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TITLE OF THESIS/TITRE DE LA THÈSE INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: THE NETWORK
AND ITS SUPPORTERS

UNIVERSITY/UNIVERSITÉ CARLETON UNIVERSITY, OTTAWA, ONT.

DEGREE FOR WHICH THESIS WAS PRESENTED/
GRADE POUR LEQUEL CETTE THÈSE FUT PRÉSENTÉE MASTER OF ARTS

YEAR THIS DEGREE CONFERRED/ANNÉE D'OBTENTION DE CE DEGRÉ 1991 (SPRING)

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INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM:
THE INTERNATIONAL NETWORK AND ITS SUPPORTERS

by

Shalom Stephen Katz, B.A.

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts.

Department of Political Science

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

March 6, 1981

The undersigned recommend to the Faculty
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INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM:

THE INTERNATIONAL NETWORK AND ITS SUPPORTERS

submitted by Shalom Katz, Hons. B.A.,
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the degree of Master of Arts.

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April 1981

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to attempt to explore certain elements (dimensions) of modern terrorism. The emphasis on the word 'modern' is in order to underline the uniqueness of this form of terrorism, ie. international terrorism, in contrast to any other social or political violence that history has recorded. Academic research must therefore start with the obvious, namely, a discussion of the various approaches to this study, along with their respective definitions and typologies in regards to the phenomenon of terrorism.

The second chapter will emphasize primarily the network of contemporary international terrorism. This study of the network, by which we mean the connections (linkages) between the ideologically (mainly from the left) oriented organizations, will attempt to answer the questions of why it has become such an effective coalition of terrorist groups, and what are the reasons and the motives behind these interdependence relations?

Chapter Three will attempt to identify and expose certain nation states, members of the society of nations, that were found guilty beyond any doubt in helping, by different ways and methods, individual terrorist organizations or the network as a whole.

Last, but certainly not least, will be our conclusions as to minimizing the effect of terrorism, thus guaranteeing a victory for civilization and the certain reduction of global hostilities. If such optimistic conclusions arise (with support) at the end of this research, then our efforts were worthwhile.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Acknowledgement is due to Dr. Gabriel Ben-Dor who supervised this entire effort, and whose fruitful and constructive advice is immeasurable. I would also like to extend an acknowledgement to the staff of the Israeli embassy in Ottawa and to Professor Michael Kelley (Carleton University) who helped me in obtaining some valuable information and recommended numerous sources of bibliography.

Finally, last but not least, to the two ladies who played a crucial role in allowing this effort to be realized: Marijke Wertheim, for her efficiency, speed, and accuracy in typing, and Julie, my future wife, whose dedication and patience in editing were just beyond description.

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PREFACE

"Short of living in a bank vault, there is no absolute protection against terrorism."¹

Ironically, the author of the above statement was unaware of a terrorist incident that occurred only a few years earlier, in Sweden.

"For those who lived through the terrifying experience in Sweden of what became known as the 'Battle of the Bank Vault', even this refuge was seen to be unsafe."²

History records many such incidents, too numerous even to mention. But in the field of political science, systematic study of this phenomenon is still rudimentary. In fact, only the activities of the network of international terrorism, which rose sharply in the 1960's, led to considerable study after the fact(s), particularly in nations that sustained these rude awakenings.

In academia, the treatment of international terrorism has traditionally been left to historians and sociologists. Among the world's intelligence communities, the problem of international terrorism has been studied most intensively. In the United States and elsewhere, there has developed a considerable body of what could be termed "doctrine", with respect to international terrorism. The most fundamental tenet of this doctrine is that terrorist acts are not effectively predictable unless such prediction is based upon (typically unobtainable) evidence which

is concrete, conclusive and unassailable.

An intimately related problem is that intelligence leaders are typically unable (or unwilling) to make the case of impending danger with sufficient force. To a degree perhaps, this is simply a human failing, but it more generally reflects a problem of organizational weakness.

This problem arises because of the fact that:

- 1 - Too few people are permitted full access to what information exists.
- 2 - What information exists is not sufficiently evaluated or turned into intelligence. (The problem of information overload).
- 3 - The information is not used effectively to direct other covert and overt means of collection to seek its corroboration or refutation.³

Therefore, in this study, the problem of international terrorism is treated largely as a problem of inappropriate (inadequate) institutional response on the part of the Western democracies, to its ambiguous threat. In attempting to concentrate on the various theoretical difficulties that are involved in this area, as well as to focus on the network of international terrorism itself and the primary forces behind it.

Finally, this work is scarcely definitive and can only be very tentative and explanatory. In part, this is due to the limitations of the writer, as well as the objective limitations

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of the literature, whereby so much relevant information about
international terrorism remains classified and therefore inac-
cessible to the public.

CHAPTER ONE

Definitional and Typological Problems in Studying Terrorism.

Dark forces have inched their way into the lighted circle of civilization, and have become established as normal phenomena to which society must accommodate itself.¹

The phenomena of "terrorism" and "terror" are as old as any other social and political activities of mankind in the modern world. However, the scientific study of both, the political and the psychological schools, can be seen as relatively new, with perhaps a recent boom in the past decade or so. Being as such, both the confusion and disagreement among scholars and students of social science has significantly risen in the past few years. Furthermore, the ultimate desire among scientists to establish grand theories that could predict and deal with these social and political conducts of human beings have so far met with little success, if any. Interestingly, the rapid increase in attention by both the public and scholars would not be possible unless the phenomenon of terrorism developed to such an extent that practically anyone anywhere can become its victim. Brian Jenkins emphasized the style of modern-day terrorism in the following way:

Terrorism may strike citizens of another country while they are living overseas, in transit from one country to another, or at home in their own country. Terrorism has become a new element in international relations.²

Thus, the theme of this opening chapter will be to demon-

strate the scope and the extent of the research which has been conducted so far in this field. Criticisms relating to this research will also be provided. An attempt will then be made to create an acceptable, or at least workable, definition of the concept of terrorism. The final step will be to build some conceptualizations and typologies in order to enable us to relate the different terrorist groups into these categories.

I

Terrorists believe society is sick and does not realize the gravity or even the nature of its own illness. They are convinced they will provide mankind with a cure before the hour is too late.³

Only some 200 years ago, such a statement would most likely have been ridiculed and not been given much attention. However, Albert Parry wrote the above statement in the late decades of the 20th century, when those optimistic views from the post-industrial revolution era are on the decline.

In the 1780's, as Edward Gibbon (Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire) and others saw it, the greatest danger for the civilized world (Western Europe) was expected from the 'savage nations of the globe'. However, in their respective, and quite rightful, conclusions, they estimated the strength of the civilized world to be increasing, thereby decreasing the threats to their maintenance substantially. Therefore, the question that now ought to be asked is, What happened in the last 200 years that resulted in a decline of optimism and conversely raised more

doubts as to the faith of the civilized world?

To answer this crucial question, there is no doubt that comprehensive evaluation will require a serious look into our history books. Paul Johnson emphasizes the importance of the study of history. He claims that:

Most people have only a very superficial knowledge of history. They tend, therefore, to underestimate the fragility of a civilization. They do not appreciate that civilizations fall as well as rise.⁴

This idea of approaching the study of terrorism as a phenomena, from a historical point of view, has been shared and practiced by many scholars writing in this discipline. Therefore, it would be quite natural to follow this logical direction, and to attempt to answer successfully our previous question, as to the changes that terrorism introduced to the civilized world in the past 200 years. If there has been in modern times an archetypal terrorist organization dedicated to revolutionary violence, the People's Will (in Russian, Narodnaya Volya) of tsarist Russia, would most likely qualify. The reason why they (the People's Will) and not another group was chosen, is primarily due to the fact that they were first to advocate and practice 'personal terror'. This group, which appeared on the scene in 1879, attracted people who were simply frustrated by attempts to mobilize the peasantry, but were determined to bring forward a radical change in the Russian political status quo. This relatively small (only about 500) group of activists finally managed to kill the Tsar in 1881, after two earlier ill-fated attempts. Hence, the impact and memory of this

small group was sharply ingrained in the minds of many Russians, who some 25 years later successfully mobilized the masses to bring about the revolution of 1917. Another reason why the People's Will movement should be studied carefully lies in the fact that in the writings of their leaders one may find a 'sophisticated model' of revolution that many terrorist groups and movements have adopted and practiced in later days. Here are some notes that one of the extreme leaders (Serge Nechayev) of that group wrote, which have been regarded by many as the epitome of the philosophy of 'personal terror'.

The revolutionary is a dedicated man. He has no personal inclinations, no business affairs, no emotions, no attachments, no property, and no name....He has torn himself away from the bonds which tie him to the social order and to the cultivated world, with all its laws, moralities, and customs...morality is everything which contributes to the triumph of the revolution. Immoral and criminal is everything that stands in his way.⁵

Regardless of whether S.Nechayev foresaw the future development of terror or not, it is striking to see present leaders of terrorist groups advocating and preaching along the same lines 100 years later.

I am not a man of settlements and concessions...Our struggle in the occupied land will be violently and bitterly escalated. We will start with the stepping up of our suicide strikes against the Zionist enemy.⁶ (Y.Arafat)

The 20th century has seen a dangerous escalation in the phenomenon of terrorism. This phenomenon practically swept throughout the globe, crossing different continents and all ideological forums. However, what differentiates terrorism in the early half of this century from what we know today or in any other given

period in history, is its extent on one hand, and particularly its motives.

The highlight of the first 50 years of this century was what the academia defines as "guerrilla warfare" or "wars of liberation". This phenomenon, which most likely starts as terrorism, rapidly manages to develop and mobilize the masses, ultimately resulting in civil war. The examples of the Communist revolutions in Russia, China, Cuba, and Vietnam can further support this analysis. Hence, this resistance against foreign powers, and the guerrilla warfare in the name of strong nationalism and nationhood, were not solely the exercise of communist movements. It is enough to mention the Zionist movements in Palestine and of those in some European countries to serve as self-evidence of this point.

The ancient Chinese military philosopher, Sun Tzu, was able to summarize the tactical doctrine of the guerrilla in four word-symbols, which illustrate the significant difference between what we know as terrorism and what actually is guerrilla warfare. He pronounced it as follows:

"Sheng Tung, Chi Hsi", or in English, "Uproar (in the) East, Strike (in the) West."⁷

The lack of discussion about terrorism and terrorist movements during the first 50 years of this century should not give rise to conclusions that this phenomenon was non-existent. On the contrary, terrorist acts and terrorist movements existed in many parts of the world: Ireland, Spain, Palestine, the Balkans. However, what captured the attention of the public and the historians at the

same time were the atrocities that came out of the two World Wars, which made terrorism look harmless, as well as the successful guerrilla warfare which led to the later establishment of many new emerging nation-states.

Another way of looking at this shortage in literature can be seen in the conclusions that Walter Laqueur has reached:

Terrorism, history shows, occurs in waves; it has its ups and downs.⁸

Moving away from the historical discussion of terrorism, the discussion will now focus on the past twenty years. One should note the sharp increase in literature on the subject during this period, as well as the increasing differences among the scholars tackling this phenomenon.

This new "wave" of literature involves many variables and assumptions that are either impossible or too complicated to control, whether using a theoretical approach or any other descriptive form. Therefore, before an attempt is made to comprehend what terrorism is in our day, one should eliminate through a screening process those characteristics which are incorrect and do not reflect the real picture.

The wrong approach is to see terrorism as one of many symptoms of a deep-seated malaise in our society, part of a pattern of violence, which includes juvenile delinquency, rising crime rate, student riots...which is blamed on the shadow of the H-bomb, western materialism, TV and cinema violence...⁹

The main reason behind the objection to the above approach is due to the fact that its most likely outcome would be the conclusion that terrorism is "mindless" violence, "senseless" violence, or "irrational" violence. In fact, the contrary is the case. There is

a theory of terrorism, and unfortunately it often works. The understanding of the theory involves primarily the understanding of the fact that,

...terrorism is a means to an end in itself. In other words, terrorism has objectives, although those who carry out acts of terrorism may be so dedicated to violent action that even they sometimes seem to miss this point.¹⁰

Another problem with the "wrong approach", as Johnson calls it, lies in the fact that it leads to some defeatist conclusions. Some scholars blame society for promoting terrorism while others simply say, "We are all guilty". What Paul Johnson, Brian Jenkins and others mean by acknowledging the existing theory behind terrorism is that terrorism is not a part of a generalized problem, but rather specific, with an identifiable nature. Paul Johnson claims that, "because it can be isolated from the context which breeds it, it is a remediable problem".¹¹ This logical and scientific line of thought, however, should have long ago provided us with a better understanding and better tools for prediction as to the future of terrorism. If Johnson's and Jenkins' conclusions are correct, why, then, are we still searching in the darkness after measures and acts to contain terrorism? Some scholars view the apathy of governments, parliaments, the media, and the public generally as the core of the problem, in attempting to contain terrorism. However, this view is rather simplistic or even primitive. The fact of the matter is that social scientists themselves are partly to blame. For the past two decades they have devoted endless time and effort to solve the problems that terrorism has

introduced, but have so far been unsuccessful. However, in order to provide a balanced critique, a survey of the literature of terrorism is necessary.

The first orientation that should capture our attention is the scientific approach. It is of interest to the reader to do so in order to discover the state of affairs of this discipline in an era of "scientific revolution". Michael Haas claims that, "As a social enterprise, science enables man to come to terms with reality".¹² So, why haven't we come to terms with reality, in our case, terrorism? Edward Mickolus, one of the most prominent individuals in this field, answers the question perfectly.

Increasing the number of sources gives more information on more incidents and fills in missing data on each incident, but it does not necessarily solve problems or erroneous information and conflicting information among sources.¹³

As a result of this normative dissensus, which occasionally leads to confusion among researchers, many advocates of the scientific method with strong ideological convictions, have lapsed on occasion into oversimplified diagnoses, panaceas, and polemics. Furthermore, the empirical approach to the study of terrorism involves the tendency on the part of the researcher to collect data endlessly, or to demonstrate the utility of a variety of research strategies on trivial questions. What is lacking is the commitment to accumulate a body of tested propositions within the framework of an organized body of knowledge.

Another problem regarding ~~the empirical approach~~ involves the question of whether or not we can remain scientific to the

extent of complete emotional detachment and ethical neutrality.

J.Nef replies to the above questions:

Such claims would be utterly impossible. This is precisely an area loaded with normative implications. I see no good reason why in order to be "objective" one should be detached and dispassionate to the point of ignoring the overwhelming human tragedy involved.¹⁴

Despite Nef's somehow flexible answer, which implies that the researcher does not have to be detached in order to remain "objective" in his final analysis, others have found some potential dangers involved in the process of an empirical approach.

Science has much to say about the most appropriate means for achieving certain ends, but the choice between penultimate goals remains outside the jurisdiction of science; analytically, values and facts are two separate realms.¹⁵

The point that Haas makes is quite clear and straightforward; he feels that we should be concerned about the type of choice that a scientist will make, given the fact that he is emotionally attached, especially in dealing with such a delicate matter as terrorism. These choices are subject to the scientist's own biases and are therefore no longer within the jurisdiction of science.

The final point of criticism of the empirical approach involves the failure of the researchers to create metatheories to successfully guide empirical efforts. As a result, the field remains in an atheoretical stage, with a disturbing lack of a conceptual mapping to guide the data gathering that the field has been "blessed" with. In conclusion to the discussion on the empirical approach, one may see that the pioneering attempts by individuals such as Mickolus, Gurr, and their followers have met with little success so far. Hence, pride and hope, or perhaps a combination of

the two, still influences some scholars to attempt to find a scientific formula (theory) to modern terrorism. Edward Mickolus further supports the rumour about the existence of this school:

...a small but growing "invisible college" attempting to apply the tools of systematic empirical inquiry to the analysis of terrorist behaviour.^{16**}

Moving away from the empirical orientation in the review of the literature, one cannot overlook the psychological approach to the study of terrorism. It would be extremely difficult to ignore this school for two main reasons: its size (numerous scientists and scholars), and its misfortune, like other types of orientation, in being unable to reach a final and sufficient analysis as to the nature of terrorism and the behavioural dilemmas regarding the terrorists.

It appears that even among the psychologists and psychiatrists who analyze the phenomenon of terrorism, there is no coherent unanimity as to the question of the causes of terror. One school for instance, the psychohistorians, tried to develop some overarching theory to cover this phenomenon by maintaining that, "such a host of phenomena is demonstrably impossible unless one subscribes to the belief that all of these events are simple manifestations of man's basic aggressive and destructive nature".¹⁷ This type of belief goes along the same lines as the famous saying that 'life is nasty, brutish and short', which found some sort of support

**See a discussion on the empirical approach: Terrorism Data Bases: A Comparison of Missions, Methods, and Systems, by William Warner Fowler, The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Los Angeles, March 1980.

throughout history, even from the greatest philosophers. Another current psychiatrist labeled the phenomenon as an "original sin", a slogan borrowed from theological belief. This approach is self-evident of its own failure, since civilization thus continues in our time despite their claim of a "destructive human nature". The other streams among the psychiatrists are primarily involved in repeated attempts to detect certain behavioural and emotional disturbances that may be, according to the scholars, the reasons behind the phenomena. This stream, unlike the previous, psycho-historian, one, does not claim that the objective conditions and political forces are the same for all the individuals and groups in question.

What is being suggested is that terrorism as advocated in anarchist, anarcho-syndicalist, and romantic Marxism, has an emotionally similar quality.¹⁸

Furthermore, the researchers who belong to this group, may go so far as to admit certain gaps in their knowledge which will make any prediction about terrorism or the terrorist mind immature and therefore easily falsifiable.

We shall never understand human cruelty until we know more about paranoid projection, a mechanism of mind which is far from confined to the psychotic.¹⁹

In fact, it is not only the lack of knowledge about the human being which limits the researchers, but also the absence of certain crucial variables such as the economic factors (unemployment, inflation, poverty) in the study of modern terrorism. That enables the psychologist to determine the social stress in the society which may have had the explanation for the phenomenon.

Anthony Storr concluded his paper by saying, "Terrorism appears to be connected with feelings of helplessness in that it tends to be initiated by people who believe that they have no power to alter events in any other way".²⁰ Therefore, those limitations of the study which were listed before can now be understood better when psychologists and psychiatrists admit that they are unable to detect these "feelings of helplessness" in a 'healthy' society.

Perhaps the most rewarding discovery of this school so far has been that the deep human factors involved in terrorism do not vary from state to state, or from one side of the ideological spectrum to the other.

It is probable that the offenders who are kooks, wherever they act, have more in common with each other than they have with the society to which they ostensibly belong.²¹

This assumption was made possible only after carefully performed psychiatric interviews with skyjackers from all around the world, and the study of their behaviour during the time in which the crime took place. This discovery is especially important since it should alert governments and parliaments and everyone else to reject the idea that "what happened to them there, won't happen to us here". Terrorism is everywhere.

In conclusion to the discussion about the psychological approach, it should be noted again that man is not destructive by nature. It also became evident that there is some lack in knowledge and a shortage of variables for the use of the scholars in this field, which so far prevents them from measuring precisely the extent of the social stress which should yield before the

uprising of terror.

Following our discussion on the historical, empirical, and psychological approaches, we should now focus on the descriptive approach, ie. the study of the phenomenon of terror from hindsight. Hindsight is usually 20-20, and foresight myopic; the main purpose of this approach is to utilize the former in self-conscious aid to the latter. This is of course done regularly and, in a sense, constitutes the mode of advance in the social sciences. But so often this is done haphazardly that insights from the past are just as regularly forgotten or held to be suspect even after they have stood the ultimate test, the test of time. This leads us to ask, why bother in revealing the past sins of terrorism over and over again, while the public and the governments are well aware of these acts? The answer is in part a serious attempt to reinvent the wheel, in an effort to help in a small way those nations that have a good reason to fear a potential uprising of terror on their land but can never be quite sure. The researchers who belong to this school do not choose to color their descriptions of terrorism and terrorists in order to avoid the slightest possibility that the young reader of this subject will sympathize even for a moment with these acts. On the contrary, they describe the impact of terrorism, "not merely on individual nations, but on humanity as a whole, as intrinsically evil, necessarily evil and wholly evil".²² In other words, terrorism represents the most horrifying elements that threaten our civilization. What are, then, some of the basic characteristics, the sins, of modern terrorism?

The first sin that we can easily detect is simply by understanding the relation between the terms 'terror' and 'power'. 'Terror' according to Hannah Arendt,

...is not the same as violence; it is, rather, the form of government that comes into being when violence, having destroyed all power, does not abdicate but, on the contrary, remains in full control....Violence can destroy power; it is utterly incapable of creating it.²³

Furthermore, both leaders and philosophers who promote terrorism, like the famous philosopher Sartre, have gone as far as to identify certain political situations as the equivalent of violence, thus justifying violence as a corrective measure or response.

Violence is presented as liberation, a fundamental Sartrean theme. For a black man, writes Sartre in his preface, to shoot down a European, is to kill two birds with one stone, to destroy an oppressor and the man he oppresses at the same time.²⁴

The second sin can be derived from the following view about terrorism:

Terrorism, as has been seen, is the weapon of those who are prepared to use violence but who believe that they would lose any contest of sheer strength.²⁵

In other words, all that the terrorists hope to achieve through these brutal and inhuman acts is the mere attention and acknowledgement of both the public and the politicians to their acts. This acknowledgement, they (the terrorists) believe, will later produce their final goals which are far more remote than what they appear to be at first sight.

The third sin of terrorism has so far only been admitted publicly by a handful of democratic states. Others will reluctantly or privately admit to the fact that terrorism became a tool in the international arena, which is very efficiently used by totali-

tarian regimes and most likely led by the Soviet Union. According to the CIA, the Soviet Union carries on a program of "bringing young revolutionaries from all parts of the Third World to the Soviet Union for training and indoctrination".²⁶ Throughout recent years, there has been enough evidence to support this claim, and it is therefore no longer only moral and ideological support that the totalitarian regimes (the Soviet Union is only one example) are giving, but rather systematic physical support as well. This quite recent development can be seen as a direct threat to democracy and to free democratic societies. The destruction in Lebanon is one example of this.

Terrorism "cannot destroy a totalitarian state. All it can do is to transform a nation struggling towards progress and legality into a nightmare of oppression and violence".²⁷ Thus it should lead us to a very significant generalization, being that terrorism distinguishes between lawful and totalitarian regimes, and it is very unlikely that one will find this phenomenon in countries such as East Germany, Bulgaria, Libya, or the Soviet Union.

The fourth, and perhaps the most deadly, sin of terrorism lies in the fact that occasionally it manages to force its wills and demands on the civilized society. To understand how it became possible for terrorists to impose their will and demands successfully on certain democratic states, we should show the complete opposite situation, where their will and demands have been almost always rejected. Israel provides a case in point. Even during the

most horrifying hours of September 5, 1972, when the lives of eleven of her finest athletes were in the hands of the worst of mankind, Israel decided to continue to stick with its old policy of not negotiating or bargaining with terrorists.

The Israeli decision-makers felt that they and they alone knew the only way to deal with treacherous Arabs...The hostages were thus abandoned to their certain fate. Their death was to symbolize the indomitable will of their country to survive. It was dreadful but inevitable.²⁸

Not all states were asked to make such a huge sacrifice, or even to risk the lives of their citizens to that extent. However, in the past decades we have witnessed on many occasions situations where a demand by terrorists was made in one part of the world, and as a direct consequence the most dangerous murderers were released from their European jails. This attitude of giving up and giving in to terrorist demands went far beyond the release of terrorists from jails, or the payments of huge sums of ransom for hijacked airplanes.

We find governments failing, time and again, in their duty to persuade the public - and this is the real heart of the matter, that terrorists are not misguided politicians: they are, first, last and all the time, criminals - extraordinary criminals...We find newspapers and TV networks - often, indeed, state TV networks - placing democratic governments, and their officials and servants, and the terrorists, on a level of moral equality.²⁹

To support these points made by Paul Johnson, it is enough to mention the fact that Yasser Arafat has given more interviews to the mass media than Henry Kissinger during his years in the White House. Another example is the warm, welcoming state ceremony that Bruno Kreisky initiated to honour Yasser Arafat, the leader of one

of the most dangerous organizations in modern times.

In summarizing the work done by researchers who belong to the descriptive stream, one of the clearest conclusions that can be drawn is that the list and the amount of terrorist sins goes far beyond the four which have so far been mentioned. Another outcome of this study is the point that terrorism is not a static threat - it is an increasing one, threatening all civilization. Finally, this orientation (the descriptive) appears to combat terrorism by utilizing certain concepts and methods borrowed from the terrorists' slogan, and are therefore most likely to be understood by them.

Unlike the three previous orientations, (historical, empirical, psychological), the 'ordinary' factual orientation does not claim that it has reached an overall theory that will either historically or mathematically explain or predict the phenomenon. Neither would it like to describe the terrorist as mentally disturbed, or as an inferior man compared to others. What this orientation does is simply collect the hard facts about terrorism, then present them in the most relevant and natural colours, even if occasionally it may offend the sensitive reader or the pacifists among us.

It now appears that the decision to choose the favourite orientation for this study is the sole responsibility of the reader. In this thesis, however, the guiding orientation chosen is the fourth one, the 'ordinary', descriptive, factual approach. Therefore, it should lead us to the quest for a workable definition of terrorism.

II

In this chapter so far there has not been a discussion of the definitions of the concepts 'terror' and 'terrorism'. Unlike most scholarly academic research, which begins with the obvious, the definitions of the concepts and the terms it entails, here a deliberate attempt has been made to blur and intentionally ignore such discussions. The problem of defining terrorism and terror is compounded by the fact that these two concepts have recently become 'fad' words, used in various forms and by different individuals. These terms are often applied to acts of violence that do not show any relevance or resemblance to terrorism, by definition. Ironically, not only members of the media, statesmen and the academics are trapped in misusing these terms, the problem was also demonstrated by the unproductive and ill-fated UN deliberations during 1973 and 1974. The UN concluded that, "there is no satisfactory political definition of terror extant or forthcoming".³⁰

An example of a traditional definition of the concept of terror can be seen in the one offered by Eugene Victor Walter (Terror and Resistance 1969), in which terror is defined as "a type of violent action...designed to ~~make~~ people afraid".³¹ In spite of the fact that much of this definition is true and entails one of the major aims of terror, it seems to be too simple and therefore may give rise to future mistakes and misunderstandings. This weak definition, for example, may lead people to equate terrorism with guerrilla warfare, or any other social or political violence that

exists in modern society. Can we label conventional war, pestilence and disease, natural disasters, the crushing burden of common crime, and even the effects of mere human carelessness, as terror? Although all these phenomena mentioned above share a common characteristic, being the actual harm to life and property of innocent civilians, we certainly have to draw a sharp distinction between terror and the other listed phenomena. By distinguishing between terror and other social or political violence, we do not mean, however, that their potential threat to human life and property markedly differ. On the contrary, traffic accidents, for instance, as a result of careless driving habits, cause on an average ten times as many casualties as does terrorism in one decade.

It has been said that, during the emergency produced by the Mau Mau terrorism, more Europeans were killed in traffic accidents within the city limits of Nairobi than were murdered by terrorists in the whole of Kenya.³²

With this in mind, we can perhaps adopt a famous Churchillian epigram that can help us improve our understanding as to the uniqueness of terrorism. "Never have so few succeeded in causing so much concern to so many."³³

An attempt was also made by Paul Wilkinson to isolate the phenomenon of terrorism. He suggested that terrorism is, "a special mode of violence, which may be briefly defined as coercive intimidation".³⁴

In short, modern political scientists must seek to understand what is happening to "whom, where, when, how, why, and with what outcomes and effects".³⁵ In order to achieve this goal, some clarifi-

cations are needed on the two major terms, 'terror' and 'terrorism'. A semantic approach would distinguish between these two, as terror is the psychic state, while terrorism is the natural outcome, or the tool. The term 'terror' can be very misleading, whereby people may associate it with acts which were only committed and exercised by criminals and others, opposing the political system. The fact is quite the opposite, for, "we must, regretfully, use new terms: enforcement terror describes terror (or counterterror) launched by those in power, and agitational terror describes terroristic acts by those aspiring to power".³⁶ A potential conclusion of this explanation, (if one, of course, accepts it), would be that repressive regimes such as Germany under Hitler, the Soviet Union under Stalin, and Iran under the Ayatola Khomeini, can be easily identified as enforcement terror. Furthermore, the term 'terror' is most likely to be used in internal war situations, either by the authorities or those who challenge them.

T.P.Thornton's final definition of the term 'terror' is:

A symbolic act designed to influence political behaviour by extranormal means, entailing the use or threat of violence.³⁷

Trying to find an acceptable definition of the tool of terror, terrorism, seems to be by far a greater, or even impossible, task for the reasearcher. The reasons for this difficulty are obvious, since one, rightfully, can anticipate a sharp disagreement among academics, stemming from conflicting biases and different ideologies. In isolating a definition of terrorism, an attempt must be made to measure the extent of those acts labeled by T.Thornton as "extranormal".

terror", they being the main functions of an internal war situation.

A traditional definition that can be found in most dictionaries and social science Encyclopedias, views terrorism as, "in fact a special mode of violence, which may be briefly defined as coercive intimidation. It involves the threat of murder, injury, or destruction to terrorize a given target into conceding to the terrorists".³⁸ This definition of terrorism may have been adequate in 1937, when it was given, but now appears to be oversimplified in light of the increasing complexity of the international arena since the 1950's. As a result of today's realities, scholars and statesmen must search for a much more descriptive and specific definition of the concept of terrorism.

One such attempt was made recently by the United Nations and its international lawyers, in their attempt to isolate the international aspects of terrorism. This leads us to the problem area of deciding when to define a terrorist act as an internal (intranational) problem, and when to define it as an international problem. L.C. Green³⁹, a famous Canadian international lawyer, goes so far as to exclude certain types of incidents from the scope of international legal control of terrorism, which may have been included in our traditional definition. Those incidents are as follows:

1. The type of terror that is initiated and executed by the authorities, ie. Nazi Germany and Russia under Stalin. 'Knock on the door at night' policy.
2. Internal violence among segments of the society, such as in

Cyprus and Ireland (Catholic vs. Protestant).

3. Acts by states during war times, in their colonies, occupied territories, as well as their treatment of prisoners of war.
4. Those private means to an end, such as kidnapping for monetary reward, the cases of Lindbergh's baby or the famous Hearst case.

The rest of academia however, in comparison to international lawyers, appears to be much less flexible and forgiving in treating the concept of terrorism. Bearing this in mind, and being aware of some future critiques, Brian Jenkins defined terrorism as:

The threat of violence, individual acts of violence, or a campaign of violence designed primarily to instill fear - to terrorize - may be called Terrorism. Terrorism is violence for effect: not only, and sometimes not at all, for the effect on the actual victims of the terrorists. In fact, the victim may be totally unrelated to the terrorists' cause. Terrorism is violence aimed at the people watching. Fear is the intended effect, not the by-product of terrorism. That, at least, distinguishes terrorist tactics from mugging and other common forms of violent crime that may terrify but are not terrorism.⁴⁰

Yosef Tekoah, Israel's ambassador to the United Nations, in his statements to the Sixth Committee dealing with the phenomenon of international terrorism, showed much personal disgust and disapproval of the descriptions of terrorism provided by L.C.Green and his colleagues. Tekoah observed terrorism as:

...crimes which are planned and executed in a manner in which the killing is indiscriminate. It does not matter to the assailants who the victims are. The blowing up of a civil aircraft in flight, the slaughter of passengers who happen to be at an air terminal, are not concerned with the identity of the casualties. The aim is murder for murder's sake.⁴¹

Thus far, the discussion of the concept of terrorism has not produced a desirable end, that being a fundamentally agreed-upon

working definition. The core of the problem as it has been demonstrated, rests in the different approaches to this study. While some scholars like Green and other international lawyers emphasize the distinctions of national and international terrorism, others treat the phenomenon as a whole, without attempting to draw boundaries to terrorism.

Therefore, we will try to provide two separate working definitions, which by their nature will reflect the two different orientations. Anthony Burton's definition can encompass the opinions of the first group of scholars, the lawyers.

Terrorism can be understood as the planned and systematic display of extreme and outrageous forms of violence by a political organization concentrated on an instrumental target (the victim) in order to induce a related primary target (the recipient) into a behaviour congruent with the organization's political objectives.⁴²

The second working definition, provided by Bard E. O'Neill, appears to be more reflective of the other approach. O'Neill perceives political terrorism as:

...the threat and or use of extranormal forms of political violence, in varying degrees, with the objectives of achieving certain political objectives/goals. Such goals constitute the long-range and short-term objectives that the group or movement seeks to obtain. These will differ from group to group. Such action generally is intended to influence the behaviour and attitudes of certain targeted groups much wider than its immediate victims. However, influencing behaviour is not necessarily the only aim of terrorist acts. The ramifications of political terrorism may or may not extend beyond national boundaries.⁴³

In spite of these contrasting approaches, we must seek to a certain degree to remain analytical. Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, the second definition, offered by Bard E. O'Neill, will serve as a working definition.

The next step will be the attempt to establish some categories and typologies (taxonomies) relating to the phenomenon of modern terrorism.

III

One of the earliest attempts to establish such a classification of terrorism was made by Eugene Victor Walter (Terror and Resistance 1969). Walter labeled the main two components of his typology as, "Siege of terror and Reign of terror".⁴⁴ In other words, Walter meant to distinguish between the terror employed by rebels, and the terror employed by those in power. A typology of this nature, that emphasizes only the dichotomy between the authority-audience, revolutionary-state, may fall short by far of classifying the different sorts of terrorist actions and movements. Another problem with Walter's typology lies in the fact that it minimizes the potential existence of some crucial variables, which enable the researcher later on to make manoeuvres in constructing future assailable hypotheses to further his knowledge of the different categories. Since the days of Walter, many attempts have been made to classify different kinds of terrorist activities and organizations. As an outcome of these attempts, it seems that the academics have agreed at least on one generalization, which is:

...if there is one common trait in terrorist activities it is that, despite a commonality of tactics, the objectives of terrorist groups vary in scope, content, and ideological persuasions. For instance, one could not equate CORO with the Baader-Meinhoff or Black September with the "provos" of the IRA.⁴⁵

Hence, in spite of the outlined differences, the role of typologies and classifications is to relate as many terrorist groups as possible to one major category, in order to allow us to draw certain generalizations about the phenomenon.

J.Nef⁴⁶ suggests distinguishing between forms of terror on either a functional or a geographical (geopolitical) basis. If one adopts this approach for functional classification, he would be advised to search for the aims, acts, and means deployed by the group against a given target (regime). However, if one were to adopt the geographical classification, the emphasis would be on tracing and detecting terrorism according to regional and continental boundaries, where it is most likely to take place.

"From a functional perspective, one could distinguish amongst different general types of terror."⁴⁷

- A. War terror - the outcomes of violence among nation-states.
- B. Repressive terror - organized and executed by the authorities.
- C. Insurgent terror - aimed to alter a given domestic or international order. One of the following three kinds:
 - 1) nationalist-irredentist
 - 2) radical-revolutionary
 - 3) radical-reactionary.
- D. Criminal terror - committed in order to provide exclusive economic gain.
- E. Psychotic terror - resulting from insane behaviour of normally one or very few individuals.

To define an act of terrorism properly on our "geographical or spatial dimension, we must take two parameters into account: site and

target. If we assume that the terrorist is working for his own cause, site and target can each be viewed in only two ways: the terrorist's own domain or a domain other than his own".⁴⁸ According to this definition, most acts by the IRA, the Candian FLQ, the Tupomaros and the ERP in Argentina would belong to the "own domain" category. On the other hand, the Baader-Meinhoff gang, the Japanese Red Army, and most fractions of the PLO would belong to the "other than their own domain" category. The following table helps to magnify the distinctions raised by the authors.

Table 1: Terrorism classified by geographical location of act.⁴⁹

<u>TARGET</u>			
<u>SITE</u>	<u>OWN</u>	OWN	OTHER
	<u>OWN</u>	Internal (Domestic)	International
	<u>OTHER</u>	External	International

As is expected, some analytical problems of control may arise from this classification. The authors themselves went on to admit some present problems in the following words:

While we have assumed up to this point that terrorists are acting in their own interests for the causes embraced by their own particular organizations, more and more groups are not limiting themselves to such personal aims, as evidenced by the increasing amount of cooperation between established terrorist groups.⁵⁰

Most contemporary approaches avoid a classification according to this basis, ie. functional and geographical, because of the weaknesses

mentioned so far. A typical example of a contemporary approach can be seen in the one offered by Russell, Banker and Miller. They considered "four tentative group models with respect to motivation and constituency, make-up, leadership, size, and outside cooperation".⁵¹

The groups (models) that the authors offered were the following:

1. Nationalist/ethnic separatist group whose motivation lies in creating an autonomous nation-state for his ethnic group. Examples: IRA, ETA, Bretons, etc.
2. The ideological type (Marxist, Maoist, Fascist, etc.) working on large-scale mobilization, highly intellectual leadership. It is most likely that international procommunist or revolutionary apparatus and sympathetic states will assist to some extent. Examples: The Italian Armed Proletarian Nuclei and Ordine Nuovo.
3. The nihilist group. While moral qualms of killing masses of people may exist, the necessity for a constituency and some eventual political reckoning is generally absent. Example: the Symbionese Liberation Army in the US.
4. The type of terrorist group that only occasionally resorts to terrorism, most of whom may well be issue-oriented interest groups. Examples: the Black Panthers in the US, or the Jewish Defence League.

Harkabi went along similar lines in his attempt to classify terrorism. "Harkabi suggested the following four types of terrorism."⁵²

- A. Coercive terrorism - in which coercion is employed against the populace.
- B. Embittering terrorism - which makes life bitter for foreign occupiers.

C. Disruptive terrorism - which, in this sense, is directed against governmental machinery.

D. Disintegrating terrorism - which is intended to make society fall apart, more or less, under the pressure of terrorism.

However, both the models offered by Russell, Banker and Miller, as well as the one offered by Harkabi, fall short of reaching our desired goal, namely, a typology which will be most descriptive and more conclusive. In short, the ultimate goal of this particular exercise is to build a model into which the reader will be able to filter any and every contemporary terrorist group.

Paul Wilkinson was the first to attempt and succeed in building such a desirable typology. Unlike the previous scholars, Wilkinson concentrated on archetypal groups he describes as, "'pure terror' movements that explicitly practice terrorism as their primary weapon for certain professed political ends".⁵³ This approach, in other words, "suggests that the basic directions of terrorist activity must be taken into account in order to make a typology truly comprehensive, as well as empirically representative".⁵⁴ According to Wilkinson, one can today distinguish between at least four main types of terrorist movements: "1. nationalist, autonomist, or ethnic minority movements; 2. ideological sects or secret societies seeking some form of 'revolutionary' justice or social liberation; 3. exile or emigré groups with irredentist, separatist, or revolutionary aspirations concerning their country of origin; and 4. transnational gangs deploying terrorists and logistic support from two or more

countries generally in the name of some vague "world revolutionary" goal".⁵⁵

Five years earlier, Wilkinson's typologies had been restricted to three groups: "1. revolutionary terrorism; 2. sub-revolutionary terrorism; and 3. repressive terrorism".⁵⁶ Wilkinson quite rightly concluded that most terrorist movements will fit into one of the four categories he proposed. The only problem that he found involves "a number of different factions and movements, often quite tiny, representing several types".⁵⁷

To support his optimistic observation further, Wilkinson has taken a safe route by drawing five "salient characteristics" that once again show the similarities in the functions of the groups in question. He found the following "qualities" as the best descriptive features⁵⁸:

1. It is inherently indiscriminate in its effect...It is of the very nature of this kind of violence that the terrorist, in order to terrorize his audience, strikes like lightning in the dark.

2. Terrorism is essentially arbitrary and unpredictable, both in the minds of its victims and audience and in its effects upon individuals and society.

3. Terrorism implicitly denies recognition of all rules and conventions of war.

4. The terrorist rejection of all moral constraints is also reflected in particularly hideous and barbarous cruelties and weapons..

5. Politically motivated terrorism is generally justified by its perpetrators on one or more grounds.

Wilkinson's typology of terrorism has so far greatly attracted academics. However, although it is popular with many, some scholars have offered adjustments to it. One such adjustment was made by Richard Shultz, who claims that:

Wilkinson's typology contains a number of weaknesses. In the first place, there is no hint as to how an observer is to distinguish between Revolutionary and Sub-Revolutionary terrorism. Second, while he does broaden his categories, he fails to precisely specify the boundaries of each, especially in terms of the internal-external environment level. Finally, and most significantly, Wilkinson's three-dimension typology (four later on) should be accompanied by a set of variables that allows for more rigorous and discriminate classification.⁵⁹

Shultz, however, does not suggest abolishing Wilkinson's typology altogether. On the contrary, Shultz adopts the three main categories of Revolutionary terrorism, Sub-Revolutionary terrorism, and Repressive terrorism, and simply "re-conceptualizes" them. He then selects a set of variables (seven altogether) he hopes will help us to operationalize Wilkinson's three main categories in order to improve our general understanding of political terrorism. The reason why only these seven variables (as will be shown in Table 2) and not others were chosen is due to the fact that, "the axiom that political terrorism is goal-oriented underlies the whole approach of this typology".⁶⁰

Finally, in reaching conclusions from the discussions on the definitional and typological (model building) problems involved in the study of political terrorism, the following can be said. Although

Table 2: Typology of Political Terrorism*

Selected variables General categories	(1) CAUSES	(2) ENVIRONMENT	(3) GOALS	(4) STRATEGY	(5) MEANS	(6) ORGANIZ'N	(7) PARTICIPATION
Revolutionary Terrorism	Economic, Political, Social, Psychological factors	Internal (urban or rural revolu- tionary groups). External (revolu- tionary groups).	Long- range/ strate- gic objec- tives. Short- term tactical objec- tives.	Primary. or sec- ondary role in the over- all stra- tegy.	Various capa- bilities and tech- niques employed.	Nature: degrees of organiza- tional structures	Participant profiles. Leadership style/ attitude.
Sub- Revolutionary Terrorism	Economic, Political, Social, Psychological factors.	Internal (non-rev.) External (non-rev.)	Long- range/ strate- gic objec- tives. Short- term tactical objec- tives.	Same as above.	Same as above.	Same as above.	Same as above.
Establishment Terrorism	Economic, Political, Social, Psychological factors.	Internal (repression of urban or rural oppo- sition). External (against other nations).	Long- range strate- gic objec- tives. Short- term tactical objec- tives.	Same as above.	Same as above.	Same as above.	Same as above.

* The table is from 'Conceptualizing Political Terrorism: A Typology', by Richard Shultz, Journal of International Affairs, Vol.32, No.1, 1978. p.11.

at the present time there is still a lot of disagreement and confusion in the field, the future looks much brighter. In looking at the scope of the literature written so far, an effort has been made to determine whether a few propositions concerning problems which are in some sense treatable may be derived which will stand up well under the 'field testing' of application to the outbreak of this particular violence. It is hoped that such analysis, if exhaustively pursued by many scholars, might eventually lead to the beginnings of such a theory - which is for all scientists the ultimate goal.

CHAPTER TWO

International and Transnational Terrorism - The Network.

In 1975, Carlos led a team of two Germans^{and} three Palestinians to kidnap ten Arab oil ministers at OPEC headquarters in Vienna. In 1976, a German was one of the leaders of the Palestinian team that hijacked a French airbus to Entebbe. In 1977, a Palestinian returned the courtesy by leading the Lufthansa hijacking to Mogadiscio.¹

There have been numerous incidents of this sort, ie. international terrorism (which will be defined later), since the 1960's, the above being only a few examples. Hence, the idea here is to introduce the reader to a different sort of violence, namely, a type of violence (terror) which does not regard or respect international boundaries. This type of violence often results in the collaboration of two or more terrorist organizations for the execution of a common cause.

The terrified author quoted above concluded in the following words as to the future trends of this phenomenon: "The terrorist underground is worldwide and plotting more savage kidnappings, assassinations, atomic blackmail, raids on nuclear bomb depots, in the cause of Marxist revolution".²

Only some 20 years ago the type of violence described above was not yet a matter of much official or academic concern. Instead, it is most likely that incidents such as those above would have been associated with, and overshadowed by, the more important consequences of clear-cut adversary relationships stemming from either the Cold War or

the anti-colonial struggle.

The reason why the media, politicians, and the public have increased their attention with regard to this phenomenon is obvious enough from the following staggering fact that, "From January 1, 1968 through 31 December 1975, there were at least 913 recorded international and transnational terrorist incidents".³

Figure 1: International (and Transnational) Terrorist Incidents*

* This figure is taken from "International and Transnational Terrorism: Diagnosis and Prognosis", by David L. Millbank, in Contemporary Terrorism, p. 56.

** No definitional distinction has been given between the terms International and Transnational terrorism. It seems, therefore, that they are used interchangeably by most scholars.

However, despite the various actions and policies that most governments have taken in their efforts to contain international terrorism, the degree of nonstate (as opposed to political internal) violence remains extremely high. Yonah Alexander and Robert A. Klimarx have traced ten major factors which, according to them, enable international terrorism to survive. The ten factors are:

...disagreement about who is a terrorist, lack of understanding of the causes of terrorism, the role of the media, the politicization of religion, double standards of morality, loss of resolve by governments, weak punishment of terrorists, flouting of world law, the support of terrorism by some states, and the existence of an international network of terrorism.⁴

Undoubtedly, all ten factors, although at times seemingly diverse by nature, deserve attention and research from academics. This chapter, however, will attempt to focus largely on the last factor, namely, international (transnational) terrorism. In order to explore this factor in the most explicit way, we should begin our research by answering the most obvious, and bothersome, questions: Why do terrorist organizations act internationally? how? and by what means?

Then, and equally important, we should discuss certain Palestinian organizations which have been identified for several years as holding some of the major responsibilities for organizing and supervising many activities of the network of international terrorism.

Finally, once these crucial questions are answered, it would be of value to the reader to understand the ways (methods) by which these terrorist organizations cooperate and collaborate with each other.

I

Earlier in this chapter it was mentioned that international terrorism has not received sufficient attention or treatment by the media and statesmen up until the late 1960's. However, this should not mislead the reader to believe that international terrorism was non-existent prior to this date. The historical record shows quite the contrary; that international terrorism existed as early as the late 19th century and has risen dramatically since then. Circumstances, however, have changed throughout this century, helping us to distinguish between the present wave of international terrorism and the kind prior to 1950. These changing circumstances added various complexities as to identifying and successfully fighting modern international terrorism. Today it seems to many of us that,

One man's terrorist is another man's freedom-fighter. While that may be true to historical movements opposing national tyranny when no other means were available, it is more difficult to sustain it considering terrorist movements in the last decade which have cut across recognized national and ideological boundaries.⁵

In the past, on the one hand, we have witnessed terrorist (guerrilla) movements operating for the achievement of national liberation or as an outcome of territorial disputes, while on the other hand, most "revolutionaries" (terrorists) today kidnap and kill to achieve objectives which are international, doctrinal, and revolutionary for revolution's sake. Therefore, the question now to be asked is, What are those conditions that have helped international terrorism develop to what it is today? One of the possible answers is given by David Millbank:

...modern-day terrorism is very much a function of our times. Advances in technology and growing world interdependence have afforded terrorists new mobility, new targets, new weaponry, and the near-certain prospect that their more dramatic acts will receive prompt and world-wide publicity. Moreover, recent changes in the overall political and economic climates have provided terrorists with a somewhat more hospitable environment in which to operate.⁶

Paul Wilkinson added six more factors to help us understand this recent shift in attitudes and motives behind the terrorists of today.

1. The hunger for 'propaganda by the deed', the world-wide publicity which can be gained from a dramatic outrage (notice the crucial role of the mass media).
2. A shift in revolutionary doctrine, occurring around the early 1960's, favouring a switch from revolutionary war in the countryside to warfare in the cities.
3. The rapid process of urbanization in both the developed and the developing world, rendering the cities the most important and populous parts of the country - "he who controls the cities controls the country".
4. The increasing vulnerability of the urban-industrial complex, with its concentrations of high technology and vulnerable and important targets.
5. The contagion effect: as other revolutionary groups saw the 'success' of terrorism in gaining tactical victories such as the release of terrorists from jail, large cash ransoms, vast publicity, and so on.
6. The highly significant growth of pro-terrorist sub-cultures and ideologies in the universities and cultural centres of the developed states.⁷

However, it seems that both P. Wilkinson and D. Millbank have missed in their assessments that which could be viewed as the most dramatic factor influencing modern-day terrorists to act on the international scene rather than on the local internal one. This

factor derives directly from the bitter experiences of some of the terrorists themselves, who have failed to achieve any of their major goals and, in certain countries, have had their very existence placed in jeopardy. H.H.A.Cooper goes so far as to claim,

That no terrorist organization is self-sufficient, and the effectiveness of terrorists and their staying power is directly proportional to the outside help they receive.⁸

Ironically, terrorist movements of today find themselves in a very similar situation as are many old and new emerging states, namely, interdependence. Consider, for instance, states like Canada, France, Britain, and others in complete isolation from the rest of the world. It is very likely that in a matter of months, perhaps weeks, they would collapse, ceasing to exist or function as independent states. The case of Japan in 1945 can further illustrate this point. By the same token, most terrorist movements, and most notably groups like the Baader-Meinhoff gang and the Japanese Red Army, would cease to exist without their strong international links.

Thus, understanding the major elements affecting the doctrines of modern international terrorist groups does not yet provide complete guidance for a researcher who is engaged in a scientific study of this phenomenon. The element which is still missing is the definition of international terrorism as opposed to state terrorism.

Martha C.Hutchinson provides us with a good definition that distinguishes between the two types. According to her,

Terrorism becomes transnational when it involves individuals of different nationalities, when it is meant to affect not only an incumbent domestic government but also foreign government and/or transnational actors such as multi-national corporations, or when it occurs outside of the geographic boundaries of the incumbent state. Transnational terrorism is thus an externalization of internal warfare, deliberately defying national borders.⁹

However, the main problem with academia is, once again, the lack of unanimity and agreement as to how exactly to define an 'international terrorist act'. As a result of this controversy, different scholars have classified and traced different numbers of incidents as 'international terrorist acts' over the same period of time, which may further help to illustrate the weakness of the empirical approach.

In contrast to M.Hutchinson, whose definition appears to be quite narrow and strict from the point of view of the researcher, Paul Wilkinson offers to some extent a more flexible approach. According to Wilkinson, an incident is judged to have an international dimension when one or more of the following conditions occurs:

...the attack is directed at foreign personnel or targets either abroad or in their country of origin; the terrorists' action is promoted or supported by one or more foreign factions or pro-terrorist regimes; the attack is partly aimed at influencing international opinion or the policies or actions of other states...And all hijackings and attempted hijackings are included.¹⁰

Once we decide on a given pattern as to how to define an international terrorist act, then the next step is to attempt to classify, or categorize, the various groups. According to Alexander and Klimarx,

...the expression of international extralegal violence has been undertaken primarily by two types of substate groups: first, by ideologically motivated movements in Third World countries and their imitators in the Western industrialized societies, and second, by ethnically based or separatist groups in both developed and developing countries.¹¹

This sort of classification, which in theory may give rise to very little disagreement, changes substantially in reality, due to the similarities and the strong cooperation among groups from both sides of the spectrum.

The following table will classify and identify some movements which belong to either one of the two main types. This table will also introduce us to some of the difficulties in attempting to draw distinctions among the various movements.

Table 3: The two major types of terrorist organizations.

IDEOLOGICAL	SEPARATIST/ETHNIC
P.L.O. (all factions)	Anaga Marg (India)
Baader-Meinhoff Gang (West Germany)	F.L.Q. (Canada)
Red Army (Sekigun) (Japan)	FLB-ARB (France)
PIRA (Ireland)	ARC (France)
ERP (Argentina)	South Moluccans (Holland)
Montoneros (Argentina)	ETA (Spain)
Tupomaros (Uruguay)	HRB (Yugoslavia)
TPLA (Turkey)	ELF (Ethiopia)
Red Brigades (Italy)	
M-19 (Colombia)	
NAP (Italy)	
Froliont (Chad)	
SWAPO (South Africa)	
ETA (Switzerland)	
Red Help (Holland)	

Another striking conclusion that can be derived from a brief glance at the above table is the fact that not all ideologically oriented movements preach and share the same doctrine, and quite

often their course of action directly contradicts their ideological commitments. Furthermore, one should be wondering what the common causes of these international terrorist groups are that so often manage to overcome ideological, regional, and political differences among them.

Ulrike Meinhoff's "Manifesto" can be used here as a source, since it clearly rationalized this dilemma.

We must learn from the revolutionary movements of the world - the Vietcong, the Palestinian Liberation Front, the Tupamaros, the Black Panthers.¹²

Thus, Meinhoff clearly admits that some of the terrorist movements collaborate with each other due to their lack of experience, their small size, and many other internal factors that are perceived as fatal to the terrorist movements's survival. Instead, what many terrorist movements have developed is what, in their own words, they call "comradeship" (universal struggle). To keep this "comradeship" alive, and in order to strengthen the notion of their "common cause", most terrorist organizations claim that their struggle is against "imperialism", "capitalism", "Zionism", and for a "universal liberation". Furthermore, it seems that many contemporary terrorist organizations actually evolved from others' national antecedents, therefore leading them to adopt doctrines and organizational models which did not necessarily fit their home environment.

In order to further illustrate these points, one should study some of the most famous of these terrorist organizations in an isolated manner, focusing special attention on their ideological motivations and their international links. Here, then is the "Who's Who" of international terrorism.

TERRORISM IN WEST GERMANY AND JAPANBaader-Meinhoff Gang (Red Army Faction) - West Germany

One of the youngest terrorist groups, which will celebrate this year (1980) its first decade of existence. However, young as they are on the international scene, the numerous crimes they have already committed, place them on equal footing with the world's most dangerous terrorist groups. The original founders of this movement were Horst Mahler, Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhoff, all upper-middle-class members with a relatively high level of education. Their ideology was based on the following elements:

The struggle is against the defense allies of the US, particularly NATO and the German Federal Armed Forces. Nationally, the struggle is conducted against the armed forces of the state apparatus - the police, the Federal frontier police, and the security services...Also mentioned are the power structure of the multinational corporations.¹³

There is an obvious lack of originality in this ideological doctrine, which is identical to almost all European-based terrorist groups. To further illustrate the lack of imagination on the part of this German terrorist group, one should realize that, "the Red Army Faction (the original name of the group) was adopted from the Japanese Red Army".¹⁴

All three German terrorist groups, RAF (the largest), the 2nd of June, and the Revolutionary Cells, have close ties with each other and strong and massive support from their international 'comrades'. For instance, in June 1970, "members of the hard-core of the RAF went, via Damascus, to Jordan to receive military training in a Fatah camp".¹⁵ Intelligence sources have since revealed

that German terrorists have received training in other countries too, such as Lebanon, South Yemen, and Algeria. In Europe, it seems that the closest links exist with the Red Brigades (Italy) and especially with the Dutch Red Help.

However, despite this wide variety of friendship and assistance, it is interesting to read Horst Mahler's conclusion in order to understand the dilemmas that German terrorists still experience.

A fighting group can only exist through struggle itself. All attempts to organize and train a group outside real conditions lead to ridiculous results, often with tragic consequences.¹⁶

The Red Army (Sekigun) - Japan

Moving away from Europe towards the Far East, roughly 8,000 miles away, it is striking to see the many similarities between Japan's Red Army and its European counterparts, especially in West Germany.

The JRA was formed in 1969 as a direct outcome of the general upheaval (riots) of students and turmoil throughout Japan caused by the strong opposition to the American intervention in Vietnam. Immediately after this period, the Red Army was organized and four main cells (groups) were established. Three minor groups continued to operate in a support role in Japan itself, while the fourth, which is responsible for most of the organization's international crimes, was named the Arab Committee. Thus, for the purposes of this essay, we will deal with the fourth group, led by a woman, Fusaka Shigenobu, and which is most likely stationed in some of the Palestinian camps in Lebanon.

The ideology and the aims of the Red Army are quite simple and straight-forward. The Red Army is, "revolutionary socialistic with strong nihilistic and mystical tendencies. Anti-American, pro-Palestinian".¹⁷

Unlike other European and Middle Eastern terrorist groups, the survival of the Red Army appears to be the most tenuous. Perhaps by explaining this point one may later understand the reasons behind the type of terrorist activities that the Red Army has been engaged in. Here, one should note the fact that the island of Japan is a free military zone, with only a small but organized army and without military industries or US military installations. In Europe, for instance, the situation is much the opposite, with large military concentrations (NATO) and a flourishing military industry. Thus, unlike the Red Army's Western counterparts, the obtaining of weapons and other necessary hardware would appear to be almost impossible. With this point in mind, it would be quite easy to explain the strong links of the Red Army with the PFLP (Wadia Hadad) and perhaps to rationalize their attack in 1972 on Israel's Lod Airport. Furthermore, the attacks by the Red Army on embassies around the world and their numerous attempts at hijacking airplanes, derives from their need to pay their debts to other organizations and to release their comrades from jails.

TERRORISM IN ITALY AND IN LATIN AMERICA

Red Brigades - Italy

The terrorism that is now endemic in Italy evolved gradually from the extremism of the revolutionary generation of 1968, through the 'hot autumn' of labour unrest in the Turin-Milan-Genoa industrial triangle, through the first guerilla skirmishes in the 'piazzas', to the ambushes that, beginning in the middle of the 1970's, marked the birth of a new category of citizens who walked on crutches.¹⁸

The Red Brigades (in Italian, Brigade Rosse) emerged as an extreme left-wing organization, much like the origins of its counterparts in West Germany, the Baader-Meinhoff Gang. According to some analysts, one of the major reasons for the evolution of the Red Brigades was the already existing terrorist organization on the extreme right (Fascists), thus creating a balance of political violence in Italy.

In the language of the Italian terrorists, one may find an attempt to give some explanation of their ideology and their striving for self-justification and legitimization, although it also points out certain contradictions.

For example, the terrorists claim that,

...there is no difference between liberal democracy, South American-style dictatorship, and fascism because, despite a few normal distinctions, all are equally oppressive structures.¹⁹

If one carefully analyzes the ideology of the Red Brigades and the type of actions that they have been advocating, the following question should arise: How does it happen that leaders like Rento Curcio, Margherita Cagol, and Giorgio Semeria (all graduates of Sociology from the University of Trent) chose to adopt a type of doctrine which may fit the Fascist organizations as well?

The latest activities of the Red Brigades and the type of violence which they have adopted (the case of Moro is only an example) have, on the one hand, decreased their support from the public and the communist politicians and, on the other hand, strengthened the right-wing Christian Democratic Party.

Furthermore, this situation creates a paradox,

...in which a left-wing ideology chooses a type of struggle which not only from a material point of view is the same as the Fascist one, but which could cause a shift to the right as a repercussion.²⁰

Although their ideologies contain certain elements which contradict their final goals, the Red Brigades appear to be quite consistent in choosing their allies from the international pool of terrorist organizations.

In February of 1978, the BR issued a 'strategic resolution' whose contents also espoused 'the necessity to develop to the fullest extent historically possible operational cooperation, reciprocal support, and solidarity' with the elements that constitute proletarian internationalism.²¹

Due to geographical and to a certain extent ideological differences, the Red Brigades appear to be quite isolated compared to other terrorist organizations. However, among their most prominent allies it is most likely that one will find the Palestinian organizations (PFLP) and especially the Baader-Meinhoff Gang (RAF), which shares a very similar ideology and is geographically the closest to Italy.

According to the Italian weekly, 'Espresso', Patritio Patcii, one of the jailed leaders of the Red Brigades, told police, "that his organization received most of its weapons from the PLO. Accor-

ding to Patcii, the Red Brigades had close ties with the PLO, and members of the Italian organization travelled to the Middle East to obtain these weapons. Patcii continued: the Red Brigade agreed to keep some weapons in Italy in case the PLO would need them for future use in Europe. These ties (with the PLO) became possible through the mediation help of the Baader-Meinhoff Gang of Germany."²²

Terrorism in Latin America

Moving once again to another continent, namely, Latin America, we are about to meet a unique type of terrorism. Furthermore, the uniqueness of the terrorist movements in Latin America allows the researcher to treat it as a single phenomenon where the risks involved in generalizing about the various organizations seems to be quite low.

Unlike the European-based organizations (including Japan's) the evolution of the Latin American terrorist organizations is a direct result of the right-wing military (sometimes Fascist) régimes which dominate the political life of almost every country in this part of the world. Another serious element that has to be considered is the successful revolution in Cuba in the 1950's, which overthrew a régime supported by the US, by mobilizing the masses.

The analysis of these Latin American terrorist groups is most important from the viewpoint of the researcher, not only because the scope of activities and the number of casualties is higher in Latin America than elsewhere, but also because as far as

organizational elements, mass support, and close links are concerned, the Latin American terrorists are far more advanced than their European 'comrades'.

One Venezuelan revolutionary summed up the ideology which is most likely shared by all socialist terrorist organizations in Latin America in this way:

To create a world where the peasants, workers, students and the people in general can share in material benefits and the advantages, requires war. This is not because the revolutionaries have so decreed it, but because the reactionaries, the rich, and those who are bolstered by North American imperialism force the people and the revolutionary armies to wage this war and induce the people to take up arms.²³

These organizations, such as the Castroite, Trotskyite, Montonero, Tupomaros and others, who came from both the rural areas and the cities, are so determined in their extreme ideology that even communist movements are not regarded as trustworthy by them.

There cannot be any alliances with the progressive bourgeoisie, as advocated by the Communist parties, because there is no progressive bourgeoisie. They, (the terrorists), believe that the bourgeoisie is aligned with the traditional oligarchy because of its fear of socialism.²⁴

Therefore, it seems that, over the years, the interconnections (links) between the various groups was unavoidable and resulted in numerous successful collaborations of various groups in Latin America. One leader of the Montonero organization put this collaboration into some rhetorical words.

We must unite at the continental level to free ourselves from the yoke of Yankee imperialism and the native oligarchies.²⁵

These rhetorical words turned out to be very significant in practice, which might raise some jealousy among other terrorist groups around

the world. According to Lester Sobel,

The Argentinian, Bolivian, Uruguayan, and Chilean terrorist groups set up a 'Revolutionary Coordination Board' to finance 'a new stage of military development' to establish rural guerrilla movements to mobilize and organize the masses, and complement the operations of the existing guerrilla units.²⁶

Despite these strong links and support from both inside the individual countries and from their neighbouring 'comrades', the Latin American organizations have at the same time systematically worked on establishing their international 'reputation' as well. While there is not much evidence of the links of the Monteneros outside Latin America, there is enough evidence to reveal, for example, that the Tupamaros of Uruguay have, "some connections with the PFLP...and also have links with the Basques (Spain)".²⁷

TERRORISM IN IRELAND

Provisional Irish Republican Army - Ireland

Although the Provos (IRA) came into existence officially in 1969, one cannot ignore the fact that Irish resistance against the British dates back some 400 years. Furthermore, the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB), which arose in the 1860's, is considered by many as the original root of what is known today as the IRA. The original, most prominent leaders of this organization were Sean Macstiofain (John Stephenson) and Rusiri O Bradaigh (Roy O'Brady).

From the beginning, it became clear that this group, the Provisional Sinn Fein, was a non-Marxist political front, as opposed to the Official Sinn Fein with its strong Marxist leanings. Daithi

O Conaill (David O'Connell) laid out the main principles of the "Provos" ideology.

The purpose of the terrorist campaign was, and still is, to make Ulster ungovernable, to force the British to relinquish all responsibility and to withdraw their armed forces.²⁸

Another formula which has been integrated into the IRA doctrine was borrowed from the revolutionaries in Algeria. As David O'Connell continues, "Armed action plus political action equals revolutionary action".²⁹ There are similarities between this slogan and those preached by famous fascists like Hitler and Mussolini, too.

The most striking element missing from the IRA's doctrine is the attack on the US, imperialism, and the capitalist world, which for most international terrorists has served as a 'holy cause'. Here, the most important thing to remember, which distinguishes the IRA from the rest of the international community of terror, is their outside sponsors.

Most of the Provos' overseas links are with the large Irish immigrant population in the United States and Canada.^{30*}

"In the US and Canada, these large minorities of Irish descent have, over the years, supported the IRA with monetary assistance and, most importantly, with moral and, to a certain degree, political support."³¹

But the international links of the IRA go far beyond their North American ties.

In Europe too, as far back as 1971, three tons of Soviet-bloc arms and ammunition were intercepted by the Dutch police...Today the most likely arms supplies come via the Middle East.³²

* According to one report, in 1972 the total contributions in the US to the IRA amounted to as much as \$750,000. However, by 1976 the contributions had dropped to only \$150,000.

Other international links have been revealed with the Bretons (France), the Basques (Spain), and the Palestinian PFLP.

Undoubtedly the list of the "Who's Who of international terrorism can be extended over many pages. Most noticeably, the ethnically oriented (separatist) organizations are missing from this list. However, this was done deliberately, due to the fact that the scope of activities of the ethnically oriented movements on the international scene have been limited and therefore do not fit into the discussion on international terrorism.

Despite the fact that not all socialist (Marxist) terrorist movements have been represented so far, one can draw some generalizations in concluding the discussion about the "ideologically motivated" (type 1) organizations and about their international links.

The first conclusion that can be drawn is that most contemporary (except Latin American) organizations evolved in the late 1960's as a direct result of the period which saw student upheavals around the world, stemming from strong socialist convictions and in opposition to the Vietnam war.

Secondly, borrowed from the terrorist slogans, the main struggle of the revolutionary is against Capitalism, Imperialism, Zionism, the Oligarchy, and the United States and its Western allies. On this ideological issue there is almost unanimous consent among the terrorist groups discussed so far. Only the IRA seems to be the exception to this rule.

Thirdly, and last, it appears that the smaller the terrorist

organization and the weaker the support it receives from home, the further it will strive to establish international links. This hypothesis was fully supported, as demonstrated in the case of the Baader-Meinhoff Gang and from the experience of the Japanese Red Army.

Thus, for people like Luigi Bonanate and others who ask, "Does terrorism involve international relations?"³³, the answer should be a clear and precise yes, very much so. The fact to remember again is that terrorism deals mainly with power, and since we study international terrorism, it seems as if we only cover within it one element of international politics, unfortunately the element we all regret but cannot ignore. Robert Moss further supports this idea:

We cannot put in the same category actions of the IRA or the PFLP with Al Capone's Valentine Massacre, the Manson murders, or more recently, the horror of Jonestown. The main trait of terrorism is that its causes are political.³⁴

Another possible angle from which to look for a relationship between international terrorism and international politics was offered by J.Nef.

International terrorism is one of several developments that has undermined the 'territorial function' of the nation state.³⁵

Finally, what most statesmen fear, and which is yet to be proven, is the idea that international terrorism only represents the adversaries among the giant superpowers. Since most of these organizations evolved during the "hot periods" of the Cold War, and as a result of the nuclear stalemate (détente) between the giants, this

fear seems to be more than mere speculation.

For a long time, the US, the USSR, and China, directly or through client states, have engaged in this type of indirect conflict. There is no mystery about Soviet support for the PLO and other 'Liberation Movements'.³⁶

The next part of this chapter will continue to deal with the network of international terrorism. However, here there will be an attempt to analyze and discuss the various Palestinian organizations. The main discussion will focus on their historical evolution, the various factions and splits among its organizations, and finally, their unique political and diplomatic achievements, which clearly distinguishes them from the rest of the network of international terrorist movements.

The Palestinian terrorist organizations, at least in theory, sound like a very prosperous body, in comparison to other contemporary movements. It has an organized armed forces which can mount up to 40,000 men and women. Politically and diplomatically it is represented in the United Nations' General Assembly and in about eighty (80) national capitals. Its leaders receive honorary salutes by famous world leaders in both Eastern and Western countries. Its annual budget is somewhere around \$500 million.

However, the task for the researcher remains to explain, on the one hand, the reasons why and how the Palestinian organizations have become so prosperous, and on the other hand, to rationalize the dilemma as to why they have failed to reach most of their long-term goals vis-a-vis Israel.

When one is engaged in the study of Palestinian organizations,

the job of isolating and separately treating the various existing factions is next to impossible. Therefore, the reader of this paper will have to forgive us if most of the time the discussion focuses on the PLO (Fatah, the largest faction) and only occasionally refers to other elements in the web of Palestinian terrorism.

The following chart will help to further convince the reader of the complexities involved in this web of terrorism.

Figure 2: The Web of Arab Terrorism³⁷

* The P.L.A. has connections with all the factions in the above chart.

Another common error that one may make in glancing through the above chart is about the degree of cooperation in this terrorist network. It is important to remember that,

...the terror organizations are linked together in a loose federation,³⁸

in which the PLO took up the official role of orchestrating their various common functions.

Arab terrorism against the Jewish population in Israel is not a recent phenomenon. In fact, one can trace it back to the early 1920's, and especially to the time after the Balfour declaration of 1917 which saw the early attempts to drive away the Jewish settlers. However, modern Palestinian terrorism came about as a result of a later development, which occurred in the midst of the 1960's.

The Arab countries created the PLO in 1964 as a weapon in their war against Israel. Thus, the terrorist organization is largely a creature of Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad, Tripoli, and other Arab capitals.³⁹

It seems that the timing by the Arab countries was not accidental but rather was used as a scape-goat for their own humiliation during the 1956 Suez war (Sinai Campaign) and the growing pressures from Palestinian and pro-Palestinian elements in their own countries. Furthermore, the conditions were generally favourable for the development of, if not a resistance movement, then a reassertion of what was hoped would be a Palestinian "sense of community". In its beginning, while the Palestinian terrorists were not yet tested in real action, it seemed for many that there was actually some sense of community among the two existing main camps. These were the Fatah, led by Yasser Arafat, and the PLO, led by Ahmed Shukairy.

However, once they were challenged, their (Palestinians') inability to achieve their goals both militarily and politically, introduced the first cracks in the theory of a "Palestinian sense of community".

The questions centered not only on the ultimate control of the movement, but also on the tactics and the goals of the movement itself.⁴⁰

Disagreements about both the best method for achieving the long-term goals and the short-term objectives among Palestinians created a sharp split among the sponsoring and/or supporting Arab states. However, what even further escalated the conflict in the Palestinian camp and among the Arab countries was Israel's defensive victory in the 1967 war. As a result of the war, not only were the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (two major Palestinian strongholds) transferred to Israeli control, but demands by the Arab states on the PLO increased, advocating tougher action against Israel.

To further illustrate to what extent the Arab leaders considered the on-going Palestinian terror as important to their cause, here are parts from some interviews given by Jordan's King Hussein to the B.B.C., and by Nasser to Cairo Radio.

Hussein: The fedayeen activities can only be brought to an end after the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the lands conquered in the June war.⁴¹

Nasser: There are some positive factors which are of importance since the Arab defeat (1967) and up to this day. The first is the Palestinian resistance movement, to defend the rights of the Palestine people and to fight for the return of the stolen country... I tell you, Egypt is fully prepared to support the Palestine resistance movement and to arm it, because this movement is, in fact, part of the decisive campaign - the fate-deciding campaign of the whole Arab world.⁴²

Ideologically, most Palestinian terrorist organizations differ

from their "comrades" around the world. The PLO (Fatah), which represents the largest movement in this web, appears to be based on strong nationalistic (anti-Zionist) feelings, prompted with Muslim fanaticism (Jihad - a holy war). However, smaller factions of the Palestinian terrorists do hold some Marxist beliefs, which only contribute to the already existing splits among the organizations and in the Arab states. The following quote will help to illustrate the above mentioned ideological splits.

For example, the class struggle ideology of George Habash's PFLP, which is currently second to Fatah in size and influence within the PLO, separates it significantly from Yasser Arafat's personal faction. At the same time, a wide gulf exists between the PFLP and the rigidly Marxist-Leninist PDFLP, headed by Naif Hawatmeh, which itself broke away from the PFLP.⁴³

One also has to mention organizations such as the Sa'ika, the Jibril Group, and the Arab Liberation Front, which are entirely supported and controlled by their "big brothers", namely Syria, Libya, and Iraq. Because of their affiliation with the above-mentioned countries, these organizations are expected to follow the ideological lines of the leading political parties of those countries.

It has already been mentioned that the main split is due to, on the one hand, the lack of agreement on the methods to be used, and on the other hand, to the short-term objectives to be achieved. However, there appears to be a unanimous consent among the Palestinians with regard to the long-term goals, and Yasser Arafat's words support this assumption.

Its (Fatah's) aim - the liquidation of the Zionist existence, the liberation of Palestine and the creation of an Arab State within its boundaries. It will not agree to less than an Arab Palestine and full victory.⁴⁴

As to the question of the expected actions that a given organization is likely to take, it is strongly believed that the capabilities of the organization, and the degree of its risk-taking propensity, will dictate its style.

The following table (No.4) will attempt to illustrate the various factors which may dictate to an organization the choice of the kinds of terroristic methods it may deploy.

Table 4: Possible factors influencing the resort to terrorism by Palestinians.

Movement Characteristics			
Actors	Capabilities and Resources	Motivation	Potential Victims and Targets
Leaders & Planners Initiators & Agents	Size of Movement Unity & Cohesion of Movement Military Capabilities of Movement Freedom of Movement; Relationship with Host Nations	Long-term Goals Short-term Objectives	Potential Terroristic Acts
			<p>Airplane hijackings Attacks on Air Terminals Letter bombings Attacks on governmental officials and Embassies Attacks on non-governmental individuals, groups, or concerns</p>
			<p>Israel & Israelis Palestinians in Israeli-occupied territories & Israeli Arabs Arab states perceived to be opposed to Israel Arab states perceived to be positive or neutral to Israel Great powers perceived to oppose or support Israel Other nations perceived to be positive or neutral to Israel</p>

Source: V.F. Bishop, "The Role of Political Terrorism by the Palestinian Resistance Movement: June 1967-October 1973", in Politics and Terrorism by Michael Stohl, p.329.

The Palestinian terrorist organizations, in terms of potential capabilities, appear to be far more advanced and powerful than any other known organization of their kind.

The Palestinians are different. The PLO can be described as a popular movement and its various groups can put armies into the field equipped with tanks and field guns (artillery).⁴⁵

In terms of size, according to one official spokesman of the PLO, "the organization can mobilize immediately up to 40,000 fighters".⁴⁶

Monetarily, the PLO is little affected by economic recessions and the world's growing inflation. Instead, while many once-powerful industrial countries appear to struggle helplessly against these economic crises,

...the PLO is a strange mixture of a business conglomerate and a crime family. With enormous subsidies paid to it by the rich Arab states which live in dread of internal subversion, the PLO has a budget of somewhere around \$500 million a year.⁴⁷

Who, then, are the leaders of these organizations, and from what part of the society are they drawn?

From various studies done on the Palestinian organizations and their core of leaders, it is fascinating to realize that it is a very highly educated core of people that can be compared to any known government in the world. It is far more difficult to comprehend how people with such high levels of academic background (doctors, engineers, lawyers, professors) can collaborate and initiate some of the methods used against Israelis and other bystanders (Lod 1972, Munich 1972). However, the majority of the "soldiers" (the rank and file) of the Palestinian organizations represent the opposite side of the educational spectrum. This dichotomy introduces a serious problem

for the organizers of the movements in relating to and controlling the ambitions of the rank and file.

They (the "soldiers") tend to be youths of little education who have been brutalized in the camps, completely tunnel-visioned, knowing nothing of the world outside, motivated only by hatred.⁴⁸

This strange dichotomy between the leaders of the organizations and the "soldiers" who are in charge of executing their plans, may be held as the prime reason for the poor performance of the Palestinian terrorists against Israel. In their many years of activities and their numerous attempts to attack Israeli targets, there has always been a repeated pattern whereby the terrorists try at all costs to avoid a direct clash with Israeli security forces, and instead aim their attacks primarily against unprotected civilian targets. One theory, presented by Walter Nelson, may help to explain their striking impotency. "The more intelligent the terrorist, the more ready he is to sacrifice his life in the service of his cause, even if this involves suicide."⁴⁹ The average Palestinian terrorist certainly does not fit into the category of the intelligent type, ie. the one who does not fear suicide. To further support this assumption, here are the words of a hired terrorist for the Palestinian cause who did not fear suicide, namely, the Japanese Kozo Okamoto, who was captured and tried by the Israelis for his part in the 1972 Lod massacre.

We (the Japanese group) believe that the killing of human beings is inevitable...The Arab world lacks spiritual fervour, so we felt that through this attempt we could stir up the Arab world.⁵⁰

Thus, it is now of great importance to analyze how, and to what extent, the Palestinian organizations have managed over the years

to become such an important element among the international network of terrorist organizations.

As early as 1968-69, non-Arab terrorists started to receive training in Palestinian camps throughout the Arab world, and primarily in Jordan. In September 1970 the first non-Arab, a Nicaraguan, took part in an aircraft hijacking together with Leila Khaled of the PLO. In its early stages, it appears that, "This cooperation was based on two elements: first, ideology, and second, pragmatic considerations".⁵¹ However, as we have already seen, there are numerous ideological splits among the members of the international network of terrorism. Therefore, it seems that the pragmatic considerations were the major reasons behind this cooperation.

There is a common understanding between them that by helping each other they may improve their own conditions. The cooperation between terrorist organizations⁵² is based more on the practical needs than on ideology.

In comparison with other terrorist organizations, the role of the PLO appears to be crucial to the survival of the international terrorist network. It seems that,

...the part of the Palestinians is not negligible; they are at present the only element able to render operational aid, training, weapons, and refuge which enables organizations considering violent activities to do so.⁵³

The following chart will further illustrate to the reader the strong links of cooperation between the various Palestinian organizations and their "comrades" spread all over the globe.

Figure 3: The Palestinian Organizations as Centres to International Terror

Thus, the Palestinians collaborate with every possible outlawed organization in the world, regardless of its ideology or its geographical location. As Salah Khalaf, one of the official spokesmen for the PLO, put it, "I am prepared to extend a hand of friendship and alliance to any power, even the devil, to crush Israel and undermine American machinations".⁵⁴

Unlike other terrorist organizations, the Palestinians managed to recover from their severe failures on the "battle-ground" by succeeding on the political and diplomatic fronts. It seems that not too many nations agree with, or understand, the message that Senator Henry Jackson delivered to the conference on international terrorism in Jerusalem in 1979. The message was as follows:

When one free nation is under attack, the rest must understand that democracy itself is under attack, and behave accordingly.⁵⁵

Unfortunately, however, it is not quite that straight-forward. Some Western leaders are motivated by political and economic considerations (blackmail) which to some Israelis and their supporters do not seem to be based on sound, rational thinking.

The main argument put forward by those who criticize these policies is that prior to the recognition and the embracing of Arafat and his kind, Western leaders should have demanded from the Palestinians, either recognition of the state of Israel or at least guarantees that they would cease their terrorist activities and drastically change their operational methods.

Some hypothetical questions best illustrate the above point.

Would Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky receive Andreas Baader or Ulrike Meinhoff? Is Chancellor Kreisky willing to declare in public his approval of Arafat's methods?

Is there any reason not to accept Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan's official protest that Kreisky's reception of Arafat was a demonstrative act against the state of Israel and the Jewish people?⁵⁶

The answers to these questions are obvious. On the one hand, by appeasing Arafat and others like him, some European statesmen hope that this type of violence will not be directed against them one day, and this is quite understandable and rational. On the other hand, some credit must be given to the Palestinians themselves. While they have not managed to scare the Israelis and break their morale, it seems that, indirectly, some European leaders are

giving up and giving in to their demands, while the price is only to sacrifice their relations with Israel. The Palestinians and their comrades know well enough how to blackmail the politicians and the public.

We have the ability to explode all the oil fields in the Gulf from Kuwait to Oman...Oil is the one weapon that can deal a mortal wound to U.S. imperialism.⁵⁷

Another common trap that both the politicians and the Western media fall victim to is their belief that the recent PLO political blitz means a positive change in their policies and methods. However, Salah Khalaf can clarify this point for all those who are living under this illusion.

Despite its political moves in Europe, the PLO will not give up armed struggle until the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the occupied Palestinian territory (read Israel)...The biggest crime or error we could make is to lay down our arms.⁵⁸

To further elaborate on this complex point in order to enable the reader to comprehend how, on the one hand, the PLO were able to convince certain segments of the public and politicians in Europe of their 'course of moderation', while on the other hand deny it at home, maintaining their methods of violence, here are some points that the reader should remember.

The PLO is an umbrella body embracing eight separate factions, some representing different political and ideological trends in the Arab world, others operated by Arab governments. The PLO leadership takes advantage of these divisions in order to project a multi-faced image to suit different conflicting goals. Thus it encourages the impression that more extreme factions (Black September) within it are responsible for terrorist excesses, while a more 'moderate' wing could gain the upper hand if its aims (political) were to be realized.⁵⁹

Finally, as Paul Johnson concluded, "Terrorists, with all the

force of rigorous argument and moral conviction, are not misguided politicians...they are criminals".⁶⁰

Thus politicians like Kreisky, Brandt, D'Estaing and Waldheim, who express their support for the Palestinian cause in the form of an independent state or otherwise, (while retaining their terroristic image), should perhaps be more careful about their assessments of the real aims of the Palestinian terrorist organizations.

The next part of this chapter will, rather than provide a theoretical description of the various organizations, attempt to reveal and explain the crimes and various methods of violence used by the different organizations over the years.

II

A correct terrorist strategy aims to avoid battles, to destroy a system by maddening and frightening its defenders into wearing themselves out in vain efforts to find an enemy who is everywhere in general but nowhere in particular, an enemy who seems to grow constantly stronger.⁶¹

Most of the strategies of contemporary terrorist organizations (roughly 45-50 groups identified) fit into this description, thus illustrating the enormous impact that the Nechayev's in Russia at the turn of the century had on the strategic thought of the terrorists of today. By no means can one compare the outcome of terrorist activities to conventional wars (between states) or any other force majeure, this is simply a wrong approach. To learn effectively about the impact of terrorism on free societies, one should isolate the phenomenon (as was earlier suggested) and trace

the various incidents caused by international terrorism. Edward Mickolus counted some 1298 incidents as such, using a similar definition to the one offered earlier by Paul Wilkinson.

One of the obvious, and worrisome, pictures that one can draw from glancing through the type of incidents mentioned is the sophistication of both the weapons and the methods that the terrorists have been using. As to the question of how advanced their weaponry is, and how far this can lead the terrorist organizations, here are some speculations from an expert in the field:

...handguns and submachine guns, especially the latter, are the basic equipment. Portable missiles (ground to air) such as the SAM-7 and explosive devices of the greatest sophistication are all available. Aside from the PLO, terrorists haven't yet been armed with tanks or jet fighters, as far as I know. Indeed, that would be to transform them into an army and make them too visible. But a bullet can threaten to take the life of a national leader - or a little child - just as quickly as can a cannon shell.⁶²

Table 5: Transnational Terrorist Incidents, 1968-1975*

Incident Type	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	Total
Kidnapping	1	4	28	15	11	30	21	32	142
Barricade and Hostage	0	0	2	1	4	8	11	17	43
Skyjacking	33	79	70	37	38	19	7	6	289
Takeover of Nonair Transportation	0	0	3	0	1	0	1	1	6
Bombing	29	55	42	45	61	90	33	78	433
Letter Bomb	2	1	1	1	147	49	1	3	205
Armed Attack	2	6	6	9	4	10	7	10	54
Murder or Assassination	6	4	10	6	5	11	3	18	63
Arson or Molotov Cocktail	0	1	10	8	1	15	1	6	42
Theft or Break-in	0	4	6	0	0	1	2	3	16
Sabotage	0	0	0	1	3	0	1	0	5
Total Incidents in a Single Year	73	154	178	123	275	233	88	174	1298

* From "Transnational Terrorism", by Edward Mickolus in The Politics of Terrorism, by Michael Stohl, Marcel Dekker Inc., New York, 1979. p.150.

To further illustrate the advancement and the sophistication of international terrorist organizations, here is an example of the IRA, which ideologically is isolated from the rest of the "network", with its home environment (Ireland) geographically a 'sealed island' according to British military plans. In spite of these limitations,

The IRA receives from the south supplies, weapons such as mortars, and 'factories' there turn out mortar bombs... Other weaponry in Provisional hands include the U.S. M-16 Armalite rifle, the Remington Woodmaster equipped with telescopic sights for sniping, and the U.S. M-60 machine-gun... The Provisional IRA listen constantly to security force radio channels, and have become more adept at cracking codes.⁶³

Yet, despite these most sophisticated weapons and other logistic supplies, the terrorist movements do face some problems which may explain their relatively low levels of success in meeting their objectives. It seems that their main problem is to find safe and secured training sites to enable them to train new recruits and practice with newly obtained weapons. The importance of this element for securing the success of the revolutionary is well acknowledged by the leaders of the various organizations. As "Carlos" Marighella, the inspirer of most urban guerrillas, put it,

No one can become a guerrilla without undergoing a period of technical preparation... You can only become a good fighter by learning the art of fighting.⁶⁴

Advocating the elements of technical training, such as the use of sub-machine-guns, revolvers, automatics, mortars, bazookas, and the knowledge of the various kinds of ammunition and explosives, became a constant theme of new terrorist recruits' training. However, "most of the training camps are located in the Middle East, controlled by the local government or the Palestinian organizations"⁶⁵, thus

introducing some problems to the terrorist organizations.

The first and most obvious problem that arises out of this situation is that which Horst Mahler admitted earlier in his conclusions about his Gang, namely, that terrorists need useful training on home ground, in their own unique environment, not the type of training they receive in some remote Palestinian camp some 2,000 miles away.

Another problem derives from the fact that these camps are located in countries such as "Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Libya, and South Yemen".⁶⁶ If one is aware of the internal and external instabilities of the Arab world, then it should be understood that the existence of these camps and the security for the terrorists visiting them is highly questionable. Jordan in September 1970 is a case in hand. During this month of war between the Jordanian armed forces and the PLO, many of the international "comrades" (including Carlos) were forced to flee, and, according to some reports, others suffered from injuries or actually died. The same phenomenon occurred during the Lebanese Civil War in 1975.

Furthermore, another unexpected enemy for those international terrorists receiving training in the camps is - Israel. In this case, the on-going battle between Israel and the Palestinian organizations, which often witnesses Israeli raids on the training camps, has claimed a high toll in the lives of other international terrorists as well.

In another Israeli raid on two training camps in Lebanon, nine Turkish terrorists were killed. They had been trained to carry out operations against Israeli and Turkish targets.⁶⁷

Thus, one of the most serious threats for the international network of terror derives from the latest activities of their Palestinian friends themselves.

Recently, the PLO (especially Fatah, the main stream in the PLO led by Yasser Arafat) has been involved in a new dimension, broadening its scope beyond the activities of international terrorism. This involves a devastating political, diplomatic, and propaganda attack directed primarily at the Western world, which in turn is designed to improve their shaky image while indirectly isolating Israel in the international arena. The PLO, knowing clearly what the Western public, media, and politicians will demand as a first "good-will" gesture on their part, have in recent years decreased (at least officially) their active support role of their international "comrades". This severe blow to the international network of terrorists increased both their dependency on extreme organizations such as the PFLP and Black September, and the price and debt for their training. As a result, one may now rationalize how it is possible that,

...an operation can be planned in Germany by a Palestinian Arab, executed in Israel by terrorists recruited in Japan, with weapons acquired in Italy but manufactured in Russia, ⁶⁸ supplied by an Algerian diplomat financed with Libyan money.

How, then, do terrorists make up for this lack of equitable training and self-discipline?

What the recruits lack in this respect they make up for in zeal and cruelty...For terrorists do not need to be so precise, nor so careful to avoid unnecessary casualties, as the forces of order operated by Western democracies.⁶⁹

Understanding the lack of training among most terrorist organizations should help to explain the type of methods that terrorists

utilize in executing their plans. It is therefore necessary to assess each type of incident in terms of the cost-effectiveness of terrorism for the terrorists themselves.

There are basically two major types of such violence:

"(1) incidents in which the terrorists attempt to injure or kill individuals and/or destroy or damage property, and (2) incidents in which individuals are taken hostage, and destruction of property and injury to the hostage are conditional upon the response of a target group to the demands of the perpetrators".⁷⁰ In fact, what the annual trends of terrorist attacks (see table 5) teaches us is that the terrorists, indeed, choose their method of violence based on their own assessment of cost-benefit balance.

Take, for instance, the method of skyjacking. Here, we can distinguish between the three main motives influencing the terrorists: 1 - seeking a means of transportation from point A to point B (from the U.S. to Cuba, or from the Communist bloc to the West); 2 - when the terrorists hijack for the sake of creating publicity and a shock (releasing the hostages and the crew and then blowing up the airplane, like in Zarka in 1970); or 3 - when the purpose is to obtain high amounts of each as ransom, and the release of their comrades from jails.

While the first type of skyjacking still occurs from time to time, it is striking to see (table 5) the sharp decrease from 1971 of skyjacking attempts which represent the second and third types. Obviously, the terrorists have realized after some of their ill-fated

attempts (Sabena, El-Al, Air France, Lufthansa) that this sort of violence involves too many risks and does not help them to improve their reputation and gain support from the public. Others may attribute this decline to the stiff conventions that both the U.N. and the ICAO have ratified in order to abolish air-piracy. But this is only speculation, and so far international terrorists have shown little or no respect for, or acknowledgement of, international conventions.

Another method of violence which may help to illustrate both the terrorists' lack of equitable training and their change of action as a result of high cost and low benefits, is their use of the letter-bomb method. According to reports, the two main organizations which have utilized this method were the PLO and the IRA. As for the rest of the organizations,

Because of their (letter-bombs) general unreliability in successfully harming the chosen target, as well as the technical sophistication required to make them, other terrorist groups do not seem to have picked up the practice of using letter-bombs.⁷¹

Obviously, the method of kidnapping is by far the most popular type of violence, in Italy, West Germany, and some Latin American countries, showing a wavering but rising trend over time. Moreover, the probability that the terrorists (kidnappers) will successfully seize a hostage has grown rather dramatically since the early 1970's. In this type of assault, unlike in delivering letter-bombs and hijacking airplanes, the targets (victims) are well-selected and it is no longer a random choice. This type of violence not only pro-

duces publicity, but also results in the occasional death of bystanders, which helps to create the desired overall panic. Furthermore, kidnapping executives from the industrial community (multi-nationals), influentials, and state bureaucrats, is well justified in the ideology of the revolutionaries itself.

Hand in hand with the reorganization of the politico-military apparatus, the restructuring of the economic apparatus marches in line with the strategy of the great multinational conglomerates...increasing their own profits, introducing still higher levels of exploitation and control over the working class, and new patterns of domination over peoples in developing countries.⁷²

Marighella ("Carlos") is more specific in his discussion about the necessary targets for the revolutionary. According to "Carlos", the revolutionary needs, "to demoralize the militants, the military dictatorship and its repressive forces, and also to attack and destroy the wealth and property of the North-Americans, the foreign managers, and the Brazilian upper class".⁷³ Despite the devastating damages and the high cost for corporations to successfully secure their facilities, international companies are increasingly becoming prime targets for terrorists because, "they offer the best promise of big money".⁷⁴ The case of the assault on the OPEC ministers in Vienna will help to further illustrate gains that a single terrorist can obtain from a single operation (kidnapping).

Between \$1 million and \$2 million was paid by Mo'amar el-Qadhafi, the Libyan chief of state, to the 'international jackal' Carlos for the kidnapping of Saudi Arabian Oil Minister...and other delegates in the OPEC raid in December 1975. Another participant in the operation, Hans Joachim Klein, the German terrorist, reportedly collected some \$100,000 for his role.⁷⁵

Then how much is the cost of such an operation and how do terrorists recover their 'investment'? "An anonymous terrorist told the Italian weekly, Panorama, a single haul from the kidnapping of a wealthy Genoese in 1977 netted more than enough to cover the Brigade's expenses in the Moro operation."⁷⁶ Thus, it seems that modern-day terrorists are not only more sophisticated and brutal than their counterparts of some 30 years ago, but they are also richer than they. The kidnapping and murder of statesmen like Aldo Moro and the German industrialist Martin Schleyer, for example, have, on the one hand, resulted in some benefits and gains for the terrorists' cause, (primarily in Italy). However on the other hand, especially in Germany, this method of kidnapping produced nothing more than the publicity generated by the act and in fact resulted in decreased support from the public and the toughening up of some laws and policies with regard to terrorism.

Therefore, the following quote can be viewed as only partially true in the case of Italy, with the reasons for this success going far beyond the control or effort of the terrorists themselves.

By now, the Moro and Schleyer operations have become textbook cases on how to destabilize a country, hold its government to ransom, put paralyzing strains on its police and courts, threaten its rule of law, frighten its population stiff.⁷⁷

These operations, and others, left behind a bitter after-taste. The public and the media are still trying to answer two main questions: 1 - how is it possible that the state's police and military, in which billions of dollars are invested every year, appear to be

so impotent in battling the terrorists? and 2 - does the cold savagery behind these acts mean that the worst is still to come? The answers to both questions can forecast, on the one hand, a very optimistic picture, and on the other hand, a very gloomy one.

The pessimistic view that "the worst is yet to come" is based upon the assumptions of many politicians and intelligence sources.

Nato's Europe-wide state of alert, ordered by Brussels headquarters barely a month after Moro's assassination, was prompted by an explicit warning from the West German state security officials of possible terrorist plans for atomic blackmail: raids on nuclear bomb depots, kidnapping of specialized NATO officers, hijacked raw materials, occupation of nuclear plants, to name a few possibilities in what the Red Brigades speak of as 'a growing sensitization to international security objectives'.⁷⁸

The second approach, which is preferred by this author, is the more optimistic view that it is not yet too late to defeat terrorism if certain actions and conditions are met. To some, this whole notion of optimism may derive simply from the actual performance of the terrorists themselves, who so far have achieved very few of their desired goals. Another reason to be optimistic results from the recent cooperation among security forces of the target states.

The growth of the international antiterrorist forces means the ability of the terrorists to mount international operations has been curtailed. It is still possible for them to mount spectaculars, but it is much more difficult and dangerous for them to do so.⁷⁹

However, international terrorism does not survive in a vacuum. In recent years evidence has revealed that the 'bread and butter' of international terrorism is certain nation-states which belong to the community of nations who directly or indirectly support these organizations.

Therefore, the third and final chapter of this essay will attempt to trace those nation-states that were identified as the prime force behind terrorism in order to establish the extent to which this support is given, as well as the reasons why and the methods used in providing this support.

CHAPTER THREE

Soviet Bloc and Arab Support to International Terrorism.

We would cease to exist and our armed struggle would be diminished without the continued help and support of our Arab brothers and the socialist countries.¹

The above statement, made by Yasser Arafat, the leader of the PLO, perhaps epitomizes the acute dependence most contemporary terrorist organizations have on the support and cooperation of certain independent nations, states.

Traditionally, Western scholars, like Y. Alexander and R. Klimarx, have supported the notion that the key factor behind the development of international terrorism to its present size is the support of the network by certain nation-states. This assertion has also helped scholars to rationalize their claim that, "the worst from the terrorists is yet to come", as well as helping to explain some of the links among terrorist organizations themselves.

Further implied in the writing of Western scholars is the notion that support for international terrorist organizations only comes from totalitarian regimes.

As Paul Johnson states:

The countries which finance and maintain the international infrastructure of terrorism - which gives terrorists refuge and havens, training camps and bases, money, arms, and diplomatic support, as a matter of deliberate state policy - are, without exception, totalitarian states.²

However, statements of this kind are inbred with personal biases and can thus be easily falsified. What is missing from these

scholars' analyses is the specification as to what type of organizations are likely to receive support of this kind. While it is evident that totalitarian régimes mainly support Marxist-oriented terrorist organizations, such as the Red Brigades, RAF, JRA, the Palestinians, and some Latin American groups, it is also true that the United States, for instance, has assisted in collaborating with certain terrorist groups such as those in Angola, Cuba, Afghanistan, and Chile. Therefore, it is now ~~more~~ correct to assume that the policy of supporting terrorist groups is ~~not~~ common to all major forces in the international arena.

The dilemma faced by Western scholars, such as Paul Johnson, is that of defining who is a terrorist, thus lending support to the old saying that, "one man's terrorist is another's freedom fighter". It would therefore be natural that the Soviet media and academics would take an opposing view regarding the question of who supports terrorism.

Official Soviet spokesmen of course deny that Moscow supports "terrorism", and they have issued vigorous denunciations of specific terrorist actions. Indeed, repeated Soviet claims that they are assisting "national liberation" forces, fighting "imperialism" in the third world have led to much semantic confusion.³

In order to avoid being exposed to the same criticism we have placed on other scholars, it would be quite valuable to clarify the concept of terrorism and, in particular, those groups on which we will focus. This clarification may help to explain why only totalitarian régimes will receive treatment and analysis in this concluding chapter.

Regardless of whether the organization preaches, ideologically, along Marxist or fascist lines, it is classified as "terroristic" if it takes place in the form of "an armed political group engaged in bombing, sabotage, kidnapping or murder, especially of civilians..."⁴ Since all the terrorist organizations discussed thus far perfectly fit the above description, the task remains to detect and expose those nation-states that either directly or indirectly, in various forms and through numerous methods, have assisted in furthering their activities. This approach was suggested earlier in this paper by Yonah Alexander and Robert Klimarx, in their discussion of the ten major factors which have enabled international terrorism to survive.

Since the early 1960's, this element (state-supported terrorism) has been on a constant rise. Table 6 will attempt to illustrate both the major and minor sponsors of international terrorism, the various terrorist groups that enjoy this help, and finally the direct or indirect targets of the terrorist organizations.

Table 6: International Terrorism: Sponsors, Terrorists, and Targets 1980

* both sponsor and target

One of the most obvious conclusions that can be drawn from a brief glance at the table is that international terrorism serves as a bridge of violence that enhances the ongoing conflict between Western democracies and the rest of the world. A second conclusion is that occasionally a major sponsor can become the victim (target) of certain terrorist groups, as has been demonstrated in the cases of Jordan (1970) and Lebanon (since 1975), thus proving the point that a sponsored state is not necessarily immune from acts of terror.

This assumption (hypothesis) will become highly important later on, when an attempt will be made to explain and rationalize certain dilemmas that the "sponsoring" states face in their relationship (engagement) with the terrorist organizations.

Finally, the enormous number of both major and minor sponsors of international terrorism poses a problem for the researcher, who must attempt to sort out the complex linkages implied therein, so as to arrive at some fruitful conclusions.

Therefore, at first, as has been rightly suggested in Table 6, the researcher should attempt to categorize the sponsoring states into different groups, based on region, ideology, type of régime, and religion. Secondly, one should focus on the main country(s) in each category, which were found responsible for the most extended methods of support. Then, in the final analysis, one will be able to compare different groups as to their reasons and the extent of their commitment to the cause of international terrorism.

The first major group to be analyzed will be the Soviet Bloc,

with emphasis on the crucial role of the Soviet Union. The controversial role of the People's Republic of China, not originally included in this category, will also be explored with respect to their support of international terrorism.

I

From Table 6 we learn that the Soviet Union, the most important force in the Soviet Bloc, has been identified as a major sponsor of terrorist organizations. Furthermore, it is understood that the various methods of this support, which range from training through directives, intelligence, logistics, and diplomatic support to the active supply of sophisticated armaments, are all deployed by the Soviets. Therefore, in the following pages of this chapter there will be an attempt to verify the accusations of the Soviet build-up of support to terrorist organizations from the early 1950's, and there will be an attempt later to explain both the roots of these policies as well as the problems that this policy has created for the Kremlin leaders themselves.

The early 1950's witnessed the changing methods that the Soviet Union has adopted vis-a-vis its physical involvement in international terrorism.

Following the extraordinary success of the paramilitary partisans of World War II, Stalin established the present system of training which now involved thousands of full time KGB, GRU, and military personnel and the use of over 100 major facilities within the Soviet Union for training of foreign terrorists and cadres.⁵

According to Major General Jan Sejna, a former First Secretary

at the Defense Ministry in Prague who defected in 1968 to the West, similar camps are located in his country and elsewhere in the world.

The training programs in my country are run under the direct supervision of the Soviet internal security and intelligence agencies, KGB and the GRU. The same pattern seems to apply throughout the Soviet Bloc, including Cuba. Soviet advisors are also deployed at terrorist training camps in the Middle East.⁶

While officially the Soviets deny the accusations that these camps are primarily designed to train and advance the military skills of the terrorists by claiming that these are "pure academic institutions", it is far more difficult to believe it when one identifies some of the alumni of these "institutions". For instance, the famous Venezuelan terrorist "Carlos" admitted on several occasions, such as his interview with the Montreal Gazette in 1980, that he is a graduate of the Patrice Lumumba University in the suburbs of Moscow. Zehdi Labib Terzi, the official representative of the PLO at the United Nations, gives further support to the assumption that these "academies" are designed in the first place to train terrorists.

There is no secret about that. I mean our boys go to the Soviet Union. They go to the socialist countries. They go everywhere for their training.⁷

However, the cooperation and assistance of the Soviet Union goes far beyond these training programs, and despite the troubled Soviet economy they have channelled significant amounts of financial aid to international terrorist organizations. This method is perceived by the Kremlin leaders as a long-term investment which is expected to yield good returns once the revolution succeeds.

The Soviet Union, according to a Central Intelligence Agency

report, "began channelling funds, weapons, and other assistance to fedayeen groups through a number of intermediaries in 1969".⁸

A further illustration of this point, which may also help to reveal that Soviet interaction with certain terrorist organizations is done through the services of proxies (puppet states) is presented in the following report from an interview with a well-known, former-European terrorist.

Klaus Rainer Rohl, divorced husband of Ulrike Meinhoff, revealed that he and his former wife received approximately \$340,000 in secret Communist funds through East Berlin and Prague. The money financed the leftist activities of Meinhoff, the late co-founder of the Baader-Meinhoff Gang.⁹

In two separate, recent cases, it has been understood that the Soviet Union and its allies from the Communist Bloc have actively (physically) participated in organizing and planning the operations of the terrorist organizations. The first evidence came from Lebanon during its civil war, which witnessed the collaboration of Soviet military advisors with the fighting units of the PLO.

Right-wing Christian officers captured and later killed a Russian agent or technician at Tel al-Zaatar. While he was not fighting alongside them, the report indicates that he was advising the Palestinians.¹⁰

The second incident that gives credence to the above assumption that the Soviet Union and its allies give active support to terrorist groups was given on January 19, 1978, when Israeli security services arrested a Greek Cypriot journalist accused of being an agent of the East German MFS (secret service). These two incidents provide evidence "of Soviet-Bloc involvement in providing operational intelligence - the selection of targets - for terrorist organizations".¹¹

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Two other major methods of support which the Soviet Union and other members of the Bloc have adopted and practiced over the years are "sanctuary" and the supply of false documents. While these two methods may appear less significant (harmless) from the reader's point of view, they have been identified as crucial for the terrorist network in, on the one hand, allowing their operations to continue and, on the other hand, helping them escape from punishment by changing their identity.

Members of the Baader-Meinhoff Gang constantly received support from the East German secret police. False papers and identity cards, money, arms, ammunition and terrorist training.¹²

Numerous reports in the past (ie. in the New York Times) also indicated potential links between Moscow and the late Rev. Jones' cult in Guyana, as well as with "Carlos", the most wanted terrorist in the West, who visited the Communist Bloc several times since 1975.

However, all the above-mentioned methods would have meant very little to the terrorist organizations without the addition of the final and most effective method - namely, the supply of weapons.

Surprisingly, despite enormous evidence of a Soviet involvement in using this method, it is also believed that the latter (weapons supply) causes many problems for the Kremlin leaders.

Thus, in addition to the concern among Western democracies, one has to examine the extent of the damage that the latter causes to the Soviet Union itself.

The analysis of this "final method" (the supply of weapons)

employed by the Soviet Union will be discussed in further detail in a later part of this chapter. The idea here, of separating the discussion of the final method from the rest, is primarily due to the fact that the supply and control of the flow of armaments to the arsenals of terrorist organizations very often involves some factors which are beyond the control of the Soviet Union. Therefore, before reaching our own conclusions as to the degree of Soviet involvement with the network of international terrorism, one has to examine the major prevailing assumptions (theories) among Western scholars who have studied this phenomenon.

The debate surrounding the question as to the degree of Soviet involvement in international terrorism has produced over the years two major approaches. By their nature, these two approaches appear to be in complete opposition to each other, thus creating a sharp split among the two extreme positions. According to Brian Jenkins of the Rand Corporation (the prominent U.S.-based research firm), "the degree of Soviet involvement (in terrorist incidents such as that in Bogota recently), is a major debating point. One extreme says that all terrorist acts are centrally directed from Moscow. The other says it is all spontaneous, with one group copying another, like a fad".¹³

However, it seems that neither of the two extreme approaches is entirely correct, and that adoption of either one of them may damage the overall conclusions with regard to this debate. Therefore the idea being presented here is to combine the two extremes in an

attempt to find a middle-of-the-road approach.

Brian Jenkins, in his concluding words, gives support to this idea.

I don't buy either extreme...I believe we have a combination of fad and some attempt to control and direct terrorism by the Soviet Union.¹⁴

The debate about the degree of Soviet involvement in international terrorism is not limited to journalists and the academia. This subject is also of great interest to politicians and officials of the State Department, as well as other intelligence communities in the Western Hemisphere. According to Everett G. Martin, the theory as to the Soviet involvement in Latin America and elsewhere is highly controversial and hotly disputed even within the CIA.

The US State Department, for example, officially gives little credence to the idea that Russians or Russian puppets (Cubans, for example) are lurking behind every Latin American bush. True, officials from the State and Defense departments recently told a congressional committee that Cuba has been involved in a plot to help overthrow the government in El Salvador.¹⁵

Furthermore, one should attempt to rationalize the Soviet point of view on this whole debate since it involves a very interesting dichotomy and some conflicting objectives (interests) vis-a-vis their support of terrorist organizations.

On the one hand, as Ernest Evans sees it, "there is no doubt that they (the Soviets) are playing a role...but their basic attitude is still one of coordination of the various movements because they are basically uncomfortable with this kind of action, and it is ideologically unpalatable to them...I think that they would really prefer good relations with the established states...rather than with

some group in the mountains".¹⁶

To further illustrate this idea about the positive attitude on the part of the Soviet Union to maintain their relations with non-socialist nation-states and with private corporations, here are the words of a security director of an American firm which markets world-wide: "The countries in which I had the least problems in protecting staff and assets were behind the iron curtain".¹⁷

Yet, on the other hand, maintaining good relations with the governments, thus allowing business and trade to flow, does not necessarily mean that the Soviets cannot simultaneously maintain their relations with terrorist organizations and other outlawed movements. However, in incidents as such, much of their conduct and the publicity given to their involvement with the terrorists will depend on the overall long-term objectives they seek in a given region of the world.

Historically, in the Soviet approach to these matters, there is nothing inconsistent about backing separatists on the one hand, so that the Soviets can come to the aid of an embattled central government on the other. We have seen this in Ethiopia, and we certainly see it today in Iran.¹⁸

Therefore, it seems that such a "double-faced" policy is quite often used by the Soviet Union as a tactic of pressuring certain governments, (after knowing the relationship between its opponents and the Soviets) into further cooperation, or total dependency on the Soviet Union (that depends on the extent of damage that the opponents caused). The verification (by the Soviets) of their involvement with the terrorist organizations and the straightforward revelation of

their objectives, can make this plan (tactic) far more effective and convincing than the use of only vague innuendo. A very similar approach in Soviet foreign policy is used vis-a-vis their arms (nuclear) race against the Western world.

There, the Soviets cooperate in revealing the size of their forces because, were we to remain ignorant, we would be neither deterred, nor impressed, nor intimidated.¹⁹

Ironically, in today's world, one can no longer be certain whether or not it is the preference of certain embattled governments, like Ethiopia in the mid-'70's, to have state-sponsored terrorism, like that which the Soviet Union exports, or rather, to have unpredictable or uncontrollable home-grown products.

Furthermore, the recent expansion of Soviet influence among the world's terrorist organizations, which has resulted in an increase in their development and maturity, can give rise to the hope on the part of some governments that "this is the right way to contain terrorism".

A different tactic is used in most cases where Soviet involvement in international terrorism occurs, especially when the target states happen to be from Western Europe or the United States. When this occurs, Moscow systematically denies any such cooperation, trying to shake off direct responsibility by activating some of her puppet (satellite) states, such as those in Eastern Europe, South Yemen, Cuba, and North Korea.

Although the long-term objectives of the Soviets, vis-a-vis Western Europe and the United States are similar to those elsewhere

in the world, their expectations from the revolutionaries are different, as a result of the strength of the democracies, their powerful institutions, and their relatively stable social orders.

Here, for instance, the very first outcome that terrorism will produce, according to Soviet plans, is that predicted by Nathan Leites of the Rand Corporation:

Microviolence...will change beliefs about what the current relationship of factors between the Authorities and the revolutionaries is, and thereby affect the balance of preferences for and against the status quo.²⁰

The first "achievement" of terrorism mentioned above is also expected to produce a second objective, that is, the desire that "by beginning the armed struggle, the awareness of its necessity will be furthered".²¹ However, the Soviet Union and the rest of the Eastern Bloc are quite aware by now of the potential military capabilities of the terrorist organizations on the one hand, and their overall chances to defeat the military forces of the Western democracies on the other.

Therefore, the most important thing to remember is the fact that by supporting terrorist organizations in Western Europe, for example, the major elements which are expected to provide the final Soviet victory are the governments in Europe themselves and not necessarily the terrorist organizations. The idea being presented here is based on the assumption that the ongoing intimidation by the terrorists will force some governments to invade certain civil rights and individual liberties (Canada in 1970, for example), thereby increasing sympathy for the terrorists' cause and challenging the

the government's legitimacy vis-a-vis the rest of the society.

In combatting an elusive terrorist, the incumbents will be forced to take measures that affect not only the terrorist but also his environment, the society as a whole. Although this result may be incidental to the aims of some terrorists, terroristic acts often are committed with the express purpose of provoking reprisals...A much greater problem is whether or not repressive measures will actually have the desired effect.²²

Pierre Kropotkin gives further support to the above assumption.

He believes that, "while the government can normally stifle the opposition by repression in times of popular upsurge (époque d'effervescence), the effect of repression will be to stimulate the insurgent movement, with corresponding divisions in the attitudes of the incumbents about the appropriate nature and degree of repression".²³

Furthermore, by aiming the terrorist acts against the most vulnerable elements in the Western democracies, such as the modern communication links in transportation, commerce and diplomacy, the whole policy becomes more effective and beneficial for the realization of the terrorists' final objectives. In spite of these well-calculated policies by the Soviet Union and other organizers, most Western European countries have so far successfully managed on the two main fronts, both by maintaining the social order (protecting civil rights and liberties) on the one hand and by minimizing the effect of terrorism and the support to it on the other.

Italy is the exception to this rule because "Italy, of all Western European countries, suffers most, because the democratic process enjoys little confidence and the administration is weak".²⁴

The element which has not yet been examined with respect to

the phenomenon of Soviet-supported terrorism is the aspect of how to tie in the facts about this support with the intentions behind this policy.

While the philosophical origins of what today we consider to be modern terrorism may be traced back to Tsarist Russia over 100 years ago (the Nechayevs), it is also generally believed, "that Russian terrorism failed, that the terrorists did not achieve their purpose and that in 1917, power was seized by a group - the Bolsheviks - who were hostile to terrorism".²⁵ Undoubtedly, we are presented with a very strange situation whereby, on the one hand, we understand that the Bolsheviks were opposed to terrorism, while on the other hand historical facts continue to reveal that the Soviets have supported terrorism since 1917. Furthermore, as Richard Pipes describes this difficulty, "the more I study the history of the Russian Revolution, the more skeptical I become about this commonplace assumption".²⁶

In fact, it was Soviet Russia, as early as 1921, which undertook the first measures in the international arena to eliminate armed terrorism. The reason behind these measures were due to the fact that,

Armed terrorism, which became an international problem in the wake of World War I, gained in importance in international relations and became increasingly evident after the October Revolution, as a result of Soviet diplomatic activity. This was due to the fact that in the beginning of the 1920's, Soviet Russia was the object of terrorist attacks by groups of White Guards who raided Russia from the territory of neighbouring countries.²⁷

It seems that the Soviet Union, in taking into consideration the world balance of political forces which existed at that time (in which

of the Soviet Union in 1933 for defining aggression at the Disarmament Conference (The League of Nations) can be viewed as a preemptive act which was dictated to the Soviets by their own fears of terrorism.

However, while in 1917 the idea of a "socialist world system" was still regarded as only a potential Marxist theory, the events of the post-World War II era (1948), which witnessed a dramatic, qualitative, change in the balance of power between the communist countries and the Western world, also marked a dramatic change in the Soviets' attitude toward the phenomenon of international terrorism.

The following paragraphs will illustrate the extent of the changes in policies and attitudes, after World War II, on the part of the Soviet Union with regard to international terrorism.

This external factor has, however, become a major component in the revolutionary struggle, manifesting itself in later stages when the Soviet Union and other communist states gave protection and active assistance to revolutionary régimes and entered the critical stage of stabilization.³⁰

The Soviets found a theoretical justification in their own ideology, concerning the world revolutionary process that stemmed from the increasing hostilities of the Cold War era, and the worldwide increase in wars of liberation. According to the official state propaganda, the methods of struggle of the national liberation movements is based on the notion of "two essentially irreconcilable lines of world development", including "all countries, classes, social strata and political currents which become involved in their struggle directly and indirectly". However, this whole effort would have been "impossible without the existence of the Soviet Union and without the

tremendous and irreplaceable political, moral and material support which it gives the peoples fighting imperialism".³¹

To a notable extent, there has not been any attempt made to distinguish between the various "national liberation groups" (terrorist organizations, in many cases), thus supporting the assumption that the Soviet Union and its satellite states has provided and coordinated this aid "to various Communist and non-Communist terrorist organizations in both developed and developing countries".³² This leads one to wonder, in light of the extensive changes of both the policies and the methods which the Soviet Union has deployed, whether or not (and if not, why?) the Soviet Union was successful in maintaining its role as a coordinator and supreme controller of the activities of the network of international terrorism. In attempting to answer this question, the illustration of the "final method" (the supply of weapons) will be quite important.

Thus, a successful analysis of this problem will have to include the discussion of the following points: 1. - Which organizations are receiving weaponry support from the Soviet Union? How? 2. - The conflict of interest with other nation-states supporting the terrorists. (This may help to explain the Soviet impotence to control terrorism on the one hand and will, on the other hand, help to rationalize some of the changes in policies that the Soviet Union was forced to adopt). 3. - Finally, what type of terrorist acts are likely to be unacceptable and condemned by the Soviet Union? Why?

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No doubt there is a constant debate in the Kremlin over how much support it is expedient to give to terrorist causes. For the KGB to be exposed as playing a key part in terrorist operations, in Europe, for example, would not assist the advocates of treaty agreements that favour Soviet interests. Nor would it help West European Communist parties that are seeking to acquire an image of democratic respectability for electoral purposes.³³

Earlier in this chapter it was argued by Ernest Evans that the Soviet Union would have liked to play the role of a "coordinator" among the various terrorist groups, thus indirectly controlling most of their acts.

Just as cooperation with bourgeois régimes was largely motivated by the Soviet interest in reducing tension, so as to further the pursuit of certain strategic and economic goals, so support for national liberations was tempered by considerations of war and peace, tension and quiet.³⁴

However, regardless of the outcomes of these debates, there has been more than enough evidence that the arsenals of the majority of terrorist organizations include mostly Russian-made weapons.

The PLO, which is the richest, best financed revolutionary organization in history, receives material support in the form of arms and support material from the Soviet Union.³⁵

Another source which gives further credence to this claim reported that, "Soviet weapons have reached Palestinian groups and both wings of the IRA, which have received Soviet RPG-7 hand-held launchers and, most recently, the Soviet AK-47 and SKS carbines".³⁶

However, as to the explanation of how other organizations managed to load their arsenals with Soviet-made weapons, the first prevailing assumption is that the other nation-states such as Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam, China and "reactionary" (extreme) Arab states, transferred these weapons from their own national (military) arsenals,

not always after consultation and approval from Moscow.

A second assumption which was discussed earlier in Chapter II pointed out the possibility that the close links and cooperation among the various terrorist organizations, more than likely resulted in the transferring (sharing) of weapons and other logistical supplies from one organization to another.

Therefore, one may conclude at this stage that the Soviet theory (plan) of coordination and control over the terrorist organizations has so far not quite been fulfilled, thus allowing the organizations more room to maneuver in their use of methods of violence.

Another major concern for the Soviet Union and for Western democracies has been the uncontrolled and sometimes irresponsible (adventuristic) behaviour of other nation-states supporting the cause of international terrorism. While it is believed that most acts of support by the Eastern European countries are controlled and directed by Moscow, other communist régimes - namely Cuba, and especially China, have almost always acted in complete opposition to Moscow's interests.

This conflict of interest between the Soviet Union and their one-time ally, China, started as early as 1953. China, led by Mao Tse-Tung, had in mind (already at this stage) some grand theories about a "New Program for World Revolution", that even to the most radical elements in the Kremlin appeared as irrational and certainly impossible to achieve.

Walter Judd labels these plans in the following words:

"It is like Mein Kampf (the Nazi party's manifesto)" which is said "to have proposed to the Soviet Union a plan for world conquest under which every nation - except the United States - would be Communist-dominated by 1973".³⁷

Despite Moscow's refusal to go along with the Chinese plans, it appears that China never gave up this dream of spreading a world-wide communist revolution and systematically formed its foreign policy toward the achievement of this goal, even if it was at the direct expense of the Soviet Union.

One of the major regions in which China challenged the Soviets' influence was the Middle East. Not only did China, in 1964, become the first major non-Arab power to officially recognize the Fatah (the Palestinian resistance movement), putting pressure on the Soviet Union to do the same, but she even went further.

During 1963 and 1964, China had unsuccessfully attempted to increase its influence in the Arab world at the expense of the Russian presence there. Now Peking saw in the establishment of the PLO a new opportunity to improve relations with the Arab world and also to establish ties with a national liberation movement in the Middle East.³⁸

However, only a year later (1965), when China realized both the extent of Soviet influence in the region and the strong commitments on the part of most Palestinian organizations to the Soviet Union, did China begin slowly to change its position..

In addition to recognizing their (PLO) revolutionary potential in the Arab world, China gave them the status of a liberation movement struggling against colonialism and imperialism alongside the other nations of the Third World.³⁹

These changes in policy which reflected China's disappoint-

ment with both Arab governments and certain "moderate" elements within the PLO, resulted in some interesting developments.

As a result of the presence of both superpowers in the region, the Middle East served Chinese strategic plans in providing a forum on which to act against the two. China perceived the ongoing hostility in the area as a means of occupying and weakening both superpowers, as well as the nations in the area.

The primary purpose of this policy was not so much the defeat of Israel or the liberation of the Arabs, but the weakening of both her enemies, hated Soviet hegemonists and the American imperialists and their running dogs.⁴⁰

However, despite China's severe limitations (industrial and military capabilities) in her race for spheres of influence in the Arab world, she kept her close and published links with the PLO.

Ahmed Shukayri stated in 1965 that his organization had obtained unconditional military help from the PRC, and soon it will organize military cooperation... More than 75% of the arms used by Palestinian revolutionary groups are free from China.⁴¹

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union was faced with a very serious dilemma regarding her own future policies in the Middle East. Unlike the PRC, "In an area as volatile as the Middle East, with its global as well as regional connections, the Soviet Union prefers stability or, at worst, controlled conflict, ruling out almost all armed conflict against Israel except what she may see as limited, static battles of attrition".⁴²

Furthermore, Soviet participation in numerous international forums which dealt with the necessity of a peaceful resolution to end the hostilities in the Middle East were traditionally used by

China as a major propaganda tool in provoking the extreme elements within the Arab world. An illustration of this idea may be seen in the following words, released by China only a few days after the end of the 1967 war.

U.S. imperialism supports Israel in real earnest, while the ruling Soviet revisionist clique supports the Arab countries in words only...Soviet revisionists betray the Arab peoples ...pose and pass themselves as friends.⁴³

Finally, due in part to their bitter experience in Egypt in July 1972, which saw President Anwar Sadat expell 15,000 Russian military personnel after their refusal to supply offensive-type weapons, the Soviet Union has gradually been forced to give in to further demands on the part of terrorist organizations and some terrorist states. In return for these concessions, the Soviet Union hoped to maintain their overall status and prestige in the international arena while sacrificing their plan of controlling and coordinating the activities of the international network of terrorists.

Robert Moss further supports this prediction:

There are signs that, over the past year or so, the most aggressive faction in the Soviet leadership - the group that centres around Mikhail Suslov, Boris Ponomarev and certain elements in the KGB - has seized on the political uncertainty that stems from Brezhnev's failing health to promote a more adventurist line in dealings with the international terrorist movement.⁴⁴

The final element which has to be explored regarding the Soviet involvement in international terrorism is the Soviets' own concern and often ambivalent feelings toward certain types of terroristic methods.

As it was demonstrated in an earlier part of this chapter, the

Soviet Union has so far disapproved of most acts of sabotage against Western industrial and commercial enterprises, in order to maintain their own businesses and trade around the world. While these economic considerations appear to be quite clear and straightforward (as pure Soviet interest), it is difficult to rationalize their condemnation of extreme elements within the PLO, for example.

A sample of Soviet responses to PLO actions will demonstrate this problem and some of the complications involved.

The September 1972 murder of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics and the murder of Western diplomats in Khartoum in March 1973 were both openly condemned by the Soviet Union (however 'understandable' such 'acts of desperation' might be)...The hijacking at Rome and Athens airports (1973) was particularly irritating to the Soviet Union.⁴⁵

For many observers in the West, these acts of condemnation and the published Soviet objections to them, came as a surprise.

From a brief glance at Figure 1 (Chapter II), one can see that between 1968 and 1975 there have been at least 22 registered incidents of terrorist acts in the Soviet Bloc (the majority of them occurring in the USSR). From this we can see that the Soviet Union, despite and perhaps because of her type of régime (totalitarian), is also vulnerable to terrorist activities and social (internal) disorders.

Furthermore, the well-known unrest among certain social segments (ethnic groups) in Soviet society, such as the Jews, Muslims, and Ukraine minorities, have forced the Soviet Union to act in a cautious manner and take certain preemptive measures, in some cir-

cumstances, to avoid this type of terror (hijacking) occurring on her soil.

Finally, the Soviet Union is prevented from supporting such acts of barbarism because she is a partner to international conventions such as those dealing with immunity and diplomatic protection as well as being an active member in international sport organizations.

The following conclusions can be drawn from the debate regarding the Soviet Bloc's involvement in international terrorism. First, despite their early objections to state-supported terrorism, the Soviet Union has been assisting and collaborating either directly or indirectly (through proxies) with both Marxist and non-Marxist terrorist organizations around the world. Second, despite their desire for a limited type of terrorism, with well-defined methods in certain parts of the world, it seems that the flow of support to terrorist organizations from other totalitarian régimes has often influenced the Soviets to turn to more adventuresome policies and to take higher risks in their engagements with international terrorist organizations.

Finally, it is important to remember that, "terrorism thrives most in societies in which the democratic system is weak or corrupt, or which fall between the two extremes".⁴⁶ Thus, the vulnerability of the Soviet Union and other totalitarian régimes to acts of terror is at least as great as in the democratic societies. Therefore, while the Soviet Union and the rest of the Eastern Bloc are identified as promoters of terrorism, it appears more than likely that in the near

future they will have to battle terrorism in their home environments as well.

The second part of this chapter will attempt to analyze another major group of states that support the cause of international terrorism. Here the focus will shift to the Arab world, where an attempt will be made to measure the extent of their role in this process as well as their degree of commitment to it. In doing so, some of the difficulties involved in such an analysis will be exposed and explained to the reader.

II

Unlike the Soviet Union and the rest of the Communist Bloc, the countries in the Arab world, by their very nature, appear to be less united and therefore less uniform in their attitudes and levels of support with respect to international terrorism.

Furthermore, while it was possible to draw useful generalizations by isolating one country (the USSR) as being representative of the behaviour of the entire Bloc, it is impossible and unfruitful from a researcher's point of view to do so in the case of the Arab world.

Therefore, an attempt will be made to divide the Arab world into three main categories in order to reflect the real attitudes of each with regard to international terrorism. This division will also be used in describing the type of support that each category

is likely to extend to the terrorist organizations.

Yehoshafat Harkabi* offered a very similar typology to that, whereby he classified and categorized the Arab world according to their overall attitude toward Israel. Surprisingly, although Harkabi's typology is concentrating on a different approach, namely, the Arab attitude toward Israel, the analysis of the Arab states' support to international terrorism is likely to produce very similar results and create almost identical categories.

* Y. Harkabi, Arab Strategies and Israel's Response, The Free Press, New York, 1977.

Table 7: The Three Main Streams (Schools) Within the Arab World and Their Support of International Terrorism

TYPE/APPROACH***	STATE	FORMS OF SUPPORT	TO WHICH ORGANIZATION	THE REASON FOR SUPPORT	THE TARGETS
Extreme "Reactionary"	Libya Algeria South Yemen	Arms Training Funds Haven	All Palestinian organizations, & also to European, L.American, and Afro-Asian	Anti-Israeli & American. Pro-Soviet. Strong Muslim Fundamentalists. A dream about an Islamic empire to which Israel is the obstacle.	Israel & the Western democracies. Anti-Jewish. Anti-Arab monarchies.
"Continuous Strife"	Iraq* Syria Iran (since late 1979)	Diplomacy Passports Propaganda	terrorist groups.		
Moderate "Erosion and Withering Away"	Jordan Lebanon Tunisia Sudan Morocco Egypt (until 1978)**	Diplomacy Haven Propaganda	Primarily to Palestinian organizations. Occasionally to Western Europeans as well.	Anti-Israel. A military strategy (option) against Israel. Results often from pressures within the Arab League.	Israel, or at least the Zionist form of its government.
The Most Moderates "Reducing Israel to its Natural Dimensions"	Saudi Arabia Kuwait Abu-Dabi United Arab Emirates Egypt (to a certain extent since 1978)	Funds Diplomacy (Pressure - Oil Weapon against the West).	Palestinian organizations only.	Anti-Israel. Their own vulnerability for Arab (Palestinian) terror. Strong religious feeling. Maintaining hostilities just to avoid them from reaching their own countries.	Israel

*Due to the latest developments in the Iran-Iraqi war, some experts speculate that Iraq may change its hard-line policies, thus predicting the possibility that it may join the Moderate stream in the Arab world.

**Egypt, up until November 1978 (Sadat's visit to Jerusalem), belonged on and off to both streams, the extreme and the moderate. At present, its only support to the Palestinian cause is through diplomatic/political means.

***According to Y.Harkabi, these are the main three schools within the Arab world vis-a-vis the question of Israel.

Even by dividing the Arab world into the three main categories results in a quite rigid solution, that occasionally incorrectly reflects the real Arab states' attitudes with regard to international terrorism. For example, the results of the Six Day War (1967) which saw the whole area of Palestine (according to Arab definitions) under Israeli control, influenced Saudi Arabia (which has been considered a very moderate force) to produce a "spirit of a sort of reverse crusade - a Jihad, or holy war, to liberate the holy places of Islam from occupation by the infidels",⁴⁷ thus qualifying herself in this period as an extreme fundamentalist state.

Furthermore, it is interesting to speculate whether the involvement of states like Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Lebanon, which have been pro-Western, are the result of a deliberate policy or were forced upon them by the rest of the Arab world. Shimon Shamir, for instance, believes that,

States like Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Jordan, who desired to maintain their political particularity, were constantly put on the defensive...Adherence to the program of Arab unification and commitment to such Arab causes as the total liberation of Palestine were like articles of faith.⁴⁸

Another important note worth considering is that although some states belong to the same category as others, it does not necessarily mean that their support of terrorism is jointly coordinated or unified. In many cases, this division is accidental, stemming by and large from their overall attitude toward Israel and the Western democracies. The example of Syria, Iraq and Iran, which all belong to the same (extreme) category, can best illustrate this point.

Finally, despite these objective limitations and the obvious rigidity of Table 7, it seems that this method of analysis can best produce the desired understanding of the Arab states' support of terrorism.

The Extreme "Reactionary" States (some label them the Rejectionists Front)

According to the CIA,

The oil-rich Qaddafi régime in Libya has for some years been the world's most unabashed governmental proponent of revolutionary violence. The recipients of its favours (in the form of various combinations of financial, logistical, and technical support) have been numerous and varied.⁴⁹

Although Libya is considered by many to epitomize a radical state devoted to the spread of international terrorism, it is not unique in the Arab world.

Several Arab nations - Libya, Algeria, Syria, Iraq, and South Yemen, in particular - have helped international terrorists, especially Arab terrorists, by providing a network of bases, logistics, and financial support and points of access not available to the same degree between the communist bloc and democratic nations.⁵⁰

Thus it appears that the Arab states' support of the network of international terrorism is more vital and certainly less limited in its scope than that of the Communist Bloc in this process. Perhaps the underlying reason (motive) behind this support, to which all the above-mentioned states are in full agreement, is;

The public rejection of all nonmilitary solutions to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and an insistence on the viability and adequacy of a total war of popular liberation on the Vietnamese model as the only "winning" strategy against Israel.⁵¹

Furthermore, the extreme faction of the Arab world believes that,

...in international relations, the tolerance and support of terrorism...stems from the belief that terrorist groups often work in their own national interests...(whereby) issues of morality are overshadowed by the presumption that terrorists, however inadvertently, are useful surrogates in the ongoing struggle for international power and influence.⁵²

Therefore, it is no longer support to the Palestinian organizations and their cause alone, but rather, a world-wide policy, which attempts to spread the revolution to all 'four corners of the globe'. Unlike the Communist Bloc's support, which is often officially denied, with various measures taken in order to control certain types of terroristic methods, the extreme Arab states provide their support in quite a 'liberal' manner, without any stipulation or conditions put on the terrorist organizations.

Here are a few examples as to the extent of tolerance by extreme Arab states to crimes of international terrorism.

Libya granted refuge to the Japanese group which took over the American embassy in Kuala-Lampur; South Yemen granted refuge to the Germans released after the Peter Lorrance kidnapping, and Algeria granted refuge to the JRA members who hijacked a Japanese airplane in 1977.⁵³

Occasionally, Arab states conduct their business with terrorist organizations within the boundaries of other states (often within the target state itself). Thus, in the past ten years or so, there have been on several occasions severe breaches (abuses) of international law and direct involvement of Arab "diplomats" in the internal affairs of the hosting states.

- While the Libyan military attaché in Tokyo maintains contacts with Red Star Army supporters and Libyan instructors are despatched to Nkomo's bases in Zambia, Qaddafi sends money to the Moro liberation front in the Philippines and the South Moluccans and hosts a conference in Benghazi for diverse Latin American groups.⁵⁴

Algeria aids terrorists by using its diplomatic network in support of terrorist operations. Safe haven, intelligence, and arms.⁵⁵

However, while evidence shows the extent of the involvement of these "terrorist states" (as Robert Moss labels the extreme Arab states), Western countries appear to be almost paralyzed in dealing with them. *B*

One of the reasons for this is the great amount of dependency Western countries have on the sources of energy supplied by these states. For example, Libya, Algeria, Iraq, and Iran are, or have been, the main exporters of oil to countries like Japan, France, Italy, and others. This dependency greatly inhibits the opportunities for successful reprisals against these "terrorist states".

Another factor which is helpful in explaining how these "terrorist states" are able to support international terrorism without significant reprisals from target states is their geographical location. With the exception of Syria (not a major force in this group), none of these "terrorist states" shares a physical border with the state of Israel, thereby saving themselves from retaliation raids as a result of their support of terrorism.

The third and perhaps most important element which helps Arab "terrorist states" continue their support of international terrorism is their close links to the Soviet Union. "South Yemen, for example, with its limited financial resources, provides support in forms other than money and arms."⁵⁶ "This tiny (radically Marxist) state at the extreme southern tip of the Arabian peninsula is completely under

the control of the Soviet Union."⁵⁷ The other "terrorist states", although maintaining their diplomatic and trade links with the West, have almost entirely depended on the supply of Soviet-made armaments which, at least in part, find their way later into the arsenals of the terrorist organizations.

One of their objectives which the "terrorist states" want to achieve through the services of terrorist organizations (perhaps under Soviet influence), is the defeat of the conservative ~~monarchies~~ régimes within the Arab world.

To a notable extent, such operations (terroristic) are directed against conservative Arab states as much (or even more) than against Israel or other Western targets.⁵⁸

The idea behind this strategy is to eliminate the conservative elements within the Arab world, such as Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Persian Gulf nations which are known as vital economic/strategic spheres for the West, thus indirectly "tightening the rope" around the economies of the Western industrialized nations and restoring unity and solidarity in the Arab world.

According to some experts, the use of terrorism against legitimate conservative régimes in the Arab world was one of the main reasons behind the successful revolution in Iran against the Shah. Links between the PLO and the revolutionaries in Iran have been acknowledged publicly by the leader of Iran - the Ayatollah Khomeini.

As a result of the revolution, Western countries have realized the seriousness (dedication) of the "terrorist states" in obtaining their objective, as well as the severe economic consequences that have

resulted from it.

Finally, in light of what has been said above, it is not difficult to agree with Robert Moss' summation on the nature of these extreme Arab states.

I believe that we are dealing with 'terrorist states' in the fullest sense of the word, in the sense that the governments concerned not only provide sanctuary and support to international terrorist groups, but actively commit their secret services to the control and execution of terrorist operations.⁵⁹

The Moderate Stream in the Arab World

The notion of the existence of some moderate forces in the Arab world vis-a-vis international terrorism stems from the fact that, at least theoretically, some states provide support only to the Palestinian terrorist organizations while not directly involving themselves with other groups in the network.

Thus, from the Israeli point of view, there is only a slight difference between extreme Arab states and those who belong to the moderate stream. Furthermore, at different times in the past 15 years, some Arab countries that at present are part of the moderate stream belonged to the extremist group in the Arab world (Jordan before 1970 and Egypt until 1974).

It appears that the single most significant period which shaped the attitude of the moderate states vis-a-vis Palestinian terrorism was the period after the Six Day War in 1967. From this period onward, support was not only given for the "justified rights of the Palestinian people", but rather as an integral part of the

overall military plans (strategies) of these states against Israel.

Here, for example, are some remarks made by King Hussein to the leaders of the PLO with regard to his attitude to Palestinian terrorism:

I am one of you! Our task is to unite our ranks for our aim ~~is~~ one. My door is always open to you. I am ready to welcome you, to work together as one strong arm.⁶⁰

Even in Lebanon, which was considered one of the most moderate elements in the Arab world, there has been an official acknowledgment of the importance of terror. Raymon ~~Edd~~ (a member of Parliament) was quoted as saying that,

These activities (terrorist) are the only effective way of opposing Israel, particularly at the present time... Despite the heavy price of Israeli retaliations... this activity must be continued intensively.⁶¹

From these theories and words of support, the moderate Arab states moved toward the establishment of their military strategy, in which the Palestinian terrorist organizations played an important role. It was therefore not surprising when, by 1968, the Fatah (main stream in the PLO) decided and was ultimately permitted by moderate Arab states, to establish its "secure bases" in regions beyond Israeli control.

The plan was based on the assumption that the sanctuaries should be: "1. - under the total control of the resistance, 2. - near enemy territory to enable the commandos to carry out their operations, 3. - in areas populated by large numbers of Palestinians, who would naturally be the main sources of support and manpower, and 4. - in locations that would enable the revolutionaries to resist the siege and annihila-

tion operations of the enemy".⁶²

The acceptance of this operational plan by some moderate Arab states (Jordan and later Lebanon) later became both a serious threat to their own régimes and a mechanism which indirectly involved them with the rest of the network of international terrorism. (Foreign terrorists have been trained in both Jordan and Lebanon).

The threat to their own régimes was highlighted during the month of September 1970 in Jordan, and later on in 1975 (until the present day) in Lebanon. Thus, "the large confrontation between the guerrilla organizations and the host régimes arose both from the natural operational requisites of any large-scale paramilitary organization - which by themselves would be sufficient to cause substantial 'friction' - and the policy of across-the-border retaliation that Israel had developed early on to counter fedayeen activities".⁶³

To a notable extent, the most significant element of support missing from that given to the terrorists by Arab moderate states is financial aid. Furthermore, since none of the moderate states is identified as a major oil exporter (unlike the extreme and Persian Gulf states), and since their annual military expenditures (Egypt and Jordan, in particular) are by far the highest, proportionally, in the Arab world, it has fallen on the oil-rich states to, in effect, subsidize these countries, enabling them to continue with their military efforts and their support to the terrorists' cause against Israel.

From the terrorists' point of view, the moderate Arab states

were never considered as a reliable source of assistance to their cause.

The commando leadership knew from past experience that a powerful and independent fedayeen presence would not be tolerated in the long run by the Jordanian and Lebanese régimes for various reasons.⁶⁴

Undoubtedly, the main reason why Palestinians were able to establish a "secured stronghold" in Syria, for example, but not in countries like Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan was because in Syria support took place in two forms - political and territorial (haven), while in moderate states the only commitment was territorial support for the terrorists.

The Most Moderate Stream in the Arab World

One cannot conclude the discussion of support for terrorism by Arab states without mentioning the role of a small but significant stream within the Arab world, namely, those that appear to be the most moderate and the closest linked to the Western world. Unlike the other two streams (extreme and moderate), it seems that one can isolate a single actor (state) in this category which reflects the real attitude of the rest to terrorism. The most significant actor in this category is undoubtedly Saudi Arabia, one of the world's richest countries and the number one exporter to the West. Saudi Arabian support of terrorism is based on a policy similar to that espoused by the "moderate stream" in the Arab world in that support for terrorism is limited to Palestinian terrorist organizations, thus avoiding the rest of the network. However, both their reasons behind this support and the

methods they use are quite different than those of the moderate stream.

The vision of a Muslim world bound together by strong political ties has haunted Arabs and Muslims for generations.

In the 1960's, this idea reasserted itself in the Islamic policy of Saudi Arabia. The Islamic Alliance aimed not only at fostering 'Islamic cooperation that would win us 600 million Muslims (Faisal)', but also at constructing an Islamic front capable of withstanding the rising revolutionary tide in the Arab world.⁶⁵

King Faisal and the rest of the Saudi Arabian decision-makers realized that prior to achieving Arab (Muslim) unity, two essential issues must be resolved. 1. A solution to the problems of the Palestinian refugees (many of whom are spread throughout Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states). 2. The recovery of the holy places in Jerusalem and the West Bank, which fell under Israeli control after the 1967 war.

In bringing about the ultimate unification of the Arabs, Saudi Arabia assigns a very significant role to the Palestinian terrorist organizations.

Israel is living today in a constant fear which shatters its peace. The activities of the Arab Fedayeen are only to prepare the ground for the coming round and the beginning of the swoop to victory... This is thanks to the solidarity of the Arabs and Muslims and their strong faith.⁶⁶

As early as 1969, Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Persian Gulf states publicly announced their support of the Palestinian organizations, providing mostly financial assistance.

The Arab Kings and Presidents have decided to allocate £26 million to meet the financial commitments of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in the coming year.⁶⁷

Even the tiny kingdom of Abu-Dabi contributed 120,000 dinar to the

cause of the PLO in 1968.

However, more deadly than financial support to the Palestinians was the method adopted by Saudi Arabia on October 16, 1973, during the latter part of the Yom-Kippur War. According to the Saudi planned strategy, the rest of the Arab oil-producing states "unanimously decided to cut oil supplies to the consuming countries at the rate of 5% per month, and to impose a total embargo on the United States and Holland because of their support of Israel".⁶⁸ According to Ahmed Zaki al-Yamani, the Saudi Arabian Oil Minister, on November 23, 1973 in Copenhagen, "the cut of oil supplies might reach, should it become necessary, as high as 80%".⁶⁹

The rationale behind this plan can easily be reduced to simplistic terms, whereby, "the world energy shortage was caused by Israel and that the only thing the world had to do was to force Israel to comply with Arab demands". Thus, the main method which was adopted against Israel was the diplomatic/political one, and not the military option that characterizes the extreme elements, for example.

It is difficult to measure, even at this time, the extent to which this method of extortion (blackmail) was successful in pressuring Western European countries to surrender to the Arab demands. However, it appears that Saudi Arabia was quite content with the results, and on many occasions has threatened to follow with similar acts in the future. In fact, when the British attempted, in April 1980, to screen the film "Death of a Princess", the Saudis warned the West

of the possibility of action similar to that of 1973.

The film was sold to other countries in Europe and the U.S....and Saudi Arabia began to apply pressure in order to prevent it from being shown...Germany, Italy, France, Australia, New Zealand, and Sweden all gave in to Saudi Arabian "warning".⁷⁰

The role that Saudi Arabia has played in the Arab world has been fully acknowledged by the leaders of the PLO and other Palestinian terrorist organizations. Perhaps this is part of the reason why the Palestinians and extreme Arab states have refrained, so far, from subversive actions similar to those employed in Iran by the revolutionaries.

Finally, Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Persian Gulf states are today facing a serious dilemma. While on the one hand they support the Palestinian organizations which are both against the ultra-conservative régimes and for close links with the Communist Bloc, on the other hand, this support most likely goes towards international terrorism - that is aimed against the Western democracies on whom Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf states are heavily dependent.

Paul Johnson, Yonah Alexander, and other Western scholars maintain that a direct correlation necessarily exists between the amount of state support to terrorism and the size and effectiveness of the terrorist organization in question. Perhaps the first, and clearest conclusion to emerge from this research is that their hypothesis has been affirmed. However, from research of this kind and scope it is expected that further conclusions will be reached as to the state of affairs of international terrorism in the world of today, and perhaps

even a prediction, or forecast, for the future. Therefore, in the conclusion we will attempt to realize these final requirements.

CONCLUSION

There is a simple psychological experiment in which one looks through a peephole at a room with uneven sides. Accustomed to even-sided rooms, most people will not see it as it is. Instead, they perceive it as square or rectangular and in doing so, misjudge the location and size of objects within it. Even when told the truth, moreover, most people find it hard to see the room in its true proportions.

Ernest May, 1973

Dilemmas similar to those experienced by people looking through a peephole at a room with uneven sides, very often result from discussion and analysis of scholars on the subject of international terrorism. Furthermore, it is rather striking and certainly disturbing to the reader that many Western scholars, despite their access to enormous amounts of information (which has already been revealed), have yet to establish a satisfying scientifically oriented study of the phenomenon of international terrorism. Thus, in a relatively advanced era of scientific discoveries, the impact of this (scientific) school has been hardly noticed. Scholars like Edward Mickolus, Ted Gurr and others, chose the relatively narrow and limited way of the scientific approach, whereby their analysis primarily concentrated on the nominal and ordinal levels of testing, while the interval level of measurement, which is expected to forecast and project the future of international terrorism, is nonexistent or at best exists with very low levels of support and empirical significance. As a result, it seems rather peculiar when members of the academia attempt to defend (rationalize) themselves by using over and over again the reason of, "lack of funding, lack of cooperation and the lack of workable (operational) definitions and typolo-

gies in the field" to justify their ineptitude in coming to grips with this study.

It has been demonstrated throughout the opening chapter of this thesis that pioneers in this field such as Paul Wilkinson, Martha C. Hutchinson and Thomas P. Thornton, have successfully managed to provide us with both the required definitions and the workable typologies with which to study international terrorism. As to the idea of lack of funding, one should not sympathize with this claim since intelligence communities in the western hemisphere and private corporations such as the RAND in the United States, have channeled over the years immeasurable amounts of money for this cause.

Thus, the element which is most clearly missing for the achievement of our desired expectations from the academia is their (scholars) own motivation and dedication to the idea of cumulation of knowledge, even if it comes at the direct expense of personal ideological beliefs for the benefit of the free societies and western civilization. Therefore, our advice to the academia is, to avoid their on-going philosophical "battles" and to abandon their arguments with respect to the definitional and typological aspects of the study of international terrorism (since we have already exhausted these aspects). Instead, they ought to proceed from there on, in an attempt to forecast the future development of the phenomenon of international terrorism.

Although the relatively poor and rigid state of affairs of the study and analysis of international terrorism deserves much more attention and criticism, it appears that the need for new policies

and advice to the embattled governments is of greater importance since "terrorists are in a chase for the obtaining of power and thus, the governments are their prime targets". (Luigi Bonanate)

However, our purpose here is not to lay the cornerstone for a new strategic doctrine concerning the defense against international terrorism for nations to rely upon. Doctrines have a marvelous way of becoming tomorrow's dogmas, of ultimately failing and of being replaced with new doctrines, soon to become dogmas. The idea here is to attempt to help those nations that have already established their own doctrines with regard to international terrorism to implement them in the most efficient and effective manner in the hope of overriding terrorism.

Furthermore, it is understood that the safest course for nations who have reason to suspect and fear the intentions of the international terrorist network is to detach themselves from the past, so as to concentrate on revealing information of the present and to maintain the vigilance which should come from the knowledge that despite every possible perception, acts of terror will still occur and many of them will unfortunately succeed.

Throughout this research, it has been demonstrated that no matter what type of régime (democratic, authoritarian, or totalitarian) in question, its vulnerability to terrorism may only vary to a certain extent in comparison to others. Thus, there are no guarantees of immunity to any of them, from acts of terror.

Undoubtedly, in the complex world structure of today, there

is no example of a society in existence which does not include some extremist elements capable of harnessing widespread social dissatisfaction for their own purposes. The question which remains to be answered is in which societies and under what set of circumstances are these extremist elements most likely to achieve their goals?

Most of the great revolutions which have occurred and succeeded have begun as 'happenings' rather than as planned productions. Sometimes, they have grown rapidly and unexpectedly out of what looked like ordinary mass demonstrations, sometimes out of resistance to the acts of their enemies, sometimes in other ways - but rarely if ever did they take the form expected by organized revolutionary movements, even when these have predicted the imminent occurrence of revolution...Like the surfer the revolutionary does not create the waves on which he rides, but balances on them.¹

Therefore, it seems that the main task for the democratic régimes is to identify and defend against both the domestic as well as the external forces, namely the "terrorist states" which were found responsible for the size of the "wave" (as Eric Hobsbawm labels it) on which the degree of success of a terrorist organization depends. Obviously, the confrontations which the democratic societies are expected to defend against both at home and in the international arena gives rise to a second crucial question, that being which front is of more importance and deserving of more attention?

Unfortunately, our answer to this question would not remove most of the dilemmas that are involved in a successful implementation of such a course. It is strongly believed here that the confrontation against terrorism has to be done simultaneously on both

fronts, through the mobilization of all available political, economic and military resources - at once. Only such a combination of actions can effectively minimize the damage caused by international terrorism and the "terrorist states".

The Domestic Front

The object of the true terrorist is to cause widespread chaos through fear and uncertainty. As Abraham Cullen put it, "A revolutionary (terrorist) organization must demonstrate that it knows more than its bourgeois rivals in power. To displace the bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy it must convince the public of their incompetence".²

If one (rightfully) accepts this idea, then the very first conclusion to draw is that terrorism is not "senseless" violence but rather well-planned in terms of "cost-effectiveness". "Or to borrow from the language of the stock exchange, terrorism is 'highly leveraged'".³ While in the past terrorists perceived that by "killing one they may frighten 10,000", in today's advanced age of communication and transportation, the axiom might be, "kill one, frighten 10 million". On the question of who is to be blamed for this drastic change, it seems that there is little disagreement and debate among the scholars and politicians.

Today, with literate publics living in 'wired nations' print and broadcast journalism change the terrorist's environment; terrorists still carry baggage, but their ideological efforts are perfunctory. Terrorism is obviously 'justified' by its magnified effects. The media are the magnifiers.⁴

This poses a dilemma for western democracies who are con-

fronted with one of the holiest and most revered principles of liberal democracy, namely the preservation of freedom of speech, freedom of information, and ultimately, freedom of the press.

While for many journalists the idea of the role of the press is that of an adversary of the government and the bureaucracy in order to protect the public, governments are divided in their interpretation of this principle. Debate on the extent of the public's right to know and the extent of the public's need to know, with regard to terrorism and terrorist incidents are at the centre of this dilemma.

What measures should be taken in order to minimize the effects of the media in promoting the terrorist's cause have sharply divided both academia and politicians. While one extreme argues for the adoption of strict censorship laws and legal action by the state against reporters, editors and owners, the other extreme suggests ignoring and downplaying the importance of the media in this process. To us, however, it appears that much of the success of a government in battling and winning against terrorism depends on the way this delicate matter (media) is handled. Furthermore, the policies adopted to deal with the media can be seen as a true reflection of the importance placed on the libertarian principle of press freedom in a country and can indirectly help to determine the type of régime there.

In light of this, none of the above-mentioned (extreme) approaches is favoured here. What we suggest is that there must be

an acknowledgement of the importance of the role of the mass media and its ultimate responsibility to keep the public informed and occasionally criticize the government, even when we are confronted with problems of terrorism. Therefore, control over the mass media should not be done through state action but rather through encouragement of self-discipline and self-control within the media itself.

Michael Elkins further supports this approach:

I am not for the application of censorship to the media. I am not for legislation or legal constraints to impose responsibility upon the media in this field. What I am arguing for is a sustained and careful effort by the media to establish guidelines in the media-coverage of terrorist organizations and activities. I acknowledge that self-censorship is a hazardous enterprise and must be carefully explored; but it is surely better than government bans. And I would point out that self-censorship - 'self-discipline' or 'editorial judgement' - is in fact exercised in all media every day.⁵

Adoption of either one of the two extremes mentioned earlier could be disastrous to democratic life and may, in the final analysis, lead to either one of two conditions: "Total freedom which is anarchy, or total order which is tyranny."⁶

A second area of major concern on the domestic front, which indirectly related to the first (media) is the maintenance of social order and civil liberties within a democratic society while at the same time attempting to eliminate the chances of terrorists gaining support and sympathy from the general public. In doing so, the civil authorities are expected to, "never lose control nor be perceived by the public to have lost control of the situation".⁷

The protection and preservation of civil rights are perceived

as highly crucial principles, since they embody both the extent (degree) to which there is democratic life in a society, and the legitimacy of the régime. These principles are also important because invasion of them, may produce one of the major objectives of the terrorist's cause. In other words, it is the responsibility of the civil and military authorities to maintain this fragile balance of values and avoid potential conflicts in an area as delicate as such to help minimize the possibility of abuse by those who overreact to a terrorist threat. "Certain standards and goals dealing with these issues must be devised with the greatest care; they should include appropriate checks and balances of an institutional nature...through the contraction of a sound, consistent plan of action, reduces the risk of falling into this terrorist trap."⁸

A President's Commission on the activities of the CIA within the United States summed up the relationship between the terms "private safety" (security) and "individual liberties", in the following way. "In the final analysis, public safety and individual liberties sustain each other."⁹

Clearly, in battling clandestine (underground) terrorist activities, the need for some sort of intelligence capability is obvious. Effective, preventive measures against terrorism depend to a large extent, however, on the efficiency of the intelligence operations of law enforcement authorities. In certain democratic countries in the past, for example, (Uruguay and Canada) terrorist activities reached such dangerous levels that there was a serious

threat to the functioning of the community, with conventional measures and forces no longer able to guarantee the safety of the public. In extreme situations as such, there seems to be enough public support for the deployment of what is labelled "emergency legislation" to cope with the crisis. Once these emergency conditions have been reaffirmed, "emergency powers given law enforcement authorities should be defined precisely and limited in scope to those absolutely necessary to meet the situation to which they are addressed. Emergency legislation should be enacted so as to be in force for a limited time only and should be subject to full review before extension."¹⁰

Canada as a whole, and the Province of Quebec in particular, exercised such an emergency policy in 1970. Their experience can serve as an example to other nations and highlights the success of such a policy.

In light of the Montreal Police Director's report that extra powers and the aid of senior government were required to deal with 'an extremely dangerous and subversive movement', (FLQ) aimed at the overthrow of government through sedition and armed insurrection: The Quebec government called in troops of the Canadian Army under the civil power clause of the National Defence Act.¹¹

Obviously, Montreal's Chief of Police established a strong and convincing case for the need of "extra powers", in light of the growing dangers that the FLQ posed to the citizens of Quebec. Furthermore, the invitation of these "extra forces" was done in accordance with the rules of the Canadian Federal Constitution (the British North America Act), whereby the provincial (Quebec) govern-

ment extended its request to the Federal government in Ottawa, prior to the entrance of any troops (RCMP and Army) within the boundaries of the Province.

It would be a gross generalization, however, if we were to conclude that there was unanimous support for these acts, or that all the measures taken were necessary and the result of well thought-out and carefully defined policies. Hence, one should not underestimate the danger imposed by the FLQ in Quebec, nor should one ignore the following statement made by Prime Minister Trudeau on October 5, 1970.

It is a difficult decision when you have to weigh a man's life in the balance, but our commitment to society is greater than anything else. We cannot let a minority group impose its will on society by violence.¹²

Thus, while most Canadians would like to wipe out the memory of the "October Crisis", the policies connected with it almost immediately put an end to terrorism in Quebec. This result may, therefore, give support to the deployment of similar policies by other governments, once a strong case for its necessity has been established. In fact, most democratic countries, especially those who have experienced terrorist attacks, have seriously studied their own constitutional restraint, attempting to invent harsher laws and policies to deter terrorists. Examples of such deterrence measures include harsher prison sentences for terrorists, the licensing of fire-arms, stricter control over the obtaining of explosives, and better protection for those people and institutions that are most susceptible to terrorist attacks.

These policies, along with a self-disciplined media and the preservation of such important democratic principles as civil rights and liberties, together are expected to defeat terrorism and eliminate the chances of these groups obtaining power.

This assumption is based on the belief that,

Political terrorism is the spearhead of attack upon established political systems. It is directed at destroying political figures and institutions, weakening the confidence of the people in the political system, creating confusion and disorder and provoking massive repression that diminishes the fundamental freedom enjoyed by citizens.¹³

Unfortunately, not all terrorist movements are predictable and understandable to conventional (rational) minded politicians. Thus countries like West Germany and Japan can never be sure of the effectiveness of such policies in deterring terrorism, or stopping it from occurring altogether.

The most dangerous terrorists are those who have no allegiance to any realizable cause. These persons - whether seriously deranged or simply nihilistic - are very few in number but extremely hard to contain. No form of response to their actions is likely to have any deterrent values.¹⁴

However, with respect to the majority of terrorist cases, one may conclude that, "terrorism is a means to an end in itself... (and that) terrorism has objectives".¹⁵ As a result of this, therefore, it is possible to identify these objectives and defend against them.

So far in this conclusion our efforts have been directed at helping governments contain one certain (major) type of terrorism, that which the academia calls intranational (domestic) terrorism.

However, as a result of the findings of this paper, it is obvious that terrorist organizations do not live in vacuums but rather depend on both certain nation states and each other to survive.

This leads directly, therefore, to the problem of how democratic countries can effectively deal with and defend against an "international terrorist conspiracy".

Although Martha C. Hutchinson does not deny that there is validity to the notion of an international terrorist network helped and financed by sovereign nation states, she says, "there seems to be little danger of a global conspiracy of terrorist movements... (She does not say, however, that) the unpredictability of this type of violence and the danger of continued innovation in weapons, victims and occasions for attack mean that the threat of terrorism will always be present."¹⁶

While Hutchinson's argument may prove valid for this day and age, (ideological and regional splits hinder the development of a global conspiracy), it may be outdated in the long run. The rapid rise of international terrorism in the past twenty years and the speculation (sometimes correct) that this phenomenon is used as a tool by the superpowers to maintain global hostility (due to their nuclear stalemate and mutual deterrence), may give rise to fears that one day, perhaps in the near future, terrorism may evolve to an international conspiracy (threat) capable of overthrowing the present system as a whole.

In a world in which national boundaries are less and less important, not only thanks to a peaceful international

integration process but also because of more evident interference of certain countries in the affairs of other ones, the terrorist cannot and perhaps doesn't even want to distinguish direct and indirect enemies, and immediate and mediate objectives.¹⁷

It is also believed that (as a result of a great deal of empirical evidence) "the greater the breach between forces, the more unbalanced is their relationship and the more likely it is that one of the two sides then resorts to terrorism".¹⁸

A very similar hypothesis to this was offered in the Status Field Theory, one of the most prominent and successful projects (the DON) in international relations. However, while in the Status Field Theory it was assumed that the greater the breach (distance) between two nations, the higher the risk of the outbreak of war, (the strong usually attacking the weak) it is believed here, with regard to international terrorism, that the use of terror by certain states is primarily due to, "the unlimited range of actions that can appear as an attempt at overthrowing the international system".¹⁹

Surprisingly, it is no longer correct to assume that support for international terrorism is done solely by the super-powers. In today's world balance of terror, there is an increasing amount of evidence that states like Cuba, Libya and South Yemen have systematically become "first class" promoters of international terrorism. Thus, the practice of state-sponsored terrorism is universal and an attempt should be made by all democratic régimes to contain it.

The International Front

Many observers, politicians and media members in the West reluctantly admit that the response of the democracies to the threat posed by international terrorism has been hesitant and inadequate and "that the civilized world is learning - but it is learning too slowly".²⁰

The by-product of such a slow adjustment by Western countries has been that certain terrorist organizations have succeeded, in places like Italy and Latin America. Meanwhile, in other parts of the world, at least as of today, "it is now more of an embarrassment than a serious danger to their existence".²¹

While for the central authorities it may be perceived as an embarrassment, for the mass media and the opposition parties such ineptitude on the part of the government is often used as a crucial political tool in changing public opinions and attitudes.

In recent years, we have been confronted repeatedly with lines similar to those below.

Has not the time come to change our strategy? What I think the rest of the world is waiting for - indeed hoping for - is some positive sign that the civilized powers are going to uphold the standards of international behaviour set by their forbearers...All over our tormented planet, there are millions of decent, peaceable and intelligent men and women who are praying that the resources of civilization are not, indeed, exhausted - and that the Brezhnevs and Amins, the Qaddafis and the Maos, the Arafats and the O'Saidists will not be allowed to take over the earth.²²

Thus, the ultimate question is whether or not the Western governments have exhausted all their resources in dealing with ter-

rorist states and organizations as such? Our answer to a defeatist question like that is decisive, being that the Western democracies have yet to exhaust their resources and are certainly capable (militarily, economically, and politically) of dealing with and ultimately winning against the phenomenon of international terrorism.

This optimistic view was reinforced throughout the deliberations of the Jerusalem Conference on International Terrorism, which was held from July 2-5, 1979, and is reflected in the summary notes of Senator Henry Jackson, read at the closing session.

Many participants believe the time has come for the leading democratic nations to convene a conference of all states which respect the principle of democracy and the rule of law, with a view to formulating concrete measures against the terrorist forces and their backers.²³

Furthermore, "first and foremost, liberal democracies must acknowledge that international terrorism is a 'collective problem'. Everything else follows from this...We must be allied in our defense against terrorism."²⁴

From words of support (preaching), the members of the conference went on, adopting some basic policies that may make the cooperative efforts more effective. Therefore, in the following pages, each one of these policies will be presented and explained to the reader.

A - A unanimous condemnation of terrorism without qualification or reserve.

A policy as such has to be ratified and therefore practiced to its full extent and in the most rigorous manner by all democratic countries. The first step to take in this direction is to avoid the

ongoing semantic and ideological/political debates as to the interpretation of the terms "terrorist" and "freedom fighter". Once and for all, it should be acknowledged that such acts as blowing up buses containing non-combatants, the capture and slaughter of school-children, or the hijacking and holding hostage of innocent men, women and children are the common practices of terrorists and murderers alone, and not that of freedom fighters who oppose these methods bitterly. Therefore, "it is a disgrace that democracies would allow the treasured word "freedom" to be associated with the acts of the terrorists".²⁵

The second step necessary to be taken to implement this policy (A) is to expose and thus publically condemn the totalitarian and other radical régimes which have been associated with terrorist organizations. All democratic countries should, therefore, establish a united and common propaganda blitz in all international forums (the United Nations, for example) and through all available communication channels. "We must educate the world as to who opposes and who tolerates international terrorism."²⁶

Just such exposure has, over the last few years, met with success, whereby certain Eastern European countries have gradually decreased their support of terrorism, due partly to the embarrassment such support has caused and partly as a result of their aspirations of maintaining normal (mainly economic) relations with Western democracies.

B - Enforcement of an international convention against terrorism, for which the European Convention on Terrorism would serve as a working model and which would cover the definition of terrorism as an international crime, the denial of political status for criminals so defined, common procedures for extradition,

appropriate penalties and the exchange of evidence.

This second policy (B) is aimed at strengthening international law and order through reinventing and redefining some international convention dealing with global security and order, that most countries have ratified in the past.

The need for this stems from the fact that present acting conventions are limited in their scope and do not, therefore, deter terrorists. The lack of agreement and unanimity on the definitional aspects have been earlier demonstrated during the ill-fated deliberations of the U.N.

For example, the United Nations produced three conventions with regard to air piracy: the Tokyo Convention of 1963, the Hague Convention of 1970, and the Montreal Convention of 1971. These, along with the Bonn Anti-Hijacking Agreement initiated by the pilots and airlines (IATA members) can be used to illustrate the degree of failure in deterring terrorists.

Yet, despite these pessimistic indications, skyjacking has been declining steadily from the high point reached in the early 1970's. It would be comforting to think that the various practical, antiskyjacking measures have produced this effect, but a rather sober appraisal of the international scene suggests that the decline has occurred without them or even in spite of them.²⁷

Therefore, we must underline and emphasize those conditions and policies responsible for the decline in air-piracy so that they can be developed further and thus eliminate the phenomenon from occurring altogether.

Undoubtedly, the most significant method that has deterred

hijackers were those offensive military measures taken by countries like Israel and West Germany. These offensive measures went far beyond the conventional preventive ones of increasing security in air terminals and onboard planes. In fact, the rescue operations in Entebbe, Mugadishoo, (and even perhaps the recent American fiasco in Iran) have proved to terrorists and their supporting nations that the law can be enforced and terrorists can be reached even in remote geographical locations.

Finally, the acceptance of a world-wide policy of extradition with the denial of any political status for terrorists immediately after the execution of their crimes would eliminate the chance of terrorists in blackmailing democratic governments for the release of their comrades in jail.

Therefore, in addition to the establishment of new and redefined international conventions, effective deterrence against terrorists will only come about through multi-lateral treaties (among the law-preserving states) and the exchange of ideas about military/strategic plans.

C - A complementary agreement to take concentrated measures, including diplomatic, economic, and other sanctions, against states which aid terrorists by supplying them with money and arms, according them facilities for training and propaganda, and granting them refuge.

It is obvious that this third policy (C) is directed primarily against sponsors (both major and minor) of terrorism, those states Robert Moss has labelled as the "terrorist states".

It was believed by the members of the Jerusalem Conference

on International Terrorism, and strongly supported by our findings, "that no terrorist organization is self-sufficient and the effectiveness of terrorists and their staying power are directly proportional to the outside help they receive."²⁸ In simple, metaphoric terms, it is assumed, therefore, that by aiming the attack (of the democracies) toward the head of the snake (terrorist states), they may be able eventually to kill the snake (the international network of terrorist organizations). This policy (C), suggested by the members of the Jerusalem Conference, is very similar in its nature to what became known as the "Kissinger Plan" in the early 1970's.

According to the "Kissinger Plan", there is a need for a linkage set of policies, whereby the Western democracies must dictate certain conditions and stipulations in their future interactions with suspect terrorist states.

- 4 For instance, is it moral to trade openly and freely with states who use the profits from such trade to finance the murder of innocents? Why should those who conduct remote control warfare against us rest easy that we will contribute to financing our own destruction?²⁹

Senator Henry Jackson points out that democratic countries can do more than simply practice economic (commercial) retaliation against these sponsor states.

There is no reason why the democratic countries should, in the future, grant representatives of terrorist states the same status and rights of immunity given to normal diplomatic corps. In dealing with "diplomats" from countries like Libya, Cuba, South Yemen and the Soviet Union, there has been enough evidence to indi-

cate that they are actively involved with terrorist and subversive elements and as a result of this should have their immunities removed and they should be declared persona non grata. This latter accusation has been supported beyond any doubt in our discussion of the role of the terrorist states vis-a-vis their methods of support to the network of international terrorism.

Furthermore, the democratic countries have even reached the stage where they have to borrow some ideas and policies from the terrorists themselves, whereby, by employing certain military reprisals, they may finally terrorize those who advocate terrorism, forcing them to recalculate the cost-benefits of supporting terrorism.

Finally, with regard to the "linkage policy" concept, it would be a severe mistake for Western democracies (particularly those with nuclear capability) to allow terrorist states like the Soviet Union to reach disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation treaties, providing them with guarantees and a sense of security while they continue to challenge our existence through the services of international terrorism. Throughout Chapter III we have seen both the sensitivity and the vulnerability of the Soviet Union to acts of aggression either internally or from abroad. Therefore, any further treaty signings (SALT and Helsinki, for example) should be subject to review and should be conditional upon the future behaviour of the countries involved, vis-a-vis terrorism.

D - Agreement to take all necessary, proper and legal measures for the effective exchange of information on terrorist activities.

This element of effective police and intelligence cooperation has disturbingly been missing from the strategy of democratic countries in combatting terrorism. The blame for this, however, should be shared among the law-enforcing agencies (police and army), their High Command, and the politicians who so far have been unable to bring it about.

The following paragraphs will attempt to provide support for this argument.

On the one hand,

Law enforcement officials (from the West) share a lively sense of the political variability of government attitudes towards anti-terrorist enforcement efforts. They assert that governments assume different attitudes toward different situations and even vary from time to time in their attitudes in similar situations.³⁰

On the other hand,

Although the use of some intelligence-gathering techniques, such as electronic surveillance, has been closely circumscribed by statute, legislative limitations on police intelligence operations generally are minimal as of today.³¹

Regardless of who is right or wrong in this argument, it is quite clear that the present state of affairs of these institutions and their general level of operation, gives the impression of overall disorganization and lack of coordination and support among the different branches. Furthermore, due to the high degree of sensitivity given these intelligence-gathering procedures in democratic régimes (often challenging basic humanitarian principles), it is appropriate to expect that the Chief of Police and no one else should have the responsibility for making and monitoring policies designed

to prevent excesses.

Once these organizational disorders are resolved and the distribution of responsibilities has occurred, it should be understood that no matter how effective one's intelligence system is, in dealing with such a complex phenomenon as the network of international terrorism, the accumulation of information and data (even the most dubious kind) is the most effective way to combat terrorism. In other words, the time has come to establish a world-wide data (intelligence) bank from which every country can withdraw relevant information for its needs in combatting terrorism, and has a duty to deposit any information it possesses that may be useful to others.

E - A final policy, which was not covered by the Jerusalem Conference but is believed to be highly significant, is the question as to whether or not a democratic régime should negotiate with terrorists in incidents where some of their citizens lives are at stake.

Almost every Western democracy has, in the the past, had to confront such a debate, but while for many years Israel was the exception to this rule (hardline, no negotiations with terrorists from 1968 on), the others have first tried to exhaust all possible options - including negotiations, payment of ransom, and the release of terrorists from jail - and only then, as a last resort, have they opted for the use of military means.

Senator Henry Jackson acknowledged Israel's pioneering inventions in the following way: "In providing her own courageous

defense against terrorism, Israel has inspired those who love freedom around the world."³²

Such a harsh policy, although occasionally resulting in tragic ends (Munich, Kiriath Shmone, and Maalot) and which can therefore never guarantee similar results to those achieved at Entebbe, still has provided Israel with two major victories in its war against terrorism.

1 - By not giving in to terrorists' demands, embarrassment of the government is avoided and despite the tragic outcome of certain incidents, both the morale of the public and support of the government and army remain firm and sometimes may even increase.

2 - Because Israel would not negotiate, terrorists were given no chance to obtain their demands and create favourable publicity through blackmail, and above all, were unable to stir up public sympathy to their cause in other parts of the world.

Recently, other countries have joined Israel in refusing to negotiate with terrorists. West Germany (Magadishoo), Holland (1977), Britain (Iranian embassy takeover in 1980), and, to a certain extent, the United States (Iran, 1980), provide us with some optimism that the democracies, now more than before, are willing to sacrifice, even if the most important thing in their societies - human life - is at stake, to combat terrorism.

Another optimistic sign came from the newly elected President of the United States and his administration, who wasted no time in revealing their attitudes to the problems posed by terrorism. The

American administration under Ronald Reagan, which represents the strongest force among the democratic nations, has officially warned states that are either practicing or associating themselves with terrorism, of future reprisals by the Americans and their allies.

Soviet action would figure importantly in the new administration's 'counter-terrorism' policy...This administration very clearly is going to take into consideration the entire gamut of Soviet behaviour and we are not going to have selective détente.³³

From our final analysis (conclusion) it can be said that the Western democracies have yet to exhaust all their economic, political, and military capabilities on both the domestic and the international fronts, in combatting terrorism. Therefore, support of a defeatist attitude regarding the balance of power between the free societies and terrorist organizations and supporting states appears inadequate and premature, and is exactly what the enemies of democracy are encouraging us to adopt.

Finally, our purpose shall have been most rewardingly served if some state, somewhere, sometime, learns something from this research, or even if some more able researcher should prove our hypotheses and assumptions wrong, for this too would be a contribution to understanding.

FOOTNOTES

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CHAPTER ONE

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APPENDIX

The purpose of this appendix is to provide the reader with some further documentation and bibliographical support to some of the main, and possibly controversial, arguments presented earlier in this thesis.

Most of the documents which will be presented in the following pages were obtained from the Centre for Conflict Studies at the University of New Brunswick. Therefore, acknowledgement is due to Dr. Maurice Tugwell and David Charters from the Centre, as well as to Dr. Henry Llambias of the Department of Political Science who generously assisted in this process.

The Linkage Theory Among the Network of
International Terrorist Organizations

From: Terrorism: Tracing the International Network. By Claire Sterling.
New York Times Magazine, March 1, 1981.

The network, as described by dozens of captured terrorists and volumes of courtroom testimony, consists of a multitude of disparate terrorist groups, helping out one another and receiving indispensable aid from not altogether disinterested outsiders. A few years ago, the C.I.A. reported that more than 140 such terrorist bands from 50-odd countries on four continents were linked in one way or another.

The roots of the terrorist network can be traced directly to the Tricontinental Congress held in Havana in January 1966. More than 500 delegates passed resolutions emphasizing the need for close collaboration between "socialist countries", ie. the Soviet Union and its satellites, and "national liberation movements". The revolutionary decade of the 1960's had been focused in Latin America as Fidel Castro preached his gospel of spontaneous, popular revolution. But that vision had faded as the Soviet presence in Cuba increased, and now the fulcrum of revolution had moved to the Middle East.

The Palestinians who, we have argued, have had a major role in this network, had their own camps for foreigners. Starting in Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan, they spread over the decade to South Yemen and then down into Moscow's new African client states, Angola and Mozambique. The Palestinians also set up such camps in Algeria

and in Libya, with the help of Libyan money and literally billions of dollars worth of Soviet armament. Cubans taught in most of these camps, East Germans in many, North Koreans in some. It was in South Yemen, however, by then a Soviet satellite state tightly controlled by the K.G.B., that a kind of postgraduate school in international terrorism emerged. The list of foreign guests in the camps around Aden included members of West Germany's Baader-Meinhoff Gang, Italy's Red Brigades, the Basque E.T.A., the Provisional I.R.A., the Japanese Red Army, the Tupomaros of Uruguay, and the Turkish and Iranian undergrounds. For most of them, the hosts were George Habash and his military commander, Wadia Haddad, of the Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (P.F.L.P.).

(In Italy, for example) Fioroni was the first important member of the underground to talk publicly about its connections with the I.R.A. and the German and Basque terrorists. Patrizio Peci, a former member of the Red Brigade's High Strategic Command, then confirmed that this training of cadres had continued throughout the 1970's (abroad). Peci added, "All the arms reaching the Italians, of whatever make or provenance save those taken from policemen and Carabinieri, were coming from a single distribution centre stocked by Palestinian formations." Consignments picked up off the Lebanese coast and off-loaded in Venice, he said, had been divided among Italians, Germans, I.R.A. Provisionals, and Spanish Basques.

(As to the present state of affairs) For all the value of

government crackdowns and educational programs, these terrorists have noticeably improved their self-protective apparatus and tactics. Smaller bands are emerging, less vulnerable to infiltration, less susceptible to public pressure, and armed with the latest technological weapons of destruction.

The Question of Soviet Control Over the Network, and
the Condemnation of Certain Types of Methods.

A: The fact that the Soviet Union, its satellites, or its surrogates provide support for a terrorist group does not necessarily mean that the Soviets control the group or that the group itself is pro-Soviet. Soviet support for terrorism, especially on the large and widespread scale that has developed in the last decade, does indicate (a) that this support is not merely occasional or informal but is approved and endorsed at the highest levels of the Soviet government, and (b) that the Soviets appear to place a high value on terrorism as an instrument of their policy and strategy.

In this connection, it is useful to inquire to what extent the Soviets actually control terrorist groups and to what degree they are able to initiate or retard the operations of these groups. There can be no precise or final answer to these questions at the present time because both terrorist groups and their relations with the Soviets are underground and clandestine or, in addition, the links are often indirect, through surrogates or satellites. A complete answer may exist in the files of a number of Western intelligence services but, if so, it is not presently available to the public.

On an informal level, the problem is much more obscure. Many important terrorist and guerrilla groups are so dependent on Soviet-provided training, weaponry, and operational and propaganda support that it is difficult to see how they could operate independently of, or in opposition to, the Soviets. Neither Yasser Arafat nor Joshua Nkomo is a Communist, but the organizations of both men might well

have ceased to be effective had they not been the recipients of massive amounts of aid from the Soviet Union. The C.I.A. estimates that the Soviet Union today spends \$200 million per year in support of national liberation fronts. It was Soviet pressure on Arafat that induced him to adopt his present "gradualist" tactic, a tactic that led to a serious split within the PLO and ultimately to a bloody internecine war among its components and rival groups in the first half of 1978. Neither Arafat nor Nkomo would probably acknowledge Soviet control in any formal sense (though both have acknowledged their indebtedness to the Soviets on many occasions), but it is virtually inconceivable that either of them could direct their organizations in courses contrary to those described by the Soviets as long as their dependence on Soviet support continues.

The small terrorist cadres that have existed in Western Europe for the last ten years are not under formal Soviet control either, and their ideologies are often at odds with Soviet orthodoxy. Yet, as we have seen, there is considerable evidence to indicate many clandestine links between these terrorists and the Soviet, East German, Czechoslovak or Cuban intelligence services as well as with Libyan and Middle Eastern surrogates.

The conclusion must be therefore that of Dr. Ray S. Cline of the Georgetown Centre for Strategic and International Studies, formerly Deputy Director of the C.I.A.

It's important to realize that when you say the Soviet Union supports terrorism, you do not mean that they direct and command each terrorist activity. That would be impossible and not very useful. What they do is supply the in-

frastructure of terror: the money, the guns, the training, the background information, the communications, the propaganda that will inspire individual terrorist groups.

(V.S.Pisano, "The Red Brigades: A Challenge to Italian Democracy", Conflict Studies, No.120, 1980, p.15.)

B: Soviets Ambivalent About Terrorism. By Bertil Haggman.
TVI - Terrorism Violence Insurgency, Journal, Vol.I, No.7.

There is a reason for the seeming contradiction: the Soviet Union has an equal and offsetting interest in stirring the pot and cooking up a stew of terrorism for the West.

A look at the public, official reactions to the number of terrorist outrages shows a general trend toward criticism, however mild, of the concept of terrorism. But in counterpoint, there has been outright support of some terrorists.

In an obvious attempt to compete with the then-militant Chinese revolutionary credo, the Soviets decided, in 1969, to get involved with Palestinian terrorist organizations. In February of 1969, Pravda supported a Palestinian terrorist attack at the Zurich airport in which four Arab terrorists, armed with automatic weapons, attacked an El-Al 720 just prior to takeoff. Three passengers and three crewmen were injured. As described by Pravda, the attack was "carried out by patriots defending their legal right to return to their homeland". But the Soviets were aware of world opinion, and perhaps the vulnerability of their own air fleet. When international opinion turned against the Palestinians for the seizure of planes and people in the early 1970's, the official Soviet attitude also

changed. Hijackings were no longer termed "patriotic acts". They became "regrettable incidents", and the Soviet Union supported the November 1970 United Nations General Assembly resolution calling for punishment of hijackers as criminals.

If the shifts in the party line were subtle, they were nonetheless real. In a lengthy article describing the growth of the Palestinian insurgency, Pravda labeled aircraft hijackings "acts of desperation"; bombings of non-military targets were said to do "serious damage to the entire Palestinian Resistance Movement and made its support by progressive and democratic forces more difficult." The Munich massacre of Israeli sportsmen was described - unlike the way it was labeled in the Western press - in modern terms as a "tragic incident".

The Soviet Union, from positions of principle, opposes acts of terrorism that disrupt the diplomatic activity of states and their representatives, transport communications between them, and the normal course of international contacts and meetings. (Andrei Gromyko, 1972).

The Soviet Union's official, public stand on terrorism is related mainly to Soviet anxiety over its interests abroad. There is some reason for such concern. Anti-Soviet activism and terrorism have flared. In the United States, for example, American Jewish militants have protested the mistreatment of Jews seeking to emigrate from the USSR. The Soviet embassy in Washington has been bombed, as have Aeroflot offices; performances of the Soviet dance troupe have been interrupted, and Amtorg Trading Corporation in New York has been attacked. In addition to the Jewish militants, the breakup of Yugoslavia and self-determination for the ethnic regions have been active against Soviet and Eastern European-

related targets in the U.S. And the United States is just one country.

It is impossible in so short a space to catalog the incidents around the world. The Soviets have just cause to be concerned.

As to the question of how to combat terrorism in the Western world, one may use the American proposals of 1977 as a formula.

PRESS GUIDANCE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OCTOBER 18, 1977

US POLICY ON COMBATTING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Our policy on hijacking, and on all other forms of terrorism, remains as it has been frequently stated in the past. Let me summarize the main elements for you:

- (1) We condemn all terrorist actions as criminal and intolerable, whatever their motivation.
- (2) We take all lawful measures to prevent such acts and to bring to justice those who commit them.
- (3) We make no concessions to terrorist blackmail because to do so would merely invite further demands.
- (4) We look to the host government, when Americans are abducted overseas, to exercise its responsibility under international law to protect all persons within its territories, including the safe release of hostages.
- (5) We maintain close and continuous contact with the host government during an incident, supporting it with all practicable intelligence and technical services, but we offer no advice on how to respond to specific terrorist demands.
- (6) We understand the extreme difficulty of the decisions governments are often called upon to make, for example, how as a practical operational matter, to reconcile the objectives of saving the lives of the hostages and making sure that the terrorists can gain no benefit from their lawless actions.
- (7) International cooperation to combat terrorism remains essential, since all governments, regardless of structure or philosophy, are vulnerable; and we intend to pursue all avenues to strengthen such cooperation.

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