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The Other Side of Spirit: Hegel on Gender and Gender Relations

University — Université

Carleton University, Ottawa

Degree for which thesis was presented — Grade pour lequel cette thèse fut présentée

Master of Arts

Year this degree conferred — Année d'obtention de ce grade

1985

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**THE OTHER SIDE OF SPIRIT:
HEGEL ON GENDER AND GENDER RELATIONS**

by

Margaret Holliston, B.A.

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Department of Philosophy

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

April 30, 1985

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**THE OTHER SIDE OF SPIRIT:
HEGEL ON GENDER AND GENDER RELATIONS**

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ABSTRACT

In this thesis I examine Hegel's account of gender and gender relations from a feminist perspective. By 'gender and gender relations', I mean characterizations of femininity and masculinity and the relationship between women and men. I argue that Hegel regards gender characteristics as fundamentally oppositional (i.e., 'natural' woman versus 'spiritual' man) and that his attempt to reconcile this opposition by way of familial gender relations is unsuccessful. Thus, I conclude that Hegel's position on gender and gender relations is dualistic in nature. Given this conclusion, I examine several implications that generic dualism might have for Hegel's overall system and philosophical project. I also propose an alternative view of gender and gender relations, taking Mary O'Brien's theory into account.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I believe that a graduate student's most constant source of advice and support often comes from her student-colleagues. I would like to acknowledge and thank my own colleagues for the encouragement and assistance they offered while I was writing this thesis. Many of my own ideas developed through discussions with them.

I would also like to thank Professors Béla Egyed and Stanley Clarke, who shared a supervisory role as they helped me with my paper.

Finally, I want to acknowledge my dear friend Philip Merklinger who remained beside me during the ups and downs of writing and saw me through from beginning to end. Encouraging, arguing, supporting, advising and proof-reading, Philip's assistance was wonderful. This thesis is for him, with love.

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ABBREVIATIONS OF HEGEL'S WORKS AS FOUND IN THE TEXT

- ETW - Hegel, G.W.F. Early Theological Writings. translated by T.M. Knox. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948.
- FPS - Hegel, G.W.F. First Philosophy of Spirit in
Hegel, G.W.F. System of Ethical Life and First
Philosophy of Spirit. edited and translated by H.S. Harris and T.M. Knox. New York: State University of New York Press, 1979.
- PG - Hegel, G.W.F. Phenomenology of Spirit. translated by A.V. Miller with a foreword by J.N. Findlay. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.
- PH - Hegel, G.W.F. Philosophy of History. translated by J. Sibree with an introduction by C.J. Frederick. New York, Dover Publications, 1956.
- PM - Hegel, G.W.F. Philosophy of Mind. translated by William Wallace. Oxford: Oxford at the University Press, 1971.
- PR - Hegel, G.W.F. Philosophy of Right. translated with notes by T.M. Knox. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967.
- SEL - Hegel, G.W.F. System of Ethical Life in
Hegel, G.W.F. System of Ethical Life and First
Philosophy of Spirit. edited and translated by H.S. Harris and T.M. Knox. New York: State University of New York Press, 1979.

INTRODUCTION: BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM

This thesis represents a combination two interests: feminist theory and the philosophy of Hegel. To a large extent, the interest in feminism is personal, but it is also a very contemporary one. 'Women's' concerns are now recognized as social, economic and political ones. Women's studies and feminist issues are now included on the academic agenda and are no longer ignored by philosophy. With feminism, philosophy is being read in new ways and different questions are being asked of it. How, for example, do philosophical observations regarding human existence and even method accord with the experience of being female? For the most part, they may reflect that experience quite well. After all, philosophy has to do with humankind and human knowledge. Being female is certainly compatible with being human. Yet, if we dig a little deeper, we frequently find some very strange things being written about women. Women are often denied full status as human beings; sometimes they seem to be denied any status as human beings. Once we discover this, other problems arise. How are we to approach a text and the conclusions it draws when they may not apply to women at all? Are they really genderically neutral or one-sidedly masculine? What do we do when we are convinced by a description of 'rational man' only to turn the page and find the claim that women are not rational? In other

words, what do we keep and what do we discard?

Such questions indicate a feminist perspective and this thesis is more or less oriented towards that point of view. But it is not a thesis on feminism, nor do I intend to argue in favour of any specific brand of feminism. Instead, I have chosen to examine the work of a particular philosopher - Hegel - as it pertains to the issue of gender and gender relations. I am simply admitting at the outset a feminist bias for which I do not apologize, believing that it will facilitate rather than hinder understanding.

Hegel has been chosen for a number of reasons, familiarity being foremost among them. More importantly, all of those questions just posed are applicable to him. Interestingly enough, for a woman to accept Hegel's overall conclusions is something of a contradiction. On rational grounds, so to speak, she would be accepting her own inability to reason.

Still, certain aspects of Hegel's work correspond to feminist concerns. There is an emphasis on individual freedom and self-determination as grounded in the community and connected with responsibility towards others. Feminism, too, is a program or world-view that blends liberation with cooperation. As well, love and personal

relationships are given an essential place in Hegel's system. The cunning of reason is not so cold and ruthless as one might suppose, and the so-called world-historical individual does not preclude an interest in the ordinary one, including her or his upbringing in the family. Given that the family is often a central theme in feminist literature, it is perhaps encouraging to find Hegel acknowledging hearth and home. Not all feminists wish to abolish the family and the majority seek a better understanding of it. To this end, Hegel can be of some assistance. His description of the family closely resembles the institution as it is today. Though we may eventually reject his theory, we can still learn something about our own attitudes towards the family by examining his.

The main topic of study, however, is Hegel's analysis of gender and gender relations. This, of course, will include his presentation of the family but will not be limited to it. According to Hegel, women and men have distinct and distinguishable characteristics. Difference is stressed over homogeneity. Women and men are not of the same 'type', even though both are human. The question of gender is therefore one of opposition and a possible dualism. Hegel belongs to a philosophical and cultural tradition in which generic opposition has consistently

been upheld. It is a tradition that preceded him and also one that succeeded him, even up to the present day. But Hegel's account of gender and gender relations becomes especially interesting when we situate it within his own philosophical project, specifically his approach to opposition and the problem of dualism in general.

Since its first major articulation in Descartes, dualism has plagued philosophy for several centuries. Hegel himself inherited the problem from Kant, in part through the unsuccessful attempts of Fichte and Schelling to replace duality with unity. Historically, Hegel's situation compelled him to address the problem and to continue in the direction of Fichte and Schelling. Thus, as Charles Taylor notes in his book on Hegel, "the major task of philosophy for Hegel can be expressed as that of 'over-coming opposition.'"1

Depending upon the specific area under investigation, the context and content of dualist theories and propositions will vary. The form, however, is always an oppositional one, with the logical expression of an 'either-or', such that the affirmation of one side entails the denial of the other. For any given proposition, form and content are consistent, but a difficulty arises once the content is translated into its form. For example, if we want to

determine the colour of an object and our choices are limited to red and green, we are not so much concerned with whether or not the object is red or not red as with whether or not it is red or green. Given the limited choice, the two propositions are identical. That is, 'The object is either red or not red' is the same as 'The object is either red or green'. Still, it is not immediately obvious that they are. That an object is either red or green need not express an opposition and will only do so if 'red' is equivalent to 'not green' and 'green' is equivalent to 'not red'. Since the example is a simple one, it is clear that we intuitively assume such an equivalence and treat the proposition 'The object is either red or green' as entailing an opposition between 'red' and 'green'.

Of course, whether or not an object is either red or green is relatively uncontroversial, at least outside of traffic courts. It is when the content has to do with more contentious issues that the problem of dualism and opposition becomes interesting. The Cartesian separation of mind and body is a case in point. If we assume that what is a mind is not a body and what is a body is not a mind, then we are confronting dualism. In our contemporary physicalist age, it might be strange to accord 'mind' an ontological status, but Descartes did just that. Again, with

the dualist approach to the problem of freedom and determinism, the same pattern applies. Whether or not human beings are free or determined is a question in which 'freedom' and 'determinism' are frequently assumed to oppose each other. 'Spirit' versus 'nature' and 'subject' versus 'object' are other examples.

With the possible exception of 'red or green', all of these problems were foremost on Hegel's agenda. How were they to be solved? A complete comprehension of Hegel's solution, including his relative success, would obviously involve a detailed examination of his work. At this point, perhaps a brief synopsis will sufficiently indicate the approach he was to take.

According to Hegel, opposites need not relate dualistically if a third term is posited in which, or through which, they can be united. Thus, for example, with Cartesian dualism the difficulty concerns the notion of disembodied mind. In all fairness, Descartes attempted to prove a fundamental separation between body and mind, he did not merely assume that the two were opposed. Nevertheless, Cartesian dualism can be resolved by introducing the notion of embodied mind. Once we realize that mind is necessarily embodied or 'of body', it makes no sense to claim that what is a mind is not a body and what

is a body is not a mind. The two are ontologically equivalent.

Similarly, once 'freedom' and 'determinism' are both grounded in the human community, their oppositional status evaporates. On the one hand, all human beings belong to and are formed by the community. At the same time, the community is inherently free; it determines itself through the actions of its members, both individually and collectively. With this background, the question 'are human beings free or determined?' is rather misput. As members of a free, self-determining community, they are clearly both.

Of course, the claims just made must be substantiated and that is what Hegel attempted to do. More importantly, the identity of opposites upon which unity is based must also avoid the reduction of one side to the other or of the third postulated term to either side. As well, the 'third term' has no status of its own separate from the relation of its two components. It exists, as it were, only because they do. Indeed, identity without reduction (and without the reification of superfluous third-term entities) is the secret of Hegel. In this way, the unity of opposites resolves the problem of dualism while at the same time retaining differentiation.

Returning once more to Cartesian dualism, it is obvious that Hegel's solution will only work if 'embodied mind' is equated with neither body nor mind. The idea of a mind-body identity without reduction is especially difficult today, for we tend to view the former as a complex of 'bodily' neurological activity. In other words, we are inclined towards an identity that does reduce one (mind) to the other (body). Yet we still speak of mind, thought, consciousness, etc. - not as separate from the body but at least as linguistically different from the body. While there is currently no doubt that the body is a necessary condition of the mind, it does not follow that 'embodied mind' can be identified with the body alone. Instead, it is to be identified with both mind and body. Hence, body and mind are no longer opposed and a sense of difference is still retained.

Identification without reduction applies to all of the problems mentioned above. The concept is not an easy one to grasp and the more complex the issue, the more difficult comprehension will be. Perhaps the relationship between spirit and nature is the most perplexing of all. Extremely crucial to Hegel's system, it is as complicated as any relationship can be.

Very simply, the opposition between spirit and nature can be described as one between the (natural) world of non-thinking, unself-conscious beings and the (spiritual) world of thinking, self-conscious beings. Even though humans are also animals and the human world part of the natural world, it is the human capacity for rational thought and self-knowledge that distinguishes (human) spirit from nature. The opposition is overcome through the relationship of each to the logical Idea. Not only does the Idea logically entail both spirit and nature, it also reveals why and how they are dependent upon each other. Moreover, it is important to stress that the Idea itself has no ontological status separate from its existence in spirit and nature.

At the same time, however, the reconciliation of spirit and nature is obviously something known. It therefore belongs to the self-knowledge of spirit itself. The problem becomes complicated because we have to discriminate between two levels of spirit; the self-knowledge of specifically human spirit and the all-encompassing self-knowledge in which spirit and nature are known to be united. Hegel calls this latter self-knowledge Absolute Spirit (or Spirit knowing itself as spirit and knowing itself as not opposed to nature by knowing the Idea as the third unifying term). Absolute Spirit, in turn, is not to

be identified with human spirit except as human spirit has the knowledge of Absolute Spirit. Nor is Absolute Spirit to be identified with nature, for obvious reasons. Finally, Absolute Spirit is not the same as the logical Idea because the Idea alone is without the moment of knowing.

Absolute Spirit is the totality of the unity of all three. Hegel's system is completed by the Idea, spirit and nature united as Absolute Spirit. But in spite of the particular relation of spirit and nature just outlined, the Idea, spirit and nature relate in other and mysterious ways. Referring to the syllogisms completing the Encyclopaedia, Findlay points out in his introduction to the Philosophy of Nature that each, in turn, constitutes the third term by which the other two are united.² The Hegelian syllogism is also found in the Logic, interpreted by Taylor in a manner consistent with Findlay's.³ While unity is derived from all three, it is derived from their interrelatedness to each other and through each other. Unity is in no way dependent upon any identification that entails the reduction of one to the other two.

Even in the most complex and crucial area, then, identification without reduction is the predominant feature of Hegel's overall method.⁴ If the identification of opposites resolves the problem of dualism by revealing

their fundamental unity, identification without reduction shows that opposition is itself an essential part of the whole process. Here, we can remind ourselves of Hegelian dialectics, in which undifferentiated unity breaks down into two opposing sides, the relationship of which indicates a return to differentiated unity. In other words, Hegelian dialectics formally consists of three basic moments: an initial moment of unity, in which difference and opposition are absent; a second moment of one-sided or oppositional differentiation; and a third and final moment of unity, where difference is present but opposition is overcome. When overcoming dualism, the most serious mistake one could make is the error of reduction.

In the first place, reduction runs the risk of violating the law of non-contradiction. Despite frequent accusations to the contrary, Hegel took the law of non-contradiction very seriously. He simply did not believe that it could say all that there is to say about opposition. To restrict inquiry to the contradictory surface of the situation is to be blind to its underlying unity. But to ignore contradiction is equally unacceptable.

Concern for the law of non-contradiction is perhaps best illustrated by the colour example. Once we realize that they are both colours, red and green are seen to

relate in a non-oppositional way. They are equivalent, so to speak, because colour, as the third term (and given the limited field of choice), is both red and green. At the same time, the equivalence of red and green does not mean that colour can be reduced to either - for example, to red. Such a reduction would violate the law of non-contradiction. Colour is also not-red and to reduce colour to red would be to reduce red to green (i.e. to not-red). As the third term, colour itself has no status outside particular instances of colour in specifically coloured objects that are either red or green. These objects may exhibit the colour 'red' or they may exhibit the colour 'green' but it is ontologically impossible for them to exhibit the colour 'red-and-green'. 'Red' and 'green' are opposed to one another.

As well as observing the law of non-contradiction, identification without reduction indicates the key ingredient of Hegelian unity - the retention of difference. With the reduction of colour to only red, the difference between red and green is annulled. Consequently, absolutely everything in the world would have to be red. Not only would this be empirically falsifiable, it would be patently absurd, signifying an inherent contradiction to the very concept of colour itself. Emptied of all determinate content, colour would, in fact, be colourless, a situation

akin to Schelling's Absolute: "the night in which, as the saying goes, all cows are black" (PG, 16).

The necessity of differentiation is demonstrated in the opening pages of the Logic.⁵ Like Kant before him, Hegel sought to establish the fundamental categories of thought and thus of reality. The Logic essentially serves this purpose. Hegel begins with the most basic category of all, the notion of reality as pure, indeterminate Being and quickly discovers that pure Being simply cannot be thought. If we tried to define pure Being, it would be according to some property, but it would also no longer be pure. Neither this nor that, pure Being quite literally refers to no thing, or pure Nothing. In turn, Nothing is also indeterminate; it does not refer to the absence of anything in particular. Pure Being and pure Nothing are therefore self-negating and, as the same thing, inter-referential. We are left with an endless and empty conceptual circle that is broken only by introducing the notion of determinate Being. To exist at all, Being must be ontologically grounded or embodied in a multiplicity of determinate beings that contrast with and oppose each other. (As Taylor points out, Hegel is adopting "the Spinozan principle that all determination is negation."⁶)

In this way, the concept of Becoming - a primary category of Hegel's method - is disclosed. Between

determinacy and Becoming, the view that contradiction and negation are the source of all movement is anticipated.

Taylor summarizes the process as follows:

It is clear why Hegel wants to bring in becoming here: for it is central to his ontology. Geist can only be embodied, and yet the embodiments are all inadequate, and hence disappear to give place to others; the being of Geist is thus a perpetual movement, a perpetual coming to be and passing away. (7)

That difference is crucial to Hegelian unity is now evident and can be further exemplified by noting Hegel's approach to the final duality mentioned above, that between subject and object. Along with the unity of spirit and nature, the successful reconciliation of subject and object is of paramount importance to Hegel. Equally presupposed by Absolute Spirit, the two are closely affiliated; the unity of spirit and nature is reflected in the relationship between subject and object. Fundamental to each is Hegel's concept of self-consciousness. Indeed, Hegel defines the Absolute as spirit "which is absolutely manifest to itself, self-conscious, (and) infinitely creative" (PM, 384, 2). As infinite, Absolute Spirit is totally self-determined and all-encompassing. Nature and objectivity are one with spirit and subjectivity.

Self-consciousness, then, is precisely the identity of subject and object. This means that the subject of consciousness (the self) is the same as the object of consciousness (the self). Such a definition, however, does not obviously meet the requirement of difference. Like Fichte's Absolute Ego, it runs the risk of emptiness, or "the motionless tautology of 'I am I'" (PG, 167). For this reason, identity cannot entail a reduction of object to subject. Although the contrast between subjectivity and objectivity must not be so distinct as to prohibit reconciliation altogether, the object must still be other than, or different from, the subjective self. According to Hegel, the proper object of self-consciousness is another subjective self. An essential condition of self-consciousness - and, indeed, of Absolute Spirit - is intersubjectivity. Unification is founded upon the recognition exchanged between two or more self-conscious individuals who acknowledge each other as self-conscious individuals. With intersubjectivity and mutual recognition, the tautological 'I am I' becomes the differentiated unity of the "'I' that is 'We' and the 'We' that is 'I'" (PG, 177).

As well, self-consciousness in general - that is, both individually and collectively - must also ensure that subjectivity is united with the objectivity of the external

natural world. This task falls to the industry and labour of the community. Here, the links between nature-object and spirit-subject are especially evident. At the level of opposition, nature is the objective other of spiritual subjectivity or intersubjectivity. With labour, nature is spiritualized and the truth of alterity revealed. Nature is spirit's other. External objects belong to the labouring individuals as the products of their own creative activity.⁸

Hegel's concept of self-consciousness clearly upholds his commitment to difference. With it, the opposition between subject and object is overcome and our summary of Hegelian unity is completed. In contrast to those of both Fichte and Schelling, Hegel's solution to the problem of dualism manages to avoid collapsing distinctions. Unlike theirs, his Absolute depends upon determinacy, diversity and opposition. A purely self-identical Absolute is, for Hegel, logically inconsistent and rationally unacceptable. Unity and difference demand one another.

What does all this have to do with the question of gender and gender relations? Though it may have appeared somewhat tangential at times, the preceding discussion is really quite relevant to the particular topic at hand. If Hegel's position on gender and gender relations is to be fully appreciated, a background of general knowledge is

requisite. When his account is examined in detail, it will become obvious that his approach to this area is consonant with his approach to any other. Indeed, Hegel is interesting because he situates generic differences within his own rational framework. For this reason, however, his analysis cannot be truly comprehended in isolation from his method of inquiry as a whole.

That women and men are considerably different was empirically evident to Hegel and, in all likelihood, commonsensically true. In his time, women and men did not look or dress the same, rarely seemed to think or speak alike and performed fundamentally diverse tasks in community life. In fact, despite some changes, the situation today is remarkably similar to that of Hegel's era. Nonetheless, the significance of such evidence is not empirically ascertainable. That difference denotes opposition, as Hegel suggests, is a rational observation and to determine the foundation, content and nature of generic opposition is a rational affair. Moreover, once opposition has been established, some kind of reconciliation is presumably in order. Without it, opposition will be supplanted by dualism.

At issue, then, is the very success of Hegel's endeavour. Given the type of opposition under consideration, someone sensitive to feminist concerns will

undoubtedly retain a certain amount of skepticism when reading Hegel. Although Hegel's overall approach to dualism might be acceptable, his achievements in any particular area may be disputed. Regarding the possibility of generic dualism, one reader who did challenge Hegel's conclusions is Mary O'Brien. In her book The Politics of Reproduction, O'Brien examines the work of a number of theorists on the question of gender and gender relations. While acknowledging Hegel as an anti-dualist, she also maintains "that the one dualism which Hegel himself finally failed to mediate successfully was the opposition of male and female."⁹

Unfortunately, O'Brien offers very little in the way of concise textual analysis to support her claim. To be fair, her intention is not to evaluate Hegel as such, but to outline and criticise traditional 'male-stream' interpretations of gender relations and the human reproductive process. As well as Hegel, she touches upon a large number of philosophers, social scientists and feminist theorists, in varying degrees of detail. To name just a few, Aeschylus, Plato, Aristotle, Marx, Freud, Levi-Strauss, Arendt, de Beauvoir, Millett and Rowbotham are all considered along with Hegel and reproached for much the same reason as he is. According to O'Brien, each of these thinkers either misunderstood the actual workings of

human reproduction, or else ignored its primary role in determining the course of human affairs. Often they did both. Consequently, gender differences themselves have been inaccurately perceived. The Politics of Reproduction represents an alternative, 'corrective' appreciation of reproduction. O'Brien's ultimate goal is the comprehension of the basis of 'male-stream' theory, coupled with the development of a theoretical framework for feminism.¹⁰

O'Brien's project may sound rather ambitious, but in spite of certain weaknesses, her claims are supported by much research, argument, imagination and thoughtful concern. In her view, generic opposition and cultural inequalities are to be grounded in reproductive differences; the burden of female pregnancy simply fails to capture those differences completely. What has largely been left unexplored is a major dissimilarity in female and male reproductive experiences. Men, O'Brien claims, are literally separated from the reproductive process and thus from the continuity of the human species. Unlike women, men do not enjoy the certain knowledge of parenthood. The male reproductive consciousness is characterized by the experience of alienation and discontinuity. In contrast, that of the female is marked by integration and continuity. From this standpoint, O'Brien concludes that the institution of marriage and monogamous sexual relations

developed as a male response to the uncertainty of paternity. Only by establishing himself as the sole sexual partner of a particular woman can a man be almost - though never quite - assured that he really is the father of his children. O'Brien further conjectures that a whole wealth of social, cultural and historical phenomena - including philosophical dualism - can likely be traced to this male separation from species continuity.¹¹

Assisted by Marxism, feminism and her own experience as a midwife, O'Brien's approach is primarily Hegelian. In the end, her own account differs radically from Hegel's, but he is still helpful, she maintains, because he did notice "that the process of reproduction was dialectically structured."¹² He just mistakenly interprets this structure, the opposition it engenders and the means for reconciling opposition from a decidedly male perspective.¹³ Insofar as O'Brien does not examine Hegel in any great detail, one can only assume that the charge of genderic dualism stems largely from her conception of Hegel's position as one-sidedly masculine and therefore inadequate. O'Brien's own position will be briefly discussed at the conclusion of this thesis. At this point, we must decide if her accusation of dualism is really justified. To do this, we must look to Hegel himself and supply the textual analysis that O'Brien fails to provide.

Is Hegel a genderic dualist? That is the question that must be answered and it is actually a rather complex one. In the first place, the term itself must be defined. While the discussion so far has implied its meaning, an explicit definition is clearly in order. Like Mary O'Brien, I have chosen to use 'gender' over 'sex', mainly because the latter denotes a multiplicity of meaning that renders it rather cumbersome. The close connection of 'sex' and 'sexuality' with copulation and sexual desire risks prejudicing the issue somewhat. Of course, copulation and sexual desire are important and will be attended to, but gender relations are not only sexual ones and gender identity should not be equated with sexual identity. Instead, 'gender' is intended to refer to women and men, femininity and masculinity in as neutral a way as possible. Hence, when sexual terms are used, they will be limited to those instances in which sexual relations or sexual desire are being discussed.

As to the term itself, genderic dualism originates from the division of human characteristics into two distinct groupings, a division that is somehow ontologically grounded in human being. Depending upon the being in question, the ontological association may be literal or figurative and will consistently indicate a relationship of opposition. This opposition does not refer to those

differences in chromosomal structure and reproductive organs that determine the biological female and the biological male. What we more importantly have is a set of fixed qualities that are categorized under the general headings of femininity and masculinity (i.e., passive/active; submissive/aggressive; emotional/rational; weak-willed/strong-willed; etc.). In other words, the qualities themselves are deemed to be either feminine or masculine. Ontology is substantiated when femininity is depicted as female and masculinity as male. The characteristics are literally grounded in human being, which is biologically divided into females and males. Clearly, generic dualism presupposes some form of essentialism.

To avoid dualism, the gender gap that precludes unity, it might be claimed that the separation does not entail an exclusive ontological association. It is possible to find a passive man and, one would hope, a rational woman. Yet, in these cases, we often find ourselves calling her masculine and him feminine, remarking that she is acting like a man or that he is acting like a woman. (Perhaps we do not do this as frequently as we used to and 'enlightened' people do not do it outloud, but the tendency remains a strong one.) Others may allow that women do have a masculine 'side' and men a feminine 'side' and that these are merely recessive. Not exactly like genes, they may

actually emerge once in a while. However, it is still the other 'side' that emerges, the uncharacteristic one.

In each of these instances, the ontological association is somewhat figurative, but the fundamental being of the feminine as female and the masculine as male is maintained. Neither example escapes the danger of dualism because both ultimately refer to a basis of oppositional qualities such as those indicated above. Indeed, if the qualities listed are universally human ones that apply to both genders, then we are entitled to ask why they are genderically categorized at all. Why should we even speak of feminine sides and masculine sides? But if we seriously and consistently regard the characteristics as neither specifically feminine (female) or masculine (male), then genderic opposition and a possible dualism are no longer at issue. As long as we do speak of femininity and masculinity in such a way, we are speaking of a fundamental genderic opposition. The gap is reinforced rather than eliminated. To avoid dualism, it must be bridged by some other means. The two sides must be united; perhaps through some kind of reconciling relationship between women and men.

In fact, this is Hegel's solution, but here we are anticipating. At this point, not enough is known about Hegel to fully answer the question put to him. Given that

generic dualism entails both an oppositional form of differentiation and the unavailability of reconciliation, the question is clearly two-fold. Each aspect of it must be addressed in turn, which is exactly what I intend to do.

To begin, the assertion of opposition itself requires further support. This will be provided in the first chapter, where Hegel's portrayal of gender characteristics will be examined in detail. I will show that Hegel's approach to gender differences is clearly oppositional and that he regards this opposition as both natural and rational. According to Hegel, the division of humankind into females and males (both biologically and culturally) represents the dialectical moment of oppositional differentiation. On this point, anyway, gender relations do reflect the structure of Hegelian dialectics.

In Chapter One, I will also argue that, for Hegel, gender characteristics at the cultural level are immediately determined by nature. There is, I believe, a kind of biological reductionism prevalent in Hegel's presentation and it is just this reductionism that worries me. While I do not believe one can deny the influence of biology upon human life, I do not agree that biological 'facts' totally determine human life. In keeping with

this concern, I will also evaluate Hegel's justification for his oppositional claim, critically and comparatively analysing its natural and cultural expressions. In the end, I do not believe that Hegel's presentation is acceptable, primarily because he makes a number of assumptions that are open to dispute. While his account can be explained in terms of his overall rational framework, it nevertheless poses crucial difficulties when it comes to the question of reconciliation.

Having thus confirmed that Hegel does understand gender differences as manifesting a dialectical opposition, the path to reconciliation will be the topic of Chapter Two. In Chapter Two, I will discuss Hegel's concept of love, marriage and the family. Similar to his claim that gender characteristics are naturally determined, Hegel comprehends the family as a cultural institution with direct links to nature. Essentially, the family reflects the natural reproductive process with the spiritual moment of recognition added. Recognizing each other first as lovers - through marriage - and then as parents - through their children - recognition is the means by which women and men are to be united. Unfortunately, I will argue, the success of Hegel's achievement is thwarted by his own unequal and oppositional depiction of gender differences.

I therefore conclude that Hegel is, in fact, a generic dualist and in my conclusion will propose several implications this might have for Hegel's system and philosophical project as a whole. I suspect that a new understanding of Hegel might be gained if he is read from the perspective of gender and gender relations. In a sense, my conclusion will represent a sort of miscellaneous third chapter, for I will also examine some of Mary O'Brien's claims and offer a few comments of my own concerning this issue. I believe that the problem of gender is as much a methodological question as it is one of human existence as such. So long as we focus on opposition, reconciliation will forever elude us. Nevertheless, I have come to no definite conclusion regarding the issue. Indeed, my investigation has raised more questions than it has answered. Though my comments will be rather brief, I hope they do point towards the practical solutions I will then outline.

CHAPTER ONE: THE FOUNDATION OF OPPOSITION IN REASON AND NATURE

Introduction

Hegel's interpretation of gender differences as oppositional stems largely from his understanding of the biological process of human reproduction. Observing the contrast between women and men in community life, he traces this difference to the fact that the human species is divided into females and males for the purpose of species generation. Since the species is biologically divided, genderic differences must somehow be natural.

As Mary O'Brien points out, Hegel comprehends human reproduction as dialectically structured, but fails to fully acknowledge its historicity. Hegel, she claims, places "vital aspects of reproductive relations outside of history proper, history being understood to start only when the human rational faculty has clearly separated the human world from the rest of the animal world."¹ The question of family historicity is neglected in favour of a view of the family as a natural, ahistorical institution.

Even more important, Hegel does not allow for the possibility of historically based and historically changing gender characteristics. Instead, differences at the level of biological reproduction are taken to provide sufficient

insight into differences at any level - including cultural life. Women are naturally of one type and men are naturally of another and gender relations correspondingly reflect such oppositional, or one-sided characteristics. Non-historical, gender types remain constant throughout history and survive virtually intact in cultural life.

Turning to Hegel himself, we find that generic differentiation is rational as well as natural; Gender differences are dialectically expressed in the form of a generic opposition. Given the previous outline of Hegel's own rational framework, this should come as no surprise. Difference is rationally necessary, mainly for reasons already discussed. At the same time, however, the rationality of difference even at the cultural level is derived from nature. Generic differentiation is rational because it has to do with the dialectical structure of human reproduction, which Hegel interprets as solely natural. In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel makes a statement that supports this claim:

The difference in the physical characteristics of the two sexes has a rational basis and consequently acquires an intellectual and ethical significance. (PR, 165)

By 'intellectual', Hegel is quite likely referring to the reasoning capacity of women and men, including consciousness of self and the world. His use of the term

'ethical' has not so much to do with morality as we commonly think of it as with the human community. For Hegel, an ethical community is the objective embodiment of such moral ideas as what is good, just, constitutive of human freedom, etc. Intersubjectively determined, these ideas are reflected in the laws, institutions, customs and symbols of the community. While it is doubtful that Hegel would have used the expression himself in this context, it is perhaps safe to put forth that the ethical more closely approximates cultural life than moral imperatives.² Insofar as human reasoning and human consciousness also operate on the cultural level, I will abbreviate the phrase 'intellectual and ethical significance' to 'cultural significance'.

The key to understanding this statement, however, is really found in the terms 'rational basis' and 'consequently'. Regarding the latter, it is obvious that Hegel is intending a derivation of some kind. The cultural significance of physical differences can only be certain cultural differences (in reasoning, consciousness and community activities, for example). From Hegel's use of the derivative form, it is evident that physical differences somehow entail cultural ones. Just what these physical differences are is not yet clear, but certainly they concern the body and are biological or natural.

In this way, we find something cultural founded upon something natural by way of derivation. Apparently, this derivation is immediate, in itself rather problematic. We tend to think of human beings as appropriators of nature and of their own natural foundations and not as bound to them. Hegel's conception of generic differentiation is clearly otherwise. Moreover, he seems convinced that the derivation is possible because physical differences do have a rational basis. It is at this point that rationality and dialectics merge, with differences presented as oppositional.

Because dialectics and Hegelian reason are virtually synonymous, one way to explain the rationality of physical difference is to view it as a specific moment in a dialectical process. This is exactly what Hegel does. O'Brien is therefore correct when she claims that Hegel understands human reproduction as dialectically structured. Generic differentiation represents the moment of opposition and opposition, in turn, is the result of the separation of the human species into two generically distinct groups, female and males.

Hegelian dialectics was briefly discussed in the Introduction as belonging to his overall rational framework. It must also be stressed that dialectics is both structure and process. As process, it involves a double-

edged movement that first separates and then negates separation. Phenomenologically, separation is experienced as alienation. At the same time, the first negation of the process is not the same as the first moment of the structure, which is the moment of undifferentiated unity, or the abstract universality in which opposition is lacking.

Instead, the first negation produces the second moment of the structure, the moment of one-sided differentiation or opposition. The second act of negation negates the first. With it, opposition is overcome and unity restored. The restoration of unity is the third moment of the dialectical structure. In it, the first two moments are related in what Hegel refers to as the unity of unity and difference. This is the moment of concrete universality. It is universal because opposition is overcome and concrete because difference is retained.

It is according to such a structure-process that Hegel perceives both human reproduction and generic differentiation. The rationality of the latter is based upon the former. But because Hegel views reproduction as natural, the moment of oppositional difference is likewise natural. Indeed, one could develop his statement in the Philosophy of Right as follows: "The difference in the physical characteristics of the two sexes has a rational basis in nature..." Such a reading is endorsed by T.M. Knox, the

translator of the Philosophy of Right. According to Knox, the rationality of physical differences is explained by the fact that the natural species generates itself from "out of the opposition between the two sexes into which it is differentiated."³

If the rationality of physical differences is based in nature, what does this mean for the consequential derivation of cultural differences? Knox claims that the rationality of physical differences "must have some bearing on ethics as a rationally ordered life."⁴ But exactly what kind of bearing must it have? If culture is rationally ordered, then it will also reflect the three moments of the dialectical structure. In the Philosophy of Right, we find that it does just that, with the family representing the moment of undifferentiated unity, economic life (civil society) the moment of oppositional difference and the political state the unification of the two.⁵

When we examine the cultural opposition in greater detail, however, we will discover that the rational ordering of cultural life is incapable of justifying opposition at the cultural level. That the community is divided into one private (family) and two public (economic and political) spheres says absolutely nothing about how women and men are to be placed within it. Women are not specifically suited to the family simply because there is a family.

Instead, there must be something intrinsic to the nature of women to convince us that they are. Like the rational basis of physical differences, the rational basis of cultural ones remains natural. As Hegel himself confirms, the derivation from one to the other is immediate. In the Phenomenology of Spirit, for example, he establishes the cultural opposition according to "the specific antithesis of the two sexes whose natural existence acquires at the same time the significance of their ethical determination" (PG, 459). Almost verbatim, this immediacy is upheld in the later Philosophy of Mind, which also compares very closely to the statement of the Philosophy of Right:

The physical difference of sex thus appears at the same time as a difference of intellectual and moral type.
(PM, 519)

To substantiate the claims made thus far, a detailed inquiry into Hegel's analysis of biological reproduction, physical differences and their cultural significance is required. It is to such an inquiry that we now turn.

The Rationality of Oppositional Difference:
Species Generation

To submit that generic differentiation is rational, it is not sufficient to simply observe that all humans are either female or male. Of this kind of move, Hegel is at least innocent. He is far more interested in the generative process of the species as a whole, for it is here that the rationality of oppositional differences will be found. Since Hegel believes that reproduction is dialectically structured, he begins his analysis from the moment of an abstract universal, the generically indifferent species. Regardless of gender, each human is an instance of this universal. To belong to the species means first and foremost that one's life is generated from out of it. As genus, the species exists prior to its individual members at any given time and will outlive them.

Implicit in the concept of an undifferentiated unity is that of self-identity. But the determination of self-identity is, for Hegel, no easy task. It necessarily gives rise to difference and alterity. Even to identify something with itself is always only achieved in light of an opposing other from which it is first to be contrasted. The process by which self and other are related and finally known as united is most famously described in the master-slave section of the Phenomenology of Spirit.

From the point of view of any species, alterity begins with the external, natural world from which it is separated and upon which it depends. Despite the fact that the species is also a part of the world, only the knowing human fully realizes that this is so. For other animals and plants, the world remains an imposing constraint. The primordial relationship is one of continuous separation and dependence. Connection with the world is gained through acts of consumption (animals) or the assimilation of various nutrients (plants). Although a momentary unity is achieved, consumption and assimilation actually destroy the external object. With plants, assimilation absorbs nutrients that are converted into plant-life. The same is true of the consuming animal. What results is not a unity that retains difference but the elimination of difference, which is no concrete unity at all. The organism returns to its original self-identity and separation from the world, facing an endless repetition of attempts to overcome separation.

In the Phenomenology, Hegel establishes that the unification of self and other is only adequately achieved when the other is also the same as the self (PG, 175). This is not meant to be a self-identification but the identity of two selves. The connective uniting self and other is the mutual recognition exchanged between two or more selves,

a recognition acknowledging similar humanity alongside autonomous alterity. Mutual recognition represents the concrete universality of the community. Difference is maintained while separation and opposition are negated.

Any reproductive process entailing generic differentiation involves a similar relationship between self and other. Like the community, the generically reproductive species also contains alterity and difference within it. In the Phenomenology, the other was a different self; with reproduction, the other is of a different gender. In this way, the abstract universality of the species as a whole is negated for the purposes of species generation. The moment of indifference gives rise to the moment of difference.

With difference, an opposition somewhat akin to that between species and external world presents itself. In the form of externality, female and male relate as opposites. To be sure, they are generically distinct and do experience separation from each other. Unlike the opposition between species and the world, however, they also share a commonality. They belong to the same species. For this reason, Hegel understands sexual attraction as a complex phenomenon.

According to Hegel, the relationship between female and male simultaneously reflects the relationship between

the individual and the species; in his language, between the particular member and the universal genus. One is dependent upon and desires unification with the other in order to overcome separation, but this dependence and desire presupposes both an original unity with and a separation from the species. Although one's life is generated from out of the species, one is always only a particular member of it. This is most acute in the particularity of gender identity. Thus, sexual union means a return to species unity while gender identity signifies a separation from that unity. Or, to put it in Hegelian terms, the particularity inherent to gender contradicts the universality of one's species identity. This contradiction is experienced as alienation from both the universal species and the opposite gender. In the Philosophy of Nature, Hegel describes the sexual relationship as follows:

... (It is) a process which begins with a need; for the individual as a singular does not accord with the genus immanent in it, and yet at the same time is the identical self-relation of the genus in one unity; it thus has the feeling of this defect. The genus is therefore present in the individual as a straining against the inadequacy of its single actuality, and as the urge to obtain its self-feeling in the other of its genus, to integrate itself through union with it and through this mediation to close the genus with itself and bring it into existence - copulation.
(PN, 368)

Copulation unites the two distinctive sides of the universal, the particular or one-sided female and the particular or one-sided male. Just as the species is really one, so do the two individuals also become one. With sexual union, we find "the disappearance of the two sexes into which the simple genus has developed" (PN, 368, 2). However, unlike assimilation and consumption, the sexual act negates separation without destroying alterity.⁷ In the life of the other, each experiences a "feeling of universality" (PN, 368, 2) that signifies the life of the species itself. As well, and perhaps even more important than this feeling, copulation reproduces the species. It is the means by which each new member is created and the species as a whole is recreated.

The negation of separation, copulation establishes the third moment of the reproductive structure. For the participants, the feeling experienced in sexual union reaffirms their species identity at a time when sexuality and, hence, gender particularity, is most pronounced. As such, it is concretely universal. With the birth of a new member, the continuity of the species is also ensured. In the child, unity and difference are combined in one individual.

At the same time, the universality produced is limited to the form of singularity and the experience of feeling.

Sexual union may be momentous but it is also momentary. To feel universality is at best a singular and vicarious achievement, gained by one in union with one other. Female and male will separate once more and desire will return. Though the child represents the reproduction of the species and originates in sexual union, it is still a particular individual that is born. Female or male, the individual will experience alienation in turn and the need to overcome it. As Hegel points out, in the end, copulation shares with assimilation and consumption the prospect of endless repetition:

The genus which produces itself through negation of its differences, does not, however, exist in and for itself but only in a series of single living beings: and thus the sublation of the contradiction is always the beginning of a fresh one. (PN, 369, Z)

Along with assimilation and consumption, then, copulation is a natural act of negation. Not simply because it is biological, naturality is also determined by the criteria of feeling, singularity and repetition. In the Philosophy of Mind, Hegel allows that "the sexual relation...is the highest point of animate Nature" (PN. 381, Z). It is at this level that nature most closely resembles spirit as free and self-creative. Yet, he also maintains

that the dialectics of natural processes are 'non-spiritual'. No genuine change or transformation takes place. Instead, nature "exhibits a perpetual cycle" which it is bound to repeat. For this reason, nature appears as the other of spirit, with the consequence that

... the animal is still not free; for it is always manifest as a one determined as feeling or excitation, as tied to one determinateness; it is only in the form of individuality that the genus is for the animal; the latter merely feels the genus, but does not know it; in the animal, the soul is not yet for the soul, the universal as such is not for the universal. (PM, 381, 2)

The distinction being made here is clearly between feeling and knowing. On the animal level, alienation, desire and satisfaction are felt. They are not known. It is also evident that Hegel holds feeling as a direct and private experience. Others may feel like I do but they do not feel the same - the same thing - that I feel. The universal aspect of feeling rests in the fact that all feel (hunger, alienation, sexual desire, etc.). As an experience, however, feeling is essentially particular. This is what Hegel means when he says that it is universal in itself but not universal for itself.

Only that which is self-conscious and self-knowing is universal both in and for itself. For Hegel, this is the human species qua human and not as just another member of the animal kingdom. In other words, he is speaking of humankind as thinking and rational and as knowing itself as such. A human property, rationality is intrinsic to human beings; humankind is rational in itself. Through the use of reason, human beings know that they are rational; humankind is rational for itself. It is reason, then, that is truly universal both in and for itself. Moreover, through rational self-knowledge, spirit is freed from the singularity and repetition of nature, an accomplishment that is strictly human:

... it is man who first raises himself above the singleness of sensation to the universality of thought...it is only man who is thinking mind and by this, and by this alone, is essentially distinguished from Nature. (PM, 381, 2)

Not only do human beings know themselves as particularly rational and self-conscious, they also know that rationality and self-consciousness are universal to their kind. They can only know that this is so, for they do not come into close (felt) contact with the universal species as such, but only with certain members of it. It would thus seem that they can only know that they are human. Since the idea, 'human', seems to refer to something

universal, it is doubtful that species identity can be felt when feeling is limited to singularity. Surely, species identity is parasitic upon the idea, or knowledge, of species universality. Thus, for example, it might make sense to say that a human being knows that she or he belongs to humankind, but does it make much sense, on Hegel's terms, to claim that a dog feels that it belongs to dog-kind? Coming across another dog, it may be vaguely aware of some similarity in appearance, but can it then conclude species identity from this similarity? Although this might be an absurd situation, it nevertheless seems to follow from Hegel's own claims.

If universality and species identity can only be known, then alienation from the universal must also be known. Even if alienation is felt as well, it clearly presupposes knowledge of this kind and therefore presents problems for Hegel's analysis of sexual attraction. Again, would we say that a male dog sexually desires a female because she represents the other half of his genus from which he is separated or because she is in heat? To explain sexual attraction in terms of alienation is not consistent with the idea of sexual attraction as a naturally felt desire only.

As to the feeling of universality supposedly attained in sexual union, perhaps Hegel should retitl e this experi-

ence 'orgasm'. Though often referred to as a 'loss of one's self', a 'being at one with the other' or a unity of some other kind, these expressions clearly require distance from and reflection upon the act. They are not immediately derived from a singular 'felt' experience. True, a feeling is being described, but the expressions are not feelings as such. They indicate a certain amount of knowledge.

Finally, it must also be noted that Hegel's analysis cannot explain homosexual attraction at all, except as an aberration of what is natural. Surely this is a limitation to his thesis. As well, one wonders as to what implications it might have for Hegel's fondness of the ancient Greeks.

There is nothing inherently mistaken with the suggestion that sexual attraction is a natural drive or instinct. Yet, even if one agrees that human sexual desire originates from such a drive, it cannot be limited to nature. Moreover, to bring alienation into the picture, as Hegel has, is to bring in something that is not solely natural but involves knowledge and experiences that are mediated on the cultural level.

For Hegel, sexual opposition presupposes a more general one between particularity and universality. Supposedly, the latter is oppositional because particularity negates, or is the negative of, universality. We know that a par-

particular individual is not the universal species, for example. A problem arises, however, in that it is not really clear that the two are opposed. If indeterminate species universality denotes the entirety of the species, then its opposite must surely be the nullification of the entire species, or no species at all. If we translate species universality into species continuity - the coming to be and the passing away of particular individuals - it seems clear that the individual is not opposed to the species but originates from the species and is always a member of it. Hegel would agree with this, but why describe the relationship between species and individual in oppositional language at all, no matter how united the two will eventually be shown to be? Against Hegel, we can perhaps conclude that although the individual is not the same as the species, it does not follow that she or he is ever opposed to it.

With this in mind, one can certainly challenge the idea of a generic opposition. Although the species is generically divided into females and males, generic opposition, again, need not follow from this biological state. If it makes no sense to claim that the individual is opposed to the universal species, can it make any sense to claim that female is opposed to male? It might be that Hegel is imposing the dialectical concept of opposition

upon biological difference. Extending well into Hegel's comprehension of what is natural, this imposition is an insidious one and must be revealed for what it is.

At this point, we have seen that Hegel's analysis of the reproductive process concludes that gender differences are rational because they comprise the dialectical moment of oppositional differentiation. The status of this opposition has been questioned. It is more likely a cultural idea than a natural phenomenon. We have now to determine its actual content.

The Rationality of Oppositional Difference:
Physical Anatomy

In the Philosophy of Mind, the sexual relation is referred to as engendering "a real antithesis" (PM, 397). This observation is repeated in the Philosophy of Nature, where Hegel states that females and males "must be different, their determinateness against each other must exist" (PN, 368, 2). Both comments confirm the oppositional status of gender differences. More importantly, they also propose this opposition as real, or physically manifest in the external world, and not simply an idea, or way of interpreting gender relations, even if rationally determined.

In his book on Hegel, Charles Taylor interprets determinacy as implying that things "exist in space and time."⁹ Taylor also notes that a "principle of necessary embodiment"¹⁰ is featured throughout Hegel's work. In other words, we have in Hegel's thought "the ontological priority"¹¹ of the rational. Of Taylor's observations, one need only remind oneself of Hegel's famous dictum in the Philosophy of Right concerning the actuality of the rational in order to grasp what Taylor is getting at.¹²

Briefly, Taylor is referring to Hegel's notion that spirit is manifest (or, to be more precise, that spirit manifests itself) in the actual world - in nature and human

institutions, for example. Spirit, moreover, is reason and the manifestation of spirit in the world is simultaneously the manifestation of reason. It is in this way that the rational has an ontological, as well as an ideational, status. Indeed, it is doubtful that Hegel really distinguishes between the two.

One might object to the presence of spirit in nature when it has elsewhere been stated that nature appears as the other of spirit. However, as was previously pointed out in the Introduction, spirit and nature are united. Once reconciled, they are not juxtaposed against one another in a relationship based on alterity. Hegel himself would likely reply to such an objection that nature is other than spirit only insofar as nature is not conscious of itself as spirit while spirit, on the other hand, is. Indeed, nature is not self-conscious at all. Likewise, nature is not rational for itself, although it is rational in itself. As Hegel maintains, "Nature is one of the ways in which the Idea manifests itself" (PN, 247, Z). Through philosophical inquiry, spiritual humankind will reveal that this is so.

Obviously, Hegel believes that he has done just this with his inquiry into reproduction. Certainly, he has determined that generic opposition is rational, at least at the ideational level. Moreover, because the rational is

actual, spirit embodied and ideas have an ontological status, generic opposition must be real; it must be physically embodied. To discover exactly what form this opposition takes, as well as the content it has, we can take the notion of 'physical embodiment' quite literally and examine the respective bodies of female and male. Hegel takes 'sexual' quite literally as well, for his examination is directed towards the female and male genitals.

Turning to the Philosophy of Nature as the appropriate text, we find Hegel explaining genital differences in dialectical terms. Needless to say, this should not surprise us. Although female and male genitals are described oppositionally, a prior genital unity is also in order. Just as female and male belong to the same species, and given that species generation begins with the moment of an indifferent universal, so does genital differentiation presuppose an indifferent genital form originally shared by both female and male alike.

As we are now speaking of physical embodiment, one would assume that Hegel has some distinct physical organism in mind, though it is difficult to discern exactly what it might be. He does mention "a single point" (PN, 368, 2), reminiscent of the single-celled zygote, yet the zygote

displays no obvious genital form itself. It is only after a certain level of embryonic cellular complexity is reached that rudimentary genital characteristics begin to appear. At this point, it is impossible to determine the specific gender of the fetus. The organs are limited and are neither female nor male. In fact, it is from this indeterminate form that determinate genitalia develop. This is sometimes called the indifferent stage and Hegel may, perhaps, be referring to it:

Though the genotypic sex of an individual is fixed at the time of fertilization, the reproductive systems of both sexes go through a stage of embryonal development during which it is difficult, if not impossible to tell the sexes apart by either gross or microscopic examination. This period is known as the indifferent stage... This state of affairs makes it possible to discuss the early development of both sexes together without distinguishing between them. (13)

Of course, the indifferent stage is not indifferent to chromosomal variations, but as long as this knowledge is not available, as was surely the case for Hegel, observation will indicate that there is a point in genital development when generic particularity is absent despite the presence of a basic genital form. Perhaps Hegel is alluding to this form when he remarks that "on account of the original identity of formation, the same type underlies

the male and female genitals" (PN, 368, 2). At the same time, one wonders how sophisticated embryology was during Hegel's time and whether or not he was even aware of the indifferent stage. Instead, he seems to take the hermaphrodite as the indicator of original unity. Although his claim of unity is scientifically valid by today's standards, one gets the impression that he arrived at it by reflecting upon the fully mature female and male. His investigation is primarily comparative, with the obvious intention of discovering differences. A number of similarities do emerge, but the emphasis is focused upon the differences. Of his investigation, Hegel has the following to report:

... the testicles represent a definite correspondence to the female ovary... the prostate in the male corresponds to the female uterus...the female labia pudendi are shrunken scrota...the medical line of the scrotum is split in the female and forms the vagina. In this way, a complex understanding is obtained of the conversion of one sex into the other. Just as in the male, the uterus is reduced to a mere gland, so, on the other hand, the male testicle remains enclosed in the ovary, does not emerge into opposition, does not develop on its own account into active brain; and the clitoris is inactive feeling in general. In the male, on the other hand, we have instead active feeling, the swelling heart, the effusion of blood into the copora cavernosa and the meshes of spongy tissue of the urethra; to this male effusion of blood corresponds the female menses. In this way, the reception (Empfangen) by the uterus, as a simple retention, is, in the male split into the productive brain and the external heart. Through this difference, therefore, the

male is the active principle, and the female is the receptive, because she remains in her undeveloped unity. (PN, 368, 2)

Whatever Hegel's original unity might be, the development to genital differentiation is clearly an attempt to establish the physical as oppositional. Because each organ has a definite correspondent in the organs of the other gender, the genitals seem to be of the same type. Still, they complement each other in much the same way that 'hard' complements 'soft' - a not unfortunate analogy, to be sure.

From Hegel's description, it seems that the rationality of gender differences is strengthened. If the indifferent stage represents the first stage of genital development, development continues with the division into genital opposition. Presumably, copulation will complete the process with the reunification of female and male, conception and a new 'single point' or indifferent embryo. Reunification is certainly not the success of either female or male alone. Indeed, the complementary nature of the genitals signifies that they are somehow meant to fit together, like two pieces in a jig-saw puzzle. One is reminded of the Hermaphrodite myth, a tale told to account for sexual attraction. As the story goes, female and male were at one time of one body, which was later split into two. So separated, women and men are simply incomplete

parts, longing to connect with their other halves. It may well be that Hegel's description has a great deal to do with that myth. Though he is here speaking scientifically, his use of the original form and the biological hermaphrodite bears close resemblance to the ancient tale. His portrayal of the reproductive organs is such that copulation is anticipated just as a prior unity is claimed. With copulation, then, the circle is closed.

But before the circle can close, we must realize that it is separated into two distinct sides. Presumably, if women and men were not incomplete (if they were circles unto themselves, so to speak), there would be no impetus for sexual relations, specifically heterosexual ones. Perhaps this is the only way to explain an attraction that is utterly baffling, especially to men, who have traditionally considered women inferior and hardly worth bothering with. Thus, it appears that female and male must oppose each other in their genital/sexual one-sidedness. If they did not, they would not 'feel' alienation and desire. The incomplete, yet complementary, characteristics of their respective genitals physically manifests this opposition, as well as the means for overcoming it.

As we saw with species generation, copulation unites the particular with the universal. Genital differences must therefore reflect the separation of particularity from

universality. Returning to Hegel's description, it becomes evident that female 'unity' must represent abstract universality while male 'difference' denotes particularity. This appraisal is based upon an observation that sees the female structure as predominantly internal and the male structure as predominantly external. Obviously correct, from it Hegel also deduces the non-emergence of the female. In other words, according to Hegel, female internality is due to a lack of development. In comparison, the male boasts external genitals that imply development and differentiation. He has emerged. Leaving behind the indifferent stage to actively oppose it, he is the particular opposing indifference, opposing the female. She, it appears, has simply been left behind. It is for this reason that she is also inactive. Because her genitals lack the action of development, her opposition to particularity, if there is such a thing, remains fundamentally passive. Only the thrust of emergence and the externalization of the male organs signify the principle of activity.

Is it not the case, however, that the female genitals are different? Even if we do grant that they more closely resemble the indifferent stage than do the male's, we would hardly be willing to leave the female there completely. Compared to her counterpart; her genital development is not

so externally pronounced, but she is not undeveloped, as Hegel's description implies. Internally, the female has also 'emerged'. Moreover, insofar as male opposition is concerned, one might very well ask what the male is opposed to. If the answer is indifference, the same can be said of the female, who is by no means 'asexual'. All that the genitals indicate is a male opposition to internality and even at that they are not completely external. Opposition to universality, or female 'unity', will only follow if universality and internality are the same. However, universality implies a lack of development and internality need not. Against Hegel, it appears that the basic internal-external difference that exists up to a point is alone incapable of validating the supposition of a more fundamental opposition, notably that between the passive, indifferent female and the active, particular male.

Once more, the rational basis of sexual differences can be challenged. Obviously, one cannot deny that female and male have different genital structures, but can we say that a penis is opposed to a vagina? The opposition that Hegel is attempting to demonstrate falls short of adequate proof. "Scientifically, his description is generally accurate. Nevertheless, one suspects that he has somehow twisted the data to fit his theory. To translate genital differences into an opposition may suit the requirements of

Hegel's own rational framework, but it may also be distorting the 'facts'. Indeed, other aspects of his analysis are also questionable.

Among these is the notion that the testicles signify 'active brain' and the penis 'swelling heart'. One might ask why Hegel uses these terms. While it is true that the penis fills with blood upon erection, it is impossible to agree that this corresponds to menstrual blood. In fact, it is doubtful that there is anything within the male organism that corresponds to menstrual blood. The female equivalent of the penis is a clitoris that also swells. One fails to see why it is 'inactive feeling'.

As for the testicles, perhaps they are 'brain-like' because they produce sperm. But is the production of sperm analogous to brain activity in any important way? Surely it is not rational! Given that brain cells die and are not replaced, one might ask if it is analogous at all.

Actually, sperm correspond to female eggs and the testicles to female ovaries, as Hegel points out. The ovaries do differ from the testicles in that they do not produce eggs as such. It does not follow, however, that they are inactive, as it is within the ovaries that the egg matures. There is nothing that prohibits evaluating the maturation process as an active one. The ovaries can and have been described as a dynamic structure.¹⁴ No less active than

the testicles, their activity is simply directed towards different ends and is to be understood as of a different type. Such a difference is not necessarily an oppositional one.

Having already identified the uterus with the prostate, Hegel then states that it is split, in the male, into 'brain' and 'heart', that which was previously equated with the ovaries and clitoris. Ignoring this inconsistency, one might suggest that he takes the primarily receptive function of the uterus to further support his assertion that the ovaries and clitoris are inactive, just as the uterus, apparently, is. Now the latter also stands opposed to the testicles and penis: the female passively receives what the male actively produces.

Yet the uterus does not receive and retain the sperm but the fertilized egg, the zygote. A great deal of preparation and participation on the part of the ovaries, egg and uterus is required for successful fertilization and the secure implantation of the zygote within the uterus. Though the sperm has to work very hard to reach the egg, the female apparatus works just as hard assisting it and making its journey worthwhile. Moreover, Hegel fails to acknowledge that the uterus is not limited to its receptive and retentive functions. If fertilization does not occur,

the uterine lining is expelled along with the mature egg. If it does and the zygote is successfully implanted, the female will eventually give birth. At this time, uterine contractions and the expansion of the vagina confirm that the female reproductive system is an active one - active in a sense that is, perhaps, unequalled by the production of sperm and penile erection.

Clearly, Hegel's account has to do with the respective reproductive functions of the female and male genitals. Conspicuous in its absence, female labour is not considered. His comparison is limited to contributions to conception and participation in copulation. This might be because his own contribution to reproduction, as a male, was limited to these. In The Politics of Reproduction, Mary O'Brien offers this as at least a partial explanation of such a restricted appraisal. She expands the reproductive process to include ovulation, menstruation and female labour as well as copulation, conception and the distinctively male moments of ejaculation and the appropriation of those children whom the male supposes to be his.¹⁵ Once again, those moments that are specifically female signify much female activity and contrast sharply with the kind of opposition that Hegel is seeking.

Since Hegel's account neglects female labour and birth, his understanding of how reproduction is productive

of a child is similarly limited. In the Philosophy of Mind, birth is "a tremendous leap" (PM, 368, 2), a metaphor that is repeated in the Phenomenology (PG, 11). Forgetting that birth is mediation, it is as if the child is first inside, and then immediately outside, of the mother's body, whereas there is actually a point during its birth when the child is in both places at the same time. In his earlier writings, Hegel speaks of a "breaking free" that can only be interpreted as referring to birth (ETW, p. 307). As such, it lends insight into the leap of birth, for here one gets the impression that the child emerges from the mother of its own accord, much like the emergence of the male genitals. As Hegel has already claimed, the male testicles, at least, develop of their 'own account'.

Although the female is supposed to represent universality, it would seem that female universality is not itself productive of particularity, despite the fact that this was the case with Hegel's analysis of species generation as a whole. It is clear that the male organs are somehow self-developmental and that the leap of birth is, in some way, the child's own activity. With such descriptions and metaphors, the participation of the female in reproduction is rendered negligible. Passive and receptive, it is hard to see that she reproduces at all. On the contrary, she appears to be quite impotent. This, in any

event, is the only interpretation available to the following claim:

Procreation must not be reduced to the ovary and the male semen, as if the new product were merely a composition of the forms or parts of both sides; the truth is that the female contains the material element but the male contains the subjectivity. (PN, 368, 2)

Genital differences now constitute an opposition contrasting male subjectivity with female materiality, or objectivity. In the Phenomenology, subjectivity is defined as self-positing movement (PG, 22), a definition reflected in Hegel's account of the male genitals, where externality is self-developed. If the female genitals are essentially inactive and undeveloped, as Hegel maintains, then the female can have very little to offer reproductive activity, or subjectivity. The active component comes from the male and insofar as the child leaps into life from out of its mother, it acquires the ability to do so from its father. In gestation, the mother may nourish the body of the child, providing it with the material necessary for its growth and survival, but the impetus to grow, develop and emerge is a decidedly male contribution.

Certain feminists, Mary O'Brien among them, read accounts such as Hegel's as usurping the female power to create life in the act of giving birth.¹⁶ In a sense, it is a power that has been stolen from women and given to

men in compensation for the fact that they do not give birth. Obviously, both 'create' life and it is more likely that their biological contributions to its conception, anyway, are more or less the same. Yet because men do not give birth, an act in which both female and child participate to their exclusion, men seem to have included themselves in ways that appear to place them as sole creators. For whatever reason, Hegel's description is rather a switch. Female participation has been severely diminished, while that of the male is exaggerated to the point of misrepresentation. As such, it belongs to a philosophical and cultural tradition that stretches all the way back to Aristotle.¹⁷

It remains, however, that there is nothing in the genital structures of either the female or the male that implies subjectivity. To the extent that it can be said to exist at all, subjectivity is a cultural phenomenon, exhibited in the beliefs, desires, goals and actions of all individuals in community life. Neither the production of sperm nor the externality of the male organs signify subjectivity any more than they denote the principle of activity. As for the female, though often active and always material, her physical structure cannot be equated with either objectivity or passivity. It is absurd to suppose that the subjective-objective dichotomy - itself

a philosophical construction - is made manifest in genital anatomy.

Nevertheless, this is exactly what Hegel has done. From internality and externality he has deduced a fundamental opposition that simply cannot be supported by reference to physical anatomy. Otherwise convinced, he continues to derive a corresponding cultural significance from these physiological differences, the content of which we shall now examine. Insofar as his attempt to establish a natural opposition has not been successful, it is more likely the case that physical differences are culturally significant because they have really been understood according to his pre-existing cultural setting and rational framework.

The Cultural Significance of the Natural Opposition

In nature, gender differences are reproductive and anatomical ones. Female and male relate in predominately sexual ways, having to do with sexual desire, copulation and procreation. In community life, gender relations remain virtually the same. The only non-sexual relationship that Hegel acknowledges is that between sisters and brothers. Even though their relationship is not sexually based, Hegel nevertheless maintains that sisters and brothers are generic opposites. To retain opposition in gender relations that are not oriented towards reproduction is problematic, however. Because differentiation has so far been parasitic upon alterity, alienation, desire and species generation, the separation of sisters and brothers into two distinct types is not immediately rational. It is difficult to see how they reflect the moment of oppositional difference. Either some link to nature must be established or another kind of justification found.

Due to the absence of desire, Hegel concludes in the Phenomenology that a sister and brother do not depend upon each other, unlike wife and husband, and especially children and parents, for whom gender identity is supposed to be irrelevant.¹⁸ Hegel may be blind to actual instances of sibling incest, but we can at least grant that he is reporting the ideal. Sister and brother, he claims, have

"reached a state of rest and equilibrium...they are free individualities in regard to each other" (PG, 457).

Presumably, sister and sister, or brother and brother, are in a similar state, but Hegel does not entertain this possibility. The idea of a non-sexual 'sexual' relationship must have intrigued him, just as attraction between opposites probably baffled him.

Directly following these remarks, we encounter the familiar term 'consequently', in turn followed by an outline of feminine and masculine qualities, complete with the roles for which sister and brother are best suited and hence destined. In this way, generic opposition is introduced, yet Hegel's use of the derivative form is again obscure. Unless the relationship clearly entails opposition, the derivation seems easily dismissed as a non sequitur.

To avoid this conclusion, Hegel's presentation must already assume opposition. With this in mind, we can now grasp why relations between siblings of the same gender are of little interest to him. Genderically alike, they relate as individuals only. In contrast, sister and brother represent distinct individualities. Specifically, they are genderically distinct; that is, each represents a genderically one-sided individuality. At the same time, sister and brother do not desire one another and refrain from

copulation. They are united by some other means. Later in the same passage, we discover that mutual recognition is the appropriate connective. Family similarities and blood ties somehow transcend differences and the two recognize each other as essentially the same. Their relationship therefore reflects the moment of difference, although alterity, alienation and desire are absent from it.

Thus, when Hegel deduces their respective characteristics and activities as oppositional, he is already working from a previous supposition that sister and brother are substantially different. The sister, he claims, comprehends herself and the world intuitively. Her sole and proper place is the family and her sense of responsibility is directed towards family concerns. This is not due to a special link between herself and her own family. Through her very femininity, she is associated with family life in general. Her brother, on the other hand, is conscious of himself as a rational individual. A citizen of the greater community, he will leave the family to participate in public affairs. Through him and in cooperation with other men, cultural institutions are developed, the rational is made actual and the actual is known as rational (PG, 457 & 458).

The primary distinction, though, is between a sister who 'feels' and a brother who 'knows'. Such a distinction

is perilously identical to that between nature and spirit. Recalling that knowledge, or reason, is an exclusively human property, separating 'man' from the rest of the natural or animal world, it would appear that the sister is not, properly speaking, human at all. This situation should leave Hegel rather uncomfortable, especially as it affects his portrayal of human love, as we shall see in Chapter Two. It remains, however, that the characterization he gives to sisters and brothers as females and males does seem to lead to such a consequence. Indeed, the difference between the two is now so fundamental that it is difficult to see how they can exchange mutual recognition. The similarity of family membership, based upon natural blood ties, is hardly capable of overcoming what is an overwhelming opposition.

The dubious availability of mutual recognition leads us back to Hegel's main argument. If mutual recognition is exchanged, it is more likely between sister and brother as similar individuals rather than as separate and distinct individualities. Hegel himself credits recognition as "the moment of the individual self, recognizing and being recognized" (PG, 457, emphasis mine). Still, he cannot leave the notion of distinct individualities behind, for if he did it would be impossible to support the claim of oppositional types. He sneaks it into his account of the sibling

relationship and attempts to solve the problem of recognition by noting that their relationship is devoid of desire. Unfortunately, so long as differences are so basic, this solution is rather improbable. As well, it is obvious from his description that the differences have absolutely nothing to do with sexual desire. Indeed, the entire issue of desire is really a red herring. It has no significant influence upon the argument, except to draw our attention away from it.

At this point, accusations of circularity can be raised. The conclusion of opposition simply repeats an assumed premise. The distinction between femininity and masculinity is consequent upon a presupposed distinction between the (feminine) sister and the (masculine) brother. But because the oppositional content that is deduced is not readily provided for, it would be premature to rule out the possibility of a non sequitur.

If we widen the circle, though, this second difficulty can be accounted for. Turning the Phenomenology back several pages, we find that cultural life is itself separated. According to Hegel, the ethical community is "split into distinct ethical substances, into a human and a divine law" (PG, 445). These laws parallel masculinity and femininity respectively. The human is customary and known, governing the institutions and activities of the community

as a whole. Divine law is intuited and rules the family (PG, 448-450). Referring to it, Hegel contends that women are not fully self-conscious because "the law of the Family is an implicit, inner essence which is not exposed to the daylight of consciousness, but remains an inner feeling" (PG, 457). Divine law is suspiciously natural, a suspicion confirmed by Hegel's claim that the family is "a natural ethical community" (PG, 450, his emphasis). Clearly, the criteria used to distinguish divine from human law can be reduced to two: feeling and knowing. Because women 'feel' while men 'know', femininity and masculinity reflect the content of the cultural dichotomy. Apparently, Hegel does not pluck the content of the genderic opposition from nowhere.

At the same time, he must also ground the genderic opposition in the two laws. Without this grounding, its content only coincides with that of the cultural dichotomy and coincidence is not derivation. Alongside the community division, he proposes a similar split in the ethical 'self-consciousness'; that is, in human beings themselves. Self-consciousness, too, "assigns to itself according to its nature, one of these powers" (PG, 445). Translated into less obscure language, this means that human beings are either divine or human, depending upon their particular natures.

Though the non sequitur can be accounted for, Hegel's argument contains a premise that commits him to circularity. More complex than it was initially, natural gender identities are now being assumed, as well as a specific cultural significance. To suppose that sister and brother are distinct individualities - that one is feminine and the other masculine - is tautological and therefore empty unless femininity and masculinity refer to something more than mere biological gender. According to Hegel, they do - divine law is feminine and human law is masculine. He then assumes that sister and brother somehow embody the divine-human division; that in them the dichotomy has "the existence of a natural difference" (PG, 459). It is only in this way and with a foundation in nature, that sister and brother constitute distinct individualities and opposition is maintained in their relationship.

Still, Hegel is trying to prove generic opposition. At any rate, his use of the term 'consequently' suggests an argument of some kind. Since Hegel has already assumed that generic opposition is natural, his argument falls short. Even within the ethical community, opposition is naturally based. Despite Hegel's talk of the cultural division, of divine and human law, nature provides the ultimate foundation for gender differences. A definite link to nature of a quite particular kind, has been found,

kind has been found, but Hegel only assumes and does not prove it.

Because it is circular, Hegel's argument is problematic. More importantly, however, the assumptions that he makes are themselves contestable. In the first place, the divine-human dichotomy is open to dispute, along with the distinction between feeling and knowing. Carol McMillan, a contemporary feminist theorist, has challenged the oppositional relation of intuition and reason in her book Women, Reason and Nature.¹⁹ Arguing that intuition, feeling and emotion are also rational experiences, McMillan's refutation is convincing. Phenomenologically, intuition may appear to require little thought, in that comprehension seems to be immediate; but this is only because the knowledge presupposed by intuition is habitual. It is much like the application of basic arithmetic skills, which are learnt and known. Raising children, for example, is thus more a matter of trial and error, coupled with the adoption of time-honoured methods and rational rules, then it is an activity governed by 'parental instinct'.

Indeed, it is difficult to accept that divine law exclusively, or even predominantly, rules the family. The separation of the family from the rest of the community is in need of further justification, as is the divine-human

dichotomy itself. In both philosophy and popular belief, one form or other of the dichotomy has traditionally and commonsensically been taken for granted. At least to this extent, Hegel's account is empirically valid. Obviously, the distinction meets the demands of his own rational framework and dialectical reasoning, for it represents the cultural manifestation of oppositional difference. Nevertheless, Hegel must also show how it came about. Was it an historical development, is it a natural condition of human life, or is it some combination of the two? Recalling Hegel's claim that the family is natural, there is no reason to suppose that the basis of the cultural split appears any differently to him. Yet, it is probably better explained as the historical and cultural appropriation of biological reproduction. Concerning the assumption of the divine-human dichotomy, he appears to have reified or idealized a particular historical situation into universal and immutable laws.

Certainly, Hegel's position of generic opposition is not tenable. Against Hegel, the respective 'natures' of women and men are not immediately discernable. Other than the purely biological female and male, it is doubtful that there is such a thing as a natural femininity and a natural masculinity. Again, femininity and masculinity are more likely historical-cultural appropriations of the biological

female and biological male. It is especially doubtful that the cultural significance of natural differences is as Hegel has described them and unreasonable to assume that it is immediately derived from nature. In community life, femininity, masculinity and gender relations have all developed and changed over time, just as the reproductive process itself has been appropriated in various ways. If women seem to be more intuitive than rational, it is perhaps because both women and women's work, so to speak, have been misunderstood and labelled as such. Though women's activities are, or at least have been, quite different from those of men, opposition need not follow. For Hegel, however, opposition must remain the order of the day.

Because he believes that opposition is naturally grounded, Hegel's evaluation of cultural differences more often than not repeats his assessment of genital physiology. Already the language of feeling and knowing - of divine and human law - resembles his description of genital differences. Thus, the internality of the female organs can only support the inner, intuitive nature of femininity and divine law. Conversely, the emergence of male externality signifies rational, productive, human masculinity. This will become increasingly evident as we examine cultural differences in greater detail, turning to Hegel's later

Philosophy of Right as well as the earlier Phenomenology.

Although alluded to, the divine-human dichotomy is not explicitly discussed in the Philosophy of Right. Nevertheless, the cultural dichotomy is retained, along with an opposition between women and men that is virtually identical to that found in the Phenomenology. Primarily, the Phenomenology is an historical and phenomenological documentation of developing forms of consciousness, from the most simple and immediate sense perception to the very complex, reflective and integrative absolute knowing. While it is not always easy to equate a particular form with a specific historical period, Hegel's account of ethical consciousness does concern ancient Greece. In it, much of his admiration for the play Antigone comes through. It is not, however, exclusively historical. Phenomenological as well, certain aspects of it are considerably ahistorical. The relationship between sister and brother, for example, is a major feature of Antigone, but also represents an ideal that is continuous throughout history. Though the Philosophy of Right was written with Hegel's contemporary culture in mind, in the areas under investigation, there is little variation between it and the Phenomenology. In fact, the Philosophy of Right applauds Antigone as a play in which the opposing natures of women and men are presented and the two spheres of ethical life contrasted (PR,

166, 2). Bearing in mind that dissimilarities do occur, both works can still be taken as essentially the same insofar as they pertain to the question of gender and gender relations. If the idea of generic opposition is a rational one, then historical variations and textual discrepancies will not undermine its rational basis, specifically in nature and genital physiology.

Comparing cultural differences to natural genital ones, a number of twists arise. Although still derived from nature, we are now viewing gender differences and gender relations from the perspective of spirit. In Hegel's systematic structure, the ethical community represents objective spirit and the indicator of self-positing spirit is objective actuality. Consequently, the dialectical moments are evaluated according to their objectification or positive determination. The main text of objective spirit is the Philosophy of Right

In the Philosophy of Right, men are said to be "powerful and active" while women are "passive and subjective" (PR, 166). At first glance, this conflicts with the physiological subjectivity of the reproductive male noted in the Philosophy of Nature. Passivity and activity are divided the same as before, but it is now women who are subjective. Here, however, subjectivity denotes a lack of objectification. It is in keeping with Hegel's notion of

the subjective will as based upon intuitive self-awareness, containing contingent and capricious aims that are unrealized (PR, 25).²⁰ With subjectivity, spirit is implicit only. While the same is true in nature, there subjectivity also signifies potential creativity. In the community of objective spirit, this potential remains unfulfilled so long as it is merely subjective. In the Philosophy of Right, feminine subjectivity is not being opposed to material man but to the objective validation of a man's own subjective being. It is consistent with the internality of the female genitals.

In contrast, masculine goals stem from conceptual knowledge and self-consciousness. Determined by man in accordance with those of his community, they are an object of knowledge for him. Man "has his substantial life in the state, in learning...in labour" (PR, 166) - in other words, reflection and production. Hence, this knowledge is available and fulfillment achievable. Unlike women, who neither reflect nor produce, man externalizes himself.

In this way, the distinction between internality and externality continues in community life. Despite some reversal of terms, the fundamental opposition determined by nature remains. In nature, the female reproductive organs are impotent. Only the male is powerful enough to exhibit an external genital structure, indicative of self-positing

activity. In culture, this is the active force of objectification. It is an exclusively masculine property. For this reason, Hegel prohibits women from participating alongside men in certain community activities:

Women are capable of education, but they are not made for activities which demand a universal faculty such as the more advanced sciences, philosophy and certain forms of artistic production. Women may have happy ideas, taste, and elegance, but they cannot attain to the ideal. The difference between men and women is like that between animals and plants. Men correspond to animals, while women correspond to plants because their development is more placid and the principle that underlies it is the rather vague unity of feeling. When women hold the helm of government, the state is at once in jeopardy, because women regulate their actions not by the demands of universality but by arbitrary inclinations and opinions. Women are educated - who knows how? - as it were by breathing in ideas, by living rather than acquiring knowledge. The status of manhood, on the other hand, is attained only by the stress of thought and much technical exertion. (PR, 166, A)

Though one might expect Hegel to associate women with universality, clearly he does not. Biologically, the female resembles the indifferent stage of genital development and in species generation the moment of universality must surely be her's. The proximity of women to nature persists in community life, but objective spirit is rational rather than natural. The customs and institutions of

the ethical community are manifestations of spirit, of human reason and action. They are inherently rational and exist objectively for thought. In and for itself, reason is self-related and universal. Incapable of thought, nature is implicitly rational only and has the form of unrelatedness or particularity.²¹ Because female internality and feminine subjectivity evince the implicit rationality of nature, Hegel associates women with particularity. Men, on the other hand, are explicitly rational and universality is therefore masculine.

Thus, in the Philosophy of Right, Hegel assigns "the knowledge and volition of free universality" to men (PR, 166). Insofar as women are somewhat human, he concedes a "modicum of comprehension and choice to them, in "the form of concrete individuality and feeling" (PR, 166). Subjectivity and particularity therefore accompany feminine intuition. In the Phenomenology, we saw that the divine-human split entails the same distinction. Human law is customary, known and universal. Only men possess "the self-conscious power of universality" (PG, 457). Only men know what this law actually is. Women, on the other hand, do not know and cannot will the universal. Like Antigone, women are "the everlasting irony in (the life of) the community" (PG, 475).

Still, feminine particularity is ambiguous. Lacking self-consciousness, women do not know themselves as particular persons. For Hegel, self-consciousness is a public phenomenon, involving self-objectification and public recognition. Until they marry, the only recognition women receive is that bestowed upon sisters by brothers.²² Guided by love and family ties, such recognition is a private exchange intuitively grasped. Already questioned, it is hardly capable of establishing self-consciousness. Unless women leave the family to participate in public life, female self-consciousness will remain undeveloped and individual particularity unknown.

Indeed, women do not assert themselves as individuals because they are confined to the family. Although individuality originates within the family, according to Hegel, one belongs to the family "not as an individual person but as a member" (PR, 158). The individuality protected by the family has its truth in the universality of membership and to claim particularity against the family is to betray it.

Women, who never leave the family, never relate to others except as family members. A woman is always only a wife, mother, daughter or sister. She identifies with wifehood and the like in general. For her, "particularity is a matter of indifference" (PG, 457). Like all family .

relations, those of women "are based, not on feeling, but on the universal" (PG, 457). Surprisingly, this is consistent with Hegel's characterization of femininity as intuitive. Women faithfully observe family piety because they feel governed by it, even when it contravenes public law, as the story of Antigone illustrates. Unknown even to women, though, family piety has to do with the universality of family membership.

Strange as it may seem, Hegel's family is both universal and not universal. Stranger still, his presentation does not violate the law of non-contradiction. An ethical institution, the family is a community and therefore universal. Yet, once opposed to the public community, it is clearly a particular institution. As well, although implicit to the family, universality is not an object of knowledge for family members. Thus, the family is not explicitly universal and, in this sense, it is not universal but particular. To further confuse things, it is also clear that particular women feel the universality of family concerns rather than the particularity of their own individual self-interest.

The law of non-contradiction is observed because universality and particularity operate on the two levels of feeling and knowing. Intuitive and particular, women do not know that the object of feminine intuition is family

universality. For women, of course, the family is never an object of knowledge and always an object of intuition. It appears to them in the form of particularity and feeling for their own mode of apprehension is limited to this form. The distance required for reflection is gained only by separating from the family. At this point, universality is known by one who reflects not as a family member but as a reasoning human being. On the level of intuition, then, universality is not known; on the level of knowledge, it is. At the same time, because implicit universality does become explicit, the truth of the family is, as Hegel claims, the universality of family membership.

Nevertheless, this knowledge - Hegel's knowledge - is complex. Implicit even to the universality of family membership is the particularity of each individual member. Supposedly intuition of self somehow occurs within the family (the sister, for example, senses particularity from her brother); certainly, knowledge of self does not. Like universality, if particularity is to be an explicit object of knowledge, then reflective distance from the family is necessary. More importantly, this distance entails the separation of particularity from universality. Inside the family, the two moments are immediately united. So combined, their unity is abstract and internal. Each is in itself but not for itself; implicit but not explicit; sub-

jective but not objective; 'natural' rather than 'human'. For this reason, they must be externalized. Externalization, in turn, means separation from the family. This, moreover, is the accomplishment of men, who leave the family to acquire the universality of citizenship and the particularity of self-consciousness. In this way, immediate unity is broken or, as Hegel puts it, "in the husband, the two sides are separated" (PG, 457). Dialectically speaking, then, the moment of difference belongs to men while women embody the moment of undeveloped unity, a situation identical to that found in nature. The two sides are then reunited in marriage (or ethical copulation). The union of wife and husband therefore represents the unity of unity and difference.

To differentiate between the genders according to dialectical reasoning is neither an easy nor an intelligible project. Certain objections have already been raised and the division between particularity and universality can also be challenged. Given Hegel's association of femininity with nature and masculinity with human reason, the corresponding assignment of particularity and universality appears to be quite reasonable. However, it seems that the naturalness of women is due to feminine particularity and men are human because universality is a masculine trait. One cannot be used to support the other. At the same time,

Hegel finds it necessary to allow for the presence of each moment in both women and men. Though he may not find this much of a problem, it does diminish the rationality of genderic opposition.

Even if one accepts that women are non-rational, intuitive, subjective and capricious, particularity does not obviously follow. So far, Hegel has only established that whatever femininity is, it is not objective. Intent on marriage, motherhood and competently fulfilling any related duties with no self-concern, a woman's job description does not easily allow for particularity. Yet, because of her character, universality equally escapes her. Somehow, Hegel decides that she is both, albeit only implicitly. Particularity and universality are to be immediately united in women, as they are in the family. To then turn and claim femininity as either one or the other, as Hegel does, is pure arbitrariness. A woman may as well be associated with neither.

The charge of arbitrariness likewise applies to Hegel's characterization of masculinity, with the added advantage that men have it both ways. Men externalize themselves, represent the moment of difference and enjoy the privileged status of knowing that they are particular persons belonging to the universal public community. Implicitly and explicitly, men are rational. While this

might enable Hegel to assign universality to masculinity, it is also true that men are self-conscious, autonomous, particular individuals. Clearly, men have it both ways. For this reason, however, the association of universality with masculinity is unacceptable.

Indeed, if universality and particularity belong to women as well as to men, we must ask Hegel why women cannot leave the family along with men. Apparently, Hegel believes that they are best suited for family life and ill suited for public pursuits. Surely, this is not because women have traditionally been so confined. Even Hegel seeks a more adequate source of justification, finding it in the so-called feminine character. Unfortunately, we have just seen that there is something askew in his presentation of that character. He has given us no reason to agree that women are incapable of self-consciousness, externalization and rational knowledge; he has only reported a number of cultural prejudices.

Ultimately, of course, Hegel's only available justification is nature. Somehow, the limitations of femininity have to do with the internality of the female reproductive organs. Masculinity, in turn, is founded upon the male testicles and penis! The cultural significance of physical differences is immediately consequent upon genital ones. This, however, is patently absurd. In the first place,

human existence is never immediately derivable from nature, no matter how it might appear to Hegel. Though his project might be classified along the lines of sociobiology, his portrayal of gender differences reads like a very crude biological reductionism. As well, Hegel's evaluation of genital differences contains enormous difficulties, as we have already seen. Concerning his own rational framework, perhaps he cannot be accused of infidelity. Nevertheless, he has established no acceptable explanation for what remains an irrational prejudice.

In spite of these problems, Hegel's assumption of opposition difference has forced him to make the claims that he does make. Having assumed the rationality of opposition in general and of generic opposition in particular, he sets out to prove it. Indeed, he interprets biological processes according to his assumption. It is in this way that he finds much in nature and in ethical life to support his claims. In the end, however, he proves nothing, as his evidence reflects his assumptions and little else. He has now before him the most difficult task of reconciliation.

CHAPTER TWO: OVERCOMING OPPOSITION THROUGH LOVE, MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY

Introduction

According to Hegel, women and men are united through marriage and family ties, initially as wife and husband and eventually as the parents of the same children. Interestingly enough, the sibling relationship does not count as a further source of reconciliation. Although sister and brother are genderically distinct, they already belong to the same family. They neither can nor need to unite with one another. Due to its consanguineous nature and corresponding lack of sexual desire, their relationship is one in which the experience of alienation and the need to overcome separation are absent. For Hegel, of course, the alienation inherent to generic opposition is always experienced as sexual desire, elevated in ethical life to the feeling of love. The frustration arising from unequal gender relations and the non-sexual aspects of opposition are left unconsidered.

To some extent, Hegel's choice of the family can be explained empirically. During his time, the family was more or less the sole area of community life in which women and men actually did come into contact with each other. The choice seems obvious, but Hegel did not turn to the family simply for empirical reasons. Like gender differences, the family has its roots in the natural reproductive process. The rational basis of unity is the same as the

rational basis of difference.

At first glance, the location of unity as a family accomplishment appears to be perfectly reasonable. It is certainly consistent with Hegel's own understanding of gender and gender relations. However, when we recall his identification of women with the family, the achievement of unity becomes problematic. The restriction of women to the family entails their separation from men and the economic-political world of masculine pursuits. Culturally, the reproductive dichotomy is expressed in a fundamental community division, yet reconciliation is supposed to occur in only one area of community life. While this might be the one area in which both women and men participate, it is also the only area in which women can participate. Consequently, Hegel's account has women and men united by way of an institution that simultaneously ensures the separation of women from men. Although we may well wonder if this makes any sense at all, the opposition must be overcome within the family, no matter how difficult or improbable the task might seem. To be achieved by any other means, reconciliation would involve removing the family restriction from women, thus rendering the 'natural' opposition culturally meaningless.

Viewed from the perspective of gender relations, Hegel's concept of marriage and the family can be compre-

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Viewed from the perspective of gender relations, Hegel's concept of marriage and the family can be compre-

hended as a process of reconciliation that begins with sexual love and is completed by parenthood. Once this process is examined in detail, it will appear that each stage is presented as if it were equally and identically applicable to both women and men. Insofar as the experience of love, the commitment of marriage, the significance of procreation and even the common ownership of property are all described in the language of universality, much of Hegel's analysis seems to be genderically neutral. Either the constraints of differentiation are thought to be irrelevant or else they are conveniently forgotten. At any rate, they are not explicitly taken into consideration by Hegel himself, something that must be done if the question concerning genderic dualism is to be settled.

A critical evaluation of Hegel's account of marriage and the family from the perspective of gender differences is therefore requisite. The very success of Hegel's approach to reconciliation is incumbent upon the universal applicability of his account. In other words, there can be nothing about the nature of women or men that prevents either from fully participating in each stage of the familial process. If there is, reconciliation will not be successful and dualism will be the result.

In the end, we will find that the significance of gender differences can only be acknowledged at the cost of equal applicability. Although Hegel's position may appear to be genderically neutral, his previous oppositional depiction of differences indicates otherwise. Indeed, the major difficulty has to do with his identification of women with the family, a difficulty that will prove to be insurmountable. Marriage and family relations do not mean the same thing for women as they do for men. Moreover, the actual process of reconciliation need not even be examined to discover that this is so. It is already anticipated by Hegel's contention in the Philosophy of Right that marriage is an "ethical duty" (PR, 162, Z). According to Hegel, one is obliged to marry and, presumably, to procreate. This is not a moral obligation as such, but a community duty, based upon the fact that marriage and family life are important and necessary elements of the community as a whole. Hence, a person who remains unmarried and childless fails to meet one of the essential conditions of full community membership.

In one sense, the duty to marry does seem to be genderically neutral. Certainly, the obligation would be nonsensical if it did not apply to both women and men. Yet the grounds for declaring marriage an ethical duty extend beyond considerations of community membership. In the

Philosophy of Right, Hegel introduces the topic of marriage by noting its foundation in natural sexual union or "the moment of physical life" (PR, 161). Quite literally, marriage is copulation made ethical and family procreation legitimate reproduction. The duty to marry is as much a negative restraint against unethical sexual relations as it is a positive commandment in favour of full community involvement. In keeping with his Lutheran background, Hegel is mainly countering the notion of priestly or platonic love by making marriage compulsory. The state of celibacy, he maintains, "characterizes the moment of physical love as purely negative and...precisely by thus separating the physical from the mental, endows the former by itself with infinite importance" (PR, 163, 2). It is only within marriage that physical passion is spiritualized and spiritual love gains concrete expression.

Again, Hegel's position appears to be genderically neutral, but with differentiation a double standard is evident. In the first place, the attack on priestly love has not the same significance for women as it has for men. Despite the celibacy of Catholic nuns, the argument primarily pertains to the religious vocation of men. The contrast is between Catholic priests who do not marry and those Protestant ministers who are encouraged to marry. In Hegel's time, neither Catholic priests nor Protestant

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ministers were ever women. Generally, the issue of celibacy is irrelevant to the condition of women. Catholic sisterhood notwithstanding, the only vocation Hegel allows for women is that of marriage and family life. Hence, there can be no question as to whether or not particular women should marry, although there was a question regarding the marriage of men.

Turning to sexual relations themselves, we find that the double standard is even more pronounced. To the extent that the duty to marry represents the duty to refrain from unethical copulation, Hegel himself admits that it is far more important for women to abide by this rule than it is for men. Once more, the difference is due to the complete restriction of women to the family:

It must be noticed that in connexion with sex-relations that a girl in surrendering her body loses her honour. With a man, however, the case is otherwise, because he has a field for ethical activity outside the family. A girl is destined in essence for the marriage tie and for that only; it is therefore demanded of her that her love shall take the form of marriage and that the different moments in love shall attain their true rational relation to each other. (PR, 164, A)

If marriage is an ethical duty, as Hegel suggests, a distinction can be made between a woman's duty to marry and a man's duty to marry. Despite appearances to the contrary, the obligation is not genderically neutral. For men, marriage and family life are necessary to complete membership in the community as a whole. Because women are restricted to the family, they do not really belong to the community as a whole. Marriage and the family are actually the sole conditions of feminine 'membership' and are hardly necessary to complete it.

However, this distinction alone cannot commit Hegel to a position of dualism, though it does indicate the kind of problems that his approach to unity will encounter. In a sense, the duty to marry is external to the family as such and need not effect the actual process of reconciliation. The question, of course, is whether or not generic opposition can be overcome within marriage and the family.

Like any other reconciliation process Hegel describes, the key element in marriage and family relations is the moment of recognition. As lovers, spouses and parents, the unification of women and men entails a mutual exchange of recognition. Moreover, Hegel conceives of the family as having a dialectical structure, one that is similar to the structure of the master-slave section of the Phenomenology. Alexandre Kojève, whose interpretation of the Phenomenology

is primarily based upon the master-slave section, sometimes refers to that section as the human dialectic, allowing that gender relations can constitute a phenomenological description of it. According to Kojève, the desire for recognition is common to both relationships.¹

Like the master-slave struggle, love begins with a single individual, whose separation from the loved one is experienced as separation from and desire for the other. As the reciprocal declaration of love and the satisfaction of desire, marriage corresponds to the intersubjective unity that completes the master-slave relationship. Love is a form of recognition that is itself recognized in the commitment of marriage. With the birth of the child, the parents' love is objectively validated. Analogous to the worker who recognizes her/himself in the product of her or his labour, parents recognize themselves in the product of their union.

But while the two processes share a common structure, they are not identical. Since there is no risk of life in the struggle to love and reproduce (at least, according to Kojève's interpretation), Kojève concludes that the gender relationship is quite different from the master-slave relationship. He does not seem to believe that the former involves much of a struggle at all, in direct contrast to the latter, which demonstrates that a struggle-to-the-death

with its attendant risk of life is a necessary condition of independence. As well, Kojève does not seem to regard reproduction as at all creative, in contrast to the worker's productive labour.²

For this reason, Kojève would probably disagree with Simone de Beauvoir's assertion that certain "passages in the argument employed by Hegel in defining the relation of master to slave apply much better to the relation of man to woman."³ De Beauvoir compares the dependent, non-spiritual existence of slavery to the situation of women and the independent, spiritual master to men. In some respects, her point regarding the respective situations of women and men might be well taken, but the comparison as a whole is not. Mastery and slavery develop from out of a particular kind of struggle that, according to Kojève and Hegel, is absent in the so-called 'battle of the sexes'. Utilizing Goethe, Kojève invites us to "remember that there have never been duels between a man and an animal - or a woman."⁴ (I trust the analogy between women and animals is nothing more than a bad sense of humour.) Given the high incidences of domestic violence, documented throughout history and which surely concern questions of individual liberty, dignity and honour, Kojève's claim is somewhat inaccurate. Nevertheless, his main argument, contrary to de Beauvoir's appropriation of Hegel, still stands.

Implied in Kojève's analysis, the claim against de Beauvoir's interpretation is explicit in accounts given by Mary O'Brien and Patricia Jagentowicz Mills. In O'Brien's words, "Hegel's scenario remains a recognition and a struggle for recognition between two adult males."⁵ Mills agrees that the master-slave relationship necessarily excludes women.⁶ O'Brien explains why:

Women cannot be either masters or slaves because, in the first instance they do not have a contradiction between themselves and nature to negate and, in the second instance, they cannot 'risk life' because, as helpless and compulsory bearers of children, they are the amoral principle of life itself.
(7)

De Beauvoir's interpretation is not acceptable but, interestingly enough, her own words already reflect the charges levied against her. As such, they actually contradict the conclusion she wishes to draw:

The advantage of the master...comes from his affirmation of Spirit as against Life through the fact that he risks his own life; but in fact the conquered slave has known this same risk. Whereas woman is basically an existent who gives life and does not risk her life; between her and the male there has been no combat. Hegel's definition (of the slave) seems to apply especially well to her. (8)

Actually, the point of all this is connected with the issue of generic neutrality. Both Mills and O'Brien maintain that the mutual recognition found in the Phenomenology is not generically neutral but generically exclusive. Whether or not the struggle-to-the-death really does occur as Hegel describes it, it clearly takes place outside the family and between men. As Mills contends, 'the Phenomenology has to do with a male world and male experiences: "The progressive movement of Spirit towards universal self-consciousness which Hegel details in the Phenomenology is never recapitulated in women."⁹ Of the extremely miniscule number of male commentators who do discuss gender relations and who do not parrot Hegel's observations, there is one who agrees with Mills and O'Brien. According to Robert Solomon, the Phenomenology is "admittedly a male odyssey."¹⁰

If the mutual recognition of the Phenomenology is not generically neutral, then what about the recognition exchanged between women and men in marriage and family relations? In other words, does the gender bias indicated in the Phenomenology extend well beyond the master-slave struggle to include the relationship between women and men? If it does, then opposition is not overcome and dualism, rather than reconciliation, will be the result. This is what we must now determine.

The Recognition of Love and Marriage

In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel states that love "is mind's feeling of its own unity" (PR, 158). While this definition points toward the kind of reconciliation that women and men will achieve, even without considering gender differences, Hegel's concept of love is somewhat ambiguous. In the first place, the statement itself requires further clarification. As a feeling, love is in some sense a natural phenomenon. It is, perhaps, best contrasted with self-consciousness, which is mind's (or spirit's) knowledge of its own unity, knowledge that is not natural but human. The unity of love implies that there are two sides to love, the subjective and the objective, or the lover and the loved one. Since these sides are united, each is simultaneously the other: the lover is loved in turn and the loved one is also the lover.

But this natural phenomenon also has a third aspect to it. Because the feeling of love belongs to spirit and is shared by human beings, it is not, strictly speaking, a natural phenomenon. A human feeling, love is natural insofar as it is a feeling. There is no love in the animal kingdom and the love between women and men is to be distinguished from the rituals of animal mating. For Hegel, love is both natural and ethical. Though love has roots in "the moment of physical life" (PR, 161), a moment common to all sexually reproducing species, the

feeling of unity is not to be equated with the 'feeling of universality' that accompanies copulation. Instead, Hegel claims that "in self-consciousness, the natural sexual union...is changed into a union on the level of mind, into self-conscious love" (PR, 161). This change is intrinsic to the concept of love itself. Without the aspect of self-consciousness, spirituality would be missing and love would not be love.

The ambiguity of Hegel's definition rests in the fact that self-consciousness is not something felt but something known. This is explicitly laid out in the Phenomenology.¹¹ Although Hegel grants that one may have a 'feeling of self', self-consciousness is really the knowledge of self. Yet, despite his own reference to self-conscious love, Hegel still claims that love is a feeling. As we shall later see, this ambiguity becomes especially interesting in light of Hegel's own depiction of gender differences. But it is still strange, regardless of these differences. Is it not possible to know what love is and, more importantly, to know that one loves and is loved? Considering that Hegel himself has conceptualized love, he cannot agree that it is impossible to know what love is. Perhaps knowing that one loves and is loved is not the same as feeling love. On the other hand, this may be a false distinction. If love involves both feeling and knowing, then one ought

not to define it as one or the other.

However, we can see why Hegel did this. Certainly, love is not the knowledge of unity, for that is what self-consciousness is. Self-consciousness may be part of love, but it is not the same as love. Since love is in some sense conditioned by natural sexual desire and union, each of which are indisputable feelings for Hegel, defining love as natural feeling may be due to its close association with these purely 'animal' elements. Still, love is not an animal feeling, nor is it solely natural.

Another constraint effecting Hegel's definition is his location of love as family feeling. According to Hegel, feeling, naturality and immediacy are all connected and together typify both the family and love. The family, as we know, is the immediate unity of universality and particularity. It is natural because unity is immediate and, presumably, because there is no risk of life involved in it. Knowledge presupposes the separation of universality from particularity. Hence, family unity is felt but not known. The feeling appropriate to family membership is love as the feeling of unity. This characterization, however, only shows that love and family unity are linked. It already assumes that love is a feeling and is hardly capable of explaining why it is only a feeling.

Hegel's definition of love must be based upon the kind of unity that he believes love is. In keeping with the immediacy of family unity, the lovers' union precludes any distinction between universality and particularity. Just as independent personhood, or 'personality', has no place in family membership, so do the lovers forego their own independence once they declare their love and commit themselves in marriage. They "make themselves one person" (PR, 162). This thought is also expressed in Hegel's earlier work, suggesting a continuity between the 'young Hegel' and the older thinker:

What in the first instance is most the individual's own is united into the whole in the lovers' touch and contact; consciousness of a separate self disappears, and all distinction between the lovers is annulled. (ETW, p. 307)

In the Early Theological Writings, Hegel claims that love is able to transcend even mortality (ETW, pp. 306-307). Though death will eventually disjoin the lovers and the certainty of future separation is recalled in their respective bodies, permanent unity or immortal love, is spiritually achieved. Love seeks to unite spirit with body. To the extent that the body does threaten the spiritual union, an act of infidelity would destroy love. Sexual relations with someone other than one's lover is the assertion of one's independence from the loved one. It

would separate the universal from the particular, thus contradicting the essence of the loving union. For this reason, the unity of love demands monogamy. All this is present in the Early Theological Writings and the necessity of monogamous marriage is also affirmed in the Philosophy of Right.

Immediacy means that unity does not require mediation. Differentiation is either absent or irrelevant; that is, there are no separate sides that remain distinct while mediating each other. Although Hegel's concept of love entails a process of reconciliation, difference is cancelled once reconciliation is realized.

Beginning with sexual desire and ending in marriage, the process of love is dialectically structured. As might be expected, the self-conscious aspect of love signifies a form of recognition. By the time Hegel wrote the Philosophy of Right, he had already established self-conscious love as that distinguishing human relations from animal mating. His presentation is therefore confined to the process of self-conscious love, taking for granted that this kind of recognition is an obvious condition of human love.

But Hegel did not always apprehend love in this way. One of his major difficulties has to do with his conception of love as natural feeling. In the Early Theological

Writings, for example, love is only described as a feeling of unity. Introducing Hegel's later System of Ethical Life, H.S. Harris observes that the love of the earlier work is held to be "an incomprehensible miracle".¹² In the Early Theological Writings, love eludes reason and understanding, transcending reflection altogether (ETW, pp. 304-305). Concerning the development of Hegel's thought, Harris remarks on the concept of love as it appears in the System of Ethical Life:

For six or seven years before he wrote this thesis Hegel had been pondering about the feeling that arises in sexual coupling...In the coupling of an animal pair the unity of the species exists as a feeling but there is no mutual recognition at the conceptual level. The recognition that each partner, regardless of the sex difference, is a rational human individual, is the distinctive human relation that is achieved between man and wife...It is only natural desire that is incomprehensible, because it is below the level of reflective consciousness altogether.

(13)

While this comment does capture the necessary conditions of love, it also overlooks some of the problems that lie beneath Hegel's analysis, problems that can be found throughout his work. In particular, Harris assumes love to

be a genderically neutral experience and that unity demands genderic equality and mutual recognition. These are features that must be available if Hegel's concept of love is to make any sense at all. As we shall soon see, however, they are not available. Harris notwithstanding, gender differences cannot be disregarded.

Moreover, Harris's remarks actually find greater textual support in the First Philosophy of Spirit than in the System of Ethical Life. In the chronology of Hegel's work, the First Philosophy of Spirit immediately follows the System of Ethical Life. Both are really unpublished lecture notes, translated and edited by Harris and Knox into textual form.¹⁴

In the earlier work, Hegel seems to take natural desire and love to be the same. At least in nature, female and male are not equal and though united in love, they love "as strangers". Love is the "inconceivability of this being of oneself in another", a description not unlike the incomprehensibility of the Early Theological Writings. A relation of inequality, love is also "desire in which one side is determined as something subjective and the other as something objective"; it belongs solely to nature and not to ethical life (SEL, p. 110). Only in marriage, as part of the ethical-natural family, do gender relations involve

"no antithesis of person to person or of subject to object" (SEL, p. 127). Either Hegel is identifying love with natural sexual desire, or else he is distinguishing between two kinds of love, ethical (married) and natural (sexual). He must be doing something like the latter for Harris's interpretation to be at all valid, yet he does not explicitly claim love for marriage. Instead, love seems only natural, still incomprehensible and without recognition or acknowledged equality.

On the other hand, the First Philosophy of Spirit does claim generic equality. Though not obviously grounded in self-conscious recognition, love at least entails the "conscious intuition" (FPS, 231) of each lover in the consciousness of the other. It has been raised above purely natural feeling or, to put it differently, love is half-way between natural feeling and recognition proper (i.e., as in the Phenomenology). It will retain that rather awkward position throughout the rest of Hegel's work.

The First Philosophy of Spirit is a horrendously fragmented manuscript, but the main thrust appears to concern a dialectical change in desire itself. This change occurs in the consciousness of desire and is possible because desire is consciously apprehended as well as felt. It originates from within natural desire, when consciousness frees desire

from natural constraints by imposing restrictions upon copulation. Objectively, this is the restriction of monogamous marriage. As the enduring subjectivity of the individual, consciousness seeks a satisfaction more permanent than the singularity of copulation. This is the desire of love, the desire to find oneself in the whole being of the other. Sexual desire ignores the conscious being of the other; it regards the loved one as an object only, something ultimately unsatisfying because the lover is a subject. With love, Hegel tells us, "the woman comes to be a being on her own account for the man. She ceases to be (simply) an object of his desire", (FPS, p. 231).¹⁵

Whether Harris's interpretation more adequately reflects the First Philosophy of Spirit or the System of Ethical Life, it does anticipate the Philosophy of Right. To a large extent, the two earlier texts lay the foundation for the latter work. According to Harris and Knox, they constitute Hegel's "mature social thought in embryonic form."¹⁶ As well, they point towards a certain continuity that persists throughout Hegel's work. In this way, Harris's observation, quoted above, represents Hegel's definitive statement on matters of love and marriage.

The idea that equality is essential to love is emphasized from the Early Theological Writings to the

Philosophy of Right. In the Early Theological Writings, Hegel insists that true love "exists only between beings who are alike in power and thus in one another's eyes living beings from every point of view; in no respect is either dead for the other" (ETW, p. 304). This means that neither is to be regarded as a mere body or object and is translated in the First Philosophy of Spirit (and, less obviously, in the System of Ethical Life) into the view that lovers intuit each other as conscious, subjective beings and not as means to the end of sexual gratification. By the time Hegel wrote the Philosophy of Right, both of these previous attempts to define or describe love had been taken up into the notion of self-conscious love. Clearly, Hegel always maintained that perceiving the loved one as somehow equal to oneself is a necessary condition of the experience of love and a key element in the declaration of love and the commitment of marriage. However, given Hegel's previous characterization of gender differences, one cannot help but wonder if equality really is present in his own account of love and marriage and whether or not generic recognition can actually be exchanged.

Already indicated in Hegel's other works, the dialectical structure of love as a process of reconciliation is most evident in the Philosophy of Right. Moreover,

while Harris contends that love is no longer incomprehensible as early as the System of Ethical Life, we have already noted the ambiguity of Hegel's definition in the Philosophy of Right. Though rightfully acknowledged as a leading Hegel scholar, perhaps Harris is simply too lenient when it comes to criticising Hegel. Once again, the ambiguity of love is due to the type of unity that love is. Demanding the surrender of independence, the experience of love contradicts the experience of self-conscious individuality, at least initially:

Love means in general terms the consciousness of my unity with another, so that I am not in selfish isolation but win my self-consciousness only as the renunciation of my independence and through knowing myself as the unity of myself with another and of the other with me. Love, however, is feeling, i.e. ethical life in the form of something natural...The first moment in love is that I do not wish to be a self-subsistent and independent person and that, if I were, then I would feel defective and incomplete. The second moment is that I find myself in another person, that I count for something in the other, while the other in turn comes to count for something in me. Love, therefore, is the most tremendous contradiction; the Understanding cannot resolve it since there is nothing more stubborn than this point...of self-consciousness which is negated and which nevertheless I ought to possess as affirmative. Love is at once the propounding and the resolving of this contradiction. As the resolving of it, love is unity of an ethical type. (PR, 158, A)

As opposed to Hegelian reason, which reveals the unity of contradictory positions, the 'understanding' cannot see beyond contradiction. It is in this sense that love cannot be understood, either in the Early Theological Writings or the Philosophy of Right. Nonetheless, love can be rationally presented in the latter. As Knox explains, Hegel believes that love "is reason in its immediacy, i.e., an immature form of reason...(because) family members are not conscious that their unity is a unity of differences."¹⁷ This clarifies why love is natural, on the one hand, and can also be conceptualized, on the other. Still, it is hard to see how the lovers might share Hegel's comprehension of what love actually is. Although Hegel refers to the 'knowing' of oneself as united with the loved one, he quickly qualifies this by stating that 'love, however, is feeling'. Perhaps the self-conscious aspect of love immediately unites even feeling and knowing in the one experience. While this might be a reasonable account of the experience, it is highly improbable that it is Hegel's, since knowledge requires mediation and is not an immediate phenomenon.

From the perspective of gender differences, this ambiguity is especially interesting. Recalling that women 'feel' while men 'know', it may signify a 'slip' of generic opposition and a corresponding lack of generic

neutrality. If anyone is at all capable of 'knowing' love, it would have to be the male lover. Indeed, Hegel's own depiction of gender differences demonstrates that 'equality at the conceptual level', in Harris' words, is absent in gender relations. Further, Hegel's position cannot be bolstered by appending a 'different but equal' clause to it. Women and men are not only different, they are rational opposites. They are not, therefore, rational equals.

According to Hegel's description, the experience of love is dialectically structured. The first moment he mentions is the state of being in love, the second is that of recognition and the reconciliatory union of love. However, a third moment is also implied. Because love is dialectically structured, it should really be understood in terms of an original self-identical unity, the juxtaposition of unity with difference and the final return to unity in which the two previous stages are combined. In this way, the experience presupposes the lover as initially an independent person. Since independence denotes separation from the loved one, the desire of love is the desire not to be independent. Without the first moment of independent personhood, the entire process would be unfounded and meaningless.

The problem, of course, is that women are not independent. Independence, which entails the objectification of

oneself as a particular person, is always only achieved outside the family. Confined to the family, a woman's individuality is such that she is never a particular person, but only a family member.

The radical discrepancy in the feminine and masculine characters must have some influence upon the state of being in love itself. Yet because Hegel does not take gender differences into account, one can only speculate as to what the experiential differences might be. In ethical life, the state of being in love is the spiritualization of sexual desire; the desire to be recognized and loved in turn. What, exactly is the content of this desire? What does it mean to want to be recognized and loved by the person one loves? Is love simply the attraction of opposites and the wish to unite with one's complementary 'other half'? Can women even feel that they are incomplete, given that universality and particularity are forever and immediately united in them? It would seem that outside of satisfying the sexual and procreative urge, the differences between women and men suggest that there can be little else to bring them together.

Couples probably 'fall in love' for a variety of reasons. They likely 'feel' a sexual attraction, whatever that really is. Often, they come from similar socio-economic and religious backgrounds. They may share common

interests, occupations and viewpoints. One or the other or both may be drawn to financial security, wit, intelligence, sophistication, dependability, vulnerability, social connections, buffoonery and so on. The possibilities are endless and inter-genderic. Partly due to the conventions of Hegel's time, but mainly due to his own rational framework, possibilities other than sexual attraction and procreative tendencies (whether natural or ethical) seem to escape him. Attraction is explained by separation and the desire to overcome it. In the end, one gets the impression that men are seeking a means for securing permanent sexual gratification, a mother for their children, perhaps a 'helpmate' and family ties that they themselves will generate. As for women, it would seem that they are simply seeking to fulfill their destiny. Quite literally, Hegel's lovers can love only as strangers, for they do not appear to love as friends, partners and equal individuals.¹⁸

However experienced, the state of being in love is followed by the union of love. At this point, independence is surrendered and love declared. The couple marry. Upon marriage, their unity is grounded as immediate. No longer conscious of separation-difference, they feel only this unity. Marriage, then, is the identification of wife and husband, of universality and particularity and of unity and

difference. It is the moment of recognition and reconciliation.

To the extent that marriage does involve recognition and reciprocated love, its immediacy is as ambiguous as its 'consciously felt' apprehension. The dialectical process of love and marriage indicates that mediation of one form or another occurs. Marriage does not establish unity by some kind of ritual 'coup'. Even Hegel acknowledges this, at least up to a point. Unity requires an act of commitment and the mutual exchange of love, trust and support. Nevertheless, Hegel believes, these mediating acts have the effect of cancelling difference rather than retaining it. Wife and husband are not so much related as they are identified as one person.

It is for this reason that marriage is not a contract. Rather, it "is precisely a contract to transcend the standpoint of contract, the standpoint from which persons are regarded in their individuality as self-subsistent units" (PR, 163, 2). As well, identification with each other is something women and men freely choose, presumably because they are in love, though even arranged marriages may also contain the element of choice:

On the subjective side, marriage may have a more obvious source in the particular inclination of the two persons who are entering upon the marriage tie,

or in the foresight and contrivance of the parents, and so forth. But its objective source lies in the free consent of the persons involved, especially in their consent to make themselves one person, to renounce their natural and individual personality to this unity of one with the other. From this point of view, their union is a self-restriction, but in fact it is their liberation, because in it they attain their substantive self-consciousness. (PR, 162)

The primary object of choice, then, is marriage itself. That a woman and man choose to marry each other is of secondary importance. Granting that particular inclination is consistent with the principle of subjective freedom that pervades modern society, Hegel admits that it is generally preferred over arranged marriages.¹⁹ So long as "the decision to marry comes first and the inclination to do so follows", particular inclination, like parental arrangement, is "an ethical way to matrimony" (PR, 162, 2).

It is difficult to see, though, how decision could precede inclination when young people choose to marry. Why on earth would they decide upon marriage if they were not already inclined towards each other? Indeed, Hegel himself seems to favour parental arrangement over inclination because the parental decision (which is, supposedly, shared by the children) is less likely to stem from contingent

considerations such as passion and, perhaps, particular inclination itself. At the same time, he also hopes to rescue his position from the threat of dualism by insisting that "in the actual wedding both decision and inclination coalesce" (PR, 162, 2). In other words, Hegel does not want ethical duty to conflict with freedom or free choice itself to be mistaken for capricious whim.²⁰

Prior to marriage, the self-consciousness of a single unwed person is one of independent individuality or personality. Upon marriage, singular self-consciousness is surrendered to the union. What one gains from the union is a more complete consciousness of self that both reflects and is reflected in the self-consciousness of the other. Both wife and husband think of themselves in terms of their union and therefore in terms of each other. Within marriage, then, individual self-consciousness is substantiated because it is united with that of the other person. This is what Hegel means when he claims that marriage is a liberation. As has previously been noted, a necessary condition of such substantiation is the previous independent personality of each spouse:

...it is personality - immediate exclusive individuality - which enters into this tie and surrenders itself to it...Personality attains its right of being conscious of itself in another only in so far as the other is in this identical relationship as a person. (PR, 167)

In this way, wife and husband are joined and become one. Yet, the opposition between women and men is not due to their being independent persons but to the radical differences in the feminine and masculine natures. In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel provides no insight into how oppositional gender characteristics themselves might be reconciled. In fact, he leaves the question as to whether or not they even need be unanswered, perhaps because his analysis begins from the position of generic neutrality. Surely, however, this position contradicts his previous characterization of women and men. If the issue of generic dualism is to be settled, feminine and masculine traits must be accounted for as not only oppositional but also as unifiable.

The one place where Hegel does outline the relationship between women and men as a relation between two distinct genders is in the Phenomenology. Again, he stresses that "the relationship of husband and wife is in the first place the one in which one consciousness immediately recognizes itself in another, and in which there is knowledge of this mutual recognition" (PG, 456). Given that Hegel portrays women as not capable of knowledge in the Phenomenology, his observation is open to the charge of one-sided male bias, as it is in the Philosophy of Right. The same ambiguity of intuition versus knowledge is also present.

1

In the Phenomenology, the relationship between women and men manifests the relationship between divine and human law. As we already know, these two laws have quite specific gender associations. The former is feminine and embodied in women; the latter is masculine and embodied in men. Through women and men, divine and human law "come into direct contact with each other as real opposites" and are also united according to some kind of "immediate interpenetration" (PG, 463). Hegel describes this unity in detail:

The one extreme, the universal self-conscious Spirit, becomes, through the individuality of the man, united with its other extreme, its force and element, with unconscious Spirit (woman) ...The union of man and woman constitutes the active middle term of the whole...and unites into one process the opposite movements: one from actuality down to unreality, the downward movement of human law, organized into independent members, to the danger and trial of death; and the other, the upward movement of the law of the nether world to the actuality of the light of day and to conscious existence. Of these movements, the former falls to man, the latter to women. (PG, 463)

Though gender relations are taken into account, unity is not so much based upon mutual recognition as the sexual metaphor of 'interpenetration'. (The 'missionary position' comes to mind!) Indeed, unity as a whole appears one-sided

and unequal, since one cannot be absolutely certain if women themselves reach conscious existence or if it is simply divine law that finds light of day. If women do achieve this status, it is only vicariously, through men. In the final analysis, Hegel does not provide enough information on how unity actually occurs to convince us that it really does or can. The opposite movements of 'interpenetration' may be a metaphorically interesting description of genderic unity, but what, exactly, does it signify?

In a Marxist-oriented critique of Hegel's concept of marriage and the family, Carol C. Gould accuses Hegel of mystifying both women and the family, claiming that Hegel understands women as creatures "not of discourse but of intercourse."²¹ In other words, men do not engage in conversation with women, they have sexual relations with them. Though Gould's criticism is directed to the Philosophy of Right, her remark may also apply to the Phenomenology. According to Gould, Hegel's family in the Philosophy of Right is an ideal based upon the 'religion' of love and privacy. Hegel intends love and privacy to unite family members into one ethical unity. Yet, Gould believes, love and privacy actually conceal inequality and the exploitation of women by men within the family. They also mystify the fact that the family primarily serves a

public function - the socialization of children into future workers and/or housewives. Gould condemns Hegel for placing the family "outside the domain of right" and for refusing to accept marriage as a contract.²² Unfortunately, Gould replies, this means that women have no legal rights at all, at least as long as they remain married:

Hegel's romantic claim here - that the family is outside the domain of right - can only be understood as reflecting the patriarchal character of the German family. On this view, the so-called immediacy of the family reduces to the claim that Papa was boss. That it is in the civil realm amounts to saying that nobody has any business telling the man not to rule his wife. (23)

Several of Gould's criticisms are repeated by Joan B. Landes in her article "Hegel's Conception of the Family". Though Landes does not dismiss Hegel altogether and accepts his argument against contractual marriage, she does stress that women are inferior and incomplete individuals in Hegel's analysis. Landes agrees that marriage relations are not equal, observes that the man dominates and claims that a woman's "sexuality is appropriated by the male in marriage."²⁴ She then submits that Hegel's position on women is contradictory. On the one hand, a woman is inferior and incomplete; on the other, she "is an indivi-

dual subject who possesses rights and transcends the standpoint of formal personality when she recognizes and is recognized by another individual within the love union."²⁵ From this Landes concludes that Hegelian marriage "is marred by the subordinate status and incomplete individuality of the woman."²⁶

But is Hegel's account only marred or does it much more seriously fail to achieve any kind of unity at all? As we have already seen, Hegel's concept of love and marriage depends upon the equality of women and men, an equality that has been challenged as simply not present. Surely the identification of wife and husband as one person does not mean that this one person is to be the husband with the wife subordinate to him. Indeed, Hegel regards it as the union of two people. To recognize each other in love means that wife and husband must respect each other as self-conscious individuals. From the point of view of a professed generic neutrality, this is all fine and good, but once gender differences are considered it will not work.

In the master-slave section of the Phenomenology, equality is a necessary condition of recognition, self-consciousness and independence. Just as the slave recognizes the master as an independent, self-conscious individual, so must the master recognize the slave in

exactly the same way. If this mutual exchange is absent, their relationship is not one of "recognition proper" but "a recognition that is one-sided and unequal" (PG, 191). For Hegel, a one-sided relationship has always the irony of establishing the opposite of what it intends. The lesson of master-slave inequality is a fundamental lack of independence, even on the part of the master. Master and slave remain opposed to each other and improper recognition is no recognition at all.²⁷

The same situation applies to Hegel's concept of love and marriage. This is not to suggest that a wife's situation is to be equated with slavery or the husband's with mastery. The problems resulting from too closely identifying the two have already been noted. Nevertheless, marriage and the master-slave relationship do have in common the ironic twist that results from unequal relationships.

In the master-slave relationship, independence must be mutually won. With marriage, independence is mutually surrendered. Clearly, one must already have acquired independence to surrender it. As Kojève argues, "Love is only a secondary "manifestation" of Man who already exists as a human being."²⁸ Admittedly, Kojève's understanding of Hegel's position is textually limited, drawn from his reading of the Phenomenology, coupled with the Early

Theological Writings. However, it represents Hegel's definitive theory quite well. According to Kojève, "Man can truly Love...only because he has already created himself beforehand as human being through the Risk incurred in a Fight for Recognition."²⁹

Patricia Jagentowicz Mills takes up Kojève's claim, maintaining that in both the Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Right 'Man' is gender specific. Independence is only achieved outside of the family and, since women are confined to and defined in terms of the family, they are prevented from truly creating themselves as human beings.

For Mills this has the following consequence:

Hegel's love relation cannot offer recognition in equality because it is not a relation where two individuals recognize each other in their individuality. This presents us with a contradiction in that woman is defined in terms of love and yet cannot truly love. Since only man can achieve a truly human existence one would have to conclude that a truly human love is only possible between men! (30)

According to Mills, then, human love between women and men is impossible on Hegel's own terms. Before a woman can love a man and commit herself in marriage, she must already know herself as a particular person. The implicit particularity of the female character is simply not sufficient to

establish women as independent individuals. So long as a woman is not particular for herself, it is doubtful that she can freely surrender particular personhood upon marriage. Hegel can only be rescued from Mills's conclusion if there is some way women can become particular for themselves and gain a sense of individual autonomy while remaining confined to the family.

A possible grounding of feminine particularity is the recognition exchanged between sister and brother. At least in the Phenomenology and probably in the Philosophy of Right as well, this is the only form of 'independent' recognition available to women. Despite the universality of family membership, Hegel contends that particularity is present in the sibling relationship. It is, however, doubtful that universality and particularity are separated in that relationship. Recognition is based upon blood ties and family membership. When Hegel claims that the sister recognizes and is recognized by her brother, he qualifies this by stating that she recognizes her passive self in him. Anticipating Antigone, he states that the loss of her brother is irreparable and "her duty towards him is the highest" (PG, 457). He says nothing about his duty towards her. Thus, if a sister receives particularity from her brother at all, she certainly does so vicariously;

it is his particular person whom she admires. Hegel gives us no reason to believe that he returns this admiration. In itself, the relationship is incapable of providing the sister with a sense of her own independence. Even if it could, it is far too contingent a relationship to rely upon, for not all women have brothers.

Rudolf J. Siebert, who is a disciple of Hegel's, has written a fairly uncritical book on Hegel's concept of marriage and the family. Concerning the question of feminine particularity, he suggests a contrast between the Greek household of the Phenomenology and the modern family of the Philosophy of Right. It would seem that for Siebert, the Greek "wife is without the moment of knowing herself as this particular self in and through another" because the principle of particularity is "possible fully only in modernity."³¹

Siebert's contrast between Greece and modern times is a valid one. According to Hegel, particularity as such was not a separate moment of Greek life for anyone.³¹ Still, it is unlikely that this has a significant effect upon Hegel's problem. To a large extent, Hegel is speaking about the Greek family in the Phenomenology but, as has already been argued, certain aspects of his discussion are also ahistorical. Certainly, the characterization of femininity and masculinity is virtually the same in the Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Right. Although

particularity was not a separate moment of Greek life, in the Phenomenology it is nevertheless implied in masculinity and not in femininity. Moreover, the rise of particularity was a decidedly male accomplishment. Represented, for Hegel, by the story of Antigone, it was achieved through the struggle between Eteocles and Polynices. While Antigone may have confirmed his particular action when she buried Polynices, she was not asserting her own particular person but upholding family or divine law.³³

In modern society, particularity and universality remain immediately united in both the family and women. The moment of difference and separation belongs to the male world of civil society. A woman is as 'particular' now as she was in Greece. Though the principle is supposed to be 'universal' in modern life, it is explicitly realized only by men and is hardly genderically neutral. The difference between Greek and modern life, as acknowledged by Siebert, has little, if any, effect upon Hegel's overall account of gender and gender relations. Nowhere do women and men equally assert the right of particularity, a right already present in men in the Phenomenology. As Mills concludes regarding the Philosophy of Right, "the bourgeois woman seems to be entitled to equal rights but when we look closely we see that she does not share the world equally with the bourgeois man."³⁴

If women are unable to realize themselves as particular persons, then how can they freely relinquish independence upon marriage? Not only does this question raise the problem of feminine particularity, which is never adequately solved, it also indicates a further difficulty concerning a woman's decision to marry. As we have already seen, Hegel favours decision over inclination as a more appropriate reason for marrying. Hegelian marriage is predominantly an ethical duty that women and men freely consent to. Since women and men are not equal in marriage, Mills interprets this as evidence that a "woman chooses her subservience to man".³⁵ Yet, even more important, a woman's choice to marry is not really free at all.

To begin, one might ask how a woman can choose to marry when she must marry. Up to a point, of course, this question also applies to the choice of men. To be fair, however, Hegel argues against opposing freedom to necessity and ethical constraints. Freedom is precisely choosing to do one's duty and is therefore compatible with necessity. Choosing to do one's duty freely presupposes that one knows what one's duty is, specifically, that one knows what duty in general is. Knowledge is a necessary condition of free choice because, Hegel tells us, "it is only as a thinking intelligence that the will is genuinely a will and free" (PR, 21, 2). Necessity, moreover, denotes that which is universal or the duties one has as a member of the ethical

community. Indeed, Hegel defines free will as "having universality...for its object, content and aim" (PR, 21). In ethical life, truly free individuals "know and will the universal; they even recognize it as their own substantive mind; they take it as their end and aim and are active in its pursuit" (PR, 260).

Since the duty to marry stems from the ethical community itself and is demanded of every community member, it is clearly universal. Insofar as it is the knowledgeable willing of the universal, the decision to marry is rational and free. While it is doubtful that many men actually decide to marry in this way, the ability to do so does belong to the masculine nature. Given Hegel's characterization of women, it cannot be the case that women freely choose marriage. Regardless of how much they may feel governed by a sense of duty, knowledge of duty surely escapes them. Women are not 'thinking intelligences'; they are not capable of willing the universal. Because the feminine will is subjective and capricious, women are likely led to marriage from 'particular' inclination rather than rational decisiveness. Hence, their choice is not free and, since women do not even know themselves as particular, it seems highly improbable that it is even their own. In the end, women are simply fulfilling their destiny when they marry, a destiny that entails entering into an unequal relationship with a man they cannot truly love and who cannot return love to them.

The Family Complete: Property and Children

Since marriage is predominantly characterized by feeling, Hegel considers it a one-sidedly subjective or incomplete union open to contingency and capriciousness. Even the wedding is not sufficiently able to secure unity although it does ensure legitimacy. Interestingly enough, Hegel justifies his position in favour of the public ceremony by claiming that community recognition confirms and formally completes marriage as an ethical bond, raising it above "the contingency of feeling and private inclination" (PR, 164, Z). Yet, despite reciprocated love, the solemn exchange of vows and monogamous sexual relations, the union still requires further substantiation. This is partly achieved in family property and fully realized in the generation of children.

As the three elements fundamental to Hegel's family as a whole, marriage, property and reproduction are internally related. Mills finds this relationship to be somewhat hierarchical, suggesting that marriage and reproduction are both "subordinated to the claims of property".³⁶ Quite likely, marriage exists to serve reproductive needs as well and although Mills does not actually state this, her argument implies it. In contrast, Gould does not really acknowledge Hegel's notion of family property at all. She accuses Hegel of ignoring or mystifying the economic basis of family life and of understanding the family as a private

institution "whose main function is that of the socialization of children."³⁷ Against Gould, Landes insists that Hegel's concept of the family is not simply 'bourgeois ideology'. According to Landes, "Hegel seems to implicitly recognize that the bourgeois family simultaneously mirrors and attempts to conceal from its members the alienated order of property within industrial capitalist society."³⁸

It would be a mistake, however, to emphasize property over reproduction or to emphasize reproduction over property. Each, in turn, conditions the other. Family property 'spiritualizes' private ownership in general because it is communally owned. It also guarantees that children are provided for, as the child has a "right to maintenance and education at the expense of the family's common capital" (PR, 174). On the other hand, inheritance fortifies the right of private ownership against the claims of non-family community members. Through inheritance, property gains a sense of temporal continuity.

That property is connected with reproduction and marriage affords some insight into Hegel's appreciation of family development and change, which is certainly difficult to fathom. Because the family is natural, it lacks any genuine transformative changeability. In the Philosophy of History, the family is held to be "excluded from that process of development in which History takes its root" (PH,

p. 59). The Greek, extended and nuclear organizations are essentially determinate variations of the same trans-historical family form. At the core of this form is the family triad - father, mother and child(ren) - headed, in the Philosophy of Right, by the father. From this, Mary O'Brien concludes that, for Hegel, "the patriarchy was not a historical institution but a 'prehistorical', natural arrangement."³⁹ While O'Brien is basically correct, she may be overstating her case. In the Philosophy of History, patriarchy denotes a more widespread cultural type, reminiscent of feudalism or tribalism. At the same time, Hegel does claim that "the basis of the patriarchal condition is the family relation" (PH, p. 41). Though the patriarchal clan (Hegel makes no mention of the matriarchal clan) has diminished over time until only the nuclear family recalls it in a very limited way, the 'family relation' itself remains unchanged, retaining the universal triadic form.

In contrast, property relations are historical. They develop according to the actions of individuals struggling with and against each other in an effort to realize themselves as free. As property relations reflect freedom more accurately, they become increasingly rational. Since the family is linked to the community through property, historical alterations in property relations will affect the

economic organization of the family. For example, the contraction of the family to the primarily non-productive nuclear unit was the result of technological innovation and broad changes in the division of labour. Given the connection between the family and property, Hegel also speculates upon the origin of the family, in a manner very similar to that of Engels:

The real beginning and original foundation of states has been rightly ascribed to the introduction of agriculture along with marriage, because the principle of agriculture brings with it the formation of land and consequently exclusively private property ... Along with these changes, sexual love is restricted to marriage, and this bond in turn grows into an enduring league, inherently universal, while needs expand into care for a family, and personal-possession into family goods. (PR, 203, 2)

Unfortunately, Hegel does not tell us why sexual relations were restricted at this time, except to suggest that it was one of the ways rationality asserted itself. Nor does he adequately explain the origin of the universal family triad. Perhaps he assumes that the family simply patterned the biological reproductive structure. However, given that maternal uncles have filled the 'father role', there is no reason to assume that the link between copulation and reproduction has always been grasped. Initially,

the basic reproductive unit was likely perceived as the mother-child diad. Moreover, if paternity is not understood, then restricted sexual relations make little sense. As Mary O'Brien would argue, the origin of the family presupposed the idea of paternity, which, as an idea, is not natural but historical. Although probably connected with the introduction of agriculture and private property, marriage and the family cannot be explained completely in terms of them.

Nevertheless, by originating the family within property relations, Hegel can account for family diversity without committing himself to family historicity. This is especially important, because historicity contradicts immediacy and naturality. According to Hegel, then, the family is not self-determining. Instead, development and change are external to it, grounded in property relations as a whole. In this sense, the family is rather subordinate to the claims of property, though not to family property as such. Subordination is also balanced by the fact that property has its ethical roots in family ownership.

Hegel's analysis of family property is crucial to the question of gender relations. Whether it consists of the full triadic group or a childless couple, the family exists as one person. Family property is therefore the external

embodiment of family personality. Generally speaking, property is an essential component of free personality. In ownership, the one-sidedly subjective individual attains objectivity by claiming some aspect of the external world as his or her own (PR, 39). Insofar as family personality is substantial rather than atomic, Hegel specifies family property as capital. In the section on civil society, capital is defined as singular ownership mediated by common concerns. In civil society, the "universal permanent capital" stems from "the complex interdependence of each on all" (PR, 199). Capital is the appropriate form of family ownership because the family is "a universal and enduring person" (PR, 170).

Family capital refers to all of the family's possessions. (Knox suggests that the term 'estate' might be a more suitable translation of the German 'Vermogen' so long as 'estate' includes all that is owned and not just 'real estate'.⁴⁰) In contrast to civil society, the private ownership of property by any particular family member is prohibited, mainly because it signifies the assertion of one's independent individuality against the family.

Hence, family "capital is common property so that, while no member of the family has property of his own, each has his right in the common stock" (PR, 171). For this

reason, one might assume that communal ownership of property ensures the economic equality of family members and, to some extent, it does. Economic equality does not mean that each member receives exactly the same share of the family's possessions. Even within the family, individual needs will vary and, in one sense, equality simply means that everyone's needs are provided for, regardless of individual variation. However, while this might be sufficient for children - at least when they are very young - if equality is limited to this definition it can create problems for adult gender relations. Equality also suggests a unity of 'interdependence' such that no single individual enjoys a privileged status in family economic affairs. To borrow from Marx, each member contributes to economic decision-making and the family capital according to her or his ability and maturity. Although there is no reason why Hegel's position should not reflect this stipulation, it is nonetheless weakened by an overriding paternalism. The situation of the wife/mother is virtually identical to that of the children:

The family as a legal entity in relation to others must be represented by the husband as its head. Further, it is his prerogative to go out and work for its living, to attend to its needs, and to control and administer its capital.
(PR, 171)

The family has this legal status in virtue of its being one person, relating to other family personalities in civil society. But it is not the family itself that participates in civic affairs, it is the family as father. Only he enters into contractual relations with other 'fathers'. It is he who increases or decreases the family income by sharing in the production and distribution of the 'universal permanent capital'. It is he who labours. Although the father is united with the universality of the family, he also realizes his own individual particularity when he participates in civil society - something that no other family member is permitted to do. Consequently, his unity with the family is not absolute because he does act in separation from it. Nor is his unity immediate. That his actions are intended to meet the needs of his wife and children as well as his own may provide his needs with an ethical foundation, but his dominant position and separate individuality must challenge family unity. From this, Mills concludes the impossibility of generic unity. The common ownership of property cannot outweigh unequal access to the administration of property. Mills also charges Hegel with circular reasoning:

The argument that the man must be the legal head of the family rests on the fact that he has the prerogative to participate in public life and the

woman does not. Woman has been assigned to the family and then told she cannot have any authority here because she is not a public person. This assumption of male dominance in the patriarchal family, disguised by talk of the 'ethical mind/spirit' at work, precludes the kind of mutuality which Hegel conceives as the essence of marriage. (41)

Of course, Hegel's reasoning will appear circular if natural gender differences are left unconsidered. According to Mills's interpretation, the father's authority within the family is drawn from his participation in civic affairs, something he is entitled to do as the family's head. Similarly, women have not this authority because they are prevented from entering civil society and engaging in non-family activities. Yet, women are so prohibited because they are confined to the family, which clearly amounts to the same thing. As well, Hegel does not explain the link between family authority and civil society. Because he is only repeating himself, Mills argues, he cannot justify the gender division.

Given Hegel's depiction of natural gender differences, however, the circle can be broken. Even though the father's position within the family is connected to his participation outside it, both are determined by his masculine nature. In direct opposition to her husband,

the wife/mother remains economically subordinate to and dependent upon the husband/father. She is confined to and dominated within the family just because she is female. Authority obviously demands the kind of rationality and commitment to universality that the feminine nature lacks. It is because rationality and universality are only fully realizable in conscious, non-family pursuits that the tie between authority and civil society can be made. In this way, the gender division is itself grounded in natural differences. Moreover, since these differences are rational ones, the division is rationally justifiable - at least, according to Hegel's account. Indeed, Hegel conceives of the family as both a natural and a rational institution, as Landes points out. But, she continues, this gives rise to a number of difficulties when it comes to comprehending gender differences:

Because the modern family is no longer viewed as a wholly natural institution but as one that also conforms to the demands of reason, family members are prone to accept as "natural" and "reasonable" the facts of male superiority and female inferiority. The actual social relations between man and wife are reproduced and anchored in the family member's consciousness as a rational product of the natural differences

between the sexes. Therefore, the exclusion of women from economic and public life in the industrialist capitalist world is considered to be a necessary result of the natural hierarchical division of the human species. The actual historical trajectory of women's seclusion in the family is lost from the conscious memory of the modern individual. (42)

Hence, the common ownership of property does not adequately reflect the supposed unity of wife and husband. It is prevented from doing so by Hegel's own portrayal of gender differences, including their significance within family life. Family property relations only continue the fundamental inequality between wife and husband inherent to marriage.

Outside the satisfaction of needs, the only other area in which some kind of generic equality can be found is the distribution of capital upon the dissolution of the family. Although one would suppose that the wife has a claim to the family capital should her husband die, Hegel discusses inheritance in generational terms. As the generation of the family parallels that of the species, family capital is actually the external, objective existence of the universal, continuous family. A key factor in the spiritualization of property, inheritance secures permanence while also ensuring the right to private property:

"The essence of inheritance is the transfer to private ownership of property which is in principle common" (PR, 178). In keeping with the patrilineal nature of the family, control over inheritance falls to the father.

The father cannot arbitrarily bequeath the family's possessions to whomever he pleases. Opposing the theory that "by a man's death, his property becomes wealth without an owner", Hegel argues that such an "ingenious idea disregards the nature of the family relationship" (PR, 178, 2). Strictly speaking, wealth is not the father's in the first place. It belongs to the family as a whole. Concerning inheritance, the claims of the children take priority, as the capital is already inherently theirs. The claims of other kin are secondary, to be considered, it would seem, only if the man has no children. Should a man ignore his family to benefit his friends, his act would violate the concept of family capital and common ownership. Finally, although Hegel does not specify exactly how possessions are to be distributed, he does stress that they should be distributed between all children. Genderic economic equality enters with his argument against wills and testaments that "favour sons by excluding daughters from inheriting, or...the eldest son by excluding the other children" (PR, 180, 2).

When Hegel outlines the structure of the state, however, several areas controvert the right to equal inheritance. Within the state, the political class of civil servants is partly governed by family principles. According to Hegel, the position of civil servants as state administrators is economically indifferent because "they are not entitled, as other citizens are, either to dispose of their wealth at will, or to the assurance that it will pass to their children, whom they love equally, in similarly equal divisions. Hence, their wealth becomes inalienable, entailed, and burdened by primogeniture" (PR, 306). Similarly, the monarch, who heads the state and signifies the state's familial roots, is also an office of primogeniture (PR, 280-281).

Certain aspects of state organization therefore do violate the family principle of common ownership and equal inheritance. This violation is especially disturbing because it occurs in those areas of the state that are, supposedly, directly linked to the family. Moreover, it is not at all justified by observing that primogeniture is "the inevitable outcome of the Idea of the state" (PR, 180, 2). The familial repercussions of primogeniture will remain and must be accounted for. In terms of gender relations, primogeniture obviously presents severe limitations to gender equality. When the eldest son has exclusive

rights to inheritance, daughters are not only denied equal access to family wealth, they are denied any access.

Even when primogeniture does not apply, such as in business and working class families, genderic equality is weakened by the fact that women have no control over the property they do inherit. The experience of certain forms of communism has shown that communal ownership of property does not alone ensure human fulfillment and freedom from exploitation. The means of production must also be communally administered if communism is to differ significantly from capitalism. Hegel himself acknowledges that ownership means very little if the owner, whether alone or in conjunction with other owners, has not the right to utilize his possessions as he sees fit, to transfer his property to another, to exchange wealth for goods, etc.⁴³ Yet, a woman's relation to family capital is similar to that of a worker in a particular type of communist state. Though she may 'inherit' property, she cannot effectively use it because it remains outside her control. As Mills suggests, she is "deprived of the experience of freedom and historical continuity which man gains through an ability not only to own property but to bequeath it to others."⁴⁴ Viewed from this perspective, it becomes clear that a daughter's inheritance is merely her dowry - something brought or promised to her husband upon marriage. It is he who

determines how it will be used and eventually left to others. Once more, the unity of marriage is obviated by the inequality of gender economic relations.

The significance of children is certainly not limited to inheritance and the endurability of family capital. Reproduction cannot be reduced to the claims of property because the latter presupposes the actual inter-generational element of family continuity. As in species generation, children represent the objective embodiment of family universality. In Hegel's words, the family "is a process which runs away into the infinite series of generations, each producing the next and presupposing the one before" (PR, 173). The 'divine' spirit governing the family reflects the natural generative process while at the same time raising it to the ethical level. Hegel's analysis is quite consistent with traditional notions of legitimacy and illegitimacy, for reproduction is only ethical if it occurs within the family. The married couple is also obliged to bear and beget children, an obligation partly due to the natural connection between sexual love (copulation) and reproduction, as well as the fact that the family is the natural foundation of community continuity. Even more important, children complete the marriage union. Without children, the substantial unity of marriage would, Hegel maintains, be outwardly "sundered in the two parties"

(PR, 173). Hegel continues:

The relation of love between husband and wife is in itself not objective, because even if their feeling is their substantial unity, still this unity has no objectivity. Such an objectivity parents first acquire in their children, in whom they can see objectified the entirety of their union. In the child, a mother loves its father and he its mother. Both have their love objectified for them in the child. While in their goods their unity is embodied only in an external thing, in their children it is embodied in a spiritual one in which the parents are loved and which they love.
(PR, 179, A)

In a rather anticipatory fashion, a similar thought is found in the Early Theological Writings: "After their union the lovers separate again, but in the child their union has become unseparated" (ETW, p. 308). In keeping with the immortality of love, reproduction transcends parental mortality. The child overcomes even the separability of the parents' own bodies. With the child, "a seed of immortality, of the eternally self-developing and self-generating (race) has come into existence" (ETW, p. 308).

While clearly a spiritual moment of ethical procreation, the relationship between parental mortality and reproductive immortality is naturally based. In the

Philosophy of Nature, Hegel observes an essential connection between species generation and the death of particular species members. In nature, individual animals primarily exist to maintain the species as a whole. It is the universal species that is preserved and continued. Since particular members are not the universal, individual immortality is contradictory. Once particular members have fulfilled their procreative function, death comes naturally to them:

The genus preserves itself only through the destruction of the individuals who, in the process of generation, fulfill their destiny and, in so far as they have no higher destiny, in this process meet their death. (PN, 379)

With 'lower' animals, such as some insects and fish, death often directly follows the procreative act. The 'higher' the animal, the longer it will survive. Death is still inevitable, but it is more precisely caused by various diseases and gradual physical decline. Such animals enjoy a greater independence from the constraints of species generation. Only the human species, because it is self-reflective, is truly capable of transcending this process. Though they themselves are mortal, human beings can rationally comprehend the universality and immortality inherent to species generation. They are also able to

rise above individual mortality by ethically appropriating the species generative process in the institution of the family. This insight is already evident in the Philosophy of Nature:

Love, on the other hand, is the feeling in which the self-seeking individual and its separated existence is negated, and the individual form (Gestalt) therefore perishes and cannot preserve itself. For only that preserves itself which, as absolute, is self-identical; and that is the universal which is for the universal. But in the animal, the genus does not exist as such but only in principle (an sich); it is only in spirit that it exists in and for itself in its eternity.
(PN, 369, 2)

From Hegel's discussion of reproduction in the Philosophy of Nature, we can comprehend his notion of the transition from nature to spirit. This transition is both conceptually and transcendentally necessary. Conceptually, the universal is defined as that which is in and for itself. In order to become so, it must be rationally grasped as such. Thus, a necessary condition of universality is spirit in the form of rational humanity. In human existence, moreover, the transition from nature to spirit occurs within the family. In the first place, the family is the institution of reproduction. Within it, children are raised from the immediacy of natural infancy to indepen-

dent personality or spiritual freedom. They receive a "second or spiritual birth" (PM, 521). Historically, it is more or less impossible to situate the transition from nature to spirit at a specific point in time. Nevertheless, we do know that Hegel believed marriage and the family, along with agriculture and private property, marked the beginning of a truly human existence, prior to which human beings were like animals, living "the nomadic life of savages" (PR, 203, 2). Finally, the family is both a natural and an ethical institution. The immediate unity of the family therefore includes the immediate unity of nature and spirit. As we have already seen, nature and spirit are genderically embodied: the female manifests the former and the male the latter.

From the perspective of the human, as opposed to the natural, individual, the family provides a necessary link to universality by way of a process that closely follows the biological process of natural reproduction. Analogous to the undifferentiated unity initiating species generation, the child enjoys an immediate unity with her or his family of origin. As the child matures, generic and individual particularity simultaneously assert themselves. This is the moment of difference, when particularity is emphasized over universality. The sexual urge then leads the grown woman or man back to the universality of family life.

specifically through the desire of love and the wish to procreate, or generate a family of one's own. In a very important sense, love is the desire to overcome separation from family universality by uniting with the loved one. As such, it contains the wish to procreate. Hegel himself describes the stages of human development in this way in the Philosophy of Mind (PM, 396-397). Of course, universality is only concretely realized in the rational pursuits of economic production, political activities and philosophical inquiry. Still, the family remains the substantial basis of universality, at least in its abstract or indifferent form.

In the Philosophy of Right, the death of the parents constitutes the natural dissolution of the family, which is ethically dissolved "once the children have been educated to freedom of personality" (PR, 177-178). Unfortunately, Hegel does not fully investigate the relationship between parental mortality and the raising of children in the Philosophy of Right, though the earlier System of Ethical Life and First Philosophy of Spirit both refer to it. In the System of Ethical Life, Hegel again notes that children complete the marriage union, adding that they also secure the family "against the concept whereby the singulars or subjects nullify themselves" (SEL, p. 128). The family achieves endurance or immortality through children.

This, Harris suggests, presupposes parental mortality. In his recent book Night Thoughts, Harris submits that for Hegel, the "raising of children is the naturally necessary goal of human ethical endeavour because we are mortal",⁴⁵ a thought he repeats when introducing the System of Ethical Life. According to Harris, Hegel understands reproduction in the System of Ethical Life as entailing the subordination of the parents' own individuality to the needs of their children so that "the parents come to terms with their own mortality as natural organisms."⁴⁶

In the First Philosophy of Spirit, the relationship between reproduction and parental mortality is examined in even greater detail. Anticipating the Philosophy of Right, Hegel now claims that the parents recognize their own unity in the child. He also contends that "this achieved unity is itself a consciousness in which the coming supersession of the parent is intuited" (FPS, p. 233). For this reason, parents must educate the child and, Hegel continues, as they do "they posit their achieved consciousness in it, and they generate their death" (FPS, p. 233). In Night Thoughts, Harris interprets Hegel's remarks as follows:

The bond that is sacred [in marriage] is the conscious intent to have children. This is not just a natural urge or function. To have a human child the parents must educate it. Human

parents become one consciousness in the child, in that they teach it everything they know (i.e., really believe)...Human parents 'recognize themselves in the child as kind' in so far as they recognize the obligation to give it the best chance in life that they can, before death takes them. It is the consciousness of mortality that imposes this obligation upon them; and therefore it is not just the human species, but their own experience of life that survives their death. (47)

As a result of parental education, Harris finds that children will follow in the footsteps of their parents:

Hegel emphasizes the connection between love and death because he wants education to be seen as a balanced experience on both sides. The parents prepare the child to take their place; and he puts off his natural self and takes on their consciousness because he recognizes that this is what they want to give him. (48)

The connection between reproduction and mortality is also evident in the Phenomenology, where Hegel illustrates how family burial, a ritual especially important to both ancient Greece and Antigone, ensures intergenerational continuity. Through the conscious recognition of the dead person as a family ancestor and continuing family member, natural death is raised to the level of spirit (PG, 452). Moreover, Hegel repeats the claim that children objectively

complete the marriage union. The relationship between wife and husband "has its actual existence not in itself but in the child - an 'other' whose coming into existence is the relationship, and is also that in which the relationship itself gradually passes away" (PG, 456).

By turning to Hegel's earlier works in this way, we can better grasp the significance of reproduction to his concept of family unity, including its expression in the Philosophy of Right. Certainly, there are differences to be found in the course of Hegel's development, but there is no reason to believe that he dropped the connection between reproduction and mortality at any point in his career. Though not as obvious in the Philosophy of Right, it is still implied in the remarks already quoted.

Since marital unity is supposed to be objectively completed in the form of a third, self-identical individual, reproduction is, perhaps, the best and most successful means of achieving generic unity. However, once reproductive relations are considered from the perspective of oppositional difference, something that neither Hegel nor Harris ever really do, the possibility of unity is circumvented. Not only do gender differences denote a radical discrepancy between motherhood and fatherhood, they also affect the child, who will only embody parental unity in the most immediate, natural and ethically insignificant way.

To begin, we might well wonder how parental love can complete and fulfill marital love when the differences between women and men must surely prevent wife and husband from loving each other. It has already been argued that Hegel's own presentation of oppositional difference draws such a sorry conclusion. Still, according to Hegel, marital love is only incomplete prior to the birth of the children, it is not altogether absent. Nor can it be. If it were, the child would have no love to objectively embody and enhance. The child is not simply the natural result of sexual union. If it were, reproduction would lack ethical legitimacy. In the absence of marital love, though, it seems as if the child can only be the natural result of sexual union. Hence, one might question the ethical status of reproduction itself.

Perhaps, as Harris contends, ethical reproduction stems from the conscious intent to have children. True, this demands a prior marital love, but perhaps we can grant Hegel this for the sake of argument, anyway. Since the desire of love encompasses the wish to procreate, Harris's claim is valid. Hegel undoubtedly conceives of marriage in terms of its reproductive functions. At the same time, something consciously intended is something people choose to do. Though an ethical duty, marriage with the intent to reproduce is freely undertaken. Because it is an ethical

duty, what is chosen or willed is the universal. Such an action is decidedly and exclusively male. As Hegel himself maintains, women are unable to will the universal and feminine free choice is weakened by feminine caprice. Women marry to meet their ethical obligations inspired by unconscious, intuited forces. Can they then consciously intend to have children or do they simply get pregnant?

Interestingly enough, the free aspect of reproduction does not seem to include the use of contraception. From Hegel's extensive study of the sciences, one might assume that he was aware of the availability of contraception. Nowhere, however, does he discuss the ethical or practical implications of 'planned parenthood'. Conspicuous in its absence, Hegel's failure to acknowledge contraception may be a mere empirical oversight, but it also coheres with his conception of reproduction in general. With or without marriage, reproduction remains the biologically inevitable consequence of copulation. Hence, freedom is not a freedom from 'natural' reproduction so much as the freedom to ethically reproduce. It is, therefore, little more than the freedom already established by marriage, notably the guarantee of fidelity. In choosing to marry each other, wife and husband correspondingly commit themselves to having children together. If honoured, monogamous sexual relations ensure that they actually do. As Mary O'Brien

argues, this 'freedom' is especially crucial to men, who require exclusive sexual rights over their wives to be certain that their children really are theirs. Women, on the other hand, do not need this kind of reassurance. Maternity is something they immediately know (and probably feel as well).⁴⁹

To be fair, though, Hegel is not only concerned with individual parental certainty. Ethical reproduction is based upon the recognition of joint parenthood. Unambiguous paternity is important to both parents; monogamy is indispensable to parental unity. The mother must 'recognize' her husband as the father of her children - just as he must be certain of the same thing - for Hegel's notion of parental unity to work. Undoubtedly, to prohibit the use of contraception will reinforce the necessity of monogamous sexual relations. It will also facilitate the reproductive purpose of marriage. Indeed, the use of contraception might seriously undermine family unity, allowing women and men to sexually unite without actually achieving family universality. Still, one cannot help but suspect that the lack of contraceptive use hinders rather than helps genderic unity. The link between contraception and women's emancipation is critical. On the other hand, the issue is not nearly so acute and is often not even relevant for men.

Conversely, the question of personal mortality and alienation from family universality seems hardly relevant to the situation of women. As in the natural reproductive process, the desire of love signifies the desire to procreate. In the Philosophy of Nature, Hegel describes natural desire in terms of an alienation from the species. A similar kind of alienation occurs in ethical life, when grown children leave their families of origin. In each instance, individual particularity is separated from species or family universality. Yet, even if alienation is a genderically neutral experience in animal existence, it is not in human life. Instead, it is a gender specific experience restricted to those who actually do separate from family universality to encounter the moment of difference (i.e., men). That women and men both leave their families of origin means little so long as women remain confined to the family in general. Regardless of which family she may find herself in, a woman is immediately united with it. Her identity as a particular person is simultaneously identified with family universality. Because she is not alienated from it in the first place, a woman's desire to procreate cannot be explained as the need to reunite with family universality. This is the experience only of men.

According to Mills, for Hegel, a woman exists not for herself but for others.⁵⁰ Since it is she who bears children, she is restricted to the family. The destiny she fulfills is a purely natural one. There is no contradiction between a woman and nature that she is driven to overcome. Men, however, do separate themselves from nature. They are also connected to nature through their familial relationships with those women who bear their children. Quite literally, the other for whom women exist is men. Indeed, this is what Landes means when she claims that men appropriate women's sexuality in marriage. It is not so much sexual gratification that is taken but the female capacity to bear children.

The same analysis applies to the notion of family universality, which represents nature in ethical life. Though women themselves are not alienated from it, they do ensure that men can be re-united with family universality. For obvious reasons, this is not reciprocated. It need not be. In the end, a woman is basically a reproductive 'sex object'. A man is not. This difference denotes a fundamental inequality in generic reproductive relations that can only challenge the possibility of generic reproductive unity.

Because there is no contradiction between women and nature or between women and family universality, a woman's

own mortality must be of little consequence to her.

Moreover, one wonders how much the human experience of mortality, including the desire to overcome it, presupposes the risk of life and fear of death Hegel describes in the master-slave section of the Phenomenology (PG, 187 & 194). According to Hegel, it is only through such an experience that human beings free themselves from mere animal existence, realizing the negating power of death as the essence of their own productive creativity. Thus, human beings produce objects - living or otherwise - that will reflect their own sense of permanence, or spiritual eternity.

These objects may be tools or buildings, musical scores or philosophical systems - or their own children, in whom they also see something of themselves continuing in the world.

Yet a woman, for Hegel, surely cannot risk life if she exists to bear life. The risk of life accompanying female reproductive labour goes unrecognized. If women do fear death, it is only at the instinctual level. The universal aspect of negation is not taken up in truly creative acts. Like the animal, a woman does what she is naturally disposed to do: she serves the reproductive needs of the species 'mankind'. Her contribution to human reproductive immortality does not extend beyond the material care and limited loving attention she bestows upon her children.

Hence, while a woman does sacrifice her own individuality as wife and mother, it is doubtful that she receives much in the way of personal immortality in return. Like the natural differences in female and male reproductive contributions, a woman nurtures while a man educates. The father provides the 'subjectivity' in nature; in ethical life, he passes his ideas and beliefs on to his children along with his genes and name. Only the man can fully experience and ascertain the human implications of individual mortality. Only he will achieve personal immortality in his children. Given his activities outside the family, he need not even sacrifice his own individuality to the needs of his children to any great extent.

This brings us to the question of the children themselves. Since adult reproductive relations consolidate, rather than reconcile, oppositional gender differences, in what way will the child reflect parental unity? Assuming the mother and father really are the child's biological parents, the child will at least represent the unification of their respective germ cells. While this may be biologically important, it is of no ethical significance. Should unity be limited to biological fusion, adoptive parents could hardly acquire it, something that Hegel is unlikely to accept. Obviously, unity is of an ethical and

familial nature. It is the human mother and father who are combined in the child. In turn, the child is meant to overcome ethical differences as well as the 'natural' opposition. Due to those very differences, however, such an accomplishment is simply not possible.

As has already been argued, family unity is itself frustrated by paternal domination. So, too, is parental unity. Parental participation in the raising of children is generically divisive. Children may internalize their mother's love and 'divine' guidance, but they obey their father. Along with their mother, they are financially dependent upon him; specifically, upon his decisions regarding their maintenance and the type of education they will receive. The father may confer with the mother, taking her suggestions into account, but as the head of the family he is not obliged to do so. At any rate, there is nothing in Hegel's account that suggests otherwise. Children are raised under his command and under his name.

As a singular person, the family is singularly named. The father's position as its head and representative necessarily entails that the family name be his. Though Hegel never says so himself, this is clearly implied. Perhaps he was blind to the importance of paternal naming because it was - and still is - the cultural and legal norm. Paternal naming is not just an efficient means of expressing family unity. If it were, the mother's name would work just as

well. A brand new name, or a combination of the two, would probably work even better. Yet, only the father's name is automatically assumed. Paternal naming indicates that family unity is one-sidedly constituted under the personage and lineage of the father. In terms of intergenerational continuity, it is his name that survives. In effect, paternal naming reifies the father, with the consequence that unity is undermined. Though the child is supposed to be the 'third term' through whom parental opposition is reconciled, paternal naming reduces the child to only one side of that opposition.

Even if we were to set aside the problem of paternal naming, another difficulty would replace it. To effectively embody parental unity, the child must be genderically indifferent. If determined as either feminine or masculine, it would reflect only one or the other of its parents. In the Philosophy of Nature, Hegel refers to the product of sexual union as "an asexual life" (PN, 369). Whether or not he has in mind the 'indifferent genital form' spoken of earlier or the newborn infant is not clear, but we can be certain that ethical generic particularity is not at all immediate. It probably develops some time after birth.

Comparing speech to a child in the System of Ethical Life, Hegel claims that "speech is like the child - i.e.

what is most indeterminate purest, most negative, most sexless, and, on account of its absolute malleability and transparency, capable of assuming every form" (SEL, p. 114). Yet, as Harris points out, this indeterminacy is limited to the child's early years: "until he/she reaches physical maturity, there will be no sexual "one-sidedness"."⁵¹ In the Philosophy of Mind, generic particularity seems to emerge with the onset of puberty, at which point the 'life of the genus' directs the youth to sexual relations in which generic opposition is present (PM, 396-397). Thus, generic particularity only develops when the child begins to separate from her or his parents, seeking independence. Prior to puberty, the child is first and foremost a family member whose generic indifference is supposed to reflect parental unity.

Hegel, however, is mistaking sexuality proper with gender identity. As we saw when examining the relationship between sisters and brothers, gender identity is not determined by the oppositional difference apparently inherent to relationships based upon sexual desire and love. Gender identity is assigned to the child at birth, as soon as the parents find out whether it is a girl or a boy. No doubt, the newborn infant and the young child do have generically indifferent needs that are met accordingly, but this does not prevent the parents from perceiving their children as

already genderically distinct. As Harris observes in his Introduction to the System of Ethical Life, the "concept that the parents have of their child is the concept both of what they believe he is and of what they hope he will become, the concept that guides all of their conduct towards him."⁵² Given that women are naturally of one type and men are naturally of another, it would be a naive and irrational set of parents whose concept disregarded their child's own gender. It would, for example, be absurd to suggest that little girls do not 'become feminine' until after their first menstrual period. As soon as they are given a feminine (first) name and feminine toys to play with, are encouraged to behave in a feminine manner and are steered towards feminine activities, little girls are already considered to be quite different from little boys. They are already acting as if they were. The education that children receive in the family can hardly be described as genderically neutral. From the moment of birth, children are raised according to their natural destiny - "the sons as heads of new families and the daughters as wives" (PR, 177). To borrow from Harris, girls are 'educated' to follow their mother's footsteps and boys to follow their father's. The notion of gender indifference simply does not apply and, because it does not, the child can hardly be said to embody parental unity.

As was the case with marriage and the common ownership of family property, parental unity is thwarted by Hegel's very own depiction of gender differences. In all three cases, strange consequences follow. To the extent that the family is united, it is united under the father and is therefore reducible to him. At the same time, underneath this inadequate unity, generic opposition remains. The identification of women with the (male-dominated) family prevents women from enjoying truly equal relations with men. Along with paternal reduction, generic inequality precludes the accomplishment of generic unity. In the end, Hegel is left with an unbridgeable gap that is only retained in gender relations. Generic opposition is not successfully reconciled. We can therefore agree with Mary O'Brien that Hegel is, in fact, a generic dualist.

3

**CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS OF DUALISM AND NON-OPPOSITIONAL
GENDER DIFFERENCES**

Introduction

Having investigated Hegel's analysis of gender and gender relations at length and in detail, I am convinced that my initial contention is well supported. Since Hegel has depicted femininity and women as one-sided and in opposition to one-sided masculinity and men, there can be no doubt that gender relations do reflect the dialectical moment of oppositional differentiation. They also, I have argued, remain at this oppositional stage.

To summarize, according to Hegel's own rational-dialectical framework, we found that the first moment of undifferentiated unity is biologically represented by natural species universality. In ethical or spiritual life, this is manifested as family universality. Such universality, both in nature and in ethical life, is productive of all human beings. As well, humans originally share an identical genital form, most likely in the early stages of embryonal genital development. Culturally, humans are generically indifferent in pre-pubescent childhood. As children mature, generic one-sidedness asserts itself. This one-sidedness attains unity with generic alterity in biological copulation-reproduction or ethical marriage and parenthood. In Hegel's analysis,

this is the third moment of differentiated unity, at which time opposition is supposed to be overcome. Such reconciliation is only enduring and universal in ethical gender relations, incumbent upon the strictly human or spiritual exchange of recognition. Biological unification is unsatisfactory because it is momentary, destined to repetition.

Yet, I have argued, the so-called natural differences between women and men preclude the possibility of any such spiritual reconciliation. Instead, the oppositional types that, according to Hegel, biology has assigned women and men pervade human gender relations such that dualism prevails. For this reason, the third moment of reconciliation is, on Hegel's very own terms, unachievable.

This conclusion represents a kind of miscellaneous third chapter, divided into two thematic areas. For the first part, I will remain with Hegel, entertaining several implications that generic dualism has for his overall system and philosophical project. I do believe that an examination of Hegel's works from the perspective of gender and gender relations will yield a new understanding of Hegel. If Hegel's portrayal of gender and gender relations is one of opposition and dualism rather than reconciliation and unity, perhaps other areas of his system will reflect a similar kind of duality. If Hegel's family is marked by

paternal domination or authoritarianism, perhaps other areas of his system are also fundamentally authoritarian in nature. Such are the questions that must be put to him.

I will then leave Hegel to briefly examine the notion of gender differences from alternative viewpoints. I will critically examine several of Mary O'Brien's claims and show how she can be placed within the Hegelian tradition. Because O'Brien adopts dialectical reasoning, her own account of gender and gender relations is also centred upon oppositional differences. I will argue against such a methodology, suggesting that any inquiry into gender differences must avoid oppositional terms. By way of 'solutions', I will complete my project with some very practical, political (and, possibly, non-philosophical) suggestions as to how the generic inequality I have found (not only in Hegel but in contemporary human relations as well) might be alleviated.

Some Implications of Genderic Dualism for Hegel

Hegel, as I showed when introducing this thesis, can best be described as a philosopher in search of unity. Moreover, the quest for unity was not unique to him, as he inherited his philosophical project from his colleagues and predecessors. Given this background and the goals he so clearly articulated, the presence of any kind of dualism in Hegel's system will surely undermine his success as a philosopher seeking to unite all instances of opposition.

Such is the most evident consequence of genderic dualism for Hegel's own philosophical project. If, as I have argued, Hegel has failed to overcome the opposition between women and men, then his quest for unity has at least fallen short of its mark. So long as humankind is irreconcilably separated into two distinct and opposing gender types, humankind will reflect dualism rather than unity. Still, this is a very general consequence at best. Grave as it is, it is not a difficult observation to make and reveals little as to the other limitations that genderic dualism might place upon Hegel's success as a philosopher of unity. In what way is this most serious shortcoming indicative of others? Indeed, we do not have to look far to discover one major difficulty. As we have already seen, genderic dualism does affect the nature of family unity.

Regarding the three spheres of ethical life (the family, civil society and the state), Hegel intends the family as the substantial foundation of ethical unity. We know that it is within the family that individuals are first acquainted with the idea of community membership. The mutual respect, love and support that governs family ties also ensures the loyalty, charity and cooperation, essential to all other aspects of community life. The family, as it were, instills in each individual the principles fundamental to a truly spiritual community. As well, the family provides its members with a haven from which to escape the contingent and often avaricious tendencies of civil society. As the family fulfills the affective needs of its individual members, it substantiates the isolated, atomic individualism which civil society is necessarily prone to.

This family unity, in turn, presupposes a prior marital unity. The mutual respect, love and support that originates between family members and continues in one's community relations stems from a particular kind of spousal relationship, one which demands generic equality. If equality is lacking, as I believe it must be in Hegel's account, then unity is supplanted by spousal disharmony. As a result of a very one-sided gender relation, recognition is not mutually exchanged. The wife remains

subordinate to her husband, similar to the slave in the master-slave struggle. As I have previously argued, this means that both marital and parental unity are only achieved by placing that unity under paternal domination. Such an achievement is certainly a dubious one. No matter how benevolent paternal domination might be, family unity is still undermined. Paternal domination must surely affect parent-child relations as well as those between wife and husband. Reminiscent of contemporary ideals, Hegel's description of the family often reads like an all too happy account of nuclear bliss. One suspects, however, that the underlying tensions resulting from this dualistic inequality are more likely productive of domestic oppression, violence and other familial explosions.

Despite the fact that Hegel may have intended it otherwise, his portrayal of the family does contain some rather strong autocratic strains. Carol Gould has already pointed this out.¹ Considering the family's place within the community, this leads to some interesting speculations regarding other areas of ethical life. To what extent, for example, does family inequality influence how an individual relates to the state? From the studies of sociology, social psychology and psychoanalysis, we have come to believe that early family life influences one's relationship to authority to quite a large degree. Though Hegel

had not the benefit of these predominantly twentieth century insights, there is nothing in his writings to indicate any major disagreement with them. One might suppose, then, that the one-sided power relations initially experienced in childhood and youth (if only by observing maternal subordination) are connected to community authority in general.

In other words, I am suggesting that the autocratic nature of the family instills acquiescence to authority, especially political authority. If this is the case; that is, if there is a parallel between the family and some form of political authoritarianism, then ethical unity itself could certainly be called into question.

According to Hegel, ethical unity, or the absolute spiritual community objectively outlined in the Philosophy of Right, presupposes a certain kind of political freedom. This is not the freedom of liberal democracy or the freedom from economic deprivation advocated by democratic socialism, though it may encompass aspects of both. Instead, it is a kind of conservative freedom and involves freely willing universal ethical laws; in short, the choosing of necessity previously discussed. Choosing necessity entails knowing and fulfilling one's ethical duties. It entails the right to know and the right to will. Choosing necessity is not acquiescence to authority and ethical laws are

not to be autocratically or one-sidedly determined. Still, given that the family is the substantial foundation of ethical unity and if family unity is undermined by paternal domination, does this not imply that ethical unity is similarly missing? Might it not be the case that Hegel's political community is also marked by autocratic tendencies and one-sided power relations?

In light of the persistent controversy as to whether or not Hegel's political philosophy actually expresses totalitarianism rather than liberation, such questions are legitimate. Nevertheless, I do not propose to fully investigate them, for that would produce yet another thesis, quite different from the one I have just undertaken. I do believe, however, that there is a connection between the specific political issue and points already raised regarding Hegel's notion of the family.

Indeed, one can find a number of connections between the family and Hegel's account of the organization of both the state and civil society. Within civil society, for instance, the agricultural class enjoys certain property rights on the basis of family ties or intergenerational continuity. As I have previously noted, these rights go against family principles to some degree because they include the right of primogeniture. With primogeniture, inheritance is one-sidedly in favour of the eldest son.

While this situation is not autocratic as such, it does indicate stronger ties to familial paternalism or patriarchy than to an egalitarian based family unity.

Within civil society as well, the Corporation furnishes a kind of buffer between the individual and civic atomism, somewhat analogous to the role of the family within the ethical community as a whole (PR, 250 - 256). As it pertains to the business class, corporate membership is especially important. Imbued with particularity, the business class has not a direct link to unity, unlike the agriculture class, whose universal element is derived from the family, or civil servants, whose state concerns mark them as the universal class of civic life (PR, 250).

When the individual leaves family universality, 'he' enters into the sphere of particularity which Hegel calls civil society. If he is a member of the business class, he is especially prone to the selfish isolationism that one-sided particularity tends towards. He is, in Hegel's words, in need of a "second family" and finds that second family in the Corporation. The Corporation provides him with a sense of belonging, protects him from civic contingencies and recognizes him as worthy of dignity, respect and material support - not for who he is as an individual, but simply because he belongs to it (PR, 252 - 253).

△

Hegel's description of the Corporation is remarkably similar to his portrayal of the family. Interestingly enough, Hegel makes the following observations:

The institution of Corporation corresponds, on account of its assurance of capital, to the introduction of agriculture and private property in another sphere. (PR, 253, 2)

As the family was the first, so the Corporation is the second ethical root of the state, the one planted in civil society. (PR, 255)

The sanctity of marriage and the dignity of Corporate membership are the two fixed points round which the unorganized atoms of civil society revolve. (PR, 255, 2)

Finally, it is also interesting that the state 'begins' with a kind of return to the family, for the transition from civil society to the state occurs at the completion of Hegel's discussion on the Corporation. As a particular institution within civil society, it would seem that the Corporation also mediates family and state universality or, at least, substantially contributes to such mediation. Just as the Corporation places the isolated individual within civil society, it simultaneously helps to ground the individual's state citizenship. It provides the individual with the concrete parameters of his determinate existence and demarcates what he can and cannot do.

By placing the individual in this way, Corporate membership certainly limits particularism in a manner very alike that of family membership. To what degree is one able to assert oneself against Corporate universality? For that matter, how much power and control does the Corporation exert over its members? Does this power and control signify a one-sided authority relation? If so, then perhaps Corporate membership really continues an acquiescence to authority, initiated in family life and maintained even in certain areas of state organization. If the Corporation shares with the family an offering of protection, support and belonging, might it not also share the patriarchy and autocratic strains that undermine family unity?

Such are a few of the questions that must be asked when examining the nature of Hegelian unity. Moreover, the context in which I have raised these questions obviously implies the answers that, I believe, can be argued for. Though affirmative replies clearly require further research, I do suspect that the unequal power relations inherent to Hegel's analysis of the family do permeate civil society and the state. As a result, I can see no other consequence than an incomplete and inadequate basis for achieving ethical unity.

Concerning the state itself, at the apex of state unity we find a monarch who again indicates a return to family principles and the familial structure. As head of state, the monarch incarnates "the personality of the state in the will of one individual" (PR, 279). Insofar as the will of the monarch signifies the universal will of a single state, it represents the will of all. Hence, particularity and universality are immediately united, reminiscent of family unity. Hegel refers to this immediate unity to justify his preference for a hereditary monarchy, based upon primogeniture, over an elected one (PR, 281). The monarch is an

...ultimate self in which the will of the state is concentrated...(in) immediate individuality...its 'natural' character is implied in its very conception. The monarch, therefore, is essentially characterized as this individual, in abstraction from all his other characteristics, and this individual is raised to the dignity of monarchy in an immediate, natural, fashion, i.e. through his birth in the course of nature. (PR, 280)

Hegel also affirmed that "with succession to the throne firmly fixed on hereditary principles in accordance with primogeniture...monarchy has been brought back to the patriarchal principle in which it had its historical origin" (PR, 286, 2).

According to Hegel, such a principle attains a higher actuality in the developed state than in primitive communities, though I am not entirely sure what he means by this. It could be because the developed state has reached a higher level of universality, due to the universal recognition of individual freedom. The monarch's will is supposed to reflect such universality. Unlike the head of less developed communities, Hegel's monarch is neither feudal nor despotic.

Hegel's monarch is clearly a Christ-like figure and one wonders as to his gender identity. Is the monarch necessarily male? Like Christ, the monarch exhibits feminine qualities. Might the monarch as easily be female? The question of gender is an important consideration for, as the incarnation of state unity, the monarch should, in some sense be both female and male. (Similarly, Christ's human identity as male is held to be irrelevant insofar as He is God incarnate.) Yet, despite the compelling attraction of the idea of a genderically indifferent monarch, I do not believe that Hegel's monarch can be a woman.

In the first place, the principle of primogeniture favours eldest sons over all other children. Though heredity and primogeniture are not the ~~same~~ thing and Hegel explicitly claims both for the monarchy. As well, contrary to that of women, the monarch's will is univer-

sal. Though expressed in the form of subjectivity, this is not the subjectivity of feminine caprice. It entails attention to universal concerns. Finally, this position is ultimately that of an authority figure. As a subject, the monarch demands and receives the obedience and allegiance of his subjects. He (actively) speaks for his subjects; they are (passively) spoken for. No matter how benevolent and forgiving a particular monarch might be, as head of state he holds a privileged position denied all others by reason of birth. The retention of early patriarchy indicates too close a similarity between the position of the monarch and that of the father. Just as the head of the family is the father and hence a male so, I believe, the head of state must be a man.

Thus, the speculation that generic dualism enters into other areas of community life, thereby undermining ethical unity, is certainly not unfounded. The tendency towards autocracy and one-sided power relations previously found to characterize the family need not be limited to the family. Though I would not go so far as to claim that family inequalities determine community inequalities, I nonetheless contend that a parallel can be drawn between the two. I see no reason why an investigation into the family should not produce certain hypotheses regarding the nature of Hegelian ethical unity in general. Given the

coherent wholism of Hegel's system, it should come as no surprise to find the connections I have just put forward to be very well grounded indeed. I am therefore not convinced of Hegel's success as a philosopher of unity. Pursuing this matter, other difficulties immediately come to mind.

One of these difficulties concerns the unity of nature and spirit. Since women represent nature and men represent spirit in human relations, generic dualism suggests similar disunity between nature and spirit. Or, to put it differently, does the unification of nature and spirit entail the control of nature by spirit, just as family unity entails the domination of women by men?

There is much in Hegel to suggest that this is, in fact, the case. There is much in Hegel that places him well in the mainstream of the modern scientific age. For several centuries, now, mastery over the apparently irrational and unpredictable forces of nature has been considered a rational human activity, confirming the superiority of 'man'. Moreover, without committing Hegel to traditional notions of creation, his attitude towards the natural world is still consistent with most interpretations of Genesis. Not only was Adam fashioned after the image of God, by naming the various plants and animals, he affirmed his right to them, showing that nature exists for the benefit of humankind, who is free to exploit it.

We may recall that, for Hegel, the transition of nature to spirit originates within the family. Though bound to a biological process, human productive relations are raised to the spiritual level through recognition and love. According to Hegel, spirit and nature are immediately united in marriage and family life. However, if recognition and love are absent in reproductive relations, as I have argued, monogamous marriage is more likely a means by which men control the natural reproductive process by, in Landes's words, appropriating female sexuality and reproductive power.²

Such is one way in which the gender relation already signifies the one-sided ascendancy of spirit over nature. We may also recall that spirituality is only fully achieved after one leaves the family. In this way, the immediacy of family unity is broken; the spiritual individual now stands in opposition to his natural origins. At this point in Hegel's scenario, he engages in some kind of human productive activity which, in turn, implies a struggle with natural constraints. This struggle is well expressed in the master-slave section of the Phenomenology.

In the master-slave section, Hegel describes two dialectically developing relationships: that between human and human and that between humankind and the natural world. The struggle begins with individuals who are

apparently without any family, kin or community ties and whose needs are fundamental, selfish and animal-like. To achieve spirituality, receive recognition and free himself from natural limitations, the individual must risk his natural existence: "it is only through staking one's life that freedom is won" (PG, 187). At the completion of the section, we learn exactly why freedom, essential to spirit, really belongs to the slave. Not only does the slave recognize a 'free' master but, more importantly, he labours upon the natural world, thereby transforming it (PG, 195). The importance of such labour is also stressed in the Philosophy of Right:

...to be confined to mere physical needs as such and their direct satisfaction would simply be the condition in which the mental is plunged in the natural and so would be one of savagery and unfreedom, while freedom itself is to be found only in the reflection of mind into itself, in mind's distinction from nature, and in the reflex of mind into nature. (PR, 194, 2)

I do not mean to argue against Hegel in favour of a utopic return to nature. I do agree that productive labour is an essential element of human existence. It would be naive to suppose that we cannot or ought not leave our collective mark upon the natural world. Clearly, human activities do interact with natural forces. Yet, I am

concerned about the kind of domination over nature, and the separation of humankind from nature in order to better control it, that persists in Hegel's thought. Though Hegel intends nature and spirit to be united and insists that the opposition between the two is reconcilable, I fear his account betrays the superiority of spirit to the extent that nature is ours for the taking. Hegel's account is in keeping with the human imperialism that has resulted in the current depletion of natural resources and numerous other environmental disasters. Remarks made in the Introduction to the Philosophy of Nature support my fears.

"In man's practical approach to Nature", Hegel writes, "he correctly regards himself as end" (PN, 245). While admitting that humans cannot completely control nature, he still finds it the order of things that they constantly attempt to do so, seeking "to wear her out, to wear her down, in short, to annihilate her" (PN, 245, 2). Hegel's words are uncomfortably prophetic but he offers no alternative approach. Despite an inclination towards destruction, human enterprise reigns supreme. Nature "is not to be deified; nor are sun, moon, animals, plants, etc., to be regarded and cited as more excellent, as works of God, than human actions and events" (PN, 248, R).

Instead, Hegel maintains otherwise:

...every mental image, the slightest fancy of mind, the play of its most capricious whims, every word, affords a superior ground for knowledge of God's being than any single object of Nature...It is especially an error to regard the products of mind as inferior to natural objects and to regard the latter as superior to human works of art...As if the spiritual form did not contain a higher form of life, and were not more worthy of the spirit, than the natural form... (PN, 248)

Together with the background of a genderic dualism that holds natural woman and spiritual man apart, such comments do seem to weaken the possibility of uniting nature with spirit. As I pointed out in Chapter One when discussing this issue as it appears in the Philosophy of Mind, unification requires the spiritualization of nature via the rational domination of human knowledge and transformative action. For this very reason, however, I suspect that reconciliation is again thwarted by a one-sided power relation.

Another difficulty indicated by genderic dualism rests with Hegel's very notion of Absolute Spirit. Concretely universal, the Absolute is supposed to unite all opposites in one enduring unity. Like God, it is neither one-sidedly female or one-sidedly male - at least, ideally. But how, exactly, are women placed within it? The criteria Hegel uses to determine its actualization are decidedly spiritu-

al. Hegel's Absolute is spirit knowing itself as spirit and willing itself accordingly. It is reached by way of human knowledge, reason and action, all of which are male attributes. Though feeling and feminine caprice are subsumed under it, they are retained as a lower stage in its actualization. Strictly speaking, Hegel's Absolute Spirit, expressed in art, religion and philosophy, remains a male manifestation.

This, at any rate, is the claim put forward by Mills. Quite likely it is a claim that Solomon would support, having described the Phenomenology as a 'male odyssey'.³ According to Mills, women are excluded from Hegel's system, an exclusion which limits and therefore discredits that system:

There is no possibility that the stages of Spirit will be repeated in woman. She can never aspire to 'concrete' universality, that is, individuality, since she cannot attain particularity much less universality. Hegel's universal is necessarily male and male is not universal. Humanity is both male and female and the claim to universality of human experience must allow for woman's experience and participation which Hegel's system does not. While Hegel is in search of a philosophical system which embraces all there is, his acceptance of male domination as patriarchal rule sets a limitation to his system such that a male rather than a human world is what is described. (4)

It must by now be clear that I believe one could trace disunity throughout the entirety of Hegel's work if one began from the standpoint of genderic dualism. I have also come to suspect that the problem is primarily a methodological one, having to do with Hegel's own rational framework. To be fair, I have found fluidity, interaction and openness in much of what Hegel says. Because it is anti-dualist, his philosophical project is an admirable one. Prima facie, I agree with some of his ideas, particularly his notions of recognition and freedom. I believe his system is intended to be a basically egalitarian one. Unfortunately, I also believe his methodological constraints have weakened his system, such that his ideas simply do not work in practice. His emphasis upon opposition has led to a quite particular kind of reconciliation. I fail to see how opposition, especially in terms of gender and gender relations, is overcome in a higher unity. Instead, it would appear that one side overpowers the other.

Gender and Gender Relations: Towards an Alternative

The question of gender differences will not likely be decided in the near future. So long as women and men live predominantly separate lives - whether at work or at play - the debate will continue. It is as much a biological as a philosophical issue. Women may be thankful that female contributions to the conception of new life are beginning to be recognized. Men are no longer credited with reproductive animation. Nevertheless, a new biological front has replaced the old one - that of hormonal determinism.

I have not discussed this front for several reasons. In the first place, this has been a thesis on Hegel and Hegel could not have known about hormones and hormonal differences. Second, I must admit that I know little about them myself. I am certainly no expert, but I do retain much scepticism when informed of certain hormonal 'findings'. I am sure that hormones do influence human development and behavior. I doubt very much, however, if gender differences can be reduced to the level of testosterone in one's body. Until I am convinced that research into hormonal differences and the way they influence gender characteristics has not the goal of grounding preconceived notions of femininity and masculinity, I will continue to suspend belief. Such research reminds me too much of intelligence tests that once proved the intellectual

inferiority of blacks. But perhaps I am being too harsh.

I will stress that any methodology employed in investigating gender differences from whatever scientific perspective must avoid couching its terms in oppositional language. To use oppositional language already influences the results. Regarding contemporary socio-political concerns, I do not think it pragmatically advisable to initiate research that will inevitably reinforce stereotypical and harmful conceptions of gender differences. Feminist research especially must strive to develop a new, non-oppositional methodology from which to approach these issues.

Unfortunately, I do not believe that Mary O'Brien has succeeded in developing such a methodology. Indeed, O'Brien's weakness rests in her too ready adoption of a Hegelian-based dialectics. Though she reveals some important distinctions regarding female and male reproductive roles, O'Brien rather quickly marks these distinctions as oppositional. She then deduces opposing gender consciousnesses from them, assigning continuity and integration to women, discontinuity and alienation to men.

As well as challenging traditional notions of the human reproductive process, O'Brien's main strength rests in her insight that opposition tends to resolve itself by way of domination. Once certain experiences are perceived

in terms of alienation and separation, resolution entails a struggle for power and control. This is a very Hegelian concept. Both Hegel and O'Brien similarly hold that certain experiences are necessarily alienating ones. Alienation is given an ontological status as a primordial human condition. Or, to be more precise, as a primordial male condition. While I do accept alienation as a historical phenomenon, linked with certain fundamental biological needs such as nutrition and procreation, I do not accept that these needs must be experienced in the form of alienation or that alienation is ontologically necessary.

Still, no matter how alienation enters the scene, it must be resolved. In The Politics of Reproduction, the material base of alienation is uncertain paternity; patriarchy is the means to resolution. According to O'Brien, "history demonstrates the lengths to which men have gone to ameliorate the uncertainty of paternity, both conceptually and institutionally".⁵ Consequently, much of The Politics of Reproduction represents an alternative reading of history as a cumulative series of male supremacist acts. Among these, we have the appropriation of children as well as the reproductive labour power of women, through the institution of monogamous marriage. In turn, the private household developed alongside monogamous marriage, thereby

ensuring exclusive propriety over women, who were separated from other men and possible temptation. As both reproductive (private) and productive (public) creators, men reigned supreme. Corresponding to the development of patriarchal institutions was a patriarchal world-view that held everything worthwhile to be man-made. In place of Mother Nature, we have God, the Spiritual Creator. Today, everything from sexual dysfunction to sexual violence, through economic imperialism and political oppression, to environmental disaster and the prospect of nuclear war, can be explained according to the patriarchal model.

I accept the conviction that male domination has contributed to and often initiated all of these things. Rape especially is a clear act of male aggression; domestic violence yet another way of asserting control. The public-private dichotomy has facilitated male ascendancy in both spheres. If only by denying women a female support system, the divide and conquer schema has been largely successful. If there is a link between gender relations and human control over nature that tends towards domination and extremism, then it would not be unreasonable to suppose a connection between patriarchy, environmental destruction and global militarism - perhaps even a causal connection of some kind.

Still, I do not accept that patriarchy alone offers a sufficient account of human history. Nor, for that matter, does any economically oriented framework such as Marxism. As well, I do not think that the uncertainty of paternity alone can ground O'Brien's claim that males must experience reproductive alienation. Though it seems evident that uncertainty is a necessary condition of alienation, it is not at all evident that uncertainty is a sufficient condition of alienation. Some other condition must be, or have been, present to instill the desire for paternal certainty. Without such desire, could one experience alienation? Would O'Brien's claim that ejaculation biologically confirms male reproductive alienation make much sense? I suspect that the need to ensure certain paternity and, indeed, the experience of alienation itself have as much to do with considerations of property as they have with reproductive ones.

To be fair, O'Brien agrees that uncertain paternity, with its corresponding patriarchy, cannot explain the whole of human history. Inclined towards Marxism, she does allow for economic analyses. Still, patriarchy remains 'determinant in the last instance'. It is my own view that neither patriarchy nor economics enjoy this privileged status, though taken together the two models likely complete each other. In terms of providing a relatively coherent and

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convincing hypothesis regarding the origin of marriage and the family, perhaps a theory such as Hegel's (or Engel's) might enrich some of O'Brien's insights, just as hers will surely enrich theirs.

In any event, I am afraid we will never have 'true knowledge' of what actually happened so many centuries ago.⁵ In the first place, there are no 'hard facts' to be had - of this or any other historical event. In the second place, the lack of written history clearly compounds the problem. Questions of origin will forever remain a matter of cogent speculation. In this matter, both Hegel and O'Brien have offered respectable, if incomplete and sometimes problematic, accounts.

While I do have difficulties with O'Brien's acceptance of Hegelian dialectics, I have noted at least one other aspect of her theory where she finds, but does not acknowledge, an ally of sorts in Hegel. Observing that death "has haunted the philosophical imagination since Man the Thinker first glimmered into action", O'Brien complains that there are "no comparable philosophies of birth".⁶ In attempting to develop such a philosophy, she forges a link between birth and death. According to O'Brien, species immortality and personal mortality are mediated in the act of giving birth. Since only women give birth, only women have direct access to this mediation or, in other words, to

species continuity. The feminine consciousness is therefore one of integration. Men, on the other hand, do not give birth, are alienated from the reproductive process and experience not species continuity but discontinuity.⁷

Strictly speaking, Hegel offers no philosophy of birth. He is, however, among a small number of philosophers who do attend to human reproduction. Like O'Brien, Hegel also recognizes that death and reproduction, anyway, are connected. Unlike O'Brien, he does not genderically distinguish between female and male experiences of this connection. At any rate, he does not do so explicitly and his evaluation of the connection is similar to O'Brien's account of male discontinuity. While I do not agree that reproduction is, as Hegel claims, the means by which we overcome separation from our species and generic other, I do agree that children are, as Hegel also observes, one way that singular humans do extend themselves. In O'Brien's words, reproduction allows humans to further integrate themselves in the ongoing community.

For different reasons, neither Hegel nor O'Brien ever really admit that women suffer or must contend with the prospect of their own personal mortality. Hegel does not find much in a woman's life that threatens her existence. As I have already argued, he too closely connects women

with nature and species-family universality. This association suggests that women somehow fail to comprehend the import of their own mortality. It is certainly not clear that a woman's inevitable demise matters to her in at all the same way that a man's death matters to him.

In contrast to Hegel, O'Brien at least points out the life-threatening aspect of female reproductive labour. At the same time, however, feminine integration diminishes the existential significance of female mortality. Perhaps philosophy has over-emphasized death as a fundamental determinant of the 'meaning of life'. Perhaps an integrative approach might balance this tradition. But it might also be the case that women, despite motherhood, must and do come to terms with death. O'Brien's analysis on this point rather oversimplifies the picture. While men go about erecting monuments to themselves in an effort to overcome personal mortality, women continue to have children and ensure species continuity with little regard to their own eventual ends. O'Brien's attitude is somewhat reminiscent of Hegel's. Indeed, there are times when her portrayal of 'femininity' is as based in nature, feeling and self-sacrifice as Hegel's is. Though she does avoid the female supremacy and consequent dualism of radical feminism, the tendencies are still there.

O'Brien's main weakness, as I have already claimed, rests in her acceptance of a dialectical method that couches its terms in oppositional language. From the uncontroversial facts of biological ejaculation and socio-biological uncertain paternity, she draws the conclusion of male reproductive alienation, a conclusion that is not at all obvious. In contrast, women immediately know their reproductive inclusion as soon as they find themselves with child. It remains, of course, that men are not excluded from reproduction in opposition to women who are included. Both are included, though in different ways. What are these ways and how can they be non-oppositionally expressed?

Since I began my own investigation into gender differences, this question has plagued me. Though I am convinced that women and men are not opposed genitally, hormonally or according to any other biologically derived opposition, it still seems that there is one opposition that cannot be avoided. The fact is, women give birth and men do not. Until such time as reproduction is rendered totally artificial, if there ever is such a time, pregnancy and labour will continue to fall to women and will never fall to men.

The social significance of this apparent opposition has a long history. Free from the burden of pregnancy, the bulk of male activities has fallen outside of the family. For whatever reason, men have traditionally overcome the

fact that they do not give birth by appropriating female labour power in various ways. Left to the family, women have tended to view freedom as lying somewhere beyond family ties. Because they do become pregnant, the responsibility for contraception has largely been left to women. Promiscuity is frowned upon. Abortion, day-care and safe and reliable birth control are all 'women's' issues. Consequently, the women's movement has rightly demanded a contraceptive-based liberation along with affirmative action and the right to work outside the home. Similar to men, who are perceived as the ones with power, women either do not want to give birth or do want to determine when in their lives they will have children.

But gender differences are not adequately captured by this reproductive opposition. Moreover, the opposition tends to distort gender relations. Left alone, it suggests an amalgam of other oppositional differences. It allows us to forget that men are included in the reproductive process which, in turn, usually leads to either over-compensation or under-representation of male participation. (Often, it leads to both; that is, men 'create' children at conception, but then leave the drudgery of child-raising up to women.) Thus, I propose that we redescribe this basic biological difference such that women bear and men, for lack of a better word, beget children. Outside the

animating residue of 'beget', 'bear' and 'beget' need not and actually do not express an oppositional relationship.

Though I may be playing with words, I believe this play is legitimate. We view the world and our respective places within it through language. Language both determines and expresses how we perceive things. When describing differences, it is less harmful to emphasize similarity over opposition. Similarity is less likely to lead to the plethora of 'isms' that has undermined human solidarity. Racism, agism and sexism immediately come to mind. In the end, of course, women and men are neither the same nor opposed.

By way of analogy, we can remind ourselves of the Freudian genital opposition: men have penises and women lack penises. The psychic development of femininity and masculinity is, for Freud, largely determined by this anatomical distinction. Moreover, while Freudian feminists like Juliet Mitchell seek to diminish Freud's emphasis upon the phallus by stressing symbolism over crude genital determinism, it is still the case that the penis plays a primordial role. According to Mitchell, the misused concept of 'penis envy' is underlied by "Freud's much more complex notion of the power of the image of the phallus within human society".⁸ The phallus is only the symbolic indicator of power and the penis itself does not determine

male supremacy.

Granted, those with penises are in control and generally enjoy a privileged social status. It is not, however, at all the case that Freud's 'Some Psychological Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction Between the Sexes', for example, is solely concerned with a symbolic phallus. Rather, Freud is discussing genderically differentiated Oedipal resolutions, based upon the fact that little boys have penises and little girls do not. Concerning the so-called feminine Oedipus complex, Freud claims that little girls behave very differently from little boys:

They notice the penis of a brother or playmate, strikingly visible and of large proportion, at once recognize it as the superior counterpart of their own small and inconspicuous organ, and from that time forward fall a victim to envy for the penis. (9)

The little girl, Freud continues, "makes her judgement and her decision in a flash. She has seen it and knows that she is without it and wants to have it."¹⁰

Accepting of psychoanalysis, Juliet Mitchell cannot pass off penis envy entirely. She agrees as to the necessity of the Oedipal phase in sexual-gender maturation.

tion. What counts, she says, "is the significance that all babies and, for that matter, all people give to absence, as such."¹¹ Apparently, we all want what we do not have. If the little girl so profoundly recognizes her lack why should she not wish to make amends for it? Why should she not want a penis and why should she not await one in the form of penetration at intercourse or in the form of a baby, as Freud observes? Why should she not emerge from the Oedipal phase (if all goes well) as a passive female complete with the other character traits that Freud has now anatomically explained?¹¹

I may be mistaken about my own Oedipal phase, but I do not recall wanting my brother's penis when, as a young girl, I used to share a bath with him. Indeed, I do not recall ever thinking of myself as lacking a penis, either because I never had one or because it had been castrated. Instead, when I noted the difference I was told that girls have vaginas and boys have penises. That was why my brother was not the same as I. Though I was about three years old at the time, I remember this explanation as being quite satisfying. Of course, this is not to say that I never wished to be a boy. Boys seemed to have more freedom, a wider range of career choices and things like that. Now, I believe that women can also achieve freedom and even

power, in spite of the fact that we do not boast the phallic indicator of freedom and power.

My personal experiences are likely philosophically irrelevant. I am sure a Freudian analyst would have a field day with my denial. Still, it does strike me that we can speculate as to sexual-gender differences without referring to the so-called lack of a female phallus. Certainly little girls do not have penises; they have vaginas. Female genitals are not marked by an absence but by a presence.

Returning to my proposal regarding the description of reproductive differences, such a description clearly emphasizes similarity.¹⁴ At the same time, it does not blur distinctions for it contains the limited 'truth' of the oppositional description while avoiding oppositional baggage. Finally, it indicates an approach to the practice of gender relations that need not entail domination. It does this because it takes similarity and difference into account.

To begin, I think my description better captures the process whereby reproduction originates with the biological egg and sperm and ends with the social phenomenon of parenthood. It further indicates that conception and parenting are shared by both women and men. Similarly, contraception and reproductive control are joint responsi-

bilities. This latter point need not lead to a male 'pill'; it does demand full community concern for safe reproductive technology. I admit that my proposal does not eliminate the biological uncertainty of paternity. Still, it welcomes men to rejoin the reproductive process on equal terms with women. This may entail the retention of monogamy or serial monogamy. It is also facilitated by contraception. Undoubtedly, some family form will remain, though it will no longer be the predominant domain of women dominated by men. So grounded, reproductive relations need not produce a private-public dichotomy. What my proposal really demands is a more difficult commitment in gender relations: that of mutual recognition and trust.

Mary O'Brien concludes The Politics of Reproduction with the hope that women and men will "abandon a long pre-occupation with sleeping together in favour of being awake together". She advocates "the reintegration of women on equal terms into the productive process" of public life and "the reintegration of men on equal terms into the reproductive process" of family life.¹² Such is the practice of gender relations that reflect the connection between similarity and difference.

In terms of similarity, this means that women and men each work outside the home as well as inside the home. It means that women and men, whether as lovers or as friends,

recognize each other as rational, emotional, independent and interdependent individuals. Moreover, once men do participate in child and home care, these activities will, as they must, be accorded a 'spiritual' status within human existence.

In terms of difference, this means that women recognize and respect the existential significance of uncertain paternity. In the past, unequal gender relations have resulted in female manipulation of this singularly powerful asset in order to compensate for an overall lack of control. To invite men back into the reproductive realm entails responsibility as well as liberation.

At the same time, women do give birth and this must be returned to them. Philosophically and scientifically, women's particular reproductive role must be acknowledged. Practically, this suggests a move away from male dominated obstetrics where labouring women are rendered virtually passive by medication and helpless by unnatural birthing positions. The current call for reinstituting midwifery is, I think, a timely one. Babies are not so much delivered as born and birthing is an active process. I believe that birthing is probably best assisted by medically trained women who obviously share the female reproductive role. Though this does not mean the exclusion of doctors and fathers from participating in the event, the call for

midwifery recognizes that the act of giving birth is basically a female affair. Given Mary O'Brien's own concern with human reproduction, her theoretical insights and her practical conclusions, it is, perhaps, most fitting that she herself was once a midwife.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

- 1 Taylor, Charles. Hegel. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975, p. 76.
- 2 Findlay, J.N. "Foreword" in Hegel's Philosophy of Nature. Oxford: Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1970, p. xiii.
- 3 Taylor, p. 313.
- 4 Gillian Rose refers to Hegel's theory of unity as one of a speculative identity. According to Rose, to "read a proposition 'speculatively' means that the identity which is affirmed between subject and predicate is seen equally to affirm a lack of identity between subject and predicate." Rose also claims that only the experience of the lack of identity enables one to grasp the identity. See Rose, Gillian. Hegel Contra Sociology. London: Humanities Press, 1981, pp. 48-50. Hegel states this kind of identity relationship himself in the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, 60-64.
- 5 My own understanding of Hegel's Logic is primarily drawn from Taylor's presentation of it in his book on Hegel. See also, Hegel, G.W.F. Philosophy of Logic, translated by William Wallace. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975, especially Chapter VII, "The Doctrine of Being".
- 6 Taylor, p. 232.
- 7 Taylor, pp. 232-233.
- 8 In light of Marxist accusations that Hegel ignored the problem of alienated labour, one could reply that he at least anticipated the problem in the master-slave section of the Phenomenology. As well, the mediating force of the collectivity in 'socializing' individual labour and property ownership (though not in terms of state or collective ownership) is indicated in the Philosophy of Right, 189-198.
- 9 O'Brien, Mary. The Politics of Reproduction. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981, p. 34.

- 10 O'Brien, pp. 4-6.
- 11 O'Brien, pp. 19-65.
- 12 O'Brien, p. 25.
- 13 This is confirmed by O'Brien's discussion of Hegel in the first chapter of her book, pages, 25-35. O'Brien also accuses Hegel of being "unrepentant and bitter misogynist" (p. 24), though this is probably somewhat exaggerated. O'Brien does not explain why Hegel hated women. As far as I can tell, neither his philosophical evaluation of, nor his own personal relationships with, women suggest that Hegel hated women. He did, however, hold women as quite different from and ethically inferior to men, as we shall see.

CHAPTER ONE

- 1 O'Brien, p. 25.
- 2 In the Phenomenology, the section on culture refers quite specifically to a form of humanism in which the divine (religion) is separated from the human. Historically, 'culture' is situated as the Enlightenment, culminating in the French Revolution. The section on morality is primarily a response to Kant, whose categorical imperative Hegel criticizes as essentially vacuous. According to Hegel, the ethical has to do with community life and not with morality as an individual affair. It concerns law or moral right in its institutionalized, customary and objective expression in the community. It is in this sense that I use the word 'culture' in conjunction with ethical or community life.
- 3 Knox, T.M., Translator's notes to the Philosophy of Right. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 351.
- 4 Ibid.
- 5 See the section on Ethical Life in the Philosophy of Right, especially paragraph 157.

- 6 See the Phenomenology, 178-196. The discussion on the unity of subject and object in self-consciousness undertaken in the Introduction to this thesis was primarily drawn from this section of the Phenomenology.
- 7 Of course, certain animals may die almost immediately after copulation, but this in no way refutes Hegel's argument. Such animals are alive during the act and so experience unity with species universality. Hegel does discuss the relationship between reproduction and immortality in the Philosophy of Nature, something that I appraise as it affects gender relations in Chapter Two.
- 8 O'Brien, Chapter One, especially p. 53 & pp. 58-60.
- 9 Taylor, p. 350.
- 10 Taylor, p. 83.
- 11 Taylor, p. 100.
- 12 See the Philosophy of Right, Preface, p. 10.
- 13 Nalbandov, A.V. Reproductive Physiology of Mammals and Birds, pp. 13-14.
- 14 Sodow, J. et. al. Human Reproduction, p. 73.
- 15 See O'Brien, Chapter One. Her outline of the reproductive moments is found on page 47.
- 16 In Chapter One, p. 57, O'Brien speaks of "man the pro-creator". Her discussion of Plato in Chapter Four holds that Plato moves "to a conception of single male parent-hood" in the Symposium, where "reproduction has nothing to do with women" (p. 127). In Chapter Five, she analyses Aeschylus' Oresteia as a play in which maternity is neglected in favour of the supremacy of paternity.
- 17 Aristotle. "On the Generation of Animals". The Basic Works of Aristotle. Random House, 1966.

- 18 Gender identity is irrelevant because parent and child do not relate to each other as generically distinct individuals. Supposedly, the child is perceived by the parents as generically indifferent. This notion is examined in Chapter Two.
- 19 McMillan, Carol. Women, Reason and Nature. London: Basil Blackwell, 1982.
- 20 Much of the Philosophy of Right concerns the unification of subject and object via the subjective and objective will. This unity, according to Hegel, constitutes human freedom. It also represents the unity of theoretical and practical reason (PR, 4, A). Because women do not achieve such a unity and are incapable of rational reflection, it is unlikely that women are able to realize themselves as free. This will have repercussions when it comes to reconciling gender differences, to be discussed in Chapter Two.
- 21 See the Introduction to the Philosophy of Nature, for Hegel's presentation of the concept of nature. In PN, 247, 2, Hegel states that nature is the Idea in the form of particularity. Relation within nature is external to nature - it is for rational human beings to comprehend. In PN, 250, Hegel refers to the impotence of nature, because reason and unity are externally grasped.
- 22 We have already seen that the recognition exchanged between sisters and brothers^c is marred by overriding gender differences. The impossibility of sibling recognition grounding a woman's sense of particularity will be further explored in Chapter Two when the recognition of love and marriage is also challenged.

CHAPTER TWO

- 1 Kojève, Alexandre. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969, pp. 243-245.

- 2 Ibid. According to Kojève, because there is no risk of life in love, love is not a relation entailing truly human, i.e. creative action. Nor is there any product, for only human action is productive. Hence, birth is something that, apparently, just happens! Procreation is not creative. Hegel's abasement or denial of female reproductive labour, implied by Kojève's interpretation, is signified in the theological metaphor of the Early Theological Writings that in procreation "God has acted and created" (ETW, p. 307). In this way, 'natural' reproduction is usurped by the eternal Holy Father. Insofar as Kojève's understanding of Hegel is an anthropologization of the theological element of Hegel's thought, ("every theology is necessarily an anthropology", p. 71), Kojève claims 'divine' creation for the "Action realized by Man in a given World" (p. 71). This action, examined in the Introduction and first chapter of Kojève's book and returned to in Chapter Seven, clearly concerns male productive labour and excludes female reproductive labour. With Hegel, of course, we already know that in reproduction the true, i.e., human parent is the father. This will be further examined in Chapter Two.
- 3 De Beauvoir, Simone. The Second Sex. New York: Random House, 1974, p. 73.
- 4 Kojève, p. 244 n.
- 5 O'Brien, pp. 69-70.
- 6 Mills, Patricia Jagentowicz. "Hegel and 'The Woman Question': Recognition and intersubjectivity" in The Sexism of Social and Political Thought edited by Lorraine Clark and Lynda Lange. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979, p. 80.
- 7 O'Brien, pp. 71-72.
- 8 De Beauvoir, p. 73.
- 9 Mills, p. 95.
- 10 Solomon, Robert. In The Spirit of Hegel. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983, p. 545.

- 11 See the Master-Slave section of the Phenomenology for an account of the transition from animal (felt) being to human (self-conscious) being.
- 12 Harris, H.S. "Hegel's System of Ethical Life: An Interpretation" in Hegel, G.W.F. System of Ethical Life and First Philosophy of Spirit, edited and translated by H.S. Harris and T.M. Knox. New York: State University of New York Press, 1979, p. 29.
- 13 Ibid.
- 14 Until the manuscripts were translated by Harris and Knox, they were available only in German as the Jena System Manuscripts. They were prepared by Hegel for lectures given in 1802/3 and 1803/4 and not intended for publication. In terms of Hegelian scholarship, they provide important insights into the development of Hegel's thought. They also enable us to better comprehend Hegel's published 'mature' works.
- 15 The transition from natural to human desire in general is outlined in the master-slave section of the Phenomenology, (PG, 166-177). Natural desire is unsatisfying because it is only singularly gratified in moments of consumption or, with sexual desire, copulation. Because "self-consciousness is Desire in general" and because self-consciousness is intrinsically universal and enduring, it seeks a more permanent source of satisfaction. This is the recognition of oneself by another (universal and enduring) self-consciousness or in sexual desire, by the human subject that one loves. Thus, love endures throughout the singularity of sexual satisfaction
- 16 Harris and Knox in Hegel's System of Ethical Life and First Philosophy of Spirit, p. 99.
- 17 Knox in Hegel's Philosophy of Right, p. 347.
- 18 Banning consanguineous marriage in the Philosophy of Right, 168, Hegel adds: "Familiarity, close acquaintance, the habit of common pursuits, should not precede marriage; they should come about for the first time within it" (PR, 168, A). Apparently, only sister and brother (or, perhaps, cousins) should and do enjoy this

kind of relationship outside of marriage. Does Hegel realize that women and men can be friends as well as (and even instead of) lovers?

- 19 According to Hegel, the right of particularity distinguishes the modern (Christian) world from the ancient Greek world. Freedom is only universally realizeable once this right asserts itself and then reunites with universality in a unity of unity and difference, or the individual and the community/state. This concept is explored throughout the Philosophy of Right as well as the Philosophy of History.
- 20 Here, Hegel may also be arguing against Kantian ethics. In the section on morality in the Phenomenology, Hegel does come out opposed to Kantian ethics, which he understands as fundamentally dualistic. (Hegel does not mention Kant by name, but it is generally held by Hegel scholars that he is referring to Kant.) According to Hegel, Kantian ethics founders on two counts: abstract tautological imperatives say nothing and Kant upholds a dualism between what we ought to do (duty or decision) and what we want to do (particular inclination). This signifies a condition in which freedom is absent. Free choice, for Hegel, means that duty and inclination are united.
- 21 Gould, Carol C. "The Woman Question: Philosophy of Liberation and the Liberation of Philosophy" in Women and Philosophy: Toward a Theory of Liberation, edited by Carol C. Gould and Marx W. Wartofsky, New York: Capricorn Books, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1976, p. 37.
- 22 Gould, pp. 34-35.
- 23 Gould, p. 35.
- 24 Landes, Joan B. "Hegel's Conception of the Family" in The Family in Political Thought, edited by Jean Bethke Elshtain. Boston: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1982, p. 138.
- 25 Landes, p. 139.

- 26 Ibid.
- 27 See the Phenomenology, 191-194. According to Hegel, the notion of recognition "is possible only when each is for the other what the other is for it"; i.e., an independent self-consciousness. (PG, 186). Mastery and slavery is completed and overcome when master and slave "recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another" (PG, 184).
- 28 Kojève, p. 244, n.
- 29 Ibid.
- 30 Mills, p. 89.
- 31 Siebert, Rudolf J., Hegel's Concept of Marriage and Family: The Origin of Subjective Freedom. Washington: University Press of America, 1979, p. 54.
- 32 See note 19 above.
- 33 In Sophocles' plays on Antigone and King Oedipus, Antigone clearly displays the attributes of femininity, both in her relations to her father and brothers, as well as to the state and Creon.
- 34 Mills, p. 94.
- 35 Mills, p. 90.
- 36 Mills, p. 91.
- 37 Gould, p. 34.
- 38 Landes, p. 131.
- 39 O'Brien, p. 25.
- 40 Knox in Hegel's Philosophy of Right, p. 351.
- 41 Mills, p. 90.
- 42 Landes, pp. 139-140.

- 40 Knox in Hegel's Philosophy of Right, p. 351.
- 41 Mills, p. 90.
- 42 Landes, pp. 139-140.
- 43 See Hegel's discussion on Property and Contract in the Philosophy of Right.
- 44 Mills, p. 92.
- 45 Harris, H.S. Hegel's Development: Night Thoughts (Jena 1801-1806). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983, p. 117.
- 46 Harris, Night Thoughts, p. 43.
- 47 Harris, Night Thoughts, pp. 323-324.
- 48 Harris, Night Thoughts, p. 324.
- 49 O'Brien, pp. 52-63.
- 50 Mills, p. 95.
- 51 Harris, in Hegel's System of Ethical Life and First Philosophy of Spirit, p. 32.
- 52 Ibid,

CONCLUSION

- 1 See Chapter Two, pp., 115-116 for Gould's comment.
- 2 See Chapter Two, p. 116 for Landes' comment.
- 3 See Chapter Two, p. 94 for Solomon's comment.
- 4 Mills, p. 95.
- 5 O'Brien, p. 43.
- 6 O'Brien, p. 20.
- 7 O'Brien, p. 32.

- 8 Mitchell, Juliet. Woman's Estate. New York: Vintage Books, 1973, p. 167.
- 9 Freud, Sigmund, "Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction Between the Sexes" (1925) in On Sexuality, Volume 7 of Collected Works, edited by Angela Richards, General Editor. London: Penguin Books, 1977, p. 335.
- 10 Freud, p. 336.
- 11 Freud, p. 342. Freud speaks of feminine character traits as follows: "(women) show less sense of justice than men...they are less ready to submit to the great exigencies of life...they are more often influenced in their judgements by feelings of affection or hostility..." A woman's 'super-ego' is primitive at best.
- 12 O'Brien, p. 210.

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