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O'NEILL'S CAVALCADE:
The Nature and Functions of
Provisional IRA Terrorist Performances

by
Steven J. Strang, B.A.

A thesis submit ed to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

Department of Sociology and Anthropology

Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
May 5th, 1992

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Provisional IRA Terrorist Performances

submitted by Steven J. Strang, B.A.
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the degree of Master of Arts

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May 21, 1992

O'NEILL'S CAVALCADE
The Nature and Functions of Provisional IRA Terrorist Performances

Abstract

This thesis uses terrorist attacks by the Provisional Irish Republican Army as examples to demonstrate that terrorism is a form of communication, structurally analogous to numerous pieces of performance art. The nature of terrorism as dramatic communicative violence using instrumental victims is the essential difference between terrorism and guerrilla warfare. This thesis also examines the web of historical, cultural, social and military reasons for the persistence and stability of terrorism in the Irish conflict. One of the functions of terrorism is that it increases the polarization between communities, and so stabilizes the conflict. Over the centuries, this conflict has become an integral part of the cultures of each of the two main ethnic communities in Northern Ireland.

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Finally, I would like to thank Sniffy the Rat, who played an inspirational role in the development of this thesis.

Steven Strang,
Easter, 1992.

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Chapter I INTRODUCTION: O'NEILL'S CAVALCADE

"O'Neill's Cavalcade" is a traditional Irish fiddle tune which has a form frequently found in that style of music: it is made up of several repeating segments, the whole is also played repeatedly for the dancers, and it has no discernible ending. In this it is similar in structure to the conflict in Ireland during the last few centuries. "P. O'Neill" is the pseudonym often used by the Provisional Irish Republican Army to sign statements and claims of responsibility for murders and other acts of violence carried out in their campaign to create a united Irish state.

This study is an examination of political violence in Northern Ireland, using anthropological theories as the main tools of the analysis. The concentration is on the activities of one specific paramilitary organization, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), during the last decade. The main issues which I am attempting to understand involve the meanings and functions of terrorist violence in this conflict. To approach this specific topic, it is essential to understand not only the history of the conflict in Northern Ireland, but also the much-disputed nature of terrorism. Terrorism, as a type of human behaviour, is too large and diverse a topic for a paper of this size, but close examination of a specific conflict while concentrating mainly on a single group will give us a window into the larger subject.

The main theoretical perspective that I drew upon when starting this analysis is from the work of Coser, who used Simmel's analysis to divide conflict into two categories: realistic and non-realistic. Terrorism in many ways appears to fall best into the category of non-realistic conflict, but this is a behaviour in which appearances can be more than usually

deceiving. My hope was that this theory would shed some light on the problematic distinction between terrorist and guerrilla actions in violent political conflicts. What I discovered is that terrorism is more a form of performance than a form of warfare. Terrorist acts are theatricalized representations of guerrilla actions, carried out more to communicate than to destroy. Because of the dependence on shock and surprise to enhance the effect of the attacks, terrorist acts can perhaps be described more meaningfully as a surrealistic form of conflict. In light of this, I later found more use in the ideas of Schechner and of a miscellany of performance artists in understanding the structure of terrorism as communication.

I did not choose to study terrorist violence in the Canadian context, because terrorism in this country has consisted only of sporadic outbursts of small separate groups of people, such as the FLQ or Direct Action. These groups, while drawing from political traditions, are not part of any ongoing deep-rooted tradition of organized violence in Canada. In Northern Ireland there is a long and pervasive cultural tradition of violent republicanism which is more appropriate for ethnological analysis. The conflict over the British presence in Ireland dates from before the time of the first lasting European settlements in Canada, and the physical force tradition of Irish Republicanism started about 60 years before our confederation. Canada lacks the strong traditions that the physical force stream of Irish Republicanism depends upon. The Provisional IRA has been active for over 20 years now in the latest bout of the Troubles, this seems to indicate that their actions are not simply dysfunctional. The cultural groups or subcultures, which are the social contexts of the members of the paramilitary organizations, must be deriving some real or perceived benefits from the conflict.

Why examine terrorism and the Northern Ireland conflict from an ethnological perspective? The first, direct, answer to this is that the conflict is rooted in a struggle between two distinct ethnic groups. The second answer is that, like a piece of sculpture, these complex issues must be examined from several separate points of view to be seen with any completeness. There are any number of studies of this problem from the point of view of political science, conflict studies, and history. The ethnological approach may also help to sort the different parts of the picture into a more understandable pattern. As Turner (1974: 17) explains it: "Any serious study of man must follow him wherever he goes".

Terrorist acts are different from acts of war in that they are not intended primarily to destroy the enemy, but to communicate. This desire to send a message is explicit in the use of claims for attacks, and frequently implicit in the choice of targets. A source of confusion in the study of terrorism is that these armed political parties sometimes use tactics that are considered legitimate in covert or irregular warfare, as well as ones that are illegitimate. While detonating a bomb in a department store in order to kill civilians doing their Christmas shopping is an act of terrorism, sniping attacks intended to kill armed soldiers on patrol is usually considered to be a legitimate tactic of guerrilla or conventional warfare. Random bombing of civilians has also been used in modern warfare, for example at Guernica during the Spanish Civil War, and at Dresden, Coventry, London, Tokyo and numerous other cities during the Second World War.

Just as there is an "art of war", so there is an art of terrorism. In this case this is not merely to say that terrorist strategy and tactics are an art -- a skill to be learned -- but also that terrorist acts are structurally analogous to some artistic acts. It is art in that it is a form of symbolic communication, not as aesthetics. I think that terrorism is not a type of

guerrilla warfare, but is, in fact, a dramatic representation of it. Dramatic in the sense that it has drama and grabs the attention of spectators, and dramatic in the sense that it is essentially theatrical. Just as in the performance of a Shakespeare history play, a half-dozen men with spears are an army, so a small terrorist group represents, or plays at being an army. Guerrilla warfare, which is a way of sparking a popular uprising, is the phenomenon which terrorists attempt to emulate through dramatic gestures. Popular insurrection is the desired substance; terrorism is merely an attempt at the style.

The Provisional Irish Republican Army, as the case in point, is structured and named in imitation of an army, and is tied to a political party. The PIRA carries out attacks that they refer to as military actions, and arrested members have gone to great lengths, including suicide by starvation, to be treated differently from ordinary criminals in the courts and in prison. The types of attacks that the PIRA commits are all also used by "real" military forces in declared wars. The difference is that, as military attacks in wars, the tactics are usually intended to damage the enemy to the point of forcing them to surrender, but as terrorist attacks they are a form of communication. They are intended to fool the audience into overestimating the strength and capability of the terrorists, and into underestimating the degree to which their own government and security forces are able and willing to protect them. It is clear from their claims for, and explanations of, many attacks that the PIRA intends them to be communicative. It is impossible to say to what extent the PIRA 'soldiers' believe that they could defeat the British militarily.

Use of the term 'drama' is a way of expressing an essential element in the definitions of terrorism, the necessity of an audience to be moved by the violence. As such, drama spills out to describe both terrorism as a tactic, and its strategic context; for terrorist attacks are

performances in their own right, and the Troubles are themselves social dramas. That terrorism is a performance does not make it any less real: the victims are still dead or scarred, the buildings have been no less violently 'deconstructed'. That the perpetrators are attempting to communicate does not exonerate them when they use corpses as their alphabet.

One of the problems that is encountered in studying terrorist groups is that much of the most desirable information, from the point of view of a social scientist, is unknowable. The ethical considerations in doing 'participant observation' among the physical force Republicans of the Falls Road in Belfast would be very problematic, not to mention other difficulties involving personal safety. Participant observation in the Catholic ghettos of Belfast has, however, been done by anthropologist Jeffrey Sluka (1989) and by journalists such as John Conroy (1987) and Martin Dillon (1988, 1989). For reasons of personal safety, both Sluka and Conroy generally avoided contact with the paramilitaries as much as possible.

The actors in the conflict are very selective about what they release to the public, in order to maintain security for their operations and personnel amongst other reasons. It has been claimed that the vast majority of press reporting on incidents in this conflict is based on information from the British Army Information Service (Schmid and de Graaf, 1982: 93). It has also been observed that journalists who manage to interview terrorists often find it difficult to release their reports, due to restrictions inside various media companies (Schlesinger, Murdock and Elliott, 1983: 122-5). There are allegations that the British Army has manipulated and even fabricated some of the information they have released to the media (Schmid and de Graaf, 1982: 93). On the other hand, it is clear that the PIRA

and the Provisional Sinn Fein have manipulated and fabricated items of information which they have given to the media. The use of propaganda, and the biases of journalists are not limited to any one side in this conflict.

Compared to many other topics, there are difficulties in the study of terrorism from an academic standpoint. Access to the perpetrators ranges from indirect to impossible, so the best materials at hand are usually public record accounts of terrorist acts, and second-hand descriptions of terrorists' attitudes and feelings. Media coverage of the Troubles has been "a very skewed and unintelligible picture" (Heskin, 1986: 97), which shows the terrorist attacks but not their context. Heskin states, "In many ways, the media coverage of the conflict in Ireland resembles a cheap Hollywood horror movie, presenting a succession of essentially inexplicable, dreadful deeds perpetrated by unseen evil forces" (1986: 97). I suggest that the terrorist acts in Northern Ireland are actually intended by their performers to be meaningful, dreadful deeds perpetrated by mysterious forces (not unseen, but not fully visible either).

The sources of information that I have used for this study are all from the public domain: primarily academic studies with some use of media information and of official statements or reports from various players in the conflict. There is a large literature on the Troubles in Northern Ireland in the English language, and published books and articles on the IRA are, if anything, over-abundant. Some of the information in these sources is inaccurate, through error, bias, or the unknowability of crucial information, but I have weeded out as much of that as possible. The academic writings that I have used include ethnographies, histories, and studies on: anthropological theory, sociology, political science, art history and theory, performance, and conflict. This multi-disciplinary

approach, using anthropology as the base of an academic ecumenism, is deliberate.

The PIRA's methodologies are changing constantly, with the continual minor alterations in the political context of the conflict, with the introduction of new technology and tactics for their use, and in reaction to new technology and tactics used by the security forces. This study is not a snapshot of the PIRA at one point in time, for to have any precision as such the window of time of the study could only be measured in weeks or months. This is not a historical chronicle of developments either; that has been done elsewhere. Instead, this is a more general, extensive view which examines the PIRA over the past ten years, but in the greater context of the current Troubles and of the history of the Irish conflict. Thus, when I describe the PIRA, it is not a picture of a static monolithic being, but of a constantly shifting assortment of individuals and behaviours.

The conflict has a triangular structure, in which the Republican paramilitaries, the Loyalist paramilitaries, and the British government and military are all in opposition to one another. Yet the Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries cooperate economically in some of their fund-raising activities, and may also cooperate in the disposal of 'loose-cannons' within their own organizations. The Loyalist paramilitaries and the British government have a degree of ideological similarity; both are attempting to maintain Northern Ireland as a part of Great Britain although they have opposing views on how Northern Irish society should be structured. There does not appear to be any balancing cooperation between the Republican paramilitaries and the British government and military, other than the opportunity the Provos give the British to develop state-of-the-art counter-insurgency skills. Despite the social and political limitations to the violence, only the security forces are explicitly rule-bound in their operations.

CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF SOURCES

"There is no such thing as a moral or an immoral book. Books are well written, or badly written. That is all."

Oscar Wilde

The current conflict in Northern Ireland and its predecessors over the centuries have been the subject of massive amounts of academic and popular attention, as Winchester (1974: 13) described the situation: "Acre for acre, Ireland has probably suffered more books than any other country on earth." In a current and deep-rooted conflict such as the situation in Northern Ireland it is to be expected that many people who study it will have at least some biases, some of them will have such extensive biases that they produce only propaganda. Documents written by persons involved in either side of the conflict are often, in fact, an extension of the conflict. Propaganda and disinformation are naturally the products of sophisticated opponents, and it is important to sort out the false or exaggerated information from that which is probably true.

When using media sources, I have attempted to use the most reliable ones that I could find, to ensure the most accurate information was included. It is important to remember, in the light of occasional media inaccuracies, that stories presented by the media often have a greater role in the entire terrorist performance than do the facts as they actually occurred. The actual event is generally experienced by a very small fraction of the people who are exposed to it through the media's particular filters.

The most serious problem in a study of terrorist groups and activity from an academic standpoint is the ultimate unknowability of much of the interesting data. This unknowability exists because of the selectiveness of any release of information both by the

group and by the security forces. The terrorists are highly secretive in order not to give the authorities useful information with which to disrupt their campaigns or to capture and prosecute them, and also because their mystery is an essential part of their power. They intentionally use any information that they do release as propaganda. The security forces are selective about what information they reveal about the group in order not to jeopardize their investigations or the lives of any informants they may have in place. Statements made by the members of the PIRA, e.g. Sean MacStiofáin or Bobby Sands, are heavily influenced by their beliefs. Statements by former PIRA members, like Maria McGuire, are in turn influenced by their reaction to formerly held beliefs. In either case, the statements are also probably written with an eye to avoiding successful prosecution for criminal acts.

The following are some examples of the biases to be encountered in the good academic studies of this conflict.

Elliot and Hickie wrote their study in the first years of the troubles, and their work has a typically late-1960's left-wing anti-police attitude. They were worried that if their data was too specific they would give the police an "unfair advantage": "Fortunately maybe, our data are too sparse to be of much use, but a larger survey could easily act as a policeman's guide to the whereabouts and aims of local troublemakers" (1971: 146).

The same concern that a detailed analysis would be of use to the security forces was expressed by Jeffrey Sluka in his ethnography of the Divis Flats (a Catholic ghetto in Belfast). His ethical stand is that his work is an academic search for the truth, and should not be useful to the security forces in their attempts to reduce paramilitary violence. In the prologue of his book, Sluka goes so far as to request that "members of the Security Forces

in Northern Ireland read no further and do not abuse my work by trying to use it as a source of intelligence or basis for planning their counterinsurgency operations" (1989: 39).

To my mind, this statement reveals an incredible degree of naiveté on his part. While he has a personal moral obligation to protect his informants, I believe that attempts to limit the security forces' understanding of the situation will only serve to perpetuate the hostility between them and the Catholic community.

Alfred McClung Lee (1983) implies throughout his book that the Northern Ireland conflict could have been avoided if the British had learned from American society. This after having commented on problems with the Ku Klux Klan in his home town (let him who is without sin...?). On pages 24-5, he accuses the British establishment: "Instead of attempting to create a cosmopolitan state in which Britishness -- like contemporary Americanism -- would wear many garbs, the dominant English elites long tried to create a state culturally expedient for themselves with the lower classes divided against themselves by ethnic differences." Other than his occasional 'holier than thou' comments, his analysis of the social origins of terrorist behaviour in Northern Ireland appear sound, and because he devotes a chapter to "Terror as Theatre", his book is worthwhile overall. His pro-republican biases are at least obvious, and he does not let these interfere too much with the parts of his analysis that were of interest to me. He uses a broad definition of terrorism, which includes actions by the security forces and government (interrogations, internment without trial), as well as actions by paramilitary groups.

From the other side of the fence, Morris and Hoe wrote a practical guide to the nature of terrorism aimed at businesses. Both writers are involved in security consulting. Morris taught at Sandhurst for 14 years, Hoe spent 20 years in the SAS, so they tend to present

the English point of view on Northern Ireland, and concentrate on the Republican paramilitaries. Their focus is on the criminal aspects of the conflict.

Sean MacStiofáin was born John Stephenson in England, he was half-Irish and had served in the Royal Air Force. He was chief of intelligence for the IRA, and then an original leader of the PIRA. His book is an inside view of the IRA and PIRA in the period leading up to the split, and during the early years of this set of the troubles. It is clearly written in his self-interest, possibly riddled with disinformation, but also a great potential insight into the mind of a leading physical-force Republican.

Bobby Sands was the leader of the 1981 hunger strikes, and a PIRA leader in the H-Blocks. His book is allegedly a description of one day of his imprisonment during the "dirty protest". It was published in 1983, after his death, and may be ghost-written. It is certainly propaganda.

Maria McGuire wrote an inside view of the PIRA Army Council. She claims not to have written the book as pro-British propaganda, and it appears to be a balanced attempt to describe the motivations and meanings of the PIRA campaigns of the early 1970's, and to explain why she became disgusted with the PIRA methods enough to leave. She was a middle-class university graduate who spent a year in the PIRA before defecting, and has been described by other writers as a "terrorist groupie". MacStiofáin states that McGuire was a minor member of the Sinn Féin working in publicity and translation, and that she included confidential information in her book (MacStiofáin, 1975: 306-7). Considering MacStiofáin's loyalties and propensity for disinformation, these statements may mean that she did not include confidential information, or that she had a more central role in the Sinn

Fein.

Despite the large number of books, papers and articles written on terrorism and on the Irish conflict, especially on the history and the Republican physical force tradition, and on the political and military aspects of terrorism, there are also some notable gaps. There has been little written on the social functions of terrorism in the Irish conflict, and most of that is made up of purely anecdotal records by journalists (Kelley and McAllister's 1986 work is an exception). I have not been able to find any study of the structure of terrorist acts, or on the factors that limit terrorist violence. In the former case, Schechner's studies of performance provided roughly parallel structures. In the latter case, there are some papers which have considered the political factors limiting terrorist violence, especially in relation to the possibility of escalation to non-conventional weapons (nuclear, chemical or biological). There are also a number of writers on terrorism who focus only on the factors that escalate terrorist violence, and it is sometimes difficult not to suspect that they are attempting to use the resulting concern in their audience to support their own careers in counter-terrorism.

Though many authors use various performing arts as analogies to terrorism, I have found very few writers who have looked at terrorism as performance in more than a superficial manner. Schechner makes some very brief references to terrorism as performance (1977: 70, 126), and there is a tongue-in-cheek article by Cheryl Bernstein (1977) about the Symbionese Liberation Army as a performance group that I discovered recently, but there appears to be no in-depth look at the similarities and their meanings.

Ethnographic studies of Northern Ireland have, according to Donnan and McFarlane

(1986: 24), focussed on rural communities. They cite Harris's *Prejudice and Tolerance in Ulster* (1972) as "the key text" on the divide between the Protestant and Catholic communities. Harris examines the complex subtleties of Ulster society with great dexterity, and gives useful insights into the similarities as well as the differences between the communities. The only exception to this rural bias is Sluka's work on Republican support in the Divis Flats, which I have already commented on.

The most interesting gap in the coverage of the Northern Irish conflict is the lack of study of the Loyalist paramilitaries. Aughey (1988: 104) describes Loyalist paramilitarism as not fitting into any easily recognizable category of terrorism, and states that the "basic characteristic of militant loyalism is inarticulacy". This is a great contrast with the songs and symbols of militant republicanism. Certainly the loyalist cause is not well represented, and outside of Ireland and the United Kingdom the symbols of Orange Irish culture are neither as clear nor as commonly known as those of the other Irish.

THEORETICAL FOUNDATION AND DEFINITIONS

"Diversity of opinion about a work of art shows that the work is new, complex, and vital."
Oscar Wilde

In this project I have used a variety of theoretical approaches in order to understand the nature of terrorism in the Northern Ireland context. I started work on the topic using the Structural-Functionalist conflict theories of Coser and Simmel, and then incorporated the idea of behaviour as performance as seen in the works of Goffman, Turner and Schechner. These two windows into the problem are complementary; they reveal different aspects of terrorist behaviour. The functionalist framework reveals the nature of the stability of the conflict, and the performative framework reveals the inner form of the acts of violence.

This thesis performs a kind of deconstructionist analysis on the phenomenon of terrorism. It is deconstructionist not in the strict sense of literary text analysis, but in the sense that I dismantle various aspects of the culture of Physical Force Republicanism and of acts of violence which have been committed for its goals, in order to find the inner structure and meaning of the acts. Gaggi (1989: 158) describes deconstructionism as having its source in "radical scepticism applied to the reading of texts". As Norris (1982: 106) admits, deconstructionist scepticism is more of a hypothesis than an answer; it is neither true nor false on its own. This use of applied scepticism is essential in the study of terrorist acts; it is necessary to dislodge the layers of disinformation, exaggeration and wilful misunderstanding which are an integral part of terrorist dramas. This thesis is not purely one of deconstruction since "The end-point of deconstructive thought, as Derrida insists, is to recognize that there is no end to the interrogative play between text and text. Deconstruction can never have the final word because its insights are inevitably couched in a rhetoric which itself lies open to further deconstructive reading" (Norris, 1982: 84). I

have taken deconstruction as a tool, not a goal.

Gaggi later states that deconstructionism is an analytical approach which argues that "the apparent meaning of a text is never the unambiguous truth about it and that other unacknowledged meanings may be present that are different from or even opposed to the apparent one" (1989: 163-4). The finding of contradictory meanings within a text is considered central to deconstruction by Norris (1982: 48), who states that the revealing of paradoxical themes which are in contradiction to the explicit meaning of the text opens the text up to a deconstructive analysis.

I think that ethnological theories are of use in the study of terrorism, because, as Dowling (1989b: 45) states: "terrorism and revolution are not aberrations, but simply another ordering of human society". Dowling argues this in the context of terrorists who oppose their own society and who are "divorcing themselves from the past" (1989b: 45), but the statement is equally descriptive of terrorists such as the PIRA members who are attempting to be true to their past.

An ethnological approach to the analysis of terrorism would be one which examines the phenomenon as an extension of the world-view of the actors. Terrorist groups make up sub-cultures with consistent ways of understanding their environment and of acting, so terrorist acts are meaningful extensions of their cosmology, in the same way that the Crusades were an extension of medieval European Christianity. These acts of terrorism can be studied as a visible result of the terrorist's beliefs. Terrorist acts are only the most visible aspect of the behaviour of terrorists; many other aspects of their culture are intentionally kept secret and are hence unknowable to the outsider.

My interest in Coser's idea of realistic vs. non-realistic conflict stems from an attempt to distinguish between guerrilla warfare and terrorism, two types of conflict that often seem to overlap, and are often confused with one another. Both types of conflict can be used as tactics and strategy; a group that is waging a guerrilla war strategically can use terrorism as a tactic, and vice-versa, just as a regular army in a war between nation states can use terrorist and guerrilla techniques. When I undertook this thesis I suspected that terrorism and guerrilla warfare could be distinguished by the tactics used and the targets selected for their attacks. This is not the case. The real difference lies in the frequency of the attacks, and in the importance of the audience. As is demonstrated later, the targets and techniques of the PIRA are no different from those in the repertoire of guerrilla or regular armies. The paradox within the 'war' that the PIRA is fighting, is that it is an imitation of a war. When a guerrilla war has a low level of activity and a high degree of publicity it becomes a representation of a guerrilla war.

One of the major differences between the terrorism and guerrilla warfare is that guerrillas are using irregular means to defeat an opponent militarily, while terrorists use a lower level of violence in order to send a message to their opponents. Terrorist violence is symbolic. Symbolic violence in this context can be physical attacks against things or people who have an obvious symbolic significance to the government, or they can be against things or people whom the perpetrators have labelled as having significance. In either case, the violence is not being used to attack an enemy directly, but is used as a form of communication with a variety of audiences. Just as speech, music, and visual art use sets of symbols to communicate, terrorist groups use them as well. The use of violence by terrorists in transmitting their symbols is a kind of amplification. This definition of

symbolic violence is entirely unlike the same term as used by Bourdieu, for whom "Symbolic violence is the gentle, hidden form which violence takes when overt violence is impossible" (Bourdieu: 1977, 196). Both the communicative use of violence and the coercion of audiences by terrorists have parallels in modern performance art which will be explored later. The intentional juxtaposition of the realistic and nonrealistic elements in terrorist events sometimes appears to indicate that terrorism is neither and both, in essence a form of surrealistic conflict. The probability that mixtures of these two ideal types of conflict would occur was admitted by Coser (1964: 53) when he stated: "The distinction between realistic and nonrealistic conflict involves a conceptual abstraction from concrete reality in which the two types may be merged."

Coser draws his idea of realistic and nonrealistic conflict from Simmel's discussion of "Antagonism as an Element in Sociation" (Simmel, 1955: 27-8). In this section, Simmel is discussing the necessity of having rules in warfare in order to allow for a negotiated peace, rather than victory through extermination. He then proceeds to describe situations in which the fight is caused by some end which can be settled, theoretically, by other means as well; and situations in which the fight exists for its own ends, with the object of the conflict serving as an excuse. In the first type, rules exist in order to allow for other forms of conflict resolution. In the second type, the conflict is merely the projection of hostility, and since no other alternative to fighting is desirable, no rules are needed. Simmel does not use the terms "realistic" or "nonrealistic" himself; these appear to be of Coser's invention. One could just as easily, and as accurately, use other paired terms such as 'rational' and 'irrational', or 'instrumental' and 'expressive'.

Coser (1964: 48-55) describes what he calls "Proposition 3: Realistic and Nonrealistic

Conflict":

There are cases, however, where the conflict arises exclusively from aggressive impulses which seek expression no matter what the object, where in the conflict the choice of object is purely accidental. In such cases, no such limitations exist, since it is not the attainment of a result, but rather the acting out of aggressive energies which occasions the outbreak.

Implicit in this differentiation between conflict as a means and conflict as an end in itself is a criterion by which to distinguish between realistic and nonrealistic conflict. Conflicts which arise from frustration of specific demands within the relationship and from estimates of gains of the participants, and which are directed at the presumed frustrating object, can be called realistic conflicts, insofar as they are means toward a specific result. Nonrealistic conflicts, on the other hand, although still involving interaction between two or more persons, are not occasioned by the rival ends of the antagonists, but by the need for tension release of at least one of them. In this case the choice of antagonists depends on determinants not directly related to a contentious issue and is not oriented toward the attainment of specific results."

Based on this statement, guerrilla warfare can be called realistic in that it is actually an attempt to use military force to defeat the opposing force, and terrorism can be called nonrealistic in that it consists of attacks against objects and individuals, the destruction of which does not lead directly to the stated purpose of the conflict.

Coser then goes on to states that:

Nonrealistic conflicts arise from deprivations and frustrations stemming from the socialization process and from later adult role obligations, or they result, as we have seen in the previous proposition, from a conversion of originally realistic antagonism which was disallowed expression. Whereas the first type of conflict takes place with the frustrating agents themselves in expectation of attaining specific results, the second type consists of a release of tension in aggressive action directed against shifting objects. The first type of conflict is viewed by the participants as a means toward the achievement of realistic ends, a means which might be abandoned if other means appear to be more effective for reaching the same end. The second leaves no such choice, since satisfaction is derived from the aggressive act itself.

For this distinction, the terms 'instrumental' and 'expressive' would be more appropriate. Non-realistic conflict appears here to be an idiosyncratic acting-out of personal frustration. This is a kind of performance, but I doubt it could be the base for an established violent tradition such as that of the PIRA. However, using this distinction the campaign of sectarian murders by Loyalist gangs such as the Shankill Butchers appear to be clearly nonrealistic in nature. They correspond most closely with the examples of racist violence used by Simmel. Lebow (1978: 46) states that the most important cause of the Loyalist sectarian murders was "the sense of rage and frustration felt within the Protestant community", which resulted in a desire among some people to strike out at those perceived to be 'the enemy'-- the Catholics. The chosen victims were just people who were perceived to be members of the opposing community; actual membership in an opposing paramilitary group was not required.

By drawing Coser's interpretations of Simmel's theories into the context of persistent small-scale political violence, we get this set of distinctions:

- Realistic conflict: uses tactics designed to defeat the enemy, targets chosen for strategic value, e.g. soldiers, policemen. To be successful it must be waged from a position of military strength superior to the enemy (this advantage may be in the form of superior strategy, motivation, training, equipment or numbers).
- Nonrealistic conflict: uses tactics designed to appear to defeat the enemy, targets chosen for publicity (shock) value, e.g. random civilians. To be successful it can be waged from a position of considerable military inferiority, with very few people and with improvised or simple weapons.

Terrorist tactics are not capable of leading to a military defeat of the enemy, they can

only lead to their propaganda / symbolic defeat due to a collapse of will or of public support. A symbolic defeat is, however, judged in a highly subjective manner, since it occurs in the mind, without requiring corresponding significant physical damage. The audience that terrorists would then be best at reaching would be their own supporters (preaching to the converted). Since it is easier to convince someone who wishes to believe you, a terrorist group's supporters would believe that their opponent had been defeated long before the opponent would acknowledge it. Also, the communicative aspect of terrorist violence is most articulate to those in the audience who share in the terrorist's world view, since the symbols then carry the same meanings.

The religious issue is not actually central to the conflict; it is really between members of two ethnic groups with different ideas about who has the right to govern Northern Ireland. The Loyalist side is more inclined to state that religion is a major issue in the conflict, while the republicans tend to explain it in terms of secular politics. The fact that the paramilitary groups on both sides tend to be made up of members of the working class does not necessarily make this a repressed class struggle, though major paramilitary groups on both sides have occasionally claimed that this was the case as have some academics such as Robin Jenkins (unpublished article cited in Elliot and Hickie, 1971: 8) . Other studies, such as that of Kelley and McAllister (1986) have discounted the Marxist economic interpretation of the conflict.

The difference between realistic and nonrealistic conflict is that one is meant to obtain victory over the opponent, the other is not. Since nonrealistic conflict is not intended to defeat an enemy, it must be an attempt to communicate with them, or with someone else. Violence that is not plausibly aimed at victory is a medium of communication, this kind of

carefully scripted communicative violence is structurally a form of theatrical presentation. In this sense terrorism is nonrealistic since it has instrumental victims and an audience, and guerrilla warfare is realistic since the important targets are the direct victims. The physical force tradition of Irish Republicanism has a mixed history of guerrilla warfare, insurrection, terrorism and civil war, which is described in the next chapter. The PIRA activity in the current Troubles, certainly since the removal of the no-go areas in 1972, has been realistic in some of its targeting, but non-realistic in its frequency.

The idea that terrorist attacks are not realistic, in the broadest sense, has also been commented on by Schmid and de Graaf (1982: 219), who state that many acts of terrorism are "pseudo-events", that is events that "were not staged for their local effects but for their mediated effects". Terrorist tactics attempt to appear to be realistic, albeit indirect, attacks aimed at the enemy. Attacks on civilians are an indirect attack at the Nation, as civilian victims are symbols of the enemy population. Attacks on security forces are direct attacks on the State, as the security forces are the personification of the authority and hence the legitimacy of the State. This reification of the victims into the enemy is a standard practice in terrorism.

Terrorism can be seen as being a form of total war in the same way that guerilla warfare is a form of limited war. One of terrorism's strengths as a form of conflict is that the two parties must fight by different rules - the terrorist can fight a total war, but the government must be seen to fight within strict limits or it will lose its ability to govern the population. The concept of total war is certainly used by the Loyalist paramilitaries -- specifically the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) in their magazine Combat (quoted in Dillon, 1989: 39):

Having realized that we are in a war situation and that we have been forced,

as a result of political compromise and treason, to engage ourselves in a war effort against our enemies, it must also be realized that the talk of humane methods of warfare and the rule of civilized warfare and all such homage to the sentiments of mankind are hypocritical and unreal and are only intended for the consumption of stay-at-home armchair generals. There are no humane methods of warfare, there is no such thing as civilized warfare; all warfare is inhuman, all warfare is barbaric; the first blast of the bugles of war sounds for the time being the funeral knell of human progress.

As Simmel had stated, total war leaves no room for a negotiated peace. Therefore the use of total war is non-realistic. Yet in the chapter on optimum violence, I will show some of the limits that exist for terrorist violence in this conflict. These limits are not, however, in the form of mutually agreed on rules. Simmel (1955: 39) in speaking on 'Conflicts over Causes', also stated that conflicts in which the participants see themselves as being "mere representatives of supra-individual claims", fighting for a cause instead of for themselves, tend to have less room for compromise or negotiation. He considers that this is because the participants, being selfless in their dedication to the cause, show no more consideration or mercy to others than they show to themselves. Since they are willing to become martyrs, they are willing to sacrifice others as well.

Simmel also made a statement which is very descriptive of the conflict between the two ethnic communities in Ireland: "The mutual hatred of very small neighboring states whose whole outlooks, local relations, and interests are inevitably very similar and frequently even coincide, often is much more passionate and irreconcilable than between great nations, which both spatially and objectively are complete strangers to one another." (1955: 42).

Terrorism can be analysed in terms of art, that is to say that a close examination of the details and structure of terrorist behaviour can lead to a reconstruction of the events as performances. According to Richard Schechner (1985: 3) the use of the "drama analogy"

has become a major trend in Anthropology; he cites Victor Turner, Clifford Geertz and Erving Goffman as prominent individuals in the field who are using this tool in the explanation of behaviour. In this context, my argument that performance art is analogous with terrorist acts should be seen as an attempt to examine the structure of these acts and their functions within the participants' culture. Schechner (1985: 33) states that:

The convergence of anthropology and theater is part of a larger intellectual movement where the understanding of human behavior is changing from quantifiable differences between cause and effect, past and present, form and content, et cetera (and the linear modes of analyses that explicate such a world view) to an emphasis on the deconstruction/reconstruction of actualities: the processes of framing, editing, and rehearsing; the making and manipulating of strips of behavior -- what I call "restored behavior".

Erving Goffman (1959: 15-16) defines a performance as:

... all the activity of a given participant on a given occasion which serves to influence in any way any of the other participants. Taking a particular participant and his performance as a basic point of reference, we may refer to those who contribute the other performances as the audience, observers, or co-participants. The pre-established pattern of action which is unfolded during a performance and which may be presented or played through on other occasions may be called a "part" or "routine".... Defining social role as the enactment of rights and duties attached to a given status, we can say that a social role will involve one or more parts and that each of these different parts may be presented by the performer on a series of occasions to the same kinds of audience or to an audience of the same persons.

Using Goffman's definition, terrorist attacks are indeed performances since by their very nature they are an attempt to influence an audience. As will be discussed later, some terrorist acts intentionally blur the line between 'audience' and 'co-participant'. The perpetrators/actors often enact their roles in a series of attacks in which the audience members are the same kinds of people (e.g. members of a particular community in Belfast). When the individuals are acting as members of their paramilitary organization outside of committing attacks, it is usually among the same circle of people in their family and/or their habitual drinking establishment.

Lee (1983: 168-99) devotes a chapter to "Terror as Theater" in which he investigates the nature of terrorism as a dramatic presentation:

Acts of political terrorization can well be perceived as a form of theater. They become dramas with possible and then sometimes actual consequences that are well or poorly calculated, predicted, assessed, and reassessed by the various participants. The purpose of a given terrorizing scenario is at the least to try to force a propaganda message into public awareness, discussion, and action.... It may use ambush, explosion, assassination, insurgent or governmental trials of captured opponents, raiding, rioting, hunger striking, or some other form of spectacle (1983: 168).

I agree with Lee's general argument here, but I would not include rioting or hunger striking as terrorism although they are politically-motivated performances which use violence or the threat of death. The identity between perpetrator and instrumental victim in the hunger-strike removes the usual triangular structure of terrorist conflict (perpetrator, victim, and audience).

The idea that terrorism is a form of performance art has been put forward in a tongue-in-cheek article by Cheryl Bernstein (1977: 79-83) in which she wrote a mock review of the Symbionese Liberation Army acts that took place in California. Her article is an ironic game in that she demands the reader assume that the SLA activists were deeply versed in the theories of performance art, were intending their activity to be art, and were only using their political rhetoric as part of artistic expression. It is a serious game because her observations about the clear similarities between terrorism and 'guerrilla theatre' are well founded. My proposal that terrorism and performance art are structurally-linked phenomena does not require that the people who perform either kind of act have any interest in, or knowledge of, the other kind.

Terrorism Definitions

The number and variety of definitions of terrorism is immense. Some consist of one sentence, others of many paragraphs; some describe only the actions of small anti-government groups in democratic states, others include acts of war between states and acts of criminal extortion and blackmail. Most include the concept of fear and intimidation, the better ones include in some way the triangular nature of terrorism in which the target of the attack is not necessarily the target of the message.

Two definitions of terrorism quoted in Smyth (1989: 103) are actually quite inclusive. Richard Clutterbuck, a British counter-insurgency authority, describes it as follows: "Terrorism aims by the use of violence or the threat of violence to coerce governments, authorities or populations by inducing fear". Paul Wilkinson, an internationally known academic expert on terrorism, gives this slightly more expansive definition: "Terrorism can be defined as the systematic use of murder, injury and destruction or threat of same to publicize a cause and to intimidate a wider target into conceding the terrorist's aims". Both of these definitions could easily include military actions in wartime such as aerial bombing of cities or commando raids, or the use of corporal or capital punishment on prisoners by governments. As Rubenstein (1987: 19) has pointed out: "All political violence, including war, revolution, and everyday enforcement of criminal law, involves the intimidation (or 'deterrence') of civilians".

"Terrorism is the threat or use of violence for political purposes by individuals or groups, whether acting for, or in opposition to, established governmental authority, when such actions are intended to influence a target group wider than the immediate victim or

victims." This is the definition used by the US Department of State, quoted in Norton (1988: 4). Norton's criticism of this definition is that it does not adequately distinguish terrorism from other, legitimate, forms of political violence. Norton considers terrorism to be "the deliberate, unjustifiable and random uses of violence for political ends against protected groups" (Norton, 1988: 5). By "protected groups" he means noncombatants, individuals theoretically protected under modern rules of war. In the Northern Ireland context, where many of PIRA attacks are against military and other security personnel, or at least are not completely at random, this definition covers only some incidents.

Eqbal Ahmad attempts to define terrorism while excluding acts of war when he states that: "Terrorism does not refer to the mutual fear of armed adversaries but only to the acts of intimidating and injuring unarmed, presumably innocent, civilians" cited in Smyth (1989: 104). I would say that by this definition terrorism does exist in military tactics, used between armed adversaries and in addition to their normal mutual apprehension. The use of snipers, commandos and other special tactics often do include a large element of psychological warfare, and are intended to terrorize an audience of enemy soldiers.

Ahmad does make a very good point (again cited in Smyth, 1989: 105) when he states that part of the source of terrorism, as a seemingly recent form of conflict, must lie in technology. More effective and compact munitions (dynamite, Semtex, submachine guns. .) allow a small group of paramilitaries to cause significant destruction. The rise of more efficient means of communication to carry the dramatic events (illustrated newspapers, radio, television...) allows the same small band to reach a greater audience than would have been possible in pre-industrial societies. So the aspect of terrorism, as a group of individuals using sporadic violence against the populace in an attempt to extort

political concessions from a government which is militarily unassailable to them, is a product of the Industrial Revolution. This is supported by the appearance of modern terroristic techniques in the Fenian movement in the late 1800's, especially in the "Dynamite War".

Townshend resists the temptation to attempt a definition, instead offering a classification of political violence in Irish history which consists of three main categories: "the spontaneous collective violence (or social violence) which may have no explicit political intention but has political implications; systematic covert intimidation or terrorism; and organized open insurrection" (1983: 407-8).

When Corrado and Evans (1988: 374) define terrorism in comparison to guerrilla and orthodox warfare, they state that:

Terrorist tactics and goals are similar to those of guerrilla warfare, except that terrorists rarely occupy or exclusively control territory ... the intention of a guerrilla army is normally to achieve a specific military objective by the application of its own resources, the immediate aim of a terrorist group is to generate fear and confusion at random among noncombatants in the hope of undermining confidence in a government's political and military forces. Whereas the target for orthodox military operations is the military capacity of an opponent, the target for insurgent terrorists is the political legitimacy of a regime or government; whereas guerrilla warfare involves a direct bid for power, terrorism is concerned with eroding political authority rather than with immediately seeking its supplantation.

This definition is too specific, leaving gaps which are revealed when it is applied to the Northern Ireland situation, and the PIRA specifically. The PIRA does not attempt to generate fear and confusion at random among noncombatants, they have specific communities of noncombatants which they target. They do attempt to undermine confidence in the security forces, not only by attacking civilians, but more by attacks on the security forces themselves. Their explicit goals are those of a guerrilla force, but they do

not exclusively control territory (although they did in the no-go areas of Londonderry and Belfast in the early 1970's). On the whole, the PIRA according to this definition is a terrorist group.

Terrorism, as used to describe symbolic violence in a political conflict, is in many ways a misnomer, as terror is not the emotion felt by the intended target audience, as opposed to the instrumental victims. Neither I, nor anyone I know who has been part of the secondary audience of an attack has ever felt real terror as a result of a terrorist incident. When three members of the Armenian Revolutionary Army seized the Turkish Embassy in Ottawa in the spring of 1985, my fiancée was waiting for her bus at the end of that street, well within range of the gunshots. My reaction to her being endangered was outrage, not terror. Her initial reaction to the nearby explosion and shots was disbelief (that sort of thing only happens on TV) mixed with some healthy apprehension. The Victorian British press, when confronted by Dynamite bomb attacks in London by the Irish Republicans in the late 19th Century, called the perpetrators "Outrage Mongers", a much more accurate and profound term than "terrorist". Outrage is, I think, a better description of the reaction of the target audience to the attacks. The instrumental victims, the individuals who are terrorized by a terrorist attack, are not the real targets. Their terror, like their injury or death, is only desired by the perpetrators for the effect it has on the audience. Unfortunately, "Outrage Monger" does not sit well in modern speech, so I will continue to use "terrorist" as the generic term.

Schmid and de Graaf (1982:15) define terrorism as a "violent communication strategy". More specifically, they state that terrorism is: "the deliberate and systematic use or threat of violence against instrumental (human) targets (C) in a conflict between two (A, B) or more

parties, whereby the immediate victims C -- who might not even be part of the conflicting parties -- cannot, through a change of attitude or behaviour, dissociate themselves from the conflict." I would not stipulate that C in this case must be human, as the attack on symbols is also terroristic, but except for that one point, this is one of my favorite definitions of terrorism. Schmid and de Graaf (1982: 58) give two conditions which must be fulfilled for an act to be terroristic: "(a) the victim cannot, through his own doing, e.g. by capitulating, save his life, and (b) the victimization is done primarily for its effects on third parties and not because of the victim himself." This definition encapsulates the triangular structure of terrorism, with perpetrator, instrumental victim, and audience.

A problem with the definition of terrorism as violence against non-combatants is that terrorism can in fact be used against military personnel in combat as well as against civilians who are not directly involved in the conflict. In this sense, terrorism is the pursuit of policy goals by the selective use of violence intended to influence an audience which may or may not include the victim. This audience can be quite small, for example the other members of a soldier's platoon; or it can include many citizens of a number of nations, as in the case of some of the longer-lasting airplane hijackings. An example of terrorism against combatants is a sniping attack on a soldier on patrol in a city. This is a form of attack that is hard to prevent, it is unpredictable, and is not only intended to remove the victim from the conflict but to increase the psychological pressure on the survivors. Terrorism is a form of psychological warfare, which can be waged by any organization against any other group of individuals in order to influence their behaviour through intimidation. The groups involved may be governments and insurgents, members of separate ethnic populations, or even rival factions within an organization.

One of the problems in defining terrorism and terrorists, is the widespread idea that such a category has real boundaries. In fact the defining outlines of the category are vague and transparent because the actors use the tactic either solely, or occasionally in conjunction with other tactics, or perhaps only once. It is not a question of the actor stating "I am a terrorist, therefore all my political activities must be terrorism". The actor's point of view is more likely to be that s/he is an activist for a cause who is willing to use terrorism as one of several tactics to further policy goals. This is further complicated by the fact that many "terrorists" deny the label, considering themselves to be urban guerrillas, or freedom fighters, or partisans.

Richard Schechner (1977, 45) has observed that: "Taxonomy in a social science is based on structures that tend to blend into each other on a continuum rather than exist as compartments of 'species' of events. Thus, the exact point at which a boundary is set marking one structure off from another is arbitrary. However, the center of each kind of structure is very different from the center of any other." Because of this situation, in this paper I will be referring not only to incidents that were terrorism, but also to incidents that were terroristic (as an alternative term, terroroid does not roll trippingly off the tongue). Terroristic incidents, as opposed to terrorist incidents, are those which approach the boundaries with ordinary crime, or conventional warfare, or some other activity.

Chapter II HISTORY AND NATURE OF REPUBLICAN VIOLENCE IN IRELAND

HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT

"Above the Irish Sea, the British Airways pilot announced that the temperature in Belfast was 60 degrees and the local time was 1690."
Sally Belfrage

The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) is the main currently active example of the physical force tradition of Irish Republicanism in the conflict in Ireland. The political root of the conflict is that the Republicans want all Ireland to be united as an independent state, while the Loyalists want Northern Ireland to remain as part of the United Kingdom and separate from the Republic of Ireland. The conflict between Republicans and Loyalists is usually simplified by the media into one between the Catholics and Protestants. This is a misleading simplification because the Troubles are not a conflict over theology or dogma, but are caused by a political situation involving two distinct ethnic groups who have opposing designs for the same parcel of land. This simplification is in part caused by the use in Northern Ireland of the denominational terms as labels for the ethnic distinction.

A variety of other terms are also used to distinguish between the two cultures: some are political, such as Loyalist and Republican, or Unionist and Nationalist; some are ethnic descriptions, such as Scotch-Irish and Gaels, British and Irish. The terms Orange and Green have historical roots, and imply religious and political affiliation as well as ethnicity. The colours are used as symbols by both sides, and on the flag of the Irish Republic as well.

Religion is only one of the differences between the two participating groups in the Northern Ireland conflict, each of whom tend to support a particular side and whose political differences are the result of the ethnic conflict. As Shivers and Bowman (1985: 3) point out, the terms 'Catholic' and 'Protestant' in Northern Ireland do not primarily refer to a person's religious faith, but to "two diverse and sometimes conflicting cultures" separated by history. The Republican paramilitaries usually describe the conflict as political, as a war against British colonial oppression, while the Loyalist paramilitaries describe it as religious, defending their freedoms from impending Papist tyranny.

Jenkins (1986: 4) defines ethnicity, drawing on the context of the Northern Ireland situation, as group membership based on "a shared social or cultural identity and which is frequently combined with an oppositional stance relative to other ethnic groups". He also states that the important aspects of ethnic identity include: "language, territorial occupation, religion and a shared history (particularly, perhaps, a history of conflict against other ethnic groups)" (Jenkins, 1986: 4). The two groups in the Northern Irish conflict generally speak the same language (although the PIRA encourages its members to learn Gaelic), they share the same island, and both sides place great importance on their history of conflict with the other. Religion is the most obvious and most easily expressed difference in their ethnic definitions.

Kelley and McAllister in the results of their statistical studies (1986: 76), point out that the conflict is between two groups with different religious affiliations, but that religious commitment and belief has "little or nothing to do with the problem". Kelley and McAllister also determine that economic/class theories do not explain the Troubles, that improving the economic condition of the Catholics in Northern Ireland would have a

negligible effect on the level of violence (1986: 92). The factor that they found as a major cause of violence is previous personal exposure to violence, "Terrorists sow dragon's teeth and reap a harvest of violence in return" (1986: 91). This sowing of dragon's teeth by acts of politically motivated violence has been ongoing throughout Ireland's history, and crops of Physical Force Republicans and Loyalist extremists have been springing up intermittently since the late 1700's.

The Republicans tend to be Irish Catholics, descendants of the Celtic Irish defeated and displaced by the English in the 16th and 17th centuries. These were the people most affected by the rise of nationalism and the cultural renaissance of the Gaelic language and of Irish art and music in the late 1800's, because it was their traditional culture that was being resurrected.

The Loyalists tend to be Orangemen, Irish Protestant dissenters (Presbyterian rather than Anglican). They are the descendants of colonists moved to Ireland by the English as part of their attempt to pacify Ireland in the 1600's. Originally, most came from Scotland. This was the group that profited most in the Industrial Revolution and through English rule, due to preferential treatment given them in industry and government in the 1800's and through most of this century. While not obviously an ethnic group, since their own specific identity is obscured by their emphasis on 'Britishness', what they describe as their "Protestant way of life" holds for them "an ethnic distinctness equal to that of any national group in Europe, and which they would defend if necessary by war." (Townshend, 1983: 342-3). The 'Britishness' of the Loyalists is actually a way they describe themselves as not being Irish (Townshend, 1983: 343).

These two ethnic groups have been in conflict, though not always in the form of open violence, since the 1600's. In this latest round of Troubles starting in 1969, 2,916 have been killed in Northern Ireland (figures current to October 1991). Only 627 of these dead have been British soldiers, including members of the UDR; all the rest have been civilians, policemen, or members of the various paramilitary groups such as the PIRA (Anon., 1991: 22).

The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) is the largest group dedicated to the creation of a united, 32 county, sovereign Ireland through the use of violence. In the context of Irish Republicanism, the PIRA belongs to the physical force, or revolutionary tradition rather than to the constitutionalist tradition. Irish Republicanism is the result of a sense of national identity among the ethnic Irish in reaction to the British rule of Ireland. It was influenced initially by the French and American Revolutions, later by a Celtic cultural renaissance at the turn of this century, and in some streams, by Marxist-Leninist theory.

The traditions of Irish Republicanism are very important to the PIRA members and supporters, as is well displayed in this quote from an editorial in *An Phoblacht*, a Republican newspaper, cited in Coogan (1980: 593):

Our rules are taken from history. We remember the famine. We remember the Fenians. We remember 1916 and the Loyalist pogroms of the twenties. We remember, and we are most proud of, the small band of republicans who down the years carried the torch of freedom. We remember Orange Rule, 1969, the Falls curfew, internment, the Loyalist assassinations, Brit murders. We remember the beating, and the leaving for dead of Stephen Montague last week.

This emphasis on their history is one of the strengths of the PIRA and supporters, as well as of the Loyalists. The remembrance and celebration of their history and martyrs

helps to create a social bond among adherents of the physical force tradition. They consider it important to mark things such as the anniversary of Bobby Sands' death, often with riots in the streets of Belfast, giving the participants a sense of shared history and shared struggle. The funerals of dead republicans, often massively attended, have been important community occasions since at least the time of the Fenians.

The importance of history is present in all sides of this conflict, "discussions of massacres and battles, political pogroms that took place two or three hundred years ago, are a part of the everyday language of the Ulsterman" (Elliot and Hickie, 1971: 29). Harris (1972: 181) when researching her ethnography of a rural Ulster town found that: "All the stories I was told from the past were never recounted with the idea of telling me dead and gone history -- on the contrary, they were repeated with the clear intention of making me realize the kind of problem the people felt themselves to be facing in their everyday lives." Shivers and Bowman (1985: 97) say that "in Ireland there is no future -- only the past, recurring again and again. For Ulster people today, events in the seventeenth century are much more significant than most recent world or even United Kingdom events." In Northern Ireland it is those who remember the past who are condemned to repeat it. The history, symbols and traditions of the conflict are so pervasive that the PIRA and other current paramilitary groups are in many ways re-enacting previous episodes of the Troubles.

Origins of Physical Force Republicanism

Theobald Wolfe Tone, considered by many to be the founder of Irish Republicanism, was born in 1763. He was a Protestant lawyer from Dublin who was influenced by the

example of the French Revolution, and believed in uniting unenfranchised Catholics and Protestant dissenters against the British. His goal was to establish an Irish Parliament elected by universal male suffrage as a preferable alternative to British rule (Bishop & Mallie, 1987: 8).

Under Wolfe Tone, the United Irishmen established the tradition of physical force Republicanism (Bishop & Mallie, 1987: 9) with their attempted rising in 1798. The plan was for a popular uprising that would be supported by French troops; however, the French were prevented from landing by bad weather, and the English forces defeated the United Irishmen. After this time, the pro-independence Irish separated into two main camps, the "constitutional nationalists" who advocated peaceful agitation, and the "physical force Republicans" who advocated a military defeat of the British (Bishop & Mallie, 1987: 9).

The ideals of the United Irishmen were founded in the philosophy of the Enlightenment and were oriented towards individual rights within a state made up of distinct nations (de Paor, 1985: 164-7). These ideals did not survive the 1798 rising and its aftermath very well, since: "By the very condition of Ireland, the war of the poor against the rich, the war of the citizens against the king's men, was to become in large part the war of the Catholics against the Protestants." (de Paor, 1985: 171). Later, influenced by romantic nationalism, the goal of Irish Republicanism altered to the creation of a 'natural' nation-state, which would be defined by ethnicity, which means by religion, language and culture (de Paor, 1985: 167). This forced a continuing parting of the ways between the two ethnic groups the United Irishmen were attempting to join together. These groups were divided by religion, by language and by culture, and only united by geography.

Throughout the 1800's, rural resistance to British rule as represented by the local landlords was carried out by a variety of agrarian secret societies, known generically as the Whiteboys or as the Ribbonmen who engaged in terroristic acts to further their aims. Their goal was some kind of land reform that would give the Irish peasantry greater rights to the land they lived on (Townsend, 1983: 14-15). They were different from ordinary criminals, and their acts were seen at the time as being intimidatory in nature, carried out with "singular cruelty" the effect of which was meant to be "public and demonstrative" (Townshend, 1983: 21). This appears to be the beginning of the use of low-level violence as a form of political communication in Ireland.

In 1848, towards the end of the potato famine, a physical force movement sprang up again, was crushed, and most of its members fled to America. In 1858 the survivors in Ireland and in the USA founded the organization that was known at first as 'the organization' or as the Phoenix Club, then later as the Fenian Brotherhood in the USA and as the Irish Republican Brotherhood or Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood (IRB) in Ireland. The word "Fenian" is apparently the adjectival form of "Phoenix" (Townshend, 1983: 25). The Clan na Gael was, at that time, the American Fenian organization (Shivers and Bowman, 1985: 106), and it still exists today. The Fenians, with their motto of "Revolution sooner or never" (Bishop & Mallie, 1987: 10) were typically impatient members of the physical force tradition. Some members of the British military still use the term 'Fenian' to describe Irish Nationalists (Arthur, 1987: 259), and the Provisional IRA still uses the phoenix as a symbol on items such as greeting cards (Chartres, Henshaw and Dewar, 1986: fig 302).

The first military action initiated by an organization calling itself the Irish Republican

Army (IRA) was the Battle of Limestone Ridge. In June 1866, a force of 800 Irish-American Fenians crossed the Niagara River, and engaged with Canadian militiamen near Ridgeway, Ontario. The battle was inconclusive, the total casualties of both sides were 20 dead and 60 wounded, and the IRA retreated to Buffalo, New York (Hardy, 1960: 176, Bishop & Mallie, 1987: 7).

The aim of the Fenians was to conquer Canada and set up an Irish government-in-exile. In this they received the passive support of the American Government. Their other attempted invasions and raids across the border were also unsuccessful, partly because of their overly optimistic assessment of the weakness of Canadian defences and partly because their military organizer, Major Henri Le Caron, was actually one Thomas Beach, a member of the British Secret Service (Deacon, 1980: 135). Beach had infiltrated the Fenian organization in order to undermine their military effectiveness, and seems to have been successful. The IRB in Ireland was also thoroughly infiltrated, and so the "Phoenix conspiracy", which included a planned invasion from the USA by the Fenian Brotherhood, was broken (Short, 1979: 14).

The Fenian Brotherhood / Clan na Gael was also active in the United Kingdom. Members of a Clan na Gael faction carried out a bombing campaign in Britain in the mid-1880's in what was called the Dynamite War, a series of attacks intended to commit "symbolic destruction of property rather than to kill or maim" (Hartigan, O'Day and Quinault, 1986: 58). The use of bombs in England was not intended to produce an uprising in Ireland, but as part of a strategy that also included arming the IRB for "the eventual revolution", and the campaign was tempered by the fear of reprisals against the Irish in the United Kingdom (Short, 1979: 3). For example, in 1885 these "disloyal Irish

and the Irish-American outrage-mongers" set off nearly simultaneous explosions in the Houses of Parliament, Westminster Hall, and the Tower of London (Hibbert, 1971: 133-134). The aim of the dynamite campaign in England was much like some of the bombing campaigns in Northern Ireland during this set of the Troubles: "to cause maximum dislocation and annoyance, to harm the tourist industry, ... to cause widespread 'moral panic' and the paralysis of business" (Laqueur, 1987: 65).

At the turn of this century, Irish culture was undergoing a revival in music, the visual arts, literature, and language. A political manifestation of this renaissance was the Sinn Fein ("ourselves alone"). Founded in 1903, this party advocated an independent, republican Ireland and originally intended to accomplish this by non-violent means, such as boycotting the British parliament and economy (Morris, 1917: 240- 44). There was some overlap in membership of the Sinn Fein and the IRB, with a resulting increasing tendency towards the insurrectionist tradition on the part of the political party (Bishop & Mallie, 1987: 11). The Sinn Fein eventually became the political voice of the IRA.

In the early years of this century the constitutional nationalists were mostly content with Home Rule as proposed by the British Parliament. The IRB wanted total independence through rebellion. The newly formed Ulster Volunteers, a radical Loyalist group, opposed Home Rule, or any form of independence from the United Kingdom (Bishop & Mallie, 1987: 12). The IRB therefore took it upon themselves to create the Republic by force, and carried out the Easter Uprising of 1916. They assumed that since the British military were busy with World War I it would be an ideal time for a rebellion (Bishop & Mallie, 1987: 13). The leaders of the Rising occupied the Dublin Post Office, and proclaimed the creation of an Irish Republic, with themselves as the Provisional Government (Ryan, 1966:

127-8). Patrick Pearse, a leader of this rebellion, styled himself as the Commandant-General and Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Irish Republic, as well as President of the Provisional Government (Ryan, 1966: 145). The Rising was a failure, commands to the rebels outside Dublin were contradictory, so the leaders were easily isolated and overpowered. In the five days of the Easter Uprising, the death toll was: 220 civilians, 64 rebels, and 134 soldiers (Bishop & Mallie, 1987: 14). This was the last of the attempts at a mass insurrection against the British (Ryan, 1966: 111).

The Sinn Fein candidates in the British Parliamentary election of December 1918 ran on the platform of abstaining from attending Westminster if they won. In January 1919 the elected Sinn Fein MP's formed their own Government and Constitution, and issued a Declaration of Independence backdated to the proclamation of the Republic in Dublin by the IRA during the Easter Uprising (Bishop & Mallie, 1987: 16). The Sinn Fein supported the IRA's campaign at this time of ambushing and killing members of the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC). It was this bout of the Troubles which saw the introduction of guerilla warfare techniques on the part of the IRA (Bishop & Mallie, 1987: 18). It was called the Black and Tan War after a popular name of a specially recruited paramilitary force which augmented the RIC.

The situation led the British to negotiations in 1921, resulting in the creation of an Irish Free State. Southern Ireland was given a degree of independence from the UK, including the right to make foreign policy, though it would remain subject to the British Crown. The price paid by the Irish Free State for independence was partition, wherein the parts of the province of Ulster in which the majority of the population was Unionist (Protestant) remained a part of the United Kingdom (Bishop & Mallie, 1987: 18-19). The island of

Ireland consists of thirty-two counties traditionally divided into four regions: Leinster, Munster, Connacht, and Ulster. Partition separated off six of the nine historical counties of Ulster to remain under British rule, and this is how the situation remains today.

The Irish Government accepted partition, the IRA rejected it, and a civil war resulted in which the Free State proved itself more ruthless in suppressing insurrection than the British had been (Bishop & Mallie, 1987: 20). About 4,000 people were killed in action in the Civil War, and the Free State executed 200 republican prisoners (Aughey, 1988: 78). The IRA was defeated politically and militarily in the Civil War, but persisted underground, claiming to be the legitimate government of Ireland. (Bishop & Mallie, 1987: 21).

By the 1930's, most of the active IRA members were anti-political, favouring violent action with no political framework other than the goal of a united, independent Ireland (Bishop & Mallie, 1987: 22). In 1939, the IRA set off 127 bombs in England, then the Irish Free State introduced internment without trial during the war, and succeeded in imprisoning most of the IRA leadership for the duration (Bishop & Mallie, 1987: 23).

In 1956, the IRA launched a border campaign against Northern Ireland. It was not successful, as it was neither militarily viable nor politically astute, and did not provoke a serious crisis in either the Republic or the United Kingdom, so it was called off in 1962. The total number of casualties was small compared to what would follow in the next bout of the Troubles: eight IRA men and republican supporters; six members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC); and 32 British soldiers were killed in the six years. The IRA had paid no attention to the possible political consequences of their acts of violence (Bishop & Mallie, 1987: 24-30). It was widely believed at the time that the end of this campaign

marked the end of the IRA, although some IRA activity persisted during the early 1960's. After this time the IRA took on some Marxist policies, and rejected the military option in favour of political activity (Elliot and Hickie, 1971: 38).

In the late 1960's a civil rights campaign had taken root in Northern Ireland, attempting to end the discrimination against Catholics in government and housing. Peaceful demonstrations sparked counter-demonstrations, which turned violent, and the latest bout of the Troubles started up. In 1969, the IRA had been almost completely de-militarized, most of its weapons had been sold to Welsh nationalists (Coogan, 1980: 423, McGuire, 1973: 37), and some of the firearms that were available and used dated back to the Black and Tan War of 1919 (Adams, 1986: 162-3). When the British Army was brought into Northern Ireland in 1969, their primary mission was to protect Catholics from Protestant mobs (Laqueur, 1987: 208).

In late 1969 and early 1970, the IRA split into two factions on the issue of recognition of the Partition Parliaments in Dublin and Belfast. The move to recognize these Parliaments passed the vote at the IRA convention (Bishop & Mallie, 1987: 103, Coogan, 1980: 429) although there have been suggestions by some participants of the vote having been rigged. Members who supported the traditional abstentionist policy split off at this point. Sean MacStiofáin led the walkout from the convention and proclaimed the Provisional Army Council (Hull, 1976: 46), which led to the creation of the Provisional IRA. Shortly afterward, a similar split took place in the Sinn Féin, one side supporting the PIRA and the other the Official IRA. The PIRA is therefore a "traditionalist" wing of the Republican movement, retaining the physical force tradition, while the OIRA was opting for a more constitutionalist approach. In essence, the OIRA wanted to try something

different, while the PIRA just wanted to try harder.

Five years later this pattern repeated itself when a similar split happened again in the OIRA. This time the Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP) and the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) were formed by OIRA dissidents who favoured a revolutionary Marxism over the constitutional approach (Coogan, 1980: 567-68). The INLA itself has since splintered and nearly self-destructed in a spate of internal feuding, and the Irish People's Liberation Organization (IPLO) appears to be the currently active result of that process.

The PIRA often refers to itself simply as the IRA, as it considers the Officials to be the splinter group and themselves to be the true inheritors of the Republican tradition (MacStiofáin, 1975: 136). It should be noted that many writers refer to the Provisional IRA as the IRA. This is probably done because the PIRA is the more active of the two IRA's, and because of its claim to be the "true" IRA. To distinguish between them I will use the terms Provisional and Official, and the acronyms PIRA and OIRA. When I refer to the IRA, it is to that organization in the years prior to 1969.

PIRA STRATEGY AND ORGANIZATION

"Out of The Ashes Arose the Provisionals"

Republican greeting card

After the split with the Official IRA, the organization of the PIRA continued to be based on traditional military lines, with a General Headquarters, Brigades and Regiments. In 1977, as a reaction to British infiltration and other intelligence gathering techniques, it was reorganized into a more secure cell structure (Lee, 1983: 159). In 1988 the membership in the PIRA was believed to consist of about 300 active personnel supported by about 3,000 sympathizers (Pisano, 1988: 76). At the same time, American military intelligence estimated the PIRA 'hardcore membership' at about 200-400 people (US Department of Defence, 1988: 56). In 1986 the RUC had stated that there were between 200 and 250 active PIRA terrorists, not counting members in support roles (Soule, 1989: 41). Aughey (1988: 91) gives a figure of about 300 for active PIRA strength, down from a membership of between 1,500 and 2,000 before the organization restructured and 'down-sized' in the 1970's.

A cell that carries out attacks, whether sniping, bombing or whatever, is known as an Active Service Unit (ASU), a term first used by the IRA to describe their formations during the Black and Tan War (Townshend, 1983: 336). A modern ASU usually consists of four members, only the leader of which should know the identity of his or her superior (Corrado and Evans, 1988: 402). In case of infiltration of the organization or interrogation of a member by the security forces, this helps to protect the identities of other members in other cells and the upper echelons. This use of three to four member groups was a return to the secure organization of the "dynamitards", the Fenian perpetrators of the Dynamite War of the 1880's (Townshend, 1983: 165).

According to the PIRA's reorganization order, cells were to be specialized; with separate ASU's committing sniping attacks, bombings, robberies, 'executions' etc., and with the cells operating whenever possible outside their own areas "to confuse Brit Intelligence" (Taylor, 1987: 53-4). Two years later, in a British Military Intelligence assessment, the reorganization of the PIRA into cells was considered to have rendered the organization both less vulnerable to penetration, and less dependent on public support (Taylor, 1987: 56). According to the same assessment, the reorganized PIRA also required fewer activists to maintain the level of violence (Taylor, 1987: 55). As an UDR officer described the situation: "They have the upper hand all the time, the element of surprise, whereas all the time we are looking to see if we can catch them out. It doesn't require a great number of people to keep this campaign going. Nor does it require a great deal of intelligence. It only requires an incident in any one area." (Arthur, 1987: 248).

Strategy

The Provisional IRA does not recognize the validity of the Parliaments in Dublin or in London, as it does not consider the partition of Ireland to be legitimate. The members of the PIRA consider themselves to be the inheritors of the legitimate government of Ireland, dating from the Proclamation of the Republic during the Easter Rising (Appendix A). The PIRA strategy is based on their belief that the problems in Northern Ireland are caused by the presence of the British government, and especially the British military. Therefore if they force the British military to pull out, and if the 32 counties of Ireland were reunited, then the conflict would stop and the Irish people could solve their own problems (Shivers and Bowman, 1985: 41). It appears from this that the root paradigm of the PIRA is one of purification. Because of this belief, they consider that 'national liberation' must precede

'social liberation' (Hull, 1976: 47). The PIRA considers members of the British military to be legitimate targets of violence because: "England could not hold any part of Ireland except by military force. When that force was exercised against the population, the troops who exercised it became legitimate targets for Republican resistance fighters." (MacStiofáin, 1975: 167).

The goal of the PIRA, according to one of their recruiting posters, is: "to force a British withdrawal from Ireland and establish a democratic, socialist republic based on the Easter Proclamation" (Chartres, Henshaw and Dewar, 1986: fig. 2). The strategy they advocate to attain this goal is to force, by what they call a guerrilla campaign, the withdrawal of the British Government and Army from Northern Ireland in order to allow the union to take place. A PIRA spokesman, quoted in the Washington Post (90-08-02), stated that "It is necessary, especially in a guerrilla campaign, to attack the enemy on ground which you choose.... To surprise the enemy, give them no rest, continually pressurize them and, of course, hit them where it hurts."

As well as hitting the British "where it hurts", the PIRA strategy relies on being able to take more damage than the security forces can inflict. The Sinn Féin newspaper, An Phoblacht in 1979 declared that the Provisional's "armed struggle and the incredible resistance of the people, and the prisoners will eventually take its toll in the despairing will of the British to continue" (Lee, 1983: 162). The emphasis on 'incredible resistance' is an echo of Terence MacSwiney's statement in 1920 that "It is not those who can inflict the most, but those that can suffer the most who will conquer." (Townshend, 1983: 356). Not long after making this statement, MacSwiney starved himself to death in a hunger strike in Brixton gaol (Jeffery, 1985: 19). Bobby Sands (1983: 117-8) wrote with the same

sentiments prior to his hunger strike, while he was on the 'dirty protest': "That's another day nearer to victory, I thought.... Nothing really mattered except remaining unbroken.... They have nothing in their entire imperial arsenal to break the spirit of one single Republican Political Prisoner-of-War who refuses to be broken".

The strategy of the Provisional's campaign against the British was modeled after the guerrilla campaigns in Cyprus in the 1950's and in Aden in the 1960's; both of these were successful attempts to end British colonial rule. Algeria, it was claimed, was not a model "because of the indiscriminate civilian casualties the FLN caused" (McGuire, 1973: 78). In the beginning of the current set of the Troubles, the PIRA Army Council's aim was "to kill thirty-six British soldiers -- the same number who died in Aden" (McGuire, 1973: 78). MacStiofáin claimed that the history of physical force Republicanism demonstrated Che Guevera's theory that revolutionaries should not wait for conditions to become 'ripe', but should commence actions and "gradually build up popular support through their successes" (MacStiofáin, 1975: 47).

PIRA attacks are carried out most often in Northern Ireland, almost never in the Republic. Occasionally an Active Service Unit (ASU) will carry out an attack or string of attacks in Great Britain, for example the bombing of the Grand Hotel in Brighton (Bishop & Mallie, 1987: 337-41). More rarely the PIRA will carry out an attack or campaign of attacks against British interests in Europe, for example the attempted car-bombing in Gibraltar. In 1988 and 1989 PIRA attacks against British military personnel in Europe became more frequent.

The distribution of terrorist attacks against British interests in several countries is not a

new idea in physical force Republican theory. In 1875, a Fenian faction proposed that:

A few active, intrepid and intelligent men can do so much to annoy and hurt England. The Irish cause requires skirmishers. It requires a little band of heroes who will initiate and keep up without intermission a guerrilla warfare -- men who will fly over land and sea like invisible beings -- now striking the enemy in Ireland, now in India, now in England itself, as occasion may present. (Townshend, 1983: 120).

These "skirmishers" acted in the mid-1880's, by carrying out the Dynamite War bombing campaign in England.

The PIRA's message is carried by attacks, claims for attacks, public displays at funerals (including firing salutes at graves and the showing of weapons) and by prison protests, such as the dirty protest in which the prisoners smeared their cells with their own excrement, and hunger strikes in which a number of PIRA and INLA members have starved themselves to death. All these actions are meant to gain coverage of the Provisionals and their cause in the news media, and so to shape public opinion and, by extension, government policy. As a British Military Intelligence assessment stated: "Propaganda considerations will frequently dictate PIRA strategy both in avoiding action that would alienate public opinion and in mounting spectacular attacks that would capture the Press 'headlines..." (Taylor, 1987: 57). To ensure that their claims of responsibility are believed, the PIRA apparently maintains a secret recognition code with the authorities (Cordes, Jenkins and Kellen, 1985:24). The prison protests are carried out to use imprisoned members in the conflict, despite their incarceration, and to attempt to maintain the distinction between paramilitary convicts as 'prisoners of war' and the other convicts (known as ODC's - ordinary decent criminals - in Northern Irish parlance).

The structure of the terrorist campaign differs from that of a classic guerrilla war in that

the PIRA have not had a *foco* since Operation Motorman opened the no-go areas in Belfast and Londonderry in 1972 (Townshend, 1983: 400). The no-go areas were barricaded ghettos which the security forces did not enter. The "bandit country" in south Armagh is close to being such a guerrilla stronghold (Townshend, 1983: 399), but the British security forces still operate there. Marighela (1971: 38) states that a guerrilla struggle does not necessarily require a *foco*, even in the rural theatre of operations. His alternative to a *foco* is "the establishment of a guerrilla infrastructure wherever our revolutionary organization appears". Laqueur (1987: 147) disagrees with Marighela when he states: "The essence of guerrilla warfare is to establish foci, or liberated areas, in the countryside and to set up small military units which will gradually grow in strength, number and equipment... in order to fight battles against government troops." This is different from the activities of terrorists, who operate in small groups in cities in order to avoid retaliation by the government. According to Townshend (1983: 394-5) the PIRA does not have the option of waging a classic guerrilla war:

The exact form to be taken by physical force has never been clearly fixed during the 'long decade' of PIRA operations. Any attempt to wage rural or urban guerrilla warfare on the pattern established in 1919-21 (and followed in other wars of national liberation) was limited by the geography of the supporting community. No IRA spark could start a prairie fire throughout Northern Ireland. Away from the 'no-go' areas of Belfast and 'Free Derry', and the borders of Fermanagh and Armagh, PIRA operations were restricted to terrorism. Even so they oscillated between discriminate and indiscriminate attacks. The theoretical underpinning of terrorist action has remained as loose as in the 1880s or 1950s.

Tactics

The PIRA operates with a wide range of weapons, both imported and home made, which allow for a similarly wide range of targets. Different weapons have their optimum effect on different types of targets. For example, explosive devices can be used against a wide variety of targets, from specific individuals to buildings, by altering the size, and the

delivery and detonation methods. On the other hand, handguns are ideally suited for punishment shootings and some murders, but have no useful effect when fired at armoured vehicles. The variety of PIRA attack methods was summed up by a British Marine Sergeant as ranging from: "homemade IED ... which is a small booby-trap device, through command wire and RCIE (remote-controlled improvised explosive) devices, to single-shot sniping, close quarter shoots, maybe using a machine gun or pistol, RPG 7's, multi-weapon shoots, mortars" (Arthur, 1987: 158).

Targets

The types of targets selected by PIRA can be broken down into three main categories:

1) Security Forces, 2) Non-combatant, and 3) Economic.

1) Security Forces. Attacks on the security forces usually take the form of murders of members of the British Military, Ulster Defence Regiment, Royal Ulster Constabulary, Prison Guards, and Judges. These murders take place when an individual is specifically targeted. Members of the military or the RUC are also killed and wounded when a patrol or base is attacked, in which case the individuals have not been singled out, but have been attacked purely because of their group membership.

In the case of an individual being targeted he or she is usually shot while off-duty, sometimes in the presence of family while at home. Occasionally, they are the victim of a bomb placed in their vehicle or elsewhere.

Patrols are sometimes ambushed by groups of attackers, sometimes by using bombs planted on the route and detonated by remote control. A classic example of this was the

Warrenpoint attack in 1979 in which 18 soldiers were killed by two concealed bombs, one containing 500 pounds of explosive, which were detonated from across the border (Bishop & Mallie, 1987: 249-50). Foot patrols are also subject to sniping attacks in which only one or two shots are fired (Bishop & Mallie, 1987: 314-16). Sean MacStiofáin has claimed that he designed the one-shot sniper tactic, in which the sniper fires only one shot before going to ground, whether he has hit or missed the target. Preferred weapons for this tactic are "high-powered" military or hunting rifles which are capable of penetrating the flak jackets issued to British troops (MacStiofáin, 1975: 301-2). As is shown later, the PIRA uses whatever firearms it can acquire, whether they are current military weapons or antiques.

Sniper ambushes are sometimes "set-pieces" in which the sniping team would create a situation that the security forces would have to respond to, for example a burning bus or a bomb threat (McGuire, 1973: 79). When the Army or RUC members arrive at the scene, the sniper then shoots at them. Security forces are also 'set up' by anonymously phoning in a tip about an empty house or other place in which booby traps have been planted (MacStiofáin, 1975: 331).

Patrols in vehicles are attacked with firearms, grenades, or rockets. Firearms used in these attacks range from small calibre rifles up to medium calibre machine guns.

Bases are attacked using home-made mortars, hurled incendiary devices and bombs. In one incident the bomb was delivered to the Loughall RUC station in the bucket of a front end loader. Bombs are more frequently delivered in stolen cars or vans.

2) Non-Combatant Targets. These include attacks which seem to have been more for propaganda value rather than for any military reason, in that they are generally aimed at people who are not members of the security forces. Examples of this sort of attack aimed at high profile targets are: the murder of Lord Mountbatten in 1979 (Bishop & Mallie, 1987: 248-49) and the bombing of the Grand Hotel in Brighton. This category also includes sectarian murders, in which civilians are killed because of their membership in the opposing community. Explosive devices are used in many of these incidents, though sectarian revenge killings are often committed with firearms. This type of attack has taken place in Northern Ireland, the Republic, and in the United Kingdom.

3) Economic Targets. These are attacks against businesses and material property, including bombing of stores and buses, and the murder of businessmen who supply the security forces. These attacks support the PIRA's funding methods by providing proof of the seriousness of threats used in protection rackets, and also disrupt the economy in Northern Ireland. The stated intention of this type of bombing campaign is "to bring life in the Six Counties [Northern Ireland] to a halt, drive out international investors, and make it so costly for the British to repair the damage we were causing that they would have to meet our demands." (McGuire, 1973: 34). Attacks of this nature include the bombing campaign against Short Brothers Aerospace since its purchase by Bombardier. This series of bombings is discussed in detail later as a case study of PIRA attacks.

Generally speaking, attacks against security forces are often of a nature that would be considered legitimate if carried out by guerrillas or commandos in a state of war. Attacks against non-combatant targets are entirely terroristic, and attacks on economic targets fall into both categories. Disruption of a nation's economy is a common tactic in modern

warfare, but the selective murder of businessmen is clearly terroristic because it is a form of extortion. Tactics and target selection are discussed at greater depth later in this paper.

The PIRA uses timing and context to enhance the psychological effect of attacks carried out using simple weaponry, for example: "Sometimes the Belfast Provisionals would give a succession of false alarms and then, just as the city was enjoying the lull, plant half a dozen bombs on the same day." (McGuire, 1973: 33). This tactic was used explicitly to increase the psychological effect of the bombing campaign, as it created tension and uncertainty. The PIRA has also intentionally staged multiple bombings, on the day of an announced news conference by the commander of the British troops in Northern Ireland, in an attempt to usurp the media attention that would normally be given him (McGuire, 1973: 84-5).

Weapons

The weapons used by the PIRA include a wide range of devices, ranging in complexity from Molotov cocktails to large timer-activated bombs equipped with anti-handling devices, and ranging in firepower from low-velocity revolvers to heavy machine guns and truck-mounted multiple-tube mortars.

The PIRA is capable of building many weapons, including explosives, mortar systems, grenades, and possibly radar-guided surface-to-air missiles. Their home-made explosives tend to be low-yield mixtures made from commercially available materials. Their favoured containers for explosives are beer kegs and milk cans, as these are common objects in Ireland, and are both easily available and innocuous looking. Their mortar systems are made completely from scratch: tubes, projectiles, propellant, and charge (Bishop & Mallie,

1987: 334-35). These truck-mounted mortars are often booby-trapped so that the last mortar bomb or an additional explosive charge will detonate at the end of the firing sequence in order to destroy the evidence.

There have been media reports that the PIRA have recently developed and successfully used home-made drogue-stabilized anti-armour hand grenades. From the descriptions, these seem to be similar in design to some used by various national armies, such as those of Egypt, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia (Jane's, 1988: 408, 435, 438-9, 450). In the summer of 1989, three persons in the United States were arrested and charged with designing and building sophisticated surface-to-air missiles for the PIRA. These devices apparently used a radar-based guidance system and proximity trigger, which would defeat the anti-missile defences of the British military helicopters in Northern Ireland (New York Times 89-07-15, Ottawa Citizen 89-07-27). This interest in research and development is similar to that of the Clan na Gael in the late 19th century, when they funded the development and construction of experimental submarines (Townshend, 1983: 119). The submarine's designer, John Holland, was an Irish-American with a brother in the Fenian Brotherhood (Short, 1979: 35-7). As well as the \$60,000 investment in the submarines, the Fenians at this time also collected money for weapons such as poisoned stilettos (Laqueur, 1987: 65).

The dominant weapon of modern PIRA folklore currently appears to be the Armalite family of high-velocity American-designed rifles, including the AR180 and the M16 assault rifle. The AR180 was introduced in this conflict in 1972, and was the first batch of modern assault rifles acquired by the PIRA, two years later the PIRA started receiving AR15's, the civilian version of the M16 (Dillon, 1988: 430). The Armalite is "the standard

weapon" of the PIRA (Laqueur, 1987: 213), hence the name of "The Armalite and Ballot Box Campaign" announced by Gerry Adams of the Sinn Fein in 1977, which consisted of the combined use of military and political tactics (Adams, 1986: 163). Photographs of PIRA arms caches in Chartres, Henshaw and Dewar (1986: figs 259-62) show a wide variety of firearms: including modern military weapons such as the M.60 machine gun, at least two different kinds of Armalite rifle, various other rifles, as well as sub-machine guns and hand guns. Also included are at least one target rifle, presumably for training and/or sniping, and a pair of pre-WWI British military carbines (comparative photograph in Upper Canada Historical Arms Society, 1963: p.42). The occasional use of obsolete weaponry is also a tradition of Irish Republicanism; a Late Bronze Age sword now on display in the Royal Ontario Museum (909.68.1) was captured from a rebel at a battle during the Wolfe Tone rising in 1798. According to its label the weapon had been made circa 900 - 700 B.C.

Maria McGuire (1973: 39-40) states that many PIRA members would say that the Thompson sub-machine gun was their favorite weapon, although she admits that "the attachment was more sentimental than practical". This firearm, "the classic IRA weapon" (Jeffery, 1985: 19) continues to show up on some of the PIRA posters and has even been used in the current Troubles (Arthur, 1987: 85, 97). Interestingly enough, the development of this weapon was apparently funded in part by the Clan na Gael (Townshend, 1983: 119), and during the Black and Tan war the IRA received the first Thompson sub-machine guns made (Townshend, 1983: 358). This made the IRA the first terrorist group to use the sub-machine gun (Laqueur, 1987:106). The use of this obsolete weapon as a symbol, much like the Fenian use of the pike into this century (Townshend, 1983: 34) indicates both the traditionalism and romanticism of physical force

republicanism, and is a concrete expression of the current Troubles as a re-enactment of mythologized historical bouts.

In their attacks the PIRA uses whatever weapons they can acquire, but in their publicity they show almost entirely American military weapons, and occasionally British weapons, but they almost never show themselves using Soviet-bloc arms except for the RPG-7. The most frequently depicted weapon which I have seen in PIRA publicity photos and murals is the AR15/M16 rifle. The PIRA seems to place great importance on showing the American connection with their weaponry, and on downplaying their access to Soviet bloc materiel. This may be due both to their history of acquiring their weapons from American supporters, and to their aversion to looking like a Communist-supported insurgency. They appear to believe that the display of American weaponry will give them a greater air of legitimacy. The one Soviet weapon which they display frequently is the RPG-7 anti-tank rocket, which has the advantage of making them appear more like a 'real' army, since it is not as clearly a terroristic weapon.

The PIRA does use a variety of communist-bloc weapons, purchased on the black market or sometimes donated by Libya. In the fall of 1987 a Panamanian-registered freighter called the Eksund was seized by French police en route from Libya to Ireland. The crew were all PIRA members, and the cargo was 150 - 200 tonnes of modern military weaponry, mostly of Soviet origin. The contents, according to the French newspaper Le

Monde (November 9, 1987), included:

- 20 SAM7 ground to air missiles
- 10 or more RPG7 anti-tank grenade launchers
- 36 RPG7 rocket-propelled anti-tank grenades
- 12 MP-41 82mm mortars
- 16 12.7mm (50 cal.) machine guns
- 8 7.62mm (30 cal.) Belgian - made machine guns
- 975 AK47 Kalashnikov assault rifles

- 448 grenades
- 984 mortar rounds
- 320,000 rounds of ammunition of various calibres
- 782 2kg blocks (total 3448 pounds) of Semtex plastic explosive
- 1,976 electrical detonators

According to the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (1987: 247-255) Libya has been supplying weaponry to the PIRA since at least March 1973 (1987: 249). The same briefing paper notes that the Qaddafi government has had 'confrontations' with Britain since 1969 (1987: 247). In light of the deals made by Irish Republican revolutionaries with the French government in the late 1700's, and with Germany during the First and Second World Wars, it is traditional for the PIRA to apply for assistance from any government in conflict with Britain's.

The basic terrorist weapon is the bomb. The PIRA uses a wide variety of these, large and small. Some are detonated by timers, others by movement, by control wires, or by radio. Some have 'anti-handling devices' built in, so that a person attempting to disarm the bomb may set it off. Bombing campaigns are carried out in certain geographic areas, or against certain types of targets. Explosive devices are sometimes planted simply to destroy a specific target or just to keep the pressure on the Security Forces, but sometimes are a part of a larger strategy. For instance a bombing campaign of the early 1970's was intended to "cause confusion and terror" and to force the security forces into taking a defensive role, so distracting them from proactive moves against the PIRA (McGuire, 1973: 33). MacStiofáin (1975: 171) claimed that warnings were always given for bombings, and that the civilian casualties were the result of British incompetence or the result of "black" psychological warfare on the part of the British military. He implies that the British military intentionally withheld some of the warnings in order to blame the PIRA for disregarding civilian lives.

Membership

While adherence to Irish Republicanism crosses both class and, occasionally, ethnic lines, members of the PIRA are mostly working-class, Catholic, young, and male (Coogan, 1980: 476). These individuals that PIRA recruits are often from families with links to the physical force tradition of Irish Republicanism, either the PIRA or its predecessors (Belfrage, 1987: 283). Bishop and Mallie (1987: 3) estimate that 80% of the current PIRA membership have close relatives in the organization. The paramilitaries are not mere hooligans, but are a fairly representative segment of their working class community (Conroy, 1987: 54-5). Women are now being used more often in ASUs -- in recent years two have died on 'active duty' and others have been arrested -- but they still seem to make up a small proportion of the individuals who perpetrate terrorist acts. Traditionally, female members of the movement have been active in support roles, leaving violence as a male activity; however, the PIRA seems to be becoming more of an equal opportunity employer.

Many PIRA members come from the 'Catholic ghettos' of the major cities, working-class areas with endemic high unemployment (Adams, 1986: 177-8, Seale, 1989: 39). For example, 55% of the "economically active" people in West Belfast were wholly unemployed in 1982; this is not counting those who were employed part-time or who were "economically inactive" (Lee, 1983: 109). Shivers and Bowman (1985: 57) explicitly link membership in paramilitary groups with the unemployment problem. Support for the Republican paramilitaries is strongest among the Catholic working class; in the ghettos in Belfast and Londonderry, and in rural areas with Catholic majorities in the population, such as south Armagh (Sluka: 1989: 63-4).

Activity in physical force Republicanism, with its sentimental image so carefully nurtured in song and literature, may frequently be seen by some marginalized individuals as their only chance to do something worthwhile, or to gain some respect in their family and community. It gives them membership in an elite group in their community. The social life of PIRA members has what Bishop and Mallie (1987: 2) describe as a "rock-pool atmosphere", in which the members associate almost exclusively with each other, drinking together in 'exclusive huddles'. For security reasons it becomes awkward for them to have friends outside the organization.

It is apparently typical that nationalist-separatist terrorist groups tend to consist of individuals from lower classes the members of socialist-revolutionary groups (Laqueur, 1987: 83). It is interesting to note that members of the violent loyalist organizations are also from similar backgrounds: lower-class ghettos with high unemployment (Globe & Mail, March 18, 1988, Lebow, 1978: 51). This shared social and educational background of both the PIRA and the Loyalist paramilitaries matches the general profile of right-wing terrorists in Europe, while left-wing terrorists tend to be from the middle class and to have some university education (Laqueur, 1987: 263).

The ghettos, which provide so much of the manpower of the paramilitary organizations in Northern Ireland's cities, tend to be well established and highly segregated on religious/ethnic lines. The degree of segregation in these communities has historically increased during outbreaks of the Troubles when members of the minority group in a given district leave it for their own safety, as during the 1857 sectarian riots (Jones, 1960: 190-1). This pattern was repeated at the outbreak of the current Troubles as well. By the

1880's, because of this tendency, the Falls Road area was already the main "catholic quarter" and the Shankill district was "almost entirely protestant" (Jones, 1960: 191), and this is still the case today. As a general rule, in the 1950's community segregation along religious lines was greatest in districts which rated "very low on the socio-economic scale" and particularly in areas of heavy population density (Jones, 1960: 203-4).

The fact that the bulk of the Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries come from identical class backgrounds should not come as a great surprise, as Simmel (1955: 43) observed: "A hostility must excite consciousness the more deeply and violently, the greater the parties' similarity against the background of which the hostility rises". The Republican and Loyalist elements are to some extent mutually supportive in that each exists at least partly to counter the threat implied by the other's existence. It will be seen later that they are also intentionally mutually supportive in the area of covert fundraising, although sporadic attempts to unite in a class struggle have been completely overwhelmed by the ethnic separation.

The situation is similar to that between the Anglo-Saxons and the Normans in post-Conquest Britain, which Simmel (1955: 42) describes as:

These two lived scattered among one another in the same territory, were mutually bound by constantly operating vital interests, and were held together by one national idea -- and yet intimately, they were complete mutual strangers, were, in line with their whole character, without reciprocal understanding, and were absolutely hostile to one another in regard to their power interests. Their reciprocal hatred, as has rightly been said, was more bitter than it can ever be between externally and internally separate groups.

The Republican paramilitaries come from a culture with a strong tradition of resistance to the British, this tradition supports the gunmen who have grown up believing in their cause. The victims of their acts are depersonalized, in the words of a Republican quoted in

Coogan (1980: 476): "We've nothing against them personally. It's the uniform we are after." The high degree of polarization between the communities would make this depersonalization easier for both Republicans and Loyalists. As Harris (1972: xi) states in her ethnography of a Northern Irish town: "Because of the separation of the social fields of Protestant and Catholic, even neighbours belonging to the different sides remain in some senses strangers. This is a major factor leading the people to think about each other in terms of stereotypes." A psychiatrist who examined a number of PIRA members who had been convicted of murder found them to be "reasonably stable" people who have strong support from other members of their group, which helps to control any feelings of guilt that they may have (Bishop and Mallie, 1987: 4).

Internal Discipline

Internal discipline in the Provisional IRA is harsh, penalties range from expulsion to kneecapping to murder, with these penalties inflicted as a response to "crimes" such as skimming the take from a robbery or extortion, or giving information to the security forces (see Appendix B for details of PIRA regulations). Members of the organization and other people living in Republican areas, are subject to these forms of punishment. The threat of expulsion from the PIRA would be considered a serious matter to most members, because for many of them membership in the organization is their main source of status and self-respect.

Individuals who are believed to have informed on the Provisionals to the security forces are usually murdered, and the bodies left in public places as a warning to others (Bishop & Mallie, 1987: 319, 322). For lesser offences such as unsanctioned robbery, kneecapping is a frequent punishment, usually carried out by shooting the victim's knees at point-blank

range with a low velocity firearm. According to a study of 80 punishment shootings, about one in three victims required prolonged hospitalization and intensive physiotherapy as a result (Montreal Gazette, 90-02-27). Between 1968 and 1987 there had been some 1,097 reported cases of kneecapping (Bishop & Mallie, 1987: 319), and in 1989 alone 152 incidents of kneecapping were reported (Montreal Gazette, 90-02-27). 1975 was also a bad year, with 188 kneecappings reported in the Registrar General's Reports 1966-1975, cited in Fields (1989: 185).

Members of the PIRA have also apparently been punished for botching attacks, e.g. for missing the target (Arthur, 1987: 169-70). Women in Republican areas have in the past been tarred and feathered if they have been suspected of consorting with British soldiers or of informing (Shivers and Bowman, 1985: 89). Loyalist paramilitaries employ the same range of coercive measures. One UDA leader, in describing his disciplinary style, was quoted as saying: "I've got this big f---ing hammer and I've told them that if anybody gives me trouble, I'll break their f---ing fingers" (Dillon, 1989: 263).

Financing

According to a British government document from the Northern Ireland Office, quoted by Adams (1986: 179), in 1983 PIRA's income sources, in order, were:

COVERT:

- 1 Bank robberies in the North and South
- 2 Extortion
- 3 Tax exemption frauds
- 4 Gaming machines

OVERT:

- 1 clubs, social functions, shops, direct collections and subscriptions
- 2 overseas sympathetic contributions

The Provisional IRA has a number of sources of income, some strictly legal, most from activities more often associated with organized crime groups. It seems that in Northern Ireland, the PIRA and the other paramilitary groups have fulfilled much of the economic role that organized crime plays in other developed nations, for example running protection rackets and providing opportunities for illegal gambling. The PIRA claims that it is not involved in the other two normal mainstays of organized crime: drugs and prostitution, and I have never seen any reliable claims that they are involved in these. Within their own set of ethics they are a prudish lot.

Adams (1986) has documented extensive economic cooperation between Loyalist and Republican paramilitaries. For example, the UDA apparently runs legal security companies as an extension of their protection rackets, the PIRA then allows these Loyalist controlled security companies to operate in Republican areas in return for a cut of the profits. It is not unusual for the PIRA to grant permission to the UDA to commit a robbery in a PIRA controlled area, with the PIRA in return fencing the stolen goods (Adams, 1986: 172). At building sites in Loyalist areas the Republicans run tax frauds and the UDA takes a share of the profits (Adams, 1986: 167-8). As Dillon (1989: 257) describes the situation: "Without such cooperation, each of the paramilitary groupings could swiftly prevent the other from sharing in well-organized scams, so the killings could continue but in one area of life there would be tacit agreement that there should be no interference from either side. As a result, many strange arrangements have been made which allow frequent contact between terrorists." In these cases, economic pragmatism both overrides and supports political fanaticism.

Economic pragmatism, though, does not always retain the upper hand, at least in the

Loyalist paramilitary circles. The finance chief of the UDA, who is believed to have been one of the architects of this cooperation, was murdered in 1988 by the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF). The man was accused of making deals with the Republicans, including the arranging of murders of rivals in the Loyalist movement (The Sunday Times, Oct. 23, 1988; Dillon, 1989: 265).

The saving grace of all these sources of income, as far as the security forces are concerned, is that the PIRA has little financial control, and much of the money disappears before it reaches the organization's coffers. Both the Provisional's leaders and the security forces wonder where this money goes, but there is the suspicion that much of the skimmed money is spent on drink. As one British officer, quoted in Adams (1986: 182) stated: "The money is pissed against the walls of West Belfast."

TYPOLGY OF PIRA TACTICS

"When you ask us what are our methods, we reply: 'Those which lie nearest our hands!'"
James Connolly

Terrorist attacks can be viewed as a type of warfare, or at least as being war-like, and so can be analysed to some extent in terms of war. Two major concepts that are useful in this are Strategy and Tactics. The best definitions I have found for these terms is in On War by Carl von Clausewitz.

The conduct of War is, therefore, the formation and conduct of the fighting. If this fighting was a single act, there would be no necessity for any further subdivision, but the fight is composed of a greater or less number of single acts, complete in themselves, which we call combats... and which form new units. From this arises the totally different activities, that of the *formation* and *conduct* of these single combats in themselves, and the *combination* of them with one another, with a view to the ultimate object of the War. The first is called *tactics*, the other *strategy* (von Clausewitz: 1968, 172).

According to our classification, therefore, *tactics is the theory of the use of military forces in combat*. *Strategy is the theory of the use of combats for the object of the War*. (von Clausewitz: 1968, 173).

While in the type of warfare that von Clausewitz was writing about, a "combat" would have been understood to be a battle or skirmish, in terrorism a combat would be a single attack. The combination of these attacks and their associated claims and statements by the terrorist group and its political front (if any) makes up the strategy. The choice of methods used for the individual attacks is tactics. The PIRA and people who have studied it have also used the "campaign" for the category which fits between war and combat. A campaign is a series of similar attacks that are claimed to have taken place to support some aim which is lesser than the actual object of the war, for example the bombing campaign against Short Brothers Aerospace by the PIRA.

In order to analyse the methods used in terrorism, it is necessary to define and categorize the various tactics used. The result of this effort is a typology of tactics. The typologies of terrorist incidents that are currently in most widespread use, for example that used by the Department of the Solicitor General (Senate of Canada, 1989: 40), US State Department (1982: 10-13) and the FBI (1986: 2) are flawed in that they include tactics that are target-specific (such as "assassination") and those that are weapon-specific (such as "bombing") in such a way that some incidents will fit into more than one category. The typology system that I propose is one that uses paired descriptors in order to state clearly both the nature of the target and the method used to attack it. The list of descriptors which gives a sufficient range of possibilities with which to study PIRA tactics follows. In order to analyse the tactics of other groups it would be necessary to add descriptors for airplane hijacking, poisoning, and other methods not used by the PIRA.

<u>Target Type</u>	<u>Weapon Type</u>
specific person	bomb (time detonated, remote detonated, booby trap)
random person in specific group	firearm (handgun, rifle, automatic)
economic	artillery (mortar, rocket)

The category for bombings, in this system includes both incendiary and blast devices; and artillery is used in its broadest sense, as any form of stand-off weapon, where an explosive charge is delivered to the target by being projected through the air by mechanical means. The PIRA rarely targets people completely at random, so the category for random people in specific group is for individuals who are attacked because they are in an RUC base, a military vehicle, or participating in an event linked to the British or Loyalist cause. Economic targets are businesses which are attacked in order to disrupt the economy, because they have dealings with the security forces, or because they are not paying up their

protection money.

Certain weapons are best suited for attacking specific kinds of targets. For example, mortars are good for attacking military bases because of their range, but are inappropriate for committing an assassination because of their lack of accuracy. For this reason, there are some target/weapon pairings which are very common, e.g. specific person / firearm which describes a fairly typical murder; and some that are not seen at all, e.g. specific person / artillery. Other weapon categories can be used against a wide variety of targets. The best example of this is the bomb, which can be used to murder a selected person in a chosen situation, or just to kill whomever happens to be nearby when the device detonates. The use of the paired descriptors creates a tactic typology that is free of redundancy and confusion.

The other main variable that can be used to describe the tactics is the location of the attack. As the category 'random person in specific group' is explained above, location is a way of determining the group membership of the people attacked.

These three factors are interdependent; the choice of a target creates a set of possible locations and, therefore, a set of possible weapons. The choice of a location determines the targets and weapons, and the choice of a weapon limits the targets and location.

If the perpetrator chooses the location of the attack first, it implies that the target is of the random type. The perpetrator could only know that the victims would be mostly soldiers, or shoppers, or some other set of people who happen to be in a given area. It would not seem that this would be a frequent sequence of decision. I think the most

frequent would be to select a target, then use that selection to determine the best weapon and location for the attack. This is because the intent of terrorism is publicity, so the instrumental target must be one that enjoys minimal sympathy in the terrorist's chosen audience (what they call a "popular hit"), and one that gathers maximum attention in the media. Attacks on British soldiers in Northern Ireland are frequent because the victims have little sympathy among the Irish Republican community and the attacks gain coverage world wide. These attacks are also effective because British policy in Northern Ireland has mixed support internationally, and the PIRA can claim that the victims are legitimate targets of a guerrilla war. Attacks against civilians in Northern Ireland are less effective because although they get more media coverage, the victims have more sympathy in the media audience, for example, the PIRA received much negative publicity over the Enniskillen Remembrance Day bombing.

The choice of weapon used will also affect the publicity. The more closely that the PIRA armoury approaches that of recognized military organizations, the more it will be feared and respected, and the more legitimate it will seem. Attacks with anti-tank rockets and other such weapons tend to garner publicity whether or not they are successful. The PIRA has gained much media attention through its purchases of ground to air missiles, and its (to the best of our knowledge unsuccessful) attempts to design and construct its own ground to air missiles.

Terrorist attacks can also be categorized according to the extent of attention and the specific audiences which they are intended to attract. Michelle Anderson (cited in Schechner 1985: 16) identified three different forms of voodoo in Haiti: "a ritual/social form for Haitians 'only', ... a social/theatrical form for Haitians and tourists, and a

theatrical/commercial form for tourists "only" " These same divisions, in terms of the target audience, can be applied to terrorist acts.

Some attacks have only a local audience as the target, an audience made up of people who know the victims, as in punitive kneecappings and murders which are intended to warn the victim and his associates against further transgressions of the rules. Other attacks have a mixed local (directly connected) and outside (media informed) audience, such as the Abernathy murder or the bombing at the Grand Hotel in Brighton, both of which will be described in detail later. These attacks with a mixed audience are still directed primarily at inhabitants of the British Isles. The third possible kind of attack (based on this structure), in which the target audience is primarily from outside the communities directly involved in the conflict, seems to be little practiced by the PIRA or other paramilitary groups active in the Irish conflict.

In this categorization, the attacks with local target audiences are ritual/social, in that they are a part of the methodology of maintaining cohesion and adherence to established rules in the community. The attacks designed for mixed and external audiences would be more theatricalized, which of course makes it more likely that they will gain media coverage. "Mixed" attacks have a theatrical and social function, to gain news coverage and to carry a message to the individuals in the communities directly involved. If "external" attacks have a theatrical and commercial function, then perhaps some incidents of mercenary "international terrorism" fall into this category.

Norton (1986: 10) divides terrorism into two categories, the first is violence as advertising, the second is violence as revenge or as a means to cause real damage. The first

kind requires some kind of public claim of responsibility, the second does not. I disagree with his proposal that terrorism includes violence intended to "destroy an adversary", since in this case the target and the instrumental victim would be identical. Both publicity and revenge attacks, however, occur in Northern Ireland. One could claim that revenge attacks are also a form of advertising; they certainly have value as warnings.

The range of violent political theatre can be arranged in terms of physical/temporal distance between the actors and audience, with the dependence on audience behaviour as an essential part of the event increasing along with that distance. At one end of this continuum is the political demonstration or march, in which the actors are obviously present and the audience observes. This escalates to murders (such as the killing of Mr. Abernathy discussed later) in which the actors are only momentarily observed as such, and in which the audience members play roles in the drama. Then at the other extreme are performances such as long-delay bombings (such as at the Brighton Tory conference) and mortar attacks, in which the actors are not observed as such at all, and have absented themselves weeks before the event or are at some distance from it when it occurs (at the firing position, rather than the target). In these dramas, the immediate audience has no players to face, the perpetrators appear only as represented by their special effects.

In a way, the temporal distance involved in terrorist performances is rendered bi-directional by the effects of anticipation on the part of probable targets. The expectation of an attack can produce dramas in which the players are coerced from the audience in the same way they would be by an actual attack. An example of this was the security around the second Brighton Tory conference. In anticipation of a reprise of the 1984 bombing, the government created a media event that supported PIRA claims of competence. A second

example is the Gibraltar incident in which the security forces created an event prior to the planned bombing by pre-emptively shooting dead the perpetrators. This garnered great publicity for the PIRA, some of it positive. Although the government was acting on the basis of past acts by the suspects/victims, the shootings were committed because of an anticipated attack. Not all threats are taken this seriously, as on one occasion when a Royal Marines unit moved into the Turf Lodge, the PIRA knew they were coming and painted a sign on a wall that read "In this spot, on ..., we killed a Royal Marine Commando" with the date left blank. A Corporal in that unit recalled: "We thought that was great. We all had our photos taken standing in front of it while the patrol covered us" (Arthur, 1987: 122).

Schmid and de Graaf (1982: 50) divide terrorism into three categories: direct, indirect, and pseudo- : "While direct terrorism chooses its victims from the enemy camp and indirect terrorism from people not directly associated with the enemy but dependent on him in one way or another, pseudo-terrorism selects its victims from its own camp with the intention of getting the guilt attributed to the enemy." The Provisional IRA uses all three of these methods: direct terrorism in their attacks on members of the security forces, indirect terrorism on businesses and tradesmen who do work for the security forces, and pseudo-terrorism in the hunger strikes and the dirty protest. They also 'recycle' failed terrorist attacks as pseudo-terrorism in their propaganda, for example the funerals of PIRA members and the publicity around incidents such as the shootings in Gibraltar.

Schmid and de Graaf (1982: 60) also have charted a typology of terrorism.

A Basic Typology of Terrorism

This typology is certainly extensive. In the Northern Ireland case, the terrorists often use categories from both I and II (Political and Criminal, the latter for funding.), and in the case of groups like the Shankill Butchers, possibly III, I.2 and I.1.b. (Pathological, Vigilante and Ethnical) as well.

The conflict in Northern Ireland does usually seem to operate within limits, the causes of which will be further explored in 'Optimum Violence'. Belfrage (1987: 302) described the situation as follows:

After the first decade of killing, the conflict began to develop the characteristics of an institution, almost with rules. Thus for instance it has never taken to the air, and is conducted almost wholly with the gun, home-made mortar, and carefully targeted car bomb (a Northern Irish invention). More than 2,500 people have died, but by now little of the violence is random. Each side has its paramilitary organizations: the Irish Republican Army attacks the British security forces -- or their local Protestant representatives; and the Protestant paramilitaries fight the IRA (and also, sporadically, the security forces, or simply Catholics).

Different tactics carry different information to the audiences. In the 'Attacks' section I describe in detail examples of the main types of tactics used by the PIRA. These include attacks on specific individuals, people chosen for their group membership (security forces) and economic targets. The methods used include firearms, bombs with various detonation systems, and mortars. The use of weapons associated only with military (as opposed to ordinary criminal activity) such as mortars has the effect, of making the PIRA appear to be more like a real army. The use of sophisticated explosive devices impresses upon the audience the technical capability of the PIRA's bomb makers, in that way making them appear to be a more serious threat than they might otherwise seem. The use of a variety of firearms gives great versatility in tactics and targets, they can be used against property, groups of people, aircraft, and selected individuals. Firearms are carried at roadblocks, for salutes at funerals, and for punishment shootings, as well as to kill people.

The terrorists' tactics are difficult to counter because of their small scale and relative simplicity, depending mostly on surprise and unpredictability. The small scale rules out any possibility of military victory, but it is an asset in terms of publicity and in evoking public sympathy, as the perpetrators may be perceived by the audience as being the underdog. Public perception of the competence of terrorists is based on the effectiveness of their simple tactics as a result of surprise, not on their actual abilities in comparison with

the security forces. The effective use of surprise, and the avoidance of any pitched battle, is popularly confused with thorough training and efficiency. Hence the typical terroristic dependence on simple weaponry that requires a minimum of training, and often a minimum of dedication on the part of the user.

An important aspect of terrorism is the appearance of a lack of defence against a terrorist attack. The feeling of vulnerability by potential victims is a desired end of terrorism. This is achieved by choosing targets which cannot be easily or thoroughly defended, for example: public figures such as politicians who cannot go into hiding, or members of segments of the civilian population which, because of their numbers cannot all be protected to any significant degree, such as judges and businessmen. The terrorist must pick individual targets who cannot hide, or generic target groups with enough individual members to make defence impossible. The correct choice of targets can give a small group using simple and inexpensive methods an appearance of invincibility.

Chapter III TERRORIST PERFORMANCES: THE FORM OF COMMUNICATIVE VIOLENCE

THE PATTERN OF TERRORIST COMMUNICATION

"Thought and language are to the artist instruments of an art."

Oscar Wilde

As I have said, terrorism may be represented as having a triangular structure, in which the three corners are: (1) the actors (perpetrators), (2) the instrumental victims (targets), and (3) the audience (opponents, supporters and the public at large). As Schmid and de Graaf describe it (1982: 15), terrorism has "a sender, the terrorist, a message generator, the victim, and a receiver, the enemy and/or the public. The nature of the terrorist act, its atrocity, its location and the identity of its victim serve as generators for the power of the message." This basic triangle can be further divided, since the audience of the attack is made up of disparate groups, who receive differing, and sometimes contradictory messages from the same terrorist acts.

Goffman's definition of a performance team (1959: 104) may be used to include not only the perpetrators of a terrorist act, but also the witnesses and the instrumental victim(s). He defines a team as "a set of individuals whose intimate co-operation is required if a given projected definition of the situation is to be maintained. A team is a grouping, but it is a grouping not in relation to a social structure or social organization but rather in relation to an interaction or series of interactions in which the relevant definition of the situation is maintained." Goffman specifically states that the team does not include the audience, but as will be shown in the Abernathy murder, audience members are sometimes co-opted into becoming co-participants. Individuals belong to various different audiences, and so in

effect see different performances. The news media see the performances of the terrorists, victims, and witnesses in the attack, and the performances of the next-of-kin, security forces and government in the aftermath. The security forces see the terrorist attack on the instrumental victims and the interaction between the terrorists and the media.

The structuring of violence as amplified communication with a third party makes terrorism seem out of place in our ideas about the 'logical' structure of violence. "Unlike in tyrannicide, from which terrorism took its first form, the elimination of the enemy was no longer the primary goal. The goal was to reach public opinion, to send a message that made all the powerful tremble and gave the powerless hope. The victim was instrumental and no longer automatically identical with the enemy." (Schmid and de Graaf, 1982: 12). The fact that the victim is not necessarily the target, and even more than this, the fact that the target was not intended to be the direct victim makes terrorism a liminoid form of violence in western culture. There is a popular opinion that violence should only be directed at the opponent, not at some other person or thing that has been selected to be a symbol of that opponent.

Richard Schechner (1977) has examined the structure of performances, and has used the 'accident' as an analogy. He finds that in both performances and accidents the same basic theatrical pattern "of gathering, performing, dispersing" occurs, and that in the case of accidents the performance is the aftermath of the event. In this aftermath, the crowd gathers, and members talk to each other "about what happened, to whom, why; this talk is largely interrogative: like dramas and courtroom trials, which are formal versions of the street accident, the event itself is absorbed into the *action of reconstructing what took place*. In trials this is done verbally; in dramas this is done analogically, by doing again what

happened (actually, fictionally, mythically, religiously)." (1977: 112). Schechner calls these accidents as performances 'eruptions', since it is the gathering of the crowd and the reconstruction of the accident after the incident itself has ended that makes the drama (1977: 113).

Since terrorist attacks are a kind of 'planned accident', the drama of the attack includes the incident itself as well as its aftermath. The perpetrators, the instrumental victims, and the witnesses take part in the drama of the attack. Then the victims (if alive), the witnesses, the security forces and emergency personnel, and the crowd that gathers take part in the 'eruption', the drama of the aftermath.

The structure of terrorism includes a number of overlapping faces, not all of which are seen by most members of the audience. Lee (1983:125) describes terrorism in Northern Ireland as engaging or confronting people in four interrelated ways: "(1) strategic procedure, (2) theater, (3) direct personal involvement, and/or (4) indirect entanglement". These four elements are certainly all in my description; however, I fit them into the overall picture differently.

Schechner has observed that terrorism is a theatrical phenomenon with an ulterior motive: "The politician, activist, militant, terrorist uses techniques of the theatre (staging) to support his social action; the social action is consequential -- that is, it is designed to effect change in the social order or to maintain stability in an order threatened by change." (1977: 144). His description of terrorism as a theatricalized event includes the triangular structure of the information flow. According to Schechner (1977: 70) terrorism:

is the main way today in which powerless groups get a hearing. In response, the authorities stage their repressive raids, their assaults and their reprisals: to show

the world how the insurgents will be dealt with, to display the power of authority and to terrorize the viewer. Thus an apparent two-person exchange between activist and authority is actually a three-person exchange with the spectator supplying the vital link. Thus are we continually being educated to the histrionic structure of communication."

Schechner (1977: 145- 146) draws a distinction between an "accidental audience" and an "integral audience". An accidental audience is made up of people who just happen to attend a public performance, the members of an integral audience attend because they must, or because the performance has some particular significance for them. These audiences can be mixed, the integral audience may be part of the spectacle for the accidental audience. The accidental audience is present to watch the performance, while the integral audience is "necessary to accomplish the work of the show".

The following series of six figures assemble into the seventh, final, drawing which depicts the paths of the flow of information around a terrorist attack. The central circle containing the perpetrators and instrumental victims represents the attack itself. The source of this pattern of communication is an amalgam of my readings and experience with terrorist incidents and their aftermaths.

Figure 1: Communication to audience and instrumental victims of terrorist attacks

The eye-witnesses to a terrorist attack are the integral audience (even if selected randomly by the attackers) since they are a part of the show to the secondary (accidental) audience. The security forces and emergency personnel are also a part of the integral audience, for while they are an audience to the terrorist performance, they are performers to the accidental audience.

Figure 1: Communication to audience and instrumental victims of terrorist attacks

Terrorism has both direct and indirect victims. The direct victims of an attack are the individuals killed or hurt. The indirect victims are those who escaped physically unscathed but who experienced the stress of the attack, the relatives and close friends of the direct victims, and any others who learn about the attack and are psychologically influenced by the implicit or explicit threat of violence to them. The choice of the direct victims results in

the selection of the indirect victims from particular populations. A peculiarity of terrorism as a form of political conflict is that the direct victims may or may not be members of the target audience of the act. These direct victims are referred to as "instrumental victims" by Martin Symonds (pp 95-103 in Ochberg and Soskis), and by Schmid and de Graaf (1982: 14) "terrorism does not murder to kill somebody, but to obtain a certain effect upon others than the victim. Terrorism, by using violence against one victim, seeks to persuade others. The immediate victim is merely instrumental.... As such, an act of terrorism is in reality an act of communication. For the terrorist the message matters, not the victim."

The message, of course, goes to both opponents and supporters of the terrorist's cause. An attack tells the audience that the group adheres strongly to their ideology and has the will to act on their beliefs, it tells that the group has the ability to attack, and it tells that the security forces are unable to prevent these attacks. The aim is coerce the opponents with plausible threats (to extort), to convert supporters of the cause into supporters of the group, and to give comfort to those who already support the group. For those who are neutral/apathetic about the cause, the message is a reminder that the cause exists and that some consider it vital. The news media view the incident as a story which meets the profile of a valuable piece of news, and they then create their own performance for their audience, which spreads these messages to a greater number of people.

Figure 2: Communication to perpetrators and supporters of terrorist attacks

Maoist political theory maintains that guerrillas must mobilize the people on their side in the conflict, so at the beginning of a conflict the guerrillas stage attacks in order to recruit people to their cause, not to inflict damage on the enemy (Schmid and de Graaf, 1982: 20). In this case, the communication of terrorist performances is directed inward, towards the

actors' potential supporters in the area in which the conflict is occurring. The communication can also be directed outwards, towards potential foreign supporters (Schmid and de Graaf, 1982: 27). A terrorist group must always be aware of the meaning of an attack to their supporters. The members of their own group and its supporting community may even be the most important intended audience of an attack, as is the case in the execution of informers.

Figure 2: Communication to perpetrators and supporters of terrorist attacks.

Figure 3: Communication to the security forces

The security forces learn about the details of the attack by examining the scene, and also from statements by the surviving victims and by the witnesses (members of the primary audience, some of whom may have been members of the integral audience). Sometimes they also have informants within the terrorist organization who may or may not have

actually participated in the attack, and they will also receive claims of responsibility from the perpetrators or others. The security forces are also part of the integral audience, in that their reaction to an attack is part of the larger performance presented by the media. In the Northern Irish context, members of the security forces are also frequently the instrumental victims and other members sometimes become part of the primary audience.

Terrorists gain information from the security forces by analysing the questions asked them when interviewed/interrogated, by the charges laid against arrested members, and by the investigational activity following a terrorist attack. This information, however, is about how much the security forces know, not about the attack itself. In Northern Ireland, there have been cases where members of the security forces have leaked information to Loyalist paramilitaries, but this information path is not shown on the chart since I believe this to be a rare occurrence.

Figure 3: Communication to the security forces.

Figure 4: Communication to and from the media

The media, like the security forces, receives statements from surviving victims and from the witnesses. They are frequently the first to receive claims of responsibility for an attack, and also sometimes are able to interview members of the terrorist group. As the producers of the news reports, they are also a part of the larger performance as witnessed by the secondary audience, both those who are exposed to the incident through the broadcast or print news, and those who witness the reporters milling about the scene in the aftermath, interviewing witnesses, policemen, and, when starved for information, each other.

Figure 4: Communication to and from the media.

The role of academics studying terrorism is similar to that of the media, although I would consider them to be part of the secondary audience. Academics use the same sources of information as the media do, as well as using media accounts. Academic

writings are also then used by some members of the secondary audience, the security forces, and presumably the perpetrating group and its supporters, in developing their understanding of the event. I have not included the academic function in the chart since, except in the context of being interviewed by the media, it generally occurs long after the fact.

Figure 5: Communication to the secondary audience through the media and the security forces

Figure 5: Communication to the secondary audience through the media and the security forces.

The bulk of the secondary audience experiences the attack through the news media, filtered into a brief clip on the television, or an article in the newspaper. Some members of the secondary audience also have personal contact with witnesses or victims, in this case they also will learn about the attack from first-hand statements.

A few members of this audience (those who are in government) will also learn about the attack through official reports from the security forces. In the cases where the members of the target audience of the attack are closely connected to the victims, or are in the government, news coverage is unnecessary for the communication to take place. There are also cases where the message of the attack is intended by the perpetrators to be different for the media and the security forces.

Figure 6: Communication with terrorist supporters, and between the security forces and the media

Like members of the terrorist group itself, members of the supporting community give statements to the media interpreting the incident, and are also in turn consumers of the news coverage. Some members of the supporting community may also provide information to the security forces.

The security forces and the media also communicate directly. Reporters interview police officers and soldiers, and receive statements from the security organizations. The security forces are also consumers of media coverage of the events, both personally like the members of the secondary audience, and also corporately as part of their intelligence gathering process.

Figure 6: Communication with terrorist supporters, and between the security forces and the media.

Figure 7: The flow of information around a terrorist attack

When assembled, the flow of information around an attack may be represented as shown in Figure 7. This final drawing depicts the aggregate web of communication generated by a terrorist attack. These communications commence during or immediately following a terrorist attack, and may continue for years afterwards. It shows how the

simple triangle of perpetrator/instrumental victim/audience unfolds when the audience is dismantled into its various component communities.

This pattern of communication as depicted holds true for terrorist attacks in general, not only for attacks by the PIRA or even just for attacks in the Northern Ireland conflict. Not every path will be used in each incident; for example, some attacks are not accompanied by a claim of responsibility, and sometimes the security forces do not have informants in the terrorist group. The pattern is constant, as a range of possible and most used routes, so I believe that it can most profitably be depicted visually, as Schechner (1977) has done with other performances. This mapping of behaviour clarifies a complex situation which may take place over days, weeks, or years.

CASE STUDIES OF PIRA ATTACKS

"We make mistakes in the beginning and shoot the wrong people; but bloodshed is a cleansing and a sanctifying thing, and the nation which regards it as the final horror has lost its manhood"

Patrick Pearse

These attacks were selected to illustrate the variety of PIRA tactics described in the typology. Some have been the subject of much open research and public comment, such as the bombing of the Grand Hotel in Brighton. Others received little media coverage or academic examination, but are typical of the ongoing violence and are equally revealing. These examples are, of course, only the barest surface of the level of violence in this conflict. According to official aggregate figures, in the years 1969 - 1985 there were 43,777 terrorist incidents, causing 2,464 deaths; in the years 1981 - 1985 there were 2,649 terrorist attacks by Republicans, and 148 terrorist attacks by Loyalists (Pisano, 1988: 75-6).

Statistics on the violence in Northern Ireland

1. Murders in Northern Ireland, 1969-87

1) Victims

Civilians	1418 (56%)
Security Forces	785 (31%)
Paramilitaries (Nat)	202 (8%)
(Loy)	50 (3%)

2) Religion of victims (excluding army)

Catholic	54%
Protestant	45%

3) Agents of civilian deaths

Loyalist Paras	587 (41%)
Nationalist Paras	523 (37%)
Security Forces	167 (12%)
Unclassified	141 (10%)

From Irish Information Partnership, cited in Bruce (1989: 16)

PM-1 3½"x4" PHOTOGRAPHIC MICROCOPY TARGET
NBS 1010a ANSI/ISO #2 EQUIVALENT

PRECISIONSM RESOLUTION TARGETS

PIONEERS IN METHYLENE BLUE TESTING SINCE 1974

15000 L. COUNTY ROAD 9 BURLINGAME OH 44017 USA
TEL: 216 835 7867 FAX: 216 835 7867 E-MAIL: S.MORROW@OHIOSTATE.EDU

Statistical breakdown of the first 2,000 fatalities in the current Troubles:

11.0% killed by security forces
 51.2% killed by republicans
 28.7% killed by loyalists
 9.1% unattributed

27.7% were security forces
 11.2% were 'subversive groups'
 58.2% were civilians
 2.9% unclassified

(Lee, 1983: 173)

The most recent published figures, from the RUC Information Office and quoted in a Conflict Studies Special Report, give a death toll resulting from the security situation of 2,916 up to October 13th, 1991. Over 36,000 people have been wounded in the same period. The same source states that from 1969 to September 30th, 1991, there have been 33,592 shootings and 13,910 bombings or attempted bombings (Anon., 1991: 22-24).

Case No. 1: Specific Person / Bomb

Bombing of the Grand Hotel, Brighton, attempted murder of members of the British Cabinet on October 12th, 1984, by timer-activated explosive device.

Based on accounts in Bishop and Mallie, 1987; and Morris and Hoe, 1987.

At 2:45 am on Friday the 12th of October, a bomb exploded on the sixth floor of the Grand Hotel in Brighton. This was the last day of the Conservative Party conference being held there, and the guests in the hotel included the Prime Minister and members of her Cabinet. This attack killed five people and wounded 30 more. On the same day, the PIRA issued the following statement through the Irish Republican Publicity Bureau in Dublin,

signed with the traditional alias "P. O'Neill":

The IRA claim responsibility for the detonation of 100 pounds of gelignite in Brighton, against the British Cabinet and the Tory warmongers. Thatcher will now realize that Britain cannot occupy our country, torture our prisoners and shoot our people on their own streets and get away with it.

Today we were unlucky, but remember, we have only to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always. Give Ireland peace and there will be no war.

Quoted in Bishop and Mallie (1987: 338).

In the Sinn Fein journal *An Phoblacht* in August 1985 a PIRA spokesman said, in reference to this attack: "The myth that the British Government is impregnable has been blown -- and that alone increases our daring and confidence." (Morris and Hoe, 1987: 20).

A senior IRA official, in conversation with Bishop and Mallie (1987: 340) said about this attack:

It proved the capacity of the IRA to strike where it wanted. Essentially anyone would know that removing Margaret Thatcher as an individual would not necessarily weaken British policy in Ireland but the fact that you can attack Mrs. Thatcher might weaken her resolve to stay in Ireland.... Her dying or living is unimportant.... The fact that she did not die but now has to look over her shoulder every time she goes out means she can never forget Ireland as a problem.

The attack itself was very sophisticated. The device was a time-bomb hidden inside the wall of a bathroom behind a panel. The man who planted the bomb, Patrick Magee, had stayed in the room for three nights in September, three weeks before the device exploded. The bomb consisted of about 20 to 30 pounds of commercial explosives attached to two timers, one mechanical and the other electronic (Bishop and Mallie, 1987: 338). As Hartigan, O'Day and Quinault describe the attempt (1986: 59), the failure was "due to

chance more than incompetence", and the tactic used "reveals the continued absence of selectivity in Irish terrorism and a reluctance of the perpetrators to be willing to sacrifice themselves for their cause". While the PIRA is willing, like Patrick Pearse, to kill a few of the wrong people in their struggle, the evidence of the hunger strikes in 1981 shows the second half of this statement to be blatantly false.

In order to avoid detection of the bomb by the pre-conference security check, the perpetrators wrapped the explosives in a number of layers of cellophane to mask the smell. They also picked a room on the sixth floor on the apparent assumption that the search teams would work from the ground floor up, and would therefore not be at their most alert when they checked the room with the bomb (Bishop and Mallie, 1987: 338).

This attempt to murder the Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet indicates a shift in PIRA strategy from the early 1970's, when they had apparently opposed political assassinations because they "only created political martyrs who would be used by the other side" (McGuire, 1973: 102). In a stable, bureaucratized system like the British governments most individual participants in the system are replaceable, up to and including the Prime Minister. As a result, the murder of individuals in power does little to weaken the system, but would strengthen the opposition to negotiation. Since both Tory and Labour Prime Ministers had followed much the same policies in Northern Ireland since 1969, there was no reason to expect Mrs. Thatcher's replacement to take a softer line. Indeed, one would expect just the opposite to take place. However, had the explosion caused the deaths of several cabinet members, it could have caused a disruption in government.

The main message of this action, based on the claim and other statements quoted above, is one of empowerment. The explosion in the Grand Hotel was an undeniable and unmistakable statement that the PIRA is capable of reaching the best protected targets, and therefore can reach all other targets. The message to Prime Minister Thatcher, that she is vulnerable to attack, is by this repeated to all the other possible PIRA targets in the British government. This threat would, of course, have been even more convincing had the assassination attempt been successful, but the obvious destructive effect of the device on the hotel and the ensuing publicity seems to have satisfied the PIRA. This terroristic statement of potential reduces murder from being an end in itself to being merely a threat of future murders, and to being proof of the seriousness of that threat.

Prime Minister Thatcher would be an appealing symbolic target on several counts: to kill her would be to symbolically destroy the government, since she was the British head of government; her death would be revenge for the deaths of the hunger strikers, for which she was popularly blamed in Republican circles; and her death would amplify the message of Irish anger at the British. Johannes Most, a German-American anarchist, in about 1884 stated (Schmid and de Graaf, 1982: 13-4): "Everyone now knows, for example, that the more highly placed the one shot or blown up, and the more perfectly executed the attempt, the greater the propagandistic effect". Physical Force Republicans had previously attempted an attack against the British Cabinet. In 1884, during the Dynamite War, a Fenian was arrested with several hand grenades which he was planning to use against a group of Cabinet Ministers (Townshend, 1983: 164).

The Conservative party held their 1988 convention in Brighton, and Prime Minister Thatcher stayed in the same hotel again, saying that "after the incident last time we could

not possibly have stayed anywhere else" (AP in the Toronto Star, Oct. 11, 1988). This was, it seems, an attempt to refute the statement of ability that the PIRA had made with the bombing and so to counter PIRA propaganda. However, the security measures for the conference were massive, costing a reported \$2.6 million and involving over 2,000 police, a ban on civilian aircraft overflights, and Royal Navy destroyer patrols offshore. The IRA released a statement through the media saying that it "takes great delight from the hysteria and the expense surrounding the security of Thatcher and the Tories" (AP in the Toronto Star, Oct. 11, 1988). The security effort was irrefutable evidence that the government took the bombing seriously, and demonstrated the PIRA's ability to coerce the British government into exceptional measures, making them play the terrorist's game.

Case No. 2: Specific Person / Firearm

Murder of Colin Abernathy near Belfast, September 9th, 1988, by men armed with handguns.

Synopsis based on reports from the Associated Press and UPI, published in the Globe and Mail and the Toronto Sun, respectively, and from The Times, all of September 10th, 1988.

Two gunmen disguised as mailmen boarded a crowded train heading for Belfast during morning rush hour. They sat across from 30-year-old Colin Abernathy for a few stops, then when the train pulled into Finaghy station they shot him once in the head. According to the UPI version, at least four shots were fired at Abernathy while he was reading a newspaper, and other passengers were warned at gunpoint not to help him. The gunmen escaped into a waiting car at the station that was later found abandoned in Andersontown, West Belfast. Colin Abernathy was a clerk with the Northern Ireland Electricity Board,

and a district treasurer in the Ulster Clubs, a Loyalist protest group opposed to the 1985 Anglo-Irish agreement. Mr. Abernathy had no reported links to any of the Loyalist paramilitary groups. According to The Times, the IRA claimed responsibility for the murder.

As a "realistic" attack, this murder probably served little purpose. Abernathy appears to have been only a regional official in a Loyalist protest group, not a significant political figure, or a member of a paramilitary group. The public reaction to the attack was therefore more important to the perpetrators than the death of Abernathy.

As a communicative attack, this murder was a powerful piece of theatre, although it is probably impossible to know which aspects of the incident were consciously chosen for their symbolism and which for their expediency. The perpetrators are unlikely to give an accessible account of the reasons for these choices.

In the first phase of the drama, the eyewitnesses of this attack were the primary audience, the perpetrators and Mr. Abernathy were the actors. In the second phase, the eye-witnesses had become actors as well, wittingly and unwittingly carrying the messages of the attack to the police, the media, their friends, relatives and co-workers. These people, and the victim's associates, make up the secondary audience. It is this audience at whom this attack was probably directed. The eye-witnesses were coerced by the perpetrators into playing a part in the performance just as Colin Abernathy had been coerced; he became a performer and they became the integral audience. By being forced not to help the victim, the witnesses became unwilling accomplices of the murderers, the innocent were coerced into becoming, in a way, guilty. In this sense, they also became victims of the attack.

His murder would be perceived by his fellow hard-line Loyalists as a death threat. If this district official was a target, then by logical extension all other activists of equal or greater importance would be targets as well. This message would not need the media to communicate it to the members of Abernathy's circle.

The second part of this message to Abernathy's associates is that they are not only potential targets, but that they are virtually impossible to protect. The murder showed a high degree of planning, organization, discipline and confidence. It also showed that the security forces cannot protect everyone, nor can they always quickly apprehend the perpetrators. The public and daring aspects of the attack were probably designed more to unnerve members of this audience than merely to kill one Loyalist. Part of the message was that members of that community are not just targets while participating in Loyalist activities, but remain targets while commuting, at work, or at home.

As a further example of this threat to Loyalist activists at any time, earlier the same week Billy Quee was shot dead by two gunmen while outside his store. The Irish People's Liberation Organization (IPLO) had claimed that attack. According to an AP story carried in the Montreal Gazette (Sept. 8, 1988) Quee was a leading member of the Ulster Defence Association (UDA).

The decision by Mr. Abernathy's murderers to use post office uniforms as disguises may have been intended to further unnerve the other members of his community. Since the Loyalists are essentially pro-government, the ironic use of government uniforms had not only the practical reason of distracting witnesses, but also stated that people who appear

to be representatives of the government may in fact be members of the violent opposition. The act in this way serves to subvert the authority implicit in uniforms. The PIRA has used post office uniforms in previous attacks (Bishop and Mallie, 1987: 317).

The message of defencelessness would also be received by other Loyalists outside of Abernathy's circle of associates, who were members of the primary or secondary audience and who heard of the murder through personal contact or media coverage. Loyalist activists in other organizations may also have been intended to receive the news of Abernathy's murder as a death threat, and as a message that their government could not protect them. Since he was not openly linked to any paramilitary group, any paramilitary or political activist of similar or greater rank could consider himself a potential target.

The message sent to Republican extremists and their supporters by this act is that republican paramilitaries are willing and capable of carrying out dramatic attacks against the "enemy" successfully. This message is one of empowerment for the Republicans, since they demonstrated that they have the ability to murder people, literally in broad daylight, with impunity. This message helps the extremists who committed the attack by increasing their prestige in their circle, hence encouraging recruitment, and financial and political support for the organization. It is important to note, in this context, that the inquest into the killing of 3 PIRA members in Gibraltar by British security forces was ongoing at the time of this murder, and no doubt the PIRA members felt some pressure to demonstrate their competence.

This murder could have been committed more privately with fewer witnesses, but the direct audience was important to the perpetrators in two ways. First, since they saw the

attack they were the carriers of the message to the police, media, and their various circles of associates. Second, the witnesses became part of the message to the secondary audience. They became symbols of helplessness in the face of Republican attack, and were coerced into playing a role in the incident. In this, the audience in the direct performance became actors in the secondary performance, which is the relating of the details of the attack to the public via the police and the media. The choice of a public venue, with a 'live audience' for the attack also spread the threat. Had Abernathy been murdered at home with no witnesses this would have removed part of the impact of the attack. By murdering him while commuting to work the perpetrators not only threatened other Loyalists with death, but they also threatened members of the general population with witnessing and being forced to play a role in an attack and being by this a victim of the paramilitaries.

The PIRA gunmen often depend on the target's regular schedule in order to set up an ambush, but they are not always as successful as they were in the murder of Mr. Abernathy. An example of this was the following attack on an off-duty RUC member (Arthur, 1987: 169-70). The story is, I think, worth quoting in its entirety here, as narrated by a British Army Lieutenant:

An off-duty RUC man was visiting his parents and he had to drive down a long lane to visit them and there was only one way to get to them which was up a long lane and back on to the main road. He used to visit them the same day of the week every week and always travelled the same road. The terrorists got to know this routine so they lined him up. There were four gunmen involved in this shooting, two people with automatic weapons and two people with shotguns. As the RUC man came round the corner the terrorists opened fire on him from a range of about seven yards but somehow the driver managed to get away. The RUC took the car in for forensic evidence and there was one round through the fender. The RUC follow-up team found stacks of shotgun cases. We had to do the cordon for the follow-up. In that area we knew who most of the players [paramilitaries] were. The very next day one of our lads, a great six-foot-three giant of a man, went up to this player and said, 'Who does your shooting? Stevie Wonder?' And the guy turned beet red and for about

two weeks they looked very uncomfortable. Then they let us know that the four blokes involved in the shooting had been punished. They'd botched up so badly and everyone was laughing at them. All the locals knew too by then, and they were really upset about that.

Case No. 3: Random Person in Specific Group / Bomb

Bombing of Magherafelt UDR base, February 3rd, 1991 by 'proxy-bomb'

Synopsis based on 'The Times', and the Montreal Gazette, of Feb. 5th, 1991, and the Globe and Mail (Reuter) of Feb. 4th.

On Sunday, February 3rd 1991 Tommy Wallace was forced, by gunmen holding his wife hostage, to drive a bomb in his van to the UDR base in Magherafelt. Mr. Wallace stopped his vehicle outside the base, and shouted a warning. The bomb exploded two minutes later, no one was killed, but several people were injured and about 50 houses and businesses were damaged. The PIRA claimed responsibility the next day.

A high degree of coercion can be found in this PIRA bomb-delivery methodology sometimes called 'proxy-bombs', where members of the accidental audience are forced to become members of the integral audience and active performers. In this type of attack the ASU, in the words of one British soldier quoted in Belfrage (1987: 281):

go to somebody's home and hold the wife or children hostage, and they put this bomb in the car and get the man of the house and say, 'Okay, this bomb will not go off for X hours. We want you to drive the car, park it next to Y building, get out and walk away.' Usually these people will stop at the nearest army patrol. That happens a lot.

The unhappy driver is left with the choice of possibly causing the deaths of numerous strangers, or probably causing the deaths of his family. Even more than the bystanders in the Abernathy murder, he has become forced to be an accomplice, and to take an active part in the attack. The advantage of this form of attack, to the perpetrators, is that the device is delivered by an individual who is sufficiently motivated to transport the bomb, but who

will not be a loss to the organization should the bomb detonate prematurely. The fact that these drivers sometimes do not deliver the bomb to the named target, is not of great concern, since the security forces are still tied up attempting to disarm it, wherever it is. In the Magherafelt example the PIRA bomb maker appears to have timed the detonation of the device closely to its arrival, allowing no chance to disarm the device and leaving evacuation as the only option for the security forces.

These attacks illustrate to the audience the power that the PIRA has to intimidate people, and their willingness to risk the lives of non-combatants by pressing them into their service. These attacks also demonstrate most clearly the willingness of the PIRA to alienate ordinary people from their cause by victimizing them in this way.

Case No. 4: Random Person in Specific Group / Bomb

Land mine attack on a UDR patrol near Downpatrick, April 9th 1990

Synopsis based on The Times, the Globe and Mail, and the Ottawa Citizen, all of April 10th 1990.

A landmine exploded just before 8:00 a.m. along the Ballydugan Road, near Downpatrick. The device was detonated either by command wire or remote control (radio) from a firing point south of the road while two UDR Land-Rovers passed by. The mine contained an estimated 1,000 pounds of explosives, and made a crater in the road 50 feet wide and 12 feet deep. The second Land-Rover in the patrol was thrown over 20 yards by the explosion; all four occupants were killed. The four soldiers in the first vehicle were treated for shock. The attack was claimed by the South Down Brigade of the PIRA. A spokesman for the Sinn Fein stated that the condemnations of the attack by the Prime

Ministers of Britain and of Ireland were worthless: "They make no positive contribution toward removing the conditions which resulted in the deaths of these British soldiers."

In this case, including the Sinn Fein statement as part of the overall 'eruption', the Prime Ministers became part of the integral audience, since the performers are using their statements to carry their own message to the accidental audience of the entire presentation.

In a guerrilla or conventional war, the victims of this attack would be considered to be legitimate targets and the attack itself would be considered a legitimate act of war. The use of landmines against military patrols is by no means an unusual tactic in conventional warfare. The military function of this attack is to keep the members of the security forces on edge, and hence to ensure at least the maintenance of the British army presence, if not an escalation of activity. These landmines are not used so frequently as actually to defeat the security forces as a whole, but they are a constant threat to the members on rural patrols. The message of this attack is to strengthen the PIRA's claims to be a guerrilla force fighting British colonial occupation, and to demonstrate the PIRA's ability to attack small military targets successfully. This attack was terroristic, in the sense that it very closely resembles a legitimate act of war, and because of the limited theatricalization of the attack.

Case No. 5: Random Person in Specific Group / Bomb

Motion activated bomb in apartment in Londonderry, August 31st, 1988, (booby-trap)

Synopsis based on The Times Sept. 1st, 1988, the Globe and Mail (AP & Reuter) Sept. 2nd, 1988

The PIRA offered a public apology after a booby-trap bomb left for security forces in an apartment killed two civilians. Mr. Sean Dalton, 55, a retired taxi driver, and Mrs.

Sheila Lewis, 60, were neighbours looking for the occupant of the booby-trapped apartment when the device exploded, killing them both. Mr. Gerry Laird, the occupant of that apartment, had not been seen for several days. Mr. Dalton had entered the apartment through a window from the balcony, and detonated the bomb when he opened an inside door. Mr. Laird told police that he had been abducted by the PIRA a week before and was held by them until after the explosion. The PIRA had expected an army patrol to investigate the disappearance. The apartment is in the Creggan estate, a Catholic section of Londonderry. Martin McGuinness, a senior Sinn Fein official, stated that he has a responsibility to criticize PIRA operations like this that cause civilian deaths, but that he was not criticizing the PIRA as a whole.

This sort of attack may alienate members of the population who would otherwise support the PIRA, but they help the PIRA in their attempts to keep the initiative. It is unknown how willing Mr. Laird was to be taken away by the PIRA. The placing of a booby-trap in an occupied apartment building shows a striking disregard for civilians, in this case possibly even for PIRA supporters. It does, however, communicate very strongly the risks that the PIRA will take with their own potential support community in attempting to cause military casualties.

Mr. Laird was part of the intended integral audience of this attack, although he would not have witnessed it, and two members of the accidental audience accidentally became members (briefly) of the integral audience. This, combined with the location of the attack in a Republican neighbourhood of Londonderry, made it a deeply confused attempt.

Case No. 6: Random Person in Specific Group / Artillery

Mortar attack on Newry RUC Station, February 28th, 1985, using home-made Mk 10 mortars.

Synopsis based on Chartres, Henshaw and Dewar (1986: 145) and The Times, March 1 and 2, 1985.

Shortly after 6:30 p.m. on Thursday February 28th, 1985, several mortar shells fell on the Newry station of the RUC. Nine police officers were killed, and more than 30 civilians were wounded. The canteen in the base received a direct hit from one shell, two shells exploded in mid-air over the station, and the other six overshot the target. Of these six misses, two exploded in the street, destroying about 10 parked cars, two exploded in an abandoned building, and the other two fell blind (failed to explode). The nine mortar tubes were mounted in a metal frame on back of a stolen flat-bed truck, the muzzles of the tubes were propped up with wooden pallets. The mortars were fired in series, started by a timer. The device was apparently set up on the truck within about five hours. The mortar tubes were made of altered steel bottles for pressurized gas, each mortar shell was about six inches in diameter and weighed about 40 pounds. This was the 18th time mortars had been used by the PIRA. The version used in this attack was the Mark 10 (the tenth version of improvised mortar developed by the PIRA).

This attack was a virtuoso turn at showing the technical skills of the PIRA. They demonstrated that they can design and build multiple-tube mortar systems out of materials that could normally be found on any building site, and that they can pierce the defences of even such a hardened base. The fact that the PIRA successfully used a military-style weapon, which they made themselves, gives them more of the appearance of a real army. Ordinary criminals will use firearms, and will sometimes use bombs, but never use

artillery. With this, the PIRA's image as a military problem for the British, not a criminal problem, is enhanced. This message is an attempt to counter the British government's position that the PIRA is an organized criminal group, not an insurgent army. As with the land mine attack described above, this attack was terroristic because it is similar to an act of war, and because of its direct effect on the opponent it makes less use of dramatization.

Attacks against hardened targets such as the Conservative party conference in Brighton, and this police station, are acts of defiance and bravado against the British security forces. The PIRA claimed that this mortar attack was a "major and well-planned operation indicating an ability to strike when and where they decided" (Hamill, 1986: 296). The morale of PIRA members and supporters must receive a great boost from successful attacks of this kind, that demonstrate a 'David and Goliath' pattern in which a small organization with make-shift weapons can get the better of a large professional army and police force.

Case No. 7: Specific Person / Firearms

Pre-empted attack, 3 PIRA members killed by security forces on Aug. 30th, 1988.

Synopsis based on: The Times Sept. 1st, 1988, Toronto Star (AP) Aug. 31st, 1988, Sunday Times Sept. 4th, 1988, Globe and Mail (AP & Reuter) Sept. 2nd, 1988.

Three gunmen were attempting to murder a former UDR member in a drive-by shooting in rural Northern Ireland when they were ambushed by security forces who had been alerted to the conspiracy. They had hijacked a car earlier in the afternoon, for an unknown reason (possibly to do surveillance from), and were in a second car when they attempted their attack. The hijacking of the first car was described by the victims to the press. The three gunmen wore black balaclavas and blue boilersuits, and were armed with two rifles

and a handgun. They burst into a house at 2 p.m. on Tuesday, ordered the family into a back room, and took the car keys. They told the family to wait for two hours until they returned. The gunmen said they were leaving someone outside, and told the hostages they would be shot if they left the house. The gunmen left a bullet with the family as a reminder, they also ripped the telephone out of the wall and cut the line. When the gunmen returned one and three-quarter hours later, they gave back the keys and said, "Thanks for your co-operation, sorry for the inconvenience. Don't tell the police, you can come out of the room in five minutes." The gunmen took a second car and were shot dead by security forces shortly after this. The hostages, quoted in *The Times*, asked not to be named since "This is a republican area; it wouldn't do to give you our name", and stated that "The police don't usually come out here quickly because they are vulnerable to attack in this area."

The killing of the three PIRA gunmen led to rioting in Catholic areas of Belfast on the next night, in which three people were injured, and a bus, two vans and over 35 cars were burned.

As in the proxy-bomb attacks, the hostages here are members of the integral audience, though not so close to being performers. The rioters in Belfast then willingly became members of the integral audience in the overall drama of the pre-empted attack and its aftermath, illustrating how dramatic effects and messages of defiance can be pulled from failures.

It seems odd, at first, that this ASU would forcibly confine a family in a Republican area. One would expect that they would want to avoid alienating people who would be possible supporters. There are, however, advantages to taking hostages in their own

support area: by taking cars this way the police cannot identify PIRA supporters simply by tracing car ownership, the way they could if the ASU had used willing assistance. If they later use the willing assistance of PIRA supporters, these supporters can claim coercion as well, they would have a plausible, already established cover story for the police.

A psychological factor that might also explain this apparent disregard for the organization's image, is that extremists often do not distinguish between people who do not actively support them, and those who oppose them, 'if you're not with us, you're against us'. Residents of an area that is generally Republican, but who are not active PIRA supporters, may be assumed by the PIRA to be opposed to them. The members of the ASU that committed this attack may then have assumed that the PIRA would not lose any potential supporters by the hijacking. They also apparently tried to ameliorate the effect of the hijacking by apologizing after, in the same way they apologize for accidentally killing civilians.

Case No. 8: Economic / Bomb

Bombings of Short Brothers Aerospace Complex, Belfast: July 3rd, 1989, November 1989, Feb. 2nd, 1990, March 1990, and March 5th, 1991

Synopsis of 89-07-03 attack based on articles in the Toronto Star, and the Ottawa Citizen, both of 89-07-04.

Three bombs exploded at an airport in Belfast owned by Short Brothers, no one was wounded, two passenger aircraft were damaged and some windows were broken in the control tower. The devices exploded at about 2:30 am. A fourth bomb was disarmed. The RUC stated that they received two warnings from the PIRA about these bombs, and the

PIRA also claimed responsibility in a call to a local radio station.

Synopsis of 90-02-07 attack based on articles in the Montreal Gazette, the Ottawa Citizen, and the Globe and Mail, all of 90-02-08 and all from Canadian Press.

One bomb exploded in a hangar at the Short Brothers plant in Belfast, no one was wounded, minor damage was done to the building. The PIRA claimed responsibility and stated that they would continue to target this company, and would no longer give warnings. A local radio station reported that the PIRA called 22 minutes prior to the blast to warn that 3 devices had been planted at the factory. The PIRA stated that it was targeting this company because Shorts is providing "labor, materials and services for the British Crown Forces". Bombardier officials stated that they were puzzled by the bombings, since Shorts was not attacked when it had been a Crown corporation, and since Bombardier had made a public commitment to equal opportunity employment.

Synopsis of 91-03-05 attack from The Daily Telegraph, 91-03-06

A PIRA bomb exploded in a Short Brothers office block which was being renovated, causing no injuries and minimal damage.

In April, 1990, a Sinn Fein representative visiting Montreal stated that Shorts needed to hire more Catholics, since only 11% of Shorts' employees are Catholic. At this time, the PIRA had bombed Shorts four times since its sale to Bombardier had been announced. The Fair Employment Commission, in Belfast, has speculated that the PIRA attacks may have had the aim of discouraging Catholics from working at Shorts, in order to

demonstrate that moderate reforms won't work. A Sinn Fein executive stated that the PIRA must balance the economic campaign, trying to force Britain out of Ireland, with efforts to encourage companies to stop discriminating against Catholics in their hiring. The proportion of Catholic employees has nearly doubled at Shorts in the past years. (Montreal Gazette 90-04-14 & 90-05-12, Ottawa Citizen 90-04-24). The possible reason for these attacks which is not mentioned in the press, is that the bombings are part of an extortion attempt against the company now that it is privately owned.

The integral audience in this campaign has included Bombardier, the Sinn Fein of course, and any employers in Northern Ireland who adjust their hiring practices either way as a result of the attacks.

These bombings communicate to the company the PIRA's dissatisfaction with something. It is unclear, and the PIRA probably intends it to be unclear, whether the intent is to encourage more hiring of Catholics in order to improve their economic status, or to disrupt the economy for everyone and further polarize hiring practices. I suspect that the latter is the truth, and that the PIRA is claiming to be encouraging equal opportunity hiring as a public relations gesture. The reason for disrupting the economy is that the situation in Northern Ireland is clearly not bad enough to make the radical solutions proposed by the PIRA acceptable to significant number of the populace. The PIRA is therefore taking the logical step of trying to make the situation worse, while simultaneously claiming to be making it better. In this way they maintain what popular support they have, and push the situation to a point where their solutions appear to be necessary.

**OPTIMUM VIOLENCE:
THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL LIMITS TO ORGANIZED BRUTALITY**

"Oh yes, it's quiet lately, really. Apart from the shootings and the bombings there's no trouble."

Belfast resident

The optimum level of violence for a terrorist group is the balance between insufficient and excessive. Excessive violence leads to a drop in popular support, and to the possibility of increased government counter-measures. Insufficient violence also leads to a drop in popular support and damages the image of the group in its members' eyes, which can lead to internal divisions, as in the PIRA / OIRA split, or the splintering off of the INLA. The social and strategic forces which impel the terrorists towards escalation of violence have been examined by a number of authors, but the social and strategic forces that limit the escalation of violence have generally been ignored, outside of speculative articles on the potential terrorist use of mass-destruction weapons.

A terrorist campaign is, in its own way, an optimum level of violence between peace and insurrection. In Ireland, terrorist attacks have traditionally been used as a substitute form of political violence when insurrection was impossible. As the Clan na Gael (an American-based physical force organization linked to the Fenians and IRB) stated in 1883 "We cannot see our way to an armed insurrection in Ireland this side of some great Foreign War with England. But in the meantime we shall carry on an incessant and perpetual warfare with the power of England in public and in secret." (Townshend, 1983: 160).

The effect of terrorist violence on the target audience is due more to the style of the acts than to the content. For example, it is not uncommon for people to be killed and injured in traffic accidents, sometimes in the presence of family or close friends. Incidents like that

arouse a response only in people with some kind of personal contact to the event. A bombing by a terrorist group that has the same physical effect on the victims is, however, considered newsworthy, and affects people who have no personal contact with the event and who would probably not have cared if the fatalities had been due to a car accident. This difference in responses may be due to the much greater frequency of traffic accidents to terrorist incidents even in relatively active conflicts such as Northern Ireland. For example, in 1984: 64 people in Northern Ireland died in the Troubles, and 187 in traffic accidents (Laqueur, 1987: 211). In 1981, 221 people had died in traffic accidents compared to the 1970-81 average death toll of 180 people per year, a death rate of 11.7 per 100,000. The comparable death rate in New York City for 1980 was 21.0, for Miami: 32.7 (Lee, 1983: 170-1). The difference may also be partly due to the fact that terrorist groups often claim their own (and others') attacks in statements to the media, turning the attack into an explicit performance.

Thorough and extensive journalistic coverage of terrorist campaigns seems to be dependent on carrying out attacks with sufficient frequency to keep the conflict interesting, but with sufficient time in between to allow the journalists to analyse the conflict and write follow up articles. A large attack such as the Pan Am flight 103 bombing on December 21, 1988 resulted in a veritable deluge of media coverage for a number of months, and which is still ongoing, albeit much abated. In conflicts where the rate of destruction is too high for the media to respond, and in parts of the world that thereby become inaccessible, the journalists fairly quickly lose interest. Examples of this are the Sendero Luminoso campaign in Peru and the attacks by the various Khalistani separatist groups in India. Despite an annual death toll in each of these conflicts that frequently exceeds the 20-year total for Northern Ireland, they are reported on very sporadically in the media. As Brian

M. Jenkins (1975: 4) put it so succinctly: "Terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead". Therefore the optimum frequency of attacks by a terrorist organization is not necessarily the highest frequency that the group can manage in terms of manpower and supplies, unlike in a guerrilla or conventional war. This means that the main difference between guerrilla warfare and terrorism is in fact quantitative - a difference of frequency not substance.

A terrorist campaign needs the time between the attacks just as a concert requires time between the pieces of music performed: as Schechner (1977: 117) points out, performances in theatres require one or two intermissions in order to give the members of the audience time to interact with each other. The impact of terrorism on a secondary audience requires time for communication to occur - the witnesses must talk to the police, both then talk to the media (if only to make "no comment"), and the media, police, and witnesses talk to the secondary audience. Since this process is essential to terrorism as communicative violence, the optimum level of violence involves a frequency of attacks which will have these spaces of time in which the communication can occur. The ideal frequency according to MacStiofáin would be for each ASU to choose carefully three or four important targets and "make a really good job of them", then wait for several months before launching more attacks, since this is "a far surer way of producing surprise and shock each time" (MacStiofáin, 1975: 43).

Some writers claim that terrorist groups are constantly or generally increasing the severity of their attacks in order to maintain and increase media coverage in the face of the public adapting to the level of violence and competition for coverage from other groups. They have to raise the level of outrage produced, and so: "there is always concern that as

the attention span of the audience wanes, terrorists will search for novel tactics that may entail greater bloodshed in order to recapture the attention of the audience" (Norton, 1988: 8). In Northern Ireland, the search for novel tactics is certainly ongoing, but the death rate has in general gone down since the early 1970's. The death toll in 1972 was 467, through the mid-70's it was between 200 and 300 a year, in 1984 it was 64, and in 1985 it was 49 (Laqueur, 1987: 211). Rather than causing more bloodshed, the development of new ways and means has merely insured continuing occasional penetration of the evolving security measures and has maintained the impression of the PIRA's ability to wage war.

A Sergeant in the British Army noted that in the early 1980's, in comparison with 1977, "The IRA had become much more professional. Instead of firing off a thousand bullets they were choosing their targets very well, and the ratio of shots to kills had come down dramatically. A wild game had become a far more professional war, which was quite depressing, in the sense that although shootings were few, we felt much more tension, because if there was a shooting there was a real chance of losing somebody." (Arthur, 1987: 140). This shows how a conflict can be escalated without increasing the death toll. Despite this escalation in PIRA competence, members of the security forces still observed that there appeared to be limits to the violence. Another British soldier, in the mid 1980's, stated that "I wasn't even particularly offended that they [the IRA] shot at me twice. That was part of the game. It's not a war. Well I justify it in my mind as a game -- I can live with that. And there's certain rules that you play to and if you know the rules then you don't get hurt so often." (Belfrage, 1987: 283).

One aspect of optimum level of violence is that it must be easier for the terrorists to commit the acts than it is for the security forces to defend against them. PIRA sniping of

foot patrols has been described (by a PIRA member) as "like aiming at the moving ducks in a fairground shooting-gallery." These patrols in urban areas were considered to be very easy targets (McGuire, 1973: 79).

Another aspect of optimum violence is that the attacks must continue to attract interest, not necessarily by increasing the death toll, but more effectively by developing new weapons or tactics. As Belfrage (1987: 300) describes her impression: "you get the sensation that Northern Irish events are almost designed to be civilized and precision-targeted enough not to panic the cameramen and sufficiently imaginative to continue to attract their interest." The advantage for the perpetrators of using new tactics, instead of just killing more people, is that it sends the message of their competence to both their supporters and their opponents, it helps them keep the initiative since the security forces will find it more difficult to respond to unexpected types of attacks, and it does not alienate public opinion to the extent that increased casualty figures would.

Three main variables affect the level of violence: the frequency, the severity, and the targets of the attacks. The PIRA claims to concentrate on what they define as 'legitimate' targets in their attacks. The early PIRA leadership had observed the lessons of the 'terror bombings' carried out by most air forces in WWII; that attacks on civilians do not break morale. As MacStiofáin stated: "Any operations aimed at the civilian population would obviously harden public opinion against a just settlement for Ireland and enable the British government to take harsh measures against the Republican movement with full public support." (1975: 42)

In Northern Ireland the 'upward spiral of violence' scenario has not been the case, the

PIRA appears to have established an optimum level of violence that allows: fairly constant news coverage, local and world-wide; constant political attention; and the appearance of a war against the British authorities without provoking them to the point where the government would have an excuse to crack down openly in an extra-legal manner using proactive military operations, rather than reactive or preventive military co-operation with civil authorities. If the government had the political support domestically and abroad to use the military in Northern Ireland as a military force fighting a war, the PIRA and other paramilitary groups probably would not last very long. As Laqueur (1987: 304) describes it:

Society usually tolerates terrorism as long as it is a mere nuisance. Once insecurity spreads and terror becomes a real danger, the authorities are no longer blamed for disregarding human rights in their fight against terror.... The basic question is not whether terrorism can be defeated; even third-rate dictatorships have shown that it can be put down with great ease. The real problem is the price to be paid by liberal societies cherishing their traditional democratic values.

One of the classic terrorist strategic goals is to force the government into adopting oppressive measures in self defence which will further alienate it from the population, who are then supposed to flock to the terrorist group as their protector. This has not generally worked out very well, since terrorist groups have a low probability of surviving an offensive mounted by an oppressive government, and since the acts that force the government into a defensive position often alienate the population from the terrorists. One can go wrong by underestimating the intelligence of the 'common man', and by underestimating the abilities of the security forces of even a small, poor nation. As Laqueur (1987: 205) observed:

It was relatively easy to provoke a Latin American government and to discredit it, but it was far more difficult to survive the backlash of a military dictatorship. Even in Western countries terrorism became distinctly unpopular the moment it ceased to be a nuisance and caused real

inconvenience to society. Once this point had been reached, governments had no difficulty in introducing more stringent laws to combat terrorism.

So the terrorists must keep their level of violence below a certain level, much in the same way that most parasites should avoid killing their host animal.

The Security Forces believe they have a good handle on who the members of the paramilitary groups are. A UDR Sergeant claimed, "The terrorist is very well identified. We are on sixty per cent first-name terms with the main terrorists in this area and they are, likewise, with us." (Arthur, 1987: 223). The Security Forces use this knowledge in investigations of course, and also to put psychological pressure on the paramilitaries, "He'd [an NCO] find out the name of a player's [PIRA member's] dog or that he collected stamps or the name of his sister in America and the fact that her son was called Billy and had a birthday on 7 May. We'd put all this down on the P card and the next time we saw him, if it was appropriate, we'd tell him not to forget his nephew's birthday in a week's time. All this just kept him under pressure." (Arthur, 1987: 163). The RUC believes that they know who the active PIRA terrorists are, and that the lower number of deaths in comparison with the first years of the conflict are proof of the fact that the security forces "know who they are, and they know we know" (Soule, 1989: 41).

For a terrorist group, the optimum level of violence is the middle ground that is high enough to maintain support from their radical community, and continuing interest in the media and by the government, yet low enough to deny the government the popular support needed to implement extraordinary measures to destroy the group. By committing acts of violence, members of a fringe political group who are frustrated by the political system gain publicity and attention from the media and therefore the government. If the attacks are discontinued, the armed political party loses the support of its active extremists without

necessarily gaining popular support: "If a revolutionary movement is not active, it dies. On the other hand, even small-scale successful actions in the early stages help to attract recruits and increase popular support" (MacStiofáin, 1975: 54). If the level of violence approaches civil war, then the government could have enough popular support to wage war against the group, allowing the military to use their resources without the legal restraints normally imposed. If the armed party provokes this reaction without sufficient popular support for their own position and methods, then the government will win, as in the case of the Irish civil war after partition. Use of the military option by the government can be highly counterproductive, as in the case of the Uruguayan defeat of the Tupamaro movement in the 1960's in which the conflict destroyed both the revolutionaries and the government, although the government has since recovered.

It can be to the terrorist's advantage to mount small-scale actions, since it emphasizes the difference in scale between them and the government: "there will always be plenty of people who like to see David making off with Goliath's weapons" (MacStiofáin, 1975: 54). Some of the successful PIRA actions, in terms of sending to their supporters the message that they are more competent than the security forces, have not involved violence. For example in the early 1970's, the PIRA had rescued one of their members from a hospital in Belfast, simply by putting on white coats and wheeling him out. This was considered a valuable action for morale among the republican community: "The rescue, which made the British look foolish, appealed to the romantic tradition of Irish politics; so long as the Provisionals carried out daring operations like these and were not involved in indiscriminate violence, they were bound to remain popular in the Twenty-six Counties." (McGuire, 1973: 13).

The British government, realising that they cannot totally defeat the PIRA and other paramilitaries in Northern Ireland without a major breach of current civil rights, have opted instead to maintain an "acceptable level of violence" (Corrado and Evans, 1988: 401). This is a policy of keeping the death toll to a minimum while wearing down the paramilitaries, and at the same time removing the inequities in the local political situation which caused this set of the Troubles to flare up. In a war of attrition, the British military has a clear advantage over the Provisionals. As described by a British Major, "Both sides are locked into the conflict. The British Army, we can go on forever. It's built into the system, has been for years now: people are programmed to go there, and the casualties we suffer per annum are no more than soldiers killed each year in road accidents." (Arthur, 1987: 254). A British Marine Corporal described the military involvement in Northern Ireland as a "cheap war" which provides practical experience for the soldiers (Arthur, 1987: 244). Soule (1989: 43) has stated that the current "acceptable level of violence" is in fact not acceptable to either the government nor the paramilitaries, since the adaptability of both sides to new tactics means that there is no way that either can gain a military victory in the conflict. An 'acceptable level of violence' in Soule's analysis is a level that would lead to military victory for one side. An optimum level of violence as I see it is a function of the social, political and security situation, it is the level closest to their respective ideal amounts of violence that the paramilitaries, and the government and security forces can approach. The optimum level of violence does not guarantee victory, it merely prevents defeat.

The PIRA have carried out attacks in England only in occasional bursts, since the ASU's active in England lack sufficient support for long campaigns. In 1972 the PIRA decided against striking in England because of the lack of public support the ASU members would be able to command, contrary to the doctrine of successful guerrilla warfare which

demands that "you fight only where the population will support you and give you refuge" (McGuire, 1973: 101). MacStiofáin believed that hostility from the bulk of the population would make a continuous campaign in England impossible (1975: 43). This means that the optimum level of violence varies from place to place, depending on public support.

In the late fall of 1968, an optimum level of violence seems to have been established between the demonstrating crowds on either side of the dispute in Northern Ireland. According to Elliot and Hickie (1971: 54 - 55) the confrontations between demonstrators followed a pattern that minimized the risk of injury:

the typical crowd situation involved two lines of demonstrators with the police either in the middle or just in front of the Protestants. The two groups usually maintain distance between each other of about twenty-five yards and the conflict is usually limited to throwing stones and the exchange of abuse.... As stones and other missiles are not very effective antipersonnel weapons the injury rate can be kept low. The conflict can thus be waged fiercely, but primarily in symbolic terms.... The large confrontations throughout the winter and spring of 1968/69 were usually limited to the extent and duration of the announced processions or marches. Both sides thus would give notice of battle and give their opponents time to prepare for it.

Some of the riots following the deaths of the Hunger Strikers apparently had similar limits. The riots in Londonderry were described by a British Army Captain who was on the scene as: "pitched battles, very controlled pitched battles, with control from both rioters and Army. One is tempted to describe them in terms of a game, or a sport, but that would be wrong: there was a lot of very sincere and deep emotion on their side." (Arthur, 1987: 142). During a massive riot in Londonderry after O'Hara's death, a British officer using a megaphone asked the rioters to hold their fire while women and children were evacuated from a row of houses, one of which was then burning. The men in charge of the rioters stopped the firebombs and other projectiles, and the lull continued after the evacuation was

complete: "I decided to capitalise on their [the rioters] inactivity: I picked up the megaphone again and boomed across: 'They've gone now. You may carry on firing.' They were nonplussed: there was some jeering and a few missiles came over rather lamely but it took a lot of the steam out of them." (Arthur, 1987: 144).

A level of violence that is bound by rules, whether explicit or implicit, is one which would allow for negotiation to solve the conflict - since both sides are obeying rules of combat, they should be able to use the trust generated to reach a negotiated peace rather than victory through extermination. As Simmel states, if there is any limit to the violence then there is a socializing factor in the conflict, and so long as some rules are held by both parties, then a negotiated peace is possible (Simmel, 1964: 26). This becomes a more difficult problem in a terrorist conflict, since the opponents (government and paramilitary groups) obey different rules of combat. In this sense it may then be easier for rival terrorist groups to arrive at a negotiated peace than for a terrorist group to make peace with the government. The rival paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland have certainly been able to negotiate ways of cooperating in their economic projects.

The limits on terrorist violence are imposed by social, as well as strategic and tactical pressures. Harris (1989: 80) argues that paramilitaries in Northern Ireland are rational, with definite goals which they intend to reach by violence. "Further they are not beyond the influence of people in their community. This is important in this argument: it implies that those who use violence will do so in ways calculated not to so alienate their own people that they will cease to tolerate such activities." So the optimum level of violence is also influenced by the rules of the paramilitaries' own community, as they cannot risk being rejected for being excessively violent.

Both Loyalist and Nationalist paramilitary groups have occasionally included sadists (the Shankill Butchers, a UVF-linked gang active in the 1970's are the most thoroughly studied example of this in the Irish conflict) yet the paramilitaries committing sectarian murders rarely attack persons who are not adult men (Lebow, 1978). This is unlike some other sectarian conflicts (the Sikh fundamentalist/separatist situation in the Punjab, and the Tamil vs. Sinhalese conflict in Sri Lanka are examples) where men, women and children of any age are quite regularly murdered for membership in the 'other' group (Harris, 1989: 93-5).

While social rules seem generally to prevent the Northern Irish terrorists from murdering entire families (bombing attacks aside), it is not all that reassuring to realize that they instead will often murder a man while he is out with his girlfriend, or at home with his wife and family. One of the Shankill Butchers' attacks clearly illustrates this: the two perpetrators were driving through a Catholic neighbourhood of Belfast looking for a Catholic to murder. At about 3:30 a.m. the gunman spotted a blind man with a guide dog, and told the driver to stop so he could shoot. They abandoned this target when they saw a young woman further up the road, and the gunman said that 'she would do'. By the time the perpetrators had driven by and came up to her again for the attack, her husband had come out to join her, so the gunman shot him in front of his wife. The driver later tried to lessen his guilt by stating that he had dissuaded the gunman from killing the blind man (Dillon, 1989: 90-1). Clearly the perpetrators saw the young man as the most legitimate target, with the woman as second ranked and the blind man as the least legitimate.

The limits of social acceptance of violence can be stretched by intimidation, and by

using violence in a socially supported way, including the 'struggle against the oppressors' and the punishment of ordinary criminals. The PIRA uses all of these methods. Since a paramilitary group in their position does not have the infrastructure to maintain their own prisons, their punishments are generally corporal, such as murder or kneecapping, depending on the seriousness of the crime.

The paramilitary community has also been known to regulate the level of violence in a direct way themselves. There have been allegations that both the Loyalist and Republican paramilitaries had passed information to the other side about members of their own organizations who had become unwanted, in order to permit their murders. This would be an efficient way of turning a member who was a liability while alive into an asset as a martyr. One example of this may have been the murder of Lenny Murphy (Bishop and Mallie, 1987: 310-11). He was leader of the Shankill Butchers, and an embarrassment to the main Loyalist paramilitary groups (UDA and UVF) because he was excessively violent, even for a terrorist.

Murphy's murder was claimed by the PIRA (Dillon, 1989: 257), but for a variety of reasons it is probable that they received the essential intelligence for this attack from someone in the Loyalist community. Dillon (1989: 265) gives reasons to believe that Jim Craig, the UDA finance chief may have passed the information through his contacts in the INLA to the PIRA to arrange the hit. Murphy was then given an official Loyalist paramilitary burial, with a volley of shots fired over the coffin and a UVF gravestone (Dillon, 1989: 259).

Chapter IV MORBID SYMBOLISM AND LETHAL PERFORMANCES IN ART AND POLITICS

"OUR FENIAN DEAD": THE ROLE OF MARTYRS

*"In the name of God and of the dead generations from which she receives her old tradition
of nationhood, Ireland, through us, summons her children to her flag"*

The Easter Proclamation

Funerals and Martyrs

A martyr is another kind of instrumental victim, one who is used to carry the message of total dedication to the cause. Patrick Pearse in an elegy over the grave of a Fenian leader clearly expressed the motivating power of the Republican movement's martyrs: "The Defenders of this Realm have worked well in secret and in the open. They think that they have pacified Ireland... They think that they have forseen everything, think that they have provided against everything; but the fools, the fools, the fools! -- they have left us our Fenian dead, and while Ireland holds these graves, Ireland unfree shall never be at peace." (Gilley, 1986: 35).

In a way, the dead helped make Fenianism. The first successful Fenian action, and the one that supported its growth in the 1860's, was the massive, stage-managed funeral of Terence Bellew McManus in 1861, which included about 7 or 8,000 people in the procession alone (Townshend, 1983: 28-9). This first lesson was not lost on the organizers. When John O'Mahony, the founder of the Fenian Brotherhood, died in the United States in the late 1870's, his body was shipped to Ireland to be buried in Dublin. One Fenian leader, and official mourner, described the funeral as being traditional in that it set greater value "on the dead patriot's bones than on his living brains" (quoted in Short, 1979: 40).

The Clan na Gael perpetrators of the Dynamite War of the 1880's were responding to a need expressed in the 'Irish World' of October 1874 as: "We want some band of men to pioneer the way --- sometimes to skirmish, sometimes to act as a forlorn hope, sometimes to give martyrs and confessors; always acting, always showing that we have still among us brave men ready to do or dare all that brave men ever did and dared for the salvation of a fallen land." (quoted in Short, 1979: 34). The theme of sacrifice for salvation is not a new one in physical force Republicanism.

The last public execution in England was of a Fenian, Michael Barrett, who was hung in 1868 for his role in the killing of 12 people and wounding of 120 in an attempt to rescue Fenian prisoners from Clerkenwell gaol. According to British news coverage of the time (quoted in Schlesinger, Murdock and Elliott, 1983: 140), the crowd's "bastard pride in his animal courage and the brutal delight that he died game made the law and its ministers seem to them to be the real murderers, and Barrett to be a martyred man". The trick to this, is to encourage the audience to view the subject's death out of its context. For the audience members who could ignore the suffering that Barrett had inflicted, perhaps assisted by agreement with his aims or at least a shared opposition to the authorities, he would indeed seem to have been martyred by the British judicial system. The technique of shifting the blame for events onto the opposition is also often used in the case of bombings causing civilian casualties. The PIRA generally claims that the security forces ignored the warnings, when the security forces and others have stated that no warning was received, or that there was insufficient time given to disarm the bomb. The idea behind the PIRA claims, in this case, is to make the public perceive that the civilian casualties are the fault of the security forces.

The uses of funerals are still a part of physical force Republican propaganda. According to Winchester (1974: 85-91) the first civilian deliberately killed by the British military in the current Troubles was one Danny O'Hagan, age 19, who was shot during a riot in northern Belfast. The riot was a set-piece, the soldiers had been lured into the ambush site by a hoax emergency call received just after one a.m. The soldiers had been on the receiving end of petrol bombs for one and a half hours when, at about 4:30 a.m., the company commander announced that any further bomb-throwing would be met with rifle fire, CS gas having not worked. The molotov cocktails continued, and ten minutes later O'Hagan was shot. The soldier who fired at him stated that O'Hagan had just thrown a petrol bomb, and had a second bomb in his hand. O'Hagan's neighbours stated that he was a quiet harmless young man who was just out doing some shopping. At the time of his death, Danny O'Hagan was not claimed as an IRA member by the organization:

but his funeral was the first of a long string of IRA ceremonies that proved the Irish supremacy in turning the art of death into one of the great folk industries of the country. In Ireland no death is ever forgotten: it is the stuff of legend, martyrdom and romance: life, in Belfast anyway, has rarely any romance about it and little of legend either. O'Hagan was canonised that Monday afternoon; rather more substantially, one suspects, than his Maker might have decreed."

O'Hagan's coffin was draped in an Irish tricolour flag, was led by a piper, and was followed by an estimated 3,000 men.

The concept of Republican martyrdom may be at its height in the case of the hunger strikers. Bobby Sands died on May 5, 1981, after 66 days without food, and was followed by nine other Republican paramilitaries incarcerated in the same prison, the last of whom died in late August of the same year (Sands, 1983). The theatrical symbolism of these suicides is discussed at greater length in Chapter IV, suffice it to say here that the hunger strikes were stage managed to represent the sufferings of the Irish people under

British rule, and to demonstrate the willingness of the Republican paramilitaries to suffer for their cause as much as they force their victims to suffer. Kevin Kelley (1982: 336) describes one of the murals painted on ghetto walls about Bobby Sands, showing a "bearded, skeletal prisoner lying on a bare mattress with only a blanket for covering. A Christ-figure looked down on him benignly and gently touched the forehead of the dying figure", the title of this mural was "They Hunger for Justice". The idea of the hunger strikers as analogs to Christ is expressed in "Easter Again (1981)" a poem by Kathleen Raine (Raine, 1981: 439) the second half of which reads:

This Easter yet again
 Remembering the short life and swift death
 Of the world's thorn-crowned king
 Whom rulers with good reason had put down
 (Better one man should die than a rebellion
 With loss of innocent lives) I meditate
 On how the cross was exalted by the man
 Who on that shameful gibbet died.
 And now in the Maze Prison Bobby Sands:
 I judge a cause
 By the dignity of the act its dream inspires.

Patrick Pearse, before the Easter Rising, had also clearly linked the physical force movement's martyrs with the Christian ideal: "It had taken the blood of the Son of God to redeem the world. It would take the blood of the sons of Ireland to redeem Ireland" quoted in Gilley (1986: 38).

In PIRA martyrology in general, and especially in the case of the hunger strikers, the resonance of religious martyrs is clear; the idea of sacrificing oneself for the faith applies not only to the Church but to the nationalist cause as well. As Turner (1974: 68) has commented: "insofar as root paradigms are religious in type they entail some aspect of self-sacrifice as an evident sign of the ultimate predominance of group survival over

individual survival". It is clear that nationalism is the religion of the physical force Republicans. They are Kathleen ni Houlihan's crusaders.

Kevin Kelley (1982: 338) describes the ritual displays at the burials of two hunger strikers (Ray McCreesh - PIRA, and Patsy O'Hara - INLA) which are typical of Republican funerals. Masked men in uniform, some of them armed with handguns, marched beside the coffin, which had a pair of black gloves and a beret neatly folded on top of it. The masked men fired a salute over the grave with their pistols, and this was met with cheers from the mourners. Then people near the gunmen would open their umbrellas, to give them cover from the British helicopters overhead while they changed and disappeared into the crowd. In Kelley's words: "these ceremonies were as much a celebration of solidarity between the people and the Provos as they were a solemn show of respect for the martyred volunteer" (Kelley, 1982: 338). Attendance at Republican burials in the mid-1970's apparently averaged five to six thousand people (Arthur, 1987: 110).

The firing of a salute over the grave is one of the ways in which the PIRA imitates real military forces, and also is significant as a symbol of the commitment to military force. Thomas Ashe was a leader in the Easter Rising who died in a hunger strike in 1917. At his burial, a guard of honour fired a volley and Michael Collins, later leader of the IRB, delivered this speech: "Nothing additional remains to be said. The volley which we have just heard is the only speech which is proper to make above the grave of a dead Fenian." (Townshend, 1983: 316).

The importance that PIRA members place on giving their comrades the 'proper' burial is illustrated in this case described by Kelley (1982: 249). In February 1976, a PIRA

prisoner who died after a hunger strike was buried without Republican rites in the Republic. The authorities claimed that the widow requested a private ceremony but she later denied this. Then one night that November a PIRA unit dug out the corpse from under the cement casing that had been laid down over the grave, and moved it to the Republican section of the cemetery. There a priest said some prayers and the PIRA men fired one round as a salute, to make it a proper Republican burial.

Mysticism

Irish Republicanism, in its 18th century roots, is based on the essentially mechanistic cosmology of the European Enlightenment, and hence is antithetical to devout Roman Catholicism (de Paor, 1985: 164-5). But as a movement heavily influenced by 19th century 'romantic nationalism' (de Paor, 1985: 167) it developed a mysticism of its own, with its roots in the Catholic traditions in which most of its adherents were raised.

Physical force republicanism has a religious tendency of its own. "Those militant republicans who not only talk of struggle but also conduct the armed campaign are a kind of warrior priesthood demanding initiation, dedication and self-sacrifice." (Aughey, 1988: 80). The physical force adherents are the elite fundamentalists of Irish republicanism, and so their righteousness forgives them their excesses. This mystical streak is not a peculiarly Irish trait; it has been observed in other violent extremists, as Laqueur (1987: 184) noted: "Whatever their professed politics, most terrorists are really mystics and the idea of martyrdom obsesses them."

In the early days of the current Troubles, the PIRA Army Council's goal was to kill 36 British soldiers, the number that had died in Aden during the independence struggle

(McGuire, 1973: 78-9). When this target was reached with no apparent effect on the British will to fight, the goal was raised to 80 in the belief that the British government would then be forced to negotiate. It is interesting that the original target was to kill as many as in Aden, despite the widely different geopolitical situations. It is difficult to believe that the PIRA Army Council's analysis of their situation was so simplistic as to equate Ireland and Yemen; this sort of strategy seems more like sympathetic magic than military planning.

The Loyalists and Republican extremists do not actually agree on the cause of the conflict. Republicans, especially the PIRA, claim to see it as a non-sectarian issue, a struggle against British colonialism in the image of the United Irishmen; while the extreme Loyalists define it as a religious issue, in which they are defending their rights against Papist aggression. Yet it has been said that militant republicanism is in essence a religion in its own. Harris (1989: 97) refers to IRA members describing their recruitment in terms of a religious conversion, and states that IRA indoctrination is like religious instruction: "it caused the recruits to see the world in a new way". Liam de Paor (1985: 186-7) describes the PIRA as being a sect, "exclusive, millennialist, unworldly, ultimately anarchic, self-obsessed and self-sufficient, dedicated not so much to an imagined future as to an imagined past." Devotion to the political cause is a substitute for more traditional religious devotion, and it is an alternative that is available on both sides of the sectarian divide. The Orange Lodge is in some respects the Protestant equivalent as a substitute religion since "membership of the Lodge allows the Protestant male to assert his religious loyalty without the inconvenience of any Christian religious observance" (Harris, 1989: 99).

The image of PIRA terrorism and of the entire Northern Ireland conflict as a religious

struggle, and the resultant manichaeian attitudes of PIRA supporters, was acknowledged by McGuire (1973: 119):

"we were quite ready to play for all they were worth the new Republican myths that were being created out of the current campaign. And nowhere was it easier to capitalize on them than in the United States, where whole communities of Irish-Americans were watching the struggle in the Six Counties like spectators at a morality play, with right and wrong, good and evil, delineated in black and white."

Patrick Pearse was probably the most eloquent of the mystical nationalists who supported the physical force movement. He said, of the first years of World War I: "Heroism has come back to the earth... The old heart of the earth needed to be warmed with the red wine of the battlefields..." (Gilley, 1986: 38). And in anticipation of the Easter Rising, Pearse said: "We make mistakes in the beginning and shoot the wrong people; but bloodshed is a cleansing and a sanctifying thing" (Gilley, 1986: 38). The physical force Republicans still finds it easy to live with their mistakes: "despite blaming the security forces [for accidental civilian casualties of a car bomb], the movement "accepted responsibility" for the explosion, and it was a curious thing that the Provisionals felt that by doing so they somehow atoned for the casualties, as if they had gone to Confession and asked forgiveness." (McGuire, 1973: 113)

Pearse and Connolly considered the sacrifices to be made in the Easter Rising of 1916 in religious terms, as a redeeming act like the crucifixion (Fennell, 1985: 204). Connolly, for some time an atheist, stated only months before the rising that "Without the slightest trace of irreverence, but in all due humility and awe, we recognize that of us, as of mankind before Calvary, it may be truly said 'Without the shedding of blood there is no redemption.'" And his last words, spoken to a chaplain before facing the firing squad, were: "Father, forgive them for they know not what they do." (Fennell, 1985: 204). The

timing of this revolt for Easter was clearly chosen to be in accordance with these beliefs. This identification with religious/mythical figures was an effective part of the Republican propaganda. "One factor, for example, in the rising popular approval of the Easter 'martyrs' was Pearse's fusion of Gaelic and Catholic motifs of redemption through self-sacrifice, which he exemplified in his self-portrayal as a Christ-Cuchulain figure." (Hutchinson, 1987: 309).

VIOLENCE, PERFORMANCE AND SYMBOLISM IN ART AND TERRORISM

"All art is at once surface and symbol."

Oscar Wilde

Acts of political violence are a form of communication, a way of amplifying the statements of the perpetrators when "a crisis moves one very quickly into a situation where real communication breaks down and actions speak louder than words" (Elliot and Hickie, 1971: 65). But despite the physical action that is the core of terrorism, it remains a rhetorical, not a physical threat to the social order (Dowling, 1989b: 48). This is the symbolic aspect of terrorism, since terrorists use symbols to communicate in the same way that artists do in mediums such as theatre and performance art. Schechner (1985:23) states that action, not language, is the core of performance. This is as true of terrorism as it is of theatre.

It would be incorrect to claim that terrorism is meaningless violence. On the contrary, terrorism is violence specifically intended to carry meaning. This is why terrorism has an apparent impact out of all proportion with the actual damage caused: "terrorists want a lot of people watching and a lot of people listening, and not a lot of people dead" (attributed to Bowyer Bell in Laqueur, 1987: 168); or, as Algerian FLN leader Abane Ramdane said, "Is it better for our cause to kill ten of the enemy in the countryside of Telergma, where no one will speak of it, or one in Algiers that will be mentioned the next day in the American press?" (quoted in Schmid and de Graaf, 1982: 19). Like any other performance, as defined by Goffman (1959: 15), terrorism is an attempt to influence an audience.

The statement that terrorism is theatre has been made by a variety of writers on political

violence. Schechner (1977: 70) refers to terrorist attacks as "theatricalized events performed by groups of people in order to catch the attention of larger masses of people by means of TV". Lee (1983: 168) says much the same thing when he describes terrorism as a form of theater which attempts to "force a propaganda message into public awareness, discussion, and action". Brian M. Jenkins (1975: 4) states that:

Terrorism is a campaign of violence designed to inspire fear, to create an atmosphere of alarm which causes people to exaggerate the strength and importance of the terrorist movement. Since most terrorist groups are small and have few resources, the violence they carry out must be deliberately shocking. Even apparently indiscriminate violence is based on the terrible logic that indiscriminate violence gets the most attention and is the most alarming. Terrorism is violence for effect. Terrorists choreograph violence to achieve maximum publicity. Terrorism is theatre.

So terrorism is theatre, but what kind of theatre is it? Goffman, Turner and others have described most of human behaviour as being performance: "All the world is not, of course, a stage, but the crucial ways in which it isn't are not easy to specify." (Goffman, 1959: 72). Terrorist theatre is tragic, but not tragedy. It is, on rare occasions, of the darkest form of humour, but it is not comedy. The theatrical form to which terrorist attacks are most structurally similar is to some types of performance art. As a form of communication both terrorism and performance art often seem to be perversely inarticulate, they both involve the coercion of audience members into the integral audience or into becoming performers. Some kinds of performance art use simplification and violence as a means of amplifying for the message, and both are liminoid. Both generally take place outside of 'theatres', those spaces that are set aside symbolically as venues for plays or for war. Interestingly, the birth of modern terrorism in the late 1800's predates the birth of performance art, which took place at the time of the First World War.

The inarticulacy of terrorism may be a result of its origins in a perceived dysfunction in political communication, as Schechner (1977: 126) had described it: "Terrorism, as

opposed to ordinary street violence which is a function of economic deprivation, is a way of getting the attention of society, of making a show; it signals a basic dysfunction of the communication process." This is also expressed by Schmid and de Graaf (1982: 219): "terrorism is not senseless violence but a symptom that something is wrong with communication".

The difficulty in reading the messages of some terrorist attacks and some performances may also be a result of the stark, direct, single image effect that many performances of both kinds aspire to. A good example of this is the speech of Michael Collins over Thomas Ashe's grave: "Nothing additional remains to be said. The volley which we have just heard is the only speech which is proper to make above the grave of a dead Fenian." (Townshend, 1983: 316). The intent is to amplify the message through simplification, but when taken to extremes simplification becomes encryption. As with much modern art, the messages become unreadable except by people with an extensive knowledge of the context of the sender. This is why many terrorist acts seem meaningless to everybody except other supporters of their cause.

In guerrilla warfare, there is a tactic that was apparently developed in China and used in the Cuban revolution called the "tactic of the dramatic gesture" (Hyde, 1968: 36). The "dramatic gestures" used by Castro's guerrillas in 1958 were kidnappings of foreign nationals, who had been abducted and released "in order to show the world that the insurgents were fighting for freedom as an organized group and were not just a rabble" (Hyde, 1968: 36-37). This reason for kidnapping foreigners was to overcome Cuban government censorship and get media coverage for the guerrillas.

Dramatic gestures used by Latin American guerrilla groups included kidnappings, hijackings, and pre-advertised murders. In this last case, leaflets were distributed announcing that a policeman would be killed each day in a city for a given period, and then the groups carried out the threat (Hyde, 1968: 43). The aim of these acts was "to make it appear to the public that the insurrectionists could strike when, where and whom they pleased" (Hyde, 1968: 43). The leaflets, and reports of the murders were as important or more important than the actual murders, since "without communication there can be no terrorism" (Schmid and de Graaf, 1982: 9).

These tactics were designed not to defeat the enemy, but to carry meaning, to communicate a message to the audience. Schechner (1977: 91) states that "Battlefields are places to show the colors, parade strength and in general scare your opponent off the field. Guerrilla war and mass combat work against these theatrical qualities. Thus even at this level the ethnological and sociological rituals are embroidered with entertainment." Terrorism consists more of these theatrical qualities than of actual combat, and it enhances the visibility of the combat that does occur much more than conventional or guerrilla warfare does. As Schmid and de Graaf (1982: 15) state: "Violence, to become terroristic, requires witnesses." The violence must also make an unusual impact on the audience, "terror is understood or illustrated not simply by killing, but by the wicked symbolism that remains fixed in one's thoughts long after the name of the deceased is forgotten" (Dillon, 1988: 89).

The way in which terrorists coerce the immediate audience into becoming participants in the act is also replicated in some artistic endeavours. As an example of this, we can examine the occasion in Vancouver in which a performance artist announced that he was

going to crush a rat between two canvases, in public, in order to produce an art object. The process itself was intended to be performance art, but the trick of it appears to be that the intent was to spark a reaction from animal rights activists and the media that would become an essential part of the event, if not the main aspect. So a self-selected portion of the audience were coerced, without realizing it at the time, into becoming actors in the performance. The rat was the instrumental victim, and the animal rights activists were, unknown to themselves, the integral audience.

Rick Gibson, a Canadian artist, had announced that he would kill Sniffy the rat with a machine that would drop a 25 kg. weight on him, outside the Vancouver Public Library on Saturday January 6th, 1990. The Vancouver Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals stated that they could legally not do anything to prevent the performance, and a spokesman for the VSPCA said that "although the perception is that it's totally inhuman the reality is it is probably a humane way of killing a rat" (Globe & Mail, 90-01-05). According to the Crown attorneys consulted by the police, Mr. Gibson would not be committing a legal offence by killing the rat. The Vancouver Humane Society stated that they could not afford to seek an injunction to prevent the act, but intended to lay a complaint with police in an attempt to have charges laid. A member of Lifeforce, an animal rights group, stated that they would "rescue Sniffy".

On the day of the advertised "Rat Piece", Mr. Gibson told the assembled crowd (estimated at 350 people) that his rat-crushing apparatus had been stolen that morning from the back of a truck at his home; he claimed that the perpetrators were animal-rights activists. Mr. Gibson also stated that he had returned the rat to the pet store "where he had rented him, and where Sniffy would probably be sold as live food for exotic snakes" (Globe &

(Globe & Mail, 90-01-08). One of the protestors apparently told reporters that "They should put his [Gibson's] head between two stones and crush him" (Globe & Mail, 90-01-08). Responsibility for stealing the rat-crushing apparatus was claimed on behalf of Lifeforce. Members of this group later stated that they had purchased Sniffy from the pet store so that he could live out his natural life in peace.

The debate over this issue resulted in an unusual amount of media attention for a piece of modern art, including front page coverage in the Globe and Mail. Since the method of killing the rat was considered legal and relatively humane (the rat had been bred to be snake food), then the protests over the issue seem to be based on an emotional reaction to the advertised public nature of the act and, I suspect, the fact that the rat was anthropomorphized by having a name. For his efforts, the artist received a great deal of free publicity, and was able to make a statement about the manipulation of political movements by the media, and of the media by political groups. The statement that he had rented Sniffy indicates that he had no intention of killing the rat, and that the public outrage was in fact the performance he intended to create.

One of Mr. Gibson's supporters, a former art gallery curator named Susan Milne, stated that the "Rat Piece" was a work of media manipulation. She said that "If it wasn't for the media, the police wouldn't have been notified... He's actually using the media as a medium for himself" (Globe & Mail, 90-01-08). Ms. Milne also criticized the media for giving the advertised event as much coverage as world events: "There's Sniffy the rat and there's 230 civilians killed in Panama... You say what's the difference; well there's a major f---ing difference.... He's managed to get the public up in arms about this ridiculous issue" (Globe & Mail, 90-01-08). While Mr. Gibson is by no means a terrorist, he appears to be

an accomplished outrage-monger.

Richard Schechner (1977: 125) has commented that:

So much of experience can now be theatricalized by editing bits of events for showing "news" that people feel nothing strange about a complementary actualization of art. When people watch extreme events knowing these are (1) actually happening and (2) edited to make them even more dramatic and to make them fit into a "showtime" format, but also knowing (3) that as observers they are stripped of all possibility of intervention -- that is, they are turned into an audience in the formal sense -- the reaction is paralysis and despair.

In the "Rat piece", Mr. Gibson managed to provoke members of his audience and structure the whole of his performance, starting with his announcement, so that the audience would attempt to intervene. He achieved the opposite of the paralysis and despair predicted by Schechner. This may have been partly because, while the situation was extreme, the integral audience felt in little or no danger to themselves so they were free to attempt to enforce the precepts of their cause on the artist.

The "Rat Piece" was a clear exposition of a tendency in journalism to give greater coverage to acts of violence, unusual events, and events nearest the readers. In Great Britain the effect of proximity in judging the importance of a story is apparently called 'McLurg's Law' (Schmid and de Graaf, 1982: 74). This principle states that a small local disaster is more newsworthy than a large distant one -- "One European is worth twenty-eight Chinese, or perhaps two Welsh miners worth one thousand Pakistanis" (Schmid and de Graaf, 1982: 74). So the Canadian version of this principle, as explained by Ms. Milne, is that one rat is worth 230 Panamanians. The PIRA are well aware of this tendency, and this is the reason behind their occasional bombing campaigns in England. They have been known to say that "in publicity terms one bomb in Oxford Street is worth

ten in Belfast" (quoted in Schmid and de Graaf, 1982: 43); this is because McLurg's Law dictates that a bombing in England receives far greater coverage in the English news media than a bombing in Northern Ireland would. It may also be that incidents involving animals have an enhanced impact; as when, in February 1983, a PIRA cell kidnapped the Derby-winning racehorse Shergar. Morris and Hoe (1987: 71) state that "The theft of Shergar in County Kildare, Southern Ireland, occupied as much news space in the United Kingdom as an aircraft hijack would have done."

An attack in England is more newsworthy to the English media because it is not only more nearby, it is also more unusual, and the more unexpected an event is, the greater its value as news: "the unexpected is inherently obtrusive.... The more obtrusive the event, the greater its currency and the higher its news value...." (Bernard Roshco, quoted in Schmid and de Graaf, 1982: 207). The use of the unexpected is traditional in physical force Republicanism, as Edward Hamilton (Gladstone's private secretary) remarked of the perpetrators of the Dynamite War: "With these scoundrels 'the unexpected' is generally the order of the day" (quoted in Townshend, 1983: 164). This use of the unexpected to grab the audience's attention is common to politics, news, and art.

The intent of Dada performance was to "jolt" the audience into "awareness of the atavistic presence of things and of self" (Erickson, 1984: 69). Max Ernst, a Dadaist and later Surrealist painter, stated:

For us, in Cologne in 1919, Dada was first of all a mental attitude... our aim was total subversion. A ghastly and senseless war had cheated us out of five years of our lives. We had seen all that had been held up to us as good, beautiful and true topple into an abyss of ridicule and shame. The work I produced in those days was not meant to please but to make people scream. (Schneede, 1973: 11)

A member of the Japanese Red Army, quoted in Schmid and de Graaf (1982: 28) explained the purpose of terrorism as a way of amplifying messages: "Violent actions, such as those we have used constantly in fighting the enemy, are shocking. We want to shock people, everywhere.... It is our only way of communication with the people". The problem with this, is that the shock value of an act decreases with exposure. Terrorism as such no longer surprises, although individual attacks still can through an exceptional death toll or through the inclusion of unusual targets or weapons.

In the mid-1920s, the Surrealist poet Andre Breton stated that "the ultimate Surrealist *acte gratuit* would be to fire a revolver at random into a crowd on the street" (Goldberg, 1988: 8). In California in 1971, performance artist Chris Burden carried out a work he called "Shooting Piece", in which he had a friend shoot him in the arm from 15 feet away. This act, and other similarly dangerous acts, was apparently meant to "transcend physical reality" and "alter people's perception of violence", and in his own words, to "re-enact certain American classics - like shooting people" (Goldberg, 1988: 159). In 1973, Burden performed "747" in which he used a pistol to fire several shots at a Boeing 747 that was flying overhead (Burden, 1988: 59). The presence of danger, or threat, is inherent in Burden's work. What Burden is doing in his performance, is removing the use of metaphor. Laurie Anderson (La Frenais, 1984: 256) describes Burden's aesthetic as: "I'm not going to talk *about* pain, I'm going to *be* in pain." According to Jan Butterfield (Burden and Butterfield, 1984: 228) "it is that terror, that thrill, that anxiety, that makes Burden's pieces impact." Another justification for hazardous performance art was expressed by Jana Sterbak, in explanation of her piece "Artist as Combustible" in which a small container of gunpowder was placed on her head and ignited: "the danger is a necessary part of inspiration" (Kalinowska, 1991).

The practice of intentionally selecting an audience of random members of an identified group of people, in order to communicate with the larger group, can be seen in a piece called "Defoliation" by Terry Fox. In a politically-motivated act commenting on the Vietnam War, Fox used a flamethrower to kill the jasmine plants in a garden outside the Berkley Art Museum. He selected the garden because: the plants were a species that bloomed only every seven years, and they were in their sixth year; and because he noticed that, in his words: "If you went there on a normal day there'd be two or three very rich-looking people sitting around having lunch -- having their bottle of wine there because it was beautiful; it smelled really good, it was real quiet, a wonderful place." (White, 1984: 207). He wanted the effects of this act to be seen and felt by individuals who he believed to be "extremely rich people who obviously supported the war in some way or another." (White, 1984: 207).

The point was to communicate the destruction in Vietnam in a concrete way to people he thought were supporting the war: "Nobody would get excited about napalming Vietnam, but you burn some flowers that *they* like to sit near..." (White, 1984: 208). In 1968 a group of German anti-Vietnam war activists set fire to department stores in an attempt to convey to the West German public what was going on in Vietnam. While on trial, one of the perpetrators said to the judge, "I am not speaking here about a few burned rubber mattresses, I speak about the burned children in Vietnam" (Schmid and de Graaf, 1982: 45). The perpetrators of this act included individuals who would later be founders of the Red Army Faction (Schmid and de Graaf, 1982: 138). An artist reifies flowering bushes, and a group of extremists reify department stores into human victims of a war that the actors consider unjust. The main difference between the acts appears to be that, unlike the

German radicals, the artist had permission before ignition.

Terrorism can be seen as not only mass-media drama, but as criminal performance art with an ideologically based ulterior motive, a sort of *avante garde* warfare. The violence is meant as an indirect, not direct, attack on the enemy's structures. The violence is designed to have a shock value, the greater the outrage, the more powerfully the message is conveyed. The intent is to place the target government into an untenable position with its own supporters, whom it appears to be unable to protect. Terrorism is to guerrilla theatre as snuff films are to horror films.

The reification of victims into symbols is common to both terrorism and to some performance art. Schechner (1977:123) has commented that: "People who want to make 'everything real' including killing animals, the 'art' of self-mutilation, or 'snuff films' where people are actually murdered are deceiving themselves if they feel they are approaching a deeper or more essential reality. All of these actions -- like the Roman gladiatorial games or Aztec human sacrifices -- are as symbolic and make-believe as anything on stage. What happens is that living beings are reified into symbolic agents. Such reification is monstrous, I condemn it without exception." This reification of victims into carriers of meaning is precisely the situation in Provisional IRA strategy: "I admit that at the time I did not connect with the people who were killed or injured in such explosions. I always judged such deaths in terms of the effect they would have on our support" (McGuire, 1973: 113).

An excellent example of this reification is to be found in the PIRA's justification for the killing of Lord Mountbatten, who died in August 1979 when a remote-controlled bomb

destroyed his boat while sailing off the west coast of Ireland (Bishop and Mallie, 1987: 248-9). A member of the PIRA Army Council (quoted in Schlesinger, Murdock and Elliott, 1983: 30) explained the murder by stating:

First of all, he was a member of the Royal Family, of a monarchy which has done nothing other than bring misery to our people. He had considerable stature within the British military machine which for the past eight centuries, and especially during these past twelve years, has enslaved Ireland. But apart from his membership of the British Royal Family, he was also an absentee landlord -- that is to say a landed proprietor in the old English tradition in Ireland, who, while living in London, benefits from the exploitation of the lands of his great house in Ireland, living there just once a year, during August.

So killing this man had the aim of making the world understand -- and first and foremost the British -- that there's a state of war in this country. Given his personal importance there was inevitably going to be enormous publicity attached to this operation... we had no hatred for him as a person. It is the society, the military and political machine he symbolised that we were aiming at.

In this statement, Mountbatten is described as an ideal symbol of British imperialism, and of the oppressors in Irish history -- he was a symbol of British Royalty, of the British military, and of the absentee landlords. In this context, his murder was meant as a symbolic attack on these institutions.

The hunger strikers of 1981 reified themselves into their cause, instead of using some other victim as symbol of the enemy in Irish history. The statement in Boyce (1986: 25) that "A leading Republican publicist explained that Bobby Sands saw his case as 'a microcosm of the way the Brits are treating Ireland historically and presently'" shows how the combination of murders and suicides were meant to re-enact Irish history. The hunger strike was presented as a performance of Irish history, in which the sufferings of a nation were represented by the self-inflicted sufferings of the actor, and centuries of 'colonial oppression' were reified into weeks of self-imposed starvation. This sacrificial dramatic cycle as presented by Sands, and the nine other H-Block prisoners who followed him to

death, is a traditional performance in the physical force Republican repertoire. The presentation of these suicides is described by Boyce (1986: 25) :

The IRA hunger strike which began on 1 March 1981 and ended after the death of ten prisoners between May and August provided the inevitable scenes that had surrounded the political martyr since the Fenians; indeed, IRA propaganda consciously looked back to earlier examples.... Deeds of violence were forgotten, and attention focussed on the spectacle of a young man willing to give his life for Ireland, just as the victims of Fenian acts in England in 1867 became anonymous numbers against the names and personalities of Allen, Larkin and O'Brien... the idea of the suffering people, redeemed by sacrifice of the few, so potent in 1916, and in 1917 and 1920 with the deaths of Ashe and MacSwiney, produced a response to the strike in the north quite unlike the general indifference felt in the Republic of Ireland.

Actions, as well as symbols, can be multi-valent. A terrorist action can have a meaning in mythic as well in practical terms, it can have a dramatic value and a separate strategic value as well. A single terrorist act can send a number of messages to a variety of audiences. Psychological warfare, reduction of opposing forces, and self-sustaining propaganda to support recruiting and fund-raising are non-exclusive results of a terrorist act; they are mutually supportive results directed at different targets.

Just as drama is kept under control by putting it in a ritualized context in theatres, so violence is controlled by keeping it in rule-bound contexts, for example in conventional warfare or professional hockey. Performance art and terrorism derive their impact from the disturbing way in which they override the boundaries of theatre (whether behind a proscenium arch or in a theatre of war) and invade everyday life. This gives both performance art and terrorism their liminoid aspect. The liminality of performance has been examined in some depth by Victor Turner (1977: 33-55) and by Schechner (1985: 21), but the liminality of terrorism has not been explicitly recognized despite the fact that it is seen as being clearly 'abnormal' behaviour, and the difficulty of expressing its place among the

other categories of conflict. This liminal nature of terrorism not only adds to its impact, but also explains some of the problems that are encountered when people attempt to define or categorize the behaviour into some other place on a sequence of political and/or violent activity. Because terrorism falls between these established categories, the terrorists do not consider themselves bound by the rules of these categories.

One reason for the outrage felt by the target audience is through the intentional breaking of the rules of war by the perpetrators of terroristic acts. This can be understood through the theories of 'symbolic dirt' and of liminality. Symbolic dirt is, briefly, matter out of place, an object that becomes "dirty" because it is in the wrong context. Terrorism is, similarly, tactics out of place. It consists of acts that are outrageous because of their context more than because of their content. The fact that other people in other parts of the world are dying violently and suddenly is not usually a matter of great concern in our culture; it is considered fairly normal. Traffic accidents, natural disasters, wars, even most murders rarely result in any great public outcry, as these all fit into the categories we have of reasonably normal circumstances of sudden death. Bombing of civilians, sniper attacks, assassinations and sabotage are all considered to be legitimate tactics used in the context of a state of war. They are only outrageous when used in the context of what we consider, or expect to be, peaceful civilian society.

The use of sniper attacks on soldiers in wartime is considered reasonably fair. Most, if not all, armies have soldiers who are specially trained and equipped for the task. The intent of military sniping is to kill members of the opposing forces, and to terrorize the survivors. Because it is a selective weapon, it leaves survivors to be terrorized. If the sniper was armed with a mortar instead of a rifle, his intent would be to kill most if not all of the

enemy in a specific site, not to kill one and frighten the rest as part of the war of nerves. When this same tactic is used by members of the PIRA against British soldiers in Belfast or Londonderry, it becomes a matter for outrage. Not because of the tactic or result, but because of the context. The military in Northern Ireland are not there to wage a war, but to assist the police, so these attacks are perceived in the context of peacetime civilian activity (except by supporters of the republican cause).

The concept of liminality comes into play in the way in which terrorists are perceived, and in the confusion over the nature of terrorism. Terrorism is a liminoid form of conflict, it is neither peaceful dissent by a political party, nor is it civil war or a war with another state. The terrorists claim that they are waging war, but the targeted government denies it (except in the symbolic sense, as in a war against drugs or a war against poverty). Therefore tactics considered legitimate acts of war by the perpetrators are dealt with as criminal breaches of the peace by the government and security forces. This strategy of terrorism, then, lies on the border between these two categories due to the irreconcilable differences between the two parties, not only over the object of the conflict, but also over the basic nature of the conflict itself. A large part of the problems in defining terrorism lies in this difference; it does not fall into any of our pre-defined categories like political activity, or civil war.

If one anthropomorphizes the nation, then the liminal role of terrorism, revolution, and guerrilla warfare are clearly a part of the nation's passage from colony or province to nation-state. This process appears to fit Van Gennep's pattern of separation, liminality, and re-incorporation (van Gennep, 1960: 21). The start of the nationalist movement is the act of separation, the struggle for self-autonomy is a liminal phase in which normal rules of

civil order and warfare do not apply, and the creation of the new state re-incorporates its people into the world order in their new role.

The witnesses of the Abernathy murder were caught in a liminoid situation; they were innocent Lystanders forced to become participants (albeit through coerced inaction) in a criminal act. They were forced into a situation in which, although innocent, they would feel in part guilty for Abernathy's death, as an unwilling audience who become performers. The unwilling drivers of the proxy-bomb attacks are even more clearly and directly the victims of this process when they are coerced into taking an active part in an attack. They are in a situation in which their choice is to feel responsible for the explosion and possible resultant deaths, or to feel responsible for the probable deaths of members of their family, while they would not in fact be directly responsible for either outcome. After the house in Belfast that John Conroy was living in was occupied by the PIRA as the firing point for a bombing he did not even consider reporting it to the police, but he did realize that this meant he had been forced to take sides (Conroy, 1987: 194). Although he was an outside observer of the conflict who at least claimed a desire to be 'neutral', he was coerced into real participant observation.

An interestingly similar use of coercion is to be seen in the 1985 installation by Chris Burden called "Samson". "Samson" consisted of a 100 ton jack placed between two beams which extended to the outside walls of the art gallery's building. The jack was run off the turnstile to the exhibit, so that in order to see the exhibit, the gallery's patrons had to, potentially, cause extensive damage to the building which housed the exhibit (Schimmel, 1988: 139, 146-7). In this case a willing audience became (presumably) unwilling assistants, members of the integral audience.

The symbolic aspect of terrorist violence is a means of saying something loudly, under the assumption that the audience did not understand the first time because the actors spoke too quietly. This is the same as when we automatically tend to speak more slowly and loudly to a person who understands little English, the subconscious assumption is that he will understand the meaning of the symbols (words) if these are only amplified enough, and ignoring the possibility that the symbols should in fact be changed (translated) or even that the message is essentially meaningless. So does amplification alter meaning, does a whispered message change in substance when it is shouted? Schmid and de Graaf (1982: 111) suggest that the message, once interpreted and retransmitted by the media to the audience, is almost never the same as originally intended by the actors. As performers, terrorists have little control over their medium.

There is some debate about the importance of the media in transmitting terrorist messages, and about the effect that extensive media coverage has. The idea that terrorism and other violent crime spreads through imitation and contagion, conveyed by popular entertainments, seems to date from the early 19th century (Schlesinger, Murdock and Elliott (1983: 139-143). According to Oots (1987: 113) political terrorism is contagious, and media coverage is what transmits it: "The media provides a channel for the transmission of the message of terrorism, and thus acts as well as a channel for terrorist contagion". Oots claims that media coverage of terrorist attacks causes physiological arousal in potential terrorists, and that it is also a learning tool for these individuals (1987: 115). It is interesting in light of this statement, and of the structural similarities between terrorist attacks and the case of Sniffy the Rat, to note that despite the rash of media coverage of the events in Vancouver there has been no reported spreading infection of rat crushing in

Canada.

The argument that runs counter to that of Oots, as expressed by Dowling (1989b: 49) is that the goal of the terrorists is to participate in the attacks, not to gain media coverage. This means that the message contained in terrorist violence is usually intended for the members of the perpetrating group and its supporters, and that these 'insiders' do not need the mass media to receive these messages. Dowling finds the cause of terrorism not in the media, but in "the nature of humanity as *homo symbolicum*" (1989b: 49), and that media attention is the result of the dramatic nature of the terrorists' symbolic product. The Sniffy the Rat performance was aimed at the media, but other performance pieces are in effect rituals aimed only at the participants (performers and integral audience). Performances of this kind when unsuccessful as communication end up involving only the performers themselves (Lippard, 1983: 159-195). In the same way, terrorism that does not communicate well does not attract supporters, so the PIRA must be producing more articulate violence than the INLA did.

The meaning of a terrorist act can also be hidden. Paramilitary groups have been known to kill one of their own people in such a way as to incriminate their opponents (or even to arrange to have their opponents actually do the killing). In the case of the murder of one PIRA informer in 1980, the killers shot him in an alleyway in a Protestant district of Belfast, and it was publicly assumed that he had been killed by Loyalists. But as a private message to the police, the murderers had placed a new 20 pound note into his hand as he died. For a variety of reasons the PIRA did not want to admit to their own community that the victim had been an informer, but they still wanted to make sure that the security forces were aware of the true meaning of the murder (Dillon, 1988: 391).

Richard Schechner (1985: 118) has stated that: "Performance behavior isn't free and easy. Performance behavior is known and/or practiced behavior -- or "twice-behaved behavior", "restored behavior" -- either rehearsed, previously known, learned by osmosis since early childhood, revealed during the performance by masters, guides, gurus, or elders, or generated by rules that govern the outcomes, as in improvisatory theater or sports." When we apply this definition to Irish Republican terrorism, we find that PIRA attacks in this set of the troubles can be seen as reenactments of previous outbreaks of violence in the Irish conflict. This view is supported by the emphasis placed on the history of the conflict by the participants on both sides, Republican and Loyalist. At this time, over 20 years into the current Troubles, the active paramilitaries on both sides have also been in a position to learn the behaviour "by osmosis since early childhood".

The motif of dramatic violence is not new to the Physical Force stream of Republicanism. As Gilley (1986: 39) points out, the Easter Rising of 1916 was "a theatrical gesture, an act of imagination, rather than a serious military affair", and that the "impossibility of the Rising is part of its attraction". The drama of Easter 1916 has a symbolic resonance "which has inspired the republican movement ever since" (Aughey, 1988: 84). Even earlier than the Easter Rising, the rural gangs that carried on the Troubles in the 19th century included terroristic attacks in their repertoire (Townshend, 1983).

For the audience that is not directly linked to the instrumental victims or the witnesses, the media -- and most powerfully the television news -- is the medium by which they learn about terrorist performances. It has often been claimed that removing television coverage of terrorist events would reduce the number of incidents. I suspect that any reduction

would be minimal, since the word-of-mouth communication would still reach the local target audience, and official reporting would still inform the government. One could counter-claim that terrorist groups would then attempt to carry out even more attacks in order to garner the same amount of audience attention, so television reporting may even be a safety valve which lowers the number of attacks.

The nature of television news, as a purveyor of dramatic information, is certainly well matched to the publicizing of terrorist performances. Richard Schechner (1985: 319) describes the theatricalization of reality that TV provides: "news as TV fare is not news, not simply information, but theater. It's theater that makes it in the marketplace, not information as such. Facticity needs a push from drama; and a liminal form, not art-not journalism, emerges." As Jerry Rubin described the situation, "Every reporter is a dramatist, creating a theater out of real life" (quoted in Schmid and de Graaf, 1982: 37).

Television is the great carrier of terrorist performances, as Lee (1983: 193) describes the situation: "These dramatic terrors are brought intimately into the lives of everyone in Northern Ireland and even in the twenty-six counties and Great Britain either directly or indirectly. Television in particular has vividly injected the terrors into their lives."

Images from TV news are then used to describe reality. Dillon (1989:170) quotes the statement of one of the Shankill Butchers to the police. This terrorist described as follows a murder in which he boarded a bus and shot the driver through the head at point-blank range:

It was just like that shooting which they have shown on television, the famous one where a South Vietnamese army officer shoots this member of the Viet Cong on a street in Saigon. The blood spurted out of his head. Shooting the bus driver was just like that. I could see it all in colour. It

was just like I saw it in that television report... it was just like you would see it in a film.

The phrase in this that I find most startling, is "I could see it all in colour". I can't help but wonder if the murderer really expected to see the death in black-and-white?

TERRORISM AND THE STABILITY OF CONFLICT

"Sure what's the difference between us anyway, excepting we go out and demonstrate and get drunk on different dates."

Northern Irish farmer

The dysfunctions of terrorism are clear, the death and personal suffering that result, the economic and political destabilization, and the increased polarization in society. The functions of terrorism are a little harder to find, but much more interesting.

Any functions that these social acts have should not necessarily be construed as the causes nor as intended effects, although this will sometimes, in whole or in part, be the case. Self-supporting functions of these cultural elements are not necessarily the reasons for the behaviour, they are a part of the reason why the behaviours persist over time and are replicated by a number of individuals.

I do not claim that every act has a function. I am not certain that every act has a reason either, but I do think that many or most behaviours and institutions that persist over time in a culture must have some function or functions to do so. This attitude can be seen as an application of the evolutionary paradigm to culture, in the sense that adaptive traits persist and maladaptive traits do not (unless tied to a more powerful adaptive trait). This is a way of explaining the mechanisms of change and stability, certainly not a statement of belief in progress through set stages. The perverse stability of the conflict in Northern Ireland is maintained by the functions of seemingly dysfunctionally phenomena, and therefore is a suitable topic to be explored using functionalism as a theoretical tool.

The central paradox of PIRA attacks in this conflict is that they increase the stability of

the conflict, which then decreases the potential for a solution. The intended function of the PIRA is to force the British government to abandon Northern Ireland. Since this effort has been futile for over 20 years, there must be other functions that the PIRA fulfill by their various activities. These functions can be divided into two main areas of influence: the social context of the actors, and the conflict in which they are participating. This categorization, like most others, is only to organize the analysis since the social and political functions interreact.

Terroristic behaviour in the Irish conflict has been used since at least the 1800s (Townshend, 1983), and seems to be embedded in the cultural backgrounds of both Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries. As Harris (1989: 88) has noted: "one of the frightening paradoxes of the Ulster situation is just that it is the well socialised, and often dutiful, young men of Belfast who have been behind so much violence. They are so well integrated within traditional culture it must be implicated in the violence."

Modern terrorism also dates back to the 1800s. Narodnaya Volya, a Russian revolutionary group of the late 1870's, were the first to create an explicit theory of terrorism. Their programme of 1879, quoted in Schmid and de Graaf (1982: 13) states:

Terrorist activity, consisting in destroying the most harmful persons in the government, in defending the party against espionage, in punishing the perpetrators of the notable cases of violence and arbitrariness on the part of the government and the administration, aims to undermine the prestige of the government's power, to demonstrate steadily the possibility of struggle against the government, to arouse in this manner the revolutionary spirit of the people and their confidence in the success of the cause, and finally, to give shape and direction to the forces fit and trained to carry on the fight.

Nicholas O. Berry (1987: 7) identifies five general strategies of terrorism, in terms of the reactions provoked from the targets: "(1) overreaction; (2) power deflation; (3) failed

repression of moderates; (4) appeasement of moderates; and (5) massive intimidation". Berry identifies the three main variables that affect these responses as: "(1) the target's perception of self; (2) the target's perception of the terrorists; and (3) the relative capabilities of both self and terrorists". What Berry is attempting here is to explain why terrorism works, in the sense that it continues to be used despite the terrorists' inability to cause serious damage directly to their enemy. He postulates that terrorism works by coercing the opponent into weakening their own position. These, however, are the political functions of terrorism as intended by the perpetrators, not the social functions. A reading of Berry's extended explanations of his five general strategies of terrorism (1987: 8-17) shows that there are in fact only three: over-reaction, under-reaction, and appeasement.

Over-reaction on the part of government causes more of the populace to side with the extremists. If the government engages in what appear to be indiscriminate reprisals, its use of force will appear less legitimate than the more selective use of force by the extremists. The failed repression of moderates is a factor of government over-reaction. When the government attempts to repress moderates who adhere to the terrorist's cause, and fails to do so, these moderates will tend increasingly to side with the extremists, as moderation has been seen not to work.

Power deflation occurs when the government under-reacts, and is therefore seen as incapable of dealing with terrorism. As a result of this perceived weakness, the government loses public support. Massive intimidation is a form of power deflation, in which the individuals in the government and security forces are forced, though fear, to allow terrorist activity to continue.

Appeasement of moderate supporters of the terrorists' goals alienates the supporters of previous government policy. While this may isolate the terrorists from their traditional supporters, it will not appease the terrorists. What Berry does not mention here is that this can also lead to increased efforts by the terrorists to provoke government over-reaction.

Terrorism is often intended to provoke repression by the authorities, and hence alienate more of the population from their government. As more of the population becomes alienated from their government, this is supposed to increase popular support for the terrorists, and aid recruiting (Morris and Hoe, 1987: 55). Repression would also be deliberately provoked in order to alienate foreign governments, as in the case of EOKA's attacks on British troops in Cyprus (Schmid and de Graaf, 1982: 19). Both results were expected by the provocations committed by the Fenians during the dynamite campaign of the 1880's (Laqueur, 1987:74).

The provocation of government countermeasures also communicates an impression of strength, it gives the audience the impression that the terrorists are a credible threat. James Connolly argued that, in the Easter Rising when the British forces used field guns to bombard rebel positions in Dublin, "the use of artillery implied a dangerous admission of insurgent strength and status" (Ryan, 1966: 210). Connolly was one of the leaders of the Rising, and other statements of his have been quoted on PIRA recruiting posters (Chartres, Henshaw and Dewar, 1986: fig 297). This was also the effect of the Grand Hotel bombing in Brighton, since when the Conservative Party conference was next held at that site, the security measures were used by the PIRA as recognition of their own ability.

As a form of communication, one of the main messages that terrorism attempts to carry

is that the government is unable to fulfill its duty to protect its people. In this it tries to create the appearance of power deflation. Maria McGuire, who spent a year doing propaganda work in the Provisional Sinn Fein, explained the message of PIRA terrorism as follows (1973: 34):

By causing such terror we demonstrated that, whatever steps the army took, the Provisionals could continue the military campaign; half a million people in Belfast would be kept wondering where the Provisionals would strike next and would be forced to tell the British to make peace with us. The terror we caused demonstrated that the British government could no longer govern.

The most important social function of terrorism, especially in the Northern Ireland example, is that it is self-perpetuating. Because of this it continues despite having had little positive effect on the political problems that it was supposed to solve. Terrorism begets terrorism not only in the immediate sense of revenge attacks, but also over generations when the effects it has on children come to light in their actions as youths and adults; and as members of physical force Republican families follow their ancestors into the current incarnation of the United Irishmen, Fenian Brotherhood, and IRB.

Terrorism in the Irish conflict also perpetuates itself by increasing the level of polarization between the two ethnic groups; this stabilizes the conflict because it removes shifting and networking alliances. In a highly polarized conflict everyone knows whose side they are on. Decreased polarization has a cohesive effect on multi-group societies by spreading a network of conflict and alliances between the groups; the divisive effect of terrorism and rioting in multi-group societies ensures that people choose which side they're on, mostly on the basis of ethnicity. This has the peculiar result of effectively giving the conflict a life of its own.

For a paramilitary group as a whole, terrorist attacks provide respect, funding, and publicity which help recruiting. For the individual members of paramilitary groups it provides a release of hostility, a chance to participate in the struggle, self-respect and respect within their support community, and for some of them a fair amount of money.

For an opposing paramilitary group, these terrorist attacks provide a *raison d'être* as defenders of their own community; this in turn encourages their own fund raising and recruiting. The members of the opposing paramilitary groups are also provided with a chance to release their hostility by taking revenge, as well as participation in the struggle, respect, and funding.

Terrorism Breeds Terrorism

A campaign of terrorist attacks that affects children will tend to create in the long term a culture in which terrorism is continued. As Fields (1989: 211) states in the conclusion of her study into the psychological effects of growing up in a situation of communal violence: "Children who have been terrorised and truncated at an early level of legal socialisation are unable to function in an open democratic society" since the violence creates a stronger, more exclusive group identity; "the insecurity, alienation and anomie that are the individual developmental psychology of childhood experiences of violence and prolonged traumatic stress devastate social organisation and xenophobically polarise the population." As Fields points out (1989: 211), "traumatisation is not limited to the immediate participants in violence. It extends to everyone who identifies with the victimised group." So the psychological effects of exposure to violence will take place throughout the audience of terrorist performances. These results show why communal violence tends to be a stable form of ideologically-based conflict. One of the functions that terrorism has in the Northern

Irish context is to create the context in which terrorism will continue across generations.

A poll conducted by the British Opinion Research Centre on the witnessing of terrorist acts in Northern Ireland, cited in Lee (1983: 194), is revealing of the level of exposure to violence. The question asked was: "Have you personally seen an act of terrorism in Northern Ireland?" and the results, by community, were: Catholic: 49% had been witnesses: 34 to street rioting, 29 to bombing of building, 16 to vehicle hijacking, 13 to murder; Protestant: 36% had been witnesses: 26 to building bombed, 20 to street rioting, 9 to vehicle hijacking, 7 to murder. It is not clear whether the numbers for specific types of incidents are percentages, or totals of respondents, but the basic result is that over one-third of the Protestant community and almost one-half of the Catholic community had been members of the primary audience of terrorist acts.

Terrorism, as an endemic cultural trait, is self-perpetuating. Morris and Hoe (1987: 57) speak of the upcoming 'third generation' of terrorists: "Children of the streets in Belfast or Beirut [who] know only a world encompassed by patrolling troops and militia, riots, bombings and the sniper. They are conditioned by acts of violence." I would disagree only with calling these people the 'third generation' of terrorism, since modern terrorism has actually been around since the 1870s. We are, however, certainly into the third generation of this set of the Troubles. Rona Fields, in a series of studies of moral and social development of children growing up in Northern Ireland, discovered that "moral judgment in these children halts at a primitive level" (Fields, 1982: 144) and perhaps more significantly, that "By 1977, the entire Belfast sample through age 15 was characteristically telling stories around death and destruction themes and unable to fantasize alternatives to violence." (Fields, 1982: 145). A condition of entrenched terrorism not only stabilizes the

conflict by its effect on polarization of the ethnic communities, but also by ensuring a continuing dependence on violence within the population.

Polarization

Elliot and Hickie (1971: 12) describe peace as "a process involving an optimum amount of conflict". They state that, based on the theories of Coser and Simmel, balanced conflict can hold a society together. If the conflicts in a society are spread out, then the society has a network of oppositions and allegiances. The example given is that if a society consists of four people, A, B, C, and D; and if A and B are united against C and D over some issue, then A and C need to be united against B and D over another issue in order to maintain peace. "Conflict is only dysfunctional when all the divisions in the society fall along the same lines" (Elliot and Hickie, 1971: 13). In this case, the society is polarized, in that "two groups contain all the positive bonds *within* themselves and have only negative bonds *between* themselves" (italics in original). While a balanced conflict can stabilize a society, polarization stabilizes the conflict. Polarized conflict is dysfunctional for Northern Irish society as a whole, but it is functional for the Republican and Loyalist extremist communities, it ensures their continued importance, it supports their binding shared view of the world. The communities which support the paramilitaries would be seriously destabilized only if the conflict depolarized.

The condition of polarization feeds itself. Elliot and Hickie (1971:35) describe the situation as: "Thus the two communities, loaded with a long history of mutual opposition, are also faced with a situation where there is a very low level of information flowing between them, which only alienates them further." The tendency for the working class and unemployed in the cities of Northern Ireland to live in sectarian ghettos is the geographical

manifestation of the social division. This physical separation increases in times of trouble, as people living in mixed areas move to neighbourhoods dominated by their own kind. This increasing geographic separation of course causes further social polarization, as it further decreases the chances of communication between communities. Elliot and Hickie (1971: 146-7) give as an example of intentional polarization the situation in which a community leader convinces his own people to move out of mixed areas for their own safety from communal riots. The use of terrorism against the opposing community in a mixed area also, of course, has the same effect of convincing people to move. In Belfast, the recurring disturbances between religious/ethnic groups have increased the degree of geographic cohesion. For example the 1857 sectarian riots caused minority group members in mixed districts to move to areas that were predominantly inhabited by their group (Jones, 1960: 190-1), an effect that was repeated as a result of the riots in the early years of the current Troubles.

It is to the advantage of terrorists and of extremist community leaders to increase the degree of polarization because it increases the stability of the communities. Robin Jenkins and John MacRae (unpublished research cited in Elliot and Hickie, 1971: 82) found that cultural groups are more cohesive when polarized. The greater the cohesiveness, the higher level of consensus within the group and therefore the easier it is for "fear-dominated propaganda" to spread within the group. This means that it is easier for a polarized system to get worse rather than better. The more polarized the groups are, the more likely it is that members of the groups will see the conflict in affective, manichaeian terms. They will perceive the conflict as one of absolutes, not as a process of balancing different interests. This tendency has the result that the more polarized the groups become, the more power radical leaders have. Therefore the polarizing effect of terrorist attacks gives more power to

radical leaders in their own community, as well as to those in the other community.

The Loyalist extremists view the conflict as being essentially religious, some of them claim that there is a 'Papist plot' to take over Northern Ireland: "The Church of Rome still plans the domination of Ireland, not simply as a Nationalist Ireland but as a Roman Catholic Ireland" (Martyn Smyth, quoted in Winchester, 1974: 240). A document claimed to be the "Sinn Fein Oath" was being passed around in the Loyalist community in the early 1980's; it includes the paragraph, "At any cost we must work in secret, using any method of deception to gain our ends towards the destruction of all Protestants and the advance of the Priesthood and the Catholic faith until the Pope is complete ruler of the whole world." (Belfrage, 1987: 67). It is this belief that leads some Loyalist extremists to claim that the struggle against the Republicans is for their religious, as well as civil liberties.

There is certainly no reason to suggest that there is a 'Papist plot', but it should in fairness be noted that aspects of the Republic of Ireland's constitution and government appear to be dominated by Roman Catholic teachings (Hutchinson, 1987: 309-10), and "as a symbol of nationality, most Irish men and women regarded it [the Irish language] as definitely secondary to religion" (Hutchinson, 1987: 308). This perceived presence of an enemy to their religion, helps to harden the division between Protestants and Catholics. However Republicans, at least on the surface, seem to save their hatred for the British, not the Orangemen (Belfrage, 1987: 81).

As Aughey (1988: 83) observed, even when the PIRA limits attacks to local "legitimate targets", members of the RUC, UDR and people who support them, these targets are "overwhelmingly Protestants who have enrolled to defend Ulster and their British

heritage". So even these attacks are seen by the Loyalists as being essentially sectarian despite the PIRA's claims to be non-sectarian, and so they again reinforce the sectarian divisions and distrust between the communities. The insistence by the Loyalists on their 'Britishness' certainly does not lower the level of distrust that the nationalists hold for them in return.

Participating in the Struggle

Terrorist behaviour in the Irish Republican context can be seen as reenactments of previous uprisings, performances that recreate aspects of the mythologized history of the physical force tradition. Schechner has commented on this sort of performance in the context of recreated Shaker dance as a way of "physically re/membering (= putting back together what time has dis/membered) an extinct behaviour." (Schechner, 1985: 48). This way politically marginalized individuals can write themselves into history by behaviour which gains widespread attention and which both continues and imitates their society's most influential historical conflict. It gives them a place in the history of their own time, and also places them in identical roles to those of their heroes and martyrs of the Easter Rebellion and previous uprisings.

When the IRA split into two in late 1969, the traditionalist wing termed themselves the Provisionals, to indicate that the split would only be temporary, since they believed that the improperly elected Official IRA executive would be replaced within a year (MacStiofáin, 1975: 138). This 'regularization' has not taken place, and the term 'Provisional' "caught the public's attention immediately. It rang a bell in the memory of the Irish people. The men of 1916 had signed the Proclamation as the Provisional Government of the Irish Republic." (MacStiofáin, 1975: 142).

The funerary rituals of physical force Republicans also have an important role to play here. Participation in these rites reaffirms membership in, and the solidarity of the supporting community, and publicly reaffirms the importance of the martyrs. The existence of these martyrs also locks the PIRA into the use of violence, since to negotiate with the British would be a disgrace to the martyrs, an unforgivable sin against the past.

It appears that the PIRA has a strong element of normative *communitas*, what Turner (1979: 47-8) describes as an attempt by a group or subculture to legislate spontaneous *communitas*, that unmediated relationship between individuals. The PIRA looks back towards the time before the English invasion, and also to the 'golden age' of non-sectarian republicans under Wolfe Tone. The explicit "non-sectarian" stance of the PIRA is possibly an attempt to forge a nationalistic *communitas* despite the fact that its attacks continue to divide the communities in Northern Ireland. This nationalistic *communitas* would be a limited version of that usually promised by religions, as it would not be inclusive of all mankind (Turner, 1979: 49) but would include only the Irish. The republican movement has certainly suffered from the 'structural cleavages' that Turner (1979: 47-8) refers to as a result of the stresses between the spontaneous goal and the rigid structure that are inherent in normative *communitas*.

The physical force republicans have a membership in a defined community with deep historical roots. This is continually reinforced by the fact that PIRA members and their immediate families tend to socialize only with each other. This membership in the Republican community is an alternative to the alienation that is unavoidable in the ghettos of industrial cities, forming a kind of ideological village for the adherents.

Elitism

Interacting within a small group where all the members have similar political ideals can also lead to alienation and tend to "xenophobically polarise the population". Schmid and de Graaf (1982: 182) describe the case of German left-wing extremists in West Berlin, whose political positions "were essentially a product of the rather incestuous debate among themselves". The problem with intellectual incest, of course, is that it breeds defective ideas. This is similar to the situation in Northern Ireland, where the actors in both Republican and Loyalist paramilitary groups in the cities tend to be from sectarian ghettos, and where the paramilitaries tend to interact only with people of similar politics: "Every paramilitary group had its own drinking clubs and, with strictly no cross-fertilization, the wonder was their similarity" (Belfrage, 1987: 158). As well as shaping the members' social lives, group membership within the sectarian communities often parallels kinship links. Again, as Schmid and de Graaf describe the situation in West Berlin (1982: 182): "With the debates being so isolated, the young radicals completely lost touch with the views that prevailed in society, while the constant interaction of those opposed to the existing social system led to an intolerant dogmatism." While terrorists are dogmatic and intolerant, and may tend to externalize their own problems, there is no reason to believe that they suffer from mental illness (Morris and Hoe, 1987: 55).

A dogmatic, elitist approach to their ideology is an essential basis for terrorist action. If a terrorist was tolerant of other ideologies, it would not so easily lead to a violence as an attempted solution for a problem. If a terrorist was not elitist, then he would not act without the support of the population he claims to represent. An activist with radical beliefs, a willingness to use violence, and a large degree of real popular support is in a

position to be a populist, to start a guerrilla campaign or popular uprising. Terrorists who are attempting to convince or coerce the unwilling masses into supporting them, must take the elitist view that they alone have the truth, and that everyone with differing or opposing ideas is mistakenly or maliciously wrong. Pat McCeown, a PIRA member described his outlook, prior to his imprisonment, as "a very romanticised view of the struggle.... You also have a very elitist attitude that you're doing the people a favour by fighting" (Bishop and Mallie, 1987: 274). There are indications that the majority of Catholics in Northern Ireland are actually opposed to the PIRA (Soule, 1989: 39).

Terrorist attacks maintain the perpetrating group's image as capable defenders of their community, and also have a positive psychological effect on their supporters: "Hitting the British Army helped morale in the movement... and there was always admiration for fine examples of marksmanship -- killing a British soldier with a single shot, or hitting one through the observation slit of a Saracen [armoured car]." (McGuire, 1973: 79).

Secrecy: Mystery and Security

The functions of group secrecy are both practical and symbolic: practical to avoid arrest by security forces and retaliation by opposing paramilitary groups, and symbolic to add to the unexpectedness of their attacks, so further amplifying their message. This latter purpose works because restrictions on personal contact "provide a way in which awe can be generated and sustained in the audience" (Goffman, 1959: 67). An 'underground', 'shadowy', 'secret' organization gives a greater impression of power than one with a membership and capabilities that are openly known. This supports the message of power that is contained in any terrorist attack. The fear of the unknown adds weight to the apprehension of future attacks, because naive audience members can not predict the target

or methodology of the next attacks.

The security forces also seem to maintain secrecy of their own capabilities for the same reasons.

Publicity: Favourable and Unfavourable

Failures in terrorist campaigns can also have a function as propaganda. 'Glorious Failures' provide martyrs and symbols of defiance; an example of this is the Easter Rising, described by Ryan (1966, 257) as "one of the most arresting and indubitable examples in all history of the triumph of failure". The value of martyrs for recruiting and education of supporters is a well-known use for defeats amongst a wide variety of movements, including the Nazi party: "New champions are attracted to a cause by the appeal of great sacrifices made for its sake, until that indomitable spirit is finally crowned with success" (Hitler, 1939: 67). A Franciscan who attended Sean Heuston, one of the Easter Rising's leaders who was executed by firing squad, said that when he looked down on Heuston's face, he found it "transformed, and lit with a grandeur and brightness I had never before noticed" (quoted in Ryan, 1966: 163). In the case of the PIRA, the existence of these 'martyrs' strengthens the requirement for total victory, since they believe that any compromise in their demands would nullify the sacrifices made by the PIRA in the past (Corrado and Evans, 1988: 408). The PIRA originally opposed committing political assassinations in order to avoid creating martyrs for the British to use (McGuire, 1973: 102).

Patrick Pearse, towards the end of the Easter Rising, said of his fellow rebels:

Each individual has spent himself, happy to pour out his strength for Ireland and for freedom. If they do not win this fight, they will at least deserve to

win it. But win it they will although they may win it in death. Already they have done a great thing. They have redeemed Dublin from many shames, and made her name splendid among the names of cities. (Ryan, 1966: 145).

Attacks by a terrorist group can result in favourable or critical publicity. Schmid and de Graaf (1982: 111) suggest that publicity, whether positive or negative, is considered good by a terrorist group, and that only a lack of publicity is considered bad, "there is only one thing in the world worse than being talked about, and that is not being talked about." (Wilde, 1949: 8). This is considered by Schmid and de Graaf to indicate the "two-faced nature of social power", the power to attract or the power to deter. This choice between exercising power through willing co-operation or through coercion is a long-established principle of politics. On many occasions the terrorist group may well prefer to be feared than loved by the population.

The terrorists, of course, also realise that negative publicity about them is still publicity for their cause. A member of the PIRA Army Council, while explaining the killing of Lord Mountbatten, summarized the value of the negative publicity the PIRA received over the attack: "Through such operations we have raised the Irish liberation struggle to a new international level, one which it has not reached for several years, giving the IRA the chance to explain itself, to make sense of the war we have been fighting for the past ten or more years" (quoted in Schlesinger, Murdock and Elliott, 1983: 31).

Guilt and Purification

Dowling (1989b: 49) argues that terrorists are enacting social dramas when physically or symbolically killing their enemies, and that these social dramas are attempts to create satisfying social symbols for the perpetrators and their supporters by "purifying his/her

guilt, and removing unsatisfactory identifications put on him/her by the enemy society by striking out at that society." He explains terrorist attacks as attempts to expiate guilt and as a symbolic act of rebirth for the perpetrators. Successful attacks on the enemy demonstrate the terrorists' 'worthiness' and disproves the opponents' claims that the perpetrators are immature, weak, or subhuman (Dowling 1989b: 44). Terrorist attacks, the killing and wounding of the victims and the risks that the perpetrators take together are "violent and dramatic attempts to form and maintain their new society by proving their own worth in accordance with their own principles of order" (Dowling, 1989b: 46).

This is a theory which is applicable to the Irish conflict, in which the Catholic population were treated as second class citizens by the British and Northern Irish governments for centuries and decades respectively, and in which the current Troubles emerged from the Civil Rights movement of the late 1960s. This would also explain the PIRA's unusual drive to develop their own weapons, as further evidence of their ability as an 'army'. Dowling's theory also helps to explain the large lower-class participation in the paramilitary Republican groups, since this participation in terrorism may be a form of overcompensation for their situation at the bottom of the social order. It is a means of gaining self-respect and respect (fear) from others by seizing some of the essentials and trappings of power.

The guilt that the physical force Republicans are attempting to expiate derives from the fact that, despite almost two centuries of struggle, the British still control part of Ireland. It would be a sense of communal guilt for not having solved this problem in the preceding generations. This is why, when the Official IRA decided to change their strategy, the traditionalists formed the PIRA in order to keep trying the old methods that they were

unwilling to abandon.

The other means of purification that Dowling suggests as being in use in terrorist societies, is that of mortification. The methods he mentions are excessive risk-taking in attacks, and martyrdom in a suicide mission (1989b: 47). The peculiar twist that the physical force Republicans have put on this is the practice of the hunger-strike, in which activists give up their lives for their cause in such a way as to have no personal opportunity to cause physical damage to their enemy. Terrorist attacks on members of the opposing side are a mixture of psychological and practical warfare, but the hunger-strike is a purely psychological weapon. The hunger strike, according to Sean MacBride in his introduction to Sands (1983: 8) was a victory:

To the IRA and their supporters it was a triumph of endurance and courage. If proof were needed, it was evidence of their determination to pursue unflinchingly their campaign of violence until British forces and administration were withdrawn from Northern Ireland. It was a morale booster for their cause. A cause that depended more on integrity and courage than on what politicians and lawyers term 'reason and common sense'.

Dowling (1989b: 46) also claims that terrorist killings fulfill the same function for terrorist societies as wars and the punishment of criminals and dissidents serve for 'mainstream society'.

Chapter V CONCLUSIONS

"It's worse than a crime -- it's a mistake"

Joseph Fouche (Napoleon's Minister of Police).

In my introduction I stated that terrorist attacks can be understood as dramatic representations of more severe types of violent conflict. I am certainly not the first to state that terrorism is theatre, but I believe my identification of the structural similarities between terrorist attacks and certain performance art pieces is useful in understanding the nature of terrorism as expression and communication. Many who have written on terrorism seem to have been blinded and misled by the immorality and seeming senselessness of the attacks. To understand terrorism we must approach it with rationality and scepticism unaltered by emotional responses to the acts studied. Terrorism is a stable, persistent, aspect of many conflicts, and in the case of Northern Ireland it has become a part of the traditional culture of the Republican community, rejected by some but accepted by a sufficient number to keep the paramilitary groups viable.

As has been shown, the physical force tradition in Irish Republicanism has deep historical roots which support the current conflict. The PIRA is a traditionalist organization within this community, with a stable structure, an established range of tactics, and sufficient public support to maintain an ongoing campaign of violence for the foreseeable future. The web of communication which surrounds every terrorist act has an established form, as depicted in Figure 7, which is generally constant for any terrorist attack. Terrorist violence is not only culturally supported in this case, but is also socially constrained; there are limits to the range of violence available to the perpetrators if they wish to maintain their own support community. Within these limits, driven by the examples of their martyrs, terrorism then adds to the stability of this conflict.

In conflicts such as that in Northern Ireland, in which peace is unlikely in the short term, terrorism may be the optimum level of political violence available. For the perpetrators it provides a stage for their interpretation of the conflict which requires a relatively small number of dedicated individuals. For the government it is preferable to allowing an escalation into guerrilla or civil war, and is in this case a degree of violence which cannot be reduced without breaching civil rights.

The major problem encountered in this study, as in any attempt to gain a close understanding of the phenomenon of terrorism, is the unknowability of crucial information through available and ethical means. This crucial information involves the reasons for the choice of specific targets or weapons, and the ways in which the terrorists understand their own acts. The former are explained in part in claims of responsibility, though with a variable degree of honesty. Weapon and tactic choices are probably usually pragmatic, but this pragmatism includes consideration of the effect of the use of that weapon in the publicity.

The practical problem in gathering this data is that the perpetrators, for security reasons, tend not to be talkative about these issues to outsiders. It would no doubt be considered unethical for an anthropologist to use covert data collection methods, and in this topic area it would probably be lethal for him or her to be caught doing so. Speaking from a personal perspective, I would consider it unethical to find and interview perpetrators of terrorist attacks without then reporting them to the authorities, since their attacks are violent crimes and I would have to place my duty to public safety above my academic curiosity. Any attempt at personal interviews would also be fraught with the danger that the perpetrators would suspect the interviewer of being part of a covert operation by the security forces, this

would also be fatal. Even if successful in gaining an interview, the probability is very high that the perpetrators would not divulge the most interesting information to the interviewer.

One possible source for this type of information is the transcripts of technical intercepts of perpetrator's conversations which have become part of the public record through use as evidence in court. Technical intercepts would include recordings of telephone calls as well as recordings made from microphones planted in rooms. Until used in court, this information is generally classified by the security forces, and so is not available to the academic.

Not surprisingly, the materials available on performance have tended to focus on more accessible behaviour, such as theatre and religious rituals. The published material in performance and anthropology is light on performances which involve lethal violence directed at people. This subject is fertile ground for study and for inclusion in the performance literature. The range extends from the organized public performances of terrorist groups, through the more private organized performances of extortion racketeers, to include the idiosyncratic private rituals of serial murderers. In the field of terrorism, the performance metaphor could also be applied to the study of counter-terrorism, such as the ritual costumes of hostage-rescue teams and other security personnel, and the use of implied threats as deterrence. It may even be possible to find a way in which performance could be useful in de-escalating a conflict, by making less lethal forms of communication more attractive as alternatives.

One of the effects that terrorist activity has, in a situation like Northern Ireland, is to

stabilize the conflict by increasing the degree of polarization. Each outrage merely serves to further entrench the other side's immovability. The mistake of terrorism in this case, is that it is inarticulate; it can threaten but it cannot convince, so it merely serves to polarize the population further into camps of support and opposition: "the waves of violence have created seemingly permanent layers of fear, which remain and create new poison and alienation and bitterness. It is as though Northern Irish people are prisoners in the violence and fear they themselves created." (Shivers and Bowman, 1985: 116). As a propaganda tool, terrorism works as much or more against the Nationalist cause as it does for it. Just as the mistakes of the Stormont Parliament, the RUC, and the British military serve the purposes of radical Republicans by giving them a semblance of moral authority, the violent acts of the PIRA give an appearance of morality to the radical Unionists and to the British presence. Part of the paradox of terrorism in Northern Ireland is that it cannot be part of the mechanism for resolving the conflict, except by stopping.

Because terrorism does not adhere to the normal rules of war, it mitigates against the possibility of a negotiated solution. When rules of conflict are followed, then the parties involved can develop enough trust for each other to negotiate with a sufficient belief that the other side will keep their bargain. Terrorism, like total war, can only lead to unconditional surrender or victory. Unlike total war, terrorism has not proven to be capable of causing the total surrender of the opposing side, when the opponent is a national government. What is interesting in the Northern Irish case, is that there are limits to the violence, and opposing paramilitary groups have demonstrated the ability to negotiate with each other when mutually beneficial. It is important here to remember that they co-operate in order to perpetuate the conflict, not to resolve it. When faced with the possibility of negotiating a solution the response of the paramilitaries is unbending. They have no political common

ground, and they all have too much to lose if the conflict were ever to end.

The PIRA's root paradigm is religious in nature, and as the fundamentalist extremists of Irish nationalism they will have no compromise with their opponents: "Facing our enemy, we must declare our attitude simply. We see in their regime a thing of evil incarnate. With it there can be no parley any more than there can be a truce with the powers of hell." said Terence MacSwiney in his speech of inauguration as Lord Mayor of Cork, 1920, (quoted in Townshend, 1983: 356).

In the Northern Ireland conflict, the players do not even agree on what kind of conflict they are all involved in, is it sectarian or secular, is it symmetrical or asymmetrical? The historical dearth of communication between the two communities has resulted in the Loyalists and Republicans fighting the image they have of each other more than the reality. It is as if they are not so much on opposite sides, but are in fact fighting in separate wars. They are duelling with each other's shadows. The Loyalists are defending their religious freedom and heritage against Papist tyranny, while the Republicans are attempting to unite the 32 counties of Ireland as a sovereign nation state in the face of imperialist oppression. The government states that the security forces are involved in law-enforcement activity, restoring order in the face of bands of criminals; while the paramilitaries think of themselves as armies facing opposing armies in a war, and claiming appropriate rights when captured.

According to Corrado and Evans (1988: 430) the Provisional IRA uses a rationale that is "simplistic and based on a distorted nineteenth century view of their societies". J. Bowyer Bell criticizes the physical force stream of Irish Republicans as being traditionalists,

immersed in their own history, who "have misinterpreted the past, selected inappropriate tactics and applied a useless strategy." (quoted in Corrado and Evans, 1988: 410).

If the PIRA is still stuck in the anti-colonial fringes of the nineteenth century, then it should be noted that many of the Loyalist extremists are still fighting the wars of the Reformation. While the Republicans speak of British colonialism, Ian Paisley, a prominent religious (Protestant) and political (Unionist) figure, is given to describing the Pope as "the anti-Christ" and "the Scarlet Whore" (Conroy, 1987: 122).

The seven misconceptions held by the PIRA, according to Corrado and Evans (1988: 407-9) are: 1) the PIRA analysis of Irish and British politics is basically the same as that of the Fenians in the late 1800's, without recognizing the real changes which have taken place; 2) the PIRA refuses to be flexible in their demands, believing that any compromise is impossible in the light of the sacrifices of their martyrs; 3) the PIRA decries the changes to constitutional processes brought in by British and Irish governments to deal with crises caused by the PIRA; 4) the PIRA claims (and may believe) that the civilian casualties of their attacks are due to deliberate British negligence to act on warnings, and on deliberate "black operations" by covert units of the security forces, carried out to discredit the PIRA; 5) the PIRA confuse 'beneficial economic interdependency' with colonialism, and ignore the fact that most of the Irish and British population prefer economic well-being to extreme nationalistic sovereignty; 6) the PIRA refuse to recognize the widespread acceptance of partition in Ireland; and 7) the PIRA fails to recognize that members of the Protestant community in Northern Ireland consider themselves to be a distinct community with centuries-old rights to their land, not 'colonial usurpers' who can return to Great Britain. What this means is that the conflict is stable, and that the paramilitaries are unlikely,

unwilling, and probably incapable of doing anything to help end it.

The differences between guerrilla warfare and terrorism are based on frequency of attacks, not on the weapons or tactics used, nor particularly on the targets attacked. The real difference between the two is that terrorism is an imitation, a theatrical representation of guerrilla warfare. Because of the lower level of violence, and fewer participants, terrorism falls into a liminoid space between crime, and insurrection and war, whereas guerrilla activity is clearly a kind of war and more clearly recognizable as insurrection. Terrorism can be carried out by a group without the personnel or materiel resources for a guerrilla campaign, and without necessarily taking and holding ground. In its imitation of guerrilla warfare, and of insurrection, terrorism is structured as a theatrical performance. The more similar an attack is to a real act of war, the less theatricalization is involved. The triangular terrorist structure involving an instrumental victim and an audience is needed less, the closer the target of the attack is to the real opponent. In this, terrorism is a non-realistic form of conflict, while guerrilla and conventional warfare are realistic.

Terrorist acts are a form of communication. Since terrorists are incapable of causing significant real physical damage to their enemy, they use their attacks to threaten them, and ideally to provoke them into making mistakes. As displayed in Figure 7, terrorist communication is directed at a number of different audiences, who receive a variety of messages. Terrorist attacks communicate the perpetrators' desire for change, their willingness to wreak destruction and cause non-combatant casualties in order to advance their cause, which implies their belief in the exceptional importance of their grievance and their fanatical devotion to that cause. This third message is carried even more effectively by self-directed actions; the hunger-strikes in particular are clear and undeniable statements of

commitment to the cause. Terrorist attacks also identify the opponents of the perpetrators, which implies a threat, and helps identify their grievance. They demonstrate the perpetrators' capability to carry out attacks and the inability of the security forces to prevent them, which in turn supports their threats. Terrorist acts are also acts of defiance against the security forces, government and moderate politics. This demonstrates their confidence in their own policies, and also illustrates their frustration in trying to cause changes.

The conflict that the Provisional IRA's participation exacerbates is a self-perpetuating ethnic dispute. Self-perpetuating because each act of violence by members of one group against the other merely increases the level of hostility, especially in light of the importance they give to the history of the conflict. This historical hostility between the two ethnic groups is actually an integral part of both cultures, and is also what supports the Provisional IRA and the other paramilitary organizations.

While the Republicans, Loyalists, and the security forces are locked in a triangle of mutual violent conflict, there are also directly supportive associations between the combatants. The Republicans and Loyalists engage in some mutually beneficial economic cooperation and there appears to be some degree of ideological similarity between the Loyalists and the authorities. The Loyalists, after all, want the army to destroy the PIRA and keep Ulster in the United Kingdom, though they greatly disagree with the leadership of the security forces on appropriate methods to be used and on the way in which Ulster should be governed.

The PIRA is economically self-supporting. It could function solely on the money brought in by its operations in Ireland, and it is capable of making many of its own

weapons from locally-available materials, using its own research and development capability. Recent changes to the Prevention of Terrorism Act, aimed at the funding of paramilitary groups, may hamper the PIRA's budget in future.

The presence of the British political and military forces in Ireland is not a major cause of this ethnic conflict, which I am sure would persist even without the British military presence in, and the British rule of Northern Ireland. The conflict is stable because it is symmetrical, the Republican and Loyalist communities are highly polarized, both have a strong sense of history and of hostility towards the other community, and both sides have a strong ideology that supports various groups willing to use a wide variety of tactics in violent and non-violent conflict.

The old hostilities between the Republicans and Loyalists would not end with partition. If Ulster were to be made subject to the government in Dublin the violence may well get worse instead. Indeed it was the threat of civil war on the part of the Loyalists that forced the creation of partition in the first place. It has been suggested (Adams, 1986: 183) that if the British were to leave the north, a civil war would result, much as was the case when the south was given independence. Adams has also suggested that if the British military withdrew, the Loyalists would probably be able to win a war against the Republic. It is certainly probable that the Provisional IRA, should partition end, would be in conflict with the Irish Government much as they were in 1920. They would be likely to fight because they consider themselves the true adherents of Irish Republicanism, and the true heirs of the Provisional Government of Easter 1916.

The British government and the various paramilitaries are locked into this conflict, and

none are in any position to win, as Soule (1989:44) summed up the situation: "Once the ritualistic dance has begun between terrorist and counterterrorist, events indicate the extreme difficulty in stopping the music."

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

ASU	Active Service Unit - a PIRA cell
FLN	Front de la Liberation National -- an Algerian independence group
IED	Improvised explosive device -- home-made bomb
INLA	Irish National Liberation Army - republican paramilitary group
IPLO	Irish People's Liberation Organization - republican paramilitary group
IRA	Irish Republican Army - republican paramilitary group
IRB	Irish Republican Brotherhood - republican paramilitary group
IRSP	Irish Republican Socialist Party - political face of the INLA
ODC	'Ordinary decent criminal' - criminal who is not a paramilitary
OIRA	Official Irish Republican Army - republican group, militarily inactive since 1970s
PIRA	Provisional Irish Republican Army (Provos) - main republican paramilitary group
PSF	Provisional Sinn Fein -- political face of the PIRA
RHC	Red Hand Commandos -- loyalist paramilitary group, possibly cover name for UVF
RPG-7	A Soviet-bloc shoulder-launched anti-tank rocket.
RUC	Royal Ulster Constabulary - local police in Northern Ireland
SAS	Special Air Service -- British elite military group
SF	Sinn Fein - republican political party founded in early 1900s
UDA	Ulster Defence Association -- loyalist political and paramilitary group
UDR	Ulster Defence Regiment -- locally recruited British regiment (militia) in Northern Ireland
UFF	Ulster Freedom Fighters -- loyalist paramilitary group
UVF	Ulster Volunteer Force -- loyalist paramilitary group

APPENDIX A: THE EASTER PROCLAMATION

Proclamation of the Irish Republic posted at the Dublin Post Office, Easter Monday, April 24th, 1916. Quoted in Ryan (1966: 127-9)

**POBLACHT NA H EIREANN.
THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
OF THE
IRISH REPUBLIC
TO THE PEOPLE OF IRELAND.**

IRISHMEN AND IRISHWOMEN: In the name of God and of the dead generations from which she receives her old tradition of nationhood, Ireland, through us, summons her children to her flag and strikes for her freedom.

Having organised her manhood through her secret revolutionary organisation, the Irish Republican Brotherhood, and through her open military organisations, the Irish Volunteers and the Irish Citizen Army, having patiently perfected her discipline, having resolutely waited for the right moment to reveal itself, she now seizes that moment, and supported by her exiled children in America and by gallant allies in Europe, but relying in the first on her own strength, she strikes in full confidence of victory.

We declare the right of the people of Ireland to the ownership of Ireland and to the unfettered control of Irish destinies, to be sovereign and indefeasible. The long usurpation of that right by a foreign people and government has not extinguished the right, nor can it ever be extinguished except by the destruction of the Irish people. In every generation the Irish people have asserted their right to national freedom and sovereignty; six times during the past three hundred years they have asserted it in arms. Standing on that fundamental right and again asserting it in arms in the face of the world, we hereby proclaim the Irish Republic as a Sovereign Independent State, and we pledge our lives and the lives of our comrades in arms to the cause of its freedom, of its welfare and of its exaltation among the nations.

The Irish Republic is entitled to, and hereby claims, the allegiance of every Irishman and Irishwoman. The Republic guarantees religious and civil liberty, equal rights and equal opportunities to all its citizens, and declares its resolve to pursue the happiness and prosperity of the whole nation and of all its parts, cherishing all the children of the nation equally, and oblivious of the differences carefully fostered by an alien Government, which have divided a minority from the majority in the past.

Until our arms have brought the opportune moment for the establishment of a permanent National Government, representative of the whole people of Ireland and elected by the suffrages of all her men and women, the Provisional Government, hereby constituted, will administer the civil and military affairs of the Republic in trust for the people.

We place the cause of the Irish Republic under the protection of the Most High God,

Whose blessing we invoke upon our arms, and we pray that no one who serves that cause will dishonour it by cowardice, inhumanity, or rapine. In this supreme hour the Irish nation must, by its valour and discipline, and by the readiness of its children to sacrifice themselves for the common good, prove itself worthy of the august destiny to which it is called.

Signed on behalf of the Provisional Government:

THOMAS J. CLARKE,

SEAN MAC DIARMADA,	THOMAS MacDONAGH,
P.H. PEARSE,	EAMONN CEANNT,
JAMES CONNOLLY,	JOSEPH PLUNKETT.

APPENDIX B: THE GREEN BOOK

The Green Book is the official handbook of the Provisional IRA. It is quoted here from Dillon (1988), and is reproduced unedited, with its original grammatical and spelling errors.

CONSTITUTION OF OGLAIGH NA hEIREANN

1. Title:

The Army shall be known as Oglaiġ na hEireann.

2. Membership:

1 Enlistment in Oglaiġ na hEireann shall be open to all those over the age of 17 who accept its objects as stated in the Constitution and who make the following pledge:

'I (name) promise that I will promote the objects of Oglaiġ na hEireann to the best of my knowledge and ability and that I will obey all orders and regulations issued to me by the Army Authority and by my superior officer.'

2 Participation in Stormont or Westminster and in any other subservient parliament, if any, is strictly forbidden.

3 Enlistment shall be at the discretion of the Army Authority.

3. Objects:

1 To guard the honour and uphold the sovereignty and unity of the Republic of Ireland.

2 To support the establishment of an Irish Socialist Republic based on the 1916

Proclamation.

- 3 To support the establishment of, and uphold, a lawful government in sole and absolute control of the Republic.
- 4 To secure and defend civil and religious liberties and equal rights and equal opportunities for all citizens.
- 5 To promote the revival of the Irish language as the everyday language of the people.

4. Means:

- 1 To organise Oglagh na hEireann for victory.
- 2 To build on a spirit of comradeship.
- 3 To wage revolutionary armed struggle.
- 4 To encourage popular resistance, political mobilisation and political action in support of these objectives.
- 5 To assist, as directed by the Army Authority, all organizations working for the same objectives.

5. Army Control:

- 1 The General Army Convention shall be the Supreme Army Authority.
- 2 The Army Council shall be the Supreme Authority when a General Convention is not in session.
- 3 The Army Council, only after Convention, shall have power to delegate its powers to a government which is actively endeavouring to function as the de facto government of the Republic.
- 4 When a government is functioning as the de facto government of the Republic, a General Army Convention shall be convened to give the allegiance of Oglagh na hEireann to such a government.

5 All personnel and all armaments, equipment and other resources of Oglagh na hEireann shall be at the disposal of and subject to the Army Authority, to be employed and utilised as the Army Authority shall direct.

6. General Army Convention:

1 A General Army Convention of Delegates (selected as set out hereinafter) shall meet every two years unless the majority of these delegates notify the Army Council that they it better for military purposes to postpone it. When a General Army Convention is postponed, it shall be summoned to meet as soon as the majority of delegates shall notify the Army Council that they deem it advisable.

2 An Extraordinary General Army Convention and that the urgency of the issue for the Convention does not permit the selection of delegates as prescribed, that the delegates to the previous General Army Convention constitute the Extraordinary General Army Convention. When for any reason a delegate to the previous General Army Convention has become ineligible, or is not available, the Battalion Council shall elect a delegate in his/her stead. Every active Volunteer in the Battalion shall be eligible to stand as delegate.

4 When the Army is engaged on active service, no Unit or General Army Convention shall be held until a reasonable time after hostilities have terminated, unless the Army Authority decides otherwise.

5 An Executive of twelve members shall be elected by ballot at the General Army Convention: at least eight of these members shall be delegates to the Convention: Four members may be elected from active Volunteers who are not delegates. The next six in line shall, however, be eligible as substitutes to the Executive in order of their election. The Executive shall always have six substitutes in readiness.

6 No member of the Executive may also be a member of the Army Council and members of the Executive subsequently elected to the Army Council will resign from the Executive.

3 of/de 3

PM-1 3½"x4" PHOTOGRAPHIC MICROCOPY TARGET
NBS 1010a ANSI/ISO #2 EQUIVALENT

PRECISIONSM RESOLUTION TARGETS

PIONEERS IN METHYLENE BLUE TESTING SINCE 1974

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RESOLUTION TARGETS

100% - 100% MEASUREMENTS - 100% QUALITY - 100%
100% - 100% MEASUREMENTS - 100% QUALITY - 100%

Vacant positions on the Executive arising in such a way shall be filled by those substitutes next in line from the Convention elections.

7 The following shall be entitled to attend and vote at the General Army Convention:

Delegates selected by Battalion Convention.

Delegates selected by General Headquarters Staff and Staffs of Brigades, Divisions and Commands.

Two members of the Executive.

All members of the Army Council.

The Chief of Staff, the Adjutant-General and the Quartermaster-General.

8 Only Volunteers on the Active List shall be eligible as delegates to the General Army Convention.

9 A majority of the General Army Convention may invite anyone whom they wish to attend to speak.

10 The Chairperson of the General Army Convention shall be chosen by the General Convention.

7. Duties and Powers of the Executive:

1 The Chairperson of the General Army Convention or his/her representative shall, within forty-eight hours of the termination of the Conventions, summon a meeting of the Army Executive over which he/she shall preside during the election of a Chairperson and Secretary. The Army Executive shall then proceed with the election of an Army Council of seven members.

2 The Army Executive shall meet at least every six months. The Secretary of the Executive shall be responsible for the summoning of the members.

3 It shall be the duty of the Executive to advise the Army Council on all matters concerning the Army

- 4 The Executive shall have powers, by a majority vote, to summon an Extraordinary General Army Convention.
- 5 A member of the Executive who, for any reason, ceases to be an active member of Oglagh na hEireann shall cease to be a member of the Executive.
- 6 Casual vacancies on the Executive shall be filled by co-operation after any substitutes that may be elected by the General Army Convention have been exhausted. Vacancies shall be filled within a period of one month.
- 7 The Executive shall hold office until the following General Army Convention shall elect a new Executive.
- 8 An extraordinary meeting of the Executive shall be summoned by the secretary of the Executive when a majority of the Army Council or a majority of the Executive so decide.
- 9 Two-thirds of the available members shall constitute a quorum of the Executive, for co-option purposes only. Full Executive powers shall not be vested in less than five members.

8. Duties and Powers of the Army Council:

- 1 The Chairperson of the Army Executive or his/her representative shall, as soon as possible after the election of the Army Council, summon a meeting of the Army Council, over which he/she shall preside, until a Chairperson and Secretary have been elected.
- 2 The Army Council shall meet at least once a month.
- 3 Vacancies occurring in the Army Council shall be filled from substitutes elected by the Executive or co-opted by the Army Council in advance. Co-options by the Army Council must be ratified by the Executive at its next meeting.
- 4 Any active Volunteer shall be eligible for membership of the Army Council.

The Army Council shall have the power to:

- 1 Conclude peace or declare war when a majority of the Council so decide. The

conclusion of peace must be ratified by a Convention.

- 2 Appoint a Chief of Staff and ratify all appointments to the Commissioned ranks.
- 3 Make regulations regarding organisation, training, discipline, equipment and operations, such as will ensure that the Army will be as efficient as possible.
- 4 Take all necessary steps to secure co-ordination with other republican organisations.
- 5 Keep in touch with all foreign organisations and countries which may help the Army in any way.
- 6 Arrange for the care of wounded Volunteers and their dependants and the dependants of Volunteers killed, imprisoned or on active-service.

The Chief of Staff, Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General shall be entitled to attend and speak at all meetings of the Army Council but shall not be entitled to vote unless they are members of the Army Council.

Four members shall constitute a quorum of the Army Council.

A member of the Army Council who, for any reason, ceases to be an active Volunteer, shall cease to be a member of the Army Council.

9. Selection of Delegates:

Delegates to the Command Conventions shall be elected by ballot as follows:

- 1 At each parade called for the purpose, each unit in Command Area shall elect a delegate to attend the Command Convention.
- 2 One member of the Command Staff, elected by the Staff at a special meeting called for the purpose.
- 3 The Command OC shall be entitled to attend and vote at the Command Convention.
- 4 Each Command Convention shall meet when instructed by the Army Authority and elect one delegate when the total number of Volunteers who parade for Unit Conventions do not exceed twenty, and two when the number of Volunteers do not exceed fifty, and one

delegate for each twenty additional Volunteers on parade at Unit Conventions.

Brigade Conventions:

Where the Independent Unit is a Brigade, a Brigade Convention may be held consisting of the delegates elected by the Units, Battalion Staffs and the Brigade Staff, with the power to pass or reject any resolution brought forward by these delegates. The delegates from each Battalion shall each elect their own delegates to the Army Convention.

Election of Brigade, Divisional and Command Staff delegates to the General Army Convention.

Two delegates shall be elected at a meeting of General Headquarters Staff officers, with the exception of the Chief of Staff, Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General.

Resolutions to General Army Convention:

Command Conventions and the meetings of GHQ Staff for the election of delegates to General Army Convention shall have power to discuss any matter relating to the Army or to the Nation and to pass resolutions regarding such matters. These resolutions shall be forwarded to GHQ within the time specified by the Army Authority and shall appear on the agenda for the General Army Convention.

10. Changes to the Constitution:

It shall require a two-thirds majority of a General Army Convention to change articles in this Constitution.

**OGLAIGH NA hEIREANN (IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY)
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS GENERAL ARMY ORDERS
(REVISED 1987)**

General Order No. 1

- 1 Membership of the Army is only possible through being an active member of any army Unit or directly attached to General Headquarters. Any person who ceases to be an active member of a Unit or working directly with General Headquarters, automatically ceases to be a member of the Army. There is no reserve in the Army. All Volunteers must be active.
- 2 The duties of a Volunteer shall be at the discretion of the Unit Commander. If for a good and genuine reason a Volunteer is unable to carry out the normal duties and routine which obtains in the Unit, the OC may allot him/her some special duties. So long as he/she performs these duties satisfactorily and makes regular reports he/she shall be considered as an active Volunteer.
- 3 Leave of absence may be granted to a Volunteer in the case of illness or for other valid reason.
- 4 A Volunteer who, for any reason, ceases to maintain contact with his/her Unit or with General Headquarters for a period of three months shall automatically cease to be a member of the Army.
- 5 The provision of this General Order does not apply to Volunteers in prison.

General Order No. 2

Volunteers when making the Army Declaration promise ' . . . to obey all orders and regulations issued by the Army Authority and any superior officers.'

- 1 Where an order issued by a duly accredited officer has been disobeyed, the Volunteer in question must be suspended immediately, pending investigation of the case.
- 2 Any Volunteer carrying out an unofficial operation is automatically dismissed from the Army and is liable to immediate repudiation.

Minimum penalty for breach of this order: Dismissal.

General Order No. 3

- 1 All applications for re-admission by those who were dismissed or who resigned from the Army, must be submitted to the Army Council or delegated authority, who alone have the power to sanction reinstatement.
- 2 Where a Volunteer is summarily dismissed from the Army he/she may apply to his/her Unit OC to have his/her case tried by Court-martial. Such application must be made within seven days from the date of receipt of notification of dismissal.
- 3 Once a Court-martial has confirmed such a dismissal, then as in all other cases, any further appeal or application for reinstatement must be forwarded to the Army Council through the Unit Commander.

General Order No. 4

No member of Oglaiġ na hEireann may be a member of a political party which recognises the partition institutions of government as sovereign authorities for the Irish people.

General Order No. 5

PART 1

A Volunteer shall not:

- 1 Swear or pledge allegiance or recognition to the partition institutions of government of the Six or Twenty Six County states.
- 2 Swear or pledge recognition of their legitimacy as sovereign governing bodies for the Irish people.
- 3 Swear or pledge himself/herself in any way to refrain from using arms or other methods of struggle to overthrow British rule in Ireland.

Minimum penalty for breaches: Dismissal.

PART 2

When arrested a Volunteer shall:

- 1 Remain silent.
- 2 Refuse to give any account of his/her movements, activities or associates, when any of these have any relation to the organisation or personnel of Oglagh na hEireann.
- 3 Refuse to make or sign any statements.

PART 3

A Volunteer shall:

- 1 Refuse to obey any order issued by the partitionist authorities requiring him/her to leave Ireland or reside inside or outside a specified area in Ireland.
- 2 Refuse to give any undertakings about his/her future behaviour. Volunteers released from prison on ticket-of-leave are bound by this.

Minimum penalty for breaches: Dismissal.

PART 4

Any Volunteer committed to prison forfeits all previous rank and shall report into the Oglagh na hEireann structure for de-briefing and further instructions.

A Volunteer's attitude in court shall be at the discretion of the Army Authority. Maximum penalty for breaches which are not also a breach of orders in Part 1: Dismissal with ignominy.

PART 5

No Volunteer should succumb to approaches or overtures, blackmail or bribery attempts, made by the enemy and should report such approaches as soon as possible.

Volunteers who engage in loose talk shall be dismissed.

Volunteers found guilty of treason face the death penalty.

General Order No. 6

Committees under Army control will have their terms of references clearly laid out for them. They will adhere strictly to these terms of reference. In case of departure from these the individual or individuals responsible will be removed from the Committee. The Army Authority has the right to remove any member of such Committees from the Committee at any time.

General Order No. 7

Volunteers are forbidden to undertake hunger-strikes without the express sanction of General Headquarters.

Maximum penalty for breach: Dismissal.

General Order No. 8

1 Volunteers are strictly forbidden to take any military action against 26 County forces under any circumstances whatsoever. The importance of this order in present circumstances especially in the border areas cannot be over-emphasised.

2 Minimum arms shall be used in training in the 26 County area. In the event of a raid, every effort shall be made to get the arms away safely. If this fails, the arms shall be rendered useless and abandoned.

3 Maximum security precautions must be taken when training. Scouts must always be posted to warn of emergency. Volunteers arrested during the training or in possession of arms will point out that the arms were for use against the British forces of occupation only. This statement should be repeated at all subsequent Court proceedings.

4 At all times Volunteers must make it clear that the policy of the Army is to drive the

British forces of occupation out of Ireland.

General Order No. 9

Firing parties at funerals are only allowed in the case of Volunteers who die on active service or as a direct result of enemy action. General Headquarters permission must be obtained.

General Order No. 10

No member of Oglaiġ na hEireann shall make any statement either verbally or in writing to the Press or Mass Media without General Headquarters permission.

Volunteers are forbidden to advocate anything inconsistent with Army policy.

Minimum penalty for breaches: Dismissal with ignominy.

General Order No. 11

Any Volunteer who seizes or is party to the seizure of arms, ammunition or explosives which are being held under Army control, shall be deemed guilty of treachery. A duly constituted Court-martial shall try all cases.

Penalty for breach of this order: Death.

NOTE: As in all other cases of death penalty, sentence must be ratified by the Army Council.

General Order No. 12

A Volunteer with knowledge of the whereabouts of Army property which is not under Army control shall report such information immediately to his/her OC.

Minimum penalty for failure to do this: Dismissal.

General Order No. 13

1 Any Volunteer who attempts to lower the morals or undermine the confidence of other Volunteers in Army leadership or in any individual in the Army control shall be deemed guilty of treachery.

2 Any Volunteer taking part in a campaign of slander and denigration against another Volunteer thereby weakening authority and discipline, and bringing the Army into disrepute, shall likewise be deemed guilty of treachery.

Minimum penalty: Dismissal with ignominy.

3 All Volunteers are expected to act in an honourable way so as the struggle is not harmed or undermined.

Any Volunteer who brings the Army into disrepute by his/her behaviour may be guilty of a breach of his/her duties and responsibilities as a Volunteer in Oglagh na hEireann and may be dismissed.

General Order No. 14

Oglagh na hEireann is a voluntary organisation and Volunteers resign membership by giving notice to the relevant Army authority. However, no Volunteer or former Volunteer may join any other military organisation where his/her training, experience and knowledge gained in Oglagh na hEireann could be used by that organisation.

General Order No. 15

No Volunteer convicted by a Court-martial on a capital offence can be executed if that Volunteer can show that he did not receive instructions in the Green Book. The officer(s) responsible for recruiting this Volunteer and clearing his/her application shall be held responsible for neglect and being in breach of this order.

COURTS OF INQUIRY

1. A Court of Inquiry may be set up to investigate allegations against any member of the Army, any alleged irregularity, or any other matter affecting the Army.
2. The Court may be convened by the OC or any Unit or by the CS. The Convening Authority should supply the Court with specific terms of reference in writing, setting out the precise nature of the matters to be investigated.
3. The Court shall consist of three members, one of who will be appointed President by the Convening Officer of his/her representative. Any active Volunteer may be appointed to sit on a Court of Inquiry.
4. The powers and duties of a Court of Inquiry are: to examine all witnesses who appear before it and having considered all the evidence, to make specific recommendations to the Convening Authority. It has no power to bring in any verdict or to pass any sentence. It may recommend Court-martial proceedings, but decision on this point rests with the Convening Authority.

NOTE: The powers and duties of the Court of Inquiry should be made clear to the members of the Court and to all witnesses appearing before it, by the Convening Authority or his/her representative.

5. The members of the Court, should be supplied with copies of all General Army Orders, as they may be required for the drawing up of recommendations.
6. Witnesses summoned to appear before the Court should be accommodated in a separate room to that in which the Court is held. They should be cautioned before hand that they are not to discuss the matters being investigated, among themselves. An officer should be detailed to remain in the room with the witnesses. The witnesses will be called singly before the Court to testify.
7. Evidence should be taken on oath which will be administered to each witness by the President. Should a witness object to testifying on oath, he/she must state the objections,

to the Court. Unsworn testimony may be taken, but will not carry the same weight as sworn testimony. Once a witness has been examined, he/she may be recalled as often as the Court requires, to answer any further questions the Court wishes to put. For this reason, witnesses will not be allowed to leave the precincts of the Court except with express permission of the Court.

8. If the Court so decided, it may call for additional witnesses to those summoned by the Convening Authority.

9. The recommendations of the Court shall be made in writing and signed by the three members of the Court. These recommendations together with a record of the proceedings and all documents connected with the inquiry, shall be forwarded to the Competent Authority by the President.

NOTE: The President appoints one member of the Court to record the proceedings unless a note-taker or other means of recording is specially provided by the Competent Authority.

OATHS FOR COURTS OF INQUIRY

To be taken by each member of the court.

I . . . swear by the Almighty God that I will conduct this Inquiry without fear, favour or affection.

And I swear that I will not disclose the vote or opinion of any member of the court unless required to do so by the Competent Authority. And I swear not to disclose the recommendations of the Court until they have disclosed by the Competent Authority.

To be taken by each witness:

I . . . swear by Almighty God that my evidence to the Court shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

To be taken by the official note-taker:

I . . . swear by Almighty God that I will maintain inviolate the proceedings of this Court, and that I will not disclose its proceedings unless required to do so by the Competent Authority.

COURT MARTIAL

1. A Court-martial is set up by the OC of any Unit or by the CS, to try any Volunteer on a specific charge or charges.
2. The Court shall consist of three members of equal rank or higher than the accused.
3. The Convening Officer will appoint one member of the Court as President.
4. When a Court-martial is set up by a Unit OC, the Adjutant of the Unit, or some members of the Unit delegated by the Adjutant to do so, will act as Prosecuting Council. When the Convening Authority is the CS, he/she may appoint any officer other than the Adjutant-General to act as Prosecuting Counsel.
5. The accused may call on any Volunteer to act as his/her Defence Counsel, or if he/she desires, may defend the case himself/herself.
6. A copy of the charge shall be supplied to the accused in reasonable time before a case is heard to enable him/her to prepare defence. The Convening Authority may either supply the accused with a summary of the evidence it is proposed to place before the Court, or arrange for a preliminary hearing at which witnesses for the prosecution will give on oath, a summary of their testimony. At such preliminary hearings, neither defence nor prosecution counsel will be present, but the accused may cross-examine the witnesses. The evidence shall be taken down in writing from each witness, shall be read over to the accused and shall be signed by him/her. If the accused wishes to make a statement or give evidence on oath, he/she must be cautioned that anything he/she says may be taken down and used in evidence at any subsequent hearing of the case.

7. If the accused objects to any of the three officers comprising the Court, the objection will be examined by the remaining two members and, if upheld, the member objected to will be replaced.
8. The Convening Authority will supply the Court with a copy of the charges and with copies of General Army Orders.
9. The Convening Authority will ensure that the Prosecuting Counsel is in possession of all the facts relevant to the case and that all prosecution witnesses are present at the Court.
10. During the hearing of the case, all witnesses will be kept in separate rooms as in the case of a Court of Inquiry. The only persons in the Court shall be members of the Court, the accused, the Defence Counsel (if any), Prosecuting Counsel and note-taker (if any) and the witness under examination.
11. Evidence should be taken on oath which will be administered to each witness by the President. Should a witness object to testifying on oath, he/she must state the objections, to the Court. Unsworn testimony may be taken, but will not carry the same weight as sworn testimony. Once a witness has been examined, he/she may be recalled as often as the Court requires, to answer any further questions the Court wishes to put. For this reason, witnesses will not be allowed to leave the precincts of the Court except with express permission of the Court.
12. At the start of the case, the President will read each charge to the accused and ask the accused if he/she pleads guilty to the charge.
13. Witnesses when called to testify will be cross-examined first by the Prosecuting Counsel and then by the Defence Counsel, or by the accused if conducting his/her own defence. Witnesses may be questioned by any member of the Court. Should either Counsel wish to recall a witness who has already testified, permission of the Court must first be obtained. The Court may recall any witness. Witnesses may not leave the precincts of the Court without permission from the Court.

14. At any time it so desires, the Court may go into private session to decide on points which may arise, such as the admissability of evidence.

15. When all witnesses have testified. Defence Counsel will sum up and make closing address to the Court. This will be followed by summing up and closing address of the Prosecuting Counsel. The Court then goes into private session to consider its verdict and sentence.

16. For a breach of any General Army Order, the Court shall not have power to impose a lesser penalty than that laid down in such an order.

17. The verdict and sentence of the Court shall be set down in writing and signed by the three members. This, together with a summary of the evidence must be forwarded by the President of the Convening Authority. Sentence is subject to the ratification of the Convening Authority.

NOTE: In the case of the death penalty sentence must be ratified by the A/C. (Army Council)

18. The accused may forward an appeal against the verdict or sentence or both to the Adjutant-General who will place it before the Competent Authority. The appeal should be forwarded by accused through his/her OC, who in turn will forward it to the Adjutant-General with a signed copy of verdict and sentence and a summary of the evidence. The Competent Authority may order a new trial or reduce the penalty, but may not increase the penalty imposed by the Court.

NOTE: The President appoints one member of the Court to as recorder, unless a note-taker or other means of recording the proceedings is specially provided by the Convening Authority.

OATHS FOR COURT-MARTIAL

To be taken by each member of the court:

I . . . swear by Almighty God that I will try the accused on the issues presented to the Court without fear, favour or affection.

And I swear that I will not disclose the vote or opinion of any member of the Court or any proceedings of the Court unless required to do so by the Competent Authority.

And I swear not to disclose the verdict or sentence of the Court until they have been disclosed by the Competent Authority.

To be taken by each witness:

I . . . swear by Almighty God that my evidence to the Court shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

To be taken by the official note-taker:

I . . . swear by Almighty God that I will maintain inviolate the proceedings of this Court, and that I will not disclose its proceedings unless required to do so by the Competent Authority.

NOTES FOR COURT-MARTIAL

1. On the Court assembling, the Convening Authority or his/her representative reads the order convening the Court.
2. The President asks the accused if he/she has any objection to any member of the Court. Members of the Court retire and consider any objections, and decide whether objection is to be upheld or rejected.
3. If any objection is upheld, the Convening Authority or his/her representative nominates another member.
4. The President appoints one member of the Court to record the proceedings, unless a note-taker is specially appointed by the Convening Authority.

5. The President then reads the charge or charges to the accused and asks him/her to plead to each separate charge.
6. The Prosecutor presents his/her authority to the Court and makes the opening statement for the prosecution, outlining the charges.
7. The Prosecutor then calls witnesses to substantiate case for the prosecution.
8. Accused or his/her Counsel cross-examine witness for the prosecution.
9. When evidence for the prosecution is closed, the accused or his/her Counsel makes opening statement for the defence.
10. Witnesses for the defence are then called.
11. Accused or his/her Counsel makes closing statement for the Defence.
12. Prosecutor makes closing statement for the prosecution.
13. Court may ask for records as to the character and record of the accused.
14. The Court retires to consider the findings on each charge and to award the sentence.
The Court may award a separate sentence or punishment on each charge on which the accused is found guilty of, or one sentence or punishment, to cover more than one charge.
15. Where different sentences are proposed, the Court shall vote first on the lesser sentence proposed.
16. Members of the Court shall vote on sentence according to their seniority, the junior members voting first.
17. The President of the Court shall be responsible for forwarding to the Competent Authority.
 - (a) The written records or other records of the proceedings of the Court and all documents connected with the trial.
 - (b) The findings and sentence of the Court.
18. The oath to witnesses shall be administered by the President of the Court.

CODE OF CONDUCT

(Issued in 1987)

No serious guerrilla organisation can exist or hope to achieve victory without a number of prerequisites.

On one side of the coin these include comradeship, an internal structure (or infrastructure), rules and regulations, an ability to recruit, and a belief in achieving objectives. On the other side there has to be public support and the commanding of the admiration and respect of the public.

Where comradeship is lacking and where there are no rules and regulations one can see from past INLA feuds how disagreements can degenerate into anarchy and demoralise one's base of support.

The Irish Republican Army is one of the oldest and surviving guerilla armies in the world. It has a long tradition of struggle but at certain times in its history a number of the prerequisites for success were absent - conditions were not right, but most importantly nationalist opinion in the North was not ripe for a sustained armed struggle. All this changed in the 1960s with the attempted repression of the Civil Rights Movement and from then until now the struggle has taken on a steady momentum of its own.

The IRA's objectives are set down in a written constitution (which can only be amended by General Army Convention: the last IRA Convention was in 1986). The IRA however, is regulated by a set of General Army Orders (which can be amended at any time by an Army Council). Volunteers have always been expected to be familiar with the Constitution and General Army Orders, but in recent years familiar also with the Green Book which is a further breakdown of the aims and objectives of the organisation, the tactics of how to conduct oneself during interrogation.

Enemy

The British government has attempted to undermine the struggle, deter people from fighting and sap the morale of Volunteers and supporters through a number of measures.

It kills people, it jails people, it consistently repeats that it will not give way to the IRA, it ridicules one's objectives as being unrealistic and unachievable. It attacks the methods such as the commandeering of cars, the taking over houses, fighting a war in the streets in which people live, the execution of informers, etc. All of this is so much hypocrisy compared to the commandeering of a country and British institutionalised violence and sectarianism. Most objective people - and not necessarily sympathetic people - can see through this hypocrisy, and only ongoing politicisation and publicity can really counter it.

It is IRA successes that demoralise the British and undermine their case. Ongoing IRA successes reinforce the belief in victory which in turn will lead to increased support.

Behaviour

No organisation and no organisation's members are above reproach. The behaviour of Volunteers on operations and how republicans conduct themselves in their private lives will, where exploitable, be used by the British, the media, and the SDLP, and the Movement's other detractors to undermine the Movement in the minds of the general public.

When Mao's Red Army was fighting the revolution in China its Code of Conduct was summed up succinctly, (if idealistically) as follows:

Three General Rules of Discipline

1. Obey orders in all actions.
2. Do not take a single needle or piece of thread from the people.
3. Hand all booty over to headquarters.

And the Eight Reminders

1. Talk to people politely.
2. Be fair in all business dealings.
3. Return everything you have borrowed.
4. Pay for anything you have damaged.
5. Don't beat or bully people.
6. Don't damage crops.
7. Don't flirt with women.
8. Don't illtreat prisoners of war.

This is somewhat idealistic but one gets the drift about striving for the optimum in good behaviour and the necessity of avoiding scandal. Given the pervasiveness of the media in everyone's lives nowadays it is therefore even more essential for republicans to consider the effect of their attitudes and behaviour on supporters. To be conscious of how their behaviour could be used to ridicule the Movement and thus unjustifiably bring the struggle into disrepute.

The Republican Movement relies on a voluntary code of conduct (through Volunteers can still be dismissed under General Army Orders for blatant actions which bring the Movement into disrepute) and below are some of the guidelines expected of members:

1. Republican Volunteers are expected to be truthful in their dealings with other comrades and other sections of the Movement.
2. They are expected to be honest in all matters relating to the public, both in terms of official and private business. Whilst the majority of members are from working-class backgrounds, a business-person (who is also a known republican activist) who provides a poor service to the public or who exploits the public in business dealings is no asset to the republican cause.

3. Republicanism stands for equality and an end to sexism. Male Volunteers who mistreat or exploit their partners are flying in the face of this principle. Volunteers must practice domestically what the Movement preaches publicly.
4. Anyone promoting sectarianism or displaying sectarian attitudes should immediately be disciplined.
5. Republicanism has an international dimension which means respecting as equals other nationalities and races. Anyone who pays lip service to international solidarity and then slips into mimicking the racist attitudes which are typical of an imperialist mentality should be immediately upbraided. All people are equal and everyone has an international duty to oppose racism and oppression from wherever it emanates.
6. Our culture is something of which we should be proud, it is part of our identity and it can also be used, not in a chauvanistic sense, but against the British to show the separateness of our identity as an individual nation. Republicans who do not subscribe to Irish culture, or who have no interest in promoting the Irish language, should respect those who are making progress on this front against considerable odds. It is simply laziness which prevents people from attempting to learn their native language: no-one is that busy!
7. The Green Book makes reference to people who take alcohol urging them to be extremely careful. Under excessive drinking people's tongues loosen, people whom one wouldn't normally trust become 'great friends', and one is vulnerable to the temptation of engaging in 'loose talk'.

Apart from the security risk, a drunken republican is hardly the best example of a freedom fighter, he or she is open to the ridicule from the Movement's detractors.

The activities of republicans even engaged in innocent celebrations could be used by the enemy, so vulnerable are ambassadors of freedom struggle on this issue! So be moderate and be careful and remember what you represent. If you need to 'let off steam' then be discreet.

8. Alcohol affects different people in different ways, turning some aggressive people into affectionate doves, and making some normally pleasant people nasty and unbearable!

Under alcohol people's attitudes can also undergo unpleasant changes: respect towards others, one's partner, the Movement, can temporarily diminish leaving one with a lot of apologising and more than a hangover the following day. Dependency on alcohol is also a major weakness which the Special Branch will be quick to exploit.

The code set out here represents mere commonsense and is a reminder to all activists of their responsibilities. No-one has been press-ganged into republic- ansim. If you cannot do the struggle the honour of your service, then do not do it the dishonour of a disservice. It is as simple as that.

Volunteer' Rights

(issued in 1988)

Volunteers should be well versed in General Army Orders and Court of Inquiry and Court Martial procedures. They should understand that they are aimed not only at ensuring that the IRA runs smoothly within these agreed disciplinary codes, but also at protecting the rights of Volunteers. While everyone is accountable to disciplinary process under General Army Orders, this is not their only function. They are there to protect the Army and as the Army is its Volunteers, they must serve to protect the Volunteers as well.

Communications within the Army are of vital importance. Thus all volunteers should: be aware of how the Army structure works and of how a Volunteer can and should pass grievances or observations upwards. The onus is on the Volunteer to do this in a non-disruptive way, working through and using the proper channels all the time. All Volunteers should have access to their immediate superiors. This is through normal Army channels to GHQ. If this is unsatisfactory then there is access through GHQ to Army Council. The onus is on each tier, if requested, to pass requests upwards.

Security permitting, a Volunteer should always get an answer. Whether the Volunteer agrees with the answer is irrelevant: once Volunteers exhaust the channels, Army discipline demands that the answer be accepted. Final redress can be sought through the Army Council. Issues which are not important enough to warrant this should not be permitted to cause disruption or harmful dissensions. The onus is on the Volunteers to behave at all times in a correct, positive and responsible manner avoiding personal conflict or diversions from our main task.

Suspension of Volunteers should be conducted sparingly. Where suspensions are necessary they should not be of lengthy duration. Except in special circumstances Volunteers should not normally be suspended, unless facing charges, eg a Volunteer facing a court of inquiry should not normally be suspended. However, when a court of inquiry decided to press charges, this would normally involve suspension until the charges are adjudicated on. Special circumstances where a volunteer could be suspended by a competent senior authority could for example, include a refusal to obey an Army Order.

The above deals with suspension of membership of the Army. Suspension of a Volunteer from specific duties or a position in the Army is permissible at the discretion of a competent senior authority. Again the normal right to appeal applies. Summary dismissal of a Volunteer should be avoided except in the most extreme circumstances. Every Volunteer has the right to a court of inquiry. It should be noted that such a court, arising out of a summary dismissal, is a court, where those responsible for the dismissal will have to stand over their actions. They are not permitted to introduce new evidence other than that on which the dismissal was based. Volunteers summarily dismissed have seven days in which to appeal against the dismissal.

Courts are established by the Army Authority. Thus recommendations by courts must be agreed on by the Army Authority before they are acted on, or made known to other Volunteers.

All of the above places a heavy responsibility on those holding positions within the Army. The Adjutant General is responsible for discipline. The Adjutant General or those to whom he/she has delegated responsibility should be consulted in all cases involving the possible dismissal of Volunteers.

An organisation like ours which seeks political objectives based upon the principles of justice and freedom, must ensure that these principles are applied internally and in our dealings with one and other.

Volunteers, and this includes everyone from the CS to the Unit Volunteer, must be treated in a fair and overhand way.

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