1 3
OF/DE

26599

National Library
of CanadaBibliothèque nationale
du CanadaCANADIAN THESES
ON MICROFICHETHÈSES CANADIENNES
SUR MICROFICHE

NAME OF AUTHOR/NOM DE L'AUTEUR Erith Edmund Haberer

TITLE OF THESIS/TITRE DE LA THÈSE THE Intellectual Evolution of G.V. Plekhanov from Populism
to Marxism

UNIVERSITY/UNIVERSITÉ Carleton University

DEGREE FOR WHICH THESIS WAS PRESENTED/
GRADE POUR LEQUEL CETTE THÈSE FUT PRÉSENTÉE M.A.

YEAR THIS DEGREE CONFERRED/ANNÉE D'OBTENTION DE CE DEGRÉ 1976

NAME OF SUPERVISOR/NOM DU DIRECTEUR DE THÈSE R. Carter Elwood

Permission is hereby granted to the NATIONAL LIBRARY OF
CANADA to microfilm this thesis and to lend or sell copies
of the film.

*L'autorisation est, par la présente, accordée à la BIBLIOTHÈ-
QUE NATIONALE DU CANADA de microfilmer cette thèse et
de prêter ou de vendre des exemplaires du film.*

The author reserves other publication rights, and neither the
thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or other-
wise reproduced without the author's written permission.

*L'auteur se réserve les autres droits de publication; ni la
thèse ni de longs extraits de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés
ou autrement reproduits sans l'autorisation écrite de l'auteur.*

DATED/DATE 31 January 1976 SIGNED/SIGNÉ [Signature]

PERMANENT ADDRESS/RÉSIDENCE FIXE _____

INFORMATION TO USERS

THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN
MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED

This copy was produced from a microfiche copy of the original document. The quality of the copy is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as received.

Canadian Theses Division
Cataloguing Branch
National Library of Canada
Ottawa, Canada K1A 0N4

AVIS AUX USAGERS

LA THESE A ETE MICROFILMEE
TELLE QUE NOUS L'AVONS RECUE

Cette copie a été faite à partir d'une microfiche du document original. La qualité de la copie dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise pour le microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

NOTA BENE: La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer. Microfilmée telle que nous l'avons reçue.

Division des thèses canadiennes
Direction du catalogage
Bibliothèque nationale du Canada
Ottawa, Canada K1A 0N4

THE INTELLECTUAL EVOLUTION OF G.V. PLEKHANOV
FROM POPULISM TO MARXISM

by

Erich Haberer, B.A.

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
in Soviet and East European Studies

Institute of Soviet and East European Studies
Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
January, 1976

© Erich Haberer 1976

The undersigned hereby recommend to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies and Research acceptance of this thesis, submitted by
Erich Edmund Forster-Haberer, in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts.

Carl H. MacMillan

Carl H. MacMillan, Director,
Institute of Soviet and East European Studies

R. Carter Elwood

R. Carter Elwood, Supervisor

Carleton University

April 28, 1976

ABSTRACT

This thesis attempts to interpret Plekhanov's conversion to Marxism from the point of view of his psychological and intellectual disposition. Taking such an approach, the present study illustrates that the main reason for Plekhanov's transition from Populism to Marxism can be found in his striving for a foolproof formula of revolution.

An extensive analysis of Plekhanov's formative years serves to identify those basic psychological features which conditioned his way of thinking and intellectual evolution towards a revolutionary calling. This is followed by a discussion illustrating the nature of his acceptance and understanding of Populist ideology in light of his psychological make-up. Having revealed the subjective sources of Plekhanov's Weltanschauung, the paper then concentrates on how Plekhanov coped with objective political and socio-economic circumstances challenging his Populist revolutionary theory and practice. By analyzing his response to these challenges, the thesis deals with the inner logic of Plekhanov's conversion. It is suggested that Plekhanov became a Marxist primarily as a result of those psychological and intellectual characteristics which had previously shaped his revolutionary world view.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE

INTRODUCTION	1
------------------------	---

CHAPTER

I. THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF PLEKHANOV'S LIFE IN PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE	18
II. PLEKHANOV'S IDEA OF NARODNICHESTVO	39
(a) A Scientific Conception of Populism	40
(b) The Plekhanovite System	53
III. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHALLENGES	79
(a) Political Challenge	81
(b) Economic Challenge	103
IV. THE 'CONVERSION' OF A BELIEVER	127
CONCLUSION	156
NOTES	1
BIBLIOGRAPHY	xx

Социал-демократ, как нельзя более
боится попасть в изолированное,
а потому ложное положение, при
котором голос его перестал бы
доходить до массы пролетариата
и оказался бы голосом вопиющего
в пустыне.

Г.В. Плеханов

PREFACE

Having had the opportunity to do research at the archive of the Leningrad Public Library, Dom Plekhanova, I was able to base a substantial part of my discussion of Plekhanov's formative years and his activity as a Populist on unpublished manuscript holdings. For the rest, I relied primarily on Plekhanov's collected works published during 1923-27. Another valuable source of information proved to be the six volume journal Gruppa Osvobozhdenie Truda edited by L.G. Deich.

For translations from these sources I am solely responsible. Although in some instances I relied on already translated material, I took the liberty of revision whenever I considered it necessary. As to the scheme of transliteration, I opted for the one used by the Library of Congress with the usual practice of dropping the soft-sign in proper names.

Before closing this prefatory note, I would like to express my gratitude to the staff of Dom Plekhanova and, particularly, to its director I.N. Kurbatova who encouraged the writing of this thesis and provided me with many valuable suggestions. Further, I am grateful to the Carleton Institute of Soviet and East European Studies for having provided me with a Paterson Fellowship and the opportunity of study and research in Leningrad. Last, but not least, I wish to thank Professor R.C. Elwood for all his advice and patience in supervising this paper.

INTRODUCTION

On October 12, 1868, Karl Marx, in a letter to Ludwig Kugelmann referred to "dem guten Stand der Dinge": namely, to the news from St. Petersburg that Das Kapital was now in print in Russian translation.¹ It was, indeed, one of the "ironies of fate," as Marx wrote in the same letter, that the Russians whom he had fought for twenty-five years had always been his "well-wishers":

In Paris in 1843-44, the Russian aristocrats bore me on their shoulders. My writings against Proudhon (1847) [Poverty of Philosophy] and the work published by Dunker (1859) [A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy] have nowhere found a greater sale than in Russia. And the first foreign country to translate Capital is Russia.²

Thus already in the 1840's Marx was known and admired by members of the Russian intelligentsia.³ At first, Marx came to the attention of men like P. Annenkov, V. Botkin, V. Belinsky, A. Herzen and M. Bakunin through their interest in Ludwig Feuerbach and left Hegelianism. Undoubtedly, their appreciation of Marx was partly conditioned by their already developed anti-capitalist outlook which they had acquired mainly from reading St. Simon, Fourier and other socialist writers.⁴ Yet, although Marx had come to the attention of some of the outstanding representatives of the Russian

intelligentsia of the 1840's, his impact on Russian thought in this period was insignificant. In the words of D.B. Riazanov, Marx's influence

remained on purely individual level and crystalized only on occasions that were quite accidental. It left no definite traces upon the further development of Russian social thought.... The acquaintance of the people of the forties with Marx constitutes only an interesting episode in the history of 'Western influence in Russian literature.'⁵

In the following two decades Russian interest in Marx did not increase substantially. His works were known only to a small number of Russian intellectuals and his name carried, as yet, little authority within the Russian intellectual-revolutionary milieu. It was only in the late 1860's and early 1870's, i.e., with the publication of Capital and its translation into Russian, that the name of Marx gained popularity among the Russian intelligentsia and subsequently became inseparably linked with Russian revolutionary history.⁶

It is surprising that Capital should have passed the barrier of imperial censorship, for in 1872 the censors had prohibited the importation and circulation of all works by Marx and Engels. The reason why Capital proved to be an exception was that the official reader of the Central Committee of Censorship of Foreign Publications characterized it as a "difficult, inaccessible, and strictly scientific work." The official readers of the translated version of Capital advocated its release on similar grounds. The book, it was thought, had no applicability to Russia. Completely

unaware of the revolutionary dynamic stored in Capital, one official reader reported: "It can be confidently stated that in Russia few will read it and even fewer will understand it."⁷

In a sense, the latter assertion was correct in that only a few indeed did comprehend Capital in its totality. But they were completely wrong in assuming that few would ever read it. In fact, the censor's miscalculation was striking. Within six weeks of the publication date, nine hundred out of three thousand copies had been sold. And, according to Marx, within a year the Russian edition was almost sold out and had won quick acclaim in Russia.⁸

Timing was propitious for there was a growing awareness among intellectuals and academicians of Russia's economic destiny and the prospects of capitalist industrialization. For example, one review noted in 1872: "Now when the economic life of our Fatherland is being re-examined, the significance of this work is especially great not only for the students of economic literature but also for every educated Russian." And of Marx's achievement in describing and exposing the social evil of capitalism, the same review states: "If one adds...the impartiality and equanimity with which the author of Capital carried out all of his many-sided investigation of the social 'ulcer' (pauperization), one may without exaggeration consider Marx as the first scholar to give a strictly scientific basis to the struggle against Capitalism."⁹

This brings forth those aspects which made Capital so attractive to many Russian readers: namely, its "strictly scientific basis" and its anti-capitalist theme which, by implication, was anti-bourgeois and anti-Western.

Capital could not have made a more timely arrival on the Russian scene. Its subject matter and manner of presentation made it an extremely popular book during the 1870's. Passages were taken from it to support this or that view. Conservatives could point to it as a classic description of what happens if liberalism and the principles of laissez-faire were given free rein; liberals could point at the inevitability of capitalist development and the necessity of reforms; and Populists, who were mainly responsible for popularizing Marx's writings, cited Marx to expose the evils and cruelty of capitalism and argued against a capitalist destiny for Russia.¹⁰

It was on the Populists that Capital exerted its greatest influence. As the Russian variant of socialism, Populism found in Capital precisely those themes which preoccupied its foremost representatives. For them Marx's analysis was irresistibly convincing in its scientific exposition of a phenomenon in response to which the generation of Herzen had laid the foundation of classical Populism.¹¹ Capital specified and demonstrated to them the source and foundation of that evil, philistine, bourgeois social order which, since the days of Herzen's polemics against it, contradicted their sense of justice and morality.

The Populists embraced Marx's 'scientifically' supported moralistic standpoint which provided a 'scientific underpinning' for their own moral and ethical beliefs. Marx's work was like a storehouse from which the Populists took what they required to build up and reinforce their conception about society, economics and politics. The Marxian analysis of the division of labour as the source of all evil was accepted in the sense of proving that the so-called social progress was in fact retrogressive from the point of view of the development of the individual. The 'scientific' explanation of the exploitation of the proletariat via the labour theory of value, and its corollary, the notion of surplus value, was understood as a scientific statement and accepted as a scientific gadget to Populist ethical ideals. And, finally, Marx's thesis that the "political superstructure" always served the interest of the ruling class and his constant criticism of 'formal' bourgeois democracy was interpreted as an argument for the Populists' priority of socio-economic change over political change.

Yet, while readily accepting and assimilating some of the elements of the Marxian doctrine into their own world view, the Populists either ignored or simply did not understand the historico-dialectical dimension of Capital. Failing to place Marx's analysis within the framework of the dialectical laws of history, they arrived at a non-Marxian acceptance of Marx: the division of labour was viewed as retrogressive

rather than progressive; the capitalist mode of production was interpreted formally (as leading to degradation of humanity) rather than dialectically (as leading to the inevitable victory of socialism); and the political achievements of the bourgeoisie were conceived as illusory rather than as real improvements over earlier political systems. Hence, disregarding Marxian dialectics, the Populists based their interpretation of Capital upon, as one writer expressed it, "an absolutization of the 'negative side'". of Marx's analysis of capitalism.¹² Consequently, unlike Marx, they found nothing progressive or positive about capitalism and its development.

This peculiar reception of Capital shows the extent and limits of Marx's influence upon Populism. As such, Marxism did not change the face of Populist ideology, nor impose on it a new world view. But it provided the Populists with new ways of looking at capitalism and, consequently, increased their passion of forging a special path for Russia, allowing her to by-pass the 'retrogressive' capitalist stage of development. Marx's Capital had demonstrated to them once and for all the undesirability of capitalist industrialization and signalled at the right time a warning to economically backward Russia to take preventive measures to stop the spreading of the 'spirit of capitalism.' It made them more than ever to stress the advantage of Russia's backwardness--a condition which had allowed the preservation of such traditional forms

of social organization as the artel and the obshchina. Since these institutions were considered communist in character, it was through them that the Populists hoped "to pass from the age of serfdom to the age of socialism."¹³ Paradoxical as it may seem, it was therefore Capital which, as one writer observed, caused the Populists "to conceive of capitalism as the 'enemy number 1,' thus contributing to the intensification of their idealization of the pre-capitalist social relationships and, by the same token, making them to full-fledged Populists."¹⁴ Hence, the influence of Marx, and particularly of his major work consisted primarily in establishing the Populist image of the history of capitalism and its present stage of development. By shaping this image Capital, far from turning the Populists into Marxists, instead reaffirmed their ideals and convinced them of the correctness of their anti-bourgeois Weltanschauung.

The Populists' reaction to the prospect of capitalist development in Russia and their response to Marx's Capital can be explained in reference to Russia's political and economic backwardness as compared with the West. Clearly, it was not the absence of socialist ideas and ideals among the Russian intelligentsia which accounted for their one-sided assimilation of Marxist ideas; it was rather their formation and presence under the conditions of backwardness that effected such a negative reception of Marxian historical theory of progress.¹⁵ For otherwise they should have deemed

themselves happy and reassured at the prospect of the historical inevitability of socialism. But, as socialists of an economically underdeveloped country, they could find no comfort in the prospect that Western historical experience would repeat itself in Russia. Indicative of this attitude are the words of N.V. Shelgunov: "Europe has awakened; she has understood her malady. Russia too has awakened; but has she risen from her slumber only in order to walk consciously the road over which Europe has passed unconsciously?"¹⁶ Not even Marx's metaphysical guarantee of the inevitability of socialism was sufficient to induce the Russian socialists to accept the evils of capitalism as a necessary pre-condition of socialism. Had they become socialists only to witness consciously a development which contradicted their ideals in every respect? There was indeed no Populist who could, in respect to Russia, accept the logic of the Marxian theory of social development.

The economic backwardness of Russia was therefore the major stumbling block for a Russian socialist to become a full-fledged Marxist. A complete acceptance of Marxian historical materialism implied a moral conflict of first degree--a conflict no Populist was prepared to inflict on himself. This explains largely why Populists like G.A. Lopatin and N.F. Danielson (who translated Capital) and others like V.P. Vorontsov, N.P. Tkachev, P.L. Lavrov, M.A. Bakunin and N.K. Mikhailovsky, who used to address themselves to the authority

of Marx, if not calling themselves Marxists at one time or another, never deviated from the path of Populism. For them, as Richard Pipes wrote, "Marx was popular as a Narodnik."¹⁷ In their lifetime none of these men accepted Marxism completely or advocated its applicability to Russia.¹⁸ And yet, with the exception of Bakunin, it was during their life-span that a devout Populist began to popularize 'Marx as a Marxist' and made himself a name as the "father of Russian Marxism." This man, of course, was Georgii Valentinovich Plekhanov (1856-1918).

Plekhanov's conversion to Marxism and adaptation of its ideology to the backward conditions of Russia was a major event in the history of Russian revolutionary thought. He resolved the Populists' moral dilemma by advocating a two-stage Marxist revolutionary scheme for Russia and herewith almost single-handedly initiated a movement that was to culminate in the Bolshevik revolution of 1917.

The intellectual evolution of Plekhanov had been such that by 1882 he had reached a position which forced him to recognize the illusory character of the Populist idealization of a uniquely Russian way to socialism. For reasons which will be discussed in this study, he had been unable to ignore the social and economic facts of a process that had been taking place since the great reforms of 1861: the rise of Russian capitalism.

In his effort to reconcile his revolutionary aspirations with the reality of this process, Plekhanov thought to have

discovered that the Narodniki's previous understanding of Marxism had been mistaken. . . Accepting Marx's blueprint of capitalist development did not imply that the Russian socialists were condemned to a state of inactivity; on the contrary, Plekhanov argued, a correct understanding of Marx proved that because of Russia's political and economic backwardness the socialist intelligentsia would play an indispensable role in shortening the process of capitalist development. As a 'latecomer' Russia was in the advantageous position of being able to adopt appropriate measures to ensure, as he wrote, that "our capitalism will fade without having fully flowered."¹⁹ The adoption of such measures depended on the revolutionary intelligenti. Hence, rather than condemn the rise of capitalism, they must view it as a progressive process; rather than oppose political revolution, they must participate in it. Their task consisted in supporting the bourgeoisie in its struggle for constitutional rights while simultaneously imbuing the workers with a consciousness of their own and helping them to create a social democratic party. The existence of such a party at the moment of bourgeois revolution entitled the Russian socialists "to hope that the social emancipation of the Russian working-class will very quickly follow upon the fall of absolutism."²⁰ Thus, instead of discontinuing their revolutionary endeavour and helplessly observing how the Russian people are subjected to the evils of capitalism, Plekhanov's Marxism indicated to them how to 'shorten and

lessen' these evils by preparing the workers, first, to support the political revolution of the bourgeoisie and, subsequently, to destroy the latter in the wake of a socialist revolution.

In order to disseminate his new ideological stand and to propagate the creation of a Russian social democratic party, Plekhanov together with P. Akselrod, V. Zasulich, L. Deich and V. Ignatov founded in 1883 the first Russian Marxist organization--Gruppa Osvobozhdenie Truda (The Emancipation of Labour Group). As the leading theoretician of the group, Plekhanov laid the ideological foundation of Russian Marxism in his 'trilogy'--Socialism and Political Struggle (1883), Our Differences (1885), and On the Development of the Monistic Conception of History (1894). In these works Plekhanov was primarily concerned with disproving the Populist claim that Marxism was inapplicable to Russia and that its acceptance required the Russian socialists to retire from revolutionary activity. This he did by arguing that capitalism was an inevitable historical phenomenon and that Marxism, rather than discouraging the revolutionaries, showed them their historic mission of awakening the Russian working class fully to a socialist consciousness--thus allowing it the "Sprung in die Freiheit" at some point in the near future.²¹

That Plekhanov's endeavour bore fruit has been documented by the tremendous impact which his writings had exerted on the Russian revolutionary youth.²² Almost all the leading figures of Russian Social Democracy began their career as

disciples of Plekhanov. I. Martov recalled in his memoirs that once he and his friends encountered Plekhanov's polemics against the Populists they quickly accepted the validity of his arguments and soon pronounced themselves Social Democrats. The leading spokesman of "legal Marxism," P. Struve, acknowledged that he had been particularly influenced by Plekhanov who, "as the author of Our Differences...played a very great part in laying down the basis of Russian orthodox Marxism."²³ And Lenin, having also been greatly influenced by Plekhanov, referred to the latter's Monistic Conception of History as a book which "reared a whole generation of Russian Marxists."²⁴

Considering the historical and ideological importance of Plekhanov as a teacher of the first generation of Russian Marxists, it is surprising that there has been no comprehensive analysis of Plekhanov's conversion to Marxism. In Russian, Soviet and Western historiography this subject has been usually treated only marginally as a chapter in general works on the history of the origin and formation of Russian Marxism.²⁵ Naturally, within such a context little attention has been paid to the particular nature of Plekhanov's transition. Partly as a result of this, the question why Plekhanov became a Marxist at a time when Populism was still the predominant ideological expression of Russian revolutionary thought has been generally interpreted in a rather simplistic manner.

Soviet historians on the whole tend to explain Plekhanov's transition to Marxism deterministically, i.e., as a function

of Russian industrialization and capitalist development. In this respect, great importance has been laid on Plekhanov's early encounter and intimate relationship with the St. Petersburg proletariat. This experience, it has been asserted, enabled him to gain a deeper insight into the actual course of Russian socio-economic development and, therefore, pre-disposed him towards the teachings of Marx.²⁶

This version of Plekhanov's intellectual evolution is often supplemented with what might be termed the 'traditionalist' interpretation. Plekhanov, it has been argued, was favoured in his eventual acceptance of Marxism by the Russian revolutionary-democratic tradition. Having gone through its school of thought--particularly the philosophy of Belinsky and Chernyshevsky--Plekhanov acquired a rationalistic and realistic world view which, because of its proximity to the philosophy of Marx, contributed significantly to his assimilation of the latter's ideology.²⁷

Not unrelated to this interpretation have been the works of those who attributed Plekhanov's conversion to Marxism to his intellectual qualities. While not necessarily singling out Belinsky and Chernyshevsky as the natural forerunners of Russian Social Democracy, they stressed the degree to which Plekhanov was shaped by the 'Westernism' of Russian revolutionary-democratic thought. Thus, for example, Boris Nikolaevsky suggested that

Plekhanov may be regarded as the last great Russian Westernizer in the tradition of Belinsky,

Alexander Herzen, and Nikolai Chernyshevsky. He was an intelligent in the full and best sense of the word. He came to his new Weltanschauung by the way of intensive study of Western philosophy, economics, history, and, in particular, the major works of socialism....²⁸

By resorting to this kind of interpretation, scholars have tended to view Plekhanov's emigration to Switzerland in 1880, and his subsequent immersion into socialist literature, as the most decisive factor in his transition to Marxism.²⁹

In his "intellectual biography" of Plekhanov, S.H. Baron arrives at the same conclusion. "The period from 1880 to 1882," he writes, "proved to be the most decisive in the whole of Plekhanov's intellectual life, for in these few short years his intellectual odyssey carried him all the way from populism to Marxism."³⁰ This, however, he modifies immediately by saying that

we misrepresent Plekhanov's intellectual evolution in the early 1880's if we treat it purely and simply as a shift from one pole to another.... Even before he left Russia he had demonstrated a high regard for Marxian ideas, in so far as he understood them, his outlook being a blend of populism and Marxism. What occurred subsequently was the sorting out of ideas that he found incompatible.³¹

Defining Plekhanov's outlook at the end of 1878 as "Marxist-materialist in form, Bakuninist in content" Baron declares that because of Plekhanov's "demand for consistency"--supposedly to be understood as an expression of "rationalist and intellectual approach in revolutionary matters"--something had "to give when, with the passage of time, he became persuaded of the essential incompatibility between populism and

Marxism."³² In his analysis of this process of 'persuasion,' Baron, by taking Plekhanov's intellectual qualities for granted, simply describes the steps of Plekhanov's conversion in reference to events which reveal to Plekhanov the contradictory character of his dichotomized Marxist-Populist world view.

It is the contention of this paper that "we misrepresent Plekhanov's intellectual evolution"--culminating in his Marxist Weltanschauung--if this process is simply analyzed by taking as the point of departure that "rationalistic bend" which "was already announced in his populist essay of 1879."³³ A more comprehensive analysis of Plekhanov's transition would require one to complement Baron's 'intellectualist' interpretation by asking what were the underlying psychological features of his 'intellectualism'? For only in this way will it be possible to reveal the inner logic of Plekhanov's intellectual evolution.

This study, then, is an effort to interpret Plekhanov's conversion to Marxism not merely in reference to his 'intellectualism,' but also in relation to the psychological dimension underlying his way of thinking and "intellectual approach in revolutionary matters." The key to such an analysis is to be found in Plekhanov's striving for consistency and certainty. These traits of his personality are already evident in his formative years, 1866-1876, when they played a significant role in his intellectual development leading to his adoption of Populist ideology in 1875-76. During his Populist period, 1876-81, one is able to observe how Plekhanov's demand for

consistency reveals itself increasingly as a manifestation of his quest for certainty. Simultaneously, it becomes apparent that his need for the latter stemmed primarily from a constant fear of isolation--i.e., isolation as a result of a course of action which, instead of leading to the realization of his revolutionary ideals, gets him into "the ludicrous position of a Don Quixote."³⁴ This aspect of Plekhanov's psychological make-up is particularly pronounced during the time of his transition to Marxism, 1879-82, which constituted for him a period of spiritual and intellectual uncertainty and, as such, demonstrates par excellence the degree to which his conversion was determined by his longing for certainty.

It is within the framework of these interrelated notions--consistency, certainty and isolation--that I intend to analyze the formation of Plekhanov's Populist Weltanschauung and, subsequently, attempt to illustrate how, as a result of political and economic circumstances, he was gradually converted to Marxism. This objective prescribes the following method of investigation and presentation: (1) inquiring into the formative years of Plekhanov in order to elucidate his psychological, moral, and intellectual disposition; (2) interpreting Plekhanov's adoption and understanding of Populism in light of his striving for consistency and certainty; (3) disclosing the logic of Plekhanov's conversion by demonstrating how political and socio-economic events undermined his system of Populist ideology; and (4) analyzing the final steps of his transition

to Marxism against the background of those psychological and intellectual characteristics which previously had conditioned his concept of Narodnichestvo.

This scheme of inquiry limits the scope of investigation in a number of ways. Chronologically speaking, it covers only that period of Plekhanov's life which is essential for an understanding of his evolution from Populism to Marxism, i.e., the time from 1866-83. This does not imply, however, that his later writings are being ignored. On the contrary, in order to substantiate some of the arguments, frequent reference will be made to works of Plekhanov which do not necessarily fall into the period under study. In respect to chronology it should also be noted that the discussion-material will be presented in analytical rather than chronological order. The question of chronology can only be of secondary importance since the subject matter is not defined in terms of when but how and, particularly, why Plekhanov became a Marxist. Due to these chronological and methodological considerations, the scope of the paper is also restricted insofar as it can neither fulfill the requirements of an intellectual biography nor attempt an analysis of Plekhanov's political and philosophical endeavours both as a founder and defender of orthodox Russian Marxism. Consequently, no attention will be paid either to the politics of the formation of the Emancipation of Labour Group, or to Plekhanov's later involvement in the Russian Social Democracy and his theoretical contributions in shaping its Marxist ideology. Last, but not least,

it should be stressed that the present framework of research is not congenial for a detailed study of the various ideological, political and social currents which shaped the intellectual climate of Russian society and, in turn, conditioned Plekhanov's intellectual development. An endeavour of this sort would, in view of the physical limitation of the paper, only tend to dilute the argument and disrupt the logical flow of discussion. Thus, assuming a certain amount of familiarity on the part of the reader with the Zeitgeist of the 1860's and 1870's, I, rather than trying to place young Georgii Valentinovich in the social matrix of his time, concerned myself only with those intellectual, socio-economic and political aspects which directly influenced Plekhanov (even though this might give the appearance that Plekhanov's conversion has been dealt with as if taking place in a 'social vacuum').

CHAPTER I

THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF PLEKHANOV'S LIFE IN PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

In a brief biographical sketch of the childhood years of Georgii Valentinovich Plekhanov, a Soviet historian contends that from his father, Valentin Petrovich, Plekhanov inherited his "seething revolutionary temperament" and his "outstanding capacity for work," while from his mother, Mariia Fedorovna, he acquired his "hatred of oppression, exploitation, deception and hypocrisy." In fact, he goes as far as to conclude that Plekhanov's "first teacher of revolution was undoubtedly Mariia Fedorovna."¹ The author of this article, N. Semashko, attempts to explain Plekhanov's future inclination for revolutionary activity by stressing hereditary factors and parental influences. This seems to be a rather misleading approach to the formation of Plekhanov's revolutionary Weltanschauung. While Semashko's observation is valid in that the father's temperament, strength of character, capacity for work, and the mother's intelligence, devotion to justice and sense of altruism were undoubtedly important elements in shaping Plekhanov's personality, it is another thing to infer that Valentin Petrovich was the source

of Plekhanov's "revolutionary temperament" and that Mariia Fedorovna was his "first teacher of revolution." Observations of this kind may have relevance in explaining some of Plekhanov's personal characteristics, but they have little, if any, explanatory value for understanding his spiritual and intellectual development in terms of his assimilation and formation of revolutionary Populist and, subsequently, Marxist ideology.

Mariia Fedorovna herself came closer to the truth when she blamed Plekhanov's revolutionary disposition on the free-thinkers of the Voronezh Military Gymnasium which Georgii had attended from 1866 to 1873.² It was usually in the gymnasiums and higher educational institutions where Russian youth received their first sprinkling of humanitarian and liberal ideas, where they were exposed to Russian revolutionary thought, and where they became acquainted with Western philosophy and science. As in the case of most of his contemporaries, it is to his student days that we must trace back the beginning of Plekhanov's revolutionary career. In various ways these institutions were instrumental in providing the necessary prerequisites without which a revolutionary calling would have been inconceivable.³ The origin of Plekhanov's calling must, therefore, be sought in his years of education at the Voronezh Military Gymnasium and the St. Petersburg Gornyi Mining Institute.

Besides the usual liberating influence of student life as such, and the inspiration derived from the reading of illegal literature, the relatively free-thinking atmosphere of the

gymnasium in Voronezh and the presence of some excellent teachers greatly facilitated Plekhanov's moral and intellectual development towards a Populist mentality and outlook. Of one of his instructors, N.F. Bunakov, Plekhanov remarked that he instilled in him "a love of literature and taught...[him] to speak and write correctly, definitely, clearly, and simply."⁴ This love of literature most likely extended to such exponents of Russian critical thought as Belinsky, Chernyshevsky, and N. Dobroliubov.⁵ It would have been surprising if under the influence of these radical writers and the guidance of such an outstanding personality as Bunakov, Plekhanov would have remained unaffected by revolutionary idealism and a sense of morality demanding its realization.

The subsequent reading of more specific Populist literature and belletristic could only lead to an intensification of such sentiments. In this respect the works of the famous Russian poet Nikolai Nekrasov were perhaps most influential in implanting in young Georgii the seeds of a Populist morality which obliged the intelligent to identify himself with the oppressive conditions of the people and to accept as his duty to serve them.⁶ Plekhanov, who retained a life-long admiration for Nekrasov, referred many years later to an interesting episode which took place in the last year of his schooling at the gymnasium.

After dinner we sat together in a group and read Nekrasov. We had hardly finished 'The Railroad' when a signal sounded calling us to drill. We hid the book and, under the strong impression of what we had read, went to the armory to get the weapons. When we began to take up formation,

my friend S. came up to me and, grasping the barrel of his gun, whispered: 'Oh, if I could only take this weapon and go into combat for the Russian people!' These words, spoken furtively within a few paces of a strict military official, were deeply engraved on my memory; I remembered them every time when I happened to re-read 'The Railroad'.⁷

The message of "The Railroad" was well taken by "S." and its underlying philosophy was not lost upon Plekhanov. By describing the sacrifices and sufferings of workers constructing a railroad--a symbol of progress--Nekrasov reminded the reader that he was now enjoying the benefits of progress and appealed to his conscience by pointing out that this progress was built upon the starvation, blood and toil of the people:

Brethren, you now reap the fruit of our struggle
We have been fated to perish and rot
Do you still think of us sometimes with kindness
Do you remember us?⁸

For Plekhanov this poem must have read like a moral imperative akin to Lavrov's conception of the intelligent's debt to the people and his moral obligation to discharge this liability by serving the people in their struggle for liberty and justice.

While still attending the gymnasium, Plekhanov broke with the orthodox faith. Having entered school with belief in God and traditional religion, he left it as a believer of Darwinian evolutionism. Under the influence of Darwin's On the Origin of Species, Plekhanov abandoned his Christian world view of the genesis of man and, henceforth, considered Darwinism as the last word in explaining the origin of man's existence and of life on earth. There is an interesting episode of how Georgii,

as a "zealous Darwinist," argued with a priest about the "law of God" and the "origin of man" during lessons of religious instruction.⁹ In this 'contest' Plekhanov's arguments were not those of a 'believer in doubt,' but rather of a person who, while no longer a believer of Christian faith, fully embraced the belief that the genesis of man was determined by the natural laws of evolution. For, we are told, it was on the basis of this proposition, i.e., by "developing those views which he had deduced from his reading of Darwin," that Plekhanov argued against the priest.¹⁰ The latter soon realized that if he were to continue the dispute his lessons of sacred law would be transformed into lessons of Darwin's law of evolution. Putting an end to the controversy, he said to Georgii Valentinovich: "Young man, let us leave off these disputes otherwise our lessons of the law of God will turn into lessons of the law without God."¹¹ By the time he had graduated from gymnasium, Plekhanov had not only acquired a Populist 'moral code' but also accepted a naturalistic evolutionary world view which he retained throughout his life and complemented in later years with Marx's 'natural laws' of social development.

The formative moral and intellectual process which Plekhanov had undergone at the Voronezh Military Gymnasium continued under much more congenial conditions when, in 1873, he began to live in St. Petersburg. Here he enrolled at the Konstantinoskoe Military School to pursue his childhood dream of a military career. This, however, never materialized. His attendance at

the school was of short duration due to a moral conflict arising from his gradually awakening revolutionary sentiments.

When Plekhanov arrived in St. Petersburg his step-brother Mitrofan, whom Georgii greatly admired, took charge of him. Mitrofan, who had already graduated with a brilliant record from the General Staff Academy, was not exactly pleased with the radical ideas of his younger brother.¹² In order to change Georgii's views, he introduced him to circles of high society, with the result that at one of these gatherings Plekhanov insulted a general by correcting his ideas about Darwin.¹³ Plekhanov's exposure to people of conservative or, at least, liberal outlook had no moderating effect on his youthful radicalism. In fact, Georgii Valentinovich exhibited increasingly radical opinions and even tried to convert Mitrofan and his friends. On one occasion, trying to convince them that the proper duty of a citizen consisted of serving the people, he was told by one of the officers: "Once the power will be in your hands, in the hands of the revolutionaries, we will join you but now it is still too early."¹⁴ Seeing how strongly Plekhanov felt about his political views, Mitrofan, finally, gave up re-educating his brother, realizing that the career of an officer was not Georgii's calling.¹⁵

As may have been expected, Plekhanov had arrived at the same conclusion. His discussions with Mitrofan and his friends had confronted him with the problem of compatibility of an officer's duty to serve the Tsar and a citizen's duty to serve

the people. Being unable to accept the Tsar as the incarnation of the Russian land and its people, the issue was whether one's 'proper duty' dictated loyalty to the Tsar or to the people. Plekhanov felt that it belonged to the latter and that his conscience did not allow any compromise with the former. As a result, Plekhanov, at the beginning of 1874, withdrew from Konstantinovskoe after only one semester and decided to take up scientific studies at the St. Petersburg Mining Institute.¹⁶

Commenting on the decision of Plekhanov to give up his military career, S.H. Baron argues that "Plekhanov's move did not represent a decision for a revolutionary career; nor was it, as has been suggested, his first gesture as a 'repentant nobleman'."¹⁷ While this is essentially correct, Baron fails to stress the actual psychological dimension underlying Plekhanov's decision: namely, his inability to compromise on a situation which contradicted his ideals and beliefs. In other words, the circumstances which made Plekhanov abandon his strong aspiration to become an officer revealed an utmost striving for consistency, one might say, an existential need to act in harmony with his convictions--a need which in the course of his life disclosed itself as a characteristic trait of his personality. In this respect, it is actually insignificant whether Plekhanov's move represented "a decision for a revolutionary career" or that of a "repentant nobleman." What matters most is that while Plekhanov may not have been a "repentant nobleman" in the true meaning of the term, he

was certainly imbued with 'Populist morality'--a sense of responsibility to the people which he was unable to ignore.

One might justifiably ask why, if it is true that Plekhanov felt so strongly about the people's cause, did he not join the crusade "to the people" in 1873-74 instead of preoccupying himself with scientific studies at the Gornyi Mining Institute? In fact, was not his decision to pursue academic studies just another compromise? Although in less than a year Plekhanov would find himself once more faced with the unacceptable proposition of a compromise, for the time being he felt at ease in his new field which harmonized with his present conception of one's moral and social obligations. To join the revolutionary movement at this moment would have violated his quest for consistency since his views were not yet sufficiently Populist to warrant such a decision. While his radical disposition had compelled him to discontinue at Konstantinovskoe, he was not 'radical' enough at this stage to identify himself with the Populist viewpoint that defined the nature of one's duty to the people as "going to the people" and which demanded that

he who wishes to work for the people must abandon the university, forswear his privileged condition, his family, and turn his back even upon science and art. All connections linking him with the upper classes of society must be severed, all of his ships burned behind him; in a word, he must voluntarily cut himself off from any possible retreat.¹⁸

Such an idealism was as yet foreign to Plekhanov. What would be gained by "going to the people" whose mentality and way of life seemed to present insurmountable difficulties in trying to communicate and fuse with them? Was it not much more

reasonable to serve the people, to contribute to their welfare, in the role of engineers, doctors or teachers? Surely, such considerations were on Plekhanov's mind when he decided to take up his studies. Such a choice was not at all at variance with the radical Russian spirit of the 1860's and 1870's:

Pisarev praised those who armed themselves with modern scientific knowledge required for struggling against Tsarism; Lavrov's "critically thinking and determined individuals" were supposed to be people of education and science; and Chernyshevsky saw no inconsistency between acquiring knowledge and serving the people. Hence studying applied sciences was a way out of Plekhanov's moral dilemma. The utilitarian character of science and its identification with progress made it appear the most natural way for a radical like Georgii Valentinovich to serve the people and, thus, to live up to his moral obligations.¹⁹

In retrospect, Plekhanov's decision to commit himself to science represents a mere interlude, one might say, a transitional period of coming to terms with himself and the world around him. And a short interlude it was! The intellectual and radical atmosphere in St. Petersburg and, moreover, the educational environment of the institute made it virtually impossible for any sympathizer of the revolutionary movement to remain for long outside its reach. It seems, however, that in his first year, 1874-75, Plekhanov paid little attention to student and Populist radicalism. Instead, he seriously committed himself

to his studies which he finished as a brilliant student of chemistry winning a sizeable scholarship for the subsequent semester.²⁰ Yet, it would be a mistake to assume that in this time Plekhanov had completely cut himself off from the revolutionary scene. He continued to read radical Populist literature and also began to frequent clandestine meetings of revolutionary students.²¹ In the course of 1875-76 this led to Plekhanov's gradual transformation into a revolutionary Narodnik. This process of assimilation took place primarily under the influence of his acquaintance with revolutionary students, Populist 'illegals', and factory workers who he met as a result of his increasing participation in their activities.²²

By the end of 1875 Plekhanov had already come to the attention of the Natansonovtsi or "Troglodytes", as the group of 'Northern Populists' were known, who a year later founded Zemlia i Volia. They must have regarded him as a reliable sympathizer when they suggested to P. Akselrod Plekhanov's living quarters as a hide-out place.²³

The meeting between the two men is worth recording because it helps to illuminate the 'logic' of Plekhanov's spiritual and intellectual development. Recalling this event many years later, Akselrod described Plekhanov as a youth who left a favourable impression on him:

He spoke well, in a business like manner, simply and yet in a sophisticated way. One perceived in him a love for knowledge, a habit of reading, thinking, working.... He dreamed at the time of going abroad to complete his studies in chemistry.²⁴

Although pleased by Plekhanov's manners and impressed by his intelligence, Akselrod, as a staunch exponent of Populist virtues, was hardly in favour of his intention to continue his studies. He responded to Plekhanov's plan with an indignation characteristic for a man of total commitment. "This is a luxury!" he exclaimed. For, he continued, "if you take so long to complete your studies in chemistry, when will you begin to work for the revolution?"²⁵ This air of unquestionability of what is right and proper left its mark on Plekhanov. Compared to Akselrod's "supreme loyalty to the revolution"--something Plekhanov admired most about him²⁶--Plekhanov's own comfortable conception of one's duty to the people began to appear like a philistine compromise. For Plekhanov this implied once more a replay of the Konstantinovskoe moral dilemma: once again he was subjected to a soul-searching experience; once again his conscience began to revolt; once again he felt guilty of his unfulfilled social obligation.

This feeling of doubt and guilt was reinforced by his acquaintance with the "representatives of the people"--the revolutionary workers of St. Petersburg. Recalling his first encounter with a St. Petersburg "worker revolutionary," Plekhanov wrote:

When I met Nitrofanov for the first time and realized that he was a worker, that is, one of the representatives of the 'people' a mixed feeling of smallness and discomfort stirred in my soul, as if I had been guilty of something before him.²⁷

Confronted with this simple worker, a "son of the people",

who was fully committed to the revolutionary cause and already persecuted by the Tsarist police, Plekhanov was overtaken by an upsurge of bad conscience--he, who as an intelligent was supposed to repay his debt to the people, had done less in this respect than Mitrofanov.

Initially, Plekhanov's anguish was intensified because he did not know how to communicate with Mitrofanov. "It seemed to me," wrote Plekhanov, "that the language of my fellow students would be utterly incomprehensible to this 'son of the people', and that in conversation with him I would have to use the absurd manner of speech of our revolutionary pamphlets."²⁸ Fortunately, Mitrofanov began to talk first, thus rescuing Plekhanov from this embarrassing situation. Soon, Plekhanov realized that there was no need to converse in a different language. Mitrofanov not only understood him perfectly well, but in addition to reading revolutionary pamphlets, was also acquainted with the works of Chernyshevsky, Bakunin and Lavrov.²⁹ Although Mitrofanov was an exceptional person in this respect, Plekhanov's subsequent experiences with St. Petersburg workers only affirmed his initial impression that there was not such an insurmountable communication gap between the intelligentsia and the people as he had originally anticipated.

Ironically enough, Mitrofanov had no sympathy for the St. Petersburg workers and told Plekhanov that "the real people were the peasantry." In his opinion, the "urban workers were

already corrupted to a large degree and imbued with bourgeois mentality." Consequently, he argued, one could not expect anything from them and the intelligentsia must, therefore, "go to the countryside" since the city was lost to the cause of revolution. Such a view was not hard to accept for, in the words of Plekhanov, it "fully corresponded with our conception of the people."³⁰ However, as a result of his own experience with the workers, Plekhanov soon discarded this pessimistic assessment of the urban proletariat. Plekhanov had ample opportunity to acquaint himself personally with this 'questionable' stratum of the people when, in January 1876, he offered his room for revolutionary worker meetings after it had come to his attention that there were no suitable quarters available for such gatherings. Contrary to his expectation, the impression he gained at these meetings was "most astonishing."

I completely forgot Mitrofanov's gloomy comments about the Petersburg workers. The only thing that I saw and understood was that all these men, who by their appearance and manners undoubtedly belonged to the 'people', were comparatively very intelligent people with whom I could talk as simply and, consequently, as sincerely as with my fellow students. Moreover, to those among them who had already spent some time in prison, I looked up in awe [realizing] 'I had done nothing so far to prove my dedication to the cause while they had already for a long time stood up for it.'³¹

Therefore, rather than confirming Mitrofanov's warnings of the workers, Plekhanov's acquaintance with them revived his initial experience with Mitrofanov himself. Participating in these workers meetings not only added to his feeling of

guilt, but also led him more and more to the realization that there was no real substance for his anticipated difficulties in communicating and "merging with the people." If previously he had been skeptical and, indeed, "frightened by the difficulties of the task of sblizheniia s narodom, it now," Plekhanov wrote, "appeared to me simple and easy; I ceased procrastinating over it and decided at once to become as intimate as possible with my new acquaintances."³²

The ice had been broken. The last, seemingly insuperable obstacle preventing Plekhanov from accepting the Populist call "to the people!", had finally disintegrated as a result of his experience with the workers. True, they were not quite the "real people" and yet, even though they represented from a Populist point of view only a 'watered-down' version of the people, they had proven to Plekhanov beyond any doubt their revolutionary inclination and receptivity to propaganda and agitation. Considering that, theoretically, the workers were supposedly less revolutionary than the peasants, his successful rapprochement with them seemed a sure indication that the peasants were even more susceptible to revolutionary agitation. Thus, the Narodniki's demand for sblizheniia s narodom was neither a Sisyphean task nor an idealistic utopia. The fact that he had not yet gone amongst the "real people" was no proof on the contrary. For, in addition to his own 'urban experience,' he had gathered sufficient 'rural information' to approve of the Populists' image of the people.³³

By accepting this image it was easy for Plekhanov to generalize from his own experience that there was no objective reason to doubt the validity of the Populist concept of revolutionary practice, namely, the necessity of "khozhdeniia v narod" and "sblizheniia s narodom."

Everyone and everything in Plekhanov's world seemed to contribute to the erosion of his previous idea of the nature of one's service to the people and summoned him to abandon what he had thought its corresponding practice: the study of applied sciences. The moral force emanating from the revolutionary ethic of men like Akselrod and Mitrofanov compelled Plekhanov to question his academic way of life; the sense of guilt arising from this confrontation with the "representatives of the people" urged him to fulfill his duty, to repay his debt to them; and, finally, the recognition of being able to "merge with the people" resulting from his participation in their activities enabled him to identify himself with the Populist proposition that the proper duty of the radical intelligent consists (in "merging with the people" by "going to the people." Morally and intellectually, there was no doubt in Plekhanov's mind at this point as to his calling in following the Populist path of revolutionary activity. If a year ago his moral and intellectual disposition had prevented him from continuing his military career, his newly acquired sense of duty was no longer compatible with his studies and forced him now to abandon his scientific career. If in view of his outstanding

academic success and capabilities it had been suggested to Plekhanov in 1875 to take up the career of a professor, in less than a year the well-known Professor Lisenko "expressed his deepest regret that his gifted student, carried away by the revolutionary activity, turned out to be lost for science."³⁴ Yet, being a loss to the cause of science, Plekhanov turned out to be a gain for the revolutionary cause. Having already been recommended by Akselrod to the Populist circle of the Natansonovtsi, its members, "seeing how interested I was in the workers' cause," Plekhanov wrote, "accepted me into their ranks and since then zaniatiia s rabochimi had been my revolutionary duty."³⁵

The revolutionary stream had already passed its most turbulent stage when Plekhanov's life merged with it. The spontaneous idealism of previous years had yielded to a more thoughtful realism of practical orientation. The youthful enthusiasm of those who, in 1872-74, had followed the call "to the people!", had spent itself in the face of peasant inertia and police oppression. Those who had been able to escape imprisonment flooded back into the cities--particularly to St. Petersburg where police harrassment was less severe than in other cities of the Empire.³⁶

Some of the surviving members of the movement gathered around Mark Antreyevich Natanson. As might be expected, in view of past experiences and present circumstances, the spirit of this new circle corresponded no longer with its predecessors --the Chaikovsky and Dolgushin circles. In this circle, wrote

Akselrod who had met some of its most distinguished members, they did not spend their time discussing "the questions of debt to the people, of service to the people, and of merging with them."³⁷ They, he emphasized, had already resolved that question once and for all. Instead of philosophizing about the nature of their obligation to the people, they were practical and realistic in their orientation and viewed as their most immediate task the resumption of revolutionary work.

This attitude was reflected by the political mood of the circle which, according to Akselrod, "was more radical and revolutionary than Lavrovism" but, nevertheless, was "strongly opposed to the rebel tactics" of Bakuninist extremism.³⁸ Ideologically, there had been no clear-cut distinction between these two denominations of the "going to the people" movement of 1872-74: both had rejected a 'political' in favour of a 'social' revolution; both believed in Russia's ability to by-pass capitalism; both considered the obshchina as the foundation of Russian socialism; both aspired to the establishment of an agrarian anarchist social order; both looked upon the people as their source of salvation; and, both, conceived their path of salvation in terms of "fusing with the people" by "going to the people." They differed, however, in their methods of how to unite with them in order to promote a social revolution. The Lavrovists went amongst them to educate them, expecting the revolution to follow

their educational efforts; the Bakuninists went to the people to incite them, assuming that the rebellious Russian peasant was already imbued with socialism and ready for an immediate social revolution.³⁹ But the disastrous consequences of their pilgrimage to the people evidenced tactical shortcomings on both sides: the propaganda of the Lavrovists and the revolutionary efforts of the Bakuninists. Recognizing these shortcomings, the Natansonovtsi strove to weld the two groups together by discarding the overly exaggerated Bakuninist emphasis on the peasants' rebelliousness and by rejecting the excessively theoretical forms of Lavrovist propaganda.⁴⁰

The Populists who induced Plekhanov to join their ranks had, therefore, already shed their idealistic belief that by simply going to the people they had found a sure way of 'fusing' with them. Yet, they had not lost their romantic faith in the socialist instincts of the Russian peasantry. Indeed, they never doubted this basic premise of their ideology. What they questioned was their practice of sblizheniia s narodom. From their past experience with the people, they concluded that if the peasants had not been receptive to their ideas and had not responded to their incitations, it was not because they were incapable of socialist ideals and revolts, but rather because the intelligentsia's propaganda was too abstract and their agitation too alien to attract and incite the people. This assessment

reflected the intelligentsia's realization that their propagation of Western ideas meant little to the people and that they had grossly overestimated the actual state of the peasants' rebelliousness.

To avoid these errors in the future the radical intelligentsia decided "to work out a program of action which closely corresponded to the concrete facts of the actual conditions of social reality of peasant life."⁴¹ Instead of indoctrinating the people and trying to incite them, the revolutionaries began to adjust their activities in such a manner so as to harmonize them with the immediate needs and desires of the people. Expressing this new orientation, A. Zheliabov said:

We decided to act in the name of the interests of which the people had already become aware--no longer in the name of pure doctrine, but on the basis of interest rooted in the life of the people, interests of which they were conscious. This was the characteristic quality of narodnichestvo. From dreams and metaphysics it made the transition to positivism and came to adhere to the soil.⁴²

Typical of this new trend and final cast of revolutionary Populism was Sergei Kravchinsky's statement that it was not sufficient "to give up the German dress and go to the villages in peasant clothes; not the socialists only, but socialism itself should be clad in the russet coat of the Russian peasant."⁴³ Less poetically expressed, this meant that the realization of socialism in Russia must be accomplished without an admixture of Western socialist ideas. Not only was any attempt to instill the people with a Western socialist consciousness bound to fail, but it also was a contradiction in

terms since the Russian peasantry carried within itself the necessary socialist elements required for the revolutionary transformation of Russian society. Practical necessity, therefore, compelled the Populists to forge a program of action which was consistent with the premises of their ideology. The Natansonovtsi, with whom Plekhanov was associated from the very beginning of his revolutionary career, represented the most outspoken advocates of this--as T. Dan has called it--empirical 'Populism' which called upon the revolutionaries to "narrow down their own demands to whatever is materially feasible in the immediate future, that is, down to the people's demands and desires, whatever they may be at the given moment."⁴⁴

It is hardly possible to exaggerate the importance of the fact that Plekhanov, instead of having been swept into the revolutionary movement at its most ecstatic moment, was rather drawn to it when its ecstasy had subsided and given way to an atmosphere of reflection and critical realism. That Plekhanov joined the movement at this time of transition from 'dreams to positivism,' from 'metaphysics to empiricism,' throws light on his own striving for consistency and certainty. For, no matter how strongly he felt about his duty to the people, his decision to serve them in the capacity of a revolutionary Narodnik was not a spontaneous but a conscious step. Rather than joining the movement in the hay-days of its unrestrained and spontaneous "going to the people," he committed himself to the study of science. When he finally decided to merge his life with the

revolutionary stream, it was not until he had convinced himself that the new 'empirical' Populist concept of "settling among the people" was a realistic and certain path to unite with them and, thereby, ignite a social revolution. Thus, although his discussions with experienced revolutionary Populists and his own experience with the workers infused him with a new sense of duty, this would not have been sufficient for him to forgo his studies had he not been able to assure himself of the viability of the idea of Narodnichestvo as a program of revolutionary practice rooted in the 'soil' of 'Russian life.'

CHAPTER II

PLEKHANOV'S IDEA OF NARODNICHESTVO

Plekhanov's Narodnichestvo--more so than perhaps any other Populist's notion of it--was determined by his literal interpretation of its new so-called 'positivistic' or 'empirical' orientation. It implied for him a 'scientific' approach to revolutionary struggle--it demanded that the revolutionary concern himself with theory and social sciences in order to formulate a correct program of action. From the very beginning of his revolutionary career Plekhanov was concerned with working out a sound theoretical foundation for Narodnichestvo. In this process, he relied heavily on Marxist social theory. Yet, his appropriation of its precepts was conditioned by the same psychological need and intellectual disposition which were evidenced in his formative years.

The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate Plekhanov's assimilation of Marxian ideas and the underlying concern which compelled him to build the idea of 'positivistic' Narodnichestvo into a consistent and comprehensive system. The first section describes the ideological setting within which Plekhanov, in the period of 1876-79, evolved his philosophy. It is intended

to highlight his conflicts with the Lavrovists, his relation to Marxism, and subsequently his intellectualism which set him apart from most of his fellow Populists in his way of thinking and conception of the 'people.' In continuation of the latter theme, section two analyzes why Plekhanov was captivated by Marx's socio-economic theory and how he appropriated its precepts in order to construe his system of Narodnichestvo-- a system that consisted of components which under 'favourable' external circumstances proved congenial for his transition to Marxism.

A Scientific Conception of Populism

The final formation of Russian Populism had only just begun when Plekhanov became a member of the Natanson Circle in 1875-76. It was in participation of the group's endeavour to fuse the dispersed revolutionary elements into a new organization and to revise the idealistic revolutionary practice of Lavrovist and Bakuninist extremism that Plekhanov himself gained a more systematic understanding of Populist ideology. Although the Natanson circle attracted many Populists to its new 'positivistic' orientation, it failed to convince the majority of St. Petersburg Lavrovists.¹ Rather than attributing their lack of success in the countryside to their methods of propaganda, the Lavrovists abandoned the 'people' and turned to the urban workers, who responded more readily to their educational efforts. Thus, instead of enlisting the support of the

Lavrovists, the Natansonovtsi found themselves defending their stand. The impending conflict between the two over a new program was duly recorded by Plekhanov, who--recalling the worker meetings assembling in his lodgings--wrote:

These gatherings were of great importance (since it was just the time of working out the program of the 'Buntarist Narodniki.' The majority of the revolutionary 'intelligentsia' thought that the main body of the Russian socialist party ought to be directed towards 'agitation on the basis of the existing demands of the people; only the so-called 'Lavrovists,' who were less active and therefore less influential in the revolutionary environment, insisted on 'propaganda.'²

Although the Lavrovists were less influential than their Buntarist counterparts, it was in relation to their opposition and ideological views that Plekhanov began to articulate his conception of Narodnichestvo and, in the process, became one of the chief theoreticians of the emerging Zemlia i Volia.

Continuous disputes with the Lavrovists became virtually unavoidable since Plekhanov was primarily active among urban workers--i.e., a 'territory' claimed by his opponents. The situation was such that from the very beginning of his revolutionary career Plekhanov was constantly forced to define his Populist standpoint both in relation to the Lavrovists and to the workers. This was not an easy task. Strictly speaking the workers had no place in Populist revolutionary theory. In this respect the Lavrovists were much more consistent than the Bakuninist-Narodniki. As Plekhanov remarked, the former's attitude to the workers was devoid of the ambivalence which prevailed among the Natansonovtsi and later on

among the Zemlevoltsi.

Imbued with Populist prejudices, we then viewed the triumph of capitalism and the development of the proletariat as the greatest evil for Russia. Owing to this, our relationship to the workers was always doublefaced and utterly inconsistent. On the one hand,...we did not attribute to the proletariat an independent political role and placed our trust exclusively upon peasant rebellion; on the other hand, we considered 'zanimat'sia s rabochimi' nevertheless necessary.... But, while going to the workers was not against our will, it was, so to speak, against /our/ theory....³

In contrast to the Buntarist Narodniki, the Lavrovists had definitely decided that work among the peasants was hopeless and that any fruitful revolutionary activity was only possible among the emerging urban proletariat. In committing this Populist heresy the Lavrovists justified themselves by appealing to the authority of Marx and the practice of German Social Democracy which, in some ways, resembled their own conception of 'preparatory' work. Relying on Marx for their theoretical justification they argued that the peasantry was a reactionary element and that its social institution, the obshchina--the 'existing' Populist ideal of a communist community--was doomed with the arrival of capitalism in Russia. Convinced that capitalism had become a necessary precondition of Russian socialism, they concluded that in view of Russia's economic backwardness there was no hope for a socialist revolution in the near future.⁴ The combination of this theory with the traditional negative Populist attitude towards 'political struggle' harmonized well with the Lavrovists'

emphasis on peaceful educational work. Thus, their immediate aim was not to organize a tight-knit revolutionary party for the purpose of a "second call-up" "to the people!"⁵ but rather to conduct preparatory work among the workers to raise their socialist consciousness and induce them to form a social democratic party of their own. Anything which would disrupt this goal was viewed with hostility.⁶

To Plekhanov the Lavrovists

constituted for themselves a rather highminded society of sectarians, stubbornly and monotonously condemning everything that caused the hearts of the 'radicals' to beat faster: student disturbances, strikes, manifestations of sympathy for political 'criminals,' mass protests against administrative arbitrariness, etc., etc.

In contrast to Plekhanov's endeavour to work out a new program of action, the Lavrovists' orientation, according to him, "was not a program of action" but the "self-justification of people" committed to a wait-and-see attitude--a philosophy of inactivity.⁸ In the course of 1877-78, Plekhanov polemized against their theoretical justification for opposing those events which 'caused his heart to beat faster.' In his memoirs, N. Rusanov recalled one such attack of Plekhanov against the Lavrovists. At that particular incident, Plekhanov arrived at the scene of discussion when the Lavrovists had already succeeded in crushing their Bakuninist opponents. Swiftly, he rescued his compatriots by immediately taking up the challenge.

I ask the meeting to forgive me, but I could not come earlier.... I have just come by the back stairs from a meeting where I was concerned

with doing just what the proponents of peaceful progress reproach us buntarists (advocates of rebellion) for doing: pushing toward 'continuous revolution.' Speaking more plainly, I advised the representatives of the students to organize demonstrations everywhere in the higher schools, and if possible also with our worker groups, in anticipation of the announcement of the verdict in the trial of the 193....

I have come just as one of your orators was feelingly expanding on the theme that he too, you see, is a revolutionist but not a buntarist; that he, of course, with all his soul is for good, nice, beneficial revolution, but with all his mind and heart against a bad, nasty, pernicious rebellion.... I value the nobility of his sentiments but I cannot follow his invitation to love virtue in the form of the revolution and to hate vice in the shape of rebellion.... I cannot because I am in doubt: does the orator possess some sort of invention office where an incipient movement can secure a patent for the correct manufacture of a revolution? Give me such a patent and I am with you! But can you say in advance, at the very beginning of a movement, that this is a revolution and that a rebellion?... And what if suddenly we begin to make a nasty rebellion and out of it there begins to emerge a nice revolution? Do we have no right, without your patent, to participate in a spontaneously arising movement? Must we refuse all participation?... Perhaps even stand at the side of the government and fight against the movement? And what if suddenly, at some unforeseen hour, out of the rebellion should grow an unpatented revolution?...

At what hour was the taking of the Bastille transformed into the great French Revolution? On which day did the three-day July uprising of 1830 cease to be an uprising and become a revolution worthy of mention in history? And the Revolution of 1848? Perhaps, in your opinion, it would have been proper to stop with the liberal banquets and not push the workers into the street? That is what the liberal bourgeoisie wanted to do.... And today bourgeois liberalism speaks from your mouths....

You are socialists? Perhaps--I do not know. But in any case you are Christian theologians. They, too, believe in the

Immaculate Conception and the bloodless birth.... We revolutionists do not believe in it just as we do not believe in the peaceful progress of humanity, as we do not believe in a revolution with the permission of the officials. Every great historical achievement of humanity was won in battle, was gained only with blood.... And in you who pretend to erudition, there is not the slightest understanding of history and not the least bit of revolutionary feeling.... That is why the youth is abandoning you.... You are a mutual admiration society and nothing more.... Stay with your self-blessed patent for a mythical bloodless revolution!⁹

This account of Rusanov illustrates par excellence Plekhanov's revolutionary temperament and level of sophistication in defending his Buntarist convictions. It would be misleading however to suggest, as Baron did, that "for the moment, Plekhanov epitomized the revolutionary will to which he later opposed a deterministic historical process."¹⁰ While at the time of his disputes with the Lavrovists, Plekhanov may not have been a 'determinist' in the Marxist sense of the word, it would be wrong to assert that in contradistinction to Lavrovism he "epitomized the revolutionary will." His Bakuninism told him even then that

revolutions are the business of the popular masses. History prepares them. The revolutionists have not the power to control anything. They can be only the instruments of history, the voices of popular aspirations. Their role consists only in organizing the people in the name of these aspirations and demands and in advancing them into the struggle for their realization; to facilitate the hastening of that revolutionary process which, in accordance with the irresistible laws of history, is taking place in the present period. Outside of that role, they are nothing; within its bounds, they are one of the most powerful factors of history.¹¹

Plekhanov's conception of history and the present state of Russian socio-economic development left no doubt in his mind that the only reasonable program of action was immediate revolutionary activity in the form of militant agitation among the people. At present there was no time for propaganda and historiosophical deliberations. The revolutionaries must act now if they want to secure socialism for Russia. To display a lack of "revolutionary feeling" under these circumstances was irresponsible and reactionary. Strictly speaking, Plekhanov--even "for the moment"--was no more of a 'free-willist' than the Lavrovists. The difference between him and them was not one of voluntarism versus determinism, but one of two different conceptions of Russian reality and, consequently, of two different interpretations of the socialist-revolutionary potential of the Russian peasantry. "For the moment, Plekhanov epitomized the revolutionary will" not only, because he was carried away by his "revolutionary temperament," but because he thought that anyone who had the "slightest understanding of history" and a realistic grasp of existing social reality would recognize that the decisive moment of revolution had arrived in Russia.

Plekhanov's so-called "Populist prejudices" and his rejection of Lavrovism were based neither on an ignorance of Marxist philosophy of history nor on unfamiliarity with German Social Democracy. In 1876 he had met I.F. Fesenko

who had come to St. Petersburg to lecture on political economy in Populist worker circles.¹² Fesenko was a popular and highly respected figure in the revolutionary movement. In contrast to many Populist radicals he had read Marx and greatly admired his writings. Studying Marx under the guidance of Russia's first Marxist economist, N. Ziber, who taught political economy at the University of Kiev, Fesenko had acquired a sound knowledge of Marx's socio-economic theories.¹³ Although a convinced 'rebel' Populist, he was sufficiently impressed by Marx to propagate his ideas to students and workers.

His St. Petersburg lectures, according to Deich, "stimulated Plekhanov's interest for political economy in general and Marx's Capital in particular."¹⁴ It seems that Fesenko enabled Plekhanov to appreciate Marxian political economy and to recognize the merits of its sociological method of analysis. But it is only in this sense that Fesenko's influence left its mark on Plekhanov. For him as for most Populists, Marx was "a very studious person but, properly speaking, not a revolutionary: Vot Bakunin - nastoiashchii revoliutsioner."¹⁵ Hence, Fesenko's lectures did not modify Plekhanov's Populist world view in any way. Typical in this respect is the fact--as Plekhanov wrote himself--that

when Fesenko had left St. Petersburg political economy was once more totally neglected by us; on the agenda were again texts from Russian history, which were generally reduced to talks about the rebellions of Razin, Bulavin, and Pugachev in relation to the history of the

peasantry.... Sometimes we also talked to them [the workers] about the International Workers Association; but as Buntarists we, of course, stressed the activity of Bakunin and portrayed the 'centralists,' i.e., the followers of Marx and Engels, as after all fairly malicious reactionaries.¹⁶

Much sooner than anticipated, Plekhanov was to meet with the "followers of Marx and Engels." Having participated both in the organization and actual event of what has been recorded as the first worker demonstration in Russia--the Kazan Square demonstration of December 1876--Plekhanov was forced to go abroad to escape the Tsarist police who, quite rightly, considered him as one of the leading activists of the affair.¹⁷ Aside from a brief stay in Paris, Plekhanov spent most of his time in Berlin. On the whole, his experience there only reinforced his Bakuninist dislike of the Germans in general and the German Social Democrats in particular. It seems that Plekhanov, perceiving Germany through his Bakuninist spectacles, only saw what he wanted to see. The arrogance and vitality of Germany's new capital was in itself a manifestation of striving for authority and state power. As to the German Marxists, Plekhanov found that they were of philistine mentality, of "moderation, regularity and graduality, totally lacking the revolutionary flair."¹⁸ Thus, neither Germany nor German Social Democracy produced any favourable impression on Plekhanov. He returned to Russia in July 1877 "still more of a zealous Narodnik than he had been before his departure."¹⁹

Since the Kazan demonstration, at which Plekhanov had given a speech heralding the arrival of Zemlia i Volia on the Russian revolutionary scene, he had made himself a name as one of the new organization's most able speakers and devoted advocates of its cause. He impressed the revolutionary community as an "extraordinary talented and well-read person who was unconditionally devoted to his /Populist/ beliefs."²⁰

Perhaps what really amazed his contemporaries was that Plekhanov was both a "zealous Narodnik" and an intellectual par excellence. "He was one of the few," Deich wrote, "who in spite of his Bakuninism violated its dogma of anti-intellectualism, the superfluous preoccupation with books, and read all that was available to him whenever he had a minute to spare."²¹ And referring to Plekhanov's concern for theory, O. Aptekman recalled that "there was none among us--his comrades--who was such a man of principles...as Plekhanov."

/He always/ argued strongly and logically, but he never strayed from his principled course: 'the principle'--the guiding theoretical principles were always the light with the help and in the name of which he conducted and defended his practical suggestions.... He was outraged whenever he had to listen to opinions 'not bound by any theory'.../and/ cuttingly ironical when he addressed people 'without any theory.'²²

Aptekman aptly summarized his impression of Plekhanov, as a man who would rather abandon his revolutionary calling than contradict his revolutionary practice, by evoking the Lutheran "Hier stehe ich und kann nicht anders!"--a declaration which Plekhanov himself was fond of using in his later days.

There was indeed something of a theologian in Plekhanov. For he was not just a faithful believer of the Populist creed, but also its theologian by necessity. Faith in itself could not have satisfied his quest for certainty. His psychological and intellectual disposition would not permit him to embrace a faith without any 'worldly' substantiation. One might say, Plekhanov's 'intellectualism'--his concern with books, theory and principles--was but a reflection of his theological tendency, i.e., to rationalize and substantiate his belief so as to be certain that he was on the right path to heaven.

Unlike the majority of the revolutionary Populists, Plekhanov's faith in the peasants could not, therefore, flow from a Rousseauian romanticism. The 'intellectualism' which distinguished him from his colleagues merely indicated another, perhaps even more, significant difference. His urge to read and study was caused by the fact that he, unlike them, did not believe in the people as some kind of religious entity ensuring the intelligentsia's salvation. Instead of a spontaneous and unquestionable veneration of the peasants, Plekhanov consciously arrived at his belief of their social-revolutionary potential by convincing himself that "life itself" had made them the chosen people.

Plekhanov articulated this belief in his first theoretical work, "O Chem Spor?," which he wrote in December 1878 as a critique of Gleb Uspensky who had begun to question the Populist faith in the peasantry.²³ Plekhanov defended the

Populist idealization of the peasants in reference to the historical experience of the Russian people and the presently existing socio-economic conditions of Russian life. Rather than resorting to the usual tautological argument of the inherent goodness of the peasants, he attributed their "high level of altruistic feeling" to the "artel" and the "communal principles" which still governed the social life of the majority of the people. These principles, he argued, have permeated the mentality of the peasants to such a degree that even when they, like the urban workers, become separated from their communal way of life they retain their sense of collectivism.²⁴ He criticized Uspensky and people like him for having characterized the social habits of the peasants without taking account of Russian economic conditions in general and the Russian commune in particular. The latter not only determined the collectivist socialist mentality of the peasants, but also contained the structural prerequisites from which Russian socialism could develop.²⁵ The basis of Plekhanov's beliefs was not the people, but their social institutions--the artel and particularly the obshchina. His confidence in the peasantry, thus, grew out of a faith in 'socio-economic determinism.'

As a matter of fact, Plekhanov's understanding of, and subsequent elaboration on, the concept of 'positivistic - empirical' Populism was shaped by his sociological perception of the people's socialist inclinations. His commitment to

the revolutionary practice of Narodničestvo was therefore not determined by some mythical belief in the people, but by the conviction that 'empirical' circumstances and their 'positivistic' (i.e., scientific) interpretation indicate to the intelligentsia the peasantry as the only driving force of social progress in Russia.

As a Populist of the new 'positivistic' orientation, Plekhanov not only accepted its Bakuninist quest for revolutionary activity on the basis of the people's "immediate needs and demands," but also embraced what he considered its basic theoretical principle: the economic interpretation of history. This "great scientific contribution of Marx" had been conveyed to Plekhanov through the words of Bakunin who wrote in State and Anarchism:

[Marx] stated and proved that unquestionable truth, confirmed by all the past and contemporary history of human societies, peoples, and states, that the economic fact always preceded and precedes juridical and political right. In the exposition and proof of this truth resides one of the chief scientific services of Marx.²⁶

As a diligent student of Fesenko's lectures and by his own repeated reading of the Capital between 1876 and 1878, Plekhanov complemented his Bakuninist understanding of Marx with a more sophisticated insight of Marxist sociology which, as was already evident in "O Chem Spor?," furnished him with the intellectual equipment to substantiate and defend his Populist Weltanschauung.²⁷

With the obshchina (i.e., empirical evidence) and Marxist sociology (i.e., scientific principles), Plekhanov was able to satisfy his 'theological' striving for certainty by systematizing

his Populist ideas into a comprehensive and consistent ideological construct. Instead of accepting Marxism (like the social democratic Lavrovists) or rejecting it (like the Populists of all ideological shades), Plekhanov utilized its sociological precepts to demonstrate that Russia was definitely not destined for capitalism and that, therefore, revolutionary Populism was the only possible form of Russian socialism. This conviction, as shall be shown, was based upon the alpha and omega of Plekhanov's philosophy--the obshchina and Marxism.

The Plekhanovite System

It was one year after his first theoretical article, "O Chem Spor?," that Plekhanov presented to the revolutionary community his brand of Populism in a programmatic article entitled "The Law of Economic Development of Society and the Tasks of Socialism in Russia."²⁸ The work was a product of Plekhanov's 'theological' concern. It reflected his need for a theory that provided a foolproof method of revolutionary practice. He built the idea of 'positivistic' Narodnichestvo into a system by demonstrating that the application of the scientific principles of Western 'positive sociology' to Russia confirmed rather than contradicted the program of Zemlia i Volia. By the same token, he attempted to show that Narodnichestvo, if it is understood correctly, was the Russian equivalent of Western 'positive socialism.'

Characteristically, Plekhanov began his article with reference to those principles which, according to the foremost

exponent of 'positive socialism,' Karl Marx, must be observed by any socialist in his conduct of revolutionary activity:

Rodbertus, Engels, Karl Marx and Dühring form the brilliant Pleiad of representatives of the positive period of the development of socialism. To the author of 'Capital' socialism arises by itself from the course of the economic development of West European societies. Marx shows us how life itself projects the necessary reforms of social co-operation of the country, how the very forms of productions predispose the minds of the masses to the acceptance of socialist teachings which, until this necessary [material] preparation has been realized, will be unable not only to accomplish a revolution but even to create a more or less significant [socialist] party. He shows us when, in which forms and within what limits socialist propaganda may be considered a productive expenditure of force. 'When a society has got upon the track of the natural law of its development,' says he, 'it can neither skip the natural forms of its development, nor remove them by legal enactments; but it can lessen and shorten the birth-pangs.' Marx, thus, indicates that the economic history of society sets limits to the effectiveness of propaganda. Dühring, who fully recognizes the influence of individuals on the course of social development, argues that the activity of the individual must have a 'broad foundation in the sentiments of the masses.'²⁹

Revolutionaries who either ignore or are ignorant of these scientific findings of 'positive socialism' were, in Plekhanov's estimate, bound to fail in their endeavour to change society. They understood neither the restrictive role of the individual in history nor the economic laws of social development.

It was in reference to and criticism of previous social thought that Plekhanov illustrated why such an understanding was absolutely essential for the realization of a social revolution. Adapting the Comtean scheme of the three stages

of the evolution of social thought and interpreting them in quasi-Marxian terms, Plekhanov proceeded to expose the shortcomings of the "theological" and "metaphysical" socialists, i.e., the Tkachevists and Lavrovists.

In the "theological period of the development of sociology," socialists, Plekhanov wrote, believed that it was a simple matter to bring about social revolutions.

One simply had to organize a conspiracy, seize power in one's hand and then come down on the heads of one's subjects with a number of beneficial degrees.... Just as in nature [natural science]...all phenomena were explained by the will of one or a few Gods, so in society [social science] the course of development was assumed to depend exclusively upon the influence of the legislative power.³⁰

Plekhanov claimed that all but a "small handful of revolutionaries" have abandoned this conception of the social phenomenon.³¹ As history progressed and people began to realize the complexity of social dynamics, the theological stage was superseded by another higher level of social thought. Thus, when the revolutionaries

became convinced that history is created by the interaction of people and government, with the people having by far the larger share of the influence, the majority of the revolutionaries ceased dreaming about the seizure of power. They understood that revolutions are much more durable when they come from below.³²

This new stage in the development of sociology was characterized, according to Plekhanov, by the metaphysical constructs of the utopian socialists. Having realized that setting a plot and seizing state power were not sufficient for a fundamental

change of social structure and that only revolutions by the masses could be truly effective, the utopian socialists began to draw up plans for an ideal society taking the desires and interests of the people into account. By this action they hoped to persuade the masses to follow their lead. "And so," Plekhanov declared, "numerous social systems appeared, worked out to the smallest details, which were propagandized among the people in order to prepare them for the social revolution aspired by the revolutionaries."³³

The metaphysical socialists were a step ahead of their theological predecessors insofar as their motto was concerned: "everything for the people by the means of the people." However, their scheming--as Plekhanov saw it--was bound to fail because it was a product of their metaphysical thinking which did not take the "laws of social development" into account.³⁴ These revolutionaries forgot that "it was impossible to invent a form of social structure" since its form was invented by "life itself." This fatal flaw in their thinking, Plekhanov concluded, was typical of the metaphysical socialists who "paid no attention to life;" who invented "their forms of social life which they considered suitable for society while in reality totally disregarding its economic history: they did not know the limits to their own reformatory fantasy; they attributed to propaganda a metaphysical essence capable of changing at will the course of history; they considered the mind all and life nothing." In constructing these utopian

37

systems the socialist writers of the 1830's and 1840's betrayed their inability to grasp the historical dimension of the problem. This, however, is not surprising, said Plekhanov, since it is "only recently that socialists have begun to pay serious attention to those elements of social overturns which are the result of the preceding life of society."³⁵

The imprint of Marx in the criticism of Plekhanov is unmistakably evident. Had it been possible for Plekhanov to have read German Ideology and Holy Family, one could presume that some of his arguments were taken straight from these works. Reading his "Law of Economic Development" one is startled by the degree to which its content reflects Marx's criticism of social revolutionary thought.³⁶

The explanation for this resemblance lies in the similarity of their intentions: both aimed at the realization of their ideals by basing their revolutionary practice upon an infallible theory of social evolution whose inherent historical logic (law) would 'inevitably' lead to a socialist order. Expressed somewhat less paradoxically, in order to ensure themselves and to convince others that their ideals were not a product of the imagination, of "reformatory fantasy," they strove to demonstrate that socialism was not a question of wishful thinking--of what ought to be--but a question of necessity, that is to say, a necessary product of socio-economic laws governing the historical process. Only by fixing socialist philosophy upon such an unshakable foundation

would it be possible to overcome the pitfalls and subsequent failures of previous social theories and revolutionary practices. Hence, if the revolutionaries wanted to be immune against the shortcomings of theological and metaphysical socialists, their actions should not be guided by spontaneity, emotionality and moral indignation but should conform to the laws of social development.

In Plekhanov's mind there was nothing 'fantastic' about the Marxian conception that society is governed by laws analogous to the Darwinian law of evolution operating in nature. Like Darwin's discovery in the natural sciences, Marx's revelation in the social sciences was attained through the application of scientific principles which permitted an objective analysis of "life itself," i.e., of objective conditions as revealed in historical and empirical reality. In other words, with the dawn of 'positive sociology' (i.e., scientific socialism)--the creation of this "brilliant Pleiad" mentioned above--such an investigation had become feasible through the application of Marx's epistemological and methodological precepts expressed in the proposition: since, epistemologically speaking, being determines consciousness, that is, since material conditions determine the forms of social life, the discovery of the laws of social development depends on the study of the economic history of society. If on the basis of these precepts Marx had shown that in the West "socialism arises by itself from the course of economic

development," then, on the basis of these very same principles, Plekhanov sought to substantiate the Populist claim of Russia's unique path to socialism by proving that in Russia socialism results from the course of Russian economic history.

Anticipating objections from his Populist compatriots that Marxist principles did not apply to Russia and allegations from his liberal opponents that if the "Russian disciples of Marx" were consistent they should endorse capitalism as a means of achieving socialism, Plekhanov explained that while the results of Marx's analysis of Western capitalist countries did not necessarily apply to other societies, its scientific principles were nevertheless universally operative. Stressing this point, he argued that the laws of development were, of course, not the same everywhere because "in general, history is not at all a uniform and mechanical process."³⁷ Indeed, even Marx himself, Plekhanov proclaimed, was not the man who would be willing "to stretch the whole human race on a Procustean bed of 'universal laws'." Hence, "to be more precise," Plekhanov concluded,

we ought to say that general laws of social dynamics do exist but being interrelated and combined differently in different societies, they give entirely dissimilar results just as one and the same laws of gravitation produce in one instance the elliptic orbit of a planet while in the other the parabolic orbit of a comet.³⁸

With such interpretation of Marxian historical materialism, the "Russian disciples of Marx"--and Plekhanov considered himself one of them--could convincingly argue their case without

either alienating their fellow Populists or consenting to the liberals' logic that they should "patronize the development of the Fatherland's industry, betray the ancient tradition of the [Russian] people and dispossess them of the land, while comforting themselves with the realization that all this is necessary for the development of socialism in Russia."³⁹

Thus, having come to terms with the controversy over the application of the Marxist analysis to Russia, Plekhanov started his discourse of the "socialist tasks" of Zemlia i Volia by announcing: "Let us see, then, to what the teaching of Marx obliges us...in view of our program." Plekhanov cited Marx's famous statement on the inevitability of West European capitalism: "Society cannot jump over the natural phases of its development, when it has got upon the track of the natural laws of this development'...." This means, Plekhanov said, "as long as society has not yet come upon the track of this law, the change of economic phases conditioned by the latter are not obligatory for it."⁴⁰ Obviously, according to such an interpretation, the crucial question of whether or not Russia must "go through the school of capitalism" depended on the question of whether or not Russia has already "come upon the track of the law of capitalistic development." Posing this question, Plekhanov set the guidelines of the discussion: first, an analysis of the sources of Western capitalism and, secondly, a comparative assessment of the socio-economic history and present material

condition of Russian society in light of the West European experience.

"Naturally the question arises," wrote Plekhanov, "when did West European society--serving Marx as objective data--get upon this fatal track [of capitalist development]?" He readily provided the answer: "It seems to us that this happened precisely when the West European commune perished. It is well-known that it was destroyed already in the struggle with medieval feudalism."⁴¹ In this struggle, the "communal principle" of collective ownership was replaced by the "feudal principle" of individual ownership, i.e., the idea that the "land belongs to every citizen" was supplanted by the idea that "the land belongs to [certain individuals] by right of birth." What Plekhanov in effect argued was that by destroying the obshchina, West European feudalism radically altered the traditional pattern of the property relations and consequently gave birth to the "spirit of individualism."⁴² On account of this 'historical fact,' Plekhanov expounded his thesis that feudalism represented the first stage in the evolution of capitalism because it substituted the "idea of community" with the "principle of individualism" which according to him, found its logical conclusion in the "bourgeois principle" of ownership, namely, the idea that "the land may belong to anyone who has the means to purchase it." Plekhanov, therefore, singled out the disintegration of the obshchina as the most important

factor in putting West European society upon that "fatal track" leading to capitalism.⁴³

Employing his dialectical skills, Plekhanov described how feudalism--carrying within itself the seeds of its own destruction--was superseded by capitalism which, in turn, generated its own negation by giving rise to a new 'communal principle,' socialism. If the feudal destruction of the communal existence of the people had given birth to individualism, the existence of the principle necessarily led to the downfall of feudalism itself:

Gradually developing, individualism, by an internal necessity, had to undermine feudalism with the assistance of arising capital, scientific discoveries and inventions. Actually, feudalism fell under the united blows of its mighty opponents; but it should not be forgotten that the 'spirit' which imparted life to this movement and which animated these discoveries was the spirit of personality, of individualism. This principle found its political embodiment and social shock--the American and the French revolution.⁴⁴

But if these bourgeois revolutions rang the death knell for feudalism, they also marked in Plekhanov's opinion the beginning of the end of the "bourgeois principle"--the final and most extreme expression of individualism. The internal contradictions of this principle came finally to the surface with the arrival of large-scale capitalist production unrestrained by any feudal limitations. Considering that the "spirit of individualism" had penetrated into every facet of West European life, into all the material relations of people, it was natural, said Plekhanov, that it "could perish only as

a consequence of the contradictions contained within itself; but these contradictions could be displayed with all their force only in the course of capitalist production." Through this mode of production,

individualism has dug its own grave by uniting in the factories great masses of workers, creating in them a sense of common interest, and exposing them to that 'socialization of labour,' which, according to Marx, cultivates in people social habits which had been suppressed since the collapse of the obshchina; and there is nothing surprising about this fact that socialism meets such a hearty reception in the localities of large-scale industrial production.⁴⁵

From these observations, Plekhanov stated, it clearly follows that "all the significance of capitalism--this extreme form of the incarnation of individualism--lies in the preparation of the minds of the working masses for the apprehension of socialist teachings."⁴⁶ The truth of this proposition is also evident from the fact that until very recently socialism was merely the property of "religious-communist sects;" "only now, in the classical time of capitalism, when by the very techniques of production people are bound to collectivism," has socialism "become a mass movement."⁴⁷ Hence, as Plekhanov saw it, the historical movement beginning with the disintegration of the commune had come full circle: via individualism West European society had finally arrived at socialism--in short, the principle which destroyed feudalism established the "communal principle" anew.

Plekhanov's concluding remarks on the origin of capitalism and the operation of its laws in the West already contained the basic theoretical premises from which he assessed the nature of Russia's destiny and, consequently, the "socialist tasks" of Narodnichestvo. He wrote:

It is now clearly intelligible to us why West European society could neither 'skip the natural phases of its development, nor change them by legal enactments.' We also readily understand /now/ the role of capitalism in the gradual uniting of the working masses. Indeed, in the West, capitalism was the natural predecessor of socialism; but we consider that the course of development of socialism in the West would have been completely different had the commune not perished there prematurely. /For/ the principle of social landownership does not bear within itself that indelible contradiction from which, let us say, individualism suffers; therefore it does not bear within itself the very elements of its doom. 48

These remarks reveal par excellence the logic of Plekhanov's reasoning. True, he said, given the historical and contemporary circumstances of the West, capitalism is indeed a necessary stage in the evolution of a socialist Europe, but under different preconditions--e.g., the preservation of the obshchina and, therefore, the survival of collectivism--the realization of socialism in a society other than Western Europe could, in fact, be achieved along completely different lines than prescribed by Marx's law of social development. For Plekhanov, this was not merely a hypothetical possibility but a concrete alternative because Russia's historical and empirical data differed radically from that of Marx's West European society.

Historically, the Russian obshchina had proven immune against external influences hostile to its existence and, empirically, it had remained the predominant social institution of society. This historically unmodified Russian obshchina--where the land was held collectively rather than individually--represented the primitive commune which, he believed, had come down from time immemorial. "And so," he concluded, "in the principle of the primitive obshchina, as it exists in Russia, we do not see any [internal] contradiction which would condemn it to destruction."⁴⁹ By implication this meant Russia had not yet come upon the fatal path of capitalist development and, consequently the mentality and social customs of its people were still largely conditioned by the socio-economic environment of the obshchina which provided an objective basis for socialism in Russia.

Therefore, as long as the land commune contains the majority of our peasants, we cannot consider that our fatherland is treading on the path of that law, according to which capitalist production would be a necessary station on the path of its progress. [In Russia] the tendency of this law on the contrary, would consist in lowering the level of social feeling in our people, whereas in the West it was once a phenomenon of real progress.⁵⁰

Expecting his reader to query why one and the same "form of co-operation"--capitalism--is at one time considered progressive at another retrogressive, Plekhanov offered the following explanation. In the West, capitalism replaced a system of co-operation (feudalism) based on the same principle as itself (individualism), but it was "a positive gain for

the social habits of the masses" because of "the socialization of labour" in large factories. In Russia, however,

the very same capitalism will oust the land commune, namely that form of co-operation which is based on a much higher principle and no 'socialization of labour' in factories will compensate for that definite decline of social feelings and habits, which will occur as a result of this radical change in the relations of the masses to their main instrument of labour--the land.⁵¹

How could it be otherwise in view of the sociological implications of the formula "being determines consciousness": if in the industrialized West the factory and its corollary, the socialization of labour, prepared the masses for socialism, in agricultural Russia the obshchina had already fulfilled this sociological function. Hence, Plekhanov pointed out, the question is not whether

the capitalist form of production is good or harmful in itself, /but rather/ which form of co-operation it has substituted. If the form of society replaced by it was of a lower type compared with it, society has progressed; if capitalism was installed in a society constructed on a more just principle, /then/ a step backward has been taken in social development.⁵²

This argument against a capitalist destiny of Russia was precisely what Plekhanov had in mind when he stated that not even Marx would have been prepared "to stretch the whole human race on a Procrustean bed of 'universal laws'." Depending on the material conditions of a given society, "the general laws of social dynamics" would yield entirely different results. In terms of methodology, this implied

that the application of one and the same theory to different conditions would produce different conclusions. Hence, if Russia were different in her development from the industrialized West this was because her destiny stemmed from a different material situation: economically, she was an agrarian society; sociologically, her primary social organization was the peasant commune.

How, then, does this difference of "social forms" translate into the formulation of an appropriate revolutionary program? What are the practical implications of the fact that in the West the objective basis of socialism is provided by the capitalist "socialization of labour" while in Russia it is provided by the communal ownership of the land? To Western socialists it prescribes the propagation of "collective ownership" since, according to Marx, this principle was a logical consequence of the capitalist mode of production which necessitates "collective labour" and, thereby, develops in the workers a sense of collectivism--a receptivity for the idea of the collective possession of the means of production. If in the West "the receptivity of the masses to this idea developed precisely from the fact of collective labour and only from it," in Russia it was vice versa.⁵³ There this idea requires no propagation since the majority of the population consists of peasants whose mentality and outlook has been shaped for centuries by the prevailing form of "the collective possession of the land." There the industrial workers

number hardly a million and the majority of them are "farmers [*zemlegel'tsy*] by sympathy and attitude." Clearly, in Russia "collective labour" cannot lead to "collective ownership," on the contrary, the latter must necessarily lead to the former.

The genesis of these two main features of socialist production will be completely reversed. We say 'will' because at the present, in our opinion, the time of propagating collective labour has yet not come. [Because of] the primitive methods of agriculture, as practiced by our peasantry, collective labour would change little in respect to the efficiency of labour.⁵⁴

The propagation of "collective labour"--the collective cultivation of the land--lies yet in the distant future and has no immediate relevance for the Russian revolutionary: "In short, one of the requirements of West European socialism, collective possession, constitutes for us an existing fact; the other, collective labour, has no relevance under the [*existing*] technique of Russian agriculture." The immediate task of the Russian socialist, therefore, consists of agitation among the people with the aim of creating "a militant Populist-revolutionary organization" in order to destroy the government which not only prevents the establishment of a socialist society, but also threatens the already existing foundation of such an order--the *obshchina*.⁵⁵ "Thus," Plekhanov concluded, "we a priori have arrived at those practical tasks which the titanic Populist revolutionary defenders Bolotnikov, Bulavin, Razin, Pugachev and others set before themselves."⁵⁶

Plekhanov supplemented this 'a priori' recipe for the practical tasks of the revolutionary Populists with a discourse on the methods and tactics for "realizing a Populist revolutionary upheaval." He took himself and his fellow Populists to task for having failed to recognize the tactical importance of the urban workers and to adopt appropriate methods of agitation in order to utilize their revolutionary potential. His experience with the St. Petersburg workers had not only convinced him that they were part of the 'people' sharing their attitude and mentality, but also that they represented a stratum which had demonstrated its cohesion, courage and revolutionary potential in a whole series of disturbances and strikes. Unable to ignore these facts of personal experience, he was forced somewhat reluctantly to admit that

the question of the city workers belongs among those which, one might say, are advanced independently by life itself to the forefront, its rightful place, despite the a priori theoretical decisions of the revolutionaries. In the past, not without some basis, we directed all our efforts at the rural masses. The urban worker occupied a secondary place in the calculations of the revolutionaries, as it were, only extra resources were devoted to him. In the city propaganda was conducted at odd moments, in times when for some reason or another, the countryside was inaccessible to the propagandists, and it was conducted exclusively with the goal to turn the city worker into a propagandist for the countryside. Such an attitude, naturally excluded the possibility of persistent, systematic propaganda as well as, in particular, the organization of the city workers....⁵⁷

Present circumstances, Plekhanov insisted, neither permit such an attitude on the part of the revolutionaries nor the continuation of a policy resulting from it.

The urban worker, in spite of the comparatively insignificant effort expended on him, is imbued with a fairly large degree of socialist ideas. Today it is already difficult to find a factory, workshop or even a craftsman's shop which does not contain some socialist workers.... In the course of last year we saw several large strikes in factories and workshops. In this time, where were our socialists, what role did they play in these movements? Almost none.⁵⁸

This situation must and will be changed, if only because "disturbances among the factory workers, gradually accumulating and intensifying day by day, force us earlier than anticipated to consider the role which the urban workers must play within the Populist-revolutionary organization."⁵⁹

In order to promote the workers to their "rightful place" within the Russian revolutionary movement and, thus, utilize this revolutionary potential for the coming upheaval, the revolutionaries must treat the urban workers "as a whole" having an "independent significance" of their own. This is not possible, Plekhanov claimed, as long as the Populist Socialists view the workers "only as material for recruiting individual persons" for the purpose of propaganda and agitation in the countryside. In short, instead of searching among the workers for new elements to replenish the ranks of the party, the Populist agitators must begin to concern themselves with the interests and daily needs of the workers--wages, labour penalties, and working time.⁶⁰

Above all, however, the revolutionaries must cease thinking that the workers would only have a secondary role in the forthcoming revolution. This misconception, Plekhanov remarked,

has always prevented the Populists to relate seriously to the urban workers. "Was this outlook correct? Is it really [true]," he asked, "that the urban worker remains without an important role in the future socialist revolution?" No, he answered categorically, "to us it seems that this opinion is absolutely mistaken" because:

Our large industrial centres group together tens and sometimes hundreds of thousands of workers. In the great majority of cases all these men are the same peasants as those in the villages. For them the factory appears only as an aspect of seasonal work. However, their separation from the village, even for a couple of years, cannot obliterate their moral ties and sympathies. Questions of agriculture, of self-administration of the obshchina, of land and freedom, all these are just as close to the heart of the workers as to the peasants. In short, they are not alienated from the peasantry but part of the peasantry itself. Their cause is the same--their struggle can and must be the same. And besides, the cities collect the very flower of the village population, younger people, more enterprising,... in the city [they] are removed from the influences of the more conservative and fearful members of the peasant family. Finally, they hear and see more, they have a more extensive experience of all social relations. Our urban workers do not represent the West European alienation from the peasant class,...they constitute the most active, the most susceptible to incitation, and the most easily revolutionized stratum of the population. Due to this they are a precious ally for the peasants when the social revolution breaks out.⁶¹

Hence, contrary to general belief, it appears that the workers are not only as important as their rural counterpart, the peasantry, but also constitute the most revolutionary stratum in Russia.⁶²

What were the actual implications arising from this kind of situation which, in the words of Plekhanov "life itself"

brought to the attention of the revolutionaries? For him this was not a question of theoretical but of practical significance. He conceived the role of the Russian workers in its practical or, to be more precise, tactical dimension. Consequently, therefore, he was only concerned with the "tactical significance" of the workers as "precious allies" of the peasantry. This significance consisted of the fact that at the moment of revolution--i.e., revolution in the countryside--the workers could engage and neutralize the forces of the government at its very core in St. Petersburg and other administrative centres of the empire:

The urban workers must and can divert the forces of the government /in order/ to give the peasant rebellion time to strengthen and develop to the degree of invincibility. Only in this sense and under such conditions can the socialist revolution be a success.⁶³

In addition, but equally important, the workers must "pave the way for the approaching avalanche of the revolutionary movement by going to the villages to incite the peasants in the same way as the 'vorovskie prelestniki' who rendered so much service to the Razin and Pugachev rebellions."⁶⁴

Plekhanov's characterization of the workers and his interpretation of their specific role as revolutionary 'vanguard' in no sense modified either his Populist interpretation of the so-called "general laws of social dynamics" as they applied to Russia, nor his conception of the nature of the coming revolution: in Russia, the laws of social development would culminate in an agrarian revolution. Although he was aware

that he introduced a new element into the "calculations of the revolutionaries," he would not have been prepared to admit that this might also call for a revision of the formula itself.

There was no compelling reason for him to change what he thought was a foolproof formula of revolution. It was a formula rooted in the reality of Russian social life: i.e., it was based upon an analysis of Russian history and society which gave him every reason to believe that, in view of the precepts of Marx's 'positive sociology,' the obshchina in its present form, with its principle of collective ownership and its forms of socialization, would represent an objective and solid foundation for an agrarian socialist revolution in Russia. It would be in the villages not in the cities where the revolution would break out; it would be a peasant not a proletarian revolution. For him, it would have been absolutely unrealistic to expect the contrary to happen since the workers constituted only a marginal phenomenon in the social matrix of Russian society--they constituted not a class but merely an appendix of the peasantry.

While it is obvious that Plekhanov should have thought it unreasonable to base the program of Zemlia i Volia on such a narrow foundation it is not as obvious why he would not acknowledge that the worker's increasing importance might introduce an element of inconsistency into his Populist concept of revolution. How is one to explain his sense of realism that urged him to acknowledge the revolutionary significance of the workers even though he must have been aware that they were but the

product of that very capitalism which according to his blueprint of revolution had supposedly no future in Russia? And how is one to account for his inability or his unwillingness to see this latent contradiction created by the inclusion of the workers into his "calculations?"

Before attempting to answer these questions it is important not to lose sight of the fact that Plekhanov's defence of the Populist thesis, claiming that Russia could skip capitalism, was not simply a philosophical but also an empirical one. As one scholar put it: "it was almost entirely based upon a 'cold-blooded' analysis of 'objective conditions'."⁶⁵

This demand for realism (i.e., objective scientific knowledge) had its source in a striving for certitude and consistency which, one might say, was rooted in a psychological need stemming from fear of dissociation from social reality and, consequently, of isolation from the people. While this fear, on the one hand, compelled him to forge a foolproof 'scientific' formula of revolution in order to ensure himself against the 'alluring fantasies of the mind'--i.e., his subjective emotional aspirations--it, on the other hand, made him more receptive than his fellow Populists to alterations in the social structure upon which he had based his formula.⁶⁶ For example, however marginal a phenomenon, the workers had made themselves noticeable to the point where they "forced" him to consider their place in the revolutionary organization of Zemlia i Volia. His own experience with them had made

him sensitive to the fact that there was an emerging social stratum with a growing sense of identity leading to its increasing differentiation from the peasantry. It seems that in spite of "the a priori theoretical decision of the revolutionaries" there was simply no escape for Plekhanov but to acknowledge the empirical evidence "advanced independently by life itself." The same 'need' which urged him to base his revolutionary world view and program of action on an objective foundation, grounded in empirical reality, forced him to acknowledge the revolutionary potential of the workers and accommodate them in his system of thought.

This structure of thinking is reflected in his demand of the necessity--necessary because "life itself" (i.e., objective circumstances) forced him to do so--to view the workers "as a whole" having "independent significance" while, at the same time, asserting that they are nevertheless representatives of the peasantry--i.e., that segment of the population which by virtue of the obshchina constituted an objective vehicle for a socialist revolution in Russia. By neatly categorizing the workers as the most revolutionary and enlightened representatives of the peasantry, Plekhanov was able to advocate their importance without having to abandon his formula of revolution or even having to account for the apparent contradiction which this new element introduced into his system. Undoubtedly, this controlling definition was not a product of intellectual dishonesty but rather of

intellectual conviction derived from his "'cold-blooded' analysis of 'objective conditions'." Although acutely aware that the question of the city workers added a new dimension to the Populist conception of a Russian revolution he, on the basis of his 'Marxist' interpretation of Russian economic history, felt fully justified in treating this question in a practical sense devoid of any theoretical significance for indicating the path of Russian social development. For the time being, Plekhanov was therefore able to discuss the "independent significance" of the workers in purely tactical terms and, thereby, retain his formula of revolution without questioning its theoretical and empirical consistency which might have jeopardized the sense of certitude he derived from it.

Plekhanov's peculiar interpretation of Marxism and the application of its principles to Russia convinced him that Russia would remain impregnable to capitalism as long as the obshchina in its present form remained the predominant social structure of Russian society. With this premise in mind he, as a self-styled "disciple of Marx," could not bring himself to view the formation of the Russian proletariat as a manifestation that capitalism was as much a fact of Russian society as the historic obshchina. Thus, paradoxically as it may seem, his 'Marxism,' as it were, prevented Plekhanov from embracing the historiosophical predicaments of Marx.

As a result of his psychological and intellectual disposition, Plekhanov's appropriation of Marxist ideas led him

to a conception of 'positivistic' Narodnichestvo which advised the intelligentsia to discard the ideology of Jacobin Tkachevism, laissez-faire liberalism, social democratic Lavrovism, and traditional Populism. Instead, they ought to follow the objective findings of science indicating to them the restrictive and possible scope of revolutionary practice.

At present, Plekhanov insisted, this scope was defined in terms of economic agitation among peasants and workers with the specific purpose of uniting with them in the creation of a popular revolutionary party--a party of the masses instilled by the intelligentsia with a sense of initiative and self-confidence. Only by means of militant agitation on the basis of the economic needs and demands of the people could the intelligentsia hope to succeed in merging with the masses and in imbuing them with a consciousness of their own revolutionary interests.⁶⁷ True, such an undertaking was not an easy task in a repressive political order like Russia, but it was nevertheless the only possible and certain method of revolutionary struggle and must be pursued relentlessly in spite of sacrifices, unsuccessful strikes and peasant rebellions. True, lives of individual agitators would be "lost," but by the same token the revolutionary energies of individuals would be transformed "little by little into the revolutionary energy of the masses."⁶⁸ This almost metaphysical undertone in his advocacy of agitation emanated, of course, from Plekhanov's conviction that this method of revolutionary

practice was prescribed to the intelligent by his scientific analysis of "life itself"--i.e., by the nature of Russian reality: its history, people, and socio-economic institutions. Hence, whatever the sacrifices and disappointments, the revolutionary can be sure that his agitational efforts would not be in vain since they synchronized with the interests of the people whose strivings were but a manifestation of the law of economic development of Russian society.

CHAPTER III

THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

From the preceding discussion of Plekhanov's systematic exposition of the supposedly scientific character of Narodnichestvo one is able to identify three interrelated themes: (1) socialist revolutionary practice must correspond to the laws of social development; (2) conditional operation of these laws must allow Russia to achieve socialism on the basis of the obshchina; and (3) the only possible method of revolutionary action in Russia as prescribed by (1) and (2) is militant economic agitation among the people.

The first proposition constitutes an article of faith for Plekhanov. That is to say, he unconditionally believes in the Marxian thesis that the evolution of society is governed by laws which can be disclosed by scientific analysis and must be observed by the revolutionary if he does not want to become a Don Quixote. Recognizing this fact, the socialist must resort to the methods of 'positive sociology' in order to uncover the specific operation of the economic laws in the society he intends to change. This enables him to determine

the scope of revolutionary practice; i.e., the limits and possibilities he must adhere to if he wants to ascertain that his actions will, in effect, yield the results envisaged by him.

Duly observing the principles of 'positive sociology,' Plekhanov arrived at the second and third proposition by formulating a comprehensive Populist ideology. The sense of certainty (i.e., possessing knowledge of the laws of Russian social development) and consistency (i.e., revolutionary practice conforming to these laws) he derived from these two propositions rested--in the case of the former--on the assumption of the continued stability and viability of the obshchina, and--in the case of the latter--on the assumption of the radical intelligentsia's ability and willingness to execute its agitational task. Whether or not these assumptions could be maintained without seriously impairing Plekhanov's blueprint of revolution depended, of course, on the economic (the question of the obshchina and capitalist development) and the political factors (the intelligentsia's political disposition and Russian political conditions) underlying the first two propositions. In contrast to the first proposition, which represented some kind of a constant in Plekhanov's Weltanschauung insofar as it depended solely on him for its acceptance and was therefore not subject to outside influences, the latter two propositions were based on assumptions subject to external factors which were not within

his range of control. By implication, therefore, these factors constituted what could be termed the 'political' and 'economic challenge' to Plekhanov's idea of Narodnichestvo.

Although the distinction between 'political' and 'economic' challenges is primarily analytical, there is also a chronological distinction. The 'political' (1878-79) precedes the 'economic challenge' (1879-80) by a whole year before the two merge into one. This time-lag is not unimportant for it allows the two events and Plekhanov's reaction to them to be treated separately. The different nature of Plekhanov's response to these challenges reflects again those psychological features and subsequent intellectual preferences which contributed to the formulation of his ideological system that satisfied his quest for certainty and striving for consistency.

Yet, it is precisely the dynamic interrelationship of these two 'responses' which led in an almost dialectical manner to his gradual abandonment of Populism. The history of Plekhanov's reaction to the 'political' and 'economic challenge' tells the real story of his 'odyssey' by revealing the inner logic of his intellectual evolution culminating in his conversion to Marxism.

The Political Challenge

It was in the form of political terrorism that Plekhanov encountered the 'political challenge' to his idea of Narodnichestvo. Ironically, he himself contributed to the formation

of systematic political terror against the government when, in January 1878, he greeted Vera Zasulich's attempt on the life of General Trepov, governor of St. Petersburg, with great enthusiasm. Unaware that herewith she had fired the starting signal for a series of political assassinations which eventually would lead to the 'dramatic' negation of his program of action, Plekhanov wrote a manifesto, on the eve of her acquittal by the jury, heralding her attempt and the court's decision as the beginning of the "prologue to that great historical drama which is called the trial of the government by the people."¹

Although the upsurge of terrorist activity following Zasulich's shot at Trepov was a new phenomenon in the history of Zemlia i Volia, terrorism as such was not an element alien to its philosophy. From the very beginning it was obvious to the founders of the organization that physical confrontation with the government or, as it was referred to in revolutionary circles, "disorganization of the government" in form of "acts of self-defence" would be an inevitable 'by-product' of agitation among the people. Under existing political circumstances it was simply a necessary evil. This was also recognized by Plekhanov who, at first, like the other leading members of Zemlia i Volia, endorsed the idea of "dezorganizatsiia pravitel'stva." As a radical Buntarist he exhibited an extremely rebellious and militant temperament with strong inclination towards terrorism as a weapon to protect both

the revolutionary movement against the infiltration of police spies and the people against immediate oppressors.² But Plekhanov's unreserved approval and passionate comments on the Zasulich incident showed that he was prepared to accept terrorism not only as an act of self-defence, but also as an act of revenge. In accepting the latter as a legitimate means of revolutionary struggle, he promoted the idea of political assassination: "Alas," wrote Deich half a century later, "neither Vera Ivanovna nor Georgii Valentinovich would have thought that a year later they would emerge as the foremost opponents of increasing terrorist activity."³

In principle, therefore, terrorism as a means of self-defence and revenge was acceptable to Plekhanov. For instance, he himself had concluded his programmatic article "The Law of Economic Development" stating that "red terror" would answer the "white terror" which was persecuting St. Petersburg strikers.⁴ But he took care to put terrorist activity in its proper perspective by criticizing the "theological socialists," namely, those people who thought they could emancipate the masses through the application of Jacobin methods. For such a struggle the revolutionary party was not only too weak but it also contradicted its basic principle: "the emancipation of the people must be the work of the people themselves" since history is made by the masses and not by a conspiratorial minority.⁵ To Plekhanov, therefore, terrorism was permissible--perhaps even desirable--as long as it remained

strictly a 'by-product' of the people's struggle for a social revolution. In fact, he seemed not even to have minded the political spill-over of such terrorist acts as Zasulich's. If such incidents incited public opinion and helped to alienate society from the government, this could only ease the socialist task as defined by Zemlia i Volia.⁶ As long as terrorism did not interfere with the program of Zemlia i Volia, neither in practical nor in theoretical terms, he was prepared to view terrorism as a necessary evil.

Unfortunately, as Plekhanov was soon to realize himself, terrorism was not an activity that could be neatly compartmentalized as a 'by-product' having no relevance to the actual conduct of Zemlia i Volia. The moment terrorism was accepted as a means of revenge it tended to follow a logic of its own: assassinations generated "white terror" which in turn called for an increase of "red terror," etc. This logic of events transformed the once 'benevolent' by-product' into a force of its own which eventually dominated all the activities of Zemlia i Volia.

One might say that Plekhanov's increasing objection to and final renunciation of political assassinations corresponded to the degree to which he began to comprehend the practical and theoretical implications of this logic of events. This process of realization which turned Plekhanov from an advocate into an uncompromising opponent of terror can be divided into three phases: (1) questioning the value of terror to the organization

as it becomes evident that this mode of revolutionary struggle consumes more and more of its strength and resources; (2) demanding the curtailment of the ever increasing number of terrorist acts when it becomes apparent that terrorism does not lead to the "disorganization of the government" but to the disorganization of Zemlia i Volia itself; and (3) opposing terrorism outright when its systematization and justification as a political means for gaining political liberties cannot be reconciled with the principles of his conception of Narodnichestvo. As the following description of Plekhanov's response to the 'political challenge' of terrorism will show, every phase of this process in his gradual rejection of terrorism was of intellectual rather than of emotional or moral nature. In effect, his own emotional inclination for terrorism against the government was held in check by his intellectual certainty that such activity could not ensure a social revolution.

It was in the fall of 1878 that Plekhanov, seemingly for the first time, expressed serious doubts about the compatibility of terror with the primary task of Zemlia i Volia, namely, agitation among the people.

Returning to St. Petersburg to find support for his rather successful agitational activity among the Don Cossacks, he was faced with an extremely unpleasant situation. A police raid had completely destroyed the "basic circle" of Zemlia i Volia.⁷ Instead of leaving again for the countryside with

additional reinforcements, Plekhanov was engaged for the next couple of weeks helping to re-establish the demolished St. Petersburg organization which constituted the centre of the Zemlevoľ'cheskii network in Russia.⁸

This fact in itself would have hardly disturbed Plekhanov had it not brought to light the general disillusionment of the revolutionary intelligentsia with the Zemlevoľ'cheskii program of social revolution through agitation by "settling among the people."⁹ It was a revelation for Plekhanov to be told by A. Mikhailov, one of his closest associates and one of the leading figures of Zemlia i Volia, that "it is impossible for us to pursue the task of extensive agitation among the people since our forces are too weak for it, [and] since it is simply necessary 'to punish' the government for its savage persecution."¹⁰ This came as a shock especially since "formerly Mikhailov was a very convinced adherent of 'agitation on the basis of the people's immediate demands' and a very outspoken opponent of 'terror'...." What caused this sudden reversal of a man who had "previously unconditionally stood for agitation among the people, but now became convinced that...we must concentrate on terror?"¹¹ Plekhanov explains this as the direct result of the "St. Petersburg collapse" of Zemlia i Volia. When Plekhanov jokingly remarked to Mikhailov that he was being led down the garden path by following the trends of "new times," he only received the laconic reply: "Our time is not the time for agitation."¹² Naturally, he could not

agree with this categorical answer which not only contradicted his 'scientific' conception of revolution, but also implied the abandonment of the society's program of action. Henceforth, the previously harmonious relationship between the two men was gradually subjected to a conflict of interests: Mikhailov began to promote the interests of the terrorists, insisting that in the allocation of resources priority should be given to their struggle in the cities; Plekhanov, correspondingly, began to defend the interests of the Derevenshchiki, the agitators settling among the peasants, demanding that all efforts of the party should be directed to agitational activity in the countryside.¹³

Plekhanov's conflict with Mikhailov came to a head in March 1879 when A.K. Solovev arrived in St. Petersburg offering to assassinate the Tsar.¹⁴ Mikhailov accepted the offer and promised Zemlia i Volia's assistance. But when he placed Solovev's plan before a meeting of leading Zemlevoltsi, Plekhanov and a large number of those present opposed its execution. A heated dispute began to take place when it became apparent what the practical implications of Solovev's attempt would entail for all other party activities. In expectation of the government's "white terror" following the assassination, all "illegals" would have to depart from the city leaving the organization in a state of paralysis and unable to function normally for some time to come. Zemlia i Volia would have to suspend temporarily its extremely important literary endeavors

2 3

OF/DE

and abandon its successful agitational activity among the St. Petersburg workers. Such sacrifices were simply not acceptable to Plekhanov and his supporters. He told the terrorist faction: "Under the impact of your venture our organization is forced to abandon one after the other its old realms of activity, just as Rome abandoned its provinces one after the other under the pressure of the barbarians."¹⁵

To such an evaluation of their "disorganizational methods of struggle," Plekhanov recalled many years later, the terrorists responded with great bitterness. The discussion took a particularly violent turn when one of the Derevenshchiki threatened that, in view of the detrimental impact which this new adventure of the Dezorganizatory would have on the activity of Zemlia i Volia, he would warn the Tsar of the planned attempt on his life. In reply to this, one of the terrorists shouted: "This is treason, we will deal with you as we have dealt with all traitors!" This threat achieved nothing but a response in kind: "Does this mean," asked a close associate of Plekhanov, "that you want to murder us? If so, don't forget that we can shoot as well as you can."¹⁶

This incident made it sufficiently clear to the terrorists that the Derevenshchiki were not prepared to yield. Confronted with their resolute opposition Mikhailov reminded them that, whatever their opinion, the assassination had to be reckoned with since Solovev had made up his mind and the organization had no right to deter him as he was not a member of Zemlia i

Volia.¹⁷ Having removed the most controversial issue from the agenda, the contending parties settled for an uneasy compromise. It was finally decided that the society would not officially sponsor Solovev's enterprise but that on an individual basis its members could collaborate in the assassination. The meeting dispersed quietly without an open break among its participants.¹⁸ "But," said Plekhanov, "we Narodniki went home with the conviction that the old, once exceptional unity of 'Zemlia i Volia' had been destroyed and that now each faction would go its own way, not concerning itself, and indeed not even having the moral obligation of concerning itself with the interests of the whole."¹⁹

Plekhanov's foreboding proved right. After the Solovev incident the terrorist faction realized that the defenders of orthodoxy would not allow them to direct the society upon a new course of action. Rather than risking the break-up of the organization, which nobody wanted, the terrorists formed their own secret society within Zemlia i Volia, i.e., they began "to create an organization within the organization."²⁰ This move, taking place soon after Solovev's unsuccessful attempt to kill the Tsar, demonstrated that the Dezorganizatory had no intention of following what Plekhanov had defined as the revolutionary's task but were set on completing what Solovev had begun.

The name of the new society, Liberty or Death, symbolized the new orientation of the terrorist faction: either political

liberty or political assassination. Solovev's attempted regicide marked the logical conclusion to that wave of political assassinations which had begun with Zasulich's daring shot at General Trepov. That is to say, the inherent political nature of terrorist acts against high government officials had imperceptively but inevitably removed the revolutionaries' concern from the sphere of agitation among the people and raised the problem of direct political conflict with the authorities.²¹ The formation of Liberty or Death merely objectified what Solovev's attempt had suggested: namely, the shift from the supposedly apolitical, self-defensive and retaliatory practice of terrorism to an outright political terrorism with the aim of forcing the government to capitulate.

That the terrorists were fully aware of--and, in effect, promoted--this course of development is clearly evident from the philosophy of Liberty or Death. The group's leading spokesman, N. Morozov, frankly admitted his preference for political terror over all other methods of revolutionary activity:

Political assassination is the most terrible weapon for our foes against which neither a menacing army nor a legion of spies will help.... That is why three or four successful political assassinations [have done more to demoralize and disorganize the government] than years of propaganda, a century of discontent in Russia, the agitation of the youth, the curses of thousands of victims tormented by its penal service and exile.²²

It was time to learn from this experience and to recognize the revolutionary potential of terrorism. Instead of practising

spontaneous individual terrorist acts, the revolutionaries must co-ordinate their terrorist activities. All efforts of the party must be directed towards the systematization of terror as the only means of fighting the government and realizing the revolutionary hopes of Zemlia i Volia. Thus, he wrote in one of his articles, while terrorism is by definition a form of revenge and self-defence it is at the same time a political weapon which must be aimed at the centre "so as to make the entire system quake.../making/ the authorities feel an abyss opening beneath their feet."²³ Under Morozov's pen political assassinations were built into a system of terrorism as a theory of revolutionary struggle which had little in common with the ideology of Narodnichestvo:

Political assassination is above all an act of revenge. Only by taking revenge for its vanished comrades can the revolutionary movement look straight into the eyes of its enemy; only then will it become a solid, indivisible force, only then will it rise to that moral height which is necessary in order to lead the masses. Political assassination is the only means of defence in the existing situation and one of the best methods of agitation.... /As a system/ political assassination is the realization of revolution at present.²⁴

"That is why," Morozov concluded "we recognize /systematic/ political assassination as one of the most important means in the struggle against despotism."²⁵

Terrorism had finally come into its own. Its latent political character was no longer denied but provided the theoretical rationale for its promotion as a political weapon. The trial of the government had begun--not by society, as

Plekhanov had envisaged, but by a small group of determined individuals who in their frustration and spirit of self-affirmation pronounced political action rather than agitation as a means to achieve social revolution.

Naturally, Plekhanov was shocked by Morozov's heretical articles. Moreover he was extremely upset by the fact that Morozov, as a co-editor of Zemlia i Volia!, had published his views without the approval of its editorial management. Even though Morozov's theoretical arguments for political terror had not been printed in Zemlia i Volia! but as a separate leaflet, Plekhanov questioned his right to express ideas which, he was sure, did not reflect the opinion of the majority. It was on the basis of his editorial dispute with Morozov that Plekhanov urged the convocation of a general congress of Zemlevoltsi.²⁶ Although Plekhanov was in the minority within the St. Petersburg organization, he counted on the support of the Derevenshchiki to attain the condemnation of the terrorists' "prodigious conception of revolutionary activity" as expressed in the proposition: "at present terrorism is the realization of revolution."²⁷

Confronted with Plekhanov's vigorous opposition on both the ideological (the editorial board) and the organizational level (central circle) of Zemlia i Volia, the terrorists recognized that the situation had indeed become intolerable since it was impossible for them to organize the society along new lines corresponding to the present needs of terrorism.²⁸

Hence, facing the inevitable, the terrorists--however reluctantly--agreed to the convocation of a party congress to be held in Voronezh on June 24, 1879.²⁹

Contrary to Plekhanov's expectation, his role in the Voronezh 'drama' was not that of a victor but that of a loser who, as a lone defender of the Populist cause, found no support among the Derevenshchiki in his struggle against the extremely well-prepared and organized faction of the Dezorganizatory. Instead of the anticipated majority support for a resolution against political terror, he had to witness the Derevenshchiki being taken in by the terrorists to support their planned assassination of Alexander II.

The terrorists showed great skill at Voronezh in creating an atmosphere which proved congenial to the approval of their plan for systematic terror. They disarmed the Derevenshchiki from the outset by unanimously supporting one of them as chairman of the meetings. This conciliatory step was followed by commemorating the victims of the government's "white terror."³⁰ When the congress turned to the crucial question of the party program, the terrorists showed their tactical suppleness by endorsing the old program which defined the party's primary activity as agitation aiming at a social revolution. Ironically, the only amendment to the old program came from the Derevenshchiki who called for the endorsement of "agrarian terror" in the countryside.³¹ Of course, this move was supported by the terrorists who, thereby, obliged the Derevenshchiki to compromise

once the discussion turned to the question of political terror in the cities. Thus, by a series of skillful tactical moves, they set the stage in their favour for the impending attack on their position by Plekhanov.

When the crucial question of political terror came up for discussion, Plekhanov sought to expose the terrorists' deviation from the old program--which they had just pledged to observe--by asking them what they expected to gain from terrorism. He received the straight and unequivocal answer: "we will obtain a constitution, we will disorganize the government and force it to give us one."³² This was of course an outright negation of the 'apolitical' ideology of Narodnichestvo. Such a heretical statement should have been sufficient to discredit the terrorists. But, although there was general consternation among the delegates, none except Plekhanov took up the challenge. He argued that in the long-run terrorist activity will only strengthen the government and this in turn will result in the crushing of the revolutionary party. The only change which could be expected with certainty would be "the replacement of the numeral two after Alexander's name by three."³³ Since political assassination leads merely to the replacement of one person by another but not to change in the political system, terrorism "alters absolutely nothing in the relationship of social forces."³⁴ Even if systematic terrorism would achieve a political revolution this would not lead to the emancipation of the people. Nothing short

of a socio-economic revolution was required to liberate the people. Revolutionary activity must therefore be based upon the people's demand for land and their hatred of oppressors--the state bureaucracy, landowners and kulaks.

Rather than yielding to Plekhanov's argument, the terrorists went even further in their heresy. A.I. Zheliabov, one of their most eloquent speakers and a convinced adherent of the new political trend, met Plekhanov head-on telling him that the present situation required the revolutionaries to join ranks with the liberals in the struggle for political liberty. In order to facilitate this rapprochement, he said, it is necessary for the time being to relinquish "any idea about class struggle." This, in effect, amounted to a complete reversal of the Populist Weltanschauung: instead of "sblizheniia s narodom" for the realization of a popular social revolution, the revolutionary Populists were advised to "sblizhat'sia s liberalami," to fight for a bourgeois political revolution.³⁵

Plekhanov was little impressed by the terrorists' claim that they had not abandoned the people since political terrorism and the demand for a constitution were no more than a means to an end--namely, a socialist revolution. Within his framework of thinking, political liberty could by no stretch of the imagination lead to an equalitarian social order but could only result in a bourgeois society of exploiters and exploited. With this in mind, he told Zheliabov that "it is not the

business of the Narodniki to pull the chestnuts of the liberals out of the fire."³⁶ "The people," he continued, "do not need political liberties." Zemlia i Volia means: by liberating the people through the people economically, liberty will follow in its course, i.e., political freedom is but a "by-product of the economic struggle."³⁷ To think that the reverse is the case only shows that he, Zheliabov, "is not a socialist but a constitutionalist, bourgeois revolutionary!"³⁸

Plekhanov's strictures against terrorism fell on deaf ears. Of course, it was impossible for the congress to approve the terrorists' constitutionalism, but none of the delegates wanted to disrupt the unity of the party and, in any case, emotionally they were all in favour of terrorizing the government.³⁹ Consequently, a compromise resolution was reached which, while preserving the principles of Narodnichestvo, left the door wide open for continuous terrorist activity. It was agreed that "political terror as a form of struggle is acknowledged as an extreme and exceptional measure for certain special circumstances." Naturally, the present situation was considered sufficiently "extreme and exceptional" for the majority of the delegates to vote in support of the terrorists' "hunting the Tsar" campaign.⁴⁰

This proclamation of the congress was followed by a similar one when Plekhanov tried to force the issue once more by raising the question of Morozov's pro-terrorist articles in Listok Zemli i Voli. Citing from the article where Morozov claimed

that terror was "the realization of revolution," Plekhanov requested that the congress determine whether this statement had anything in common with the program of the party, and if Morozov had the right to express such ideas in the name of the society.⁴¹ Although a heated exchange of opinions took place, the final verdict of the congress was that "taking the particular circumstances of the present into consideration, /Morozov/ is entitled to maintain the editing of /such articles/."⁴² At this point Plekhanov could no longer hold himself back. According to one of the participants of the congress, Plekhanov flew into a rage and "delivered an impassioned, caustic philippic against the congress." Since the congress, he said, is of the opinion that "at present political assassination is the realization of revolution," it has betrayed the revolutionary Populist tradition of Zemlia i Volia, and since the congress persists in this course there is nothing more for him to do but to leave. And so he did.⁴³

Fully aware of the incompatibility of political terror with the ideology of Narodnichestvo, Plekhanov--unlike the 'illogical' Derevenshchiki--could not reach a compromise with the terrorists and their political aspirations. Step by step Plekhanov began to oppose terrorism as he realized that such an activity could neither benefit the revolutionary movement nor be justified on the basis of "certain special circumstances." Instead of contributing to the emancipation of the people, terrorism would merely result in the revolutionaries' isolation from the people;

instead of strengthening and protecting the revolutionary organization, terrorism would lead to its destruction; instead of gaining political freedom for the people, terrorism replaces one Alexander with another or one form of political oppression by another.

As far as Plekhanov was concerned there were no objective conditions which justified the claim that political terror was necessitated by the "logic of events"--as to that logic the terrorists were themselves to blame. It was they who had helped to create a political climate which made it difficult to continue agitational work. There was nothing special or objective about political terrorism and its demand for political liberties. Although there was seemingly nobody left to realize the social revolutionary program envisaged by Plekhanov, he saw no objective reason to doubt the validity of his formula of revolution. The 'political challenge' emanating from the terrorists' belief that the continuation of agitation necessitates a constitution was nothing more than an apparition of their mind. Were the people asking for political liberty?--No, they wanted land and to preserve their communal way of life!

More convinced than ever of his own systematic and 'scientific' understanding of the Russian revolutionary situation, Plekhanov viewed the 'political challenge' not as an objective phenomenon of social reality, but merely as the psychological expression of a frustrated, impatient and disappointed group of intelligenti. The radical intelligentsia represented only an insignificant

fraction of society and as such their aspirations reflected neither social reality nor the needs and demands of the people. Their claim that political terrorism was necessary since a social revolution by means of agitation among the people was not possible without a minimum of political freedom and that to work among the people was like "fish beating against ice" --this, according to Plekhanov, was a self-fulfilling prophecy reflecting only their own subjective mood.⁴⁴ The revolutionaries themselves were to blame if they were unable to take advantage of the social unrest in the countryside; there was a lot of unrest, he said, "but few turned out to reap the harvest."⁴⁵

We do not deny that there were many misfortunes adverse to our survival, but the reasons for it are not to be found in the nature of the people... /exclusively/ in the political conditions of the time. /They are to be found/ in our own clumsiness and inability.⁴⁶

The "settlements among the people" did not "collapse" because of the police but they "disintegrated" because the revolutionaries left for the cities to fight the government. This, for instance, was the fate of the Voronezh settlement: "many of its members left with the onset of the 'terrorist struggle' because they could no longer sit in the countryside and therefore deserted it at the first convenient moment."⁴⁷ It is simply not true, Plekhanov argued, that activity among the peasants was impossible; the revolutionaries could have dealt with police harassment if their mood had compelled them to go to the countryside."⁴⁸ The disintegration of the colonies must therefore be attributed to a subjective rather than an objective element.⁴⁹

Continuing his argument, Plekhanov pointed out that the reason for the revolutionary intelligenti's changing attitude was not a reflection of changes in social reality but their own disappointment with tactics which, they thought, would be easy to practise and in no time would lead to a social upheaval.⁵⁰ As it happened, however, their

activity among the people fell short of these ruptureous, one might say, almost childish expectations upon which they had put their hopes. By going to the people the revolutionaries had imagined that it would be very easy to make a social revolution and that it would be soon accomplished: they thought /in terms/ of another two or three years. But it is well known that once such a superficial 'belief'...collides with life it is destined to disintegrate.⁵¹

Disillusioned by their experience, "'the people' ceased to attract the attention of the revolutionaries,...'going to the people' ceased to appear to them as a sure and fast method of destroying the existing order."⁵² Realizing that agitational activity was far from the easy task they had expected and that a large peasant rebellion was not feasible in the near future they turned to "'terror' /which/ promised a fast victory."⁵³ They now put all their hopes on an "immediate struggle with the government." Thus it was not under the pressure of police persecution that revolutionary Populism was destroyed; rather, it was abandoned by the Populists themselves who were no longer interested in "the idea of agitation."⁵⁴ The terrorists or, as they were called later, "the 'Narodovoltsi', were Narodniki disappointed in the 'people' --in this lies the whole secret of their psychology."⁵⁵

The terrorists who had won the day in Voronezh were leading Zemlia i Volia to its destruction because they did not see the illusory character of their enterprise--illusory and contradictory because, although they acknowledged the theory of Narodnichestvo, their tactics were not grounded upon its principles and their aspirations were not rooted in social reality, i.e., the "reality" of the working masses who were little concerned about political liberties.⁵⁶

Recalling his departure from congress, Plekhanov wrote many years later:

I went from Voronezh to Kiev, carrying with me the cheerless conviction that Narodnichestvo, which seemed to me then the sole possible type of socialism in Russia is perishing, mainly due to the illogic of the Narodniki themselves; I recognized that one alone in the field is not a soldier and with anguish I asked myself: what is there left for me to do?⁵⁷

Tragically, in his effort to restrain Zemlia i Volia from the self-destructive path of terrorism, to prevent it from forsaking the people, Plekhanov had been abandoned by the Zemlevoltzi who, in spite of their pledge to the principles of Narodnichestvo, had succumbed to the seductive promises of a terrorist struggle against the government.

When Plekhanov arrived in Kiev to join Rosaliia Markovna Bograd, his future wife, he told her:

Now I am virtually alone, friends and sympathizers have failed to support me, but I cannot go against the interests of the people.... /Since/ the socialism of Narodnichestvo has yielded its place to the liberals, I broke with the organization and am left alone....⁵⁸

Although the rupture with Zemlia i Volia and the prospect of becoming totally isolated from and superfluous to the revolutionary movement caused a spiritual conflict in Plekhanov, he was absolutely convinced of the correctness of his view and was therefore not prepared to settle for a compromise between terrorism and agitation. Such a compromise, he was sure, would be "purely platonic" since political terrorism by its very nature would drain the energy of the movement and provoke severe government retaliation which would make any agitation impossible.⁵⁹

White terror will be the answer to red terror and will destroy any possibility of work among the people. Like a relentless moloch, revolutionary terror will demand more and more all the means, people and money. It is clearly self-evident that both methods of revolutionary activity--terror and settling among the people (agitation, i.e.,)--cannot exist side by side. One excludes the other.⁶⁰

To cease agitation among the people would doom the revolutionary movement which for its success depended on the people. The revolutionaries will lose touch with the masses and eventually become totally isolated from the people--from the elementary revolutionary force itself.⁶¹

Whatever his emotional disposition, however tortured spiritually, his intellectual certitude would not allow him to be carried away by, what Mikhailov called, "the logic of events."⁶² There was no compelling objective reason for him to change his theory because of the subjective mood of the intelligentsia. So absolute was his hier steht ich und kann nicht anders that

he was determined to abandon his revolutionary career rather than compromise. When he was asked many years later by one of his friends what he had intended to do after the Voronezh debacle:

He said sadly: 'What is there to say: it was difficult. But I have the best medicine for everything--striving to accumulate more knowledge: if you /Deich, Zasulich, and Stefanovich/ had not returned from abroad in agreement with my views, but on the contrary as terrorists, and if the split within Zemlia i Volia, to which I could have never returned, had not taken place, I would have dedicated myself completely to science.' That was precisely his answer.⁶³

That he might have done precisely this if he had remained isolated is not as improbable as it may sound. After all, he had once before drawn a similar conclusion when he abandoned his military career because he could not contradict his convictions even if it meant to forgo his active striving for an ideal society.

The Economic Challenge

Shortly after the Voronezh congress it became apparent that Plekhanov would not have to resort to his "best medicine for everything--striving to accumulate knowledge." While still in Kiev, he received the encouraging news that the well-known and highly respected Populists Vera Zasulich, Leo Deich and Iakov Stefanovich, who had been abroad during the congress, supported his stand. Hoping to reach a common platform, Plekhanov quickly returned to St. Petersburg to

discuss with them the new state of affairs. The news had not been deceptive. Indeed, to his own surprise he found that they agreed with him in "almost every question of revolutionary theory and practice."⁶⁴

By the end of August Plekhanov had overcome the depressing experience of his break with Zemlia i Volia. Rejuvenated by the prospect of salvaging the old Narodnichestvo, Plekhanov joyfully communicated to Rosaliia Markovna his "belief in resuming revolutionary activity among the people."⁶⁵ In Voronezh Plekhanov may have been isolated, but in the sequel he regained the support of most of those who for the sake of compromise had deserted him and thereby contributed to the terrorist triumph. They now kept a close check on the terrorists indicating that they expected them to observe the ideological and financial resolutions of the congress. On account of this, the party, as in its pre-Voronezh days, found itself once more in a state of disarray. In order to resolve the conflict, it was finally decided in October 1879 to dissolve the organization. The funds and, symbolically speaking, even the name of Zemlia i Volia were equally divided between the Derevenshchiki and the Dezorganizatori: the former took the 'land' and the latter 'liberty,' calling themselves respectively, Chernyi Peredel (The Black Partition) and Narodnaia Volia (The People's Will).⁶⁶

The determination of the Chernoperedeltsi to continue their revolutionary practice in the spirit of Zemlia i Volia

was reflected in the first issue of their periodical, Chernyi Peredel. In its editorial, Plekhanov, who now considered himself chief ideologist and sole defender of Narodnichestvo, stated: "As before, 'Zemlia i Volia' will remain our practical fighting slogan since these two words most fully and broadly express popular demands; aspirations and ideals."⁶⁷ The Chernoperelets viewed the collectivist instincts and socialist virtues of the Russian people, he went on to explain, not as an authochthonic quality, but as a result of their history and their presently existing form of social organization--the obshchina. The Chernoperelets, therefore, remained faithful to the motto "Zemlia i Volia" not because they considered popular ideals in themselves holy and incontestable, but because these ideals, from a scientific point of view, constituted a stepping-stone towards the realization of socialism in Russia.⁶⁸ Thus, 'science' itself attested to the actuality of Narodnichestvo as the only possible form of Russian revolutionary theory and practice.

In his programmatic article, following the editorial for which he was mainly responsible, Plekhanov elaborated his scientific conception of Populism as a foundation of the program of Chernyi Peredel. In doing so, he intended to demonstrate that the revolutionary program of Chernyi Peredel was a 'synthesized expression' of scientific socialism and popular strivings and, as such, reflected in a 'scientific language' the "strivings of the people" towards socialism.⁶⁹ "Our

views on the practical task of our party," Plekhanov wrote, "consist of two components: /1/ the general indications of science, and /2/ the special conditions of Russian history and contemporary reality."⁷⁰ With regard to the first proposition, he declared:

We recognize socialism as the last word of science on social relations and owing to this we consider the triumph of collectivization in the sphere of ownership and labour as the alpha and omega of progress in the economic order of society.... The principles of scientific socialism must serve as the criterion for the evaluation of the various aspects and forms of popular life.⁷¹

Transposed into Russian reality, Plekhanov's "alpha and omega" called for the preservation of the already existing form of communal ownership, until economic necessity would bring about the communalization of labour required for the final establishment of a socialist order.⁷² In defending the obshchina as a socialist form of the collective ownership of land, the socialist will ensure the natural development of this institution into a form of collective ownership of the implements of labour. He will, in other words, defend and promote the interests of the people who by virtue of their communal socialization had always been spontaneously striving for the ideals of socialism.

On account of this the socialist, in calling for the collective ownership of the tools and objects of labour...expresses and generalizes the strivings of the people, and, by retaining his world view developed with science, he can with full justification call himself a revolutionary Narodnik in the best sense of the word.⁷³

This was, perhaps, the most perfect expression to date of Plekhanov's attempt to reconcile Marxism (i.e., scientific socialism) with Populism (i.e., Russian Socialism): reason and feeling, consciousness and spontaneity, scientific socialism and popular strivings, the socialist intelligentsia and the Russian people--all were reconciled in the program or, to be more precise, in the Plekhanovite system of Narodnichestvo. Chernyi Peredel was not a contradiction of the scientific Weltanschauung of socialism. On the contrary, a Chernoperedelets was both a Populist and a scientific socialist because by defending the interests of the people he defended those forms of social life which, according to the principles of scientific socialism, were indispensable for the realization of a Russian socialist order. He was, so to speak, a scientific socialist by virtue of being a 'true' Narodnik or vice versa.

In view of Plekhanov's eventual transition to Marxism, it is significant that in his articulation of the relationship of 'science' and 'Populism,' the former was elevated to an 'official' component of Populist ideology. To be sure, Plekhanov had always viewed the scientific principles of 'positive sociology' as an indispensable and fundamental aspect of his philosophy of revolution. But the very fact that he now felt compelled to stress the marriage of Populism with scientific socialism betrayed his need for a securely fortified position within the revolutionary movement which

was increasingly dominated by the Narodovoltsi. Unable to match their operational successes and popularity among the radical youth, Plekhanov could preserve his complacency only by stressing the infallibility of his own formula of revolution while disclosing the fallacy of the terrorists' political struggle.

This shift towards a more pronounced 'scientific' conception of revolutionary theory was duly reflected in his discussion of the practical tasks of a Chernoperedeles and the rules he would have to observe as a 'scientific representative' of Russian socialism. First of all, he would have to accept the "sociological fact" that social revolutions had nothing to do with the "seizure of power" and with terrorist coups against the government. A revolution was only the last act of a 'natural' and 'gradual' process depending on the economic development of society. "We know," Plekhanov wrote,

that 'nature does not jump'--this expression applies equally well to the path of the development of societies as it does to the phenomena of nature. We understand that every step on the path of the development [of human societies] is determined by the preceding history of society and by its condition at a given moment, in short, by the whole sum of given dynamics and statics of the economical society.... Since economic relations in society are recognized by us not only as the fundamental cause of all the intellectual and moral habits of its members, but also as the basis of all the rest, radicalism above all else must become, in our opinion, economic radicalism.⁷⁴

This "economic radicalism," Plekhanov continued, must be guided by the 'sociological facts' of contemporary Russian society.

They must clearly indicate to the revolutionary that history will reward his efforts only if he goes among the people and recognizes that their "forms of Russian social life" contain these elements which will lead towards the "complete socialization of the instruments of labour," i.e., towards socialism. If we "defend these forms," then, said Plekhanov, the peasant masses will give us "unshakable support." In short, we must understand that "the sum of the presently possible economic reforms and, relating to them as effect to cause, political reforms in Russia consists in the removal of hostile influences and clearing of the path for the correct development of these [communal] forms."⁷⁵

The immediate task of a Chernoperedelets had nothing to do with the Narodnovoltzi's immediate 'political' efforts to force the government to grant constitutional rights and to legislate economic reforms to protect the obshchina. Only the people can effect a social revolution. The revolutionary, Plekhanov repeated time and again, must never forget that the "emancipation of the people must be the work of the people themselves." In this struggle the intelligentsia can represent no more than the 'conscious voice' of the people--a voice which must "destroy" the "fiction" of the paternalistic state in the people's mind and at the same time bring their minds to the full realization of all the necessary consequences it can expect from an agrarian revolution.⁷⁶ This cannot be achieved by fighting government directly, but only.

[by] pushing the people to active struggle with the government, educating in them independence and activity, organizing them for struggle, taking advantage of every small situation for inciting the people by propaganda of word and deed, [communicating to them] the right views as to the meaning of presently existing and future desired social relations. The social revolutionary party must carry the people from passive anticipation of 'Chernyi Peredel' [the repartition of the land] accomplished from above to active demand for 'land and freedom' coming from below.... All other avenues of action, even though they may appear radical,... will be reactionary by definition because they all presuppose not only the preservation of the state, but also act in its interest.⁷⁷

And, concluding his programmatic pronouncements, the 'chief theologian' of orthodox Populism proclaimed that "the voice of the people, demanding an agrarian revolution, is like the voice of God indicating to the intelligentsia its true, providential designation."⁷⁸

From Plekhanov's theoretical justification of the program of Chernyi Peredel as "the last word of science" expressing "the strivings of the people," it seems that except for a more pronounced--but nevertheless significant--emphasis on the word science, his conception of Narodnichestvo as a Russian variant of 'scientific socialism' had essentially remained what it had been when he wrote his first programmatic article, "The Law of Economic Development." Although on the surface nothing seemed to have changed in Plekhanov's outlook, it can be observed that in addition to his inclination towards science there was a degree of concern and urgency which had been absent in his earlier writings. There was both an urgency expressed

in his demand to defend the existing form of the communal ownership of the land and a real concern regarding the transition from the latter to a complete "socialization of agriculture," i.e., of the 'communalization' of both the "tools and objects of labour."⁷⁹ Was he questioning his previously unquestioned belief of the vitality of the obshchina? Was there a possibility that the 'necessary' and 'gradual' transition of socialism-- i.e., to the collective ownership of the implements of work-- could be interrupted by forces hostile to the survival of the obshchina? Was it the task of the radical intelligentsia, a tiny minority, to ensure the "correct development" of the obshchina to a higher form of social co-operation? Whence did this pessimism arise?

The clue to these questions is to be found in his article entitled "The Land Commune and Its Probable Future," published in the legal learned journal Russkoe Bogastvo.⁸⁰ Plekhanov wrote the essay at the turn of 1879-80 in response to a statistical research of V. Orlov on the present state of the obshchina in the province of Moscow and to a historical survey by M. Kovalevsky on the fate of the communal institutions in many countries.⁸¹ Commenting on Kovalevsky's study many years later, when already a Marxist, Plekhanov wrote: "This was a very serious scholarly book doing me personally a great service since it, for the first time, strongly shook my Populist views."⁸² As to his reaction to Orlov's book, Rosaliia Markovna later recalled:

I vividly remember what deep impression the book of the statistician Orlov...produced on Plekhanov.... This serious study, which mercilessly confuted that basis upon which the revolutionary Narodniki had built all their future hopes, gave rise to a dramatic moment in Plekhanov's life. It was impossible to disagree with the figures. We read the book together, stopping on every fact. I remember Plekhanov's passionate commentaries on these facts which he did not dispute; but he was fervently convinced that the misfortune might still be avoided.... G.V. was completely engrossed in this reading: it seemed that the question of whether the obshchina was to be or not, whether it was to disintegrate or not, was for him a question of life and death.⁸³

Although the findings of the book were not a matter of "life and death" for Plekhanov personally, they definitely posed a deadly challenge to his system which was erected upon his Populist faith in the socialist potential of the obshchina. In contrast to the 'political challenge,' the possible destruction of the commune would have been an objective phenomenon produced, as Plekhanov would have said, by 'life itself.' This would have been of disastrous consequence for his formula of revolution since the obshchina was the cornerstone of the logical edifice grounded entirely upon the existence of such an 'objective phenomenon'--a phenomenon on the basis of which he had predicted that the social development of Russia was objectively moving in the direction desired by the Populists.⁸⁴

If not the 'shock' itself, then at least its resonance is reflected in Plekhanov's article. The title itself indicated a change in his thinking about the obshchina. For him the question of its future had become one of probability. His

previously unquestionable faith in the socialist potential of the obshchina and its future prospects had yielded to a more cautious if not sceptical attitude. Nor did his introductory remarks dispel this impression. On the contrary, the air of certainty and self-assurance present in his first programmatic statement, "The Law of Economic Development," had dissipated, leaving behind a 'vacuum of doubt;' the sure and undaunted tone of his first theoretical article, "O Chem Spor?" was gone.⁸⁵ Instead of defending his previously unqualified conviction concerning the latent strength of the obshchina against the new challenge from Kovalevsky and Orlov, he now, in the light of their studies, acknowledged the need for a thorough examination of the history of the commune: "The problem of the historical form of relationships to the land, with regard to the entire sum of statistical and dynamic influences, one might say, is a question that is just rising to the fore."⁸⁶

Further reading of the article reveals the sources of Plekhanov's apprehension. On the basis of historical evidence from countries in America, Asia and Africa, Kovalevsky proved rather convincingly that the communal form of land possession was doomed to destruction as a result of external and internal influences. Both these forces led to the triumph of individualism causing the members of the commune to abandon the communal principle. Orlov's book, as Plekhanov himself put it, "apparently provided only new proof for the inevitable destruction of the Russian obshchina."⁸⁷

It was particularly the material presented by Orlov which, vindicating Kovalevsky's thesis, had an extremely disturbing effect on Plekhanov. Orlov's data showed that in the region of Moscow the process of economic differentiation in the village, the migration of the latter to the cities, the penetration of money economy into rural life, pointed to the disintegration of the traditional communal institution. The symptoms of this development were also manifested in the rejection of the principles of the communal way of life by an ever increasing number of peasants. More and more of the communal land was sold and went into private ownership. In many villages the principle of landownership had instituted itself, thus putting an end to the periodic repartition of the land.⁸⁸ Both, rich and poor peasants were eager to break away from the communal order which restricted them in improving their material condition. The impoverished peasants desired to leave the obshchina, to find other sources of livelihood in the cities. But in order to do so they needed an internal passport which, under the existing laws, was only issued by the mir. This enabled the more prosperous peasants to force their fleeing brothers (Pustyrniki) into making their tax payments on the very land they were abandoning: "otherwise the mir will not issue them a passport and 'whips' them in the volost court for nonpayment."⁸⁹ Naturally, the Pustyrniki had no interest in the perpetuation of an institution which punished them for their poverty. The rich peasants, on the

other hand, desired the dissolution of the obshchina on account of their prosperity. They had understandable reasons for blackmailing their poor cousins because under the existing communal system of "collective responsibility" they were also obliged to pay the taxes of their insolvent brothers. Consequently, the collective principle not only hindered them in the acquisition of private holdings, but also imposed considerable economic burdens upon them. Hence, with great distress, Plekhanov had to admit that "the obshchina was divided into two parts each of which grew increasingly hostile to the other;" and each of which could not but welcome the dilution of communal principles and the dissolution of the obshchina itself.⁹⁰

The scope and method of Orlov's study made it impossible for Plekhanov "to disagree with the figures" and their implications for the so-called 'probable future' of the Russian obshchina.⁹¹ The scrupulosity of Orlov's research was enhanced by the fact that he had no intention whatsoever of shattering the Populists' ideal of the commune. On the contrary, Orlov himself tended towards a Populist interpretation. This is evident from his own subjective evaluation of the material he had collected. In addition to and, as it were, in spite of the 'hard' facts he had forwarded, he had also found evidence that the communal tradition was still thriving. He cited as an example, that most of the peasants he had questioned as to their attitude towards the obshchina were outspokenly attached

to it. From this he concluded that the communal principles remained so ingrained in the people that they were virtually unassailable.⁹²

Such an argument, however, provided little consolation to Plekhanov, who, as an advocate of Marxist sociology, was less concerned with what people say than what they actually do. In the light of Orlov's data, Plekhanov was unable to agree with the author's optimistic assessment:

We cannot share Orlov's gratifying confidence. And so we are convinced that rural collectivism is not always able to resist the pressures of hostile influences; particularly in the Russian obshchina we can perceive signs of the distortion of the basic principle itself and even cases of its complete disintegration, although these, fortunately, are few as yet.

But, he concluded, "we believe nevertheless that under a combination of favourable circumstances the land commune can have a sound future."⁹³

Through a rather 'philosophical' critique of Kovalevsky Plekhanov attempted to prove that, contrary to all empirical evidence put forward, the obshchina could not be considered a historical phenomenon per se inevitably destined to disappear. Hence, although Plekhanov was critical of Orlov's "gratifying confidence" as to the future survival of the obshchina, he rejected outright his thesis that the commune was doomed one way or another since, in addition to hostile external influences, the institution also suffered from internal deficiencies. In contrast to Orlov, Kovalevsky, therefore, not only presented material which indisputably pointed to the

destruction of the commune, but also questioned in the evaluation of his material the claim that the obshchina, by definition, was indestructible from within.

In claiming that the traditional commune was not free from inner contradictions, Kovalevsky undermined Plekhanov's system of revolutionary faith which, as has been seen, was based upon the unquestionable assumption that "the principle of social landownership does not bear within itself that indelible contradiction from which...individualism suffers /and/ therefore does not bear within itself the very elements of its doom."⁹⁴ Since the proposition was an a priori truth for Plekhanov, he criticized Kovalevsky for confusing "external" with "internal" causes. If Kovalevsky arrived at the conclusion that the dissolution of the obshchina was historically inevitable, this, according to Plekhanov, must be attributed to his conceptional inability rather than to his indisputable historical evidence on the destruction of the communal form of social organization.⁹⁵

To demonstrate his point, Plekhanov engaged in picking apart Kovalevsky's so-called "spontaneous" internal causes and illustrated time and again that they were in fact "external" having "no connection with the internal organizational structure of the obshchina."⁹⁶ By strictly distinguishing between what he termed "internal" and "external" forces of destruction, Plekhanov showed that in every case where Kovalevsky attributed the disintegration of the commune to "internal" or "spontaneous"

causes they, in effect, must be ascribed "to external influences hostile to the obshchina." ⁹⁷ He proved that in each case the destruction of the communes in the localities studied was, in the final analysis, caused by external elements which did not constitute part of their socio-economic structure. ⁹⁸ Thus, Plekhanov concluded, since all of Kovalevsky's so-called "'spontaneous causes' destroying the obshchina were, in essence, not spontaneous 'but' artificial external" ones, ⁹⁹

we cannot consider the destruction of the obshchina an inevitable historical phenomenon. Under a certain combination of negative influences this destruction is, indeed, inevitable. Precisely such a combination also caused the destruction of the communes in almost all the countries known to us. But from this does not follow that another combination of conditions is impossible under which, on the contrary, the obshchina would grow and develop. ¹⁰⁰

Well aware of the semantical nature of his philosophical argument, which amounted merely to a theoretical but not an empirical refutation of Kovalevsky, Plekhanov assured the reader that "the quarrel deals not with words alone." ¹⁰¹ If so, why did he write almost a whole article which seemed to boil down to a mere quibbling over terms in order to 'refute' with hypothetical possibilities what the facts themselves spelled out?

Plekhanov's dissection of Kovalevsky's study actually served two purposes. On the one hand, he of course wanted to prove to his own and his readers' satisfaction that the traditional commune was, indeed, superior to all other historical forms of social organization; on the other hand, by

illustrating that the only real threat to the commune must be attributed to "external" causes, he indicated to his readers that in the case of Russia the state constituted the only external threat to the obshchina.¹⁰² Having sorted out the facts in this manner, Plekhanov initiated the reader to that mystical "combination of circumstances" which was supposed to secure a "sound future" for the Russian obshchina.

Repeating his argument put forth in "The Law of Economic Development" that Russian history differed radically from the socio-economic development of the West, Plekhanov argued that in Russia historical circumstances and present conditions were such that "the commune vanishes--and only if it vanishes--in the struggle with capitalism."¹⁰³ In other words, it was not feudalism but capitalism which now confronted the Russian commune with another "artificial external" threat to its natural development towards a higher form of social organization, i.e., socialism. Of course, the real villain was once again the state which through reforms it instituted opened the gates to capitalist development in the countryside:

It has made the people pay for what has always been theirs--i.e., the land--and has demanded a fee which is even greater than the price of the fields.... Labour as a whole is dominated by the state. The land hunger that was created by seizing the people's property has given rise to that crowd of manual workers, artificially snatched from their houses and fields, which constitutes the labour in our factories and workshops. It imposes heavy taxes and thus compels the peasant to find extra work with which to pay them. In this way it forces the peasant to submit to economic exploitation. It supports the kulaks and the capitalism of

the extortioners in the villages, thus undermining the forms of the people's life in those very places /the communes/ which are most dangerous to it.¹⁰⁴

This was indeed a gloomy picture. Clearly, if this course of development continued, the end of the obshchina was in sight.

Yet, for Plekhanov there was still a ray of hope, which he believed, was more than just wishful thinking. True, with the inception of capitalism, the struggle between the obshchina and the state had reached its final phase. But the condition under which this struggle was carried out differed substantially from that which had led to the downfall of the collective principle in the West. There were essentially two decisive factors that had been absent in the West but which were now present in Russia: the feasibility of a timely transition to the "socialization of agricultural work" complementing the already existing communal ownership of the land; and the presence of a Populist revolutionary party which set as its goal the defence of the obshchina and promoted its natural development towards collective labour.¹⁰⁵ It was the combination of these factors which made Plekhanov believe that the commune could be saved to serve as a foundation for socialism in Russia without having to pass through a capitalist stage of development. Having survived until now, there was, thus, a real possibility that in time the obshchina would prove strong enough to resist and eventually overcome the external threat from the state and its 'helping hand,' capitalism. The realization of such a possibility depended to a large degree on the success of

revolutionary propaganda to imbue the peasantry and the intelligentsia with a "consciously positive attitude" towards the commune. Such an attitude "can to a significant degree neutralize the effects of the influences harmful to it, if they do not remain, of course, Platonists."¹⁰⁶ As Baron put it, translated into the non-Aesopian language of the clandestine press, this meant that Plekhanov called upon the intelligentsia and the people to take appropriate action against the government on behalf of the obshchina. In such a case, he proclaimed,

we consider it permitted to suppose that the obshchina can survive until such times when the intensive cultivation of the land is possible and necessary, i.e., when the usage of (new) implements and methods of work require the communal exploitation of the communal land.... Collective labour and the collective ownership of its implements will become an economic necessity...providing the future obshchina with a solid realistic foundation.¹⁰⁷

Such then was Plekhanov's understanding of a different "combination of conditions" which would make it possible for "the commune to develop and grow." The most important factor in his equation was, of course, the revolutionary intelligentsia whose effort must be directed to develop a "consciously positive attitude" in the peasants towards their social form of existence --an attitude, which if it did not merely remain 'Platonic' might temporarily neutralize the negative effects of 'state capitalism.' In this case, the obshchina might last until the advent of the next historical stage when collective forms of ownership and production would necessarily become more advantageous and individualism would vanish naturally in its process.

The time was not congenial for Plekhanov's "combination of favourable circumstances."¹⁰⁸ Neither the prevailing political conditions nor the mood of the intelligentsia was such as to warrant Plekhanov's high hopes for the resumption of the traditional practice of Narodnichestvo.

"Going to the people" had become an anachronism. Of course, in their own way the revolutionary intelligentsia was still following "the voice of God." But in their interpretation of it, they understood that their "providential designation" was to save the obshchina and liberate the people by the means of immediate political action. The urgency of the situation required either to topple the government or, at least, to force it to institute political and economic reforms which would guarantee the survival of the commune, and the possibility of revolutionary agitation among the people. In a situation which Plekhanov himself acknowledged as extremely grave in respect to the survival of the Russian people's superior form of existence, his 'gradualism' in the name of orthodoxy and scientific infallibility was surely not the 'stuff' to attract potential revolutionaries:

It was all too evident that Narodnaia Volia was vastly more attractive to potential recruits than Chernyi Peredel; as agitational methods had once triumphed over Lavrovist propagandism, so now terrorism was triumphing over Bakuninism. Now, as before, impatient radicals favoured plans of action which promised to engage the foe most directly and forcefully. They were eager to get quick results, and though they gave due respect to the sincerity of the Peredeltsi, they had no desire to spend their time on activities which seemed by contrast so tame.¹⁰⁹

This attitude was not confined to the intelligentsia alone. When the Peredeltsi turned to the workers they found that many of them sympathized and some even had joined the Narodovoltsi. Although they had formerly opposed terrorism, the workers no longer showed reservations about such activity but rather openly admired and supported Narodnaia Volia, sharing with it the demand for political freedom.¹¹⁰ Even Plekhanov's prestige among the workers and his close relationship with one of their most outstanding representatives, Stephan Khalturin, was of no avail in trying to convert them to the Chernyi Peredel standpoint. In fact, even Khalturin himself took to terrorism, startling Plekhanov by telling him that the question of the obshchina was really not that important at the present.¹¹¹ In frustration and despair Plekhanov had to witness how this "most talented, most enlightened representative" of the St. Petersburg proletariat 'took the path of terror' and had to be 'counted as harmful for the growth of the revolutionary movement'.¹¹²

In addition to the 'harmful influence' of terrorism on the workers and the intelligentsia, it created a political climate which made agitation among the peasants practically impossible--not to speak of Plekhanov's plan for large-scale agrarian agitation. Even if the Peredeltsi were successful in attracting the intelligentsia and, therefore, could increase and replenish their numbers, severe government repression following every terrorist act made it but impossible to engage in any form of revolutionary activity other than terrorism.

At such a stage, it mattered little whether this situation was, as Plekhanov pointed out, a splendid case of self-fulfilling prophecy.¹¹³ It conveyed one and only one message: that there was simply no hope for any fruitful propaganda and agitation as long as there were no political liberties; and conveyed it rather forcefully to the political advocates of traditional Narodnichestvo: "Not in a fortunate time was the organization Chernyi Peredel born. God did not give it life and three months later, it expired."¹¹⁴ These doleful words of Aptekman, the chronicler of Chernyi Peredel, refer to the virtual destruction of the organization at the end of January 1880, when a police crack-down led to the confiscation of the group's printing press and to the arrest of nearly all of its members.¹¹⁵

Even before the physical liquidation of their St. Petersburg centre, the Peredeltsi had come to the conclusion that their cause was doomed for the time being. The tradition they had intended to preserve had been rapidly losing its value. This 'currency' was no longer in demand despite Plekhanov's proclamations that, if only the intelligentsia would believe in it and convince the people of its value, it would pay Russia a socialist future. Although Plekhanov's system of Narodnichestvo had survived the 'political challenge,' it had become a structure without support from the radical intelligentsia who, rather than following its prescriptions, had followed the political "trends of new times." If just a couple of

months before Plekhanov had been overjoyed at the prospect of salvaging Populist activity from entering a cul-de-sac leading to nowhere but isolation from the people, he now had to face the bitter experience that his group of 'pure' Populists had manoeuvred themselves into a cul-de-sac signifying the end of his brand of Narodnichestvo in the practical sphere. Too weak to work among the people, ignored by the workers, deserted by the intelligentsia and last but not least, pressed by the police, the central group voted to send abroad those of its members--Plekhanov, Zasulich, Deich and Stefanovich--who were most threatened by the police until such times when the conditions would again become more favourable for the resumption of the revolutionary practice of Chernyi Peredel.¹¹⁶

At first Plekhanov was reluctant to go abroad, but when his friends continued to urge him to do so, he, in the words of Rosaliia Markovna, "soon began to discover the positive aspects of going abroad: the possibility to complement his education and to verify the correctness of his revolutionary convictions."¹¹⁷ Although Plekhanov may have had some scruples about discontinuing his revolutionary work in Russia, it was actually not very difficult to convince him to leave the country. Rather than having "discovered the positive aspects of going abroad," he had been thinking of them all along.¹¹⁸ Ever since his reading of Orlov and Kovalevsky he had felt the need of intensively studying political economy and the

works of scientific socialism hoping this would enable him to mend the cracks which their books had caused to his system.

Unaware of the inner logic of his intellectual evolution towards Marxism, Plekhanov did not realize the symbolic character of his departure from Russia. If political circumstances urged him to move into the geographical proximity of that "brilliant Pleiad" of 'positive socialists,' political terrorism had already induced him to stress the 'scientific' Marxist elements of his system in order to strengthen his orthodox Populist convictions. But instead of stabilizing his system, this shift had made it more vulnerable to the impending 'economic challenge.' If in the first instance he had undergone a profound spiritual conflict on account of his momentary isolation from the revolutionary movement while still retaining his intellectual certainty, he now found himself in a state of intellectual uncertainty as to the prospects of his idea of Narodnichestvo. His Populism, therefore, was badly shaken by the dynamic interaction of the 'political' (terrorism and Tsarist repressions) and 'economic challenge' (the development of capitalism). The only component of his revolutionary Weltanschauung which was still intact--and would always remain so--and from which he drew all his strength was his belief in scientific socialism. To find this truth was undoubtedly the main stimulus for his journey to the country of Russian émigrés--Switzerland. Thus, having arrived in Geneva, he buried himself in the works of scientific socialism--not as a sceptic but as a true believer who was sure to find the answers to all his questions. ¹¹⁹

CHAPTER IV

THE 'CONVERSION' OF A BELIEVER

"New time needs a new garment
For the new job it's got to do"

Heinrich Heine

With these words of the German radical poet Heinrich Heine, Plekhanov terminated a period of three years (1880-83) during which he had searched for a way to retain his 'old Populist garment'.¹ In this time he had striven to find a solution to the problems which the political and economic circumstances of 'new times' raised for his conception of the theory and practice of Narodnichestvo. He found a solution--but not of the sort he had expected when, in January 1880, he left Russia with the intention of thoroughly studying the writings of scientific socialism. This, Plekhanov had hoped, would allay his doubts about Populism, which, in spite of its apparent impracticality, still seemed to him the only possible form of revolutionary socialism in Russia. But "the books," he wrote some twenty years later, "prepared for us a new surprise."

When we began to study them we were convinced that they would dispel the doubts which had involuntarily arisen in us and aid us to find

a stable theoretical basis for our Populist strivings. But the opposite occurred. The more we became acquainted with the theories of contemporary scientific socialism, the more doubtful our Narodnichestvo became for us from both the theoretical and practical point of view. In any case, I can say with confidence about myself that already at the time of the appearance of the second number of Chernyi Peredel, i.e., in the summer of that same 1880, I was almost half a Social Democrat....²

The accuracy of Plekhanov's own assessment of his intellectual evolution towards Marxism was amply documented in his editorial in the second issue of Chernyi Peredel. There, for the first time, he spoke of the probability that the peasants' agrarian revolution might be preceded by the establishment of a bourgeois constitutional order.³ Within Plekhanov's economic framework of reference such an admittance also implied the probability that Russian socio-economic life might develop similarly as West European society. That Plekhanov was thinking along these lines, without however, openly admitting it, became even more apparent in subsequent statements.

When we were speaking of the conditions and methods of socialist activity in Russia, we had mainly the peasantry in mind. We pointed out the importance of agitation in this sphere, the necessity of uniting and organizing the revolutionary forces produced by it; we tried to formulate the demands in the name of which the fusion of the socialist intelligentsia with the masses of the agrarian population can be accomplished. But this does not mean that some sort of a peculiar peasant socialism is our goal. We do not at all deny the significance of revolutionary work in our industrial centres. Such a denial is impossible for us because we are unable to determine in advance

from which segments of the labouring masses the main forces of the social-revolutionary army will be recruited when the hour of economic revolution strikes in Russia. At present, the industrial development of Russia is negligible and the term 'labouring masses' is almost covered by the meaning 'peasantry.' Therefore, speaking of practical activity, we have in mind mainly the economic existence, the needs and demands of the peasantry.... But while we are occupied with our [revolutionary] enterprise, Russian industry is not standing still. [Material] need is tearing the peasant from the land and is pushing him into the factory, into the work-shop. In this connection, the centre of gravity of economic questions is shifting in the direction of industrial centres.⁴

The activity of the revolutionary party, Plekhanov concluded, "must conform to this organic process."⁵ In formulating a program of action, the radical intelligentsia must therefore not only take account of existing circumstances, but also pay attention to the dynamics of Russian economic development. In this way, the revolutionary party "will take on a position in accord not only with the contemporary situation but also with the entire course of Russia's economic development."⁶

Clearly, Plekhanov had reached the point where he was ready to stray from the tried path of orthodox Populism in order to harmonize the revolutionary practice of his party with socio-economic reality. This 'objective force' of an "organic process" induced him to take a more positive attitude to questions of political liberties. "We know," he proclaimed, "the value of political liberties," and we, therefore, "hail every struggle for the rights of man"--"light more light," such is the demand of every person in Russia.⁷ Yet, having made this admission, he immediately qualified it by attributing

to such a struggle "only a secondary importance" within the framework of the intelligentsia's revolutionary activity.

The premise underlying this modification is to be found in his Populist belief--that the people as such are not interested in political freedom since their immediate demands are of an economic nature. As he put it, not political but economic questions will always be the central issue for the labouring masses.

It is from the viewpoint of this [economic] question [that] they define their relationship to the existing order of things.... Actively emerging in the moments of social crisis, the people pursue precisely the aim of their economic liberation. Political questions, if they are not ignored completely, have for them only secondary significance. This is the reason for the indubitable success of the socialists who recognized the fundamental importance of the economic question and resolved it in favour of the labouring masses.⁸

Socialists who do not take this elemental fact into account and deviate from "the path of economic evolution will punish themselves by weakening their connection with the people, by losing and destroying their influence among the people."⁹

Isolation is the besetting danger of the political struggle for constitutional rights. In this pursuit the revolutionary organization of the Populists will become "a socialist 'party' without foundation and influence among the people." But such a party, according to Plekhanov, is "nonsense"--it is "a staff without an army, a negligible quantity without significance in the course of the country's social life."¹⁰ Without the ideological and material support of the people, the

enemies of the socialists would "not have to take such a party into account; they would ignore its demands without any serious danger to themselves."¹¹ For instance, if the socialists would succeed in attaining a constitution, they would find themselves hopelessly isolated from the people and be therefore completely at the mercy of the liberal bourgeoisie which, having restored its ties with the government, would renounce its socialist allies and impose a new form of oppression.¹² Hence, Plekhanov warned the intelligentsia not to be lured into an alliance with the liberals just because of their appreciation of political liberties. Let the liberals fight for political freedom--we, he advised the revolutionaries, shall continue to fight for the economic emancipation of the people. Whether or not the next historical stage will be a bourgeois socio-political order is immaterial for the revolutionary practice of the intelligentsia. As before, their primary task consists of economic agitation aimed at the consolidation of their support among the people.

Plekhanov's reason for relegating politics to a secondary place in his calculations stemmed from the same source which had compelled him to divert from orthodox Populism in order to bring the party's program into accord with objective reality. Both his deviation from (recognizing capitalism as an economic reality for Russia) and desired adherence to orthodoxy (rejecting political struggle) were dictated by his fear of becoming isolated from the future course of political events.

He saw as much a danger of isolation in the struggle for political liberties as in the failure to comprehend the political implications of socio-economic reality.

Plekhanov's Chernyi Peredel editorial of September 1880 clearly reflects his mind in a state of transition. Uncertain whether to base his revolutionary hopes upon the peasantry or the proletariat and unable to reconcile 'politics' with 'economics,' he vacillated between Populism and Marxism. This inconsistency and uncertainty in Plekhanov--produced by his unsuccessful endeavour to base his Narodnichestvo again upon a sound and consistent theoretical foundation--is aptly summarized by Baron:

The transitional and eclectic character of his thinking...is evident in his failure to rationalize conclusions, to reconcile newly acquired views with persisting populist concepts. If his reading of Marx suggested that a bourgeois rather than a socialist revolution impended for Russia, he continued to think with the populists that Russian industrial development was still unimportant. If, in some unspecified way he regarded political liberty as having real value, he nevertheless insisted on dissuading the socialists from struggling in its behalf. While still arguing that for the socialists the agrarian question remained paramount, he reported with considerably more warmth on the results of agitation among the industrial workers than among the peasants.¹³

September 1880 can justly be called the low-water mark in Plekhanov's attempt to restore his ideological system. The more he tried to bring consistency and order into his outlook, the more eclectic and vague became his programmatic statements. But, by the same token, it is possible to say that this particular moment also signified the half-way mark of his transition

to Marxism. If his reading of Orlov had initiated the disintegration of the Populist system of thought, one can observe that at the end of 1880 Plekhanov gradually began to enter a process of consolidating and systemizing a new world view.

Indicative for this stage in Plekhanov's intellectual development is his third Chernyi Peredel article written in January 1881. There Plekhanov forthrightly stated that the next socio-political formation will be a bourgeois-constitutional regime. What had been a probability four months previously had now become a certainty for Plekhanov.¹⁴

This new certitude in predicting Russia's political future induced Plekhanov to accept political struggle as a means of revolutionary practice. He rationalized his acceptance by pointing out that, with the definite prospect of a bourgeois political order, the Tsarist government would cease to be the only real obstacle to "economic and political liberation of the people." If the revolutionary party would prove incapable of preparing the people for this new challenge, bourgeois rule would lead only to the perpetuation of the Tsarist "enslavement of the people." In order to prevent this from happening and to ensure the people's liberation, the radical intelligentsia, Plekhanov insisted, must help the people

to produce its consciously organized strength capable of checking all the exploiters of all historic formations, of all phases of the development of the country. Otherwise, in place of the representatives of the absolute monarchy will be the representatives of the constitutional regime, the spokesmen of the economic interests of the bourgeoisie. Struggle

with them will be as inevitable for the people as were their protests against the oppression of absolutism. The more incomplete their [the people's] forces, the less prepared will they be for understanding social relations in bourgeois society, the harder will their struggle be against the new masters, the longer delayed will be their victory.¹⁵

In practical terms this meant:

Chernyi Peredel may consider its task fulfilled only then, when every Russian socialist party recognizes as the main purpose of its effort the creation of a social revolutionary organization in the people's midst, among whom the demand for political freedom enters as a component part in the general sum of the highest demands presented by their organization to the government and the upper class. The other part of these demands is composed of urgent economic reforms, such as changes in the tax system, introduction of governmental inspection of factories, shortening of the working day, limitation of female and child labour, etc., etc....¹⁶

For Plekhanov, therefore, political struggle had now become an indispensable means for preventing the bourgeoisie from consolidating its rule and for ensuring that the benefits of political liberties would be shared by all people.

Political involvement, Plekhanov argued, had become necessary because of the greater complexity of Russian political and socio-economic life. With the advent of a bourgeois constitutional order, the liberation of the people had become a function of class-struggle and could no longer be defined merely as a struggle against the Tsarist state. Hence, Plekhanov ceased to equate socialism simply with "the strivings of the people." Now it was "the theoretical expression of the antagonism of class-struggle in existing society from the point

of view of the labouring masses."¹⁷ In this class struggle the political and economic demands of the people were indissoluble and their "unbreakable linkage...will serve as a guarantee that the forthcoming political revolution will not be achieved in the interests of the upper classes alone."¹⁸

Although he had finally succeeded in accommodating 'politics' within the framework of his revolutionary conception, he still claimed that the Populists' motto "Zemlia i Volia" corresponded to "the ideas of contemporary socialism." But there was no mentioning of the commune which supposedly was the empirical proof of the correctness of revolutionary practice in terms of agitation. Plekhanov also chose to ignore the related question of capitalism even though his assessment of the political situation implied a capitalist development for Russia and, therefore, the disappearance of the peasant commune.

It took almost another year before Plekhanov was ready "to rationalize his conclusion" by proclaiming that "Russia has already entered the path of the natural law of capitalist development and that all other routes...are closed to her."¹⁹ But even then silence prevailed as to the fate of the obshchina itself.

Why did it take him so long to affirm a conclusion which already had been implied in his announcement that Russia was destined for a bourgeois-constitutional regime? And why would it take still another year before he was prepared to spell out the obvious, namely, that with the arrival of capitalism

the obshchina was relegated to the 'museum of antiquities'?
Whence this hesitation?

Before discussing these questions some attention should be paid to the various influences to which Plekhanov had exposed himself once he decided to search for the philosophers' stone in the West. During his first year abroad Plekhanov had abandoned Narodnichestvo step by step even though his intention had been the opposite--to reassemble its ideology in such a manner so as to serve as a comprehensive and rational theory of revolutionary practice.²⁰ While this development can be attributed largely to his own studies and reflections on the theories of modern socialism and political economy, one should not overlook the fact that in addition to the holy books of Marx and Engels there were numerous other influences detrimental to his Populist faith.²¹

In contrast to his first journey to the West, when he was a convinced Buntarist-Narodnik who despised the 'philistine socialism' of Western social democracy, Plekhanov now was much more susceptible to Western influences. This time he had come to the West not only as a political refugee, but also as a believer in doubt searching for 'the truth.' His changed attitude allowed him to perceive much in West European life which had escaped him earlier. For instance, his newly gained appreciation of political liberty was at least as much a result of his personal experience of living in a state which guaranteed this 'luxury' as it was a result of his recognition that nowhere

within social democratic literature was there a claim that politics and socialism were irreconcilable.²² Besides the general effect of Western milieu, he had the chance to meet prominent socialists like Pavel Lavrov and Jules Guesde who greatly stimulated him intellectually and whose ideological influence should not be underestimated.²³ Moreover, Plekhanov's second journey coincided with the decline of Bakuninist anarchism within the international socialist movement and a steady increase in the popularity and international prestige of German Social Democracy. That these circumstances were not without influence on Plekhanov has been pointed out by Deich who seemed to go so far as to suggest that Plekhanov changed from a Bakuninist 'Germophobe' into a 'Germophil' of German culture and Social Democracy.²⁴

While all these influences--foremost the Marxist one--definitely contributed to Plekhanov's transition to Marxism, their 'cumulative effect' was not sufficient to bring about a 'qualitative change' in his Weltanschauung. In other words, he was still wearing the 'old garment' however badly patched. To be sure, he was well aware that he needed a "new garment" --but there was none, as yet, to fit his measurement and to please his taste, i.e., his intellectual and psychological disposition.

Once more the crucial question arises: what made him so reluctant to try on a new 'ideological garment'? In order to account for this one has to recall the 'texture' of the 'old'

and the 'wear and tear' to which it had been subjected.

Plekhanov, as has been mentioned, entered the Populist movement at a point when it had taken a 'positivistic' turn in assessing its revolutionary task. Such an orientation was more in line with Plekhanov's quest for certainty which, among other things, had prevented him from joining the movement when it was still captivated by a utopianism that gave little hope for success. Plekhanov had articulated his own understanding of the 'positivistic' nature of Narodnichestvo for the first time in "O Chem Spor?". There he defended the Populists' idealization of the peasantry in reference to its traditional form of social existence, rather than appealing to the usual cliché of the inherent socialist instincts of the peasants. The collective principle of the communal form of social organization, he argued, determined the consciousness of the majority of the Russian people. For him, as he subsequently pointed out, the Populists' idealization of the people was therefore based on an empirical fact, which, according to 'modern' sociological theory, attested to the latent revolutionary character of the obshchina and its members.

In "The Law of Economic Development," Plekhanov, relying on the obshchina as the cornerstone of his revolutionary Weltanschauung, systematized his 'positivistic' conception of Narodnichestvo in order to demonstrate that its ideology did not contradict the 'scientific' principles of 'positive sociology' (i.e., scientific socialism qua Marxism), but--

on the contrary--vindicated its theory and practice: namely that social revolutions were made by the masses and that therefore, the revolutionary task of the intelligentsia was restricted to economic agitation which had to aim at the liberation of the people by the people themselves. His application of Marxian methodological precepts to Russia proved to him beyond any doubt that on the basis of the defining principle of 'modern' socialism--the collective ownership of the means of production--the obshchina provided the key for defining the revolutionary activity of the Populists. Thus, Plekhanov's substantiation of his idea of revolutionary Populism did not require him to invoke Marx's historiosophical theory of the inevitability of socialism via capitalism. There was no need for such speculation on his part since, according to his understanding of Marxian sociology, Russian history and social reality furnished the necessary prerequisites for a social revolution in the very near future. His interest in Marx was therefore determined primarily by the desire to attain a foolproof method to guide his revolutionary practice. The sociology of Marx, he was convinced, permitted him to define the restrictive and possible scope of revolutionary activity correctly and, thereby, ensure that his actions would not be a product of 'revolutionary fantasy' placing him in "the ludicrous position of a Don Quixote" because they were out of touch with social reality and ran counter to the rational movement of the historical process.²⁵

For Plekhanov the only way to escape the fate of Don Quixote--the trappings of the "irony of history" which reduced men to fools in their attempt to change the world--was to rely on science or, to be more precise, the "last words of science," as he was fond of saying. Science to him meant the analysis of "life itself," i.e., of those organic processes within nature and society which had to be understood and observed by man if he desired to act successfully in either sphere.

Plekhanov believed that the evolution of social life, as in the case of nature, was a natural process governed by laws which could not be changed arbitrarily. The discovery of these laws however allowed man to control to his own benefit the natural processes of social and natural phenomena. If Darwin discovered the natural law of the evolution of species, it is to Marx's credit that he disclosed the natural laws of the evolution of social phenomena. If in his youth Georgii Valentinovich greeted Darwinism as the last word in the natural sciences, he now considered Marxism as the last word in the social sciences. Consequently, the socialists who had taken it upon themselves to change society could not afford to ignore the teachings of Marx without relapsing into the utopianism of the 'theological' and 'metaphysical socialists.'

Since Marxism signified for Plekhanov "the scientific substantiation of socialism"--whether Populist or social democratic--the best guarantee to avoid the danger of becoming

a victim of one's own subjective strivings was to let oneself be guided by "the propositions of scientific socialism" which must serve as the revolutionary's "criteria in evaluating the various aspects and forms of national social life."²⁶ These propositions--i.e., the methodological and epistemological precepts of Marx's sociology--were as true and irrevocable as the biological pronouncements of Darwinism. As he had embraced Darwinian evolutionism, Plekhanov now accepted Marxian scientific socialism as an article of faith which, on account of its scientific nature, was for him the only reliable criterion for conceptualizing the social world--the dynamic and natural processes of "life itself." As long as he could not perceive any contradiction between the principles of scientific socialism and the ideology of Narodnichestvo, he remained a devout adherent of the latter. This explains why he was able to call himself a "Russian disciple" of Marx while at the same time--and because of it--he arrogated himself to a defender of orthodox Populism. But, ironically enough, Plekhanov's defence marked the beginning of the end of "old Narodnichestvo" because it forced him to stress the 'scientific Marxist component' of his conception of Russian socialism which eventually disrupted his attempted synthesis of 'science' and Populism--the distinguishing feature of his ideological system.

Plekhanov's increasing reliance on scientific socialism was evidenced by his reaction to the 'political challenge' at the time and in the aftermath of his break with Zemlia i Volia.

His subsequent isolation on account of this event induced him to stress the 'scientific component' of his system to offset the obvious failure to attract the attention of the radical intelligentsia. But just when he was advocating strict adherence to "the propositions of scientific socialism," his Populist orthodoxy, which had led to his isolation from the mainstream of revolutionary life, suffered another devastating blow from the studies of Orlov and Kovalevsky.

Plekhanov's system, one might say, fell victim to its own orthodoxy. It was, as has been shown, an orthodoxy which Plekhanov maintained because of his 'scientific' conception of Populism. But it was precisely this conception which doomed his system since it was grounded entirely on the obshchina. Once the disintegration of the commune had become an undeniable fact, it was evident from the very logic of Plekhanov's own premises that Narodnichestvo was doomed as well. In other words, the dissolution of the obshchina--the 'economic challenge'--deprived his system of its solid foundation in social reality. Without the commune, the peasants could no longer be relied on as that stratum which would guarantee Russia a social revolution in the near future. Yet, as far as Plekhanov could see, there was no other alternative but the 'people.' Thus, in spite of the fact that his system had been thrown into a vacuum, he could not bring himself to abandon it completely. The nature of the 'economic challenge,' however, was such that his attempt to save the Populist faith through

a more intensive study of the "theories of contemporary scientific socialism" merely enhanced its doom.

Plekhanov soon realized that in view of the impending disintegration of the obshchina and the corresponding growth of Russian capitalism there was not much hope to find support for his battered ideological system in Marx. If at the time of his first programmatic article, "The Law of Economic Development," Marx's sociological theory had lent itself to the substantiation of Populist ideology, this time it could not fulfill the same function. As long as the viability of the commune was beyond question and represented an indisputable 'empirical fact,' it was not hard for Plekhanov to find proof in Marx's sociology that Narodnichestvo was the only correct and possible form of Russian revolutionary socialism. But once the 'empirical immediacy' of the obshchina ceased to exist, it was no longer possible for Plekhanov to predict 'scientifically' the 'relative immediacy' of a socialist revolution and to define revolutionary practice in terms of a Marxist socio-historical analysis of Russia. Consequently, once he had convinced himself at the end of 1881 that Russia was destined to pass through a capitalist phase of development --thus implying the dissolution of the commune--his essentially methodological conception of Marxism was no longer sufficient to furnish him with the intellectual certainty he so characteristically required.

Naturally, as a 'true believer' of Marx's scientific socialism, he was not prepared to forsake its principles in

order to explore alternatives to save his ideological construct of Narodnichestvo. To Plekhanov such alternatives were simply non-existent since he viewed the teachings of Marx as the only and final word in the realm of the sciences of society and socialism. Nolens volens, he opted therefore to follow the lead of the 'scriptures' even though they led him away from an affirmation of his Populist ideological system.

It was at this junction along the path of his search "to find a stable theoretical basis for [his] Populist strivings" that Plekhanov was struck by Marx's historiosophical theory. Although he must have been quite familiar with the preface to A Contribution of the Critique of Political Economy, it was only now in the light of his European experience and his waning faith in Narodnichestvo that this classical statement of Marxist philosophy of history revealed its "grandiose perspectives" to him. Impressed by the "grandiose consequences of the universal triumph of socialism," he now was able to reconcile himself with a capitalist development of Russia as a sure road to a social revolution.²⁷ Instead of the obshchina, it was now the factory which guaranteed the realization of his socialist ideals; instead of relying, as previously, on the peasants whom his 'scientific' analysis of the obshchina had designated to be the primary revolutionary force in Russia, Plekhanov now relied on the workers whom Marx had declared as the sole revolutionary force in achieving socialism.

Plekhanov's unconditional belief in science in general and scientific socialism in particular had led him all the way from the Populist rejection of the universality of Marx's historiosophy to its acceptance. If the 'political challenge' had led to his increased reliance on scientific socialism, the 'economic challenge' completely overpowered the 'Populist component' of his system, replacing it with Marx's historiosophical inevitability of capitalism as a means to socialism. If previously, Plekhanov's formula of revolution had been securely grounded in the 'empirical immediacy' of the obshchina, it was now the 'metaphysical becoming' of Marx's philosophy of history which provided Plekhanov with the objective and secure prospect of a socialist revolution in Russia at some indefinite future date.

The preface to the Critique certainly satisfied Plekhanov's quest for certainty. But before it could serve, like previously the obshchina, as a cornerstone for his Weltanschauung, Plekhanov still had to overcome seemingly insurmountable difficulties. As noted above, Plekhanov had been extremely hesitant to accept the consequences of his conclusion as to the capitalist development of Russia at which he had already arrived at in January 1881. When he finally decided to do so at the end of that very year, he consoled himself "with the grandiose consequences of the universal triumph of socialism." Yet, it was precisely this long withheld nolens volens acceptance of Marx's 'grandiose historiosophy' which accounted for Plekhanov's silence on the

fate of the obshchina and, consequently, his reluctance to clad himself in a 'new ideological garment'--i.e., to bring himself to a total acceptance of Marxism.

As a Russian revolutionary, Plekhanov's problem of devising an appropriate program of action was not solved by merely replacing the commune with the factory. In fact, by selecting the latter, the question of revolutionary activity might not even have arisen since Russia, due to her socio-economic backwardness, would take decades if not centuries of economic development before socialism as predicted by Marx would become more than a utopian dream. Plekhanov's dilemma was given expression when in early 1881 his friend and comrade in arms, V. Zasulich, addressed herself to Marx on this crucial question. She wrote:

If...the commune is fated to perish, the socialist has no alternative but to devote himself to more or less ill-founded calculation, in order to find out in how many decades the land of the Russian peasant will pass from his hands into those of the bourgeoisie, and in how many centuries Russian capitalism will perhaps attain a development similar to that in Western Europe.²⁸

This gloomy 'if' question had become an actuality for Plekhanov. Was he condemned to witness the horrors of capitalist development with his hands folded, consoling himself that capitalism inevitably breeds its own negation? In a sense, this was Voronezh all over again. Now as then he was convinced intellectually that no matter what one felt subjectively it was necessary to observe the limitations of objective reality--

i.e., of the natural laws of social development. If at Voronezh he had been faced with the prospect of inactivity because he could not contradict his convictions even if it entailed his isolation from the revolutionary movement, he now was threatened once again with the grim possibility of becoming a 'superfluous man' because he would and could not contradict his belief in the truth of scientific socialism. The only discouraging difference was that, while at Voronezh it was the Populists' "illogic" which might have forced him to resign from revolutionary activity, this time "life itself" seemed to compel him to pursue an academic rather than a revolutionary career.

Time (history) and space (Russia) did not prove congenial for Plekhanov's total acceptance of Marxism. At present, the Marxist prescription could not be automatically applied to Russia. In the case of England, France and Germany this problem did not arise because their socio-economic development had proceeded according to Marx's blueprint, while in Russia, to which Marx in 1877 denied the applicability of his theory,²⁹ this had become a problem of first order. In the West, unlike in Russia, capitalism was an existing reality producing its own negation--the proletariat. What the commune had been for Russia, the factory symbolized for the West. The Western socialists could therefore actively participate in the proletariat's struggle for its emancipation in the awareness that the natural course of history was on their side. Plekhanov could not derive the same sort of 'consolation' from Marx's

historiosophy as his West European counterparts. Had he been a German Social Democrat it would not have been difficult for him to comfort himself, like Karl Kautsky, with a purely evolutionary interpretation of Marx. 'Kautskyism' applied to Russia would have been equivalent to fatalism, namely, to a 'philosophy of inactivity' reminiscent of the Lavrovists' wait-and-see attitude which had been so repugnant to Plekhanov.

Plekhanov's increasing realization of and commitment to the necessity of political struggle indicated that he was not prepared to accept a fatalistic attitude. While reading the works of Marx and Engels he must have sensed that there would be a 'legitimate' way of bending the 'law' in such a manner as to permit a fruitful continuation of revolutionary activity in Russia.

In the spring of 1882, Plekhanov had seemingly found the answer to his dilemma. In the preface to his translation of the Communist Manifesto (second Russian edition) Plekhanov for the first time plainly enunciated a social democratic program for the Russian revolutionaries.³⁰ The philosophical justification for it he only supplied, however, in 1883 and 1885 when he published Socialism and Political Struggle and Our Differences respectively.³¹

Plekhanov attested to the significance of the Manifesto in his intellectual development and final transition to Marxism many years later: "I can say for myself that the reading of the Communist Manifesto constituted an epoch in my life. Inspired by the Manifesto I decided right there and then to translate it into Russian."³²

As in the case of the Critique, it seems hardly credible that Plekhanov should have read this work only now. Most likely he re-read and re-read it in order to find 'conditional clauses' allowing him to 'modify' the inexorable natural law of capitalist development and, therefore, 'legitimately' forge a social democratic strategy for an economically backward country like Russia. And find them he did!

To put it somewhat dramatically, it was the last page of the Manifesto which contained the message of salvation.³³ In it Plekhanov found the evidence to conclude that the Russian socialists had not come too early and were not forced to retire in despair but, on the contrary, could continue their revolutionary work in the conviction that their activity was in harmony with the rational historical movement of the natural laws of social development. In reference to this page, Plekhanov told his compatriots:

Capitalism developed in Germany at a time when the working class there was more highly developed than in England or France, and that is why the rebuff given to capitalist exploitation in that country was swifter and more resolute. The German Communists did not even think of entering the service of capitalism. They knew that the more or less early victory of the working class depends among other things, on the influence that those who understand the meaning of historical development have on that class. They actively set about the work of propaganda among the workers and success exceeded their expectations. Why should we not follow their example?³⁴

Clearly, what Plekhanov implied was that when Marx wrote the Manifesto he had found himself in a similar situation as the Russian revolutionaries. But guided by his historical theory,

Marx, in spite of Germany's backwardness, neither abandoned his revolutionary activity nor decided for the seizure of power by the Communist League. Understanding the social dynamics of development, Marx propagated the need to prepare the emerging working-class for its struggle against the old feudal and new bourgeois order with the aim of shortening the impending rule of the latter.³⁵

Quoting from the very same page, Plekhanov insisted that the Russian revolutionaries

must follow the splendid example of the German Communists who, as the Manifesto says, fight 'with the bourgeoisie whenever it acts in a revolutionary way, against the absolute monarchy,' and yet 'never cease, for a single instant, to instill into the working class the clearest possible recognition of the hostile antagonism between bourgeoisie and proletariat.' Acting thus, the Communists wanted 'the Bourgeois revolution in Germany' to 'be but the prelude to an immediately following proletarian revolution.'³⁶

In other words, the Russian radical intelligentsia must learn from the German experience that in Russia the rule of the bourgeoisie will be of short duration compared with any of the countries of Western Europe. Thus he concluded:

If the German bourgeoisie 'came too late,' the Russian has come still later, and its domination cannot be a long one. Only the Russian revolutionaries should not, in their turn, begin 'too late' the preparation of the working class, a matter which has now become of absolute urgency.³⁷

What a 'grandiose task' for "grandiose perspectives!" History--no longer the people--assigned the revolutionary intelligentsia the task of working actively to develop and

to consolidate the class consciousness of the proletariat.³⁸ A correct understanding of the rational movement of the historical process indicated to them that such an activity allowed the realization of the real "possibility of shortening the length of the [capitalist] phase."³⁹ Thus, the determinism of Critique did not prevent the Russian intelligentsia from playing a vital role in the inevitable historical process towards socialism. On the contrary, said Plekhanov, it prescribed to us the urgent task to shorten and regulate this process:

For us the desirable arises from the necessary.... For us the freedom of the individual consists in the knowledge of the laws of nature--including, incidentally, the laws of history--and in the ability to submit to those laws, that is incidentally, to combine them in the most favourable manner. We are convinced that when 'a society has got upon the right track of discovery of the natural laws of its movement...it can neither clear by bold leaps, nor remove by legal enactments the obstacles offered.... But it can shorten and lessen the birth-pangs.' It is precisely this 'shortening and lessening of birth-pangs,' that, in our opinion, constitutes one of the most important [desirable] tasks of socialists who are convinced of the 'historical inevitability of capitalism in Russia.'⁴⁰

With this the last element restraining Plekhanov from completely embracing a Marxist Weltanschauung had finally fallen in place. His new understanding of revolutionary practice within the context of the rational movement of the historical process convinced him that Marxism was not only applicable to Russia but, indeed, the only possible socialist doctrine in guiding the Russian revolutionaries' struggle for the liberation of

the people. Instead of putting the Russian socialists 'out of work' it made them indispensable for the 'new job' which, while it required a 'new garment,' necessitated their old skills.

Somewhat less metaphorically speaking, the new formula of revolution urged the intelligentsia to 'go to the proletariat,' rather than to the 'people.' But, as previously, Plekhanov defined the intelligentsia's practical tasks in terms of propaganda and agitation.⁴¹ In this way, he argued, they must help the proletariat to develop a class-consciousness and organizational strength of their own.⁴² They must aim

[to] become the leader of the working class in the impending emancipation movement, explain to it its political and economic interests and also the independence of those interests and must prepare it to play an independent role in the social life of Russia. They must exert all their energy so that in the very opening period of the constitutional life of Russia our working class will be able to come forward as a separate party with a definite social and political program.⁴³

Although this new program of action was derived from a different theoretical framework than the one put forth in "The Law of Economic Development," its practical proposals read very much like the ones that had been advocated in the latter. True, the intelligentsia's revolutionary practice was no longer confined to agitation only, it also included political activity and educational propaganda. Its basic task, however, remained essentially the same: going among the people in order to create a revolutionary party of the masses (i.e., the workers)

by raising their level of class-consciousness, by imbuing them with a sense of independence, self-confidence and initiative.⁴⁴

Plekhanov himself acknowledged this similarity when he stated in the preface to Socialism and Political Struggle that "the desire to work among the people and for the people, the conviction that 'the emancipation of the working classes themselves'--that this practical tendency of our Narodnichestvo is as dear to me as before."⁴⁵ Formulating this idea even more distinctly, he later wrote:

When the quarrel between the Populists and the Social Democrats began in our country, the Populists were sincerely convinced that the Social Democrats, owing to their aspirations, were directly opposed to them. While it is undoubtable that in regard to theory the Social Democrat has nothing in common with the Populist, the Social Democrat is not at all as far from the Populist in regard to practical activity as it might have seemed in the fever of debate. They share one common feature which established close ties between them. Both of them see all their chances of success in the independent activity /samodeiatel'nost'/' of the masses, and are firmly convinced that their own work has meaning only in the event that it awakens the masses. In this respect the Populists have much more in common with the Social Democrats than, for example, with the Narodovoltsi. And this is too little noted even now.

Those Populists /therefore/ who subsequently became Social Democrats /i.e., like Plekhanov himself, fully carried over to their new Weltanschauung the feature I noted, in spite of the fact that their theoretical notions concerning the masses were subjected to a radical refashioning.⁴⁶

In reference to Plekhanov's observation one might add that it has also been 'too little noted' that, as in the

case of Populism, this "common feature" of educational and agitational work among the masses was seen by Plekhanov as a means to prevent the radical intelligenti's isolation by fusing them with the 'people' as that elementary force capable of realizing a socialist revolution. His "radical refashioning" of the old ideological 'garment' now indicated to the socialists that it was with the proletariat and "not with the peasants that the...intelligentsia must begin its merger with the people."⁴⁷ "It seems to us," Plekhanov told the intelligenti, "that the formation of a workers' party is what would free us from [the failures of our previous revolutionary activity] as a result of which, in the last seven years, the Populists existed in a state of complete alienation [isolation] from the people."⁴⁸ The intelligentsia's only real chance to escape this dilemma and to ensure the success of its revolutionary strivings was to tie its fate to that of the proletariat, i.e., to merge with the industrial workers "as the one intermediary segment capable of fusing it with the 'people'."⁴⁹

In view of Plekhanov's concern with the possibility of "existing in a state of complete alienation," it is apparent that the "one common feature" which established "close ties" between Populists and Russian Marxists signified more than just an intimate connection in terms of practical activity. This "feature" was not merely "carried over" to his new world view in spite of "a radical refashioning" of old "theoretical

notions." On the contrary, it was because of this "refashioning" that he was able to accommodate this "feature" in his new ideological system, thus, allowing him to continue his revolutionary practice without having to fear the possibility of isolation. His Marxism removed this possibility because it provided him with the certitude that by identifying himself with the proletariat he could be sure that his actions would not put him in "the ludicrous position of a Don Quixote" since they were consistent with the pronouncements of "history--the god of human societies."⁵⁰

CONCLUSION

In 1880 Plekhanov was obliged to emigrate to Western Europe, where he was able to gain closer acquaintance with the socialist movements in the countries of their origin. After lodging first in Geneva and later Paris, he eventually settled for good on the shores of Lake Geneva, where he devoted himself to intensive study of the works of Marx and Engels, whose effect upon him was that of a revelation.¹

This remark of G. Wetter in his history of dialectical materialism expresses the prevailing view in Western literature that "having encountered the works of Marx and Engels [in Geneva], Plekhanov now declared himself a Marxist."² As I hope to have demonstrated in this survey, such an interpretation misrepresents the actual course of Plekhanov's conversion, since his "intellectual odyssey [which] carried him all the way from populism to Marxism" did not commence with his emigration to the West and his subsequent study of the books of scientific socialism, but goes as far back as the Zemlia i Volia congress in the summer of 1879. As one scholar aptly expressed it: "Russian Marxism may have been born in Geneva, but it was conceived at Voronezh."³

The break-up of Zemlia i Volia at Voronezh and the formation of Narodnaia Volia and Chernyi Peredel had been largely the result of Plekhanov's response to the 'political challenge'--

a challenge that negated his 'scientific' idea of Narodnichestvo. This idea was based on his belief that, according to his reading of Marx's economic law, the peasant commune constituted a viable foundation for socialism in Russia. Had he not already been a believer in Marx's teachings and construed a formula of revolution according to the principles of 'positive sociology,' his ideological system would not have been as vulnerable to the ensuing 'economic challenge' which marked the beginning of the end of his Populist faith.

It would be wrong, however, to attribute Plekhanov's conversion to the 'economic challenge' alone. As in the case of political terrorism, economic circumstances--i.e., capitalist development and the dissolution of the obshchina--could only pose a threat to his idea of Populism because it was an intellectual construct that expressed his longing for certitude and, correspondingly, his striving for consistency. It is therefore not sufficient to explain Plekhanov's conversion simply in terms of socio-economic development as has been generally done in Soviet historiography. Industrialization and the formation of a Russian proletariat was a necessary but not a sufficient cause in compelling Plekhanov to trade in Populism for Marxism, to replace the obshchina with the Critique, and to turn from the peasantry to the proletariat.

What predisposed Plekhanov towards the teachings of Marx was not so much his early encounter and continuous "zaniatiyas rabochimi," as it was his endeavour to forge a

foolproof method of revolutionary practice. The conclusion he drew from his experience with the urban workers illuminates his way of thinking and psychological make-up rather than provides any evidence that it induced him to change his Populist world view. He continued to believe in the peasantry until under the pressure of irrefutable economic facts he was forced to question the very basis of his belief: namely, the viability of the obshchina as an objective foundation of Russian socialism. Yet, as in the case of his acknowledgement of the revolutionary significance of the workers, his recognition of the dissolution of the obshchina did not automatically transform him into a Marxist. It was rather as a result of the "grandiose perspectives" of Marxian historical theory and its applicability to Russia that Plekhanov converted to Marxism and then viewed the Russian proletariat as the new 'life force' of revolution.

Plekhanov's conviction that salvation rested on the industrial workers was therefore not born out of a faith in the proletariat, but it grew out of a faith in the inexorable dialectical laws of history. His new Marxist Weltanschauung was marked by the same 'theological tendency' as his previous conception of Populism. If formerly his deep-rooted confidence in the peasantry had been based on the obshchina, he now based his genuine belief in the proletariat on the Critique; if formerly he had expected a peasant revolution because of the determining force of economic laws, he now predicted a proletarian revolution because of the determining force of history.

Instead of the obshchina, the Critique was now the cornerstone of Plekhanov's ideological system. The latter fulfilled essentially the same function as the former had in "The Law of Economic Development": it satisfied Plekhanov's quest for certainty and, as such, ensured him that his revolutionary practice was in harmony with the laws of social development which could act "with the overwhelming force and the blind cruelty of laws of nature" if they were not taken into account. But through the knowledge of the dialectical dynamic of history it was possible, he thought, to avoid clashing with these laws and to regulate them "in such a manner as to draw profit" from their operation.⁴ Hence, he now confidently proclaimed: "we undertake to spread our ideas, being able to prove mathematically that every step Russia takes on the road of progress brings the time closer when those ideas will triumph.... We know where we are going and board the train of history that takes us at full speed to our goal."⁵ *

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. K. Marx and F. Engels, Werke, XXXII (Berlin: Dietz Vlg., 1965), 566. It is interesting to note that the book was printed in the Press of the Ministry of Ways and Communications (See A. Mazour, Russia, Tsarist and Communist, Toronto: Van Nostrand, 1962, p. 340).
2. Werke, XXXII, 566-67.
3. A.L. Reuel, Russkaia Ekonomicheskaiia Mysl' 60-70-x godov XIX veka i Marksizm (Moscow, 1956), pp. 180-81.
4. Thus, for example, Marx's Poverty of Philosophy and Engels' The Condition of the Working Class in England were to be found in the library of the Petrashevsky Circle along with the Utopian Socialist literature of Sismondi, St. Simon and above all Fourier (see Reuel, Russkaia, p. 184).
5. Cited in A. Reuel, "Polemika Vokrug 'Kapitala' Karla Marksa v Rosii 1870-kh. godov," Letopisi Marksizma, I (XI) (1930), 67.
6. There is an excellent account of the Russians' response to the works of Marx and Engels before the publication of Capital in Reuel, Russkaia, pp. 180-224.
7. Cited in A. Resis, "Das Kapital comes to Russia," Slavic Review, XXIX, no. 2 (June 1970), 221.
8. In comparison, the German edition of one thousand copies in 1867 did not go into a second edition until 1872.
9. Cited in Resis, Slavic Review, XXIX, no. 2, 221.
10. Cf., ibid., pp. 235-36.
11. This term has been coined by A. Walicki. In defining it he states: "the adjective 'classical' is applied... to Populist thought after 1869, and not to any individual Populist thinker. Populism was a broad current of thought, differentiated within itself; it was a supra-individual ideological structure within which many positions were possible, sometimes complementary and sometimes symmetrically opposed to each other.... [For example] both Lavrov and Tkachev...gave a classical expression of some aspects of Populism, and not a faithful reflection of the whole structure of Populism. The difference between them and Chernyshev

whose ideology, after all, also contained some important elements of Populism, consisted in the fact that they opposed each other within the classical Populist framework of thought. And it is this general framework, together with the characteristic pattern of possible standpoints within it, that constitutes the distinctiveness and unity--the structure--of Populist thought." (A Walicki, The Controversy over Capitalism [Oxford, 1969], pp. 27-28)

12. Walicki, Controversy, pp. 138-39.
13. A. Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (New York, 1962), p. 168.
14. Walicki, Controversy, pp. 132-33.
15. Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness, pp. 183-85.
16. Ibid., p. 182.
17. R. Pipes, "Russian Marxism and its Populist Background: The Late Nineteenth Century," The Russian Review, XIX, no. 4 (Oct. 1960), 320.
18. To determine what, in the case of a Russian revolutionary, constitutes a conversion to Marxism, I suggest following definition: (1) he accepts Marx's historical materialism not only as a methodological device or sociological theory, but also as a 'metaphysical' philosophy of history--i.e., as a historiosophical system which, on the basis of its dialectical laws, predicts the inevitable triumph of socialism over capitalism; and (2) he believes in the universal validity of these laws and, thus, in their applicability to Russia even under the condition of economic backwardness.
Although the term 'historiosophy' is rarely used in English, I have opted for it as a useful shorthand in referring to Marx's 'metaphysical' philosophy of history.
19. G.V. Plekhanov, Sochineniia (2n ed., Moscow, 1923-27), II, 338 (hereafter cited as Soch.).
20. Ibid., p. 86.
21. To be sure, Engels, from whom this quote is taken, refers actually to "humanity's leap from the realm of necessity into the realm of freedom." But, says Engels, "To carry through this world-emancipating act is the historical mission of the modern proletariat." In other words, the proletarian revolution must be seen as the proletariat's and, consequently, humanity's Sprung in die Freiheit.

- (See F. Engels, "Anti-Duehring," in H. Selsam & H. Martel, eds., Reader in Marxist Philosophy, New York: International Publishers, 1963, p. 223.)
22. See S.H. Baron, Plekhanov, The Father of Russian Marxism (Stanford, 1966), pp. 136-38.
 23. Ibid., pp. 142-43.
 24. B.A. Chagin and I.N. Kurbatova, Plekhanov (Moscow, 1973), p. 59.
 25. Cf. T. Dan, The Origin of Bolshevism (New York, 1970); B.A. Chagin, Proniknovenie idei marksizma v Rossii (Leningrad, 1948); Iu.Z. Polevoi, Zarozhdenie marksizma v Rossii 1883-1894 gg. (Moscow, 1959); L.H. Haimson, The Russian Marxists and the Origin of Bolshevism (Cambridge, Mass., 1955).
 26. See G. Zhuikov, Gruppa "Osvobozhdenie Truda" (Moscow, 1962); Iu.Z. Polevoi, Zarozhdenie marksizma.
 27. I. Mindlin, "Perekhod G.V. Plekhanov ot Narodnichestva k Marksizmu," Voprosy Istorii, No. 12 (1956), pp. 5-6.
 28. Cited in A. Ascher, Pavel Axelrod and the Development of Menshevism (Cambridge, Mass., 1972), p. 64.
 29. Such an interpretation has also been provided by L. Deich, G.V. Plekhanov Materialy dlia Biografii (Moscow, 1922), pp. 30-75.
 30. S.H. Baron, Plekhanov. The Father of Russian Marxism (Stanford, 1963), p. 59.
 31. Ibid.
 32. Ibid., pp. 54, 57.
 33. Baron refers here to Plekhanov's article "The Law of Economic Development of Society and the Tasks of Socialism in Russia" (Soch., I, 56-74).
 34. Soch., VII, 389.

CHAPTER I

1. N. Semashko, "O detskikh godakh G.V. Plekhanova," Katorga i Ssylka, no. 7 (1923), p. 34.
2. A. Frencher, "Na rodine G.V. Plekhanova," Proletarskaia

Revoliutsiia, no. 8 (1922), p. 45.

3. The role of educational institutions in radicalizing the Russian youth has been analyzed by D.R. Brower, Training the Nihilists. Education and Radicalism in Tsarist Russia (London, 1917).
4. M. Aleksandrov, "Odin iz pervykh uchitelei Plekhanova," in Gruppa Osvobozhdenie Truda, edited by L.G. Deich, V (Moscow, 1926), 37 (hereafter cited as Gruppa). Bunakov was a well-known proponent of liberal pedagogical ideas. Although not a revolutionary, he found himself constantly in conflict with the authorities. For instance, before joining the academic staff of the Voronezh Gymnasium, he had been dismissed from the Vologda Gymnasium for his advanced political views. Bunakov's activities were curtailed during the 1880's, and in 1903, after publicly going on record in support of civil liberties he was exiled (Baron, Plekhanov, p. 7).
5. L.G. Deich, "G.V. Plekhanov, ego zhizn' i deiatel'nost'" (unpublished manuscript in the archive of Dom Plekhanova, 1936), AD.6.419, p. 7 (hereafter archival material from Dom Plekhanova will be cited as Archive).
6. Cf. Soch., X, 389, 377-95.
7. Ibid., p. 389.
8. Poems of Nicholas Nekrassov, Transl. Juliet Soskice (London, 1929), p. 190.
9. R.M. Plekhanova, "Plekhanov i rabochie," Archive (1925), AP. 13.20, pp. 4-5.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., p. 5.
12. Iu. Arzaev, Preface to G.V. Plekhanov's God na Rodine (Paris, 1921), p. 12. Arzaev's biography of Plekhanov is based on R.M. Plekhanova's memoirs.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Baron, Plekhanov, p. 9.
17. Ibid.

18. A. Akselrod, "Sergei Kravchinskii," in Rabochii Klass i Revoliutsionnoe Dvizhenie v Rossii, p. 98, cited by Baron, Ibid., p. 15.
19. Plekhanov's decision to enter a technological rather than a humanistic institution, even though his marks at the gymnasium had been best in the humanities, can be interpreted as a first conscious act to live up to his moral obligations; i.e., to serve the people in the role of doctors, engineers, etc. As to his academic records at the Voronezh Gymnasium see I. Smirnov, "G.V. Plekhanov v Voronezhskoi Voennoi Gimnazii," Katorga i Ssylka, no. 61 (1929), p. 143.
20. Deich, Gruppa, IV (1925), 408.
21. Plekhanova, "Plekhanov i Rabochie," Archive, p. 6.
22. Deich, "G.V. Plekhanov, Ego Zhizn' i Deiatel'nost'," Archive, pp. 12-13.
23. P. Akselrod, Perezhitoe i Peredumannoe (Berlin, 1923), pp. 156-57.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., p. 157.
26. Baron, Plekhanov, p. 6.
27. Soch., III, 127.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid., p. 128.
31. Ibid., p. 120.
32. Ibid., p. 131.
33. How anxious Plekhanov was in gathering "rural information has been vividly described by O. Aptekman who met Plekhanov in the winter of 1875-76 (O.V. Aptekman, Georgii Valentinovich Plekhanov. Iz lichnykh vospominanii [Leningrad, 1924], pp. 10-16).
34. Deich, Plekhanov, p. 9; Gruppa, IV, 408.
35. Soch., III, 132.

36. Akselrod, Perezhitoe, p. 152.
37. Ibid., p. 153
38. Ibid., p. 154.
39. For an elaborate account of the role of Lavrovism and Bakuninism in the Russian revolutionary movement see: F. Venturi, Roots of Revolution (New York, 1966), pp. 429-69; Dan, Origin, pp. 39-128; Plekhanov, Soch., XXIV, 81-126; B. Sapir, ed., "Vpered!" 1873-1877 (Dordrecht-Holland, 1970), pp. 227-38.
40. As for M.A. Natanson's efforts in this direction see: Sapir, "Vpered!", pp. 337-46.
41. P. Akselrod, "Russland," Jahrbuch fuer Sozialwissenschaften und Sozialpolitik, II (1881), 271.
42. "Iz rechei na sude A.I. Zheliabova, N.I. Kibalchicha i S.L. Perovskoi," Byloe, no. 3 (March 1906), p. 64, cited by Walicki, Controversy, p. 96.
43. B.P. Kozmin, Iz istorii revoliutsionnoi mysli v Rossii, p. 642, cited by Walicki, Controversy, pp. 95-96.
44. Dan, Origin, p. 104.

CHAPTER II

1. Sapir, "Vpered!", pp. 337-46.
2. Soch., III, 129. Italics are Plekhanov's (henceforth, italics within quotations are Plekhanov's emphasis if not indicated otherwise).
3. Ibid., 139.
4. Ibid., XXIV, 88.
5. Dan refers to the two separate "going to the people" movements (1872-74 and 1875-79) in terms of the "first" and "second call-up" (see Dan, Origin, pp. 109-17).
6. Cf. Sapir, "Vpered!", pp. 233-35.
7. Soch., IX, 11.
8. Ibid., XXIV, 88.

9. N. Rusanov, Iz moikh vospominaniakh (Berlin, 1923), pp. 180-86, cited in Baron, Plekhanov, pp. 23-24.
10. Baron, Plekhanov, p. 25.
11. From an article by S. Kravchinsky in the November issue of Zemlia i Volia, cited by Baron, ibid., p. 35. As Baron admits himself, this passage was so close in spirit to Plekhanov's own thinking that he might have written it himself. Although this article was published almost one year after the dispute in question, there is little evidence to suggest that Plekhanov had since suddenly changed his ideas about revolutionary theory and practice (cf. Aptekman, Plekhanov, 20-24).
12. Ibid., III, 140-41.
13. Cf. L. Deich, Za Polveka (Berlin, 1923), pp. 100-11.
14. Deich, Plekhanov, p. 21. According to Deich, Fesenko spoke rather "enthusiastically about Plekhanov's intellectual abilities" (ibid.).
15. Akselrod, Perezhitoi, p. 87.
16. Soch., III, 141.
17. As the speaker and one of the leading organizers of the demonstration Plekhanov had irrevocably put himself outside the law and was henceforth sought by the Tsarist police. For Plekhanov's description of the event see Soch., III, 149-55.
18. Deich, Plekhanov, pp. 30-31.
19. Ibid., p. 35.
20. R.M. Plekhanova, "Periferiinyi kruzhok Zemli i Voli," in Gruppa, IV, 85 (*italics mine*).
21. Deich, Plekhanov, p. 25. Even in his appearance and personal habits, Plekhanov differed from his revolutionary friends. Thus, Deich writes: "In his external appearance and dress, Plekhanov--in contrast to almost all of us revolutionists of that time--did not resemble a 'nihilist': he dressed cleanly, neatly, but without pretensions of being a dandy; his hair was brushed straight back, and his small dark-red beard was regularly trimmed, whereas many of us rarely encountered a razor and comb, so that our hair was in 'picturesque disorder.' In manners, ways, and habits, also, Plekhanov was sharply distinguished from us: he was polite, correct, produced the impression

of a 'well-bred young person,' whereas our 'nihilistic manners' had gained a noisy notoriety" (ibid., p. 6).

22. Aptekman, Plekhanov, pp. 21, 23.
23. Soch., X, 399-407.
24. Ibid., pp. 403-405.
25. Ibid.
26. M. Bakunin, Gosudarstvo i Anarkhiia (1873), pp. 223-24, cited by Baron, Plekhanov, p. 50. Plekhanov himself acknowledged his debt to Bakunin in inducing him to Marx more than once. See Soch., XXIV, 90-91; I, 19-20.
27. According to Deich, Plekhanov read Capital for the first time in 1876 (Deich, Plekhanov, p. 25). In her unpublished memoirs, "Moia Zhizn'," R.M. Plekhanova mentions how she and Plekhanov read Capital, Archive, AP. 13^a, 13^b, pp. 151-52 (hereafter cited as "Moia Zhizn'").
28. Soch., I, 56-74.
29. Ibid., pp. 57-58 (italics mine).
30. Ibid., p. 56.
31. Ibid., pp. 56-57.
32. Ibid., p. 57 (italics mine).
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Of the two works Plekhanov could have only read Holy Family since German Ideology was published for the first time in the 1920's. As to the former work, although accessible to Plekhanov, there is no evidence that he had read it already.
37. Ibid., I, 62.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid., pp. 58-59.

40. Ibid., p. 59.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid., p. 60.
43. Ibid., pp. 59-60.
44. Ibid., p. 60. One might add here that Plekhanov has mistaken the effect for the cause. Surely, according to Marx, the rising capitalism and the discovery and inventions related with it gave rise to the principle of individualism.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid., p. 61.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid., p. 62.,
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid., p. 64.
54. Ibid., p. 65.
55. Ibid., pp. 65-66.
56. Ibid., p. 66.
57. Ibid., p. 67.
58. Ibid., pp. 67-68.
59. Ibid., p. 67.
60. Ibid., p. 69.
61. Ibid., pp. 69-70.
62. It seems that for Plekhanov the revolutionary character of the Russian worker was enhanced by the fact that he was still tied to the peasantry while being exposed to city life which helped him to overcome the conservatism

of peasant life, Hence, on the one hand, he retained his 'socialist instincts' while, on the other, he was 'revolutionized' as a result of his new urban environment.

63. Soch., p. 70.
64. Ibid.
65. L.H. Haimson, Bolshevism, p. 33.
66. Cf. ibid, p. 35.
67. Soch., pp. 66, 72.
68. Ibid., pp. 73-74.

CHAPTER III

1. G.V. Plekhanov, "K russkomu obshchestvu," in Literaturnoe Nasledie G.V. Plekhanova (Moscow, 1934), I, 381.
2. Cf. Deich, "Iz otnoshenii G.V. Plekhanova k narodovol'tsam," Katorga i Ssylka, No. 7 (1923), p. 9.
3. Deich, Gruppa, III, 50.
4. Soch., I, 74.
5. See supra, pp. 55-57.
6. See Plekhanov, Literaturnoe Nasledie, I, 381-82.
7. Soch., XXIV, 303-304, 97-98.
8. Ibid., I, 164; XXIV, 98, 304.
9. For once the "basic circle" of Zemlia i Volia had been re-established Plekhanov turned his attention again to the continuation of agitation. Since, at this point, it was still impossible to expect any help from the weakened society for his projected agitation among the restless Don Cossacks, Plekhanov began to search for volunteers among the intelligenti of the revolutionary youth. But to his disappointment he was not successful in inducing the St. Petersburg youth to go among the Cossacks. Even though, wrote Plekhanov, "they listened with great interest to my accounts about Cossack disturbances and fully agreed with me that the revolutionaries must immediately utilize them...there was not one

of the St. Petersburg revolutionaries who actually went there." Instead of enlisting the support of the radical intelligentsia for the program of Zemlia i Volia he had to discover that the trends of "new times" had penetrated the mood of the intelligentsia who now "wanted immediate struggle against the government" rather than following Plekhanov's call "to go to the people!" (Soch., XXIV, 97-100).

10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.; also cf., XXIV, 30.
12. Ibid., p. 304.
13. Plekhanova, "Periferiinyi kruzhok Zemli i Voli," in Gruppa, IV, 109-10; "Moia Zhizn'," pp. 157-58.
14. F. Venturi, Roots of Revolution (New York, 1966), pp. 630-32.
15. Soch., XXIV, 305.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., p. 304.
18. Venturi, Roots, p. 631.
19. Soch., XXIV, 306.
20. Sh.M. Levin, Obshchestvennoe Dvizhenie v Rossii v 60-70-e gody, XIX veka (Moscow, 1958), p. 487.
21. Cf., Venturi, Roots, p. 595; Soch., IX, 18.
22. Cited by Baron, Plekhanov, p. 36.
23. Cited by Venturi, Roots, p. 630.
24. Cited by V. Vaganian, G.V. Plekhanov: Opyt Kharakteristiki Sotsial'no-Politicheskikh Vozzrenii (Moscow, 1924), p. 39.
25. Ibid.
26. Baron, Plekhanov, pp. 37-38.
27. Soch., XXIV, 807.
28. Mikhailov expressed this mood of frustration in the following words: "The spring of 1879 was the most favourable moment for trying to create a wider organization. Circumstances themselves suggested this idea to all of us."

The government's repression had weakened the party as far as numbers were concerned, but had helped to make it five times stronger from the point of view of quality. It had created a remarkable unity of spirit and aims. Everywhere the majority had only one desire; a bloody fight with the government. But there are people who are more influenced by theory than by the logic of events, and they did not share this state of mind. These people had their representatives in the Populist organization, and so the organization despite the determined efforts of the other side, could not change direction without the problem being discussed collectively" (*italics mine*, cited in Venturi, Roots, pp. 639-40).

29. Like Plekhanov, the terrorists calculated that they would be in the minority. Thus, in order to consolidate their ranks they held a secret gathering at Lipetsk just before the Voronezh congress. For a description of the Lipetsk meeting see Baron, Plekhanov, pp. 37-38.
30. In this context Morozov read the testament of V.A. Osinsky, who had just been executed, which ended with the statement that terrorism is the only road open to the revolutionaries and that, therefore, all the party's "activities must now be directed in this one single direction" (cited in Venturi, Roots, pp. 628-29).
31. Baron, Plekhanov, pp. 38-39.
32. Cited in Vaganian, Plekhanov, p. 42.
33. Ibid., pp. 42-43. As Plekhanov saw it then, by aiming against the head of state terrorism ceased to be merely an act of self-defence or revenge; it directly challenged the state power with the predictable result of a boomerang effect: "The so-called disorganizational activity would not disorganize the government but, on the contrary, ... lead to the disorganization of Zemlia i Volia" (Soch., XXIV, 144).
34. Soch., XXIV, 144-45.
35. Ibid., p. 137.
36. Deich, Plekhanov, p. 14.
37. Aptekman, Plekhanov, p. 32.
38. Plekhanova, "Moia Zhizn'," p. 169.
39. Aptekman, Plekhanov, p. 31.

40. Baron, Plekhanov, p. 40.
41. Aptekman, Plekhanov, pp. 33-34.
42. Ibid., p. 34 (*italics sic*).
43. Ibid.
44. Soch., XXIV, 96.
45. Ibid., I, 127.
46. Ibid., 128.
47. Ibid., XXIV, 95.
48. Ibid., p. 97.
49. Ibid., p. 95.
50. This explanation has also been put forward by B. Akselrod in his article "Perekhodnyi moment nashei partii," Obshchina, no. 8/9 (1878), pp. 23-24.
51. Soch., XXIV, 97.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid., IX, 19.
54. Ibid., XXIV, 99-100.
55. Ibid., p. 141.
56. "In terrorism," as L. Haimson put it, "Plekhanov could not fail to see a reckless spirit of self-affirmation, a recklessness which violated his rule that thought and conduct conform to the guiding line of a universal, consistent, rational system, and a self-affirmation which runs counter to the imperative that revolutionary action be in accord with objective reality" (Haimson, Bolshevism, p. 38).
57. Soch., XIII, 24.
58. Plekhanova, "Moia Zhizn'," pp. 168-69.
59. Soch., XXIV, 144.
60. Plekhanova, "Nasha zhizn' do emigratsii," in Gruppa, VI, 65-66.

61. Ibid.
62. See supra footnote 28.
63. Deich, Plekhanov, p. 48.
64. Soch., XII, 24. This has also been confirmed by Deich, see Gruppa, III, 61.
65. Plekhanova, "Nasha zhizn' do emigratsii," in Gruppa, VI, 87.
66. Venturi, Roots, p. 657. Dan, Origin, p. 117.
67. Soch., I, 108.
68. Ibid., pp. 108-109.
69. Cf., Haimson, Bolshevism, p. 40.
70. Soch., I, 114.
71. Ibid., pp. 114, 108.
72. By this Plekhanov means--when a certain level of agricultural technique has been reached which allows intensive methods of cultivation and the use of such agricultural tools, i.e., machines which require the collectivization of labour. See Soch., I, 106-107.
73. Ibid., p. 119.
74. Ibid., p. 114.
75. Ibid., p. 115.
76. Ibid., pp. 116-17.
77. Ibid., p. 117.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid., p. 121.
80. Ibid., pp. 75-107.
81. V. Orlov, Formy Krest'ianskago Zemlevladieniia v Moskovskoi Gubernii (Moscow, 1879). M. Kovalevsky, Obshchine Zemlevladienie v Koloniakh i Vliianie Pozemel'noi Politiki na ego Razlozhenie (Moscow, 1879).
82. Soch., I, 197.

83. R.M. Plekhanova, "Nasha zhizn' do emigratsii," in Gruppa, VI, 94.
84. Cf., Haimson, Bolshevism, p. 42.
85. Supra, pp. 50-51.
86. Soch., I, 75.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid., p. 88.
89. Orlov cited in Soch., I, 102.
90. Ibid.
91. For instance, Orlov evaluated material collected from 5,500 villages in the district of Moscow (V. Orlov, Formy krest'ianskago zemlevladieniia v Moskovskoi gubernii [Moscow, 1879], pp. 1-21).
92. R. Wortman, The Crisis of Russian Populism (Cambridge, 1967), p. 144.
93. Soch., I, 104-105.
94. Supra, p. 64.
95. Soch., I, 103.
96. Ibid., p. 99.
97. Ibid., p. 103.
98. Ibid., p. 104.
99. Ibid.
100. Ibid., p. 103.
101. Ibid., p. 104.
102. Not mentioning the Russian state directly was necessitated because of the fact that Russkoe Bogatstvo was a legal journal and, therefore, subject to censorship.
103. Soch., I, 106.
104. Ibid., pp. 113, 114.
105. Ibid., pp. 121-22.

106. Ibid., p. 106 (*italics mine*).
107. Ibid., pp. 106-107.
108. Ibid., p. 105.
109. Baron, Plekhanov, p. 45.
110. Soch., III, 184-86, 201-202.
111. Ibid., pp. 197-98.
112. R.M. Plekhanova, "Nasha zhizn' do emigratsii," in Gruppa, VI, 96-97; "Moia Zhizn'," pp. 254-55.
113. Soch., XXIV, 96.
114. Cited in Baron, Plekhanov, p. 44.
115. Ibid.
116. Deich, Plekhanov, p. 55.
117. Plekhanova, Gruppa, VI, 102-103.
118. Cf., Deich, Plekhanov, p. 55; Plekhanova "Moia Zhizn'," pp. 235-36.
119. I. Tolmachoff, "Plekhanov's Understanding of Marxism" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia, 1972), p. 74.

CHAPTER IV

1. See Soch., II, 71.
2. Ibid., XIII, 26.
3. Ibid., I, 124-25.
4. Ibid., p. 131 (*italics mine*).
5. Ibid. (*italics mine*).
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., p. 125.
8. Ibid., p. 126.

9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., pp. 125-26.
13. Baron, Plekhanov, pp. 72-73.
14. Soch., I, 134-35.
15. Ibid., p. 135.
16. Ibid., pp. 135-36 (*italics mine*).
17. Ibid., p. 134.
18. Ibid., p. 136.
19. Plekhanov, Literaturnoe Nasledie, VIII, 209-10.
20. Soch., XXIV, 178.
21. Plekhanov's understanding of Marxism was also deepened through the studies he conducted for writing two articles on political economy: "Novoe napravlenie v oblasti politicheskoi ekonomii (1881)" and "Ekonomicheskaiia teoriia Karla Rodbertusa-Iagetsova (1882/3)" (Soch., I, 168-215, 216-364).
22. Plekhanov, Literaturnoe Nasledie, I, 203. Deich, Plekhanov, p. 51.
23. How much the former anti-Lavrovist had come under the influence of the 'social-democratic' Lavrov is evident from Plekhanov's correspondence with the latter (see "Pis'ma G.V. Plekhanova k P.L. Lavrovu," in Deich, Plekhanov, pp. 78-104). Both Deich and R.M. Plekhanova attributed great importance to Plekhanov's acquaintance with the French Marxist Jules Guesde (see Deich, Plekhanov, p. 71; R.M. Plekhanova, "Nazha pervaiia vstrecha s Zhiulem Gedom," in Gruppa, I, 95-100, also in "Moia Zhizn'," p. 220).
24. Deich, Plekhanov, p. 64. Plekhanov's personal acquaintance with leading German Social Democrats was also favourable for his appreciation of the German Marxist movement ("Moia Zhizn'," p. 227). Cf. also I.B. Mindlin, "Perekhod G.V. Plekhanov ot narodnichenstva k marksizmu," Voprosy Istorii, no. 12 [1956], pp. 11-12).

25. Soch., VIII, 64.
26. Supra, p. 106.
27. Akselrod, Perezhitoe, p. 421. In addition to reading Critique, Plekhanov also read Anti-Dühring in 1881-82 (Ibid., p. 422; Deich, Plekhanov, p. 64).
28. K. Marks, F. Engels i revoliutsiannaia Rossiia (Moscow, 1967), p. 435.
29. K. Marx and F. Engels, Werke, XIX, 111.
30. See Plekhanov's foreword to his translation of Manifesto in Soch., I, 150-52.
31. Soch., II, 27-90; 91-400. For the English translation of these works see G. Plekhanov, Selected Philosophical Works, I (Moscow, 1974), 49-106; 107-350.
32. Soch., XXIV, 178-79.
33. K. Marx and F. Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party (Moscow, 1967), pp. 95-96.
34. Soch., II, 338 (italics mine).
35. Cf. Manifesto, pp. 95-96.
36. Soch., II, 86.
37. Ibid. (italics mine).
38. Ibid., p. 274.
39. Ibid., p. 337.
40. Ibid., p. 113.
41. Ibid., p. 166.
42. Ibid., pp. 357, 63.
43. Ibid., p. 84.
44. Ibid., p. 348.
45. Ibid., p. 27.
46. Ibid., XXIV, 128.
47. Ibid., II, 351.

48. Ibid.
49. Ibid., pp. 341, 351.
50. Ibid., p. 67.

CONCLUSION

1. G.A. Wetter, Dialectical Materialism (London, 1958), pp. 100-101.
2. S.D. Bailey, "The Father of Russian Marxism," Contemporary Review, CLXXXV (May 1954), 286.
3. I. Tolmachoff, "Plekhanov's Understanding of Marxism" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia, 1972), p. 26.
4. Soch., II, 271.
5. Ibid., p. 340.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

Unpublished Material

Adler, C.C., Jr. "The Politics of Socialism: The Thought of G.V. Plekhanov." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1958.

Deich, L.G. "G.V. Plekhanov, ego zhizn' i deiatel'nost' (k 20-letiiu so dnia smerti Plekhanova 1918-1938)." Dom Plekhanova, Leningrad, AD. 6.419.

_____. "Semidesiatniki." Dom Plekhanova, Leningrad, AD. 12.1 (587).

_____. "Gorniak--G.V. Plekhanov." Dom Plekhanova, Leningrad, AD. 6.423.

Plekhanov, G.V. Notebooks. Dom Plekhanova, Leningrad.

Plekhanova, K.V. (sister of G.V. Plekhanov). "Vospominaniia." Dom Plekhanova, Leningrad, bg. 14.II; II^b; 13.

Plekhanova, R.M. (wife of G.V. Plekhanov). "Moia Zhizn'." Dom Plekhanova, Leningrad, AP. 13a/13b.

_____. "G.V. Plekhanov i rabochie." Dom Plekhanova, Leningrad, AP. 13.20; 13.6.

_____. "Italiia i Gorkii." Dom Plekhanova, Leningrad, AP. 14.2.

_____. "Kak organizovyval svoi umstvennyi trud G.V. Plekhanova." Dom Plekhanova, Leningrad, AP. 12.23.

_____. "Biografiia G.V. Plekhanov (nachalo 1880-kh gg.)." Dom Plekhanova, Leningrad, AP. 12.16.

_____. "Vospominaniia o P.B. Akselrode. 1878-79." Dom Plekhanova, Leningrad, AP. 14.6.

Tolmachoff, I., Jr. "Plekhanov's Understanding of Marxism." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia, 1972.

"Pis'mo G.V. Plekhanova--P.L. Lavroyu /Fev.-Mart, 1882/." Dom Plekhanova, Leningrad, A. 35.15.

"Pis'mo G.V. Plekhanova--N.S. Rusanovu /do Avgusta 1883/." Dom Plekhanova, Leningrad, A. 64a.2.

"Pis'mo IA.V. Stefanovicha--L.G. Deichu /Iul' 7, 1882/." Dom Plekhanova, Leningrad, AD. 4/263.6.

Writings of Plekhanov

Plekhanov, G.V. Filosofsko-literaturnoe nasledie G.V. Plekhanova. Edited by M.T. Iovchuk, I.N. Kurbatova, and B.A. Chagin. 3 vols. Moscow: Izd. Nauka, 1974.

_____. God na rodine. 2 vols. Paris: J. Povolozky et Cie, 1921.

_____. Literaturnoe nasledie G.V. Plekhanova. Edited by A.V. Lunacharskii, F.D. Kretov, and R.M. Plekhanova. 8 vols. Moscow: Sotsekgiz, 1934-40.

_____. Literatura i estetika. Edited by B.I. Bursov. 2 vols. Moscow: Gosud. Izd., 1958.

_____. Iskusstvo i literatura. Edited by N.F. Belchikov. Moscow: Gosud. Izd., 1948.

_____. O Voine. 2d ed. Petrograd, n.d.

_____. Perepiska G.V. Plekhanova i P.B. Akselroda. Edited by P.A. Berlin, V.S. Voitinsky, and P.N. Nikolaevsky. 2 vols. Moscow: Gosud. Izd., 1925.

_____. Selected Philosophical Works. 2d ed. Edited by M.T. Iovchuk, A.N. Maslin, P.N. Fedoseyev, V.A. Fomin, and B.A. Chagin. 5 vols. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974.

_____. Sochineniia. 2d ed. Edited by D. Riazanov. 24 vols. Moscow: Gosud. Izd., 1923-27.

_____. "Chto takoe sotsializma." Gruppya Osvobozhdenie Truda. Edited by L.G. Deich. Vol. III. Moscow, 1925.

"Pis'ma G.V. Plekhanova k P.L. Lavrovu /Mai 1880-1890/." In L.G. Deich. G.V. Plekhanov. Materialy dlia biografii. Moscow: Novaya Moskva, 1922.

"Pis'mo G.V. Plekhanova--Zh. Gedu /Sent. 27, 1892/." Gruppa Osvobozhdenie Truda. Edited by L.G. Deich. Vol. III. Moscow, 1925.

Documents, Memoirs and Works by Contemporaries

Akselrod, P.B. Perezhitoe i peredumannoe. Berlin: Z.I. Grzhebina, 1923.

_____. "Perekhodnyi moment nashei partii." Obshchina, no. 8/9 (1878), pp. 21-33.

_____. "Russland." Jahrbuch fuer Sozialwissenschaften und Sozialpolitik, II (1881), 261-306.

Aleksandrov, I. "Odin iz pervykh uchitelei Plekhanova." Gruppa Osvobozhdenie Truda. Edited by L.G. Deich. Vol. V. Moscow, 1926.

Aptekman, O.V. Georgii Valentinovich Plekhanov. Iz lichnykh vospominanii. Leningrad: Kolos, 1924.

_____. "Otryvok iz vospominanii 'zemlevoltsa'." Sovremennaiia Zhizn', I (Sept.-Oct. 1906), 1-45; II (Nov. 1906), 26-94; III (Dec. 1906), 14-56; IV (Jan. 1907), 59-110.

_____. "Zapiski semidesiatnika." Sovremennyi Mir, no. 5-6 (1916), pp. 185-236.

_____. "Dve dorogie teni (Iz vospominanii o G.V. Plekhanove i M.A. Natansone kak semidesiatnikakh)." Byloe, no. 16 (1921), pp. 3-14.

Bogucharskii, V. /Iakovlev, V./ Aktivnoe narodnichestvo semidesiatykh godov. Moscow: Sabashnikovykh, 1912.

Bubergal, A.N. "Vospominaniia o demonstratsii na kazanskoi ploshchadi." Katorga i Ssylka, no. 7-8 (1926), pp. 21-29.

Bulanova, O.K. "Chernyi Peredel, Vospominaniia." Gruppa Osvobozhdenie Truda. Edited by L.G. Deich. Vol. I. Moscow, 1923.

Chernavskii, M.M. "Demonstratsiia 6 dek. 1876. Po vospominaniam uchastika." Katorga i Ssylka, no. 7-8 (1926), pp. 7-20.

- Deich, L.G., ed. Gruppa Osvobozhdenie Truda. 6 vols. Moscow, 1924-28.
- _____. "Pervye shagi Gruppy 'Osvobozhdenie Truda'." Gruppa Osvobozhdenie Truda. Vol. I. Moscow, 1924.
- _____. "G.V. Plekhanov v 'Zemle i Vole'." Gruppa Osvobozhdenie Truda. Vol. III. Moscow, 1925.
- _____. "O sblizhenii i razryve s narodovoltsami." Proletarskaia Revoliutsiia, no. 8 (1923), pp. 5-54.
- _____. "O vospominaniakh P.B. Akselroda." Proletarskaia Revoliutsiia, no. 10 (1923), pp. 176-201.
- _____. G.V. Plekhanov. Materialy dlia biografii. Moscow: Novaia Moskva, 1922.
- _____. "Iz otnoshenii G.V. Plekhanova k narodovoltsam." Katorga i Ssylka, no. 7 (1923), pp. 9-20.
- _____. "Plekhanov v gornom institute (pis'mo v redaktsiiu)." Gruppa Osvobozhdenie Truda. Vol. IV, Moscow, 1926.
- _____. Za Polveka. Berlin, 1923.
- Fedorchenko, L. "G.V. Plekhanov." Katorga i Ssylka, no. 7 (1923), pp. 21-32.
- Frencher, A.A. "Na rodine G.V. Plekhanova." Proletarskaia Revoliutsiia, no. 8 (1922), pp. 27-47.
- Frolenko, M. "Lepetskii i Voronezhskii s'ezdy." Byloe, no. 1 (1907), pp. 67-86.
- K. Marks, F. Engels i revoliutsionnaia Rossiia. Edited by Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the CC CPSU. Moscow: Izd. Politicheskoi Literatury, 1967.
- Kharodchinskaia, I. "Vospominaniia o Plekhanove." Katorga i Ssylka, no. 2 (1930), pp. 159-68.
- Lavrov, P.L. Istoricheskie Pis'ma. 5th ed. Petrograd: Zadruga, 1917.
- Liubatovich, O. "Dalekoe i nedavnee. Vospominaniia iz zhizni revoliutsionerov 1878-81." Byloe, no. 6 (1906), pp. 108-54.
- Lunacharskii, A. "Neskol'ko vstrech s G.V. Plekhanovym." Pod Znamenem Marksizma, no. 5-6 (1922).

Morozov, N. "K. Marks i 'Narodnaia Volia' v nachale 80-kh godov." Katorga i Ssylka, no. 3 (1933), pp. 142-48.

_____. "Vozniknovenie Narodnoi i Voli. Iz Voronezhskom s'ezdakh letom 1879 g." Byloe, no. 12 (1906), pp. 1-21.

Orlov, V. Formy krest'ianskago zemlevladieniia v Moskovskoi gubernii. Sbornik Statisticheskikh Svedenii po Moskovskoi Gubernii, IV, 1. Moscow, 1879.

Plekhanova, R.M. "Periferiinyi kruzhok Zemli i Voli." Gruppa Osvobozhdenie Truda. Edited by L.G. Deich. Vol. IV. Moscow, 1926.

_____. "Nasha zhizn' do emigratsii." Gruppa Osvobozhdenie Truda. Edited by L.G. Deich. Vol. VI. Moscow, 1928.

_____. "Nasha pervaiia vstrecha s Zhiulem Gedom." Gruppa Osvobozhdenie Truda. Edited by L.G. Deich. Vol. I. Moscow, 1924.

Popov, M.R. "Zemlia i Volia nakanune voronezhskogo s'ezda." Byloe, no. 8 (1906), pp. 13-34.

Pozdniakova-Plekhanova, V.V. "Detstvo i otrochestvo G.V. Plekhanova (vospominaniia sestry)." Gruppa Osvobozhdenie Truda. Edited by L.G. Deich. Vol. I. Moscow, 1924.

Ryzhanskaia, M. "Pervyi referat G.V. Plekhanova v Tsiurikhe." Gruppa Osvobozhdenie Truda. Edited by L.G. Deich. Vol. II. Moscow, 1925.

Sapir, B., ed. "Vpered!" 1873-1877. Translated by Brian Pearce. Dordrecht-Holland: D. Reidel Publ. Company, 1970.

Semashko, N. "O detskikh godakh G.V. Plekhanova." Katorga i Ssylka, no. 7 (1923), pp. 33-36.

_____. "Iz vospominanii." Proletarskaia Revoliutsiia, no. 1 (1921), pp. 167-79.

Smirnov, I. "G.V. Plekhanov v Voronezhskoi voennoi gimnazii (Po arkhivnym dokumentam)." Katorga i Ssylka, no. 12 (1929), pp. 140-44.

Stepniak /Kravchinsky, S.M./ Underground Russia. Revolutionary Profiles and Sketches from Life. London: Smith, Elder, & Co., 1883.

Thun, A. Geschichte der Revolutionaeren Bewegungen in Russland. Leipzig: Drucker & Humblot, 1883.

SECONDARY SOURCES

- Arzaev, Iu. "G.V. Plekhanov 1857-1918 (biograficheskii ocherk)" in G.V. Plekhanov, God na rodine. 2 vols. Paris: J. Povolozky et Cie, 1921.
- Ascher, A. Pavel Axelrod and the Development of Menshevism. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972.
- Bachmann, P. "Marx und Engels zu Fragen der Obshchina und der russischen Revolution." Jahrbuch fuer Geschichte der Deutsch-Slawischen Beziehungen und Geschichte Ost-Mittel-Europas, II (1958), 263-72.
- Bailey, S.D. "The Father of Russian Marxism." Contemporary Review, CLXXXV (May 1954), pp. 286-90.
- Bakunin on Anarchy. Selected Works by the Activist-Founder of World Anarchism. Edited and translated by Sam Dolgoff. New York: Random House, 1971.
- Baron, S.H. Plekhanov. The Father of Russian Marxism. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1963.
- _____. "Legal Marxism and the Fate of Capitalism in Russia." Slavic Review, XVI, no. 2 (1957), 114-26.
- _____. "The First Decade of Russian Marxism." Slavic Review, XIV, no. 3 (1955), 315-30.
- _____. "Plekhanov on Russian Capitalism and the Peasant Commune 1883-85." Slavic Review, XII, no. 4 (1955), 463-74.
- _____. "The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism in Russia; a Major Soviet Historical Controversy." American Historical Review, LXXVII, no. 3 (June 1972), 715-29.
- _____. "Plekhanov, Trotsky, and the Development of Soviet Historiography." Soviet Studies, XXVI, no. 3 (July 1974), 380-95.
- _____. "Plekhanov's Russia: Impact of the West upon an Oriental Society." Journal of the History of Ideas, XIX, no. 3 (June 1958), 388-404.
- Batishchev, S. "Plekhanov--Velikii pioner Marksizma v Rossii." Boi'shevik, no. 15 (1945), pp. 24-37.
- Berdyaev, N.A. The Origin of Russian Communism. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966.

3 3

OF/DE

- Berdyayev, N.A. The Russian Revolution. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1961.
- Berlin, P. "Plekhanov-Zapadnik." Gruppa Osvobozhdenie Truda. Edited by L.G. Deich. Vol. III, 28-43. Moscow, 1925.
- Billington, J.H. Mikhailovsky and Russian Populism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958.
- Bottomore, T.B. and Rubel, M., eds. Karl Marx, Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy. London: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1964.
- Brower, D.R. Training of the Nihilists. Education and Radicalism in Tsarist Russia. London: Cornell University Press, 1975.
- Chagin, B.A. Proniknovenie idei Marksizma v Rossiiu. Leningrad: Gosud. Izd., 1948.
- _____. G.V. Plekhanov i ego rol' v razvitii marksistskoi filosofii. Moscow: Izd. Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1963.
- Chagin, B.A. and Kurbatova, I.N. Plekhanov. Moscow: Izd. Mysl', 1973.
- Chernyshev, V.P. "G.V. Plekhanov kak ekonomist." Vestnik Sotsialisticheskoi Akademii, no. 6 (Oct.-Dec. 1923), pp. 51-76.
- Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought. Edited by E.J. Simmons. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955.
- Coonist, G. "G. Plekhanov penseur marxiste eminent." Cahiers du Communisme, no. 12 (1956), pp. 1407-24.
- Evgrafov, V. "Dialektika N.G. Chernyshevskogo." Bol'shevik, nos. 11-12 (June 1945), pp. 49-62.
- Fomina, V.A. Filosofskie vzgliady G.V. Plekhanova. Moscow, 1955.
- Frankel, J., ed. Vladimir Akimov on the Dilemmas of Russian Marxism, 1895-1903. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969.
- Frankel, J. "Voluntarism, Maximalism, and the Group for the Emancipation of Labour." Revolution and Politics, no. 573 (1967), pp. 55-74.
- Galaktionov, A.A. "Rol' Plekhanova v rasprostranenie idei marksizma v Rossii." Rasprostranenie idei marksistskoi
- Dan, T. The Origin of Bolshevism. New York: Schocken Books, 1970.

- filosofii v Evrope. Konets XIX i nachalo XX veka. Leningrad: Izd. Leningrad University, 1964.
- Gerschenkron, A. Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. New York: F.A. Praeger Publishers, 1965.
- Gorev, B. "K voprosu o revoliutsionnoi taktike i prosvetitel'stve Plekhanova." Pod Znamenem Marksizma, nos. 6-7 (June-July 1923), pp. 254-56.
- Haimson, L.H. The Russian Marxists and the Origin of Bolshevism. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955.
- Hardy, D. "Tkachev and the Marxists." Slavic Review, XXIX, no. 1 (March 1970), 22-34.
- Iovchuk, M.T. G.V. Plekhanov i ego trudy po istorii filosofii. Moscow, 1960.
- Jordan, Z.A. The Evolution of Dialectical Materialism. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967.
- _____, ed. Karl Marx: Economy, Class and Social Revolution. London: Nelson, 1972.
- Karpovich, M.M. "P.L. Lavrov and Russian Socialism." California Slavic Studies, II (1963), 21-38.
- Kirpotin, V. "Pervaia stupen' teoreticheskoi evoliutsii Plekhanova i perekhod ego k marksizmu." Problemy Marksizma, no. 5-6 (1931), pp. 129-66.
- Kovalskaia, E. "Stranichka iz zhizni G.V. Plekhanova." Katorga i Ssylka, no. 6 (1924), pp. 25-47.
- Kozmin, B. "'Narodniki' i 'Narodnichestvo'." Voprosy Literatury, no. 1 (Sept. 1957), pp. 116-35.
- _____. "Odin iz pervykh literaturnykh opytov G.V. Plekhanova." Katorga i Ssylka, no. 7 (1927), pp. 40-45.
- Krivtsov, S. "Plekhanov kak sotsiolog." Pod Znamenem Marksizma, nos. 6-7 (June-July 1923), pp. 45-58.
- Kurbatova, I.N. "Ideinaiia bor'ba vokrug filosofskaiia naslediiia Plekhanova. Literatura o Plekhanove" in Filosofskaiia Entsiklopediia, V. Moscow: Izd. Akademii Nauk, 1961.
- Kuzmin, D. "Kazanskaia demonstratsiia 1876 i Plekhanov." Katorga i Ssylka, no. 5 (1928), pp. 7-40.
- Levin, Sh.M. Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie v Rossii v 60-70-e gody XIX veka. Moscow: Izd. Sotsial'no-Ekonomicheskoi Literatury, 1958.

Levin, Sh.M. Ocherki po istorii russkoi obshchestvennoi mysli. Vtoraia polovina XIX-nachalo XX veka. Leningrad: Izd. Nauka, 1974.

_____. "Manifest Kommunisticheskoi Partii Marksa i Engelsa v Rossii 50-80-kh godov XIX veka." Voprosy Istorii, no. 2 (1948), pp. 100-108.

Malakhovskii, V. "Plekhanov o sushchnosti narodnichestva." Proletarskaia Revoliutsiia, no. 1 (1929), pp. 179-220.

Malinin, V.A. Filosofiia revoliutsionnogo narodnichestva. Moscow: Izd. Nauka, 1972.

Markova, O. "Otkliki na Kapital v Rossii 1870-kh godov." Letopisi Marksizma, I, no. 11 (1930), 115-49.

Martov, Iu. Obshchestvennye i umstvennye techeniia v Rossii. Moscow: Izd. Kniga, 1924.

Marx, K. and Engels, F. Manifesto of the Communist Party. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1967.

_____. Werke. Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1965.

Mendel, A.P. Dilemmas of Progress in Tsarist Russia. Legal Marxism and Legal Populism. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961.

Miller, M.A. "Ideological Conflicts in Russian Populism: The Revolutionary Manifestos of the Chaikovsky Circle, 1868-1874." Slavic Review, XXIX, no. 1 (March 1970), 1-21.

Mindlin, I.B. "Perekhod G.V. Plekhanova ot narodnichestva k marksizmu." Voprosy Istorii, no. 12 (1956), pp. 3-16.

Moskalev, M. "Razryv Plekhanova s narodnichestvom i perekhod ego k marksizmu." Istoricheskii Zhurnal, no. 11 (1938), pp. 44-54.

Nikolaevsky, B. "Marx und das russische Problem." Die Gesellschaft, I (1924), pp. 359-366.

Pantin, I.K. Sotsialisticheskaiia mysl' v Rossii: perekhod ot utopii k nauke. Moscow: Izd. Politicheskoi Literatury, 1973.

Pipes, R. "Russian Marxism and its Populist Background: The Late Nineteenth Century." The Russian Review, XIX, no. 4 (Oct. 1960), 316-37.

_____. "Narodnichestvo: A Semantic Inquiry." Slavic Review, XXIII, no. 3 (Sept. 1964), 441-58.

- Pokrovskii, M. "G.V. Plekhanov kak russkii istorik." Pod Znamenem Marksizma, nos. 6-7 (June-July 1923), pp. 5-18.
- Polevoi, Iu.Z. Zarozhdenie marksizma v Rossii 1883-1894 gg. Moscow: Izd. Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1959.
- Polianskii, F.Ia. Plekhanov i russkaia ekonomicheskaiia mysl'. Moscow: Izd. Moskovskogo Universiteta, 1965.
- Polianskii, V. "Plekhanov o Tolstom." Pod Znamenem Marksizma, nos. 6-7 (June-July 1923), pp. 37-44.
- Potosh, M. "Marks i Engels o narodnicheskom sotsializme v Rossii." Proletarskaia Revoliutsiia, no. 12 (Dec. 1929), pp. 36-58.
- Pudnik, D. "Plekhanov-Narodnik." Problemy Marksizma, no. 2 (1930), pp. 130-49.
- Pustarnakov, V.F. "Kapital" K. Marksa i filosofskaia mysl' v Rossii. Moscow: Izd. Nauka, 1974.
- Resis, A. "Das Kapital comes to Russia." Slavic Review, XXIX, no. 2 (June 1970), 219-37.
- Reuel, A.L. Russkaia ekonomicheskaiia mysl' 60-70-kh godov XIX v. i marksizm. Moscow: Gosud. Izd. Pol. Lit., 1956.
- Revisionism. Essays on the History of Marxist Ideas. Edited by L. Labedz. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1963.
- Rumii, V. "Plekhanov i terror." Pod Znamenem Marksizma, nos. 6-7 (June-July 1923), pp. 19-37.
- Schapiro, L. "Plekhanov als Politiker." Forschung Osteuropaeischer Geschichte, no. 9 (1962), pp. 282-98.
- Selsam, H. and Martel, H., eds. Reader in Marxist Philosophy. New York: International Publishers, 1963.
- Sergieievskii, N. "Chernyi Peredel i Narodniki 80-kh godov." Katorga i Saylka, no. 1 (1931), pp. 7-58.
- Shulgin, V.N. "K voprosy o proniknovenii marksizma v Rossii v 40-60-kh godakh XIX v." Istorik-Marksist, nos. 5-6 (1939), pp. 168-74.
- _____. "Kogda v Rossii stali izvestny Marks i Engels idei marksizma." Istorichskii Zhurnal, nos. 5-6 (1940), pp. 61-69.

Shulgin, V.N. "K. Marks i F. Engels i peredovaia obshchestvennaia i nauchnaia mysl' Rossii 70-80-kh godov." Istoricheskii Zhurnal, no. 4 (1944), pp. 26-34.

Sidorov, M.I. G.V. Plekhanov i voprosy istorii russkoi revoliutsionno-demokraticheskoi mysli XIX v. Moscow, 1957.

Teodorovich, N.A. "Sotsial'no-politicheskaia mysl' chernopere-del'tsestva i ee znachenie v nashem proshlom." Katorga i Ssylka, no. 4-5 (1933), pp. 5-56.

Utechin, S.V. Russian Political Thought. London: J. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1963.

Vaganian, V. G.V. Plekhanov. Opyt kharakteristiki sotsial'no-politicheskikh vozzrenii. Moscow: Gosud. Izd., 1924.

_____. "Plekhanov: I. Ot narodnichestva k marksizmu." Pod Znamenem Marksizma, no. 2-3 (1923), pp. 153-92.

_____. "Plekhanov: II. Plekhanov i gruppa Osvobozhdenie Truda." Pod Znamenem Marksizma, no. 8-9 (1923), pp. 21-53.

_____. "Plekhanov: III. Sotsializm i politicheskaia bor'ba." Pod Znamenem Marksizma, no. 10 (1923), pp. 18-39.

_____. "G.V. Plekhanov i V.G. Belinskii." Pod Znamenem Marksizma, no. 6-7 (June-July 1923), pp. 59-76.

Venturi, F. Roots of Revolution. Translated by F. Haskell. New York: Grosset and Dunlop, 1966.

Vodolazov, G.G. Ot Chernyshevskogo k Plekhanovu. Moscow: Izd. Moskovskogo Universiteta, 1969.

Volk, S.S. Karl Marks i russkie obshchestvennye deiateli. Leningrad: Izd. Nauka, 1969.

_____. Narodnaia Volia. 1879-1882. Moscow: Izd. Nauka, 1966.

Volkovicher, I. "Pervaia rabochaia demonstratsiia." Proletarskaia Revoliutsiia, no. 12 (1926), pp. 5-13.

Von Laue, T.H. "The Fate of Capitalism in Russia: The Narodnik Version." Slavic Review, XIII, no. 1 (Feb. 1954), 11-28.

Walicki, A. The Controversy over Capitalism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969.

Weeks, A.L. The First Bolshevik. A Political Biography of Peter Tkachev. New York: New York University Press, 1968.

Wetter, G.A. Dialectical Materialism. A Historical and Systematic Survey of Philosophy in the USSR. Translated from the German by P. Heath. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958.

Wolfe, B.D. "Backwardness and Industrialization in Russian History and Thought." Slavic Review, XXVI, no. 2 (June 1967), 177-203.

Wortman, R. The Crisis of Russian Populism. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1967.

Zhelnik, R.E. Labor and Society in Tsarist Russia: The Factory Workers of St. Petersburg, 1855-1870. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971.

. "Populists and Workers: The First Encounter between Populist Students and Industrial Workers in St. Petersburg 1871-74." Soviet Studies, XXIV, no. 2 (Oct. 1972), 251-69.

Zhuikov, G. Gruppa "Osvobozhdenie Truda." Moscow: Sotsekgiz, 1962.

END

3

FIN