly imply the questions: what are its affections? How is it capable of being acted upon? Ethics of immanence will hinge on a materialistic interpretation of the relationship between mind and body, but such a position is neither transcendental nor reductionist. Immanence carries a dual definition: as the sensible conditions of actuality, by which bodies are affected, and the internal principles which produce its affections. By this definition certain things may be good for a body, and certain

¹²³ Deleuze, *Expressionism and Philosophy* 256.

things may be bad for it, the determination is always made from an internal physical standpoint, not through abstract conception which universalizes its judgments through an absolute good and evil, without taking into account the uniqueness, the differentiation between the makeup of bodies.

To articulate Deleuze's immanent ethics I will consider the ethics of immanence from the standpoint of each question that has formed the structure of this chapter. Moreover, this should provide a comprehensive view of how the two questions interrelate, and provide a consistent framework of the concepts that Deleuze uses to articulate his ethics.

SECTION 3: DELEUZE'S MODEL OF THE BODY

Deleuze argues for the body as a model by employing three key conceptions derived from his readings of Nietzsche and Spinoza. The three concepts are: 1. The immanent distinction between good and bad in place of the transcendental moral distinction between good and evil. 2. The distinction of forces. 3. The argument in regard to affections of the body.

Nietzsche remarks: "*Beyond Good and Evil*.-At least this does *not* mean Beyond Good and Bad."¹²⁴ By this he was articulating a statement that described an immanent development in regard to ethics. From an immanent point of view, good and bad serve as criteria by which we can determine the results of interaction between bodies. Certain bodies, when they come into relation with one another, decompose each other, while others combine to form a stronger body. Deleuze writes:

The good is when a body directly compounds its relation with ours, and, with all or part of its power increases ours. A food, for example. For us the bad is when a body decomposes our body's relation, although it still combines with our parts, but in ways that do not correspond to our essence, as when a poison breaks down the blood. Hence good and

¹²⁴ Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, Inc., 1989) 55.

bad have a primary objective meaning, but one that is relative and partial: that which agrees with our nature or does not agree with it.¹²⁵

The body as a model is to be understood in Deleuze's argument as interaction between bodies. The examples that Deleuze offers have a scientific element to them, and these examples are appropriate, for they contextualize the concreteness of taking the body as a model for ethics. Ethics if we are to take the term in its literal meaning means ways of acting. Further, the most basic forms of interaction are between bodies in nature. Deleuze's argument then proceeds along the following lines: Bodies interact according to the process of nature, certain bodies agree with one another, other bodies do not. The vitality of the organism is dependent on the relation between bodies. The relation between bodies is an immanent relation, since it not based upon anything but the interaction of one body with another, according to the law of nature. There is no recourse to a transcendental argument to explain the interaction between bodies. Deleuze writes:

If someone happens to encounter a body that can combine with his own in a favourable relation, he tries to unite with it. When someone encounters a body whose relation is incompatible with his own, a body that affects him with sadness, he does all in his power to ward off the sadness or destroy the body, that is, to impose on the parts of the body some new relation that accords with his own nature.¹²⁶

¹²⁵ Gilles Deleuze, *Spinoza Practical Philosophy*, trans. Robert Hurley (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1988) 22.

¹²⁶ Deleuze, *Expressionism and Philosophy* 257-58.

This immanent point of view considers relations between bodies on a practical level. The distinction between this approach and a transcendental approach is important to note. For example, from a transcendental point of view, if one body enters into relation with another body and is harmful to it, the harmful body is considered as evil. This however, is to misconstrue the bodies nature in regard to its interaction with the first body, and as a consequence, a natural cause is misunderstood as a moral prohibition. Deleuze uses an interpretation of the biblical story of Adam and the fruit as an example.

“Thou shalt not eat of the fruit...”: the anxious, ignorant Adam understands these words as the expression of a prohibition. And yet, what do they refer to? To a fruit that, as such, will poison Adam if he eats it. This is an instance of an encounter between two bodies whose characteristic relations are not compatible: the fruit will act as poison; *that is it will determine the parts of Adam's body* (and paralleling this, the idea of the fruit will determine the parts of his mind) *to enter into new relations that no longer accord with his own essence*. But because Adam is ignorant of causes, he thinks that God morally forbids him something, whereas God only reveals the natural consequence of ingesting the fruit. Spinoza is categorical on this point: all the phenomena that we group under the heading of Evil, illness, and death, are of this type: bad encounters, poisoning, intoxication, relational decomposition.¹²⁷

The relationship between bodies that was understood transcendently from a moral point of view is now given a properly immanent perspective. This model is wholly immanent in that it occurs in nature. Given Deleuze's substitution of the Nietzschean

¹²⁷ Deleuze, *Spinoza Practical Philosophy* 22.

distinction good/bad for the transcendental moral distinction good/evil, how do we determine the manner in which bodies interrelate? To answer this question Deleuze identifies two concepts that may account for how bodies interrelate with each. These two concepts are “conatus” (striving) and “affections” I will now turn my attention to these.

“Affections at each moment determine *conatus*, but conatus is at each moment a seeking of what is useful in terms of the affections that determine it.”¹²⁸ The first point that one should note about this statement is that the relationship between conatus and affections is reciprocal. The striving of an agent is determined by the affections that make up its body, yet an agent’s striving is always towards affections that are useful for it. On one level, this point can be understood as a type of utilitarianism of the body. Depending on the affections that determine a body, an agent will seek similar affections that agree with its body. Deleuze explains this point on a very concrete level, and we can come up with many examples. For instance, a person may pursue an education because she/he believes that a university degree will ensure development of academic talents. In pursuit of this goal, that person will seek out bodies with similar affections, such as other people pursuing the same goals, and in a good case, a mutual utilitarian relationship will ensue. The students pursue similar goals and derive mutual utilitarian advantage; the professors have students to teach which enhances their own pursuits, so they also derive a utilitarian advantage from

¹²⁸ Deleuze, *Expressionism and Philosophy* 258.

the agreement of bodies. The affections that have determined our student's conatus, (desire for improvement through education); have focussed the students striving into an area where similar useful affections can be gained, (the university). The interaction between affections and conatus can be displayed by such an example.¹²⁹ Such everyday ordering of encounters is at least partially sufficient in giving us an understanding of the point that Deleuze is making. In my example, there is a consideration of what is good for a given body from the standpoint of constructing a specific course of action. However, there is a deeper level of understanding the distinction between good and bad that Deleuze is attempting to argue for. Deleuze writes,

The individual will be called *good* (or free or rational, or strong) who strives, insofar as he is capable, to organize his encounters, to join with whatever agrees with his nature, to combine his relation with relations that are compatible with his, dynamism, power, and the composition of powers. That individual will be called *bad*, or servile, or weak, or foolish, who lives haphazardly, who is content to undergo the effects of his encounters, but wails and accuses every time the effect does not agree with him and reveals his own impotence. For, by circumstance, believing that with a lot of violence or a little guile, one will always

¹²⁹ This type of ordering of encounters corresponds to Kant's idea of imperfect duties, which I discuss in chapter one. It is interesting to note that in the example I give here, both the students and the professors are fulfilling what Kant would term an "imperfect duty to oneself" by cooperating to develop their mutual talents. The situation may not arise from adhering strictly to one's duty, and may not hold universally in this sense, but even Kant might have to admit that the situation is good and beneficial to the individuals involved, and serves to enhance one's native talents. My example serves to display, I think, that aspects of Kant's theory are not wholly irreconcilable with Deleuze's point of view.

extricate oneself, how can one fail to have more bad encounters than good.¹³⁰

Deleuze expresses a similar sentiment is expressed in *Expressionism and Philosophy*,

There is in nature neither Good nor Evil, there is no moral opposition, but there is an ethical difference. This ethical difference appears in various equivalent forms; that between the reasonable man and the foolish, the wise and the ignorant, freeman and slave, strong and weak. And wisdom or reason have in fact no other content but strength, freedom. This ethical difference does not relate to *conatus* since fools and the weak, no less than reasonable men and the strong, strive to persevere in their being. *It relates to the kind of affections that determine our conatus.*¹³¹

In this context, the example that I have given above appears to be a consciously organized good encounter, which is important for understanding Deleuze's conception of ethics. The more important point is that all agents strive but there are only certain ways in which that one can think, or in which one can strive, depending on the type of affections that determine one's conatus. This is the key to understanding the ethical difference present in nature that Deleuze argues for. To understand the kind of affections that together form a body, and determine its conatus, we have to understand the body as a typology of immanent forces. For, good, and bad are evaluated in nature by evaluating the types of forces that permeate a body. Forces can be understood as affections, and the

¹³⁰ Deleuze, *Spinoza Practical Philosophy* 22-23.

¹³¹ Deleuze, *Expression in Philosophy Spinoza* 261.

term “force” is derived from Nietzsche’s works, while affections are derived from Spinoza’s. They determine a very similar effect when describing the body. This leads to our second question, if a mode of existence is determined by taking the body as a model, how, then, is a mode of existence evaluated? Deleuze understands evaluation of modes of existence, as evaluating modes of existence according to a typology of immanent forces.

It is important, however, before proceeding to the discussion of a typology of immanent forces, to consider, exactly how Kant might reply to the materialistic model of the body that Deleuze suggests? Kant, of course, could not have had a Deleuzian position in mind when writing, but he did consider the position of materialism and formulated a careful response to it. Kant’s position on materialism, insofar as morality is concerned, centres around the concepts of human dignity and hypocrisy. Essentially, it is Kant’s position that a materialist perspective would make human dignity impossible, because we would never be able to rise above our animal nature if we did not have our moral consciousness, which, leads us to the supersensible. Moreover, Kant argues, that when we consider finite rational beings as beings of mere nature, and compare this consideration to the moral law, that sensible nature is humiliating, “the moral law unavoidably humiliates every human being when he compares it with the sensible propensity of his nature.”¹³² Kant argues, as I have endeavoured to show, that morality cannot spring from empirical

¹³² Kant, “Critique of Practical Reason” 200.

determinations, because such a position would not be binding on all rational individuals. It is Kant's aim to argue, that if morality, or more precisely the moral law, is considered as the result of a materialistic or empirical standpoint, the result might be hypocrisy. In other words, if the moral law is not real, and if the law of autonomy does not exist, and if finite rational beings nature are not considered from the dual standpoint that Kant envisions: law of autonomy and the law of nature, morality and moral actions might slip into hypocrisy, because the letter of the law is being adhered to for ones own advantage, but the moral *disposition* is not to be found. Kant writes,

Everything would be sheer hypocrisy; the law would be hated or even despised, though still observed for the sake of one's own advantage. The letter of the law (legality) would be found in our actions, but the spirit of it in our dispositions (morality) would not be found at all; and since with all our efforts we could not altogether free ourselves from reason in our judgment, we would unavoidable have to appear to be worthless, depraved human beings in our own eyes, even if we sought to compensate ourselves for this mortification before the inner court by enjoying the pleasure that, in our delusion, we suppose a natural or divine law has connected with the machinery of its police, guided only by what was done without troubling about the motives from which it was done.¹³³

It is evident from this passage that Kant was deeply concerned about hypocrisy. And, it will be remembered, that Kant argued at great length that a rational being's disposition towards an action is more important than the result of the action itself. The

¹³³ Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason" 261.

question is: Does Kant address the body specifically? In my view the answer is yes. Kant's concern is that if individuals ignore moral dispositions, and maintain only the legality of the moral law, they will invariably seek to maximize their own advantage, in which case an individual's encounters will always be approached from the position of personal advantage. Certainly, this point appears to echo, though of course not directly, the example of the university student that I gave above. In addition, Kant would also be concerned about ordering our encounters with other rational individuals from a wholly materialistic premise, since the spirit of the moral law might be violated in such cases. Essentially, Kant's concern is that if we consider our actions from a materialistic standpoint we will be concerned only with consequences. Kant goes so far as to argue that hypocrisy, in the sense of obeying merely the letter of the law, is evil. Moreover, he suggests in the following passage that a materialistic standpoint, judging solely from the point of view of consequences, gives us no gauge by which to differentiate between an evil and a good action. Kant writes,

So far as the agreement of actions with the law goes, however, there is no difference (or at least there ought to be none) between a human being of good morals...and a morally good human being...except that the actions of the former do not always have, perhaps never have, the law as their sole and supreme incentive, whereas those of the latter *always* do. We can say of the first that he complies with the law according to the *letter* (i.e. as regards the action commanded by the law); but of the second, that he observes it according to the *spirit* (the spirit of the moral

law consists in the law being of itself a sufficient incentive). *Whatever is not of this faith is sin* (in attitude). For whenever incentives other than the law itself (e.g. ambition, self-love in general, yes, even a kindly instinct such as sympathy) are necessary to determine the power of choice to *lawful* actions, it is purely accidental that these actions agree with the law, for the incentives might equally well incite its violation. The maxim, by the goodness of which all moral worth of the person must be assessed, is therefore still contrary to the law, and the human being, despite all his actions is nevertheless evil.¹³⁴

What Kant is suggesting in this passage is twofold: 1. From the point of view of observation, there is apparently no difference between a person who is acting from the letter of the law and a person who is acting from the spirit of the law. 2. If we rely on the consequences of an action as our factor of differentiation, we will be unable to distinguish between a good or evil disposition, since materialistically the effect is the same. I have already argued, earlier in this work, that it is difficult to identify an action done from the spirit of the moral law, and Kant recognizes this difficulty, nonetheless it is a compelling argument, if only for the fact that it suggests that many so called “moral actions” may be nothing more than hypocrisy, rationalized in moral language simply to promote one’s own advantage. This is a serious charge against the materialistic utilitarianism of good encounters that Deleuze is proposing. How would a position based on Deleuze’s arguments reply to this position?

¹³⁴ Immanuel Kant, *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, ed. and trans. Allen Wood and George di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998) 54.

First, one could suggest that it is the distinction between good and evil that already opens the door to hypocrisy. As, argued above, Deleuze believes that the immanent distinction between good and bad can offer an evaluative distinction that is preferable to the distinction between good and evil. I think a Deleuzian reply could be defended consistently in the following way: The immanent distinction between good and bad is more likely to lessen the propensity to hypocrisy, by placing the subject into a position where she/he is more honest with her/himself. In other words, it might be a better strategy for the subject to admit to him/herself that it is impossible to act morally in all situations in the true spirit of the moral law, rather than to rationalize one's shortcomings in any given situation. The emphasis is a shift towards the actions of an individual, for an ethics is literally, a way of acting. If what is at stake is human dignity, I would argue that such an approach improves one's moral disposition both towards oneself and towards others, in the sense that to actively pursue good encounters removes at least some of the situations in which hypocrisy can arise. But, to fully understand the critical edge of Deleuze's position we must understand the typology of immanent forces, which underlies the possibility of ordering encounters. Moreover, the next section will show that the self-love and ambition that Kant believes will arise from a materialistic understanding of ethics, can be accounted

for from an immanent standpoint, specifically if we properly understand Deleuze's doctrine of power.

SECTION 4: THE TYPOLOGY OF IMMANENT FORCES

According to Deleuze, the typology of immanent forces is the evaluative criteria by which we can determine whether a body or an encounter can be defined as good or bad. It is this evaluate criteria that Deleuze substitutes for moral evaluations. The term “force” is taken directly from Nietzsche:

The victorious concept “force,” by means of which our physicists have created God and the world, still needs to be completed: an inner will must be ascribed to it, which I designate as “will to power,” i.e., as an insatiable desire to manifest power; or as the employment and the exercise of power, as a creative drive...one is obligated to understand all motion, all “appearances,” all “laws,” only as symptoms of an inner event and to employ man as an analogy to this end.¹³⁵

Nietzsche actually presents two distinct ideas that complement each other. The concept of force and the concept of will to power are closely related. The two are intertwined and inseparable from each other. Together they form the axis by which an immanent typology can determine whether a body is permeated by “good” or “bad” forces. I will begin with how Deleuze uses Nietzsche’s concepts to articulate and describe precisely what will to power and force are.

¹³⁵ Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Random House, Inc., 1967) sec, 619.

The concept of “will to power,” defended above, is not to be understood as something external that exerts itself independently of what it conditions, and in this sense, will to power is not an absolute or unitary principle that can be traced through forces to a point of origin. Will to power is rather a dynamic plurality of forces that strive. The term can be understood as the completion of the concept of conatus, which as argued above is striving towards a preservation or extension of a certain mode of existence. Will to power, in Deleuze’s interpretive framework, is the active process by which our ethical differences- in Deleuze’s sense of good and bad-are organized into new encounters, which increase our power of acting. In this sense, will to power manifests itself through certain combinations of forces and constitutes, or more accurately, reconstitutes forces as they relate to one another. As such, will to power is the internal element of force which reconstructs forces into different arrangements of becoming. Forces alone do not will, which is why will to power is needed as an internal complement

All reality is a quantity of dynamic and pluralistic forces. “Every relationship of forces constitutes a body-whether it is chemical, biological, social or political.”¹³⁶ It is forces that come together into relation to form given a body. How forces come together to form a body is fortuitous, in the sense that it would be impossible to identify *every* circumstance that contributed to the relation of forces in a single body. In this sense, how

¹³⁶ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy* 40.

we evaluate forces is not a question of origins, for all origins that we can postulate will always be partial and incomplete. It is rather the question of evaluating a becoming of forces within an existing body. The question one asks is: What is the relationship between forces in a given body? Deleuze argues, through his reading of Nietzsche, that the relationship between forces is always a question of dominant and dominated. This can imply any type of bodies as the above quote suggests. There is always a tension between forces, that results from their fortuitous construction, "The birth of a living body is not therefore surprising since every body is living, being the "arbitrary" product of the forces of which it is composed."¹³⁷ The dominant forces in a body Deleuze terms "active" and the dominated forces in a body are termed "reactive." This relation has to be carefully explicated for the distinction is not to be understood merely quantitatively. Deleuze will argue that the quantitatively superior forces in a given body are not necessarily active, rather, as soon as the smallest degree of power is no longer separated from what it can do it is equal to the largest degree of power:

For Deleuze, this is the point of convergence that unites Nietzsche and Spinoza. It is never a matter of judging degrees of power quantitatively: the smallest degree of power is equivalent to the largest degree once it is not separated from what it can do. It is rather a question of knowing whether a mode of existence, however small or great, can deploy its power, increasing its power of acting to the point where it goes to the limit of what it can do. Modes are no longer "judged" in terms of their

¹³⁷ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy* 40.

degree of proximity to or distance from an external principle but are “evaluated” in terms of the manner by which they “occupy” their existence: the intensity of their power, their tenor of life.¹³⁸

This is perhaps the most important aspect of Deleuze’s critical philosophy. Power has often been misunderstood as a means of subjugation, or as a desire to dominate over others. Deleuze’s use of the term power does not endorse anything like this, but should be understood, at least in one aspect, as regaining the power of acting that transcendental developments in philosophy may have removed from us. Thus, external modes of evaluation that rational beings were previously subject to are replaced with an internal criterion by which they live their existence. What Deleuze removes from the schema of judgment is the argument that a universalizing principle can judge, in formal terms, the actions of individuals. As mentioned above, Deleuze distinguishes between active and reactive forces. Perhaps the best way to understand what Deleuze is getting at is to look at the distinction between active and reactive forces.

Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche suggests, that Nietzsche was arguing against the fact that actions and organisms were always being judged from the point of view of reactive forces, since, “We always think that we have done enough when we understand

¹³⁸ Daniel W. Smith, “The Place of Ethics in Deleuze’s Philosophy: Three Questions of Immanence”, ed. and trans. Eleanor Kaufman and Kevin J. Heller, *Deleuze and Guattari: New Mappings in Politics, Philosophy and Culture* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998) 263.

an organism from the point of view of reactive forces.”¹³⁹ What such an interpretation does not consider is forces that are active within an organism as well. For example, a person’s behaviour may be understood in a number of ways, but speaking to that person, by observing their behaviour, we understand only the reaction of the person according to certain stimuli. We do not understand the active forces that may permeate that body. This is not to say that we should look only for active forces in a body, this would be pointless since all forces are in a relation of active/reactive. The distinction corresponds to the one between consciousness and unconsciousness:

Consciousness merely expresses the relation of certain reactive forces to the active forces which dominate them. Consciousness is essentially reactive; this is why we do not know what a body can do, or what activity it is capable of...It is inevitable that consciousness sees the organism from its own point of view and understands it in its own way.¹⁴⁰

To understand the body as a configuration of forces, differentiated into active and reactive, is to be able to evaluate degrees of power in a more accurate way. How does this translate into an evaluate criteria? The body is evaluated according to its totality, not merely from the side of reactive forces. Psychoanalysis may be a good example to illustrate the active/reactive distinction. Deleuze had an ambivalent relation to

¹³⁹ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy* 41.

¹⁴⁰ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy* 41.

psychoanalysis, for that reason I intend my example not to imply adherence to any specific school of thought here. I am only suggesting an example of a process that considers more than just superficial conscious reactions, in order to give a context for the explanation of forces. For example, when a psychoanalyst performs a counselling session, they are not simply gauging the conscious reactions of their patients, though this certainly plays a part of the procedure. They are searching for motives, desires, in Deleuzian terminology, “forces,” that may explain why the patient is acting in a certain way. Consciousness is a symptom of what is happening in the unconscious mind, however the greater activity of the mind is unconscious. Moreover, if a certain arrangement of forces can be determined, and considered as what is active what is reactive, perhaps they can be changed into a new relation by being brought into the conscious mind. Uncovering relations of forces in this sense is a very concrete process, by which we learn about our motivations, our desires and ourselves. The reason why such a process is not brought under a universal principle is because relations of forces can never be exhausted, the world as it comes to affect us and as we come to affect it will never be fully exhausted. New relations of forces will always be played out according to ever changing circumstances. By understanding subjects in this way we are open to new modes of existence, by which we can actively pursue good encounters. A good mode of existence will be active, rational and aware of itself, a bad

mode of existence can be considered irrational, and unaware of itself and the forces that permeate it. Deleuze believes that we should always maintain a sensitivity to the active and reactive forces within us and around us. An ethics of immanence encourages openness to new situations and to consideration of the immanent relations between bodies and forces, which open the door to new solutions to concrete problems.

This is in Deleuzian terms a typology of immanent forces. The relation between forces becomes an ethical question between types. What type of forces have to be in relation for a person to be cruel or kindhearted, technical or literary minded, a logician or a poet, or both in one person? What are the forces that permeate a society to make it a certain type, democratic or totalitarian? Deleuze's point is that we will always be asking questions like this, Deleuze, however, presents us with a new form for our questioning: Immanent relations, in which, nonetheless the solutions to our problems will never be exhausted, and that is the crux of the issue, since from an immanent point of view we can always compose solutions to concrete problems, and understand our solutions as a process or becoming, which will constantly yield new and different solutions. Deleuze is opposed to transcendental theories of morality because such theories limit this progression, and attempt to refer circumstances that, by their nature are constantly changing, to a static principle, that by definition cannot encompass all of reality.

Given what has been said, the following question may now be asked: Can there be any possible compromise between the positions of Kant and Deleuze? The answer, I think, is yes, though a strict Kantian position might not be possible. Essentially, what is at stake is the following: Either Kant's position can be incorporated by Deleuze's position or it is untenable. Also, by considering the two positions in this way we are in a better position to understand Deleuze's ethics as both a continuation of, and as a critique of Kant's position. This is not to suggest that there is not much of value in the Kantian philosophy, clearly are vital contributions present in the way that Kant presents his moral theory, and his position is still important for individuals who are committed to being moral in the way that Kant suggests. This is I think, the crux of the issue and the key point of compromise between a Kantian and a Deleuzian position.

As I have tried to show in this essay, Kant has argued for a universally binding moral position with great depth and subtlety, nonetheless he has failed to show convincingly, that the call of duty and the moral law are in fact binding on all finite rational individuals. Further, he has not shown that one could act in accordance with the moral law in the empirical world without contradiction. Moreover, it was determined that Kant went to great lengths to give an account of freedom which would allow for finite rational individuals to act in accordance with the moral law. Freedom, it will be remembered, is

admitted as a possibility but not as a necessary reality, since no theoretical deduction of freedom was possible. The proof of freedom is in the practical experience of it, yet this is too subjective a position from which to present a normative understanding of freedom. Kant's main concern was to establish a rational foundation on which morality could be based, and to argue for the moral law as binding on finite rational beings. In the final analysis, Kant does not achieve this point. For if the moral law is to be binding on the actions of all finite rational beings, freedom has to be shown as the state that finite rational beings' exist in. But since, this cannot be proven, there exists no necessary ground by which the moral law can be argued for as binding on all finite rational individuals. Moreover, Kant relies on the call of natural moral consciousness to make his case for morality, and the result is a highly idealized subject. Moreover, it is difficult to believe, that a finite subject, could ever act with the moral consistency that Kant envisions. In the final analysis, Kant's position is formal as the conditions for the possibility for morality. Such a position depends too much on rational faith. The result is, to use Hegel's phrase, is a "beautiful soul," which may be a noble thing to contemplate, but a near impossibility to actualize.

Kant's position does command considerable respect, in the sense that the moral law can be seen as binding on those who are committed to being moral in the specifically

Kantian sense. In this sense, Kant's position is an important elucidation of the requirements for this specific type of morality. Thus, seen from this point of view the moral law can be seen as an important regulative fiction or a guiding principle that may aid rational individuals with at least some of their moral decision making. What Kant's position cannot be said to achieve, however, is absolute moral truth.

An ethics of immanence can incorporate such a position, in the sense that Deleuze's distinction does not bluntly reject the moral view of the world, but opens the possibility of extending it to include a pragmatic way of acting. If what is at stake are the issues of human dignity, decent behaviour towards one's fellow human beings, and respect for oneself then Deleuze's ethical framework, at the very least, provides a reasonable groundwork for how these issues can be promoted, however at the price of a universally binding moral law. If we insist on positing foundational transcendent values, then compromise is impossible, since such values are static and not open to actual change. However, if we can envision morality as not wholly rigid, and open to criticism and interpretation, then perhaps some compromise is possible. If such is the case, blunt contradiction between Kant and Deleuze does not arise, but rather a complementary position results, perhaps not with the strict letter of the law that Kant intended, since the

moral law cannot be accepted as an absolute. However, since Deleuze was seeking the actual conditions for a good life his position is certainly in accord with its Kant's spirit.

CONCLUSION

A study of Deleuze will reveal that he was vigorously opposed to systems of morality that rely on transcendent principles, what is not immediately obvious is that Deleuze's project as a critical philosophy owes a certain debt to Kant's idea of critique from an immanent point of view. In the first chapter of this paper Kantian morality was presented in its essential components. Ultimately, this chapter argued that Kant's presentation of concepts such as duty, the moral law, and freedom depend on understanding the rational subject from a dual point of view, on the one hand as phenomena, and on the other hand as noumena.

In the second chapter the Kantian moral theory was evaluated in more detail. It was argued that Kant's presentation of the highest good was a reformulation of a Stoic position that substituted the worthiness to be happy, in place of actual contingent happiness. Furthermore, it was argued that even the highest good can be understood as a consistent development, insofar as the postulates are assumed, it is not realizable in the actual world. Moreover, it was concluded that, at best, a certain dignity could be attained by striving to promote the highest good, yet this did not make the highest good realizable in the finite world. Moreover, Hegel's criticisms in this chapter argued that Kant's moral view of the world carries with it certain difficulties from the point of view of freedom, moral

action, and the moral disposition of the “beautiful soul.” Hegel’s conclusion was that the Kantian morality is inadequate, only in so far as it is partial. We then proceeded to a discussion of Hegel’s view that the Kantian morality requires a more concrete development.

The third chapter discussed Deleuze’s relation to Kantianism, and then proceeded to outline how an ethics of immanence could be understood as a possible alternative to a transcendental moral development. It was concluded, that an immanent ethics could at least be considered as an option to more traditional moral theories, from the point of view of two key questions. Further, it was concluded in this chapter that the discrepancies between Kant and Deleuze are not as severe as they might seem upon preliminary study, and it was argued that even though Kant’s morality, in the strictest sense, could not be maintained in its entirety, much of what Kant wished to accomplish, could be accounted for in Deleuze’s philosophical framework.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Deleuze, Gilles. *Difference and Repetition*. Trans. Paul Patton. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994.
- Deleuze, Gilles. *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*. Trans. Martin Joughin. New York: Zone Books, 1997.
- Deleuze, Gilles. *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983.
- Deleuze, Gilles. *Kant's Critical Philosophy*. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999.
- Deleuze, Gilles. *Spinoza Practical Philosophy*. Trans. Robert Hurley. San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1988.
- Hardt, Michael. *An Apprenticeship in Philosophy Gilles Deleuze*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995.
- Hegel, Georg, Wilhelm, Friedrich. *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Trans. A.V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.
- Hegel, Georg, Wilhelm, Friedrich. *Philosophy of Right*. Trans. T.M. Knox. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971.
- Hegel, Georg, Wilhelm, Friedrich. *Logic*. Trans. William Wallace. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.
- Kant, Immanuel. "Critique of Practical Reason", in *Practical Philosophy*. Ed. and Trans. Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Pure Reason*. Ed. and Trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Kant, Immanuel. *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*. Trans. James W. Ellington. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 1993.

Kant, Immanuel. *Lectures on Philosophical Theology*. Trans. Allen W. Wood and Gertrude M. Clark. London: Cornell University Press, 1978.

Kant, Immanuel. *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*. Trans. Paul Carus. Rev. James W. Ellington. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 1977.

Kant, Immanuel. *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*. Ed. and Trans. Allen Wood and George di Giovanni. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Korner, Stephen. *Kant*. London: Penguin Books, 1955.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. *On the Genealogy of Morals*. Ed. and Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Random House, Inc. 1989.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Will to Power*. Trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale. Ed. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Random House, Inc. 1967.

Robinson, Jonathan. *Duty and Hypocrisy in Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind: An Essay in the Real and the Ideal*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977.

Smith, Daniel. W. "The Place of Ethics in Deleuze's Philosophy: Three Questions of Immanence." *Deleuze and Guattari: New Mappings in Politics, Philosophy and Culture*. Ed. and Trans. Eleanor Kaufman and Kevin Jon Heller, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998. pp.250-269