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**On the Strategies of East Asian Limited Wars
States, Militaries, Technologies**

by

Jainxiang Bi, M.A.

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Political Science

Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
June 20, 1996
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the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
acceptance of the thesis,

**ON STRATEGIES OF EAST ASIAN LIMITED WARS:
STATES, MILITARIES, TECHNOLOGIES**

submitted by

Jianxiang Bi, B.A., M.A.

in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Chair, Department of Political Science

Thesis Supervisor

External Examiner

Carleton University
September 6, 1996

When names are not correct, what is said will not sound reasonable; when what is said does not sound reasonable, affairs will not culminate in success; when affairs do not culminate in success, rites and music will not flourish; when rites and music do not flourish, punishments will not fit crimes; when punishments do not fit the crimes, the common people will not know where to put hand and foot. Thus when the gentleman names something, the name is sure to be usable in speech and when he says something this is sure to be practicable. The thing about the gentleman is that he is anything but casual where speech is concerned.

----Confucius

For my parents

Abstract

This thesis is a comparative study of the strategies of East Asian limited wars-- Japanese strategy in the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945, Soviet strategy in the Nomonhan War of 1939, and Chinese strategy in the Korean War of 1950-1953--in light of Sun Zi and Carl von Clausewitz. Sun Zi's and Clausewitz' perceptions of strategy with emphasis on material and cultural power made the strong impacts on Japanese, Soviet, and Chinese strategic thoughts. By focusing on the interaction between material and cultural power, the thesis explained how Japan, the Soviet Union, and China developed strategies on the basis of their material power and, in turn, how their cultures shaped or reshaped such strategies. To achieve limited objectives in regional limited wars, the thesis found, material and cultural control over mutually reinforced objectives, costs, and means through cooperation between states helped indeed formulate explicit or tacit rules, distribute costs and benefits, and employ limited human and technological means. Materially and culturally oriented rules, costs, and means constituted the essence of the strategies of East Asian limited wars.

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INTRODUCTION

Sun Zi, Clausewitz, and East Asian Limited Wars

This thesis, about the conventional strategies of East Asian limited wars waged between 1937 and 1953, has three purposes. First, it compares and contrasts Sun Zi's and Carl von Clausewitz' strategies of limited war to explore their fundamental strategic principles in explaining their theoretical strengths and weaknesses. Second, it constructs a new composite strategy that remedies some theoretical defects, to provide criteria for analyzing the contemporary strategies of regional limited wars. Third, it tests the constructed strategy against Japanese strategy in the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945, Soviet strategy in the Nomonhan War of 1939, and Chinese strategy in the Korean War of 1950-1953. The thesis shows that technological innovations, along with contemporary theories of strategic studies, have in fact made great contributions to and enriched Sun Zi's and Clausewitz' strategies, but they have not indeed transcended the very nature of their strategies characterized by the rational ties between ends and means. In other words, this perspective on change and continuity does not assert that their strategies have firmly molded the strategies of regional limited wars. Nor does it claim that the strategies of regional limited wars have totally escaped from their strategic insights. On the contrary, the strategies of regional limited wars are typically mixed with change and continuity, which are integrated into one coherent framework. In this context, the thesis demonstrates what the strategies of regional limited wars entail--with the goal of improving our ability to understand Japanese, Soviet, and Chinese strategies.

Limited war is defined as a war fought by states for limited objectives--the absence of unconditional surrender, the acceptance of a stalemate, or the achievement of some greater advantage from the status quo--through the use of limited forces and technology with three considerations: the establishment of mutually recognized rules, explicit or tacit, for achieving limited political objectives, the distribution of costs and benefits, and

the use of limited human and technological means. Cooperation between states on the limits of war--states actively adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated interests of others through a process of strategy coordination--helps protect a state's limited interests essential to its security, its fundamental purposes in its relations with other states, and its priorities with respect to objectives. Such limited interests and objectives facilitate the rational distribution of costs and benefits by employing limited weapons and forces on the battlefield. Control over mutually reinforced objectives, costs, and means through adjustment and cooperation is the key to maintain war as limited as possible. Such a limited war in fact becomes political, military, and technological in nature and in essence. This definition sharply differs from many other ones such as B.H. Liddell-Hart's attempt to "make a code of rules" for limiting violence, Bernard Brodie's favor of seeking an alternative in "fighting without using the full military power," William Kaufmann's interest in two most likely limits--"geography and weapons," Henry Kissinger's and Robert Osgood's insistence on "the political primacy," Thomas Schelling's necessity of "bargaining and communication," Lawrence Freedman's focus on the interaction of "limited ends and limited means," and Robert Jervis' "reciprocal restraints on objectives and weapons."¹ These scholars are mainly concerned about "the political primacy" within the context of limited nuclear war without fully exploring the Clausewitzian approach to conventional limited war in general and the impacts of Sun Zi and Clausewitz on East Asian limited wars in particular.

¹ B.H. Liddell-Hart, Revolution in Warfare (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947); Bernard Brodie, "Unlimited Weapons and Limited War" The Reporter no. 11, 1954: 16-21; William W. Kaufmann, "Limited Warfare" in William W. Kaufmann, ed. Military Policy and National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956) 102-136; Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Row, 1957) 114-125 and 139-144; Robert E. Osgood, Limited War Revisited (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979) 2-3; Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960) 53-80; Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (London: Macmillan Press, 1981) 91-119; Stephen Peter Rosen, "American Theory of Limited War" International Security no. 2, 1982: 83-113; and Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989) 237-243.

This underdeveloped, if not ignored, topic within relatively developed field of strategic studies raises crucial questions: What are Sun Zi's and Clausewitz' strategic principles of conventional limited war in maintaining war as limited as possible? To what extent do these principles influence the strategic thought of East Asian powers such as Japan, the Soviet Union, and China? and How do these powers manage their objectives, costs, and means in conducting limited war? This thesis attempts to answer these questions. Chapter one explores Sun Zi's and Clausewitz' strategic principles in demonstrating their logical, coherent, and plausible structure of the strategy of limited war. Chapter two constructs a new composite contemporary strategy explaining that their emphasis on the relationships between the state and the military is very important, but insufficient to understand the contemporary strategy of conventional limited war. Their strategies need to be supplemented, though not replaced, by a concept stressing military technology. Chapters three, four, and five test the constructed strategy against Japanese, Soviet, and Chinese strategies in regional limited wars. The conclusion then compares and contrasts them in highlighting their strategic principles of regional limited wars.

CHAPTER 1

Sun Zi and Clausewitz on the Strategies of Limited War

Sun Zi and Clausewitz dominate strategic studies, but the literature on their works appears to mainly emphasize linguistic reinterpretations or historical and philosophical analyses, or both, yet generally ignoring their strategies of limited war. This has skewered the field, produced misperceptions, and prevented scholars from further exploring, generalizing, and refining their strategies of limited war. Moreover, different interpretations based on different philosophies, cultures, and methodologies have focused on different issues discussed by Sun Zi and Clausewitz and intentionally or unintentionally led to misunderstanding rather than better understanding of their works. Some misunderstanding partly derives from these leading scholars such as Li Jijun, Guo Huanuo, Wu Jiulong, B.H. Liddell-Hart, Henry Kissinger, Peter Paret, and Michael Howard, who either misinterpret or downplay their strategy of limited war.¹ It partly lies in their non prescriptive and non judgmental approaches to the strategy of limited war, in which, rather than suggest new solutions, Sun Zi and Clausewitz simply clarify well-known phenomena, then conceptualize, theorize, and contribute them to the overall theoretical structure of strategy and war, effectively denying or minimizing the significance of universal theories related to strategy and war. It is partly due to the fact that much, if not all, of Sun Zi's and Clausewitz' works may, on closer reading, seem to be mere common sense. Even highly philosophical and theoretical chapters and

¹ For the details, see Li Jijun, *Junshi lilun yu zhanzheng shijian* (Military Theory and War Practice) (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1994) 27-39; Guo Huanuo, *Sun Zi yizhu* (The Interpretation of Sun Zi) (Shanghai: Guji chubanshe, 1984) 4-24; Wu Jiulong, eds, *Sun Zi jiaoyi* (Correction of Sun Zi) (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1990); B.H. Liddell-Hart, *Strategy* (London: A Meridian Book, 1991) 319; Henry A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* pp. 114-125 & 139-144; Peter Paret, *Clausewitz and the State: the Man, His Theories, and His Times* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); and Michael Howard, *Clausewitz* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983) 47-58.

paragraphs, when examined, largely center on self-evident facts or simply illustrate implications that almost necessarily follow from them. Theoretical and empirical problems that persist in their works thus continue to perplex scholars in the field of strategic studies.

Even though scholars regard Sun Zi as "the greatest strategist," the study of The Art of War is still underdeveloped. Most, if not all, scholars seek a perfect translation of his short but sophisticated work from classical Chinese into contemporary languages for a better understanding of his "Thirteen Chapters," while some attempt to reassess and reevaluate his strategic ideas by adopting contemporary theories of social sciences. Unfortunately, Sun Zi's strategy of limited war is not focused on; it has not been a major concern.² In contrast, the study of On War is more developed than that of Sun Zi. Scholars have produced a variety of excellent works explaining his philosophy, history, politics, strategy, and war. Yet his strategy of limited war as a whole is still untouched, despite Cold War and Post-Cold War generations of "experts" on limited war. To make matters worse, no academic work has concentrated on a comparative study of their strategies of limited war.³

² Samuel B. Griffith, *Sun Tzu: the Art of War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963); Thomas Cleary, *Sun Tzu: the Art of War* (Boston: Shambhala Dragon Editions, 1988) and *Mastering the Art of War: Zhuge Liang's and Liu Ji's Commentaries on the Classics by Sun Tzu* (Boston: Shambhala Dragon Editions, 1989); Emerson M.S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook, "A Game-Theoretic Interpretation of Sun Tzu's the Art of War" *Journal of Peace Research* vol. 31, no. 2, 1994: 161-174; Roger T. Ames, *Sun Tzu: the Art of War: New Translation Incorporating the Recently Discovered Yin-Chueh-Shan Texts* (New York: Ballantine Books, Inc., 1993); J.H. Huang, *Sun Tzu: the New Translation* (New York: Morrow, Williams, & Co., Inc., 1993); Ralph D. Sawyer, *Sun Tzu's Art of War* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994); Tao Hanzhang, *Sun Tzu's Art of War: the Modern Chinese Interpretation* (New York: Sterling Publishing Co., Inc., 1990); Hattori Senkasuga, *Sun Zi bingfa jiaojie* (Correction of Sun Zi's Art of War) (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1987); Zhang Wenmu, *Sun Zi jiegu* (The Interpretation of Sun Zi) (Beijing: Guofang daxue chubanshe, 1987); and Wu Rugao, *Sun Zi xintan: zhongwai xuezhe lun Sun Zi* (A New Interpretation of Sun Zi: Chinese and Foreign Scholars on Sun Zi) (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1990).

³ Peter Paret, *On Clausewitz & the History of War: Essays* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); W.B. Gallie, *Philosophers of Peace and War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978); Michael I. Handel, *Clausewitz and Modern Strategy* (London: Frank Cass, 1986); Raymond Aron, *Penser la guerre:*

This chapter attempts to explore their principles, regularities, uniformities of the strategy of limited war, demonstrating their logical, coherent, and plausible structure within the context of their times, traditions, and cultures. The critical examination illustrates the structural relationships of strategy, explaining how one element of strategy is related to another, how the whole is connected with its parts, and how theory provides the guide for practice. The comparative analysis highlights both similarities and differences in their perceptions of and approaches to strategy, politics, and war. The chapter begins with Sun Zi on strategy, then focuses on Clausewitz' strategy, and finally compares and contrasts their strategies in presenting their enduring values, as well as fundamental weaknesses.

Sun Zi on Strategy of Limited War

Sun Zi in The Art of War attempted to codify his strategic principles, regularities, and uniformities of limited war through logical, philosophical, and pragmatic reasoning, in the context of the power struggle of warring states aiming to reunify China. But his strategic principles, regularities, and uniformities, heavily dependent on a variety of political and combat experiences ranging from the Spring-Autumn period to the Warring States period, were largely fragmented and scattered throughout his entire work.⁴ Strategy
(..continued)

Clausewitz 2 vols. (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1976); Christopher Bassford, Clausewitz in English: the Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); and Stephen J. Cimbala, Clausewitz and Escalation: Classical Perspective on Nuclear Strategy (London: Frank Cass, 1991).

⁴ The thesis examines Sun Zi's strategy of limited war, rather than the authenticity of the work focusing on questions such as who was the author of The Art of War, when did he write it, and how did e write it. While some Chinese scholars and soldiers have confirmed Sun Zi as the author, others are convinced he was not.

Si Maqian, historian (145 B.C.), in Shiji stated that Sun Zi, a native of Qi, won the respects of King Holu of Wu for his capabilities in successfully turning King's concubines and beauties into well-trained soldiers. As a result, the King appointed him as his general. In the West, Sun Zi defeated mighty Chu, entering Ying. In the North, he struck awe into Qi and Jin and Wu's fame spread through all the

was, despite his failure to define it, regarded as a rational, balanced, and limited act of the state, aimed at winning war without bloodshed or with low cost. Such limited objectives could be reached by either attacking the enemy's strategy, or disrupting his alliances, or attacking his army. "The worst policy is" however "to attack cities. Attack cities only when there is no alternative" (III 4-7).⁵ This ideal strategy for Sun Zi was to conquer the

(..continued)

states. Following this fundamental historical evidence, contemporary Chinese soldiers such as Guo Huaruo and Wu Jiulong assert that Sun Zi, a contemporary of Confucius, did write the book around the late Spring and Autumn or the early Warring States period.

In contrast, ancient and contemporary Chinese scholars challenged Si Maqian's biography of Sun Zi. Ouyang Xiu (1007-1072) claimed that *The Art of War* was a product of the Warring States' period. Guo Meruo argued that Si Maqian's biography was not dependable. It was a fiction. Sun Zi bingfa was written during the Warring States period. The authorship was unknown. Feng Youlan contended that up to the time of Confucius (551-479 B.C.) there appeared to have been no one who composed any sort of literary work in a private capacity. Qian Mu asserted that Sun Zi and his book were fabricated by later generations. Li Ling stated that *The Art of War* was the collected work of the Sun Zi school. In other words, these scholars shared the view that *The Art of War* was a product of the Warring States, rather than of the Spring-Autumn or the early Warring States period. Some examples could support their claim. First, Sun Zi utilized the character "zhu" in the sense of "sovereign" as a word descriptive of the head of the state that came into use during the Warring States. In the Spring-Autumn era, this character meant "lord" or "master," to describe the head of the state. Second, the separation of power between ministers and generals occurred in the Warring States, not the Spring-Autumn. Third, large armies in the Warring States were effectively organized, well trained, commanded by professional generals, whereas during the Spring-Autumn armies were small, inefficiently organized, usually ineptly led, poorly equipped, badly trained, and haphazardly supplied.

Despite their persistent debate on the authenticity of the book, questions remain unsolved: Why did not Confucius, the greatest Chinese teacher, produce his own work? Why did Sun Zi, his contemporary soldier, apparently much less educated, than the greatest teacher, write his book? Why was his theory of strategy and war fragmented and scattered throughout his work, if he was a conscious, capable writer? and Who did write the book, if no one could write one's own works during Confucius's times? Despite the controversy over Sun Zi, this thesis views *The Art of War* as a product of the Warring States. See: Si Maqian, *Shiji* (Historical Records) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1987); Guo Huaruo, *Sun Zi zhuyi* pp. 29-33; Samuel B. Griffith, *Sun Zi: the Art of War* p. 12, p. 77, and p. 78; Guo Meruo, *Guo Meruo qianji* (The Collected Works of Guo Meruo) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1982) 71; Feng Yulan, *History of Chinese Philosophy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), 7; Wu Jiulong, *Sun Zi xiaoyi* p. 3; and Li Ling, "Guanyu Yinqueshan jianben Sun Zi yanjiu de shangque (A Preliminary Discussion of the Yinqueshan Bamboo-Slips Version relating to Sun Zi Studies)" *Wenshi* no. 7, 1979: 12.

⁵ The quotations of Sun Zi's *Art of War* throughout this thesis are mainly taken from Samuel B. Griffith's translation. The notion following each quote refers to chapter and paragraph as indexed by Griffith. Despite the popularity of this version in the West, Chinese military academics such as Pan Jiabin and Liu

enemy through peaceful means such as diplomacy and deterrence, or through the use of force within limited areas in the shortest possible time, at the least possible cost in lives, and with infliction of the fewest possible casualties on the enemy, or both. Central to his strategy was control over limits in order to keep war as limited as possible.

The key to have control over the limits of both ends and means rested essentially on the concept of "knowing the enemy and knowing oneself," since "war is a matter of vital importance to the state; province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin" (I 1). The emphasis on the rational analysis of strategic environments demonstrated that Sun Zi appeared to appreciate the difference between national and military strategies. National strategy reflected the state's strategic environments, resources, military forces, political belief, and culture, which influenced how it perceived, protected, and promoted its interests and values in the community of states. As a byproduct, military strategy explained how to achieve the political objectives on the battlefield. These strategies were further divided into four different levels: political, ideological, economic, and operational, which appeared to be beyond the capacity of soldiers. Because of their inability to handle such complicated issues, it became the natural province of political leaders who knew how to employ the military with their repertoire of statecraft. The military became a subordinate of the state.⁶ This classification of strategy required the state to deliberately

(..continued)

Ruixiang hold that there are three major problems in Griffith's translation. First, the translator carelessly abridged the Sun Xingyan-Wu Renji version of Sun Zi, especially in the chapters of Maneuver, the Nine Variables, and Marches. Second, he poorly defined some terms and expressions such as "to prepare the shielded wagon" instead of "to make mantlets and shielded vehicles ready." Third, some subtitles were misleading, for example, he translated "jipian" into "estimates" and "mougongpian" into "offensive strategy." Although they may exaggerate some translation errors, this thesis will add some explanations about terms and definitions when it is necessary. See Samuel B. Griffith, Sun Tzu: the Art of War and Yu Rubo, eds. Sun Zi xinlun jicui (The Collection of Contemporary Views on Sun Zi) (Beijing: Changzheng chubanshe, 1992) 19-26.

⁶ John K. Fairbank, "Varieties of the Chinese Military Experience" in Frank A. Kierman, Jr. and John K. Fairbank, eds. Chinese Way of War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974) 10.

analyze the political, economic, military, societal, and psychological resources of both enemy and oneself in making full preparations for either defending one's state or attacking the enemy. "It is a doctrine of war," Sun Zi warned, "not to assume the enemy will not come, but rather to rely on one's readiness to meet him; not to presume that he will not attack, but rather to make one's self invincible" (VIII 16). The failure to do so would invite strategic disasters.

Strategy and war as an organism was essentially made up of nature, human beings, and multitudinously interrelated, interconnected, and interdependent parts. Any one of the parts that fell from its place or was disrupted in its functioning could impair the harmony of the whole. Heaven, which was neither deity nor blind fate, presided over this organic whole and was a force for harmony and balance, whereas human beings were the principal agents of harmony and disorder. Out of ignorance or perversity human beings could not only cause serious disruptions through the application of knowledge, wisdom, and discipline, but also restore harmony.⁷ Thus, balance between nature and human being would preserve and sustain the whole without seriously damaging its related parts. Such an appropriate balance could be achieved only through coordination and adjustment, which would reduce violence or damage, if there is, to the lowest level needed to fully or at least partly restore harmony, rather than to establish the new harmony. Harmonious cooperation of all beings arose not from the orders of a superior authority external to themselves, but from the fact that they were all parts in a hierarchy of the whole forming a cosmic pattern, and what they obeyed was the internal dictates of their own nature.⁸ By extension, in limited war, the balance between expectations and realities would facilitate

⁷ Arthur F. Wright, "Introduction" in Arthur F. Wright, ed. *Confucianism and Chinese Civilization* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964) IX.

⁸ Joseph Needham, "Human Laws and Laws of Nature in China and the West" *Journal of the History of Ideas* XII 1951: 230.

the concentration of available resources on the limited objectives which the state pursued and for which the military fought in an effort to restore harmony. Limited objectives could be reached by utilizing limited forces within limited areas and time to make the enemy powerless. These principles proposed by Sun Zi were based on two fundamental elements: the state and the military. The interaction between them within the context of Chinese culture and tradition constituted his strategy of limited war.

The State

Sun Zi's state was an authoritarian state, in which the sovereign firmly dominated all political, military, economic, and societal activities, while society in turn recognized and backed the legitimacy and authority of the state's control as a function of Chinese tradition and culture. Such ties between the state and society influenced and shaped his approach to strategy of limited war, which emphasized the rationally balanced relationship between civilian control over the military and military autonomy. "Normally, when the army is employed," argued Sun Zi, "the general first receives his commands from the sovereign. He assembles the troops and mobilizes the people. He blends the army into a harmonious entity and encamps it" (VII 1 and VIII 1). This procedure of war making reflected Chinese civil-military relations that were dominated by the sovereign, legitimized by Confucian ideology, and sustained by family authority.⁹ The combination of the top down and the bottom up ensured the internal harmony among the state, the military, and the people, which became the very essence of initiating, making, and implementing strategy of limited war.

⁹ Confucianism is the name given by later generations to the collection of teachings of the scholar Confucius (551-479 B.C.) of the ancient Zhou dynasty (1122-221 B.C.), expositions on the classics of poetry, literature, rites, music, and history, and on his ethical teachings as recorded by his students in the work known as the Analects. In this thesis, Confucianism is defined as the classical Confucianism distinct from later Confucianism of the Han and Song dynasties, which is a syncretic fusion of Confucian, Taoist, and Buddhist conceptions.

Civilian control over the military had deep roots in Chinese tradition. The Western Zhou empire established the Son of Heaven's absolute power to govern the state and society by way of creating a new basis of legitimacy espousing the doctrine of Heaven's mandate. This doctrine asserted that his sanction to rule came from a broader, impersonal deity, Heaven (tian), whose mandate (tianming) might be conferred on any family that was morally worthy of the responsibility. His accountability to a supreme moral force guided the state and society. Together with such moral force, the Son of Heaven adopted two approaches to strengthening his effective control over the state and society. First, he set up the political organization based on family ties by naming his sons and relatives as sovereigns (zhuo); meanwhile sovereigns named their sons and relatives as ministers (dafu); and ministers named their sons and relatives as nobles (shi). This kinship-oriented political organization guaranteed political power of the state in the hands of the Son of Heaven's family. Second, he formalized religious procedures to secure his political power. The Son of Heaven had privileges to enshrine his forefathers dated back to a hundred generation without disruption, whereas sovereigns, ministers, and nobles cherished their forefathers as sacred only within five generations. These procedures were devoted to avoiding religious independence on the part of the subordinates of the Son of Heaven, which might in turn result in their political independence.

The legitimization of such kinship and religious criteria for holding power was moreover coincident with emerging Confucianism, which provided concrete moral criteria for both rulers and subordinates. In accordance with Confucianism, governmental institutions, central and local, were supposed to be benevolent and righteous, and devoted to the common people (min). "Approach your duties with reverence and be trustworthy in what you say; avoid excesses in expenditure and love your fellow men; employ the labor of the common people only in the right seasons." Based on these moral values, rulers as father and mother "treated the common people with the same loving care given to babies, guided the common people by virtue, kept them in line with the rites. They would,

besides having a sense of shame, reform them."¹⁰ With such paternalistic care, the state would become strong, but its absence would undermine the interests of the state in war and in peace. "When a country is impoverished by military operations it is due to distant transportation; carriage of supplies for great distances renders the people destitute." Sun Zi saw, "Where the army is, prices are high, when prices rise the wealth of the people is exhausted. When wealth is exhausted the peasantry will be afflicted with urgent exactions. With strength thus depleted and wealth consumed the households in the central plains will be utterly impoverished and seven-tenths of their wealth dissipated" (II 11-13). Therefore, rulers must avoid protracted operations or focus on limited objectives in order to safeguard the welfare of the common people. Paternalism in government would help maintain the harmony between the state and society for waging limited operations and battles. A state of this kind "caused the people to be in harmony with their leaders so that they would accompany them in life and unto death without fear of mortal peril" (I 4).

As a result, the welfare of the state became an important determinant of war. "Operations of war require one thousand fast four horse chariots, one thousand four-horse wagons covered in leather, and one hundred thousand mailed troops. When provisions are transported for a thousand li, expenditures at home and in the field, stipends for the entertainment of advisors and visitors, the cost of materials such as glue and lacquer, and of chariots and armor, will amount to one thousand pieces of gold a day. After this money is in hand, one hundred thousand troops may be raised" (II 1-2). To gain societal support for war required the state to address the economic interests of the people. This concern reflected Sun Zi's attempts to balance the relationship between the political objectives of the state and the economic interests of the people, since without such balanced and harmonized relationship, it was impossible for the state to wage war. His reasoning based

¹⁰ Confucius, *The Analects* (London: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1979) 59 and 63.

on the economic interdependence among the people, the military, and the state became the essential theme that persisted throughout his book. "When an army of one hundred thousand is raised and dispatched on a distant campaign the expenses borne by the people together with the disbursements of the treasury will amount to a thousand pieces of gold daily. There will be continuous commotion both at home and abroad, people will be exhausted by the requirements of transport, and the affairs of seven hundred thousand households will be disrupted" (XIII 1). When each family sent the able men from fifteen to sixty years old to the army, the people staying at home should support families and war. But the people unable to attend the army were physically unable to take the responsibility of ploughing, sowing, and transportation. Such gradually ruining the people's wealth would eventually weaken the capabilities of the state and the military to wage war.

The strain on resources imposed heavy burden on the government. "As to government expenditures, those due to broken-down chariots, worn-out horses, armor and helmets, arrows and crossbows, lances, hand and body shields, draft animals and supply wagons will amount to sixty per cent of the total" (II 14). With limited resources, the state should concentrate on limited objectives in an effort to avoid irrational approaches to war such as attacking cities and protracted war. "When troops attack cities, their strength will be exhausted. When the army engages in protracted campaigns the resources of the state will not suffice. When your weapons are dulled and ardor damped, your strength exhausted and treasure spent, neighboring rulers will take advantage of your distress to act. And even though you have wise counselors, none will be able to lay good plans for the future" (II 3-4). Sun Zi warned repeatedly, "There has never been a protracted war from which a country has benefited" (II 7). The mismatch between ambitions and resources would lead to internal instability as well as external defeat.

Confucian paternalism in government was largely based on family authority focusing on the defined order of role relationships between father and son, between

husband and wife, and, by extension, between friends.¹¹ The family ties, with special attention to the paramount value of filial piety and the absolute denial of the legitimacy of all forms of aggression, created the family hierarchy. The hierarchy and ordering of the family and society prescribed the proper place each agency and individual should, as a rule, occupy, in order to "Let the ruler be ruler, the minister minister, the father father, and the son son."¹² Then, ruler, minister, father, and son were orderly political, social, and biological ties that fostered social order. Accordingly, each one had one's own responsibility and obligations and was supposed to fulfill them. The ruler dominated the state, the minister or general served the ruler to administer or defend the state, and the father and son provided material and moral support for the state.

Chinese tradition and culture indeed provided a solid political, moral, and hierarchical foundation for the state to control society in general and the military in particular. The state became the master of society and soldiers. But the separation, the decentralization, and the redistribution of power among sovereigns, ministers, and nobles inevitably weakened the centralized state. As a consequence, autonomous warring states led by sovereigns gradually replaced the central government. The Son of Heaven became merely a symbolic character of the state.¹³ The constant struggle for power among sovereigns in turn substantially reduced the number of warring states to an ever smaller

¹¹ John K. Fairbank, *China: A New History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992) 39-40 and Herrlee G. Creel, *The Origins of Statecraft in China: the Western Chou Empire* (Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 1970) 47-51.

¹² Confucius, *The Analects* p. 114.

¹³ Chinese scholars commonly divided the Zhou dynasty into two periods: the Western Zhou and the Eastern Zhou. The former extended from the time of the Zhou conquest in 1122 B.C. to 771 B.C.. The latter included two periods: the Spring-Autumn (770 B.C.-464 B.C.) and the Warring States (463 B.C.-221 B.C.). In the classification of the transitional period from the Spring-Autumn to the Warring States, there were three primary schools: (1) Guo Morou claimed that it was the period from slavery to feudalism; (2) Fan Youlan asserted that it was the period from feudalism to the landlord system; and (3) other scholars saw it as the period from underdeveloped slavery to developed one.

circle of rationally administrated, unified states. In 221 BC., after the nominal dynasty and the warring states were displaced, the Emperor of Qin, the first emperor, succeeded in incorporating all China into the "Middle Kingdom."¹⁴ During the process of separating and reunifying China, sovereigns strove to preserve and enrich their states and to enhance their power and influence by establishing local governments: counties (xian) and prefectures (jun). Administrative and military power in counties and prefectures was directly controlled by sovereigns, who named the heads implementing laws, regulations, and registration of the population in order to maintain social order.¹⁵ Ironically, in spite of sovereigns' struggle for power, this new power structure did not produce political independence of the military, but created a fundamental principle of "wen over wu" (civilian over military). Civilian control rested on the assumption that the military was only one means of the state seeking or defending its interests. Other means involved the formation, recognition, and extinction of states; the sending of official envoys, missions, and hostages; acquisition and loss of territories; extradition of criminals; resolution of conflicts; cooperation against famine; and the formation of leagues of states with occasional meetings and agreements.¹⁶ The subordination of the military to the state minimized the possibility of military political independence.

Sun Zi's civilian control emphasized rationality, that the state rationally utilized the military to achieve limited political objectives, while the military was subordinated to political leadership. Cooperation between them facilitated the attainment of limited

¹⁴ Max Weber, *The Religion of China* (New York: the Free Press, 1951) 42-43 and Yang Kuan Zhanguo shi (A History of the Warring States) (Beijing: Renmin chunbanshe, 1979) 75-79.

¹⁵ Gao Yu, ed. *Zhangguo ce* (The Stratagem of the Warring States) (Shanghai: Shanghai shudian, 1987) 51-53 and Zhou Gucheng, *Zhongguo tongshi* (A History of China) vol. I (Shanghai: Remin chubanshe, 1980) 184-185.

¹⁶ John K. Fairbank, "Varities of the Chinese Military Experience" pp. 4-5.

objectives while minimizing costs on both belligerent states. "Generally in war, the best policy is to take a state intact; to ruin it is inferior to this" (III 1). This objective called for calculating strategic environments and national interests in hopes of winning without fighting. "If war was not in the interest of the state, do not act. If you can not succeed, do not use troops. If you are not in danger, do not fight" (XII 17). Since force was the last option to settle conflict, Sun Zi asked sovereigns to think thrice before they took military action. "A sovereign cannot raise an army because he is enraged, nor can a general fight because he is resentful. For while an angered man may again be happy, and a resentful man again be pleased, a state that has perished cannot be restored, nor can the dead be brought back to life. Therefore, the enlightened ruler is prudent and the good general is warned against rash action. Thus the state is kept secure and the army preserved" (XII 18-19). The criteria for conducting rational analyses were classified as "measurement of space, estimation of quantities, calculations, comparisons, and chances of victory," in order to maintain the external harmony between one's available resources and one's expected targets and between warring states who followed the explicit or tacit rules concentrating on limited targets. "Measurements of space are derived from the ground. Quantities derive from measurement, figures from quantities, comparisons from figures, and victory from comparison" (IV 16-18). Sun Zi attempted to adopt a comparative approach to calculating relative strength of the enemy and oneself. The farmland, large or small, might produce different quantities of products; the calculations of these products explained the extent to which these resources could sustain operations and battles; their comparison provided concrete figures delineating real differences between the enemy and oneself; and the differences indicated the possibilities for victory.

Such rational analysis was designed to show the diversity of interdependent choice situations and to deduce efficient strategies or plans of action, which might lead to

victory.¹⁷ The focus of such analysis required that sovereigns and generals "must consider both favorable and unfavorable factors. By taking into account the favorable factors, they make their plans feasible; by taking into account the unfavorable, they may resolve the difficulties" (VIII 12-13). The calculation involved moral influence, weather, terrain, command, and doctrine. For Sun Zi, moral influence referred to the factors, which caused the people to be in harmony with their leaders so that they would accompany them in life and unto death without fear of mortal peril. Weather meant the interaction of natural forces such as winter's cold and summer's heat that required sovereigns and generals to conduct operations in accordance with the seasons. Terrain indicated the chances of life or death, since distances, whether the ground was traversed with ease or difficulty or whether it was open or constricted made direct impacts on combat. Command stressed the general's qualities of wisdom, sincerity, humanity, courage, and strictness. Doctrine was related to organization, control, assignment of appropriate ranks to officers, regulation of supply routes, and the provision of principal items used by the army. Furthermore, sovereigns and generals should conduct a comparative study of seven elements.¹⁸ "If you say which ruler possesses moral influence, which commander is the more able, which army obtains the advantages of nature and the terrain, in which regulations and instructions are better carried out, which troops are the stronger; which has the better trained officers and men; and which administers rewards and punishments in a more enlightened manner" (I 11-13). The combination of five factors and seven elements was to ensure the internal harmony among the state, the military, and the people and to reflect the extent to which the enemy responded to one's preparation and to the

¹⁷ Emerson M.S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook, "A Game-Theoretic Interpretation of Sun Tzu's The Art of War" p. 166.

¹⁸ Liu Chuenzhi, "Sun Zi zhanlue juece sixiang qianxi (The Brief Analysis of Sun Zi's Strategic Decision-Making)" in Yu Rubo, eds. Sun Zi xinlun jicui pp. 285-288.

potential war. Based on such analysis, the state would identify both its own and the enemy's strategic advantages and disadvantages. These interdependent and interrelated factors and elements became one criterion for both strategy-making and strategy-conducting.

For Sun Zi, a balanced strategy of limited war also needed to understand the enemy's strategy, terrain, and people. "If ignorant of the plans of neighboring states he cannot prepare alliances in good time; if ignorant of the conditions of mountains, forests, dangerous defiles, swamps, and marshes he cannot conduct the march of an army; if he fails to make use of native guides he cannot gain the advantages of the ground. A general ignorant of even one of these three matters is unfit to command the armies of a Hegemonic King" (XI 51). To take account of these issues helped adapt strategy to combat environments so that "when a Hegemonic King attacks a powerful state he makes it impossible for the enemy to concentrate. He overawes the enemy and prevents his alliances from joining him. It follows that he does not contend against powerful combinations nor does he foster the power of other states. He relies for the attainment of his aims on his ability to overawe his opponents. And so he can take the enemy's cities and overthrow the enemy's state" (XI 52-53). Obviously, for Sun Zi, surprise attack and deterrence would increase the possibility of achieving limited objectives. "He who intimidates his neighbors does so by inflicting injury upon them. He wearies them by keeping them constantly occupied, and makes them rush about by offering them ostensible advantages" (VIII 14-15). The very essence of knowing the enemy was to create as much flexibility of action as possible, since the unpredictability of events in war made the state prudent that was best able to modify its strategy in response to new information. Flexibility moreover required explicit or tacit cooperation among states to maintain war as limited as possible through taking advantage of strategic environments, surprise attack, deterrence, and deception. In other words, to keep options open was a criterion for strategy-making and strategy-conducting. Such rational calculations were

usually made in the temple before one waged war. "If the estimates made in the temple before hostilities indicate victory it is because calculations show one's strength to be superior to that of his enemy; if they indicate defeat, it is because calculations show that one is inferior. With many calculations, one can win; with few one cannot. How much less chance of victory has one who makes none at all" (I 28). To closely examine, compare, and contrast political objectives and military capabilities of the enemy and oneself within the context of international politics was essential to strategy.

Nevertheless, civilian control was circumscribed by Sun Zi's insistence on military autonomy on the battlefield. The military in warring states was "the quasi professional army," in which mass soldiers were led by professional generals.¹⁹ Generals were selected through the examination of martial arts. They not only had strong moral qualities but also were experts on the management of troops and on violence. The moral qualities consisted of "wisdom, sincerity, humanity, courage, and strictness." Wisdom meant that generals must know the strategy of the state, the weather and ground of the battlefield, and troops. Sincerity involved the loyalty to their sovereign, state, and people in the sense that "they in advancing do not seek personal fame and in withdrawing are not concerned with avoiding punishment, but their only purpose is to protect the people and promote the best interests of their sovereign" (X 19). Humanity emphasized their love of soldiers. "Because such a general regards his men as infants they will march with him into the deepest valleys. He treats them as his own beloved sons and they will die with him" (X 20). Courage implied that generals "seek victory from the situation and do not demand it of their subordinates" (V 21). Strictness contained the idea of "command them with

¹⁹ Yang Kuan, *Zhanguo shi* p. 233; Chen Nenlin, *Xianqin junshi zhidu yanjiu* (A Study of the Military System before the Qin Dynasty) (Changchun: Jilin wenshi chubanshe, 1991) 163-222; and Gao Zuai, *Zhongguo junshi shilue* (Short History of the Chinese Military) vo. I (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1992) 146-151.

civility and imbue them uniformly with martial ardour" (IX 48). Meanwhile, they should also overcome or at least avoid their fatal weaknesses that might lie in irrationality. There were five qualities which were dangerous in the character of a general. "If reckless, he can be killed; If cowardly, captured; If quick-tempered you can make a fool of him; If he has too delicate a sense of honor you can calumniate him; If he is of a compassionate nature you can harass him. Now these five traits of character are serious faults in a general and in military operations are calamitous. The ruin of the army and the death of the general are inevitable results of these shortcomings. They must be deeply pondered" (VIII 17-24).

Along with these moral standards, the qualified generals must be expert on the management of their troops. "If a general indulges his troops but is unable to employ them; if he loves them but cannot enforce his command; if the troops are disorderly and he is unable to control them, they may be compared to spoiled children, and are useless" (X 21). The way to resolve this dilemma was to enforce military laws and regulations.²⁰ "If troops are punished before their loyalty is secured they will be disobedient. If not obedient, it is difficult to employ them. If troops are loyal, but punishments are not enforced, you cannot employ them. If orders which are consistently effective are used in instructing the troops, they will be obedient. If orders which are not consistently effective are used in instructing them, they will be disobedient. When orders are consistently trustworthy and observed, the relationship of a commander with his troops is satisfactory" (IX 47-50). The generals of this kind were "the minister of the people's fate and the arbiter of the nation's destiny" (II 21).

As expert on violence, professional generals called for autonomy in waging their own operations and battles, since "He whose generals are able and not interfered with by

²⁰ Chen Nenlin, *Xianqin junshi zhidou yanjiu* pp. 190-222 and Liu Xiang, *Zhengou ce* pp. 85-87.

the sovereign will be victorious (III 29)." In other words, sovereigns' interference with operations and administration might contribute to defeat. Sun Zi presented three scenarios, in which a sovereign could bring misfortune upon his army. "When ignorant that the army should not advance, to order an advance, or ignorant that it should not retire, to order a retirement. This is described as hobbling the army. When ignorant of military affairs, to participate in their administration. This causes the officers to be perplexed. When ignorant of command problems to share in the exercise of responsibilities. This engenders doubts in the minds of the officers" (III 19-22). Sun Zi further argued that there were occasions when the commands of the sovereign needed not be obeyed. A general thoroughly versed in the advantages of the nine variable factors knew how to employ troops. The general who did not understand the advantages of the nine variable factors would not be able to use the ground to his advantage even though familiar with it. In the direction of military operations one who did not understand the tactics suitable to the nine variable situations would be unable to use his troops effectively, even if he understood the five advantages. Within this context, generals, having received the mandate of command, were not required to obey the orders of the sovereign blindly, but they should act or adapt sovereign's orders to operations and battles.²¹ "If the situation is one of victory but the sovereign has issued orders not to engage, the general may decide to fight. If the situation is such that he cannot win, but the sovereign has issued orders to engage, he need not do so" (X 18). The skillful adaptation of the orders reflected Sun Zi's belief that "The doctrine of war is to follow the enemy situation in order to decide on battle" (XI 60).

Sun Zi's state codified civil-military relations in keeping war as limited as possible. The limits lay in rationally calculating the political, military, economic, and social

²¹ Wu Jiulong, eds. Sun Zi xiaoyi p. 135.

environments of the enemy and oneself to create the internal and external harmony among nature, the state, and the military by the way of a combination of sovereign's top down control and society's bottom up support and to facilitate explicit or tacit cooperation among belligerent states. In other words, civil-military relations through rational calculations were the fundamental criterion for the state to make the strategy of limited war in an effort to avoid escalation. Chinese tradition and culture fostered civilian control over the military to seek to settle conflict without bloodshed or with low cost, while recognizing military autonomy in operations and battles, since the general is the protector of the state. Civil-military relations was based on the assumption that "If this protection is all-embracing, the state will surely be strong; if defective, the state will certainly be weak" (III 18). Therefore, only by knowing when it was time to start and stop on the basis of rational calculations could military escalation be avoided and could the best result be achieved. The joint efforts made by nature, the state, and the military in minimizing violence would facilitate the attainment of limited political objectives.

The Military

Sun Zi's rational but pragmatic approach to maintaining war as limited as possible could be achieved by focusing balanced ties between operational art and psychological force constantly on limited military objectives. These well defined objectives required the military to conduct quick but limited mobile warfare in hopes of making the enemy powerless at acceptable cost. The employment of operational art and psychological force for such limited objectives was mainly dependent on the extent to which the military knew the enemy and itself "to subdue the enemy's army without battle," "to capture his cities without assaulting them," and "to overthrow his state without protracted operations." Winning without fighting or with low cost became an ideal objective persistent in all the operations and battles. To attain this objective, Sun Zi reminded generals, "Determine the enemy's plans and you will know which strategy will be

successful and which will not; Agitate him and ascertain the pattern of his movement. Determine his dispositions and so ascertain the field of battle. Probe him and learn where his strength is abundant and where deficient" (VI 20-23). Such suggestions mirrored his perception that "numbers alone confer no advantage." He repeatedly warned, "Do not advance relying on sheer military power. It is sufficient to estimate the enemy situation correctly and to concentrate your strength to capture him. There is no more to it than this. He who lacks foresight and underestimates his enemy will surely be captured by him" (IX 45-46). The rational calculation of the enemy's strength, the concentration of forces, and psychological support from soldiers resulted in victory on the battlefield.²² The key to wage mobile warfare was to identify the enemy's weaknesses to determine where he could strike.

Sun Zi strongly believed that carefully evaluating an enemy's readiness and capabilities helped discover his real purposes and weaknesses. He was intent on determining them as the necessary prerequisite for constructing and theorizing patterns for analyzing combat environments. Patient and cautious observation would provide the basis for generalization which in turn yielded explanation and understanding of how to conduct limited combat. In other words, observation would suggest certain regularities and uniformities that would lead to rational conclusions. Combat environments furnished such regularities and uniformities concerning enemy's operational, or tactical intentions, which would become the guide for conducting limited operations and battles.²³ Sun Zi prescribed combat environments in hopes of explaining an enemy's movements. When the trees were seen to move the enemy was advancing. When many obstacles had been

²² Ibid., pp. 163-164.

²³ Zhang Jiaju and Lou Huanjia, eds. *Junshi renshi lun* (Military Epistemology) (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1993) 201 and Sun Bolin, "Sun Zi de xitong he yunchou sixiang (Sun Zi's Theory of System and Operational Research)" in Yu Rubo, eds, *Sun Zi xinlun jicui* p. 252.

placed in the undergrowth, it was for the purpose of deception. Birds rising in flight was a sign that the enemy was lying in ambush; when the wild animals were startled and flee he was trying to take you unaware. Dust spurting upward in high straight columns indicated the approach of chariots. When it hung low and was widespread infantry was approaching. When dust rose in scattered areas the enemy was bringing in firewood; when there were numerous small patches which seemed to come and go he was encamping the army. These enemy's movements were theorized as his advance, or deception, or ambush, or approaching, or camping. The performance of the enemy's envoys might suggest their real purposes. When they utilized humble terms, but the enemy continued his preparations, he would advance. When their language was deceptive but the enemy pretentiously advanced, he would retreat. When they spoke in apologetic terms, he wished a respite. When without a previous understanding the enemy asked for a truce, he was plotting. The behavior of an enemy's soldiers might also demonstrate their logistical, psychological, and administrative problems. When his troops leaned on their weapons, they were famished. When drawers of water drunk before carrying it to camp, his troops were suffering from thirst. When the enemy saw an advantage but did not advance to seize it, he was fatigued. When birds gathered above his camp sites, they were empty. When at night the enemy's camp was clamorous, he was fearful. When his troops were disorderly, the general had no prestige. When his flags and banners moved about constantly he was in disarray. If the officers were short-tempered they were exhausted. When the enemy fed grain to the horses and his men meat and when his troops neither hung up their cooking pots nor returned to their shelters, the enemy was desperate. When the troops continually gathered in small groups and whispered together the general had lost the confidence of the army. Too frequent rewards indicated that the general was at the end of his resources; too frequent punishments that he was in acute distress. If the officers at first treated the men violently and later were fearful of them, the limit of indiscipline had been reached. Starvation, thirst, fatigue, fear, and disorder were the

measurements of an enemy's logistics, psychological status, and administration. A comprehensive analysis of empirical observations might explore the enemy's real purposes and weaknesses. Then, the military should concentrate its limited strength to strike selected enemy weaknesses.

For Sun Zi, deception was the way to reduce costs and to create initiatives in operations and battles. All warfare was based on deception. "Therefore, when capable, feign incapacity; when active inactivity. When near, make it appear that you are far away; when far away, that you are near. Offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike him. When he concentrates, prepare against him; where he is strong, avoid him. Anger his general and confuse him. Pretend inferiority and encourage his arrogance. Keep him under a strain and wear him down. When he is united, divide him. Attack where he is unprepared; sally out when he does not expect you" (I 17-26). This principle persisted in his strategy and war. Deception was based on his concept that war was a recurrent conscious act, in which sovereigns and generals consciously estimated costs and benefits, before adopting a course of action. Taking advantage of deception would contribute to destroying the enemy.²⁴ "Those skilled at making the enemy move do so by creating a situation to which he must conform; they entice him with something he is certain to take, and with lures of ostensible profit they await him in strength" (V 20). They lured the enemy to move according to their plans, while their dispositions were invisible and shapeless in reducing costs of war. According to Sun Zi, "Only the enlightened sovereign and the worthy general who are able to use the most intelligent people as agents are certain to achieve great things. Secret operations are essential in war; upon them the army relies to make its every move" (XIII 23). His emphasis on secret agents was an attempt to gain strategic, or operational, or tactical advantages that would

²⁴ Wu Jiulong, Sun Zi xiaoyi p. 12.

help the sovereign and general make decisions. Ignorance of deception and secret agents might, in turn, increase the costs of war and damage the interests of the state. "One who confronts his enemy for many years in order to struggle for victory in a decisive battle yet who, because he begrudges rank, honors and a few hundred pieces of gold, remains ignorant of his enemy's situation, is completely devoid of humanity. Such a man is no general; no support to his sovereign; no master of victory" (XIII 2). Deception along with employing secret agents became a means to minimize or neutralize the costs of military action.

The combination of objective observation and subjective deception would produce a series of flexible operational art devoted to taking advantage of one's strengths in attacking the enemy's weaknesses. Sun Zi said, "A victorious army is as a hundredweight balanced against a grain; a defeated army as a grain balanced against a hundredweight. It is because of disposition that a victorious general is able to make his people fight with the effect of pent-up waters which, suddenly released, plunge into a bottomless abyss" (IV 19-20). Central to his operational art was to invent chances to strike the enemy according to combat environments. "The art of using troops is this: When ten to the enemy's one, surround him; When five times his strength, attack him; If double his strength, divide him; If equally matched you may engage him. If weaker numerically, be capable of withdrawing; If in all respects unequal, be capable of eluding him, for a small force is but booty for one more powerful" (III 12-17). Sun Zi was obviously intent on analyzing, through empirical observations and deception, a variety of interdependent combat environments, and deducing efficient operational art to create and identify an enemy's weaknesses, to attack these limited targets, and to restrain violence. Such rational analysis presented a model of formulating strategy and operational art, i.e., "if the enemy

does...then I will respond with..."²⁵ Fundamental to this action and reaction approach was the flexibility that remained a cornerstone in his strategy and operational art.

In contrast, psychological force made the impact on soldiers that contributed either to victory or to defeat. Sun Zi divided psychological force into two different categories: societal and soldier. The former referred to the morale of the masses in war. To maintain high morale in society, the military must escape from protracted war that would substantially erode the psychological support of the masses for war. This theme was repeated throughout The Art of War. The latter was soldiers' morale emerging from daily administration and the battlefield. Daily administration was an important way to cultivate soldiers' strong morale. "Now when troops flee, are insubordinate, distressed, collapse in disorder or are routed, it is the fault of the general" (X 9). These problems reflected extremely poor management of the troops by generals, but a sound one could create the harmony between generals and soldiers that led to strong morale on the battlefield. Skilled commanders undermined the enemy's spirit, while increasing the spirit of their own soldiers.²⁶ "An army may be robbed of its spirit and its commander deprived of his courage. During the early morning spirits are keen, during the day they flag, and in the evening thoughts turn toward home. And therefore, those skilled in war avoid the enemy when his spirit is keen and attack him when it is sluggish and his soldiers homesick. This is control of the moral factor. In good order they await a disorderly enemy; in serenity, a clamorous one" (VII 20-23). On the battlefield, Sun Zi warned to avoid fighting with the desperate enemy. "To a surrounded enemy you must leave a way of escape. . .Do not

²⁵ Emerson M.S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook, "A Game-Theoretic Interpretation of Sun Tzu's the Art of War" p. 166.

²⁶ Sun Jizhang, *Zhanyi xue jichu* (Introduction to Operational Art) (Beijing: Guofangdaxue chubanshe, 1990) 225-230 and Wen Jingian and Du Rubo, "Sun Zi bingfa de xinlizhan lilun jiqi zhidao yiyi (Sun Zi's Theory of Psychological Warfare and Its Significance)" in Yu Rubo, eds. *Sun Zi xinlun jicui* pp. 349-350.

press an enemy at bay" (VII 31-32). Poor combat environments might increase either the enemy's morale or the morale of one's own troops. "Throw the troops into a position from which there is no escape and even faced with death they will not flee. For if prepared to die, what can they not achieve? Then officers and men together put forth their utmost efforts. In a desperate situation they fear nothing; when there is no way out they stand firm. Deep in a hostile land they bound together, and there, where there is no alternative, they will engage the enemy in hand to hand combat" (XI 33). Morale became decisive in dangerous environments. When the army was in the enemy's territory to wage war, Sun Zi argued that the tears of seated soldiers soaked their lapels and the tears of reclining soldiers coursed down their cheeks. In overcoming such poor morale, the good general burned "his boats and smashes his cooking pots; he urges the army on as if driving a flock of sheep, now in one direction, now in another, and none knows where he is going" (XI 49). Psychological force for Sun Zi was an important factor to make war limited, but it had both positive and negative impacts on soldiers. Skilled generals should take advantage of positive ones while transforming or at least avoiding negative ones.

The central theme of Sun Zi's operations and battles was to conduct limited mobile warfare for striking selected enemy's weaknesses in an effort to make the targeted enemy powerless at acceptable cost by combining flexible operational art with psychological support. Through empirical observations and subjective deception, he discovered that to attack selected enemy's weaknesses within limited space and time would substantially minimize costs of military operations and battles, while it would create initiatives and priorities on the battlefield so that generals sought "victory from the situation." On the other hand, psychological force influenced and reshaped a soldier's behavior that might lead to decreasing or increasing combat effectiveness on the battlefield. Morale might be increased by enforcing military law and by cutting off all means to retreat, but tolerance to disorder among soldiers surely decreased morale. The interplay between flexible

operational art and strong psychological force would produce chances for generals to achieve limited objectives with low cost.

The State and the Military

Sun Zi discovered two approaches to maintaining war limited. At the level of strategy, states, by maintaining the balance between civilian control and military autonomy, manipulated the strategy of limited war focusing on limited objectives. The search for peaceful means for conflict resolution, based on the traditional Chinese philosophical idea that weapons were tools of ill omen, further restrained the employ of force in war.²⁷ This approach to minimizing violence shaped his strategy and war. At the level of operations and battles, autonomous generals, by the way of empirical observations, subjective deception, and flexibility, identified enemy's fatal weaknesses, created initiatives and priorities, and struck selected targets, while managing the moral strength and intellectual faculty of soldiers to sustain them in winning short and quick combat. The balance between strategy and operations and battles could be achieved by skillful coordination and adjustment between civilian control and military autonomy and between operational art and psychological force.

Such an approach to strategy rested methodologically on the Chinese concept of yin-yang. Accordingly, any two distinctive co-existing forces, processes, or entities always had mutual complementarity between them; each was dependent on the other for strength, actuality, values, and productiveness; and they constituted a harmonious but organic unity. The key to the harmony was the concept of benevolence in human relations (ren). Human factors in social exchange had always laid stress on what man was (i.e., his

²⁷ Chen Changrong, "Zhongguo moushi lun (On China's Strategists)" Souzhou daxie xiebao nos. 2 and 3, 1989: 68 and 74; Confucius, *The Analects* p. 113; and Lao Tzu, *Tao Te Ching* (London: Penguin Classics, 1963) 89.

moral qualities), rather than what he had (i.e., his intellectual and material capacities).²⁸ Ren embraced all moral qualities which must govern one man in his relations with another. "Ren is the denial of self: respond to the right and proper, and every one will accord you ren." This notion implied putting oneself into the position of the other person in order to receive equal treatment--that is to say, "desiring to maintain oneself, one sustains others; desiring to develop oneself, one develops others."²⁹ If one cut short one's own desires, however, one could not comprehend the desires of others, and one might fail to reach one's own desires. In other words, if one did not understand this general law of human relations and merely depended on one's own caprice for conduct, harmful results must be the consequence. Good was rewarded with good, and evil with evil.

People in society must moreover practice kindness to others in order to produce the equal relations, since everything in human society was closely connected with human relations, relations which formed the basic structure of human activities. Human relations emphasized that all human activities were interconnected, interdependent, and interrelated; and could be transformed. As the most important element in war, human relations might be changed: enemies could become friends and vice versa, since armed conflict was caused by the unharmious relationship between people. Skillfully handling the human relations might lead to winning without fighting. As a consequence, "The whole world recognizes the beautiful as the beautiful, yet this is only the ugly. The whole world recognizes the good as the good, yet this is only the bad. Thus Something and Nothing produces each other; the difficult and the easy complement each other; the long and the short off-set each other; the high and the low incline each other; note and sound

²⁸ Feng Yulan, *History of Chinese Philosophy* vol. I p. 2 and "Duiyu Kong Zi suojiang de rende jinyibu lijie he tihui (My Further Understanding of Confucius' Benevolence)" *Kong Zi yanjiu* no. 3, 1989: 154.

²⁹ Confucius, *The Analects* p. 85 and p. 144.

harmonize each other; and before and after follow each other."³⁰ The harmony was to return to the root. All things in the world were mutually dependent and conditioned. Human beings should follow the nature of the world. The harmony was essential to success, political and military.

Chinese culture provided the array of formal or informal rules guiding the Chinese in the selection of their appropriate behavior and framework for action. The strategic success depended on the balance between the state and the military, between operational art and psychological force, and between internal resources and external objectives. The mechanisms that governed strategy derived from domestic politics. The factors such as politics and war, economy and war, and generals and soldiers were interdependent so that all these factors had their own yet also inter-related place in war. They could proceed toward a harmony through adjustment and coordination. Mismanagement of these relations would lead to defeat. Sun Zi's emphasis on the rational analysis was aimed at reducing the violence, the same aspiration as was embedded in the Confucian and Lao Zian philosophical beliefs of war. Zi Lu, favorite student of Confucius, asked his Master, "If you were leading the Three Armies whom would you take with you?" The Master replied, "I would not take with me any one who try to fight a tiger with his bare hands or to walk across the river and die in the process without regret. If I took anyone it would have to be a man who, when faced with a task, was fearful of failure and who, while fond of making plans, was capable of successful execution."³¹ The ideal general was one who could overcome his enemy by strategy, rather than by force. In the same way, Lao Zi argued, "It is because arms are instruments of ill omen and there are things that detest them that one who has the way does not abide by their use. One who assists the ruler of

³⁰ Lao Zi, Tao Te Ching p. 58.

³¹ Confucius, The Analects p 87.

men by means of the way does not intimidate the empire by a show of arms."³² Obviously, Chinese philosophers were interested in the way to win war without the use of force. In order to keep war limited, the state should, suggested Sun Zi, seek other means than violence to conquer the enemy, and generals who could skillfully adapt strategy to combat environments in waging their own quick but limited operations and battles.

Even though Sun Zi strongly believed that war was manageable through coordination and adjustment of the relationships between civilian control and military autonomy and between operational art and psychological force, there was no universal theory of war. "As water shapes its flow in accordance with the ground, so an army manages its victory in accordance with the situation of the enemy. An army may be likened to water, for just as flowing water avoids the heights and hastens to the lowlands, so an army avoids strength and strikes weakness. As water has no constant form, there are in war no constant conditions" (VI 27-29). This uncertainty of war required flexible operational art to deal with the enemy. "In battle there are only the normal and extraordinary forces, but their combinations are limitless; none can comprehend them all. For these two forces are mutually reproductive; their interaction as endless as that of interlocked rings. Who can determine where one ends and the other begins" (V 11-12). The distinction between normal (zheng) and extraordinary (qi) was a center piece in Sun Zi's operational art. In Chinese, the term qi means uncommon, unusual, and atypical, whereas the term zheng is common, usual, and typical. Operational art required qi to attack an enemy's weaknesses surprisingly from his flanks and his rears and zheng to confuse the enemy at his front. Yet no operational art was always zheng or always qi. Zheng could be qi and vice versa.³³ The interaction between them produced a variety of

³² Lao Zi, Tao Te Ching pp. 88-89.

³³ Guo Huanuo, Sun Zi zhuyi pp. 121-124 and Wu Jiulong, Sun Zi xiaoyi pp. 69-74.

operational art that kept the enemy guessing. Therefore, "in battle, use the normal force (zheng) to engage; use the extraordinary (qi) to win" (V 5). Generals, who struck the enemy as swiftly as a falcon, struck its target by creating favorable conditions. Normal and extraordinary forces could create these favorable conditions on the battlefield. "Now the resources of those skilled in the use of extraordinary forces are as infinite as the heavens and earth; as inexhaustible as the flow of the great rivers. For they end and recommence; cyclical, as are the movements of the sun and moon. They die away and are reborn; recurrent, as are the passing seasons. The musical notes are only five in number but their melodies are so numerous that one cannot hear them all. The primary colors are only five in number but their combinations are so infinite that one cannot visualize them all. The flavors are only five in number but their blends are so various that one cannot taste them all" (V 6-10). Such flexible operational art was designed to match the uncertainty of war, to partly solve the dilemma that "It is not possible to discuss the strategist's keys to victory beforehand" (I 27). Military autonomy might partly settle the gap between theory and practice, since "He whose generals are able and not interfered with by the sovereign will be victorious" (III 29). In other words, without political intervention, generals could skillfully adapt strategy and operational art to combat environments. "It is according to the shapes that I lay the plans for victory, but the multitude does not comprehend this. Although every one can see the outward aspects, none understands the way in which I have created victory. Therefore, when I have won a victory I do not repeat my tactics but respond to circumstances in an infinite variety of ways" (VI 24-26).

Sun Zi's strategy of limited war with special emphasis on control over the limits was important, but insufficient to understand contemporary strategies of regional limited war. First, the dominant theme of Sun Zi's strategy was that the state with rich resources rationally calculated strategic environments of both the enemy and oneself in order to formulate explicit or tacit rules for both restraining violence and guiding limited

operations and battles. But his strategy was heavily dependent on domestic politics and missed key points of how to bargain and communicate with the enemy in ensuring such rules. The whole process of knowing the enemy became mystical and incomplete. Moreover, Sun Zi failed to clarify the basic concepts of domestic politics such as the state and the military, though his strategy centered on conquering the enemy's state, while defending his own state by balancing the delicate relationship between civilian control and military autonomy. Despite the authoritarian nature of the Son of Heaven's state, the rise and fall of the Zhou dynasty ironically concentrated on the centralization and decentralization of his political power. In the ascendant phase, the Son of Heaven had successfully established a centralized state that effectively dominated society, whereas, in the fall from grace, sovereigns forced him to redistribute political power among them. Then, after their power was consolidated, they waged the new round of struggle for a centralized state.³⁴ Regarding this issue, Sun Zi seemed to have no idea of which kind of state, centralized or decentralized was his ideal. He happened to use the term state to describe the relationship between civilian control and military autonomy, since his main concern was to defend his sovereign against foreign aggression. Under the strong influence of Chinese tradition and culture, Sun Zi was apparently interested in the traditional authoritarian state with emphasis on loyalty, benevolence, and sincerity. In this state, sovereigns and soldiers disesteemed heroism and violence, only reluctantly glorified them, and preferred nonviolent means in conquering the enemy. Thus, the military was regarded as only one of several means to subdue the enemy and not an end.

Second, Sun Zi overestimated his ideal of winning without fighting or with low cost by conducting offensive operations and battles, while downplaying the interaction between offense and defense. His strategy rested on the concept of the harmony and on

³⁴ Zhou Gucheng, *Zhongguo tongshi* vol I, pp. 144-169 and Herrilee G. Creel, *The Origins of Statecraft in China* pp. 47-51.

the cases which were consistent with this concept. During the period of the Warring States, one could not conquer the enemy's state by conducting limited operations, since most, if not all, wars in that period were total wars in which states mobilized all their resources in order to overthrow the enemy's state and to establish a new centralized empire by employing absolute violence. Other means than force such as negotiations and deterrence might reduce or curb violence on the battlefield, but only if small and weak states knew that further resistance would invite greater disasters for the lives and properties of their citizens. Clearly, without the use of force, the political objectives could not be achieved. Force rather than winning without fighting was the Chinese way of war.

Third, Sun Zi deliberately neglected military technology as a potential variable of strategy. In his time, the introduction of bronze metallurgy indeed revolutionized warfare. Weapons such as swords and spears, once molded into shape, lasted indefinitely, and even if they were blunted or dented in battles they could easily be restored to usefulness with a little sharpening or hammering. This change in weapons was closely associated with the arrival of war chariots. The improvement that made chariots supreme instruments of war was the invention of the wheel with a friction-reducing hub-and-axle design. Craftsmen manufactured hubbed wheels from wood covered with bronze and iron and made them accurately circular and dynamically balanced so that rapid motion while carrying several hundredweight would not rack them to pieces.³⁵ The supply of metal, weaponry, and war-chariots, though important, was in Sun Zi's eyes seldom a critical variable, and the industrial aspect of warfare remained insignificant, because war was normally fought with similar weapons made of bronze and war-chariots. Moreover, the great majority of the population in society worked in the field, toiling to produce food for their own support and surplus was small. In offensive limited war, the economic

³⁵ Joseph Needham, *Science and Civilization in China* vol. 5, part 7, section 29 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

dimension, precisely food, was naturally an important factor. "The wise general," suggested Sun Zi, "sees to it that his troops feed on the enemy, for one bushel of the enemy's provisions is equivalent to twenty of his; one hundredweight of enemy fodder to twenty hundredweight of his. . .Plunder fertile country to supply the army with plentiful provisions" (II 15 & XI 31)." The economic dimension, especially food, was more important technology, which was supposed to be a variable of limited war.

Clausewitz on Strategy of Limited War

Clausewitz in On War provided logical, philosophical, and pragmatic reasoning for a strategy of limited war through exploring the essential content of conducting war, but such a strategy was almost at random, scattered throughout his "eight books," fully bearing out his gloomy prophecy that readers could find in his work only a collection of theoretical and empirical materials from which strategy was to have been distilled. This dilemma emerged largely from the unfinished or at least imperfectly revised nature of On War because of his sudden death. As a consequence, although Clausewitz wrote for professional soldiers, they saw it as too theoretical and abstract to offer any significant principle and method for waging war, whereas philosophers or social scientists viewed it as too empirical and narrowly military-oriented to produce any valid political theory, or even to conceptualize and theorize war without emphasis on causes, origins, and the aftermath of war.³⁶ In spite of these weaknesses, Clausewitz held that strategy was a rational and balanced act of the state, since the state sought "the use of engagements for the object of the war" (p. 128).³⁷ Rational calculations seemed to show the difference

³⁶ Michael Howard, Clausewitz p. 2 and p. 40; W.B. Gallie, *Philosophers of Peace and War* p. 61; and Michael I. Handel, *Clausewitz and Modern Strategy* pp. 1-2.

³⁷ The quotations of Carl von Clausewitz' *On War* throughout this thesis are taken from Micheal Howard's and Peter Paret's translation of 1984. The notion following each quote refers to the page number of his book. See Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

between national and military strategies. The former involved strategic environments of the state, purposes of war, and the use of armed forces to reach political objectives, whereas the latter included the "moral, physical, mathematical, geographical, and statistical elements" of the armed forces.³⁸ For him, strategy consisted of various parts such as the state, the military, physical and psychological force, theory, and practice, which contributed to the whole of strategy, but each strategy had its own characteristics and priorities.

Clausewitz divided strategy into those of total war and limited war. The strategy of total war, offensive or defensive, was aimed at overthrowing the enemy through total violence, i.e., expanding space and time of war to physically and psychologically exhaust the enemy and then to thoroughly destroy him on the battlefield; and the strategy of limited war, offensive or defensive, was designed either "to occupy some of the enemy's territories so that we can either annex them or use them for bargaining at the peace negotiations" (p. 69) or "to wait for either additional allies who came to the defender's help or allies who began to desert the enemy" (p. 613). These totally different characteristics and priorities of strategies led him to further exploring the strategy of limited war, which sought either "to seize a small or larger piece of enemy territory," or "to explore the advantage of the moment which is advisable whenever the future affords better prospects to the enemy than it does to us," or "to promise nothing definite to either side and hence to afford no ground for a decision" (p. 601). Accordingly, this strategy might be taken by the side possessing the political initiatives--that is, active purposes for

³⁸ According to Clausewitz, military strategy refers to the moral, physical, mathematical, geographical, and statistical elements of the armed forces. The moral covers everything that is created by intellectual and psychological qualities and influences. The physical consists of the size of the armed forces, their composition, armament, and so forth. The mathematical includes the angle of lines of operations, the convergent and divergent movements wherever geometry enters into their calculations. The geographical comprises the influence of terrain, such as commanding positions, mountains, rivers, woods, and roads. The statistical contains logistical support and maintenance. See, p. 183.

which it went to war. If it lost such initiatives, the initiator would suffer the loss of war. The political initiatives were the real source of limited war. Political control over limits becomes fundamental to all operations and battles.

Limited war required the limits focusing on a province, or a strip of territory, or a fortress. In explaining such war, Clausewitz developed a modified approach of thesis and antithesis to showing the relationship between limited ends and limited means. This new approach illustrated how one element of strategy was related to another, how to keep the important and unimportant separated, and how the component parts contributed to the whole. In other words, war and politics, physical and psychological force, and theory and practice were never absolute opposites; rather one flowed into the other.³⁹ These interdependent and interrelated elements reflected a concept of science as the ordering of observable facts by means of certain logical assumptions--Kant's principles of understanding.⁴⁰ For him, strategy and war could be developed by accounting for the past and the present. "Its scientific character consists in an attempt to investigate the essence of the phenomena of war and to indicate the links between these phenomena and the nature of their component parts. No logical conclusion has been avoided; but whenever the thread became too thin I have preferred to break it off and go back to the relevant phenomena of experience. Just as some plants bear fruit only if they don't shoot up too high, so in the practical arts the leaves and flowers of theory must be pruned and the plant kept close to its proper soil--experience" (p. 61). This empirical approach to theory-building was intended to show that the polarities of the state and the military, physical and psychological force, and theory and practice never excluded each other; on the contrary, they support each other and helped not only understand each member of the

³⁹ Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State 149-152 and "The Genesis of On War" in Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* 15-16.

⁴⁰ Michael Howard, Clausewitz 13-14 and Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State 149.

pair, but also trace the dynamic links connecting all the elements of war into the permanent interaction among them.

The State

Clausewitz' Prussian state was an absolute monarchical state constantly under the shadow of the French revolution and war.⁴¹ This state was made by the Prussian army and the subsequent political development of Prussia was, to a far greater extent than any other state, dependent on the army, on the relationship of the army to the sovereign power, and on the will of army's leaders. By challenging the Prussian tradition of the military domination over the state, Clausewitz claimed that the state must control the military, since politics was the real nature of war. For him, the political domination over the military was the core of the strategy of limited war.

The state, though it treated the Prussians as humanly as possible, was incapable of facing a real crisis, because of the absence of trust between the state and society.⁴² Under the influence of the Great Elector's belief that "military power alone could make a ruler considerable," strengthening and modernizing the army became the top priority of the King. Maintaining an army capable of winning international recognition was based on subordinating the total energies of the state to the military establishment. Thus, governmental institutions, economic activities, and social organizations were largely

⁴¹ The Prussian state was strongly influenced by China's civil service examination tradition. The Great Elector, Frederick William (1620-1688), was extremely interested in China and planning to establish formal ties with this Far East empire. He purchased many books in Chinese and patronized scholars who studied Chinese and published articles and books on China. Although his successor, Frederick III, showed no great interest in China, several of his advisors such as Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Samuel Pufendorf, were fascinated by China, especially the Chinese civil service examinations. In 1693, the first written civil service examinations ever given in Europe were administered in Berlin for legal officials. See Herrlee G. Creel, *The Origins of Statecraft in China* pp. 24-26.

⁴² Herbert Rosinski, *The German Army* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publisher, 1966) 46.

determined by the needs of the army. Created to serve the army and administer to its needs, the civil service was governed in accordance with the military principles of rank and discipline. During Frederick William I's period, ministers of the state, like generals and colonels, obeyed unquestioningly and carried out orders with military precision and punctuality. Every minister was compelled in his own interest to maintain in his own department the same rigid spirit of order, punctuality and speed which the King enforced on his own ministers. Never before had it been impressed upon the officials so urgently and so unceasingly that they were personally responsible, and never before had personal responsibility been so sternly enforced.⁴³ The fatal weakness of this state was that it was heavily dependent on the army without exploring the underdeveloped energies of society. The gap between the state and society prevented the people from identifying themselves with their government and deprived the state of popular support during crisis. The King, moreover, monopolized all aspects of state business and dismissed officials who had their own ideas. The authoritarian approach to governing deepened the existing gulf between himself and ministers. Concerning this issue, Clausewitz was confused about his political ideal and responsibility as the King's subordinate. On the one hand, his loyalty to the King and his state remained unshakable. Even though he was one of the most prominent reformers, his reform was aimed at transforming the political structure of the state into a constitutional kingdom capable of developing in the same direction as the liberal states in Europe, rather than at abandoning the King. On the other hand, the King doubted him. When Napoleon forced Prussia to make its territory available to him as a staging area for his invasion of Russia and to contribute twenty thousand soldiers to his army in 1811, Clausewitz was among the most outspoken opponents of what he called a surrender that was both morally humiliating and politically unwise and, with some thirty other officers,

⁴³ Gordon A. Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955) 1-20.

resigned his commission a step that confirmed his reputation as a man who put his own values above the policies of the King.⁴⁴ Despite his confusion, awakening the spirit of a nation and restoring the Prussian state must, he believed, remain the top priority of the state.

In the era of the reform, Clausewitz expressed his great interest in the liberal state which might narrow the gap between the state and society. Before 1806, he had committed himself to the political ideal of a strong, self-reliant, and honorable state placing heavy demands on the people. Since such a state served cultural and national ends, it would eventually enable both the state and society to reach their innate potentials. Prussia's defeat by Napoleon's army made him reformulate his concept of the state, which was designed to seek absolute power and authority from the top down. "The state now appeared as a supreme individual--the mass of its citizens becoming effective through the leadership of the few--existing free and feared in a community of states."⁴⁵ In spite of the political and military weaknesses inherent in the Prussian state, Frederick William III believed that he could defend the Prussian interests by governing the state

⁴⁴ Charles Edward White, *The Enlightened Soldier: Scharnhorst and the Militarisch Gesellschaft in Berlin, 1801-1805* (New York: Praeger, 1989) 127-141 and Peter Paret, *Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986) 195.

⁴⁵ Clausewitz's views on the state and reform often led to the confusion among people. Prussian conservatives saw him as a radical revolutionary aiming at bring the revolution to Prussia, whereas reformers viewed him as a loyal soldier attempting to make Prussia as powerful as other European powers by proposing political, military, and social reforms. Contemporary scholars, such as Peter Paret hold that the perceptions of Clausewitz' liberalism was significant evidence about his position, whereas C.B.A. Behrens challenged Paret by discounting those perceptions as parochial and backward-looking. She evaluated Clausewitz's ideas in light of a broader tradition of European liberalism to which they did not measure up. His inconsistent support of parliamentary government, ambiguous and occasionally hostile attitude toward the constitutional movement of his time, the hardness of his response to Polish demands for self-determination in 1830, and his unqualified acceptance of state power suggested that he was on the side of those who crushed the revolution and steered Germany down the path of illiberalism. See C.B.A. Behrens, "Which Side Was Clausewitz On?" *New York Review of Books* October 14, 1976: 41-44; Carl von Clausewitz, *Historical and Political Writings* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) 227; and Peter Paret, *Clausewitz and the State* pp. 128-129.

"with strength and justice," if "he decided all matters, large and small, himself by means of cabinet orders in the manner of Frederick the Great." Although cabinet government became the strongest, most efficient, and vigorous form of administration, he had too little trust in his abilities and in the abilities of others that undermined the spirit of enterprise, opposed enthusiasms, and inhibited every kind of creativity. The ministers were not trusted, without power and real responsibility; they could not come forward with a significant idea or a comprehensive plan; they merely tried to keep things limping along in the accustomed way and held on to their offices. Obviously, cabinet government was not an ideal form of administration, since the councillors were not the recognized representatives and leaders of the bureaucracy, thus lacking "the necessary power, prestige, and confidence." But while it was in charge, Prussia's outdated cabinet regime, Clausewitz held, contributed its full share "to the state's decline into a morass of meaningless red tape and to the complete vitiation of her excellent king's nobler qualities."⁴⁶

Since 1792, the Prussian army no longer was what it had been under Frederick the Great. Its generals and commanding officers had not grown gray in arms, but old and soft in peace; military experience had mostly faded, Frederick's spirit no longer coursed through the whole; the old budget was retained unchanged despite rising prices in all areas; and the army's equipment declined into useless decrepitude. These problems arose partly because the military system no longer suited the changed times but, having been

⁴⁶ The term cabinet government refers to the government of King's private cabinet in contrast to that of "ministerial government." The purpose of cabinet government was to reduce conflicts among provincial and departmental ministries and to strengthen unified leadership. But Prussian cabinet councilors were personal secretaries and advisors to the King, rather than administrators or executive officers of the government. They served along side a mixed system of provincial and departmental ministers who were responsible for carrying out the King's wishes, which might or might not have been informed by the advice of his cabinet councillors. A collective executive comprising these various individuals did not exist. See Carl von Clausewitz, *Historical and Political Writings* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) 34-36.

moved off its foundation, was full of cracks and gaps and partly because the system itself was rusted and decayed.⁴⁷ The alternative appeared to have a representative government supported by the masses to restructure the army. This government would help rebuild the Prussian state. "Let the government gather around it representatives of the people, elected from those who share the true interests of government and are known to the people. Let this be the government's main support, friend and ally, as Parliament has been for a century the support of the king of England." Clausewitz further argued, "with this institution let the government mobilize the energies of a valiant people against its external enemies and rivals; with this institution let the government enchain reckless forces if they turn against their own community in frenzy and ferment." Finally, he concluded, "we see no other way and the goal can hardly be achieved more easily and cheaply; whoever promises to cure the problem with palliatives should be regarded as a charlatan who only makes the sickness worse."⁴⁸ Under this representative government, "to arm the people--that is to adopt the institution of the Landwehr," would raise "the defensive potential of the state to a point that cannot be equaled by regular forces." Strong political leadership would eventually contribute to an effective military in defending the national interests against foreign aggression. A state of this kind would, Clausewitz expected, be the model for the Prussian future. "The reader will agree with us when we say that once barriers--which in a sense consist only in man's ignorance of what is possible--are torn down, they are not so easily set up again" (p. 593). Harmony between the state and the people would strengthen the unity of the Prussian state during war. "War is a remarkable trinity--composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to

⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 37-41.

⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 331-333.

roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone" (pp. 78-89). The trinity in fact demonstrated that military power was inherent in the state. "No nation should be dependent for its existence on the goodwill of another power. If Prussia's future was for Napoleon to decide, she was lost in any event. A war against the tyrant, even if it almost certainly led to defeat, would at least save honor and create the moral strength that alone might inspire the rebirth of the state at some future date." Clausewitz insisted, "whatever our condition, it was essential that we decide to fight to gain our independence. . . It did not matter at all whether we have more or less means with which to save ourselves; the decision should arise from the need for salvation, not from the ease of gaining it."⁴⁹ Only in one way--through the sword, the powerful army--could the state regain its independence from French domination.

The Prussian military was above the political battle in which it was an arm of the crown, but not of the constitutional state. It was the strongest supporter of the absolute monarchical state and the most effective and inveterate opponent of political reform in Prussia. Moreover, retention of "the canton system" not only blocked military reform, but also made impossible any appreciable increase in the size of the military.⁵⁰ A large number of foreigners and native nobles recruited by the military excluded bourgeois officers, talent and experienced officers, from the military. Thus, Clausewitz argued that the state must dominate the military. The employment of foreign mercenaries should and must be abolished, the nobility should give up most of its legal rights to preference in the

⁴⁹ Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State 214.

⁵⁰ The Prussian recruiting procedure was mainly based on the decrees of 1732-1733 latterly called the canton system. The whole Prussian territory was divided into districts, the so-called cantons. Every regiment in the army was assigned a specific recruiting district; all young males in the district were enrolled on the regimental recruiting list; and when they could not be filled by voluntary enlistment, the quotas were made up from the eligibles on the rolls. See Gordon A. Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army* 9-10 and 40 and Herbert Rosinski, *The German Army* 24-25.

appointment of officers, and the promotion by strict seniority should be weakened by placing new emphasis on military education and performance.⁵¹ If the military was to be reorganized according to a new spirit, universal obligation for military service had to be introduced so that the burden was carried on all shoulders, a proud civic duty, which turned the cause of the state into the cause of every man. The new military would be the school of a new nation. The objective of military reform was to remake the Prussian state which would in turn establish political control over the military in restoring its great power position.

The war that Prussia faced however had a dual nature: absolute and real. On the one hand, "War is nothing but a duel on a larger scale. Each tries through physical force to compel the other to do his will." "War is an act of force. There is no logical limit to the application of that force. A reciprocal action is started which must lead, in theory, to extremes." "War is always the collision of two living forces. So long as I have not overthrown my opponent I am bound to fear he may overthrow me. Such interaction leads to the second extreme." "The total means at the disposal and the strength of the will must again force you both to the third extreme" (pp. 75-77). The interactive nature of war produced a system-driven psychological force and was characterized by positive feedback leading, in theory, to limitless extremes of mutual exertion, and efforts to get the better of one another. Such extreme led to absolute violence ending in the total destruction of one side by the other. On the other hand, "War is never an isolated act. Man and his affairs, however, are always something short of perfect and will never quite achieve the absolute best. Such shortcomings affect both sides alike and therefore constitute a moderating force." "War does not consist of a single short blow. If the decision in war involves several successive acts, then each of them will provide a gauge for those that follow. The

⁵¹ Gordon A. Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army* 20-24.

abstract world is ousted by the real one and the trend to the extreme is moderated." "The political object--the original motive for the war--will thus determine both military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires. The smaller the penalty you demand from your opponent, the less you can expect him to try and deny it to you; the smaller the effort he makes, the less you need make yourself. The more modest your own political aim, the less importance you attach to it and the less reluctantly you will abandon it if you must. This is another reason why your effort will be modified" (pp. 78-88). Obviously, war in the abstract, with limitless escalation of cost and effort, was contradicted by human experiences in war, total and limited, shaped by political environments, domestic, or international, or both, human imperfection, and friction. These factors would inevitably neutralize absolute violence as much as possible.⁵² As a result, the modifications of war would inevitably lead to an explicit or tacit agreement on the limits, i.e., the extent to which belligerent states waged the war. At the highest level, the art of war turned into policy, but a policy waged by fighting battles rather than by sending diplomatic notes.

The political nature of war demanded that the state rationally evaluate and assess strategic environments.⁵³ "No one starts a war--or rather, no one in his sense ought to do so--without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. The former is its political purpose; the latter its operational objective. This is the governing principle which will set its course, prescribe the scale of

⁵² Clausewitz was deeply frustrated by and failed to fully develop his own concepts of absolute war and real war. On the one hand, absolute war, or war, in theory was something absolute so that it was designed to seek a total destruction of the enemy for a total victory. On the other hand, real war, or war in practice, never reached such an absolute form as a result of political, human, and environmental constraints. In other words, war became limited. Regarding his confusion, see p. 69, pp. 75-80, pp. 92-94, pp. 104-106, pp. 119-121, pp. 579-581, pp. 605-610, and pp. 617-637.

⁵³ Martin van Creveld, "The Eternal Clausewitz" in Michael I. Handel, ed. *Clausewitz and Modern Strategy* p. 38 and Michael I. Handel, *War, Strategy, and Intelligence* (London: Frank Cass, 1989) 60.

means and effort which is required, and make its influence felt throughout down to the smallest operational detail" (p. 579). War became a rational conflict of interests. "War is part of man's social existence. It is a clash of major interests, which is resolved by bloodshed--that is the only way in which it differs from other conflicts. Rather than comparing it to art we could more accurately compare it to commerce, which is also a conflict of human interests and activities; and it is still closer to politics, which in turn may be considered as a kind of commerce on a larger scale" (p. 149). This social nature of war explained that interests, human will, ends, and means were interconnected and interdependent.

As a consequence, war became a political act of the state. "War is not an independent phenomenon but the continuation of politics by different means. The main lines of every major strategic plan are largely political in nature, and their political character increases the more the plan applies to the entire campaign and to the whole state." According to Clausewitz' logic, "a war plan results directly from the political conditions of the two warring states, as well as from their relations to third powers. A plan of campaign results from the war plan, and frequently--if there is only one theater of operations--may even be identical with it. But the political element even enters the separate components of a campaign; rarely will it be without influence on such major episodes of warfare as a battle, etc." Therefore, "there can be no question of purely military evaluation of a great strategic issue, or of a purely military scheme to solve it."⁵⁴ Obviously, the total political domination over the military became central to strategy and war. "If it is all a calculation of probabilities based on given individuals and conditions, the political object, which was the original motive, must become an essential factor in the equation. The political object will thus determine both the military objective to be

⁵⁴ Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State pp. 379-380 and Christopher Bassford, Clausewitz in English p. 22.

reached and the amount of effort it requires. The political object cannot, however, in itself provide the standard of measurement. Since we are dealing with realities, not with abstractions, it can do so only in the context of the two states at war" (pp. 80-81). Political objectives were real purposes of war and the military was merely means to achieve political objectives. Within this context, the state should maintain the balance between resources and objectives. "To discover how much of our resources must be mobilized for war, we must first examine our own political aim and that of the enemy. We must gauge the strength and situation of the opposing state. We must gauge the character and abilities of its government and people and do the same in regard to our own. Finally, we must evaluate the political sympathies of other states and the effect the war may have on them" (pp. 585-586). The comparative study of both the enemy and oneself helped explore the strengths and the weaknesses that would determine the size and the scope of war.

For Clausewitz, such strategy had nothing to do with the relative strength of the state, but it was simply the way for a weak state to protect its interests. "Supposing that a minor state is in conflict with a much more powerful one and expects its position to grow weaker every year. If war is unavoidable, should it not make the most of its opportunities before its position gets still worse? In short, it should attack--but not because attack in itself is advantageous, but because the smaller party's interest is either to settle the quarrel before conditions deteriorate or at least to acquire some advantages so as to keep its efforts going" (p. 601). Such war might, at least in theory, be war of a weak state for creating opportunities to bargain with a strong state. "The future promises nothing that will influence either side's decisions. If a political initiative lies with the smaller power, it should take the military offensive. Having had the nerve to assume an active role against a stronger adversary, it must do something definite--in other words, attack the enemy unless he obliges it by attacking first" (p. 602). With this scenario, the political objectives of war, the scale of demands put forward by either side, and the total political situation of

one's own side were the factors that influenced limited war designed to "reduce the enemy's national resources and fighting strength, and to increase our own strength." As a result, "we fight the war partly at his expense. At the peace negotiations, moreover, we will have a concrete asset in hand, which we can either keep or trade for other advantages" (p. 69). This strategy explained that limited war was a combination of bargaining and fighting through the employment of limited means for limited ends to minimize risks of total war and avoid military escalation. Whatever the military objectives were, the characteristic and the scope of war were determined by politics involving both political and military power of the state.⁵⁵

The political domination over the military was in sharp contrast to freedom of the military, which challenged the legitimacy of political domination. "If we keep in mind that war springs from some political purpose, it is natural that the prime cause of its existence will remain the supreme consideration in conducting it. That however does not imply that the political aim is a tyrant. It must adapt itself to its chosen means, a process which can radically change it, yet the political aim remains the first consideration" (p. 87). Although the political objective was not a tyrant in war, Clausewitz seemed to question the significance of the autonomous military or at least reluctant to grant autonomy to the military. He contended, "Policy, of course, will not extend its influence to operational details. Political considerations do not determine the posting of guards or the employment of patrols. But they are more influential in the planning of war, of the campaign, and often even of the battle" (p. 606). Although military autonomy for Clausewitz merely meant the posting of guards and the employment of patrols, not the management of war, operations and battles, political objectives might not always

⁵⁵ Jehuda L. Wallach, *The Dogma of the Battle of Annihilation: the Theories of Clausewitz and Schlieffen and Their Impact on the German Conduct of Two World Wars* (Westport: Green Wood Press, 1986) 17.

dominate all military activities in war.⁵⁶ "Even the ultimate aim of contemporary warfare, the political object, cannot always be seen as a single issue. Even if it were, action is subject to such a multitude of conditions and considerations that the aim can no longer be achieved by a single tremendous act of war. Rather it must be reached by a large number of more or less important actions, all combined into one whole. Each of these separate actions has a specific purpose relating to the whole. So in the field of strategy we can reduce all military activity to the unitary concept of the single engagement, and concern ourselves exclusively with its purposes (p. 227)." The solution for this dilemma proposed by Clausewitz was to combine general and politician as one person in order to reduce conflicts between them. "Commander-in-chief must be a statesman, but he must not cease to be a general. On the one hand, he is aware of the entire political situation; on the other, he knows exactly how much he can achieve with the means at his disposal" (p. 112).

Obviously, Clausewitz favored such a combination, removing political and military barriers in order to avoid both military escalation and the mismanagement of operations and battles by politicians. "Only if statesmen look to certain military moves and actions to produce effects that are foreign to their nature do political decisions influence operations for the worse. In the same way as a man who has not fully mastered a foreign language sometimes fails to express himself correctly, so statesmen often issue orders that defeat the purpose they are meant to serve. Time and again that has happened, which demonstrates that a certain grasp of military affairs is vital for those in charge of general policy" (p. 608). But Clausewitz quickly denied the possibility that commanders could detect and cure these faults. "Even if there really had existed a thoughtful strategist capable of deducing the whole range of consequences simply from the nature of the hostile elements, and on the strength of these prophesying their ultimate effects, it would

⁵⁶ Christopher Bassford, Clausewitz in English p. 23 and Michael Howard, Clausewitz p. 38.

have been quite impossible to act on his speculation. The only sound expedient is to make the commander-in-chief a member of the cabinet, so that the cabinet can share in the major aspects of his activities. But that, in turn, is only feasible if the cabinet, that is, the government, is near the theater of operations, so that decisions can be taken without serious loss of time" (pp. 608-609). The participation of cabinet in military decision, rather than military participation in political decision, would avoid both political and military handicaps.

Clausewitz vigorously criticized purely military views of strategy, in proposing the political subordination to the military.⁵⁷ "That the political view should wholly cease to count on the outbreak of war is hardly conceivable unless pure hatred made all wars a struggle for life and death. In fact, as we have said, they are nothing but expressions of policy itself. Subordinating the political point of view to the military would be absurd, for it is policy that has created war. Policy is the guiding intelligence and war only the instrument, not vice versa. No other possibility exists, then, than to subordinate the military point of view to the political" (p. 607). In order to fully control military action, he maintained the importance of the government staying so close to the army as to function as general headquarters. "The strategist will draft the plan of the war, and the aim will determine the series of actions intended to achieve it: he will, in fact, shape the individual campaigns and, within these, decide on the individual engagements. Since most of these matters have to be based on assumptions that may not prove correct, while other, more detailed orders cannot be determined in advance at all, it follows that the strategist must go on campaign himself." The strategist at the front would not only ensure political control, but also readjust the war plan for operations and battles. "Detailed orders can then be given on the spot, allowing the general plan to be adjusted to the

⁵⁷ Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State p. 380.

modifications that are continuously required. The strategist, in short, must maintain control throughout" (p. 177). The limited military autonomy would allow the government to control the war within the limits. "If the political aims are small, the motives slight and tensions low, a prudent general may look for any way to avoid major crises and decisive actions, exploit any weaknesses in the opponent's military and political strategy, and finally reach a peaceful settlement" (p. 99).

Clausewitz' state was aimed at maximizing political control over the military from the top down by granting only limited autonomy to the military, while denying the traditional military control over the state. For him, political control over limited operations and battles would guarantee that limited war did not advance toward the absolute, as the theory would demand, but instead advance toward the real--limited action on the battlefield. The military as an instrument that had merely limited autonomy in deciding combat details would further reduce the risk of escalation. Minimizing escalation through political control and the limited autonomy of the military would promote an explicit or tacit agreement between states on limited war. In other words, "Politics is the womb in which war develops--where its outlines already exist in their hidden rudimentary form, like the characteristics of living creatures in their embryos" (p. 149). Thus, war could not be divorced from politics. "Whenever this occurs in our thinking about war," warned Clausewitz, "the many links that connect the two elements are destroyed and we are left with something pointless and devoid of sense" (p. 605). Nonetheless, the political objectives did not always provide a suitable military objective in battles or at least in some of them. Within this context, "another military objective must be adopted that will serve the political purpose and symbolize it in the peace negotiations" (p. 81). The adjustment of strategy based on the realities would be the key to maintain the balance between political objectives and the military instrument. The harmony of the state, the military, and society under state control would facilitate the attainment of limited political objectives.

The Military

The military was a means of the state designed to reach limited political objectives in combat, which became the trial of operational art and psychological force. "Though strategy in itself is concerned only with engagements, the theory of strategy must also consider its chief means of execution, the fighting forces. It must consider these in their own right and in their relation to other factors, for they shape the engagement and it is in turn on them that the effect of the engagement first makes itself felt. Strategic theory must therefore study the engagement in terms of its possible results and of the moral and psychological forces that largely determine its course" (p. 177). War was fighting. Fighting was the essential military activity. All other activities simply sustained fighting. In other words, "war was slaughter and its price was blood." This characteristic of war reflected the theme of absolute war--"of all the possible aims in war, the destruction of the enemy's armed forces always appears as the highest" (p. 99). On the assumption that the only solution of war was to annihilate the enemy's forces, Clausewitz ridiculed the people who tried to find some way to disarm the enemy without bloodshed.⁵⁸ "Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed: war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst. The maximum

⁵⁸ Scholars presented three different ways to explaining the Prussian ideas of winning without bloodshed. First, Prussian Kings traditionally depended on diplomatic manoeuvres and shifting alliances to protect Prussia. But Frederick William, the Great Elector, saw that forces of one's own were better than manoeuvres and alliances. Second, Immanuel Kant argued that if only rational, humane statesmen effectively controlled the affairs of states, the world might enjoy perpetual peace. Third, rational principles based on hard, quantifiable data might, according to military thinkers, reduce the conduct of war to a branch of the natural sciences, a rational activity from which the play of chance and uncertainty had been entirely eliminated; or war in the hands of experts could be carried on with such skill and moderation as to be virtually bloodless. See Gordon A. Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army* p. 2 and Michael Howard, *Clausewitz* pp. 12-13.

use of force is in no way incompatible with the simultaneous use of the intellect" (p. 75). His emphasis on violence appeared to show war as different from other political activities. "We are not," he contended, "interested in generals who win victories without bloodshed. The fact that slaughter is a horrifying spectacle must make us take war more seriously, but not provide an excuse for gradually blunting our swords in the name of humanity. Sooner or later some one will come along with a sharp sword and hack off our arms" (p. 260).⁵⁹ The destruction of the enemy's forces was of paramount importance in war.

War consisted of three levels based on space and time. "In terms of space, it relates to the country, the theater of operations, or the position; in terms of time, to the war, the campaign, or the battle. True these are not unalterable units, but the central points of certain areas that overlap and merge with one another. In practice, however, one must often be satisfied with merely arranging things into categories rather than strictly separating them; and those terms, in general usage, have become clearly enough defined to serve as nuclei around which other ideas may conveniently be gathered" (p. 379). According to him, the concepts characteristic of time--war, campaign, and battle--were parallel to those of space--country, theater of operations and position--and so bore the same relation to the subject. Clausewitz further defined the terms theater of operations, the army, and the campaign. Theater of operations was a sector of war. "A sector of this kind is not just a part of the whole, but a subordinate entity in itself--depending on the extent to which change occurring elsewhere in the war area affect it not directly but only

⁵⁹ This theme persisted throughout *On War*. But Clausewitz also acknowledged the possibility of winning without bloodshed. "When one force is a great deal stronger than the other, an estimate may be enough. There will no fighting: the weaker side will yield at once. The fact that engagements do not always aim at the destruction of the opposing forces, that their objectives can often be attained without any fighting at all but merely by an evaluation of the situation, explains why entire campaigns can be conducted with great energy even though actual fighting plays an unimportant part in them" (p. 96). For the more detail of winning with low cost, see p. 96, p. 181, p. 205, p. 228, p. 259, & p. 529.

indirectly." The army meant "all the forces under supreme command located in a given theater." "Campaign denotes all military events occurring in the course of a calendar year in all theaters of operations, but normally and more accurately it denotes the events occurring in a single theater of war" (pp. 280-281). The theater of operations, the army, and the campaigns in space, mass, and time, constituted the key elements of operational art.

Essential to operational art was the use of force to annihilate the enemy's forces by striking the center of gravity and maneuvering. "A center of gravity is always found where the mass is concentrated most densely. It presents the most effective target for a blow; furthermore, the heaviest blow is that struck by the center of gravity. The same holds true in war" (p. 485). Accordingly, "a theater of war, be it large or small, and the forces stationed there, no matter what their size, represent the sort of unity in which a single center of gravity can be identified. That is the place where the decision should be reached" (p. 487). The center of gravity was the fatal point of the enemy that became the operational targets in order to make the enemy powerless.⁶⁰ The concentration of superior strength on these targets must however be based on the calculations of the time when, the place where, and the forces with which battles were to be fought. "War is the impact of opposing forces. It follows that the stronger force not only destroys the weaker, but that its impetus carries the weaker force along with it. This would seem not to allow a protracted, consecutive, employment of force: instead, the simultaneous use of all means intended for a given action appears as an elementary law of war" (p. 205). To achieve this objective, all energy, he suggested, should be directed against "the center of gravity, the hub of all power and movement of the enemy state." "If the enemy is thrown off balance, he must not be given time to recover. Blow after blow must be aimed in the same

⁶⁰ James J. Schneider and Lawrence L. Izzo, "Clausewitz's Elusive Center of Gravity" *Parameters* vol. 17, no. 3, 1987: 50.

direction: the victor, in other words, must strike with all his strength and not just against a fraction of the enemy's. Not by taking things the easy way--using superior strength to filch some province, preferring the security of this minor conquest to great success--but by constantly seeking out the center of his power, by daring all to win all, will now really defeat the enemy" (p. 596). The possible centers of gravity were the capital of the enemy state, the army of the protector state, the common interest of the alliance, leaders' personalities, and public opinions.

To eliminate these centers of gravity in operations and battles, the military should identify advantages and disadvantages. Maneuver would create chance of "gaining an advantage from the other, while avoiding any disadvantage to oneself" (p. 513). The term maneuver carried "the idea of an effect created out of nothing, that is, out of a state of equilibrium, by using the mistakes into which the enemy can be lured" (p. 541). The potential targets of maneuver consisted of enemy's food supplies, communications centers, a threat to the retreat, attack on individual points with superior forces, and transportation lines. A strategic maneuver had two pairs of opposites. "The first pair of opposites consists of outflanking the enemy or of operating on interior lines; the second, of concentrating one's forces or of extending them over numerous posts" (p. 541). These two pairs became the principle for maneuver. But it might not have fixed principle at all, since the principle rested on combat environments, rather than on the abstract concept. "No rules of any kind exist for maneuver and no method or general principle can be determined the value of the action; rather, superior application, precision, order, discipline, and fear will find the means to achieve palpable advantage in the most single and minute circumstances. It is on these qualities that victory in this type of contest largely depends" (p. 542). The skillful application of such a principle in combat would be essential to soldiers.

In limited war, surprise attack was basic to operations and battles. "Each surprise action is rooted in at least some degree of cunning." Cunning implied secret purpose.

"The use of a trick or stratagem permits the intended victim to make his own mistakes, which, combined in a single result, suddenly change the nature of the situation before his very eyes. It might be said, that, as wit juggles with ideas and beliefs, so cunning juggles with actions" (p. 202). Cunning, aimed at discovering the enemy's weaknesses by confusing him, was based on rational calculations. "If we surprise the enemy with faulty measures, we may not benefit at all, but instead suffer sharp reverses. Our surprise will cause the enemy little worry, by exploiting our mistakes, he will find ways of warding off any ill-effects" (p. 200). To exploit and discover the enemy's weaknesses allowed the launching of surprise attacks. Attack often culminated in the point where the remaining strength was only enough to maintain defense and wait for peace. Thus, limited operations and battles might create the environments which led to negotiations to settle conflict.

In contrast to operational art, psychological force constituted the spirit that permeated war as a whole and established a close affinity with the will that moved and led the whole mass of force.⁶¹ As a result, it became "the precious metal, the real weapon, the finely-honed blade" (p. 184), which might increase or decrease combat effectiveness. Human weaknesses often resulted in the suspension of action in war. First, fear and indecision "creates a permanent tendency toward delay and thus becomes a retarding influence. It is a sort of moral force of gravity, which, however, works by repulsion rather than attraction: namely aversion to danger and responsibility." Second, the imperfection of human perception and judgment "is more pronounced in war than anywhere else. We hardly know accurately our own situation at any particular moment, while the enemy's,

⁶¹ B.H. Liddell Hart claimed that Clausewitz's most important contribution to the theory of war was his emphasis on psychological force. Raising his voice against the geometrical school of strategy, then fashionable, he showed that the human spirit was infinitely more important than operational lines and angles. See B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (New York: Meridian, 1991) 340.

which is concealed from us, must be deduced from very little evidence." Third, the greater strength of the defensive "acts like a ratchet-wheel, occasionally stopping the works completely. A may not feel strong enough to attack B, which does not, however, mean that B is strong enough to attack A. It therefore happens that both sides at the same time not only feel too weak for an offensive, but that they really are too weak" (pp. 217-218). Fear and indecision, the imperfection of human perception and judgment, the greater strength of the defensive produced the suspension of action in war. Nevertheless, with the strong support of the martial spirit, psychological force might increase the soldiers' resistance. "An army that maintains its cohesion under the most murderous fire; that cannot be shaken by imaginary fears and resists well-founded ones with all its might; that, proud of its victories, will not lose the strength to obey orders and its respect and trust for its officers even in defeat; whose physical power, like the muscles of an athlete, has been steeled by training in privation and effort; that is mindful of all these duties and qualities by virtue of single powerful idea of the honor of its arms--such an army is imbued with the true military spirit" (pp. 187-188). Clausewitz saw that military spirit could be replaced by the psychological strength of commanders under some conditions.⁶² "So long as a unit fights cheerfully, with spirit and elan, great strength of will is rarely needed; but once conditions become difficult, as they must when much is at stake, things no longer run like a well-oiled machines." Clausewitz asserted, "The machine itself begins to resist, and the commander needs tremendous will-power to overcome this resistance. As each man's strength gives out, as it no longer responds to his will, the inertia of the whole gradually comes to rest on the commander's will alone" (p. 104). Notwithstanding the presumed strong morale of commanders, the increase or the decrease in morale of soldiers would affect combat effectiveness. The increase in morale might

⁶² Michael Howard, Clausewitz pp. 26-30.

sometimes risk escalation of war, but the decrease in morale might lead to defeat. "The loss of morale has proved the major decisive factor. Once the outcome has been determined, the loss continues to increase, and reaches its peak only at the end of the action. This becomes the means of achieving the margin of profit in the destruction of the enemy's physical forces which is the real purpose of the engagement. Loss of order and cohesion often makes even the resistance of individual units fatal for them." Under such circumstances, "the spirit of the whole is broken; nothing is left of the original obsession with triumph or disaster that made men ignore all risks; for most of them danger is no longer a challenge to their courage, but harsh punishment to be endured. Thus the tool is weakened and blunted at the first impact of the enemy's victory, and is no longer suitable for countering danger with danger" (p. 231). The psychological factor eventually reduced violence on the battlefield and led to maintaining operations and battles as limited as possible.

The essence of war was fighting designed to destroy the enemy by balancing ties between operational art and psychological force. The concentration of forces on limited objectives through maneuver and cunning would gradually destroy the enemy forces, but such operational art sometimes was unable to help achieve expected objectives. Its failure might weaken absolute violence and lead to attaining only limited objectives. Psychological force might either neutralize absolute violence as a result of human weaknesses or maximize absolute violence as a result of longing for military honor and renown. Despite these possibilities, "immobility and inactivity," Clausewitz believed, "are the normal state of armies in war and action is the exception (p. 217)." The interplay between operational art and psychological force would reduce absolute violence on the battlefield. War became limited.

The State and the Military

Clausewitz proposed two approaches to avoiding escalation: political and psychological. Absolute political control over the military reduced absolute violence, whereas psychological force minimized the effectiveness of employing forces in combat. For him, everything in war was very simple, but the simplest thing was very difficult. The gap between theory and practice led to complications and difficulties on the battlefield. As a result, the strategic objectives based on theoretical principles for the conduct of war became desirable, but unattainable.⁶³ "Countless minor incidents--the kind you can never really foresee--combine to lower the general level of performance, so that one always falls far short of the intended goal. The military machine is basically very simple and very easy to manage. But we should bear in mind that none of its components is of one piece: each part is composed of individuals, every one of whom retains his potential of friction. A battalion is made of individuals, the least important of whom may chance to delay things and sometimes make them go wrong" (p. 119). This friction made real war different from war on paper. "The novice can not pass through these layers of increasing intensity of danger without sensing that here ideas are governed by other factors, that the light of reason is refracted in a manner quite different from that which is normal in academic speculation." Clausewitz strongly believed, "It is an exceptional man who keeps his powers of quick decision in fact if he has never been through this experience before. It is true that (with habit) as we become accustomed to it the impression soon wears off, and in half-an-hour we hardly notice our surroundings any more; yet the ordinary man can never achieve a state of perfect unconcern in which his mind can work with normal flexibility" (pp. 113-114). On the battlefield, friction always drove war into uncertainty, unpredictability, and unexpectedness.

⁶³ Alan Beyerchen, "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War" *International Security* vol. 17, no. 3, 1992: 81.

Clausewitz' inference helped him construct the assumptions of strategy and war and test such assumptions against historical cases. His theoretical analysis sought to identify and separate the numerous components of political institutions, military organization, and social bases and to reduce each to its essential core before fitting them together again into larger and dynamic structures.⁶⁴ He concluded that each war had its own strategy, which was shaped by its political purpose and by the particular means available to achieve them. "Our purpose was not to assign, in passing, a handful of principles of warfare to each period. We wanted to show how every age had its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions. Each period, therefore, would have held to its own theory of war, even if the urge had always and universally existed to work things out on scientific principles. It follows that events of every age must be judged in the light of its own peculiarities" (p. 593). There was no universal theory of strategy and war.

War became an art, whose object was creative ability as, for instance, fine arts, rather than a science, whose object was pure knowledge. "We must, therefore, be prepared to develop our concept of war as it ought to be fought, not on the basis of its pure definition, but by leaving room for every sort of extraneous matter. We must allow for natural inertia, for all the friction of its parts, for all the inconsistency, imprecision, and timidity of man; and finally we must face that war and its forms result from ideas, emotions, and conditions prevailing at the time--and to be quite honest we must admit that this was the case even when war assumed its absolute state under Bonaparte" (p. 580). This assumption led him to the conclusion that the endless complexities in the study of war made it impossible to formulate a positive theory of war. "It is a very difficult task to construct a scientific theory for the art of war and so many attempts have failed that

⁶⁴ Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State p. 8.

most people say it is impossible, since it deals with matters that no permanent law can provide for" (p. 71). But the theory of war appeared merely to put all the elements of war in systematic order and to clarify concepts and ideas that have become confused and entangled. "Theory should," he insisted, "cast a steady light on all phenomena so that we can more easily recognize and eliminate the weeds that always spring from ignorance; it should show how one thing is related to another, and keep the important and the unimportant separate. . . Theory then becomes a guide to anyone who wants to learn about war from books; it will light his way, ease his progress, train his judgment, and help him to avoid pitfalls. . ." On the other hand, he argued, "theory cannot equip the mind with formulas for solving problems, nor can it mark the narrow path on which the sole solution is supposed to lie by planting a hedge of principles on either side." Despite the contradictions, "it can give the mind insight into the great mass of phenomena and of their relationship, then leave it free to rise into the higher realms of action. There the mind can use its innate talents to capacity, combining them all so as to seize on what is right and true as though this were a single idea formed by their concentrated pressure--as though it were a response to the immediate challenge rather than a product of thought" (pp. 141, 577, & 578). Theory was essentially utilized as a guide to educate soldiers, but not as a guide to wage war.

Therefore, Clausewitz challenged Heinrich von Buelow and Henri de Jomini for attempting to formulate scientific theory to guide war. Buelow intended to codify strategy and war on the basis of geometry by defining strategy as "military movements out of the enemy's cannon range or range of vision and tactics as all movements within this range."⁶⁵ His strategic ideas emphasized the importance of bases and lines. "The base of operations must be a fortified line of prepared magazines; the two lines of operations

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 91.

projected from the ends of this base must converge upon the point under attack at an angle of at least ninety degree."⁶⁶ Clausewitz completely rejected Buelow's "breadth of a base" as well as his propositions of strategy and tactics, since in his urge to understand war, to rationalize the use of violence, to turn it into a science and to make it predictable, Buelow overlooked much that actually took place in war. "He (Buelow) started by substituting this concept (of the base) for all these individual factors; next substituting the area or extent of this base for the concept itself, and ended up by substituting for this area the angle which fighting forces created with their base line. All this led to a purely geometrical result, which is completely useless" (p. 135). Like Buelow, Jomini also tried to reduce strategy to a simple set of rules.⁶⁷ Strategy was controlled by invariable scientific principles, which prescribed offensive action to mass forces against weaker enemy forces at some decisive point if strategy was to lead to victory.⁶⁸ Science for Jomini was mathematics that provided theoretical explanation of his Maxim 3 on the direction of lines of operation. Clausewitz objected to Jomini's "interior lines", arguing that war was extremely complex in reality and that theory could only illuminate this complexity by identifying and clarifying the relationships between the whole and parts of war. "As a reaction to that fallacy, another geometrical principle was then exalted: that of so-called interior lines. Even though this tenet rests on solid ground--on the fact that the engagement is the only effective means in war--its purely geometrical character, still makes it another lopsided principle that could never govern a real situation."⁶⁹ According

⁶⁶ Raymond Aron, *Penser la guerre, Clausewitz: l'age europeen* (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1976) 397-398.

⁶⁷ Peter Paret, *Clausewitz and the State* p. 93 and Baron Henri de Jomin, *The Art of War* (Westport: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1971) 68-70.

⁶⁸ John Shy, "Jomini" in Peter Paret, ed. *Makers of Modern Strategy* p. 146.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 135-136.

to Clausewitz, the formulation of a positive or a scientific theory of war and strategy would never be possible. All attempts to propose such a theory led to neglect of the essence of war. "It is only analytically that these attempts at theory can be called advances in the realm of truth; synthetically, in the rules and regulations they offer, they are absolutely useless. They aim at fixed values; but in war every thing is uncertain, and calculations have to be made with variable quantities. They direct the inquiry exclusively toward physical quantities, whereas all military action is intertwined with psychological forces and effects. They consider only unilateral action, whereas war consists of a continuous interaction of opposites" (p. 136).

What we needed, insisted Clausewitz, was to go back to history and experiences. "We cannot formulate any principles, rules, or methods: history does not provide a basis for them. On the contrary, at almost every turn one finds peculiar features that are often incomprehensible, and sometimes astonishingly odd. Nevertheless, it is useful to study history in connection with this subject, as with others. While there may be no system, and no mechanical way of recognizing the truth, truth does exist. To recognize it one generally needs seasoned judgment and an instinct born of long experience. While history may yield no formula, it does provide an exercise for judgment here as everywhere else" (pp. 516-517). He intended to provoke the downfall of all dogmatic strategy based on mathematics; to restrain considerably the scope of scientific approach, and to establish the limits of scientific inquiry. But he steered a middle course between ambitious rationalist enthusiasm and philosophically ascetic human skepticism, by leaving room for legitimate irrational factors without again embarking on rational decision-making. Clausewitz believed that theory was possible only through cooperation of understanding and sensibility and of the intellectual faculty and the sense. The linkage between theory and practice was coordination between expectations and realities.

Clausewitz' strategy provided some valuable insights with special attention to political control over the limits, but it was incomplete. First, Clausewitz' strategy of

limited war mainly depended on his defensive strategy of total war that centered on the liberation of the fatherland from French domination. His concepts of the state and politics remained unclear, although he devoted a large part of his books to discussing the relationships among the state, the military, and society. His concepts of the state and politics appeared, argued Peter Paret and C.B.A. Behrens, to have paralleled his thesis of absolute war--a war of total violence, the necessary extreme in theory.⁷⁰ In other words, Clausewitz preferred an authoritarian state from the top down dominating society, notwithstanding his passages suggesting moderate political reforms favoring a constitution, responsible ministerial government, equality of legal rights, and representation for the upper classes, which might help preserve the monarchical state by narrowing the gap between the state and society. After 1806, he increasingly emphasized these extremes of state power and authority. The poverty of the German spirit was revealing itself more and more, the feebleness of character and principle emerging everywhere was enough to make one weep. Clausewitz complained that he wrote this with infinite sadness, for no one on earth felt a greater need for national honor and dignity than I did; but it was impossible to be mistaken, the facts could not be denied. That the attitudes of our people were not marked by greater nobility was not the fault of nature, but the fault of men. Had those who led the nation shown themselves to be better men, then the nation would have been animated by a different spirit. In terms of the approach needed to change men's belief, he further asserted "If I am to express my innermost thoughts I would say that I favor the most extreme measures. With whips I would stir the lazy animal and teach it to burst the chains with which out of cowardice and fear it permitted itself to be bound. I would spread an attitude throughout Germany, which like an antidote would eliminate with destructive force the plague that is

⁷⁰ C.B.A. Behrens, "Which Side Was Clausewitz On?" pp. 41-44 and Peter Paret, *Clausewitz and the State* p. 128.

threatening to decay the spirit of the nation."⁷¹ Obviously, an absolute state was Clausewitz' ideal that paralleled his absolute war, a war in theory, since such a state could effectively mobilize masses for national liberation.

Second, the methodological dilemma of Clausewitz' strategy of limited war lay in his approach to the construction of the scientific theory. "We must," he asserted, "remind ourselves that it is simply not possible to construct a model for the art of war that can serve as scaffolding on the which the commander can rely for support at any time" (p. 140). "But war, though conditioned by the particular characteristics of states and their armed forces, must contain some more general--indeed, a universal--element with which every theorist ought above all to be concerned" (p. 593). On the one hand, he claimed that war was an art, rather than a science, since the scientific theory of strategy totally ignored the role of psychological factors. These factors influenced, modified, and reshaped operational art on the battlefield. On the other hand, he adopted a deductive method to formulating his universal theory of war and strategy, namely, war as the continuation of politics by other means and the interaction between operational art and psychological force on the battlefield. For him, these two principles became the absolute truth. Whereas, in order to deny the value of a scientific theory of war, Clausewitz employed particular cases to show that the universal theory of war lacked capability to explain his war. He apparently forgot that theory could not explain or account for unexpected events, but regularities and repetitions.

Third, contemporary military technology thoroughly transformed the traditional approach to strategy and war. Military technological developments had deeply permeated every aspect of war: the destructiveness and violence, the expansion in space and compression in time, the relationship between offense and defense, the role of

⁷¹ Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State pp. 129-130.

intelligence and possibility of achieving strategic surprise, the shifting emphasis from the front to the rear in the conduct of war, and the correlation between economic and military strength.⁷² Clausewitz deliberately ignored the role of military technology in war as well as other aspects, economic, naval, administrative, organizational, and ethical, that were not of immediate relevance to the conduct of the war with which he himself was familiar. "The conduct of war has," he argued, "nothing to do with making guns and powder out of coal, sulfur, copper and tin; its given quantities are weapons that are ready for use and their effectiveness. Strategy uses maps without worrying about trigonometric surveys; it does not inquire how a country should be organized and a people trained and ruled in order to produce the best military results" (p. 144). He indeed recognized the changing nature of war, but very few of his described manifestations in war could be ascribed to either new inventions or new ideas. Many previous ways of fighting would, he concluded, reappear, so he gave up the exploration of the deep impacts of technological innovation on war.

Sun Zi and Clausewitz

The fundamental principle of Sun Zi's and Clausewitz' strategies was their insistence on control over the limits based on rational calculations in hopes of making the state, the military, and society consistent with the purpose of maintaining the war as limited as possible. This principle, in spite of its fragmented, scattered, and incomplete nature, placed emphasis on civil-military relations, the interaction between operational art and psychological force, and dialectics. The state calculated strategic environments, domestic and international, in determining the employ of limited force for limited objectives. Close cooperation between domestic and international environments, between

⁷² Michael I Handel, *Clausewitz and Modern Strategy* p. 86 and Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* pp. 208-209.

means and ends, and between belligerent states would facilitate the establishment of explicit or tacit rules for guiding limited war. The military utilized forces within limited space and time to conduct land operations and battles for making the enemy powerless, while psychological force was used to increase one's own and to decrease the opponent's combat effectiveness. Such limited means and ends were designed to provide the enemy with acceptable prospects. The dialectical relationships between the state and the military and between operational art and psychological force constituted the linkage between expectations and realities through coordination and adjustment. Coordination and adjustment created chance for the state and the military to narrow the gap between theory and practice.

First and foremost, the key to their strategies of limited war was to establish mutually recognized rules, explicit or tacit, in order to keep war as limited as possible. Sun Zi viewed Chinese tradition and culture as the driving force, subordinating the military to the state in an effort to reduce the risk of escalation--although soldiers enjoyed their autonomy; whereas Clausewitz argued that total political control over the military eventually minimized escalation or violence. This political supremacy focusing on the harmony of the state, the military, and society helped them manage the military instrument. Nonetheless, war was the business of soldiers. Chinese soldiers were mass soldiers led by professional generals to fight limited war, whereas Clausewitz advocated transformation of the Prussian professional army into a mass army for waging war, total or limited. Despite the differences in their definitions of soldiers, they held that soldiers' freedom to wage limited operations and battles facilitated the attainment of limited political objectives. In other words, lack of such freedom or autonomy would severely undermine the interest of the state. This ultimate political supremacy was to prevent war from escalation beyond the needs of the given purpose.

Second, limited war was designed to defeat, rather than crush the enemy at acceptable cost. But Sun Zi and Clausewitz took different ways to reach this objective.

The former favored to strike the enemy's weaknesses by waging quick, limited mobile warfare in hopes of neutralizing costs through knowing both the enemy and oneself. The latter was interested in the use of force on the basis of rational analyses with special emphasis on maneuvering and cunning, but believed that the imperfection of human nature and friction would effectively ensure escape from absolute violence and keep operations and battles within limited scope. But psychological force made a strong impact on soldiers and reshaped their behavior, either increasing or decreasing combat effectiveness. The cultivation of a professional culture would partly overcome inertia and foster the morale of soldiers. The attempt to reduce costs by both sides would lead to the termination of limited war at acceptable cost.

Third, each war had its own theory; the lack of universal theories led to uncertainty in war. But they utilized different approaches to the study of war and strategy. Sun Zi adopted the Chinese yin-yang to understanding war and strategy. In contrast, Clausewitz preferred a modified Hegelian thesis-antithesis to analyzing war and strategy. Despite their denial of universal theories, they insisted that the political supremacy over the military and the interaction of operational art and psychological force were the fundamentals which would minimize escalation through persistent focus on limited objectives. For them, these two fundamentals became the basic criteria with which the state and the military measured, calculated, evaluated, and modified operations and battles.

The strength of Sun Zi's strategy was his normative and empirical approach to and his interests in balancing the ties between expectations and realities for waging quick, but limited war, aimed at conquering the enemy and reunifying China through strategy. Such balanced objectives were essentially to avoid escalation in a great effort to maintain war limited or to neutralize costs. In this respect, deterrence and deception helped divide the enemy's alliances, and confused the enemy in order to win war without fighting. The traditional ideas such as benevolence, filial piety, and righteousness would strengthen

societal support for limited war and civilian control over the military that reduced violence on the battlefield. These objectives could be achieved by maneuvering human relations, since all human activities were interdependent and interrelated and could be transformed. Chinese tradition and culture were the cornerstone of Sun Zi's strategy of limited war.

The strength of Clausewitz' strategy was his empirical approach to and interests in the use of force for conducting limited war partly designed to liberate his fatherland from French domination or to defend it against foreign aggression. Prussian history appeared to convince him that the King failed to protect Prussian heritage, interests, national integrity, and sovereignty by depending on diplomatic maneuver and shifting alliances. Only force through the mobilization of masses could save Prussia. The employment of force--waging limited war--emerged as the unique means for the state, either strong or weak, to reach national liberation from foreign occupation. Polemical objectives and psychological force modified absolute violence. The interplay between them resulted in limited war, although uncertainty made war like gambling.

Neither was sufficient. Their greatest deficiencies were the failure to sufficiently account for the political aspects of limited war such as bargaining and communication with the enemy state as a means to keep war limited and their relative inattention to technology as an essential assumption in strategy. On the one hand, limited war required limits. Limits needed explicit or tacit agreements or at least some kind of mutual recognition. Because of lack of bargaining and communication, tacit or explicit, and of fear that the advantage of one state to reach agreements on limits might enhance the disadvantage of the other state or vice versa, agreements on limits was difficult to reach. Without them, neither might see that the best choice of military action depended on the action one expected the other to take, which one knew depended, in turn, on the other's expectations of one's own. Within this context, limited war would become unlimited. On the other hand, technological revolution challenged the traditional approach to strategy

and war. New weapons not only changed the battlefield, but also needed elite, highly trained soldiers to use them effectively. This fundamental change in strategy and war show that the fifth century BC. and eighteenth century mind-sets of strategy were no longer compatible with the twentieth century wars, even though these old mind-sets of strategy and war transcended the political and military limitations imposed on their insights by their times. War in the twentieth century however requires new strategy that can account for continuity and change in limited war. Technology, along with the state and the military, constitutes a new trinity that dominates and shapes the strategy of limited war.

CHAPTER 2

The Strategy of Limited War

Limited war as presented by Sun Zi and Clausewitz is a war fought by states, strong or weak, for limited objectives by utilizing limited means within limited areas. The focus on control over limited objectives mirrors the intention of states to affect the enemy's will and behavior, not to crush it, by imposing conditions that appear more acceptable than continued resistance. Central to this war concept is the assured control of the limits, i.e., states maintain war as limited as possible by adjusting the action and reaction of states with emphasis on the relationships between civilian control and military autonomy and between operational art and psychological force. Unfortunately, the strategies illuminate traditional, but not contemporary, limited war. Since their times, war has undergone fundamental changes in its nature, scope, and implications, all of which are closely associated with changes in states, militaries, and technologies. Such changes have widespread consequences for strategy, in that the diffusion has resulted in a major structural crisis of adjustment in which political, military, and technological transformations are necessary to bring about a new approach to limited war. Such progress requires building a new strategy.

This chapter reconstructs Sun Zi's and Clausewitz' strategies with respect to contemporary limited war. Despite their denying theoretical values, their classical analyses in fact present the interrelated strategic principles that constitute the necessary basis for restructuring their strategies so as to be compatible with contemporary limited war. Such principles, though crucial, are insufficient to the task of addressing issues such as the extent to which states can cooperate with each other in clarifying explicit or tacit rules for guiding war to avoid an out-of-control increase in the scope and intensity of war; the extent to which the military can achieve limited objective through the distribution of costs and benefits on the battlefield; and the extent to which the utilization of limited

weapons and soldiers can be proportionate to limited objectives. Thus, control over mutually reinforced objectives, costs, and means through adjustment and cooperation between states is the theme of a new strategy that can supplement, enrich, and extend classical strategies--amending them to accord with today's realities. This chapter starts with methodology that restructures the hard cores of the classical strategies in light of a methodological discourse conducted by philosophers of science and political scientists. Next, it tends to strengthen the hard cores of strategy by constructing the auxiliary assumption of technology in preserving the classical hard cores. Then, it presents a new strategy of limited war that explains how cooperation between domestic and international politics fosters control over mutually reinforced objectives, costs, and means in an effort to maintain war as limited as possible. Finally, it shows the reasons for choosing Japanese, Soviet, and Chinese cases and the way to test a new strategy of limited war against these cases.

Methodology

To facilitate the assessment of Sun Zi's and Clausewitz' strategies of limited war, this thesis employs a comparative method to explain necessary amendments and essential continuities to their strategies for making them compatible with contemporary East Asian limited wars. This method is Not indeed designed to truncate, distort, and sacrifice Sun Zi's and Clausewitz' multiple strategies in an effort to fit them to a heavy positivist notion of science extracted from physics or to impose a scientific method on Sun Zi and Clausewitz, as positivist philosophers might have social scientists believe. Rather it seeks or selects a set of coherent criteria to reconstruct a framework of strategy for analyzing regional limited wars with considerations of substantial changes in military technology. Imre Lakatos has developed the concept of "the scientific research programme" based on hard physics as an effective tool for the evaluation of scientific theories in proving regularities and uniformities. His research program responds partly to what he regards as

the "ruthlessness" in eliminating a research program that is entailed by Karl Popper's notion of "revolution in permanence" and partly to what he regards as "the absence of standards" for the estimation of normal science in Thomas Kuhn's notion of paradigm.¹ According to Popper, we all make mistakes. But to err is not distinctively human. Rather than wait for errors to reveal themselves, perhaps with disastrous consequences, scientists consciously and deliberately seek them out: they put their ideas and inventions to the test, they probe critically, they scrap what they find to be wrong and try again. As a result, science becomes "revolution in permanence" aimed at trial and error, a series of conjectures and refutations. The methodological rules for scientific advance involve two principles. First, the game of science is "without end." A scientist, who decides one day that scientific statements do not call for any further test and can be regarded as finally verified, retires from the game. Second, once a hypothesis has been proposed and tested and has proved its mettle, it may not be allowed to drop out "without good reason." A good reason may be, for instance, replacement of the hypothesis by another which is better testable or the falsification of one of the consequences of the hypothesis. The research method is not to defend theories in order to prove how right we are, but to overthrow them. By using all weapons of the logical, mathematical, and technical armory, it tries to prove that our anticipations were false--in order to put forward, in their stead, new more apparently justified but still inherently unjustified and unjustifiable anticipations, new rash and premature prejudices.² Popper's emphasis on the dogmatic attitude of sticking to a theory as long as possible, that explains the stable period of a theory, is of considerable significance. Without it scientists could never find out the

¹ Imre Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978) 8-9.

² Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York: Harper Torch Books, 1968) 53-54; David Miller, ed. Popper Selection (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985) 9; and Imre Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes pp. 8-9 and p. 89.

potential of any theory--they would give the theory up before they had a real opportunity of finding out its strength; in consequence, no theory would ever be able to play its role of bringing some order into the world, of preparing them for future events, of drawing their attention to events they would otherwise never observe. Nevertheless, his scientific change remains rational or at least rationally reconstructible and falls in the realm of the logic of discovery. His recipe for "revolution in permanence" is composed of boldness in conjectures and austerity in refutations that become the essence of naive falsification.

In contrast, Kuhn maintains that "scientific revolution" is an exceptionally scientific activity, marked by periods of steady refinement, interrupted on occasion by discontinuous jumps from one paradigm to another with no bridge for communicating between them. Paradigms, some accepted examples of scientific practice, serve as the conventional basis for the evaluation of research, developed within paradigms and in analog with them. Such research is called normal science. Kuhn sees that "normal science" is research firmly based on one or more past scientific achievements, achievements that some particular scientific community, rather than an individual, acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practice. Such acknowledged achievements do not however provide scientists with rules for solving specific problems, rules which scientists can follow like so many rational automata. They are merely used as the entire constellation of beliefs, values, and techniques shared by "the members of a given scientific community" or as one sort of element in that constellation, the concrete puzzle-solutions which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules as "a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal science." Over time, they will eventually produce a series of anomalies that cannot be resolved within existing paradigms. Old paradigms are replaced by new ones, leading to a new period of normal science, even though scientists may not agree to utilize and how to

utilize the new "incommensurable" paradigms.³ Kuhn uncompromisingly and comprehensively undermines the rationalist account of science, repudiates the power of an autonomous individual reason of research, and denies a gradual evolutionary progression of scientific change. But his scientific change from one paradigm to another is "a mystical conversion" which is not and cannot be governed by rules of reason and which falls totally within the realm of the (social) psychology of discovery. Science is a kind of "religious change."

By challenging Popper's "ruthlessness in eliminating a research program" and Kuhn's "religious change in scientific theories," Lakatos argues that scientific theories are embedded in research programs, which contain two inseparable parts: negative heuristic--"the hard core" of the program defined as a certain continuity in irrefutable variants free from objective appraisal of scientific growth--and positive heuristic--the construction of "the protective belt" that involves a partially articulated set of suggestions or hints on how to change and develop the refutable variants of the research program in order to protect the hard core. Accordingly, all research programs may be characterized by their hard core. Since negative heuristic forbids scientists to falsify the hard core of a research program, they must utilize their ingenuity to articulate or even invent auxiliary hypotheses forming a protective belt around this core and falsify these hypotheses. The protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses has to bear the brunt of tests and be adjusted and re-adjusted, or even completely replaced, to defend the core. In other words, the negative heuristic of a research program rationalizes the process of theory-building in the case that scientists may rationally decide not to allow refutations to transmit falsity to the hard core as long as the corroborated empirical content of the "protecting belt of auxiliary

³ Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 1962) 10 and 175 and Barry Barnes, Thomas Kuhn in Quentin Skinner, ed. The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) 85-100.

hypotheses" increases.⁴ As a rule, negative heuristic is aimed at specifying the hard core of the program, which is irrefutable by the methodological decisions of its proponents. In practice, even the most rapidly and consistently progressive research programs can digest their counter-evidence only piecemeal: anomalies are never completely exhausted. But yet unexplained anomalies--puzzles are not taken in random order; and the protective belt is not built in an eclectic fashion without any preconceived order. Order of research is normally set out, in more or less detail, in the positive heuristic of the research program, which explains how to modify and make more sophisticated the "refutable protective belt." The positive heuristic saves scientists from becoming confused by the ocean of anomalies. Which problems scientists working in powerful research programs rationally choose, is determined by the positive heuristic of the research program rather than by psychologically worrying anomalies. A research program is a set of methodological rules telling scientists "what paths of research to avoid (negative heuristic) and what paths to follow (positive heuristic)."⁵

In the course of research, anomalies are bound to appear to sooner or later: predictions of theory will likely prove false. According to Lakatos, the key mission of scientists developing the research program is to protect the hard core by constructing the auxiliary hypotheses that will explain the anomalies. Yet any research program, good or bad, can invent such auxiliary hypotheses on an ad hoc basis. The key test of the value of a research program is whether these auxiliary hypotheses are progressive, that is, whether their invention leads to the discovery of new facts other than the anomalous facts that they were designed to explain. Progressive research programs display continuous growth: the protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses increases the capacity to understand reality and generates the relative autonomy of theoretical science. Lakatos develops this concept to

⁴ Imre Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes pp. 48-49.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 47-52.

explain that there are no such things as crucial experiments, or experiments that can instantly overthrow a research program.⁶ Clearly, his concept has provided a clear, sensible criterion for the evaluation of scientific theories, natural and social by the way of establishing a criterion of demarcation between "mature science," consisting of research programs, and "immature science," consisting of a mere patched up pattern of trial and error. Mature science, unlike pedestrian trial and error, has heuristic power, whereas immature science should be formed in accordance with the positive heuristic of a genuine research program. This new requirement brings scientists to the problem of continuity and change in science.

The strength of Lakatos's research program based on the physical sciences is to emphasize the importance of the hard core and the protecting belt in theory-building, but it does not suffice to offer a comparative way to rebuild Sun Zi's and Clausewitz' strategies within the context of contemporary East Asian limited wars. To understand these classical strategies requires a research program to be modified and meshed with comparative method in order to meet the needs of comparative political, military, and technological inquiries. Just as other research programs essentially rested on the regularities and uniformities of the hard sciences, the comparative method provides the primary criterion for judging the quality of research in political science. It becomes "one of the basic scientific methods" aimed at discovering, explaining, and establishing general empirical relationships among variables through qualitative analysis, not a method of measurement. But in comparative politics, political scientists are, Arend Lijphart contends, deeply frustrated by two methodological problems: "many variables, small number of cases" and "the fallacy of attaching too much significance to negative findings."⁷ These two problems are closely associated. The former is common to virtually

⁶ Ibid., p. 86.

⁷ Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method" The American Political Science Review vol. 65, 1971: 682.

all social science research regardless of the particular method applied to it; the latter is peculiar to the comparative method and renders the problem of handling many variables more difficult to solve. "Many variables, small number of cases" forces social scientists to shift from a comparative method to other methods such as a statistical, or a case, or across-national study. Such a shift allows the social scientists to test hypotheses against as large a sample as possible, or conduct intensive comparative analysis of a few cases, or test either "macro hypotheses concerning the interrelations of structural elements of total systems" or "micro replications" designed to "test out in other national and cultural settings a proposition already validated in one setting." This problem may contribute to what John Galtung called traditional quotation and illustration methodology, where cases are picked in accordance with the hypotheses, which are rejected if one deviant case is found. Deviant cases weaken a probabilistic hypothesis, but they can only invalidate it if they turn up in sufficient numbers to make the hypothesized relationships disappear altogether.

Lijphart proposes three ways to overcoming methodological barriers. The first is to increase the number of cases to as many as possible, while reducing the property-space of the analysis--the focus on key variables. The great innovations of comparative politics such as Parsonian theory and Gabriel Almond's functional approach, have sought to improve or provide universally applicable vocabularies of basic politically relevant concepts.⁸ Such restatements of variables in comparable terms make many previously inaccessible cases available for comparative analysis. Moreover, the possibilities of "longitudinal" (cross-historical) extension, together with geographical analysis, result in

⁸ Gabriel A. Almond, "Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics" in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds. The Politics of Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960); Stanley Rothman, "Functionalism and Its Critics: An Analysis of the Writings of Gabriel Almond" Political Science Reviewer no. 1, 1971: 236-276; Talcott Parsons, The Social System (New York: Free Press, 1951); and Harold Kaplan, "The Parsonian Image of Social Structure and Its Relevance for Political Science" Journal of Politics vol. 30, 1968: 883-909.

the enlargement of as many historical cases as possible. Meanwhile, the combination of two or more variables that express an essentially similar underlying characteristic into a single variable will eventually reduce the number of "property-space," i.e., cells in the matrix representing the relationship, while increasing the number of cases in each cell correspondingly. In certain cases, to reduce the number of classes into which the variables are divided is achieved by simplifying a set of several categories into a dialectical relationship. In other words, the comparative analysis must escape from the danger of being overwhelmed by large numbers of variables. Therefore, it must restrict itself to the really key variables, eliminating those of only marginal importance.

Second, the comparative analysis should focus on comparable cases. Comparable cases offer particularly good opportunities for the application of the comparative method, since they allow the establishment of relationships among a few variables, while other variables are controlled. The way to maximize comparability is to conduct the area analysis of comparative politics. This approach lends itself well to the application of the comparative method because of the cluster of characteristics that the areas tend to have in common and that can, therefore, be used as controls. "Area studies are," argues Gunnar Heckscher, "of the very essence of comparative government." Furthermore, "the area concept will," contend Roy Macridis and Richard Cox, "be of great value, since certain political processes will be compared between units within the area against a common background of similar trait configuration."⁹

Third, comparative analysis is closely connected with the case study method; certain types of case studies can even be considered implicit parts of the comparative method. The great advantage of the case study is to focus on a single intensively examined case contributing to the establishment of general propositions and theory-

⁹ Gunnar Heckscher, The Study of Comparative Government and Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1957) and Roy C. Macridis, "Comparative Politics and the Study of Government: The Search for Focus" Comparative Politics no. 1, 1968: 79-90.

building in political science, although it may constitute neither the basis for a valid generalization nor the ground for disproving an established generalization. "Just as the analytical power of the comparative method increases the closer it approximates the experimental methods, so the analytical power of the case study method increases the more it approximates the comparative method in the form of deviant case analysis."¹⁰ Such analysis is the study of single cases known to deviate from established generalizations, i.e., uncovering relevant additional variables that were not considered previously, or refining definitions of some or all of the variables.

Lakatos' research program and Lijphart's comparative method provide the criteria for the evaluation of scientific traditions, and ask penetrating questions that may help understand the strategy of East Asian limited wars. Nevertheless, their fundamental weakness is to separate facts from values in proving or falsifying regularities and uniformities which largely rest on physics or cast-iron science. As a result, their implications for social science in general and political science in particular appear to have limited application, because the properties of political, military, and social realities are different from those of "hard" science. Almond explains the soft nature of social science. The regularities that social scientists discover are imbedded in history and involve recurrent passing-through of large numbers of human memories, learning processes, human goal-seeking impulses and choices among alternatives. They appear to have a short half-life or decay because of the memory, creative searching, and learning that underlie them. Social science itself may contribute to this decay, since learning increasingly includes not only learning from "experience," but "scientific research itself." Therefore, social science is not simply a set of methods extracted from mathematical physics, as positivist philosophers might have social scientists believe; it is ultimately a

¹⁰ Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science" in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds. The Handbook of Political Science (New York: American University Press, 1970) 86-87.

commitment to explore and an attempt to understand a given segment of empirical reality. The means employed to pursue this goal should be secondary: in "good science," research methods are fit to the subject matter, rather than the subject matter distorted in order to fit it to a preordained notion of "scientific method." The lesson that social scientists have learned from the physical sciences is that "they need to be freed themselves from copying the research methods of the hard sciences and to reconstruct their own notion of science and their own methodological approach appropriate to the particular subject matter."¹¹ Like other fields of social science, strategic studies have both soft and hard characteristics, since decisions affecting war and peace are made by individuals. These people have free will, but they may also feel such powerful constraints that strong and unchanging patterns will emerge. The important regularities and uniformities in perception and misperception and the exceptions coexist in the field. Therefore, to progress scientifically, strategic studies require their own philosophy of science primarily based on explanatory strategies, possibilities, and obligations appropriate to war as well as political and social realities.¹² Building the bridge between physical regularities and uniformities and political reality and creativity will eventually provide a rational way to solve the dilemma of "hard" physical science and "soft" strategic studies.

The combination of the research program, the comparative method, and the ramifications of the softness of social science constitutes the research method for my thesis, which concentrates on the hard-cores and the protective belt that bolster my capacity to understand reality, on comparable cases explaining continuity of and changes in strategy, and on both facts and values that demonstrate scientific and cultural features

¹¹ Gabriel A. Almond and Stephen Genco, "Clouds, Clocks, and the Study of Politics" in Gabriel A. Almond, A Discipline Divided: Schools and Sects in Political Science (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1990) 32-61 and Kenneth J. Arrow, "Methodological Individualism and Social Knowledge" American Economic Review vol. 2, 1994: 8.

¹² Robert Jervis, "Models and Cases in the Study of International Conflict" Journal of International Affairs no. 1, 1990: 99.

of strategy. For Sun Zi and Clausewitz, the state and the military are the determinants of strategy. The state as a unitary rational actor protects its power positions in the international community by waging limited war. In doing so, the state carefully calculates the costs and benefits of military action seeking to rationalize its expected utility by maintaining the balance between the state and the military, although it may be difficult under conditions of uncertainty and without sufficient information about alternatives or resources to conduct a full review of all possible courses of action. The military as an instrument strives for limited objectives in combat by correlating operational art and psychological force. Lack of automatic adjustment mechanisms operating within the state to assure the internal-external balance requires the state to balance expectations and realities. Such balance concerning domestic sectors occurs when the state adjusts its behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of other sectors through a process of policy coordination.¹³ It creates cooperation or the harmony among the state, the military, and society that validates, shapes, and determines the external behavior of the state; international environments in turn influence and reshape the behavior of the state in cooperating with others for the purpose of reaching its expected, but limited political objectives. Such interaction between domestic and international politics in seeking cooperation on the establishment of limits forms the basic structure of strategy of limited war. Accordingly, Sun Zi and Clausewitz present two assumptions that become the hard core of strategy: the balance between civilian control and military autonomy creates the environment in which the state can nurture explicit or tacit rules for guiding limited war to avert non-controlled expansion of violence; the balance between operational art and psychological force enables the military as an instrument of the state to seek limited victory through the distribution of costs and benefits between states.

¹³ Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) 51.

However, the nature of the contemporary state and military appears totally different from that of Sun Zi's and Clausewitz' states and militaries and, more importantly, technology or military technological innovations has contributed to strategy with its own trends that are less deterministic or functional, but no less influential in their impacts on strategy. The anomalies emerging from this change suggest that classical strategies cannot fully explain the contemporary strategy of limited war. Technology as the protective belt must be created in preserving the credibility of the hard cores.¹⁴ Limited war requires limits. Such limits call for explaining the extent to which the state keeps war as limited as possible through the distribution of costs and benefits between states and through the employment of limited political, military, and technological power for limited objectives without raising the level of fighting. Within this context, the strategy of limited war rests on cooperation between domestic and international politics through adjustment of the relations between subjective expectations and objective realities, in an effort to escape from increasing violence.¹⁵ In other words, sound strategy should optimally coordinate the action and reaction of the state to avoid either overreaction leading to escalation or poor reaction contributing to the failure of strategy, or contradiction between a deficient supply of resources and effective resources demand as well as between oversupply of resources and insufficient demand. To seek a rational value-satisfying balance of ends and means, this strategy assumes that these elements are essentially interrelated, interdependent, and complemented; they are prone to encounter

¹⁴ Regarding military technological revolution, see Carl G. Jacobsen, ed. The Uncertain Course: New Weapons, Strategies, and Mind-Set (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987) and William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Forces, and Society (Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 1982)

¹⁵ Concerning cooperation, see, Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980); Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony; Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision-Making, and System Structure in International Crisis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977); Kenneth A. Oye, Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); and Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1984).

all differences and distinctions generated by the interaction between domestic and international politics.

Such strategy attempts to avoid extreme formulations. At one end of the spectrum is overemphasis on the external behavior of the state, which, simply pursues the use of force to reach political objectives regardless of the responses of other states. At the opposite end, or extreme, is overemphasis on the internal relationships among the state, the military, and technology which effectively downplays the interaction between the action and the reaction of states in war. This thesis is primarily interested in the middle spectrum, i.e. the strategy of limited war involves both fighting and bargaining, requiring the state to manage not only its internal relations as between the state, the military, and technology, to achieve the necessary consensus on limits, but also its external relations with other states, to reach explicit or tacit agreement on limits to avert unwanted escalation that refers "action that crosses a saliency which defines the current limits of a war and that occurs in a context in which the actor cannot know the full consequences of his action."¹⁶ Strategy to be presented in this thesis rests on a set of the hard cores--the state and the military--and the protective belt--technology.

The State

Following Sun Zi's and Clausewitz' traditions, central to this hard core is the state's control over limited objectives through cooperation between domestic and international politics in making explicit or tacit rules for guiding war. In limited war, the state makes strategy to conduct war, what guide what to command, and how to implement commands designed to maintain wars within designated limits. Since there is no automatic surety

¹⁶ Concerning the term escalation, see: Lawrence Freedman, "Escalation/Limited War: the US View" in Carl G. Jacobsen, ed. Strategic Power: USA/USSR (London: Macmillan Press, 1990) 157-161; Richard Smoke, War: Controlling Escalation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977) 35; and Herman Kahn, On Escalation (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965).

that the expected political objectives of the state naturally corresponds to those of the military or that the military naturally recognizes, accepts, and sustains those of the state, the state must manage the extent to which force can be utilized to achieve limited objectives. This distinctive characteristic shows that the achievement of the expected political objectives by the use of force needs a strong central agency responsible for coordinating the correspondence between political and military interests. The state itself becomes such an agency to control the military in focusing the political, military, and technological resources on its expected strategic objectives. This state-centric nature of limited war reflects the fact that the state seeks its own self-interests in terms of power. "Each state pursues its own interest, however defined, in ways it judges best." Although the state may explore other ways than force to settle conflict, force appears to be "a means of achieving the external ends of states because there exists no consistent, reliable process of reconciling the conflicts of interests that inevitably arise among similar units in a condition of anarchy."¹⁷ Regardless of peaceful or non-peaceful approaches, the state is always a central agent for guiding limited war.

The state in the thesis is defined as the authoritarian state. The essence of this state is control, either objective behavioral and institutional or subjective and ideological, though scholars may, to some extent, agree or disagree on it. Carl Frederick identifies Sun Zi's and Clausewitz' style authoritarian state favoring control and coercion in the 20th century as the totalitarian state with a pattern of the interrelated traits and views: (1) a totalist ideology; (2) a single party committed to this ideology and usually led by a dictator; (3) a fully developed secret police and three kinds of monopoly: mass communications, operational weapons, and all organizations.¹⁸ For him, monopoly control

¹⁷ Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959) 238.

¹⁸ Carl J. Frederick, Michael Curtis, and Benjamin R. Barber. Totalitarianism in Perspective: Three Views (London: Pall Mall Press, 1969) 126.

is not necessarily exercised by the party, but, sometimes, is in the hands of whatever "elite" rules the particular society, thereby constituting its regime. Karl Deutsch describes the three most important characteristics as: "extreme mobilization of effort," "unity of command," and "effective power of enforcement." But, these characteristics must be dependent on some conditions without which they cannot be maintained. "The mobilization of resources," human and material, relies on a freedom of previous commitments which is constantly threatened by the possibility of a relapse of the population into apathy or resentment and by the previous political, organizational, or ideological commitments of the regime itself. "The unity of command" mainly depends on a unity of memories or a coordination of information channels and communication processes, which is constantly threatened by the tendency toward a diversification of memories and by the danger of overloading undiversified centralized decision making facilities. "Effective power of enforcement" is threatened by its dependence on at least limited popular support and by the tendency toward a downward migration of power that is inherent in most hierarchical systems of command.¹⁹ According to him, state's control is relative. Harry Eckstein and David Apter state that the essence of such a regime is to annihilate all boundaries between the state and the groupings of society. Thus, there are no institutional boundaries in the state.²⁰ Obviously, these scholars attempt to isolate objective attributes that describe the behavioral and institutional characteristics. Such analyses are intended to eschew or at least minimize the questions of ideology and ends.

On the other hand, Hannah Arendt claims that total terror is the essence of the regime.²¹ Her analysis appears to focus on "ideological content," "system goals," and

¹⁹ Karl Deutsch, "Cracks in the Monolith: Possibilities and Patterns of Disintegration in Totalitarian Systems" in Carl J. Frederick ed. Totalitarianism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954) 308-309.

²⁰ Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter. Comparative Politics: A Reader (New York: the Free Press, 1963) 434.

²¹ Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Cleveland: World Publishing, Meridian ed., 1958) 466.

"other relatively abstract non measurable attributes" of the totalitarian state. Sigmund Neumann argues that what distinguishes a totalitarian state from an absolutist state is not primarily the caesaristic element. . .but rather the destruction of the line between the state and society and the total politicization of society through the device of a monopolistic party.²² The fusing of the state, society, and ideology under a monopolistic party becomes the salient features of the regime. Zbigniew Brzezinski asserts that the totalitarian state is a new form of government falling into the general classification of dictatorship, a system in which technologically advanced instruments of political power are wielded, without restraint, by the centralized leadership of an elite movement, in order to effect a total social revolution on the basis of ideological assumptions proclaimed by the leadership in a context prescribing and enforcing the coerced unanimity of the entire population.²³ Coercion through ideological control is the real nature of the totalitarian state. Despite their differences, objective and subjective approaches share the idea that the totalitarian state widens the scope of politics to embrace the whole of human existence and rejects boundaries between the state and the groups of society, since the political system is coherent and united in doctrinal persuasion and political action. In other words, the state dominates all political, military, and societal activities.

Effective control, objective and subjective, demands that the political and administrative structures be subordinated to a hegemonic party, hierarchically organized along centralist lines, or to a dictator. This party or dictator plays the role by supervising, coordinating, and directing the functions of political, military, and social institutions. From the pinnacle of politics, the party or dictator acts as an integrator by setting public policy and assuring that other institutions follow through faithfully with its

²² Sigmund Neumann, Permanent Revolution: Totalitarianism in the Age of International Civil War (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965) xii.

²³ Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967) 46-47.

implementation. Despite these functions of direction, arbitration, and integration carried out more or less successfully in specific instances, they are always and everywhere a function that is in principle the preserve of the party or dictator and is thus the essential content of the role of political leadership. When a ruling party or dictator is not successfully performing such functions, the political system is almost always in a clear state of crisis.

The absence of strict authority and of elite boundaries between the state and political institutions such as the military, gives politics its distinctive nature. But exercise of control cannot be complete without the complexity of governing that requires a division of labor among various political institutions. The division of labor indeed contributes to some degree of institutional autonomy, at least vis-à-vis the implementation of policy. The boundaries or "the islands of separateness" facilitates the ties between the state and its institutions within the context of overall political subordination to the state. According to Frederick, in spite of the effort of the totalitarians to destroy all separate group autonomies, there remain in all these regimes some groups that manage some resistance. The family, the churches, the universities and other centers of technical knowledge, the writers, and the artists must, if they are to survive, resist the total demands of the rulers.²⁴ Autonomy also exists in other areas. Under totalitarian regimes, considerable autonomy has always been present in an area like science, partly because of its intrinsic utility and partly because it is unlikely to threaten the basic principles of the regime.²⁵ Such a state is more monopolistic than monolithic.²⁶ This monopolistic state decides to wage or not to wage limited war to pursue its interests.

²⁴ Carl J. Friederich, Michael Curtis, and Benjamin R. Barber, Totalitarianism in Perspective p. 151.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 106.

²⁶ Raymond Aron, Democracy and Totalitarianism: A Theory of Political System (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1990) 44-51.

The state rationally makes strategy to wage limited war through effective control over the military and makes the military an instrument through which to pursue its interests. Civilian control over the military reflects the long-standing relationship between the state and the military, designed to keep soldiers out of politics by promoting professionalism. Military professionalism allows specialists in violence to enjoy their autonomy in managing their business--operations and battles. The essence of such autonomy is that war as an autonomous and yet instrumental science has its own grammar and regulations which, in turn, require military professionals to develop their own expertise at this grammar and at these regulations without extraneous interference. Samuel Huntington sees that professionalism is composed of three elements: expertise, responsibility, and corporate loyalty to fellow-practitioners. The distribution of political power between the military and the civilian is conducive to the emergence of professional attitudes and behavior among soldiers. Military professionals are subordinated to and yet independent of politics. "Just as war serves the ends of politics, the military profession serves the ends of the state. Yet the statesman must recognize the integrity of the profession and its subject matter. The military man has the right to expect political guidance from the statesman. Civilian control exists when there is this proper subordination of an autonomous profession to the ends of policy."²⁷ As a result, objective civilian control, rather than subjective control over the military becomes the ideal model of the professional army that militarizes the military and makes it the tool of the state. Its very essence is the recognition of autonomous military professionalism.

Civilian control can be achieved by two levels of civil-military relations. On the power level, the key issue is the power of the officer corps relative to civilian groups in society. Power has two forms: formal authority and informal influence. Formal authority

²⁷ Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: the Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957) 71-72.

involves control of one person over the behavior of another on the basis of their respective positions in a defined social structure. It is an attribute of statutes and positions and becomes ordered, structured, or legitimate power. Informal relationships exist where one person or group of persons controls the behavior of other persons not because they occupy particular positions in a formal structure, but because they control other sanctions or rewards. This influence may stem from personality, wealth, knowledge, prestige, friendship, kinship, or a variety of other sources. It always inheres in specific individuals or groups, not in the roles which those individuals or groups occupy. On the ideological level, the issue is the compatibility of the professional military ethic with the political ideologies prevailing in society. The military ethic is concrete, permanent, and universal. In contrast, there are a variety of civilian minds different from one another that may be compatible in some areas with the military ethic and incompatible in other areas. If the political ideology is inherently anti-military, the military acquires political power only by sacrificing their professionalism and by adhering to values and attitudes dominant within society. In such an anti military society, military professionalism and civilian control are maximized by the military's renouncing authority and influence, leading a weak, isolated existence, divorced from the general life of society.²⁸ The realization of objective civilian control depends on the balance between the power of the military and the ideology of society.

On the basis of his study of civil-military relations in the developing states, Morris Janowitz finds that most, if not all, political control over the military by totalitarian states rests on a centralized one party political system. With the extensive resources under the control of the totalitarian party, the military supports the political elite, while the political elite is dedicated to revitalizing the military. The expanded military profession is given an area of professional competence within the strategic goals of the totalitarian party.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 94.

Political control of the totalitarian variety is enforced by the secret police, by infiltration of party members into the military hierarchy, by the party's arming its own military units, and by control of the system of officer selection.²⁹ Thus, civilian control seeks to minimize military power in domestic politics by professionalizing the military and by rendering it politically instrumental. The military autonomy lies in its internal organization. The military organizational format designed to carry out military functions in managing violence, as compared to economic and civilian functions, contributes to a unified organization with internal cohesion, the feeling of group solidarity and the capacity for collective action, since it constantly requires preparation for combat.³⁰ Military technology further strengthens such internal cohesion. A trend toward increased transferability of the officers' skill to domestic political activity has grown as a result of military command that requires elements of persuasion and coordination, but military professionals have important limitations in producing leadership skills in bargaining and political communications. The skill structure of the military, i.e., internal division of labor--heroic leaders, military managers, and military technologists, widens the gap between the civilian and the military spheres. These soldiers are mainly recruited from middle and lower middle class groups. The combination of hinterland and middle-class social origins plus professional military education does not produce a traditional conservative outlook, but, in varying forms, a modernizing, collectivistic orientation. Their ideological orientations such as nationalism and puritanical outlook differ from Western military professionals in terms of their greater acceptance of collectivist forms of economic enterprise. They are more hostile toward politicians and organized political groups. Their political behavior is essentially conditioned by their profession's internal

²⁹ Morris Janowitz, Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations (Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 1964) 80.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 107-150.

organization. The degree of cohesiveness is a function of a wide variety of specific sociological and organizational factors. Armies with high internal cohesion will have greater capacity to intervene in domestic politics.

Military autonomy is in fact embedded in complex military technology. As military technology becomes complex, Eric Nordlinger contends that the state has been forced to cede greater institutional autonomy to the military, at least on the issues in which the military holds a monopoly of technical knowledge.³¹ A political sociology of the military explains the basic characteristics of officer corps in its involvement in politics. First, the officer corps in developing countries is a middle class preserve. The officer corps is predominantly recruited from men who come from middle-class backgrounds. The middle class is interested in the preservation of its privileged material position where it is already firmly entrenched economically, and in the enhancement of its position through economic expansion and modernization where it is not yet securely established. Second, communal identifications and loyalties are not markedly weakened within the military. The officer corps may well be cohesive, but its unity does not grow out of secular and national values. On the contrary, it stems from communal homogeneity and exclusiveness. Third, the military is a bureaucratic organization. Military authority hierarchically flows downward and responsibility upward. It differs from the civilian bureaucracies in the forcefulness, extensiveness, and explicitness of its hierarchical structure. Fourth, officers are professional managers of force and violence, since they are trained and skilled in directing, administering, and operating an organization whose primary activity is preparing for the application of force and violence. They have attained special abilities in managing force and in directing enlisted men who actually apply the violence. This expertise is attained in a training program that includes courses

³¹ Eric A Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice, Inc., 1977) 48.

in strategy and tactics, troop command, weapons technology, transport of men and supplies, and usually basic engineering and administration. Fifth, their political attitudes have an especially pronounced impact on their actions. The political attitudes are firmly internalized because of the intensive and lengthy socialization experiences. The military comes close to being a total institution: officers work and live within its confines, military life is sharply differentiated from civilian life, officers are often segregated and occasionally isolated from civilians, and they remain within the same institution throughout their careers. But military autonomy may under certain circumstances lead to military coups.³²

Central to military intervention for S.E. Finer is the military consciousness of having an identity that is separate from, different from and yet juxtaposed with that of civilians and politicians. This awareness permits the military to conceive that it has a unique duty to watch over the national interest. The national interest constitutes a motive; but it is colored by sectional and regional interests, by the corporate self-interest of the military as such, and by the individual careerism, egotism, and ambition of its members. Thus, the military has three important political advantages over civilian organizations. First, modern armies are cohesive and hierarchical. Second, the army is an instrument involving centralized command, hierarchy, discipline, intercommunication, and esprit de corps and corresponding isolation and self sufficiency. Third, military virtues--bravery, discipline, obedience, self-abnegation, poverty, and patriotism--are associated, by long-standing, with the soldier's choice of career. They are values which all esteem. Where they are identified with the military, these values acquire a moral halo which is politically of profound importance.³³ Despite the fundamental differences in the militaries of the

³² Ibid., pp. 31-61.

³³ S.E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: the Role of the Military in Politics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988) 5-63.

developed and developing states, military institutions share the characteristics of expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. They enjoy their autonomy, total or relative and subjective or objective. Even though military autonomy may increase or decrease prospects for military intervention in politics, civilian intervention in military internal affairs may also damage military professionalism. Civilian control is aimed at maximizing professionalism, in which the military retains the right to relative institutional independence. Maintenance of their structural integrity becomes a necessary condition for performing the designated functions of maintaining internal order and waging war.

At the international level, the state is assumed to be a rational actor able to carefully calculate the costs of alternative courses of action in order to achieve its expected objectives during limited war. Under conditions of uncertainty and without necessarily having sufficient information about all possible alternatives or resources, this rational actor may not however conduct a full review of all possible courses of action as a result of shifts of the distribution of power in an international system over a period of time, or in the behavior of other states, or in the forces of nature. It becomes subject to limitations on its cognitive abilities, which then combine with uncertainties inherent in its environments, renders it unable to make rational decisions. Herbert Simon explains this fatal weakness of a rational actor. "Particularly important is the distinction between those theories that locate all the conditions and constraints in the environment, outside the skin of the rational actor, and those theories that postulate important constraints arising from the limitations of the actor himself as an information processor. Theories that incorporate constraints on the information-processing capacities of the actor may be called theories of bounded rationality."³⁴ For him, the sources of the difficulties in rational calculations spring both from the external world, which poses risk and uncertainty, incomplete

³⁴ Herbert A. Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality: Behavioral Economics and Business Organization vol. 2, (Cambridge: the MIT Press, 1982) 409.

information about possible alternatives, and complexity in the cost function or other environmental constraints, and from the cognitive limitations of a rational actor. Similarly, business firms face the same dilemma. Certain parameters of one or both of the demand and cost functions can be regarded as assumed to random variables with known distribution. As a consequence, the assumption that the rational actor possesses perfect knowledge about these functions has been replaced by the assumption that he has perfect knowledge about their distributions. This change in assumptions may, in turn, make it easier or more difficult to perform the calculations needed to arrive at the optimum decision--usually it is much more difficult than in the corresponding case of certainty. The rational actor has only incomplete information about possible alternatives in finding the best way to pursue his expected gains. Complexity in the cost function along with other environmental constraints often prevents it from calculating the best course of action. Therefore, the rational actor seeks "satisficing," rather than "maximizing," processes that denote problem solving and decision making that set an aspiration level, and searches until an alternative is found that is satisfactory by the aspiration level criterion, which alternative is then selected.

Nevertheless, neoclassical theories focus on the assumption of perfect maximization. Simon asserts "Limits and costs of information are introduced, not as psychological characteristics of the decision maker, but as part of his technological environment. Hence, the new theories do nothing to alleviate the computational complexities facing the decision maker do not see him coping with them by heroic approximation, simplifying and satisficing, but simply magnifying and multiply them." Under such circumstances, "he needs to compute not merely the shapes of his supply and demand curves, but in addition, the costs and benefits of computing those shapes to greater accuracy as well. Hence, to some extent, the impression that these new theories deal with the hitherto ignored phenomena of uncertainty and information transmission is

illusory."³⁵ According to him, people are searching for satisficing levels that are changed and adjusted from time to time in response to new information available to decision makers about environments. The rational actors laboring under bounded rationality cannot calculate the costs and benefits of each alternative course of action on each issue. Therefore, they should simplify their own decision-making processes in order to function effectively at all. Simon's analysis of bounded rationality is echoed by Glenn Snyder's and Paul Diesing's study of bargaining, decision making, and system structure in international crisis and by Robert Keohane's study of cooperation. For Snyder and Diesing, bounded rationality reminds people that a crisis bargainer always has a number of conflicting objectives in an international crisis. In addition to the main objective of stopping the opponent or taking control of some territory, there are always other objectives, for example to maintain peace, or to maintain the loyalty of an ally, or to maintain and improve bargaining reputation. Thus, a strategy is acceptable only if it achieves each of the objectives. The process of setting objectives is a process of listing constraints and setting levels of aspiration or acceptability for each constraint. This theory, "by providing a practical way to deal with the difficulties a little, loses sight of the ideal goal of the whole process." Furthermore, "change of aspiration level may occur only once or twice in a whole crisis, so that the approximation to the ideal may be very limited indeed." In other words, sometimes, it is difficult and perhaps even humanly impossible to find the absolutely best alternative. Ordinary human decisions fall short of the ideal in various way. In international politics, states simply seek a satisfying course of action.³⁶ Similarly, Keohane argues that people simplify their decision making processes in order to achieve acceptable alternative. In ordinary life, people satisfice all the time. They usually economize on information by developing habits, by devising operating rules to simplify

³⁵ Ibid., p. 485.

³⁶ Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict among Nations pp. 345-346, p. 363, and p. 387.

calculation in situations that repeat themselves, and by adopting general principles that we expect, in the long run, to yield satisfactory results.³⁷ The limitations on behavior of the state demonstrate that the state is looking for acceptable objectives in international politics and in limited war scenarios.

The inability of the state to effectively evaluate information about war requires the state to keep its options open when seeking a satisfying way to attain its limited objectives. Through explicit or implicit communication, states cooperate with each other in maintaining war as limited as possible. Kenneth Oye defines cooperation as "conscious policy coordination, necessary to the realization of mutual benefits." For him, cooperation is desirable but not autonomic. The capacity of states to cooperate under anarchy, to bind themselves to a mutually beneficial course of action without resort to any ultimate central authority, is vital to the realization of a common good.³⁸ Robert Axelrod argues that cooperation is to pursue the self-interests of individuals without the aide of a central authority to force them to cooperate with each other. Despite lack of a central authority, the potential for cooperation arises when each player can help the other. The dilemma arises when giving this help is costly. The opportunity for mutual gains from cooperation comes into play when the gains from the other's cooperation are larger than the costs of one's own cooperation.³⁹ Even though cooperation varies among issues and over time, both sides share the idea that they conduct war within limited areas by using limited forces. But cooperation is not equivalent to harmony, which requires complete identity or complementarity of interests. It can only take place in situations that contain a mixture of conflicting and complementary interests. It reflects partially successful efforts to

³⁷ Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony p. 112.

³⁸ Kenneth A. Oye, "Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies" in Kenneth A. Oye, ed. Cooperation under Anarchy p. 6.

³⁹ Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation p. 6 and p. 173.

overcome conflict, real or potential. Without the specter of conflict, there is no need to cooperate.⁴⁰ In other words, states adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others in order to cooperate. Although achieving cooperation in war is difficult as a result of the absence of common government or international organizations to enforce rules of cooperation, common interests exist in situations where states try to avoid military escalation. Issue-linkage may be employed by powerful states seeking to use resources from one issue-area to affect the behavior of others elsewhere, or it may be employed by outsiders achieving objectives outside war. Linkage can be beneficial to both sides in a negotiation and can facilitate agreement that might not otherwise be possible.⁴¹ Both sides understand that a threat of military escalation is costly when it fails, but a concession is also costly when it succeeds. A fundamental principle for such cooperation is reciprocity in which cooperation is achieved not by providing benefits unilaterally, but by providing conditional cooperation. In war, each state, contends Jervis, knows that others see war as too costly to be a viable option; this allows each to use the common interest of avoiding catastrophe as a lever to extract competitive gains. But because the costs of war are high, states have incentives to reduce conflict, and are willing to accept substantial risks of being exploited in order to decrease the chance that their policies will lead to unnecessary competition.⁴² Cooperation becomes the way to help avoid fatal escalation.

This hard core of strategy aims at strengthening state's control over limited objectives through cooperation between domestic and international politics in order to create explicit or tacit rules for guiding limited war. On the one hand, the state seeks

⁴⁰ Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony p. 54.

⁴¹ Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," in Kenneth A. Oye, ed. Cooperation under Anarchy, p. 239.

⁴² Robert Jervis, "From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation" in Kenneth A. Oye, Cooperation under Anarchy, p. 66.

effective control over the military in order to determine limits. But the military is granted autonomy because of its expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. Professional soldiers are experts on violence. Their responsibility is to defend the national interest by the use of force. On the other hand, the state has great difficulties in evaluating information about possible alternative courses of action in limited war. This constraint prevents the state from making rational decisions. The barriers to rational decisions options compel the state to cooperate with other states in order to rationalize the means employed and the ends to be attained. The internal and external interaction fosters cooperation between states so as to clarify the limits of war. These limits become the rules for guiding war to avoid undue military escalation.

The Military

At the heart of this hard core according to Sun Zi's and Clausewitz' traditions is control over operational art and psychological force within mutually recognized limits through the distribution of costs and benefits on the battlefield. As an instrument, the military rationally maintains the balance between operational art and psychological force either in accumulating resources or in complementing them in order to demoralize the enemy. The immediate objective is to defeat the enemy on the battlefield, not to overthrow the enemy's state or to send troops to occupy that state. Thus, it is essential to strike the enemy's center of gravity through mobility and combined arms by concentrating forces to achieve the limited objectives; morale, cohesion, and esprit de corps sustain the combat effectiveness of soldiers.

The term center of gravity, defined by Clausewitz as "the hub of all power and movement on which everything depends" and as "the point against which all energies should be directed," is mainly concerned with the questions of how, when, and where the military decisively engages the enemy to attain the immediate military objectives for which the state fights on the battlefield. In other words, the center of gravity is the center

of power. Political power is "the mutual relations of control among the holders of public authority and between the latter and the people at large." The essence of politics, domestic and international, is a struggle for power, conceptualized as the goal of politics.⁴³ Power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains control of man over man. "A political policy seeks to keep power."⁴⁴ Accordingly, the use of force for the state whose objective is to keep power and not to change the distribution of power in its favor is to apply a policy of status quo. The policy of the status quo is to maintain the distribution of power which exists at a particular moment in history. Klaus Knorr holds that power may be used either coercively or noncoercively. When power is used coercively, for instance, an actor (B) is influenced if he adapts his behavior in compliance with, or in anticipation of, another actor's (A) demands, wishes, or proposals. But when it is used noncoercively, it means all influence. Knorr defines the term power as "only exercise of coercive influence."⁴⁵ By viewing power as an influence relationship, Kalevi Holsti suggests that power is a multidimensional concept consisting of "(1) the acts by which one actor influences another actor; (2) the capabilities utilized for this purpose; and (3) the response elicited." Thus Holsti conceptualizes power as a means to an end, even though some political leaders may seek influence as an end in itself, as some people may value money not only for what it can buy but for its own sake. For him, power is "the general capacity of a state to control the behavior of others."⁴⁶ Karl Deutsch contends that

⁴³ This thesis follows Morgenthau's approach to power. He thinks of the rational statesman as ever striving to accumulate more and more power. Power becomes an end in itself. In contrast, neorealists see power as a possibly useful means, with states running risks if they have either too little or too much of it.

⁴⁴ Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967) 36.

⁴⁵ Klaus Knorr, The Power of Nations: the Political Economy of International Relations (New York: Basic Books, 1975) 4.

⁴⁶ Kalevi J. Holsti, International Politics: a Framework for Analysis (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967) 193.

power is a symbol of the ability to change the distribution of results and particularly the results of people's behavior. In this respect, power can be compared in some ways to money, which is our usual standardized symbol of purchasing power--that is, of our ability to change the distribution of goods and resources.⁴⁷ In spite of their focus on the different aspects of power, these authors' definitions emphasize the ability to influence and change one's status in the international system. For them, the use of force is the vehicle through which to pursue power.

The struggle for power among states is based on the national interest, as determined by the political traditions and the cultural context within which a state formulates its foreign policy. The national interest involves two elements: one that is logically required and in that sense necessary and one that is variable and determined by circumstances. Any foreign policy which operates under the standard of the national interest must obviously have some reference to the physical, political, and cultural entity. In a world, in which states compete with and oppose each other for power, the foreign policies of all states must consider survival as their minimum requirement. All states are compelled to protect the physical, political, and cultural identity against encroachments by other states. The national interest is identified with national survival. In isolation, for example, the determination of its content in a concrete situation is relatively simple, because it contains the integrity of the nation's territory, its political institutions, and its culture. As long as the world is divided into states, Morgenthau asserts, the national interest is the last word in international politics.⁴⁸ The legitimacy of the national interest is moreover determined in the face of possible usurpation by subnational, supranational, and other national interests. On the subnational level, the national interest may be shaped by

⁴⁷ Karl W. Deutch, The Analysis of International Relations (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1978) 45-46.

⁴⁸ Hans J. Morgenthau, "Another Great Debate: the National Interest of the United States" American Political Science Review vol. 46, 1952: 961-978.

particular ethnic and economic groups, who identify themselves with the national interest. This kind of national interest exerts constant pressure on the conduct of foreign policy, but it will normally evolve into a compromise between divergent sectional interests. The concept of the national interest, as it emerges from this contest and becomes the actual guide for foreign policy, may well fall short of what would be rationally required by the overall interests of the nation. On the supranational level, public and government officials, at least in their public utterances, attribute the values represented and the policies pursued by international organizations either as alternatives or as supplements to the values and policies for which the national government stands. In other words, the foreign policy of a nation should be identical with the policy of the international organizations, such as the United Nations. The real issue here is that the constitutional structure of international organizations and their procedural practices make it impossible for them to pursue interests apart from those of the member-states which dominate their policy-forming bodies. A powerful nation can determine the interest of international organizations and secure the interests which international organizations support. On the other-national level, the national interest must be defended against usurpation by non-national interests. Yet once that task is accomplished, a rational order must be established among the values which make up the national interest and among the resources to be committed to them. While the interests which a nation may pursue in its relations with other nations are of infinite variety and magnitude, the resources which are available for the pursuit of such interests are necessarily limited in quantity and kind.⁴⁹ No states have the resources to promote all desirable objectives with equal vigor; all states must therefore allocate their scarce resources as rationally as possible. In the end, all kinds of objectives, actual or potential, are justified in terms of national survival. Once their

⁴⁹ Ibid., pp. 969-970.

survival is assured, states may pursue lesser interest. Ignorance of the national interest will be at the risk of destruction

The conflicts between states are thus simple conflicts between competing survival impulses, in which each state seeks to guard its power and prestige against the peril of competing expressions of power and pride.⁵⁰ Because the very possession of power and prestige always involves some encroachment on the prestige and power of others, this conflict is by its nature a more stubborn and difficult one than the mere competition between various survival impulses in nature. National power is the projection of the will-to-power. When there are the fewer moral restraints on a state, the greater violence results at the national level. A state loses his identity, becoming instead a member of an anonymous mass. The tendencies toward power are magnified at the national, level.

Obviously, the center of gravity is the power center, which becomes the immediate target of limited operations and battles. Striking this center can directly demoralize the enemy. But defining such a target is complicated by the combat environments in which success is dependent on whether the enemy accepts limited defeat, rather than escalate war. This dilemma makes strategy conjectural, subtle, and indeterminate. War can be kept limited only if both parties desire to maintain control of military operations and battles. Since the military can never be certain how many forces the opponent will in fact commit to combat and since both feel obliged to guard against every contingency, "both will devise plans for limited war which approach the level of total war."⁵¹ The potential escalation of war that is closely associated with striking the center of gravity permanently haunts military commanders. The gradual expansion of the scale of war in eliminating the enemy center of gravity is largely rationalized by limited war's calling for the restricted,

⁵⁰ Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society (New York: Scribner's, 1947) xi-xii.

⁵¹ Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957) 140-141.

flexible, controlled, proportionate use of force needed to persuade the enemy to terminate the war.

The identification of the center of gravity creates operational and tactical coherence. The employment of military force to reach limited objectives in a theater of operations through the design, organization, and conduct of operations and battles, focuses on mobility that produces strategic initiatives and priorities aimed at setting and changing the terms of operations and battles by action. Mobility seeks to pit strengths against weaknesses to break the enemy's will to resist by following the principle of attacking weaknesses, while avoiding strengths. It operates faster than the enemy can react so that a given response will inevitably lag behind one's own decision cycle. Out-cycling the enemy ensures speed and surprise relative to the enemy, keeping the initiatives out of the enemy's hand. Mobility demands that commanders conceptualize the desired effect on the enemy and how all means available must be sequenced to achieve their objectives. Based on their conceptualization, they decide where, when, and for what purposes the forces seek or accept battles. Under the plan that establishes the path to the political objectives of war, commanders know when and where to precipitate operations and battles or decline to accept an enemy attempt to do the same. In other words, mobility is aimed at bringing about a quick victory and constantly forces the enemy to react to it, rather than merely reacting to enemy action. By both frustrating the enemy and preempting the enemy's ability to adjust to new environments, it demands a predisposition and the ability to act independently within the framework of the higher command's intent, stressing aggressive exploitation of opportunities. The military understands to what end mobility must be exercised, i.e., what effect on the enemy forces must be produced to secure the goals of limited operations.⁵² Based on a desire to circumvent a problem and

⁵² Jacob W. Kipp, "Conventional Force Modernization and the Asymmetries of Military Doctrine: Historical Reflections on Air/Land Battle and the Operational Maneuver Group" in Carl G. Jacobsen, ed. The Uncertain Course pp. 154-155 and Raoul Henri Alcala, "The United States and the Future of Land Warfare: the AirLand Battle" in Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, eds. Emerging Doctrines and Technologies:

attack it from a position of advantage rather than straight on, mobility stresses the intangible human factors of leadership, organization, cohesion, and morale. It relies more on speed and surprise as multipliers of combat power than on sheer weight of numbers. To trap the enemy, mobility seeks to exploit the enemy's weak spots and avoid his heavily defended areas.⁵³

Deception, closely associated with mobility, seeks to manipulate the enemy's perceptions of conditions on the battlefield, that is, to make the enemy do something he does not want to do, thus giving one a clear advantage. Successful deception requires clarified targets, namely, either enemy decision makers or commanders in hopes of affecting their military operations.⁵⁴ The best deception operations are those which deceive even friendly forces until the last possible moment. Because the entire force is involved in the deception effort, actual operations may have to be sequenced in order that they support or at least do not obviously conflict with the deception plan.

The arrangement of battlefield activities in space, time, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat effectiveness at the decisive point will almost invariably involve more than one arm or service. The battlefield is changing in a number of variables--speed, space, and time, becoming a geometric dimension. Commanders direct the proper generation, positioning, and application of combat power to the best joint effect in order to obtain the best result by applying all services' capabilities at the decisive time and place. They reinforce complementary effects of combining all available combat means, the ways in which friendly and enemy capabilities interact, mastery of time-space relationships, and unambiguous unity of purpose. The objective is to utilize every asset

Implications for Global and Regional Political and Military Balances (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1988) 180-181.

⁵³ Richard D. Hooker Jr., "Redefining Maneuver Warfare" Military Review Feb. 1992: 50-58 and John F. Antal, "Maneuver versus Attrition: a Historical Perspectives" Military Review Oct. 1992: 21-33.

⁵⁴ James R. Koch, "Operation Fortitude: the Backbone of Deception" Military Review March 1992: 66-77.

where, when, and in the way in which it will contribute most to superiority at the point of decision.⁵⁵ Therefore, units should share common expectations in plans and orders. This clear, concise intent is the commander's vision of what objectives are and how operations are conducted. The commander must take the time to reflect and think to set priorities determining the critical tasks. Flexible plans are founded on shared expectations and team work developed within the unit. Effective teams within a unit and across unit boundaries are requirements for battle success. On the battlefield, the military identifies the center of gravity by concentrating resources on these targets; mobility further emphasizes initiatives and priorities in eliminating these targets, and through combined operations and battles, the military reaches the expected objectives. The center of gravity, mobility, and combined arms are the foci of operational art on the battlefield.

In contrast, psychological force substantially strengthens, generates, and complements the effectiveness of operational art on the battlefield. Soldiers in combat, however, are affected by a variety of the stressors inherent in combat environments--threat of harm, noise, time pressure, hot and cold, and isolation--that impose severe debilitating effects on performance. The stressors in fact become the restraint that keeps a war limited. But the objective of limited operations and battles is to render the enemy powerless. To achieve this objective the commander needs to overcome psychological barriers by strengthening morale, cohesion, and the esprit de corps of the military. Morale is "a confident, resolute, willing, often self-sacrificing and courageous attitude of an individual to the functions or tasks demanded or expected of him by a group of which he is a part that is based upon such factors as pride in the achievements and aims of the group, faith in its leadership and ultimate success, a sense of fruitful participation in its

⁵⁵ Raoul Henri Alcala, "The United States and the Future of Land Warfare: the AirLand Battle," pp. 176-182.

work, and a devotion and loyalty to the other members of the group."⁵⁶ In other words, morale is the mental, emotional, and spiritual state of the individual within objective-oriented groups, expressed in the interaction between individual-level attributes and objective-oriented groups. Sometimes, it is impossible to identify a military ideology. But some common themes such as a strong sense of nationalism, a puritanical outlook, acceptance of extensive government control over social and economic change, and a deep distrust of organized civilian politics, can often be found to explain the professional officer political behavior.⁵⁷ These themes shape their political and military attitudes toward the state and their choices in either defending the established national interest or intervening in politics. Sometimes, officers' political attitudes are made up of beliefs, values, and norms--beliefs about the nature of reality, values regarding the kind of reality that is desired, and norms about what reality ought to be like. The political attitudes of officers have a decided impact on their behavior. Their attitudes toward political order, political activity, and the governing of the state form a mutually reinforcing pattern in coups or on the battlefield.⁵⁸ Thus, the morale of soldiers is not simply how they feel--happy, hopeful, confident, appreciated, worthless, sad, unrecognized, or depressed, but it is how they behave politically in combat and in politics.

Cohesion refers to the unity of soldiers in war and in peace. "When the soldier's immediate group, and its support formations, met his basic organic needs, offered him affection and esteem from both officers and comrades, supplied him with a sense of power and adequately regulated his relations with authority, the element of self-concern in battle, which would lead to disruption of the effective functioning of his primary

⁵⁶ Frederick J. Manning, "Morale, Cohesion, and Esprit de Corps" in Reuven Gal and A. David Mangelsdorff, eds. Handbook of Military Psychology (New York: John Wiley & Son, 1991) 454-455.

⁵⁷ Morris Janowitz, Military Institutions and Coercion pp.104-105.

⁵⁸ Eric A. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics p. 53.

group, was minimized."⁵⁹ Such group relationships bound soldiers together, to sustain the will, to meet the affection, and to commit to each other. Friendship strengthens the relationship among soldiers. Friendships are easily made by those who might never have been compatible at home, and are cemented under fire. "Such powerful forces are antisemitism, anticatholicism or differences between Northerners and Southerners are not likely to disturb interpersonal relationships in a combat crew. The comraderie is so effective that even the arbitrary distinctions imposed by the military caste system, probably one of the most rigid social devices in the world, are noticeably weakened."⁶⁰ The group relationship is, according to Huntington, based on the values, attitudes, and perspectives inherent in the performance of the professional military function and deducible from the nature of that function. The professional military ethic or mind for him derives from the peculiar expertise, responsibility, and corporateness of the military profession. It is concrete, permanent, and universal. The military emphasizes the importance of the group as against the individual. Success in any activity requires the subordination of the will of the individual to the will of the group. Tradition, esprit, unity, and community influence the behavior of professional soldiers.⁶¹ An army must be animated by consciousness of its martial purpose and inspired by a corporate spirit of unity and solidarity. Its organic solidarity, defined by Emile Durkheim as a system of different and special functions united by definite relationships, has to be supplemented by its mechanical solidarity, i.e., a more or less organized ensemble of the beliefs and the sentiments common to all the members of the group. This more or less organized ensemble of the beliefs and sentiments common to all members of the group is

⁵⁹ Frederick J. Manning, "Morale, Cohesion, and Esprit de Corps" in Reuven Gal and A. David Mangelsdorff, eds. Handbook of Military Psychology pp. 456-457.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 462.

⁶¹ Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State p. 61.

deliberately inculcated in armies and constitutes the vital spark--the esprit de corps. This military spirit molds soldiers' behavior in politics and war.⁶² Effective combat performance requires not only the existence of cohesive primary groups, but also groups that are articulated with the larger military organization.

Esprit de corps involves a strong political or ideological belief in justifying military action. "Soldiers need to have some justification, however inchoate, to legitimate doing something which few would do willingly in other circumstances."⁶³ Military honor becomes the basis of the belief system. This honor is both a means and an end. The code of military honor is composed of four elements: gentlemanly conduct, personal fealty, self-regulating brotherhood, and the pursuit of glory. "Officers are gentlemen; fealty to the military commander is personal; officers are members of a cohesive brotherhood which claims the right to extensive self-regulation; and officers fight for the preservation and enhancement of traditional glory."⁶⁴ The persistence of esprit de corps sustains the morale and cohesion of soldiers on the battlefield. But the psychological correlation of forces in a limited war is not stable; it depends on a series of intangibles. The side which is more willing to risk total war or can convince its opponent of its greater readiness to run the risk is in the stronger position so that psychological force is constantly shifting to the side which seems to have chances to win.⁶⁵

Despite its intangible nature, psychological force is embedded in the political culture that shapes the behavior of soldiers. The term political culture refers to "the specifically political orientations--attitudes toward the political system and its various

⁶² S.E. Finer, The Man on Horseback p.7.

⁶³ Frederick J. Manning, "Morale, Cohesion, and Esprit de Corps" p. 457.

⁶⁴ Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier pp. 215-232.

⁶⁵ Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy p. 168.

parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system."⁶⁶ In combat, the political culture affects the performance of soldiers--it constrains performance, but it surely does not determine the performance. The dimensions of political orientations are threefold: cognitive, affective, and evaluational. Cognitive orientation includes "knowledge of and belief about the political system;" affective orientation involves "feelings about the political system;" and evaluational orientation comprises "the judgments and opinions about political objects that involve a combination of value standards. . .with information and feelings."⁶⁷ In this context, they present the subjective political culture, which is characterized by a high frequency of orientations toward the system as a general object and toward the output process of the system, while orientations toward input processes and toward the self as an active participant are minimal. Subjective political culture is congruent with a centralized authoritarian structure. The political culture defines the spectrum of military subjective orientations to the state, including knowledge and beliefs about political reality, feelings with respect to politics, and commitments to political values. Each state has its own distinctive traditions, social and intellectual orientations, and political arrangements, which shape military orientations toward war.

The political culture is mainly concerned with value orientations regarding the legitimate authority relations of the political system. The military as an instrument to pursue or defend the national interest is constitutionally subordinated to the state. The primacy of state authority is the norm, within which virtually all military participation in politics takes place. All institutions of the state are intentionally politicized. The political beliefs of the military are not distinct from those that operate in civilian society. On the contrary, they are a refraction of civilian society wrought through the recruitment system,

⁶⁶ Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963) 13 and Jack Snyder, "The Concept of Strategic Culture: Caveat Emptor" in Carl G. Jacobsen, ed. Strategic Power pp. 3-8.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 15.

and through the education and military experiences of a professional career. War and hostilities increase political ferment, but changes in political thinking among the military elites are the result of a long-term process. The vast majority of officers are primarily concerned with purely professional and technical matters, yet, as they ascend in the hierarchy, they become increasingly conscious of their political loyalties and preferences. It is best to recognize that political beliefs are invariably sustained by a minority of men. Even within the elite, it has been those men whose unconventional careers have involved them in politico-military assignments who display the most sustained political consciousness. Political attitudes among soldiers have become more representative of those of the larger society. This has been the result of changes in the social composition of the military profession, as well as increased contact between soldiers and civilians. Political beliefs among the military have become explicit, elaborate, and doctrinaire; in this sense, they have become ideological.⁶⁸ The political culture generates psychological force. After all, the military is held together by a set of control mechanisms designated to govern behavior. The mechanisms between those that are formal--codified laws, organized force as an instrument of public authority in keeping order, and governmental institutions--and those that are informal--customs, religious beliefs, and political orientations--reinforce each other. The political culture is preserved by public authority in organizing and enforcing law and order; power is moreover strengthened by significant symbols that impose meaning on experience and provide a specific construction for particular individuals. But power and culture are not always compatible and sometimes they form an adversary relationship. The state as the source of power need not presume to aim at the creation of a particular military moral order, a task generally left to the military initiatives. Even though state authority and military spheres of activity sometimes remain

⁶⁸ Morris Janowitz, The professional Soldier: a Social and Political Portrait (New York: Free Press, 1971) 234-235.

separate, their intertwining relationships have affected military political orientations toward the state.

This hard core of the strategy is to seek control over operational art and psychological force within mutually recognized limits through the distribution of costs and benefits on the battlefield in order to reduce losses. Within such limits, the military tests its muscle and fights limited operations and battles to comply with strategy. Although morale, cohesion, and esprit de corps, as states expect, shape the behavior of soldiers and generate combat readiness and effectiveness, the military places special emphasis on the center of gravity, mobility, and combined arms for pursuing limited objectives and to make sure that its actions never confront the opponents with the choice of systemic collapse or systemic total war. Since the outcomes of limited war, win, loss, or draw, produce no final solution, the distribution of costs and benefits between states through control over operational art and psychological force becomes the way to terminate war.

Technology

Since Sun Zi's and Clausewitz' times, the most radical change in the conduct of limited war is technology, which has indeed revolutionized war fighting. To understand such military technological revolution, technology as a protective belt is in fact designed to preserve Sun Zi's and Clausewitz' fundamentals in hopes of making them consistent with contemporary limited war. Essential to the protective belt is control over limited technological and human means for reaching limited objectives in accordance with explicit or tacit rules recognized and accepted by belligerent states within the context of the distribution of costs and benefits. Technology, as the protecting belt of the strategy increases the capacity to explain anomalies deriving from contemporary limited war. To wage limited operations and battles, soldiers armed with advanced weapons attempt to defeat or demoralize the enemy in the shortest possible time, at the least possible cost in

lives and effort, with infliction on the enemy of the fewest possible casualties. Because weapons have widespread effects on war, the state and the military need to carefully account for the balance between weapons and soldiers. On the one hand, the development of military technology makes possible and desirable new distributions of responsibilities and power with a concomitant distribution of different military roles and missions on the battlefield. Since the rate of technological innovations accelerates, it becomes increasingly important and difficult to figure out the range of effects that a given innovation will have. When compounded by the increasing complexity of sociotechnical systems, changes make it more and more difficult to carry out some of the most basic activities of limited war: planning, design, and functional coordination. On the other hand, it needs the full compatibility of soldiers to mesh the military technology that is fielded with meaningful operational capability for troops. The adaptation of military technology calls for the new forms of cooperation among arms and services for limited objectives. The failure to control it may produce the unintended, unwanted effects that eventually lead to escalation.

Nevertheless, most, if not all, scholars differ in the question of how military technology or weapons become an instrument of the military. Seymour Melman explains his uneasiness about theories viewing man as the captive of his weapons. For him, these theories are self-defeating modes of understanding, rather different from identifying the top decision-makers and their modes of control. Men may be captives, but only of other men. The concept of man in the grip of a Frankenstein weapons system has a severely limiting effect on our ability to do anything about it, if that is desired.⁶⁹ The idea of a weapons culture, implying a kind of weapons-technological Frankenstein, is less helpful than to appreciate the sources of political control over weapons. Political control in the

⁶⁹ Seymour Melman, Pentagon Capitalism: the Political Economy of War (New York: McGraw-Hill, 197) 12.

United States is, according to him, located in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, whose chief is the Secretary of Defense, a Cabinet officer directly responsible to the President of the United States. Thus, decision-making concerning employed and to-be-employed weapons is in the hands of the principal political officers of the federal government. Similarly, George Kateb scoffs at the idea that somehow machines will develop a volition of their own, independent of their makers; and come eventually to change roles with man and make men their servants. According to him, such views only reflect fear and hatred of the machine, amongst the stalest and most pervasive emotions of modern life.⁷⁰

In the same way, William McNeill sees technological innovation as command technology. For him, military technology is largely under human control and obedient to human needs and wishes. This view stresses the determinative role of intention in technological evolution. While it does not exclude the impact of unforeseen developments and occurrences, the concept tends to view innovation as an instrumental value, that is, technological innovation is largely directive and conforms well to human management. Political control over technological innovation seems characteristic of human history, in which political management over the organization of armed forces presumes its primacy over human behavior. Self-interest and the pursuit of private profit through buying and selling are relegated to the margins of daily life, operating within limits and according to rules that are laid down by the holders of political-military power. Human society returns to the normal. Social change reverts to the leisurely pace of pre-industrial, pre-commercial times. Clearly, "adaptation between means and ends, between human activities and natural environments and among interacting human groups eventually achieves such a precision that further changes become unnecessary and

⁷⁰ George Kateb, Utopia and Its Enemies (New York: the Free Press, 1963) 108-109.

undesirable."⁷¹ In the past, routine and ritual prevailed in European and all other armed forces. Technical upheavals were few and far between the flow of peoples and the tides of victory and defeat. Perhaps the extraordinary disturbances arising across the past century and a half, since the industrialization of war began to accelerate, would be contained after all, allowing the world's armed forces to again sink back into their unchanging routine of sustaining and restraining regimes. As long as rivalry between states continues, organized technological invention will be persistent. Absolute economic limits are scarcely in sight. Every productive resource not needed for bodily life is in principle available for defense; and the enhanced productivity of automated machinery is so great that the practical limits on military expenditure are limits on the efficiency of human organization for war rather than anything else. Once again the state comes up against the question of consensus and obedience. Material limits are comparatively trivial. New models of old weapons with improved performance capabilities are disturbing enough to the world's power balances. The further possibility that some device of a quite different kind might suddenly open a new avenue for paralyzing violence also prevents the world's great powers from settling down to any stable, trusting accommodation with one another. Break-throughs in chemical or biological warfare might at any time create an end run around the atomic balance of terror. Competition for strategic advantage by dint of new break-throughs in the design of a secret weapon is impossible to exorcise in a world where rival states fear one another. Mounting costs, as successive generations of weapons become more and more elaborate, constitute a brake of sorts. In contrast, interest groups, seeking new contracts or assignment of new resources of manpower and material, can point with alarm to research and development efforts undertaken by the other side. Political managers have to balance demands from the civilian economy against the ravenous appetite for new resources that military research and development teams

⁷¹ William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power p. 386.

regularly exhibit.⁷² Command technology becomes an instrument of the military to achieve limited objectives on the battlefield.

The autonomy of technology however suggests that the human mind cannot master what the human mind has made. Karl Marx insists that under the conditions of capitalist technology, men are no longer the masters of their tools, products, or productive social relationships. The advanced factory system is a huge automation driven by a self-acting prime mover, which executes, without man's help, all the movements requisite to process raw material. The crystallization of social activity, that is, what we ourselves produce into an objective power above us, growing out of our control, thwarting our expectations, bringing to naught our calculations, becomes one of the chief factors in historical development up till now.⁷³ Likewise, John Kenneth Galbraith contends that we are becoming the servants in thought, as in action, of the machine we have created to serve us. According to him, it is a commonplace of modern technology that there is a high measure of certainty that problems have solutions before there is knowledge of how they are to be solved. If methods of performing the specified task are uncertain, the need for bringing organized intelligence to bear will be much greater than if the methods are known. This uncertainty will also lead to increased time and cost and the increase can be very great. "Uncertainty as to the properties of the metal to be used for the skin of a supersonic transport; uncertainty as to the proper way of handling and working the metal; and uncertainty as to the character and design of the equipment required to work it can add extravagantly to the time and cost of obtaining such a vehicle."⁷⁴ This problem-solving, with its high costs in time and money, is a recognized feature of modern

⁷² Ibid., p. 373.

⁷³ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The Germany Ideology (New York: International Publishers, 1964) 22-23.

⁷⁴ John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State (New York: the New American Library, 1968) 7.

technology. In other words, the more sophisticated technology is, the greater, in general, will be all of the foregoing requirements. Technology not only causes change, but also is a response to change. Technological change of this kind makes people become the servants in thought and in action.

Although no one can foresee the radical changes to come, technological advance will move faster and faster and can never be stopped. In all areas of his existence, man will be encircled ever more tightly by the forces of technology. For Martin Heidegger, the forces, which everywhere and every minute claim, enchain, drag along, press and impose upon man under the form of some technical contrivance or other--these forces. . . have long since moved beyond his will and have outgrown his capacity for decision.⁷⁵ Technological advance is beyond human control. Precisely, if the hydrogen bombs do not explode and if human life on earth is preserved, an uncanny change in the world moves upon us. Yet it is not that the world becomes entirely technical which is really uncanny. Far more uncanny is our being unprepared for this transformation, our inability to confront meditatively what is really dawning in this age. No single man, no group of men, no commission of prominent statesmen, scientists, and technicians, no conference of leaders of commerce and industry, can brake or direct the progress of history in the atomic age. No merely human organization is capable of gaining dominion over it.

Therefore, the people are unable to predict and to control consequences unwanted, or unintended, or unforeseen by those who presumed to direct an action. The unintentioned consequences of technological change become more determinative than the intended goals and comprise an autonomous variable in power politics. Langdon Winner holds that one symptom of a profound stress that affects modern thought is the prevalence of the idea of autonomous technology--the belief that somehow technology has gotten out of control and follows its own course, independent of human direction. Autonomy is at

⁷⁵ Martin Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking (New York: Harper & Row, 1966) 51.

the heart a political or moral conception that brings together the ideas of freedom and control. To be autonomous is to be self-governing, independent, not ruled by an external law or force.⁷⁶ This autonomy lies in the history. Without doubt the most excellent of Promethean stories is the theme of technology that explains Prometheus's crime against the gods. The fall of man is in Aeschylus's view closely linked to the introduction of science and the arts and crafts. Chained to a desolate rock for eternity, Prometheus describes his plight.

Prometheus: I caused mortals to cease foreseeing doom.

Chorus: What cure did you provide them with against that sickness?

Prometheus: I placed in them blind hopes.

Chorus: That was a great gift you gave to men.

Prometheus: Besides this, I gave them fire.

Chorus: And do creatures of a day now possess bright-faced fire?

Prometheus: Yes, and from it they shall learn many crafts.

Chorus: These are the charges on which. . .

Prometheus: Zeus tortures me and gives me no respite.⁷⁷

For Aeschylus, the theft of fire is in its primary consequence the theft of all technical skills and inventions later given to mortals. The secret spring of fire fills the stem which, when revealed, became the teacher of each craft to men, a great resource. Prometheus confesses that it is I and none other who discovered ships, the sail-driven wagons that the sea buffets. Such were the contrivances that I discovered for men--alas for me. For I myself am without contrivance to rid myself of my present affliction. Prometheus' problem is something like that of modern people who have filled the world with the most remarkable array of contrivances and innovations. If it happens that the

⁷⁶ Langdon Winner, Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-Control as a Theme in Political Thought (Cambridge: the MIT Press, 1977) 16.

⁷⁷ Aeschylus, "Prometheus Bound" in David Grene and Richard Lattimore, eds., Aeschylus II (New York: Washington Square Press, 1967) 148-149.

works cannot be fundamentally reconsidered and reconstructed, humankind faces a woefully permanent bondage to the power of its own inventions.⁷⁸ The loss of mastery manifests itself in a decline of the ability to know, judge, and control the technical means. It is in this general waning of intellectual, moral, and political command that the idea of autonomous technology finds its basis.

The two different approaches to military technology as an instrument of the military miss some important points. Command technology seems to overestimate the ability of individuals and institutions to control technology and its consequences, while the autonomy of technology school in fact underestimates the unintended, unwanted, and unforeseen effects of technological innovation, and the impact of normal developmental problems on ultimate capability. Nonetheless, they underline that, without technology, people have great difficulties in achieving their expected objectives. Military capability can be achieved by technological innovation, including a significant advance in a basic or component technology, a synergistic effect arising from the particular interaction of two or more basic technologies, the similar synergistic or interactive effect of combining two weapons in highly complementary way, or a combination of all of the foregoing.⁷⁹ Focus on the relationships among embryonic, emerging, evolving, or evolved technologies enhances combat effectiveness.

Modern technology has produced such a high level of specialization that soldiers are likely to think of themselves as members of a specific skill group. The growth of skill specialization further creates professionalization, which, in turn, influences soldiers' political perspectives. Technology and weapons controlled by these professional soldiers will therefore facilitate the achievement of limited objectives on the battlefield.

⁷⁸ Langdon Winner, Autonomous Technology p. 335.

⁷⁹ William H. Kincade, "New Military Capabilities: Propellants and Implications" in Carl G Jacobsen, ed. The Uncertain Course 70.

Offensive limited war requires professional, rather than mass soldiers, aiming at fighting a conventional total war by fully mobilizing manpower. Soldiers have three common characteristics: expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. They are experts on the management of violence. All the activities conducted within the military establishment are directly related to this expertise. The military monopolizes such expertise. The responsibility of soldiers is to safeguard the interests of the state by the use of force. The military's obligation of unconditional service to the lawful authority of the state is unique. Despite changes in the nature of expertise required for defending the state and in the policies and programs of the state, the responsibility of soldiers remains. Corporateness is a shared sense of organic unity and group consciousness. The military formalizes, applies, and enforces the standards of professional competence. These three criteria enable soldiers to render specialized service. The technological nature of war requires highly skilled and motivated soldiers to command complicated weapons. The more mechanized the military formation, the greater the reliance on the professional team.⁸⁰

Professional soldiers face the increasing interaction between technological sophistication and their own abilities to operate these weapons and equipment. The growing disparity between projected soldiers and the demands on these soldiers made by weapons and equipment shows the delicate dilemma that the military may run the risk of technological illiteracy in the short run and of technological disenfranchisement in the long run. But the military can afford neither. It must guarantee a flow through its ranks of people dependably trained and conversant with the material they manage.⁸¹ Soldiers must become qualified for the requirements of advanced weapons and equipment. Training and simulation are the way to provide practice and the exercise of critical tasks under

⁸⁰ Morris Janowitz, Professional Soldier p. 9.

⁸¹ David Williamson, Jr., "The Army's Arms for the Future: Some Technological Implications" in Robert H. Kupperman and William J. Taylor, Jr., Strategic Requirements for the Army to the Year 2000 (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1984) 71-85.

operational conditions similar to those likely to be encountered in real environments. Realistic training and simulation are a necessary instructional strategy to prepare personnel to operate in stress environments. Military training, in addition to providing realistic pre-exposure to stress environments, is directed at ensuring ritualized or highly drilled response.⁸² Well-rehearsed tasks are less prone to disruption by stress; well-rehearsed tasks become automatic and require less of an individual's attentional capacity; and well-drilled tasks enhance predictability and control. Through intensive training and simulation, soldiers can meet combat challenges and match their weapons.

This protecting belt rests on control over the limited means, technological and human, for achieving limited objectives in accordance with explicit or tacit rules within the context of the distribution of costs and benefits. Weapons can be utilized to increase firepower so as to demoralize the enemy. Threats to use advanced weapons can serve as a powerful deterrent to terminate war, but they may equally lead to spreading violence. But military technology has created a high level of specialization that in turn produces military professionalization. Soldiers think of themselves as military professionals. Without such expertise, mass soldiers are unable to effectively fight limited operations and battles in the shortest possible time, at the least possible cost in lives and effort, with infliction on the enemy of the fewest possible casualties. The match of limited weapons and soldiers can prevent the unintended, unwanted effects of weapons on soldiers and war and the dysfunction of advanced weapons in the hands of mass soldiers.

The Cases

In light of Sun Zi, Clausewitz, and contemporary theories, the preceding parts of this chapter have introduced a method of analysis and sketched a theoretical framework,

⁸² James E. Driskell and Eduardo Salas, "Overcoming the effects of Stress on Military Performance: Human Factors, Training, and Selection Strategies" in Reuven Gal and A. David Mangelsdorff, eds., Handbook of Military Psychology p. 188.

both of which are in principle applicable to the investigation of many cases related to the strategy of limited war. This thesis does not, of course, analyze in depth all available historical cases of limited war strategy in East Asia. Nor does it analyze a random sample from all possible cases in the world. A comparative study works best when applied to a few cases that share certain basic features. Cases need to be carefully selected and the criteria for grouping them together made explicit. In following chapters, Japanese, Soviet, and Chinese strategies are to be treated together as basically similar examples. Historical links between Sun Zi, Clausewitz, and East Asian limited wars may justify this selection of cases.

East Asia is "the melting pot" of Eastern and Western strategic thoughts. Sun Zi was a native of China. Over two thousand years Chinese soldiers, scholars, and politicians such as Cao Cao, Zhu Geliang, Guo Huanuo, Wu Jiulong, Zhang Wenmu, Wu Rugan, Yang Bingan, and Yang Shanqiu, constantly sought to interpret Sun Zi's The Art of War so as to better understand his clear vision, profound insight, and eternally fresh approach to war. His advice on the strategy of limited war, with its emphasis on civil-military relations, rationality, operational art, deception, and psychological factors, deeply molded Chinese strategic thought and approaches to war, either civil or against foreign aggression; indeed, it was incorporated into Chinese political culture, and thus politics.⁸³

Sun Zi was, according to Japanese official sources, introduced to Japan in 734 A.D. by Kibi Makibi, who spent 18 years in China studying Chinese literature and martial arts, even some Japanese may well have known of or had this book centuries before, considering the extensive cultural contacts between China and Japan. After its official introduction, book volumes were collected by the Imperial Palace and reserved

⁸³ Wu Jiulong, ed. Sun Zi xiaoyi (The Correction of Sun Zi) (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1990) 1-12 and Guo Huanuo, Sun Zi yizhu (The Interpretation of Sun Zi) (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji chubanshe, 1984) 1-33.

exclusively for Imperial family members until 1606 A.D., when it was released by the Imperial Palace. As early as the 1700s, Ogyu Sorai translated The Art of War into Japanese, entitled Sonshi Kokujikai (An Explanation of Sun Zi in Japanese). For centuries, Japanese soldiers and scholars such as Uyesugi Kenshin, Hayashi Razan, Yamaga Soko, Ogyu Sorai, Yoshida Torajiro, and Komiyama Yasusuki, attempted to reinterpret Sun Zi within the context of Japanese strategic environments. As a consequence of the thousand-year critical assimilation, his ideas of offense, psychological factors, and quick decision war became part of Japanese strategic culture.⁸⁴

Sun Zi was translated into Russian in 1860 by Sreznevskij under the title of Instructions of the Chinese General Sun Zi to his Subordinate Generals. In 1889, Putyata contributed an article entitled "The Principles of the Art of War in the Commentaries of Chinese Generals of Antiquity" to the Handbook of Geography, Topography, and Statistical Materials relating to Asia.⁸⁵ Despite the substantial differences in Chinese, Japanese, and Russian political and strategic traditions and cultures, Sun Zi was credited with having greatly influenced limited wars in East Asia.

Clausewitz was the most popular western strategic thinker in East Asia. The introduction of Clausewitz to China was closely associated with the Self-Strengthening Movement launched by reform-oriented provincial scholar-officials, who constantly sought to modernize China in general and its armed forces against foreign invasion in particular. Despite frequent contacts between Chinese and German soldiers, the Chinese version of On War was only published for the internal circulation by Baoding Military Academy in 1911. The first six books were translated by the General Staff Department of

⁸⁴ Gao Dianfang and Mu Zhicao, "Yongru Riben de Sun Zi bingfa (The Introduction of Sun Zi's Art of War to Japan)" Junshi lishi no. 1, 1992: 39-43, Samuel B. Griffith, Sun Tzu: the Art of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971) 169-178; Sato Kenji, Sun Zi yanjiu zai Riben (Sun Zi Studies in Japan) (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1993); and Yu Rubo, ed. Sun Zi xinlun jingchuai (The Collection of Contemporary Views on Sun Zi) (Beijing: Changzheng chubanshe, 1991) 461-482.

⁸⁵ Samuel B. Griffith, Sun Tzu: the Art of War p. 183.

the Imperial Qing Dynasty, while the last two books were translated by He Runshan and Ju Xianghen on the basis of the 1903 Japanese version. This Japanese version was also the basis for Qu Shouti's retranslation of On War into classical Chinese, published by the Chinese Publishing House in 1915. Chinese politicians and soldiers embraced the work enthusiastically. Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) and Mao Zedong were among the most enthusiastic. Jiang's interests in On War dated from the late 1920s. The Nationalists, after their honeymoon with the Soviet Union in 1927, turned to Germany for military assistance. Hans von Seeckt, the best known scholar in the study of Clausewitz, became Jiang's military advisor responsible for restructuring the Chinese armed forces along German military lines. His outstanding performance in establishing the Chinese professional army, in improving the Chinese command system, and in clarifying Chinese strategy with emphasis on offense and decisive battles shaped Jiang's approaches to military modernization and war and won his lasting respect for Germans. Seeckt's vision of Clausewitz fascinated Jiang, motivating him to further explore the very essence of On War. In 1956, on his orders, the Translation Office of the Ministry of Defense in Taiwan retranslated On War. During the period of the translation, Jiang was always the first reader of each first draft of the chapters, made notes and comments at the top of the pages, and discussed the version with the translator a dozen times. His focus on the professional army, central command, offense, and decisive battles became the Nationalist way of war. Mao was also an expert on Clausewitz. On December 28, 1937, he wrote a memo to Guo Huanuo, Division Director of the Central Military Commission (CMC), asking him to read On War before preparing his essay on strategy of guerrilla warfare. Shortly thereafter, Mao conducted his own intensive study of On War from March 18 to April 1, 1938, while writing On Protracted War. On January 27 1957, Mao criticized Joseph Stalin for denying Clausewitz' theory of war and politics. In the early 1970s, he confessed to Chancellor Helmut Schmidt that he held in the high esteem the German philosopher of war, Carl von Clausewitz. Clausewitz' assumption of defensive total war--

war of exhaustion through the mobilization of masses for expanding space and time--dominated Mao's strategy of war and politics.⁸⁶

Clausewitz' strategic thought was introduced to Japan by Klemens Wilhelm Jakob Meckel, a disciple of Clausewitz, who taught at the Army War College from 1884 to 1888 disseminating German ideas of tactics, logistics, and general staff operations into the Japanese Army. Following the Clausewitzian tradition, Meckel insisted, despite the growth in firepower on the battlefield, that artillery barrage and rifle fire were preparation for, and not the heart of battles. Infantry capable of fighting under any conditions could compete with technology, if it learned to use its natural ally--the terrain. For him, all warfare must focus on offense and decisive battles, which were based on moral, rather than material force. In order to sustain offense and decisive battles, the Japanese Army should, suggested Meckel, adopt the divisional system consisting of cavalry, artillery, engineering, and logistics as a self-sufficient operational unit, establish an efficient

⁸⁶ The Sino-German military exchange could be dated back as early as 1872 when Li Hongzhang sent several officers to Germany for military training. In 1885, he employed German officers to teach at his newly established military preparatory school in Tianjin. Soon thereafter, Zhang Zhidong invited German instructors to his newly set up military academy near Guangzhou. China's defeat by Japan in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895 forced the government of the Imperial Qing Dynasty to modernize its armed forces by creating two new armies, the Self-Strengthening Army under Zhang Zhidong and the Newly Created Army under Yuan Shikai, largely based on the German military system of organization, training, and administration. The Self-Strengthening Army was trained until 1898 by 35 German officers under Major Baron von Reitzenstein who, pending the training of Chinese officers, served as both instructors and brigade, battalion, and company commanders. The Newly Created Army retained a smaller number of advisors and established a German language school for officers. See Xia Dongyuan, Yangwu yundong shi (The History of the Self-Strengthening Movement) (Shanghai: Huadong shifan daxue chubanshe, 1992) 296-353; William C. Kirby, Germany and Republican China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984) 8-10; Billie K. Walsh, "The German Military Mission in China, 1928-1939," Journal of Modern History no. 9, 1974: 503-513; Nue Xianzhong, Zhanzheng lun jinghua (The Essence of On War) (Taipei: Junshi pingcui, 1976) 1-15; Wenxian yanjiushi, Mao Zedong zhexue zhuyi (Mao Zedong's Notes on Philosophy) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1988) 282-283; Mao Zedong, Selected Works vol. 5, (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1979) 367; Fan Hao, Mao Zedong he ta de junshijiaoyu guwen (Mao Zedong and His Military Instructor) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1993) 162; He Xiaoming, "Zhang Zhidong junshi sixiang lunlue (The Brief Account of Zhang Zhidong's Military Thought)" Junshi lishi no. 5, 1992: 10-14; and Bao Shixiu, "Ribei dui wanqing jundui gaige de yingxiang (Japan's Influence on the Military Reform during the Late Qing Dynasty)" Junshi lishi no. 3, 1989: 30-32.

logistical system to provide war materials, and create an effective command system responsible for national defense, military plans, communications, and transportation. Meckel's permanent mark on the Japanese Army was his emphasis on offense, decisive battles, logistics, and command. Under Meckel's influence, Dr. Mori Rintaro translated Books 1 and 2 of On War into Japanese on the basis of the German version of 1888. The Army Academy then translated the following books in accordance with the French version in 1901. The complete version was published in 1903 for internal circulation. Clausewitz' concept of offensive war--war of annihilation--dominated the Japanese approach to war.⁸⁷

In contrast to the Chinese and Japanese second-hand students of Clausewitz, the Russians had Clausewitz fight on their side against Napoleon's invasion in 1812. His strategic thought made an impact on Russian soldiers such as P.A. Yazykov, M.I. Bogdanovich, F. Goremykin, M.I. Dragomirov, G.A. Leer, and N.P. Mikhnevich, who sought to clarify the theoretical relationships between war and politics, between physical and psychological force, and between theory and practice. The Bolvisheks later followed the Marxist tradition searching in On War for revolutionary strategy and tactics. Frederick Engels praised Clausewitz in a letter to Karl Marx, saying that "I'm now reading, among other things, Clausewitz' On War. An extraordinary way of philosophizing on these matters, but very good." Encouraged by Engels, Marx read On War, claiming "the chap has a common sense that borders on brilliance." V.I. Lenin, working in the municipal library of Bern in 1915, searched in On War for the

⁸⁷ Ernst L. Presseissen, Before Aggression: Europeans Prepare the Japanese Army (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1965) 69-88; Santo Kenji, Sun Zi yanjiu zai Riben p. 161-163; Pan Junfen, Riben junshi sixiang yanjiu (The Study of Japanese Military Thought) (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1992) 184-188; Gao Dianfang, "Zhanzhenglun zai Riben de chuanbo (The Circulation of On War in Japan)" in Wang Sijin, ed. Zhongwai junshi lishi bechai (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1991) 124-125; Xie Chaohuai, "Mingzhi weixinian xifang junshi sixiang zai Riben de chuanbo (The Circulation of Western Military Thought before the Meiji Reform)" Junshi lishi no. 2, 1991: 46-48; and Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms and Policy Responses in a Changing World (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993) 11-13.

revolutionary ideas, which coincided with fundamental Marxist assumptions. He was deeply impressed by the close relationship between war and politics. As a result, the political domination of war seemed the most important lesson that the Bolsheviks learned from Clausewitz.⁸⁸ Thus, despite their different interpretations of On War, Clausewitz strongly affected the approaches of Japanese, Russian/Soviet, and Chinese soldiers, scholars, and politicians to politics, strategy, and war.

Historical evidence explains the impacts of Sun Zi and Clausewitz on Japanese, Russian/Soviet, and Chinese strategic thoughts and on their approaches to limited war. Despite their differences in political and strategic traditions and cultures, it is the premise of this thesis that Japan, the Soviet Union, and China exhibit important similarities in their "totalitarian" nature of political institutions, their attention to operational art and psychological force, and their ways of technological development. These similarities will allow these three cases to be grouped together for a comparative analysis. More important, this thesis not only emphasizes the common patterns shared by Japan, the Soviet Union, and China, but also explores the particular features of each of these strategies. The similar but distinctive characteristics of their strategies show their ways to conduct limited wars in East Asia.

Conclusion

The chapters to come present a comparative analysis of Japanese, Soviet, and Chinese strategies--an analysis conceived and executed within the framework of strategy developed in this chapter. Central to the strategy of limited war is control over mutually reinforced objectives, costs, and means through adjustment and cooperation between

⁸⁸ Carl Van Dyke, Russian Imperial Military Doctrine and Education, 1832-1914 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990) 49-90; Bernard Semel, Marxism and the Science of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981) 66; V.I. Lenin, "Notebook of Excerpts and Remarks on Carl von Clausewitz" in David R. Jones, ed. Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual 1: 1977 (Gulf Breeze: Academic International Press, 1977) 189-229; and Collected Works vol. 11, p. 220.

domestic and international politics in order to maintain war as limited as possible. This strategy rests on three interrelated requirements:

First, the authoritarian state rationally makes strategy to wage limited war by commanding the military and technology so as to reach its desired but limited objectives. This responsibility of the state requires control over the limited objectives through cooperation between domestic and international politics for developing mutually recognized rules, explicit or tacit, for avoiding escalation.

Second, within the limits prescribed by the state, the military wages limited operations and battles to comply with strategy. Control over the limited operations and battles through the balance between operational art and psychological force is designed to distribute costs and benefits among states in order to provide a rational solution for limited war.

Third, the state and the military manage control over the limited means, technological and human, for achieving limited objectives in accordance with explicit or tacit rules within the context of the distribution of costs and benefits. The balance between weapons and soldiers facilitates the achievement of limited political and military objectives.

To be balanced, strategy requires to harmonize the relationships between domestic and international politics. The poor relationships between them may escalate violence and increase costs. But cooperation between them allows the state to exploit excellence in all three areas or at least to exploit excellence in one area that is not imperiled by mediocrity in another. Such cooperation inevitably contributes to agreements on the limits that keep war as limited as possible. Fundamental to the strategy of limited war is control over mutually reinforced objectives, costs, and means through adjustment and cooperation between states in order to formulate explicit or tacit rules, to distribute costs and benefits, and to employ limited technological and human means for limited objectives.

CHAPTER 3

Japanese Strategy in the Sino-Japanese War

This chapter tests the strategy developed in the last chapter against Japanese strategy in the Sino-Japanese war of 1937-1945, which was originally a limited war aimed at stabilizing strategic environments in the Beijing-Tianjing area. Japanese strategy in this war was deeply grounded in their own interpretations of Sun Zi's and Clausewitz' perceptions of military leadership.¹ Inspired by such interpretations, Japanese soldiers along with their supporters gradually escalated the war involving Japan, China, and the Allies in order to seek total victory. The war ended with Japan's defeat. The literature on this war presents three exploratory theories. Chinese scholars and politicians insist on the conspiracy theory formulated by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), that is, Japan's own wrong doing resulted in its tragedy--the tragedy was caused either by a group of twenty-eight war criminals, or by the elite in nearly all areas of Japanese life, or by the political and social structure of the state. But Chinese commentators were reluctant to acknowledge that Japan in fact had no concrete strategy to launch a war against China. Orthodox Japanese Marxist-Leninists in the early post-war period supported the conspiracy theory, concentrating their condemnation on not only those top officials responsible for decision-making, but on the entire elite. They left untouched the fact that the working class supported and sustained the war. In contrast,

¹ Japanese soldiers incorporated the Chinese concept of loyalty and Sun Zi's ideas of military leadership, moral factors, surprise attack, and close combat into Japanese military culture--Bushido, which shaped their perception of war. Such perception was further strengthened by Meckel's explanations of Clausewitz' absolute war centering on defense through total mobilization for total victory. To safeguard Japan against foreign invasion, according to Meckel, Japanese defense was dependent on three major factors: the mobilization of masses, military leadership, and advanced technology. Among them, military leadership defined as officer corps would be decisive in war. Nevertheless, the Japanese soldiers shifted strategic defense to strategic offense for expansion on the East Asian continent, while ignoring political leadership--the fundamental principle of Sun Zi's and Clausewitz' strategies.

contemporary Japanese scholars challenge the verdict of the IMTFE by exploring the new evidence that Japan was unprepared to launch a total war against China, but they fail to explain why it waged such a violent eight-year war, killing millions of unarmed Chinese civilians. American revisionist scholars accept that Japanese soldiers were honorable and loyal servants of the Throne, pursuing the security and prosperity that their predecessors had sought, but American academic interests appear to center on the Pacific war, rather than the Sino-Japanese war.² But all these theories totally neglect Japan's actual strategy in the war.

The Sino-Japanese war was essentially motivated by the Meiji-era goal of "rich country, strong military" (Fukoku-kyohei). The Japanese initiative in China was to create a new pro-Japanese order of "peace and prosperity." In the 1920s, China was dominated by Britain, France, and the United States. As a new regional power emerging from both the first Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese war, Japan continued to act within the framework of the diplomacy of imperialism, seeking understandings with Western powers whenever and wherever possible and attempting to gain their implicit or explicit recognition of Japanese special interests in China. With the Nationalist unification of China nominally completed, China became a new power attempting to change the order in East Asia. Within this context, Japan shifted from Shidehara Kijuro's internationalist policy to Tanaka Giichi's nationalistic policy, which was intended to meet new challenges

² International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Judgment of the IMTFE 1948; Wang Fu, Rijun qinhua zhanzheng (The Aggression War of the Japanese Army against China) 4 vols. (Shenyang: Liaoning renming chubanshe, 1990); Wang Daoping, eds. Zhongguo kangri zhanzheng shi (The History of the War of Resistance against Japan) 3 vols. (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1991); James William Morley, ed. Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971); James B. Crowley, Japan's Quest for Autonomy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966); Robert J.C. Butow, Tojo and the Coming of the War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); and James William Morley, ed. The China Quagmire: Japan's Expansion on the Asian Continent, 1939-1941 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).

by working out its own conception of a new world order.³ The new Japanese world order was Pan-Asianism. The instrument of world reform and enlightenment was the "Kokuta"-the unique characteristics of the Japanese nation, under which the world would be unified. Proceeding to world unity and harmony were two great paths of cultural conflict and synthesis: one in the West and the other in Asia, i.e., the unification of Western civilization under the United States and the unification of Asian civilization under Japan. A final war between two cultural giants was inevitable and Japan would win it.⁴ According to this ideal, Japan would unify Asian civilization by liberating Asia from Western powers and by restoring Asia to its natural state so that Asian states could cooperate for mutual welfare and happiness. As a consequence, driving the Western powers out of China, if not waging a war against China, emerged as the first step of the struggle for establishing a free Asia.

This chapter examines Japanese strategy, explaining its failure to have effective control over mutually reinforced objectives, costs, and means through adjustment and

³ Shidehara's foreign policy included three key principles. 1. International collaboration was generally accepted to mean diplomacy centering on the League of Nations, but basically it involved a policy of cooperation with the United States and Great Britain. 2. Economic diplomacy referred to emphasizing peaceful economic advance and to shifting away from the policy of military pressure embodied in the Twenty-One Demands, the Siberian expedition, and military assistance to Chinese warlords, which had invited nationalistic resistance. 3. Nonintervention in China's domestic affairs, the most important element of Shidehara's policy, meant accepting the unification of China by the Kuomintang and sympathizing with China's demands for tariff autonomy and the abolition of extraterritorial rights. Whereas Tanaka's foreign policy, confirmed at the Eastern Regions Conference, claimed that if Japan wanted to control China, it must first crush the United States. But in order to conquer China, it must first conquer Manchuria and Mongolia. In order to conquer the world, it must first conquer China. If Japan succeeded in conquering China the rest of the Asian countries and the South Sea countries would fear it and surrender to it. Then the world would realize that East Asia was Japan's and would not dare to violate its rights. This was the plan left to Japan by Emperor Meiji, the success of which was seen as essential to its national existence. See Akira Iriye, After Imperialism: the Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921-1933 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964) and William Fitch Morton, Tanaka Giichi and Japan's China Policy (Kent: Wm Dawson & Son Ltd., 1980).

⁴ Mark R. Peattie, Ishiwara Kanji and Japan's Confrontation with the West (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975) 56.

cooperation between Japan and China that contributed to total war. The chapter starts with the Japanese state, exploring its traditions of making and implementing strategy, in order to show the political reasons for the inability to make explicit or tacit rules for guiding war. Then, it assesses the Japanese way to conduct operations and battles backed by "Bushido"--the ethics of the samurai--for highlighting its perception concerning the distribution of costs and benefits on the battlefield. Finally, it analyzes the fatal weaknesses inherent in Japanese weapons and soldiers that led to mismatch between war demands and the logistical capability to supply the war effort.

The State

Japan was an authoritarian state without either a single dictator or a political party, but it softly, if not firmly, dominated political, military, and economic institutions and society. Lack of strong political leadership proposed by Sun Zi and Clausewitz produced a weak coalition of soldiers, politicians, bureaucrats, and business men, sustained by Confucianism and Shintoism in managing its internal and external affairs.⁵ Despite this weak coalition, Japan pursued an elusive strategic objective of total mobilization through total control for total war, which echoed Clausewitz' idea of total war designed to extract

⁵ Japanese Confucianism is different from Chinese Confucianism. Chinese Confucianism serves as both the political ideology of the state and the social and ethical codes for society to sustain the state with special emphasis on benevolence. Whereas Japanese Confucianism started as a cultural ideology serving the political needs of the Tokugawa Bakufu, and its flexibility made it useful for other social purposes as well. As time went on, it diverged further and further from its origin as a politicized cultural ideology and became a collection of social and ethical codes in support of certain kinds of social actions. The central themes of Japanese Confucianism are loyalty and filial piety, but not benevolence. See Samuel Hideo Yamashita, "Confucianism and the Japanese State, 1904-1945" in Tu Wei-Ming, ed. Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity: Moral education and Economic Culture in Japan and the Four Mini-Dragons (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995) 151-153; Byung Tai Hwang, "Confucianism in Modernization: Comparative Study of China, Japan, and Korea" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1979) 18; and Michio Morishima, Why Has Japan Succeeded? Western Technology and the Japanese Ethos (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) 12-18.

material and human resources in society, in hopes of "reunifying world civilization."⁶ But theories regarding this Japanese state were fragmented; they tended to simply focus on one aspect, while ignoring others. Harold Lasswell, for example, defined Japan as "the garrison state," in which specialists in violence, replacing those in bargaining, became the most powerful group and monopolized state affairs.⁷ Political power was dictatorial, centralized, and integrated in the hands of soldiers at the expense of legislature, democratic institutions, and civilian politicians. Although devolution might be practiced to mitigate bureaucratism, all organized activities were governmentalized with the exception of secret societies. Government was highly centralized in administrative structure. Decisions were dictatorial. Instead of elections to office, there was government by plebiscite that encouraged unanimous demonstrations of collective sentiment. Rival political parties were suppressed either by monopolizing legality in one political organization or by abolishing all political parties. As legislatures and elections went out of use, petition played a prominent role. Lawmaking was in the hands of the supreme authority and his council; and as long as the state survived, this agency exerted effective control. As the state militarized, specialists in violence became the managers of large-scale civilian enterprise.

In the economic sector, the garrison state actively regularized the rate of production in an effort to produce military products by diverting from the full utilization of modern productive capacity for nonmilitary consumption. The heavy reliance on war scares as a means of maintaining willingness to forego immediate consumption contributed to the tendency toward rigidity. But war scares that failed to culminate in violence eventually lost the values of the garrison state. This dilemma forced the state to choose bloodletting

⁶ Perry Anderson, "The Prussia of the East" in Masao Miyoshi and H.D. Harootunian, eds. Japan in the World (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993) 34.

⁷ Harold D. Lasswell, "The Garrison State" American Journal of Sociology 1941: 455-467.

in order to preserve those virtues of sturdy acquiescence in the regime. Thus, every one must work, since all work became public work. All people who did not accept employment in effect scorned military discipline. The duty to obey, to serve the state, and to work was the cardinal virtue of the state. Every one must struggle to hold in check tendencies, conscious or unconscious, to defy authority, to violate the moral code, to flout the demand for sacrifice in the collective interest. Every one was trained to subdue--to disavow, to struggle against--any specific opposition to the ruling code of collective directives. Such consciousness imposed feelings of guilt and anxiety on the individual whenever one's impulses were aroused, ever so slightly, to break the moral code.⁸ Lasswell's assumption of the garrison state largely concentrated on military control over political institutions, economic organizations, and political ideology, while ignoring the nature and the function of the military, political, governmental, and industrial coalition established to reinforce this control.

Control over political and governmental institutions was by way of integrating the interests, attitudes, and objectives of soldiers, politicians, and civilian revisionists, since none of them was strong enough to rule alone. The balance of interests, attitudes, and objectives among them contributed to at least a temporary consensus on the solution of crisis or war. The China war in fact enabled politicians such as Konoe Fumimaro and Hirota Koki to assume broader authority than they would have possessed otherwise and to wield meaningful power in determining policies related to the war.⁹ Broader authority and power in turn helped them meet the demands of the Army and the Navy for northern expansion and southern advance by extending operations into North, Central, and South

⁸ Ibid., pp. 461-464.

⁹ John W. Dower, Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979) 204-205 and James William Morley, Japan's Foreign Policy, 1868-1941 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974) 72-80.

China, though the objectives of the war were unclear at the early stage. War cabinets, civilian and military, governed as party cabinets had governed through informal coalitions or working agreements with career civilian bureaucrats. Each cabinet, whether led by party politicians, by civilian bureaucrats, or by military officers, found that managerial skills and detailed knowledge of governmental problems could rarely be discovered outside the career bureaucracy. On the other hand, the competition among bureaucrats for advancement to better posts or higher rank gave each cabinet some leverage in obtaining bureaucratic cooperation. On the whole, the bureaucratic revisionist-military coalition found legal procedures tended to disarm, confound, and conciliate potential dissenters within the plural elite, including career bureaucrats. The revisionist bureaucrats brought to the coalition legalistic ingenuity and substantive thought that shaped Japan's policies during the war.¹⁰

Control over the economy was the top priority of the state's agenda during the war. Such control was through cooperation between the military and the zaibatsu, big business. The military constantly incorporated into the government men who were in tune with the thinking of the business community, while big business strove to manage the economy moving it in the direction that the military demanded. Clearly, the military involvement helped the zaibatsu aggressively seek the acquisition of international technologies, master advanced techniques, promote industries of strategic national importance, and finally, through the process of development, create domestic and international markets.¹¹ The state under the leadership of the coalition assumed specific responsibilities for industrial

¹⁰ Robert M. Spaulding, Jr., "The Bureaucracy as a Political Force, 1920-1945" in James William Morley, ed. Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar Japan pp. 70-80.

¹¹ Arthur E. Tiedemann, "Big Business and Politics in Prewar Japan" in James William Morley, ed. Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar Japan 306 and Ken-ichi Imai, "Japan's Corporate Network" in Shumpei Kumon and Henry Rosovsky, eds. The Political Economy of Japan: Cultural and Social Dynamics (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992) 203-208.

development and national economic security. Central to this state-guided economy in fact was the relationship between the state bureaucracy and privately owned businesses. Japan developed three solutions for dealing with this relationship: self-control, state control, and cooperation. Self-control was designed to help state licensed private enterprises to reach developmental goals. The typical institution was the state-sponsored cartel, in which the state authorized cartels in industries it designated as strategic, but it left the task of fashioning and operating the cartel to the enterprises themselves. State-control was intended to separate management from ownership and to put management under state supervision. This solution was preferred by the "control" bureaucrats of the late 1930s. Cooperation emphasized public and private joint ventures through governmental financing, targeted tax breaks, government-supervised investment coordination, the equitable allocation by the state of burdens during times of adversity, governmental assistance in commercialization, and governmental assistance when an industry as a whole began to decline. But ownership and management were in private hands.¹² The military managed the economy by establishing coalitions with the business community through either self-control, state-control, or cooperation.

Ideological control over society was based on Confucianism and Shintoism. Confucianism codified the moral values of individuals focusing on the relationship between loyalty to the Emperor and filial piety to parents. The Cardinal Principles of the National Polity of Japan issued in 1937 stated, "For us to show loyalty to the Emperor is in effect a manifestation of the manners and customs of our ancestors, and this is why we show filial piety to our forefathers."¹³ Similarly, Shintoism formalized the relationship between the state and religious practice. Through ritual and influence within the

¹² Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: the Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982) 309-311.

¹³ Samuel Hideo Yamashita, "Confucianism and the Japanese State," p. 152.

educational system and the local civil administration, the Shinto priesthood greatly contributed to expanding the power of the center over the periphery. Shinto, by creating Japan's first national ceremonial calendar, flag, national anthem, and rites of state accessible to all subjects, constituted three basic doctrines. First, Japan shall be reigned over and governed by "a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal;" "the Emperor is sacred and unviolable." Accordingly, he became a living god, his will was absolute, and the highest duty of the subject was no merely obedience to that will but identification with it: the loss of self in enthusiasm for the Emperor. Second, "the national gods" have given to Japan a divine land, a divine racial psychology, and a divinely established structure in the state. Third, Japan's mission was to make "the boundless virtues of the Emperor prevail throughout the whole world." The world would be united under one roof through benevolent Japanese leadership.¹⁴ These doctrines had morally binding force for all Japanese, decreeing loyalty to the Emperor, support for the government, and the sacrifice of individual interests, even lives, for those of the state.

The weak coalition of soldiers, politicians, bureaucrats, and business men at least temporarily harmonized the relations among themselves. Such relations enabled them to contract with one another for sharing information, influence, and resources without invoking the issue of formal leadership among them, although "a Minister of War is able to force the adoption of any measure desired by the Camp or to block any measure that meets his disapproval."¹⁵ In other words, the Japanese state was determined not solely by one group's acts but by the coalition or the joint acts of all the groups. It rarely employed legal coercion, let alone violence, as a form of regulatory command in its process of rule.

¹⁴ Daniel C. Holtom, Modern Japan and Shinto Nationalism (New York: Paragon, 1943) 7; Helen Hardacre, Shinto and the State, 1868-1988 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989) 4-5; and Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State 124-125.

¹⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State p. 132.

The idea of legal rules being subject to private control over their application and enforcement was "foreign not only to the state, but also to the people themselves." Decisions were made and social order was maintained, "not by the rule of law, but by a kind of dynamic regulatory relation operating among individuals and groups." Without strong political leadership, the state tended "to be closed and selfish in the sense that it selected homogeneous members who shared the basic values and philosophy and that the objectives of the state were often defined narrowly in terms only of their members' interests." It was common that the state overemphasized "emotion and value judgments, rather than facts and reason" in their communication.¹⁶ But conflicts among the elite inevitably emerged from such shared emotion and value judgments.

Even though Japan saw China as its rival in East Asia, not as a primary enemy threatening its vital national security and economic prosperity, China was also regarded as the country best able to provide natural resources, cheap labor, and a giant market for Japan's modernization, which in turn spurred Japan's attempt to unify China under its cultural sway by driving Western powers out. However, Japan appeared deeply confused as how to achieve these objectives. Just one year before the war, the Five Ministers Conference of August 7, 1936 sanctioned "the Basis of National Policy."¹⁷ This policy involved four points: a consistent policy of overseas expansion; completion of Japan's national defense in order to secure the Empire as an established power in East Asia; the development of Manzhouguo (Menchukou) in order to stabilize Japan-Manzhouguo defense so as to further Japan's economic development, evicting Russian influence while preparing war against Britain and the United States; and promoting racial and economic

¹⁶ Shumpei Kumon, "Japan as a Network Society" in Shumpei Kumon and Henry Rosovsky, eds. The Political Economy of Japan 109-141.

¹⁷ Five Ministers Conference included Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Finance Minister, Navy Minister, and War Minister.

development in the Southern Seas. The objective of Army's preparations was to enable Japan to cope with any force which the Soviet Union could mobilize in the Far East, so that it might smash Soviet Far East forces with one short, early blow. The Navy must complete its armaments sufficiently to maintain control over the Western Pacific against the US. Navy.¹⁸

This conference was the cornerstone of Japanese strategy for preparing total war against the perceived Soviet menace, and against Britain and the United States. The Five Ministers Conference of August 11, 1936 affixed their signatures and seals to an official statement that validated the basic national policy, providing more details about the war preparation: 1) The aim was to counteract all military forces that Russia could deploy in the Far East so as to be able to strike these at the very outset of the war, upon completion of the military force build-up in Korea and Manchuria, while at the same time securing command of the sea on the Western Pacific against the US. Navy. 2) The military authority must assist the diplomatic organ to secure it the requisite time, and to avoid precipitous foreign response. 3) Public opinion should be led and solidified so as to sustain military action; administrative and economic institutions should be improved to stabilize the people's livelihood; concrete measures should be taken to generate drastic progress in air and sea transportation; a self-sufficient policy should be established for important resources and materials essential to national defense and industry; and diplomacy should be used to promote Japan's national culture abroad.¹⁹ Since China was not the target of war, real or potential, Japan would adopt a dignified attitude and policy

¹⁸The International Military Tribunal for the Far East, "Decisions of Imperial Conferences, Liaison Conferences, Privy Council Meetings, Cabinet Meetings, Four Ministers' Conferences, Five Ministers' Conferences, Senior Statesmen's Meetings, Supreme War Plans Council, Joint Conferences, and Miscellaneous Conferences" p. 242.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 244.

toward China, aiming to create, in North China, a special anti-Communist, pro-Japanese, and pro-Manzhouguo area. As the United States Strategic Bombing Survey described,

Thus, as confirmed by many Japanese officials interrogated by the Survey, the 1937 thrust into northern China was not expected to develop into a major war. Those responsible for national policy at the time were fully confident that the Chinese government would yield quickly to Japan's demands and adjust itself readily to the position of a Japanese puppet. A full military conquest of China was considered to be neither necessary nor desirable. Troops were sent to China not to force a military decision but to serve as symbols of Japanese power. Negotiations--or rather intimidations--were to accomplish the rest.²⁰

Obviously, Japan, when the Marco Polo Bridge Incident happened on July 7, 1937, was unprepared to plunge into a total war against China.²¹ On that night, a Japanese company left its compound in Fengtai in the suburbs of Beijing for a night maneuver and headed for Huailongmiao, which was located about six-tenths of a mile northwest of the Marco Polo Bridge. As they completed the first stage of the maneuver, around 10:30 P.M., a dozen live shells were fired into the assembled company from the direction of the river embankment. Shimizu Setsuro, the company commander, immediately gathered his men for a roll call. One soldier could not be located, and a messenger was hurriedly dispatched to report the matter to the battalion commander. The exercise was called off and the company moved eastward to wait for further instruction. Itsuki Kiyonaho,

²⁰ Hata Ikuhiko, "Marco Polo Bridge Incident" in James William Morley, ed., The China Quagmire p. 243.

²¹ Who fired the first shot on that night may never be known. But there were four theories about the cause of the incident. The first one was conspiracy on the part of the Japanese China Garrison Army for the conquest of North China. The second one had soldiers of General Feng Yuxiang plotting the incident. The third one had Communist Party members, led by Liu Shaoqi, the first secretary of the northern branch office of the Communist Party, responsible for the outbreak of the incident. The fourth ascribed fear on the part of Chinese soldiers who fired the first shot.

battalion commander, on receiving the report, felt that the disappearance of a soldier was a grave matter and requested regiment commander Mudaguchi Renya's permission to move the main body of the battalion to where the shots had been heard, for surveillance purposes. In fact, after twenty minutes of his absence, the missing soldier had returned to his ranks, but Shimizu failed to report this to his superior until four hours later. In the meantime, Japanese soldiers attempted to search the county of Wanping, but Chinese troops refused to allow them to enter the county. Both sides exchanged fire, then the skirmish was ended.²²

On July 8, the Army General Staff (AGS) formulated a basic policy of nonextension for making conflict resolution on the spot. The Policy of the Army High Command for Dealing with the Incident provided that: 1) Since the field army was fully aware of the policy of nonextension, the implementation of such policy should be entrusted to the China Garrison Army. Should the latter request additional troops, the government would continue to treat the incident as confined to the Beijing-Tianjing area. 2) If the situation worsened, the government would dispatch troops sufficient to achieve a quick solution to the incident. 3) All divisions stationed in the west of Tokyo were to be ordered not to discharge soldiers, though such a discharge was originally scheduled for July 9.²³ Despite the strong influence on this policy of the Guandong Army (Kwantung Army), associated with the faction within the Army that favored sending troops to China to break the deadlock in Japan's North China policy, the policy of nonextension appeared to stand firm as the recipe for conflict resolution favored by the AGS. But then in a special cabinet

²² During the Marco Polo Bridge incident, the Japanese China Garrison Army of about 5,700 commanded by Lieutenant-General Tashiro Kanichiro, with its Headquarters in Tianjing, was stationed in the area of Beijing and Tianjing in accordance with the provisions of the Boxer Protocol of 1901. The Chinese 29th Army with about 100,000 commanded by General Song Zheyuan was in the same area. See Wang Daoping, eds. *Zhongguo kangri zhanzheng shi* vol 2, p. 6.

²³ Hata Ikuhiko, "The Marco Polo Bridge Incident," pp. 248-249.

meeting held on July 9, Sugiyama Gen recommended that three divisions be sent to North China. Hirota Koki and Yonai Mitsuma opposed the recommendation, since dispatching troops might lead to all-out war. Meanwhile, Chinese and Japanese troops reached an agreement calling for the immediate withdrawal of Chinese troops to the right bank of the Yongding River and the replacement of the regular troops in Wanping by the Peace Preservation Corps. The Five Ministers Conference and the full cabinet conference held on July 11 accepted the Army's proposal, with the proviso that the China Garrison Army observed the policy of nonextension. The proposal to dispatch troops was canceled, but on July 20 the cabinet approved it again, without discussion. On the night of July 25, at the Langfang railway station, a new clash occurred between Chinese and Japanese troops. Kazuki Kiyoshi immediately requested Tokyo's permission to retaliate with force. Without authorization from Tokyo, he decided independently to abandon the policy of nonextension and to resort to force on July 28 to chastise the Chinese troops located in the Beijing-Tianjing area. On July 29 the AGS formulated an operation strategy: 1) to expel the Chinese army and secure stability in the Beijing-Tienjing area; 2. to limit military operations to the area north of a line connecting Baoding and Duliuzhen; and 3. if necessary, to deploy part of the forces in the Qingtao and Shanghai areas.²⁴ The Army intended to employ three divisions, for only three months, and at a cost of only 100 million yen to settle the conflict.²⁵ But this limited war quickly developed into total war, partly because the Army had great success in North China and quickly moved to Central China, and partly because the Shanghai Expeditionary Army and the Navy easily occupied Shanghai, where the Japanese government had no specific political or military objective. The Army's attack culminated with the capture of Nanjing, the Chinese capital,

²⁴ Ibid., p. 452.

²⁵ Michael A. Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987) 90-91.

on December 13. But the war was far from over. The Army and the Navy continued to fight, and occupied virtually all of China's most economically developed areas.

Clearly, the Japanese state failed to develop a coherent strategy to clarify the objectives of the war. Lack of well-defined objectives led to gradual escalation from a limited war to a total war involving China, Southeast Asia, and the United States that became a multi-front war. The inability of the state to solve this issue intensified conflicts between the field armies in China and the high command in Tokyo, and between the Army and the Navy. Japanese soldiers, like Sun Zi's and Clausewitz' soldiers, were die-hard loyalists to the Emperor and his state, but they appeared to seek their own interests, which were, by extension, those of the state. Under the strong influence of Sun Zi's idea that field generals need not obey the commands of the Sovereign, most, if not all, middle echelon and lower-ranking army officers stationed in China advocated punitive actions.²⁶ They subsequently abandoned the nonextension policy without authorization from Tokyo in order to chastise Chinese troops, advanced to Zhangbei, sustained the establishment of autonomous regimes in North China, while opposing ending the war by negotiation, and broke the initial operations plan, which prescribed a halting line connecting Baoding and Duliuzhen.²⁷ The field armies under these autonomous officers of the middle and lower echelons became independent of the state and high command in Tokyo.

The AGS was cautious about the potential war in China. On July 8, 1937, Operations Division Chief Ishiwara Kanji, a strong supporter of a Clausewitzian total war against the Soviet Union and a final war against the United States, prevailed on Prince Kanin Kotohito, the Chief of Staff, to cable the China Garrison Army to settle the conflict locally. Together with War Guidance Section Chief Kawabe Torashiro, he opposed the

²⁶ Sato Kenji, Sun Zi yanjiu zai Riben pp. 160-161.

²⁷ Hata Ikuhiko, "The Marco Polo Bridge Incident" pp. 258-276; and James William Morley, Japan's Foreign Policy pp. 72-80.

extension of conflict, claiming that if several divisions were sent to North China, Japan might have to set up a military institution similar to that of the Siberian Expedition, which demanded a large expenditure of funds; Japan would then be in no position to take action if difficulties should develop in other places. For Japan, to fight the Chinese might invite Soviet intervention in the conflict. Ishiwara argued that the most urgent task awaiting Japan was to effect a truce through diplomatic means before reaching the Baoding-Duliuzhen line. He proposed two solutions: that the Army should pull all its troops out of North China and move them to the east of Shanhaiguang, and that Prime minister Konoe should fly to Nanjing to negotiate a basic solution directly with Jiang. Then he took his plan for a summit meeting to the Prime Minister's office to urge the Prime Minister to fly immediately to Nanjing, before the two states slipped into total war. When he was told that Konoe declined his proposal, he said "Tell the Prime Minister that in two thousand years of our history no man will have done more to destroy Japan than he has by his indecisiveness in this crisis."²⁸ His insistence on nonextension contributed to his being relieved of his duties as Operations Division Chief of the AGS.

The objective of nonextension was aimed at consolidating the East Asia League, including Japan, China, and Manzhouguo, through control over China, so as to prepare for total war against the Soviet Union and the United States. To achieve this objective, Japan tried to use moral persuasion and example as the means for obtaining Chinese participation in the bloc. "The West's greatest fear," argued Ishiwara, "is a Japanese policy of benevolence towards China; its greatest hope is that through a Japanese policy that promotes feelings of oppression in China there will be racial conflict between the two."²⁹ For him, the Japanese army should avoid conflicts with the Chinese in order to let

²⁸ Mark R. Peattie, Ishiwara Kanji and Japan's Confrontation with the West pp. 294-308 and Hata Ikuhiko, "Marco Polo Bridge Incident" pp. 254-275.

²⁹ Mark R. Peattie, Ishiwara Kanji and Japan's Confrontation with the West p. 276.

diplomats negotiate with them. But the Army's foreign policy, formulated on July 3, 1938, expressed its concerns over foreign involvement in the war. Strengthening the anti-Comintern axis and disposing of the China incident would decisively facilitate the winning of de facto recognition by other powers for Japan's China Policy, persuade them to cooperate in the construction of a new China in accordance with our wishes, and gain their support for Japan's posture. All diplomatic and economic activities should be based on the principle of national policies, and seek to adopt positive measures to persuade the Soviet Union not to participate in the Sino-Japanese war, and induce Britain to abandon its policy of supporting Jiang, and persuade the United States at the very least to retain a neutral attitude, or if possible, to adopt a pro-Japanese attitude, and strengthen friendly economic ties. The importation of arms into China should be banned through diplomatic means. The rights of the powers in China should be respected so long as they would not interfere with Japan's fundamental principles. Japan welcomed friendly third states to participate in the economic development of the new China. The Empire of Japan would assist the new China in the determination of all financial and economic policies, including matters relating to currency, customs, and customs rates.³⁰ Despite these concerns, the cardinal elements of the Army's China Policy remained threefold: the establishment of a new government; the attempts to effect a truce with Jiang, persuading him to unite with the new government; and the determination to prepare for a prolonged war in China.

The debate on strategy polarized the Army and the Navy. The Army saw the Soviet Union as the primary threat to Japan's security and prosperity, but the settlement of the China issue could substantially enhance its national defense against Soviet threats, real or potential. On the special meeting held on July 9, 1937, Sugiyama argued that cabinet

³⁰ James William Morley, ed. Deterrent Diplomacy: Japan, Germany, and the U.S.S.R., 1935-1940 (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 1976) 268-269.

authorization for sending three divisions would enable the Army to prepare for unforeseen changes in North China. But the Navy did not share the Army's perception that the Soviet Union was the main strategic issue, and insisted that expansion into South China as well as Southeast Asia would directly increase Japan's naval strength vis-à-vis Anglo-American power in the region. Sato Tetsutaro, known as the "Japanese Mahan," argued that an ocean state should not go too far into the continent and that there was no danger of an island country like Japan being invaded by a foreign power.³¹ The commanding officers of the 3rd Fleet in Shanghai even drew their plan for naval operations based on the possibility of full-scale war. Sugiyama's response to the Navy's suggestion was negative, reminding the cabinet that the potential threat from the Soviet Union meant that Japan was in no position to deploy large forces elsewhere. Despite the debate on the North-South issue--the preparation of a Clausewitzian total war against the Soviet Union or the preparation of a Sun Zi's war of quick decision against the southern states, in July 1940 a group of Army officers in the AGS, in cooperation with the staff of the Military Affairs Bureau of the Army Ministry, reviewed its policy and drafted "the Main Principles for Coping with the Changing World Situation," contending that Japan was supposed to form an economically self-sufficient zone, including the Southern Area, to establish a powerful political structure, and to institute a planned economy. These principles were approved by the Navy. It was the first time since the Sino-Japanese war that both services had reached a consensus on strategic planning, "but with the proviso that the southern expansion be achieved if possible by peaceful means."³² The Army and

³¹ Hata Ikuhiko, "Continental Expansion, 1905-1941" in Peter Duus, ed. The Cambridge History of Japan vol. 6, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) 275.

³² Hata Ikuhiko, "Marco Polo Bridge Incident" pp. 265-268; James William Morley, Japan's Foreign Policy p. 85; and Tsunoda Jun, "The Navy's Role in the Southern Strategy" in James William Morley, ed. The Fatal Choice: Japan's Advance into Southeast Asia, 1939-1941 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980) 241-296.

the Navy, however, committed to different convictions. The Army, especially the AGS, pursued the idea that the Coprosperity Sphere was essential to national defense, whereas the Navy primarily aimed at the American Navy, which it regarded as the major barrier to Japanese expansion. Obviously, both services were powerful lobbying groups or veto groups within the coalition that determined foreign and domestic policies. By taking advantage of regulations requiring the service ministers to be generals or admirals on active duty, they could easily bring down cabinets they disliked or manipulate them by hinting at such action. As the military was paramount in the state, the Army functioned as an increasingly independent political institution, often moving away from government control, to monopolize continental policy, whereas the Navy exploited their own opportunities when these arose.

In contrast to internal conflicts concerning the strategic objectives, the Japanese state attempted to explore an alternative to settle stalemate. The Liaison Conference was held on June 6, 1941 to discuss tentative choices in the event of a Nazi-Soviet war. These involved: 1) an independent move into Southeast Asia; 2) a compromise with the United States over this region, while preparing war against the Soviet Union; and 3) military control over Indochina, while strengthening the Guandong Army. The consensus on southern advance was sanctioned at the Imperial Conference of July 2, because the Army concluded that the United States was the major obstacle to China war termination; war against Southeast Asia became only an alternative to sustain the China war. The Outline of National Policies in View of the Changing Situation stated that regardless of whatever changes might occur in the world situation, Japan would adhere to the established policy of creating "a Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere." To reach this objective, Japan would not hesitate to "engage in war with Britain and the United States."³³ Thus, its

³³ Bunso Hashikawa, "Japanese Perspectives on Asia: from Dissociation to Coprosperity" in Akira Iriye, ed. The Chinese and the Japanese: Essays in Political and Cultural Interactions (Princeton: Princeton

gradual escalation from limited war to total war against China, Southeast Asia, and the United States was perceived as necessities to self-defense and self-preservation. The search for resources spilled the war into Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Total mobilization through total control for total war became essential in order to garner the resources necessary to prevail in this total war.³⁴

Meanwhile, the Army tried to adopt Sun Zi's indirect approach to minimizing violence in order to secure its position in the occupied areas by swiftly setting up local puppet regimes to promote its policy of "divide, collaborate." As early as October 28, 1937, the Special Service Department headed by Kita Seiichi under the North China Army outlined the policy concerning the establishment of a North China Regime. "The new regime to be established in the North should," it claimed, "be a central government that would supplant the Nanjing regime. Its authority should be uniformly accepted throughout the areas,

University Press, 1980) 346-355 and James B. Crowley, "Japan's Military Foreign Policies" in James William Morley, ed. Japan's Foreign Policy pp. 84-95.

³⁴ Japan's approach to the Sino-Japanese war was partly derived from its lack of China experts. In the Army, important posts were usually given to officers with excellent records at the War College, with expertise in operations, or experience in foreign countries other than China. China experts, therefore, could not occupy posts that would allow them to command the army's China policy from Tokyo, while high-ranking officials in the General Staff and the War Ministry had to deal with the intelligence reports and activities of these China experts without the benefit of much experience in China. As a result, the army's China policy became changeable and inconsistent. Similarly, the Foreign Ministry, along with other institutions in Japan, had been created to make Japan equivalent to the major Western powers. Perhaps for this reason, Japan's Anglo-American-oriented statesmen dominated amongst the ministry's top level personnel. Ironically, however, with the passing time, the major arena of activity came to be China, not the West. The institution's response to this new development was slow and inadequate, with diplomatic experience and expertise in China never gaining the systematic recognition within the Ministry that such qualifications deserved. On the contrary, officers of the Kwantung Army were extremely hawkish on China. Tojo Hideki advised the Army General Staff that the Nationalist regime should be eliminated before attending to the Russian problem, to remove any threat to Japan's rear. Furthermore, a group of staff officers were sent to Tokyo to urge decisive action against China by the high command. See Kitaoka Shinichi, "China Experts in the Army", Barbara J. Brooks, "China Experts in the Gaimusho, 1895-1937", and Alvin D. Coox, "The Kwantung Army Dimension" in Peter Duus, eds. The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989) 330-428.

where Japanese influence extended."³⁵ As a result, the Provisional government of the Republic of China was inaugurated in Beijing on December 14, 1937. Despite the Army's great efforts to replace the Nationalist government by the North China regime, the Imperial Conference held on January 11, 1938 showed its willingness to press for a peaceful settlement through negotiations with the Nationalist government.³⁶ According to Japan's proposal, Japan reserved the right to negotiate peace terms with China, if China would approach it with sincerity, seeking peace; if China made no peace offer, however, then Japan would drop the idea of seeking conflict resolution through negotiations; and it would then build up a new China by crushing the Nationalist Regime and merging it into a new central government.³⁷ As a result of strong domestic opinion, Jiang Jieshi was determined to fight, rather than accept the offer. On January 15th, Japan decided to create a new regime.

This policy was reconfirmed by the Privy Council. Its resolution stated that the government intended to proceed on the basis of three prescriptions, aimed at establishing a new order in East Asia through mutual collaboration in political, economic, and cultural fields among Japan, Manzhouguo and China. First, it was Japan's policy not to mediate at this time, whether the proposal was made by a third party or by the Jiang's government. Japan would, however, give a different consideration to the matter if the Jiang government abandoned his pro-Comintern and anti-Japanese policy, restructured his organization, and voluntarily dissolved his regime by merging with the new central

³⁵ Susi Katsumi, "The Politics of War, 1937-1941" in James William Morley, ed. The China Quagmire 310.

³⁶ Chen Wenyan, "Dui kangRi zhanzhengshi yanjiu zhong jige wenti de tantao (Discussion of the Several questions in the History of the Sino-Japanese War)" Junshi shilin no. 3, 1987: 6-7.

³⁷ The International Military Tribunal for the Far East, "Decisions of Imperial Conferences, Liaison Conferences, Privy Council Meetings, Cabinet Meetings, Four Ministers' Conferences, Five Ministers' Conferences, Senior Statemen's Meetings, Supreme War Plans Council, Joint Conferences and Miscellaneous Conferences" pp. 4-5.

government. Second, Japan would foster the establishment of a new pro-Japanese central regime. The regime would adhere to the principles of collaboration among Japan, Manzhouguo, and China, and friendship, joint defense against the Comintern, and economic cooperation, and set up a Sino-Japanese unity zone in North China and Menjiang in terms of defense and economy. Third, some restrictions should be imposed on other powers in China. The major objectives were that Japan would control the development of natural resources in North China and Menjiang and that the currency system, customs and maritime customs systems in new China should be adjusted to accord with the standpoint of the Japan-Manzhouguo-China economic bloc. Regarding diplomatic policy towards third powers such as Britain, the United States, and France, Japan would reject the idea of disposing of the Chinese problem through the Nine Power Treaty and other collective machinery.³⁸

But one faction of the Nationalist Party, led by Wang Jingwei, sought collaboration with, rather than resistance against Japan. Wang's visit to Japan contributed to Tokyo's recognition of Wang's movement of collaboration which consisted of the supporters of Wang and Wu Paifu, members of the existing regimes, and "penitent" members of the Chongqing government. The form of the government was to be based on the principle of cooperation among independent regional entities.³⁹ A new policy for China, The Basic Policy for Dealing with China in order to End the Greater East Asia War was set forth at the Imperial Conference of December 21, 1942. The policy in fact represented the Army's acknowledgment that its "supervision" and "guidance" of the Wang regime and the North China Political Council might reduce direct intervention in purely internal Chinese

³⁸ Ibid., pp. 102-104.

³⁹ Lloyd E. Eastman, "Facets of an Ambivalent Relationship: Smuggling, Puppets, and Atrocities during the War, 1937-1945" in Akira Iriye, ed, The Chinese and the Japanese pp. 302-303 and Usui Katsumi, "The Politics of War" p. 389.

affairs. Army officers were instructed to cease using harsh or imperious language to Chinese citizens and government officials, and instead adopt a low-profile approach characterized by "assistance," "suggestion," and "guidance."⁴⁰ Japanese authorities and their puppet regimes further made some armistice overtures directly or indirectly to the Nationalists and the Communists. The offered concessions involved withdrawal of Japanese troops, termination of Japanese economic spheres of influence, assistance for rehabilitation programs in China, and proposed agreements on mutual respect for each other's territorial and political integrity, collaboration in regional economic development, and cooperation in maintaining peace and stability. But the Nationalists and the Communists in turn had to cease hostilities toward Japan and sever their relationships with the United States and Britain. Even though Japan attempted to play the cards of Wang and negotiations with Jiang and Mao, this ignored the fact that Wang was reluctant to cooperate on the basis of Japanese conditions.⁴¹ He was not "a pro-Japanese politician," but "a nationalist" who intended to take advantage of the Japanese invasion to put more pressure on Jiang in order to establish his own leadership inside the Nationalist Party; thus Wang and his regime collaborated with the Japanese, while keeping a variety of connections with the Nationalists in Chongqing. Jiang, meanwhile, downplayed proposed negotiations, while continuing to seek military assistance especially from the United States. In contrast to Wang and Jiang, Mao pushed his idea of united front with the Nationalists, while propagandizing among the puppet troops in order to win over them. He remained totally convinced of his final victory over both the Japanese and the

⁴⁰ John Hunter Boyle, China and Japan at War pp. 309-310.

⁴¹ D. Clayton James, "American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War" in Peter Paret, ed. Makers of Modern Strategy p. 713; Wang Daoping, eds. Zhongguo kangri zhanzheng shi pp. 40-42; and Chen Lifu, The Storm Clouds Clear over China: the Memoir of Chen Lifu, 1900-1993 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1994) 138-139.

Nationalists. The divergence in their interests prevented them from cooperation on clarifying rules for guiding the war.

The absence of effective political leadership emphasized by Sun Zi and Clausewitz contributed to the weak coalition of soldiers, politicians, businessmen, and bureaucrats. Without leadership, Japan had great difficulties in specifying its elusive strategic objectives and explicit or tacit rules for guiding operations and battles. As a result, a limited war became a total war, through total mobilization, against China, Southeast Asia, and the United States. On the one hand, the war allowed the politicians to assume broad authority and to maximize power. But they were led by hard-liners, expressing militant, escalatory rhetoric, who formulated the policies that enabled field commanders to further expand their military operations, calling for wars of annihilation. The leaders of the business and industry community endorsed the goal of setting up the pro-Japanese government in China, rather than protested increasing tax burdens. The Japanese Emperor indirectly approved the policy formulated by politicians and sustained by business and industrial leaders.⁴² Such loose cooperation between civilians sustained the hard-line position of field armies wishing to expand violence. On the other hand, the war created strategic environments for Chinese politicians, Nationalist, Communist, and puppet, to maneuver in their own struggle for power in China. The war in general and Japan in particular became their instruments to maximize power so that all Chinese parties hoped, if not explicitly, to maintain the war as it was. Within this complicated strategic environments, the AGS sought to terminate the China war in order to prepare war against the Soviet Union. The Navy strongly opposed northern advance by proposing southern expansion to South China, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific. The expansions were aimed at strengthening the Japanese economy by occupying either northern or southern areas rich

⁴² John W. Dower, Empire and Aftermath pp. 204-210.

in natural resources in hopes of being able to wage a multi-front war for surviving from it. But lack of concrete strategy to wage a war against China, factional struggles between and within the services, and the independence of field armies from the state prevented Japan from seriously accounting for the international strategic environments in order to make explicit or tacit rules for guiding war. Under such a weak coalition, the objectives of the China war remained elusive.

The Military

Without the mutually recognized limits of war, the Japanese military placed special emphasis on the Clausewitzian total destruction of Nationalist and Communist troops in a total China war regardless of costs and benefits. To reach the objective, Japanese operational art, sustained by Bushido, exclusively centered on decisive battles of annihilation through maneuver and close combat in one short blow. Decisive battles of annihilation indeed reflected the strong influence of Prussian operational art and of Japanese strategic culture on Japanese soldiers. Japanese operational art favored a small professional army that could win rapid and decisive victories at the very outset of a war through encircling the enemy in one continuous operational-tactical sequence combining mobilization, concentration, movement, and fighting. Complete encirclement eventually led to attack from four directions: front, flanks, and rear. This way of war was aimed at escaping from protracted war, terminating the war in short time so that the primacy of operations and battles was totally given to offense, rather than defense. According to Meckel's interpretation of Clausewitz, "a vast defense system" becomes fatal for the offensive spirit; the army loses its maneuverability and capacity for the attack; and protection of this sort becomes "a hindrance" rather than a help. Since creating initiatives and priorities on the battlefield rested on offense, maneuver, and morale, the role of material factors became minimal. Thus, "the infantry remained the independent arm capable of fighting under any conditions. Combining firepower and naked steel--the

bayonet--it could advance or stand its ground and it could operate by day or night on any terrain accessible to human beings."⁴³ In addition, "effective small arm fire" could make artillery positions untenable. Such neutralization of material factors derived from the Japanese Bushido code, which fostered the spirit of Sun Zi's close combat.⁴⁴ Spirit became decisive in combat. The business of the samurai consists in reflecting on his own station in life, in discharging loyal service to his master, in deepening his fidelity in associations with friends, and with due consideration of his own position, in devoting himself to duty above all.⁴⁵ The principles of decisive battles of annihilation, close combat, and strong morale became enshrined in Japanese operational art.

But the military lacked a sound strategy based on appropriately evaluating its own and the enemy's military capabilities so as to clarify priorities and initiatives. The absence of specified objectives to measure strategic, operational, and tactical achievements was bound to result in mismatch between objectives and capabilities. The Japanese center of gravity called for waging decisive operations to force the Chinese to surrender or at least to negotiate peace. Though the way to destroy them would vary according to combat environments, the Army seemed to have no ideas of how to do it. During its strategic offense, its primary targets were Chinese troops, major cities, and industrial and agricultural centers along the railways. After taking complete control of the Beijing-Tianjing area, the Army with the Navy's support took Shanghai on September 13, captured Nanjing--the Chinese capital--on December 14, entered Hankou in Central

⁴³ Ernst L. Presseisen, Before Aggression pp. 82-83; Pan Junfen, Riben junshi sixiang yanjiu pp. 233-236 and pp. 285-290; Ryusaku Tsunoda, eds. Sources of Japanese Tradition p. 399; and Michael Howard, "Men against Fire: the Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914" in Peter Paret, ed. Makers of Modern Strategy pp. 518-519.

⁴⁴ Sato Kenji, Sun Zi yanjiu zai Riben pp. 169-171 and Pan Junfen, Riben junshi sixiang yanjiu pp. 170-180.

⁴⁵ Eiko Ikegami, The Taming of the Samurai: Honorific Individualism and the Making of Modern Japan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995) 288-298.

China on May 20, 1938, and seized Guangzhou in South China on October 21. Within 15 months, it occupied almost all the Chinese major cities and most of the important industrial centers and rich agricultural areas, but it failed to destroy Nationalist regulars. Despite the fall of Nanjing, Chinese resistance against Japan did not collapse.⁴⁶ Although the objective of war was supposedly to annihilate Chinese troops within months, the Army vainly captured territories. In these operations, it committed five mistakes. First, it adopted piecemeal reinforcement, since it substantially underestimated China's resistance and therefore fell short of troops. Second, it had no clear strategic directions of operations. It simply divided its troops more or less evenly between North and Central China. With successes on the battlefield, it needed more garrisons in the newly occupied areas, but it lacked forces for further advance. Third, it suffered from an extreme deficiency of strategic coordination. It could only coordinated operations within the group army, but not between North and Central China. Fourth, it failed to grasp strategic opportunities to launch attacks on the Chinese troops. Fifth, it encircled large numbers of Chinese troops, but only annihilated small numbers of them.⁴⁷ As the Japanese troops unevenly spread across North, Central, and South China, their defense of occupied areas was overextended, creating many weak spots. Chinese troops took advantage of these vulnerabilities to prolong the war and succumb Japanese aspirations for a war of quick decision. In Jiang's words, China employed space to gain time, because China was so large that it was not possible for the Japanese to fight everywhere. Thus, China deliberately gave up major cities, railways, and rich agricultural areas in order to entrench itself and slowly turn defeat into victory.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Wang Daoping, eds. Zhongguo kangRi zhanzheng p. 160.

⁴⁷ Mao Zedong, "On Protracted War" in Selected Works vol. II, (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1967) 178-179.

⁴⁸ Chen Lifu, The Storm Clouds Clear over China p. 138.

Protracted war moreover created two battlefields: the front battlefield targeted to field armies and the rear battlefield directed at guerrillas. But the Japanese high command failed to develop a strategy to simultaneously deal with these two battlefields. The strategic failure along with the strategic stalemate forced the Army to shift strategy from the front battlefield aimed at destroying Nationalist forces to the rear, to consolidate occupied strategic "points" and "lines." On this new battlefield, it seemed also to lack operational and even tactical mobility; it simply and desperately conducted a series of mopping-up operations in North China to eliminate Communist guerrillas and to stabilize its rear. The guerrillas, described Hayashi Saburo, in fact took the best possible advantage of their vast and boundless terrain. They preserved their own fighting strength while wearing down the Japanese troops with frequent shifts of force and fluid tactics of advance and retreat, depending on the situation. But the Japanese Army appeared not well prepared to fight against such guerrillas. The most striking feature of counter-guerrilla warfare efforts, regardless of the merits of individual military techniques or policies instituted in a few selective areas, was that the Army had neither an overall plan nor a system of operations.⁴⁹ This enlarged guerrilla warfare wore Japanese soldiers down by expanding space and time. The total failure of Japanese policy in North China ended with the cruel slogan of "three-all: burn all, loot all, kill all." The shortage of war materials together with the economic embargo imposed by the United State and its Allies, created serious problems for the Army's logistics, which substantially undermined combat effectiveness. The high command attempted to adopt "the strategy of the Chinese fighting the Chinese" to solve the problem. This strategy was essentially directed at taking advantage of the puppet troops in maintaining social order in the rear as well as striking

⁴⁹ John King Faibank, China p. 319 and Alvin D. Coox, "Recourse to Arms: the Sino-Japanese Conflict, 1937-1945" in Alvin d. Coox, eds. China and Japan: a Search for Balance since World War I (Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, Inc., 1978) 307.

Chinese regular troops or guerrillas. The puppet troops included 410,000 regulars and 490,000 local troops, but they were politically unreliable in waging operations and battles. In 1941 alone, Communist forces won over 34,167 puppet soldiers or about 3.8 % of the total puppet strength, and captured 20,850 rifles, side arms, mortars, and field pieces.⁵⁰ Many of them were in fact simultaneously working for the Nationalists, the Communists, and of course the Japanese.

During its strategic defense, the Army launched operations aimed at separating the Chongqing government from Hunan province and at smoothing the connection between South and Central China, while waging wars against the United States and its South and Southeast Asian and European allies.⁵¹ The major target of the operations was the Nationalist regular forces. The Japanese Army partly reached its objectives, but it was unable to destroy the American-supplied Chinese main formations. Although the Army tended to strike fast to destroy Nationalist regulars and Communist guerrillas in the shortest possible time, while occupying all vital and decisive "points" and "lines," it was dragged deeply into the Chinese war of attrition as a result of superior China's human resources and huge territory. The Army was unable to concentrate on its center of gravity.

Despite the persistent emphasis on mobility on the battlefield, the Army drove blindly to occupy the Chinese capital, which they thought would bring them honor and glory, rather than crush the Chinese troops. The high command misjudged the combat environments that ensured that Nanjing would not fall until the following year. It was then unprepared to utilize its capture to bring an end to the war.⁵² Further, the Army's

⁵⁰ Susan H. Marsh, "Chou Fo-Hai: the Making of a Collaborator" in Akira Iriye, ed. The Chinese and the Japanese pp. 325-327 and Chen Lifu, The Storm Clouds Clear over China p. 279.

⁵¹ Wang Daoping, Zhonggou kangri zhanzheng vols II and III.

⁵² Li Changhua, "Ribei tiguozhuyi quanmian qinhua zhanzheng de zhanlue fangzhen yanbian (The Transition of Japanese Imperialist Strategy during China Total War)" Junshi shili no. 3, 1987: 9 and Usui Katsumi, "The Politics of War" pp. 279-280.

endless occupation forced it to simultaneously fight both Nationalists and Communists. In fact, however, the Chinese regulars never really wanted to defend them, but simply utilized them as tools to exhaust the Japanese troops and then retreat. On the rear battlefield, the Japanese Army adopted the principle of "divide, rule" to create puppet regimes to consolidate its power in the occupied areas, while waging a war against the guerrillas. The Five Ministers' Conference set out in detail the quid pro quo for any Wang regime. Wang had to accept limitations on the authority of the central government. Inner Mongolia, an especially intensive anti-Communist zone would have no more than nominal authority. North China, "in view of national defense and economic considerations," would be made into a Sino-Japanese zone of intensive consolidation. For economic reasons, "the lower reaches of the Yangtze River" would be a zone of consolidation. As a final condition that reflected the Navy's increased emphasis on strategic planning for "an advance to the south" and on confrontation with Great Britain and the United States, Wang would grant Japan "a special position" in islands along the South China coast.⁵³ The Chinese puppet regimes were intended to control the countryside by establishing rural pacification movements aimed at both clearing communist guerrillas and restoring full economic productivity. These movements proposed by the Wang regime fell back on the age-old system of collective responsibility known as "Baojia." The first step in this institution was a careful census check and the establishment of basic units: each family unit constituted a "hu;" ten hu constituted a "jia;" ten jia constituted a "bao." Leaders were then appointed at each level, their responsibility and authority delegated on the basis of jia and bao, and local militia squads created to maintain local order. Blockades and checkpoints were set up in each district. Identity cards were distributed and travel permits were required for all movement. Each

⁵³ John Hunter Boyle, China and Japan at War pp. 242-243.

household displayed a certificate on its front door giving information on the occupants of the house. These measures did not, however, eliminate communist guerrillas; instead, it protected them from Japanese mopping-up operations. The puppet regimes became the shelter of the guerrillas. The objective of Japanese encirclement was designed to destroy Chinese troops in operations with one short blow. In fact, the Japanese themselves were encircled by the Chinese Nationalists, Communists, and puppets and doomed to wage protracted war.

The Sino-Japanese war was in essence a continental war in which the Navy and the Air Division of the Army merely provided naval and air covers for the Army's operations. A large part of the Navy was diverted from its primary high-sea mission to support the ground forces engaged in China. Possessing air supremacy, the Navy sent flights to bomb Chongqing and other inland cities between May and August of each year. After the Navy blockaded the Chinese coast, the Army seized all major coastal cities. Along with the Navy, Army Aviation conducted "fatigue bombing and blockade bombing" against Chinese political and industrial targets, seeking psychological impacts on China's governments, troops, and people. As a result of the outbreak of the Pacific War, the Japanese high command decided to withdraw large numbers of fighters and bombers from China, and sent them to the Pacific theater. The Army Aviation then switched its targets from the political and industrial to the military.⁵⁴ China lacked planes and tanks in both

⁵⁴ The Soviet Union and the United States sent their volunteers to China to help the Chinese Air Force. As early as October 1937, 701 Soviet pilots and technicians, along with 124 aircraft, arrived in the Hankou Airport. Up to February 1939, around 2,000 Soviet volunteers came to China to fight against the Japanese. From 1938-1939, the Soviet Union provided \$ 250 million US Dollar credit for buying 600 Soviet airplanes. The volunteers were withdrawn from China after the outbreak of the German invasion of the Soviet Union. The American volunteers arrived in China in June 1941, after the US government ratified the Lend-Lease bill allowing retired naval and air personnel to engage in the Sino-Japanese War. These Flying Tigers, under a retired American airman, Claire Chennault, harassed Japanese communication lines from its base in Kunming. In June 1942, the US government turned this volunteer unit into the US Special Detachment in China. In March 1943, the US government expanded this detachment into the 14th Wing of the US Air Force. See Peng Yulong, "Sulian duai Zhongguo kangRi zhanzheng de junshi yuanzhu (The Soviet Military Assistance to China during the Sino-Japanese war)" *Junshi lishi* no. 2, 1992: 50-53; Wang

quantity and quality so that the Japanese tended to think in terms of an automatic aerial and armored supremacy. They did not organize a long-range strategic air command nor devise substantial formations embodying heavy or medium tanks. The Army rarely employed tanks in North, Central, and South China's combat.⁵⁵

As a result of the weaknesses inherent in operational art, the Army was unable to conduct its war of annihilation. Such failure mirrored the Japanese misperception of Chinese politics, military, and society. Japan saw China as "a plate of sand" where warlords, Nationalists, and Communists fought one another in the struggle for power, but it greatly underestimated Chinese nationalism and patriotism. Even though the Chinese military was weak, compared to the Japanese military, it possessed an unlimited manpower pool, together with foreign military assistance and societal support. The absence of a rational study of Japan's and China's capabilities resulted in the operation's failure. Therefore, the military, like Sun Zi and Clausewitz, heavily emphasized the management of soldiers' mind to increase combat power. The Japanese mind management was closely associated with emphasis on duty. Everyone must hold in check any tendencies, conscious or unconscious, to defy authority, violate the code of work, or flout the incessant demand for sacrifice in the collective interest. From the earliest years youth would be trained to subdue--to disavow, to struggle against--any specific opposition to the ruling code of collective decisions. Conscience imposed feelings of guilt and anxiety on the individual whenever one's impulses were aroused, ever so slightly, to break the code. A characteristic response was self-righteousness--quick justification of coercive punishment, and tacit acceptance of the inference that all who were subjected to coercion

Daoping, eds. Zhongguo kangri zhanzheng shi vol III, pp. 282-288; Wnag Fu, Rijun qinhua zhanzheng vol. I, pp. 701-702; Chen Lifu, The Storm Clouds Clear over China pp. 124-125; and John King Fairbank, China pp. 326-327.

⁵⁵ Wang Fu, Rijun qinhua zhanzheng vol. II, pp. 1113-1114 and vol. III, pp. 1822-1827 and Alvin D. Coox, "Recourse to Arms," pp. 310-311.

were guilty of anti-social conduct. To maintain suspended judgment or to absolve others in particular instances was to give at least partial toleration to countermoves tendencies within the self. Hence, the quick substitute responses--self-righteous attitudes, deflection of attention. A psychic pattern of the military state was the startle pattern, which was carried over to the internal as well as to external threat of danger.⁵⁶ Lasswell's analysis merely showed that ideological control was an important instrument of the garrison state to dominate society, but he failed to explain the nature and the sources of ideological control.

The mind management was in fact based on the Bushido ethic code, the way of the warrior that combined Japanese feudal traditions with Chinese Confucian ethics and Shintoism and placed them at the service of the Emperor. Loyalty and nationalism strengthened thought control over the Japanese military and society and had carefully nurtured racial superiority in preparing the nation for a war of conquest. The Confucianism adopted by the Tokugawa Bakufu regime as its orthodox doctrine was the Cheng-Zhu School of Confucianism. This Confucianism was a highly generalized cultural system, in which all of the dimensions of human culture were integrated into a single self-sufficient whole.⁵⁷ From the very moment of its liberation from the libraries of Zen monasteries, the Chinese attributes of Confucianism as a generalized cultural system

⁵⁶ Harold D. Lasswell, "The Garrison State," pp. 460-461.

⁵⁷ The Cheng-Zhu school attempted to synthesize the competing cultures of Taoism and Buddhism by coopting their strong points into Neo-Confucianism. The result of this synthesis was a highly philosophized cultural system which not only provided a Ming-Chiao culture for the political empires of Tang and Song via the scholar-officials but also met the intellectual needs of the newly rising gentry class. By virtue of this combination, Neo-confucianism became an ordered system of meaning and symbol providing the framework of belief, expressive symbol and value in terms of which individuals define their world, express their feelings, and make their judgment. See: Feng Yulan, History of Chinese Philosophy (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1956); Wm. Theodore de Barry, ed. The Unfolding of Neo-Confucianism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975) 141-206; and Benjamin Schwartz, "Some Polarities in Confucian Thought" in David Nivison, ed. Confucianism in Action (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966) 52-58.

maintaining its integrity against the social system were then reduced to a cultural ideology in the service of the Tokugawa Shogunate. Having deteriorated into a cultural ideology which politically legitimized the Bakufu regime and socially stabilized the Tokugawa ming-chiao, Japanese Confucianism, without philosophical structure, was bereft of emotional undertones. It was purely an intellectual means of furthering the Bakufu regime. The Japanese Tao of rule by military force and the Confucian Tao of rule by civil virtue were accommodated under the Bakufu sponsorship of Confucianism.⁵⁸

Together with the Confucianist ethical codes, Shintoism was also used to strengthen military morale. The Shinto's rites and symbols were appropriated and assembled in new forms and given new meanings, which provided the theoretical foundation for its national ceremonial calendar, flag, national anthem, and rites of the state accessible to all subjects.⁵⁹ Shintoism had two branches: State Shinto (Kokka Shinto) and Sectarian Shinto (Shuha Shinto). The former had a carefully defined official relationship to national life and was protected with a special status because of its value to the state, while the latter was dependent entirely on the voluntary support of adherents for institutional maintenance. Shintoism served as a conduit for access to the prestige of the state, promoting nationalistic values in society by increasing societal loyalty to the state and the Emperor. Amaterasu-Omikami, the Sun Goddess, was the primordial ancestor, offspring of the gods and herself a deity. The Goddess everlastingly showed Herself in the person of the Mikado, the August Ruler, the representative of the unbroken line of the Imperial Family, who in the firmament reigns supreme over the planetary system.⁶⁰ This central

⁵⁸ Byung Tai Hwang, Confucianism in Modernization 316-317 and Ryusaku Tsunoda, Wm. Theodore de Bary, and Donald Keene, eds. Sources of Japanese Tradition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958) 344-345.

⁵⁹ Helen Hardacre, Shinto and the State pp. 21-41.

⁶⁰ Daniel C. Holton, Modern Japan and Shinto Nationalism p. 64.

element of the national spirit, the major grounds for the belief in the one-tribe origin of the nation as all descended from a common ancestor, became the inspiration for a spiritual mobilization program carried out in a thousand ways through the length and breadth of the empire--a basis of unity and authority in human affairs that broadened its dominions over men with every success of Japanese arms, and the embodiment of the highest political authority elevated to the position of deity. In a word, it was the deification of the political might of the military state. The military became the most political army in the world.⁶¹

Moreover, Shintoism provided the foundation on which the Japanese state was deliberately established. A major purpose of successive governments from the opening of the Meiji era in 1868 had been to furnish state life with a standardized ritual, centering on a faith in the traditional gods, to the end that the national psychology would be safeguarded against the dangers of foreign contacts, and unified in the support of national policy. Sadao Araki argued that the Japanese conception of political origin lay in the very law of nature, in conformity with Divine Will. According to their belief, the Imperial House was descended from the Sun Goddess. They were proud to look on their Emperor as the fountain-head of national life. In this respect the Empire rested on the foundation of a blood relationship that far transcended mere morality, and the Ruler was viewed in the light of a super-moral Being. As the Japanese "Fundamental Principles of the National Structure" stated,

The Emperor by means of religious ceremonies becomes one with the divine imperial ancestors, and through participation in the spirit of the imperial ancestors, he is able to educate the subjects of the state ever more and more and promote their prosperity. In this way the spirit wherewith the Emperor rules

⁶¹ Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State pp. 125-126; Michio Morishima, Why Has Japan Succeeded? 36-40; and Daniel C. Holtom, Modern Japan and Shinto Nationalism p. 65.

the country is imparted. For this reason the worship of the gods on the part of the Emperor and his administration of government are in their fundamental aspects one and the same thing. Furthermore the Emperor is the custodian and executor of the testaments of the ancestors and with these he makes clear the great principles on which the nation was founded and the Great Way in which the subjects should walk. In these consist the great essentials of our education. Thus, education in its fundamental aspects is unified with religious ceremonies and government. That is to say, although religious ceremonies and government and education have their own separate operations, yet in the last analysis they are one and the same.⁶²

The Emperor as the Sun Goddess dominated the Japanese state and people. Thus, all new shrines established on the Asian mainland and overseas would honor only the Sun Goddess and the spirit of the Emperor. As "A Policy for the Unification of the National Faith" asserted,

If when we worship before the sanctuaries where the ancestors of the Imperial Family are enshrined, we bear in mind that the sacred spirits of the great ancestors are even now living in the mighty will of the Emperor, then mediated through these shrines, we do reverence to the Emperor's will. If again when we worship at the shrines dedicated to national heroes, we bear in mind that the great work of the Emperor in ruling over the state is exalted by these heroes, then in the same way, mediated through these shrines, we are revering the will of the Emperor. And if again when we worship before the shrines dedicated to the manifestations of the natural world such as mountains, rivers, animals, and plants, we bear in mind that these various manifestations of nature offer up their manifold powers and thereby sustain the imperial destiny, then in the same way, mediated through these shrines, we worship the will of the Emperor.

In this manner, no matter what may be the nature of the enshrined deity, if mediated through them all in a single line, the great heart of the Emperor and that alone is revered, then

⁶² Ibid. p. 7.

the faith of the nation is completely unified and the greater the number of deities worshipped, the more does this single faith attain depth and loftiness.

Shintoism supplied a religious rationale for promoting national unity and loyalty during a crisis. Whenever an emergency arose, the national spirit was manifested to advance the prestige and fortune of the nation. It was incumbent to leave no stone unturned in order to promote loyalty and bravery on the home front as well, and to replenish and demonstrate the nation's powers, for which were required the inoculation of the spirit of reverence for deities and respected ancestors, the renovation of national education and the improvement of the people's physical strength.⁶⁴ Shintoism was utilized as an instrument to defend Japaneseness. "All of the evils of thought and society in our country today are the result of the excessive and extreme introduction of the manifold and complicated European and American culture, institutions, and technique subsequent to the beginning of the Meiji Era, taken in connection with the fact that we were prone to forget our origins and rush for results, and being deficient in rigorous and sound judgment, we failed to accomplish a fundamental purification."⁶⁵ Therefore, Japan must defend not only the Japanese culture but also the Asian culture. Seishiro Itagaki said that the fundamental cause of the outbreak of the present China incident, which had resulted in the unfriendly position of the two oriental nations, was a lack of realization by them of their true culture and their running after the individualistic conception which formed the basis of the culture of Europe and America. The rulers of China had depended too much on European and American countries. The Japanese people boasting of their country's superior position had been insulting China and worshipping things Occidental. These

⁶³ Ibid., p. 44.

⁶⁴ Michio Morishima, Why Has Japan Succeeded? pp. 38-39.

⁶⁵ Daniel C. Holton, Modern Japan and Shinto Nationalism pp. 89-90.

factors had combined to bring about the present predicament.⁶⁶ Therefore, it was up to both the Japanese and Chinese people to correct fundamentally the present Sino-Japanese relationship on the basis of awakening consciousness of their position as Orientals.

Loyalty and Japaneseness strengthened soldiers' fighting spirit. All the wars were holy wars since soldiers were under the command of the Emperor and since the wars were carried on in the name of the Emperor. All soldiers who participated in these holy wars were representatives of the Emperor or his loyal subjects. To put the matter from the side of the subjects, every Japanese regardless of what kind of person he might be possesses the inherent capacity of becoming a loyal subject and of being empowered to put that loyalty into operation. The matchless superiority of the Japanese national life lay just here.⁶⁷ Shintoism led soldiers to fight for the Emperor and die for their country. Living in the spirit world, they became the guardians of their families and the nation. A combination of Confucianism and Shintoism generated the Bushido spirit.

Bushido provided soldiers a set of formal moral codes with special emphasis on control over individual behavior through doctrination. As a result, absolute loyalty and self-sacrifice became the ideal that guided soldiers who wished to exemplify the true spirit of the samurai.⁶⁸ The Kogaku (Ancient Learning) school reduced Confucianism to a set of ethical codes of limited applicability to particular types of social interaction, sustained by Shintoism. Yamagu Soko rendered them into a set of functional ethical codes for the samurai class. As he explained,

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 91.

⁶⁷ Hillis Lory, Japan's Military Masters: the Army in Japanese Life (New York: the Viking Press, 1943) 36-38 and Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State pp. 124-139.

⁶⁸ Eiko Ikegami, The Taming of the Samurai: Honorific Individualism and the Making of Modern Japan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995) 279-280.

Thus, the occupations of farmer, artisan, and merchant necessarily grew up as complementary to one another. However, the samurai eats food without growing it, uses utensils without manufacturing them, and profits without buying or selling. What is the justification for this? . . . It cannot be said that he has no function at all as a samurai. . . . The business of a samurai consists in reflecting on his own station in life, in discharging loyal service to his master. . . . He dispenses with the business of the farmer, artisan, and merchant and confines himself to practicing the Way. . . . The samurai summarily punishes him (who transgresses against moral obligation) and thus upholds proper moral principle in the land. . . . The three classes of the common people make him their teacher and respect him. By following his teachings, they are enabled to understand what is fundamental and what is secondary. Herein lies the Way of the samurai,⁶⁹ the means by which he earns his clothing, food, and shelter.

For him, Confucianism was a set of functional ethical codes for the samurai class. This set of particular codes would provide moral standards for society. The guiding principle of the sage was useful to a samurai in developing his appropriate ethical orientation in relations with others and in appropriating functional capabilities in the arts of war and the manufacture and use of armor and horse trappings. The sage was the archetype of the best samurai, who was not concerned over personal success or failure; content with his own lot, he never deviated from the course of duty.⁷⁰

This set of samurai codes were inserted into Emperor Meiji's "Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors" with emphasis on five precepts. First, soldiers must be loyal to "the Emperor and the nation." The soldier and the sailor should consider loyalty their essential duty. Who that was born in this land could be wanting in the spirit of grateful service to it? No soldier or sailor, especially, could be considered efficient unless this spirit be strong within him. A soldier or a sailor in whom this spirit was not strong, however

⁶⁹ Ryusaku Tsunoda, eds. Sources of Japanese Tradition p. 365.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 367.

skilled in art or proficient in science, was a mere puppet. Duty was weightier than a mountain, while death was lighter than a feather. Never by failing in moral principle fall into disgrace and bring dishonor upon their name. Second, soldiers must obey the commands of their officers. The soldier and the sailor should be strict in observing propriety. Inferiors should regard the orders of their superiors as issuing directly from the Emperor. Always pay due respect not only to their superiors but also to their seniors, even though not serving under them. If they neglect to observe propriety, they will not only be a blight on the forces but also be an unpardonable offender against the state. Third, soldiers must be courageous on the battlefield. The soldier and the sailor should esteem valor. Ever since ancient times valor had been held in high esteem in Japan, and without it her subjects would be unworthy of their name. They should have sound discrimination of right and wrong, cultivate self-possession, and form their plans with deliberation. Never to despise an inferior enemy or fear a superior, but to do one's duty as soldier or sailor--this is true valor. Fourth, soldiers must be faithful and righteous. Faithfulness implied the keeping of one's word, and righteousness meant the fulfillment of one's duty. If they wished to be faithful and righteous in anything, they must carefully consider at the outset whether they could accomplish it or not. If they thoughtlessly agreed to so something that was vague in its nature and bound themselves faithful and righteous, they might find themselves in grave straits from which there was no escape. Finally, soldiers must adhere to the ideal of simplicity of living. They should make simplicity their aim. If they did not make simplicity their aim, they would become effeminate and frivolous and acquired fondness for luxurious and extravagant ways; they would finally grow selfish and sordid and sink to the last degree of baseness, so that neither loyalty nor valor would avail to save you from the contempt of the world.⁷¹ These moral codes became the fundamental principles for Japanese soldiers in war and in peace.

⁷¹ Hillis Lory, Japan's Military Masters pp. 241-244.

The Sino-Japanese war reflected the Japanese psychological perception of China that China in general and Jiang in particular were the puppets of Western imperialists. This perception was in fact based on Sun Zhongshan's theory of China as "a hypoclony of Western imperialism," personified in the western orientation of the Songs and the Kongs, illustrated in trade and industrial statistics, graphically evident in the Westernized character of the coastline from the Shanghai Bund to the resorts at Beidaihe, and eventually proved by Land-Lease and massive financial assistance. The military held that Jiang became a puppet of Chinese Communists or the Soviet Union or both after the Sian Incident. Despite the substantial differences between him and them, he was basically Bolshevik at heart. This potentially threatened the Japanese national security. Sakai Ryu wrote "China is a society, but she is not a nation. Or rather, it would be fair to say that China is a society of bandits. The Chinese people are bacteria infesting world civilization."⁷² His comment on China obviously represented the view, i.e. China destroyed its own civilization in order to woo the Western states. Thus, the use of force was aimed at saving the oriental culture and the Chinese people. The struggle between Japan and China was always a fight between brothers within the "Asian family". "It has been my belief during all these years that we must regard this struggle as a method of making the Chinese undergo self-reflection. We do not do this because we hate them, but on the contrary because we love them too much. It is just the same as in a family when an elder brother has taken all that he can stand from his ill-behaved younger brother and has to chastise him in order to make him behave properly."⁷³ In the name of the Asian family, Japan attempted to employ force to punish its younger brother to maintain harmony in the family. For some Japanese observers, the Chinese human nature should be blamed for

⁷² John Hunter Boyle, China and Japan at War p. 341.

⁷³ Alvin D. Coox, "Recourse to Arms," pp. 296-297.

inviting the invasion. "Such a thing could never be if any enemy occupied Japanese towns, and the men, women, and even children would never forget that they were enemies and would be hostile to the very end. Japanese would sooner die than be friendly with an enemy." In contrast to the Japanese, "the Chinese would sell their smiles and flattery to an enemy for the price of their own skins when the destiny of their nation was in the balance. To us soldiers, they were pitiful, spineless people."⁷⁴ Apparently, these politically insensitive Chinese might be concerned with their economic interests and their safety. In fact, they were in a multi-dilemma. Partly, they were caught in conflicts between the Nationalists and the Communists, between the Nationalists/Communists and the Japanese, between the puppet regimes and the Japanese, and between the Nationalists/Communists and the puppet regimes. Partly, the Nationalist government had no system of political organization that enlisted the political participation of masses. Partly, lacking a viable object of suprapersonal loyalties, the Chinese in the occupied areas showed the characteristics, which perplexed foreign observers. Thus, the Japanese misunderstood that such Chinese human nature seemed to justify their use of force to save the Chinese from the western colonization.

These moral values justifying the war became esprit de corps, which encouraged soldiers to fight on the battlefield. As a result of prolonged war, the field armies, although numerically reinforced, became weaker, overall, than they had been in the early stages of the war. Morale was low, along with increasing casualties. Within four and a half years, Japan suffered 190,000 men killed in China, 520,000 wounded, and 430,000 sick. Moreover, sick, injured, and wounded soldiers had to be evacuated to the homeland. For instance, the Northern Area Army alone sent home 18,000 sick men in 1938, 230,000 in

⁷⁴ Lloyd E. Eastman, "Facets of an Ambivalent Relationship" pp. 298-301 and John Hunter Boyle, China and Japan at War p. 343.

1939, and 150,000 in 1940, plus another 23,000 injured and wounded. Soldiers became frustrated and questioned the Japanese approach to war.

Why, oh why, did not we cut the China Incident short, after we had attained our initial objectives? It was senseless of us to get lured into the hinterland. Wasn't the creation of our dream empire in Manzhouguo enough? all we ever ended up with was real estate, not popular support from those we liberated. We really believed that Hankou would be the last clean-up operation, and then we might concentrate again on the building of Manzhouguo. But it was Nanjing all over again, quite the reverse of what the Japanese operations staff had thought. Jiang Jieshi was supposed to give up, but instead the Chinese fled to Chongqing. We bogged down, deeper and ever deeper, in that endless morass of attrition.

The Bushido spirit was essentially based on the Japanese political culture. Confucianism and Shintoism created a set of moral codes that facilitated the loyalty of soldiers to the Emperor and the nationalist sentiments for the state. Loyalty and nationalism contributed to the cohesion of soldiers defending the national interest. Such political ideologies further promoted esprit de corps among soldiers. Despite political ideology consistent with political objectives, however, soldiers were increasingly influenced by casualties and protracted operations that undermined combat effectiveness.

Despite the influence of Clausewitz' decisive battles and Sun Zi's tactics, the Japanese objective of destroying Chinese troops remained disjointed, short-range, and unrealistic without clarified centers of gravity, mobility, and combined operations. Even though offense persisted in all operations and battles, the Army never annihilated the encircled Chinese troops in operations. The operational failure was closely associated with its occupation of many large cities and areas rich in industrial and agricultural resources that forced it to deploy its limited forces to defend them, so that it had not enough forces to

⁷⁵ Wang Tingyue, "QinHua Rijun shibai naiyixi (The Analysis of Internal Reasons for Japanese Defeat)" *Junshi lishi* no. 1, 1991: 24-28 and Alvin D. Coox, "Recourse to Arms" p. 303.

conduct ideal operations. On the other hand, well developed political ideologies sustained the morale, cohesion, and esprit de corps of soldiers on the battlefield. But prolonged operations, together with heavy casualties, sick, and injured, substantially reduced soldiers' morale. The absence of measures to coordinate the relationships between operational art and psychological force resulted in Japan's failure to achieve its operational objectives on the battlefield.

Technology

In contrast to Sun Zi's and Clausewitz' strategies, control over technological and human means always occupied an important position in the Japanese state's effort to conduct total mobilization through total control for total war in China, even though Bushido might minimize the role of technology. Issues of technology and soldiers constantly influenced and shaped the war. Since weapons had stood as representations of advanced military technology utilized to achieve the objective on the battlefield, the degree to which soldiers could handle the weapons determined combat outcomes. The match between them was the main Japanese concern. Technology improved weapons production. New models of old weapons with substantially improved performance capabilities encouraged the military in cooperation with civilians to seek ever new breakthroughs in the design and production of weapons. The technological interdependence of military and civilian production was the salient feature of the weak coalition.

But scholars often disagreed on the extent to which these sectors depended on one another. Lasswell summarized the material conditions of the garrison state. He contended that the elites of the garrison state, like the elites of recent business states, would confront the problem of holding in check the stupendous productive potentialities of modern science and engineering. The ruling elites of the modern business state had not known how to control productive capacity; they had been unwilling to adopt necessary means

aimed at regularizing the tempo of economic development. Hence, modern society had been characterized by periods of orgiastic expansion, succeeded by periods of flagrant under utilization of the instruments of production. Thus, business elites had been unwilling to revise institutional practices to the extent necessary to maintain a continually rising flow of investment. The institutional structure of the business state had called for flexible adjustment between private and governmental channels of activity and for strict measures to maintain price flexibility. Wherever the business elites had not supported such necessary arrangements, the business state itself had begun to disintegrate. Thus, ruling classes would feel that bloodletting metaphorically, if not literally, was needed in order to preserve those virtues of sturdy acquiescence in the regime which they so much admired and from which they so greatly benefited. "We may be sure that if ever there is a rise in the production of nonmilitary consumption goods, despite the amount of energy directed toward the production of military equipment, the ruling class will feel itself endangered by the growing frivolousness of the community."⁷⁶ For him, as long as modern technical society endured, specialists would focus their entire attention on the discovery of novel ways of utilizing nature. Scientists and engineers were able to demonstrate the efficiency of many of their suggestions for the improvement of fighting effectiveness. The people anticipated further exploration of the technical potentialities of modern civilization within the framework of the garrison state. The military state would multiply its gadgets specialized in acts of violence. Therefore, the Japanese economy was focused on military purposes and provided weapons and war materials for the military. But Lasswell failed to explore and explain the relationship between civilian and military technology.

⁷⁶ Horold D. Lasswell, "The Garrison State," pp. 464-466.

Richard Samuel asserted that technonationalism, referring to a coherent, consistent, and contested view of technology as the source of national security, never isolated defense production from the general commercial economy. To the contrary, industrial, technological, and national security concerns had long been fused in the institutions of the Japanese economy. Therefore, in thinking seriously about Japan's long-term national security, "we must focus on technology-based productive capabilities as a strategic element of Japan's national defense structure, in addition to technological power per se. It is meaningless to think we can separate clearly civilian from military technologies. They are all dual-use."⁷⁷ For him, Japan's fused technology policy involved three elements: 1) import-substituting indigenization--the identification and acquisition of foreign products and manufacturing and design processes in order to stimulate local development; 2) diffusion--the distribution of this know-how throughout the economy; and 3) the nurturance of a capacity to innovate and manufacture. The national commitment to the pattern of indigenization, diffusion, and nurturance was central to the Japanese industrial revolution. Despite his emphasis on this pattern, Samuel seemed to ignore the significance of western technology in shaping the Japanese industrial revolution.

The technological interdependence of civilian and military production lay in the pattern of western technology and Japanese state control over the economy that dominated Japanese war production. In the Japanese aircraft industry, Sumitomo Metals obtained from Hamilton Standard Company the right to produce metal propellers. Nakajima Aircraft purchased a license to build the Douglas DC-2 commercial transport for \$ 80,000; one of the six built was used by the Army. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries bought the rights to build advanced trainers from North American Aviation and turned the project over to Kyushu Aircraft. In 1938 alone, Lockheed exported thirty twin-engine

⁷⁷ Richard J. Samuel, Rich Nation, Strong Army: National Security and Technological Transformation of Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994) 31.

transports to Tachikawa Aircraft for commercial transport. The Army and the Navy secretly acquired license rights to build the American planes from Lockheed and Douglas. The US Strategic Bombing Survey concluded that "many Japanese engines and propellers came from American designs which were sold under license in prewar years. Many top Japanese aeronautical engineers could claim degrees from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Stanford, and the California Institute of Technology. The Japanese fought the war with aircraft on which the strongest influences in design were American." Germany and Italy sent engineers, sold licenses, and delivered planes to Japan throughout the war. The Army flew Italian Fiat heavy bombers and the Navy flew German Heinkel and Seversky fighters during the Sino-Japanese war. After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, European and North American facilities remained open, despite formal political opprobrium, to Japanese visitors who scoured the West for advanced technology.⁷⁸

Total war in China and the preparations for a greater conflict with either the Soviet Union or the United States forced Japan to intensify state intervention in economic life. The Army's General Mobilization supported such state control over the economy. "In order to meet the needs of the defense services in wartime and to enable them to devote the whole national strength to war operations, while keeping the national life untouched, it is of paramount importance to adapt all national activities to war conditions, to place manpower, material, and all other visible and invisible resources at the disposal of the Government, and thereby, to utilize them rationally and economically for war purposes."⁷⁹ State control was reaffirmed by the National General Mobilization Law. According to this law, the government might cause subjects or juridical persons or other

⁷⁸ Ibid., pp. 120-122.

⁷⁹ T.A. Bisson, Japan's War Economy (New York: the Macmillan Company, 1945) 206.

organizations of the Empire to cooperate with the State or local public organizations or other persons designated by the Government; it might issue necessary orders regarding the prevention or settlement of labor disputes or the closing of plants, suspension of operations, or restriction or prohibition of acts relating to labor disputes; and it might issue necessary order regarding the production, repair, distribution, transfer or other disposal, uses, consumption, holding and movement of goods.⁸⁰ Economic control did not however settle the problems of military production. In the post-war interrogation conducted by Allied forces, Goko Kiyoshi explained the mismanagement of military production. "Q. Do you feel that the Japanese fighting forces suffered shortages of military supplies? And, if so, what specific supplies were most lacking? A. Aircraft. Q. What were the limiting factors in aircraft production? A. Especially skilled workmen, light metals, and special steel. Q. Which specific light metals? A. Duraluminum. Q. What was the trouble with aluminum? A. Lack of bauxite. Q. Was it through lack of bauxite or shipping facilities? A. Lack of shipping facilities."⁸¹ These domino factors led to the poor military supplies for the field armies.

The struggle between the Army and the Navy for raw materials, technology, and skilled labor became intense. Fujihara Ginjiro described this problem after his second administrative inspection of the aircraft industry. The Army and the Navy were anxious to build even one more plane, if it could be done. The Navy was ahead of the Army in technical skills and the Army tried its best to catch up with the Navy. That the Navy tried to keep ahead of the Army led to the intense competition between them. The Munitions Ministry was set up in order to reduce this severe competition in aircraft production. Japan was supposed to produce 53,000 planes per year. As a result of the conflict

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 213.

⁸¹ Jerome B. Cohen, Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction (Westport: the Greenwood Press, 1973) 193.

between the Army and the Navy, only 8,000--10,000 planes were built. The competition between the Army and the Navy became intense. Both had very large factories and pretty good machinery. There was a lot of competition with little thought to efficiency.⁸² Together with poor management, the shortage of raw materials that could no longer be secured from either colonies or Western states and lack of parts furthermore forced designers to change specifications and producers to change suppliers. The quality of materials and parts often became problematic, since there were few special-purpose and automatic machine tools.⁸³ These problems affected the quality of aircraft. As the deteriorating quality of workmanship and materials, particularly in engine and power plants, at the beginning of the war the Navy was able to maintain operational availability of 80 percent. The percentage progressively became 50 and in some cases 20. These losses were due to a combination of poor factory workmanship, inferior materials and poor maintenance. In many cases one out of three airplanes never reached the front lines due to engine failure.⁸⁴ Such deteriorated economic and technological environments pumped a new round of the competition between the Army and the Navy. The Army was planning to build its own submarines. The Navy opposed such plan. But the Army said that it would build special submarines for supplying the islands, because the Navy had important missions to fight with fleet. Finally, the Navy agreed with the plan. The Navy explained to the Army that building submarines was very difficult and it wanted to show the Army how to build them, but the Army did not want to be assisted by the Navy. So the Army itself built the submarines.⁸⁵ The logic of the irrational competition appeared

⁸² Ibid., p. 74.

⁸³ Richard J. Samuel, Rich Nation, Strong Army p.125.

⁸⁴ Jerome B. Cohen, Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction p. 73 and p. 230.

⁸⁵ Micheal A. Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War pp. 254-258.

to be that if the Army's demands were met, the Navy's share would be trimmed and the Navy had to redesign its operation plans, or vice versa.

In order to reduce these conflicts, the Munitions Ministry was established, but it failed to solve the problems. Fujihara saw his three important jobs as: 1) to expand aircraft production; 2) to increase iron and steel production; and 3) to step up aluminum production. When he became Munitions Minister, his efforts to expand production, however, faded. The reasons lay in the fact that the decrease in shipping tonnage drastically affected bauxite supply; that the shortage of coal greatly reduced steel production; and that the agreement reached by the Navy, the Army, and himself did not eliminate the competition between the Army and the Navy, since lower ranking officers simply did not like the idea. His solution was to maintain the balance between two services. Suppose, for example, that they wanted 30,000 machine tools for stepping up aircraft production. The same order for both services were put to the factories. But the factories might only produce say 10,000. Then his job was, in order to satisfy everybody, to give one-third to the Army, one-third to the Navy, and one-third to the Munitions Ministry. He became a conciliator between the Army, the Navy, and the Air people.⁸⁶ The Japanese state pretended to control the national economy to support the war, but it failed to coordinate the industrial sectors for munitions production and to trim the competition between the Army and the Navy. The internal conflicts as well as lack of technology, sufficient materials, and financial support for the military industry undermined the ongoing war.

But the quality of soldiers was also a determinant of war. The Japanese soldiers different from those of Sun Zi and Clausewitz were professional and well trained. Their military training was based on the French and German models, which standardized and

⁸⁶ Jerome B. Cohen, pp. 78-79.

modernized the Japanese Army. As early as February 1867, 15 French officers led by Captain Chanoine arrived in Japan to train Japanese Army officers on the basis of French military and administrative experience. The mission ought not, according to French War Minister, to copy slavishly what was done in France, but to take careful account of the military aptitudes and habits of the country and to improve them by introducing discipline and knowledge. The French instructors taught the Japanese to organize, train, and command military units from the company to the brigade, demonstrated how to use artillery by insisting on the importance of field batteries despite the problems of terrain, and put their greatest efforts into the establishment of an officers' academy, which they regarded as the key to a modern army. In 1884, Klemens Meckel came to Japan to teach officers at the Army War College. During his stay, he restructured the military system and high command. The General Staff was provided with a well-trained corps of officers. The army was transformed into divisions with logistics and medical care. The Japanese learned how to organize full-scale mobilization, including a strategic railway network, a new conscription act, and improved staff exercises for war.⁸⁷ The system of conscription was based on those of France and Germany. The motive for the imposition of conscription was by no means a desire to form a people's army for national defense. Conscription was initially enacted in 1870, in a system which provided for three years of active service, but allowed exemption for certain categories of citizens, including those who paid for a substitute. The basic pattern of Japan's conscription was designed by Omura Masujiro on the basis of French conscription. The study of the French and German Armies by Yamagata Aritomo helped to incorporate their experiences into the Conscription Law of 1873, which provided for general conscription with inductees to be chosen by lots. Conscription was revised and extended once again in 1883, after the

⁸⁷ Pan Junfeng, Riben Junshi sixiang yanjiu pp. 181-187; Ernst L Presseinszen, Before Aggression pp. 9-13, 67, and pp. 135-137; and Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State p. 126.

crushing of the Satsuma Rebellion. This revised and extended conscription law paved the way for a strong and effective army.⁸⁸

Support for the Army essentially derived from peasants who attempted to maintain the Japanese tradition focusing on leadership, the group, and nationalism. The submissiveness to elusive authoritarian leadership had deep roots in an acceptance of hierarchical status distinctions which implied a natural right of those above to rule and a natural duty for those below to obey. The willingness to subordinate the individual to the group and to sacrifice the individual interests for the good of the family, the village, and the nation was associated with the emphasis on harmony in the family, the village, and the nation. The tendency to interpret the good of the nation was largely in terms of Japanese power and prestige in the aggressive competition with other powers. The Army through the Imperial Military Reserve Association, the Greater Japan Youth Association, the Youth Training Center, and the Greater Japan National Defense Women's Association, created and won rural support. The organizations became parts of the community's structure. The activities not only consolidated the Army-local ties, but also spread the military and nationalist values and ideas that the Army wanted to inculcate in rural Japan. Furthermore, the membership recruitment techniques, financing, leadership, and activities helped to reinforce submissiveness and family and village-oriented holism that became a major stimulus to the creation of nationalism. They ensured that the Army would be nationalism's beneficiary. Farm production remained high, farm boys faithfully

⁸⁸ Shinichi Kitaoka, "The Army as a Bureaucracy: Japanese Military Revisited" The Journal of Military History no. 10, 1993: 71; Roger F. Hachett, Yamagata Aritomo in the Rise of Modern Japan, 1838-1922 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971) 50-89 and Thomas M. Brendle, "Recruitment and Training in the SDF" in James H. Buck, ed. The Modern Japanese Military System (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1975) 67.

served their nation and Army as soldiers, and the rural branches of the Army's organizations enthusiastically performed all kinds of war mobilization activities.⁸⁹

When dragged into protracted war, the Army became short of qualified soldiers on the battlefield as a result of increasing casualties. Replacements and reserves were generally green, lacking not only training but also experience. The rapid increase in new recruits contributed to a dilution in the quality of the officer corps. Company-grade officers were generally trained intensively and carefully, both in headquarters and in units, but field-grade officers (especially those above the rank of regimental commander) received comparatively brief training. Although training for battalion commanders was conducted prior to the war, regimental commanders were not trained until thereafter. Despite the keenly appreciated necessity to train division commanders, such a program was never instituted. During the campaigns, in fact, a number of division commanders merely parroted the tactical views of their staff officers. All in all, a relatively large incidence of weakness in Japanese Army officer training was revealed.⁹⁰ The lack of necessary training of high commanders was associated with the transferring of the best trained troops from the China theater to South East Asia, which undermined the combat effectiveness of Japanese troops in general. The Japanese soldiers were essentially based on rural support. Such support provided not only ideological values, but also soldiers in conducting the war in China. As a result of escalation, the Army needed more qualified soldiers and commanders than before to cover the large theater across East and Southeast Asia. The absence of qualified soldiers compelled Japan to shift its emphasis from the domestic human resources to the puppet regimes to ensure provision of more troops. The

⁸⁹ Richard J. Smethurst, A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974) 141-184 and Ronald P. Tsutomu Ouchi, "Rural Origins of Japanese Fascism" in James William Morley, ed. Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar Japan pp. 181-210.

⁹⁰ Wang Tingyue, "QinHua Rijun shibai naiyinxin" p. 26 and Alvin D. Coox, "Recourse to Arms," p. 309.

inability of the puppet troops to conduct independent operations, however, in turn forced Tokyo to continue to rely heavily on the domestic human resources, by lowering the standards set to recruit soldiers.

Japan's total war in China emphasized control over its own technological and human resources. On the one hand, the Japanese state and soldiers understood the importance of military technology and weapon production, but the struggle between the services for raw materials, equipment, and skilled workers along with the economic embargo severely weakened Japan's capability to manufacture qualified weapons to meet the demand of the war. Limited resources substantially reduced production. On the other hand, the military became short of qualified soldiers and officers as a result of protracted operations. The gradual transfer of well trained troops from China to other theaters undermined the combat effectiveness of the China Expeditionary Army. The absence of qualified weapons and soldiers partly contributed to the Army's failure to reach its expected objectives.

Conclusion

The fundamental weakness of Japanese strategy in the Sino-Japanese war was the failure to have control over the mutually reinforced objectives, costs, and means through adjustment and cooperation between Japan, China, and the Allies in order to maintain as limited as possible. Such failure was closely associated with its misinterpretation of Sun Zi's and Clausewitz' approaches to strategy and war, since they often focused on one aspect, while ignoring others. Such distorted theories were poorly adapted to the China war environments. Japan's mismanagement of the war moreover lay in the nature of the state, which was in fact a weak, loose coalition of soldiers, politicians, bureaucrats, and business men designed to manage its internal and external affairs. The absence of strong political leadership led directly to its inability to develop and implement a coherent, consistent, and well defined strategy. Poor leadership, elusive objectives, and the political

independence of soldiers then fostered the spread of violence, which generated further asymmetries between the state and the military, between decisive battles of annihilation and Bushido, and between weapons and soldiers.

At its outset, the weak coalition valued the importance of diplomacy in deciding the war abroad and negotiating with divergent political factions at home. The coalition essentially favored the interests of the military, which, by extension, became the interests of the state. But the state was strongly influenced by its culture with special emphasis on the critical importance of small groups, on the capacity of juniors collectively to put pressure on seniors, on the intricate approach to decision-making through the use of intermediaries, on consensus and morale, and on the willingness to sacrifice oneself, defy authority, and take the punishment for the honor of the fatherland and race. The culturally oriented elements contributed to the extremes such as orders deliberately disobeyed by subordinates, critical decisions taken without the appropriate authority, and the leaking of classified decisions to unauthorized personnel in an effort to influence subsequent actions. These problems existed within each branch of government and at nearly every level. Such an approach to making or shaping strategy from the bottom up became the Japanese rationale, for making or implementing strategy, which in fact escalated violence.

This weak nature of the Japanese state challenged the commonly accepted model of the Japanese monolithic state under the firm control of the Emperor. Even though the Emperor retained his active role in domestic politics, samurais were the leaders in this reassertion of imperial control, and in the formation of the new governmental institutions. The Constitution of 1889 legitimized the legal authority of the Emperor for his control over the military. The Emperor became the supreme commander of the military forces, with authority to command the military, declare war, and conclude treaties, while the military remained his personal implements. But his authority was merely symbolic. The close identification of the military with the Emperor provided the basis for military intervention and finally military control over the state, through the establishment of the

coalition with politicians, bureaucrats, and business men. Such control lay in the Meiji-era goal of "rich country, strong army," which reflected the priorities of the state, as derived from an assessment of Japan's situation imperatives. These imperatives included late development, a lack of natural resources, a large population, and the need to trade. Thus, Japan attempted to solve these problems, by handing over the responsibility for achieving objectives to the military. But in the Sino-Japanese war, the objectives were elusive, since the state and the military appeared to have different interests, at least during the first four years of the war. For the state, the war was an inner war to cleanse Western influences, whereas the Army attempted to set up pro-Japanese autonomous governments in North China in order to prepare for war against the Soviet Union, while the Navy focused on Central and South China as well as Southeast Asia with the aim of defeating the US Navy. Despite these differences, the state and the military seemed to share the idea of establishing an Asian block protecting Asian culture. Because of elusive objectives, soldiers were deeply confused with the long bitter struggle between Nationalists, Communists, and warlords so that they substantially underestimated the Chinese will to fight and the ability of severely divided political groups to mount effective, if separate, mobilization and defense efforts. The war became a power struggle involving Japan, the Nationalists, the Communists, warlords, puppet regimes, and the western powers.

The military under this weak coalition favored decisive battles of annihilation through maneuver and close combat, sustained by the Bushido ethic codes. Despite this mind-set, the Army failed to use appropriate operational art to destroy Nationalist and Communist forces; instead, it simply occupied the Chinese territories, while being unable to coordinate cooperation between the North, Central, and South China Armies. High command was further frustrated by the debates on northern expansion vs. southern advance. The inability to properly identify China's strengths and weaknesses led them to severely underestimate the Chinese military. On the other hand, soldiers regarded

psychological force as a decisive factor. Their Bushido culture promoted loyalty to the Emperor and the state, which became the way to consolidate morale, cohesion, and esprit de corps and to increase combat effectiveness. The cultural bonds which linked soldiers and citizens into a relational whole were living energies emanating from society shared meanings and sentiments which in time formed a people's collective soul. Soldiers and citizens became emotionally loyal to the Emperor and his state. This ideal was embraced by Meiji government leaders in order to counteract the more liberal theory of popular sovereignty based on equality and freedom of individuals. The manipulation of the people was designed to unify the country and enhance nationalism. This cultural loyalty, associated with the Bushido spirit, motivated their pursuit of honor and fame regardless of costs, which inevitably escalated violence on the battlefield.

The weak coalition emphasized the significance of dual-use technology. Control over technology helped it sustain the war. Such control was based on the consensus of soldiers, politicians, bureaucrats, and business men on the primacy of military production at the expense of nonmilitary products. But the consensus did not facilitate firm control over the economy in wartime because of the conflicts between the Army and the Navy, who refused to subordinate their self-interests to the interests of the state. The absence of sufficient technology, raw materials, and skilled workers dramatically reduced the production of weapons and deteriorated the quality of weapons. When dragged into protracted war, the soldier standards for both services had to be lowered as a result of inadequate manpower. The mismatch between weapons and soldiers prevented the military from achieving its expected objectives on the battlefield. In short, weak political leadership and the pursuit of honor and fame escalated violence, but the inability to provide enough advanced weapons and qualified soldiers severely undermined the attainment of its ambitious objectives. Clearly, Japan's lack of control over the mutually reinforced objectives, costs, and means through adjustment and cooperation led to its total defeat in the Sino-Japanese war.

CHAPTER 4

Soviet Strategy in the Nomonhan War

Unlike Japanese strategy in the Sino-Japanese war, Soviet strategy in the Nomonhan war of 1939 had deep roots in Sun Zi's and Clausewitz' ideas of political control that facilitated the conduct of limited operations against the Japanese invasion into the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR). It ended with victory, which produced two strategic outcomes: Japan reoriented its strategy to emphasize southern advance, leading to the wars with Southeast Asia and the United States; and the Soviet Union freed itself from the fear of fighting a two-front war. Despite its strategic significance as the first test of modernized Soviet military muscle in the east and of the mature of its military art, this war appears forgotten by Western scholars and soldiers alike. There is little literature on the war. Much, if not all, of what there is centers on a historical analysis tracing the roots, the operations, and the consequences of the war. Scant attention had been devoted to Soviet strategy.¹ Myths about Soviet strategy in Nomonhan have persisted in strategic studies in general and in the study of Soviet limited war in particular.

Soviet strategy in the Nomonhan war derived from the decades of reformulations by Russian and Soviet military thinkers. Russia's geographic, economic, and technological concerns forced soldiers to seek a unified military doctrine aimed at defending the European frontiers, at keeping order along their long southern borders, and

¹ International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Transcripts of Proceedings 1946-1948; Alvin D. Coox, Nomonhan: Japan against Russia, 1939 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990; Stuart D. Goldman, The Forgotten War: the Soviet Union and Japan, 1937-1939 (Ph.D. thesis, Georgetown University, 1970); Edward J. Drea, Nomonhan: Japanese-Soviet Tactical Combat, 1939 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1981); Amnon Sella, "Khalkhin-Gol: the Forgotten War" Journal of Contemporary History no. 4, 1983: 651-687; Larry W. Moses, "Soviet-Japanese Confrontation in Outer Mongolia: the Battle of Momonhan-Khalkhin Gol" Journal of Asian History no. 1, 1967: 64-85; Albert C. Myers, "Khalkin Gol: Stalin's Battle to Stabilize the Soviet Far East" Military Review no. 4, 1983: 60-65; and Katsu Hirai Young, "The Nomonhan Incident: Imperial Japan and the Soviet Union" Monumenta Nipponica no. 1-2, 1967: 82-102.

at maintaining their position in the east. Continued efforts were also made by Soviet soldiers--most, if not all, of whom had also served the old regime--to explore the essential elements of a revolutionary unified military doctrine to protect their fatherland. Such a doctrine was in fact "a system of guiding views and directions of a state on the character of war in given specific historical conditions, the determination of the military tasks of the state, the armed forces and the principles of their structuring, and also the methods and forms of solving all these tasks, including the armed struggle, which flow from the goals of war and the socio-economic and military-technological possibilities of the country."² It was a set of officially approved, scientifically based views on the basic fundamental problems of war, free from private views and evaluation, designed to determine the over-all policy of national security and war, and to provide inspiration and guidance for the development of military art--strategy, operations, and tactics. The doctrine involved three major elements: political, military, and technological.

The Nomonhan war had deep roots in poorly managed Soviet-Japanese relations. Over a century, the Soviet Union and Japan were rivals in East Asia. The Soviet Union was frustrated by Imperial Russia's and its own relations with Japan. The Russian defeat in the Russo-Japanese war deprived Russia of Southern Sakhalin, the Southern Chinese Eastern Railway, and the Liaodong Peninsula. The wound was reopened by Japanese military intervention in the Soviet Union occupying Siberia between 1918 and 1922 and Sakhalin until 1925. The assassination of the Manchurian warlord, General Zhang Zuelin, by Japanese soldiers culminated in the Japanese occupation of Manchuria. Obviously, to seize Manchuria, to eliminate the western powers from China, and to proceed from the influence of economic penetration to direct seizure of the Soviet Far East constituted key

² V.D. Sokolovskiy, Soviet Military Strategy (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1975) pp. 5-46; Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979) pp. 69-89; and Jacob W. Kipp, "Conventional Force Modernization and the Asymmetries of Military Doctrine: Historical Reflections on Air/Land Battle and the Operational maneuver Group" in Carl G. Jacobsen, ed. New Weapons, Strategy, and Mind-Sets pp. 138-139.

elements of Japan's strategy in East Asia. As a result, Moscow felt persistently threatened by Japanese military muscle. Conversely, Japan was deeply concerned about Russian and Soviet expansion into China, Korea, and Mongolia. Despite its victory over Russia in the Russo-Japanese war, it still saw too much Russian influence in China and Korea. With the collapse of the Russian empire, the rise of the Soviet regime was seen to constitute a new ideological threat to spread Communism in East Asia, which reinforced Japan's emergent view of the Soviet Union as a major obstacle to the defense of its interests in East Asia. For Japan, the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war further strengthened the Soviet position in China, partly because the best Japanese troops were drawn into engagements with the Chinese, and partly as a result of the Soviet provision of military aid to both the Nationalists and the Communists, therefore helping keep Japan embroiled in China. These misperceptions about threats, real or potential, associated with poorly defined borders, in fact contributed to the eruption of border incidents, which in turn led to pitched battles between Soviet and Japanese troops on vast flatlands.³

This chapter deals with Soviet military doctrine, elucidating Soviet firm control over mutually reinforced objectives, costs, and means through adjustment and cooperation among the Soviet Union, Japan, and other European and Asian powers that led to Soviet strategic success in the Nomonhan war. The successful Soviet offensive is seen to require belligerent states to develop mutually recognized rules, explicit or tacit, for guiding limited operations and battles, matching the ends with the means to avoid fatal escalation. On the battlefield, however, the match does not automatically facilitate

³ Carl G. Jacobsen, Sino-Soviet Relations since Mao: the Chairman's Legacy (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981) 123-145; David R. Jones, "Soviet Strategic Culture" in Carl G. Jacobsen, ed. Strategic Power pp. 35-49 and "Russian Tradition and Soviet Military Policy" Current History May 1983: 197-200; Jonathan Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Threat from the East: Moscow, Tokyo, and the Prelude to the Pacific War (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992) 6; Ken Booth, "The Military Instrument in Soviet Foreign Policy" in John Baylis and Gerald Segal, eds. Soviet Strategy (London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1981) 78-80; and R. Craig Nation, Black Earth, Red Star: a History of Soviet Security Policy, 1917-1991 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992) 80-81.

the attainment of the ends; rather, this occurs when states successfully adjust operational art and psychological force to limited ends within the mutually recognized limits in order to distribute costs and benefits among belligerent states. Such a strategic match is also mixed with mismatch between technological and human resources and reflects efforts to overcome such mismatch, real or potential. In other words, the adaptation of strategy to particular combat environments is vital to any strategy of limited war.

The State

The Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin was an authoritarian state that dominated virtually all political, military, and economic activities. Such total control however facilitated the formulation of explicit rules for guiding limited war against Japanese invasion into the MPR. Even though the focus on control with its peculiarly Stalinist features had deep roots in Vladimir Illyich Lenin's works What Is to Be Done? and The State and Revolution, as well as older Russian traditions, Sun Zi's and Clausewitz' systematic analysis of the permanent interaction between the state and war influenced, shaped, and dominated the Soviet strategic perceptions and behavior. For them, politics, war, and society were inseparable. Firm political control by the state over war and society, while the struggle sustained by society for a state's objective through military activities became the basic feature of Soviet strategy.⁴ Concerning Stalin's control over the party, state, and society, Adam Ulam described the main characteristics. The use of appeals to popular passions for settling conflicts within the party marked an advance in the authoritarian technique. During the struggle for the succession to Lenin, Stalin

⁴ V.I. Lenin, "Notebook on War" in David R. Jones, ed. Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual pp. 194-222; Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967); Timothy Colton, Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979); and William Odom, "The Party-Military Connection: a Critique" in D.R. Herspring and I. Volgyes, eds. Civil-Military Relations in Communist System (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978).

successfully adopted this technique to fight against Leo Trotsky, who attempted to counterpoise "world revolution" to "socialism in one country" as an intellectual argument in order to provide a sense of direction to the Soviet regime. But Stalin, along with his supporters, accused Trotsky of having the young and weakened Soviet state postpone its building of socialism until revolution swept the West, and risk its existence in a foolhardy war on all the capitalist powers. As a result, Trotsky was gradually removed from the inner circle of the state. Then, at the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Party Congresses, Stalin, associated with his new allies, Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsy, criticized the Zinoviev and Kamenev Left Opposition that attacked the policy of concessions to peasants defending the policy as an ideological principle of the party. This new alliance defeated the Left Opposition. Finally, at the Sixteenth Party Congress, Stalin launched attacks on the Right Opposition, alleging it intended to lead the Soviet Union to capitalism. This group had helped Stalin crush the Left Opposition by steering the Moscow delegation away from its projected alliance with the Leningrad delegation in order to avert the danger of the two capitals combining in revolt against the regime. Appeals to popular passions for resolving conflicts inside the party became his instruments to eliminate his enemies. Then, terror and ideology as powerful instruments became indissolubly linked in the Soviet system. Stalin held that an elitist society and dictatorship required an ideology if corruption and privilege, and sheer human restlessness under the denial of all freedoms, were to be held in check. Every Soviet citizen must be ideologically motivated--with the proviso that Stalin himself formulate and interpret such ideology. The use of terror, through the great purges, eliminated Stalin's oppositions and destroyed the remnants of the Lenin-era Bolshevik Party; he thus, consolidated his control over the party, state, and society. Finally, forced industrialization and collectivization became the process for uncovering the class enemy in order to increase production.⁵ Ulam's analysis of Stalin's

⁵ Adam B. Ulam, The New Face of Soviet Totalitarianism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963) 43-64.

totalitarianism focused exclusively on his technique of "divide, destroy," which aimed at creating a concrete enemy in order to eliminate him, while ignoring Stalin's ideological or cultural link with Russian tradition and his perception of the military and war.

"Socialism in one country" reflected the re-emergence of old Russian strategic-political realities and ended the internationalist dream of a world-wide socialist revolution. This nationalist-oriented socialism differed greatly from Lenin's Bolshevism in motives and manners of rule, and in the way in which their personalities impressed themselves on the shape of historical events. In other words, Bolshevism might contain both neo-Stalinist seeds and crucially different seeds, while Stalinist seeds might conversely be found elsewhere, perhaps even more in Russian historical and cultural tradition than in Lenin's thought. Unfortunately, the Western "totalitarian school" of scholarship simply portrayed Stalinism as "full-blown Bolshevism in its modernizing stage."

In contrast to "such well-established school," Robert Tucker and Stephen Cohen summarized the Soviet state under Stalin. Stalin's state largely mirrored the traditional pattern of conflict between the Russian state and society. In Imperial Russia, centralized autocratic state power was embodied in the person of the Tsar, operating through a hierarchy of bureaucratic institutions and their local agents. Everything pertaining to this state power, such as the autocrat, the court, the bureaucratic officialdom, the official customs, the official uniforms, and official ideology, came to be subsumed under the concept of official Russia. Whereas the population, society, and the nation came to be conceived as a separate and distinct Russia with a life and truth of its own. This juxtaposition of official Russia and popular Russia suggested that the Russian state organism took shape as an autonomous force acting to create or recreate its own social base and to shape or reshape the institutional pattern of society through a series of revolutions from above, at the expense of society. Reviving the historical pattern of revolution from above, the Stalinist state eventually moved to bring every element of

society under coercive state regimentation and control. A state-initiated, state-directed, and state-enforced revolution from above abolished Lenin's New Economic Policies (NEP), which favored a reformist approach designed not to totally break up the old social-economic system--permitting trade, petty production, petty proprietorship, and capitalism--but in fact sought to gradually revive trade, petty proprietorship, and moderate/controlled capitalism, while retaining basic control sufficient to compel them to subject to state regulations if and when they threatened to usurp effective power. The Stalinist state now, instead of proceeding steadily by means of persuasion, advanced at breakneck speed, wielding state power to push collectivization in the countryside, while state-generated, state-directed, military-oriented industrialization was geared to priorities of heavy and war industries over consumer-goods industries. In addition, the purge was, despite an outward continuity of organizational forms and official nomenclature, aimed at replacing the one-party system by a one-person system, i.e., the ruling party by a ruling personage. The Leninist Bolshevik idea of the party as popular Russia's authoritative organ of consciousness and rule gave way to the concept of the party as the apostle and agent of the interests of the state. But revolution from above found fertile soil from below, becoming an authentic social phenomenon or mass religion, a peculiar Soviet form of worship.⁶ However, in spite of the great efforts of many scholars to explore the essence of Stalin's state in order to explain the asymmetries between Bolshevism and Stalinism, the precise function of the military and war in that state remained unclear.

The priority of Stalin's state was to protect the Soviet revolution as reinterpreted in Stalin's image. The strategic realities of the Russian empire, the geographic and political entity inherited by Lenin, and, then Stalin, forced the state to be the defender of both

⁶ Robert C. Tucker, The Soviet Political Mind: Studies in Stalinism and Post-Stalin Change (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1963) 69-90; Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1977) 77-110; and Stephen F. Cohen, Rethinking the Soviet Experience: Politics and History since 1917 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985) 38-70.

"Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy" and the multinational Eurasian imperium forged by the Great Russian tsars since the 1400s. Stalin's Clausewitzian political control over the military was secured through purges eliminating Trotsky's and Bukharin's supporters, real or suspected, inside the Red Army, and the appointing of "new men" whom he trusted to support him.⁷ Thus, the suspicion that some senior commanders did not wholeheartedly support his policies might appear to have been his main motive for launching the final military purge. In 1937, one-fifth of officers were veterans of the civil war. Many of them were ex-officers or ex-non-commissioned officers of the old Imperial Army occupying almost all the highest commands. Few of them owed their positions to Stalin. None had any special reason to show loyalty to him as against any other faction that might have formed within the party leadership. For Stalin, the removal of these officers might have appeared as a valuable prophylactic measure that would reinforce his position inside the Red Army by promoting younger officers who owed everything to him. The purge and the reintroduction of the political commissar system at the highest level of command became the way for him to fully dominate the Red Army. Stalin now assumed unquestioned responsibility for the military.

Under Stalin's total control, the military became a professional army serving as an instrument of the state designed to pursue the internal and external interests of the state, although Lenin, Trotsky, and Frunze tried to follow Engels' and Marx's tradition that the Clausewitzian militia would be the appropriate military form in the socialist era and

⁷ According to the Soviet sources, the great purge claimed nearly half the regimental commanders, nearly all brigade commanders, all corps commanders and district commanders, and the majority of political commissars at almost all levels. More than 40,000 commanders were murdered or imprisoned, and by 1938, the military purge had taken such a toll that the year's military students, some 10,000 new officers, were graduated early. By 1941, only 7.1 percent of the Red Army's commanders had completed their higher military education. See Thomas M. Nichols, The Sacred Cause; John Erickson, The Soviet High Command: A Military-Political History, 1918-1941 (New York: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1962), Leonard Schapiro, "The Great Purge" in B.H. Liddell Hart, ed. The Red Army: The Red Army, 1918 to 1945 and The Soviet Army, 1946 to the Present (Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1968) 65-72; and Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge of the Thirties (New York: Macmillan, 1973).

explicitly or implicitly favored the building of a Clausewitzian mass army. This nature of Stalin's military was inherent in Russian tradition, which to some extent seemed to reflect the Frederician civil-military relations. "In truth," Sergei Witte stated, "what is it that has essentially upheld Russian statehood? Not only primarily, but exclusively the army. Who created the Russian Empire, transforming the semi-Asiatic Muscovite tsardom into the most influential, dominant, grandest European power? Only the power of the army's bayonet. The world bowed not to our culture, not to our bureaucratized church, not to our wealth and prosperity. It bowed to our might."⁸ The Russian influence in the international community was based on military power. Despite its underdeveloped economy, the Imperial state devoted a large portion of its human and material resources to the military. "Since Peter I all the emperors have taken particular care of the army, which is the object of their continual solicitude. The army is the preponderant element in the state, for upon it rests the Sovereign's power; and it is through it that civilization spreads within the empire."⁹ The military sustained the Tsar's political power, while enjoying a privileged status in the state. The state stressed military ceremonial, an ideology supportive of military ideals, the regular inculcation of these values through the educational system, heavy state expenditure on military projects, a willingness to incur high casualty tolls in warfare, a readiness to commit the armed forces in foreign and domestic conflicts, and extensive control over the life of society for military needs. The dependence of the state on the military for both internal and external security reduced the distinction between civilian and military leaderships. The autocrats and members of the imperial house occupied ceremonial positions in elite regiments, wore military uniforms dripping with

⁸ Richard Pipes, "Militarism and the Soviet State" *Daedalus* no. 4, 1980: 1.

⁹ John L.H. Keep, *Soldiers of the Tsar: Army and Society in Russia, 1462-1874* (Oxford: Clarence Press, 1985) 4 and David R. Jones, "Soviet Defence Burden through the Prism of History" in Carl G. Jacobsen, *The Soviet Defence Enigma: Estimating Costs and Burden* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987) 153-154.

medals and insignia, and issued proclamations which underscored their devotion to the Russian army. Military officers occupied high civilian posts while retaining army rank and they were often to be found working for central agencies such as the Ministry of Finance, the State Control, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or administering provinces as governors in provincial capitals. This interaction between civilian and military spheres constituted the distinct feature of Russian civil-military relations.¹⁰ On the other hand, the Tsar distrusted professional soldiers, especially well-educated, young, and reform-minded officers. In 1825, Tsar Nicholas I was shocked and frightened by the Decembrist Movement, in which a group of officers--most of them were young, and many had served abroad with distinction, observing reforms in European states--joined secret societies dedicated to Russian political reform, a constitutional monarchy, or democracy preceded by only temporary dictatorship. They sought to assassinate the Tsar in order to eliminate serfdom, restructure the military system, abolish the military colonies, and institute representative government. Profoundly disturbed by the disloyalty of officers, Tsar Nicholas I concluded that unquestioning obedience and no leeway for dangerous initiatives on the part of subordinates were essential to the security of his realm.¹¹ He severely crushed the Decembrists' attempt to enact military reform. Despite his brutal punishment of these soldiers, the close ties between the state and the military remained the main characteristic of Imperial Russian civil-military relations. The state was heavily dependent on the military and allocated an extraordinary share of resources to support the military, which in turn defended and pursued the interests of the state--while emphasizing effective control over the military to ensure that it remained a tool of the state.

¹⁰ William C. Fuller, Jr. Civil-Military Conflict in Imperial Russia, 1881-1914 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985) XXI-XXII.

¹¹ John Shelton Curtiss, The Russian Army under Nicholas I, 1825-1855 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1965) 9-20.

Russian tradition influenced and shaped the Soviet approach to the military. The main mission of the military was to protect the state. The Soviet military, like other governmental institutions, was subordinated to the state, yet it also sought and defended its internal autonomy. The struggle for control versus autonomy between the state and the military was an abiding aspect of Soviet civil-military relations. Persistent western debates about Soviet civil-military relations might be divided into three different models. Roman Kolkowicz contended that control was the main variable in explaining Soviet civil-military relations. The political leaders were inherently antimilitary, i.e. there was profound distrust of the professional military men who possessed the weapons and technology of war. The political norms of the Soviet system rejected any particularistic interests, whether institutional, or functional, or ethnic. This rigid insistence on party hegemony and on suppression of expression of group interests had been undergoing a progressive transformation, brought about by several forces of change. But as military technology had become more complex, the party elites had been forced to cede institutional autonomy to the military. Carl Jacobsen and, later, Timothy Colton challenged this control model. According to them, party-military elite relationships were actually coalitional. The Soviet military establishment had been at least capable of playing far more ambitious roles in politics than it had. But while Jacobsen saw military coup speculations as fundamentally misunderstanding the essence of Russian and Soviet military culture viz the larger military hierarchy's consistent part disavowal of such advocacies, including the Decembrists', Colton asserted the belief that military autonomy might be extended to include seizure of power in society. Interestingly, military participation in politics was narrowest in clearly military matters, and widest when set in institutional and societal terms. The challenge to authority rested not so much with civilian or party control, but depended on officers' actual and potential roles in politics. William Odom challenged both Kolkowicz and Colton by stating that the Soviet military was an administrative arm of the party and in this view he echoed Jacobsen. Military

professionalism did not indeed contradict the military's subordination to the party. Cleavages in the leadership over military policy were intraparty functional divisions, not simple divisions of the party vs. the military. Involvement or intervention was a characteristic of party-army symbiosis, a term first coined by Jacobsen.¹² Amos Perlmutter and William LeoGrande argued that where the complexity of military technology required specialized knowledge inaccessible to non military elites, the autonomy of the military tended to be high. The relationship between the party and the army was coalitional. The state would not tolerate any political structure's challenge to its supremacy and sovereignty, and the Soviet military in fact never demonstrated any desire to challenge the constitution, any more than did the American military. The relationship between the party and the military could sometime be dependent, and sometimes coalitional and symbiotic. This thesis did not deny military-party conflicts, mutual intervention, and the party's abuse of the military when it was ruled by a tyrant. The military might challenge the party elite or parts of it but never the party itself.¹³ Apparently, the military might be said to suffer from the exaggeration of either conflicts or cooperation between the state and the military. However, the extent to which the military under Stalin enjoyed its own institutional autonomy while being subordinated to the state remains unsolved.

In fact, the military was the state, while the state was the military. "To be a Bolshevik was to be a soldier, while a Red Army man or woman was also a Bolshevik." Military officers served on party and state bodies at all levels. Party and state officials

¹² Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party p. 15; Carl G. Jacobsen, Soviet Strategy--Soviet Foreign Policy (Glasgow: Glasgow University Press, 1972) 170-199; Timothy Colton, Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian authority pp. 250-278; and William Odom, "The Party-Military Connection: a Critique" in D.R. Herspring and I. Volgyes, eds. Civil-Military Relations in communist Systems pp. 27-43.

¹³ Amos Perlmutter and William M. LeoGrande, "The Party in Uniform: Toward a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist Political Systems" American Political Science Review vol 76, 1982: 778-789.

served on military councils at all levels in peace as in war. In other words, the military permeated society, but it did not dominate society. The party and the state dominated the military, but they did not abolish institutional autonomy in conducting operations and battles. The question of military opposition to the party and the state did not exist because it was of the party and the state. Even though military factions did exist, they were not functional separatists--on policy issues, their weight reflected the weight of the composite political-economic-military-social factions of which they were integral parts.¹⁴ Political indoctrination became one of the most effective means with which to strengthen such closed ties. "Without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement." Only under the revolutionary theory, created by the revolutionary intelligentsia, could a revolutionary movement reach its objectives, because without it there would not be socialist and communist consciousness among soldiers. Revolutionary consciousness "must be brought to them from without."¹⁵ The soldiers must be indoctrinated by the party elites, the proletarian intelligentsia. The indoctrination paved the way for political control over the military, designed to make it an instrument of the state. But the state also authorized the military some degree of institutional autonomy as a result of the division of labor among political institutions.

To command the military, the state further introduced the political commissar system. The Red Army was developed during the October Revolution, in which its main role was to create and protect the new regime. Unfortunately, the regime had not created an army led by politically reliable officers. The external interventions as well as the internal enemies from white Russia forced it to set up its own army drawn in part from the former Tsarist officers and soldiers, whose political loyalty was not necessarily

¹⁴ Carl G. Jacobsen, "Moscow's Military-Industrial Complex: Its Nature and Impact" in Carl G. Jacobsen, ed. Strategic Power p. 301.

¹⁵ Vladimir Illyich Lenin, "What Is to Be Done?" in V.I. Lenin Collected Works vol. 5 (Moscow: Moscow Progress Publishers, 1961) 369 and 375.

consistent with the Bolsheviks. Political control over the military was extremely important for the party and the state. The organizational structure of the party in the military was hierarchical. All constituent parts were accountable to a single central agency--the Main Political Administration (MPA) paralleling the Ministry of Defense; the Political Departments paralleled the Military District, Force Group, or Fleet, and the Political Sections paralleled the divisional level. Each of these military divisions had administrative organization, with established size and function: the ministerial level dealt with policy and broad administration; the district level had operational and administrative responsibilities; the divisional level was largely operational. The primary function of the MPA was to ensure the party's control over the military. Stalin described "the mechanism of the dictatorship of the proletariat" as "the transmission belts," "the levers," and "the directing force."¹⁶ It became a tool to transform soldiers into proletarian fighters in an effort to demolish old political institutions, social structures, and value orientations; and to replace these with a new socio-political edifice based on Leninist ideology. Therefore, all political and administrative structures in the state were subordinated to the party's ideological dictatorship. The party politically supervised, coordinated, and directed all governmental or non governmental institutions, including the military.

The main function of the party was to exert control over the armed forces in hopes of fully implementing its policies. The party as the supreme authority, sustained by the strict discipline of democratic centralism, ensured the loyalty of the military always to the party. In doing so, it set up the political commissar system designed to guarantee the party's political leadership; the party elites wanted to guarantee that professional soldiers never became potential opponents inside the party-state. Based on this system, the early (and later) military was led by both professional soldiers and professional revolutionaries so as to avoid any possibility of military's institutional independence from the state. Such

¹⁶ Roman Kolkwicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party p. 84 and p. 16.

distrust dated back to the early days of the regime. Lenin and Trotsky planned to build a Clausewitzian militia rather than a Red Army. Stalin was even more distrustful of any professional military establishment than Lenin and Trotsky, and eliminated the military professionals who might, he feared (probably wrongly), be disloyal to himself. Through his political skill of "divide, destroy," he increased his political and military power. First, he sided with Frunze in the battle against Trotsky and successfully removed Trotsky; then he liquidated Frunze and gained control over the War Commissariat; and finally he managed the contrived resignation and killing of Tukhachevsky.¹⁷ Stalin succeeded in dismissing his political rivals inside both the party and the military and wrested total political control over the military.

Stalin's political control over the military was essentially based on denying full political authority to commanders, yet it could not be achieved without permitting a limited degree of military autonomy. The complexity of governing required giving authority to the military to pursue its professional and institutional interests (in terms of command authority, professional rank and status, and economic and social privileges).¹⁸ With the development of technology, war became more complicated than before. The state was forced to cede intra-institutional autonomy to commanders loyal to Stalin, to manage troops and wage operations and battles. It did so partly because their political loyalty was unquestioned, but more importantly because they enjoyed a monopoly of technical knowledge of war. The military, of course, remained constitutionally subordinated to the state. It upheld and advanced the national interests--eliminating the capitalist system. The military might challenge some of the party and state elites or of the party's and state's policy, but it never challenged the party or the state as a whole. The

¹⁷ Thomas M. Nichols, The Sacred Cause: Civil-Military Conflict over Soviet National Security, 1917-1922 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993) 44.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 49.

military was a military school of communism, in which youth from diverse ethnic, economic, and geographic backgrounds were indoctrinated and assimilated. Objective control over and through the military was the main characteristic of the Soviet armed forces.

In spite of his total control over the state, the military, and the economy, it was thought that the state would never be safe until there was a ring of brother states. A strong Soviet Union could aid revolution while a weak one would simply be overcome. Clearly, what was good for the Soviet Union was good for the proletarian revolution. Socialism in the Soviet Union in the short term was a rational choice for the world revolution, which was subordinated to the interest of the Soviet state. The revolution in an industrialized state needed a special combination of political, economic, military, and social circumstances at home and abroad to bring about communism. Without such required environments, an industrialized state was perhaps relatively immune to revolution. As international capitalism became stabilized in industrialized states during the 1920s, coexistence with the capitalist world became mandatory, just as the necessity of internal development and the security of the state that had achieved the rudiments of socialism had to be the supreme objective of the world proletariat, taking priority over the temporary success of this or that Communist Party.¹⁹ Thus, socialism in one country was defined as the way both to protect the Soviet state and to support the world revolution. This socialism was controlled by one man. His total control was reinforced by revolution from above coupled with direct support from below by millions of masses--party members, peasants, workers, and soldiers.

¹⁹ Condoleezza Rice, "The Making of Soviet Strategy" in Peter Paret, ed. Makers of Modern Strategy pp. 660-661; David R. Jones, "Soviet Strategic Culture" p. 35; and Robert C. Tucker, "The Emergence of Stalin's Foreign Policy" in Alexander Dullin, ed. Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1990 (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc. 1992) 29-55.

The constant concerns of the Soviet state about a potential war with Japan were fundamental to its assessment of strategic environments. The Soviet calculation appeared to be irrational during the mid-1930s, since it entailed being prepared to fight a two-front war with both east and west. But the Soviet Union steadily switched from preparing a two-front war to preventing such war, by taking advantage of the Sino-Japanese war and of British and French peripheral strategy. Soviet policy towards East Asia was designed to protect its essential interests in the Chinese Eastern railway, Mongolia, and Korea. But it was in Northeast China, where the Soviet Union faced a weak China and a strong Japan, where the conflicts among them deepened. The Manchurian incident in 1931 and the subsequent establishment of Manzhouguo changed the strategic environments in East Asia. Moscow then shifted its policy toward Japan from a conciliatory policy to an aggressive policy of preventing Japanese invasion of the Soviet Union and the MPR. The Soviet Gentlemen's Agreement of November 27, 1934 with the MPR was aimed at defending the MPR against Japanese threats. Stalin warned Japan in his interview with Roy Howard of the Scripps-Howard newspapers, "if Japan ventured to attack the MPR, seeking to destroy its independence, we would have to assist the MPR." Foreign Minister Litvinov's deputy, Stomoniakov, had also informed the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow of this warning, pointing out the invariably friendly relations which the USSR had entertained with the MPR since 1921. He made clear, "We would assist the MPR in the same way as we did in 1921."²⁰

The Soviet Union formally concluded the Mutual Assistance Pact with the MPR on March 12, 1936, which reconfirmed the Gentlemen's Agreement of 1934. In accordance with this pact, both sides would provide mutual aid to prevent and avert threats of military attack, and extend the other aid and support in the event of an attack by a third party. Article 1 stated, "In case of the threat of an attack on the territory of the

²⁰ Jane Degras, ed. Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1953) 164.

USSR or the MPR by a third country, the Governments of the USSR and the MPR undertake to consult each other immediately regarding the situation and to adopt all measures that may be necessary for the protection and safety of their territories." Article 2 specified, "The Governments of the USSR and the MPR are obliged, in case of a military attack against either party, to help one another with all means, including military assistance." Article 3 provided, "The Governments of the USSR and the MPR are in full understanding that the troops of either country that shall be sent by mutual agreement into the territory of the other, in accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of this protocol, shall immediately be withdrawn from that territory as soon as the period of emergency is over," as occurred in 1925, when Soviet troops were withdrawn from the territory of the MPR.²¹ The protection of the territories, mutual military assistance, and the stationing of the troops were the key elements of the pact.

This pact allowed Moscow to provide military assistance if the MPR faced or was attacked by a third party. Vyacheslav M. Molotov explained that according to the existing mutual assistance treaty between the USSR and the MPR, we regarded it as our duty to render necessary support to the MPR for the purpose of safeguarding its frontiers. We approached earnestly such matters as a treaty of mutual aid, signed by the Soviet government. I must warn that on the strength of the Mutual Assistance Treaty concluded between us, we would defend the frontiers of the MPR just as resolutely as our own border.²² This implied that Moscow had switched its defense policy from one-front to two-front operations. Marshal Mikhail N. Tukhachevsky contended, "Now we are in a

²¹ Jan F. Triska and Robert M. Slusser, The Theory, Law, and Policy of Soviet Treaties (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962) 234-235 and Jane Degras, ed. Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy pp. 168-170.

²² Liu Zhiqing, "Lun Sulian zai dierci shijiedazhanzhong de yuandong zhanlue (On Soviet Far East Strategy during the Second World War)" Shehuai kexue zhanxian no. 1, 1994: 177-180; Jan F. Triska and Robert M. Slusser, The Theory, Law, and Policy of Soviet Treaties p. 235 and David J. Dallin, Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy, 1939-1942 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942) 225.

position, whenever the government asks, to cope with enemies on both the eastern and western frontiers at any time, using mighty, well-trained, and perfect strength."²³ In response to the Soviet-Mongolian pact, Japan signed the Anti-Comintern Pact aimed at seeking cooperation between Japan and Germany in order to fight against Soviet threats, subversion, and aggression.

Soviet-Japanese relations were further soured by the Soviet attitude toward the Sino-Japanese war, in which it supported both Nationalists and Communists helping them conduct a protracted war against Japan, and thus indirectly prevent or at least make more problematic a Japanese attack on its own territory. German Foreign Minister von Neurath pointed out that Japanese armed clashes with China would only benefit the Soviet Union. The Soviet government at this moment was particularly interested in keeping Japan busy, in order that it should not exploit the weakening of the Red Army that was caused by the execution of so many officers. The Soviet Union therefore provided military aid at the request of the Nationalist Government, which asked for 350 planes, 200 tanks, and 236 heavy guns, as well as Soviet pilots, aviation technicians, artillery officers and tank specialists to help command Chinese forces. By the end of 1937, there were 450 Soviet pilots in China. From the autumn of 1937 to mid-February 1939, a total of 3665 Soviet military specialists worked in the Chinese armed forces.²⁴ In return, the USSR received minerals vital to Soviet war production, including wolfram and tungsten. Litvinov insisted that such sales of arms, including air planes, to China, was entirely in accordance with international law. . . .especially in view of the fact that arms were provided to China, just as, incidentally, to Japan, by many countries. A new Sino-Soviet trade treaty signed in

²³ Hata Ikuhiko, "The Japanese-Soviet Confrontation" in James William Morley, ed. Deterrent Diplomacy: Japan, Germany, and the USSR, 1935-1940 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976) 132.

²⁴ Lu Wenpai, "Silun SuRi zhongli tiaoyue dui Zhongguo kangzhan de yingxiang (Preliminary Discussion on the Impact of Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact on the Sino-Japanese War)" Shehuai kexue zhanxian no. 1, 1994: 171-176 and Jonathan Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Threat from the East, 1933-1941 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992) 90-94.

Moscow on June 16, 1939 extended most-favored nation status and immunities for the Soviet trade delegation and was followed by a further credit of 150,000,000 dollars in August 1939. Vladimir Potemkin called the situation in China splendid, since the Chinese resistance would last several years, after which Japan would be too enfeebled to be capable of attacking the USSR.²⁵ The Soviet aid to China substantially worsened Soviet-Japanese relations. In August 1937, the Japanese soldiers raided the Soviet consulates in Tianjing and Shanghai. In September, the Soviet Union withdrew recognition from the Japanese consulates at Odessa and Novosibirsk. In December, a Soviet mail plane was shot down in Manchuria, followed by strong Soviet protests at Japan's failure to release its crew and hand over its cargo. These incidents further strengthened Moscow's determination to safeguard its interests against the Japanese-Manzhouguo insolent acts.

These incidents were moreover coupled with endless clashes along the 3,000-mile long and poorly defined border that stretched between Korea, Manzhouguo, the Soviet Union, and Mongolia.²⁶ Japanese aggression was not only, argued Litvinov, confined to

²⁵ Max Beloff, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1929-1941 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1949) 184, 94, and 189-190.

²⁶ According to the Japanese statistics, 152 border clashes occurred between 1932 and 1934, 176 border clashes in 1935, 152 border clashes in 1936, 113 border clashes in 1937, 166 border clashes in 1938, and 195 border clashes in 1939. The major points of difference between Japan and the Soviet Union accounting for initial troubles around the Nomonhan war centered on five issues. First, whose border was violated? If the boundary lay on the Halaha River, as the Japanese side claimed, it was the Mongolians who were trespassors. If the line extended 20 to 25 km. east of the river, as according to MPR contention, then it was the Manzhouguo-Japanese forces that intruded. Nevertheless, all Soviet prisoners taken during the war told that Soviet officers and men had been instructed not to advance beyond a certain line drawn east of the Halaha river. Second, who attacked whom? The Japanese claimed that Manzhouguoan elements were fired on by MPR soldiers first, whereas the other side asserted that its horses were merely grazing on the eastern shores of the Halaha river when attacked by the Japanese-Manzhouguoan forces who penetrated as far as the river. Third, how many troops were involved? The intelligence reports reaching Guandong Army headquarters indicated that at least 700 Mongolian horsemen had come across the Halaha river on May 12 and engaged smaller Manzhouguo forces. But local evidence, admitted Komatsubara Michitaro, suggested a figure closer to 30-50 horsemen. Fourth, exactly when did the fighting commence? Guandong Army records showed that the first telegram was received from Komatsubara on the afternoon of May 14 concerning the MPR incursion on the morning of the 12th. But the Soviets asserted that even the headquarters of the MPR 6th Cavalry Division did not learn from the Mongolia's 7th Border Guard outpost until the night of 14/15 May that there had been a clash on May 11. Fifth, how unexpected was the clash

the boundaries of China, but also threatened the borders of the Soviet Union. Aggressors would always seek new prey in those territories whose masters had shown flabbiness and inability to defend their positions. They needed short distances and weakly defended territories; they would find neither one nor the other in the USSR. Litvinov reminded Japan that every inch of Soviet soil was protected--Japan would be kept from Soviet frontiers.²⁷ The first truly serious conflict, over Zhanggufeng (the Changkufeng incident or Lake Khasan affair), occurred in fighting for possession of the hill lying at the juncture of the frontiers of northeast Korea, southeast Manchouguo, and the Soviet Maritime province near Posyet Bay.

In contrast to this intensified conflict in the east, the Soviet Union tried to avoid or at least postpone war with Germany in the west. At the Eighteenth Party Congress, Stalin accused Britain, France, and the United States of "egging on the Germans to march east." But the Soviet Union would frustrate their schemes by strengthening business relations with all countries. In order to prevent direct military confrontation, he was willing to align with Germany, his most dangerous potential enemy, since it was believed that the contradiction inherent in capitalism would lead to war within capitalist states first. A temporary alliance with one warring faction could buy more time. A German-Soviet neutrality pact might counterpress the British and French strategy, which was designed to seek peripheralized conflict, and draw Germany into a long war fought on the backs of the smaller nations of Europe; in order to stretch German resources and thus reduce

(...continued)
 near Nomonhan? When Komatsubara's telegram arrived at Guandong Army headquarters, the staff's reaction was "has it happened again?" As Hattori Takushiro said, "nobody at Guandong Army headquarters believed that such an insignificant little mound of sand would become the site of raging battles that made world headlines." Wang Fu Rijun qinhua zhanzheng p. 1141 and Alvin D. Coox, Nomonhan pp. 190-193.

²⁷ In early May, 1939, Anglo-Soviet negotiations on the British proposal for a joint declaration of England, France, the Soviet Union, and Poland against the threat of aggression and on the possible aid of Soviet aviation to the Polish army in the eventuality of a German attack were lagging. On May 2, the British Government rejected Moscow's proposals and the same day, Maxim Litvinov, Foreign Commissar, was replaced by Vyacheslav Molotov.

German ability to pursue decision-seeking strategy against them. But the Allied blockade, reinforced by growing American support, pushed Germany into dependence on the Soviet Union from the German objectives of apocalyptic war. The temporary relief from the west strengthened Stalin's position in the east. He stated that "any invasion of the USSR would be met by double strength." Within the context of the Roy Howard interview in parallel with the mutual defense pact, any serious Japanese violation of the MPR--claimed borders would be regarded by Moscow as tantamount to an invasion of the Soviet Union itself.²⁸ The Soviet Union was determined to protect its interests in the MPR.

Under the influence of Sun Zi and Clausewitz, Stalin's total control helped identify Soviet limited objectives in the Nomonhan war and produce explicit but mutually recognized rules to constrain military activities within the Nomonhan areas. On the one hand, the state as Sun Zi and Clausewitz suggested had supreme authority of control over the military. This dependent nature of the military on the state reflected the very essence of all institutions in the Soviet political system.²⁹ Complex technology of war however forced the state to grant institutional autonomy to the military to implement military doctrine, wage battles and operations, and defend the Soviet interests in the MPR against Japan's aggression. This institutional autonomy seemed to echo Sun Zi's soft control over the military. On the other hand, the Soviet calculations of ends and means, to some degree also mirrored Sun Zi's and Clausewitz' ideas of rationale. In the Nomonhan war, the Soviet objectives were justified by the Soviet-Mongolian Mutual Assistance Pact. To achieve these objectives, Moscow endeavored to manage its relations with European and

²⁸ Earl F. Ziemke, "Soviet Net Assessment in the 1930s" in Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, eds. Calculations: Net Assessment and the Coming of World War II (New York: the Free Press, 1992) 200; Condoleezza Rice, "The Making of Soviet Strategy," p. 670; and Michael Geyer, "German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare, 1914-1945" in Peter Paret, ed. Makers of Modern Strategy pp. 575-577.

²⁹ Amos Perlmutter and William M. LeoGrande, "The party in Uniform" p. 782.

East Asian powers. A temporary alliance with Germany, together with Japan's heavy involvement in the Sino-Japanese war, relieved Soviet concerns about the possibility of a two-front war. Within this context, the Soviet Union tried to wage a short, effective limited war against Japan.

The Military

Control over operations and battles within the mutually recognized limits for distributing costs and benefits was the foundation of Soviet limited war in Nomonhan. Soviet military art in Stalin's state involved three major elements: strategy, operations, and tactics, whose subject was "the nature and the methods of military operations of various scopes, in the aggregate and as applied to each separate service of the armed forces, and each branch of service in particular."³⁰ Such military art favored deep operations centering on the offensive, mobility, and combined arms for striking an enemy's flanks and rear, for encircling, disrupting, and dismembering him, and finally for destroying him. The effectiveness of deep operations was reinforced by Soviet psychological force--morale, cohesion, and esprit de corps--formalized and promoted by the Soviet state in an effort to increase soldiers' will to fight on the battlefield. The immediate objective of the Nomonhan war was to stabilize the borders between the MPR and Manzhouguo and avert further escalating border conflicts. This objective called for matching the available military means with the prospective combat environment or for readjusting the ends to the available military means, balancing military art and psychological force.³¹

³⁰ V.D. Sokolovskiy, Soviet Military Strategy p. 7.

³¹ Harriet Fast Scott, William F. Scott, and Condoleezza Rice argued that by the late 1930s, the writings of Soviet Military theoreticians had been destroyed or suppressed, since those published were essentially mosaics from speeches by Stalin on military operations. The theory of deep operations was discounted on the basis that there was no pronouncement on it by Stalin; its creators were enemies of the people. It was forbidden even to speak of operations in depth. Military concepts developed earlier by Tukhachevskiy and others were abandoned.

The emphasis on the match insisted by Sun Zi and Clausewitz between military art and psychological force indeed reflected Russian and Soviet military tradition, because Stalin's state, though permeated with different ideas and aspirations, inherited the same land with the same traditions and with many of the same problems. It could not entirely discard these traditions and problems, or, indeed any other deeply embedded legacy of Russia's past.³² In the eighteenth century, the Russian way of war was dominated by the Frederician ideal that allegedly sought a totally unthinking mechanical performance of duties by soldiers as ordered. This ideal prevented night marches, camps in forested areas, the use of small detachments of infantry for scouting and harassing the enemy or for foraging, due to fear of desertion. Russian commanders adopted the tradition with great success, but thereby failed to take advantage of the potential for tactical innovations that reliable Russian peasants soldiers afforded them.³³ General Alexander Suvorov challenged the ideal by developing a new Russian way of war, with emphasis on quick grasp, speed, and shock in war; that is, to quickly evaluate the environments, to prepare for war, and to make decisions; to achieve surprise by speed; and to utilize adequate equipment for conquering the enemy. Despite his influence on the Russian way of war, defeat in the Russo-Japanese war encouraged Russian soldiers to explore new approaches to war. For them, the need to maintain the harmony of the explicit and implicit administration of command demanded a single military school, one method and manual for resolving military questions--a truly unified military doctrine. Among these soldiers, V. Domanevskii championed a unified doctrine in a series of articles titled "On the New Field Service Regulations," "Unity of Military Doctrine," and "Unity of Military Doctrine and the Field Regulations," arguing that the nature of contemporary war imposed on the

³² Richard Pipes, "Militarism and the Soviet State" p. 4.

³³ Walter M. Pintner, "Russia's Military Style, Russian Society, and Russian Power in the Eighteenth Century" in A.G. Cross, ed. Russia and the West in the Eighteenth Century (Newtonville: Oriental Research Partners, 1983) 263-266.

leadership of an army the reality that direct command of battle would in fact be in the hands of young, relatively inexperienced officers following only the most general orders from above. The therefore necessary independence of the subordinate commander in turn required that he be able to select the proper means to achieve a set objective, and position himself to act not only without orders, but even in spite of orders if these did not meet the situation. Without a command structure that could efficiently and effectively provide direct command to tactical operations from higher levels, there should be an explicit doctrine in the form of field regulations, as well as an implicit one residing in the officer's professional capabilities, that would offer basic guideline to the conduct of battle.³⁴ This unified doctrine, with special emphasis on the offensive, mobility, and weapons, remained dominant in the Russian army.

Military specialists of the Russian imperial army were influential contributors to the birth and the development of Soviet military art. Throughout the 1920s, these military specialists with their revolutionary counterparts sought to match traditional strategic orientations with communist political ideology.³⁵ The debate between Trotsky and Frunze largely mirrored continuity in the Russian strategic debate. Frunze proposed a unified military doctrine which was designed to combine communist ideology with the experiences of the Civil War. For him, the Red Army should be a cadre army, but not a militia. The military doctrine of this army should emphasize the primacy of the offensive, of the centrality of maneuver based on the experiences of the Civil War, and of the technology that would play an increasingly important, even decisive role in the next war. In contrast, Trotsky attempted to develop a coherent set of strategy, operational art, and tactics suitable to the Clausewitzian mass army. Thus, he contended that the proponents

³⁴ Sophie de Lastours, "Les grands traits de la pensee militaire Russe" *Strategie* no. 49, 1991: 79-80 and Carl Van Dyke, *Russian Imperial Military Doctrine and Education* pp. 150-154.

³⁵ D. Fedotoff White, *The Growth of the Red Army* pp. 161-162 and John Erickson, *Soviet High Command* pp. 172-178.

of a new unified military doctrine not only improperly formulated general goals, strategy, tactics, but diverted attention from the most practical and vital tasks--defending the new regime against foreign aggressors and internal enemies. He even questioned Frunze's political loyalty by linking his doctrine to Suvorov's offensive and maneuver. In spite of these charges, Frunze still won the debate, first becoming Trotsky's deputy and, then, replacing him as the war commissar. Maneuver, offensive, and technology became paramount in Soviet strategic thought.

The continued efforts to search for a new military doctrine was closely associated with the forced industrialization that provided advanced weapons and equipment. These new weapons required a new doctrine to match them with soldiers, to facilitate the attainment of combat objectives. Around 1928, Vladimir Triandifilov, Head of the Operations Administration of the Red Army Staff, introduced the concept of successive operations designed to break through enemy lines, exploiting penetration to deliver a decisive and annihilating blow. He recognized the potential that tanks with increased mobility and speed would be employed for deep operations against the enemy's supporting units and lines of communication. Mikhail Tukhachevesky further developed this concept by focusing on the combined use of motorized rifle units, self-propelled artillery, and aircraft and aeromobility to achieve breakthrough in depth. Bombers were utilized to interdict enemy resources and paratroopers were to seize rear targets and block the enemy's retreat, allowing a crushing blow to be delivered by the second echelon of forces. Deep operations required the incorporation of tanks, artillery, aircraft, and well-trained professional soldiers into combat formations.³⁶ Thus, victory in the next war would depend on an offensive blow that could be achieved by the simultaneous

³⁶ Yu Waimin, "Sulian 30 niandai junshi gaige de quzhe ji jiaoxun (The Complications and Lessons of the Soviet Military Reform during the 1930s)" *Junshi lishi* no. 2, 1989: 19-24 and Wang Baofu, "Sujun zhaoqi yanjiu he gaige zhanyi lilun de jingyan jiaoxun (The Experiences and Lessons of the Soviet Military Early Research on Reformulating Operational Art)" *Junshi lishi* no. 2, 1989: 25-28.

suppression of the enemy defense throughout its entire depth with air and artillery strikes; by penetration of the tactical defense zone by attacking formations on a broad front with armored forces; and by a decisive follow-up of tactical success with operational maneuver aimed at full encirclement and destruction of the enemy. The infantry became responsible for organizing the cooperation of all forces in combat.³⁷ Deep operations sought unity and compactness of doctrine, strategy, organization, and plan. This unity implied "a granite-like organization with absolute internal homogeneity and external unity of action, with no fissures through which the enemy can penetrate to destroy this unity of aim and action." It became the principle of Red Army-building. "One of the basic conditions for securing the maximum potency of the Red Army is to transform it into a monolithic organization, wielded together from top to bottom not only by common political ideology, but also by unity of views on the character of the military problems, on the method of solving the problems as well as on the system of combat training of troops."³⁸ This concept was reflected in the prewar instructions and directives as well as in the plans of the operational strategic games and field maneuvers.

The 1936 Field Regulations of the Red Army stated, "Every war, offensive and defensive, has the aim of defeating the enemy. But only a decisive offensive in the main direction, concluding with persistent pursuit, leads to a complete annihilation of the forces and means of the enemy." Essential to operations and battles were speed, maneuver, and flexibility. "Speed of action in conjunction with organization, expert maneuver and dexterous application to the terrain, with an account of the enemy's air, is a

³⁷ Condoleezza Rice, "The Making of Soviet Strategy" pp. 653-660 and 663-669; Peter H. Vigor, "The Soviet Union and the Future of Land Warfare: the Combined Arms Concept" in Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. eds. Emerging Dctrines and Technologies pp. 142-146; and David M. Glantz, The Soviet Conduct of Tactical maneuver: Spearhead of the Offensive (London: Frank Cass, 1991) 80-95.

³⁸ Raymond C. Garthoff, How Russia Makes War: Soviet Military Doctrine (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1954) 171; D. Fedotoff White, The Growth of the Red Army p. 161; and V.D. Sokolovskiy, Soviet Military Strategy p. 133.

basic guarantee of success in battle. Troops having quickly executed a disposition, quickly regrouped with a changing situations, quickly arising from rest, quickly perfecting a campaign movement, quickly falling out in combat order and opening fire, having quickly attacked and pursued the opponent can always count on success." Combined arms was the way to reach the objective of destroying the enemy. "Use of each type of troop in combat must be based on an account of its nature and strong points. Each type of troop must be used in close combined action with other kinds of troops in conditions of the maximum utilization of its potentialities."³⁹ As Matvey Zakharov described it,

The deep operation as a process included several stages: breakthrough of the tactical defense and forming a breach in it by the combined efforts of the infantry, tanks, artillery and aviation; the exploitation of tactical into operational success by means of sending masses of tanks, motorized infantry, and mechanized cavalry through this breach and also by means of making air landings (the destruction of reserves and liquidation of the enemy's operational defense); the exploitation of operational success (operational pursuit) to the complete destruction of the enemy grouping selected as the objective of the operation and seizing a favorable assault position for a new operation. The first stage is the foundation for a deep operation since without a breakthrough of the tactical defense it would not have taken place at all, that is, it would have been frustrated. But its main point was that artillery, tanks (several echelons), aviation and infantry, cooperating among themselves, simultaneously inflict a defeat on the enemy's combat order throughout its whole depth and, as if by a single, surprise, deep and powerful strike, they break his defense, form breaches in it, and try to reach the operational area. In accomplishing this, all branches of service act in support of the infantry.⁴⁰

³⁹ Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Military Doctrine (Glencoe: the Free Press, 1953) 67, 89, and 177.

⁴⁰ Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, eds. The Soviet Art of War: Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982) 20.

Deep operations with special emphasis on the offensive, mobility, and combined arms firmly dominated Soviet strategic thought. In Nomonhan, the Soviet center of gravity was to strike Japanese troops by encircling, disrupting, and dismembering them, while deceiving them by sending a variety of false information. This war represented the first Soviet test of tanks, aircraft, and artillery on a large-scale. The battlefield was the vast flatland adjoined the MPR, Manchuria, and the Soviet Union, suitable for mechanized troops and Air Force involvement. In the battle of the Halaha river, sharp fighting broke out to the rear and flanks of the Azuma Yaozo-led regiment as the well-armed Red Army launched attacks across the river. Even though Azuma beat off every Soviet attack, he was obliged to split his meager strength and seek cover behind the slope. In effect, the Japanese were surrounded and under continuous bombardment by artillery from across the Halaha river and by mortars and a half-dozen antitank guns that sprayed fire blindly but effectively from the east shore against the remaining Japanese heavy weapons. The horsemen had to fight dismounted, crawling and clawing out holes in the sand. The Azuma unit was supposed to launch a night attack toward the confluence, but the Red Army preempted it. Armored vehicles were rumbling up from the south-southeast, and during the night three Soviet searchlights lit up the Japanese trenches while 45mm rapid-fire guns and mortars laid down a barrage paving the way for 500 or 600 infantry and the tanks that were approaching. With the coming of first light on 29 May, the Soviet artillery--12cm howitzers, field pieces, mortars, and antitank guns--which had been quiescent through the night, unleashed even more intensive fire than on the 28th, striking Azuma's isolated front, left, and rear. Scooped from the sandy soil, portions of the Japanese trenches caved in, threatening the Japanese with burial alive. The Soviet troops had come within 50 meters of the Japanese on both flanks and in the front, and three tanks had penetrated the rear.⁴¹

⁴¹ Alvin D. Coox, Nomonhan pp. 207-211 and Edward J. Drea, Nomonhan: Japanese-Soviet Tactical Combat pp. 28-29.

The Red Army, in order to prevent Japanese close and night combat, asked Moscow for reinforcement that involved the 11th Tank Brigade, the 7th, 8th, and 9th mechanized Brigades, the 36th motorized rifle division, a heavy artillery detachment, and the MPRA 8th cavalry division, and that more than 100 fighter planes, including the improved I-16 and the I-15, were dispatched to the war zone. On July 3, the Red Army launched the attack against the Japanese troops. Tanks and motorized troops skillfully cooperated with the Air Force and mobile artillery. They were a decisive means to carry out swift military operations.⁴² The bulk of M.P. Yakovlev's 11th Tank Brigade was to conduct a rapid on-the-march attack from the north, while its 2nd Battalion was to meet the Japanese frontally and check their movement southward. Supported by an artillery battalion, I.I. Fedyuninsky's 24th Motorized Regiment was to attack from the northwest, cooperating closely with the 11th Tank Brigade's offensive. A.L. Lesovoi's 7th Armored Brigade would attack from the south, while an armored battalion of the MPRA 8th Cavalry Division, armed with 45mm guns, moved from that direction too. The heavy artillery battalion of the 185th Artillery regiment opened fire on the Japanese group of forces. Simultaneously, the artillery deployed beyond Nomonhan and supporting the 9th Armored Brigade shifted its fire onto the enemy. The bombers and the fighters began to bomb and storm the Japanese positions. To prevent them crossing the river and reaching their concentration in the mountain area, aircraft and artillery continued heavy bombing and shelling on the crossing area.⁴³

Japanese soldiers described this Soviet attack. Several scores of tanks attacked unexpectedly, causing chaos among our troops. Horses stampeded, neighing and dragging gun carriages with them, and cars scattered in all directions. Two of the Japanese planes were shot down. The morale of the troops fell extremely low. The Japanese soldiers could

⁴² Georgi K. Zhukov, The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov (New York: Delacorte Press, 1971) 154.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 152 and Alvin D. Coox, Nomonhan pp. 304-305.

be heard saying more and more frequently: "terrible," "sad," and "ghastly."⁴⁴ In the face of the heavy Soviet bombardment, Japanese confidence quickly eroded partly because of insufficient logistics, disadvantageous terrain, and lack of initiative. Japanese units were fatigued from movement and fighting and were extremely low on food and ammunition. Fighting in scorching desert heat, they found no potable water sources on the uplands across the river. To make matters worse, the infantry ran out of antitank ammunition. Moving up a slope line 2,000 meters long, the Japanese infantry were attacked by tanks before they ever reached the top. The Soviet troops, on the other hand, could look down on every Japanese movement with the naked eye. As Soviet troops dominated the battlefield, Japanese foot soldiers had no targets within their range. Soviet artillery pounded the unshielded Japanese from invisible positions. Japanese infantry were accomplishing nothing; their small arms were useless, their momentum had been lost, and they were merely hanging on across the Halaha river.⁴⁵

In the final stage of the war, Zhukov had moved his main forces across the river, deployed in three groups. The first group, the very strong southern force under Zhukov's deputy, Potapov, consisted of about three mechanized brigades and three regiments of one infantry division. The 8th MPRA Cavalry Division screened the claimed border on the far right. The southern force was to strike toward Nomonhan destroying Japanese units north of the Holsten river. The second group, the less powerful northern force commanded by I.V. Shevnikov, was made up of the 7th Armored Brigade and two battalions of the 11th Tank Brigade, working with only one infantry regiment of the 82nd Rifle Division. Coverage on the outermost northern sector was to be provided by the 6th MPRA Cavalry Division. It was directed to roll up the Japanese northern flank at Fui Heights and then join with the other forces to surround and to destroy enemy units north

⁴⁴ Georgi K. Zhukov, The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov p. 153.

⁴⁵ Alvin D. Coox, Nomonhan pp. 319-320.

of the Holsten river. The third group, on the broad center of the front, was led by KomBrig D.E. Petrov. Whereas the other strike forces encircled both flanks of the Japanese, this grouping was to engage the enemy's main strength by frontal attacks. With this plan, the Red Army pinned down the Japanese troops on the battlefield.⁴⁶

Essential to these battles was maneuver, aimed at holding the frontal position, at concentrating superiority to attack the Japanese flanks and at encircling the Japanese troops so as to destroy them one by one. The Field Regulations of 1936 made clear "Contemporary technical means of struggle permit the attainment of a simultaneous blow on the enemy's battle order in the entire depth of its disposition. The potentialities for swift alterations of grouping, sudden flanking and seizure of the enemy's rear region with gaining on the path of his withdrawal, are greatly increased."⁴⁷ These flanking and rear attacks helped swiftly smash and destroy an enemy's defense lines and formations. In the attack, the enemy must be encircled and annihilated. The enemy must be pinned down in the entire depth of his position, encircled and destroyed. Tanks, artillery, aviation, and mechanized attack provided the wherewithal to organize simultaneous attack on the entire depth of the enemy's battle order, with the aim of its isolation, complete encirclement and annihilation. The plan of attack both for an offensive on the enemy's flank and in a breakthrough, must pursue the target, not squeezing it out, but by encirclement and annihilation of the manpower and seizure of the material of the enemy.⁴⁸ The final stage of the war reflected this salient strategy of the Red Army. On August 19, Soviet bombers suddenly bombed the Japanese position, while tanks, armored carriers, and motorized infantry swiftly encircled the Japanese from the south and north flanks and from the rear.

⁴⁶ Alvin D. Coox, Nomonhan p. 587 and Otto Preston Chaney, Jr. Zhukov (Oklahoma City: the University of Oklahoma Press, 1972) 54-57.

⁴⁷ Raymond C. Garthoff, How Russia Makes War p. 98.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p.106.

Three Soviet and Mongolian infantry divisions, two Cavalry divisions, five armored brigades, one machine-gun brigade, and one parachute brigade supported by aircraft, tanks, and artillery divided the enemy and, then, destroyed him one by one.

Deception closely accompanied maneuver. For the Red Army, it was both active (misleading and misinforming the enemy) and passive (concealing its intentions and disposition). It was achieved by means of concealment of existing objects from Japanese observation as well as by the creation of simulated objects diverting the attention of Japanese intelligence and forces in the direction desired by the Red Army⁴⁹ For active deception, the Red Army created the impression that it was making no preparation for an offensive operation. It deceived the enemy by working out a program of radio and telephone reports referring only to the construction of defenses, and preparations for the autumn and winter campaign--knowing full well that the Japanese tapped the telephone wires and intercepted radio messages. In their radio exchanges, they employed a code that could be easily deciphered. They passed on to the enemy the printed instruction leaflets for the soldier in defense. All these measures created the false conception that the Red Army was in a defensive posture. For passive deception, the Red Army concealed its movements in the front line and in the rear. Pieces of ordnance, mortars, vehicles, and all other types of equipment were hidden under camouflage nets made of material available on the battlefield. The tank detachments were moved to take-off areas for offense in small groups from different directions. During the night, all the movements were jammed by noise specially created by aircraft, artillery, mortar, and machine-gun and rifle fire. The Red Army built under-river bridges for tanks, armored vehicles, and trucks. The Japanese were thoroughly confused about the real intention of the Red Army.

Combined arms smashed the Japanese traditional tactics of close and night combat. In the defense, the Red Army and the Mongolian Army constructed solid

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 266.

defensive positions armed with anti-tank tunnels, anti-tank mines, and wire. The front line was also armed with lighting equipment. When the Japanese launched their attacks, the Soviet turned on their lights and shot lighting bombs. The battlefield became daytime. This approach to operations and battles forced Japanese soldiers to conduct mobile and positional warfare, rather than night and hand-to-hand combat. The Soviet combined arms prevented the Japanese from approaching the Soviet position and destroyed Japanese soldiers without hand-to-hand combat. Reflections of the Nomonhan war by Japanese officers highlighted the strengths of Soviet deep operations and the weaknesses of Japanese strategy. As Mishima Giichiro argued,

The fatal problem concerned the vague meaning of the Nomonhan affair in general and of the operations in particular. . . The organization and equipment of Japanese troops on the spot were not appropriate for anti-Soviet combat in such region. In particular, the use of horses was out of the question. Whereas even a slightly wounded horse was useless, motor vehicles remained in action even when hit, unless fatally damaged in their engines. . . Mobility was crucial in vast flatlands; foot units were hopeless. Deployment to new positions and supply of ammunition demanded motorization. . . A major defect encountered in tactical training was the fact that officers, even at the war college, had been taught only the "Meckel tactics" of the German army. In other words, since the Meiji era, when Prussian Major Jakob Meckel had come to advise the Japanese military, there was no concrete analysis of the extent to which the foe could be destroyed. No methodical attention was paid, at any level, to such questions as friendly attrition rates or the time to rotate units. Meckel had stressed the need to attack the enemy's soft points, but it was left to commanders to create weaknesses by concentrating superior firepower. This was not attempted at Nomonhan. Instead, huge maneuvers were devised that looked good on paper but that only led to an accumulation of disasters. Such maneuvers were practicable when the terrain was advantageous, when friendly artillery could provide long-range cover, and when there was both mechanization and

motorization. At Nomonhan, cover was absent inside the effective range of Soviet artillery.⁵⁰

The concepts of offensive, mobility, and combined arms firmly dominated Soviet strategic thought in conducting operations and battles. These consistent concepts, reformulated by generations of Russian and Soviet soldiers, were sustained by the moral and psychological force that shaped military art. Combat effectiveness, Russian and Soviet soldiers held, derived fundamentally from moral and psychological force. Suvorov strongly believed that the superiority of mind over matter be based on religious and national motives.⁵¹ Such art of war became the foundation for the Russian national school, stressing the national element as a driving force making soldiers fight with loyalty and enthusiasm. The emerging national school had a substantial influence on Russian military professionals who constantly searched for the real motivators for soldiers on the battlefield. Dmitrii Miliutin discussed Clausewitz' idea of psychological force and argued,

There are two sides in military art: the material and the spiritual. An army is not only a physical power, a mass consisting of weapons of military operations, but it is well a union of humans endowed with intelligence and heart. Spiritual force plays an important part in all considerations and calculations of the military leaders, and consequently for the latter it is insufficient to rule armies as a machine. He must be able to rule the human being to fasten the army to himself, and with his spiritual power over the army acquire conditional authority.⁵²

Following the same tradition, M.I. Dragomirov emphasized the importance of the bayonet and morale on the battlefield: "Imagine, for example, contemporary advanced rapid-firing artillery; assume that the officers are skilled in aiming, and those servicing

⁵⁰ Alvin D. Coox, Nomonhan p. 1007.

⁵¹ Serge Andolenko, "Imperial Heritage" in B.H. Liddell Hart, The Red Army pp. 15-16.

⁵² Walter Pintner, "Russian Military Thought" pp. 361-362.

the artillery are superbly trained in the working of these guns; the significance of such artillery will be nevertheless destroyed if the men working it cannot stand the experience of shells exploding over their heads and abandon their wonderful guns."⁵³ Morale based on loyalty and nationalism became the decisive factor in combat.

Likewise, Soviet soldiers came to believe that the Communist Party was the inspirer of heroic actions. Their performance on the battlefield was influenced by the party's ideological control, which directly resulted in military efficiency, by the way of inculcating the will to fight, reinforcing discipline, bolstering morale, and imparting technical knowledge. Through this control, the party successfully monitored, manipulated, and constrained soldiers as well as officers. High morale derived from their faith in the ideas of Marxism-Leninism. This political ideology, concentrating on pursuing and protecting the interests of the Soviet state, was skillfully translated into patriotism defending the native land against the foreign invaders. "The Soviet Red Army men not only have inherited the best fighting qualities and proud spirit of the Russian soldiers, but they differ. . .as regards their position in society. For Soviet fighters have tested life in the great commonwealth of free peoples of the USSR, a life for which every officer and soldier of the Red Army is ready to fight the last drop of blood." Such heroic patriotism encouraged soldiers to fight, safeguarding the fatherland.

The loyalty of the Red Army was also motivated by patriotism, which was regarded as a technique with which to recast the loyalty and behavior of the soldiers. The Soviet state was encircled by largely hostile capitalist powers who covetously eyed the riches of the former Russian empire. The state was obligated to maintain an army to secure its frontiers. The party's interpretation of the international environments convinced the soldiers that they had to defend the interests of the fatherland, since foreign powers were consistently trying to overthrow the Soviet state that set an example for the

⁵³ Ibid., p. 367.

oppressed and exploited people within these foreign powers. Revolution or potential revolution in these countries would inevitably threaten the interests of all the bourgeois ruling classes. For the sake of the world revolution, the soldiers had to wholeheartedly support the revolution of the working class around the world. To defend the interests of the working class was to defend the Soviet state. Revolution in foreign countries would, in turn, reduce threats to the Soviet Union from foreign powers. Accordingly, patriotism and internationalism were complementary and interchangeable.

Soldiers' cohesion had deep roots in political indoctrination and a patriotism that instilled the military virtues of honor, self-sacrifice, and obedience. In combat, soldiers without hesitation saved their commanders and their comrades. They acted according to the old maxim of Suvorov: "you must save your commander even if you have to sacrifice your own life."⁵⁴ Their bravery showed that they fought for the interests of the state regardless of their own lives. The discipline of the Red Army also reinforced the moral and psychological factors. "Discipline in the Red Army must," argued Frunze, "base itself not on fear of such punishment. . .but on the voluntary consciousness of the fulfillment by each of his service duty and commanding personnel must give the primary example of such discipline. How can such discipline be maintained? In the first place, by the conscious progressive part of the Red Army mass, its communist core, its political commanders, and its whole commanding personnel."⁵⁵ Severe punishment for those who failed to accomplish their missions or who violated discipline compelled Red Army soldiers try their best to achieve their objectives.

The esprit de corps of soldiers sprang from their political ideology. They knew very well that their proletarian and international duty committed them to helping the Mongolian people against the Japanese aggression. The political workers utilized

⁵⁴ Georgi K. Zhukov, The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov p. 163.

⁵⁵ Raymond C. Garthoff, How Russia Makes War p. 245.

newspaper and information leaflets to indoctrinate the spirit of internationalism. "In all the languages of the world the words Soviet soldiers mean an honest, magnanimous, brave, noble man who does not spare his life for the good of the workers, to whatever nation they belong, for Soviet soldiers are soldiers of any army brought up in the spirit of internationalism, of respect for the people of other countries, in a spirit of the consolidation and maintenance of peace among the nations." The party intensified political work in companies, platoons, and squads in hopes of making sure that every soldier and every officer knew their internationalist duty to help the Mongolian people. For the party, as always, the party members were in the front ranks. By personal example, true to the party word, they united together the ranks of the soldiers by organizational work and inspired them by military heroism. The party continued its invaluable work on the ideological-political upbringing of the soldiers. The Red Army, like the whole Soviet people, was indebted for all its victories to Stalin's policy.⁵⁶ The political work molded "new men" and "new women." Soldiers and officers, according to the party, enjoyed equal political rights, since both were under the leadership of the party. A certain inequality between them did exist after the military reform, but they regarded this as appropriate and even essential for the smooth functioning of the military organization.⁵⁷ Despite such inequality, the party designated the Red Army to be a school of socialism, akin to a family. Stalin was haloed as the father of all Soviet soldiers. All soldiers and officers owed loyalty to the party and Stalin. No doubt, the Russian military tradition focusing on morale and patriotism continued to imbue Soviet soldiers. Such influence derived from the common objective of the Russian and Soviet states, in requiring soldiers to defend their Fatherland against foreign invasion, real or potential. Moreover, Marxist-Leninist ideology strengthened such patriotism. Morale would reinforce the performance

⁵⁶ Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Military Doctrine pp. 232-235 and How Russia Makes War p. 234.

⁵⁷ Mark von Hagan, Soldiers in the Proletarian Dictatorship p. 282.

of the soldiers on the battlefield. Cohesion facilitated the relationship among soldiers under hard conditions. Esprit de corps contributed to the willingness of the soldiers' sacrifice for both the state and the collective. In other words, strong psychological force eventually increased combat effectiveness.

Control over operations and battles within mutually recognized limits for the distribution of costs and benefits among the Soviet Union and Japan directly contributed to Soviet successes in combat. Such control emphasized Sun Zi's and Clausewitz' ideas of maintaining the balance between operational art and psychological force. On the one hand, Soviet military art inherent in the Russian way of war centered on deep operations--offensive, maneuver, and combined arms. By targeting the Japanese troops in the limited areas, it kept the war as limited as possible; conversely, the Japanese soldiers were reluctant to expand limited border conflict into a full-fledged war after their defeat. On the other hand, the Russian and Soviet military traditions always gave priorities to moral and psychological force. Morale, cohesion, and esprit de corps strengthened soldiers' will to fight on the battlefield. Military art and psychological force complemented each other in achieving the limited objectives on the battlefield.

Technology

Control over technological and human means for the limited objectives within the mutually recognized limits resulted in Soviet success in the Nomonhan war. The development of technology in Stalin's state was dependent on forced industrialization that gave priority to the heavy and military industries in hopes of catching up with advanced capitalist states and defending the Soviet proletarian revolution against foreign aggression, real or potential. Unlike Sun Zi and Clausewitz, Stalin's state placed emphasis on technology. "Old Russia," Stalin passionately argued, "had been beaten continuously by enemies ranging from the Mongols to the Poles and the French. . . . We lag behind the advanced countries by 50 to 100 years. We must make up this distance in 10 years. Either

we do this or they crush us."⁵⁸ The Soviet state was in the forefront of efforts to upgrade the Armed Forces, since the most effective military establishment was always conceived of as being essential to the defense and furtherance of the party and state ambitions. Despite the innate conservatism of a basically agricultural state, Russian and Soviet soldiers were often at the forefront of technological and socio-economic development. Their technological thrust centered initially on borrowing and imitation, although under Stalin the Soviet masses were still peasants who distrusted innovations and were ill-equipped to assimilate and utilize western technology.⁵⁹ Industrialization required the state to concentrate available resources on heavy and military industries for transforming the Soviet Union into a great industrial and military power, to safeguard the socialist state and to win future war against capitalist states. Thus, technological advance in general and military technological growth in particular would provide advanced weapons and equipment for the Red Army to win the next war in the shortest possible time. Meanwhile, new weapons and equipment further called for professional soldiers to handle them in order to develop higher combat effectiveness. The match between them was at the core of Soviet military doctrine.

The Russian and Soviet states were the primary agents initiating military technological changes. Military technology as an instrument of war revolutionized the ways of conducting battles, operations, and war, while it also brought the technological autonomy of weapons and equipment that made an impact on battles, operations, and war. As the instrument of war, new weapons and equipment became decisive on the battlefield. The lessons that Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union learned from the Russo-Japanese war and from the first World War emphasized the importance of

⁵⁸ Bruce Parrott, Politics and Technology in the Soviet Union (Cambridge: the MIT Press, 1983) 21-22.

⁵⁹ Carl G. Jacobsen, "Soviet Military-Party Relations" Current Comment 10 p. 9 and David R. Jones, "Soviet Strategic Culture" pp. 40-46.

weapons and military technology in war. In Imperial Russia, the academic school sought to understand contemporary war as shaped by the industrial revolution. Following Clausewitz' tradition that war was state policy conducted by force, G.A. Leer saw that the theoretical balance responsible for accurately determining the relationship between the ends and the means synthesized the whole range of military affairs. The military objectives of a nation must be calibrated in accordance with its strengths and means in general, and with its national resources. Over-extension of military objectives could lead to the deterioration of domestic and foreign political relations. Principles of a subjective nature garnered from critico-historical analysis, such as the old Suvorovian principle of firearms as preparatory weapons and the cold steel of the bayonet or saber as shock weapons, provided the subjective correlation between the goals set by the resourceful genius of the commander and the moral capabilities of his troops. The Napoleonic principle of concentrating one's forces at the decisive location and time offered the operational variant needed to correlate material and moral resources to the dictates of circumstance. These factors formed the basis of military strategy or positive military science.⁶⁰ Obviously, Leer recognized the importance of resources and moral factors in war. The combination of them constituted the essential element of strategy.

The great technological changes evident in the Russo-Japanese war called for new solutions for contemporary war. A.A. Neznamov claimed that military technological innovations were the real solution.

Merely knowing basic principles is not enough; principles are eternal, but the means of battle change and with them, it goes without saying, methods and forms must change too. The task of theory is to show just these contemporary methods and forms and even look forward somewhat into the near future. For ideas there is an inexhaustible source in the best models

⁶⁰ Carl Van Dyke, Russian Imperial Military Doctrine and Education p. 70 and Thomas Esper, "Military Self-Sufficiency and Weapons Technology in Moscovite russia" Slavic Review no. 2, 1969: 185-208.

of all the most recent past, that is, those in which contemporary factors were prominent, factors of strategic significance--railroads, the telegraph, and mass armies, and of tactical significance--rapid-firing weapons and the telegraph.⁶¹

These changes in war resulted in changes in the way of war. Decisively reversing Suvorov and the long line of his followers, Neznamov concluded that firepower decided operations and battles. M.V. Alekseev drafted a proposal for compiling a general plan of state defense. Clearly recognizing the increasing dependence of military policy on other ministries in the government, it listed the priorities, "to technically improve the army's equipment with new weapons, to introduce a territorial scheme for building up the army, to make broad preparations for the theater of war using engineering methods, to devise a plan for developing a railroad network in broader regions, to more intensively use the systems of highways, dirt roads, and waterways, to create an active navy, and to improve the well-being of the masses by raising their level of education which should improve the make-up of the armed forces."⁶²

Peter the Great's motives in industrialization were primarily military, focused on iron mills, armaments works, gunpowder plants, uniform factories, and sails. Because of lack of the capacity to set up his own military industries, he needed foreign technicians and technology, but he did not want his factories in foreign hands. As a consequence, the state built and owned most military factories, which were directed to supplying the army and the navy from Russian sources rather than foreign imports. As Neznamov explained,

Peter the Great with his genius certainly recognized the boundary between the useful and the damaging in adopting foreign things; he loved Russia more than his own son, whom he sacrificed for its welfare. In his own words he thus described the nature of his "imitation:" "Europe is still necessary to us for several decades, after that we will turn our

⁶¹ Walter Printner, "Russian Military Thought" p. 369.

⁶² Carl Van Dyke, Russian Imperial Military Doctrine and Education pp. 145-146.

back to it." He dreamed "that we would overtake and outstrip it." In some ways so it was, even if only in military affairs! But then history repeated itself, and Europe overtook us again. And once again we will take up the old method; quickly take what is ready, what is best, and improve upon it at home and then turn our backs afterwards.⁶³

Russia tended to borrow technology from the West in order to catch up with the West. Nevertheless, in one and a half centuries, it never generated the comprehensive and rapid technological progress that would constitute a true technological revolution or drive to technological maturity. In other words, technological growth was stunted in this period of Russia's history. The consumer market and Russian industry were in turn extremely disorganized and limited. In such a situation, the state was either unable or unwilling to divert major resources into industry, or for the significant development and application of military and industrial technology. Russia enjoyed the advantage of being able to use and copy the end products of European technology.⁶⁴ The Russian pattern of industrialization was to take advantage of foreign technology and engineers by allowing foreigners to set up their factories within Russia. Workers would be supplied by Russia and some of them would eventually be trained as technicians or skilled workers. Russia expected that it would eventually be able to build industries independent of foreign control.

Nevertheless, Russian scientists and researchers were largely concerned with "the pure sciences" and "theoretical studies" in studying or solving scientific problems, not with the application of their achievements or ideas for economic purposes. At the same time, industry did little systematic industrial research. Despite, or because of lack of interest in the application of scientific knowledge to practical life, scientists and

⁶³ Walter Pintner, "Russian Military Thought" p. 370.

⁶⁴ William L. Blackwell, The Beginnings of Russian Industrialization, 1800-1860 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968) 16-18 and 326 and Kendall E. Bailes, "The American Connection: Ideology and the Transfert of American Technology to the Soviet Union, 1917-1941" in Alexander Dallin, ed. Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1990 pp. 23-28.

researchers constantly sought ways to prevent governmental intervention in their pure scientific research. They argued that the government's role should be restricted to outlining the broad areas of concern, in order to provide the aid they needed and to allow them self-rule in achieving results without interfering in the details of their work. "Support without control, autonomy with government aid" marked the constant conflict between the Tsarist governments and the scientific community.⁶⁵ The absence of applied science resulted in Russia's heavy dependence on foreign technology and technicians, particularly English, Scottish, and American engineers. The governmental policies and the attitudes of the scientists and researchers undermined the development of technology and industry. Lack of technological innovations prevented the military from achieving its desired objectives.⁶⁶ Thus, Russia had to depend on foreign technology and technicians to develop its industrialization. The state consistently failed to narrow the gap between scientific research and the application of its achievements.

After the revolution, the Soviet state nationalized industries and repudiated Tsarist foreign debts. Soviet anxiety focused particularly on military technology because of threats from the west to the Soviet Union. Stalin's state mobilized all human, material, and capital resources for the radically state-initiated, state-directed, and state-enforced agricultural collectivization from above and directly supported from below by the millions of peasants who were declared to be fighting to throw off Kulak bondage and longing to live in freedom on collective farms. The forcible mass collectivization was, as widely accepted, a necessity for the desired high-speed super-industrialization; the kolkhoz system enabled the state to extract otherwise unobtainable or uncertainly obtainable agricultural surpluses to finance such basic needs of industrialization as the

⁶⁵ Kendall E. Bailes, Technology and Society under Lenin and Stalin: Origins of the Soviet Technical Intelligentsia, 1917-1941 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978) 40-41 and Alexander Vucinich, Science in Russian Culture, 1861-1917 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970) 481-484.

⁶⁶ Carl van Dyke, Russian Imperial Military Doctrine and Education pp 133-141.

importation of foreign machinery and technicians, and to supply the urban population with food and industry with raw materials. Industrialization would inevitably strengthen socialism in one country.

As a result, the state rapidly, forcefully, and disproportionately invested in the heavy and military industries essential to economic and social modernization and indispensable for its survival in face of aggressive enemies to the east and the west.⁶⁷ In meeting these requirements, the state introduced the central planning system, whose priority was heavy industry focusing on research on and production of weapons and military technology. It attempted to upgrade industry's technological level, to overtake and surpass the economic levels of advanced capitalist states. These reasons justified an all-out push to boost the expansion of industrialization. The state, intent on surpassing the West, at first drew massively on western science and technology, but it also dramatically expanded domestic R & D. Spurred by the overriding importance of military power and by the problem of obtaining foreign military know-how, the state quickly moved beyond the strategy of borrowing in weapons development. It was now producing weapons that approached, if they did not already equal, those of its international rivals. Despite its firm commitment to complete technological independence, there were few equivalent achievements in civilian technology, and officials responsible for the economy frequently fell back on foreign copying for new methods and products in nonmilitary sectors. Outside the military sphere it proved unexpectedly hard to make a smooth transition from western technology transfers to the creation of advanced indigenous technologies. The campaign for rapid growth based on western technology left the industrial bureaucracy little incentive to generate innovations of its own. Even though the state showed deficiencies in creating and diffusing new technology, it transcended difficulties and

⁶⁷ Robert C. Tucker, "Stalinism as Revolution from Above," pp. 82-83 and William G. Rosenberg and Lewis H. Siegelbaum, eds. Social Dimensions of Soviet Industrialization (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993) 1.

achieved successes in the military industry, which enjoyed rich resources, access to top bureaucrats, the autonomy of military researchers and engineers, and military pressure on the industry.

Soviet technological innovations were largely targeted at borrowing and imitating western technologies, since technological illiteracy among the mass of Russians, and the gap between theoretical scientists and the populace at large, undermined Soviet efforts to modernize its industries.⁶⁸ In the military industry, the Soviet scientists and technicians were also often dependent on foreign technology, which made substantial contributions to Soviet military technology and industries. The Soviet fighters and bombers used in the Nomonhan war were partly based on American technology. An offspring of the agile I-15 biplane based on Boeing P-12, was the much more powerful I-153 fighter-bomber (Chaika), which was equipped with retractable landing gear. The Chaika appeared in 1939 and joined in the battles at Nomonhan. The stubby Polikarpov I-16 low-wing monoplane, the best Russian fighter struck Japanese artillery sites and troop concentrations. The I-16 was developed from the old Boeing P-26. CKB-26 possessed the features of Douglas DC-2.⁶⁹ Obviously, the Soviet aircraft designers and factories benefited from American aircraft manufacturers and from their equipment suppliers who signed technical assistance agreements and contracts to provide either assistance or parts and equipment, or both.

Similarly, Soviet tanks employed in the war owed much to western design. The 12 tons BT (Bystrokhodny Tank), the BT5, and the BT28 produced at the Chelyabinsk Tractor School were based on the Christie M 1931 model medium tank (MB), purchased

⁶⁸ David R. Jones, "Soviet Strategic Culture" p. 40 and Kendall E. Bailes, "The Politics of Technology: Stalin and Technocratic Thinking among Soviet Engineers" in William G. Rosenberg, ed. Social and Cultural History of the Soviet Union: the Lenin and Stalin Years New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1992) 188-189.

⁶⁹ Alvin D. Coox, Nomonhan p. 997 and Antony C. Sutton, Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development 1930-1945 vol. 2 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971) 224-225.

by the Soviet Union in 1932 from the US Wheel Track Layer Corporation, after Walter Christie delivered a number of similar vehicles to the US. Army. The very advanced features of Christie vehicles were independent suspension with large bogie wheels, ability to move on wheels or tracks, and a very high power to weight ratio that contributed to a high degree of tactical and strategic mobility. As R.M. Ogorkiewicz commented on the Christie model series, "The power-weight ratio was actually higher than could be efficiently used, but the Russians copied it all and confined their development largely to armament, which increased from a 37-mm gun on the original models of 1931-32, to 45-mm guns on the BT5 of 1935 and eventually to short 76.2-mm guns on some of the final models of the series."⁷⁰ The Soviet T-37 and T-38 amphibious vehicles were based on the Vickers Carden-Lloyd Amphibian, known as the Model A4 in the British Army. Apart from being amphibious, the T-37 and T-38 did not differ much from their contemporaries, but they had the distinction of being the first tanks that could be carried by air, slung under the bellies of four-engine Soviet bomber-transport.⁷¹ The Soviet artillery and shell production derived partly from German cooperation. Gesellschaft zur Forderung Gewerblicher Unternehmungen (GEFU) supervised production of shells and the plants for the construction of artillery were built by Krupp in Central Asia.⁷² The foreign contribution to Soviet military technology and weapons facilitated the Soviet victory over the Japanese in the Nomanhan war.

By the time of the offensive on August 20, Soviet Air Force equipment showed considerable improvement. The I-16, Type-17 fighter, in addition to its 7.62 mm. machine-gun, carried two 20 mm. cannon or 12.7 mm. machine guns. The cockpit was

⁷⁰ Ibid., pp. 240-242.

⁷¹ R.M. Ogorkiewicz, "Soviet Tanks" in B.H. Liddell Hart, ed. The Red Army p. 298 and Antony C. Sutton, Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development vol. 2, p. 241.

⁷² Ibid., vol. 1, p. 265.

reinforced with 8 mm. armor-plating and the fuel tanks were likewise protected. In contrast, the Japanese planes were poorly equipped when it came to radio receivers/transmitters. Only two or three machines in every squadron boasted a radio and the transmitters were unreliable. When a Japanese bomber finally arrived over its target, it could never be very effective because its bombs only weighed 15 kg, 50 kg., or at most 100 kg. Even these rather small bombs had to be dropped from a great height, because the Soviet anti-aircraft batteries were very effective.⁷³

These advanced but effective weapons and equipment required professional soldiers to master them. The Soviet conscription system bore the marks of imperial Russian military tradition. The use of conscription as a basis for military personnel procurement in the Russian army dated from the Petrine reforms of the early eighteenth century. Peter the Great set up a regular army and navy and systematized personnel procurement replacing the earlier patchwork of recruiting procedures with a single procurement system. The officers corps was recruited largely from the nobility, while the burden of recruitment levies fell on the peasantry. Obligation to serve was not universal even within the eligible social groups, but was based on a quota system that varied with military needs. In 1874 Milyutin along with other critics of the Petrine system of procurement managed to convince Tsar Alexander II to eliminate this system in favor of a universal military obligation. The new system eventually increased the size of the standing army and its mobilization base. But the numerical superiority was counterbalanced by the relatively low technical level of its weaponry.

After the Soviet Union was established, it passed a decree aimed at organizing a Workers-Peasants Red Army that was staffed exclusively by volunteers and limited to workers and poor peasants, whose political reliability had been vouched for by a military committee, by the party, or by a social organization that endorsed party rules. But the

⁷³ Amnon Sella, "Khalkhin-Gol: the Forgotten War" pp. 674-675.

army was severely plagued by insufficient food, arms, and equipment, and lacked the administrative system necessary to procure a new mass army and experienced and reliable commanders. By the mid-1930s, the Red Army finally moved toward a regular and cadre army as a result of increased military threat to the Soviet state, of the increasing technical complexity of weapons and equipment, and of the emergence of the strong economic base needed to sustain such an army.⁷⁴ The industrial revolution not only provided advanced weapons and equipment for the Red Army, but also increased its size from 885,000 in 1933 to 1,513,000 on January 1938. Well trained military personnel were needed, able to master complicated weapons and equipment and in adequate numbers for the expanded military force. The increased supplies of weapons and well trained soldiers permitted the formation of tank forces and special supporting services, such as the engineers. The Air Force was divided into specialized branches--bomber, dive bomber, and fighter. Naval vessels entered the inventory in sufficient numbers to form a Pacific Ocean Fleet and a Northern Fleet. Despite the purge, the Red Army remained a viable combat force.⁷⁵

These professional soldiers became experts on war. In the Nomonhan war, Soviet pilots included 21 Heroes of the Soviet Union. They conducted joint training with young pilots and passed on their experiences to them. The tank, armored, and artillery brigades cooperated with the air force. On the battlefield, the Red Army's artillery played a crucial role in defeating the Japanese by experimenting for the first time with the use of artillery fire over open sights, and for the first time in history using aircraft on a very large scale; sometimes 150-200 aircraft and even more, were actively engaged in a single battle. The

⁷⁴ Ellen Jones, Red Army and Society: A Sociology of the Soviet Military (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985) 33-38.

⁷⁵ Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR pp. 16-21.

greatest technical innovation introduced into these air battles was the RS82 air-to-air missile.⁷⁶

The Japanese military greatly misread Soviet military capabilities. They believed that a Soviet rifle corps possessed only one artillery regiment, when it actually contained two. An antitank battalion was thought to be equipped with 18 45 mm. pieces but it really had 36. Furthermore, the Japanese tactical manuals based on intelligence input, were still describing Russian artillery as late as June 1938 as mostly old, heavy, slow in rate of fire, and having a range of less than 10,000 meters. In contrast, the Japanese soldiers were shocked by the unexpected ability of Soviet armored forces to operate without infantrymen. The invisible wall of artillery bombardment prevented the advance of foot soldiers.⁷⁷ One Japanese officer described the battle launched by the Red Army utilizing these powerful artillery, aircraft, rockets, and tanks.

The enemy artillery opened massive fire whining over our heads. Thousands of shells were falling close to us. It was horrible. The observation posts were doing everything possible to identify the enemy artillery, but they failed as a result of heavy bombing and shelling by enemy bombers, fighters, and artillery. The enemy was triumphant all along the front. It was becoming ever more fearful. The moans of soldiers and explosions reminded one of all hell broken loose. The situation was extremely bad. We were surrounded. If it was getting dark, all of us would have to be in the communication trenches arranged in a row. . . The soldier's soul was sad. . . Our situation was bad, complicated, terribly complicated. The enemy artillery did not stop shelling our troops. There was no shelter anywhere, shells were falling everywhere and we could be safe only in Bdisatva. A ruthless battle was raging. We did not know how many wounded or killed we had. . . Shelling did not stop. A multitude of Soviet-

⁷⁶ Amnon Sella, "Khalkhin-Gol: the Forgotten War" pp. 674-675 and Alvin D. Coox, Nomonhan p. 997.

⁷⁷ Edward J. Drea, Nomonhan: Japanese-Soviet Tactical Combat pp. 71-72 & 87. Alvin D. Coox, Nomonhan p. 1022 and 1019.

Mongolian aircraft were bombing our positions, their artillery was worrying us all the time. After bombing raids and artillery fire, the enemy infantry charged to attack. The number of the killed was increasing. During the night enemy planes bombed our rear. The enemy infantry began an offensive, their machine-guns opened heavy fire. We were in great danger and frightened. Our morale sank. When all the officers were killed I would be commander of the company. This greatly excited me and I did not sleep throughout the night.⁷⁸

The powerful weapons substantially undermined the morale of the Japanese soldiers. Military technology contributed to the Soviet Union's final victory over the Japanese troops.

Control over limited advanced weapons and well-trained soldiers for limited objectives was decisive in the Nomonhan war. In contrast to Sun Zi's and Clausewitz' advice, the weapons in fact played an important role in destroying the Japanese troops and decreasing their morale on the battlefield. Soviet firepower was essentially based on forced industrialization and technological growth in which the state was the primary agent for borrowing and imitating foreign technology to improve Soviet industrial and technological infrastructure designed above all to enhance military power. Foreign technology and engineers helped the Soviet state catch up with advanced capitalist states, modernize Soviet heavy and military industries, and produce advanced weapons and equipment for the Red Army. Furthermore, these weapons and equipment needed well-trained professional soldiers to handle them. The professional soldiers indoctrinated by the party became a means to achieve political and military objectives in the Nomonhan war, since war in essence is conflict between human beings. The match between weapons and soldiers allowed the military to achieve the given political and military objectives.

⁷⁸ Georgi K. Zhukov, The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov p. 161.

Conclusion

The central theme of Soviet military doctrine in the Nomanhan war was effective control over the mutually recognized objectives, costs, and means through adjustment and cooperation between the Soviet Union, Japan, and other European and Asian powers. Stalin's total control over the state, the military, and technological developments contributed directly to the identification of the limited objectives. Such control had deep roots in the Russian strategic culture that favored firm control of the state over the military and technology. This strategic culture indeed influenced Soviet strategic thought, but the Soviet state reshaped it in accordance with its own strategic environments. "Socialism in one country" consolidated Stalin's power in the state, the military, and the economy. Effective control was also strengthened by Soviet diplomacy. In the east, the Soviet Union took advantage of the Sino-Japanese war, deeply trapping Japan which therefore had limited resources available for the Nomonhan war. In the west, the negotiations with Germany on the neutrality pact deterred Germany from waging a war against the Soviet Union concurrent with the Nomanhan war. The domestic and international environments created a chance for the Soviet Union to conduct limited war against Japanese invasion into the MPR.

Following Lenin's interpretation of Clausewitz, Stalin's state firmly dominated political, military, and economic activities, but his control was not as absolute as Clausewitz expected; rather, it was as soft as Sun Zi favored, designed to give some degree of institutional autonomy to professionals, at least in the sectors related to the military. Stalin's purge aimed primarily at strengthening control, targeting those soldiers who most strongly claimed autonomy and who regarded the high command and general staff as responsible for all aspects of military and defense policies. Soldiers who carefully and cautiously followed Stalin's line by rejecting total military autonomy survived the purge. In other words, state control over the military centered on political control over the

military--over the strategic and defense policies of the state. Stalin dominated military doctrine-making, but professional soldiers enjoyed autonomy in conducting operations and battles. The conversation between Stalin, Kalinin, Molotov, other members of the Politburo, and Zhukov after the Nomonhan war revealed that these top political leaders had no ideas at all about the operations and battles, although it was they who decided to send troops to defend Mongolia. This evidence highlights the fact that these top leaders were essentially responsible for strategic issues, while the military professionals waged operations and battles without any interference from central political command. Soft control of the state over the military or relative autonomy of the military was the salient feature of Soviet civil-military relations in peace as well as in war.

Stalin determined military art, but professional soldiers had their own autonomy to fight their own operations and battles. Soviet military art emphasized the importance of the match suggested by Sun Zi and Clausewitz between operational art and psychological force. Deep operations reformulated by Russian and Soviet soldiers characterized the Soviet approach to the war, which adapted this operational art to contemporary combat environments. Although Stalin purged senior officers in high command, this remained the Soviet style of war. In other words, as noted above, the purge was only targeted on the soldiers that Stalin distrusted or suspected of their loyalty; did not seek to change operational art derived from Russian and Soviet military tradition and experiences. The party's ideology strongly affected and shaped the morale of soldiers. Through ideological indoctrination, the soldiers were motivated to defend the interests of the fatherland. Such indoctrination encouraged them to fight heroically on the battlefield. Fundamental to the Soviet operational principle was deep operations sustained by party's indoctrination.

Stalin dominated technological development, but civilian and military scientists, technicians, and engineers enjoyed extensive autonomy in weapons and equipment research and production. Top Soviet leaders, especially Stalin, constantly watched all aspects of weapon innovation and production. Stalin personally knew dozens of plant

directors, party organizers, and chief engineers in the defense industry and met with them regularly to discuss key issues. Such connections established the channels for people to overcome administrative bottlenecks. Close supervision by top leaders gave them professional autonomy in their research and production without administrative interference. With such autonomy, they designed, produced, and provided advanced weapons and equipment for the Red Army. These advanced weapons and equipment also required well-trained soldiers to handle them. Professional soldiers armed with advanced weapons produced combat effectiveness. Constant emphasis on the match between weapons and soldiers became a Soviet principle in strategy-making and strategy-implementing. Calibration of domestic and international politics in the context of limited war contributed to a win-win situation: the Soviet Union was relieved from constant fear of fighting a two-front war, while Japan secured its borders and reoriented its strategy towards war with Southeast Asia and the United States.

CHAPTER 5

Chinese Strategy in the Korean War

In contrast to Japanese and Soviet strategies, Chinese strategy in the Korean war of 1950-1953 was essentially based on Sun Zi's and Clausewitz' ideas of total mobilization for waging a people's total war against United Nations (UN) forces led by the United States (US). This war was designed, as the Chinese slogan stated, to "resist America and aid Korea and to protect the homeland and defend the country." By extension, this slogan became China's ambitious political objective of the war--reunifying Korea under Kim Il-sung--but the war gradually became limited and ended around the 38th parallel dividing North and South Korea. The literature on the Korean war presented by scholars and soldiers covered almost all major aspects. Western scholars and soldiers were interested in exploring the origins of the war from conventional fighting between North Korea and South Korea to the UN involvement to China's intervention, American strategy, and the impacts of the war on East Asia or in both, building and testing deterrence theory. Lack of Chinese documents concerning the war has forced them either to deduce Chinese strategy from their behavior or simply to ignore it.¹ Chinese scholars and soldiers clarified

¹ Allen Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: the Decision to Enter the Korean War (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1960); Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China: 1941-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968); John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959); Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimension of the Korean Conflict, 1950-1953 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985); Allan E. Goodman, Negotiating While Fighting: the Diary of Admiral C. Turner Joy at the Korean Armistice Conference (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978); Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1967); David Rees, Korea: the Limited War (New York: Macmillan, 1964); Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981) and The Origins of the Korean War: the Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953 (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1983); James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction: the First Year (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1972); Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1961); Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1966); Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, "China's Decision to Enter the Korean War" China Quarterly no. 121, 1991: 94-115; Thomas J. Christensen, "Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for

what happened in the war, but their studies suffered from the absence of academic or theoretical analysis. Chinese strategy, moreover, was not on their agenda.² Thus, Chinese strategy in the Korean war remains inadequately understood or studied.

The Chinese initiative in the Korean war was essentially to protect its territorial integrity and its national security. But this war was primarily civil in nature. North and South Korea sought to reunify their country not alone, but in the presence of the two new great powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, that dominated the postwar era as well as the two regional rivals, China and Japan. Driven by anti-communist ideology, by miscalculation of strategic environments in East Asia, and by concerns over the potential domino impacts of the Korean war on Europe and other areas, the Harry Truman administration was determined to rescue South Korea by committing all three branches of the American armed forces to the civil war. This commitment was later justified by the third resolution of the UN Security Council which recommended that all members provide military forces and other assistance to a command under US authority. But the absence of rational estimates of probable Soviet reactions to an expanded war and to potential military action elsewhere while the US was preoccupied in Korea, and misperceptions of the vulnerability inherent in China's political, military, and economic

(...continued)

Peace" *International Security* no. 1, 1993:122-154; and Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993).

² Nie Rongzhen, *Nie Rongzhen huiyilu (Nie Rongzhen's Memoirs)* (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1984); Du Ping, *Zai zhiyuanjun zongbu (In the headquarters of the CPVA)* (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1989); Hong Xuezhi, *KanMei yuanChao zhanzheng huiyi (Reminiscences of the War of RAAK)*; Peng Dehuai, *Peng Dehuai huiyilu (Peng Dehuai's Memoirs)* (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1981); Yao Xu, *Chong Yalujiang dao Banmendian (From Yalu River to Panmunjon)* (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1985); Yang Fenan and Wang Tianchun, *Jiayu Chaoxian zhanzheng de ren (The Driver of the Korean War)* (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyiang chubanshe, 1993); Junshi kexueyuan junshi lishi yanjiubu, ed. *Zhongguo renmin zhiyuanjun kangMei yuanChao zhanshi (The Combat History of the CPVA during the War of the Resistance against America and the Aid of Korea)* (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1988); Junshi kexueyuan lishi yanjiubu, ed. *Yuendongzhan nuegan wenti yanjiu (The Study of Mobile Warfare)* (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1994); Wang Yian, *Peng Dehuai zuan (The Biography of Peng Dehuai)* (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1993); and Tan Qiqiao, *KangMei yuanChao zhanzheng (The War of the Resistance against America and the Aid of Korea)* (Beijing: Zhonggou shehuai kexue chubanshe, 1990).

strength led them to minimize China's serious warnings. The misperceptions gradually contributed to escalation of the war, which saw UN forces cross the 38th parallel in an effort to eliminate communism in North Korea. China in turn misperceived this military action as severely threatening its own national security; this was the result of its failure to deter UN forces crossing of the 38th parallel and MacArthur's offensive to the Yalu river. Such misinterpretation of the strategic environments moreover coincided with Stalin's inducement to China to enter the war, to save North Korea, and to safeguard Northeast China. This perspective pushed Beijing to a point of no return. China decided to wage a people's war against UN forces in hopes of protecting its national security and its territorial integrity.³

This chapter reassesses Chinese strategy in the Korean war. It shows how China has control over mutually reinforced objective, costs, and means through adjustment and cooperation among China, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the international community. The examination explains its approach to formulating mutually recognized rules, explicit or tacit for guiding the war through the interaction between domestic and international politics. These rules further explore its way to conduct limited operations and battles in order to distribute costs and benefits on the battlefield. Limited operations and battles highlight its perception of weapons and soldiers for the limited objectives of war. Finally, it demonstrates the very characteristics of China's strategy in the Korean war.

The State

China was an authoritarian state under the collective leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which inherited the party's rich tradition of guerrilla warfare

³ Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu pp. 158-160; Serei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners pp. 187-192; John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy pp. 84-103; and Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War vol. II, pp. 737-745.

through the mobilization of masses for the conduct of war, political campaigns, and economic reconstruction, designed to establish or consolidate a new communist regime. Mobilization was essentially based on Clausewitz' concepts of absolute war and real war which enriched the party's theoretical approach to politics and war and on Sun Zi's ideas of calculations--knowing the enemy, knowing oneself--which rationalized politics and war. Marxist-Leninist ideology in turn justified the legitimacy of such mobilization. Thus, in light of this synthesis of Clausewitz', Sun Zi's, and Marxist-Leninist ideas, mobilization became the process of seeking a rational option that reflected resources in society. In other words, rational control over resources in society through mobilization was the way to develop explicit or tacit rules for achieving expected objectives.⁴ As Mao described, "The mobilization of masses across China would create a vast sea in which to drown the enemy, the environments that would compensate the inferiority in weapons, and the prerequisites for overcoming all difficulties in the war." Such process was dependent on the rational assumption, namely "to seek a victory, commanders could not overstep the limitations imposed by the objective conditions; but within them, they could play a dynamic role in striving for victory. The stage of action for commanders in a war must be built on the objective possibilities, in which they could direct the performance of many a drama, full of sound and color, power and grandeur."⁵ Accordingly, the party elites worked as a team, vigorously debating major policy issues, reaching consensus, and making decisions. The symbolic coalition government led by the party implemented the decisions and policies by adapting them to local conditions, to smooth the gradual and piecemeal process of social transformation. Thus, the party was in command, supervising, coordinating, and directing the functions of the polity's constituent institutions

⁴ Jianxiang Bi, "The Impact of Clausewitz on Mao: War and Politics" (M.A. Thesis, the University of Alberta, 1989) 148-157.

⁵ Mao Zedong, Selected Works vol. II (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1967) 119 and 152-154.

responsible for the state, the military, and the economy. Control by party elites through government bureaucrats was regarded as the basis for peace, order, prosperity, and power in the state. Efficient control was essentially through ideological indoctrination and through self-sustaining motivations of fear and hope among the people. The fully indoctrinated and mobilized masses would in turn support the regime. Such support would further consolidate the party's control.⁶

Tang Tsou saw that "the party's monistic leadership" (*dang de yiyuanhua lingdao*), adopted by the party in 1942 became an important principle for organizing whole society during the period of democratic revolution. The principle was retained and reaffirmed after 1949 in accordance with the need for a command center, in which power could be concentrated. On this basis, the party recreated society in its own image, to the extent that was possible, through mass organizations in most of the important functional spheres and territorial bodies, ostensibly to represent the people, but in practice to govern them. Under the party, the state was subject to many practical and even political constraints in its plans, its policies, and its actions to expand or alternatively to contract state functions. The reach of the state was not totally without bounds, but varied at different times and for different functional areas, territorial jurisdictions, and ethnic groups, even within a single totalitarian or totalistic party-state.⁷ Tang Tsou highlighted the very essence of the Chinese state. The division of power, explicit or tacit, might prevent the party from directly interfering in state business, but he failed to show the extent to which the party intervened in the state. Similarly, Franz Schurmann raised the same question with an

⁶ Bo Yibo, *Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huaigu* (Reflections on Some of Major Decisions and Issues) (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang danxiao chubanshe, 1991) 28-35; John K. Fairbank, *China: A New History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992) 345-351; and Lucian W. Pye, *China: An Introduction* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991) 233-235.

⁷ Tang Tsou, "The Tiananmen Tragedy: the State-Society Relationship, Choice, and Mechanisms in Historical Perspective," in Brantly Womack, ed. *Contemporary Chinese Politics in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 270-272.

attempt to clarify the relationship between the party, society, and the state. The party was the organized expression of the will of society--"the interests of the people"--that determined the policies of the state, but its roots were in society. The core of society was masses to which the party must be close. Despite the party's firm control of society and the state, it did not theoretically command and could not technically issue orders. Formal command must flow from instruments of the state. The state was bureaucracy, army, and law; the body of formally organized instruments from which command flowed.⁸ In spite of his effort to identify the party's status in the state and society, however, Schurmann was unable to show the mosaic nature of the party, that is, the combination of collective leadership and soft control during the early 1950s.

Alexander Eckstein held that the Chinese economic path was not only influenced by its past but by the determination of the new leaders to transform China into a modern, industrialized, powerful socialist state. A strong Chinese tradition of unity, cohesion, and stability could potentially facilitate or retard development. A strong and developmentally oriented regime could draw on the tradition to mobilize the people and get them committed to the pursuit of the national objectives. The relatively stable and highly integrated system of traditional China, with conservative Confucian political elites, could present strong barriers to technological and institutional innovations. Therefore, normative appeals, such as patriotism and working for the good of society as a whole became the favorite methods for pursuing development objectives. At the same time, material incentives played an important role in motivating peasants, workers, and cadres. Eckstein tried to demonstrate that the Chinese economic objectives, i.e., narrowing income disparities, keeping full employment without inflation, and reaching rapid industrialization, required a potent ideology capable of providing a strong faith and

⁸ Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968) 109-114.

motivational force for the mass mobilization of resources, yet he did not expound how the party controlled the economy. Peter Nan-shong Lee attempted to demonstrate differences between "political totalitarianism" and "economic totalitarianism." The former could be taken to embody a preceptoral type of decision making marked by the moral ideal of class struggle, by charismatic leadership, by a movement-oriented party, and by mobilizational approach; whereas the latter was represented by an administrative type of decision making, characterized by a quest for modernization, by a sovereign planner, by an organizational hierarchy, and by the use of experts and regulatory means. But neither became mature until the mid-1950s, when China approximated a totalitarian state.⁹ Lee tended to explicate the transition from totalitarianism to corporatism, but missed the point of whether the state dominated the economy and of how the state controlled it during the early 1950s.

Central to the Chinese state was the mobilization of masses through ideological control for economic recovery and social stability. China's emphasis on ideological control derived from the Chinese and communist cultures, which effectively strengthened each other to consolidate ideological control. Like Sun Zi's and Clausewitz' model, the Chinese ideal of authority was that all power should emanate from a single supreme ruler. Mao as the unquestioned party leader then became an amplification of the Confucian model of the father as the ultimate authority in the family. Just as the father's word was absolute in the family, so the party in general and Mao in particular could not tolerate any challenging authorities. Leading cadres at the center and in the provinces promoted themselves by posing, not as starring players, but as cheerleaders for Mao and the party. Nevertheless, to stress that all legitimate power in China came from above was not to say that in practice there were no local or institutional forms of power. Power indeed existed

⁹ Alexander Eckstein, China's Economic Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977) 27-30 and 63-65 and Peter Nan-shong Lee, "The Chinese Industrial State in Historical Perspective: from Totalitarianism to Corporatism" in Brantly Womack, ed. Contemporary Chinese Politics pp. 156-159.

in provinces and in the central governmental institutions--which in turn drove the party's attempts to eliminate its manifestations through political campaigns designed to strengthen the Chinese single-mindedness virtue.¹⁰ Unlike Sun Zi and Clausewitz, the party's success in controlling all political, military, and economic activities in the state was partly based on Lenin's principle of the vanguard, which became the "pure political ideology" of the CCP. "The ideas of pure ideology stated values: moral and ethical conceptions about right and wrong."¹¹ Leninism, for the Chinese, was the theory that Lenin generalized on the basis of the revolutionary movements in Russia. This theory would provide pure ideology for communist movements around the world, leading to the creation of communist parties by propounding principles of organization that derived from the application of Marxist theories to the problems of contemporary reality. The Leninist party was essentially designed to impose the party elites on the masses, the hegemony of the working class on the peasantry, and the hegemony of the cities on the countryside. This party dominated the whole process of the Russian revolution. Marxist and Leninist ideology was the universal truth of the proletarian revolution. But it could not create a theory that accorded with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. Therefore, Marxism-Leninism must be incorporated into the Chinese reality. According to Mao, the history of the Chinese people over several millennia exhibited its national peculiarities and many precious qualities. Today's China was an outgrowth of historic China. The Chinese communists were Marxist historicists; they must not mutilate history. They must sum it up critically from Confucius to Sun Zhongshan (Sun yat-Sen), and they must constitute themselves the heirs of all that was precious in this past. Conversely, the assimilation of this heritage itself turned out to be a kind of methodology that was of

¹⁰ Lucian Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural dimensions of Authority (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985) 183-191.

¹¹ Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization p. 38.

great help in the guidance of the revolutionary movement. A communist was a Marxist internationalist, but Marxism must take on a national form before it could be applied. There was no such thing as abstract Marxism, but only concrete Marxism. What they called concrete Marxism was Marxism that had taken on a national form, that is, Marxism applied to the concrete struggle in the concrete conditions prevailing in China, and not Marxism abstractly used. The critical incorporation offered the "practical ideology" of the party--the thought of Mao Zedong. The ideas of practical ideology stated "norms:" rules which prescribed behavior and thus were expected to have direct action consequences.¹² The revision of Marxism and Leninism on practical grounds was aimed at explaining the characteristics of the Chinese revolution. Peasants, in Lenin's view, were when left to themselves largely uneducated, incapable of organizing themselves and solving their own problems, so they must receive from the cities not only the leadership which could be provided by the party of the industrial proletariat, but the modern knowledge generated in the urban environment. Mao's sinification avowed that the countryside was not inferior to the city and that Chinese peasants were not objects of the revolution but the driving force of the revolution.

The term democratic centralism referred to the decision-making process inside the party, that is, freedom of discussion, but absolute acceptance of decisions once adopted; consultation with the rank and file, but absolute obedience of lower organs to higher organs. The CCP adopted this concept as the fundamental principle of the party and, by extension, developed the concept of the mass line to reduce the gap between elites and masses. The mass line became the ideal model of decision-making. This model suggested that all correct leadership was necessarily "from the masses, to the masses," namely, taking the ideas of the masses (scattered and unsystematic ideas), concentrating them

¹² Stuart R. Schram, ed. Authority, Participation, and Cultural Change in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973) 25.

(through study turn them into concentrated and systematic ideas), then going back to the masses designed to propagate and explain these ideas until the masses embraced them as their own, held fast to them, translated them into action, and tested the correctness of these ideas in such action. Then once again concentrated ideas from the masses and once again took them to the masses so that the ideas were persevered in and carried through. Over and over again in an endless spiral, with the ideas becoming more correct, more vital and richer each time. Such was the Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge, or methodology. Therefore, the unity of the coalition of peasants and workers, democratic centralism, and the mass line produced the new Chinese interpretation of Marxism and Leninism, which became the ideological foundation of the CCP. The values of pure ideology and the norms of practical ideology became ideological tools to overthrow the old regimes, to endeavor to effect fundamental changes in the relations of production, and to defend the interests of the party and national security. Such ideologies had two major organizational functions. First, it motivated individuals to give full commitment to the organization. Second, it provided a set of rational ideas with which to carry out the actions demanded by the organization. As a result, they produced ideal organization men, individuals fully committed to the organization's cause and behaving correctly on the basis of their commitment.¹³ Ideological control over the masses generated the party's penetration into every corner of society, in hopes of dominating thought, expression of ideas, family life, and individual behavior towards the party.

The political campaigns launched by the party was aimed at mobilizing masses to restore, rehabilitate, and control a war-disrupted, inflation-torn, fragmented national economy. To achieve this objective, the party established a financial and economic commission responsible for stabilizing the economy by removing money from circulation through tax, bonds, and forced savings, by curbing government expenditures, by

¹³ Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization p. 39.

controlling key commodities such as grain, cotton, and cooking oil through state trading companies, and by severely punishing speculation. Their successes in restoring healthy financial and economic conditions eventually paved the way for nationalizing the private economy. But Mao reminded the party and his associates of "avoiding hitting in all directions" in the sense of gradually removing the private sector, since the top priority of the state was to thoroughly eliminate the remnant Nationalist forces, rather than the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie. The state attempted to convert those who were dissatisfied with the new regime into supporters by the way of granting some autonomy to businessmen, and sustaining them in terms of finance, labor, and raw materials in order to smooth the economy. At the same time, the state conducted land reform in the countryside to encourage peasants to produce more agricultural products than before. In order to tighten discipline over cadres who were often being carried away with their own self-importance, the state conducted the Three Antis Movement directed against corruption, waste, and bureaucratization. The attack on selfish and sometimes anti-socialist officials was balanced with a continuing campaign against counter-revolutionaries who were presumably infiltrating the new regime. These movements were closely associated with the Five Antis Campaign directed against bribery, tax evasion, theft of state assets, cheating in reporting labor or material costs, and stealing state economic information. The campaign was aimed at the individuals from whom money was extracted to help pay the costs of the ongoing Korean war. These measures help the state allocate resources to support the war by "walking on two legs," rather than by simply monopolizing the economy.¹⁴

¹⁴ Bo Yibo, Nuogan zhongda jiuze yu shijian de huaigu pp. 21-211; Mao Zedong, Selected Works vol V, pp. 24-36; Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979) 263-281; and Vivienne Shue, The reach of the State: Sketches of the Chinese Body Politic (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988) 33-71.

The party was, contended Perlmutter and LeoGrande, born at the base of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Chinese historical circumstances and the length of its civil war created a relationship of high dependency and symbiosis that essentially had not changed since 1927; that is, the party commanded the gun. Even when the party erupted in serious factional struggle, it had not lost control of the gun. But such command then lay with one faction of a fractured party rather than with the party as a whole. Military subordination to party authority had not been lost; only party unity had been. One party faction used the military as an instrument of inner-party struggle, with the military as its ultimate resource.¹⁵ But these two scholars did not adequately answer the questions of how civilian authorities prevented the PLA from usurping political power in "normal politics" and in "crisis politics," and of the extent to which the PLA enjoyed its own relative autonomy as a result of the division of labor.

The PLA fused with the party, came to power by controlling the party and the state mainly through soldiers in plain clothes, although Chinese tradition had constantly been to minimize, if not ignore, the role of the military in the state.¹⁶ When the PLA defeated the Nationalist troops on the mainland, commanders and political commissars naturally became the leaders of the local Military Control Commissions set up to manage local political, economic, military, and foreign affairs, while the top military leaders controlled the central government. As a result, it had not only the dual function of defending and operating governments, but also multifactes in representing the interests of the party and the state. Such representation depended largely on its own judgment of its best interests in policy debates or fractional struggles inside the party. The political autonomy of the PLA

¹⁵ Amos Perlmutter and William M. LeoGrande, "The Party in Uniform" pp. 784-787.

¹⁶ At each stage of Chinese history, soldiers and armies have played an important role in the state. Every dynasty was established by military force and the rule of all emperors depended ultimately on their armies. But Confucius viewed soldiers as insignificant and ranked near the bottom of the social scale. Accordingly, the Chinese held that a good man would not become a soldier, like a good iron would not be made a nail.

in maintaining local social order, in restoring local production, and in eliminating the bandits and remnants of Nationalist troops in newly liberated areas reflected the decentralized and mobilized nature of Chinese politics.¹⁷

Under the Chinese state, the PLA similar to the Clausewitzian mass army, despite its political autonomy in running local governments and party organizations, had very limited institutional autonomy in waging war, since "the party commands the gun and the gun will not be allowed to command the party," in the sense that the party monopolized strategy, operational art, and tactics. But the dilemma was that "political power is out of the barrel of the gun." This gun serving as fighting, working, and production forces recreated the party and the state. Its active involvement in domestic politics was rooted in its experiences, rich in guerrilla warfare, which partly demonstrated the symbiotic nature of Chinese civil-military relations. The symbiotic relationships were characterized by low levels of differentiation between military and nonmilitary elites and the circulation of elites between military and nonmilitary posts. The functional and even institutional boundaries between military and nonmilitary structures might well be obscure, as it was during the early 1950s. According to Perlmutter and LeoGrande, such relationship were most common in communist systems that came to power by waging guerrilla war, a form of politico-military combat in which fusion of political and military elites was virtually inevitable and in which the governing of liberated territories was a function performed largely by the guerrilla army itself.¹⁸ They were right to show the fusion between the military and the civilian sides, but they failed to explain that the Chinese military itself was the party that created the new regime. Military control over the state was not only at the local level but also at the top level.

¹⁷ Mao Zedong, Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao vol. I pp. 109-111, p. 124, and pp. 127-128.

¹⁸ Amos Perlmutter and William M. LeoGrande, "The Party in Uniform" p. 784.

Schurmann claimed that the army as a party of the trinity of state power entered civil society and played a vital role in economic administration. No military enemy left to fight became its very reason for being changed. Nevertheless, it was a common phenomenon for armies in the newly emerging countries to play an important role in civil society. The Chinese Communists pursued a similar policy in the 1950s. At the same time, they decided to adopt Soviet techniques to build a modern, professional army.¹⁹ Ellis Joffe asserted that the big strides taken by the PLA towards modernization were inevitably accompanied by a wholesale departure from Maoist military principles and practices. Forged in the fires of revolutionary warfare, the Maoist military model was the wellspring of the Red Army's inner strength. This model was a singular product of the revolutionary struggle from which it emerged and was supremely suited to that milieu, i.e., based on the superiority of the human element, it had enabled the Chinese communists to confront enemies possessing immeasurably greater material resources. It was however largely unsuited to the post-revolutionary milieu of a modernizing army. As a result, fundamental features of the model were rapidly discarded, either deliberately or by default, as the PLA rationalized its organization and procedures.²⁰ But the PLA was not yet a professional army.

For Mao, the PLA was the fighting, working, and production forces that was politically and militarily controlled by the party. The military became an instrument of the party responsible for seeking and defending the party's interests. The party was however Mao himself, whose control was through party organization inside the military. First, the unified leadership of the party committee was the supreme organ of the PLA. At the lower level, the party organization began with party members in the squad, with the party group in the platoon, with the party branch in the company, with the general party

¹⁹ Franze Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China pp. 12-13 and pp. 557-561.

²⁰ Ellis Joffe, The Chinese Army after Mao (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987) 8-9.

branch in the battalion, and with the party committees in the regiment, the division, and the army. Political officers through the party organization dominated all soldiers and officers. Second, the collective leadership of the party committee rested on democratic centralism and on the mass line. When the decision was done, the party insisted that the minority was subordinated to the majority. In implementing these decisions, the party mobilized soldiers and officers to adapt them to their own environments. Third, the division of power with individual responsibility was the principle for implementing party decisions. Military, political, and logistical officers were responsible for their own business, respectively.²¹ The PLA was furthermore the working force, having political autonomy to control local governments and party, partly because of lack of reliable cadres and partly because of the military itself as the party. The transfer of power between the government and the military was the common procedure for managing state affairs. The PLA became a key player in Chinese politics. Finally, the PLA was the production force that struggled for its economic survival. Such survival not only provided materials for its own needs, but also substantially reduced the financial burden of the state. Despite the communist nature, China under Mao preferred the Clausewitzian total mobilization of party members, soldiers, and masses, but it was interested in Sun Zi's soft political control over them in order to achieve the rationalized objectives, namely economic recovery and social stability.

Over centuries, Korea was Imperial China's tributary. Despite historical links with Korea, Beijing apparently had no special interests in the Korean War at all, when it broke out on June 25, 1950. But the involvement by UN forces in the war coincided with the Taiwan issue, and this forced Mao and his associates to view it and its ramifications more

²¹ Yan Shikuai, Dang dai jundai jiudai lingdao lilun yu shijian (Theory and Practice of the Party's Absolute Leadership to the Military) (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1993) 23-26 and Chen Dan, Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun minzhu zhidu de lilun yu shijian (Theory and Practice of the Democratic System of the PLA) (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1993) 247-252.

seriously, within historical, contemporary, and future contexts. China was traditionally regarded by all the Chinese rulers as the natural center of East Asia. The Sino-centric concept consisted of three main zones. The Sinic zone involved the nearest and culturally most similar tributaries, Korea and Vietnam, parts of which had in ancient times been ruled within the Chinese empire, the Liuqiu (Ryukyu) Islands, and, occasionally, Japan. This zone was presumed to be umbilically tied to China by cultural bonds, such as the Chinese written language, the Confucian classical teaching about family and social order, the official examination system, and the imperial Chinese monarchy and bureaucracy. The Inner Asian zone included tributary tribes and states of the nomadic or semi-nomadic peoples who were not only ethnically and culturally non-Chinese, but also were outside of or on the fringe of the Chinese culture area. The Outer zone was composed of the outer barbarians, generally at a further distance over land and sea, including states of Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Europe that were supposed to send tribute when trading.²² Like other Chinese rulers, Mao expressed the same Sino-centric view. "It is the immediate task of China to regain all our lost territories. We do not, however, include Korea, formerly a Chinese colony, but when we have reestablished the independence of the lost territories of China and if the Koreans wish to break away from the chain of Japanese imperialism, we will extend them our enthusiastic help in their struggle for independence."²³ Mao's nationalist view on Korea was further coupled with the debt owed by the Chinese to their North Korean comrades. The Korean Volunteer Army (KVA) under the Eighth Route Army fought the Japanese during the Sino-Japanese War. In early 1945, the KVA massed in Yenan and then moved with the crack troops of the Eighth Route Army and the party cadres led by Lin Biao to Northeast China in hopes of cooperating with the Soviet Red Army to recover Northeast China and Korea. Unfortunately, the Red Army prevented it

²² John K. Fairbank, The Chinese World Order (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968) 2.

²³ Edger Snow, Red Star over China (New York: Random House, 1944) 96.

from entering Korea because of its strong China connection. Subsequently, it was incorporated into the Korean 156th, 164th, and 166th divisions of the Northeast United Democratic Army (NUDA) and laterally the PLA fighting from Northeast China in 1945 all the way down to the last battle for Hainan Islands in 1950. More important, North Korea provided the shelter to the NUDA's families, and a connective channel between North and Northeast China during the civil war.²⁴ For these historical reasons, Kim repeatedly urged Mao to send troops to help him.

Facing perceived threat from UN forces, China's immediate objective was to secure its border so as to stabilize domestic social order. The best way to protect China was to drive the UN forces out of Korea, or at least from the north of the 38th parallel. Nonetheless, senior generals and officials diverged on the issue of how to handle the war. Lin Biao insisted on the idea to "fortify the Yalu River border." For him, the PLA might not conquer US troops with available weapons and equipment. Lack of modern weapons, especially artillery and tanks, prevented it from resisting American offensives, unless it possessed three or four times the artillery and tanks that the US forces had. If defense was collapsed, the Americans were likely to cross the Yalu River. If not sure whether China could win the war, it was better to avoid it, rather than to lure the enemy into Northeast China. Gao Gan supported Lin's cautious approach to the war, but he hoped that the Soviet Union would intervene, or that China and the Soviet Union might share risk and cost. Zhu De was worried about the potential impacts of Chinese intervention on its national security, especially the possibility that the Americans might use atomic bombs

²⁴ The Korean Volunteer Army was commanded by Mu Chong who participated in the Long March. The political commissar was Pak Il-U, who became Interior Minister of North Korea after returning to North Korea. During the Korean war, on Mao's recommendation and with Kim's approval, Pak became Deputy Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army (CPVA), Deputy Political Commissar of the CPVA, and Deputy Party Secretary of the CPVA. Wen Zhengyi and Chi Kuangzhong, "Huaigu Zhongguo kangRen zhanzheng shiqi de Chaoxian yiyongjun (Reflections on the Korean Volunteer Army during the Sino-Japanese War)" Junshi lishi no. 4, 1995: 45-49; Cai Chengwen and Zhao Yongtian, Panmunjon Negotiations pp. 33-34; Du Ping, Zai zhiyuanjun zongbu pp. 46-47; and Mao Zedong, Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao vol. I, p. 600.

against China. He encouraged Mao to let the North Koreans get out of their own mess themselves. Nie Rongzen argued that, if there was an alternative, it was better not to wage this war. Despite their estimates focusing on different aspects of the war, they clearly saw that China alone did not have the military and economic capacity to fight the UN forces.²⁵ But sudden prospects for rapid military victory for the UN forces without overly deterring expenditures of lives and material, would constitute an increasing threat. Mao explained this issue in his request to a wealthy Hong Kong businessman, Lu Sofu, to bring a message to the Americans. "In view of the long association of North Korean Communists with the CCP and because of the military assistance given the Chinese communists by Korean volunteers in fighting the Japanese and later the Nationalists in Manchuria, the CCP owed a debt of gratitude to the Korean Communists which they could not ignore. (Mao) did not wish war with the US but. . . if American forces crossed the 38th parallel he would be under very heavy pressure to send Chinese forces."²⁶ The reluctance to commit was closely associated with the priority of the Chinese state--which was the reconstruction of the new regime. The CMC had decided to demobilize 1.4 million of the PLA forces in May 1950. Mao's telegram to his regional commanders reflected this priority.

The telegram concerning the demobilization of 530,000-600,000 troops in the South China Military Regional Command sent by Comrade Lin Biao to Deng Zihui, Tan Zhen, Zhao Erlu, and Tao Zhu may have been received. We hope that this demobilization can be finished within four months from May to August in order to save the expenditure of four months from September to December and to reduce some of peasants' grain tax. It is requested that the South China Bureau of the CCP will convene a special meeting on

²⁵ Yang Fengan and Wang Tianchun, Jiayu Caoxan zhanzheng de ren pp. 80-82; Wang Zhenzhu, eds. Peng Dehuai zhuan pp. 400-403; and Nie Rongzen, NieRongzen huaiyilu pp. 735-736.

²⁶ Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War: the Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950 vol. 2, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990) 738-739.

this issue, discuss it, and make a detailed plan of demobilizing those troops within four months and of avoiding disorder. This plan will be telegraphed us for approval before May. The telegram will involve two components: whether you have difficulties to demobilize those troops within four months and whether you can overcome those difficulties.²⁷

Based on this demobilization plan, Mao asked other military regional commands to present their plans. In his telegram of May 19, 1950 to regional commanders, Mao informed them that the Central Committee had set up a commission headed by Zhou that would be responsible for restructuring and demobilizing troops. Even after the breakout of the Korean war, demobilization was still on the agenda. On August 4, 1950, Mao approved the report on demobilization presented by the 19th army corps and recommended it to other military regions as a reference.²⁸ These telegrams indicated that China was unprepared for the Korean War, although Mao might have known that Kim intended to reunify Korea through the use of force.²⁹

²⁷ Mao Zedong, Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao vol. I, pp. 310-311.

²⁸ Ibid., vol. I, p. 359.

²⁹ Concerning the roots of the Korean war, scholars disagree on who started the war. Sergei Goncharov, John Lewis, and Xue Litai asserted that Stalin and Mao were involved in planning the war. According to them, a mixture of short and long-term estimates of the US posture in Asia, as of April 1950, finally led Stalin to become directly involved in Kim's military designs. Stalin would be pursuing his goals on several levels—to expand the buffer zone along his border, to create a springboard against Japan that could be used in a future global conflict, to test American resolve, to intensify the hostility between Beijing and Washington, and finally and foremost, to draw US power away from Europe. Mao was aware of Kim's preparation for military action because he had dispatched ethnic Korean troops and weaponry to North Korea in January, communicated with Stalin on the issue in February, and had relevant conversations with the Korean leaders in May. From this they deduced that Kim had the first shot. Harrison Salisbury, however, contended that Mao knew that Kim had been preparing a move against the south, but he had no word on the date. The clash on June 25 did not sound like a North Korean move. If the north was beginning a drive south, surely Mao would have known. Apparently, the south invaded the north. Bruce Cumings insisted that the question of who started the Korean war could not be answered. There were three conspiracy theories partially supported and partially unsupported by the meandering streams of evidence. The first mosaic was "the official story" and especially the documentary evidence behind it. Mosaic three was the North Korean account which precisely reversed the first position: the south launched a surprise, unprovoked invasion all along the parallel. The most absorbing was Mosaic two: the South provoked the war. Sergei Goncharov, John Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners pp. 130-167; Harrison E. Salisbury, The New Emperors: China in the Era of Mao and Deng (New York: Little, Brown Company, 1992) 105-106; and Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War vol. II, pp. 568-621.

China was deeply concerned about future financial and political costs and future threats from American deployments along the Sino-Korean borders. Zhou asserted that the border's great length meant unbearable costs and the dispersal of many military units. Thus, it made sense to launch a swift smashing attack by concentrating volunteers to carry the war into North Korea. For him, the US had adopted Japan's strategy to strike China. By using the bases in Japan, the United States inherited the adventurism of the Japanese militarists, following the history since the war of 1895 and took the track of conquering China, namely, to occupy Northeast China before annexing China and to occupy Korea before grabbing Northeast China. Thus, the Korean question was not simply a question concerning Korea, it was also related to the Taiwan issue. The US imperialists had adopted a hostile attitude towards China and set up their defense line in the Taiwan Strait while paying lip service to non-aggression and non-intervention. The Americans wanted to calm China first; and after occupying North Korea, they would come to attack China.³⁰ Mao, like Zhou, was concerned with China's long-term interests. His calculations of the Korean war essentially rested on his understanding of American strategy, and its apparent focus on Europe. Militarily, the United States had one advantage, that is, possessing "a lot of steel and iron." But it had also three weaknesses. "First, its front line is very long covering from Berlin to Korea. Second, its transportation line is overextended crossing the Atlantic Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. Third, its combat effectiveness is weak compared to German and Japanese troops."³¹ This calculation of strength and weaknesses convinced him that a cheaper protection from any future American attack than a permanent manned defense was to strike UN forces. Mao explained his decision to Zhou, who was in Moscow to consult Stalin on military aid.

³⁰ Zhou Enlai, Selected Works of Zhou Enlai vol. 2 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1986) 52.

³¹ Meng Zhaohuai, "Mao Zedong junshi sixiang zhai kangmei yuancuo zhanzheng zhong de yuanyong fazhan" Junshi lishi no. 1, 1991: 3.

1. The result of a discussion on the part of comrades of the Politburo is that we unanimously believe that having our troops enter Korea is more advantageous (than the alternatives). In the first period we can focus on attacking the puppet forces; our troops' countering of puppet forces is certain (of success); we can open up a base in Korea in the large mountain region north of the Wonsan-Pyongyang line, and can inspire the Korean people.

2. The adoption of the active policy will be extremely advantageous for China, Korea, the Far East, and the world; and on the other hand, if we do not send troops, allowing the enemy to press to the Yalu border, and (allowing) the arrogance of reactionaries at home and abroad to grow, then this will be disadvantageous to all sides. Above all it will be most disadvantageous to Manchuria; all of the Northeastern border defense forces will be absorbed, and South Manchuria electrical power will be controlled by the enemy.

In summary, we recognize that should enter the war; we must enter the war; entering the war will have great benefits; the harm inflicted by not entering the war would be great.³²

Despite his constant concerns over China's inferiority in weapons, Mao still downplayed the significance of atomic bombs on the battlefield. "You wage your war," argued Mao, "but I conduct mine. You utilize your atomic bombs, but I prefer my hand-grenades. To strike your weaknesses through close combat will eventually lead to your total defeat."³³ Mao seemed confident that the CPVA could achieve its expected objectives. "We have," he said in his cable to Stalin, "decided to send a part of the armed forces to Korea, under the name of the Volunteer Army, to do combat with the forces of America and its running dog Syngman Rhee, and to assist our Korean comrades. We recognize this course as necessary. If we allow the United States to occupy all of Korea, the revolutionary strength of Korea will suffer a fundamental defeat, and the American invaders will run more rampant, with negative effects for the entire Far East."³⁴ For Mao,

³² Ibid., p. 556.

³³ Junshi kexueyuan zhanlue yanjiubu, Mao Zedong junshi zhanlue lun pp. 100-101.

³⁴ Mao Zedong, Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao vol. 1, pp. 539-541.

China faced four options. First, the CPVA would destroy UN forces and expel them from Korea. Second, it would take advantage of night operations to destroy them except major cities. To destroy the larger quantities of the enemy would compel the US to negotiate with China, or else, as soon as the CPVA had enough aircraft and artillery, it would liberate the cities. Third, China must prepare for a US declaration of war against China, since Chinese troops fought American troops in Korea. The declaration of war might involve the use of the air force to bomb major Chinese cities and industrial centers and the use of the navy to blockade and assault coastal regions. Such war might not develop into a major conflict. Fourth, the dilemma was the possible deadlock of war--if, on the battlefield, it could not destroy the larger quantities of the enemy, while it failed to rebuild its economy at home--that would contribute to the internal unrest.³⁵ Thus, the best option was to prepare for protracted war, while striving for negotiations to end the war. This risk-taking reflected China's response to a threat to its vital interests, even when such threat came from a remarkably stronger military power.

Thus, Korea became a Clausewitzian battlefield in order to seek China's political interests. On this battlefield, Mao was more aggressive than his field commanders. He asked them to fight successive operations without a rest in hopes of either totally destroying UN forces or creating a chance to negotiate with UN forces concerning terminating war. "Negotiations on the cease-fire could," argued Mao, "be held after US imperialism agrees to withdraw its troops from Korea, or at least, first to the south of the 38th parallel. It would be best for us to capture not only Pyongyang, but Seoul; that would forcefully compel US imperialism to withdraw."³⁶ Inability to cross the 38th parallel or to capture Seoul would severely damage China's interests in seeking negotiations with the US. Thus, the third operation should be started as soon as possible

³⁵ Ibid., vol. I, pp. 539-541 and pp. 588-590.

³⁶ Junshi kexueyuan junshi lishi yanjiubu, KangMei yuanChao zhanshi p. 76.

to cross the 38th parallel in order to force the US to negotiate with China. But Peng seemed militarily concerned with securing a foothold first. "Because if we penetrate south too far, thus driving the enemy to Taegu and Taejon, it will bring more difficulties to us in the subsequent operations. So we plan to halt along a line ten kilometers to the north of the 38th parallel and let the enemy stay around the parallel. This arrangement would greatly enable us to annihilate the main force of the enemy once the offensive is resumed next year."³⁷ His view was sustained by poor logistical supply and high casualties, which compelled Peng to suspend operations. Despite these difficulties, however, Mao still urged Peng to cross the 38th parallel by shifting the next operation from February to January, because he judged that American and British calls for cease-fire were simply a stalling tactics to gain some breathing space. A cease-fire along the 38th parallel would be politically highly disadvantageous to China. But the failure to achieve the expected objectives in the fifth operation forced the CPVA to wage positional warfare. In spite of high costs, it still managed to stabilize the combat line between the 38th parallel and the 38.5th parallel.

Within this context, Beijing was planning to negotiate while fighting, since the US was not, Mao believed, preparing to wage "a world war."³⁸ Its strategy was to fight and negotiate at different times on different political and military levels. As expected, in the wake of the fifth operation of the Korean war, George Kennan approached Jacob Malik on the possibility of settling the conflict on the negotiation table. China quickly reassessed the situations on the battlefield and the potential impact of negotiations on the war. On the one hand, the enemy had superiority in weapons and equipment, but it suffered from lack of manpower resources. The US and its allies were unable or reluctant

³⁷ Wang Yan, eds. *Peng Dehuai zhuan* pp. 437-438.

³⁸ Mao Zedong, "The Remark on the Telegram of the Contral Committee of the Chinese Communist Party concerning the Points of Propaganda for the Korean War" vol. 2, p. 26.

to reinforce their combat troops in Korea. Without such manpower, it was very hard for them to penetrate the Chinese and Korean defense line. On the other hand, the CPVA had extreme advantages of infantry troops and its firepower and logistical supply were substantially improved, but it could not conduct daytime combat, and logistical support was still limited as a result of lack of air cover and transportation means. Thus, it was impossible for the CPVA to destroy large quantities of the enemy.³⁹ Within this context, the restoration of the status quo eventually leading to the final armistice became the primary political objective. Thus, Mao decided that negotiating while fighting would be the best way to settle the war. Negotiations while fighting formally became the new guidance for the war.⁴⁰ Military operations and political negotiations worked along two lines. Negotiations were combined with operations, which were utilized to facilitate negotiations so as to strive for the end of the Korean war at a reasonable price. Mao instructed Peng and Kim on how to prepare negotiations and operations.

There are about ten to fourteen days during the period of preparing and conducting negotiations. Please pay attention to the following points.

1. Within ten days, try your best to strengthen front line troops and to supply weapons and ammunitions for those troops. It is hoped that Comrade Gao Gan will carry those troops, weapons, and ammunitions to North Korea within ten days. We must prepare that once the agreement on the truce is reached, personnel and materials can not be moved.

³⁹ Junshi kexueyuan junshi lishi yanjiubu, KangMei yuanChao zhanshi p. 160.

⁴⁰ On June 27, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union Andrei Gromyko informed American Ambassador Alan G. Kirk in Moscow that the armistice should be negotiated by the field commanders and should be limited to strictly military questions without involving any political or territorial matters. On these issues, Mao Zedong insisted on the withdrawal of all the foreign troops out of Korea by claiming that foreign troops came to Korea for combat, not for travel. See, Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1966) 16 and Mao Zedong, "The Telegram to Li Kenong regarding Insisting on the Withdrawal of All the Foreign Troops out of Korea" in Mao Zedong, Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao vol. 2, p. 392.

2. Heighten alert. The front line armies must prepare that the enemy launch major attacks on us and bomb our rear in order to compel us to sign the agreement before or during the negotiation. If the enemy launches attacks, our army must counterattack the enemy and defeat him.
3. Order the two armies led by Yang Chenwu and the 50th army to immediately move to Wonsan in order to prevent the enemy from landing and the 38th, 39th, and 42th armies to prepare against the enemy's landing from the West.⁴¹

Mao's strategy was on the one hand to make full preparation for war. The front line armies took the opportunity of negotiations to reinforce their troops and to replenish ammunitions. Then, they chose the targets to destroy. On the other hand, he instructed that the Chinese team continue to "take hard line" in hopes of "gaining the initiatives and forcing the enemy to make concession."⁴² To prolong negotiations, the Chinese insisted on discussing the general principles rather than the details. For them, the American impatience with protracted negotiations would in turn reinforce the Chinese position in the negotiations.

China's control over the political objectives was essentially through mobilization designed to formulate explicit or tacit rules for guiding the Korean war. Under the strong influence of Clausewitz' absolute war and real war and Sun Zi's soft control, it attempted to mobilize masses to wage a Clausewitzian people's protracted war in order to drive the UN forces out of Korea. But it quickly shifted its objective from a total victory to a limited one, namely restoring North Korea along the 38th parallel. The Chinese way to clarify the objectives was based on the informal regional military and political factions that competed with one another on the questions of how to deal with the Korean war. The authority of the state and the process of decision-making derived from a series of consultations among them. Threats from foreign powers, that reduced cleavages between

⁴¹ Mao Zedong, *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao*, vol. II, pp. 381-382.

⁴² *Ibid.*, vol. III, p. 424.

military and civilian elites, led to China's decision to enter into the war regardless of short-term costs. On the other hand, China's rational calculations were based on Sun Zi's idea of "knowing the enemy, knowing oneself." Its comparative study of military strength between the PLA and UN forces forced it constantly to seek the way to avoid or reduce direct military confrontations with UN forces through India, the Soviet Union, and the United Nations. Lack of direct communication channels, together with Stalin's promises to provide moral and material support, however reinforced Chinese and American misperceptions and miscalculations, which contributed directly to China's involvement in the war, despite its concerns about technological inferiority. As a result, China was determined to mobilize masses for fighting a people's war against UN forces.

The Military

In the context of the Clausewitzian people's war, China's control over operations and battles through the balance between operational art and psychological force was designed to inflict heavy casualties on UN forces in order to force them to terminate the war. As an instrument, the CPVA fought operations and battles strictly within the limits defined by the state. Central to China's operational art, as sustained by Chinese political ideology, was the need to wage mobile and positional warfare through the Clausewitzian total mobilization of soldiers to reach objectives in the shortest possible time at the least cost, with the infliction of the highest casualties on the enemy. This objective required the state in close cooperation with field commanders to make decisions for operations and battles. Joint efforts to clarify missions, targets, and the way to adapt operational art to combat environments would, according to the Chinese, reduce the gap between decision-makers at the top level and field commanders. The mobilization of soldiers and officers to fully discuss the details of their missions made operations and battles manageable. Fighting a quick operation and battle to force a quick decision through Sun Zi's "the strong and the many pitting the weak and the few" was the principle for all operations and

battles, with emphasis on moral factors aimed at increasing combat effectiveness on the battlefield. The appropriate balance between the Clausewitzian mobilization of soldiers and Sun Zi's flexibility would eventually be complementary to inferiority in technological strength.⁴³

The principle of quick decision consisted of two distinct levels: tactics and operations. In tactics, the principle was codified as "the enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; and the enemy retreats, we pursue," in an effort to cripple the enemy, to pin him down, and to destroy him. An extensive but slow extraction of rich resources in society would help the weak create superiority in isolated battles by concentrating all available resources on the enemy and then launching a surprise attack in order to destroy him in a single short blow despite inferiority in operations and war. The accumulation of numerous unrelated tactical victories would gradually shift a strategic imbalance favoring the strong to a strategic balance between them. In operations, space and time were central to all military activities: the weak insisted on a protracted war, while waging quick, decisive operations, and insisted on interior-lines defense, while conducting exterior-lines offense. The continuous increase in the number of victories in operations and battles would naturally transform the strategic balance between them to a strategic imbalance favoring the weak. With cumulative and repeated victories in battles and operations, the weak would finally annihilate the encircled but exhausted enemy with one single short blow.⁴⁴

The CPVA followed this traditional way of operations and battles in hopes of standing up to technologically superior UN troops. As a result of its technological

⁴³ Junshi kexueyuan zhanlue yanjiubu, Mao Zedong junshi zhanlue lun pp. 151-170; Liu Guaifang and Li Jinhui, eds. Junduai zhihuai lilun jijin (Collections of the Theory of Military Command) (Beijing: Guofang daxue chubanshe, 1992) 292-293; and Junshi xueshu zazhishe, Junshi xueshu lunwenxuan (Proceedings of Military Papers) (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1984) 46-47.

⁴⁴ Jianxiang Bi, "China's Active Defense Strategy" pp. 62-62.

inferiority, night combat became vital to the CPVA and persisted in all military actions. The Chinese center of gravity was designed to identify the weak points of UN forces in order to destroy them one by one, although the CPVA initially attempted to adopt defensive measures, to "build two or three defensive fronts in the region north of the Pyongyang-Wonsan Railway and south of the Tokchon-Yongwon road" in order to prevent UN forces from approaching the Chinese border. As Mao stated,

If the enemy comes and attacks, then cut them off and destroy them in front of the positions; if the Pyongyang American Army and the Wonsan Puppet Army come from two fronts to attack, attack the route which is relatively weak and isolated. Currently, we have resolved ourselves to attack the puppet armies; we may also attack some isolated American forces. If time allows, then we will continue to strengthen our defense, and if, within the next six months, the enemy is firmly entrenched in Pyongyang and Wonsan and will not leave, then we will still not go and attack Pyongyang and Wonsan. When our forces are fully equipped and trained, and after in the air and on the land we enjoy a state of overwhelming superiority in comparison to enemy forces, then we will attack Pyongyang, Wonsan, etc.; after six months we will again discuss the issue of attacking. This way of proceeding will be assured of success and will be very beneficial.⁴⁵

Defense for Mao would help the CPVA get a firm foothold in northern North Korea, while testing the combat capabilities and the response of UN forces to the Chinese involvement in the war. The weak point of the UN forces appeared to be South Korean puppet troops. As China moreover possessed neither air and naval power nor tanks to cover infantry troops, it deliberately gave up the idea of striking strong US troops, unless they were isolated, and attacking cities along east and west coasts in order to strengthen and expand defense in the mountainous regions north of Pyongyang-Wonsan and to conduct guerrilla warfare in South Korea.⁴⁶ Thus, puppet troops became the primary

⁴⁵ Mao Zedong, *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao* vol. I, pp. 560-561.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 590.

target of the CPVA. The bottom line of this defense was to prevent UN forces from crossing the Pyongyang-Wonsan line.

Nonetheless, the rapid bypass of the predetermined Chinese defense lines by UN troops marching along two routes separating from each other by a 80 km-wide breach and dispersed along each route, and the surprising arrival of the vanguard unit of the US 7th Infantry Division at Hyesanjin on the Yalu River without either having detected the Chinese presence in Korea created a great opportunity for the CPVA to conduct mobile warfare.⁴⁷ Mao immediately ordered Peng to shift from the defensive to an offensive position. "This campaign will," said Mao, "be the first victory of the CPVA, aimed at destroying three or more divisions of the puppet troops. It is a good chance to change the situation in the Korean war."⁴⁸ This ambitious target was directed at crushing several puppet divisions, though Peng seemed instead to draw the defense lines further north in order to get hold of the mountainous areas behind his lines and of the ferry points on the Yalu River.

Mao recalculated the strategic environments in Korea, in an effort to convince Peng to strike UN troops by demonstrating how to shape strategy in accordance with combat environments. "Safety should be our starting point in avoiding unrealistic objectives." But the Korean war would be more or less determined by following questions. First, successfully destroying two, or three, or even four puppet divisions by surprise attack would force UN forces to withdraw to the Wonsan areas and to postpone their redeployment. If surprise attack was not successful, and they were not destroyed or escaped, or if they successfully defended themselves in waiting for reinforcements, or even forced the CPVA to withdraw from the front line; the situation would become a

⁴⁷ Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1961) 732-738.

⁴⁸ Mao Zedong, Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao vol. I, p. 577.

dilemma for the CPVA. Second, if the enemy airplanes could not inflict intolerable casualties on infantry troops, the CPVA might carry on night operations to strike these isolated fortified points, except those big cities, such as Pyongyang, Wonsan, Seoul, Taegu, and Pusan, which might force the United States to negotiate with the CPVA. But if the airplanes inflicted heavy casualties and impeded the activities of the CPVA, they would be in a difficult position within 6 months to a year, without airplanes. Third, if the US would continue to transfer 5 or 10 more divisions to Korea and, before the transfer, the CPVA could not destroy several American divisions as well as several puppet divisions in a mobile warfare or in the operations of conquering isolated points, then the situation would be unfavorable to the CPVA. But if successful, it would be highly favorable to them. In short, they should strive for all possible victory on the basis of safety.⁴⁹

The best option according to Mao's rational analysis was to repulse puppet troops, to force the US to negotiate with the CPVA, but the dilemma was that the CPVA could not destroy them and was even compelled to withdraw from its positions. In spite of the concerns with traditional operational art and tactics and with lack of experiences in combat with Koreans, the CPVA was determined to utilize the traditional approach to striking puppet troops. "If we can," contended Mao, "destroy all puppet troops or most of them, American troops will be isolated so that they can no longer stay in Korea."⁵⁰ For him, the destruction of puppets would eventually force the UN to withdraw its troops out of Korea. The initial battles explored their fatal weaknesses, which were summarized as "low combat effectiveness," "lack of spirit to fight," "fear of close and night combat," and "heavily dependent on firepower of airplanes, tanks, and artilleries."⁵¹ The victories

⁴⁹ Ibid., vol. I, pp. 588-590.

⁵⁰ Ibid., vol. I, p. 731.

⁵¹ Ibid., vol. I, pp. 630-631.

convinced Mao and his field commanders that they had chosen the correct target, which was constantly under the attack of the CPVA. Even the last battle was still aimed at destroying 15,000 puppet troops in order to force the South Korean regime to sign the cease-fire agreement.⁵²

The experiences in fighting puppet troops strengthened the CPVA's confidence in striking American forces. Although they were armed with advanced weapons and equipment, which had strong firepower, possessed great mobility and controlled the air, China believed that the US will to fight was weak, that they were heavily dependent on the Air Force, artilleries, and tanks, that they were afraid of close and night combat and of outflanking and encircling, and that they relied excessively on roads and on logistical supplies as a result of their mechanized equipment. Thus, American troops were not invincible. The subsequent victories generated the Chinese ambition to destroy two or more American divisions in one operation. The failure in the fifth operation demonstrated China's strategic mistake. "All previous operations have shown that it is very hard to destroy several encircled American divisions, or one division, or even one regiment through strategic or operational outflanking as a result of their pretty high will to fight and self-confidence. To completely crush American self-confidence for the final annihilation requires the CPVA to concentrate on realistic targets. To request each army to destroy one American, or British, or Turkish battalion and, at maximum, two battalions is good enough for one combat."⁵³ For Mao, tactics utilized to annihilate American and British troops were totally different from those employed to annihilate puppet troops, as they might take advantage of outflanking. The CPVA should concentrate on American battalions and companies, rather than divisions, in an effort to thoroughly destroy them in

⁵² Junshi kexueyuan junshi lishi yanjiubu, KangMei yuanChao zhanshi pp. 282-294; Du Ping, Zai zhiyuanjun zhongbu pp. 593-603; and Hong Xuezhai, KangMei yuanChao zhanzheng huaiyi pp. 258-270.

⁵³ Mao Zedong, Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao vol. II, pp. 331-332 and Junshi kexueyuan junshi lishi yanjiubu, Yundongzhan nuegan wenti yanjiu pp. 81-82 and KangMei yuanChao zhanshi pp. 305-308.

a short battle. This piecemeal approach would reduce Chinese combat costs, while inflicting heavy casualties on American troops. The Chinese center of gravity was aimed at increasing the will of the CPVA to fight and at creating the chance to negotiate with UN forces.

Essential to Chinese operations and battles was mobility concentrating on night combat, outflanking, and deception. Mobility helped create and identify UN weaknesses, which naturally became the targets of assault. Night combat as a Chinese fundamental tactics persistent in the war was essentially to avoid UN air superiority over Korea; the CPVA could wage operations and battles during the night. Lack of air cover and firepower forced China to adopt this method, which substantially restricted the UN air force in bombing and striking the CPVA. Fortunately, UN forces were not used to fighting during the night. Thus, night provided space and time for Chinese military activities free from air strikes, and compensated for inferiority in weapons. The combination of night combat and mobile warfare resulted in tremendous success.⁵⁴ As the official US Marine Corps history of the Korean War stated,

Although the Chinese Reds were represented by a peasant army, it was also a first-rate army with its own tactical and strategic standards. Military poverty might be blamed for some of its deficiencies in arms and equipment, but its semi-guerrilla tactics were based on a mobility which could not be burdened with heavy weapons and transport. The Chinese in the padded cotton uniform could do one thing better than any other soldier on earth; he could infiltrate around an enemy position in the darkness with unbelievable stealth. Only Americans who have had such an experience can realize what a shock it is to be surprised at midnight with the grenades and submachine gun slugs of gnome-like attackers who seem to rise out of the very earth. Press correspondents were fond of

⁵⁴ Chen yan and Pan Jiaying, eds. "KanMei yuanchao zhanzheng jingyan" pp. 15-16; Meng Caohuai, "Mao Zedong junshi sixiang" p. 5; and Junshi kexueyuan junshi lishi yanjiubu, KangMei YuanChao zhanshi pp. 309-314 and Yundongzhan nuegan wenti yanjiu pp. 71-73.

referring to "the human sea tactics of the Asiatic hordes." Nothing could be further from the truth. In reality the Chinese seldom attacked in units larger than a regiment. Even these efforts were usually reduced to a seemingly endless succession of platoon infiltrations. It was not mass, but deception and surprise which made the Chinese Red formidable. . .Ironically, Americans fighting the first war of the new Atomic Age were encountering conditions reminiscent of the border warfare waged by their pioneer forefathers against the Indians. . .⁵⁵

The miracle did not last long. The CPVA quickly lost its initial advantage of surprise and momentum. The UN forces learned to absorb the Chinese thrusts and to counter-attack along a firm battle line which deprived the CPVA of the ability to maneuver on the UN's flanks, which was crucial to Chinese operational art and tactics. The counter-attacks were supported by murderous firepower which incessantly pounded the Chinese troops and forced them to conduct positional warfare. Mao explained the difficulties on the battlefield to Stalin. From the recent campaign waged in Korea, China found that without annihilating large enemy forces, the enemy would not withdraw from Korea, but annihilating large enemy forces would need more time. Therefore, the Korean war might become "a protracted war" so that China should at least "make preparation for two years." The enemy attempts to conduct a war of attrition. In the last month, after the enemy consolidated their positions and were reinforced, they sought opportunities to launch probing attacks. The objective was on the one hand preventing the CPVA from the necessary rest and reorganization and on the other hand they attempted to wear them down by using their advanced technologies. Meanwhile they actively harassed China's coastal line and bombed her transportation line. Therefore, "only the 60 percent or 70 percent" of the replenished materials could reach the front line, while "30 percent or 40 percent" were destroyed on the way to the front line. Within one and half month, the

⁵⁵ Alexander L. George, The Chinese Communist Army in Action: the Korean War and Its Aftermath (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967) 3-4.

enemy might re-enter the South and the North of the 38th parallel, because the new armies could not arrive at the front line, while the old ones could not replace the losses.⁵⁶ Mao realized that in order to smash the firm battle line of UN forces for annihilating them step by step, the CPVA should concentrate its forces to wage combat in waves by forming three shifts of troops: the first shift involving 30 divisions, the second shift including 27 divisions, and the third shift containing 30 divisions. Three combat shifts to compensate for inferiority in firepower forced UN forces to keep fighting without rest and reorganization. Mao summarized such tactics as follows.

First, concentrating superior forces and fire power on a number of selected tactically critical points, springing surprise attack and wiping out the enemy by whole platoons, whole companies, whole battalions, or by the larger part of such units. Second, inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy in repeated operations as he mounts counterattacks. Third, firmly holding those captured strong points which can be held and abandoning those which can not according to circumstances so as to keep the initiative in our hands in preparation for future counterattack. If such operations are kept up, we will have the enemy by the throat and force him to come to terms and end the Korean War.⁵⁷

Throughout offensive operations, the CPVA stressed mobile warfare aimed at outflanking, encircling, and penetrating UN forces, at dividing them into small but isolated groups, and at thoroughly destroying them one by one. Mobility took full advantage of Chinese traditional close combat in order to neutralize the UN superiority in weapons. To wage quick decision combat, it targeted either isolated forces, penetrating deep into the territory, or dispersed forces unable to have a foothold for defense or offense, or fully prepared forces in defense. The point of assault was the weak flank of UN forces by employing reinforced special regiments, divisions, and even armies to

⁵⁶ Mao Zedong, vol 2, pp. 151-153.

⁵⁷ Mao Zedong, vol. 3, p. 596.

outflank and penetrate deep into their rears or their vital communication lines in close cooperation with frontal units. Nevertheless, night attack and the narrow battlefield in mountains North Korea necessitated offensive mobile warfare which was ended with defensive positional warfare. Moreover, to strike UN troops in one direction sometimes entailed the need to defend another, to prevent them from shifting positions to launch a counterattack or counterencirclement. With the absence of strong firepower, it was impossible for the CPVA to destroy the several encircled puppet or American divisions.⁵⁸

Deception was an integral part of Chinese mobile warfare, ensuring success in waging operations and battles or in defending transportation lines. The American ignorance of Chinese warnings about potential involvement in the war facilitated the conduct of surprise attack by the CPVA. Creating environments to confuse UN forces in order to lure them deep into Chinese encirclements or hiding larger troop numbers near UN front positions, the Chinese succeeded in their attacks. Deception was the main means to protect transportation lines in the absence of air defense. The camouflage of warehouses, trains, and trucks matched local environments, near-blinded the UN air force, and secured the logistical supply. Deception substantially reduced the effectiveness of UN air strikes.⁵⁹

The CPVA was mainly composed of infantry soldiers without an air force, navy, and independent arms such as tank, engineering, and communication. When the Korean War was broke out, the Chinese air force, set up in November 1949, had only 117 aircraft. Despite its formal participation in the war, it was only responsible for covering transportation lines. The Chinese navy, established in 1949, was not involved in the war at all. Three artillery divisions of the CPVA were equipped with only 320 pieces. The

⁵⁸ Junshi kexueyuan junshi lishi yanjiubu, Yundongzhan nuegan wenti yanjiu pp. 76-77 and pp. 85-101 and Meng Zaohuai, "Mao Zedong junshi sixiang" pp. 5-6.

⁵⁹ Junshi kexueyuan junshi lishi yanjiubu, Yundongzhan nuegan wenti yanjiu pp. 107-110.

absence of combined arms forced China to restructure their traditional infantry. With the help of the Soviet Union, it gradually set up the air force and arms such as railway corps, anti-air artillery command, artillery, and tank. Because of lack of coordination, these new services and arms simply conducted their own battles. In spite of inexperience in waging combined operations and battle, however, the CPVA gave priority to develop cooperation between artillery and infantry units.⁶⁰

Like Sun Zi and Clausewitz, Mao strongly believed that combat effectiveness lay in the fully political mobilization of soldiers and officers, designed to increase their morale, cohesion, and esprit de corps, which complemented and at least partly offset their lack of advanced weapons and equipment. "Among all things in the world," argued Mao, "human beings are the most precious one. Under the leadership of the communist party, they can create whatever magic in the world."⁶¹ The emphasis on psychological factors was closely associated with the Chinese communist tradition, which dominated and shaped their approach to the Sino-Japanese war and to the civil-war. Strengthened political mobilization would facilitate fighting operations and battles of quick decision on the battlefield. The match between them would contribute to victory. Therefore, the primary mission of political officers in the Korean war was to ensure that all soldiers and officers were politically and psychologically ready for combat. But war tiredness seemed to prevail among the troops, since they had spent decades in war against the Japanese and Nationalists. After the communist victory, soldiers and officers, especially those having family in Northeast China, expected normal family life, i.e., "30 mu of land with one farm cattle, wife and kids in a warm house," rather than to go to war to help North Korean comrades. Fear of American aircraft, tanks, and atomic bombs moreover fostered

⁶⁰ Junshi kexueyuan junshi lishi yanjiubu, KangMei yuanChao zhanshi p. 300 and p. 317 and Yundong zhan nuegan wenti yanjiu pp. 47-48.

⁶¹ Mao Zedong, Selected Works vol. 4, p. 347.

such reluctance to be involved in the war. Among the troops, "50 percent were die-hard to support the war, 40 percent were reluctant to go to the war, and 10 percent opposed the war." The party launched an intensive political campaign to reeducate them and pursued them that they must fight the Americans in order to protect the motherland and that they would win final victory in spite of their technological inferiority. The campaign was to make sure that they were "not going home until they destroy all the enemy in Korea."⁶² Party organizations, democracy, and the reward system became the driving force for reinforcing morale, cohesion, and esprit de corps.

Emphasis on morale had deep roots in Chinese tradition that directly contributed to increasing the combat effectiveness of the CPVA in the war. "The Chinese were likely to see the dynamics of human behavior as governed above all by the forces of purposeful will power and physical energy." The purposeful will power implied that morale would provide solutions to the problems not only of politics and culture, but also of war. The moral magic was sustained by "a powerful and essentially mystical belief that moral uprightness and ethical correctness on the part of rulers was enough to determine the fate of empires." The magical quality of will power showed that "great things could come out of nothing while great efforts might yield little." "The universe was not lawlike, it all depended who you were."⁶³ Moral uprightness and ethical correctness on the part of the CCP was to guarantee the success of the CPVA in the war. That CPVA able to carry out such arduous fighting without falling apart in Korea was due to the fact that "the party branch is organized on a company basis."⁶⁴ The party controlled the gun through political indoctrination designed to foster psychological force and to turn it into physical force.

⁶² Mao Zedong, Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao vol. 1, p. 734; Du Ping, Zai zhiyuanjun zhongbu pp. 23-30; and Junshi kexueyuan junshi lishi yanjiubu, Yundongzhan nuegan wenti yanjiu pp. 24-26.

⁶³ Lucian W. Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992) 126-127.

⁶⁴ Mao Zedong, Selected Works vol. 1, (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1967) 84.

This relationship between ideology and action frustrated the party, since traditionally social elites in theory adhered to the Confucian ideology, but in practice cultivated effortlessness, while masses accepted the Taoist ideology of nonaction, but behaved entirely in the spirit of diligent purposefulness. The party as the vanguard of the workers and the peasants attempted to narrow the gap between elites and masses by cultivating efforts closely associated with the interests of the masses and by overcoming the inertia of the masses through compulsive and voluntary behavior.

In this context, the party apparatus was all-pervasive in the CPVA and paralleled and straddled the military command structure from the top down. By politicizing the entire military, the party installed party soldiers as many as possible in all leadership positions, including those at the squad level. Each squad was further subdivided into combat groups of three, each of which was led whenever possible by a party soldier or by a person considered to be reliable by the party apparatus. The function of party soldiers was to take the lead in everything so as to set an example to the rest. In combat, they stood foremost and, in retreat, they followed last. In doing so, the party attempted to create the environment in which all soldiers were loyal to the party and fought for the party objective.

The cohesion of soldiers and officers was essentially based on Chinese communist democracy: political, economic, and military, which was formulated and tested during the civil war. Democracy inside the PLA was directed at political mobilization through the creation of an environment of equity between soldiers and officers, between superiors and subordinates, and between party members and non party members. According to Mao, the policy for political work in army units was fully to arouse the masses of soldiers, the commanders and all working personnel in order to achieve, "through a democratic movement under centralized leadership," "three major objectives," namely, a high degree of political unity, an improvement in living conditions, and a higher level of military

technique and tactics.⁶⁵ Political democracy centered on the equity of political rights of soldiers and officers, who were the real masters of the PLA. Such equity of political rights was based on their common class status and political objectives. Officers and soldiers were simply the division of labor, but not the exploitation of one group by another group. Because their objective was to seek the interests of the party, soldiers had the right to propose a plan to implement party policies, to criticize the behavior of violating party policies, to put forward suggestions for improving grass-root work, to question, criticize, and supervise leading officers, and to appeal to higher level command when one's political rights and interests were violated. Criticism and self-criticism were an instrument to strengthen the relationship between officers and soldiers. Officers respected the political rights of soldiers, developed a democratic style of work, and followed the mass line. Soldiers were in turn subordinated to officers in combat and in training.

Economic democracy was to create equity between soldiers and officers as concerns economic rights such as food, equipment, and living conditions. Economic transparency was essential to prevent officers from violating the economic rights of soldiers through corruption and waste. It required regularly published accounts related to food, production, and captured materials in order to maintain equal standards of material distribution among soldiers and officers. Soldiers through the economic committee directly managed their own cafeteria and supervised company commanders in improving living conditions, while commanders and political instructors tried their best to take care of soldiers, economically. Officers and soldiers shared their hardship and their happiness on the basis of having the same food, uniforms, and salaries. As one Chinese POW confessed,

⁶⁵ Mao Zedong, Selected Works vol. 4, pp. 191-192. In the armed units, Three Checkups were on class origin, performance of duty, and will to fight. Three Improvements meant organizational consolidation, ideological education, and rectification of style of work.

[The commanders and political instructors] did their best to improve the daily life of the men. The men in the unit were grateful to them. They expressed their gratitude by executing strictly what [commanders and political instructors] ordered and did not complain about anything. For instance, when the men felt hungry for want of food, they thought that, despite their efforts, food could not be supplied sufficiently and they did not complain. Even though there were some who grumbled about it, other members soothed them, saying that it was not good to be discontented, having no consideration of their efforts.⁶⁶

Military democracy was designed to increase combat effectiveness by fully mobilizing soldiers and officers to accomplish their missions, to discuss and make suggestions of how to implement their combat plans, and to teach and learn from each other in order to improve their military technique. Before a combat action, commanders and political instructors gave soldiers a detailed briefing on the immediate tactical situation and on the battle plan for the unit. The briefings provided a good opportunity to create a sense of responsibility and obligation among officers and soldiers in each unit to the larger operation. Officers and soldiers were encouraged to spell out how to implement the plan. The approach was aimed at finding the best tactics in combat. After combat, they held discussion meetings to summarize their experiences, good or bad, so that they could learn some lessons. In this regard, officers and soldiers taught and learned from each other so as to improve their tactics and their technique. Such democracy created an environment of learning the war from the war.⁶⁷

⁶⁶ Alexander L. George, The Chinese Communist Army in Action: the Korean War and Its Aftermath (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967) 70.

⁶⁷ Chen Dan, Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun minzhu zhidu de lilun yu shijian (Theory and Practice of the PLA's Democratic System) (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1993) 93-154 and Gue Qiqiao and Yao Yanjin, eds. Jundai jianshe xue (Military Building) 349-341.

Chinese esprit de corps rested on the rewards system, which was a particularly important part of the indoctrination, training, and morale-building program.⁶⁸ Officers encouraged subordinates to win fame, honor, and material prize, which were also extended to the families of the recipients. Soldiers strove for such behavior in war time and in peace time, putting their lives at risk for the fatherland, people, themselves, and their families. For them, glory was not only for themselves but also for their families. The local government of the soldiers' area of residence would be informed of the meritorious services of these comrades. Their families would be treated well. Newspapers would talk of their glorious deeds. A plaque, "Glorious House of a Soldier," would be placed on the gate of their house. The people in the community would offer their gratitude and respect to the families of these soldiers. It spurred other soldiers to perform meritorious deeds for themselves and their families. The glory shared by family members encouraged soldiers to fight bravely on the battlefield.⁶⁹

Under the party's "big centralizationism," "small democracy" indeed heightened morale, strengthened cohesion, and motivated soldiers to fight heroically on the battlefield. Before going to combat, soldiers and officers regularly engaged in a ritual of standing up before their fellows and of boasting dramatically about how bravely they were going to fight. Even Mao encouraged commanders of the 19th Army Corps and other military regional commands to take such measures to generate psychological force. To conduct fully ideological mobilization in the 19th Army Corps would generate high ideological preparation for fighting against Americans and are prepared to overcome all the difficulties. In doing so, the CPVA could defeat Americans, since the combat force of the American troops compared to some of Jian Jieshi's elite troops were relatively weak. .

⁶⁸ In February, 1952, the CMC promulgated PLA Regulations relating to Rendering Meritorious Services and Rewards (Draft), aimed at encouraging all kinds of desired behavior.

⁶⁹ Du Ping, Zai zhiyuanjun zhuongbu p. 255-259.

.All the military regions, especially East China, North China, and South China should conduct ideological education of fighting against Americans, heighten morale, and be ready at all times to destroy aggressors.⁷⁰ However, heightened morale did not help the CPVA improve combat effectiveness in the face of well trained American troops armed with advanced weapons. As one POW stated, "We had more political training than military training. . . .The political officers gave the men high morale. . .but when we were driven by a strong enemy this kind of training became less effective."⁷¹ Mao appeared to see this problem.

In order to meet the requirements of the situation, it is necessary to strengthen military training. The new time table for military training and cultural education is as follows:

1. The percentage of time for military training in the ordinary troops of the military regional commands is 60 percent for military training, 30 percent for political indoctrination, and 10 percent for cultural education.
2. In the full-time speeded-up high schools, students have 80 percent of time for cultural education, 10 percent for military training, and 10 percent for political indoctrination.
3. Some of the uprising troops who need to continue to conduct political reform have 60 percent of time for political indoctrination, 30 percent for military training and 10 percent for cultural education.
4. Each military school follows its own teaching programs.⁷²

The PLA spent less time on military training than the Americans, since its primary mission was to maintain social order, to suppress bandits and to restructure the economy. After achieving the initial victory of recovering North Korea and occupying Seoul, it substantially underestimated UN forces. Though lack of military training resulted in lower effectiveness on the battlefield, Mao was not persuaded to direct troops to full-time

⁷⁰ Mao Zedong, Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao vol. 1, pp. 678-679.

⁷¹ Alexandre L. George, The Chinese Communist Army in Action p. 166.

⁷² Mao Zedong, Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao vol. 1, p. 704.

training. But lower combat effectiveness clearly made an impact on morale. Officers and soldiers questioned their strategy and tactics in the war.

After they experienced combat with USA in Korea, all the leaders up to and including the company commanders proposed, at a meeting at the Regimental command post, that a recommendation be made to Premier Mao: "While the enemy can operate day and night, we have to fight only at night under various bad conditions. Such unfavorable conditions can be overcome only by reinforcements of airplanes and artillery. We hope such reinforcements will be given us as soon as possible." Such a recommendation was proposed not only once but each time when there was a meeting. Leaders of regimental commanders rank also agreed with our opinion and felt that they could not expect victory in their operations unless the problems were resolved. . . They tried to defeat the enemy's firepower with predominance of manpower. This was also the same tactics used in the last phase of the anti-Nationalist war. But I think such a military idea is no good. . . It was possible in the Chinese civil war but is impossible in a modern scientific war.⁷³

Obviously, the Chinese operational art developed in the Sino-Japanese war and in the civil war did not fit the Korean war. Such incompatibility forced field commanders to reduce the disparity between the Korean war and their traditional tactics by emphasizing positional warfare.

China's control over the operational limits was essentially through the conduct of quick, short combat, supported by Chinese political ideology. The objective was aimed at increasing the enemy's costs through the Clausewitzian total mobilization for limited objectives in order to force him to negotiate with China. Emphasis on Sun Zi's quick decision combat with available obsolete weapons helped the CPVA win initial victories. Morale reached the highest point, at which time Mao and his associates were determined to fight a Clausewitzian people's total war in order to drive UN troops out of Korea. UN

⁷³ Alexandre L. George, The Chinese Communist Army in Action p. 174.

troops however shifted strategy and utilized strong firepower to attack the Chinese. The morale of the Chinese soldiers plummeted. At this point, Mao switched his strategic objective from a total one--driving the enemy out of Korea to a limited one--maintaining the existing front line along the 38th parallel, in an effort to negotiate with UN forces. Constant adjustments of the ties between quick decision combat and psychological force, through "fighting for negotiations" or "negotiating for fighting," remained at the center of Chinese strategy.

Technology

Control over technological and human means occupied an important place in the Chinese strategy. To seek advanced weapons and equipment to gradually replace obsolete ones was the top priority persistent in the war. But the Clausewitzian people's war had consistently downplayed technological factors in war, since human factors were deemed to be more important than weapons and equipment. "Weapons are an important factor in war, but not the decisive factor; it is people, not things, that are decisive. The contest of strength is not only a contest of military and economic power, but also a contest of human power and morale. Military and economic power is necessarily wielded by people."⁷⁴ This concept dominated Chinese communist strategic thought during both the Sino-Japanese war and the civil war and became "the bible" of the PLA. Combat experiences in Korea however forced China to recognize that weapons and equipment were at least as important as the human beings. Therefore, it sought a new match between weapons and soldiers in order to produce higher combat effectiveness.

The Chinese perception of technology had roots in the Chinese modernization that started with the Self-Strengthening Movement, in which reform-oriented officials and intellectuals sought to find the best way to save China from foreign aggression and

⁷⁴ Mao Zedong, Selected Works vol. 2, pp. 143-144.

military occupation. The movement was initially motivated by provincial scholar-officials, such as Zeng Guofan, Zuo Zongtang, and Li Hongzhang, who had crushed the Taiping Rebellion, but failed to defend the Imperial Qing dynasty against British and French invasion. The settlement of internal disorder and foreign aggression required, they believed the adoption of western technology to strengthen China's military power. In theorizing their approach, Zhang Zhidong proposed the "tiyong model," i.e., "Chinese learning as the fundamental structure, Western learning for the practical use" in order to safeguard the Imperial state from foreign threats without demolishing the Confucian culture. For them, Chinese learning should be preserved as "ti," the foundation or substance, while Western learning should be selected for its relation to "yong," utility or function. His terminology of "ti" and "yong" was indebted to the Buddhists of the Tang dynasty and the Neo-Confucianists of the Song dynasty. For them, "ti" and "yong" were inherent in a single being or object. In man "ti" was his hidden nature or the essence of his mind and "yong" was the manifestation of ti in action. But Zhang's "ti" and "yong" were external to man and separate in objective embodiment. Man could draw his "ti" from the Chinese source and his "yong" from the Western source. "His sum of a ti from here and a yong from there never added up to be Zhu Si's indivisibility entity." Despite this philosophical dilemma, they set up their own arsenals by importing machines, by hiring American, British, French, and German specialists to supervise these factories, and by imitating foreign products. Self-Strengthening finally became the movement of saving China through technology.⁷⁵

⁷⁵ Xia Dongyuan, Yangwu yundong shi (The History of the Self-Strengthening Movement) (Shanghai: Huadong shifan daxue chubanshe, 1992) 23-66; Ku Guaishen and Jiang Luming, Zhongguo guofang jingji shi (History of the Chinese National Defense Economy) (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1991) 187-198; Sun Zhenhuan, Zhongguo guofang jingji jianshe (The Reconstruction of the Chinese National Defense Economy) (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1991) 15-17; John K. Fairbank, China: A New History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992) 217; William Ayers, Chang Chih-tung and Educational Reform in China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971) 3-4; and Douglas R. Reynolds, China, 1898-1912: The Xinzheng Revolution and Japan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993) 141-148.

Radical reformers were critical of this movement. They claimed that mastering scientific and mechanical secrets enabled the West to create superior weapons, to build better means of communication, and to manufacture more desirable goods for trade. Imitating western technology, however, contributed to the dilemma that, once borrowed technology had been mastered by the Chinese, it would already be obsolete. In spite of this dilemma, one borrowing led to another, from machinery to technology, from science to all learning, eventually from acceptance of new ideas to constitutional reform. Thus, they attempted to modify the Confucian faith to justify their ideal of constitutional reform. China's tao was an attribute of human civilization, the property of both the West and China, and injected something very new into the picture. Tao would bring the West into a Chinese world of discourse. The West would furnish China with a rationale for borrowing more technology. Even though Self-Strengthening was developed into a constitutional reform movement, radical reformers at heart were nationalists who hoped the Qing monarchy could lead to China's salvation.⁷⁶ On the other hand, conservatives feared that modernization would upset the harmony between man and nature (fengshui) and create all sorts of problems--by disturbing the imperial ancestors, by assembling unruly crowds of miners, by throwing boatmen out of work, by absorbing government revenues, by creating a dependence on foreign machines and technicians. The clash between values and knowledge in the search for the way to ensure China's survival became a central ingredient in modernization and in the development of nationalism, but

⁷⁶ Ding Weizhi, "Zhongti siyong lun zai wuxu weixin shiqi de tanbian" Lishi yanjiu no. 1, 1994: 137-154; Paul A. Cohen, Between Tradition and Modernity: Wang Tao and Reform in Late Ching China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974) pp. 143-153, pp. 196-197, and pp. 234-235; and Benjamin Schwartz, In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964).

it ended with the military coup d'état by the Empress Cixi (Dowager) to destroy the reform movement.⁷⁷

Despite the persistent debate on the ties of values and knowledge, the ideas of imitating and borrowing foreign technology shaped Chinese military modernization. Provincial and warlord arsenals copied foreign models to produce guns and rifles to re-equip their armies. The subsequent governments followed the same pattern of imitating and borrowing foreign military technology. Although the Communist regime had not yet re-established the defense industry destroyed in the Sino-Japanese war and the civil war, its technological inferiority would, China perceived, affect combat effectiveness.⁷⁸ Mao explained the difficulties in his telegram to Stalin. According to intelligence reports, "an American Army (2 infantry divisions and one mechanized division) totals 1500 pieces of artillery ranging from 7 to 24 centimeter caliber, including tanks and anti-aircraft artillery; one of our armies (3 divisions) only has 36 pieces of artillery. The enemy has control of the air and the air force we have begun training will not be able to put more than 300 planes into the war until February of 1951. Because of this, our forces are still unable to assure destruction of an American army in one blow."⁷⁹ Mao was concerned that the US superiority of artillery, the air, and the sea would greatly threaten the CPVA's performance on the battlefield. Having led China to believe that the intervention would be a joint venture, with the Soviets responsible for the air war, while the Chinese conducted the land war, Stalin broke his promise to send the air force to Korea in spite of constant Chinese requests.⁸⁰

⁷⁷ Mary Clabaugh Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: the Tung-Chih Restoration, 1862-1874 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962) 266-268; Xia Dongyuan, Yangwu yundong shi pp. 460-487; and John K. Fairbank, China p. 219.

⁷⁸ Hong Xuezhi, Kanmei yuanChao zhanzheng huiyi p. 70 and pp.170-186.

⁷⁹ Mao Zedong, Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao vol. 1, pp. 540-541.

⁸⁰ Harrison E. Salisbury, The New Emperors pp. 111-116; Sergei N Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners pp. 216-217; Wang Yan, Peng Dehuai zhuan pp. 404-408, Hong Xuezhi,

But the initial victories appeared to demonstrate that UN air superiority was ineffective on the battlefield, against the CPVA's night combat and the Korean terrain. "Before crossing the Yalu River, we learned how fearful the enemy is. After this campaign, however, our soldiers came to know that the enemy's combat effectiveness is not high. Without airplanes and artillery, he can assume neither the offensive nor the defensive effectively. If we make full use of the night and carry our daring outflanking and deep thrust movements, we are competent enough to annihilate the enemy."⁸¹ Traditional operations and battles of quick decision quickly lost their momentum in combat. In spite of the CPVA's attempt to further "strengthen fire power of each army and each division, especially anti-tank and anti-aircraft fire power," the UN air force greatly restricted Chinese mobility during daytime by repeatedly bombing front positions, transportation lines, and the rear areas.⁸² The UN's air superiority forced the CPVA to wage military activities during night. Night combat and anti-air defense became the strategic issues in the war. Nonetheless, operations with special emphasis on outflanking, encircling, penetrating, and cutting the enemy off could not achieve the expected result without strong firepower. UN forces sometimes waited until daytime to launch counter-attacks in cooperation with the air force. Their attack easily broke Chinese encirclements. The CPVA could do nothing to either destroy them or escape from their counter-strike. As the US Marine Corps history described,

Only from the air could effects of the UN counterstroke of May and June 1951 be fully appreciated. It was more than a withdrawal; it was a flight of beaten troops under very little control in some instances. They were scourged with bullets,

(...continued)

KangMei yuanChao zhanzheng huaiyi pp. 24-27; and Yang Fengan and Wang Tiencheng, Jiayu Chaoxian zhanzheng de ren pp. 97-106.

⁸¹ Peng Dehuai, Peng Dehuai junshi wenxuan (Selected Military Works of Peng Dehuai) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1988) 337.

⁸² Mao Zedong, Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao vol. 2, p. 355.

rockets, and napalm as planes swooped down on them like hawks scattering chickens. And where it had been rare for a single Chinese soldier to surrender voluntarily, remnants of platoons, companies, and even battalions were now giving up after throwing down their arms. There had been nothing like it before, and its like would never be seen in Korea again. The enemy was on the run.⁸³

Sun Zi's combat of quick decision created new problems, stretching supply lines dangerously thin across the bleak Korean mountains, where they were mercilessly pounded from the air. Though the CPVA attempted to resupply itself from the enemy as it always had before, the captured materials were quickly destroyed by the UN air force. Without the logistical supply, the Chinese soldiers became the targets of the UN air force and artillery.

The UN strategy was aimed at fighting a war of attrition against the numerically superior Chinese forces by inflicting maximum casualties on them rather than to hold or win territory. In adopting "rolling with the punch tactics," the UN forces took precautions to safeguard their flanks and rear and moved the battle line forward and backward, forcing the Chinese to conduct positional warfare. At the same time, they strove to cut Chinese supply routes by employing the air force and mobile firepower. Railroads, bridges, supply points, and marshaling yards were repeatedly hit to slow down the southward movement of Chinese troops and equipment.⁸⁴ As a result, Chinese logistical difficulties such as "shortage of provisions," "frostbite or illness due to lack of footwear," and "limitations on military operations due to nonsupply of weapons and ammunition" substantially reduced combat effectiveness, and, to some extent, demoralized front-line troops. Mao tried to reinforce logistical supply, and to convince his field commanders that "trucks are not the serious problem, since the Soviet next delivery of trucks will soon

⁸³ Alexandre L. George, The Chinese Communist Army in Action p. 9.

⁸⁴ Walter G. Hermes, United States Army in the Korean War: Truce Tent and Fighting Front (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1966) 105-108.

arrive." In order to secure the railway transportation, "it is possible to have the air force to cover the railway, but it needs to consult (the Soviet Union) to finalize it."⁸⁵ As the Eighth Army assessed the value of interdiction,

The success of the interdiction program can best be estimated by assuming its absence. If there had been no Operation Strangle the enemy would now have a rail head in the vicinity of Sibyon-Ni served by an excellent double track line and in the central sector he would have another important rail head somewhere between Pyonggan and Sepori. In this event, his expenditure of artillery and mortar ammunition could have been increased many times. The air interdiction program has not been able to prevent the enemy from accumulating supplies at the front in a static situation. It has, however, been a major factor in preventing the enemy from attaining equality or superiority in artillery and other weapons employed at the front. Thus, it has also decreased the offensive and defensive capability of the enemy.⁸⁶

Despite Mao's rational analysis and Stalin's promise to provide more trucks in order to solve the transportation problems, the issue remained. The primitive logistical system put such restrictions on ammunition supplies, particularly artillery and mortar shells, that a battalion often had to pull back to wait for replenishments if the first night's attack failed. At best the infantry received little help. Sometimes, the total supply of each soldier was the issue of 80 rounds of small arms ammunition on crossing the Yalu River. The artillery and mortars were so limited that they had to reserve their fire for the front line while passing up lucrative targets in the rear areas. Some attempts were made to bring reserve stocks up to forward supply dumps about 30 miles behind the front, but not much could be accomplished with animal and human transport. Lack of advanced weapons and reliable logistical supply became the bottleneck of the CPVA in the war.

⁸⁵ Mao Zedong, Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao vol. 1, p. 653 and pp. 722-723.

⁸⁶ Walter G. Hermes, United States Army in the Korean War p. 196.

The CPVA was a mass army rich in manpower, but poor in weapons and equipment and in basic knowledge to handle advanced weapons and equipment. The soldiers were professional revolutionaries specializing in political propaganda, agricultural production, and guerrilla warfare that were aimed at mobilizing mainly peasants for war. As a result, they became peasant soldiers stationed in relatively autonomous revolutionary bases, but they were under the party's political leadership. This nature in fact reflected the Chinese military tradition that promoted the integration of soldiers and peasants. But such peasant-soldiers were partly under control of the Emperor and partly under control of provincial scholar-officials, though the military forces were in theory under the sole control of the Emperor. Reformers in the Self-Strengthening Movement modernized their own provincial forces by importing rifles and guns and by hiring British, French, and German military instructors to train them. Then, they restructured the conscript system from the integration of soldiers and peasants to a mercenary system, in which the Xiang forces led by Zeng Guofan and the Huan forces led by Li Hongzhang had advanced weapons and equipment and good pay. Such military reform was rapidly spread to other provinces.⁸⁷ In contrast, the troops under the central government consisted of the "Baqi" and the "Luiqing" forces. The former was the "Manchu" forces based on the system of integrating soldiers with peasants who engaged in war fighting and production, whereas the latter was the "Han" forces who were politically and economically lower than the former. Both of them were paid by the government. Defeat in the Sino-Japanese war led to the emergence of the modernized new (Xin) army under the command of Yuan Shikai, which replaced the former provincial and central troops. But after overthrowing the Qing dynasty, the military under the warlords repeated

⁸⁷ Richard J. Smith, "Li Hung-Chang's Use of Foreign Military Talent: the Formative Period, 1862-1874" in Samuel C. Chu and Kwang-Ching Liu, eds. Li Hung-Chang and China's Early Modernization (New York: Armonk, 1994) 130-136 and Mary Clabaugh Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism pp. 197-199.

the same pattern of integrating soldiers with peasants, although the Nationalists introduced a conscript law.⁸⁸

The PLA inherited the tradition of integrating soldiers with peasants or, by extension, with masses. Most of its soldiers were from the families of poor peasants, and voluntarily joined the PLA. With experiences in the Sino-Japanese war and the civil war, their combat effectiveness was high in night and close combat, even though they lacked formal military training. Their specialty was the people's war, prolonging space and time of war at the expense of weapons and equipment. The mobilization of masses provided enough manpower for the CPVA. Millions of young men and women across China signed up for joining the CPVA, millions of civilians were involved in logistical support, and all the people made donations to buy weapons and equipment for soldiers.⁸⁹ The Korean war for the Chinese became total war against UN forces.

Rich manpower strategically was an asset in traditional war, but this was not the case in Korea, where Chinese soldiers faced well trained soldiers, an extremely poor combat environment, and strong firepower. Their inability to destroy the enemy derived partly from lack of training and preparations for the Korean war. During early 1950, most of the troops involved in the war were busy managing their own agricultural production for economic survival. China's decision to enter the war forced them to shift their missions from production to combat. Moreover, some of them were restructured to form new combat units, in which officers and soldiers did not even know each other. Since the troops were hurriedly involved in the war, soldiers did not have winter coats and boots. The casualties of the 9th Army Corps were over 40,000, including non combat within two

⁸⁸ Wang Zhilin, "Qingme jundai xi yangchao (The Practice of Foreign Exercise by the Military at the End of the Qing Dynasty)" *Junshi lishi* no., 4, 1995: 59; William Ayers, *Chang Chih-tung and Educational Reform in China* pp. 102-121; Xia Dongyuan, *Yiangwu yundong shi* pp. 36-45 and pp. 296-353; and *Qingshi gao* (The History of the Qing Dynasty) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1956) vol. 139, p. 4126-4128; vol. 132, p. 3930-3940; and vol. 130, p. 3859. - -

⁸⁹ Tan Qiqiao, *KangMei yuanChao zhanzheng* pp. 339-386.

months.⁹⁰ In addition, under UN fire, large numbers of new recruits and captured Nationalist soldiers, defected or surrendered to UN forces--partly as a result of poor logistical support. These factors substantially reduced combat effectiveness.⁹¹

Control over weapons and soldiers was China's central concern during the Korean war. Technological inferiority, together with the poor quality of soldiers, forced China to wage a Clausewitzian people's war, although China had intended to rearm troops with advanced weapons and equipment, to send elite troops to Korea, and to improve the primitive logistical system to ensure the supply of food, ammunitions, footwear, coats, and dresses. This weakness made a strong impact on the combat performance of soldiers. Lack of the air cover, anti-aircraft guns, artillery, and the reliable logistical system, along with poorly trained mass soldiers, prevented China from reaching its expected objectives, deteriorated combat power, and multiplied the costs of the CPVA.

Conclusion

The essence of Chinese strategy in the Korean war was control over the mutually reinforced objectives, costs, and means through adjustment and cooperation among China, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the international community. China's control over objectives, costs, and means was essentially dependent on total mobilization, which would, according to Mao's analysis, deter UN's intention to expand military operations so that the war might be kept as limited as possible. But such control was as soft as Sun Zi's model. Despite the nature of total mobilization and soft control, China's strategy involved three essential elements: in strategy, "the weak pitted against the strong"

⁹⁰ Mao Zedong, Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao vol. 1, p. 724.

⁹¹ Junshi kexueyuan junshi lishibu, Yundongzhan nuegan wenti yanjiu pp. 26-28, pp. 33-36, and pp. 96-99, and KangMei yuanChao zhanzheng pp. 321-329; Du Ping, Zai zhiyuanjun zhongbu pp. 7-12, pp. 222-223, pp. 255-259, and pp. 295-299; and Hong Xuezhi, KangMei yuanChao zhanzheng huaiyi p. 115.

for fighting the Clausewitzian people's war; in operations and battles, Sun Zi's "the many and strong overcame the few and weak" by conducting quick decision combat; and in technology, it constantly sought advanced weapons and equipment to gradually replace the obsolete ones. The final objective was to defend and restore North Korea. Though it partly achieved this objective with higher material and human costs, obviously, China had no the strategy of limited war at all. The framework of its strategy was the Clausewitzian people's total war, through the total mobilization of material and human resources in society, for the limited objectives. But technological inferiority substantially restricted China's traditional operational art and minimized the attainment of its other expected strategic objectives.

The Chinese approach to developing mutually recognized rules for guiding the Korean war rested on the authoritarian state, which emphasized the collective leadership of the party with individual responsibility. This state was neither authoritarian in that it lacked a single dictator nor democratic in that governmental institutions made decisions regardless of the interests of society and interest groups. It was in fact a mixture. China's search for internal stability and external security led to its involvement in the Korean war. The PLA was utilized as an instrument of the party to defend China's stability and security in an effort to prevent UN forces from approaching the Chinese border--which, it was feared, might lead to internal unrest. The consensus and conformity reached by top party leaders, along with fully mobilized masses, generated China's determination to conduct people's war against UN forces. Despite the nature of the Chinese state, developing the Chinese rules relied on the mobilization of masses in order to deter or prevent the enemy from escalating the war.

Within the context of people's war, China was always interested in control over operations through the balance of operational art and psychological force in order to increase the enemy's costs to force the enemy to negotiate with China. At the heart of operations was mobile warfare by outflanking, encircling, penetrating, and cutting the

enemy off, together positional warfare. Following this tradition, Chinese troops skillfully avoided well-trained US troops armed with advanced weapons and equipment, while striking poorly-trained puppet troops. The destruction of Korean troops would, it was hoped, isolate UN troops in Korea, and eventually result in their withdrawal from Korea. The Chinese soldiers, with strong communist indoctrination, became the political animal fighting for the objectives of the state and the party. But communist ideological force appeared to be unable to overpower UN firepower, which substantially demoralized soldiers. Without firepower, traditional operations of quick decision could not reach their objectives on the battlefield.

Advanced weapons were as decisive in contemporary limited war as professional soldiers. Lack of advanced weapons, sustained by unreliable and inefficient logistical support, prevented China from driving the UN forces out of Korea. The traditional human superiority failed to crush the UN "rolling with the punch" offense, which forced China to wage positional warfare. Chinese soldiers were familiar with traditional strategy and operational art, but had no idea how to conduct contemporary limited war. They failed to reach their expected objectives. Despite the ineffectiveness of its Clausewitzian people's war to deal with contemporary limited war, China's strategy explained that actively shaping strategy could foster cooperation between domestic and international politics. Such cooperation might reduce violence, keeping it as limited as possible.

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CONCLUSION

On the Strategies of East Asian Limited Wars

At the heart of the strategies of East Asian limited wars discussed in this thesis is control over the limits, namely mutually reinforced objectives, costs, and means through adjustment and cooperation between states, in order to keep war as limited as possible. It reflects the (sometimes only partially successful) efforts of the state to overcome internal conflict and to cooperate with other states for making mutually recognized explicit or tacit rules, in hopes of guiding limited military activities. The interaction between domestic and international politics helps create rules, distribute costs and benefits, and employ limited technological and human means for limited objectives. Such control, subjective or objective and soft or hard, has distinct characteristics rooted in a nation's traditions, cultures, and the structure of political institutions. Subjective control is the way of the state to manipulate orientations, attitudes, behavior of its own citizens from the bottom up to limited war and to their role in war that shape its perceptions of and approaches to strategy; whereas objective control is to take advantage of state authority from the top down to impose war on society. Such control may be either soft in the sense of granting institutional or political autonomy to the state and the military or hard in the sense of eliminating these institutional boundaries. A combination of them strengthens domestic control over the limits of war. Though the threats, potential or real, that a state faces are constantly changed as a result of variations in time, power structures, and technological innovations, they will continue to influence the approaches of the state to perceiving and calculating the strategic environments, to preparing and planning the use of its resources for war, to deploying its forces, and to waging war for achieving strategic objectives. These reflections on threats require the state rationally to manage international politics and to take account for and, if possible, to influence the expected reactions of belligerent states and other states to the war.

Control over limited objectives is aimed at reducing or at least avoiding internal and external conflicts between the state and the military, between operational art and psychological force, and between weapons and soldiers. Internal adjustment facilitates the concentration of limited means on limited objectives within limited space and time, in an effort to distribute costs and benefits between states. Limited objectives must match limited forces and weapons or limited forces and weapons must be adjusted to meeting limited objectives for achieving these objectives at acceptable costs. The key is to neutralize internal conflict, whether real or potential, through adjustment. Externally, states cooperate with each other, since they need to develop mutually recognized rules within which they wage war without overstepping the limits. The alternative for either depends on what one expects the other to do, knowing that the other is similarly guided, so that each is aware that each cooperates with the other on implementing the rules for maintaining the limits. These limits call for conducting limited operations and battles by utilizing limited technological and human means in order to distribute costs and benefits. Thus, limited operations and battles accompanied with limited means for limited objectives within limited space and time weaken potential escalation.

The strategy of limited war requires limits. Limits need rules, or at least some kind of mutual recognition to prescribe the extent to which war can be fought. Agreement on the rules is difficult to reach, because of uncertainties, divergent interests, and poor communication. To make the rules, states need clarify their own limited objectives by rationally estimating the strategic environments that they face. The rational analyses call for balanced ties between the state and the military, in which the state dominates the military in hopes of determining limited objectives, while granting autonomy to the military to help attain the objectives. Strategic success depends on the extent to which the state makes rational decisions in calculating its strategic environments, and to which the state controls the military sufficiently to achieve and enforce limited objectives. Although Sun Zi and Clausewitz have made strong impacts on East Asian limited wars, Japan, the

Soviet Union, and China have in fact had their own interpretations of control over limited objectives as a result of their different political, strategic, technological, and cultural environments.

The Japanese state based on the coalition of politicians, soldiers, businessmen, and bureaucrats, favored Sun Zi's soft control, while granting institutional autonomy to the military. But Japanese soldiers, inspired by Sun Zi's and Clausewitz' ideas of military leadership, constantly sought their interpretations of the objectives and made their rules for guiding operations in China so that they quickly expanded local conflict into total war. The inability of the state under the Emperor to control them and enforce its objectives to keep conflict as limited as possible led to gradual escalation; soldiers not only strongly influenced the Emperor in his decision-making regarding the war, but also decided the destiny of the Japanese Cabinet. The conflicts over strategy between politicians and soldiers, between two services, and between the high command in Tokyo and field commanders persisted throughout the war, although soldiers tended to make alliance and build consensus with politicians by forming new governments. Without clarified objectives, the Army and the Navy simply waged their own wars. At the same time, the Japanese government under control of soldiers refused to negotiate with the Chinese Nationalist government. Such refusal happened to match Chinese expectations. The Nationalists expected to be able to take advantage of the Japanese invasion to destroy communist forces and restore internal order, while the Communists hoped that the war would help them overthrow the Nationalist government through Japanese military muscle. The strange common interests shared by the Japanese military and by the Chinese contributed to the protracted war, in which neither of them in fact planned to set the explicit or tacit rules for guiding the war, and settling it through negotiations.

In sharp contrast, Stalin appeared to follow Sun Zi's and Clausewitz' ideas of political control by firmly dominating the state and the Red Army through ideological control and the purge in order to seek and defend the national interest. Under his control,

the priority of the Soviet state was not only to avoid a two-front war with the East and with the West simultaneously, but also to safeguard its interests in the MPR. To conduct limited war by the Red Army to drive Japanese troops out of the MPR became the immediate objective of the state. But his control seemed to be soft one, since soldiers loyal to Stalin enjoyed the autonomy necessary to manage their operations and battles. Such autonomy allowed them to assume their responsibility as military professional to secure the borders. Similarly, Japanese soldiers also prioritized the fixing the borders, rather than the launching total war against Mongolia, as a result of the protracted war in North, Central, and South China. This tacit agreement prevented the war from escalation.

The Chinese collective leadership with individual responsibility mirrored the soft nature of the new regime that favored reaching consensus through Sun Zi's and Clausewitz' total mobilization of elites and masses. Facing threats from the UN forces to its borders, which might result in internal unrest, China was determined to drive UN troops out of Korea by conducting a people's total war in order to protect the new communist regime. But the absence of firepower forced it to shift its strategy from total victory to a limited one, aimed at restoring North Korea locating in the north of the 38th parallel. In the same way, the heavy material and human costs compelled the UN forces to focus on keeping South Korea intact, rather than to eliminate communists in Korea. The 38th parallel became the tacit limit of the war. The Japanese, Soviet, and Chinese cases indicate that soft control facilitates the development of explicit or tacit rules, but does not necessarily avoid fatal escalation. The prevention of escalation is essentially dependent on cooperation between states to making explicit or tacit rules keep the war as limited as possible.

The strategy of limited war requires the distribution of costs and benefits between states on the battlefield, designed to collapse the enemy's will to fight, rather than to ideologically or physically annihilate the enemy on the basis of explicitly or tacitly accepted rules. Neither state can gain by outsmarting the other. Each loses unless it does

exactly what the other expects it to do. Therefore, each is the beneficiary of their mutual expectations. The need for agreement on limited defeat or victory and on avoidance of initiative or retaliation that breaches the rules overrules the potential disagreement. Each must concert with the other in an effort to either win or lose together. The mutual desire to restrain human and material costs fosters tacit cooperation leading to victory at acceptable costs with special emphasis on the coherence of operational art and psychological force. Under Meckel's influence, Japanese soldiers inspired by Bushido sought a Clausewitzian quick, decisive operation of annihilation through encirclement to strike flanks and rears by concentrating large forces on the encircled Chinese troops, while tactically favoring Sun Zi's close, night combat. Although it successfully achieved operational encirclements, it never annihilated the Chinese encircled troops, due to ineffective coordination of services and arms. At the same time, the Chinese deliberately avoided direct confrontation with the Japanese by conducting mobile, guerrilla warfare, striking only weaknesses. Greatly underestimating China's strength and will to resist and overestimating its own capabilities prevented the Japanese from shifting operations and battles to their side. Together with these weaknesses, Japanese soldiers, inspired by loyalty and the Bushido fighting spirit, pursued their honor and fame that further escalated out-of-control violence on the battlefield regardless of rules and objectives. In contrast, the Soviet military indoctrinated by the Bolvishek party emphasized deep operations by utilizing combined arms in striking flanks and rears. It favored Sun Zi's and Clausewitz' ideas to demoralize Japanese soldiers, who were unable to smash Soviet attacks in an effort to fix the border. On the other hand, the Chinese military, educated by the Chinese Communist Party, was used to wage Sun Zi's mobile warfare by outflanking, encircling, penetrating, and cutting off the UN forces with the purpose of conducting Clausewitzian operations of annihilation, while emphasizing his night and close combat tactics. But the CPVA never destroyed encircled UN divisions in any operation, as it had expected to. Chinese offensive mobile warfare was forced to gradually transform itself to

defensive positional warfare, because of changes in UN operational art and tactics. Despite their insistence on the combination of operational art and psychological force in operations and battles, the absence of explicitly or tacitly accepted rules for waging operations and battles contributed to Japanese military escalation regardless of costs and benefits, while the presence of tacit rules to achieve limited military objectives at acceptable costs facilitated the attainment of the Soviet and Chinese limited objectives. In other words, the distribution of costs and benefits on the battlefield also needs cooperation between states and militaries.

The strategy of limited war requires the employment of limited technological and human means to reach limited political and operational objectives in the shortest possible time, at the least possible cost in lives and effort, and with least infliction of casualties on the enemy. Within the context of the distribution of costs and benefits, limited means weaken the possibility of escalation, while fostering the achievement of limited military objectives. In contrast to Sun Zi's and Clausewitz' mass soldiers, Japanese soldiers were professional warriors armed with advanced weapons and equipment. In light of "Western technology, Japanese culture," Japan modernized its military industries, producing high quality aircraft, artillery, and tanks for its troops. But when the war dragged on, it became extremely short of the resources and manpower for the war. Their limited weapons and soldiers were unable to sustain protracted war. Whereas the Chinese nationalist troops, financially and materially aided by the Soviet Union, the US, and Britain, and the Communist troops, partly financed by the Nationalist government and partly through aid provided by the Soviet Union, were rich in the manpower needed for expanding the space and time of the war. The huge gulf between the resources it had and the forces it met on the battlefield showed the fatal weakness of Japanese strategy. Similarly, Soviet soldiers were not Sun Zi's or Clausewitz' mass soldiers, but professionals, well trained and equipped. Inspired by forced industrialization in order to catch up with the West, Soviet military industries were heavily dependent on imitating and borrowing Western

technology. Despite such imitation and copy, they successfully produced advanced weapons to equip the Red Army. They centered their limited weapons and soldiers constantly on limited targets. Chinese soldiers were similar to Sun Zi's and Clausewitz' mass soldiers, but professional revolutionaries armed with primitive weapons and poorly trained. The Chinese had more experience than Japanese and Soviet soldiers in political and production work. Even though they were guided by the "tiyong" model, they never manufactured relatively advanced weapons for soldiers. The military industries of all three states were influenced by Western technology, but the outcomes were different. The Japanese aimed at modernizing Japan in hopes of having "rich nation, strong army;" the Soviets attempted to protect socialism in one country; while the Chinese were interested in the human factors at the expanse of technology, because of the failures of Chinese modernization. But the combination of advanced weapons and professional soldiers for limited objectives within limited space and time was decisive in strategy of limited war.

In spite of technological innovations, Sun Zi's and Clausewitz' strategic insights will continue to influence the strategy of limited war, but Japanese, Soviet, and Chinese strategies remain their own. The strategies of East Asian limited wars discussed in this thesis concentrate on control over mutually reinforced objectives, costs, and means through adjustment and cooperation between states. The theoretical and empirical studies highlight the fact that such control, despite differences in power structures, military institutions, technological innovations, cultures, and times, is central to strategy. Emphasis on mutually recognized explicit or tacit rules for limited objectives, the distribution of costs and benefits on the battlefield, and limited technological and human means through cooperation of domestic and international politics constitutes the essence of the strategies of East Asian limited wars.

APPENDIX

I. THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR

A. The Yalta Agreement

The leaders of the three Great Powers--the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain--have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe has terminated the Soviet Union shall enter into the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:

1. The status quo in Outer-Mongolia (The Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved:

2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz:

(a) the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union,

(b) the commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the USSR restored,

(c) the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South-Manchurian Railroad which provides an outlet to Dairen shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese Company it being understood that the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria;

3. The Kuril islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.

It is understood, that the agreement concerning Outer-Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek. The President will take measures in order to obtain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin.

The Heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.

For its part the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the USSR and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

Joseph Stalin

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Winston S. Churchill

February 11, 1945

B. The Potsdam Proclamation

(1) We--the President of the United States, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that Japan shall be given an opportunity to end this war.

(2) The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and of China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west, are poised to strike the final blows upon Japan. this military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied nations to prosecute the war against Japan until she ceases to resist.

(3) The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to the people of Japan. The might that now converges on Japan is immeasurably greater than

that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the lands, the industry, and the method of life of the whole German people. The full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, will mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland.

(4) The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by those self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or whether she will follow the path of reason.

(5) Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay.

(6) There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.

(7) Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.

(8) The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.

(9) The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.

(10) We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who

have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.

(11) Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to re-arm for war. to this end, access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted.

(12) The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.

(13) We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.

- C. Japan's Final Note

The Japanese Government would like to be permitted to state to the Governments of America, Britain, China and the Soviet Union what they most earnestly desire with reference to the execution of certain provisions of the Potsdam Proclamation. This may be done possibly at the time of the signature. but fearing that they may not be able to find an appropriate opportunity, they take the liberty of addressing the Governments of the Four Powers through the good offices of the Government of Switzerland.

1. In view of the fact that the purpose of occupation as mentioned in the Potsdam Proclamation is solely to secure the achievement of the basic objectives set forth in the said Proclamation, the Japanese Government sincerely desire that the Four Powers, relying upon the good faith of the Japanese Government, will facilitate discharge by the Japanese Government of their obligations as to forestall any unnecessary complications.

It is earnestly solicited that:

(a) In case of the entry of Allied fleets or troops in Japan Proper, the Japanese Government be notified in advance, so that arrangements can be made for reception.

(b) The number of the points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies for occupation be limited to minimum number, selection of the points be made in such a manner as to leave such a city as Tokyo unoccupied and the forces to be stationed at each point be made as small as possible.

2. Disarming of the Japanese forces, being a most delicate task as it involves over three millions of officers and men overseas and having direct bearing on their honor, the Japanese Government will, of course, take utmost pains. But it is suggested that the best and the most effective method would be that under the command of His Majesty the Emperor, the Japanese forces are allowed to disarm themselves and surrender arms of their own accord.

Disarming of the Japanese forces on the Continent be carried out beginning on the front line and in successive stages.

In connection with the disarming it is hoped that Article 35 of the Hague Convention will be applied, and the honor of the soldier will be respected, permitting them, for instance, to wear swords. Further, the Japanese Government be given to understand the Allies have no intention to employ disarmed Japanese soldiers for compulsory labor. It is sincerely hoped that shipment and transportation facilities necessary for the evacuation of the soldiers to their homeland will be speedily provided.

3. since some forces are located in remote places, difficult to communicate the Imperial Order, it is desired that reasonable time be allowed before the cessation of hostilities.

4. It is hoped that the Allies will be good enough quickly to take necessary steps or extend us facilities for the shipment of indispensable foodstuffs and medical supplies to Japanese forces in distant islands, and for the transport of wounded soldiers from those islands.

D. The Imperial Rescript of August 15, 1945

To Our Good and Loyal Subjects:

After pondering deeply the general trends of the world and the actual conditions obtaining in Our Empire today, We have decided to effect a settlement of the present situation by restoring to an extraordinary measure.

We have ordered our Government to communicate to the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, China, and the Soviet Union that Our Empire accepts the provisions of their Joint Declaration.

To strive for the common prosperity and happiness of all nations as well as the security and well-being of Our subjects is the solemn obligation which has been handed down by Our Imperial ancestors, and which We lay close to heart. Indeed, we declared war on America and Britain out of Our sincere desire to ensure Japan's self preservation and the stabilization of East Asia, it being far from Our thought either to infringe upon the sovereignty of other nations or to embark upon territorial aggrandizement. But now the war has lasted for nearly four years. Despite the best that has been done by everyone—the gallant fighting of military and naval forces, the diligence and assiduity of Our servants of the State and the devoted service of Our one hundred million people, the war

situation has developed not necessarily to Japan's advantage, while the general trends of the world have all turned against her interests. Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is indeed incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should we continue to fight, it would not only result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization. Such being the case, how are we to save the millions of Our subjects; or to atone Ourselves before the hallowed spirits of Our Imperial Ancestors? This is the reason why We have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the Joint Declaration of the Powers.

We cannot but express the deepest sense of regret to our Allied nations of East Asia, who have consistently cooperated with the Empire towards the emancipation of East Asia. The thought of those officers and men as well as others who have fallen in the fields of battle, those who died at their posts of duty, or those who met with untimely death and all their bereaved families, pains Our heart night and day. The welfare of the wounded and the war-sufferers, and of those who have lost their homes and livelihood, are the objects of Our profound solicitude. The hardships and sufferings to which Our nation is to be subjected hereafter will be certainly great. We are keenly aware of the inmost feelings of all ye, Our subjects. However, it is according to the dictate of time and fate that We have resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is insufferable.

Having been able to safeguard and maintain the structure of the Imperial State, We are always with ye, Our good and loyal subjects, relying upon your sincerity and integrity. Beware most strictly of any outbursts of emotion which may engender needless complications, or any fraternal contention and strife which may create confusion, lead ye astray and cause ye to lose the confidence of the world. Let the entire nation continue as one family from generation to generation, ever firm in its faith of the imperishableness of its divine land, and mindful of its heavy burden of responsibilities, and the long road

before it. Unite your total strength to be devoted the construction for the future. Cultivate the ways of rectitude; foster nobility of spirit; and work with resolution so as ye may enhance the innate glory of the Imperial State and keep pace with the progress of the world.

(Imperial Sign manual)

(Imperial Seal)

The 14th day of the 8th month of the 20th year of Showa

II. THE NOMONHAN WAR

Soviet-Japanese Agreement Ending the Conflict

On the Mongolian-Manchurian Frontier: Tass Statement

15 September 1939

As a result of negotiations conducted during the last few days between the Japanese ambassador Mr. Togo and the Foreign Commissar Comrade Molotov, the two parties, that is, the Japanese-Manchukuo and the Soviet-Mongolian, reached the following agreement:

1. The Japanese-Manchukuo troops and the Soviet-Mongolian troops shall cease all military operations on 16 September at 2 a.m. Moscow time.
2. The Japanese-Manchukuo and the Soviet-Mongolian troops shall remain on the lines they occupied at 1 p.m. Moscow time on 15 September.
3. Representatives of the armies of the sides on the spot shall begin immediately the execution of paragraphs 1 and 2 of the present agreement.
4. prisoners and corpses held by both sides shall be exchanged: the representatives of the armies of the two sides on the spot shall work out an agreement on this point and begin its execution immediately.

In addition, Mr. Togo and Comrade Molotov reached agreement on the setting up, as quickly as possible, of a commission, consisting of two representatives of the Soviet-Mongolian side and two representatives of the Japanese-Manchukuo side, to establish the precise frontier between the Mongolian People's Republic and Manchukuo in the area of the recent conflict. The commission shall begin work as soon as it is set up.

III. THE KOREAN WAR

A. Armistice Agreement

PREAMBLE

The undersigned, the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the other hand, in the interest of stopping the Korean conflict, with its great toll of suffering and bloodshed on both sides, and with the objectives of establishing an armistice which will ensure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved, do individually, collectively, and mutually agree to accept and to be bound and governed by the conditions and terms of armistice set forth in the following Articles and paragraphs, which said conditions and terms are intended to be purely military in character and to pertain solely to the belligerents in Korea.

ARTICLE I

Military Demarcation Line and Demilitarized Zone

1. A Military Demarcation Line shall be fixed and both sides shall withdraw two (2) kilometers from this line so as to establish a Demilitarized Zone between the opposing forces. A Militarized Zone shall be established as a buffer zone to prevent the occurrence of incidents which might lead to a resumption of hostilities.

2. The Military Demarcation Line is located as indicated on the attached map (Map 1).¹

¹ Not printed.

3. The Demilitarized Zone is defined by a northern and a southern boundary as indicated on the attached map (Map 1).

4. The Military Demarcation Line shall be plainly marked as directed by the military Armistice Commission hereinafter established. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall have suitable markers erected along the boundary between the Demilitarized Zone and their respective areas. The Military Armistice Commission shall supervise the erection of all markers placed along the Military Demarcation Line and along the boundaries of the Demilitarized Zone.

5. The waters of the Han River Estuary shall be open to civil shipping of both sides wherever one bank is controlled by one side and the other bank is controlled by the other side. The Military Armistice Commission shall prescribe rules for the shipping in that part of the Han River Estuary indicated on the attached map (Map 2). Civil shipping of each side shall have unrestricted access to the land under the military control of that side.

6. Neither side shall execute any hostile act within, from, or against the Demilitarized Zone.

7. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to cross the Military Demarcation Line unless specifically authorized to do so by the Military Armistice Commission.

8. No person, military or civilian, in the Demilitarized Zone shall be permitted to enter the territory under the military control of either side unless specifically authorized to do so by the Commander into whose territory entry is sought.

9. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone except persons concerned with the conduct of civil administration and relief and persons specifically authorized to enter by the Military Armistice Commission.

10. Civil administration and relief in that part of the Demilitarized Zone which is south of the Military Demarcation Line shall be the responsibility of the Commander-in-

Chief, United Nations Command; and civil administration and relief in that part of the Demilitarized Zone which is north of the Military Demarcation Line shall be the joint responsibility of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. The number of persons, military or civilian, from each side who are permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone for the conduct of civil administration and relief shall be as determined by the respective Commanders, but in no case shall the total number authorized by either side exceed one thousand (1,000) persons at any one time. The number of civil police and the arms to be carried by them shall as prescribed by the Military Armistice Commission. Other personnel shall not carry arms unless specifically authorized to do so by the Military Armistice Commission.

11. Nothing contained in this Article shall be construed to prevent the complete freedom of movement to, from, and within the Demilitarized Zone by the Military Armistice Commission, its assistants, its Joint Observer Teams with their assistants, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission hereinafter established, its assistants, its Neutral Persons Inspection Teams with their assistants, and of any other persons, materials and equipment specifically authorized to enter the Demilitarized Zone by the Military Armistice Commission. Convenience of movement shall be permitted through the territory under the military control of either side over any route necessary to move between points within the Demilitarized Zone where such points are not connected by roads lying completely within the Demilitarized Zone.

ARTICLE II

Concrete Arrangements for Cease-Fire and Armistice

A.--General

12. The commanders of the opposing sides shall order and enforce a complete cessation of all hostilities in Korea by all armed forces under their control, including all

units and personnel of the ground, naval, and air forces, effective twelve (12) hours after this Armistice Agreement is signed. (See paragraph 63 hereof for effective date and hour of the remaining provisions of this Armistice Agreement.)

13. In order to ensure the stability of the Military Armistice so as to facilitate the attainment of a peaceful settlement through the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, the Commanders of the opposing sides shall--

(a) Within seventy-two (72) hours after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies, and equipment from the Demilitarized Zone except as otherwise provided herein. All demolitions, minefields, wire entanglements and other hazards to the safe movement of personnel of the Military Armistice Commission or its Joint Observer Teams, known to exist within the Demilitarized Zone after the withdrawal of military forces therefrom, together with lanes known to be free of all such hazards, shall be reported to the Military Armistice Commission by the Commander of the side whose forces emplaced such hazards. Subsequently, additional safe lanes shall be cleared; and eventually, within forty-five (45) days after the termination of the seventy-two (72) hour period, all such hazards shall be removed from the Demilitarized Zone as directed by and under the supervision of the Military Armistice Commission. At the termination of the seventy-two (72) hour period, except for unarmed troops authorized a forty-five (45) day period to complete salvage operations under Military Armistice Commission supervision, such units of a police nature as may be specifically requested by the Military Armistice Commission and agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing sides, and personnel authorized under paragraphs 10 and 11 hereof, no personnel of either side shall be permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone.

(b) Within ten (10) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies and equipment from the rear and the coastal islands and waters of Korea of the other side. If such military forces are not withdrawn

within the stated time limit, and there is no mutually agreed and valid reason for the delay, the other side shall have the right to take any action which it deems necessary for the maintenance of security and order. The term "coastal islands," as used above, refers to those islands which, though occupied by one side at the time when this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, were controlled by the other side on June 24, 1950; provided, however that all the islands lying to the north and west of the provincial boundary line between Hwanghae-Do and Kyonggi-Do shall be under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, except the island groups of Paengyong-Do (37 58'N, 124 40'E), Taechong-Do (37 50'N, 124 42'E), Sochong-Do (37 46'N, 124 46'E), Yonpyong-Do (37 38'N, 125 40'E), and U-Do (37 36'N, 125 58'E), which shall remain under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. All the islands on the west coast of Korea lying south of the above-mentioned boundary line shall remain under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. (See Map 3).

(c) Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing military personnel; provided, however, that the rotation of units and personnel, the arrival in Korea of personnel on a temporary duty basis, and the return to Korea of personnel after short periods of leave or temporary duty outside of Korea shall be permitted within the scope prescribed below. "Rotation" is defined as the replacement of units or personnel by other units or personnel who are commencing a tour of duty in Korea. Rotation personnel shall be introduced into and evacuated from Korea only through the ports of entry enumerated in paragraph 43 hereof. Rotation shall be conducted on a man-for-man basis; provided, however, that no more than thirty-five thousand (3,5000) persons in the military service shall be admitted into Korea by either side in any calendar month under the rotation policy. No military personnel of either side shall be introduced into Korea if the introduction of such personnel will cause the aggregate of the military personnel of that side admitted into

Korea since the effective date of this Armistice Agreement to exceed the cumulative total of the military personnel of the side who have departed from Korea since that date. Reports concerning arrivals in and departures from Korea of military personnel shall be made daily to the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; such reports shall include places of arrival and departure and the number of persons arriving at or departing from each such place. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, through its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, shall conduct supervision and inspection of the rotation of units and personnel authorized above, at the ports of entry enumerated in paragraph 43 hereof.

(d) Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons and ammunition; provided, however, that combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition which are destroyed, damaged, worn-out, or used up during the period of the armistice may be replaced on the basis of piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same type. Such combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition shall be introduced into Korea only through the ports of entry enumerated in paragraph 43 hereof. In order to justify the requirement for combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition to be introduced into Korea for replacement purposes, reports concerning every incoming shipment of these items shall be made to the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; such reports shall include statements regarding the disposition of the items being replaced. Items to be replaced which are removed from Korea shall be removed only through the ports of entry enumerated in paragraph 43 hereof. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, through its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, shall conduct supervision and inspection of the replacement of combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition authorized above, at the ports of entry enumerated in paragraph 43 hereof.

(e) Ensure that personnel of their respective commands who violate any of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement are adequately punished.

(f) In those cases where places of burial are a matter of record and graves are actually found to exist, permit graves registration personnel of the other side to enter, within a definite time limit after this Armistice Agreement become effective, the territory of Korea under their military control, for the purpose of proceeding to such graves to recover and evacuate the bodies of the deceased military personnel of that side, including deceased prisoners of war. The specific procedures and the time limit for the performance of the above task shall be determined by the Military Armistice Commission. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall furnish to the other side all available information pertaining to the places of burial of the deceased military personnel of the other side.

(g) Afford full protection and all possible assistance and cooperation to the Military Armistice Commission, its Joint Observer Teams, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, in the carrying out of their functions and responsibilities hereinafter assigned; and accord to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and to its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, full convenience of movement between the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the ports of entry enumerated in paragraph 43 hereof over main lines of communication agreed upon by both sides (See Map 4), and between the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the places where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred. In order to prevent unnecessary delays, the use of alternate routes and means of transportation will be permitted whenever the main lines of communication are closed or impassable.

(h) Provide such logistic support, including communications and transportation facilities, as may be required by the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and their Teams.

(i) Each construct, operate, and maintain a suitable airfield in their respective parts of the Demilitarized zone in the vicinity of the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission, for such uses as the Commission may determine.

(j) Ensure that all members and other personnel of the Neutral nations Supervisory Commission and of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission hereinafter established shall enjoy the freedom and facilities necessary for the proper exercise of their functions, including privileges, treatment, and immunities equivalent to those ordinarily enjoyed by accredited diplomatic personnel under international usage.

14. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing ground forces under the military control of either side, which ground forces shall respect the Demilitarized Zone and the area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side.

15. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing naval forces, which naval forces shall respect the waters contiguous to the Demilitarized zone and to the land area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and shall not engage in blockade of any kind of Korea.

16. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing air forces, which air forces shall respect the air space over the Demilitarized zone and over the area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and over the waters contiguous to both.

17. Responsibility for compliance with and enforcement of the terms and provisions of this Armistice Agreement is that of the signatories hereto and their successors in command. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall establish within their respective commands all measures and procedures necessary to ensure complete compliance with all of the provisions hereof by all elements of their commands. They shall actively cooperate with one another and with the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in requiring observance of both the letter and the spirit of all of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement.

18. The costs of the operations of Military Armistice Commission and of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of their Teams shall be shared equally by the two opposing sides.

B.--Military Armistice Commission

1. Composition

19. A Military Armistice Commission is hereby established.

20. The Military Armistice Commission shall be composed of ten (10) senior officers, five (5) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and five (5) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Of the ten members, three (3) from each side shall be of general or flag rank. The two (2) remaining members on each side shall be major-generals, brigadier-generals, colonels, or their equivalents.

21. Members of the Military Armistice Commission shall be permitted to use staff assistants as required.

22. The Military Armistice Commission shall be provided with the necessary administrative personnel to establish a Secretariat charged with assisting the Commission by performing record-keeping, secretarial, interpreting, and such other functions as the Commission may assign to it. Each side shall appoint to the Secretariat a Secretary and an Assistant Secretary and such clerical and specialized personnel as required by the Secretariat. Records shall be kept in English, Korean, and Chinese, all of which shall be equally authentic.

23.--(a) the Military Armistice shall be initially provided with and assisted by ten (10) Joint Observer Teams, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission.

(b) Each Joint Observer Team shall be composed of not less than four (4) nor more than six (6) officers of field grade, half of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and half of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, and interpreters shall be furnished by each side as required for the functioning of the Joint Observer Team.

2. Functions and Authority

24. The general mission of the Military Armistice Commission shall be to supervise the implementation of this Armistice Agreement and to settle through negotiation any violation of this Armistice Agreement.

25. The military Armistice Commission shall:--

(a) Locate its headquarters in the vicinity of Panmunjom (37 57' 29"N., 126 40' 00"E.). The Military Armistice Commission may re-locate its headquarters at another point within the Demilitarized Zone by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Commission.

(b) Operate as a joint organization without a chairman.

(c) Adopt such rules of procedure as it may, from time to time, deem necessary.

(d) Supervise the carrying out of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement pertaining to the Demilitarized Zone and to the Han River Estuary.

(e) Direct the operations of the Joint Observer Teams.

(f) Settle through negotiations any violations of this Armistice Agreement.

(g) Transmit immediately to the Commanders of the opposing sides all reports of investigations of violations of this Armistice Agreement and all other reports and records of proceedings received from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

(h) Give general supervision and direction to the activities of the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War and the Committee for Assisting the Return of displaced Civilians, hereinafter established.

(i) Act as an intermediary in transmitting communications between the Commanders of the opposing sides; provided, however, that the foregoing shall not be construed to preclude the Commanders of both sides from communicating with each other by any means which they may desire to employ.

(j) Provide credentials and distinctive insignia for its staff and its Joint Observer Teams, and a distinctive marking for all vehicles, aircraft, and vessels, used in the performance of its mission.

26. The mission of the Joint Observer Teams shall be to assist the Military Armistice Commission in supervising the carrying out of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement pertaining to the Demilitarized Zone and to the Han River Estuary.

27. The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of either side thereof, is authorized to despatch Joint Observer Teams to investigate violations of this Armistice Agreement reported to have occurred in the Demilitarized Zone or in the Han River Estuary; provided, however, that not more than one half of the Joint Observer Teams which have not been despatched by the Military Armistice Commission may be despatched at any one time by the senior member of either side on the Commission.

28. The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of either side thereof, is authorized to request the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to conduct special observations and inspections at places outside the Demilitarized Zone where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred.

29. When the Military Armistice Agreement determines that a violation of this Armistice Agreement has occurred, it shall immediately report such violation to the Commanders of the opposing sides.

30. When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation of this Armistice Agreement has been corrected to its satisfaction, it shall so report to the Commanders of the opposing sides.

3. General

31. The Military Armistice Commission shall meet daily. Recesses of not exceed seven (7) days may agreed upon by the senior members of both sides; provided, that such recesses may be terminated on twenty-four (24) hour notice by the senior member of either side.

32. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meetings of the Military Armistice Commission shall be forward to the Commanders of the opposing sides as soon as possible after each meeting.

33. The Joint Observer Teams shall make periodic report to the Military Armistice Commission as required by the Commission and, in addition, shall make such special report as may be deemed necessary by them, or as may be required by the Commission.

34. The Military Armistice commission shall maintain files of the reports and records of proceedings required by this Armistice Agreement. The commission is authorized to maintain duplicate files of such other reports, records, &c., as may be necessary in the conduct of this business. Upon eventual dissolution of the Commission, one set of the above files shall be turned over to each side.

35. The Military Armistice commission may make recommendations to the Commanders of the opposing sides with respect to amendments or additions to this Armistice Agreement. such recommended changes should generally be those designed to ensure a more effective armistice.

C.--Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission

1. Composition

36. A Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is hereby established.

37. The Neutral Nations Supervisory commission shall be composed of four (4) senior officers, two (2) of whom shall be appointed by neutral nations nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, namely Sweden and Switzerland, and two (2) of whom shall be appointed by neutral Nations nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, namely, Poland and Czechoslovakia. The term 'neutral nations' as herein used is defined as those nations whose combatant forces have not participated in the hostilities in Korea. Members appointed to the Commission may be from the armed forces of the appointing nations. Each member shall designate an alternate member to attend those meetings which for any reason the principal member is unable to attend. Such alternate members shall be of the same nationality as their principals. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may take action whenever the number of members present from the neutral nations nominated by one side is equal to the number of members present from the neutral nations nominated by the other side.

38. Members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be permitted to use staff assistants furnished by the neutral nations as required. These staff assistants may be appointed as alternate members of the Commission.

39. The neutral nations shall be requested to furnish the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission with the necessary administrative personnel to establish a Secretariat charged with assisting the Commission by performing necessary record-keeping, secretarial, interpreting, and such other functions as the Commission may assign to it.

40.--(a) The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be initially provided with, and assisted by twenty (20) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, which number may

be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be responsible to, shall report to, and shall be subject to the direction of, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission only.

(b) Each Neutral Nations Inspection Team shall be composed of not less than four (4) officers, preferably of field grade, half of whom shall be from the neutral nations nominated by the Commander-in-chief, United Nations Command, and half of whom shall be from the neutral nations nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Members appointed to the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams may be from the armed forces of the appointing nations. In order to facilitate the functioning of the Teams, sub teams composed of not less than two (2) members, one of whom shall be from a neutral nation nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and one of whom shall be from a neutral nation nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, may be formed as circumstances require. Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, interpreters, and communications personnel, and such equipment as may be required by the Teams to perform their missions, shall be furnished by the Commander of each side, as required, in the Demilitarized Zone and in the territory under his military control. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may provide itself and the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams with such of the above personnel and equipment of its own as it may desire; provided, however, that such personnel shall be personnel of the same neutral nations of which the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is composed.

2. Functions and Authority

41. The mission of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be to carry out the functions of supervision, observation, inspection, and investigation, as stipulated in sub-paragraph 13(c) and 13(d) and paragraph 28 hereof, and to report the results of such supervision, observation, inspection and investigation to the Military Armistice Commission.

42. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall:--

(a) Locate its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.

(b) Adopt such rules of procedure as it may, from time to time, deem necessary.

(c) Conduct, through its members and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, the supervision and inspection provided for in sub-paragraphs 13(c) and 13(d) of this Armistice Agreement at the ports of entry enumerated in paragraph 43 hereof, and the special observations and inspections provided for in paragraph 28 hereof at those places where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred. The inspection of combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be such as to enable them to properly ensure that reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition are not being introduced into Korea; but this shall not be construed as authorising inspections or examinations of any secret designs or characteristics of any combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, or ammunition.

(d) Direct and supervise the operations of the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams.

(e) Station five (5) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams at the ports of entry enumerated in paragraph 43 hereof located in the territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command; and five (5) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams at the ports of entry enumerated in paragraph 43 hereof located in the territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers; and establish initially ten

(10 mobile Neutral Nations Inspection Teams in reserve, stationed in the general vicinity of the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission. Not more than half of the mobile Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be despatched at any one time in accordance with requests of the senior member of either side on the Military Armistice Commission.

(f) Subject to the provisions of the preceding sub-paragraph, conduct without delay investigations of reported violations of this Armistice Agreement, including such investigations of reported violations of this Armistice Agreement as may be requested by the Military Armistice Commission or by the senior member of either side on the Commission.

(g) Provide credentials and distinctive insignia for its staff and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, and a distinctive marking for all vehicles, aircraft, and vessels, used in the performance of its mission.

43. Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be stationed at the following ports of entry:--

Territory under the military control of the United Nations Command

Inchon (37 28'N, 126 38'E)

Taegu (35 52'N, 128 36'E)

Pusan (35 06' N, 129 02'E)

Kangnung (37 45'N, 128 54'E)

Kunsan (35 59'N, 126 43'E)

Territory under the military control of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers

Sinuiju (40 06'N, 124 24'E)

Chongjin (41 46'N, 129 49'E)

Hungnam (39 50'N, 127 37'E)

Manpo (41 09'N, 126 18'E)

Sinanju (39 36'N, 125 36'E)

These Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be accorded full convenience of movement within the areas and over the routes of communication set forth on the attached map (Map 5).

3. General

44. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall meet daily. Recesses of not to exceed seven (7) days must be agreed upon by the members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; provided, that such recesses may be terminated on twenty-four (24) hour notice by any member.

45. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meetings of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be forwarded to the Military Armistice Commission as soon as possible after each meeting. Records shall be kept in English, Korean, and Chinese.

46. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall make periodic reports concerning the results of their supervision, observations, inspections and investigations to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission as required by the Commission and, in addition, shall make such special reports as may be deemed necessary by them, or as may be required by the Commission. Reports shall be submitted by a Team as a whole, but may also be submitted by one or more individual members thereof; provided, that the reports submitted by one or more individual members thereof shall be considered as informational only.

47. Copies of the reports made by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be forwarded to the Military Armistice Commission by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission without delay and in the language in which received. They shall not be

delayed by the process of translation or evaluation. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall evaluate such reports at the earliest practical time and shall forward their findings to the Military Armistice Commission as a matter of priority. The Military Armistice Commission shall not take final action with regard to any such report until the evaluation thereof has been received from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of its Team shall be subject to appearance before the Military Armistice Commission, at the request of the senior member of either side on the Military Armistice Commission, for clarification of any report submitted.

48. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall maintain duplicate files of the reports and records of proceedings required by this Armistice Agreement. The Commission is authorized to maintain duplicate files of such other reports, records, &c., as may be necessary in the conduct of its business. Upon eventual dissolution of the Commission, one set of the above files shall be turned over to each side.

49. The neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may make recommendations to the Military Armistice Commission with respect to amendments or additions to this Armistice Agreement. Such recommended changes should generally be those designed to ensure a more effective armistice.

50. The Neutral Supervisory Commission, or any member thereof, shall be authorized to communicate with any member of the Military Armistice Commission.

ARTICLE III

Arrangements relating to Prisoner of War

51. The release and repatriation of all prisoners of war held in the custody of each side at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective shall be effected in

conformity with the following provisions agreed upon by both sides prior to the signing of this Armistice Agreement.

(a) Within sixty (60) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, each side shall, without offering any hindrance, directly repatriate and hand over in groups all those prisoners of war in its custody who insist on repatriation to the side to which they belong at the time of capture. Repatriation shall be accomplished in accordance with the related provisions of this Article. In order to expedite the repatriation process of such personnel, each side shall, prior to the signing of the Armistice Agreement, exchange the total numbers, by nationalities, of personnel to be directly repatriated. Each group of prisoners of war delivered to the other side shall be accompanied by rosters, prepared by nationality, to include name, rank (if any) and interment or military serial number.

(b) Each side shall release all those remaining prisoners of war, who are not directly repatriated, from its military control and from its custody and hand them over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission for disposition in accordance with the provisions in the Annex hereto: "Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission."

(c) So that there may be no misunderstanding owing to the equal use of three languages, the act of delivery of a prisoner of war by one side to the other side shall, for the purposes of this Armistice, be called "repatriation" in English, " " (song hwan) in Korean, and " " (ch'ien fan) in Chinese, notwithstanding the nationality or place of residence of such prisoner of war.

52. Each side ensure that it will not employ in acts of war in the Korean conflict any prisoner of war released and repatriated incident to the coming into effect of this Armistice Agreement.

53. All the sick and injured prisoners of war who insist upon repatriation shall be repatriated with priority. In so far as possible, there shall be captured medical personnel

repatriated concurrently with the sick and injured prisoners of war, so as to provide medical care and attendance en route.

54. The repatriation of all of the prisoner of war required by sub-paragraph 51 (a) hereof shall be completed within a time limit of sixty (60) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective. Within this time limit each side undertakes to complete the repatriation of the above-mentioned prisoners of war in its custody at the earliest practical time.

55. Panmunjom is designated as the place where prisoners of war will be delivered and received by both sides. Additional place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war in the Demilitarized Zone may be designated, if necessary, by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.

56.--(a) A Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War is hereby established. It shall be composed of six (6) officers of field grade, three (3) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and three (3) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. This Committee shall, under the general supervision and direction of the Military Armistice Commission, be responsible for coordinating the specific plans of both sides for the repatriation of prisoners of war and for supervising the execution by both sides of all of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement relating to the repatriation of prisoners of war. It shall be the duty of this Committee to co-ordinate the timing of the arrival of prisoners of war at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war from the prisoner of war camps of both sides; to make, when necessary, such special arrangements as may be required with regard to the transportation and welfare of sick and injured prisoners of war; to co-ordinate the work of the joint Red Cross teams, established in paragraph 57 hereof, in assisting in the repatriation of prisoners of war; to supervise the implementation of the arrangements for the actual repatriation of prisoners of war stipulated in paragraphs 53 and 54 hereof; to

select, when necessary, additional place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war; to arrange for security at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war; and to carry out such other related functions as are required for the repatriation of prisoners of war.

(b) When unable to reach agreement on any matter relating to its responsibilities, the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall immediately refer such matter to the Military Armistice Commission for decision. The Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall maintain its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.

(c) The Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall be dissolved by the Military Armistice Commission upon completion of the program of repatriation of prisoners of war.

57.--(a) Immediately after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, joint Red Cross teams composed of representatives of the national Red Cross Societies of the countries contributing forces to the United Nations Command on the one hand, and representatives of the Red Cross Society of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and representatives of the Red Cross Society of the People's Republic of China on the other hand, shall be established. The joint Red Cross teams shall assist in the execution of both sides of those provisions of this Armistice Agreement relating to the repatriation of all prisoners of war specified in sub-paragraph 51 (a) hereof, who insist upon repatriation, by the performance of such humanitarian services as are necessary and desirable for the welfare of the prisoners of war. To accomplish this task, the joint Red Cross teams shall provide assistance in the delivering and receiving of prisoners of war by both sides at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war, and shall visit the prisoner of war camps of both sides to comfort the prisoners of war and to bring in and distribute gift articles for the comfort and welfare of the prisoners of war. The joint Red Cross teams

may provide services to prisoners of war while en route from prisoner of war camps to the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war.

(b) The joint Red Cross teams shall be organized as set forth below:--

(1) One team shall be composed of twenty (20) members, namely, ten (10) representatives from the National Red Cross Societies of each side, to assist in the delivering and receiving of prisoners of war by both sides at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. The chairmanship of this team shall alternate daily between representatives from the Red Cross Societies of the two sides. The work and services of this team shall be co-ordinated by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.

(2) One team shall be composed of sixty (60) members, namely, thirty (30) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each side, to visit the prisoner of war camps under the administration of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers. This team may provide services to prisoners of war while en route from the prisoner of war camps to the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. A representative of the Red Cross Society of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or of the Red Cross Society of the People's Republic of China shall serve as chairman of this team.

(3) One team shall be composed of sixty (60) members, namely thirty (30) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each side, to visit the prisoner of war camps under the administration of the United Nations Command. This team may provide services to prisoners of war while en route from the prisoner of war camps to the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. A representative of a Red Cross Society of a nation contributing forces to the United Nations Command shall serve as Chairman of this team.

(4) in order to facilitate the functioning of each joint Red Cross team, sub-teams composed of not less than two (2) members from the team, with an equal number of representatives from each side, may be formed as circumstances require.

(5) Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, and interpreters, and such equipment as may be required by the joint Red Cross teams to perform their missions, shall be furnished by the Commander of each side to the team operating in the territory under his military control.

(6) Whenever jointly agreed upon by the representatives of both sides on any joint Red Cross team, the size of such team may be increased or decreased, subject to confirmation by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.

(c) The Commander of each side shall co-operate fully with the joint Red Cross teams in the performance of their functions, and undertakes to ensure the security of the personnel of the joint Red Cross team in the area under his military control. The Commander of each side shall provide such logistic, administrative and communications facilities as may be required by the team operating in the territory under his military control.

(d) The joint Red Cross teams shall be dissolved upon completion of the program of repatriation of all the prisoners of war specified in sub-paragraph 51 (a) hereof, who insist upon repatriation.

58.--(a) The Commander of each side shall furnish to the Commander of the other side as soon as practicable, but not later than ten (10) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the following information concerning prisoners of war:--

(1) Complete data pertaining to the prisoners of war who escaped since the effective date of the data last exchanged.

(2) In so far as practicable, information regarding name, nationality, rank, and other identification data, date and cause of death, and place of burial, of those prisoners of war who died while in his custody.

(b) If any prisoners of war escape or die after the effective date of the supplementary information specified above, the detaining side shall furnish to the other side, through the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War, the data pertaining

thereto in accordance with the provisions of sub-paragraph 58 (a) hereof. Such data shall be furnished at ten-day intervals until the completion of the program of delivery and reception of prisoner of war.

(C) Any escaped prisoner of war who returns to the custody of the detaining side after the completion of the program of delivery and reception of prisoners of war shall be delivered to the Military Armistice Commission for disposition.

59.--(a) All civilians who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and who, on June 24, 1950, resided north of the Military Demarcation Line established in this Armistice Agreement shall, if they desire to return home, be permitted and assisted by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, to return to the area north of the Military Demarcation Line; and all civilians who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, and who, on June 24, 1950, resided south of the Military Demarcation Line established in this Armistice Agreement shall, if they desire to return home, be permitted and assisted by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers to return to the area south of the Military Demarcation Line. The Commander of each side shall be responsible for publicizing widely throughout the territory under his military control the contents of the provisions of this sub-paragraph, and for calling upon the appropriate civil authorities to give necessary guidance and assistance to all such civilians who desire to return home.

(b). All civilians of foreign nationality who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers shall, if they desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, be permitted and assisted to do so; all civilians of

foreign nationality who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, shall, if they desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, be permitted and assisted to do so. The Commander of each side shall be responsible for publicizing widely throughout the territory under his military control the contents of the provisions of this sub-paragraph, and for calling upon the appropriate civil authorities to give necessary guidance and assistance to all such civilians of foreign nationality who desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the commander of the other side.

(c) measures to assist in the return of civilians provided for in sub-paragraph 59 (b) hereof shall be commenced by both sides as soon as possible after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective.

(d)--(1) A Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians is hereby established. It shall be composed of four (4) officers of field grade, two (2) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and two (2) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. This Committee shall, under the general supervision and direction of the Military Armistice Commission, be responsible for coordinating the specific plans of both sides for assistance to the return of the above-mentioned civilians, and for supervising the execution by both sides of all of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement relating to the return of the above-mentioned civilians. It shall be the duty of this Committee to make necessary arrangements, including those of transportation, for expediting and coordinating the movement of the above-mentioned civilians; to select the crossing point(s) through which the above-mentioned civilians will cross the Military Demarcation Line; to arrange for security at

the crossing point(s); and to carry out such other functions as are required to accomplish the return of the above-mentioned civilians.

(2) When unable to reach agreement on any matter relating to its responsibilities, the Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall immediately refer such matter to the Military Armistice Commission for decision. The Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall maintain its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.

(3) The Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall be dissolved by the Military Armistice Commission upon fulfillment of its mission.

ARTICLE IV

Recommendation to the Governments concerned on both Sides

(60) In order to ensure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military Commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the Governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three (3) months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, &c.

ARTICLE V

Miscellaneous

(61) Amendments and additions to this Armistice Agreement must be mutually agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing sides.

(62) The Articles and Paragraphs of this Armistice Agreement shall remain in effect until expressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides.

(63) All of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement, other than paragraph 12, shall become effective at 2200 hours on July 27th 1953.

Done at Panmujom, Korea, at 1000 hours on the 27th day of July, 1953, in English, Korean, and Chinese, all texts being equally authentic.

Kim Il Sung

Marshal

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Supreme Commander

Korean People's Army

Peng Teh-Huai

Commander

Chinese People's Volunteers

Mark W. Clark

General

United States Army

Commander-in-Chief

United Nations Command

Present:

Nam Il

General

Korean People's Army

Senior Delegate

Delegation of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers

William K. Harrison, Jr.

Lieutenant-General

United States Army

Senior Delegate

United Nations Command Delegation

B. Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission

(See Sub-paragraph 51b)

I-General

1. In order to ensure that all prisoners of war have the opportunity to exercise their rights to be repatriated following an armistice, Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, Czechoslovakia and India shall each be requested by both sides to appoint a member of a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission which shall be established to take custody in Korea of those prisoners of war who, while in the custody of the detaining Powers, have not exercised their right to be repatriated. The neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall establish its headquarters within the Demilitarized Zone in the vicinity of Panmunjom, and shall station subordinate bodies of the same composition as the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission at those locations at which the Repatriation commission assumes custody of prisoners of war. Representatives of both sides shall be

permitted to observe the operations of the Repatriation Commission and its subordinate bodies to include explanations and interviews.

2. Sufficient armed forces and any other operating personnel required to assist the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in carrying out its functions and responsibilities shall be provided exclusively by India, whose representative shall be the umpire in accordance with the provisions of Article 132 of the Geneva Convention, and shall also be chairman and executive agent of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Representatives from each of the other four Powers shall be allowed staff assistants in equal number not to exceed fifty (50) each. When any of the representatives of the neutral nations is absent for some reason, that representative shall designate an alternate representative of his own nationality to exercise his functions and authority. The arms of all personnel provided for in this paragraph shall be limited to military police type small arms.

3. No force or threat of force shall be used against the prisoners of war specified in paragraph 1 above to prevent or effect their repatriation, and no violence to their persons or affront to their dignity or self-respect shall be permitted in any manner for any purpose whatsoever (but see paragraph 7 below). This duty is enjoined on and entrusted to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. This Commission shall ensure that prisoners of war shall at all times be treated humanely in accordance with the specific provisions of the Geneva Convention, and with the general spirit of that Convention.

II.--Custody of Prisoners of War

4. All prisoners of war who have not exercised their right of repatriation following the effective date of the Armistice Agreement shall be released from the military control and from the custody of the detaining side as soon as practicable, and, in all cases, within sixty (60) days subsequent to the effective date of the Armistice Agreement to the Neutral

Nations Repatriation Commission at locations in Korea to be designated by the detaining side.

5. At the time the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission assumes control of the prisoner of war installations, the military forces of the detaining side shall be withdrawn therefrom, so that the locations specified in the preceding paragraph shall be taken over completely by the armed forces of India.

6. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 5 above, the detaining side shall have the responsibility for maintaining and ensuring security and order in the areas around the locations where the prisoners of war are in custody and for preventing and restraining any armed forces (including irregular armed forces) in the area under its control from any acts of disturbance and intrusion against the locations where the prisoners of war are in custody.

7. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 3 above, nothing in this agreement shall be construed as derogating from the authority of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission to exercise its legitimate functions and responsibilities for the control of the prisoners of war under its temporary jurisdiction.

III.--Explanation

8. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, after having received and taken into custody all those prisoners of war who have not exercised their rights to be repatriated, shall immediately make arrangements so that, within ninety (90) days after the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission takes over the custody, the nations to which the prisoners of war belong shall have freedom and facilities to send representatives to the locations where such prisoners of war are in custody to explain to all the prisoners of war depending upon these nations their rights and to inform them of

any matters relating to their return to their homelands, particularly of their full freedom to return home to lead a peaceful life, under the following provisions:--

(a) The number of such explaining representatives shall not exceed seven (7) per thousand prisoners of war held in custody by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission; and the minimum authorized shall not be less than a total of five (5);

(b) The hours during which the explaining representatives shall have access to the prisoners shall be as determined by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, and generally in accord with Article 53 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War;

(c) All explanations and interviews shall be conducted in the presence of a representative of each member nation of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and a representative from the detaining side;

(d) Additional provisions governing the explanation work shall be prescribed by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, and will be designed to employ the principles enumerated in paragraph 3 above and in this paragraph;

(e) The explaining representatives, while engaging in their work, shall be allowed to bring with them necessary facilities and personnel for wireless communications. The number of communications personnel shall be limited to one team per location at which explaining representatives are in residence, except in the event all prisoners of war are concentrated in one location, in which case, two (2) teams shall be permitted. Each team shall consist of not more than six (6) communications personnel.

9. Prisoners of war in its custody shall have freedom and facilities to make representations and communications to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and to representatives and subordinate bodies of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and to inform them of their desires on any matter concerning the prisoners of war themselves, in accordance with arrangements made for the purpose by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

IV.--Disposition of Prisoners of War

10. Any prisoner of war who, while in the custody of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, decides to exercise the right of repatriation, shall make an application requesting repatriation to a body consisting of a representative of each member nation of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Once such an application is made, it shall be considered immediately by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission or one of its subordinate bodies so as to determine immediately by majority vote the validity of such application. Once such an application is made to and validated by the Commission or one of its subordinate bodies, the prisoner of war concerned shall immediately be transferred to and accommodated in the tents set up for those who are ready to be repatriated. Thereafter, he shall, while still in the custody of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, be delivered forthwith to the prisoner of war exchange point at Panmunjom for repatriation under the procedure prescribed in the Armistice Agreement.

11. At the expiration of ninety (90) days after the transfer of custody of the prisoners of war to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, access of representatives to captured personnel as provided for in paragraph 8 above, shall terminate, and the question of disposition of the prisoners of war who have not exercised their right to be repatriated shall be submitted to the Political Conference recommended to be convened in paragraph 60, Draft Armistice Agreement, which shall endeavor to settle this question within thirty (30) days, during which period the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall continue to retain custody of those prisoners of war. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall declare the relief from the prisoner of war status to civilian status of any prisoners of war who have not exercised their right to be repatriated and for whom no other disposition has been agreed to by the Political

Conference within one hundred and twenty (120) after the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission has assumed their custody. Thereafter, according to the application of each individual, those who choose to go to neutral nations shall be assisted by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the Red Cross society of India. This operation shall be completed within thirty (30) days, and upon its completion, the Neutral nations Repatriation Commission shall immediately cease its functions and declare its dissolution. After the dissolution of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, whenever and wherever any of those above-mentioned civilians who have been relieved from the prisoner of war status desire to return to their fatherland, the authorities of the localities where they are shall be responsible for assisting them in returning to their fatherlands.

V.--Red Cross Visitation

12. Essential Red Cross service for prisoners of war in custody of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall be provided by India in accordance with regulations issued by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

VI.--Press Coverage

13. the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall ensure freedom of the press and other new media in observing the entire operation as enumerated herein, in accordance with procedures to be established by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

VII.--Logistical Support for Prisoner of War

14. Each side shall provide logistical support for the prisoners of war in the area under its military control, delivering required support to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commissions at an agreed delivery point in the vicinity of each prisoner of war installation.

15. The cost of repatriation prisoners of war to the exchange point at Panmunjom shall be borne by the detaining side and the cost from the exchange point by the side on which said prisoners depend, in accordance with Article 118 of the Geneva Convention.

16. The Red Cross Society of India shall be responsible for providing such general service personnel in the prisoner of war installations as required by the Neutral Nations Repatriation commission.

17. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall provide medical support for the prisoners of war as may be practicable. The detaining side shall provide medical support as practicable upon the request of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and specifically for those cases requiring extensive treatment or hospitalization. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall maintain custody of prisoners of war during such hospitalization. The detaining side shall facilitate such custody. Upon completion of treatment, prisoners of war shall be returned to a prisoner of war installation as specified in paragraph 4 above.

18. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission is entitled to obtain from both sides such legitimate assistance as it may require in carrying out its duties and tasks, but both sides shall not under any name and in any form interfere or exert influence.

VIII.--Logistical Support for the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission

19. Each side shall be responsible for providing logistical support for the personnel of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission stationed in the area under its military control, and both sides shall contribute on an equal basis to such support within the

Demilitarized Zone. The precise arrangements shall be subject to determination between the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the detaining side in each case.

20. Each of the detaining sides shall be responsible for protecting the explaining representatives from the other side while in transit over lines of communication within its area, as set forth in paragraph 23 for the Neutral nations Repatriation Commission, to a place of residence and while in residence in the vicinity of, but not within each of, the locations where the prisoners of war are in custody. the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall be responsible for the security of such representatives within the actual limits of the locations where the prisoners of war are in custody.

21. Each of the detaining sides shall provide transportation, housing, communication, and other agreed logistical support to the explaining representatives of the other side while they are in the area under its military control. Such services shall be provided on a reimbursable basis.

IX.--Publication

22. After the Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the terms of this agreement shall be made known to all prisoners of war who, while in the custody of the detaining side, have not exercised their right to be repatriated.

X.--Movement

23. The movement of the personnel of the Neutral nations Repatriation Commission and repatriated prisoners of war shall be over lines of communication as determined by the command(s) of the opposing side and the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. A map showing these lines of communication shall be furnished by the command of the opposing side and the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

Movement of such personnel, except within locations as designated in paragraph 4 above, shall be under the control of, and escorted by, personnel of the side in whose area the travel is being undertaken; however, such movement shall not be subject to any obstruction and coercion.

XI.--Procedural Matters

24. The interpretation of this agreement shall rest with the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, and/or any subordinate bodies to which functions are delegated or assigned by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, shall operate on the basis of majority vote.

25. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall submit a weekly report to the opposing Commanders on the status of prisoners of war in its custody, indicating the numbers repatriated and remaining at the end of each week.

26. When this agreement has been acceded to by both sides and by the five Powers named herein, it shall become effective upon the date the Armistice becomes effective.

Done at Panmunjom, Korea, at 1400 hours on the 8th day of June, 1953, in English, Korean, and Chinese, all texts being equally authentic.

Nam Il

General

Korean People's Army

Senior Delegate

Delegation of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers

William K. Harrison, Jr.

Lieutenant-General

United States Army

Senior Delegate

United Nations Command Delegation

C. Temporary Agreement Supplementary to the Armistice Agreement

In order to meet the requirements of the disposition of the prisoners of war nor for direct repatriation in accordance with the provisions of the Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation commission, the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers on the other hand, in pursuance of the provisions in paragraph 61, Article V, of the Agreement concerning a military armistice in Korea, agree to conclude the following Temporary Agreement supplementary to the Armistice Agreement-

1. Under the provisions of paragraphs 4 and 5, Article II, of the Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, the United Nations Command has the right to designate the area between the Military Demarcation Line and the eastern and southern boundaries of the Demilitarized Zone between the Imjin River on the South and the road leading south from Okum-ni on the north-east (the main road leading south-east from Panmunjom not included), as the area within which the United Nations Command will turn over the prisoners of war, who are not directly repatriated and whom the United Nations Command has the responsibility for keeping under its custody, to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the armed forces of India for custody. The United Nations Command shall, prior to the signing of the Armistice Agreement, inform the side of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers of the approximate figures by nationality of such prisoners of war held in its custody.

2. If there are prisoners of war under their custody who request not to be directly repatriated, the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers have the right to designate the area in the vicinity of Panmunjom between the Military Demarcation Line and the western and northern boundaries of the Demilitarized zone, as the area within which such prisoners of war will be turned over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the armed forces of India for custody. After knowing that there are prisoners of war under their custody who request not to be directly repatriated, the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers shall inform the United Nations Command side of the approximate figures by nationality of such prisoners of war.

3. In accordance with paragraphs 8, 9, and 10, Article I, of the Armistice Agreement, the following paragraphs are hereby provided:--

(a) After the Cease-Fire comes into effect, unarmed personnel of each side shall specifically authorized by the Military Armistice Commission to enter the above-mentioned area designated by the their own side to perform necessary construction operations. None of such personnel shall remain in the above-mentioned areas upon the completion of the construction operations.

(b) A definite number of prisoners of war as decided upon by both sides, who are in the respective custody of both sides and who are not directly repatriated, shall be specifically authorized by the Military Armistice Commission to be escorted respectively by a certain number of armed forces of the detaining sides to the above-mentioned areas of custody designated respectively by both sides to be turned over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the armed forces of India for custody. After the prisoners of war have been taken over, the armed forces of the detaining sides shall be withdrawn immediately from the areas of custody to the areas under the control of their own side.

(c) The personnel of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and its subordinate bodies, the armed forces of India, the Red Cross Society of India, the

explaining representatives and observation representatives of both sides, as well as the required material and equipment, for exercising the functions provided for in the Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation commission shall be specifically authorized by the Military Armistice Commission to have the complete freedom of movement to, from, and within the above-mentioned areas designated respectively by both sides for the custody of prisoners of war.

4. The provisions of sub-paragraph 3 (c) of this agreement shall not be construed as derogating from the privileges enjoyed by those personnel mentioned above under paragraph 11, Article I, of the Armistice Agreement.

5. This Agreement shall be abrogated upon the completion of the mission provided for in the Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

Done at Panmunjom, Korea, at 1000 hours on the 27th day of July, 1953, in English, Korean, and Chinese, all texts being equally authentic.

Kim Il Sung

Marshal

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Peng Teh-Huai

Commander

Chinese People's Volunteers

Mark W. Clark

General

United States Army

Commander-in-Chief

United Nations Command

Present:

Nam Il

General

Korean People's Army

Senior Delegate

Delegation of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers

William K. Harrison, Jr.

Lieutenant-General

United States Army

Senior Delegate

United Nations Command Delegation

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