Pearl Harbor and American Intelligence Culture: Cultural Symbols in American Intelligence
Discourse Communities, Meta-Theoretical Lenses and Multi-Perspective Approaches

by
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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate and Post Doctoral Affairs in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Political Science

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

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Abstract

Ideas of the world persist long beyond the contexts that gave rise to them. In intelligence, as in strategic culture, these persisting ideas form a culture which shapes the intelligence system. Persisting ideas can come to form part of a national culture that ultimately shapes the actors, interests, and decision-making of intelligence stakeholders. This thesis illuminates how specific American cultural symbols influence and reflect U.S. intelligence ideas, discourses, policies, and practices, thereby contributing to a distinctly “U.S. intelligence culture.” As a result, this dissertation demonstrates that national cultural symbols are not epiphenomenal: These symbols tangibly influence the thought and action of diverse audiences both within and outside the formal U.S. intelligence community. Through an analysis of national and institutional definitions, norms, narratives, and warrants, the contours of a uniquely American intelligence culture emerge. A test case of how Pearl Harbor functions as a powerful cultural symbol among intelligence discourse communities illustrates national culture’s influence vis-à-vis policy decisions, intelligence reform, institutional openness, and intelligence education. Ultimately, this dissertation’s meta-theoretical lens and multi-perspective approach productively bring together conceptual resources from the fields of Intelligence Studies, Strategic Studies, and International Relations contributing to the development of “intelligence culture” as a theoretically sound and useful approach to studying intelligence-related phenomena.

Acknowledgements

The assistance of discussants, panel organizers, chairs, and audience members at the Toronto, Montreal, and San Diego ISA Conventions has been invaluable for a number of these thesis chapters. Any errors are those of the author. With thanks to friends, family, and to everyone who encouraged. And of course, Seth Meyers.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ABM.....	Anti-Ballistic Missile
AFSA.....	Armed Forces Security Agency
ALQ.....	Al-Qaida
BMI.....	Bureau of Military Information
CBRN.....	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear war/weapons
CIA.....	Central Intelligence Agency
CIC.....	Counterintelligence Corps
CIG.....	Central Intelligence Group
COI.....	Coordinator of Information
COINTEL(PRO).....	COunterINtelligence Program
COMINT.....	Communications Intelligence
DCI.....	Director of Central Intelligence
DI.....	CIA's intelligence
directorate	
DIA.....	Defense Intelligence Agency
DHS.....	Department of Homeland Security
DNI.....	Director of National Intelligence
DO.....	CIA's operations directorate
EU.....	European Union
FBI.....	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FISA.....	Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
HUMINT.....	human intelligence
HPSCI.....	House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
(HPSCI)	
IC.....	Intelligence Community
IJIC.....	<i>International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence</i>
IMINT.....	imagery intelligence
INR.....	Bureau of Intelligence and Research
INS.....	<i>Intelligence and National Security</i>
INTS.....	intelligence disciplines
IR.....	International Relations
IRTPA.....	<i>Intelligence Reform and Terrorism</i>
<i>Prevention Act</i>	
JIC.....	Joint Intelligence Committee
MAGIC.....	codename for allied cryptanalysis in World War Two
MID.....	Military Information Division
MI5/MI6.....	British security service/intelligence service
NIE.....	national intelligence
estimates	
NRO.....	National Reconnaissance Office
NSA.....	National Security Agency
NSC.....	National Security Council
ON/E.....	office of national
estimates	
ODNI.....	Office of the Director of National Intelligence

ONI.....	Office of Naval Intelligence
OSS.....	Office of Strategic Services
PFIAB.....	President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
PRISM.....	NSA collections program codename
PH.....	Pearl Harbor
SC.....	Strategic Culture
SSCI.....	Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
SIGINT.....	signals intelligence
TECHINT.....	technical intelligence
WMD.....	Weapons of Mass Destruction
USSR.....	union of soviet socialist republics

(Chapter One) Introduction

What is culture ? Why is it important to intelligence ? What, then, is intelligence ‘culture’? This dissertation will do two things: show that intelligence culture exists in America, and show that it is not epiphenomenal – that is, it has real importance in different ways, to different audiences – as explained later in this chapter, and must be understood in order to have a full picture of intelligence.¹ If intelligence culture is shown to exist, but without demonstrating its relevance and impact shaping policy and the intelligence system, its significance to Intelligence Studies, Security Studies, and International Relations would be diminished. This chapter introduces this dissertation’s approach to intelligence culture. The chapter begins by introducing the idea of a culture of intelligence briefly through a popular culture incident tied into cinematic retelling of history. The layout of the chapter follows in the subsequent section with the main body of the chapter.

With the study of the cultural aspects of intelligence still in infancy, this dissertation cannot move through a linear approach of identifying likely elements of American intelligence, and investigating them as possible key aspects of intelligence culture. An *explicit* intelligence culture literature does not exist at multiple levels, is in the initial stages at others, and in light of the general relative theoretical paucity of Intelligence Studies approaches to culture in general (discussed in chapter two), this dissertation is an exploratory, multi-perspective approach, which seeks to both develop intelligence culture theory and to show the ways it can be seen to exist in the American context. Ultimately, it must show that American culture exists, but to begin to do so, it is necessary to lay the groundwork that has not been done in the intelligence field; to

¹ Just as Neorealism, alongside other approaches, has claimed religion, international law, and international institutions – because they are not “material forces” (such as economic, military power) – do not have “a ‘real’ influence on the structure of international relations...” and are also therefore epiphenomenal. Pasquale Ferrara, *Global Religions and International Relations: A Diplomatic Perspective*, (NY, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), p 26.

describe a theoretical framework appropriate to its study, the historical evolution of American intelligence, its intellectual fault-lines and major debates, and only then to show how it exists at present, and where its overall impacts might be said to lie, in a study of Pearl Harbor as a key cultural symbol. In laying groundwork, this dissertation is a meta-theoretical study, in many ways, on the lenses suitable to study intelligence culture rather than laying out the entirety of the culture itself. I use the term culture to refer to the overarching whole, comprising multiple interlocking and contrasting strands. While we might analytically separate dominant or contrasting sub-cultures, these sub cultures are part of a whole, and draw from and write to a shared security imaginary.

*Mutants, Missiles, and Intelligence Culture: An Introduction to Intelligence Culture Through Popular Culture*²

The idea of a 'culture' of intelligence can be introduced by way of popular cinema intersecting with intelligence history. The movie *X-Men: First Class* (2011) replays the classic historical events of the Cuban missile crisis, casting a mutant villain as the unlikely mastermind behind near-war between the superpowers. While repeating the now well-known idea that missiles in Turkey were seen as a reciprocal threat to the USSR,³ the film centres on the idea that placing missiles in Cuba was fundamentally irrational because the Soviets had to have known and expected the American reaction to the missiles as unacceptable. Only the insane Magneto, the film's Bond-like villain, could have been responsible for the missiles, inciting a false-flag

² This introduction is a sketch showing, from popular culture, the persistence of an account of the Cuban Missile Crisis, which is also found in intelligence. It is not an analysis of the events themselves, but their representations. The recent historical yet popular culture superhero film *X-Men First Class* becomes an incitement for reflection on how popular culture may mirror the lacunae addressed by intelligence culture (while texts from film theory could be brought to bear for a serious analysis of the film, the introduction is not intended to comprise a formal academic treatment of the film and its message and does not assess it in terms of its validity). As will be noted, multiple cultural strands co-exist.

³ Hilsman writes "The possibility that the Soviets had put the missiles in Cuba to trade them for the missiles in Turkey had already been discussed and dismissed. But perhaps a trade would give the Soviets a fig leaf for the decision to pull their missiles out of Cuba." Roger Hilsman, *The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Struggle Over Policy* (Westport CT: Praeger Publishers, 1996), p 97. Hilsman makes the point that Eisenhower, not Kennedy had ordered the missiles placed in Turkey, but also notes that Hafner critiques the 'myth' that Kennedy was shocked that the missiles had not been removed, *Ibid*, p 92.

battle between the two Cold War enemies. This cultural account replays assumptions National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) director Sherman Kent made at the time—that the missiles were obviously untenable for Americans, that the Russians were aware they were an immediate danger to the U.S., and that the American reaction required a halt or removal.⁴

Characters in the film mouth these ideas in simplistic terms, that “the Soviets should have known.” The underlying idea is more complex—it presumes that the Soviets could have or must have had access to a full understanding of the American reaction. *Of course* the missiles would be perceived of as a threat. Of course the Soviets had to know they would be unacceptable to the Americans regardless of the complex international balance of power. In Kent’s ‘reliving’ of the Cuba estimate, he argued that some Soviet arrogance or folly must have overcome their undoubtedly accurate assessment that Americans would not allow a missile installation. This is Kent’s contention in his defense of the Cuba NIE (the estimate that did not predict the missile installation): that those Soviet officials who could have accurately understood the situation were sidelined for a fetishization of secret information. Irony, perhaps, for the nation that would go on to create one of the biggest intelligence systems⁵ in the world, producing metric tons of classified documents each year. Kent wrote at the time that the Russian ambassador likely “did send back [correct] appraisals and that Moscow gave them little notice because they were not picked up in a fancy clandestine operation.”⁶ In Kent’s view, there had to be a disregard by the Soviets for the objective situation on the ground.⁷

⁴Sherman Kent, “A Crucial Estimate Relived,” *Studies in Intelligence* 8, no. 2 (1964). <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/sherman-kent-and-the-board-of-national-estimates-collected-essays/9crucial.html>

⁵ The term ‘intelligence system’ is from Warner (and others) - and the definition of intelligence is discussed later, in chapter five.

⁶ Kent, in “A Crucial Estimate Relived” writes “[t]hat the finding of this type of effort are denied the cachet of “intelligence” may rob them of standing, perhaps even of credibility.” The historical accuracy of Kent’s assessment is not at issue for the argument – what is key is that his perception of intelligence and his belief that Russian sources incorrectly assessed a ‘clear’ situation with ‘overt’ and objective facts, a view that is still replicated replayed in recent popular culture – viz *X-Men*.

⁷ The White House’s post-mortem is available through the NS Archives, See Memorandum, “Post Mortem on Cuba,” Oct 29, 1962 *National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Books* http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/19621029mortem.pdf.

Kent's "relived" estimate (encapsulating these views) is flawed and has itself been critiqued;⁸ yet what is important is not his substantive points, but its instantiation of this culturally specific narrative, still found in *X-Men: First Class*. The film's revisionism is significant because it still promulgates parts of the fifty-year-old Kentian account and its assumptions. It implies a continuation of the Realist view of the world, in which statesmen pursue the national interest defined as an objective calculation of power in terms of interests, and these interests can be understood by all.⁹ The basic ontology is of a world composed of rational actors who act 'normally' and respond objectively to the world,¹⁰ or what in intelligence terms might be called mirror imaging,¹¹ clearly persists in popular culture in *X-Men: First Class*. Perhaps in truth the Soviet intelligence understood the American reaction well enough but felt that they required a strategic threat similar to that of the American missiles in Turkey as either an equalization or retaliation.¹² Yet still intelligence wrestles with the cultural differences not only between states, but also, as we are pointed to by Kent's observations about the peculiarities of Soviet intelligence, the cultural basis of intelligence itself in thought and practice.

In this thesis culture is understood not only as film or the arts, but part of a broader concept linked to intelligence. It follows Geertz's famous study of culture, taking it to mean

⁸ Michael Douglas Smith, "The Perils of Analysis: Revisiting Sherman Kent's Defense of SNIE 85-3-62" *Studies in Intelligence* 51, no. 3 <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol51no3/revisiting-sherman-kent2019s-defense-of-snie-85-3-62.html>; and Amy B. Zegart, "Organization Theory, Intelligence, and the Cuban Missile Crisis" (paper, American Political Science Association (APSA), Washington, DC, September 2 2010).

⁹ Realism has developed academically away from its early views, with the advances of neo-classical Realism and the challenges of Constructivism encouraging new avenues of thought – however – *X Men First Class* apparently displays the older style thinking that is traditionally associated with older Realist thought. Since popular culture is rarely current with scholarly creation, this is not surprising, and shows the currency of these views.

¹⁰ Kent writes "It is when the other man zigs violently out of the track of "normal" behavior that you are likely to lose him." In Kent, "A Crucial Estimate Relived."

¹¹ Richards J. Heuer, Jr. *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, "Keeping an Open Mind" 2007, <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/psychology-of-intelligence-analysis/art9.html>.

¹² The film suggests that the Americans conversely underestimated the Soviet reaction to missiles in Turkey. In a scene between the villainous Shaw and an American general: "'I hear you blocked the proposition to reposition Jupiter missiles in Turkey," Shaw says. "You reposition missiles in Turkey, or anywhere that close to Russia, and you're looking at war," stutters the general. "Nuclear war." In reality, the US *did* position Jupiter missiles in Turkey...." writes *The Guardian's*, Alex von Tunzelmann, "Does X-Men Get a First Class in History?" *The Guardian*, (UK Edition) 16 June 2011, <http://www.theguardian.com/film/2011/jun/16/reel-history-x-men-first-class>

shared codes or systems of meaning.¹³ Failing to understand the ‘culture’ of intelligence leads to the same Kentian errors we slight “Sherm” today for: his unscientific, non-analytical method (compared with today’s analytic standards), his universalization of Western reason, and the assumption that others understand our actions as we understand them. For this reason, the specificities of our own intelligence culture, as well as those of others, must be understood if we hope to realize Kent's own goal of a field and profession that systematizes and accumulates knowledge.¹⁴ In our present era, cultural differences in intelligence are much more pronounced than those between the two powers playing the ‘great game’ together with tacit agreement. This pop-culture incitement reminds us that the cultural basis of intelligence, then, is more important than it ever was.

In this thesis, I will examine the concept of intelligence culture at a national level to explain the specificities of American intelligence thought and practice. Can a unique overarching ‘culture of intelligence’ be demonstrated in the United States using a rigorous theoretically sound analysis?¹⁵

¹³ This is elaborated, in terms of strategic culture theory’s understanding of culture, in chapter two. Clifford Geertz, “Thick Description: Toward an interpretive theory of culture,” *The Interpretation of Cultures*, (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1973). The term culture is, of course, defined with difficulty. The Geertzian definition, for Sewell stands as representative of two types of definitions of culture; one sees culture for a “concrete and bounded world of beliefs and practices,” such as Geertz, while the other sees, in Bordieu-ian terms, culture in its theoretical aspect, contrasted always “to some other equally abstract aspect of social life that is not culture...” (the economy, politics, etc.). William H. Sewell Jr., “The Concept(s) of culture,” In *Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture*, ed. Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999): 35–61, p 39. This dissertation is concerned with, broadly, how intelligence imagines the world, and concepts and practices, shared, surrounding American intelligence. As such it adopts the former understanding of culture.

¹⁴ Sherman Kent argued that intelligence practitioners of all types, should contribute to the aim at systematizing and accumulating knowledge – about analysis, collection, etc, etc. Just as any profession, such as medicine or engineering, would keep professional records as well as publishing results and lessons learned, the intelligence profession should accumulate knowledge about its successes and failures (which he felt was not done at the time). This was Kent’s goal, pursued in founding the CIA’s journal, *Studies in Intelligence*. Harold P. Ford, “A Tribute to Sherman Kent,” in *Sherman Kent and the Board of National Estimates Collected Essays*. <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/sherman-kent-and-the-board-of-national-estimates-collected-essays/1tribute.html>

¹⁵ It has been argued in comparative Intelligence Studies that the United States must always be regarded as an exceptional case, due to its size, complexity, and funding levels. “The sheer scale and complexity of the American system makes comparisons difficult...” Len Scott and R. Gerald Hughes, “The Future of Intelligence: Seeking Perfection in an Imperfect World?” in *Intelligence and International Security: New Perspectives and Agendas*, eds. Len Scott, R. Gerald Hughes, and Martin Alexander (NY: Routledge, 2011) p 8. Turner argues that certain norms make American intelligence distinctive but not unique; Michael A. Turner, “A Distinctive U.S. Intelligence Identity,” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 17, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 42–61, p 42. Presumably this means that other nations could fit a similar combination of norms, albeit, one assumes, arising from different sources. I tend to agree that common practices and ideas are shared, but subcultures, contending ideas (or norms), and additionally the scale of construction of the American intelligence apparatus and

The persisting ideas which we can call 'intelligence culture' can clearly be shown to impact the American intelligence system.¹⁶ Differences in national intelligence approaches are analogous to differences in the nation's strategic cultures. Intelligence, like the practices of the societies it studies, is a cultural practice. It is historically situated, set into the security imaginaries and strategic cultures of the societies that produce it. Just as each society's approach to security is distinct, so too is the respective intelligence culture. The differences between states' intelligence systems are not only material or structural, stemming from institutional variance. Moreover, intelligence policy is profoundly shaped by intelligence culture. For Rishikoff and George, "[d]escribing these 'organizational' or 'professional' cultures ... is the first step to understanding the expanding NSE [National Security Enterprise]."¹⁷ We can only understand the failures, successes, and outputs of the intelligence community when their culturally specific basis is understood.

This dissertation focuses on specific intelligence cultural symbols within what we might call certain discourse or epistemic communities¹⁸ (such as policymakers, practitioners, cultural publics, etc.). The investigation of the attitudes and ideas of those affected by and producing these cultural symbols is broad, but with a concern for shared cultural symbols, such as Pearl Harbor, because these widely shared symbols catch the intersection of public and elites, policymakers and practitioners. Pearl Harbor, particularly, because it is not part of the organizational culture of any agency alone (since most agencies were re-organized or created

national security enterprise as a whole. Thus in one way, Turner is correct that it is not 'unique', in sharing concepts similarly part of other intelligence cultures, yet its culture at the granular level must be wholly unreplicable as all cultures are unique in that sense. Norms are a common way to understand business organizational cultures, but more nuanced theory is necessary.

¹⁶ Impact, for Realists, will be discussed in this chapter in section two. Additionally, while the terminology of levels is problematic, as noted in IR, and reifies particular ideas about disciplinary boundaries, this dissertation uses the language of the "national" level, or preferably the overarching level, because the levels terminology is used commonly by both Realists, and in strategic culture.

¹⁷ Harvey Rishikof and Roger George, "Conclusion: Navigating the Labyrinth of the National Security Enterprise," in *The National Security Enterprise: navigating the labyrinth*, eds Harvey Rishikof and Roger George, (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2011) p 334.

¹⁸ Discourse communities, in Swales view, have shared goals, communication and participatory mechanisms, genres and a specific lexis, as well as membership thresholds in John Swales, "The Concept of Discourse Community," *Writing About Writing: A College Reader* ed. Elizabeth Wardle and Doug Downs (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2011), p 471-3.

after it) but is carried by all—it is part of an element of culture that is shared and carried by both practitioners and non-practitioners. Specifically, in Bean's typology of four levels or 'perspectives' on the study of intelligence or organizational cultures, it is both a third and fourth level study; first, the vernacular or mundane level which comprises primary data or non-theoretical artifacts; second, strategic or reflective discourse which is second-level discourse produced by stakeholders around their own cultures; third, theoretical discourse about organizational or intelligence culture; and fourth, meta-theoretical discourse, which includes statements by scholars about theory itself, and may compare and contrast other theoretical claims.¹⁹ This dissertation is situated at both the third and fourth levels, with a focus on meta-theory as an avenue to draw intelligence culture theory to different perspectives, beyond the managerial focus of organizational (intelligence) culture theory. The aim of the project is to contribute beyond the organizational level, drawing on diverse methods and resources to point to a number of less-studied areas and facets of intelligence culture. However, it recognizes the "boundaries among national, strategic, political, and organizational culture blur and overlap."²⁰ The aim is to find the overarching and shared, rather than confine study to an analytical construct of a 'national level'.

Chapter Organization

This introduction explains why— and how—this thesis is organized as pieces (or multi-perspective lenses) comprising chapters on the history, institutions, intellectual debate, and present contours of American intelligence. Yet, in introducing the concept of intelligence culture, this dissertation must first establish what it *means* to show intelligence culture exists, and what it

¹⁹ Hamilton Bean, "United States Intelligence Cultures," *The International Studies Encyclopaedia* (Denmark, Robert A. Blackwell Publishing, 2010).

²⁰ Bean, "United States Intelligence Cultures."

requires, in turn, to show that it has some impact on outcomes however defined. It does not, however, predict them or future actions through them. The problem in doing this is that different theories have disparate assumptions about what relevance or importance means. What may satisfy some critics will seem immaterial to others. The standards for both propositions (existence and what might be called importance)—reflect different criteria. This chapter attempts to explain them, while the broader theory and methodology for this dissertation are found in chapter two. The following section discusses how this chapter is organized to address these issues.

This chapter looks at the premises of the argument for intelligence culture and how it will be laid out and the rationale for its structure. First, this chapter points to the multiple fields and standards intelligence culture must address. Next, in section one, this chapter recounts the most common ways to show that intelligence culture exists. It lays out the approach of the dissertation – in opposition to some of these popular approaches. It makes the argument that intelligence culture must be addressed in a particular way, because it does not stand, at present, in a well-researched and accepted area of study. This section focuses on the dissertation’s descriptive approach.

Section two shows the importance of intelligence culture to different groups. Assuming intelligence culture exists, this chapter also addresses the ‘difference’ it must make to different critics, to address the charges that it is not significant to the study of policy, statecraft, and intelligence. These critical charges are discussed, as well as the ways in which this dissertation will attempt to meet their challenges. Overall, this chapter addresses the rationale of the dissertation in assembling a number of unusual and complementary pieces of American intelligence culture, rather than forcing together a single unsubstantiated or speculative picture. I

will show that this bricolage is both necessary, methodologically superior, and part of the development of a theory of intelligence culture.

Essentially, this dissertation does three things, in total: it constructs theoretical foundations (for intelligence culture theory); it describes current intelligence culture and its components or roots; and it demonstrates the policy and patterning relevance of intelligence culture in as a test case of national intelligence culture in Pearl Harbor. It must do all these things to address different critics, and different standards. The subsequent chapters will discuss the relevant literatures, methodologies, and other theoretical considerations in depth. A full dissertation plan is included at the end of this chapter; it will lay out the role and arguments of subsequent chapters, and how they demonstrate the essential proposition of this thesis.

Multiple Approaches and Multiple Audiences: Describing Intelligence Culture

Describing intelligence culture could proceed by picking out a few common items for American intelligence culture and list them. But we cannot simply catalogue the parts of American intelligence culture.²¹ As yet, not enough research exists on what that American intelligence culture is to be able to collect such a list. In sum, without an intelligence culture literature, demonstrating all the parts of American intelligence culture is not feasible. For this reason, instead, this dissertation explores a number of different approaches to and aspects of intelligence culture, which together help form a portrait of American intelligence.

I will argue below, at the end of section one that unlike strategic culture, intelligence culture is not easily accessible in codified, repeated, written doctrine.²² Second, as I note later in section one of this chapter, the handful of works on intelligence culture do not comprise the body

²¹ I explain the reasons for this below, in the section in this chapter entitled Common Approaches.

²² Kier's *Imagining War: French and British military doctrine between the wars*, is considered authoritative on doctrine and strategic culture because hers is one of the few studies in strategic culture focusing sharply on only doctrine. Elizabeth Kier (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).

of extensive scholarship that strategic culture does – and therefore mean that a full intelligence culture literature does not yet exist. Descriptions of the pieces of intelligence culture – explorations of their history, currency, and myriad meanings, are not present. With no established intelligence culture literature to stitch these pieces together, through content analysis, interview, textual analysis– approaching intelligence culture as an entity easily summarized in short lists, is an exercise in assumption (although it is sometimes fruitful, though flawed). This means that while it is tempting to list the components of American intelligence culture as a set and continuous object, this is not methodologically sound. This dissertation eschews that approach. Intelligence culture is shown through a multi-perspective approach emphasizing meta-theory, described in the dissertation plan at the conclusion of this chapter, which builds up the basis for a theory of intelligence culture.

In this way, chapter three depicts the necessary precursor to understanding intelligence culture; the history of the formation of intelligence bureaucracies, as the modern American ‘intelligence community.’ This chapter is important, as ideas become embedded through institutions and American intelligence changes after 9.11; its bureaucratic shape both represents an idea of intelligence and forms the expression of that idea. Chapter four moves to the intellectual history of the idea of intelligence in America, in the Kent-Kendall debate, wherein epistemological and ontological assumptions about the world are shown to be linked to two popular ‘packages’ of ideas around intelligence, security, and the American state, titular to their early proponents (Kent and Kendall). Chapter five refracts intelligence culture through a series of different understandings of intelligence. This chapter begins with the definition of intelligence as the central point at which to define American intelligence. Norms of intelligence, narratives of its place in American history, and warrants of its acceptability in American statecraft then follow up

the initial ideas exposed in the American definitions, with a focus on avoiding a list of “norms” (for the same reason that lists of sources are eschewed), and finding the lesser seen corners of the American ideas of intelligence. Chapter six uses the background of this tour of American intelligence ideas, to focus on part of American intelligence and establish how it has actually been used and understood (through a content analysis). The chapter then takes these findings, and—based on the commitment to show ‘what difference’ intelligence culture makes—selects significant results to attempt to show how intelligence culture has demonstrably shaped the American intelligence system in general, and policy, in the specific symbol of Pearl Harbor (which would be applicable to future intelligence culture studies). Chapter two describes the methodology and theory behind these approaches, much more concretely.

Together these chapters allow us to look towards *current* usage—at the ‘national’ level or overarching perspective, explained more fully in chapter two, based on a study of a key symbol of American intelligence (Pearl Harbor). This study helps show both past and present elements of culture, while respecting the central point of the security imaginary heuristic²³—that aspects of culture are constantly being rearticulated, with both similar and new meanings, shifting, sometimes violently and sometimes as slowly as tides and glaciers. Attempting to describe “American intelligence culture” *without* the insight that it is inextricable from a particular time, sensibility, and place—abdicates all and any insights that cultural study can bring to intelligence. American intelligence culture can only be described in pieces – for particular groups, at a particular time, and around particular themes. Moreover, writing the history of American intelligence culture can help us understand the present. But it does not help us predict, in the sense of actor plus culture equals *future* behavior – more it aims to understand and explore. This is because history must be partial, and all cultures are many-headed. Crucially, our histories exist

²³ For a discussion of the security imaginary heuristic, see chapter two section “The Security Imaginary Heuristic.”

for us only as we understand them, and re-interpret them. We give meaning to the past – the past exists only for us, in the present, and has no being of its own (paraphrasing Thomas Hobbes).²⁴ Thus to predict policies from past strategic or intelligence culture is to use a mirror, to reflect one own self back into history, and towards to the future. As with strategic culture, certain broad directions can be drawn from the past and presents of intelligence culture – with the awareness that cultures are multiple and conflicting – but this does not allow prediction. Thus to show intelligence culture exists is to be careful about drawing connections and correlations between past and present.

Multiple Approaches and Audiences: Speaking to International Relations, Intelligence Studies and Intelligence Culture

The reason for the above approach is that this dissertation asserts that intelligence culture is relevant to multiple fields. There is an important reason that this thesis must address a series of critics and in so doing, bring together different descriptive pieces of intelligence culture. It must speak to International Relations, as well as Intelligence and Strategic Studies because, as tool for both understanding the world and securing the state, the study of intelligence clearly intersects both International Relations and Strategic and Intelligence Studies. To leave aside one field or the other is to abdicate the insights of intelligence culture.

This dissertation must then attempt to balance and speak to these multiple fields: the policy and empirical focus of Intelligence Studies, with the more theoretical basis of IR. Ideally, intelligence culture's research program (discussed in the concluding chapter to the thesis) would

²⁴ See Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, "Prudence" in Part I Of Man, Chapter I, Of Sense (any Ed).

comprise work in both fields. IR and Intelligence Studies do have a connection disciplinarily.²⁵ However, in terms of actual scholarly citation and circulation, there is little circulation between Intelligence Studies and International Relations, and even no great dialogue exists between Intelligence and Security Studies. Der Derian put it, famously, that intelligence is the “least understood and most ‘undertheorized’ area of international relations.”²⁶ Security studies intrudes here and there into intelligence and vice versa, but there are not so many indications of real academic sharing.²⁷ Intelligence studies and IR, however, should speak to each other, and I speculate in the concluding chapter to this thesis, that indeed they must as intelligence and security become ever more closely intertwined.

I would like to strengthen the interlinkages between the two areas of study because Intelligence Studies and International Relations *can* speak to each other about intelligence despite their different methods and assumptions. For an example, the study of norms is common to both, as is that of surprise attack, and misperception. Critical Security Studies often touches on aspects of intelligence (in securitization theory, for example) yet seems to lack the awareness to address the role of intelligence.²⁸ Fry and Hochstein agree that “[in]ternational relations [c]ould be increasingly conceptualized as a perspective which sees intelligence not merely as the ‘eye’ which perceives the objective international reality of power politics and describes it, but as in fact one of the primary locations of International Relations practice.”²⁹ Intelligence culture work

²⁵ In the field/subfield story, Intelligence Studies in America is a subset of Security Studies, which is then a part of IR, under the overarching umbrella of political science. Stephen Marrin, “Preventing Intelligence Failures by Learning from the Past,” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 17 (2004): 655–672, p 658; and generally, Len Scott & Peter Jackson, “The Study of Intelligence in Theory and Practice,” *Intelligence and National Security* 19, no. 2 (2004): 139-169.

²⁶ Der Derian is one of the few who have successfully worked to meld International Relations and Intelligence Studies, so his *Antidiplomacy* is a key text in that context. James DerDerian, *Antidiplomacy: spies, terror, speed, and war* (Cambridge, MA : Blackwell, 1992) p 19.

²⁷ There are clear exceptions; Jennifer Sims and Gill and Phythian have made a number of attempts to speak to and with International Relations.

²⁸ For example, Mark Salter, “Why Securitization Fails: the hard case of counter-terrorism programs,” in *Understanding Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*, ed. Thierry Balzacq. (New York, NY: Routledge 2011).

²⁹ Michael G. Fry and Miles Hochstein, “Epistemic Communities: Intelligence Studies, International Relations and National Security *Intelligence and National Security* 8, no. 3 (1993): 14-28, p 25.

speaks to Intelligence Studies by foregrounding unspoken assumptions (that are sometimes the norm in Intelligence Studies) and it speaks to International Relations by stressing the interconnection of strategic norms and intelligence, and the role that intelligence culture plays in national security policy and practice. ‘Speaking’ to multiple fields means meeting the standards of each. With disparate assumptions and ideas of what constitutes theory, this means that intelligence culture must be shown to exist, in a number of ways. This conditions the approach of this dissertation, so that intelligence culture might meet the standards of many groups, as being both relevant and valid. Despite their different theoretical commitments and assumptions, this thesis is important making a case for intelligence culture to all these fields. The ways this thesis meets the challenge of demonstrating the importance of intelligence culture – to different theoretical standards – is described later, in section two.

SECTION 1: SHOWING INTELLIGENCE CULTURE EXISTS

To show that intelligence culture exists, this section establishes, first, what intelligence culture is, and, crucially, what it means to demonstrate that it exists. The definition of intelligence itself is discussed later in the dissertation, in chapter five (as a medium to discern intelligence culture’s fault lines).

(Intelligence) Culture

The intelligence culture concept as used in this dissertation originates³⁰ primarily in strategic culture theory.³¹ An organizational culture literature began in the 1970s also focusing

³⁰ It also clearly has roots in political culture, and the famous behavioral works that field produced, including Gabriel A Almond and Sidney Verba’s *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*, (Newbury Park, Calif. : Sage Publications, 1989). This work is concerned with electoral behavior and governance, typically, thus strategic culture remains the much more important literature to situate intelligence culture. It is also something like comparative Intelligence Studies, which is has been a rare subfield in the past (but with significant works like May’s *Knowing One’s Enemies*). The “intelligence culture” label is not completely new – “national style” in intelligence

often on culture and intelligence failure.³² Since 9.11, however, organizational literature has burgeoned, with the post-9.11 supposition that culture is a primary source of system failure (over personal accountability).³³ Yet the overarching theoretical discourse of intelligence has not yet reached the comparable stage of the strategic culture literature (which is discussed in chapter two). Particularly, it has not been yet significantly expanded beyond the organizational level, according to Bean's survey of the literature.

Subsequently, we can assess that a full historical and theoretical 'intelligence culture' literature does not exist, comparatively, and as a consequence this thesis applies a revised version of strategic culture theory to solidify the intelligence culture concept. Strategic culture sought to explain differences in strategy, those that persisted beyond mere policy.³⁴ Its focus has shifted now to explain the attitude of states in general toward war and peace, and the formation of norms that regulate state conduct in the international system.³⁵ Intelligence culture theory (discussed in the following chapters) promises to explain, at the very least, differences in national approaches to and understandings of intelligence. Its promise is grander still; intelligence culture theory might help transform the relationship between Intelligence Studies and International Relations. It may be the vanguard of a new way of understanding the importance of intelligence. Understudied as it is, a carefully constructed theoretical foundation is needed.

used to mean sometimes similar things. See James Wirtz, "The American Approach to Intelligence Studies," in *Handbook of Intelligence Studies*, ed. Loch Johnson (New York: Routledge, 2007) p 28.

³¹ Isabelle Duyvesteyn writes that "Strategic culture has to date, however, only been marginally linked to the domain of intelligence studies." She notes Bozeman's 1976 contribution, and Davies', and suggests that the majority of links presently deal with the "use and manipulation of intelligence in the Iraqi missing weapons of mass destruction case" citing Philip Davies. Her article appears in a special issue of *Intelligence and National Security* that contains this piece and a number of others on intelligence and strategic culture. Isabelle Duyvesteyn, "Intelligence and Strategic Culture: Some Observations," *Intelligence and National Security* 26, no. 4 (August 2011): 521–530, P 522.

³² Bean, "United States Intelligence Cultures." Bean cites as the key early work, Victor Marchetti, John D. Marks, and Melvin L. Wulf. *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (New York: Knopf, 1974).

³³ Hamilton Bean, "Organizational Culture and US Intelligence Affairs," *Journal of Intelligence and National Security* 24, no. 4 (2009), p 479–481.

³⁴ The Gray-Johnston debate that animates the use of strategic culture theory is discussed in chapter two, in the section "Lessons from Strategic Culture". Strategic culture theory is also explained in depth in chapter two.

³⁵ Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed Peter Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

In general, this thesis demonstrates that intelligence is a cultural practice and does not simply reflect an objective response to the world or pure shaping by policy and law. More specifically, it shows that this culture can be discerned at the national level in the form of persisting ideas or symbols with Pearl Harbor as a key study. If it can be shown that these national ideas affect intelligence as 'Munichs'³⁶ – which are important symbolic policy ideas or analogies – affect foreign policy, then American intelligence culture must be understood as traceable factor in the development of intelligence in America, and at more than just the organizational culture analytical level.³⁷ This is discussed further in the dissertation plan, and the levels of analysis (the national level) discussed in chapter two. Pearl Harbor, as one key policy 'idea' or analogy relevant to intelligence, is explored in chapter six, as a widely shared national symbol intelligence culture, which also attests to the relevance of intelligence culture for policy-focused theories.

Common Approaches

There are a couple of common – but not always fruitful– ways to approach intelligence culture. Strategic culture, as a similarly patterned field (discussed further in chapter two), suggests a couple of broad approaches taken in describing strategic cultures. These often include: listing or explaining sources of cultures, dissecting one core text (or a small number of key texts), following one piece of culture from the past to the present, or circling a couple of

³⁶ The literature on 'Munichs' includes early work such as Keith L. Shimko, "Metaphors and Foreign Policy Decision Making," *Political Psychology* 15, no 4 (1994): 655-671; as well as Jack S. Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy: sweeping a conceptual minefield," *International Organization* 48, no. 02 (1994): 279-312; Göran Rystad, *Prisoners of the Past?: the Munich syndrome and makers of American foreign policy in the cold war era* (Lund: LiberGleerup, 1982).

³⁷ Even Hayden Peake has observed that Lowenthal was one of the few writing on the 9/11 Commissions "to point out the irony that while the commissions were all very critical of assorted analytic shortfalls, their recommendations dealt largely with organizational changes— which seldom solve operational problems." Hayden Peake, "Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf," *Studies in Intelligence* 50, no 1, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol50no1/12_Books_helf.htm

commonly understood parts of culture that are believed to have a current relevance.³⁸ Some of these approaches are useful, in certain cases. Others have been shown to be misguided, methodologically, whether applied to strategic or intelligence culture. And finally, in some ways, strategic culture is not intelligence culture, and approaches cannot, for certain reasons, be imported wholesale. Below I will discuss the reason why each of these methods is not suited to showing that intelligence culture exists, at present. Establishing the methodology of what will be done is discussed in the next chapter. However, this chapter must show the general approach to intelligence culture, and why this dissertation cannot be structured as a descriptive collection of commonly cited pieces of intelligence culture.

Sources

This dissertation will not (primarily) deal in the sources of American intelligence culture. While sources are an interesting, if elusive subject, overall the ‘can do’ attitudes, or Judeo-Christian religious instruction of the American peoples seems less relevant to intelligence policy than stories we tell about intelligence itself.³⁹ What we say (or believe) intelligence – and by extension, what we believe intelligence culture to be – is the foundation of this dissertation. It cannot be stressed more fully that if we wish to know how intelligence culture is present in America, then studying how intelligence is understood at present must be the logical avenue (to begin). Once the current contours of American intelligence culture are more solidly known, tracing their sources may become useful. However, the first premises of the study of intelligence culture need to be finding how intelligence is understood at present; written, spoken,

³⁸ This does not suggest that all strategic culture studies take these approaches; many are sophisticated studies of in-depth cases, or use multi-part methods such as process tracing, or include primary source interviews and ethnography.

³⁹ One caveat is that the authors and texts identifying sources of intelligence culture, even if the lists of sources are less important, tell an interesting story about intelligence culture in the process of their selection of sources for it. They reveal their own ‘cultures’ in looking for those of intelligence.

academically, publicly and privately, & etc. Not only should the evidentiary basis of present understanding be tackled first, many attempts at sourcing strategic culture claim a kind of prediction of present or future strategy from these.⁴⁰ This post-hoc work ignores the principle of falsifiability; and sources could be attributed to present culture as easily as to the past. Rarely, the use of this approach is a kind of archeology that attempts a grander understanding of intelligence in the past and present.⁴¹ Otherwise, it must be bracketed until current usage is researched.

Key Texts

What this dissertation will not do is look at one key text and attempt to generalize. It does not seek to explain all of current intelligence based on a handful of texts, or a ‘doctrinal’ text. This is A.I. Johnston’s approach to strategic culture, in part, based in classic, historical texts in his famous study of Chinese strategy. He encourages this method, and it has been useful to some extent in strategic culture where a cultural text serves as an explicit touchstone for modern strategic thinking.⁴² These texts are more relevant the more clearly modern military doctrine teaches them directly, since this creates a demonstrable re-interpretation, and socialization to strategic thinking through the text.⁴³ Intelligence lacks such formal, widely shared and understood texts.⁴⁴

⁴⁰ A.I. Johnston discusses the requirements of prediction in *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998) p 52.

⁴¹ Gill does something like this in “The Global Panopticon? The neo-liberal state, economic life and democratic surveillance,” *Alternatives* 20, no. 1, (Spring 1995): 1-49.

⁴² For example, Kautilya in Indian strategic culture.

⁴³ Tobias Wilke, *German Strategic Culture Revisited: Linking the Past to Contemporary German Strategic Choice*, (Münster : Lit ; London : Global Book Marketing, 2007) p 25/6.

⁴⁴ We might argue that instead of key texts, since few deal with all aspects of American intelligence – that America shares instead, key events as texts (or what I argue in chapter five are “warrants”). The event as text also possesses a shared meaning and lesson, and this is why this dissertation investigates Pearl Harbor as a capstone to the study of intelligence culture.

This approach is a variation on former, in looking for sources. It looks to the past to generate a template, or ur-text of culture, so that the present can be explained as a result of these historical roots and trends. Yet the text, in and of itself, is meaningless.⁴⁵ Its authors, dead or living, do not explain what the text means – and it is the meanings we attribute to the text, *in the present* that matter. No text, unless it is under constant construction (Twitter might be seen as this kind of in-perpetual construction), can be anything but reflected in our readings of it. These readings are affected by time, place, geographic and other contexts. Thus what makes a key text ‘key,’ is its construction, which is not addressed in this kind of text A = behavior B, approach. We cannot simply point to one, or a handful of short and agreed upon texts to demonstrate that “this” is what is believed about intelligence culture. Also, without clear consistent or shared doctrinal texts, a *prima facie* discussion of culture from systematic doctrine is not possible as it is in strategic culture.

In intelligence, the existence of texts symptomatic of the discourses of intelligence, are rare. The entire theoretical literature on intelligence (save that directed at its history) was virtually non-existent until the early 1970s, (see chapter two) so that we can find no common and bedrock text which encompasses all of intelligence. The analysis of the key text relies on the understanding of the wider frame it is symptomatic of. Moreover, in intelligence, the variation between the services and departments which conducted intelligence, and the military and civilian personnel who conducted them, renders the selection of single texts much less valuable. No ‘bible’ of American intelligence has existed, and even the legal framework for intelligence – both civilian and military – leaves relatively few discursive clues.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ This is discussed in chapter five.

⁴⁶ The definitions and legal bases of the American understanding of intelligence are discussed in chapter five; but they are notoriously and intentionally vague on the subject of intelligence so that it remains both secret and can be allowed to adapt to circumstances as they arose.

Selected Pieces

Bringing together a selection of a culture's prominent features (regardless of source) is another common approach in strategic culture. While this may be an attractive way to collate the multiple parts of a strategic culture, it is also impossible at present for intelligence culture. Without, in comparison, the full literature strategic culture possesses on innumerable aspects of strategic culture, a selection of parts of intelligence culture must only be the sewing together of a quilt of possible intelligence cultures. Intelligence culture, instead, must build up a study of current usage and ideas around intelligence, towards the more general study of intelligence culture. That is, a study of a small part of intelligence culture – such as a key text – must rely on the assumption of existing reviews, historiographies, and theoretical accounts. This kind of study of a small piece of intelligence culture cannot exist without much more basic groundwork, which is begun in this dissertation in intellectual, institutional, and cultural theory. As discussed above, this differs from the puzzle-piece assemblage of selected pieces, as it is a meta-theoretical catalogue⁴⁷ of appropriate approaches, domains, and lenses constituting intelligence culture. It does choose pieces at random and assume they comprise the entirety of intelligence culture, moreover, this approach explicitly emphasizes that the richness of intelligence culture cannot be covered in total, by only approach. The multi-perspectival approach of this thesis, then, seeks to build up intelligence culture, rather than assuming or speculating on its effects.

Importantly, it is impossible to attempt to discern American intelligence culture without bringing together the necessary history and structure that I describe in the dissertation plan at the conclusion of this chapter. However, a multi-perspective approach also has significant benefits. It engages with theory construction as important, which help build the basis for a multi-disciplinary discussion of intelligence and intelligence culture. It also brings a historical and

⁴⁷ See the discussion in Bean's typology, in this chapter, of the meta-theoretical level, above in the section National Intelligence Culture.

institutional sensitivity to what is often a policy or outcomes focused field, in Intelligence Studies. Finally, it shows, more critically, that *more than one* way of investigating intelligence culture is possible. It is not just norms, or history, or current discussion, or popular narratives—but all of these. To focus on one is acceptable – but the pretense that no other ways of accessing culture is not, particularly in light of the wide variety of approaches in other fields. I have discussed above how the approach of this dissertation is to build a theoretical foundation for intelligence culture (explained further in a literature review in chapter two). Chapter two also reiterates both how the key approaches from strategic culture (the closest analogue for intelligence culture) should be altered, adopted, or rejected as problematic, and why. This section has dealt with the reasons why more general approaches are not appropriate, following a brief discussion of the nature of intelligence culture (whose theoretical antecedents are laid out in chapter two). Below, the way the dissertation approaches the demands of its different audiences is discussed.

SECTION 2: SHOWING INTELLIGENCE CULTURE IS NOT EPIPHENOMENAL

When intelligence culture matters, why, and to whom are the important questions – bridging Intelligence Studies’ more Realist approaches with Constructivist and cultural theory, we find that intelligence culture makes a difference in different ways and in different places (in commission structure, in education, in openness and in reform). This requires a dissertation approach that brings together a number of ways intelligence culture can be seen working.

Why and How It Matters

This chapter has introduced the central argument of this dissertation; that an American intelligence culture exists (at a national level). However, as noted, to be relevant to Intelligence Studies (and indeed other disciplines) it must not only be shown to exist, but to be important to outcomes. The *Competing Explanations* section below describes the challenges of Realist and Neorealist theory to the existence of intelligence culture. Because this thesis takes in both Constructivist theory, and speaks to an intelligence and Strategic Studies audience, it must show the importance of intelligence culture both to Realists and Constructivists.

Cultural theory is often dismissed as unimportant – nice to know about but ultimately irrelevant to policy. In a word, inconsequential. Intelligence culture theory must then show more than the existence of intelligence culture, but also its relevance. Crucially it must not only exist – but be shown to be more than epiphenomenal. Different theoretical perspectives stipulate different kinds of proofs of importance or relevance. Naturally, there are many ways a study of intelligence culture can be useful. It might assist in training and hiring practices, or flesh out the historical record on beliefs about intelligence and trust in government, to give two examples. Yet useful information, for the standard of many theories, does not rise to the level of importance. In NeoRealism, for example, knowing the personal psychology of leaders of hostile states is useful politically, but in theoretic terms, it is not important to predicting state behavior, shifts in power, and polarity (since the state is seen as a ‘billiard ball’). Essentially, this is the importance of being important – to answer the charges of these critics, this thesis must show that intelligence culture exists and is relevant *in particular ways* that certain (core) disciplines deem important.

Competing Explanations

I have outlined a very broad vision of intelligence culture. As such, identifying competing theories becomes more difficult, but this section identifies the most common competing explanations to the intelligence culture hypothesis that ideas (Snyder's set of general beliefs and attitudes) become 'semi-permanent' and thus divert policy and practice away from a purely rational pursuit of interest.⁴⁸ The major competing explanation at the state level is (Neo)Realism. Warner identifies it as the major alternative model for intelligence institutions.⁴⁹ Realism presents an (unconvincing) case that cultural explanation is irrelevant, and its critics far outweigh its proponents. Below, NeoRealism's account of objective state action, is explained, and then contrasted with cultural theory's (including intelligence culture) objections to its assumptions.

Competing Explanations: (Neo) Realism

The strategic culture literature situates Neorealism as the primary competing explanatory account.⁵⁰ Intelligence culture theory is also a challenge to and challenged by classical Realist views, as it is the predominant conventional theoretical understanding of intelligence (because of its long association with military history).⁵¹ Relevant to intelligence culture, Matey observes on the study of intelligence, that "[...] while there exists an implicit assumption that the study of intelligence falls within the realist field, contemporary Neo-realist writers have largely ignored

⁴⁸ However, the idea that theory seeks only to explain, is problematic. This proposition would fall on the AI Johnston side of the debate of explaining and understanding, and separating culture from behaviour to 'predict' state action.

⁴⁹ Michael Warner, "Building a Theory of Intelligence Systems," in *National Intelligence Systems: current research and future projects*, eds. Gregory Treverton and Wilhelm Agrell (New York : Cambridge University Press, 2009).

⁵⁰ Neorealism is a key structuralist account of security and international politics. *Neorealism versus Strategic Culture: A Debate*, eds. John K. Glenn, Darryl A. Howlett, Stuart Poore (Burlington, VT : Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2004). It also is a more recent form of Realism. While Realism and strategic culture's connections and oppositions have been studied, in *Neorealism Versus Strategic Culture*; while intelligence culture and Realism have not been systematically studied, therefore I take the criticisms and positions on strategic culture vs. Neorealism to be applicable to intelligence culture.

⁵¹ Realist state theory emphasizes the military element of state power (though Morgenthauian account power is comprised of multiple elements; Michael C. Williams, "Why Ideas matter in International Relations: Hans Morgenthau, classical realism, and the moral construction of power politics," *International Organization* 58, no. 4 (2004): 633-665.). Intelligence does not often figure prominently in Realist explanations of state action.

intelligence in their reflections.”⁵² Realists have often explained state behaviour and national security policy choices as a response to considerations of power and interest; and, further, argue that state action can be understood objectively – particularly in Neo-Realism.⁵³ For NeoRealists, intelligence (and national security) agencies are the product of their (international) environment or the international system—based on NeoRealist theory that the environment is the only consideration that shapes state behaviour.⁵⁴ NeoRealism posits that there is no need to examine the inner workings of the state, given that states, like firms in economic theory, merely respond to pressures of the external environment, with their ultimate goal always being to survive.⁵⁵ Thus intelligence services can be explained by the same international pressures. In classical Realism, national security apparatuses function on a realist imperative for states to either seize power or survive.⁵⁶ For both classic and NeoRealism, states accomplish these goals by ‘objectively’ assessing evident threats/opportunities and organizing the nation to respond to them.⁵⁷ This

⁵² Gustavo Diaz-Matey, “Intelligence Studies at the Dawn of the 21st Century: New Possibilities and Resources for a Recent Topic in International Relations,” *UNISCI Discussion Papers* 8 (May 2005), p2 <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=110259>. Mark Phythian does, in an Intelligence Studies collection, attempt to develop the premises of structural Realism but this is more an attempt to understand how intelligence functions in a structural realist paradigm than an importation of structural Realism to intelligence. Phythian argues that essentially, intelligence helps reduce uncertainty, and secrecy helps protect the state from others, thus in a ‘stable’ world, states still need intelligence because according to Neorealist propositions, war is always possible. Mark Phythian, “Intelligence Theory: key questions and debates” in *Intelligence Theory: Key Questions and Debates* ed. Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin and Mark Phythian (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009) p59/60.

⁵³ Hans Morgenthau described this in his ‘six principles of political Realism’ in Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Fifth Edition Revised, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978) p 4-15. Morgenthau was not a pure objectivist, nor do the variants of classical realism necessarily adopt a theory-fetishism characteristic of Waltz and Neo-Realism.

⁵⁴ Kenneth Waltz, “Anarchic orders and Balances of Power” in *Neorealism and Its Critics* ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York : Columbia University Press, 1986) p 102.

⁵⁵ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, (Reading, Mass. : Addison-Wesley, 1979). While Neorealism seeks only to explain the international distribution of power, as I note later, its approach has been applied to intelligence so that it is assumed that the development of intelligence services (as part of national power, International Relations and systemic distribution of capabilities) must also be explicable with reference to that same theory and assumption. See esp. Phythian, “Intelligence Theory: key questions and debates,” p 57-61.

⁵⁶ For one side, see John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001). For a discussion of the types of Realism, see Glenn H. Snyder, “Mearsheimer’s World-offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security: A review essay,” *International Security* 27, no. 1 (2002.): 149-173.

⁵⁷ Hans Morgenthau expounds the ‘scientific’ idea of Realism, in his “Six Principles of Scientific Realism”; Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*; however more on science and Realism are found in Robert Jervis, “Hans Morgenthau, Realism, and the Scientific Study of International Politics,” *Social Research* 61, no. 4 (1994). On the more complex history of Morgenthau and the community studying the ‘science of politics’, see Nicholas Rengger, “Realism, Tragedy, and the anti-Pelagian Imagination in International Political Thought,” in *Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations*, ed. Michael C. Williams (Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2007) p 124-126. See also Robert Jervis, “Hans Morgenthau, Realism, and the Scientific Study of International Politics,” *Social Research* 61, no. 4 (1994).

means that the behaviour of states or statesmen can be objectively understood, because they theoretically act on a shared objective assessment of the world. In IR this unsophisticated realist view is theoretically out of date. There have been many critiques of Realism's explanations of national security: that it explains very little, it does not reflect the real world, and is prescriptive not descriptive.⁵⁸ Moreover, objective assessments seem to rarely occur in real life, and the many flaws of bias, misperception and information processing cast doubt on the biological and psychological capability to "objectively" understand the world.

For NeoRealism, deviation from the expected 'realpolitik' is considered "epiphenomenal, a product, say, of the logic of anarchy."⁵⁹ Johnston points out a number of problematic aspects of the Realist response to cultural theory – that only 'deviant' non-Realist behavior is ideational (while Realist behavior is not), and that ideology is not considered in explaining behavior.⁶⁰ Moving to intelligence culture theory, we can see that it similarly rejects the assumption that state action can be understood 'objectively', as in NeoRealism.

Contra Realism, cultural explanations deem that state behaviour cannot be understood without reference to internal politics or culture. Intelligence culture explains intelligence thought and practice as the partial result of different cultural ways of thinking about intelligence. Essentially, it explains state (intelligence) behaviour or practice as 'encultured.'⁶¹ It rests on the constructivist proposal that our conception of intelligence is shared inter-subjectively – and cannot be an 'objective' response to the world, because each society creates its own image of the

⁵⁸ Robert W. Cox, "The Poverty of Neorealism," in *Neorealism and Its Critics*, eds. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).

⁵⁹ Al Johnston, "Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed Peter Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996): 216-268, p 217. Waltz does not posit Neorealism as a theory of foreign policy, but its adaptation by intelligence scholars to their theoretical purposes makes it applicable. The applicability of Neorealism to intelligence is discussed in footnote 45, this chapter.

⁶⁰ Al Johnston, "Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China," *Ibid*.

⁶¹ Colin Gray, "Strategic Culture as Context: the first generation of theory strikes back," *Review of International Studies* 25, no. 1 (1999): 49–69, P 52 (see note 8).

world in the process of representing it.⁶² There are two key interrelated arguments that demonstrate the Realism's paucity; the first is that the forces (of interest, power, survival) that buffet states are not actually real and measurable, but are partly of the state's own construction; the second, if the world cannot be understood based on objective forces apparent to theorists and statesmen alike, then national security policy cannot be understood as the result of an objective assessment of the external world.

Intelligence culture theory does not dispute the state motivation of power or survival. However, it stipulates that the avenues to power, or survival, that states 'see' are partly conditioned by the cultural parameters of their intelligence functions. As Alexander Wendt famously noted, the concept of anarchy is hollow: Anarchy is what we, and states, make of it. It is intelligence that helps states make something of the world.⁶³ Intelligence, security, power, and interest are all culturally specific constructions or articulations.

The second element of Realist theory is the 'objective' world component.⁶⁴ (Neo)Realists argue that state action can be studied objectively because this is how statesmen, who act for the state, understand the world.⁶⁵ If I can show this is not a plausible assumption, the Realist challenge to intelligence culture then becomes weak. An objective world is a direct contrary assumption to the principles of intelligence culture because an objective world assumes cultural differences are of no consequence, if they exist.

⁶² This is Weldes's argument about the construction of all types of state interests, in Jutta Weldes, "Constructing National Interests," *European Journal of International Relations* 2, no. 3 (1996): 275.

⁶³ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Makes of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (Spring, 1992): p. 391-425.

⁶⁴ Naturally, given the breadth of Realist writers and ontological positions, and variations on scientific, critical, pragmatic or 'external' realism have been offered as possible ontological positions. Emanuel Adler, "Constructivism in International Relations: Sources, Contributions and Debates," in *Handbook of International Relations* 2nd E (London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif. : Sage, 2013) p 13. The variants are discussed in: Joshua Rust, *John Searle* (London, UK: Continuum, 2009) p 1-13; John G. Gunnell, *Political Theory and Social Science: Cutting Against the Grain* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) p 63.

⁶⁵ See footnote 48 and 52 in this chapter; An important part of realist theory is the access granted to statesmen's thoughts and understanding by adopting a Realist view of the world. That is, jettisoning moral considerations, bias, and idealism, the Realist is able to access the same hard-headed, unprejudiced assessment that the statesman works on. This claim is meant to give Realism particular epistemological authority; by claiming that statesmen *only* think in a Realist (or 'realistic') manner- Realist theory thus has privileged access to their thoughts, which no other theory can claim. For Constructivists the claim to privileged access is a political one.

Intelligence culture theory disputes the Realist assumption of an uncomplicated, objective assessment of the world.⁶⁶ When meanings are socially constructed and nationally specific, there cannot be a shared ‘rational’ universal understanding of the world. Without this objective understanding, the Realist and NeoRealist models of state behaviour fall apart. The proof that the world is not objectively accessible can be found equally in Weldes and Kent. Discussed at the beginning of this chapter, Kent wanted to think a Soviet fetish for secrecy must have interfered with an objective assessment of the American response to Cuban missiles, but it is clear from decades of intelligence estimation that often adversaries, even with similar information, do not make the same assessments.⁶⁷ Simply put, if the world is objectively knowable to all (as Realists claim), intelligence has not been able to take advantage of this. Intelligence culture’s reasonable assumption is that national differences in culture prevent this objective understanding. Thus, understanding the cultural elements that shape policy is clearly an important theoretical avenue.

It may seem irrelevant to the conduct of intelligence (and to an objective world) whether or not our conception of it is constructed through shared meanings. However, just as Snyder and early strategic culturalists discovered, the assumption of a common objective view of the world had serious strategic consequences.⁶⁸ They found themselves puzzling over why the Soviets failed to act in the obvious way, and seemed to misunderstand their clear nuclear strategic signals. While it was the careful balance of terror that unearthed these revelations about the permanence of strategic culture, they are relevant to intelligence as well. The objective theory of Realist international politics had failed as theory fails to translate to real practice. Intelligence

⁶⁶ While the Wendtian “via media” can be claimed by Realists, Alexander Wendt’s discussion of the difficulties in matching the world to our labels (and the converse), evidences a belief in the complicated relationship between the world and understandings of it, in contrast. Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 1999), Chapters two, three and four.

⁶⁷ This is the principle behind Ernest R. May, *Knowing One’s Enemies: Intelligence Assessment Before The Two World Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University, 1986).

⁶⁸ Jack Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operation*, (Santa Monica, CA, RAND Corporation Report, 1977) p 1-4.

agencies teach analysts the dangers of believing everyone thinks similarly,⁶⁹ the fallacy of mirror imaging that Realists themselves failed to escape.

Competing Explanations: Challenges and Response

Essentially, strategic culture theory – with the proposition that cultures (beliefs, perceptions, doctrines, etc.), persist – defines itself explicitly *against* the Realist argument that states and statesmen merely respond to the world as they see it. However, other charges stand beside this core challenge. There are three that are noteworthy. First, that intelligence culture’s effects are the same as/explained by bureaucratic politics. Second, that actions linked to intelligence cultural explanations, are merely ‘rational;’ and third, that intelligence culture may persist, but ultimately do not affect policy or ‘outcomes.’

In response to the first challenge, I argue that bureaucratic politics (BP)⁷⁰ is a reflection of cultural persistence as well – bureaucratic conflicts reflect ideas embedded in institutions, specifically, habits, s.o.p.s, & etc. Finnemore and Barnett propose that “the characteristics of bureaucracies as a generic cultural form” shape thinking and behaviors, thus making bureaucratic politics continuous with bureaucratic culture.⁷¹ The BP argument transposes the Realist competition theory inside the state, to explain policy as a result of theoretically rational competitions and games for bureaucratic power and survival. Yet modern institutionalist theory

⁶⁹ To the Constructivist literature (as well as political economists, post-structuralists, and post-Marxists) ‘rationality’ is a Western construct bound up with the liberal (Judeo-Christian) autonomous individual or subject – exemplified in Foucault’s work (such as Philip Barker, *Michel Foucault: Subversions of the subject* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993). The state is a constructed institution, and thus, as Weldes and others show, the idea of rational objective interests, are actually formed by the process of articulation and interpellation, through which policymakers represent themselves and others and the world outside. To be clear, then, states do not have national interests as such – what an interest is, whether it is rational, what rationality counts as, who counts as representative of the state, depends on what kind of actor one is, one’s position in various matrices of power, etc. See Jutta Weldes, “Constructing National Interests,” p 275.

⁷⁰ Most famously, Graham Allison developed the theory in his *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, in which he compared explanations from the rational actor model, organizational process model, and bureaucratic politics or governmental politics model accounts of the Cuban Missile crisis decision-making (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).

⁷¹ Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations,” *International Organization* 53, no 04 (September 1999): 699-732, p 700 – 702.

is clear that bureaucratic competition is no more rational than state action is – it is the product of irrational (and possibly biased) groups – such as those depicted in groupthink theory.⁷²

Institutions themselves are seen as a form of embedded, or persisting, idea. Actors draw their institutional identities from these ideas, as the basis of their competition with other units.⁷³ Yet clearly, as with the international, this competition is not a fully rational one (nor does the goal of institutional survival sweep away the function of identity, culture, and embedded ideas).

Ultimately, the bureaucratic politics explanation of intelligence, specifically, is part of intelligence culture theory itself since bureaucratic identities shape and are shaped by cultural conceptions of intelligence. In part, bureaucratic struggles are battles over the defined space and allowable activities of ‘intelligence,’ and not separate from the national conception of intelligence.

Similarly, it becomes clear that the second challenge, that policy decisions are actually rational actions, or the product of a game theoretic process of pursuit of optimal outcomes, and the third challenge, that intelligence culture does not affect policy/outcomes, are essentially moot. Rational though actors may deem their policy choices, the parameters around what are possible policy choices, what the outcome of those choices are, and how they will purportedly affect the world, are defined partly in intelligence culture.⁷⁴ For example, in chapter four, on the Kent-Kendall debate, we will see two accounts of the ideas around intelligence policy – both asserting how intelligence “must be” conducted so that America’s position in the world will be secured. In chapter six, as well, the discussion of analogical-explanation details how intelligence policy analogies between Pearl Harbor and 9.11 helped define the stakes and consequences of

⁷² Jerel Rosati and James Scott, *The Politics of United States Foreign Policy* 5th Edition (Boston MA: Wadsworth, 2011) p 64.

⁷³ Colin Hay explores this in “Ideas and the Construction of Interests,” in *Ideas and Politics in Social Science Research*, eds. Daniel Beland and Robert Henry Cox (Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2011).

⁷⁴ Lina Eriksson, *Rational Choice Theory: Potential and Limits* (NY NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011) p 111.

policy and American actions, following the tragedy. Finally, it is evident that actors, even ‘rational’ ones pursuing utility, form their identities based on culturally specific articulations and interpellations (discussed in chapter two). The rationality of any action, in and of itself, is defined in cultural terms,⁷⁵ and thus, with reference to intelligence culture.

The third challenge, that neither policy, nor ‘outcomes’ are impacted by intelligence culture is the most difficult. This is because the standards for “ideas” making a causative impact are high, if not unreachable.⁷⁶ For if the inherently cultural nature of the perimeter of actions, and the identity of actors, is rejected – it is more difficult to show that specific policy cases reached a specific choice because of cultural factors. In chapter six, this dissertation discusses Khong, who, through extensive research on three cases, has shown that analogical explanation logic was not only a rhetorical justification in certain cases, but had a real impact on both the policy choices present, and the ultimate outcome.⁷⁷ Replicating Khong’s work, given the private meeting transcripts he uses, is difficult in intelligence. However, showing that intelligence culture – and specifically, culturally based analogical explanation – affected policy and outcomes, is possible. This is why chapter six makes two kinds of arguments; that overall the intelligence community has followed a pattern (of a certain kind of oppositional openness/secretcy) which conditions the limits and possibilities of the present intelligence community. This broad argument makes the case that American intelligence system as a whole is partly conditioned by cultural factors. The second argument is that looking to specific policy cases, suggested in this case by a content analysis of Pearl Harbor, particular outcomes cannot be explained without reference to a key

⁷⁵ Frédérique Apffel-Marglin, “Introduction: Rationality and the World,” in *Decolonizing Knowledge : From Development to Dialogue*, eds. Frédérique Apffel-Marglin, Stephen A. Marglin (Oxford : Clarendon Press; New York : Oxford University Press, 1996).

⁷⁶ Albert S. Yee, “The Causal Effects of Ideas on Policies,” *International Organization* 50, no. 1 (1996): 69-108, p 70.

⁷⁷ Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965* (Princeton University Press, 1992).

symbol in intelligence culture, Pearl Harbor. In the Pearl Harbor case, 9.11 Commissioners were instructed to, and did conceive their work in opposition to the result of the Pearl Harbor inquiries. Ultimately, the choices made to pursue a unanimous commission, because of this analogy, affected the shape of intelligence reform post 9.11.

Other challenges to intelligence culture theory may exist, but by showing both policy relevance (and overall systemic outcomes)—to answer the challenges of Realism and NeoRealism⁷⁸— and by investigating the intellectual, bureaucratic and cultural history and present of intelligence in a number of ways, to demonstrate its importance to cultural and constructivist theory, intelligence culture is shown to both exist and be relevant in a number of ways. This dissertation must do both to show that intelligence culture is an important avenue of study, for multiple types of scholarship.

Importance

I have discussed how intelligence culture theory can maintain claims to relevance, against competing explanations. If intelligence culture cannot merely be explained through rational action, bureaucratic politics, or objective behavior, this opens the possibility for these approaches, that intelligence culture does add something theoretically – something of potentially crucial importance. This leads to the ways this thesis shows that importance.

This dissertation, in attempting to adapt to the claims of Realist, constructivist and critical interpretations (in Intelligence Studies, IR and Strategic Studies) – shows the importance of intelligence culture in different ways. Glimpses of intelligence culture, in history, culture, definitions, narratives, are used in different ways to meet the different demands of importance.

⁷⁸ Arguably, one older tradition of International Relations as a whole sets the entire field the problem of the current world issues of the time. Christopher Hill, “Academic International Relations: The siren song of policy relevance,” in *Two Worlds of International Relations: Academics, Practitioners and the Trade in Ideas*, eds. Pamela Beshoff, Christopher Hill (New York, NY: Routledge, 1994) p 5.

To constructivist and critical theorists, the development of intelligence culture, with reference to institutions, in chapter three, and intellectual dialogue or discourses of chapter four are the necessary discursive basis research intelligence culture. They both expose the institutional and intellectual frameworks from the past and present which have become the persisting American intelligence cultures.

Chapter six builds a basic framework of current American intelligence, from Realist, constructivist, and more critical viewpoints (ranging from definitions, and norms, to warrants and narratives including popular culture). Chapter six demonstrates the importance of intelligence culture, in terms of its policy relevance and effect on behavior, through the study of Pearl Harbor. Realism's focus more on policy and material fact makes demonstrating the 'policy relevance' of any theory difficult.⁷⁹ However, chapter six attempts to follow existing studies in this regard (Johnston, Khong) by combining content analysis with other primary source research. Constructivism and critical Security Studies present a somewhat easier case for importance – in focusing on different parts of intellectual history, discourses, usage, imagery, definition, narratives and norms we can build foundation for discussion of discourses of intelligence, and for intelligence culture theory. These chapters and their connections are laid out below, in the dissertation plan.

The study of Pearl Harbor demonstrates the relevance, validity and importance of intelligence culture theory. It does two important things. As discussed, first, it establishes the actual usage of concepts of American intelligence culture. Second, the study also focuses on policy decisions and outcomes to address Realist challenges. The Pearl Harbor case shows Realist critics how intelligence culture interacts with policy – and its importance or relevance to

⁷⁹ Even Neorealism itself, by stressing structural power position, is criticized for its limited policy relevance. Michael Spiritas, "A House Divided: Tragedy and Evil in Realist Theory," *Security Studies* 5, no. 3 (March 1996): 385-423, p 395.

understanding policy as well as the elements of statecraft related to international relations. This chapter addresses the Realist test for policy importance, by showing where one idea from intelligence culture (Pearl Harbor) shapes policy decisions. It makes the case that intelligence culture also shapes reform efforts, and that it patterns American approaches to intelligence generally, therefore having an influential effect on the American intelligence system. Pearl Harbor, in large part, remains significant to American intelligence through the mobilization of PH in the 9.11 context; an event which is made significant in American intelligence through invocations of the aftermaths of Pearl Harbor, in a variety of ways still in current usage.

While the key focus of this dissertation is not policy relevance or policy decision, it must address the problem of culture as rhetorical (explained in the subsection of chapter two, *Symbolic vs. Operational Cultures*). The rhetorical contention is that cultural influences are secondary to real decision-making methods, such as rational choice, and so actors pay ‘lip-service’ to concepts but they play no part in the actor’s actual decision-making. While this problematic fetishizing of the independence of the actor has been addressed in IR’s great debates – it still remains to be shown that beyond the central areas in which this dissertation locates and analyzes intelligence culture (in definitions, symbols, language, intellectual history) intelligence culture is evident in policy decisions as well. For this reason, the examination of Pearl Harbor does not place policy relevance and decision-making at the centre of this dissertation, but instead tries to integrate it into a broader look at the shaping and constraining forces of intelligence culture in a variety of areas. Ultimately, for the Realist argument, looking at how the intelligence system was shaped by Pearl Harbor, and how policy decisions followed the contours of the lessons of Pearl Harbor can elide the ‘real actor’/rhetoric argument.⁸⁰ If policy choices, reform slates, and the patterning of the entire

⁸⁰ This is one of the reasons this thesis will eschew a common ‘norms’ approach – because it is not a matter of identifying a set of norms and predicting that they will be acted on – as Turner does, discussed in chapter two. Instead, intelligence culture’s persisting ideas shape actor’s own

American intelligence system all show the influence of persisting ideas from intelligence culture, the cultural aspects of intelligence become hard to dismiss as merely ‘rhetorical’.

Dissertation Plan

The goal of this thesis is a better understanding of intelligence and national security policy; the development of intelligence culture as a theoretically sound approach to comparative and domestic intelligence systems; and ultimately, the genesis of a research program that speaks to both IR and Intelligence Studies.

This study contains six chapters (including this introductory chapter one), with the conclusion as chapter seven. After this introduction, the second chapter situates intelligence culture theoretically, while the third does so institutionally, and the fourth, historically, tracing the main wellsprings of present American intelligence culture. The fifth frames collected elements of current US culture, as background to the sixth chapter, a study of the cultural symbol of Pearl Harbor as evidence of the impact of a national level intelligence culture symbol of American policy and practice.

The multi-perspective approach of the dissertation must accomplish a number of tasks to present a compelling case for the existence of American intelligence culture. The dissertation must work, theoretically, to construct, using strategic culture as a guideline and departure point, for an avenue in Intelligence Studies of culturally focused work which still answers to the tenets of constructivism, and also the more Realist determinations of influence and policy relevance. This theoretical function is largely begun in chapter one, but chapter five and six (and indeed throughout the dissertation), aim to bring the theoretical underpinnings constructed in chapter

one, through a series of approaches to demonstrating American intelligence culture. The multi-perspective approach must also build a historical background to American intelligence, through chapter three's description of the bureaucratic evolution of intelligence – as well as the following discussion of the intellectual evolution of American intelligence. The historical perspective of American intelligence is necessary to understanding how American intelligence culture comes to find significance in Pearl Harbor, both at the time of the attack and in the present in a number of ways, discussed in chapter six. The dissertation has a similar institutional approach, showing the development of the institutions that would become the (imagined and 'real') 'intelligence community' after Pearl Harbor, and the subsequent influences, in chapter six of the concepts around Pearl Harbor, on American intelligence education, policy, and reform and commissioneering. These perspectives are necessary to understanding intelligence culture because the historical work – that attempts to foreground assumptions about intelligence and hence the understandings around it rather than support an historical thesis – has not yet been done in intelligence history. The institutional accounts of intelligence services, while addressing the 'cultures' of law-enforcement intelligence against the other military and services, again, lack the links to how those cultures reflect varying ideations of intelligence itself, and the larger ideas of America's mission and role in the world. Finally, intelligence culture must be approached theoretically through this multi-perspective approach to elide a repetition of the early efforts of strategic culture, where the supposed behavioral results of strategic culture theory were joined to a basic understanding of key texts and limited grasp of the dynamics of ideas in institutions and policies, outside of the dynamic of group socialization.

This thesis ultimately demonstrates the impact of intelligence culture on the progression of the intelligence system as a whole in America, and on intelligence and national security policy

specifically. While it is not a thesis about Pearl Harbor as such, the selected study provides enough evidence to suggest that intelligence culture needs to be developed as a further line of study between Intelligence Studies and International Relations. The plan of the dissertation demonstrates this progression, and shows how each chapter is a necessary support to the central thesis— *that the ‘national level’ intelligence culture has had real effects on American intelligence*. It is the pattern of the broader American intelligence system and shapes and constrains intelligence reform. Additionally, even the Realist challenge – that it must show effects national security and intelligence policy – is met. Intelligence culture answers A.I. Johnston’s challenge for cultural studies to trace how discourses and symbolic language have actually functioned to narrow debate, and limit policy options.⁸¹

The second chapter delineates the theory behind the intelligence culture concept. It outlines the existing literature on intelligence cultures, and the nature of selected key approaches. It also introduces theoretical additions to the sometimes methodologically unsound intelligence culture scholarship, by combining the insights of the security imaginary heuristic to the standard strategic culture approach. After describing the Gray-Johnston debate, I explicate my own typology of two models of intelligence culture – one where either the use or rejection of intelligence forms an intelligence culture, and the other where only a developed use of intelligence forms an intelligence culture (Type 1 and Type 2). This chapter concludes with methodological considerations, case selection, and competing explanations for intelligence culture. This chapter argues in essence that existing approaches in Intelligence Studies are not suitable to explore intelligence culture. Ultimately, the intelligence culture concept, developed through the addition of the security imaginary heuristic, better explains the origins of some national security and intelligence policy and practice than competing explanations, and more

⁸¹ Johnston, *Cultural Realism*, p18.

importantly, it is an understudied area that must be explored to fully realize any theory of modern International Relations and intelligence policymaking.

Chapter three describes the historical and present components of the American intelligence community. From the evolution of intelligence from the first days of the Republic, through the Civil War, and World Wars, through 9.11 to the present, key events in intelligence are sketched briefly. This history is intended as a subject introduction, and to outline the different ways the pieces of the modern intelligence community fit together. This helps to show how intelligence cultures can arise from multiple sources, illuminating the security imaginary heuristic, and it suggests certain themes that are articulated in intelligence culture.

From the second chapter's theoretical outline of intelligence culture, and the third chapter's historical account – the following chapter, chapter four, introduces one of the more important episodes in the intellectual history of domestic American intelligence culture. In it, the functional aspect of intelligence is bracketed to focus on intelligence as knowledge. This narrowing allows the chapter to frame an intellectual history of the central ideas of American intelligence culture as a series of articulations and counter-articulations in kind. Sherman Kent and Wilmoore Kendall are representative of the two enduring schools of thought about predictive/estimative American intelligence knowledge.⁸² This chapter discusses their distinct ideas of intelligence knowledge, and the constellation of assumptions dictated by their opposing concepts. Kent is representative of what has been called a 'ticker tape' view of the world where the collections of knowledge and facts unmolested by politics can approach a perfect understanding of the record of history, and thus gain better and better prediction of the future. I

⁸² This chapter focuses on the intelligence disciplines that seek to know the world (as opposed to those which act in it), particularly estimation, or warning: Sharfman defines warning intelligence as "a prediction that the probability of an unwanted event taking place has risen above the noise level..." and estimative intelligence to be products prepared, unlike current intelligence, regarding longer periods of time. Peter Sharfman, "Intelligence Analysis in an Age of Electronic Dissemination," *Intelligence and National Security* 10, no. 4 (1995): 201-211, p 207-8.

show that Kendallian critics see this as unnecessary because, they argue, superior prediction does not win wars, and most importantly, American policymakers already understand the threats America faces and are best able to direct intelligence towards opportunities to further its global policies. These two schools of thought have remained relevant throughout modern American intelligence history, and function as backdrop to chapter five and six discussing current intelligence culture and one element of it, Pearl Harbor. Their contentions allow us to understand the origins of the disparate elements of current American intelligence culture in terms of a whole set of assumptions, something that is otherwise lost in contemporary descriptions.

In chapter five I show that American intelligence culture has a number of unique elements, examined through three ‘cuts’ at intelligence culture (definitions, norms and narratives). American definitions particularly emphasize covert action, secrecy, and a foreign/domestic intelligence divide. These become more evident in American norms of intelligence, where I show that a central tension in American intelligence is actually a conflict between the particularly American version of democratic norms of checks and balances, and the American intelligence normative area of secrecy. I conclude by describing how these articulations become part of a number of historical narratives of American intelligence. Pearl Harbor, positioned narratively as the origin of American intelligence, is one kind of warrant for US intelligence (others warrants include public support, tradition, institutionalization, etc.). These warrants become necessary in US intelligence culture because of the inherent suspicion of secret activities and the accumulation of power. This begins to indicate the enormous symbolic weight Pearl Harbor has accumulated. Overall, this chapter’s description of current intelligence culture – through definitions, norms, and narratives– alongside the previous chapter’s discussion of the selected intellectual history of intelligence culture from Pearl Harbor to present, forms the

basis for the content analysis in chapter six of a central national symbol in intelligence culture: Pearl Harbor itself.

Finally, in chapter six I take up the challenge of demonstrating the real influence of cultural ideas and articulations of intelligence culture. I argue that the influence of Pearl Harbor, a national level aspect of intelligence culture, can be demonstrated in both indirect, patterning influences on American intelligence, and direct reform choices made based on analogies between 9.11 and PH. This is a proof-of-concept for my vision of intelligence culture theory. Both these indirect and direct influences have ‘real’ impacts – choices made based on the Pearl Harbor analogy/symbol resulted in different outcomes than in the absence of these ideas of intelligence. To show this, I conducted a content analysis of the major journals in the literature, with references coded into seven categories (series or case, place, time marker, hearings/inquiries/commissions, Wohlstetter, event, and future PH/other analogy). The methodology for this study is for the most part discussed in chapter six, supplementary of the general theory and methodology section of the first chapter, to allow a more detailed discussion.

This content analysis used Khong’s influential Analogical Explanation framework to first show that the PH/9.11 analogy remains relevant in intelligence culture. In the hearings/inquiries/commissions category I then used further research to show that intelligence culture conceptualizations of Pearl Harbor contributed to both direct and indirect influences on American policy and practice. Pearl Harbor’s lessons have had an indirect influence on intelligence education, scholarship, and the power of conspiracists and skeptics. Overall, this might be seen as a patterning effect on the tradition of openness in America in general. The direct influences are even more interesting: primary sources from 9.11 inquiries demonstrate that the commission was explicitly directed to avoid the path of the Pearl Harbor inquiries. This

direct influence was expressed in two ways; the need to have a single unanimous commission (at the time the initial *Joint Inquiry* suggested a possible PH like fragmentation), and to avoid the issue of personal responsibility. This essentially meant that the 9.11 Commissioners were directed to avoid the question of blame and to present a single report (without dissents).

This chapter also explains the theory of commission influence and commission types to show how the direction to a unanimous commission shaped the slate of recommendations for reform. The DNI (Director of National Intelligence) post is typical of the 9.11 Commission reforms, and demonstrates the thesis that a unanimous commission resulted in ‘shallow’ and only tried reforms. The commission’s choices also stunted examination of the real causes of the attack; while the PH inquiries were the genesis of American intelligence scholarship and education, the 9.11 inquiries may be a detriment to future scholarship. Whether or not the influence of the PH analogy was pernicious or beneficial, the fact of its influence in these multiple ways will demonstrate the proposition that ideas about intelligence – intelligence cultures– are not just rhetoric. ‘Pearl Harbors’ can have as much influence in intelligence policy as did the ‘dominoes’ and ‘Munichs’ of the last century’s foreign policy discourse. They are critical to both shaping, and to our understanding of the shaping, of the nation’s intelligence system and intelligence services. Based on this research, I assert that intelligence culture has had a discernible impact on the course of American intelligence, in a number of ways, (direct and indirect) and in a number of venues (policy, scholarship, reforms, investigations and commissions). It is also the context for all intelligence thought and practice. In this way the chapter attempts a causal argument, in terms of the analogy’s lessons limiting and directing policy choices, and then through commission type to reform; it also makes a broader constitutive

argument that the policies and reforms could not have been conceived or made possible in the absence of the lessons and meanings of PH for intelligence.

In the conclusion to this thesis, as the final chapter, I return to the broader question of the future of intelligence culture research and intelligence culture in general. I argue that further research in intelligence culture can be fruitful in a number of areas, and is necessary to help Intelligence Studies deepen its research program. This conclusion looks towards the post 9.11 changes to intelligence, and suggests that we integrate a new understanding of intelligence, and intelligence culture, towards theories of security. In this way, like Pearl Harbor, 9.11 marks a new 'origin point' for intelligence. As intelligence's place in statecraft shifts, our old ideas and debates—our intelligence cultures—will be challenged and shift as we continue to create the post-9.11 world. I hope to suggest that intelligence culture theory will be a useful tool in the new information-centric and intelligence oriented practice of security.

(Chapter Two) Intelligence Culture, Theory and Methods

Introduction

This chapter discusses intelligence culture theory, analogous literatures, and methods. It expands the discussion of the previous chapter on the theoretical and disciplinary bases for intelligence culture. It first reiterates the approach of this dissertation. Subsequently, the two major parts of this chapter outline the proposition that, given the non-existence of an explicit and developed “intelligence culture” literature (discussed below), intelligence culture can be situated in two ways. First, this thesis can be situated with works in a similar vein, in my own typology of the two kinds of approaches to intelligence culture. Second, this thesis discusses the necessary lessons and precautions drawn from strategic culture debates, because of their close relationship to intelligence culture theory. Intelligence culture is thereby situated with respect to its closest extant literature, but with careful distinctions about the similarities and differences. Next, the theoretically antecedents of my own approach are outlined, in terms of the security imaginary heuristic, as well as interpellation and articulation. Finally, the methods and methodological justifications for the selection of the different chapters, which were discussed in chapter one, are explained with greater detail.

Persisting ideas of intelligence are the basis for our construction of the American term, intelligence. If intelligence culture consists of persisting ideas of intelligence – we must answer the questions: Which ones ? And how ? And finally, what is their influence ? This dissertation takes seriously the task of answering these questions with appropriate evidence and analysis; it begins with the theory of these persisting ideas as central to interpellative identity and broadly in articulation. It follows by outlining the institutional context of these ideas as institutions

represent and superintend embedded conceptions of intelligence; the intellectual history of the prominent worldviews of intelligence then show the packages of assumptions and ontologies behind intelligence culture, while the current culture is outlined in a number of disparate areas, subsequently. Finally, Pearl Harbor is studied as a clear, widely shared, national symbol of intelligence. The content analysis and study of Pearl Harbor demonstrates the ways these persisting ideas shape outcomes over the long term (such as education and commissions), and in the short term policy debates that can result in intelligence reform. Thus these ‘inconsequential’ persisting ideas of intelligence form the concept actors use to describe intelligence, and determine its meaning and its place. They direct and constrain reform, make possible certain actions, and lend authority and credence to certain courses of actions, with suggestions about the shape of the future – as many central concepts, such as security, power, freedom, and democracy, do.⁸³

To demonstrate intelligence culture exists, this chapter lays out the theoretical basis of intelligence culture theory, the methodology appropriate to its study, and the specific choices required to study American intelligence culture, given a dearth of writing on the subject, or adopting a useful approach. Briefly, this chapter will address theory construction, the theories and methods appropriate to study American intelligence culture, and the importance of exploring in depth a widely shared element of American intelligence culture.⁸⁴ As discussed in the

⁸³ Freeden discusses these semi-plastic ‘adjacent’ concepts; Michael Freeden, “Ideology and Political Theory,” *Journal of Political Ideologies* 11, no. 1 (February 2006): 3–22, p16. These are some of the core contentions of Foucaultian and other strands of discourse theory, of the power nexus inherent in these kinds of concepts and discourses; for example, Judith Butler in *Gender Trouble*, (New York: Routledge, 1990); and Foucault, “Discourse on language,” in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (New York: Pantheon, 1972) p.215-238.

⁸⁴ Interestingly, Isabelle Duyvesteyn suggests “Methodologically, the process of intelligence would lend itself very well to a thorough comparison of the role of culture; since ‘[i]t provides a setting in which one can realistically expect to see through different implementations of the common tasks of “doing” intelligence the role of culture providing influences, orientations and expectations that cannot be reduced to the internal logic of those tasks’. The role of culture can thus be seemingly logically derived by careful analysis of intelligence processes” in “Intelligence and Strategic Culture: Some Observations,” p 524. This kind of focused comparison (presumably from Alexander George’s methods) could be used, but has tended to not be the substance of the majority of

introduction (the previous chapter), in exploring the wellsprings and sources of American intelligence culture, this thesis takes a new approach. Instead of memoir and personal reflection, as many studies have been to present, the idea of intelligence culture is stabilized through a rigorous research methodology and textual content analysis. In this way intelligence culture can claim to be an academic avenue of study with repeatable results.

This dissertation has three core areas; intelligence culture theory, American intelligence culture, and Pearl Harbor, discussed below.

Intelligence Culture Theory

To make a theoretically sound study, I construct a vision of intelligence culture as a fusion of strategic culture theory and the security imaginary heuristic. This is an important advance for Intelligence Studies. Fry & Hochstein write that, compared to Intelligence Studies, "... the international relations community of social scientists is serious, and explicitly so, about theory, and about method."⁸⁵ Utilizing these two distinct approaches provides a more secure and coherent base to avoid the epistemological pitfalls of strategic culture theory alone, and advance theory and methodology in Intelligence Studies. The contribution of this section is to encourage intelligence culture studies towards a focus on how articulations are actually in use, that is, less on putative sources of intelligence culture, and more on *how* in a variety of ways, ideas affect decisions, policy, interactions, based on a well-researched understanding of current usage.

strategic culture work. Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured Focused Comparison," in *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy*, eds. Paul Gordon Lauren, (New York: Free Press, 1979), p 43-68.

⁸⁵ Fry & Hochstein, "Epistemic Communities," p 18.

American Intelligence Culture

Using this combined theoretical model, a description of intelligence culture and its philosophical roots is adapted for the United States of America. The key challenge in describing intelligence culture is to ensure a repeatable and rigorous study. I have gathered and analyzed common elements of description of intelligence culture. This serves as preface to my research on Pearl Harbor—combining an intertextual approach to intellectual history, and content analysis, looking at real usages instead of anecdotal evidence.⁸⁶ I use the debate between Sherman Kent and Wilmoore Kendall, in chapter four as an entry point to currents in intelligence culture in America.⁸⁷ Following this intellectual history of present debates, and the general history of chapter three, this study explores the current American intelligence culture. Current intelligence culture must be understood to theorize what impact it might have on policy and practice.

Pearl Harbor Content Analysis and Cultural Symbol

Pearl Harbor (PH) is the centre of my content analysis of persisting intelligence ideas and articulations. It is also a test case of the methods of intelligence culture. As one of the central “national tragedies or traumas” in intelligence,⁸⁸ and I would argue that its influence

⁸⁶ This refers to the common criticism of the strategic culture literature, discussed in the section below “Methods and Evidence” of post-hoc analysis and a lack of discussion of multiple texts.

⁸⁷ Some describe the Kent-Kendall debate as a straw man, but its articulation as a ‘debate’ actually provides fresh insight into the contradictory influences in American intelligence culture, regardless of the two men’s own intellectual engagement. Paraphrasing Robert Cox’s famous phrase, it is made to be a ‘debate’ by someone, for some purpose.

⁸⁸ Philip Davies, “Divergent National Concepts and Institutions,” *Harvard International Review* 24, no. 3: 62-66.

indicates both the linkages and disjunctures of intelligence in the post-911 era to its historic past. While this is discussed more fully in chapter five and six, PH is a suitable cultural symbol because it contains a number of meanings; it has multiple articulations that indicate its varied and continued relevance to American intelligence. It shows that policy ideas can have traceable direct and indirect effects.

While I have highlighted here the three tasks of this dissertation—elaborating theory and methods, advancing the study of intelligence culture, and demonstrating this approach in a content analysis and in-depth study of the cultural symbol of Pearl Harbor, further chapter plans are discussed more fully in the dissertation plan at the end of the previous chapter.

1 Intelligence Culture: Methods and Approaches and Cultural Theory

The subsequent parts of this chapter will argue that the existing understandings of intelligence through Intelligence Studies are insufficient to explain differences in approaches to intelligence. The first section will explain the state of the field of intelligence culture: it situates this work in the scant existing intelligence culture scholarship. It also discusses the importance of intelligence culture in International Relations. Subsequently, I explain my own typology of the two kinds of work on intelligence culture. The following section then discusses strategic culture and the security imaginary heuristic as the two necessary bases to intelligence culture theory. Strategic culture theory and the Gray-Johnston debate are explained in greater depth, alongside the mistakes and lessons we can draw from strategic culture literature for the betterment of intelligence culture theory. Gray sees culture as context, opposing Johnston's separation of culture and behavior; Gray's model is defended in this thesis. I thus show how strategic culture theory can be applied to intelligence. The final section explains contending

methodologies and concludes by discussing the idea of ‘national’ intelligence culture.

Intelligence culture as a relatively new avenue of study has yet to solidify interdisciplinary ties. Yet it might form part of the advance of cultural theory in Intelligence Studies. I briefly explore what might become of its place in the research programs of IR and Intelligence Studies.

The concept of intelligence culture has recently come into more widespread use for the examination of intelligence failures, problems with strategic intelligence systems,⁸⁹ as well as democratic transitions and security sector reform (SSR).⁹⁰ Current works include various articles from Lemozy and Swenson,⁹¹ Bean,⁹² Turner,⁹³ and others, as well as a plethora of items on intelligence sharing and cooperation and work on intelligence organizational cultures,⁹⁴ including a series by Philip Davies.⁹⁵ Work on the development of American “intelligence community” organizational cultures, also includes, to some extent, Ferch and Marchetti and

⁸⁹ This work is not specific to strategic intelligence alone, however it does have more applicability towards it (particularly in light of past work that looks at normative or cultural factors to explain American comparative lack of strategic or long term intelligence. See Adda B. Bozeman, “Introduction,” *Strategic Intelligence and Statecraft: Selected Essays* (Washington: Brassey's, 1992) p 24).

Crocker also writes “...the notion of strategic surprise deriving from ‘intelligence failure’ is often misleading when the real problem lies in leadership style and bureaucratic culture” in “Reflections on Strategic Surprise,” in *The Impenetrable Fog of War: Reflections on Modern Warfare and Strategic Surprise*, ed. Patrick M Cronin (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International 2008) p 177-185. I will also not deal with what has been called cultural intelligence, from the disciplinary anthropological study, now in fashion with the military.

⁹⁰ For example, Matei and Bruneau have analyzed seven democratizing countries (Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Poland, Romania,

Spain, and Russia) and their experiences institutionalizing democratic intelligence. Florina Cristiana Matei and Thomas C. Bruneau, “Policymakers and Intelligence Reform in the New Democracies,” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 24, no. 4 (2011): 656–691, p 657. In the literature on control of intelligence in democratic societies is also well established is an interesting piece that is on the edge between the two which discusses changes in Portuguese intelligence after 9.11. Maria Do Ce‘u Pinto, “Portugal’s Intelligence Evolution in the Post-9/11 World,” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 25, no 2 (2012): 160–177.

⁹¹ Susana C. Lemozy, and Russell G. Swenson, *Democratization of Intelligence: Melding Strategic Intelligence and National Discourse* (Washington: National Defense Institute College, 2009).

⁹² Bean, “United States Intelligence Cultures.”

⁹³ Turner, “A Distinctive U.S. Intelligence Identity,” p 42-61.

⁹⁴ For a list see Bean’s entry for “United States Intelligence Cultures” in *The International Studies Encyclopedia*, *op. cit.*

⁹⁵ Davies, “Ideas of Intelligence,” and Philip H.J Davies, “Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure in Britain and the United States,” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 17, no. 3 (Oct. 2004): 495-520; and Philip H.J. Davies, “Organizational Politics and the Development of Britain’s Intelligence Producer/Consumer Interface,” *Intelligence and National Security* 10, no. 4 (Oct 1995).

Marks.⁹⁶ A secondary vein in Bean's other work is the use of "culture" in intelligence agency and related departmental literature, which are similar to private sector accountings of corporate culture, and maintain a relationship to the practices of the organization but are also part of an intervening discourse on accountability, efficiency, produced for public consumption.⁹⁷ Discussed in chapter one, different work on intelligence culture exists in different levels and areas; much of it is primary "data" in Bean's assessment, useful as primary source material but essentially unreflective or a-theoretical.

Although all these can be said to comprise body of literature on "intelligence culture," what might be called the research program of this subject has developed in fits and starts and is less than coherent in its infancy. To this point an intelligence culture literature, as such, comparable to the strategic culture literature, did not exist (nor does it).

To begin with, as discussed in chapter one, there is a need for new theories in Intelligence Studies, with interdisciplinary attention to the most current and sophisticated approaches to studying culture (because of the few interdisciplinary ones).⁹⁸ Ontologically and epistemologically, I situate this work in constructivist approaches to security. As explored in chapter two on the intellectual history of American intelligence, the congruence of certain "packages" of ontology and epistemology in intelligence makes it is important to set out my own situation explicitly. This adopts the constructivist position of a Wendtian "via media," based in scientific realism (also known as philosophical realism).⁹⁹ Philosophical scientific realism argues for a material basis for our understanding of the world, but shows that there can be no one-to-one

⁹⁶ J.A. Ferch, "Ossification in Organizational Cultures," *Studies in Intelligence* 34, 11-15; Marchetti, and Marks, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*. Bean considers these the early contributions to organizational intelligence culture theory. Additionally cited for specific areas are; Cooper, Treverton, Jones, Garciano and Posner, Tucker, Diamond, Keyton, Berkowitz, Mouton, Wirtz, Green, Boardman. Cited in Bean, "United States Intelligence Cultures."

⁹⁷ Hamilton Bean, "Organizational Culture and US Intelligence Affairs," *Journal of Intelligence and National Security* 24, no. 4 (2009): 479-498, p 488-89, 496-8.

⁹⁸ Intelligence Studies requires new theories for its long lamented 'under-theorization'; high profile attempts have being made, by Sims, Phythian, Gill, and others.

⁹⁹ Not to be confused with political Realism from International Relations scholarship.

correspondence of the terms we use and the material “facts” of the world.¹⁰⁰ Our labels are corrected, at times, by the qualities of material reality, but they will never come to perfectly correspond. Part of the commitment to scientific realism is the epistemic access to unobservables, in addition to material facts, through abductive inference. This also recognizes that what constitute discourses are the meanings humans attach to the non-material, which are at a remove from such correction. In general— following constructivists, particularly Alexander Wendt—I agree that the epistemology of a reality easily and uncomplicatedly perceived is false.¹⁰¹ Ideational theory is necessary to fully study security.

As discussed in chapter one, Intelligence Studies can benefit from the constructivist advances in IR theory; to begin with, cultural theory must be established in a field where constructivism is an untried theory for many. Historically, intelligence has had an uneasy relationship with (or recalcitrance to) theory, and where theory has developed, it has generally been consistent with Realist thought and the rationalist paradigm.¹⁰² Too often, scholars both in traditional Security Studies and Intelligence Studies assume that only “empirical” work is relevant for the advancement of knowledge, and by implication intimate that reflectivist work is not empirical and therefore not useful.¹⁰³ The oft-repeated criticism that ideational work denies the “real world” and leads to nihilism is simply a reflection of a scholarly attempt to denigrate a

¹⁰⁰ Andrew Sayer, “Introduction” *Method in Social Science* 2nd Ed (New York: Routledge, 1992).

¹⁰¹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*. And see for examples of philosophical realism, ex. Sayer, *Method in Social Science* and on the recalcitrance of intelligence to all theory, see in general Der Derian, *Antidiplomacy*.

¹⁰² Jennifer Sims, “The Theory and Philosophy of Intelligence,” in *Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies*, eds. Robert Dover, Michael S. Goodman, Claudia Hillebrand (Routledge, 2013) p 4.

¹⁰³ Fry & Hochstein write that political scientists – presumably in America- generally do empirical work, and those outside, who have “left the realist paradigm so much of Intelligence Studies seems to be an enterprise of diminishing intellectual relevance.” While this assessment may be slightly dated, it is still relevant. Fry & Hochstein, “Epistemic communities,” p 15, 18. A 2005 discussion paper, remarking on the currency of Fry and Hochstein, notes “Intelligence is all but absent, in the work of most International Relations theorists and it does not figure in any key International relations theory debates between realist, liberal, institutionalism, constructivist and postmodernist approaches.” Diaz-Matey, “Intelligence Studies at the Dawn of the 21st Century.”

challenger to academic authority.¹⁰⁴ Studying intelligence “culture” does not mean knowledge cannot be generalized, or that a post-structuralist idea of a world of meaning unconnected to the material must be adopted.¹⁰⁵

The intelligence culture approach is not a threat to the development of intelligence theory or comparative Intelligence Studies.¹⁰⁶ In fact, it encourages comparisons of intelligence systems by recognizing the differences that result among states, even with similar institutions.¹⁰⁷ Works that emphasize building a theory of intelligence are not threatened by the integration of culture, which can be understood systematically as well. For example, Warner’s Intelligence Systems theory explicitly mentions culture as a value of variances in strategy (alongside regime type, etc.).¹⁰⁸ Moreover, whether they are labeled organizational culture and bureaucratic culture or national “styles,” ideas and beliefs inevitably affect the functioning of all aspects of

¹⁰⁴ Felipe Krause Dornelles, “Postmodernism and IR: From Disparate Critiques to a Coherent Theory of Global Politics,” *Global Politics Network* 19 (2002) p10.

¹⁰⁵ See Andrew Rathmell, “Towards Postmodern Intelligence,” *Intelligence and National Security* 17, no. 3 (2002): 87-104.

¹⁰⁶ Ernest May’s *Knowing One’s Enemies* is one of the most famous. Comparative work has its own difficulties: Peter Gill, “**Knowing the Self, Knowing the Other”: the Comparative Analysis of Security Intelligence,**” in the *Handbook of Intelligence Studies*, ed. Loch Johnson (New York: Routledge, 2007) p 88, writes on issues in comparative studies as applied to intelligence. O’Connell’s “Thinking About Intelligence Comparatively” also illustrates the possibilities for comparison (drawn from Loch Johnston’s original framework), including a variety of organizational factors common to the public and private sector (cohesion, size, budget, management) and those relevant for intelligence (government use of intelligence, operational emphasis, national security contexts); Kevin M O’Connell, “Thinking About Intelligence Comparatively,” *Brown Journal of World Affairs* 11, no 1. (2004): p 195/196. More ethnographic work includes, for example Rob Johnston, *Analytic Culture in the US Intelligence Community: An Ethnographic Study* (Washington, DC: Center For The Study Of Intelligence, 2005); and Bridget Rose Nolan, “Information Sharing and Collaboration in the United States Intelligence Community: an ethnographic study of the National Counterterrorism Center,” (PhD diss., Princeton University, 2013) has also contributed, but O’Connell’s judgment seems accurate that “We must include more sophisticated sociological, cultural and psychological underpinnings of how different countries conduct intelligence,” *op. cit.* p 197. Comparative studies are less able to capture more ephemeral cultural elements, and ‘Pearl Harbors’ will of necessity not be shared. For this reason comparative Intelligence Studies are key for determining the bases for differences in approaches to intelligence, but less apt for the study of culture.

¹⁰⁷ Intelligence studies has begun recognize the importance of studying intelligence practice and policy over focusing

on reforming institutions, see Jennifer E. Sims and Burton L. Gerber, *Transforming US intelligence*, (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005).

¹⁰⁸ Michael Warner, “The Rise of the US Intelligence System,” in *The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence*, ed. Loch Johnson, (Oxford, 2010); see also O’Connell, “Thinking About Intelligence Comparatively,”; Warner, “Building a Theory of Intelligence Systems.”

human society.¹⁰⁹ Intelligence studies cannot remove itself from the “cultural” turn that has taken firm hold in security studies and IR, nor should it remove itself from these developments.

This need for cultural theory is the fundamental reason why Intelligence Studies’ existing work cannot explain differences in national approaches, or provide a true understanding of the shaping of national intelligence systems. The lack of cultural theory means the field resists unearthing cultural differences, which is something not captured in comparative Intelligence Studies—for example, see the section in this chapter on methodology. This prevents Intelligence Studies from fully conceptualizing national differences appropriately.

2 Intelligence Culture - Current Theory and Work

This section introduces intelligence culture writings and theory. As noted, work under the rubric of intelligence culture has gained recent attention. However, it does not comprise a literature, of a handful of works from a scant few authors. Current work on the subject of intelligence culture has a variety of underlying (and already developed) theories to draw from. These include the plethora of cultural approaches to security, both new—the culturalist turn in Security Studies¹¹⁰ and more recent critical security work¹¹¹—and old—the ‘national styles of warfare’ and ‘grand strategy’ work.¹¹² For example, A.I. Johnston goes back to the 4th century

¹⁰⁹ Geertz, Mead and other anthropologists and sociologists point out that our most ‘secure’ and treasured institutions, war, money, marriage, and the state, are all ideational—and that culture has always been the context to all human action (see Geertz’ famous discussion of thick description, on winking, blinking, etc). Clifford Geertz, “Thick Description,” p 215.

¹¹⁰ Allan Bloomfield, “Time to Move On: Reconceptualizing the Strategic Culture Debate,” citing Yoseph Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996).

¹¹¹ For example, securitization theory deals with national security professions and publics, and occasionally intelligence institutions (though intelligence is not often a primary focus of securitization) For example, Thierry Balzacq, “The Policy Tools

of Securitization: Information Exchange, EU Foreign and Interior Policies,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 46, no. 1 (2008): 75-100 and Kyle Grayson, “Securitization and the Boomerang Debate: A rejoinder to Liotta and Smith-Windsor,” *Security Dialogue* 34, no. 3 (2003): 337-343 both critical security scholars, mention intelligence but without extended discussion in the context of securitization.

¹¹² Christian Büger and Frank Gadingerm “Culture, Terror and Practice in International Relations: An Invitation to

BC to claim Wu Zi's *Art of War* as one of the first analyses of national style of warfare. As a survey of existing work on intelligence culture, I begin by describing how I understand the two major works on types of approaches to intelligence culture, and their use of differing, existing, theoretical models.¹¹³ I then turn to explore the security imaginary heuristic and strategic culture theory, which together form the theoretical basis of my work on intelligence culture due to the methodological deficiencies in existing approaches.

Intelligence Culture Approaches: A Typology

Culture is a somewhat amorphous term,¹¹⁴ but for the purposes of this study I use culture to mean shared codes or systems of meaning.¹¹⁵ I do not narrow it in function to a delimitation of means, or a set of ranked preferences. Intelligence is not defined for the purposes of this thesis because the definition reflects intelligence culture itself (definitions from the field are discussed in chapter five).¹¹⁶ The primary agents of concern are those socialized into intelligence culture and those civilians and practitioners involved in the intelligence process and policy. However, elements of popular culture are also of importance; pop culture represents both public and private fears and fantasies of intelligence, which may

Practice Theory" (Paper presented at workshop "The (Re-)turn to Practice: Thinking Practices in International Relations and Security Studies", European University Institute, Florence/Italy 18-19 May, 2007).

¹¹³ This is a division of my own analysis.

¹¹⁴ A.I. Johnston, *Cultural Realism*, (Footnote 24 p 24).

¹¹⁵ Following Clifford Geertz, in A.I. Johnston, *Cultural Realism*, *ibid*.

¹¹⁶ The American definition of intelligence is parsed in chapter five, and the debates that lead to these definitional distinctions are explored in chapter four (the Kent-Kendall debate). The terms of the definition also can be seen as a product of the historical evolution of American intelligence organizations, discussed in chapter three. I do not define intelligence here *de novo* because the essence of this argument is that intelligence culture is formed from (re)articulations, which can shift over time. The definition of intelligence is essentially culturally constructed. To define it would undermine the project's search for its meaning. As an aside, functionally, many current definitions agree with Kent's classic definition of intelligence as process and product; Sherman Kent, "Prospects for the National Intelligence Service," *Yale Review* 36 (Autumn 1946), p. 117.

influence the overall culture of intelligence.¹¹⁷ Dover and others have shown that from the TV show *24* to the so-called “invasion” novels about covert German attacks (*The Battle of Dorking*) to *Spooks* in the present-day, popular cultural forms “help create the reality they operate in.”¹¹⁸ This means that popular and elite cultures are both relevant. I define intelligence culture by explaining the common uses of the term. I have also created a typology of their broad differences. Collecting and categorizing the variety of approaches that might be labeled as intelligence culture, I differentiate between two types of studies, based on my own survey of the existing literatures of various kinds. Both are valuable avenues of study and have been academically fruitful. I will not therefore offer a *study of definitions* of intelligence culture in this chapter, because they vary according to the type of study, assumptions, and levels chosen. The nature of definitions of intelligence are explored as cultural artifacts in chapter five. Generally, however, from the strategic culture literature, we could say that following Snyder’s original formulation of strategic culture, intelligence culture is “a set of general beliefs, attitudes, and behavior patterns... [that have] achieved a state of semi-permanence that places them on the level of ‘cultural’ rather than mere policy....”¹¹⁹ Or more simply, at the national

¹¹⁷ James Der Derian’s *Antidiplomacy* discusses this phenomenon – that popular culture represents a serious influence on intelligence. Naturally, the literature on other intersections is vast- from the Bond related literature (Wark’s “The Intelligence Revolution and the Future” – is one of many); *Queen’s Quarterly* 100, no. 2 (Summer 1993): 273-290. Black’s *The Politics of James Bond* is comprehensive in that area, and many works on Fleming himself and his real experiences exist, as well as growing literature on the link between popular culture and spy scares; Jeremy Black, *The politics of James Bond: from Fleming's novels to the big screen* (U of Nebraska Press, 2005). Hitz takes a mild (although not entirely opposed) view: The august Hayden Peake assesses Hitz’s *The Great Game: The Myth and Reality of Espionage* thusly: “In answering his original question, Hitz concludes that, “no fictional account adequately captures the remarkable twists and turns that a genuine human spy goes through in pursuit of his mission of treachery and betrayal”; Peake “The Great Game: The Myth and Reality of Espionage: Intelligence in Recent Public Literature,” *Studies in Intelligence* 48 no. 3: p 189. This is a remarkable position when it is remembered that many of his academic colleagues hold the opposite view. They would do well to rethink their positions. On the other hand, what he doesn’t say is that no non-fiction account portrays all the vicissitudes of the espionage world either, although some of the recent studies of Cold War cases based on archival materials come close. The Great Game shows the real value of fiction when it examines the morality of espionage. Even when dealt with in the abstract, such issues are worth thinking about before the fact, and fiction does that well.” *Ibid*. Peake also cites Wark’s *Espionage: Past, Present, Future?* (Portland, Or: Frank Cass, 1994).

¹¹⁸ Rob Dover, “From Vauxhall Cross with Love,” in *Spinning Intelligence: Why Intelligence Needs the Media and Why the Media Needs Intelligence*, eds. Robert Dover and Michael S. Goodman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009); and Jérôme Aan de Wiel, “German Invasion and Spy Scares in Ireland, 1890s-1914: Between Fiction and Fact,” *Études Irlandaises: Études d'histoire et de civilisation* 37, no. 1 (2012).

¹¹⁹ Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture*, p 8.

level, it is a system of persisting symbols.

My typology illuminates the essentials of the intelligence culture concept by comparing ideal types of opposed approaches. This typology does not originate in the literature, and I have developed it to show the two ways we might understand the existence – (in terms of presence or absence) of an intelligence culture. This typology captures some of the existing intelligence culture literature, and literature outside it. I have formulated it in this way to capture both explicitly labeled “intelligence culture” studies, and more importantly, as well as work that does not explicitly label itself, but falls under this general category.¹²⁰ Type one is a ‘builder’ approach – where intelligence culture can be created or manipulated (or it may not exist at all). Type two is a content oriented approach, which is concerned with both positive and negative symbols, attitudes, norms or expectations surrounding intelligence. The typology essentially shows the two different kinds of assumptions that underlie the few works on intelligence culture, which I discuss in this chapter.

The first type of intelligence culture is that which can be conceptualized as present or absent. That is, it deals with the elite and governmental use and of understanding of intelligence, alongside the complementary public knowledge of and support for an intelligence system. In this view, a state can be entirely lacking a “culture of intelligence” where the institutions are absent and the general public does not understand or support the democratic use of intelligence. From this usage, states may have intelligence institutions, then, without an intelligence culture, as Lefebvre notes in Canada.¹²¹ Studies on this kind of

¹²⁰ My formulation could in fact be applied to any similar study - the presence or absence of strategic culture, religious culture, etc. Strategic culture tends not to face this question because unlike intelligence, most nations support some form of military organization.

¹²¹ Stephane Lefebvre, “Canadian Intelligence Culture: An Evaluation,” in *Democratization of Intelligence: Melding Strategic Intelligence and National Discourse*, eds. Susana C. Lemozy, and Russell G. Swenson (Washington: National Defense Institute College 2009). Wark's discussion in his widely cited “Learning to Live With Intelligence” focuses more on the technological determinism of the intelligence institutions Canada has but he and others have lamented the lack of overall awareness and concern for intelligence in Canada, and the media and policymaker

intelligence culture deal with the development and evolution of intelligence cultures towards an ideal set of democratic or Western intelligence institutions.

The second type of intelligence culture study counts intelligence culture as the totality of the full set of “norms” or unwritten assumptions, beliefs, and concepts that structure the use of intelligence in a given country of study. Turner has called this an intelligence identity.¹²²

The key difference from the first type is that any basic cultural knowledge of intelligence, at all, forms an intelligence culture. For example, a state may lack a large formal military yet still have norms and conventions surrounding the use of force and its appropriateness in both daily life and International Relations.¹²³ Similarly, an intelligence culture does not require a developed intelligence system, in this usage, but a set of conventions around its use. Even the lack of development of intelligence systems might be a conscious (or unconscious) choice stemming from negative prescriptions in the nation’s intelligence culture.

This type of approach is interesting because it includes norms against the use of intelligence. Contra Turner’s usage of the term norm (as described later), while norms are guidelines for action they are often contradictory, weak, or adaptable. America has had an often conflicted relationship with intelligence because many see it in tension with democratic openness.¹²⁴ The periods in American history where intelligence was little used, then, are as much a part of American intelligence culture as today’s technological behemoth intelligence

disregard for it; Wesley K. Wark, “Introduction: Learning to Live With Intelligence”, *Intelligence and National Security*, 18: 4, (2003) p 5. For more informal discussion, see James Cox’s “The Future of Intelligence 2013,” *Frontline Security*, http://frontline-security.org/index_archives.php?page=734

¹²² Turner, “A Distinctive U.S. Intelligence Identity,” Turner’s work does not specifically define the typology, but his approach reflects the view that both positive and negative understandings of intelligence comprise intelligence culture, as in type two work.

¹²³ The military industrial complex/militarization literature discusses this aspect of the positive valuation of the military in civilian life - for example - Brian Fogarty, *War, Peace, and the Social Order*, (Boulder, Colo., Westview Press., 1999) Chapter 4 “Militarism: Making war possible.”

¹²⁴ The response to the NSA controversies over data collection are familiar: that the entire agency should simply be shut- echoing similar calls for decades (most famously by D.P Moynihan) that the CIA be shut. For example, Joshua Keating, “...And keep it shut! Which parts of the government should be permanently furloughed” *Foreign Policy*, April 8 2011.

agencies. Therefore, an idea of the “negative” nature of intelligence can still be part of intelligence culture. In this way, all states that use intelligence have an intelligence culture, which often reflects ideas or institutions from a source of socialization. A clear example is that the question of whether covert action is considered an integral part of intelligence may reflect a cultural belief about intelligence. Some Americans believe as strongly that it fits the definition and nature of intelligence, because intelligence is seen as an active engagement.¹²⁵ The reasons for these ideas of covert action are discussed in chapter five, regarding norms and narratives of intelligence, and to a lesser extent in chapter six, on openness. Both the explicit rejection and the wavering acceptance of covert action represent different intelligence cultures. Here, the extant literature on the two different types of intelligence culture may serve as a further guide to the differences between the two approaches:¹²⁶ Type 1 literature discusses moving states towards a democratic intelligence system through public and elite knowledge and support. This type tends to focus on democratizing regimes, but the democratization of the intelligence system can occur regardless of the political regime (i.e. the American intelligence system could be made more democratic). Type 2 literature outlines sets of norms or attitudes to use of intelligence, generally nationally or organizationally. I will discuss these two types in more detail in the following sub-sections.

Type 1 Intelligence Culture Approaches: Normative

¹²⁵ Der Derian’s definition of intelligence as a continuation of warfare, (“the continuation of war by the clandestine interference of one power into the affairs of another power,” p 21) is perhaps the most extreme of this kind of definition, but Shulsky and Schmitt in a popular text also espouse the idea that intelligence must be understood as a contest related to information, hence action cannot be separated out – as is often the case with those that prefer a definition of intelligence that takes it in its ideal type as information; Abram Shulsky and Gary Schmitt, *Silent Warfare* (Washington : Brassey's, 1993), Chapter 8, “Towards a Theory of Intelligence”. Philip Davies also discusses this question in “Ideas of Intelligence: Divergent National Concepts and Institutions.” The *Title 50* American legal definition of covert action can be found in Section 413b(e), as the “activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly,” James M Scott and Jerel A Rosati, “Such other functions and duties: Covert Action and American Intelligence Policy,” in *Strategic Intelligence: Understanding the Hidden Side of Government* Vol 3 (Westport, Conn. : Praeger Security International, 2007) p 84.

¹²⁶Davies, “Ideas of Intelligence: Divergence National Concepts and Institutions,” 62-66.

During the Cold War, a school of thought in United States distinguished between democratic intelligence and “authoritarian” intelligence as being fundamentally different.¹²⁷ Scholars argued they required separate concepts and study. The implication was that the nature of society (closed or open) and the orientation of the service (internal and/or external) had a deep and far reaching impact on the practice and essential nature of intelligence. Cynics might speculate that the similarities were too close to be comfortable, hence the desire for conceptual distinction. This work can be considered the precursor to Intelligence Studies theory in that it encapsulates the Cold War understanding of cultural differences.¹²⁸ While falling out of fashion after the end of the Cold War, the DNA of this study in intelligence has been taken up by work on democratization and intelligence culture. The democratic intelligence project has a history, therefore, in the discussions of the differences between authoritarian and democratic intelligence.

Current work on democratization and intelligence is linked to the general SSR literature, and there are a growing number of country case studies on democratization or reform that deal with intelligence culture in some way.¹²⁹ Other intersections include the democratic peace literature, terrorism/counterterrorism studies, work on the rule of law and civil society, constitutionalism and legal and ethical frameworks, civilian control of institutions in states, and law enforcement and policing. This type of intelligence culture has a

¹²⁷ Particularly in Roy Godson, “Intelligence: an American View,” in *British and American Approaches to Intelligence*, ed. K.G. Robertson (London: Macmillan Press, 1987): p5.

¹²⁸ Roy Godson is a well-respected representative of this school of thought, and his series on Intelligence Requirements (for the 1980s and 1990s) was widely read and cited and included prominent Intelligence Studies scholars: Roy Godson ed. *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's* (Washington, D.C. : National Strategy Information Center, 1979); Roy Godson ed, *Intelligence requirements for the 1990s : collection, analysis, counterintelligence, and covert action* (Lexington, Mass. : Lexington Books, 1989).

¹²⁹ Cristiana Matei and Thomas C. Bruneau record that “in five of the most widely used and recent anthologies or handbooks on intelligence” 22 deal with intelligence in countries making the transition to democracy, and that

as a general resource on the subject, a comprehensive bibliography on intelligence, is updated by Greta Marlatt of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) with 30 items on democratizing: “Intelligence and Policy-Making: A Bibliography” compiled by Greta E. Marlatt, January 2011, available at <http://www.nps.edu/Library/Research/Bibliographies/Intelligence/IntellPolicyBib.html>. Other resources from the same source include Larry L. Watts, “Intelligence Reform in Europe’s Emerging Democracies,” *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol. 48, No. 1 p. 11–25; Florina Cristiana Matei, “The Legal Framework for Intelligence in Post-Communist Romania,” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 4, no. 22 (Winter 2009–2010):p 667–698; Florina Cristiana Matei, “Challenges of Intelligence Sharing in Romania,” *Intelligence and National Security*, 24, no. 4 (August 2009): p 574–585.

prescriptive element that assumes the desirability of the movement of all intelligence systems to democratize.¹³⁰ Additionally, it would like to prevent “de-evolution” and to alter existing authoritarian intelligence cultures. Bean’s work on intelligence’s organization cultures (while of the second type) is useful here because it highlights how the belief that culture can be changed or “fixed” reflects a particular view of culture as an object that can be manipulated consciously.¹³¹

Lemozy and Swenson’s *Democratization of Intelligence* collection provides a variety of case studies demonstrating the principles of this type of intelligence culture. Democratization is clearly an institutional and cultural change, so naturally the idea of intelligence culture is particularly suited to democratization studies. Swenson and Lemozy believe “that a country’s national intelligence culture modulates the de facto legal or juridical perception of intelligence through the history of any given society.”⁷⁵ Their work, drawing on a variety of country cases from the experience of practitioners, develops a model of the evolutions of intelligence cultures in terms of their relative democratization/ military orientation/authoritarian roots. This kind of overarching model is much rarer (than single case studies) and this makes it valuable. In this model they specify three different evolutionary paths, with the majority of intelligence systems reflecting “military roots” but evolving to respond to civil society and then to a national intelligence culture.¹³² For intelligence culture to evolve, certain preconditions are required for it to exist, and then for it to flourish. “Strategic Intelligence Culture requires well-defined national interests and a broad societal

¹³⁰ Lemozy and Swenson, *Democratization of Intelligence*.

¹³¹ Hamilton Bean, "Organizational Culture and US Intelligence Affairs," *Journal of Intelligence and National Security* 24, no. 4 (2009): 479-498.

¹³² Lemozy and Swenson, *Democratization of Intelligence*, p 4.

consensus” so that intelligence institutions remain no matter the leader or administration.¹³³

Lemozy and Swenson argue that strategic intelligence cultures will flourish only where long-term thinking prevails, and the existence of intelligence organizations is legitimized as an “anticipatory response to the need for such thinking.”¹³⁴ These types of evolution produce one of three intelligence cultures: the first involves intelligence with military precedences, which is a hierarchical system with military priority or focus; the second is a culture of strong public acceptance and enduring support for intelligence institutions (e.g., states in long conflicts), but in which military influence persists; and the third involves non-military systems, in which culture is circumscribed, with less concern for strategic intelligence because of lack of military history.

This is valuable research in showing the assumptions behind intelligence culture, and which can be applied both to the new and democratizing countries and to those with established intelligence systems (Lemozy and Swenson include Canada and the US as cases).¹³⁵ Established intelligence systems can find potential value in the study of those states without strong “public” intelligence cultures, or lacking a particular type of intelligence, strategic, or otherwise. For example, Canada, lacking intelligence culture (according to Lefebvre),¹³⁶ might build its public and elite knowledge and support for intelligence through building intelligence culture, by developing greater understandings.

This type of intelligence literature may also be useful to bring a state’s culture in line with the actual practice and value of intelligence. This connects to studies on public diplomacy or “public intelligence.” It might help illuminate the positive sides of intelligence as well as the

¹³³ Lemozy and Swenson, *Democratization of Intelligence*, p 5.

¹³⁴ Lemozy, and Swenson, *Democratization of Intelligence*, p 6.

¹³⁵ This kind of research has been applied in SSR cases, see footnote 9 and 10 in this chapter for examples.

¹³⁶ Lefebvre, “Canadian Intelligence Culture: An Evaluation.”

negative (like the “selling” of Iraq war intelligence) and the possible consequences of the move of intelligence into the public debate over policy decisions.¹³⁷ Overall, as Zegart and others (including Christopher Andrews) have pointed out, it is difficult to do policy well when public perceptions diverge too much from the reality of intelligence.¹³⁸ Thus, in cases where popular portrayals of intelligence are overwhelmingly negative (and inaccurate), popular intelligence culture studies may provide a counterpoint to educate the public as to the role of intelligence.¹³⁹

Type 2 Intelligence Culture Approaches: Analytical

The second type of intelligence culture study begins with the assumption of the existence of intelligence culture (whether it is at the civilizational, national, or sub-state level). Intelligence systems are shaped by broad societal priorities and values, just as all policy instruments are. Every government that develops even a rudimentary intelligence bureaucracy has to make choices about how this system will function. Warner points out that two intelligence systems, formed in the same year and thus in the same international context, turned out radically different.¹⁴⁰ Contra Realism, states do not simply shape their institutions to respond to the international environment of the time. To a number of authors it is “More obvious[s] than ever, the intelligence process ... is conditioned by American culture and style, the organization of U.S. national security decision-making, and the perception and

¹³⁷ For this debate, see Joshua Rovner, *Fixing The Facts* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011).

¹³⁸ Amy B. Zegart, “Cloaks, Daggers, and Ivory Towers: Why Academics Don’t Study US Intelligence” in *Strategic intelligence Vol 1: Understanding the hidden side of government*, ed Loch K. Johnson (Westport, Conn. : Praeger Security International, 2007). Christopher Andrew, “Intelligence, International Relations and Under Theorization”, *Intelligence and National Security* 19, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 29-30.

¹³⁹ Nicholas Dujmovic does this in a series of articles, including David Robarge, Nicholas Dujmovic, and Thomas G. Coffey,

“The Good Shepherd: Intelligence in Recent Public Media,” *Studies in Intelligence* 51, no. 1.

¹⁴⁰ Warner, “Building a Theory of Intelligence Systems,” p 24.

proclivities of American leaders.”¹⁴¹ Moreover, the use of external models (often American or British) to develop intelligence systems, as well as outside expertise, belies the fact that intelligence systems become creatures of the society and governments they are part of.¹⁴² America’s historical use of the British model and British intelligence know-how shows that an intelligence system is rapidly culturally adapted.¹⁴³ So while many nations model their intelligence bureaucracies after that of another nation, inevitably they are not identical. Even nations as similar as Canada and the United States have different cultural conceptions of strategy, war, and intelligence.¹⁴⁴

Compared to the first type of approach that I identify, the principle of this type of intelligence project is that all intelligence institutions are encultured, from their organizational culture to the more diffuse levels of national or elite culture. Even a government that does not use intelligence and has no intelligence bureaucracy has likely at some point made a choice to not develop these systems, partly informed by beliefs and cultural assumptions (in addition to structural and resource constraints). Thus the non-use of intelligence is itself even a type of intelligence identity. Just as strategic culture may be perpetuated in terms of the belief in the utility of diplomacy and not force, so too is intelligence two-sided.

Studies of this type have, in the past, directly adapted strategic culture, particularly as

¹⁴¹ Michael Turner, quoting Dr. Stephen J. Cimbala, in Turner, "A Distinctive U.S. Intelligence Identity."

¹⁴² Philip Murphy, "Creating a Commonwealth Intelligence Culture: the view from Central Africa 1945–1965," *Intelligence and National Security* 17, no. 3 (2002): 131-162; Christopher Andrew, "The Growth of the Australian Intelligence Community and the Anglo-American Connection," *Intelligence and National Security* 4, no. 1 (Apr. 1989): 213-256.

¹⁴³ For example, Larry A. Valero, "The American Joint Intelligence Committee and Estimates of the Soviet Union, 1945-1947: An Impressive Record," *Studies in Intelligence* (Summer 2000).

¹⁴⁴ The debates on the similarities and differences between the two great nations could be measured in terrabytes of exposition. Beginning with political cultures, Gad Horowitz famously (from his contribution to his mentor Hartz' 'fragment thesis') argues a dissimilarity based on the lack of persisting 'Tory' element in America. Economically, the North American Free Trade Agreement pushed many to evangelize (for and against) continentalism, based on economic ties and cultural connections. In intelligence terms, the size and foci of each system remains vastly different despite intelligence sharing in the so-called Five Eyes agreements. See the debate in Gad Horowitz, "Conservatism, liberalism, and socialism in Canada: An interpretation," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* (1966): 143-171; Allan Smith, *Canada--an American Nation?: Essays on continentalism, identity, and the Canadian frame of mind* (Montreal, QB: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994).

evidenced in Turner's work.¹⁴⁵ Most organizational culture literature also falls under the Type 2 category.¹⁴⁶ The "organizational" level sub-state study is one of the more common types of intelligence culture work, more so than Turner's national or Bozeman's civilization study of intelligence culture.¹⁴⁷ Related fields include the intelligence systems and intelligence theory literature, and comparative Intelligence Studies. More postmodern work on discourses and narratives of intelligence can also be placed into the strategic culturally based intelligence culture framework.

The Utility of Existing Work on Intelligence Culture

Given this brief survey of types of work in the field, there has been mostly scattered work over decades on the idea of different national approaches or cultures of intelligence. The "democratic" intelligence work discussed earlier might be seen as the early work leading to the more recent study in intelligence, explicitly advancing the idea that nations have distinct intelligence cultures. Organizational level work is discussed in the previous chapter.

Two scholars have been seminal in the development of the idea of intelligence culture, and few other explicit works on intelligence culture exist. Historical work in the area is scattered and tends to lack theoretical analysis.¹⁴⁸ For this reason I focus on Turner and Davies work. Turner attempts to describe "A Distinctive U.S. Intelligence Identity" in the article of that

¹⁴⁵ Turner, "A Distinctive U.S. Intelligence Identity."

¹⁴⁶ Bean's entry in the *International Studies Encyclopedia* on intelligence cultures is a good example; Bean, "United States Intelligence Cultures."

¹⁴⁷ Interesting organizational work is also done by Amy Zegart, particularly chapter one of *Spying Blind*, Titled *on the organizational view of 9.11*; Amy B. Zegart, *Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11* (Princeton University Press, 2009).

¹⁴⁸ Ernest May's *Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars* is a classic, but directed at consideration of assessment, not comparative cultures.

title.¹⁴⁹ He draws on Snow's description of the strategic culture of the US and then modifies it into a number of intelligence norms comprising intelligence culture. Phillip Davies instead uses organizational culture theory to look only at intelligence agencies in "Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure in Britain and the United States."¹⁵⁰ Davies has continued to develop this line of investigation, but this is his earliest work on intelligence culture. More work on intelligence culture is in progress (including a funded project at Leeds on the history of intelligence),¹⁵¹ as well as, in America, on agency cultures (the FBI and CIA) and American history. Other work has also begun to infiltrate culture into Intelligence Studies in different ways, but these early works are important in conceptualization and tone for the development of intelligence culture.

Turner's and Davies' approaches both show individual elements of the range of early scholarly work on intelligence culture, but together they demonstrate where further development needed.¹⁵² From small numbers of published and unpublished work on intelligence culture explicitly (unlike my typology of approaches, which cover implicit and explicit conceptions of intelligence culture), I focus here on Davies' and Turner's work because both pieces are significant as two of the earliest full-length works on intelligence culture in the major intelligence journals. These journal articles would have reached both scholars and practitioners, and also represent the product of the two different sides of Intelligence Studies. Michael Turner and Philip Davies represent the spectrum of Intelligence Studies – the more theoretically inclined social scientist (Davies)¹⁵³ and a former senior practitioner, with the CIA (Turner), with a basis in practical policy experience. Davies' selected writings include a range of

¹⁴⁹ Turner, "A Distinctive U.S. Intelligence Identity."

¹⁵⁰ Davies, "Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure in Britain and the United States."

¹⁵¹ University of Leeds, Faculty of Arts, "Cultures of Intelligence," http://www.leeds.ac.uk/arts/homepage/433/cultures_of_intelligence

¹⁵² I do mean to imply that these works are not valuable, but only that theoretical development is needed.

¹⁵³ Retrieved through "People," people.brunel.ac.uk/~isstppd/

topics,¹⁵⁴ while Turner's work is more American in focus.¹⁵⁵ They serve as examples of the possible areas that intelligence culture should improve upon (and in later work Davies does). Their substantive ideas of intelligence culture are discussed more fully in chapter four.

Turner's description of norms has little discussion of how and why intelligence culture is different from the general strategic culture. Additionally, his norms of intelligence have no historical context or examples of their functioning in the United States. When applying Snow's strategic culture norms, he asserts that norms "comprise" an identity and that "U.S. intelligence has a particular identity because its norms specify the kind of actions it takes for others to recognize it as intelligence."¹⁵⁶ Norms do not comprise identity, nor do they necessarily specify actions. Norms are not the same as organizational rules of thumb. They often describe acceptable or unacceptable actions. However, the relevant actors can choose to disobey, manipulate, or ignore norms in any number of ways.¹⁵⁷ An actor may attempt to promulgate a new norm, and disregard an old one (i.e., norm entrepreneurs acting against slavery). Thus norms cannot be the *components* of identity; they are external to the actor—although they may eventually be internalized in a different form. For these reasons I reject his specific version of a norm-focused framework, although not the applicability of norms. His use of norms has more common in the public administration literature, for example, examining norms of hierarchy and

¹⁵⁴ These include the titles "Intelligence and the Machinery of Government: Conceptualizing the Intelligence Community"; "Britain's Machinery of Intelligence Accountability: Realistic Oversight in the Absence of Moral Panic"; "Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure in Britain and the United States"; "Ideas of Intelligence: Divergent Concepts and Institutions"; "Organizational Politics and the Evolution of Britain's Intelligence Producer/Consumer Interface"; "Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage Outside the Anglosphere"; "Intelligence and Government in Britain and the United States: a Comparative Approach".

¹⁵⁵ They include the titles *Why Secret Intelligence Fails* (2006) and *Historical Dictionary of U.S. Intelligence* (2007); "Setting Analytical Priorities in U.S. Intelligence," (1996); "CIA-FBI Non Cooperation: Cultural Trait Or Bureaucratic Inertia" (1995); "Intelligence Reform and the Politics of Entrenchment" (2005); "Issues in Evaluating U.S. Intelligence," (1991); "Understanding the CIA's Role in Intelligence," (1990).

¹⁵⁶ Michael A. Turner, "A Distinctive U.S. Intelligence Identity," p 43.

¹⁵⁷ Geoffrey Brennan, Lina Eriksson, Robert E. Goodin, Nicholas Southwood, *Explaining Norms* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013), Part III "Explaining With Norms" p. 240.

distance. However, as many in the literature in that area at present have advanced, norms are not all that comprise an organizational (nor an intelligence) culture. For example, norms are only one of six elements of Schein's often reprinted and influential *Organizational Culture and Leadership*.¹⁵⁸ Culture is more than norms; however this does not prevent the examination of specific norms that are part of intelligence culture.

Davies, unlike Turner, focuses narrowly only on intelligence agencies' organizational culture.¹⁵⁹ That is, he looks at the institutional and management arrangements only of intelligence agencies, without reference to their integration in government (and society) as a whole.¹⁶⁰ Analogizing to strategic studies, the organizational culture level Davies studies is comparable to military culture because it studies only the organization. In the military analogy, it would be similar to examining the military, but not the broader national strategic culture including policymakers and civilians. Davies uses "collegiality" and "hierarchical rigidity" concepts from organizational culture theory to explain intelligence failures;¹⁶¹ these are valuable at his level of analysis, but are less so when looking at intelligence culture in general. His organizational focus also misses all actors not employed in intelligence organizations, including professional groups such as policymakers and think tanks. Many different groups participate in different ways in shaping such a broad culture as that of intelligence.¹⁶² They cannot be ignored. This focus on organizational culture only captures the sub-national (or organizational) intelligence culture. As I will discuss later (in reference to strategic culture), this level of study raises some analytical and terminological questions.

The general problem with existing work is not so much a failing of intelligence culture

¹⁵⁸ Edgar Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership* 2nd Ed (John Wiley & Sons 1992) chapter one.

¹⁵⁹ Other writers, notably, Hamilton Bean use the term 'intelligence culture' similarly, to refer to what in other disciplines would be considered bureaucratic or organizational culture. Bean, "United States Intelligence Cultures."

¹⁶⁰ Davies "Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure in Britain and the United States," p 49.

¹⁶¹ Davies, *Ibid*.

¹⁶² George and Rishikoff write that many groups participate in the 'national security' enterprise, outside of the core of the executive, congress and the courts – think tanks, lobby groups, the media, and others also help 'set the agenda' *The National Security Enterprise*, p 3.

as the nature of Intelligence Studies. Many former practitioner-writers, with excellent intelligence experience, are not academics and write reflections on individual experience. Davies, in the journal *Politics*, discussing memoir, evidence and primary sources – notes that different types of intelligence memoirs have different levels of validity.¹⁶³ Moreover, the insulation of many in the field from the latest currents in IR and Security Studies means that the importance of culture may not be obvious—or even the advance of theory beyond classical Realism. Academics in intelligence are also often trained historians,¹⁶⁴ and can be less well-versed in constructivism and other cultural theories (or at least less aware). At one end, intelligence culture work does not seek evidence or generate testable hypotheses, as A.I. Johnston’s approach would dictate:¹⁶⁵ and at the other end, there is no theoretically sophisticated treatment of multiple, co-existing elements of intelligence culture based on the substantial postmodern and post-structural approaches to culture and security.

To remedy these issues, I build and improve on past work in two ways. The first is in using evidence. My research uses detailed content analyses of the various cultural artefacts of intelligence, and a historical textual analysis separating out the assumptions of intelligence cultures. This will give repeatable sources others can refer to: clearly delineated analogies, narratives, symbols, and ontological assumptions. Other scholars can study the same texts, compare their understanding, and check outcomes.¹⁶⁶ The second innovation is in the understanding of intelligence culture. Using the plethora of culturalist studies of security as a model, I argue there are multiple “cultures” of intelligence in the United States. As with strategic culture, intelligence culture primarily derives from elites. However, they are in turn influenced

¹⁶³ For him the memoir is most useful when it is a firsthand primary source style document. However, he warns of second hand hearsay accounts, and that the validity declines the further from the event the account is written. Philip H. Davies, “Spies as Informants: Triangulation and the Interpretation of Elite Interview Data in the Study of the Intelligence and Security Services,” 21, no 1 (February 2001); 73–80, p 79.

¹⁶⁴ Michael Goodman, “Studying and Teaching About Intelligence: The Approach in the United Kingdom,” *Studies in Intelligence* 50 no 2.

¹⁶⁵ Johnston, *Cultural Realism*, chapter one, and p 52.

¹⁶⁶ Roberto Franzosi, *From Words to Numbers: Narrative, Data, and Social Science* (NY, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2004) p 23.

by popular perception and cinematic and literary texts. Security imaginary theory particularly highlights the broad reservoir that cultural meanings are drawn from. These so-called reservoirs also surface from academia, the media, think tanks, and more recently social media and the internet.¹⁶⁷ So while organizational culture is important to intelligence culture, it cannot be determined from it alone. My contribution to the current work in the area is adapting a hybrid theory model that more accurately reflects the totality of intelligence culture and respects the influence of public discourse and cultural texts. Having categorized the major intelligence culture literature, I begin to explicate my own adaption of strategic culture and security imaginary theory in the next section. I treat strategic culture as the first component of a theoretical framework for intelligence culture.

3 Lessons from Strategic Culture

We can see the imprint of strategic culture studies in the Intelligence Studies work because it has been used, as described above, to understand intelligence in a variety of ways. Strategic culture is often taken as the base pattern for intelligence culture.¹⁶⁸ Strategic culture theory is not perfect, and like all approaches, it has its detractors and critics.¹⁶⁹ This makes it all the more

¹⁶⁷ The role of popular culture is developed more in chapter five, discussing popular culture and Pearl Harbor. See also recently,

Amy B. Zegart ““Spytainment”: The Real Influence of Fake Spies,” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 23, no. 4 (2010): 599-622 and many others on popular culture, the media, and intelligence.

¹⁶⁸ Obviously this occurs most explicitly in Turner, where he directly adapts Snow's discussion of American strategic culture.

¹⁶⁹ Jeannie L. Johnson, “Strategic Culture: Methodologies for a Research Program”: Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, in *Comparative Strategic Culture Curriculum*, ed (Contract No. DTRA01-03-D-0017, Technical Instruction 18-06-02) 31 October 2006 p3; and Jeffrey Lantis,, “Strategic Culture: From Clausewitz to Constructivism,” in *Comparative Strategic Culture Curriculum*, ed. Jeffrey Larsen, (Contract No. DTRA01-03-D-0017, Technical Instruction 18-06-02, 31) 31 October 2006. Johnson writes “strategic culture suffers from lack of a defined set of assumptions or codified theoretical construct.” See also Colin S. Gray, “Out of the Wilderness: Prime Time for Strategic Culture,” *Comparative Strategy* 26, no. 1 (2007): 1-20.

valuable for intelligence culture, since it can help provide cautions from the problems encountered, which have resulted in refined theory. In short, the problems in strategic culture theory become valuable for intelligence theory precisely because they have been discussed, debated, and delineated. This particularly includes the famous “Gray–Johnston” debate about the nature of culture and explanation, which I discuss below in the section dealing with culture and the rational actor model.¹⁷⁰

I will begin with an examination of strategic culture’s insights and mistakes, following which I have identified seven areas where strategic culture theory is a guide to developing intelligence culture work (whether as caution or prescription): i) methods and evidence; ii) sources; iii) (Gray-Johnston debate) the definition of culture and the rational actor model; iv) levels of analysis; v) terminology; vi) the keepers of strategic culture; vii) and symbolic vs. operational cultures. All of these issues together— specifying the levels studied, clarifying the assumptions about culture in the selection of evidence and sources, and drawing on methodologies pioneered in strategic culture—will all assist intelligence culture by ensuring due academic rigor.¹⁷¹

Strategic Culture’s Insights and Mistakes

An introduction to the strategic culture concept is necessary to understand how it can be used in Intelligence Studies to create a hybrid intelligence culture theory. Strategic culture also represents the incursion of culture into a field similarly resistant to ideational theory, so its tribulations are an excellent guide for Intelligence Studies. The strategic culture concept began

¹⁷⁰ Stuart Poore, “What is the Context? A reply to the Gray-Johnston debate on strategic culture.” *Review of International Studies*, 29, no. 2 (2003): 279-284.

¹⁷¹ Gray, “Out of the Wilderness.”

at odds with the presumption of strategic studies of the universal unchanging nature of strategy. Strategic studies, as all academic fields, must seek patterns in the world that allow the accumulation of knowledge. Tracing these patterns led the field to the view the insights gathered as universal and the patterns as ahistorical. This is the essence of the strategists' presumption that Sun Tzu has truths for us about warfare, a thousand years distant from the world he knew. All the masters of modern strategy, from years past, are relevant because there is an assumed unchanging essence to warfare.

Strategic culture theory seems a radical revision of the role of culture in strategy and the universality of war. The axiom of generals fighting the last war makes it clear that most do not escape from their history, culture, and experience. Strategic culture theory takes advantage of this insight, and attempts to understand how a specific state may act and think according to its past—the sum of its culture, history, geography, demography, etc. These form an encultured basis out of which doctrine, policy, and orders influence and interact. Snyder wrote, “as a result of this socialization process, a set of general beliefs, attitudes, and behavior patterns with regard to ... strategy has achieved a state of semi-permanence that places them on the level of ‘cultural’ rather than mere policy.”¹⁷² Consequently, studying specific cultural elements is necessary to understand strategy.

The strategic culture (SC) approach is based on the insights of Snyder, Gray, and later strategists who argued that strategic assumptions were not universal, or necessarily shared between countries. The term *strategic culture* was famously coined in Snyder's 1977 work on nuclear strategy¹⁷³ as the differences in Soviet and American strategies caused Snyder to

¹⁷² Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture*, p 8.

¹⁷³ Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture*, *Ibid.*

assert that each possessed a different strategic culture.¹⁷⁴ Cultural differences were finally becoming apparent to the superpowers. Since Snyder, strategic culture has come to refer to much more than nuclear strategy. Strategic culture definitions vary, but in brief, the literature deals with “cultural and ideational influences on strategic choice.”¹⁷⁵ Strategic culture theory has been developed, according to Johnston, in three waves, each with its own methodological and ontological commitments.¹⁷⁶ I prefer to designate them as three *categories*, since (as critics point out) they are not necessarily chronological. The first category, emerging in the Cold War, treats strategic culture as a more fixed and all-pervasive “background.”¹⁷⁷ The second category of writers, “Gramscians” to Johnston, recognize a divide in the thought and action of elites with respect to strategy—arguing that culture is used instrumentally to control or legitimate policies and perceptions.¹⁷⁸ The third category, Johnston’s own, focuses on “testing” culture, critiquing (Neo)Realist versions of strategy, and separating the independent and dependent variables of culture and behaviour/action.¹⁷⁹ Many authors represent an amalgam of elements of each of these three ideal types.

Each approach has a different interpretation of the definition of strategic culture. Strategic culture has been called by Johnston an “ideational milieu that limits behavioral choices” based on earlier ideas of a “way of war,”¹⁸⁰ but Gray believes the essence is the concept that “different security communities think and behave somewhat differently about

¹⁷⁴ Snyder defined it as “the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses and patterns of habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community have achieved through instruction and imitation with each other with regard to nuclear strategy.” Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture*, p 38.

¹⁷⁵ A.I. Johnston, *Cultural Realism*, p 5.

¹⁷⁶ His is not the only categorization. Johnston asserts that these waves are temporal, claiming the last and most recent for his own work. However, a good case can be made that they are contemporary, given that work that does not fit in Johnston’s own ‘wave’ is being done currently. Johnston, *Cultural Realism*, p 10.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid, p 10.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid, p 15.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid, p18-19.

¹⁸⁰ Johnston claims Wu Zi’s *Art of War* from the 4th Century BC is one of the first analyses of national styles of warfare. Johnston, *Cultural Realism*, p 24.

strategic matters.”¹⁸¹ These cultural differences have been attributed by strategic culturists to a variety of sources: geography, religion, demographics, climate, economics, technology, resources, traditions, myths, symbols, texts, history, crises, regions, education, regime type, leadership, organizations and institutions, relations (civil-military), and the policymaking processes.¹⁸² From these different sources we can attempt to understand the strategic thought and behaviour of states.

More recent SC work looks at strategic culture as different strengths of norms (strong or weak) or continuums of belief about the occurrence of war in human affairs, the nature and acceptability of conflict and violence, the possibilities for gains in war, the likely path of diplomacy versus warfare, the nature of the enemy, as well as the legitimate objectives for security and defence policy, and the means or necessary authorizations.¹⁸³ Generally, definitions of strategic culture include similar elements, but they vary on the inclusion of norms, behaviour, and ranked-preference sets.¹⁸⁴ Johnston, characteristic of the latter, defines strategic culture as “[a]n integrated system of symbols (e.g. argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors) which acts to establish pervasive and long lasting preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs.”¹⁸⁵ Moreover, SC should be a variable “distinguishable from non-strategic variables but should also provide decision-makers with a uniquely ordered set of strategic choices from which predictions can be made about behavior.”¹⁸⁶ Some projects have been attempted to systematize the definition of

¹⁸¹ Gray, “Out of the Wilderness,” p 8.

¹⁸² See Darryl Howlett, “Strategic Culture: Reviewing Recent Literature,” *Strategic Insights*, 4, no. 10 (October 2005); Johnson,

“Strategic Culture: Refining the Theoretical Construct,”; Lantis, “Strategic Culture: From Clausewitz to Constructivism.”

¹⁸³ Christoph O. Meyer, “Theorizing European Strategic Culture: Between Convergence and the Persistence of National Diversity,” *Columbia International Affairs Online*, <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/mec01/index.html>, p 20.

¹⁸⁴ Stuart Poore, “Strategic Culture,” in *Neorealism versus Strategic Culture: A Debate*, eds. John K. Glenn, Darryl A. Howlett, Stuart Poore (Burlington, VT : Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2004) p 49.

¹⁸⁵ Johnston, “Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China,” p 222.

¹⁸⁶ Poore, “Strategic Culture,” p 49.

strategic culture,¹⁸⁷ but because of divergent models of culture, as will be discussed later, there is no universal definition.

Methods and Evidence

Strategic culture scholarship did not initially have a strong emphasis on methods and evidence. Unsophisticated writers often simply stated the elements they perceived to be present in a nation's strategic culture, using single classic texts as evidence.¹⁸⁸ This post-hoc explanation raises serious issues. There may be value in articulating a single strand of strategic culture narrative, but it is possible to raise the standards of evidence and the seriousness studies—to make them repeatable, contestable, “falsifiable,” and thereby cut through some of the intractable strategic culture debates. This is where A.I. Johnston's attempt to systematize strategic culture is useful, insisting as he does on careful definitions and clear bodies of evidence, with information on the method and methodology.¹⁸⁹

This is one lesson intelligence culture should learn from SC: that as the subject develops, travelogues and vague descriptions of norms are not progressive. Jones and Smith point out the inferiority of works that “just assert a state's strategic culture as a self-evident given. The findings derived from this are frequently so generalized that they have to be taken on trust.”¹⁹⁰ Particularly, the use of historical events or experiences to justify a description of culture needs improvement. If certain historical periods are discussed but other periods and events are ignored, the author should provide a rationale. The selection of an event or era cannot be its own justification. The standards of the historian, which are perhaps more evident in Intelligence

¹⁸⁷ Melanie Graham, “Defining Strategic Culture,” (unpublished thesis UNBC and Royal Roads); Poore, “Strategic Culture,” p 50.

¹⁸⁸ Johnston's chapter on methodology is an excellent response to this, and the field has since advanced, particularly with constructivist efforts; Johnston, *Cultural Realism*, “Chapter 2.”

¹⁸⁹ Johnston, *Cultural Realism*, “Chapter 2.”

¹⁹⁰ David M. Jones and Mike L. Smith, “Review Article—Noise but No Signal: Strategy, Culture and the Poverty of Constructivism,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 24, no. 6 (2001) p 489.

Studies because of its necessarily historical focus, should be upheld. Intelligence culture studies face a particular difficulty, one common to Intelligence Studies as a whole, in the inability to support or cite with evidence that may be classified or unverifiable. Critically, the intelligence culture field does not often trespass on protected sources and methods, so that it may face less serious concerns due to classified materials. Lemozy and Swenson's democratization study avoids this problem by using practitioners;¹⁹¹ however, as the databanks of ethnographies, interviews, and cultural studies in intelligence grow, historical and current evidence should become more important and remain central to the argumentation of theory.¹⁹²

Sources

If strategic culture shows an attention to sources and evidence is necessary, then the types of sources and the methods of their selections become an issue. The direct collection of information—from ethnographies, interviews, group discussions, participant observation, and surveys—are particularly useful because they build a body of evidence that others can cite and interpret in the future. Reading texts from history and the field of education is useful. Jeannie Johnson notes, "Military texts are essential sources of information on the values, identity, and acceptable methods of achieving security within a regime. Christopher Twomey recommends a deep survey of all sorts of doctrinal texts—telegrams, military orders, descriptions of

¹⁹¹ For example, Jon Wiant, "Reflections on the U.S. Intelligence Culture: Career Engagements of a Civil and Military Intelligence Officer," in *Democratization of Intelligence: Melding Strategic Intelligence and National Discourse*, eds. Susana C. Lemozy, and Russell G. Swenson (Washington: National Defense Institute College 2009).

¹⁹² As noted below, in the discussion of sources, secrecy is a methodological challenge. However, if intelligence cultures are fairly widely shared, there should be some evidence of the same culture in public documents as well as secret ones. Moreover while practitioners are unable to disclose secret material, memoirs from early tell-alls, to the more recent work; Richard Holm's *The American Agent: My Life in the CIA*, Jose A. Rodriguez JR.'s *Hard Measures*, Glenn Carle's *The Interrogator*, and John Kiriakou's *The Reluctant Spy*—have furnished important portraits of the organizations they have been a part of. Arguably we are in the golden age of intelligence memoir, according to the Ian Shapira, "CIA memoirs offer revelations and settle scores among spies," *Washington Post*, June 4, 2014.

training regimens, diaries, memoirs, communications between military leaders, etc.”¹⁹³ Next, archival work can be important. Although less relevant to the study of the current intelligence culture, it can reveal trends and past tendencies as well as historical origins. Finally, public and open existing sources—such as testimony at hearings and government inquiries, government reports and public documents, as well as speeches and debate transcripts—can also be used. For the study of the public level of intelligence and strategic culture, researchers can collect sources such as polling and demographic data, fiction, cinema and novels, media and websites, journals and magazine articles, and conference and think tank documents.

The problem of secrecy will always limit the available sources for intelligence, however, if, like strategic culture, intelligence cultures are fairly widely shared, there should be some evidence of the same culture in public documents as well as secret ones.¹⁹⁴ This is a key reason for the content analysis method of this thesis: by collating enough sources, the same ideas and articulations should be present in public as well as secret texts (see the methodology section discussion of intertext).

The collection of sources is more obvious than the selection of method for the interpretation of the data collected. The methods used will depend on the theoretical approach and the focus of the study—whether to determine norms/narratives/future culture, etc. Possible methods from the strategic culture literature include content analysis, cognitive mapping,¹⁹⁵ textual and rhetorical methods, discourse or narrative analysis, and process tracing.¹⁹⁶ Content

¹⁹³ Jeannie L. Johnson, “Strategic Culture: Refining the Theoretical Construct,” Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, in *Comparative Strategic Culture Curriculum* (Contract No. DTRA01-03-D-0017, Technical Instruction 18-06-02) 31 October 2006, p 21.

¹⁹⁴ Looking at methodological problems related to secrecy, Davies notes that even non-intelligence related studies of certain aspects of politics face and meet the same challenge of government secrecy. Davies, “Spies as Informants.”

¹⁹⁵ This form of analysis maps the relationships between types of action or behavior, and compares with a text for congruence; Johnston, *Cultural Realism*, p 50.

¹⁹⁶ Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen, *Process-Tracing Methods : foundations and guidelines* (Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press, 2013).

analysis is the chosen method of A.I. Johnston's study, and has been historically used to analyze elite perceptions, as in Lasswell's famous 1941 work on the garrison state and the political-military elite.¹⁹⁷ It is well suited as supporting evidence for strategic culture, with the caution that the assumption that things that can be counted (word variants, verbs, etc.) are therefore scientific is somewhat misleading. Content analysis is best used as part of a suite of mixed methods. It can be used alongside other methods that are more in-depth (interviews, observation, discourse analysis) and broader (surveys, focus groups, intellectual history).

A favoured SC tool is the "key text."¹⁹⁸ Bodies of classic texts are useful, but must be treated with caution. The status of classics or canons is construed by the strategic culture itself, but the problem of reception and audience remains. Not all classics are read, nor are they read with universal lessons.¹⁹⁹ Each culture interprets the lessons of its classics in particular ways, regardless of the content of the text. Thus, interpreting the text without secondary context is a mistake. It is the *influence* of the text that is key, not the text in and of itself. As much as it is foreign to many to study the reception of texts, and then the texts themselves, it is a necessary component of the study of culture. Moreover, the texts that comprise an "authoritative" cannon may actually be different for different groups at different times. Finally, a single text, or a historic set of texts, is not enough evidence alone, as a strategic culture may not be textual, instead trusting to symbols and experience. A text-only focus can miss important elements of the strategic culture. Studying the Bible would give a good background to understand the Christian religion, but could not tell us what worshipping at church is like, nor predict church doctrine. Perhaps some proponents of strategic culture forget too much the material (practice, items, icons, etc.) that gives rise to culture alongside the ideational.

¹⁹⁷ Harold Lasswell, "The Garrison State," *The American Journal of Sociology* 46 (1941): 455-468.

¹⁹⁸ For example, see note 121 in this chapter.

¹⁹⁹ The film studies literature on audience reception is relevant here (such as reception theory).

The Gray-Johnston Debate - Culture and the Rational Actor Model

The major theoretical controversy that has defined strategic culture is the “Gray–Johnston debate.”²⁰⁰ I describe the terms of the debate here, but those familiar with the IR literature will see it is similar to “explaining” versus “understanding” and the rationalist versus reflectivist debates.²⁰¹ In strategic studies, the debate hinges on the disagreement over whether behaviour can be separated from culture so as to act as a separately testable variable. Johnston designates strategic decision as the dependent variable and culture the independent variable.²⁰² His opponents protest that culture and behaviour cannot be artificially separated in what Johnston et al. want to be a testable, causal relationship. Instead, Gray and others argue that culture is context. “Alas, the world is not like that. Culture is not an intervening variable. We are all encultured.”²⁰³ More recently some strategic culture scholars have proposed their own way beyond the debate, and certain approaches simply avoid it.²⁰⁴

This is an important issue for strategic culture because of the often large disconnect between the professed symbols and myths of a strategic culture and the actual practices justified through rhetoric. Moreover, the contortions induced to “predict” behaviour from culture should warn Intelligence Studies off this line of theory. “If individuals are granted responsibility for the communication (and, hence, perpetuation) of culture, the argument that culture constitutes

²⁰⁰ Poore, “What is the context?”

²⁰¹ Most famously in Robert O Keohane, “International Institutions: Two Approaches,” *International Studies Quarterly* 32, no. 4 (Dec. 1988).

²⁰² A.I Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” *International Security* 19, no. 4 (Spring, 1995), p 41/42.

²⁰³ Gray, “Out of the Wilderness,” p 8.

²⁰⁴ For example, Christopher O'Meyer, “Convergence towards a European strategic culture? A constructivist framework for explaining changing norms,” *European Journal of International Relations*, 11, no. 4 (Dec. 2005): 523-549.

behaviour but that behaviour does not constitute culture becomes questionable.”²⁰⁵ Most importantly, the definitional assumptions of intelligence culture scholarship should still be made explicit, to avoid theoretical acrimony. The Gray–Johnston debate does provide a useful outline of the nature of these two positions on culture, and their assumptions.

The (Colin) Gray²⁰⁶–(Alastair Iain) Johnston²⁰⁷ debate shows two possible models for treating culture. The first, Gray’s “culture as context” model, directs us to study cultures to better understand existing actions and decisions and to intimate trends, but not to try to predict or search for causation. This model makes less bold claims for the theory of strategic culture, but points to the utility of the study of norms and narratives, as has happened throughout IR theory, in the “constructivist turn.”²⁰⁸ This does not mean that this model is less useful, or that scholars should prefer one over the other as superior, but rather that they simply reflect different assumptions and theoretical commitments. This model of culture will be best suited for scholars who draw on the insights of culture from sociology and anthropology.

The second model, Johnston’s, pursues parsimony and predictive power by assuming ranked preference sets for actors. While this model is at odds with constructivist views of culture and theory, it offers strong claims for scholars assuming instrumentally rational actors, as well as a well-defined toolbox of methods to draw on.²⁰⁹ For those who would aim to measure or statistically analyze culture, Johnston’s approach will offer some answers. However, in the case of intelligence culture, determining future intelligence culture is not as

²⁰⁵ Edward Lock, “Refining Strategic Culture: The Return of the Second Generation,” *Review of International Studies* 36, no.03 (July 2010) 685-708.

²⁰⁶ Colin S Gray, “Strategic Culture as Context: the first generation of theory strikes back,” *Review of International Studies* 25, no. 01 (1999): 49-69.

²⁰⁷ Johnston, *Cultural Realism*.

²⁰⁸ Jeffrey T Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory,” *World Politics* 50, no. 2 (Jan., 1998): 324-348, p 325.

²⁰⁹ Johnston, *Cultural Realism*, “Chapter 2 “Some Questions of Methodology.”

valuable as predicting an opponent's future moves based on strategic culture.²¹⁰ Therefore, the aim of this model is not as necessary for intelligence. Those who prefer work based on traditional strategic studies, which can encompass culture, will hew to Johnston's systematization; however, scholars who do not feel a ranked preference set is necessary for strategic culture, as has been the case in the majority of work related to intelligence culture, will be able to use either model.

Levels of Analysis

Strategic culture theory works on a number of different levels, from the doctrinal and organizational to the national and supranational. The distinctions of grand strategy versus national and systemic interests may not be as relevant to intelligence, but the location of culture certainly provides a guide.

4 **Table 1: Strategic Culture Levels of Analysis**²¹¹

		Effect of Strategic Culture <i>Dependent Variable</i>			
		Doctrine	National Grand Strategy	National Interests	Systemic
Location of Culture <i>Independent Variable</i>	Organizations Other Sub-State	Legro Posen (Sources of Doctrine) Kier Twomey	Snyder (Soviet Strategic Culture)	Snyder (Myths of Empire)	
	Nation		Johnston Gray Lantis Scobell	Hopf Kahn Clunan	Kissinger
	International System	Van Evra (Cult of the Offensive)			Wendt

²¹⁰ Lantis, "Strategic Culture: From Clausewitz to Constructivism," p 7.

²¹¹ *Ibid*, p 18.

A major problem for Intelligence Studies is terminological confusion over the levels of intelligence culture. The levels of analysis debates are familiar in IR; however, SC studies compound the problem.²¹² It is not simply a matter of choosing a level and sticking to it. Theoretically the levels-of-analysis issue has no solution as such, seeming to confirm the IR dictum that inside each theoretical “black box” (such as the state as unit of analysis) is another set of boxes to be opened. In strategic culture, the types of studies have been simplified as dealing with individual actors (leaders);²¹³ groups (elites); institutions (the military); and society (the general public/popular culture). In a modified version of these levels, actors both above and below the state, transnational actors such as terrorist groups, and supranational actors such as the EU may also possess a strategic culture. Different authors posit many different models on how different factors input and how the different levels interact in SC.

Based on the evidence of strategic culture studies, there is no single “appropriate” level for intelligence culture. Limiting research to only one level is not valuable. Arguably, the levels overlap and cannot be easily separated from one another. Looking to strategic culture, the public or societal element of strategic culture is typically considered less important because there is less identifiable influence on specific policy decisions. However, in intelligence, the ideas of faction and intertext,²¹⁴ as well as the proliferation of spy literature including some written by former practitioners, means that there may be more utility for intelligence culture investigating this aspect. In the strategic culture literature, there has been some suggestion that studies purporting to deal with strategic culture should address both the national and

²¹² J. David Singer, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations,” *World Politics* 14, no. 1 (The International System: Theoretical Essays Oct., 1961): 77-92.

²¹³ Thomas Skypek, “Comparative Strategic Culture: A Literature Review, Part I,” in *Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum*, ed Jeffrey Larsen, (Contract No. DTRA01-03-D-0017, Technical Instruction 18-06-02, 21 November 2006) p 8.

²¹⁴ Der Derian, *Antidiplomacy*.

organizational level.²¹⁵ In general, scholarship in strategic culture indicates that all levels are legitimate subjects of study, and further, that it is acceptable to look at subjects that traverse them. The point is clarity, and the level of study will depend on the interest of the researcher and the nature of the case investigated. The danger that SC demonstrates is the tendency to focus on one part or level of culture to the exclusion of others. The lesson here is that a sharp focus on one part must still recognize that other elements exist, and ideally should attempt linkages.

Terminology

Because the study of intelligence culture intersects with so many other lines of approach in Intelligence Studies (from information sharing, assessment, and cultures of analysis to organizational and management styles and process), it may be at times difficult to determine what is meant by intelligence culture. Bean's excellent work on organizational intelligence culture uses the terms of intelligence culture,²¹⁶ but so does Turner, who does not look at the organizational culture level. With so much blurring between levels, looking to strategic culture might help clarify the levels/terminology confusion. Strategic culture has the same issue of blurred and overlapping levels, but some have attempted to clarify the different levels that strategic culture theorists are working at (see Table 1 above).

In strategic culture, much more work occurs at the national level or higher, with grand strategy, security culture, and national style in warfare. I propose that this sort of study for intelligence adopt the term "national intelligence culture" for the overarching elite level, and

²¹⁵ Johnson, "Strategic Culture," p 8.

²¹⁶ Bean, "United States Intelligence Cultures,"

“public/popular intelligence culture” for cultural studies that focus exclusively on media and popular representations of intelligence. Many intelligence culture studies look at organizational or bureaucratic culture and politics, and although it would be helpful to use the more cumbersome “organizational intelligence culture” for the purposes of clarity and distinction, it seems likely it will remain a catchall.

Looking below the bureaucratic level to other non-state groups, I think it is useful to maintain Warner’s terminology of an intelligence system, of which intelligence culture is a surrounding milieu. The “system” concept distinguishes government intelligence culture from that of non-state actors (i.e. terrorist groups). This dissertation does not specifically address the intelligence culture of non-state actors like ALQ, but these groups could still be considered, in general according to my framework, a legitimate object of study.²¹⁷ Any sub-group’s particularly outstanding and persisting ideas of intelligence could be considered in terms of intelligence culture. Finally, an interesting strategic culture subset is the investigations of strategic culture around specific issues, in particular CBRNE²¹⁸ weapons. Thus, in intelligence, attitudes and beliefs about specific elements of intelligence, such as covert action or analysis, could be categorized as issue-specific studies under the rubric of intelligence culture.

Keepers of Strategic Culture: Single or Multiple Cultures

Having discussed the fault lines over culture and levels, these concerns re-emerge in the disagreement as to the possessors of strategic culture and how it is communicated. Do elites alone keep strategic culture, or are there differences between those who carry and shape/change

²¹⁷ Chapter two clarifies the specific elements of the intelligence community that are the subject of this dissertation, in addition to their origins and general functions.

²¹⁸ CBRNE are Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive weapons. The more colloquial shorthand is ‘weapons of mass destruction.’

it?²¹⁹ Should the general public be included? And how does the military (or other organizations) as a whole contain strategic culture, in relation to civilians?²²⁰ The literature generally accepts that elites are keepers; but others extend strategic culture to the general public, and many recognize institutions or organizations (the military) as keepers of culture. Who the ‘stewards’ of SC are remains one of the thornier issues in SC because it bears on SC stability—on how it changes, is transmitted, and translates to actions. Some of these issues can be clarified by being explicit about the level or group under study, and, in intelligence, by more clearly drawing the lines between policymakers and practitioners. I also discuss this in the American context at the end of chapter two, in light of the organizational divisions of the national security apparatus.

The problem of who stewards a strategic or intelligence culture raises one of the fundamental theoretical issues in the field: whether there is a single culture or whether multiple cultures or sub-cultures co-exist. In strategic culture work, empirical case studies support the general findings that multiple cultures exist, which are modelled as either clusters or sub-cultures. This returns us to the problem of change and effect. When and how do the cultures change? Is one dominant or are there varying effects? Some argue that there are times when SC is more or less affecting and that it may not exist in all states, but this is under-explored in the literature.²²¹ Perspectives on change in SC are necessarily divided: to profess that strategic culture is changing constantly would be to deny most of the utility of its study, while to assert that strategic culture is unchanging seems to deny the evidence of states’ strategic shifts. This has been a problem in SC since its start, with most adhering to Snyder’s concept that SC is more

²¹⁹ Rodney Jones, “India’s Strategic Culture,” in *Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum*, ed. Jeffrey Larsen (No.

DTRA01-03-D-0017, Technical Instruction 18-06-02, 31 October 2006), p 28.

²²⁰ Thomas Mahnken, “United States Strategic Culture,” in *Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum*, ed Jeffrey Larsen (No.

DTRA01-03-D-0017, Technical Instruction 18-06-02, 31 October 2006), p 4 and Lantis, “Strategic Culture: from Clausewitz to Constructivism,” p 21.

²²¹ Colin Gray, “Out of the Wilderness: Prime Time for Strategic Culture.”

than an of-the-moment policy. A move to study when strategic culture changes suggests that change occurs with failures, technological revolutions, generational changes, domestic crises, movement in the international environment, and learning from others.²²² This type of work is not contrary to the essence of strategic culture theory, as might be gleaned from the insistence that strategic culture is slow to change. Instead, highlighting changes points to the originating and continuing sources of strategic culture. A useful model of cultural change describes change in norms through norm/myth shapers, or “entrepreneurs,” as they have been termed.²²³ From these accounts, it must be clear that multiple intelligence cultures co-exist and evolve, but that it is likely also possible to identify a dominant strand or strands. I use culture to refer to the overarching whole, which superintends these sub-cultures or ‘strains’ of culture. Ideally we should see the multiplicity of ideas and attitudes undiminished by the federative term culture.

Symbolic vs. Operational Cultures

The second generation of strategic culture work purportedly operates on the assumption that elites intentionally manipulate the rhetoric of policy and strategy, while acting oppositely. Whether or not the divide between symbolic language and operational doctrine/actions is an intentional one, it exists. This divide causes problems for the Johnstonian model of culture because the study of rhetoric (speeches and texts) helps determine and predict the strategic culture that will be carried out.²²⁴ For Johnston, this rhetorical falsity might indicate either the mendacity of elites or problems with strategic culture theory.

Johnston’s type of study uses texts that may be hundreds of years old to describe current

²²² Jeffrey Lantis, “Strategic Culture and National Security Policy,” *International Studies Review* 4, no.3 (Fall 2002): 87-113.

²²³ Peter Lavoy, “Pakistan’s Strategic Culture,” in *Comparative Strategic Culture Curriculum*, ed. Jeffrey Larsen (Contract No. DTRA01-03-D-0017, Technical Instruction 18-06-02, 31) 31 October 2006, p22.

²²⁴ A.I. Johnston, “Cultural Realism,” p 49.

and future strategic culture. This points to caution in methods, presuming that rhetoric and behaviour are identical (particularly, when texts are chosen selectively historically). Culture reflects identity, which may not necessarily become action. A norm is not always, or in all situations, acted on. For example, the mantra of centralized intelligence at the CIA has not historically been translated into a power structure that allows true centralization of intelligence. Does this mean such “unconsummated” elements of US intelligence culture should be ignored? On the contrary, such policy/culture fault lines typically point to cultural problems, similar to the psychological experience of cognitive dissonance in the individual. If public texts of strategic (or intelligence) culture continue to say one thing while policymakers act in another way, this may indicate a more complex norm or belief than initially indicated. Decision makers may be acting from different clusters or sub-cultural elements, making this scenario plausible and without duplicitous intent.²²⁵ This idea of intelligence culture rhetoric, then, like all belief structure models, must be dealt with carefully when connecting intelligence culture to policy or action.

The preceding elements from strategic culture make clear the methodological and epistemological controversies that I have attempted to clarify for intelligence culture. If most writers take strategic culture as their template for intelligence culture, these cautions must be made to theorize intelligence culture. In the following section, I introduce the security imaginary model to improve intelligence culture and resolve some of the clear problems that persist in strategic culture. The point is to show how this heuristic improves the basic strategic culture premises. Additionally, the security imaginary heuristic demonstrates intelligence culture’s theoretical promise.

²²⁵ Writing a speech, the president’s rhetoric will likely emphasize America’s positive qualities, such as the respect for freedom, democracy, and its exemplary status. When confronted with a threat, the nature of it may lead policymakers to feel it must be dealt with at any cost. Seemingly contradictory, it shows that for example, the norm of the protection of vital interest may override the values of the freedom and democracy for a time.

5 The Security Imaginary Heuristic

“Imaginarities” are commonly used concepts, ranging from the idea of an overall “social imaginary”²²⁶ encompassing the arrangements of meaning that are unique from one society to another, to more specific imaginaries, such as the religious imaginary. The security imaginary concept is somewhat expansive, speaking to the national interest, security, danger, statehood, and international identity.²²⁷ The most relevant scholarship is the work on the “security imaginary” popularized by Weldes and Muppidi.²²⁸ Security imaginary research attempts to explain how security-related actions were conceived of, made possible, and expressed in certain ways. It also looks at how the self and other become labelled (or “interpellated”)²²⁹ with certain characteristics. The security imaginary highlights these two connected functions: first, articulation, or linking together chains of ideas to form meanings; and second, interpellation, or hailing a subject into a created subject position. Through these two functions, I will demonstrate that in a number of areas intelligence helps to construct the nature of the world that the state is confronted with. In this way intelligence comes to be central in defining what security is for a particular state at a particular time, and in authorizing the state’s attempt to secure itself and its interests. This both underlines the centrality of a study of intelligence to security, and sketches a model for understanding it. I briefly outline Althusser’s work first, as the origin of the security imaginary heuristic.

Origins of the Security Imaginary

²²⁶ See Charles Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries* (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2004).

²²⁷ Jutta Weldes, “The Cultural Production of Crises: U.S. Identity and Missiles in Cuba,” in *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger*, ed Jutta Weldes (Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, 1999) p 10.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*

²²⁹ Drawn from the Althusserian conception of interpellation, from his *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, 1977 though generally more in line with Judith Butler’s and others’ broader conceptions of hailing and the possibilities for resistance.

Althusser's theory has become the core of the security imaginary heuristic. Louis Althusser's key contribution to post-Marxism was the concept of interpellation, used in the social sciences and media theory today.²³⁰ In extending the Marxist concept of ideology, he shifted the traditional concept of ideological propagandizing in Marxist theory (the priests, jurists, intellectuals) towards institutions in what has classically been considered the private, or civil sphere. Althusser's innovation was to posit that ideology is not simply a limited product of certain groups and functionaries of the state. Instead, institutions throughout civil society continually "hail" us as ideological subjects. Even at birth, Althusser wrote, we are born into pre-existing subject positions. This hailing occurs through the non-state apparatuses (ISAs), which include religious, educational, family, legal, political, union, communications (radio, TV), and cultural (arts, sports) structures.²³¹ Althusser famously wrote that ideology:

"recruits" subjects among the individuals (it recruits them all), or "transforms" the individuals into subjects (it transforms them all) by that very precise operation which I have called *interpellation* or hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace every day police (or other) hailing: "Hey, you there!"²³²

Butler has nuanced Althusser's discussion of interpellation and hailing by emphasizing the unpredictability and subtlety of hailing; "[i]nterpellation, according to Butler, is not a simple performative in that it does not always effectively enact what it names. Sometimes people do not obediently respond to hailing in predictable ways."²³³ Butler's use of interpellation is the one generally adapted in the security imaginary heuristic, as it provides a more complex portrait of the creation of a subject position and identity. Both interpellation and articulation are modelled in the security imaginary heuristic. Where interpellation is useful for in

²³⁰ Louis Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays* (New York : Monthly Review Press, 2001).

²³¹ Althusser wrote that state apparatuses primarily function through violence, but also by ideology to a lesser extent, and conversely the ISAs function 'primarily' by ideology, but to a lesser extent by violence.

²³² Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*.

²³³ Shaughney Aston, "Identities under construction: Women hailed as addicts," *Health* (2009) p 615-616.

intelligence culture, is providing a model of identity and subject-position (taking), alongside articulation. This model of identity is multiple and both conscious and unconscious, which accords with the understanding I portray of multiple, overlapping cultures.

In more recent work, Weldes and Muppidi both adapt the security imaginary heuristic. They each use it to focus on zones where cultural understandings clash at the edges of two different security imaginaries. Muppidi looks at the conceptual divide between the American and Indian security imaginaries. Muppidi argues the US historically failed in its hailing of India, because the subject position that the US created was not consistent with the organizing principle of the Indian security imaginary: post-coloniality. India could not see itself in the construct of relations the US presented to it.²³⁴ Weldes looks at the Cuban Missile crisis and how the identifications and articulations surrounding the event differed in the Soviet and American imaginaries.²³⁵ Following Weldes' and Muppidi's work, the security imaginary can be an important heuristic for demonstrating the impact of intelligence on the state's conception of security and the (re)creation of enemies and allies. As an extension of this, I would suggest that the constellations of assumptions about intelligence in a given intelligence culture will also then help form a subject position, or map the subject position of others.

Modelling the Security Imaginary for Intelligence Culture

Using the security imaginary heuristic to understand intelligence²³⁶ gives intelligence

²³⁴ Himadeep Muppidi, "Postcoloniality and the Production of International Insecurity: The Persistent Puzzle of U.S.-Indian Relations," in *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger*, ed Jutta Weldes (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).

²³⁵ Weldes, "The Cultural Production of Crises."

²³⁶ Intelligence clearly interfaces with the security imaginary (as per other notes in this chapter).

culture a more secure foundation than through strategic culture alone. Strategic culture highlights the socialization of groups, but the security imaginary additionally, and importantly, shows us the group agency (and includes publics as well as elites). It shows that elite groups and intelligence policymakers will be affected by and create certain intelligence related articulations, while other groups may at the same time be articulating those elements in contradictory ways.

The overarching “imaginary” concept reminds us of the shared (intersubjective) basis of intelligence culture. Intelligence has a particular role in writing to the imaginary, and also in creating national subject positions. When we model the intelligence role in the imaginary, we can define distinct competing intelligence cultures that co-exist but, more properly, that draw from the same social imaginary while articulating concepts in diverse and contradicting ways. One of the security imaginary key contributions is the articulation concept because it demonstrates how contributors to strategic culture can be from different parts of society. Elites react to and draw from public articulations, and publics are influenced by elite representation of events. In contrast to traditional SC theory, anyone can “write to” the strategic imaginary and make articulations available for use. Each group, then, makes use of salient articulations and connects disparate available elements of the security imaginary.

One of the strongest points of the security imaginary heuristic is that it clearly answers the question of change in strategic culture. As discussed, the issue of the “keepers” of strategic culture, and when and how they change, has been a puzzle. The security imaginary heuristic is essentially a model of this kind of change—it demonstrates how different groups articulate concepts and interpellate subject positions, and how these articulations change over time.

Sometimes security imaginaries remain powerful and are widely re-articulated; other times articulations persist only in certain groups. Strategic cultures, then, change according to changes in these dominant articulations and interpellations. This kind of change can be tracked by tracing the dominant articulations and their persistence.

The security imaginary heuristic makes what I see as three significant contributions to intelligence culture, strengthening and modifying strategic culture. First, it supports the view of multiple cultures that flow together and co-exist. Second, the articulation model highlights the role of important symbols or analogies—intelligence culture’s “Munichs.” Finally, the idea of interpellation shows the broad impact of intelligence culture on state action and foreign policy. I will look at these in the following sub-sections.

Culture in the Security Imaginary

The first way the security imaginary heuristic is valuable to intelligence culture theory is its revised construct of culture. The alternate account of culture demonstrates that terms of the Gray- Johnston debate are hollow. Culture is not something that can be separated from behaviour and measured; it is diffuse and changeable.²³⁷ The keepers of culture are also similarly changeable. While particular articulations are most meaningful to policymakers, and socializations surround these, many are supported by a wider cultural articulation relevant to other publics. The security imaginary heuristic also disproves the possibility of a single strategic culture. With multiple “writers” to the imaginary, and myriad possible articulations of any cultural elements, there can be no single strategic culture. A dominant culture is possible, but the security

²³⁷ Reading Geertz’ thick description, it seems impossible that we could systematize or measure winks, blinks, burlesque blinks, and so on; Geertz, “Thick Description,” Gray’s is the classic rejoinder in strategic culture as to culture as context; Gray, “Strategic Culture as Context.”

imaginary forcefully demonstrates that multiple cultural elements are always being articulated at the same time. Our perception of a dominant culture may be subjective, depending on the questions of “dominant for whom?” and “dominant when/or where?”

Supporting this idea of culture, interpellation shows us that we can be hailed to multiple, overlapping, and inconstant subject positions. Our personal identities are in some way contradictory; yet as individuals, we hold overlapping subject positions (e.g., being Canadian, female, Catholic, Liberal, Latina, environmentalist, architect, all at once). The security imaginary heuristic posits, similarly, that America’s “identity” clearly cannot dictate intelligence culture, because only those elements of identity salient at the time will be expressed. Intelligence culture is linked to identity in part through norms (in chapter five), but intelligence “identities” are demonstrated in the Kent-Kendall debate, and in famous incidents such as the Team A/B debate. Intelligence is also part of the understanding of the American identity, as a whole, for Turner.²³⁸

“Munichs”: The Role of Analogies and Symbols in Intelligence Culture

The second contribution of the security imaginary heuristic is to highlight analogies and symbols in intelligence culture. Intelligence and foreign policy are clearly linked. Intelligence in many societies plays an important role in policy decision making and in the accumulation of information about friends and adversaries. Intelligence surprises (or failed estimates), such as Pearl Harbor, 9.11, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Bay of Pigs, have all become historical turning points—and might not have occurred as they did had intelligence been otherwise.²³⁹

²³⁸ Turner, “A Distinctive U.S. Intelligence Identity,” p 42-50.

²³⁹ For the Cuban Missile Crisis, see Zegart, “Organization Theory, Intelligence, and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” and Amy Zegart, “The Cuban Missile Crisis as Intelligence Failure,” *Policy Review* 175 (October 2012): 23-39.

These events have been etched into the national consciousness of the US too, creating strong associations for the public (though not always with the same articulations of meaning). In foreign policy, these seminal events or analogies (or ‘policy ideas’) are treated as important influences.²⁴⁰ Yee writes that the failures of game theory and NeoRealism “has led many analysts of International Relations to rediscover the importance of ideas and beliefs in policymaking” particularly these kinds of policy ideas.²⁴¹ Munich has been one of the most cited in the Western world, with long-term persistence. The Munich analogy had an impact on American foreign policy because of the American unwillingness to enter the war and its insistence that Europe’s problems were inconsequential to the new world. Munich had a specific policy lesson: to resist aggression and not appease. “For more than a half-century, the application of the presumed lesson of Munich that appeasement only encourages dictators has been used repeatedly to argue for a firm policy stance and, if necessary, military action.”²⁴² Munich as a foreign policy symbol and analogy has been articulated to many new situations and assessments of the world. For decades in the fight against communism, American policy was predicated on not allowing another Munich. The security imaginary highlights intelligence’s ‘Munichs.’

Munich is just one component in the American security imaginary, but this idea of important symbols that are continually re-articulated points us to intelligence’s Munichs. Intelligence culture has its own sets of key events and symbols that help shape policy, action, and thought about intelligence. It is these key cultural symbols, like Munich, that I think have a unique and understudied effect on intelligence and on policy. Find these symbols and trace

²⁴⁰ Andrew J. Taylor, and John T. Rourke, “Historical Analogies in the Congressional Foreign Policy Process,” *The Journal of Politics* 57, no. 2 (May, 1995): 460-468, p 460.

²⁴¹ Yee, *The Causal Effects of Ideas on Policies*, p 69-108.

²⁴² Taylor and Rourke, “Historical Analogies in the Congressional Foreign Policy Process,” p 460.

when and where they are relevant, how they are used, and how they are articulated and re-articulated and you begin to uncover the wellsprings of (American) thinking on intelligence. Even Johnston essentially calls strategic culture a “system of symbols.”²⁴³ They may not be as obvious as Munich, or Pearl Harbor, but this does not render them less valuable to a constructivist understanding of intelligence. Intelligence culture symbols also cross over into foreign policy discourse, making them even more useful.²⁴⁴ This, of course, indicates the importance of intelligence culture for foreign policy in general, or for the state’s overall perspective on the world.

Intelligence’s Munichs, then, come to have multiple sets of meaning—for the intelligence community specifically and for foreign policy in general. The security imaginary heuristic points towards these multiple changeable articulations for PH and national intelligence culture, and the interesting role these key symbol/analogies play in statecraft. PH, like Munich, is constantly rearticulated as cultures change and new history is written. The security imaginary heuristic shows us this constant rearticulating of meaning around Munichs, and helps developing research understanding this kind of symbol in intelligence culture.

Intelligence Culture and the Representation of the National Interest

The final unique contribution of the security imaginary heuristic is to show how national intelligence culture is implicated in constructing basic ontology of the state. Intelligence shapes the state’s representation of the world, as well as the threats and interests in it.²⁴⁵ We can

²⁴³ Johnston, “Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China,” p 223.

²⁴⁴ For example, the Cuban missile crisis, Bay of Pigs, and Pearl Harbor are arguably both foreign policy and intelligence

‘events’ or symbols.

²⁴⁵ This depends on how integrated intelligence is into policymaking, and the policymaking style of the state, but if intelligence is used at all it can be considered to contribute to this function.

understand this by looking how intelligence helps to construct the national interest. Jutta Weldes' argument is that the state constructs its national interest through the very process of representing the world.²⁴⁶ What Weldes and others neglect to describe, is the process of representation itself. Intelligence is the missing piece, and as intelligence culture affects the conduct of intelligence, so too does it impact these far-reaching representations. Intelligence culture affects foreign relations deeply. In creating meaning out of collections of facts and suggesting courses of actions and policy positions, intelligence is more central than any other part of the government in forming the society's security imaginary.²⁴⁷ The military, foreign policy, and executive bureaucracies all play a role, but none is specifically tasked with knowing the world and the threats in it.²⁴⁸

How do the simple facts of an event become meaningful and remain so for a society? The security imaginary allows us to access questions like these. In this way, the concept of an imaginary is a fixing of the constant process of creating and negotiating meaning. The security imaginary relates to creation of meaning for the state generally, through intelligence, because intelligence performs some ontological functions of an imaginary. Reservoirs of security meanings are articulated and produced by intelligence. As part of its reproduction, intelligence also assists in interpellating subject positions through which the world is recognizable, for the "other" and the self. It forms chains of association that are recognizable from a given subject position. That is, intelligence attempts to translate the meaningless world outside into concepts that are meaningful for a specific society. "It is through the imaginary that the total world given

²⁴⁶ Jutta Weldes, "Constructing National Interests."

²⁴⁷ In the United States, the heft of the intelligence bureaucracies give it this power, while in other countries, the role of intelligence would vary according to its cultural accepted role in digesting the raw 'facts' of the world and producing reporting, prediction, and advice.

²⁴⁸ The secret nature of most intelligence information clearly blunts the transfer of the portrait of the world painted by intelligence to the public. However, the key relation to the security imaginary is that intelligence uses existing conceptions of the world (as all

concepts/ideas/theories predate testing) and attempts to determine what the current and future nature of it will be. It validates some articulations of threat and security in the existing security imaginary, and may lessen the authority of others, or introduce new articulations. Finally, it also directly tests the assumptions about the subject positions of other entities/states, by asking how the government believes other states or actors will act, and attempting to discern if this prediction is correct, and what fundamental assumptions can be made about these actors.

to a particular society is grasped in a way that is determined practically, affectively, and mentally, that an articulated meaning is not imposed on it, that distinctions are made concerning what does and does not possess value [...] and what should and should not be done.”²⁴⁹ So because intelligence performs a representational function similar to those ascribed to the security imaginary, its role in the creation of meaning for the state in general may be mapped using the security imaginary heuristic.

Beliefs about intelligence take on particular significance when intelligence and policy choices are formed through cultural meanings attached to intelligence. These beliefs shape what kind of world intelligence can construct for the state. Intelligence is bearer and judge of information, creating a portrait of the world and the state’s interests in it. Although shaped by existing information and beliefs, it plays a key role in specific crises and in shaping the political generally. The dominant cultural conception of intelligence therefore shapes the map of the world that intelligence furnishes to government. Intelligence pictures the nature of the state, the sovereign self at the centre, positioned on a terrain of politics (hostile or friendly) confronting state enemies and other actors, with the assistance or indifference of other nations and allies. Intelligence could be called the unseen narrator of security and all it entails. This expansive view of intelligence has been neglected by conventional and critical security studies. It is an important piece missing in the constructivist understanding of state representations of the world.

This argument may seem esoteric, but it is supported by intelligence practice. Proponents of opportunity-oriented analysis have understood that intelligence creates threats and

²⁴⁹ Muppidi, “Postcoloniality and the Production of International Insecurity,” p 145-146.

opportunities in its analysis of the bare “facts” of the world.²⁵⁰ They see analysis as a key stage at which the world reveals itself, where beliefs change our understanding of evidence. Cold War opportunity analysis could judge facts based on the belief that the Soviet empire was implacably aggressive and find opportunities to oppose it instead of waiting to confirm intentions. In *Studies in Intelligence*, Jack Davis wrote that, acting as scouts for policy, “opportunity-oriented assessments would help policymakers identify [...] opportunities to advance US interests through diplomatic, military, and economic means, public diplomacy, and covert action” as well as “strategic and tactical vulnerabilities” and other factors “subject to influence.”²⁵¹ Intelligence is also not only understood as information.

Intelligence’s fragile and constitutive nature reveals itself in the analysis of intentions.²⁵² Intentions are difficult or impossible to verify, yet they make so much difference to our understanding of evidence. An increase in missile installations might indicate preparation for war in light of an aggressive intent, or it might be the strengthening of a deterrent for peace time. If we could estimate without belief or representation, intelligence’s predictive record might be perfect: this is clearly not possible.

Theory and Analysis: Using Strategic Culture and the Security Imaginary

²⁵⁰ This idea is demonstrated in the team A/B debate which showed opportunity analysis square off against the ‘estimating machine’ (roughly), over soviet intentions – see Anne Hessing Cahn, *Killing Detente: The Right Attacks the CIA College Station* (PA: Penn State Press, 1998). Jack Davis also cites a National Strategy Information Center (NSIC) document entitled “The Future of US Intelligence,” that captures opportunity oriented analysis. In this document, “The analysts are charged, in effect, with leveraging their expertise to enable the USG to gauge the seriousness of national security threats and anticipate policy opportunities. The general label for the sought-after intelligence deliverable is “opportunity analysis” (also called “action analysis”), elaborated as follows in an earlier NSIC publication. Opportunity-oriented assessments would help policymakers identify: 1. Opportunities to advance US interests through diplomatic, military, and economic means, public diplomacy, and covert action. 2. Strategic and tactical vulnerabilities of foreign leaders, parties, and...movements. 3. Factors subject to US influence. 4. The likely results of given US courses of action on foreign societies.” Jack Davis, “Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Analysts and the Policymaking Process,” *The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis. Occasional Papers* 1, No 2, Sept. 2002.

²⁵¹ Davis, “Improving CIA Analytic Performance.”

²⁵² Michael A. Turner, *Why Secret Intelligence Fails* (Dulles, Va.: Potomac Books, 2005), p 105.

These two theoretical models are the combined basis for my thesis.²⁵³ They are evident in chapter four dealing with current intelligence culture. The security imaginary heuristic prompts my use of multiple “cuts” at current intelligence culture (using definitions, norms and narratives), because of the multiplicity of articulations possible in any given imaginary. This is also the reason I *did not* choose one classic text to read from to justify a single intelligence culture. Security imaginary theory, with its emphasis on multiple competing interpretations and multiple “cultures” of security makes it clear that no single book can encompass all of one culture. Moreover, as I will explain in subsequent chapters, there is no single socialization and instruction process in intelligence (compared to military staff colleges), so that it would be difficult to infer even from classic texts, the totality of intelligence culture.²⁵⁴ Thus analytically, the dissertation is shaped by the theoretical lessons of what must not be done. Chapter two and four also demonstrate the proposition that there are multiple intelligence cultures at any time (from the security imaginary heuristic), and throughout the dissertation I emphasize both public and elite conceptions of security, because the model of the security imaginary heuristic enjoins us to consider the ways multiple and unlikely groups can “write” to the imaginary. With these major caveats, I follow the theoretical form of strategic culture work, in attempting to discern key norms and ideas, and then compare them with historical cases and current ideas or debates. In chapter six, this is done in the study of Pearl Harbor which is discussed in the methodology and dissertation plan sections of this chapter, looks at a number of articulations of Pearl Harbor, both in intelligence and publicly. Finally, the content analysis of chapter six analyses intelligence

²⁵³ This dissertation does not, in the text, focus on how the security imaginary (or strategic culture) informs the intelligence imaginary- that would be a separate project on the *sources* of intelligence culture, instead of on its *content*. It does make clear how they are conceptually interlinked.

²⁵⁴ This would also be methodologically unsound, see the methodology section below. However, there is a kind of socialization at some levels (as with any company or profession. Bean, "United States Intelligence Cultures" cites discussion of the agency-level or organizational socialization, and the (disputed) socialization to specific tradecraft.

culture through Khong's Analogical Explanation (AE) framework. It is a framework for tracing the influence of analogies in (foreign) policy. However, the study of analogies is another form of the security-imaginary focused work on articulation. Analogies are comprehensive articulations of two (or more) unconnected events or situations to specify results and courses of actions. In these ways, the security imaginary heuristic and strategic culture theory animate my dissertation's analysis. These issues are discussed more fully below, in the methodology section below.

6 Methodology

For each element of this thesis, I will explain the methodology more clearly in the respective sections. The details of the content analysis on Pearl Harbor, in chapter six, are found primarily in that chapter. Here, however, I bring together the overall methodological choices of country, symbol, time frame, and textual analysis. The core methodological selection was a single in-depth symbol, rather than a multi-case or comparative study of intelligence culture. Textual and content analysis is best done with detailed, clearly defined groups of sources. This is not possible with multiple countries and multiple separate cultures. The study of a single country ensures better ideational research by carefully addressing the meanings one society attaches to material factors and events, teasing out culture from the common sense. Because of the greater depth possible in a single country study, it is more feasible to address the question of the existence of intelligence culture, and to justify the ideational study of intelligence. A comparative study would have to assume the existence of intelligence culture, and therefore might not be able to demonstrate as persuasively that material factors alone are insufficient to research in this area. While it would be useful to demonstrate cultural differences in intelligence

through a direct comparison of nations, this is unfeasible while intelligence culture literature is not developed theoretically. Strategic culture and security imaginary literatures have begun some comparative studies, but there are too few works on intelligence culture for the theory to be strong enough to base comparisons on. More single country studies must be done, or comparisons on single elements.

The United States was selected as the single subject mainly because, compared to any other nation, it conducts intelligence “in public.” That is, its frequent scandals, reforms, and inquiries have led to the de-classification of much material. In addition, there is more written about current US intelligence than any other nation. This is due to the location of Intelligence Studies in political science (instead of history as in the UK), and because the American ethos of democracy prompts much interest in and work on intelligence and its secrets.²⁵⁵

Methodologically, the plethora of texts generated in the US means the danger that secrecy might distort textual analysis is low. I do not consider secrecy a serious impediment to the study overall: secrecy is intended to protect “methods and sources”²⁵⁶ as well as the specifics of particular events, not overall intelligence thought. There are many non-secret texts that can be used, and few, if any, instances in which (previously) secret data is preferable to open archives. For the issue of access in general, no intelligence culture is wholly secret—intentionally hidden from all public disclosure and scrutiny. Intelligence culture is reflected in declassified documents, memoirs, public documents, and the like (and more tangentially in popular culture). Secrecy is a core concern for many aspects of Intelligence Studies; yet with appropriate methodological caution, many writers are sanguine:

²⁵⁵ Used in the sense of David Campbell’s description of a democratic “ethos”, in his *National Deconstruction*. David Campbell,

National Deconstruction: Violence, identity, and justice in Bosnia, (U of Minnesota Press, 1998).

²⁵⁶ This is the intelligence phrase for describing the protection of names of agents and informants, and the tradecraft methods used in intelligence.

"Problems of archival access and evidence remain, government paranoia being more in evidence in Britain than in the United States, placing a premium on inference. This remains true, arguments about information overload from the files of democratic governments notwithstanding. Quality of data also remains a problem. International and military history got a long way without them[...]"

argue Fry & Hochstein.²⁵⁷ Michael Warner believes that sources can still help illuminate the grand sweep of events.²⁵⁸ On sources from the outside – he says “without access to the official, classified documentation” – one may cobble ‘fragmentary’ pieces together as the historians of old did, Livy, Tacitus and Thucydides. For Warner the problem always is lack of reliable data, so the content analysis of this dissertation looks at usage (or articulation) to infer effect, helping to elide the worst of the issues surrounding secrecy.²⁵⁹

The selection of textual analysis in the form of content analysis is appropriate to my philosophically constructivist theoretical orientation. These methods are particularly suited to studying the social world and its webs of meaning. As well, textual analysis affords methodological rigor over pure supposition. One of the criticisms of interpretive methods is that they have only weak evidence. Turner is challenged in the *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*: “[I]t is very hard to tell whether Turner's US intelligence identity really is distinctive without some kind of comparative data against which to demonstrate that distinctiveness. As a result, whether Turner's characterization is accurate or not, it contributes very little that is new to our understanding of intelligence in America.”²⁶⁰ The benefit of textual analysis is that by identifying sources, other researchers can judge if the text fits the conclusions produced. This is not repeatability in the scientific sense, but is much stronger than historical

²⁵⁷ Fry and Hochstein, "Epistemic Communities," p 14.

²⁵⁸ Michael Warner, "Sources and Methods for the Study of Intelligence," *Handbook of Intelligence Studies*, ed. Loch Johnson (New York: Routledge, 2007) p18- 21.

²⁵⁹ *Ibid*, p 23.

²⁶⁰ Davies, "Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure in Britain and the United States," p 495-520.

anecdotes and non-textual interpretation. The opponents of cultural approaches criticize culture as unfalsifiable. They charge that culture is derived from behaviour and behaviour is then predicted from culture.²⁶¹ This makes it impossible to disprove, and demonstrates nothing. Choosing textual methods to read the content of the intelligence culture, while rejecting the false separation of behaviour and practice, is intended to avoid this tautology.

Overall, this broadly qualitative analysis, using a number of methods of textual and content analysis, has certain strengths. The interpretation of meaning is not a science, and those who attempt it practice something of an art. The strengths of these methods are in providing guidelines to interpretation and concepts through which to understand form and content, which have been used in many contexts by many other authors. They instruct the researcher in the art of interpretation, while recognizing that textual analysis is not fully objective. This is, in turn, the weakness of these methods. There is nothing necessarily preventing the researcher from presuming the uniqueness of her research. The researcher may come up with an “unrepeatable” set of conclusions, which may or may not seem to others to be supported by the evidence marshalled. This is to say, personal interpretation may overcome methodology.

However, this weakness is not unique to these methods. Textual analysis rests on the argument that while all interpretation must be to some extent personal, there are sets of self-referential meanings that can be discerned through close study and are repeated in other texts. Thus, my method follows Der Derian’s supposition of an intelligence “intertext,” an underlying interrelationship among multiple artifacts on the topic.²⁶² Intelligence texts, then, are “constituted in an intersection of other texts” because, taken together, they form a more comprehensive

²⁶¹ Lock, “Refining Strategic Culture,” p 685-708.

²⁶² James Der Derian, *Antidiplomacy*. See also Jef Huysmans, “James Der Derian: Reflexive Contributions” in *The Future of International Relations: Masters in the Making?* Iver B Neumann and Ole Waever eds. (London ; New York : Routledge, 1997) p 366.

picture of the hidden linkages between public, secret, and private ‘readings’ of intelligence culture than any single ‘key text’ could.²⁶³ In sum, I have attempted to overcome the weakness of this method by studying both form and content and by using multiple methods that may reinforce one another. The most important guards are diligence toward the text and self-reflexivity over the nature of interpretation and objectivity. That is, without pretending to objectivity, it is easier to guard against claiming a subjective interpretation as the authoritative one.²⁶⁴

Time Frame Limits and Selection

The time frame was a key selection for the argument of the dissertation. Given, as discussed, that PH is a rich and historic symbol for intelligence, the entire period from 1941 to present could have been selected. However, this was not considered feasible or desirable.

The key focus of this dissertation is the exposition of present intelligence culture, partly to expose the value of Intelligence Studies to International Relations. While conducting a historical study of the changes in intelligence culture over time, through PH, would be valuable, the importance of current culture cannot be overlooked. America recently weathered a number of new intelligence scandals such as 9.11 itself, the Iraq War intelligence scandals, and more recent controversies over the NSA. Intelligence culture ideally can speak to present national security policymaking, and thus the current intelligence culture should be explored before historical studies.

Additionally, the period after 9.11 is a key time for re-articulation for PH and its lessons.

²⁶³ For example, the method in Rashed Uz Zaman’s examination of Indian Strategic culture as a “manifestation” of the teachings of Kautilya in The Arthashastra, and an idea common in strategic culture literature; Rashed Uz Zaman, "Kautilya: the Indian strategic thinker and Indian strategic culture," *Comparative Strategy* 25, no. 3 (2006): 231-247.

²⁶⁴ It can be seen as a personal distance in which one is aware of the personal nature of all interpretation, and the multiplicity of readings of any given text.. See Brooke A. Ackerly, Maria Stern, and Jacqui True, “Chapter 1” in *Feminist Methodologies for International Relations*, eds. Brooke A. Ackerly, Maria Stern, and Jacqui True (Cambridge, UK ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2006), p 4.

Pearl Harbor is remade in the lessons of 9.11, and it is these re-articulations that will guide the intelligence community in the future. While a content analysis from PH to present would be an excellent historical document, what is important for intelligence culture are those articulations that persist – thus, those that have remained relevant to the present. Scott and Hughes write that an early American “lesson” from 9.11 “was the need for a more centralized structure” in shades of PH.²⁶⁵ It is these new lessons of PH that are the core of this dissertation, filtered through 9.11.

The time frame referred to here for ‘present’ intelligence culture is September 11, 2001 onward, an accepted periodization in Intelligence Studies.²⁶⁶ This selection allows both for changes and for the reassertion of continuity to resurface after the terrorist attacks. Using a longer time frame would introduce the possibility of change or distortion in the meanings in the intelligence culture. While the texts of the current culture might be weighted to the Bush and Obama eras, there are likely to be sufficient continuities between the varied narratives of intelligence, since these have endured previous administration changes. The study recognizes the inherent instability of meanings, and the content analysis of PH is constructed separately to follow the shifts in meaning over time that might not be apparent when looking at intelligence culture as a whole.

My choice to explore the national intelligence culture raises the question of the boundaries of intelligence culture. The security imaginary heuristic helps to clarify the idea of national and sub-national intelligence cultures because it places the society as the cultural unit, but at the same time stipulates that others (other nations, other groups) may assist in making elements available for articulation and emphasizing particular articulations. Each nation may share

²⁶⁵ Scott and Hughes, "The Future of Intelligence: Seeking Perfection in an Imperfect World," p 8.

²⁶⁶ Patrick C. Neary, "The Post 9/11 Intelligence Community Intelligence Reform, 2001–2009: Requiescat in Pace?"

general symbols, like Munich or Cuba, but may articulate it in ways that make it relevant to the particular society. The Cuban Missile Crisis example demonstrates the limits of the imaginary and intelligence culture. The 'Cuban Missile Crisis' is bounded by the societal American experience. The Canadian experience, under the same name, has inevitable discontinuities because Canadians experienced the same events, but under the influence of their previous beliefs, ideas, identities, histories, and cultures.²⁶⁷ So while Canadian and American values and perspectives are relatively close, they are not identical. Each societal imaginary creates unique articulations and interpellations. Outside of the national imaginaries, the large Western security imaginary might share general Cuba articulations, but would be further bounded by the former communist countries, who called the event the 'October Crisis' and the 'Caribbean Crisis.'²⁶⁸ Other larger imaginaries might include the commonwealth, or the so-called five eyes, from which some shared articulations could be drawn.²⁶⁹ In the end, the common elements that are ultimately articulated in particular societies are furnished by broader, shared imaginaries.

Finally, while a history of America's intelligence culture would likely focus on the 9.11 attacks and their effects on existing culture, I do not attempt this because this thesis is not a complete history of American intelligence culture (but an exploration of selected national elements). I have explored the impact of 9.11 through the lens of the Pearl Harbor analogy. 9.11 is also discussed in the context of American history in chapter three. However, the impact of 9.11 will take decades to be fully felt, and would necessitate a stand-alone study of its nascent effects. At present, this kind of study is impossible; to determine the impact of 9.11 on American intelligence culture, a consensus on what that culture has been would have to have been

²⁶⁷ Peter Trevor Haydon, *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian involvement reconsidered* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993).

²⁶⁸ Weldes, "Constructing National Interests."

²⁶⁹ For example, Murphy, "Creating a Commonwealth Intelligence Culture."

developed. Pearl Harbor is one of the few well-studied points of intelligence culture that can conceivably present data on both what American intelligence culture attitudes *were*, and how they have changed at present. Investigating the changing intelligence culture surrounding 9.11 remains the province of a dedicated project.

National Intelligence Culture

As discussed in chapter one, in general, this thesis demonstrates that intelligence is a cultural practice and does not simply reflect an objective response to the world or pure shaping by policy and law. It shows that this culture can be discerned at the national level in the form of persisting ideas or symbols (with Pearl Harbor as national level symbolic study). If national ideas affect intelligence as 'Munichs'— policy ideas or analogies—affect foreign policy, then American intelligence culture must be understood as traceable factor in the development of intelligence in America, and at more than just the organizational culture analytical level.²⁷⁰

This research focuses on the national level element of intelligence culture, although other aspects are considered in the description of intelligence culture in chapter five. It is evident that all organizations (intelligence agencies no less so than any other) develop habits, management styles, and organizational cultures.²⁷¹ However, the impact of these sub-national cultures should not remove focus from their interface with what I theorize as an overarching intelligence culture, analogous to the national or grand strategic part of strategic culture.²⁷²

While this level is often the primary focus in strategic culture studies, the fractured American

²⁷⁰ Even Hayden Peake has observed that Lowenthal was one of the few writing on the 911 Commissions “to point out the irony that while the commissions were all very critical of assorted analytic shortfalls, their recommendations dealt largely with organizational changes— which seldom solve operational problems.” Peake, “Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf.”

²⁷¹ The vast literature on this, most famously includes Graham Allison’s work, but today includes the public and private sector; Tom Christensen, Per Lægreid, Paul G. Roness, and Kjell Arne Røvik, *Organizational Theory and the Public Sector: Instrument, Culture and Myths* (Routledge, 2007), p 39.

²⁷² See Table 1 in this chapter; the levels differentiate strategic culture authors including Snyder, Hopf, and Kahn.

intelligence community hides these connected (national) culture elements. The ‘national level’ intelligence culture can provide interesting insights about how culture might shape the largest number of actors and the most common interactions, among both policymakers and practitioners. Just as the Munich analogy for decades shaped American foreign policy, in intelligence the Pearl Harbor (PH) analogy shapes intelligence policy. Intelligence culture also not only contends with intelligence doctrine and mission, but shapes the very parameters that doctrine is defined under.

It is important to intelligence culture to include broadly shared, or national elements; strategic culture would put it at the level of ‘grand strategy’ (see the section on strategic culture in this chapter). Organizational work is done on many professional intelligence services; yet as Warner has observed in the context of the intelligence system theory, “[n]ot so much [research] has been done of the *collective* authorities, resources, oversight, and missions[...]

assigned to intelligence. That is, at the systemic or national level scholarship is absent.²⁷³ Clearly, persisting national intelligence culture ideas if they exist as will be shown, can have significant effects on national security policy. They also have broader implications as the background to all sub-national intelligence cultures. Understanding the national level in connection with—instead of in contrast to—these sub-cultural fracturations open²⁷⁴ up community-wide issues such as intelligence failure, surprise, crisis, the direction on intelligence reform, and system evolution (in addition to democratization in developing nations’ security sector reform (SSR)).²⁷⁵ This is also the grand promise of intelligence culture: that we can come

²⁷³ Warner believes several possibilities in regards to the obstacles to this work, and the barriers to comparisons of intelligence systems (or ‘collectivities’) across “nations, cultures, or eras”.

²⁷⁴ Initial strategic culture work by Snyder did not treat it as monolithic, and allowed for these “subcultures.” Johnston, *Cultural Realism*, p 5.

²⁷⁵ Fry and Hochstein write that “Taking a lead from the literature on civil-military relations points one toward the problem of the creation, evolution and even dismemberment of intelligence services. New states create intelligence structures as a matter of routine. ... There maybe more to that process than can be subsumed under the generalization that, for example, all East European intelligence services were modeled

to understand the influence of intelligence culture on American foreign policy and international relations as a whole. As intelligence shapes the state's representation of the world, the cultural formation of intelligence itself contributes to the state's portrait of the world and its place in it. In this way, intelligence is the missing element in Weldes' constructivist argument that states create the national interest through the very process of representing the world to themselves. The representational process is grounded in intelligence. Intelligence culture then affects states' foreign relations and security policy at a deep level (through a unique function not present in strategic culture). This thesis emphasizes that not only are beliefs about intelligence and policy choices about its use formed by cultural meanings attached to intelligence, but intelligence culture plays a role in what is called the broader "security imaginary."

Conclusion

This chapter outlined the basics of intelligence culture theory, as well as existing works (which do not approach the status of a literature), and methods. The central concern is to construct a considered and well-ordered theoretical underpinning for the examination of American intelligence culture(s). First, the idea of intelligence culture is situated in two ways: through the strategic culture literature which is its closest analogue, and second, through a typology of two kinds of approaches to intelligence culture.

The discussion of strategic culture included an extensive comparison of the lessons and problems from that literature, with suggestions for amelioration for the study of intelligence culture. In some ways, existing approaches are not suitable to the study of intelligence culture – and for this reason, the theoretical framework of interpellation and the security imaginary

slavishly on the KGB during the Cold War, or that imperial legacies determined the path followed by newly independent states in the era of decolonization. Proto-intelligence agencies played a role, undoubtedly, in the securing of independence, in state formation, and that role would influence the shape of the fledgling intelligence service" in Fry and Hochstein, "Epistemic Communities," p 2,3.

were adopted. Finally, the specifics of selection, level and time frame were developed in detail.

This chapter leads into an historical chapter, chapter three. That chapter builds on the theoretical basis of intelligence culture by outlining the historical growth of the American intelligence community. This history of the bureaucratic development of intelligence is then companioned by the subsequent chapter, chapter four, on its intellectual history and conceptual development. Ultimately, these form the basis of chapter five and six, wherein current American intelligence culture can be outlined using a variety of approaches (norms and narratives) and the study of a current symbol in American intelligence culture: Pearl Harbor. These together demonstrate that intelligence culture does exist, and demonstrably has an impact at various levels of American statecraft, policy, reform, and education.

(Chapter Three) American History and the American Intelligence Community: US Intelligence Past and Present

This chapter is an introduction to the history and organization of the American intelligence community, and key events. It functions as a subject matter primer. It also serves as background to the domestic intelligence culture described in subsequent chapters. It in turn demonstrates how the institutions of the American intelligence community—both as a concept and set of institutions—emerged prior to and after Pearl Harbor, and showing how the role of intelligence, as a component of intelligence culture, was enacted bureaucratically. That is, as noted elsewhere, the term “the intelligence community” has particular cultural articulations. The formation of the *idea* of an intelligence community is particularly American, and this “velvety” term both reflects and shapes the bureaucratic evolution of intelligence.²⁷⁶ This bureaucratic history tries to show the institutional forms intelligence has taken, and key shaping events, relevant for intelligence culture.

This chapter discusses the development of intelligence prior to World War Two, and the subsequent formation of the modern intelligence community after World War Two, beginning with a description of the current configuration.

It is divided into two sections – pre-WWII, and WWII to present. World War Two is typically seen as the crucible of the modern intelligence community in America, and the general point at which it becomes stabilized, bureaucratized (or institutionalized) and founded on a more clear legal basis (as will be explicated further in this chapter). This history deals with both civilian and military intelligence, as well as foreign and domestic intelligence. This chapter concludes by suggesting intelligence culture may be understood through institutions as

²⁷⁶ Troy, “The Quaintness of the US Intelligence Community,” p 245-250.

embedded ideas.

If we are to understand the present intelligence culture of America, its history, as much as can be taken as precursor, must be fully laid out. Some intelligence histories intentionally focus only on the post-war community because the early and scant efforts by the Congress and Executive at intelligence little resemble the industrial phase of American intelligence.²⁷⁷ Additionally, the typical wartime efforts were initially fitful and left less material given the small scale and short time frames of intensive intelligence activity, for the historian of intelligence. Typical works, then, have less reason to deal with this early period as extensively.

This chapter deals with early American intelligence history substantially for two purposes. First, this institutional history of intelligence before Pearl Harbor is the necessary context to that event, and to the present American intelligence organization regardless of whether it was ultimately continuous or discontinuous with early American intelligence organization. That is, Pearl Harbor had to be initially understood in the context of what had come before. Second, if the early American history of intelligence were neglected, it could be charged as bias towards post-war intelligence. A relatively equal discussion of both periods attempts to provide a full picture of both pre-war and post-war intelligence. Naturally all histories are partial. To offer just one reflects a particular moment in history and a nexus of culture and perspective.

²⁷⁷ This is not to suggest that works on this period do not exist. A selective set of works on pre-WWII American Intelligence include, from both contemporary and historical sources: Robert G. Angevine, "Gentlemen Do Read Each Other's Mail: American Intelligence in the Interwar Era" *Intelligence and National Security* 7, no. 2 (Apr. 1992): 1-29; Thomas Boghardt, *The Zimmermann Telegram: Intelligence, Diplomacy and America's Entry into World War I* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2012); Ralph Lee DeFalco, "Blind to the Sun: U.S. Intelligence Failures Before the War with Japan," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 16, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 95-107; Thomas Fleming, *George Washington Spymaster* (New York City); Edwin C. Fishel, *The Secret War for the Union* (Mariner Books, 1996); James L. Gilbert, *World War I and the Origins of U.S. Military Intelligence* (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow, 2012); David Kahn, *The Reader of Gentlemen's Mail: Herbert O. Yardley and the Birth of American Intelligence* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004); Thomas G. Mahnken, *Uncovering Ways of War: U.S. Intelligence and Foreign Military Innovation, 1918-1941* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002); Louis S. Patrick, "The Secret Service of the American Revolution" *Journal of American History* 1 (1907): 497-508; Alexander Rose, *Washington's Spies: The Story of America's First Spy Ring* (New York: Bantam, 2006); P.K. Rose, "The Founding Fathers of American Intelligence," *Studies in Intelligence* (Summer 2000); Richard Rowan, *Secret Agents Against America* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1939); Michael J. Sulick, *Spying in America: Espionage from the Revolutionary War to the Dawn of the Cold War* (Georgetown University Press, 2012); Thomas M. Johnson, *Our Secret War: True American Spy Stories, 1917-1919* (Indianapolis, Indiana: Bobbs-Merrill, 1929); Herbert O. Yardley, *The American Black Chamber* (Indianapolis, Indiana: Bobbs-Merrill, 1931); and various chapters in single histories of the Civil War, Spanish American war, and other conflicts of the early era.

Historiographically (as discussed in chapter one and five) then, every account must emphasize different things, must leave something out. History is the articulation of what counts as an ‘event’ of significance. This chapter attempts to present the historical consensus aspects of American intelligence history, and not narrate from any one perspective on American intelligence history. To do so would be to prejudge intelligence culture. The ‘cultural’ history of intelligence is dealt with alongside other norms and narratives, later in the dissertation, in chapter five, as part of a more holistic view of the current concepts of intelligence culture.

Grand themes can still be discerned at play throughout American intelligence history. Organizationally, attempts at institutionalization, aimed at centralization (or in present parlance, ‘jointness’)²⁷⁸ recur as countervailing fragmentation and bureaucratic contestations shape new forms of the intelligence community. While the bureaucratization of intelligence may seem inevitable, in some ways the professionalization of all aspects of American society tended to favor this; yet similarly, the American emphasis on non-permanent intelligence and amateurism conflicted.

These themes are clearly suggestive for the discussion of intelligence culture. However in this chapter, the history is not assembled intentionally to highlight these themes, or draw from any one perspective on intelligence history or organization. In general, it tries to adopt the best consensus of the literature, highlight those facts commonly attested to, and where controversies exist, show them explicitly. These cultural aspects are discussed at the end of the chapter, moreover, the themes of this history will be drawn out more explicitly in the following chapters, particularly in chapter four.

²⁷⁸ In *National Security Intelligence*, one of Loch Johnson's "yardsticks for intelligence reports" is ‘jointness.’ Loch Johnson, *National Security Intelligence* (John Wiley & Sons, 2013), p 68.

Section 1 Overview: The Current Intelligence Community and Key Concepts

The present configuration of the intelligence community and key concepts, which are the most relevant elements for the study of Pearl Harbor re-articulated through 9.11, are discussed here, before the history of American intelligence is parsed.

There are 17 current members of the intelligence community—some wholly independent and some part of larger institutions.²⁷⁹ These service components are: Air Force Intelligence, Army Intelligence, Marine Corps Intelligence, Coast Guard Intelligence,²⁸⁰ and Navy Intelligence. The Program Managers are: Office of the DNI (ODNI),²⁸¹ Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Justice - Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Security Agency. The Departmental Components are: Department of Justice - Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Energy, Department of Homeland Security, Department of State, and the Department of the Treasury. The expansion of the community following 9.11 is discussed in the section of the chapter on post-WWII history.

²⁷⁹ DNI, <http://www.dni.gov/index.php/intelligence-community/members-of-the-ic>.

²⁸⁰ Coast Guard Intelligence is actually part of the Department of Homeland security “departmental element.” http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2012/OIG_12-87_Jun12.pdf.

²⁸¹ “The DNI Staff is primarily responsible for IC policy and oversight and the preparation of the National Intelligence Program Budget.” The DNI organization also includes ‘mission support’ activities, like the National Counterterrorism Center and National Counter proliferation Center. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “An Overview of the United States Intelligence Community for the 111th Congress,” 2009, p 1-2.

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6.1 While major concepts for describing American intelligence include the intelligence cycle are debated and disputed, this diagram above of how intelligence is directed by and ultimately disseminated to policymakers, is used to understand intelligence by the community and scholars even while it may not reflect exactly the true flows in practice.²⁸³ Additions and alterations have been proposed, but it is still found in the basic form it is taught, above.

Another important set of concepts are the ‘ints’²⁸⁴ (or the intelligence disciplines): Human Intelligence (HUMINT) or intelligence collected (often directly) from human sources, contends with Technical Intelligence (TECHINT)—or all “machine based means of gathering information” collected from any sources.²⁸⁵ Other ‘ints’ include Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) or electronic transmissions, of which (COMINT) or Communications Intelligence is a type and refers to communications between two parties, Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) or PHOTINT for photographic intelligence, Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT) and Telemetry Intelligence (TELINT) on weapons and radar systems’ emissions. Open source intelligence is OSINT, from non-secret public sources, and geospatial intelligence is GEOINT.²⁸⁶ Open source information and ‘grey’ literature (material “not disseminated through conventional publishing

²⁸² Jim Cox, *Intelligence: Definitions, Concepts and Governance* (Parliamentary Information and Research Service Library of Parliament, 2009), p 6.

²⁸³ 7 Arthur S. Hulnick, "What's wrong with the Intelligence Cycle," *Intelligence and national Security* 21, no. 6 (2006): 959-979. Loch K. Johnson, "Making the intelligence “Cycle” work," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence* 1, no. 4 (1986): 1-23.

²⁸⁴ Gill writes that the "Ints" are blurring, as are many separating concepts in intelligence (foreign/domestic), but they still remain in use as concepts. Peter Gill, "Knowing the Self, Knowing the Other," in *Handbook of Intelligence Studies* ed. Loch Johnson (New York : Routledge, 2007) 82-3.

²⁸⁵ Johnson *National Security Intelligence*, p 43-44.

²⁸⁶ Federal Bureau Of Investigation, “About us,” <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/intelligence/disciplines>.

channels”)²⁸⁷ has been historically a source of contention, on its proportional use in comparison to (although often contributing in greater proportion to) the ‘secret’ ints.²⁸⁸ Moving on from the ‘ints’, a welter of categorizations or separations surface in the American idiom.

Intelligence has also been separated according to the kind of product (or method of analysis) – single source analysis uses only one type of collection source, while all- source intelligence products integrate multiple collection sources. Specific products are produced for different clients; the President’s requirements are not the same as other consumers.²⁸⁹ ‘Finished’ intelligence takes a number of forms. These include current intelligence, which focuses on describing the present and immediate developments, and estimative intelligence, which suggests long-term future patterns, and predicts key trends.²⁹⁰ Basic intelligence covers what might be called the “facts” of the world, the encyclopediac style information. Warning intelligence focuses on items which might threaten national interests and require a ‘counteraction.’²⁹¹ Target intelligence focuses on targeting data.²⁹² Kent’s terms for these were ‘basic-descriptive,’ ‘current-reportorial’ and ‘speculative-evaluative’ – relating to the past, present and future.²⁹³ Finally, we can divide intelligence by level or focus: strategic intelligence (the highest or broadest level of planning),²⁹⁴ operational intelligence (for planning major operational campaigns) and tactical intelligence (for the purpose of specific engagements).²⁹⁵ According to former DNI John Negroponte, intelligence has three ‘dimensions’, foreign, military, and domestic, while Randol

²⁸⁷ Christopher Murphy, *Competitive Intelligence: Gathering, Analysing and Putting it to Work* (Gower Publishing, 2005).

²⁸⁸ Robert David Steele, “Open Source Intelligence,” in *Handbook of Intelligence Studies*, ed. Loch Johnson (New York : Routledge, 2007): 129-147, p 95-98.

²⁸⁹ Steele, “Open Source Intelligence,” p 99.

²⁹⁰ John Hollister Hedley, “The Challenges of Intelligence Analysis,” in *Strategic intelligence Vol 1: Understanding the hidden side of government*, ed. Loch K. Johnson (Westport, Conn. : Praeger Security International, 2007) p 126/7.

²⁹¹ Cox, *Intelligence: Definitions, Concepts, Governance*, p 10.

²⁹² *Ibid.*

²⁹³ Sherman Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1949).

²⁹⁴ Culturally, one narrative thread suggests that America has never been ‘good’ at strategic intelligence (or thinking ahead in general), and that it neglected, more and more, strategic intelligence. Steele “Open Source Intelligence,” p 112.

²⁹⁵ Cox, *Intelligence: Definitions, Concepts, Governance*, p 12.

suggests adding homeland security intelligence to the list.²⁹⁶ The next section moves to discuss the early foundations of American intelligence.

Section 2: Early American Intelligence

Prefatorily, it should be understood that intelligence history is colored by a couple of perspectives that historiography can highlight, particularly around early American intelligence history.²⁹⁷ One is an intentional valorization of intelligence's significance in American history, to demonstrate that it is a positive force (and not dangerous for democracy). Works on the other side of the spectrum highlight acrimonious histories of the revolution and Civil War spying,²⁹⁸ the abuses, and the generally uncontrolled and unorganized nature of intelligence as a means of showing the dark side of intelligence in America. In scholarship generally there is less focus on the early period in American intelligence history, since no permanent civilian intelligence community existed. Tidd writes that

Intelligence as a permanent, organized activity of government was slow to emerge. During the country's first century, it generally appeared when a war began and disappeared when the war ended. Only in the late 19th century, when U.S. leaders grew concerned about the country's ability to protect its growing foreign interests, did ongoing intelligence organizations begin to take hold.²⁹⁹

By necessity, then, this period reflects primarily military and domestic intelligence, save during key international events.

²⁹⁶ Mark A. Randol, *Homeland Security Intelligence: Perceptions, Statutory Definitions, and Approaches* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 14 Jan. 2009), p 4.

²⁹⁷ More overt historiography tends to focus on institutions, such as the historiography of the CIA.

²⁹⁸ This was a difficult time, but as with the optimist portrayal, darker histories overemphasize the bitter results of espionage, and the dangers for America. For example, Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, *Cloak and Dollar: A History of American Secret Intelligence* (Yale University Press, 2003).

²⁹⁹ John M. Tidd, "From Revolution to Reform: A brief history of US intelligence." *SAIS Review* 28, no. 1 (2008): 5-24, p 5.

The Revolutionary War

6.2 Davis takes the perspective that “[t]he American nation emerged from a total breakdown of internal security.”³⁰⁰ The British failed to suppress a nationalist insurgency, and in the following decades America had serious and persistent internal security issues (for example: the Shays’ Rebellion).³⁰¹ This context shaped the development of early American intelligence. The key feature of most revolutionary war intelligence histories is George Washington’s role as ‘spymaster general’ during the war.³⁰² Washington directed numerous agents (most famously ordering the Culper spy ring) and coordinated his own intelligence. Other famous figures in the revolution include John Jay, called the “Founding Father of American counterintelligence” for conducting “[...] hundreds of counterintelligence investigations, arrests, and trials.”³⁰³ Benjamin Franklin also was famously involved in what could be called ‘covert actions’ including propaganda and paramilitary operations against the British. Tidd writes that in organizational terms, “intelligence was carried out by both the Continental Congress and the Continental Army. The Congress had no sustained or centralized intelligence organization, but instead it had several committees that managed specific intelligence efforts.”³⁰⁴ These secret committees dealt with covert action, codes, propaganda, and deception.³⁰⁵ There was scant formal organization to intelligence gathering during the revolution.

³⁰⁰ David B. Davis, “Internal Security in Historical Perspective: From the Revolution to World War II,” in *Surveillance and Espionage in a Free Society: a report by the planning group on intelligence and security to the Policy Council of the Democratic National Committee*, ed. Richard H. Blum (Praeger Publishers, 1972) p 3.

³⁰¹ Davis, “Internal Security in Historical Perspective,” p 4.

³⁰² “George Washington is highly regarded within the intelligence community for his use of intelligence during the Revolutionary War” according to Thomas B Allen, *George Washington Spymaster: How The Americans Outspied The British and Won the Revolutionary War* (2004) cited in Kristan J. Wheaton, and Michael T. Beerbower, “Towards a New Definition of Intelligence,” *Stanford Law & Policy Review* 17 (2006) Footnote 15.

³⁰³ P.K. Rose, “The Founding Fathers of American Intelligence.”

³⁰⁴ Tidd, “From Revolution to Reform,” p 6.

³⁰⁵ James S. Van Wagenen, “A Review of Congressional Oversight: Critics and Defenders,” *Studies in Intelligence* (unclassified). <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/97unclass/wagenen.html>.

Between the revolution and the Civil War, intelligence remained ‘ad-hoc’ and low level, in the sense that the executive had less call for intelligence³⁰⁶ but still used executive agents.³⁰⁷ Generally “popular distrust of standing armies discouraged any ongoing military intelligence effort....”³⁰⁸ Ransom notes that military intelligence was neglected as well because the military relied on the diplomatic agencies and the military attaché system.³⁰⁹

Civil War

³⁰⁶ According to the report of the Federation of American states, and other authors, “Judging by the paucity of the historical record, interest in intelligence as a tool of the Executive appears to have waned in succeeding Administrations.” Federation of American States, “The Evolution of the U.S. Intelligence Community-An Historical Overview” in *Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of US Intelligence* (March 1, 1996), <http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/report.html>.

³⁰⁷ Tidd writes that it was “a part-diplomatic, part-intelligence activity still primarily controlled by the President or the Secretary of State, which was used at times to support covert action.”; “From Revolution to Reform,” p 7.

³⁰⁸ Tidd, “From Revolution to Reform,” p7. Additionally, Tidd notes that the war of 1812 showed characteristic intelligence failures, “During the War of 1812, for example, military intelligence failed to discover that British troops were advancing on Washington until they were 16 miles from the Capital. The Secretary of War had refused to believe that the British would invade Washington, and military intelligence reported from this perspective.”

³⁰⁹ Ransom, *The Intelligence Establishment*, p 51.

6.3 The Civil War is a critical early American intelligence event, where espionage was ‘easy’ and was used extensively by both sides.³¹⁰ Leaders of the Union and the Confederacy both “valued intelligence information, established their own spy networks, and often railed at the press for providing intelligence to the other side.”³¹¹ Pinkerton agents were also used by the Union army;³¹² Pinkerton’s bureau was “the first one in any American army” but was ‘incomplete.’ It was replaced by the professional organization, the Bureau of Military Information (BMI) in 1863.³¹³ It represents a ‘milestone’ in intelligence history because its files show its officers “integrated information from all types of sources – spies, scouts, cavalry, balloonists and Signal Corps observers....”³¹⁴ This portended the growth in SIGINT and IMINT, now procured from balloon corps, and other new techniques and sources of intelligence.³¹⁵ At war’s end the BMI³¹⁶ was “disestablished” but as a by-product the Secret Service was “established in 1865 to combat counterfeiting.”³¹⁷ In terms of domestic security, the Civil War resulted in more internal security laws and prosecutions.³¹⁸ The legacy of the Civil War was a ‘proliferation of spies’; the Civil War trained the men (professionals and private agents) who would fight subversion and run intelligence operations in the coming decades.³¹⁹

³¹⁰ Dulles argued, it ultimately had little effect on battles’ outcomes (though more Civil War historians disagree; also see Fishel, *The Secret War for the Union* p 1. Fishel feels Gettysburg, Chancellorsville benefitted from “citizen-spies and scouts” for position.

³¹¹ *Ibid*, Fishel, *The Secret War for the Union*.

³¹² John M. Oseth, *Regulating U.S. Intelligence Operations: a study in definition of the national interest* (University Press of Kentucky, 1985), p ix.

³¹³ Fishel, *The Secret War for the Union*, p 3.

³¹⁴ Stephen W Sears, “foreword” in Fishel, *The Secret War for the Union*, p xiv.

³¹⁵ Stephen W Sears, “foreword” in Fishel, *The Secret War for the Union*, p xiii.

³¹⁶ Ironically the BMI was initially known as the “secret service department”, briefly; Fishel, *The Secret War for the Union* p 294.

³¹⁷ Federation of American States, “The Evolution of the U.S. Intelligence Community-An Historical Overview” in *Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of US Intelligence* (March 1, 1996).

³¹⁸ Davis, “Internal Security in Historical Perspective,” p 5.

³¹⁹ Tidd, “From Revolution to Reform,” p8, discusses more specialization and more diversification in intelligence. See also Davis, “Internal Security in Historical Perspective,” p 12.

Perhaps due to the disorganization of the time, after the Civil War the Department of Justice was established in 1870 to “restrain or coordinate the agents employed by the State Department, the War Department, the attorney general, military commanders, and various state officials.”³²⁰ The State Department had had prior province over “spies and counterintelligence” and worked with the Secret service (with British assistance) to track “suspicious” Germans. The Justice Department sanctioned “American Protective League” whose civilian ‘vigilantes’³²¹ spied on radicals and other agents (including military intelligence).³²² The Justice Department continued to employ private detectives until it was forbidden by Congress; the “‘white slave’ scare” of 1910 convinced Congress to allocate funds for the Justice Department’s own bureau of investigation (the forerunner to the FBI).

Military intelligence established two important permanent, more ‘modern’ intelligence organizations– the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI),³²³ in 1882, and the Military Information Division (MID) of the Army in 1885.³²⁴ The MID³²⁵ and G-2³²⁶ created a system that included

³²⁰ Davis, “Internal Security in Historical Perspective,” p 12.

³²¹ Davis, “Internal Security in Historical Perspective,” p 14.

³²² Davis, “Internal Security in Historical Perspective,” p 13.

³²³ ONI still provides naval intelligence; <http://www.oni.navy.mil>

³²⁴ They would run the military attaché systems, and “focus[ed] on acquiring information about foreign military capabilities, including military technology that U.S. forces lacked”; Tidd, “From Revolution to Reform,” p 9. The military attaché system was questioned as a waste, and not a career advancement area inside the service.

³²⁵ For example, the MID duties assigned in 1918, are: “This division shall have the cognizance and control of military intelligence,

both positive and negative[...] The duties of this division are to maintain estimates revised daily of the military situation, the economic situation, and of such others matters as the Chief of Staff may direct, and to collect, collate, and disseminate military intelligence. It will cooperate with the intelligence section of the general staffs of allied countries in connection with military intelligence; prepare instructions in military intelligence work for the use of our forces: supervise the training of personnel for intelligence work: organize, direct, and coordinate the intelligence service: supervise the duties of military attaches: communicate direct with department intelligence officers and intelligence officers at posts, camps, and stations, and, and with commands in the field in matters relating to military intelligence: obtain, reproduce, and issue

1 maps; translate foreign documents; disburse; and account for intelligence funds; cooperate with the censorship board and with intelligence agencies of other departments of Government.” National Counterintelligence Center, *A CounterIntelligence Reader Vol 1*. Ed. Frank Rafalko. <http://fas.org/irp/ops/ci/docs/ci1/index.htm>.

³²⁶ G-2 originated with Pershing’s French-style staff system, making intelligence the “second section”-and by the end of the war,

2 it had become “a full-fledged theater intelligence center, engaging in a span of activities that was even broader than that of the Military Intelligence Division...” John Patrick Finnegan and Romana Danysh, *Military Intelligence* (Center for Military History, 1998) p 33.

signals intelligence and tactical counterintelligence, as well as all-source intelligence.³²⁷

“Essentially then, the years before World War I saw the genesis of an MI agency at the War Department level....”³²⁸ The MID would be later succeeded by the Military Intelligence Section, who developed Army intelligence policies, as well as combatting military espionage.³²⁹ ONI is significant as one of the earliest permanent intelligence organizations in America.³³⁰ Intelligence remained marked by “decentralization, amateurism, and jurisdictional rivalries, all of which were encouraged by the constitutional division between state and federal powers and by a native preference for private enterprise.”³³¹ In the Spanish-American war, the military attachés “created informant rings and ran reconnaissance operations to learn about Spanish military intentions and capabilities....”³³² The attaché system would remain central to military intelligence.³³³

*The Secret Service*³³⁴ and FBI³³⁵

Bumgarner notes that during the Civil War the U.S. Marshalls, also loosely organized, were ‘preoccupied’ tracking espionage and subversion (neglecting duties combatting

³²⁷ Federation of American States, *The Evolution of American Military Intelligence* (Ft. Huachuca AZ, The US Army Intelligence Center, May 1973), p 30.

³²⁸ Federation of American States, *The Evolution of American Military Intelligence*, p 30.

³²⁹ Finnegan and Danysh, *Military Intelligence*, p 22.

³³⁰ Amy B. Zegart, “Origins of the Central Intelligence Agency: ‘Those Spooky Boys,’” in *Intelligence and the National Security Strategist: Enduring Issues*, eds. Roger Z. George, Robert D. Kline (Oxford, UK: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), p 24.

³³¹ Davis, “Internal Security in Historical Perspective,” p 13.

³³² Central Intelligence Agency, “News and Information” *A Look Back ... The National Security Act of 1947* (2008), <https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2008-featured-story-archive/national-security-act-of-1947.html>.

³³³ Finnegan and Danysh, *Military Intelligence*, p 106.

³³⁴ Jeffrey Bumgarner, *Federal Agents: The growth of federal law enforcement in America* (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006), p43.

³³⁵ The organization was The Bureau of Investigation in 1909, the United States Bureau of Investigation in 1932, the Division of Investigation in 1933 and the Federal Bureau of Investigation on March 22, 1935. It was essentially created after the

Justice Department was forbidden by Congress from (temporarily) employing private detectives following a scandal of

Pinkertons involved in strikebreaking, and with additional restrictions on appropriations, and on using Secret Service agents. Athan G Theoharis, “A brief history of the FBI’s role and powers,” in *The FBI: A Comprehensive Reference Guide*, ed. Athan G Theoharis (Phoenix, AZ: The Oryx Press, 1999), p 3, 14.

counterfeiting), so in 1865 Lincoln signed legislation “creating the Secret Service as a bureau of the treasure department with the specific mission of halting counterfeiting.”³³⁶ Its powers were expanded to informal protection of the president (esp. following two assassinations, those of Lincoln and Garfield) a power bestowed formally after McKinley’s assassination.³³⁷ In 1908 Secret Service agents transferred to Justice Dept. formed the basis of the later FBI.³³⁸ The Bureau of Investigation began playing a role in counterintelligence in 1916, and “Congress passed the first federal espionage law in 1917.”³³⁹ During World War One, the Secret Service (in cooperation) “aggressively thwarted numerous German covert actions inside the United States, including psychological warfare, political and economic operations, and dozens of acts of sabotage against British-owned firms and factories supplying munitions to Britain and Russia.”³⁴⁰ After the war, “...the FBI launched an extremely effective counterintelligence attack on German and Japanese espionage and sabotage operations in the Western Hemisphere.”³⁴¹ Today the Secret Service retains a “security and safety” mission that includes securing events that may be the target of terrorists.

World War One

Intelligence preparations started prior to the American declaration of war; but Woodrow Wilson was “suspicious” of intelligence, reflecting a general American view at the time.³⁴² State department collection began in 1916, “but it was not until the United States declared war on

³³⁶ Bumgarner, *Federal Agents*, p 43.

³³⁷ Bumgarner, *Federal Agents*, p 43, p 45.

³³⁸ Bumgarner, *Federal Agents*, p 49.

³³⁹ Central Intelligence Agency, “News and Information” *A Look Back ... The National Security Act of 1947*.

³⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁴¹ *Ibid.*

³⁴² Tidd, “From Revolution to Reform,” p 10.

Germany in 1917 that Army and Navy intelligence finally received more money and personnel.”³⁴³ By the end of the war, military intelligence had become a “full-fledged staff element”³⁴⁴ and collected information on broader economic and social factors, as well as the military situation globally.³⁴⁵ At the eve of the war, domestic intelligence was, according to Davis, little developed because “[h]istorically there has been little need to keep track of spies or to counteract foreign efforts to mobilize domestic dissidents.”³⁴⁶ This changed somewhat with the war stirring the cauldron of nativism and spy scares, in what Davis calls the WWI ‘loyalty’ or spy hysteria.³⁴⁷ These fears led to ‘widespread’ and numerous indictments under federal security laws.³⁴⁸ It wasn’t necessarily the rise of ‘genuine’ foreign espionage, but the product of war-heightened animosities and distrust in some less-well assimilated immigrant populations.

Revelations about German intelligence activities, and foreign interdiction between America and the Allies inflamed the public discourse. The Zimmerman telegram, a secret proposal of alliance between Germany and Mexico, wherein Germany promised assistance to Mexico for a possible invasion of Texas and other American held territories, convinced the public for the war.³⁴⁹ It was decrypted by British intelligence, and also suggested Mexico might receive Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico should Germany win the war, something intolerable to the American government.

The war helped develop American intelligence in a way not seen before;

“Among developments having long-term significance, however, the creation of a formal U.S. cryptographic organization stands out. “MI-8”

³⁴³ Central Intelligence Agency, “News and Information” *A Look Back ... The National Security Act of 1947*.

³⁴⁴ Finnegan and Danysh, *Military Intelligence*, p 21.

³⁴⁵ Finnegan and Danysh, *Military Intelligence* p 24.

³⁴⁶ Davis, “Internal Security in Historical Perspective,” p13.

³⁴⁷ Davis, “Internal Security in Historical Perspective,” p 15.

³⁴⁸ Davis, “Internal Security in Historical Perspective,” p 16.

³⁴⁹ The Zimmerman Telegram was leaked by the British, and turned public opinion against Germany. Redacted, The National Security Agency, “The Zimmerman Telegram” *Cryptologic Quarterly* (unclassified): 43- 52.
https://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/cryptologic_quarterly/the_zimmermann_telegram.pdf

focused on breaking the diplomatic messages of Germany and its allies, and in the new era of radio telegraphy, the unit grew rapidly to exploit the volume of intercepted messages.”³⁵⁰

The Bureau of Investigations expanded, and became the FBI in 1935. Its charter “was broadened particularly in the years leading to World War II, when concerns for U.S. internal security were mounting in the face of German aggression in Europe. The FBI was made responsible for investigating espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, and violations of the neutrality laws.”³⁵¹ Tidd notes that resources naturally shrank in demobilization, but most important overall development in the early years was that “the late 1800s saw acceptance of peacetime intelligence.”³⁵² Intelligence organizations slowly became more permanent, but not necessarily coordinated.

Section Three Modern American Intelligence: From World War II to the Present

Pearl Harbor

The attack that plunged America into war has been called the most significant intelligence failure in American history. Setting aside the debates on the exact source of the failure, and the nature of surprise in terms of the specific signals preceding the attack, it was clear the existing intelligence organizations failed to fully coordinate information.³⁵³ Ransom writes, “[n]o truly national intelligence ...existed.”³⁵⁴ Frequently intelligence was not shared, or in the instance of Pearl Harbor, it was not shared with the right persons. Organizationally, things

³⁵⁰ Tidd, “From Revolution to Reform,” p 10. Subsequently it was transferred to the State Department and turned to diplomatic communications, becoming known as the “Black Chamber” but returned to military auspices following Stimson’s famous statement that “Gentlemen do not read each other’s mail.”

³⁵¹ Federation of American States, “The Evolution of the U.S. Intelligence Community-An Historical Overview.”

³⁵² Tidd, “From Revolution to Reform,” p 10.

³⁵³ Lowenthal makes the point that it is not simply a lack of institutionalization that led to the sparse use of intelligence; without a long intelligence history, intelligence was simply not well-used by elite, what we might call a lack of demand. Mark M. Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy* (Washington, DC: 2013), p12. Intelligence was a “novelty” to the executive and Congress.

³⁵⁴ H. H. Ransom, *The Intelligence Establishment* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), p 76.

were changing;³⁵⁵ five months before the PH attack President Roosevelt had asked William Donovan³⁵⁶ to draft plan for new intelligence service.³⁵⁷ Donovan was an advocate for a new organization and spent time in England studying British intelligence models³⁵⁸ and British officers had encouraged this line of development).³⁵⁹ Donovan was appointed Coordinator of Information (COI) heading the “first peacetime, non-departmental intelligence organization,”³⁶⁰ a “civilian office attached to the White House.”³⁶¹ The COI office was predecessor to the wartime OSS (the Office of Strategic Services),³⁶² and the “seed of the modern CIA’s Directorate of Operations.”³⁶³ Although the COI’s main task was presenting “unified” reports to the President, Troy writes that Donovan assembled the agency to deal with “white” and “black” propaganda, sabotage and guerrilla warfare, special intelligence, and strategic planning.”³⁶⁴

America’s Entry to WWII

The lead up to the war replayed the internal security issues of World War One. The fear of ‘fifth columns’ of both communists and fascists led to a call for greater departmental intelligence

³⁵⁵ Waldo Heinrichs, “The United States Prepares For War,” *The Secret War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II*, ed. George C. Chalou (DIANE Pub., 1995), p 8. Preparations for war were not “inconsiderable” before the entry into the war. Heinrichs points out that the threat posed by German and Japanese expansion was still a “menace” to American security even before their entry into the war, and American preparations existed even through 1933-39. *Ibid*, p 9.

³⁵⁶ Colonel William J. “Wild Bill” Donovan would go on to fame with the OSS. See Douglas Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster Who Created the OSS and Modern American Intelligence Community* (New York: Free Press, 2011).

³⁵⁷ Troy’s “Donovan’s marching orders details the period between the order authorizing COI through implementation. Thomas F. Troy, “Donovan’s Original Marching Orders,” *Studies in Intelligence* 17, no. 2 (Summer 1973): 39-69.

³⁵⁸ Ransom, *The Intelligence Establishment*, p 62.

³⁵⁹ Admiral John H. Godfrey and William Stephenson, purportedly encouraged; *Valero*, “The American Joint Intelligence Committee and Estimates of the Soviet Union, 1945-1947.”

³⁶⁰ Additionally, Roosevelt authorized the collection and analysis of all information and data, “which may bear upon national security; to correlate such information and data, and to make such information and data available to the President and to such departments and officials of the Government as the President may determine; and to carry out, when requested by the President, such supplementary activities as may facilitate the securing of information important for national security not now available to the Government.” Central Intelligence Agency, “Historical Intelligence Documents: From COI to CIG” *Studies in Intelligence* 37, no. 3 (May 08, 2007) https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol37no3/html/v37i3a10p_0001.htm

³⁶¹ Central Intelligence Agency, “COI Came First,” *Intelligence History*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/intelligence-history/oss/art02.htm>.

³⁶² Mark M. Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, p 12.

³⁶³ Central Intelligence Agency, “COI Came First.”

³⁶⁴ Troy, “Donovan’s Original Marching Orders.”

coordination in the 1930s.³⁶⁵ Domestic security and intelligence would remain a concern during the war, culminating in internment of Japanese, German, Italians, and other persons (citizens and non-citizens) during the war.³⁶⁶ The ‘spy scares’ of the Cold War did not, in other words, begin with the peace; the fear of German and Communist spies was concurrent with fighting, and the FBI worked against fascist and other agents before and during the war.³⁶⁷

The war brought about the usual expansion in military intelligence, and the services’ goals were “hugely ambitious”³⁶⁸ but Ransom writes that a chronic lack of intelligence information in War Department was still felt, according to Eisenhower.³⁶⁹ Moreover, Ransom argues the war did not change the American habitual mistrust of intelligence.³⁷⁰ During the war key successes included MAGIC decryption, and the American COMINT (communications intelligence) success breaking Japan’s machine cypher, nicknamed PURPLE and RED.³⁷¹ The military also operated the Corps of Intelligence Police, renamed the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC),³⁷² and tracked down subversives, took part in psychological warfare, censored mail, provided security on the Manhattan Project, and would later hunt Nazi war criminals.³⁷³

Critically for the modern intelligence community, the war did form the patterns of the modern intelligence community (and formed it from men with experience in the war). The key change was the overall persistence of intelligence from wartime into peacetime, and the general failures

³⁶⁵ Regin Schmidt, *Red Scare: FBI and the Origins of Anticommunism in the United States, 1919-1943* (Museum Tusculanum Press, 2000), p149-150.

³⁶⁶ Japanese, Italian, and German persons, as well as Latin-Americans, were interned in America. Alice Yang Murray, *Historical Memories of the Japanese American Internment and the struggle for redress* (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2008).

³⁶⁷ Theoharis, “A brief history of the FBI’s role and powers,” p 23.

³⁶⁸ The goal was to control the adversary as well as collect information. Nigel West, *Historical Dictionary of World War II Intelligence* (Toronto: The Scarecrow Press, 2008), p xxv.

³⁶⁹ Ransom, *The Intelligence Establishment*, p54.

³⁷⁰ Ransom attributes this to the US isolation, retrenchment, commanders mistrust of military estimates, view of immorality of intelligence, contributed to inabilities of intelligence. This is one opinion, but it seems that while there was more acceptance of intelligence’s utility there was no wholehearted acceptance. *Ibid*.

³⁷¹ National Security Agency, National Security Agency, “Pearl Harbor Review- Red and Purple,” *Center for Cryptologic History* (2009) http://www.nsa.gov/about/cryptologic_heritage/center_crypt_history/pearl_harbor_review/red_purple.shtml.

³⁷² CIC was made part of the U.S. Army Intelligence Corps in 1962.

³⁷³ James P Finley, *U.S. Army Intelligence History: A Sourcebook* (U.S. Army Intelligence Center & Fort Huachuca, Arizona, 1995) p 161.

of the services to work together which caused the post-war reorganization of the military services and national security system.

Tidd writes that “prewar clashes over ‘turf’ would persist during the war, especially with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) competing with Army and Navy intelligence, the FBI, State Department, and Army and Navy signals intelligence, and several smaller efforts by other departments.”³⁷⁴ As Waldo Heinrichs puts it, no intelligence system existed because each service or department was a separate “empire of knowledge.”³⁷⁵ Military intelligence underwent significant growth, but an important change for the post-war intelligence community was the expansion of non-military intelligence, particularly the OSS. The OSS was reorganized a number of times throughout the war, but Ransom argues “In many ways the postwar CIA’s organization was similar to that of the OSS.”³⁷⁶ The OSS dealt in a range of activities from “research and analysis, espionage and overseas political action”³⁷⁷ similar to the contemporary CIA. Throughout the war it had faced resistance from military intelligence.³⁷⁸ When Donovan proposed a more powerful central agency, the existing bureaucracies advocated for the new intelligence organization to be based on confederation not centralization, or placed under their own control.³⁷⁹

The OSS was disbanded (in 1945), but clearly a new organization would take its place; the “interim” organization, the Central Intelligence Group (CIG)—which was created alongside the National Intelligence Authority³⁸⁰ whom the DCI served,³⁸¹ and the Intelligence Advisory

³⁷⁴ Tidd, “From Revolution to Reform,” p 12.

³⁷⁵ Heinrichs. “The United States Prepares For War,” p 10.

³⁷⁶ Ransom, *The Intelligence Establishment*, p 68, p 73.

³⁷⁷ *Ibid*, p 75-76.

³⁷⁸ Zegart, “Origins of the Central Intelligence Agency,” p 25.

³⁷⁹ Mark Riebling, *Wedge: From Pearl Harbor to 9/11: How the Secret War between the FBI and CIA Has Endangered National Security* (Simon and Schuster, 2010), p 59.

³⁸⁰ The NIA was comprised of “the Secretaries of War, State, Navy, and the President’s personal representative, was charged with planning, developing, and coordinating the intelligence effort.” Federation of American States, *The Evolution of American Military Intelligence*.

Board³⁸²—was then dissolved in “the historic unification” of the 1947 Act.³⁸³ The CIG was headed by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) who would “*coordinate* the activities of U.S. intelligence organizations, but without having direct *authority* over them.”³⁸⁴ This structure was the first draft of the post-war attempt to create “coordinated all-source intelligence.”³⁸⁵ The first national estimate was produced under this system.

1947 National Security Act

The 1947 National Security Act was a watershed, and controversial not only for its intelligence provisions, but for its simultaneous restructuring of the military. The rationale behind it was to “establish something like the British war cabinet in the American system, ... bring[ing] the defense services together with the State Department and other vital agencies in the formulation of coordinated foreign policies.”³⁸⁶ The Act established the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the office of the Secretary of Defense and re-organized the services.³⁸⁷ It fundamentally altered the statutory basis of intelligence.³⁸⁸ The Act also created the National Security Council (NSC).³⁸⁹

³⁸¹ Richard A. Best Jr, "Leadership of the US Intelligence Community: From DCI to DNI," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 27, no. 2 (2014): 253-333, p 247.

³⁸² This board consisted of the heads of military and civilian intelligence agencies, as advisors to the DCI. Federation of American States, *The Evolution of American Military Intelligence*.

³⁸³ Ransom, *The Intelligence Establishment*, p 80-81.

³⁸⁴ Tidd, "From Revolution to Reform," p13.

³⁸⁵ Best, "Leadership of the US Intelligence Community," p 247.

³⁸⁶ Alfred D. Sander, "Truman and the National Security Council: 1945-1947," *The Journal of American History* 59, no. 2 (Sep., 1972): 369-388, p 369.

³⁸⁷ Michael J. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954* (Cambridge University Press, 2000), p 59.

³⁸⁸ Tidd writes that prior to the Act, presidents conducted “foreign intelligence activity...on their own authority”(p 6) and the Act saw Congress “reduce the reliance on ‘comprehensive and undefined’ Presidential power that had previously been the principal source of authority.” Tidd, “From Revolution to Reform,” p 12.

³⁸⁹ “Currently, statutory members of the Council are the President, Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and, since 2007, the Secretary of Energy; but, at the President’s request, other senior officials participate in NSC deliberations. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of National Intelligence are statutory

advisers.” Richard A. Best Jr, *The National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment* (Washington DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 2009).

The NSC has remained one of the ‘most important’ bodies in national security policymaking,³⁹⁰ and provides direction on intelligence matters. The Act created the head of the NSC staff, the National Security Advisor.³⁹¹ NSC influence typically varies with the attitude of the incumbent President. For intelligence matters specifically, the National Security Council has helped guide the Intelligence Community through ‘NSCIDs’ establishing interagency community workings more clearly, and outlining clearer mandates.³⁹²

Most famously, the 1947 National Security Act created the CIA, and set out some of the key rules and provisions for intelligence.³⁹³ However, the ‘domestic component’ to the security apparatus was left unresolved, according to Stuart’s account of the Act.³⁹⁴ In terms of national intelligence, the CIG had grown³⁹⁵ after the peace and begun to collect as well as collate intelligence. Based on its success, the second ever DCI, Lieutenant General Hoyt Vandenberg proposed language around an “independent” central intelligence agency for the legislation for the 1947 Act.³⁹⁶ Both the military and intelligence structures of the bill were criticized by those who felt bureaucratization of the national security state threatened the democratic government

³⁹⁰ The NSC is allowed to “make such recommendations and such other reports to the President as it deems appropriate or as the President may require.” Under Nixon a specific “NSC Intelligence Committee” was created, p13. Ford abolished the NSC

Intelligence Committee, but later iterations would include the Homeland Security Advisory Council (post-9.11).

³⁹¹ The national security advisor post “This position has been a continuing one, although its title has varied over the years (Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, National Security Adviser). An adviser or an assistant to the President arguably has a position of greater independence from Congressional

oversight than the incumbent of a position established by statute; see Richard Ehlke, *Congressional Creation of an Office of National Security Adviser to the President* (reprinted in U.S. Congress, 96th Congress, 2d session, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, “The National Security Adviser: Role and Accountability,” Hearing, April 17, 1980): 133-135.

³⁹² Warner, *Central Intelligence Origin and Evolution*, p 6.

³⁹³ Michael Hogan writes, for example that the CIA was allowed access to FBI and Atomic Energy Commission files but only with certain permissions, and the DCI would be allowed to come from military ranks but would not be accountable to his superiors while in that post. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*, p 65-6.

³⁹⁴ Douglas T. Stuart, “Ministry of Fear: The 1947 National Security Act in Historical and Institutional Context,” *International Studies Perspectives* 4, no. 3 (2003): 293-313, p 297.

³⁹⁵ When Truman had wanted to place the Research and Analysis branch of OSS into the State Department, according to Stuart, State department officials were afraid the intelligence effort would cut their departmental budgets, and new personnel would disrupt the organizations’ culture. Stuart, “Ministry of Fear,” p 299.

³⁹⁶ Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*, p 62.

of the United States.³⁹⁷ Resistance to centralization also stemmed from military distrust of non-military bureaucracies being involved in intelligence. The result of the battle for control was a “compromise between the competing organizational concepts – centralization vs decentralization.”³⁹⁸ Hogan frames the 1947 Act as a conflict between a new ‘national security ideology’ and one “rooted in an older political culture.”³⁹⁹ Ultimately, “federation prevailed over the concept of tight centralization”⁴⁰⁰ This resulted in the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which Lowenthal notes was, importantly, not placed under military command and was not given a domestic role.⁴⁰¹ The CIA, and the DCI, were intended to stop the ‘rain’ of intelligence at the executive level of competing intelligence products. The desire for ‘single’ products created the President’s Daily Brief, and the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) which brought together all community thinking on a given topic.⁴⁰²

While the Act set out important structures, it provided little specificity in some areas. The CIA’s core mandate is “to correlate and evaluate the intelligence relating to national security.”⁴⁰³ In the CIA’s case, the 1947 Act is infamously vague, and allowed a ‘maximal interpretation’ for missions the agency.⁴⁰⁴ This allowed the integration of multiple missions in the CIA (analysis as well as operations). The CIA is currently divided into the National Clandestine Service (operations), the Directorate of Intelligence (analysts), the Directorate of

³⁹⁷ Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*, p 63-4.

³⁹⁸ Ransom, *The Intelligence Establishment*, p 79. This dissertation does not suggest that centralization was inevitable, or preferable; merely that strong trends both politically and socially, collided with the events of Pearl Harbor around an articulation of centralization, which has become an important narrative in American intelligence culture (discussed in chapter five).

³⁹⁹ Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*, p ix, xi.

⁴⁰⁰ Ransom, *The Intelligence Establishment*, p 81.

⁴⁰¹ Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy* (2013), p 20.

⁴⁰² The first ‘national estimate’ was produced under the CIG system (Federation of American States, “The Evolution of the U.S. Intelligence Community”) but The *ONE* (Office of National Estimates) was officially formed in 1950 after the Office of Reports and Estimates was ‘broken up’ after resistance to its coordination process. Richard K. Betts, *Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and power in American national security* (Columbia University Press, 2007); Donald P. Steury, “Introduction,” in *Sherman Kent and the Board of National Estimates Collected Essays*, ed. Donald P. Steury (2007), p 10.

⁴⁰³ Jeffrey Richelson, *The U.S. Intelligence Community*, 4th ed (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1999), p 17.

⁴⁰⁴ Stuart, “Ministry of Fear,” p 301.

Science and Technology and the Directorate of Support.⁴⁰⁵ Historically, inter-directorate rivalries frequently flourished, with operators denigrating the position of ‘paper pushers’ and vice versa.⁴⁰⁶

DCI

Following the 1947 Act, the DCI position remained a product of compromise and negotiation; documents from the *National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book* indicate the frequency of struggles between the DCI and other actors, and the constant attempts to clarify the DCI's authority and assert it. DCI Helms complained he was “ostensibly responsible for the activities of the entire intelligence community, he only controlled 15% of its resources, with almost all the remaining 85% in the hands of the Secretary of Defense.”⁴⁰⁷ However, Best notes that the DCI post was a step towards more formalized cooperation and more control over community budgets.⁴⁰⁸ The DCI has had frequent incremental additions and changes to his authority, but the DCI's “responsibilities beyond the CIA were essentially limited to an undefined and ambiguous role of coordination that in practice was subordinated to the management of the CIA and especially its clandestine operations.”⁴⁰⁹ The DCI post has been replaced by the DNI (Director of National Intelligence) described below. The CIA is likely the second most widely known member of the intelligence community, but its coordinator position has not necessarily made it preeminent bureaucratically in the Intelligence Community since 1947. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and National Security Agency (NSA) are lesser-

⁴⁰⁵ Central Intelligence Agency, “Today's CIA,” <https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/todays-cia>.

⁴⁰⁶ Ronald Kessler, *Inside the CIA* (Simon and Schuster, 2012), Chapter 1 Inside the CIA.

⁴⁰⁷ Jeffrey T. Richelson, “From Director of Central Intelligence to Director of National Intelligence,” *National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book* 144 (December 17, 2004).

⁴⁰⁸ Best, “Leadership of the US Intelligence Community,” p 254

⁴⁰⁹ Best, “Leadership of the US Intelligence Community,” p 258.

known, but important intelligence community members.

DIA

The 1947 Act altered the military services, as noted above, as well as the JIC organization that had served during the war—creating the Joint Intelligence Group, to serve the newly created Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁴¹⁰ In 1946 the Army removed its military intelligence structure, restoring the Intelligence Division (formerly MID) to an ‘equal functional division’ of the War Department General Staff,⁴¹¹ headed by a director of intelligence. The overall military intelligence structure, Tidd writes, was still “highly decentralized.”⁴¹² Military intelligence post-war aimed at primarily understanding Soviet military capabilities and support to combat operations. The DIA was created in 1961 to “promote greater defense unification, but the services’ intelligence entities continued to function and even expanded.”⁴¹³ Betts writes that though it was intended to reduce duplication in the services’ intelligence, after the creation of the DIA, they were in a decade, larger than ever.⁴¹⁴ However, Aid reckons that at V-J Day “the Army signals intelligence empire stood at the zenith of its power and prestige.”⁴¹⁵

At present, the Director of the DIA chairs the military intelligence community and the Military Intelligence Board, coordinating Navy, Army, Marine Corp and Air Force intelligence components.⁴¹⁶ The DIA was part of the move towards creating ‘national’ intelligence. It shrunk

⁴¹⁰ A new Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) was created postwar, consisting of ONI, and the heads of MID. It “had the dual mission of providing intelligence advice to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and representing the United States in combined Military Intelligence matters with its British counterparts.” Finnegan and Danysh, *Military Intelligence*, p 62.

⁴¹¹ Finnegan and Danysh, *Military Intelligence*, p 103/4.

⁴¹² Tidd, “From Revolution to Reform,” p 15.

⁴¹³ Best, “Leadership of the US Intelligence Community,” p 255.

⁴¹⁴ Betts, *Enemies of Intelligence*, p 41.

⁴¹⁵ That thousands manned listening posts and staffed the Signal Security Agency (SSA) and Naval Communications Intelligence Organization (OP-20-G). But after this intercepts fell off. Matthew Aid, *The Secret Sentry: the untold history of the national security agency* (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2010), p 8.

⁴¹⁶ IBP, *US Military Intelligence Handbook Vol 1* (Washington, DC: USA International Business Publications, 2011) p 72.

at the end of the Vietnam War and was reorganized around five directorates in 1979 (production, operations, resources, external affairs and J-2 support).⁴¹⁷ The “DIA came of age in the 1980s by focusing heavily on the intelligence needs of both commanders and national-level decision makers.”⁴¹⁸ In the 1980s it was designated a combat support agency in the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization, and would establish the first “all-source fusion cell for terrorism analysis” after the embassy bombings in Beirut, Lebanon.⁴¹⁹

NSA

For decades, a ‘leviathan’ dwarfing other agencies,⁴²⁰ the National Security Agency’s creation (NSA) followed failures⁴²¹ of the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA), a national cryptologic organization. The Brownell report recommended replacing the AFSA entirely with a “new unified SIGINT agency”⁴²² to assist with coordinating signals intelligence. Aid makes the point that the US was already breaking Soviet codes during the war, and so a measure of continuity existed to post-war targets.⁴²³ For Aid, ULTRA and military decrypts ‘won’ the war on the battlefield, but “diplomatic COMINT” would ‘win the peace’.⁴²⁴ The NSA was created in 1952, and has remained intensely secret so its role in intelligence has been more difficult to

⁴¹⁷ Currently – DH Directorate for Human Intelligence, DS Directorate for Information Management, DT Directorate for MASINT and Technical Collection, DI Directorate for Analysis, J2 Directorate for Intelligence Joint Staff, DJ Defense Intelligence

Operations Coordination Center. IBP, *US Military Intelligence Handbook*, p 76.

⁴¹⁸ *Ibid*, p 74.

⁴¹⁹ Defense Intelligence Agency, “History,” <http://www.dia.mil/About/History.aspx>.

⁴²⁰ “As others have noted, during that the 1950s the CIA had achieved a budget twice the size of that of the State Department, but the NSA had achieved a budget twice the size of that of the CIA.” Richard Aldrich, “‘Grow Your Own’: cold war intelligence and history supermarkets,” *Intelligence and National Security* 17, no. 1 (2002): 135-152.

⁴²¹ The North Korean invasion is detailed in Aid’s *Secret Sentry*, Chapter 2.

⁴²² Aid, *The Secret Sentry*, p 43.

⁴²³ Aid, *The Secret Sentry*, p3.

⁴²⁴ *Ibid*, p 6.

discuss.⁴²⁵ The NSA “sits atop an empire”— the United States SIGINT system, with operational control of the military services cryptological elements, and over the joint NSA-CIA ‘Special Collection Service’.⁴²⁶ The CIA also has a number of SIGINT ‘organizations’ and both work with the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) that operates reconnaissance satellites.⁴²⁷ Signals intelligence in the NSA remained a Defense Department responsibility (until the creation of the DNI, who shares joint responsibility with Secretary of Defense) and the NSA is formally considered a “combat support agency.”⁴²⁸ In the 1990s SIGINT felt deep cuts, and perhaps as a result, has been charged with mismanagement and violations of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court rules.⁴²⁹ The NSA has become more widely studied, as a result of the Manning and Snowden revelations about intelligence, the PRISM program, and debates over FISA and data collection and retention.

INR (State Department)

The State Department, as noted in the beginning of this chapter, was involved in early work in intelligence and remains an important ‘departmental’ intelligence community member. “World War II created the Bureau of Intelligence and Research [INR]. ... the lineal descendent of the Research & Analysis division of the famous wartime Office of Strategic Services (OSS).”⁴³⁰ State Department intelligence would contribute to the major questions post-war, and particularly during Vietnam by “called attention to the poor data and inadequate intelligence

⁴²⁵ Matthew Aid, “The Time of Troubles: The U.S. National Security Agency in the 21st Century,” in *Intelligence and the National Security Strategist: Enduring Issues*, eds. Roger Z. George, Robert D. Kline (Oxford, UK: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), p 182.

⁴²⁶ The Director of the NSA serves as Chief of the Central Security Service (CSS) which includes elements of the armed forces - Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard; Aid, “The Time of Troubles,” p 182.

⁴²⁷ *Ibid*, p 183.

⁴²⁸ Lowenthal, *Intelligence*, p 20.

⁴²⁹ Aid, “The Time of Troubles,” p 183.

⁴³⁰ John Prados, “The Mouse That Roared: State Department Intelligence in the Vietnam War,” *The National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 121*, <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB121/prados.htm>.

collection taking place.”⁴³¹ State’s INR now covers all countries and regions, using “a combination of Foreign Service officers” and integrates diplomatic reporting with other forms of intelligence.⁴³²

Cold War: Korea and Vietnam

Korea marked a number of important early Cold War intelligence surprises (including the North Vietnamese attack itself).⁴³³ As a long running acrimonious conflict, assessments of Vietnam reflected differences in perspective and bureaucratic position among intelligence community members: “The IC came under enormous pressures to assess the extent of progress (or the absence thereof) in halting North Vietnam’s transfer of men and supplies into South Vietnam, and bitter disputes emerged among agencies on the extent of success in interdiction efforts.”⁴³⁴ The effects of the Vietnam War, for Lowenthal, included concerns that “policymakers were politicizing intelligence to be supportive of policy.”⁴³⁵ CIA estimates clashed with military estimates, a fault line that would be replayed throughout the Cold War on a variety of issues, but particularly the estimates of Soviet missiles.⁴³⁶

Internally, security and subversion, particularly related to nuclear weapons and communist infiltrations remained a long running concern and flared up nationally in McCarthy hearings. Domestically the Cold War saw continuous expansion of FBI authority, as “the FBI

⁴³¹ *Ibid.*

⁴³² Jane A. Bullock, George D. Haddow, and Damon P. Coppola, *Homeland Security: The Essentials* (Butterworth-Heinemann, 2012), p 115.

⁴³³ Best includes “the timing of the Soviet Union’s first test of an atomic device in 1949, ...and of a hydrogen weapon in 1953; the arrival of new Soviet longer range bombers (the Tu-95 Bear and the M-4 Bison) in the mid-1950s; and, eventually and dramatically, the launching of the world’s first intercontinental ballistic missile in August 1957 and, shortly thereafter, the Sputnik satellites, indicating a capability to land missiles in North America.” Best, “Leadership of the US Intelligence Community,” p 259.

⁴³⁴ Best, “Leadership of the US Intelligence Community,” p 268.

⁴³⁵ Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, p 23.

⁴³⁶ Raymond L. Garthoff, “Estimating Soviet Military Intentions and Capabilities,” *Watching the Bear: Essays on CIA's Analysis of the Soviet Union* (Washington, DC.: Government Printing Office, 2007).

acquired even greater institutional autonomy over its COINTELPRO (domestic counterintelligence program) operations directed against the Ku Klux Klan, civil rights groups, and antiwar activists.”⁴³⁷ The FBI remained concerned with law enforcement, creating an intelligence community divide since the law enforcement goal of ultimately prosecuting crime was felt to be dissonant with the goal of keeping secret sources of information in the foreign intelligence services.⁴³⁸ Counterintelligence was always problematic, with the most famous cases being discovered during 1985—the “year of the spy.”⁴³⁹ Prados writes that this was also the year that the CIA’s Aldrich Ames would begin spying for the Russians, causing serious damage for a decade, followed by FBI mole Hanssen in 1991.⁴⁴⁰

The nature of the Soviet Union, as a closed society, shaped American intelligence services during the cold war. The SALT I treaty and its ABM treaty created issues around monitoring and verification for intelligence.⁴⁴¹ Tidd writes the long term threat of the USSR and allies “...not only motivated substantial expansion of peacetime intelligence; it also shaped the collection and analytic programs and the new organizations created to manage them.” The classic problem of the difficulty in collecting information from ‘closed societies’ (such as the USSR);⁴⁴²

...prompted expansion of technical collection, with profound implications for U.S. intelligence structure. Tight security severely constrained the CIA’s ability to recruit and operate spies in Soviet bloc territory. While agent recruitment outside the Soviet bloc proved more successful, the CIA had few on-site observers reporting on Soviet military or industrial activity. This increased the reliance on technical means of

⁴³⁷ Stuart, “Ministry of Fear,” p 300.

⁴³⁸ The Law enforcement/intelligence divide – believed to impede sharing and cooperation between FBI and other intelligence community members; Richard L. Russell, “Achieving All-source Fusion in the Intelligence Community,” in *Handbook of Intelligence Studies*, ed. Loch Johnson (New York : Routledge, 2007): p 193.

⁴³⁹ The Walker Spy ring, Pollard, Chin, and others were discovered passing secrets to various allies and enemies.

⁴⁴⁰ John Prados, “A World of Secrets: Intelligence and Counterintelligence,” *The Central Intelligence Agency: Security Under Scrutiny*, ed. Athan G. Theoharis (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006), p 145-146.

⁴⁴¹ Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, p 24.

⁴⁴² Kent pontificated on the differences in collection in his discussion of The Yale Report, although he did not recommend further secrecy in democracies. Sherman Kent, “The Yale Report,” *Studies in Intelligence* (Summer, 1973).

collection.”⁴⁴³

The emphasis on technical collection makes clear the importance of U2 reconnaissance flights, and later satellite programs (for example, offensive missile basing was confirmed in the Cuban Missile Crisis through U2 flights).⁴⁴⁴ CIA involvement in collection was not initially embraced, given that it was intended to coordinate not collect. However, Eisenhower approved U2 programs as a special project, managed by the CIA (with Air Force assistance).⁴⁴⁵ Later similar co-arrangements would be used for satellite programs.⁴⁴⁶

Cold War: Covert Action

The Communist threat led to the “the rapid growth of the CIA’s power during the first three decades of the Cold War,”⁴⁴⁷ particularly due to CIA involvement in covert action. However, Kessler points out that the Soviet Union was not more than 10 percent of the agency’s focus.⁴⁴⁸ Gregory Treverton’s⁴⁴⁹ *Covert Action: The limits of Intervention in the postwar world*, makes the point we must distinguish different types of covert action, and second, the types of covert action America has engaged in have changed over time.⁴⁵⁰ The CIA was not initially directed to conduct covert action by the 1947 Act. Treverton divides covert action into three

⁴⁴³ Tidd, “From Revolution to Reform,” p 13.

⁴⁴⁴ The missile site photographs, in the Cuban case were seen as evidentiary ‘proof’ which could be trusted implicitly unlike defectors and agent reports. This and other U2 successes, perhaps reinforced the America desire for such ‘trustworthy’

intelligence, and photographs seemed to offer a way around the messy and difficult business of HUMINT - never an American intelligence strength, although even the strongest services tend to find HUMINT ‘difficult’.

⁴⁴⁵ Bruce E. Geelhoed, “Dwight D. Eisenhower, The Spy Plane, and the Summit: A Quarter-Century Retrospective,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 17, no. 1 (1987): 95-106.

⁴⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴⁷ Stuart, “Ministry of Fear,” p 300.

⁴⁴⁸ Kessler, *Inside the CIA*, p 321.

⁴⁴⁹ Gregory F. Treverton, *Covert Action: The limits of Intervention in the postwar world* (New York : Basic Books, 1987), p 4.

⁴⁵⁰ Treverton, *Covert Action*, p 7.

types or categories and contrasts it with espionage, whose purpose is gaining information:⁴⁵¹

- Propaganda (disseminating information);
- Paramilitary (secret military aid and training); and
- Political action (“changing the balance of political forces” in a country).⁴⁵²

The two early successes for covert action, Iran and Guatemala were considered by some, world changing: “With few men and a little money, the new Agency determined the fate of governments.”⁴⁵³ But with this effectiveness, more action was undertaken, and targets became bigger and activities more difficult to successfully conclude.⁴⁵⁴ It remained significant to the CIA, and at the “peak” of the Vietnam War covert action took more than half the CIA’s total budget. Covert action fluctuated after, but rose again against the Soviets in Afghanistan.⁴⁵⁵ Treverton notes at the time in some ways covert action was ascendant over espionage in the CIA.⁴⁵⁶

Oversight and Investigation

Naturally, the growth in activities during the Cold War throughout the intelligence community, led to abuse. Wagenen writes that Congressional intelligence oversight was, for a century, characterized by benign neglect.⁴⁵⁷ In 1974 Hersh and the *New York Times* revealed that the CIA spied on Americans during Vietnam, and attempted a coup in Chile. Investigations were launched by the House and Senate, and 1975 would for that reason become the “Year of

⁴⁵¹ Although Kibbe suggests that clandestine missions require “tactical secrecy” but covert actions emphasize the “secrecy of the sponsor”; Jennifer D. Kibbe, “Covert Action and the Pentagon,” *Intelligence and National Security* 22, no. 1 (2007): 57-74.

⁴⁵² Treverton, *Covert Action*, p 13.

⁴⁵³ *Ibid*, p 8.

⁴⁵⁴ *Ibid*, p 9-10.

⁴⁵⁵ *Ibid*, p 14.

⁴⁵⁶ *Ibid*, p 36, p 42.

⁴⁵⁷ Van Wagenen, “A Review of Congressional Oversight.”

Intelligence.”⁴⁵⁸ Up to that time the executive had “for the most part kept Congress out of intelligence affairs until the mid-1970s. Over the decades, Congress occasionally made feeble attempts at oversight, specifically to see how the money it had appropriated for secret, intelligence-related activities was being spent, only to be rebuffed by the President.”⁴⁵⁹ In response to scandals of 1975, Ford revived the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB, now the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board)⁴⁶⁰ in the executive office of the president, to provide independent advice on the intelligence community and “monitor the secret agencies on behalf of the chief executive.”⁴⁶¹ The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) were both established shortly after, following the recommendations of the Church and Pike committees.⁴⁶² More restrictions were also placed on covert action.⁴⁶³ After 9.11, Walker writes that these House and Senate Committees often depended on the attention of the chairs (and hence the perceived importance of the committee) as well as the ability to operate in a bipartisan environment.⁴⁶⁴ The FBI also came under scrutiny,⁴⁶⁵ for its COINTEL programs spying on Americans and undermining anti-war protestors.⁴⁶⁶ Further statutory improvements to oversight, including the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,⁴⁶⁷ which requires that a court order be

⁴⁵⁸ Loch K. Johnson, “Balancing Liberty and Security,” in *Intelligence and the National Security Strategist: Enduring Issues*, eds. Roger Z. George, Robert D. Kline (Oxford, UK: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), p 68.

⁴⁵⁹ Timothy J Doorey, “Intelligence Secrecy and Transparency: Finding the Proper Balance from the War of Independence to the War on Terror,” *Strategic Insights* VI, no. 3 (May 2007). www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA484534.

⁴⁶⁰ The White House, “Introduction,” *The President’s Intelligence Advisory Board and Intelligence Oversight Board*, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/piab>.

⁴⁶¹ Johnson, “Balancing Liberty and Security,” p 68.

⁴⁶² The Pike and Church committees followed the CIA actions in overthrowing Chilean President Salvadore Allende; L. Elaine Halchin and Frederick M. Kaiser, *Congressional Oversight of Intelligence: Current Structure and Alternatives* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2010).

⁴⁶³ Van Wagenen “A Review of Congressional Oversight.”

⁴⁶⁴ Matthew B. Walker, “Reforming Congressional Oversight of US Intelligence,” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 19, no. 4 (2006): 702-720, p 704- 705.

⁴⁶⁵ Stuart, “Ministry of Fear,” p 300.

⁴⁶⁶ Van Wagenen “A Review of Congressional Oversight.”

⁴⁶⁷ FISA, later expanded to include physical surveillance, “requires that a court order be obtained from a special court

obtained from a special court established by the Act for all electronic surveillance for intelligence purposes within the United States. For oversight, the NSA has typically been more highly ‘secret’ and thus subject to only “limited internal oversight”⁴⁶⁸ in its history.

1990s: Gulf War and Post-Cold War Intelligence

At the same time as the community managed cutbacks, it shifted away from cold war threats to new targets. The Aspin-Brown Commission was one of a number at the time that examined the mission of intelligence.⁴⁶⁹ Military intelligence remained important during the Gulf War, Bosnia, and other American interventions. The ‘lightning’ ground and air war, and the ‘linguistic’ and technical challenges of the Gulf challenged military intelligence; “In this intelligence campaign high technology at last came into its own.”⁴⁷⁰

While the communications technology revolutions are ongoing—Kahn famously noted the shift from intelligence about physical things to verbal intelligence (information from a written or oral source)⁴⁷¹—the late 1990s began to show signs of the internet and cell revolutions that would transform daily communications. But Aid notes that while the type of intelligence has shifted, the revolution in information technology is accompanied by vast increases in differing new techniques of hiding and transmitting information, encryption being only one SIGINT must contend with.⁴⁷² Volume, is the other problem of the digital age—the scale of

established by the Act for all electronic surveillance for intelligence purposes within the United States.” Van Wagenen “A Review of Congressional Oversight.”

⁴⁶⁸ Aid, “The Time of Troubles,” p 186.

⁴⁶⁹ The Community was reorganized by the 1992 Intelligence Organization Act, “the first successful effort by the Congress since the National Security Act of 1947 to enact organizational legislation for the IC.” Largely it assigned additional responsibilities to the DCI, alongside some additional provisions; Van Wagenen “A Review of Congressional Oversight.”

⁴⁷⁰ For example, UAVs collecting targeting data; Finnegan and Danysh, *Military Intelligence*, p 189.

⁴⁷¹ David Kahn, “An Historical Theory of Intelligence,” *Intelligence and National Security* 16, no. 3 (2001): 79-92.

⁴⁷² Aid also points to fibre-optic cables, wireless networks, and 128-bit encryption; Aid, “The Time of Troubles,” p 190.

‘drinking from a firehose’, that metaphor so often employed in the early years of the digital revolution, no longer even seems adequate to describe the terabytes of data produced each day. This has culminated in the recent pre-eminence of the NSA today, and COMINT, with some estimates that the NSA budget “may be as high as \$10 billion.”⁴⁷³ Another general trend begging in this period was intelligence subcontracted to private hands, yet *Secret Intelligence: A Reader*⁴⁷⁴ points out that as discussed in the early sections of this chapter, private agents were historically involved in American intelligence.⁴⁷⁵

9.11

The problems in tracking Al-Qaida in America at the time of the attacks are well known.

“There was no smoking gun that in itself could have foiled the attack. But if the disparate intelligence had been integrated properly into a coherent picture, perhaps the terrorist attempt could have been thwarted....”⁴⁷⁶ The 9.11 Commission would ultimately assess the failure as stemming from “four kinds of failures: “in imagination, policy, capabilities, management.”⁴⁷⁷ Clearly the threat of terrorism would come to focus an intelligence community that had seen a proliferation of sometimes vague targets, at the end of the Cold War.

The major organizational change that followed was the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. The DHS was formed from twenty two existing agencies, in 2002,⁴⁷⁸ into

⁴⁷³ Maria Kiriakova, “National Security Agency” in *The SAGE Encyclopedia of Terrorism*, 2nd Ed, ed. Gus Martin (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 2011), p 422-424.

⁴⁷⁴ Christopher Andrew, Richard J. Aldrich and Wesley K. Wark “Introduction,” in *Secret Intelligence: A Reader*, eds. Christopher Andrew, Richard J. Aldrich, Wesley K. Wark (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York : Routledge, 2009), p 1- 2.

⁴⁷⁵ John D. Negroponte and Edward M. Wittenstein, “Urgency, Opportunity, and Frustration: Implementing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,” *Yale Law & Policy Review*, 28, no. 2 (spring 2010): 379-417, p 379/380.

⁴⁷⁶ Richard J. Harknett and James A. Stever, “The Struggle to Reform Intelligence after 9/11,” *Public Administration Review* 71, no. 5 (2011): 700-706, p 701.

⁴⁷⁷ Created through the “Homeland Security Act by Congress in November 2002” according to the DHS, “About DHS,” <http://www.dhs.gov/creation-department-homeland-security>.

⁴⁷⁸ Robert H Dorff, “The Search For National and Homeland Security: An integrated Grand Strategy,” in *Terrorism and homeland security: Thinking strategically about policy*, eds. Paul Viotti, Michael Opheim, Nicholas Bowen (Boca Raton : CRC Press, 2008), p 26.

what some called a ‘mega agency’ to focus attention on securing the homeland, in the “‘single largest reform’ of the U.S. national security apparatus since the National Security Act of 1947.”⁴⁷⁹ The DHS’s Intelligence and Analysis Office helps deal with threats “related to border security; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear... issues; critical infrastructure protection” and travel and disease related threats.⁴⁸⁰ The 9.11 attack in general reoriented all agencies toward missions related to domestic threats, for example, requiring “the Defense Department to add an internal focus to its intelligence mission parameters.”

Another more controversial intelligence debate emerged after the attacks—first, over the public use of intelligence to ‘sell’ the Iraq war, intelligence that turned out in many ways to be problematic; scandals included improper intelligence from the source codenamed curveball, from alleged yellowcake uranium purchases, and the capabilities and intended purpose of aluminum tubes, & etc.⁴⁸¹ Second, the issue of ‘cherry picking’ or politicization, centered on the Office of Special Plans, as the origin of the sometime faulty WMD intelligence used by the Bush administration,⁴⁸² and finally, intelligence’s role in the failures of the war—especially the failure to anticipate the difficulties of the peace, and the number of troops required.⁴⁸³ The Iraq War contributed to new research into intelligence and the public use of intelligence. Some of these were investigated by the so-called ‘WMD Commission.’⁴⁸⁴ The report found that the failure resulted from ‘analytical shortcomings’ (being too wedded to assumptions) but also failures of collection (collecting “worthless or misleading” information) and a failure to explain

⁴⁷⁹ Bullock, Haddow, and Coppola, *Homeland Security*, p 114.

⁴⁸⁰ Harknett and Stever, “The Struggle to Reform Intelligence after 9/11,” p 701.

⁴⁸¹ Bob Drogin, *Curveball: spies, lies, and the con man who caused a war* (Random House, 2007).

⁴⁸² Peter Jackson, “Historical Reflections on the Uses and Limits of Intelligence,” in *Intelligence and Statecraft: The Use and Limits of Intelligence in International Society*, ed. Peter J. Jackson, Jennifer L. Siegel (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2005), p 49.

⁴⁸³ Dina Badie, “Groupthink, Iraq, and the War on Terror: Explaining US Policy Shift toward Iraq,” *Foreign Policy Analysis* 6, no. 4 (2010): 277–296, p 291/2.

⁴⁸⁴ United States Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Laurence H. Silberman, and Charles S. Robb. *Commission on the intelligence capabilities of the united states regarding weapons of mass destruction* (The Commission, 2004).

how little evidence existed.⁴⁸⁵

2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA)

The IRTPA is the “landmark legislation” congealing post 9.11 intelligence reform in response to the 9.11 failures.⁴⁸⁶ The IRTPA reflected the Bush Administration’s implementation of selected parts of the recommendations of the 9.11 Commission.⁴⁸⁷ As discussed above, the Act created the DNI and the ODNI (Office of the Director of National Intelligence) to coordinate the intelligence community. The “dual charge of the DNI—[is] to coordinate daily intelligence and to pursue fundamental reform....”⁴⁸⁸ The intention was to create ‘jointness’, information sharing, and cooperation; to “shift from an agency-centric community model to an integrated networked enterprise modality.” The DNI has more budgetary authority, and input in personnel decision than the DCI did, and presumably more coordinative ability due to this authority.⁴⁸⁹ However, as with the 1947 Act “...the vagaries in the IRTPA legislation provided opportunities for agencies to try to limit the DNIs authorities.”⁴⁹⁰ The DNI has faced the same gradual negotiations of authority as the DCI.⁴⁹¹

The FBI was also restructured in the 2004 reform, with a DI or Directorate of Intelligence created to better focus on intelligence, with “broad and clear authority over

⁴⁸⁵ *Ibid*, “Summary” (Overview).

⁴⁸⁶ Negroponte and Wittenstein “Urgency, Opportunity, and Frustration,” p 381.

⁴⁸⁷ *Ibid*, p 387.

⁴⁸⁸ Harknett and. Stever, “The Struggle to Reform Intelligence after 9/11,” p 702.

⁴⁸⁹ Richelson, “From Director of Central Intelligence to Director of National Intelligence.”

⁴⁹⁰ The example given is the greater control over personnel set out in IRTPA, over other agencies’ leadership- the DNI only is

required to have ‘concurrence’ and in some cases, ‘consultation’ only. This is similar to the provisions for budgetary controls as well. Negroponte and Wittenstein “Urgency, Opportunity, and Frustration,” p 389, p 382.

⁴⁹¹ Negroponte and Wittenstein “Urgency, Opportunity, and Frustration,” p 383.

intelligence” in the FBI.⁴⁹² This “elevated intelligence from program support to full program status.”⁴⁹³ Additionally, a new Executive Director post was created for intelligence, alongside new “field intelligence groups” established in each field office.⁴⁹⁴ The CIA has also “been pushed into counterterrorism” post 9.11, independently, and working with special forces.⁴⁹⁵ Other new organizations in the community include the 2002 Joint Terrorism Task Force, and the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (in the National Counterterrorism Center, which was codified in the 2004 IRTPA).⁴⁹⁶

Many other new positions and personnel changes focused on increased information sharing and terrorism. Terrorism, as much as the post-9.11 reforms, has changed the shape of the Intelligence Community, but the reforms implemented to prevent another 9.11 have been criticized by many outside and inside the intelligence community.⁴⁹⁷

Shared Intelligence Culture

Having only sketched the history of the many moving parts of the intelligence community, it should be made clear how ‘intelligence’ as a whole is diverse. Clearly there is no *uniform* culture across such disparate parts; yet this does not indicate there is no *shared* culture. We can understand these shared pieces of culture with reference to the security imaginary heuristic, as discussed in the first chapter. In the catholic version of what could be called the intelligence imaginary (the security imaginary concerning intelligence) all the parts of the

⁴⁹² Alfred Cumming and Todd Masse, *FBI Intelligence Reform Since September 11, 2001: Issues and Options for Congress* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2010), p 19.

⁴⁹³ Cumming and Masse, *FBI Intelligence Reform Since September 11, 2001*, p 21.

⁴⁹⁴ Cumming and Masse, *FBI Intelligence Reform Since September 11, 2001*, p 23.

⁴⁹⁵ Gregory F. Treverton, “Covert Action: Foreward to the Past?” in *Strategic Intelligence Volume 3: Covert Action* ed Loch K. Johnson (Westport, Conn. : Praeger Security International, 2007), p 17.

⁴⁹⁶ Cumming and Masse, *FBI Intelligence Reform Since September 11, 2001*, p 29-30.

⁴⁹⁷ Neary, “The Post 9/11 Intelligence Community Intelligence Reform, 2001–2009.”

intelligence community can “write” to the imaginary,⁴⁹⁸ but their articulations and interpellations are not always shared. However, their raw materials, and their articulations are conceptually available to others. The shared articulations and ‘national’ concepts are what forms the common national intelligence culture that this dissertation is studying.

It is easier to emphasize the uniqueness and differences between community members than shared precepts. Often the intelligence community is sliced apart, split between “program managers,” “service” agencies and “departmental” components (as I and others do), to highlight the defense community members, or departmental members, or any other break-away.⁴⁹⁹ Before the 9.11 attacks, agencies with a foreign versus domestic mission were often distinguished. There is nothing problematic in identifying the unique features of each and every agency, bureau, department or service. However, as former DCI W. Colby noted, this should not blind us to the common-ness of the group as a whole: “The intelligence community exists in the same sense as does any other group of people involved in a common endeavor.”⁵⁰⁰ The ‘state’ itself, is a collection of diverse institutions conceptually grouped together, and often linked through an imaginary: this is Benedict Anderson’s famous ‘imagined community’ of the nation.⁵⁰¹

Focusing on specific organizational views of intelligence, or sub-cultures, is valuable; but what this should not replace a study of the broad, shared and persisting articulations of intelligence. The national layer of intelligence culture, then, interconnects with militaries’ ‘strategic’ and intelligence cultures, and the civilian agencies organizational cultures, as well as

⁴⁹⁸ The wider public can as well, as noted elsewhere and in chapter two.

⁴⁹⁹ For example historically the division was made between the foreign and domestically focused intelligence community

members, but as noted above, this distinction has partly dissolved with the additional domestic missions in the wake of 9.11.

⁵⁰⁰ W.E. Colby, “Statement of W.E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence” in *The Intelligence Community: History, Organization and Issues*, Vol. 1, eds. Tyrus Gerard Fain, and Katharine C. Plant (New York: RR Bowker Company, 1977), p 25.

⁵⁰¹ The nation must have some limits, for it cannot extend to all. Yet, nationalism does not specify, of necessity, what these limits must be, as per Benedict Anderson, famously. Thus nationalism is particular to time and place, although possessing a distinct but narrow universal ‘core’ as per Michael Freeden, “Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology?” *Political Studies* 46, no. 4 (1998): 748-765.

the departmental culture of State and Treasury (and others). These institutions layer diagonally with intelligence culture – and can produce a kind of inter-articulation, one which other members of the wider community are free to embrace or reject.

Taking the military example, as described, strategic culture exists at a number of facets and levels. Yet the military itself is comprised of masses of different types—each service has its own traditions, civilian employees bring their own habits, and then each service itself is composed of sub-organizations and professions from anthropologists to mechanics, who have their own respective professional socialization. Just as our daily identities are multiple and overlapping, and cultures and subcultures are not single. The conceptual fluidity of culture cannot be underlined enough. The security imaginary heuristic in no way denies it (as some versions of strategic culture might), it instead asks us to look to the (at least) temporary fixity of some modes of thought and language and identity—our articulations and interpellations, to show how and where these cultures ebb and flow.

The essential point is that despite different histories, socializations, etc., shared ideas do exist—for example in the religious imaginary, we can divide Protestantism and Catholicism into a thousand sub groups—yet they share overarching concepts that give them unity. Just as the nation is millions of individuals, they articulate shared ideas and identities of being American, that retain some fixity. A subset of strategic culture may exist for each service, just as a subset of intelligence culture can be generated from specific agencies (or types of agencies). Yet I take intelligence culture, in this dissertation, as a product of all the intelligence community organizations, military and civilian services, as well as those influential members of the wider public and government. As noted in the previous chapter, myriad groups can be considered both “holders” and authors of different facets of American intelligence culture.

Historical Themes

This narrative and institutional account avoided drawing conclusions about the nature of intelligence so as to avoid importing cultural judgments about intelligence. A number of clear themes can be identified. Discussed at greater length in chapters five and six, the American tendency to be suspicious of intelligence, and view secret services as suspicious may be conditioned by three factors shown here; the traumatic acrimony of spying in the Civil and revolutionary war, repeated scandals from spy scares and saboteurs to covert action, and the clearly early preference for amateurism and non-professional or ad-hoc agents. Second, we can see an issue which will recur in a number of ways; the early separation of traumatic periods of war or dissension (the Revolution, the Civil War, the First and Second World Wars) which saw an increased concern with foreign threats; commentators suggest that this both reflects and conditions a separation between the domestic and foreign in intelligence (in chapter five) and between intelligence in war and peace. This is explicated more fully in the next chapter, where the Kent-Kendall debate begins to show how different ideas of intelligence posit alternate ideas of how intelligence should act in the world, and whether it should be understood as information only, or information and action (in chapter five).

This bureaucratic development of proliferating departmental intelligence is clearly related to the Weberian bureaucratization and professionalization of governments throughout the world and in security bureaucracies, the proliferation of the Prussian staff office model.⁵⁰² Yet, the American intelligence system developed in the absence of centuries long tradition of secret services of Europe, and in the concurrent trends of American behavioralism and the Fordist rationalism particular to the new world. American intelligence culture reflects these wider trends, but in turn, is shaped by the

⁵⁰² Michael R. Matheny, *Carrying the War to the Enemy: American Operational Art to 1945*, Vol. 28. (University of Oklahoma Press, 2012) p 19.

processes, procedures, and institutional forms developed in this uniquely American way.

Institutions shape American intelligence thoughts and attitudes, and in turn are shaped by them.

They are, then, embedded ideas, which we will come to see, in the next chapter.

This history itself of intelligence is situated in the pre-war debates over intelligence and the professionalization of government in general. The post-war debates are discussed in the context of Kent-Kendall and the surrounding trends and literatures in chapter four. Relevant from that discussion is Yeardley's *The American Black Chamber*; one of the earliest, if sensationalist reflections on the need for American intelligence. Yeardley reflects the same debate commentators today rejoin; whether America must suffer intelligence or whether it is un-American; whether it is a source of power or a kind of danger itself. The most prominent elite debate over the bureaucratization of intelligence is touched on in this chapter in discussing the successors to the OSS. The military, and other intelligence bureaus, did not relish a competitor or superintendent to their power; yet after Pearl Harbor and during the war there was a recognition that reorganization was needed and would happen. The major issue was on what, and whose terms; the 1947 National Security Act is truly the record of the compromise of that debate in institutional terms (including the services themselves).

Conclusion

This chapter attempted to clarify the basic concepts and members of American intelligence, as well as who 'counts' in the American intelligence community, and how the present organizations recognized as part of the community were formed, including their rationale. The past and present of American intelligence is also a necessary context to understanding the

focus of this dissertation, the present American national intelligence culture. This institutional history also begins to show the ideas of intelligence, embedded in American institutions, further clarified in the next chapter.

The next chapter begins to develop the themes of modern or post-Pearl Harbor American intelligence culture by highlighting what I argue are the key epistemological and ontological positions in the American understanding intelligence. While this is demonstrated by recounting the 'Kent-Kendall' debate and its conceptual consequences, which arose from civilian and estimative intelligence, these positions are not limited to civilian intelligence, and can be understood as a general intellectual framework for intelligence as it is conducted in America (this is explored in that chapter). Chapter five will then show how American intelligence culture as whole has been characterized in existing work, and theorize its central tensions according to present descriptions. Ultimately this dissertation regards description as unsatisfying without further verifactory research. This chapter is then the companion to the study of the real usage and understandings of American intelligence culture (or articulation), through the national symbol of Pearl Harbor, after 9.11, with attention to the subsequent implications of its uses.

(Chapter Four) Sherman Kent and Wilmoore Kendall: The Kent-Kendall Debate and the Foundations of American Intelligence Thought

The previous chapter constructed a history of the American intelligence community to show its history and eventual evolution following the transformative event of Pearl Harbor. This chapter comprises instead, an intellectual history of the evolution of the ideas of those in intelligence. It is the necessary basis for a discussion of American intelligence culture, as it shows the history and emergence of the many core concepts and assumptions about intelligence at present, which will be discussed in chapter five. It must precede that chapter to show the complex sets of ideas that are the antecedents of any modern concepts of intelligence.

What is the optimal relationship of intelligence to policy? What is the appropriate methodology of intelligence analysis? Must secrecy constitute an inherent part of what is understood as intelligence? How does oversight constrain intelligence, and what are the optimal means of intelligence control⁵⁰³? How does intelligence function in a democracy? How many times have these questions been considered in the history of American intelligence, without reference to one another – and many other questions of approach, strategy, mission, and doctrine. All these questions bear on intelligence culture, and each of these issues each has an intellectual history of its own. Yet they have points of interconnection. They reflect deeper assumptions about the way the world works, the production of knowledge, and the appropriateness of action in the world. These conflicting assumptions are most clearly revealed in what has been called the Kent-Kendall debate, which ranged over the nature of knowledge, the type of actors

⁵⁰³ Intelligence control systems refer to all the mechanisms through which democratic control can be exercised on intelligence (law, professional ethics, oversight, etc.). See Hans Born, and Thorsten Wetzling, “Intelligence Accountability : challenges for parliaments and intelligence services,” in the *Handbook of Intelligence Studies*, ed. Loch Johnson (New York : Routledge, 2007) p 320; also see Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C. Boraz, *Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007).

in the world, the possibility of prediction, the need and authority of science for intelligence, and the nature of intelligence.⁵⁰⁴

There is an awareness in Intelligence Studies of what have been called two ‘schools’⁵⁰⁵ or two opposing positions.⁵⁰⁶ The differences between the two approaches are most often discussed through a single question – the debate over analyst-policymaker distance, which has a long contentious history both intelligence theory and in practice. Other issues, such as the importance of secrecy to intelligence, and technology, seem isolated from other discussions.⁵⁰⁷ The question of intelligence and social science, and of general methodology is treated by Kent, Platt and others,⁵⁰⁸ but not as often in interlinkage with these other questions. Intelligence as a form of knowledge production socially is treated more rarely, and generally in more recent work (and work from outside the profession).⁵⁰⁹ These questions do not often come together, thus the deeper aspect of these debates is hidden.

Looking at these kinds of issues in isolation (and looking only at separate ‘norms’ of intelligence culture) then, does a disservice. Particularly, the present aspects of intelligence culture emerge from this historical debate more clearly than simply listing them. Naturally, the present is both continuous and discontinuous with the past – yet these deeper assumptions, represented by the Kent-Kendall debate, retain currency. For example, Sherman Kent’s idea of the importance of secrecy (as discussed in the introduction to chapter one) has shifted with the advent of the internet, yet the idea of an objective

⁵⁰⁴ Like the ‘great debates’ in International Relations theory, the Kent-Kendall debate is a reconstruction of the opposition of a greater number of writers and ideas, which ebb and flow in intelligence. It retains utility, as this dissertation will argue, by throwing each position or set of ideas into relief against the other. On the other authors involved, see the “Early Intelligence Literature” section, this chapter.

⁵⁰⁵ Shulsky, and Schmitt, *Silent Warfare*, p 188-189. A third (or new second) school is added by Taylor. Robert W. Taylor, “Terrorism and Intelligence,” *Defense Analysis* 3, no. 2 (1987): 165-175, p 165.

⁵⁰⁶ Some other figures are associated with the debate; Russell opposes Gates’ position to Kent’s (Gates could be considered philosophically a Kendallian) in Russell, “Achieving All-source Fusion in the Intelligence Community,” p 195. Betts notes the somewhat confusing terms in the modern debate, noting that Uri Bar Joseph uses “realists” and “professional” schools for the same debate. Richard K. Betts, “Politicization of Intelligence: Costs and Benefits,” *Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel*, eds. Richard K. Betts, Thomas Mahnken (Routledge, 2003) Fn 8, page 72; also George S. Pettee, with a slightly different but somewhat Kendallian position is discussed later in this chapter.

⁵⁰⁷ The issue of secrecy is related to collection because it references the question of additional importance of HUMINT – defined in chapter three – and whether this additional secret information is what differentiates intelligence from other kinds of similar information (news and research). Gill and Phythian discuss; Peter Gill and Mark Phythian, *Intelligence in an Insecure World* (Cambridge, UK ; Malden, MA : Polity Press, 2006), p 64.

⁵⁰⁸ For example, Washington Platt, *Strategic Intelligence Production: basic principles* (Praeger, 1957).

⁵⁰⁹ Such as Betts, *Enemies of Intelligence*, or Eva Horn, “Knowing the Enemy: The epistemology of secret intelligence,” *Grey Room* 11 (2003): 58-85.

world, at heart, remains popular (as explicated later in this chapter). For this reason, the Kent-Kendall debate still throws into relief base epistemological and ontological opposing principles. Even as their contentions are updated today, these deeper ideas persist in intelligence culture, as they do in strategic culture, and make themselves felt in new positions.⁵¹⁰ For this reason, this chapter uses the Kent-Kendall debate (the terms of which are explained in this chapter) to do three things: first, to give context to present day intelligence culture (discussed in the next chapter); second, to show the contradictory and sometimes oppositional nature of ideas of intelligence; and finally, to demonstrate the epistemological and ontological assumptions that ultimately underlie the norms and symbols of the American intelligence culture.

Theory and Methodology

The putative ‘sources’ of intelligence culture are discussed in the next chapter; this is not the focus of this chapter for reasons discussed below on context. Instead – it forms a sort of triangulation of the present with the other chapters. This dissertation’s methodological insistence on determining real usage of intelligence culture ‘norms’ and symbols, is buttressed by a more constructivist approach to the ‘how possible’ – how have current norms and symbols in intelligence culture been made possible by past thought and approaches. The constructivist approach asks what background “social/discursive practices and meanings which make possible the practices as well as the social actors themselves...” and how meanings are articulated in particular constellations so as to “create certain possibilities and preclude others.”⁵¹¹ In this case,

⁵¹⁰ How the Kent-Kendall debate remains current, is discussed later in this chapter.

⁵¹¹ Roxanne Doty, cited in “Agent Level and Social Constructivism”, *Psychology and Constructivism in International Relations: An Ideational Alliance*, ed Shannon P Vaughn, Paul A. Kowert (University of Michigan Press, 2012), p 154.

the ontology and epistemology of Kent and Kendall's early positions make possible many later ideas of intelligence, definitions, and present debates and discourses (in chapter five).⁵¹²

For single study, this is an appropriate way to help adumbrate the directions that were positively taken, against what might have been. In the absence of comparison, a historical intellectual archeology may show what otherwise might have been plausible, and how the taken-for-grantedness of current ideas was instantiated. Clearly a history of the entire American intelligence culture, in appropriate depth, is not possible; therefore select pieces are highlighted by discussing the overall currents of debate in the Kent-Kendall debate, which has continued under different labels for decades.⁵¹³ This means that this chapter forms part of a broad constructivist approach to intelligence culture in America. As noted, the aim of this chapter specifically is to—by discussing the Kent-Kendall debate—give context to, and show the oppositional nature of 'norms' and approaches to intelligence, and highlight epistemology and ontology (or underlying assumptions) that shape intelligence culture. Each of these purposes is discussed directly below.

Contextualizing Norms and Symbols

This chapter begins to expand on the content of American intelligence culture symbols or norms. That is, it paints their historical articulation and formulation. This serves to show that the American 'idea' of intelligence does not simply 'emerge' from its geography, its exceptionalism,

⁵¹² Of course, Matt McDonald points out that in addition to Doty's 'how possible' on how meanings are produced, others (Krebs and Lobasz) ask the 'how possible' less as how "particular policy options become 'imaginable' than how particular policy choices are 'sold' politically" – in a spectrum of constructivist analyses. Matt McDonald, *Security, the Environment and Emancipation: Contestation Over Environmental Change*, (Routledge, 2011), p 16.

⁵¹³ The Kent-Kendall debate is written about (briefly) as recently as 2014's Dan Mazare, and Gabriel Sebe, "Learning Intelligence Analysis: The Development of Cognitive Strategies," in *The Art of Intelligence: Simulations, Exercises, and Game*, eds. William J. Lahneman, Rubén Arcos (Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), p 75.

or its Anglo-Saxon heritage fully formed. None of its ‘sources’ are deterministic – an isolated geography is relative: America still borders two nations and is linked by land to another continent, as well as being close to a number of other island nations. Another nation might consider this position beset. This is why it is more important to discuss the real context out of which these norms emerge (and why they are *understood* as sources of intelligence culture). The early intellectual debates of American intelligence provide this.

Ideas of intelligence are forged in historical intellectual history and dialectic/debate (which reflect interpretations of history, events, etc.).⁵¹⁴ Constructivism clearly contends that the ‘meaning’ of an event or its history is created by the intersubjective understandings of the community and has no intrinsic message or interpretation: “...international politics is a ‘world of our own making.’”⁵¹⁵ Thus tracing the intellectual debates forming assumptions behind, and context to, intelligence culture tries to show the very basic level at which the preconceived ‘universes’ of intelligence culture become meaningful and dictate the importance and lens through which events (and geography, texts, history, etc.) become comprehensible.

Oppositional Norms and Approaches

As discussed in the previous chapter, this dissertation holds that that theoretically the idea of intelligence culture is unsound without the inclusion of sub-groups and conflicting cultural articulations. Any account of persisting symbols, then, must pay attention to norms (relationally) in relation to one another – in their forms of opposition and coalition. This results from the more sophisticated conception of strategic culture and the security imaginary heuristic discussed in

⁵¹⁴ Grey wrote that changes to strategic culture are “mediated by pre-existing cultural beliefs.” Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture*, p 38.

⁵¹⁵ Onuf, cited in Karin Fierke, “Constructivism,” in *International Relations Theories*, eds. Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, Steve Smith (New York : Oxford University Press, 2010) p 189.

chapter two. Persisting ideas of intelligence may be opposed – and may coalesce as part of an underlying intellectual structure – but one that is not rigid and permits temporary alliance. The contradictory nature of intelligence norms arises both from their articulation by actors with different interests and experiences, but also by their utilization at different times (or situations) by the same actors.⁵¹⁶ The Kent-Kendall debate shows exactly how these positions contrast.

Underlying Assumptions (Epistemology and Ontology)

As noted above, these ‘loose groupings’ correspond with some deeper ideas of epistemology and ontology (as discussed in this chapter). Connecting ideas of intelligence to this deeper framework is important because it can show that different norms/symbols of intelligence reflect perhaps incommensurable background ideas of knowledge, action and the appropriate conduct of foreign and security policy. These may be the deep roots to differences in approaches in American intelligence.

The significance of the underlying assumptions about knowledge can be more obvious in other types of discourse. The impact of scientific paradigms on the accumulation of knowledge (for example in Kuhn’s study) is well known.⁵¹⁷ In policymaking, the literature on frames is well known in examine the solutions to policy problems.⁵¹⁸ For intelligence, the paradigms are less clear, as is the nature of assumptions about the wider world that shape intelligence. Moreover, the connections between these assumptions and what actions they make possible on the wider political landscape (whether in foreign, economic or defense policy) are again, less articulated

⁵¹⁶ This is discussed in chapter two as well as chapter five and six.

⁵¹⁷ Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

⁵¹⁸ For example, Donald Schön, and Martin Rein, *Frame Reflection: Toward the resolution of intractable policy controversies* (New York: Basic Books, 1994).

than other in other discourses. These ‘world making’ assumptions are important because we cannot really understand different conceptions of intelligence without understanding the background epistemology and ontology.

Ontology And Epistemology in Intelligence

Our most basic assumptions about the world are usually hidden. We rarely discuss what we assume makes up the world and the preconditions that allow us to know and understand it.⁵¹⁹ These assumptions can be categorized through ontology, and epistemology, which shape the limits and possibilities of any enterprise. “Disagreements about ontology are real, profound, and consequential...”⁵²⁰ and “[i]t is the *consequences* (both ethical and analytical) of different ontological assumptions that are worth arguing about.”⁵²¹ Ontology comprises the 'furniture' of reality, what exists in the world, what kinds of actors, objects, and relationships. Epistemology deals with our knowledge of the world –how we can we know, and under what conditions. For intelligence, the scope and extent of the possibility of knowledge is critical to its function in government. By what justification can information or sense data become authoritative 'knowledge' and finally, intelligence ? What kind of process can comprehend the future and what kind of “being” does the future have?⁵²² Together, ontology

⁵¹⁹ International Relations, being a very theoretically inclined discipline, has more explicit discussion of ontology and epistemology than Intelligence Studies. For example, work on ontological security: Brent J. Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations: self-identity and the IR state* (Routledge, 2008).

⁵²⁰ Ian Hurd, “Constructivism,” in *The Oxford Handbook of International Relation*, eds. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2008), p 312.

⁵²¹ *Ibid*, p 312.

⁵²² From Hobbes’ supposition that the future has no being, as Hobbes poetically puts it, there is no true foresight, except by those whose actions will cause the future because for Hobbes the future does not actually exist. This is an important point- in the past auguries and omens reflect a future that *already existed* – for example, this is why in Oedipus Rex the oedipal prediction must come true no matter the attempts to prevent it because the future is already written, in that conception. The modern philosophical view tends to be less deterministic and hence our understanding of knowledge of the future is different. For another discussion of this kind of ancient view, Rose Mary Sheldon, *Intelligence Activities in Ancient Rome: Trust in the Gods but Verify* (Routledge, 2004).

and epistemology are the building blocks of how we see the world.⁵²³ Together they also determine the character of intelligence for society.

For intelligence, it is important to emphasize that there are primarily ontological differences among national security professionals who are socialized in different environments (or the same ones).⁵²⁴ Intelligence culture emphasizes the epistemological breaks between national security professionals. It highlights that epistemologies, as well as ontologies, are different nationally and do not correspond only to the 'real world'. Some see a threatening world of war and limitless violence – others a regularized peaceful world where violence is of limited utility.⁵²⁵ Kent and Kendall show two kinds of ontological ‘packages’ at play in intelligence thought. So when we ask what is the purpose of the intelligence enterprise, what its methods of analysis should be and its missions– essentially how can (and should) it know and act in the world –we are asking about the epistemology and ontology of intelligence.

This chapter argues that the lacuna in current intelligence culture is that we have not understood ideas of intelligence in context, with reference to their history, formation, and deeper epistemological and ontological assumptions. Ultimately, then, the Kent-Kendall debate can be seen as a prelude to the discussion of Pearl Harbor, and the present understandings of its lessons and meanings. It helps fill in a historical picture of American intelligence culture in brief, prior to the present, and indicates the currents of thought before and after Pearl Harbor. One of the problems I identified in chapter one and two with SC and intelligence culture research is the a-historical, anti-methodological assumption that no evidence is needed to demonstrate current

⁵²³ Hollis and Smith argue making sense of the world requires an ontology, a methodology (to reveal it) and an epistemology. Cited in Colin Wight, *Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006) p 253.

⁵²⁴ This is something securitization theory somewhat neglects. For an overview of securitization (and its failings) see “what is securitization,” in Thierry Balzacq, “Constructivism and Securitization Studies,” in *The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies* eds. Thierry Balzacq, Myriam Dunn Cavelty (London ; New York : Routledge, 2010).

⁵²⁵ Clearly these perceptions are part of strategic culture as well – for example one of the core strategic culture paradigms are the core beliefs about the types of threats and “role and efficacy” of warfare. Lawrence Sondhaus, *Strategic Culture and Ways of War* (Routledge, 2006), p 128.

usage and meanings. Lantis writes that even supporters have “called for more careful study” since the early literature was “anecdotal at best.”⁵²⁶ The assumption that these cultures are simply self-evident avoids tracing their historical changes and origins. In this way, this chapter is a necessary prelude, to the following chapter describing current American intelligence culture, and to the study of Pearl Harbor in chapter six.

Chapter Plan

As this chapter traces the intellectual history of a segment of American intelligence culture, I show how different ideas about the nature of intelligence knowledge dictate a set of assumptions about the world, intelligence’s mission, and scope. Sherman Kent and Wilmoore Kendall represent these two enduring schools of thought about American intelligence. The first part of this chapter introduces the different ideas of intelligence, and the terms of the Kent-Kendall debate (as well as the men themselves). The main body argues that Kent is representative of what has been called a ‘ticker tape’ view of the world in intelligence, where the facts and events of the globe can be objectively known, using a combination of the scientific method, mind (mental capacity or excellence); and professional knowledge (tradecraft). Ultimately, if left unmolested by politics, this ‘estimating machine’ (Kent’s words), can come closer and closer to a perfect understanding of the record of history, and thus gain better and better prediction of the future. The Kendallian counter-position is that these processes are unnecessary; superior knowledge doesn’t win the war, and it is already apparent who and what the threats to America are. Truth through science is thoroughly unnecessary and likely impossible. Key to the Kendallian view is that the policymaker, then, not the analyst, knows best

⁵²⁶ Lantis, “Strategic Culture and National Security Policy,” p 95.

how to direct intelligence and what its mission should be. Intelligence should be used to actively pursue opportunities to further policy, and separating it from policy only undermines its effectiveness. I discuss in the conclusion how other famous strategic thinkers, notably Wohlstetter and other national security officials, have been influenced by one or both of these views. They remain relevant in debates over politicization, analyst-policymaker distance, and covert operations.

Two Ideas of Intelligence: Kent and Kendall

Sherman Kent (the ‘father of intelligence analysis’) wrote and thought about intelligence for most of his career while Wilmoore Kendall wrote only one piece on intelligence. Yet the historiography of intelligence thought has anointed these men as the champions of its formative debate. They represent the two opposing, major American conceptions of intelligence. Each has a characteristic epistemology and ontology, bound together. Shulsky and Schmitt paint the two men as respective representatives of ‘new’ and traditional ideas of intelligence. The former (in their opinion), harkens to Stimpson’s gentlemen not reading each other’s mail, poised against the latter’s hardscrabble realist assessment of the struggle of nations through subterfuge and deception. They claim that a belief in the social scientific method is the key difference between the two.

There is no single “central” point of difference. It is not only a question of whether social scientific method can ever approach the precision of the natural sciences. The simple matters of tools of analysis and methodology hide a multitude of other issues. Any of the points of these two sides are rhizomatic. One can attack or defend covert action as essential to intelligence, decry secrecy, demand competitive teams, plead for better warning – all of these questions are inter-related and stem from the

compound worldview of each of the two sides. The answers depend on the entire approach of each side. In this chapter I will show that each approach's epistemology and ontology dictates an entire and inseparable set of views about the major questions of intelligence: what it is, what its value or mission should be, how it creates knowledge, and what knowledge it can glean from the world. Together these help form the ideational component of intelligence culture. The men, Kent and Kendall, are synecdochical to the positions attributed to them. While at times their words or thoughts may have diverged from the position they in general espoused, they are assumed as representatives for their eponymous approaches. Even if we do not always find their positions in the ideal in real debate, from the scope of each approach in its ideal, we can understand how these ideas form American intelligence thought.

Early Intelligence Literature

How did these historical ideas of intelligence develop ? In this section I discuss early American intelligence writing out of which the Kent-Kendall debate emerged (the debate itself is explained more fully in the next section). The debate gained prominence because it emerged from the early, bare, years of the first real scholarly investigations of intelligence. While chapter three shows that intelligence activity extended through the early years of the American polity, there was little to no academic writing on intelligence from that period. Second, its importance in defining (or crystallizing existing thinking on) intelligence becomes clear given the dearth of literature. The significance of these two positions cannot be underestimated, then. This section discusses first early fiction, and then the more numerous non-fiction works extant at or around

the time of the debate.⁵²⁷ It shows how small the initial number of authors was, and how revolutionary, then, Kentian and Kendallian early theoretical writing became to systematizing the tradition received ideas or knowledge of intelligence.

Fiction

The term literature in the academic sense tends to refer only to scholarly and expert works in a subject area (and professional accounts). Intelligence literature stretches these bounds, as the strictures of secrecy have caused some authors to couch their experiences in fiction. These fictional accounts have been taken as didactic - and semi-historical accounts of real intelligence - perhaps regardless of the author's specific intent.⁵²⁸ While this is not a claim that spy fiction is academic in the sense of peer review, it does make a contribution to the literature in illuminating our understanding of intelligence, however diffusely. For one writer, Le Carre's stories feel "truer than many so-called "real-world" accounts because they raise hard questions about espionage and its relationship to society."⁵²⁹ In this way the American intelligence, literature - loosely defined, began with the revolutionary war. There is a popular myth that America never produced a strong fictional spy genre: as Bold puts it, "the genre failed to take root in that culture because fictions of clandestinity, subterfuge and political duplicity jarred against the Republic's self-image of democratic openness."⁵³⁰ American spy fiction is not without its very early

⁵²⁷ This does not precisely follow H.H. Ransom's categorization of the intelligence literature into memoirs, exposes, and scholarly "objective analysis" showing "how the system works" - but this dissertation is in agreement with Ransom that a complete intelligence literature does not exist while the two former exist without the latter. Cited in David H. Hunter, "The Evolution of Literature on United States Intelligence," *Armed Forces & Society* 5, no. 1 (1978): 31-52, p 31, 33.

⁵²⁸ Clearly not all spy fiction is a reflection of reality - generally only specific cases and elements reflect pieces of real experience (usually written by former practitioners or those involved in some ways).

⁵²⁹ Ron Edwards, *Spione : Story Now in Cold War Berlin* (Chicago, IL: Adept Press 2007), p 17.

⁵³⁰ Christine Bold, "Secret Negotiations: The Spy Figure in Nineteenth-century American Popular Fiction," *Intelligence and National Security* 5, no. 4 (1990): 17-29.

contributions – famously James Fenimore Cooper's *The Spy*.⁵³¹ However, it likely did not produce the fictive accounts that the UK intelligence services did (for example, William Somerset Maugham's and of course Ian Fleming's)⁵³² because American intelligence was less active (see chapter three section on pre-world war two activities). The spy genre was still an American mainstay, but less as an illustrative reflection of practice.

Non-fiction

A similar, but more patchwork, story might be told for the non-fictional literature – but non-fiction accounts were rarer.⁵³³ We might first distinguish three kinds of (non-fiction) accounts of American intelligence. The first, and most common, is memoir. In *Studies in Intelligence* Kimball writes that former intelligence officers' memoirs, had “become a cottage industry....” after Dulles, because they were often ‘politically useful.’⁵³⁴ The utility of some memoir sources is affected by the issue of secrecy; Warner also warns about memoirs with ‘no access’ and intentionally propagandistic ones.⁵³⁵ Non-fiction memoir tends to be more personal and historical, but often includes a kind of analysis of the way things should be done (and thus is an implicit assessment of intelligence).⁵³⁶ Histories, while non-fiction, similarly may blend some personal reflection with a record of how intelligence was conducted. Again, this kind of

⁵³¹ A number of articles discuss the correspondence between fiction and reality, including (discussing early fiction); Thomas J. Price, “Spy Stories, Espionage and the Public in the Twentieth Century,” *The Journal of Popular Culture* 30, no. 3 (1996): 81-89. Popular culture is discussed more fully in chapter four and five.

⁵³² Jeffrey T. Richelson, “The IPCRESS File: The Great Game in Film and Fiction, 1953-2002,” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 16, no. 3 (2003): 462-498.

⁵³³ Douglas Wheeler makes the point that, even in 1955, part of the intelligence literature extant might be unknown to us. The literature outside America was also more substantial, and likely read to some extent, when available, in America – noting a 1933 best-selling memoir by Robert Bruce Lockhart. Douglas L. Wheeler, “Guide to The Study of Intelligence: The Literature of Intelligence ‘Another Kind of Need to Know’,” *Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies* 21, no. 1 (Winter 2014-2015) p1, p3, p5. For a list of non-fiction popular memoirs, he cites Alice Payne Hackett and James Henry Burke, *80 Years Of Best Sellers 1895-1975* (New York: R.R. Bowker, 1977), p. 115, 131, 158 [citation in original].

⁵³⁴ Warren F Kimball, “Openness and the CIA: Arguing for accountability,” *Studies in Intelligence* 44 no. 5 (2001).

⁵³⁵ Warner, “Sources and Methods for the Study of Intelligence,” p 23.

⁵³⁶ This kind of analysis has also been seen as venting “disapproval and disdain” for various aspects of their experience with intelligence – including work by Victor Marchetti, John Marks, John Stockwell, and others. Wilfred D Koplowitz, *Teaching Intelligence: A survey of College and University Courses on the Subject of Intelligence* (Washington: National Intelligence Study Center, 1980) p 46.

record can assess the success and failure of the recorded conduct, and Hunter writes that “many of them continue to be of value” to the study of intelligence.⁵³⁷ Finally, writers in intelligence theory describe and analyze the intelligence system primarily (with some reference to history or personal biography) or discusses specific issues, and roles.

Theoretical Writers of the Early Period

Thomas Quiggin writes that a ‘serious’ literature did not emerge until 1975, following the post war boom in intelligence writing.⁵³⁸ Wheeler lists a series of accounts (particularly internationally) after World War One, including articles, where “journalists and spymasters began to probe systematically the history of spying in international affairs.”⁵³⁹ However, there is a general consensus that a full intelligence literature does not predate the world wars in America, particularly since theoretical analyses did not appear before then.⁵⁴⁰ Wheeler notes that the early literature was often sensational stemming from communist scares and the Cuban missile crisis; it took until the 1970s for more accounts of the second world war to be published and “[f]inally, in the 1980s, British and American scholars began to publish capsule histories of their intelligence services...”⁵⁴¹ and only in that decade were the first public journals dedicated entirely to intelligence, published. Quiggin lists three phases of intelligence literature: first, in the initial

⁵³⁷ Hunter’s list includes Steward Alsop and Thomas Braden’s *Sub Rosa: The OSS and American Espionage* (1946), Zacharias (1946) and Ind (1958); Hunter, “The Evolution of Literature on United States Intelligence,” p 34.

⁵³⁸ Quiggin’s focus is work on the strategic intelligence function – but this was a general subject of most early intelligence work. Other examinations of the ‘phases’ of intelligence literature include Hunter’s analysis in “The Evolution of Literature in the United States” of a pro intelligence phase, an anti-intelligence phase in the 1960s and 1970s, and reaction and reform; p 33/4/5.

⁵³⁹ Wheeler, “Guide to The Study of Intelligence: The Literature of Intelligence,” p 4. Hunter sketches the “popular” intelligence history genre, including one of the best-known, 1937’s Richard Rowan’s *The Story of Secret Service*, and his later *Terror In Our Time: The Secret Service of Surprise Attack*, and Rowan’s *The Spy and the Next War* (1936), as well as Schwein’s *Combat Intelligence* (1936), Henry Wriston, *Executive Agents in American Foreign Relations* (1929), [p 33 Hunter] and Pratt’s *Secret and Urgent: The Story of Codes and Ciphers* (1939). *Ibid*, p 34.

⁵⁴⁰ This follows both Hunter, “The Evolution of Literature on United States Intelligence,” p 34 and Wheeler, “Guide to The Study of Intelligence: The Literature of Intelligence,”

⁵⁴¹ Wheeler, “Guide to The Study of Intelligence: The Literature of Intelligence,” p 7.

post-war period, 1949-69, the key writers are Kent, Wohlstetter and Dulles.⁵⁴² The second period, the 1970s, the "Intelligence Debate" marks the "rise of academic interest" characterized by Godson and the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, with the third period, from the 1980s and 90s seeing a "major upturn in academic work" and "matured" debate. In the 1990s the literature split in new directions, examining the Cold war, and questioning the role of intelligence.⁵⁴³

In the period before the Second World War, relatively few non-fiction works were produced. One of the earliest is Yardley's *The Black Chamber* in 1931. The book is primarily a history – an account of events – yet it is not only and precisely so. In Yardley's concluding account of a 'failed' gambit, after which the Secretary and State Department were informed of the Black Chamber's activities and removed all funding, Yardley opines that America, abandoning the "secret practices of the Black Chamber" must then try to find protection by demanding a "new treaty with the Great Powers that diplomatic messages remain inviolate. But would America be shrewd enough to make such a demand?" His suggestion is that America's current position on intelligence is untenable (implying that no power would respect such an agreement, thus America's own rejection should be reversed).⁵⁴⁴ This fragment of analysis of the American intelligence system –and Yardley's supposition that the Black Chamber assisted with American diplomatic success–suggests that Yardley's work is not solely historical.⁵⁴⁵ In reflecting on how American intelligence should be – in addition to how it was conducted – helped inaugurated a reflective literature, and the sensation caused by the book's publication ensured a continued appetite for 'popular' intelligence literature.

⁵⁴² Thomas Quiggin, *Seeing the Invisible: National security intelligence in an uncertain age* (World Scientific, 2007), p 70-71.

⁵⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴⁴ Yardley, *The American Black Chamber*, p 373.

⁵⁴⁵ Yardley, *The American Black Chamber* p 372-4.

Kent is clearly one of the fathers of the early intelligence literature.⁵⁴⁶ Wohlstetter's *Warning and Decision*, is also a universal classic, and is discussed further in chapter five and six.⁵⁴⁷ Wohlstetter's analysis of Pearl Harbor and intelligence reflected on the events preceding the war. For this reason, the text, while central to intelligence culture, is not apparently seen provide direct fodder for the debate (while her contribution remains important). Allan Dulles' book, *The Craft of Intelligence* is significantly later than these two (as are a few others, below) and is a melange; a mix of personal reflections and illustrations. Dulles was not solely responsible for writing it but the stories collected in the volume were Dulles' own anecdotes.⁵⁴⁸ One author even calls it American 'propaganda' ⁵⁴⁹ because it is a cheery display of the positive side of American intelligence services.⁵⁵⁰ Dulles' book served as an introduction to intelligence in early years of teaching but according to Koplowitz the book's appeal 'diminished' to scholars "as it predates the more revealing and dramatic outpourings of subsequent writers."⁵⁵¹

Aside from Kent, Wohlstetter and Dulles, probably the three most famous writers of the early period, a number of other authors began to contribute to the intelligence literature. Other writers contributed popular texts, or informative ones, that did not quite hold the title of a classic.⁵⁵² In an early issue of *Studies in Intelligence*⁵⁵³ Pforzheimer describes a "... selection of the most broadly informative books on intelligence available in English.... that should be part of the intelligence officer's basic equipment." In addition to Kent, these texts included Hilsman

⁵⁴⁶ *Studies in Intelligence* hails Kent (as do innumerable others) as the father of intelligence analysis (some go so far to say of modern intelligence) for his call for an intelligence literature and his famous piece, Sherman Kent, "The Need For an Intelligence Literature," *Studies in Intelligence* (1955), <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/sherman-kent-and-the-board-of-national-estimates-collected-essays/2need.html>

⁵⁴⁷ Its dating is slightly unusual since it was written and submitted for publishing earlier than its 1962 edition.

⁵⁴⁸ James Srodes' *Allen Dulles: Master of Spies* tells the story of his co-writer Howard Roman who "effectively rewrote" the *Craft of Intelligence* for readability. James Srodes, *Allen Dulles: Master of Spies* (Regnery Publishing, 2000), p 552.

⁵⁴⁹ Edwards, *Spione*, p 60.

⁵⁵⁰ Koplowitz, more aptly, calls it "unabashed." Koplowitz, *Teaching Intelligence*, p 46.

⁵⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵² Hunter lists a number of lesser works, including Goudsmit's *ALOUS* (1947), Glass and Davidson's *Intelligence is for Commanders* (1948) and Townsend's *Risks: The Key to Combat Intelligence* (1955) – as two tactical studies.

⁵⁵³ Walter Pforzheimer, "Public Texts In Intelligence," *Studies in Intelligence* 5 no 2.

(1956), Platt (1957), Ransom (1958), and a number of historical works.⁵⁵⁴ These texts all are significantly later than Kent's work. Not mentioned, Ladislav Farago's *War of Wits: The Anatomy of Intelligence*⁵⁵⁵ was popular at the time it was released and even ended up as a television show. Farago enjoyed popular notoriety but not the long-lasting professional acclaim Kent would receive;⁵⁵⁶ his less theoretical analytical approach means that his work was more widely read at the time but became more dated.⁵⁵⁷ Ultimately, these other early works were significant contributions to the study of intelligence, but were not so openly or dramatically opposed to each other as were Kent and Kendall.

Pettee & The Third Term in the Debate

Another very early writer (not mentioned in the *Studies* list),⁵⁵⁸ George Pettee was less well-known by the wider public but recognized professionally.⁵⁵⁹ Pettee was an instructor in government at Harvard, an economist, who served in the war in intelligence in the Office of War Information.⁵⁶⁰ He wrote his *The Future of American Secret Intelligence*, while teaching, in

⁵⁵⁴ These include: Don Whitehead, *The FBI Story: A Report to the People* (New York: Random House, 1956); Richard Rowan, *The Story of Secret Service* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran, 1937); John Bakeless, *Turncoats, Traitors and Heroes*. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1959); Philip Van Doren Stern, *Secret Missions Of The Civil War* (New York: Rand McNally, 1959); Stewart Alsop and Thomas Braden, *Sub Rosa: The O.S.S. and American Espionage* (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1946).

⁵⁵⁵ Ladislav Farago, *War of Wits: the anatomy of intelligence* (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1954).

⁵⁵⁶ Pforzheimer would write about the book; "The only comprehensive unclassified essay covering both the organization and procedures of world intelligence agencies ...Marred by theoretical crudities, factual inaccuracies, and uncritical journalism, it nevertheless is useful as a composite of the most important information on intelligence doctrine publicly available in 1954. Pforzheimer, "Public Texts In Intelligence."

⁵⁵⁷ For example, Farago wrote in his *Burn After Reading*, that he avoided drawing conclusions but the facts presented "may still supply certain pragmatic lessons" in his preface; Ladislav Farago, *Burn After Reading: The Espionage History of World War II* (Pinnacle Books, 1961). However, his *War of Wits* was more 'informational' and scrutinized intelligence and analysis.

⁵⁵⁸ Linebarger praises (in 1965) Pettee's "notable" but out of print book, *The Future of American Secret Intelligence*. Paul M. A. Linebarger, "The Macropolitics of Systemic Revolution: A Secret Ideology of Dr. George Pettee," *World Affairs* 127, no. 2 (July, August, September 1964): 94-99.

⁵⁵⁹ Hammond et al, in 2003 (based on library catalogues), in a perusal of the "earliest academic literature on U.S. intelligence agencies" takes it to be Pettee and Kent. Technically, these are the only two major theoretically inclined works to appear before the 1950s. Thomas H. Hammond, Kyle I. Jen and Ko Maeda, "Intelligence Organizations and the Organization Of Intelligence: What Library Catalogues Can Tell Us About 9/11," (presentation, Conference on Innovation, Institutions and Public Policy in a Global Context, International Political Science Association, Washington DC, May 22, 23, and 24th, 2003), p 17.

⁵⁶⁰ He also wrote, as Kent did, about his experiences there, publishing in 1943: George Pettee, and Lester G. Hawkins, "OWI—Organization and problems," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 7, no. 1 (1943): 15-33.

1946.⁵⁶¹ He worked in similar open source research, to Kent – and lectured on economic intelligence and planning.⁵⁶² Like Kendall, Pettee was not convinced by the power of ‘objective facts’ and better data– Olcott recounts that Pettee argued, as an instructor, regarding the persuasiveness of totalitarianism and that must be countered with guidance (a position taken by many Neoconservatives).⁵⁶³ Pettee felt prediction could be difficult; he recounted how common misperception and mis-estimation was in the war, that German war production was scaled back before Pearl Harbor because wartime warehouses were already full and the war’s end seemed to be in sight.⁵⁶⁴ Pettee believed better information could help America in the future. Pettee argued that research, the gathering of facts, is useless if conducted separately from the functions of policy.⁵⁶⁵ His book received favorable (and some mixed)⁵⁶⁶ reviews⁵⁶⁷ but not the widespread attention Kent garnered. The very early publishing of his book is significant, because Pettee was one of the few theoretical contributors before the 1950s. He is often taken to have a position largely Kendallian, although he was Kentian on certain points.

The Debate

The Kent-Kendall debate essentially ranges over the nature of intelligence, how intelligence can understand the world, whether it should act in the world, and how it can both know and be directed by decisionmakers. The Kent-Kendall debate points to the core differences

⁵⁶¹ Anthony Olcott, "Revisiting the Legacy: Sherman Kent, Willmoore Kendall, and George Pettee–Strategic Intelligence in the Digital Age," *Studies in Intelligence* 53, no. 2 (2009): 21-32, p 22.

⁵⁶² George S. Pettee, "Economic Intelligence," lecture delivered to Industrial College of the Armed Forces (Washington D.C., publication number L49-13331 May 1949).

⁵⁶³ Olcott, "Revisiting the Legacy," p 28.

⁵⁶⁴ Pettee, "Economic intelligence."

⁵⁶⁵ "The failure to define clearly the special province of ‘strategic’ or ‘national policy’ intelligence... meant in the past that the conduct of the work lacked all the attributes which only a clear sense of purpose can give" Pettee quoted in Olcott, "Revisiting the Legacy," p 28.

⁵⁶⁶ Norman M. Pearson, "The Future of American Secret Intelligence. by George S. Pettee: Review" *The Journal of Politics*, 9, no. 2 (May, 1947):291-293. p 293.

⁵⁶⁷ George S. Pettee, *Strategic Intelligence: The Future of American Secret Intelligence* (Infantry Journal Press, 1946).
Review by: Myron P. Gilmore, *Public Administration Review* 7, No. 2 (Spring, 1947): 129-131.

in American views of intelligence. It begins with Lippmann's 1922 proposal in the seminal book *Public Opinion* that investigators and executors should be separate.⁵⁶⁸ In intelligence, this was translated, by Sherman Kent, as the separation of intelligence from policy. Arguments still circle in the modern intelligence community over separation because it is a 'big' question - literally covering thousands of people and billions of interactions - and fixing it is a near impossibility.⁵⁶⁹ The question of analyst-policymaker distance determines how to ideally organize intelligence, but is at the same time also a disagreement over status, experience, and prestige.⁵⁷⁰ Behind it all is the question of how intelligence – qua information – becomes authorized knowledge.

Simultaneous to the surface organizational question (should HQ be in Langley or somewhere else), then, the Kent-Kendall debate is also about the way it is possible for intelligence and 'policy' to understand the world. Kent wrote explicitly on what information is out in the world – what intelligence can know – and his formulation has been a jumping off point for later revisions of this question of intelligence knowledge (in his unclassified studies in intelligence writings).⁵⁷¹ While Davis concludes that there was no debate⁵⁷² – which is true for the men personally – their differences in approach raise points that perennially recur in intelligence today. For example, the post-Iraq question of intelligence reform and the dangers of politicization are only the latest review of Kent-Kendall issues. Willmoore Kendall's writing is less explicit and voluminous, but he and a strong core of followers have adequately adumbrated

⁵⁶⁸ From Walter Lippmann's 1922 *Public Opinion*- Kent cites the passages that note the "staff which executes" should be as separate as possible from "the staff which investigates," as "parallel but quite distinct bodies of men," cited in OLCOTT/davis – in order to safeguard 'objective and impartial analysis'; Kent cited in Olcott, "Revisiting the Legacy."

⁵⁶⁹ There is a wide literature on separation and politicization.

⁵⁷⁰ Stephen Marrin, "At Arm's Length or at the Elbow?: Explaining the distance between analysts and decisionmakers," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 20, no. 3 (2007): 401-414.

⁵⁷¹ Kent's unclassified pieces in *Studies in Intelligence* include: "Allen Welsh Dulles," Spring 1969; "A Crucial Estimate Relived," Spring 1964; "The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962: Presenting the Photographic Evidence Aboard," Spring 1972; "Death of an Hypothesis," Spring 1965; "Estimates and Influence," Summer 1968; "Notes on Capabilities in National Intelligence" Fall 1955; "The Summit Conference of 1960: An Intelligence Officer's View," Spec. Ed. 1972; "Valediction," Winter 1968; "Words of Estimative Probability," Fall 1964; "The Yale Report," Summer 1973.

⁵⁷² Jack Davis, "The Kent-Kendall Debate of 1949," *Studies in Intelligence* 35 (1992): 37-49, p 96.

the opposing position.⁵⁷³ Together the Kentian and Kendellian models are the post-war basis for modern intelligence thought, in the intelligence community and in policymaking circles. The epistemological assumptions of their models remain little changed. More than we might imagine has (ontologically) *not* changed since Pearl Harbor, world-view sets lurking underneath policy questions and current issues. Illuminating the debate is critical to understanding modern American intelligence.

Sherman Kent

Sherman Kent was one of the influential pioneers in the study of intelligence and in the direction of the national system for estimation (including the NIE) in the US intelligence community. The so-called dean of American intelligence, Kent's work at the office of national estimates (ON/E) under the Director of Central Intelligence at CIA⁵⁷⁴ generated some of the early seminal pieces of intelligence literature. He developed a particular, passionately held view of intelligence, which he sought to shape intelligence toward. In many cases he did. He founded *Studies in Intelligence* in 1955, the CIA journal that he argued was necessary to create professional intelligence knowledge.⁵⁷⁵ Kent's work shaped much of the content and later the structure of estimative intelligence process in America, and set the tone for work in the intelligence community.⁵⁷⁶ His doctrine "had considerable currency in practice in the 1950s."⁵⁷⁷ Through his writing, speeches, personal papers, correspondence, and his 1949 *Strategic*

⁵⁷³ Notably, in Roger Hilsman, "Intelligence and Policymaking in Foreign Affairs," *World Politics* 5, no 1. (1952), 1-45.

⁵⁷⁴ This was the National Board of Estimates in place in the CIA during Kent's time, from *Sherman Kent and the Board of National Estimates: Collected Essays, Appendix*.

⁵⁷⁵ Ford, "A Tribute to Sherman Kent."

⁵⁷⁶ Central Intelligence Agency, "News and Information" A Look Back.

⁵⁷⁷ Davis, "The Kent-Kendall Debate of 1949," p 97.

Intelligence for American World Policy,⁵⁷⁸ we can reconstruct the elements of his view of the epistemological basis of intelligence. *Strategic Intelligence* was one of the earliest scholarly overviews of American intelligence, becoming immensely popular at a time when publishers believed publics lacked an appetite for non-fiction intelligence literature. Kent's writings relate primarily to the estimative type of intelligence he spent most of his career working on— but he did write on other subjects.⁵⁷⁹ For Kent it was the pinnacle of the process, but it also underlies the entire intelligence project. Moreover, his writings provide a general approach to intelligence. Kent's view of intelligence forms the basis that Kendall reacts against, so his position is presented first.

Kentian Knowledge

Kendall entitles Kent's philosophical ideal as the "ticker tape"⁵⁸⁰ view of history. He refers to Kendall's words about Kent: "The course of events is conceived ... as a tape all printed up inside a machine; and the job of intelligence is to tell the planners how it reads."⁵⁸¹ This image neatly captures the philosophy that history has but one course, and it is intelligence's job to follow and report it. Whatever the label,⁵⁸² the consequence of Kent's epistemological model of is that intelligence should pursue knowledge of the world objectively and separately from it. It carefully avoids tainting the ticker tape record of the universe. Thus intelligence's proper task is not action, but rather scientific elimination of bias towards collection of data. Kent's thinking in

⁵⁷⁸ Written in 1937 over 'one week's vacation in Florida' according to Kent himself— it took 5 years and 5 drafts to be published. Ford, "A Tribute to Sherman Kent."

⁵⁷⁹ For example, he wrote on French Voting Patterns and that paper and other various subjects are held at Yale.

⁵⁸⁰ Willmoore Kendall, "The Function of Intelligence," *World Politics* 1, no. 4 (July 1949).

⁵⁸¹ Kendall, "The Function of Intelligence," p 549.

⁵⁸² Olcott labels it a 'Platonic' worldview, referencing Plato's 'forms' in the Republic based on the idea of a single 'true' universal form of each thing; Olcott, "Revisiting the Legacy," p 22.

this line stemmed from his experience as a professor of history at Yale prior to his work in intelligence research during the Second World War.⁵⁸³ His background combined a respect for science, a historian's training, and wartime work with the "Research and Analysis Branch" card catalogues and the data files of intelligence, all shaping how Kent understood knowledge.⁵⁸⁴

Kent stressed the "physical accumulation of knowledge" in these card libraries: "They take in, as a result of their own and other peoples' efforts, the data of yesterday; they index and file it; they safeguard it; they dispense it to the people who are putting the data together in new patterns and deriving from it new approximations to truth."⁵⁸⁵ Berkowitz and Goodman noted Kent and Langer were 'largely responsible' for the development of this system of information accumulation and analysis in America.⁵⁸⁶

The Known World

The limits of what it is possible to know are the first boundary in defining what intelligence is. Knowledge is the first element of the Kentian approach to intelligence. In the epistemological question of the types of knowledge in the world, Sherman Kent believed that there were three types of things intelligence could attempt to know. Kent wrote that estimates include

three kinds of statements. The first [...] is the statement of indisputable fact ("The Soviets have a long-range heavy jet bomber, the Bison"). The second and third kinds do not carry any such certainty; each rests upon a varying degree of uncertainty. They relate

⁵⁸³ Kent had tenured teaching position at the university, and wrote "Writing History," which has been used to teach history at the college level; Sherman Kent, *Writing History* (New York, F.S. Crofts & Co, 1941).

⁵⁸⁴ Steury, "Introduction," p 9.

⁵⁸⁵ Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, p 106-107.

⁵⁸⁶ *Ibid*, p 11.

respectively (a) to things which are knowable but happen to be unknown to us, and (b) to things which are not known to anyone at all.⁵⁸⁷

The first item, facts, are (relatively) certain. The second item are those knowable but presently unknown things – secrets – which could be ascertained. Finally, the third item is “things which are not known to anyone at all” (sometimes called mysteries).⁵⁸⁸ These three elements of possible knowledge of the world represent levels of decreasing certainty, but Kent’s image of them was as the pyramid of information formed in an estimate. This helps us understand what they mean together for the possibility of intelligence knowledge. Kent believed that estimates are formed by a base of fairly solid facts on which a conjecture is formed. However, different conclusions may be built upon the same factual base. This is why different estimates are possible from the same facts.⁵⁸⁹ Contra his critics, Kent pointed out there are not so many solid facts as imagined in other fields (for example, the population of Mongolia might not be easy to verify).⁵⁹⁰ This pyramid describes for Kent the range of different types of information that can be attained from the world (for intelligence). In sum, these are the types of things intelligence can know, for Kent, and the varying difficulties in knowing them.

This third or “peak” level of the pyramid is key to understanding how the Kentian model of (predictive) knowledge works. Kent’s typology of three could be divided into the present and the future. The present includes facts (things we think we know fairly certainly, or have evidence of), as well as things that could be known securely but are not because they are secret or hidden because they have not yet been obtained. These are things that are known, and those that could be known, currently. More effort and information would allow the latter to be discovered

⁵⁸⁷ Kent, “A Crucial Estimate Relived.”

⁵⁸⁸ Kent, “A Crucial Estimate Relived.”

⁵⁸⁹ Joshua Rovner argues that in many Iraq estimates information from the 1980s was dug up and reinterpreted – the same facts, but with new assessments of what it meant. “Intelligence, Policy and the War in Iraq,” *Fixing The Facts*.

⁵⁹⁰ Kent, “A Crucial Estimate Relived.”

presently. Future knowledge is the cap of the estimative pyramid, those things that are “not known” (as opposed to unknown) to anyone.

What is critical here is that Kent is not dichotomizing the known and the unknown, or the knowable and unknowable. He is not making a binary division of the world. All things are potentially knowable. In the present they can be known with the addition of effort and research (and espionage or other collection). The other category of items, what I call future knowledge, is the most important. It tempting to think that it is qualitatively different from the other elements of Kent’s pyramid, that it is somehow greater. The peak of the pyramid of knowledge does represent a distinct type of information – but it is only temporally distant. It can be insecurely pieced together in the present to allow us some idea of the future, through an intelligence estimate. However, it is not fundamentally different. Elaborating on this, Kent noted,

The third kind of statement, in (b) above, represents an educated guess at something literally unknowable by any man alive. Characteristically it often deals in futures and with matters well beyond human control: Will Nkrumah be with us for the next two years? Five years? Or it deals with matters under human control but upon which no human decision has been taken: How many Blinders will the Soviets have five years hence?⁵⁹¹

Unknowable only at present, all of these are matters that will become clear, or will be explained somewhat by the historical record. We now know how long Nkrumah lasted. Archives furnish the record of past guesses of these mysteries against historical facts that can help us correlate the estimate. Defending two past NIE failures, based on the historical record, Kent argues that no better estimate could have been made.⁵⁹² These estimates had relied on what analysts thought was a good understanding of the past record of Soviet behaviour and so should have yielded a fairly accurate analysis. “In each case, the facts—mostly, the USSR’s past practices— were well

⁵⁹¹ Kent, "A Crucial Estimate Relived."

⁵⁹² *Ibid.*

known, and the estimate was made that the Soviets would probably continue to adhere to “*well-understood...past policy*.”⁵⁹³ Kent argues that no indicators showed any shift in policy and no one knew of any reason the Soviets would deviate from past history.

This idea that future unknowns can become facts once they have passed into history, I argue, must be understood as the basis of Kentian epistemology and ontology.⁵⁹⁴ It gives Kent’s views the “ticker tape” label, and it is how Kent believes the estimator predicts the future, using history as a base. While he was not under the illusion that the method was infallible, it made possible the estimative pyramid he envisioned. This Kentian approach is clearly conditioned by Kent’s time as a historian. “When asked, he always said he saw intelligence as he saw the study of history, which he believed was crucial to an understanding of the present and the future, and therefore, accurate empirical data was essential.”⁵⁹⁵ Nothing is ever permanently hidden from the analyst-cum-historian, because in time the clouds and fogs of the present day and future are slowly dispersed. In the long-duree there is not a separate category of things unknown in the future, merely things which are unknown yet. Once they are in the past, they will become the known and the knowable (or facts and mysteries). The transition is temporal. In the historian’s view this makes sense— it is not so much a matter of unknowable things like intentions (in the intentions vs. capabilities debate), because these things will be known to the historical record. In retrospect, intentions become clear (leaving aside unintended consequences). Intentions generally correspond to eventual behaviour and can be ‘known’ by analysts, when they come to understand an enemy or state’s motivations and actions in retrospect. These things cannot be

⁵⁹³ Kent, “Notes on Capabilities in National Intelligence.”

⁵⁹⁴ Taylor agrees that the Kentian school maintains a focus on *past* events. Taylor, “Terrorism and Intelligence,” p 165.

⁵⁹⁵ Alfred Rolington, “Objective Intelligence or Plausible Denial: An Open Source Review of Intelligence Method and Process Since 9/11,” in *Intelligence, Crises, and Security: Prospects and Retrospects*, ed. Len Scott, R. Gerald Hughes (Routledge, 2013) p 95.

known only at the present moment. However, in Kent's epistemology, there is no true unknown and no perpetual unknowable.⁵⁹⁶

Normal Behaviour

What actors are bound to appear in the Kentian world for objective intelligence to assess? Kent's view of what can be known has bundled implications for what actors exist in the world, how they (re)act, and how intelligence should be organized to understand them. Historical prediction is supposed to allow estimators to comprehend the actor objectively. It is distilled into the concept of the 'normal actor' for Kent.⁵⁹⁷ This demonstrates how the Kentian idea of knowledge dictates an ontology of a world of rational 'normal actors,' which then shapes how intelligence understands the world.

The operationalization of this normal actor/historical knowledge model into estimation based on past behaviour, is epitomized in Kent's defence of the Cuban NIE which preceded the Missile Crisis. In the illuminating "A Crucial Estimate Relived," Kent's account of the estimate process describes the assumptions for prediction from so-called normal behaviour. Kent says that the "other" will act "as diagnosed" because he is in his right mind; he cannot 'capriciously' make decisions (he is constrained by advisors); he is aware of forces in his country "the generally accepted notions of its broad national interests and objectives, and the broad lines of policy which are calculated to protect the one and forward the other" and he is well informed.⁵⁹⁸ Most great powers could be supposed to follow these limits, and thus would be generally estimable. Outside of these constraints, 'trouble begins,' and it is no longer possible to estimate without

⁵⁹⁶ Kent's *Strategic intelligence for American World Policy* is marked by the historian's caution, that some things may not be part of the record.

⁵⁹⁷ Kent, "A Crucial Estimate Relived."

⁵⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

evidence. “It is when the other man zigs violently out of the track of "normal" behavior that you are likely to lose him. If ... the zig is so far out of line as to seem to you to be suicidal, you will probably misestimate him every time.” Without normal actors, Kent’s estimative system – and by extension his ordered world – falls apart.⁵⁹⁹

The normal actor concept is the reason why Kent is dismissive of a kind of competitive analysis, called “red teaming” (where special groups try to think like the enemy).⁶⁰⁰ Kent writes that it gives no more access to enemy minds than any other intelligence process: “objectivity of judgment about the other man's probable behaviour is the crux of the intelligence business, to that extent is the importance of living the other man's life recognized and revered.”⁶⁰¹

Understanding the normal actor’s thought and behaviour is essential to Kent’s estimative process, thus enrobing in Soviet uniforms and reading Marx would seem to him a foppish dressing up of what the “estimating machine” normally accomplished. The historian’s method style approach to intelligence relies on experts who ‘normally’ reason like the enemy.⁶⁰² With the normal actor concept, historian’s method, and typology of knowledge together, an orrery begins to take shape of the possibilities of human knowledge. I have described the Kentian view of what can be known, why, and what actors populate Kent’s conceptual universe. Crucially, these assumptions about history and knowledge itself dictate a certain method, and what might be called a “posture” – that is, both a method and process for intelligence.

Process

⁵⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰¹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰² *Ibid.*

The Kentian model permits and requires certain methods. That is, his epistemology is tailored to a presumed ‘appropriate’ method to study the world. There is a very specific set of processes, encompassing prescribed methods, needed for the tricky business of Kentian estimation and intelligence. For Kent there are three process elements that run the estimative machine.⁶⁰³ They help transform information into intelligence. They are: method (scientific); mind (mental capacity or excellence); and professional knowledge (tradecraft) and practitioner expertise.⁶⁰⁴ The first, an adapted scientific method drawn from the social sciences, determines the appropriate way to weigh evidence and hypotheses. Kentian intelligence does not function well without any one of these elements. They should be seen not strictly as a methodological guide for intelligence. They are more akin to Thomas Hobbes’ concept of knowledge of the future by way of prudence. Prudence is the sum of one part inborn faculties, one part pattern recognition, and one part experience.⁶⁰⁵ I discuss these elements in turn in the following sections.

*Scientific Method*⁶⁰⁶

The Kentian approach relies on the scientific method as the basis for the estimating machine. Raw information becomes available knowledge only when using the scientific method to gather data and reason to read the record of facts to predict the future. Epistemologically, the version of scientific method used in the social sciences assumes a set of ideas about the proper

⁶⁰³ Kent calls it the ‘estimating machine,’ it is not mechanistic as such. *Ibid*.

⁶⁰⁴ This is a composite drawn from all Kent’s writing, in Strategic Intelligence, Crucial Estimate Relived, and pieces unclassified from studies in intelligence (listed in footnote 69 in this chapter).

⁶⁰⁵ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Section “III: Of the Consequence or Train of Imaginations.”

⁶⁰⁶ Rolington makes an interesting point that the UK’s Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction uses a quote from Clausewitz on the contradictory nature of intelligence and that the “law of probability” should be our guide - “in order to persuade the reader that intelligence is certainly not a science and that much of its value is questionable and that we perhaps should not blame politicians for acting on what turns out to be bad intelligence.” Alfred Rolington, “Global Intelligence for an Asymmetric Threat,” *Eeas.europa*, [http://eeas.europa.eu/ifs/publications/articles/book1/book%20vol1_part5_chapter32_global%20intelligence%20for%20an%20asymmetric%20thr](http://eeas.europa.eu/ifs/publications/articles/book1/book%20vol1_part5_chapter32_global%20intelligence%20for%20an%20asymmetric%20threat_alfred%20rolington.pdf) eat_alfred%20rolington.pdf p 332. Clearly the appeal to science and the charge against it is still an important basis for the authority of intelligence.

discovery of knowledge regarding the natural world are applicable to the social body. According to intelligence scholar Stephen Marrin, two fields have often justified the application of the scientific method to society: astronomy and medicine. The movements of celestial bodies and the course of disease in human bodies can be predicted. The analogy of these bodies to the social one implies human events are predictable with similar methods: “[T]he similarities in processes used to analyze and interpret data are striking. Practitioners in both fields use approximations of the scientific method – observation, hypothesis, experimentation, and conclusion – as a means to organize and interpret the information they have collected.”⁶⁰⁷ These beliefs allow the scientific method to be the foundation of the Kentian intelligence process.

Those universal elements of the scientific method are, generally, characterizations (observations, definitions, and measurements), hypotheses, predictions, and experiments.⁶⁰⁸ Additionally, the method implies a much broader bundle of epistemological commitments. Femia describes the social science version’s five major interlocking assumptions. The first is an independent reality that “can be described in a value-neutral, scientific language”; second, this is a world of “causal relations that exists independently of human subjectivity”; third, “such a language provides the basis for the prediction and control of human or natural behaviour”; fourth, truth can be tested by correspondence to experience; and fifth, social beings can be “treated as an ‘object’ in the natural world.”⁶⁰⁹ For intelligence, implied in the commitment to act as if the world were a scientific object, analysts must remain free from bias, must avoid interference in their object, and must objectively weigh the evidence of observation, as scientists do from experimental results. The command of science is that the knower must attempt to remain

⁶⁰⁷ Stephen Marrin, "Intelligence Analysis: Turning a craft into a profession," *International Conference on Intelligence Analysis* (2005): 2-4, p 1.

⁶⁰⁸ Robert H. Jackson, Robert Jackson, Georg Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p 44.

⁶⁰⁹ Emphasis mine. Femia, Joseph. "Gramsci, epistemology and International Relations Theory," in *Gramsci and Global Politics: Hegemony and Resistance* eds Mark McNally, John Schwarzmantel (Routledge, 2009), p 33.

separate from that which is being studied. This dictates much of how intelligence must be organized. Kent's estimating machine begins by creating hypotheses, then seeing which are supported by evidence.⁶¹⁰ However, present analytic methods, no matter how different the particular steps and sophistication, can still be scientific in type. In application to the more current intelligence methods (such as linchpin analysis, drilling uncertainty, or sensemaking), regardless of where they lie in terms of an emphasis on science –if they assume objectivity and separation, they fall in the Kentian model.⁶¹¹

Kent believed that the methods of science were the best and only methods Western civilization knew to create understanding: “[T]he method in question is the one which students reared in the Western tradition have found to be best adapted to the search for truth. It is the classical method of the natural sciences, retooled to serve the far less exact disciplines of the so-called science of human activity.” There is no alternative: “This is our method; we are stuck with it, unless we choose to forsake it for the ‘programmer’ and his computer or go back to the medicine man and his mystical communion with the All-Wise.”⁶¹² This was his defense against the charge that the failure of the Cuba NIE called for an overhaul of intelligence ‘method.’ Kent demurred. The error was one of judgment, not method.⁶¹³ He resisted the challenge to the basis of his ‘estimating machine,’ the scientific method, which permits prediction. Rolington reminds us that all methods of intelligence “are traditionally locked into a national culture” and of course that methods vary depending on who has commissioned and carried out the collection and

⁶¹⁰ Intriguingly, the importance of the scientific method, for Kent and Kentians, is constructed through its trans historical universality. Kent, even in his own writings as part of his project to systematize the process of collection of intelligence knowledge failed to question the development of the scientific method, and was often terse in describing its actual application. In some ways a shibboleth for the academic and historian's view of knowledge and evidence, the scientific method had to remain unexamined because its foundations relied on the very assumption that it was understood by all through the application of reason. Thus while Fermia's definition may not chart a Kentian's understanding of the method perfectly, the insistence on a separate reality, causal relations, and prediction seem to correspond reasonably well to the unsophisticated view of Kent in the early years.

⁶¹¹ Stéphane Lefebvre's description of current intelligence analysis process is very much similar to Kent's; Stéphane Lefebvre, 'A Look at Intelligence Analysis', *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 17, no. 2 (2004): 231 — 264, p 236.

⁶¹² Kent, "A Crucial Estimate Relived."

⁶¹³ Kent, "A Crucial Estimate Relived."

analysis of intelligence.⁶¹⁴ In the Kentian model these national differences are erased through the universal nature of thought and reason – which is of course, itself cultural.

The Mind

The second element of the Kentian intelligence process is the mental capacity of the analyst -or in Kent's words, a good mind. "By definition, estimating is an excursion out beyond established fact into the unknown- a venture in which the estimator gets such aid and comfort as he can from analogy, extrapolation, logic, and judgment."⁶¹⁵ The importance of this element is that, as practitioners emphasize, good analysis and estimation in some ways cannot be taught. Estimation and analysis are not solely method driven. If intelligence could be gleaned from just the addition of facts together, a computer could be programmed to do it. Pettee wrote of the 'wrongheaded idea' of plugging variables into an equation.⁶¹⁶ For decades, intelligence practitioners have emphasized the need to hire the right people.⁶¹⁷ They must have the right mindsets, and top intellectual abilities. Mental capacity is partly innate, and partly from accumulated experience.

A strong mind is the foundation of reasoning, and hence of estimative judgment in the Kentian scientific method. This second part of the intelligence process belies the supposed Kentian obsession with facts and numbers. Although intelligence uses a version of the scientific method, it is an art, not simply a science. It is the mental process that makes intelligence. Johnston writes, "The quality of any tradecraft depends on the innate cognitive capabilities of the

⁶¹⁴ Rolington, "Global Intelligence for an Asymmetric Threat," p 332.

⁶¹⁵ Kent, "A Crucial Estimate Relived."

⁶¹⁶ Pettee, "Economic intelligence."

⁶¹⁷ Kendall, "The Function of Intelligence," p 552.

individual....”⁶¹⁸ Kendall did not disagree here –but this element can be overlooked in Kent’s thought, and it remains critical to his approach to intelligence. Kent advocated not only science but also individual knowledge and brainpower – estimating may be part of a machine, but it requires the highest form of human reason. The ineffable ‘yeast’ from which hypotheses grow, for Kent, reflects the mental power needed for intelligence work.⁶¹⁹ Even as the young intelligence community emerged from the war, the psychological foibles of the well intentioned were obvious. Kent was famously quoted as saying, “When an intelligence staff has been screened through [too fine a mesh], its members will be as alike as tiles on a bathroom floor — and about as capable of meaningful and original thought.”⁶²⁰ In all the technology that intelligence accumulates toward understanding the world, the mind is still part of the intelligence process.

Professional Knowledge

Bernard Brodie lectured at the naval war college in 1947 on how Americans should “systematize their thinking” so as to “perpetuate [their] reflections in a professional literature.”⁶²¹ Kent lamented the identical lack of an American intelligence literature. The third process additive to intelligence is this professional knowledge or expertise. It forms a triumvirate with science and the mind, because the sciences dictate that knowledge must be cumulative. Scientists do not have to start each inquiry by verifying every accepted tenet of the field. Work begins where others left off; otherwise the aim of the accumulation of knowledge is thwarted. “Where

⁶¹⁸ Johnston, *Analytic Culture in the US Intelligence Community*, p 20.

⁶¹⁹ Kent, “A Crucial Estimate Relived.”

⁶²⁰ Jack Davis, “Sherman Kent and the Profession of Intelligence Analysis,” *Studies in Intelligence Occasional Papers* 1, no. 5 (Nov. ’02).

⁶²¹ Sherman Kent, “Valediction.”

would we be if each new conscript to medicine had to start from scratch with no more to guide him than the advice of fellow doctors and his own experience?”⁶²² Kent asked. For him intelligence knowledge is the product of a profession. A profession replicates for intelligence the knowledge structure of the academic discipline: “...like most professions it has taken on the aspects of a discipline: it has developed a recognized methodology; it has developed a vocabulary; it has developed a body of theory and doctrine; it has elaborate and refined techniques.”⁶²³ This is important because as a scholar, Kent wanted to import traditions of good scholarship and research. Similar to the discipline, a profession develops and passes on its own knowledge, identifies members, and records advances in knowledge.⁶²⁴ It creates commonly understood, if debated, concepts.⁶²⁵ If the analyst cannot quite claim the expertise of a subject area academic, professionalized knowledge adds the security of epistemological clarity, certainty of terms, shared understandings, and specializations. The individual skill and the mind of the analyst estimator is buttressed by the knowledge and experience of thousands of others. This is what Kent wanted from his call for professional intelligence literature. The discipline-like structure of professional knowledge provides the final component of the estimating machine and its process of turning information into knowledge.⁶²⁶ The accumulation of knowledge by an intelligence profession also allows more perfect prediction, because it gathers known facts/techniques/laws to be built on towards greater understanding.⁶²⁷

⁶²² Sherman Kent, “The Need For an Intelligence Literature,” p 36/37.

⁶²³ *Ibid*, p 36.

⁶²⁴ George and Bruce cite MacEachin’s phrase that “intelligence is a profession of cognition”: Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce, “Introduction: Intelligence Analysis- The Emergence of A Discipline,” in *Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations*, eds. Roger Z. George, James B. Bruce (Georgetown University Press, 2008), p 1.

⁶²⁵ Uri Bar Joseph, *Intelligence Intervention in the Politics of Democratic States: The United States, Israel and Britain* (Pennsylvania, Penn State Press, 1995) p 54 – p 57.

⁶²⁶ Kent discussed the similarities between intelligence and a newspaper or university: Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, p 74–5.

⁶²⁷ The Kentian ideal of prediction is alive in the American intelligence system, Beth A. Williams, “Fixing Intelligence and Achieving Omniscience,” (US Army War College Thesis, 11 March 2010).

These three elements of Kent's estimating machine – method, mind, and professional knowledge –also all function as authorization for Kent's idea of intelligence (and how it should be organized). The authority of science, the faith in logic and universalized Western reason in the highly developed mind, and finally the imposing weight of academic style professional knowledge, are the magic that makes information into fact, fact into knowledge, and knowledge into intelligence. Our shared belief in their correctness, their power, and status creates this authority, which has made Kent's model of intelligence knowledge strong. For this reason Kendallians must often assail Kent's position before asserting their own alternate model of knowledge. In sum, the Kentian view relies on a complex epistemological and ontological package of methods that processes raw information into intelligence. It requires certain defined assumptions, and together these all define the limits of what can be known – and how it can be known –to intelligence. Consequently, the whole manufactures an answer to what intelligence is.

Kendall & the Kendallian Model

Wilmoore Kendall was an academic for much of his life. A correspondent of Leo Strauss, he co-founded the *National Review*– a conservative intellectual magazine – with William F. Buckley. Like Kent, Kendall spent the war years in intelligence and taught at Yale.⁶²⁸ His followers have lamented the lesser impact of his ideas on intelligence, and his critique of Kent would be his only piece directly bearing on subject.⁶²⁹ Kendall is important in the Kent-Kendall debate because (out of his similar wartime intelligence experience) he developed opposing ideas to challenge the Kentian mainstream. Moreover, as a respected Conservative intellectual, he

⁶²⁸ Wilmoore Kendall (written correspondence), *Willmoore Kendall: Maverick of American Conservatives*, eds. John A. Murley, John E. Alvis (Lexington Books, 2002), p 206.

⁶²⁹ His only piece was his Kendall, "The Function of Intelligence."

represents the ideological reverse of Kentian Liberalism. Wilmoore Kendall has become a signal figure for a line of supporters throughout the scholarly and professional intelligence communities, who reject Kent's most basic assumptions.⁶³⁰ Kendallians include many Wohlstetterians, Straussians and Neoconservatives.⁶³¹ Even the powerful and elite – for example, Paul Wolfowitz – believe in Kendall's approach. These men and women have impacted national security policies at the highest level. For example, during the Cold War they argued that intelligence indicated a hostile Soviet Union, discrediting détente.⁶³²

Kendall's positions create a conceptual universe that, like Kent's, is woven from an indivisible set of assumptions. They dictate what sort of actors intelligence will confront in the world, how intelligence should view knowledge, and what intelligence's definition and mission are. The separation of intelligence from policy is a highly visible and contentious point in the debate for Kendallians: "Kendall's major salvos against Kent concern 'the relation of intelligence to policy.'"⁶³³ For Kentians, closeness can be tantamount to politicization;⁶³⁴ for Kendall, it is understood in the wider political context. Kendallians believed enforced separation betrayed only a recalcitrance of some intelligence agencies to 'follow the policy line' of administrations. It was exacerbated by the perception that objectivity was special pleading on behalf of agencies that did not want to be told what to do. The CIA was thought to be an overly 'liberal' institution that did not or could not understand the Soviet threat. It seemed to use distance to pursue its own agenda.⁶³⁵ "As the analytic cadre at the CIA became more substantively specialized and bureaucratic [...] it also became more introverted and self-

⁶³⁰ These include Roy Godson, the students of Albert Wohlstetter including Paul Wolfowitz, and others.

⁶³¹ A good example is the writings in Godson's *Intelligence Requirements* series, as well as selected articles in studies in intelligence and other monographs at CIA; Godson ed. *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s*, and Godson ed. *Intelligence requirements for the 1990s*.

⁶³² Cahn, *Killing Détente*.

⁶³³ Davis, "The Kent-Kendall Debate of 1949," p 95.

⁶³⁴ Betts, *Enemies of Intelligence*, p 76.

⁶³⁵ There are also cultural differences in the legacy of the overweening power of the military and its intelligence systems, views of threats, not overcome in the *National Security Act* of 1947 that created the CIA – see for example, Davies on differences between civilian and military intelligence, in Davies, "Divergent National Concepts and Institutions."

satisfied.”⁶³⁶ Again, the intractable question of the subordination of intelligence and policy hides a deeper and wider disagreement about knowledge, the world, and intelligence’s claims to ‘truth.’

Wartime Precedent

Kendallians interrogated the historical experience of the Nazi and Soviet threat to make their case. They assaulted Kent’s premises in arguing that the world is not as it was during the war. The wartime experience (and British guidance) had a substantial impact on the development of American intelligence, shaping the modern intelligence community. Most men “learned the intelligence business during the war” and gleaned their ‘intellectual habits’ ineluctably from this period.⁶³⁷ Kent’s experience of intelligence was in the research cadres, racing to figure out beach landing spots at a moment’s notice for surprise invasions during the war. Physical intelligence was what was needed.⁶³⁸ In Pettee’s apt phrase, they were “peeling facts off the face of the unknown.”⁶³⁹ Kendall believed that the new intelligence services should empathetically not replicate these intelligence processes from the war. He wrote that a Kentian ‘state of mind’ is “dangerously [...] dominated by an essentially wartime conception of the intelligence function.” Kendallians argued that America did not need intelligence centred on research bureaus and observation. More specifically, the research function that supported war actions should not continue to dominate because the battlefield troop movements and resistances to coordinate were gone. Therefore, the battle against the Soviets would not be won by piling up facts: “Kendall

⁶³⁶ Davis, “The Kent-Kendall Debate of 1949,” p 98.

⁶³⁷ Willmoore Kendall, “The Function of Intelligence,” p 548.

⁶³⁸ At least a portion of the research was on economic production (see Pettee’s lectures) and consumption, as well as conditions of terrain, and the like.

⁶³⁹ Pettee, “Economic intelligence.”

[...] saw the enemy not as one to be proven to be in factual error.”⁶⁴⁰ The view of intelligence as a passive attempt to understand a single course of history through the record of facts is seen as ill-conceived. If the enemy does not restrict themselves to science and research, there is no victory in limiting oneself.

In the Kendallian approach, intelligence is not needed as the leader in knowledge creation and prediction (as it was in the war)⁶⁴¹ for two reasons. The first, as discussed, is that superior knowledge is not the best weapon against threats internationally. The second reason is that it remains apparent who and what the threat to America is. For the post-war the threat – the Soviet and communist menace– Kendall’s approach posits a clear understanding of their aggressive intentions of international expansion. Intentions are not a mystery.⁶⁴²

The second lesson drawn from the American experience with the Axis powers was that evil should have been recognized.⁶⁴³ The belief was that Hitler was ignored; the Japanese attack, a surprise. If the threat of Japan and the expansionist aims of Hitler had not been ignored or appeased, Americans might not have been embroiled in the war.⁶⁴⁴ Had statesmen recognized the directions of the threats beforehand and acted, American lives would not have been lost. This presentism of course disregards the state of diplomatic relations with Japan, the strong domestic (immigrant) resistance to war, and isolationists. Hindsight bias is powerful in human psychology. It is much easier to piece together a threat, in retrospect; psychologists show that once brain

⁶⁴⁰ Olcott, "Revisiting the Legacy," p 32.

⁶⁴¹ Kendall decried the “compulsive preoccupation” with prediction and linked it to an obsession with eliminating surprise from international relations. Kendall, "The Function of Intelligence," p 549.

⁶⁴² Kennan’s famous long telegram is a good example of the question of Soviet aspirations. X [George Kennan], “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” *Foreign Affairs* 25 (July 1947): 566-82.

⁶⁴³ Gary J. Schmitt and Abram N. Shulsky, "Leo Strauss and the World of Intelligence (by which we do not mean nous)," *Leo Strauss, the Straussians, and the American Regime* (1999): 407-12.

⁶⁴⁴ Franklin D Roosevelt, Fireside Chat 142, (December 24 1943), <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/>

‘knows’ what happens, our minds cannot un-see a pattern.⁶⁴⁵ This makes it hard to truly assess the difficulty in identifying past threats, sifting signals from noise.

The Munich analogy encapsulates the intelligence lesson of hindsight. The present is often understood through analogy to such historical cases.⁶⁴⁶ The appeasement analogy suggests that all threats are potential Munichs. To make concession is to be seen as weak by the enemy, and will only feed their expansionism. This is why America always had to ‘stay strong’ against the communists, to never show weakness. ‘Munich’ strongly buttressed the domino analogy.⁶⁴⁷ The shock of Pearl Harbor punished America for its complacency– it taught that (unclear) intentions must never be assumed to be peaceful. Aggression must be the default. From these two cases, the Kendall model assumed a deductive logic based on the lessons of these threats. Deduction, not inductive scientific knowledge, is the clear basis for Kendallian intelligence to know the world. As we saw previously in the Kantian model, actors’ behaviour is predictable because of the historical record. Kendall’s model allows foreknowledge on a different kind of pre-existing understanding. It uses the lessons of history (or historical analogy) to argue that motives and intentions are clear. Instead of a Hobbesian world, where every fact must be witnessed because of the uncertainty of knowledge,⁶⁴⁸ Kendall’s world has profound epistemological certainty once a threat is identified.

Induction/Deduction

⁶⁴⁵ Heuer, Jr. *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, Chapter 13 “Hindsight Biases in Evaluation of Intelligence Reporting,” and Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford University Press, 1962) p 387.

⁶⁴⁶ Robert J Beck, “Munich’s Lessons Reconsidered,” *International Security* 14, no. 2 (Autumn 1989).

⁶⁴⁷ Jeffrey Record, *The Wrong War: why we lost in Vietnam* (Naval Institute Press, 1998), p 18-19.

⁶⁴⁸ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Chapter Five “Of Reason and Science.”

Kent's inductive logic required that intelligence marshal evidence to demonstrate a hypothesis. Kendall attacked this method as being "crassly empirical."⁶⁴⁹ He charged Kent with amassing data beyond what was strictly necessary for prediction. Kendallians argue that Kent regarded the volume of documents as proof, rather than selectively valuing sources. "The performance of the intelligence function accordingly becomes a matter of [...] a tidal wave of documents, whose factual content must be 'processed' [...] and exploited as raw material for 'hypotheses.'"⁶⁵⁰ The underlying claim is that Kent ignored the truth of situations – that is the nature of the enemy – which could have been determined without empirical confirmation. Kendallians argue that not all propositions need to be proved; some can be assumed. For Kendall, the epistemological stance of objectivity is not required to produce intelligence knowledge. Kendall emphasized that Kent's scurrying data clerks were not doing what could be truly called intelligence, for it was not the higher level of unencumbered mental work of pure theoretical thought.⁶⁵¹ In the Straussian sense, a Kendallian certainty may proceed from an understanding of regime type, and an understanding of human nature.⁶⁵²

Replacing the complicated thunderings and epistemological processes of Kent's estimating machine, Kendall's model of intelligence begins with deductive logic. Hollister Hedley posits that day-to-day intelligence combines induction, deduction, and inference.⁶⁵³ This is true, and it highlights how different the *ideal types* of the Kentian and Kendallian approaches are. Kendallians still assess reports, but evidence is evaluated within the context of the understanding of the aggressiveness of the threat. A deductive logic is possible because the

⁶⁴⁹ Kendall, "The Function of Intelligence," p 551.

⁶⁵⁰ Kendall, "The Function of Intelligence," p 550.

⁶⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵² Thomas L. Pangle, *Leo Strauss: An introduction to his thought and intellectual legacy* (JHU Press, 2006), p 95

⁶⁵³ John Hollister Hedley, "Learning from Intelligence Failures," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 18, no. 3 (2005): 435-450, p 446.

threats (at one time the Soviets, later rogue states, and now terrorism) are clear and evident to policymakers. They do not need to be predicted by gathering up tables of evidence.

This discernment phase of intelligence –determining what to collect data on and establish the base facts– is now predetermined. Intelligence tasking by policymakers “starts” the intelligence cycle, and is targeted to the recognized threat. The policymaker drives the cycle forward.⁶⁵⁴ The isolation of the analyst, in order to remain unbiased or objective, is therefore unnecessary. There is also no need to be concerned with accumulating professional knowledge, except insofar as it supports policy. Professionalization is a negative development because it furthers the separation from policy, assumes the separate accumulation of knowledge, and authorizes the experience of the analyst. Kentian professionalism, autonomy, and objectivity all imply a superiority to the wisdom and knowledge of the policymaker. Kendall felt the reality was the reverse; policy should always be superior to intelligence.⁶⁵⁵ Kendallian thought sees intelligence instead as the “shield of the republic”⁶⁵⁶ which policymakers in their wisdom, should direct. The Kendallian universe centres on the policymaker as the director of national security, the vanguard in the direction of an American national interest. This figure looms over intelligence, promising a more “Realist,” and realistic, outlook on the world, in contradistinction to Kent.⁶⁵⁷ Interestingly, in this approach it is policymakers who are objective. Paul Wolfowitz takes offense from the claim of analyst objectivity and policymaker bias.⁶⁵⁸ Objectivity is positioned as a quality of a policymaker’s perspective/vision of the world (stemming from

⁶⁵⁴ In “The direction phase” Strachan-Morris suggests that while the intelligence cycle is classically seen to begin with direction, (or tasking), that Hulnick says guidance often comes from managers, not policymakers themselves, and Marrin’s point that is that information is ‘pushed’ up from agencies instead of always being pulled. David Strachan-Morris, “The Intelligence Cycle in the Corporate World: Bespoke or off-the-shelf?” in *Understanding the Intelligence Cycle* ed. Mark Phythian (Routledge, 2013).

⁶⁵⁵ Kendall, “The Function of Intelligence.”

⁶⁵⁶ This is Lipmann’s phrase – Kent also elaborated on it that it was intelligence’s task to get it to the right place. Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, p viii.

⁶⁵⁷ Ekpe characterizes Kendall as a Realist, (opposed to a more ‘liberal’ conception of international relations, in the terms of IR theory. Bassey Ekpe, *The United Nations and the Rationale for Collective Intelligence* (Cambria Press, 2009) p 122/123.

⁶⁵⁸ Jack Davis, *Paul Wolfowitz on Intelligence Policy-Relations* (CIA, Center For the Study of Intelligence, 1996).

classical Realism's "six principles"). It becomes a product of experience, not method. The analyst then is no longer primary in the intelligence process. Knowledge of the future does not begin with the analyst but with the awareness of policymakers.

Deductive Failure

Kent and his estimators did weigh certain sources as more reliable (as present intelligence services do). They also assume some facts not in evidence. After all, judgment, extending out beyond the vista of facts, is the essence of Kentian estimation. Thus, the Kentian model is not strictly guilty of an overbearing empiricism. The real problem is Kent's inductive logic. Data must be accumulated beyond all doubt because Kent's method requires that estimators keep an open mind. "Everyone knows the virtues of open-mindedness; no one boasts imperviousness to new thought."⁶⁵⁹ Assumptions might prematurely close off valid hypotheses.⁶⁶⁰ Evidence is not deductively directed, so Kent's practitioners must assume all courses of action are possible, even if implausible, until they sort out the support for each hypothesis. This type of method is better suited to catch the unlikely and irregular or rare events that might surprise a deductive estimator. The Cuban estimate offers some proof. Kent claims that he and his fellow estimators considered all possible Soviet activities. While they judged there was not significant evidence at the time to prove offensive basing, (and without the U2 photos, this may have been correct), nuclear missiles were one of a number of possible hypotheses considered.⁶⁶¹ By contrast, in Kendall's method the Soviet intention to use Cuba to threaten America should never have been doubted. The estimating team would not have taken the unclear or contradictory observer reports as

⁶⁵⁹ Kent, "A Crucial Estimate Relived."

⁶⁶⁰ Kent, "A Crucial Estimate Relived."

⁶⁶¹ *Ibid.*

lightly, and might have predicted offensive basing by the Soviets prior to any U2 photo confirmation. Inductively directed intelligence had to ‘re-prove’ the proposition of Soviet intentions in each case.

Deceptive Evidence

Secrecy is another key assumption in the Kendallian universe.⁶⁶² The secrecy problem is paramount.⁶⁶³ A debated element in the definition of intelligence is whether secrecy is characteristic of intelligence, and distinguishes it from all other types of public and private information. In Kent’s approach “secre[cy] is not an inherent part of intelligence...”,⁶⁶⁴ open information is more trustworthy. Indeed, Kent assumes objective perception and the ability to understand actors (and scientific methods). This naïve view of the social world prevalent in the 1940s and 50s disregards the difficulties of deception. His epistemology does not deal well with deceitful information, which might taint both the ‘facts’ of the present and the record of the past. Moreover, intelligence was supposed to elide the deception problematic by uncovering information on the motivation of actors. To some extent, the eventual record of history will attest to intentions, even if they are initially camouflaged. Deception must be assumed to play only a small role, or be overcome by a deep understanding of the actors, and the ultimate accumulation of information. Kent’s Cuba defence illustrates this, where a preference for secret reports over open information may have overridden the (presumably objective) Soviet man on the ground, the

⁶⁶² This clearly is relevant to the definition of intelligence, discussed in the next chapter. It bears on whether secrecy is the ‘essential’ ingredient of intelligence. For the contrary view, that intelligence is no longer about the secret see Arthur S. Hulnick, “Openness: Being Public about Secret Intelligence,” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 12, no. 4 (1999), pp.463-483; and Thomas Patrick Carroll, “The Case Against Intelligence Openness,” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 14, no. 4 (2001), pp.559-574.

⁶⁶³ Shulsky and Schmitt, *Silent Warfare*, p 190-2.

⁶⁶⁴ Shulsky and Schmitt, *Silent Warfare*, p 192

ambassador.⁶⁶⁵ Secrecy was therefore a damaging and even deadly factor in international relations. Kent does not ignore secrecy and deception, but open source information is a balm to his scientific intelligence methods.

Secrecy and deception are also close brothers. In Kendall's approach deception is always assumed; no intelligence service should ever imagine that competing services are not trying to withhold information or create false perceptions. The Soviet iron control on information was the Kendallian referent. This is why Kendallians downgrade the pursuit of endless evidence: deception is omnipresent. "Once we understand that intelligence is part of a struggle between two countries we see [...] not only is it important to limit or distort what one's adversary can learn about one, but one cannot even be sure what one knows about the adversary."⁶⁶⁶ Trying to estimate the world objectively is thus foolhardy. It is never possible to ensure information is wholly accurate, and it may be planted from within or without. The Cold War decades of moles and infiltration taught American practitioners this lesson. A nation as important as America cannot simply opt out of the counterintelligence struggle.⁶⁶⁷ Kendall's disciples assume that each side attempts to protect and deny the enemy their own most sensitive information, while deceiving and decoying and conversely, attempting seize the information the other side is hiding. Evidence can only be viewed with suspicion and interpreted in the context of a known threat. The problem of deception erodes Kent's system of scientific method furnishing unbiased evidence.

Actionable Intelligence

⁶⁶⁵ Kent, "A Crucial Estimate Relived."

⁶⁶⁶ Shulsky and Schmitt, *Silent Warfare*, p 193.

⁶⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

Clear threats, deductive logic, policymaker guidance: The Kendallian model combines this epistemological and ontological triumvirate to form a different definition of what intelligence is and should be one that is both descriptive and prescriptive. Functionally, the model redefines intelligence because intelligence's basic activities are seen to be different. Typically, intelligence encompasses a binary combination of active and passive elements, exemplified in the CIA's classic operations/intelligence directorate (DO/DI) division. The Kendallian definition is firmly centred on activity. William Colby famously stated that the "true function of intelligence is to help make decisions to bring about a better future and avoid the dangers that an intelligence projection might present –to change rather than merely to know the future."⁶⁶⁸ In the sub-sections below, I highlight three key elements of the Kendallian definition of intelligence: first, intelligence is and should be the fight against other powers, as the world is constantly embroiled in a 'war' fought by intelligence.; second, intelligence's mission is active intervention in this war; and finally, this active mission is pursued through the central activities of covert action, espionage, and counter-intelligence.

I: War of All

As Thomas Hobbes believed the scholastics (and classical Aristotelian philosophy) failed to describe the universe, so too critics believe that Kendall more accurately sketches the world faced by intelligence. The portrait is dark. Kendall's 'active' approach is required by the character of a world under siege and the relentless threats in it. America is permanently at risk and isolationism will never head off the Pearl Harbors of the future. This means the undeclared

⁶⁶⁸ William Colby, "Deception and Surprise: Problems of Analysts and Analysis," in *Intelligence Policy and National Security*, eds. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Uri Ra'anan, and Warren Milberg (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1981) p 94. Colby also stressed that intelligence knowledge must, as in science, insist on "constant improvements in the scope and provision of our intelligence knowledge."

warfare of espionage is not a transitory, irregular or unusual pursuit. Hence the title of Kendall acolytes Shulsky and Schmitt's classic text *Silent Warfare*.⁶⁶⁹ It is a war of all against all, with no quarter given. This is a departure from the American tradition of a sharp demarcation between periods of war and peace.⁶⁷⁰ That Jacksonian idea combined with isolationism, gave rise to the American strategic culture that views the normal condition of relations as peaceful. Wars are assumed to be infrequent, rarely or never touching home soil. Kendall's heirs still argue that this foundational version of America's strategic culture needs to be changed (and, by consequence, a new ontology).⁶⁷¹ For them, the fact of the constant threats to the nation means that a covert war is always taking place.

Der Derian's modern redefinition of intelligence encapsulates perpetual intelligence war, defining it as "the continuation of war by the clandestine interference of one power into the affairs of another power."⁶⁷² Clearly this is a product of the post-World War Two contention with Soviet services, but it also represents the Kendallian world view as intellectual Kentian antipode.⁶⁷³ Intelligence as a form of international relations is a continuous war because, as Der Derian defines it, covert action and counter-espionage are corollaries of the attempt to compel and control one's enemy through warfare. Stafford Thomas notes that following World War II, the US largely demobilized, and the Korean War (with its spectre of nuclear use) demonstrated that "shooting wars" should be avoided.⁶⁷⁴ So intelligence would fight wars where the military

⁶⁶⁹ Shulsky and Schmitt, *Silent Warfare*.

⁶⁷⁰ Adda Bozeman believed that intelligence did not understand the "modern species of irregular, protracted, and political warfare" which goes against traditional American ideas of war and peace; Bozeman, "Political Intelligence in Non-Western Societies: Suggestions For Comparative Research," in *Comparing Foreign Intelligence*, ed. Roy Godson (Washington DC: National Strategy Information Center 1985) p 132.

⁶⁷¹ We easily forget that isolationism was one of the prevailing strains in American foreign policy through the Second World War; without Pearl Harbor America may not even have entered the war at the late date it did, without further influence. Brian Maybee, *Understanding American Power: The Changing World of US Foreign Policy* (Palgrave, 2013).

⁶⁷² James Der Derian, *Antidiplomacy*, p 21.

⁶⁷³ Der Derian is not a Kendallian himself. Kendallian thought is not solely a product of the cold war experience however, with the early definitions of the Kendallian view, intelligence (theory) writers like Pettie and Wohlstetter even before and during the war. They were involved in roughing out the character of the new peacetime intelligence community.

⁶⁷⁴ Stafford T. Thomas, "A Political Theory of the CIA," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 11, no. 1 (1998): 57-72, p 60.

no longer could. As Sun Tzu had it, the greatest victory is the one achieved without fighting,⁶⁷⁵ and by implication, with intelligence. Unlike warfare, there are no proportional limits to intelligence. Intelligence war is not bounded, temporally, and is neither declared nor demarcated to a field of battle. Though America has military peace, the silent warfare of intelligence does not cease. So intelligence is an enterprise of action, war, espionage, and influence. Intelligence becomes war by other means.

II: Opportunity Oriented /Action Analysis and Policy Support

The ontology of a world of war requires an active, rather than passive force in international relations.

“The purpose of the intelligence function in this context is to play an active role in influencing the decision making process by presenting the decision maker with facts which in a timely manner can enable the consumer to seize the initiative [...]. This approach implies a relationship between intelligence and policy, with producers more actively disposed towards policy objectives and action based upon perceived opportunities.”⁶⁷⁶

Intelligence supports an active foreign policy – what Kendall’s heirs call opportunity-oriented analysis (or action analysis). This replaces isolation and objectivity with the goal that intelligence find opportunities to advance the American position in the world, as well as American values.⁶⁷⁷ This flows from the neoconservative philosophy of the moral importance of promoting

⁶⁷⁵ The famous phrase is “to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill” Sun Tzu, quoted in Mark McNeilly, *Sun Tzu and the Art of Modern Warfare* (Oxford University Press, 2014), p18.

⁶⁷⁶ Recep Tayfun, “A New Paradigm in Intelligence Sharing: International Cooperation (IC),” *Intelligence Cooperation Practices in the 21st Century: Towards a Culture of Sharing*, ed Musa Tuzuner (2010). P 47- p 48.

⁶⁷⁷ See chapter three in this thesis.

democracy internationally in support of American primacy.⁶⁷⁸ George Bush spoke of how “America must be involved in the world. But that does not mean our military is the answer to every difficult foreign policy situation – a substitute for strategy. American internationalism should [...] concentrate on enduring national interests.”⁶⁷⁹ Kendallian intelligence is defined by its active mission to support American interests – not warning and not ‘truth.’ Moreover, if intelligence counters enemy actions, passive prediction can become, as Treverton put it, a series of “self-negating prophecies.”⁶⁸⁰ Since the world is not a social science laboratory, the more effect America has on the world and its adversaries, the closer the “observer-actor linkage.”⁶⁸¹ As a key great power, America naturally has more influence on other actors, and other actors respond and adapt to its behaviors (so we cannot predict the world as though it was comprised of uninfluencable independent entities).

III: Covert Actions

Moral certainty of purpose allowed America to solicit the covert support of anyone - from rebels (including Taliban Mujahedeen) to dictators - willing to fight communism.⁶⁸² These dubious means were overshadowed by the greater end of fighting Soviet evil. So pursuant to the policy of containment, the CIA (and the intelligence community as a whole) became a preeminent tool to actively thwart international communism, the centrepiece of Cold-War policy.

⁶⁷⁸ Michael C. Williams, “What is the National Interest? The Neoconservative Challenge in IR Theory,” *European Journal of International Relations* 11, no. 3 (2005): 307-337.

⁶⁷⁹ George Bush, “A Distinctly American Internationalism,” (speech, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California, November 19, 1999).

⁶⁸⁰ Gregory F. Treverton, *Intelligence for an Age of Terror* (Cambridge University Press 2009), p 33.

⁶⁸¹ Warren Fishbein and Gregory Treverton, “Making Sense of Transnational Threats,” *Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis Occasional Papers* 3, no. 1 (Oct. ’04). Pillar also discusses the problem of the “paradox” by which Americas own policies in response to intelligence predictions may negate the predictions themselves. Paul R. Pillar, “Predictive Intelligence: Policy Support or Spectator Sport?” *SAIS Review* 28, no. 1 (Winter-Spring 2008): 25-35, p 27/28.

⁶⁸² Chronicled in Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden from the Soviet invasion to September 10, 2001* (Penguin, 2004); John Cooley, *Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism* (London: Pluto Press, 2002) and many others. For post-911 activities, see William Nester, *Hearts, Minds, and Hydras: Fighting Terrorism in Afghanistan, Pakistan, America, and Beyond--Dilemmas and Lessons* (Potomac Books, 2012) p 97.

This pursuit of policy advantage to battle communism, stressed certain types of action and reaction. The ‘action’ includes covert action, espionage, and counter-intelligence, as the defining activities of intelligence. While they might seem essential components of any service, smaller countries often dispense with expensive foreign activity. Canada has no official foreign intelligence service, and historically concentrates on domestic and signals intelligence.⁶⁸³ The Kendallian approach justified decades of Cold War American covert action because to the Kendallian, intelligence’s mission is not only to understand the world, but to act in it.⁶⁸⁴ Covert action and espionage, and not analysis and estimation, are the apex of intelligence. While intelligence still involves the other parts of the intelligence cycle, these are in service of action. Analysis is relatively unimportant, except in the merest processing of raw data. By contrast, Kent famously wrote that intelligence was not a ‘formulator of objectives’ or ‘carrier out of operations.’⁶⁸⁵ Defensively, a counterintelligence mission is the active protection of national security. The organizational functions of intelligence are conceived of as support for the mission to act and influence.

Authorizations of Intelligence Knowledge

Kendall’s alternate view of intelligence is now more clearly outlined. The problem with an alternate definition and a new account of human knowledge, is that it must appeal to different sources of authority than the predominant view. For centuries, the authority of the ancient philosophers and the name of Aristotle authorized an understanding of the natural world.

⁶⁸³ Martin Rudner, “Canada’s Communications Security Establishment from Cold War to Globalization,” *Intelligence and National Security* 16, no. 1 (2001): 97-128.

⁶⁸⁴ For example, on this perception of mission, see James Doolittle, “Report on the Covert Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency,” *Leary. Central Intelligence Agency* (1954); and Harold M. Greenberg, “The Doolittle Commission of 1954,” *Intelligence and National Security* 20, no. 4 (2005): 687-694.

⁶⁸⁵ Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for and American World Policy*, p 182.

Hobbes' work was to challenge these assumptions, and to do so he had to contest Aristotelian authority.⁶⁸⁶ What counts as knowledge is what we consider legitimate, verified or trustworthy, and there are different ways of authorizing knowledge. Kent's authorization, as noted, rests on science, experience, and professionalism. Kentallians contest these, and to do so, they posit their own alternate authorizations.

The Kentian model justifies intelligence by granting the analyst/estimator status in transforming information into knowledge. The authority that science gives to the mental process of judgment in intelligence is important. It grants intellectual solidity to a sometimes vague process.⁶⁸⁷ The intelligence-as-profession concept also justifies Kentian analytic intelligence knowledge. Typically professions are seen as sources of authority (e.g.: police, doctor, lawyer) because of their specialized training, experience and knowledge. The separation of the analysts and the development of experts also mimics the disciplinary structure of academia, which commands its own authority because of the tradition, language, and intellectual dedication to subject. The structure of disciplinary peer review and tenure all contribute to academic knowledge authority.⁶⁸⁸ Laying claim to the scientific method also links analysis to academia and the authority of scientists to intelligence. Kent saw policymakers as ignoring this real wisdom, and beholden to domestic lobbies. Interestingly, this is one way he diverges from a Morgenthauian Realism.⁶⁸⁹ Instead of valuable experience and democratic authorization, Kent saw bias and domestic gerrymandering: "Indeed, there will be some policymakers who could not

⁶⁸⁶ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, preface.

⁶⁸⁷ Hank Prunckun, *Handbook of Scientific Methods of Inquiry for Intelligence Analysis* Vol. 11 (Scarecrow Press, 2010), p 2.

⁶⁸⁸ Ken Hyland, *Disciplinary Identities: Individuality and Community in Academic Discourse* (Cambridge University Press, 2012), p 60.

⁶⁸⁹ While Morgenthau had a complex position on science and the 'normal actor', (viz Sean Molloy, "Realism: A problematic paradigm," *Security Dialogue* 34, no. 1 (2003): 71-85), the high esteem of the policymaker or diplomat is not embraced by Kent in the way seen in classical Realism. While Realism often functioned as a kind of modern *Prince* for the new foreign policy elite, Kentian knowledge stressed science and method, not just a practical experience, as the basis of wisdom.

pass a rudimentary test on the ‘facts of the matter’ but who have the strongest views on what the policy should be and how to put it into effect.”⁶⁹⁰

Kendall’s model shifts status away from the analyst to the policymaker. At issue is who is the source of accumulated wisdom. For Kent, the structure of the profession provided knowledge that justified superiority. But to Kendall and others, this is not real world, hands on, lived experience with decision-making. An analyst might visit a subject region, and even speak the language, but would not have years of extensive interactions with heads of state and other government officials. This irreplaceable experience gives a policymaker a vast store of knowledge that secret analysis cannot surmount. Analysts are tools, while “[p]olicymakers are like surgeons.” They know what they are seeing when they “cut an issue open” according to Wolfowitz.⁶⁹¹ Their experience, their status as members of a political administration and indirectly or directly elected, and their responsibility for representing constituents is also an authorization for their position (if not also for their knowledge and decision). Theoretically, as elected representatives of an administration, officials are responsible for the judgment made through intelligence because their constituents delegate the responsibility of decision through their vote. This authority, placed in them, cannot be abdicated to intelligence analysts. Moreover, they face the consequences for decision taken, and must rely on their judgment of the situation. “Kendall was calling for intelligence professionals [...] writing directly to the perspective of elected officials, taking account of domestic politics as well as policy prerogatives.”⁶⁹² The heritage of this idea of personal responsibility perhaps stems from the pre-NIE discomfort with

⁶⁹⁰ Sherman Kent, “Estimates and Influence.”

⁶⁹¹ Davis, *Paul Wolfowitz on Intelligence Policy-Relations*.

⁶⁹² Davis, “The Kent-Kendall Debate of 1949,” p 97.

estimating intentions.⁶⁹³ Military estimates were typically confined to capabilities, and intentions were the decision of command. The Clausewitzian attitude is that whatever little good intelligence may be, it is the commander's prerogative to make decisions with it.⁶⁹⁴ Kendall wrote that the course of the nation should be decided not by elites, but by the democratic majority.⁶⁹⁵ Policymaker knowledge and decision as to the nature and location of a specific threat provides an authorization for the direction of intelligence. It authorizes Kendallian deductive and policy directed intelligence.

This debate mirrors developments that were contemporary in International Relations at the time.⁶⁹⁶ The desire to predict the course of international events and particularly significant wars or crises, was shared by the two fields – only the preference for knowledge accumulated through history (and the wisdom of method over experience) seems to sharply distinguish the Kentian position. Interestingly, Kendallian ideas diverged in somewhat different ways; while sharing a classical Realist stress on the statesman, Kendallians would come to eschew a world consisting of normal or rational predictable actors because of their insistence that intelligence shift events before they could come to pass (and hence be predicted). These differences can be understood through the battle in their debate (discussed as follows) over the authority of truth and science.

Scientific Authority

⁶⁹³ Kent, "The Yale Report."

⁶⁹⁴ Michael I. Handel, "Intelligence and Military Operations," *Intelligence and National Security* 5, no. 2 (1990) p 3. This view is more common in military intelligence structures (but varies by strategic culture).

⁶⁹⁵ Olcott, "Revisiting the Legacy," p 26.

⁶⁹⁶ Brian C. Schmidt, *The Political Discourse of Anarchy: a disciplinary history of international relations* (SUNY Press, 1998), p 31.

The mantle of authoritative knowledge of science makes direct attacks against Kent difficult. Traditionally, science in Western society is matched only by religion as a higher (or ‘revealed’) source of knowledge.⁶⁹⁷ The Kendallian approach is not precisely religious, but it is something close. The second, and concurrent, Kendallian form of authorization is a moral one. This authorization draws on, in contrast to Kent’s scientific truth, the bundle of deeply held emotional values associated with America. Exceptionalism, democracy, justice, freedom and the American way all are invoked by the moral argument of Kendall and the neoconservatives. America embodies the highest form of good in the world and is always on the side of right (intentionally, though sometimes with unforeseen negative consequences). Kendallians draw on patriotic emotional attachment to the constitution and the principles of the founding of the republic. While not directly referenced, this view uses the mythology of the ‘city on a hill’, the jeremiad with religious undertones of America as God’s chosen. In this image America is a new Jerusalem, inheritors of the Hebraic belief that they were blessed by God, and uniquely so.

Because America is inherently imbued with righteous values, the fight against communism is the opposition of good against evil, not science against science or system against system. During the Cold War, capitalists had argued that the success of the American system would be conclusive because of the superiority of the free market. As an economic system capitalism generates better results, so in the long term, communism would under-perform and fail. For Kendallians and neoconservatives, this market based –efficiency argument ignored the question of the justness of the system: the Soviet system being responsible for human suffering, death, and the rejection of freedom for secrecy and repression.⁶⁹⁸ Naturally America’s freedom

⁶⁹⁷ For example, see Foucault’s work on the confession. Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction*, 1978. Salter makes some links to confession and security in general (but not intelligence) in Mark B. Salter, "Governmentalities of an Airport: heterotopia and confession." *International Political Sociology* 1, no. 1 (2007): 49-66.

⁶⁹⁸ Roy Godson, "Intelligence Requirements for the 1990s," *The Washington Quarterly* 12, no. 1 (1989), p 54.

made it the model for good the world would (want to) follow. So it was America's responsibility to use covert action to counter evil Soviet communist interference, which might prevent nations from following the righteous path.⁶⁹⁹ The Neoconservative movement associated with Wohlstetter believed that this moral fight authorized the actions of America in the contest against all forms of communism, throughout the world. The only way to be sure of the victory of good was to actively use intelligence to further policy, instead of requiring it to stay 'objective' and be separate from policy. Evil would otherwise have the upper hand. Kristol writes the statesman must "have the ability to distinguish friends from enemies."⁷⁰⁰ Altogether these authorizations stand against the Kentian claim to approach truth through science. They represent an alternate epistemological and ontological vision of intelligence.

Modern Intelligence Ontology and Epistemology

The Kent-Kendall debate perhaps initially appears to be simply an early round of the recurring question of intelligence policy distance. However, it is now clear that it is a deeper disputation of what intelligence is. Kent's historian's ontology and epistemology is confronted by Kendall's moral war. The real question between the two sides is whether intelligence should follow a model of science, requiring objectivity, separation from policy, and a passive knowledge collecting approach to the world. Epistemologically, Kendallians disagree that the process of inquiry into the world must stand apart from it. Kendall's model does not require objectivity and non-interference to produce intelligence. This flows from the alternate ontology of a world of intelligence war, constantly disgorging threats. In this dangerous universe,

⁶⁹⁹ For example, Bozeman and Shulsky on the non-aligned movement; see Roy Godson, ed. *Comparing foreign intelligence; the U.S., the USSR, the U.K. and the Third World* (Washington, Pergmon-Brassey's 1988).

⁷⁰⁰ Irving Kristol, "The Neoconservative Persuasion," *The Weekly Standard* (25 August 2003).

deception, secrecy, and penetration are unimpeded and can only be met with covert action and counter intelligence. Naturally, in such a world the scientific method is not necessary or desirable. Truth can never be arrived at by intelligence, reading facts from the record of history (and truth is not the goal of intelligence).⁷⁰¹ If intelligence cannot perform as Kent sets it out, then its primary mission is now active support of policy to counter deductively understood threats.⁷⁰² As policymaker guidance superintends the intelligence cycle, and the analysis of threats, a new conception of intelligence emerges from the Kendallian worldview.

The two approaches are at odds over what intelligence is, what its primary mission must be, how that mission should be carried out, and the appropriate and possible methods through which it can know and act in the world. In full, they are the bricks and mortar, the basis for America's diverging intelligence cultures, and furnish the raw materials of much in the security imaginary. They remain the DNA of modern intelligence thought in America. Godson, Wolfowitz, Rolington, Olcott, Davis, and Wohlstetter as well as Straussians like Mylroie, and their students, are still in the corridors of power.⁷⁰³ As time goes on Kentian and Kendallian positions diverge and combine, new influences emerge. Still, these important positions lay bare much of the conceptual confusion in intelligence. For example, to ask whether secrecy is inherent to intelligence is to ask which assumptions one believes regarding deception, science,

⁷⁰¹ *Foreign Policy* thought that intelligence had once been the cutting edge of information: "Similarly, the process of drafting National Intelligence Estimates, originally developed in the early 1950s, represented one of the first methods for establishing the "best truth" within an organization, predating professional facilitators, red-teaming, brainstorming, and other methods currently in corporate vogue." Bruce D. Berkowitz, "Information Age Intelligence," *Foreign Policy* 103 (Summer, 1996): 35-50, p 36. But Kent's ideas of finding truth have become less popular in the information age- although his embrace of open source has become much more relevant as the intelligence bureaucracies focus on the central role of information management. Cicero Magazine discusses the 'value'/truth distinction between the two sides. Chris Miller, "Two Views of Intelligence," *Cicero Magazine* (Jun 19, 2014).

⁷⁰² An interesting strain of the debate, more recently, is the discussion of "mysteries" or "puzzles" – it is another version of what kinds of problems intelligence can know and how to respond to them. Popular intellectual Malcom Gladwell reformulated the phrase, (personal research indicates it may have its origins in the popular phrase "the Russia puzzle" but a welter of variations of the phrase exist, from mysteries, puzzles, secrets, complexities). Gladwell (citing Trevorton) writes that Bin Laden whereabouts were a puzzle – solution involved getting more information. What would happen in Iraq after Hussein's ouster, a mystery – because it had no single, "factual" answer. "The distinction is not trivial." Because the solution to a puzzle is more information, while it is not the solution to a mystery. It is a way to conceptualize the kind of world and problems that intelligence faces, similar to Kent and Kendall's attempts. Malcom Gladwell, "Open Secrets," January 8 2007, <http://gladwell.com/open-secrets/>.

⁷⁰³ Some sources have explicitly linked these personages as "Straussians" however, this term is politically and philosophically laden and does not explicitly add to the debate. See Miller, "Two Views of Intelligence." Roy Godson himself lists Kendall, Bodeman, Codevilla and De Graffenreid. Godson, "Intelligence Requirements for the 1990s," p 49.

and knowledge. Modern intelligence in the intervening decades has changed – but these signal figures – and the epistemological and ontological elements of their debate, still shape modern intelligence thought. They remain important – in questions from need for strategic intelligence, to the pressures towards current intelligence,⁷⁰⁴ and the increasing volume of information. Neither approach is necessarily more logical or more appropriate; it is a matter of choice.⁷⁰⁵ Each approach has its own precedences and ideational frame. Their divergences connect to the broader American culture: Kentians faith in science, logic, and Western universality, Kendallians fear of enemies, evil and the need for action. The current intelligence culture is a blend of these two intelligence approaches.

Present Articulations

The Kent-Kendall debate sets the stage for modern intelligence culture, as an enduring debate over the direction of intelligence, its doctrine, methods, and targets. It is reflected in many articulations of intelligence culture (which will be more clearly described in chapter four and five). In 1964 Paul M. A. Linebarger wrote that for more than a decade “and more, many sensitive policymakers at the highest level in Washington have been influenced by a brilliant, compelling group of ideological insights which gave the views of distant horizons in the

⁷⁰⁴ See Fingar on the increased demand for ‘actionable’ intelligence. Thomas Fingar, “Analysis in the U.S. Intelligence Community: Missions, Masters, and Methods,” *Intelligence Analysis: Behavioral and Social Scientific Foundations* (Committee on Behavioral and Social Science Research to Improve Intelligence Analysis for National Security, Board on Behavioral, Cognitive, and Sensory Sciences, Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education, National Research Council), p 8.

⁷⁰⁵ Donnelly writes (following Ian Hacking) “... to say that X is socially constructed is to show that X is neither ‘natural’ nor ‘inevitable’.” Faye Donnelly, *Securitization and the Iraq War: The Rules of Engagement in World Politics* (Routledge, 2013), p 16.

future.”⁷⁰⁶ These insights were Pettee’s (and by implication, the Kendallian position). Their influence has remained important, as discussed briefly in this section.

Davis’s perspective is that the strength of each approach, seen in terms of intelligence policy separation and guidance, reflects the attitude, style, and needs of each administration, as well as the bureaucratic organization of the community and CIA at the time. For example, in the 1970’s Kissinger’s antipathy to intelligence was reversed by the Kennedy and Eisenhower administrations, while “[d]uring the mid-1980s [analysts and supervisors] ...regularly raised the name of Sherman Kent to ward off Gates’ efforts to close their distance from the policy world.”⁷⁰⁷

As an enduring debate about intelligence’s doctrine, methods and targets, the Kent-Kendall positions were particularly salient during the Cold War (for example, the Team A/B debates). The left tended to view the Kentian evidence-weighting and empiricism as a more favourable way to gauge Soviet intentions and as a basis for policy, while the right tended to see the USSR as aggressive and implacable, and favored a Kendallian approach. After the Cold War, the debate over intentions grew less important, but the new concern for efficiency and new missions returned intelligence agencies to soul searching about the nature of intelligence (see chapter three on the post-war intelligence community) treading in a different way on how intelligence should know the world. Re-orienting intelligence after the end of the Soviet threat, the debate resurfaced post-9.11, over the reliability of secret sources (compared with open information) used in the so-called selling of the Iraq war.⁷⁰⁸ Particularly, allegations surfaced that the (neoconservative) heirs of Kendall crossed the ‘politicization’ boundary in using intelligence

⁷⁰⁶ Linebarger, “The Macropolitics of Systemic Revolution: A Secret Ideology of Dr. George Pettee,” p 94.

⁷⁰⁷ Davis, “The Kent-Kendall Debate of 1949,” p 98- 99.

⁷⁰⁸ The source codenamed Curveball was the focus of much of this debate: James P Pfiffner, “Decision-making, Intelligence and the Iraq War,” in *Intelligence and National Security Policymaking on Iraq: British and American Perspectives*, eds. James P. Pfiffner, Mark Phythian ((Texas A&M University Press, 2008), p 224. Popular accounts include Drogin, *Curveball*.

inappropriately to shape debate around the Iraq War. Russell writes that the debate on intelligence-policy distance “in the post-9/11 environment has taken on a new intensity.”⁷⁰⁹ The scandal over ‘cherry-picking’ intelligence supportive of the war through the Office of Special Plans revitalized the classic Kent-Kendall controversy over the relationship of intelligence to policy.⁷¹⁰ Finally, Davis makes the point that even if the two approaches are opposed conceptually, they can be carried out simultaneously (“from both a detached and close-support service”) organizationally – so they may coexist.⁷¹¹

Some of the lasting legacies of the Kent-Kendall debate (in addition to recurrent debates over politicization and distance)⁷¹² include the literature on intelligence failure. In the broader sense, the Kentian faith in science and empiricism is of the same vein as what has been called the technological fetishism of America (deriving from a wider belief that technological solutions will always prevail based on American innovation).⁷¹³ The Kentian historian’s method, or ticker tape world, also is an important source for the American belief that perfect prediction is possible. What has been called the popularity of technological ‘solutions’ to intelligence ‘failures’ may have been aided by the Kentian conception of the ‘estimating machine’ with its dream of perfect prediction. It creates the idea that intelligence ‘failures’ must be preventable and not inevitable.⁷¹⁴ Betts has been working for decades to try and change this view (and Hulnick feels

⁷⁰⁹ Russell, “Achieving All-source Fusion in the Intelligence Community,” p 195.

⁷¹⁰ James P. Pfiffner “Did President Bush Mislead The Country in his Arguments for War with Iraq?” in *Intelligence and National Security Policymaking on Iraq: British and American Perspectives*, eds. James P. Pfiffner, Mark Phythian (Texas A&M University Press, 2008), p 75.

⁷¹¹ Davis, “The Kent-Kendall Debate of 1949,” p 97.

⁷¹² For example, charges of politicization similar to those over the Iraq War were made (against Kendallians) in the 1990s over the Gulf War. See Wyland F. Leadbetter Jr. & Stephen J. Bury, “Prelude to Desert Storm: The Politicization of intelligence,” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, 6, no. 1 (1993):43-54.

⁷¹³ This has resulted in repeated criticisms of the American focus on SIGINT over HUMINT; see Matthew Aid, “All Glory is Fleeting: SIGINT and the Fight Against International Terrorism,” in *Twenty-First Century Intelligence* ed. Wesley K. Wark (Routledge, 2013): 72-120, p 94-96.

⁷¹⁴ Pillar notes that this view ignores the fact that failures or surprises may in fact be necessary *before* “salutary” actions can be taken. Pillar, “Predictive Intelligence: Policy Support or Spectator Sport?” p 29.

that intelligence's record is good)⁷¹⁵ in America, because it results in less optimal approaches to prediction and organization.⁷¹⁶

The Kent-Kendall debate has remained relevant in the more recent controversies over the ethics of intelligence and the right to privacy (particularly the controversy over 'drone wars' and NSA data collection). The Kendallian position that all available action is necessary in the struggle that is intelligence, founds the retort that the NSA collection is necessary – because privacy rights or the restrictive letter of law will not be respected by an adversary. The new generation of libertarian-leaning privacy advocates have found the revelations of NSA data collection incomprehensible and an abuse of power,⁷¹⁷ because they do not understand that to the Kendallian, the intelligence community is simply protecting them as citizens through intelligence (instead of infringing on their constitutional rights).

In the 'drone wars' debates, detractors also feel that America cannot ethically use drones as a tool of what could be seen as assassination – traditionally foresworn (publicly) by the American government. The Kendallian position would be that the ethics of assassination are superseded by the need to use whatever tools to gain advantage that the adversary would otherwise seize. Intelligence must also use these kinds of tool for action to support American policy as a whole, and thus protect American interests. Drones are not morally suspect because they are in use against a clearly 'evil' adversary (just as in the Soviet case).⁷¹⁸

⁷¹⁵ Arthur Hulnick, *Fixing the Spy Machine: Preparing American Intelligence for the Twenty-First Century* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), p 48.

⁷¹⁶ Critics of the idea of intelligence failure (resulting from an emphasis on prediction) include- Betts, *Enemies of Intelligence*, "Permanent Enemies: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable"; Pillar, "Predictive Intelligence: Policy Support or Spectator Sport?" and many others.

⁷¹⁷ Contemporary authors like Ryan Gallagher and Micheal Geist offer more nuanced comment on these types of surveillance and information freedom stories (http://www.slate.com/authors.ryan_gallagher.html) and (<http://www.michaelgeist.ca/>)

⁷¹⁸ A blogger's analysis of the interaction between the normative environment (of the rules of engagement, laws of armed combat and international humanitarian law) which "shape the permissible" and how weaponized drones were considered "incongruent" to these norms prior to 9.11, when the perception of these norms changed and "targeted killing operations became suddenly 'normal' and practical." It notes that these new conceptualizations shifted perceptions of populations and special operators themselves. 6GW, "The Strategic Culture of Special Operations" Feb 6, <http://www.6gw.org/2011/02/strategic-culture-special-operations/>

The Kendallian Model and Intelligence After 9.11

On a more speculative note, the deductive side of the Kendallian model may have made it more difficult to operate when an identified or presumptive threat is not the ‘real’ (subjectively) or only major threat facing the nation. After the 1993 world trade center attack, the heirs of Kendall and Wohlstetter were convinced that terrorism – *state* terrorism – was the great threat to be faced. For the nutshell argument, Mylroie’s *Study of Revenge* outlines the line of thought.⁷¹⁹ They were both right – and very wrong. The book made the case that the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993 was a signal of this (new) threat. The study was prescient in one way; terrorists were determined to attack America, as the Kendallians depicted. The problem was that they concluded state terrorism was the source of the threat. Hence, in combination with the Wohlstetterian concern for arms control and nuclear proliferation, attention was directed to the so-called rogue states and known state-associated terror. Specialists on Al-Qaida at the CIA (and elsewhere in the community) were not discouraged in particular, but they did not rapidly advance in their careers.⁷²⁰ While the blame for the attack does include other factors— poor management, information sharing, or the famous ‘failure of imagination/ideas’⁷²¹ – Kendallian deductive intelligence was in vogue with the Bush administration, and deduction work against understanding this kind of ‘unknown’ or less under-stood threat.⁷²² At a time when budget cuts forced the intelligence agencies to focus their efforts, cuts meant that this ‘unknown’ threat was denied extra resources and attention because there wasn’t enough to go around for existing

⁷¹⁹ Laurie Mylroie, *Study of Revenge: Saddam Hussein's unfinished war against America* (AEI Press, 2000).

⁷²⁰ Lefebvre, “A Look at Intelligence Analysis,” p 234. The Joint Inquiry Staff statement of 18 September 2002 concluded that the community didn’t consider likelihood of ALQ or UBL attacks. The ‘Manson family’ sobriquet was applied to those true-believers who remained in the groups warning about ALQ and Bin Laden.

⁷²¹ Julian Richards, “Intelligence Failure and Success,” *The Art and Science of Intelligence Analysis* (Oxford University Press 2010), p 35; Lefebvre, “A Look at Intelligence Analysis,” p 233-234, and others.

⁷²² Interestingly, DNI Dennis C. Blair’s foreword to the new “National Intelligence Strategy” (2009), emphasizes the “known” nature of post 9.11 threats, and America’s epistemological security: “We know the type of world we face, the nature of the threats, challenges, and opportunities before us, and the role intelligence can play in supporting policies that advance our national interests.”

concerns.⁷²³ In another case, however, the tenets of the Kendallian approach could have positioned the intelligence community to deal with Hussein's deception on the existence of a weapons program. Wolfowitz, prior to 9.11 recounts how it was clear that Hussein was not going to 'change his spots.'⁷²⁴ Unfortunately elements of the Kendallian approach collided here, the assumption of deception and the assumption that unclear evidence indicated aggression (in the face of an 'evil' adversary).

Current Intelligence Culture

This chapter has used the Kent-Kendall debate to show two epistemological and ontological positions and the respective ideas about intelligence they are associated with. I posit that American intelligence culture cannot be understood without them. They do not account for all elements of American intelligence culture but this is not the intent –they show that there is a basic divide in the understanding of the world and how it is knowable. The consequence is that each has a particular set of interconnected principles about how intelligence must be conducted and how it is useful in the world.

From the domestic intellectual roots and assumptions of intelligence culture, discussed in this chapter, in the next chapter I move to the current American intelligence culture. Present ideas of intelligence are clearly the inheritors of Kent and Kendall. My contention is that

⁷²³ While some outsiders have suggested that the CIA failed to spend counterterrorism dollars allocated before 9/11; James Bovard, *Terrorism and Tyranny: Trampling Freedom, Justice, and Peace to Rid the World of Evil* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) p 57 -58. The reality is complex- shifts were made in response to Tenet's declared "war on terrorism" but reallocations (which Aid notes the response of the NSA in "All Glory is Fleeting") are not identical to new allocations of funds; Melissa Boyle Mahle writes that the Defence Department did not follow Tenet's call. Melissa Mahle, *Denial and Deception: An Insider's View of the CIA* (Nation Books, 2005) p 326.

⁷²⁴ Davis, "Paul Wolfowitz on Intelligence Policy-Relations."

intelligence culture cannot be merely list of norms and symbols. The intellectual history of intelligence thought cannot be separated from intelligence culture. The present chapter starts to give intelligence culture a history, and a context, without which it cannot have a present. This dissertation finds that the ‘sources’ of intelligence culture are much less important than asking how it has become possible to conceive of intelligence in a particular(ly) American way. Based on this history, modern American intelligence culture can be discussed. This discussion is not possible prior to contextualizing the sources and epistemologies and ontologies that layer behind the ideas, norms, and symbols in American intelligence.

In chapter five, then, I can show that American intelligence culture has a number of unique elements – definitions that emphasize covert action, secrecy, and a foreign/domestic intelligence divide. These become more evident in American norms of intelligence, where I show that a central tension in American intelligence is between the particular American version of democracy and the American view of both the importance of intelligence and the need to conduct it secretly. I conclude with how these articulations have become part of a number of narratives of American intelligence. This chapter is also the backdrop to the study of the symbolic weight of Pearl Harbor in American intelligence, as one key symbol with both historical roots and modern re-articulations.

(Chapter Five) Current American Intelligence Culture: Norms, Narratives, Definitions and Warrants

One of the core contentions of this dissertation is that existing, single methods of researching intelligence culture are faulty because they show only a small fraction of intelligence culture, separated from its necessary context and historical depth. Treatments of intelligence culture can focus on often under theorized sources of intelligence culture,⁷²⁵ with the result that finding and substantiating actual current ideas of intelligence may be neglected. A better understanding of American intelligence requires multiple interlocking approaches and an expanded conceptual model of how to represent or explore intelligence sub-cultures that fall under the overarching whole.

The specific aim of this chapter is to describe current, broad (not organizational) elements of American intelligence culture. I explore these broad elements of intelligence culture by collecting a number of ways of describing of what American intelligence is and what it does. Crucially, this chapter does *not* seek to describe all parts of intelligence culture. Nor does it aim to catalogue the ‘sources’ of intelligence culture.⁷²⁶ Instead, this chapter uses multiple methods to sketch some important ideas persisting in American intelligence. It is not exhaustive, and multiple cuts are preferred to greater individual depth; its final purpose is to outline a series of high level descriptions, towards an in-depth study in intelligence culture.

⁷²⁵ The treatment of sources tends to be relatively speculative: For example, Jennifer Sims, “Understanding Ourselves,” in *Transforming US Intelligence*, eds Jennifer E. Sims and Burton L. Gerber (Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press, 2005) p 34/35; Turner, “A Distinctive U.S. Intelligence Identity,” p 44 ; Joop Van Reijn notes the mode of understanding strategic culture through its sources, in “Foreword: Intelligence and Strategic Culture: Essays on American and British Praxis Since the Second World War,” in *Intelligence and Strategic Culture*, ed. Isabelle Duyvesteyn (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013), p 2. Davies’ “Ideas of Intelligence: Divergent National Concepts and Institutions,” is a more fruitful attack at sources, in mining multiple and cross-national ideas of national intelligence in the context of institutions, and with the aim of determining consequences. This institutional sourcing is much less esoteric and epiphenomenal.

⁷²⁶ The reasons for this are discussed in chapter one, detailing the lesser utility of understanding putative ‘sources’ of intelligence culture, particularly prior to understanding current articulations. Any study of intelligence culture should establish: first, the history of the item and/or its past articulation; and second, the real current usage, and understandings of the item.

Generally, this chapter is a kind of semi-thick description⁷²⁷ culled from the existing intelligence culture literature. The combination of norms and narratives shows how American intelligence describes its own limits and authorizations in a variety of ways. Whereas in chapter four, I used epistemology and ontology to show two coherent packages or units of assumptions about intelligence, in this chapter, I examine the multiple ways that definitions, norms, and narratives as a different way of separating out beliefs and practices. Together, these elements let us outline the boundaries of current American intelligence. All of these norms, definitions and narratives are not ‘fact’ or description, but contingent articulation and interpellation of aspects of American intelligence culture.⁷²⁸ Nevertheless, they possess explanatory power, and the conduct of intelligence cannot be understood without reference to them. They paint a fuller picture than the Kent–Kendall debate in chapter four, which is superseded in some ways by the modern intelligence world.

I explore intelligence cultures in this chapter in three ways: first, I examine definitions for what they can tell us about the nature of American intelligence. Second, I use the strategic culture approach to briefly categorize some American intelligence norms, highlighting those areas that are important for intelligence. I also suggest links from strategic to intelligence culture. Third, I examine the use of warrants in American intelligence culture, focusing on the use of origin stories. Finally In part four, I use the more historically sensitive method of recounting intelligence ‘narratives’ that help define American intelligence’s multiple identities, focusing on pop culture accounts, and the centralization story of Pearl Harbor. Because intelligence culture is not singular, but consists of multiple strands or discourses, combining and competing, this multi-

⁷²⁷ Geertz, "Thick Description," 213-231.

⁷²⁸ These concepts are discussed in chapter two of this dissertation, in the section *The Security Imaginary Heuristic*. Laclau and Mouffe’s brief definition of articulation is as “every practice that establishes a relation between elements such that the identity of the elements is modified.” Marianne Jorgensen and Louise J. Phillips, *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method* (Sage 2002), p 28.

approach method is best suited to capture different parts or perspectives on current American intelligence culture.

Chapter Approach

The chapter is structured this way, with a lesser focus on norms, because the temptation to follow strategic culture, in this particular way, is detrimental. Lists of norms miss the point that studying intelligence culture is not an assembly of puzzle pieces, with the goal to ‘cover’ the entirety of intelligence culture. Nor is a culture a combination lock, dialed correctly, to predict future policy/behavior(s).⁷²⁹ Instead it is a rich composite, which can be approached in many different ways by many authors and different kinds of artists. This dissertation’s goal is to reflect the richness of this culture, and to ultimately emphasize that ideas of intelligence have effects on actors and their actions/policy. The reason strategic culture is able to focus debate on sometimes short descriptions or lists of components of culture is that subjects such as the ‘cult of offense’ and national disposition/style have been subject to significant research.⁷³⁰ So, for example, Gray’s attempt to discuss and list strategic components (examples include: mobilization in response to perceived ‘evil’⁷³¹) reflects the intertext of a centuries old debate over American strategy.⁷³² No such similar, historic, debate exists for intelligence. This chapter then, eschews a list of norms, given that any developed intelligence culture research would require each norm to

⁷²⁹ The problems with the desire to predict policy, instead of understanding, are discussed in chapter two, in the sections on the Grey-Johnston debate under the heading *Lessons from Strategic Culture*.

⁷³⁰ For example, for American “national style” see Russell Wigley, *The American Way of War: A History of US Military Strategy and Policy* (Bloomfield In, Indiana University Press, 1973); Colin Gray, *Nuclear Strategy and National Style* (Lanham, Md.: Hamilton Press, 1986); Asle Toje, *America, the EU and Strategic Culture: renegotiating the transatlantic bargain* (Routledge, 2009); and many more. Wirtz makes the point that “generations” of strategists have debate ways of war, in America, yet “this debate about strategic *military* culture has not been mirrored by a similar discussion about the existence of a specific American approach to intelligence....” Wirtz, “The American approach to Intelligence Studies,” p 28.

⁷³¹ Gray, *Nuclear Strategy and National Style*, p 43.

⁷³² Gray also points out that strategic “[f]acts” tend to be historically bounded” even if some larger strategic cultural ‘legacies’ persist. This reflects an understanding of historical periods of American strategic culture, which have not been identified in intelligence culture. *Ibid*, p 24.

be considered in its own research program. One of the key contributions of this dissertation, then, is offering an enhanced understanding of a single element of national intelligence culture, since intelligence culture theory is not fully advanced to allow well-founded description of its entire landscape. As noted in chapter two, an intelligence culture ‘literature’ as such does not exist. This chapter attempts to further the discussion of intelligence culture in America, in general, but without offering a definitive list.

The approach of this chapter may seem initially, then, to bring together a variety of approaches, but more precisely, the chapters of this thesis each comprise a part reorientation, methodologically, to the study of intelligence culture. They also construct the necessary basis to a theory of intelligence culture. In chapter three an overarching history does not concentrate on only one key text, but tries to highlight the multiple interacting pressures that shaped the intelligence community towards the present. Chapter four’s intellectual history foregrounds clashing epistemological and ontological assumptions instead of trying to define only one ‘dominant’ culture. The present chapter collects more unusual ways intelligence culture has been described, instead of using a norm-only approach (or attempting to describe intelligence culture in total). While these chapters are partial ways of describing intelligence culture, combined, they further the discussion of the national intelligence culture, concluded in chapter five.

The entrée to this chapter is the definition of intelligence. It continues and reflects the Kent-Kendall debates about intelligence as a type of knowledge or way of thinking about predicting the future, and as a mode of acting in the world. Recent definitions are often still updates of Kent’s original formula of intelligence as knowledge, the activity, and

organizations.⁷³³ The definition of intelligence also is the perfect medium to being to show current (re) articulations of intelligence culture. It flushes out into the open the different conceptions of intelligence, and the reasoning behind them.

This chapter serves as a bridge to discuss how intelligence culture is described— towards how Pearl Harbor, as a symbol in intelligence culture, fits into the American culture. As much as it cuts to the heart of our ideas of intelligence, the definition of intelligence cannot show the whole of intelligence culture. Understanding the beliefs and practices of intelligence is more complex – more divisive even, perhaps than the nature of intelligence. Essentially, this chapter opens up the Pandora’s box of intelligence culture, describing intelligence as action, practice, information, attitudes, norms (and normative institutions), and narratives (with Pearl Harbor as a focus). It brings us to the present, finally – to how contemporary intelligence culture is described. While this chapter collects multiple understandings of intelligence culture, making use of norms and interpellative narratives –with reference to Pearl Harbor – chapter six will deal with more specific norms and articulations around Pearl Harbor alone (as a proof-of-concept for national intelligence culture).

Part 1: Intelligence Defined

Definitions of intelligence uncover basic debates about the nature of intelligence. They remain an important source to outline the broad ideational conflicts in American intelligence culture. Definitions make visible articulations, from the commonsense. Davies believes that national ideas of intelligence are found in definitions, showing “fairly fundamental” divergent

view of intelligence.⁷³⁴ These disputations also show that American ideas of intelligence are not settled.

This section is not a study of the correct or appropriate definition. This dissertation cannot offer a *definitive* definition because definitiveness is impossible. Words are a clouded glass to meaning: “Language... opens a not quite transparent window on the abstractions and representations individual speakers glean from their experiential reality.”⁷³⁵ From a constructivist perspective it is detrimental to offer a fixed definition (for this dissertation) instead of allowing the literature to speak for itself. This is critical. Newman writes that definitional “debate itself is an interesting space for considering competing visions of security and international politics, and the study of these”; what is seen as “fruitless and interminable debate” is actually an informative explication.⁷³⁶ Any single definition offered from the position of the dissertation would be contingent, and would interfere with opening the conceptual space for a review of the work itself of defining intelligence. This dissertation argues that what is important and interesting in many cases is not the ‘definitional’ work itself, but the debate over definitions – which reveals real fault lines in ideas of intelligence. Intelligence is what it is understood to be, and what it is defined through, in a particular time and place.

This section of the chapter outlines a number of ways to describe intelligence. A great deal is meant in the definition of what intelligence ‘is.’ This ‘is’ is partial, in the sense that intelligence’s definition is created and constructed. Definitions are partial, just as all language has only a contingent connection to ultimate reality.⁷³⁷ Every definition is a particular articulation of its own present, and conceptual world. “Despite our hopes and pretensions, all

⁷³⁴ Davies, “Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure in Britain and the United States,” p 500.

⁷³⁵ Ernst Von Glasersfeld, *Radical Constructivism: A Way of Knowing and Learning Series 6* (Taylor & Francis, 1995), p 137.

⁷³⁶ Edward Newman, “Critical Human Security Studies,” *Review of International Studies* 36, no.1 (2010): 77–94.

⁷³⁷ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p 56-60.

definitions are partial: ‘Men seek for vocabularies that will be faithful *reflections* of reality. To this end, they must develop vocabularies that are *selections* of reality. And any selection of reality must, in certain circumstances, function as a *deflection* of reality.’⁷³⁸ This section discusses first, then, the nature of definitions and the possibility of defining intelligence; second, the changes in the term etymologically; and, third, the key features of American definitions. This section investigates how intelligence has been constituted as information, action, practice, secret, and foreign.

The Definition and the Real

As an entrée to the shape of current American intelligence culture, this chapter begins by discussing the American definitions of intelligence. In ideal type, definitions can also be descriptive or prescriptive;⁷³⁹ taking the world as it is, or emphasizing how it should be. They may also be nominal, emphasizing the names, instead of the phenomenon behind the world.⁷⁴⁰ All these kinds of definitions are useful here. I take (in this section) as my primary definitional sources the elite (governmental) and academic discussion of intelligence in the American intelligence community (popular culture ideas are discussed in section three).

Intelligence does not exist, objectively, as a thing in the world on which we refine our thoughts. It is a shared concept that exists through our definitions. A definition is composed of precise words, knife-edges between ‘knowledge’ and ‘foreknowledge,’ here and there describing figures (the enemy), with the condition of the world (danger and security) intruding. Foucault

⁷³⁸ Kenneth Burke, *A Grammar of Motives* 2nd ed. cited in Ross Wolin, “The Tactics of Motivation,” *The Rhetorical Imagination of Kenneth Burke* (University of South Carolina Press, 2001) p 156.

⁷³⁹ John Macartney writes: “Note that Shulsky’s definition is prescriptive rather descriptive”; John Macartney, “How Do You Define Intelligence?” *Intelligencer* 6, no. 1 (January 1995): 3–4.

⁷⁴⁰ Thomas F. Troy, “The ‘Correct’ Definition of Intelligence,” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence* 5, no. 4 (1991): 433-454, p 433.

writes that even these precise terms of language are fleshed out in layered meanings: “that an obvious meaning, understood without difficulty by everyone... will finally reveal; that beneath a visible formulation there may reign another that controls it, disturbs it, and imposes on it an articulation of its own; in short, that in one way or another things said say more than themselves.”⁷⁴¹ All explanations of intelligence, all attempts to define it, are partial and, in truth, explain their own context. So, to describe American national intelligence culture must be to chart its definitions (writ large), not to be bounded by them.

As discussed below, Glen Hastedt justifies his definition of intelligence because it essentially reflects American practice. The importance of definitions is that what intelligence is thought to be both reflects practice and also constrains it – it represents expectations around the way of doing things. Psychologists suggest “[o]ur ordering of reality both shapes and “constrains what is meaningful.”⁷⁴² Any definition does not wholly constrain or reflect the practice, and, conversely, the practice does not perfectly reflect the definition. Each shapes the other. It is difficult for some theorists to agree that a definition is not *only* a function of practice, but also a kind of archeology – it reflects common sense, the unthought of, the unpardonable, the conceptual limits of the subject. The puzzling of scholars over the inability to move beyond the ‘intelligence cycle’ diagram (because it does not accurately reflect practice) is symptomatic of this definition/practice confusion.⁷⁴³ A definition tells us not only what intelligence is, but what it is not. Even if the definition leaves out part of practice – if it elides uncomfortable elements of intelligence – this is useful and informative. Practice is only how we label it: if we labelled

⁷⁴¹ Michel Foucault, *The Archeology of Knowledge*.

⁷⁴² Our ordering of reality both shapes and “constrains what is meaningful”, Polly Y. Eisendrath, James James Albert Hall, *Jung’s Self Psychology: A Constructivist Perspective* (Guilford Press 1991), p 14.

⁷⁴³ For example, yearly ISA Panels (and Mark Phythian’s edited volume *Understanding the Intelligence Cycle*). For all the proposals for new conceptions of the cycle, and additions to it – on the basis that it does not reflect practice, the reason for the differences between didactic concepts and practice is sometimes lost. There are reasons, to constructivists, that a concept that does not reflect practice is still taught and used. The principle of intelligence culture itself is that ideas persist beyond their reflection of reality, partly because of their conceptual usefulness. Glenn H. Snyder, “Process Variables in Neorealist Theory,” *Security Studies* 5, no. 3 (1996): 167-192, p 167. Even the Neorealist insistence on parsimony is applicable; that a descriptive theory need not (indeed must not) be identical to an entire picture of the object of theory.

covert action “war” it would then cease to be an intelligence practice (in a certain way).

Intelligence culture is about the *why*: Why are certain elements thought to be intelligence, while other elements are thought not to be, even if in practice they are? In what ways do ideas of intelligence persist and interact with perceptions of the present ? This sometimes uncomfortable relationship between thought and practice may confound empiricists, but it is perfectly suited to the constructivist study of the meanings we construct for the world.

Etymology of Intelligence

The story of the term is one of change.⁷⁴⁴ In America, ‘intelligence’ as a label has achieved significant fixity. This fixity makes ‘intelligence’ appear as the natural or universal label. Yet this can hide alternate possibilities; the tendency is to assume that intelligence is always the overarching term. The word intelligence is not always the preferred term used for the same activities. Matei and Bruneau write that

...the polemic has developed about the term information versus intelligence (in Romania) and vice versa (in Portugal). In Romania, for example, the word “intelligence” refers strictly to “cleverness,” and intelligence agencies have always been called “information agencies” or “secret services.” ... Romanian intelligence practitioners and policymakers are currently endeavoring to introduce “intelligence” into the vocabulary.⁷⁴⁵

Thus in America, the use of intelligence as a sort of ur-textual, originary term, is itself a choice.

With changes in technology intelligence also has new subsidiary activities (data mining); new

⁷⁴⁴ Warner thinks the term has remarkable stability because we still use it to talk about “privileged information” and the related processes – but many uses – particularly intelligence as news, have become uncommon. Michael Warner, “Intelligence as Risk Shifting,” in *Intelligence Theory: Key Questions and Debates* ed. Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin and Mark Phythian (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009) : 16-32, p 16.

⁷⁴⁵ Matei and Bruneau, “Policymakers and Intelligence Reform in the New Democracies,” p 658.

activities that may stay as part of ‘intelligence’ or may wander to new terminology.⁷⁴⁶ With the information society becoming the digitization of all social interaction, intelligence may shift radically in its functional content. The key features are discussed next – not all American definitions display them, but they together describe the landscape of American definitions (and definitional debates).

Another important aspect of intelligence is the welter of what could be called ‘adjacent terms’ (an idea used by Freedman in the political ideologies literature). The related terms ‘espionage’ and ‘spying’ are often not explored in definitions. For example, intelligence as an overarching term, also helps define many subsidiary or adjacent concepts such as counterintelligence, cryptography, analysis, and more. Overarching and subsidiary terms of intelligence also help define it in the American context. While the disciplinary study of intelligence is situated under political science or history, typically (see chapter one and two), Gill and Phythian think surveillance should oversee intelligence as the parent term. This idea is instructive because it destabilizes the idea that ‘intelligence’ is the only applicable term for the term for what we use the label.

Historical usage, pre-dating the American Revolution, shows a number of shifts in common understanding of intelligence. According to Troy, historical usage tended to refer to news/information.⁷⁴⁷ By the 14th century it meant “the faculty of understanding,” then later, the “interchange of information” and came to be associated with the “communications of spies.”⁷⁴⁸

⁷⁴⁶ For example, Dave Clemente, “Cybersecurity,” in *Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies* Ed. Robert Dover, Michael S. Goodman, Claudia Hillebrand (Routledge, 2014).

⁷⁴⁷ Thomas F. Troy writes that news won out for simplicity, and was once synonymous; in “The ‘correct’ definition of intelligence,” p 436/7, he writes that news won out for simplicity, and was once synonymous.

⁷⁴⁸ Troy, “The ‘correct’ definition of intelligence,” p 436.

Because intelligence, however labeled, has a thousand years of practice and use from which definitional variants can draw- a definition that fits centuries of activity would be unwieldy.⁷⁴⁹ Yet definition must reflect the past as genesis. Some work has been done to make intelligence a universal definition – common for all usage. The definition of ‘intelligence’ as mental capacity (studied by psychologists) is usually separated from attempts to define governmental intelligence, but Jim Cox has essayed the formulation of a definition that is amenable to both the scientific and governmental forms and Wheaton & Beerbower have a similar project.⁷⁵⁰ More importantly, the tendency to apply the term intelligence to doing everything that intelligence services may do – from collecting information to analyzing, to action, suggests that a definition reflecting common usage may not always seem historically or etymologically appropriate. Intelligence, however, has become a catholic term, embracing much, and yet both more and less than it was once understood as.

One of the most remarkable features of American definitions is the sense that intelligence *should be* amenable to a universal, or consensus agreement, on its major features. We can see this in the attempts to systematize and extract universal definitions⁷⁵¹ *instead of* explaining why intelligence should be defined as such and why certain elements are understood as intelligence or not. The puzzlement over its recalcitrance, reveals a sense that intelligence should be universal, logical, or discernable. Kahn writes that like ‘news,’ one knows intelligence when one sees it,

⁷⁴⁹ Davies points out that complete buy-in on a new standard definition would be impossible, “any new, post-hoc standard would end up conflicting with a considerable corpus of precedent and practice.” Kristian Gustafson and Philip Davies, “Civilian and Military Approaches to Intelligence,” (presentation, *International Studies Association Annual Conference*, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, March 17, 2011), p 1.

⁷⁵⁰ Cox, “Intelligence: Definitions, Concepts and Governance,”; and Wheaton & Beerbower, “Towards a Definition of Intelligence,” p 319-331.

⁷⁵¹ The most obvious ‘systematization’ attempts are Warner’s “Wanted: A definition of intelligence” but Sherman Kent’s own *Strategic Intelligence* is a kind of systematization, as are other early works such as Bimfort, and Random (Martin T. Bimfort, “A Definition of Intelligence,” *Studies in Intelligence* 2, no. 4 (Fall 1958): 75-78; R. A. Random, “Intelligence as a Science,” *Studies in Intelligence* 2, no. 2 (Spring 1958): 75-79; and continuing to the present; Alan Breakspear, “A New Definition of Intelligence,” *Intelligence and National Security* 28, no. 5 (2013): 678-693; Michael Warner, *Wanted A Definition of ‘Intelligence’* (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2002), 15-22.

but its precise categorization is difficult.⁷⁵² I argue this reflects the persistence of Kent's objective world, or at least an ordered world. Shouldn't something everyone does, and knows, be amenable to a parsing of its elements? In some fields, the variance and recalcitrance of definition could be celebrated – but for intelligence, the desire for a universal, 'unaccented' summation remains. It reflects the idea that the world is amenable to the theory – an annoyance that definitions cannot agree amongst themselves. Kahn writes, seemingly despairing, "None of the definitions that I have seen work."⁷⁵³ This may be more characteristic of the academic study of intelligence, but still points to a particular approach. Virtually all academics in the field have weighed in at some point with a discussion or version of a definition.⁷⁵⁴ Thus the belief in a common definition is itself a feature of American definitions.

American Definitions: Information and Action

American definitions come mainly in two (general) kinds; those that include activity/action, and those that confine it to knowledge/information.⁷⁵⁵ Davies concludes, "[t]his is not merely a semantic difference...."⁷⁵⁶ Comprehended in many American understandings of intelligence is that state both acts, to influence, and (passively) analyzes, to understand – through intelligence.⁷⁵⁷ The controversy in American definitions is over definitions taking intelligence as

⁷⁵² Kahn, "An Historical Theory of Intelligence," p 79.

⁷⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵⁴ Davies cites Shulsky's famous work, as well as Sims, Godson, May and others; Jennifer Sims, "What is Intelligence? Information for decision makers," in *US Intelligence at the Crossroads: Agendas for Reform*, eds. Ernest May, Roy Godson and Gary Schmitt (London: Brassey's, 1995); Michael Herman, "Intelligence and Policy: a Comment," *Intelligence and National Security* 6, no. 1 (January 1991) p 19. See also K.G. Robertson, Richard Betts, etc.

⁷⁵⁵ Each type limits and specifies provisos or types of information or action. The focus here is the reasoning behind definitions that insist intelligence is only information or knowledge, given that those that include action are equally vociferous in America.

⁷⁵⁶ Davies, "Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure in Britain and the United States," p 500.

⁷⁵⁷ Micheal Herman categorizes definitions as narrow (dealing with espionage/secrets and covert action) and broad (intelligence as finished product). I feel "action" and "information" are more illustrative of American definitions or conceptions of intelligence. Michael Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p 114-118.

information (alone) or in essence.⁷⁵⁸ While government and scholarly works use information and action definitions, the definitional divide, and the controversy over it, reflects American thinking about the division between war, peace, and intelligence.⁷⁵⁹ Other persisting ideas of intelligence found in characteristically American definitions, including the foreign/domestic division and secrecy, are discussed subsequently.⁷⁶⁰

Information

It is not hard to see Kentian ideas of science and truth echoing in the insistence that intelligence is only knowledge or information. One of Sherman Kent's formulations called it "[t]he knowledge, which our highly placed civilians and military men must have..."⁷⁶¹ Commonly, American government definitions have tended to call intelligence information – of various kinds ("relating to capabilities, intentions" and the actions of foreign governments, persons, or organizations; or relating to "things foreign – people, places, things, and events..."; or "information that meets the stated or understood needs of policy makers and has been collected, processed, and narrowed to meet those needs").⁷⁶² A frequently cited CIA definition reduces it "to its simplest terms, intelligence is knowledge and foreknowledge of the world

⁷⁵⁸ Warner's argument is that intelligence = information doesn't tell us enough, in "Wanted."

⁷⁵⁹ Der Derian cautions that while intelligence ranges "from purely analytical to violently 'wet' work; and from overtly persuasive to covertly manipulative forms of influence...." "a definitions should go beyond this binary The binary thinking tends to reinforce the "either/or" thinking, or HUMINT or/over TECHINT, analysis over/or policy; good/bad, shaded into a classic ethical division, privileging either one element or the other as superior, mapping the binary as good/bad. *AntiDiplomacy*, p 21.

⁷⁶⁰ Non-American definitions can include these ideas, but the debates over their inclusion, in the American literatures, show particularly American ideas of intelligence. For example, Davies notes a focus on secrecy in the British understanding of intelligence, but it stems from completely unique circumstances ("In British usage, then, "intelligence production" means raw intelligence collection," Davies, "Divergent National Concepts," p 14). Thus while secrecy is an element of definitions of intelligence in many countries, it reflects a particular context and set of articulations, as well as a unique historical development.

⁷⁶¹ This definition is in reference to strategic intelligence- Kent's full definition is the tripartite one. Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy* p 83.

⁷⁶² Abridged Department of Defense definition of defense intelligence, cited in David Thomas, "US Military Intelligence Analysis: Old and New Challenges," in *Analyzing Intelligence*, eds. Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce (Washington DC.: Georgetown Press, 2008) p 139 – and similar to a number of government definitions; Aspin-Brown Commission (1996) "Introduction," p 5; Lowenthal, *Intelligence* (2006) p 1.

around us- the prelude to decision and action by U.S. policymakers.⁷⁶³ Intelligence as information remains prevalent in current usage: the DNI's website has defined intelligence as "[a] body of evidence and the conclusions drawn therefrom that is acquired and furnished in response to the known or perceived requirements of consumers. It is often derived from information that is concealed or not intended to be available for use by the acquirer."⁷⁶⁴

Wheaton and Beerbower – in an attempt to apply an 'intelligence' definition to multiple areas – find that intelligence is often information in American definitions.⁷⁶⁵ Prominent academics have also adopted the knowledge/information conceptualization. Troy writes that "intelligence is...knowledge of the enemy."⁷⁶⁶ Kahn's widely read *Historical Theory of Intelligence*, also uses the definition of intelligence "in the broadest sense as information" to draw out the transition of obtaining information "from physical objects" to the human ability to "obtain it from words."⁷⁶⁷ Loch Johnson's definition also sees it as knowledge and foreknowledge.⁷⁶⁸ It is understood as specific kind of information: Davies suggests that the American "... definition includes the collection of raw information, but the end result does not become 'intelligence' as such until it has been thoroughly analyzed. Hence, in the US context, intelligence production means analytical production."⁷⁶⁹ The vast digitization of communications has also prompted the reflection that in the information age, even if it is other things, intelligence

⁷⁶³ The CIA Consumer's Guide to Intelligence, originates this, which is cited in a number of sources including Roger George, "Intelligence And Strategy," in *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, eds. John Baylis, James J. Wirtz, Colin S. Gray (Oxford University Press, 2013) p 153.

⁷⁶⁴ The definition concludes, It is often derived from information that is concealed or not intended to be available for use by the acquirer – but Beerbower and Wheaton are most concerned by 'evidence' which is "aimed at proving something true or false" compared to the more common "foreknowledge." It is cited by a number of others (including "Balancing Privacy Rights and Intelligence Needs," in Ed. Lee Freeman, A. Graham Peace, *Information Ethics: Privacy and Intellectual Property* others); The definition was changed post-2006. Cited in Wheaton and Beerbower, "Towards a New Definition of Intelligence," p 322.

⁷⁶⁵ They write from the perspective of library science. Specifically they cite the IRTPA of 2004 which "represents the most significant intelligence-related legislation since the original National Security Act" amending the 1993 definition, but remains an intelligence = information definition. Wheaton and Beerbower, "Towards a New Definition of Intelligence," p 323 -324.

⁷⁶⁶ In the tradition of Constantine Fitz Gibbon; Troy, "the 'correct' definition of intelligence," p 433.

⁷⁶⁷ Kahn, "An Historical Theory of Intelligence," p 80. In discussing theories of intelligence in general, Kahn expands this to "historical, mathematical, and psychological." Gregory F. Treverton, Seth G. Jones, Steven Boraz and Phillip Lipsky, *Toward a Theory of Intelligence Workshop Report* (Arlington, VA: RAND Corp., 2006) p 3.

⁷⁶⁸ Johnston specifies it as knowledge sought "in response to external threats and to protect their vital interests, especially the well-being of their own people" cited in Warner, "Wanted," FN 31.

⁷⁶⁹ Davies, "Ideas of Intelligence," p 13. Davies is also critiqued on his assessment of this difference, for neglecting the JIC process as similar in creating a finished product.

will become primarily, about information. Berkowitz and Goodman wrote that “[i]f one theme runs throughout... it is *intelligence is information*. To understand intelligence issues and problems, it helps to look at what is going on in the world of information as a whole.”⁷⁷⁰

The early military experience in American also saw intelligence as information;⁷⁷¹

Warner writes that the military definition of American intelligence flowed from the World War I experience and in 1924, American William Sweeney used the idea of intelligence as information about both the enemy and terrain, to define it as “information of the enemy or military forces of the enemy that has been collected, tabulated, measured as to its possible value...”⁷⁷² By WWII, Warner writes that two conclusions were reached about intelligence by the military: “First, it is essentially information ... second, intelligence is not operations.”⁷⁷³ Davies believes that it is civilian and military approaches often condition a definitional preference for intelligence as information or as espionage. Each service needs “the idea of intelligence to do something profoundly different”: “Civilians... tend to talk about intelligence as espionage while uniformed service personnel and institutions (both military and law enforcement) tend to take a broader approach seeing it in terms of research, analysis, knowledge-management and overall information-support to decision-making.”⁷⁷⁴ These differences may be one reason a universal American definition has so far not become standard. However, more can be found in information definitions than a simple military/civilian culture distinction.

⁷⁷⁰ Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman, “Preface,” *Best Truth: Intelligence in the Information Age* (New Haven : Yale University Press, 2000), p x.

⁷⁷¹ Civilian and military services (with separate strategic cultures) have differences in definition, but the tendency in American definitions (with exceptions) is not to deal with military aspects.

⁷⁷² Warner, “Intelligence as Risk Shifting,” p 26.

⁷⁷³ *Ibid*, p 26.

⁷⁷⁴ Kristian Gustafson and Philip Davies, “Civilian and Military Approaches to Intelligence,” (presentation, International Studies Association Annual Conference, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, March 17, 2011).

Informational definitions highlight a couple of important points. First, that it is perhaps simpler to define intelligence as information, and so these shorter definitions may be expedient – as Troy suggests of the term intelligence itself. Second, clearly intelligence as knowledge or information only – echoes Sherman Kent’s predictive⁷⁷⁵ estimative or warning information– and has continued to make itself felt in American understanding. *Intelligence Theory: Key Questions and Debates*, argues that the reason for “the evolution of usage mirrors the evolution of systems, and vice versa” during the 20th century.⁷⁷⁶ These American definitions served the new “‘departmental’ intelligence establishments” and definitions were constructed from the need to have a “definition for national missions” and larger coordinated interests.⁷⁷⁷ Intelligence definitions here show the hallmarks of their interlinked development with the American foreign policy establishment, and departmental research bureaus. The wartime faith in card files and social science research (expressed by Kent, Pettee and others) was embraced by the new American professional bureaucracy, and would be expressed in persisting ideas of intelligence as information.⁷⁷⁸ Third, interpellatively, America’s imagined isolation – discussed later in this section - might help dictate the emphasis on intelligence as information. If America is not menaced by enemies but disconnected from the rest of the “great powers” – isolation implies a lack of knowledge or understanding, requiring information. The longstanding foreign policy debate over isolationism and the grand strategy for the new American superpower, would split over whether a new role would be undergirded by (secret and overt) action or information alone. American grand strategy has faced this problem repeatedly; the pressure of isolationists has often made covert action more attractive; yet any action still raises the debate over whether any

⁷⁷⁵ The term is used in analysis – see *The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence*. ed Loch K. Johnson (2010), p 65 - and Pillar “Predictive Intelligence, Policy Support or Spectator Sport?” p 25.

⁷⁷⁶ Phythian, “Intelligence Theory.”

⁷⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷⁸ Hoffman famously chronicles this “American Social Science” of International Relations and the formation of the American foreign policy establishment in Stanley Hoffman, “An American Social Science: International Relations,” *Daedalus*, 106, no. 3 (Summer, 1977): 41-60 (esp pp 49).

intervention is destabilizing.⁷⁷⁹ Action or information reflects, then, a broader geopolitical sensibility, a positioning in isolationism v. internationalism, and a conception of America's mission and the nature and possibility of meeting threats.

Finally, 'information' definitions split on what kind of information intelligence is understood to be. Information as knowledge of the enemy, raises the specter of a Kendallian conflictual world. Yet intelligence as foreknowledge emphasizes intelligence as a kind of knowledge that is *predictive*; on that has a being in the future (from a more Kantian understanding of the 'ticker-tape' of history). Intelligence may also be information characterized by secrecy (discussed further in the section on Secrecy: definitions below). Thus the type of knowledge intelligence is understood as differs. The consequences of these kinds of different understandings of knowledge were explored in chapter four. Intelligence as information/knowledge clearly forms a component of the conceptual space of American intelligence. The next type of definitions discussed do not reject intelligence as information, but crucially, insist that it is not only (or primarily) so.

Action

American definitions emphasize the active aspect of intelligence. This manifests in two ways: first, in the inclusion of covert action and an emphasis on espionage and counter-espionage and counterintelligence; and second, in the articulation of the competitive/ conflictual or dangerous aspect of intelligence or the world. Sims' definition is an example of the latter.

⁷⁷⁹ ISIS/ISL has been the most recent subject of this debate- with activists, and some experts, arguing that American intervention caused or created the group (or at least fueled its extremism) through intervention. [for example, code pink- <http://www.thewire.com/politics/2014/09/codepink-isnt-having-obamas-new-war-against-isis/380281/> or <http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2014/06/isis-the-slow-insurgency-kowcast-vol-1/>].

Sims defines as intelligence “the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information for decision makers engaged in a competitive enterprise,” – highlighting a classic Kendallian-style assumption of intelligence as a competition against an adversary.⁷⁸⁰ The other type of active definition, including covert action or counterintelligence, is also common (for example in Shulsky and Godson).⁷⁸¹ Warner’s essay on the definition of intelligence sees the “missing ingredient,” as he calls it, from previous definitional attempts, as being activities conducted under secrecy – i.e. operations including covert actions or other campaigns of influence.⁷⁸² Warner argues that intelligence is “[i]nvolved in influencing foreign entities by means that are attributable to the acting government (if the activities are open and declared, they are the provenance of diplomacy; if they utilize uniformed members of the armed forces, they belong to the military).”⁷⁸³ While this seems to exclude some forms of military intelligence, it does conceptually strike a broad base for many kinds of interventions.⁷⁸⁴

There are strongly opposed views, however, to Warner’s.⁷⁸⁵ An interesting exchange is Warner’s critique of Gill and Phythian’s for being excessively ‘defensive’: “to wit, the emphasis on “security” can be seen to neglect the offensive and aggressive uses of intelligence to gain or

⁷⁸⁰ This definition does not specify covert action, which Sims contends is actually policy-making; Timothy R. Sample, “A Federal Approach to Domestic Intelligence,” *Vaults, Mirrors, and Masks: rediscovering U.S. counterintelligence*, eds. Jennifer E. Sims and Burton Gerber (Washington, D.C. : Georgetown University Press, 2009), 254.

⁷⁸¹ Hastedt singles out Godson’s addition of covert action as a definition worthy of particular note. Glenn Hastedt, “Controlling Intelligence: Defining the Problem,” in *Controlling Intelligence*, ed. Glenn P. Hastedt (Ny NY: Frank Cass & Co, 1991) p 6 &7.

⁷⁸² Micheal Warner, “Wanted,” p 19.

⁷⁸³ Michael Warner, “Wanted,” p 21.

⁷⁸⁴ It also has some interesting parallels with the idea of the three sovereign encounters, from IR – where diplomacy is the open interaction of states, while war is the punctuation of these normal relations with the violent encounter of sovereignties – which Der Derian ultimately argues are undermined by “Spies speed and terror/surveillance” in “The (S)pace of International Relations: Simulation, Surveillance, and Speed,” *International Studies Quarterly* 34, no.3 (Sept 1998): 295-310.

⁷⁸⁵ One opponent stated “I consider, as Congress does, counterintelligence and covert action to be Intelligence Related Activities. They are very important, in my view, but they are not intelligence per se.” Intelligence is not “...policy or policymaking, police or law enforcement, special operations, or green berets.” Macartney, “How Do You Define Intelligence?”

expand power.”⁷⁸⁶ While the authors accede, they note that the Neo-Realist view (of a more aggressive or conflictual world) isn’t necessarily the basis of all definitions.⁷⁸⁷ Yet we can see how little has changed in the ‘action’ assumption, from the work of a reviewer of Kent’s *Strategic Intelligence*, writing that “[i]ntelligence derives its *raison d’être* from conflict, whether in times of peace or war.”⁷⁸⁸

This is a key feature of action definitions; their portrait of the world outside. Action definitions are the conceptual reverse image to that of isolationism: an interpellation an America, menaced by existential threats – Pearl Harbor in a line with the Alamo. World War Two stands as the final lesson for interventionists (exemplified in the very American strains of Realism). For American ‘hawks,’ the teaching of WWII was that Germany, and indeed no state, could be trusted to relinquish the *animus dominandi*, Hans Morgenthau’s will to dominate.⁷⁸⁹ Thus Pearl Harbor is a reminder that isolation is never enough; action is required. Passivity – ignoring European power politics and intelligence matters (such as the famous closing of the Black Chamber) – saw America embroiled in both world wars nonetheless. Thus isolation, while seductive, was ultimately profitless. This represented a conceptual reorientation.⁷⁹⁰ Bidwell argued in 1946, “[i]solation versus international co-operation was for twenty years the issue at the heart of all discussions of American foreign policy. The Japanese put an end to that controversy at Pearl Harbor. If, after that disaster, there were any who were still confident of the

⁷⁸⁶ The original definition includes covert action - “Intelligence is the umbrella term referring to the range of activities – from planning and information collection to analysis and dissemination – conducted in secret, and Where deemed desirable, covert activities”. Warner, “Intelligence as Risk Shifting,” p 19.

⁷⁸⁷ Warner, “*Intelligence As Risk Shifting*,” p 30, FN 37.

⁷⁸⁸ Harold M Greenberg, “Intelligence of the Past, Intelligence for the Future,” in *Strategic Intelligence: Understanding the hidden side of government*, ed Loch K. Johnson (Westport, Conn. : Praeger Security International, 2007), p 173.

⁷⁸⁹ Hans Morgenthau, *Scientific Man vs Power Politics* University of Chicago Press, 1946). On the German threat – and the Neo-Realist perspective- see Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*.

⁷⁹⁰ Maybee argues that the initial phase of American power was always markedly different from other states in that it relied both on its military for “expansion” and it is democratic form and limited government were always “very important to its foreign policy.” For Maybee, these would continue to find expression in the critical “moment” of the post-WWII genesis of American superpower. Maybee, *Understanding American Power*, p 15.

ability of the United States to live in security, untroubled by the fear of attack, they were convinced of their error by the atomic bomb.”⁷⁹¹ Bidwell concluded that the creed of a “new school of foreign policy” in America (a Realist one) was to first promote the security of its own people; second, to resist any outside interventions in its own, western, hemisphere; and third, to oppose domination by any power of Europe or Asia.⁷⁹² Thus the security of its peoples became assured by international intervention. Intelligence would be part of the attempt to act in this so-called new creed. ‘Active’ definitions, then seem to reflect a (Neo)Realist or perhaps Kendallian view of the necessity of action.

Having already discussed the Kendallian emplacement of covert action in intelligence in chapter four, it is apparent action definitions are in line with intelligence articulations of an ‘opportunity oriented’ or interventionist view of American action in the world. However, action definitions can be parsed as reflecting another concern: the domestic necessity of intelligence. The second key feature of action definitions is their communication of the necessity of intelligence. The link to articulations of competition, security, danger, and secrecy in ‘active’ definitions seem emplaced to demonstrate a rationale for intelligence services, even in the absence of a perceived need for direct external action. The disdain in information definitions for the popular assumption that intelligence is ‘James Bond and secrets’⁷⁹³ represents a desire to communicate the truth of the bureaucratic nature of modern American intelligence. Action definitions take an opposing point of view for a different reason; they do not aim simply to emphasize espionage as part of intelligence, but are part of a discourse that shows that

⁷⁹¹ Percy W. Bidwell, “Ideals in American Foreign Policy,” *International Affairs* 22, no. 4 (Oct., 1946): 479-487, p 479.

⁷⁹² Bidwell, “Ideals in American Foreign Policy,” p 484.

⁷⁹³ According to Lord, the portmanteau term created for this perception, by a historian, is *jamesbonderie*. Kristin M Lord, “National Intelligence in the Age of Transparency,” in *Strategic Intelligence Vol 1: Understanding the hidden side of government*, ed. Loch K. Johnson (Westport, Conn. : Praeger Security International, 2007), p 185.

intelligence is a dirty, dangerous, and necessary game to a superpower.⁷⁹⁴ Active definitions emphasize that the mere existence of other ‘adversaries’ conducting intelligence in their own way means that America is at risk, and the articulation of security emphasizes the need for intelligence for all purposes, domestic and international. I argue that action definitions maintain the conceit of intelligence as a form of power.⁷⁹⁵ Action definitions assert and articulate both the internal and external necessity of intelligence. Compared with action definitions, intelligence qua information diminishes the perceived power of intelligence, because it must be acted on or disseminated to be ‘useful’ or relevant.⁷⁹⁶ The capacity for action become power itself; Jones writes “[t]he ultimate object of intelligence is to enable action to be optimized.”⁷⁹⁷

Practice

Linked to active definitions, the ‘intelligence is intelligence’ definition – intelligence is what it does – is also common in America. While many kinds of definitions stem from practice, descriptive definitions are considered American because of the influence of American empiricism and behavioralism. Davies has written, for example, that American definitions are shaped by “[t]he behavioralist undercurrent in political and policy thinking.”⁷⁹⁸ Sherman Kent’s early practical definition is often the pattern for later definitions.⁷⁹⁹ In Lowenthal’s

⁷⁹⁴ In general, Shulsky and Schmitt exemplify this in Shulsky and Schmitt, *Silent Warfare*.

⁷⁹⁵ Marrin conceives of intelligence and “streams of power” in government, where intelligence is the lookout for dangers and opportunities – and essentially functions to derive the “most effective and efficient use of power.” Stephen Marrin, “United States,” in *Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies*, eds. Robert Dover, Michael S. Goodman, Claudia Hillebrand (Routledge, 2013), p 146. Micheal Herman calls intelligence a kind of state power *Intelligence Power in Peace and War* (1999) p 2.

⁷⁹⁶ Jensen et al. write that dissemination, in the intelligence cycle, may be the most important phase because it can “make or break the process” as a whole. Carl J. Jensen, David H. McElreath and Melissa Graves “Putting it All Together: the Intelligence cycle,” *Introduction to Intelligence Studies* (Boca Raton, FL: Taylor and Francis, 2013), p 161.

⁷⁹⁷ R. V. Jones writes about not only intelligence and action, but the decision for action – however, these articulations show the key place of intelligence-for-action or intelligence-as-action holds. Additionally, as Herman points out, in Michael Handel’s assessment, intelligence, as a force multiplier, also functions as conserver of power. Michael Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*, p 138.

⁷⁹⁸ Davies, “Ideas of Intelligence: Divergent National Concepts and Institutions,” p 63.

⁷⁹⁹ Kent’s definition is that it is a kind of knowledge, organizations that produce this knowledge, and the activities of those organizations. Herman 1996 follows this. His formula is followed closely by Laqueur and others. Walter Laqueur, *A World of Secrets: The Uses and Limits of*

process/practice⁸⁰⁰ definition: “Intelligence is the process by which specific types of information important to national security are requested, collected, analyzed, and provided to policymakers; the products of that process; the safeguarding of these processes and this information by counterintelligence activities; and the carrying out of operations as requested by lawful authorities.”⁸⁰¹ The final modifier – “lawful authorities” – reflects the concern, which we will see in section three, with unlicensed or unauthorized activities (such as the Iran Contra scandal).⁸⁰² Here we can see the operation of practice/process as a tool of definition-making. It allows the assertion that intelligence is what it has typically been; yet the definer cannot allow any and all practice to constitute intelligence, since this would include unacceptable practices or abuses of intelligence, such as the partisan and unsanctioned intelligence gathering of Hoover’s FBI. ‘Practice’ definitions, then, require more clear limitations. This exercise points us to the edges of definitions, and how their uses and articulations reflect deeper concerns in national intelligence.

If we choose to define intelligence by its practices – we might extrapolate that intelligence can be whatever is needful; this is classic American pragmatic realism, contending that whatever must be done should be. This pragmatic approach to the content of intelligence could be linked to a similar idea set around intelligence oversight/control – that its needs are dictated by practice. Applied to oversight or control, what becomes paramount is not fixing concrete ethical or moral boundaries, but defining limits situationally or post-hoc.⁸⁰³ Limit-

Intelligence (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1985), p 12. Kent’s descriptive definition precedes Lowenthal’s product/process definition. Warner notes the similarity with Sherman Kent’s work in “Prospects For the National Intelligence Service 1946,” Warner, “Wanted,” p 17-18.

⁸⁰⁰ On practice v process, some definitions focus on process, which Lowenthal mentions, but Jackson and Siegel argue it is misleading to divide “approaches that define intelligence as information and those that understand it as a process” because there is always a relationship among process and product. Peter Jackson and Jennifer Siegel, “Introduction,” in *Intelligence and Statecraft: The Use and Limits of Intelligence in International Society*, eds. Peter J. Jackson, Jennifer L. Siegel (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2005), p 3.

⁸⁰¹ Lowenthal, *From Secrets to Policy*, 2006, p 9, (also cited by Warner, “Wanted”).

⁸⁰² Lee H. Hamilton and Daniel K. Inouye, *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran/Contra Affair* 100th Congress 1st Session (Nov 13 1987), Chapter 25, and p 496- 497.

⁸⁰³ This operates at the personal level, by placing the intelligence officer as the primary moral agent (who makes individual choices on rule and

making in both cases is left for later concretization. This kind of definition suggests that American ethical and legal limits coexist with practice, but are diffuse or delegated. Glen Hastedt's own conclusion is that actual American intelligence activity, dating back to the OSS, "requires that any discussion of controlling intelligence encompass covert action and counter-intelligence."⁸⁰⁴ This definition frames for Hastedt intelligence as crucially offering a "'third option' between the application of large amounts of military force and doing nothing when confronted by foreign policy challenges or when they see opportunities for furthering state goals."⁸⁰⁵ Using practice as the core 'field' from which to draw a definition is an important definitional choice. Hastedt and others also use practice as subsidiary justification for action, and opportunity oriented analysis (see section three on warrants).

Other ideas of intelligence also emerge from American definitions. Warner's conclusion, in a widely cited article reviewing the most prominent definitions in the field, is that "[i]ntelligence is secret state activity to understand or influence foreign entities."⁸⁰⁶ This points to two prominent and common features of American definitions – the importance of secrecy and the foreign/domestic division – which I examine in more detail in the sub-sections below. These features are not always included in American definitions, but their frequent recurrence still demonstrates their position as important and persistent articulations of intelligence.

Secrecy: Definitions and Articulations

ethic-following). Jennifer Morgan Jones, "Is Ethical Intelligence A Contradiction in Terms?" in *Ethics of Spying: A Reader for the Intelligence Professional*, ed. Jan Goldman (Scarecrow Press, 2005), p 29. On the institutional level, the American attitude has often been to respond to abuses instead of setting up strong oversight, preferring "aftersight" or post scandal firefighting. Johnson, *National Security Intelligence*, p 161. Hildebrand indicates there has often been an ignorance or a kind of groupthink about even asking the question about ethical and legal limits on intelligence. Claudia Hillebrand, "Intelligence Oversight and Accountability," in *Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies*, eds. Robert Dover, Michael S. Goodman, Claudia Hillebrand (Routledge, 2014), p 305.

⁸⁰⁴ Hastedt, "Controlling Intelligence: Defining the Problem," p 8.

⁸⁰⁵ Hastedt defines intelligence three ways – once in terms of "analysed information", and "counterintelligence" and then as the third option, "in terms of covert action." Hastedt, "Controlling Intelligence: Defining the Problem," p8.

⁸⁰⁶ Michael Warner, "Wanted."

Secrecy is a core part of many intelligence services, but in America it has important and resilient articulations. The longstanding debate over secrecy as the defining feature of intelligence suggests a conceptual fault line worthy of investigation. D.P. Moynihan once charged American intelligence with a ‘culture of secrecy’; many American definitions in fact insist that secrecy is fundamental to intelligence.⁸⁰⁷ Warner uses a series of famous works to support secrecy’s importance in defining intelligence, concluding, “[i]ndeed, secrecy is the key to the definition of intelligence[...]. Without secrets, it is not intelligence.”⁸⁰⁸ Warner’s definition echoes much of the American literature. Secrecy is so central to American conceptions of intelligence that intelligence is not ‘intelligence’ without it, for many.⁸⁰⁹ Shulsky goes so far as to question whether open research (such as Kent’s Great Frusina case example) “should be considered ‘intelligence’ and why it should be located in the intelligence agencies.”⁸¹⁰

Secrecy has also been an important part of American definitions historically. An oft-cited, early definition from *Studies in Intelligence* is that: “Intelligence is the official, secret collection and processing of information on foreign countries to aid in formulating and implementing foreign policy, and the conduct of covert activities abroad to facilitate the implementation of foreign policy.”⁸¹¹ In that definition, “official” does the work of separating private information gathering from intelligence. However, the secrecy articulation is used as

⁸⁰⁷ Moynihan was commenting on the lack of a culture of accountability; yet secrecy is understood by American definitions in both senses – as the pursuit of secret information, and as a process conducted under secrecy. The idea of a culture of secrecy is discussed in Sergo A. Mikoyan, “Eroding the Soviet ‘Culture of Secrecy,’” *Studies in Intelligence* (Fall/Winter 2001).

⁸⁰⁸ Warner, “Wanted,” p 20.

⁸⁰⁹ Gill writes about the debate over secrecy as a “necessary” condition for intelligence, and identifies Jennifer Sims as one of the few in opposition. Peter Gill, “Theories of Intelligence: Where are We, Where Should We Go and How Might We Proceed?” in *Intelligence Theory: Key Questions and Debates* eds. Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin, Mark Phythian (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), p 214. Other discussions include Lowenthal *From Secrets to Policy*, Chapter 13.

⁸¹⁰ Shulsky and Schmitt, *Silent Warfare*, p 164. Recalling the discussion of the Kent-Kendall debate, in chapter four of this dissertation, secrecy is perhaps here a talisman against the Kentian open epistemological commitments discussed at length in that chapter. Kentian ideas imply the continuity of open and secret research, while secrecy, by contrast, a Kendallian approach differentiates different kinds or processes of research.

⁸¹¹ Random, “Intelligence as a Science,” *Studies in Intelligence* (Spring 1958) p. 76 (declassified).

another way to differentiate intelligence (in kind) from police work, or business ‘intelligence.’⁸¹²

A discussion of counterintelligence demonstrates this: Warner writes that Bimfort’s definitional use of secrecy, but not counterintelligence, is flawed because it misses that “an activity that is official and secret ipso facto implies subsidiary activities to keep it secret.”⁸¹³ Work similar to counterintelligence is done by law enforcement and investigative works by businesses – but what makes it intelligence, for proponents, is that it has to be done secretly. Secrecy, at all stages of the intelligence process, in this concept, makes intelligence distinct from all other forms of research and investigation.

Exploring this articulation is worthwhile for intelligence culture. It seems common sense-ical that intelligence must be conducted in secret; however strong the association, secrecy is not, of necessity, articulated to intelligence for the reason that every articulation is created and not “natural”.⁸¹⁴ Counterfactually, intelligence could be articulated to openness/democracy – according to the extreme democratic principle that even if its security is at stake, all activities of the state must be conducted approaching full openness.⁸¹⁵ It is the strength of secrecy-related norms that makes this idea difficult to imagine.⁸¹⁶ In American history, the strength of secrecy related norms has sometimes pitted secrecy against efficiency, and at extremes, against even overall effectiveness (one could argue that the belief in secrecy’s paramountcy played a role in the lack of cooperation before 9.11).⁸¹⁷ The American norms of secrecy in intelligence are not

⁸¹² Warner, “Wanted,” p 20.

⁸¹³ Warner, “Wanted,” p 23.

⁸¹⁴ Weldes comments, on articulations, that “[t]he creation of common sense occurs, that is, because representations of the world that are constructed are treated as if they were directly observable and natural.” Weldes, “Constructing National Interests,” p 304

⁸¹⁵ Patrice McDermott, “Building Open Government,” *Government Information Quarterly* 27 (2010) 401-413.

⁸¹⁶ Recently, open government and freedom of internet/information activists have been pushing back against the secrecy norm- those who argue “information wants to be free” find it difficult to convince insiders who are socialized to the secrecy norm, such that the debates over Snowden, the NSA and oversight of intelligence have become frozen between these groups.

⁸¹⁷ For “over-secrecy, and compartmentalization”, Handel cites McLachlan’s *Room39* pp 360, 362-3 in Betts, “Politicization of Intelligence: Costs and Benefits,” p 57.

absolute; yet despite American foundational values democracy and openness⁸¹⁸ – most seem unable to conceptualize intelligence without some level of secrecy: “[t]here is a near universal consensus that some measure of secrecy is justified and necessary to protect authorized national security activities, such as intelligence gathering and military operations.”⁸¹⁹ Sherman Kent’s discussion of this problem in the early years of the Cold War is the best way to understand the development of the multi-part articulation of security, secrecy, and intelligence; Zwerling writes “[t]he implications of the Yale report strike profound cords today....”⁸²⁰

As Sherman Kent noted in some depth in *The Yale Report*– an account of a group of estimators trying to determine how much the Soviets could determine about America from only open sources – in the early 1950s America may have actually been poised to put in place a more open intelligence system. The move to greater openness was halted (in part) in the exercise described in the titular *Yale Report*, which inflamed fears that the Soviet iron control of information put America at a disadvantage, when America could get little ‘vital’ information about its adversary.⁸²¹ A different, less ‘closed’ foe may have led to a less secrecy-centric approach in the American intelligence system. Other events and currents reinforced the move to, and the importance of, secrecy.⁸²² “Regardless of how it originated...a fixation on secret sources

⁸¹⁸ Turner seems to indicate that openness is the opposite, in American perceptions, of secrecy. Turner, “A Distinctive U.S. Intelligence Identity,” p 50.

⁸¹⁹ Steven Aftergood, “National Security Secrecy: How the Limits Change,” *Social Research* 77, no. 3 (2010): 839-852, p 839.

⁸²⁰ David Price, “Uninvited Guests: A Short History of the CIA on Campus,” in *The CIA on Campus: Essays on Academic Freedom and the National Security State*, ed. Philip Zwerling, (Jefferson NC: McFarland & Co, 2011), p 36.

⁸²¹ The Yale report was the common name for a specific, specially constructed National Intelligence Survey. Only open source were used by estimators, in an exercise to guess at how the Kremlin would itself formally estimate American capabilities. It began, according to Kent as a way to determine how soviet intelligence thought about America, and thus what their policies towards America would be. Estimators assembled an unnervingly complete picture of American capabilities, inflaming fears of how much information about America remained un-secret. Sherman Kent, “Yale Report,” This response is not, however, the ‘necessary’ one; an alternate response would be that if so much was available openly, then America could better cooperate with the other superpower. One can see, as Kent did, that the parameters of the exercise were designed to show the importance of secrecy, from the start. See also Robin Winks, *Cloak & Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939-1961* 2nd Ed (Bookcrafters: Chelsea Michigan, 1987) p 457-461.

⁸²² Russian counter-intelligence successes also ensured the paranoia that came to rule the compartmentalized American classification system. These successes and “aggressive counterintelligence” are detailed in Tennent H. Bagley, *Spy Wars: Moles, Mysteries, and Deadly Games* (Yale University Press, 2007), p 130-132. 2007. Bagley also asserts that during the war moles were placed in the OSS, and were purportedly in the early CIA as well.

now amounts to a debilitating cognitive bias,” opines Sims.⁸²³ Ideas about secrecy persisted, moving to the level of cultural beliefs rather than a response to a clear threat. Even Kent’s account of the *Yale Report*⁸²⁴ demonstrates that secrecy has been not only understood as the best way to protect the state, but considered an end in itself, becoming itself a kind of security.

The demonstrably widespread secrecy-intelligence articulation has remained one of the stronger elements of intelligence culture.⁸²⁵ Once secrecy is strongly articulated to intelligence – so that it becomes unquestioned – it comes to constrain what action and policy is thought of as appropriate. If intelligence is a kind of information made valuable by secrets, the analysis and collection of intelligence is patterned by this understanding. To many Americans, security rests on secrecy, and secrecy means intelligence.⁸²⁶ Secrecy has been a cardinal articulation in American intelligence culture as a whole. The 9.11 Commission found that “excessive secrecy left the nation needlessly ill-prepared for the threat of terrorism” and the left the public uninformed.⁸²⁷ We can see at present more of the effect of the secrecy-intelligence articulation through the addition of the (related) secrecy-security link (as noted by Gill).⁸²⁸ The articulations joining secrecy to security also link intelligence to security, forming a triumvirate of secrecy-security-intelligence. That is, where secrecy and intelligence are linked, first, and secrecy and security are linked, second, security and intelligence are also implicitly linked. I argue this is actually an understudied and very important articulation, the unconscious binding of security to intelligence; security *as* intelligence. The articulation of security to intelligence is infrequently

⁸²³ Sims argues that Americans believe in “secrets”. Sims, “Understanding Ourselves,” p 37.

⁸²⁴ Sherman Kent, “The Yale Report.”

⁸²⁵ On recent work on the prevalence of American secrecy, the *Washington Post* series “Top Secret America,” <http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/articles/editors-note/>; and additionally the Pulitzer prize winning series, from the AP, “AP’s Probe Into NYPD Intelligence Operations,” <http://www.ap.org/Index/AP-In-The-News/NYPD>

⁸²⁶ Bigo, focusing more on democracy and surveillance, still notes that “Security is this a joint venture between timely information, surveillance and intelligence capacity...” and is part of a securitization of citizens. Didier Bigo, “Security, Surveillance and Democracy,” in *Routledge Handbook of Surveillance Studies*, eds. Kirstie Ball, Kevin Haggerty, David Lyon (Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2012) p 277.

⁸²⁷ Aftergood, “National Security Secrecy: How the Limits Change,” p 840.

⁸²⁸ In the discussion of intelligence as the defining characteristic of intelligence, Gill suggests that all systems with *security* as their focus require secrecy. This is a form of the secrecy-security articulation. Gill, “Theories of Intelligence,” p 214.

discussed in critical security studies.⁸²⁹ The implications for policy are important: the post 9.11 security focused intelligence measures would have been in many ways incomprehensible to a society that did not understand intelligence, and secrecy, as security.⁸³⁰

‘Security’ is a central, fundamental concept to multiple aspects of practice, policy, etc. It shapes a core contention of what the state is: to provide security to citizens – an issue that strikes at the legitimacy of all government, the need to obey laws, and the powers of the government compared with the rights of citizens.⁸³¹ Binding security and intelligence together through this multi-part articulation, positions intelligence as a kind of foundational concept – suggesting the state itself cannot exist without intelligence to support it. This articulation is not so old; yet the cold war solidified for America that the state ‘needs’ secrecy as it aims at its security (instead of any other equally plausible aims, such as freedom or growth (as would be dictated by other articulations or ideologies).⁸³² The law, or other forms of limit, cannot constrain something so fundamental to security, in this articulation.

In forming the secrecy-intelligence link, then, there is much more at stake than meets the eye. If security requires secrecy, it becomes more difficult to design accountability systems (although not impossible). Certain kinds of oversight, or more likely, ‘aftersight’ mechanisms

⁸²⁹For example, see Zygmunt Bauman, Didier Bigo, Paulo Esteves, Elspeth Guild, Vivienne Jabri, David Lyon, and R. B. J. Walker. "After Snowden: Rethinking the Impact of Surveillance," *International Political Sociology* 8, no. 2 (2014): 121-144. Particularly, the field has only lately has understood intelligence to be an important focus, rather than simply risk, war, borders, etc.– and still concentrate on the practices of intelligence and surveillance (critical studies’ preferred focus) rather than its conceptual implications). Bigo, “Security, surveillance and democracy,” p 281.

⁸³⁰ From a critical perspective, for example, see Bigo’s “Security, Surveillance and Democracy.” I argue that the particular shape of American intelligence culture was what also allowed the administration to suggest that the solution to a supposed “failure” of intelligence was more intelligence, and more security. The lessons surrounding Pearl Harbor are an important part of the discourse that makes this kind of “solution” possible, and plausible –are discussed in chapter six.

⁸³¹ On security, its object, its conception of sovereignty, legitimacy and laws see Kirstie Ball, Kevin Haggerty, David Lyon, “Introduction: Contexts of Surveillance,” in *Routledge Handbook of Surveillance Studies*, eds. Kirstie Ball, Kevin Haggerty, David Lyon (Abingdon, Oxon ; New York : Routledge, 2012) p 189; for the classic view on the changing referents of security and the conception of the state, David Mutimer, “Beyond Strategy: Critical Thinking and the New Security Studies,” in *Contemporary Security and Strategy*, Ed. Craig A. Snyder (New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) p 82.

⁸³² For example, for growth, Arendt discusses totalitarianism as an ideology where the state aims at limitless growth not security. Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1973).

would become preferable in a secrecy-security articulation.⁸³³ After 9.11 and the Prism/Snowden/Manning controversies, articulations of secrecy and intelligence have been challenged from new quarters.⁸³⁴ Once, the internet slogan went “information just wants to be free.” Now denizens of the internet raised on limitless information assume it is free (and open) and react against restrictions when it is not. Through this assessment of intelligence culture, it becomes clear that what is attacked by open government campaigns is something synonymous with security itself; yet open government activists see themselves as providing transparency, not threatening security.⁸³⁵ Just as Muppidi chronicled the failure of American diplomacy with India because of the inability to understand the postcolonial imaginary out of which India’s subject position was based,⁸³⁶ these two sides in American security debates cannot understand the interpellative subject positions of the other side.

These (re)articulations of security and secrecy in American intelligence culture have already had an impact on intelligence policy debates.⁸³⁷ Ultimately, the endogenous articulation, of the self and intelligence – discussed further in table 2 below – is what is at stake in these definition articulations. The divide between proponents of freedom of information, open government and open data – and security focused critics, is so deep precisely because these kinds of articulations are difficult to discuss. How can one explain that secrecy (and intelligence) means security, especially when this has been an assumption of the past half-century ? Equally,

⁸³³ While “oversight” is used more colloquially to characterize failings in oversight, the term is used in the study of intelligence control. Cees Wiebes, “ ‘Oversight or Aftersight?’ Democratic control of the Netherlands Intelligence Community,” in *Geheimhaltung und Transparenz: demokratische Kontrolle der Geheimdienste im internationalen Vergleich*, ed Wolbert K. Smidt (LIT Verlag Münster, 2007).

⁸³⁴ Recent works on secrecy and intelligence include: Michael P. Colaresi, *Democracy Declassified: The Secrecy Dilemma in National Security* (New York : Oxford University Press, 2014); for example for typical newsmedia coverage see Alan Travis, “Theresa May defends culture of secrecy over mass snooping,” *The Guardian*, October 16, 2014 (<http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/oct/16/theresa-may-secrecy-intelligence-services-spies>).

⁸³⁵ Thomas S. Blanton, “Transparency and Competing Values: Privacy, Security, Efficiency- National Security and Open Government in the United States: Beyond the Balancing Test,” in *Transparency and Secrecy: A Reader Linking Literature and Contemporary Debate*, ed. Suzanne J. Piotrowski (Plymouth UK.; Lexington Books 2010) p 29.

⁸³⁶ Muppidi, “Postcoloniality and the Production of International Insecurity.”

⁸³⁷ For example; Joshua Foust, Eric Posner and Jameel Jaffer, “Is the N.S.A. Surveillance Threat Real or Imagined?” *The Opinion Pages, The New York Times* (New York) June 9, 2013.

defending this kind of articulation proves difficult because to common-sense (marking the hidden or effaced origin in the Derridian sense – secrecy) intelligence was always security. In this way, because it is deeply held and its very ‘articulation,’ the ‘put-together’ ness we are trying to explore, is shadowed by its wide and deep acceptance, debates about openness and secrecy/security become circular quite quickly, in the absence of an understanding of this aspect of intelligence culture. Definitionally, there are even more ways to potentially investigate the impact of secrecy – for example secrecy and the importance of counterintelligence (or covert action), and much more work could be done secrecy-security-intelligence – but this chapter highlights the broad and remarkable areas of current intelligence culture, leaving further research to the area-specific work.

Foreign/Domestic Division

The foreign/domestic division in intelligence definitions is found in the work of most early American authors including Sherman Kent.⁸³⁸ Warner’s article on definitions explains that intelligence is “[f]ocused on foreigners—usually other states, but often foreign subjects, corporations, or groups (if its objects are domestic citizens, then the activity becomes a branch of either law enforcement or governance).”⁸³⁹ Those organizations, even the FBI, which have typically conducted domestic intelligence are not thought of doing ‘intelligence’ as their primary function.⁸⁴⁰ From the American construction, intelligence also does not ‘fit’ conceptually with

⁸³⁸ The division is not wholly absent in present understandings or articulations; see Marrin, “United States,” p 147-149.

⁸³⁹ Warner, “Wanted,” p 21.

⁸⁴⁰ Ronald A Marks writes that “The historic track record of American domestic intelligence is not covered with glory.” Ronald A. Marks, *Spying in America in the Post 9/11 World: Domestic Threat and the Need for Change* (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Praeger, 2010), p 5. From surveillance of MLK and others, to Watergate, p6 there remains a collective bad feeling toward domestic intelligence. As such many authors identify a *particular* distrust in domestic intelligence, and an impression (from Watergate) that some of these activities were not intelligence at all, but political or partisan information gathering. Also see Sample, “A Federal Approach to Domestic Intelligence,” p 246.

law enforcement, if secrecy is taken to distinguish normal police based security investigations from intelligence (as above). Secrecy is not usually a core feature of American police work.⁸⁴¹

Domestic intelligence has had less conceptual fixity; Sample writes “currently, the term ‘domestic intelligence’ has no legal definition.”⁸⁴² The belief that anything domestic is law enforcement has since become less strong;⁸⁴³ yet its remnants have still made it difficult for American intelligence to negotiate post-9/11 terrorism policing. The NYPD’s disruption and surveillance programs, charged with racial profiling, are the most prominent example of the problems the American intelligence system has had coming to grips with the broken foreign/domestic paradigm.⁸⁴⁴ This is not to say that domestic intelligence collection does not or has not occurred – see chapter three (intelligence has been employed against subversion domestically since the first days of the nation) – but the key perception was that intelligence is in essence, dealing with the foreign. The corollary is that what does exist domestically is separated from foreign intelligence.

Gill and Phythian point to the formulation as “a very *American* definition, in that its focus is on *foreign* entities, reflecting political debates at the time of the creation of the CIA and the basic American suspicion of secret police activity at home, thus ignoring a significant sphere of

⁸⁴¹ Naturally, policing involves secrecy; however, it is not fundamental to it conceptually. In the American context, policework is actually defined by a lack of secrecy, because “secret police” is a negative articulation in the US, that represents the police forces of dictatorships, autocracies, and fascists/communists. For example, common usage refers to the “soviet secret police”, although critics of American activities occasionally use the term as a negative smear against American forces. For example of typical use; Jonathan R Adelman, *Terror and Communist Politics: The Role of the Secret Police in Communist State* (Westview Press, 1984). Masse et al. also write that the law enforcement definition of intelligence differs in a number of ways from the intelligence community’s; it is similar to the idea of “finished” intelligence. Todd Masse, Siobhan O’Neil and John Rollins “Philosophies of Intelligence,” *Information and Intelligence (including terrorism) fusion centers* (New York : Nova Science Publishers, 2008): 81- 84, p 83.

⁸⁴² Sample, *Vaults, Mirrors, and Masks*, p 242.

⁸⁴³ Law enforcement was made in the Constitution a state responsibility, as “police power” thus domestic security matters also confront a problem of coordination among states, (although the early activities detailed in chapter three, stemmed from the recognition of an across-state enforcement need – but not a fully national ideation). James Huffman, *Private Property and the Constitution: State Powers, Public Rights, and Economic Liberties* (Ny, NY: Palgrave Macmillan 2013), p 186.

⁸⁴⁴ Adam Goldman and Matt Apuzzo famously detail these problems in a Pulitzer prize winning series. Adam Goldman and Matt Apuzzo, “AP’s Probe Into NYPD Intelligence Operations,” (AP, 2011-2012) <http://www.ap.org/Index/AP-In-The-News/NYPD>.

potential intelligence.”⁸⁴⁵ This division disappears somewhat definitionally after 9.11⁸⁴⁶—but reflects a deep historical American belief that intelligence is about “things foreign” (in the Aspin-Brown commission’s famed phrase). The *idea* of the division still affects practice. The belief that intelligence is different because laws may be broken outside the state but not inside is an expectation and not a necessarily fact.⁸⁴⁷ Conceptually, this view that state borders were inviolable and that threats originated from outside the state has been shared by many powers (but in America it may have been reinforced by the perception of geographic ‘isolation’ in America).⁸⁴⁸

The construction of isolation begins with America’s very separation from the ‘old world.’⁸⁴⁹ Thus the implication that threats exist inside the state is a betrayal of the narrative of America’s founding, and that it rejected power politics, secret alliances, and internal domestic unrests of nations cobbled together from old empires. It could also stem from the conception of citizen – as American – embodying the state instead of subject to it. “[T]he difference between the British and [Americans] is we are citizens and they are subjects.”⁸⁵⁰ The American is one who rejects outside influences – the British, the old country, tradition- and pledges blood to defend the nation. The spy despoils the happy union of republican citizen-patriots.⁸⁵¹ The concept of ‘homeland security intelligence’ seems to be a re-articulation of these ideas. The idea that a focus on or separation of the foreign is interesting, as it seems to throw into relief

⁸⁴⁵ Gill and Phythian, *Intelligence in an Insecure World*, p 7.

⁸⁴⁶ Warner writes that the distinction is illusory in “Intelligence as Risk Shifting,” p 19.

⁸⁴⁷ Sample “A Federal Approach to Domestic Intelligence,” p 242.

⁸⁴⁸ Echevarria writes that isolation is a fiction, and that North America was long a “land of war” P38-39. This debunking of American perceptions is illustrative, yet what is key is the shape of these “American fictions” as Echevarria labels them. Antulio J. Echevarria *Reconsidering the American Way of War: US Military Practice from the Revolution to Afghanistan* (Georgetown University Press, 2014) p 38-9.

⁸⁴⁹ Gray also believes that it is not only this kind of conceptualization of geography that is effective; geography is one of the most deterministic sources of strategic culture (in addition to history), but “both objective and physical geography and the geography of the imagination have to be assigned pole position.” Colin Gray, *Perspectives on Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) p 102. Nossal and Bloomfield point out that in the Canada, a similar perceived isolation was rendered less meaningful with the advent of ballistic missiles, for example. Alan Bloomfield, and Kim Richard Nossal, “Towards an Explicative Understanding of Strategic Culture: the cases of Australia and Canada,” *Contemporary Security Policy* 28, no. 2 (2007): 286-307.

⁸⁵⁰ Marks, *Spying in America in the Post 9/11 World*, p 5.

⁸⁵¹ Republican is used here in the classical –political theoretic– sense of the term.

something of the purportedly competing cultures of law enforcement and foreign intelligence services. The concepts of ‘national’ and ‘military’ intelligences may also reinforce the idea of separate levels or ‘intelligences’ in America.⁸⁵² Through secrecy, things foreign, action and information, and practice, the definition of intelligence begins to be a roadmap to intelligence culture (though one with large broad features, instead of fine detail). Section two and three below, help fill in these features.

New Articulations and Definitions

The foreign/domestic division for a long time helped to define intelligence: “Prior to 9/11, it was possible to make a distinction between “domestic intelligence” [...] and “foreign intelligence” – primarily military, political, and economic intelligence collected outside the country.”⁸⁵³ The *foreign* articulation to intelligence has more recently been disappearing. This disappearance is not unremarkable; in the past, foreign intelligence had a ‘privileged’ articulation.⁸⁵⁴ The breakdown of this distinction, then, becomes important for intelligence.⁸⁵⁵ While “specific articulations reproduce or challenge the existing discourses by fixing meaning in particular ways”⁸⁵⁶ re-fixing meaning in ‘homeland security’ points us to the difference in commitments to intelligence as dividing as opposed to an intelligence as instantiated in the homeland. Bozeman has stressed how intelligence has been shaped by the American, Jacksonian,

⁸⁵² On national and military intelligence, see Edward Waltz, *Knowledge Management in the Intelligence Enterprise* (Boston: Artech House, 2003), p 15-6.

⁸⁵³ Randol, “Homeland Security Intelligence,” p 1.

⁸⁵⁴ On the precedence of the foreign; Marrin, “United States,” p 146-147. On the privileged articulation; Jorgensen and Phillips, *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, p 30.

⁸⁵⁵ In discourse analysis terms, “What signs are the objects of struggle over meaning between competing discourses (floating signifiers); and what signs have relatively fixed and undisputed meanings (moments)?” *Ibid*.

⁸⁵⁶ Jorgensen and Phillips, *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, p 29.

divide of peace and war, a binary sometimes linked to the foreign/domestic.⁸⁵⁷ We can find significance in new articulations because they are the closures help define an imagined community.⁸⁵⁸ As discussed above, if the foreign/domestic articulation helped define the community of the state and the citizen, homeland security models a new citizen that is the subject of intelligence and, implicitly, a new state.⁸⁵⁹ These changes point to the shifting and sometimes radical edges of the post-9.11 American security imaginary.

In this section I have gathered from a variety of literature a handful of definitional signifiers, reflecting common American articulations or preoccupations. This discussion, of articulations and definitions, is not exhaustive. Instead it points to the (importance of the) question – what articulations of intelligence signify. Asking what intelligence signifies – is to ask what its definitions make possible.⁸⁶⁰ If we establish that intelligence is defined as either (info alone) or action, in terms of practice, characterized by secrecy, and as ‘things foreign’ (so famously put by Aspin-Brown⁸⁶¹) – allow ? What actions become necessary (or possible), what power structures and narratives are authorized, and what possibilities are foreclosed by each of those articulations ? Many more articulations are implicit in these definitions. As Weldes might ask, what did the term ‘foreign intelligence’ signify, in terms of the security imaginary, and what

⁸⁵⁷ The war/peace binary means that homeland security intelligence creates or fixes a new and different community than foreign/domestic intelligence (with foreign the privileged term). This is suggested in Bozeman, “Political Intelligence in Non-Western Societies.”

⁸⁵⁸ In Foucaultian analysis, discourse produces a subject in a deeper way- discourses produce both the subject and the place of the subject; Jorgensen and Phillips, *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, p 112. See also Stuart Hall, “Foucault: Power, Knowledge and Discourse,” in *Discourse Theory and Practice: A Reader*, eds. Margaret Wetherell, Stephanie Taylor, Simeon J Yates (Sage, 2001) p 79/80.

⁸⁵⁹ Gates argues the “homeland security” is based on a paradigm of inclusion and exclusion, and citizenship, in it, requires patriots to “distinguish oneself as non-threatening and civilized, proving one’s legitimate legal identity on a constant basis”, calling this “always-identifiable” citizenship. Kelly Gates, “The Globalization of Homeland Security,” in *Routledge Handbook of Surveillance Studies*, eds. Kirstie Ball, Kevin Haggerty, David Lyon (Abingdon, Oxon ; New York : Routledge, 2012): 292-300, p 295. See also Henry A Crumpton, “Intelligence and Homeland Defense,” in *Transforming US Intelligence*, eds Jennifer E. Sims and Burton L. Gerber (Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press, 2005). Benjamin Muller also touches on a number of post-modern assessments of the citizen in the new security state (from Agamben, risk, biometrics, etc.) Benjamin J Muller, *Security, Risk and the Biometric State: Governing Borders and Bodies* (Routledge, 2010) p 38-40, 59-60, 78, 95, 107.

⁸⁶⁰ We can also ask conversely what limits are imposed by definitions, in the same way – Mills notes that we can expect that discourse’s limitations (which express a particular set of interests and are sanctioned by an institution) are of interest because of “the effects on expression that these limitations have.” This, Mills argues, is characteristic of Foucault’s own interest in the constraint on discourse, which can be “productive as well as limiting”... This is a different way of looking at the meanings produced by articulations. Sara Mills, *Discourse: The New Critical Idiom* 2nd ed (Ny, NY: Routledge 2004), p 63-4.

⁸⁶¹ Aspin-Brown Commission, “Preparing for the 21st Century,” US Congress. Senate. 103rd Cong., 2d sess, 1996 “Introduction,” p 5.

does the articulation *secret intelligence* make possible ? “...every expression is an active reduction of the possibilities of meaning because it positions the signs in relation to one another in only one way, thus excluding alternative forms of organisation.”⁸⁶² Finally, what is relinquished when we move away from these core definitional articulations, as is the case in homeland security ? The point is not to exhaustively catalogue, but to query.

Based on this section, we can assert more clearly that the visible foundations of intelligence are indeed cultural, in the basic elements defining intelligence in America. As we open up (the term) ‘intelligence,’ what constitutes secrecy, danger, knowledge, security, practice, foreign, and more – reveal themselves as contingent, specific cultural understandings (as discussed in the section in this chapter, earlier, *the definition and the real*). At the very least, they reveal that culture is a set of nesting dolls, with articulations inside articulations. These definitions show the shape of an American understanding of intelligence – and therefore, for this dissertation, an American intelligence culture. Even in the simplest definition of intelligence, then, we find hints of American intelligence culture.⁸⁶³

Beyond Definitions

Definitions of intelligence seek to limit it in its very basic parts. For America, what intelligence is (and hence, what it can do, answer, and seek) shapes the national security

⁸⁶² Jørgensen and Phillips, *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, p 30.

⁸⁶³ As noted in chapter two this dissertation posits that both positive and negative articulations reflect an underlying intelligence culture; a definition of intelligence as a dangerous method fraught with evil/peril, would reflect a culture surrounding intelligence just as a positive definition would. While critics might see these definitions as similar to those of other nations, this section teases out the historically and contextually specific meanings of the sub-components of the American definition of intelligence to show that each of these is understood in a way that derives from the American intelligence experience. Secrecy, then, means different things to different states because what secrecy itself is understood or defined as is created out of a culturally specific context. Jeffrey-Jones’ *Cloak and Dollar: A History of American Secret Intelligence*, is a good overall historical chronicle of the development of American, and to Jeffrey-Jones, excessive secrecy. Ted Gup, *Nation of Secrets* (New York : Doubleday, 2007), sees intelligence and national security secrecy as kind of a contiguous culture in America with extensions throughout many governmental agencies, p 9.

enterprise, and limns the shadows of the future. “Words are used to ‘stand for the reality of things....’”⁸⁶⁴ These definitions point to key areas of American intelligence culture that I now will turn to explore in more depth- and are not only the product of Kent-Kendall. There are also many other, more informal ways to look at our descriptions of what (American) intelligence is supposed to be and do.⁸⁶⁵ Intelligence can be understood through its mission or doctrine, through policy (or policy instruments), or it can be conceptualized through its related laws or institutions. Yet it is less frequently understood by its broad norms and narratives (discussed in the final section of this chapter). The purpose of this chapter is to show how these additional descriptive forms can weave together a portrait of the overall constructions of intelligence culture.

This next section explores normative approaches to intelligence culture. The section focuses on broad norms, over fine-grained description; any of these norms would need triangulation through multiple methods in their own respective research programs for an in-depth approach. However, despite this, describing potential intelligence culture norms is valuable in three ways. First, it helps illustrate plainly the connections of intelligence culture to strategic culture, which is itself a key shaping force of intelligence. Second, it highlights the contradictory and varied terrain of intelligence culture. Many beliefs surrounding intelligence—as the imaginary heuristic suggests—are loosely articulated (and can be re-articulated at will). Consequently, we should *not* expect only coherent sets of ideas, *a la* Kent–Kendall, to appear. These normative/ideational descriptions help access the other ‘surrounding’ ideas in intelligence culture not obviously linked to Kent or Kendall. Finally, and most importantly, it helps

⁸⁶⁴ Francoli and Clarke, “What’s in a Name? A Comparison of ‘Open Government’ Definitions across Seven Open Government Partnership Members,” *Journal of Edemocracy and Open Government* 6, no.1 (2014): 248-266, P 249-50.

⁸⁶⁵ For example, (discussed in this chapter, Footnote 19) the intelligence cycle is another kind of description of what intelligence does (though not strictly a definition). The yearly debates over its parts, and its persistence – why we like to think and teach the intelligence cycle, even when it may be a flawed picture of intelligence – tell us much about intelligence culture. The famous ‘secrets, mysteries or puzzles’ dichotomy is another interesting avenue of thought.

demonstrate the more current, broad elements of intelligence culture, while the Kent–Kendall debates illustrated the recent past. Norms expand the description of intelligence culture, but in concert with other approaches.

Part 2: Intelligence Culture and Strategic Culture Norms⁸⁶⁶

One way American authors have attempted to describe intelligence culture is through norms (for example, secrecy-related norms are discussed above). Strategic culture theory frequently uses norms to describe strategic attitudes and to highlight areas where cultural assumptions differ between militaries.⁸⁶⁷ Intelligence norms are clearly connected to strategic culture, and as noted in chapter 1, Turner has even adapted Snow's list of American strategic culture norms to intelligence.⁸⁶⁸ In this section I want to highlight the relationship between intelligence culture and strategic culture. Shared norms are an appropriate way to demonstrate this link: Murray and other strategic culture theorists have argued that since strategic culture is not unitary, both adjacent *and* distinct subcultures are influential, as are national attitudes. By consequence, "strategic culture needs to take into account the fact that (i) public culture; (ii) strategic culture; and (iii) military (organizational) culture exists and should be taken into consideration."⁸⁶⁹ This is true as well for intelligence culture. The broad level of *strategic culture* helps illuminate the higher national level of American *intelligence culture* that is the focus of this dissertation (not organizational level intelligence culture norms).⁸⁷⁰ This means that this section

⁸⁶⁶ Meyer suggests we use the more general phrasing of 'norms, beliefs and ideas'. Meyer, "Convergence Towards a European Strategic Culture?" p 523.

⁸⁶⁷ Strategic culture theory tends not to focus on intelligence or the effect of intelligence norms (but mentions of intelligence in passing are not uncommon – A.I. Johnston discusses it as part of his case study of the strategic culture of China). Johnston, *Cultural Realism*, p 95/96.

⁸⁶⁸ Turner, "A Distinctive U.S. Intelligence Identity," p 42-61.

⁸⁶⁹ Rashed Uz Zaman, "Strategic Culture: A 'Cultural' Understanding of War," *Comparative Strategy* 28, no. 1 (2009): 68-88, p 82.

⁸⁷⁰ Organizational intelligence culture studies focus on lower level norms (such as hierarchy, collegiality, and process collegiality) which are not relevant to the national focus. Davies does suggest these norms filter an overall "national" idea of intelligence, in a multi-level modified

looks more to theories of norms around intelligence culture than the norms themselves. This dissertation sees the lens of norms as relevant for intelligence culture, but remains a largely meta-theoretical analysis of norms, so that an appropriate groundwork can be outlined.

In this section, I also want to show that with a better basic model, even a brief one, norms can also help us arrive at a more precise understanding of the elements of intelligence culture. Listing all the norms of intelligence culture is less important than understanding what kinds of normative areas are important for intelligence. This section will first explain a strategic culture-originating norm model. Based on this set of norms, I construct a possible model for categorization (or typology) of intelligence culture for norms.

Norms define the boundaries of acceptable practice (although they can be violated). They can be defined, succinctly, as shared standards of appropriateness.⁸⁷¹ This is a widely used definition,⁸⁷² with some variations - Kratochwil and Keohane phrase it as a “standard of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations” (rights and obligations substituting for appropriateness).⁸⁷³ Different norms can be held more highly at different times and revisited as understandings change.⁸⁷⁴ More importantly, “no norms exist on their own; instead, all norms exist as part of larger normative structures in which they are positioned in a hierarchical

organizational model. Davies “Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure,” p 517. Organizational norms could be compared fruitfully to military service organizational norms, in the sub-national level of analysis.

⁸⁷¹ Adapted from Finnemore and Sikkink, - shortened from their concluding clause “for actors with a given identity” (because the identity/actor relationship, is more fruitfully understood through the imaginary heuristic, and is unnecessary to the definition) Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” *International Organization* 52, no. 4, (Autumn, 1998): 887-917, p 891. Substantively, norms can be thought of as “rulelike linguistic entities.” Steven A. Hetcher, *Norms in a Wired World* (Cambridge University Press, 2004), p 1. Norms can be differentiated from other kinds of ideas or beliefs, Tore Nyhamar argues, because norms are adhered to without consideration of outcomes/consequences; for example, he notes the norm that “intrasystem solutions are to be preferred to extrasystem solutions to African problems whenever possible. It is a norm because it does not say that intrasystem solutions should be preferred when they lead to good or optimal results.” Thus norms are contrasted with “rational” actions because rational choices are made based on perception of a good outcome. Thus a norm of inter-departmental rivalry does not specify the conditions of competition. Tore Nyhamar, “How Do Norms Work? A Theoretical And Empirical Analysis Of African International Relations,” *International Journal of Peace Studies* (2000): 27-43.

⁸⁷² According to Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” p 887.

⁸⁷³ For Ruggie, norms, are a “community’s shared understandings and intentions; they are ‘social facts’ and reflect ‘legitimate social purpose’ ” John Gerard Ruggie, *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization* (New York: Routledge, 1998), p12.

⁸⁷⁴ Mark Berlin, “From Pirates to Pinochet: Universal Jurisdiction for Torture,” in *Globalization of Law and Human Rights: From Norms to Fulfillment*, ed. Alison Brysk (Routledge, 2013): 83-106, p 87.

relationship with other, associated norms.”⁸⁷⁵ That is, these understandings are painted against shared or “intersubjective background understandings to make sense of them.”⁸⁷⁶ They can prescribe or proscribe—they tell an actor what to do or not do, and under what conditions.⁸⁷⁷ For some these prohibitory norms are ‘taboos.’⁸⁷⁸ Yet they can always be renegotiated, and revised. Norms function both through sanctions and coordination.⁸⁷⁹ There are a number of types of norms, but the most common division is regulative norms (that order and constrain behavior) and constitutive norms (creating actors, interests and categories of action).⁸⁸⁰ Because they are taken for granted, it is easiest to see norms when they are in the process of change (post-war Germany),⁸⁸¹ or when they come into conflict (inside society, or with another society’s norms). Norms can be of differing strengths and specificities.⁸⁸² Very deeply held norms may be near universal, and are often unspoken common sense. However, even very strong norms—such as the prohibitions against slavery— will have their detractors (such as the KKK).⁸⁸³

While norms are a useful ‘cut’ at hidden aspects of culture—because they can be contradictory, abstract, and partial—I do not see them as the ideal form to study intelligence culture alone. However, they can still contribute to describing American intelligence culture. They help describe the ideational universe of intelligence. As discussed in chapter one, the IR

⁸⁷⁵ Berlin, “From Pirates to Pinochet,” p 87.

⁸⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷⁷ Vaughn P. Shannon, “Norms are What States Make of Them: the political psychology of norm violation,” *International Studies Quarterly* 44, no. 2 (2000): 293-316, p 294.

⁸⁷⁸ Nina Tannenwald, “The Nuclear ‘Taboo’: The United States and the normative basis of nuclear non-use,” *International Organization* 53, no. 03 (1999): 433-468.

⁸⁷⁹ Hetcher, *Norms in a Wired World*, p 1.

⁸⁸⁰ Finnemore and Sikkink “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” p 891.

⁸⁸¹ Sebastian Harnisch and Kerry Longhurst, “Understanding Germany: The Limits of “Normalization” and the Prevalence of Strategic Culture” in *German Culture, Politics, and Literature Into the Twenty-first Century: Beyond Normalization*, eds. Stuart Taberner, Paul Cooke and Tobias Wilke, (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2006): 49-60; and Wilke, *German Strategic Culture Revisited: Linking the Past to Contemporary German Strategic Choice* Vol 36.

⁸⁸² Codified norms may be stronger, and a variety of measures of strength exist. Audie Klotz and Cecelia Lynch, *Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations* (ME Sharpe, 2007), p 13.

⁸⁸³ See Price et al. for a useful discussion of norm strength, in Richard Price, Nina Tannenwald, and Peter Joachim Katzenstein, *Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboos* (Columbia University Press, 1996). There is also interesting work on the paradoxes of norm violation, such as Eftychia Stamkou and Gerben A. Van Kleef, “Do we give power to the right people? Then and how norm violators rise to the top,” in *Power, Politics, and Paranoia: Why People are Suspicious of Their Leaders*, eds. Jan-Willem van Prooijen and Paul A.M. van Lange (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

theory understanding of norms differs from Turner's use discussing intelligence culture. The key difference is that norms require greater precision in language and theory. "For example, political scientists tend to slip into discussions of 'sovereignty' or 'slavery' as if they were norms, when in fact they are (or were) collections of norms and the mix of rules and practices that structure these institutions has varied significantly over time."⁸⁸⁴ Norms are similar to institutions (in sociology), but institutions are understood to be collections of interrelated norms or rules.⁸⁸⁵ Thus we should more properly understand general terms, like secrecy or openness as institutions or normative areas, comprised of sets of norms and practices. This precision is important in separating out the mix of practices and rules. Comparatively, Turner's intelligence culture norms, of 'Institutional Survival' and 'Secrecy' are underspecified.⁸⁸⁶ Secrecy would not be a norm as such, but a normative area, under which specific norms are grouped; and 'Institutional Survival' is not clear enough to specify what norms it refers to (since it is common to many public and private bureaucracies).⁸⁸⁷

Strategic Culture Norms

Intelligence culture partially overlaps with strategic culture. That is, in certain areas—perceptions of the likelihood of war, its usefulness in human affairs, the nature of threats in the

⁸⁸⁴ Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," p 891.

⁸⁸⁵ Finnemore and Sikkink write "March and Olsen define an "institution" as "a relatively stable collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behavior for specific groups of actors in specific situations." "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," p 251.

⁸⁸⁶ Turner's complete list of norms are: Institutional Survival; Secrecy; Intelligence Exceptionalism; Ambiguous Mandate; Confederal Structure; Flexible Accountability; Separation of Intelligence from Law Enforcement; Competitive Intelligence; Separation of Intelligence from Policy; Policy Support; "Can Do" Attitude; Primacy of Intelligence Analysis; Emphasis on Current Intelligence; Provision of Accurate, Timely, and Relevant Intelligence. Turner, "A Distinctive U.S. Intelligence Identity," p 49.

⁸⁸⁷ For an example of normal usage, Price and Tannenwald write that 'civilizational' norms, related to the chemical weapons taboo *specifies* that chemical weapons users are "unfit for membership in civilized international society." Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald "Norms and Deterrence," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996): 114-152, p 149.

world⁸⁸⁸—intelligence culture and strategic culture share the same normative influences.⁸⁸⁹ For Turner, intelligence culture’s “evolution and operational milieu is the product of a strategic culture that spawns the intelligence norms.”⁸⁹⁰ Intelligence cultures share and are influenced by perceptions of what threats exist in the world, as well as what means to use to understand and respond to them. These basic beliefs help dictate military doctrine, strategy, and, at times, tactics. Militaries may separately socialize strategic cultures at an organizational level,⁸⁹¹ but this is always true of many sub-cultures within society. Understanding these links is important, because intelligence culture should never be conceived of as a sharply bounded, defined box of set attitudes. Intelligence culture has links to many other cultural reservoirs; strategic culture is one of the most relevant of these. As explicated in chapter two, the security imaginary heuristic shows that security beliefs (even in the insular culture of intelligence) still draw on and articulate to larger reservoirs of cultural meaning. Intelligence culture, partly, becomes meaningful through articulations present in strategic culture. Sims writes that “[i]t seems indisputable that an American paradigm, derived from this country’s history and laws, informs the way U.S. decision makers, analysts, and intelligence producers think about intelligence... [and] strategic political culture is the subset of this mix that particularly influences the mindset of those involved in the intelligence process and those who evaluate it for the purposes of oversight and

⁸⁸⁸ This kind of formulation is seen in what has been called the second-wave of strategic culture theorization (see chapter two), for example, in 1991 Yitzhak Klein, “well before the third wave emerged, Klein’s article, “A Theory of Strategic Culture,” proposed that strategic culture be defined as “the set of attitudes and beliefs held by a military establishment concerning the political objective of war and the most effective strategy and operational method of achieving it.” Zaman, “Strategic Culture,” p 79. Strategic theory on perception and misperception was more fully developed by Robert Jervis, in his seminal *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton University Press, 1976), and by his students.

⁸⁸⁹ Similar works are listed below in Footnote 169.

⁸⁹⁰ Turner, “A Distinctive U.S. Intelligence Identity,” p 43.

⁸⁹¹ For an expansive discussion of socialization and organizational culture, see Chapter 14, Joseph L. Soeters, Donna J. Winslow, and Alise Weibull, “Military Culture,” in *Handbook of the Sociology of the Military*, ed. Giuseppe Caforio (New York : Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2003): 237-254. Farrell argues that after the military’s post *Goldwater-Nichols* reorganization act reduced the impact of sub-cultures in the push to ‘jointness’; Theo Farrell, “Strategic Culture and American Empire,” *SAIS Review* XXV no. 2 (Summer–Fall 2005), p 7.

accountability.”⁸⁹² Again, this helps flesh out a discussion of intelligence culture in its proper context.

I have adapted a model of strategic culture norms that are inter-linked with intelligence culture norms. While there are a variety of strategic culture models,⁸⁹³ the four-axes ‘norm continuum’ model is superior to binary norm models—and is more appropriate because it provides a comparative basis for multiple strategic cultures while avoiding a seemingly random list of unconnected norms.⁸⁹⁴ The continuum locates strategic cultures from *very acceptant* to *very unacceptant* for four norms: the occurrence of war in human affairs; the acceptability of violence; the possibility for gain (or zero-sum); and the likely outcome of certain strategies (war as leading to victory or diplomacy as leading to victory). These norms are time and context-specific: for example, a century ago Americans might have been much less sanguine about the regularity of wars in human affairs compared to today, given the experience of the war on terror. I suggest this model as an appropriate way to conceptualize the link between strategic and intelligence culture.⁸⁹⁵ It draws from advanced strategic culture scholarship.

Linking Intelligence Culture and Strategic Culture

The relevance of strategic culture norms is in showing more clearly what content exists in American intelligence culture. There is little actual *research* on how intelligence is connected to

⁸⁹² Sims, “Understanding Ourselves,” p33.

⁸⁹³ There are a number of strategic culture norm models that vary for the object of study and context; similar models include Tobias Wilke, *German Strategic Culture Revisited: Linking the Past to Contemporary German*, p 27; or Wilhelm Mirow, *Strategic Culture Matters: A Comparison of German and British Military* (Berlin, Germany: Lit Verlag, 2009), p 18.

⁸⁹⁴ For example, Wilke, *German Strategic Culture Revisited: Linking the Past*, p 27.

⁸⁹⁵ One limitation of adaptations of strategic culture to intelligence, is that, while valuable, they do not necessarily result in a better understanding of intelligence culture. As Duyvesteyn notes, much work has been done on intelligence in regards to preparations for war and strategic cultures, but with a focus on outcomes, over understanding culture. Duyvesteyn, “Intelligence and Strategic Culture: Some Observations,” p 523.

strategic culture norms.⁸⁹⁶ We can speculate, as an example, perhaps, that American strategic culture's technological 'fetish' is shared by both strategic and intelligence cultures and rests on a norm of pursuing technological solutions to security problems.⁸⁹⁷ It is expressed in American strategic culture as the belief that American innovation will always triumph over enemies, and results in the essential American pursuit of victory (over strategy).⁸⁹⁸ In American intelligence, the mid-90s budget cuts to intelligence led to the pursuit of satellites and SIGINT (signals intelligence) because technology was seen as the best solution to maintain protection from threats while reducing expenditures.⁸⁹⁹ Without the cultural positive attitude to technology, the pursuit of reform under conditions of austerity would have taken other paths. To conclusively demonstrate this, however, a series of discourse, textual, or content analyses would have to be undertaken. For this reason I focus on suggesting a new categorization for strategic culture/intelligence culture norms, with a discussion of the norms identified in the existing literature.

For a series of four basic, and accepted, strategic culture 'norm continuums,' some elementary conclusion about the effects on intelligence can be drawn (see Table 1 and 2 below). These norms are a simplified version – relevant for intelligence – of Meyer's work on strategic culture norms on the four continuums: the use of force, the way in which force is used, modes of

⁸⁹⁶ There is a body of research on the organizational norms (noted in chapter two) of intelligence services, but infrequently on the overarching national or strategic level. For example: Hamilton Bean's excellent "Organizational Culture and US Intelligence Affairs," and Philip Davies, "Organizational Politics and the Development of Britain's Intelligence Producer/Consumer Interface," and "Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure in Britain and the United States." There is speculation in Turner's early piece, but he does not indicate that additional research was conducted on the links (outside of his textual adaptation of Snow's work).

⁸⁹⁷ On the predominance of SIGINT and the importance for intelligence collection, James Lewis and Mary DeRosa, "Intelligence," in *Five Years After 9/11: An Assessment of America's War on Terror*, eds. Julianne Smith, Thomas M. Sanderson (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006), p 28. On the "political" aspects of all American technological fetish items, see Jodi Dean, "Communicative Capitalism: circulations and the Foreclosure of Politics," in *Digital Media and Democracy: Tactics in Hard Times* ed. Megan Boler (MIT Press, 2010): 123-136, p 111. Farrell discusses the evolution of the technological fetish identified by Gray, for civilian and military policymakers, after recent technological advances, concluding "In short, Gray's observation about the techno-centric nature of U.S. strategic culture is more accurate than ever." Farrell, "Strategic Culture and American Empire," p 8.

⁸⁹⁸ Colin S. Gray, "National Style in Strategy: The American Example," *International Security* 6 no. 2 (1981) p 23-36.

⁸⁹⁹ Brice Harris, "The American Strategic Approach: A functional Analysis," *America, Technology and Strategic Culture: A Clausewitzian Assessment*, (Routledge, 2009) p 41. See also Robert Kohler, *The Intelligence Industrial Base: Doomed to Extinction? Working Group on Intelligence Reform Series*, (Washington, DC: Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, 1994).

cooperation or diplomacy, and threshold for domestic or international authorizations for war.⁹⁰⁰

Bozeman's ideas of norms and beliefs around modern war and the Jacksonian split between times of war and times of peace; and her assessment of western and non-western principles and norms of security are also relevant to understand these beliefs.⁹⁰¹ These kinds of ideas are particularly significant at the national level, and just as important as organizational norms.

This table shows, for four basic strategic culture norms, what kind of intelligence norms would be likely consequent. For example, if the occurrence of war in human affairs is held to be regular, intelligence ideas would also likely consider intelligence a 'regular' tool of the state. If intelligence culture scholarship makes the attempt to link strategic culture norms with intelligence culture norms, it should be on the basis of clear, accepted norms from strategic culture, linked to similar ideas in intelligence culture.

Table 1: Strategic Culture Norms Areas and Intelligence⁹⁰²

Strategic Culture Norms	Influence on Intelligence
Occurrence of war in human affairs - high	➔ Need for intelligence if war is regular
The acceptability of violence - high	➔ Use of covert action/assassination
Possibility for gain (or zero-sum)- high	➔ Opportunity-oriented intelligence
Victory as likely from war/diplomacy- high	➔ Intelligence as support to military/or as

⁹⁰⁰ Meyer adds to this norm set with a continuum 4 norms: Norm 1 – Goal for the use of force (lower) “Defence against immediate attack on home territory” across two middle positions, to (higher) “Extra-territorial expansions of political, economic or cultural control”; Norm 2- The way in which force used (lower) “Reactive, proportionate”, to (higher) “Aggressive, disproportionate towards in- and out-groups”; Norm 3- Preferred mode of cooperation – (lower) “Neutrality (non-interference)” up to “Cooperation on the basis of laws, treaties and rules” to “Cooperation of choice among preferred partners” (higher) “Unilateralism (Preference for acting alone)”; Norm- Threshold for Domestic and International Authorization (lower) “High Domestic and High International” to (higher) “Low Domestic and Low International.” Meyer, *Convergence Towards a European Strategic Culture?* p 530.

⁹⁰¹ The non-western norms Bozeman cited, were, that intelligence dominates statecraft, internal and external intelligence interpenetrate (and include knowing and fighting the enemy) and the centrality of deception. Moreover, she opines that the key mismatch at the time (during the Cold War) was the American perception that while their own identity was a stable formation (beginning in 1776), the norms and identities of others would be quick and easy to change – while in fact non-western norms were, in her view, strong and resistant to change or compromise. Bozeman, “Political Intelligence in Non-Western Societies,” p127-145 and 146-9.

⁹⁰² Using four basic strategic culture norms, this table suggests, possible attitudes to intelligence for a high level of acceptance of the given strategic culture norm (shown in the table). Conversely, a low acceptance of these strategic culture norms would be associated with the opposite effect on attitudes to intelligence (not shown in the table).

Intelligence Culture Norms Sets and Institutions

Outside of the influence of existing strategic culture norms, I propose a set of four *categories* of intelligence culture norms (or ideas and institutions/regimes): those surrounding 1) the function of intelligence; 2) its use externally; 3) its direction internally; and 4) national- or self-identity. Using this typology as a complement to the original set of strategic culture norms, we can probe a similar set of basic assumptions about intelligence, as strategic culture does for war. These intelligence norms, which I consider in more detail in the sections below, do not all rest on a continuum, but I argue that they represent basic groups of beliefs and attitudes around intelligence. I suggest that this kind of categorization of intelligence culture norms may help advance the study of intelligence culture, by helping to systematize it. It is, in a way, a very preliminary kind of suggestion to help negotiate the many vast, and different kinds of norms and ideas surrounding intelligence that exist in every society.

Table 2: Norm Types and Related Intelligence Culture Norm Areas⁹⁰³

Norm/Institution Types	Areas of Intelligence Culture Norms/Institutions
Functional	Covert action; assassination; analysis (and strategic intelligence) as pre-eminent; secrecy

⁹⁰³ These are tailored to the specific case and set of texts, as I have developed these questions from my own research in intelligence. While it could be argued that dividing “internal” from “external” norms reifies the foreign/domestic division that appears in historic definitions of intelligence, discussed in section one above (this chapter), arguably the deeply instantiated conception of the zone of sovereign action inside the state, with international anarchy outside the state – that is the basis of the western state system- is still reflected in most state security discourse or imaginaries, and thus shapes their basic normative categories. This is visible both in Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War; a theoretical analysis* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1959), and RBJ Walker’s explanation of the philosophical terms of the conceptual model of peace inside/anarchy outside in *Inside/Outside: international relations as political theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

External	Doctrinal norms; intelligence's utility as a tool of statecraft (compared to military force/diplomacy/other means (soft power); direction by civilian or military forces ⁹⁰⁴
Internal	Citizens as legitimate targets; intelligence for the survival of the regime; foreign/domestic divide; law enforcement/intelligence ⁹⁰⁵
National or self-identity	Self-perceptions (peaceful, democratic, open) that conflict or are consonant with the function norms intelligence ⁹⁰⁶

The first category of functional norms might include things like normative practices and beliefs surrounding secrecy – for example, the perception that most or all government information should be classified unless explicitly necessary.⁹⁰⁷ Covert action is also shaped by norms around its functional limits (and what might be called an ‘assassination taboo’).⁹⁰⁸ **The second category of intelligence culture norms concerns its use externally. These norms deal with beliefs such as whether the state’s intelligence mission is global or circumscribed, how it should it be directed (by civilians or the military), and if intelligence is seen overall as a useful tool to obtain the ends of statecraft over other forms.**⁹⁰⁹ **These external norms can be compared to strategic culture norms on the utility of war with other states. The third category of intelligence culture norms deals with direction internally.**⁹¹⁰ **This group of**

⁹⁰⁴ Gill terms this autonomy, the extent to which “which secret state agencies resist the encroachment of other state agencies and citizens,” Peter Gill, “Securing the Globe: Intelligence and the Post-9/11 Shift from ‘Liddism’ to ‘Drainism’,” *Intelligence & National Security* 19, no. 3 (2004): 467-489, p 468.

⁹⁰⁵ These would then dictate, to some extent, what Gill terms the penetration of society “the variety of techniques by which the secret state carries out its surveillance and supervision of other agencies and society in general.” *Ibid*, p 468.

⁹⁰⁶ These are perhaps similar to the acceptability of the military in what theorists see as militarization – whether or not the institution (military or intelligence) is portrayed positively throughout society, if positive or negative language is used in their portrayal in the median and popular culture, and whether their symbols and references to them are widely used. Fogarty, *War Peace and the Social Order*, p 80-86.

⁹⁰⁷ This would be an example of a secrecy related norm. Shulsky and Schmitt in *Silent Warfare*, suggests that “Until recently the more common tradition has been that of governmental secrecy, broken when the government itself sees some advantage in disclosing information,” p 101.

⁹⁰⁸ Ward Thomas, “Norms and Security: The Case of International Assassination,” *International Security* 25, no. 1 (Summer 2000), p 105-133.

⁹⁰⁹ For example, the idea of intelligence “missions” seems normatively charged: Johnson discusses three missions, (collection analysis, counterintelligence and covert action) but these are more tasks or functions, than mission conceptions; Loch Johnson, “An Introduction to the Intelligence Studies Literature,” in *Strategic Intelligence Vol 1: Understanding the hidden side of government*, ed. Loch K. Johnson (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2007), p 4. Discussing an intelligence “ethos” Michael Turner includes “Mission-Specific Myopia” as one of a number of “cultural principles.” Turner notes, interestingly, that it is the sense of mission itself that is a problem; “American intelligence officers have an unbounded sense of mission” and this commitment – a deep devotion to duty and organizational loyalty divert CIA employees and others, from dedicated to a wider intelligence community mission, and diverts from “wider intelligence objectives.” Turner, *Why Secret Intelligence Fails*, p 41-2.

⁹¹⁰ One relevant internal intelligence model that identifies a set of internal intelligence attitudes, albeit from the study of intelligence ethics, is Hillebrand’s list of five “values” (openness/participation, power, rule of law, privacy, and mutual trust; and their respective democratic ideals –

norms covers those beliefs relating to the overall internal conduct of intelligence, from how much information is acceptable to collect, using what tools (interrogation, surveillance, disruption, etc.), and how important intelligence should be in the internal ‘policing’ of the state. They also refer to the intersection in the American conception of the citizen and the state. These kinds of norms determine “what the proper objective of such surveillance in a democracy should be...”⁹¹¹ – the foreign, the terrorist, the citizen, etc. The final category of norms (the fourth category), deal with intelligence and national- or self-identity. It brings together concerns that are separated under the internal/external direction categories. These norms are more diffuse but refer to perceived validity of intelligence in consonance with perceived national self-identity. Essentially, under what circumstances is intelligence valid – if it protects privacy, if it remains apolitical (or is not ‘politicized’) or if it is democratic or open – whatever the meaning of those terms are for a given society. This is an intersectional area of national identity norms and beliefs, with the norms and practices of the other three areas. Naturally, conflict is not only likely, between these norms, but general because of the competing sub-groups who choose to subscribe to different norm sets.

Additional categories or further sub-types of norms could be added here; the goal of this tabled set of categories is to outline and suggest a basis for further normative study of intelligence culture (rather than to begin it). In this second section, then, I have put forward this possible categorization of intelligence culture norms. This attempt tries to ask what basic groups of beliefs and attitudes around intelligence do intelligence norms represent. Categorizing them is a way to help to map the varied elements of American intelligence culture. It is a starter guide to

followed by their articulations in intelligence practice. These could begin to form a model of internal intelligence attitudes. Claudia Hillebrand, “Intelligence Oversight and Accountability,” p 306.

⁹¹¹ Marina Caparini, “Controlling and Overseeing Intelligence Services in Democratic States,” in *Democratic Control of Intelligence Services: Containing Rogue Elephants* Ed. Hans Born, (Burlington Vt.: Ashgate, 2007), p 6.

the constellations of American intelligence cultures. While I argue that norms do not paint a complete picture and existing work on them in intelligence culture has flaws, they can help demonstrate the breadth of the disparate parts of intelligence attitudes and perceptions. Further discussion of normative beliefs and attitudes surrounding intelligence are present to a degree in some specific intelligence culture literatures (for example on secrecy and failure).⁹¹² The aim of these sections was to begin to create a “consistent ... framework for assessing intelligence culture” as Wirtz does in his study of American Intelligence Studies.⁹¹³ Because norms are one of the popular avenues of address of intelligence culture (see the discussion of Turner and Davies), they need to be examined in terms of the theory construction of this thesis, with due caution and attention to their operation and implications.

Part 3: Warrants⁹¹⁴

This part of the chapter will introduce the concept of a warrant—or authorization—for intelligence in America. It is particularly American aspect of intelligence culture because through even a brief exploration of American intelligence, as discussed in the previous section, intelligence is evidently marked by a deep perceived dissonant with the founding values of the

⁹¹² As Joop Van Reijn points out, “failure” is perhaps one of the few cultural concepts that has been investigated in terms of the role of perceptions and the intelligence process. Van Reijn, “Intelligence and Strategic Culture: Essays on American and British Praxis since the Second World War,” *Intelligence and National Security* 26, no. 4 (2011): 441-444, p 441-442. Aid’s “Sins of Omission and Commission,” is another more recent piece in this vein. Matthew M. Aid “Sins of Omission and Commission: Strategic Cultural Factors and US Intelligence Failures During the Cold War,” *Intelligence and National Security*, 26:4 (2011): 478-494. Other unique American areas may include norms centered around the attitude to time; exceptionalism; attitude to technology/methods of collection; secrecy; professionalism; failure/reform and more.

⁹¹³ Wirtz, “The American approach to Intelligence Studies,” p 28.

⁹¹⁴ The Oxford dictionary calls a warrant a “justification” or “authority”, it captures this sense of dual legitimation and authorization aptly, while Weldes adopts the term “warranting conditions”; Gitika Commuri, *Indian Identity Narratives and the Politics of Security* (Sage: 2010), p 12. The field of intelligence control adopts a more catholic view of what authorizes intelligence, making the point that it is not simply laws, but the coordinated systems of the executive and the courts, regulators, and etc. etc. It is this idea, that either the warrant (authorizing intelligence) or the controls as the converse limiting intelligence are a broad system of thought and concepts. Hastedt, “Controlling Intelligence,” p 3-23. The similarity – authorization, or control, is clear, although care clearly must be taken in usage. In constructivist terms, it is the process of legitimation that we are concerned with, including the narrativization of both the past and the present; the construction of the world and interpellation of respective subject/identities, and finally the chains of reasoning and logic that these narratives make possible (discussed in chapter six). Warrant is also used as a referent term in strategic culture; “For the Islamists, therefore, jihad is morally warranted, both culturally and religiously.” Jerry Mark Long, “Strategic Culture, Al-Qaida, and Weapons of Mass Destruction,” in *Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum*, ed Jeffrey Larsen (Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, 2006), p 16.

American republic.⁹¹⁵ Wiant and others identify “a significant duality in the way it is seen by the country’s citizens: whereas on the one hand, national intelligence needs to be reinvigorated in the wake of the 9/11 attacks to neutralize the continuing threat, there exists at the same time a notable reluctance to see additional intelligence vigor because it can threaten Constitutional protections.”⁹¹⁶ This dissonance means that American intelligence culture is torn between opposing intelligence and its sinister accumulation of power while embracing it at the same time in service of keeping the nation ‘secure.’ For this reason, American intelligence culture places unique importance on the ‘warrant’ for intelligence.⁹¹⁷ I contend that warrants can be as important as definitions, in the case of American intelligence (and thus are a necessary start to describing and understanding its intelligence culture). Moreover, many historical narratives of American intelligence (discussed in section 4) also function as warrants, creating a rich cultural terrain that has been largely understudied.

I assess a number of types of potential warrant. Warrant can be achieved through public support or strong institutionalization (tradition). There are ethical warrants (i.e., moral codes) and legal warrants and limits (e.g., charter, Constitution, or other laws). Warrant can also be achieved through formalized organizational mandate.⁹¹⁸ Kratochwil identifies one of the most deeply felt warrants, “truth... as a warrant for our knowledge claims.”⁹¹⁹ Here, however, I will mainly be concerned with warrant in the form of the intelligence history or origin story. In the section

⁹¹⁵ The roots of this are also discussed in chapter six, under the section titled Indirect Influences.

⁹¹⁶ Jorge Serrano Torres “Invited Commentary,” in *Democratization of Intelligence: Melding Strategic Intelligence and National Discourse*, eds. Susana C. Lemozy, and Russell G. Swenson (Washington: National Defense Institute College 2009), p 57-58.

⁹¹⁷ Not in the legal sense, but as a justification or foundation for, or an authorization and legitimation.

⁹¹⁸ The vision/mission statements, when formalized by proper authorities.

⁹¹⁹ Friedrich Kratochwil, “History, Action and Identity: Revisiting the ‘Second’ Great Debate and Assessing its Importance for Social Theory,” *European Journal of International Relations* 2006 12: 5, p 7. This warrant has been relevant for intelligence, in terms of the debate between politicization, objectivity, and epistemology. See chapter four, of this dissertation, section “The Debate.” The intelligence literature on this includes Rob Dover, “The place of intelligence in political narratives,” in *Diversity in the Discipline: Tension or Opportunity in Responding to Global Challenges*. Paper presented at the British International Studies Association and the International Studies Association Joint International Conference Edinburgh June 5, 2012. 20 - 22 P1; and the well-known treatment of “best truth” in Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman , *Best truth : intelligence in the Information Age* (New Haven : Yale University Press, 2000) preface.

following this one, I detail a number of these ‘origin’ narratives as the capstone for understanding current American intelligence culture. I focus on narratives specifically because they are a useful addition to the definitional and normative approaches, drawing the self-imposed limits of American intelligence in a different way. They complement the Kent–Kendall story and provide an important background to the Pearl Harbor symbol (which is itself representative of an origin). Finally, tracing narratives is a more subtle way to describe and reflect on the factors shaping current intelligence community (and intelligence itself). Narratives often reflect the vibrancy of subcultures, whereas definitions and norms can tend to show dominant perceptions. As noted above, narratives are also part of the web of interpellation throughout security cultures, since strategic and intelligence cultures are “negotiated realities.”⁹²⁰

These two sections, on warrants, and the following section, on narratives, complete a more constructivist portrait of the parts of modern American intelligence culture. Norms and definitions shadow the other aspects of intelligence culture, spread throughout the social imaginary entire. The idea is to draw from multiple perspectives, discourses, and approaches. Intelligence cannot be described only in the bounds of norms; thus methodologically, this chapter extends the study of intelligence culture to multiple, new or less conventional, formats.

Authorizing Intelligence

As noted, research on norms alone misses other important ways to demonstrate and capture the self-imposed limits and vistas of intelligence culture. I draw attention to an area not

⁹²⁰ Thomas U. Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), p. 1.

often discussed, intelligence's warrant.⁹²¹ Many American practitioners and experts see the Constitution (and related intelligence laws to a lesser degree) as the 'authorization' for intelligence.⁹²² Yet text of the Constitution itself never mentions intelligence. Thus the common-sense question often goes unanswered; why is the Constitution considered an authorization for intelligence, and moreover, why is justification needed for intelligence ? I have already discussed (in chapter four) the authorizations of science, linked to a particular epistemology and ontology. Scientific knowledge is one warrant to the Kentian idea of intelligence.⁹²³ In day-to-day practice the perceived warrant of intelligence might include this idea of 'science' (diffusely), but usually a more concrete and limited authorization shapes normal action. Other warrants visible in intelligence might include key documents, written principles, as well as unwritten professional modes of conduct, providing some warrant. The very idea of intelligence *qua* profession is part of the construction of these codes and of warranting.⁹²⁴ Scott and Jackson write, "[t]he codes of conduct – both written and unwritten – of intelligence services provide one avenue for exploring [ethical] constraints..."⁹²⁵ and I argue similarly, these codes and other texts reflect the politics of authorizations and warrants for intelligence. Such warrants may also define the limits of what intelligence can do: "To what ends should the 'morally suspect' means of intelligence be put ? For what 'good ends' should these means be employed ? To whom, or to what, should they be

⁹²¹ Jones approaches these kinds of ethical self-restrictions as a "just-war/just-intelligence" theory. Jennifer Morgan Jones, "Is Ethical intelligence a contradiction in terms?" in *Ethics of Spying: A Reader for the Intelligence Professional* ed Jan Goldman. 2010, P 26. The idea of "just intelligence" is a common frame, borrowing from classical just war terminology. See Toni Erskine's "Moral Agents and Intelligence Gathering," – who lists Quinlan's use in "The Future of Covert Intelligence," Herman in "Modern Intelligence Services," in *Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century: Journeys in Shadows* Eds. Peter Jackson, L.V. Scott (2004 Routledge New York, NY) p210, 215 FN 59.

⁹²² Opponents of intelligence also stress the protections of the Constitution (while not specifically providing a right to privacy), invoking the fourth amendment against unreasonable search. *Strategic Intelligence* ed. Loch K. Johnson, (2007). P 119 The Constitution may have become more of a factor as oversight increased. Preface, *Strategic Intelligence* ed. Loch K. Johnson, 2007 pp xv. However, the Constitution also does not tend to figure into day-to-day practice. Frederick A.O. Schwarz Jr. "Intelligence Oversight," p33 in *Strategic Intelligence* Ed. Loch K. Johnson.

⁹²³ Kent, "A Crucial Estimate Relived."

⁹²⁴ Kent, "Valediction."

⁹²⁵ Len Scott and Peter Jackson, "Journeys in Shadows," in *Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century: Journeys in Shadows*, eds. Peter Jackson, L.V. Scott (London ; New York : Routledge, 2004), p 16-17.

ultimately responsible?”⁹²⁶ In some nation states, it is a formal Constitution that defines and limits where intelligence should act and where it must be restrained. For others, a collection of laws or the endorsement of leaders/founders might be considered the warrant for intelligence. A warrant is not a norm—it is an authorization and circumscription. The need for, and sources of, warrants are variable.

For a few states, intelligence needs no justification—the practice of intelligence is so ingrained as to be unquestioned. If intelligence is seen to be purely and necessarily dictated by the needs of the state, it may not need secondary authorization – although this would assume a deep belief in the authorization of *raison d'état*, or something similar.⁹²⁷ In states where intelligence is more deeply institutionalized, the warrant may be difficult to define. In the UK, for example, the warrant for intelligence may be the centuries spanning public support for a society founded on tradition—of which intelligence is a long part.⁹²⁸ This kind of warrant—tradition—need not (necessarily) be more explicit than that, to a society that holds government as an elite trust based on reciprocal duty.⁹²⁹ The trust in intelligence, then, would be synecdochal of the trust and accepted authority for government as a whole. However, even in these societies, if intelligence abuse is exposed or a shock occurs (e.g., a terrorist attack) these warrants can be

⁹²⁶ Scott and Jackson, “Journeys in Shadows,” p 16.

⁹²⁷ The realist and neorealist beliefs that power, and the international system, respectively, both cause and allow the state to do as is needful, is a constructed warrant of a kind that takes a created entity (the state) and renders it certain needs and imperatives. Of course Foucault’s work famously traces this concept, the “raison d’etat” through history; Colin Gordon, “Governmental Rationality: An Introduction,” *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality* (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1991), p 8-10.

⁹²⁸ While the Security Service (MI5) was founded in 1909, chronicled in Christopher Andrew’s *The Defence Of The Realm* ; “Introduction,” *Defend the Realm: The authorized history of MI5* (Toronto, Ontario: Penguin Canada, 2009). It was of course predated by other services (such as the intelligence division, in London). Robert Johnson, “A Plain Tail of Pundits, Players and Professionals: The Historiography of the Great Game,” in *Intelligence Studies in Britain and the US: Historiography Since 1945*, eds. Christopher R. Moran, Christopher J. Murphy, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), p 196. Moreover, every schoolchild knows the adventure of famous spies of the past; such as the travails of Francis Bacon as the Queen’s Intelligencer under Burghley, in 1578, one among many spies historically employed by the crown, in a tradition of intelligence gathering spanning the centuries; John Michael Archer, *Sovereignty and Intelligence: Spying and Court Culture in the English Renaissance*, (Stanford University Press, 1993), p 124. The information gathered at that time was known as intelligence, and though methods and institutions changed, the idea of a continuous tradition of intelligence remains in the UK through continued terminological fixity.

⁹²⁹ Arthur Aughey, Greta Jones, William Terence Martin Riches, *The Conservative Political Tradition in Britain and the United States*, (Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1992), p 141.

questioned.⁹³⁰ Likewise, if intelligence itself changes (methods or function) its warrant becomes questioned. Because intelligence is not seen as ‘American,’ the authorization of intelligence – in the form of a strong warrant – is critical. As with just-war theory, “in bypassing normal moral constraints” (such as killing an enemy), the adopter becomes in theory subject to those same methods. This is problematic for American intelligence, because it would allow American citizens to reciprocally be a legitimate target of espionage.⁹³¹ This legitimacy or warrant of espionage and intelligence, has been a concern in American culture.

American Warrants

Some part of all of the types of warrants that listed above apply to American intelligence, largely because of the strength of the belief that intelligence is ‘unwarranted’ – a belief reflected, for example, in the debates over NSA spying and the Snowden leaks.⁹³² Public support is a lesser warrant in the US. After decades of intelligence scandals, counter-intelligence failures, and general suspicion of government, the public does not render unconditional support.⁹³³ Likewise, tradition, even as it exists in America, would not provide as strong a warrant as in the UK. Even

⁹³⁰ One way of discerning the evidences of these shocks is through pop culture. James Bond has been hailed filmic reflection of the British power imaginary; Bond and secret agents in general “returns human agency to a world which seems less and less the product of human action” and so cinematically confronts the threats, personally, which seem to menace the state broadly. Michael Denning, *Cover Stories: Narrative and Ideology in the British spy thriller* (London: Routledge, 2014), p 14, 29. The Bond film *Skyfall* (2012) then was a, mythically, popular representation of the confrontation of the monsters, personal and political, resulting from the 7.7 London Subway bombings.

⁹³¹ Thus “just intelligence” theories suggest various ways of specifying legitimate (or non-“civilian”) targets for intelligence. Jones, “Is Ethical Intelligence A Contradiction in Terms?” p 27.

⁹³² The well-respected progressive group, the Electronic Frontier Foundation chronicles this, “NSA Spying,” <https://www EFF.org/nsa-spying>.

⁹³³ American polling data shows support for intelligence is no longer at its post 9.11 heights. Most recent polls (2013 and beyond) indicate that somewhere near a majority of Americans, no matter the phrasing or particulars, feel that more oversight of intelligence would be better. There is also significant opposition to many forms of intelligence collection, even when only used against suspected terrorists. There is also a stronger concern for privacy over security. Naturally, the polling data has variance depending on the sample size, but multiple polls testify to this general lack of support: Harry J. Enten and Ed Pilkington, “NSA surveillance: Guardian poll finds majority in US want greater oversight,” *The Guardian* (UK), Thursday June 13, 2013. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/13/nsa-surveillance-guardian-poll-oversight>. Pew Research, “Few See Adequate Limits on NSA Surveillance Program,” July 26, 2013, <http://www.people-press.org/2013/07/26/few-see-adequate-limits-on-nsa-surveillance-program/>. Mark Jaycox, “Update: Polls Continue to Show Majority of Americans Against NSA Spying,” *EFF*, January 22, 2014. <https://www EFF.org/deeplinks/2013/10/polls-continue-show-majority-americans-against-nsa-spying>. Glen Greenwald, “Major opinion shifts, in the US and Congress, on NSA surveillance and privacy,” *The Guardian*, Monday 29 July 2013. <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jul/29/poll-nsa-surveillance-privacy-pew>

the Bard has words on intelligence,⁹³⁴ whereas in America there is sometimes a fear or reticence even to discuss intelligence or question changing it.⁹³⁵ The services in many continental states have long weathered scandals and existed for centuries through re-organizations –even if they were primarily the personal intelligences services of the monarch. By contrast, philosophically, the American distrust of tradition stems from the principle that all institutions should be questioned, and the place in America of intelligence institutions has not been fully negotiated. Rational democratic institutions, in the revolutionary sense, cannot rest on tradition, as America rejected tradition as the fetter of ‘old Europe’ against progress.⁹³⁶ The liberal world is one that “damns tradition, exalts equality and welcomes change...” in the immortal worlds of Russell Kirk.⁹³⁷ Thus, respect for tradition – in the philosophical or conservative sense as an unquestioning faith in the wisdom of the past, and ancestors- does not seem to strongly warrant American intelligence because tradition cannot be a warrant in the new world.

For Wiant, a warrant for American intelligence might be found in the Constitution.⁹³⁸ The Constitution is the strongest law in America, the great eulogized basis of the nation. The Constitution may offer some warrant to Americans for this reason, by claiming it under the moral umbrella of its codes of rights and duties. However, the Constitution functions as warrant as a limit primarily: what is legal is what is contained within it, and what is not allowed is anything outside it. Naturally, the Constitution’s lack of specificity on intelligence also makes it sometimes problematic to use it as an authorization. Law is thus, without tradition, a sometimes

⁹³⁴ William F. Friedman, “Shakespeare, Secret Intelligence, and Statecraft,” *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 106, no. 5 (Oct. 11, 1962), 401-411, p 403.

⁹³⁵ For a discussion of this operating in the case of the Iraq war to present, see Lisa Finnegan, *No Questions Asked: News Coverage Since 9/11* (Westport CT: Praeger, 2007).

⁹³⁶ Gad Horowitz’ “fragment theory” argues that unlike the continent, in America the liberal ideology, with its faith in rational institutions instead of traditions, prevailed. Horowitz, “Conservatism, Liberalism, and Socialism in Canada: An Interpretation,” p 143-171.

⁹³⁷ Russell Kirk, *The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Eliot* 7th Ed (Regnery Publishing, 2001), p 4.

⁹³⁸ Torres “Invited Commentary,” p 57-58.

uncertain warrant because it is subject to interpretation and revision. This is why I suggest a key set of warrants have been historical narratives.

Historical Warrant

Historical warrants are clearly a facet of American intelligence culture. For example, Allen Dulles (former CIA director) begins his classic book *The Craft of Intelligence*⁹³⁹ with historical spies stories, from Sun Tzu's 'Divine Skein' to Herodotus and the Greeks, and finally the biblical intelligence stories and that famous directive to "go spy the land."⁹⁴⁰ He is showing that the principles of intelligence have been developed and demonstrated throughout history, even postulating that intelligence is borne out of human instinct: "The desire for advanced information is no doubt rooted in the instinct for survival."⁹⁴¹ It seems to be a project intended to remind Americans that the 'second oldest' profession has even God's sanction (and a thousand years of history). Dulles' sunshine and God's blessing are not the typical American story; the 2006 film *The Good Shepherd* is a dark tale of the rotten moral core and compromises at the heart of the 'origin' of American intelligence. This is more typical of popular American spy fiction.⁹⁴² Dulles stories construct acceptance of intelligence, around a certain American interpellation/subject position. History is used to craft an authorization for intelligence by showing that both, intelligence has done good in the past, and has existed historically in a text as widely sanctioned as the Bible. However, narratives use history to the opposite effect as well, to reinforce intelligence as dark, and dangerous (discussed below). Through the construction of narrative, these stories are actually powerful negotiations of the warrant for American

⁹³⁹ Allen Dulles, *The Craft of Intelligence*, (New York : Harper & Row, 1963).

⁹⁴⁰ Dulles, *The Craft of Intelligence*, Chapter 1 "The Historical Setting."

⁹⁴¹ *Ibid*, p 1.

⁹⁴² The famous *Bourne* series by Robert Ludlum, is one example.

intelligence. Pearl Harbor, then, as chapter six will demonstrate, serves as a powerful narrative or justification for intelligence. I will discuss historical narratives as warrants in more detail in section four, on narratives.

In the next section I explore more specifically one facet of ‘hailing’ or interpellation (from the security imaginary heuristic), in the form of three narratives of intelligence. They loosely centre on the conceptual origin point of modern American intelligence culture. Each narrative creates a particular subject position and interpellates America as a certain kind of intelligence producer and consumer. It defines a kind of identity, but one peculiar to its own assumptions and ideas (that is, not universal).

Part Four: Narratives⁹⁴³

This section discusses three kinds of narratives of intelligence, centered around Pearl Harbor). First, the more traditional stories of intelligence ‘centralization’ tell a common narrative of the development of the modern intelligence community in response to Pearl Harbor. The second set of narrative – or counter-narratives – are the broad groups of stories opposed to the first, traditional narrative. The third kind of narrative are those told ‘outside’ intelligence, in popular culture, yet contribute to the overall understanding of Pearl Harbor’s place in American intelligence. The three narrative groups give a different perspective on the culture surrounding intelligence in America, and Pearl Harbor specifically. Pearl Harbor has been central to American stories of intelligence, and these narratives flesh out a unique broad understanding of the concepts of American intelligence that are not captured in norms and definitions. In America

⁹⁴³ A number of strategic culture studies use discourses instead of norms; Rasmussen discusses how the discourses of Cosmopolitanism and Defencism have impacted Danish security practices. Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, “What’s the Use of It?: Danish Strategic Culture and the Utility of Armed Force,” *Cooperation and Conflict* 40, no. 1 (2005) p 72, 67. Also James Roger, ‘Civilian Power’ to ‘Global Power’: Explicating the European Union’s ‘Grand Strategy’ Through the Articulation of Discourse Theory,” *JCMS* 47, no 4. (2009), p 831–862.

the importance of these narratives comes from the previously discussed American need for ‘warrants’ for intelligence. They also represent a fuller, constructivist based approach to understanding intelligence culture, showing aspects of current culture present outside norms and definitions.

Narratives as Warrants⁹⁴⁴

I want to focus preliminarily on the origin story as warrant. Pearl Harbor has been, for decades, a key warrant for US intelligence (see chapter six). The Pearl Harbor story in one way is stronger than the Constitution: while the latter may merely allow intelligence, the events of the PH attack direct Americans to the *positive* need for it. The importance of any narrative is ultimately what it constructs as allowable, necessary, and impossible. Wibben writes that the George Bush’s “authoritative” narrative of the events of September 11, 2001 was one such powerfully shaping narrative: “Bush’s *Address* frames the events of 9/11 in as particular way; like any narrative it orders events [...]. In doing so, it not only imposes an authoritative account of the events, but it also shapes the possible responses and limits alternative presentations.”⁹⁴⁵

The narrative or origin story of intelligence is a way of understanding intelligence culture through interpellations because it defines who ‘we’ are, what has happened, and what ‘we’ have become, all in intelligence terms. The narration of history is the creation of a comprehensible face. Each narrative signals a different interpellation of the American intelligence role and identity; they create their own internal logics. We must not mistake these

⁹⁴⁴ For intelligence culture, narratives offer a methodologically unique way to study the woven representations of both public and elite groups shaping intelligence culture, since these narratives and warrants are a product of mixing of these groups.

⁹⁴⁵ Annick TR. Wibben, *Feminist Security Studies: A narrative approach* (Routledge, 2010), p 57.

narratives for ‘reality’—these are not factual accounts of intelligence.⁹⁴⁶ Most importantly, narratives signal ways different groups want to think about intelligence. These inform intelligence culture; this process is understood through the subject positions and hailing of interpellation, and construction of meaning in articulation. Each narrative highlights certain aspects of intelligence and leaves others out, creating connections (articulations) and internal logics. Each selection made in presenting the history of intelligence helps us to understand intelligence culture: “choosing to narrate an event in a certain manner... is to produce meaning.”⁹⁴⁷ Lustick argues that pictures of ‘what happened’ of any series of events are a function of personal and methodological commitments, and “imaginative constructions” of events, “woven into particular overarching narratives.”⁹⁴⁸ Analyzing the narrative points us to its own “conditions of possibility.”⁹⁴⁹

The first part of any story or narrative is its origin. Each narrative begins somewhere or sometime. Some explicitly identify an origin. The creation of an origin is also the formation of a conceptual break with the past. In this way, it is a construction of identity, a hailing – every history is a selective account of the world. For postmodern scholars, constructing an origin or foundation is an effacing of the foundationless-ness of foundations.⁹⁵⁰ Essentially, it hides its own partiality and constructedness. In constructing an origin, we create a break with the past, minimizing whatever continuities had existed to emphasize uniqueness. Intelligence origin stories support a particular narrative of US intelligence history. If ‘modern’ American intelligence finds its origin in World War II rather than 9/11, or the Cold War, certain assumptions about what is intelligence and what its importance has been are made. Each

⁹⁴⁶ Ian S. Lustick, “History, Historiography, and Political Science: Multiple Historical Records and the Problem of Selection Bias,” *The American Political Science Review* 90, no. 3 (Sep., 1996): 605-618, p 606.

⁹⁴⁷ Wibben, *Feminist Security Studies: A Narrative Approach*, p 57.

⁹⁴⁸ Lustick, “History, Historiography, and Political Science,” p 606.

⁹⁴⁹ Wibben, *Feminist Security Studies: A Narrative Approach*, p 46.

⁹⁵⁰ Jacques Derrida, “Declarations of Independence,” *New Political Science* 7, no. 1 (1986): 7-15.

narrative must leave something out; it must select and in doing so it adumbrates intelligence culture. The origin or narrative, then, is an attempt to secure intelligence's place in American common sense, in its own putative liberal tradition. This next heading, then, is a continuation of the examination of warrants from above (as well as norms and definitions). But origins are multiple, and need to be constantly renewed. The renewal of the PH origin is what is at issue in the final chapter of this dissertation, and its consequences for intelligence culture.

The Traditional 'Centralization' Story

Although national intelligence coordination was already begun by Roosevelt and Donovan before the US's entry into the war, and the Pearl Harbor attack, this has not prevented Pearl Harbor from becoming, in peacetime, the symbol of the lack of centralized intelligence. Through the seven inquiries into Pearl Harbor by 1945, this event came to stand for the problem of intelligence coordination.⁹⁵¹ The investigations of the attack helped make the struggles with collaboration prior to the attack, public knowledge. While PH investigations and hearings were drawn out because of the battle over who was responsible for the attack – base commanders or Washington – and partisan rancor over Roosevelt's anti-isolationism policies. These inquiries, while primarily concerned with the question of military responsibility, clearly demonstrated that a number of pieces of intelligence had pointed to an attack.⁹⁵² As a result of this evidence, the

⁹⁵¹ See chapter three of this dissertation on coordination problems, prior to and during the war. Smith's "The American Road to Central Intelligence," is a good concise look at the direct antecedents to central intelligence, from the 1800s onward, without recounting the specific debate over centralization itself. Bradley F. Smith, "The American Road to Central Intelligence," in *Eternal Vigilance? 50 years of the CIA*, eds. Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones and Christopher M. Andrew (London, Cass., 1997).

⁹⁵² The NSA's own Cryptologic History Centre notes that each of the first eight hearings dealt with Magic intercepts to a greater and lesser extent (as well as all other intercepts). National Security Agency, "Pearl Harbor Review - The Investigations," *Center for Cryptologic History* https://www.nsa.gov/about/cryptologic_heritage/center_crypt_history/pearl_harbor_review/investigations.shtml.

leaders at Pearl Harbor, Kimmel and Short, were blamed and retired, because, as military commanders, the readiness and responsibility fell to them.⁹⁵³

However, the question of responsibility foregrounded the issue, not only of the chain of command, but of how intelligence was and should be organized as to effectively respond to PH like events. Thus the narrative of PH became more than overall question of simply readiness for the attack, but includes the problems of competing signals and noise.⁹⁵⁴ Arguably, if the analysis and decryption of intelligence signals had been centralized, the various indicators may have been put together. For example, Slackman writes that MAGIC was “one of the few inter-service operations which worked smoothly” (distribution being done on alternating days), but messages were not disseminated to analysts who could have understood their implications.⁹⁵⁵ This is the oft-repeated notion of “connecting the dots.”⁹⁵⁶ And if national central intelligence had been able to pull together these pieces into a coherent picture, then the warnings—instead of remaining haphazard, low priority, and too late—would have been effective and clear. So in intelligence, Pearl Harbor often stands for the need for coordination and centralization of intelligence. Advocates of central intelligence prior to the war immediately took up Pearl Harbor; Langer lectured in 1946 that the attack stemmed from “lack of ‘integration’”⁹⁵⁷ and Truman implemented the National Security Act because he felt Pearl Harbor could have been prevented “if there had been something like co-ordination of information in the government.”⁹⁵⁸ The concept of ‘national’ intelligence was also invented in this period, according to Troy, and the

⁹⁵³ Fred L. Borch, “Comparing Pearl Harbor and “9/11”: Intelligence Failure? American Unpreparedness? Military Responsibility?” *The Journal of Military History* 67, no. 3, (Jul. 2003), p 846.

⁹⁵⁴ Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor; Warning and Decision*; Discussed further in chapter six.

⁹⁵⁵ For an explanation of MAGIC see National Security Agency, “Pearl Harbor Review- Red and Purple,”; and National Security Agency, “Pearl Harbor Review.” Michael Slackman, *Target: Pearl Harbor* (Honolulu : University of Hawaii Press : Arizona Memorial Museum Association, 1990), p 25-26.

⁹⁵⁶ Malcom Gladwell, “Connecting the Dots,” *The New Yorker* 10 (2003) (and numerous others). Stephen Marrin, *Improving Intelligence Analysis: Bridging the Gap Between Scholarship and Practice*, (NY, Ny Routledge 2011), p 21.

⁹⁵⁷ *Ibid*, p 118.

⁹⁵⁸ Warner, *Central Intelligence Origin and Evolution*, p 2,p 14.

complimentary concept of the ‘intelligence community’ was born (just a little later), *e pluribus unum*.⁹⁵⁹

With the fault for the surprise of the attack attributed to not solely to lack of intelligence, a new kind of organization was the solution; “[CIA] was not just another service, in addition to the linear [departmental] lineup.” “It was different from everything else....” Established not by mere directive, but “by an act of Congress and the President- after a Constitutional provision the most substantial of foundations.”⁹⁶⁰ The numerous Pearl Harbor-related inquiries are usually portrayed as leading to the storied 1947 National Security Act, which created the CIA, thus producing the narrative that this attack demonstrated the necessity of central intelligence. This connection is reinforced by the narrative of the history of the CIA, which retroactively justifies its existence and origin with the Pearl Harbor attack. Thus the PH attack generates the wartime OSS, which becomes, the post-war CIA in essence.⁹⁶¹ Nomikos reifies the idea of PH as origin myth for the CIA, in suggesting that the EU could use the experience with Yugoslavia as defining reason to found an intelligence service, just as “Pearl Harbor was for the United States an important reason to found the CIA....”⁹⁶²

In this way Pearl Harbor is a point of origin in the institutional history of the CIA, whose initial rationale for existence is centralized intelligence. The CIA reinforces this origin; the entire history of the CIA, from the background it gives to its employees, as well as to school children on its website, points to Pearl Harbor as a symbol of the necessity of centralized intelligence. In a

⁹⁵⁹ Troy dates the term to 1955, officially – and speculates that the term suggests (from Steiner) a “harmonious interplay between agencies and government control” and that it is misleading or a “polite fiction” and perhaps the lack of examination of the name “actually masked the Achilles heel of American intelligence.” Thomas F. Troy, “The Quaintness of the US Intelligence Community: Its origin, theory, and problems.” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence* 2, no. 2 (1988): 245-266, p 253, 245. Historiographically for Troy, the “community” in intelligence community, may be revealing- it could have been “circle” or “system”. *Ibid*, p 254.

⁹⁶⁰ Troy, “The Quaintness of the US Intelligence Community,” p 232.

⁹⁶¹ Constantinides calls it a “genetic connection”, noting “as one writer put it, the OSS was the direct lineal ancestor of the CIA.” George C. Constantinides, “The OSS: A Brief Review of Literature,” in *The Secret War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II*, ed. George C. Chalou (National Archives and records Administration, 2002), p 109.

⁹⁶² John M. Nomikos, “A European Union Intelligence Service for Confronting Terrorism,” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 18, no.2 (2005): 191 – 203, p 195.

perfect narrative simplification- the CIA writes for children that: “The United States suffered its most costly intelligence disaster when the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. That intelligence failure...” led to the OSS, the “forerunner” of the CIA.⁹⁶³ A clear connection ties this origin story together: American was vulnerable and was attacked, and so peacetime centralized intelligence was created to prevent any future insecurity. Intelligence would predict or warn of threats before they even arose, taking the burden off the military.

The fascinating leitmotif of the story – for the present – is the constant striving for, and failure to, centralize.⁹⁶⁴ The factors standing in the way of centralization are clear: bureaucratic politics, organizational cultures, institutional inertia, and the military/civilian divide of the community and budgets. Yet centralization has remained attractive; in the reforms following the 9.11– “The issue was less *whether* the 9/11 Commission would recommend further centralization than it was *how much*.”⁹⁶⁵ The way (some) practitioners and policymakers continue to make centralization a goal—to understand it as the ideal model of intelligence – reflects a great deal about the intelligence community. After fifty years of failure, two major disasters, and countless minor ones, centralization has still not been jettisoned as a plausible, if not superior, formula for intelligence. Yet why keep calling for centralization, if an idea a century old⁹⁶⁶ has yielded only continued problems?⁹⁶⁷ Regardless of whether centralization answers America’s intelligence problems—it might be if it were achievable—clearly the ideational heft of “centralization” has a

⁹⁶³ CIA, “History of American Intelligence,” <https://www.cia.gov/kids-page/6-12th-grade/operation-history/history-of-the-cia.html>

⁹⁶⁴ Troy suggests that the “mousetrap” idea of a centralized clearing agency was present as early as 1915, and recurred frequently in debates among American policymakers. Troy, “The Quaintness of the US Intelligence Community,” p 248.

⁹⁶⁵ Michael Allen, *Blinking Red: Crisis and Compromise in American Intelligence after 9/11*, (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2013), p 34-35.

⁹⁶⁶ It is dated from 1915, if we accept Troy’s history of the idea of a central clearinghouse. Troy, “The Quaintness of the US Intelligence Community,” p 248.

⁹⁶⁷ In truth the American system is neither centralized nor decentralized; in practice it has been more and less so due to a variety of factors. What is key is that the ideal of centralization, Warner calls it a “durable idea –born from the Pearl Harbor disaster” persists in “axiom” that centralization is best, and suggests we will continue to live with the decentralization and “the impulse toward centralization”. Michael Warner, “Central Intelligence: Origin and Evolution,” p 53/54. Zegart argues the system was only centralized in name, and “decentralized in substance.” Amy B. Zegart, *Flawed by Design : the evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC* (Stanford, Calif. : Stanford University Press, 1999), p 74.

power of its own, beyond the real.⁹⁶⁸ Centralization as Holy Grail has remained a theme from Pearl Harbor to the present; it is a core part of American intelligence culture. Red Team, competitive analyses, and other forms of apparent duplication have come up against the power of this norm.⁹⁶⁹

The centralization narrative aligns a couple of assumptions. It suggests that the information is always ‘in the pipeline’ colloquially, and must be better organized, or understood to be effective: “it is generally assumed that accurate information about what is about to transpire always exists somewhere in the intelligence pipeline.”⁹⁷⁰ It is not insufficient information that is the problem. Again, we can see links to Kentian ideas of knowledge (discussed in chapter four) – we are menaced, not by mysteries but puzzles. “Puzzles have an answer in principle; intelligence just may not know it.”⁹⁷¹ Yet Berkowitz and others have argued that September 11 failure/surprise attack was understood as having the same solution as PH “too: focus intently on the target, centralize data collection, and wait for the sign of an imminent strike.”⁹⁷² What is important is the repeated perception of centralization as a solution to a variety of problems – placing intelligence in a Kentian world. Naturally, not all assessments understand Pearl Harbor this way; Berkowitz’s and other critiques are a rejection of this narrative.⁹⁷³ This origin story also persists in because of that unspoken assumption that ‘intelligence’ is foreign intelligence (discussed above): that is, not the FBI and domestic surveillance. Framing intelligence this way may follow Sherman Kent’s classic definition, as many do, that what he discusses is “high-level

⁹⁶⁸ Loch Johnston identifies the easy unreal rhetoric around centralization – noting the “pleasant ring” of intelligence coordination rhetoric as located in the CIA, alongside the idealized term intelligence “community” – used “to describe America’s loose aggregation of ‘stovepiped’ espionage organizations” each with its own ‘gorilla’ (slang for directors). Loch Johnston, *National Security Intelligence*, p 24.

⁹⁶⁹ Historically, proponents of competitive or decentralized intelligence have had difficulty arguing for this form of organization. Kevin P. Stack, “Competitive Intelligence,” *Intelligence and National Security* 13, no.4 (Winter 1998), p 194-202. Interestingly, Stack’s discussion of the advantages of competitive intelligence explains it with reference to the Kent Kendall debate, *Ibid* p 194.

⁹⁷⁰ James J Wirtz, “The Art of the Intelligence Autopsy,” *Intelligence and National Security* 29, no. 1 (2014): 1–18, p 4.

⁹⁷¹ Gregory F. Treverton, “Addressing ‘Complexities’ in Homeland Security,” in *The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence* ed. Loch Johnston, (Oxford, 2010), p 344-345.

⁹⁷² Bruce Berkowitz, “Spying in the Post-September 11 World” *Hoover Digest* no. 4 (2003): 14- 21.

⁹⁷³ *Ibid*.

foreign positive intelligence.”⁹⁷⁴ This context ignores state department and military (attaché) foreign intelligence work, as well as the earlier foreign work of the FBI. By excluding these from a narrative of intelligence in the US, Pearl Harbor becomes the contemporary source for the intelligence community and its ethos of centralization. So the traditional story goes that the Pearl Harbor attack demonstrated the need for peacetime centralized (*foreign*) intelligence, and since then the CIA has fulfilled this function; thus if the CIA were ever eliminated, we would face the threat of another Pearl Harbor.

Counter-narratives

There are a number of counter-narratives to the PH-centralization narrative supported by smaller factions in the intelligence community. These alternatives are not necessarily more sensitive to context or ‘better’ stories –they are only different visions of intelligence. Jeffreys-Jones’ work is a key resistive account, because in denouncing the CIA he attempts to disabuse the reader of the link between Pearl Harbor and the need for intelligence centralization. Jeffreys-Jones writes: “On the intelligence front, Pearl Harbor became an important *justification* for the creation of the Central intelligence Agency, and then for the expansion in the CIA’s functions, budget and personnel.”⁹⁷⁵ A justification, but not an adequate reason. He resists the PH narrative by attempting to break the continuity of the origin myth, showing that civilian intelligence existed in a heretofore undiscovered agency.⁹⁷⁶ Jeffreys-Jones also attacks the use of “expert” opinion used to support the proposition that “Pearl Harbor dictated the need for central

⁹⁷⁴ Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, p 3.

⁹⁷⁵ Jeffreys-Jones, *Cloak and Dollar*, p 116. Jeffreys-Jones devotes a chapter in his book to how PH was used by CIA boosting ‘expansionists’ even though he believes the connection is specious, “In intelligence terms, [PH] was not significant in itself, but as an irrelevance that metamorphosed into a justification” [emphasis added].

⁹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

intelligence”⁹⁷⁷ attacking Pettee and praising Kendall. He has been attacked for the poor factual basis for his ‘pre-history,’ but the very provocation of such strong reaction shows the strength of the PH myth.

For one school of thought, the OSS is more important than Pearl Harbor: “I believe it can legitimately be claimed that the experiences and traditions of the wartime office of strategic services, the first U.S. central, and despite the war, largely civilian intelligence organization of pre-Pearl Harbor origin, have greatly influenced and shaped the philosophy behind the CIA as an instrument of the national security state.”⁹⁷⁸ Constantinides diplomatically writes that some groups have stressed the OSS’s role (overmuch) compared to its real influence.⁹⁷⁹ One other rejection of the PH CIA origin was by way of failure; if the CIA did not prevent or warn of the ‘Pearl Harbors’ it was created for, then its justification might be faulty. In Korea, an early failure to predict the surprise enemy attack was cause for censure; “The CIA’s overriding purpose was to prevent another Pearl Harbor, and the North Korean attack... was too close a parallel to pass...”⁹⁸⁰ For its sins, the CIA was charged with not being able to prevent “another Pearl Harbor.”⁹⁸¹

One of the most powerful counter-narratives of the American experience with intelligence is that of conspiracies—powerful men abusing secrets and controlling, manipulating, and repressing the public.⁹⁸² Virtually every major American spy action film involves a

⁹⁷⁷ *Ibid*, p 158.

⁹⁷⁸ Siegfried Beer, “The CIA in Austria in the Marshall Plan Era, 1947-1953” in *The Marshall Plan in Austria*, ed. Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, Dieter Stiefe, (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2000), p 189.

⁹⁷⁹ Constantinides, “The OSS,” p 109-110.

⁹⁸⁰ John Ranelagh, quoted in Richard L. Russell, *Sharpening Strategic Intelligence: Why the CIA Gets It Wrong and What Needs To Be Done To Get It Right* (Ny, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p 31.

⁹⁸¹ This charge was made against the under-resourced post-war CIA, according to Donald P. Steury (recounting panel comments) in Donald P. Steury, “Origins of the CIA’s Analysis of the Soviet Union,” in *Watching the Bear: Essays on CIA’s Analysis of the Soviet Union*, eds. Gerald K. Haines, Robert E. Leggett (Government Printing Office, 2003), p 14; and at present – Charles S. Faddis, *Beyond Repair: The Decline and Fall of the CIA*, (Gulfport CONN, Lyons Press, 2010), p5/6.

⁹⁸² H. H. Ransom calls this kind of work on intelligence “muckracking”; this kind of work tends to be biased and poorly sources – but this does not diminish its public appeal or prevent it from being believed by the public. Ransom, *The Intelligence Establishment*, CH 3.

conspiracy of power or shadow government. Recently, one of the biggest franchises in film history, Marvel's cinematic universe, showed American intelligence as corrupt, shot through with a Nazi-like secret society.⁹⁸³ This narrative highlights the dark side of intelligence, the negative impacts of secrecy. It often rests on the articulation of America and democracy and freedom, suggesting that these two cannot survive. The narrative locates itself in stories of America's covert action, and failures such as the Bay of Pigs, countering the 'heroic' necessity of intelligence to the nation's security with incompetence.⁹⁸⁴ This negative portrayal of intelligence is a narrative common to many intelligence cultures, but in the US it is supported by particular articulations and has been strengthened by the repeated failures, scandals, and spies that have been revealed and investigated in inquiries and commissions.⁹⁸⁵ For example, the Cuban Missile Crisis, The Iraq War, 9.11, The Atomic Bomb spies, Watergate, Pearl Harbor, Vietnam, The Korean War, the prediction of the fall of the Soviet Union, & etc. have all been understood, in their various aspects, as 'intelligence failures' (of control, prediction, warning etc.).⁹⁸⁶ In these narratives, failures are evidence of the corruptness of intelligence, counterintuitively. The assumption is that by using intelligence at all, American invites unto itself the evil and corruption of intruding politics and harm – although this is clearest in domestic intelligence abuse/scandals.⁹⁸⁷

⁹⁸³ This event takes place in the continuity of the entire franchise, although it occurs primarily in the worldwide blockbuster *Captain America: The Winter Soldier* (2014).

⁹⁸⁴ While rightly subject to criticism, Wiener's *Legacy of Ashes* is a frequently cited representative of this school of thought. Tim Weiner, *Legacy of Ashes: the history of the CIA* (New York: Doubleday, 2007) Ch 17 "Bay of Pigs."

⁹⁸⁵ See chapter three in this dissertation, on the Year of the Spy.

⁹⁸⁶ Popular laundry lists of these failures, such as Foreign Affairs' "The Ten Biggest American Intelligence Failures," are the pop filtering of the academic literature on failure, such as Michael Fitzgerald & Richard Ned Lebow, "Iraq: The Mother of all intelligence failures," *Intelligence and National Security*, 21, no. 5 (2006): 884-909; Mark A. Jensen, "Intelligence Failures: What Are They Really and What Do We Do about Them?," *Intelligence and National Security*, 27, no. 2 (2012): 261-282; among historical accounts of these subjects. Uri Friedman, "The Ten Biggest American Intelligence Failures," *Foreign Affairs*, January 3, 2012.

⁹⁸⁷ The blogosphere is the common mode of dissemination for critics now, examples of respected or prominent critical blogs include the ACLU's "national security state" blog <https://www.aclu.org/blog/tag/national-security-state>; the Electronic Frontier Foundation's NSA blog, <https://www EFF.org/nsa-spying>. Other critics include L. Fletcher Prouty- *The Secret Team: the CIA and its allies in control of the United States and the world* (Skyhorse Publishing, 2011) - and Victor Marchetti - Victor Marchetti, John D. Marks, and Melvin L. Wulf, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (New York: Knopf, 1974).

The conspiratorial or counter-narrative, narrates American intelligence as a series of failures, incompetencies, scandals, and abuses, continuing through the Cold War to today, and it has been revived in the conspiracy theories surrounding the 9/11 attacks.⁹⁸⁸ The conspiracy narrative is shared by civil rights advocates, reporters, antigovernment activists, and some historians.⁹⁸⁹ It draws on the pre-PH ambiguity in intelligence, reflecting the bitter side of espionage in sabotage, killing, and treason. Scholars have taken up the task of writing about intelligence to advocate its dismantling, in the vein of this narrative.⁹⁹⁰ They would prefer to see the PH origin effaced, because its dismantling allows the argument that intelligence is unnecessary for America. The Kendallian narrative (already seen in chapter four) could also be seen as opposed to the more optimistic idea that central intelligence, along with the power of reason and science, can thwart all threats.⁹⁹¹ It now emphasizes the spy, re-christened as bulwark against terror in a ‘hunter-gatherer’ ethos.⁹⁹² It contends that liberalism and the peace-politics of the post-Cold War have failed; aggressors still threaten America and the world. Finally, those scholars who resist the common PH-9.11 articulation, may also be resisting the PH origin narrative.⁹⁹³

These are not the only narratives that resist Pearl Harbor as an origin, and others cover an even wider range. Each of the two outlined above purports to describe the nature of intelligence and America’s historical experience with it to the present. Both counter-narratives clearly reflect

⁹⁸⁸ This is reflected in the literature, past and present, of texts such as John M. Diamond’s *The CIA and the Culture of Failure: U.S. intelligence from the end of the Cold War to the invasion of Iraq*, (Stanford, CA : Stanford Security Series, 2008). On the non-academic, extremist position, are texts like the popular David Ray Griffin book *The New Pearl Harbor: Disturbing questions about the Bush administration and 9/11* (Interlink Books, 2004).

⁹⁸⁹ Counter-narrative historians, for example, feature prominently for events like Pearl Harbor and 9.11. R.J.C. Butow, “How Roosevelt Attacked Japan at Pearl Harbor: Myth Masquerading as History,” *Prologue* 28, no. 3 (Fall 1996).

⁹⁹⁰ James D. Calder, *Intelligence, Espionage and Related Topics : an annotated bibliography of serial, journal, and magazine scholarship, 1844-1998* (Westport, CT : Greenwood Press, 1999).

⁹⁹¹ Culturally, this position might have links to the ‘heroic spy’ figure who acts on instinct and patriotism, and depictions of officials who act not on arguments, but gut feelings of right and wrong. While this narrative faded – but did not vanish- after the Cold War, following 9/11, the idea of a moral intelligence war against the enemy of “evil” terrorism was resurrected (in the guise of freedom/democracy rhetoric). Culturally, these mythic figures never fully disappear – viz Joseph Campbell’s famous hero theories.

⁹⁹² Martin Rudner, Hunters and Gatherers: The Intelligence Coalition against Islamic Terrorism,” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligences* 17 no 2 (2004).

⁹⁹³ The PH/9.11 links are explored in depth in chapter six of this dissertation. See Borch, "Comparing Pearl Harbor and" 9/11": p 845-860.

elements of American engagement with intelligence before Pearl Harbor. However, the ‘signal myth’ of Pearl Harbor, as the origin point of the modern US intelligence community, remains the dominant one. This mythic origin colors the narration of modern intelligence issues, and the context of the development of the PH origin-myth has been the primary continuity in American intelligence culture. I will explore its impacts on policy and practice in the next chapter.

Cultural Narratives of Intelligence

I argue (pace Jeffreys-Jones) that there is an alternate ‘factive’ context, or what we could call popular cultural narrative, ignored in the above PH origin narrative. Culture can be seen as an alternative reservoir for and reflection of the security imaginary. As Farrell writes, “Numerous groups in civil society – including artists, business interests and the media – are all involved in the cultural framing of war” and similarly, intelligence.⁹⁹⁴ Many historians have done excellent work on the rich literary and cinematic histories and narratives of American intelligence. For example, Nigel West's discussion of the fictive and factive side of intelligence refers to how fiction and facts/events in intelligence become inextricably intertwined in retrospect.⁹⁹⁵ His fictive context is made up of the films, novels, and pulp literature that shaped and reflected society's experiences with intelligence and that created the archetype/character of the spy as an important national figure. The historical account, despite its importance to scholarly practitioners, is not always the main reflection of perceptions of intelligence. Of course, popular culture is not a perfect mirror, but is, rather, a reservoir of the elements that become articulated in American intelligence culture. This is how Der Derian approaches it: In an alarmist articulation,

⁹⁹⁴ Farrell, “Strategic Culture and American Empire,” p 11.

⁹⁹⁵ Nigel West, “Fiction, Faction, and Intelligence,” *Intelligence and National Security* 19, no. 2 (June 2004): 275-289.

a red dust outside is a mysterious Soviet plot (generating newspaper headlines), while at the same time the dust story is dismissed as natural “bee droppings.”⁹⁹⁶ We must understand that popular culture creations of intelligence reflect deeply held beliefs about it (and in some instances create those beliefs). Dennings quotes Graham Greene, that the history of contemporary society is writ in the ‘cheap editions,’ essentially the popular spy thrillers and fantasies and pulps.⁹⁹⁷ A famous case is the fictional heritage of the fear of invasions of the British Isles prior to the world war – regardless of the actual indications of the possibility of such an attack – spurred both popular fiction and expert attention.⁹⁹⁸ These stories reflected an existing fear of infiltration, and made popular the idea that it was a possible danger. A brief look at the popular narratives of intelligence can yield interesting answer to questions around intelligence culture; what rights and duties does the citizen have to the government, what tools of intelligence are acceptable, and more generally, what does the figure of the spy mean in America? I explore American intelligence culture in both past and present cultural artifacts, below.

Civil and Revolutionary War Intelligence Origins

Espionage and intelligence have been important in the narratives and subject positions created in American popular culture. It is evident from American popular literature on intelligence, dating back to the Revolutionary and Civil Wars, that the US historically had a conflicted relationship with intelligence, seeing it as necessary nation-founding on one hand, and dangerous secret manipulation, on the other. To (re)affirm the rightness of their founding and the

⁹⁹⁶ James Der Derian, *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics* (Lexington Books 1989), p 163.

⁹⁹⁷ Denning, *Cover Stories*, “Introduction.”

⁹⁹⁸ See chapter four of this dissertation.

tyranny of the British, the narrative of the revolutionary war had to incorporate (and justify) the obvious roles of spies and intelligence. This fielded a contradiction, because the US situated itself against the imperialism and rigid aristocratic control Old World, associated with the alliance system of diplomacy and spy systems of intelligence.⁹⁹⁹ Spies were weapons against the rebels, betraying them to the tyrannical British. Fenimore Cooper's *The Spy*, a dark narrative of the turns of patriotism and betrayal. This was the beginning of the American spy in popular fiction.

The spy-as-turncoat, is in Bold's contention, an inaccurate picture of the American spy as a whole because it overlooks the role of genre fiction. While Fenimore Cooper's famous 1821 tale is one of ambiguity, popular "story-papers retell Cooper's narrative of American independence, radically reorienting the symbolism of the spy within that design."¹⁰⁰⁰ From spy as figure of America's dislocation, the spy becomes historical hero, helping Washington cross the Delaware, or saving a patriot from Benedict Arnold's bullet.¹⁰⁰¹ But the key is that the spy "symbolizes America's reunification" so that the spy "brings public honor to the individual as well as the nation".¹⁰⁰² Buntline's spy Saul Sabberday brings peace to the revolutionary war in the conclusion of his story. This reverence for the spy and his historic adventures is replayed in Dulles' historical chapters of his *The Craft of Intelligence*, lionizing Nathan Hale and George Washington, and in his *Great True Spy Stories*.¹⁰⁰³ Thus, the dual character of a spy as patriotic, yet treacherous, was the core image popularly, in the retellings of the revolutionary war.

⁹⁹⁹ As discussed in this chapter, an article from the 1860s titled "The Spy System in Europe," boasts of the freedom of America in contrast with Europe, and its disassociation from intelligence. Bold, "Secret Negotiations," p 16.

¹⁰⁰⁰ *Ibid*, p 24.

¹⁰⁰¹ These stories take place in Ned Buntline's *Saul Sabberday; or The Idiot Spy* (1858).

¹⁰⁰² Bold, *Ibid*.

¹⁰⁰³ Allen Dulles, *Great True Spy Stories* (New York, Harper & Row, 1968) & Dulles, Allen. *The Craft of Intelligence*, CH 2 & 3.

If the revolutionary war had been the only significant conflict involving intelligence in the US's early history, this resolution of the ambiguity of the spy might have been permanent. However, the Civil War reinforced the portrayal of spying as distasteful, since it had few heroes and spilt much blood. In literature, "the heroic spies of the Civil War finally remain trapped in some form of liminality at the end of their own adventures [...] These imperfect unions signal the unfinished story of the Civil War, the one narrative which the formula cannot resolve."¹⁰⁰⁴ The story of the Civil War had no clear resolution of good and evil, American and British, to conjure with, so the problematic nature of intelligence persisted. This dual portrayal of espionage – at once savior from the British and divider of the nation; spying as good American patriotism, or as distasteful old world secret – persists today in the US conception of identity and intelligence. The famous heroic and traitorous spies of the period, real and fictional, are remembered in popular culture – from the Benedict Arnolds to Paul Sabbersdays.

WWI and pre-WWI: Spy Scares and Cinematic Trials

The entry into to both wars furnished many spy intrigues, so I will sketch the most important precursors for the later PH attack. The relevance of these early spy scares lies in their placement of narratives of aliens and spies attacking American soil. The 'German spy scare' (1915-1918) and 'Red scare' (1919-1921) were both fuelled by nativism and anti-immigrant sentiments. "Espionage, real or imagined, became a central element in the growing myth of German treachery in America and popular belief in it grew partly out of the manner in which the German government attempted to get its message across during American neutrality."¹⁰⁰⁵ The Zimmerman telegram in 1917, initially debated as part of tapestry of publicized real German spy

¹⁰⁰⁴ Bold, "Secret Negotiations," p 27.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Ragnhild Fiebig-von Hase and Ursula Lehmkuhl, *Enemy Images in American History* (Providence, RI : Berghahn Books, 1997) p 188.

papers and British forgeries and propaganda, is widely seen as having precipitated entry into the war. It was very much a piece with real spy films of the time. For example, one Japanese silent film actor starred in five spy films from 1914 to 1919, and gained U.S. notoriety for a role as a Japanese spy in 1914's *The Typhoon*.¹⁰⁰⁶

When Wilson got his declaration of war, it was partly based on claims that Germany had filled the US government “with spies” and intrigues.¹⁰⁰⁷ Booth also suggests that the 1915 sinking by U-Boat of the *Lusitania* and the resulting American casualties contributed to the “anti-German bias of many early American spy features.”¹⁰⁰⁸ The American preoccupation in these features reflected a fear of the submarine, a new weapon that could threaten even America's far away shores.¹⁰⁰⁹ Pre-war films arguing for US action featured spy themes and the threat of espionage, and the declaration of war was followed by an ‘avalanche’ of spy films. Instead of patriots, spies were now threatening aliens who walked US soil. Depression Era pulps were also a cavalcade of spies and secret plots; one such agent of action was *Operator #5* or Jimmy Christopher, famous as a spy-fighting, American intelligence service ‘Undercover Ace’ – courtesy of his pulp tagline.¹⁰¹⁰

Booth suggests that following the spy fevers on screen and in public, in the decade before World War II American audiences slowly turned away from spy films. After the armistice, the public had less taste for espionage films due to anti-war revulsion.¹⁰¹¹ It was not until the emergence of films urging America to fight Germany that spy motifs returned. The most famous of these is Warner Bros. *Confessions of a Nazi Spy* (1939), based on a real book by an agent who

¹⁰⁰⁶ Daisuke Miyao, “Doubleness: American Images of Japanese Men in Silent Spy Films,” *The Japanese Journal of American Studies* 9 (1998), p 69.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Fiebig-von Hase, and Lehmkuhl, *Enemy Images in American History*, p 188.

¹⁰⁰⁸ Alan Booth, “The Development of the Espionage Film,” *Intelligence and National Security* 5, no. 4 (1990): 136-160, p 136.

¹⁰⁰⁹ Booth, “The Development of the Espionage Film,” p 136.

¹⁰¹⁰ *Operator #5*, April 1934 – see Nick Carr, *America's Secret Service Ace: The Operator 5 Story* (Wildside Press, 2007).

¹⁰¹¹ Booth, “The Development of the Espionage Film,” p 137. Arguably, even if this was not a preferred cinematic theme, pulps took little notice of the change since action and mystery was always a pulp fiction stock-in-trade.

arrested the spies for FBI. Portraying a fascist spy ring, “The film’s message was clear: America was not immune to Nazi subversion.”¹⁰¹²

At this point the battle over isolationism turned from the divisive anti-immigrantism that was bound up with WWI spy fears, to the Roosevelt’s administration definition of “bigots as internal enemies—Nazi agents who were working to undermined America’s pluralistic unity.”¹⁰¹³ Once again spy films were part of a campaign directly preceding the entry into war. Hitchcock would make his unparalleled *Foreign Correspondent* in America in 1940, part of this campaign. Moreover, for Americans, spy films were again primary genre through which to articulate the tensions between citizens, patriotism, spies, and the battle over isolation and America’s broader role in the world.¹⁰¹⁴

For Americans the same themes transferred from spy films to Pearl Harbor itself: a secretive enemy makes a surprise attack using intelligence to take the US by surprise. Pearl Harbor was represented in the fictive context of espionage in film and literature; this is evidenced by 1942s *Careful*, *Soft Shoulders*, the first movie produced after the PH attacks – a recycled spy boilerplate plot adapted to Japanese spies. In 1942 almost every major studio would release a film related to PH. Many of them depicted the Japanese as having spied before the attack, and as treacherous and disloyal to the United States (e.g., *Little Tokyo, U.S.A.*).¹⁰¹⁵ Pearl Harbor was firmly intertwined into the narratives of spies and WWI, and the fear of German

¹⁰¹² Ernest D. Giglio, *Here's Looking at You: Hollywood, Film & Politics*, (Lang, 2010), p 174. Michael Chabon’s 2000 Pulitzer Prize winning *The Amazing Adventures of Kavalier and Clay* chronicled this era in comics and pulps, and the personal anguish it brought to Germans, Jews, and those linked by accident of birth to the conflicts America had not yet joined (Random House).

¹⁰¹³ Fiebig-von Hase and Lehmkuhl, *Enemy Images in American History*, p 210.

¹⁰¹⁴ Phillip L. Gianos, *Politics and Politicians in American Film* (Greenwood Publishing Group, 1999), p 114.

¹⁰¹⁵ In *Little Tokyo U.S.A.*, the prologue “asserted that ‘for more than a decade, Japanese mass espionage was carried out in the United States and her territorial outposts while a complacent America literally slept at the switch.’” Fraser A. Sherman, *Screen Enemies of the American Way: Political Paranoia About Nazis, Communists, Saboteurs, Terrorist and Body Snatching Aliens in Film and Television*, (McFarland, 2010), p 32.

spies easily translated to treacherous Japanese spies after the infamous attack.¹⁰¹⁶ Film theorists McLaughlin and Parry comment that Japanese “duplicity and treachery” was stressed in American film through “repeated use of four basic tropes. The first of course, is the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, rarely depicted but referred to continually.”¹⁰¹⁷

Thus intelligence films re-articulated the early portrayals of the treacherous spy, and both served as context to PH, and were in turn shaped by it and, naturally, the American entry into the war. The 1930s and 1940s were the golden age of Hollywood, before television stole its visual monopoly, and after the development of the multi-reel ‘feature-length’ film.¹⁰¹⁸ They helped articulate the mythos of the citizen-patriot and the spy. Later, one of Hitchcock’s most famous American feature (*North by Northwest*) would use the conceit of the everyman unknowingly embroiled in a spy conspiracy that rages around him – the perfect American spy hero who can partake in the mystery and action of spying, but without the taint of any involvement in it himself (whatsoever).¹⁰¹⁹ Thus the terrorist conspiracies of today’s film, television, and literature, have a long American heritage. In some ways, then, the origin story of intelligence was also bound up and expressed in cinema and literature dating back to the revolutionary war. We may locate in American film and literature the same concern with intelligence as directed against the foreign, the spy as invader, that American definitions of intelligence reference.

Modern Pop Spy Culture

¹⁰¹⁶ Thomas Schatz notes that while *Little Tokyo, U.S.A.* was actually approved by the wartime censor, the OWI, its excessive bigotry cause the OWI to ask for major changes- most of which were not made by the studio, since it was complete and the army had participated in filming. *Boom and Bust: American Cinema in the 1940s* (University of California Press, 1997), p 269/370.

¹⁰¹⁷ Robert L. McLaughlin and Sally E. Parry, *We'll Always Have the Movies: American Cinema during World War II*, (University Press of Kentucky, 2006), p 127.

¹⁰¹⁸ Keith M. Booker, *Historical Dictionary of American Cinema* (Scarecrow Press, 2011) p 152.

¹⁰¹⁹ Alfred Hitcock (Dir), *North By Northwest* (1959).

The success of James Bond on film prompted a new genre of devil-may-care spy heroes, with more fantastical settings than the secret criminal/spy plots of early cinema (such as Fritz Lang's famous *Spione*).¹⁰²⁰ Cold War spy films also continued along the classic American themes of conspiracy and government abuse of power (*The Manchurian Candidate*, for example). In recent years, a number of spy 'franchises' have followed in that general theme; the Bourne series is more conspiratorial, while the sporadic Jack Ryan films have been less so.

Since 9.11, no clear revolution has transpired in American spy films. *The Kingdom*, *Rendition*, *Syriana*, *Green Zone*, and others have attempted to make sense of torture and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.¹⁰²¹ Recently, *Safehouse*, *Captain America: The Winter Soldier*, *Salt* and *Zero Dark Thirty* have made public, divisive, cases about the government's abuse of intelligence. For many Americans, the chief chronicler of the post-9.11 spy era was Jack Bauer on the television series *24* (and, to a much lesser extent, J.J. Abrams' *Alias*). Interestingly, one of the dystopic American intelligence-related series, James Cameron's *Dark Angel*, premiered before 9.11 and ended shortly after. Thus it seems the immediate 'mediated' response to 9.11 was an attempt to deal with the new reality of intelligence by simply representing it, rather than presenting a message about intelligence. American pop culture has only more recently turned to serious spy films to suggest what post- 9.11 intelligence means for the nation – *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy* – while set outside America and in the past, struck a resounding tone for critics and the public on the new moral universe of American intelligence efforts.¹⁰²² Naturally, big budget spy hero films like *Mission Impossible* continue to be made in America, reflecting blockbuster

¹⁰²⁰ The title translates simply to "Spies". Master director Fritz Lang's *Spione* is a classic with similarities to the *Dr. Mabuse* and *Fantomas* series— where criminals rely on secret networks of information to carry out their plots. Booth calls *Spione* the "first true espionage feature...." Booth, "The Development of the Espionage Film," p 138.

¹⁰²¹ The failures of intelligence linked to 9.11 have not been dramatized in America- instead, films about the attacks focus on stories of survivors and responders to the attack (*United 93*, *Reign Over Me*, *World Trade Center* Sara E. Quay, Amy M. Damico "Film," in *September 11 in Popular Culture: A Guide* (Greenwood, ABC-CLIO, 2010), p 179-180.

¹⁰²² *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy* (2011) replays the compromises made in the name of intelligence, and dangers to personal integrity, as well as the influence of partisan or political concerns. Michael Bradford and James Burridge, "Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy: The Movie" *Studies in Intelligence* 56, no. 3 (September 2012), p 85.

genre conventions more than they contain any real intelligence commentary. A more salient representation is the unassuming post 9.11 (2011-ongoing) *Person of Interest*; wherein a ‘machine’ is built to predict large scale events like 9.11, out of the information generated by cell phones, surveillance cameras and other devices.¹⁰²³ The show makes knowledge of the future its central conceit; the protagonists are given a scrap of information at the outset, but must determine whether the individual identified is the victim, or a perpetrator, of a crime. Its themes circle the surety of prediction, foregrounded against the undecidability of both information and intentions, positioning the show as commentary on trade-offs in surveillance and modern American intelligence. Finally, the popular re-envisioning of television’s *Battlestar Galactica* (2004-2009) has been called a PH in space (the series begins with a surprise attack under pretense of armistice). The remade show features the often harrowing moral quandaries of war with an enemy that could be anyone; spies wear the faces of robots.¹⁰²⁴ It seems that the figure of the spy in America remains ambiguous, in popular narrative.

Clearly spy films re-articulate intelligence cultures, and themselves retain persisting ideas of both the heroic patriot spy, and the power-hungry conspiratorial government. As cultural theorists have discovered, film and literatures help society work through social anxieties, and confront fears by showing them in their most extreme form or logical limit. Drone strikes become walking police-robots, in *Robocop*, and domestic surveillance is a massive government kill-list of Americans, in *Captain America: TWS*.¹⁰²⁵ Even isolation versus interventionism is up

¹⁰²³ The show’s actual action revolves around the information it generates a side product predictions of “ordinary” crimes (murders), and its creator is determined to prevent or solve these subsidiary crimes. The show also features numerous “establishing” shots from the perspective of surveillance and CCTV cameras. Joshua Rothman, ““Person of Interest”: The TV Show That Predicted Edward Snowden,” *The New Yorker*, Jan 14 2014.

¹⁰²⁴ Glen A. Larson, “Glen Larson on the Creation of *Battlestar Galactica*,” *Battlestar Galactica: The Complete Epic Series* DVD (2003). Charli Carpenter, Hrvoje Cvijanovic and Wesley Mason also write about the depth of the show’s security/state relationships in their, “Security or Human Security? Civil-Military Relations in *Battlestar Galactica*,” (UMASS Working Paper 2011) <http://people.umass.edu/charli/bsg.pdf>.

¹⁰²⁵ *Captain America: The Winter Soldier*’s story line was drawn from a comic run from the in the 1990s, the name originating from Thomas Paine’s famous phrase (“the summer soldier and the sunshine patriot”). In the film, the storyline indicts American espionage, based on a kind of root causes theorem. Ultimately the most powerful heroes of the universe come to agree that American intelligence as it is conducted is

for debate in many films dealing with terrorism, and American power projection. The very discussion of these topics suggest a returning disquiet in American culture over intelligence, related to the effects of post 9.11 intelligence and surveillance/policing.

“After the attacks on September 11... films about 9/11 were released, and films that were reflective of the post-9/11 zeitgeist of uncertainty, mourning, anger and fear became part of the cinematic landscape.”¹⁰²⁶ One of the important functions of film is to work through shocks, fears, tragedies, the uncertain and the monstrous.¹⁰²⁷ But the relationship of film and literature to intelligence culture is deeper than it first seems. It is not only new events that find artistic expression, like the incomprehensible September 11 attacks. Methodologically, this is why connecting popular culture and intelligence presents difficulties for ‘traditionalists’ – who would like to link films and novels directly to a single theme or event. Truly, however, film and literature are cultural expressions which can plumb the entirety of centuries of the intelligence imaginary, resurfacing sentiments decades old. They are a mixture of the culture expressions of the last decades. Moreover, the lag in production/publishing time, makes a one-to-one event to expression formula impossible. Even films like *Black Hawk Down* (2001) in production before 9.11, could still be responsive to the attacks in final cut editing.¹⁰²⁸ However, when understanding intelligence culture – aiming for a rich tapestry of intelligence culture – popular sources clearly show the currency and shape of important articulations and re-articulations. For this reason, they remain central to a full understanding of American intelligence culture. “In

illegitimate. The film ends with the secrets of the film’s major intelligence service, S.H.I.E.L.D. being disbanded, with Congressional hearings about its misdeeds. S.H.I.E.L.D. is destroyed because it was an “incubator” for the Nazi-like evil organization, HYDRA, implying that intelligence and secrecy will always breed evil.

¹⁰²⁶ Quay and Damico, *September 11 in Popular Culture*, p 185.

¹⁰²⁷ For example the collection *Horror after 9/11: World of Fear, Cinema of Terror*, eds. Aviva Briefel, Sam J. Miller, approaches this classic theory, in terms of 9.11, through a number of essays; (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2011).

¹⁰²⁸ According to Markovitz, the lesson of the film was that no matter the losses, America should not cut-and-run – one made relevant to a post-9.11 audience. Jonathan Markovitz, “Reel terror post 9/11,” in *Film and Television After 9/11*, ed. Wheeler W. Dixon, (Carbondale : Southern Illinois University Press, 2004) p 219. Marketing and promotional campaigns, as well as trailers (which do not always include only scenes in the actual theatrical release versions of the film), and media coverage of films can also impact the post-production perception and impact of a film.

other words, objects of popular culture are not simply ... mirrors of existing norms, ideas and identities, but ... mutually constitutive of those norms.”¹⁰²⁹

Popular culture’s fascination with intelligence clearly merits fuller treatment (and has).¹⁰³⁰ Behind many popular treatments, we find articulations similar to those in intelligence definitions. Ultimately, as reservoir for the security imaginary, these above themes of conspiracy, abuse of power, and anti-democratic tendencies of intelligence are nourished in American film and literature. They reflect and shape popular perceptions, and create the more suspicious or activist view of intelligence.¹⁰³¹ They are no less meaningful than elite cultures, and they are the broad context for many sub-cultures of intelligence. Moreover, the figure of the spy is a still a potent one in the American popular psyche.

Conclusion: Intelligence Policy

Sections one and two of this chapter – norms and definitions – explored the broadest and most popular ways of describing current intelligence cultures. Together these sections showed the some of the ways current intelligence culture might be described in America. This chapter also highlighted more unusual methods of describing American intelligence culture (in the form of narratives and warrants). These contribute to the methodological richness of the study of intelligence culture. They are important to challenging the conventional approaches of Intelligence Studies, and move towards more current practices in IR and critical security

¹⁰²⁹ Benjamin J. Muller, “Securing the Political Imagination: Popular Culture, the Security Dispositif and the Biometric State,” *Security Dialogue* 39, no. 2-3 (2008): 199-220, p 200.

¹⁰³⁰ See chapter six for more discussion of popular culture and intelligence events (in terms of Pearl Harbor).

¹⁰³¹ This is discussed in terms of the birth of the “skeptical” or conspiracist movement, in chapter six.

scholarship. Thus they do not follow together in a perfect fit, but together shed light on significant aspects of intelligence culture that a single approach would miss.

While popular intelligence cultures help shape public activism, Intelligence Studies cares most about whether ‘cultural’ ideas actually constrain policymakers. The dissonance of internal norms and national self-identity may lead to schizophrenic thinking about intelligence, but what choices, ideas, and institutions do they shape? The following chapter will use articulations, and interpellations surrounding Pearl Harbor to attempt to show two kinds of traceable impacts on intelligence policy and reform. If this influence can be demonstrated, the broader ideational constraints may be more easily accepted (by Intelligence Studies).

The next chapter follows the question of demonstrating the effects of national intelligence cultures – in the form of a content analysis and overarching study of Pearl Harbor. It does not pursue the prediction of behavior (as eschewed in chapter one and two) – but instead make clearer the concepts that shape our thinking about intelligence. The difficulty with these narratives, norms, and definitions is linking them to evidence of their continued existence and, more importantly, showing that they have a real impact on decisions and policy. While a series of case study of all parts of American intelligence culture is impossible, this dissertation has selected one of the most important national-level symbols, Pearl Harbor. This focused research of a national element of intelligence culture allows for in-depth study. Pearl Harbor has featured in this chapter in the ‘origin’ narratives of intelligence culture, and the story of centralization. The next chapter does what a serious study of strategic or intelligence culture must; it looks at real current usage – not just the ‘sources’ of intelligence culture. From indicators based on usage, specific areas are explored in depth. Finally, it hypothesizes from content analysis and in-depth research what effects Pearl Harbor has on American ideas, practice and policy.

(Chapter Six) Pearl Harbor in American Intelligence Culture: A Content Analysis

This chapter begins the final avenue in a multi-perspective approach to American intelligence culture. With the theoretical, institutional and intellectual groundwork of American intelligence culture discussed in previous chapters, this chapter is in some ways the culmination of that work, asking where and how intelligence culture might be understood to have shaped the thought, articulations, institutions, and policies of American intelligence. Ultimately this chapter seeks to address the Realist concern that cultural symbols are rhetorical and do not affect outcomes, however defined. Because the study of intelligence culture is in its infancy, this chapter is also a necessary part of merely showing how intelligence is actually understood and what concepts are important to it and are adjacent to it. This study of current usage outlines the significance of a widely shared and hence national American intelligence symbol – Pearl Harbor. As one of the important ‘warrants’ for American intelligence, as we saw previously, Pearl Harbor is a rich symbolic vein for intelligence, and moreover, has been articulated in the aftermath of 9.11 as an analogous lesson which suggests stakes and dictates possible consequences for security and intelligence. In this way, it is one of the most important and unique symbols in American intelligence, encompassing both past and present; in it we can see the traces of the Kent-Kendall debate, the fragmented history of American intelligence institutions, and outline of many definitions, narratives and norms. The PH analogy also has a significant effect on the direction of intelligence inquiries after 9.11, and the composition and direction of the 9.11 Commission. In addition to patterning American intelligence, the 9.11 analogy to Pearl Harbor include the pressure to a unanimous commission and avoidance of the question of political blame, which ultimately resulted in a particular set of reforms. Regardless as to the ultimately effectiveness of these PH influenced reforms, the key point is that these kinds of

limiting and shaping are a consequence of intelligence culture. The causal argument, for Realist audiences, is that the PH lessons caused a mandate and commission choice, which then in turn resulted in particular reforms. More broadly, constitutively, the chapter also shows that the lessons and patterning effects of PH were such that reforms and policy after 9.11 were intrinsically shaped by the concepts and lessons of PH. The in-depth study of PH suggests the direction intelligence culture theory must take, and puts into practice the theory and methodology suggested in chapter one and two. If intelligence's existence and influence in America can be shown, it is through Pearl Harbor.

Pearl Harbor, 'Munichs' and Intelligence: Ideas and Policy

What can a half-century-old tragedy have to do with modern intelligence and security policy? What relevance do ideas about crisis have for the real practices of intelligence? Can a symbol that justified the birth of the modern American intelligence community tell us anything about intelligence policy today? For decades, the American foreign policy community has been guided by the lessons and impact of Munich,¹⁰³² 'dominoes,'¹⁰³³ and Pearl Harbors;¹⁰³⁴ "Pearl Harbor and Munich as powerful code-words in America's foreign policy, and are two of the most important analogies used to guide the nation's response to international threats."¹⁰³⁵ These beliefs had a real impact on policy – the case of the Vietnam War and the domino theory is well

¹⁰³² Scholars see the 'ghosts' of Munich, even in Obama's 44th Presidency; Fredrik Logevall and Kenneth Osgood, "The Ghost of Munich: America's Appeasement Complex," *World Affairs* 173, no. 2 (July/August 2010): 13-26.

¹⁰³³ The domino theory purportedly drew its power from being a 'game metaphor', not only as a historical parallel. Fabian Hilfrich, "Domino Theory," in *Encyclopedia of the Cold War*, eds. Ruud van Dijk, William Glenn Gray, Svetlana Savranskaya, Jeremi Suri, Qiang Zhai, (Routledge: 2013) p 268. Duncan Snidal, "The Game Theory of International Politics," in *Cooperation Under Anarchy* Ed. Kenneth A. Oye, (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), p 29-30. On domino theory in general, see Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," *International Security* 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994), 72-107.

¹⁰³⁴ The specific details of the Pearl Harbor analogy, the stakes it claims, and its consequence linkages and suggested course of action are discussed in this chapter in greater details in Part Three, in the Section "Direct Influences".

¹⁰³⁵ Richard J. Payne, *The Clash with Distant Cultures: Values, Interests, and Force in American Foreign Polic*, (Albany, NY : State University of New York Press, 1995) p 69.

documented.¹⁰³⁶ Kennedy chose not to bomb Cuban missile installations (reportedly) because of the analogy to Pearl Harbor.¹⁰³⁷ *In general terms*, foreign policy influences are simple to trace: Was the analogy referenced implicitly or explicitly either in private discussions (or papers) or in public? If an action was taken – before or after the justification – that reflected the substance of the analogy, links can be suggested. Scholars agree, “[h]istorical analogy has long shaped the development of foreign and security policy.”¹⁰³⁸ Intelligence policy is instead, more delayed, diffuse, and broad. Intelligence ideas may face what Béland and Cox call the ‘epistemological problem’ of the unuttered idea – where we cannot draw a direct line between statement of a policy idea and outcome.¹⁰³⁹ This can make showing the effects of this kind of idea on policy, more complex.

I argue that we can see Pearl Harbor as a national intelligence culture symbol, impacting intelligence policy, thought and practice.¹⁰⁴⁰ While its actual (not predictive) effects are complex, I have attempted to unpack the lessons of Pearl Harbor through a content analysis of major intelligence literature. It justifies the central question of this dissertation, whether or not a unique national level intelligence culture exists. Second, it completes the methodological commitment to a fuller set of approaches to intelligence culture. In addition, it remedies a gap in understanding current usage of intelligence terms.¹⁰⁴¹ As more selective study, in-depth research on each

¹⁰³⁶ Jerome Slater, "The Domino Theory and International Politics: The Case of Vietnam," *Security Studies* 3, no. 2 (1993): 186-224.

¹⁰³⁷ Kennedy's Cuban Missile Crisis invocation of a "reverse Pearl Harbor" is cited by Khong as one of the successful analogical uses in American history, because the blockade worked where an airstrike might have caused nuclear retaliation. Khong, *Analogies at War*, p 5. Dominic Tierney, "Pearl Harbor in Reverse": Moral Analogies in the Cuban Missile Crisis," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 9, no. 3 (Summer 2007): 49-7, p 51.

¹⁰³⁸ William Anthony Hay, "Reading the Past into American Foreign Policy," *Orbis* 48, no. 2 (2004): 369-380, p 369. Of course the obligatory caution applies- as many studies contend that these analogies (and the use of historical parallel in general) are faulty, ill-conceived, or result in narrow understandings or negative consequences. *Ibid*, p 370; and Ernest R. May, *Lessons of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1973).

¹⁰³⁹ Daniel Béland and Robert Henry Cox, *Ideas and Politics in Social Science Research* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), p 6.

¹⁰⁴⁰ This impact functions on different levels – and because the chosen item of study is what can be considered a ‘national’ level symbols (i.e. one shared across all levels of the intelligence community and general public), the impacts will be shown in two different types: direct and indirect, and for a number of different groups: practitioners, educators, journalists/activists, policymakers, commission members.

¹⁰⁴¹ See part one of chapter one. While some studies exist – such as Loch Johnson's content analysis of topics in newspaper and journal literatures, (Johnson, *An Introduction to the Intelligence Studies Literature*,") few current content analyses are found in intelligence literature.

dimension of intelligence contributes to our understanding of American intelligence culture, and that as a concept it potentially bounds the evolution and goals of the American intelligence system. It also appears that the study of the rhetoric of the war on terror has not substantially covered Pearl Harbor allusions in security discourses, as opposed to popular or presidential discourse.¹⁰⁴²

In this chapter I explore the role of Pearl Harbor (PH) as one of intelligence's important national symbols, connected to its role in American intelligence culture. This chapter asks what Pearl Harbor shapes, delimits, or directs in American intelligence. In what ways is Pearl Harbor, as a national intelligence symbol, deployed in American intelligence reform and policymaking? These questions are answered in three broad parts. The first introduces the reconstructed memory of Pearl Harbor in America. These are the general and current meanings of the event for Americans today. The second part lists the method, methodology, and results of a content analysis of the meaning surrounding Pearl Harbor in intelligence.¹⁰⁴³ The third part is an extension of the areas indicated by the content analysis with more direct research on the effects of these meanings and patterns. It demonstrates, through indirect and direct influences of the Pearl Harbor analogy, how these elements of intelligence culture can be shown to influence American intelligence in terms of the composition of institutions, day to day practices, as well as national security policy. In this way I challenge the claim made by critics of the culture approach

IJIC has only 12 articles that *mention* content analysis, while INS has only 7. Very few textual, content, or discourse analyses have been conducted.

¹⁰⁴² Popular and Presidential rhetoric are discussed in Maria Cristina Paganoni, "Blogging 9/11 and Memory Discourse," *Saggi/Essays 9/11 – 11/2011*, p 279- 294 ; Mary Marshall Clark, "The September 11, 2001, Oral History Narrative and Memory Project: A First Report," *The Journal of American History* 89, no.2 (2002) : 569-579; Lee Jarvis, "9/11 Digitally Remastered? Internet Archives, Vernacular Memories and WhereWereYou.org," *Journal of American Studies* 45, no. 04 (November 2011): 793-814; John Oddo, "War legitimization discourse: Representing 'Us' and 'Them' in four US Presidential Addresses," *Discourse & Society* 22, no. 3 (2011): 287-314; Geoffrey M White, "National Subjects: September 11 and Pearl Harbor," *American Ethnologist* 31 no. 3: 293-310, although Weber does some work on this from a feminist perspective in Cynthia Weber, "Flying Planes Can Be Dangerous," *Millennium Journal of International Studies* 31, no 1 (2002): 129-147, and some discursive work is part of Eric Dahl's *Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and Beyond* (Washington DC, Georgetown University Press 2013).

¹⁰⁴³ According to Holsti, in a commonly used definition, content analysis is "any research technique for making inferences by systematically and objectively identifying specified characteristics of messages." Cited in Stefan Titscher and Bryan Jenner, *Methods of Text and Discourse Analysis: In Search of Meaning* (Sage: 2000), p 55-57.

that, while ‘ideas’ of intelligence exist, they are mere rhetoric or justification and play no real role in day to day decisions and actions. Pearl Harbor, just as Munich in foreign policy, has played a key role in intelligence. In this chapter I will discuss more of the policy implications of Pearl Harbor,¹⁰⁴⁴ over the broader ideational or popular imaginary (discussed in chapter five). Betts, and others, “believes that the most under-researched intelligence topic is ‘what effects on policy can really be attributed to intelligence.’”¹⁰⁴⁵ This will help to satisfy the assorted Realist and other critics, assertions that if ideas have no effects on policy, they are epiphenomenal.¹⁰⁴⁶

6.4 PART 1: RECONSTRUCTING THE MEMORY OF PEARL HARBOR

Munich and its Lessons

I would argue that conceptually, PH can be understood as one of intelligence’s ‘Munichs’ – what is called in foreign policy studies an ‘historical analogy.’¹⁰⁴⁷ According to Taylor and Rourke, policymakers in America ‘frequently’ used historical analogies in foreign policymaking, on the basis that “lessons for the present can be derived from historical events,” Munich, chief

¹⁰⁴⁴ Spracher categorizes Pearl Harbor, in terms of the literature on intelligence failure, as understood particularly as a *policy* failure. William C. Spracher, "National Security Intelligence Professional Education: A Map of U.S. Civilian University Programs and Competencies," (Diss., (unpub.) The George Washington University, 2009) p 1.

¹⁰⁴⁵ Betts quoted in Loch Johnson, “The Development of Intelligence Studies,” in *Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies*, eds. Robert Dover, Michael S. Goodman, Claudia Hillebrand (Routledge, 2013), p 19. One of the other key questions for Intelligence Studies has always been the historiographical assessment of how much of a difference has intelligence made in key events, and more generally “it seeks to establish the significance of intelligence as a factor in American history.” Charles D. Ameringer, *U.S. Foreign Intelligence; the secret side of American History*, (Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books., 1990), p xii; Michael Herman and Gwilym Hughes, eds. *Intelligence in the Cold War: What Difference Did it Make?* (Routledge, 2013).

¹⁰⁴⁶ Goldstein and Keohane famously describe this argument as calling ideas ‘hooks’: “competing elites seize on popular ideas to propagate and to legitimize their interests, but the ideas themselves do not play a causal role,” or they are simply ‘unexplained variance’ in rational actor models. Goldstein and Keohane, “Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework,” in *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*, eds Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1993): 3-30, p 4. See also, Susan G. Sample, “The Impact of Ideational Interests on State Behavior,” in *War and Virtual War: The Challenges to Communities* Ed. Jones Irwin, (Amsterdam ; New York : Rodopi, 2004), p 25-26.

¹⁰⁴⁷ I am borrowing the “Munich” concept not to indicate the similarity of the lessons, but more to the view that the analogy to a historical event can and has had relevance to American policy, as is widely understood in foreign policy studies about the Munich analogy. Taylor and Rourke, “Historical Analogies in the congressional foreign policy process,” p 460. The lessons of Munich and Pearl Harbor are not the same, nor are they historically contemporaneous, but their function, as lessons are similar, as discussed later in this chapter.

among them.¹⁰⁴⁸ The Munich analogy shows by inference, that concepts of intelligence (or we might think of them as intelligence policy ideas) do have real policy consequences.¹⁰⁴⁹ They shape thought about how enemies will act, what is out there in the world, and possible dangers to secure. As with Munich, the unwavering attempt to avoid certain consequences has its own repercussions. The belief in them can make them self-fulfilling – if dictators must be assumed to be implacably aggressive, few will disprove this assumption simply. Payne comments that the “essentially [...] blind belief in the Munich analogy” led to a confirmation bias of sorts for foreign policy.¹⁰⁵⁰ PH then is one of intelligence’s ‘Munichs.’ It is a longstanding idea that founds certain perceptions of the world, and suggests necessary policy. The key questions are how it acts to do this and to what extent it can be demonstrated. The study of Munich shows demonstrable links between the idea and policy positions. The diffuse intelligence-related ideas behind PH are more numerous than Munich’s ‘single message,’ so it has much broader influence on intelligence generally. That is, Munich doesn’t specify the way foreign policy should be generally conducted, while some of the lessons of PH apply to the general conduct of intelligence. Neither PH nor Munich is just rhetorical; both have had real effects on policy and practice.

PH is not just rhetoric or justification – though that is the subject of an epistemological debate in strategic culture over how culture is the context for action (see chapter two, ‘Lessons from Strategic Culture’ section). A symbol does not always function the way it ‘says’ it does (although this does not obviate its importance or influence). Symbols are likened to identity, which is composed of multiple competing elements. America wants to keep its citizens secure, so

¹⁰⁴⁸ Taylor and Rourke, “Historical Analogies in the congressional foreign policy process,” p 460. They also cite the Vietnam, and Korean war as examples of these impactful ideas. *Ibid*, p 461.

¹⁰⁴⁹ In addition to Khong’s discussion of Munich (see note 16 above), and see Jeffrey Record, *Making War, Thinking History: Munich, Vietnam, and Presidential Uses of Force from Korea to Kosovo* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003) Chapter One, “Munich and Vietnam: Lessons Drawn”.

¹⁰⁵⁰ Payne, *The Clash with Distant Cultures: Values, Interests, and Force in American Foreign Policy*, p 69/70.

it spies on them with the NSA (The National Security Agency); yet citizens consider this a violation of their rights and personal security. The essential tension in PH, and what makes it a fascinating symbol, is that its central lesson for intelligence is centralization, yet the American system cannot achieve true centralization, despite its function as an ideal. Desired and constantly delayed – this constant tension is emblematic of the American intelligence community. I use intelligence culture theory as the avenue to untangle these contradictory aspects of this key intelligence symbol – intelligence’s ‘Munich.’

Before arriving at the core parts of this dissertation, in this first section I will examine briefly in what ways Pearl Harbor is remembered in America, and how these remembrances are invoked in intelligence terms. The general, and intelligence related aspects of the symbolic traces of Pearl Harbor, will help ground the results of the content analysis later in Part 2. Below, the first I discuss the ways in which PH is remembered: that is, what memory resources are available in the general security imaginary. The next section then focuses on how PH is invoked in intelligence (and as an analogy). Pearl Harbor is a frequently re-articulated motif. In the 1980s and 1990s it was as an ‘economic’ motif, and soon after, a ‘digital’ Pearl Harbor came to dominate discussion.¹⁰⁵¹ The refocusing of attention on PH in the 1990s was also spurred by the fifty-year commemorations of the attack.

How We Remember Pearl Harbor: Traces

In what ways do we reconstruct PH? Without visiting the sites, or hearing survivors, it is hard to understand what this moment – this attack, this tragedy, this ‘infamy’ – represents. In the

¹⁰⁵¹ The peaks and valleys of these usages can be seen using the Google labs N-Gram viewer tool, <https://books.google.com/ngrams>.

past, and to the general public, PH has been understood in different ways. Important events contain multiple meanings. PH in many ways forms a concretization of WWII was for America – the last good war, a just response to aggression, and the ascendance to superpower, with the atomic bomb.¹⁰⁵² Dower, in his history of Pearl Harbor, Hiroshima and 9.11, suggests that PH was understood in terms a number of ‘codes.’¹⁰⁵³ It is strongly linked to American innocence, but has also been linked to everything from exceptionalism, surprise attack, (lack of) warning, infamy, national unity, just retaliation, and active internationalism. We need to understand these historic ideas of PH because past articulations influence current understanding and use of PH. Different forms of recollection do not simply memorialize history, but connect it dynamically to the present.

Symbolically, PH is a rich vein. It is not only invoked for a multitude of ideas, images, and lessons, but also through different mediums, which themselves lend it their own colours. PH is invoked textually and in speech through the “Remember Pearl Harbor” phrase, and visually through movies and posters, personally in the form of survivor stories and retellings, materially through artifacts and places (the location of downed battleships, and Hawaii itself), and aurally through radio broadcasts, especially of FDR’s radio-broadcast ‘infamy’ speech.¹⁰⁵⁴ Memories of the Pacific War are also particularly invoked by the attack.¹⁰⁵⁵ For intelligence, other traces are more relevant. PH is invoked in ‘purple,’ ‘magic,’ and other acronyms, not in battleship ruins and speeches. PH was culturally linked to spies and intelligence through the threat of foreign

¹⁰⁵² PH is often used as an example of just war, as clear response to an unprovoked attack. Andrew Gordon Fiala, *The Just War Myth: The Moral Illusions of War* (Plymouth UK, Rowman and Littlefield: 2008), p 61.

¹⁰⁵³ John Dower, *Cultures of War: Pearl Harbor / Hiroshima / 9-11 / Iraq* (New York : W. W. Norton : New Press, 2010).

¹⁰⁵⁴ It is remarkable that a love story/action film like *Pearl Harbor* (and not a historical genre film) was made decades afterward; the film as re-articulation of the story suggests the mythic potency of Pearl Harbor. Moreover, it purportedly alters a number of historical details, so that it is much less a historical re-telling of the event, than a re-imagining. Trevor B. McCrisken and Andrew Pepper, *American History and Contemporary Hollywood Film* (New Brunswick, N.J. : Rutgers University Press, 2005) p 106/107.

¹⁰⁵⁵ Emily S. Rosenberg, *A Date Which Will Live: Pearl Harbor in American Memory* (Duke University Press, 2003), p 29.

agents and saboteurs.¹⁰⁵⁶ At the time, Japanese saboteurs, and German agents, were believed to be actively scheming on American soil while the rest of the world fought, and PH was the consequential intrusion of the great game, the secret world, onto American soil. There are other more concrete ways PH has influenced intelligence, and its meaning expressed in various forms: we narrate its intelligence meaning in our teaching,¹⁰⁵⁷ our classroom exercises,¹⁰⁵⁸ our syllabus choices,¹⁰⁵⁹ and, of course, our articles. Intelligence education and literature is one way intelligence understands and invokes PH. PH is also invoked in speeches and in government documents on national security and intelligence.

Unconventional Remembrances: How is PH invoked?

The way Pearl Harbor is invoked reflects the way it is remembered. PH's intelligence meanings have been strengthened in an unusual way: through over fifty years of conspiracy theories and about fifty years of commissions and hearings. Academic journals and speeches are thus not the only way Pearl Harbor memories are kept alive. Our invocations of Pearl Harbor in the present are filtered through these pasts. It is not the content of this sometimes well-reasoned historical revisionism that matters.

¹⁰⁵⁶ The spy films adapted following the PH attacks include *Careful, Soft Shoulders* a recycled spy plot adapted to Japanese spies, discussed in the chapter four section 'WWI and pre-WWI: Spy Scares and Cinematic Trials'.

¹⁰⁵⁷ On the pedagogy of Pearl Harbor, through the film, *Pearl Harbor*, Ardis Mackie, and Bonny Norton, "Revisiting Pearl Harbor: Resistance to Reel and Real Events in an English Language Classroom," *Canadian Journal of Education* 29, no. 1 (2006): 223-243, 344-345.

¹⁰⁵⁸ One intelligence educator's classroom exercise had students play the role of different groups that worked on Pearl Harbor decrypts and other collections sources; the students had to discover, without prompting, that they were allowed to talk with the other separate groups and could build a better picture cooperating. Personal Communication, ISA (2011), verbal communication. The CIA has also used Pearl Harbor in its teaching materials, and in the past, conducted a Pearl Harbor simulation for Chicago students, as part of recruitment relations. Meredith Meyer, "Operation Recruitment," *University of Chicago Magazine* 98, no. 3 (Feb 2006). <http://magazine.uchicago.edu/0602/chicagojournal/operation.shtml>

¹⁰⁵⁹ Meredith Hindley, "Teaching Intelligence Project," *Intelligence and National Security* 15, no. 1 (Spring 2000):191—218, p 217.

Dower's *Cultures of War: Pearl Harbor/Hiroshima/9.11/Iraq* explores how PH is 'code' – that is, it stands in for other meanings.¹⁰⁶⁰ This is similar to saying, from the security imaginary heuristic, that it is articulated to any number of other items. A code, for Dower, is the complex of meaning invoked by a single word or simple phrase. In these codes, 'infamy' represents, in a single word, the treachery of surprise attack on American soil¹⁰⁶¹ ("Remember the Alamo" would be similarly understood as protection of home soil); /signals to noise/ is code in Intelligence Studies for failure to discern the accurate warnings from the irrelevant 'chatter'/information;¹⁰⁶² and "backdoor to war"¹⁰⁶³ is code for the conspiracy theory that American officials knew of the impending attack. Generally PH stands in for surprise attack or American unpreparedness (hence the re-articulation in a digital or economic Pearl Harbor). It is a shock, an awakening, and, in some cases, a useful catastrophe. It is articulated implicitly to the image of the sleeping country, the disastrous and unforeseen intrusion on American peace – hence, the warning that America will suffer if (the cyber 'PH', the economic 'PH') are ignored.¹⁰⁶⁴

TABLE 1.1: Pearl Harbor Articulations

General PH Articulations	Intelligence PH Articulations
Articulations to future attacks on America:	- Lack of strategic understanding of threat;
- Unpreparedness (military or civilian);	- View of enemy as weak, not logical to attack (capability as determining intentions);
- Mis/non identification of threat.	- Surprise;

¹⁰⁶⁰ Dower, *Cultures of War*: p 4. Dower explains that PH codes were a key part of the use of the past in post 9.11 discourse, as well as the "moral equivalence" of the two events.

¹⁰⁶¹ This is Dower's example of PH as code (the items that follow are my examples); *Cultures of War*.

¹⁰⁶² The classic phrase was popularized from Wohlstetter's *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision*.

¹⁰⁶³ Martin H. Folly, Niall A. Palmer, *Historical Dictionary of U.S. Diplomacy from World War I Through World War II*, (Scarecrow Press, Plymouth UK: 2010) "Backdoor to War" p 21-22.

¹⁰⁶⁴ "On a Hilltop Uncle Sam lay fast asleep": from John Ford's famous censored Pearl Harbor film, *December 7, 1941* (1943) docudrama.

Symbols of:

- Need for retaliation; - Immediate unity of purpose/clarity of threat/path to war; - Righteousness of response; - American innocence; - American victimization; - Infamy; - American exceptionalism; - Violation of homeland/American soil.	- Lack of tactical preparation and direct warning (unpreparedness); - System failure; - Organizational failure; - Problem of protecting information/ lack of sharing; o Compartmentalization; o Culture of secrecy; o Lack of cooperation; o Lack of communication; o Inter-service/agency turf wars and fights; o Bureaucratic politics.

In foreign policy terms, Pearl Harbor is used as a ‘stakes raising’: a warning of danger (discussed below in part three). As a useful catastrophe, from Dower’s perspective, PH is sometimes seen as a useful shock to open up new foreign policy paths, unite the nation, and justify war.¹⁰⁶⁵

In intelligence more generally, Pearl Harbor is placed in a narrative about the origin of intelligence in America, a narrative that focuses on centralization as necessary to avoiding intelligence failures (discussed in chapter five, part four). Obviously, what is important is PH is how it is *perceived* of as an intelligence failure, not the empirical cause of the failure itself, (the subject of entire libraries).¹⁰⁶⁶ It is invoked in the discussion of the difficulties in separating intentions and capabilities, because a lack of Japanese intent to attack was inferred from inferior capabilities.¹⁰⁶⁷ It is symbolic of a failure to understand a ‘weak’ or illogical enemy,¹⁰⁶⁸ to fail to tactically prepare and respond to general warnings (as discussed in the results of the content analysis). It is also symbolic of organizational failure,¹⁰⁶⁹ and all the problems associated with

¹⁰⁶⁵ John Dower, *Cultures of War: Pearl Harbor / Hiroshima / 9-11 / Iraq*, Chapter Six.

¹⁰⁶⁶ On the scholarly perceptions of intelligence failures – see Betts, *Enemies of Intelligence*, (2013) p 20. For an overview of the schools of thought on failures, see Or Honig, “A New Direction for Theory-building in Intelligence Studies,” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 20, 4 (2007): 699-716.

¹⁰⁶⁷ Hixon writes that Cox asserts the American “focus on enemy intentions rather than their capabilities,” led to Pearl Harbor. Walter L. Hixon, “Volume Introduction,” in *The American Experience in World War II: Pearl Harbor in history and memory*, ed. Walter L. Hixon (Routledge, NY NY: 2003), p. xi. Wohlstetter also discusses the problems in intentions vs capabilities assessment, in Wohlstetter, “Noise in Honolulu,” *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* p 80, FN 20.

¹⁰⁶⁸ Richard A. Best Jr., “the Inevitability of Intelligence Failures,” in *Perspectives on Intelligence* ed. M. S. Grolier (Hauppauge, N.Y. : Nova Science Publishers, 2002) p 118.

¹⁰⁶⁹ Eliot Cohen and John Gooch, *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War*, (New York: Vintage Books 1991), p 57.

imperfect sharing of intelligence (compartmentalization, cultures of secrecy, institutional walls, ‘silos,’ lack of communication, lack of coordination, bureaucratic politics and inter-service/agency turf wars over control of information).¹⁰⁷⁰ Particularly, it represents failure in a number of ways (in the present). It is seen as a failure of everything from collection, collation, analysis, warning, management, dissemination, imagination, to think outside the box, and to ‘connect the dots.’¹⁰⁷¹ Some of these failures are re-readings of Pearl Harbor in light of the analyses of 9.11, but this list represents the key articulations of PH and intelligence failure. Its lessons as a failure have become some of the core American ideas about intelligence reforms, as it is invoked (as I will show in Part 2) in many different ways for the study of intelligence.

Both intelligence and general invocations of PH, also, finally, represent PH as the signal of a new kind of security era or engaged security commitment. This invocation parallels WWII with the War on Terror/WWIII/ Long War.¹⁰⁷² As Pearl Harbor evokes the American decision for war and entry to WWII, so 9.11 evokes a new security era – a world war three. Yet PH also was articulated as a time of innocence, hence the ‘infamy’ linkages, above. 9.11, in its rearticulating, ceases to be the reaction of an isolated innocent power, unused to international action. Instead it is the justified response of a great power seeking to restore or refill the empty shell of its post-war order.¹⁰⁷³ Thus the war on terror is both like and unlike entry into WWII – yet the two events are both articulated as era-defining signals

¹⁰⁷⁰ George Victor writes that the first Pearl Harbor investigation ‘concluded erroneously that Short and Kimmel had failed to cooperate’ and that this was the origin of a myth that PH was caused by failure to cooperate. George Victor, *The Pearl Harbor Myth: Rethinking the Unthinkable*, (Potomac Books, Washington DC: 2007), p 13. Diamond also calls the lack of sharing information, charged by the 9.11 Commission, is the “Pearl Harbor” critique. Diamond, *The CIA and the Culture of Failure*, p 324.

¹⁰⁷¹ David Kahn, “The Intelligence Failure of Pearl Harbor,” in *The American Experience in World War II: Pearl Harbor in history and memory*, ed. Walter L. Hixon (NY NY: Routledge, 2003), p 136; Len Scott and R. Gerald Hughes, “Intelligence, Crises, and Security: Lessons from History?” in *Intelligence, Crises and Security: prospects and retrospects*, eds. Len Scott, R. Gerald Hughes (London ; New York : Routledge, 2008) p 8. William F. Friedman, *Special Research History* (National Security Agency) SRH 125, p 63. Dower, *Cultures of War: Pearl Harbor/Hiroshima/9-11/Iraq*, p 38; Dahl, *Intelligence and Surprise Attack* “Chapter One”; Nate Silver, *The Signal and the Noise: Why So Many Predictions Fail-but Some Don't* (Penguin, 2012) p 415-420.

¹⁰⁷² Jeffrey Michaels’ *The Discourse Trap and the US Military: From the War on Terror to the Surge* discusses a variety of discursive formulations for this “new” war, including GWOT (global war on terror), long war, war on terror and ‘surge’ (NY NY: Palgrave, 2013).

¹⁰⁷³ Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin, “The Unique American Empire,” in *The War on Terrorism and the American 'Empire' After the Cold War*, eds. Alejandro Colas, Richard Saull (NY NY: Routledge, 2006).

which end or begin a transition to a new phase of action.

6.5 PART 2: CONTENT ANALYSIS

Methodology

This study of intelligence culture traces the web of meanings associated with Pearl Harbor to the present, investigating its effects on the current intelligence system and intelligence culture, through a content analysis.¹⁰⁷⁴ In this, I am following Davies' suggestion that intelligence culture investigate national traumas such as Pearl Harbor, and in the British case, the Boer War.¹⁰⁷⁵ Pearl Harbor has served as an important analogy for American strategic thinking as well as for intelligence (just as 'Munich' and appeasement have). This certainly has been true for 9.11, which has seen countless popular Pearl Harbor references. PH in an intriguing symbol because it is a diffuse, national level analogy that can be reasonably widely shared and affects both policymakers and practitioners. This chapter will attempt to determine the current meaning of PH for intelligence, asking in what ways it has affected intelligence policy, limited or directed reform, and constrained beliefs about the reform of the US intelligence mission.¹⁰⁷⁶

This investigation of the symbols surrounding Pearl Harbor in American intelligence will be useful for future research because it assists in drawing distinctions between the continuities, differences, and links with strategic culture. It builds on the literature dealing with state learning

¹⁰⁷⁴ As noted in chapter one, prediction, based on intelligence culture theory (despite its employ in strategic culture), relies on a separation of culture and behavior, and thus this chapter does not seek to predict the shape of intelligence culture based on Pearl Harbor. However, the current system can be understood more fully, and the *shaping* of decisions about the future can be more adequately explained with reference to Pearl Harbor and intelligence culture. (See footnote 56 in this chapter on Edward Lock, in particular).

¹⁰⁷⁵ Davies, "Divergent National Concepts and Institutions," notes "Key traumatic events that demonstrate the failures of intelligence in each country have driven national perceptions of what intelligence ought to be. And such normative concepts are crucial in how we think we ought to go about building an intelligence community, much as key normative concepts provide an intellectual framework for other activities."

¹⁰⁷⁶ Yee explores the role of the causal 'constraints' of ideas on policy through discourse. Yee, "The Causal Effects of Ideas on Policies," 69-108.

by analogy;¹⁰⁷⁷ deepens understandings of characterizations of accountability and oversight/responsibility and blame (because of the substantial experience with Pearl Harbor related hearings); illustrates sharing, cooperation, and politicization issues (in terms of PH as the protection of centralized intelligence); assists with the study and process of strategic surprise and intelligence failure, and intelligence and the national identity. This one element of the national intelligence identity thus touches many different aspects of Intelligence Studies.

Finally, as Hamilton Bean pointed to in “Organizational Culture and US Intelligence Affairs,” organizational culture scholars note that if culture can be “changed effectively” it must be deeply understood first (to avoid possible unintended consequences and certain kinds of cultural pushback against change), and PH is deeply symbolic in the American psyche.¹⁰⁷⁸ Thus PH’s role in intelligence culture may illuminate the limits and extent of change possible in intelligence. Second, if we follow Bean, culture is not just an object – a Rubik’s cube one can manipulate and set back down.¹⁰⁷⁹ Those responsible for intelligence reform and cooperation would like to imagine that reforming culture is as simple as having a manager tasked with it. What managers cannot do is change the deep perceptions, like those around Pearl Harbor, of the nature of the world and America’s place in it. This highlights an important aspect that organizational culture theory alone may miss – the higher level of culture – which is the national or social context. PH is not part of the organizational culture of any agency alone (since most agencies were re-organized or created after it) but is carried by all – it is part of an element of

¹⁰⁷⁷ This literature includes a variety of topics; David Patrick Houghton, “The Role of Analogical Reasoning in Novel Foreign-Policy Situations,” *British Journal of Political Science* 26, no. 4 (Oct., 1996): 523-552; Markus Kornprobst, “Comparing Apples and Oranges? Leading and Misleading Uses of Historical Analogies,” *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 36, no. 29 (2007): 655-671; Jan Angstrom, “Mapping the Competing Historical Analogies of the War on Terrorism: The Bush Presidency,” *International Relations* 25, no. 2 (2011): 224-242; Annika Brändström, Fredrik Bynander, and Paul T. Hart, “Governing by Looking Back: Historical analogies and crisis management,” *Public Administration* 82, no. 1 (2004): 191-210; Christopher Hemmer, “Historical Analogies and the Definition of Interests: The Iranian Hostage Crisis and Ronald Reagan’s Policy toward the Hostages in Lebanon,” *Political Psychology* 20, no. 2 (Jun., 1999): 267-289; & etc.

¹⁰⁷⁸ Bean, “United States Intelligence Cultures.”

¹⁰⁷⁹ More and more numerous calls for changes to both intelligence “agency” and “community” cultures are made; Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, “The Cultural Revolution in intelligence: Interim report,” *Washington Quarterly* 31, no. 2 (2008): 47-61, p 52.

culture that is shared and carried by non-practitioners. Thus the national level of intelligence culture, while not the same as strategic culture, can help identify elements of policymaking culture with respect to intelligence that are context to the nation's security policy as a whole.

Methods

This content analysis approach offers superior methodological rigor to some *single* methods of intelligence and strategic cultural analysis, and lets other researchers identify sources and draw their own conclusions as to whether the texts support the conclusions produced. This is not replicability in the scientific sense, but is much stronger than historical anecdotes and non-textual interpretation.¹⁰⁸⁰ This is discussed more fully in chapter two of this dissertation, in the section "Time Frame Limits and Selection" Methodologically, the plethora of texts generated in the US means the danger that secrecy might distort textual analysis is low. I do not consider secrecy a serious impediment to the study overall: secrecy is intended to protect 'methods and sources',¹⁰⁸¹ as well as the specifics of particular events, not overall intelligence thought. There are many non-secret texts that can be used, and few, if any, instances in which (previously) secret data is preferable to open archives.¹⁰⁸² For the issue of access in general, no intelligence culture is wholly secret – intentionally hidden from all public disclosure and scrutiny. Intelligence culture is reflected in de-classified documents, memoirs, public documents, and the like.

¹⁰⁸⁰ As Neuendorf writes, in content analysis, reapplication by other researchers can add to the validity of content analysis. *The Content Analysis Guidebook* (SAGE, 2002), p 12, 13, 280. Document analysis itself, practiced by historians and other scholars, is actually a research method, with the reader determining the meaningful and useful messages; Lindsay F. Prior, *The Sage Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods* Vol 2, "Document Analysis," (Sage: 2008), p 230. By adding greater transparency and replicability, in some ways formal content analysis may be a superior method.

¹⁰⁸¹ This is the intelligence phrase for describing the protection of names of agents and informants, and the tradecraft methods used in intelligence.

¹⁰⁸² For a discussion of this as methodological issue for intelligence culture research, see chapter two, section "Sources" and the section "Methodology".

The selection of content analysis is particularly suited to studying the social world and its webs of meaning.¹⁰⁸³ As well, textual analysis affords methodological rigor over supposition. One of the criticisms of interpretive methods is weak evidence. Turner is challenged in the *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*: “[I]t is very hard to tell whether Turner's US intelligence identity really is distinctive without some kind of comparative data against which to demonstrate that distinctiveness. As a result, whether Turner's characterization is accurate or not, it contributes very little that is new to our understanding of intelligence in America.”¹⁰⁸⁴ The benefit of content analysis is that by identifying sources, other researchers can judge if the text fits the conclusions produced.¹⁰⁸⁵ This is not repeatability in the scientific sense, but is much stronger than historical anecdotes and non-textual interpretation. The opponents of cultural approaches criticize culture as unfalsifiable.¹⁰⁸⁶ They charge that culture is derived from behavior and behavior is then predicted from culture.¹⁰⁸⁷ This makes it impossible to disprove, and demonstrates nothing. Choosing textual methods to help define the current intelligence culture, while rejecting the behavior and practice separation, is intended to avoid this tautology.

Content Analysis

¹⁰⁸³ The disciplines of Sociology (and Communications) frequently use content analysis because of its utility in studying the social world in ways that are difficult to get at otherwise; content analyses can code visual media (tv, film, etc.), behavior, text, speech, interviews, & etc. For example, David L. Altheide, Christopher J. Schneider, *Qualitative Media Analysis* (Sage, 2013): 23-3, p 9; Russell K. Schutt, *Investigating the Social World: The Process and Practice of Research* 7th ed (Sage 2011), p 436-7. For a “map” of theories and methods see Titscher and Jenner, *Methods of Text and Discourse Analysis*: p 51.

¹⁰⁸⁴ Davies, "Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure in Britain and the United States," p 495-520.

¹⁰⁸⁵ Neuendorf, *The Content Analysis Guidebook*, p 115. On different measures of validity, see Titscher and Jenner, *Methods of Text and Discourse Analysis*: “Content Analysis”.

¹⁰⁸⁶ In general, this charge is made against constructivism in IR, for example, but more consistent (and recent) critics have recognized that realist and constructivist theories may be constructed so that as to be unfalsifiable. Richard Rosecrance, “The Failure of Static and The Need for Dynamic Approaches to International Relations,” in *The Oxford Handbook of International Relation*, eds. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2008), p717.

¹⁰⁸⁷ Lock, “Refining Strategic Culture:” 685-708. This is discussed more fully in chapter two of this thesis, in the section *The Gray-Johnston Debate - Culture and the Rational Actor Model*.

I conducted a content analysis of the most prominent journals in Intelligence Studies (*The International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* [IJIC] and *Intelligence and National Security* [INS]). INS is published six times a year, while IJIC is published four times a year, both by Taylor and Francis.¹⁰⁸⁸ According to Johnson, INS was founded in 1986, and the IJIC began publishing in 1987, and are ‘key’ journals in intelligence.¹⁰⁸⁹ Johnson notes that “[d]espite these riches of specialized publication outlets, interest in intelligence all but disappears when one enters the mainstream journals of history and political science.”¹⁰⁹⁰ The National Military Intelligence Association’s journal *American Intelligence Journal* was also inadmissible because it is published only semi-annually, and available only to members. It is not an indexed journal, and thus not available to the public and academics. Finally, the CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence’s *Studies in Intelligence* has been an important journal for intelligence and is available internally, in a classified version, and to the public with selected pieces in an unclassified version. While *Studies in Intelligence* is available generally in a modified form, it is not systematically declassified, and would not provide a complete picture of concept usage. For this reason, *Studies* is not suitable for content analysis; it also draws on a more narrow authorship pool than INS and IJIC.¹⁰⁹¹ Other analysis of popular print media, television transcripts, speeches, and newspapers in test cases did not show significantly different results, and typically

¹⁰⁸⁸ Taylor and Francis, “About this Journal” <http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fint20> and <http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=ujic20>

¹⁰⁸⁹ Johnson, “The Development of Intelligence Studies,” p 8. Johnson also cites the *Journal of Intelligence History*, but does not accord it the same distinction; *Ibid*. For this reason, and that the historical focus, over the more political aspect of IJIC and INS, and the broader readership and authorship of these journals, the Journal of Intelligence History was not included in the content analysis. The niche focus, recent founding, and lower than four issues-per year publishing schedule of two specialty intelligence journals- the *Journal for Intelligence, Propaganda and Security Studies* and the *International Journal of Intelligence Ethics* – were not used in the content analysis (<https://rowman.com/page/IJE>; <http://www.acipss.org/journal?lang=en>) Johnson also provides a list of the major topics of INS (only), with the top subjects including intelligence collection, history, CI, analysis, and theory/methods. *Ibid*, p 10.

¹⁰⁹⁰ He also adds a list of publications the occasionally will publish intelligence articles, but notes in the *American Political Science Review*’s history entire, only 1 intelligence reference exists. Johnson, “*The Development of Intelligence Studies*, 8/9. This confirmed initial database searches that suggested the number of intelligence related articles in non-intelligence journals was too small to include in a content analysis.

¹⁰⁹¹ Also, a preliminary analysis of *Studies* found less than 10 total results (on a variety of search key words) related to Pearl Harbor. This sample size would be too small to make significant generalizations.

yielded non-intelligence articulations. The pursuit of the intersection of policymaker and practitioners conceptual foci showed the best results in the journals selected.

An analysis of both INS and IJIC captures an important set of articulations. Since the goal is to capture real usage of intelligence culture terms, they provide a large number of total possible articles. Second, these journals capture a broad spectrum of both ‘elites’ – policymakers and practitioners who publish or have left government, and academics in Intelligence Studies (and related fields) who are respected by the intelligence community.¹⁰⁹² As such they capture an important cross-section of intelligence culture usage (not only an academic one). Moreover, as the most-prestigious and well known intelligence journals, edited by top academics, their usage of intelligence concepts is likely to reflect widely shared usage. More selective textual analysis methods for popular media would be an area for future research.

This content analysis is not a multi-level analysis; the term Pearl Harbor is the primary focus, in the form of a manifest content analysis:¹⁰⁹³ “the explicit or manifest content of a text can be depicted as a network consisting of relationships between meaning objects.”¹⁰⁹⁴ The content analysis was designed to determine how concepts are articulated around Pearl Harbor. As such, “Pearl Harbor” was the manifest term, used to determine the areas of relevant latent

¹⁰⁹² Having discussed general public articulations of PH already, this content analysis is trying to capture the *intelligence related* articulations of Pearl Harbor and not necessarily those of any specific group. Public articulations, are mentioned for the general articulations of Pearl Harbor, but they tend not to extend to intelligence focused understandings.

¹⁰⁹³ Manifest coding codes for particular words to indicate a concept, while latent coding codes the entire unit in subjective terms (positive/negative). *The Content Analysis Guidebook* notes that there is a manifest-latent continuum, and studies may use manifest measures of latent content, or the converse; Neuendorf, *The Content Analysis Guidebook*, p23. This dissertation did not begin with a latent analysis (for example of the overall tone of the article, or of the sentence unit or links because it is not the purpose of this research to determine whether PH is viewed positively or negatively; it is more significant how PH is understood, and what concepts it is linked to. While this kind of study is common in content analyses that wish to determine, for example, attitudes to the EU, attitudes to PH (as positive or negative) are not useful compared with mapping the concepts associated with PH, and thus, the articulations of the concept, and the ideas it is linked to. The intensity of the term (the number of times it appears in a given unit) did not add relevant data to the study.

¹⁰⁹⁴ According to Kleinnijenhuis et al., the analysis or mapping the content parses the text into sentences. This allows a latent analysis of the manifest content. “Reasoning in Economic Discourse: A network approach to the Dutch Press,” Jan Kleinnijenhuis, Jan A. De Ridder, and Ewald M. Rietberg, “Reasoning in Economic Discourse: A network approach to the Dutch Press,” in *The Content Analysis Reader*, eds. Klaus Krippendorff, Mary Angela Bock (Sage, 2009) p 430.

content.¹⁰⁹⁵ That is, Pearl Harbor was the term around which related concepts were coded (the unit of analysis is described below). This analysis was designed as an appropriate methodology for “a study design whose aim is to describe a phenomenon.” In this kind of simple (or ‘conventional’) study, “Researchers avoid using preconceived categories... instead allowing the categories and names for categories to flow from the data.”¹⁰⁹⁶ This is in contrast to directed content analysis, where the analysis proceeds based on existing theory that guides the study design.

References from INS and IJIC were taken from the ten-year period 2002-2012. The time period was chosen to reflect the decade directly including and following the 9.11 attacks.¹⁰⁹⁷ This time period allows the analysis to primarily reflect current American intelligence culture. This period is long enough to reflect multiple presidential administrations, and thus not be only a reflection of administrative policy and ideological beliefs. The current focus should additionally capture any persisting historical understandings (in addition to re-articulations); The past exists in the security imaginary reservoir, but our understanding of it is conditioned by our present. Moreover, this time frame also allows for the lag time between research and published articles, and the immediate evolution of discourse, to encompass the changes in meaning that followed the 9.11 attacks. It reflects any ‘new’ understandings of Pearl Harbor. This is discussed more fully in chapter two under the ‘methodology’ section. This time frame is important because PH works on two levels – it has its original meanings for intelligence from the lessons of the original attacks, and it also undergoes a re-articulation through 9.11. This re-definition is not immediate although

¹⁰⁹⁵ An analysis of the manifest content of these articles, in terms of the most common words collected in list form, was also conducted using NVIVO’s word frequency function, which “list the most frequently occurring words or concepts...” Nvivo excludes common stop words (the, a, an, etc.) as part of accepted practice. Nivo, “Run a Word Frequency Query,” http://help-nv10.qsrinternational.com/desktop/procedures/run_a_word_frequency_query.htm

¹⁰⁹⁶ Hsiu-Fang Hsieh and Sarah E. Shannon, “Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis,” *Qualitative Health Research* 15, no. 9, (November 2005) :1277-1288, p 1279, p 1281.

¹⁰⁹⁷ Neary, “The Post 9/11 Intelligence Community Intelligence Reform, 2001–2009: Requiescat in Pace?”; the reference period was Jan 1 2002 to Dec 31 2012 for both INS and IJIC. No references were selected from 2001 because of the time lag between article submission and journal publishing that can take up to a year or more.

even in the first days after the attack, PH was adopted as a parallel.¹⁰⁹⁸ In the wider literature, the real effects of the new understanding of PH in light of 9.11 – in intelligence terms – take time to become concrete. The specific re-articulations, in intelligence terms, are discussed below in the section ‘Pearl Harbor/ 9.11 Analogies in the AE Framework.’ This time frame allows for that process, as well as capturing the original lessons.¹⁰⁹⁹ Other data sets were tested with a variety of sources (news media, television broadcasts, popular print media) and time periods, but yielded no significant results – no additional concepts were observed- when a longer data period was used.¹¹⁰⁰

References were determined by a keyword search¹¹⁰¹ of the journals, producing **89** unique articles with references to Pearl Harbor in INS and **62** unique articles with Pearl Harbor references in IJIC. Of the total **151** unique articles in the two journals, book review articles were eliminated from the content analysis, as were historical articles (See Appendix AA for a list of sources and eliminated articles).¹¹⁰² These were historical research articles that did not include a current analysis (these dealt with purely historical questions of codebreaking, signals, etc. without mentioning the present, drawing any lessons, or making any mention of the connection

¹⁰⁹⁸ White, “National Subjects: September 11 and Pearl Harbor,” 293-310.

¹⁰⁹⁹ Many ‘10 years after’ style intelligence conferences and special issues were held in 2011 (example: the Gregynog Conference of the Centre for Intelligence and International Security Studies: ‘A Decade of Intelligence Beyond 9/11: Security, Diplomacy and Human Rights’ was held in 2011).

¹¹⁰⁰ These other data sets included broader texts that would include the more general public understandings of PH. A preliminary analysis of manifest content in newspapers was conducted through LEXIS-NEXIS on three sets of influential and foreign policy focused newspapers, widely read in America. A keyword search for “Pearl Harbor AND intelligence” in the New York Times, Washington Post, and The USA Today (with no date limitation). These yielded a large number of irrelevant articles (death notices for veterans, historical articles, etc) and a word frequency search showed the sample sizes were too large to show anything except the most general concepts associated with Pearl Harbor (for example, “New York”, “war” “white house” “attack” “Roosevelt”, etc. A similar test of the searchable documents [official press releases] for some of the agencies of the intelligence community – DHS, DIA, FBI, and CIA, yielded too few results to analyze (the only exception was DIA, due to a number of historical documents on MAGIC and Pearl Harbor decrypts). Also, the form of agency press releases was not indicative of concepts around Pearl Harbor, and more generally related to history and commemoration. A longer-time frame study of IMBD as reservoir for the possible cultural aspects of PH articulations was also conducted in a preliminary phase; however, a plot keyword search using www.imdb.com’s comprehensive film database did not show intelligence related concepts – likely due to the community selective nature of the plot keyword system in the database, as opposed to a content-based description.

¹¹⁰¹ Because the two journals automatically capture the “intelligence” focus, a keyword search for “Pearl Harbor” in all areas (article text, abstract, and title) yielded the initial article results.

¹¹⁰² All eliminated articles were treated initially as all the other content analysis articles, using the same unit of analysis, derived using the initial search terms, and sources, and read in their entirety. They were eliminated due to the entirety of their content – not simply the context to sentences relating to Pearl Harbor.

to any events following Pearl Harbor). Those historical case studies that referred, in any way, to events following the PH attacks, or drew any kind of lesson or commentary on the present, were not eliminated. These were included in the coding, and coded under the “Series or Case” code (the full list of codes is below in the next section).

The unit of analysis for coding was the paragraph; individual sentences sometimes contained more than one reference to PH, and often required greater context than the sentence itself. However, separate references in the same paragraph could be assigned different codes provided they referred to a separate concept. Based on a full reading of each article, an initial set of codes was developed. This set of codes was tested against the text, and subsequently a final code set (or “codebook” was created). Because this coding did not examine more subjective content analysis questions – such as whether a reference is ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ – a definition set was not created.¹¹⁰³ Inter-coder reliability was high enough (above 90%) to justify this decision.¹¹⁰⁴ This approach coded for the concepts most clearly associated with the textual reference to Pearl Harbor. For example, in INS article 25 (see Appendix AA for article identifiers), the sentence, “One *New York Times* editorial in 1942 concluded matter-of-factly: ‘The primary responsibility for the disaster at Pearl Harbor must rest where the report of the Roberts Commission placed it – on the men in command at Hawaii itself,’” was coded as referring to Pearl Harbor commissions and inquiries, and counted in coding category four (see

¹¹⁰³ For this kind of coding, see Neuendorf, *The Content Analysis Guidebook* p 19, p 232; Definition sets help guide coders as to what kind of statements can be taken as positive or negative or neutral, etc. In the case of this dissertation, this positive/negative binary was not considered useful in comparison to an approach that focused on the *concepts* associated with PH, which was adopted.

¹¹⁰⁴ Manual coding, instead of computer assisted coding, was used. Alonso et al. recommends a manual approach initially, when coding a concept for which “no other data are available with which to compare these results” so where “no quantitative evidence exists the first step should always be to use the manual approach.” Sonia Alonso, Andrea Volkens, Braulio Gómez, *Content-analyzing Political Texts: A Quantitative Approach* (Calson, 2012), p18. Manual coding proponents stress its validity, and simplicity (an elaboration of a dictionary is not necessary as it is in computer coding). Ibid. Alonso et al also stress that overly complex manual classification schemes are dangerous in that they may detract from the actual research question, or may “contain more categories than can be deduced from your concept” *Ibid*, p 19-20.

table below). Rarely, if the PH reference individually fell into more than one of these categories, it was included more than one category. Because of the extensive analysis required by the two-step process of creating initial code categories, with the revised final categories it was determined that references with multiple codes could not be separated by creating further code categories. This research methodology would not attempt to make concepts exclusionary, but code for the clearest, most distinct, separate concepts related to Pearl Harbor. Sub-categories are discussed in each major coding category below.

The content analysis was not directed at the historical controversies of Pearl Harbor (the battles over codebreaking, the question of radio silence, foreknowledge, etc.), but rather at the present understandings and uses of Pearl Harbor. It aimed not to the understanding of what occurred in the historical event itself, which is of course well documented, but about the uses to which it is put in an intelligence context. The truth of the events – ‘Who knew what?’ – is secondary: what is important is how Pearl Harbor is used: what it is associated with and what it justifies. What we think, argue, say and believe about PH forms articulations and discourses that are a key part of the intelligence system. This aim to study real current usage of a term is an important step in the development of intelligence culture.

Codes

TABLE 2.1: Pearl Harbor Reference Coding Categories

1 Series or case
2 Place
3 Time marker
4 Hearings/inquiries/commissions
5 Wohlstetter
6 Event
7 future PH/other analogy

In the following section, I will give a brief description of the codes, followed by an outline of the themes that emerged from the content analysis in each coding category.

1. Series or Case: 24 IJIC; 22 INS references

Under this code are references where Pearl Harbor is used as one case, or mentioned as one of a series of cases. As one of America's early critical intelligence failures, PH is taken as a case for a number of different arguments. Moreover, there are few (globally) cases of successful surprise attacks, and particularly against a major power. This makes PH a compelling case for a variety of scholarship. Aside from frequent comparisons to 9.11, PH is cited as a case of intelligence 'mistakes,' strategic intelligence failure (one of the most serious cases), 'screw ups,' patterns of groupthink in intelligence processes, intelligence disaster, a structural failure, reasons to create intelligence services, events that change America's strategic focus, betrayals of imagined rules, and presumption in policymaking. Pearl Harbor is also clearly important to the intelligence literature around surprise: it is cited as an example of tactical deception, strategic surprise, and one of the 'foremost' examples of surprise attacks.

Some of these are similar, but the sheer variety is instructive. Pearl Harbor is also often singled out in these references (although this may be because the authors in these journal tend to write to an American audience and PH is one of a few American examples) as the most 'high profile'/important or serious case of these. For surprise and deception, it is catalogued along with the greatest surprise attacks of all time (alongside the Normandy landings, the Yom Kippur War

and 9.11) and the biggest intelligence failures (with Barbarossa, Yom Kippur, Iraqi WMD).¹¹⁰⁵ Inside America, it is compared with Gettysburg and 9.11 as peers.

If there is a theme among these cases, it is that PH is seen as representative of a variety of types of intelligence failures, broadly, of various kinds. The PH failure (as many of these references label it),¹¹⁰⁶ in these references, is caused by low signals, groupthink, structural failure, mistakes by analysts (they are fooled, deceived, lose sight of assumptions, or arrive at the wrong conclusions), as well as deficiencies in expertise, unmet responsibilities (chain of command), corporate weaknesses, the lack of a peacetime intelligence service, the organization and classification of information, the lack of integration of information, the inability to understand breaking of unwritten rules, and underestimation of both America and Japan, (presumption about Japanese military capabilities, and Japanese presumptions about American response to the attacks).¹¹⁰⁷

2. Place & 3. Time Marker: : 9 IJIC, 3 INS references

These references have less substantial meaning for PH itself. In the place code, a small number of references refer to actions, events, or people who were at Pearl Harbor (as a place). These do not draw any other inference for modern intelligence (but were included because the article as a whole was not a purely historical case). The time marker references are somewhat more interesting. In these cases, Pearl Harbor was used to designate a period of time. That is, XYZ (the designated happening) occurred before/after the PH attacks, again without another

¹¹⁰⁵ A number of authors the greatest cases of surprise – in intelligence terms. Bar-Joseph examines Yom Kippur in detail alongside Pearl Harbor in Uri Bar-Joseph, "The Professional Ethics of Intelligence Analysis." *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 24, no. 1 (2010): 22-43. Len Scott & Peter Jackson also compare a number of these cases in "The Study of Intelligence in Theory and Practice," p 154.

¹¹⁰⁶ For example, Christina Shelton, "The Roots of Analytic Failures in the U.S. Intelligence Community," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, 24, no. 4, 637-655.

¹¹⁰⁷ As in all these categories, these descriptions are drawn from the references included in the content analysis. See Appendix AA.

concept linked. The idea of the Pearl Harbor as a time marker, in and of itself, indicates that Pearl Harbor marks a significant break for the intelligence community. As the beginning of the peacetime intelligence community, the CIA, and the industrialized intelligence system, PH clearly retains its significance for historical periodization.

4. Hearings/Inquiries/Commissions: 9 IJIC, 9 INS references

The content analysis of IJIC and I&NS yielded 18 total unique references discussing the PH investigations. The substance of these references is varied, with the most common topic being a comparison to the 9.11 investigations and commissions. Other subjects include the host of similar intelligence failure investigations internationally and historically. References fell into one of three broad categories: as a public tool, as a resource for scholarship, and in comparison with other inquiries. Based on the variety of subjects and references, it seems that the PH inquiries have a robust resonance in modern intelligence understandings, not confined to the scholarly community.

Public Tool

In the first category (as a public tool), the PH hearings were significant for the development of intelligence in publicizing the story of PH. The hearings raised the profile of intelligence, and at a basic level acquainted the public with the functions of intelligence. This function of the commissions as an informational event in American history is quite separate from the conclusions or lessons of the inquiries, or their enduring controversies. The first and second categories both position the PH inquiries as an informational event.

Resource for Scholarship

The second category (as a resource for scholarship) considers the PH inquiries in the lens of intelligence scholarship, primarily as an archive. The inquiries were significant for the incredible volumes of information they produced around intelligence, eventually generating the data for Roberta Wohlstetter's important work, *Warning and Decision*.¹¹⁰⁸ The hearings and evidence provided clues to important elements of the national security system – such as the use of SIGINT by the major Western intelligence services – that were unknown to scholars at the time. The PH inquiries are an enduring resource, as Intelligence Studies develops and revisits the problems of which PH is considered emblematic in intelligence.

Comparison with other Inquiries

Finally, in the third category (comparative), the PH inquiries, as an 'archetype' are understood in comparison with others intelligence-related investigations throughout American history and around the world. The PH inquiries are linked to the 9.11 inquiry, the McCarthy hearings, the WMD investigations, the lack of Iraq post-invasion planning, and the Butler report, among others. Themes of comparison range from the subject of FBI investigations and domestic intelligence, to norms of accountability and the question of centralization. The nature of the references in particular is further developed in Section 3, discussing the influence on policy and practice.

5. Wohlstetter: 4 IJIC; 9 INS references

¹¹⁰⁸ Wohlstetter wrote other intelligence related pieces on the same themes, these include; Roberta Wohlstetter, *Cuba and Pearl Harbor: Hindsight and Foresight* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1965); Roberta Wohlstetter, "Sunday, December 7, 1941, and the Monday Morning Quarterbacks," *Air Force Magazine* (Dec. 1966) 82-8; Roberta Wohlstetter, "Slow Pearl Harbours and the Pleasures of Deception," in *Intelligence Policy and National Security* (London, Macmillan., 1981).

Wohlstetter was a unique reference because no other author was so directly linked to Pearl Harbor. This suggests that Wohlstetter's 'classic' *Pearl Harbor; Warning and Decision*¹¹⁰⁹ is a key text for American intelligence. The references to Wohlstetter link up to modern concepts of intelligence failures and reform—modern ideas of intelligence failure and reform refer to Wohlstetter as a baseline. Thus for any intelligence failure – one way PH shapes thought and practice is as the key example (through Wohlstetter) of 'signals to noise.' Wohlstetter's signals to noise concept is one of the core ideas of failures of intelligence (and new failures, like 9.11, are automatically reinterpreted through it).

Wohlstetter's importance stands for a couple of things. The most basic is the seminal explication of the signals to noise problem – the difficulty in possessing the correct information but at the same time having too much extraneous information is distinguishing which pieces are important and putting together the right ones. As Ben-Zvi puts it, it is not a collection, but rather of the understanding the information one already possesses (although it could be argued a failure to collect the piece of information that highlights the signals from the noise is itself a collection failure).¹¹¹⁰

Why is Wohlstetter's conceptualization of the PH problem so important? It is one of the first 'modern' takes on intelligence (failure), using what the references refer to variously as information theory, communications theory, and psychology (in cognitive closure and discourse failure).¹¹¹¹ It goes beyond the simple prescription of 'more sharing.' As Stephen Marrin writes,

¹¹⁰⁹ Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor; Warning and Decision* (Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press: 1962). Despite using unclassified sources, a classification review held up publication of her book for five years. Patricia Sullivan, "Roberta M. Wohlstetter, Military Intelligence Expert," Obitis Section, *Washington Post*, January 10, 2007, p. B7.

¹¹¹⁰ Abraham Ben-Zvi, "Between Warning and Response: The case of the Yom Kippur War." *International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence* 4, no. 2 (1990): 227-242.

¹¹¹¹ Woodrow J. Kuhns, "Intelligence Failures: Forecasting and the Lessons of Epistemology," in *Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel*, eds. Richard K. Betts, Thomas Mahnken (Routledge, 2003), p 77. David Kahn feels Wohlstetter's use of information theory terms is actually misleading, David Kahn "United States Views of Germany and Japan in 1941," in *Knowing One's Enemies* Ed. Ernest R. May, (Princeton University Press, 1986), P 500, FN 90.

“The signal-to-noise problem noted by Roberta Wohlstetter in her *Pearl Harbor* case study has no obvious or easily implemented solution.”¹¹¹² This is why it remains important in American intelligence culture: it can be endlessly revisited.

6. Event: 24 IJIC; 30 INS references

These were some of the most common references, because they counted the most general kind of reference to Pearl Harbor. These include the ‘attack’ at Pearl Harbor, the ‘disaster’ at Pearl Harbor, with little conceptual content.

7. Future possible/analogy : 2 IJIC; 6 INS references

These are essentially the invocation of an analogy, usually to a future possible event that could occur. The most well-known example is a possible ‘digital’ Pearl Harbor, but anything in the form of a modifier to Pearl Harbor (a surprise PH, an economic PH) was coded. For example INS reference 38b was, “After World War II ended, American political leaders decided that the United States needed an intelligence agency capable of integrating disparate pieces of information distributed throughout the military and other government agencies to prevent ‘another Pearl Harbor.’”¹¹¹³ The concept here is that the new agency was a hedge against a future/ ‘another’ Pearl Harbor.

Note that any specific 9.11 PH analogies were coded in code 7 along with future possible/other analogies. Both INS and IJIC contained a significant number of references to 9.11, in proximity to Pearl Harbor. PH is an obvious analogy for 9.11. However, the textual references were not always related conceptually. As such, I have chosen to explain the PH 9.11 relationship

¹¹¹² Marrin, “Preventing Intelligence Failures by Learning from the Past,” :655 — 672.

¹¹¹³ Stephen Marrin, “Intelligence Analysis Theory: Explaining and Predicting Analytic Responsibilities,” *Intelligence and National Security* 22, no. 6 (2007): 821-846, p 833-4.

more fully in my study of the direct and indirect influences of intelligence culture, in part 3 of this chapter.

From here this chapter moves to investigate more fully the points yielded from these initial analyses. Having shown current usage more clearly, I engage in further research on the direct use of PH in intelligence related discourse, following Khong's model (in terms of accountability/blame , and commission/inquiry type). I also, first, draw out possible, more speculative consequences of the intelligence culture concepts the content analysis has reflected – represented as openness, and the inquiry tradition. Ultimately, the goal of this chapter is to show that PH is impactful in American intelligence to both Realist and constructivist standards, to demonstrate the proposition that national intelligence cultures exist, and show that a multi-perspective approach can help outline them.

6.6 PART 3: EFFECTS ON POLICY AND PRACTICE

In Part 3, I use the results of this content analysis to create a more in-depth exploration of the practical effects of the symbols on American intelligence. I do this in four main movements/sections. In the first two sections, I examine the indirect and direct influences, of which I argue we can see both in the PH analogy's effects. While this part of the analysis draws on all results of the content analysis, the focus is on the link drawn by the Bush administration between the Pearl Harbor inquiries and the 9.11 Commission. Then, in the third main section, I examine the impact these influences had on reform. Finally, I will look more specifically at the 9.11 Commission reforms.

This content analysis affirms that PH inquiries are part of the current intelligence culture. But how do markers of past significance translate into the present? How do we use the lessons of

PH in the present? While multiple paths of influence can be drawn to many elements of intelligence culture, a handful of specific topics have been selected as linked to explaining the present influence of the PH inquiries. The analysis of these four areas draws on the results of the content analysis, but also broaches wider sources and literature to demonstrate the case. These influences are understood in two types (with two examples): indirect influences and direct influences.

- A) Indirect influences shape the present through a patterning effect; whereas
- B) Direct influences shape the present as a conscious model or set of lessons.

These direct and indirect influences, revealed by detailed textual analysis following the initial spread of content of PH inquiry codes, are: openness (indirect), the inquiry tradition (indirect), accountability/blame (direct), and definitive inquiry (direct).

The two indirect influences—openness and the inquiry tradition—are very broad, so it may be more difficult to draw the links in the case of intelligence, but no less important or rewarding in regards to understanding the modern intelligence system in America. I will thus attempt to show how these elements actually influence important elements of the present. I suggest that the strategic culture literature more easily demonstrates how diffuse principles of doctrine and beliefs about historical experience shape present thought and action because it deals with the explicit and usually formal socialization of the members of the armed forces.¹¹¹⁴ If a text is read, taught, and discussed on the record as a part of military training, the link from idea to action

¹¹¹⁴ Jeffrey S Lantis, “Strategic Culture: From Clausewitz to Constructivism,” p 35.

seems simpler.¹¹¹⁵ However, as noted, Khong's framework explores foreign policy, which lacks this explicit socialization, so this type of study is still feasible.

I will also make the case for two direct influences of the PH inquiries, in the areas of accountability/blame, and definitive inquiry. In these cases, a direct and explicit link is made by those in the present from the PH inquiries to their choice of action. In both, the legacy of the PH inquiries essentially shaped the understanding of the present, the necessary courses of action, and hence the final outcomes for the intelligence community. The accountability/blame issue refers to how individuals (or administrations) are considered responsible for the intelligence 'failure,' with the 9.11 attacks as a particular focus. The modern choice to look for institutional failings and not individuals is a response to the history of acrimony of the PH inquiries. The fifty-year controversy over holding local commanders Kimmel and Short responsible made it clear, given of the analogy of the two events, that the 9.11 Commission faced a danger should it attempt to apportion blame. Advisors to the 9.11 Commission argued directly that individual blame had to be avoided because of the result of the PH inquiry (discussed later). The lesson of the PH inquiries for the 9.11 commissions was that personal accountability must not be the focus.

The PH inquiries also directly influenced the area of definitive inquiry. Linked to the issue of personal responsibility and duty (and arguably to FDR conspiracy theories), the PH inquiries and commissions proliferated not just directly after the disaster, but for decades after. Some of these 'extra' inquiries were directed to information gathering due to the exigencies of wartime,¹¹¹⁶ but the majority were fragmented examinations of evidence based on political position. Each group wanted its own hearing from its own perspective, so that their own conclusions would be supported. The inability to build consensus over a single inquiry as

¹¹¹⁵ Zamanan, "Kautilya."

¹¹¹⁶ Hixson, "Volume Introduction."

definitive contributed to the re-opening of the PH inquiries, decade after decade. The lesson of the PH inquiries was that the lack of a comprehensive, bipartisan, authoritative commission led to endless revisiting of the disaster and its failures. To avoid the political danger of this constant re-opening, after 9.11 and the first *Joint Inquiry* investigation, the administration decided a single authoritative committee was necessary—because of the experience of PH.

Before turning to examine these indirect and direct areas of influence in full detail, however, I will begin with discussion of Commission types (in the American context)—as background to discussing the PH and 9.11 commissions in-depth. The aims of commissions to record, or reorient, do not necessarily correlate with their process – discussed later – unanimous or fragmented and crisis or agenda commissions. The do make clear the basic differences in American security commissions, so this section introduces the literature on commission types.

Commissions¹¹¹⁷ Types

Even among the Pearl Harbor commissions themselves, there have been inquiries of different types. I think it is useful to differentiate their aims and methods. I divide intelligence inquiries into three categories based on their aims:¹¹¹⁸ to record; to reform; or to reorient (in mission/efficiency). The differences are salient because, in my view, the aim to record fully the history of an event requires quite different thought processes and returns different results than either the aim to determine how to reform the intelligence community or the aim to reorient intelligence. The first is a historical data-gathering enterprise, the second – usually focusing on

¹¹¹⁷ I use the terms commission, inquiry and hearings as substitutes throughout. Zegart points out that fundamentally to kinds of commissions exist, *ad hoc* and *continuing* ones (such as the EPA's advisory committee on small farms). My usage refers to the ad-hoc commissions that focus on specific, rather than continuing issues. Amy Zegart, 'Blue Ribbons, Black Boxes: Toward a Better Understanding of Presidential Commissions,' *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 34, no. 2 (Jun., 2004): 366-393, p 368.

¹¹¹⁸ Although different categorizations are possible and this is not meant to be a comprehensive typology: some investigations may have all three, others, just one or two)

practices and structures – aims to reform the thought around day-to-day practices, often in order to increase efficiency or responding to changed circumstances, and the third explores theory or the concept of intelligence, targets, and mission. The multiple commissions and investigations of the mid 1990s, including the notable Aspin-Brown Commission,¹¹¹⁹ were aimed at reorientation. They examined what the intelligence is, and what it should do. They detailed many of the scandals of the past, but were not directed at recounting any particular one. While they were concerned with efficiencies – with reductions and cost cutting – they assessed the intelligence in entirely different ways than the 9.11 commission because they emphasized the core theory and concepts. One might call such a commission a ‘strategic’ reorientation, compared to a reform investigation’s tactical aim.

The reform investigation and the recording mission are often yoked together. It is what they do not do that is more important. The mission to record the course of history—how the scandal unfolded, how the events took place, especially with a responsive reform—usually removes much of the commission’s output ability to consider the basic concepts and theories of intelligence. It is rarely possible to combine all three types—and yet a major reform following a scandal or tragedy would be in great need of this kind of guidance. As I will explain, however, certain factors prevent the discussion of these concepts of the ‘essence’ of intelligence. Reorientation commissions typically grapple directly with intelligence—the norms of what intelligence should be and do. Reform commissions do this as well; but more typically if they arise from shock or tragedy, as did the 9.11 and PH commissions, certain pre-existing solutions may be imported.¹¹²⁰ This prevents a fuller consideration of intelligence as such, while still being

¹¹¹⁹ Loch Johnson, “The Aspin-Brown Intelligence Inquiry: Behind the Closed Doors of a Blue Ribbon Commission,” *Studies in Intelligence* 48, no. 3.

¹¹²⁰ In modern policy idea theory, any emergent policy “problem” actually confronts a welter of pre-existing ideas and solutions, many of which already have proponents, critics, and debates. Thus the process of solving a policy problem (whether through commissions or otherwise) is the

indirectly influenced by intelligence culture. In short, in two of these types of investigation, the examination of first principles is often not possible.

Based on the above typology, I would like to define commissions of inquiry (or hearings)¹¹²¹ in terms of their *functions*,¹¹²² segregating these into two categories: first, inquiries with an information gathering and assessment function (gather and assess evidence, take testimony, uncover facts) – what Zegart calls “information Commissions”; and second, inquiries with an advice-giving function (advise on policy/or advise on crisis/reform). In the process of gathering information and rendering advice – Zegart’s “Agenda Commissions,” commissions of inquiry may also help define the issue or set the agenda (through what path they do or do not take), or they may also render a judgment on the issue (as to its cause, consequences, and potential solutions or blame/responsibility).¹¹²³

The Varied Legacy of the PH Inquiries

As we saw in the content analysis in Part Two earlier in this chapter, three kinds of references were made to the Pearl Harbor inquiries and hearings: as a public tool, as a resource for scholarship, and in comparison to other inquiries. To begin to understand the significance of

process of linking problems to existing or adapted solutions ‘out’ in the policy environment. See Jal Mehta, “The Varied Role of Ideas in Politics: From Whether to How,” in *Ideas and Politics in Social Science Research*, eds. Daniel Beland and Robert Henry Cox (Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2011).

¹¹²¹ Kitts cites Marcy’s *Presidential Commissions* (1945), Wolanin *Presidential Advisory Commissions* (1975) and Flitner’s *The Politics of Presidential Commissions* (1986) as some of the most important non-case study specific works on Commission of the American style, sometimes called “blue-ribbon” (i.e. excluding Royal Commissions). Kenneth Kitts, *Presidential Commissions and National Security: The politics of damage control* (Boulder, Colo. : Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), p 8. Zegart cites Flitner, that “There have been but a handful of books relating to commissions in this century” (1986, 4,) in Zegart, ‘Blue Ribbons, Black Boxes;,’ p 367.

¹¹²² The results may be that they also accomplish what might be called subsidiary political goals – minimizing criticisms, and creating solidarity (among others). Lipsky and Olsen call this part of the “whitewash” tendency of commissions; Kitts, *Presidential Commissions and National Security*, p 8. Other kinds of classificatory schemes exist (aside from function): Some have provided it, (Marcy 1945; Sulzner 1971; Wolanin 1975; Flitner 1986)- Zegart suggests Flitner is superior, with a simple but broad three category system: procedure-oriented commissions, situation-oriented, and crisis-oriented commissions; cited in Zegart, ‘Blue Ribbons, Black Boxes;,’ p 372.

¹¹²³ Ashforth adds a Foucaultian function of legitimization of the idea of the state, to the function of commissions, running in three phases, investigative, persuasive, and archival. Adam Ashforth, “Reckoning Schemes of Legitimation: On commissions of inquiry as power/knowledge forms,” *Journal of Historical Sociology* 3, no. 1 (1990): 1-22, p1,7. I have not used Zegart’s third category, “Political Constellation Commissions,” since arguably, based on the foreign policy problem solution literature, any problem recreates the constellations of the political landscape and thus is not a function specific to certain commissions. Zegart, “Blue Ribbons, Black Boxes;,” p 375.

these representations for current intelligence culture in America, we need to see the depth and variety in the legacy of the PH inquiries. A multifaceted portrait of the PH inquiries emerges from this content, neither wholly positive or negative: as a ‘good inquiry,’ the evidence gathered has benefited the public and scholars; As a ‘bad inquiry,’ they were the site of partisan maneuvering that generated revisionist conspiracy theories and an enduring and bitter debate over the responsibility of local commanders.¹¹²⁴ These multiple views, surfacing in the past ten years of intelligence literature, suggest that PH is a seminal inquiry in more ways than one, and that it still has relevance for intelligence today. That it is not so distant as to be irrelevant, and is still enough like our own intelligence system’s functioning to be a useful comparison. As long as it is believed to have continued importance, it does. The belief in its continued importance – as we will see demonstrated in the content analysis – also has its own impact.

Indirect Influences

I will now turn to detail the indirect influences of PH on intelligence. Meyer writes that while some culture studies want a) direct explanation of decision, or b) a medium-term ‘roadmap,’ it also “operates at several higher levels of generality” – beyond official documents and planning.¹¹²⁵ I want to show these more general influences, what I term indirect influences.

The PH investigations and commissions changed the understanding of intelligence in America indirectly in three key ways. First, this wealth of information and the public study of it enhanced both a public belief in the right to know about intelligence and an overall openness of

¹¹²⁴ See both scholarly books on the debate and the host of semi-academic websites debating the minutia of the evidence surrounding the attacks. A literature on the Pearl Harbor attack also exists due to the welter of conflicting sources: for example, Stanley H. Smith, *Investigations of the Attack on Pearl Harbor: index to government hearings* No. 3. (Greenwood Publishing Group, 1990).

¹¹²⁵ Christoph O. Meyer, “European Strategic Culture,” in *The Routledge Handbook of European Security* eds. Sven Biscop, Richard G. Whitman, (Ny, NY: Routledge, 2013) p 51.

the American attitude to intelligence. Second, the hearings, inquiries, and reports, along with Kent's and then Wohlstetter's landmark studies, launched American Intelligence Studies.¹¹²⁶ Third, it had a role in legitimating the conspiracists and skeptics, who maintain a vigil over and investigate modern intelligence. Overall, then, the PH inquiries transformed the existing view of intelligence and created the assumption, first, of a right to knowledge and, second, that intelligence must be exposed to and directed by the public (or at least, democratic principles) – all this at a time when almost every other nation denied, protected, and classified the workings of intelligence. Davies opines that the very “foundations of the contemporary US intelligence community ... arose out of a public inquiry, the joint Congressional committee that investigated the causes of the Pearl Harbor attack.”¹¹²⁷ This view is confirmed by the understandings identified in the content analysis.

The Post-War Transformation of the American View of Intelligence

Two of the categories of reference from the content analysis of the PH inquiries – education of the public and a resource for scholars – both point to the role these inquiries played as an ‘informational event.’ Today we are accustomed to investigative journalists writing on national security, even to having monographs on the major intelligence agencies. Prior to PH, intelligence was primarily romanticized fodder for the popular imagination. In the early days of the country, there was an almost total absence of non-fiction intelligence work.¹¹²⁸

¹¹²⁶ Stephen Campbell, “A Survey of the US Market for Intelligence Education” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 24, no. 2 (2011): 307-337, p 308.

¹¹²⁷ Davies, “Ideas of Intelligence,” p 65.

¹¹²⁸ Simon Willmetts argues that Intelligence Studies can actually be conceived of as a response to the fictional body of literature that existed. “Reconceiving Realism: Intelligence Historians and the fact/fiction dichotomy,” in *Intelligence Studies in Britain and the US: Historiography Since 1945*, eds. Christopher R. Moran, Christopher J. Murphy, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), p 146. See also chapter four, in this dissertation, in the section following and including, *Early Intelligence Literature*.

In pre-war America, this fictionalized intelligence was often sensationalized. The FBI and J. Edgar Hoover supported fictional portrayals of FBI work – they hoped to demonstrate the abilities of the ‘G-men’ in the popular imagination, and thereby combat the folk-hero popularity many criminals had obtained in the past. FBI related movies, radio shows, coloring books, did talk about the scientific techniques, but against a largely sensational background. Hulnick writes that in FBI publicity campaigns agents were groomed for appearances and “Hoover supported radio programs and motion pictures that glorified the Bureau’s reputation.”¹¹²⁹ Pettee, Kent, Wohlstetter, and others had difficulties getting non-memoir/non-fiction intelligence work published before the war, as publishers were not convinced it would sell.¹¹³⁰ Lacking kind of information that would come out of the PH investigations, no real portrait of the American intelligence community could be made. Many pre-WWII intelligence events – spy cases – focused on the efforts of foreign spies and the activities of subversives conducted against America, not on the institutions charged to prevent it.

The inquiries of PH brought real intelligence—strategic and tactical—on a grand stage before the American public. Rushforth actually identifies a specific ‘archival’ phase of commissions, where their “reports enter a dialogue with history” and become a historical ‘source’ on social realities.¹¹³¹ The real issues of intelligence—understanding the enemy, fitting existing knowledge in with new information, avoiding deception, collating signals, codebreaking, sharing information—were no longer concealed under the cinematic portrait of intelligence. While American intelligence had faced scandals, the real workings of intelligence were very rarely indicated. The complex issues of warning, deception, and analysis were

¹¹²⁹ Arthur S Hulnick, 'Home Time: A New Paradigm for Domestic Intelligence', *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 22, no. 4 (2009): 569- 585, p5 72. See also Willmet, “Reconvening Realism: Intelligence Historians and the fact/fiction dichotomy,” p 160.

¹¹³⁰ Jack Davis, “Sherman Kent and the Profession of Intelligence Analysis,” p 5.

¹¹³¹ Ashforth, “Reckoning Schemes of Legitimation,” p 8.

foregrounded at the PH inquiries. The PH inquiries are repeatedly noted for their depth, detail and the breadth of evidence assembled. The project was breathtaking, and the result was the most comprehensive iteration (including publishing previous commission findings) was the famous 39 volume report.¹¹³² In the amassing of evidence, it is a case of one of the first – of many – exposures of American intelligence. This was taken positively, as an inducement to scholarship and a boon to historians.

To make the case that PH inquiries significantly contributed to openness, it must be clear what the attitudes were at the time. The open examination of PH only could have occurred in America, whereas the British wartime use of intelligence remain, in part, is still shrouded today. The PH inquiry does not stand free of context. The pre-existing tradition of American openness of government and democratic principle, and the opposition to secrecy, had developed for decades in the founding republic. Only in America could intelligence have been revealed as it was in the PH inquiries.¹¹³³ However, even in the context of this pre-existing tendency, PH established an important precedent. The PH failure was spectacularly public, and the controversy over who was responsible was explosive. As such, the PH investigation was widely debated and editorialized.¹¹³⁴ The questions animating the inquiry, which would have previously been of interest to bureaucrats and military men, now generated public debate. Americans could now have opinions about intelligence matters. I would argue the furor over the ‘responsibility’ of Kimmel and Short took an existing taste for public scandal and turned it towards intelligence. To

¹¹³² A 40 part, 39 volume report of HEARINGS BEFORE THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS was released July 20, 1946. It contained the proceedings of a number of previous investigations and commissions. *Pearl Harbor Attack: Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session, Pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Congress, a Concurrent Resolution Authorizing an Investigation of the Attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and Events and Circumstances Relating Thereto Volume: pt.12 (Washington: U.S.G.P.O., 1946).

¹¹³³ The radicalness of the inquiry – was that few open national security commissions had existed to that point.

¹¹³⁴ A “public clamor” for a fuller investigation began, according to Borch and Martinez, immediately after the release of the Roberts Commission Report. Frederic L. Borch and Daniel Martinez, *Kimmel, Short, and Pearl Harbor: The Final Report Revealed* (Naval Institute Press, 2005) p 87.

argue that the Mssrs. Kimmel and Short were heroes, one had to have at least a rudimentary knowledge of how intelligence should have worked and had otherwise failed.

PH was thus a milestone in an American public intelligence, inaugurating America's real public intelligence tradition and indirectly allowing for intelligence to be used as it was in the Iraq WMD case, as a sort of ultimate argument. Whether this tradition of public intelligence is beneficial – Joshua Rovner in *Fixing the Facts* argues that public intelligence should be curtailed¹¹³⁵ –it has become such a strong norm culturally that administrations no longer possess the luxury of the secret file. That this is harmful is evident, in many cases, as with the Bush administration's almost Machiavellian scheme to leak information to selected press and then publicly cite the leaked information as proof of their position.¹¹³⁶ However, it is clear that in America, the standards of evidence for intelligence matters were forever changed with the opening of the files on Pearl Harbor inquiries. Wirtz writes, "Compared to other nations, however, American appear to be remarkably open..." and "several *traditions* create this culture of openness...": post mortems, "often conducted by blue-ribbon commissions or Congressional committees" by collecting the facts of an event, and suggesting solutions. Wirtz cites PH as the most famous example of these.¹¹³⁷ The origins of this tradition, include PH, particularly because we can see, in the content analysis of part two, that it is still understood today as a justification for openness.

Counterfactual

¹¹³⁵ Rovner, *Fixing the Facts*.

¹¹³⁶ Julian Borger "Cheney's aide revealed as source of CIA leak," *The Guardian* (Washington) 11 February, 2004.

¹¹³⁷ Wirtz, "The American Approach to Intelligence Studies," p 29/30.

Counterfactually, this is not how it had to be. While it is difficult to otherwise imagine, America *could have* followed British-style refusal to speak about secret services and operations. As noted previously, many American intelligence institutions were initially imported from Britain,¹¹³⁸ and the British trained American intelligencers during and after the war. Yet in Britain, traditionally, intelligence was a taboo subject. For many decades, was inconceivable to violate the official secrets act. Michael Howard famously described that attitude: “Enemy agents are found under gooseberry bushes and intelligence is brought by the storks.”¹¹³⁹ Despite this influence, in the US, deeply held secrecy, with the attendant norms of silence for practitioners, was always tempered by democratic feeling. In America, following PH, intelligence was too controversial, too important, and too dangerous to be fully entrusted to the government’s sole and silent direction. The PH inquiries thus contributed to the patterning of one of the central tensions in American intelligence culture: open oversight vs. secrecy and intelligence vs. the rules of democratic accountability.

The origins of the secrecy norms in America are well-known – and discussed in this dissertation in the definition of intelligence, in part one of chapter five. This ‘culture’ of secrecy was partly created through a combination of the bureaucratic and institutional desire to protect one’s own resources (since secret information is a potent power). Moreover, philosophically the framers of the American constitution had an underlying fear of the masses and their power, should it be unleashed. This elite, conservative strain in American politics held that only those with knowledge to guide the nation needed to understand all the elements of policy. This modified Straussianism would remain a principle of the political elite through Bush’s advisors, many of whom had served for decades under Nixon and Bush Sr. and naturally emphasized the

¹¹³⁸ For example, the JIC, was modelled after the British institution of the same name. See for example, Valero, “The American Joint Intelligence Committee and Estimates of the Soviet Union, 1945-1947.”

¹¹³⁹ Howard cited in Andrew, “Introduction,” *Defend the Realm*.

need to accumulate secret intelligence.¹¹⁴⁰ Yet it is a particular kind of tension arising from American society – a fear of the secret and its implied power even as it rises with the desire to possess that power (for political ends and the ends of the nation). The ‘secret gestapo’ is feared by the American public, but is the, perhaps unwitting, object of the accumulation of power by those at the top of the American political system. J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI is the quintessential example – secrecy in the name of democracy. The schizophrenia of American politics – the opposition of secrecy and democratic openness – is engendered partly by the PH openness.¹¹⁴¹ This opposition seems so natural that we forget that other democracies with similar enemies and positions in the international system have approached the issue otherwise. The American approach was not necessary or natural – it could have been different (see the discussion of the *Yale Report* in chapter five, which resulted in lasting classifications of routine information as proof against Soviet spies). The Cold War reinforced this pattern, but given both countervailing trends to a fetishized secrecy and democratic openness, it is not clear that America would not have been ruled by the directive for intelligence secrecy that governed the intelligence systems of most other countries at that time.

The PH inquiry demonstrates the willingness to make public what was considered very secret and sensitive information. It increased the lengths of exposure tolerated, which would have been unthinkable in sister nations (e.g., the UK only made public the existence of its security services in 1989).¹¹⁴² The norm of openness has had a recurrent effect on intelligence.

For example, in the case of the Pentagon papers, the *New York Times* was willing to publish the

¹¹⁴⁰ A discussion of a Straussian view of intelligence is written by Kendallians, is “Leo Strauss and the World of Intelligence (By Which We Do Not Mean Nous),” - in it they critique the Kantian idea of intelligence, and apply Strauss to stress, as they do in other work (*Silent Warfare*), the primacy of deception in International Relations thus necessitating intelligence; A number of authors have associated senior Bush administration officials with a cadre of those like-minded to Kendall and Strauss specifically. James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet* (Penguin, 2004), Chapter Two; Aggie Hirst, *Leo Strauss, the Straussians & The Iraq War: Encountering the Abyss* (Routledge, 2013), p 87.

¹¹⁴¹ In fact, Hulnick writes that Hoover himself used the ‘secret gestapo’ smear against the new CIA in an attempt to preserve his intelligence collection mantle; Hulnick, “Home Time: A New Paradigm for Domestic Intelligence,” p 572.

¹¹⁴² Andrew, *Defend the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5*, p 767.

documents despite legal challenges,¹¹⁴³ whereas in the UK, someone bound by the official secrets act likely would have been turned away, not only for legal reasons, but for normative ones as well. The Supreme Court of the United States ultimately “ruled that, barring a ‘clear and present danger,’ restrictions on the media were unconstitutional,” and this was a reaffirmation of media prerogative.¹¹⁴⁴ This openness has more frequently exposed intelligence scandals, with the repetitive effect that the scandals are then investigated and exposed, further reinforcing public knowledge and the expectation of access to intelligence materials.

It is evident that, like many countries in the same era, the tendencies to secrecy and classification were strong in America. My argument is that the democratic intelligence tradition in America is significantly influenced by the PH inquiries, because secrecy was and remains a strong countervailing tendency in the republic. There is no argument, as Campbell writes, that the PH inquiry was significant.¹¹⁴⁵ It set a standard of openness, and public inquiry into intelligence matters.¹¹⁴⁶ Counterfactually, had the PH attack been where expected, in the Philippines or elsewhere in the Pacific, and inquiries and commissions never held, American attitudes might not have developed toward openness in the same way. Without the public knowledge, scholarship, and conception of a right to know about failures, which all reinforced a tradition of openness, the American intelligence culture could have been much less strongly disposed to openness.

The Launching of Intelligence Education and Scholarship

¹¹⁴³ Bruce D. Berkowitz, Allan E. Goodman, *Strategic Intelligence for American National Security* (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1989), p 23-4

¹¹⁴⁴ Berkowitz and Goodman, *Strategic Intelligence for American National Security*, *Ibid.*

¹¹⁴⁵ Campbell, “A Survey of the US Market for Intelligence Education.”

¹¹⁴⁶ Wirtz, “The American Approach to Intelligence Studies,” *section* “A culture of openness.”

The argument is made in the literature that the PH inquiries are a foundational influence on intelligence scholarship and education (which is a relatively large enterprise in America).¹¹⁴⁷ Stephen Campbell writes about the influence of PH inquiries on the eventual growth of intelligence education.¹¹⁴⁸ The results of the content analysis of this area demonstrate that PH inquiries were the first of their kind to allow scholars insight into what might be in the archives of nations. It held out possibility for future releases, and today, the events of PH are still revisited in new discoveries from the archives. More salient, I suggest, is the effect this has had on the study of modern American intelligence. A field historically ‘recalcitrant’ to theorizing, American Intelligence Studies has flourished, developing its own disciplinary boundaries and sub-specialization.¹¹⁴⁹ While Steve Marrin recently observed the lack of interplay between professionals and academics, Intelligence Studies has come to push new standards of teaching, training, and conceptualization.¹¹⁵⁰ For Kent, the very nature of an intelligence profession was its fastness in a standard, recorded body of information.¹¹⁵¹ Additionally, the growth in the education of students in intelligence in national security has shaped the personnel the intelligence community hires, and their own standards and requirements. It is not exactly a revolution akin to the first military staff college, but its influence can be understood in the same way. If the PH inquiries sparked an intelligence education revolution, then they have had an important effect on the eventual systematization of intelligence, in thought and practice. This was concurrent with the development and systematization of political science and International Relations, particularly

¹¹⁴⁷ See IAFIE the International Association for Intelligence Education, <http://www.iafie.org/>

¹¹⁴⁸ Wirtz, “The American Approach to Intelligence Studies.”

¹¹⁴⁹ In Der Derian’s phrase. On the new facets of Intelligence Studies, Christopher J. Murphy and Christopher R. Moran, “Introduction: Intelligence Studies Now and Then,” in *Intelligence Studies in Britain and the US: Historiography Since 1945*, eds. Christopher R. Moran, Christopher J. Murphy, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013).

¹¹⁵⁰ Comments, ISA panel and in Stephen Marrin. “Intelligence Studies Centers: Making Scholarship on Intelligence Analysis Useful.” *Intelligence and National Security* 27, no. 3 (June 2012): 398-422.

¹¹⁵¹ Sherman Kent, “The Need For an Intelligence Literature.”

with intelligence as a subfield of political science (and its tools of empirical or structured analysis).¹¹⁵²

The PH inquiries may have also weighted the combined political science/historical approach to American intelligence.¹¹⁵³ The historian's project admirably adds to our understanding of policymaking and grand strategy. Yet the political science and public administration project of understanding intelligence to improve it can potentially furnish better government and security for all. An example of this is the democratic intelligence work at the National Intelligence College on democratizing intelligence services as part of the transition away from authoritarian government. Only fifty years ago, the US had no journals of intelligence and, as Kent noted, no way of accumulating knowledge on how intelligence is done and how to do it better, or of sharing information on a variety of subjects.¹¹⁵⁴ The work of intelligence scholars – many of whom, in the US, are former lifetime professionals – may be the only forum for long-term reflections on craft, as intelligence becomes inexorably more 'current-intelligence' focused, with more demands on time. We have fewer Sherman Kents, holding full professorships, in the years they do not work in intelligence careers, and as such, less opportunity for those working in the field to improve the global (in the sense of overall) understanding of intelligence and how it should be structured and carried out.¹¹⁵⁵ Thus the Pearl Harbor inquires hold their place as a unique patterning event in the history of intelligence education and scholarship.

¹¹⁵² In America, the growth of political science, and particularly strategic studies have contributed to the study of intelligence as well. As they became an important disciplinary area, the study of intelligence through political science flourished; American Intelligence Studies are more associated with political science than history, and the converse is true in the UK and elsewhere. Fry and Hochstein, "Epistemic Communities: Intelligence studies and International Relations," p 15. See also chapter three, in this dissertation.

¹¹⁵³ Goodman, "Studying and Teaching About Intelligence: The Approach in the United Kingdom", and others.

2.1.1 ¹¹⁵⁴ Jack Davis, "Kent's Contributions to Professionalism," *The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis Occasional Papers* 1, no. 5, (Nov. '02).

¹¹⁵⁵ "Scholar-practitioners" do exist –Nye and Trevorton have been cited in Russell, *Sharpening Strategic Intelligence*: p 174- but barriers for academics to gain a 'global' view of intelligence may have grown, although the Kent school and others more concertedly carry out outreach to academics. Mahle, *Denial and Deception: An Insider's View of the CIA*, p 266

The Legitimation of Conspiracists, Skeptics, and Intelligence Culture

One of the more interesting ways the PH inquiries may have indirectly influenced intelligence is by nourishing, ironically, its foes—those who fail to believe it is needful to America or in fact is harmful. American conspiracists and skeptics are often considered the ‘enemies’ of intelligence because they frequently call for the end of the CIA and NSA. They are of a breed not quite seen elsewhere in the world. I argue that these two groups were given respectability and evidence through the PH inquiries; both the conspiracists who believe the worst of secret power and the democratic skeptics/critics who believe it is error prone and unpredictable. PH is the key event in modern American history for these two groups because they are often dismissed as ignorant about the ‘real’ workings of intelligence, characterized as political opponents and partisans to the administration with shadowy documents and anonymous insiders.¹¹⁵⁶ The PH inquiry provided legitimate fodder for both.¹¹⁵⁷ It furnished the valid evidence of reams of data to support their positions, and a public, legitimately recognized example of their arguments. For the conspiracists, and for many historians, the case is at least arguable that the government possessed the intelligence, or pieces of it, on the Japanese attack (whether or not it was read, understood, and communicated in a timely manner). For the skeptics, even mainstream accounts of the intelligence failure showed that it was not wholly attributable to the Japanese attempts at secrecy.¹¹⁵⁸ All the evidence of the inquiry pointed to American awareness of a possible war with Japan, but that what intelligence did exist was so frustrated by excessive secrecy,

¹¹⁵⁶ We can see this in the titling of Griffin’s *The New Pearl Harbor: Disturbing Questions About the Bush Administration and 9/11*, which does not deal with Pearl Harbor at all – it invokes it in the title only, to make a connection to Pearl Harbor revisionism, and telling the real story about government. Despite the relatively poor quality of the text, it is also cited frequently in the 9.11 truth/conspiracy movement.

¹¹⁵⁷ The conspiracists position was widely argued by the opponents of the Roosevelt administration, and taken up by the (mostly) respectable school of academics known to PH historiography as the revisionists school. See Robert H. Ferreix, “Pearl Harbor and the Revisionists” *The Historian* 17, no. 2 (March 1955): 215–233.

¹¹⁵⁸ Ferreix, “Pearl Harbor and the Revisionists” *Ibid.*

uncooperativeness, and inter-service infighting that no one was able to see the whole picture. The attack, for democratic skeptics, proves the case that intelligence does not do its job without being closely watched.¹¹⁵⁹ PH demonstrated all the abuses of power, the fractiousness, infighting, and disregard for the common good – all one could want to show how intelligence power can function undemocratically. In the logic of the skeptics, under an open democratic intelligence system, PH failures would not occur because we would be able see and catch problems in the system. Publics could be apprised of failings and poor institutional design. The Pearl Harbor inquiries have always been their foundational case for the benefits of an open intelligence system. They are a constant reminder of the consequences of lack of intelligence scrutiny.

While skeptics and conspiracists have never held the mainstream of American thought about intelligence, they remain a vocal minority.¹¹⁶⁰ In the past, they were sometimes one of the few sources of information about the goings-on of the intelligence community.¹¹⁶¹ Even in their outlandish ‘9.11 truth campaigns’ they have both remained in the vanguard pressing for openness and accountability and checks on secret intelligence.¹¹⁶² They have also shaped the face of modern intelligence inquiry: for decades, when intelligence books and studies were rare or non-existent, these groups wrote monographs, published newsletters, and maintained constant inquiries into all aspects of US intelligence, domestic and foreign. These encompass what Wesley Wark categorized as the 6th and 7th of 8 different “projects” or methodologies:

¹¹⁵⁹ C. William Michaels, *No Greater Threat: America after September 11 and the rise of a national security state* (Algora Publishing, 2007), p 115. Even the agencies themselves recognize this, awarding keen scrutinizer D.P. Moynihan a CIA award for showing the necessity and possibility of effective oversight, in a democracy. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *Secrecy: The American Experience* (Yale University Press, 1998), p 3.

¹¹⁶⁰ Lisa Finnegan writes that skepticism is part of a journalist’s job; *No Questions Asked: News Coverage Since 9/11*, p 66.

¹¹⁶¹ Calder, *Intelligence, espionage and related topics: an annotated bibliography of serial, journal, and magazine scholarship, 1844-1998*. They remain important in the present (Zegart lists the most prominent); Zegart, “Cloaks, Daggers, and Ivory Towers,” p 23.

¹¹⁶² Jeffreys-Jones (and his book *Cloak and Dollar*) might even be counted as a well-regarded skeptic, or perhaps conversely, a conspiracist academic; *Cloak and Dollar*.

(6) *civil liberties* project – inherently these are not objective and are designed to reveal the surreptitious activities of intelligence agencies where they impinge on domestic life; (7) *investigative journalism* – typically these are on topics for which there are no historical archives available.¹¹⁶³

Moreover, while in the pre-internet days I would argue they were actually more influential, but the investigators of intelligence still draw their ranks these skeptical invigilators – and they have discovered important recent intelligence stories of note.¹¹⁶⁴

With the decline in investigative journalism, the skeptics and conspiracists may yet once again become pre-eminent sources in intelligence. In investigating intelligence, information is hard to obtain, let alone verify. These groups have kept intelligence information in the public domain. They often conduct the tedious, access to information and freedom of information requests that result in revelations about intelligence.¹¹⁶⁵ Whether or not their positions and campaigns are justified, they do shape the American perspective on intelligence and contribute to its public oversight and accountability. In sum, skeptics and conspiracists have arguably been a force in the constant scrutiny of the American intelligence community (as well as a spur to scholarship), and therefore are an important facet in the continued tradition of openness. The PH inquiries, furnishing decades of evidence for these two groups, may then have had an indirect patterning influence on American intelligence by buttressing these two groups.

In these three ways then – through public expectation, scholarship, and conspiracists/skeptics – the Pearl Harbor inquiries helped develop the pattern of openness that has persisted in American intelligence culture. They led to the development of Intelligence Studies, a public

3 ¹¹⁶³ Cited in Goodman, “Studying and Teaching About Intelligence.”

¹¹⁶⁴ For example, see Phil Patton “Exposing the Black Budget The Cold War is over. So why, Paul McGinnis wanted to know, are major CIA, NSA, and Department of Defense programs still being kept secret from Congress and US taxpayers?” *Wired*, 3.11.

¹¹⁶⁵ There are numerous accounts of the difficulties of the FOIA System in intelligence research; Zegart writes that the oldest requests pending for the CIA were pending for more than 14 years; Zegart, “Cloaks, Daggers, and Ivory Towers,” p 25.

debate over the direction of intelligence, an expectation of public oversight, and a reservoir of real knowledge that countered the cinematic portrait predominant in America until that time.

Direct Influences

In this section, I shift the focus to the direct influences of PH on intelligence. The two areas where PH directly influences the present – that is, the areas of accountability/blame and definitive inquiry – rely on an analogy to the past, similar to the Munich analogy. I have been guided by Khong’s work on how analogies are used (whether poorly or well) in policy and exactly how they influence decision-making.¹¹⁶⁶ His theoretical perspective has been developed as the Analogical Explanation (AE) framework.¹¹⁶⁷ My own version of the AE framework, scales weak to strong analogies on three levels:

1. *Strong analogies.* These have direct influence on specific policy options. For example, in the Cuban case, AE explains not only why force was chosen over diplomacy, but why a blockade was chosen out of a number of suggested force options. These choices were specified by “reverse PH analogy” In strong cases, then, an analogy might specify a particular option. These are the clearest analogical cases.
2. *Medium analogies.* These are analogies that affect the general spread of plausible outcomes – they delimit certain choices as dangerous or negative consequences. These choices might be selected under duress or as a later resort, but would be considered with negative consequences according to analogical reasoning. They specify and limit some elements of choice but not as strongly or as fully as in 1 (above).
3. *Weak analogies.* These are analogies that shape the concepts used, the basic assumptions, and the public justifications, but that do not necessarily specify specific options. In these cases, the analogy then becomes a means to identify the assumptions about the situation that might otherwise be hidden.

¹¹⁶⁶ The analogy framework could be seen as one type of articulation, from the security imaginary heuristic. The two events are articulated together with specific stakes and lessons, forming a comprehensive set of articulations. Khong is considered one of the seminal writers on analogies in policymaking.

¹¹⁶⁷ Khong, *Analogies at War*, p10.

Pearl Harbor/ 9.11 Analogies in the AE Framework

The core of my argument with regard to direct influence is that the PH inquiries were taken as an important analogy to the 9.11 hearings and commission and, to a much lesser extent, to the WMD investigations. The analogical lessons of this link shaped post-9.11 intelligence reform and the inquiries and commissions in a number of ways. The two direct lessons taken by the 9.11 from the PH commission inquiries were, first, the dangers of a ‘fragmented’ inquiry and, second, the need to avoid question of individual blame. Using a (condensed) version of the AE framework,¹¹⁶⁸ I will answer three key questions, adapted to the PH analogy:

- 1) How does understanding the events following 9.11 (and particularly the 9.11 Commission) in terms of the PH inquiries *define the situation*?
- 2) What does this analogy say about (or *define*) *the stakes* of the present?
- 3) What is the *best course of action* and its *chances of success*?/ What course of action should be avoided and what are its pitfalls?¹¹⁶⁹

Using these three questions based on Khong’s work and the AE framework, I explore below how the PH and 9.11 inquiries have been linked through historical analogy. We are used to the association, but Khong’s framework lets us see how (in these three steps) first, the analogy helps to define the situation and its stakes; and ultimately, how it prescribes the best course of action or actions to be avoided (and sometimes the consequences of success).

Preliminary to the examination of PH’s direct influences on 9.11, however, I will explore the nature of the analogy between the two. Only by understanding how the two cases are believed to be similar furnishes a basis to understand how they have influenced the present.

¹¹⁶⁸ Khong frames his AE theory as six “diagnostic tasks” that analogies perform: 1 defining the nature of the situation, 2 assessing the stakes, 3 provide prescriptions; evaluate alternatives by 4 predicting their chances of success, 5 evaluating their moral rightness and 6, warning about dangers of any of the options. Khong, *Analogies at War*, p 10, p 22. Khong’s final three elements are all sub-aspects of providing prescriptions/courses of action. I have simply chosen a condensed version using the first three (which are the primary parts of his thesis).

¹¹⁶⁹ Connor, writing from a cultural sociology perspective, prefers to call this phase, creating a schema for future action. Brian T. Connor, “9/11 – A New Pearl Harbor? Analogies, Narratives, and Meanings of 9/11 in Civil Society,” *Cultural Sociology* 6, no.1 (2012): 3–25, p 4.

Similarities between 9.11 and PH

The analogies of the inquiries are linked strongly through the identification of the events themselves. Never had America had a more important intelligence failure than PH. Never had the country suffered an unprovoked attack on home soil of such devastation than 9.11. These two events, PH and 9.11, unique in American history, were to many, unannounced, unforeseen, and incomprehensible. The attack of this popularly *unanticipated* enemy,¹¹⁷⁰ the strong resonance between the attacks, made PH the only logical comparison. On a national security level, the resonance is even deeper. The strategic uncertainty resulting from both attacks led to a full American intervention in the world – a military re-engagement on a massive scale beyond its borders.¹¹⁷¹ Finally, the intelligence failures are intertwined. PH was the one of the furthest reaching intelligence failure of the nation save for the civil war, where the general malfeasance and tragedy did less to underline failures of either side, and, moreover, intelligence failures were part of the fog of war, and the origin point to the modern peacetime intelligence community. As an intelligence failure, 9.11 has been the most severe and most significant to the general public, since PH. It was once said among strategists that in the history of the world, warfare has been the most common human experience. For intelligence failures, the direct touch of intelligence either for ill or good, on most Americans lives and concerns, is negligible. Only PH and 9.11 have seen intelligence intrude into American society in that visceral way. These links in both causes and consequences solidified the analogical understanding that we could learn from the experience after PH in dealing with the aftermath of 9.11.¹¹⁷² “Intended or not, implicit in the analogy are answers to questions about whether the attacks were acts of war, how people should cope with

¹¹⁷⁰ Wirtz writes that the threats “(literally) materialized out of a clear blue sky.” James Wirtz, “Responding to Surprise,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 9 (2006): 45-56, p 45.

¹¹⁷¹ Weber identifies this as a similarity in sequencing (adapted from Chomsky’s analysis). Weber, “Flying Planes Can Be Dangerous,” p 129.

¹¹⁷² Dower, *Cultures of War: Pearl Harbor / Hiroshima / 9-11 / Iraq*.

the attacks, what the nation should do next, and much else.”¹¹⁷³ PH could be the only precedent for the 9.11 hearings, despite the long decades of congressional oversight and commissions, because of the similarities of the event/response/threat context/intelligence failure. That is, as Jervis famously discussed in his “Hypotheses on Misperception,” to understand new information or an unfamiliar actor, we tend to rely on slotting it/them into an existing category;¹¹⁷⁴ the category of an ‘act of war’ made possible by Pearl Harbor was the consequence of the analogy.

In addition to the strong similarities, which typically need only be superficial to adhere, (as discussed below) the PH–9.11 relationship, or articulation, was already primed.¹¹⁷⁵ Bush administration hawks had, in a number of forums, written about the usefulness of another Pearl Harbor-like event.¹¹⁷⁶ Naturally, the implication of this priming, combined with the public identification of 9.11 as a ‘new PH,’ clearly linked 9.11 to PH.¹¹⁷⁷ The strength of such pre-existing articulation, reinforced in the media and public, would have been extremely strong and durable. Veterans of American national security politics, the ‘hawks’ would have been intimately familiar with PH, its causes, and consequences, and took warning from the well-publicized outcomes of the PH inquiries.

Question 1: How does understanding the events following 9.11 in terms of the PH inquiries define the situation?

¹¹⁷³ Connor, “9/11 – A New Pearl Harbor? Analogies, Narratives, and Meanings of 9/11 in Civil Society,” p 3. Connor’s analysis of the Ph-9.11 analogy ultimately uses narrative genre to understand the analogy.

¹¹⁷⁴ Robert Jervis, “Hypotheses on Misperception,” *World Politics* 20, no. 3 (Apr., 1968): 454-479, p 466-467.

¹¹⁷⁵ The short period (four months) between the multi-million dollar launch of the film *Pearl Harbor* and the events of 9.11 also likely had an impact in popular ideation.

¹¹⁷⁶ For example, the infamous Project for the New American Century (PNAC), see Zelikow. See also Inderjeet Parmar, “Catalysing Events, Think Tanks and American Foreign Policy Shifts: A Comparative Analysis of the Impacts of Pearl Harbor 1941 and 11 September 2001,” *Government and Opposition*, 40, no. 1 (2005), p 2.

¹¹⁷⁷ “The September 11 Digital Archive”—records a number of popular stories linking 9.11 to Ph. <http://911digitalarchive.org/>

Linking the 9.11 and PH inquiries ‘defines the situation,’ as per the AE framework, by assuming similarities.¹¹⁷⁸ Both were vastly important hearings that followed a national crisis. Both were also similar intelligence failures, and both failures were investigated by an independent commission to identify reforms. The similarities appear to be obvious, but they appear natural because the two events have been linked, articulated together. This is the first stage in creating an analogy. But no analogy is ever necessarily natural: ‘similar’ historical events may often be considered irrelevant for comparison. Often events outside the society or nation, or too far in the past, are believed ineligible. That these two events, decades apart, are considered linked demonstrates the strength of the analogy – since no two events are necessarily linked save through our perception of them.¹¹⁷⁹ The analogy works to define the situation by positioning both as significant intelligence failures subject to public investigations. Once the definition is made, then the results, the lessons, the dangers of PH become significant in the present.¹¹⁸⁰ As the idea of prudential wisdom suggests, having identified our patterned events, we now expect like to follow like.

Question 2: What does this analogy say about the stakes of the present? Setting the Stakes

The result of setting or “defining the stakes” is what makes the lessons of the analogy important. Khong describes it through Herzog’s conquistadors, analogizing the founding of Mexico with their own quest for el Dorado. The analogy the conquistador makes to the founding Mexico is important because suddenly the stakes of their journey become glory and wealth, not

¹¹⁷⁸ Khong, *Analogies at War*, p 20.

¹¹⁷⁹ Connor, “9/11 – A New Pearl Harbor? Analogies, Narratives, and Meanings of 9/11 in Civil Society,” p 4-5.

¹¹⁸⁰ Connor argues that narratives and meta-narratives are also, in the case of PH-9.11 subsidiary structuring devices to reduce variance in meanings. Connor, “9/11 – A New Pearl Harbor? Analogies, Narratives, and Meanings of 9/11 in Civil Society,” p 6.

dysentery and hacking through the undergrowth.¹¹⁸¹ The analogy seizes the imagination, conjuring their journey as a historic opportunity with similar potential rewards. Once we know how the events are similar, defining the stakes tells us *why* they are important. While the *conquista* is a positive “stakes raising,” the stakes can just as easily be danger, damage, or loss. In analogizing to the PH inquiries, as I will explain, the stakes become political blame of the administration (and the president in particular), evidence of failings in the administration and day to day operations of intelligence, and recursive and repetitive re-openings of the crisis. At its worst, defining the stakes suggest that the choice of how to approach the inquiry would have consequences for decades potentially – the various PH inquiries continued for over fifty years after the event.¹¹⁸² The “stakes raising” of the PH inquiry analogy is that there is much more involved in the investigation of intelligence failures of this magnitude – and on American soil – than the identification of problems that led to these failures. The political fallout over the long term is how the PH inquiry raises the perception of danger. Despite an early initial investigation of PH – and the initial response of the country to unite behind the war and the President – the PH inquiry showed that this initial unity did not forestall hard questions about the events, continuing reinterpretations, and the apportioning of political blame. It raises the stakes beyond the inquiry itself to enormously important long-lasting political consequences.

Question 3: What is the best course of action and its chances of success? What course of action should be avoided and what are its pitfalls? Consequences

¹¹⁸¹ Khong, *Analogies at War*, p 3.

With the stakes established, the analogy can suggest both positive and negative possible results. The PH inquiry suggests lessons in a course of action to avoid. Its primary lesson is the dangers in conducting an inquiry in way the PH investigations and hearings were conducted. It is a course to be avoided. Such ‘reverse’ analogies are not uncommon; the reverse PH attack analogy, for example, convinced Kennedy that, based on the PH experience, Cuba should not be attacked unannounced.¹¹⁸³ For the PH inquiry analogy, the lesson was that the question of individual blame must be avoided, because otherwise a potentially rancorous and decades-long debate which could implicate the president and the administration’s failing might follow, as it did in Pearl Harbor’s case. Because the PH hearings were conducted in fits and starts repeatedly over five decades, the analogy suggests a reverse course of action: Have a single, definitive and agreed-upon joint inquiry (which would limit attempts to reopen the crisis and to blame), and focus the commission mandate to problems in institutions and intelligence systems and in information.¹¹⁸⁴ The inquiry should precisely avoid the question of blame and personal responsibility (and avoid the role of individuals while searching for the roots of failure) to avoid a Pearl Harbor-style inquiry aftermath.

Having explained the basic form of the analogy, then, I will show the influence of the analogy on the 9.11 (and WMD) commissions. I will examine the two linked lessons under the headings of unanimity and accountability/blame. Members of the 9.11 Commission, and others, consciously adopted these analogical lessons. The result was a limited and directed set of reforms that consequently shaped the ‘new’ intelligence community birthed in that reform effort. These cases imply that intelligence culture can have a real impact on present policy and practice.

¹¹⁸³ Tierney, "Pearl Harbor in Reverse": Moral Analogies in the Cuban Missile Crisis," p 49-77.

¹¹⁸⁴ Kean and Hamilton, in their account of the commission, use interesting terminology regarding the pursuit of unanimity; it is a growing “sense [of] momentum” for unanimity. They also begin an entire chapter on unanimity of the commission, with the words “Unanimity did not come easily.” Thomas H Kean, Lee H. Hamilton, and Benjamin Rhodes, *Without precedent: The inside story of the 9/11 Commission* (Vintage, 2007) p 290.

Unanimous Commissions

The inquiry into PH, unlike the 9.11 Commission,¹¹⁸⁵ was not a singular event. That lack of a definitive PH Commission resulted in dozens of different PH inquiries over nearly a half century.¹¹⁸⁶ Multiple elements contributed to what I label the ‘fragmentation’ of the PH inquiries. One could also term this a set of iterative, multiple, or repeated investigations. The key feature in a unified or consensus commission is that through unanimity (i.e., no significant public dissention) and by producing a single consensus report, the issue is viewed as settled. Because partisan consensus has been achieved, there is what Tama calls a focal point, around which changes coalesce.¹¹⁸⁷ A respected, bipartisan unanimous report does not leave political capital for others to re-visit the issue, unless new evidence or events occur.¹¹⁸⁸ This does not necessarily mean the commission’s recommendations are adopted, but it makes it much more likely. The opposite case is what I call a fragmented investigation. I will explain the concepts of fragmented versus unanimous investigations; following that, I will extrapolate how the choice of a unanimous investigation affected the inquiry and reform process following 9.11.

A fragmented investigation is characterized by multiple commissions, commissions producing minority reports, or dissentions. Fragmented investigations are re-visited not only for new information, but for political purpose. I contend that PH typifies the fragmented investigation, and this ‘definition of the situation’ and its stakes and consequences (as expected

¹¹⁸⁵ While we usually use the phrase “the 9/11 Commission,” a previous investigation did precede the one that is typically referred to by that singular name.

¹¹⁸⁶ Even as late as 1999/2000 Congress was still ‘working’ on the issue of Kimmell and Short (two of the military commanders responsible for the base at the time) and the events of Pearl Harbor. The New York Times writes that “The latest Pentagon study of Pearl Harbor, conducted in 1995 at the request of Congress, found that fault for the attack went well beyond Admiral Kimmel and General Short and should be “broadly shared.” Philip Shenon, “Senate Clears 2 Pearl Harbor ‘Scapegoats’ *New York Times*, May 26, 1999.

<http://www.nytimes.com/1999/05/26/us/senate-clears-2-pearl-harbor-scapegoats.html>

¹¹⁸⁷ Tama writes on focal points that a commission creates a focal point which is not the exact ‘center’ of a bipartisan compromise. However, if it is credible it alters the landscape/context so that it becomes the organizing point, around which ideas, proposals and bargains are worked out.

¹¹⁸⁸ Kitts, *Presidential Commissions and National Security*, p 9, 165, 174.

by the AE framework) led to the conscious choice to preserve or enforce unanimity, so as to avoid fragmentation. The PH inquiries may not have been identical to the process of the 9.11 Commission, but perfect symmetry is not needed; Khong points out that the ‘superficial’ similarities are actually the most frequently invoked.¹¹⁸⁹ Moreover, as a reverse analogy – in that it specifies parallels to avoid – it does not necessarily detail the causes of fragmentation, only that it be avoided. The analogy to PH suggested that the only similar national tragedy and major intelligence failure resulted in commissions diverging into multiple partial investigations from a plethora of groups, driven especially by victims and families of the military men deemed responsible, and continuing for decades. The PH inquiries’ fragmentation lesson is that this has serious negative consequences – that endless inquiries raise uncomfortable questions for the administration (and sometimes both parties). Whitney, introducing a volume of excerpts of 9.11 Commission staff reports, compares the Roberts Pearl Harbor inquiry, noting, that it “did not put the issues to rest. One of its main shortcomings was that it was not unanimous.”¹¹⁹⁰

This has been proven repeatedly in the history of American intelligence oversight: legitimate investigations into American intelligence frequently find oversight lacking and lapses in legality and ethics.¹¹⁹¹ Thus, the stakes of avoiding a PH-type inquiry might be the entire historical legacy of a president and his administration, should inquiry revelations be damaging enough.

History of the PH Inquiries’ Fragmentation

¹¹⁸⁹ Khong, *Analogies at War*, p 12.

¹¹⁹⁰ Craig R. Whitney, “Introduction,” in *The 9/11 Investigations: Staff Reports of the 9/11 Commission*, eds. Steven Strasser, and Craig R. Whitney (Public Affairs: 2004), p xiv.

¹¹⁹¹ This occurs, usually because of the firefighting pattern, discussed above, whereby intelligence is let to ‘do its own thing’ followed by the discovery of missteps, or errors and overblown investigations which promise new closer management, and then a subsequent relaxing of scrutiny and return to normal; Loch Johnson, “Lawmakers and Spies: Congressional Oversight of Intelligence in the United States.” *Geheimhaltung und Transparenz. Demokratische Kontrolle der Geheimdienste im internationalen Vergleich* (2007): 173-192.

The proliferation of the early investigations into PH in the immediate war and post-war period (on behalf of the Army, Navy, and an independent commission) contributed to nurturing the disputing sides. Axiomatically, there was no definitive commission. Each group produced its own partial reading; hence there was no finality. The anti-Roosevelt opposition, which had until the attack kept America out of the Second World War, found an outlet in PH hearings.¹¹⁹² Blaming the Roosevelt administration for the attack and a ‘back door to war’ conspiracy, they adapted the PH inquiries to air pre-war political grudges. Many still held fast to isolationism, and the decades of America as world policeman were as yet on the horizon. The lack of a single definitive inquiry into PH allowed the use of the hearings to a variety of political ends, and fueled the adoption of the tragedy by the enemies of the administration – and the enemies of the president in particular.¹¹⁹³ I would point out that although this bears a resemblance to the normal use of commissions and the course of politics in Washington,¹¹⁹⁴ a tragedy of this scale and importance has exponential potential to be used to partisan ends. The president who fails to ‘get out in front’ of a PH could have his legacy to history tarnished, and face criticisms long beyond the end of his term(s). Roosevelt is indelibly associated with the ‘backdoor to war’ conspiracy.¹¹⁹⁵

These fragmented commissions were also driven by public attention and what might be called stakeholder pressure. A catastrophe is often seen as incomprehensible and unexpected – before PH many Americans likely had no idea relations with the Japanese were deteriorating

¹¹⁹² Rosenberg, *A Date Which Will Live: Pearl Harbor in American Memory*, p52.

4 ¹¹⁹³ Rosenberg, *A Date Which Will Live: Pearl Harbor in American Memory*, p 51.

¹¹⁹⁴ The history of the PH investigations is the most obvious, repeated, example of this. Neil MacNeil, Richard A. Baker, *The American Senate: An Insider's History* (Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 246. Ashforth also understands Commissions and their elaboration, as a way for institutions themselves to communicate legitimation. Ashforth, “Reckoning Schemes of Legitimation: On Commissions of Inquiry as Power/Knowledge Forms.” Kitts also writes that commissions – both quasi-Presidential and non-Presidentially appointed – are often used for partisan ends by the administration or its enemies. Kitts, *Presidential Commissions and National Security*.

5 ¹¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

diplomatically.¹¹⁹⁶ As a result, the public found the catastrophe inexplicable yet wanted an explanation, a solution, to somehow justify the unjustifiable. Oftentimes, it does not matter what the explanation or solution is, and whether or not it really resolves the situation. The public wants to feel that something has been done, that social order is once again secured, and a return to normality is possible. In the aftermath of 9.11, this was captured when public officials counselled citizens to return to shopping, to McDonald's, to normal life. Americans were told to return to their daily routines or "the terrorists would win."¹¹⁹⁷ Those most deeply affected, which in the case of PH included families and victims of the attack, as well as those deemed responsible in the chain of command, felt the destabilization of their world most deeply. They pushed for further investigations and inquiries, constantly seeking that resolution, to tell them why it had all changed. The power of the families and affected, especially those bearing the stigma of shame in the blame for the event, continued the PH investigations and inquiries and contributed to the fragmentation of the PH investigations.¹¹⁹⁸ It is, literally, a case study "in the politics of heavily politicized investigations."¹¹⁹⁹

These groups had legitimate grievances and reasons to revisit the tragedy, but it was at a great political cost over decades. The lesson of the PH inquiries for future administrations was clear.¹²⁰⁰ No future president could allow a fragmented set of commissions and investigations for a 'similar' national tragedy. To do so would be to knowingly invite partisan groups to use hearings to advance their own political perspectives, and it would also cater to the human desire of the families and victims to revisit the tragedy out of their own grief. Each PH investigation

¹¹⁹⁶ Wirtz cites the *Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack* (1945)'s use of Honolulu newspaper headlines to suggest everyone knew an attack was imminent – but clearly these were not the headlines of the New York Times, or at least little attention was paid to these in light of concerns about Europe, and America's relative high-water isolationism. Wirtz, "Responding to Surprise," p 51/52.

¹¹⁹⁷ David Ropeik, "Risk Communication—An Overlooked Tool in Combating Terrorism," in *Wiley Handbook of Science and Technology for Homeland Security* ed. John G. Voeller (Wiley and Sons, 2008).

¹¹⁹⁸ There are obvious similarities with the 9/11 investigations here, although the results differed.

¹¹⁹⁹ David Kaiser, "Conspiracy or cockup? Pearl Harbor revisited," *Intelligence and National Security* 9, no. 2 (1994): 354-372, p 354.

¹²⁰⁰ Liberals including Joe Lieberman, ironically, called for a "Roberts Commission" (the wartime PH investigation) for 9/11. Joe Lieberman, "Meet the press," *Washington Post*, Oct 21 2001.

had its own agenda and provided evidence for a partial perspective on events, making it difficult to ever close the question of the origins of the intelligence failure at PH. The analogical lesson is that if an administration wants to avoid this, a single definitive inquiry is necessary. This analogy between the PH and 9.11 hearings influenced the course of the PH hearings and the recommended reforms. Again and again, PH is cited as the only precedent for the 9.11 report and investigations.¹²⁰¹

Elements of the Analogy

The obvious parallels of the attacks of PH and 9.11 aside, there are more specific reasons the analogy was made between the commissions. Key factors – victim advocacy groups, political exploitation of the events, and a ‘failed’/dissenting investigation – made 9.11 seem like a potentially fractious commission. What made the identity in the situations: How did PH describe the 9.11 Commission situation? It may seem, given the relatively smooth progress of the 9.11 Commission and its readily accepted recommendations, that it faced no danger of being a PH-like fractious playground of opposing camps. In fact, its authoritative status, given the psychological tendency to hindsight, biases us to assume this was always the case – that there was always going to be a single commission. Tama is at pains to point out commissioners did not see this at the start.¹²⁰² This belies the early history post-attack.

Shenon’s account of the first investigation, the *Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001*, which took place in 2002

¹²⁰¹ Kaiser, "Conspiracy or cockup?", p 354.

¹²⁰² Jordan Tama, *Terrorism and National Security Reform: how commissions can drive change during crises* (New York : Cambridge University Press, 2011), p160.

(prior to the 9.11 Commission), is one of maneuvering.¹²⁰³ This first investigation into the attacks was composed of members of the Senate and House intelligence oversight committees, long-time experts in intelligence. Their effort met with resistance from the administration, including a refusal to release documents and key witnesses to testify. It weathered a series of subsequent odd scandals: the controversy over hiring a CIA officer under counter-intelligence investigation, and the unprecedented use of the FBI to demand polygraphs from sitting senators over a leak of classified testimony.¹²⁰⁴ Finally, the report was marred by a number of “blistering” minority dissents (Tama’s words),¹²⁰⁵ centering on individuals personally responsible for failures leading to the attacks. While this ‘first cut’ at 9.11 could be expected to be rocky, these incidents signaled that – should anyone be in doubt – the 9.11 investigations would be no less a defining political battle than the decades of PH inquiries. The question of responsibility had already surfaced, and while the commission’s rancorous split reduced its ability to advocate for specific reforms – to create a credible focal point, in Tama’s language¹²⁰⁶ – the failings uncovered in their report began to attract notice. Moreover, the administration was under pressure for the controversies surrounding Iraqi WMD intelligence as well.¹²⁰⁷ In fact, it was only after the Joint Inquiry issued their report that the Bush administration ‘reversed position’ and endorsed, rather than blocking, an independent investigation.¹²⁰⁸ Pressure from the 9.11 victims’ families overcame Bush’s assertion that an investigation would be a distraction for national security

¹²⁰³ It was conducted by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. The final report was released December 2002. Philip Shenon, *The Commission: The uncensored history of the 9/11 investigation* (Hachette Books, 2008); *Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence*, Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001: S. Report No. 107-351, H. Report No. 107-792, 107th Cong., 2d sess., December 2002.

¹²⁰⁴ Eleanor Hill, “Joint Inquiry Staff Statement, Part I,” September 18, 2002. https://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_hr/091802hill.html.

¹²⁰⁵ Tama, *Terrorism and National Security Reform*, p 157.

¹²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p 18.

¹²⁰⁷ Glenn Hastedt, “Investigative Oversight of the American Intelligence Community : promise and performance,” in *Commissions of Inquiry and National Security : comparative approaches*, eds. Stuart Farson and Mark Phythian (Santa Barbara, Calif. : Praeger, 2011), p 145.

¹²⁰⁸ Melvin A. Goodman, “9/11: The failure of strategic intelligence,” *Intelligence and National Security* 18, no. 4 (2003): 59-71, p59/60.

professionals. Goodman seems clear that from the outset the Bush administration was resistant to any commission or any serious inquiry and collection of evidence.

What could have spiraled off into decades of controversies, as PH did, would be contained in one definitive commission because of a conscious direction. Kean himself writes (with Hamilton and Rhodes), “Perhaps because the contrast to the current political environment was so stark, everyone noted our bipartisanship and unanimity,”¹²⁰⁹ in a chapter titled “Unanimous: Rolling out a Report.” The Bush administration was opposed to a number of the proposals for intelligence reform that gained support after 9.11, including the Department of Homeland security (DHS) recommendation of the Hart-Rudman report, and the (Director of National Intelligence) DNI proposal of the joint Senate – House 9.11 investigation.¹²¹⁰ Tama recounts that in both cases the Bush administration was forced to reverse its recorded opposition to these reforms, after political opponents and interest groups gathered support for them.¹²¹¹ The public attention to these proposals, and the growing demands of the 9.11 families, gave enormous power to those who could use the attention to political gain.¹²¹² When it became apparent that the Bush administration’s stalling strategy could not foreclose others from adapting these political benefits to their use, or to push through their own reforms, the benefits of an independent commission became greater than the drawback (of possibly identifying Bush administration failures). With one investigation by congressional intelligence experts already having fragmented explosively over reform, the cycle of PH seemed to be rewriting itself: repeated investigations made for political gain. Some in the administration seemed to realize the

¹²⁰⁹ Kean, Hamilton and Rhodes, *Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission*, p 306. Kean heads the chapter: “We file no additional views... We have no dissents...[...]We will instead ...work together in support of the recommendations in this report....” p 290.

¹²¹⁰ Tama, *Terrorism and national security reform*, p 148.

¹²¹¹ Tama, *Terrorism and national security reform*, p 151. This pattern was also repeated with the 9/11 commission recommendations, when they were adopted by then-Democratic Presidential nominee John Kerry, as a way to assail the administration’s strength on national security, during the election campaign, *Ibid* p 165.

¹²¹² Kent M. Bolton, *US National Security and Foreign Policymaking After 9/11: Present at the Re-creation* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007) “Call for New Investigation by 9/11 Families”; p 244-51.

looming season of inquiry, should a definitive commission not be assembled, bore the stamp of the perpetual PH inquiries and conspiracies.

Taking a lesson from the PH inquiry analogy, the obvious way to forestall repeated political adaption of the tragedy would be to direct a single investigation, gathering in all the data at once. It would then have to clearly and unanimously recommend changes to prevent another failure – “a third Pearl Harbor” (as some called it). So the motive behind the 9.11 Commission was not only to ‘deflect blame’ (as will be explored later in this chapter), but was seen as the best solution to end the already-apparent PH-style fragmentation show in the 2002 *Joint Inquiry*. At that point it became clear that the Bush administration was not able to succeed in its earlier strategy of blocking any semi-independent investigation.¹²¹³ By forming a commission that would be cooperated with, respected, independent, authoritative, and unanimous, it would limit and congeal the free-floating public attention, political capital, and media concern, giving that commission incredible power to reform as a by-product. Most importantly, it could secure the Bush administration against the diffusion of the power of the tragedy outwards from its initial centering on George Bush as a “war president.”¹²¹⁴

Finally, we can trace the PH ‘priming’ described above, apparent in the Project for a New American Century (of which key Bush administration officials were members), which wrote in *Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategies, Forces, and Resources For a New Century* (2000): “Further, the process of transformation, even if it brings revolutionary change, is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event – like a new Pearl Harbor.”¹²¹⁵ They

¹²¹³ Charles F Parker and Sander Dekker, “September 11 and Post crisis Investigation: exploring the role and impact of the 9/11 Commission,” in *Governing After Crisis: The Politics of Investigation, Accountability and Learning*, eds. Arjen Boin, Allan McConnell and Paul ‘T Hart, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008) p 266.

¹²¹⁴ Richard C. Eichenberg, Richard J. Stoll, and Matthew Lebo, “War President: The Approval Ratings of George W. Bush,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50, no. 6 (2006): 783-808, p 791/2.

¹²¹⁵ Donald Kagan, and Gary James Schmitt, *Rebuilding America's Defenses: strategy, forces and resources for a new century* (PNAC, 2000).

created association not only of the positive elements that group desired (a warrant for international disarmament and arms control, a dampening of American isolationism, an attack on state terror sponsors, and a world safe for democracy), but also primed the eventual analogy with the negative consequences of the PH inquiries. The analogy would have patterned the administrations' understanding of both the event and its likely consequences. It clearly did, and was referenced in Bush officials' post-9.11 speeches: he "likened September 11 to Pearl Harbor as a challenge to the freedom of the US, and a war that will be won..."¹²¹⁶

Commission Chairs Draw Direct Links to PH Inquiries

An explicit link to the PH hearings was made when the 9.11 Commission members and executive staff were directed to ensure a unanimous, official, bipartisan report to avoid the PH outcome. Thomas Kean, 9.11 Commission Chairman, and Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton wrote,

The 9.11 Commission's leadership (Chairman Thomas Kean, Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton, and Executive Director Philip Zelikow) agreed: "*The Pearl Harbor inquiries were perceived as partisan-intent on finding individuals to blame*, and not looking at the flaws across the government that enabled the attack to take place [...] We would not miss the forest for the trees in the 9.11 story by looking solely for individuals to blame."¹²¹⁷

Compounding the irony, the excess of power/authority that allowed the 9.11 Commission to effectively press for reform, also transformed and pressurized the deliberative process that led to the commission's final report. This is the power of unanimous crisis commissions. To become a definitive commission and avoid PH inquiry fragmentation of investigations into the attack, the 9.11 Commission had to be credible, and to be credible it had

¹²¹⁶ Connor, "9/11 – A New Pearl Harbor?" p 12.

¹²¹⁷ Kean, Hamilton and Rhodes, *Without Precedent*: [emphasis added] p 30.

to be unanimous. “[Unanimity] improves the prospects for the adoption of a commission’s recommendations, but ... the quest for unanimity precludes bold proposals, confers veto power on individual commission members (thus fostering unprincipled compromises)...” making an assessment of the commission’s real conclusions more difficult.¹²¹⁸

In terms of recommendations, this meant that the commission had to issue a report without footnotes or dissents; otherwise, these would fuel the PH fragmentation effect. We know that commissioners did intend to write dissents until they were convinced by deliberation to drop them. At the end, Shenon assesses that “they knew that their own legacies were tied up in the commission and its final report. [...] Unanimity would cement their place in history.”¹²¹⁹ We can theorize how this unanimity was achieved from the generally well known and accepted group decision making and deliberation studies of political science and psychology. Tama’s account, drawn from personal interviews and other research sources, makes it clear that the pressure to unanimity, while beginning with the same unfamiliarity and suspicions of a new group working out its dynamics, was early and constant. The commission chairs, Kean and Hamilton, chose to take the step to act as co-chairs. They also spoke publicly only together, and “facilitated a sense of unity early in the commission’s work”¹²²⁰ An impediment to this consensus, Max Cleveland, was identified and removed early.¹²²¹ Evidently, the pressures to unanimity were exceptionally strong and present at the very early stage. This was a conscious adoption of the lessons of the PH inquiry. Thus the influence of the analogy is direct and open, not an indirect shaping or patterning effect.

¹²¹⁸ Richard A. Posner, *Uncertain Shield: The US Intelligence System in the Throes of Reform*, (Rowman & Littlefield, 2006) p 8.

¹²¹⁹ Tama, *Terrorism and National Security Reform*, 162 citing Shenon (2008) , p 402.

¹²²⁰ Kean, Hamilton and Rhodes, *Without Precedent* 2006.

¹²²¹ Tama, *Terrorism and National Security Reform*, p 161.

Groupthink

Groupthink is not precisely the correct term to describe the pressure on a consensus commission, but it captures the idea of the elimination of unpopular views, the development of a shared language.¹²²² It is possible that the other effects identified in the groupthink concept – the unwillingness to reconsider settled decisions, the difficulty in integrating unusual or contradicting information to existing thoughts – are also applicable.¹²²³ However, in the case of a consensus commission, these actions might not be unwitting, for while greater debate is likely to occur than in a groupthink group, the end result, of forced consensus, is the same. All the same, since the outcomes of enforced unanimity and groupthink are similar, I draw on the groupthink literature to assist in explaining commission unanimity.¹²²⁴ The outcomes of groupthink tend to poor decisions (particularly if the decisions are iterative), the inability to change course once decisions are made (because the group is seen as right); and lack of outside evidence.¹²²⁵

Having established the links of the PH and 9.11 inquiries, not only in the content analysis of intelligence literature, but in the events and the direction of the committee, I will, in the next section, shift to look at the consequences of this direction. My guiding principle is to investigate how the outcome of the 9.11 commissions may have been restricted, filtered, or delimited by the direction to a definitive or unanimous inquiry. The PH inquiry lesson was understood and acted on by the administration. The consequences of this interpretation are what is interesting for intelligence culture. The consequences of this choice might seem slight, but they ripple

¹²²² Posner's *Uncertain Shield* does use the term, citing Cass R. Sunstein's *How Groups Blunder* (University of Chicago Law School, July 2005) in *Uncertain Shield*: p 8.

¹²²³ Groupthink was most famously discussed by Irving Janis in his "Groupthink Among Policy Makers," In *Sanctions for Evil*, ed. Nevitt Sanford and Craig Comstock (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1971), 71-89. He listed a number of 'symptoms' of groupthink, including self-appointed mindguards, the belief that the groups decisions are right, a shared illusion of invulnerability, and the use of jargon to distance from the out-group, distancing from the outgroup, self-censorship, and a kind of enforced unanimity. Groupthink tends to lead to consensus, but its result is that these consensuses are not fully examined, or optimal choices of all considered possibilities.

¹²²⁴ In addition to Janis's case study of the "Tuesday luncheon group" that led to Vietnam, the literature has expanded to include a number of case studies and reviews; James D. Rose, "Diverse perspectives on the Groupthink theory—a literary review," *Emerging Leadership Journeys* 4, no. 1 (2011): 37-57, p 40.

¹²²⁵ Janis, "Groupthink Among Policy Makers," *op. cit.*

throughout the intelligence community through the adoption of the 9.11 reforms. The following section examines these impacts.

Impacts on Policy and Practice

In this section, I explore how this analogy ultimately affected policy and practice, especially in the area intelligence reform. First, the choice of a unanimous commission had (unintended) consequences. Second, the outcome of a ‘definitive approach’ was a shaping of all reform efforts and recommendations. Generally, I theorize that the decision to avoid a PH-style fragmented series of investigations resulted in a particular ‘definitive’ or consensus commission that was essentially required to be unanimous. In the process of achieving consensus or unanimity, the type of report, and reform recommendations it was possible for the commission to recommend were circumscribed. This section will conclude that they were circumscribed in particular ways that may have resulted in poor reforms, shallow theory, and less comprehensive and controversial accounting of the failures of intelligence. Ultimately, the majority reforms, due to the powerful influence of the 9.11 Commission, have been implemented in some way,¹²²⁶ changing the face of the American intelligence community. For good or ill, the Pearl Harbor analogy has had its direct role in the outcome of intelligence reforms.

The Children of Discord: Consequences of Unity

¹²²⁶ Richard F. Grimmett, "9/11 Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status," in *9/11 Commission Recommendations*, ed. John Iseby (NY: Nova Science Publishers, 2008).

The lesson of the PH inquiry seems like common sense: to avoid partisan bias and create consensus. No one is ‘for’ bias, and any benefits of fifty years of PH hearings and investigations may appear dubious or marginal. The unity of purpose of a definitive commission would seem an unalloyed good. However, this ‘good’ is a choice. It is a decision with consequences, positive and negative. While the negative consequences of the PH inquiries seem extreme, the opposite choice, consensus, has its dangers. Unintended consequences are often more important than the original goal. This is apparent in those commissions created to deflect blame; Tama writes that these ironically may generate more reforms – perhaps undesirably – than those commissions seeking to advise on policy.¹²²⁷ Though the motive is to deflect blame, the outcome of the commission is something else entirely. For inquiries, the good of avoiding future Pearl Harbors blinds us to the unintended consequences of the choice. The choice of investigation type shapes the landscape of reform discussions, recommendations, public debate, and even conspiracies and skepticism. Therefore, returning to the theme of the lessons of the PH analogy, the choice to use the lessons of the PH investigations as a model to avoid had necessary consequences for what could be possible from reform. I explicate these intended and unintended consequences, and their influence on reform and intelligence in America in general. To demonstrate the influence of PH, first the differences between ‘unanimous’ and non-unanimous commissions must be stipulated.

TABLE 3.1: Types of Commission Influence

Unanimous Commissions	Fragmented Commissions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Generate a focal point - Seen as bipartisan (if composition is balanced) - Can conduct post-advocacy phase in support of recommendations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Do not generate a focal point - Seen as partisan - Seen as less credible/authoritative - Cannot advocate for single reform slate

¹²²⁷ Tama, *Terrorism and National Security Reform*.

As the PH inquiry legacy prompted the formation of a definitive or unanimous 9.11 Commission,¹²²⁸ the effects of these types of commissions, and how they influence reform, becomes important. What does it mean to be a unanimous, or definitive, crisis commission?¹²²⁹ What kind of influence does this bring? Thus to understand the effect of the 9.11 Commission reforms, we must understand *how (or why) commissions influence*.¹²³⁰ The second key element is how and why unanimous commissions possess *increased* influence. Tama studies commission influence and writes that the most effective ones are the result of a number of factors; influential commissions often have narrow mandates, a small size, quick appointment, some diversity (but not too much), credibility, unanimity in reporting, a smaller number of issued recommendations, and post-report advocacy.¹²³¹ These factors are inter-related; for example, presidentially appointed commissions influence change because they are timely, small, and have medium diversity, making them more likely to be unanimous. Extending Tama's research on commission influence, I theorize that a single definitive commission should produce a different (note: not a *superior*) outcome than multiple sequential partial commissions.

Unanimous Commissions

How are unanimous/definitive commissions different? How does unanimity translate into influence? Unanimous commissions influence by generating focal points (which maybe or not be

¹²²⁸ A commission cannot be definitive while not being unanimous (because a non-unanimous commission report reflects multiple perspectives and so implies two partial views are plausible and not reconcilable) thus I will treat a definitive commission as a unanimous one, under Tama's typology.

¹²²⁹ Zegart does caution that commissions do not hew to ideal types, "Diversity, not uniformity, is the hallmark of the commission universe." Zegart, "Blue Ribbons, and Black Boxes," p 390.

¹²³⁰ Kitts argues that the literature on national-security related commission influence tends to be smaller than that on domestic commissions (partly because earlier commissions tended to be domestic-focused; Kitts, *Presidential Commissions and National Security*, p 9.

¹²³¹ Tama, *Terrorism and National Security Reform*.

‘new’), “proposal[s] or idea[s] around which political debate revolves in a given policy area.”¹²³² Tama argues that these focal points “shape outcomes” by coalescing support. They are attractive in comparison to the status quo in that they create a compromise position between congress and the president, or between the two parties. However, a focal point is just that – a singular point (not multiple ones) around which ideas coalesce. No matter how credible, without unanimity a single focal point is unlikely to be created. Multiple policy proposals divide constituencies around party lines, while single points represent (at least some) compromise. Thus, the recommendations of commissions without unanimity – and hence presenting multiple policy points and not a single focal point – are unlikely to be implemented. A non-unanimous commission, like Hart-Rudman (prior to 9.11), might generate a proposal that later is implemented, but Tama demonstrates in that case it was not that report which prompted change (it was the later 9.11 crisis).¹²³³ A credible and unanimous commission convinces stakeholders it does not simply ‘follow the party line’ (of either the president or parties) and represents a ‘real’ compromise.¹²³⁴ Any other result is seen as partisan.

Unanimous commissions also are superior advocates for their reforms. This usually involves giving interviews, writing articles, appearing as experts, and reaching out to others to promulgate the reform program, as well as a variety of other forms of raising awareness. Unanimous commissions generate more media attention, and more pressure to take their recommendations seriously (particularly if it is a crisis commission). Unanimous commissions are also able to clearly advocate for their single set of recommended reforms, where divided commissions would be obviously divided between recommendations. While the advocacy phase does not happen after every unanimous commission – because many commissioners must return

¹²³² *Ibid*, p18.

¹²³³ *Ibid*, p156.

¹²³⁴ *Ibid*, p 37.

to private lives or other occupations – it can be a critical phase.¹²³⁵ It was influential in the success of the Aspin-Brown and 9.11 Commission, so that recommendations became adopted reforms. This increases their ability to ‘act as policy entrepreneurs’ and not simply rely on others to speak for their proposals.¹²³⁶ *New York Times*’ Richard Posner writes of the ultimately successful “enormous public relations effort that the commission orchestrated to win support for the report.”¹²³⁷ Unanimous commissions that are able to take the step of continuing to operate and advocate have increased success in influencing and creating reforms.

Crisis Commissions

The 9.11 Commission was a unanimous one, but it was also a ‘crisis commission.’ PH and 9.11 were both crises, and Tama’s study shows crisis commissions have much greater influence on reforms adopted than ‘agenda’ commissions (established without a crisis) to direct policy. Keeler writes that crises can remove issues from “normal policymaking.”¹²³⁸ Agenda commissions are typically created to “overcome congressional gridlock” or spark public interest, or bring in new ideas to an issue.¹²³⁹ Crisis commissions are created in response to an event, shock, disaster, or crisis, and are “underappreciated and powerful tools for making public policy.”¹²⁴⁰ Crisis commissions differ from agenda commissions because crises make the status quo unpopular; there is usually both a public and governmental demand for change or reform.¹²⁴¹ Crisis commissions with less broad and more specific and focused recommendations also tend to

¹²³⁵ Ashforth, “Reckoning Schemes,” p 7.

¹²³⁶ Tama, *Terrorism and National Security Reform*, p 39.

¹²³⁷ Richard A. Posner, “The 9/11 Report: A Dissent,” *The New York Times*, August 29, 2004.

¹²³⁸ John Keeler, “Opening the Window for Reform: Mandates, Crises, and Extraordinary Policy-Making,” *Comparative Political Studies* 25, no. 4 (1993), 433-486, p 434. Keeler also notes that the effective nature of ‘extraordinary’ policymaking is linked to the “severity” of the crisis, p 478.

¹²³⁹ Tama, *Terrorism and National Security Reform* p 15,16.

¹²⁴⁰ *Ibid*, p 181.

¹²⁴¹ *Ibid*, p 8.

have more influence (because their efforts are more focused). Narrow commissions' focal-point proposals refer to specific changes in a limited number of areas, and so crystallize support by drawing it towards one point. In general, however, crisis commissions, particularly at the magnitude of PH and 9.11, tend towards what I have called fragmentation (as discussed above). In short, this is because crisis commissions possess great power in relation to the scale and power of the crisis that created them. This power tends to be divisive, for a variety of reasons, resulting in divided commissions – those with minority dissents, or, as with PH, multiple iterative commissions. What I am arguing is that there is a natural tendency to fragmented (not unanimous) commission arising out of crises; thus, when a crisis commission (as in the 9.11 Commission) is unanimous, there is incredible power behind their reform proposals.

Focusing the power of public attention and pressure exponentially, crisis commissions like PH tend to fragment. However, to compress that tendency to fragmentation, in the massive political rewards in adapting the power of the crisis, gives the commission a super credibility. To agree on such an important and politically charged event magnifies all the other credibility effects of unanimous commissions. We might call these 'super-commissions' – in a crisis, or iterative issue, a commission gains an excess credibility from intense public focus. This is a magnified version of the credibility argument. If single 'authoritative' commissions possess credibility, then these definitive crisis commissions gain 'extra' credibility – and hence greater power to focus around reforms and advocate.¹²⁴² This additional power makes it even more important that the work they do results in effective and thoughtful recommendations for reforms. In the case of 9.11, the nature of the commission meant that their proposals were likely to be

¹²⁴² The theory is that any commission needs some credibility to be influential; credibility can be gained from unanimity, but also from independent backgrounds, their separation from the charged political atmosphere of Washington, and their access to information on the subject (although not from 'technical expertise'), and particularly from bipartisanship, and personal stature. Tama, *Terrorism and National Security Reform*, p 32, 33, 40.

translated into policy. Thus, the shape and scope of their recommendations were critical for the future of the intelligence community.

In sum, influential commissions are usually credible and unanimous. The effect of these is a greater power to enact and implement reform. I argue that this composition and unanimity limits and shapes what those reforms would be – it is a filtering of the content of reforms. It structures the output of commissions and, as I will demonstrate, the intelligence reform created by the 9.11 Commission. The effect of unanimity was the greater power of the 9.11 Commissions to effect reform, but it was a reform that was shaped by that very unanimity.

Right Reform?

How does commission type affect the type of reform produced?

Unanimous ‘super-commissions’ are very likely to effect at least some, if not major, reforms. But what are good reforms? While Tama has studied influential commissions, it is exponentially more difficult to determine whether reforms were useful, not just that they were implemented. Given congressional gridlock, perhaps a good outcome is simply one that effects some reform. If good commissions are those that ‘work,’ axiomatic, this is not all they do. Commissions for events like PH and 9.11 are nation altering. Their results shape society, shape perceptions of the event, and shape future understandings of national security and intelligence. Just as wars affect the dominant strategic culture of a military, intelligence failures affect the intelligence culture of the national security apparatus. Because Tama focuses on the output of commissions as measured in terms of adopted reforms, this gives an artificial perspective on the puissance of certain crisis commissions. The irony – that created to deflect blame, they typically produce

more reform – is true.¹²⁴³ However, the critical factor – what those reforms are and what problems they solve or address – cannot be understood by this metric. Tama recognizes this in the last pages of his study, and admittedly it can play no part in his straightforward investigation of which commissions influence. While it is an admirable project in his view, he writes, there is no way ‘objectively’ to judge reforms.¹²⁴⁴ This is true: reforms may take years or decades to receive a ‘verdict of history.’ Some may be apparent early, such as the DHS office in the White House, criticized in less than a year.¹²⁴⁵ Others are amended as they go, as with the 1947 DCI, whose powers were gradually added or changed to make up for perceived weakness or deficiency in the original legislation. Thus it is impractical, if not impossible, to measure the ratio of effectiveness to number of reforms.

Intelligence reform is an industry in America. The status quo in intelligence has been flawed for some time, and so reform ideas proliferate. Moreover, reform theories and approaches are favorite subjects for former practitioners, so that volumes of ‘modest proposals’ have been written on intelligence. In contrast to the volumes of writing, action on intelligence reform is scarce. Seldom can congress overcome the aggregate gravity of the existing agencies and their desire to remain unchanged. Without a precipitating ‘failure’ there are also few political incentives to altering the intelligence system. So when an opportunity for changing the intelligence community arises, it might appear desirable to push through as much change as is possible. However, more reforms are not better. The problem for American intelligence is common to other ‘unique’ institutional set-ups (the UN, the EU), that reforms cannot be ‘tried’ beforehand, and due to institutional inertia it is easier to add new layers rather than eliminate

¹²⁴³ Kitts is sanguine that even “damage control” commissions do not simply “get rid” of issues. *Presidential Commissions & National Security*, p 166/7.

¹²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p 193.

¹²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p 150.

institutions.¹²⁴⁶ This means that finding the right reform, even in the absence of pressure to unanimity, is exceedingly difficult. Perhaps the best, most effective reform could be a casualty of commission consensus. Or the familiar ideas of the past are the only objects of consensus.

Where consensus is *not* enforced, this is not problematic, since dissenters often write minority opinions. Thus we can see which reforms were accepted by the majority, and which caused enough controversy to prompt a minority split. The WMD commission investigation was roundly criticized as a deflection exercise and a waste of time,¹²⁴⁷ yet it produced significant alteration and reforms that were adopted partly through the advocacy of the commission. However, in the case of the 9.11 Commission, where a kind of enforced consensus was virtually required of the commission, I argue this impacted the type, number, and content of reforms the commission was able to recommend. The types of reform that are available to such commissions are naturally limited by the circumstances of their birth.

The deep question for scholarship and policy analysis is: Are these the ‘right’ reforms? My thesis that the PH analogy shaped reform outcomes is demonstrated in two ways: first, when the reform produced is seen to be shaped by the unanimity/blame lessons of analogy; second, when the reform is seen to be inferior because of this shaping/limiting. This dissertation begins this demonstration, in the following brief examination the limitations, structural and imposed, on the 9.11 reforms (in the context of the PH inquiry analogy). Some of these limitations are hypothesized or extrapolated. However, while they are speculative, the idea of the limitations imposed by intelligence culture can be robustly demonstrated through the 9.11 example. Below, I

¹²⁴⁶ Glenn Hastedt, “9/11 Intelligence Reform: An Opportunity Lost,” *American Diplomacy*; Betts, *Enemies of Intelligence*, p 150, and others.

¹²⁴⁷ Thomas Preston, *Pandora's Trap: Presidential Decision Making and Blame Avoidance in Vietnam and Iraq* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2011), p 162.

will first assess restrictions in the types of reforms, and then the restrictions on the specifics (content) of the recommendations themselves.

The 9.11 Commission Reforms

In this section, I explain the specific results of restricted reform that follow from the goal of commission unanimity and avoidance of individual blame (again, to avoid the Kimmel – Short result of decades of hearings on whether they or the administration and the president was responsible for the tragedy). The results might have been the following: a narrowed mandate, restricted ability to explore controversial areas (“the reader decides”); outsider alternative perspectives not brought in; a lack of controversial stakeholders’ perspectives; lack of fuller play for individual insider perspectives; and lack of range of academic perspectives. Not all of these effects would necessarily be felt to the same extent. In general, they capture my contention that a push to consensus ‘waters down’ the content of reforms. I will explore narrowed mandate and narrative closure (“the reader decides”), as well as limits to reform content in the form of the DNI reform. I conclude by asking what effects these had on scholarship and public debate.

Narrowed Mandate and Narrative Closure

The mandate the commission defines as acceptable, and the narrative accounting of crisis events, naturally constrain the resulting reform recommendations, which are presumably based on the accounting of events. Narrowed mandate and narrative closure are both results of the same cause: the need to avoid sensitive and controversial issues and topics in order to preserve

unanimity. Stubbornly protected areas and politically sensitive ones could escape the final consensus. Thus, the 9.11 Commission had the ability to examine a host of areas, but because of the consensus needed, would only have been able to bring forward for the public a more focused number of areas. There is a balance between the power of the commission's credibility and the dissatisfaction with the status quo, allowing them entry and opportunity to change those things normally unmalleable, but they still operate in a political environment. The political pressure on a definitive commission demands greater sacrifices than a more unencumbered crisis commission. We should expect that while the mandate might be broad¹²⁴⁸ (to investigate measures to prevent terrorism), the practical reporting could be limited. The choice to not report on individual failures is perhaps emblematic of the other compromises that may have been made.

Narrowed Mandate

The 9.11 Commission was well-staffed to gather data, with scope to investigate almost any area leading up to and directly after 9.11.¹²⁴⁹ This would qualify as a broad mandate, compared to the narrow avenues of commission investigation (such as one model of fighter jet, or a specific policy proposal). Posner argues, about the 9.11 Commission, that the “insistence on unanimity, like central planning, deprives decision makers of a full range of alternatives.”¹²⁵⁰ An enforced unanimity must limit certain avenues of investigation and recommendation. The commission chose not to investigate the question of personal responsibility or blame. Posner writes that their choice to avoid blame means the commission, “while the narrative portion of the commission's report is a great read and contains a great deal of information [...] is not

¹²⁴⁸ Tama, *Terrorism and National Security Reform*, p 156.

¹²⁴⁹ Hill, “Joint Inquiry Staff Statement.”

¹²⁵⁰ Posner, “The 9/11 Report: A Dissent.”

necessarily a reliable guide to where the principal fault, if there was a fault, in failing to prevent the 9.11 attack lies.”¹²⁵¹ Unrestricted “commissioneering” would lead to the question of blame, and already there were steps in this direction. But it would have led to a better account of fault- and hence, the causes of the intelligence failure.

This narrowing of the commission mandate to avoid blame also caused changes to the post-9.11 intelligence culture. New funding after the attacks allowed most intelligence agencies to hire new analysts ‘in the line.’ One scholar writes that those new analysts brought into the Al-Qaida (ALQ) files following the attack felt a sense that those ‘responsible’ for the analytic failure were being kept on. Conversely, and interestingly, those who risked their careers, personal lives, and personal slur (infamously a group of ALQ alarmists being called the ‘Manson family’) felt they were blamed by those who came in.¹²⁵² These sentiments, the unspoken belief that blame was not apportioned, or that those who failed the system remained in place, could have been ameliorated by the commission.¹²⁵³ Indirectly, the result of these courageous few who dedicated their lives exposing the ALQ threat were exposed to recriminations instead of recognition. Many quit. The commission’s choice to avoid blame helped perpetuate this poisoned environment, where even those who warned about the threat felt blamed. The loss of experienced analysts in any area has repercussions for organizational efficiency and culture, but these will likely be only evident in the future. The end of the Cold War and the move of the ‘old Russia hands is a similar organizational change that may suggest the impact on the intelligence community.

¹²⁵¹ Richard A. Posner, *Preventing Surprise Attacks: Intelligence reform in the wake of 9/11* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), p 8.

¹²⁵² Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower* (Vintage, 2006), p 313.

¹²⁵³ Elizabeth Drew, “Pinning the Blame,” *The New York Review of Books*, Sept 23, 2004, <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2004/sep/23/pinning-the-blame/>.

Narrative Closure

One of the interesting challenges for a crisis commission is to produce an accounting of the crisis events, and, crucially, the causes leading up to the events. The Commission report, as “[t]he product of a search for the truth are stored in the archive...from whence they can be drawn to authorize the writing of history.”¹²⁵⁴ As discussed, commissions can perform a number of functions, from recording the history of an event to providing advice. For a reform commission, the causes of failure follow from the event history. However, a consensus commission must work towards an agreed upon narrative. The experiences and perspectives of individual stakeholder groups – that is, their narratives of the event – must be distilled into a more common general narrative, losing some of the detail and conceptual clarity that is attendant to hearing the participants in their own words. The more controversial of these interpretations will need to be jettisoned for unanimity. The multiple commissions of PH were created to promote and shape partisan (personal) narratives. While this confused some PH issues, for others it brought greater clarity on the perspectives of each stakeholder in the crisis, and more detailed accounts, contributing to the famous 39 volumes of hearing data. Because of the masses of information made available through PH commissions, historians may still be able to fill in further details, and even discover important truths about intelligence (Wohlstetter and Kahn) that a rushed, single inquiry could not. In one way, that is part of the point – certain things may be protected from a single inquiry, where multiple, repeated attempts could perhaps succeed.

A caution: the narrative closure is not a failure to report history, or distortion of facts. Narratives present our understanding of the causes, consequences, and logics of the chain of

¹²⁵⁴ Ashforth, “Reckoning Schemes of Legitimation,” p 9. An extensive literature on “the archive” and the writing of history through its texts exists in Foucaultian and post-modern theory: Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*; Agamben, *Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive* are two key texts in this literature.

historical facts or events. In the end, many accountings must be partial, and hence partisan – we cannot agree, based on the ‘facts,’ how it happened or why. Thus, in the commission’s narrative history of the events, pressure to unanimity would result in narrative closure. Those aspects of the story that cannot be agreed upon must be discluded or sanitized. The effect of narrative closure is not obvious – but unlike the PH inquiries’ constant revisiting and ‘revision’ of historical events – the 9.11 Commission’s narrative closure is unlikely to help future historians, and may cloud reform where the ‘real’ causes of failings are not explored. It may simply be that iterative explorations, in comparison to unanimous commissions, generate greater understandings because of the act of re-viewing the facts and searching to fill gaps. Narrative closure can also be an attitude – that once the facts are established they are not open for discussion – which may be produced by enforced unanimity. Scholars have identified the commission’s narrative account as being unclear, vague on causation, and poorly connected to reform recommendations.¹²⁵⁵

Others have suggested that the reform recommendations do not follow the narrative.¹²⁵⁶ Richard Posner writes in the paper of record, the *Times*, reflecting many critics:

Much more troublesome are the inclusion in the report of recommendations (rather than just investigative findings) and the commissioners’ misplaced, though successful, quest for unanimity. Combining an investigation of the attacks with proposals for preventing future attacks is the same mistake as combining intelligence with policy. The way a problem is described is bound to influence the choice of how to solve it. The commission’s contention that our intelligence structure is unsound predisposed it to blame the structure for the failure to prevent the 9.11 attacks, whether it did or not. And pressure for

¹²⁵⁵ Joshua Rovner, and Austin Long, ‘The Perils of Shallow Theory: Intelligence Reform and the 9/11 Commission’, *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, 18, no. 4 (2005): 609-637.

¹²⁵⁶ Posner, “The 9/11 Report: A Dissent;” Posner writes that the “recommendations that conclude the commission’s report; they come to very little. Even the prose sags, as the reader is treated to a barrage of bromides.”

unanimity encourages just the kind of herd thinking now being blamed for that other recent intelligence failure – the belief that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction.¹²⁵⁷

The reform constraints resulted from the lessons of PH led to the eventual ‘shallow theory’ of the 9.11 Commission (as I will explain in the next section). As explicated, the limited narrative account of events leaves less space and possibility to define and understand the concepts and theories behind recommendations. This tendency is more pronounced because of the effects of a definitive commission. In an academic setting, theoretical understandings are difficult to achieve even among like-minded scholars. Panels with members who operate on ‘common sense’ understanding and experience will likely find it more difficult to even explore their basic assumptions about intelligence, its nature, and the purpose and scope of reform. With time pressures (and the commission by all accounts had too little time), such academic theory may be avoided altogether, with the belief that the events ‘objectively’ dictate reforms. This is reflected in the ‘reader decides’ attitude – the commission report does not explain why or how assumptions are arrived at, as it is not their place to ‘teach’ the recipient of the report.

Additionally, the scope, number, and type of reforms might also be limited by this earlier narrative stage of the commission (shallow theory). Rovner and Long link shallow theory and shallow reform.¹²⁵⁸ Without deep understandings of the sources of failure, or sophisticated concepts, the reforms suggested by these shallow theories will likely not be ideally suited to addressing failures that are multifaceted and complex. The community, with its multiple agencies and hundreds of thousands of personnel, is not a simple system that can be ameliorated through basic ideas; it is tightly coupled and complex, with multiple interactive feedback loops. It is not a

¹²⁵⁷ Posner, “The 9/11 Report: A Dissent.”

¹²⁵⁸ Rovner, and Long, “The perils of shallow theory;” p 609-637.

set of systems that would be amenable to shallow reform without multiple interacting unintended consequences.

Shallow reform may also be a product of the epistemological view embodied in the report. This shallow theory proposition is demonstrated by the ‘reader decides’ statement. It reflects an idea that the world is understood objectively, commonsensically. It reflects an ‘objective,’ behaviorist account of the world. This kind of understanding must underestimate the lack of perfect correspondence between theories modeling assumption of cause and consequence, and the real world run of cause and effect. Theories rarely, if ever, neatly package the social world as a clear demonstration of their assumptions. Typically, correlation, and not causation, is the best that can be hoped to ‘prove.’ As such, an ‘objective’ account of the 9.11 events can never perfectly and objectively suggest the causes and consequences of the problems that occurred. Multiple theories often do good jobs of explaining the same results in the social sciences. Moreover, any account that immediately suggests one, and only one, theoretical assessment of the causes is likely to have been pre-conditioned towards that conclusion. Thus the ‘reader decides’ idea neglects theoretical complexity in the causes and consequences of intelligence failure, and indeed, human and institutionally related social interactions.

The consequence of failing to account for and test different theoretical models of intelligence failure is shallow theory – and existing reforms. That is, reforms are not proposed on the basis that they respond to identified deficiencies leading up to the crisis, but rather that they have been proposed in the past and are agreed to by commissioners. The results are not necessarily bad. But they are not the product of close attention to the events of the crisis, matched with a complex theoretical picture of the world.

Reform Content Limits

The most obvious concession in term of reforms, then, will be a limit in the number and types of reforms that can be agreed upon. In particular, this would hobble any comprehensive reform strategy. In a broad slate of reforms, some will be acceptable to all while a number will be unacceptable to even a few. In enforced unanimity, even those distasteful to only one or a few commissioners would have to be dropped. If dissenters to the whole slate were allowed to defer publicly, this would allow the slate of reforms, but not unanimity, to be preserved. This would be exacerbated in cases such as the 9.11 Commission, with a fixed timeline and less ability to build consensus around all pieces of a forward agenda.

The theoretical understandings that do color the account of the event and its ‘failures,’ as well as the recommended solutions, will then be necessarily ‘safe,’ or in Rovner and Long’s words, shallow.¹²⁵⁹ Only the most basic, even common sense, understandings and conceptualizations will likely be shared. More sophisticated, cutting edge, academic descriptions and theories will likely be avoided. Only those pre-existing shared concepts may survive the general consensus on theory. The result of these tendencies – the inability to present complex stakeholder narratives, the reduction of reflection of outsider perspectives, and eschewing theory and close examination of concepts – will result in safe or shallow theory. Safe theories beget shallow, or at least contradictory or misunderstood, reform. One example of this is the DNI reform, which as a pseudo-copy of the original post-PH DCI reform, shows the many ways ideas of intelligence reform have not moved past Pearl Harbor. The DNI is considered a ‘principal

¹²⁵⁹ Rovner, and Long, "The perils of shallow theory;" p 609-637.

reform' of the 9.11 Commission, and thus a representative example of the limiting of the reforms proposed.¹²⁶⁰

The Director of National Intelligence Reform

One of the most well-known of the 9.11 reforms, the creation of the Director of National Intelligence post (DNI) in many ways is counterintuitive. Patterned on the reform made in PH's aftermath, it was the creation of the Director of Central Intelligence, who also served as head of the CIA. This post was the original attempt at centralization of intelligence, and was both frequently criticized and amended throughout the years.¹²⁶¹ The DCI was often cited for lacking the authority to coordinate the intelligence community. The power of those agencies linked to defense, and the unfixed term of the DCI (serving at the pleasure of the president), meant that the DCI's ability to coordinate depended greatly on the president's personal attitude to intelligence and the CIA, and was often hindered by personality conflicts, lack of trust, lack of experience together, and ideological differences.¹²⁶² The DCI may never have fully achieved what the framers of the PH reforms wanted: a single individual to direct the coordination of the intelligence community. With insufficient authority, the DCI never could live up the ideal, and there was never a solution to the power of the defense agencies. Their budgetary independence, as well as political leanings, have consistently opposed to those of the CIA.

Around the DCI a much greater set of institutions to assist with intelligence policy directions had grown up, such that the DCI cannot be considered a failed reform. However, it

¹²⁶⁰ Richard A. Best, Jr, "9/11 Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status," (Congressional Research Service, December 4, 2006), p 1.

¹²⁶¹ Alfred Cumming, "The Position of Director of National Intelligence: Issues for Congress," (Congressional Research Service, August 12, 2004), p 16, "History of Recommendations to Centralize and Strengthen IC Leadership."

¹²⁶² *Ibid.*

was never clearly a solution to the PH problem. Even had the new DCI been given the authority to do what was originally envisioned in the post, it might not be possible, or advisable, for a single person (also head of the CIA) to force the cooperation of the disparate agencies.¹²⁶³ In short, the DCI was not so much a failure as unable to respond to problems in the intelligence community (sprawl, culture, classification, different missions, turf wars) that could not be avoided merely by the guidance of one coordinator. Other incentives and changes, perhaps to the deep structure of 17 agencies,¹²⁶⁴ would have been necessary.

So given the historic and repeated criticisms, the sometimes strained presidential relationships, and the difficulties over allowing the DCI to function as intended – including the ability of those who did not want to be under DCI authority to block that authority being given legislatively – the DCI model (of a single central coordinator) seems an unlikely choice to reform a ‘failed’ DCI post and lack of centralization. The 9.11 Commission recommended DNI should be seen as essentially a reformed DCI – with an addition layer of management.¹²⁶⁵ Hastedt notes the “The 9/11 Commission was not the first or last to call for a DNI-type figure to sit atop the intelligence community.”¹²⁶⁶ The new DNI does include other changes (such as the link to the new Department of Homeland Security). However, it seems inconceivable that a reform that was never truly successful, and was obviously blocked by entrenched interests, could be the model to reform that same failure.¹²⁶⁷ From one viewpoint, it seems absurd that the (part) cause of a systematic intelligence failure be remedied on the very model that had failed.

¹²⁶³ Warner writes that the post-war administration essentially faced a tradeoff- merge the services of the military into one, or coordinate intelligence. The choice Eisenhower made was to forge a single armed forces, at the expense of intelligence centralization. See Warner, *Central Intelligence Origin and Evolution*.

¹²⁶⁴ According to the DNI, <http://www.dni.gov/index.php/intelligence-community/members-of-the-ic> . These are described in Chapter two, section *Overview: The Current Intelligence Community and Key Concepts*.

¹²⁶⁵ Russell calls this “the Illusion of bureaucratic fixes for all-source fusion problems,” Russell, ‘Achieving All-Source Fusion,’ p 195.

¹²⁶⁶ Hastedt, “Investigative oversight of the American intelligence community,” p 148.

¹²⁶⁷ Thomas E. Copeland, *Fool Me Twice: Intelligence Failure and Mass Casualty Terrorism* (Martinus Nijhoff Pub., 2007), p 255.

The PH/9.11 Commission analogies, and the forced consensus, make this a much more plausible choice. The ‘single centralizer’ reform might be understood, after PH, to have functioned for fifty years in preventing another such attack (until 9.11). Moreover, for the uncooperative, fragmented military intelligence system, which at PH failed to work jointly in the pursuit of intelligence to predict and warn, the DCI post was a successful improvement. Along with the creation of the CIA, it was a step towards centralization. It created a single output to the president, the PDB, coordinated by the DCI – achieving what Truman had wanted in stopping the ‘rain’ of intelligence on him, as each agency attempted to further its own position by a connection to the president.¹²⁶⁸

Most importantly, from the pattern of forced consensus, likely only those ‘known’ and tested reforms would be acceptable to all commissioners. Prior to 9.11, recurring discussion examined solutions to the lack of DCI power, including re-creating the post, adding more authority, a greater mandate, and greater control. Even before 9.11, many assumed the solution was based on the principle that a single-post coordinator was the appropriate model for the American intelligence community. In line with typical thinking on reform, the DCI must just be given more power, a larger staff, and more statutory authority to function. Thus, reforming the DCI to the DNI is a solution based on a tried and true reform, with its genesis in PH. That is, the DNI attempts to fix the centralizer, instead of attempting something new.

The reform’s history, in the 1947 National security act, also gives it plausibility. While true intelligence centralization was traded for the unification of the services, which has worked fairly well, the combined services have generated their own further unification (Goldwater-Nichols) and have been much more coordinated than pre-1947 model. In parallel, reformers

¹²⁶⁸ Michael Warner, “Central Intelligence: Origin and Evolution.”

might hope to achieve this kind of success with intelligence, ignoring the trade-off between military power and civilian intelligence functionality and the orderly nature of military command and communication. The military service structure, however, was more amenable to change because it includes set (and sometime rigid) chains of command, while intelligence.¹²⁶⁹

The DNI: An Old Solution to an Old Problem

The PH/9.11 analogy would have linked the assumed problem to make centralization the natural solution, coordinated through an ‘intelligence czar’ like the DCI.¹²⁷⁰ This solution is particularly appealing because it allows reformers to ignore (to an extent) how the DCI/DNI will then solve coordination issues, and leave it to him to extract the desired final product of coordinated intelligence. In short, it replaces functional coordination with coordinated output, and mistakes the two.¹²⁷¹ The DNI reform seems to originate in the concept of getting the old PH reform right (ignoring the massive political capital and interests opposed to its success) and this would ideally ‘fix’ the system. All that was ever wrong after PH would be righted, and intelligence agencies would happily work together. The proposals to add counter-terror centers seems of a piece with the DNI reform: problems are solved by re-centralizing, adding on new structures, and not addressing the reasons existing structures disincentive cooperation and why warnees suffer from lack of political capital to implement reforms.¹²⁷² The debate over Kentian organization of intelligence into regional ‘desks’ or into ‘centers’ focusing on issues has of course persisted since the founding of the modern American intelligence community – and the

¹²⁶⁹ James Jay Carafano argues fixing the intelligence community is like “herding cats”: James Jay Carafano, “Herding Cats: Understanding Why Government Agencies Don’t Cooperate and How to Fix the Problem,” *Heritage Foundation Lectures*, no 955 (June 15, 2006).

¹²⁷⁰ Turner, *Why Secret Intelligence Fails*, p 149.

¹²⁷¹ Obviously other commission reforms address deeper functional coordination, but this reform embodies a mindset relevant to intelligence culture.

¹²⁷² David Carment & Karen Garner, “Early Warning and Conflict Prevention Problems, Pitfalls and Avenues for Success,” *Canadian Foreign Policy* 6, no. 2 (Winter 1998) 103-121.

cultural domestic/foreign intelligence wall is an additional structural barrier highlighted particularly after 9.11. “There is no perfect organizational structure for intelligence...as all forms...require bridging the inevitable organization divides,”¹²⁷³ yet the addition of new centers upon centers is its own version of simply identifying a problem in terms of the easiest solutions. Unfortunately, this perhaps is the real root of the failure of both PH and 9.11: the ‘turf wars’ between agencies set against one another in the classic battles of bureaucratic politics.¹²⁷⁴ By having to avoid such a costly type of reform (in terms of political capital), it may be that this is the root of intelligence failure and the real reason that agencies do not share and cooperate – and as such, the 9.11 reforms may miss entirely their goals of cooperation, coordination, and sharing.¹²⁷⁵

In terms of the difficulties of fixing or reforming a sprawling, powerful, combative group of agencies as the American intelligence community, the least difficult fix is to alter it as little as possible – leave the fiefdoms of everyone intact. Undoubtedly this contributed to the choice of the DNI reform; however, it seems clear that the conceptualization of this reform as appropriate and a successful (not an unsuccessful or flawed) idea of how to centralize intelligence was drawn from PH and the PH reforms, and reinforced as a plausible reform because it needed to be a ‘tried’ or what I would call an existing reform. The history of proposals for the alteration of the intelligence community is as long as those to end war or reform congress. Perhaps even UN watchers pay more attention to their critics than do the intelligence agencies, in the case of reform ideas. However, despite the plethora of advanced ideas, these are often, if not usually, put forward by experienced former practitioners, or even policymakers, with long experience with

¹²⁷³ George Pettee, Sherman Kent, and others have acknowledged the difficulty of determining the appropriate or optimal organizational form, as do Berkowitz and Goodman, and Hammond; Stephen Marrin, *Improving Intelligence Analysis*, p 55.

¹²⁷⁴ This was always a criticism of the addition of centers; Turner, *Why Secret Intelligence Fails*, p 151.

¹²⁷⁵ They may have greater incentives to preserve their own authority and position, than to give up information and share it – as bureaucratic politics would dictate – even if the result of not sharing is ultimately intelligence failure.

the system and its present functioning. However, as May wrote, few ‘outside’ experts were really considered.¹²⁷⁶ Though the commissioners possessed excellent skills and experience themselves, their proposals, shallow as they are, do not seem to have arisen from a look at best practices¹²⁷⁷ or at key changes proposed in the literature, voluminous as it is, on intelligence reform in America.

The results have been mixed. They are about what one could perhaps predict from a retread of the DCI post, with more management layers. In 2011, the *Washington Post* noted that four men have held the DNI post since its 2005 establishment: “The turnover suggests the difficulties defining the job. Too often, it produced layering and turf battles.”¹²⁷⁸ Even good DNIs find the position untenable, and ‘bad’ candidates may damage the whole system. The article goes on to argue that the third DNI, Dennis Blair, waged a destructive challenge to CIA’s Leon Panetta.¹²⁷⁹

Ideas of Reform

In the future, intelligence culture research may be able to contribute more to this study of the idea of reform – of what is possible (Can individuals be reformed? Can institutions? Systems? Organizational cultures?). Hamilton Bean has already done intelligence culture work in this vein,¹²⁸⁰ and the 9.11 Commission reforms clearly show the impact of not only commission type, but ideas of intelligence, its function, and what counts as ‘fixing’ it. The record of events

¹²⁷⁶ Ernest May, “When Government Writes History: A Memoir of the 9/11 Commission,” *The New Republic* 30, p 30-35.

¹²⁷⁷ Work at benchmarking best practices in other services, as is done in public administration and in the private sector, was not indicated in the report. On benchmarking approaches, A Gunasekaran and Krishan M Gupta, “Benchmarking in Public Administration and Public Policy,” in *Encyclopedia of Public Administration and Public Policy* (Dekker, 2003). This approach does seem to be used in private sector competitive intelligence.

¹²⁷⁸ David Ignatius “The 9/11 Commission’s Unheeded Warning,” *Washington Post*, September 7 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-911-commissions-unheeded-warning/2011/09/06/gIQADepUAK_story.html

¹²⁷⁹ *Ibid* Ignatius.

¹²⁸⁰ Bean, “United States Intelligence Cultures..”

suggests the PH Commission was still stuck on the old idea of reform through centralization/bureaucratization. That classic idea of intelligence reform, obviously drawing much from PH, colors the very idea of the intelligence community and what it does.

Centralization, as another PH inquiry legacy, might in fact be one of the ‘useful’ failures of political systems. Like ‘democracy,’ it may be an ideal never realized in its current institutional arrangement, and even though it does not produce the desired result, is in powerful institutional interests. What counts as ‘reform’ has been a contentious issue for decades in government and for scholars in Intelligence Studies.¹²⁸¹

Secondary Effects of the PH Analogy and Unanimous Commission on Scholarship and Public Debate

The most important influence on American intelligence – as a community, in its practices, and for its future – are the shallow reforms engendered by unanimity that were a consequence of the PH inquiry analogy. However, the choice of a unanimous commission also impacted the public sphere in two ways. If the information from the Pearl Harbor Inquiries is seen as the crucible of the study of intelligence in America, the 9.11 Commission provided fodder for conspiracists, but did not similarly benefit the study of intelligence. The single commission may have also resulted in truncated resources for scholars and reduced critical media assessment of commission output.

¹²⁸¹ CIA veteran Arthur Hulnick is one of the most prolific commentators on reform, including a series following the post 9.11 reforms. Hulnick “U.S. Intelligence Reform: Problems and Prospects,” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 19, no.2 (2006): 302-315; Hulnick, “Does the U.S. Intelligence Community Need a DNI?” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 17, no. 4 (Winter 2004-2005): 710-730; Hulnick, “Intelligence Reform 2007: Fix or Fizzle?” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 20, no. 4 (Winter 2007): 567-582; Hulnick, “Intelligence Reform 2008: Where to from Here?” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 21, no. 4 (Winter 2008-2009): 621-634; Hulnick, *Fixing the Spy Machine: Preparing American Intelligence for the Twenty-First Century*.

Having discussed how the PH inquiries contributed to an openness about intelligence in American intelligence culture, the drawback to a shortened ‘season of inquiry’ is the reverse. In the case of 9.11, there was inevitably a surfeit of public interest, awareness, and scholarship on the subject. This was the case with PH, but to a lesser extent, partly due to the focus on the war after the tragedy itself.¹²⁸² Though the PH inquiries generate partisan debate, they also kept the question of the failure of PH constantly before the public, increasing the information available for scholars. Additionally, each revisiting of the tragedy was an opportunity to reassess. Khan writes that the verdicts of history are uncertain – it wasn’t until 1962 that Wohlstetter’s *Warning and Decision* was published (though it was actually written earlier and held up due to classification issues with publication). Khan argues that now, when we go back to the archives with Wohlstetter’s thesis in hand, we can see now that no indications pointed directly to war or to an attack and no piece specifically pointed to PH.¹²⁸³ These reassessment, in my argument, point to how the inquiries led to re-evaluations of the evidence, and further scholarship on the subject. The repetitions of these inquiries give the space for attention and careful scrutiny of the information that a single outing, no matter how well prepared, cannot offer.

In the public sphere, in a single authoritative commission, the media’s investigative function is reduced. The public’s attention to the specific issues of intelligence failure and commission outcomes is limited. With the ‘definitive’ 9.11 Commission presenting simplified solutions to intelligence problems, a recurring national debate cannot occur (as over the controversies of PH). The 9.11 Commission was naturally subject to media scrutiny, and was an important part of the national discussion on 9.11. However, the authoritative nature of the commission, the unanimity of the recommendations, and the political climate of support for the administration all

¹²⁸² Again, it also predated twenty-four hour news media, and was not on the ‘mainland’ (and thus seen as less important than the international events).

¹²⁸³ Kahn, *The Intelligence Failure Of Pearl Harbour*, p148/9.

contributed to a less critical media acceptance of the commission report and its recommendations.¹²⁸⁴ After 9.11, the media failed to examine national security issues critically because of a climate of fear and the Bush administration's "war presidency."¹²⁸⁵ Multiple commissions would have given the media a basis for comparison, time for close investigations, and critical space to examine reform proposals. Repeated re-examinations of the event might bring forth new interpretations and generate new understandings of the sources of failure.¹²⁸⁶

Competing Explanations

Competing theoretical explanations of the results discussed in this chapter could include the charge that they merely reflect bureaucratic forms at the organizational level. This recalls the discussion in chapter two and three on how bureaucratic politics actually represents another level of the operation of culture, and second that institutions such as bureaucracies are also comprised of "embedded ideas."¹²⁸⁷ Much is happening at the organizational level in intelligence culture, and this level has been characteristic of the existing work in the area. However, these do not lessen the broad impact of such deeply felt symbols as 'Munichs' and Pearl Harbors, which cut across the organization to elites and publics of various kinds. That is, the national aspects of intelligence culture invalidate the idea that these cultures are only the result of bureaucratic form, since they extend far beyond any single one.

¹²⁸⁴ See Posner, "The 9/11 Report: A Dissent," While this is a prominent critique, he notes how the commission worked to avoid a critical media response to the report.

¹²⁸⁵ Editors, "The Times and Iraq," *The New York Times* May 26, 2004.

¹²⁸⁶ Claudia Hillebrand, "The Role of News Media in Intelligence Oversight" *Intelligence and National Security* 27, no. 5 (2012) Special Issue: A Decade of Intelligence Beyond 9/11: Security, Diplomacy and Human Rights.

¹²⁸⁷ See the discussion of this in chapter two.

A competing explanation could contend that the choice to follow the lessons of Pearl Harbor was a ‘rational’ process.¹²⁸⁸ Second, the unified commission choice might also be considered the natural result of institutional learning about the dangers and consequences of fragmented commissions. In institutional learning, it is safe to argue that commission learning, particularly in matters of national security is rarely cultural. Because these commissions rarely involve the same commissioners, and even infrequently the same commission staff, a direct process of institutional learning seems less likely.¹²⁸⁹ Moreover, the link from the mostly military focused commissions on Pearl Harbor stands in contrast to the civilian personnel of the 9.11 Commissions. Additionally, any socialized learning that might have occurred could also be considered as cultural in an intelligence culture model. Finally, the partisan political nature of the American two party system is such that the tendency to fragmentation is larger than any procedural rules or rational choice – because dissent and footnotes tend to be politically necessary and even incentivized because commissioners do not want constituents to think that they wholly endorse all results of commission actions and recommendations.

I have argued that, indirectly, the PH inquiries helped pattern traditions of openness in American intelligence that could have been otherwise. They also nourished two important (albeit unpopular with the intelligence community) groups – skeptics and conspiracists – who maintain a kind of informational or journalistic function in the modern intelligence system. Direct influences from the PH/9.11 analogy include the pressure to a unanimous commission and avoidance of the question of political blame. Based on this analogy, I argued that unanimous

¹²⁸⁸ The rational actor model would contend that a unified commission was the result of a balance of interests based on preferences, which would then result in actors selecting the best or optimal option – in this case, a single commission. However, it seems clear from evidence discussed above, that some commissioners intended to footnote or dissent and were encouraged to abandon this at the last minute; hence the interest model does not seem likely to explain the unified commission choice. Archival records of the 9.11 Commission also seem to validate this; David A Wallace and Lance Stuchell, “Understanding the 9/11 Commission archive: control, access, and the politics of manipulation,” *Archival Science*, 11, no.1-2 (March 2011): 125-168.

¹²⁸⁹ The relatively haphazard investigations into intelligence are discussed in Loch Johnson, “A Shock Theory of Congressional Accountability for Intelligence,” in *Handbook of Intelligence Studies*, ed. Loch Johnson (New York : Routledge, 2007).

(versus fragmented) commissions influence differently, and consequently have different outputs. This resulted in shallow theory and a limited, if unimaginative, set of recommendations for reform -although the case would be equally persuasive if it could be shown that superior reform was shaped by these pressures, the key outcome is that shaping is a consequence of intelligence culture. While it is unfortunate that shallow reform likely resulted- the case for intelligence culture is only that it did have an impact, whether positive or negative. One of these reforms, the Director of National Intelligence proposal, seems to show signs of a Pearl Harbor ‘redux’ thinking, and has never really resulted in the centralization it was supposed to achieve. Finally, the push for a single commission instead of allowing multiple iterative investigations is a detriment to the historical records and understanding of the attack, and provides a much more limited archive for academic scholarship in our lifetimes on the causes and nature of the intelligence failure of 9.11. In these ways – based on the content analysis of selected intelligence sources – I have attempted to show that concepts, derived from intelligence culture, do impact intelligence policy and practice, and particularly shaped the post-9.11 reform efforts. Causally, for Realists, the analogy to PH directed the choice to avoid blame and to a unanimous commission. Constitutively, the patterning effects and conceptions of blame from the PH inquiries also made it so that the policy and reforms chosen were conceived of and made possible through the PH experience and its re-articulated lessons.

Altogether, this chapter shows the importance of intelligence’s national symbol (or analogy in the policy ideas literature) ‘Munich’ – in the form of Pearl Harbor. Even as Pearl Harbor is reinterpreted through 9.11 it asserts its own conceptual power and draw, and has shaped the American intelligence system and intelligence reforms.

In the next chapter (the final one), the conclusion to this thesis, will reiterate the goals of the dissertation, and demonstrate that they have been addressed so as to be evident, in the course of this multi-perspective approach. It also suggests a research program for further work on intelligence culture, given the shifting place of intelligence in statecraft and the overall national security enterprise.

(Conclusion) Pearl Harbor and American Intelligence Culture

Intelligence Studies agrees on the importance of the historiographical question, caricatured as ‘what difference?’ That is, in what has been labeled famously ‘the missing dimension,’¹²⁹⁰ scholars ask what difference intelligence has made to the outcomes of history. As the revelations of Bletchley Park, breaking the enigma machine, and numerous other details of intelligence operations began to be made public, the question seemed to grow in immediacy. Yet this question, as long as intelligence culture is neglected, remains unanswered. Intelligence culture shows ‘what difference; intelligence makes to the present, and in a more comprehensive way. It helps show us how we think about intelligence, how we articulate it affects what it is, and what it can do. This dissertation looked at this via multiple groups, both elites and publics, practitioners and policymakers, to see the intersection of their shared ideas and key intelligence cultural symbols.

In that way, ultimately, the goal of this thesis is first, a better understanding of intelligence and national security policy; second, the development of intelligence culture as a repeatable, theoretically sound approach to comparative and domestic intelligence systems; and third, the genesis of a research program that speaks to both IR and Intelligence Studies. It has argued that intelligence policy and systems, are not, as Realists would have it, the objective response to international conditions (or for Neo-Realists, structural pressures on the state) – as explored in the study of Pearl Harbor in chapter six. Moreover, this dissertation also traced two key persisting streams of intelligence thought, in the Kent-Kendall debate; their countervailing assumptions about knowledge, history, profession and secrecy or objectivity were shown to form

¹²⁹⁰ Christopher M. Andrew, and David Dilks, *The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century* (Macmillan: 1984); Moran and Murphy, “Intelligence Studies Now and Then,” p 2. Now many other authors have used this famous phrasing to suggest “other” missing dimensions (foreign language intelligence, the organization).

a deep epistemological divide and to have continued relevance for intelligence today. We cannot deny the persistence of the ideas crystallized in both Kent and Kendall and the recurrence of ideas of reform, ideas about the importance of secrecy, and the doggedness debates on the relationship of policymakers and intelligence and the like. Just as ideas about doctrine, signaling, war, and peace persist in strategic culture – these ideas of intelligence linger. I have shown clearly that, paraphrasing Snyder, “a set of general beliefs, attitudes, and behavior patterns with regard to ... [intelligence] has achieved a state of semi-permanence that places them on the level of ‘cultural’ rather than mere policy”, based on Snyder’s famous definition of strategic culture.¹²⁹¹

According to that formulation, this thesis has shown the essential persistence of some ideas (or semi-permanence, in Snyder’s phrasing). Essentially, ideas of intelligence do exist. It has shown general beliefs about intelligence proliferate in the form of articulations, definitions, norms, and narratives. There are also important epistemological and ontological assumptions that underlie ideas of intelligence. We find throughout American intelligence, different sets of ideas and attitudes to intelligence behind even the most elementary ideas of what intelligence is, its mission, targets, and policy around how it should go about knowing and acting in the world.

This dissertation also demonstrated intelligence culture’s persisting ideas by showing sets of related, if at points opposing narratives and warrants form a series of interconnected patterns with regards to attitudes to intelligence (from the skeptical to the valedictory). While tracing the general outlines of norms and normative institutions, the dissertation also discussed how norms can and do reflect general beliefs and attitudes, and how we might understand them with relation

¹²⁹¹ Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture*, p 8.

to general ideas and norms from strategic culture theory. This meta-theoretical perspective was concerned with showing how the study of norms can identify these permanent ideas.

Finally, this dissertation showed that, in chapter six, that policy cannot be formed in a vacuum without ideas. Over the long-duree, culture patterns ideas, attitudes, and beliefs, were shown to have a patterning effect in a discussion of openness based on the results of a content analysis. This thesis has also shown that policy itself is formed in the context of historical lessons and analogies, and cultural symbols such as Pearl Harbor shape policy choices, attitudes, and pattern general responses. With the re-articulation of Pearl Harbor in light of 9.11, it has been foremost of the semi-permanent ideas, shared by different groups or in discourse communities. Evidently, this thesis has shown in numerous ways, through multiple lenses, that intelligence cannot be comprehended separately from culture. As discussed, the mere choice of the word ‘intelligence’ itself, rather than equally plausible adjacent terms, shows the inherently cultural nature of even basic choices of language and discourse.

Meta-theory and Multi-perspective Approaches

What characterizes this culture? In truth, there is no single (not always one dominant) intelligence culture. As such, to investigate it, multiple methods and approaches are needed to explore its disparate corners. What the core ideas of American intelligence culture are remains a matter for debate- the areas for future research are suggested below. However, chapter five added to early work, still undone, towards the formalization of an intelligence culture literature. As noted, this approach has emphasized the fourth level in Bean’s typology¹²⁹² of intelligence

¹²⁹² Bean, “United States Intelligence Cultures.”

culture study, taking a meta-theoretical approach towards creating a ‘grammar’ of intelligence culture, rather than assembling an exhaustive, speculative descriptive listing. The dissertation highlighted the need for and possibilities of multiple lenses, in the study of intelligence culture. This dissertation also sought to broaden the theoretical of intelligence culture beyond strategic culture and organizational theory. The theoretical approach of the dissertation was also built on the security imaginary heuristic, with its supposition that a shared imaginary (culture) will be articulated in diverse and contradictory ways. Thus intelligence culture is both a singular product, and a set of threads and fragments of opposing and incommensurable ideas.

This dissertation looked to both key shared cultural symbols, such as Pearl Harbor (capturing the most widely shared ideas of intelligence), and to fragmentation in the form of the Kent-Kendall debate and the multiple narratives of intelligence in both history and popular culture. This theme of unity also emerges in the preservation of openness or skepticism as an element of American intelligence education and investigative apparatuses, and fragmentation in terms of the multiple shared, but sometimes antipodal articulations of Pearl Harbor, 9.11 and the legacy of the Pearl Harbor inquiries for intelligence, found in the content analysis in chapter six. Therefore, while it does not attempt to create a comprehensive account of American intelligence, these multiple lenses and multiple approaches show that intelligence culture exists in many ways and many places.

While American intelligence culture exists, the methodology appropriate to its study is not settled. The core contention of this dissertation is that lists of components of cultural elements are less useful than studies of real concepts and symbols. Additionally, focusing on a single approach to intelligence culture is likely to miss the richness, and multiple strains of intelligence culture. This dissertation has adopted multiple approaches towards outlining

intelligence culture. Listing elements of culture is not the same as describing them; hence chapter five used a number of broad approaches (parsing definitions, norms, warrants, and narratives) to capture different ways of seeing current intelligence culture. Chapter two also discussed extensive lessons drawn from the study of strategic culture, in terms of methods and evidence, sources, the rational actor model and the Gray-Johnston debate, levels of analysis, terminology, keepers or single/multiple cultures and symbolic vs operational cultures.

This dissertation has outlined the past and present of American intelligence culture, to show that it is not epiphenomenal, and adopted an approach that widens the scope of methods used to understand it. Chapter one introduced the idea of intelligence culture, and chronicled both the reasons that intelligence culture must be described in this dissertation in a particular way, and also the ways it can be shown to both exist and be important. Ultimately it justifies the need for the multi-perspective approach of this dissertation. This introduction was continued in chapter two described intelligence culture theory and the need for an improved theoretic basis (using articulation and interpellation courtesy of the security imaginary heuristic). In chapter three, the historical and organizational basis of the current American intelligence community was delimited. Chapter four extended this historical focus to trace a key ‘founding’ debate for modern intelligence, the Kent-Kendall debate, which shows larger epistemological and ontological commitments in intelligence culture. Chapter five then demonstrated that these two cultures still show an impact (but also that they do not represent the totality of intelligence cultures understood plurally as the product of a variety of groups). A series of existing methods of describing intelligence culture were applied to show in brief the different, and understudied aspects of the present American intelligence culture with the caveat that no single method can

fully describe the multiple, conflicting and interacting cultures that make up the global term, ‘intelligence culture.’

Finally, chapter six built a content analysis and study of these contentions, and attempted to answer the challenge that, should intelligence culture exist, it remains epiphenomenal, with no real impact on policy, behavior, or practice. Although this epiphenomenal critique is inherently false since our very linguistic concepts of the world are intersubjectively constructed and actor identity is the background for all ‘decision,’ behavior and policy – it must be demonstrated to the realist and policy focused discipline of Intelligence Studies the acceptability of a constructivist account of intelligence culture. Chapter six showed how one national level aspect, Pearl Harbor, is understood using real current usage of the term – an important step in studying all parts of intelligence culture with added methodological rigor. This usage was linked, following a content analysis, to subsequent direct and indirect patterns in the American intelligence system.

Chapter six yielded what have been called ‘codes’ by Dower around Pearl Harbor, some shared between the general public and elites, and numerous articulations specific to intelligence culture. Pearl Harbor has been invoked in myriad ways (for infamy, intelligence failures of every kind, and for solutions and presumed lessons of all types). The content analysis coded into seven concept categories from two key journals; it found significant results around the Pearl Harbor inquiries, and the results were investigated in greater depth to show both direct and indirect results for the intelligence system and intelligence policy.

The second part of the chapter made a couple of different types of arguments. First, the discussion of indirect effects showed that, counterfactually, while secrecy is important in the American system, openness has also had an impact, and in part results from a patterning

influence from the PH inquiries. The chapter then focused on what might be called direct effects. These are directed at a Realist audience that challenges, not the existence of intelligence culture, but that it has no ‘real’ or important effects on policy. The discussion argued that through the analogy to Pearl Harbor, the 9.11 inquiries were directed away from personal blame, and towards a unanimous commission report. These consequences were important because in turn, they caused a number of secondary effects such as narrowed mandate, narrative closure, and allowed for only ‘shallow’ reform. This is the causal argument about the effect of PH as a cultural symbol on policy and reform outcomes. Additionally, the constitutive argument is that even if a direct analogy-outcome link is not made, the reform and commission choices were made in the context of the history of the Pearl Harbor investigations (which continue to the present-day) and therefore shaped the very framework in which policy and reform choice was made. The ‘DNI’ reform was characteristic of these PH shaped, limited scope, and blame-avoidant reforms.

This chapter, the conclusion, returns to the broader question of the future of intelligence culture research and intelligence culture in general. I have argued throughout this thesis that further research in intelligence culture can be fruitful in a number of areas, and is necessary to help Intelligence Studies deepen its research program. As intelligence’s place in statecraft shifts, our old ideas and debates – our intelligence cultures – will be challenged and shift as we continue to create the post-9.11 world. In the future, scholarship will demonstrate that intelligence culture theory will be a useful tool in the new information-centric and intelligence oriented practice of security.

The theoretical background for intelligence culture theory is drawn largely from strategic culture, as a model of similar multi-level studies, and from managerial-focused literatures in the organizational culture aspect of intelligence culture (as discussed in Bean's typology).¹²⁹³ The lessons from strategic culture particularly pointed to the need for a more holistic view of culture and behavior – the faults of the Grey-Johnston debate over whether culture is context or whether it should be used to predict future behavior showed the possible flawed conceptions of strategic culture theory that should be rejected. Strategic studies, at the outset, was also at odds with similarly ideational theory, and the debate shows the need for careful attention to theory and methods in the study of intelligence culture. Strategic culture also shows the danger of assuming the evident nature of sources and their purported relevance, as well as the problems using norms without understanding that they can be strong, weak, contradictory and violated. Additionally, issues in using evidence, such as those surrounding studies of single key or 'classic' texts, and single methods, was noted. Some of the most important points were that the separation of 'levels' can be useful, but is ultimately more about having precise terminology, than trying to maintain separation (since levels are an analytical construct which can be problematic). Finally, the key and interrelated questions of who 'carries' or stewards culture, how it changes, where it is dominant or effective, and whether it is at times rhetorical and not 'operational' pointed, in this dissertation, to the need for a more sophisticated interpretation of the process of 'writing' to and from culture, and the role of different actors. As such, the security imaginary heuristic's idea of multiple articulations by different groups, with at times, opposing or contradictory meanings generated from the same cultural and linguistic shared resources, show that no single person or group 'holds' culture. Additionally, the understanding of articulation is joined to a more salient concept of multiple overlapping identities in articulation, where it becomes clear that

¹²⁹³ Bean, "United States Intelligence Cultures."

intelligence, and hence intelligence culture, is implicated in the representational mapping of the world that takes place from both elites and publics.

The Future of Intelligence Culture

Foreign policy theorists suggest great tectonic changes in the background ideas of foreign policy (variously, called zeitgeist, ideology, paradigms, or ideological orders)¹²⁹⁴ may radically change the environment for foreign policymaking. In intelligence culture, arguable, PH marked a new era, but one whose birthing had already been in progress. PH became the marker for the beginning of a peacetime intelligence community, for the beginning of the 'industrial' intelligence machine, and the struggle for centralized intelligence. These changes were not only choices made by the state, internally; the world also had changed around American intelligence, and the burgeoning superpower recognized that a modern intelligence system was an implicit requirement for global power. Moreover, the technology by which American spies surveilled in past wars – hot air balloons, and coded messages by fife in the civil war – had rapidly advanced.

Similarly, in many ways 9.11 was the inauguration of a new intelligence era. It too marks the beginning of a new era, one, as with PH, with roots in the past decades. It inaugurated new practices, but also reflected the culmination of changes in-progress. The immediate result of the attacks was the re-evaluation of the intelligence needs of the state and the intelligence system as a whole. Like PH, these changes crystallized new practices, and new ways of thinking about intelligence. The denigration of collection of non-secret information has vastly changed in a few short years, in part due to post-9.11 concerns about terrorism, in addition to changing

¹²⁹⁴ See *Ideas and Politics in Social Science Research*, eds. Daniel Beland and Robert Henry Cox (Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2011).

information technologies. 9.11 has also bent or broken part of the historic division between foreign intelligence and domestic law enforcement (as discussed in chapter five, at one time a backbone definition of intelligence).

In this new intelligence era, the place of intelligence, state sovereignty, and the information-gathering bureaucracies of the state have all been fundamentally altered. If the ‘industrialization’ or bureaucratization was what characterized the birth of modern intelligence at Pearl Harbor, then the bureaucratic, institutional, and technological changes following 9.11 surely demand no less attention. At the end of the Cold War, the American intelligence bureaucracies complained of ‘drinking from the firehose’ of information. The post-9.11 intelligence bureaucracies essence is now information and communications, not secrets or sources. Their characteristics form is less the apparatus with which to know the world, in place of a consuming surveillant of the citizens and the state itself. Epistemologically, the search for facts, and the Kantian pyramid of understanding, with a ticker-tape world, reeling out from under it, is hollow. A new world of unknowns and shadows menaces America, undermined by the uncertainty of terror threats and the indistinguishability of the ‘normal’ citizen actor from the abnormal. In practice, this has meant changes to collection, and a proliferation of ‘centers’ over the old regional organization. The problem is no longer seeking information, but which information, about what, and when it is applicable.

Cultural theory may be one way to speculate about the new place of intelligence in statecraft, which will ultimately alter intelligence culture. Looking to the future of American intelligence culture, scholarship must account for these radical changes, which will continue to shape the development of intelligence. If PH represented an ever-present yet unfulfilled aim of perfect prediction and perfect security- the new intelligence culture, may turn these out. The new

intelligence era may shatter the worn antipodes of present binaries (foreign/domestic, current intelligence and strategic prediction, HUMINT/TECHINT, and so on).

A Program for Future Research

The beginning of a research program towards the future of intelligence culture requires a more comprehensive understanding of the state, the bureaucracies of information, and the military/ diplomacy/ intelligence divide. This can be best achieved through interdisciplinary work on intelligence, both in and outside of Intelligence Studies.

I suggest a number of avenues for a future intelligence culture research program. Intelligence culture can form the locus of a research program integrating disparate disciplinary scholarship from a number of fields. In this way, intelligence culture can develop concrete methodologies, definitions, and models for a variety of forms of cultural research relating to intelligence. Moreover, if intelligence culture, organizational culture, democratization or SSR (security sector reform), national culture, national approaches, comparative intelligence and intelligence systems, and public intelligence cultures are seen to be part of a continuum of research- innovation and evidence from one area can be more easily transmitted to diverse scholars. In Gill and Phythian's 'map' for intelligence theorizing, different aspects of intelligence culture can be seen to span all areas.¹²⁹⁵

I have outlined a description of intelligence culture which is far more expansive than that used by individual scholars in Intelligence Studies. However, I think it can form a valuable research program for intelligence, with possibilities suggested for future extended research.

¹²⁹⁵ Gill and Phythian, *Intelligence in an Insecure World*, p 37.

Work should continue at all levels of intelligence culture study, from the societal, through the elite, organizational, doctrinal, and issue specific levels.

First, existing work, such as that on cultures of secrecy¹²⁹⁶ should be continued. Further, to integrate more deeply with strategic culture work, investigations of the interconnections and contributions of intelligence culture to strategic culture at its various levels should be expanded. Second, the level of doctrine provides an interesting avenue in intelligence - there are some intelligence ‘doctrine’ or mission studies, such as Rudner’s “Hunters and Gatherers”¹²⁹⁷ and Gills’ “Securing the Globe: Intelligence and the Post-9/11 Shift from ‘Liddism’ to ‘Drainism.’”¹²⁹⁸ However, this research could be brought together with strategic culture work and grand strategy theory. Such intelligence doctrine studies might come to assist in public policy debates. The moral outrage over intelligence use of drones in ‘assassination’ as detractors call it, could benefit from a serious examination as to whether this is an appropriate intelligence method to further American strategy and interests. Clearly there are cultural reasons this method, as covert action before it, has engendered the belief that it is illegal and those who carry it out contravene international law.

Intelligence culture work could also add a new perspective on the reasons for the ‘lack of cultural/language/expert knowledge’ issue in intelligence. This is partly a structural problem, in that those persons with significant ‘native’ experience with a critical country and language for US national security purposes are also likely to be harder to obtain security clearance for, and may not have as much interest in national security employment in American bureaucracy. Intelligence education strategies may be changing slowly this, but the demographic aspect, that is, the rarity of ‘secure’ native speakers, still exists. However, insularity is a cultural orientation,

¹²⁹⁶ For example, in Berkowitz and Goodman, *Best Truth*.

¹²⁹⁷ Rudner, “Hunters and Gatherers:” p 193-230.

¹²⁹⁸ Gill, “Securing the Globe:” p 467-489.

and it might be possible to utilize scholarship on the nature and sources of American isolationism historically and in the present, to revisit tired debates on culturally broadening intelligence professionals and their education.

Fourth, the study of reform itself is often mired in decades old debates. American patterns of responses to scandals, the ‘firefighting model’ and others have been put forward, but perhaps it is time to examine as a whole the American culture of intelligence reform (as Bean sees it, a particular understanding of culture and discourses of accountability authorizes particular types of reform).¹²⁹⁹ Chapter six, on Pearl Harbor, demonstrates the impact intelligence culture can and does have on reform.

Finally, in the democratization of intelligence literature, national and civilizational intelligence culture work (such as Bozeman’s)¹³⁰⁰ might point to how intelligence must be situated in broader civilizational cultures (and perhaps colonial heritage and experience with communist models). The intelligence system, Bozeman argues, should be organic to the ‘home norms’ of the state, and so it could be useful to examine how to adapt intelligence institutions in democratizing countries to better fit their existing normative structures. Additionally, this leads to the scholars who have argued that (US) intelligence has resisted new ideas, and culture as a whole after the Cold War.¹³⁰¹ Intelligence culture research could form models of the ‘plasticity’ or adaptiveness of intelligence systems to new ideas and cultures, applicable to both new and established intelligence systems. This work would extend into comparative Intelligence Studies, with the possible axes of domestic, and internationally shared intelligence norms. Additionally, each fact of American intelligence culture, from its ‘norms’ around secrecy, to the warrant of the

¹²⁹⁹ Bean, "Organizational Culture and US Intelligence Affairs:" p 479-498.

¹³⁰⁰ Bozeman, "Introduction."

¹³⁰¹ Zegart, "Cloaks, Daggers, and Ivory Towers."

constitution, could be investigated in a historical case study, or cultural ethnography. Some of this work is beginning to be done, but much remains.

Finally, while work using the term ‘intelligence culture’ explicitly is relatively recent, studies that touch on the cultural aspects of intelligence, from cultures of analysis, to national approaches in assessment¹³⁰² and patterned responses of reform and oversight, to the cultural nature of cooperation, exist throughout Intelligence Studies. Utilizing intelligence culture as an overarching framework for a research program which can connect these elements, will allow studies in these areas to benefit from the lessons and the problems encountered by strategic culture studies. Exciting work on the democratization of intelligence cultures, and the possibilities for reforming organizational cultures, are likely to continue. Adopting a sound, standard theoretical framework will result in more rigorous study, and increase the interconnection of scholars working in sometimes disparate areas on intelligence. Finally, only through fully integrating intelligence theoretically into International Relations, can that field reflect accurately the future of security and the practices surrounding the security institutions that matter most in an information society. Additional theoretical turns in IR, such as the feminist study of international relations emphasizing lived experience and grounded theory, as well as the hidden reality of international power relations, could be useful. Moreover, constructivism itself has advanced in IR theory, and the material turn to material practices, architectures, and technologies may be a way to advance beyond the focus on ideas in intelligence culture.

Rhetoric and Culture

One key focus of this dissertation was to address the challenge that culture is rhetorical. As discussed on chapter two, on symbolic versus operational cultures, the contention of some

¹³⁰² May, *Knowing One's Enemies*.

critics is that actors use cultural symbols to justify their actions to various publics, but these concepts play no real part in decision-making. This dissertation shows, by way of a content analysis and study of Pearl Harbor, that culture is not only invoked in policy decisions, but that it patterns the contexts in which the decisions are made, it makes plausible certain options and discourages others. In the case of Pearl Harbor, the analogy to 9.11 was taken seriously as a conceptual articulation through which to understand the consequences of the investigations into the attack. In the overarching culture, the inquiries also patterned an expectation of openness and tradition of intelligence education, which had a role in the demand for reform, and the expected tradition of openness in America. Thus, while opponents can claim the Pearl Harbor analogy was rhetorical, the integration of its lessons and the expectation of the course of events had a clear impact on reform direction. The choice to avoid personal blame, and to a unanimous report would have seemed unnecessary and unimportant in the absence of the lessons of the Pearl Harbor / 9.11 analogy. Evidently if the American intelligence system, and specific policy choices and reform slates are shaped by the symbol of Pearl Harbor, then the challenge of showing that intelligence culture affects outcomes, has been met by this thesis. This thesis has shown in many different ways the influence of persisting ideas from intelligence culture, so that the cultural aspects of intelligence become hard to dismiss as merely ‘rhetorical’.

In the pursuit of the development of further knowledge around the American intelligence system, security policy, and intelligence culture, there are numerous avenues for further research. This dissertation has attempted to bring a selection of lenses for this research together, while refining the theoretical basis of intelligence culture study, and demonstrating that ideas of intelligence do persist, and do have an impact in different ways.

Appendix AA

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