INTRODUCTION

During the early 1970s, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's English AM radio service cast off its traditional emphasis on entertainment programs and underwent a "revolution" which created what has come to be known as "information radio." While the new information format of CBC radio is familiar to many Canadians, the process by which it came about is obscure. Little has been written on the so-called "radio revolution" and the report which is believed to have caused it is still treated by the CBC as a secret document. Such accounts as are available have contributed to several misconceptions about its origins.

The first of these misconceptions is that the changes that occurred constituted a relatively peaceful and harmonious transition in CBC programming. In 1980, for example, CBC Executive Vice President William Armstrong noted how in 1970 the CBC began "the long process of rebuilding both an innovative radio service and the audiences for it." Similarly, a 1983 CBC report recalled that "from the ashes of indifference and paralysis in 1968, the radio service has developed in 15 years to the point where it has surpassed its television child in fulfilling CBC's mandate." However, like most revolutions, the radio revolution was a struggle involving conflicting ideologies and desires for change. In 1970, CBC executive Peter Campbell called the attitudes of some CBC programmers "insolent", "egocentric" and "unprincipled". Without action against them, he felt, the CBC would not only bring itself "into ridicule, but we encourage the same outrageous behaviour in other employees." The radio revolution was not, therefore, merely revolutionary in the sense of
THE CBC RADIO REVOLUTION 1964 - 1976,
A RE-EXAMINATION
by
CLAY CARTER
A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Journalism
School of Journalism

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Ottawa, Ontario
22 February, 1990
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A RE-EXAMINATION"
submitted by Clay Carter
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the degree of Master of Journalism

Thesis Supervisor

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ABSTRACT

"The CBC Radio Revolution 1964-1976, a re-examination" studies the causal forces underlying changes the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's English AM radio programming underwent in the 1960s and 70s, marked by information programs, block programs, and new network shows like "As It Happens" and "Cross Country Checkup". It examines the literature, especially the "CBC English Radio Report," (also called the Meggs/Ward, or Ward/Meggs radio study) and misconceptions surrounding the radio revolution. It details work of the CBC, the CRTC, the federal government, and the CBC's audience which effected change during these years. It also discusses change in post-war North American society which gave rise to the New Left youth protest movement, its evolvement into a popular protest, and it's reflection in New Journalism. It concludes that New Journalism practices and ideas spawned during social change, which entered mainstream media during these years, was the main causal force behind the CBC's radio revolution.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis is dedicated to the true revolutionaries who served under the banners of integrity, courage, principle and passion, some of whom I have had the honour to know: K.A. Carter; B. Campbell; C.E. Delmage; R.A.E. Murphy; and the 1985 staff of CBC Morning who created their own radio revolution: H. Abbott; N. Cooper; J. Crump; M. Fry; S. Mosher and M. Sourial. They captured what once had been, and realized that it can always be.
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INTRODUCTION

During the early 1970s, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's English AM radio service cast off its traditional emphasis on entertainment programs and underwent a "revolution" which created what has come to be known as "information radio." While the new information format of CBC radio is familiar to many Canadians, the process by which it came about is obscure. Little has been written on the so-called "radio revolution" and the report which is believed to have caused it is still treated by the CBC as a secret document. Such accounts as are available have contributed to several misconceptions about its origins.

The first of these misconceptions is that the changes that occurred constituted a relatively peaceful and harmonious transition in CBC programming. In 1980, for example, CBC Executive Vice President William Armstrong noted how in 1970 the CBC began "the long process of rebuilding both an innovative radio service and the audiences for it."1 Similarly, a 1983 CBC report recalled that "from the ashes of indifference and paralysis in 1968, the radio service has developed in 15 years to the point where it has surpassed its television child in fulfilling CBC's mandate."2 However, like most revolutions, the radio revolution was a struggle involving conflicting ideologies and desires for change. In 1970, CBC executive Peter Campbell called the attitudes of some CBC programmers "insolent", "egocentric" and "unprincipled." Without action against them, he felt, the CBC would not only bring itself "into ridicule, but we encourage the same outrageous behaviour in other employees."3 The radio revolution was not, therefore, merely revolutionary in the sense of
involving dramatic change. It also embodied a significant conflict over how best to forge a national broadcasting service.

The second misconception is that the radio revolution began after 1970. For example, it is claimed that "it was not until the outset of the 1970s that CBC radio underwent the revolution," and that "after 1971, the CBC scrapped the old daytime format and added seven hours a day of morning and late afternoon information programs." In addition, network programs such as "As It Happens" and "Cross Country Checkup" are considered products of a radio revolution which took place from 1971 to 1976. A milestone is said to have been reached "in 1972 with the implementation of local information programming in the 6:00-9:00 a.m. period which combined national, regional and local news." However, "As It Happens" was created in 1968 and "Cross Country Checkup" began in 1965. Further, local information programming began in 1969 and major morning newscasts, such as the "World At Eight", began years earlier.

This leads us to the third misconception; namely, that the radio revolution was largely the product of a single report which made its appearance in 1970. Following the appointment of George F. Davidson as president of the CBC in 1968, the CBC Board of Directors called for a thorough study of CBC radio. There were several reasons for this study, the main one being that it was believed that CBC radio audiences had steadily declined for several years. Undertaken by Douglas Ward and Peter Meggs, the study questioned the rationale of traditional radio practices and sought to provide solutions. The resultant "CBC English Radio Report" (also referred to as the Meggs-Ward or Ward-Meggs radio study) has frequently been described as the cause of the radio revolution. A 1976

The "CBC English Radio Report," May 1970, is thus regarded as the foundation on which CBC radio's return to popularity was built. Its recommendations are credited with bringing about a "massive overhaul" of programming. It supposedly first recognized that television had forced radio to change. Evening periods had traditionally been considered the domain of radio. Television stole this evening audience, leaving radio with a crisis that "threatened to make radio redundant." Another development credited to the report is that it "recognized that the prime time was daytime, not evenings." Another is that radio programs should be organized in large blocks of time, instead of in hour, half-hour, quarter-hour or even smaller time periods. However, many of the ideas attributed to the "CBC English Radio Report" of May 1970, had previously been enunciated. In 1957, the Royal Commission on Broadcasting found that television had significantly affected evening radio audiences. In a 1965 submission to government, the CBC's management not only identified prime time as being during the day but talked about block programming. The latter was introduced by the CBC in 1967 when the two-hour "Gerussi!" program was created. If developments such as block programming, the
recognition of prime time during the day and major network programs such as "As It Happens" were creations of the radio revolution, it is difficult to lend credence to accounts which see the "CBC English Radio Report" as the main causal force behind this revolution. While these accounts have adequately described what occurred, they have over-simplified the reasons why it occurred. This is not to say that the report had no causal significance, but rather it was only one factor among many in bringing about the development of CBC AM radio as we know it today.

Though useful to a degree, the term "radio revolution" itself obscures the fact that two distinct processes of change to CBC radio were actually taking place in the 1960s and early 1970s. One process was an evolution of changes to CBC radio negotiated by government and the CBC's management. This evolution began with the Fowler Commission of 1957, which recognized that television had replaced radio as an evening medium. The evolution continued and was highlighted by the second Fowler study of 1965 and CBC management's submission to that Committee. The CBC brief recognized the need to attract an audience and that day time was prime time. It recommended block programming, a separation of the FM and AM radio services, a non-commercial public radio system and that CBC radio serve special audience interests, especially in local programming. The "CBC English Radio Report," May 1970, was a continuation of this evolution. To a significant degree, it compiled the findings of the CBC's management in one volume.

The second, and neglected, process of change was rooted in the changes in North American society during the 1960s, such as the rise of the New Left youth movement and the emergence of New Journalism, and
related ideas such as participatory democracy, equality of rights, and a challenge to the status quo. This fundamental shift in philosophy was introduced into the CBC by an influx of new programmers. This philosophical change contributed to much of the conflict which arose during the radio revolution. But it was also the driving force which accomplished many of the changes attributed to the revolution.

The success of this new programming philosophy was eventually recognized by the CBC. For example, a 1976 CBC radio study found that "the impact of This Country In The Morning is impossible to measure; its national importance is undeniable."\textsuperscript{18} Similarly, Armstrong declared in a 1980 speech that CBC radio's "personalities and programs were becoming as well known as many television equivalents . . ."\textsuperscript{19} However, the closest the CBC has come to recognizing that this was due to a philosophical change was in a 1983 assessment of the radio revolution which declared that it had "aggressively developed 'personality' radio in critical time periods -- block programs with a distinct style, hosted by personalities who could attract and hold audiences."\textsuperscript{20} Virtually all accounts of the radio revolution confine their descriptions to the CBC management and government findings already described. It was not, however, the creation of things such as block programming or the recognition of prime time, but what was done with them, that constitute the major accomplishments of the radio revolution.

In addition to basic misconceptions about the timing and causes of the radio revolution, there have also arisen two myths about its impact. The first of these was that the program changes of the information or radio revolution, succeeded in a significant change in audience. In his
1980 speech, for example, Armstrong ended his praise of the information revolution by declaring that "audiences responded."²¹ A few years earlier, a CBC report had claimed that "'As It Happens' has been a dramatic triumph -- increasing audiences spectacularly with attendant national impact that has surpassed that of its television cousins with their larger audiences."²² A 1983 CBC document likewise claims the radio revolution "helped us win back listeners."²³ Paul Rutherford writes in *The Canadian Encyclopedia* that the "renaissance of CBC programming almost doubled the audience share of the network's own stations between 1967 and 1977."²⁴ However, other reports by the CBC and one by the Canadian Radio-Television Commission (CRTC) indicate that CBC radio audiences actually declined after the "CBC English Radio Report." A CBC study of 1983 points out that "the CBC share of weekly circulation has fallen 7 per cent since the Meggs/Ward Report."²⁵ Another study claims that "between 1970 and 1984, CBC radio's audience share fell from 15.4 per cent to 9.9 per cent."²⁶ The CRTC found a total CBC AM radio audience share of 19.26 per cent in 1968 and 19.6 per cent in 1978.²⁷

One reason for these apparently contradictory claims was a failure to distinguish between audience impact and audience size. As the underlying philosophies behind programs changed, their content and format also changed. Because they reflected the New Journalism and challenged the status quo, some of the new programs had an impact beyond the traditional CBC audience and thus called attention to themselves. While the actual CBC radio audience may not have increased spectacularly, the new programs did have an impact on Canadian society. Increased renown of CBC radio programs was equated to an increase in audience.
The second myth to arise from the radio revolution is that the "CBC English Radio Report" was the salvation of CBC radio. Concurrent with George Davidson's 1968 appointment as CBC president was a cut in federal funding to the CBC. It is believed that there were so few listeners to CBC radio that (in an effort to save money) the new president considered cancelling the CBC radio network.²⁸ Before such rash action could be taken, the CBC Board of Directors supposedly ordered the radio study to be done. In his 1983 examination of CBC radio, Robert Sunter claims that "from a low point in the late sixties, when CBC President George Davidson questioned the worth of continuing network radio, the weekly audience for the mono service soared from 300,000 (not including hockey and network news) to ten times that number."²⁹ Similarly, in Peter Bruck's "Power Format Radio," CBC employees claimed that in May, 1969, "the elimination of the radio network was discussed."³⁰ However, those that have made this conjecture have been unable to provide documented support for it and are unsure of its origins.³¹ There is no record of a discussion to cancel CBC radio and all who are alleged to have taken part deny that such action was ever considered. For example, Davidson says that such a discussion never took place.³² The CBC Executive Vice President at the time, Laurent Picard, also claims it was never discussed.³³

To a great extent, these myths can be linked to the political and ideological conflicts of the late 1960s and early 1970s within and around the CBC. A series of difficulties between the CBC and government, and its agent the CRTC, has focused attention on Davidson. Several circumstances led Davidson to declare the "CBC English Radio Report" to be a secret document. His handling of the report was criticized and he was blamed for
its ultimate rejection by the CRTC. At the same time, Davidson imposed budget cuts on the CBC, from a federal government directive. This action has been criticized as ruinous to CBC radio programs. As well, the "CBC English Radio Report" was co-authored by one of the leaders of the Canadian New Left youth movement, Doug Ward. The new programmers, who moved into the organization in the mid-1960s, were imbued with new ideas. They would tend to assume that a creation originating with someone from their ranks would succeed. The fact that the report was secret and that it was officially rejected, was blamed on the handling of the report, rather than its quality. Most importantly, there were substantial changes to CBC radio during these years and the "CBC English Radio Report" is the only major report written in the midst of this change. As a result, any change has been attributed to this secret document. Over time, the report has taken on a patina of grandeur, Davidson has been blamed for nearly cancelling CBC radio, and a report which few employees had read has been credited with radio's salvation.

The term "radio revolution" itself came from a period before the "CBC English Radio Report." CBC Information Services, which was responsible for publicity, used the slogan "the Radio Revolution is underway" in April of 1969.\(^\text{34}\) It declared that "two new personalities have emerged on the Canadian broadcast scene with the CBC radio network's latest contribution to its current 'radio revolution'."\(^\text{35}\) The authors of the report later recalled they were astonished to see billboards throughout Toronto heralding a radio revolution. They felt it undermined any credibility CBC radio had with its dwindling audience. In a recent interview, Ward explains that people were going to listen to the radio and hear "nothing
different, tune out and then they're not going to trust us a year later when this report comes out and we say that is revolutionary." The information department's slogan clearly suggests, however, that other forces were at work besides the radio study. The purpose of this thesis is to show how these diverse forces ushered in CBC radio as we know it today.
NOTES FOR INTRODUCTION


3. Peter Campbell, "Insolent programmers" (August 17, 1970); National Archives Canada, RG 41, vol. 799, file 7-3-1.


9. Ibid., p. 20.


12. Ibid.


24 Paul Rutherford, op. cit., p. 1820.
25 Robert Sunter, op. cit., p. 32.
29 Robert Sunter, ibid.
31 Interview with Jack Craine; telephone interview with Robert Sunter, November 17, 1989; interview with Walter Unger.
32 Telephone interview with George Davidson, August 10, 1989.
35 Ibid.
36 Interview with Doug Ward.
CHAPTER ONE

THE CBC ENGLISH RADIO REPORT: ORIGINS AND CONTENT

The "CBC English Radio Report," May 1970, was written by Peter Meggs and Doug Ward at the request of the CBC Board of Directors. In May of 1969, the CBC Board had ordered an extensive review of CBC radio, "the object being to make these services more attractive, better adapted to present conditions, and economically more viable, so that the Corporation could capture its fair share of the listening audience."\(^1\) Officially called the Radio Project, this review was to look into every aspect of CBC radio and recommend changes. It is the Radio Project's report that is commonly credited with causing the radio revolution.

The Radio Project was broken into two teams, one English, the other French. The Managing Director of CBC radio, Jack Craine, was given the task of the English redefinition. Craine had had a long history with CBC radio. He had been the first Program Director of the CBC's new Northern Service, had established the Canadian Forces network in Europe and had served as the CBC's United Nation's representative before becoming the Managing Director of radio.\(^2\) Craine, and his assistant Alan Brown, chose two radio people to conduct the study: Peter Meggs, host of the CBC radio program "Concern", and Doug Ward, a radio producer at CBC Toronto who had worked for two years on programs such as "Five Nights" and "Radio Free Friday". In July, Meggs and Ward met Brown and Craine in a room in the Park Plaza Hotel in Toronto and were formally asked to take on the project. They agreed to do the study on the condition that their report would be presented to the Board of Directors for action. There was
agreement and Meggs was named Assistant Program Director.

Meggs and Ward shared a number of preconceptions. Both came from backgrounds of liberal arts and theology and subscribed to Graham Spry's ideal of public commitment, accountability and civic duty. For years, Meggs had juggled the callings of the Anglican church and CBC radio, torn between broadcasting and the ministry where, during the 1960s, there had been considerable change. Ward was a graduate in theology from the University of Toronto where he had been student president. While in university he had served on the executive of the Canadian Union of Students, "working with some success, at taking that organization from its posture as an apple-pie outfit . . . and swinging it sharply to the New Left." He had also been involved with the more radical activities of the Student Union for Peace Action. By 1967, SUPA dwindled and then disbanded. Meanwhile Ward had been one of the driving forces behind the formation of the Company of Young Canadians (CYC), placing him at the centre of the New Left youth movement in Canada. When the CYC became mired in federal bureaucracy, he moved to the CBC, though as a former leader of the New Left, he remained for some years on the periphery of the politics of the youth movement.

The Radio Project group decided Meggs and Ward should visit CBC locations across Canada. Meggs was to concentrate on CBC staff, while Ward was to focus on community groups. Input by CBC employees was considered crucial to the success of the project. According to Ward, "ninety per cent of the good ideas in the report came from the folks working in the trenches across the CBC system." They met over four hundred CBC employees and received over seventy-five briefs. Many were
retrieved from the bottom of desk drawers by employees who had submitted
them to management years before without result. In February of 1968, for
example, public affairs producer Stuart Marwick had proposed that a
consumer unit be set up because Canadians had "little or no voice in
redressing matters" when injustices were done. He felt that the high
interest in the United States in consumer programming indicated that the
subject was "of intense concern to Canadians though they have had nothing
around which to polarize their concern . . . at least not yet." This was
typical of the ideas from the ranks. The response was also typical.
After leaving the CBC, Marwick wrote that he had made several proposals,
"all of which were ignored and never even discussed with me." To counter
this style of management, Meggs and Ward formed sub-committees of the
Radio Project which included CBC personnel from across the system.

Meggs and Ward were committed to reforming the CBC even before they
studied its problems. Technology, management, program production,
commercials, promotion and career development were all areas on which they
wanted to focus attention. As well, they believed that the philosophical
drives behind CBC radio programming had to change. Ward felt that
information was power and that the CBC's role was to provide information
to allow people more control over their lives. He thought that a truly
public corporation could do this only by giving citizens access to the
airwaves. He was aware of a desire within CBC radio production ranks to
move from a highly scripted form of radio to a more conversational
approach, but feared that CBC radio might become a series of phone-ins and
slip into "shallowness" and "mindlessness." There are a number of
accounts of how Ward and Meggs set about mapping a "revolution" for CBC
radio. But the actual circumstances leading to the CBC Board of Director's creation of the Radio Project have never been adequately explained. Ward assumes that there was a previous report which brought it about. In an interview, he said that he does not know "who did the report that scared the hell out of the Board, but that's the person who had the most innovative idea, because from then on we had the Board's attention." It is important to probe beyond this, however, because the circumstances leading to the creation of the Radio Project are crucial to understanding the eventual fate of its report.

It began in 1965, when the CBC presented a report entitled "Programming in the Public Interest -- CBC Radio," (written by CBC Vice President Eugene Hallman and Managing Director of Radio Doug Nixon) to the federal Committee on Broadcasting, called the Fowler Committee. The report offered a far-reaching vision of what CBC radio should be. It stated that the increase in the number of radio stations, the popularity of local radio, the rise of FM, and the popularity of television and portable radio "add up to a revolution for radio, both for the listener and for the broadcaster." In response to this environment, it recommended a separation of AM and FM programming: "A general service for AM broadcasting. A specialized program service for FM and stereo broadcasting." This specialized service on FM came from the CBC's "research into FM listening that many Canadians look to this medium for good music, popular or serious and for news and short comment, rather brief in duration." In 1965 the CBC FM service was non-commercial and the report suggested not only that this be continued, but that spot commercials on CBC AM radio be withdrawn. The CBC managers felt that
commercials were "unsuitable for use in programs of classical or semi-classical music or any spoken word programs."\textsuperscript{16} In response to the recent popularity of local radio, the CBC would develop "local and regional CBC program services to ensure strong community and regional support."\textsuperscript{17} Included in their presentation was a radio schedule which proposed programs that were "in somewhat larger units than at present."\textsuperscript{18} It was thought that this would benefit the listener, who would no longer have to "search out an individual program" in the way that was necessary when programs were often only minutes long. An example of one of these larger blocks was a "major morning magazine" program from 6:00 until 9:00 a.m. on all CBC stations.\textsuperscript{19} The aim of these changes was to "reach and command the interest of significant listening audiences against existing radio competition."\textsuperscript{20}

The 1965 Fowler Committee found the main thrust of the CBC presentation to be "block" or "magazine" format programming and rejected these as being too similar to private radio formats. The Committee also echoed the findings of the Fowler Commission of 1957 by reiterating that a principal function of a broadcaster was to sell goods and that CBC AM radio should pursue a vigorous commercial policy. The only CBC recommendation the Committee supported was the bolstering of local programming. The CBC included a written reply to the Committee's findings in its 1965–66 annual report. It stated that the CBC "rejects the Committee's view that CBC radio will be better, and more in touch with reality, if it continues to carry commercial messages."\textsuperscript{21} It declared that the CBC "still regards these program improvements as highly desirable and will introduce them as funds for program improvement become
available." The differences between the CBC's management and the Fowler Committee laid the groundwork for further conflict with the new regulating agency established by the Broadcasting Act of 1968.

The same year as the Board of Broadcast Governors was replaced by the Canadian Radio and Television Commission, the CBC acquired a new President, a new Executive Vice President and a new Board of Directors. Two aspects of these appointments would affect events. Following Prime Minister Pearson's appointment of George F. Davidson as CBC President, there was a discussion between Davidson and several federal cabinet ministers about who would be appointed to the CBC vice presidency. It was clearly suggested to Davidson that it should be Pierre Juneau. When Davidson made it clear he would offer his resignation rather than accept Juneau, he was allowed to choose his own vice president, Laurent Picard. According to Davidson, one of the federal cabinet ministers at that meeting roomed with Juneau in Ottawa and a report of the discussion got back to him. Davidson's belief that Juneau was adequate, but the "chemistry" would be wrong for the CBC job, may well have been foundation for a strained relationship between himself and Juneau after the latter's appointment as CRTC chairman. To complicate matters, Davidson was contacted by a former member of the Fowler Committee, Under Secretary of State C.G. Ernie Steele, to suggest a CBC staff employee to sit on the new CRTC executive. Two people were mentioned: Eugene Hallman and Harry Boyle. Davidson replied that he had plans for Hallman but no plans for Boyle, who subsequently took the job. Davidson's comment was apparently reported to Boyle. From then on, the new CBC president was faced with a new regulatory body under a chairman and vice chairman who both were aware
Davidson had less than the highest regard for them.\textsuperscript{23}

The appointment of Davidson from Secretary of the Treasury Board was made at a time when CBC expenditures were exceeding government financing. For the first two years of Davidson's mandate the CBC trimmed its budget, but in 1970, just as it was getting its finances in order, the federal government imposed a freeze on spending. Former CBC producer Val Clery considered Davidson "in the government's eyes, the best president the CBC ever had: at once victim and dedicated victimizer. His instinctive response to a three-year federal freeze of the CBC's budget was to freeze all program budgets and reduce staff by banning the refilling of any personnel vacancies."\textsuperscript{24} Faced with a need for austerity, it is generally believed that Davidson considered cancelling the radio service. There were so few listeners, he allegedly considered doing away with it and putting the money into television.\textsuperscript{25} It is generally perceived that the CBC Board of Directors moved to prevent this from happening and on May 6, 1969, ordered a study, to be called the Radio Project, which ended Davidson's supposed plans to cancel CBC radio.\textsuperscript{26} However, Davidson and Picard maintain that the cancellation of radio was never discussed.\textsuperscript{27} A common belief that the cancellation of radio was seriously considered, is rooted in the effects of the financial pressures on the CBC during these years.

When Davidson, Picard and the other members of the board of Directors joined the CBC in 1968, they knew little about broadcasting. During the new Board's first meeting on April 23, 1968, several committees were formed, including the Program Committee. On June 18 it was decided that this committee would look at the future of CBC radio.\textsuperscript{28} Management
personnel worked on a report and several people, including Jack Craine, appeared before it. As well, the new Board examined the directions of the previous Board. For example, following the rejection of the CBC recommendations to the Fowler Committee, the 1966 Board had emphasized that the changes should still take place.\(^{29}\) Craine tried to convince the Board that for several years, "radio has had a low priority within the Corporation and that, because of this, the morale of radio staff has been low."\(^{30}\) He urged that immediate action by the Board would "help to modify the present attitude of radio personnel."\(^{31}\) However, the new Board's immediate concern was funding. Davidson explained (at the first CBC appearance at a CKTC broadcast licence hearing in 1970) that the new Board had felt great pressure from various committees and commissions as well as Parliament that the CBC was expected to "achieve more and more of its gross revenue requirements from the commercial side of the operation."\(^{32}\) Realizing there was a limit on the revenue to be had from commercials, Davidson gave Laurent Picard the task of restructuring the CBC so as to streamline its operations and reduce expenditures. According to CBC executive Robert Blackwood, it was during this time that he attended a meeting of CBC vice presidents where Davidson stated that at some point the CBC would have to justify to government the high costs of distributing the CBC radio network to such a small audience. This statement has since been incorrectly interpreted as a threat to cancel CBC radio.\(^{33}\)

In May of 1969, the Board's Program Committee reported that the radio service had a small share of the listening audience, low morale, and several technical problems such as lower powered transmitters compared to the private stations. It also told the Board that private radio stations
were obtaining their highest advertising revenue during local programs. There was thus great potential for increasing CBC radio advertising revenue through local programs. During the discussion that followed, Davidson explained to the Board that "while television stole the evening audience, the Corporation has continued to schedule in the evening hours the programs which support Canadian drama and musical talent." Thus, the Board realized that television had affected radio audiences, yet CBC radio had not responded. On the basis of these points, the Board decided that a thorough study should be conducted to discover why CBC radio audiences were low and how CBC should go about increasing its audience.

The Board members' belief that radio should be examined with the objective of garnering a larger audience, and possibly more revenue, meshed with Executive Vice President Picard's plans, but for different reasons. Picard actually focused his attention on English television, which he considered a disaster. His Harvard Business School training and years as a consultant on corporate strategy told him that he had to rebuild television, but such a complicated task could not be initiated so early in his tenure. Strategically, there was a high risk of failure. When he proceeded to examine CBC radio, he found a smaller organization, highly respected, dominated by people who were rejuvenating the service with great skill. The risk of failure in a redefinition of radio was low because Picard found it already exciting and vibrant. Redefining radio was the first step in Picard's plan to redefine television. It was to be a training exercise, starting with smaller problems, developing people with the capacity to structure a mission. In an interview, he said he wanted to "start with radio, redefine it, and then move to television and
that's the only rationale behind it. The Board knew very little about that.\footnote{37} When it later came time to redefine CBC television, Picard himself headed the committee. But his respect for the abilities of the people in the radio service led him to assign the redefinition of radio to others.

In July of 1969, just after Ward and Meggs had started the project, they received further instructions from the Board. Its Program Committee had discovered that the 1965 Board had recommended that advertising be withdrawn from CBC radio. For some years, this debate had been gathering momentum. The Program Committee directed that the Radio Project examine CBC radio advertising policies.\footnote{38} Unknown to the members of the project, however, the Board also directed the Sales, Policy and Planning Department, which handled commercials for the CBC, to prepare a parallel and independent report on advertising.

At the same time, Orville Shugg, a long time broadcaster with a reputation for excellence in organization, was seconded from the Sales and Planning Department to be the Special Assistant to Executive Vice President Laurent Picard. Shugg had originated farm broadcasting on the CBC and had hired Harry Boyle.\footnote{39} His main task was to familiarize Picard with English radio which, for two reasons, Picard knew little about. Picard was not an experienced broadcaster and was entrenched in French culture. Picard felt so firmly about the latter that throughout his CBC career in Ottawa, his family never moved from Montreal. The remainder of Shugg's duty was to manage the Radio Project. However, in December of 1968, Shugg had urged the Board to consider sales revenue vital to CBC and that all management should recognize that the CBC would be operating
commercially for years to come. Shugg, the former director of the department which handled commercials for CBC, had been declared chairman of a radio study which was to recommend the future of advertising on CBC radio.

The Radio Project was given a mandate which contained four goals for CBC radio. The primary concern of the Board was with funding. The austerity imposed by the federal government had created a need for more money. This explains the Board's instruction that the Radio Project suggest means to a more economically viable radio service. A second and related goal was that CBC radio should attract a larger audience. This had been recommended in the 1965 CBC report and had been reiterated by Davidson. In itself, a larger audience was a measure of success, but it would also contribute to increased finances, because a larger audience would mean larger revenues from commercials. A third goal assigned to the Radio Project group continued this theme. The Board had discovered that private radio made its highest commercial revenues during local program periods. Therefore, it was thought desirable to improve audiences in the local program periods of CBC radio. Implied in this goal was the need for the Radio Project to discover how CBC radio could respond to television, which had stolen the evening radio audience. A final goal was to clarify the directions of CBC radio's commercial policy. It is significant that this was suggested as an afterthought, following the striking of the Radio Project group, and that the Board had also asked that the Sales Department of the CBC independently examine the same question. It is apparent that there was still debate over economic realities and that some members of CBC management, notably Vice President Eugene Hallman, considered the
ideal of public broadcasting to be non-commercial. The Radio Project reflected these goals by eventually recommending block programming, the cancellation of commercials, the separation of the CBC FM and AM radio services, the bolstering of local programming, and a greater emphasis on information programming.

It is important to examine the environment which Ward and Meggs believed would develop, because this affected how they arrived at these recommendations. Ward and Meggs sifted through government reports, such as Economic Council of Canada forecasts, and CBC reports, such as the CBC Research Department's analyses of radio audiences, to gather descriptions of Canadian society in the 1970s. They envisioned it as an "age of anxiety," a decade of unsettling change. Economic growth would be marked by consumer spending, expansion in public services, a better paid labor force with more leisure time, and competing demands to occupy this leisure time. However, prosperity was a two-edged sword which would "widen the gap between "haves" and "have-nots." The frustration the "have nots" would experience at their plight would be compounded by their attitude of individual helplessness against decisions of government and business. Low income groups would need the most information to help them make decisions with little money.

Ward and Meggs felt that this need for information, though centred on low income groups, would affect all Canadian citizens, who would be increasingly frustrated by a lack of information about government and business decisions. A new environment with new life styles already demanded "involvement by the individual in such areas as tenant legislation, pollution control, and the entire decision-making process."
This need for greater individual involvement would increasingly lead Canadians to seek information to keep abreast of events.\textsuperscript{47} Ward and Meggs concluded that CBC radio should seek to fulfill the growing need of Canadians for information about the world around them. However, simply providing information was not enough. Meggs and Ward believed that "the media have yet to find their potential as interpreters of the meaning of these events or instruments for preventing them."\textsuperscript{48} Therefore, CBC radio should not only provide information, but should help shape Canadian society by interpreting information relevant to an individual's world. Further, they perceived that the impact of the social upheaval of the 1960s had not yet been considered by the media and demanded attention. They considered that the duty of CBC radio was to help prepare the citizenry for social change. Should this not occur, "the 'occupation' of the radio or television station in Canada to protest misrepresentation, to demand community participation or to oppose commercialism may well be an event of the seventies."\textsuperscript{49}

In the context of their projected society of the seventies, Ward and Meggs examined the problems that they believed were preventing the achievement of the goals given them by the CBC Board of Directors. Meggs and Ward felt CBC radio existed to serve the needs and desires of Canadians. A new society with a new need for information about the activities of government and business had developed, yet CBC radio had not responded.\textsuperscript{50} Therefore, CBC radio's audience had declined because Canadians were not getting the information they needed from what CAC radio broadcast. In addition Ward and Meggs believed specialty forms of media, such as special interest magazines, reflected the development of an
increasing pluralistic Canadian society and the disintegration of the mass audience. Individual concerns were emerging and new groups within society were forming, such as the tenant, the urban dweller, the budget-conscious consumer. Traditional groups were being replaced and the audience was dividing into fragments. Meggs and Ward felt CBC radio's fragmenting and splintering audience was caused by the CBC's inability to seek out these new constituencies and involve them with CBC radio.

A more obvious reason cited for the decline of CBC radio's audience was television. According to Meggs and Ward, CBC television had stressed entertainment programming. But while television had mesmerized its audience, it had provided no opportunity for involvement. Traditional supporters of the CBC, such as church groups and farmers, found there was less opportunity to participate in the entertainment oriented medium of television, in contrast to the involvement they had over the years with the discussion programs of CBC radio. When the CTV network appeared in 1961, Ward and Meggs believed that CBC supporters expected that American and entertainment programming would move to CTV and CBC television would concentrate its activities on news and information programs.51 This, they argued, did not happen. Instead, CBC television retained its entertainment programming. Consequently, the audience and traditional CBC supporters supposedly became disillusioned with not only CBC television, but the entire CBC.52

A final factor affecting the CBC radio audience was the way that the CBC produced its radio programs. Ward and Meggs found a lack of listener involvement and feedback, a lack of research which probed issues affecting Canadians, programs produced in studios which should be presented before
audiences, school broadcasts seldom used in schools, the presentation of evening drama which was more appropriate to television, no hourly newscasts on the weekend, and little consumer information. The program formats were "stuffy" and "tired" and were not designed with the audience in mind.

The Radio Project had been directed to suggest how CBC radio should become more economically viable. Meggs and Ward concluded that the main impediment the CBC was experiencing was poor management practice. They found the lack of measurable objectives to track the performance of managers and departments was a major constraint on both sound financial practices and the development of a public radio service suited to the 1970s. Meggs and Ward found "an attitude of disinterest and defeatism on the part of management" and "poor radio leadership and uninspired direction." CBC radio was being managed with meetings "to the point of overkill," with no objectives, time limits or follow-up. They found that some production staff had heard nothing from management about their radio programs in five years. Program planning was "almost non-existent" and radio schedules were often devised days before their implementation. The use of measurable objectives was an approach favored by Picard with his business training. Ward recalled that during the Radio Project it became apparent that some form of accountability was needed. "We wanted clear job descriptions for managers and programmers, we wanted clear program objectives, we wanted measurable audiences and measurable audience appreciation and measurable quality."

Ward and Meggs claimed that they had also "talked with people on staff who have been given no training in their own skill or in the broader
objectives of public broadcasting i- eleven years on the job." They believed that without objectives and training, no recommendation in the report would stand much chance of success. In addition, few managers listened to CBC radio and "some members of senior management considered radio a haven for underachievers from television." Ward and Meggs concluded that this emphasis on television by management in all departments left radio neglected. However, not all the blame was laid at the feet of poor management practices. They found that the structure of management made the situation worse. A concentration of decision-making and network programming in Toronto prevented the local stations, which controlled the important local program periods, from developing the resources and talent to serve their community and reflect it through the network. Virtually all of the regional staff of CBC radio resented the dominance of Toronto in both programming and management.

A similar lack of effective management was found in the support services. Record libraries "were in a state of anarchy . . . untrained staff, poor cataloguing, poor handling practices, poor relationships with recording companies." CBC archives were in a similar state. Ward and Meggs believed that if public participation in CBC radio was to occur, the technical and support services within CBC radio would have to change.

Other management problems revealed themselves when Meggs and Ward devoted the lengthiest chapter in their report to publicity. They believed that CBC radio had "virtually disappeared from the Canadian landscape." It was not available on hotel radio systems and there were no advertising signs outside CBC buildings. They considered CBC publicity efforts "inadequate, inefficient, and ineffective." They attributed
this to "unimaginative publicists and inadequate direction within the department . . . the approach of many of these publicists indicates tired techniques reminiscent of the era of the newspaper publicist rather than the vital multi-media attache of the new communicator."\textsuperscript{66} The publicity department, like other areas of CBC radio, did not have clear policies, objectives, or budget planning. Out of a staff of seventy-nine Information Services employees in Toronto, six worked on English radio publicity, which suggested "that the Corporation has not really cared at all about informing its audience about its [radio] programs."\textsuperscript{67} In addition, Information Services had been asked "to find room in their establishment for persons whom they considered unqualified for the work."\textsuperscript{68} Ward and Meggs used the lack of a national CBC logo to illustrate the confusion they had found. Montreal had forty-one versions of a visual design. As well, the "Radio Revolution" publicity campaign of 1969 was not carried in Montreal because of a decision by local information officers. Meggs and Ward regarded the "present position relating to publicity and public relations as desperate."\textsuperscript{69}

Ward and Meggs then turned to the most difficult problem they had been instructed to address: the commercial policies of CBC radio. They found that private stations could get commercials on the air three days faster than CBC. "When we asked one local [CBC] salesman how he disposed of the eleven copies of the form which covers each sale," they wrote, "he said that he kept one, sent one to the sponsor, one to the regional sales office and threw out the rest. Perhaps an extension of this attempt to streamline the sales function would be good for our entire sales operation."\textsuperscript{70} CBC commercial acceptance personnel dealt directly with the
sponsor rather than let their regional salesman know their decisions. Ward and Meggs concluded that "the lack of clarity in commercial policy, the constraint of many sales practices, the pressure of rising costs and declining commercial revenues, all combine to make a continuance of the present alternative completely untenable."\(^7\)

Meggs and Ward listed the perceived benefits of continuing commercials. A major advantage was the lessening of the burden on the taxpayer because the anticipated increased audiences would improve revenues. This increased revenue would also help finance expansion of the radio service. As well, consumer information programming would attract an audience that advertisers would want.

Nonetheless, Ward and Meggs argued that cancellation was beneficial because public broadcasting is non-commercial. The increased audience anticipated would not appreciably change the level of revenue and commercial success would make it difficult to obtain public funds in the future. Programs dependent on sponsorship, such as "Metropolitan Opera", could be negotiated without spot commercials. Whereas the Fowler Committee report had recommended that the CBC attain a maximum of four percent of total radio commercial sales, CBC radio was well above that figure and was thus risking spirited opposition from the private stations. To bring commercials down to the four percent level would further reduce revenue. Moreover, the distinction between editorial matter and commercial messages was becoming blurred with more and more commercials produced in the documentary style.

In favoring the cancellation of commercials from CBC radio, Meggs and Ward were entering a minefield of opposition. Although CBC senior
management had recommended to the Board of Directors the cancellation of commercials from CBC radio in 1965 and again in 1967, it was a controversial topic.\textsuperscript{72} The Board's desire for an increased audience for radio was partly based on a desire for increased commercial revenues and the idea of dropping commercials was strongly opposed by the entire CBC Sales Department. Moreover, unknown to Meggs and Ward, the Sales Department was preparing a report for the CBC Board of Directors in support of its interest. In addition, the Radio Project Chairman, Orville Shugg, was sympathetic to the Sales Department's point of view. Ward later remembered that there was such strong opposition, that the report was almost rewritten before it was submitted.\textsuperscript{73}

Having outlined the problems faced by CBC radio, Meggs and Ward then set about to propose some solutions.

To attract an audience, the report suggested providing programs that would allow citizen's groups to present their own points of view. These would have minimal involvement by CBC personnel and the CBC would pay the groups for their efforts.\textsuperscript{74} The piston that would drive this participatory engine would be an "ombudsman" approach to programming. Meggs and Ward believed that CBC radio should "help establish a consciousness among consumers that they can have an organized effect on governments or companies which provide shoddy and irrelevant goods and services."\textsuperscript{75} They felt that CBC radio's duty was to provide information that would enable the audience to make responsible choices. In their view, a radio service involved with its audience would soon become essential to it. They also thought that the interpretation of society could be achieved by "encouraging the real experts, those who are most
directly affected by events, to participate in dialogue about their
meaning." They believed that this approach would attract new listeners
and urged that audience targets of at least 120,000 new listeners a year
be projected. In fact, they argued that the ability to attract increased
audiences should become the main measure of CBC radio's success. The
audience, they wrote, "must be seen as the only reason for any of us
working for the Corporation." 77

Ward and Meggs found that advertising executive Jack Sturman had
pinpointed the future for successful radio programs. "The 1970s," Sturman
had written,

call for a new kind of radio programming spiked with confrontation,
concern, and exploration of the things people are interested in. I
call it Boutique Radio. It's radio programming designed for the
minority audience - not for the mass audience, whatever that is. It
reaches out for the specific-interest listener. It's radio
programming that talks to consumers about things that concern them
... food prices ... new products ... information. 78

This was a good summation of what Meggs and Ward envisioned as CBC radio's
future. As described by Sturman, "boutique radio"

picks up the phone and goes after an interesting or unusual story
that the newspapers didn't carry beyond the short paragraph that came
over the news wire ... Boutique radio involves people's minds.
Sure, it also entertains with music, sports, and other news. But its
soul and point of view isn't owned by a top forty mentality that's
plugged into some expert's office in L.A. 79

According to Sturman, "boutique radio" could already be found on CBC,

and despite what rating services may show, I think it's going to
become more and more addictive ... Every program director in Canada
should be locked in a hotel room by Pierre Juneau with the radio dial
locked on CBC radio. That's where the real radio revolution is going
on. Admit it fellows. Damned if those CBC boys haven't got
something there. The audiences will follow. Just you wait. 80

Meggs and Ward agreed with this analysis, but thought that there was
still room for improvement. For example, they wanted to change the early
morning local time periods. In an interview, Ward recalled that "Toronto had 'Toast and Jamboree' with Bruce Smith, well you can tell what it was, it was music and chit chat all morning . . . and that was a very good example of where we wanted a radical change and the example was the work done in Winnipeg by the experimenters there on their information morning show." The "Winnipeg Experiment" was a move by CBC Winnipeg in September of 1969 to provide information programming and no music on its local morning show. It coincided with Meggs and Ward's philosophy of community-driven, information broadcasting and they recommended that it be exported to all local stations. In keeping with this community orientation, Ward and Meggs felt that the prime listening times of early morning and late afternoon should remain under the control of local CBC stations for local programming, rather than be allocated for network programs. Programs of interest to certain societal groups could be developed with each group's involvement and these could be broadcast during the early morning and late afternoon local prime times. They recommended that this community broadcasting begin, on an experimental basis, in three CBC radio stations to be identified by the CBC's management.

At the network level, they proposed that the program day be "divided into longer time periods," similar to the 1965 suggestions of magazine or "block" programs. Executive producers, given production teams, would be expected to produce programs with "shorter items from all parts of the country integrated into a well-paced, well-presented program flow." They would provide program plans which developed costs, audience targets and publicity plans on the basis of stated objectives and program targets.
This would result in longer programming blocks and a "more flowing and consistent sound."  

Meggs and Ward recognized that a greater stress on information might endanger arts programming. As listeners adapted to "boutique" radio, it would be increasingly difficult to schedule arts programming, which required "more concentrated and extended" formats. They thus suggested that "information programming" be separated from "arts programming." Information would include news, special events, sports, features, agricultural news, religion, schools and youth programming. Arts would include music of all types, drama, poetry and literature. To accommodate both the arts and information, they proposed the creation of two distinct radio services, or networks: Radio One and Radio Two.

Radio One was to be a 24-hour AM service of information with longer local programming periods and a variety of shorter items. It would stress audience involvement and listener participation. It was to be heavily weighted with consumer information, news, sports, special events and satire. It was to have newscasts on the hour, including weekends, and more local information.

Radio Two was to be a national FM service of programming in the arts, humanities, science, religion, classical music, jazz, rock, news, drama and poetry. It would also provide coverage of conferences and the Parliamentary question period. FM was chosen for music because of the availability of frequencies in all Canadian cities and the superior quality of the stereo FM radio signal. During the evening, Radio Two was to present longer musical events, special dramas and extended documentaries. At the time, the CBC had only five FM stations. However,
there were plans to expand the number of CBC FM stations and eventually form an FM network.

Ward and Meggs suggested that the starting date for Radio One and Radio Two be April 1, 1971. The five cities that had a CBC FM facility were to have a separate Radio One and Radio Two service at the outset. To phase in Radio One and Radio Two in cities without CBC FM facilities, Radio One was to be broadcast on all CBC stations from sign-on until 7:00 p.m. At that time, Radio Two was to come on the air and run until sign-off. A separate Radio One and Radio Two service was to be implemented (in each Canadian city) as each acquired FM facilities. The all-night service on Radio One was to begin April 1, 1972.

When Meggs and Ward had visited the CBC station in British Columbia, they had spoken with two CBC staff members, Jimmy James and Andrew Cowan. James and Cowan had argued that the more remote areas of Canada needed special consideration. As a result of that discussion, Meggs and Ward recommended the establishment of a third radio network, Radio Three. It was to link the smaller CBC stations and the Low Power Relay Transmitters in remote areas. Radio Three stations were to choose a mixture of programs from Radio One and Radio Two. The programming was to be highly participatory, providing "native involvement, luvian and Eskimo broadcasts (some in the native tongue), [and] a sharing of concerns through small, economical, production centres." An experiment to develop this kind of community broadcasting was to begin in British Columbia and Northern Ontario shortly after April 1, 1971.

The CBC had long considered complete radio coverage to Canada beyond its capital funding, so partnerships with private stations, called
affiliates, had been developed. In 1970, the 57 affiliates served about a quarter of the population. On average, they carried 31 hours a week of CBC programs. They played no part in the development of radio schedules and the CBC did not encourage affiliate involvement in program planning or program contributions. The Radio Network Advisory Committee, representing the affiliate stations across Canada, was interested in buying CBC news and public affairs, but was reluctant to carry Radio Two programs and wanted greater flexibility in scheduling. Ward and Meggs did not agree, however; they felt that the sale of newscasts and the resultant commercial inserts would blur the line between informing and persuading. As well, they believed that arts programming also played a vital role. They thus proposed a series of conditions for affiliates to fulfill their contracts.89

Meggs and Ward's proposed solution to the CBC's management difficulties was to topple Toronto's rule. They had already outlined how a Toronto-oriented management was preventing the local program periods from developing. Traditionally one director in each region of the country represented both the CBC's television and radio operations. They recommended the creation of Regional Directors of Radio who would attend regular Radio Planning Directorate meetings. This dovetailed with the design of senior management for a restructured CBC. Following the "Seven Days" affair, which saw CBC management cancelling the popular television program because of its controversial approach to journalism, it was decided that management control over programming should be shifted from Ottawa to Toronto. Eugene S. Hallman, the Vice President of English Services, moved to Toronto where he created the Senior Policy Group, which
included the ten regional directors. The weakness of this arrangement was that it tended to place television at the top of the agenda. There was a feeling among radio managers that as long as radio was a "Friday afternoon activity," it would not get the attention it deserved. To those in radio management, the next logical step was to create a group whose only concern was radio. The Radio Project took this step with its recommendation of a Radio Planning Directorate.

Ward and Meggs considered this new group to be pivotal in changing CBC radio. It would examine the mix of national, regional and local programming; national program objectives; and national and local audience targets and their critical paths. It would also establish task forces to examine computers, line contracts, a splitting of the LPRT networks, automation, signal compression, equipment purchase and recording standards. Publicity staff would be assigned to radio directors and publicity efforts would be integrated with programming efforts. But at the top of the Directorate's priority list would be the programming solutions of Ward and Meggs.

In terms of commercial policy, Ward and Meggs recommended "the complete withdrawal over the next three years from all commercial activity in CBC Radio." They believed that the mandate of CBC radio could not support a vigorous commercial operation and only a strong commercial emphasis could raise the revenue CBC radio required. At the same time, however, they suggested three alternatives for the Board to consider: a non-commercial policy for the FM and Northern Service; an equal commercial policy on Radio One, Two and Three; and a streamlining of commercial services and a re-examination in three years.
With the "CBC English Radio Report" completed, the next step was to present it to the CBC Board of Directors. While Meggs and Ward stated that some of the changes recommended were already underway, other proposals required the approval of the Board.94 Their visits to CBC locations had created an expectation of change among CBC radio personnel. As a result, they concluded by saying that inaction on the report "will embitter and drive away that core of extremely creative personnel who stand ready in the regions and local areas to implement the Board's decisions."95

To a great extent, the report from the Radio Project group was a reflection of past recommendations. The separation of AM and FM programming, the idea of block programs, the cancellation of commercials, the bolstering of local programming, and the need to increase the radio audience had all been suggested before. But the funding difficulties of the CBC had created a sense of urgency on the part of the Board and Picard was anxious to plot the progress of CBC radio in terms of clearly stated objectives.

While the "CBC English Radio Report" reflected some of the ideas and aspirations of CBC employees, the perspective of the CBC Board of Directors and CBC management were well represented within its pages. What was not known at the time was the scope of the difficulties that this representation would occasion. The conflict that only barely surfaced when the Fowler Committee rejected the ideas of the CBC, emerged full-blown when portions of the "CBC English Radio Report" became public.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER ONE

1 CBC minutes of meetings of the Board of Directors (May 6, 1969), p. 2184; National Archives Canada, RG 41, vol. 672.


5 Interview with Doug Ward.

6 Stuart Marwick, "Consumer broadcasting proposal" (February 20 1968); NAC, RG 41, vol. 947, file 1058, p. 6.

7 Ibid.


9 Interview with Doug Ward.

10 Ibid.


12 Interview with Doug Ward.


14 Ibid., p. 33.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid., p. 22.

17 Ibid., p. 1.

18 Ibid., p. 24.

19 Ibid., p. 25.

20 Ibid., p. 1.

22 Ibid., p. x.

23 Interview with George Davidson.


25 Interview with Peter Meggs.


27 Interview with George Davidson; interview with Eugene S. Hallman; interview with Laurent Picard.

28 CBC minutes of meetings of the Board of Directors (June 18, 1966), p. 1977; NAC, RG 41, vol. 672.


30 CBC minutes of meetings of the Board of Directors (May 6, 1969), p. 2185; NAC, RG 41, vol. 672.

31 Ibid.


34 CBC minutes of meetings of the Board of Directors (May 6, 1969), p. 2186; NAC, RG 41, vol. 672.


36 Interview with Laurent Picard.

37 Ibid.

38 CBC minutes of meetings of the Board of Directors (July 15, 1969), p. 2442; NAC, RG 41, vol. 672.


40 CBC minutes of meetings of the Board of Directors (December 4, 1968), p. 7079; NAC, RG 41, vol. 672.
Interview with Eugene S. Hallman. Hallman had introduced commercials on CBC AM radio as a temporary measure to increase revenue. In the mid-1960s he considered that this policy should be reversed and the ideal of a commercial-free public radio service should again be pursued. However, he was not able to voice these sympathies because the Director of Sales Policy and Planning reported to Hallman.


Ibid., p. 2.

Ibid., p. 3.

Ibid., p. 2.

Ibid., p. 4.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 2.

Ibid., p. 16.

Ibid.

Interview with Doug Ward.


Ibid., p. 127.

Ibid., p. 128.

Ibid., p. 126.

Ibid., p. 32.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 137.

Ibid., p. 35.

Ibid., p. 34.

Ibid., p. 100.
64 Ibid., p. 95.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid., p. 102.
67 Ibid., p. 96.
68 Ibid., p. 99.
69 Ibid., p. 96.
70 Ibid., p. 114.
71 Ibid., p. 115.
73 Interview with Doug Ward.
75 Ibid., p. 41.
76 Ibid., p. 38.
77 Ibid., p. 25.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
81 Interview with Doug Ward.
83 Ibid., p. 55.
84 Ibid., p. 39.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid., p. 45.
87 Ibid., p. 52.
88 Ibid., p. 60.
89 see appendix A.
90. Interview with Jack Craine.

91. See appendix A.


93. See appendix A.


95. Ibid., p. 127.
CHAPTER TWO

THE CBC ENGLISH RADIO REPORT EMBARGOED

The presentation of the "CBC English Radio Report" to the CBC Board of Directors was scheduled in Ottawa on the afternoon of Monday, May 25, 1970. The Friday before, Peter Meggs was still writing it in Toronto. Orville Shugg called him and told him to be at the Toronto airport; without waiting for a response, he hung up. Not knowing whether Meggs would meet him or not, Shugg flew to Toronto, picked up the report, had it printed and bound, and on Sunday placed the copies around the boardroom table. 1 On Monday afternoon, Davidson explained to the Board that no decisions were to be made. The Board had only to hear the findings of the Radio Project and the Sales Department's Report on Commercial Radio. Shugg introduced the French and English committees which, through Marcel Blouin and Peter Meggs, made their presentations.

Meggs had wanted to use audio-visual aids, but recalls that this was not allowed. Instead, he obtained biographies of the members of the Board and tailored his 29-minute speech. It mentioned each of their communities and what would be available should the report be approved. To a member of the Board from the Maritimes, for example, Meggs explained that on the highway to Halifax he could choose between the Radio One information service or the Radio Two arts service. 2 The Sales Department used a different tactic. The Director of Sales Policy and Planning, John Trower, played a tape recording summarizing the goals and objectives of CBC commercial radio. 3 Jack Craine remembers the surprise of the Radio Project group as it listened to a presentation which undermined and gutted
their report. "Unknown to us they'd prepared their own presentation and when we finished, they got up and just destroyed us, or at least tried to." Though leader of the Radio Project, Shugg actually swung his support behind the sales group.  

Shugg's sympathies had been evident the previous March, when Davidson told the Special Senate Committee on Mass Media that, while he would like to cancel radio commercials, financially it could not be done. Worried by Davidson's statement, the Sales Department's staff wrote to Shugg asking if Picard shared Davidson's view. In a memo, Shugg assured them that "Picard does not believe that CBC could or should abandon commercial radio. Indeed, he has told the Radio Project committees quite clearly of his personal viewpoint while also saying that he wants the non-commercial alternative to be thoroughly explored and in evidence in the final report." Bolstered by Shugg, as well as by the previous statement of the Fowler Committee that a principal function of the CBC was to sell goods, the Sales Department pulled no punches in its presentation to the Board. It said that the decision about commercials should not be based solely on the amount of revenue which they generated, but also on their compatibility with the basic commercial values of Canadian society. Should CBC's relationship with the commercial sector be destroyed, the CBC would soon become an "effete" service. However, Picard came to the defence of the Radio Project, declaring that advertising was attaching the radio service to the wrong values.  

After the presentations, there was a discussion between the members of the Board that resulted in a general agreement on several points. The minutes of the meeting show that they agreed that the objective should be
to improve the quality of radio programs and "not to maximize commercial revenue as proposed" by the sales group. However, the production of better and more popular programs could increase advertising revenue and this was important insofar as larger grants from Parliament would probably not be forthcoming. They agreed that a "modest commercial policy" could help provide the almost $6 million increase to the CBC radio budget that the Radio Project had requested. At the same time, however, the Board concluded that the subject was too large to be resolved quickly. It agreed to study it further in October when a full analysis of the radio budget could be prepared by CBC management for consideration. In the meantime, the Radio Project group was to continue its work and provide a more concise report that detailed the costs of implementing Radio One and Radio Two. During the presentations, Alan Brown, the Network Program Director of English Radio, suggested to Vice President Eugene Hallman, that a plan for public release of the report should be discussed. Later, in a memo to the Assistant General Manager of English Services, Marce Munro, Brown recalled that Hallman had considered this unnecessary. This turned out to be a grave error.

The CBC's annual report was printed and released in June, 1970. It noted that a report had just been completed which recommended "two distinct radio services for urban Canada and a third service for people who live outside the major centres of population. One would be a predominantly live information service riding a current of contemporary music. The other would emphasize longer programs in the arts, programs that inform and enlighten." This contributed to the belief that the CBC was planning one service for urban Canadians and another for rural
residents. This was compounded by further developments in Toronto.

When Meggs returned to Toronto, he held two meetings with CBC producers. In order to help him refine the report, he distributed it to the fifty or so people at each meeting, collecting the copies back at the end of the session. Later, in a memo to his superiors, Meggs wrote that "someone in production circles got a black market copy of the report and began to circulate it among certain producers before any supervisors had been allowed to see it." When this was discovered, Meggs held more meetings with the producers, telling them that the report was confidential. However, rumours about what the report contained began to circulate. Meggs was contacted by, and spoke with, two reporters: Joan Irwin of the Montreal Star and Sid Adilman of the Toronto Telegram.

Adilman began his conversation with Meggs by describing what he was about to write. Meggs thought Adilman's version would be damaging to the CBC and "straightened him out." On July 25, Adilman wrote that the report "calls for total revolution in the programming and philosophies guiding CBC radio." He quoted Meggs as admitting that the "recommendations will shake up listeners, and will shake up the schedule as we know it today." While Meggs considered Adilman's story favorable, CBC senior management disagreed. According to Meggs, exception was taken to Adilman writing that the report blamed "senior network management and those running CBC radio for not gearing it to today's listener's needs." At a senior CBC management meeting on July 29th, which included Picard and Davidson, it was decided that "Mr. Munro is to explore and report the circumstances of confidential information released by Mr. Peter Meggs to the press about the radio
study." Meggs claims that he received a telephone call from the CBC president telling him he was not to speak to the press. At this point, Alan Brown came to Meggs' defence. In a July 30th memo to Marce Munro, Brown stated that Hallman had rejected a discussion of publicity for the report; that the distribution of the report by CBC Head Office had been haphazard; that the report had not been marked confidential; and that he took "full responsibility for referring Adilman to Peter Meggs." On August 27, Hallman sent a memo to Craine stating that no one should discuss the report with those outside the CBC until authorization had been given. The next day, Craine passed this memo on to Brown, Meggs and Ward, adding that no part of the report was to be released before the scheduled October Board meeting. Three days later, Brown tendered his resignation. He wrote to Hallman, Munro and Craine that, "after some soul-searching, I have decided to accept the position offered to me in Information Canada... this letter is a very curt ending to a long association..." When Brown left, Meggs was promoted to the vacated Program Director position.

The Radio Project group continued to work on its report. Following the report's initial presentation in May, the CBC Board of Directors had expressed concern over finance, but it had not expressed any concern over its programming suggestions. Accordingly, the group began to implement some of its program plans. After discussing the matter with several station managers, it was decided to begin with the CBC stations in Fredericton, Ottawa and Vancouver. These were to introduce the "Winnipeg Experiment" of information programming on the morning local programs and monitor their audience size and commercial revenue. The intention was to
expand thereafter to Halifax, Regina, Edmonton and Calgary.

During further discussion of commercial policy, Meggs and Ward continued to favor complete withdrawal. But following the Board's decision of a "modest commercial policy" they contented themselves with reducing commercials from ten minutes every hour to eight. By the end of the summer, they had begun to compile costs for the implementation of Radio One and Radio Two and to draft new network schedules. But by September, Shugg realized that the Radio Project group would not meet the October deadline and asked for a postponement. They were given until November.

On November 16, the Radio Project group was back in the board room. Peter Meggs, Chairman of the English Radio Project Steering Committee, again described the Radio One/Radio Two concept and provided detailed costs of the plan -- costs which had been trimmed, but were still in the millions of dollars. The minutes of this meeting show that the Board still considered it possible to increase commercial revenue with the expected increases in audience between 6:00 and 9:00 a.m. The Board passed a motion that endorsed the concept of the new radio services, but stated that complete operational plans and costs were to be presented at the Board meeting in March of 1971. The full Radio Operations Plan was to assume that CBC radio would continue to have commercials on AM, but not on FM. It was also to base its plans on half the money the committee had asked for, with the other half to be found through cost reductions that were currently being made to the radio budget.

This time the Board's discussion included the need for a publicity plan. One Board member said that he had been told that CBC affiliates had
CBL TORONTO

SCHEDULE FOR MONDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 1964

0600 Local Programming
   ("Toast and Jamboree": local news, weather, sports; national news at 0700 and 0800; "Preview Commentary" at 0810.)

0825 Bob Goulet Show
0835 Max Ferguson Show
0900 National News
0910 Local Programming
   ("Toast and Jamboree")
0945 Court Of Opinion
1015 Playroom
1030 News and weather
1033 Local Programming
   ("Plain Talk")
1045 Local Programming
   ("Edna May")
1055 For Consumers
1100 Ontario School Broadcasts
1130 The Archers
1145 Music On the Heather
1200 News
1215 Tennessee Ernie Ford
1230 Farm Broadcast
1259 Time Signal
1300 News, weather
1330 Tommy Hunter Show
1345 Stories with John Drainie
1400 News
1403 Trans Canada Matinee
1500 Maitland Manor
1530 Montreal Playhouse

1600 News
1603 Canadian Roundup
1610 Lift Up Your Hearts
1620 Local Programming
   ("At Ease with Elwood Glover")
1700 News
1705 Local Programming
   ("At Ease with Elwood Glover")
1755 Business Barometer
1800 National News
1810 On Parliament Hill
1820 Today's Edition
1825 Local Programming
   ("Sports")
1830 Countdown
1900 Local Programming
   ("CBC News and Commentary")
1915 Local Programming
   ("Theatre Anyone")
1936 RPM
2000 Assignment
2030 Crime Quiz
2100 Farm Forum
2130 Distinguished Artists
2200 National News
2215 On Parliament Hill
2220 Speaking Personally
2230 Continental Holiday
2300 Gilmour's Albums
2400 News, weather, sports
2407 Local Programming
   ("Don Sims Show")
0100 Local Programming
   ("News and Music")
their report were so important that they were under no obligation to observe rules of confidentiality. But it was not unusual for documents of this kind to be declared confidential by the CBC. What was unusual was that the report had been declared secret even to CBC employees. Davidson believed that he had good reasons for an order of secrecy, given what had occurred between the 19th and the 26th of November. At a meeting on January 18, 1971, he explained to the Board just what had happened during that week.

The Secretary of State had been the first to respond to the November press release. Davidson had not notified the minister about it, which left him unprepared for questions which were raised in Parliament. Immediately after, the CRTC expressed what Davidson called "adverse reaction," because the CBC had announced that it was planning to build a number of FM stations, without first submitting the appropriate applications to the CRTC as required under the Broadcasting Act. Davidson had a meeting with Juneau and assured him that the plans would only be implemented following formal CRTC approval. In a subsequent letter, however, Juneau suggested that the CBC was not free to change its programming without obtaining permission from the CRTC. He also implied that the CRTC had not been sent the radio report. Davidson explained to the Board that he felt the report was an internal document and should not be made available to the CRTC.

Davidson also told the Board that at a recent meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Planning and Priorities, the CBC had been asked for a document outlining its role and strategies for the years ahead. It was suggested that the CRTC should collaborate with the CBC on the content.
Following this meeting, the Prime Minister wrote to the Secretary of State suggesting that the CBC budget should be reviewed by the CRTC before it was submitted to Treasury Board. Davidson explained to the Board that he felt firmly that CBC budgets should continue to be presented to the Secretary of State, which, under law, was the only body authorized to review them prior to submission. These events made Davidson increasingly wary of government attempts to use the CRTC to exercise greater control over the CBC. 33

Davidson ended his remarks to the Board by saying that the press had raised "quite a furor", questioning the value of the new programming of Radio One/Radio Two and stressing that Radio Two on FM would have only limited availability. 34 Feeling that the CBC was under attack and that battle lines were being drawn, the President decided it would be prudent to limit public discussion of the Radio Project report until a CRTC hearing could be held.

These circumstances alone might have forced Davidson to order the report to be a secret document, but there were other factors at work as well. The report's recommendation of a separation of programming between AM and FM was a sensitive subject. The creation of Radio Two was publicly perceived as an immediate transfer of all arts programming to the FM service, which only about twenty per cent of Canadians received. As well, CBC AM coverage through the stations which it owned and operated was limited to about fifty per cent of the population. To reach the rest of Canada, the CBC had to rely on private station affiliates, but some of these carried as little as twenty-five hours of CBC programs a week. Therefore, it was widely considered that the CBC was developing an FM
service, while half of the population were still without a full CBC AM service. In addition, it was thought that the CBC was taking the serious programs away from AM, to the detriment of the majority of Canadians who could not receive CBC FM.³⁵ This resulted in various protests such as that led by Maryanne West of Cower Point, British Columbia. She gathered signatures for a petition and travelled to Toronto to discuss the changes with CBC executives. She based her position on the 1968 Broadcasting Act which called for a balanced service for all ages, tastes and interests. She argued that any program change on AM was a move to attract higher audiences in the cities and that was not what CBC should be doing. The CBC, she said, should get back to serving the people.³⁶

Under a veil of secrecy, Picard and Shugg pushed ahead and outlined an agenda for the radio committees, and in February of 1971, Picard reviewed their work. On March 12, Picard, Davidson and the Radio Project group met with the CRIC executive. Juneau presented two arguments against the Radio One/Radio Two plan. First, by seeking a larger audience, the CBC would forsake the minorities it had traditionally served.³⁷ This argument dated back to a difference of opinion between Davidson and Juneau during the first CBC licence renewal hearing in 1970. At that hearing, Juneau had compared the English radio service with the French, implying that English radio should be more like Radio-Canada, which Juneau thought was more concerned with artistic and intellectual pursuits. Davidson disagreed. He rejected Juneau's traditionalist argument in favor of an essentially populist one. "By definition," Davidson said, the CBC's responsibility "rules out the possibility of the CBC concentrating its attention primarily or exclusively on a minority, elite, intellectual,
culture oriented group within the total population." Juneau shot back: "Those are your words, not mine." Davidson replied that CBC radio must meet the interests of the twenty-two million Canadians who paid for the service and that it must provide "at different times and in different ways all of the varied tastes that are represented in the spectrum of Canadian audience." The second argument that Juneau put forward at the meeting with the Radio Project group was that public support should be evident before the CBC changed its radio program formats. To this, Davidson simply replied that he would bring Juneau's concerns to the attention of the Board.

Five days later, an article by Blaik Kirby appeared in the Globe and Mail. It decried the secrecy of the report and the fact that changes would be implemented at the upcoming Board meeting without public input. In recounting a conversation with Meggs, Kirby wrote: "the Board of Directors will approve the whole operational plan for the complete change of radio' Meggs says crisply. And then? 'Then we implement it'." Immediately after its appearance, Meggs sent a memo to Craine, Davidson, Hallman, Munro, Picard and Shugg, admitting that he had spoken with Kirby, but claiming that "at no time did I utter words resembling in any way the quote attributed to me." A week later, Juneau wrote to Davidson that the CRTC would like a "special public hearing on the policy aspects of these plans." Davidson wrote back that the CBC would agree to appear before the Commission, but he would advise the CRTC when the CBC Board of Directors had decided on a course of action.

Jack Craine presented the Radio Operations Plan to the Board on March 29, 1971. He stated that the Radio One service would continue the
traditions of the "World At Eight", "Sunday Magazine", "Capital Report", "Radio Noon" and "Cross Country Checkup". He described the information morning experiments in Ottawa, Vancouver and Fredericton. No change had been observed in Ottawa or Vancouver, but Fredericton had recorded a significant audience increase. He also pointed out that Radio Three would have to play a more significant role than previously thought. Realistic construction dates for FM facilities would force a majority of AM stations to carry information programming during the day and arts programming at night during the first year. Radio One/Radio Two could only be implemented immediately in the five cities which had existing CBC FM stations. Therefore, it was suggested that the Radio Three concept, a mix between Radio One and Radio Two, be extended to urban centres. No community would change to Radio One until FM was available.  

Craine estimated that the first year costs were to be about $3.5 million. He concluded that "because of our reticence to give these proposals a full public airing, we have encouraged professional critics to vent charges that are much more radical -- and perverse -- than anything we have ever considered . . . I therefore close with this strong request: that we be permitted to take the 'confidential' label off our plans and begin the campaign to take our public with us."  

The Board passed a motion that gave "approval in principle to the plans for development of CBC radio services which have been discussed by the Board at its meetings."  

To Craine's request for a publicity campaign, it instructed the Radio Project group to prepare a white paper which would summarize the plan and be distributed to the CRTC, the Parliamentary Committee on Broadcasting, and CBC employees. The Board
also ordered that a letter be sent to the CRTC indicating the intention of the CBC to file the necessary application forms for its plan.\textsuperscript{48}

On April 7, Davidson met with senior CBC management to assess the situation. He explained that Juneau had again contacted him, attempting to convince him that the Radio One/Radio Two plan should be put to a CRTC hearing and should be separate from the FM applications.\textsuperscript{49} One reason for this was that the CBC plans would force the CRTC to formulate and announce an FM network policy, which it did not have.\textsuperscript{50} Davidson had responded that this "would cause further delay and would mean a double hearing."\textsuperscript{51} Doubtless, he believed that it would also imply that program changes came under the scrutiny of the CRTC. Juneau had further argued that he was reluctant to support the Radio One/Radio Two plan while some areas of Canada were still not receiving CBC signals from CBC-owned stations. This, Juneau felt, should be the priority rather than an improvement of existing CBC services. Davidson explained to senior management that "we are going to have to meet at some point in time, the question; how should Radio One and Two be given priority over the needs of the unserved area?"\textsuperscript{52}

On another issue, Ron Fraser, CBC Vice President of Corporate Affairs, explained that "Radio Three is being made a major issue by such people as [Conservative M.P.] Pat Nowlan."\textsuperscript{53} Nowlan was chairman of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Transportation and Communications as well as chairman of his caucus committee on broadcasting. In 1971, he also sat on a special committee empowered to investigate and report on the CYC. Davidson replied that "we will have to be very careful," and ordered that the summary that was being written should "not identify a new service
as Radio Three." The following week, when Picard met with the Radio Project group to examine a draft of the summary, he explained that Radio Three should not be mentioned directly. Instead, it should be presented as an improvement to the AM service. As well, he sanctioned the immediate implementation of programming changes, such as new network programs, on the grounds that CBC program changes should remain independent of the CRTC and that such changes would not affect the CRTC hearings. This was an aspect which marked Laurent Picard's CBC career throughout his vice presidency and subsequent presidency. He insisted at every opportunity that the CBC, not the CRTC, would decide the programming directions the CBC would follow.

The summary was completed on April 30, 1971, and the Board confidentially distributed "A Plan For CBC Radio In The Seventies" to all CBC managers. Intended to be the basis for meetings with the Parliamentary Committee on Broadcasting and the CRTC, each copy of the report was attached to a "Secret and Urgent" memo from the CBC President's office:

Extensive summary of radio study just completed in preparation for Parliamentary Committee hearing Tuesday morning, May 4. Important that sensibilities of Committee be respected and also that staff concerned have opportunity to become acquainted with document. Needs of press are equally important. With these three objectives in mind President has asked that embargo be placed on release to staff and press until 8:50 AM Eastern Daylight Time May 4 . . . Once initial distribution has been completed Tuesday morning we will be prepared to handle requests for further copies. 57

The CBC summary outlined Radio One/Radio Two and declared that the CBC was "conscious of the repercussions such a changed pattern would have" and its impact on Canada. It claimed to take direction from the Special Senate Committee on Mass Media under Senator Keith Davey, which had tabled
its report the previous December. The Davey Committee had criticized "the CBC's commercial policy, its program distribution arrangements, its record in collective bargaining, the effectiveness of its commercial sales department, its dollar efficiency in producing programs, its 'preoccupation' with the major production centres in Toronto and Montreal, and the extent to which it used video tape editing." It had also found that "there is a tendency in radio today to become community-involved, to narrow the programming focus. We welcome this trend among private broadcasters, as a relief from their years of regarding radio as some species of perpetual Wurlitzer: But we hesitate to endorse a similar approach on the part of the CBC." It had warned that CBC network radio "should not be tampered with wantonly because of the trend among private broadcasters." It provided a striking parallel to the criticisms in the "CBC English Radio Report," but also contained some criticism of its solutions.

The CBC summary used the Davey Committee's finding that CBC radio was "a national medium in a country unable to support a national press," to bolster its claim that there was a growing need among Canadians for information. It then went on to list eight recommendations. The first six explained the Radio One/Radio Two plan. The seventh declared that there would be an emphasis on local programming on CBC AM stations. The last stated that the plan was to be implemented over five years. It mentioned that there would be no change in the commercial policy of CBC radio and that implementation would not begin until a full CRTC hearing had been held.

According to Picard, the four-day embargo on the summary was part of
the CBC's ongoing battle with the CRTC. Picard considered it imperative that the CBC retain its autonomy and report to Parliament, distancing itself from the CRTC whenever possible. He felt that whenever the CBC had to appear before the CRTC, it should also attempt to appear before a Parliamentary Committee. The four-day delay would ensure that the Parliamentary Committee would see the plan before the CRTC.64

The Davey Committee's criticism of community-based broadcasting, which was basic to Radio One, needed to be addressed and smoothed over with the politicians. In a letter to the CBC in May, Senator Davey expressed a concern that Radio One was to be a "rip and tear" operation.65 However, the Davey Committee did share some common ground with Meggs and Ward. Its measure of a good newspaper "was like a leaf out of Alvin Toffler's Future Shock: success in preparing people for social change."66 As it turned out, the criticism by the Davey Committee that community radio was an unacceptable focus for CBC radio would be echoed by the CRTC.

During the summer of 1971, the new fall radio schedule was finalized. Since January of 1969, there had been plans to expand the Monday night program "As It Happens".67 On Monday, October 4, 1971, "As It Happens", which had been part of the CBC radio schedule for almost three years, became weeknightly with alternating hosts William Ronald and Barbara Frum. The same day, a new network weekday program, "This Country In The Morning" began with hosts Peter Gzowski and Helen Hutchinson.68 In addition, many of CBC radio's morning programs officially became information programs. Reaction from listeners was not favorable, according to Adilman who wrote that "already CBC switchboards have been jammed with complaints from hard core listeners." He added that: "On her pre-recorded "Music on the
Heather" program today, Anne Robertson said goodbye to her listeners after a decade on the air, and accused CBC management of 'being morons.' That remark was wiped from the tape."69 

On November 24, six weeks after the new programs had begun, the CRTC gave notice that there would be hearings in March of 1972 on "a proposal from the CBC on its radio policy, a plan commonly referred to as Radio I and Radio II." It said that the CBC had been "carrying out experimental radio programming" and that it was time "to assess the effect and value of these experiments."70 

On March 28, 1972, Pierre Juneau opened the CRTC hearings in the Grand Salon of the Skyline Hotel in Ottawa. He announced that the CRTC had received notice of 38 interventions, 10 of which would appear.71 During his opening presentation, Davidson explained that in the past CBC radio had attempted the impossible in "trying to be all things to all people."72 He briefly described Radio One/Radio Two and then introduced Jack Craine. Craine said that the suggested changes had been developing for ten years and described the CBC's programming plans as "evolutionary rather than revolutionary. Trends which began five years ago with the development of stronger information programs on the AM network -- most particularly the World At Eight and the World At Six -- continue to be program formats we foresee for Radio One."73 Craine stressed that the changes would be minimal as "Radio One would sound almost identical to the daytime service heard on our AM stations" with news on the hour, information and consumer news on "Radio Noon" and a continuation of the 4:00 to 6:00 p.m. local information formats similar to Ottawa's "Now Just Listen".74
The intervenors did not agree. Former CBC employee William Young, one of two program organizers who had created the "Ideas" program under Craine, said that CBC radio was losing sight of its mandate. Information programming was important, but the kind of information behind that programming was even more important. Young felt that the new programs of Radio One would be shallow or superficial and there was a danger that Radio One would become popular. If that occurred, he felt that the CBC "could lose simply by becoming very successful, then, we all lose, and I think that would be a real shame." This view was echoed by Jack Gray of ACTRA who said that the proposed changes would turn information into entertainment, or worse, entertainment into information. Another intervenor, Elizabeth Zimmer of Halifax, opposed the changes because she had "listened in despair as the formerly fine information morning radio program grew slowly more and more popular and less and less stimulating as vital commentaries on local events were replaced by raucous commercials." This led Commissioner Gertrude Lain of Calgary to ask Craine whether a change in style was part of the new concept of AM programming. He replied that it was. A letter was read from Maryanne West, of rural British Columbia, with 175 signatures attached. "Almost the whole day from 6:00 a.m. until 8:00 p.m. is taken up with magazine format programs," she wrote. "We do not feel at all precious to the CBC, in fact it appears to us that with increasing urban orientation, we rural residents will very soon become expendable, like the children who have already been dispossessed these many years." 

At this point, Juneau observed that the CBC presentation mentioned that Radio One/Radio Two production centres would produce 260 hours of
programs per week. "Should we not," he asked Davidson, "at least ask ourselves the question whether there would not be another solution, to produce 130 hours, but making sure that it reaches 100 per cent of the population?" Davidson replied that it was not by choice that CBC-owned radio stations were limited to coverage of fifty per cent of the population. 80

At a Board meeting on April 26, 1972, Davidson assessed the hearing and said that the Radio One/Radio Two proposal would probably be discouraged by the CRTC as being too similar to private radio. At the same meeting, he announced his intention to resign on July 31. 81 Picard was to succeed him as president. On June 29, the CRTC announced its decision. It rejected the Radio One/Radio Two plan on the grounds that "the CBC cannot, like a private corporation, modify and adapt its services in response to the fluctuations of the market in order to achieve institutional survival." It said that "the trends inherent in the Radio 1 Proposal and in the 'experiments' that have been carried out in relation to this proposal shift CBC AM programming away from what is unique and bring it much too close to the programming already available on many of the privately owned stations." 82 It also reminded the CBC that the Broadcasting Act stated specifically that its service was to be extended to all parts of Canada as funds became available. This, it concluded, should be the priority, not the Radio One/Radio Two plan.

The effect of this announcement was devastating for the CBC. In Broadcaster, Robert Douglas wrote:

the CBC is faced with piecing together a new radio program policy out of the shattered remains of the two-stream radio system rejected by the Canadian Radio-Television Commission in June. The task is tough because the CRTC is demanding a turnabout in CBC thinking
about its role in Canadian radio broadcasting. And it is not clear, at the moment, how much -- if anything -- can be salvaged from the policy proposed at CRTC hearings in Ottawa in March. 83

In Ward's opinion, the CBC had contributed to the rejection. "The CRTC slammed Radio One and Radio Two because they hadn't even received the report but they had heard what they thought it included." 84 According to Meggs, there was another reason for the CRTC rejection: "The CRTC was publicly saying, 'Look, fellows, you've been bad boys and you have got everybody all stirred up in the country'." 85 But a more important factor was the broader power struggle between the CBC and the CRTC. Much of it revolved around the conflicting attitudes of Juneau and Davidson that had developed over the years and their opposing views of what CBC radio should be. It is likely that the circumstances surrounding the Davidson, Juneau and Boyle appointments further complicated events. By late 1971, the morning program experiments and the new network programs only fueled this division. Later in the year, Picard blamed the CRTC rejection on the experimental morning programs which had impressed the CRTC as being too close to private radio. 86

Whatever the reasons, the "CBC English Radio Report" had failed in the corridors of power. There was to be no Radio One/Radio Two. To make matters worse, the CRTC had not approved the FM applications, but had deferred its decision. It also recommended what the CBC had decided against -- namely, that the Corporation phase out commercials on the French and English radio networks. In short, the CRTC had approved nothing that the CBC had wanted.

The "CBC English Radio Report" has remained secret. In 1981, Peter Meggs was asked by National Archives for a copy of the report. He
approached the CBC to release it officially, but his request was refused. Resentfully, he recalls, "every time they've taken it up the line the answer's come back no, you can't have one." In August of 1989, the office of the CBC Vice President of English Radio, Michael McKwan, confirmed that the report was never publicly released. It might thus seem that the ideas of the radio revolution were sealed, hidden and secreted. However, this was not actually the case. While the CBC Board of Directors was dealing with the politics of the Radio Project from the fall of 1970 until the spring of 1972, the CBC's radio programming staff set about making changes. They were able to do so because there was a strong commitment to change. Craine and Meggs had moved ahead at the network level with "This Country In The Morning" and the weeknightly "As it Happens". With Craine's support, Ward had organized the information morning experiments in Fredericton, Ottawa and Vancouver. With Regina announcer-operator Pat Riley and Toronto technician Wally Cox, Ward had also conducted the "Espanola Experiment" in community programming. There was no shortage of people willing to introduce changes at either the network or local levels.

These changes occurred despite, rather than because of, the "CBC English Radio Report" which had consumed a considerable amount of time and effort, but had also become a political liability. The program changes were the product of forces greater than the report's "royal commission" approach to change. The existence of such forces is scarcely suggested in what has been written about the radio revolution. But unless we assume their operation, it is impossible to solve a number of puzzles about the radio revolution. How, for example, could Elizabeth Zimmer have objected
at the CRTC hearing that CBC radio was not broadcasting the traditional 
information morning program when information is considered to be a 
creation of the radio revolution based on the "CBC English Radio Report"?
How could the radio revolution have created new local information program
periods when Jack Craine described traditional local information programs
and told the CRTC that they would not be changed? Was this, as Craine
suggested, an evolution that went back to 1966 and not a revolution at
all? To answer these questions, it is necessary to examine the CBC's
English AM radio programs and determine the changes they underwent, both
before and after the "CBC English Radio Report."
NOTES FOR CHAPTER TWO

1 Interview with Orville Shugg.

2 Interview with Peter Meggs.


4 Interview with Jack Craine.

5 Ibid.

6 Dent Hodgson, "President said this on commercials" (March 18, 1970); NAC, RG 41, vol. 337, file 14-4-2-1, pt. 8.

7 Orville Shugg, "Commercials are OK" (March 18, 1970); NAC, RG 41, vol. 337, file 14-4-2-1, pt. 8.

8 Interview with Jack Craine; interview with Eugene S. Hallman; interview with Laurent Picard.


10 Ibid.


12 Alan Brown, "I take full responsibility" (July 30, 1970); NAC, RG 41, vol. 799, file 7-3-1.


14 Peter Meggs, "Only three press references" (July 30, 1970); NAC, RG 41, vol. 799, file 7-3-1.

15 Interview with Peter Meggs.


17 Peter Meggs, "Only three press references".

18 "President's meeting minutes" (July 29, 1971); NAC, RG 41, vol. 799, file 7-3-1, p. 2.

19 Interview with Peter Meggs.

20 Alan Brown, "I take full responsibility".
21 Eugene S. Hallman, "Keep the report secret" (August 27, 1970); NAC, RG 41, vol. 799, file 7-3-1.

22 Jack Craine, "The report must be secret" (August 28, 1970); NAC, RG 41, vol. 799, file 7-3-1.

23 Alan Brown, "I resign" (August 31, 1970); NAC, RG 41, vol. 799, file 7-3-1.


25 Jack Craine, "Radio project can't meet deadline" (September 11, 1970); NAC, RG 41, vol. 799, file 7-3-1.

26 CBC minutes of meetings of the Board of Directors (November 17, 1970), pp. 2578-9; NAC, RG 41, vol. 672.

27 Ibid., p. 2581.

28 Ibid., p. 2603.

29 Jack Craine, "Keep keeping it secret" (November 26, 1970); NAC, RG 41, vol. 799, file 7-3-1.

30 Interview with Peter Meggs.

31 Ibid.

32 Interview with Doug Ward.

33 CBC minutes of meetings of the Board of Directors (January 18, 1971), p. 2630; NAC, RG 41, vol. 673.

34 Ibid., p. 2629.


37 Jack Craine, "CRTC meeting" (March 12, 1971); NAC, RG 41, vol. 799, file 7-3-6.

38 CRTC, Public Hearing on applications by CBC p. 377.

39 Ibid., p. 376.

40 Jack Craine, "CRTC meeting".

42 Peter Meggs, "I didn't say what Kirby said I did" (March 17, 1971); NAC, RG 41, vol. 799, file 7-3-6.

43 Pierre Juneau, "Dear George" (March 22, 1971); NAC, RG 41, vol. 799, file 7-3-6.

44 George Davidson, "Dear Pierre" (March 23, 1971); NAC, RG 41, vol. 799, file 7-3-6.

45 CBC minutes of meetings of the Board of Directors (March 29, 1971), p. 2651; NAC, RG 41, vol. 673.

46 Jack Craine, "Presentation to CBC Board of Directors" (March 29, 1971); NAC, RG 41, vol. 799, file 7-3-6, p. 8.


48 Ibid., p. 2656.

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Interview with Doug Ward.
85 Interview with Peter Meggs.

86 CBC minutes of meetings of the Board of Directors (September 11, 1972), p. 3236; NAC, RG 41, vol. 673.

87 Interview with Peter Meggs.

88 Letter from Anne Wright Howard, Executive Assistant to the Vice President, English Radio to the author, August 11, 1989.
CHAPTER THREE

THE CHANGES IN CBC RADIO:

EVOLUTIONARY OR REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE?

According to a number of accounts, CBC AM radio programming underwent a revolutionary change in the early 1970s primarily as a result of the "CBC English Radio Report." This revolution is thought to have consisted of five basic changes: i) the introduction of block programs; ii) an increased emphasis on information content; iii) the creation of new network programs; iv) the development of new local current affairs programs in prime listening times; and v) the use of new production techniques.¹

It is clear from even a cursory examination of CBC AM radio schedules that all of these changes took place at some point between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s. The question is whether they began, for the most part, after the "CBC English Radio Report" (and under its stimulus), or whether they might already have begun, to a significant degree, before the Radio Project was even established.

Some of the basic differences between CBC AM radio programming in the mid-1960s and the same programming in the mid-1970s can be discerned from the following schedules for CBL Toronto:
CBL TORONTO

SCHEDULE FOR MONDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 1964

0600 Local Programming
("Toast and Jamboree": local news, weather, sports; national news at 0700 and 0800; "Preview Commentary" at 0810.)
0825 Bob Goulet Show
0835 Max Ferguson Show
0900 National News
0910 Local Programming
("Toast and Jamboree")
0945 Court Of Opinion
1015 Playroom
1030 News and weather
1033 Local Programming
("Plain Talk")
1045 Local Programming
("Edna May")
1055 For Consumers
1100 Ontario School Broadcasts
1130 The Archers
1145 Music On the Heather
1200 News
1215 Tennessee Ernie Ford
1230 Farm Broadcast
1259 Time Signal
1300 News, weather
1330 Tommy Hunter Show
1345 Stories with John Drainie
1400 News
1403 Trans Canada Matinee
1500 Maitland Manor
1530 Montreal Playhouse
1600 News
1603 Canadian Roundup
1610 Lift Up Your Hearts
1620 Local Programming
("At Ease with Elwood Glover")
1700 News
1705 Local Programming
("At Ease with Elwood Glover")
1755 Business Barometer
1800 National News
1810 On Parliament Hill
1820 Today's Editoria
1825 Local Programming
("Sports")
1830 Countdown
1900 Local Programming
("CBC News and Commentary")
1915 Local Programming
("Theatre Anyone")
1930 RPM
2000 Assignment
2030 Crime Quiz
2100 Farm Forum
2130 Distinguished Artists
2200 National News
2215 On Parliament Hill
2220 Speaking Personally
2230 Continental Holiday
2300 Gilmour's Albums
2400 News, weather, sports
2407 Local Programming
("Don Sims Show")
0100 Local Programming
("News and Music")
CBL TORONTO

SCHEDULE FOR MONDAY, NOVEMBER 4, 1974

0600 Local programming
("Metro Morning": local news, weather, sports; national news at 0600, 0700, World At Eight; "Commentary" at 0815.)
0900 The World At Nine
0913 "This Country In The Morning
1000 News
1003 This Country In The Morning
1100 News
1103 This Country in the Morning
1200 News
1203 Local Programming
("Radio Noon")
1259 Time Signal
1300 News
1303 Local Programming
("Radio Noon")
1400 News
1403 Local Programming
("Radio Noon")
1430 Bob Kerr's Off the Record
1500 News
1503 Bob Kerr's Off the Record
1530 Max Ferguson Show
1600 News
1603 Local Programming
1700 News
1703 Local Programming
1706 The World At Nine
1800 The World At Six
1830 As It Happens
1900 News
1903 As It Happens
2000 News
2003 Music Of Our People
2030 Identities
2100 News
2103 Identities
2200 CBC National News and From The Capitals
2215 Five Nights
2230 Great Canadian Gold Rush
2300 News
2303 Great Canadian Gold Rush
2400 News
2410 Local Programming
0109 Sign Off

What is immediately striking about these two radio schedules is the different number of programs. In 1964 there were 54 separate programs; in 1974 there were 35. This is due to a significant difference in the amount of time allotted each network program. In 1964 the program "For Consumers" was five minutes, the "Bob Coulet Show" was 10 minutes, and "Playroom" was 15 minutes. The longest network program of the 1964 schedule was one hour in duration, with nine programs scheduled between 9:00 a.m. and noon. Ten years later, only the three-hour "This Country in the Morning" was presented. Similarly, in the evening, there were four
programs between 6:30 and 8:00 p.m. In 1974 only "As It Happens" was scheduled. Many of the short programs of 1964 were commentaries such as "Edna May", "Speaking Personally", "Today's Editorial" and "Plain Talk". Individuals with a particular experience or expertise reflected on current events for a few minutes. By 1974 these had disappeared, except for "Commentary", which was broadcast weekdays after the 8:00 a.m. national news. There was thus a complete shift to block programming at the network level.

Change in the duration of local programs was not as dramatic. For example, in 1964 the local morning program was three hours and ten minutes long. By 1974 it was three hours. Similarly, the local afternoon program, which was an hour and thirty-five minutes in 1964, was twenty-five minutes longer in 1974. However, a significant change was the consolidation of local program periods, which were no longer separated by network programs. For example, in 1964 CBL's "Toast and Jamboree" was aired from 6:00-8:25 a.m., interrupted by two short network programs, and then continued until 9:45 a.m. Similarly, in 1964 "At Ease With Elwood Glover" began at 4:20 p.m., followed two short network programs, and finished at 5:55 p.m. leaving five minutes for a network program before the 6:00 p.m. news. Between 1964 and 1974, these network programs were removed, resulting in a morning show that was uninterrupted from 6:00-9:00 a.m., and an afternoon show uninterrupted from 4:00-6:00 p.m.

There was more dramatic change in the local, half-hour "Farm Broadcast". In 1964 it was preceded by a network musical program, followed by a network musical program and then a network literary program. By 1974 there was only one local program. "Radio Noon" was broadcast from
12:00-2:30 p.m. It is apparent that by 1974, block programming had occurred at both the network and local level.

During this period, there is an indication of a change in emphasis from entertainment to information programming. A fascination with entertainment was reflected in the way the 1964 programs were named after their hosts. Canadian musical stars like Tommy Hunter and Bob Coulet hosted their own shows and other programs (like the "Max Ferguson Show", "News with Walter Dowles" and "Don Sims Show") tried to exploit the star quality of their announcer. On any weekday at least eleven programs carried a person's name. By 1974 only two programs carried on this tradition. By then most program names reflected a new stress on information (e.g. "As It Happens", "This Country In The Morning", "Concern").

In 1962 the CBC calculated that 56 per cent of its AM radio programming was entertainment, 29 per cent was information, while 15 per cent was idea or opinion. The "idea or opinion" category consisted of "commentaries or subjective interpretations of local, regional, national or international occurrences." It is thus reasonable to group this category with information programming. In this case, 44 per cent of AM radio programming was information. According to the 1974-75 CBC Annual Report, information comprised 59.5 per cent of all programming, a marked increase from the figures for 1962.

Changes in the format of programs also occurred between 1964 and 1974. A significant difference was the use of the "magazine" format, marked by the presentation of a variety of topics and guests during one show. The CBC's senior management thought this would enable "the listener
to turn on his radio at any time to find something of interest." By the mid-1960s, it was already being used. For example, in 1964 CBC Times noted that "CBC radio's 'Business Barometer' departs from its usual magazine-type format this week." However, because the programs of 1964 were so short, the magazine format could rarely be exploited. With the longer block programs of 1974, however, almost every program used the magazine format.

The increased use of the magazine format was accompanied by a switch to permanent program hosts from announcers. This first occurred on the weekday program "Trans-Canada Matinee", an hour-long general information program for women. In October 1959, it introduced permanent host Betty Tomlinson, despite a CBC survey which found that 40 per cent of the program's listeners "were opposed to the notion of the program having a permanent host or hostess." Tomlinson's success in the role helped to ensure that this development would be continued. Whereas announcers had read from scripts, the hosts made use of their performance abilities. On the "Gerussi!" program of the late 1960s, for example, Gerussi "chatted with guests, read poems and stories, played his own kind of music and commented on everything." Although announcers such as Alan McFee still played a role, programs such as "Gerussi!" relied on the ability of their hosts to comment, to question guests, and to discuss issues freely in a conversational tone without a script. By 1974 announcers were largely relegated to the reading of news and announcements.

An even more important change of format between 1964 and 1974 was the use of the telephone for live interviews. In 1964 interviews were conducted either by having guests come into the studio, or by sending a
technician and host to an outside location. The telephone was not used for either "phone-ins" to "open-line" or "hot-line" programs, or for "phone-outs" from the radio station. By 1974, however, the telephone was the mainstay of programs such as "As It Happens" and "Cross Country Checkup". It allowed them to become more immediate and flexible; they could respond to events as they occurred and contact a variety of people more quickly and easily. The introduction of telephone interviews provided an efficient means to increase the amount of information within the CBC's radio programs.

Taken collectively, these changes in CBC radio programming certainly constitute a major transformation. Network and local programs were consolidated into blocks; there was a greater emphasis on information programming; and new programs were created using new methods of production. But to what extent were these changes actually caused by the "CBC English Radio Report?" To what extent were other forces responsible? As a preliminary step towards answering these questions, it is helpful to look at the CBC radio schedule of 1969 -- halfway between 1964 and 1974 and six months before the "CBC English Radio Report."
CBL TORONTO

SCHEDULE FOR MONDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 1969

0600 Local Programming
("Bruce Smith Show": local news, weather, sports; national news at 0600, 0700, World At Eight; "Preview Commentary" at 0815.)

0822 The Max Ferguson Show

0900 News

0910 Ontario Weather

0915 Gerussi!

0955 Assignment-Entertainment

1000 News

1003 Gerussi!

1055 Assignment-Consumers

1100 News

1103 Matinee 1

1155 Assignment-Flight

1200 Local Programming
("Radio Noon")

1255 Assignment-Life

1259 Time signal

1300 News and Weather

1315 After Noon

1355 Assignment-Personality

1400 News

1403 Ontario School Broadcasts

1430 Matinee 2

1455 Assignment-Actuality

1500 News

1503 World's Greatest Music

1555 Assignment-Stocks

1600 News

1603 Canadian Roundup

1610 Local Programming
("Interplay")

1615 Local Programming
("At Ease With Elwood Glover")

1655 Assignment-Elements of Life

1700 News

1703 Local Programming
("At Ease With Elwood Glover")

1800 The World At Six

1830 Local Programming
("Folk Song '69")

1900 CBC News

1910 Local Programming
("Chansonnettes")

2000 News

2003 As It Happens

2200 National News, The Capitals

2215 Five Nights A Week

2230 Theatre 1030

2300 News

2303 Distinguished Artists

2333 Local Programming
("This Is Robert Fulford" News, weather, sports)

The first thing that is apparent from a comparison of this schedule with those examined previously is that there were fewer programs in 1969 (48) than in 1964 (54), but more than in 1974 (35). By 1969 there had been an increase in the average amount of time allotted to each program. Almost every program in the 1969 schedule was half an hour or longer. Some programs, such as "Gerussi!" or "As It Happens", were two hours in length. As well, the commentaries which had dotted the 1964 schedule
had disappeared, except for "Assignment", a five-minute feature heard eight times a day. In other words, by 1969 CBC radio had already consolidated its network schedule and to some extent moved to block programming. There is a progression, for example, from the nine programs in the mid-morning of 1964, to the two-hour "Gerussi!" program of 1969, to the three-hour "This Country In the Morning" of 1974.

There had also been consolidation of local program periods by 1969. The local morning program was no longer divided by network programs. In the afternoon, CEL's "At Ease With Elwood Glover" still followed two short network programs. However, some CBC stations, such as Windsor and Montreal, began their afternoon show at 4:00 p.m. and promoted everything that followed until "The World At Six" as one local program.

Four programs were still presented between noon and 2:00 p.m. in 1969, but two of them were only five minutes long. The rest of the time was devoted to a network music production and a local agricultural program. At least six months before the "CBC English Radio Report," it is evident that both local and network programs had become blocks of program time.

In 1969 programs still featured personalities (e.g. "Max Ferguson", "Gerussi!"). Five programs carried people's names, compared to 11 in 1964 and two in 1974. But other program titles suggest that there was already a new stress on information (e.g. "As It Happens", "Five Nights A Week", "The Capitals").

Moreover, the CBC Annual Report for 1969-70 estimated the amount of information programming at 51.5 per cent, compared to 44 per cent in 1962, 46.5 per cent in 1965, and 59.5 per cent in 1974. 13 Information
programming increased at the rate of a little more than one per cent a year during most of the 1960s. While information programming increased slightly more rapidly in the early 1970s, at about one and a half per cent a year, the trend to more information programming was clearly established before then. This is further illustrated by the creation of "Cross Country Checkup" in 1965 and the creation of "As It Happens" in 1968.

One of the influences on CBC radio's local information programming in the 1960s was the American concept of "all-news" radio. The first successful American commercial all-news operation, WHER, began on May 6, 1961. It was operated by Gordon McLendon, who had developed a number of radio formats including "Top 40." by August, 1967, there were eight American all-news stations on the air, including WCBS which was the first all-news network supported by a major news gathering operation. Taking the American all-news format as a model, a group of producers at CBC Winnipeg tried using information and no music on the local morning show. The "Winnipeg Experiment," as it was called, originated the terms "information radio" and "information revolution." The new Winnipeg program, called "Information Radio", began on September 15, 1969. It was this program that Meggs and Ward had suggested be copied and produced by all CBC stations.

An emphasis on information by 1969 in local morning programs at other CBC stations can be seen in the CBC Times program notes, which featured previously separate programs such as "Ontario Farm Broadcast", "Plain Talk" and "Shop Talk" as part of the morning shows. In 1967, the CBC measured the percentages of music and talk on the Calgary morning program. "Talk" was taken to include: public affairs; "hot-line" programs; time;
temperature; weather; newscasts; religion; "announcer patter;" and commercials. The study came up with percentages of 63 for talk and 37 for music. If we take the Calgary show as a typical morning program, it can be compared to a study in 1973 of the Ottawa morning program which contained 74 per cent talk and 26 per cent music. One year later, following the deletion of commercials, the Ottawa program was comprised of 82 per cent talk and 18 per cent music. Over seven years, almost three hours of talk a week had been added to the local morning programs. However, in 1967 there had already existed nine-and-a-half hours.

There are indications of an increased information content in the local noon and afternoon program periods by 1969. CBL's "Kadio Noon" had been created in September, 1968. In discussing the origin of "Kadio Noon", a 1971 CBC study states that "within one program, a wide range of topics is dealt with, ranging from the specific (supermarket comparisons for the consumer, farm market price reports for the farmer) to the more general (weather reports, editorial points of view on agriculture and consumer matters and so on)." Both the name of the program and its content had been decided by 1969. A clue as to whether the local 4:00-6:00 p.m. programs increased their information content by 1969, is found in the promotion of the programs. CBL's "At Ease With Elwood Glover" included several "Assignment" programs, "Metro Byline", "Metro News", "Sports Opinion", as well as stock prices, egg prices and a financial report.

Although the magazine format for radio programs had been used by the CBC since the late 1950s, it did not dominate the radio schedule until the late 1960s. The presentation by senior CBC management to the 1965 Fowler
Committee gave notice that CBC radio would exploit the magazine format. The Fowler Committee's rejection of this was criticized by the CBC in its annual report for 1965-66. The CBC explained that it had "experimented with magazine formats" and that they were being used with success on the French radio network in a ninety-minute weekday program called "Présent". It was described as a program of "fast moving items on current events, science, the arts and anything else that is interesting, all interspersed with music -- 'Présent' is a step towards enabling the listener to turn on his radio at any time to find something of interest." The report mentions that this technique was also being used by English radio "in the morning and late afternoon when magazine periods offer local services and music combined with short network features like 'Assignment'." The magazine format was thus encouraged by the CBC's management, was considered to be the program format of the future, and was already becoming established in the radio schedule.

The most dramatic development of CBC radio production between 1964 and 1969 however, was the use of the telephone to conduct interviews. In 1965 "Cross Country Checkup", a national phone-in program which exists to this day, was created. The CBC described the new program as a "dynamic concept of instantaneous opinion taking." Just how dynamic is clear from a comparison with the previous logistics of CBC radio production.

In 1962 CBC radio's "Citizen's Forum" was in its 24th season of weekly panel discussions co-produced with the Canadian Association for Adult Education. That year, program organizer Christina McDougall conducted an experiment using the open-line concept, which received such enthusiastic response, the CBC announced that "all the 'Citizen's Forum'
broadcasts are being planned around this technique. The CBC's promotion of the new program concept described it this way:

To set the ball rolling, CBC will invite prominent people to record a brief statement of their opinions on the issues raised. These tape recordings will then be shipped to private radio stations at strategic points across Canada to be broadcast on their local programs. Using the "open-line" technique, the private stations will invite listeners to telephone and express their own opinions on the topic or the speaker... telephone calls will be recorded by the private stations and sent, un-edited, to whichever CBC station will be preparing the final program... in its final form [the program] will consist of the original statement expressed by a public figure, a selection of the best listeners' comments, and a brief summation by the same person voicing the opening statement.

While editing the hours of tape collected from private stations for an upcoming "Citizen's Forum" program, CBC producer Andrew Simon asked himself "why am I doing this?" It did not seem to him to make sense to have private radio stations doing what CBC radio could do, and he submitted a proposal to CBC management for an open-line program. At 3:00 p.m. on May 16, 1965, the CBC launched an "unprecedented experiment" -- Canada's first national phone-in show, produced by Simon and hosted by Brad Crandall.

The next major influence on CBC radio production was the European concept of the phone-out. This made CBC radio renowned world-wide and its importance cannot be over-emphasized. In her book As It Happened, a former host of "As It Happens", Barbara Frum, points out that "people have been phoning in to radio programs since the early 1950s. Phoning out -- that was the breakthrough..." It is generally recognized that "As It Happens" was the first radio program in Canada to base its production entirely on the phone-out technique. "As It Happens" made its debut at 8:00 p.m. on November 18, 1968. This program, more than any other, made CBC radio immediate and flexible. It was able to reach people all over
the world as events were occurring. It greatly contributed to the achievement of the CBC management's 1965 goal of "speed of delivery and omnipresence."

Another indication that the radio revolution was well established by 1969 can be found in the use of the term itself. Although it was a 1965 CBC management report that had first suggested that radio in Canada was entering a revolution, the term had remained in the background. In April of 1969 however, one month before the CBC Board of Directors decided that a study on radio should be conducted, the CBC Information Services Department promoted the new information-oriented block programs under the banner "The Radio Revolution is Underway." The promotion also pointed to other, more elusive, qualities of a radio revolution. It described the 1969 radio programs as "radio with brains and guts. Brighter minds. That's what the radio revolution is all about."

The implication of this promotion was that the radio revolution did not rest solely on the amount of information, but also on the type of information being broadcast. This point had also been suggested in the presentations of several individuals at the 1972 CRTC hearings who objected to the Radio One/Radio Two concept.

At the same hearing moreover, Jack Craine had confirmed that there had been a change of program style. Assessments of the radio revolution describe it as "adapting formats and styles to popular use of the medium" and "a new form of public broadcasting." These likewise imply a change in approach or philosophy. It would thus seem that in addition to such developments as block and information programming, the adoption of a new program philosophy was also underway by the late 1960s and was
already influencing production techniques.

One indication that this was indeed the case can be seen in the transition from programs like "Citizen's Forum" to those like "Cross Country Checkup". "Citizen's Forum" was always recorded, allowing complete editorial control and a "selection of the best listeners' comments." As well, it was based on the authoritative comments of a prominent person, with listeners' comments enclosed between them. Once it began using the phone-in technique, CBC radio was able to have direct contact with the Canadian public. "Cross Country Checkup" allowed all listeners, not only the "best listeners," to participate, to express an opinion and to ask questions of guests. At its beginning in 1965, its program organizer, Christina McDougall, said that they were "instigating the 'ombudsman' approach in some of our programs. We shall check up on apparent miscarriages of justice or violations of civil rights which do not seem to have any redress." Authority was no longer plumbed for program material, but was challenged. This questioning of authority also accompanied the development of the phone-out program. The fast and efficient method of telephone interviews allowed the program production personnel to get answers quickly to questions about events or issues. Their main task became providing questions for program hosts. This emphasis created a form of radio production that was concerned as much with the question as with the answer.

The changing role played by the program hosts also contributed to a tendency to question or challenge authority. In the mid-1960s, CBC management had stated that they wanted a "more relaxed style of broadcasting."

The ability of the hosts to discuss issues freely
achieved a conversational tone. However, their skilled questioning and comment also made CBC radio programs controversial. In 1964, for example, Montreal producer Andrew Simon created the program "Let's Consider". Its host, journalist Betty Shapiro, felt that her role was to "drag out all the facts which nobody wants made public." With some pride, the CBC described Shapiro as a "threat to anyone with facts to hide." "Radio Free Friday", a phone-in program created in 1969, was also hosted by what the CBC described as a "controversial journalist" -- in this case by Peter Czowski. The same year, artist William Ronald, who took over as host of "As It Happens", was described by the CBC as holding "forthright opinions," which the CBC would not attempt to soften.

The dependency on the challenging nature of these programs was strikingly evident by the late 1960s. By then controversy had become an accepted style of CBC radio broadcasting. In 1968 the producer of "As It Happens", Val Clery, stated that the program would appeal to anyone "who believes in scrutiny and argument and confrontation . . ." By 1970 Colin MacLeod was the new producer and he said that the mandate of "As It Happens" was to "comfort the afflicted and afflict the comfortable." The new production techniques, in combination with a mandate to embrace argument, defined the essence of these programs. The CBC publicized these developments as a radio revolution.

These changes in CBC radio production did not occur in isolation. In embracing controversy, the new CBC programs reflected a larger transformation in North American journalism in the 1960s. This is described under various headings, such as "adversary," "consumer," "investigative" or "ombudsman" journalism. They are the result of a North
American society in transition; a revolution greater than the radio revolution. In a recent interview, Ward likened the "CBC English Radio Report" to an international treaty, which "usually reflects a new status quo, something that has developed over the years." The development of a new status quo was in full force in CBC radio by the late 1960s. It was occurring in an ethos of dynamic change in North American society and reflected a revolution as much outside as within the CBC. In 1964 the participants in the annual Couchiching Conference discussed "Order and Good Government." In 1968 Couchiching asked "Why Are We Revolting?" and revolution was also a subject on "Cross Country Checkup", "As It Happens", and various specials. In the answer to the question posed at the 1968 Couchiching Conference lies the basic explanation of the CBC's radio revolution.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER THREE


5 Ibid., p. 5.


9 CBC Research, "The reaction of 'Trans Canada Matinee' listeners to the introduction into the program of hostess Betty Tomlinson" (Ottawa: CBC, 1961), p. 3.

10 Ibid., p. 10.

11 CBC Annual Report 1968-69, p. 34.


16 CBC Research, "The content of early morning radio in Calgary and the size of the audience reached" (Ottawa: CBC, 1967), table 3.


20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.


30. Ibid.


36. Ibid.


40 Telephone interview with Colin MacLeod, August 24, 1989.

41 Interview with Doug Ward.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE REVOLUTION OF THE 1960s AND THE RISE OF NEW JOURNALISM

The 1960s was a period of dramatic change in North America. New attitudes and a revolutionary spirit in the United States spilled over into Canada and affected a number of institutions, not the least of which was the CBC. There were several conditions that led to this, the most important being affluence. Ironically, the protests of the period were not against the material conditions of life, but against the perceived spiritual shortcomings.

World War II was followed by a period of dynamic growth. Not only was there a boom in babies, but there was an economic boom which seemed to have no end. As Todd Gitlin writes in The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage, "the boom of 1945 to 1973, occasionally interrupted by recessions only to roll on seemingly undiminished, was the longest in American history."1 This post-war boom began somewhat later in Canada, but also featured a rising gross national product, high employment, extensive investment, and vigorous industrial expansion.2

Post-war affluence gave rise to new attitudes and lifestyles and helped to create what came to be known as the "generation gap." Robert Lauer has suggested that "change tends to intensify generational conflict and generational conflict leads to change."3 Those who had lived through the Depression and the War had a nagging fear that the affluence would end -- a fear which their children could not understand. The post-war generation listened to stories about the Depression and the War, but never truly understood. The need to be grateful for the unceasing affluence
unbudgeable, their language was evasion, their rationality unreasonable, and therefore they were going to have to be dislodged.\textsuperscript{20} The evolution of the movement to accept action as a legitimate form of expression was a dramatic and important step.

In 1960, four black youths in North Carolina challenged segregation by conducting a sit-in at a Woolworth's lunch counter. The students were bullied and beaten.\textsuperscript{21} However, it was a powerful protest. Simply sitting down had pushed the opposition to commit acts of violence which illustrated their unreasonableness. Within days there were pickets at Woolworth's across the United States. A group of New Left protestors, called The Freedom Riders, began to test whether a Supreme Court decision banning bus terminal segregation in the southern United States was a reality. "Police chief Bull Conner had promised the [Klu Klux] Klan enough time to attack the Freedom Riders, whom Conner wanted beaten until 'it looked like a bulldog at hold of them,"\textsuperscript{22} in Politics of Protest, Jerome Skolnick argues that the New Left youth movement was moved to revolution when nonviolent demonstrations were met with violence; the government war on poverty did not deliver what it had promised; the Vietnam war was escalated; the draft was forced upon those who did not want to participate; the police moved on to university campuses; and government revealed its inability to solve problems of race, poverty and urban decline.\textsuperscript{23} At the same time the protest movement began to splinter into single issue movements. There was the civil rights movement, the ban the bomb movement the black power movement, and so forth, each resting on a single issue with action as a prescribed form of protest. As well, television began to depict the protests, and as demonstrations on other
seemed cut of touch with reality. The Cold War and arms race aggravated these tensions. Children, subjected to air raid drills in schools, regarded nuclear war as a real possibility. But their parents, who had lived through a war they had won, did not seem to fully share their fear, leaving youth even more isolated.

Alan Freed, a Cleveland radio disk jockey, unknowingly created a bond for disaffected youth when, in June 1951, he coined the term "rock 'n roll." Its rapid growth depended upon the portable radio and the economics of playing records rather than hiring orchestras. But its underlying stimulus was the desire of youth for something of their own and it was ready made for an isolated youth. Rock was founded on a new beat with new words, incomprehensible to parents. "Rock was clamor," Gitlin writes, "the noise of youth submerged by order and affluence, now frantically clawing their way out."6

Writers began criticizing the consumer society and materialism. Film provided a new, non-conformist role for youth through characters portrayed by James Dean and Marlon Brando. They played rebels who protested the hypocritical world of the adult. They were counter to popular culture, a counterculture. According to Lewis Feuer in The Conflict Of Generations, this followed the pattern of generational revolt in affluent societies. He writes that youth's aggressive emotion "is much more likely to take a moralistic form; the very values of the System as a whole are rejected, precisely because the System is so economically stable that it provides jobs and opportunities for the willing and capable."7 By the mid-1950s, the beat generation had established a counterculture in the flesh in a post-modern movement whose members were called Beats, and later, Beatniks.
Centered in San Francisco, they rejected all that society offered and escaped by means of marijuana, wine and Buddhism. They wrote their views of society in books such as Jack Kerouac's *On The Road*. When full attention was focused on them, the Beats were condemned. In *Esquire*,

Norman Podhoretz called the Beats:

> a movement of brute stupidity and know-nothingism that is trying to take over the country from a middle class which is supposed to be the guardian of civilization but which has practically dislocated its shoulder in its eagerness to throw in the towel . . . what juvenile delinquency is to life the San Francisco writers are to literature. 8

Despite this reaction, and partly because of it, the post war "anti" movement and its rejection of societal values became established. The jeans, black turtleneck and guitar of the Beats became a trademark of those at odds with society. However, the Beats still shared an important characteristic with their parents. Both lacked, more often than not, a university degree. The "anti" movement's next development occurred when it acquired an education.

Affluence and the baby boom swelled the universities. "By 1960 the U.S. was the first society in the history of the world with more college students than farmers." In Canada, university enrolment jumped from 73,000 in 1955 to over 200,000 by 1965 and almost 300,000 by 1969. By the early 1960s the true Beats had disappeared, but students maintained their non-conformity. For example, during her first year as a student at Ohio State University in 1963, Donna Henes discovered, "drugs and Beat poetry, Bob Dylan, Zen Buddhism, everything that first year."!

From this period of change, the New Left youth movement arose. It originated in groups of politically active liberal or left-leaning university students who wished to redress the plight of groups such as
Blacks, Cubans, the poor and Vietnamese. First and foremost, they were educated and were "insulted when power behaved stupidly." In do you believe in magic? Annie Gottlieb calls the New Left youth movement "potentially the Sixties most substantial contribution to American politics, until it got sucked down the drain of hard-line Marxism. Students for a Democratic Society began in 1962 with a sober statement on participatory democracy, a vow to hold America to its own revolutionary promises." Gitlin, one of the first members of SDS, describes its paradoxical ideology. It was:

the ideology of a middling social group caught between power and powerlessness, and soaked in ambivalence toward both. The principal property of educated radicals was its knowledge credentials. We were angry at managers whose power outran the knowledge that would entitle them to legitimate authority. We were queasy about dominating the voiceless, yet we knew that education had equipped us to fuse knowledge and power as professionals. We believed in equality but experienced superiority. Fearful of giving up the de facto authority we possessed by virtue of education and articulateness, we were unwilling to pin ourselves down to policies and formal authority.

In contrast to the Beats, whose rejection of North American society left them uninvolved, the desire of the short haired, jacket-with-tie, New Left university radicals was to set society right. Participatory democracy meant "the right of universal assertion . . . the expressive tendency was in revolt against all formal boundaries and qualifications, which it saw as rationalizations for illegitimate or tedious power." These were liberal ideals. However, they soon rejected traditional liberal organizations. This occurred because the leading liberals of the time, such as Adlai Stevenson, favored reform through traditional institutions. According to Feuer, Stevenson was perceived by the young as a "liberal, doubt-tormented intellectual," the persona of their parents. The majority of American liberals believed that the difficulties of the
world lay outside the borders of the United States and that American
domestic problems, such as poverty, could be addressed through the formal
democratic process. Both affluence in the United States and the chilling
effect of the Cold War and McCarthyism contributed to this perspective.
Liberals did not win the hearts of the young because they refused to
accept that American institutions were part of a problem. They were thus
considered by youth to be part of the "establishment." In addition, the
"generation gap" had isolated the New Left youth movement from the older
and more cautious members of the political left. McCarthyism had stamped
a reluctance within older individuals to share in an open celebration for
reform.

According to political scientist Lucian Pye, in "transitional
societies young people find it easiest to direct all their hostilities and
frustrations against, not the still-anxiety provoking commands of parental
authority, but against the larger examples of political authority." Feuer also argues that the rebellion of youth in the 1960s was predictable
because "a student movement has its roots in an emotional revolt against
the older generation. It can be radical, revolutionary, or reactionary,
but its driving force is always an assault on the status quo." The
question, however, is why the protests of youth in the sixties erupted
into violent action?

During its beginning, the SDS organized peace protests and presented
petitions, but it soon became obvious to members of the group that
authority would continue to act as it saw fit. Protesters such as Gitlin
felt that "men such as this are not going to be persuaded to be sensible.
They were grotesque, these clever and confident men, they were
unbudgeable, their language was evasion, their rationality unreasonable, and therefore they were going to have to be dislodged."\textsuperscript{20} The evolution of the movement to accept action as a legitimate form of expression was a dramatic and important step.

In 1960, four black youths in North Carolina challenged segregation by conducting a sit-in at a Woolworth's lunch counter. The students were bullied and beaten.\textsuperscript{21} However, it was a powerful protest. Simply sitting down had pushed the opposition to commit acts of violence which illustrated their unreasonableness. Within days there were pickets at Woolworth's across the United States. A group of New Left protestors, called The Freedom Riders, began to test whether a Supreme Court decision banning bus terminal segregation in the southern United States was a reality. "Police chief Bull Conner had promised the [Klu Klux] Klan enough time to attack the Freedom Riders, whom Conner wanted beaten until 'it looked like a bulldog just hold of them."\textsuperscript{22} In Politics of Protest, Jerome Skolnick argues that the New Left youth movement was moved to revolution when nonviolent demonstrations were met with violence; the government war on poverty did not deliver what it had promised; the Vietnam war was escalated; the draft was forced upon those who did not want to participate; the police moved on to university campuses; and government revealed its inability to solve problems of race, poverty and urban decline.\textsuperscript{23} At the same time the protest movement began to splinter into single issue movements. There was the civil rights movement, the ban the bomb movement, the black power movement, and so forth, each resting on a single issue with action as a prescribed form of protest. As well, television began to depict the protests, and as demonstrations on other
issues spread throughout the United States, police and protestors became more violent.

In August of 1965, nineteen year old P. F. Sloan wrote a song which rocketed to the top of the charts. "Eve of Destruction" epitomized the mood of youth and it was banned by many radio stations. As well, students began to heed Timothy Leary's call; "drop out, tune in, turn on." LSD, mescaline, THC and the pill furthered a counterculture lifestyle which promised that youth could have it all, or at least all that was important: sex, drugs and rock 'n roll. It was at this point, the protest movement changed. In the 1950s the Beats had used a derogatory term to describe someone who was only "half hip;" a "hippie." The lower rent districts of cities, the most famous being haight Ashbury of San Francisco, became hippie havens. On the campuses of 1966, the jackets and ties were gone and the previously shunned long hair and sandals of the Beats were commonplace. Members of the youth movement became more interested in defining, or at least seeking, their non-conformity as political ideology. The popularity of protest spread as more and more baby boomers came of university age. Gitlin writes that,

thanks to the sheer numbers and concentration of youth, the torrent of drugs, the sexual revolution, the traumatic war, the general stampede away from authority, and the trend spotting media, it was easy to assume that all the styles of revolt and disaffection were spilling together, tributaries into a common torrent of youth and euphoria, life against death, joy over sacrifice, now over later, remaking the whole bleeding world. 24

In his studies, Feuer found that "civil disobedience itself was a tactic which emphasized the community of the young as well as the defiance of the old. It carried with it an unusual emotional satisfaction." 25 By the mid-1960s, the New Left no longer dominated the "anti" movement and
its demonstrations. Protests had ceased to be part of a political movement, but had become a popular movement. At an anti-war protest in New York City in 1966, 22 thousand people marched down Fifth Avenue. One year later, over 250 thousand did the same thing. The protest movement began with a desire to represent the plight of others. By the mid-1960s it represented its own interests. It was the beginning of the "me" generation.

In Canada the youth movement had similarities to, and roots in, the American movement. The common ideals of an educated youth, its music and demonstrations knew no borders. The youth of both countries shared an outrage at the behaviour of authority and placed faith in participatory democracy, suspicion of institutional structures and a belief in minority groups and the poor as agents for social change. However, the youth protest movement evolved differently in Canada, mainly because the authorities handled events differently. They seldom used violence to curb protest. As well, much of the protest was directed against the United States and not against the Canadian government itself. At the same time, moreover, some ideals of Canadian youth were co-opted by the federal government.

The New Left youth movement emerged in Canada in 1964 as a protest against the Canadian government obtaining nuclear weapons from the United States and coalesced into an organization called the Student Union For Peace Action. Evidence of the American origins of the Canadian New Left youth movement is considerable. In The Revolution Game, Margaret Daly writes that "civil rights and the Vietnam war were the big left-wing issues in Canada as well as the U.S. The [SUFA] radicals had done virtually no
analysis of specifically Canadian society, and when such analysis was attempted, it was derivative to say the least. In *Canadian Dimension*, James Laxer evaluated SUPA as "the major instrument for drawing American New Left ideas into Canada and for diffusing them among Canadian youth organizations." Similarly, James Harding, a former SUPA member, writes that "SUPA tended to simplistically copy models of radical movements in Britain and the United States without regard to their relevance to Canada." Popularly, SUPA was described as a university protest group which staged ban the bomb sit-ins, protested Adlai Stevenson's visit to Canada, and held an anti-discrimination sit-in outside the U.S. consulate. In *Thinking About Change*, Howard Adelman writes that eventually SUPA "followed the American lead to haunt the Canadian domestic dream of an affluent society with the exposure of the plight of the natives and the poor."

On April 5 in 1965, a Speech from the Throne mentioned the creation of a crown corporation which would come to be called the "Company of Young Canadians." The government sponsored organization would allow Canadian youth to "do worthwhile volunteer work." U.S. President Kennedy's Peace Corps was the model for the idea. Behind its creation was the Pearson government's desire to sway youth over to its side in votes and ideology. Adelman writes that this action "Canadianized" the New Left. "The government nationalized the ideology, true to its heritage as the representative of the benevolent state." Members of the Canadian New Left youth movement regarded the move with contempt, but it placed them in a difficult position. In creating the crown corporation, the federal government had placed four million dollars at their disposal. If they
didn't take it, someone else might.\footnote{34} After much hand wringing, three key members of the movement, Art Pape, Doug Ward and Alan Clarke, worked to help establish the CYC. Ward and Pape had been involved in SUPA and most of that group moved over to the CYC with them. Daly writes that had Pape and Ward not got involved and attracted many of the SUPA people to the CYC, "the history of the New Left in Canada would be entirely different today."\footnote{35} In the fall of 1967, similar to the SDS experience in the United States, SUPA folded.

The American roots of SUPA were continued in the CYC. Laxer points out that the founding president of SDS, Tom Hayden, greatly influenced the attitudes of Art Pape.\footnote{36} In addition, Rick Salter, a founding member of the SDS in 1962, moved to Canada to join the CYC in 1966.\footnote{37} The CYC was not only burdened by government involvement, but the participatory democracy style of management (which marked youth organizations on both sides of the border during the 1960s) led to hours of discussion which impeded action. A year after the Throne Speech, the CYC had still not done anything and there was pressure from the federal government for it to do something. On June 26, 1966, the CYC organized a giant encounter group session for its members. Daly writes that it was a "hastily arranged, uncoordinated, ill conceived and utterly bizarre training session that was to prove useless for most, [and] mentally destructive for a few (the Company picked up the subsequent psychiatrist bills) . . ."\footnote{38}

By the fall of 1968, most of the former SUPA members had left the CYC "in various states of personal or ideological defeat."\footnote{39} By then, according to Daly, Ward was viewed "as an ambitious liberal who sold out to the Establishment for power and prestige."\footnote{40} Although he was still
council chairman, he had "long since lost the trust of the New Left. The Liberals had been successful in their attempt to co-opt radical youth."\textsuperscript{41} Writing on the failure of the CYC, Adelman recalls Gitlin's paradox within participatory democracy. He believes the failure of the CYC was that "in its desire to remain unencumbered by the corrupting effect of power and to retain a pure conscience, it was tied to an individualistic bourgeois ideology... youth matured to outgrow parental power but failed to outgrow parental ideology."\textsuperscript{42} By late 1968 Fape and Ward had moved to the CBC, where Ward worked with Peter Czowski. Jim Littleton, the last original member in the CYC, lasted until August of 1969. He also ended up at the CBC. In looking back on those times, Littleton felt that Ward had the unenviable task of moderating between government and the youth movement. In Littleton's assessment, Ward "retained his integrity and honesty in his role as a liaison between government and the CYC... in my memory he comes out better than most people do during a time when a lot of people gave in to their instincts."\textsuperscript{43}

The Canadian youth movement persisted and arose in new forms, often with the stamp of the federal government on its charter. Rochdale College in Toronto, an experimental educational program, became the centre of drug distribution. By 1970 the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation, the first mortgager, initiated proceedings to take it over.\textsuperscript{44} In 1971 youth was again sanctioned in the "Committee on Youth" report to the Secretary of State. The young were "celebrated for the serious intellectual challenge that they provide to conventional institutions to enable those institutions to undertake basic reforms; the institutions must reform if the young are to accept social roles."\textsuperscript{45} Through the use of tolerance,
patience and money, the federal government helped manage the youth protest movement to a conclusion. Years later, John Gray looked back on those years and wrote: "our prime minister appeared on TV in his shoulder length hair, proclaimed the War Measures Act and suspended civil liberties coast to coast. In Vancouver, amid the kitsilano counterculture, it hardly raised a peep." 46

There was one other factor which helped to soften Canadian anti-establishment sentiments, so violently expressed in the United States. Towards the end of the 1960s, the celebration of Canada's birthday and Expo began a groundswell of nationalist fervor. According to Robert Fulford,

the rise of cultural nationalism has been one of the striking aspects of life in English-speaking Canada during the early 1970s. If this surprises visitors to the country and those who hear of it from a distance, it also surprises many older Canadians. Certainly no one predicted that it would appear so suddenly and in so many fields at once, reaching into everything from legitimate theatre to popular music. 47

In reflecting on the effect of these events on Canadians during this time, Donald Willmott wrote that "the 'citizen participation' movement is fast establishing the legitimacy of the principle that citizens should be allowed to take part in decisions which vitally affect them. More and more people are coming to feel a right and a desire to at least be consulted, if not to participate in policy formulation." 48

During the unrest of the 1960s, North American journalism also changed. As the New Left youth movement rose as an alternative political force in North America, alternative styles of journalism arose as well. When the New Left political movement evolved into a popular movement, its tenets of participatory democracy, a suspicion of institutional structures
and a desire to represent minority groups, became popular within mainstream journalism. These tendencies, in combination with several other developments, resulted in New Journalism, a term that refers to a break with "traditional journalistic form," which provided "the writer with new freedom." \(^{49}\)

During the affluence of the 1960s, there were numerous mergers and takeovers of North American magazines and newspapers. As competition for circulation intensified, there was an opportunity for new styles of writing. Editors were willing to publish these styles, hopeful that they might attract a new readership. \(^{50}\) Fiction writers, such as Truman Capote, concentrated on real events. The 1960s had presented a reality equal to what a writer's imagination might conjure. Capote's *In Cold Blood*, the story of the multiple murder of a Kansas farm family, was called the first "non-fiction novel." \(^{51}\)

In *Fables of Fact* John Hellman maintains that during the 1960s, traditional journalistic practice was deficient to deal with events. The "who, what, where, when, why, style of reporting could not begin to capture the anger of a black power movement or the euphoria of a Woodstock." \(^{52}\) As a result, literary techniques such as the use of dialogue, extended description, interior monologue (reporting a source's thoughts) and the hectoring narrator (the use of invective to create a mood) became techniques of New Journalism. These were intended to provide "information in a vivid, exciting way." \(^{53}\) The impressions and thoughts of the New Journalists were also considered important elements of story telling. This differed from the traditional ideal of objectivity and fused "the journalist's passion for detail and the novelist's personal
vision." In Other Voices, Everett Dennis and William Rivers called writing from a particular point of view "advocacy" journalism. Its hallmark was a journalist who was involved and engaged in events.

Advocacy was integral to another aspect of New Journalism -- the "alternative" or "underground" or "opposition" press which had become popular in the 1960s. Similar to the youth movement, its roots also lead back to the 1950s. For example, one writer who is completely identified with the creation of New Journalism, Tom Wolfe, updated Kerouac's Beat saga On The Road in his book, The Electric Kool-Aid Acid Test. Similarly the newspaper Village Voice had been established in the 1950s, but it wasn't until 1963 that it became profitable. Wilf Kesterton writes that there was a perception that traditional news organizations reflected the aims of the "establishment" and failed "to take account of the new mood of social revolution and activism" of the 1960s and 1970s. The concerns of this neglected audience emerged in the "alternative" press. Eugene Cervi, the owner of Cervi's Rocky Mountain Journal, believed a newspaper should be "controversial, disagreeable, disruptive, unpleasant, unmercifully to concentrated power and suspicious of privately-owned utilities that use the power with which I endow them to beat me over the head politically." In their study of the "alternative" media, John Johnstone et al found that its members had a median age of twenty-three; described themselves as "radicals," "revolutionaries" or "communists;" subscribed to advocacy journalism; and believed that the "proper role of a journalist is to become involved, active, critical and
questioning -- positions which, of course, are entirely consistent with their own background and experience as activists and protesters." 61

Dennis and Rivers found that by the early seventies "advocacy journalists are threaded through the entire fabric of journalism, in the conventional press as well as the unconventional." 62

During the Tet offensive in January 1968, when the American embassy was attacked by the Vietcong, CBS Evening News anchor Walter Cronkite was reading the newswire. "What the hell is going on?" he asked, "I thought we were winning the war." 63 In another incident, Associated Press photographer Nick Ut captured the horror of the war in his award winning photograph of nine-year-old Kim Phuc running down a road, arms outstretched, a victim of napalm. The commander in chief of the U.S forces in Vietnam, General William Westmoreland, said the girl had been burned in "a hibachi accident." 64 American journalist David Eason considers that journalists eventually acknowledged a "relationship between the delegitimizing of authority and the public lying of government officials . . .". 65 Not only was the traditional adversarial relationship between the American media and the government heightened, but other institutions, including media organizations, were regarded by journalists with suspicion. For example New York Times reporter Seymour Hersh, who first wrote of the events at My Lai, found that his editors would "tone down his accounts" about attacks on black civil rights organizers. 66 He would stay to rewrite his editors' work and send it out on the overnight wire. He said that he was not "a radical, but I am against the war. I also think, for example, that multinational corporations are dangerous, and many of them will have to be nationalized in time." 67 The
tenets of the popular protest had been pervasive.

It can be argued that a number of facets of New Journalism were not new at all. For example, there was disaffection with authority on the part of journalists during the era of the Muckrakers. However, as Dennis and Rivers point out, it was not the creation of these forms of journalism that was significant. What was remarkable about New Journalism was that "practices centuries old in some cases and decades old in others should suddenly appear together today, be developed along new lines, force a place for themselves, and threaten a structure of reporting that only recently seemed strong and durable."68

Developments in Canadian journalism mirrored developments in the United States. In Canada, "alternative" publications such as Georgia Strait, Octopus, Logos and The Fourth Estate sprang up.69 An "alternative" magazine, The Last Post, was co-founded by Mark Starowicz, who later produced "As It Happens". A disaffection with authority also developed in Canadian mainstream media. Carleton University's Tony Westell believes that in the mid-1960s there was "a shift in the attitude of the Canadian media of news and commentary, toward the adoption of U.S. adversary theory."70

Daly reveals that, as in the United States, there was affection for the tenets of the youth movement within the Canadian media. For example, SUPA received publicity "all out of proportion to its achievements." This was because "media-left liberals over 30 (such as Peter Czowski of Maclean's) fell in love with it."71 Former SUPA member James Harding wrote in 1968 that "many of us were deceived by the publicity we received for our projects that, in fact, were ill-conceived and weakly organized.
The press helped us create and live off new-left myths."72 Another example involved Globe and Mail reporter Michael Valpy, who was assigned to write a story on the CYC. Taken with the organization, he resigned a few months later to work for the CYC as an information officer. 73

Within the CBC, New Journalism appeared on CBC television's "Close-Up", produced by Ross McLean. Several of those who worked under McLean went on to create one of the CBC's most popular television programs, "This Hour Has Seven Days", introduced on October 4, 1964. The program was described as "part showbiz, part crusader, part ombudsman, part freak show, part through-the-keyhole titillation, part documentary."74 In The Cool, Crazy, Committed World of the Sixties, Pierre Berton describes the eventual fight between the producers and management, which succinctly captured the tone of the 1960s. It was a classic case of the old versus the new. An ex-announcer, an ex-naval man, and an ex-engineer, all reared in the age of radio, were pitted against a group of young intellectuals (a university professor, an M.A., and two Niemann Fellows from Harvard), struggling, not always wisely, to create a form of television journalism to fit the age. 75

It's interesting to note that, similar to CBC radio producer Andrew Simon who attended Boston University, some of these young intellectuals also had American experience. Executive Producer Doug Leiterman considered the ideal "Seven Days" program to be "anti-establishment" and "titillating," one that would "reflect the human condition" and "serve as an ombudsman."76 This New Journalism rocked the foundations of several Canadian institutions, but especially the CBC. The journalistic approach of "Seven Days" saw it embroiled in controversy and led to its cancellation by the CBC's management. Kesterton stresses in A History Of Journalism in Canada that the "Seven Days" struggle was not a classic
libertarian struggle against the state, but an internal CBC struggle, mostly between producers and older managers. However, New Journalism did not come to an end with "Seven Days". In 1967 the CBC's management was unable to contain the controversy following its "Air of Death" broadcast. The program had examined air pollution and its allegations were the subject of a government inquiry.

In both Canada and the United States, what had begun as a political movement of opposition evolved into a popular movement of opposition and this manifested itself in mainstream journalism. The new attitudes that helped create "Close-Up", "Seven Days" and "Air of Death" were part of the larger forces of change affecting journalism. These events accentuated the attention that CBC television received from government, the CBC's management, and the public. However, the pervasive forces of the 1960s were also acting upon CBC radio, causing dramatic change.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER FOUR


15. Ibid., p. 134.


20. Todd Gitlin, op. cit., p. 96.

22 Todd Gitlin, *op. cit.*, p. 137.


27 Margaret Daly, *The Revolution Game* p. 32.


30 Margaret Daly, *op. cit.*, p. 36.


32 Margaret Daly, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

33 Howard Adelman, "Wrong turn: Youth and social change," p. 128.

34 Margaret Daly, *op. cit.*, p. 31.


37 Margaret Daly, *op. cit.*, p. 102.


43 Telephone interview with Jim Littleton, August 22, 1989.


51 Ibid., p. 10.


53 George S. Hage et al., *New Strategies for Public Affairs* p. 45.

54 John Hollowell, *Fact and Fiction* p. 47.

55 Ibid., p. 22.


59 Wilf Kesterton, "Social currents and the printed media" p. 20.

60 Everette E. Dennis and William L. Rivers, *Other Voices* p. 7.


67 Ibid., p. 53.


69 Wilf Kesterton, op. cit., p. 20.


71 Margaret Daly, op. cit., p. 33.


73 Margaret Daly, op. cit., p. 44.


76 Alan Edmonds, "Show that survives by success alone," p. 10.

CHAPTER FIVE
THE RADIO REvolutionARIES

The CBC recognized a changed environment in 1965. That year CBC management submitted a report, authored by Eugene Hallman and entitled "Programming in the Public Interest -- CBC Radio," to the Fowler Committee. The report claimed that there was about to be a revolution for radio and outlined the CBC's role in this revolution. It recommended block programming and topical daily public affairs magazine programs, some of them three hours long.\textsuperscript{1} As well, it called for a separation of the AM and FM services and a withdrawal of local spot advertising.\textsuperscript{2} Further, the CBC identified radio prime time periods as morning, noon, and afternoon, with no mention of the evening.\textsuperscript{3} Many of the ideas that are alleged to have originated in the "CBC English Radio Report" of May, 1970, are evident here. However, bringing them to fruition was another matter.

In 1965 the CBC's new Managing Director of Radio, Jack Craine, wanted to implement these ideas.\textsuperscript{4} However, they had been rejected by the Fowler Committee as being too similar to private radio.\textsuperscript{5} Telephone interviews were also considered a private broadcasting technique and at a CRTC hearing, Craine had to defend their use. He quoted General Booth who had defended the Salvation Army band when it was criticized for playing marches, by asking "why should the devil have all the good tunes?"\textsuperscript{6} Craine's openness to new ways of broadcasting greatly facilitated change within CBC radio.

When Canadian national radio was founded in 1932, most of the newly hired broadcasters had been born around the turn of the century. By the
mid-1960s, they were leaving CBC radio. Craine called his first few years as Managing Director "one long retirement party." The high number of vacancies provided an opportunity for a new generation of programmers. Harry Boyle, the head of Features, and Margaret Lyons, the head of Current Affairs, hired most of the new people, many of them imbued with the ideas of the 1960s. In the midst of the demise of the CYC, for example, people like Doug Ward and Art Pape and, later, Jim Littleton, were drawn to the CBC. Harry Boyle hired Alex Frame, who had been close to Pape and Rick Salter. Margaret Lyons hired Mark Starowicz, who has been described as being from the underground newspaper counterculture. According to Craine, most of the new people were 26 to 29 years old, university educated, with a mission to express new ideas, and they despised television as being too commercial. They felt that an opportunity lay in radio to deal with issues that mattered to society. At times, Craine found it frightening. He would attend meetings "just like a Red Guard gathering. I was the boss and I'd be sat on a stool and they'd tell me what they thought of me for two hours ... but it was exciting too, because these people felt they were unleashing forces." The first development under Craine was more a product of circumstance than design, but it helped to establish new ideas within CBC radio. This development was the 1965 creation of "Cross Country Checkup".

Before "Cross Country Checkup", interviews were rarely conducted by telephone. Though private broadcasters had used the phone-in technique for years, the CBC had shunned the practice. As a result, international news coverage was cumbersome. In 1964, for example, the CBC and UNICEF sent program organizer Charles Winter and freelancer Dan McCarthy on a
two-month tour of south-east Asia to prepare a series of documentaries. Diplomatic couriers, en route from the Far East to United Nations' headquarters in New York, carried tapes intended for broadcast in their diplomatic pouches. Audience participation programs of the early 1960s, such as "Citizen's Forum", also were unwieldy. In the tradition of "Farm Forum", the audience was expected to discuss the program, summarize this discussion, and send their summary to a provincial secretary. The provincial secretaries reported to a national secretary, and each week "Citizen's Forum" took 10 minutes to read the views of its audience. Following the complex "Citizen's Forum" experiment using the open-line technique in 1962, the CBC had made the telephone integral to radio program production. However, a refinement of this technique in television led radio to its next development.

In 1963 "Metroplex", a summer television current affairs program of the CBC in Halifax, involved its audience in a new way. The CBC wrote that "this successful experiment in community television is a program with a 'difference' -- the viewers are brought into the weekly discussions by telephoning questions to the guest panelists, becoming something like the old town hall meetings." This direct contact with the audience was quite different from "Citizen's Forum". A producer in Montreal, Andrew Simon, was aware of "Metroplex" and the popular phone-in shows of private radio which had large audiences. He and his supervisor, Margaret Howes, sent a proposal for a network phone-in program to Craine. However, a network phone-in program at 7:00 p.m. Toronto time was considered to be too early at 4:00 p.m. on the west coast, so the idea was shelved.

Soon after Simon's proposal, CBC radio was faced with the
cancellation of one of its most popular programs, "Saturday Night Hockey", which went to other broadcasters. To retain hockey broadcasts, it was suggested that CBC radio carry the Sunday night games. However, while the Saturday games were played in either Toronto or Montreal, the Sunday games always originated from different time zones, with different starting times. Sunday hockey would wreak havoc on the radio schedule. At this point, the phone-in proposal was remembered. A phone-in could easily change the time it ended, accommodating any time zone. Still unsure of the worth of the idea, CBC management decided that Simon should do one show to gauge audience reaction.\\n
Simon chose a subject of vital interest to Canadians: the medicare issue. Justice Emmett Hall's Commission on a national health care system was being heatedly debated. To stress the Canada-wide nature of the program, Simon used the title "cross country" and added the term "checkup" (like a medical checkup), which had been coined by a CBC television medical series in 1963. Bell Telephone laid special lines, telephone operators were assembled, and the CBC published material to supplement the program. At 3:00 p.m. on May 16, 1965, Canada's first national phone-in went on the air.\\n
It was more popular than anyone thought it would be. It was immediately placed in the fall schedule as a preamble to "Sunday Night Hockey". On October 24, the CBC Public Affairs Department broadcast the first regular "Cross Country Checkup" program under producer Andrew Simon in Montreal.

Several aspects of "Cross Country Checkup" were new to CBC radio and represented the new ideas of the 1960s. In itself, the desire for audience participation was not original. However, traditional production
methods had controlled audience participation by carefully selecting and editing listener comments. "Cross Country Checkup" made it possible for anyone, anywhere in Canada, to say whatever they wanted to say, live. The CBC considered the program's main attraction to be the ability of all Canadians "to air their views on various contentious or topical issues by merely picking up the telephone."

During a recent interview, Simon said that "Cross Country Checkup"'s most important contribution was to gain the acceptance of "average" Canadians being on CBC radio with "no control over what they said."

The role this audience involvement played also broke with tradition. Previously, prominent individuals made a statement and listeners responded. "Cross Country Checkup" reversed this, forcing prominent individuals to respond to questions from listeners. This facet of "Cross Country Checkup" was a continuation of the questioning of authority which Simon had engendered in his 1964 "investigative" program "Let's Consider". Its host, Betty Shapiro, said that her aim was to discover "stories that bother or annoy Montrealers, the more controversial the better."

It was natural, therefore, that controversy would be an element of the new "Cross Country Checkup" and this was enhanced when Shapiro became the host in 1966. Christina McDougall, program organizer of "Cross Country Checkup", said that a theme of the program would be to examine the "infringements of citizen's rights." A producer in Toronto, Moses Znaimer, was assigned to produce "ombudsman" items and Elizabeth Gray, later to become a tough-questioning host for "As It Happens", was the researcher. The novel approach of "Cross Country Checkup" is evident when it is compared to another radio program created the same month by CBC Toronto, the
"Thelma Dickman Show". Dickman focused on such events as a high society haute couture fashion show, the life of a lobster, and the lack of good manners. Years later, CBC Toronto would recognize Simon's efforts by creating its own "investigative" program, "Metro Intercom", modelled after "Let's Consider".

Simon rejects the idea that "Cross Country Checkup" was a product of New Journalism. Despite its marks, such as addressing social injustice, full participation by the audience and a questioning of authority, he says that the "Cross Country Checkup" personnel believed that their "principal duty was to find out the truths" and that this was rooted in what seemed like a national movement in Canada at the time. But an attempt to uncover a perceived truth was, of course, the rationale behind New Journalism techniques. This is why it questioned authority and addressed injustice.

The next development was the creation of block programs with program hosts, and these too furthered the establishment of the ideas of the 1960s within CBC radio. In April of 1967, the Directors of radio and television presented to the CBC Board of Directors a reaffirmation of the 1965 plan and told the Board that the radio schedules were being modified "to offer a more consistent sound for longer periods of the day." A few months after this meeting, Harry Boyle and a producer he had hired, Alex Frame, began creating two block programs: one for the day and one for the evening. As Boyle reflected on daytime programming, he expressed the opinion that he thought women were "horny" in the morning. According to Frame, Boyle thought that an audience of women, alone at home during the day, wanted a "relationship" with the radio. This insight into female
psychology, which had escaped the notice of professional researchers, apparently brought about the creation of "Gerussi!", a local program which mixed entertainment with current affairs. The evening program Frame and Boyle created in 1967 was "Concern". It was described as a "religious-humanistic" series on people and problems, hosted by Peter Meggs and produced by Frame. A series of programs covered men who had committed violent crimes and their rehabilitation. Later, it covered a wider spectrum of topics, attempting to fulfill its title and address the concerns of Canadians. "Concern" regularly received mail from its listeners and some programs resulted from their suggestions.

In the summer of 1968, "Gerussi!" became a network program from 9:00 to 11:00 a.m. The outspoken Bruno Gerussi represented the new freedom of program hosts to express opinion. By July of 1969, the Toronto Telegram assessed "Gerussi!" as an experimental program which "has now become almost a classic of the New Sound, or, as CBC puts it, the Radio Revolution." Under producer Diana Filer, "Gerussi!" became popular with the audience. However, it was not always popular with the CBC's management.

A feature of the "Gerussi!" program was Fred Dobbs, a dirt farmer from Beamsville, Ontario, who was sometimes called the public conscience of Canada. Dobbs, played by Mike McGee of Toronto, had "his own pet projects and different causes. The difference, is that he says more of what people think than most people do." In August of 1970, while Peter Gzowski was hosting the show for a vacationing Gerussi, Dobbs called Canada's Secretary of State a "dumb Frenchman," which was quite in keeping with his character, considering that the CBC had promoted him as being
"apolitical in the sense that he doesn't back any one political party. (translation: everyone can expect to feel the back of Fred's hand)."²⁹

However, this apparently did not apply to the ultimate boss of the CBC. Program Director Alan Brown ordered that McGee not be used on the program again on the grounds that

his use of the words 'dumb Frenchman' as applied to Mr. Pelletier is an unacceptable and gratuitous piece of bad manners, unjustified by any circumstance, and out of keeping even with the assumed character of 'Fred Dobbs' and whatever fool's licence the assumption of that character may have conferred on Mr. McGee . . . It is certainly within his rights to defend Canada's British ties, and indeed this very incident prompts me to wish that our colonial connection had not been severed before we had the opportunity to learn more thoroughly the lesson of British manners. I'm also more than a little surprised that the producer of the program took this piece of effrontery so calmly. It illustrates a fatal unawareness of what bad judgement is, or indifference to the duty to report and correct it. ³⁰

On his show a week later, Gerussi called the CBC's management

"nincompoops that should not be allowed to put on a children's Christmas party."³¹ The General Supervisor of Program Policy, Peter Campbell, immediately wrote to the Assistant General Manager of English Services, Marce Munro.

How long do we have to put up with these insolent, egocentric and thoroughly unprincipled attacks from someone who is making a fat living for himself from the Corporation! I think it is very dangerous for the Corporation, under a misguided sense of liberalism, supinely to permit an employee to make persistent attacks on it with impunity . . . we not only bring ourselves into ridicule but we encourage the same outrageous behaviour in other employees, which I am sure we would come to regret. ³²

The Director of Information Programs, Knowlton Nash, urged that freelance contracts (which Gerussi was on) be revised to "inhibit freelancers on contract from speaking out." Nash went so far as to say that the new clause should state that "while in the employ of the CBC they should not make public statements to the press etc. attacking the CBC."³³ Munro
wrote to Campbell: "Thank you for your violent diatribe against Bruno
Gerussi . . . I must agree with everything you say." Scrawled on
Munro's copy of the memo, now held by the National Archives, is a reminder
that Munro have a "fatherly but firm" talk with the outspoken host.
Gerussi later apologized to his listeners, but his impassioned attack was
an indication of changes underway within CBC radio other than block
programming.  

A further development facilitating the questioning of authority was
the introduction of the phone-out in 1968. Its origins go back to the
mid-60s, when the Current Affairs Department under Margaret Lyons and the
News Department under Charlie Gunning were at each other's throats.
During the modification of the radio schedules, members of the "mostly
young" Current Affairs Department and the "mostly old" News Department had
become territorial about their program periods. In an effort to bring
the departments together and create block programs, Craine suggested that
the News Department be given 6:00 to 6:30 p.m. and the Current Affairs
Department the following hour to elaborate and analyze the news. There
was agreement and on October 31, 1966, a half hour newscast, "The World At
Six", created by Angus McLellan, went on the air. The same day, "news
on the hour every hour" became a CBC radio trademark. However, the
question of what to do with current affairs, remained unanswered.

When producer Val Clery, who had joined the CBC in 1965 after six
years with the BBC, produced several "Cross Country Checkup" programs, he
was astonished at the way Canadians frequently used the telephone.
According to Clery, he felt that the telephone could be used to respond to
events immediately and proposed that a program using the phone-out
technique be done. Clery maintains that in late 1966, at Craine's request, he was asked to produce a pilot phone-out program, hosted by Philip Forsyth, which was designed to be a major morning magazine program. However, when the pilot was evaluated, it was felt that because of the number of commercials, and a limited amount of program time, the morning was not ideal for such a program and the concept was shelved.39

By the spring of 1967, the CBC's management felt that the half-hour "World At Six" newscast had "put CBC in the forefront of radio news programming on this continent."40 This increased the desire to find a news oriented current affairs program. The head of the German section of Radio Canada International, Gerd Pick, knew Craine was looking for program ideas. He would occasionally send clippings on developments in German radio, which included details of phone-out programs. However, Craine had not paid much attention until he hired Alan Brown as Radio Program Director in 1967. Brown was just back from Europe where he had been running the Canadian Forces network in Germany, established by Craine 10 years earlier. It was Brown's wife, Sigrid, who was quite taken with the phone-out technique. Brown related news of a German radio station, Radio Saarland, that had become renowned during the Arab-Israeli war by phoning a German tanker captain in the Gulf of Aqaba who gave an eyewitness account of its shelling. Brown and Craine decided they must do a program like that, and the planning began. This included sending three people to Germany: newsman Larry Duffy, Harry Boyle's assistant Larry Glover, and Val Clery. Upon their return, they recommended a phone-out program should be done. Rather than create one program, Margaret Lyons wanted to experiment with the technique and insisted on the creation of two teams to
create different versions.41

It must be noted that phoning out from Canadian radio stations did occur before this. In the mid-60s, Canadian private radio phone-in programs, called hot-lines, were extremely popular. On some of these programs the "announcers telephoned well-known or little known persons to ask them questions."42 One of the "hottest of the hot line" hosts was Pat Burns. His program literally closed down CJOR in Vancouver, which was refused a licence by the Board of Broadcast Governors. Burns moved to CKGM in Montreal in the summer of 1965. During his first Montreal program, he telephoned Paul-Emile Cardinal Leger and aggressively questioned him on separatism. The interview brought complaints of inflaming the community. There is some question as to whether the Archbishop of Montreal knew he was on the radio. In November the board of Broadcast Governors brought in regulations requiring consent of participants before they could appear on an open-line program.43 Though the CBC did not create the first radio program to phone-out in Canada, it was the first to introduce it as a mainstay.

The Monday night program "As It Happens" (named by Clery's wife, Susan), produced by Val Clery and hosted by Philip Forsyth, made its debut at 8:00 p.m. November 18, 1968, speaking with guests throughout the world by telephone. "As It Happens" stressed immediacy, as in the case of a series of interviews with British runner Bruce Tulloh, who was attempting a record from Los Angeles to New York. The program "roller coastered" across Canada. This new term described how each time zone in Canada would receive two hours of the program live. It would "roll" through six time zones, beginning its first two hours at 7:00 p.m. EST in the Maritimes and
ending at 1:00 a.m. EST on the west coast. Its debut received interest, rather than acclaim, but controversy was an integral element. At the time, Clery said that the program was based on "scrutiny and argument and confrontation." In the fall of 1969, when artist William Ronald became the host of "As It Happens", the CBC wrote that "it's no secret that he's controversial. Bland he isn't and that's what the producers wanted."

On April 11, 1969, the second weekly phone-out roller coaster, "Radio Free Friday", hosted by "controversial journalist" Peter Gzowski and Louise Delisle and produced by Doug Ward, began on Friday nights. This program was heralded by the CBC as the "latest contribution to the 'radio revolution'." CBC Vice President Hallman confirmed the controversial nature of the program when he wrote that "from time to time I catch snatches of Radio Free Friday and I am somewhat concerned at the tone and style of the interviewing... the handling of [3.C. minister] Cagliardi by our people was cavalier and apparently calculated to make him look something less than competent. This is simply not acceptable." However, controversy was popular. William Ronald had been lauded for his forthright opinions and Gerussi certainly held some of his own. The Publicity Department had described Gzowski as controversial and the radio revolution as "radio with brains and guts." In addition, an "investigative" program, "Metro Intercom", had been established in Toronto in 1968. Conflict was in the streets and on the campuses of North America. It was desired by CBC producers, exploited by CBC hosts, and promoted by the CBC Publicity Department. It was a new direction, a celebration, a "revolution." In a 1969 description of the radio revolution, CBC Times quoted U.S. sociologist Saul Alinsky, who said that
"change means movement; movement means friction; friction means heat; and heat means controversy." 49

It was clear to Craine that both "As It Happens" and "Radio Free Friday" were bubbling over with ideas, but neither was very good. 50 By late 1969, Craine wanted to make changes and expand "As It Happens" into a weeknightly program. 51 However, this was delayed because it would displace a number of programs and the people who worked on them. 52 In addition, the political ramifications of the "CBC English Radio Report" had to be considered, especially the challenge by the CRTC to CBC radio's autonomy in making program changes. On April 14, 1971, a meeting to discuss the Radio Project was held and CBC Executive Vice President Laurent Picard insisted that program changes were the jurisdiction of CBC. As a result, serious planning of the fall 1971 network schedule began. On October 4, 1971, "As It Happens" was finally made weeknightly, to use the "roller coaster phone-out formula which has proved so successful in the former Monday series." 53

In 1970 Margaret Lyons had hired Colin MacLeod to take over as the new producer of "As It Happens". The roller coaster method was dropped, and the program was broadcast live to the east, and recorded for playback to each time zone. MacLeod and Lyons hired Barbara Frum to alternate the hosting job with Ronald. Frum recalls that when she joined "As It Happens", the program was designed "to break all the old, safe CBC rules. The orders were: provide an iconoclastic, zippy, nightly information package. Speak to everybody, not just to the few who genuflect to the sound of a mid-Atlantic accent." 54

In 1972 MacLeod became the head of current affairs and another
producer hired by Lyons, Mark Starowicz, brought his journalism to the program. At the time, MacLeod was in his late twenties, Starowicz was in his mid-twenties, and none of the editors or producers of "As It Happens" was over thirty. The job of the producers was "prowling the world by telephone" and they were described as "a pack of zesty young newshounds who are high on their own energy and enthusiasm and fear nothing except dullness." To work on the program, they had to be "aggressive, competitive, enthusiastic." Starowicz made the program "adventurous, irreverent, timely, saucy, whimsical -- a tabloid of the airwaves -- but it is also serious and informative enough to win the respect of critics all too eager to go for the jugular of the CBC and all its progeny." Like the writing techniques of New Journalism, the phone-out radio technique provided information in a vivid, exciting way. The documentary "Dying of Lead" by Max Allen brought about "the largest libel claim in the history of Commonwealth law." When "As It Happens" proved that audio tape could be doctored to prevent detection of edits, Sam Ervin of the Watergate hearings requested a copy. It was a fast, dynamic program which challenged authority; a sublime creation from the New Journalism ideals of the 1960s. This philosophy was continued by producer Bob Campbell when Starowicz left to create CBC radio's acclaimed "Sunday Morning". Both individuals have been assessed as not only hard-working and driven, but graduates "of the underground newspaper counterculture of the sixties." In 1978 an article on "As It Happens" appeared under the title "Conzo Radio," referring to New Journalist Hunter S. Thompson's term, "gonzo," meaning "gone" or being completely immersed, in a story. Several aspects of "As It Happens" represented the New Journalism.
The live and immediate nature of the program brought with it an excitement and urgency. As well, the program was marked by the adversarial questioning of authority, first introduced by Clery and continued under MacLeod when the mandate was to comfort the afflicted and inflict the comfortable. "As It Happens" was described as "participatory journalism. The telephone has its own peculiar authority and with an area code you can be your own foreign correspondent, ranging the world from Istanbul to Belfast." By speaking directly to those involved in events world-wide, the young "As It Happens" producers were engaged in their stories, presenting up-to-the-minute information. The questions of the "As It Happens" producers, which conveyed their own thoughts and impressions, replaced the participatory listener questions of "Cross Country Checkup". Margaret Lyons later wrote that the renown of programs like "As It Happens" was in part due to the ability of the programmers to articulate "the deeply felt yearnings of their audience, which led and moulded Canadian thinking, at the same time as bringing flashes of instant recognition of their insights." The other phone-out program of the 1960s, "Radio Free Friday", also contributed to change within CBC radio. Robert Sunter writes that "the Peter Gzowski of 'Morningside' is not the private Peter Gzowski. His public performance is a talent born of the writer, which has been developed and honed by the radio craft to a level of professional expertise. What began on 'Radio Free Friday' has found fruition on 'Morningside'." This evolution, from "Radio Free Friday" to "Morningside", involved an interim step. The same day that "As It Happens" became weeknightly, a new weekday three-hour block program, "This
Country in the Morning", was launched. Its origins can be traced to "Concern" and "Gerussi!".

Peter Meggs wanted Alex Frame, his producer when he hosted "Concern", to get together with Margaret Lyons because he knew "interesting things would happen." Since "Concern", Frame had moved to CJOH in Ottawa. It had been earmarked to expand into television and radio cable networks, attracting "This Hour Has Seven Days" hosts Patrick Watson and Laurier Lapierre among others. The CRTC did not approve the entire plan and CJOH laid off a number of employees, including Frame. In the spring of 1971 Meggs met him in Ottawa and asked him to come to work on the Radio Project. Three weeks later, Frame was hired as a consultant and became involved in designing the 9:00 a.m. to noon period, which had the working title "This Country In The Morning". While management examined the results, Frame produced "Gerussi!" with summer replacement host Peter Gzowski. According to Frame, it was while on "Gerussi!" that Gzowski first discovered that his radio work was "causing thoughtful and fascinating feedback from the listeners." Shortly afterwards, Frame was asked to become the executive producer of the 9:00 a.m. to noon period, Gzowski was named host, and "This Country In The Morning" became renowned. This was in part because the program staff continued "Concern"'s philosophy of being in contact with its listeners. Frame believes that it "related the content to people's lives more than had happened before." It also rode on the wave of nationalism that had developed in the late 1960s. A thousand letters a month poured in saying "I don't feel as isolated as before," and favorable media declared the program was bringing the country together. At the time, Frame said that "if you wanted to do
that, a rope would be better than a radio program."

The renown of "This Country In The Morning" was well rooted in its immediate predecessors, "Gerussi!" and "Matinee". Helen Hutchinson, the previous host of "Matinee", shared the host duties with Gowski, and Bruno Gerussi was also featured on the program. Danny Finkleman was a wandering reporter and "Captain Canada and his pal Groon will put in an appearance from time to time, as well as other characters from the Gerussi! show," which had been created by Gary Dunford during producer Diana Filer's tenure. Within the CBC, "This Country In The Morning" was called "The Family," referring to the "Charles Manson Family" because of the closeness of the program staff. Frame considered the programmers, including himself, "a group of freaks making radio." There were changes to the local programs of CBC radio which also had roots in the 1960s. In 1970 Doug Ward was given the task of introducing the "Winnipeg Experiment" to other stations, as suggested in the "CBC English Radio Report." Winnipeg's morning program, "Information Radio", was first broadcast on September 15, 1969, the result of a long process of development. The producers in Winnipeg were enthused by new programs such as "Gerussi!" and "As It Happens" and wanted to create their own program. However, to avoid the involvement of Toronto, they realized it would have to be done in a local time period. They constantly sought new ideas, getting tapes of radio programs from the United States, England and Germany. Their answer came after Winnipeg producer Dave Cruikshank returned from a "Sunday Night Sports" assignment in Los Angeles, where he had heard a radio format that the Americans called "all-news." This had first appeared in 1949 on WAVZ in New Haven, Connecticut, when two
newspapermen created a "newspaper on the air."\textsuperscript{74} San Francisco followed in 1960 with the seven-month KFAX attempt, which folded for lack of advertisers. Gordon McLendon's successful XETRA, an "all-news" station based in Tijuana, Mexico, broadcasting to Southern California, debuted on May 6, 1961.\textsuperscript{75} In 1964 McLendon took the all-news format to Chicago and shortly afterwards other commercial operations, such as Group W, brought all-news to New York City. It was McLendon's Tijuana station which Cruikshank had heard.

Walter Unger, then a sports announcer/producer, remembers that Cruikshank brought back a tape of XETRA and they found the continuing stories in the morning of a fire and a police chase impossible to turn off. The format was compelling because it was being programmed in the morning, was concerned with the community, and was the latest in radio development. Unger and Cruikshank worked on the concept which, because of other elements in the program they wanted, was soon called information, hence, "Information Radio". The excitement of Cruikshank and Unger was shared by the Supervisor of News Herb Nixon, the Supervisor of Current Affairs, Lorne Watson, Brandon freelancer Bill Morgan, who became a producer in the fall, and technician Dave Hodgkinson. Eventually the entire station was working on the project. Unger, the first producer of "Information Radio", says they "were all mavericks willing to experiment, whereas the people they succeeded had been absolutely opposed to it."\textsuperscript{76} The CBC Prairie Regional Director, James R. Finlay, vehemently objected to the idea. Despite this, the programmers continued to work on the concept. Circumstances changed when Keith Morrow replaced Finlay and supported them.
The group began dry runs over the summer of 1969, going so far as to pipe the experimental program into homes to test audience reaction. The content was changed from what the group considered American sensationalism to social issues. The phone-out and radio-mobile techniques were used, including reports on the progress of forest fires from an aircraft. The programmers also used "stings," or short pieces of music only seconds long between current affairs items, which has become a technique of every CBC radio current affairs program. This was an important new development; even "As It Happens" was playing entire songs from records between its interviews.

When "Information Radio" was first broadcast in September, it received a reaction similar to that received when "As It Happens" and "Cross Country Checkup" were first broadcast. At each program's debut, no one believed the programmers could maintain the pace and find enough material to keep the programs going. But the tenacity of the Winnipeg programmers and their pursuit of a new program concept over the objections of Finlay proved to be beneficial. "Information Radio" moved up in the ratings and the program became the second most popular program in Winnipeg. In an article by the CBC, it was announced that "in a one year period, spot commercials have gone up by about one hundred per cent until now Information Radio's time period is sold out. For really the first time advertisers can find it both feasible and economical to advertise on radio . . . CBC Radio."77 An added attraction was that the changes at CBC Winnipeg did not require additional money, but redirected existing funds. A higher listenership in the morning and increased advertising revenue, without higher costs, was exactly what was wanted by senior management.
In following the directions of the CBC Board of Directors as well as their own beliefs, Ward and Meggs could not ignore the "Winnipeg Experiment"'s success. They declared in their report that it should occur across the system.

The same day that the new "As It Happens" and "This Country In The Morning" went on the air in 1971, the local morning programs in major cities were changed to "information radio." However, they were quite different from the "Winnipeg Experiment." As Sid Adilman described in the Toronto Telegram, the change left an impression that the days of the short program had returned: "injected into the local shows are a minimum of 12, 3 minute commentaries -- on consumer affairs and unions, sports, humour, entertainment, finance, business, the stock market, science, the arts, ecology and national politics." These commentaries were produced by the network. This explains the adverse reaction by Elizabeth Zimmer to the programming of CBC Halifax at the 1972 CRTG hearing. She had heard "information radio," but it was not "Information Radio" of CBC Winnipeg. Morning audiences had a negative reaction and the morning information shows were evaluated by the Radio Project group. The results showed that some shows were good, while others were not. The inconsistencies were found to be based on poor production rather than a weak concept. In Ottawa, where members of Parliament routinely listened to CBC radio, weak production was particularly embarrassing and was later thought to have fueled opposition to "information radio." Despite the difficulties, and in light of CBC Winnipeg being so successful, the programmers persisted. Eventually morning radio based on information became a standard format for local CBC stations.
There were thus several developments in CBC radio programming and the creation of several important radio programs and formats before the writing of the "CBC English Radio Report." In particular were the information oriented block programs such as "Gerussi!", "Radio Noon", the "World at Eight" and the "World At Six". The participatory phone-in program "Cross Country Checkup" and the phone-out programs "As It Happens" and "Radio Free Friday" had been created. "Investigative" programs, such as "Let's Consider" and "Metro Intercom" had been developed and the program "Information Radio", which excluded music, had also been created. Many were celebrated for their controversial approach and freedom to comment. In other words, the desire, willingness and wherewithal to produce innovative information programming, which marks the radio revolution, was already evident and well underway in the 1960s.

The 1971 radio schedule is almost identical to the 1974 schedule of chapter three, (p.72) and the present CBC radio schedule has virtually no difference. There was only one more important creation that came from those involved in the radio revolution, and that was Starowicz's three-hour "Sunday Morning". That happened on November 7, 1976, when "Sunday Morning" replaced "Sunday Morning Magazine". It was a wise selection of a time period for a new information program. In 1970 the CBC Research Department had found that "there is a tendency for people who are light listeners to CBC radio to spend disproportionately more time listening to the Sunday morning 8:00-11:00 a.m. block of information programming than to the rest of the CBC radio schedule. "Sunday Morning" would set a course to world renown. It would base its production on the program's producers travelling the globe bringing stories to life
through their eyes and the use of sound in their documentaries. No longer would stories simply be sought and culled from other people over the telephone. Questions of producers would no longer be answered by others. The telephone was traded for an airline ticket. The "me" generation had come to CBC radio journalism.

"Sunday Morning" was the final phase of a radio revolution which began in 1964, had its major creations by 1969, and had perfected its concepts by 1976. The revolution depended on programmers taking the ideas of management to places the managers never imagined. The radio revolutionaries honed and polished their visions with such brilliance, the impact of their efforts still shines today. When "Sunday Morning" went on the air, a keystone was slipped into place. A circle had been closed and the radio revolution was over.

Assessments by those who took part in the radio revolution point to several factors contributing to change during those years. Ward does not believe that the new morning shows were a revolution. He believes "they were just acknowledging attitudinal change in the communities, the ideas that good CBC people had for programming." Picard says that the radio revolution was a shift in power. He believes that the revolutionaries were already within radio and people like Margaret Lyons were only given full opportunity to create their visions. MacLeod also credits Lyons for being a driving force, for "she's the one who fought the battles, got us resources and encouraged us to take risks. Radio was not considered as important as television, therefore the risks were not as great." Lyons believes Boyle, Frame, Gzowski and Starowicz deserve "as much credit as our leading writers, film makers and musicians for showing us who we are
and what we could be" in the programs they created.\textsuperscript{85} She also credits Craine "for the creative leadership at the time."\textsuperscript{86} Craine reinforces the view that change occurred because attention was diverted from radio to television and he is sure that CBC senior management did not know what was going on, for, if they ever had, they would have stepped in. "We got away with things" Craine said, "rather than planning them."\textsuperscript{87} To an extent, Hallman agrees. He believes that management "generated a climate where creative activity flourished. Sometimes this is best done when you can hide in a corner and create."\textsuperscript{88}
NOTES FOR CHAPTER FIVE


2 Ibid., p. 23.


4 Interview with Jack Craine.


7 Interview with Jack Craine.

8 Interview with Jim Littleton.


10 Interview with Jack Craine.

11 Ibid.

12 Although the CBC claimed to broadcast the 1964 Tokyo Olympic games via the Syncom III satellite, the videotaped broadcasts were flown from the Naval Missile Centre at Point Mugu, California to Toronto by aircraft; see "Olympics covered via satellite," CBC Times (August 8-14, 1964), p. xvi.


14 Interview with Andrew Simon.

15 "Metroplex returns for summer season," CBC Times (July 4-10, 1964), p. 81.

16 Interview with Jack Craine.


19 Interview with Andrew Simon.

20 "Let's Consider Betty Shapiro," p. 81.

22. Interview with Andrew Simon.


24. Interview with Andrew Simon.


29. Ibid.

30. Alan Brown, "Dobbs is fired" (August 13, 1970); NAC, RG 41, vol. 799, file 7-3-1.

31. Transcript, "Gerussi! apologizes" (August 21, 1970); NAC, RG 41, vol. 799, file 7-3-1.

32. Peter Campbell, "Insolent programmers".

33. Knowlton Nash, "Freelancers should not have freedom of speech" (September 4, 1970); NAC, RG 41, vol. 799, file 7-3-1.

34. Marce Munro, "I agree on Gerussi" (August 19, 1970); NAC, RG 41, vol. 799, file 7-3-1.

35. Transcript, "Gerussi! apologizes".

36. Personal interview with Margaret Lyons, November 3, 1989; interview with Jack Craine.


38. Cover, CBC Times (October 29-November 4, 1966).


41. Telephone interview with Alan Brown, February 14, 1990; interview with Jack Craine; interview with Margaret Lyons.

43 Ibid.


45 "As It Happens," p. 4.

46 CBC Information Services, "Press release no. 220, ".

47 CBC Information Services, "Press release no. 68, ".

48 Eugene S. Hallman, "Radio Free Friday is disrespectful" (July 13, 1970); NAC, RC 41, vol. 799, file 7-3-1.


50 Interview with Jack Craine.

51 Sid Adilman, "Roller coaster of the airwaves," p. 3.

52 Interview with Margaret Lyons.


54 Barbara Frum, As It Happened p. 10.


57 Blaik Kirby, "Barbara bites and Harry smiles," p. 31.


59 Ibid., p. 11.

60 Barbara Frum, op. cit., p. 47.

61 Ibid., p.48.

62 Martin O'Malley, op. cit., p. 29.

63 Ibid., p. 13.

64 Ibid.

65 Letter from Margaret Lyons to the author, November 5, 1989.
67. Interview with Peter Megges.
68. Interview with Alex Frame.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
73. Interview with Alex Frame.
76. Interview with Walter Unger.
78. The specific cities which had introduced information morning programs by the fall of 1971 were: Fredericton, Halifax, Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto, Vancouver, Windsor and Winnipeg; "New Sounds," *Time* (October 18, 1971), p. 13.
79. Sid Adilman, "CBC radio has an evolution," p. 47.
80. CBC Radio Network Promotion, "CBC radio announces new AM fall schedule," (April 30, 1976); the creation of "Sunday Morning" was announced in April, 1976, but it did not appear until the fall.
82. Interview with Doug Ward.
83. Interview with Laurent Picard.
84. Interview with Colin MacLeod.
85. Letter from Margaret Lyons.
86. Ibid.
87. Interview with Jack Craine.
Interview with Eugene S. Hallman.
CONCLUSION

There were two distinct and separate processes of change that CBC AM radio underwent in the 1960s and 70s. One was a management-driven evolution of the basic structure of CBC radio which ushered in such things as block programs, the magazine format, and a separation of the AM and FM services. The other was a series of revolutionary producer-driven changes involving programming philosophies and practices within CBC radio. The origins of both processes pre-date the "CBC English Radio Report."

Over time, these processes became so intertwined that they came to be regarded as the same, for both made significant contributions to the development of CBC radio. In 1965 Eugene Hallman drafted an evolutionary blueprint for CBC radio which was followed for many years. Jack Craine shared this vision and implemented many of its recommendations. But it was only through the revolutionary work of innovative CBC producers that the framework of Hallman and Craine was filled with substantive programming, and in many cases this produced unforeseen results.

The radio revolution was not, then, "fomented by the 1970 Radio Report." Rather, the report was the culmination of the management-driven structural evolution of CBC radio. It compiled previous management recommendations and programming directions and presented them in somewhat altered form to the government and a new senior CBC management. Much of what appeared in the report, such as the recognition of prime time and block programming, was later presented as if it had originated with the Radio Project. But for the most part, this was simply not the case.

The 1957 Fowler Commission found that "as television broadcasting
spread across Canada, evening listening to radio gradually began to diminish."^2 As well, it reported that "evening network commercial business has been most affected. Daytime network business has fared better while local business has stood up well."^3 Thirteen years before the "CBC English Radio Report," it had been recognized that daytime had replaced evening as prime time and that local periods were the most popular. The 1965 Fowler Committee carried this recognition of the new radio environment a step further when it recommended that the CBC "strengthen materially its local and regional radio program service"^4 and that CBC radio needed "fresh wind blowing through its programming."^5 To this Committee, CBC management recommended the magazine format, block programming, a splitting of the AM and FM networks, and a withdrawal of commercials.

Essentially what the "CBC English Radio Report" did was build upon this foundation. Read in isolation from earlier reports, it would strike one as revolutionary. But as Doug Ward has acknowledged in an interview, "this was no revolution. This was just a decent next logical step for CBC radio. There was no revolution in that. It was radical in the sense of going back to the roots; non-commercial, doing more of the basic things."^6

Until 1968, the management-driven process of change to CBC radio still had considerable momentum. But it came to a halt when difficulties in funding forced the CBC Board of Directors to reconsider CBC radio's direction. This was complicated by the attitudes within the CRTC, a new organization which asserted its power while attempting to fit into the Canadian broadcasting environment. The subsequent "CBC English Radio Report" and its implementation poured vinegar into the souring
relationships between the CBC, the CRTC, and the CBC's audience. The Davey Committee of 1970 also disrupted the evolution of CBC radio by rejecting local programming and any "tampering" with network radio. These delayed, but did not prevent the "next logical steps." Developments such as block programs, separate AM and FM networks, and the cancellation of commercials eventually occurred. Over the years, these were attributed as creations of the radio report.

There are several reasons why the "CBC English Radio Report" has been credited with so valuable a contribution. The most important is the order of secrecy placed upon it by the CBC's management. Few knew what the report contained, yet all knew it called for change. There was, therefore, a tendency to attribute any change to the "CBC English Radio Report." In addition, the order of secrecy was motivated by senior management's fear of the consequences should it be released. This embargo was seen as another of the battles occurring in the streets of North America between those who wanted to change society and those in power who were opposed. Had the report been released and presented to CBC personnel as a plan written by management, its mystique would have been destroyed. Change would likely have been measured against the report rather than attributed to it.

The significant changes which did occur to CBC radio programming during this period have also heightened the report's importance. As programs like "As It Happens" gained journalistic renown, their origins were gradually mythologized. The secret "CBC English Radio Report" was carried to fame on the coat-tails of radio programs which had garnered a reputation for excellence based on New Journalism techniques.
There is one other reason why the radio revolution has been attributed to the "CBC English Radio Report." The radio revolution depended on the "threat" of Betty Shapiro, the "group of mavericks" in Winnipeg, and the "Red Guards" who grilled Jack Craine. The revolution outside of the CBC had instilled these programmers with passion, tenacity and the courage of their beliefs. But these challenges to the status quo are neglected by those who have assessed the radio revolution. Instead, attention has focused on things such as block programming, magazine formats and the recognition of prime time, which were all creations of management. There has been a natural reluctance to give credit for the radio revolution to a group of producers who regularly sat the Managing Director of Radio on a chair and interrogated him for hours. If it was acknowledged that the radio revolution was the product of maverick producers spawned by the dynamic societal change of the 1960s, it would seem to have been the result either of luck, or, what was worse, as a case of the tail wagging the dog. It would certainly not be seen as an official CBC plan to manage change to radio. It was thus prudent to recognize management's planned evolution of program changes and the report which catalogued it.

The efforts of the young CBC producers which constitute the radio revolution are considerable. This is best illustrated following the introduction of information morning programs in 1971. Though the idea originated in Winnipeg, those producers did not discuss their program with the Radio Project and did not implement the concept at several CBC locations. Rather, the idea was shared at the management level. When the new shows were evaluated, some were found to be good, while others
were not. The variance in program quality illustrates how the performance and impact of CBC radio programs is directly attributable to producer practices rather than management directives. This was again demonstrated in 1974, when the Ottawa morning program was the first to delete commercials and add more information programming in their place. The CBC Research Department found no audience increase, no change in audience composition, and less audience enjoyment of the program.\(^8\) It was not, therefore, the creation of things such as information programming or magazine formats that brought renown to CBC radio, but rather what was done with these creations. Jack Sturman recognized this in February of 1970 when he wrote that radio programming "spiked with confrontation, concern and exploration of the things people are interested in . . . that's where the real radio revolution is going on."\(^9\) The circumstances and forces which surrounded and gave rise to the radio revolution dramatically illustrate Bruce McKay's finding that "the shape, conditions and problems of a national broadcasting system are a strikingly accurate reflection of the shape, conditions, and problems of the nation it was created to serve."\(^10\)

There are indications that the radio revolution did not bring dramatic change in the audience of CBC radio. Certain CBC reports have claimed that it helped "win back listeners,"\(^11\) was "increasing audiences spectacularly,"\(^12\) and that audiences "soared."\(^13\) But elsewhere the CBC has admitted that its audience fell "7 per cent since the Meggs/Ward Report," that there was "a decrease in the total number of CBC listeners"\(^14\) and that "between 1970 and 1984, CBC radio's audience share fell from 15.4 per cent to 9.9 per cent."\(^15\) This was also recognized by
Doug Ward who said that "the audience increase that we have had is nowhere near the size that people think that it might be." It has even been acknowledged that "the audience profile of CBC Mono stations has not changed appreciably since the Meggs/Ward Report of 1970." 

There are several reasons for these contradictory statements, apart from the fact that "the CBC" is not a monolithic entity. During each audience ratings period, both the percentage of the audience listening to CBC radio and the actual number of people who make up that audience, vary from previous measurements. As well, the number of people listening to any radio at all can fluctuate. It is possible to attain a higher percentage of the listening audience with actually fewer people listening. The reverse, (a lower percentage of the audience with actually more people listening) is also possible. In addition, the methods used to determine audience size by the Bureau of Broadcast Measurement changed in 1975 and again in 1981, making comparisons difficult. The claim that the audience to CBC radio declined is based on the fact that CBC radio was ending its relationship with affiliated stations, and therefore a fewer number of Canadians heard CBC radio. On the other hand, those who believe that CBC radio audiences increased argue that despite the loss of CBC affiliates, CBC radio maintained its percentage of the radio audience with fewer stations and, therefore, obtained a relative increase. While conclusions about audience are difficult, it is clear that a "spectacular" increase in the audience to the CBC AM radio service did not occur during these years.

It can be argued that even if the radio revolution did not produce a substantial increase in the audience for CBC radio, it has nonetheless
made two fundamental contributions. First, it brought world renown to CBC radio, based on new and innovative journalistic techniques. Secondly, this new approach and its attendant regard rejuvenated the relationship between CBC radio and its audience. In February of 1990, former CBC broadcaster Bronwyn Drainie argued in a Globe and Mail column that CBC radio needed a second radio revolution. She is not the first to do so. However, it is evident that a desire for change alone is not enough to bring such a revolution about. As this thesis illustrates, an impetus from at least two directions caused dramatic change within the CBC's radio service. Those who wish for a second revolution, might look for its signs when the CBC's senior management either desires or is forced to embrace change and is faced with programmers imbued with the passion, tenacity and courage to seize upon the opportunity to mould this change and give it form.
NOTES FOR CONCLUSION

3 Ibid., p. 204.
5 Ibid., p. 267.
6 Interview with Doug Ward.
7 Interview with Walter Unger.
8 CBC Research, "The impact on the early morning audience", p. 4.
9 Jack Sturman, "Radio," p. 44.
10 Bruce McKay, "The CBC and the Public", p. 263.
14 Ibid., p. 32.
15 Mardi Matthews and Paul Tisdall, "Regionalism and public broadcasting," p. 60.
16 Interview with Doug Ward.
17 Robert Sunter, op. cit., p. 32.
18 See appendix C.
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APPENDIX A

Recommendations of the "CBC English Radio Report, May 1970":

1. PROGRAMMING (pp. 62-70)

1. The Director of Radio would appoint officers to identify network direction and development. An implementation officer would be appointed to carry out recommendations of the report, and a Director of Radio would be appointed in Toronto, responsible for CBL, CBL-FM and its LRPTs.

2. The Director of Radio would form a Radio Planning Directorate consisting of Directors of Radio from each region to meet quarterly to plan radio development. The first meeting should include on its agenda:
   a) national, local and regional program mix and the methods of feeding material.
   b) the establishment of national program objectives.
   c) methods to develop national and local audience targets.
   d) grouping CBC program departments under three headings: Music; Drama/ Literary; Information.
   e) a critical path for the development of time-block production teams.

3. The Director of Radio would appoint a senior radio officer to co-ordinate relations with arts groups in the country.

4. Development of transcriptions, archives and learning systems would occur by appointing a task force to study the problems for 6 months and reporting to the Director of Radio.

5. A producer would be seconded to study the record libraries and begin implementation of the critical needs in this area and frame recommendations for the Director of Radio on Canadian content quotas.

6. Archives would be assisted to develop as a vital program and educational resource.

7. The Music Co-ordinating Committee would be given the responsibility of developing long range CBC radio music policies.

8. A freelance musician would be retained to act as a CBC Radio Talent Scout to assure that talent in the regions and local areas was developed and promoted.

9. As many programs as appropriate would be performed before audiences with appropriate publicity and display materials.

10. CBC radio would immediately prepare to use orchestral talent in different ways and orchestra managers would be advised of discussions to use musicians differently.

11. Provincial departments of education would be told of the intention to terminate all provincial and national schools broadcasts.

12. Audience Research would develop short inexpensive surveys to enable CBC to receive quick feedback on its program efforts.

13. CBC would declare itself committed to steier broadcasting.

14. Hourly newscasts would be extended throughout the weekend.

15. Tape recording standards and tighter control of tape would be established which, along with an efficient Archives, would clear out
the vast quantities hoarded in producers' offices.

16. Evening dramas would be reduced on Radio One and longer dramas put on Radio Two.

17. Units producing consumer broadcasting would be integrated into one unit to research and develop that service for Radio One.

18. A daily evening program would be developed for youth, and all programs would incorporate young people in planning.

19. Short programs of interest to particular groups would be developed with maximum involvement by those groups and maximum promotion within those groups.

20. Local prime times for community broadcasting, especially early-morning and late afternoon would be developed. Three centres would be chosen by the Radio Planning Directorate to launch pilot projects. The projects would:
   a) establish program objectives and make them known to all staff.
   b) establish audience targets and work towards them.
   c) determine the amounts and type of publicity required and develop means of testing its success.
   d) develop inexpensive research methods for measuring audience reaction.
   e) develop a strategy for probing the real life of the community.
   f) assess signal strength and competitiveness of signal during prime periods.
   g) keep a running account of the experiments and report to the Director of Radio at the end of the test.
   h) assess projects in the Radio Planning Directorate and share results with other regions and areas.

21. New delivery systems for specific information would be developed, for example, providing a publicized telephone number listeners could call to receive specialized information from a taped message machine.

II. TECHNICAL (pp. 80-4)

1. The Radio Planning Directorate establish a task force on technical development for radio in the seventies.


3. Existing line contracts be reviewed for future needs.

4. The traffic load of the lines which connect CBC stations to feed material (ISSF) be studied.

5. The Directorate prepare an outline of benefits and costs of broadband transmission.

6. The Directorate ask program clearance to recommend how computers could be introduced into the ISSF system.

7. The CBC proceed with extension of the FM network, to attain 66 percent coverage by 1975 (80 percent coverage including affiliates). This network would be delivered 70 percent on tape. Approval be given to construct a tape mixing and dubbing centre in Toronto.

8. That FM be considered when existing LPRTs were replaced.

9. That experiments be launched in Northern Ontario and British Columbia which would split LPRT networks into sub-networks for local
programming two hours a day, and inexpensive production centres be established for this purpose.

10. The Cape Dorset pilot project, which was a report recommending the establishment of a community FM radio station in Cape Dorset, which was beyond the broadcast reach of the CBC northern service be approved.

11. EHQ (Engineering Headquarters) decentralize its ordering and billing practices for equipment to eradicate unnecessary delays.

12. A study be undertaken to identify areas where automation could be introduced.

13. Each production centre be studied to determine its studio capabilities to ensure intelligent planning of studio updating.

14. Signal compression on Radio One at all times would become policy.

15. ISSF times be allocated to allow limited syndication for the AM service.

16. Music feeds which were sent by tape for FM and by ISSF for AM would be sent solely on tape, freeing up ISSF time.

17. The establishment of policies regarding:
   a) equipment purchase, with future program objectives as a criterion.
   b) pre-taped disc programs be produced as live, without retakes.
   c) acceptable editing and packaging times permissible for various types of programs.
   d) recording standards covering all transcriptions, commercial recordings, stereo etc.

18. An annual review of all studio facilities, plant operations, coverage and signal quality, automation possibilities and equipment.

iii. AFFILIATES (pp. 89-92)

1. Between sign-on and 7:00 p.m. Radio One was concerned with information. An affiliate would fulfill its contract if it carried major newscasts and two "Assignment-like" items per hour during this time. It would have to provide an outlet for Radio Two service either in the evening on AM, or as an FM affiliate. Reasonable delays would be allowed.

2. Radio Two obligations be fulfilled three ways:
   a) If an FM service was also owned, that FM service could become an affiliate of Radio Two.
   b) If another station in the same market wished to become an affiliate of Radio Two, then the Radio One affiliate could withdraw the Radio Two program material from its schedule.
   c) If CBC was not able to get an FM service into a market, and the affiliate did not own an FM service, the AM service carry a mix of Radio One and Radio Two programming, with all Radio Two programming after 7:00 p.m.

3. When it was decided to establish Radio One and Radio Two, distinct affiliation agreements for these two services be made.

4. Radio One be developed to include an exchange of items on a regional basis.

5. There be agreement with affiliates on the amount of mandatory programming which would depend on affiliate participation (e.g.
national phone-ins).
6. Affiliates with no FM outlets carry 25 hours a week of CBC national programming. The affiliates could select the remainder of their national programs, with a proportion of music, drama, literary and features acceptable to CBC.
7. As existing private and CBC FM stations were large enough in number to form a network, conversations begin with affiliates to form part of the FM network and a national network affiliate package be arranged.
8. A national syndication unit in Toronto be established to gather and package short items for Radio One to broadcast live on the network. A reasonable delay of this material be allowed for affiliate broadcast.
9. Affiliates be informed of the progress of the proposed task force on transcriptions.
10. Regional affiliates and CBC regional centres develop new relationships leading to program exchanges.
11. An affiliate member appointed from Radio NAC be invited to critical program planning sessions of CBC which affected affiliates.

iv. PUBLICITY (pp. 104-110)

1. Information Services be divided nationally and regionally between radio and television with assignment of staff to each service.
2. Management begin to "think publicity" by:
   a) including accountability for promotion in program objectives.
   b) including promotion personnel in program planning.
   c) involving both producer and publicist in production.
   d) convening a national seminar on promotion bringing together producers and publicists.
3. Promotion expenditures be kept to a minimum to save funds for a major campaign after the implementation of the report.
4. The imbalance of newspaper publicity available to radio as compared to television be corrected by diverting 60 percent of contra-account funds to radio.
5. 500,000 dollars be assigned annually for three years to national and regional CBC radio for advertising. At the end of three years the amount of money be reviewed against results achieved.
6. Every effort be made by regional and local management to achieve maximum promotion through contra-accounts e.g. billboard companies and hotel systems.
7. A senior publicity officer be assigned at the network planning level and publicists be attached to each of the three proposed networks.
8. An assessment of each region be done to determine the possibility of reassignment of staff or posting to other areas where the need was more urgent.
9. The assignment of publicity staff to radio be determined by the Regional Director, the Director of Radio and the Senior Information Services officer.
10. A realistic budget be struck at the beginning of each fiscal year and assigned to the Director of Radio for administration and accountability. The budget assignment be made only in response to a
creative and inventive plan for promotion.
11. National promotion objectives be established by the Radio Planning
Directorate with agreed themes, audiences, media, materials etc.
12. As many shows as possible be placed before local audiences with
visual backdrops, handouts, posters etc.
13. Call letters and frequency of the local station be a promotion
objective.
14. Publicity take into account audience constituencies.
15. Management clarify whether radio and television services were
competitive or complementary. If complementary, a policy of
cross-promotion be promulgated.
16. Major television panel shows employ CBC radio and television stars
rather than only promoting private stations (e.g. Pierre Berton,
Betty Kennedy, Gordon Sinclair).
17. The services of air-promotion writers be diverted to other areas of
promotion.
18. Information Services personnel be consulted on presentation of
programming. Station identification be made frequently and naturally.
19. It was urgent, for reasons of morale and co-ordination, that
management design a logo for the national organization. It was
recommended a committee be struck to:
a) employ a communications design company to prepare and submit
designs and a program of implementation. Total cost of 25,000
dollars.
b) final decisions would be made by the president.
c) a committee of CBC graphic designers supervise the
implementation.
d) this committee be given freedom of imagination.
e) the design be applicable to English and French networks and to
television as well as radio.
20. That promotion of CBC personnel, meaning announcers, performers and
technicians and listeners would make CBC radio a people service.

The authors concluded the section on publicity by making 5 points:

1. promotion must be integrated with programming.
2. promotion staff must be assigned to the programming function.
3. budgets must be assigned to radio directors.
4. objectives must be established and updated.
5. given support, CBC radio could attract attention, improve
audience and become a topic of animated and interested
conversation across Canada.

v. COMMERCIALS (pp. 123-4)

a) Declare a phased withdrawal over three years from all commercial
activity in CBC Radio.
b) Retain a non-commercial policy for the Northern Service and FM;
accept a 2.2 million dollar five year commercial target for the
AM service, aware that audience should not be tied to commercial
targets.
c) Adopt a commercial policy applicable to Radios 1, 2 and 3
equally, accepting the same target as (b) but with aggressive selling and package deals involving all three networks.
d) Accept targets as in (b); bring sales into close planning proximity with programming; keep a watching brief on audience; streamline commercial acceptance and billing procedures; confine commercial activity to AM (daytime) as a declared policy. Review the procedure in 3 years. If commercial prospects do not appear much more promising then declare the phasing out of all commercial activity in CBC radio within two years of that date.

vi. MANAGEMENT (pp. 129-31)

1. No one would be placed or kept in a managerial position without a clear job description, a knowledge of the people with whom they were to work, preparation of the task through training and clearly identified objectives.

2. Managers would be held accountable for their objectives. Assessment against objectives would be done annually and termination of employment would be considered as open an option as annual increment or promotion.

3. New and younger blood was constantly needed. Early retirement would be considered an opportunity rather than a criticism for employees. Retired staff members would supplement pensions with tasks performed on a freelance basis. Ineffective managers would not be recommended for transfer.

4. The Radio Planning Directorate would be charged with long range planning of all aspects of the radio operation including national program planning, development of the arts, music and information programming. It would include, as consultants, representatives from audience research, publicity, engineering and sales.

vii. PLANNING (pp. 135-7)

1. A task force which would include union and management representatives would be appointed by the Radio Planning Directorate to examine the opportunity for automation, the improvement of daily relations between management and the unions, and the participation of union personnel in planning. Their report would be completed by April 1, 1971 and would go to both management and unions.

2. Program plans would be forecast two years ahead of broadcast by the Radio Planning Directorate and these plans would be forwarded to the unions. This way union members could take into consideration future opportunities in planning their future.

3. These program forecasts would be the basis for the CBC to negotiate levels of spending with talent unions. Financial guarantees to unions would be spent in ways which would serve the contemporary needs of radio.

4. Producers would be involved as consultants in talent negotiation.

5. Management would encourage cooperation between unions as many union employees would have welcomed a single union for all CBC staff members.

6. Some members of the CBC Pension Plan Board would be elected by staff.
7. The CBC would be a leader in involving its staff in working out CBC policies and their execution.

viii. STAFF DEVELOPMENT (pp. 138-9)

1. The appointment of national radio personnel on a senior level would involve the regions and that this process would be a concern of the Radio Planning Directorate.
2. Probationary periods for staff would be used responsibly and staff would be released who did not meet the criteria.
3. Staff would be required to spend one month of organized reading and studying the audience, social trends, union contracts, technical developments etc. before reporting to their appointed task.
4. Executive producers would be required to provide objectives to program staff which would include targets, promotion, criteria for evaluation; and these would be considered in regular performance reviews.
5. Performance reviews would be conducted at least twice per year with an annual review understood to carry with it the possibility of increase, promotion, status quo, or dismissal.
6. A regular program of development seminars would be established.
7. Younger personnel would be recruited by reaching into the institutions of higher learning.
8. Program bursaries would be established which would take the form of one month's leave of absence and 1,000 dollars for a producer to make a tape illustrating the stylistic, electronic, social frontiers of his or her practice which would be used in producer seminars.
9. First hand knowledge of the north would become increasingly important for production people. As a result, consideration would be given to assigning staff to the Northern Service before or during their appointment.
10. An interdisciplinary panel would be established and assigned a program area for a month and would meet weekly with the producer to offer criticism.
11. Regular training in the areas of transcriptions and stereo production would occur. A recording sound engineer would visit regions once a year to assist with development. This would establish standards. In addition, technical staff would be detached from their jobs to work in Toronto on experimental recording and broadcast techniques.
APPENDIX B

Recommendations of "A Plan For CBC Radio in The Seventies," April 1971:

(1) That the existing CBC radio service, in English and French, be divided into two complementary services (with the working titles Radio One and Radio Two) in each language.

(2) That Radio One concentrate (though not exclusively) on information and lighter entertainment and Radio Two on music, drama and the arts.

(3) That Radio One use AM stations and Radio Two use FM stations.

(4) That Radio One use, basically, the facilities of the present CBC Radio Networks (AM).

(5) That Radio Two be developed from the CBC FM stations now operating in five cities (Toronto, Montreal, Winnipeg and Vancouver) by (a) the establishment of new CBC FM stereo stations in a number of centres and (b) the affiliation of private FM stations in a number of other centres.

(6) That communities not served by FM stations receive a CBC network service which would combine the essential program features of Radio One and Radio Two.

(7) That there be increased emphasis on local programming on all CBC AM stations.

(8) That the plan be implemented over a period of five years.
APPENDIX C

The difficulties outlined in this paragraph and the lack of a "spectacular" increase in audience are illustrated in the following tables:

Year by Year Fall Trends in the National Share of Listening to CBC-owned AM English Language Radio (in percentages)  

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Year by Year Fall Trends in the National Share of Listening to CBC-owned AM English Language Radio and Affiliates (in percentages)  

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Tuning to CBC AM Radio Stations -- Fall Weekly Reach (in 000s)  

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