Neoliberal Modernity Crisis in Latin America at the Twenty-First Century: Social Cleavages, National Challenges and Hemispheric Revisionism

by

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Gustavo Adolfo Morales Vega
To my wife Catalina and our son Gabriel
who often remind me that
our representations of the world are also tied
to deep feelings and emotions.
Abstract

This dissertation is concerned with the way the crisis of the neoliberal modernity project applied in Latin America during the 80s and 90s affected the political order of the hemisphere at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

This work’s main argument is that the responses to the social cleavages produced by the global hegemonic pretension of neoliberalism have, on one hand, produced governments in the region driven internally by different and opposed places of enunciation, practices, ideas, and rationalities. On the other hand, these responses have generated locked international communities in the continent between “blocs” moved by different collective meanings. What Latin America is currently living through is not a process of transition resulting from the accomplishment of a new hemispheric consensus but a moment of uncertainty, a consequence of the profound crisis of legitimacy left by the increased weakness of neoliberal collective meanings. It is precisely the dispute about the “correct” collective judgement to organize the American space that moves the international stage in an apparently contradictory dynamic of regional integration and confrontation. In general terms, it is a wide-ranging dispute, not limited exclusively to the political, economic or social sphere. It is an all-encompassing one embedded in the problem of modernity, and as such, related with conflicting worldviews.

The first chapter explores the course that the neoliberal project took in the region; its origins, development and crisis. The second chapter is a cross-national analysis of the
emerging projects in Latin America. The purpose is to determine the collective meanings
behind new national projects such as postcolonial indigeneity, confrontational populism,
defective neoliberalism and social liberalism. The next chapter is a genealogy that
introduces the changes that the new practices and agents emerging in the continent are
producing on the international stage. The aim is to grasp the singularity of the
contemporary juncture in the light of its continuities and ruptures with the past. The final
chapter is a cross-international analysis that holds that with the crisis of neoliberalism, the
Americas seem to be fragmented in different rival projects competing between each
other.
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List of Abbreviations

ALBA - Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America

ANIF - National Association of Financial Institutions

ASP – Assembly of the Sovereignty of Peoples

CELAC - Community of Latin American and Caribbean States

CAN - Andean Community of Nations

CDS – South American Defence Council

CMS - Coordination of Social Movements

COB - Workers Central of Bolivia

CSUTCB - Labor Confederation of Rural Workers of Bolivia

CONAIE - Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador

DANE – National Administrative Department of Statistics

ECLAC - The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean

E.U - European Union

FTA - Free Trade Agreements

FTAA - Free Trade Area of the Americas

IADB – Inter-American Development Bank
IMF - International Monetary Fund

INE – National Institution of Statistics

INEGI – National Institution of Statistics and Geography

IR – International Relations

LAFTA - Latin American Free Trade Association

LAIA - Latin American Integration Association

MAS - Movement for Socialism–Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the Peoples

MERCOSUR - Southern Common Market

NAFTA - North American Free Trade Agreement

OAS - Organization of American States

OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

UNASUR - Union of South American Nations

US - United States of America

WB – World Bank

WTO - World Trade Organization
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Introduction: Neoliberal Modernity Crisis in Latin America at the Twenty First Century: Social Cleavages, National Challenges and Hemispheric Revisionism

The central debates in Latin America in the twenty-first century have changed markedly since the 1990s. Twenty years ago, the continent’s central questions largely concerned technical or administrative nuances. Today, these debates revolve around differentiated worldviews. In politics, the discussion then was about whether or not an electoral threshold of 3 or 4 per cent was the most convenient to strengthen a representative electoral and party system. What is at stake now is the system of representative democracy and the notion of democracy itself. In economics, debates on the extent, depth and speed of fiscal, privatization, and liberalization reforms have given way to questions on the viability of the neoliberal economy as a whole. Likewise, in culture, debates on the rights of indigenous peoples have moved beyond minimal packages of rights and equality of opportunities. Today, the debate is on the very notion of the system of neoliberal multiculturalism that denies equality between nations and civilizations.

In contemporary Latin America, a great disenchantment with the neoliberal modernity project coexists with different emergent forms of understanding and acting in the world. This disenchantment is reflected in the powerful social movements that have taken to the
streets. It is manifested in the governments of different ideological stripes that promise revolution, reform or restoration. It is seen, moreover, in the profound changes in inter-American relations, where an explosion of new regional initiatives is emerging.

The new ideas, rationalities, and places from where the world is perceived differentially in the continent cut across politics, economics, and culture as spheres of social life. There is an endless debate about the kind of change that the continent is undergoing: What forms of government are emerging in the region? Is there a new model of development? Are the regional initiatives of integration like UNASUR, ALBA, and CELAC a sign of the reversion of US hegemony? However, much of this debate is issue-specific, and has often strayed into bitter ideological discussions.

This dissertation aims to provide a wide-ranging and nuanced analysis of the current complexity of the global Latin America – What practices and rationality have been driven by neoliberalism? How are they expressed in politics, economics and culture? Which were the shortcomings that hastened the crisis of neoliberal modernity? What are the emerging projects at both the national and international levels? What are their singularities with regard to the previous projects? What kind of challenge do they pose to neoliberalism?

The wide-ranging analysis of this dissertation is executed through the introduction of modernity as a heuristic tool in order to understand the place of enunciation, ideas, rationalities and practices contained in the different projects at stake in the national and continental levels, which are transversal to the political, economic, and social spheres. By examining contemporary Latin America through the problem of modernity, it is possible
to go beyond the issue-specific debate, and to offer instead a holistic view that clarifies and makes sense of the main trends that are present in the continent, which in turn are expressed in different spheres and levels.

This nuanced analysis is performed by introducing a variation-finding comparison (Tilly: 1984) that focuses on the multiple goals and different aspects of a phenomenon. This comparative approach opens up room for multiple variations in the paths and aims towards modernity in the region, and it also seeks to explain the variations among cases. At the national level, this comparison allows for a taxonomy that takes into account the multiple forms adopted by groups of countries with respect to neoliberal modernity. At the international level, it allows us to go beyond the typical IR “case study” that, in claiming that the international sphere is just one, has made the variation and coexistence of different international cultures in the Americas impossible to analyze. By approaching contemporary Latin America through a variation-finding comparison, it is possible to break the predominant universalistic view that considers that every instance of a phenomenon follows essentially the same rule (Tilly: 1984). Such a teleological perspective trumpets the “turn to the left” in the region at the national level (see, e.g. Rodríguez Garavito et al, 2004; Sader, 2011; Cameron & Hershberg, 2010), and it describes a continent in an avoidable transition towards a “post neoliberal order” at the international level (see, e.g., Bautista, 2013, 2014; Rojas and Morales, 2014; Kellogg, 2007; Russell and Tokatlian, 2011; Vigevani and Ramanzini, 2009; Hirst, 2006; Schenoni, 2014; Peña, 2009).
At its heart, this dissertation is concerned with the way in which the crisis of the neoliberal modernity project applied in Latin America during the 80s and 90s affected the political order of the hemisphere at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

This work’s main argument is that the responses to the social cleavages produced by the global hegemonic pretension of neoliberalism have produced governments in the region that are driven internally by different and opposed places of enunciation, practices, ideas, and rationalities. These responses have also allowed the creation of locked international communities in the continent between “blocs” moved by different collective meanings. Latin America is not experiencing a process of transition as a result of the accomplishment of a new hemispheric consensus—as most of the works on the region explicitly or tacitly support. Latin America is experiencing a process of uncertainty as a consequence of the profound crisis of legitimacy left by the increased weakness of neoliberal collective meanings. The dispute about the “correct” collective judgement to organize the American space is what moves the international stage in an apparently contradictory dynamic of regional integration and confrontation. In general terms, it is a wide-ranging dispute, not limited exclusively to the political, economic or social sphere, but rather, it is an all-encompassing dispute embedded in the modernity problem, and as such, related to conflicting worldviews.

My work takes issue from the new but widely extended “turn to the left approach” that seeks to grasp the conflicting worldviews and the changes experienced in the continent by way of an analysis of the Latin American ideological spectrum (see, e.g., Sader, 2011; Rodriguez and Barrett, 2005; Cameron and Hershberg, 2010). This set of works divides the region into two rival ideological fields, left and right. Conceived by committed
intellectuals, this approach has gained paramount visibility due to the chain of electoral successes of left wing candidates and parties, especially since 2005. Underpinned by a teleological view that finds the telos in the final triumph of the left - which gives a unified meaning of history- the turn to the left approach reads Latin American politics within a conceptual hierarchical structure in which the left and its attributes are privileged, while those of the right are disqualified. The main limitation of this approach to understanding the conflicting worldviews of the continent is its propensity to offer a generic characterization of the left wing as a group of forces strategically opposed to the right, and to neoliberalism. In its desire to construct the “common front” required for an ideological confrontation, the vague label of “left wing” obscures the comprehension of different ideas, rationalities, and practices amongst countries that seek an alternative to neoliberal modernity, but not necessarily all in the same way. Thus, the main limitation of the “turn to the left” academic literature is its failure to grasp the different worldviews in the region as related to the reductionist perspective that results from its strategic imperatives, and its elusive generic characterization of the left and right which lacks empirical evidence.

In order to overcome the “strategic reductionism” that leads to present a binary world, this dissertation embraces the notion of modernity. Specifically, what I develop is a middle ground perspective between two very different –and openly opposed- approaches to modernity in order to understand the conflicting worldviews that are currently shaping Latin America.

The first approach, identified by Quijano (2007) as “modernity/rationality”, is supported by academics who adhere to the modern project and who also present themselves as
neutral in ideological terms arguing that there is continuity between the modernity from the West and the modernity from Latin America (see, e.g., Whitehead, 2002; Eisenstand, 2002; Carmagnani, 2011; Leiva, 2008). By and large, this approach sees modernity as a historical process of disenchantment and rationalization of the world, in Weber’s words. This perspective presents rationality as the core of modernity. The question of modernity in Latin America is then how to bring about and consolidate a social order based on a formal rationality, and thus, to assure the continuity between the modernity from the West, and Latin America as the “Other West.” The “modernity/rationality” analysis revolves around a “historical subject that embodies [the rational project of modernity] in a practical manner, and a critical view of some misconceptions, or ideologies that must be fought” (Larrain, 1996:43).

The second approach, which Quijano (2007) calls “modernity/coloniality”, is supported by scholars who are critical of modernity and who, particularly from the post-colonial school, stress the project of domination behind the discourse of modernity, and emphasize the rupture between the project of western colonial modernity and the subaltern groups in the region. They call into question that universal history, which on behalf of reason, presents the West as the pattern and future for other societies while it disqualifies non-western societies as non-rational, rooted in tradition, and as such condemned to be silenced, to live in the past, and to inhabit the periphery (see, e.g., Quijano, 2007; Mitchell, 2000; Dussel, 2005; Rojas, 2002, 2009; Mignolo, 2011; Escobar, 2008, 2010). For this critical approach, modernity, rather than a rational problem is primarily a place of enunciation, not about what is said but about the privileged place from where it is said. In this sense, the debate shifts from rationality as a
unit of analysis to the examination of its margins. Variables such as time and space, that had been taken without question and which had been naturalized by modernity/rationality, emerge as the distinctive features that characterize modernity, while the old problem of rationality is now hidden.

This dissertation begins by establishing a middle ground between these perspectives, because in order to grasp the singularity of the different worldviews and projects that are at stake in contemporary Latin America, it tackles the problem of modernity from a double dimension: rationality (hidden by the modernity/coloniality approach) and the place of enunciation (which is overlooked by the modernity/rationality approach). In that sense, the emerging projects and worldviews are analysed from the ideas and internal logics that seek to legitimize them. At the same time, they are also analyzed from the context of meaning that defines their privileged and subordinate places of enunciation and limits their possibility of circulation. This work aims to go beyond the modernity/rationality approach by bringing to light the relations of power that condemn some discourses to be enunciated from the periphery only, while others have leeway to be enunciated from the center. In a region with a colonial past like Latin America, the discourses that have the privilege to be articulated from the core of the national political life are very often closely linked with the old West metropolises. This work also aspires to go beyond the modernity/coloniality approach by introducing a comparison that analyses the variations in the logic, ideas, and practices of the projects articulated from the periphery vis-à-vis those that are articulated from the center. It is a matter not only of rejecting neoliberalism due to its center-imperial condition, but of establishing a
discussion with neoliberal modernity about the kind of rationality proposed by the projects that emerge from the periphery — which aspire to be an alternative to it.

Modernity/rationality and modernity/coloniality are two very different approaches to the problem of modernity in Latin America. However, this does not exclude the possibility of bridging perspectives in order to find a third way that would contribute to interpreting and grasping the complexity of variations in worldviews that both approaches shed light on and obscure. This does not exclude the existence of a common ground in the current debate between both approaches that has to be expanded. In this way, for example, modernity/rationality, mainly in the case of the neoliberal perspective, and in the modernity/coloniality perspective, often conceive the international stage as a single world society or great society for all mankind. While neoliberalism is a project that proposes a world free market promoted by the privileged western centers, the modernity/coloniality project drives towards a post-colonial world for all mankind formulated by the people and the social movements of the periphery. Both, however, neglect the society of states as a catalyst and objective of those emergent worldviews that are present in the region at the international level. Neoliberalism sees the state as a mere instrumental means to accomplish the construction of a global market, whereas post-colonialism sees it as a colonial means that must be decolonized. Obscuring the role of the state in the construction of the worldviews that regulate the relations in the international stage is problematic, especially in a Latin America in which the state led the process of modernization during an extended period in the twentieth century. Any work that aims to offer a wide-ranging analysis of how the emergent views that are affecting the neoliberal order in the continent has to expand the debate from the world society — as
presented by neoliberalism and postcolonialism—in order to explore the tension between that world society and the society of states (see, e.g., Bull, 2002).

It is clear from a review of the academic works mentioned above, that the problem of how the conflicting worldviews and practices that have marked the political dynamics of the continent has not been fully elucidated yet. Hence, this study seeks to answer four sets of questions. The first set concerns the emergence and crisis of neoliberalism as a kind of governmental rationality and technology oriented to constitute subjectivities that are functional to it and to western modernity through the interpretation of practices such as free competition and conditionality: What are the ultimate values and rationality promoted by a practice like free competition? How are they expressed in the economic, political and cultural realms? What are their incoherencies and inconsistencies? How does the practice of conditionality work in neoliberalism? How is it related to the crisis of neoliberalism? What kind of social cleavages emerge after the crumbling of neoliberal collective meaning?

The second set of questions focuses on understanding the different trajectories followed by the countries within their domestic orders with the purpose of analysing the emerging collective meanings that explain these trajectories: What kinds of variations do the new governments present in their ultimate values, rationality, and place of enunciation vis-à-vis the project of neoliberal modernity? What are the predominant social cleavages and political issues that mark the trajectories of these new projects? How can the variation among the emergent projects be explained?
The third set aims to grasp the singularity of the tensions underlying the current hemispheric order produced by the competitive relations amongst the projects at stake in the region, in the light of their continuities and ruptures with the past: Which have been the predominant practices in each historical moment that underlie the changing tension between the single continental society and the society of states? How have those practices constituted different identities, interests, and legitimacy criteria at a continental scale?

The final set of questions is concerned with the polarization and integration that currently characterizes the hemisphere: How can the different “scenarios of understanding” from which the continental order is read and aspires to be reconstructed, reformed or defended be mapped? How do these different logics relate to the world society and the society of states? What are the predominant logics, ideas, and practices promoted by each scenario with the aim of comprehending the identities, principles of legitimacy and the kind of hemispheric order that they seek to construct? How do the scenarios boost the dynamics of integration and polarization?

In order to introduce the variation-finding comparison, this work is inspired by Lipset and Rokkan’s classical dichotomies (1967), produced by territorial and functional dimensions, which were laid out analytically in a 2x2 matrix. The aim of that analytical figure was to develop a cross-national perspective of the four main cleavages that explain the variations in the party system and voter alignments in the first part of the twentieth century. The functional dichotomy was expressed in terms of ideological oppositions and interest-specific oppositions. The territorial dichotomy was posed in terms of oppositions within national established elite and local-regional oppositions. For each quadrant, a cleavage was identified: in the quadrant consisting of oppositions within national
established elite and ideological oppositions, the cleavage was churches vs. governments. In the quadrant for local-regional oppositions and ideological oppositions, the cleavage was subject and dominant culture. In the quadrant made up by oppositions within national established elite and interest-specific oppositions, the contradiction was between workers and owners. Finally, in the quadrant for local-regional oppositions and interest-specific oppositions, the division was between the primary and secondary economy (see, figure 1).

Figure 1

This dissertation maintains Lipset and Rokkan’s aim of developing a cross-national perspective through an analysis of the variations of a phenomenon along four quadrants. It also focuses on cleavages as a point of departure to explain the variation in each quadrant. However, there are important differences with this 1967 seminal text.
First off, the dimensions for studying modernity in Latin America are different than those used to study voter alignments in western societies. Rather than functional and territorial dimensions, this dissertation recovers rationality and place of enunciation as the dimensions introduced by modernity/rationality and modernity/coloniality for the study of modernity in the region. Thus, the functional dimension is discarded, because this research is concerned with the kind of rationality that serves as a base for the emergent projects that aspire to be an alternative to the project of neoliberal modernity, rather than being concerned with the kind of possible opposition in a political arena. The question is to determine whether the emergent projects are constructed questioning the main ideas of the neoliberal project, because they consider that they are not appropriate (substantive rationality)-- or they are constructed questioning the neoliberal technical rationality because they think that it is not convenient (formal rationality) (see, e.g., March and Olsen, 1998; Hall & Taylor, 1996; Kalberg, 1980). The territorial dimension is also substituted by place of enunciation because the focus of this work is related not only with the site from where the projects are articulated –national established elite, local and regional opposition- but also with the privileged context of meaning that defines them as central or peripheral in terms of place of enunciation. In societies with a colonial past like those of Latin America, that privileged context of meaning is very often associated with projects linked to western society. This colonial aspect is not present in Lipset and Rokka’s territorial dimension.

Second, the levels of analysis for a study of modernity in a continent differ from those used to study party systems. Whereas the former includes the local, national, and international levels, the latter encompasses only the first two. If we understand modernity
not only as the material wealth it produces, but mainly as a new distribution of ideas and a process of rationalization that creates new ways of thinking and behaving in the world, it is clear that modernity encompasses the international stage as well. In fact, one of the cardinal points to understanding the differentiated worldviews at the hemispheric level today is associated with the struggle about whether or not Latin America should follow its integration into the global political economy in relation to western powers. In that sense, the current work goes beyond Lipset and Rokkan’s cross-national perspective, and it proposes a cross-international perspective through an analysis of the variations in the international worldviews along four quadrants. This cross-international perspective is not very common in IR as it calls into question the unnecessary shrinkage of the discipline’s ontological field that results of approaching the international stage as a “case study.” As Eckstein (1975) argues, “case studies” work with a range of research that deals with single individuals. Following the case studies perspective, IR transforms the international system in a “collective individual,” and thus, it denies everything outside of it. With any ontological status outside the international system denied, it is not possible (by subtraction of matter) to contrast the culture of the international system with other co-existing cultures. The theoretical consequence, then, is to open up room for a “universalizing theory” that considers that the international culture follows essentially the same rule. This research proposes to put aside the case study, and instead, introduce a cross-international comparative approach in order to broaden the ontological universe.²

Finally, whereas Lipset and Rokkan’s work aims to establish the territorial⁴ and functional⁵ dimensions as causes that explain variations in voter alignments, this dissertation aims to establish both causal and constitutive relations. The constitutive
relations are directed first at understanding the collective meaning and the sense given to the different worldviews that emerge in the region, and then the effects of the structure in the agent’s properties (identities and interests). In this sense, and according to Wendt’s (1999: 79, 25) explanation of causal theorizing, the rationality of the projects and their place of enunciation are not taken exclusively as causes of the agents’ practices. Thus, it is not only, for example, that market rationality and the center-oriented nature of neoliberalism reflecting western or core thinking brought with the introduction of the practices of free competition and conditionality in Latin America. Rationality and place of enunciation do not temporally precede the agents’ practices, and but for rationality and place of enunciation, the agents’ practices would not have occurred. In the constitutive argument (that is transversal in all the projects of my dissertation) rationality and place of enunciation are what they are in virtue of their relation with the agents’ practices. Then, for example, market rationality and the central-metropolitan nature of neoliberalism presuppose free competition and conditionality as practices, and as such there is no temporal disjuncture. The four are necessary rather than contingent to constitute a reality called neoliberal modernity (Wendt, 1999).

As a consequence, my approach distances itself from Lipset and Rokkan’s political sociology perspective, and it embraces a constructivist perspective that assumes that the relationship between ideas and agents’ practices is necessary rather than contingent. Without ideas, the agent cannot order and make sense to its practices, but without agents’ practices the structures behind ideas cannot exist (Wendt, 1999). Thus, rather than just affecting the agents’ behavior as in Lipset and Rokkan’s work, and following the neoliberal modernity example, this dissertation argues that market rationality and the
central-metropolitan logic affects agents’ practices but also their identity, shaping their interests as egoist individuals favouring free competition. Yet, at the same time, free competition and the interaction of egoist individuals (which direct their behavior according to the norms of external capitalist centers) are what validate market rationality and neoliberalism as a central-metropolitan project.

In general terms, it is possible to say that this work embraces the kind of “eclectic messy center” described by comparativists such as Peter Evans, Theda Skocpol and Atul Kohli (Kohli, et al, 1995). This work “draws on a mélange of theoretical traditions in hopes of gaining greater purchase on the cases [the work] cares about, […] and it sees particular cases as the building blocks for general theories” (Evans, 1995: 4.)

In this regard, my approach adopts a general constructivist framework but does not hesitate to bring in concepts of other ideational schools to identify what is interesting and significant about Latin America. For example, this work introduces a concept of neoliberal modernity based on a composite/blend of Weberian rationalities, post-colonial places of enunciation and Foucauldian governmental technology in order to describe and analyse the course of neoliberalism in the region. While in a first moment, the discussion of neoliberal market rationality and the practice of free competition allows us to grasp the “official” discourse through which neoliberalism searches to represent its own project of modernity, in a second moment the analysis of places of enunciation and the practice of conditionality as technology opens room to deconstruct and disclose the western project of domination behind neoliberalism. Following the governmentality approach, this work shows how the possibility for liberal forms of freedom such as free competition in societies and populations considered less “civilized” like the ones of Latin America
depends upon the exercise of discipline such as conditionality (Barry, Osborne, and Rose, 1996; Hindess, 2004). In this part of the work, the governmental analysis tackles the neoliberal discourse and technologies not as a neoliberal self-representation of modernity, “but rather as a system of meaning [and government] that constitutes institutions, practices and identities in contradictory and disjunctive ways” (Larner, 2000: 12).

Neoliberalism, with its boom and bust in Latin America, is too complicated to vindicate a single theory. However, Weberian, post-colonial and Foucauldian approaches—beyond their differences—share the basic constructivist assumption to tackle neoliberalism. That is, ideas, rather than material capabilities, shape the course of this project in the continent.

In the analysis of the international stage, following the same mélange of theoretical traditions, this work steps on a limited use of the English School in order to understand diachronically (Chapter 3) and synchronically (Chapter 4) the competitive relations between continental projects in the Americas. Keeping up with the emphasis of the non-deterministic nature of international anarchy proper to constructivism, Bull’s (2002) thesis of the tension between the society of states and the world society goes further than Wendt’s (1999) tacitly sequential relation between societies in the comprehension of those continental competitive relations. However, this work makes a limited use of the English School because it does not place the start of the contemporary hemispheric cultures in the shared Christian and Roman Empire legacies, but in the unsolved exclusions produced by the ambiguities of the relation between former colonies and the earlier empires. This historical ambiguity results from expelling the imperial administration but maintaining the exclusionary logic embedded on the western projects
embraced by the countries of the continent. In consequence, rather than adopting the normative approach of the English School that takes western society as a referent, this limited use of that approach problematizes the normative referents in the context of the Americas. What is more, this dissertation makes some points towards de-Europeanizing/decolonizing the concept of international society opposing the principle of legitimacy in Latin America (republicanism) to the one existing in Europe (dynastic) at the same period of the nineteenth century. It is also a limited use of the English School because there is no systematic analysis of the war, diplomacy, great power management, etc. as the fundamental institutions of international society.

Within this eclectic messy center, “neither theories nor cases are sacrosanct” (Evans, 1995: 4.) The interpretation of cases like Venezuela, Brazil, Bolivia or even the US, to cite some examples, are only relevant as far as they help to understand other cases in the region. In this sense, my work, like others with this orientation (Kohli, et al, 1995), “can be chastised for ‘trespassing’ on the historical case of other specialists in its searches for broader generalizations” (Evans, 1995: 4.)

This dissertation is based on the analysis of three different sources of information. The first source is comprised by official documents that include thirty government plans of eighteen Latin American countries6 from 2000 to 2014; twenty campaign programs of elected presidents of the region during the same period; the international strategic plans of two countries; six official declarations of international organizations; and thirty-nine US classified cables disclosed by Wikileaks. This huge volume of qualitative information was classified, sorted, and arranged through a software called Nvivo. The ideas, rationalities, places of enunciation and practices contained in those sources are studied
through the discursive institutionalism approach (Schmidt, 2008) that recognizes three analytic instances: the text, the agency, and the place of enunciation.

The analysis of the first instance —the text— refers to what is being said in those documents. Two ideas are especially important: the cognitive and the normative. While the former appeals to interests, the latter appeals to values (Schmidt, 2008). Those two kinds of ideas are key in identifying the type of rationality behind those official documents. Cognitive ideas are the base of formal rationalities, while normative ideas are the base of substantive rationalities. In that sense, the first step is to identify the kind of ideas embedded in the documents and relate them with the type of rationality (Schmidt, 2008).

The analysis of the second instance —agency— refers to who said what to whom in those official documents. The crucial point is to establish how the discourse defines the actors’ identities within it. In Larraín’s words (1996, p. 43), “all universalizing typical theories from the enlightened modernity share some basic criteria, such as an unlimited trust in instrumental reason, a historical subject that embodies progress in a practical way, and critical conceptions of some wrong ideas that need to be fought against”. In this instance, the aim is to identify who the privileged historical actor is in each project and who is the excluded (Schmidt, 2008.)

The analysis of the last instance refers to linking the two previous components of the discourse —text and agency— with the interactive practices attached and by which ideas are conveyed in order to establish the context of meaning of both discourses and
practices. This step leads to the analysis of where, when, and why (place of enunciation)—along with how (practices) the text was said (Schmidt, 2008.)

The second source of information is media reports (especially newspapers) from countries such as Colombia (El Espectador, Semana, La República, Caracol Radio), Ecuador (El Comercio), Venezuela (Telesur), Brazil (Folha de S.Paulo), and Spain (El País, TVE). The objective of this review was to construct chronologies that support the previous document analysis with the reconstruction of the different processes that have taken place in the region with the purpose of identifying events, critical junctures and to pinpoint some valuable statements of the protagonists that were missing in the official documents.

The last source is drawn from statistics, different indexes and quantitative data collected by international organizations (UN, IMF, WB, IADB, ECLAC), think tanks (Economic Freedom of the World), international NGOs (Human Rights Watch, the Carter Center), government agencies (DANE, Colombia; INEGI, Mexico; INE, Chile; US Department of State; US Energy Information and Administration), or provided by electoral databases (Electoral Geography 2.0, Political Database of the Americas), and surveys (Latinobarometro). The objective is to explore the constraining and enabling effects of materiality in the construction of social representation and worldviews. In that sense, this work adopts Wendt’s ‘rump materialism’ using statistics and quantitative data to “measure” the material world in order to establish the way it can affect social representations (Wendt, 2000: 166). Briefly, I apply an ideational approach with a “rump” material dimension.
This dissertation is organized into four chapters. The first chapter explores the course of neoliberalism in Latin America. In it, I claim that at the end of the twentieth century, Latin America found a macro-narrative in western neoliberalism that promised to achieve the elusive goal of modernity. Economic, political, and cultural modernization became the natural corollary of this path that searched for the transformation of the society as a whole. This chapter analyzes the course that the neoliberal project took in the region; its origins, development and crisis through two practices that, despite being contradictory, are inherent to the neoliberal project: free competition and conditionality. The first part explains the “official” version of neoliberal modernity in which free competition becomes the central practice of a society, arranged around individualism, and market rationality that promises material progress as its logical consequence. The second part explores the disruptive effects that conditionality as a “neoliberal non official practice” has for the neoliberal project itself, once free competition has proven its inability to create material wealth. The work is organized to understand the different cleavages and their variations across contemporary Latin America as a consequence of the crisis of neoliberal modernity.

The second chapter is a cross-national analysis of the emerging projects in Latin America in the early twenty-first century after the crisis of the neoliberal modernity project. The purpose is to determine the collective meanings behind these new national projects (postcolonial indigeneity, confrontational populism, defective neoliberalism, and social liberalism) that are building a new regional order. The chapter is organized in three sections. The first section engages critically with notions such as “turn to the left” and “post-neoliberalism.” The second section compares the projects of the new governments
vis-à-vis the project of neoliberal modernity of the previous decades. This implies categorizing and analyzing the variations of the new proposals with respect to neoliberalism, not only in their ultimate values and rationalities, but also from their places of enunciation. The third and final section draws a brief explanation about the causes behind the variations amongst the different projects. The chapter offers an original typology to understand globally the main changes that are taking place in the region in political, economic, and social fields.

The third chapter is a genealogy that introduces the changes that the emerging practices and agents in the continent are producing on the international stage. In one way or another, current inter-American relations seem to be shaped by the tight but conflictive bond that exists between what Bull (2002) called the *international society* and the *world society*. The former is materialized in the common ground of norms that regulate the relationships among the countries of the Americas as a society of states, and the latter is manifested in the transnational solidarity or conflict between people across national borders that results from conceiving the continent as a single “world” society rather than a society of states. This chapter analyzes the “historical beginnings” of the tight and conflictive bond between both societies in the hemisphere. The aim is to grasp the singularity of the contemporary juncture in the light of its continuities and ruptures with the past. Two questions are used to map this process: Which have been the predominant practices that underlie the changing tension between the single continental society and the society of states in each moment? And, how have those practices constituted different identities, interests, and legitimacy criteria at a continental scale? The purpose of such
review is to add a historical background in the analysis of the juncture introduced in chapter four.

The final chapter is a cross-international analysis focused on the competitive relations unfolding in the hemisphere aimed at re-defining the international order in the Americas. I argue that with the crisis of neoliberalism, the Americas seem to be fragmented in different competing rival projects. The number of regional initiatives such as ALBA, UNASUR, CELAC and the Pacific Alliance are not the result of new emerging collective meanings, but they are the result of dispersed initiatives, including the neoliberal project that refuses to disappear. This chapter is organized in three sections. The first section questions the works that claim that Latin America is experiencing a process of transition as a result of the establishment of a new consensus. The second part traces an “epistemic map” with the diverse “scenarios of understanding” in the hemispheric order. The third section develops the logic, practices, and ideas contained in each of the four scenarios of hemispheric understanding — the scenario of international proselytism, the scenario of confrontation and interventionism, the scenario of institutional revisionism, and the scenario of latent state of war. The aim of this chapter is to categorize and analyze the variations of these new international proposals in regards to neoliberalism in order to understand the worldviews of the projects that are at stake in the region.
Chapter One: The Course of Neoliberalism in Latin America, 1980–2000: Practices and Rationality of a Modernity Project

Ever since the “triumph of the West”–of the “western idea” (Fukuyama, 1989: 3)–was proclaimed at the end of the last century, and any alternative different from western neoliberalism was considered closed; free market competition and the commercialization of social relations as a practice have become the *leitmotif* of neoliberal modernity.

The importance of free market competition was highlighted by prestigious neoliberal scholars such as Fukuyama (1989), Huntington (1991), and Williamson (1990). The new American Grand Strategy recognizes a value in that practice that transcends purely economic matters and has important implications in the security of the global superpower. In fact, in its version of liberal imperialism, the American Grand Strategy considers that a world more like the United States will be a safer place not only for that country, but for the world itself (Mearsheimer, 2012). In turn, multilateral organizations in charge of improving the economic and social well-being of the people around the world such as the OECD, IMF, WB, and WTO have made of free competition a "good practice”, desirable and actively promoted by their policies. In Latin America during the 80's and 90's, a whole generation of statesmen, politicians, and businessmen mobilized around the introduction of such practice, and the commitment to
dismantling dictatorships, populisms, civil conflicts, and structures that, like the developmental state, prevented its flowering.

The importance of the promotion of this practice seems more than justified. “The victory of liberalism has occurred primarily in the realm of ideas or consciousness and is as yet incomplete in the real or material world” (Fukuyama, 1989: 4). The collapse of the monarchy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and fascism and communism in the first and second half of the twentieth century positioned the neoliberal system of ideas as the only system able to give a full response to the contradictions that have characterized human history. Once the "end point of mankind's ideological evolution" was reached thanks to the neoliberal modernity, only its universalization is missing, that is, on the one hand, ensuring the implementation of its principles as fully as possible and, on the other, "extending those principles spatially" from the vanguard of civilization to the rest of the world (Fukuyama, 1989: 5). It is here when the importance of the free competition and commercialization of social relations is revealed: as a practice, it is responsible for consolidating neoliberal modernity, rendering its ideas to the material world, and expanding its legacy from the center to the periphery.

Often, another practice no less inherent to neoliberalism coexists with the openly celebrated free competition and commercialization of social relations. However, this practice is far from stimulating a comparable enthusiasm within neoliberal circles. Neoliberal politicians do not praise it in their speeches; multilateral organizations neglect discussing how their policies are based on it, and the American Grand Strategy accepts it guiltily as inevitable. The three reference texts on neoliberalism during the late twentieth century "The End of History?" (Fukuyama, 1989), "The Third Wave" (Huntington, 1991), and "What Washington Means by Policy Reforms" (Williamson, 1990), hardly mention it. Obscured and silenced by the
promoters of neoliberalism, condemned to inhabiting the margins and limits of the neoliberal doctrine, this practice has been, however, as recurrent as the first one since Fukuyama and the West announced the final victory of neoliberal modernity. I am talking about the practice of conditionality.

However, as it has become evident through recent Latin American history, conditionality is not a practice that is fortuitous only to neoliberalism, meaning that it exists only accidentally or mistakenly by way of the introduction of neoliberalism into the periphery of the world. On the contrary, it is the logical derivation of the metropolitan character of the ideas that shape neoliberal modernity. Neoliberal modernity claims to be the "end point of mankind's ideological evolution" and the West is its natural bearer. If “any fundamental contradiction in human life can be resolved in the context of modern liberalism”, “if any ideological pretension of representing different and higher forms of human society is closed”, if the Third World remains very much “mired in evolution” as Fukuyama (1989) argues, the logical consequence is that in the name of neoliberal modernity, the West imposes an array of conditions upon the Third World in order for the latter to embrace the destiny of the former.

Free competition and conditionality coexist in regions that, like Latin America, are seen as “mired in human evolution”⁸. The free competition as a practice is based not only in freedom but also in the agents’ equality in freedom; hence, it accepts pluralism and the competition resulting from it. In contrast, conditionality constructs an asymmetric scenario that stems from the privileged character that one or some of the agents claim for themselves. Consequently, it is a type of coexistence that is not exempted of strains and paradoxes. In fact, the celebrated victory of neoliberal modernity, sustained by free competition, ends up being confronted by the
practice of conditionality, which based on the monopoly that emerges from the superiority of the modern neoliberal project, authorizes the suspension of free competition.

Overall, what I develop in this chapter is not only an account of how a generic western discourse of neoliberal modernity came to Latin America. In that sense, my work does not keep up with the concern over the “proper” expansion of the project in the world as proposed by the three-pillar authors of neoliberalism—Williamson in the economic field, Huntington in the political one, and Fukuyama in the “cultural” field. Instead, in this chapter, I provide a specific account of neoliberalism as a kind of governmental rationality and technology oriented to constitute subjectivities that are functional to it and the West through the implementation of practices such as free competition and conditionality.

Therefore, this work introduces a concept of neoliberal modernity based on a composite/blend of Weberian rationalities, post-colonial places of enunciation, and Foucauldian governmental technology in order to describe and analyse the course of neoliberalism in the region. While in a first moment, the discussion of neoliberal market rationality and the practice of free competition allows us to grasp the “official” discourse through which neoliberalism searches to represent its own project of modernity, in a second moment the analysis of places of enunciation and the practice of conditionality as technology opens room to deconstruct and disclose the western project of domination behind neoliberalism. Following the governmentality approach, this work shows how the possibility for liberal forms of freedom such as free competition in societies and populations considered less “civilized” like the ones of Latin America depends upon the exercise of discipline such as conditionality (Barry, Osborne, and Rose, 1996; Hindess, 2004). In the third part of the chapter, the governmental analysis tackles the neoliberal discourse and technologies not as a neoliberal self-representation of
modernity, “but rather as a system of meaning [and government] that constitutes practices and identities in contradictory and disjunctive ways” (Larner, 2000: 12). Thus, the final part draws the social cleavages and political issues that emerged after the crumbling of the collective meanings that sustained the neoliberal modernity project. These cleavages and issues would mark the different course of the countries at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

The Official Version of the Neoliberal Modernity and Its Widely Accepted Practice. An Analysis of the Western Narrative of Neoliberalism in Latin America.

Very often, people define neoliberal modernity by focusing in its material characteristics as capitalist and industrial, technologically advanced, and with an immense capacity to produce unstoppable economic progress (e.g., Zakaria, 2009). However, those material attributes say little about people’s reasons behind such material changes or why they lead the process of change based on free competition and the commercialization of social relations.

In his seminal work of social constructivism, Wendt (1992: 396) reminds us that “people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of meanings that the objects have for them”. It is a suggestive way to say that the practices of people are closely related to the discourses that conform the collective meaning of social groups and societies. People turn nature–and even other people–into commodities, because they conceive progress as material progress; they also compete because they believe in the value that private accumulation has in itself. In fact, a specific social practice is what it is only in virtue of its constitutive relation with the ideas and rationalities contained in specific discourses. The commercialization of social relations as a practice is possible and makes sense in a neoliberal modernity discourse, yet it makes no sense at all in a feudal society or a socialist discourse (except to be overcome in the latter).
Hence, the relation between the discourse and the practice is necessary rather than contingent. Without a discourse, the agent cannot give order and sense to its practices, but without the agent’s practices the discourse cannot exist (Wendt, 1999). In fact, the neoliberal discourse about modernity is a macro narrative that connects texts under different rationalities in an attempt to relate events to one another, and it presents a gradual progress of society that would make sense. Indeed, modernity is presented as a historical *process* of disenchantment and rationalization of the world. The neoliberal discourse, like other discourses about modernity, stresses the view of modernity as a *process*—one that responds to sheer rationality and is based on means-end rational calculation with reference to universally applied rules, laws and regulations (formal rationality) (Kalberg, 1980). The free competition as a practice is imbedded in a *process* underpinned by market laws in the economy and in written constitutional laws in politics that are presented as universally applied rules that frame the competition and set the terms for the actors’ calculations.

Nevertheless, what makes that modernity a neoliberal one is an array of *ultimate values* proper to neoliberalism like individual freedom, in addition to others shared by all modernity projects such as the belief in science and reason, and the faith in progress. Rather than opting for a centralized and planned practice inspired by collectivism as done by socialism in order to achieve progress, neoliberalism opts for competition inspired by individual freedom. However, this choice between collectivism and competition, as well as believing in the goodness of progress, belongs to the realm of substantive rationality. The choice is oriented not by technical reasons but by values and ethical norms, this is, actors select individual freedom because they deem it good for its own sake, like progress, and reject collectivism because it is deemed to be inherently wrong. Indeed, authors like Weber (1968) usually present formal rationality and
substantive rationality as opposed, because the former orders actions into patterns following a means-end calculation, while the latter establishes valid canons to define appropriate behavior.

This can be true in many social orders. Yet, in modernity, rather than competing, these rationalities coexist and are complementary in many ways. Firstly, because formal rationality can only be introduced and flourish in a society that has recognized the value of reason and science as an ethical norm to approach reality, as opposed to other ways such as religion or magical thinking. Secondly, because behind the universally applied rules, laws, and regulations which act as a frame for technical calculations, there are always ultimate values. Behind the universal laws of the market or the universal republican rule of division of power and participation there is the ultimate value of individual freedom, expressed in the first case as private accumulation, and in the second one as political rights. Finally, because once the ideas and values that lead modernity are naturalized and become common sense—this is, when rationality, science, and progress become the natural order of things—formal rationality can present itself as a sheer rationality based on means-end rational calculation with reference to universal “objective” rules.

As a consequence, what remains specific of neoliberal modernity is that it establishes a set of ultimate values—not only centred around the idea of progress and faith in science and reason, but also around individual freedom—that prescribe a formal rationality as the legitimate mean to achieve them (Larrain, 1996). In that sense, neoliberal modernity becomes a macro narrative that connects texts under different rationalities—some of them focused in the process and oriented by a formal rationality such as an integrated policy framework and development plans; others centered more in the aspirations and the direction of change and oriented by a substantive rationality such as ideologies and campaign platforms—in an effort to relate events
with one another, transform society and its material reality, and present a gradual process of society in the emancipatory direction of individual freedom, rationalization and progress. As such, neoliberal modernity is condemned to remain as a project, incapable of bridging the gaps between its ultimate values and the practice, but it is able to be perceived in comparative terms by placing the countries in a scale ranging from the more western neoliberal societies, to western non neoliberal societies, to non-western traditional societies. Hence, it is not coincidental at all that Fukuyama made a call to advance in a double lane: to extend the neoliberal project spatially to the remote regions of the world while “Europe and North America at the vanguard of civilization implement their liberalism more fully” (Fukuyama, 1989: 5).

Therefore, what defines neoliberal modernity is not only, as people often say, the material wealth it produces, but mainly the new distribution of neoliberal ideas and the process of rationalization behind those ideas that create new ways of thinking and behaving in the world. The core of modernity is not the complex industrial machinery, the technological change or the immense production of industrial goods, but the market rationality, which combining the ultimate values and the means-end calculation proper of the neoliberal modernity, orient change in such a way. However, as Wendt (2000) reminds us, materiality defines the necessary limits of possibility of an idea, and it helps to define the cost and benefits of an alternative course of action. No society could claim to be modern in a context that is removed from industrialization and technological development or that is incapable of creating material wealth and decrease, if not eradicate, poverty and inequality. When neoliberalism cannot keep the material promise that modernity involves, other discourses become attractive as an alternative course of action.
Materiality matters because it imposes physical limits to ideas, but the collective meaning that gives sense to the material reality and orders the actors’ actions comes from the constitutive relation between discourse and practices. As Kalberg (1980: 1159) holds, the discourse of neoliberal modernity guides the agents’ practices towards “all technical possible calculations within the ‘laws of the market’” (formal rationality) while, I would say, strengthening the ultimate value of individual freedom (substantive rationality). But, as I pointed out above, without free competition and the commercialization of social relations as an agent’s practice, neoliberal modernity cannot exist. This is a way to recognize that an agent’s practice is a “cognitive process, not just a behavioral one” (Wendt, 1992: 399). It is in the practice of free competition where the agent learns how to control the world out there through calculation while it internalizes and endorses the value of individuality. Furthermore, “agents acquire identity—relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self—by participating in such collective meaning” (Wendt, 1992: 397). Identities are inherently relational and emerge from the practices: It is through the free competition that the agent defines the self as *bourgeois*. Once that *bourgeois* identity is assumed within a world that has been socially constructed as modern, the agent’s interest will be conceived in egoistic terms and promoted under cost-benefit calculation. Thus, the agents’ free competition creates and reproduces the discourse of the neoliberal modernity, which will guide and align their practice later on, but which will also define the agent’s identity and interest.

As a consequence, at the end of the twentieth century, Latin America found a macro narrative in neoliberalism that promised to achieve the elusive goal of modernity through the enactment of free competition and commercialization of social relations. Economic, political and cultural modernization became the natural corollary of this path toward the transformation of society as
a whole. It was a profound process of transformation for the region, articulating a discourse of texts with different rationalities, such as policy frameworks, developmental plans (formal rationality), and ideologies and campaign promises (substantive rationality) in order to lead Latin America towards a more competitive and individualistic region.

The Neoliberal Economic Modernization, and The Free Economic Competition

Despite differences between countries regarding the extent, depth, and speed of neoliberal reforms, these were experienced in Latin America with a peculiarly unsurprising tinge of “shock”. Inspired by the work of Milton Friedman (1962) and Friedrich Hayek (1944), this economic doctrine sought to organize the economy on individualistic lines as an ultimate value, switching the previous developmentalist experience of the region arranged around the idea of a national, popular, sovereign, and strong state. Subsequently, the economic decisions were to be in the hands of private national and international enterprises, rather than in the hands of state agencies.

In addition, neoliberalism proposed a process of modernization led by an efficient market economy that was focused on the correct interpretation of the laws of the market regardless their social costs. As Williamson (1990:3), who in 1989 coined the term “Washington Consensus”, and who also became a benchmark within neoliberalism, stated, “[Fiscal deficit] results not for any rational calculation of expected economic benefits, but from a lack of the political courage or honesty to match public expenditures and the resources available to finance them”. As in the previous case, this call for an efficient market economy implied a rupture with the preceding developmentalism in which government regulation, through its planning agency, adjusted the laws of the market to the state’s development programs of import substitution industrialization. Previously, rationalization was measured by the state’s capacity to design and
execute coherent development programs. In contrast, neoliberalism considered the state’s intervention as non-rational (with the exception of the central bank’s regulation of the money supply), because it introduced distortions to the market information ruled by supply and demand, which prevented doing a correct calculation for economic decisions (e.g., Friedman, 1962). For neoliberalism, rationalization means market rationality. The liberal economic reforms, then, had this peculiar tinge of “shock”, because an entire region was exposed to a structural reform that not only switched the rationality of the previous modernization process (to one based on market rationality), but also its ultimate values (to ones inspired by individualism), all together in less than two decades.

The emphatic character of the structural economic reforms came from the imperative necessity to overcome the economic disaster unbounded by the debt crisis and the high inflation of most Latin American economies in 1982. In the short term, the task was to “set the house in order” through the sharp introduction of market reforms, the internationalization of national economies, and the restoration of macroeconomic discipline (Williamson, 1990). Overcoming the crisis and catching up with the economic growth of the neoliberal West were considered the point of departure. In the long term, the objective of neoliberalism has been to construct an efficient market economy in a continental scale. This is an open space for the practice of free economic competition and private accumulation, outwardly oriented and with no intervention from the government.

This triumphant entrance of economic neoliberalism in Latin America could be located in 1985, when the structural market reforms were introduced in Brazil and Argentina and questioned the gradualist therapy of recessive type for dealing with high debt and inflation, in vogue until then (Torre, 1998). Previously, “the economic emergency had been defined as a crisis of liquidity
and not as one of solvency” (Torre, 1998: 25). In that sense, although the origin of neoliberalism could be tracked to Pinochet's Chile in the early 1970s and the dictatorships of the region that applied recessionary policies to face the initial effects of the debt crisis between 1982 and 1984, neoliberal economic reforms became structural and embraced the entire region after 1985 with the return of democracy.

The Washington Consensus accurately summarized the ten policy instruments that shaped the integrated policy framework of the neoliberal structural change, which has been promoted by multilateral organizations since the mid-1980s. This “package” of reforms—applied in the region with different extents, depths and speeds as I mentioned above—contain the means that the technocratic Washington considered the right ones to construct an efficient market economy. In other words, the Washington Consensus constitutes the formal rationality’s core of the neoliberal discourse and as such was in charge of directing the process of rationalization of the Latin American economic field. According to Baker (2010: 16), the three directions of the Washington Consensus structural reforms were: “(1) privatization: the transfer of state-owned enterprises to private actors; (2) globalizing policies: measures such as trade and capital account liberalization that increased foreigner’s access to various aspects of the domestic economy; and (3) fiscal reform:...tax reforms designed to improve the state’s financial health”.

In the end, what the Washington Consensus tried to promote and consolidate with this set of reforms was the practice of free economic competition in the region. In the same vein of the most classical liberal doctrine, Washington technocracy thought that economic progress would be guaranteed by the practice of free economic competition of the agents, who, looking for their own benefit and having to compete in an open market, would make an efficient allocation of resources. The beneficiaries would be the producers who had access to a wider market, and
the consumers who would get better and cheaper products. Thus, the practice of economic
competition becomes the spearhead of the neoliberal economic modernization; and the utility
produced for the parties, derived from material progress associated with competition, would be
the main source of legitimacy.

The Neoliberal Political Modernization and the Free Competition
Perhaps one of the distinctive features of the democratic transition of Latin America during the
80’s and 90’s, which was almost an obsession, was the interest for democratic practices and the
procedures that regulated them. Elections and written constitutions were tantamount to
democracy. Competitive elections marked the end of ten dictatorships: Ecuador in the late 70’s,
Peru, Honduras, Bolivia, Argentina, Uruguay and Guatemala in the first half of the 80’s, and
Brazil, Chile and Paraguay in the second half. In revolutionary Nicaragua and El Salvador,
after bloody civil wars took place, the competing sides left their weapons to go into election
campaigns as part of peace agreements during the 90’s. The late dictatorships that started in the
80’s, such as General Noriega’s in Panama–an exceptional one for a continent moving towards
democracy in those years–found under the US invasion a way to restore the electoral path in the
90’s. Colombia, Venezuela and Costa Rica, countries that did not break their democratic
institutional order throughout the 60’s and 70’s, kept holding elections as usual during the 80’s
and 90’s. At the end, Castro’s Cuba was the only country that did not ride the wave of
democratization that shook the region.

At the same time, new constitutions were issued in ten of the nineteen Latin American
countries, and at least four others introduced deep reforms in their previous constitutions during
the same period. In Brazil, Peru, and Ecuador, these new Magna Cartas allowed the derogation
of previous constitutions that had served as legal support for authoritarian governments. In
others cases like Colombia, they expanded the guarantees and citizen rights of the preceding restricted democracy. In Bolivia, Uruguay, Argentina and Chile, the emergent civil order opened new democratic spaces through constitutional reform. In general, the new constitutions and reforms were oriented to create a general framework that was capable of guaranteeing access to political power through free and fair competition and subjecting the civilian governments to a new republican order of separation of powers, checks and balances, and, of course, respect for the rights and freedoms of their citizens. Moreover, eleven countries of the region with indigenous populations moved forward towards the construction of a multicultural society with the “recognition of a minimal package of cultural rights [after a large history of] assimilationist policies” (Hale, 2002: 485).  

Perhaps, the culminating point at hemispheric level of this constitutionalist movement profoundly influenced by neoliberal ideas was the adoption of the Inter-American Democratic Charter by the heads of state and government of the Americas, gathered in Quebec City in 2001. In that charter, the OAS members “recognized that representative democracy is indispensable for the stability, peace, and development of the region, and that one of the purposes of the OAS is to promote and consolidate representative democracy, with due respect for the principle of non-intervention (...) that any unconstitutional alteration or interruption of the democratic order in a state of the Hemisphere constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to the participation of that state's government in the Summits of the Americas process” (Organización de Estados Americanos: 2003, 3).

By and large, what written constitutions and the celebration of elections as distinctive features of the Latin American democratic transition showed was an emphasis in the procedures for constituting governments and regulating their exercise. During those years, as clearly put by
Huntington (1991), the definition of democracy in terms of “the will of the people” and “the common good”, the former defining democracy in terms of sources of authority and the latter in terms of purposes served by the government, were discarded, giving way to a conception of democracy in terms of process. Establishing a set of stable universal rules—contestation and participation in competitive elections and checks and balances for the government’s exercise—the neoliberal modern project aimed to incentivize the means-end calculation of the agents in the political struggle but within precise laws and norms. What was at stake in this neoliberal political modernization was a project based on formal rationality and concerned with the rationalization of power. According to Lievesley and Ludlam (2011, 2), who wrote critically more than a decade after, it was this “narrow conception of democracy as a set of constitutional and legislative procedures (...) [that was] responsible for the increasing conflict with a mass electorate, much of which was expecting its material poverty to be redressed through a broader conception of the purpose of democracy”.

In short, the premise of neoliberal modernization rested on stable universal rules that would guarantee the uncertainty of the results of free competition in all Latin America. However, the practice of free competition cannot be understood only as a behavioral one, but mainly as a cognitive process capable of demystifying what was considered a traditional political field while going further in its process of rationalization. For a traditional continent ruled along its history by “enlightened” oligarchies, by dictators who were considered saviors of their countries, and by populist parties, insurrectional guerillas, and charismatic leaders who claimed to embody the “true national spirit”; pluralism and the free competition of agents meant the possibility of “rationalizing politics by the demystification of those previous authorities, the devaluation of their ‘divine right,’ and its replacement with secular utility” (Janos: 1986: 28).
In addition, the free competition practice goes further in the process of rationalization by switching the previous “divine right” for market principles as the base of political authority. In fact, the neoliberal modernity project seeks to “construct a political arena in which public office is ‘auctioned off’ to the highest bidder” (Janos, 1986: 28). In that sense, a popular democracy is popular as far as the rules of the game allow everyone to be part of the auction and participate equally and freely as bidders. In this “system of reciprocity, in which chiefs can rule effectively only if they satisfy the expectations on the parts of their subordinates” (Janos, 1986: 28), the “utilitarian worldliness” becomes the main criterion of legitimacy. There is no room for “divine will”. Thus, in a context where political relations are commercialized, accountability and transparency were considered requirements for the democratic consolidation in the region.

**The Neoliberal Cultural Modernization and Free Competition**

In the early twenty-first century, Whitehead (2002: 53) looked back at the recent history of the region and optimistically pointed out how global neoliberalism was quickly displacing all alternative worldviews in Latin America since its introduction in the 80’s. In a way, this was the confirmation of Fukuyama’s prophecy (1989: 18) that with the expansion of neoliberalism: “the struggle for recognition, the willingness to risk one’s life for a purely abstract goal, the worldwide ideological struggle that called forth daring, courage, imagination, and idealism, will be replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands”.

In this sense, both authors implicitly indicate how the processes of structural change in the economic and political fields must be understood more deeply since they constitute new subjectivities (see, e.g., Larner, 2000; Jaeger, 2003). The neoliberal agent that emerges with the commercialization of the social relations is one detached of the social entitlements and mutual
obligations; this is an agent that finds little interest in matters outside the individual’s private life, seeking primarily to maximize one's own gains (see, e.g., Armony, 2005). This neoliberal subjectivity solves its daily demands in the market sphere, and according to the market rationality in politics, looks for the bidder that better guarantees its self interest in the auction that turns democracy into the commercialization of political relations. Thus, within the culture of global neoliberalism, the “utilitarian worldliness” (Janos: 1986, 27) becomes the final goal to pursue and, as such, the main criterion of legitimacy for any field of social life. Authors like Oxhorn (2009: 228) speak about a citizenship as consumption to refer to this neoliberal subjectivity.

Rather than radical antagonisms built around worldwide ideological struggles and led by a logic of friend-or-foe, global neoliberalism proposes moderate and transitory antagonisms where the self and the other identify themselves as competitors and bearers of immediate and concrete interests that are susceptible of being fulfilled by increasing the efficiency of a market society. Moreover, in the field of cultural diversity, neoliberal multiculturalism endorses the constitutions of a new subjectivity that affirms and celebrates cultural differences as long as these new cultural identities (like indigeneity) are consistent with the ideal of the market and procedural democracy (Hale, 2002: 490-491). Instead of pursuing assimilationist policies, neoliberalism sees in multiculturalism the possibility to advance in linking together diverse cultures through the universalistic rationality of the market in order for them to be functional for the market society (Hale, 2002).

Indeed, with the return of free competition as a practice, the rational, pragmatic, and depoliticized agents become the privileged actors of national histories. In the economic field, the initial search for macroeconomic stability gave a “large role to market forces and private
enterprises in the allocation of resources vis-à-vis the state, and trade and financial liberalization” (Moreno-Brid, 2005: 357). The entrepreneurs, with their characteristic tendency towards innovation, the creation of new businesses, in addition to a strong concern for efficiency, became the central agents in a rapidly globalizing economy.

In the political field, the democratic transition from authoritarianism and civil war was led by center-left and center-right parties, which established a growing number of what Castañeda (2006) called “centrist technocratic governments”. The defeated forces were those placed in the extremes of the ideological spectrum, whose missionary message sided either with “overwhelming majorities” like Peronism in Argentina, the Apra in Peru, the Worker’s Party in Brazil and Sandinistas in Nicaragua, or with a “military boot” like the Democracy and Progress Party in Chile. The core of the new global neoliberalism was not only a pragmatic citizen who was less interested in electing a proper politician than an efficient and accountable public administrator, but also the so-called “broker parties”. These parties generally try to appeal to a wide range of interests of society in order to become the highest bidder and win elections, but in the process, they also relinquish any claims for a focused ideological approach (Dyck, 2011: 338). The triumph of the Radical Party with Alfonsín in Argentina in 1983, the National Reconstruction Party with Collor de Mello in Brazil in 1989, the Christian Democratic Party with Alwin in Chile in the same year, the Popular Action with Belaúnde in Peru in 1980, the Colorado Party with Sanguinetti in 1984 and 1994, and the National Opposition Union with Barrios de Chamorro in Nicaragua in 1990, among others, was a clear sign that Latin America was taking the moderate way under the flag of government efficiency to create consensus.

Additionally, when old nationalist political forces, historical leaders, and socialist parties came back later during the process of transition, as Sader (2011: 12-14) argues, they did so
embracing the neoliberal socio-economic model and depriving themselves of their previous radical antagonisms. Such was the case of the return to power of the Justicialista Party with Menem in Argentina, the National Revolutionary Movement with Paz Estenssoro in Bolivia, the Democratic Action with Perez in Venezuela, and the Brazilian Social Democracy Party with Cardoso. At that point, global neoliberalism was becoming dominant throughout the continent. Latin America seemed to have left behind the ideological struggles, at least in party competition.

**Disruptive Effects of Free Competition in Latin America**

Despite the fact that the function of free competition as a practice was the expansion and consolidation of the neoliberal modernity from centric western societies to peripheral regions of the world, its application in Latin America had at least two disruptive effects for the future of the project itself not previously foreseen.

The first one was related with the incoherence of the neoliberal modernity project, this is to say that the implementation of free competition did not bring the logical consequence expected by the neoliberal doctrine: economic progress for the region. On the contrary, the economy was immersed in a process of slow and unstable growth, and the social costs of the economic reforms became unbearable to the population at large. This situation of scarcity restricted the possibility of reaching a consensus through the negotiation of different demands of social groups as it was proposed by political neoliberalism.¹⁴

The neoliberal proposal can be summed up by the following formula: Washington Consensus + free economic competition practices = economic progress. The disruptive effect of the formula was precisely that the two factors being added sought to constitute a society where the
“utilitarian worldliness” became the main legitimacy criterion; yet, material utility never appeared as a result of the reform processes, at least not for the population at large and not in the middle term. Without material progress, neoliberalism seriously undermined its main criterion of legitimacy. In other words, the gap between the concrete results of the neoliberal policy and its promise of economic prosperity lessened the support of a population that demanded immediate economic and social improvements.

Rather than transitioning towards a society where the population could distribute the continuously increasing income, Latin American economies remained in a situation of virtual stagnation in which the slow economic GDP growth represented losses for the wide population. Not only did the social indicators show a deterioration of the historic situation of poverty and income concentration in relation to the 80’s, but also deregulation reforms threatened the quantity and quality of the jobs on which the income of the population depended.

In fact, the neoliberal project was not able to keep its promise of bringing a steady and fast economic growth. “Measured in constant US dollars, the region’s real GDP increased at an average annual rate of 3.3 per cent during 1990–2000. Such performance, though a marked improvement with respect to the 1.1 per cent annual average registered in the 1980s, was much slower than the average annual rate of 5.5 per cent registered during 1950-80” (Moreno-Brid et al., 2005: 347). The perennial goal of catching up with the modern western society from where the neoliberal model was imported became elusive as well. “In 1980, Latin America’s per capita GDP in real terms was equivalent to 29.1 per cent of the US average. Ten years later (...) the gap had widened, and the corresponding figure was 21.8 per cent” (Moreno-Brid et al., 2005: 348). Moreover, the lack of fast economic growth resulted in a postponement of a significant response to the urgent social question in Latin America. In 2003, “the incidence of
poverty in the region was 43.9 per cent and extreme poverty was 19.4 per cent, higher than the figure for 1980: 40.5 per cent and 18.6 per cent, respectively” (Moreno-Brid et al., 2005: 354). The situation of poverty was even worse within the indigenous population. According to the WB, during the period of 1994–2004, in countries with high indigenous populations such as “Bolivia and Guatemala, more than half of the total population was poor, but almost three-quarters of the indigenous population were poor. [In the same vein,] poverty among indigenous people in Ecuador was about 87 per cent and reached 96 per cent in the rural highlands. In Mexico, the incidence of extreme poverty in 2002 was 4.5 times higher in predominantly indigenous than in non-indigenous municipalities, up from a ratio of 3.7 times a decade earlier” (The WB, 2011). According to the data provided by ECLAC (1999: 39) in about 13 Latin American countries, the urban open unemployment rate went from 6.63 per cent in 1980 to 8.82 per cent in 1998. The unemployment situation was dramatic, not only because the rate rose 2.19 per cent in comparison, but also because most of the jobs created during the 90’s were in the informal sector; that is, with low standards of social protection. Deininger and Squire (1996) state that Latin America remained the most unequal region of the world during the 80’s and 90’s, and it registered no significant progress from its social indicators. In fact, the media Gini coefficient in the region was 49.1 in 1970s, 49.7 in 1980s and 49.3 in 1990s.

The second disruptive effect of free competition is linked to the inconsistency of the West in the thorough application of this neoliberal principle in the region. On one hand, western societies promoted the self-regulating market as the way to construct an efficient economy in Latin America; but on the other hand, their national security policies, and even their moral conceptions, often prevented people from freely turning nature into commodities as required in a free market economy. The western prohibitionism is a paradigmatic case with profound
negative impacts in Latin America. By relating the consumption of products such as marijuana, cocaine, and heroin with moral decay and international threats (Thoumi, 2002: 37), the US and European proscription of these products prevented groups from the region from taking part in this business legally, paying taxes and being regulated by the “rule of law”. What is worse, the distortion of the international market produced by the stiff prohibitionism advocated by the western states created powerful economic incentives for the consolidation of a parallel illegal drug market in some countries of Latin America. As result of the huge gains allowed by prohibitionism, drug traffickers were able not only to challenge the state but also to jeopardize the social stability that any self-regulated market demands.

Since Richard Nixon launched the War on Drugs in 1971, the illegal psychoactive drugs market has showed great dynamism and capacity to respond to the legal prosecution, affecting most of the countries of the region in different forms and degrees. The US Department of State, in its 1996’s Narcotics Control Report, an accurate document of that time, established the kind of participation and the level of involvement of countries from South America, Central America, and Mexico in the commodity chain of drugs.

In South America, six of ten countries were considered involved in the shipment of drugs in their territories (in Argentina, Chile, and Paraguay the problem was present, but Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela were classified as countries of major transit). Another six were linked with money laundering (Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela), and three with the shipment of precursor chemicals to producer countries (Chile, Ecuador, and Venezuela). A greater concern arose in the Andean Region with Peru, Bolivia and Colombia, respectively, as the first, second and third world largest coca producers. Nevertheless, Colombia was by far the most critical country in the region, remaining the world’s leading
producer and distributor of cocaine since the 80’s and an important supplier of heroin and marijuana. According to the report, Colombian drug cartels still dominated the market, producing three quarters of the world’s cocaine production from locally grown coca, and also from the coca products being imported primarily from Peru and Bolivia. Although the illegal nature of the drug trafficking makes it very difficult to establish the size of the drug industry, the works of Steiner (cited by Thoumi, 2002: 184) and Rocha (cited by Thoumi, 2002: 184) calculated that the income from illegal drugs in Colombia ranged from US$ 973 million to US$ 6,699 million during 1980 to 1995. In Central America and Mexico, the same 1996 Narcotic Control Report states that six of the seven Latin American countries of the region were involved with the transit and transship, mainly of cocaine, from Colombia to the US (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and Nicaragua). Another three countries were linked to money laundering (Costa Rica, Panama, and Mexico), and only one (Guatemala) was spotted as a producer of small amounts of opium, marijuana, and amphetamine for the US. Mexico was a special case in the sub-region. The vast criminal empire that was consolidating its power was syndicated for “the production of illicit drugs, the smuggling of hundreds of tons of South American Cocaine, [the] operation [of] drug distribution networks reaching well into the continental United States, [becoming] the major source of marijuana and heroin, as well as a major supplier of methamphetamines to the illicit drug market in the US” (Department of State, The United of State of America, 1997).

This report is meaningful because it shows in detail the different ways in which Latin American societies were affected by the production and distribution of illegal drugs. Most of the region’s countries are imbedded in one way or another in the production and distribution of the illegal market. Nevertheless, the report is eloquent by its omission too. None of the fifty four pages of
the report mentions the responsibility of the US as the biggest drug consumer and main supporter of prohibitionism. The basic assumption of the report is the widely spread idea explained by Thoumi (2002) that drugs are evil and a threat for the health and moral integrity of the American nation; they are produced by evil people in foreign countries, and therefore the illegal drugs are a “national security issue”. Perhaps the sole voice that distanced itself from this moral and securitized rhetoric was Milton Friedman. In a 2005 letter, signed by other 500 economists and directed to the “president, congress, governors and state legislatures of the US”, the Nobel Prize in Economics and leader of the neoliberal school supported marijuana legalization, suggesting an economic response to the “drugs problem” (formal rationality) rather than a moralistic one (substantive rationality), and showing the high costs that this distortion of the free market had for American society (Friedman, et al., 2005). In this way, Friedman’s letter affirmed Fukuyama’s call for the full application of the neoliberal rationality at the “vanguard of civilization”.

The 1996 report is also interesting because it shows the great dynamism of the illegal drug market. In that year, the Colombian government dismantled the Cali Cartel, the last of the two most powerful cartels that dominated the drug business in Colombia. Three years earlier, in 1993, the capo of the Medellin Cartel, Pablo Escobar, was killed in a raid by security forces of the state. However, instead of seriously undermining the drugs business, the Mexican cartels quickly replaced the disappeared Colombian drug-trafficking organizations as distributors controlling the “juiciest” part of the deal. Hereafter, the cartels of Juarez, Sinaloa, Gulf, Los Zetas, and Tijuana would control the business by fire and sword. Nevertheless, this adaptability extends in all stages of the business. In the case of producer countries, an efficient eradication of coca crops in Colombia since 2002 has resulted in the expansion of crops in Bolivia and
Peru, producing the well-known “balloon effect”. Another case is the success of air interdiction in the Caribbean, which has led to a change in routes through Central America and Mexico as transit countries. The bitter lesson of the War on Drugs is that as long as there is demand, an offer will appear.

Perhaps the most disruptive effect of the illegalization of the drug market is the violence associated to it. The regions of Chapare in Bolivia and Huallaga in Peru, where the new coca plantations concentrated in the 80’s in response to the rise of the international demand for cocaine, exhibit the highest levels of violence in both countries (Thoumi, 2002). Nevertheless, the countries that have controlled the distribution of drugs such as Colombia and Mexico have suffered the most devastating effects of violence. Thus, during the 80’s and 90’s in Colombia an “emergent and delinquent class” associated with cartels made a fortune out of drug trafficking, unleashing a war against the state and extradition (Tokatlian, 2000). During the mid 90’s, once the cartels were destroyed, the guerilla and paramilitary groups seized control of the production of cocaine, investing the gains in their wars. “The extreme multiplicity of manifestations of violence and actors responsible for this, their mutual feedback and high levels” (Pizarro, 2004: 222), the illicit extensive resources to feed the internal war, and the remarkable state weakness (Pizarro, 2004: 258) led to the thought that the Colombian state would collapse. In 2006, the Mexican war against drugs was declared. It was an ongoing attempt to stop not only the disruptive violence produced by the confrontation among cartels and against the Mexican state, but to dismantle a cartel structure that in 1999 exported cocaine by US$ 3.001 million (Resa Nestares, 2003: 44). The bitter lesson of American prohibitionism for Latin America is the extreme violence linked to any illegal business that threatens the rule of
law of a society in varying degrees. The immense profits from illegal drug trafficking are the fuel of any war.\textsuperscript{16}

In summary, at the end of the twentieth century, Latin America found a macro narrative in western neoliberalism that promised to achieve the elusive goal of modernity through the enactment of free competition and the commercialization of social relations. Economical, political and cultural modernization became the natural corollary of this path that searched for the transformation of society as a whole. The neoliberal modernity discourse directs the agent’s practices towards all technical possible calculations within universally applied rules in the fields of economics and politics. The new practices aimed to constitute a new subjectivity in which the rational, pragmatic, and moderate agents became the privileged actors of national histories. Within this project of society, where rationality became synonym of market rationality, utilitarian worldliness turned out to be the main criterion of legitimacy.

Nevertheless, the neoliberal modernity and its free competition as official practice had two disruptive effects that are important to understand the course of this project in Latin America. The first one is related to the incoherence of neoliberalism, this is, the fact that the structural economic reforms and the free economic competition did not create the material progress necessary to ensure the utilitarian worldliness of the agents. This material reality would impose physical limits to the consolidation of the neoliberal ideas in the region. The second one is linked with the inconsistency of western neoliberalism. The prohibitionism produced by the moralistic and securitized approach to the “drug problem” in the US and Europe has both disrupted the free economic market promoted in Latin America by those western societies, and it has jeopardized the rule of law that any neoliberal order needs in order to be consolidated.
Neoliberal Modernity “Behind the Scenes”: The Non-Official Version

To understand the course of modernity in the region, it is crucial to figure out the official proposal of neoliberalism before anything else, even with its incoherencies and inconsistencies. To a large extent, the direction of the neoliberal modern project is marked by its ideas about the individual and progress, market rationality, and the free competition as leitmotif. But the meaning of what neoliberalism says is tightly related with the timing and the practices attached to it and by which its official content is conveyed. Indeed, the unquestionable conditionality as a practice used to introduce and consolidate the neoliberal modernity project in Latin America is linked with the momentum lived by the western capitalist society in the late twentieth century after the end of the Cold War. The meaning of the neoliberal modern project, then, remains incomplete if the when and how of its proposal’s articulation is neglected, i.e. if the approach only focuses on what neoliberalism argues.

Therefore, the analysis of conditionality as a practice implies going further than the conventional understanding of conditionality as an objective and technical tool aimed to give economic assistance and support to countries in problems, in exchange for some requirements demanded by donors addressed to improve the situation of the formers (see, e.g., Koeberle, 2003; Dreher, 2009; Ivanova, 2006). It entails to understand conditionality in a broader meaning and significance as a governmental technology, which clearly overcomes the economic spaces and involves the political and cultural spheres of those societies. It intends not only to affect the behavior, but to constitute a new subordinated identity of Latin American countries as agents with regard to western donors.
**A Matter of Timing**

Indeed, the triumph of the "free world" and the defeat of the socialist bloc allowed the absolutization of the neoliberal project. This was presented not as a specific historical fact but as the culmination of human progress by overcoming a series of stages of consciousness marked by the clock of history. Once neoliberalism is considered as the end,—the rational form of society by excellence—it emerges as the only and complete modern project. A new temporalization and spatialization of the world in the late twentieth century would be opened by uplifting the historical experience of the capitalist and democratic West to be universal. Market rationality and free competition would signal a new consciousness of time in which the new is associated with the western society, and the present and future are monopolized by the neoliberal modernity (see, e.g., Mitchell, 2000; Mignolo, 2011).

After its defeat, the Soviet bloc was relegated to being a museum piece in human history. Stripped off its promise of a credible future, socialism was doomed to inhabit the past, to quickly become tradition. The dispute over the future society in the West has come to an end. Without rival modern projects to be afraid of in the twenty-first century, the universal history that emerges presents neoliberalism as the only project of future society, and the capitalist West as the only possible West. In this sense, conditionality is constitutive of the neoliberal project because it emerges not as a coincidence, but from the metropolitan nature of a discourse that is focused on the West, and that presents itself as an end and a constant reference of the process of consciousness evolution. In this new “peaceful” world, for example, the US switched its previous Grand Strategies aimed at engaging militarily specific areas such as Europe, East Asia and the Persian Gulf to Liberal Imperialism aimed at the dominance of the whole globe by more subtle means such as international institutions and the extended use of conditionality.

**Conditionality as Practice**

Conditionality is shaped by the timing in which this practice emerges. As such, it is directly related with the history of identity formation of Latin America, and thus, it is crucial to explain the role of western society in the course of the neoliberal project in the region. A prosperous and victorious West, far from the current one in recession and beaten in Iraq and Afghanistan, traced the conditions to a region that was dragging the burden of civil wars, dictatorships, populisms, drug trafficking, debt crisis, and hyper-inflation. As a practice, conditionality is addressed not only to introduce and consolidate free competition in the region, but also to perpetuate the subordinate role of Latin America within the hegemonic western social order. The Washington Consensus and the War on Drugs are eloquent in that sense; they were designed in the US and implemented in Latin America, but without the participation of the region in their design.

Confined to the economic field, conditionality began to be applied by multilateral organizations such as the IMF and the WB in the 80’s (Koeberle, 2003). The most affected countries by the debt crisis, Bolivia, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, were the first to be exposed to conditionality in 1985. However, it was quickly adopted in the next decades by other multilateral organizations like the OECD, supranational organizations like the European Union, and agencies of powerful countries like the Department of State of the United States. It was extended to other areas besides the economy, and it encompassed an array of varied issues such as human rights, democracy, governance, and also free trade agreements and the war against
drugs. Uvin and Biagiotti (1996) refer to it as the “‘new’ political conditionality”. In 1986, for example, the US established the process of annual certification of the countries that collaborate in the war against drugs; in 1990, the European Union—and in 1991 and 2002, the US—gave the Andean Countries a preferential commercial treatment as encouragement and recognition for their willingness to help in the war on drugs. In the same line, and during all these years, international NGOs have submitted accurate reports about the state of democracy and human rights in the region that are the base to condition not only development assistance, but also free trade agreements with western countries (see, e.g., Department of State, The United States of America, 1997; European Union, 2013; The Carter Center, 2013; Human Right Watch, 1996).

Therefore, in a broad sense, conditionality could be defined as the practice of giving economic, political or even diplomatic assistance and support contingent upon the implementation of specific policies. It involves at least two actors in an asymmetric relationship: the disadvantaged government (usually a Latin American one), and the external providing agent (the US, the European Union or a multilateral organization). Nonetheless, the act of giving is not an accidental action. On one hand, it has the function of signaling the western provider as the privileged agent of history: someone placed in the peak of the consciousness evolution, living in the *now*, and as such, authorized to trace the path for those others dwelling in a certain point of the western *past*. The US, and by extension the European countries, became economic and political models in Latin America. The IMF, the OECD, and The WB, as well as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, became reputed external centers with privileged information and with the knowledge to do objective recommendations to the region. On the other hand, this act is also addressed to mark the recipient Latin American country with the infamy of being “mired” in history: lacking universal expression and as such without agency,
and therefore, placed in the past. They are recipient countries due to their own countries’
incompetence and the proven inconsistency of their local model of inward-oriented
development. Their populist coalition and the interventionist state became an anachronism in
this new epoch.

Conditionality itself gives the provisions to establish the gap that separates the recipient from
its provider. As Dreher (2009) points in the IMF’s case, but which can be applied to
conditionality in general, “the negotiation of an (...) arrangement may be an indication of
economic failure, with the degree of conditionality providing evidence of the extent of the
failure”. The proliferation of conditions shows the distance that separates the incompetent
governments and underdeveloped countries from the reputed external centers considered
vanguards of civilization. In brief, the degree of conditionality would reflect the level of failure.

Nevertheless, while conditionality sets the distance between the West as the privileged agent of
history from a Latin America “mired” in it, it is also true that this same conditionality allows to
separate the “good” from the “bad” government recipients. Conditionality condemns but also
redeems. By accepting the conditionality of the western states and institutions, the recipient is
provided with a “seal of approval” in the eyes of the “international community”, who would
prefer to interact with this “good government” rather than with a “bad one”. Argentina, for
example, went from being considered a troubled economy with out-of-control inflation in 1989
to be presented as a successful showcase by the IMF throughout the 90’s, once the appointed
Ministry of Economics fulfilled the Fund’s conditions. The IMF’s seal of approval let
Argentina to be one of the main destinies of foreign direct investment in the region, a situation
that changed when the country’s financial crisis surprised the markets again in 2001.
The “good recipients” are those governments that have the “willingness to implement the conditions and the ability to do so” (Dreher, 2009: 242). The “bad ones” are, on the contrary, those that reject the help and conditions imposed by the western external centers or even those which, accepting the conditionality, “reverse or abandon the reforms once the support program ends” (Koeberle, 2003: 252). The western conditionality in the region, and the elaboration of this kind of classification has gone further in three areas: economical, political and in drug trafficking.

In that line of conditionality, the Inter-American Bank elaborated a structural reform index that assessed the advances of neoliberal reforms in 16 Latin American countries in five policy areas (trade policy, financial policy, tax policy, privatization, and labor legislation). The report “compares the state of the reforms in 1985 and 1999 for those countries with the best and worst indices in 1999. The five countries with the best indicators are Bolivia, Jamaica, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Argentina, all having final values of the index by over 0.6, and with improvements of at least 0.2 points over their initial situation in four of the five countries. The five countries farthest behind in the reform process are (starting with the worst) Uruguay, Mexico, Venezuela, Ecuador and Costa Rica with indices situated between 0.48 and 0.55” (Lora, 2001: 21).

In the same vein, within the political field, Freedom House (2013) presented a ranking of the levels of freedom and respect for human rights in the region. In 2013, in a scale from 1 to 7, out of the 19 Latin American countries, nine were classified as free, ranging from 1 to 2 (El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Panama, Peru, Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile); other nine were placed as partly free, ranging from 3 to 5 (Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Paraguay); and one was
considered not free (Cuba) with 6.5. Freedom House has created this kind of ranking during at least the last 30 years in the region. In addition, the European Union and the Carter Center, among other international organizations, have been involved in monitoring twenty eight elections through observers on the ground since the 90’s in Latin America. The former has taken part in nineteen elections (European Union, 2013), while the latter has been present in nine (The Carter Center, 2013). The European Union considers that “presence adds credibility, strengthens public confidence in the electoral process, and deters fraud” (European Commission, 2013). Human Rights Watch has also been very active in the region. In its 1996 report, this international NGO presented an overview that included ten countries of the region (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, and Peru). The report stressed the dramatic situation of human rights in Cuba and Colombia; the very worrying situation in Mexico and Peru; the deadlock situation in Guatemala and Chile; and some progress in Brazil, Haiti, Honduras and El Salvador. At the same time, Human Rights Watch enhanced the collaboration and willingness of those last four countries, criticized the ambivalent position of Colombia, and condemned the unwilling position of Peru, Mexico, Guatemala and Chile, and called for the pressing necessity of structural reforms in Cuba (Human Rights Watch, 1996).

Although the conditionality on drugs is linked to the inconsistency of western society with its own neoliberal project, this conditionality also intends to categorize the recipient countries into “good” and “bad” allies. In this field, the major source of conditionality comes from the American government. Every year, the United States through the Department of State produces a report assessing not only the outcomes in the war on drugs in each country of the region, but also its willingness to cooperate with the US.
The 1996 report reads that “the Government of Argentina actively opposes narcotics trafficking and the use of illegal drugs”, and “Bolivia, the world’s second leading source of cocaine, cooperated closely with the US on counterdrug efforts and took adequate steps toward full compliance with the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN convention”. The report also includes misdemeanor recriminations like, “although Brazil has a bilateral counternarcotics agreement with the USG, Brazil did not sign the annual Letter of Agreement (LOA) with the US in 1996”. The text also contains harsh disapprovals: “as in 1995, the Colombian government made only limited progress in 1996 against the pervasive, narcotics related corruption from which it suffers. In a process which can only be described as flawed, President Samper was exonerated of charges of corruption by the Colombian Congress. Moreover, Samper remained unwilling to fully confront the drug [cartels’] interests that contributed heavily to his presidential campaign” (Department of State, The United States of America, 1997). As a result of the drugs trafficking conditionality, the US did not certify the government of Colombia in 1996 and 1997, which created a diplomatic crisis between both countries. In 1997, after a heated debate in the US congress, Mexico came close to join Colombia in the group of “pariah countries”. 18

By and large, there is a wide consensus among the institutions that applied conditionality and the scholars who study this practice on the fact that the sustainability of the reforms depends on the recipient government’s commitment. In that sense, conditionality cannot be understood as a shallow process addressed exclusively to affect the recipient’s behavior, but to constitute its new subjectivity. This constructed subjectivity, called “ownership” in specialized jargon, refers to the willingness to engage with the western society and its neoliberal modern project—its worldview, policies, and programs—by the officials in a borrowing country, based on an understanding that the project is achievable, and it is in the country’s own interest. Then, the
new subjectivity that emerges recognizes the *universal value* of the neoliberal modernity and naturalizes the western hegemony thereby aligning Latin America’s identity and interests with the West. Latin America, recognized as the “other West”, would have to follow and to try to catch up with the authentic West.

*Between Free Competition and Conditionality as Practices*

*The Crisis of the Neoliberal Cultural Modernization*

The lack of good outcomes and the broken promise of neoliberalism triggered the neoliberal crisis in the region in the middle term. The material “reality” began to limit the possibility of extending the neoliberal modernity idea in the region. The economic growth became more elusive as the days passed, but the social cost of the reforms was very tangible. Political participation was seen as a mere formality without any substantive improvement in the individuals’ lives. In that sense, the questionable material achievements of the neoliberal modern project stripped the West’s domination over Latin America exercised by conditionality. The universality of the “we” that was constructed between the western society and Latin America by extending the practice of free competition–oriented by market rationality, and the faith in progress and individual freedom–came into question. The weak material results in the region, and the conditions imposed by the external centers opened room for an identification of “we” and a demarcation of “they” within an asymmetric scenery of conditionality characterized by the antagonism between a subordinate Latin America and a hegemonic West. The external providing agent came to be identified by the needy governments as the enemy, the adversary, the “constitutive outside” mentioned by Mouffé (2013) that allows recognizing the “we” through the ineradicable antagonism and division that separates it from “they”.

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Soon, the material crisis of neoliberalism in the region exposed the profound contradiction between the official message of the neoliberal discourse—based on the equality of all actors in the competition whether or not they are western agents—and the asymmetric practice attached to that message by which its ideas were conveyed and which assumed an inherent superiority of the western society. The neoliberal subjectivity that finds little interest in matters outside the individual’s private life and which seeks to maximize its own gains (see, e.g., Armony, 2005) was destabilized with the economic crisis. In the indigenous world, the failure of this selfish individual paved the way to question the neoliberal view that celebrates cultural pluralism and recognizes a minimal package of rights to the ancestral people, but which did nothing to produce lasting change for members of the culturally oppressed groups in terms of distribution of power and resources. In times of neoliberalism, Latin America kept boosting the euro-mimesis aligning “whiteness” to social welfare privileges (Goldberg, 2008). In that emerging context of meaning, the voices that portrayed conditionality not as a technical matter but as an imperial practice won more and more audience. For many, “rational imperialism had proved to be a façade for cynical imperialism” (Koskenniemi quoted in Mouffe, 2013: 36). Conditionality became a practice through which, to use the premonitory words of Galeano (1970: 153), “the oppressed is forced to take an alien, dissected, sterile memory created by the oppressor and to make it its own, thereby being resigned to live a life that is not his own as if it was the only one possible”. The neoliberal modernity project that depicted one hemisphere, from Alaska to Patagonia, integrated in a free market economy and ruled by neoliberal democracies began to crumble in the early twenty-first century. This ideal was supposed to be materialized in the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), whose negotiations took off with high optimism in the First
Summit of the Americas held in 1994 in Miami. The summit gathered all the 34 countries of the region, but it went into a state of permanent stagnation almost 11 years after in the Fourth Summit of the Americas. The idea of a western “we”, constituted by an “original West” that dictated the conditions ex ante and from outside, and the “other West” embodied by the government elites of the region, subject to being monitored and in charge of internally applying the conditioned policies, was challenged by the increased popular discontent and mobilizations. Thus, a neoliberal project that aimed for a culture concerned with the technical problem of efficiency, and which enhanced the moderation and depolitization, gave leeway to the radicalization of antagonisms in which the we/they dichotomy gained centrality, while the shared “we” came to lose its predominance.

The Crisis of the Neoliberal Economic Modernization

The anti-neoliberal positions spread quickly gaining a wide range of publics. The rejection of neoliberalism showed varying degrees, from radical opposition to moderate ones. The perspectives of the critiques varied as well. Some were based on ultimate values (substantive rationality), and focused on the outcomes of the process and the quality of the actors; while others were based on technical matters (formal rationality) and centred on the process. With all their degrees and forms, the truth was that the anti-neoliberalism discomforts had ignited in the entire region at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

Perhaps, an interesting indicator of the growing dissatisfaction with the neoliberal economic modernization was the loss of the agents’ prestige, which had driven the process of the economic reforms in the region. The IMF, the WB, and the WTO were spotted as mere institutions that served the international financial capital and the US imperialism in the region. The critics of neoliberalism found the “practice of giving financial assistance contingent to the
implementation of specific policies” (Dreher, 2008: 233) as an immoral behavior engaged with wild capitalism that let the international capital associated mainly with the US exploit and loot the region. The governments’ elites that introduced the package of reforms were accused of being allied with the imperial forces and of being insensitive to the demands of the people; the elites were traitors of their own nations. The poor economic results (connected with this neoliberal failure) fed radical criticism, given that the economic outcomes were judged as unsatisfactory according to ultimate values such as social justice or equality. In that sense, the broken promise of economic progress paved the way for a higher level of polarization as the basic moral assumption of organizing the economy on individualistic lines—and the virtue of private accumulation—were called into question.

This criticism usually came from social movements and trade unions, which protested against the neoliberal policies. At the same time, other emerging alternatives like neo-structuralism began to appear. This alternative aspired to resist and to present a potential substitute for the neoliberal modern economic project. It moved away from the former opposition (which could be defined as “anti”) not only because it was moderate rather than radical, but because it was also oriented by formal rather than substantive rationality. Since the launch in 1990 of the publication of Changing Production Patterns with Social Equity, the much discredited ECLAC gained influence progressively throughout the decade with neo-structuralism and its critique about the neoliberal market fundamentalism practiced by multilateral organizations (Leiva, 2008).

This fundamentalism becomes clear in many ways with some examination of the period in retrospective. For instance, “if the basic purpose of conditionality”, as the IMF and the WB argue, “was to safeguard their [own] resources” rather than convert the disadvantaged countries
into neoliberalism, “this could almost certainly be achieved with more modest conditions” (Bird quoted in Dreher, 2009: 244). Moreover, if the aim was to “set the house in order”, as the Washington Consensus states, rather than turning the region into neoliberalism, why was it necessary to “bribe” governments like Colombia, for example, which did not present problems of external debt and did not have an economic emergency during the 80’s and 90’s? As Torre (1998) reminds us, the event that catalyzed neoliberal structural reforms in Colombia was the request of the Barco administration in 1990 of a loan from the WB. One of the loan’s conditions was the adoption of policies addressed to open the national economy. There was no doubt that the external pressure induced the Barco government to “pursue policies it would not have chosen without the offer of aid (bribery)” (Dreher, 2009: 238).

**The Crisis of the Neoliberal Political Modernization**

At first glance, one of the facts that is surprising is confirming that there was a crisis of representation in Latin America at the beginning of the twenty-first century. As I mentioned earlier, this is because one of the distinctive features of the democratic transition of Latin America during the 80’s and 90’s was the interest in democratic practices and the procedures that regulate them. This interest became almost an obsession.

Furthermore, rather than showing a contrast between the generosity of political rights recognized in written constitutions, and the restrictive practices characterized by the recurrence of electoral fraud—as it was typical of the liberal democracy in the nineteenth century (Rouquié, 2011)—neoliberalism made important advances in electoral turn out, in the protection of the citizens’ political rights, and in the establishment of clear rules. With some well-known exceptions, like the successive re-election of Castro in the communist Cuba and the authoritarian regression of Fujimori in Peru, electoral fraud and dictatorships were virtually
banished from the region. Up to a certain point, the market rationality was successful in creating a political arena of free competition in which the public office was “auctioned off” to the “highest bidder” (Janos, 1986: 28). In fact, not only broker parties, but also nationalist political forces, historical leaders, and socialist parties won elections in the region. Nevertheless, the dissatisfaction of the common citizen with neoliberal democracy was more related with the fact that independently of whoever was in office, they led the country in a similar fashion.

In fact, the exclusion exercised by neoliberal democracy is not reflected in the participation of citizens (as the right to vote is recognized as universal), nor in the contestation (as no force that accepts the constitutional order is proscribed), but in the exclusion of economic, political, and social subjects imposed by external conditionality on the internal democratic debate. Then, the authoritarian component of neoliberalism in Latin America can be found in the depolitization of subjects that affect the wide population in the name of its technical necessity rather than in the return of militarist leaderships of the sort of Pinochet, Castelo Branco or Somoza. Market rationality, extrapolated to politics, allowed people to be part of the “auction” and participate as “bidders” under the restriction of not introducing into the “bid” the market conditions agreed with the external centers. This was done with the purpose of not having those conditions challenged, given that they were self-imposed in the name of “‘market governance’ that encourages both institutions and individuals to conform to the norms of the market” (Larner, 2000: 12). The pretended superiority of the objective rationality of the western external centers succeeded in keeping crucial topics for Latin American countries, such as the neoliberal model and the war on drugs, far from the electoral debate and the democratic modifications for the sake of the own country’s benefit.
Thus, it is not surprising that in Bolivia, none of the seven governments of the traditional parties nor any of the six elections before Morales became a presidential candidate, seriously called into question the “Decreto 21060 passed in 1985 [which following the recommendations of the Washington consensus] established the foundations for a new economic policy introducing an orthodox plan for stabilization and fiscal austerity measures” (Domingo, 2005: 1735) for the country. By the same logic, it is not surprising that in Colombia, presidents Gaviria (1990–1994) and Samper (1994–1998)--the former a well known critic today of the US war on drugs, and the latter a very famous advocate of the marijuana legalization at the end of the 70’s as a member of the ANIF\textsuperscript{21}--did not only omitted the controversy during their political campaigns, but also followed the terms imposed by Washington on this subject during their governments.

As a consequence, the subordination of “the will of the people” to the imperative of the universal rational demands of the modern project itself and the western society led to the crisis of the neoliberal political modernization in the region. With the depoliticization of the crucial topics that affect the national societies, whose decisions involve exclusively the external centers and the highest instances of the government, democracy becomes an innocuous game in “which different [elites] compete [just] to occupy the positions of power, their objectives being to dislodge others in order to occupy their place, without putting into question the dominant hegemony” (Mouffe, 2013:8).

The indifference of the political class, in many cases perceived as corrupt with respect to the situation of structural poverty and the social exclusion worsened by some neoliberal policies, produced disaffection with procedural democracy. The classical debate discussed by Huntington (1991) about whether or not the source (the will of people) or the purpose (the
common good) defines democracy was back in twenty-first century Latin America. Radical sectors, which conquered more spaces along the countries, addressed neoliberal democracy and its procedural conception as simple entelechies, mere façades to serve the elite and imperialism. The rioters’ claim, “throw them all out” during the Argentinean financial crisis of 2001, summarizes the state of affairs experienced by crucial sectors of the population in the continent with the neoliberal democracy.

3. Social Cleavages and Political Issues in the New Years of the Twenty-First Century

In the early twenty-first century, it was clear that the neoliberal project had not been enough so that Latin America could consolidate a new order and reach the elusive modernity. The causes of that situation can be found in the stiff conditionality through which the universal western truth attempted to spread in the region, in the failure of the formula “Washington Consensus + free economic competition = economic progress”, and in the inconsistency of the West to fully apply the neoliberal principles in its war on drugs, which transferred the high costs of the traffic to the region. The varied combination of these three causes affected the region in different forms and degrees, but nonetheless encompassed it entirely. After all, neoliberalism had addressed a “system of reciprocity, in which chiefs can rule effectively only if they satisfy the expectations on the parts of their subordinates” (Janos, 1986: 28). However, the utilitarian worldliness never appeared, at least not decisively in the economy or politics or in security.

The decline and dawn of the old and new centuries in Latin America were marked by instability, disaffections, and mass mobilizations.
There was instability in the political field, because “9 democratically elected presidents and their respective constitutional successors could not finish their terms of office” (Latinobarómetro, 2005). Most of them were toppled not by the military but by what the procedural democracy advocates call “street coups” (e.g., Valenzuela, 2008). The instability in the economic field was produced by the shrinkage of Latin America’s per capita GDP that had decreased in real terms during 1998 to 2003 (Moreno-Brid, 2005). This economic uncertainty was worsened by three almost consecutive shocks: Mexico 1995, South East Asia in 1998 and the Argentinean default of 2001 that engendered fear of Brazilian contagion.

Disaffection with the neoliberal modernity project was widespread as well. For the period between 1996 and 2000, only 37 per cent of Latin Americans were satisfied with democracy, in contrast to, for example, 53 per cent of the European Union and 48 per cent of Sub Saharan Africa citizens who affirmed to be satisfied or highly satisfied during a similar period. Only Costa Rica (61 per cent) and Uruguay (69 per cent) were satisfied with democracy. Others, such as Brazil, Paraguay and Ecuador showed worrying falls from 27 per cent in 1998 to 17 per cent in 1999/2000, from 24 per cent in 1998 to 12 per cent in 1999/2000 and from 33 per cent to 15 per cent, respectively (Latinobarómetro, 2001: 6-8). Even worse, six of the main problems pinpointed by Latin American citizens were linked with the lack of good economic outcomes and the costs related with the neoliberal structural reforms. Thus, between 2001 and 2003, the population considered unemployment (with 24.4 per cent) as the more pressing problem of their countries; low salaries and poverty came in third and fourth places (both with 10.2 per cent); and employment instability in fifth place (with 7.4 per cent). No less disturbing is that the second problem, corruption (with 10.6 per cent), and the sixth one, crime and public security (with 8.3 per cent) were issues tightly related with the political and social costs of drug
trafficking which stemmed from the war on drugs. Moreover, in Mexico and Central American countries such as Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, those problems are considered sometimes ahead of the issues related to employment and poverty. In the same period, most Colombians considered terrorism, political violence, and guerilla incursions as their main issues with 42 per cent, far above of the regional average of 6.4 per cent (Latinobarómetro, 2003).

What institutional instability and the profound dissatisfaction of the citizens show is that the collective meanings that give sense to the neoliberal modernity project were crumbling. Social protests run through the region at the local and national levels: from the premonitory “Caracazo” in 1989 that would seal the destiny of Venezuela ten years later, to the spiral of anti-neoliberal contention that shook the provinces of Argentina between 1996 and 1998, which led to a national mobilization that toppled President De La Rua in December 2001. This wave of uprisings was also marked by indigenous and peasant mass mobilizations, mainly in Bolivia and Ecuador, but also in Peru, Colombia and Chile in lesser degrees. It included intermediate strife such as the War of Water in Cochabamba in 2000, the Gas War in Bolivia, the protest of CONAIE in Ecuador, the indigenous minga in Colombia, and the Mapuche protest in Chile. Yet, this wave also involved decisive encounters characterized by massive protests that concluded with the forced resignation of President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada in Bolivia in 2003, and presidents Bucaram in 1996, Mahuad in 2000, and Gutiérrez in 2005 in Ecuador (Silva, 2009).

Colombia and Mexico were also places of huge mobilizations. Colombian society, fed up with the war and with the acts of barbarism committed by the guerilla, massively mobilized in a protest that was convened through social networks by a group called One Million Voices
Against FARC. This march in 2008 was the peak of other public manifestations against kidnappings, terrorism, and in favor of a humanitarian agreement between the government and the guerilla such as the march of professor Moncayo from his home town to Bogota in protest for his son’s release, the March for Life and Peace in 1997, and the march to condemn the attack of Club El Nogal, among others. Similarly, Mexico has also experienced a visible protest movement. For instance, the March for Peace with Justice and Dignity, arrived in Mexico City in 2011 and denounced the grievances produced by violence in the Mexican society. This claim for peace and justice added to other previous initiatives such as some related with mass serial killings of women in Juarez, and the struggles in favor of migrants’ rights.

Nevertheless, it is possible to see at least three different emerging political dynamics that would mark the recent future of the countries of Latin America behind all the instability, dissatisfaction, and mobilization produced by the crumbling of the collective meanings that gave sense to the neoliberal modernity project.

Two of these dynamics are bottom-up forces, which are explained as movements that emerge on the basis of identification with social groups placed along social cleavages (Van der Eijk and Franklim, 2009). Both of these movements heighten the sense of social exclusion, the discredit of the ruling class, and struggle to subvert the neoliberal order considered responsible for the oppressive situation. One movement stresses “cultural demands” (e.g., Calderón Gutiérrez, 2012: 25) that look to enhance the differentiation between the “we” and the “they”, expressed in terms of anticolonial struggle among local cultures vs. western society. This trend includes the Movement of Coca Growers, the Revolutionary Movement Tupaj Katari of Liberation, and the Assembly of the People’s Sovereignty in Bolivia; the Confederation of
Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE), and the Movement Pachakutik of Plurinational Unity in Ecuador; the Zapatista movement in Mexico; and the Indigenous, Social and Popular Minga in Colombia. The other movement emphasizes the situation of structural poverty and social inequality addressed to articulate demands related with “the problem of social reproduction” (e.g., Calderón Gutiérrez, 2012: 25). The dialectic between “we” and “they” is established more as a problem of what Buzan and Albert (2010) have called in conceptual terms uneven “access to basic resources” and it is expressed internally in terms of 

*pueblo* vs. oligarchy, and internationally between the western empire and the Latin American periphery. Here it is worth mentioning the Landless in Brazil and the Route Cutters Movement in Argentina, among others. Both the former and the latter trends articulate their identity or equality politics through an anti-global-neoliberal discourse that allows linking and calling into question international phenomena such as western hegemony and the leadership of national elites.

Distinctly, the third trend responds more to a *politics of issues* in which people imbedded in demonstrations come from different social groups, driven by whatever forces they consider harmful to all members of society as a whole (Van der Eijk and Franklim, 2009). In this time of confusion and social strains, those mobilizations prioritize “higher efficiency and legitimacy of state institutions” (Calderón Gutiérrez, 2012: 25) over subverting the neoliberal modern order. They advocate to improve the system, not to change it: the aim is to re-establish the rule of law and to stop the violence that affects all people equally, rich and poor, left and right wing. The heightened sense of insecurity prompted by the actions of organized crime, drug trafficking and the violence of guerilla groups has motivated those kind of politics. Organizations like Free Country and Azfamipaz in Colombia, and the Movement for Peace with Justice and Dignity,
Conclusion

The course of the neoliberal modernity project in Latin America is related with the tension between the practices of free competition and conditionality. During the 80’s and 90’s, the project’s introduction and implementation was made on behalf of free competition. Market rationality and individual freedom shaped the project’s economic, political, and cultural aspects. Modernity became neoliberal par excellence. Neoliberalism proposed free economic competition and market rationality as the bases of a model centered in private accumulation. Procedural democracy introduced market rationality to the political field commercializing political relations and “auctioning off” the office to the “highest bidder”. The global neoliberal culture attempted to constitute a subjectivity that found little interest in matters outside the individual’s private life and which sought to maximize its own gains. In the field of cultural pluralism, neoliberalism celebrated cultural diversity and recognized a minimal package of cultural rights as long as they did not jeopardize the self-interested neoliberal agent. It was the time of neoliberal structural reforms–privatization, trade and capital account liberalization, and fiscal reforms;–the period in which the free elections and constitutions that guarantee the citizens’ political rights and the republican order were back. In general, it was a project aimed to construct a “we” between the western society and Latin America through the expansion of the practice of free competition.

Nevertheless, the persistent situation of economic scarcity and the high social costs brought by neoliberal reforms, as well as the crisis of the rule of law in some countries heightened by the drugs prohibitionism in western societies, opened room for the politicization of conditionality.
as a practice to introduce and consolidate the neoliberal project in the region. The practice of conditionality allowed Latin America to see the hegemonic project behind the neoliberal modernity in which the western society as its natural bearer presents itself as superior in moral and rational terms. The call to bring back the agency of the region, this is, its responsibility as a subject of its own history which was snatched by the West in the name of the unquestionable market rationality gained more audience each day. The crisis of the neoliberal economic modernization is seen in the impossibility of keeping with the promise of assuring economic progress. The crisis of the neoliberal political modernization is reflected in the subordination of the “will of people” to the imperatives of the universal rational demands of the modern project itself and the western society. The crisis of the global cultural neoliberalism is seen in the radicalization of the antagonism between the “we” of Latin America and the “they” of the western society that opens room for confrontation.

In that sense, the early years of the twenty-first century began with the crisis of the neoliberal modernity project. This crisis would allow for different political trends in the region to open; some would call for subverting the neoliberal modernity project, while others would call to reestablish it. All things considered, the top-down politics that took the West as referent and neoliberalism as content will have to compete with an emerging bottom-up politics that, prone to radicalizing the antagonism of the West, would search for its own path in a global world.
Chapter Two: Emerging Projects in Latin America in the Early XXI Century: An Interpretative Analysis of Their Variations

Neoliberalism reached its tipping point in Latin America in the early twenty-first century. The effects of the crisis were not confined to a single country, but they were widespread throughout most of the region. In theory, a competitive political system is “likely to persist if, and only if: (a) the more important societal problems are put on the agenda.., and (b) the more important policy problems are solved in a satisfactory way” (Freddi, 1985: 147).

Those were the very two things hindered by the practice of conditionality, as I previously discussed in the first chapter.

On the one hand, this practice not only put aside the public discussion about the high social costs and low economic growth following the adoption of neoliberalism as a socioeconomic model, but it also depoliticized the debate about the legalization of drugs in producer countries and the limits imposed by the American prohibitionism to the neoliberal free economic competition. Those important societal problems were approached outside the electoral contention, in closed circles, and among specialists: neoliberalism as a socioeconomic model
became a matter of technocratic centers, while drug trafficking remained a topic of Washington and of national security forces.

On the other hand, instead of solving the problems in a satisfactory way, the recipe of the Washington Consensus and the American prohibitionism seemed to exacerbate them. The package of policies introduced by the former fell short in the global evolution of the per capita GDP that the sub-continent demanded, and the recessionary inertia of the 80’s was not overcome decisively in the 90’s. Prohibitionism kept the high costs of the War on Drugs in the producer countries, while the violence and corruption related with the illegal traffic were not significantly affected.

As a result, the contradiction between the practice of free competition and the practice of conditionality led to delegitimize the entire collective meanings that maintained the liberal modernity project. The crack in the neoliberal worldview led to a deep crisis in the projects of economic and political modernization.

This disenchantment was expressed out of the traditional party system as massive social mobilizations shocked the continent. Bottom-up forces stressed the situation of structural poverty and social inequality, while others pressed for alternative worldviews expressed in terms of decolonial struggles. Those social movements that called for subverting the liberal modernity project were the contemporaries of other movements that demanded higher efficiency and legitimacy of state institutions. While some street demonstrations attacked the main ideas and ultimate values of liberal modernity, others expressed their discontent with the disparity between the actual outcome and the expected economic progress and democratic stability.
Nevertheless, when the discontent reached the electorate and the first left-wing presidents were elected, many committed analysts began to talk about the regional “turn to the left” (e.g., Silva, 2009; Rodríguez Garavito et al., 2004; Sader, 2011) and a “post neo-liberal turn” (e.g., Bebbington and Humphreys-Bebbington, 2011; Brenner et al., 2010; Macdonald and Ruckert, 2009). Sader (2011) argues, for example, that the continent went from being a focus of resistance to neoliberalism (with the social movements) to being the place in which the most developed alternatives to neoliberalism began to take form (with the promising leftist governments). For some of the direct protagonists, like the Venezuelan former president Hugo Chávez (1999-2013), the time of liberalism was gone; it was the end of a paradigm, of an era (Blanco Muñoz, 1998: 121).

In contrast, on the opposite end of the ideological spectrum, the most sensible thing to do was to wait for “normality” to come back. After all, with the “triumph of the West”–of the liberal idea–history was on their side (Fukuyama, 1989: 3). Technocrats, members of the high governments, and international agencies, like Rudolf Hommes (2006: 29), Minister of Economics of Colombia during president Cesar Gaviria administration (1990-1994), referred to the emerging left governments as momentary deviations, arguing that “until leftist presidents reach their inevitable fall, we will have to endure them and to bear the costs of the negative externalities generated by them”.

A careful analysis of recent Latin American history shows that the sub-continent is neither the privileged place for “alternative worlds” depicted by the left, nor is it the “land of neoliberalism” that it used to be. Indeed, the current Latin America is producing different national projects, all of which are not necessarily “alternatives”. The twenty-first century is the time of self proclaimed revolutionaries like Chávez and Maduro in Venezuela, Gutiérrez and
Correa in Ecuador, and Ortega in Nicaragua; it is also the time of novel decolonizers like Morales in Bolivia, and to some extent, Correa himself in Ecuador; it is the time of widely accepted reformers like Lula and Rousseff in Brazil, and Vázquez and Mujica in Uruguay; and even long awaited restorers of order like Uribe and Santos in Colombia, Calderón and Peña Nieto in Mexico, Lobo in Honduras, and Pérez Molina in Guatemala.

Clearly, in the first decade and a half of the twenty-first century, the neoliberal promise of bringing modernity to the area seems broken or not clear...except perhaps in Chile. It is true that countries like Peru, Colombia, and Mexico, for example, keep applying neoliberal policies. However, it is also true that they did it in the midst of high uncertainties. Peru applied these policies in a context of profound social inconformity and with the presence of strong anti-system candidates, as the current president Humala was in the 2006 campaign. The states of Colombia and Mexico have had to face the difficult situations of violence, public order and the effects of drug trafficking. Hence, in these three countries, neoliberal policies have lacked the necessary national consensus or stability that may guarantee their sustained application in the future. Only in Chile is neoliberal modernity consolidated. This southern country is the baseline for describing and evaluating the departures from this model in the rest of the region.

A diachronic comparison confirms the extent to which free competition became a cornerstone practice of social order in Chile. On one hand, the Socialist Party historically jeopardized the free economic competition. The socialist candidate Lagos, and fellow party member Bachelet, were elected presidents in 2000 and 2006 respectively. However, they pledged to promote the capitalist system, which their co-partisan Allende had promised to eliminate nearly three decades earlier in 1970. In her first government plan, for instance, Bachelet (2005) stated that “the free economic competition [w]as necessary so that the market could operate to benefit the
citizens and not the powerful” (42). This dictum abandoned the call to overcome the “capitalist dependent system which counterposes the rich minority to the disadvantaged majority” (Allende, 1974: 418). On the other hand, in the political field, the right wing that had adopted a putschist position with Allende’s electoral triumph (Silva, 2011) made an important change accepting the rules of procedural democracy. Its candidates would not only participate in free electoral competitions against left parties later, but they also respected the republican order of checks and balances. When the right-wing candidate, Piñera, came to power in 2010, he observed the republican order that Pinochet once broke in the name of the “defence of freedom and against the Marxist threat” (Pinochet, 1973) in 1973.

The acceptance of Chileans towards neoliberalism was rewarded with good economic outcomes and political stability. Since Pinochet’s time in office, Chile has directed its economic reforms according to the policy actions that are desirable to the Washington Consensus such as “macroeconomic discipline, outward orientation and market economy” (Williamson, 2005: 197). The efficient fiscal and financial policies have usually placed Chile in the top of the World Economic Forum’s ranking of macroeconomic management, and it made it worthy of the first place in 2005 (World Economic Forum, 2005-2006). The outward orientation of the Chilean economy is also clear: it is not only one of the countries with the lowest tariffs in the sub-continent, around 10 per cent in 1999 (Lora, 2001: 5), but it is also at the forefront in terms of commercial agreements. Chile has signed 22 commercial agreements, including 16 Free Trade Agreements that involve 52 countries counting the main economies of the world like the US, the E.U and China, in addition to Asia-Pacific countries (Gobierno de Chile, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2014: Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2014). Finally, the Global Competitiveness Index 2011-2012 published by the World Economic
Forum ranked Chile as the most competitive economy of Latin America and placed it 31 in the world, confirming its market economy orientation.

The market practices implemented by Chile along those years allowed it to be the first Latin American country to be accepted in the OECD and to become the 31st member of that prestigious international organization (OCDE, 2010). In addition, and in contrast with the average GDP annual rate of 3 per cent in Latin America during the 90’s (Lora, 2001: 352)—clearly not enough to reduce the poverty index of the region—Chile’s annual growth was 7.3 per cent, making it the longest, strongest and most stable period of growth in its history, and far above the regional average (Aninat, 2000). The country reduced the percentage of the population living in poverty from 38.6 per cent in 1990 to 21.7 per cent in 1998, and the population living in extreme poverty fell to 5.6 per cent from 12.9 per cent in the same period (Aninat, 2000). In Freddi’s (1985) terms, the neoliberal order “put down roots” in Chile because (a) it put economic development as the most important societal problem on the agenda, and (b) it was solved in a satisfactory way.36

The Chilean democratic transition meant the consolidation of the neoliberal modernity project in the sense that it legitimized a discourse that established a set of ultimate values—the idea of progress, the faith in reason and science and in individual freedom—and it prescribed market rationality as the legitimate means to achieve them. In that sense, the efficient market economy based on private accumulation became the actual path to reach progress and to finally catch up with the West. Thus, according to the left-wing Bachelet, “for Chile, it is imperative to make sure that the Chilean economy keeps growing. If we do that for the next decade at the same rates that the Concertation has made it possible since 1990, we will reach the income levels of countries such as Spain or Portugal” (Bachelet, 2005: 9). This is a goal shared by the right-wing
Piñera who thinks that development, with an annual growth rate of 6 per cent, is only 8 years away. This would allow Chile to enter officially in the First World in 2018 (Ministerio de la Presidencia, Gobierno de Chile, 2012: 15-16). Around this rational neoliberal agreement, the previous centripetal forces that once divided Chile into two enemy fields—the anticapitalist left-wing side led by Allende vs. the antidemocratic right-wing side led by Pinochet—became simple “competitors” that, as Mouffe (2013: 8) critically notes with regard to liberalism in all its different variations, just have the “objective to dislodge their [opponents] in order to occupy their place, without putting into question the dominant hegemony and profoundly transforming the relations of power”. It was the notorious continuity between the governments’ programs of the left and the right what led Silva (2011: 223) to describe Piñera’s administration as the “fifth Concertation government”, despite the fact that the right had been waiting almost 50 years to win an election in Chile again.

In general, it is clear that with the crisis of the neoliberal modernity, new national projects are emerging in Latin America while others remain, resulting in different collective meanings, practices, and trajectories that are giving form to the region. Hence, understanding the different trajectories followed by the countries within their domestic orders (and the variations among the emerging collective meanings that explain those new trajectories) becomes a crucial task to interpret what is happening in the area.

Therefore, the first part of this chapter engages critically with such notions like the “turn to the left”, “post-neoliberalism”, and other less popular theses postulated by a number of authors to explain those changes. The second part aims to compare the projects of the new governments vis-à-vis the neoliberal modernity project of the previous decades, including the one currently held by Chile. This requires the categorization and analysis of the variations of the new
proposals regarding neoliberalism, not only in their ultimate values and rationalities, but also from their places of enunciation. The third part aims to understand the collective meaning and the representation of the different emerging projects. This involves identifying the predominant social cleavages or political issues that mark the trajectory of each project, and in addition, it involves working out the ultimate values, rationalities and practices of the new projects. Finally, in the conclusion, the main arguments are summed up in order to draw a very brief explanation about the causes behind the variations among the different projects.

**Critical Review**

To understand the meaning and direction of the current change in Latin America is an unresolved task. After the neoliberal modernity crisis, the region has mostly been tackled in strategic terms as an opposition between right wing and left wing forces. This interpretation depicting the sub-continent divided in rival ideological fields has been done through two different approaches: the first one is the universalizing approach (Tilly, 1984) –in which usually the well known “turn to the left” and the “post-neoliberal studies” are placed–that argues that every instance of the process of change follows essentially the same rule. The second one is the variation finding approach (Tilly, 1984)–in which authors like Castañeda (2006) and Calderón Gutiérrez (2008a, 2008b) are placed–that opens room for taking into account the multiple forms adopted by groups of countries with respect to the liberal modernity.
The Universalizing Approach

Turn-To-The-Left Studies

The left-right dichotomy shapes the content of the “turn to the left” studies, given that its analysis occurs in a kind of hierarchical structure in which the attributes of the left are assessed as positive, while those of the right are considered negative. Within this dichotomous world, the left is characterized as equalitarian, democratic, pluralistic and anti-imperialist (e.g., Rodríguez Garavito et al, 2004; Sader, 2011; Cameron & Hershberg, 2010), while the right is described as socially insensitive, authoritarian and imperialist (e.g., Domínguez et al, 2011). This kind of analysis, usually led by committed intellectuals, objectifies the left wing identity in the historic struggle for emancipation against the right forces that represent oppression and that have to be defeated. Thus, Rodríguez Garavito and Barrett (2004) undoubtedly characterize the new Latin American left wing forces in strategic terms according to their perspectives of “opposition and search for alternatives with respect to economic neoliberalism and the deepening of democracy” (21). Within a recurrent logic in this kind of literature, the aforementioned authors create a checklist that contains the five common features of the left forces of the continent: “Plurality of strategies and articulation of decentralized organizational forms, multiplicity of social bases and political agendas, centrality of the civil society, reformism, and the deepening of democracy” (Rodríguez Garavito and Barrett, 2004: 31-37).

However, when the new left-wing governments of the region are closely seen through those five features, it becomes clear that they are not common to all the governments. Thus, for example, the plurality of strategies can be seen in the Broad Front in Uruguay and the Workers’ Party in Brazil, both of which work as “coordinators” of social movements and left-wing forces, but it is definitely not a characteristic of the Justicialista Party in Argentina with a
centralized political party machinery, or in the United Socialist Party of Venezuela, which is centralized around the caudillo’s will. In the same way, the centrality of the civil society becomes doubtful in countries including Ecuador and Argentina that harass the free press, or Venezuela, which represses social protests. In general, the main limitation that this approach has in order to understand the sense of the current change in Latin America is its tendency to offer a generic characterization of the left wing as a group of forces strategically opposed to the right and to neoliberalism. In its desire to construct the “common front” required by the ideological confrontation, the vague label of “left wing” obscures the comprehension of different ideas, rationalities, and practices among countries of the area that seek an alternative to neoliberal modernity but not necessarily all in the same way. In short, the “turn to the left studies” presents an elusive generic characterization of the left that lacks empirical evidence.

“Post-Neoliberal Studies

Following the same “turn to the left” logic, and going one step further, the “post-neoliberal” approach asks, “what might come after neoliberalism?” (Yates and Bakker, 2014: 62). Formulated in this way, this question presumes first the eventual extinction of the neoliberal project in the sub-continent rather than merely a “turn”; and second, it makes way for the debate of the next stage of “post-neoliberalism” (e.g., Bebbington and Humphreys-Bebbington, 2011; Brenner et al., 2010; Macdonald and Ruckert, 2009). This linear view of current Latin America envisions neoliberalism as a process that makes sense only insofar as it enables the advent of the emancipatory project nowadays. The “post-neoliberal project” would allow overcoming the fundamental contradiction of neoliberal modernity that promises economic progress and democracy, but which in turn produces poverty, inequality and oppression. From this perspective, the general characterization of the region is produced when the aims of “post-
neoliberalism” as a specific utopian project are linked with the “final goals” of the entire region, and the path to reach those aims is bonded to a package of flexible policies that the area is gradually and evenly putting in practice.

Yates and Bakker (2014), for example, found that the ideas of re-socialization and deepened democracy are the aims of the post-neoliberal approach, defined *ex-ante* and presented as the “final historical goals” of the region. The former is understood as a re-socialization of the market economy and a process of re-funding the state around the social sphere, and the latter is conceived as the re-politicization of the civil society and a new regional political economy in the regional integration. The linear view is completed here with a checklist made of sixteen policies that constitute the right path to the final goals and allows identifying the early signs of the process in the subcontinent. Thus, on one hand, post-neoliberalism matches the idea of re-socialization with the implementation of a package of nine policies that includes, in the case of market economy, building a solidarity economy, strengthening labor relations, decommodification, re-establishing common property rights and participatory budgeting; and in the case of re-funding the state around a social sphere, it includes the regulation of the social sector and social services, nationalization, regulation of big business, and domestic market stimulation. On the other hand, the post-neoliberal approach matches the idea of deepened democracy with seven policies that, in the case of the re-politization of civil society, includes the creation of spaces of consensus building, the institutionalization of participatory decision-making mechanisms, pluri-nationalism and pluri-culturalism, and social mobilizations as ‘politics as usual’; additionally, in the case of regional integration, it contains regional cooperation, financial autonomy, and regional anti-imperialism (Yates and Baker, 2014: 71).
The immediate consequence of this teleological historical view is that it ignores some of the political realities present in the area. Firstly, the hasty “post-neoliberal” proclamation in Latin America tends to overlook the fact that at least ten of the nineteen countries of the zone are governed by center or center-right parties. However, it also disregards that fact that the neoliberal modernity project got consolidated in Chile, and that some countries such as Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Panama keep pursuing the neoliberal track; moreover, that some neoliberal tendencies are still operating in practice in countries like Costa Rica, or even in Brazil and Uruguay, to a certain extent. Nevertheless, this reality is not usually registered as meaningful in the “post neoliberal analysis” because vis-à-vis the ex-ante assigned regional finality, it lacks historical positive significance. Right-wing forces and neoliberalism are depicted as anachronisms that are condemned to disappear by historical necessity (e.g., Dominguez, et al, 2011). The problem with this approach is that the empirical evidence is not conclusive.

To sum up, the “turn to the left” and “post-neoliberal” works introduce a dialectic and linear view around the dichotomy left-right in order to understand the meaning and direction of the current change in Latin America. The more systematic empirical analysis based on the development plans of the eighteen Latin American governments introduced in this chapter will allow, on the one hand, to disprove their assertions with regard to the unity of the sub-continent under the label of “left wing”; and on the other, to question how they neglect right wing forces and how they underestimate the relative importance that the current neoliberal modernity project, albeit lessened, still maintains.
Variation Finding Approach

Castañeda’s Work

Castañeda’s article published in 2006, the time in which the “Pink Tide” peaked and seemed to be unstoppable in the continent, has been widely publicized but also criticized by supporters of the two aforementioned schools. The reasons are many and self-evident in certain respects. Clearly, one reason is the ideological position of his work. In contrast with the “turn to the left” and “the post-neoliberal” studies, Castañeda’s paper is not addressed to undermine the neoliberal modernity but to preserve it.

The second reason, which is very interesting for its methodological consequences, is that in spite of embedding his work in the strategic opposition right-left, his analysis does not occur in a rigid hierarchical structure. Evidently, he favors the right enhancing qualities of what he calls the “virtuous cycle of economic progress and improved democratic governance, overseen (…) by centrist technocratic governments” (Castañeda, 2006: 28). However, the left is not necessarily unified under negative attributes. In fact his paper identifies variations between the “right” and “wrong” left. The “right” left is characterized with positive attributes such as economic responsibility, being respectful of representative democracy, and tempered anti-Americanism (Castañeda, 2006). On the other hand, the “wrong” left is tied to negative attributes as concerned to “maintaining the popularity [and the power] at any cost, picking as many fights as possible with Washington, and getting as much control as they can over sources of revenue” (Castañeda, 2006: 38). In methodological terms, it is interesting that by calling into question the sharp dichotomy right-left, his work breaks the general characterization of the region, finding variations among the countries that are considered part of the left wave. His
paper shows that beyond the vague label of left, there are “left-wing countries” driven by different ideas, rationalities and practices.

Finally, another point that distances Castañeda’s works from previous universalizing approaches is related with the evaluation of the perspective from where he writes and the strategy that is required for future movements. While the committed intellectuals are interested in creating an elusive “common left front” that would lead them to sweep the neoliberal status quo, Castañeda is concerned with finding divisions that would allow the “right-wing governments” to establish a dialogue with the left side and ensure neoliberal continuity. The author makes two important contributions with this final point in order to understand the sense and the orientation of change in the sub-continent: first and in contrast with the historical deterministic view, he allows to see that the neoliberal modernity project is still crucial in order to understand what is going on in the area; and second, he hints at the importance of understanding the rationalities that would let the countries speak beyond the ideological differences. It is not just a matter of a checklist of ideas and practices, but also of the rationalities that determine how to handle those differences.

**Calderón Gutiérrez’s Work**

Calderón Gutiérrez presents a Latin America experiencing a moment of crisis, inflection, and political change. He traces a typology of a region divided in four different political orientations, and each of them seemed to be defined according to their ideological inclination and the group of policies that they apply. Those orientations are: “conservative modernization, practical reformism, popular nationalism, and indigenous developmentalism” (Calderón Gutiérrez, 2008a: 130; 2008b: 34-35). The originality of this suggestive typology relies on the fact that it breaks the teleological and predominant general characterization of the area, and it also goes
beyond the right-left dichotomy that does not acknowledge all the differences by assigning vague labels in its aim to favor the strategic confrontation. His contribution to find the projects’ variations in the current region is significant because it paves the way to search for multiple possible goals, all with different paths.

Although it points in the right direction, Calderón´s work never goes beyond the description of the four political and ideological projects of the area. His work can neither explain the direction of the change nor clarify the causes of the variations among the cases he describes.

In order to grasp the direction of the continent’s change, it is necessary to systematically compare the sense of the emerging discourses vis-à-vis the neoliberal one, and like Castañeda’s work, to analyze whether or not they are compatible with the neoliberal discourse and establish the kind of continuity or rupture they present. Only by comparing the ex-ante situation with the ex-post is it possible to establish to what extent the new projects take distance of the neoliberal modernity project. Also, in order to establish the context of meaning of the discourse, it is important to study the perspective from where they are announced: do the new discourses share or dispute the central and metropolitan nature of global neoliberalism? Or on the contrary, are they peripheral discourses linked with subordinate groups? The risk of not taking this approach is to assume, rewording one of Castañeda’s examples, that Morales (professing an indigenous local discourse) is the indigenous Che (professing a Marxist international discourse).

The main limitation in explaining the variations among the cases is that the author describes the external characteristics of the four orientations, but he leaves out the explanation of the social representations and even the material conditions that work as causes of those variations. In order to grasp the divergences among the projects, it is not enough to cover in a checklist, for
example, that “practical reformism” displays a pragmatic policy with the US; that “popular nationalism” shows an anti-imperialist policy; that “indigenous neo-developmentalitym” presents a moderate anti-imperialism ideology; and that “conservative modernization” displays an ideological association with the US. Instead, it requires (paraphrasing Weber, 1968) an interpretative understanding behind those four precise policies in order to trace a causal explanation of their course and consequences. In brief, it is by figuring out the subjective meaning that the actors behind the different orientations attribute to these, so that the variations can be explained. The author seems concerned with identifying practices understood only as the application of specific policies that are common to each particular ideological project. However, he omits the understanding of the practices and rationalities of the groups involved in the creation and development of these policies, and the place of enunciation from where they speak. Therefore, his work can describe the form of each project, but it does not explain the subjective meaning behind each of them.

**Project Variations in Current Latin America: Places of Enunciation and Rationalities**

Instead of composing descriptive checklists of principles and policies to characterize the region—lists that remain incomplete either by excess or by default but never fully applied in practice by the countries—this chapter focuses on understanding the social representations behind those incomplete checklists. My analysis is based on the development plans of 18 Latin American countries.

As a consequence, rather than focusing on listing the external characteristics of the region as a whole (e.g., the turn to the left and the post neoliberal studies), or on their different orientations (e.g., Calderón Gutiérrez), this work addresses the internal discourses and social practices of
the political groups involved in the construction of the specific policies and principles. This perspective allows for an understanding of the orientation and sense of the changes, and it explains why those checklists are always incomplete and inaccurate.

In general terms, it is possible to interpret the orientation of the change in Latin America with respect to neoliberal modernity in light of two possible discussions. One refers to the place of enunciation of the new projects and is concerned with the extent to which those emergent discourses are articulated from the center or the periphery. The other is about the sort of continuity or rupture that the rising projects represent with respect to the rationality of neoliberal modernity, that is, if the alternatives to neoliberalism are constructed following a critical formal rationality or a critical substantive rationality. Each debate contains two basic positions, which yields four different projects in the region (deconstructive indigeneity, confrontational populism, social liberal reformism, and radical neoliberalism) and a 2x2 “map” of combinations (peripheral agency-substantive rationality, central agency-substantive rationality, and so on). This “map” can be applied to the countries of the area that implemented neoliberal structural reforms.

**The Discussions Regarding the Neoliberal Modernity Project**

The point of departure is to explain each pair of discussions as a continuum like Wendt (1999) did in his ontological approach to IR. The first pair is center-periphery. The debate is over the place of enunciation of the emergent discourses and the kind of challenge they represent. In order to create a single continuum, I will delineate the core question as follows: To what extent are the emergent projects articulated in the privileged center like neoliberalism? While it is possible to find a position along the continuum, they are often classified in two groups: central or peripheral projects.
The “peripheral projects” are related not only with the site where the projects are articulated but also with the origin of the discourse they enhance. Thus, those projects are articulated from the margins of the society—from “far, local and uncivilized” places, or from illegal and persecuted activities that escape the state’s control—and also from the subordinate groups that have been silenced for centuries—indigenous and afro descendent groups, for example—or emergent sectors that have been excluded and criminalized like drugs traffickers. Outside the official neoliberal rationality, those places of enunciation and actors are often not recognized, and they become subject of intervention: Territories and peoples that either the free market or the rule of law have to integrate and “civilize”. In this way, peripheral projects resist and question both the privileged central place from where neoliberalism is announced and its western metropolitan origins that disregard national “realities” and deprive local actors of any agency.

“Central projects” are, on the contrary, and in the same vein of neoliberalism, articulated from the very core of the national political life. They compete against it from the center for “the control, organization, goals, and policy options of the system as a whole” (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967: 10). What those central projects look for is less to resist the neoliberal expansion along the national space as peripheral projects do, but rather more to modify or substitute it. Given the colonial history of the region, those central rival projects usually share a similar privileged western origin with neoliberalism that can be traced down to the West’s recent past. International epistemic communities, national political parties, or even military barracks are some of the privileged places from where those alternative national projects are articulated. 40

The second discussion is concerned with the sort of continuity or rupture that the rising projects mean with respect to the representation of the neoliberal modernity narrative. Thus, in order to grasp how the emerging projects challenge neoliberalism in both its ideas that mark the
modernity direction and its rationality that organizes the neoliberal practice, the discussion introduces the formal rationality-substantive rationality problem. For purposes of defining a continuum in this case, the central question is: to what extent do the emerging projects mean a rupture with respect to the neoliberal social representation? Substantive rationality and formal rationality are the two main answers.

The emergent projects driven by a substantive rationality critique call into question the very main ideas and ultimate values that give direction to the neoliberal modernity project. The universal value given to individual freedom for its own sake as a form to organize the social world becomes sharply contested as we go further in the continuum: private accumulation turns unfair, citizen liberties become a mere façade, and the moderate citizen turns highly suspicious of any complacency with the establishment. In the continuum’s extreme, it is possible to find a more radical version, which going beyond neoliberalism, can reject modernity’s ultimate values, such as the idea of progress and the faith in science and reason. The controversy between the emerging projects and neoliberalism oriented by a substantive rationality tends to take the form of a radical ideological struggle about what is considered appropriate. The reason is that what is at stake is the validity of the liberal ultimate values applied as “unique standards against which reality’s flow of unending empirical events may be selected, measured, and judged” (Kalberg, 1980: 1155). The confrontation between non-negotiable ultimate values leads to a clash of worldviews, and to an essentialist form of antagonistic identification between a “we” and a “they” that paves the way for a friend-foe logic (see e.g., Lipset & Rokkan, 1967: 11; Mouffe, 2013: 7; Wendt, 1999: 260). The new projects based on this rationality tend to present a rupture with the neoliberal modernity project.
In contrast, the new projects oriented by a formal rationality question the convenience of some neoliberal policies rather than the appropriateness of the main ideas that hold the neoliberal modernity project together (March & Olsen, 1998; Hall & Taylor, 1996). They accept to a large extent the principle of individual liberty that, once naturalized, is formalized through “universal” “objective” laws such as supply and demand in economics, contestation and participation in electoral matters, and checks and balances in government exercise. However, these new projects oriented by a formal rationality call into question the orthodox application of the neoliberal policies with respect to their high costs and poor results. Thus, for example, as Leiva (2008) argues, they reject the notion of an automatic adjustment of the market because it falls short of promoting social cohesion, and they advocate for state intervention in the cultural and social realms. As a consequence, rather than strongly rejecting the neoliberal modernity, the new projects led by a formal rationality negotiate with it trying to find an acceptable formula for the parties involved and affected by the policies. Given that the institutional frame is not at stake, and that individual freedom is guaranteed, the antagonism between “we” and “they” is transformed in a consensual opposite wherein enmity becomes rivalry, that is political opponents want similar things, only in a different way. More than a conflict about ultimate values, this rivalry is related with the means-end calculation and the “allocation of resources, products and benefits of the economy” (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967: 10). The new projects driven by a formal rationality lean towards reformism and present continuity with the previous neoliberal order.

In order to illustrate the two discussions around the kind of change being experienced by the region, it is possible to put the debate between formal rationality and substantive rationality along the x-axis, and the debate between center and periphery on the y-axis (see Figure 2).
Clearly, *substantive rationality* can range from extremely high to extremely low independently of the place of enunciation of the new projects; while the level of centrality of the new project can range from extremely high to extremely low as well, without regard to the kind of rationality they use. This figure will help us understand the four different orientations that result from these two debates.

Figure 2

*The Four Different Projects in the Region*

Once the axis of rationality (x) is related analytically with the axis of place of enunciation (y), a 2x2 “map” of combinations emerges. This “map” traces a typology of the different directions of the four projects that are emerging in the region *vis-à-vis* neoliberal modernity. They are:
• Deconstructive indigeneity: It corresponds to projects placed in the lower-right quadrant (see Figure 3). In contrast with neoliberalism, they are formulated from the periphery of society, and their critique to the neoliberal project is mainly underpinned by a substantive rationality. The ancestral colonial-decolonial conflict frames the rejection of neoliberalism and orients deconstructive indigeneity.

• Confrontational populism: It is located in the upper-right quadrant. Like neoliberalism, this is a project formulated from a privileged social center and its critiques with regard to the former follow a substantive rationality. The contradiction nationalism-imperialism and pueblo-oligarchy is the base to reject neoliberalism (just as it was the base to reject liberalism in the twentieth century) and construct the new project.

• Social liberal reformism: It is found in the upper-left quadrant. Those projects are also articulated from a central place of enunciation, yet their confrontation with neoliberal modernity is based on a formal rationality. The distributive contradiction between contributors and beneficiaries is the core critique to neoliberalism, and it is this cleavage that drives social liberal reformism.

• Radical neoliberalism: It corresponds to the lower-left quadrant. These projects evaluate the negative effects that the limited application of the neoliberal project—imported mainly from the external centers—have on the periphery of Latin American markets. They advocate for the full application of neoliberalism in the region based on a technical formal rationality. The contradiction between the legal and illegal markets, or legal and criminal businesses, boosts this kind of reforms oriented towards radical neoliberalism (see Figure 3).
Collective Meanings and the Representations of the New Latin American Projects

*Deconstructive Indigeneity*

In the same way that free competition is the practice *par excellence* of the neoliberal project, social grass-roots mobilizations are those which characterize deconstructive indigeneity. These mobilizations are often organized in the *periphery* “along the lines of identity” (Silva, 2009: 38) and adopt the form of struggle of minority groups against the dominant culture. Deruyttere (1997) estimated that between 33 and 40 million of indigenous people, which represent 8 per
cent of the hemisphere’s total population and include more than 400 different ethnic groups, each of them with its own language and culture, inhabit the region. Because of the geographical concentration of the indigenous communities, these mobilizations become local protests triggered by a specific state policy with direct impact in their community. They have taken place in Araucaria around the Mapuches (in Chile), in the north of Cauca with the Paeces (in Colombia), and in Chiapas around the well-known Zapatista uprising (in Mexico), to name a few. These mobilizations, which have increased along the continent with the process of neoliberal reforms, are not surprising. This is evident if we take into account the opening of major political spaces for participation brought by neoliberal multiculturalism, and also the large number of unsatisfied demands of the indigenous population in the region, living in conditions of poverty and exclusion.

Other social grass-roots mobilizations are originated in the periphery, but they end up in the center of the national political life via their capacity to go beyond their own line of identity and to coordinate actions with one or more organized social sectors (Silva, 2009). The coordination is done from the periphery with peasants, miners, the informal sector, and social sectors from the center such as the middle class, political parties, and the military (Silva, 2009: 38). This phenomenon in which the cleavage is originated in the periphery but moves to the center has been present in countries with a large number of indigenous populations and strong organization at the national level like Ecuador and Bolivia; the former with 24.85 per cent of the national total population being indigenous people (Deruyttere, 1997) and the latter with 66.2 per cent (Celade, 2001) (see figure 4). In contrast with local mobilizations, those with national scope do not only seek to resist the intrusive dominant culture and speak against a
specific state policy that affects the community, but also they usually look to overthrow the current government and even go further by switching the established order.

The trajectory of CONAIE, the most powerful indigenous confederation of Ecuador is telling in that sense, as Silva (2009) clearly reconstructs its evolution along three waves of anti-neoliberalism. CONAIE opened a wave of national mobilizations with the first indigenous uprising in 1990, which structured a defensive agenda that demanded self-determination and a solution to 72 unsettled land claims. The second wave began in 1994, but around a clearly offensive agenda against neoliberalism, this time demanding changes in the managing of oil revenues, the reorganization of inter-cultural education, the resignation of the government to privatize, and a call for a Constituent Assembly. During that period, which extended up to 1996, CONAIE went beyond the lines of identity creating a coalition with the Coordination of Social Movements (CMS, for its name in Spanish), which rallied the organized labor sector, the informal labor sector and the Christian based communities. The third wave that began in 1996–based on the anti-neoliberal CONAIE and the CMS alliance, which was extended even to the military in 2000–is characterized at this point by massive mobilizations that seek to reconfigure the order. They concluded with the resignation of two presidents committed to neoliberal reforms–Bucaram in 1997 and Gutiérrez in 2005–and a brief coup d'état with CONAIE’s support to president Mahuads in 2000.

The indigenous trajectory in Bolivia follows a similar trail to the one in Ecuador, but with an important difference. In contrast with Ecuador, in which the movement ended up being co-opted by an anti-system, mestizo, and populist leader like Rafael Correa in 2006, Bolivia’s maintained its autonomy, elected the first Aymara president of the country, and issued a Constitution oriented to the construction of a plurinational state.
In Bolivia, the indigenous mobilizations began in “the form of the coca-grower federations of the Chapare in the Department of Cochabamba and the Yungas region of the Department of La Paz” (Silva, 2009: 113). The indigenous, mainly Quechua and Aymara, whose culture involve the use of coca leaves, mobilized against Paz Stenssoro’s policy of coca eradication, a programme that was promoted by the US as part of their War on Drugs. During the second wave (Silva, 2009), the coca-growers, now in control of the Labor Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia (CSUTCB for its name in Spanish), went beyond their own line of identity. They coordinated actions with the Worker’s Central of Bolivia (COB, for its name in Spanish)—which congregates mainly miners and factory workers, students, and teachers to speak against the Zero Coca programme, as well as against the package of new privatizations (the Capitalization Law) and educational reforms of the Sánchez de Lozada government. Those mobilizations culminated in September of 1994 with the “March for Life, Coca, and National Sovereignty” in La Paz, with a conflict that seems to move steadily from the periphery to the center. “The Third Wave of anti-neoliberalism contention began during Hugo Banzer’s and Vice President Jorge Quiroga’s turbulent government (1997–2002), and ended in the truncated second presidency of Sánchez de Lozada, who was forced to resign (2002-3)” (Silva, 2003: 123). It included the “mythical” War of Water and Gas War, both huge mobilizations that shook the country protesting for specific policies, and also pressing at that point for the fall of the establishment and the current social order. According to Garcés (2013:31), those wars are the point of departure of a new order and the final fall of neoliberalism: The struggle becomes less against the implementation of specific policies—the privatization of water—or in favor of some others—the nationalization of hydrocarbons—but rather, in favor of a Unity Pact led by
indigenous peoples and other popular sectors who pressed for an Constituent Assembly capable of re-founding Bolivia with the construction of a plurinational state.

Behind all those grass-roots movements led by the indigenous peoples in Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Ecuador, and Bolivia, there is an identity politics that places the indigenous question at the forefront as the ultimate value that guides their project. However, it is not the “limited” identity politics proper of the previous neoliberal multiculturalism which advocates for the recognition of a minimal package of cultural rights and the understanding of the cultural diversity merely in terms of celebration. On the contrary, this renewed “identity politics” claims the right to be different and vindicates indigenous people with regard to the historical exploitation and exclusion they have suffered, in order to achieve the social, political, economic and juridical equality as nations and as communities.

In the cases of Chile, Colombia and Mexico, the indigenous question remains more in the field of a defensive agenda against the intrusive policies of the center in the periphery. In Bolivia, and to some extent Ecuador, the indigenous question (or so-called “indigeneity”) becomes the main idea from where the entire social order is approached and the conflict goes from the periphery to the center (see, e.g., Dávalos, 2004). In that sense, the “emergent indigeneity does not mean a new mode of being indigenous. [It means] an insurgence of indigenous forces and practices with capacity to significantly disrupt prevalent political formations, and reshuffle hegemonic antagonisms, by rendering illegitimate (and, thus, denaturalizing) the exclusion of indigenous practices from nation-state institutions” (de la Cadena, 2010: 336). What the indigenous question means in this emergent indigeneity is less a claim for the equality of opportunities for all in the liberal sense but rather more a recognition that different worlds with equal status coexist in a state that cannot be conceived as national but as plurinational. These
worlds are diverse culturally, politically and juridical, and as such, demand recognition of linguistic diversity and of the right of self-government, of co-government with the president, and the existence of different normative systems with an equal status (Garcés, 2013: 40-43). This plurality is expected to “end with the myth of lineal progress” (Ministerio de Planificación, República de Bolivia, 2006: 11) that has historically justified the assimilationist policies towards indigenous peoples in order to catch up with the neoliberal West that is regarded as the measure of all social structures.

According to the Bolivian National Development Plan (Ministry of Development Planning, Republic of Bolivia, 2006) “in a multiethnic and multicultural country, development must be built from a plurinational logic of 'civilizational coexistence', which articulates the different ways of perceiving, assuming, interpreting life, society, nature, the economy and the state” (10). The indigenous question as the ultimate value from where the Bolivian society is approached leads to the conception of a plurinational state whose idea can be tracked to 1983 with the Second National Congress of the CSUTCB as a reaction to the assimilationist policies. However, it got its political momentum in 2004 with the Unity Pact which rallied the political support of most grassroots organizations to call for a Constituent Assembly, and was officially born in 2009 as the Plurinational State of Bolivia with the adoption of the new constitution.

The deconstructive indigeneity presents a substantive rationality critique in regards to the neoliberal project and the western modern project itself because “indigeneity” contests not only individual freedom as the universal canon used by neoliberalism to select, measure and judge the world, but also the ideas on which western modernity relies (see, e.g., Morales, 2013: 3). Subsequently, for example, “living well” as the idea that guides the new plans of development
in Bolivia called into question “the western ‘living better,’ which is considered individualistic, self-interested, separated from others, and separated from nature” (Ministry of Development Planning, Republic of Bolivia, 2006: 10). In the next line, the plan calls to construct a “new institutional structure that lessens the centrality of the liberal institutions...and incorporates new ones that are foreign to modernity” (14). In the same vein of Goldberg’s critique to neoliberalism, deconstructive indigeneity sees the necessity to dismantle a “racial neoliberalism that entails the privatising of institutionalised racism through the protection of private sphere from any state incursion” (Goldberg, 2009).

At the same time, along the same lines of a deconstructive logic, this kind of indigeneity aims to show that the market rationality that leads the neoliberal modernity project is “blind regarding the multicultural tapestry that conforms our country, and for that reason the community and the indigenous peoples are sentenced to be diluted by colonialism and globalization” (Ministry of Development Planning, Republic of Bolivia, 2006: 9). Thus, the neoliberal development plans, which once were presented as “technical instruments, without ideology and strangers to the political and historical conditions of the reality they pretended to change” (Ministry of Development Planning, Republic of Bolivia, 2006: 9), stand alone and unsupported, representing nothing bigger than the oppression of the western metropolis and national dominant elites. Consequently, this colonial order is destabilized and overthrown causing the collapse of the internal hierarchies that have privileged western attributes—whiteness, rationality and progress—and oppressed the original cultures—indigeneity—by considering them irrational and traditional.

In general terms, deconstructive indigeneity articulates a discourse from the periphery that calls into question the whole hegemonic social order as constructed by and for the privileged western
center (Rojas, 2002; Mignolo, 2011; Quijano, 2007). In such a context, the trust in the intermediation of political parties and the congress tends to be low given that they are considered part of the oppressive order, and a central one in fact. For example, Centella’s (2009) statistical analysis of disaggregated electoral data shows how the Bolivian electoral reform of 1994 (when the mixed-member proportional system was adopted) was an attempt to stop the loss of legitimacy of the political system, especially among indigenous sectors. Therefore, the greatest weight to transform the social order in deconstructive indigeneity is less in the exercise of political representation proper of the political system, but more in the social grass-roots mobilizations. These mobilizations originated in the periphery that through bottom-up politics seek to resist, contest, and break the colonial order (see, e.g., Dávalos, 2004). It is a discourse that empowers indigenous social movements as the privileged actors that would lead to a post-colonial order. Therefore, it is not surprising that the great indigenous leaders of Bolivia, Alejo Véliz, Felipe Quispe and current president Evo Morales himself carved their political careers within grass-roots organizations such as the CSUTCB and ASP despite the fact that they have “opportunistically” ran in elections heading anti-systemic parties as Morales did with the MAS in several elections since 1999.

In this post-colonial order conceived from the indigenous question, identity is the result of collective mobilizations rather than individual choice; anti-racism is the struggle against structural inequity rather than opposition to individual acts of discrimination; and the value of indigeneity comes from collective empowerment rather than the mere legal recognition and celebration of the “difference” as folklore (Hale, 2002). Following Oxhorn (2009: 229), we would have here the emergence of a citizenship as agency rather than as consumption, like in neoliberalism. Although Bolivia is the only case of consolidated deconstructive indigeneity, it
remains latent in the periphery of many countries in the region such as Colombia, Chile, Mexico, and of course Ecuador, among others.

**Confrontational Populism**

The central practice of confrontational populism is not free competition. Like deconstructive indigeneity, social grass-roots mobilization is the distinguishing practice of this project. Many have compared the mobilizations in Bolivia with the demonstrations in Chávez’s Venezuela, and Correa’s Ecuador. However, the direct unmediated politics that emerged from the latter cases are not the result of organized bottom-up social movements articulated from the *periphery* as in the former case. On the contrary, in confrontational populism, a charismatic leader imposes personalistic top-down politics from the *center* to a largely unorganized mass of followers who are co-opted by a nationalistic and anti-establishment discourse (see, e.g., Weyland, 2001, 2003; Armony, 2005; Schuttenberg, 2012). For instance, the Bolivarian Circles (a grassroots organization created for the defence of the revolution by Hugo Chávez in 2001) was replaced in 2006 by the Communal Councils (a neighbourhood-based initiative, which receives funds directly from various levels of the government); or the recurring attempts of the government in Ecuador to take control or weaken the indigenous movement are good examples of this kind of vertical politics that seeks to mobilize from the top.

Hugo Chávez (1999–2013) and Rafael Correa (2006–to date) imposed their personalistic leaderships to represent the people’s interest by not only weakening deliberately the established intermediary organizations of representative democracy (see, e.g., Weyland, 2001), but also by applying anti-organizational tactics against the autonomous social movements. On one hand, Chávez and Correa handled skillfully the incendiary rhetoric against the “partitocracy”, “the oligarchy”, and the “lackeys of the empire” that Correa took from Chávez. This rhetoric aimed
to boost the unmediated and direct politics and to undermine the legitimacy of the formal institutions of the political system (Weyland, 2001). On the other hand, cooptation, patronage, and repression are other tactics used to keep the followers unorganized, and thus to undermine movements like CONAIE in Ecuador, and the Confederation of Workers and the student movement in Venezuela that question the personalistic leadership from the civil society, even though some these movements supported the leaders in the beginning, as was the case of CONAIE.

Thus, despite the fact that grass-roots mobilization is the practice *par excellence* required by both deconstructive indigeneity and confrontational populism to assure the support of the majority and form a government, the place from where the discourse is articulated is different in each project. In both cases the street demonstrations are convened to speak against the neoliberal order and to express their support to their governments. The high number of street demonstrations, presidential elections and referendums shows the preference for these projects to participate in direct democracy. Nevertheless, in deconstructive indigeneity, the project is articulated in the periphery, and the social mobilizations emerge from below; while in confrontational populism the project is articulated in the *center*, and the social mobilizations are called from above. As a consequence, social mobilizations in the first case rely on empowered social movements; and in the second, they are the results of co-optation (Venezuela) or social movements that were co-opted (Ecuador). In Oxhorn’s (2009) terms, while Bolivia would be a case of *citizenship as agency*, Venezuela and Ecuador would be cases of *citizenship as co-optation*.

Authors such as Rouquié (2011), Hobsbawm (2003), and Sader (2011) bring the central and metropolitan conditions of the populist project to the forefront. These authors often trace the
populist project’s origin to 1930–1950 when “strong men” such as Perón in Argentina, Vargas in Brazil, Velazco Ibarra in Ecuador, and Cárdenas in Mexico ruled their countries following practices and ideas alike to those of the rightist authoritarian regimes and fascisms that thrived in Europe in that time. Of course, the authors recognize important differences. Rouquié (2011) argues that “in Latin America, the so-called populist states have been neither antidemocratic nor antiworkers” (254). Sader (2011) argues that although in certain occasions the Communist Party recognized those political figures “as reproductions of fascism in Latin America” (70), their nationalism, which was both politically and economically anti-liberal, and their anti-imperialist stance, puts them on the side of the left (Sader, 2011: 70). Therefore, tracing down the link of the current populism with the old European authoritarian regimes—and beyond the differences that can exist among them both in content and strategic position within the left-right dichotomy—which certainly exist—the influence of European external centers in Latin American nationalism becomes clear. Confrontational populism then maintains a tie with the metropolis—just as the neoliberal modernity does—which is absent in deconstructive indigeneity.

Furthermore, rather than being announced from the periphery of society as the indigenous population from Bolivia does, the confrontational populism of the new century is articulated and conveyed from the very core of the social and political life. After all, Hugo Chávez in Venezuela was a former putschist Lieutenant Colonel that came from the military barracks; and Correa in Ecuador was a middle-class economist who served as Minister of Finance during the year immediately before his election as president. Even current populist leaders that have not been able to win the presidency, such as Manuel López Obrador, who lost twice in the elections of 2006 and 2012, come from a dissidence of the party that continuously held the power in
Mexico for 71 years. To sum up, and in contrast with deconstructive indigeneity, confrontational populism has not only the center of the political life as the privileged site from where the project is articulated, but its national-popular discourse has a metropolitan origin whose roots are found in the old European authoritarian regimes (See, figure 4).

By and large, Chavism and Correism have tried to construct new majorities by dichotomizing the political space between a “we” –the pueblo–and a “they”–the antipueblo (see, e.g. Lander, 2004; Schuttenberg, 2012; Rouquié, 2011; Weyland, 2001; Weyland, 2003; Armony, 2005). The creation of this essentialist form of antagonistic identification within a polity leads to a replacement of the liberal market rationality–based on the belief in [impersonal] legality as the basis of the current order–by a confrontational logic–centred in the affectual connection between the leader and the pueblo (see, e.g., Weber, 1968). Thus, when Chávez took office in 1999, “he swore on the moribund Constitution and before his people” to re-found the country under new bases of legitimacy (Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela, 2014). This example was followed by Correa once he became president. This emotional connection is constructed by the attacks of the leader, who speaking on behalf of his pueblo, repeatedly denounces the legal order not as a voluntary agreement of the majority, but as an imposition of a minority. Consequently, legality is deprived of its character of universal stable rules that regulate and guarantee the individuals’ free competition, and it becomes a mere ruse of an internal minority—the oligarchy, the partitocracy—often allied with an external one—the empire, the IMF, the multinationals—to oppress the majority. As a result, the charismatic leader appeals to people who distrust the distant legal system and offers a different mean to change it: personalistic leadership. “When I see them [pueblo], when you [pueblo] see me, I feel something that tells
me, Chávez, you are no longer Chávez, you are the *pueblo*. Chávez became the *pueblo*”, exclaimed the Venezuelan leader in the middle of a red cheering crowd, evoking the *affective* connection “leader- *pueblo*” recreated in his emotive speech, full of attacks against the establishment, as was characteristic during the presidential campaign of 2012 (Telesur, 2012).

Therefore, in confrontational populism there is no room for what Mouffe (2013), against liberalism, critically calls the “general consensus based on reason” (3). The illusion of liberal rationalism is broken. The electoral contention, as well as the whole political life, the economy, and the society adopt the form of an “all or nothing” struggle driven by a *confrontational logic* within the dichotomy *pueblo*-anti*pueblo*. The new constitutions (e.g., the Venezuelan and the Ecuadorean issued in 1999 and 2008, respectively) are illiberal in essence, and rather than strengthening new legal orders, they are addressed to boost the discretionary power of the president. “The power adopts the style of confrontation and intimidation. ‘Hugo’s threat’ allows foreseeing the worst circumstances for those who criticize or simply do not follow him unreservedly” (Rouquié, 2011: 214); and the same would seem to apply for Correa. In politics, the threat is against the “empire and the stateless bourgeoisie that conspires against the socialist homeland [and the country's independence]” (Chávez Frías, 2012: 2). In economics, the war is against the ones who support the “savage and destructive capitalist system” which hinders the country to “accomplish the greatest social security, greatest political stability, and greatest happiness for our *pueblo*” (Chávez Frías, 2012: 6). In daily life, the invitation is to take sides, to follow the leader and to not listen to the “bourgeois press” which, in Correa’s words, is the “new opium of our people” (El Comercio: 12). A logic of *confrontation* rather than a *market logic* is the engine of the system, and grass-roots mobilization rather than free competition is
the constitutive practice to realize it. In the same vein as Mouffe (2003), it is possible to say that the de-politicization of the antagonisms driven by market logic is replaced by the logic of confrontation as the center of society and politics.

Like deconstructive indigeneity, confrontational populism is embedded in identity politics, but instead of placing the indigenous question in the center, it places the pueblo as the ultimate value that orients the project. Here, the notion of pueblo has worked as a specific vindication to differentiate the “we” from the “they”, and it also became the idea from where the entire social order is tackled. In that sense, confrontational populism presents a substantive rationality critique regarding the neoliberal project, because it contests the idea of individual freedom as the canon to understand and organize society and its main problems. Thus, though from the pueblo, democracy is not a matter of procedures that guarantees “pluralism, citizen rights, competitive elections, the rule of law, and checks and balances” (Romero Ballivián, 2008: 18), but it is a matter of “social improvements in favor of the pueblo and popular mobilization” (Romero Ballivián, 2008: 18).51

In one way or another, populism again opened the debate about the source of authority (the will of people) and the purpose of democracy (the common good) that Huntington (1991) thought was closed in favor of the neoliberal conception of democratic procedures. In the same way, the economy is not approached as a free market centred in private accumulation, but it is conceived increasingly in terms of nationalization and regulated-market oriented by a state that is self-defined as national and popular (see Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Comunicación y la Información, República Bolivariana de Venezuela, 2008: 43-56; The Republic of Ecuador,
It is not at all a coincidence that the index of Economic Freedom of the World (2012), which measures the extent to which rightly acquired property is protected and individuals are engaged in voluntary transactions, places Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador at the bottom of the Latin American and Caribbean region’s ranking, locating them as 22, 20, and 19 respectively among 22 countries of the region (Crisp & Gwartney, 2012: 175). The powerful role of the state in the economy and the logic of confrontation, characteristic of these governments, put the “bourgeoisie” in a context of high uncertainty and turned it into easy prey of state intimidation. Through a “stick and carrot” strategy, which is characteristic of the confrontational logic, the Venezuelan, Bolivian, and Ecuadorean governments seek to intimidate a “bourgeoisie” that knows it is walking on the “razor’s edge”. Through an ambiguous discourse regarding capitalism, the populist leaders of those governments use a rhetoric that moves from total confrontation to tolerance and complementarity: from the construction of different versions of socialism and the destruction of capitalism (the stick)—Venezuela talks about the Socialism of the twenty-first Century, while Ecuador talks about Democratic Socialism—to the professed respect for private property (the carrot) according to the changeable political junctures.

The privileged historical actor that emerges inside this project is the leader and his pueblo. Without a leader, there is no pueblo: in order to ascend to power, the leader calls the pueblo, but only those who answer the leader’s call can be considered as such. In that sense, the leader’s empowerment deprives ordinary people of their quality of pueblo because it can be conceived exclusively in terms of Chavism and Correism. Consequently, the practice of mobilization not only describes a behavior, but it entails a cognitive process through which the
pueblo’s identity itself is constituted. “People would gain rights through active participation in the ‘national-popular’ bloc, whose great internal heterogeneity was ultimately subordinate to a higher, unitary political consciousness, which in turn formed the basis for a newly formed national identity” (Hale, 2002: 504).

In this way, pueblo remains as an open notion presented as social totality, and it includes indigenous peoples, peasants, the unemployed, middle class, military, intellectuals, and people in the informal and formal sector of the economy among others, who are willing to mobilize in their leader’s name. If they do not, they are declared part of the oligarchies, enemies of the nation. Correa would say in defence of the constitutional reform that will allow his unlimited re-election and in response to his different critics, that “we cannot allow the white, mestizo, or indigenous oligarchies—losers of the elections—, to attempt to impose their will on the large majority based on their mass media influence, economic power and alleged ancestral rights. We are more; we are much more” (Correa, 2014). Along the same line, Nicolas Maduro, Chávez’s successor after his death in 2013, accused the 48.99 per cent of the population that did not vote for him (Electoral Geography 2.0, 2014)—in an election with serious suspicions of fraud in favor of the president-candidate Maduro—of being part of the parasitic oligarchy, fascism, and imperialism that conspires against the country. In brief, the leader becomes the pueblo. With the power embodied in a single individual, the experience of the “historical time” (Koselleck, 1993) of those societies will be marked not by the idea to catch up with the West, but by the “biological calendar” attached to the vital cycle of their leaders. Power is no longer “the empty place subject to the procedures of periodical redistributions [through a] controlled contest with permanent rules” that Lefort (1988: 17) assigns to liberal democracy. From this point on, it will
be more common to refer to Chávez's Venezuela and Correa's Ecuador in the same way that people talk about Castro's Cuba.

Figure 4

**Social Liberal Reformism**

Perhaps the analysis of the "Letter to the Brazilians" provides a good beginning to understanding the practice and logic behind this project. In this communication, dated June 22, 2002, the leftist presidential candidate Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva publically pledged that, if elected president, he would insist on the national task of “accomplishing a sustainable fiscal balance [with] control of public accounts and inflation” (Lula, 2002). I could hardly think of a
more critical juncture for that statement. Not only was the country a target of speculative attacks after the financial crisis that shook its neighbor Argentina, but also the political debate was heated as a result of the general elections, which were only three months away (Kucinski, 2003; Avritzer, 2004). The letter was meaningful because for the first time, the leader of the leftist Workers Party, historically engaged with a “new model of socialism centred in the social movements struggle for their demands” (WP, 1979: 2, quoted by Avritzer, 2004: 73), promised to keep previous neoliberal policies by discarding any attempt to renegotiate the external debt or regulate the movement of the financial market. At the end of the day, this missive achieved its purpose: Lula won in the second round with 52,772,475 votes, equivalent to 61.3 per cent of the total votes (Electoral Geography 2.0, 2014). However, how to understand that result: “was the victory of the leftist in Brazil a popular mandate for reversing market reforms an ‘unraveling of the so-called Washington consensus? Or was Lula’s necessitated moderation a mandate for continuing the extant economic model? In other words, did Brazilians choose a leftist in 2002 because they were experiencing ‘reform fatigue’? Or did they choose a former leftist because of his promise to keep market policies in place?” (Baker, 2010: 5).

The answer is both. In order to get the office, the Workers Party, which had made politics along social cleavages, moved to the center of the political spectrum seeking for the votes that were missing to ensure electoral victory. This move implied leaving aside the practice of grass-roots mobilization that encouraged the workers’ unilateralism and in which its activists played an important role but had proven to be incapable of breaking the “historical peak of slightly over 30 per cent of the total electorate” (Sader, 2011: 54). Instead Lula, and the top figures of the Workers Party, searched to come closer to sectors of the middle class and some establishment
parties in order to create an alliance driven by the logic of finding the *acceptable* programmatic decisions for all the parts involved, and a wider electorate (see e.g., Kucinski, 2003; Sader, 2011; Avritzer, 2004). Rather than constructing majorities through the logic of confrontation pursued by deconstructive indigeneity and confrontational populism, social liberal reformism follows the logic of *acceptability*\(^{54}\) which implies a switch from the practice of mobilizing its own bases to the practice of negotiating with the adversaries in order to attain the “one-third of undecided voters” (Kucinski, 2003: 61).

In that sense, what was *acceptable* for sectors of the middle class and the Brazilian establishment was that the socialist leader, who awoke so much fear among them, committed his government to continuing a responsible economic policy that would guaranty fiscal adjustment and monetary stability in a context of imminent risk of contagion from the Argentinean financial crisis. On the contrary, for the bases of the party and popular sectors, the *acceptable* change was that the new government guaranty “redistributive social policies and an independent foreign policy” (Sader, 2011: 56), which had been postponed by sixteen years already. As a consequence, Lula’s *acceptable* solution was oriented to create a new consensus, “drawn from a broad national bargaining” (Lula, 2002) that included social justice and monetary stability as its two main axes (Lula, 2002). This search for consensus between social and economic sectors with contradictory interests is present in other leftist governments of the region, such as Uruguay, and to some extent, Argentina. In the same vein as Lula, the current Uruguayan left-wing president Mujica, recognized for his commitment to the poorest of the country, has reiterated his respect for market stability over and over again in his messages. For Mujica, “if it is all about the market [size], then [the investors] would go to other countries that
are bigger. Therefore, we must play the seriousness and security card. [The investors] do not only look for gains, but also for security for their investments, and the latter is offered by Uruguay” (Mujica, 2013). It is this moderation, exercised by the leader of the Broad Front, which leads to the conclusion that “in the programmatic horizon of the Uruguayan left, neither the construction of socialism nor the introduction of radical changes in the social power structure are in sight” (Chavez, 2004: 169).

For social liberal reformism, the frustration and conflict unleashed by the gap between “the ratio of expected outcome [and] the actual outcome” (Freddi, 1986: 166) reached by the neoliberal reforms did not lead to a radical denial of the set of ultimate values behind its modernity project. Rather than a struggle over “the conception of moral right and over the interpretation of history and human destiny” (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967: 11), social liberal reformism calls into question the convenience of keeping a neoliberal orthodoxy in which decisions arrive ‘without regard to persons’ but following exclusively sheer calculation in terms of abstract markets rules (Kalberg, 1980). In contrast with deconstructive indigeneity and confrontational populism that, underpinned by a substantive rationality, reject the principles of neoliberalism as not morally appropriate, social-liberal reformism engages with finding a more convenient point of agreement that deals with both the imperatives of market efficiency and the imperatives for social cohesion and political acceptance. In that sense, the words of the Uruguayan left-wing president Tabaré Vázquez (2005–2010) in the Fourth Congress of his Party, the Broad Front are eloquent with regard to the need to negotiate between the socialist utopia and market realities. For him, “to aspire to the impossible is as irresponsible and reactionary as to surrender oneself only to what there is” (Chavez, 2004: 180). This approach to
the indeclinable pursuits of social equity and justice, while following the rules of the game, imbeds social liberal reformism as a project framed within a *formal rationality*: the distributive social policy pace is marked by the technical capacity of assuring economic growth inside a reasonable cost-benefit calculation (See, figure 4).

Nevertheless, this moderate path of reformism was not created with a single blow. The practice of negotiation was learned through a long process originated by the necessity to reach electoral victories and achieve good governments. This contrasts with the “meteoric” rise of confrontational populist leaders as national political forces: Chávez and Correa were practically unknown figures four and two years before they won the presidency.—Meanwhile, national majorities constructed by the Workers Party and the Broad Front experienced electoral setbacks at the national level, but they achieved some significant victories at the local level.

In fact, Lula himself as the Workers Party’s presidential candidate was defeated three times in 1989, 1994, and 1998 before he led his party to office in 2002 and 2006. The Workers Party was also victorious in 2010 with Dilma Rousseff. Similarly, the leader of the Uruguayan Broad Front, Tabaré Vázquez, accumulated two defeats in 1994 and 1999 prior to his victory in 2004. That victory, along with Mujica’s in 2009, marked the end of 174 years of bipartisan hegemony in Uruguay. In both cases, the electoral successes needed patience, moderation, and a careful negotiation of their political agendas. For example, Lula’s 2002 campaign isolated the left wing of his party, trying to keep the so-called Landless Movement from frightening moderate voters with land occupations. Also, the party gave a *carte blanche* to Lula to form whatever alliances of forces he deemed necessary, which was materialized in the alliance with right-wing parties,
and the choice of the entrepreneur José Alencar, who belonged to the Liberal Party, as his vice president. Finally, as proof of his engagement with an acceptable moderate agenda, he conveyed the "Letter to the Brazilians" (Kucinski, 2003). In Uruguay, despite the fact that governments of the Broad Front did not negotiate any kind of coalition with right-wing forces, their political campaigns have structured platforms that were acceptable for the establishment. Thus, for example, Vázquez’s 2004 campaign also isolated the left wing of his party, the so-called Left Stream, and he avoided controversial topics such as external debt payment and the trial of perpetrators of human rights violations during the dictatorship of the 70s and early 80s in order to moderate their radical image (Chávez, 2004).

The necessity of achieving good governments also made room for the practice of negotiation and moderate agendas for the two parties. Although the Brazilian Workers Party and the Uruguayan Broad Front remained minority parties for many years, this was no obstacle to attaining important victories at the local level. The Workers Party won the municipal elections in important cities such as Sao Pablo, Porto Alegre, and Recife, but also got control of a number of states such as Rio Grande do Sul, Espírito Santo, and Mato Grosso do Sul before Lula won the presidency. The Broad Front won the municipal election in Montevideo with Tabaré Vázquez-a tremendous political victory because the capital city represented a concentration of 42.5 per cent of the country’s population. Those local victories challenged the two political groups to prove to public opinion that left-wing parties could govern responsibly and efficiently. In Uruguay, the need to pass bills like the “participative decentralization” forced the leftist local government to negotiate with the national parties of the establishment in order to implement it and get an acceptable deal for all the parties (Chávez, 2004). In all the
cases, the left party campaigns for the good use of public resources launched a crusade against corruption (with excellent gains in electoral terms), and it also raised awareness of the importance of budgetary stability for a good government. Most scholars of Brazil and Uruguay agree that, in the slow road to the presidency taken by the Workers Party and the Broad Front, the success of the left-wing local governments was a decisive factor (Avritzer, 2004; Sader, 2011; Chavez, 2004; Bradford & Kucinski, 2003).

Thus, social liberal reformism with its predominant acceptable logic as the most convenient one to maintain the equilibrium between economic growth and social cohesion presents the left-wing moderate parties as privileged historical actors. Through their practice of negotiation, these moderate but progressive actors are capable of aggregating and articulating interests, crafting policy alternatives, and providing the basis for a new reasonable consensus between the social demands for social justice and the imperative of efficiency imposed by a global market economy. These moderate leftist parties do not press for changes in the political order from the periphery, outside of the political system, as the indigenous social movements do in the decolonial indigeneity project. They do not seek to blow up the weak institutional structure from the center itself as the confrontational populist project does with its anti-organizational tactics and its pueblo-antipueblo discourse. What they do from the very core of the neoliberal democratic institutions is, on one hand, “moderate the more extremist aspects of the neoliberal project”; and on the other, “regulate social discontent avoiding explosive situations” (Chavez, 2004: 182) as in the two previous projects. Under the permanent practice of negotiation, and the search for consensus, Chavez (2004) defines the Broad Front as a “permanent coalition to unify the different left-wing groups that previously competed among themselves” (152); and
Kucinski (2003) defines the Workers Party as a “mass party that in practice has worked as the nucleus of a network of leftist and popular groups” (41, 51). In both cases, the moderate factions have maintained the leadership of their parties over the more radical ones.

In general, we can say that the economic strategies of contemporary Brazil and Uruguay are embedded in the general lines of ECLAC’S neo-structuralism. This heterodox market view aims to “change production patterns with equity [but] within a context of greater international competitiveness” (ECLAC, 1990: 14). In contrast with neoliberalism, the emphasis of neo-structuralism is not on private competition, but on achieving the process of modernization via internationalization of the economy. Hence, the main obstacle for modernization is not “mistaken domestic policies that hobble market allocation [as in neoliberalism,] but the patterns of external insertion [such as an] uncoordinated productive apparatus that traps countries in ‘low’ road (competing via cheap labor and currency devaluations) rather than through productivity increases and innovations” (Leiva, 2008: 4). Within this new model, the role of the state switches from being a “provider of the minimum conditions for the market to function” to being an active agent in charge of “generating social and political acceptable consensus, increasing competitiveness of exports (clusters, public-private partnerships), facilitating adaptability, upgrading of labor forces, and producing social cohesion” (Leiva, 2008: 4). It is not at all surprising that the index of Economic Freedom of the World (2012) places Brazil and Uruguay in the middle: the former in 16th place and the latter in 7th among the 22 countries of the region. This represents a better relative position in the ranking compared to the countries of the two previous projects placed at the bottom (Crisp & Gwartney, 2012: 175).
Bringing back the debate over the convenient socio-economic model to the electoral arena, social liberal reformism calls into question the neoliberal limited notion of procedural democracy. The exclusive concern with competitive elections and republican forms, characteristic of neoliberal democracy, yields to a substantive democracy centred on the conditions of life of the population. The conception of democracy, defined in terms of the “purposes served by it” (Huntington, 1991), or what many would call ‘the common good’, gains centrality again in societies with significant segments of the population living in conditions of poverty, inequality, and exclusion. The struggle among mere competitors that resemble the figure of the “politician-manager” who simply competes to dislodge others and occupy their place but without questioning the socioeconomic model, as it is done in neoliberalism, gives room to a struggle among rivals with diverging political ideas that nonetheless aims to reach an acceptable point of understanding through negotiation and moderation.

Turning once again to the discussion of the new Latin American projects to this point, it is interesting to analyse the Kirchners’ Argentina, which seems a border case between confrontational populism and social liberal reformism. In order to understand this “hinge case”, it is important to note both the changes in the trajectory presented in Kirchnerism throughout the years and the dissociation between the discourse and the practice that is characteristic of this experience. Nestor Kirchner (2003–2007) came to office shortly after the financial crisis and the massive social protest that shook the country, which, under the demand of “away with them all!” (in reference to the establishment), concluded with the fall of President Fernando de la Rua (1999–2001), and the transitional government of Eduardo Duhalde (2002-2003). In
the presidential elections of 2003, the historical Argentinean bipartisanism was broken, just like many other things in the country at that time. Basset (2007) argues that voters held the Radical Civic Union (the party of the former president De la Rua) and Frepaso (a young and small political ally) responsible for the crisis, opening up the political space to the Justicialist Party. In this context, Basset states that the 2003 presidential election became a primary election of the Justicialist Party that confronted two rival factions: one, lead by former president Carlos Menem (1989-1999) who was a candidate again in 2003; and the other, headed by Eduardo Duhalde, the powerful governor of the province of Buenos Aires, in charge of the transitional government and, as such, unable to run for office. Duhalde chose Nestor Kirchner, the governor of the far and unimportant province of Santa Cruz, as his candidate. With the votes of the provinces of the south from where he came and the votes of the populated province of Buenos Aires dominated by Duhalde (see, e.g., Basset, 2007), Kirchner came in second place after Menen as they both advanced to the second round of balloting. After the adverse results of the surveys and polls that favored Néstor Kirchner, Menem (who registered a high negative image due to his previous two governments) unexpectedly decided to abandon the political contention, arguing a lack of political guarantees by Duhalde’s administration.

Néstor Kirchner was officially proclaimed president without having defeated his adversary in an election. With a bankrupted country, and facing political demonstrations on the streets led by the Route Cutters Movement, he had a serious challenge to achieve governability. In order to recover governability, the Kirchner administration began a “transversal dialogue” aimed at adding the support of left-wing parties and movements, and restoring calm to the streets. This “transversal dialogue” of the Justicialist Party brings to mind the Brazilian Workers Party and
the Uruguayan Broad Front, all of which worked as the heart of a network of leftist groups under the practice of permanent negotiation. However, Kirchner's confrontational logic, which was characteristic of his discourse, placed his administration less on the side of a formal rational critique that would question the convenience of neoliberalism, but rather more towards the side of a substantive rationality that rejects its ultimate values. His anti-imperialist rhetoric, his calls to the pueblo, and his constant critiques to the neoliberal socio-economic model resemble the confrontational populist discourse. Nevertheless, the moderate economic management that put Nestor Kirchner’s administration in line with ECLAC’S neo-structuralism, the absence of refoundational intentions in the political arena under the bases of personalistic leadership, and the massive grass-roots mobilizations, make it difficult to place this government within the category of confrontational populism despite its occasional resemblance. Indeed, once the governance crisis was overcome and the country recovered its economic growth, the trajectory followed by Kirchnerism opens up the question about the project that Argentina will finally embrace. The two governments of Cristina Fernández have shifted from the “transversal dialogue” with the leftist movements to a more “top-down” one centered in the traditional structure of Justicialist Party. In economics, the government has pursue a major participation of the state with controversial measures such as the foreign exchange control decreed in 2011 and the 2012 nationalization of the Argentinean oil producer YPF (a subsidiary of the Spanish company Repsol). At this point, Argentina could be considered a case of social liberal reformism moving towards confrontational populism.

**Radical Neoliberalism**

In the summer of 1971, the US government launched its prohibition campaign in order to eradicate the production, trade, and consumption of illegal drugs. A few years after, in
Colombia, during the late 70’s and early 80’s, as recalled by the writer Héctor Abad in the documentary “The Times of Pablo Escobar” (Zuleta Lleras, 2012), “various weird characters, who initially seemed to be just another group of smugglers, but very much richer, began to appear”. In the same documentary, the ex-vice president of Colombia Humberto de la Calle recalls that “Bogota’s elite initially saw this with complacency”, and he says that “it was laughable [to see] that a man in the far Colombian province was making a fortune marketing a narcotic” (Zuleta Lleras, 2012). However, by 1986 the violence caused by the cartels had already forced the Colombian state to declare what was called the “total war against drug trafficking”. Before this emergent and delinquent new bourgeoisie could be seriously reduced with the dismantling of the Medellin and Cali cartels in 1993 and 1996 respectively, those structures of organized crime carried out a violent campaign through crimes directed against their prosecutors and critics, and indiscriminate bomb-attacks that terrorized society and almost managed to bend the state.

After the destruction of the two big Colombian cartels, the country was far from overcoming the drug problem: it switched its initial role as center of the cocaine drug trade (processing and trafficking), and became a producer (planting and processing) whose profits did not go any longer to the hands of a delinquent class, but to boost the guerrilla and paramilitary wars against Colombian society (Tokatlian, 2000; Pizarro Leongómez, 2004). “The economy of the coca leaf became the production base of the territories of colonization. The subversives and paramilitary could have since then not only territory and population, but the financial capital to escalate the war”56 (Duncan & Velasco, 2013: 4). Consequently, during this new stage (1995–2006) the Colombian state went from losing control over an illegal economic activity to being
increasingly unable to govern and enforce the law in its territory and over its population. Year after year it was common to find the name of the country in the failed states index published by *Foreign Policy*. “The General Report of Violence in Colombia: Memories of War and Dignity, enough!”57, written by the Center of Historical Memory (2013), speaks of the terrifying death toll of nearly 220,000 in the Colombian conflict.

The center of drugs distribution migrated to Mexico. The cartels of Sinaloa, Juarez, el Golfo, Michoacán, Tijuana, and los Zetas replaced the Colombian cartels in the commercialization of cocaine, especially towards the US market. Central America–in particular El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala–became the main traffic routes between the South American cocaine producers–Colombia, Peru and Bolivia–and the new hub of commercialization–Mexico (US Department of State, Diplomacy in Action, 2014). By 2006, both Mexico and Central America were “burning in flames”. The press spoke of a “colombianization” of the region. That year seemed to be “Mexico’s turn”: Calderón’s government declared the war against drugs in an attempt to control the violence unbounded by the confrontation among rival cartels and against the state. Although the number of deaths produced by this ongoing war varies according to different sources, in 2011 its number was calculated to be between sixty thousand to ninety thousand since the war was officially declared (Mendoza Hernández, 2011). Those figures are absolutely unacceptable for a country that calls itself a democracy, and which is not experiencing an external or civil war.

The situation is not different in the small countries of Central America, now transformed in the “natural bridges for cocaine”, as a former vice-president of Nicaragua (Ramirez, 2012) called
them. The area became the most violent sub-region of Latin America with a homicide rate four times higher than the world’s average in 2013 (24 homicides per every 100 thousand people, as opposed to the world average of 6.2 victims per 100 thousand people). Honduras has the gloomy record of being the country with the highest rate of homicides in the world, and Belize, El Salvador, and Guatemala are in the third, four and fifth place of the Latin American ranking (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2013). Behind the violence in those fragile countries, there are gangs like the Maras and drug cartels that include some foreign ones like the Mexican Zetas, which dispute the control of the drug-trafficking routes and other illegal activities.

The early negative experience of Colombia, followed by Mexico and Central America, especially Guatemala, Honduras and Salvador, has called attention to the disruptive effects that the drug prohibitionism—introduced by the US, and strongly supported by the states of the area—have on the region. A mix of dispersed voices coming from different places in Latin America, which can be grouped under the label of “radical neoliberalism”, has critically approached those experiences by focusing on the way that the practice of prohibitionism undermines the core practice of the neoliberal modernity project, which is free competition. Prohibitionism introduces a serious offence to free competition by outlawing psychoactive drugs. Firstly, it prevents people from freely turning nature into commodities as required in any free market economy (the principle of free enterprise). Secondly, it removes products from the market not based on market criteria (a lack of demand, for instance), but in the name of external criteria such as morality (drug consumption is related with moral decay) and national security (drugs constitute an international threat) (Thoumi, 2002). The consequence of this prohibitionism is
the emergence of a distorted legal market with powerful economic incentives to create an illegal market in its *periphery*. The combined existence of a huge world demand of psychoactive drugs and the illegal nature of the business, which exponentially increases the risks and also the profits, attracts an emergent and delinquent new bourgeoisie that flourishes in those peripheral markets. Imposed by the illegal condition of the drug market, the absence of state authority leads to a space where property rights and the right to compete are not guaranteed by the rule of law that regulates the legal market. These rights are in the hands of illegal merchants (or any other illegal actor), who violently defend their participation in the market against other competitors or any state attempting to control them.

By and large, radical neoliberalism critiques the practice of prohibitionism not only because it undermines free competition, but also because the weakening of the latter creates a disruptive phenomenon of illegality in the market *periphery* of the region’s national economies. Prohibitionism is rejected because the distortion it produces in the market. It allows the new bourgeoisie of drug traffickers—who are organized around cartels run their business by violent means and escape state control—to break the rule of law and jeopardize the social stability that any proper self-regulated market demands—thanks to the huge gains and resources that result from an illegal business. In that sense, the main critique by radical neoliberalism of prohibitionism is led by a *formal rationality*. What is called into question is the lack of technical *convenience* rather than the moral *appropriateness* of the drug prohibitionist policy to construct *efficient* market economies and stable democracies. They do not care whether or not psychoactive drugs are “good” or “bad”. What they question is the poor results of the prohibitionist policy and the high economic, political, and social costs associated to it.
Nevertheless, in contrast with social liberal reformism, here the *convenience* is not defined in terms of the *acceptable* equilibrium point among all parts involved in a negotiation, but in terms of *technical market efficiency*. In that sense, prohibitionism is rejected due to the distortion it creates in the *market rationality*.

Radical neoliberalism, very much unlike the three projects mentioned above, advocates for the full application of the neoliberal modernity project. While, in one way or another, deconstructive indigeneity, confrontational populism, and social liberal reformism contest the excesses of neoliberalism; radical neoliberalism critiques the way in which the region falls short in its application in the matter of drug traffic. The radicalism of this project relies on the fact that it vindicates ultimate values, market rationality, and free competition as a practice even beyond the limits imposed by the western society from where it was imported. For radical neoliberalism, the problem stems not from the structural reforms of a neoliberal stamp introduced in the 80’s and 90’s, but from their unfinished character. Thus, for Mario Vargas Llosa (2013), the Peruvian Nobel Prize winner for Literature and famous advocate of neoliberal modernity in the region, the “nightmare endured by Colombia” during many years, “when the country lived not under the rule of law but of drug trafficking”, was due to the “repressive approach to drugs [not the drugs themselves] which only creates destructive monstrosities like the one built by Pablo Escobar”. As a result, the economic, political, and social problems of “defective neoliberal cases” deeply associated to the matter of criminality and security such as Colombia, Mexico, Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, come not from the wrong character of market rationality and free competition, but from their incomplete application. Consequently, Vargas Llosa (2013) does not hesitate to state that “the criminality associated to
drug trafficking will only disappear with the drug legalization, and when the huge amounts of money, which are currently invested in combating it, are spent in rehabilitation and prevention campaigns”.

However, radical neoliberalism has remained in the field of policy discussion, more than it has been regarded as a project with proven empirical experience such as deconstructive indigeneity, confrontational populism, and social liberal reformism. Boosted by independent international figures like the aforementioned Vargas Llosa, or well-known neoliberal former presidents such as Henrique Cardoso (Brazil), Cesar Gaviria (Colombia), and Ernesto Zedillo (Mexico)—who were convened in the Commission on Drugs and Democracy in Latin America—, radical neoliberalism has been more an “academic exercise” than a political initiative. Nevertheless, two different events elucidate the way in which the legalization of drugs as a “taboo” topic for the governments of the region has begun to be broken slowly—one event took place in the 2012 Sixth Summit of the Americas, and the other was the legalization and regulation of marijuana in Uruguay in 2012. Both events have occurred amidst warnings from Washington such as “legalization is not the answer”, as President Obama stated (La legalización de drogas no es la respuesta: Barack Obama, 2012), or as the sub-Secretary of State for the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, William Brownfield iterates, “there are red lines that no country wants to cross” (Gómez Maseri, 2013).

Specifically, the first event relates to the call made by the presidents of the region gathered in the Sixth Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia, in April 2012 to assess the results of the War on Drugs, and to explore new and more efficient approaches to the problem. As a
result of the Summit, the OAS was in charge of carrying out a study whose conclusions echoed the necessity of decriminalizing drug consumption (drugs are a problem of public health), and of discussing different models of drug regulation as it is currently done with cigarettes and alcohol (market solution but with legal limits of commercialization, advertisement, and consumption without outlawing it) (OEA, 2013; Cardoso, Gaviria and Zedillo, 2012). The second event is the legalization and regulation of production, commercialization, and consumption of Marijuana made by Mujica’s government in Uruguay. This market response to the problem of drugs is meaningful, but it has a limited scope to challenge the predominant punitive approach that has characterized prohibitionism in the region. Firstly, because the records of the International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports of the US Department of State determined that “Uruguay is not considered a major narcotics-producing country” (US Department of State, Diplomacy in Action, 2013). This country has a marginal role in the regional drug problematic confronting some small issues “of local consumption and logistics and transit operations” (US Department of State, Diplomacy in Action, 2013). Secondly, the legalized drug was marijuana rather than cocaine or heroin, which are more directly involved with the crime industry in Latin America. By the relative weight of these two drugs in the illegal business of the region, every serious discussion of legalization has to include them.

Although radical neoliberalism remains more in the field of policy discussion and less in a discussion of its empirical evidence, it is useful to understand defective neoliberal cases. Those cases are free market economies–Colombia and Mexico are in the top 5 of the ranking, places 4 and 5; while Guatemala and El Salvador are in the middle, in 8 and 11 respectively according to the index of Economic Freedom of the World, 2012 (Crisp & Gwartney, 2012: 175)–which
despite the fact of having a competitive advantage in the drug market, they remain with a prohibitionist practice in this field. This prohibitionist practice that responds more to a moralistic view framed within a substantive rationality (drugs are not appropriate), rather than a technical approach framed within a formal rationality (how convenient it is to legalize drugs?) creates a serious distortion of the market rationality. The result is the emergence of a rich illegal market in the periphery of the legal market (in the economic field), and a serious threat to democracy and state security (in the political field) given the capacity of the cartels and other illegal organizations to break the rule of law and to challenge state control, thanks to the firepower that comes from their immense resources (see, figure 4). Here, defective neoliberalism accepts the main ideas and rationality of procedural democracy, at least as an aspiration, but it lacks a “state with capacity to enforce its political decisions” (Tilly, 2007: 15)–in contrast with deconstructive indigeneity, which questions procedural democracy as part of colonial republicanism; or confrontational populism, which mainly critiques its elitist source of authority detached from the pueblo; or even social liberal reformism, which questions the unpopular purpose served by it.

Given that no democracy can work if the state lacks capacity to enforce the rule of law, control its territory, and guarantee its citizens’ security, the government agendas subordinate the neoliberal strategic aims of economic growth and market efficiency to the pressing aim of achieving higher levels of security and heightening the repressive capacity of the state and its judicial apparatus to fight the crime challenge (see, e.g., Departamento Nacional de Colombia, República de Colombia, 2002-2006; 2006-2010; 2010-2014; Poder Ejecutivo Federal, Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 2007-2012; 2013-2018). The political goal of achieving security becomes a
requirement to accomplish market *efficiency* in the economy field. In defective neoliberalism, the drug problem is a security issue instead of a market issue. In such an order, it is not the entrepreneur (although it remains as a crucial ally), but it is the strong man or the right-wing party who are called to re-establish order, i.e. the historically privileged actors. In those procedural democracies that characterize defective neoliberalism, the challenge comes initially from the “high involvement of semi-legal and illegal actors in public politics [cartels, paramilitary, guerrillas,] and substantially higher levels of lethal violence in public politics [intimidation, kidnappings, assassinations, massacres, displacements]” (Tilly, 207: 20.)

However, in a second moment, with the persistence of violence and society’s co-existence with illegality, the government becomes easily an active actor that undermines the bases of the republican order and the rule of law as well. For example, Rojas (2009) showed how during the Uribe administration in Colombia (2002-2006 and 2006-2010), the population’s demands for security produced “citizens less inclined to claim his or her rights politically [to participate] and more prone to “voluntary obedience” [voluntary servitude] in return for protection” (229). Nevertheless, the search for security and the shrinkage of citizen rights “rather than lasting peace engenders a continuation of the barbarisms, this time in the name of securing citizens” (Rojas, 2009: 227). Indeed, the drop in the homicide rate, infrastructure attacks, and massacres and kidnappings perpetrated by the guerillas was achieved during the Uribe administration by a “shared sovereignty” between government and paramilitaries, whose terror was justified in the name of the security of the state and the society (Rojas, 2009).
In summary, the practice of prohibitionism is crucial to understand the discussion of “post-neoliberal” modernity projects in the region, because it shows how neoliberal countries with a competitive advantage in the illegal market of drugs (e.g., Colombia and Mexico) switch the market logic of neoliberalism –characteristic of countries like Chile– for a confrontational one that is alien to neoliberalism. This practice also shows why a group of countries that is usually left aside from the current analysis of the region subordinates the aim of market efficiency to security demands. Prohibitionism not only illustrates the limits of western society with its own neoliberal discourse, but it also sheds lights on how decades of conditionality have contributed to construct “high roads” of neoliberalism like Chile and “low roads” of a defective neoliberalism like Colombia and Mexico in which the rule of law is jeopardized initially by the high involvement of semi-legal and illegal actors, and then by the government itself.  

Conclusion

Once the variations in the representations and collective meanings of the emerging projects in regards to neoliberal modernity are established, it is possible to identify the causes behind the different projects that currently exist in Latin America. The final project, (e.g., neoliberal, deconstructive indigeneity, confrontational populism, social liberal reformism, radical neoliberalism, and defective neoliberalism, is explained by the sort of agency involved (central or peripheral) and the kind of rationality (substantive-formal) that leads each one.

Out of the combinations of those two variables we have the following six paths: first, central agency with top-down politics and formal rationality in the form of market logic results in neoliberalism. Here we find the case of Chile, but it is possible to some extent to make analogies with Peru where the neoliberal reforms brought satisfactory economic growth and
political stability. Second, peripheral agency with bottom-up politics and substantive rationality in the form of deconstructive decolonial logic resulting in deconstructive indigeneity. Here, the paradigmatic case is Bolivia, and to some degree Ecuador, where the colonial-decolonial cleavage starts at the periphery and takes the center. Examples of cases where the cleavage remains in the periphery without jeopardizing the center are Colombia, Chile, and Mexico. Third, central agency with co-opted grass-roots mobilization that responds to a personalistic top-down politics and substantive rationality in the form of a pueblo-antipueblo confrontational logic leads to confrontational populism. Venezuela and Ecuador are part of the countries that belong to this group. Fourth, central agency with top-down politics but with negotiation and formal rationality in the form of the logic of what is acceptable boosts social liberal reformism. Brazil and Uruguay are the cases par excellence, but Argentina could be included here as a “hinge case”. Fifth, peripheral agency by illegalized markets and substantive rationality in the form of prohibitionism breeds defective neoliberalism. Colombia, Mexico, and to some extent Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador can be considered as such. Finally, peripheral agency by illegalized markets and formal rationality in the form of market logic results in radical neoliberalism. This project remains mainly in the field of policy discussion.

When we see the rich variation of collective meanings behind those projects, it is clear that the notions of a homogeneous turn to the left in the region or a post-neoliberal order become elusive. The extensive check-list of principles and policies elaborated by the scholars who advocate for one or the other in order to characterize the region has a limited descriptive scope (the lists are always incomplete either by excess or default), and also little explanatory capacity. After looking into the rationalities, practices, and places of enunciation of each project, I can
say that some of them are more prone to adopt some of the policies and principles contained in those check-lists while rejecting others. Thus, practices that, according to Yates and Bakker (2014), should be common in the current Latin American post-neoliberal order such as “nationalization”, “regulation of big business”, and “social mobilization as ‘politics-as-usual’” are applied by deconstructive indigeneity and confrontational populism, but avoided by social liberal reformism and strongly rejected by the neoliberal and defective neoliberal projects. In the same vein, the policy of “plurinationalism” (Yates and Bakker, 2014: 71), rather than being generalized, is only pursued by deconstructive indigeneity. The situation is repeated in regards to the policy oriented to boost “spaces of consensus building” (Yates and Bakker, 2014: 71), promoted by social liberal reformism but strongly attacked by confrontational populism. The same circumstance is replicated over and over with each one of the policies and principles that appear on the check-list.
Chapter Three: Societies of the Americas:
A Genealogy of Inter-American Relations
from the Independence Wars to the
Projects of the Twenty-First Century

In the early twenty-first century, and with the crisis of the neoliberal modernity project, it becomes clear that the new practices and agencies emerging in the continent are producing not only variations in the domestic order, but also in the hemispheric order, although not always in the same way. For example, while Brazilian foreign policy presses for a more inclusive system of norms and rules at the international level, and to lessen the US weight in the region, the Bolivarian project led by Venezuela calls for social insurrection at the continental level against the neoliberal order and its main agents, identified as the US empire and the national elites. In one way or another, current inter-American relations seem to be shaped by the tight but conflictive bond that exists between what Bull (2002) called the international society and the world society. The former is materialized in the common ground of norms that regulate the relations between the countries of the Americas as a society of states, and the latter is manifested in the transnational solidarity or conflict between people across national borders that results from conceiving the continent as a single “world” society rather than a society of states.
This chapter analyses the “historical beginnings” of the tight and conflictive bond between both societies in the hemisphere. The aim is to comprehend the singularity of the current tension in light of its continuities and ruptures with the past. Two questions are used to map this process: what have been the predominant practices at each moment that underlie the changing tension between the single continental society and the society of states? and, how have those practices constituted different identities, interests, and legitimacy criteria at a continental scale? My goal is to determine whether or not those practices have constructed hemispheric cultures across the different periods that have boosted a common bond among the countries and legitimized states as the main actors (as required by an international society); or on the contrary, whether or not those practices have driven universal views that undermine the states’ sovereignty and raise ideological struggles that cut across their boundaries (as required by the continental world society).

The purpose of such review is to give a historical background to the analysis introduced in chapter four that examines the different scenarios of cooperation and conflict in the Americas after the crisis of the liberal modernity project and with the interaction of both societies.

The chapter is organized in six sections that correspond to different cultural sceneries: first, the foundational anti-colonial Pan-Americanism, 1776–1889; second, imperial Pan-Americanism, 1889–1932; third, the “Golden Age” of Pan-Americanism, 1932–1953; fourth, Pan-Americanism in time of the Cold War, 1953–1980’s; fifth, neo-liberalism as the new Pan-Americanism, 1980s–2000; and finally, Bolivarianism, Indigeneity, and Brazilian social liberal reformism vis-à-vis neoliberalism, where the singularity of the current tension is analysed in light of the continuities and ruptures with the previous
periods. In one way or another, those cultural sceneries are closely related with the encounter and the different kinds of relations held by two Americas: One Anglo-Saxon, protestant, and rich, led by the US, considered a protagonist in world politics and set north of the Rio Grande in the north of the continent; the other one, defined mainly as Latin, Catholic, poor, composed by the Spanish and Portuguese speaking countries, living in a peripheral condition and set south of the Rio Grande.

From a methodological perspective, this work implies mapping out a series of events and practices ranging from 1776, year of the US independence, to the early twenty-first century, time of crisis of the neoliberal modernity (see, Annex 1). The theoretical point of departure of this genealogy is the constructivist assumption that the meanings given to the world arise out of social interactions. There is no society of states or a single great continental society beyond the intersubjective relations of the members of the Americas. This is a way to grasp the socialization and the agents’ practices not just as mere external behavior that is susceptible to being described and reconstructed, but as a cognitive process that constitutes “realities” in the sense that it introduces meaning to the social world (Wendt, 1992). Therefore, understanding socialization over time in the Americas is less a matter of accurately registering independence wars, military occupations, multilateral negotiations, insurrectional and counter insurgent practices, etc. but rather more of establishing how those specific practices and socializations have constituted different international cultures in the continent.

The Foundational Anti-Colonial Pan-Americanism, 1776–1889

In the independence wars that led to the collapse of the colonial domination in the continent by the old European empires, we find the origin of both the American society
of states, and the single great continental society, the latter at least as an aspiration. It is a process that takes us back to the revolutionary wars that took place in the US between 1776, year in which it was announced that the thirteen American colonies would be regarded as independent sovereign states; and 1783, date in which the British Empire was compelled to accept this fact after its defeat in the Yorktown battle (see, e.g., Ward, 1995). In Hispanic America, it takes us back to the historical events unbounded with the Napoleonic occupation of the Iberian Peninsula and the usurpation of the Spanish throne in 1808, the declaration of independence of the Spanish colonies in absence of a legitimate king, the launch of the Spanish imperial counteroffensive aimed to recover the empire after the return of the absolutist Ferdinand VII, and the frustration of this attempt with the military victories of the American armies of Bolivar and San Martin, the last of them in Ayacucho in 1824 (see, e.g., Lynch, 1991; Bushnell, 1991).

On one hand, the republics were born with these independences, and with the republics, a society of states was born—one that made of the people, rather than of the dynastic principle, the base of sovereignty and the legitimacy of power. In that sense, the independence wars led the states of the Americas to constitute a society of republics oriented by “ultimate values”, and bounded by ties of different nature than those which had connected the European monarchies since the Peace of Westphalia (See, e.g., Carmagnani, 2011). What it is more, after the quick recognition of new Hispanic countries by the US, the Old Continent and the New World seemed to move in different directions. While the former perceived in republicanism the germ of all disorders—even more after the Napoleonic Army defeat and the onset of the European Restoration—the latter saw in the monarchy the seed of peoples’ oppression and a constant threat for the
republics’ independence that demanded cooperation among them (Carmagnani, 2011: 94). Republicanism as a principle of legitimacy was so widespread in the Americas that even the independent Brazil, born as an empire in 1822, invested “dom Pedro” with the title of emperor rather than king of Brazil, indicating that his mandate derived from popular acclamation and not from dynastic tradition (see, e.g., Bushnell & Macaulay, 1994).

On the other hand, independence wars as revolutionary practices also boosted the idea of a universal single great continental society by urging the “transnational” solidarity among the different oppressed colonies and peoples of the Americas so as to transcend the political and administrative divisions imposed by the European empires, and by inciting the conformation of a unique great American nation capable of stopping the common European oppressor thrones. Nevertheless, in English America, the dream of a single Anglo-American society of continental dimensions was rapidly broken after the War of 1812 with which the US attempted to annex Canada. In Spanish America, the project of a single great polity capable of unifying the Hispanic world in America beyond the colonial divisions was frustrated as well first with the war outbreak between the Great Colombia and Peru (1828–1829), and then with the dissolution of the Great Colombia in 1831. The Great Colombia had maintained together four of the current nations that had fought as one for their liberation against Spain under Bolivar’s command. In that sense, although neither Anglo-Saxon nor Hispanic America could materialise the idea of a continental world society, the latter could not avoid the secessionism that the former warded off in the American Civil War of 1861–1865. It is perhaps in this excessive secessionism of Hispanic America that bitterly frustrated the
aspiration of a **single great Hispanic world** during the nineteenth century where we find the roots of the current Bolivarian discourse that calls for leaving aside the difference, constituting a **single Latin American homeland**, and defeating the external imperialism.

In general, it is possible to argue seriously that in the period after the independence wars, the inter-American relations were bound for a nascent pan-Americanism that swung between the construction of a **society of states** and a **continental world society**. While the former relied on the young republics and the system of values that bound them as the main members of the emergent system, the latter stressed the construction of a single great nation (the *pueblo* in Hispanic America) as the privileged historical actor. All in all, the embryonic Americanism created the bases for a common identity between the Americas underpinned by the shared idea of mutual defence and protection against European colonialism. During this period, the idea of a **society of republican states** and a **continental world society** co-existed and often reinforced each other. In that sense, the later infamous Monroe Doctrine was originally and simultaneously a sign of moral support for the people and for the republican system of the Americas. Issued by the US government in 1823, a time when San Martin and Bolivar were still fighting the Spanish army in Peru, this doctrine stated firstly that the American continents were not subjects of future colonization by any European power, and therefore that any attempt to oppress the new independent countries would be considered an unfriendly stance towards the US. Given the asymmetry of power between the US with regard to the Holly Alliance and the UK, highlighted by authors like Domínguez, (1999: 36), Kissinger (1994) and Bushnell (1986), the Monroe Doctrine could not be understood as anything different than an indication of the solidarity that linked the Americas.
Nevertheless, and just like the external wars and the secessionism were the events that marked the limit of the **continental world society** in the Americas, the Congress of Panama shaped and marked the limited scope of the **international society of republics** in the hemisphere in that period.\(^{63}\) Called in 1826 under the auspices and initiative of Simón Bolívar, (Scott, 1935), this Congress invited the governments of the Great Colombia, Mexico, Central America, the United Provinces of Buenos Aires, Chile, and Brazil, with England as an observer. It also included the US by the suggestion of the Colombian patriot Francisco de Paula Santander, despite Bolivar’s reluctance. The Dominion of Canada, the three Guianas (British, Dutch and French), and the Caribbean islands that remained under the control of European empires were excluded and not considered part of the emergent republican system of states. In fact, countries like Canada would remain outside the inter-American system until its formal acceptance into the OAS only in 1990, one hundred and sixty four years later. Despite the wide number of guests, only four countries–Peru, the Great Colombia, Mexico and Central America–were represented at the Congress of Panama (Scott, 1935). Thus, the Treaty of Perpetual Union, League, and Confederation between the republics of the Americas, far from being materialized in a formal body of institutions and rules, remained as a vague communion of anti-colonial origin and republican spirit during this period.

While it is true that the independence wars were the genesis of both the **continental world society** and the **international society of states** in the hemisphere, these societies did not fully liberate themselves from the ambiguities of the relation between former colonies and the original empires. After all, the wars of independence were anti-colonial rather than decolonial struggles. The wars sought to “expel the imperial administration
from the territory, in order for the local elites to govern themselves” (Mignolo, 2011: 53); but also, those elites accepted the western modernity project without unveiling the exclusionary logic of coloniality embedded in this project (Mignolo, 2011; Rojas, 2002). In addition, the local European descendant elites saw themselves as the heirs of that modernity project in a new world that in many ways remained backward, traditional, and uncivilized (see, e.g., Rojas, 2002). Based on that ambiguity, only ten years after England recognized the US independence in 1803, the US federal government launched the westward expansion and the Indian annihilation under the idea of the American manifest destiny. Hence, for the settlers in the Americas, the confrontation with the former empires was less a rupture with an alien culture, but more a “reflexive” exercise in coming to terms with their own origins (Eisenstadt, 2002: 14). While the US soon became a self-sufficient center of modernity, Latin America would remain oriented to external centers and concerned with the extent to which it was indeed part of the western society (Eisenstandt, 2002: 23, 24).

In Hispanic America, where there is the presence of a more diverse ethnic society composed by Creole, mestizos, Indigenous and Afro-descendants, “coming to terms with their western origins” meant plainly the exclusion of the majority of the population. Both the conservative project that conceived independence as a rupture with Bourbon absolutism instead of with the Iberian culture (Bosch, 1986; Jaramillo Uribe, 1986: 36), and the liberal project that saw in the independence a bourgeois revolution and a new “phase of the great French revolution” (Hale, 1996: 135) had the subordination of the non-European population as a basic assumption. In that sense, the paradox of Hispanic republicanism was self-evident given that it vindicated the sovereignty of the pueblo.
rather than the dynastic principle as the base of its legitimacy; but it could not govern with the pueblo given its non-European origin and its ignorance of western culture (Rouquié, 2011). This ambiguity between empire and former colony would be object of the more diverse interpretations, and would be recalled by the current Bolivarian project, and also by different anti-status quo projects throughout the history.

The Imperial Pan-Americanism, 1889-1932

In the late nineteenth century, the fear of European colonialism ceased to shape the relations between the US and the oligarchic republics of Hispanic America. With the exception of the fiasco represented in the French invasion of Mexico (1862), which ended with the execution of the intended new emperor Maximilian of Habsburg at the hands of Mexican republicans, European imperial adventures in the American continent were no longer an imminent threat. This does not mean that all traces of the old transatlantic empires had disappeared in the New World. Spain, England, Holland, and France maintained their possessions in the Caribbean, and also events like the British occupation of the Falklands (1833) still occurred. This indicates that by 1889 (the year of the First International Conference of American States gathered in Washington), European colonialism stopped being a credible threat in the American mainland on a grand scale, and that the idea of mutual defence and protection against the monarchical Europe declined as a bond among the new republics of the Americas.

The independence wars and the regional conferences like the Congress of Panama as the two practices that constituted that embryonic pan-Americanism began to be replaced. At this point, the hemisphere was about to encounter a new practice that would mark inter-
American relations and construct a new geopolitical reality: the oscillating and multifaceted unilateralism of the US. This practice will constitute the most predatory side of a new geopolitical fact called United States continental hegemony.

In the 1889–1932 period, US hegemony adopted the form of a fierce predatory imperialism through the implementation of a unilateral double track practice. On one track, the US led the pan-American movement as part of its imperial strategy by focusing on its economic expansion and overlooking sensible political discussions in the continent. Bolívar's legacy is revisited in this new stage as a symbol of Pan-Americanism but under the United States’ commercialist interpretation, free of Bolívar’s ambiguities regarding that country, and free of his political approaches against imperialism (see, e.g., Scott, 1935). On the other track, the US carried out a “big stick” policy, which consisted of systematic military occupations of foreign countries in the area that aimed to expand the US borders and consolidate its influence in the whole hemisphere (see, e.g., Gólcher, 1996). The first and the second track—the military and the economic ones—were complementary rather than antagonistic: American investment and trade often grew in the occupied countries, and the military interventions were frequently used to deal with unpaid loans or labor strikes affecting American investments. During those years, six pan-American conferences took place in the midst of invasions by US marines in at least nine different countries of the continent. The Conferences of Washington (1889), Mexico (1901), Rio de Janeiro (1906), Buenos Aires (1910), Santiago (1923), and Havana (1928) (see, Scott, 1935) alternated with the US military occupations in Cuba and Puerto Rico (1899-1902), Nicaragua (1912-1933), Mexico (1914, 1917), Haiti (1915-1934), the Dominican Republic (1916-1924), Honduras (1924), and Panama (1925). In Panama, the
US also participated actively in its secessionism from Colombia (1903) when the Colombian Congress blocked the construction of the inter-oceanic canal (see, e.g., Randall, 1992).

Given that the “self is the reflection of an actor’s socialization” (Wendt, 1992: 404), the unilateral double track introduced by the US would have a profound impact on the embryonic identity of the Americas with direct consequences in the international society of states, and in the aspiration of building a single great continental society.

The international society of states and the Hispanic American republics, members of this embryonic society, were deeply undermined by the practices of the US as their significant other, which had turned into an imperial power. In that sense, the pan-American conferences of this period were embedded in a different context of meaning than the context discussed in the Congress of Panama. During those years, the predator was neither outside of the continent (in Europe) nor was it of a different nature (a monarchy). The predator was found in the American republics themselves. As an emergent but internal imperial power, the US first deprived the young republics as depositories of the pan-American discourse. Then, it shifted the content of the pan-American movement from political concerns (such as the republican and non-intervention issues that characterized the Congress of Panama) towards commercial and economic matters that, like the approval of a regional code of a private international law, were in line with the US expansionist interests (see, e.g., Gölcher, 1996; Scott, 1935). With the predator itself talking about pan-Americanism, this movement became a mere imperial contrivance. Rather than being considered an active part of an anti-colonial alliance of independent republics, united by a vague communion of spirit forged by shared
independence wars, the oligarchic states of Hispanic America came to conceive themselves as semi-independent states under the US sphere of control. The US pan-Americanism reduced Hispanic America to the empire’s “back yard”, where South American states preserved a relative autonomy while Central American and Caribbean countries became, in practice, protectorates under almost permanent US military occupation. Although fully applied in 1889, this imperial doctrine was formalized under the Ulysses Grant’s administration in 1870 when the Monroe Doctrine was reinterpreted not as an anti-colonial principle against all imperial behavior as it was originally conceived, but as an aspiration to substitute the European imperial power in the name of the special virtues of the American people and the superiority of their republican institutions (Herring, 2008).

There is no doubt that the material superiority of the US, along with the absence of a powerful competitor in the whole region during this period, incentivised its double-track predatory policy. After the modernization of its Navy in the 1880s, and the changes to the naval power strategy of the next decade, the US put its forces in line with the imperial navies of Britain and Germany, and ahead of any of the weak ones of the continent (Hendrix, 2009). This uncontested advantage paved the way for constant landings of marines in the Central American Isthmus and the Caribbean islands. The superiority was also evident in the economic field. The increased demand of commodities of the US industrialization positioned its market in the agrarian Latin American societies as the main export destiny. The emergent (international) imperial power was not only the main export market for most Latin American republics by 1913–no fewer than eleven of the twenty one countries reported the United States as their leading market–but its weight
was overwhelming within Central American and Caribbean total exportations (it represented between 70 and 80 per cent) (Bulmer-Thomas, 1994: 74-75).

In general, it is clear that the anti-colonialism of the previous period as a principle of identification between the Americas faded with the US military and commercial predation. Additionally, the sense of differentiation that was already present in the continent between the Anglo-Saxon and the Hispanic world became more acute. The two Americas developed mutually exclusive identities. The northern and southern sides of the Rio Grande, less than representing the borders between two regions of the same American continent, turned into the edges of two different political entities: the imperial centre/metropole and its sphere of control.

According to Bergel (2011), the Latin American literature of that period, using a predominantly culturalist and racial approach, explored the emergent anti-Americanism that began to spread along the elites of the region as the new form of anti-imperialism. Anglo-Saxon materialism was often contrasted with Latin idealism. “The US society was portrayed as one governed by utilitarianism, and by a desire of bland and vulgar material welfare, lacking of depth and aesthetic sense; while the Ibero-Latin society was presented as a selfless idealism that was detected in populations of the continent under its Latin lineage, and was absent in the Saxons of the north” (Bergel, 2011: 157). This idea was reiterated in the essays of the Cuban José Martí and the Nicaraguan Rubén Darío, and in the subsequent works of the Uruguayan Rodó, the Peruvian García Calderón, and the Argentinean Manuel Ugarte. The comments of the previous period regarding the US as an admirable society were left behind (Bergel, 2011).
The cultural and racial approach was not absent either from the American Manifest Destiny that led the US to launch an imperial policy in the continent in the name of the special virtues of the American people and the superiority of their institutions vis-à-vis Hispanic America. In 1823, Stephen Austin, historically known as the father of Texas, would already say that “the majority of the people of the whole nation [talking about Mexicans] as far as I have seen them want nothing but tails to be more brutes than the Apes” (Austin, cited in Gleijeses, 1882: 490.) In 1857, Senator Buchanan was “projecting that Central America would have in a short period of time a significant Anglo-American population and that such a population will carve the future of the indigenous people, by which term he was not referring the Amerindians but rather the Creole population of Nicaragua” (Torre Caicedo, cited by Mignolo, 2000: 136.)

In the face of the merge of the Manifest Destiny and the Monroe Doctrine, the Hispanic American elites called for the unity its people in order to resist the uncontested material superiority and the imperialist policy of the emergent great power of the north. In that sense, during the time of the oligarchic governments in Hispanic America, the evocation of a single continental Hispanic society as a form of resistance was still present and, although lessened by its elitist component, Pan-Hispanamericanism became anti-Americanism in this binary world.

In summary, the emergence of the imperial pretension of the US in the continent during the 1889-1932 period, seriously undermined the international society of states in the Americas. Adopting the characteristic unilateralism of empires, the US unpacked a double-track practice that combined economic expansionism and military occupations aimed to increase and consolidate its power in the continent, and to reduce the countries
to simple satellites in its area of influence. The republican principle of self-determination and anti-colonialism crusade, as the bond that regulated the relations within this embryonic American society fell apart with the implementation of the US predatory practices. In times of US imperialism, Central America and the Caribbean were reduced to “semi-protectorates”, and the South American countries knew the conditioned sovereignty. With the destruction of anti-colonialism as the referent of identity among the Americas, not only did Pan-Americanism turn into an imperial contrivance, but also the difference between a rich and imperial Anglo-Saxon America, and a poor and subordinate Latin-Iberian became more acute. In the face of an uncontested economic and military US superiority, Pan-Hispanamericanism as an elitist anti-Americanism evocated rhetorically the aspiration of a single continental Hispanic society as a form of resistance. Perhaps, this period constitutes the most infamous episode in the history of inter-American relations. Very often, when subsequent US economic and trade initiatives in the region have wanted to be linked with an imperial strategy, reference to paramount scenes of this period are brought to mind—for example, the banana enclaves, “the dollar diplomacy”, and the confiscations of customs revenues in Central American countries.

The “Golden Age” of Pan-Americanism, 1932–1953

Just like the previous period turned into a benchmark for what Russell (2006) called “the will and imperialist practices”, the events of the interlude of 1932–1953 illustrate how a western Hemisphere, constructed in observance of sovereignty and democratic values, could bridge the Americas beyond its differences. Nevertheless, the explanation of the gap between the “black legend” of Pan-Americanism as mere imperial humbug, and the “golden age” perspective that depicts the Pan-American movement as a real inter-
American Society of States, is not in the United States’ substantial loss of power. On the contrary, from 1889–1932 to 1932–1953 the US went from being a regional great power to be a world super-power. The material supremacy of the United States in the economic and military field not only remained uncontested in the Americas, but it also increased. The “presumption of hegemony”, to use Lowenthal’s suggestive expression (2006), stayed; but the practices of the hegemon changed. The US switched the unilateral double-track predatory practice, in line with an imperial conception, for a more multilateral practice of negotiation and consensus construction with the countries of the hemisphere, more in accordance with a new idea of a benevolent leadership. In consequence, and by effect of “the symbolic interactionist notion of the ‘looking-glass self,’” which asserts that the self is a reflection of an actor’s socialization” (Wendt, 1992: 404), Latin American countries as the “significant other” came to conceive themselves more and more as members of an inter-American society of states.

The tipping point for the US unilateralism became explicit in 1933 when the new President Franklin D. Roosevelt outlined his new foreign policy to the hemisphere saying that “I would dedicate this Nation to the policy of the good neighbour—the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others—the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors” (Roosevelt, 1933). This doctrine, announced the first day of his four administrations was meant to abandon Grant's adjustment to the Monroe Doctrine aimed at substituting the European for the American imperialism in the continent. It also implied calling off the assumption of “legitimate expansionism”, implicit in the Manifest Destiny, in favour of the respect for the “neighbors’ rights”,

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including property and self-determination. The effects of the Good Neighbour doctrine were visible: marines were withdrawn from Nicaragua and Haiti, the Platt Amendment that formalized American domination over Cuba was repealed, and the US opted for bargaining compensation rather than occupying its neighbour to the South after the Cardenas administration nationalized the American oil companies with operations in Mexico (see, Padilla, 1954: 3).

The previous unilateralism had been enough to impose the US as an irresistible power across the continent, but not to construct what Bull (2002: 33), citing Wight, called “the principle of international legitimacy”. In other words, given its military power and the situation of dependency of the countries of the Americas with regard to its economy, the US had the capacity to make its decisions prevail by threat or direct action. However, the United States lacked the collective judgement of a hemispheric society of states, capable of investing its actions with the necessary legitimacy to gain acceptance and not be seen as the abusive and greedy (international) imperial power depicted by the Pan-Hispanoamericanist movement. The Manifest Destiny and the Monroe Doctrine fed US unilateralism, but these policies never posit hemispheric questions about rightful membership of the family of republics of the Americas, or about how sovereignty over territory and population should be fixed. Shortly, in contrast with the foundational period, in which the independence wars switched the dynastic principle to a republican one as a criterion of international legitimacy, the unilateral US double-track predation could not do the same with its imperial pretension.

In all the six Pan-American conferences that took place during that period, the US promoted its new doctrine of the Good Neighbour. It was an attempt to gain distance
from its immediate imperial past, settling new practices, establishing common interests and values, and building a common institutionalism capable of regulating, and investing in inter-American relations with legitimacy. The Pan-American conferences became multilateral spaces of concertation and dialogue. The foundational idea of a western hemisphere, recognized in its common anti-colonial past and bound in the promotion and defence of its shared democratic and republican values, was retaken and largely driven. The inter-American society of states became a more institutionalized space with the creation of a permanent multilateral institution like the OAS, which hereinafter would become the core of the inter-American system. In short, the two Americas were tied by “special relations”.

As I mentioned above, the Good Neighbour policy implied the rejection of the Monroe Doctrine, at least of Grant’s interpretation. This means that the United States ceased its unilateral imperial practice in the Americas, but it also broke its historical isolationism that confined its political foreign policy to the continent, and no longer kept out of the intrigues and geopolitical struggles that took place in Europe. In that sense, the phrase “to leave America for the Americans”, which summarized the Monroe Doctrine, was dismantled in its double meaning. In fact, the US new multilateral practices explained the strengthening of the American International Society of States (constructed around the promotion and defence of democracy) and the emergence of the United States as its benevolent hegemon. However, the new multilateral practices implemented in the Americas can only be explained by Washington’s rupture of its previous pattern of isolationism.
Indeed, what led the US to formulate the Good Neighbour policy was its growing involvement in European geopolitics since its decisive participation in the First World War, and its growing concerns with the progress of Mussolini and Hitler in Europe. Certainly, the lack of a “principle of hemispheric legitimacy” made it hard for the countries of the Americas to distinguish the US imperial pretention from the aspirations that European totalitarianism could have in the continent in case of a war. Specifically, the Good Neighbour was oriented to re-construct the foundational republicanism of the Americas as the “principle of hemispheric legitimacy”. This principle aimed not only to re-legitimize the United States hegemony and convocate the hemisphere around it, but also to build functional institutions to coordinate diplomatic and military actions in promotion of the collective defence of the continent and against the old European oppressors. During this period, the two Americas built “special relations”, where the enemy was placed outside once more, and democratic values became the bond between the American republics yet again.

The more we dig into the past looking for details of this Pan-American “golden age”, as it often happens with the search for gold, the more it is clear, however, that no such treasured period is to be found. It is true, as Gólcher (1996) points out, that in the Panamerican Conference of Lima in 1938, the countries of the Americas issued the Statement of Principles of the Americas. It is also true that in the Summit of Ministries of Panama of 1939, the US implemented measures of economic cooperation in order to dampen the trade costs of an unavoidable war. In addition, it is also true that with the Treaty of Rio of 1947, hemispheric defence took form under the assumption that an aggression of any foreign country was a matter of collective responsibility (Gólcher,
1996). However, it is no less true that the resentment against the US presence in the Americas did not cease. The anti-Americanism linked to the Pan-Hispanic movement of the previous period left behind its disposition regarding race, its elitist origin, and its intellectual nature--instead becoming more focused on the economics, popular in its social component, and more combative and nationalist in its practice.

The historical emergence of this new anti-Americanism could be tracked to Haya de la Torre in the late 20’s. With his discourse--not yet free of the racial component--he spoke of an indo-America rather than an Ibero-Latin America. This Peruvian intellectual and politician also introduced the idea of imperialism mainly as a matter of economic exploitation to the student and workers movements (See, Bergel, 2011). However, it was with nationalist movements that Vargas came to power in Brazil in 1930, Cardenas in Mexico in 1934, and Perón in Argentina in 1946, when not only did pan-Hispanamericanism become pan-Latinoamericanism (now including the presence of Brazil), but also when the anti-Americanism inherent to it began to be articulated by the exploited people of the exploited countries.

Rather than a Pan-American “golden age”, what we have between 1932 and 1953 is the tension between the international American society of states, and the emergent aspiration to construct a Latin American order composed by national, popular, and sovereign countries. While the former stresses the specifically democratic character of the American society of states and the sense of differentiation with European totalitarianisms, the latter emphasizes its inherent antagonism due to the exploitation of one America by the other; and it does not hide its sympathy with European fascisms, at least in the cases of Vargas and Perón. In contrast to the international society of states, which places the
republics in the forefront, boosts diplomatic and multilateral negotiation, and follows the US lead; the new nationalisms take the exploited of the exploited countries as the privileged historical actor, make confrontation the practice *par excellence*, and turn anti-Americanism to its own cause. Pan-Latinamericanism becomes a nationalist and popular assertion. In this period, although the emancipatory aspiration to construct a single *continental society* like the Great Colombia of Bolivar is not present, given that the vindication is mainly national, the connection with the past is possible, because those nationalist movements demand the inclusion of the *pueblo* in whose name the independence was proclaimed, but who was later excluded from the government by the Creole elites.

**Pan-Americanism in Cold War Times, 1953–1980**

With the US participation in the *coup* against Jacobo Arbenz in 1953, who led a progressive government in Guatemala, the complex but fragile hemispherism based on states’ shared values and interests collapsed like a house of cards. This event was an undeniable sign that Latin America had become another stage for the Cold War. After fascism was defeated in the Second World War, international relations moved less towards the construction of an *international society of states* that assured cooperation and prosperity in times of peace, but more towards the idea of a *community of mankind* divided between capitalists and communists (in the latter’s view) or democracies and totalitarianism (in the former’s perspective). “The United States and the Soviet Union were inclined to speak of each other as heretics or outcasts beyond the pale, rather than as member states of the same *international society*” (Bull, 2002: 41). Latin America was dragged by an ideological confrontation between the two previous allies whose doctrines
demanded global transnational solidarity, driving the “states [of the Americas] and the factions within them [to be] ranged in opposite sides” (Bull, 2002: 40). In contrast with the “golden age” depicted as a society of states that cooperate due to their shared faith in democracy and self-determination, the new period often presented the Americas as a single great society jeopardized by international communism.

The Cold War was rendered in the Americas through insurrectional and counter-insurgent practices. The former were aimed to break the status quo and make changes, not always towards establishing a communist society but usually perceived as such during the Cold War. Counter-insurgent practices were done in name of the defence of order and institutions, not always led by reactionary forces but often so.

The insurrectional practices encompassed nationalist manifestations that stemmed from the times of Haya de la Torre, Perón, and Vargas, but whose “strong anti-US overtones” turned more disturbing now due to the risk of communist subversion (US Department of State, 1969: 3).^71 They also included proper revolutionary actions–public and clandestine, and carried out by communist parties, together with guerrillas–aimed to constitute a mass movement capable of withdrawing the “ancient regime”. After Castro’s success in Cuba (1959), the revolutionary fever took the continent.^^72 The first cycle of guerrilla movements in the continent went from 1959 to 1969; it was rural in nature, and it involved Venezuela, Guatemala, Peru, Colombia, and Nicaragua. The second cycle ran from 1967 to 1973 with new urban guerrillas in Uruguay, Brazil, and Argentina (Sader, 2001: 17).
Counter-insurgency was a practice implemented by the repressive apparatus of the state, addressed to track and disarticulate anything that would resemble subversion, *e.g.* guerrilla members, collaborators, and sympathizers, by any “necessary” means the mission required. The counter-insurgency campaign was launched by the US in the name of the ‘special relations’ between the Americas ever “since the days of the Monroe Doctrine [and the] protective relationship toward Latin American nations that we have asserted [since then]” (US Department of State, 1969: 2). Therefore, once again, the Monroe Doctrine expanded its meaning. Evoked to protect Latin America against international communism, the "updated" Monroe Doctrine left behind the characteristic isolationism of the United States once again, and it also resumed the imperial temptation proclaimed by Grant under the assumption of sweeping the revolutionary threat from the continent. The US embarked on a worldwide anti-communist crusade, paradoxically from the hand of the old rival European empires, leaving aside the limitations imposed by the Good Neighbor policy to its pretension of acting as the police in the Americas. During the Cold War, the Monroe Doctrine was no longer a statement of moral support for the continent, neither was it an anti-imperial nor isolationist line of action in the United States foreign policy.

The moral imperative in the field of international relations of both the revolutionary and anti-revolutionary causes seriously undermined the bond of the *pan-American society of states* boosted by the previous Good Neighbor policy. Very often, the principles of non-intervention and democratic promotion that sustained coexistence and social intercourse among the states in the “golden age” were ignored because the higher moral imperatives of the anti-communist crusade demanded it.
Stuck in the midst of an ideological clash that was inclined to depict the continent as a single great society, the inter-American society of states was deeply delegitimized. The principle of non-intervention boosted by the previous pan-Americanism unveiled its fragility when it became clear how fast the US could switch its multilateral practice to the imperial unilateralism of other times. Although the landing of US marines to occupy the neighbouring countries was not absent in the counter-insurgent war,—for example, the Dominican Republic invasion (1965), and the Bay of Pigs disaster (1962)—this time, the stress was in the covert intelligence operations and military aid aimed to overthrow the “communist” governments. This new practice paved the way to the US intervention in the whole continent. According to Pastor (1992), “the United States sent troops to the Caribbean Basin more than twenty times, but not once to South America” (24). However, with secret intelligence operations, the US had not only direct participation in many coups in South America, but it also had the capacity to coordinate clandestine operations with the dictators of the South Cone, like the Operation Condor, aimed to prosecute and assassinate “communists”.

Like non-intervention, the call to promote and defend the democratic principles as a bond among the states of the inter-American society became an empty word. In the OAS—hemispheric institution where the web of treaties and initiatives to promote democracy in the region converged—elected presidents sat together with dictators in power. This was met with the aggravating situation of presidents becoming fewer in number every day, while the military turned into the historical agents in charge of saving the homeland from subversion. The US foreign policy for the Americas rhetorically addressed the democratic values as a source of legitimacy, while in practice it had taken the side of stability: the
stability offered by dictators against the revolution. Even more cynical, the new dictators usually carried out the coup on behalf of the defence of democracy. In such a context, the OAS, promising incarnation of pan-Americanism, was reduced to a simple “useful provider of a ‘political fig-leaf’ for actions [the US] deemed essential for its security, like the Dominican Republic intervention” (US Department of State, 1969: 4).

In the background of this open conflict between, in Bull’s words, “the elected and the damned, the liberators and the oppressed”, there was a dispute about the “ultimate values” required to properly order the continent as a single society. Slowly, Latin America—either by the nationalist path with roots in Haya de la Torre or the communist road that promised to spread the revolution from Cuba to the rest of the continent—found in the sphere of economics, rather than in politics, those “ultimate values”. Instead of “innocuous political forms” based on “empty” principles such as non-intervention and republicanism, the nationalist and communist projects stressed the sense of differentiation within the Americas through the material contrast between rich and poor, empire and nation, elites and pueblo, industrial and agrarian, exploiters and exploited. In this dichotomous society, the historical situation of dependency, underdevelopment and exploitation of Latin America was the result of the alliance of the national elites with international capitalism, often the US capital, aimed to pursue the interest of their own class rather than being true nationalists or revolutionaries. The present and future, on the contrary, were on the side of the exploited people of the exploited countries (see, e.g., Gilpin, 1987; Cardoso & Faletto, 1979; Di Tella & Germani, 1974; Love, 1996; Allende, 1974). Indeed, the attractiveness of communism for the exploited population laid in its promise to involve them as the historical force in charge of the continent’s emancipation
through an anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist revolution. Communism implied getting rid of the “distorted thinking” that promised freedom since the independence wars, but it strengthened oligarchic domination and imperialism instead. The central economic planning, inspired in the “proved” Soviet Gosplan experience, with the proscription of private property, the creation of agricultural cooperatives, and the nationalization of the foreign and national industry, was the technical model introduced by Cuba in order to stop capitalist exploitation, halt imperialism, and achieve communism.

Looking retrospectively at the results of the Cold War in the Americas, it is clear that the horizontal conflict across state boundaries demanding ideological solidarity with the insurgent or even the counter-insurgent cause was neither enough to spread the revolution nor to stop the US authority crisis. After all, communism took root only in Cuba, but even so, the island stayed outside of the inter-American system throughout the twentieth century. The US could conduct its foreign policy in the Americas as a true imperial power without concern for the balance of power or any institution, as once expressed by Kissinger (1994), but it could not avoid that the collective judgement of the battered international society of states was structured more and more with the inequities of the social relations of production in mind. Thus, economic nationalisms and communisms, despite their shortcomings in the promotion of their own agendas, were very successful in contributing to make Latin America aware of the divergence of interests between a capitalist, developed, and industrial North America vis-à-vis a “semi-feudal”, underdeveloped, and agricultural South America.

In fact, the structuralism linked to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (1948), popularly known as ECLAC, responded to the necessity of reducing
the economic gap between Latin America and the US, and a search for its own path
towards development (Prebisch, 1982: 469). However, this search was not in the field of
the continental “world” society like the communist project, but in the field of the
international society of states. Rather than boosting the idea of transformation through a
continental social revolution, ECLAC’s structuralism proposed to reduce the gap through
the implementation of a capitalist developmentalist model centred in the national states of
Latin America. In other worlds, the leadership of the process of change was not in the
hands of any anti-system communist party or guerilla group, but in the reformist hands of
national, popular, and sovereign states.

The idea of the national state as an agent of its own development acquired legitimacy not
from shared “ultimate values”, like Pan-Americanism often did, but from the technical
necessity expressed in cost-benefit calculations. The Pan-American movement usually
appealed to the bond that emerged from a colonial past or a very dubious democratic
nature to emphasize membership to the same international society. In contrast,
ECLAC’s structuralism appealed to the “objective law” of “deterioration of the terms of
trade” to highlight the sense of differentiation between the two Americas based on the
idea that it was not convenient for the peripheral and agricultural Latin America to trade
indefinitely with a central and industrial United States. According to this law, Latin
American countries, located in the periphery of the international capital system, would
need to export more raw materials per day to import the same amount of manufactured
goods from the industrial countries located in the center.76

In that sense, the call made by ECLAC was not only to empower the state as an agent of
its own development by leading a process of import substitution industrialization, but it
was also a call to constitute an international society of Latin American states aimed to cooperate in order to overcome the peripheral conditions. As a result of the new technical consensus driven by ECLAC, in the first step of industrialization during the 50’s, Latin American governments, either from the right or from the left, began to adopt the inward-looking model. In the second step, when it was evident that industrialization required bigger markets than the national ones, inter-state negotiation led to the constitution of regional initiatives like the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) in 1960, and sub regional initiatives like the Andean Pact in 1969. (See, e.g., Prebisch, 1982; Magariños, 2005; Salgado Peñaherrera, 1995). Both, LAFTA and the Andean Pact became the emergent societies of Latin American states.

This growing distance between the two Americas was reflected in a less satisfying cooperation within the formal inter-American system. In the 1967 Punta del Este Summit, convened under the OAS auspices, the clash between the US proposal centred on the free trade included in the Alliance for Progress and the inward-looking development supported by the Latin American countries was unavoidable (Rosenberg, 2001). The conference was a complete failure. “It would be the last time a US president would attend a full hemispheric meeting until the unilateral invitation from President Clinton in 1993. [Aware of its peripheral conditions], Latin American countries would begin to meet among themselves in regional and subregional forums” (Rosenberg, 2001: 83).

Regardless of the US note of protest presented in the Conference of Montevideo of 1959 with regard to the LAFTA initiative (Magariños, 2005: 4), the search for development became the new bond between the emergent international societies of Latin American states. US national security reports seemed to recognize the authority crisis of the country
in the continent. A response of March 1969 by the US Department of State to a National Security Study reads: “Despite our preponderance in wealth and power, our ability directly to control and channel developments in Latin America will be increasingly inhibited by the rising anti-American nationalism” (US Department of State, 1969: 3).

**Neoliberalism the New Pan-Americanism, 1980s–2000**

The renewed liberal agenda made its triumphal entrance as the winner of history. While its rival projects perished as a result of their own contradictions, the neoliberal project thrived, claiming to be the only competent system able to give a full response to the contradictions that have characterized human history (see, e.g., Fukuyama, 1989).

In the world society, the ideological confrontation was extinct with the final collapse of the Communist Block. While the process of openness towards the capitalist bloc that accompanied the Perestroika in 1987 signaled the start of the capitalist-communist distension, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and then the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 meant, respectively, the end of a divided world and the failure of communism as a credible project of future for the world society. In the Americas, Cuba, which stoically resisted the collapse of the communist bloc, went quickly from being perceived as the “cradle” of a communist revolution that inspired young generations with its promise to redeem the continent— to being seen as one among many dictatorships of the region. Henceforth, “Castro’s regime” (as people frequently began to refer to the island’s government), would be denounced many times for the absence of elementary individual freedom and its terrible record of human rights violations. Excluded from the inter-American system, economically embargoed by Washington, abandoned by its previous communist allies, and stripped off its revolutionary appeal, Cuba would be
reduced, in a literal and metaphorical sense, to be an island: a living and floating museum in the Caribbean (see, e.g., Orozco, 1993).

The communist parties and guerilla groups would not have better luck. The former began to struggle to reach the electoral threshold and not disappear. The latter bitterly recognized that the revolution did not have a future. Except for Peru, which saw the emergence of a bloody Maoist guerilla during the 1980’s, and Colombia, where those groups became more and more associated with drug trafficking and organized crime, the guerrillas of the continent began to negotiate their reintegration into civilian life. Just as the revolution was over, the counter-insurgency war was too. The US Army School of the Americas, which trained the military and police forces of Latin America in this kind of irregular war, was dismantled. The military progressively withdrew from governments and returned to their barracks. Free and competitive elections took place in the continent. A constitutionalist movement sought to rationalize the exercise of power. And finally, the Central American civil wars ended with a peace process between irregular forces and the weak states (see, e.g., O’Donnell, 1988; Rouquié, 1994; Huntington, 1991).

In the Latin American society of states the results were conclusive as well. The prevailing center-periphery approach to the world system, which introduced the agricultural countries of the periphery into the inward-looking development, and involved them in a profound south-south cooperation far from the industrial center, was questioned with the outbreak of the debt crisis in 1982. The over-indebtedness and the hyperinflation of the region was explained in part due to the flaws of the inward-looking development model which, incapable to fully completing the substitution process of imports, stressed the original dependency of the countries now importing very expensive capital goods for
an inefficient industry in order to produce basic consumer goods. An aggravating circumstance was that the countries did not reinvest their incomes in the primary export sector, which was the one that generated more revenues, but in an overprotected and non-competitive national industry (see, e.g., Faletto, 1994). In brief, rather than reducing the economic gap with regard to the center, industrialization became a “broken vein” that “bled out” the states’ finances in Latin America. ECLAC’s thesis that the periphery was underdeveloped because the center enriched itself at the expense of the periphery due to the deterioration of the terms of trade inherent to the world system, lost its strength. The 1982 debt crisis opened up the room to approaching the problem from a neoliberal perspective; in other words, if Latin America remained underdeveloped, it was because its productive system was not efficient.77

The new hemispheric order was constructed through two practices: free competition and conditionality. Both practices are closely related with the absolutization of the neoliberal project. In fact, the defeat of the communist bloc was understood not as a specific historical fact but as the culmination of human history by overcoming a series of stages of consciousness marked by the clock of history (see, e.g., Fukuyama, 1989). Then, the celebrated “end of history” boosted the conception of mankind as a world society. This world society was united by the promise of redemption contained in the universal neoliberal idea; but at the same time, it was split between a western vanguard, which already knew this true idea, and the rest of society, stuck on human evolution, which had not yet accessed this idea.

Free competition became the practice through which the individualist ideas and market rationality contained in the neoliberal western truth would travel from the western
vanguard to the peripheries, thus universalizing neoliberalism. Nevertheless, in a world where neoliberalism should become common to all nations, but where some countries lacked agency, conditionality became the practice that the western vanguard applied across the boundaries of the states to guarantee free competition based on an understanding that this was achievable, and that it was in the backward societies’ own interest. In that sense, the US unilateralism did not disappear during this period, but it was just more subtle. The invasion of countries and the undercover operations were not necessary in a peaceful and non-ideological world in order to press for changes in foreign countries; but conditionality, through multilateral organizations in the name of the technical necessity, was.

For a bankrupted Latin America, taken and plagued with dictatorships through “the end of history”, the only convenient way became to assume a subordinate role adopting western societies as a model, especially the US, trying to catch up with them, and strengthening the sense of resemblance by adopting neoliberalism from the more advance western centers. Conditionality was the practice that the reputed external centers applied to introduce and consolidate free competition in exchange for their economic, political, and diplomatic support to the region. No country from the region was beyond conditionality. Not even Chile, which could be considered the “big-bang” of economic neoliberalism with its market reforms in the early 1970s, yet which also experienced international pressure to expand free competition to politics during the 1980s. Conditionality was a unilateral practice through which the western provider signed its role as a privileged agent of history and reminded Latin America of its subordinate place.
In a world depicted as a single community of mankind, hemispheric societies of states like the inter-American System were obscured not only by the global nature of the emerging order rather than regional, but also because it privileged relations that cut across state boundaries rather than inter-states relations. It is no coincidence that during this period, world multilateral organizations such as the IMF and the WB displaced the protagonism of society of states’ regional forums like the OAS, or regional institutions like ECLAC. Yet, given that neoliberalism did not lead to a fully global government, it could not liberate itself from the ambiguities between its original meaning of a set of principles, rationality, and practices common to all nations (as a world society), and a set of principles that regulated the relations between states and nations (as an international society of states). The “end of history” did not conclude with the emergence of a supranational democratic government, liberated from the states’ interference and capable to construct a free space for the circulation of goods, services, capitals, and people on a planetary scale and without any restriction. However, in a world that embraced the idea of a world society, the international society of states became a complementary means to address that idea step by step. Thus, the hemispheric, regional, and sub-regional initiatives among states as societies in the Americas made sense as complementary and temporal means not only to expand the new global order, putting the region in line with the new times, but also to prepare the region to openly compete in a world society.

Clear signs of the new times in the international society of states in the Americas were the re-launching of initiatives like LAFTA and the Andean Pact, which under the names of LAIA\textsuperscript{78} and the Andean Community, embraced western external models, and adopted “Open Regionalism” as a regional trade strategy to lead to a full insertion into the global
market in the middle term. Other new initiatives that adopted the same Open Regionalism in the period—either of sub-regional scope such as MERCOSUR and NAFTA— or of a hemispheric scope like the FTAA—contributed to bury the bond of previous societies of Latin American states, which based on state planning and North-South antagonism, pursued their own path to development. The lack of Latin American agency during this period was reflected not only in the imitation of western institutional designs in the society of states, but also in the renewed leadership of the US at the hemispheric level. In fact, the Miami Summit (1994), the first of more than seven Summits of the Americas meant, on one side, the initial invitation to the United States to a hemispheric gathering after 27 years of absence; and on the other, its leadership of a “new movement in the Americas” addressed to boost the values of democracy and the free market. Concrete results of those summits were the approval of the Inter-American Democratic Charter and the priority given to the negotiation of a Free Trade Area from Alaska to Patagonia in the continental agenda (see, e.g., Rosenberg, 2001).

All things considered, the relation world society-international society of states was far from being a linear process in the Americas and free of contradictions. Beyond the complementarity between the latter as a mean to construct the former, the negative response of Washington to include the free mobilization of people across the borders in the agreements, a situation that became critical with the construction of a wall between US and Mexico, indicated that the Americas’ “we” constituted by the free competition was far from being accomplished.

Authors like Prevost and Campos (2002) see neoliberalism as the new guise of neo-Panamericanism in the sense that it re-stimulated a system of relations in the hemisphere
around traditional issues of the old Pan-Americanism like democracy and free trade. However, the uncontested victory of neoliberalism in the world society field, and the uplifting of the US as a global power gave little room to the return of the “special relations” between the two Americas that were cultivated previously in periods like the Golden Age. The traditional agenda came back, but not on behalf of a common history and shared values to protect democracy in the continent against extra territorial threats like in the “good old times”. On the contrary, the call to Latin-American countries was to rectify their path and emulate the one traced by the US in order to be redeemed in world history. Thus, the emergent society of states became bound not by the neoliberal principles and rationality shared by the countries of the Americas but by the Latin American commitment to adopt those principles and logics from the US as the winner of history in the world society field. Rather than “special relations”, it was “mentor relations” that characterized the renewed society of states in times of globalization. The non-contribution to the final triumph of the US and the rest of the western society, as well as the failure of the region, left Latin America with only one chance at redemption: to jump on the bandwagon of neoliberalism.

**Bolivarianism, Indigeneity and Brazilian Social Liberal Reformism vis-à-vis neoliberalism: The Same Old Wine in New Bottles?**

In the early twenty-first century, neoliberalism is on the defensive at the continental level. On one hand, its universalist interpretation of individual freedom and market rationality common to all nations is challenged by Bolivarianism and Indigeneity, which have given new currency to the doctrine of Pan-Latinamericanism. The former, led by Venezuela and close to confrontational populism, and the latter, led by Bolivia and close to
deconstructive indigeneity, have not only rescued the characteristic anti-Americanism linked to Pan-Latinamericanism, but also its call for transnational solidarity against imperialism in the continent. On the other hand, neoliberalism as sets of rules, rationality, and institutions that regulate the relations between states and nations in order to help accelerate the advent of the final world society is challenged by the social liberal reformist project of a regional and emergent global power like Brazil.

Questioning simultaneously the conceptual predominance of neoliberalism in the continental world society and in the international society of states of the Americas, those projects together have put considerable pressure on neoliberalism’s viability and the US leadership in the hemisphere. In fact, despite their differing approaches, Bolivarianism, Indigeneity, and Brazilian Reformism compose a core critique to neoliberalism: the subordination of the Latin American path to the guidelines outlined by external centers. This subordination is not new but foundational: since after the wars of independence the Creole liberal and conservative projects embraced external centers as well, either the French Revolution or the Iberian Culture, as models for the young republics. In that sense, it is possible to say that it is “the same old wine in a new bottle”. Nowadays, the three projects that challenge neoliberalism—either through the anticolonial, decolonial or reformist path—question this mimetic historical position of the region with regard to external centers and claims to give back agency to Latin America in the construction of its own hemispheric order.

In a way, it is possible to argue that in the early twenty-first century, the Americas as a single great continental society and as an international society of states ceased to be neoliberal and came to be an area in dispute where different projects compete for
hegemony. The crisis of authority of the US in the hemisphere and the level of
polarization of the dispute are such that in several occasions the headlines of newspapers
(see, e.g., El País, 2008; El Diario, 2014) and news agencies (see, e.g., BBC, 2009) have
reported a revival of the Cold War in the continent. Furthermore, leaders themselves have
added to this scenery by talking about bloc confrontation, as it happened during the
Colombian and Ecuadorean crisis of March 2008, thus incentivising a complex system of
alliances in the region, pushing an arms race, and taking up old Cuban slogans such as
“homeland, socialism, or death” in their public speeches as Chavism does.

There are cons and pros in this persistent analogy with the Cold War. Nowadays there is
no presence of a superpower in the region like the Soviet Union that would question the
basic organizing principle and market rationality of the World Society on a global scale.
It is true that the influence of China grows quickly in the region, but currently “China is
not an expansionist regime driven by a fundamental different ideology (...) opposed to the
continued existence of capitalism anywhere in the world” (Russett and Oneal, 2001: 293).
The presence of the Asian giant in the continent is economic and commercial. It is related
with its rapid economic growth and its high demand of commodities from Latin America.
In contrast with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the Chinese version of Asian
authoritarianism lacks appeal in Latin America, and moreover, “the Chinese have given
no indication that they seek to export their particular form of government by force”
(Russett and Oneal, 2001: 294). Anti-Americanism and anti-neoliberalism in the
hemisphere are currently driven by countries like Venezuela– which is unable to contest
the material American supremacy– but these antagonisms are expressed in a region that,
paradoxically, is less economically dependent of the US than it was in the past, precisely due to Latin America’s economic relations with China.

Other two important distinctions could be made regarding the Cold War: first, in the current Latin America there are no armed revolutions or counter-insurgent wars in progress. Indeed, Chávez, Correa, and Morales came to power via overwhelming electoral victories rather than through armed revolutions. Furthermore, beyond the histrionic accusations from anti-American governments about alleged assassination attempts, coups, or imminent landing of marines, there is no conclusive evidence that Washington has taken up the counter-insurgent war in the hemisphere. A second difference with the Cold War is that the spearheads of the radical confrontation against the US are not isolated as with the case of Cuba but, on the contrary, they have become key players within the inter-American system. Venezuela, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Bolivia not only remain part of the OAS, but have also promoted the exclusion of the US and Canada from the system and have actively confronted these two countries’ allies in the hemisphere such as Mexico, Peru, Panama, and Colombia.

Nevertheless, the pros of the analogy with the Cold War are visible when we approach the crisis of authority that the continent currently experiences. Indeed, the pressure that communism and ECLAC’s structuralism once put on the world society; and on the Americas’ Society of States, respectively; is being currently taken up by Bolivarianism and Indigeneity at the former society, and Brazilian reformism at the latter. Therefore, the analogy is valid as far as we see the current situation as a competitive scenery produced by rival projects that aspire to reorganize the hemisphere. However, it is essential to keep in mind the differences between the past and the present as well because, the singularity
of the Americas’ tensions in the twenty-first century lies precisely in the absence of an extra-territorial superpower, the profound asymmetry that characterizes the revisionist positions vis-à-vis the US, and the lack of a counter-insurgent war across the continent.

Although the hemispheric crisis was unbounded by shortcomings inherent to the neoliberal project, new events in world politics have helped feed the tension in the hemisphere. Undoubtedly, the persistent situation of economic scarcity, the high social costs brought by the reforms, and the weakness of the rule of law were all three outcomes that boosted the anti-imperial and technical critiques against neoliberalism and also contributed to unveil the practice of conditionality hidden behind its announced free competition. However, other events linked with world politics, such as the 9/11 attacks and the Great Recession initiated in 2008, have fed the tension in the hemisphere as well. The War on Terror has increase this tension because, the US military interventionism in the Middle East and Asia sparks profound critiques in a region that has not forgotten the US predatory imperialism of 1889–1932 and 1953–1980. Moreover, this War has led the US towards more turbulent regions, lessening the priority of the Americas and its presence in the continent. In short, the world campaign against terrorism exacerbates the tension in the region because, while it gives evidence against US interventionism in the world, it contributes to further weaken the US position with its withdrawal from the region. Additionally, The Great Recession that has mainly affected the US and the First World has created material possibilities for the revisionist position of the Americas. Indeed, the presence of the US and European economies has decreased, while the presence of emergent countries like China, India and Russia has increased. The result is that today, Latin America is less dependent than ever on western economies. Secondly,
the self-esteem and self-confidence of Latin America vis-à-vis the US and the First World has increased in this novel scenery in which the latter suffers the worst economic recession since the Second World War, and the former experiences the highest aggregate economic growth of the last 54 years. The spell of the “end of history” seems to be broken.

As I mentioned above, the challenge for the conceptual predominance of neoliberalism in the continental world society has been in the hands of Bolivarianism and Indigeneity. The former is led by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela motivated by anti-colonial and anti-imperial aims, and concerned with the destruction of the hierarchical order that has allowed and legitimized the US and other imperial forces in the past to raise themselves above Latin America, creating an order of exploitation. The latter is led by the Plurinational State of Bolivia, motivated by a decolonial goal, and directed to unveiling the epistemic logic of coloniality linked to the western project that has constructed binary oppositions such as white versus aboriginal, civilized versus barbarian, rational versus passion-based, and modern versus traditional, in order to justify western expansionism and domination. Both aim to destroy the hierarchical order in the continental world society. However, while Bolivarianism attempts to do this by expelling the foreign invader, stopping exploitation, and feeding nationalism, Indigeneity stresses the necessity of doing this by understanding the current world from the perspective of civilizations and people that have been suppressed and subordinated in order to maintain the appearance of coherence of the western world.

Bolivarianism and Indigeneity conceive themselves as part of a new emergent continent that, nonetheless, always interpellates the past to invest their vindictive actions with a
sense of transcendence that exceeds the limits of the direct political experience. Indeed, for those international movements “the historical discussion is part of the immediate political debate”, as Medina (2001: 32) has pointed out in the case of Bolivarianism.

In that sense, the transcendent and imperative nature of the current “great homeland” of Chávez relies on the fact that it promises to bring back the uncompleted emancipatory campaigns of the past, beginning with the postponed full independence of the nineteenth century. In this regard, the reconstruction of the unity of the nineteenth century Great Colombia as a **single world society** became the point of departure and the core of Bolivarianism’s internationalism at the same time. However, the promise of unity of Chávez’ Bolivarianism not only encompasses the countries liberated by Bolivar but it extends to the continental scale involving the whole Latin American “world”. Furthermore, Chávez’ Bolivarianism promises to finally give sovereignty back to the *pueblo* in whose name the independence was pursued, but which was immediately snatched by the Creole elite in which Bolivar himself belonged. Given that Chávez’ Bolivarianism responds to a foundational aspiration and an historical injustice, its sense of transcendence and its nature of moral imperative become self-evident.

Based on the particular interpretation of Bolivar as acting on behalf of the *pueblo* rather than on behalf of his own Creole class, as authors like Harwich (2002) have suggested, Bolivar is represented in Bolivarianism as a social fighter and a revolutionary instead of the military and conservative president that he had proven to be. In Bolivarianism, Karl Marx’s depiction of Bolivar and the independence process of Hispanic America are also erased. Thus, for example, there are no references to the biography *El Libertador*, written by the father of communism for The New American Cyclopaedia in 1858 in which, as
Larrain (1996: 66-67) points out, Bolivar is described as “cowardly, brutal and miserable”, and the process of independence as “irrational and arbitrary”. Far from incompatibility and rupture, Chávez’ Bolivarianism proposes to bridge the frustrated nineteenth century dream of the single great Latin American society and the unconcluded twentieth century socialist revolution, thus solving the contradictions of the two previous projects in Chávez’ “Bolivarian Revolution” that will lead to socialism in the twenty-first century. While the dream of a united Hispanic America and the myth of the great man are recalled by Bolivarianism, the figure of Bolivar is “cleaned” of any hints of oligarchic thought. The Bolivar who, in the Jamaica Letter of 1815, claimed the Creole supremacy in the New World by “being American by birth (as opposed to the European usurpers), and having the rights of the European (as opposed to the indigenous, black, and mestizos)” is completely neglected. Along these lines, while the idea of social emancipation, strong anti-Americanism and anti-oligarquic discourse are recalled from the Cuban experience, Bolivarianism overlooks allusions to the Soviet Union as an external referent. In this way, the socialism of the twenty-first century is something inherent to the Latin American self.

This world society, presented by Bolivarianism as a “Great Homeland”, is populated by great men like Bolivar and Castro in the past, or currently by Chávez, Correa, Ortega, and even Morales, who as privileged historical actors—with their adjuvant pueblos—fight back against US imperialism and the traitor national oligarchies. Rather than being the complex market where rational economic agents looking for their self-interested gains converge, the world society becomes scenery of confrontation under the friend-foe logic where technical knowledge, as a principle of legitimacy, lost the centrality that it had
gained since the times of ECLAC. In that sense, the international legitimacy principle in this version of Pan-Latinamericanism is defined in opposition to the US, the oligarchies, and their neoliberal project, which have permanently frustrated the dream of unity and the revolutionary aspirations of the continent.

The past is also important to emphasize the sense of transcendence of indigeneity in the present. However, whereas Bolivarianism claims that Latin America has been the “loser of history in the last two hundred years”, basically since independence (see, e.g., Salgar y Cardona, 2001); Indigeneity affirms that this situation of loss began even before in history: it started six hundred years ago, with the arrival of the European conquistadors in the Americas (see, e.g., MAS-IPSP, 2014: 1). Bolivarianism presents its current struggles as a continuity of the white anti-colonial leaders of the nineteenth century, including Bolivar and Sucre, and anti-imperialists of the twentieth century like Castro. On the contrary, indigeneity stresses its link with the struggles of indigenous in the “age of insurgence” in the Andean Region between 1740 and 1781 (Thompson, 1999: 276), including “Tupak Katari, Bartolina Sisa, Apiaguaiki Tumpa, among others” (Morales, 2013: 1). Consequently, the locus of the indigeneity project is not in Pan-Latinamericanism as such, but in a kind of Pan-Indoamericanism that could be tracked back in the last century to the allusions of Haya de la Torre during the late 1920s. Also, like Haya de la Torre’s indo-Americanism, the current indigeneity is not free of the ambiguity between the racial component and economic exploitation. This is why international indigeneity as a discourse has plenty of objections against national oligarchies and the US imperialism; but it also appeals to the peasants, workers, trade unions, and social movements as the segments of the society that have been socially,
economically, and politically excluded. This appeal also explains why international indigeneity as a discourse is close to the anti-imperial aims of the current Bolivarianism.

However, and beyond all those diachronic and synchronic coincidences with other projects, the singularity and historical transcendence of the current indigeneity rely on its promise of emancipation through decolonization, a task that will correct the original injustice that has enabled all the others. In that sense, hemispheric emancipation involves reversing the neoliberal project and the US hegemony as well as bringing into being the “living well” shared by “our people”—the pre-Hispanic and native peoples of the continent—from the local to the hemispheric level. Indeed, the moral imperative of this call, which cuts across the divisions among states, stems from the necessity of re-establishing the “true” essence of the Americas’ self, and thus restoring the original equilibrium among people, community, and environment in the continent.

As I have mentioned, Brazilian social liberal reformism challenges the conceptual predominance of neoliberalism in the society of states of the Americas. In this case, the privileged agents are not great men, people, or nations, but states. In contrast with Bolivarianism, this project has not permanently waved the flag of the US conspiracy against Latin American sovereignty and unity. The evocation of imminent marines’ landings (1889–1932) or undercover operations (1953–early 1980s) is absent from Brazilian reformism. The point of departure for the international Brazilian project is “a global order”—which is highly inequitably conceived—and [wherein] the United States [appears] as a dual player (a threat and an opportunity)” (Russell and Tokatlian, 2011: 132). But in any case, it is a player that is not keen to use military power in the hemisphere given its high costs. In this landscape of globalization and hemispheric US
hegemony, the relations among Latin American countries are not on the same basis as relations between them and other countries. Latin American countries recognize themselves as the vulnerable part in both asymmetric sceneries, and as such they are united by the imperative of cutting down the differences with the developed western centers, but with a pacific co-existence with the US. In that sense, the society of states led by Brazil is bound by the aim of Latin American countries of retaking the agency that they lost during the previous neoliberal period, and it enhances its collective capacity for negotiation at a global and hemispheric level.

In contrast with a Latin American society of states driven by the influence of ECLAC and neoliberalism, the approach to the Latin American problem and cooperation among states ceases to be mainly economic. Technical and economical rationality is not the exclusive principle of legitimacy. Although this new society of states takes up the state as an agent of its own development and calls to cooperate in order to overcome the peripheral conditions as LAFTA and the Andean Pact did in the past, the new neo-developmentalist is embraced again, but not by going back to the economic protectionism of the previous two experiences. Nor does this new society of states align directly with the policies of the western external centers, assuming regional initiatives to be mere tools that help accelerate the advent of the final world society and subordinated to the imperative of the global market as it was the case with the Open Regionalism inspired in neoliberalism. Rather than being a society of states oriented by economic logics, and concerned with economic and commercial aims, these new regional initiatives are conceived from a political perspective as multidimensional processes that involve spheres as diverse as defence, health, and infrastructure (see, e.g., Vigevani and
Ramanzini Jr., 2009; Comini and Frenkel, 2014; Serbin, 2009). In that sense, rather than the “autarchy” of LAFTA and the Andean Pact, or the subordination of the Andean Community, MERCOSUR, and the FTAA to the global market-- or even the anti-American crusade of the Bolivarian Great Homeland-- UNASUR seeks to recover the lost autonomy of the South American states in the international arena but in pacific coexistence with US hegemony.

In summary, we could say that the current tension between Bolivarianism, Indigeneity, and Brazilian social liberalism vis-à-vis neoliberalism is, in a retrospective view, the same “old wine in new bottles”. The “old wine” can be recognized in the historical tension between the hemispheric world society and the Americas society of states that, with different predominance between them in each period, reappears in the present era. Foundational problems about the subordination or autonomy of Latin America with regards to external centers keep coming back, aged by the years and adopting different forms. The challenged neoliberalism evokes the Golden Age of Pan-Americanism with its closeness to Washington policies as an external center and the defence of the liberal system of values. Such orientation to external centers can even be tracked back to the time immediately after the independence wars when the young republics adopted models that were inspired in the European society. Revisionist Bolivarianism is reminiscent of the historical Pan-Latinamericanism and its aspiration to construct first a single Latin American world and then a revolutionary one driven by an anti-American crusade. Likewise, the revisionist Brazilian social liberalism evokes ECLAC’s path in its reformist proposal, and further, in the empowerment of the states of the region as privileged historical actors that search for their own way in the international stage.
Nevertheless, the “new bottles” are represented in the diverse practices that give new meanings to old problems. The uncontested material superiority of the US has been grasped in different ways throughout history. From the predatory imperialism linked to the military and undercover operations of the periods of Imperial Pan-Americanism (1889–1932), and the Cold War (1953-1980s) to the idea of benevolent hegemonies based on subtle forms of unilateralism like neoliberal conditionality, which discarded the use of force; from the shared Pan-Americanism constructed by multilateral practices of the Golden Age to the neoliberal order imposed to the “losers of history” by conditionality. The same is valid for Latin America as the significant other. One thing is the meaning of resistance of Pan-Latinamericanism as an anti-imperial discourse vis-à-vis the US military unilateralism, but another thing is its current instrumental meaning as a technique of domestic governance and international mobilization in the absence of such imperial military threat. However, not everything is the same “old wine in new bottles”: the Indigeneity’s proposal of bringing into being the “living well” shared by “our people” from the local to the hemispheric level is a new chapter in Latin American history.
Chapter Four: The Disputed Order of the Americas in the Early Twenty-First Century: Four Scenarios in Competition

It is hard to find a more appropriate moment than the current western hemisphere’s order to explore Bull’s classical thesis about the tight but conflictive bond that exists between the international society and the world society (Bull, 2002). The former materialized in the common ground of norms that regulate the relations between the countries of the Americas as a society of states, and the latter manifested in the transnational solidarity or conflict between people across national borders that results from conceiving the continent as a single “world” society rather than a society of states. In the early twenty-first century Americas, this conflictive bond becomes self-evident when the gaps left by the weakening neoliberal norms, which used to establish the way states dealt with one another, seem to be filled by inflammatory calls from capital cities such as Caracas, Quito, or La Paz to social insurrection and the construction of a single Bolivarian “great homeland”.

Nevertheless, in the studies about international relations in the continent, it is common to find a lack of interest in analysing the recurrent and always conflictive bond between the international society and the single “continental-world” society. Very often, the set of works that analyses these regional projects that strongly reject the neoliberal narrative (Bautista, 2013, 2014; Rojas and Morales, 2013; Kellogg, 2007) tends to depict a
hemisphere in a sort of undergoing revolutionary change that furthers the consolidation of a single post-colonial or post-capitalist society at the continental scale. Even the studies that place the analysis at the level of struggle among different kinds of international societies, and which are mainly concerned with Brazil’s role in the construction of an alternative to the neoliberal system of norms, usually present a region in transition as well, although a moderate one (see, Russell and Tokatlian, 2011; Vigevani and Ramanzini, 2009; Hirst, 2006; Schenoni, 2014; Peña, 2009). Neither the first group of works nor the second problematize the aforementioned tension, because they quickly side with the emergent projects.

However, this idea of hemispheric transition towards a radical or gradual post-neoliberal order stands first, if we focus on the international initiatives of the revisionist countries of the region; second, we lose sight of the current neoliberal onslaughts led by the regrouping pro-status quo countries; and third, we neglect the present weaknesses of the anti-status quo initiatives. In other words, the arguments that uphold these transitions can be supported only if we overlook the clear signs of tension and competition in the region.

On one hand, the widespread announced transition gets blurred when it is evident that other regional initiatives, different from those characterized by an anti-neoliberal position or by the rejection of the US and Canada, also thrive in the region. ALBA, UNASUR, and CELAC are not unique regionalisms in this new century. Not only has the US maintained a considerable political influence through hemispheric forums like the OAS, and both Canada and the US have deepened their economic integration through bilateral FTAs with a handful of Latin American countries, but initiatives like the Pacific
Alliance also show that projects that are committed with the neoliberal agenda have room in the new regionalisms of Latin America.

On the other hand, the argument of indeclinable transition becomes obscured when it is evident that it is not only the neoliberal project that has suffered sensible setbacks in the region. It is true that the hegemony of the neoliberal project has been undermined at the continental level with the strong anti-Americanism of most Latin American countries, the failure of the US-led FTAA, and the loss of influence of the OAS as a hemispheric forum. This project has also been damaged at the sub-regional level with the stagnation of the Andean Community after Venezuela’s withdrawal and accusations of the Community being neoliberal and at the service of traditional oligarchies (see, e.g., Morales Vega, 2006a; 2006b). However, the return of Mexico to the region after almost 20 years questions Brazil’s rising leadership in South America. In addition, the limited progress achieved by ALBA and UNASUR on matters of integration, and the very few steps taken in order to consolidate CELAC as a political forum, raise some questions about the future of those initiatives. This uncertainty appears bleaker nowadays, if we also consider the profound disagreements within the members of UNASUR, and that Chávez’s Venezuela (one of the main drivers of this new regionalism) is stuck in a deep crisis characterized by social strains, political polarization, product shortages and financial instability (see, e.g., Comini and Frenkel, 2014).

Therefore, what I am going to analyze in this chapter is not the idea of a hemisphere in transition towards a post-neoliberal order but rather a view of a continent moving steadily towards the threshold of uncertainty. On one hand, this uncertainty is produced by competitive relations between projects inspired in the international society and others
imbedded in the idea of a single world society; and on the other hand, competitive relations between projects that struggle to define the content of the norms that regulate the inter-American society of states. This intense competition creates the paradoxical scenario of having the largest boom in regional integration agreements in the history of the continent but in the midst of a high ideological polarization and increased diplomatic tensions. After all, the four integration projects that have been created in the fourteen years that have elapsed so far in this century are equivalent to fifty-seven per cent of all integration projects created in the entire twentieth century. During the same period of time, massive mobilizations that have shaken the continent have occurred in addition to serious diplomatic incidents among some of the hemisphere’s countries, four complaints of attempted coup, multiple incidents of undue interference in internal affairs, a bombing in the territory of a neighboring country, and an order to mobilize troops, among others.

Within this situation of integration and polarization, it becomes crucial to analyse the way in which variations in the political practices and ideas linked to the projects that challenge the neoliberal modernity’s hegemony in Latin America are affecting the hemispheric order. Hence, the first part of this chapter aims to identify the different international approaches to the continent today by relating the broad international cultures to the current international projects in the hemisphere. The aim is to map different “scenarios of understanding” from which the continental order is construed and aspires to be reconstructed, reformed, or defended. The second part explains in detail the sort of proposal of hemispheric order that corresponds to each international scenario and the kind of challenge that each one poses to the neoliberal order. It implies analyzing the
predominant logics, ideas, and practices promoted in the scenarios with the aim to understand the identities, principles of legitimacy and, in general, the kind of hemispheric order they seek to construct.

**Scenarios of Understanding in The Americas: A Comparative International Approach.**

A good point of departure to approach the diverse “scenarios of understanding” that challenge the neoliberal order in the Americas is by tracing an epistemic map of the continent. Such map results from relating the discussion about the broad international cultures with the specific forms adopted by the projects currently at stake in the hemisphere. Specifically, I match the emergent Bolivarianism, Indigeneity, and Brazilian Liberal Social Reformism with the different possibilities offered by the broad international cultures such as the **continental world society** and the **society of states** in order to elucidate the predominant logics, ideas, and practices of each scenario.

However, this kind of epistemic map is rarely outlined in the study of inter-American relations, and in IR in general—not even by authors like Wendt (1999) who, like Bull (2002), recognizes the existence of different broad cultures and approaches in international relations. Rather than a discussion about a methodological instrument, what underlies the absence of comparative maps that can help us understand the complexity of the hemisphere today is a much deeper ontological problem that leads one to see international cultures as mutually exclusive rather than coexisting.

Except for Bull, authors tend to see the international order as either an **international society** or a **world society** but never as both, or as experiencing an unavoidable transition.
from one stage to another as shown by the bibliography mentioned in the introduction. Indeed, based on “case studies” inspired by “clinical studies”, International Relations (ontologically speaking) deal with single individuals. In that sense, very often IR approaches transform the international sphere in a “collective individual” denying anything outside of it (Eckstein: 1975). Hence, the hemisphere is reduced to a single one. With any ontological status outside the international sphere canceled, it is not possible (by subtraction of matter) to contrast a culture of the international sphere with another with which it coexists. There cannot be any encounters between “collectivities” that live under different forms of international society or world society.

The theoretical consequence of this approach invites a “universalizing theory” that considers that international cultures follow essentially the same rule—that they are in transition from one stage to another or that they are mutually exclusive. By introducing an epistemic map, I propose to put aside the “case study”, and instead, to introduce a comparative approach of International Relations in order to broaden the ontological universe in the study of the hemisphere.

Rather than mutually exclusive cases, currently in Latin America there is coexistence among broad international cultures—what Wendt (1999) calls Lockean and Kantian international cultures, and what Bull calls (2002) Grotian and Kantian—that correspond with the international cultures of the international society of states and the world society, respectively. Even the Hobbesian international culture approached by those two authors, which describes the world as a state of war, and which tends to be marginal to understanding a continent with a common history and conceived as a continent of no
war among states (although not free of violence), can be crucial to approach some latent, critical, and exceptional scenarios.

By and large, it is possible to outline the epistemic map of the hemisphere encompassing the broad international cultures around two possible debates. One debate is focused on whether or not the Americas constitute a single world society. This debate is centered on people as the main agent and it is intended to establish to what extent people share ideas or not—if there is transnational or national solidarity in the hemisphere. The other debate discusses the presence or absence of international societies of states in the continent. It focuses on the state as the main agent of the international sphere and is concerned with the extent to which states share ideas. Each discussion encompasses two binary relations which yield four different “scenarios of understanding” from which the continental order is interpreted and aspired to be reconstructed, reformed, or defended (International Proselytism, Confrontation and Interventionism, Institutional Revisionism, Latent State of War) and a 2x2 “map” of combinations (States share ideas-transnational solidarity, states do not share ideas-transnational solidarity, states share ideas-national solidarity, and states do not share ideas-national solidarity).

**The Discussion Regarding the Broad International Cultures in the Hemisphere**

First of all, it is important to explain each pair of discussions as a continuum like Wendt (1999) did in his ontological approach to IR. The first pair is transnational solidarity-national solidarity. This first debate aims to know whether or not people share ideas beyond their national societies in the continent, establishing or discarding the presence of a hemispheric “world” society in the Americas. For purposes of defining a continuum in this case, I will frame its central question as: To what extent do the emerging projects
boost people’s solidarity beyond national borders? The preponderance of *transnational solidarity* or of *national solidarity* yields the two main answers.

The emergent projects that increase *transnational solidarity* challenge the preponderance of the states in international politics through a cosmopolitan perspective that accepts identity of interest among people beyond national communities. For instance, Bolivarianism very often stresses the idea of a Latin American *pueblo* united by an identity of interest that stems from a common past of oppression and a common destiny of emancipation which stays above the loyalty of national communities. People rather than states are the privileged agents of history. In Bolivarianism, there are moral and historical imperatives in the international arena beyond states, like resisting US imperialism and liberating and uniting the *pueblo* of the Americas. Under this view, the *hemisphere* is seen as a *single world society*.

In contrast, in projects that boost *national solidarity*, people consider themselves part of a national community that is conscious of its “coherence, unity, and particular interests” (Smith, 1983) living in a common ground that corresponds to the territorial borders of their states. In other words, they identify themselves mainly as Brazilians, Uruguayans, or Peruvians before Latin Americans. The national state as the representative and defender of this cultural-political community is the bearer of its voice in the international arena. Brazil, Uruguay, and Peru as states speak on behalf of all Brazilians, Uruguayans, and Peruvians but not of anybody else. Given that the nation is the main group of solidarity, the activism of sub-national groups in the international arena tends to range from low to not present at all. Under this view, the existence of a *single world society* is discarded.
The second debate is concerned with whether or not it is possible to find a society of states in the hemisphere, and it is based on the dichotomy of states share ideas-states do not share ideas. In order to create a single continuum, I will frame the question as: To what extent do the states connected to the emergent projects share ideas? While it is possible to find a position along the continuum, they are often classified in two groups: states that share ideas or states that do not share ideas.

States share ideas means that states orient their international behavior under (and are tied by) similar moral imperatives, logics, and practices. For instance, the US, Mexico, and Argentina as members of the OAS have to orient their interaction according with the moral imperatives, logics, and practices that are proper for the inter-American system that they share. Cuba, as a non-member of the OAS, would not have to observe this practice, at least not until June 2009 when a new resolution was adopted. As a consequence, “states, in their dealing with one another, are bound by the rules and institutions of the society they form” (Bull, 2002: 25). In that sense, the US is bound by the rules of the OAS as one of its members, but is not obligated by the rules of CELAC like Mexico, Argentina, and Cuba, as active members, are. The same can be said for the US, Mexico, and Cuba with regard to UNASUR given that—as not being members of this society—they are not bound by its rules, like Argentina would be. Often, those international societies are scenarios based on the practice of cooperation. Although states keep looking for their self-centered interest, the fear of being militarily attacked by other countries is highly reduced, given that they recognize rights such as self determination and territorial integrity (See, Bull, 2002; Wendt, 1992, 1999). All (the OAS, CELAC, and UNASUR) formally recognize the due respect for those principles in their statutes.
States do not share ideas means that states do not belong to any society of states, and as such “they are free to pursue their goals in relation to other states without moral or legal restrictions of any kind” (Bull, 2002: 24). However, in a continent with large tradition of Pan-Americanism and Pan-Latinamericanism, it is hard to find this as a permanent situation. International politics in a culture in which states do not share ideas is seen as a state of war with no rights recognized, wherein the length and extension of states’ liberties are linked to states’ capacities to impose them by force. The closest moment when the Americas experienced this kind of culture was perhaps the period of US imperialism in 1889–1932, when Washington adopted a fierce predatory policy through an aggressive economic expansionism matched by systematic military occupations along the region. A permanent state of war is unthinkable today in the continent. However, the United States and some Latin American countries like Cuba have been inclined to speak of each other in some current critical junctures as “terrorists” beyond the pale, rather than as member states of the same hemispheric society. Therefore, it is perhaps more accurate to talk about a latent state of war regarding those crises, where the spiral of distrust soars and the mutual threat among states is present, but without escalating to military confrontation.

In order to illustrate the two debates around the current changes taking place in the international relations of the continent, it is possible to place the debate between transnational solidarity and national solidarity along the x-axis, and the debate between states share ideas-states do not share ideas on the y-axis (Figure 5). Clearly, the transnational solidarity of populations ranges from extremely high to extremely low without regard to states, while states share ideas ranges from extremely high to
extremely low disregarding its populations as well. This figure will help to lay out the different “scenarios of understanding” that are emerging in the continent vis-à-vis neoliberalism and the US, and where the hemispheric order is at stake.

Figure 5

The Different Scenarios of Understanding in the Americas

Once the axis of population (x) is related analytically with the axis of states (y), a 2x2 map of combinations emerges. This “map” outlines a typology of the different scenarios of understanding emerging in the continent, locates the international emerging projects on it, and establishes the kind of coexistence in which they stand with neoliberalism. They are:
• The scenario of international proselytism: it is placed in the upper-right quadrant (see, Figure 6). This scenario of understanding is characterized by the presence of transnational solidarities among the people of the region and the cooperation between states, which by sharing the same ideas of unity, help in the way of constructing a **single world society** at a continental scale. Frequently, transnational ideological solidarity among countries becomes a requirement for cooperation among states. It is called a scenario of international proselytism due to its high ideological activism, and because it aims to conquer the “soul” of people beyond national borders in order to gain their solidarity with the goal of continental unity. The Bolivarian project ALBA falls into this scenario of understanding, given its use of the logic of ideological solidarity to fight back the US neoliberal order, work for the unity of Latin America, and incentivize cooperation among sister states in order to accelerate the so-called “Great Homeland” process.

• The scenario of confrontation and interventionism: it corresponds to the lower-right quadrant (see, Figure 6). It emerges when there is an involvement of states that do not share ideas with respect to the hemispheric order, but there is presence of transnational solidarities between relevant segments of the countries’ populations. A sub-national diplomacy is established by governments with groups of people and organizations that share their “cause” in other countries, strengthening their cooperative ties; however, it creates confrontational and interventionist policies in internal issues of those rival foreign countries. It is a scenario that responds to the logic of international ideological confrontation. It
also corresponds with the clash between neoliberal countries and those which support Bolivarianism.

Figure 6

- Institutional revisionism: it is located in the upper-left quadrant (see, Figure 6). It is driven by the regrouping of states under new shared ideas about the hemispheric order, but within a context of scarce mobilization of national societies. In this scenario, the previous rules and institutions that bound the states in the societies they have formed are called into question encouraging new ones with different memberships and oriented by new ideas, logics, and practices. The search for those new regional consensuses demands an active participation and
negotiation within regional institutions from the states themselves that lead the process. Here, there is no complete identity of interest, like in international proselytism, or a clash of views about the hemisphere like in the scenario of interventionism, but a permanent negotiation between diverse interests. The clearer project of institutional revisionism is the International Brazilian Social Liberalism initiative UNASUR.

- Latent State of War: it corresponds to the lower-left quadrant (see, Figure 6). It emerges when states “are inclined to speak of each other as heretic or outcast beyond the pale, rather than as member states of the same international society” (Bull, 2002: 41). Yet, instead of having an open interstate war, the conflict remains latent. In this scenario neither the state nor society seems to share values. The relations of the US and Cuba in different critical occasions have fallen into this situation.

Looking at this diversity of scenarios of understanding from which the current continental order is construed and aspires to be reconstructed, reformed, or defended, it becomes clear that the hemisphere is undergoing a period of high uncertainty with no easy forecast. Rather than experiencing a transition towards an unambiguous post-neoliberal order (either revolutionary or moderate) the continent has been involved in a race of competitive relations among international projects of different scopes. Whereas some of them are inspired in the culture of a single continental world society, others embrace the idea of an international society of states. Indeed, the neoliberal order and the US leadership are currently being challenged in the hemisphere; however, there is also uncertainty regarding the possibilities of success of those challenges, as we will see.
The Challenges to the Neoliberal Order in the Hemisphere: Four Competitive Scenarios and One Huge Uncertainty.

*International Proselytism*

The project that operates mainly in this scenario is Bolivarianism. This is a scenario of international proselytism for two reasons: first, because the hemispheric order aspires to be reconfigured by means of the promotion of the Bolivarian cause at an international level; and second, because it is aimed at “winning the soul” of people for Bolivarianism by cutting across national borders in those countries where states share values. In that sense, it is no coincidence that the government plans for all Bolivarian countries to include the construction of a “new man” for the revolution (see, e.g., Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Comunicación y la información, República Bolivariana de Venezuela, 2008: 9-16; República del Ecuador, Consejo Nacional de Planificación, 2009: 28; Ministerio de Planificación, República de Bolivia, 2006: 11).

The core of this continental project is Venezuela for several reasons. As the birthplace of Bolivar, this country has the historical credentials; it also has the ideological appeal of being the “the last revolution of the twentieth century [and] the first one of the twenty-first century” (Chávez, 2011: 13); and, as an oil producing country, it has the financial muscle to be the main provider for the revolution.

Like Neoliberalism, Bolivarianism conceives the hemisphere as a *single “world” society*. However, while the former is a project of a *world society* devised and promoted by the centers associated to globalization, the latter drives an alternative *world society* formulated and endorsed by countries located in the periphery of global neoliberalism. In
that sense, Bolivarianism is deeply rooted in the collective frustration produced by the broken promises of neoliberalism, and in the full rejection of the neoliberal response to the crisis by the countries of the area. Thus, the historical beginnings and future development of Bolivarianism are associated with countries such as Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Ecuador, and to some extent, a few Caribbean Islands. In that sense, while neoliberalism is imbedded more in a *world society* discourse linked to globalization with some rhetorical mentions to Pan-Americanism, Bolivarianism is imbedded in a *world society* aligned with Pan-Latinamericanism, and with a strong anti-American component.

Venezuela, as the core of this emergent project, drives the continental Bolivarian cause through a double track of international practices of proselytism. The first track follows the patterns of “formal diplomacy” with countries that are hostile (Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Ecuador) and critical of Washington (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay). It is aimed at gaining the sympathy of those countries for the Bolivarian cause and at promoting cooperation within the Bolivarian group led by Caracas (see, *e.g.*, Cardozo, 2002; Ramírez, 2003; Morales Vega, 2006b).

The huge oil revenues of Venezuela during the early twenty-first century, particularly during the oil boom between 2003 and 2008, became an additional incentive to sign agreements with Venezuela and to take part of the Bolivarian initiatives of cooperation. During those years, the oil barrel went from US $28.17 in April 2003 to US $74.41 in July 2006, and it skyrocketed to US $133.88 in July 2008 (US Energy Information and Administration, 2015). According to authors like Corrales and Penfold, this has been (2011) “an unprecedented oil boom in the history of oil production in Venezuela” (54).
As part of this oil diplomacy, Venezuela has bought foreign-debt bonds from Argentina for US $3.5 billion, and from Ecuador for US $500 million; it has acquired fighter aircrafts; it has invested US $4.05 billion in an oil refinery in Brazil; it has done investments for US $1.5 billion in the Bolivian oil gas sector; it agreed to collaborate on an oil refinery in Ecuador estimated to cost US $5.5 billion; and it has increased its trade with Cuba from US $1.7 billion in 2006 to US $7 billion in 2007 (Alvarez and Hudson, 2009). Venezuela has as well signed an energy cooperation agreement to sell oil in preferential conditions and guaranty full access to the Venezuelan oil reserves to all eleven countries of the ALBA bloc for at least 25 years (ALBA, 2007a: 2). “It is a diplomacy of prizes for like-minded governments with the Bolivarian cause” (Morales Vega, 2008: 36).

The second track is unorthodox, and centred in boosting allied sub-national groups (social and political movements, researchers, academics) around Venezuelan embassies and in other countries in order to incentivise mass mobilizations and bring support to the Bolivarian revolutionary process throughout the continent (Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Comunicación y la Información, República Bolivariana de Venezuela, 2008: 93). This is a practice aimed at expanding its transnational support in the Americas and strengthening the sense of solidarity with Bolivarianism. Indeed, Chávez’s support of the coca-grower movement in Bolivia, his open sympathy with Sandinism, Correism, and the financial aid to the political campaign of Kirchnerism might have contributed to the rise to power of presidents Morales, Ortega, Correa, and Kirchner.89

The powerful logic of solidarity underlies this Bolivarian double-track practice—which Ramirez (2003) called “formal diplomacy” and “sub-national diplomacy”. This solidarity
is capable of summoning new “souls” across state borders around the political unity of the Latin American world, and of fighting back the presence of American imperialism in the continent. “All of us must unite; join together in a victorious offensive against the empire”. Chávez (2006: 72) declaimed in his speech in the VI World Social Forum of Caracas, in 2005. This type of solidarity is defined in two ways: solidarity for something (to cooperate), but also against somebody or something (to confront). In practice, it means that the logic of transnational solidarity in Bolivarianism tends to condition strongly whether or not there is inter-state cooperation.

Indeed, in 2006, President Hugo Chávez announced that the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the leader of Bolivarianism in the continent, would leave the Andean Community of Nations and stop its cooperation after Colombia and Peru signed a Free Trade Agreement with the United States, because his government considered it unacceptable. From an economic perspective, Chávez’ decision was erratic because intra-community exports had reported a growth of 457 per cent in 1998 in relation to 1982, and because Venezuela’s exports to Colombia (its most important partner in the group) grew from 1.9 per cent in 1989 to 572 per cent in 1998 (see, e.g., Morales Vega, 2006b: 124-125). From a classical statesman’s perspective, this decision seems pointless, but not for someone who is self-defined as a revolutionary, like other Bolivarian leaders such as Correa, Ortega, and Morales. In this scenario of international proselytism, ideological solidarity among countries becomes an important requirement for cooperation among states, although among ideological partners only. In this scenario of proselytism (see Figure 6), there is a convergence of both transnational solidarity as the strategic
component, and states share ideas as the tactical component for supporting the former through active cooperation between states.

For Bolivarianism, the only possible integration of the Americas, “the true integration”, (in ALBA’s own words) must be in terms of transnational ideological solidarity against the US imperialism and neoliberalism, and it must transform the societies of Latin America (see, e.g., ALBA, 2004a, 2006a, 2006b, 2007b). It is a type of solidarity constructed along the historical struggles of Latin American people against imperialism, dependency, poverty, exclusion, and oligarchic domination. Since Cuba and Venezuela created ALBA, the group has always vindicated its solidarity contribution with the struggles for independence, integration, and revolution initiated by “Bolivar, Martí, Sucre, O’Higgins, Hidalgo, Petion, Morazán, Sandino, and many others” (ALBA, 2004a). With the entrance of Bolivia and Ecuador into the group, names like “Tupaj Amaru, Tupaj Katari, Gualcalpuro, Diriangén, and Miskut” (ALBA, 2007b) were added to the list of Latin American heroes, and issues of indigenous resistance and decolonial struggle were also introduced. In that respect, ALBA becomes the vanguard of the integration in the continent, because it shows the “proper” path towards Latin American and Caribbean union (ALBA, 2012:2). Thus, authors like Malamud (2009) seem to be in the right direction when they note that “for many Latin Americans, the integration will be Bolivarian or it will not happen at all” (108).

Transnational solidarity becomes the leading logic of Bolivarianism, because the aspired hemispheric order is not built around the right of state sovereignty—and the problem of whether or not states cooperate—but around the promotion of a cause that aims to overthrow the continental system of states through a transnational solidarity struggle. The
final goal is the “Great Homeland”, as it became clear since ALBA’s foundation (ALBA, 2004a:2). Therefore, more than just traditional statesmen, Chávez, Correa, Morales and the other leaders of Bolivarianism have to be understood as active promoters of a cause that they conceived as revolutionary. In response to the criticism of wasting the resources of his country, Chávez stated that “the government of Venezuela does not give away [its oil], the government of Venezuela is integrationist; so what the elites and the North American empire used to loot and take for themselves, we have now recovered, and part of that we share with fraternal pueblos” (Chávez, 2006: 60).

This double-track practice and logic of solidarity construct gradually a hemispheric society divided into two opposing fields: one, the heretics, apostates, the oppressors; and the other, the trustees, the bearers of true faith, the revolutionaries. In fact, ALBA’s declarations and resolutions often start by blaming neoliberalism and their supporters of “the lack of union of Latin America, the growing poverty, the desperation of the majority of sectors of our countries, and the total subordination to the dictates from abroad” (ALBA, 2004a: 1). After such an introduction, ALBA’s members elevate themselves as the voice of the “historically excluded indigenous people, afro descendants, women, young people, children, the elderly, and people with disabilities” (ALBA, 2010:1), and in general, the Latin American pueblo “recognized as victim of poverty and governmental indifference that demands substantive justice”, as once described by O'Donnell (1988: 7). In such a context, Bolivarianism proposes an order based on the logic of solidarity, and aimed to boost the transnational solidarity and incentivize the cooperation, but only among “initiated” states.
Bolivarianism has certainly grown since its emergence in 1999 with the arrival in power of Chávez in Venezuela. In just over a decade, it went from being a defensive international movement aimed at gaining sympathies in the area regarding a nascent anti-status quo revolution-- to being a relatively successful transnational movement that is concerned with integration and solidarity, and known for resisting neoliberalism and the leadership of the US in the hemisphere. At the Summit of the Americas in Mar del Plata in 2005, we can see one of the most well-known achievements of Bolivarianism: the defeat of the FTAA, which took place in the midst of opposition from Bolivarian governments, heated statements by their leaders, and massive protests prompting social and political movements. Other less spectacular but equally meaningful achievements have been the constitution of the ALBA bloc, the energy cooperation agreement led by Venezuela, the creation of the South Bank in order to reduce the financial dependency of the region, the foundation of Telesur which broadcasts to the whole hemisphere as an alternative mass media, and the creation of dozens of what Bolivarianism calls “Great-National Endeavours”.

Nonetheless, the question that remains unanswered is the sustainability of the Bolivarian Revolution as a continental project in the middle term. This is not an easy question and there is no conclusive answer. However, a quick look at the institutional aspect and the economic restrictions produced by the current oil crisis shows that the levels of uncertainty are high.

Pointing out the low institutionalization of Latin American processes of integration has become commonplace. However, in the case of Bolivarianism, this seems to be only the logical consequence of governments constructed around massive mobilizations rather
than around stable rules that facilitate cost-benefit calculations. Those governments can hardly have internationally what they lack internally. Thus, more than any other current initiatives in the hemisphere, ALBA depends on the permanence of the charismatic figures that awaken the love of the people and the good relations among them. The permanence of charismatic figures is jeopardized by the uncertainty of the electoral results every four years and by natural constraints such as the death of Chávez or the aging of the Castro brothers. Hence, it is common to hear that with Maduro, Bolivarianism has not been able to recover the protagonism it used to have during Chávez’s times.

In the absence of strong institutions, the good rapport among leaders becomes a critical mechanism to solve the contradictions and strains inherent to the process. Despite the good results of inter-presidential summits so far, the presence of structural tensions within this international movement has led to queries about the sustainability of this mechanism. At this point, it is important to highlight that inside present Bolivarian initiatives like ALBA, at least two different currents co-exist: the Bolivarian, led by Venezuela; and the Indigeneity one, led by Bolivia. The deep solidarity between both does not come from sharing an identical approach to hemispheric relations. Actually, the former stresses the specific need to reject the presence of any imperial power in the Americas, while the latter embraces the more ambitious project of overcoming the exclusionary logic of coloniality embedded in western civilization as a whole (see, *e.g.*, Mignolo, 2011: 53).

Nevertheless, on the ground, the two projects have to face the same opponents: the international financial system, the conditionality of multilateral organizations, free trade
agreements, etc.,—an order built by American hegemony through its neoliberal project. In other words, the solidarity between Bolivarianism and Indigeneity stems from sharing the same practical needs of facing identical opponents, and from sharing complementary rather than equal objectives. It is a coexistence that nonetheless opens question for the future: will those two projects continue to enforce each other at an international level? Will they end bitterly confronted as a result of their contradictions? Or on the contrary, will one co-opt the other following the logic of the Ecuadorian domestic experience in which a populist leader like Correa finally co-opted the indigenous struggle of CONAIE? It is too soon to answer.

The relative economic restriction that is currently experienced in Venezuela is the other aspect of uncertainty about the consolidation of this project in the middle term. The substantial “Venezuelan oil checkbook”, which was used generously since 2003 to promote the Bolivarian cause through a particular double track diplomacy, seems seriously undermined with the oil price crisis. The oil barrel price dropped from its peak US $105.79 in June 2014 to US $53.50 in January 2015, and it is expected to continue dropping (US Energy Information Administration, 2015). Thus, for the first time, the oil price seems to have restrictive rather than enabling effects on the Bolivarian revolution. How keen would the countries of the area be with a leader that cannot apply the powerful oil-diplomacy of the past? What are the Caribbean Islands, attracted to ALBA more for the cheap oil supply than for an ideological engagement, going to do? Besides the low oil prices, the uncertainty worsens when we add the current internal crisis of Venezuela. This domestic crisis is characterized by economic components like high inflation, product shortages, recession and financial instability and also by social strains and political
polarization. These concerns are all factors indicative of a tenuous future for Bolivarianism in the continent.

**Confrontation and Interventionism**

This scenario of confrontation and interventionism sets in the conflictive coexistence between the emergent Bolivarianism and the already established neoliberalism. The point of departure of this scenario, paraphrasing Bull’s argument (2002:24), is the belief that the “differences among the states” of the region are only “apparent” and driven by the oligarchy and the empire. Yet, as “properly understood” through the lens of Bolivarianism, the interest of Latin American people “is all the same”. “They [the empire and oligarchy]”–and Chávez is categorical in this regard–“have divided us [the Latin American pueblo] in order to dominate and apply their model of exploitation, dependency, and colonialism” (Chávez Frías, 2006: 62). Therefore, and following the logic of transnational solidarity, Bolivarianism has the moral imperative to assist all those sub-national groups from other countries of the Americas who fight their international and national oppressors, and support the revolutionary process initiated in Venezuela (see, *e.g.*, Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Comunicación y la Información, República Bolivariana de Venezuela, 2008: 93).

This is called a scenario of confrontation and interventionism, because the horizontal conflict of ideology that cuts across state boundaries leads to confrontation and interference in the domestic affairs of other states that are considered hostile to the cause. In Figure 6, the promotion of transnational solidarity takes place in a state that does not share the same ideas as the intervening state. In contrast with the scenario of proselytism, this is not a case of what we could loosely call “intervention by invitation”–in which, at
the invitation of the government of the concerned state, a foreign allied state intervenes to support it. In this category we can find the sub-national diplomacy of Venezuela in the Bolivarian countries, also the active participation of Cuba in Venezuela through its intelligence apparatus and social welfare programs called Missions.

On the contrary, a case of “undue interventionism” in domestic affairs of another country is evident in the current scenario. Instead of invitations by governments, the request comes from opposition groups, and the lawful basis for invitation that the host state could provide is replaced by the revolutionary bona fides of opposition groups. Hence, this is a scenario of confrontation and interventionism because, in a clear sign of hostility that overlooks state institutions, a third party is not only putting the government and its internal opposition at the same level, but it also yields a policy of rampant unilateralism (Fox, 2014). An eloquent example of this situation is found in a secret cable of the US Embassy in Mexico, dated October 23, 2009, which reports the meeting between the President of Mexico, Felipe Calderón, and the US Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair. In it, “Calderon emphasized that Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez is active everywhere, including Mexico. He [Calderón] went out of his way to highlight that he believes Chávez funded the PRD opposition during the presidential campaign nearly four years ago. Chávez uses social programs, including sending doctors, to curry political influence, and there are governors in Mexico who may be friendly with him” (WikiLeaks cable: 09Mexico3061).

In the early twenty-first century, the centre of this confrontational and interventionist practice is Caracas, just as Havana was in the 60s and 70s. Nevertheless, other Bolivarian countries have also followed an interventionist policy. In fact, President Correa, for
example, pushed for granting the FARC belligerency status in 2008 against the wishes of the Colombian state, when this state had already decisively gotten back the military initiative in the battlefield (Caracol Radio, 2008). By the same token, a diplomatic crisis between Lima and La Paz erupted when President Morales of Bolivia encouraged an indigenous upheaval in the north of Peru after García’s government authorized oil explorations in the Amazon area of his country (BBC Mundo, 2009). In any case, the only country that has followed this policy systematically is Venezuela. This claim is substantiated by the explicit principle of international solidarity contained in the Venezuelan development plans and in other official documents—and further, by the accusations of undue interventionism made by other presidents of the area in confidential and secret diplomatic summits.

Of course, interventionism is an old practice in the hemisphere. This unilateral policy of intervention was driven initially (and ruthlessly) by the US during the period of Imperial Pan-Americanism (1889-1932) and the Cold War (1953-1980), and with subtle manners and peacefully during Neoliberal Hegemony (1980-2000) through conditionality. This is why Bolivarian governments are unsparing in pointing out that the US and its allied countries in the region (including national oligarchies), conspire constantly against the sovereignty of their countries by plotting assassinations of presidents, invasions, and coup d’états. It is a charge that certainly awakens many passions in Latin America and brings back ghosts from the past. However, one current difference from the previous periods is that evidence of similar conspiracies have not materialized yet. This suggests another side of anti-Americanism: in absence of a true foreign military threat, it can work both as a technique of domestic governance and as a rhetorical technique that opens up
room to confrontational and interventionist practices in the international level. In fact, authors like Serbin (2006) and Malamud (2009) conceive the Venezuelan foreign policy in terms of a “regional sub-imperialism” and an “aggressive nationalism”, respectively.

Chavism sees Venezuela as the locus of a revolution that is in motion and expanding. Indeed, Chávez (2011) does not hesitate to state that “what happens in Venezuela will influence what is going on in Latin America in many ways”, and immediately adding that “the fate of humanity could depend on the Bolivarian Revolution, let us say so without vanity and with humility, but that is the truth” (46). In order to expand the Bolivarian revolution outwards, Caracas has unpacked a double-track international practice of confrontation and interventionism in the hemisphere.

The first track follows the patterns of “formal diplomacy”, as in the previous scenario of proselytism; however, in this case it is not oriented to reward like-minded governments but to punish those who are not aligned with its Bolivarian cause (see, e.g., Morales Vega, 2008: 36). The aim of this practice is to directly confront and isolate the countries that Caracas sees as hostile and close to Washington. The practice of confrontation includes blackmailing the hostile countries and threats that swing from ruptures of diplomatic relations to military aggression. Thus, for example, in May 2006, Chávez threatened to break relations with Peru if García won the presidential election; and in February 2008, he threatened to shoot the missiles from his new Sukhoi aircrafts against the “oligarchy” of Colombia which, according to President Chávez, was planning to invade Venezuela with the United States. However, this practice of confrontation includes the application of concrete measures in the diplomatic and economic field as well. For instance, in November 2005, Venezuela and Mexico mutually withdrew their
ambassadors for almost a year after President Fox of Mexico advocated for the FTAA; in March 2014, Venezuela broke diplomatic relations with Panama after that country called for an OAS summit to respond to the Venezuelan crisis triggered by the massive social protests and the government repression; and in 2009 Venezuela called for a reduction of trade with Colombia and restricted access to the foreign currency used to pay Colombian entrepreneurs. This inter-state diplomacy of confrontation is also mediated by personal attacks, name-calling and insults that remind us of the idea of a neighborhood fight directed to break the minimum social conventions and undermine other presidents’ moral dignity. Along these lines, President George Bush is called “the devil”; President Fox “a lapdog of the empire”; President García a “burglar;” President Santos a “liar”, and so on.

The second track maintains the unorthodox “sub-national diplomacy” from the scenario of proselytism, but it is aimed to boost the internal groups that share the revolutionary cause of Bolivarianism, and who are opposed to their own governments. “Each embassy of Venezuela today, anywhere in this huge world, must be a trench of battle”, states Chávez (2006: 47), promoting this line of action. He revisits this idea in Havana saying that “these are not times of defensive positions; these are times of attacks, times of offensive positions” (Chávez, 2006: 41). Venezuela's rampant interventionism has produced different outcomes throughout the continent: In Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua it was rewarded because Morales, Correa, and Ortega took power and became active members of Bolivarianism. In Mexico and Peru, the intervention of Chávez in the elections of 2006 in both countries provoked nationalist reactions in the electorate as his candidates were defeated, and the newborn governments of Calderón and García became distrustful and hostile to Bolivarianism. In the following election of 2011, candidate
Humala had to distance himself from Bolivarianism in order to gain the vote of the majority of Peruvians. In Honduras, president Zelaya’s attempt (following the Bolivarian formula) to force his re-election against the national constitution resulted in his unseating by the congress, and prompted a conservative reaction that led President Lobo to the presidency. In Colombia, the diplomatic and political support of Chávez to the guerrillas in their military confrontation against the state became a national security issue with a serious impact on the prolongation of the internal conflict and the peace of the region.\textsuperscript{94}

Thus, Venezuela’s interventionism has helped to expand the Bolivarian revolution at the cost of polarizing and destabilizing the region even more.

The powerful logic of solidarity also underlies this Bolivarian double practice. However, in this case, it is used to confront the heretics, the apostates, and the oppressors—not to enhance the cooperation between the initiates, as in the scenario of proselytism. Rather than a hemispheric order constructed around a process of integration led by the logic of transnational solidarity and cooperation between states, the hemispheric order would emerge as a result of an ideological crusade that would divide the states (and the sub-national groups within them) on opposite sides. The High Level Workshop of November 2004, in which Chávez drew the New Strategic Map, accurately indicates the Bolivarian approach to the hemispheric order. On one side, we find the Bolivar Axis (composed by all the hemispheric states aligned with Caracas) and the Latin American \textit{Pueblo} (people disposed to the Bolivarian cause), and on the other side, we find the Monroe Axis (conformed by all countries aligned with Washington) and the oligarchies (anyone that is sceptical, critical, or opposed to Bolivarianism). The aim of Bolivarianism is to break the
latter axis and defeat the oligarchies in order to achieve Latin American unity (see, e.g., Chávez, 2004:25).

In ideological terms, however, the main problem for Bolivarianism is not the US: “We do not foresee an invasion of the US right now, so do not write it down yet”, joked Chávez (2004: 25) during the above mentioned workshop amid laughs of the audience. After all, the US is not only too powerful to be seriously defied by any Latin American country, but it also belongs to the distant, rich, and imperial Anglo-Saxon America. They are not and they cannot share the Bolivarian legacy, simply because they are not part of the Latin American “world”.

Nonetheless, the real problem are states like Colombia, Panama, Chile, Peru and Mexico, and the “oligarchies” of the continent that despite belonging to the same “world”, are perceived to be dissenting and deviating from the “proper” understanding of the continent and its “common” interest. In Schleichert’ words, “they have the truth before their eyes, and they still refuse to see it” (2004: 66). The alignment of those countries with the US, and the permanence of oligarchies in power are an open challenge to the Bolivarian revolution. The persistence of these alignments and oligarchies reminds Bolivarianism “of the unfinished character of its project, and it threatens to contaminate it and break down its coherence. It destroys the illusion that its truth will assert itself on its own merits” (Schleichert, 2004: 66). For this reason, the heresy of US allies must be repeatedly confronted, and their societies intervened. Coexistence between these two fields (the Bolivar Axis and the pueblo - the Monroe Axis and oligarchies) is not possible. Chávez (2011) articulates this clearly saying that “the homeland is either one
and great, or it is no homeland or anything at all” (19). Therefore, the moral duty of Bolivarianism is to fight them back in any corner of the continent.95

In the core of this bitter ideological confrontation, there is a deep crisis of the principle of international legitimacy as defined by Martin Wight, and quoted by Bull (2002: 33). The collective judgement of the hemispheric society about the centrality of individual freedom, market rationality, and free competition as the referents to define questions about the rightful membership of the family of nations--and about sovereignty over territory and population--have cracked. The respect for human rights and the protection of representative democracy have lessened their weight as “just causes” to accept states into the international society of states and to lead international interventionism on their behalf. Liberal principles are not, as the colloquialism goes, "the only ones in town” nowadays. There is a new collective judgment emerging through the Bolivarian expansion that sees in the “just cause” of confronting US imperialism and national elites the principles to establish the rightful membership to the family of nations in the hemisphere, and the criteria to define whether or not there is a legitimate intervention in any state of the region. This is why it is not a coincidence that a new international society of states is emerging in the region that expressly excludes the presence of the US and Canada, and that the Bolivarian countries are hypersensitive concerning the respect for their sovereignty, but not the others’.

With the principle of international legitimacy at stake, the hemisphere seems to move in two opposite directions within this scenario of confrontation and interventionism. While Bolivarianism perceives in Neoliberalism the germ of all oppressions–imperial and oligarchic– Neoliberalism sees the seed of destruction of all liberties–political and
economical freedom— in the revolutionary Bolivarianism. In this context of meaning, states with different ideas stop recognizing each other. “Uribe is no longer only a threat (his government) for Colombians and the internal situation. He is a threat for the sub-continent. Colombia has become a bomb” (Caracol TV Channel, 2008), stated President Chávez after Colombia’s government announced the establishment of seven US military bases in its territory in the midst of increased tension between the two countries. In the same tone of mutual non-recognition, President Uribe compared the threat that Chávez poses to Latin America with the one posed by Hitler in Europe, during a confidential meeting with the US senate majority leader Harry Reid. He argued that the “personal empire” Chávez is trying to create and his expansionist plans violated democratic values such as freedom of the press, local elections, and the independence of the Central Bank (WikiLeaks cable: 07BOGOTA8384).

In such a context of polarization, transnational solidarity among neoliberal countries activates as well. In the middle of the FTA negotiations between Colombia with Canada and the US, Stephen Harper, Prime Minister of Canada, a new but potential key hemispheric player, stated: “in my view, Colombia needs its democratic friends to lean forward and give them chance at partnership and trade with North America. I am very concerned that some in the United States seem unwilling to do that (...) There is a lot of worry in this country about the ideology of populism, nationalism and protectionism in the Americas and the governments that promote it, but frankly, my friends, there is nowhere in the hemisphere that those forces can do more real damage that those forces in the United States itself. And if the US turns its back on its friend in Colombia, this will
set back our *cause* far more than any Latin American dictator could hope to achieve” (Harper, 2007).

Yet, the question that still remains is: how sustainable is this ideological crusade as a path to construct a new order in the middle term?

After high levels of polarization, Latin America and the Caribbean region seem to move towards a period of coexistence and distension. This new situation is reflected in the creation of the Community of Latin American and the Caribbean States (CELAC), led by Venezuela and Brazil. This initiative was launched in 2011, presenting important differences compared to ALBA. First, it is a process of regional integration conceived as gradual rather than revolutionary. Second, its point of departure is to establish a political forum for dialogue between the thirty-three countries of the region, except the US and Canada, but recognizing the diversity of political and economic models and the different ideological orientations in the region. It was in this line of “peaceful” coexistence when, in July 2010, the President of Venezuela Hugo Chávez (Bolivarian) and the President of Chile Sebastian Piñera (Neoliberal) were appointed as co-chairs of the forum to draft the statutes for the organization. Lastly, the international organization was launched as an intergovernmental mechanism that recognizes the system of states in the region. The Great Homeland is not mentioned. However, until now, CELAC's accomplishments as a mechanism for dialogue, political agreement, and for constructing consensus in the region are scarce. Taking into account the currently experienced weakness by Venezuela and the general disarray of the Bolivarian group mentioned above, some inquires about whether or not CELAC’s path would become the real project of Bolivarianism are on the table.
After all, under the logic of ideological solidarity, “good faith with heretics has no meaning, except in terms of tactical convenience” (Bull, 2002: 25).

**Scenario of Institutional Revisionism**

This scenario is revisionist, because it revises the two initiatives at stake in the continent: One is the neoliberal universalism of market rationality led by Washington, which conceives hemispheric Pan-Americanism and the regional and sub-regional projects among states as mere complementary and temporal means to accomplish the global neoliberal order. The other is Bolivarian pan-Latinamericanism, which is based on ideological solidarity that ensures that the continental order will be brought into being either by cooperation between “initiates” or by a “crusade” against the “oppressors”. This revisionist scenario emphasizes the necessity to re-ininstitutionalize and create a new set of rules for regulating the relations among states.

The core of this revisionist project is Brazil. Due to its relative weight vis-à-vis its Hispanic neighbours, this country has the material incentives to drive an international society of states that would follow its lead instead of Washington’s. According to the Brazilian Secretary of Strategy Affairs, with “50 per-cent of the territory of South America, 50 per-cent of its population, 55 per-cent of the regional GDP, [and] 50 per-cent of its hydroelectric capacity”, Brazil has the material potential to take a protagonist role in the region (Presidencia Da República, Secretaria de Assuntos Estratégicos, 2010: 47). According to this Secretary, Brazil–like countries such as India and Russia–due to their economic, territorial, and demographic dimensions, cannot be incorporated to any of the three current blocks led by the US, China, and the EU without undermining their potential as states. As a consequence, Brazil has to pursue the arduous task of
constructing a South American block in order to organize a bigger market for its economy (and for the economy of its neighbours)-- and at the same time, gain more capacity of negotiation in the global political chess match (Presidencia Da República, Secretaria de Assuntos Estratégicos, 2010: 27). Additionally, by not belonging to the historical Pan-Hispanic movement, Brazil can hardly embrace the dream of unity described in the Bolivarian aspiration of constructing a “great homeland”. For instance, Bolivar did not liberate Brazil. The Giant of the South was born being a self-proclaimed empire. In fact, Brazil could be considered a single continental Portuguese society itself because of the size of its territory and population. The Giant of South America does not fit into the same dream of Latin American unity as its fragmented Hispanic neighbours.

Instead, as a state during the early twenty-first century Brazil aspires to become an emergent global power, and a leader of a community of South American states (see, e.g., Russell and Tokatlian, 2011: 132; Vigevani and Ramanzini Jr, 2009: 81). Both aspirations are closely bound: while Brazil’s recognition as a global power depends on its ability to lead a regional block, the chance that South America could count on a structure of international institutions and rules that would be more suitable for its necessities would rely on Brazil’s capacity of global interlocution, to some extent. In this sense, the Brazilian strategic plan states that “the future of Brazil depends on South America just as the future of South America depends on Brazil” (Presidencia Da República, Secretaria de Assuntos Estratégicos, 2010: 33). Rather than stressing the idea of a common belonging of all Latin America that would pave the way for a future union of the continent, Brazil highlights the common peripheral condition of the countries of the neighbourhood in order to establish a community of states who share the same interest of overcoming this
unfair situation. Thus, the Brazilian proposal of a community of states enhances simultaneously the sense of differentiation regarding a project like neoliberalism, which is boosted by a central power like the US, and regarding a unionist project like Bolivarianism, which appeals to a common Latin American pueblo and origin.

Brazil has driven its scenario of revisionism at a global and regional level through a practice of active participation and negotiation. Both practices aim to build consensus and create majorities in order to construct a new structure of governance, and they also aim to reform the existing structures.

On a global scale, Brazil ensures that international forums like the UN respond to the interests of the great western powers, while financial institutions such as the IMF, the WB and the WTO privilege the needs of the central economies (see, e.g., Presidencia Da República, Secretaria de Assuntos Estratégicos, 2010: 15, 28). Through an active participation within those world-level organizations and the articulation of new groups of states like BRICS, Brazil seeks to construct new majorities and press to reform the structures of global governance. BRICS is a promising political and diplomatic initiative formed by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, all emergent global powers, asserting that the current rules and institutions that regulate inter-states relations at a global level are clearly unsatisfactory and imposed by a false majority of states. It is a structure that does not respond to the needs of the large group of peripheral and powerless countries.

At the hemispheric scale, Brazil perceives that the persistence of the neoliberal project with all its inconsistencies in sensitive subjects like drug-trafficking subdues the entire
continent to US strategic interests. In geopolitical terms, within the neoliberal context of increased conditionality, the Washington’s War on Drugs of the 80s and 90s paved the way for a securitized approach to Latin American politics (see, e.g., Hirst, 2006: 134). Through the figure of “intervention by invitation”, the US assured its presence in the region by extensive plans of eradication and interdiction of drugs in all the neoliberal countries of the region with problems of production and commercialization of narcotics. It is clear that this securitized approach, including the direct antinarcotics involvement of the US during the late twentieth century, hindered the possibility of a Brazilian leadership in the region. Furthermore, as Zibechi (2012) highlights, Brazil became widely concerned in tactical terms with the way in which the “country was surrounded by a collar of US military installations carrying out joint operations with countries of the region” (88). With the crisis of the neoliberal project in the hemisphere, Brazil wanted to revise the subordination of the region to US strategic interests, which, after 9/11, threatened to expand Plan Colombia to all of Brazil’s neighbours (see, e.g., Hirst, 2006). In order to carry out such a revision, an intense diplomatic campaign of negotiations got under way in Brasilia. This campaign aimed to build consensus, construct new majorities, and articulate novel regional institutions like UNASUR that are capable of promoting a stiff and serene rejection of Washington’s policies in the region, specifically among its neighbours (See, e.g., Pinheiro Guimaraes, quoted by Zibechi, 2012: 88).

In economic and trade terms, the Brazilian project of a regional society of states seeks to revise the “mentor relations” introduced during the neoliberal hegemony, which allowed central countries to dictate the rules, logics and practices that the peripheral countries had to adopt in the inter-state bargaining. Thus, for Brazil, the FTAA as a proposal of
continental integration was just a unilateral attempt of the Northern countries of the continent (the US and Canada) to force the rest of the Southern countries to accept negotiation as equals with powerful and developed countries resigning to their legitimate need for a “special and differentiate treatment”–just as Mexico did in NAFTA. In contrast with the NAFTA model, Brazil moved towards South-South negotiation inspired in the previous ECLAC model. This renewed proposal seeks to bring the agency of peripheral countries back, and recover the centrality of their states to discuss socio-economic and trade policies (Presidencia Da República, Secretaria de Assuntos Estratégicos, 2010: 42).

Brazil socialises the idea that the rules and logics of neoliberal inspiration contained in initiatives like FTAA, which focuses exclusively in free trade and liberalization of capital and services, seriously limit the possibilities for the underdeveloped countries of the region to respond to their own needs. The historical problems of infrastructure, of a system of transportation and communication, of low levels of industrialization, and the extended poverty and inequality of the countries of the continent--not only do not find an answer under those neoliberal initiatives, but become more acute (Presidencia Da República, Secretaria de Assuntos Estratégicos, 2010: 33).

As a consequence, the creation of the Community of South American Nations in 2004 (re-named UNASUR three years later) can be understood as a platform that is deeply linked to the Brazilian aspiration of leadership in its neighbourhood, and of consolidating its potential as an emergent global power. After all, with the idea of “geographical proximity” between countries as one criterion that shapes UNASUR, this initiative seems custom fitted for Brazil’s needs (see, e.g., Comini and Frenkel; 2014: 67). It is telling that Brazil appeals to its eleven neighbour states (sharing borders with nine of them), rather
than to the transnational solidarity awakened by Pan-Latinamericanism. South America as a “natural” area of Brazilian influence is the base of UNASUR, which revises integration thought in the hemispheric terms of Pan-Americanism and the continental terms of Pan-Latinamericanism.

UNASUR, then, is created as a result of intense diplomatic negotiations with the aim of constructing a new consensus and rallying for a new majority around Brazil’s leadership. The common purpose that calls on the states of the region is the construction of a new institution that promotes and defends their interests as southern countries more efficiently. In this sense, UNASUR emerges through a political approach that breaks the previous neoliberal initiatives of integration led exclusively by market rationality. However, at the same time, it also questions the transnational solidarity characteristic of the Bolivarian initiatives that conditions the cooperation among states. Ultimately, UNASUR intends for governments placed in different ideological fields such as the Bolivarians (Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia) and the neoliberals (Chile, Colombia and Peru) to reach agreements and articulate cooperation plans beyond their differences. The “sub-national diplomacy” that opens space to undue interventionism in third countries is set aside in this case. Brazil actively participates and negotiates, but it does so through formal diplomatic channels and within the framework of International Organizations. The rationality behind the practice of intense interstate negotiation is the rationality of convenience, which tries to find the acceptable policy for all parties involved, and these parties share the same peripheral condition, and the same interest to overcome it (see Figure 6).
UNASUR was born as a multidimensional project that recuperates the wide revisionism of Brazil. First, it aspires to work beyond trade and economic matters through the construction of a political forum whose main objective is cooperation and political coordination between the different countries of South America. Second, oriented by the South-South cooperation, it pursues the convergence of previous sub-regional initiatives such as the Andean Community and MERCOSUR in a South American Free Trade Area. Third, recovering elements of ECLAC’s developmentalist initiatives of the 60s and 70s, UNASUR has the goal of stimulating the physical and energetic connectivity of the region (Peña, 2009: 51-52). In practice, UNASUR has become an institutional alternative in relation to the OAS and the FTAA. In the first place, it has promoted South America as a new forum to activate a new consensus that rejects the presence and subordination of the region to US hegemony; in the second place, it has promoted the region rather than the hemisphere as the area of economic integration.

One question remains with regard to UNASUR’s consolidation. As in the other previous scenarios, there is not a conclusive answer, but, a quick look at some recent events shows that the Brazilian project has lost its momentum, and it is entering in a period of relative stagnation.

In order to build a majority around its proposal, Brazil "artificially" reduced Latin America, an area that was initially hemispheric with neoliberalism, to South America, by appealing to the notion of geographical proximity. In this sense, it distanced itself from the United States as a hegemon, and it left out potential neoliberal competitors of similar weight within the Latin American space itself such as Mexico. The new South American majority was built through Brasilia coming closer to Caracas, which marked the entry of
the latter to MERCOSUR as a permanent member. In this new period, as noted by several scholars of UNASUR, Brasilia has extended its strategic alliance from Buenos Aires to Caracas. The first partnership was initiated in the mid-80s, later giving rise to MERCOSUR in the early 90s. The second partnership was built around the development of joint oil projects and a shared distrust of Washington (see, e.g., Hirts, 2006; Vigevani and Ramanzini JR, 2009; Zibechi, 2012; Comini and Frenkel, 2014). In this manner, the new South American majority materialized in UNASUR emerges with the articulation of the Bolivarian countries (Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia) and the South Cone (Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay) around "the giant" of South America, Brazil. This is a large enough majority that puts the neoliberal countries of the neighborhood (Colombia, Peru and Chile) to face the dilemma of joining the group or being isolated within their own neighbourhood. All three of them chose to enter into this alliance.

This was UNASUR’s heyday. The newly created organization became the forum for resolving crises of great importance for the region, replacing the OAS in taking this role. UNASUR mediated the crisis between Colombia, and Venezuela and Ecuador, which threatened the region with an armed confrontation and whose most critical chapter was the frustrated construction of seven US military bases in Colombia. Similarly, UNASUR addressed the Bolivian crisis of 2008 that threatened to jeopardize the unity of the country and to reconfigure the boundaries of a region characterized by border stability. In addition, in the commercial field, UNASUR began to gradually move forward in the convergence between the Andean Community and MERCOSUR in a South American free trade area, which is expected to be completed by 2019. In the economic field, the South American Bank was launched using capital contributed by Venezuela and Brazil to
fund development projects in the region. In the matter of infrastructure, UNASUR facilitated the construction of the Interoceanic Highway connecting Pacific countries with Brazil and Argentina, and it began talks directed towards building a South American Energy Ring that would guarantee a natural gas interconnection among the countries of the region. Even in sensitive matters for states like the military, UNASUR has made progress in the creation of the South American Defence Council (CDS its acronym in Spanish), which is responsible for promoting military cooperation among member countries.

However, as Comini and Frenkel (2014) have pointed out, UNASUR entered a slowdown period since 2011. The change of presidents and governments, and the low economic growth of the countries that constitute its core are among the causes identified by the authors. Certainly, the departure or disappearance of founding leaders like Lula, Chávez, and Nestor Kirchner affected UNASUR, which relies on a model of inter-presidential negotiation. Likewise, the economic slowdown of Venezuela and Argentina as Brazil’s “strategic partners” vis-à-vis the steady growth of Colombia, Peru, and Chile, which entered the group as "silent partners", has affected UNASUR’s dynamic.

Nevertheless, the reason for UNASUR’s stagnation seems to be more structural and directly linked to Brazil’s increasing inability to impose the logic of negotiation that it initially sought to have. In this regard, Venezuela becomes an equally necessary and uncomfortable partner for Brazil. In order to build a majority, it is necessary to get close to Caracas, because Venezuela is the leader of the Bolivarian countries. However, Caracas becomes an uncomfortable partner because it seeks to promote the agenda of ALBA (considered the vanguard of integration) within an initiative promoted by Brasilia.
(see, e.g., Campaña Chávez Presidente, Corazón de mi Patria, 2013-2019, 2012: 35). As a result, UNASUR tends to replicate the logic of transnational solidarity that polarizes and undermines interstate bargaining and its logic of acceptability. In this way, there are greater incentives of the neoliberal countries of the region (i.e., the silent partners) to make themselves heard through other organizations such as the newly created Pacific Alliance. With the sustained economic growth of all the Pacific Alliance's members and the return of a heavyweight like Mexico to the region--which is capable of counterbalancing Brazil and enlarging the South American area once again--this new configuration seems to have an increasing influence that threatens the consolidation efforts of UNASUR.

**Latent State of War**

In a hemisphere with a large tradition of Pan-Americanism and Pan-Latinamericanism, the situation in which “states do not share ideas” is not the rule. However, it is possible to find moments throughout the history of the continent in which states, to use Bull’s words (2002), are “free to pursue [their] goals in relation to other states [or nations] without moral or legal restrictions of any kind” (24). Some of those moments can be pinpointed in the US westward expansion initiated in 1803, when the recently independent United States unilaterally launched a series of Indian wars aimed to confine the indigenous nations in small reservations. In this westward expansion, the US government felt free of any moral or legal restriction to act against the indigenous nations that were in its way of accomplishing the manifest destiny. No right of self-determination or property over the land was recognized to the indigenous nations in the American mission of rebuilding the
west to the image of the east, and in the state interest of expanding its borders in order to bridge the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.

A similar episode can be found in the period of US imperialism (1889–1932) when that country often overlooked the rights of the new Latin American republics in the name of the superiority of US institutions and the special virtues of their citizens. President Grant’s interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine led to an imperialist predatory practice throughout the continent, which meant permanent US military occupations specifically for Central America and the Caribbean. The absence of common respected rules and rights that regulated the relations among states transformed the newborn Latin American republics into satellites of the US. In this specific period, the states’ liberties were dependent on the capacity to impose them by force. In such a context of “state of war”, the US turned into an empire, Central America into a “semi-protectorate”, and South America into subordinate countries.

In contrast with these two episodes, the current scenario is called a latent state of war, because it does not turn into an armed confrontation. Within this scenario, the “states are inclined to speak of each other as heretic or outcast beyond the pale, rather than as member states of the same international society” (Bull, 2002: 41). Yet, instead of having an open interstate war, the conflict remains latent.

After the missile crisis of 1962, which put the world on the edge of nuclear war, communist Cuba became the closest historical example of this kind of scenario in the hemisphere. Once the US abandoned any attempt of invading the Island, Cuba had to live as an outcast beyond the pale for the rest of the twentieth century. This latent state of war
led to the exclusion of the island from the inter-American system, and subsequently to the rejection from the then newly created Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA). The US-Cuba hostility was reflected in the US economic embargo on the island and the mutual imprisonment of spies.

Another example of a latent state of war can be seen in the so-called War on Drugs. During 1996 and 1997, the United States government did not certify Colombia in its engagement with the struggle against drug-trafficking. The introduction of money into the political campaign of President Samper led Washington to label Colombia as a “narcodemocracy”, and a pariah. For Colombia, this latent conflict implied the threat of a potential US financial and trade embargo (see, e.g., Tokatlian, 1997: 4).

In the early twenty-first century, the emergence of a scenario of a latent state of war that comprehends the hemispheric order-- based on the assumption that national solidarities and states do not share ideas-- is still far from being predominant, although it is not completely absent (see, Figure 6). Until very recently, the governments of the US and Cuba were inclined to speak of each other as sponsors of terrorism. The former did by including Cuba on a black list of “rogue states” together with countries like Iran, Syria and Sudan; the latter, by denouncing the US bombing campaign in Iraq and Afghanistan and the economic embargo against the island as state terrorism. Moreover, they did not recognize each other as part of the same hemispheric society of states.

Yet, the question remains: how feasible is it for the latent state of war between states to continue in the hemisphere and spread wider?
In contrast with the previous questions about the continuity of the former scenarios, this answer seems clearer. The latent state of war will not be the predominant approach to understand the hemispheric order. The exclusion of Cuba from the Inter-American system, which placed it as an outcast that did not share the minimum necessary values to be accepted in the Hemispheric Society of States, seems to be coming to an end. Rather than shifting towards a set of policies of economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation, the hemisphere seems to begin to gradually re-integrate Cuba into the hemispheric society and normalize the diplomatic relations. Even the US, the declared enemy of the island, which strengthened the embargo in the mid-nineties with the Cuban Democracy Act and the Helm-Burton Act, seems to be moving in that direction.

“The resolution AG/RES.2438 of June 3, 2009, issued by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Americas, resolves that the 1962 resolution, which excluded the Government of Cuba from its participation in the inter-American system, ceases to have effect in the Organization of American States (OAS)” (OAS, 2015). This resolution paves the way for re-establishing the rights of the island and recognizing it as a member state of the hemispheric organization through a diplomatic dialogue with the Government of Cuba. Along the same lines, and in contrast with the LAFTA experience of 1962, the island has taken an active role in the creation and development of Latin American new initiatives, which shows a progressive insertion of Cuba in the region as well. President Chávez and President Castro were the founding partners of ALBA in 2004. President Raúl Castro was appointed President pro tempore of CELAC for the 2013–2014 period. Along with recognizing Cuba as an active member of the hemispheric society of states, Washington and Havana announced in December 2014 that the two countries would restore the
diplomatic ties broken since the Cold War. This does not mean an automatic end of the US embargo, which requires congressional approval, but it does open the diplomatic channels to normalize the situation between the two countries, and to end the latent state of war in the hemisphere.

Conclusion

In the early twenty-first century, the neoliberal hemispheric order is faltering. However, instead of witnessing the emerging of some new project taking its place, the Americas seem to fragment into different rival projects that compete among them. The large number of initiatives such as ALBA, UNASUR, CELAC, and the Pacific Alliance are not the result of a new, emerging collective meaning but the outcome of many projects, including the neoliberalism that refuses to disappear.

What Latin America experiences is not a process of transition resulting from the accomplishment of a new hemispheric consensus, as most of the works on the region explicitly or tacitly claim, but a process of uncertainty, consequence of the profound crisis of the principle of international legitimacy left by the increased weakness of neoliberal collective meanings. It is precisely the dispute about the “right” collective judgement to organize the American space what moves the international stage in an apparently contradictory dynamic of integration and confrontation. The dispute is not only about whether or not the integration has to be organized as a single continental society or as a society of states, but also about the main ideas, rationalities, and practices that have to guide such a process of integration.
Nowadays, it is possible to identify four different scenarios where the hemispheric order is at stake. Those scenarios result from relating the broad international cultures with the current international projects. This is, from connecting the world society, the international society and the state of war with the emergent Bolivarianism and Liberal Reformism, and the persistent neoliberalism. In other words, those scenarios result from “mapping” the region cognitively in order to grasp the main ways in which governments understand the international order in the continent.

The scenario of international proselytism is focused on the idea of a hemisphere constructed by cooperation among states that are united by a transnational solidarity between their pueblos. The main project in this scenario is Bolivarianism. Venezuela is the leader of this initiative, which guides the process through a double-track practice that combines formal and sub-national diplomacy. The logic behind this project is a kind of transnational solidarity that tends to condition cooperation among states to the existence of ideological affinity. This is a project that aspires to a construction of the “great homeland” that would unite the Latin American world and would create a separate order from the Anglo-Saxon one.

The scenario of confrontation and interventionism is focused on the idea of a hemispheric order that emerges from an ideological crusade. It results from the clash between Neoliberalism and Bolivarianism. Venezuela is again the focus of attention in this scenario, via the implementation of double-track practices aimed at weakening the governments that are hostile to its cause, and by strengthening its sub-national allies through very aggressive interventionism in those countries. Once again, the logic behind this project is transnational solidarity, but this time, aimed at fostering a crusade against
the oppressors, apostates, and traitors. This scenario is characterized by diplomatic
tension, ideological polarization, and the spiral of distrust that jeopardizes the peace and
stability of the region.

The scenario of institutional revisionism presents a third way between Neoliberalism and
Bolivarianism. The protagonist of this scenario is neither Washington nor Caracas, but
Brazil. Rather than speaking of continental integration as neoliberalism and
Bolivarianism do, this scenario proposes the construction of a different regional society
of states around the leadership of the great powers of the region. Although Brazil’s
proposal also implies a separate order from the one led by the Anglo-Saxon powers, it is
more inclined to present this separate order as pacific co-existence mediated by
diplomatic negotiation. The practice par excellence in this scenario is negotiation and re-
institutionalization among states, guided by the logic of what is acceptable for countries
placed in the periphery of the world economy.

Finally, the scenario of latent state of war is focused on the idea of a hemisphere
constructed by confrontation between states and national societies that do not share ideas.
This scenario has been marginal yet not absent in the hemisphere.

By and large, the hemispheric relations in the region are still quite preliminary and under-
institutionalized today, with higher levels of uncertainty in terms of where things might
be heading. Apart from the generally recognized decline in US influence, it is still far too
early to know how the resultant vacuum might influence the evolution of hemispheric
affairs. A hemispheric system of governance constructed around Chavez´ Bolivarianism
is quite uncertain not only for its dependence on oil money and the persistence of
Venezuela’s political instability but also for the low level of institutionalization of an international process centred in social mobilizations and charismatic leaders. Indigeneity has had a slow start in the international stage due to tactical reasons and it remains, in good measure, a promise. Will Morales’ indigeneity promote the “living well” more actively in the hemisphere and appeal directly to the indigenous pueblos applying a new version of double track diplomacy? Or on the contrary, will indigeneity finally be co-opted by Venezuela’s hegemonic project? It is too soon to know.

Brazilian institutional revisionism seems to be more likely to go forward. Nevertheless, this project faces the challenge of driving a project that strengthens the formal diplomatic practice of negotiation in order to avoid Bolivarian polarization and neoliberal dissidences like the Pacific Alliance. It is a hard task taking in account the different system of meanings that move countries in the region today. Finally, the latent state of war offers a low level of uncertainty given the open spaces produced by the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between the US and Cuba which promises to relinquish all vestiges of the Cold War.
Conclusion

At its heart, this dissertation is concerned with the way in which the crisis of the neoliberal modernity project applied in Latin America during the 80s and 90s affected the political order of the hemisphere at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

The main argument of this work is that the responses given to the social cleavages produced by the global hegemonic pretension of neoliberalism have produced governments in the region that are driven internally by different and opposed places of enunciation, practices, ideas, and rationalities. These governments have tended to create locked international communities in the continent between “blocs” moved by different collective meanings. As a consequence of the profound crisis of legitimacy left by the increased weakness of neoliberal collective meaning, Latin America is experiencing a process of uncertainty, and not a process of transition resulting from the accomplishment of a new hemispheric consensus, as most of the works on the region explicitly or tacitly argue.

The dispute about the “correct” collective judgement to organize the American space moves the international stage in an apparently contradictory dynamic of integration and confrontation. This is a wide-ranging and encompassing dispute, not exclusive to the political, economic or social spheres, and it is a dispute imbedded in the modernity problem, and as such, related with conflicting worldviews.

This dissertation begins with an analysis of neoliberalism as a kind of governmental rationality and technology oriented to constitute subjectivities that are functional to it and
the West through the implementation of free competition and conditionality. The contribution of this analysis is to show neoliberalism as a project that responds both to market rationality through free competition, and as a central-metropolitan view that seeks to perpetuate its position through conditionality. It is a matter of not only expanding market rationality to different spheres of Latin American social life—politics, economics, culture—but also of perpetuating the privileged role of western society by assuming the rational superiority of their project.

During the 80s and 90s, Latin America found a macro narrative in western neoliberalism. This narrative promised to achieve the elusive goal of modernity and to leave behind the economic and political crisis expressed in the debt crisis, hyperinflation, authoritarianism, and civil wars (see, e.g., Williamson, 1990; Fukuyama, 1989; Huntington, 1991.) Neoliberalism was a metropolitan project inspired in the policies of the Thatcher and Reagan administrations during the 80s. It was introduced in Latin America by the western society through the practice of conditionality following a top-down dynamic. Technocratic external centers conditioned their economic, political and diplomatic assistance and support to the implementation of specific policies based on an understanding that the project was achievable and was in the country’s own interest (see, e.g., Dreher, 2009; Koeberle, 2003.) In turn, Latin American countries, from the top of the governments, introduced the package of reforms to the whole society. In this way, neoliberalism was a central project from the beginning because it had a metropolitan western origin and it was introduced and developed by the very political, economic, and cultural core of Latin American countries.
Multilateral organizations started to apply conditionality. To a great extent, all those reputed external centers gained their prestige and power on the basis of the privileged information and the technical knowledge they managed (information and knowledge that the countries of the region lacked) (Koeberle, 2003). This information and knowledge was supposed to be used for the countries’ own interest — after all, what is modernity if not the promise to emancipate the human being through reason? In that regard, neoliberalism, like other modernity projects is, in Weber’s words, a process of rationalization and disenchantment of the world. However, what is specific about neoliberalism is that it sees in the market logic the paradigm of rationality.

In economics, market logic led to tax reforms, trade and financial liberalization, and an intense process of privatization (Williamson, 1990). In politics, elections to access power and the respect for written constitutions to govern introduced this logic. In culture, Latin American societies counted on the construction of an agent that found little interest in matters outside the individual’s private life (Armony, 2005), living amidst a general commercialization of social relations.

The neoliberal modernity project started to crumble at the beginning of the twenty-first century due to its incoherence and inconsistency. Incoherence, because, the neoliberal project promised success by applying the Washington Consensus + free competition = economic progress equation, which never happened. Inconsistency, because, neoliberalism promised a free market, but, for example, maintained drug prohibitionism, which caused countries like Colombia, Mexico, Guatemala or Honduras to get involved in violent wars against illegal groups that control a huge market. The result was that the critical voices that viewed conditionality not as technical and objective process to redeem
the region through market logic and free completion, but as an imperial practice to dominate and exploit Latin America, gained more and more audience and political power. This section of the dissertation closes with the identification of the differentiated social cleavages and political issues that stem from the neoliberal crisis and marked by the two main issues of the continent in the twenty-first century: decolonial and socio-economic cleavages, and the demands for a higher state efficiency.

Once the ideas, rationality, practice and place of enunciation of neoliberalism are disaggregated, the dissertation introduces a cross-national comparison in order to grasp the variations of the emergent projects vis-à-vis neoliberalism. The cleavages and political issues produced by the neoliberal crisis became the bases for emergent alternatives. This part of the work develops a variation-finding comparison that expanded the understanding of the region beyond the reductionist labels of right and left that have dominated the current discussion. The matter is not only to know whether or not the emergent projects opposed the neoliberal project but under which ideas, rationalities, practices, and place of enunciation did they construct those alternatives.

At the early twenty-first century, then, the neoliberal modernity is called into question by four emergent projects.

The first project is deconstructive indigeneity. This is a project articulated from the periphery rather than from the country’s center of social, political and economic life. It is not the voice of the powerful technocratic and economic groups imbedded in the government but of the subaltern groups that have been silenced for centuries. They are articulated not from Washington, like the Washington Consensus, and then replicated
from all capital cities of the region, but they come from places like Araucaria in Chile, the north of Cauca in Colombia, and Chapare in Bolivia and they replicate the voices and struggles of the Mapuches, Paeces, Aymaras and Quechuas, among others. The practice of this project is grass roots mobilization that gives politics a bottom-up direction, rather than a free competition and a top-down direction. It is driven by the decolonial vs. colonial cleavage.

Deconstructive indigeneity presents a substantive rationality critique with regard to the neoliberal project and the western modern project itself, because “indigeneity” contests individual freedom as the universal canon used by neoliberalism to select, measure and judge the world, and also the ideas on which western modernity relies (see, e.g., Morales, 2013: 3). In Bolivia, where the conflict moves from the periphery to the center, the indigenous question (the so-called “indigeneity”) becomes the main idea from where the entire social order is approached. What the indigenous question means in this context is less a claim for equality of opportunities for all in the liberal sense, but rather the recognition that different worlds with equal status coexist in a state that cannot be conceived as national but as plurinational. These are worlds that are diverse culturally, politically and juridical, and as such, demand recognition of linguistic diversity, and the right of self-government and the existence of different normative systems with equal status (see, e.g., Garcés, 2013). It is this plurality that is expected to end with the myth of lineal progress that has historically justified the assimilationist policies towards the indigenous people in order to catch up with the neoliberal West. The case associate to this project is Bolivia and in some extent Ecuador.
The second project is confrontational populism. Like deconstructive indigeneity, social grass-roots mobilization characterizes this project. Many authors have compared the mobilizations in Bolivia with the demonstrations in the Chavista Venezuela, and the Correista Ecuador. However, the direct, unmediated politics that emerged from these two cases are not the result of organized bottom-up social movements articulated from the periphery as in the former case. On the contrary, in confrontational populism, a charismatic leader imposes a personalistic top-down politics from the center to a largely unorganized mass of followers who are co-opted by a nationalistic and anti-establishment discourse. The cleavage that drives this process is pueblo vs. oligarchy.

Confrontational populism has a similar central nature as neoliberalism. Due to its western origins — if we dig into the past, we will find links between the Latin American nationalisms and the rightist authoritarian regimes and Fascism that thrived in Europe in the 30s — and because they were articulated from the very center of the national political life. After all, Chávez in Venezuela was a former putschist Lieutenant Colonel that came from the military barracks; and Correa in Ecuador was a middle class economist who served as Minister of Finance the year immediately before his election as president. Those places of enunciation are far from the peripheral Chapare from where Morales came from in Bolivia. Like deconstructive indigeneity, confrontational populism is embedded in identity politics, but instead of placing the indigenous question in the center, it places the pueblo as the ultimate value that guides the project. In confrontational populism, the notion of pueblo has worked as a specific vindication to differentiate the “we” (the pueblo) from the “they” (the antipueblo) but it also became the idea from where the entire social order is tackled. In that sense, confrontational populism presents a
substantive rationality critique with regard to the neoliberal project because it contests the idea of individual freedom as the canon used to understand and organize society.

Thus, thought from the pueblo, democracy is not a matter of procedures that guarantee “pluralism, citizen rights, competitive elections, the rule of law, and checks and balances” (Romero Ballivián, 2008: 18) but it is a matter of “social improvements in favor of the pueblo and popular mobilization” (Romero Ballivián, 2008: 18).

The third project is social liberal reformism. For this project, the frustration and conflict unleashed by the gap between “the ratio of expected outcome [and] the actual outcome” (Freddi, 1986) reached by the neoliberal reforms did not lead to a radical denial of its ultimate values. Rather than a struggle over “the conception of moral rightness” (Karlberg, 1980), social liberal reformism calls into question the convenience of keeping a neoliberal orthodoxy. Social-liberal reformism engages with finding a more convenient point of agreement that deals with both the imperative of market efficiency, and the imperative for social cohesion and political acceptance. Rather than follow exclusively the market logic as in neoliberalism or the confrontational logic of confrontational populism, the social liberal reformism proposes the logic of negotiation as a way to reach this political acceptable point for the parties involved in terms of costs and benefits. It is a project driven by the contradiction between contributors and beneficiaries. The cases associated with this project are Brazil, Uruguay and in some extent Argentina.

The last one is radical neoliberalism. This project shows the limits of the western society with its own neoliberal discourse, specifically highlighting how the region falls short in the application of the free market in the field of psychoactive drugs, and how
prohibitionism creates a distortion in the legal market with powerful economic incentives to create illegal trade in its *periphery*. The central cleavage in this project is around legal vs. illegal market. Prohibitionism is rejected because the distortion produced in the market is such that it allows the new bourgeoisie of drug traffickers (see, *e.g.*, Friedman, 2005; Vargas Llosa, 2013; Cardoso, Gaviria & Zedillo, 2014.) These cartels break the rule of law and jeopardize the social stability (that any proper self-regulated market demands) due to the huge gains and resources that result from the illegal business. The main critique of prohibitionism made by radical neoliberalism is led by a *formal rationality*. The lack of technical *convenience* rather than the moral *appropriateness* of the drug prohibitionist policy to construct *efficient* market economies and stable democracies is called into question. Radical neoliberalism does not care if psychoactive drugs are “good” or “bad” things. What radical neoliberalism questions is the poor result of the prohibitionist policy and the high economic, political, and associated social costs. The cases pertaining to this experience are Colombia, Mexico, Guatemala and Honduras.

The profound domestic changes experienced in the different countries of the region are producing important transformations in the way that the hemisphere is conceived and in the way that the countries are acting in the international stage. However, and in contrast with most of the international analyses of the Americas, this dissertation distances itself from the idea that the region is undergoing a process of transition as a result from a new hemispheric consensus. Instead, it argues that the region is facing a process of high uncertainty, consequence of the profound crisis of legitimacy left by the increased weakness of neoliberal collective meanings. The dispute about the “correct” collective
judgement to organize the American space moves the international stage in an apparently contradictory dynamic of integration and confrontation. The double dynamic of integration-polarization experienced by the continent does not express a new hemispheric consensus; it illustrates the intense competition among projects with different forms to conceive the hemisphere and the world.

In order to grasp the different forms to understand and act in the continent, this work introduces a cross-international comparison that makes two contributions. First, it helps to go beyond the predominant “case study” method that shrinks artificially the ontological field of IR. Secondly, with the cross-international approach, it is possible to analyse the international cultures that co-exist in the continent, and relate them to the different scenarios of integration and polarization that compete in the hemisphere moved by different collective meanings.

It is possible to identify four different scenarios where the hemispheric order is at stake within this process of fragmentation in the continent. The scenario of international proselytism focuses on the notion of a hemisphere constructed by cooperation among states that are united by a transnational solidarity between their pueblos. The main project in this scenario is Bolivarianism with Venezuela as the leader. This initiative drives the process through a double track practice that combines formal and sub-national diplomacy. The logic behind this project is the transnational solidarity one that tends to condition cooperation among states to ideological affinity. This is a project that aspires to the construction of the “great homeland” that would unite the Latin American “world.”
and would create a separate order from the Anglo-Saxon world. ALBA, for example, is the initiative in the forefront of Bolivarianism.

The second scenario, the one of confrontation and interventionism, focuses on the idea of a hemispheric order that emerges from an ideological crusade. It results from the clash between Neoliberalism and Bolivarianism. Venezuela is again the center of attention in this scenario through the implementation of double-track practices aimed to weakening the governments that are hostile to its cause and to strengthen its sub-national allies through very aggressive interventionism in those countries. Once again, the logic behind this project is transnational solidarity, but this time it is aimed at fostering a crusade against the oppressors, apostates, and traitors. This scenario is characterized by diplomatic tension, ideological polarization, and the spiral of distrust that jeopardizes peace and stability in the region. The bitter confrontation between Bolivarian and Neoliberal countries and the interventionism of the formers in the latter are the clear signs of this scenario.

The scenario of institutional revisionism presents a third way between Neoliberalism and Bolivarianism. The main actor in this scenario is Brazil. Rather than stressing continental integration as neoliberalism and Bolivarianism do, this scenario proposes the construction of a different regional society of states around the leadership of the great powers of the region. Although Brazil’s proposal implies a separate order from the order led by the Anglo-Saxon powers, it is more inclined to present this separate order as pacific co-existence mediated by diplomatic negotiation. The practice par excellence in this scenario is negotiation and reinstitutionalization among states, guided by the logic of what is
acceptable for countries placed in the periphery of the world economy. UNASUR is the initiative that sustains this project in the region.

Finally, the scenario of latent state of war focuses on a hemisphere constructed by confrontation between states and national societies that do not share ideas. This scenario has been marginal but not absent in the hemisphere. Given the open spaces produced by the current hemispheric and regional initiatives, this scenario could be overcome definitely. The US-Cuba relationship marks this scenario ever since the conflicts caused by the Missile Crisis.

The current tension between Bolivarianism, Indigeneity, and Brazilian Social Liberalism vis-à-vis neoliberalism expressed along those four scenarios is not completely new. In a retrospective view, it is possible to say that it is the same “old wine in new bottles.” The “old wine” is the historical tension between the hemispheric world society and the Americas’ society of states that, with different predominance in each period, reappears in the present. Aged by time, and adopting different forms, foundational problems about the subordination or autonomy of Latin America with regards to external centers keep coming back. The challenged neoliberalism evokes the “golden age” of Pan-Americanism with the acquiescence of Washington policies as an external center, and as the defence of the liberal system of values. Such orientation to external centers can be traced back to the post-independence wars period when the young republics adopted models inspired by the European society. Revisionist Bolivarianism brings to mind the historical Pan-Latinamericanism charged of its aspiration to construct first a single Latin American world, and then a revolutionary Latin America driven by an anti-American crusade. The also revisionist Brazilian social liberalism evokes ECLAC’s path for its reformist
proposal, and for the empowerment of states as the privileged historical actors of the
region to search for their own path in the international arena.

Nevertheless, the “new bottles” can be noted in the diverse practices that give new
meanings to old problems. The uncontested material superiority of the US has been
present in different ways through time. From the predatory imperialism linked to the
military and undercover operations of the periods of Imperial Pan-Americanism (1889-
1932) and the Cold War (1953-1980’s) to the idea of benevolent hegemonies based on
subtle forms of unilateralism like neoliberal conditionality which discarded the use of
force. From the shared Pan-Americanism constructed by multilateral practices of the
“golden age” to the neoliberal order imposed to the “losers of history” by conditionality.
The same is true for Latin America as the significant other. One thing is the meaning of
resistance of Pan-Latinamericanism as an anti-imperial discourse vis-à-vis the US
military unilateralism and another thing its current instrumental meaning as a technique
of domestic governance and international mobilization in the absence of such imperial
military threat. However, not everything is the same “old wine in new bottles”: the
indigeneity’s proposal of bringing into being the “living well” shared by “our people”
from the local to the hemispheric level is a new chapter in Latin American history.

Nevertheless, with its synchronic and diachronic comparison, the whole picture shows
how the connection between the rationalities and practices of the emergent projects
transcend the supposed divide between domestic and international politics. In line with IR
governmentality studies developed in other countries, it is possible to trace “both the
continuity (or homogeneity) and the specificity (or complementarity) of domestic and
international aspects of governmentalisation” (Jaeger, 2013:30) from the current situation in Latin America.

Certainly, it is possible to identify the connection between confrontational populism’s appeals to the pueblo and the Bolivarian international references to the common origins of all Latin Americans, as well as to identify the continuity among confrontational populism’s calls to defeat local oligarchies and Bolivarianism’s calls against imperialism as part of the same discursive techniques for mobilization. The continuity is clear because it is the same logic of confrontation that leads to scale the internal polarization up to a hemispheric level. The specificity of the practice is also patent. While polarization takes place in the practice of internal mobilization; internationally, it takes place in the double track of formal and sub-national diplomacy. The aim of domestic and international politics is the same: to promote a “revolutionary” cause.

The case of social liberal reformism shows that the internal and international levels of governmentality are continuous and distinct at the same time. There is a continuum among the revisionist aims of reforming domestic and international orders that are considered unsatisfactory. In the former case, the discontent stems from the incapacity of combining macro-economic stability with social welfare that guarantees social cohesion and political acceptance. In the latter, the discontent comes from the unfair international system that ignores the interests of the underdeveloped countries and strips them of agency. The unsatisfactory situation in both cases is resolved by the logic of convenience, which through an active practice of negotiation and participation, takes into account what is acceptable for a new majority. However, there is discontinuity as well: while domestically, the new consensus is pursued by following the institutions of neoliberal
procedural democracy, internationally, the negotiations are oriented to reform and to
create new structures of governance.

Radical neoliberalism sheds light on the current discontinuity between the international
free market rationality promoted by western society and the confrontational logic
experienced internally by Latin American countries with competitive advantages in the
narcotics industry. In order to re-establish the internal governance of those countries, it
proposed to end with the drug prohibitionism that introduces distortions to market
rationality. The illegalization of competitive markets in Latin America is not a convenient
solution, because it is not efficient and has high political costs.

The novel case of deconstructive indigeneity is the only case in which the continuity and
specificity between the internal and international aspects of governmentality are not
registered. The promotion of “living well,” which internally established that different
worlds with equal status coexist in a state, is not reflected internationally, or at least not
systematically due to its tactical alignment with Bolivarianism. The indigenous project of
constructing governance that recognizes cultural, political, and juridical diversity, and
also the right of self-government seems to be jeopardized by the Bolivarian continuous
calls to a homogenous Latin American pueblo of continental dimensions. The
decolonization project underpinned by a deconstructive logic appears to be co-opted by a
logic of transnational solidarity oriented to the construction of a socialist, anti-imperial,
Great Homeland.

The complexity of the continent demands the development of more middle ground
approaches that attempt to encompass the different dynamics of the region rather than
ignore them under labels such as left or right, modernity or nonmodernity. These labels, undoubtedly, overlook the complex realities and the nuances of countries that may not fit completely into one category or the other. Hence, the need for more all encompassing studies that could explain what is actually going on –or would take place in the years to come- in the region as a whole. There is also an extraordinary potential in exploring deeply the domestic and international aspects of governmentalization contained in the emergent projects of Latin America. This domestic-international nexus is opened to study in a synchronic and diachronic manner.
List of Appendices

Appendix A - Chapter 3: Timeline of the Hemispheric Relations Since the Independence
Foundational Anti-Colonial Pan-Americanism, 1776-1889

1820
The Oporto Liberal Revolution breaks out and it demands the return of King João.

1821
Dom Pedro is appointed simple governor. Jose de San Martin was appointed Protector of Peru.

1822
Dom Pedro is acclaimed as Dom Pedro I, constitutional emperor and "Perpetual Defender of Brazil".

1823
Battles of Junín and Ayacucho
Dissolution of the United Provinces of Central America

1824
Independence of Mexico
Battle of Pichincha in Ecuador

1825
Independence of Venezuela

1828-1829
The Greater Colombia–Peru War

1829
José de San Martin was appointed Protector of Peru.

1831
Dissolution of the Greater Colombia (Created in 1821)

1833
Independence of Venezuela

1846-1848
US-Mexican War

1848
Annexation of Texas

1861-1865
US Civil War

1847
Plenipotentiary Congress in Lima, Peru

1856
Continental Treaty signed at Santiago, Chile

1864
Plenipotentiary Congress in Lima, Peru

1888
First International Conference of American State Washington

1870
President Grant's reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine formally paves the way for US expansionism

1889
International South American Law Congress at Uruguay

1842
The annexation of Hawaii began

1862
Napoleon III invades Mexico

1888
US attempt to annex the Dominican Republic

1889
First International Conference of American State Washington

1894
Continental Treaty signed at Santiago, Chile

1847
Plenipotentiary Congress in Lima, Peru

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Plenipotentiary Congress in Lima, Peru

1856
Continental Treaty signed at Santiago, Chile

1864
Plenipotentiary Congress in Lima, Peru

1888
First International Conference of American State Washington

1894
Continental Treaty signed at Santiago, Chile
Imperial Pan-Americanism, 1889-1932

- **1889**
  - First International Conference of American States, Washington

- **1898**
  - Spanish-American War
  - US occupation of Puerto Rico

- **1899-1902**
  - US occupation of Cuba

- **1900**
  - Elitist Anti-Americanism reflected in works such as *Ariel* by Rodó

- **1903**
  - Creation of Panama after its separation from Colombia

- **1904**
  - Roosevelt's Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine leads to increased US intervention in the Caribbean

- **1906**
  - Third International Conference of American States, Rio de Janeiro

- **1910**
  - The Pan American Union replaces the International Union of American Republics
  - The US intervenes in Nicaragua in support of Adolfo Diaz

- **1912-1933**
  - Almost permanent US occupation of Nicaragua

- **1914**
  - US occupation of Veracruz, Mexico

- **1915-1924**
  - US occupation of the Dominican Republic

- **1917**
  - US occupation of Mexico D.F in pursuit of Pancho Villa

- **1920s**
  - Haya de la Torre extends Anti-Americanism to the masses

- **1923**
  - Fifth International Conference of American States, Santiago

- **1924**
  - The US invades Panama

- **1925**
  - The US invades Honduras due to a civil conflict

- **1928**
  - Sixth International Conference of American States, Habana
    - First time a US president attends the conference (Calvin Coolidge)
    - Private International Law Code is approved

- **1930**
  - Great Depression

- **1930s**
  - Getúlio Vargas becomes dictator of Brazil until 1945 and then serves a term as a democratically elected president in 1951
The “Golden Age” of Pan-Americanism, 1932-1953

1932
Election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt

1933
Removal of US marines from Nicaragua

1934
End of the US occupation in Haiti

1933-1945
Good Neighbor policy

1939
Beginning of World War II

1938
Eighth International Conference of American States, Lima

1941
The US enters the war

1941-1947
Cardenas’ administration in Mexico. Negotiations of expropriation of US oil companies take place

1945
End of World War II

1945
Conference on Problems of War and Peace in Chapultepec, Mexico

1941
The US enters the war

1946
Peron is elected president in Argentina

1947
Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security in Rio De Janeiro, Brazil
-The bases for the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance or Rio Treaty are created

1948
ECLAC is founded. It is headquartered in Chile

1948
Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogota
-The OAS is created through the OAS Charter, in substitution of the Pan-American Union

1953
US intervention in the coup that overthrew Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala
Pan Americanism in Cold War Times, 1953-1980s

1953
US intervention in the coup that overthrew Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala

1959
Triumph of the Cuban Revolution

1960
Dependency Theory

1961-1970
Alliance for Progress

The Latin American Free Trade Association LAFTA/ALALC is created

1963
The school of the Americas is relaunched

1964
The US supports the military coup in Brazil against president Joao Goulart

1965
US invasion of the Dominican Republic

1966
The US supports massive counter-insurgency campaign in Guatemala

1967
Punta del Este Summit
- It fails as there are 2 opposite positions: democracy and free trade vs. Militarism and ECLAC
- The US moves away from regional forums

1970
Salvador Allende is elected president of Chile

1971
President Nixon declared the War on Drugs

1973
The US supports coup against Allende in Chile

1977
Triumph of the Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua

1970-1980
Henry Kissinger helps create the Operation Condor, a campaign of political repression and state terror

1979
President Nixon declared the War on Drugs

1980
The Latin American Integration Association LAIA/ALAI is created

1980-1985
Free elections take place in Peru, Honduras, Bolivia, Argentina, Uruguay, and Guatemala

1983
US invasion of Grenada

1984
The School of the Americas is moved from Panama to Georgia, US.

1985
Declaration of Foz do Iguazu as an antecedent of Mercosur

1984
Introduction of Conditionality Policies

1988
Debt Crisis
Neoliberalism the New Pan-Americanism, 1980s-2000s

1985
Introduction of Conditionality Policies

1986
US Drug Certification Process is enacted
Total war against drug-trafficking in Colombia

1987
Perestroika is introduced by Gorbachov

1989
The Washington Consensus is coined
Andean Pact. The strategic design of a new model based on open regionalism is approved in the meeting of Galapagos

1989
The Protocol of Ouro Preto supplements founding treaty of Mercosur delineating its institutional framework

1985-1990
Free elections take place in Brazil, Chile and Paraguay
Fall of the Berlin Wall
The US invades Panama and removes Noriega from power

1990
Free elections take place in Nicaragua
Oslo Agreement. Peace in Guatemala

1992
End of civil wars in Central America

1994
US occupation of Haiti
Protocol of Ouro Preto supplements founding treaty of Mercosur delineating its institutional framework

1994
First Summit of the Americas, Miami, FL

1995
End of civil wars in Central America

1998
Second Summit of the Americas, Santiago, Chile

2001
The Inter-American Democratic Charter was adopted
Argentinean default

2001
Third Summit of the Americas, Quebec, Canada
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1 Figure 1 was slightly modified in order to present it in a simple way and to summarize Lipset and Rokkan’s complex argument.

2 There is a discussion about the terminology of Weber’s rationalities. He mentions the German words Wertrationalität = substantive rationality, or literally “rationality of values”, or evaluative rationality vs. Zweckrationalität = formal rationality or literally “rationality of purposes” or instrumental rationality. Accordingly, my notions of “appropriate” and “convenient”, the former taken from March & Olsen and the
latter from Hall & Taylor might sometimes be also captured as “morally appropriate/legitimate” and “instrumentally rational/efficient”.

3 The 2x2 matrix is constructed around two dimensions: the existence of a single world society and the existence of an international society. The single world society is expressed in terms of the dichotomy transnational solidarity-national solidarity. The single world society is presented in terms of states share ideas-states do not share ideas. Four international scenarios emerge after relating analytically the two dimensions: a scenario of international proselytism, a scenario of confrontation and interventionism, a scenario of institutional revisionism, and a scenario of latent state of war. Each scenario is constructed following different rationality, ideas and practices.

4 Oppositions within national establish elites-local, regional oppositions

5 Interest specific oppositions-ideological opposition

6 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Cuba was not included because this country did not apply neoliberal reforms during the 1980’s and 1990’s.

7 Mearsheimer (2012) argues that any American leader can choose from four grand strategies as models: The first one is Isolationism, which states that the US should not fight out of the western hemisphere. The second one is offshore balancing, which states that the US should only intervene in Asia, Europe, and the Persian Gulf given their strategic importance for the US, but just in order to prevent any potential hegemon from controlling the region. Similarly, the third one considers that the three previous areas are those which matter to the US, but rather than interventions ad hoc to balance the power, it proposes a permanent military engagement to prevent a war from breaking out. Finally, the last American grand strategy is global dominance, which states that the entire globe is strategically important, and the US must be a global hegemon. For Mearsheimer, only two groups support global dominance: the neoconservatives and the liberal imperialists. While the former believe that the way to achieve global dominance is trough US unilateralism and military force, the latter think that it is through multilateralism and international institutions. After the end of the Cold War, the US has chosen global dominance as the American Grand Strategy. Given the current “mess” of America in the international arena, the author proposes to apply offshore balance in order to return to a more rational model for the US. Nevertheless, for the sake of our discussion, it is important to highlight that from the early 90’s; liberal imperialists in the US have pursued global dominance through international organizations and multilateralism, which are strong supporters of free competition.

8 This expression is used by Fukuyama (1989) regarding the Third World.

9 Regarding the discussion about substantive rationality behind formal rationality, the justification that Huntington gives in The Third Wave is illustrative: “The current book focuses on [procedural] democratization. I have written it because I believe that democracy is good in itself and that, as I argue in chapter 1, it has positive consequences for individual freedom, domestic stability, international peace and the United States of America”. (Huntington, 1991: XV).

10 As Doyle (1997) has convincingly shown, given that liberalism has been a highly malleable discourse historically, it is more accurate to talk about liberalisms in plural rather than of a single liberal school. I will focus on the trajectory of its neoliberal version introduced in Latin America in the 1980s that is characterized by this idea of establishing a set of stable universal rules –taking the market as paradigm– and aimed to incentivize the means-end calculation of the agents but within precise laws and norms. This procedural version of liberalism emphasizes the idea of process over notions such as common good, characteristic of welfare liberalism that requires, for example, the intervention of the state to guarantee the greatest happiness for the greatest number of individuals.

11 The ten policy actions summarized in the Washington Consensus were: “(1) Budget deficits...should be small enough to be financed without recourse to the inflation tax; (2) Public expenditure should be redirected from politically sensitive areas that receive more resources than their economic returns can justify...toward neglected fields with high economic returns and the potential to improve income distribution, such as primary education and health, and infrastructure; (3) Tax reform...so as to broaden the tax base and cut marginal tax rates; (4) Financial liberalization, involving an ultimate objective of market-determined interest rates; (5) A unified exchange rate at a level sufficiently competitive to induce a rapid growth in non-traditional exports; (6) Quantitative trade restrictions to be rapidly replaced by tariffs, which would be progressively reduced until a uniform low rate in the range of 10 to 20 per cent was achieved; (7)
Abolition of barriers impeding the entry of FDI (foreign direct investment); (8) Privatization of state enterprises; (9) Abolition of regulations that impede the entry of new firms or restrict competition; (10) The provision of secure property rights, especially to the informal sector”. (Williamson, 2005: 196).


Since the 80’s some Latin American states have tried to incorporate indigenous peoples in their constitutional order, from where they were absent until then, except in the case of Panama which has recognized their rights since 1971. The states that are recognized as multiethnic and multicultural are Nicaragua (1986), Brazil (1988), Colombia (1991), El Salvador (1992), Guatemala (1992), Mexico (1992, 2001), Paraguay (1992), Peru (1993), Argentina (1994), Bolivia (1994), Ecuador (1994 and 1998), and Venezuela (2000) (Comisión de Trabajo autónomo Mapuche, 2003).

The idea of turning nature into commodities through human work is present in classical liberal thinkers such as Locke, Mill and Smith. In that sense, drugs prohibitionism discloses the inconsistence of western neoliberal countries with the basic assumptions of their own doctrine, which assumes that the natural entities are freely exchangeable in the market. Social movements in Latin America are particularly critical of this neoliberal commodification of nature given the environmental degradation that it produces. This neoliberal conception of nature has been one of the most contested issues in countries like Ecuador and Bolivia. However, radical neoliberal’s critique is based not in the negative effects that the commodification of nature has for the environment (as environmentalist social movements argue) but in the negative effects that hindering the commodification of nature would have for the market.

This is a situation that is far from being solved in the region if we take into account the aggregate financial flow produced by drug trafficking. For example, the United Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2011) estimated that the gross profits of organized crime groups in the cocaine market operating in Latin America rose to some US$ 18 billion in 2009, a figure that is equivalent to 0.06 per cent of the gross domestic product of the region, 0.17 per cent of the GDP of the 7 countries that were affected the most in the region, and 17 per cent of the GDP of Honduras, a small country that was seriously impacted by the drug traffic. As long as these high levels of demand persist in huge illegal markets such as those that currently exist in the First World–the profit for retail and wholesale in the cocaine market of North America and Europe was estimated in US$ 35bn and US$ 26bn respectively, in contrast to the mere US$ 3.5 bn of Latin America (UNODC, 2011)–the supply will continue to appear in the region and other parts of the Third World.

The index ranges from 0 to 1 based on the worst and the best observation of the variables (trade policy, financial policy, tax policy, privatization, and labor legislation) in the entire sample of countries and years.

In 1986, convinced that the executive branch should be paying more attention to the rising threat of international drug trafficking, the US Congress amended the Foreign Assistance Act to require the administration to certify annually whether or not drug producing and drug transit countries were cooperating fully with US anti-drug efforts” (Golding, 2001). The US Drug Certification was dismantled at the beginning of the this century given its little usefulness in the effort to reduce the flow of illegal narcotics, and given the negative effects that the drug certification had on the US relations with nations in the western hemisphere (Golding, 2001). However, the US Department of State is still producing reports on narcotics every year, but without the punitive sanctions previously attached to the drug certification process.

In the 2005 meeting in Mar del Plata, Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela formed a bloc that strongly opposed the FTAA. This bloc rapidly gained the support of new left wing governments of South America and managed to add to the all ready existing reasons – that I previously mentioned – to bring down the treaty.

National Association of Financial Institutions.

“¿Que se vayan todos”

Indeed, the Latinobarómetro report compares similar but not the same periods. For Latin America, it takes the period of 1996-2000 and Latinobarómetro as source. For the European Union, it takes the period 1997-1999 and Eurobarometer as source. For Sub Saharan Africa, Ghana, Zambia, Sud Africa, it only takes 1997.

Un Millón de Voces contra las FARC.

Marcha por la Paz con Justicia y Dignidad.

Movimiento Cocalero, el Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaj Katari de Liberación y la Asamblea de los Pueblos Soberanos.

Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE); Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Achakutik

El Movimiento Zapatista de México.

La Minga Indígena, Social y Popular.

Los Sin Tierra.

Los Piqueteros.

Pais Libre y Azfamipaz

Movimiento de Paz con Justicia y Dignidad, Nuestras Hijas de Regreso a Casa y Red Mesa de Mujeres de Ciudad de Juárez.

Although there are some recent signs of instability in the country, e.g., the student protest against the system of private education, the uncertainty generated by the declining prices of raw material, and the questioning of the principle of WC in the pensions and health system, none of them seems to seriously jeopardize the viability of the neoliberal model.

Despite all the accomplishments in poverty reduction, income distribution is the remaining task for this southern country. According to ECLAC, Chile is the eighth country of Latin America with the worst income distribution behind countries such as Uruguay (Gini 40 per cent) and Peru (Gini 45 per cent), but ahead of Brazil (Gini: 56 per cent) and Colombia (Gini: 55 per cent). (Cited by Sanhueza, 2013).

In February 2014, the countries governed by center or center-right wing parties were Chile, Colombia, and Peru in South America; Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, and The Dominican Republic in Central America; and Mexico in North America.

(i) Conservative modernization: modernization of the party system, the return and strengthening of authority, re-legitimization of authority on the basis of undisputed and shared values, moral order associated with the expansion of the market and ideological association with the United States; (ii) practical reformism: the renewal and recreation of the party system; building economic alliances; institutional management that combines economic growth with inclusionary policies; pragmatic relations with the US; (iii) popular nationalism: political hegemony, centralized state imposition of development and democracy, mass mobilization, charismatic leadership, prioritization of redistribution over production, anti-imperialism; (iv) Indigenous neo-developmentalist: broad political participation and deliberative democracy, strong social and indigenous movements, negotiation with transnational corporations, egalitarian order and moderate anti-imperialism (Calderón Gutiérrez, 2008a: 130; 2008b: 34-35).

The 2x2 map was traced based on Wendt’s proposal to sum up the ontological debate about international relations (Wendt, 1999: 22-33).


The previous chapter shows how the universal aspiration, or if we prefer the imperial character of the neoliberal modernity project, posed two social cleavages in some of the Latin American societies. The first cleavage was structured around the colonial/decolonial contradiction, and the second one was around the pueblo/antipueblo. Given that the analysis of how the opposition emerged is concluded, the current chapter
aims to interpret the way in which those contradictions contribute to the emergency of new social orders in the region in opposition to the neoliberal project.

42 On this discussion about rivalry and antagonism see, e.g., Wendt, 1999: 279; Mouffe, 2003: 8

43 The 31 per cent of the Araucania population belongs to the ethnicity Mapuche (INE, Chile, 2012), the Paez population ranges from 22 to 61 per cent of the total of Cauca’s population (DANE, Colombia, 2007), and 20 per cent of the Chiapas population is considered indigenous (INEGI, Mexico, 2005).

44 In Bolivia and Guatemala, more than half of the total population was poor, but almost three-quarters of the indigenous population were poor. [In the same vein], poverty among indigenous people in Ecuador was about 87 per cent, and it reached 96 per cent in the rural highlands. In Mexico, the incidence of extreme poverty in 2002 was 4.5 times higher in predominantly indigenous municipalities than in non-indigenous ones, up from a ratio of 3.7 times higher than a decade earlier” (The World Bank, 2011).

45 There is real questioning of the size and percentage of the indigenous population in Ecuador. CEPAL asserts that it was equivalent to 6.8 per cent in 2001. Nevertheless, that information does not match with the information provided by another report by UNESCO, and authors like Deruyttere that in 1993 calculated it as 24.85 per cent. The Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de Ecuador (CONAIE) states that the percentage was equivalent to 33.3 in 2006.

46 The grassroots organizations include the Unique Confederation of Rural Laborers of Bolivia (CSUTCB), the National Confederation of Peasant Indigenous Originary Women of Bolivia - Bartolina Sisa, the Syndicalist Confederation of Intercultural Communities of Bolivia (CSCIB), the Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia (CIDOB), and the National Council of Ayllus and Markas of Quillasuyu (CONAMAQ) among others.

47 About deconstruction as a technique see (Fuchs and Ward, 1994).

48 The Assembly of the Sovereignty of Peoples

49 According to the Electoral Geography database, Venezuela has held 5 presidential elections between 1998 and 2013 (1 every 3 years); Ecuador held 3 between 2006 and 2013 (1 every 2.3 years); while Bolivia arranged 2 presidential elections between 2004 and 2013 (1 every 4.5). During the same periods Venezuela had 3 referendums (1 every 5 years), Ecuador 3 (1 every 2.3 years) and Bolivia 3 (1 every 3 years) (Electoral Geography 2.0, 2014).

50 López Obrador has lost twice in the presidential elections by narrow margins: the first one in 2006 by a scarce 0.56 percentage points; the second, in 2012 by 6.6 (Electoral Geography 2.0, 2014).

51 The author here is talking about the MNR and the Bolivian revolution of 1952, but this distinction is also adequate to understand what is going on currently in Venezuela and Ecuador.

52 As I discussed in Chapter One, the Economic Freedom Index is part of the wide extend neoliberal practice of conditionality in which external centers classify countries according with the neoliberal parameters in order to separate the good government recipients from the bad ones. The bad countries are those that lack willingness to apply market reforms, or even worse, jeopardize them.

53 See, Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Comunicación y la Información, República Bolivariana de Venezuela, 2008; The Republic of Ecuador, 2010; República de Nicaragua, 2012.

54 About the logic of acceptability see, Freddi (1986)

55 ¡Que se vayan todos!

56 Rather than subversion and the paramilitary, the authors refer specifically to the FARC. However, in my opinion, their statement is useful to understand all the groups outside the margin of the law in Colombia, not only the FARC.

57 ¡Basta ya! Colombia: Memorias de guerra y dignidad. Informe General Grupo de Memoria Histórica. Escrito por el Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica.

58 The idea of turning nature into commodities through human work is present in classical liberal thinkers such as Locke, Mill and Smith. In that sense, drugs prohibitionism discloses the inconsistence of western neoliberal countries with the basic assumptions of their own doctrine, which assumes that the natural entities are freely exchangeable in the market. Social movements in Latin America are particularly critical of this neoliberal commodification of nature given the environmental degradation that it produces. This neoliberal conception of nature has been one of the most contested issues in countries like Ecuador and Bolivia. However, radical neoliberals’ critique is based not in the negative effects that the commodification of nature has for the environment (as environmentalist social movements argue) but in the negative effects that hindering the commodification of nature would have for the market.
The idea of “high roads” and “low roads” to understand the development of liberalism is introduced by Doyle (1997) in his discussion of this school, see the introduction of part two.

The concept is not very precise in the sense that they were not yet nations at that time, but colonies searching for their independence. It would be perhaps more precise to talk about “transcolonial” solidarity.

The viceroyalties, general captaincies, etc.

The Great Colombia was created in 1819, bringing together the current countries of Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador and Panama.

Other Congresses followed the line drawn by the Congress of Panama in regards to the collective defence against aggression from outside of the continent. They were the plenipotentiary congresses celebrated in 1847, 1864 and 1877 in Lima, the Continental Treaty signed at Santiago in 1856, and the International South American Law Congress at Montevideo in 1888 (see, Padilla, 1954).

The clash between the liberal and conservative projects turned around the meaning and scope of independence from the monarchies in the formation of the new republics. For liberalism, “independence was not only necessary and justified in itself, but it also required a rupture with the Spanish tradition and all its values. [For conservatism] ‘independence’ was accepted, but the rupture with the Hispanic traditions, whose values were considered the nationality's essence, was not accepted” (Jaramillo Uribe, 1986: 32). As Carlos Bosch (1986) argues, different prominent conservatives of Chile, Colombia, Argentina, Mexico, among other countries, embraced Bolivar’s thesis of rejecting colonialism and depicting a “sui genesis” Latin American culture with a prominent Creole leadership. For Bolivar, the right to revolution and independence stemmed from the breach of Castilian law that established a social pact through the “capitulaciones” signed between Carlos V and the conquerors (Bosh, 1986). Those agreements “obligated the licensee to explore, settle and populate the grant territory at the [conquerors] own expense” (Carmagnani, 2011: 31). In exchange, the crown recognized the right to titles of nobility, tax exceptions, and to be appointed in official and municipal positions in addition to the lands and indigenous tributes (Carmagnani, 2011). However, it was the dispossession by the Bourbon absolutism of the creoles’ rights, first under Charles IV and later under Ferdinand VII, what justified Independence. For Bolivar and the other conservatives, the spirit of the real Iberians relied on the creoles as heirs of the Spanish conquerors, and the restitution of the lost rights was an act of simple justice and a way of bringing back the social pact broken by the Bourbon absolutism (Bosh, 1986). In the “sui generis” Latin American society, made up of indigenous, blacks and mestizos, the supremacy of the Creole oligarchy came from being American by birth (in opposition to the European usurpers), and having the rights of the European (in opposition to the indigenous, blacks and mestizos) (Bolivar, 1815). Shortly, in independence, the conservatives rejected absolutism rather than the Iberian order characterized by its lordly nature and Catholic tradition. In contrast, for the liberal republicans, independence was not just a matter of self-government, but one of revolution. The new republics required a rupture with iberianism, which represented absolutism and backwardness. For Argentinean figures like “Juan Bautista Alberdi (1810–84), their civilization was European, and ‘our revolution’ in its ideas was no more than a phase of the great French Revolution” (Hale, 1996: 135)

Spain kept its possessions in the Caribbean (Cuba and Puerto Rico), and the Asia Pacific (the Philippines and Guam) until the Spanish-American War of 1898 that led to the US occupation of those colonies.

“Hereafter no territory of this continent shall be regarded as subject to transfer to European power”, said President Grant. (Herring, 2008: 259)

I am aware that to place the beginning of this second period in 1889 is controversial. The United States military predation in Hispanic-America can be located much earlier with the US-Mexican War of 1846–1848. In that war, the US devoured approximately fifty five per cent of the Mexican territory. The predation was followed with the annexation of Texas in 1848. Nevertheless, it can also be interpreted as an early period in which countries were still defining their borders, affirming their political power within their territories, and trying to consolidate their unity. Far from being a united country in expansion, the United States had to face a civil war thirteen years after. I have selected 1889 for four reasons: firstly, at that point,
the US was already a unified country in expansion. Secondly, the project of military expansion was previously formalized under Grant’s administration with the adjustments to the Monroe Doctrine that justified military intervention. Thirdly, the military systematic occupations of the US began with the Spanish-American War of 1898. This event had a profound impact in Latin American public opinion as no other had before. Finally, consider the formalization of the introduction of the economic track in 1889 with the First International Conference of American States.

Franklin Delano Roosevelt was elected president of the United States four times. He governed from 1932 to 1945.

About the discussion of the principle of international legitimacy see: (Bull, 2002: 33)

About the relations of Perón and Vargas with European fascism see: Rouquié, 2011; Hobsbawm, 2003; Sader, 2011.

For the anti-communists of the region, the convergence of communism and nationalism became indistinguishable in practice because, as Marx (2010) argues, “though not in substance, yet in form, the struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle. The proletariat of each country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own bourgeoisie” (20). However, and beyond the substantial differences between one and the other, the Cuban revolution illustrated how struggles of national liberation turned communist in the midst of Cold War geopolitics, a situation facilitated by the necessity of tactical responses to the same enemies who embodied economic exploitation, that is, the national elite and the US capitalism (see, e.g., Baran, 1974).

Perhaps, it was the nationalist and the communist nature of the Cuban revolution that cut the former ties with US imperialism and capitalism almost simultaneously, and that “struck a responsive chord in many parts of Latin America”, as once argued by a veteran correspondent of the New York Times on the island (Helbert, 1974: 413). In fact, the revolutionary fever spread rapidly throughout the continent after 1959 and inspired a young generation of Latin Americans. They acted in support of the “workers, the peasants, the victims of colonialism, all the exploited” because, in Castro’s terms, “the problem was not only who made the revolution, but whose basic interests it served” (Castro as cited in Baran, 1974: 386).

The severity of this practice varied along the continent—from the systematic state terrorism implemented by the bureaucratic authoritarian experiences in the South Cone, embodied also by the praetorian guards that obeyed whichever dictator was in power in Central America—to the doctrine of national security applied by democracies like Colombia and Venezuela which recurrently governed under a state of siege (see, e.g., O’Donnell, 1988; Rouquié, 1994; Leal Buitrago, 2003).

Cuba was expelled from the OAS on January, 1962, shortly after the revolution took power. In the same year, its application for admission to LAFTA was rejected (See, e.g., Magariños, 2005).

“Empires have no interest in operating within an international system; they aspire to be the international system. Empires have no need for a balance of power. That is how the United States has conducted its foreign policy in the Americas, and China through most of its history in Asia” (Kissinger, 1994: 21).

As Love (1996) has illustrated, in 1937 Prebisch began to draw what in 1949 would be the reason behind structuralism’s main policy of accelerated import substitution industrialization: the theory of unequal exchange. “He noted that the agricultural exchange was inelastic compared to industrial output, and that its products’ prices tended to rise and fall faster than industrial prices in the trade cycle” (Love: 1996: 222). In straightforward terms, this means that Latin American economies would need to export more raw materials per day to import the same amount of commodities and, in addition, their economies would be subjected to the ups and downs of international demand. In 1944, Prebisch returned to teaching after he was dismissed from the central bank. Teaching a course at the University of Buenos Aires, he shaped the second basic thesis of structuralism: the Center-Periphery dichotomy. Taking Britain as the nineteenth-century Center of the trading and monetary system based on the gold standard, Prebisch argued that, while the periphery is condemned to suffer the cost of an economic contraction in order to diminish the gold flow during the
downswing of the cycle, the Center can maintain monetary stability during its downswings by adjusting the rediscount rate to domestic needs (Love: 1996).

77 About the discussion between developmentalism and liberalism, see, e.g., Gilpin, 1987.

78 Latin American Integration Association.

79 About segmentation, stratification, and functionality in the international order see: Buzan, 2010: 318

80 About binary opposition in Latin America, it is advisable to study the postcolonial literature about the region developed by Mignolo (2011), Rojas (2002), Escobar (2008, 2010), and Quijano (2007), among others.

81 The US has signed FTAs with Mexico, Chile, Peru, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Canada has FTAs in place with Panama, Colombia, Peru, Costa Rica, Chile, Mexico, and Honduras.

82 In the last fourteen years, four projects have been created: ALBA, UNASUR, CELAC, and The Pacific Alliance. In the twentieth century, seven were created: CELAC, ALADI, the Andean Community, CARICOM, MERCOSUR, OEC-SIC, and NAFTA.


84 The Colombian bombing of March 2008 to a FARC’s base camp located in Ecuadorian territory near the border.

85 In March 2008, Chávez ordered to mobilize troops against Colombia after that country bombed the FARC in Ecuadorian territory.


87 “On June 3, 2009, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Americas adopted resolution AG/RES. 2438 (XXXIX-O/09), that states that the 1962 resolution, which excluded the Government of Cuba from its participation in the inter-American system, ceases to have effect in the Organization of American States (OAS). The 2009 resolution states that the participation of the Republic of Cuba in the OAS will be the result of a process of dialogue initiated at the request of the Government of Cuba, and in accordance with the practices, purposes, and principles of the OAS” (OAS, 2014).

88 In the founding document of ALBA, Cuba offers a price of no less than US$ 27 by oil barrel to Venezuela when the oil barrel was sold at US$ 53.28 in October of the same year (2004). See, ALBA, 2004c:2

89 In 2007, “The suitcase scandal” erupted when a Venezuelan entrepreneur, sent presumably by Chávez, was caught in Argentina carrying US$ 800.000 in cash, and whose intended recipient was the Kirchner campaign.


91 Only if we give credit to eccentric accusations like those of President Maduro’s which held that Chavez’s cancer was inoculated by the CIA, or President Correa’s who stated that the police strike for salaries was an attempt to overthrow him when the military, rather than the police, have been the putschist in the continent.

92 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JeNBYZm8kic

93 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AxKpwd5Nybw

94 In July 22, 2010, the government of Colombia presented in an extraordinary session of the OAS Permanent Council proof about the presence of the FARC and ELN in Venezuela, situation that affects the national security of Colombia. The diplomatic delegation of Colombia attached pictures of the guerrilla camps and leaders of those irregular groups that, together with satellite images with the exact coordinates in which those camps were placed, would prove the presence of those guerrillas in that country with the protection of Venezuela’s government. See, e.g., https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=18fJgBJZu48

95 To see an accurate discussion about Colombia as a case of apostasy with regard to Bolivarianism, see: (Morales Vega, 2008: 39–42)