

Who Supports Basic Income?

Constituency as a Constraint in Political Feasibility Testing

by

Patricia V. Wallinger

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Affairs in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

in

Political Economy

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

Abstract

With a provincial welfare system in crisis, Basic Income is re-merging as a strategy to guarantee a minimum level of income for everyone, regardless of employment status. According to polls, public opinion on Basic Income in Ontario is almost evenly divided among those supporting it and those rejecting it. From a policymaking perspective, understanding the demand for policy changes is critical in assessing the political feasibility of Basic Income. This research tests the *political feasibility* of Basic Income by examining *soft constraints*, specifically, its *constituency* base. It inquires on the socio-economic characteristics behind public support for Basic Income through the analysis of a survey conducted in 2016. The findings provide insights on the constituency base of Basic Income which proves to have no socio-demographic homogeneity. Instead, perception- and ideology-related variables have been identified as predictors of attitudes towards the Basic Income proposition in Ontario.

Acknowledgements

I could not begin in any other way than acknowledging the unconditional support of my dear husband Andrew Stacey whose relentless encouragement turned the unthinkable into a reality, and my dearest daughter, Andrea, who inspires me to get through the toughest of times.

As I prepare to complete this new chapter in my academic endeavours in Canada, I would like to acknowledge Carleton's emeritus Professor, Dr. Warren Thorngate, as the brilliant mind who inspired me to take my first undergraduate university course many years ago after attending one of his lectures and joining his writing workshops. The amazing friends I found in these workshops, later known as *The Workshoppers*, have provided the guidance and support I needed to navigate these uncharted waters in my life. One such friend stands out for her commitment to explaining statistics to this non-statistic human with an enthusiasm that I continue to admire; my dear Chunyun, thank you. Raymond, thank you for proofreading and helping me with all those pesky prepositions and articles so challenging for ESL people like me. I also want to thank my thesis supervisor, Scott Bennett, for his guidance and straightforward feedback at all times that made this work possible.

I can only wish for every university student to have as much support as I have. Be it from their partners, families, and friends, or from their own Warrens and a group of fellow students who support each other week after week, reading manuscripts, hearing rehearsals, and discovering scholars outside the usual course syllabus and marvel at the vast world of written thoughts.

Table of Contents

Abstract	ii
Acknowledgements	iii
Table of Contents	iv
List of Figures	vii
List of Tables	viii
List of Appendices	x
Chapter 1: Introduction	1
Extraordinary Times.....	1
Pre-Covid Introduction	3
What is Basic Income?	5
Background on Welfare and Economic Insecurity	10
Background on Basic Income in Ontario.....	11
Problematization	13
Research Questions	16
Thesis Statement	16
Chapter 2: Literature Review	18
Employment Precarity, Income insecurity, and Basic Income.....	18
Job Displacement and Basic Income.....	20
Public Opinion, Morality, and Basic Income	21
Basic Income and the Feasibility Question	23
Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework.....	27
Feasibility in Principal	28
Feasibility in Implementation	30

Chapter 4: Methodology	36
Methodological Design	36
Description of Dataset	37
Research Design Limitations	38
<i>Sample Design</i>	38
<i>Question Design</i>	38
<i>Cognitive Capacity of Respondents</i>	40
Research Design Strengths	42
Instrumentation.....	43
Chapter 5: Data Analysis and Findings	44
Data Analysis.....	44
Univariate Analysis.....	48
Bivariate Analysis	52
<i>Gender and Dependants and Approval Rates</i>	52
<i>Age and Education Levels and Approval Rates</i>	54
<i>Income Level and Approval Rates</i>	56
<i>Views on the Economy and Approval Rates</i>	60
<i>Vote Intention and Approval Rates</i>	61
Binary Logistic Regression Analysis.....	63
<i>Vote Intention as Predictor of Basic Income Approval</i>	63
<i>Views on the Economy and Vote Intention as predictors for Basic Income Approval</i>	64
<i>Demographic Variables influence on the Regression Model</i>	66
Chapter 6: Conclusions	69
Appendix I: Code Book	75
Appendix II: Tables	82
Univariate Tables	82
Bivariate Tables.....	85

<i>Gender and Approval Rates</i>	85
<i>Dependants and Approval Rates</i>	90
<i>Age and Approval Rates</i>	92
<i>Education and Approval Rates</i>	93
<i>Annual Income and Approval Rates</i>	95
<i>Views on the Economy and Approval Rates</i>	97
<i>Vote Intention and Approval Rates</i>	99
Binary Logistic Regression Tables	100
<i>Vote Intention as Predictor of Basic Income Approval</i>	100
<i>Views on the Economy and Vote Intention as Predictors for Basic Income Approval</i>	102
<i>Demographic Variables Influence on the Regression Model</i>	103
References	105

List of Figures

Figure 1 - Views on the Economy	49
Figure 2 – Approval-Disapproval of Basic Income	50
Figure 3 - Basic Income Payment Amount.....	51
Figure 4 - Basic Income Eligibility Criteria.....	51
Figure 5 - Gender and Approval Rates.....	53
Figure 6 - Dependants and Approval Rates	54
Figure 7 - Age and Approval Rates.....	55
Figure 8 - Education Level and Approval Rates.....	56
Figure 9 - Income and Approval Rates.....	58
Figure 10 - Income and Approval Rates: Regrouped Categories	59
Figure 11- Views on the Economy and Approval Rates	61
Figure 12 - Vote Intention and Approval Rates	62
Figure 13 - Vote intention and approval rates: Classification Plot.....	64
Figure 14 - Vote Intention and Views on the Economy: Classification Plot	66
Figure 15 - Demographic Variables in Model: Classification Plot	67

List of Tables

Table 1 - Views on the Economy	82
Table 2 - Approval and Disapproval Rates	82
Table 3 - Approval and Disapproval Rates: Missing Cases	83
Table 4 - Basic Income Payment Amount	84
Table 5 - Basic Income Eligibility Criteria	84
Table 6 - Gender and Approval Rates	85
Table 7 - Gender and Approval Rates: Missing Cases	86
Table 8 - Gender and Approval Rates: Case Summary	87
Table 9 - Gender and Approval Rates: Percentages	88
Table 10 - Gender and Approval Rates: Significance Tests	89
Table 11 - Gender and Approval Rates: Symmetric Measures	89
Table 12 - Dependants and Approval Rates	90
Table 13 - Dependants and Approval Rates: Significance Tests	91
Table 14 - Dependants and Approval Rates: Symmetric measures	91
Table 15 - Age and Approval Rates	92
Table 16 - Age and Approval Rates: Significance Test	92
Table 17 - Age and Approval Rates: Symmetric Measures	93
Table 18 - Education Level and Approval Rates	93
Table 19 - Education Level and Approval Rates: Significance Tests	94
Table 20 - Education Level and Approval Rates: Symmetric Measures	94
Table 21 - Income and Approval Rates: Case summary	95
Table 22 - Income and Approval Rates	95
Table 23 - Income and Approval Rates: Significance Tests	96
Table 24 - Income and Approval Rates: Symmetric Measures	96

Table 25 - Views on the Economy and Approval Rates: Case Summary	97
Table 26 - Views on the Economy and Approval Rates	97
Table 27 - Views on the Economy and Approval Rates: Significance Tests.....	98
Table 28 - Views on the Economy and Approval Rates: Symmetric Measures	98
Table 29 - Vote Intention and Approval Rates: Case Summary	99
Table 30 - Vote Intention and Approval Rates.....	99
Table 31 – Vote Intention and Approval Rates: Significance Tests	100
Table 32 - Vote Intention and Approval Rates: Symmetric Measures	100
Table 33 - Vote Intention and Approval Rates: Model Test.....	100
Table 34 - Vote Intention and Approval Rates: Model Summary	101
Table 35 - Vote Intention and Approval Rates: Goodness of Fit Test	101
Table 36 - Vote Intention and Approval Rates: Classification Table	101
Table 37 - Vote Intention and Approval Rates: Odds Ratios.....	101
Table 38 - Vote Intention and Views on the Economy: Model Test	102
Table 39 - Vote Intention and Views on the Economy: Model Summary	102
Table 40 - Vote Intention and Views on the Economy: Goodness of Fit Test.....	102
Table 41 - Vote Intention and Views on the Economy: Classification Table	102
Table 42 - Vote Intention and Views on the Economy: Odds Ratios	103
Table 43 - Demographic Variables: Model Test.....	103
Table 44 - Demographic Variables: Model Summary	103
Table 45 - Demographic Variables: Goodness of Fit Test	103
Table 46 - Demographic Variables: Classification Table	104
Table 47- Demographic Variables: Odds Ratios.....	104



List of Appendices

Appendix I: Code Book.....75

Appendix II: Tables.....82

Chapter 1: Introduction

Extraordinary Times

A different moment in history

When I started this thesis, the idea of enacting radical changes to our economic systems was relegated to those who suffered from utopian visions of economic inclusion and a fairer society. Currently living through a global pandemic in what looks like a dystopian reality, those visions from the fringe have become everyday conversation even among the most apolitical members of society. Countries around the world have shut down their economies due to the novel SARS virus (Covid-19) in attempts to protect their populations. Environmentalists saw in disbelief how a microscopic force could, within a short couple of months, green the economy in unprecedented ways by switching daily commute for telework, reducing consumption to the bare minimum necessities, and overall disrupting the world-wide unsustainable economic system in ways that could have only been dreamt of a year ago.

The shutting down of the economy in Canada came at a cost of many people losing their jobs, companies closing doors, some permanently moving to the virtual world leaving empty buildings and entire industrial parks closed with no return date. More than seven million Canadians, about a third of the entire workforce and over 20% of Canada's population, saw their government providing expedient social assistance to secure subsistence through a non-stigmatizing guaranteed income of \$2000 per month per individual applicant whose employment income was disrupted by the pandemic (Statistics Canada 2020). The Canada Emergency Response Benefit (CERB) was implemented as a federal income supplement for those who were unable to

maintain or seek new employment given conditions brought by the pandemic. It also offered a source of income for over 40% of the labour force who did not qualify for Employment Insurance Benefits. CERB came to be a quasi-guaranteed basic income experiment on its own. Not universal in nature and with many coverage gaps, CERB's design differences from a Basic Income became evident such as the employment income penalization for those earning between \$1000 and \$2000, the exclusion of many in the 'gig' economy, and the precarity of CERB as a temporary measure. Conversely, the roll out of CERB also demonstrated Federal leadership, political will, and the capability of the current tax-infrastructure administration system to timely and efficiently deliver this quasi-basic income payment to each individual applicant (Hunsley 2020).

Covid-19 was in many ways, an accelerator of post-productivist arguments in favour of reduced consumption and sustainable levels of economic activity, traditionally associated with ecologist views (De Wispelaere and Yentsov in Gentilini et al. 2019, 194). This pandemic has brought inequality and welfare assistance inadequacies to the fore thus forcing new debates on the political economy of policymaking in Canada. Scholars, advocates, and policy makers are already engaged in debating the transitioning of CERB into a more permanent social security feature in the well-established Canadian welfare system. Notably, an unprecedented call from fifty Senators urging the Federal government to take advantage of the now-proven ease of administration of such a payment using existing tax infrastructure to ensure the continuation of a guaranteed income for all Canadians (Hunsley 2020; Pate and Lankin 2020).

As discussed later in this thesis, the political feasibility of a structural policy change such as the implementation of a Basic Income depends on the existence of a significant constituency to produce a strong political demand (De Wispelaere and Yentsov in Gentilini et al. 2019, 188–91).

Under the current circumstances, this change in demand for a Basic Income policy is expected to shift the intermittent and ambivalent support for Basic Income seen in Canada. Emerging data suggests the pre-pandemic lukewarm support for Basic Income has changed in favour of this policy after the economic emergency measures put in place under the first wave of the pandemic. This aligns with findings of a strong association between labour positioning and basic income support (Gentilini et al. 2019, 191–92). A recent poll (June 2020) shows six-in-ten Canadians are in support of Basic Income but they remain divided on issues of affordability and perception on whether Basic Income discourages people from working (Angus-Reid Institute 2020). The increased levels of support for a guaranteed income are driving the demand for policy changes making it perhaps a turning point in the welfare policymaking in Canada.

Pre-Covid Introduction

Basic income can be thought of as an idea, a concept, or a policy proposal depending on the level of knowledge on the subject matter of the person discussing it. Regardless, it has been intuitively dismissed by many as unrealistic, unaffordable, and impossible among other dismissive waves of the hand. The basic income idea has also been ruled out as impossible or altogether dismissed as undesirable, usually following Hirschman-like effects of perversity, futility, or jeopardy that are commonly used to counter progressive ideas on policy changes. In the case of basic income, the perversity effect is usually along the lines that if implemented, the policy would have undesired effects (e.g. labour withdrawal, unaffordable levels of taxation, unsustainable inflation). The futility effect implies that if basic income were to be implemented it would be ineffectual (e.g. poverty is a result of character flaws, poverty has always existed therefore no meaningful impact on poverty is to be expected). Finally, arguments that resonate

with the jeopardy effect claim that basic income risks damaging other social goals (e.g. by risking dismantling the welfare system or furthering the commodification of social goods). However, such arguments are flawed, immature, and overly simplistic. Probably as with advocates of basic income, these overall evaluations of basic income are “impatient of the kind of close, open-ended, and finely balanced debate that complicated decisions require” (Hawthorn 1991).

Two things need to happen in order to elucidate in a more careful and systematic analysis whether basic income is correctly qualified as overall utopic or infeasible. On the one hand, basic income needs to be well defined, beginning with an agreement on whether the discussion is based on a principle (moral ideal), or a policy proposal (concrete and containing implementation details). On the other hand, the concept needs to be tested for its feasibility, which is different from probability and possibility. For this thesis, I am interested in the policy concept of basic income as defined for the 2017 Ontario Pilot programme¹. This thesis will inquire on the issue of political feasibility of this Basic Income by leveraging the empirical analysis of a dataset on public opinion of Ontarians as a starting point for the inquiry on the constituency profile for Basic Income.

¹ The Ontario Basic Income Pilot defined Basic Income as “a payment to eligible couples or individuals that ensures a minimum income level, regardless of employment status.” Eligible participants had to be “living on a low income (under \$34,000 per year if you're single or under \$48,000 per year if a couple)” and payments were set at 75% of the Low Income Measure, following a tax credit model, the Ontario Basic Income Pilot participants received up to \$16,989 per year for a single person, less 50% of any earned income; \$24,027 per year for a couple, less 50% of any earned income; and people with a disability also received up to \$500 per month on top. (Government of Ontario 2019)

In everyday language, feasibility is used synonymously to the idea of what is possible or probable. It is important to clarify the use of feasibility for the purpose of a policy analysis. Feasibility, unlike possibility, narrows down its focus only to the most realistic policy paths for achieving a desired outcome. Probability differs from feasibility in that it rules out 'aspirational' policy recommendations, accounting only for what is most likely to happen and considering the likelihood of a *status quo* bias in policy (De Wispelaere 2015, 69; Lawford-Smith 2013, 256). Feasibility then becomes a necessary and more helpful theoretical framework for policy analysis that allows for narrowing down what is possible in each context and expanding on what is probable by accounting for some desirability considerations. First, I provide a short discussion on what basic income is and the main features that raise the most contended arguments for and against it.

What is Basic Income?

There are many definitions and similar terms used to refer to the concept of basic income. They all share in common the idea of a set amount of money given to people as a form of social assistance and they are mainly guided by principles of poverty alleviation, freedom, and social justice. In Canada, the Basic Income Canada Network defines basic income as “an unconditional cash transfer from government to individuals to enable everyone to meet their basic needs, participate in society and live with dignity, regardless of work status” (Pasma and Regehr 2020, V).

Many advocates of basic income proclaim it as gaining strength given the support the idea gets from across the political divides but a closer look at this phenomena quickly shows the big

divides in what the idea entails, other than the agreed 'give people money' (Calnitsky 2017; De Wispelaere 2015, 73). There are great differences in the definitions and prescriptions when the idea attempts to take the form of a policy. The arguments on financing and implementing the idea of a basic income date back to pre-industrial times, most pointing to Thomas Paine in the 1700s (Erreygers and Cunliffe 2004; Young and Mulvale 2009). It has been researched and argued for and against across disciplines, including philosophy, economics, and political sciences. The idea of a basic income policy has been proposed across political lines, left, right, and center, each with their own rationale and unsurprisingly incompatible views. In most simplistic terms, from the left, notions of basic income are part of a comprehensive social welfare system that includes access to universal health care, public education, and many other components of a social welfare infrastructure. From the right, basic income is the gateway to removing interferences with private liberties, in which case a universal cash payment in all concepts is seen as an efficient scheme for true market liberalization through the elimination of all social welfare infrastructure. Thus, from a free-market ideology, basic income positions the individual as a free economic agent that can participate in the market economy at their own will, selling their labour, buying their own education, paying for their own health costs, and purchasing whatever housing is available at their income level, just to name a few, all these without state intervention.

The longevity and mixed support base of various basic income ideas can be attributed to the fact that various elements that can define a basic income proposal appeal to both conservative and liberal political thinkers alike (Kearney and Mogstad 2019). Notwithstanding this pseudo broad appeal, the normative arguments that dominate the criticisms of basic income tend to fall into two main categories, those who insist on the expansion of current welfare provisions should take

precedent over policy innovation, and those who think it a moral abhorrence since everyone has an obligation to work, narrowly understood as participating in the wage-labour market (Calnitsky 2017).

Tracing a genealogy of basic income has been most competently done elsewhere and it is beyond the scope of this thesis (Widerquist, Noguera, and Vanderborght 2013 offer a thorough anthological work with a good balance between advocates and critics of Basic Income; see Hamilton and Mulvale 2019a for a brief history of basic income in Ontario, Canada). Nonetheless, it is relevant to address some of the points of contention around the topic to help clarify the contemporary debate in the Canadian context and the 2017-Ontario Pilot which serves as the data exhibit for the argument put forward in this thesis.

Universality and Coverage

This can be interpreted from two perspectives: universal outcome or universal recipient. From an outcome perspective, universality means everyone should have their welfare guaranteed which means that if it is not needed (i.e. welfare of an individual is covered through other means such as employment income, accumulated wealth, etc.) then individuals would not receive a basic income payment. From a perspective of its recipients, universality means everyone is equally entitled to receive a basic allowance regardless of their socio-economic conditions (this is usually in tandem with some form of recovery through taxation). Coverage can also be interpreted from an outcome vs a recipient perspective. From an outcome perspective, it can be defined as a risk insurance hence made available only when needed (similar to a health

insurance) or it can be defined as a default payment regardless of individual conditions such as age, income, or employment status (Gentilini et al. 2019, 4).

Amount and Complementarity

The payment amount has proven to be a defining factor on the potential beneficial vs perverse incentives a basic income policy can have. The claim of basic income having an emancipatory capacity, i.e. freeing people from compulsory participation in market society is very much dependent on the amount set for the payments. Any amount lower than the necessary to cover all basic necessities would not serve to decommodify labour but rather to alter the price point within the markets, in which case basic income would be less effective than a liberal welfare state and a targeted social assistance approach (Caputo 2008; Panitch 2011).

Whether a basic income is seen as a replacement of all existing welfare infrastructure or as a transformation of outdated and stigmatizing workfare programs continues to be one of the biggest points of contention. On the one hand, a basic income that serves to dismantle all other forms of social protection would inevitably put those whose needs are not 'basic' (for instance people with disabilities) at a great disadvantage if they are to satisfy all their needs by purchasing from the free market with an equal monthly amount than those who can participate in the labour market to replace or supplement their basic income. On the other hand, there are proponents who see it as a way to improve welfare infrastructure in a way that is complementary to other existing key service delivery policies (Pasma and Regehr 2020).

Normative Arguments

The purpose – the moral vision – for a basic income policy envisioned by different proponents determine its normative value. Normative arguments supporting basic income tend to fall into two categories: basic income as an *ameliorative* reform in contrast with basic income as an *emancipatory* reform. As a life-improving policy, basic income is argued as a tool to provide targeted assistance to the poor while when presented as being an emancipatory strategy for achieving freedom from exploitation (including self-exploitation), basic income is acclaimed as a true option to market participation (Calnitsky 2017). These conceptual differences are a great point of disagreement and have triggered a myriad of opinions on the desirability of basic income, but these remain as criticisms in the abstract which do not respond to questions about feasibility.

In public opinion polls, Canadians are said to be almost evenly divided on the adoption of a basic income policy with narrow count differences between those supporting it and those rejecting the policy proposition (Ipsos 2017; Research Forum Inc. 2016a; Pierre and Trudeau 2013). Some polls gathered data on public concerns based on imagined negative social and economic outcomes if basic income were implemented, such as labour withdrawal and welfare dependency (Ipsos 2017) or due to the increased technological disruptions and economic precarity (Gallup and Northeastern University 2019; Research Forum Inc. 2016c). It is relevant to note that there is no consistency on polling methods, questionnaire design, or definitions of basic income (when provided in polls) which requires that the values collected are treated with a high degree of caution.

For this thesis, basic income is conceptualized as a non-stigmatizing income-tested cash transfer from government to individuals to enable them to meet their basic needs regardless of work status or fulfillment of any conditions (such as pursuing education or having a specific household composition). More specifically and to differentiate from other interpretations, here Basic Income² is used to signify “a payment to eligible couples or individuals that ensures a minimum income level, regardless of employment status” as described in the criteria set by the Government of Ontario for the pilot program run in this province in 2017 (Government of Ontario 2019).

Background on Welfare and Economic Insecurity

In the context of intensified capitalism, the premise of maximization of profits is leading to changes in the labour market, transitioning from full-time secure, long-term employment to short-term, contract, part-time offers (Western et al. 2012; Piketty and Goldhammer 2014; Picot 1990). Labour flexibilization gave birth to the ‘gig’ economy, namely self-employed freelancers, on-demand online workers, and day labourers, whose share of the labour force in Canada grew from 5.5% from 2005 to 8.2% in 2016 (Jeon, Liu, and Ostrovsky 2019). The current welfare system has not adapted to these changes thereby creating a vacuum for gig workers in which they do not qualify for employment insurance and do not meet the criteria for welfare assistance either. In the case of Ontario, these issues combined with inadequate coverage have worsened the poverty gap of those who do access the welfare system, that is, the difference between the

² Basic Income is capitalized to differentiate it as used in this paper to refer to the Ontario policy from the various definitions used by different authors and in different policy projects around the world.

social assistance amounts and the poverty line, leaving people who depend on welfare further down below the poverty line (Tiessen 2016).

Although rising job insecurity supports arguments for an increased demand of welfare programs, the type of welfare changes is highly debated (Anderson and Pontusson 2007). Despite people tending to agree on poverty and economy insecurity as an undesirable social phenomena (Hennessy and Yalnizyan 2008), ideas on how to best reduce poverty range widely, and it is speculated to be based on people's ideas of morality regarding welfare, measures of merit, and individual responsibility among possible value systems (positive morality) determining peoples' attitudes to earning versus receiving income and requiring economic assistance (Ipsos 2017; Martin 2016; Huber and Form 1973).

Basic income has re-emerged in contemporary debates claiming the results of its implementation would outperform all other options, such as increasing current welfare amounts, since it also addresses issues on stigma associated with welfare services and provides overall freedom (unconditionality) and minimal intrusion through policing individuals (Parijs 1992; Standing 2002; De Wispelaere 2015; Forget 2018). However, public opinion regarding basic income and the political debate around it tend to hinge on the morality of the deserving versus the undeserving poor together with the upholding of an inherited work ethics from earlier industrial times (Weeks 2011; Althusser 1971; Steensland 2008; Ipsos 2017).

Background on Basic Income in Ontario

In 2008 the provincial government set a goal to reduce child poverty levels by 25 per cent by 2013. Yet by 2014, child poverty levels remained unchanged and social assistance was between

30% and 60% below low income measure³, thus locking people into deep poverty (Tiessen 2016, 7–11). With the recommitment to reduce poverty by 25 per cent, in 2014 the government of Ontario included adult and homeless populations in their renewed pledge, albeit no timeline for achieving such goal and without a clear strategy on needed social assistance reforms (Tiessen 2016, 8).

In this context, a pilot policy project was devised to test the effectiveness of a guaranteed basic income in reducing poverty, affecting close to one million Ontarians as of 2016 (Tiessen 2016, 10). Under the leadership of Liberal Premier Kathleen Wynne a pilot project on guaranteed Basic Income was developed, to be tested in three cities in Ontario, over a three-year period (Hamilton and Mulvale 2019b, 559). Important to note, as pointed out by De Wispeleare and Yemtsov, a basic income *pilot* offers a ‘unique political solution’ by circumventing the risks of a policy commitment and engaging with the idea while avoiding an immediate policy implementation decision. In this view, political leaders running these experiments can “claim credit for engaging with a policy innovation while avoiding the risk of being held responsible for a policy fiasco” and it does not imply any commitment for its actual implementation (De Wispeleare and Yemtsov in Gentilini et al. 2019, 202).

Shortly after launching, the Ontario Basic Income Pilot was cancelled in 2017 when provincial political leadership changed. The scrapping of the program followed a change of discourse on poverty, portraying welfare as a source of dependency cycles (Gazso et al. 2019, 3).

³ The low-income measure (used in Canada since 1991) is based on the distribution of household income across the Canadian population with the intention of creating a reference point for international comparisons. Statistics Canada “Low Income Lines 2011- 2012.”

Ontario has seen an ambiguous level of support for a basic income policy which could partially explain the undetermined political feasibility for this policy proposal in Ontario. The other partial explanation is suspected to derive from political will which is not an issue of concern for this research. Evidence found in research from other fields indicate guaranteed income policies consistently lead to positive societal and economic outcomes which serves to prove one aspect of it being a *feasible* policy (Parijs 1995; Sayer 2018; Widerquist 2001). The economic feasibility of basic income has been proven in extensive cost analysis and budgetary studies as well, thus proving the “mathematical” aspect of its feasibility (Segal 2016; Forget 2018; Lerner, Clark, and Needham 1999; Smith-Carrier and Green 2017). However, the unenthusiastic support for this policy in Ontario seems to be the determinant for it not being *politically* feasible.

Problematization

The Canadian welfare infrastructure is outdated and ill-equipped to handle the demands for social assistance needs in contemporary times marked by increased economic insecurity. At a provincial level, this has kept the issue of welfare policies in the political agenda, with many policy options for decision makers. One such policy option is the implementation of a basic income in Ontario. But there seems to be a jump in literature from ‘this is good and possible’ to ‘this should be implemented’ skipping some crucial systematic assessment of other options available to policymakers. Despite the extensive evidence of consistent overall positive outcomes for basic income policy experiments around the world (Gentilini et al. 2019; Hamilton and Mulvale 2019a; Forget 2018; Pulkka 2017; Widerquist, Noguera, and Vanderborgh 2013) the question of feasibility remains unanswered. Gilabert and Lawford-Smith (2012) argue for the

importance of separating the debate over the principles versus the implementation of an idea. This is particularly important when debating the feasibility of Basic Income in Ontario.

Although advocacy groups have been moving away from ideals of basic income to concrete non-ideal but implementable forms of basic income in Canada, they cannot escape the built-in bias in the fact that these proposals and all the supporting evidence is being produced by advocates themselves, which does little to counter accusations of confirmation bias (seeking evidence that confirms one's position) and theory tenacity (maintaining a commitment to a principle even in response of disconfirming evidence). These action-guiding recommendations suffer from limited buy-in from the public and skeptical policymakers. Thus, they do little to advance the issue of the political feasibility of Basic Income.

There is ample research on the broad beneficial impacts of basic income, its *economic* feasibility, and the *administrative* feasibility to move this policy forward in Canada (Segal 2016; Widerquist 2017; Forget 2018, 148–66). However, the feasibility assessments are done using different conceptualizations (definitions, scope, methods), in different settings (place, time), and considering different agents (decision makers), thus making it hard to analyze competing alternative policies for any particular case of policy making scenario. Furthermore, little systematic research has been conducted on the *political* feasibility of the implementation and the post-enactment of basic income, meaning the popular support that would drive policy makers to implement and maintain (as supposed to fold back) a basic income regime.

When thinking about feasibility, a common notion of 'can it be done?' comes to mind and in a very stylized synthesis, it can be said that binary responses to whether Basic Income can be

implemented can both be considered valid answers. ‘Yes, it can’ and ‘no, it can not’ are equally valid, yet at this point, the feasibility question is remarkably useless in advancing elucidation of a policy proposal unless it is first specified what, by whom, where, how, and when the feasibility question is addressing. Lawford-Smith (2010) argues for the necessary specificity when debating what *is* or *is not* feasible, by first establishing the ‘what is it’ that makes a theory feasible. The same specificity is needed when determining whether a policy is politically feasible and for this, the specific subject, the power of the agent, and the outcome must be unequivocally clear. With this in mind, this thesis sought that specificity in the 2016-2017 Ontario context, where a pilot was devised and people were asked for their opinion on it.

If the question were posed as “was it feasible for the provincial government to implement Basic Income in Ontario in 2017?” the answer would be no. Do we know this based on the fate of the pilot after the change in political leadership or could it have been known prior to the pilot? Was it feasible for the provincial government to implement Basic Income in Ontario in 2019? What about if the time variable were changed to current ‘Covid’ times? What would the answer be to the same question if the agent variable were changed to federal instead of provincial government?

Without specifying the feasibility of *what* is being determined and what is meant by feasible or not (as in different from possible or probable), both sides of the basic income divide, advocates and detractors, continue to speak in their own language, echoing themselves, leaving the public unclear on what exactly is being debated. Feasibility allows for consistency across policy proponents and detractors, allowing for systematic comparative assessments of policy options.

Research Questions

The main research question in this thesis is whether Basic Income is politically feasible in Ontario. In pursuing this inquiry, I turn to the issue of the Basic Income constituency (its support base) to look for a constituency profile that can aid further policy analysis.

What is Basic Income's constituency in Ontario? Is it robust enough to determine its political feasibility? Are there homogeneous socio-economic groups supporting an income security scheme such as Basic Income? Do they have the political leverage needed for influencing policymaking? Who are those who oppose it? In analysing the dataset from the Ontario public opinion poll selected for this study, this thesis will explore demographic (age, gender, household composition, education, and income) and non-demographic data (namely perceptions of the economy and political affiliations) in relation to patterns of agreement-disagreement with Basic Income.

Thesis Statement

Following arguments made by Lawford-Smith (2010; 20112) and Gilabert (2012), I subscribe to the premise that understanding *feasibility* aids political judgement by using the best available evidence to determine the best choice to reach a desired outcome. Starting with the postulate that the positive effects of a guaranteed basic income outweigh the challenges (such as a complex overhaul of social assistance bureaucracy and restructuring of the taxation model), the question that follows is whether Basic Income (as described for the 2017 pilot) is a feasible policy in Ontario. To this end, later expanded in this thesis, feasibility is hereby described as having two purposes. It can be used as a 'blunt tool' to rule out a policy if it is "logically or mathematically

impossible” or if it violates “key findings from other social sciences such as economics or psychology” (Moran, Rein, and Goodin 2010, 543–45; Gilibert and Lawford-Smith 2012, 813). It can also be used in a more refined manner to compare two or more available policy options and determine the better one to pursue (Lawford-Smith 2013, 254–56). This more nuanced feasibility assessment tests a policy option based on its ability to overcome limitations such as economic, institutional, and cultural, but also include some psychological and motivational constraints and constraints related to positive morality.

I argue that once ‘hard constraints’ are overcome in the analysis of a prospective policy and when attention is turned to ‘soft constraints,’ a distinction is to be made between the various soft constraints to be tested. I argue that not all soft constraints carry equal weight and that in relative priority, constraints dealing with positive morality weight heavier as determinants of policy options by affecting the constituency supporting the policy and thus limiting the demand for its implementation.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Employment Precarity, Income insecurity, and Basic Income

The literature in this field is relevant to understand the current socio-economic conditions in a historical context of changes in practices and institutions that are increasing income insecurity, which in turn, have a negative effect on an array of societal issues. The survey of this literature indicates there has been a shift in business practices, that include the 'flexibilization' of employment practices, using individualization of risk as a corporate strategy for maximizing profits that negatively impact on the quality of employment (Chen and Mehdi 2018; Sverke et al. 2002). Flexibilization of employment practices has been used to describe processes of deregulation demands from corporations as well as processes to accommodate different employment demands (Arnold and Bongiovi 2013). There are workers who seek flexible (non-standard) work arrangements, such as those voluntarily entering the 'gig economy.' For this thesis, the "involuntary" flexibilization from the workers' point of view is most relevant. In this set of literature, flexibilization is equated to precarity.

Precarity is an important concept for this research, particularly as it explores the direct link between employment precarity and income insecurity. There is substantial literature on employment precarity although the concept has been used to describe various employment conditions, using different terms such as 'informal' or 'casual' opposed to *secure* employment. The inconsistent use of related terms in the field has led some researchers to declare that studies are still in their infancy (Benach et al. 2016). The most prominent distinctions are between forms of employment (full-time, part-time, permanent, etc.), the employment status

(self-employed vs wage labour), and the social context such as gender, ethnicity, citizenship (Vosko 2010). The process of cost reduction on employment contracts, coined 'casualization' is at the core of the growing informal and precarious work, where "[t]emp agencies thrive supplying 'just-in-time' workers" (Lerner, Clark, and Needham 1999, 1; Standing 2011). A defining characteristic of precariousness is that "the worker bears the risks associated with the job, rather than the business that is hiring the worker" (ILO 2016, 18). Precarity can be classified according to the degree of certainty of continuing employment, the degree of regulatory effectiveness, and the adequacy of the income package. The lower these measurements, the greater the level of precarity (Vosko 2010).

In 2016, the ILO produced a report on Non-Standard Employment as part of a response to a policy advice request "to address *decent work* deficits associated with non-standard forms of employment, so that all workers – irrespective of their employment arrangement – could benefit from decent work" (ILO 2016, v emphasis added). Dennis Arnold and Joseph Bongiovi (2013) produced an excellent taxonomy of the important differences of various definitions and uses of the term 'employment precarity,' following the work of Kalleberg and Hewison (2013) and research work conducted by Bacchetta, Ekkehard, and Bustamante (2009). These authors researched the significant impacts of employment precarity given the "differential vulnerability based on education, age, family responsibility, occupation, industry, welfare, and labor market protections" (Arnold and Bongiovi 2013).

This advancement of employment precarity does not affect all labour market participants equally. It has a greater detrimental impact on low-income earners than on middle to high-earning workers and it is characterized by limited or no statutory entitlements, high job

insecurity, and negative effects on health (Vosko 2006; Clarke et al. 2007; Benach et al. 2016). For instance, those entering the gig economy by choice and benefiting from its perks, such as flexible work arrangements (for instance short-term contract work, work from home, and flexible hours) are high-earning professionals offering scientific and technical consulting services and can afford the ebbs and flows of contract work mainly due to the resources available to them, such as financial assets (savings) and networks of support. This high-resource positioning allows them to better negotiate terms of employment and function as a buffer for unsuccessful employment negotiations. At the lowest earning tiers are the vulnerable workers who involuntarily enter this flexible (precarious) labour market, mainly new immigrants and women. They represent close to 50% of the gig economy for whom resources are scarce and where employment uncertainty increases individual and social tensions together with competition for employment opportunities (Jeon, Liu, and Ostrovsky 2019). This competition for employment, in turn, feeds the forces that drive employment precarization and devaluation of labour by increasing instances of exploitative jobs. Lacking sufficient personal resources and little available from personal networks, employment precarity increases competition for social assistance (Vosko 2006, 246).

Job Displacement and Basic Income

The need for basic economic security in a changing economy becomes more pressing when considering labour-saving technologies increasingly available to corporations (Wyonch and Oschinski 2017). Thirty-five percent of the jobs in the Canadian labour force are highly susceptible to automation, and although conservative estimates claim that it is unlikely labour will be completely replaced by smart machines in the near future, the assumption is that there will be a significant replacement of workers for labour-saving technologies as well as skill related

labour-displacement (Wyonch and Oschinski 2017; Forget 2018, 63–77). The arguments on technology replacing human labour is counterargued with statistics of labour shortages and employers desperate in search of *qualified* workers. The problem is that the jobs being replaced by technology leave some people without the specific skills solicited out of job. In other words, the jobs being created through technology innovation cannot be filled by those being displaced by technology. The sort of labour shortages experienced in the Canadian market are due to skill mismatches (Karren and Sherman 2012); and “[n]o amount of legislation designed to keep sixty-five-year-olds working for a few more years as Walmart greeters, and no rules requiring the unemployed to show that they have actively searched for work, will solve this problem” (Forget 2018, 73).

Basic Income is then proposed as a strategy in the new economy to distance the wage relation from the possibility of a life – and the quality of such life – outside the wage relation (Weeks 2011, 145). In her approach to basic income, Kathi Weeks argues that a policy of secure income with no-work component directly challenges productivist values and “rejects the usual prescription that we should work harder and want less” in order to counter income insecurity (Weeks 2011, 146). Basic income hence is defined by Weeks as an “utopian demand,” that is to say, a proposition that although not impossible, is rather difficult to succeed under present institutional and ideological constraints (Weeks 2011, 176).

Public Opinion, Morality, and Basic Income

The literature on basic income and public opinion polls in Canada indicate that two of the most contested points are the no-work requirement for receiving the income benefit and ideas on

individual responsibility vis-à-vis dependency on state support (Ipsos 2017; Forget 2018; Lerner, Clark, and Needham 1999). This is highly problematic for the pursuit of the implementation of basic income, since the beliefs and attitudes people happen to have in relation to the proposal in question are considered determinants on whether a proposal will fail or succeed (Gilabert and Lawford-Smith 2012, 817; De Wispelaere 2015, 22–23; Gentilini et al. 2019, 194).

In the case of basic income, the proposition of *income* without ‘work’ elicits strong reactions on issues of what is ‘fair’ based on social norms of reciprocity (Green and Janmaat 2011) and who can be exempted from the social norms of meritocracy and reciprocity, such as those not physically or mentally able to “get a job” (Harms Smith 2015). Important distinctions on what constitutes ‘work’ in the public imaginary need to be considered. On this point, Weeks offers an excellent analysis on the arbitrariness of what is ‘waged’ (Weeks 2011, 139–50).

A recent study on the psychological impediments to basic income looked at the power of metaphors in revealing hidden ideologies in the argumentation for and against Basic Income and welfare regimes in general (Legein et al. 2018). The authors found that when the public debate is around controversial and ambiguous concepts (basic income being considered one of the kind), “citizens’ opinions are sensitive to framing effects” for example, related to the word “unconditional” being present or not in the description of the policy (Legein et al. 2018, 2). This seems to indicate that “unconditionality” of basic income challenges the dominant liberal ideology of the self-made man (i.e. you get what you work for, hard work pays off hence if you are not well off you should work harder, you are personally responsible for your own circumstances, and the like) common in public discourse (Huber and Form 1973). The study in Legein et al. (2018) did not explore the variable of using the word “income” versus other words

(i.e. benefits, dividends, support, etc.) to describe the welfare policy, which could also be expected to have a framing effect as it relates to “earning” not only “receiving.” There have been several other scholars who had studied the feedback effects between welfare policy designs and political attitudes supporting them and vice versa. One such study found a correlation between welfare programs providing means-tested benefits to the poor and a hostility towards the expansion of the welfare system, while universal welfare garnered greater support (Sabatier 2014, 169).

Furthermore, recent studies on the politics of basic income, remark the lack of research literature on the political impediments to implementing basic income, indicating that the likelihood of a basic income policy is no longer an issue of economic feasibility but rather, that it hinges on morality (De Wispelaere and Morales 2016; van der Veen and Groot 2000).

Basic Income and the Feasibility Question

Political feasibility has been described as one evaluation criterion used in the field of political theory (Sabatier 2014, 400). Although, in normative political theory, little attention has been paid to the theorizing of political feasibility resulting in a logical and nomological lack of consistency (Gilbert and Lawford-Smith 2012; Lawford-Smith 2013). The concept of feasibility draws from literature in philosophy where feasibility is shaped under the ‘ought implies can’ proviso, in particular in the sense of dissolving obligation when something ‘cannot be done.’ In this set of literature, if something is not feasible (as in ‘it cannot be achieved’), the principle is to be discarded. In political theory, “the fact that some political proposal violates feasibility constraints should function to rule that proposal out from serious consideration for

implementation” (Lawford-Smith 2010, 74). Political feasibility borrows from ‘ought implies can’ to develop a binary sense of what is feasible. In earlier works discussing feasibility, the concept was used to discuss whether a proposition was achievable, desirable, or both. This raised empirical and theoretical questions that made the development of a finer understanding and reinterpretation of feasibility even more relevant (Räikkä 1998, 32). Feasibility then is to consider not only the achievability (an accessible path from starting point to desired point) of a proposition but also the moral costs it would entail (Räikkä 1998, 25–30; Gilabert and Lawford-Smith 2012, 812–13). For example, a policy could be achievable but only at the moral cost of disarming a pluralistic democratic society and replacing it with an authoritarian regime. Regardless of the desirability and achievability assessment of the policy, it would be deemed infeasible because of the high moral costs, but *what* constitutes a universally accepted moral cost is left undefined. This analysis led Räikkä (1998) to conclude that in political theory there is a tendency to attribute infeasibility status based on *normative views*, thus likely rendering infeasibility attributions as poorly justified (49). The intensified discussion in recent political philosophy on the usefulness of normative political theories indicate a concern on the lack of systematic study on the ways in which “social and political practices delimit our normative political principles” (Erman and Möller 2019, 1–2). Put simply, talking about feasibility in binary terms and without comprehensive definitions of the concepts at hand is “all but useless in politics” (Lawford-Smith 2013, 244).

Despite the study of feasibility still being a young one, scholars have been advancing important distinctions, separating feasibility from concepts of possibility, probability, and desirability.

Following Räikkä’s analysis, Erman and Möller (2019) argue for treating feasibility and desirability

as conceptually different assessments (6). Gilabert and Lawford-Smith (2012) *theory of political feasibility* proposes two types of feasibility tests: 1) feasibility as a possibility in relation to 'hard constraints' which are those that cannot be lifted such as logical, biological, and laws of nature; and 2) feasibility as a probability in relation to 'soft constraints' such as economic, institutional, and cultural constraints which are 'malleable' and highly context dependant (Gilabert and Lawford-Smith 2012, 814–15). These feasibility tests are then applied at three stages of a normative political theory, starting with the core normative principles, followed by their institutional implementation and finally, the political changes to achieve a policy goal (Gilabert and Lawford-Smith 2012, 819–22). The second feasibility test proposed by Gilabert and Lawford is a 'scalar feasibility' as opposed to 'binary' meaning there is not feasible/unfeasible divide but rather, once a proposition passes the first test of hard constraints (a binary outcome), the result of the scalar feasibility test will denote the degree of feasibility of a proposition considering competing alternative propositions (Lawford-Smith 2013, 813).

Building on the work of previous scholars, Erman and Möller (2019) proposed two metatheoretical constraints: 1) the functional constraint, a constraint in relation to what an intended normative political principle is aimed to regulate, 2) the fitness constraint, a constraint in relation to how it fits together with the other principles, values, and states of affairs which are endorsed in the account (6). Within these two overarching constraints, the authors classify five central aspects that properly determine feasibility constraints of a proposition in political theory (7). In devising this classification, Erman and Möller (2019) attempt to provide a better way to answer the question of 'what we should do, taking into account all the things that matter' putting an emphasis in being explicit on what 'matters' at each instance of feasibility testing (8).

In doing so, the authors put an emphasis on the fact that when assessing feasibility, “the sought context is almost never properly specified when critical claims about the infeasibility of mainstream political theory are made” (Erman and Möller 2019, 3–4). This aligns with Wispelaere’s (2015) proposition (following Korpi and Palme 1998) that the political prospects of basic income may lie in the political rather than policy context (22).

On the issue of the political feasibility of basic income, Wispelaere (2015) argues that ‘constituency’ is a fundamental piece for a proposition to transition from the idea to the policy stage. Constituency is defined as a political category made up of individuals or groups who have and are willing to put their political resources to demand, promote, or maintain a given policy. This is a sub-group of the entire population who has vested interests in the policy, is aware of them, and has the capacity to influence policymakers, for instance through their vote (De Wispelaere 2015, 23). This resonates with the arguments advanced through the ‘demand-capacity paradox’ in which the level of support for basic income is dependent on the existing wealth redistribution schemes and welfare infrastructure already in place (Parolin and Siöland 2019). This demand aspect is weighted against the state capacity for the restructuring of the welfare system, such as in implementing basic income, thus creating the ‘paradox’ that Parolin and Siöland present, where in countries with high capacity there tends to be low demand and vice versa, situating Canada in the high-capacity-low-demand spectrum (Gentilini et al. 2019, 190).

Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework

This thesis uses the feasibility tests proposed by Gilabert and Lawford-Smith (2012) to which I incorporate the concept of ‘constituency’ advanced by De Wispelaere (2015). I also use the ‘demand-capacity paradox’ by Parolin and Siöland (2018) as a supplementary tool to evaluate the level of support for Basic Income in Ontario.

I propose that the issue of constituency falls under what Gilabert and Lawford-Smith (2012) call ‘soft constraints,’ an analytical category that includes economic, institutional, and cultural elements when determining the political feasibility of a policy in question, and to a finer degree of classification, Lawford-Smith (2010) further adds the soft constraints of ‘psychology and motivation,’ ‘positive morality,’ and ‘effort’ categories. For this thesis, I will maintain the three main categories (economic, institutional, and cultural) of soft constraints, folding psychology and motivation and positive morality under the category of cultural constraints (Lawford-Smith 2013, 255). Also, for the purpose of the analysis I intend, effort (crudely put meaning how hard an agent tries to reach a desired outcome) is assumed.

Importantly, the Gilabert and Lawford-Smith (2012) clarify that these constraints are “neither permanent nor absolute” and that in the case of people’s preferences in relation to a policy proposal (translated into support), it must be considered that the fact that people do not ‘want’ something (for our case, a basic income), it should not be deemed an infeasible proposition, “it just means we should think about how to change incentive structures and thereby change people’s desires” (Gilabert and Lawford-Smith 2012, 813). Although I subscribe to the notion that political theories can serve as social criticism with the purpose of challenging status quo and

even preferences, this thesis will be limited to evaluating the constituency base in favour of Basic Income in Ontario, by looking for a constituency profile in the demographic qualities of supporters, leaving out issues of ethical desirability and rationale for public policy preferences.

Feasibility in Principle

The first feasibility test in the Gilabert-Lawford-Smith model is used only to rule out recommendations that cannot be implemented. As such, it is a binary test that states what can 'in principle' be feasible. The formulation is as follows:

Test 1/Binary: It is feasible for **X** (agent) to ϕ (action) to bring about **O** (outcome) in **Z** (place and time) only if **X's** ϕ -ing to bring about **O** in **Z** is not incompatible with any hard constraint.

An example of this would be a proposition such as 'for the purpose of not having any person living below the poverty line, pay each Ontarian a sum above the average income in the province.' Which, in the model it would read as:

Test 1/Binary: It is feasible for the **provincial government** to **pay each person a sum above the average income in the province** to bring about **not having any person living below the poverty line** in **Ontario** only if **provincial government's** **paying each person a sum above the average income in the province** to bring about **not having any person living below the poverty line** in **Ontario** is not incompatible with any hard constraint.

This proposition is categorically unfeasible because it violates a mathematical principle (hard constraint). However, for the same purpose of securing livelihoods above the poverty line in

Ontario, there are many policy options, other than Basic Income, that pass the first feasibility test and can be moved forward in the policy agenda, such as increasing current welfare program minimum payments, adding new payments for existing or new criteria or expanding eligibility criteria on existing programs to be more comprehensive, to name just a few.

Gilbert and Lawford-Smith (2012) propose that the feasibility assessment changes at different stages of a normative political theory, therefore it must be tested at different moments through the transition from the idea-stage (Stage 1) where only principles are tested, to the implementation-stages (Stages 2 and 3) which will be discussed later on.

I start from the position that Basic Income has passed the first feasibility test, since no 'hard constraints' (such as logical, biological, and laws of nature) to categorically rule out Basic Income as infeasible in principle (Stage 1). This assumes the position that deeply held moral beliefs, although closer to 'hard constraints' they are still 'soft' in the sense that, unless deemed pathological, they have the potential of being malleable.

When articulating the various feasibility considerations and how they interact with issues of desirability and epistemic limitations, De Wispelaere's concept of 'constituency' is built in the political feasibility assessment of Basic Income policy in Ontario. I use the concept of constituency as a 'soft constraint' in the feasibility test because soft constraints do not 'rule out' but instead allow for a policy assessment on scalable terms, from least to most feasible. Soft constraints tend to include a probabilistic element, and being malleable, they are subject to dynamic variation. Using the scalar feasibility model, Basic Income can be ranked as more or less feasible than other competitive alternatives for being successfully implemented depending on

economic, institutional, and cultural facts. Accounting for the malleability of soft constraints is two fold, it raises awareness of the fluctuating nature of some factors when conducting a political feasibility assessment, and it makes it easier to identify those constraints that are blocking “the pursuit of morally desirable goals” (Gilabert and Lawford-Smith 2012, 815).

Feasibility in Implementation

The second type of feasibility test proposed by Gilabert and Lawford-Smith is a ‘scalar test’ to determine the comparative feasibility of a proposition with other competing alternatives. This type of feasibility testing aids political judgement (Gilabert and Lawford-Smith 2012, 818–19). The scalar test is used at Stages 2 and 3, which are context-specific implementation stages, as opposed to Stage 1, which is only testing for the principle of the proposition. It is pertinent to note that the Basic Income pilot discussed in this thesis is in an ‘in-between’ position in the idea-policy process. Although it has passed the feasibility Test 1 as a principle, being a ‘pilot’ (and modest in reach in that, it cannot be taken as being at a policy implementation stage. Nonetheless, the feasibility testing exercise is useful in bringing analytical consistency to competing propositions that purportedly aim to bring about the same outcomes in society, namely lifting people out of poverty.

According to the Gilabert and Lawford-Smith model, Stage 2 testing focuses on the ‘stability’ aspect of a proposition. This means that a proposition is categorically tested based on it not clashing with general empirical truths from social sciences. This is Test 1/Stage 2. It is then comparatively tested for its desirability from an institutional perspective, being at least not worse than the alternatives. This is Test 2/Stage 2 (Gilabert and Lawford-Smith 2012, 820).

Finally, in Stage 3, the focus of the feasibility assessment turns to issues of ‘accessibility’, meaning a practicable route from the starting point to the end point and including the moral considerations of implementing the proposition. This requires a balance between process-related and outcome-related considerations (Gilbert and Lawford-Smith 2012, 820). Based on the Test2/Scalar model built by the authors, I propose the following:

Test 2/Scalar: It is *more* feasible for **X** (agent) to ϕ (action) to bring about **O** (outcome) in **Z** (place and time) than for **X** to ϕ_1 (action) to bring about **O** given soft constraints

Test 2 is non-binary in that it has a probabilistic component which can be calculated based on how well the policy accommodates the identified soft constraints at the time of the test and in the future, thus accounting for indirect diachronic ability.

In the case of testing Basic Income in this scalable feasibility test, one set of variables could be:

X (agent)= provincial government

ϕ (action)= implement Basic Income

ϕ_1 (action)= increase welfare payments

O (outcome)= no one in Ontario lives below poverty line

Z (place and time)= Ontario, 2016

soft constraints=

- a) Economic system= the payment of welfare benefits is compatible with the current capitalist system

- b) Institutional= the capacity of existing institutions to accept the new proposition
- c) Cultural= the payment of welfare benefits is not against cultural norms, religious beliefs, general practices in society, public attitudes, and opinions

Certainly, the list is merely an outline of the very many possibilities to refine the query, but they suffice for now for the purpose of exemplifying the feasibility testing capacity of the model. In this case, the scalar feasibility formulation would be:

Test 2/Scalar: It is *more* feasible for the **provincial government to implement Basic Income** (action) to bring about **that no Ontarian lives below the poverty line** (outcome) in **Ontario in 2017** (place and time) *than* for the **provincial government to increase welfare payments** bring about **that no Ontarian lives below the poverty line** given [specified soft constraint]

Certainly, ϕ_1 can be replaced with as many options as available, provided they have passed Test 1 of categorical feasibility, thus rendering different feasibility assessment outcomes. The feasibility test will also yield different answers depending on the selected X (the agent to whom the action is assigned), the Z variable (when and where), as well as the specific constraint we are evaluating.

Now that the variables have been presented, I turn to the specific case of the Basic Income proposition back in 2016. In order to test the political feasibility of Basic Income, I will use Z= Ontario in 2017 (a year later than the time when the public opinion data was collected and when the pilot was scheduled to be implemented) and the variable of constituency (support) as the specific soft constraint.

First, I run the binary feasibility assessment, using Test 1 but at Stage 2 (since the principle of Basic Income has already been deemed free from any hard constraints) to test whether the proposition clashes with empirical data from social sciences. In the case of Basic Income, I assign this as the evidence so far gathered on how people behave when receiving a guaranteed basic income, based on empirical data discussed earlier in this thesis, namely, positive societal behaviours (improved health, increased education attainments, maintain labour participation, among the most salient ones).

Test 1/Binary-S2: It is feasible for **X** (agent) to ϕ (action) to bring about **O** (outcome) in **Z** (place and time) only if **X's** ϕ -ing to bring about **O** in **Z** does not clash with empirical data from social sciences.

Taking one variable at the time, the proposition is to be tested against them to determine a categorical yes/no for its political feasibility at this stage. Using 'health' as one of the variables from empirical data from social sciences for the subject of this inquiry, the test translates as:

Test 1/Binary-S2: It is feasible for the **provincial government** to **implement Basic Income** to bring about **not having any person living below the poverty line** in **Ontario** in **2017** only if **provincial government's** **implementing Basic Income** to bring about **not having any person living below the poverty line** in **Ontario** does not **worsen health of recipients**.

Then it can be said that Basic Income is feasible in that it does not clash with the selected variable, therefore proving its 'stability' as a prospective policy alternative.

Once Test 1/Stage 2 is completed, the analysis turns to Test 2 at Stage 2. In this case, the competitive alternative must be specified. I argue that one such alternative is a 'no action'

option, meaning, maintaining the *status quo* which is a known bias in policymaking. To name a few, competitive alternatives could be:

- a) Maintaining welfare payments at their current levels (no action)
- b) Increasing welfare payment levels (with sub-variables specifying dollar amounts)
- c) Changing qualifying criteria for welfare payment (with sub-variables specifying criteria)
- d) Implementing additional welfare payments to supplement existing ones (with sub-variables specifying dollar amounts and eligibility criteria)

Considering the first competing alternative (a) from the examples above as the variable for this modeling, and for the purpose of testing the incorporation of the concept of constituency, i.e. the support for Basic Income, as a soft constraint, the feasibility test would look as follows:

Test 2/Stage 2: It is *more* feasible for the **provincial government to implement Basic Income** (action) to bring about **that no Ontarian lives below the poverty line** (outcome) in **Ontario in 2017** (place and time) *than* for the **provincial government to maintain welfare payments at their current levels** to bring about **that no Ontarian lives below the poverty line** given **the constituency (support base)**.

Here the feasibility test clashes with the findings in the survey data (to be analysed in detail in the next chapter) in that the only information known about the constituency for Basic Income is that it support means 39.7% of respondents in 2016's survey. Not knowing who compose that forty percent of supporters is an empirical limitation to determine what is the constituency for

Basic Income in Ontario, least that it is less than half of the surveyed population that approves this policy. Here I draw on issues on the composition of a support base.

As noted earlier, constituency refers to the individuals who *have* and *are willing to* put their *political resources* to demand, promote, or maintain a given policy. This constituency, different from net beneficiaries of a policy, has vested interests and is aware of them, and has the capacity to influence policymakers. With this framework, I approach the data set to inquire about the composition of the support base shown in 2016 in favour of Basic Income. While the low-income and unemployed constitute a stable base of support for basic income, they represent a minority of voters (De Wispelare and Yentsov in Gentilini et al. 2019, 203). This is relevant when considering the concept of constituency advanced by De Wispelaere (2015).

Chapter 4: Methodology

Methodological Design

This section details the approach to selection, evaluation, and intended use of the data collected from the Forum Research Political Poll on Provincial Issues survey regarding people's opinion on a proposed Basic Income policy in Ontario (Research Forum Inc. 2016a). The survey was conducted over the phone by Research Forum using a Random Digit Dialing method with Interactive Voice Recognition procedure. A total of 16 survey questions were asked and seven diagnostic questions were included to collect demographic data of respondents.

The data analysis plan for this research, included organizing the survey questions in alignment with the research questions and identifying different demographic groupings by segmenting survey respondents. A cross-tabulation analysis was carried out to compare different groups and subgroups by filtering through different variables such as income, employment status, gender, and age.

It is assumed that all data collected from public opinion polls is subject to certain conditional restraints. These are discussed below under three main caveats: 1) sample design; 2) question design; and 3) cognitive capacity of respondents (Kanji 1998, 3). Although discussed separately, these considerations are not independent one from another. For instance, decisions made in the question design can interact to accentuate or mitigate limitations on cognitive capacity of respondents. That is to say, an otherwise uninformed respondent who might not have an opinion on the Basic Income policy proposal in Ontario, might have an opinion once accessible information is provided to them. After discussing these caveats, the strengths of the research

design are outlined, concluding on the overall suitability of the instrument for the purpose of this research.

Description of Dataset

This survey is a provincial opinion poll with 16 general political questions that was conducted on July 15, 2016. The total sample size was 1097 randomly selected Ontario voters for a total population of 13,448,494 in Ontario that year for an estimated margin of error of $\pm 2.96\%$. Subsample results (such as age, gender) are less accurate and respective margins of error for subsample can be calculated using the Forum Research's online sample estimator.⁴ The survey also included seven diagnostic questions that collected demographic data of participants.

According to disclosed information by Research Forum Inc., the data was statistically weighted by age, region, and other variables “to ensure that the sample reflects the actual population according to the latest Census data” where appropriate (Research Forum Inc. 2016b). However, no further details are available to the public on where it was deemed appropriate to make such adjustments. The survey was conducted over the phone by Research Forum using a Random Digit Dialing method with Interactive Voice Recognition procedure.

⁴ Research Forum Sample Estimator can be accessed at <http://www.forumresearch.com/tools-sample-estimator.asp>

Research Design Limitations

Sample Design

The sample design for this survey is deemed adequate as it follows standard randomized sampling design and with a sample size that allows for data analysis of some significance. As with any design, despite the most careful planning to reduce or eliminate potential bias, limitations must be acknowledged. In this case, the sampling frame consisting of randomly selected telephone numbers for the target population (Ontario) likely missed people within the target population who do not have a phone or who only have a cell phone with a non-regional area code. This sampling design may also have missed people who are apprehensive of answering calls from unknown numbers. These limitations, however, do not hinder the overall quality of the sample design for the purpose of this research.

Question Design

The wording of questions, as well as the ordering of questions within a survey, can lead or otherwise affect respondents' attitudes. The questions asked in this survey are not free from flaws, both in wording and order but nonetheless provide a good data set to do a basic exploration of variables and relationships between them. The questions in this design have minimal framing despite some being imprecise or repetitive. Questions in this poll have been designed without the use of persuasive tactics, introduction of biases, or explicit framing. For example, this can be noted in a more recent survey (2019) where 74.6% Canadians polled indicated support of a Basic Income with only 25.4% not supporting it (Gallup and Northeastern University 2019). In this case, it can be argued that respondents' attitudes were primed with

fears of Artificial Intelligence making labour force redundant in the 25 questions preceding the one about supporting a guaranteed income or not. In the case of the Forum Research design, only six prior questions were asked, and only Question #6 could have had a framing effect on respondents by asking their opinion on whether the economy is getting better or worse.

The most important limitation of using this research design is their use of the term “basic income” giving only an oversimplified definition. In the polling, Question number 7 of the survey was posed as:

“The government of Ontario has proposed a basic income for those in the lowest income brackets. This would be a guaranteed annual income that would replace social assistance, welfare and other provincial support payments. Do you approve or disapprove of this proposal?”

This shorthand definition is rather problematic and could have triggered disapproval, for instance if a respondent had some knowledge or experience with the Ontario Disability Support Program (ODSP) allowances compared to welfare paid through Ontario Works, the workfare program currently in place in Ontario. Defining Basic Income as “replacing” all other provincial support payments may have sounded too drastic for some people. For other respondents, it could be speculated that they approved of Basic Income because the question did not mention the unconditionality feature of this policy. Not knowing about this feature of Basic Income may have led them to respond with an approval while the mentioning of it could have swayed them towards the opposite response option. The conditionality of welfare assistance has shown to be

a highly contentious point in other surveys done on Basic Income, as discussed in earlier chapters.

Other limitations regarding the question design of this survey are the few demographic details collected, leaving out potentially relevant variables such as citizenship status, household composition (other than the number of underage dependants living at the same address), and other financial status indicators apart from total income, for instance, source of income or wealth. This additional information would have made for a richer data set. Furthermore, the ideal design would have included at least one question on the reasons people have for approving or disapproving of Basic Income. This would have provided some insights to help analyze data results that seem at first sight, counterintuitive, such as someone in a low-income bracket (a likely beneficiary) disapproving of this expansion of social welfare. Another important question not asked is the employment status and quality of employment (full-time, part-time, contract work) of the respondents. This could have served to analyze if there is any relationship between employment conditions (as a proxy for income insecurity levels) and respondents' attitudes towards a guaranteed income policy.

Cognitive Capacity of Respondents

Full or "perfect" information is rarely a condition while surveying the general public. This is the case of this Research Forum poll on people's opinions on Basic Income. Respondents were asked whether they approve or disapprove of the Basic Income proposal after only receiving a rudimentary definition as described earlier. This could have led to many respondents to make uniformed or misinformed assumptions (conditions for receiving it, effect on taxation, or

implementation issues) immediately before responding with one of the three options given: 1) approve, 2) disapprove, or 3) don't know.

A similar problem can be observed in Question 8, where respondents were asked how much the Basic Income payment amount should be. This response can be assumed to be highly dependent on respondent's knowledge of the cost of living and their own perceptions of what is an adequate living allowance. For example, for respondents in the higher income brackets (\$80,000 to \$100,000 or \$100,000 to \$250,000) the idea of living with \$20,000 a year (one of the options given to respondents on possible payment amounts to be paid out to Basic Income recipients) might have seem unreasonably low. Conversely, it could be speculated that for respondents in the low-middle class, providing an allowance for roughly half their *earned* income to welfare recipients might seem overly generous. The 'amount to be paid' question could also have been thought as relative to family size of those prospective Basic Income recipients, which was not an issue considered in the wording of this question either.

On the issue of respondent's income, in Question D7 participants were asked "What is your annual household income before taxes?" and they were provided ranges of income in \$20,000 intervals up to \$100,000, then a single bracket between \$100,000 and \$250,000, followed by "\$250,000 or more," and finally, "prefer not to answer" as options to choose from. This is problematic since it does not specify the definition of income on whether it means from all sources, or only earned income. Instead, the question leaves open the possibility that different respondents interpreted the question in different ways, therefore affecting the accuracy of the data collected.

Research Design Strengths

The selected design has several strengths worth mentioning. One important advantage of using this survey data is that Forum Research Inc. is a reputable Canadian agency. This agency was founded in 1993 and has an extensive track record of reliable data collection on market research, consumer experience, and public opinion polling. The agency is also the owner and sponsor of The Forum Poll™, Canada's leading public opinion poll on all trending social and political issues at municipal, provincial, and federal levels. Their frequent and consistent polling questions and methods allow for linear analysis as well, although out of the scope for this paper.

The combination of randomized selection of respondents and a representative sample of total population allow this data set to be used for initial exploration of dependent and independent variables and their relationships. Although Forum Research specifically states that “this research is not necessarily predictive of future outcomes, but rather, captures opinion at one point in time,” the statistics can be used to speculate on public opinion within the given population given the possibility of creating regression models to test some predictors (Research Forum Inc. 2016b).

For the purpose of studying the profile of Basic Income constituency as of 2016, the data collected in this public opinion poll was deemed the most appropriate. Despite the caveats discussed in the previous section, a sample survey provides an efficient way to capture cross-sectional data that includes opinions of those who may otherwise not be consulted, defaulting in relying on advocates and activists (in favour or against) to voice citizens’ opinions (Kanji 1998, 4).

Compared to other public opinion research methods, the telephone survey approach is a cost-effective tool for gathering this type of data. The survey was conducted over the phone by Research Forum using a Random Digit Dialing method with Interactive Voice Recognition procedure. This is acknowledged as a good method for obtaining potentially sensitive information.

Instrumentation

This research conducted a secondary data analysis, and it was not subject to ethics review. The analytical process included organizing the survey questions in alignment with the research questions and identifying different demographic groupings by segmenting survey respondents. A cross-tabulation analysis was carried out to compare different groups and subgroups by filtering through different variables such as income, education, gender, and age. Finally, three binary logistic regression models were tested.

There are some minor discrepancies between the data set variables and the survey questionnaire provided in the respective Codebook. Two discrepancies identified are 1) question 8 in the codebook reads the same as question 7; “If the government of Ontario introduced a basic income, how much should it be?” while in the dataset, question 8 is actually worded properly as “If the government of Ontario introduced a basic income, *to whom should it be paid?*”; and 2) in diagnostic question number one, the codebook questionnaire only states two response options: “Male” or “Female” while in the actual dataset there is a third option “other” that participants could have chosen. These minor discrepancies are nonetheless nonconsequential for the purpose of this study.

Chapter 5: Data Analysis and Findings

Data Analysis

This study analyzed the responses to five of the 16 general political questions in this survey – Q1, Q6, Q7, Q8, and Q9 – and five out of the seven diagnostic questions asked – D1, D2, D3, D4, and D7.

The following question, Q7 was selected as the dependent variable:

Q7: “The government of Ontario has proposed a basic income for those in the lowest income brackets. This would be a guaranteed annual income that would replace social assistance, welfare and other provincial support payments. Do you approve or disapprove of this proposal?”

R7.1: “Approve”

R7.2: “Disapprove”

R7.3: “Don’t know”

These remaining selected questions (Q1, Q6, Q8, and Q9) were used as independent variables to analyze their relationship to approval rates on Basic Income:

Q1: “If a provincial election were held today, which party are you most likely to vote for?”

R1.1: “Progressive Conservative”

R1.2: “Liberal”

R1.3: “New Democratic”

R1.4: "Green"

R1.5: "Other Parties"

R1.6: "Undecided"

Q6: "From your own personal experience, how is the economy changing in Ontario?"

R6.1: "Economy is getting better"

R6.2: "Economy is getting worse"

R6.3: "Economy isn't changing"

R6.4: "Don't know"

Q8: "If the government of Ontario introduced a basic income, how much should it be?"

R8.1: "About \$30,000 a year or more"

R8.2: "About \$20,000 a year"

R8.3: "About \$10,000 a year or less"

R8.4: "Don't agree any basic income should be paid"

R8.5: "Don't know"

Q9: "If the government of Ontario introduced a basic income, to whom should it be paid?"

R9.1: "It should be universal, paid to all regardless of income"

R9.2: "It should be income-tested, paid only to those in need"

R9.3: "Something else"

R9.4: "Don't agree any basic income should be paid"

R9.5: "Don't know"

The demographic data collected of interest for this study are gender, age, dependents in the household, and annual household income before taxes.

Questions 1 and 6 are included in this analysis as independent variables working as proxies of soft constraints (beliefs, values, norms discussed earlier) in relation to approval and disapproval rates of Basic Income.

The selected diagnostic questions (independent demographic variables) to be analyzed are:

QD1: "What is your gender?"

RD1.1: "Male"

RD1.2: "Female"

QD2: "How old are you?"

RD2.1: "Under 25"

RD2.2: "25 to 34"

RD2.3: "35 to 44"

RD2.4: "45 to 54"

RD2.5: "55 to 64"

RD2.6: "65 and over"

QD3: "Do you have children under 18 years old in the household?"

RD3.1: "Yes"

RD3.2: "No"

QD4: "What is the highest level of education you completed?"

RD4.1: "Secondary school or less"

RD4.2: "Some College or University"

RD4.3: "Completed College or University"

RD4.4: "Post graduate studies"

QD7: "What is your annual household income before taxes?"

RD7.1: "Less than \$20,000"

RD7.2: "\$20,000 to \$40,000"

RD7.3: "\$40,000 to \$60,000"

RD7.4: "\$60,000 to \$80,000"

RD7.5: "\$80,000 to \$100,000"

RD7.6: "\$100,000 to \$250,000"

RD7.7: “\$250,000 or more”

RD7.8: “Prefer not to answer”

A cross-tabulation of demographics with Q7 provided an insight into the constituency of a Basic Income policy. The dependent variable selected for testing these diagnostic questions was the same Q7 mentioned above (approve/disapprove of basic income).


The null hypothesis is that there is no relationship between the selected dependent and independent variables.

Univariate Analysis

Respondents in this survey were asked about their opinion on the Canadian economy. The frequency table below shows that “economy is getting worse” has the highest frequency, with 630 respondents choosing this option representing 57.4% of total responses. In this survey, only 11.5% of respondents thought that the economy was getting better (126 people) while 24.2% saw no changes in the economy (265 people). These overall (81.6%) unenthusiastic and gloomy views on the state of the economy could have a framing effect for the immediately following question in the survey which asked about respondents’ attitudes towards Basic Income. This issue is explored later with the bivariate and regression analysis.

Figure 1 - Views on the Economy


From your own personal experience, how is the economy changing in Ontario?



When asked about their approval or disapproval of Basic Income, from all 1097 individuals polled, 39.7% (435 respondents) approved of the Ontario government proposal of a Basic Income as a social assistance program. This group was only slightly higher in number than the total of respondents who disapprove of this proposal which amount to 397 individuals representing 36.2% of the total people polled. It is important to note the considerable number of people (265) who chose “don’t know” to this question, 24.2% of all respondents. This contrasts with the small percentage (6.9%) of respondents who chose this “don’t know” option when asked about their perception of the economy.

Figure 2 – Approval-Disapproval of Basic Income

The government of Ontario has proposed a basic income for those in the lowest income brackets. This would be a guaranteed annual income that would replace social assistance, welfare and other provincial support payments. Do you approve or disapprove of this proposal?




Excluding those who selected the “I don’t know” option, of all those who had an opinion (832 cases), 435 individuals (52.3%) agreed on Basic Income while 397 individuals (47.7%) disapproved of it.

More than half of all respondents (54.6%) suggested the potential amount of money to be paid to Basic Income recipients should be between \$20,000 and \$30,000 or more. Interestingly, from the 397 respondents who disapproved of the program (previous question) only 267 chose the option stating “don’t agree any basic income should be paid” so despite disapproving of Basic Income they had an opinion on the amount it should pay recipients of the program. There was also a shift between those who had responded “I don’t know” to whether they approve or disapprove of Basic Income, decreasing from 265 individuals to 133 responding they did not know how much should be paid to potential recipients. The latter is interpreted as respondents having an opinion on the amount to be paid despite their uncertainty of whether supporting or not the introduction of Basic Income. A similar interpretation can be made of those 100

respondents who initially stated their disapproval of Basic Income who later selected an amount that should be paid.

Figure 3 - Basic Income Payment Amount


If the government of Ontario introduced a basic income, how much should it be?



Finally, 523 respondents (47.7%) think that a Basic Income should be paid only to those in need, meaning that it should be income-tested while only 161 (14.7%) think it should be universal, regardless of income.

Figure 4 - Basic Income Eligibility Criteria

If the government of Ontario introduced a basic income, to whom should it be paid?



Bivariate Analysis


The following bivariate analyses investigated the empirical relationship between variables. Through a cross-tabulation procedure, the selected variables were tested for association. A crosstab analysis was run in order to better understand the relationship between agreement rates and the selected demographic data. For those variables that showed some statistical significance, further tests were run to determine the strength of the relationship between those variables.

Gender and Dependents and Approval Rates

Looking at the gender distribution of respondents and their attitudes towards Basic Income, 50.5% of males agreed with the government implemented a Basic Income policy while 54.3% female respondents agreed with it.

Looking at the formal significance of the relation between gender distribution and approval rates, it can be said that the relationship is not statistically significant when tested at the standard level of significance of 5% (Cramer's $V = .037$, $P = .290$). The detailed tables can be found in Appendix II (Tables 6-11, pages 91-95).


Figure 5 - Gender and Approval Rates



Interestingly, when considering “I don’t know” responses to the approval-disapproval question, there were only 96 male respondents compared with 165 female respondents who did not express a definite position.

Looking at the household composition of respondents and accounting for 265 missing cases (approve/disapprove of Basic Income = I don’t know), from the remaining 832 cases, only 180 respondents had children under 18 living with them. Although there is a slightly higher approval rate in households with children, whether respondents had children under 18 years old or not, did not show a statistically significant result (Crammer’s $V = .011$, $P = .750$).

Figure 6 - Dependents and Approval Rates



The data show that 53.3% of those who had children under 18 years old in the household approved of Basic Income, and 52% of those who did not, also approved of Basic Income.


Likewise, there was a very small difference between those with underaged children (46.7%) and those without minors in the household (48%) disapproving of Basic Income. There is no statistically significant relationship between these variables (Crammer's $V = .011$, $P = .750$; Gamma $V = .036$, $P = .483$). For further details see Tables 12 through 14 (pages 96-97).

Age and Education Levels and Approval Rates

Similar to previous demographic variables tested, age of respondents did not show a statistically significant relation to their approval rates of Basic Income (Crammer's $V = .091$, $P = .234$).

Although it is worth noting that the highest approval rates were among the 25 to 34-years old, with 63% of that age group approving of Basic Income. This could be interpreted in light of the advancement of employment precarity bringing higher uncertainty to those entering the labour force. Conversely, the only age group that had a higher percentage (albeit not by much) of disapproval rates was the 55-64 cohort. This could be speculated as reflecting on meritocratic assessments by those closer to retirement. The detailed tables 15-17 are presented on pages 98 and 99 of Appendix II.


Figure 7 - Age and Approval Rates



Education level of respondents also showed no statistically significant correlation with respondents' approval rates of this policy proposition (Crammer's $V = .082, P = .135$; Gamma $V=.042, P=.402$). Although, there is a slightly greater number of supporters of Basic Income among respondents with post-graduate education levels, with 101 respondents with completed

post-graduate studies approving of Basic Income compared to only 67 respondents in that education level group who stated disapproval. See tables 18-20 on pages 99 and 100 in Appendix II.

Figure 8 - Education Level and Approval Rates



Income Level and Approval Rates

Considering the notions of net beneficiaries and net contributors that could explain a constituency base for Basic Income as described by De Wispeleare (2015, 68), it could be expected that people with higher earnings, who are unlikely beneficiaries of a Basic Income

payout would disapprove of the implementation of this policy. Conversely, people in lower income tiers who are target beneficiaries will be in favour of Basic Income payouts.

Null hypothesis is that there is no association between this independent variable, i.e. level of income of respondents and the dependent variable, i.e. their approval or disapproval of Basic Income. Despite some higher counts on different groups, contrary to the expected association, the contingency table analyzing these two variables showed no statistically significant relationship between income of respondents and their approval rates of Basic Income.


Household income responses of “prefer not to answer” (127 respondents) were coded as missing values, as well as “don’t know” responses (265 of total respondents) to the question of approval or disapproval of Basic Income. These made for a total of 392 responses (35.7%) coded as missing values as shown on Table 21 (page 101).

The highest approval rate (68%) was seen among people reporting less than \$20,000 of annual household income before taxes while the lowest approval rate (44%) was found among those with incomes of \$250,000 or more. Similarly, the lowest disapproval rate of the Basic Income proposal (32%) was observed among the lowest income bracket while the highest disapproval rate (55%) was found among respondents reporting the highest annual household income before taxes.

The division of approval and disapproval of Basic Income among the income levels other than both highest and lowest extremes, were less marked. However, it can be noted that among respondents in the low-income bracket (\$20,000 to \$40,000) more (55%) were in favour of Basic Income than against it (44%) while in the following two income brackets (\$40,000 to \$60,000

and \$60,000 to \$80,000) the reverse was true, showing more respondents against Basic Income (53% and 52% respectively) compared to those in favour (47% and 48% respectively), as shown in Figure 9 below. Finally, in the following two earning brackets (\$80,000 to \$100,000 and \$100,000 to \$250,000) a reversal of the division of approval disapproval rates is noted, with more (56% and 57% respectively) in favour of Basic Income than against it (44% and 43% respectively).


Figure 9 - Income and Approval Rates



The correlation of these variables, i.e. high-income are less in favour and low-income are more in favour of Basic Income, did not reach conventional statistical significance but they could have a relationship that is simply not a linear one ($\text{Gamma } V = .036, P = .483$). This gives reason to think that with a larger sample size the correlation between income levels and approval rates might reach statistical significance (see Table 24 on page 102).

In order to highlight the significance of the relationship between income and approval rates, the income categories were regrouped into fewer income groups, namely combining 1 and 2 into 1=low income (\$40,000 and below); 3 and 4 into 2=middle income (between \$40,000 and \$80,000), and 5 and 6 into 3=high income (between \$80,000 and \$250,000) and coding value 7 as missing (250k and up) with the rationale that there were only 12 cases in the analysis. The results of this analysis did not fundamentally alter the outcome of the analysis but rather, they served to amplify the relationship between income and approval rates, showing a reverse trend between income extremes and middle. Those in the middle showing greater disapproval rates.

Figure 10 - Income and Approval Rates: Regrouped Categories



Views on the Economy and Approval Rates


Another possible relationship explored in this data set is whether people's approval of Basic Income corresponded with people's views on the economy. The hypothesis is that public perceptions on the economy influences opinions on welfare policies. The null hypothesis then being that there is no relation between these two variables.

Excluding "don't know" responses from people's views on the economy, a contingency table was created to analyze whether people who see the economy changing for the better were more likely to approve of Basic Income than those who saw the economy getting worse. The data show that from all respondents, 26% thought there was no change in the economy and 12.5% who thought the economy was getting better. These two groups had higher approval rates of Basic Income than the 61% of total respondents who thought the economy was getting worse.

Interestingly, these pessimistic views on the economy seemed to alter people's attitudes towards Basic Income, perhaps considering improvements to the welfare system are unaffordable when the economy is not doing well.

A further analysis showed that despite the statistically significant result, there was only a moderate relationship between peoples' view of the economy and their approval rates of Basic Income (Crammer's $V = .231$, $P = .000$). See detailed tables 25-28 on pages 103 and 104.

Figure 11- Views on the Economy and Approval Rates




In summary, when the economy was seen as performing poorly there was a decline in generosity towards welfare innovation. It can then be expected that an increase in approval rates of Basic Income could be correlated with an increased optimism in the economy.

Vote Intention and Approval Rates

One final analysis looked at people’s voting intention as it relates to political party preferences, and the relationship to their attitudes towards a Basic Income policy proposal. For the purpose of this analysis, responses “other parties” and “undecided” were coded as missing values, as well as “don’t know” responses to the question of approval or disapproval of Basic Income.

Figure 12 - Vote Intention and Approval Rates



The data show a significant difference on those choosing to vote for the Progressive Conservative party and their approval rates, considerably lower than all other parties. Having obtained a statistically significant relationship, a further analysis was conducted. The data show a moderately strong relationship between the vote intention variables (Cramer's $V=.424$, $P=.000$), allowing the interpretation that peoples' political preferences affect their attitudes towards Basic Income. Detailed tables (29-32) can be found on pages 106-106.

Binary Logistic Regression Analysis


Vote Intention as Predictor of Basic Income Approval

Having found statistically significant relationships between these last two variables; people's views on the economy and their vote intention, I proceed to test the predicting capacity of these variables through a binary logistic regression analysis. For this purpose, the vote intention data were recoded into binary terms first, maintaining the missing values as before and turning the dependent variable into 0=Approve and 1=Disapprove with "don't know" as missing value.

For the modelling, the Conservative variable was used as the reference category for the analysis. The statistically significant coefficient of the model ($P = .000$) is an indicator that the model was a good fit for the data set. The overall classification accuracy of the model is 71% as shown in Table 36 (page 107). The model indicated that with all three political preferences, namely Liberal, New Democrats, and Green Party, the voting intention was statistically significant. This means there is a positive predicting relationship between each of these vote-intention responses and the likelihood of respondent's approval of Basic Income while there is a negative predicting relationship with the reference group (Progressive Conservatives). The odds ratios on Table 37 (page 107), all significantly lower than 1, indicate the negative relationship between the vote intention on these predictors and the approval rates compared to the Progressive Conservative, meaning that the more right leaning the vote intention the less likely the approval of Basic Income. The classification plot below serves to visualize the percentages expressed in the classification table (Table 36 on page 107), showing that the model performed well, accurately

classifying 70% of data. Details of the model are expressed in Tables 33 through 37 on pages 106 and 107.

Figure 13 - Vote intention and approval rates: Classification Plot




Views on the Economy and Vote Intention as predictors for Basic Income Approval

In order to further investigate the other statistically significant independent variable analyzed earlier, a regression model was built to test the predicting capacity of Q1 (voting intention) in combination with Q6 (views on the economy) on the approval rates for Basic Income. First, the views on the economy variable was reordered to create a hierarchical variable where views on the economy were ranked from pessimistic (1), to no-change (2), and lastly to optimistic (3) perceptions. Once the variable was recoded, a binary logistical regression analysis was run to see the predictive power of respondent's vote intention combined with people's perceptions on the economy to their approval rates of Basic Income. The pseudo r-squared values for this model

indicated a good fit of the model for this microdata (Cox and Snell's $R^2 = .181$, Nagelkerke's $R^2 = .241$). This means that with just these few variables the model was able to predict between 18% and 24% of the approval for Basic Income; a considerable likelihood predictor for social sciences given the microdata set. The goodness-of-fit provided by the Hosmer-Lemeshow statistic allowed the determination that the model adequately describes the data ($P = .602$). The classification table (see Table 41 on page 108) shows the model can predict outcomes with a 71.3% accuracy.

As shown in Table 42 (page 109) the odds ratios indicate that all variables tested were statistically significant. Given that the dependent variable was coded Approve = 0, Disapprove = 1, the outcome of this analysis indicates that Progressive Conservative prospective voters are predicted to disapprove of Basic Income and people with an optimistic view of the economy can be predicted to approve of Basic Income. The accuracy of this model is visualized in the classification plot below.

Figure 14 - Vote Intention and Views on the Economy: Classification Plot




Demographic Variables influence on the Regression Model

Finally, the non-statistically significant demographic variables tested earlier were added to this regression model to test whether vote intention and views on the economy were still dominant predictors of approval rates for Basic Income. The model test and the model summary (Tables 43 and 44 on page 109) show that while the test was statistically significant and the pseudo r-squared values were still good, the r-squared values decreased slightly when demographic variables were added to the model (Cox and Snell's $R^2 = .153$ from $.181$ previously, Nagelkerke's $R^2 = .204$ from $.241$ previously). The same effect was noted in the accuracy of the classification capacity of the model, going down to 69.4% from 71.3% when only vote intention and views on the economy were used as predictors. The classification plot below shows that despite the slight

decrease in accuracy, the model still maintained a good degree of success in predicting approval rates for Basic Income.

Figure 15 - Demographic Variables in Model: Classification Plot



In concluding, the analysis of this data set has provided an insight on the composition of the Basic Income constituency; beyond its advocacy groups, focusing on the support the proposition receives from the public in Ontario. The study of the demographic variables in this dataset indicated that despite some weak to moderate correlations, the evidence is rather weak to support any one variable as a determinant of people's approval or disapproval for this policy. The analysis of approval rates of Basic Income in relation to age, gender, household composition, and level of education of participants did not render any statistically significant results.

As noted earlier, other public opinion surveys done on the topic of welfare, including Basic Income, indicate that people's ideas of morality regarding welfare hinge on the concept of merit linked to individual responsibility. This aligns with the two statistically significant findings in this research (vote intention and views on the economy) where 'perceptions' and 'ideologies' are better predictors of support for Basic Income than any demographic variable tested (age, gender, education, income). Further research would allow the exploration of people's attitudes to welfare in the context of earning (conditions to be met) versus receiving (no conditions required) a set amount of income as proposed under the Basic Income policy in Ontario.

Although it could be argued that the kind of survey data collected on Basic Income may well be skewed with impromptu responses that do not reflect opinions as outcomes of information processed by individuals, the few correlations and statistically significant results found in this analysis indicate that some non-demographic variables hold a key to a better understanding of public opinion on this topic. In the following chapter, I discuss the contribution this study offers to the conversations over the political feasibility of Basic Income as a realizable policy for Ontario.

Chapter 6: Conclusions

It could be said that the answer to a past event for which we have a known outcome (the Ontario Basic Income Pilot being cancelled only a few months after being launched) is as enlightening now as trying to determine whether your tire is puncture resistant while examining the flat tire on the side of the road. However, I argue that the exercise of testing for political feasibility for Basic Income in Ontario at the time of the pilot is a helpful analysis to advance the systematic study of a policy alternative that carries the promise of delivering benefits that the outdated provincial welfare system fails to deliver.

Is Basic Income politically feasible in Ontario? The tentative answer *today* is yes. Was Basic Income politically feasible in Ontario in 2016? The answer is no. The Basic Income proposition was not ready to pass to an implementation stage, even in the format of a pilot project. The simplest answer comes from applying the ‘demand-capacity paradox’ by Parolin and Siöland (2018) to evaluate the level of support for Basic Income in Ontario. The analysis of the data collected in this survey indicated a ‘divided’ public opinion on the issue of Basic Income. In few words, there was no clear demand for the policy, irrespective of the government’s implementation capacity. The lack of demand presents no incentive for policy makers to implement Basic Income given the risk it poses of raising opposition or antagonizing potential voters. This lack of demand (correlated to the constituency of a policy) also considerably lowers the political cost of doing away with policy advancements, such as was seen with the cancellation of the Basic Income pilot.

A more nuanced answer comes from assessing the political feasibility of Basic Income based on its capacity to overcome 'soft constraints' such as institutional capacity, cultural norms, and other soft constraints described in Chapter 3. In particular, this thesis looked at 'constituency' as a soft constraint, meaning, whether the proposition has a robust basis of support to drive a policy change. This can sound similar to the 'lack of demand' conclusion above. However, the power of 'constituency' as an analytical concept lays in its capacity to look beyond percentages of support and evaluate the characteristics of that support base. Constituency, as conceptualized by De Wispelaere (2015) refers to the individuals who have and are willing to put their political resources to advance Basic Income and that they have the capacity to influence policymakers. Considering social history and the evidence from political economy research, the role of middle-class support for welfare policy agendas is critical (De Wispelaere and Yentsov in Gentilini et al. 2019, 193). While the low-income and unemployed constitute a stable base of support for basic income, they represent a minority of voters (De Wispelaere and Yentsov in Gentilini et al. 2019, 203). This is relevant when considering the concept of constituency advanced by De Wispelaere (2015) in light of the survey data observed here where we see a tension between the support level at the two lowest income levels (\$40,000 and under), where there are more people in favour of Basic Income, compared with the immediately following income brackets (between \$40,000 and \$80,000), namely the middle class, where there are more people against Basic Income than there are in favour of it.

The data on public support for basic income does not indicate robustness. On the contrary, there is a clear lack of a 'profile' of a typical supporter of Basic Income in Ontario. It could be a parent, middle-aged man with only high-school education or a single mother with a postgraduate

degree; someone in a household with a comfortable income over \$100,000 or a struggling young family living with under \$40,000 a year; or any other combination based on the demographic data observed. Notwithstanding the lack of a demographic profile of a Basic Income supporter, this research has found a different type of profile that makes up for the Basic Income constituency; those with optimistic views on the economy and those whose vote intention favour *anything but* the Progressive Conservative party. Therefore, it can be inferred that perception-measuring variables such as views on the economy and political preferences could be used as proxies for peoples' beliefs and value systems. I argue that this is to be studied, designing surveys that maintain consistency so as to build on existing data, in order to further determine the constituency of Basic Income, which in turn helps to determine the policy's political feasibility.

Finally, is it accurate to state that society is 'divided' on the issue of basic income? Despite the data, I would argue that the tentative answer is no. This answer is based on the consideration that most people do not necessarily know what basic income *is* (at best they may have an ambiguous definition of it), or the implications of such policy (implementation, costs, effect on the economy, myths of laziness effect among other commonly verbalized fears)⁵. It could well be that people think of basic income in ways that are far from accurate (such as equating it to a minimum wage) and that determines their attitude towards it. Looking at the definition given to participants in the survey studied here, it is easy to see the lacking specificity that renders the

⁵ This is based on researchers own experience while offering public presentations on the issue of Basic Income. Participants to these presentations as well as comments made during various interactions in discussing the issue have consistently shown people's lack of clarity on what Basic Income is, however, this has not keep people from voicing strong opinions about it.

responses, both in favour and against Basic Income, as gut-reactions rather than informed policy positions.

Public opinion is important to understand what people 'want' but for a policy analyst to use public opinion data, how the data is designed and collected matters. Looking at the data collected, I am inclined to say that we do not really know whether people support Basic Income in Ontario, and clearly, we do not know the rationale for their support or rejection of it because we are still not clear on what people 'know' about Basic Income. For instance, if we were assured that before we ask for someone's opinion we would first agree on the definition of the object of the inquiry, here Basic Income policy proposal in Ontario, and the response was negative (rejection of policy), then a) we would be certain that the opinion given is based on the same baseline understanding than someone providing a positive response, and b) we would want to ask the reasoning behind the opinion.

Gained from insights from other surveys, peoples' concerns from Basic Income lay on the myth of dependency and the fear of an increased tax burden (Ipsos 2017; Angus-Reid Institute 2020). Therefore, if we were to consider those concerns are leveraging the number of opponents, we could also infer that a comprehensive definition of Basic Income that addresses those specific concerns with available data and evidence *prior* to asking people's opinion about the proposed policy could impact the percentages of supporters versus detractors. Nonetheless, even if the distribution of approval-disapproval rates were to remain the same, at least the researcher would have a higher degree of confidence on those opinions collected thus providing a more accurate measure of public opinion on the issue. Not knowing what the conjured notion of basic

income respondents had when surveyed in 2016, other than the minimally worded definition provided in the polling question studied here, the value of the response loses its relevance.

Public opinion surveys are to be better designed if they are to be tools for the systematic study of the political feasibility of policy propositions. This brings up another issue, that has been purposely left out of the scope of this thesis but is nonetheless a highly relevant aspect for the overall assessment of public opinion and policymaking; the role of public opinion in governance. An exploration on this matter would offer insights on whether policymakers are indeed interested in asking the public for their opinion and if so, what they do with the data collected. One can only wonder, risking sounding cynical, whether that could explain the lack of systematic polling on complex issues, such as moral views on poverty, which are ultimately at the heart of welfare policymaking.

As I work on the concluding thoughts in this thesis, it is hard to maintain the historical boundary in which the data was collected and keep the analysis as intended when this thesis was first started, in 2019. I have avoided conjectures in the light of the extraordinary socio-economic shift brought on by a global pandemic and currently being felt even in the most remote communities in Ontario. What are the implications of the reasoning hereby presented in the new context we are living? How has the political feasibility of Basic Income in Canada changed after many months of a quasi universal emergency fund (CERB) being implemented? Has public opinion on Basic Income shifted into a robust constituency?

I have shown here how a structured, systematic analysis helps respond to divisive assessments against the feasibility of Basic Income. I hope that this discussion will aid further inquiries on how

to think clearly about political feasible policy alternatives. Feasibility is a critical issue for the political economy of policy propositions, conceptually as well as practically, and it offers an analytical method to consistently assess policy alternatives at different points in time, considering the dynamic soft constraints that determine the political feasibility of policy implementation.

Appendix I: Code Book



Country:	Canada
Geographic Coverage:	Ontario
Title:	Forum Research Political Poll – Provincial Issues July 2016
Survey Producer:	Forum Research Inc.
Survey Dates:	July 15 th , 2016
Sample Group/Type:	National Adult – Public Opinion Poll
Sample Size:	1097
Survey Method/Procedure:	Interactive Voice Recognition – Random Digit Dialing
Data Collector:	Forum Research Inc.
Weighting:	Representative Weighting
Estimated Sampling Error:	±2.96%
Distributor:	Department of Political Science - www.politics.utoronto.ca
Related Studies:	See other Federal/Provincial/Municipal Studies
Size of Collection:	12 Provincial Datasets from 2016
Survey Description:	This survey is an Ontario Provincial opinion poll with general political questions as well as various focus questions.
Citation Requirements:	Please note that this data may not be redisseminated without written permission. The results of any analyses conducted on the data may, however, be published with appropriate acknowledgements and source citation.

FORUM RESEARCH INC.
-SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE-

SURVEY QUESTIONS

Q1A If a provincial election were held today, which party are you most likely to vote for?

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------|
| 1.00 = "Progressive Conservative" | 2.00 = "Liberal" |
| 3.00 = "New Democratic" | 4.00 = "Green" |
| 5.00 = "Other Parties" | 6.00 = "Undecided" |

Q1B Even though you may not have made up your mind, which party are you leaning towards at this time?

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------|
| 1.00 = "Progressive Conservative" | 2.00 = "Liberal" |
| 3.00 = "New Democratic" | 4.00 = "Green" |
| 5.00 = "Other Parties" | 6.00 = "Undecided" |

Q2 Do you approve or disapprove of the job Kathleen Wynne is doing as premier?

- | | |
|---------------------|---------------------|
| 1.00 = "Approve" | 2.00 = "Disapprove" |
| 3.00 = "Don't know" | |



Q3 Do you approve or disapprove of the job Patrick Brown is doing as interim leader of the Opposition?

1.00 = "Approve"

2.00 = "Disapprove"

3.00 = "Don't know"

Q4 Do you approve or disapprove of the job Andrea Horwath (HOR-vath) is doing as Leader of the NDP?

1.00 = "Approve"

2.00 = "Disapprove"

3.00 = "Don't know"

Q5 Regardless of which party you would vote for, who do you think would make the best Premier of Ontario?

1.00 = "Kathleen Wynne"

2.00 = "Patrick Brown"

3.00 = "Andrea Horwath"

4.00 = "None of these"

5.00 = "Don't know"

Q6 From your own personal experience, how is the economy changing in Ontario?

1.00 = "Economy is getting better"

2.00 = "Economy is getting worse"

3.00 = "Economy isn't changing"

4.00 = "Don't know"



Q7 The government of Ontario has proposed a basic income for those in the lowest income brackets. This would be a guaranteed annual income that would replace social assistance, welfare and other provincial support payments. Do you approve or disapprove of this proposal?

1.00 = "Approve"

2.00 = "Disapprove"

3.00 = "Don't know"

Q8 If the government of Ontario introduced a basic income, how much should it be?

1.00 = "About \$30,000 a year or more"

2.00 = "About \$20,000 a year"

3.00 = "About \$10,000 a year or less"

4.00 = "Don't agree any basic income should be paid"

5.00 = "Don't know"

Q9 If the government of Ontario introduced a basic income, how much should it be?

1.00 = "It should be universal, paid to all regardless of income"

2.00 = "It should be income-tested, paid only to those in need"

3.00 = "Something else"

4.00 = "I don't agree any basic income should be paid"

5.00 = "Don't know"

Q10 How would you describe the recently cancelled Ontario Retirement Pension Plan, or ORPP?

1.00 = "Waste of time and money"

2.00 = "Good idea that is no longer needed"

3.00 = "Necessary step towards expanding the Canada Pension Plan"

4.00 = "Something else"

5.00 = "Don't know"



Q11 The government of Ontario has initiated a Cap and Trade system for greenhouse gases that will cost the average household about \$13 a month. Do you approve or disapprove of the provincial government's Cap and Trade initiative?

1.00 = "Approve"

2.00 = "Disapprove"

3.00 = "Don't know"

Q12 Do you agree or disagree third parties should be allowed to spend as much as they want on provincial election advertising?

1.00 = "Agree"

2.00 = "Disagree"

3.00 = "Don't know"

Q13 Who spends the most on third party provincial election advertising under the current rules?

1.00 = "Mostly unions"

2.00 = "Mostly individuals"

3.00 = "Mostly corporations"

4.00 = "Someone else"

5.00 = "Don't know"

Q14 Did you vote in the recent provincial election in June 2014?

1.00 = "Yes"

2.00 = "No"

Q15 Which party did you vote for in the last Ontario provincial election held in June 2014?

1.00 = "Progressive Conservative"

2.00 = "Liberal"

3.00 = "NDP"

4.00 = "Green"

5.00 = "Other Parties"

Diagnostic Questions:

D1 What is your gender?

1.00 = "Male" 2.00 = "Female"

D2 How old are you?

1.00 = "Under 25" 2.00 = "25 to 34"
3.00 = "35 to 44" 4.00 = "45 to 54"
5.00 = "55 to 64" 6.00 = "65 and over"

D3 Do you have children under 18 years old in the household?

1.00 = "Yes" 2.00 = "No"

D4 What is the highest level of education you completed?

1.00 = "Secondary school or less" 2.00 = "Some College or University"
3.00 = "Completed College or University" 4.00 = "Post graduate studies"

D5 Have I reached you on a landline or on a cell phone?

1.00 = "Landline" 2.00 = "Cellphone"

D6 In addition to your cell phone, do you also have a landline in your household or not?

1.00 = "Also have a landline"

2.00 = "Don't have a landline"

D7 What is your annual household income before taxes?

1.00 = "Less than \$20,000"

2.00 = "\$20,000 to \$40,000"

3.00 = "\$40,000 to \$60,000"

4.00 = "\$60,000 to \$80,000"

5.00 = "\$80,000 to \$100,000"

6.00 = "\$100,000 to \$250,000"

7.00 = "\$250,000 or more"

8.00 = "Prefer not to answer"

Appendix II: Tables

Univariate Tables

Table 1 - Views on the Economy

From your own personal experience, how is the economy changing in Ontario?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	economy is getting better	126	11.5	11.5	11.5
	economy is getting worse	630	57.4	57.4	68.9
	economy isn't changing	265	24.2	24.2	93.1
	don't know	76	6.9	6.9	100.0
	Total	1097	100.0	100.0	

Table 2 - Approval and Disapproval Rates

The government of Ontario has proposed a basic income for those in the lowest income brackets. This would be a guaranteed annual income that would replace social assistance, welfare and other provincial support payments. Do you approve or disapprove of

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	approve	435	39.7	39.7	39.7
	disapprove	397	36.2	36.2	75.8
	don't know	265	24.2	24.2	100.0
	Total	1097	100.0	100.0	

Table 3 - Approval and Disapproval Rates: Missing Cases

The government of Ontario has proposed a basic income for those in the lowest income brackets. This would be a guaranteed annual income that would replace social assistance, welfare and other provincial support payments. Do you approve or disapprove of

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	approve	435	39.7	52.3	52.3
	disapprove	397	36.2	47.7	100.0
	Total	832	75.8	100.0	
Missing	don't know	265	24.2		
Total		1097	100.0		

Table 4 - Basic Income Payment Amount

If the government of Ontario introduced a basic income, how much should it be?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	about \$30,000 a year or more	315	28.7	32.7	32.7
	about \$20,000 a year	284	25.9	29.5	62.1
	about \$10,000 a year or less	98	8.9	10.2	72.3
	don't agree any basic income should be paid	267	24.3	27.7	100.0
	Total	964	87.9	100.0	
Missing	don't know	133	12.1		
Total		1097	100.0		

Table 5 - Basic Income Eligibility Criteria

If the government of Ontario introduced a basic income, to whom should it be paid?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	it should be universal, paid to all regardless of income	161	14.7	16.0	16.0
	it should be income-tested, paid only to those in need	523	47.7	51.8	67.8
	something else	98	8.9	9.7	77.5
	don't agree any basic income should be paid	227	20.7	22.5	100.0
	Total	1009	92.0	100.0	
Missing	don't know	88	8.0		
Total		1097	100.0		

Bivariate Tables

Gender and Approval Rates

Table 6 - Gender and Approval Rates

**The government of Ontario has proposed a basic income for those in the lowest income brackets. This would be a guaranteed annual income that would replace social assistance, welfare and other provincial support payments. Do you approve or disapprove of *
Finally, just a couple of question to help us group the data. What is your gender? Crosstabulation**

Count

		Finally, just a couple of question to help us group the data. What is your gender?		Total
		Male	Female	
The government of Ontario has proposed a basic income for those in the lowest income brackets. This would be a guaranteed annual income that would replace social assistance, welfare and other provincial support payments. Do you approve or disapprove of	approve	230 ^a	197 ^a	427
	disapprove	225 ^a	166 ^b	391
	don't know	96 ^a	165 ^b	261
Total		551	528	1079

Each subscript letter denotes a subset of Finally, just a couple of question to help us group the data. What is your gender? categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level.

Table 7 - Gender and Approval Rates: Missing Cases

**The government of Ontario has proposed a basic income for those in the lowest income brackets. This would be a guaranteed annual income that would replace social assistance, welfare and other provincial support payments. Do you approve or disapprove of *
Finally, just a couple of question to help us group the data. What is your gender? Crosstabulation**

Count

		Finally, just a couple of question to help us group the data. What is your gender?		Total
		Male	Female	
The government of Ontario has proposed a basic income for those in the lowest income brackets. This would be a guaranteed annual income that would replace social assistance, welfare and other provincial support payments. Do you approve or disapprove of	approve	230 ^a	197 ^a	427
	disapprove	225 ^a	166 ^a	391
Total		455	363	818

Each subscript letter denotes a subset of Finally, just a couple of question to help us group the data. What is your gender? categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level.

Table 8 - Gender and Approval Rates: Case Summary

Case Processing Summary

	Valid		Cases Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
	The government of Ontario has proposed a basic income for those in the lowest income brackets. This would be a guaranteed annual income that would replace social assistance, welfare and other provincial support payments. Do you approve or disapprove of * Finally, just a couple of question to help us group the data. What is your gender?	818	74.6%	279	25.4%	1097

Table 9 - Gender and Approval Rates: Percentages

The government of Ontario has proposed a basic income for those in the lowest income brackets. This would be a guaranteed annual income that would replace social assistance, welfare and other provincial support payments. Do you approve or disapprove of * Finally, just a couple of question to help us group the data. What is your gender? Crosstabulation

			Finally, just a couple of question to help us group the data. What is your gender?		Total
			Male	Female	
The government of Ontario has proposed a basic income for those in the lowest income brackets. This would be a guaranteed annual income that would replace social assistance, welfare and other provincial support payments. Do you approve or disapprove of	approve	Count	230	197	427
		% within Finally, just a couple of question to help us group the data. What is your gender?	50.5%	54.3%	52.2%
	disapprove	Count	225	166	391
		% within Finally, just a couple of question to help us group the data. What is your gender?	49.5%	45.7%	47.8%
Total	Count	455	363	818	
	% within Finally, just a couple of question to help us group the data. What is your gender?	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	

Table 10 - Gender and Approval Rates: Significance Tests

Chi-Square Tests					
	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1.120 ^a	1	.290		
Continuity Correction ^b	.976	1	.323		
Likelihood Ratio	1.121	1	.290		
Fisher's Exact Test				.292	.162
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.119	1	.290		
N of Valid Cases	818				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 173.51.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 11 - Gender and Approval Rates: Symmetric Measures

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.037	.290
	Cramer's V	.037	.290
N of Valid Cases		818	

Dependants and Approval Rates

Table 12 - Dependants and Approval Rates

The government of Ontario has proposed a basic income for those in the lowest income brackets. This would be a guaranteed annual income that would replace social assistance, welfare and other provincial support payments. Do you approve or disapprove of * Do you have children under 18 years old in the household? Crosstabulation

			Do you have children under 18 years old in the household?		Total
			Yes	No	
The government of Ontario has proposed a basic income for those in the lowest income brackets. This would be a guaranteed annual income that would replace social assistance, welfare and other provincial support payments. Do you approve or disapprove of	approve	Count	96	339	435
		% within Do you have children under 18 years old in the household?	53.3%	52.0%	52.3%
	disapprove	Count	84	313	397
		% within Do you have children under 18 years old in the household?	46.7%	48.0%	47.7%
Total	Count	180	652	832	
	% within Do you have children under 18 years old in the household?	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	

Table 13 - Dependents and Approval Rates: Significance Tests

Chi-Square Tests					
	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.101 ^a	1	.750		
Continuity Correction ^b	.055	1	.815		
Likelihood Ratio	.101	1	.750		
Fisher's Exact Test				.800	.408
Linear-by-Linear Association	.101	1	.750		
N of Valid Cases	832				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 85.89.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Table 14 - Dependents and Approval Rates: Symmetric Measures

Symmetric Measures					
		Value	Asymptotic Standard Error ^a	Approximate T ^b	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.011			.750
	Cramer's V	.011			.750
Ordinal by Ordinal	Gamma	.027	.084	.319	.750
	Spearman Correlation	.011	.035	.318	.750 ^c
Interval by Interval	Pearson's R	.011	.035	.318	.750 ^c
N of Valid Cases		832			

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

c. Based on normal approximation.

Age and Approval Rates

Table 15 - Age and Approval Rates

The government of Ontario has proposed a basic income for those in the lowest income brackets. This would be a guaranteed annual income that would replace social assistance, welfare and other provincial support payments. Do you approve or disapprove of * How old are you? Crosstabulation

Count

		How old are you?						Total
		Under 25 years	25 to 34	35 to 44	45 to 54	55 to 64	65 and over	
The government of Ontario has proposed a basic income for those in the lowest income brackets. This would be a guaranteed annual income that would replace social assistance, welfare and other provincial support payments. Do you approve or disapprove of	approve	18	51	45	77	101	143	435
	disapprove	13	30	42	74	114	124	397
Total		31	81	87	151	215	267	832

Table 16 - Age and Approval Rates: Significance Test

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	6.831 ^a	5	.234
Likelihood Ratio	6.884	5	.229
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.620	1	.203
N of Valid Cases	832		

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 14.79.

Table 17 - Age and Approval Rates: Symmetric Measures

		Value	Asymptotic Standard Error ^a	Approximate T ^b	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.091			.234
	Cramer's V	.091			.234
Ordinal by Ordinal	Gamma	.042	.050	.838	.402
	Spearman Correlation	.029	.035	.835	.404 ^c
Interval by Interval	Pearson's R	.044	.034	1.273	.203 ^c
N of Valid Cases		832			

- a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
- b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.
- c. Based on normal approximation.

Education and Approval Rates

Table 18 - Education Level and Approval Rates

The government of Ontario has proposed a basic income for those in the lowest income brackets. This would be a guaranteed annual income that would replace social assistance, welfare and other provincial support payments. Do you approve or disapprove of* What is the highest level of education you completed? Crosstabulation

Count

		What is the highest level of education you completed?				Total
		Secondary school or less	Some college or university	Completed college or university	Post graduate studies	
The government of Ontario has proposed a basic income for those in the lowest income brackets. This would be a guaranteed annual income that would replace social assistance, welfare and other provincial support payments. Do you approve or disapprove of	approve	74	104	156	101	435
	disapprove	70	110	150	67	397
Total		144	214	306	168	832

Table 19 - Education Level and Approval Rates: Significance Tests

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	5.554 ^a	3	.135
Likelihood Ratio	5.590	3	.133
Linear-by-Linear Association	2.713	1	.100
N of Valid Cases	832		

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 68.71.

Table 20 - Education Level and Approval Rates: Symmetric Measures

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.082	.135
	Cramer's V	.082	.135
N of Valid Cases		832	

Annual Income and Approval Rates

Table 21 - Income and Approval Rates: Case Summary

	Case Processing Summary					
	Valid		Cases Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
The government of Ontario has proposed a basic income for those in the lowest income brackets. This would be a guaranteed annual income that would replace social assistance, welfare and other provincial support payments. Do you approve or disapprove of * And finally, what is your annual household income before taxes?	705	64.3%	392	35.7%	1097	100.0%

Table 22 - Income and Approval Rates

The government of Ontario has proposed a basic income for those in the lowest income brackets. This would be a guaranteed annual income that would replace social assistance, welfare and other provincial support payments. Do you approve or disapprove of * And finally, what is your annual household income before taxes? Crosstabulation

			And finally, what is your annual household income before taxes?							Total
			Less than \$20,000	\$20,000 to \$40,000	\$40,000 to \$60,000	\$60,000 to \$80,000	\$80,000 to \$100,000	\$100,000 to \$250,000	\$250,000 or more	
The government of Ontario has proposed a basic income for those in the lowest income brackets. This would be a guaranteed annual income that would replace social assistance, welfare and other provincial support payments. Do you approve or disapprove of	approve	Count	44	71	63	46	56	89	12	381
		% within And finally, what is your annual household income before taxes?	67.7%	55.5%	47.0%	47.9%	56.0%	57.4%	44.4%	54.0%
	disapprove	Count	21	57	71	50	44	66	15	324
		% within And finally, what is your annual household income before taxes?	32.3%	44.5%	53.0%	52.1%	44.0%	42.6%	55.6%	46.0%
Total		Count	65	128	134	96	100	155	27	705
		% within And finally, what is your annual household income before taxes?	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 23 - Income and Approval Rates: Significance Tests

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	10.963 ^a	6	.090
Likelihood Ratio	11.086	6	.086
Linear-by-Linear Association	.484	1	.487
N of Valid Cases	705		

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 12.41.

Table 24 - Income and Approval Rates: Symmetric Measures

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Asymptotic Standard Error ^a	Approximate T ^b	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.125			.090
	Cramer's V	.125			.090
Ordinal by Ordinal	Gamma	.036	.051	.701	.483
N of Valid Cases		705			

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

Views on the Economy and Approval Rates

Table 25 - Views on the Economy and Approval Rates: Case Summary

	Case Processing Summary					
	Valid		Cases Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
From your own personal experience, how is the economy changing in Ontario? * The government of Ontario has proposed a basic income for those in the lowest income brackets. This would be a guaranteed annual income that would replace social assistance, welfare and other provincial support payments. Do you approve or disapprove of	790	72.0%	307	28.0%	1097	100.0%

Table 26 - Views on the Economy and Approval Rates

The government of Ontario has proposed a basic income for those in the lowest income brackets. This would be a guaranteed annual income that would replace social assistance, welfare and other provincial support payments. Do you approve or disapprove of * From your own personal experience, how is the economy changing in Ontario? Crosstabulation

			From your own personal experience, how is the economy changing in Ontario?			Total
			economy is getting better	economy is getting worse	economy isn't changing	
The government of Ontario has proposed a basic income for those in the lowest income brackets. This would be a guaranteed annual income that would replace social assistance, welfare and other provincial support payments. Do you approve or disapprove of	approve	Count	68	208	135	411
		% of Total	8.6%	26.3%	17.1%	52.0%
	disapprove	Count	31	277	71	379
		% of Total	3.9%	35.1%	9.0%	48.0%
Total		Count	99	485	206	790
		% of Total	12.5%	61.4%	26.1%	100.0%

Table 27 - Views on the Economy and Approval Rates: Significance Tests

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	42.301 ^a	2	.000
Likelihood Ratio	42.939	2	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.769	1	.183
N of Valid Cases	790		

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 47.49.

Table 28 - Views on the Economy and Approval Rates: Symmetric Measures

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.231	.000
	Cramer's V	.231	.000
N of Valid Cases		790	

Vote Intention and Approval Rates

Table 29 - Vote Intention and Approval Rates: Case Summary

	Case Processing Summary					
	Valid		Cases Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
The government of Ontario has proposed a basic income for those in the lowest income brackets. This would be a guaranteed annual income that would replace social assistance, welfare and other provincial support payments. Do you approve or disapprove of * If a provincial election were held today, which party are you most likely to vote for? - PROV VOTE	711	64.8%	386	35.2%	1097	100.0%

Table 30 - Vote Intention and Approval Rates

The government of Ontario has proposed a basic income for those in the lowest income brackets. This would be a guaranteed annual income that would replace social assistance, welfare and other provincial support payments. Do you approve or disapprove of * If a provincial election were held today, which party are you most likely to vote for? - PROV VOTE Crosstabulation

			If a provincial election were held today, which party are you most likely to vote for? - PROV VOTE				Total
			Progressive Conservative	Liberal	New Democratic	Green	
The government of Ontario has proposed a basic income for those in the lowest income brackets. This would be a guaranteed annual income that would replace social assistance, welfare and other provincial support payments. Do you approve or disapprove of	approve	Count	98	162	78	34	372
		% within If a provincial election were held today, which party are you most likely to vote for? - PROV VOTE	29.8%	75.7%	66.1%	68.0%	52.3%
	disapprove	Count	231	52	40	16	339
		% within If a provincial election were held today, which party are you most likely to vote for? - PROV VOTE	70.2%	24.3%	33.9%	32.0%	47.7%
Total	Count	329	214	118	50	711	
	% within If a provincial election were held today, which party are you most likely to vote for? - PROV VOTE	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	

Table 31 – Vote Intention and Approval Rates: Significance Tests

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	127.769 ^a	3	.000
Likelihood Ratio	132.229	3	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	71.533	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	711		

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 23.84.

Table 32 - Vote Intention and Approval Rates: Symmetric Measures

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.424	.000
	Cramer's V	.424	.000
N of Valid Cases		711	

Binary Logistic Regression Tables

Vote Intention as Predictor of Basic Income Approval

Table 33 - Vote Intention and Approval Rates: Model Test

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients

		Chi-square	df	Sig.
Step 1	Step	132.229	3	.000
	Block	132.229	3	.000
	Model	132.229	3	.000

Table 34 - Vote Intention and Approval Rates: Model Summary

Model Summary			
Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1	851.894 ^a	.170	.226

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.

Table 35 - Vote Intention and Approval Rates: Goodness of Fit Test

Hosmer and Lemeshow Test			
Step	Chi-square	df	Sig.
1	.000	2	1.000

Table 36 - Vote Intention and Approval Rates: Classification Table

Classification Table ^a					
Observed		Predicted		Percentage Correct	
		Approve	Disapprove		
Step 1	ApproveBinary	Approve	274	98	73.7
		Disapprove	108	231	68.1
Overall Percentage					71.0

a. The cut value is .500

Table 37 - Vote Intention and Approval Rates: Odds Ratios

Variables in the Equation								95% C.I. for EXP(B)	
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	Lower	Upper
Step 1 ^a	Liberal	-1.994	.200	99.539	1	.000	.136	.092	.201
	NewDemocrat	-1.525	.229	44.438	1	.000	.218	.139	.341
	Green	-1.611	.326	24.389	1	.000	.200	.105	.378
	Constant	.857	.121	50.589	1	.000	2.357		

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Liberal, NewDemocrat, Green.

Views on the Economy and Vote Intention as Predictors for Basic Income Approval

Table 38 - Vote Intention and Views on the Economy: Model Test

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients

		Chi-square	df	Sig.
Step 1	Step	136.073	4	.000
	Block	136.073	4	.000
	Model	136.073	4	.000

Table 39 - Vote Intention and Views on the Economy: Model Summary

Model Summary

Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1	808.059 ^a	.181	.241

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.

Table 40 - Vote Intention and Views on the Economy: Goodness of Fit Test

Hosmer and Lemeshow Test

Step	Chi-square	df	Sig.
1	3.639	5	.602

Table 41 - Vote Intention and Views on the Economy: Classification Table

Classification Table^a

	Observed		Predicted		Percentage Correct
			Approve	Disapprove	
Step 1	ApproveBinary	Approve	261	95	73.3
		Disapprove	101	225	69.0
		Overall Percentage			71.3

a. The cut value is .500

Table 42 - Vote Intention and Views on the Economy: Odds Ratios

		Variables in the Equation					95% C.I. for EXP(B)		
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	Lower	Upper
Step 1 ^a	Liberal	-1.808	.221	66.883	1	.000	.164	.106	.253
	NewDemocrat	-1.472	.234	39.716	1	.000	.229	.145	.363
	Green	-1.657	.344	23.149	1	.000	.191	.097	.375
	orderedViewsOnEconomy	-.329	.135	5.933	1	.015	.720	.552	.938
	Constant	1.280	.212	36.313	1	.000	3.595		

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Liberal, NewDemocrat, Green, orderedViewsOnEconomy.

Demographic Variables Influence on the Regression Model

Table 43 - Demographic Variables: Model Test

		Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients		
		Chi-square	df	Sig.
Step 1	Step	95.432	9	.000
	Block	95.432	9	.000
	Model	95.432	9	.000

Table 44 - Demographic Variables: Model Summary

Model Summary			
Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1	698.162 ^a	.153	.204

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.

Table 45 - Demographic Variables: Goodness of Fit Test

Hosmer and Lemeshow Test			
Step	Chi-square	df	Sig.
1	8.813	8	.358

Table 46 - Demographic Variables: Classification Table

Classification Table^a

	Observed		Predicted		Percentage Correct
			Approve	Disapprove	
Step 1	ApproveBinary	Approve	224	86	72.3
		Disapprove	90	175	66.0
		Overall Percentage			69.4

a. The cut value is .500

Table 47- Demographic Variables: Odds Ratios

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	95% C.I. for EXP(B)	
								Lower	Upper
Step 1 ^a	Liberal	-1.680	.239	49.368	1	.000	.186	.117	.298
	NewDemocrat	-1.275	.253	25.412	1	.000	.279	.170	.459
	Green	-1.462	.382	14.647	1	.000	.232	.110	.490
	orderedViewsOnEconomy	-.257	.146	3.095	1	.079	.773	.581	1.030
	Finally, just a couple of question to help us group the data. What is your gender?	.140	.190	.544	1	.461	1.151	.793	1.670
	How old are you?	-.006	.072	.006	1	.936	.994	.863	1.145
	Do you have children under 18 years old in the household?	.043	.247	.031	1	.861	1.044	.643	1.696
	What is the highest level of education you completed?	-.060	.101	.360	1	.548	.941	.773	1.147
	And finally, what is your annual household income before taxes?	.063	.059	1.148	1	.284	1.065	.949	1.195
	Constant	.695	.633	1.207	1	.272	2.004		

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Liberal, NewDemocrat, Green, orderedViewsOnEconomy, Finally, just a couple of question to help us group the data. What is your gender?, How old are you?, Do you have children under 18 years old in the household?, What is the highest level of education you completed?, And finally, what is your annual household income before taxes?.

References

- Althusser, Louis. 1971. "Lenin and Philosophy, and Other Essays ." New York : Monthly Review P .
- Anderson, Christopher J., and Jonas Pontusson. 2007. "Workers, Worries and Welfare States: Social Protection and Job Insecurity in 15 OECD Countries." *European Journal of Political Research* 46 (2): 211–35. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2007.00692.x>.
- Angus-Reid Institute. 2020. "As COVID-19 Rewrites Playbook on Social Safety Net , Majorities Support Idea of Basic Income of up to 30K."
- Arnold, Dennis, and Joseph R Bongiovi. 2013. "Precarious, Informalizing, and Flexible Work: Transforming Concepts and Understandings." *American Behavioral Scientist* 57 (3): 289–308. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764212466239>.
- Benach, J, A Vives, G Tarafa, C Delclos, and C Muntaner. 2016. "What Should We Know about Precarious Employment and Health in 2025? Framing the Agenda for the next Decade of Research." *International Journal of Epidemiology*. England. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ije/dyv342>.
- Calnitsky, David. 2017. "Debating Basic Income." *Catalyst* 1 (23): 63–90.
- Caputo, Richard K. 2008. "Standing Polanyi on His Head: The Basic Income Guarantee as a Response to the Commodification of Labor." *Race, Gender & Class* 15 (3/4): 143–61.
- Chen, Wen-Hao, and Tahsin Mehdi. 2018. "Assessing Job Quality in Canada: A Multidimensional Approach." Vol. no. 412;no. Ottawa: Statistics Canada = Statistique Canada.
- Clarke, Marlea, Wayne Lewchuk, Alice de Wolff, and Andy King. 2007. "This Just Isn't

- Sustainable': Precarious Employment, Stress and Workers' Health ." *International Journal of Law and Psychiatry* . Netherlands : Elsevier Ltd . <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijlp.2007.06.005>.
- Erman, Eva, and Niklas Möller. 2019. "A World of Possibilities: The Place of Feasibility in Political Theory." *Res Publica (Liverpool, England)* 26 (1): 1–23. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-018-09415-y>.
- Erreygers, Guido, and John. Cunliffe, eds. 2004. *The Origins of Universal Grants : An Anthology of Historical Writings on Basic Capital and Basic Income* . Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; Palgrave Macmillan.
- Forget, Evelyn L. 2018. *Basic Income for Canadians: The Key to a Healthier, Happier, More Secure Life for All*. Lorimer.
- Gallup, and Northeastern University. 2019. "FACING THE FUTURE U.S, U.K. and Canadian Citizens Call for a Unified Skills Strategy for the AI Age."
- Gazso, Amber, Stephanie Baker Collins, Tracy Smith-Carrier, and Carrie Smith. 2019. "The Generationing of Social Assistance Receipt and 'Welfare Dependency' in Ontario, Canada." *Social Problems*. <https://doi.org/10.1093/socpro/spz032>.
- Gentilini, Ugo, Margaret Grosh, Jamele Rigolini, and Ruslan Yemtsov. 2019. *Exploring Universal Basic Income: A Guide to Navigating Concepts, Evidence, and Practices*. Washington, D. C: World Bank Publications. <https://doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-1458-7>.
- Gilabert, Pablo, and Holly Lawford-Smith. 2012. "Political Feasibility: A Conceptual Exploration." *Political Studies* 60 (4): 809–25. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2011.00936.x>.

Government of Ontario. 2019. "Ontario Basic Income Pilot." 2019.

<https://www.ontario.ca/page/ontario-basic-income-pilot>.

Green, Andy, and Jan Germen Janmaat. 2011. *Regimes of Social Cohesion: Societies and the Crisis of Globalization*. Hampshire;New York, NY; Palgrave Macmillan.

Hamilton, Leah, and James P. Mulvale. 2019a. "'Human Again': The (Unrealized) Promise of Basic Income in Ontario." *Journal of Poverty* 23 (7): 576–99.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/10875549.2019.1616242>.

Hamilton, Leah, and James P Mulvale. 2019b. "'Human Again': The (Unrealized) Promise of Basic Income in Ontario ." *Journal of Poverty* . Philadelphia : Routledge .

<https://doi.org/10.1080/10875549.2019.1616242>.

Harms Smith, Linda. 2015. "'Blaming-the-Poor': Strengths and Development Discourses Which Obfuscate Neo-Liberal and Individualist Ideologies." *International Social Work* 60 (2): 336–

50. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0020872815594218>.

Hawthorn, Geoffrey. 1991. "The Logic of Pessimism -- The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy by Albert O. Hirschman." Washington: New Republic.

Hennessy, Trish, and Armine Yalnizyan. 2008. *Ready for Leadership: Canadians' Perceptions of Poverty*. Electronic. Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives.

Huber, Joan, and William Humbert Form. 1973. "Income and Ideology: An Analysis of the American Political Formula." New York: Free Press.

Hunsley, Terrance. 2020. "Basic Income: Is This the Time?" The Pearson Centre. 2020.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XOrBwPAxjo8>.

ILO. 2016. "Non-Standard Employment Around the World: Understanding Challenges, Shaping Prospects." *Policy File*. International Labour Organization.

Ipsos. 2017. "What Do Canadians Think About Universal Basic Income?" *Public Perspectives*.

Jeon, Sung-Hee, Hujun Liu, and Yuri Ostrovsky. 2019. "Measuring the Gig Economy in Canada Using Administrative Data."

Kanji, Mebs. 1998. "Priming Public Opinion Research: A Systematic and Analytical Approach." Toronto: ITP Nelson.

Karren, Ronald, and Kim Sherman. 2012. "Layoffs and Unemployment Discrimination: A New Stigma." *Journal of Managerial Psychology* 27 (8): 848–63.

<https://doi.org/10.1108/02683941211280193>.

Korpi, Walter, and Joakim Palme. 1998. "The Paradox of Redistribution and Strategies of Equality: Welfare State Institutions, Inequality, and Poverty in the Western Countries." *American Sociological Review* 63 (5): 661–87. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2657333>.

Lawford-Smith, Holly. 2010. "Feasibility Constraints for Political Theories." The Australian National University.

Lawford-Smith, Holly. 2013. "Understanding Political Feasibility." *The Journal of Political Philosophy* 21 (3): 243–59. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9760.2012.00422.x>.

Legein, Thomas, Audrey Vandeleene, François Randour, Pauline Heyvaert, Julien Perrez, and Min Reuchamps. 2018. "Framing the Basic Income: An Experimental Study of How Arguments

and Metaphors Influence Individuals' Opinion Formation." *Basic Income Studies*.

<https://doi.org/10.1515/bis-2018-0010>.

Lerner, Sally C, Charles Michael Andres Clark, and W Robert Needham. 1999. "Basic Income: Economic Security for All Canadians." Toronto, ON: Between the Lines.

Martin, Josh. 2016. "Universal Credit to Basic Income: A Politically Feasible Transition?" *Basic Income Studies* 11 (2): 97–131. <https://doi.org/10.1515/bis-2015-0028>.

Moran, Michael, Martin Rein, and Robert E Goodin. 2010. *The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy*. New York;Oxford; Oxford University Press.

Panitch, Vida. 2011. "Basic Income, Decommodification and the Welfare State." *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 37 (8): 935–45. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0191453711413715>.

Parijs, Philippe van, ed. 1992. *Arguing for Basic Income : Ethical Foundations for a Radical Reform* . London ; Verso.

———. 1995. "Real Freedom for All: What (If Anything) Can Justify Capitalism?" Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Parolin, Zachary, and Linus Siöland. 2019. "Support for a Universal Basic Income: A Demand–Capacity Paradox?" *Journal of European Social Policy* 30 (1): 095892871988652–19.

<https://doi.org/10.1177/0958928719886525>.

Pasma, Chandra, and Sheila Regehr. 2020. "Basic Income : Some Policy Options for Canada Basic Income Canada Network Basic Income : Some Policy Options for Canada."

Pate, Kim, and Frances Lankin. 2020. "Senate Open Letter: Canadian Emergency Response

Benefit.” Ottawa, Ont.

Picot, W G. 1990. *Good Job/Bad Jobs and the Declining Middle: 1967-1986*. Edited by John Myles and Ted. Wannell. Research Paper Series ; No. 28. Ottawa: Statistics Canada.

Pierre, The, and Elliott Trudeau. 2013. “Responsible Citizenship A National Survey of Canadians.”

Piketty, Thomas, and Arthur Goldhammer. 2014. “Capital in the Twenty-First Century .”

Cambridge Massachusetts : The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press .

Pulkka, Ville-Veikko. 2017. “Widerquist, Karl, Noguera, José A., Vanderborght, Yannick, & de Wispelaere, Jurgen. Basic Income. An Anthology of Contemporary Research.” *Basic Income Studies* 12 (1). <https://doi.org/10.1515/bis-2017-0007>.

Räikkä, J. 1998. “The Feasibility Condition in Political Theory.” *The Journal of Political Philosophy* 6 (1): 27–40. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9760.00044>.

Research Forum Inc. 2016a. “Forum Research Political Poll - Provincial Issues (Ontario) 2016.”

Edited by Research Forum Inc. Scholars Portal Dataverse.

<https://doi.org/doi:10.5683/SP/RXVQZW>.

———. 2016b. “Plurality Approval for Basic Income: Press Release.” Toronto [Ont.].

———. 2016c. “Plurality Approval for Basic Income.” 2016.

Sabatier, Paul A. 2014. *Theories of the Policy Process*. Edited by Christopher M Weible. 3rd ed.

New York: Westview Press.

Sayer, Andrew. 2018. “Welfare and Moral Economy .” *Ethics and Social Welfare* . Abingdon :

Routledge . <https://doi.org/10.1080/17496535.2017.1377273>.

Segal, Hugh D. 2016. "Finding a Better Way: A Basic Income Pilot Project for Ontario," 101.

Smith-Carrier, Tracy A, and Steven Green. 2017. "Another Low Road to Basic Income? Mapping a Pragmatic Model for Adopting a Basic Income in Canada ." *Basic Income Studies* . Berkeley : De Gruyter . <https://doi.org/10.1515/bis-2016-0020>.

Standing, Guy. 2002. *Beyond the New Paternalism: Basic Security as Equality*. New York: Verso.

———. 2011. "The Precariat ." Bloomsbury Academic .

Statistics Canada. 2020. "Labour Force Survey, April 2020." The Daily. 2020.

http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2020/statcan/45-28/CS45-28-1-2020-19-eng.pdf.

Steensland, Brian. 2008. *The Failed Welfare Revolution: America's Struggle over Guaranteed Income Policy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Sverke, Magnus, Johnny Hellgren, Katharina Näswall, Stockholms Universitet,

Samhällsvetenskapliga Fakulteten, and Psykologiska Institutionen. 2002. "No Security: A Meta-Analysis and Review of Job Insecurity and Its Consequences." *Journal of Occupational Health Psychology*. United States: Educational Publishing Foundation.

<https://doi.org/10.1037/1076-8998.7.3.242>.

Tiessen, Kaylie. 2016. "Ontario's Social Assistance Poverty Gap." Ottawa, ON, CA: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives.

Veen, Robert van der, and Loek Groot. 2000. "Basic Income on the Agenda: Policy Objectives and

Political Chances ." NL : Amsterdam University Press .

Vosko, Leah F. 2006. *Precarious Employment: Understanding Labour Market Insecurity in Canada*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

———. 2010. "Managing the Margins: Gender, Citizenship, and the International Regulation of Precarious Employment." Oxford: Oxford University Press.

<https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199574810.001.0001>.

Weeks, Kathi. 2011. "The Problem with Work: Feminism, Marxism, Antiwork Politics, and Postwork Imaginaries ." Durham : Duke University Press .

Western, Bruce, Deirdre Bloome, Benjamin Sosnaud, and Laura Tach. 2012. "Economic Insecurity and Social Stratification." *Annual Review of Sociology*. Palo Alto: Annual Reviews.

<https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-soc-071811-145434>.

Widerquist, Karl. 2001. "Perspectives on the Guaranteed Income, Part I ." *Journal of Economic Issues* . Lincoln : Association for Evolutionary Economics .

<https://doi.org/10.1080/00213624.2001.11506401>.

———. 2017. "The Cost of Basic Income: Back-of-the-Envelope Calculations." *Basic Income Studies* 12 (2): 1–13. <https://doi.org/10.1515/bis-2017-0016>.

Widerquist, Karl, José Noguera, and Yannick Vanderborght. 2013. *Basic Income: An Anthology of Contemporary Research*. West Sussex, England: John Wiley & Sons.

Wispelaere, Jurgen De. 2015. "An Income of One's Own? The Political Analysis of Universal Basic Income." University of Tampere, Finland.

- Wispelaere, Jurgen De, and Leticia Morales. 2016. "The Stability of Basic Income: A Constitutional Solution for a Political Problem? ." *Journal of Public Policy* . CAMBRIDGE : CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS . <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0143814X15000264>.
- Wyonch, Rosalie, and Matthias Oschinski. 2017. "Future Shock? The Impact of Automation on Canada's Labour Market ." Toronto, ON, CA : C.D. Howe Institute .
- Young, Margot, and James P Mulvale. 2009. *Possibilities and Prospects the Debate over a Guaranteed Income*. Ottawa, Ont: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives.