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EDUCATION IN NIGERIA AND
ITS ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

by
Richard Alexander Maclure, B.A., P.G.C.E.

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies and Research in partial
fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
in International Affairs

The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs
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April 8, 1980

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ABSTRACT

The Nigerian Federal Government has embarked on an ambitious programme of free universal primary education (UPE) and continuing expansion of subsidized post-primary schooling. The rationale underlying the government's national education programme is that education is considered the instrument par excellence for effecting national development. Certainly there is justification for UPE. However, on the basis of numerous socio-economic indicators, there is substantial evidence to suggest that too much is expected of Nigeria's education programme. As the school system expands the quality of education appears to be declining. At certain levels of the educational system the economic returns and the instrumental value of school learning do not seem to justify the present rate of educational investment. Similarly, education appears to have little positive effect on rising unemployment and a dualistic political economy. In fact, the dilemma of state-subsidized education in Nigeria is that while it is eagerly endorsed throughout the country, it reinforces socio-economic dualism, and thence may hinder a truly national process of development.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

page

INTRODUCTION

A. National Educational Aims and Objectives	1
B. The Shortcomings of Formal Education: Socio-Economic Indicators	12
C. The Proposed Study	14
D. A Comment on Methodology	17
E. Chapter Outline	21

CHAPTER 1: The Internal Function of Formal Education: Quantity versus Quality

1.1 Introduction	28
1.2 Curriculum Content in Primary and Secondary Schools	31
1.3 Individual Modernity: The Affective Influence of Formal Schooling	37
1.4 The Indicators of Declining Educational Quality	53
1.5 Teachers	62
1.6 Examinations and School Curricula	69
1.7 Quantity versus Quality: The Long-Term View	79

CHAPTER 2: The Economics of Education: Costs and Returns and the Allocative Effectiveness of Educational Funding

2.1 Introduction	89
2.2 Costs of Formal Education	92
2.3 Cost-Benefit Analysis of Education: A Contentious Issue	105
2.4 The Subsidization of Education: The Differential of Private and Social Rates of Return	114
2.5 The Estimated Economic Value (and Related Degree of Subsidization) of Some Areas of Nigerian Education: The Results of Three Cost-Benefit Studies	119
2.6 Conclusion: The Need for Reduced Spending and/or Re-Investment in Other Forms of Education	138

CHAPTER 3: The Instrumental Value of Education in
Labour Productivity

3.1	Introduction	149
3.2	The Instrumental Value of Education in the Modern Sector	152
3.3	The Instrumental Value of Education in the Intermediate Sector	165
3.4	The Instrumental Value of Education in the Agricultural Sector	177
3.5	The Instrumental Limitations of Formal Education	186

CHAPTER 4: Education, Employment, and the Pattern of
Industrialization in the Modern and Inter-
mediate Sectors of Nigeria's Economy

4.1	Introduction	195
4.2	Unemployment: The Imbalance between the Supply and Demand of Formally Educated Manpower	200
4.3	Unemployment and Modern Sector Industrialization	215
4.4	Unemployment and the Modern Sector Wage Structure	229
4.5	Education, Employment, and Underdevelopment in the Intermediate Industrial Sector	241
4.6	Education and the Potential for Intermediate Industrial Development: A Need for an Alternative Strategy	254

CHAPTER 5: Education, Agriculture, and Rural Under-
development

5.1	Introduction	276
5.2	The State of Agriculture in Nigeria	279
5.3	Rural-Urban Migration Among School Leavers	285
5.4	UPE and Rural Development	290
5.5	Informal Education and the Need for an Integration of Development Policies	300

CHAPTER 6: <u>Education and National Integration</u>	
6.1 Introduction	310
6.2 Formal Education and Conflict Minimization	316
6.3 Formal Education and Horizontal Integration	322
6.4 Formal Education and Vertical Segmentation	338
CHAPTER 7: <u>Education and the Need for Change: A Socio-Political Dilemma</u>	
7.1 Introduction	354
7.2 Public Demand for Formal Education	357
7.3 Formal Education and Individual Attitudes: Entitlement versus Obligation	368
7.4 Formal Education and the Preservation of the Status Quo	374
7.5 The Role of the State	382
<u>CONCLUSION</u>	391
<u>APPENDICES</u>	404
<u>BIBLIOGRAPHY</u>	418

LIST OF TABLES

page

Table I.A	Educational Enrollments, 1960-80	6
Table 1.A	Correlations of Ten Independent Variables with OM-500 (Overall Modernity)	42
1.B	Percentage High on OM-500 for Increasing Amounts of Education	44
1.C	Correlations of Education and OM-500 for Factory Workers	45
1.D	The Modernity of Otherwise Matched Groups, Differentiated, as Having More or Less Education	47
1.E	Results of Primary School Leaving and West African School Certificate Examinations	61
Table 2.A	Recurrent Estimates of Government Expenditure	95
2.B	State Budgets, 1976/77 and 1977/78	96
2.C	Social and Private Rates of Return by Educational Level	122
2.D	Social Unit Costs per Student Year by Educational Level	122
2.E	Foregone Earnings per Student Year by Educational Level	123
2.F	Ratios of Direct and Total Costs per Student Year by Educational Level	123
2.G	Absolute and Relative Enrollments by Educational Level	124
2.H	Distribution of Enrollments by Educational Level	124
2.I	Distribution of Total Resources Devoted to Education	124
2.J	Average Annual Wages by Educational Level	125
2.K	Private and Social Rates of Return in Wage Employment (Apprentice Training and Trade School Training)	131

Table 3.A	Educational Distribution According to Category of Labour	155
3.B	Wage Relationships between Non-Schooled and Schooled Workers	160
3.C	Average Annual Earnings by Age and Schooling Level	168
3.D	Educational Background of Small-Scale Entrepreneurs	171
3.E	Level of Education Among Apprentices (Printing Industry)	176
3.F	Level of Education Among Proprietors/ Entrepreneurs (Printing Industry)	176
3.G	Level of Farmers' Education and Exposure to Instrumental Information	180
3.H	Exposure to Instrumental Information and Adoption of Recommended Farm Practices	182
Table 4.A	Sectoral Distribution of Total Gainful Employment, 1975	203
4.B	Sectoral Distribution of Employment, 1980	204
4.C	Growth Rates in Sectoral Output and Employment, 1975-80	206
4.D	Unemployment, 1975 and 1980	212
4.E	Activity of Primary and Secondary School Leavers, Western State, 1969 and 1972	213
4.F	Inter-Skill Differentials in Selected Sectors of the Nigerian Economy	232
4.G	Skill Wage Differentials in the Nigerian Industrial Sector, 1956-67	233
4.H	Industrial Disputes, 1974-76	236
Table 6.A	Recognition of National Identity by Educational Level	328
6.B	Percentages of Fathers of Ilosho Students in Various Occupational Categories, 1948-66	331
6.C	Data on University Students' Fathers' Occupations and Incomes	333-34
6.D	Education of Students' Parents: Contrasting Samples	335

Table 7.A	Educational Expectations of Secondary School Boys and Girls	362
7.B	Occupational Expectations of Secondary School Boys and Girls	363
7.C	Student Employer Preference (University)	378

INTRODUCTION

A. National Educational Aims and Objectives

Of all the policies undertaken by Nigeria's Federal Military Government in the past decade, none has had such a direct sweeping impact, nor has fired such widespread hopes and aspirations, as has its commitment to expand and consolidate subsidized formal school education throughout all regions of the country. On the basis of the view that education is "the instrument par excellence for effecting national development",¹ the federal government has since 1975 incorporated an ambitious programme of free universal primary education (UPE) and post-primary school expansion into its overall development strategy.² Spurred on by soaring national revenue in the aftermath of OPEC price hikes, the government formalized its commitment to education in the Third National Development Plan:

Nigeria continues to recognize education as a powerful instrument for social change in a process of dynamic nation-building. Government commitment...is the creation of an educational system capable of ensuring that every citizen is given full opportunity to develop his intellectual and working capabilities for his own benefit and that of his community. In this pursuit, the Educational Programme for this Plan period will seek in a very radical way to transform the educational scene of this country by improving and expanding substantially the existing facilities.³

For the purpose of this paper, and in accordance with the explicit assumptions of Nigerian policy, education is here defined as the organized provision of training which is meant to instill or enhance the knowledge, skills and abilities of individual learners. Arguably, the phenomenon or process of education is not amenable to categorization. Nevertheless, for the sake of clarity, we suggest that a differentiation be made between formal and informal education. Generally, we shall refer to the education which is provided by all those institutions (schools) operating under the jurisdiction of federal or state ministries of education as being formal. Those education programmes which operate independently of government, or are sponsored by different ministries, we shall refer to as informal.

By initiating a massive educational programme within the context of the Third National Plan, and by underwriting the immense costs which such a programme has since shown to entail, the government has in effect demonstrated its conviction that the education of the majority of Nigerians is a vital factor in the nation's development process.

Before attempting to examine specifically the proposed contribution of education to Nigeria's national development, it may initially be useful to define the concept of national development and to provide an indication of the overall objectives of Nigeria's development strategy. We shall base

the arguments of this paper on the assumption that development is both an economic and a socio-political process.

Firstly, we may say that economic development encompasses two components. Obviously, one component is simply that of economic growth, that is, the increase in per capita output as measured by GNP. The second component of economic development is the creation of an overall economic system which has the capacity not only to sustain its rate of growth, but also to distribute in a fairly equitable manner the benefits of that growth, i.e. the increasing number of goods and social services which become available.

Socio-political development appears less cut and dried, if only perhaps because it is less susceptible to quantitative measurement and is therefore open to more subjective analysis and debate. Nevertheless, in the view of a number of contemporary writers socio-political development involves the creation of societal and political infrastructure in which all citizens are free to participate actively and gainfully in all spheres of the political economy, not only for their own individual benefit, but for the collective benefit of society as well.⁴ Development in this sense refers to the broad process of human development. The development of man and of society is a process of evolution, of adaptation to the environment, and to other men and other societies.

From this we may accept the view that "development is a historical process which encompasses the entire life of

the nation".⁵ We would be mistaken, however, if we were then to surmise that this historical process is simply a haphazard series of events, dependent only on the exigencies of uncontrolled forces. On the contrary, for many countries -- and for Nigeria in particular -- the idea of national development is given concrete substance in the form of comprehensive economic and socio-political programmes designed to meet what are perceived as the needs of society. It is in the adoption of these programmes that the course of a nation's development is largely realized. In short, for a developing country such as Nigeria, development involves the array of fiscal, monetary, and income policies, and of social services, which must be planned for. Development is a planning process with specified objectives, and while the process may often result in quite unanticipated outcomes, its momentum is nonetheless dependent on the programmes which planners devise and which administrators carry into effect.

In Nigeria, throughout the last five years, national development programmes have largely emanated as part of an overall development strategy outlined in the aforementioned 1975-80 Third National Development Plan. As outlined in the Plan, the fundamental objectives of national development are as follows:

- a) increase in per capita income;
- b) more even distribution of income;
- c) reduction in unemployment;
- d) increase in the supply of high level manpower;
- e) diversification of the economy;

- f) balanced development;
- g) indigenization of economic activity.⁶

On close examination it is apparent that some of these objectives are vague or immeasurable on a time scale. Others appear almost contradictory. Nevertheless, the official view is that,

The overall strategy of the Plan is simple... it is the development strategy of the government to utilize the resources from oil to develop the productive capacity of the economy and thus permanently improve the standard of living of the people. In the relatively short time that the economy will enjoy a surplus of investible resources it is intended that maximum effort will be made to create the economic and social infrastructure necessary for self-sustaining growth in the longer run when resources scarcity may recur.⁷

In pursuit of these broad national objectives, the expansion of education has been considered of prime importance. As stipulated in the Third Plan, for instance, enrollment in the school system during the plan period was to have risen at an unprecedented rate: at the primary and tertiary levels, the numbers of students were to be more than doubled and in secondary schools and teachers' colleges, enrollment figures were to increase four-fold and five-fold, respectively (see Table).

Table I. A
Educational Enrollments, 1960-80

Year	Primary	Secondary Grammar	Sec.Tech.and Vocational	Teacher Training	Universities
1960	2,912,618	135,364	5,037	27,908	1,395
1964	2,849,488	205,002	7,702	31,054	6,719
1971	3,894,559	343,313	15,590	38,095	14,371
1973	4,746,808	448,904	22,588	46,951	23,173
1980 ^o	11,521,500	1,555,180	177,686	234,680	53,000

^oProjected.

Source: Federal Republic of Nigeria, Third National Development Plan
1975-80, Vol. I, Tables 16.1-16.5, pp. 238-43.

Such quantitative targets, of course, have generated further demands in terms of administrative efficiency, the provision of buildings and school materials, and the supply of professionally competent teaching personnel. Likewise, the expansion of schooling has substantially raised capital and recurrent expenditure on education. Yet the official view is as follows: "Government's over-riding intention is to make ...education at all levels cheaply available to the greater numbers of qualified students. In other words, finances should not be the main constraint in the path of a serious and qualified student's access to good education."⁸

The expansion and subsidization of the school system, however, are not the sole educational concerns of government. Because the role of education in the nation's development

process is regarded as "a powerful instrument of social change", efforts in the past few years have been made to define the precise aims and objectives of education in Nigeria. The initial thrust to establish a single well-defined approach to education came in 1973 when the federal government organized a seminar of experts to examine the entire national education system. Instructed to promulgate ideas for a new national education policy to be "closely related to the socio-economic needs and goals of the country",⁹ the seminar concluded by proposing the following aims and objectives:

- a) the inculcation of national consciousness and national unity;
- b) the inculcation of the right type of values and attitudes for the survival of the individual and Nigerian society;
- c) the training of the mind in understanding the world around;
- d) the acquisition of appropriate skills, abilities, and competence both mental and physical as equipment for the individual to live in and contribute to the development of society.¹⁰

The Report of the Seminar further declared that "Nigeria's national philosophy on education must be based on equal opportunity for all citizens of the nation at the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels, both inside and outside the formal school system".¹¹

These points were duly endorsed by the Federal Military Government, and on the basis of the seminar's recommendations

the government ultimately published its White Paper, National Policy on Education, in 1977. In brief, official educational policy was to embrace the following ideals:

- a) Education is to be highly rated, because education is the most important instrument of change -- intellectual and social change must be preceded by educational revolution.
- b) Lifelong education is to be the basis of policy.
- c) Educational and training facilities are to be multiplied and become more accessible so as to enable more individual choice.
- d) Educational activity is to be centred on the learner for maximum self-development.
- e) Universal basic education, in a variety of forms, is to be provided to all citizens.
- f) Education is to be related to overall community needs.
- g) Educational assessment and evaluations are to be liberalized; there shall be continuous assessment of individual progress.
- h) Modern educational techniques are to be increasingly used at all levels of the educational system.
- i) The education system is to be structured so as to develop the practice of self-learning.
- j) At any stage after primary education an individual can choose:
 - (i) continuation of full-time study;
 - (ii) a combination of work and study;
 - (iii) full-time employment without excluding the possibility of later study.
- k) Religious instruction will be available.
- l) Physical education will be available at all levels.¹²

A further policy proposal is the re-organization of the formal education structure from the so-called 6-5-2-3 system to a 6-3-3-4 system. According to the first system, at the base of the structure is the six-year primary school programme. This is followed by five years of secondary education, consisting of grammar school, commercial or technical trade school, or teacher training college. The next tier consists of the two-year secondary advanced programme, again divided according to content -- pre-university academic, advanced teacher training, or commercial-technical. At the top of the structure is the three-year tertiary level of university or polytechnic (see Appendix I). The revision of the school system along the proposed 6-3-3-4 lines obviously creates major change at the secondary school level. In this case, following primary schooling the secondary stage is to consist of a three-year junior secondary programme "designed to offer continuing basic education and vocational advice and orientation. Those who leave at this stage are expected to possess improved communication skills and some basic scientific and technical skills which will make them employable in commerce and industry."¹³ At the senior secondary level, schools will offer a further three years of training and, for those students eligible, will provide "alternative routes" to the proposed four years of higher education. In effect, the "third stage and the tertiary levels are expected to

meet the middle and high manpower needs for rapid economic growth."¹⁴ (See Appendix II). While the adoption of the proposed re-organization of the formal school structure has necessitated the creation of an Implementation Task Force to ensure a systematic transformation, it is not yet possible to assess the extent to which this re-organization will facilitate the government's educational aims and objectives.

While several of the points outlined in the seminar report and the government White Paper appear to be relatively straightforward and uncontroversial, the underlying theme is that education will contribute substantially to the attainment of Nigeria's national development goals. For instance, a prime function of education is to provide "appropriate skills, abilities, and competence" which will enable an individual "to live in and contribute to the development of society". In other words, education is a means of developing human resources: man's contribution to development will largely be determined by his educational training and experience. Likewise, education is to be related to the satisfaction of "overall community needs", which we may tacitly assume include the Third Plan objectives of even income distribution and reduced unemployment. Indeed, the notion of employment is significant, for a further objective of educational policy is that after primary education an individual should be able to choose between continuing full-time study, part-time work

and study, or "full-time employment without excluding later study". The assumption here is that a function of education is not only to instill or enhance the skills and ability of the work force, but also that it should lead to the satisfactory utilization of the nation's human resources.

Another major objective of educational policy is to foster the process of national integration. In a plural society such as Nigeria's, the broadening of the educational system throughout the country may be seen as an essential means of inculcating "national consciousness and national unity" and disseminating "the right type of values and attitudes for the survival of the individual and Nigerian society". While such values and attitudes may not be specifically defined, we may assume -- given the country's recent turbulent past -- that such values are meant to contribute to the minimization of internal hostility and conflict, and to the maximization of an overall spirit of tolerance, cooperation, and service to society.

From these brief policy pronouncements, therefore, there is no denying the major significance which the federal government attributes to education. Indeed, as development and growth are characterized by change,¹⁵ the government's observation that "education is the most important instrument of change -- intellectual and social change must be preceded by educational revolution"-- **is a clear indication that** its broad educational programme is considered to be a virtual

pre-requisite to national development.

Clearly it would appear that much is expected of the education system in Nigeria. By expanding and subsidizing formal education throughout the country the government is in effect investing in a programme whose returns are to be manifested by a more skilled, able citizenry, a more effectively utilized labour force, and a more stable, unified national society. In fact, the implication of government policy is that the ultimate return on educational expenditure will be the advancement of national development, in both an economic and socio-political sense.

B. The Shortcomings of Formal Education:
Socio-Economic Indicators

In the past few years, Nigeria's federal government has actively demonstrated its unwavering commitment to expand and subsidize formal education at all levels. Despite this effort, however, there are a number of indicators which suggest that the government's national education programme is not responding adequately to overall economic and social needs. In other words, on the understanding that the maximization of net socio-economic benefit in relation to costs is a fundamental premise of sound development policy management, the practical implementation of educational policy in many ways does not appear to be meeting the objectives of that policy as effectively as present educational expenditure

would warrant.

For instance, there are indications to suggest that the rapid expansion of the formal school system in Nigeria may impair the quality of education within the system, and hence its effectiveness as a means of human resource development. Likewise, there is some evidence that the opportunity costs of the government's investment in education are unfavourable, that in macro-economic terms the present allocation of educational funding will not result in the maximization of economic growth. Other indicators demonstrate that while formal education may be an instrument for the development of human resources, its ultimate impact on labour performance and output in various sectors of the economy is negligible. Indeed, in some respects formal educational training appears to have little relevance to the stated aim of enabling an individual to contribute to the development of society.

The rising incidence of unemployment among young school leavers is a further indication that education alone is not sufficient to satisfy community needs. Government's increasing investment in education, contrary to its objective of fostering full employment, has so far made virtually no headway in this direction: indeed, evidence suggests an increasing imbalance between the supply and aspirations of educated school leavers and the demands of the various sectors of the labour market. Moreover, while there would appear to be

a sound basis for suggesting that development may be occurring in certain areas of the economy and society, other sectors which demand far greater numbers of the labour force appear to be either stagnating or developing at a minimal rate regardless of current educational activity.

In addition, despite concerted efforts to equalize educational opportunity by means of universal primary education and post-primary school expansion, there are signs which indicate that within Nigeria's stratified political economy the socio-economic significance which is generally attributed to formal educational achievement may well exacerbate rather than diminish societal inequalities. Indeed, it frequently appears that many school leavers sustain values and modes of behaviour which, while perhaps suited to "the survival of the individual", may prove less conducive to the ideals of co-operation and service to society.

C. The Proposed Study

In recognizing the cumulative evidence of the foregoing socio-economic indicators we may be led to surmise that the overall effectiveness of Nigeria's national education programme is less than expected or desired. The purpose of this paper will thus be to undertake a descriptive analysis of these indicators and, in so doing, provide a comprehensive evaluation of various aspects of the government's education programme.

Evaluation of education is here defined as an endeavour to determine the effectiveness by which resources and planned activities devoted to the nation's education programme are able to contribute to the stated aims of education policy and the overall objectives of national development. Throughout the paper, numerous policy aims and objectives will be reiterated in order to ascertain the extent to which education is an effective or sufficient means for their attainment. If, on the basis of the available data, the effectiveness of the education programme in some areas is gauged to be less than expected or desired, then various policy alternatives will be explored.

Specifically, to provide a clear focus of intent, this study will attempt to resolve the following questions:

1. In what ways, and at what levels, does the federal government's education programme effectively contribute to the process of national development?
2. What aspects of the organization and operation of the school system diminish the value of formal education as a component in the development process?
3. Beyond the formal school system, what other forms of education demonstrate a real or potential contribution to national development and might conceivably benefit from greater state support?
4. What is the nature of the function and organization of Nigeria's political economy, and how does this affect the

role of education in the development process?

5. What policy alternatives, educational or otherwise, might enhance the role of education -- formal and non-formal -- in the process of national development?

In dealing with these questions, we do not propose to arrive at anything beyond tentative conclusions, especially when we consider the broad scope of the proposed evaluation, the limited availability of sufficient data, and the long term nature of educational investment. However, these queries do provide a focus for subsequent analysis.

A comprehensive evaluation of Nigeria's massive education programme is undoubtedly an ambitious task. Indeed it would be presumptuous to suggest that the findings of such an analysis can be rigorously accurate. Nevertheless, a study of this type should be considered neither an impossibility nor without practical purpose. Despite Nigeria's daunting physical size, its large population, and its rich ethnic and linguistic diversity -- or perhaps because of these factors -- a great number of social science studies have been conducted in all major regions of the country throughout the last twenty years. Many such studies have unearthed data which may be useful in assessing the effectiveness of education as an instrument of national development. Thus, bearing in mind the fundamental questions which have been posed, the analysis of the relevant data derived from these studies may enable us to carry out a quite plausible evaluation.

of various aspects of the country's education programme.

Likewise, while subject to limitations which shall be enumerated, and no doubt susceptible to some generalization, a comprehensive evaluation of this kind does have practical value. Field work and in-depth studies which are restricted in area coverage are naturally essential for data collection, and perhaps for local policy initiatives as well. Yet policies must also be formulated at the national level and implemented through nationally co-ordinated programmes which affect the majority of citizens throughout the country. Indeed, the newly elected federal government will shortly present a new National Development Plan and the first of its annual federal budgets in which planned overall education expenditure will be included. Clearly, therefore, there is a continuing need for on-going analyses of the various socio-economic indicators to which policies and programmes must inevitably respond. By such means, the effectiveness of present national development schemes can be evaluated and, where necessary, new directions for policies and programming can be considered.

D. A Comment on Methodology

Because of the comprehensive nature of the proposed analysis, and because field work in the country was ruled out as a direct part of the study (although my experience as

a secondary grammar school teacher in northern Nigeria during 1974-76 has afforded some insights), the methodology of this study will be to synthesize the findings of numerous economic and sociological surveys carried out in post-Independence Nigeria and to use these findings as the empirical base for evaluation.

Of course, in considering a developing country as large and diverse as Nigeria, it is important to note that the nature of the data and the available sources of information to be used are varied and sometimes limited in focus and/or in value. For instance, discussion of the phenomenon of individual modernity as induced by formal schooling is based on two isolated studies, one using a sample survey of 700 Yoruba adults in the former Western Region, the other focussing on a number of young secondary school leavers in Kano City. Comparative information on the private and social costs and benefits of schooling derives from two studies undertaken more than a decade ago -- one in the former Western Region, the other in a limited area of the former Northern Region. Efforts to establish a correlation between levels and types of education and eventual labour performance and output are severely handicapped by a disequilibrium in the price structure of the labour market. And because formal education in many rural regions is still in its infancy, information concerning the effectiveness of education in furthering rural development is as yet sparse and inconclusive.

Generally too, the data are biased in favour of those sectors, regions, and institutions which have reached higher stages of development: the modern capital-intensive sector of the economy as opposed to the informal intermediate and traditional agricultural sectors; urban centres as opposed to the rural hinterland; and the internal function of the formal school system as opposed to informal on-the-job training and privately sponsored apprenticeship schemes. Indeed, it almost goes without saying that in all areas there is a need for more research and analysis. Nevertheless, despite obvious shortcomings, the contention here is that aggregate data findings which are available provide sufficient evidence for the proposed evaluation.

A further point to make is that the breadth of the evaluation will be limited somewhat by centring mainly -- although not completely -- on the effectiveness of primary and secondary grammar schooling in the formal education system. The reasons for this are two-fold: a) of all areas in the education system, the largest percentage of public educational funding is devoted to primary schools and secondary grammar schools; and b) formal education for approximately 90% of Nigerian schoolchildren terminates at the primary level, while among those advancing to the secondary stage, the great majority enter grammar school. Consequently, evaluation of these two areas of the education system has the greatest relevance not only for national education policy,

but for the overwhelming number of Nigerians who are exposed to the government's education programme. At the same time, however, reference will be made to formal technical schooling and to higher education since both are integral factors in national education policy. In fact, the role of the university will be considered particularly in relation to the economic costs and benefits of education and to the effect of formal education on national unity and integration.

Education, of course, extends beyond the formal system in Nigeria. It is important, therefore, to consider such informal methods of training as small-scale industrial apprenticeship schemes, adult vocational training programmes, and agricultural extension. Discussion of these informal training schemes will be valuable not only in assessing the extent of their effectiveness -- albeit in a limited way -- but also when considering the need for educational programme alternatives. The government has, of course, proposed a reorganization of the formal school system. However, as this structural reorganization is still in a stage of transition, it shall be regarded here as an indication of the direction of official alternative programming, and not as a "fait accompli".

E. Chapter Outline

The body of this paper consists of seven chapters, each divided into numbered subsections. Each chapter will centre on a number of related socio-economic indicators which are pertinent to the five questions which have been posed as a basis for evaluation. In effect, while the areas of analysis in each chapter differ, they will nonetheless have a direct bearing on most, if not all, five questions. In other words, the findings in each chapter will provide partial responses to all five questions. As such, whether the indicators we examine relate to the internal function of schooling, or to the economics of education, or to the relationship between education on the one hand and job productivity, sectoral employment, and national integration on the other, they will remain integral to the overall evaluation.

Briefly, chapter content will be as follows:

In chapter one we shall examine the internal function of formal schooling, i.e. the types of skills and abilities which schools are expected to induce among students. A review of examination and curricular content, as well as evidence suggesting the important affective impact of formal education will demonstrate that formal schooling in certain circumstances can be an effective means of human resource development. At the same time, however, the accumulated evidence of two decades indicates that in Nigeria formal edu-

cation has generally suffered a number of qualitative shortcomings. A question arises, therefore, as to whether rapid educational expansion may further diminish the quality of schooling. In this regard, we shall discuss the quality of teachers, the emphasis on school examinations, and the value and relevance of school curricula.

In chapter two we shall go on to consider the economics of education in Nigeria. Since the promulgation of the Third National Plan, the costs of the government's education programme have risen phenomenally, far more than was initially expected. Expenditure on education, of course, is widely considered among other things to be an investment in human resources or human "capital".¹⁶ Consequently, it is possible that the eventual returns on investment may outweigh present costs. Viewed in this light, educational systems are occasionally assessed by means of cost-benefit analyses. In Nigeria, because of data limitations, circumstances are generally ill-suited for this type of analysis; indeed, the economics of education is frequently regarded as a dubious field, particularly when applied to developing countries. Nevertheless, it may be useful to consider the work which has been done in this field in Nigeria if only to give a rough indication of the possible financial returns -- and opportunity costs -- accruing from investment in different levels of the formal school system.

In chapter three we shall discuss the instrumental

value of formal schooling, i.e. the extent to which school learning enhances an individual's practical contribution to national development. Obviously, of course, individuals may contribute to national development in any number of non-measurable ways. Our intention in this chapter will, therefore, be limited to an assessment of the effect which school-induced skills and abilities have on improving individual job performance and output in modern industry, small-scale business, and agriculture. Likewise, we shall consider the instrumental value of alternative means of human resource development outside the formal school system; as such we may be able to assess whether or not the instrumental value of formal education is overrated.

In chapter four we shall extend our discussion to a consideration of the relationship between education on the one hand and the general pattern of employment and industrial growth on the other. In examining what appears to be a growing discrepancy between the supply of educated manpower and the sectoral demands for labour, we shall review the problem of urban unemployment and its apparent causes. As well, we shall consider the characteristics of the capital-intensive modern sector and the more labour-intensive intermediate sector of the economy. In both cases, our purpose will be to investigate the extent to which employment and growth in both sectors are affected by education and whether or not a revision of present educational strategy might prove to be more

effective in this regard.

In chapter five we shall shift our attention towards an assessment of the relationship between education and rural development. Although data are often scarce and unreliable, we shall nonetheless briefly review the state of agriculture and of rural living conditions in Nigeria. We shall also discuss the phenomenon of rural outmigration among young people and its apparent linkage with schooling. Our prime intention here will be to examine the extent to which formal education is able to enhance the development of the rural hinterland and whether or not alternative forms of education may be as, if not more, effective for rural development.

In chapter six we shall turn to the socio-political issue of national integration and here relate the functioning of formal education to the horizontal and vertical dimensions of the integrative process. In particular, we shall investigate the effectiveness of formal education in minimizing the potential for internal conflict and in fostering new social segments which cut across traditional ethnic and regional divisions.

Finally, in chapter seven, we shall examine the political dilemma of subsidized formal education in Nigeria. Within a dualistic, socially stratified political economy, formal education is widely regarded as a vehicle for individual socio-economic mobility. In this light, we shall review the widespread public demand for subsidized schooling and the

competitive scramble for educational qualifications and concomitant societal reward which this has spawned. We shall also attempt to demonstrate that in view of the nature of Nigeria's political economy and the government's overall practical approach to development, increased investment in formal education may in fact hamper the intellectual and social change which education is meant to bring about.

We shall conclude the paper by reiterating the five questions included in the Introduction and by responding directly to each. In so doing, we shall marshal the findings of the various chapters accordingly.

FOOTNOTES /
(INTRODUCTION)

¹ Federal Republic of Nigeria, National Policy of Education, White Paper, Lagos, 1977, cited by Erukora Joe Okoli, "Educational Hopes and Realities", West Africa, No. 3227, May 21, 1979, p. 873.

² In October 1979 the federal military regime was replaced by the newly elected civilian government. There is little likelihood, however, that the changeover in government will result in any fundamental change in education policy. President Shagari's National Party of Nigeria (NPN) is committed to UPE and the expansion of post-primary education. See text of Alhaji Shenu's radio broadcast in West Africa, No. 3247, October 8, 1979, p. 1863.

³ Federal Republic of Nigeria, Third National Development Plan 1975-80, Vol. 1, Central Planning Office, Lagos, 1975, p. 245.

⁴ For discussions concerning the meaning of development as it pertains to the quality of life both in terms of the satisfaction of basic needs and the freedom, as well as responsibility, of individual participation in the economic, social, and political process of society, see the following: Denis Goulet, "The Challenge of Development Economics", Communication and Development Review, 2 (1), Spring 1978, pp. 18-23; Martin Igbozurike, Problem Generating Structures in Nigeria's Rural Development, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1976; Louis Malassis, "Toward A Technical Humanism", Ceres, 10 (1), January-February, 1977, pp. 30-33; John O'Manique, "The Ethics of Survival", Philosophy Forum, Vol. 15, 1977, pp. 225-43; Dudley Seers, "The New Meaning of Development", The International Development Review, No. 3, 1977, pp. 2-7; Paul Streeten, "The Distinctive Features of a Basic Needs Approach to Development", The International Development Review, No. 3, 1977, pp. 8-16.

⁵ Mustafa Izzat Tuquan, Education, Society, and Development in Underdeveloped Countries, Centre for the Study of Education in Changing Societies (CESO), The Hague, 1975, p. 123.

⁶ Third National Plan, op.cit., p. 29.

⁷ Ibid., pp. 30-31.

⁸ Ibid., p. 250.

⁹ Federal Republic of Nigeria, Report on Major Trends in Education, Federal Ministry of Education, Lagos. Report Presented at International Conference on Education (36th, Geneva, Switzerland, August 30-September 8, 1977), p. 3.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Cited by Guy Arnold, Modern Nigeria, Longman Group Limited, London, 1977, p. 104.

¹² Report on Major Trends, pp. 4-5.

¹³ Ibid., p. 10.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Change is generally considered to be integral to the development process. Malassis writes, "The essence of development is change, the introduction into social practice of a new technology, the fruit of experience accumulated by the people concerned or of a sensible transfer", pp. 31-32. Sanda suggests that "the first and foremost characteristic of development is change which is drastic and which touches all layers of society", A.O. Sanda, "The Nigerian National Youth Service", The Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, 18 (1), March, 1976, p. 35. And Seers, in suggesting that self-reliance is a crucial element in the development process, argues that for most LDCs this necessitates changes in consumption patterns and in styles of living at "given income levels", p. 5.

¹⁶ Harbison has defined human capital as the stock of people's "knowledge, skills, and motivation", the sum total of which may be seen as a "key element in every well-designed programme of economic development". F. Harbison, "The Development of Human Resources: An Analytical Outline", in E.F. Jackson, ed., Economic Development in Africa, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1965, p. 71.

CHAPTER 1: THE INTERNAL FUNCTION OF FORMAL EDUCATION:
QUANTITY VERSUS QUALITY

1.1 Introduction

In undertaking to expand and subsidize the school system at all levels, the federal government in Nigeria would appear to be demonstrating a deep-seated conviction that formal education is the key instrument for the development of the nation's human resources. As stipulated in its policy aims and objectives, the purpose of education is to train "the mind in understanding the world around" and to instill "appropriate skills, abilities, and competence" so as to enable an individual to live in and contribute to society". Likewise, education should enable the individual to achieve "maximum self-development" and to carry on "the practice of self-learning". In order to evaluate the extent to which formal education in Nigeria does in fact meet these objectives we must first of all examine the internal function of schools; in other words, we must clarify precisely what it is that schools provide in the way of skills and abilities. At the same time, we must also consider the effect which the rapid expansion of schooling may have on the actual development of these skills and abilities. Our purpose in this chapter, therefore, is two-fold: a) to examine the specific content of children's learning and experiences in

2

formal (pre-university) schooling; and b) to discuss the impact which expansion may have on the quality of educational content.

In the following two sections we will focus our attention briefly on the substance of school learning and experience. In section 1.2 we shall examine the fundamental skills and abilities -- what we may summarize as cognitive knowledge -- which are disseminated in primary, secondary grammar, and technical schools. Because of the strong emphasis which is placed on final examinations in Nigeria, evidence on curricular content will be based largely, although not completely, on the content of examinations -- the assumption being that those skills which are tested are those which are stressed in the classroom. In section 1.3 we shall go on to consider the affective changes induced by schooling. In this regard, we shall discuss recent findings which demonstrate the potential capacity of formal western education in fostering individual attitudinal and behavioural "modernity".

Having considered the substance of school learning and experience in an attempt to ascertain what it is that formal education is generally seen to instill -- or is meant to instill -- among students, we shall then shift our attention towards some of the qualitative and organizational drawbacks which have characterized Nigeria's school system in the past. A question to be seriously examined is whether or not such drawbacks may be further exacerbated by the federal government's

present policy of rapid educational expansion. In section 1.4 a brief overview of the various factors affecting the qualitative standards of the formal school system will be presented. We shall see that the general quality of formal education in Nigeria has been a moot point since Independence; moreover, indications are that as the school system expands rapidly, standards do tend to deteriorate.

One major cause for the general decline in educational quality is that the expansion of schooling appears to be out-running the availability of qualified teaching personnel. This presents a tremendous challenge to the federal government's education policy, for good teachers are often pivotal to good education. In section 1.5 we shall examine the twin problems of teacher shortages and under-qualified teaching personnel.

In some ways, of course, the substance of schooling itself may contribute to the qualitative weaknesses within the system. The heavy emphasis on examinations and the breadth of an academically-oriented curricula may hinder children's learning experiences. In section 1.6 then we shall consider the extent to which examinations and curricula themselves may restrict the qualitative value of formal schooling in Nigeria.

Finally, in section 1.7 we shall attempt to summarize the problem of quantity versus quality in light of what is essentially a long-term national investment, the returns of which will be indicated by factors largely external to the

educational process itself.

1.2 Curriculum Content in Primary and Secondary Schools

Undoubtedly, for Nigeria as a whole, the most important area of its educational system is the primary school, simply because for the great majority of young Nigerian citizens primary school will be for a long time to come the educational terminal point. Thus, in keeping with its expressed faith in the productive role of formal schooling, the federal government has clearly stipulated that not only will free universal primary education be provided, but also that the curricula of primary schools, while not specifically related to occupational goals,¹ should nonetheless enable children who complete their six years of primary education to be prepared to undertake training for an occupation. In effect, primary education should enable them to become "functional members of society".²

To gain an insight into the type of training offered by primary schools, we shall review a number of primary school examinations. While the duration of student attendance in primary school throughout Nigeria is normally six years, the ultimate goal for most students is to successfully write two sets of formally administered examinations on completion of Primary VI -- the Primary School Leaving Certificate Examination and the National Entrance Examination to Secondary Schools. Assuming that virtually all children who enter primary school

are illiterate and are aware of very little beyond their own local environment (especially in rural villages), these two examinations provide a clear indication of the learning which is acquired -- or expected to be acquired -- by all Nigerian children during the first six years of formal education.

The primary school leaving examination, which is written by all children completing Primary VI, is set either by the local education authorities or by state ministries depending on the state in which it is administered. This examination is generally a basic achievement test which touches on most subjects of the school curriculum. For example, the 1978/79 examination set by the LEA of Tangale-Waja Division in Bauchi State included the testing of the following subjects: General Knowledge, Social Studies, English Language, Arithmetic, and General Science (see Appendix III). In Oyo State, the 1979 state-wide school leaving examination included these subjects for testing: English, Arithmetic, Mathematics, History and Civics, Nature Study and Health, Gardening or Needle Work, Geography, Yoruba, and either Bible Knowledge (Christian) or Religious Knowledge (Muslim) (see Appendix IV). Clearly, the subject areas which are tested are numerous and vary between divisions and states. Nevertheless, a close scrutiny of both school leaving exams -- one administered in the north, the other in the more educationally advanced western region of Nigeria -- reveals that similar skills are tested, and that often these appear to have a practical function.

In the Tangale-Waja examination more emphasis appears to be on English and Arithmetic in terms of time allotment (two hours for each) than on other subject areas. The basic language skills which are tested include reading, comprehension, vocabulary and grammar, spelling, and original sentence construction. Arithmetic skills are simple yet conceivably can be put to practical use in buying, selling, weighing, and measuring. In other areas of testing, the General Knowledge and Social Studies questions demonstrate an evident effort to broaden students' socio-political awareness and instill a sense of national identity. General Science appears to be a means of improving knowledge of the environment, with particular relevance to farming and health.

The Oyo State examination is obviously aimed at more advanced students -- not surprising considering the longer historical exposure which southern Nigerians have had to western education. Nevertheless, similar to the Tangale-Waja exam, the emphasis centres on the skills of literacy and numeracy. The English test is lengthy, yet the language skills are virtually the same -- comprehension, grammar and vocabulary, spelling, and creative writing (paragraph form). Arithmetic and mathematics skills, while much more advanced than those tested in Tangale-Waja, also demonstrate a relationship to practical usage. Questions on the costs and weights of foodstuffs, on the measurement of time, the value of currency, the length of cloth, the price and volume of petrol,

and on the population figures of a town are all clearly linked to practical situations of everyday life. In other areas of learning such as History, Civics, Nature Study and Health, Geography, Gardening, and Needlework the aim is clearly to broaden awareness and to improve functional skills all within a very definitely outlined Nigerian context.

The other Primary VI examination, the secondary school entrance exam, unlike the local or state school leaving exams, is set by the West African Examinations Council (WAEC) and is uniform throughout the country. As its title indicates, the function of this examination is to determine the selection of candidates for entry into secondary schools and is written only by those who hope to carry on their formal schooling. The range of testing here is narrow. The 1978 secondary school entrance exam consisted of four sections: English, Mathematics, Verbal Aptitude, and Quantitative Aptitude (see Appendix V). Quite clearly, this examination attempts to focus on aptitude so as to select those students who demonstrate a high potential for future satisfactory achievement. Again, however, like the school leaving exams, these competitive aptitude tests reflect the emphasis placed on numeracy and literacy training in primary school. The stress on literacy is particularly significant when we consider that for practically all children in Nigeria English is a second (and sometimes third or fourth) language which is generally only learned in school. Indeed, the very fact that all examination questions and answers,

except for indigenous language tests, are in English (Nigeria's official lingua franca) demonstrates the importance of English language training in primary schools.

At the post-primary level most students are enrolled in five-year secondary grammar schools. Here they are subjected to a full academic load consisting of traditional western courses such as English Language and Literature (British as well as African), Mathematics, History, Geography, Islamic or Bible Knowledge, Physics, Chemistry, Biology, a vernacular language (usually Hausa, Yoruba, or Ibo), and sometimes French. On completing Form V, all students sit for the nationally administered West African School Certificate (WASC) Examination. Similar to the primary school exams, the 1979 WASC examination places strong emphasis on English language (reading comprehension, grammar and vocabulary, and composition), and Mathematics (algebra, geometry, trigonometry, basic set and number theory, etc.). Two separately written tests are devoted to each subject. The same is true with English Literature; in two papers questions are posed on novels, poems, and plays by such diverse writers as Kenneth Kaunda, George Eliot, D.H. Lawrence, Milton, and Shakespeare. Science is no longer "general", but is divided into the tripartite subjects of Physics, Biology, and Chemistry; testing in each of the latter two involves a practical and a theory exam. It is evident, therefore, that most secondary school students are exposed to a broad-based liberal arts and science education organized very much ac-

according to the western mode of institutionalized secondary schooling. While it is questionable perhaps as to whether one can describe much of what is taught in secondary grammar schools as "skills and abilities" in a practical sense, there is little doubt that grammar school curriculum does conform to the specified aim of "training the mind in understanding the world around".

In secondary technical schools the curriculum consists of much of the same academic fare as that of the grammar schools; secondary technical students in Form V also sit for the WASC examination. In addition, however, various technical subjects are also provided, including such skills as auto mechanics, woodworking, metal working and electricity. Practical training takes place within the institutional setting and testing involves theory as well as practice. While some secondary technical students may shift after the third year to a semi-formal technical training centre, those who successfully complete the five-year course may go on to any type of post-secondary training, either technical or academic.

Other secondary institutions include commercial colleges offering a five-year course leading up to the WASC/RSA examinations,³ and teacher training colleges which also provide a five-year programme for prospective primary school teachers.⁴

In summary, the curricula of all formal secondary schools are attuned very much to the institutionalized setting

of classroom seatwork. The specialized technical, commercial, and teacher training schools do offer practical skills which are oriented to specific job situations -- although these, as we shall see, are usually situations confined to the modern sector of the economy. Generally, however, the prime internal function of formal secondary education in Nigeria is to inculcate further literacy and numeracy skills, along with a broad knowledge in the sciences and humanities. Whether or not these formally learned skills and abilities, as opposed to those gained through more informal methods of training, actually enhance the human contribution to societal development, is a matter which will have to be examined in due course.

1.3 Individual Modernity: The Affective Influence of Formal Schooling

From the evidence already cited it would appear that the main purpose of the internal function of formal schooling is to instill among students the skills of basic literacy and numeracy, a broad general knowledge of arts and sciences, an awareness of and identity with the socio-political reality of the Nigerian state, and, for some, a varying degree of proficiency in several technical or handicraft skills. Such is the cognitive knowledge acquired through the conscious processes of teaching and learning in the classroom. In short, this is

the stuff of curricula outlines and teacher lesson plans and student prep work.

Conscious cognitive learning, however, is but one aspect of the school experience; formal institutional education comprises another internal function which also deserves attention -- namely the dimension of affective change which schools prompt among individuals, change which may well influence their attitudes and behaviour in later life. In reference to this affective aspect of schooling, A.O. Lewis, who has conducted a number of studies of small businesses in Nigeria, suggests that "probably one important advantage of having educated men and women as the proprietors/entrepreneurs of small-scale businesses is the fact that such men and women will not by and large be opposed to modernization, especially the adoption of modern techniques, which is of importance from the point of view of economic development".⁵ The implication here, of course, is that a) school is a catalyst of modernization (which in effect involves attitudinal and behavioural change, and b) the modernization will lead to greater job efficiency and output. For example, the functioning of schools according to a daily time schedule may quite naturally lead to the acceptance of the concept: "time is money." Such consciousness is western-oriented and, for school leavers in later competitive job situations, conceivably may lead to greater marginal output. In this sense, therefore, it is possible to hypothesize that if the experience of

39

formal education develops in students certain attitudes and behaviour which we may describe as "modern", and which may cause them to act in ways ultimately beneficial to the development of the economy and society, then the affective impact of schooling can also be regarded as a further dimension in the school's capacity to develop the "skills, abilities, and competence" of the nation's human resources.

The idea of individual "modernity" has spurred a number of recent studies which have attempted to illuminate the role of formal education in psychological and behavioural change. The notion of modernity in fact has sparked an on-going discussion concerning its precise nature and what specific individual characteristics make some men modern as opposed to those who are more "traditional". For our purposes here, in defining the concept of individual modernity, we shall accept the criteria of Inkeles and Smith whose book, Becoming Modern, represents "the largest and most systematic exploration of the issue".⁶

For Inkeles and Smith the modern man displays a set of characteristics which distinguishes him from the traditional man: he is ready for change, and is open to new experience, he tends to be independent from traditional authority, he has a developed sense of personal efficacy and a belief in science and medicine, he has educational and occupational ambitions, he is conscious of time and of the need for planning, he maintains an interest in current affairs, and he tends to be

active in community endeavours. Other areas of consideration are his attitudes towards kinship and family, women's rights, religion, politics, and family planning.⁷ These personality traits which enable an individual to adapt to and function effectively in a contemporary urban society are generally acquired through experience in institutions characteristic of that society. "Modernity, then, is seen as a set of attitudes, values, and related ways of acting occasioned by participation in the institutions of modern industrial society."⁸ Taken all together, these traits form what Inkeles describes as the "modernity syndrome".⁹

As part of their overall research, Inkeles and Smith tabulated the results of a survey of more than 700 Yoruba speakers in the Western region of Nigeria. The individuals who were interviewed and tested represented a fairly diverse cross-section of low- and middle-income workers; cultivators, urban migrants, workers in modern industry, and urban workers outside of large-scale productive enterprises.¹⁰ While one might initially conclude that a major weakness in confining the survey to a particular region would hinder generalization on a national scale, cumulative research demonstrated that there were in fact broad cross-country similarities¹¹ -- thus it may be safe to assume that within Nigeria there would likewise be cross-regional similarities.

The syndrome of modernity among the Yoruba-speaking workers was calculated on the basis of linking attitudinal and

value questions with a series of behavioural tests. In this way, a causal chain was created "connecting structure, values, and behaviour",¹² and thus establishing that "the previously theoretically defined modern man is an empirical reality".¹³ In order to establish a general syndrome of individual modernity, several multi-dimensional OM (overall modernity) scales were devised so as to provide a summary measure of the results.¹⁴ As the authors write, "[The scales] permitted us conveniently to express each man's score on a scale from 0 to 100. These scales took into account a man's attitudes, values, and behaviour over the whole range of issues, topics, and themes identified by our theory, and by those of others, as being relevant to the definition of modern man."¹⁵ The most useful scale for cross-national purposes, and the one most often cited, was labeled OM-500.

For our purposes here, the most striking result of the survey in Nigeria was that of the ten major factors which were considered as correlating to the development of psychological and behavioural modernity, formal education proved to be the most significant variable. (This is shown in Table 1.A.) Moreover, what is especially interesting is that 95% of those individuals sampled had received only eight years of formal schooling or less -- i.e. at most a year or two beyond primary school. The results also showed that with each increased educational level (measured in years), the percentage of individuals classified as modern rose. As the authors write,

Table 1.A

Correlations of Ten Independent Variables with OM-500

<u>Variable</u>	
1. Formal Education.....	52 ^x
2. Months Factory Experience.....	29
3. Objective Skill.....	23
4. Mass-media exposure.....	43
5. Number of factory benefits.....	28
6. Years of urban experience since age 15.....	22
7. Urbanism of residence.....	36
8. Modernity of home-school setting.....	02
9. Father's education.....	17
10. Consumer goods possessed.....	42

N for variables 1, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10721

N for variables 2, 3, 5.....520

N for variable 6.....184

^x.001 level of statistical significance or better

Source: Alex Inkeles and David H. Smith, Becoming Modern,
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1974, p. 125.

fewer than 10 percent of the men with the least education were classified as modern, that is, had OM-500 scores in the upper third of the distribution. By contrast, of the men whose education was the highest..., some 80 percent... were commonly rated modern. In between, each step up the educational ladder brought with it a fairly regular and substantial increment in the proportion of modern men.¹⁶ (See Table 1.B.)

The impression from this would appear to be that there is no threshold to the increase in modernity, and that it progresses at a steady linear rate with each educational advance, at least to the end of secondary school.¹⁷

Of course, in attempting to measure the impact of education on the development of individual modernity, there is the very real possibility that the variable of education may become entangled with other social factors such as urban home environment, socio-economic status, father's education, learned job skills, etc., all of which tend to be inter-related and can affect one another. Consequently, in order to isolate these diverse factors, two separate analytical techniques were undertaken. One involved a multiple cross-tabulation of factory workers in which several variables considered extraneous were "controlled";¹⁸ thus it was possible to examine the isolated correlation between education and modernity. As Table 1.C shows, while the link between education and modernity is lowered,

the partial correlations of education and modernity were generally strong, whatever the combination of other variables controlled

Table 1.B

Percentage High on OM-500^a for Increasing Amounts of
Education^b

<u>Years of Education</u>	<u>Percentage High</u>
4.....	9 (34)
5.....	3 (34)
6.....	9 (123)
7.....	21 (159)
8.....	43 (320)
9.....	--
10.....	90 (10)
11.....	80 (25)
12.....	--
13.....	--

^a"High on OM-500" means a score in the top one-third of the frequency distribution.

^bNumbers in parentheses are value of N upon which the percentages are based; a dash means that fewer than ten men are at that level of education in the sample.

Source: Inkeles and Smith, Becoming Modern, p. 134.

Table 1.C
Correlations of Education and OM-500 for
Factory Workers

Simple (Zero-Order) Correlations ^a	42
Partial Correlations controlling for:	
Mass Media.....	35
Factory Experience.....	38
Mass Media and Factory Experience.....	32
Early Socialization (such as father's education, rural origin, ethnicity).....	41
Late Socialization (living standards, urbanism of residence, modernity of work place, etc.).....	26
Early and Late Socialization.....	24

N = 520

^aAll are significant at better than .001 level of significance.
Source: Inkeles and Smith, Becoming Modern, p. 137.

in the partialling process...the fact that education so well survived a quite rigorous process of partial correlation also tells us that it was, in its own right, a very powerful direct and independent factor in determining men's modernity.¹⁹

Notable also was that there seemed to be little discrepancy between the impact of rural schools and urban schools on modernity, since half the urban industrial workers sampled had attended rural schools. Consequently, we may assume from this that irrespective of location, formal schooling retains a characteristic of western-oriented modernity. As we shall see later in chapter five, this has significance for rural development policies.

The other method used to isolate the effect of education on individual modernity was a matching technique. As Inkeles and Smith write, "By this means men were matched to be statistically indistinguishable in a large number of characteristics whose influence we wished to control, while being different on the one variable whose independent influence we wished to assess".²⁰ In this case, in all sets of matched pairs the independent variable was education, with one individual in each set being "less educated", the other being "more educated".

Again, as shown in Table 1.D, the results point to "the direct and independent contribution which education makes to individual modernity".²¹ Clearly, therefore, as Nigeria develops within the framework of an export-oriented capitalist

Table 1.D

The Modernity of Otherwise Matched Groups, Differentiated,
as Having More or Less Education

Percent Modern ^a among Group with Less Education:	10%
Percent Modern among Group with More Education:	50%
Mean OM Score of Group with Less Education:	54 ^c
Mean OM Score of Group with More Education:	61
Match Correlation ^b :	40 (significant at .01 level)
Match N:	30

^a"Modern" indicates a score in the top one-third of the frequent distribution on OM-500.

^bIndicates the correlation of OM score of each man with his classification on the match variable, i.e. 1 for "less education" and 2 for "more education".

^cFigures given are the numbers of pairs in the match.

Source: Inkeles and Smith, Becoming Modern, p. 137.

economy, and as it attempts to effect policies which further urbanization and industrial expansion (points which we shall elaborate in succeeding chapters), a significant aspect of the school system would seem to lie in its role of "modernizing" Nigerian citizens and thereby "developing" the country's human resources. In this sense, therefore, education can be viewed as instrumental in effecting widespread intellectual and social change.

These results obtained by Inkeles and Smith from a sample of Yoruba-speaking men in Nigeria's western region are strikingly similar to those of an earlier study by Armer and Youtz in mid-1965. In light of the fact that formal education was not nearly as prevalent in the north at that time as it is today, and while other potential variables in the modernizing process may have since become increasingly significant, their conclusions may be somewhat outdated. Nevertheless, their attempt to "establish whether a positive association exists between formal schooling and individual modernity that is independent of other modernizing forces and selective factors"²² is still valid when we endeavour to assess the effectiveness of formal education in stimulating intellectual and social change.

Armer and Youtz defined the dimensions of modernity by weighting several value orientations such as independence from family, ethnic quality, empiricism, mastery or efficacy, receptivity to change, and orientation to the future.²³

Data were collected by interviewing 591 seventeen-year old males in Kano City, of whom 52.8% had received no education, 35.7% had acquired between one and seven years of primary school, and 11.5% had received at least one year of secondary school. By controlling numerous alternative modernizing influences such as urban experience, factory experience, voluntary association membership, and "modern" home environment, cross-tabular analyses of educational level with "high" and "low" individual modernity demonstrated a positive association between level of education and modern value orientations. These results were independent of selectivity processes and the other modernizing forces. 83.8% of those with some secondary schooling ranked high in individual modernity, while only 37.8% of those with no education at all were in a similar category. The authors further conclude that "the association of formal Western education and individual modernity is not highly specific to certain categories of youth but, rather, tends to be comparable in strength for all, regardless of background differences."²⁴ Hence, similar to the later findings of Inkeles and Smith, the implication is that institutional schooling, regardless of location, is a significant modernizing force.

While the studies by Inkeles and Smith in the west, and Armer and Youtz in the north point to the similar overall conclusion that formal education in Nigeria is a powerful

modernizing influence which shapes attitudes, values, and behaviour, they differ somewhat in their views on those functional aspects of school which contribute to individual modernity. Inkeles and Smith argue that a great deal of learning in schools appears to be incidental to that of curriculum content and formal instruction. The capability to join public organizations, to be open to change and new experience, to develop a sense of personal efficacy, to be conscious of time, etc., all seems in their view to grow from a generalized experience rather than from any specific lessons.

...one could not account for the higher OM scores of the better educated men on the grounds that the formal curriculum of the school directly prepared for high performance on our test of modernity. Even where our measure of modernity excluded any test of information or verbal fluency, the fields in which the formal curriculum specializes, education still showed as a substantial independent cause of modernity.²⁵

The findings of Armer and Youtz are different. In contrasting formal Koranic schools with western-oriented secondary schools they observe that the

data offer consistent, preliminary support for the suggestion that the curriculum may be more effective in producing differences in psychological modernity than is the formal organization of the school. That is, without denying the probable effects of both (and other factors), the more important modernizing factor of Western education may be not that it is formal but that it is Western.²⁶

As yet, there is no conclusive evidence demonstrating which contributes more to the attitudes and behaviour mani-

festated by individual modernity -- cognitive knowledge consciously acquired in school or simply the unconscious impact of prolonged exposure to an institutional setting. Arguments fall on both sides. For example, Peshkin's case study of Kanuri primary school children has led him to conclude that generally the "maximization of human achievement which underlies specialization and complexity of modern society is promoted by the routine operation of the school" and has less to do with curricular content.²⁷ Darrel Dubey's survey of several northern Nigerian teachers' colleges resulted in the observation that beyond school curriculum, school as a functional institution has a significant socializing effect which results in an individual placing "greater emphasis on technology and reationality of organization".²⁸

Elsewhere, however, researchers have stressed the significance of cognitive skills gained from formal academic learning. In reviewing the research on cognition in Africa, McLaughlin writes that the

results of recent studies appear to indicate that formal education in the Western sense affects cognitive processes. On a host of Western defined cognitive tasks -- concept formation or classification, attribute preference in classification, clustering of recall, conservation, and verbal logic -- those who had been formally trained for several years generally gave more sophisticated performances than those who had never been to school.²⁹

Likewise, Cole from his own studies of the Kpelle people of Liberia has argued that those who have received some years of formal school instruction are generally more competent at

problem-solving than are those who are unschooled:

...we find that the ability of Kpelle people to make verbal logical judgments depends upon the subjects' education and on the way in which the problem is posed. For nonliterate people, to pass judgment on the conclusions reached by someone else presents no great difficulties. However, to reach a conclusion for oneself based upon premises handed down by others leads non-literate Kpelle subjects to depend on the particular content of the problem in forming an answer. However, education shifts dramatically the mode of response to such verbal problems, so that the particular content no longer determines the answer. Rather, subjects begin to respond on the basis of the logical relations contained in the problems themselves. Under some circumstances, there are differences between problems on the basis of the logical relation involved, but in general, the problem type makes little difference.³⁰

This is similar to Wiles' conclusion that the activity of learning formal school lessons exercises the mind. Such cognitive processes as decision-making, evaluation, presentation of arguments, all develop from the work, the drill, and the thinking that actually occur in the schools. "Sheer schooling undoubtedly develops general intelligence, just as sheer repetitive unskilled juvenile labour dulls it. Education generates mental gymnastics and the brain is like muscle."³¹

Whether or not formal schooling promotes cognitive or simply affective development (although it seems likely that both are generated) the point from these various studies does seem clear: formal western education appears to demonstrate a capacity for developing among students certain skills,

abilities, and competence which we may assume can have a positive effect on their attitudes and actions. A basic competence in reading, writing, and arithmetic; a knowledge of science, history, and the arts, and of the world at large; an awareness of time and the value of punctuality, and of the need for planning and organizing; a faith in science and technology; and an overall willingness to accept new ideas and new methods - all are valuable human attributes which, if promoted and generated on a mass scale, may well enhance the process of national development.³² Certainly, on these grounds, the government's assertion of the need to develop the nation's human resources through the expansion and further subsidization of the formal education system would seem fully justified.

1.4 The Indicators of Declining Educational Quality

In reviewing the content of examinations and curricula and the apparent linkage between education and individual modernity, we have perhaps up to this point conveyed the impression that formal education is somehow a uniform process which operates in a like manner throughout the country, constituting the same advantages and the same problems, and almost mechanically discharging increased amounts of learning at ever-higher grade levels. Obviously, of course, such is not the case. Examination questions and curricula outlines

may provide an indication of the functional purpose of schooling, but these alone cannot tell us the actuality of day-to-day activity in the classroom. Similarly, evidence showing a strong correlation between schooling and individual modernity among a relatively small number of people in a few random areas in the country, while demonstrating the capacity which formal western education may have in generating affective change, does not necessarily reflect the overall national picture. In other words, what schools are meant to do -- or what they have shown themselves capable of doing in a number of isolated instances -- may not be what they do in practice in many parts of the country. By simply referring to the internal cognitive and affective function of schools, and to different types and levels of formal education, it is not possible to fully assess the value of formal schooling as a means of developing human resources throughout Nigeria. This is especially so in the case of a developing country pursuing a policy of very rapid educational expansion.

We must, therefore, proceed one step further in our analysis -- in terms of the educational process itself, we must also examine the overall quality of schooling provided. For as Ronald Dore writes, "A year of schooling is not just a year of schooling -- it can be a joy, or a crippling misery. And which it is makes an enormous difference to the outcome -- a difference which footling measures of 'internal efficiency' do not even begin to capture".³³ Likewise, in reference

to the modernizing effect of formal education, Inkeles has acknowledged that oftentimes learning in schools can be limited and possibly retrogressive:

The modernizing outcomes...are not necessarily produced in every classroom. [The teacher] who is rigid, compulsive, and doctrinaire is not likely to stimulate openness to new ideas...

Just as the teacher may lack the qualities making him an appropriate model of modernity, so may the school fail to exemplify the organizational principles we identify with the modern mode. The flow of work in the classroom may be chaotic, the school day subject to constant disruption, the annual schedule erratic, and the very continuance of the school uncertain. Such a school will not effectively exemplify the virtues of planning and will provide little training in developing fixed schedules. Moreover, either the conditions of a pupil's life outside, or the nature of the school itself, may lead his school experience to be one of continuous frustration, failure, and rejection. In so far as this pupil generalizes from his school experience, therefore, it will hardly be by way of feeling more efficacious or more open to new experience.³⁴

It is no use, therefore, to defend a policy of rapid educational expansion simply on the grounds that formal education can be an effective method of developing human resources. What is just as important is to assess the overall quality of education provided, and to determine whether or not quality is adversely affected by quantitative expansion.

The concern with quality in Nigerian education is not new. Even before Independence, the former Eastern and Western Regions had attempted to initiate UPE and rapid post-primary educational expansion, both with varying degrees of success.³⁵

In 1961, the Banjo Commission was set up to review the UPE programme in the former Western Region. The Commission concluded that in general none of the original aims of primary education was being achieved.

Deteriorating standards of conduct were excused by 'freedom of speech and freedom of enquiry which the lazy teacher takes for impudence and lack of respect'. Rather than understanding the community, the young primary school leavers migrated from rural areas to the towns 'in search for pen-pushing jobs which they are not even trained for'. As to lively curiosity and a desire for knowledge, the Commission noted that there was 'the impression that the pupils were just sponges imbibing knowledge not understood or digested, for the purpose of regurgitating it for examinations'. There was some degree of permanent literacy in Yoruba, but not in English, the language of instruction in the upper primary and post-primary institutions. The last aim, that of the acquisition of skill of hand and the recognition of the value of manual work was least achieved.³⁶

Among the reasons cited for the decline in quality were the qualifications and behaviour of the teaching force, the structure of the school system which included large class size and automatic promotion, the age and background of the pupils themselves, and the sketchy nature of the syllabus.³⁷

By the mid- and late 1960's, similar worries about the entire national education system were being expressed. In particular, there were major concerns about the professional competence of many teachers, for as the 1960 Ashby Commission Report had noted, "No educational system can be stronger than its teachers".³⁸ In 1966, Ukeje expressed his perturbation

that often the typical Nigerian school teacher

can do no better than recite his notes to pupils and the pupils can do no better than be passive receptacles. Even the subject matter which the teacher is supposed to teach cannot be seen in its true perspective for the teacher can hardly go beyond the facts to their implications; hence invariably, he lacks initiative and creativity, and is slave to his notes, the syllabus, and his textbook. Consequently, teaching lacks enrichment and vitality and learning lacks direction and reflection, becoming simply the acquisition of inert knowledge.³⁹

At the National Curriculum Conference in 1969, the quality of teaching was also raised, particularly as it related to the needs of children in their formative years at school. As Banjo stated:

We need teachers better trained as regards academic qualifications and professional skill. We need teachers earnestly devoted to the full education of the child. The infant school demands highly trained specialist teachers to lay the foundations and to give children the proper orientation for life...Poor teachers produce none other than poor pupils...

We need to recruit candidates for teacher training from good secondary school pupils and not from the dregs. Anything less than that is a makeshift.⁴⁰

Likewise, there have been grave concerns as to the lack of educational facilities for primary schools. In a 1968 report on the primary education system in the former Western State, Professor Taiwo observed, "One of the unhappy features of most primary schools is an appalling shortage of reading materials. The problem would appear to be due to shortage of funds, partly

to poor interest on the part of many teachers, and partly to lack of direction".⁴¹ And this in one of the more educationally advanced regions in the country! Undoubtedly, it seems, while the former Western region of Nigeria had attempted a programme of universal primary education, the quality of schooling had not matched the quantitative efforts.

The National Curriculum Conference, which met essentially to review what were perceived as the qualitative drawbacks to formal education in Nigeria as a whole, concluded by submitting the following recommendations for improving the existing system; a major upgrading of teachers' qualifications should be undertaken; the construction of schools should be improved upon; more and better teaching facilities should be provided; and greater efficiency should be infused into the administration and supervision of schools.⁴²

Along with these aims, the Conference also proposed the availability of free and universal compulsory primary schooling.⁴³ This proposal eventually gained dramatic impetus following the unexpected hike in national revenue which succeeded the oil price increases of 1973/74. Within a year, the federal government had announced its intention to carry out a nationwide programme of UPE: with ample funds it appeared that quantity could be had without serious loss to the qualitative aspect of education.⁴⁴

Since then, as we shall discuss in the next chapter, the federal government has followed through on its promise to

expand and heavily invest in formal education at all levels. Yet the quantity versus quality debate continues. Despite the financial commitment of federal and state governments to education, recent indications continue to suggest that quantitative expansion is generally carried out at the expense of qualitative input. Yet it is the quality of the input rather than sheer numbers of students, teachers, and schools which may in the long run affect the role of education in the development process.⁴⁵

One signal of this decline in quality can be seen in school examination results. While school enrollments have been increasing over the years, the percentage of passes in final examinations has been steadily falling. An example of this was demonstrated in the former Western State during the period of 1967-73. As shown in Table 1.E, while the number of candidates writing the primary school leaving examination rose from 60,733 in 1967 to 85,578 in 1973, the percentage of passes declined from 53% to 49%. Similarly, the number of candidates writing the secondary school WASC Examination more than doubled during that time, from 5,669 to 13,027, yet the percentage of passes dropped startlingly from 71.6% to 41.6%. These results are all the more disturbing when we again consider that the Western region of Nigeria has had a longer experience of western education than have many other parts of the country. As Sofenwa suggests, "Although it is possible to draw a lot of inferences from [these results] , ...it is suf-

efficient to observe that quality has not followed quantity and that somewhere in the system there is a lot of mediocrity and wastage in spite of the enormous investment of the government in education".⁴⁶

More recently tabulated nation-wide WASC results indicate the same downward trend in exam performances. In 1974, 51.3% of all secondary school WASC candidates qualified for the School Certificate. By 1975, the percentage of candidates who qualified had dropped to 47.4%, and in 1976 the percentage had fallen to 42.04%. Indeed, of the 88,336 candidates who wrote the WASC exam in 1976, 51,193 failed to qualify, and among these failures, 23,965 were considered to have failed "woefully".⁴⁷ In contrast, during that same year, 15,148 students in Ghana sat for the same WASC examination, less than one-fifth the number of Nigerian students; yet 193 Ghanaian students received Division One (first class) results, as compared to only 160 Nigerians receiving the same honours.⁴⁸

The decline in examination results which appears to have succeeded the expansion of the educational system cannot be dismissed lightly, for examinations form the most significant method of impartial evaluation and selection in Nigeria. Consequently, the dwindling school exam pass rate would appear to lend substance to Duruji's remark: "To force the pace of educational development leads to one absolute certainty. Standards of scholastic attainment begin to fall and continue in the downward trend until, paradoxically, education for all

Table 1.E

Results of Primary School Leaving Examinations
Western State 1967-73

Year	No. of Candidates	Grade "A" Passes	Grade "B" Passes	Total Passes	Percentage of Passes
1967	60,735	5,057	27,099	32,156	53
1968	58,373	2,583	24,365	26,948	46.2
1969	60,483	21,344	22,510	43,854	72.5
1970	67,264	18,212	33,479	51,691	76.8
1971	69,580	20,570	32,859	53,429	76.8
1972	79,207	14,328	40,400	54,728	69.1
1973	85,578	10,655	31,850	42,505	49.7

Results of the West African School Certificate
Examinations: Western State, 1967-73

Year	No. of Candidates	Grade I	Grade II	Grade III	All Passes	Percentage of Passes
1967	5,669	615	1,351	2,095	4,061	71.6
1968	6,513	603	1,470	2,528	4,601	70.6
1969	7,356	616	1,495	2,787	4,998	69.9
1970	8,198	344	1,249	3,563	5,156	62.9
1971	9,676	520	1,631	4,055	6,206	64.1
1972	11,065	527	1,628	4,507	6,662	60.2
1973	13,027	365	1,052	3,997	5,414	41.6

Source: L.A. Sofenwa, "Observations on the Primary School Education in Nigeria in Relation to UPE," West African Journal of Education, Vol. 20, no. 1, February 1976, p. 131.

becomes education for none. This is the dilemma of educational expansion."⁴⁹

As is frequently pointed out by educators and psychologists, however, examinations tend often to be at best crude indicators of scholastic ability or skill attainment.⁵⁰ While recent examination results in Nigeria are suggestive of declining standards in the school system, they do not explain the causes for the apparent decline. For these we must look to other internal factors: the availability of qualified teaching personnel; their ability and degree of dedication; and the general nature and orientation of activity in the classroom.

1.5 Teachers

As always, a chief concern regarding the issue of educational quality in Nigeria centres on the availability of sufficient numbers of teachers to meet the needs of an expanding school system. Since 1975, when the federal government estimated that 163,000 additional primary school teachers would be needed just to satisfy the initial intake of pupils in the first year of UPE, a major problem has been a perpetual shortage of teachers. Numerous reports from states, along with available statistics, indicate that even in regions where UPE may in fact be close to being achieved, the supply of teachers often does not meet the demand. Ogun State, for exam-

ple, has reported a continuing shortage of teachers and, despite financial and other forms of inducements, a drift among many initial recruits away from the profession. Likewise, Rivers State has recently had to put up with several hundred graduate teacher vacancies, thus hurting their "bold education plans". In other states, teacher training has become an operation for crash programmes designed to fill the pedagogical gap.⁵¹ In Kano State, the number of teacher training colleges has tripled in less than a decade.⁵² In Gongola State, an emergency training program was devised to accommodate an influx of 2,000 in 1976 and a similar increase the following year. Yet the general shortage of teachers remains acute. It has been estimated, for instance, that a decade ago the average ratio of students to teachers in post-primary institutions was 20/1; at present, the figure is reckoned at 40/1.⁵³ Even where required numbers of personnel do seem close to being met, the official recruitment figures generally do not account for the wastage which occurs after the training and development of teachers when many decide to drop out of the profession and embark on other careers.⁵⁴

In effect then, in view of the government's committed policy of school expansion, all areas suffering teacher shortages face two rather bleak alternatives: the Ministries of Education can fill classrooms with students and simply do without teachers (and this is not uncommon),⁵⁵ or they can intensify efforts to raise the supply of teachers to meet man-

power demands and thereby almost certainly lower qualifications. Concerned as the government is with filling the need for teaching personnel,⁵⁴ the absence of large numbers of certified primary school teachers is a serious problem in some areas. As the Financial Times has noted, "despite the fact that 100,000 students passed through the training colleges every year between 1974 and 1978, UPE still relies very heavily on unqualified, untrained teachers".⁵⁶ Similarly, while large numbers of expatriate secondary school teachers are recruited at great expense from a wide range of countries, there are indications that many may either be underqualified, or lack a sufficient command of English.⁵⁷

Where the projected teacher supply requirements are met, too often such crucial factors as the quality and dedication of the individuals concerned and the type of preparation which they undergo are ignored. In a speech delivered in 1976, Professor Ukeje emphasized that the obvious shortage of teachers in Nigeria could only be balanced in future by those academic "dregs" who are at present pupils in the system. A large proportion of teachers, he argued, will consist of the following:

- a) those who have not been able to complete their secondary schooling because of poor academic background;
- b) those who have, for one reason or another, dropped out of secondary schools;
- c) those who have attempted and failed school certificate examinations;

d) those who have failed in other occupations, either in the civil service, or in private enterprises.⁵⁸

In corroboration of this view, T.M. Bray has documented the 1975 examination results of all teacher trainees in Kano State. Only 17% of the 908 Grade II candidates passed the required three papers, and 39% failed in all three. Moreover, those who did pass were not expected to go on to teach in primary schools; instead it was assumed they would obtain places in Advanced Teachers' Colleges, from whence they might either go on to university, take jobs in secondary schools, or pursue careers outside of teaching altogether.⁵⁹ These poor exam results, according to Bray, are indicative of a "malaise" in much of the school system:

The most important cause of the malaise, which also afflicts the secondary schools, is a collective lack of effort and motivation. Since all the students in teachers' colleges know full well that they have a guaranteed job awaiting them when they leave, they can live a carefree life on the fairly substantial allowances. There is practically no incentive for them to behave otherwise since 95% of the [primary school] headmasters, even, are uncertified. In any case, few of the students anticipate remaining in teaching for the rest of their lives. Many entered teachers' college simply because they failed to secure a place in secondary school.⁶⁰

Similar observations have been made by the Principal of Basawa College in Kaduna State where only one out of 73 candidates was successful in the 1975 Grade II Teachers' Certificate Examination. "Many students were uninterested in their studies because they had definite teaching posts awaiting

them."⁶¹

The examination results of teacher trainees - and hence their level of certification -- may, of course, mean little. After all, the quality and input of teaching is generally "not as dependent on what the teacher knows" as it is on "his enthusiasm and how much he 'cares'".⁶² In reference to Kano State's UPE programme Bray writes, "As with almost every other aspect of the scheme, the single most important factor contributing to success seems to have been the personalities of the people involved".⁶³ Yet the suspicion is that too often the enthusiasm and devotion of many teachers towards their profession is at best lukewarm. One newsmagazine cites instances of consistent lateness and absenteeism among teachers, and their lack of lesson notes and preparation; of headmasters failing to supervise their staff and of using school time to manage other personal concerns; and of teachers who devote a large proportion of their time to the operation of outside businesses.⁶⁴

The lack of enthusiasm among many teachers towards their profession is often attributed to a deterioration of their professional status and to inadequate or discouraging conditions of service. Certainly a consequence of educational expansion is that teaching has lost much of its traditional status as it has developed into a mass profession: as Renes has suggested, "the 'mwaliimu's' [teacher] halo is doomed to fade".⁶⁵ However, in recognition of this fact the federal

government in Nigeria has seriously attempted to reinstate teaching as an attractive profession by offering reasonable salaries. All teachers are ranked according to grade (usually reflected by educational qualifications and teaching experience) and by their positions within the school system. These positions and grades are then pegged to salary levels which are accorded to all public servants who possess commensurate positions and qualifications. As teachers' salaries are thus fixed to a uniform public service rate, the financial rewards for teaching can be seen as being analogous to all other positions in the civil service. (Further information on teachers' salaries is contained in the following chapter. For a list of salary rates, refer also to Appendix VI.)

While salary may be important, however, "it is not the only thing in the hierarchy of needs".⁶⁶ For example, as Sofenwa observes, little has been accomplished in altering the public image of primary school teachers as rather low class civil servants or as paid children's custodians.⁶⁷ Neither has much success been made in improving the environment of many schools (classrooms, playing fields, class material and equipment) or in developing out-of-school social amenities, most especially in the rural areas, so as to enable unwilling recruits to gain satisfaction from their work and concurrent lifestyles. After all, in many rural villages schools provide the only semblance of "modern life".⁶⁸ Thus for the rural-based teachers who have probably spent several

years in the relative comfort of modern teacher training colleges which generally are located in or near populous towns, the very locale of their jobs and the change in their life-styles may prove discouraging. Finally, for many teachers the limited potential for promotion out of the classroom, combined with the necessity of often having to serve for a long duration away from home and family and friends, can easily contribute to their disenchantment with school teaching and to a desire to disengage themselves from the profession.⁶⁹

Obviously, therefore, if disillusioned, frustrated, underqualified individuals are to fill the requirements for teaching personnel, as evidence indicates is often the case, educational administrators will be employing a category of teachers who are, as Banjo had argued, either "an educational bane" or who prove to be "temporary tolerable".⁷⁰ For the present time, however, if Nigeria's objective of expanding the educational system at all levels is to succeed, there seems little hope for any short-term alternative. Inevitably, if a populous developing nation attempts to implement a massive extension of any school service, top priority will be directed to the fulfillment of quantitative targets. This highlights a major difficulty with government educational policy objectives in Nigeria. So often planning focuses on quantitative para-educational data such as enrollment figures, teacher employment figures, salary rates, graduation figures, transition rates, etc. In their efforts to fill the shortfalls

in teacher recruitment, state and federal education authorities are often forced to ignore such factors as the potential leadership qualities and personalities of recruits, the relationship between the content and environment of teacher training colleges and eventual conditions of teachers' service, and the general quality of life (psychological as well as material) experienced by teachers outside of school hours. Instead the emphasis is on manpower quantity. The result is that while sometimes it is suggested that teachers create their own image, in the main "the government is so eager to appoint any failure, drop-out, and frustrated individual as a teacher" in order to meet its quantitative educational commitments.⁷¹ In doing so, the consequences may be deleterious to the teaching and learning of whatever skills and abilities may be inculcated in schools.

1.6 Examinations and School Curricula

It would be a misconception however -- perhaps to some extent an injustice -- to suggest that the overwhelming qualitative drawback to Nigerian education lies primarily with Nigerian teachers. In many ways the operation of the school system itself, which owes much to its colonial heritage, underscores shortcomings which may have a negative impact on children's learning. Nowhere is this more evident than in the administration of examinations and the heavy emphasis which is

placed on them. Besides being a method of evaluation, examinations in Nigeria form the basis of student, and oftentimes too, manpower selection. And generally, it is this selection function of examinations which not only colours people's attitudes towards the education process, but may also prove a drawback to the potential value of educational activity in school.

This is not to say, however, that examinations per se cripple the education process or even that they lie at the root of qualitative shortcomings of schools in Nigeria. On the contrary, examinations are useful pedagogical tools for assessing individual achievement and aptitude. (Indeed, any form of assessment constitutes an examination.) Likewise, as we have seen, the comparison of examination results over a period of time is one means of evaluating the effectiveness and quality of schooling. For example, since the format of WASC examinations has changed remarkably little over the past decade (modeled as it is on the Cambridge O-Level format in Britain), the decline in the national pass rate provides evidence of a qualitative decline in secondary school education. If no formal uniform examinations were administered nationally at the end of Form V, the assessment and comparison of regional educational standards would doubtless prove exceedingly difficult.

School examinations have a further obvious value: very often they are the key motivating factor in children's learning

activity. Unless students know that in the near future their school-induced skills and abilities are to be tested and rated, it is difficult to imagine that the majority of them would demonstrate much enthusiasm for schoolwork (unless, of course, as we have seen in an instance of a teacher training programme, the exam results themselves appear meaningless to students). There is a likelihood too that examinations can, depending on their content, mitigate to some extent the ill effects of unimaginative rote teaching.⁷² This is particularly so at the primary school level in Nigeria where in many regions "much emphasis is still placed on rote learning and on the children only answering questions in chorus".⁷³ As we have already observed, both sets of primary school terminal examinations -- the primary school leaving exams and the secondary school entrance tests -- place strong emphasis on literacy and numeracy. Clearly then these are the skills which teachers must stress most frequently in the classroom. As often as not, the teaching of reading, writing, and arithmetic (the so-called 3Rs) involves simple, often repetitious practice; as one writer notes, "these basic skills do require a great deal of disciplined drill to make them into automatic reflexes, so that extrinsic motivation of examination preparation might not be so damaging".⁷⁴ While this is not an apology for using repetitive, unimaginative rote drill in the classroom, the fact that the weight of primary school testing is placed on the 3Rs does mean that examinations at this level may

allow for some accomodation of poor teaching if such at least enables students to master some basic literacy and numeracy skills.,

In and of themselves, therefore, examinations are not a fundamental factor in the apparent qualitative failings of the school system in Nigeria. Instead, the major difficulty would seem to be in the excessive nation-wide preoccupation that Nigerians have with examination results. At the heart of this preoccupation is a societal opportunity and reward structure which magnifies the selection function of examinations. As we shall discuss more fully in succeeding chapters, formal education is widely considered to be the most important avenue for social and economic mobility. At the same time, however, placements in ever higher levels of schooling and in modern sector jobs are often far fewer than the number of individual applicants. Consequently, the selection function of examinations is highly significant.

Indeed, the importance of the selection mechanism may be such that formal examinations are not viewed as simply a means for assessment but instead become the fundamental purpose for educational activity. In other words, when examination results form the criteria upon which a limited number of rewards is parceled out, the "raison d'être" of an established curriculum, and the prime objective of classroom activity, may be seen to lie simply in the ultimate score to be had on an examination sheet. Accordingly, formal education

may evolve into little more than a preparatory primer for final exams. And herein lies a qualitative hazard, for in such cases the breadth or imaginative scope of school teaching and learning may be limited; instead the preoccupation with ultimate exam scores may have the effect of reducing "significant school-related human behaviour to performance acts (training, not education)".⁷⁵

While we shall discuss the implications of popular attitudes and aspirations more fully in chapters 6 and 7, we may observe here that there are grounds for suggesting that widespread preoccupation with examination scores can seriously hamper both the learning and the teaching processes carried on in Nigerian schools. For students "the threat of the examiner" means that they often "cannot be said to be governing [themselves], or be in control of [their] own fate".⁷⁶ Lessons and facts may become meaningless. In northern Nigeria, for instance, primary school children have been observed learning and memorizing answers for examination purposes, but not believing the veracity of those answers.⁷⁷ For teachers as well the ever-present pressure of training and coaching their pupils for successful exam performances may often lead to the sort of teaching which is little more than a long drawn-out procedure of monotonous rote drill for which the sole purpose is the achievement of a satisfactory exam score. As already noted, such teaching is not uncommon in Nigerian schools. Indeed, it has been observed that students

in secondary schools, especially in Forms IV and V, may express dissatisfaction if a teacher attempts to modify the structure of lessons or departs temporarily from the formal school syllabus. In such instances, the students' main concern has been to prepare for upcoming final examinations, and so they have shown little interest in any regularly scheduled classroom activity which deviates from a steady diet of question-and-answer or exercise drills.⁷⁸

There are, of course, liabilities in conducting lessons this way. Discussing primary education in Kano State, Bray observes that the common method of rote teaching often renders school activity "very old-fashioned and unadventurous".⁷⁹ Myrdal has argued that rote drill "does little to encourage a questioning, critical attitude or an interest in self-education outside and beyond".⁸⁰ Similarly, O'Connell has suggested that such teaching stifles questioning and initiative -- "yet initiative is the single greatest entrepreneurial characteristic and is vital to economic development".⁸¹ Studies by Gay and Cole, although undertaken among the Kpelle of Liberia, paint a vivid picture of the ineffectual consequence of authoritarian rote drill which so often is the method of exam coaching:

No occasion arises for a child to use his talent for discovery, or his curiosity, in relation to the subject matter of a course. He is forced to repeat aloud collections of words that, from his point of view, make no sense. He knows that he must please the teacher in order to survive, but he finds

what he is taught incomprehensible.

...[He makes] little use of logical organization and structure, or argumentation in school...The child is rarely challenged to follow a train of reasoning to its conclusion...Nor is evidence used to reach general conclusions...Since logical argument is not stressed in the classroom, it is understandable that inconsistencies do not upset the students.⁸²

Poor teaching and excessive preoccupation with the selection function of examinations, then, often reinforce and perpetuate each other. In such circumstances, the rigid examination-oriented nature of classroom activity may simply create a "stultifying effect of joyless schooling"⁸³ which renders meaningless the policy aims of "self-learning" and "maximum self-development".

In referring to the apparent qualitative mediocrity of education in many Third World countries, several writers point to the content of school curricula as being a causal factor. For example, complaints have often been expressed that primary school curricula are frequently over-burdened with too many subjects. Remarking on the primary school curriculum in Kano State, Bray suggests that the twelve prescribed subjects make for a curriculum which is "too wide and therefore too shallow".⁸⁴ Furthermore, he argues, "In a situation where the quality of teaching is bound to decline in the short run [because of rapid school expansion], it would be worth considering a reduction in the number of subjects so that at least some, particularly the 3R's, can be

done well".⁸⁵ As we have indicated, and as most writers agree, the most significant cognitive skills acquired during the early years of schooling appear to be literacy and numeracy. Thus, as Dore writes,

...it might not be a bad thing, at the primary level, at least, if children did concentrate heavily on 'basic' mathematical and linguistic skills. That might, at least, minimize the proportions of children who leave school after four or five years without having secured enough of these minimum preconditions for further learning to remain literate and numerate five years later.⁸⁶

In a similar vein, Elliot argues for greater emphasis on numeracy and literacy at the primary level. "...if the horizons of primary education are to be widened...will the less well-educated and ill-trained primary teacher...be capable of effectively realizing these wider objectives, requiring a high degree of motivation and curriculum reform? By settling for less it may be possible to achieve more."⁸⁷

It is, of course, quite probable that a heavy curriculum load may at times prove beyond the capabilities of under-qualified teachers. However, to scale down the curriculum content of primary schools in Nigeria might well prove of dubious value. For one thing, as we have already seen, the emphasis of primary school curricula is already centred on the basic 3Rs. Such subjects as civics, history, geography, and general science, while not specifically oriented to grammatical training, nonetheless demand continual reading, writing, and oral practice. Consequently, while cutting these subjects from

the curriculum would doubtless lessen the potential absorption of general knowledge in the classroom, it is difficult to see how such action would lead to much further improvement in literacy ability.

Another point to consider is that no educator would seriously propose inflicting a steady diet of reading, writing, and arithmetic on young children -- or their teachers -- throughout every hour of every school day for six years. The provision of such subjects as civics and history, geography, religion, gardening and needlework, physical education, art, music, and crafts, while perhaps constituting a "shallow" curriculum which often may seem beyond the competence of many teachers to direct, nonetheless does at least allow for a range of activity which may better sustain children's interests. Inadequate teaching in some of these areas may be stultifying, but if schools were to function without a range of classroom activities beyond the 3R's, they would be just as deficient. Moreover, it is important to remember that the interests and abilities of teachers and their students vary. By offering a broad latitude of subjects and skills, the primary school system does cater to a wide range of different interests. Thus there is more opportunity for the kindling of enthusiasm among students and teachers -- and enthusiasm can only enhance the overall learning situation. In short, while the standard of education in many primary schools throughout Nigeria may sometimes

be abysmal, and while the content of curricula may appear overly ambitious in view of the shortage of qualified teachers, it is doubtful whether change in primary school curricula would lead to qualitative improvement. In fact, to scale down the subject content might lessen the educational value of many schools.

At the post-primary level, however, where curriculum content is often heavily biased in favour of a liberal arts and science education, there may be more substantial grounds for criticism. There is as yet no clear evidence indicating that in the context of existent circumstances -- rapid school expansion, high teacher turnover rates, automatic student promotion in many regions -- a dramatic change in secondary school curricular content would lead to an improvement in educational standards. Yet in view of the declining pass rate among WASC candidates and the strictly academic nature of much of what is taught in formal secondary school -- which, as we shall see, would appear to be irrelevant to the ultimate needs of large numbers of secondary school leavers -- considerations of curricular change, if not of the entire secondary school structure, would seem warranted. Indeed, as Hinchcliffs argues (and in anticipation of further arguments in this paper), "As regards secondary education, it is easier to sympathize with deschoolers. The cost of secondary school, unemployment, and frustrated aspirations, and often irrelevance of the curriculum suggest a need for alternatives. In

northern Nigeria, 8% pass rates should be sufficient incentive."⁸⁸ In short, while we may suggest that the content of primary school curricula itself probably does not diminish the qualitative value of primary education, the broad liberal arts and science bias of formal secondary school would appear to be overly ambitious, and hence unrealistic in terms of human resource development, especially when we regard the already low standards of primary schooling and the low WASC pass rates.

1.7 Quantity versus Quality: The Long-Term View

In this chapter we have provided a broad outline of the internal function of the primary and secondary school system in Nigeria. Undoubtedly, formal western education has a capacity for inducing certain skills, abilities, and competence which can benefit individual learners and which may ultimately enhance their contribution to the nation's socio-economic development. At the same time, however, it is apparent that education is by no means a uniform process, nor is school activity always a positive learning experience. Throughout the past decade in fact, formal education in Nigeria has consistently been plagued by various qualitative shortcomings: poor scholastic performance of students, lack of qualified teaching personnel, a dearth of equipment and books, an over-emphasis on examinations, and a sometimes

over-burdened, unrealistic school curricula. In effect, there are two sides to the internal function of formal education in Nigeria: on the one side there is the potentiality for inculcating cognitive knowledge and attitudinal and behavioural modernity, and on the other, there is an array of practical qualitative shortcomings. It is in light of this situation that Nigeria's federal government has undertaken to rapidly expand the entire school system of the country.

From the evidence presented thus far it would seem safe to suggest that as the school system is rapidly extended at all levels throughout the country, the general qualitative standards of formal education will steadily decline, perhaps over the next decade or so. Nevertheless, to evaluate formal education on the basis of the quality of schooling alone would be insufficient. This is particularly so in a developing country such as Nigeria, where the value of education (particularly as it is perceived as an investment in human resources) lies not so much in the internal function of the schools per se, but rather in the long-term overall socio-economic effect it has on the nation. It is quite possible, for instance, that in the long run the nationwide economic and social benefits which derive from the government's ambitious programme of rapid school expansion may outweigh the short-term drawbacks of a decline in functional educational quality.

Ultimately, therefore, if formal education in Nigeria

is to be evaluated as a key to overall national development, it is essential to review not only factors inclusive of the educational process itself, but also to examine other external indicators which may attest to its effectiveness as an instrument of socio-economic development. Such indicators as the financial costs and benefits of education, the effect of education on individual job performance, the deployment and utilization of school leavers throughout the various sectors of the economy, and the political exigencies of national integration, regional balance, and equality of opportunity, all have a bearing on educational policy and all may provide insights into the effectiveness of formal education in Nigeria. Our purpose in succeeding chapters will thus be to examine these various external indicators.

FOOTNOTES

(CHAPTER I)

¹Report on Major Trends, pp. 9-10.

²C.A. Duruji, "The Dilemma of Educational Expansion in Developing Countries: A Case Study of Nigeria", Educational Review, 30 (1), February, 1978, p. 70.

³RSA is the abbreviation for Royal Society of Arts. Commercial college qualifications are still closely linked to United Kingdom standards.

⁴The foregoing information on secondary schooling has been obtained from copies of WASC and MOCK/WASC examinations (1979), as well as from various Nigerian technical school job descriptions, all located at the CUSO Head Office in Ottawa.

⁵A. Olufemi Lewis, "A Study of Small Enterprises in the Printing Industry in Nigeria's Lagos State", Quarterly Journal of Administration, Vol. 8, January 1974, p. 196.

⁶Donald B. Holsinger and Gary L. Thiesen, "Education, Individual Modernity, and National Development: A Critical Appraisal", Journal of Developing Areas, 11 (3), April 1977, p. 316.

⁷Alex Inkeles and David H. Smith, Becoming Modern, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 19-32.

⁸Holsinger and Thiesen, p. 318.

⁹Inkeles and Smith, p. 84.

¹⁰Alex Inkeles, "The School as a Context for Modernization", in Alex Inkeles and Donald B. Holsinger, Education and Individual Modernity in Developing Countries, (E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1974), p. 8.

¹¹Field work for the project was carried out in the following countries: Argentina, Chile, East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), India, Israel, and Nigeria. A combined total of almost 6,000 men including peasants, industrial workers, and those in traditional small craft industry pursuits were interviewed. See Inkeles and Smith, p. 6.

¹²Holsinger and Thiesen, p. 321.

¹³Ibid., p. 333.

¹⁴Inkeles and Smith, Chapter 6, pp. 84-98.

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 97-98.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 133-34.

¹⁷While studies on individual modernity have shown the steady progressive influence of ever higher levels of education, the data do not cover the attitudinal and behavioural characteristics of the individuals who have continued formal education beyond secondary school. However, according to Holsinger and Thiesen, studies in other developing countries suggest that possibly "there may be a ceiling effect on the level of modernity that schooling is able to produce. In other words, it is probable that beyond an as yet undetermined point in the schooling experience, increased levels of education provide decreasing increments in modernity scores." Holsinger and Thiesen, p. 324.

¹⁸Inkeles and Smith, p. 126 and p. 136.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 136.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Ibid.

²²Michael Armer and Robert Youtz, "Formal Education and Individual Modernity in an African Society", American Journal of Sociology, 76 (4), January, 1971, p. 606.

²³Ibid., p. 609.

²⁴Ibid., p. 617.

²⁵Inkeles and Smith, pp. 139-40.

²⁶Armer and Youtz, p. 621.

²⁷Alan Peshkin, Kanuri Schoolchildren: Education and Social Mobilization in Nigeria, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., New York, 1972, p. 142.

²⁸Darrell L. Dubey, Educational Institutionalization: The Effects of Schooling in Two Societies on Citizens' Attitudes, Stanford Ph.D. Thesis, 1972, p. 23.

²⁹ Stephen D. McLaughlin, "Cognitive Processes and School Learning: A Review of Research on Cognition in Africa", The African Studies Review, April 1976, p. 88.

³⁰ Michael Cole, John Gay, Joseph A. Glick, Donald W. Sharp, The Cultural Context of Learning and Thinking: An Exploration in Experimental Anthropology, Basic Books Inc., Publishers, New York, 1971, pp. 193-94.

³¹ Peter Wiles, "The Correlation Between Education and Earnings. The External-Test-not-Content Hypothesis (ETNC)", Higher Education, 3 (1), 1974, p. 51.

³² Similar comments are put forward by Dubey, p. 22, and Holsinger and Thiesen, p. 328.

³³ Ronald Dore, The Diploma Disease, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London, 1976, p. 96.

³⁴ Inkeles, p. 22.

³⁵ For a discussion of educational expansion in the Western and Eastern Regions prior to Independence, see David B. Abernethy, The Political Dilemma of Popular Education: An African Case, Stanford, California, 1969, Chapters 6 and 7, pp. 144-87.

³⁶ Michael Ade Ogunyemi, Primary School Curriculum Reform in the Western State of Nigeria, Occasional Paper No. 34, UNESCO, International Institute of Educational Planning, Paris, July, 1974, p. 13. The aims of primary education to which the Banjo Commission referred were endorsed at the Cambridge Conference on African Education in 1954 and were as follows:

(i) the development of sound standards of individual conduct and behaviour;

(ii) an understanding of the community and of what is of value for its development and of the contribution which the individual can make to the community;

(iii) the development of a lively curiosity leading to a desire for knowledge about the immediate environment and the world outside;

(iv) the development of permanent literacy;

(v) the acquisition of some skill of hand and the recognition of the value of manual work.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 13.

³⁸ Federal Government of Nigeria, Investment in Education: The Report of the Commission on Post-School Certificate and Higher Education in Nigeria, Ministry of Education, Lagos, 1960, p. 6. The Report is commonly known as the Ashby Report; Sir Eric Ashby was Chairman of the Commission.

³⁹ Ukeje, cited by Tuquan, p. 60.

⁴⁰ S.A. Banjo, "The Object of Primary School Education", in Adeniji Adaralegbe, ed. A Philosophy for Nigerian Education: Report of the National Curriculum Conference, 8-12, September 1969, (Heinemann Educational Books (Nigeria) Ltd., Ibadan, 1972), p. 22.

⁴¹ Taiwo, cited by S.O. Olanlokun, "Education and Library Services in Nigeria", International Library Review, 8 (4), p. 480.

⁴² Banjo, pp. 24-25, and Adaralegbe, pp. 221-24.

⁴³ Banjo, p. 24.

⁴⁴ Duruji, p. 68.

⁴⁵ As one report suggests, "What is still uncertain is whether too much attention has been given to the logistic problems of the scheme...which will certainly be solved, and too little to the type and quality of education which is given." West Africa, no. 3140, September 12, 1977, p. 1875.

⁴⁶ L.A. Sofenwa, "Observations on the Primary School Education in Nigeria in Relation to UPE", West African Journal of Education, 20 (1), February, 1976, p. 131.

⁴⁷ West Africa, no. 3140, September 12, 1977, p. 1885.

⁴⁸ Ibid. At Government Secondary School, Potiskum, in Borno State where I was teaching, 65 students sat for the 1976 WASC examinations. Of these 13 passed, 11 receiving third class rating, and 2 receiving first class honours. The WASC pass rate for the school that year was 20%.

⁴⁹ Duruji, p. 73.

⁵⁰ G.A. Badmus, "Problems and Issues of Criterion-Referenced Measures: A Cautionary Note to Curriculum Evaluators", West African Journal of Educational and Vocational Measurement, 4 (1), August, 1977, pp. 47-54.

⁵¹Figures on Ogun and Rivers States in "How the States Meet their Problems", West Africa, No. 3140, September 12, 1977, pp. 1877-83.

⁵²T.M. Bray, "Universal Primary Education in Kano State: The First Year", Savanna, 6 (1), June, 1977, p. 3.

⁵³From a speech delivered by Dr. Albert Ozigi at a recent conference on education, in Jos, cited by West Africa, No. 3245, September, 24, 1979, p. 1753. Ozigi also went on to say that whereas a decade ago the average number of students in post-primary institutions in Nigeria was roughly 300, at present some institutions have enrollment figures approaching 2,000 and by the early 1980's most schools will have enrollment targets of 1,000. "Consequently, principals have to operate under the heavy pressure of inadequate physical failure in order to accomodate the large population increase." He also referred to the problem of the rapid turnover rate of teachers which is common in most regions. In many post-primary schools the staff turnover rate is as high as 70% a year; one school experienced a change in headship once every six months for three years. P. 1753.

A further example of the difficulties relating to the shortage of teaching personnel was cited in 1976 by the Principal of Daura Teachers College in Sokoto State. In his annual report, he stated that there were only 24 full-time and part-time teachers for a student population of 800. The resultant situation was such that a fence was constructed around the school grounds to curb "persistent truancy". West Africa, No. 3140, September 12, 1977, p. 1884.

⁵⁴Sofenwa, p. 134.

⁵⁵Throughout the two years (1974-76) I spent teaching at GSS Potiskum, the school was frequently short of an adequate number of teaching staff -- consequently there were instances when several of the lower forms often spent more time in class without a teacher than with one.

⁵⁶Financial Times, August 29, 1988, p. 32.

⁵⁷West Africa, No. 3140, September 12, 1977, p. 1885. From an educational point of view, there are probably advantages as well as disadvantages in hiring expatriate teachers. In my own school, for instance, among a teaching staff usually numbering less than twenty, there were individuals from Canada, Egypt, India, Pakistan, the U.K., and the U.S.A., as well as from different regions within Nigeria. The international flavour which this introduced into the school might be envied by many

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Canadian schools. However, the contrasting English accents of a Scotsman and an Egyptian might have been confusing for pupils for whom English was a second or third language!

⁵⁸Ukeje, cited by Duruji, p. 70.

⁵⁹Bray, pp. 6-7.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 8.

⁶¹West Africa, No. 3140, September 12, 1977, p. 1884.

⁶²Dore, p. 96.

⁶³Bray, p. 6.

⁶⁴West Africa, No. 3140, September 12, 1977, p. 1885.

⁶⁵P. B. Renes, cited by Tuquan, p. 69.

⁶⁶Sofenwa, p. 134.

⁶⁷Ibid.

⁶⁸Ibid.

⁶⁹James O'Connell, "Education and Economic Growth: Some Reflections on the Nigerian Situation", Savanna, 1 (1), June, 1972, p. 49.

⁷⁰Banjo, p. 22.

⁷¹Sofenwa, p. 135.

⁷²As we shall mention shortly, rote teaching should not be dismissed out of hand as a pedagogical tool; intervals of repetitious drill are probably effective in teaching basic literacy and numeracy.

⁷³Bray, "UPE in Kano", p. 12.

⁷⁴Dore, p. 158.

⁷⁵Badmus, p. 52.

⁷⁶Dore, p. 9.

⁷⁷Peshkin, p. 136.

⁷⁸In preparing students for the English Language and Literature WASC examinations I found this frequently to be the case; students were agitated unless they were confident that lessons rigidly adhered to the syllabus.

⁷⁹Bray, p. 12.

⁸⁰Myrdal, cited by Tuquan, p. 66.

⁸¹O'Connell, p. 49.

⁸²Gay and Cole, cited by Tuquan, pp. 66-67.

⁸³Dore, p. 12.

⁸⁴Bray, p. 12.

⁸⁵Ibid.

⁸⁶Dore, p. 158.

⁸⁷J. Elliot, "Education and Economic Growth: An Analytical Study of the African Situation", South African Journal of African Affairs, 7 (1), 1977, p. 18.

⁸⁸Keith Hinchcliffe, "Screening, Deschooling, and Developing Countries", Higher Education, 4 (3), August, 1975, p. 313.

CHAPTER 2: THE ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION: COSTS AND RETURNS, AND THE ALLOCATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF EDUCATIONAL FUNDING

2.1 Introduction

Public funding of education in Nigeria is generally considered to be an investment in the development of human capital. Indeed, since the submission of the 1960 Ashby Commission Report, titled Investment in Education, this has been a premise upon which Nigerian educational policy has been formulated.¹ Moreover, because investment in human capital is seen as essential for economic growth, the returns on educational investment are frequently considered in monetary terms. During the past half decade, Nigeria has channeled an enormous and ever-increasing percentage of its national revenue towards the development of formal education in the country. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of Nigeria's education system, we must, therefore, account for the expense of the federal government's educational investment and relate the costs of education to its estimated financial returns.

Placing a monetary tag on the returns to educational investment is by no means a thorough method of measuring the aggregate benefits which accrue from education. Nevertheless, by considering education in terms of its financial costs and benefits only, we may gain at least some insight into the allocative effectiveness of educational funding. In other words,

the analysis of financial costs and benefits may help to indicate that in some areas of the educational system subsidization may be excessive while in other areas there may be need for greater investment. This then shall be the purpose of this chapter -- namely to consider, in view of the economics of education in Nigeria, the allocative effectiveness of government spending on education.

In Section 2.2, we shall review the soaring educational costs which the federal government has incurred within the past few years, and identify some of the causes of high expenditure as well as those areas of education which command the greatest expense. The main concern here is that while education is considered to be vital for national development, runaway educational costs appear to be contributing substantially to a rising national deficit.

The assessment of educational costs is a relatively straightforward procedure. Analysis of the financial returns on educational investment, however, is far more difficult: indeed, the entire notion of placing a monetary value on the benefits of education has for some time been a controversial issue. Therefore, before examining the estimated financial returns on education in Nigeria, we shall summarize in Section 2.3 the main points of the controversy, pro and con. In doing so, we may be able to appraise the findings of educational cost-benefit analyses in Nigeria within the context of a circumscribed, yet realistic, perspective.

In measuring the economic returns to education a differentiation must be made between the private and social rates of return. In Section 2.4, we shall examine a theoretical model demonstrating the difference between the two rates as being roughly equivalent to the rate at which education is subsidized. The assumption of the model is that the greater the difference between the social and private rates at a given educational level, the more substantial is the subsidy at that level.

This relates directly to the results of a number of cost-benefit studies carried out in Nigeria which we shall present in Section 2.5. The results of these studies provide rough indications of the profitability as well as the rate of subsidization of various types and levels of education. By linking estimated educational profitability and the related degree of subsidization, we may be able to demonstrate the differing economic values of subsidizing different forms and levels of education.

Bearing in mind the present high investment in formal education, we may thus arrive at tentative conclusions regarding the allocative effectiveness of present public educational funding. We shall conclude in Section 2.6 by offering possible policy alternatives which, based solely on economic reasoning, might result in a more effective allocation of educational expenditure.

2.2 Costs of Formal Education

As we have mentioned, in devising its expansionary education programme within the context of the Third National Development Plan, the federal government stressed that high costs were not to be considered a major constraint. In effect, this attitude is reflected in all areas of the Plan, for in the mid-1970's, development planning echoed the euphoria of the so-called "oil revolution"; at that time, it seemed that the major problem facing planners consisted in devising effective means of spending the giant revenues of "petronaira".² Within a very short period, however, the euphoria has all but vanished. National revenue, mainly in the form of petroleum profits, has dropped³ from a peak in the fiscal year 1976/77 when current revenue was ₦ 6.8 billion;⁴ the figure has since fallen, declining slightly to ₦ 6.3 billion in 1977/78, and dropping substantially to ₦ 5.2 billion during the last fiscal year.⁵ The result is that presently, in order to meet its planned commitments, the federal government faces the prospect of racking up high deficits in public expenditure. Indeed, the current account deficit for the past fiscal year was up to ₦ 2.3 billion from ₦ 656 million the previous year -- more than a three-fold increase in a single year! The rise in deficit spending has been so dramatic in fact that in April of 1979 General Obasanjo was moved to declare: "In the interest of the economy, this situation

cannot be allowed to continue...In the new financial year, we will all have to tighten our belts, either as government or individuals in order to live within our means."⁶

Despite this intention, however, the 1979/80 budget itself contains a projected deficit of ₦ 3.239 million -- "the second largest anticipated deficit in recent years".⁷ Obviously, therefore, the basic problem facing Nigerians now is not how to use their oil wealth for development, but rather how "the injurious consequences of affluence [can] be arrested so that the prospects of development are not completely scuppered".⁸

Nevertheless, an official austerity programme has been announced. As part of the programme, allocations of the federal capital account amount to ₦ 6.6 billion -- about half the amount requested by federal ministries and agencies. More significant for our purposes, however, is that efforts continue to be made to scale down the government's recurrent expenses. To support an array of commitments the Federal Military Government proposed in April that total recurrent expenditures for the fiscal year 1979/80 should amount to ₦ 2.9 billion, as against ₦ 2.8 billion in 1978/79. While this is a marginal increase of just under 5%, the approximate inflation rate of 15¹/₂ means that in fact the budgeted recurrent expenses will be roughly 10% lower in real terms than the previous year. In light of the fact that the rate of inflation has fallen over the past two years, General Obasanjo

was able to argue that "for two years running, the Federal Military Government has not only resisted pressures to increase recurrent expenditures, but has in fact managed to reduce such expenditures in real terms".⁹ Indeed, as shown in Table 2.A, over the past two years most of the main spending ministries have experienced cutbacks.

Such, however, has not been the case with the proposed recurrent expenditure on education. Since the introduction of the Third National Plan, federal spending on education has shown no signs of diminishing. From the period 1972/73, when recurrent expenditure was approximately ₦ 9.3 million and capital expenditure totaled some ₦ 23.2 million, the allocation of financial outlay has steadily risen until by 1978/79 recurrent and capital costs of education totaled ₦ 779 million and ₦ 321 million respectively.¹⁰ The massive leap in educational expenditure can be illustrated by the fact that in the first year of UPE (1976-77), the Federal Ministry of Education received a record vote of ₦ 738.6 million; this was an increase of ₦ 637.1 million over the previous year's allocation of ₦ 101.5 million.¹¹ In terms of recurrent expenditure, education ranked only second for several years; in 1978, however, education exceeded defence as the greatest recurrent expense, although when the capital budget was included in the account, defence still led with a total estimate of ₦ 1.3 billion as opposed to ₦ 1.1 billion for education. Most revealing of all was that, while the federal government

TABLE 2.A

Recurrent Estimates, 1977/78, 1978/79, and 1979/80

(tt million)				
Ministry	1977/78	1978/79	1979/80	% change 1977/78-1979
Education	239	779	914	282
Defence	818	598	520	-36
Police	165	128	146	-12
Works	118	92	106	-10
Health	110	81	97	-12
Information	669	63	76	10
Finance	73	52	70	-4
Labour	44	48	63	43
Internal Affairs	50	45	50	0
External Affairs	42	33	37	-12
National Science and Technology Develop- ment Agency	40	31	33	-17
Economic Development	30	28	28	-7

Source: Quarterly Economic Review of Nigeria: Third Quarter, 1978, p. 9; and West Africa, 16 April, 1979, p. 661.

TABLE 2.B

State Budgets 1976/77 and 1977/78 (N Million)

State	Total Budget 1976/77	Education	Total Budget 1977/78	Education
Anambra	184.7	34.5 (18.7%)	308.6	108.3 (35.1%) *
Bauchi	180.0	24.8 (13.8%)	224.8	5.7 (2.5)
Bendel	341.3	62.5 (18.3)	466.3	116.6 (25)
Benue	222.4	58.5 (26.3) *	302.0	101.0 (33.4) *
Borno	253.5	74.3 (29.3) *	472.3	102.9 (21.8) *
Cross River	249.3	53.4 (21.4) *	282.7	58.8 (20.8) *
Gongola	247.0	96.6 (39.1) *	417.8	70.5 (16.9)
Imo	259.4	52.1 (20.1) *	274.9	63.8 (23.2) *
Kaduna	244.0	63.9 (26.2) *	370.0	109.6 (29.6) *
Kano	269.5	65.0 (24.1) *	456.1	197.7 (43.3) *
Kwara	277.5	58.0 (20.9) *	339.3	38.9 (11.5)
Lagos	338.5	91.0 (26.9) *	474.5	98.8 (20.8) *
Niger	131.1	13.8 (10.5)	197.6	3.1 (1.6)
Ogun	180.8	9.6 (5.3)	262.4	- (-)
Ondo	211.6	46.8 (22.1) *	321.5	7.8 (2.4)
Oyo	255.6	75.4 (29.5) *	422.5	147.9 (35.0) *
Plateau	265.5	97.0 (36.5) *	318.1	98.3 (30.9) *
Rivers	220.0	48.2 (21.9) *	293.1	68.0 (23.2) *
Sokoto	208.6	48.8 (23.4) *	291.8	101.9 (34.9) *

* -- denotes the highest spending percentage of total budget.

Source: Quarterly Economic Review of Nigeria: Annual Supplement 1976, p. 18; and Annual Supplement 1977, p. 21.

had pledged to cut back its total recurrent budget of 1978 by 10% of the previous year, its recurrent budget for education "shot up by a staggering 226%".¹²

Likewise, as indicated in Table 2.B, numerous state governments allotted their largest recurrent and capital costs to education. Despite the continuing fall in national revenue, and the government's subsequent announcement to reduce public spending, total federal expenditure on education has continued to rise and has this past year surpassed total defence spending. In fact, only the manufacturing and crafts sector shows a slightly larger budget than education (N 1,366 million capital expenditure as opposed to a combined recurrent and capital expenditure of N 1,305 million on education)¹³. Thus, contrary to the rhetoric of restraint, official commitment to the long-term venture of education in Nigeria has developed into an extremely costly undertaking. As one writer has suggested, "the expansion of education has placed a severe drain on state and federal recurrent budgets year after year after year".¹⁴ Indeed, there can be little doubt that a major cause of Nigeria's national deficit lies with increased expenditure on schooling.

This rapid rise of educational costs has far outstripped original expense estimates as outlined in the 1975-80 Third National Development Plan. Indeed, the Plan not only underestimated costs, but only provided estimates for capital costs. These were projected to be N 500 million over

the planned five-year period of which ₦ 200 million was to be allocated for UPE-related teacher training.¹⁵ We have only to note the budgeted capital expenditure on education of ₦ 391 million for this past fiscal year alone to see how wrong this estimate was. One major cause for the phenomenal underestimation of capital costs was that no account could be made for the soaring rate of inflation which occurred after the publication of the Third Plan. For example, in 1974 a classroom capable of seating 30 children cost approximately ₦ 900 to construct; by 1976, the estimated cost was ₦ 3,500, excluding furniture.¹⁶ Another explanation for high capital costs is that much of the expense may simply have been drained by unnecessary extravagance as this example suggests:

Perhaps the level of expenditure on buildings may be criticized as too high, especially since the quality of work is frequently poor. It is not necessary, for example, to make glass windows and doors in schools, especially if they are then painted over and so provide no light on cold harmattan mornings. Already many of them have been broken. The prices paid to contractors have been high -- as much as ₦ 12,000 per 2-classroom block in some areas. Likewise, it is doubtful whether it is necessary to construct such costly latrines. These are being built out of cement blocks with zinc roofs and iron doors at a price of ₦ 2,400 per 4-hole unit.¹⁷

Recurrent expenses have also been drastically underestimated, particularly at the primary school level. In 1974, for instance, the Federal Commissioner for Education reckoned

9

that the annual recurrent cost for UPE would be approximately ₦ 200 million.¹⁸ In fact, the first year of UPE recorded a combined federal and state recurrent expenditure of ₦ 515 million,¹⁹ and it has been rising steadily since then. A significant reason for this has been that primary school enrollments have surpassed practically all early expectations, especially during the first year of the UPE programme. For example, Imo State received an initial grant for 700,000 Grade 1 students, yet an additional 300,000 were enrolled as well.²⁰ In Anambra State, projected primary school enrollment was reckoned at 9.8 million, but the figure duly recorded was 20.5 million.²¹ Largely, this was the result of the dearth of accurate population figures; much of the planning for UPE was based on 1963 census returns. Partly, too, there is a common suspicion that many children who are being enrolled in primary schools are under the official entry age. Bray estimates that as many as 10% of first year primary school children in Kano State may be under-aged.²²

A further inducement to rising educational costs lies in the government's commitment to heavily subsidize formal education. The provision of free primary education has placed a growing burden on the grants-in-aid system. Indeed, since the start of the UPE programme, special federal grants to the state governments and local education authorities have steadily risen. In one year alone, 1978 to 1979, the increase in federal

grants rose approximately 22% - from ₦ 506 to ₦ 647.²³ These grants are not included as part of the statutory allocation provisions agreed upon by the federal government and the states, and yet for 1979/80 they amount to 6.8% of total federal expenditure.²⁴ In addition to its commitment to free universal primary education, the federal government has also embarked on a legislative programme to encourage pre-primary education. "Individuals, private voluntary organizations, and local communities should see it as a social responsibility to establish pre-primary or nursery schools."²⁵ Doubtlessly, this will add to future federal expenses as well.

Grants for secondary schooling have also expanded. Prior to 1979, families in most areas were compelled to pay fees for children's secondary schooling. In April of that year, however, the federal government announced that with the start of this coming financial year, secondary education will be tuition-free, although boarding fees and the costs of books will still be paid by students or their families.²⁶ When one considers that in 1979 grants to states for secondary education already amount to ₦ 40 million, it is clear that the federal government is readily promoting the further development of formal secondary education and that greater public expenditure will be devoted to this end in future.

Likewise, tertiary education is to command greater financial assistance, for recently universities have also complained of deficits in essential funding. This has been

particularly so since 1975 when six new universities were established in the country.²⁷ For instance, for the 1976-77 fiscal year, the universities had applied for a total operating grant of ₦ 196 million. However, the federal government could only provide ₦ 153 million, a shortfall of 14.5%. According to the Nigerian Universities Commission, this shortfall was "far greater than the universities could absorb"²⁸ and some universities incurred substantial debt.²⁹ Likewise, there have been shortages of university teachers, particularly for the newly established institutions, and reports of overcrowding of faculty and students.³⁰

The universities are, of course, the most expensive educational institutions to operate. For example, the 1975-77 Report of the NUC estimated that "a 500-bed hall of residence costs about ₦ 5 million and takes more than 52 weeks to build" -- and this is assumed to be a very moderate estimate.³¹ When we consider that the total number of Nigerian university students (numbering less than 60,000) represents a very tiny percentage of the country's overall population, and that the universities operate in English and contribute to the formation of a highly selective elite (we shall discuss this more fully in Chapters 6 and 7), it is not surprising that they "necessarily stand not at the centre but on the margins of society".³² Nevertheless, federal government commitment to higher education will result in ever greater financial outlays. As the Head of State announced in April

1979:

In the new fiscal year, more resources will be made available through the National Universities Commission to enable the universities to meet their recurrent and capital commitments. Government hopes that with more resources, it would be possible to increase university enrollment significantly from its present level of about 53,000. Government is determined to ensure that research and academic staff development in all the 13 universities are pursued with greater vigour.³³

Recurrent expenditure, of course, constitutes the lion's share of formal educational funding. Undoubtedly, the overwhelming percentage of this goes towards teachers' salaries. And with rising inflation, increasing numbers of teachers, and efforts towards raising teaching standards, the rate of teacher salary outlay is bound to mushroom if the formal education system is to be maintained. As Bray and Cooper write:

The recurrent cost is particularly important, first, because it has to be paid each year and, secondly, because it increases with time. As the system expands, more teachers have to be employed. But even if the number is held constant, the wage bill still increases as individuals improve their qualifications and as they gain increments for experience.³⁴

An example of this can be seen by teacher salary levels.³⁵

For Grade II and Grade I teachers, most of whom teach in primary schools, starting salaries are ₦ 1,476 and ₦ 1,944, respectively, rising to ₦ 1,908 and ₦ 2,520 after seven years. Teachers with Nigerian Certificates of Education (N.C.E.) earn a starting salary of ₦ 2,532, rising to ₦ 3,252. Grad-

uates with Bachelors and Masters degrees earn ₦ 3,264 and ₦ 4,368 rising to ₦ 4,168 and ₦ 5,340, respectively. Heads of schools or colleges and their assistants earn much higher, ranging from ₦ 5,460 up to ₦ 11,028 depending on qualifications and years of service. When we consider the per capita income of the entire country to be approximately ₦ 284 (although for most people it is probably much lower),³⁶ we may begin to appreciate the extent to which government is willing to invest in formal schooling.

Throughout all states in Nigeria many teachers are not certified at all. In mid-1978, for example, it was estimated that 90% of all primary school teachers were not certified by any of the training colleges, and that even in the educationally developed eastern Anambra State 60% of the primary teachers were uncertified.³⁷ Uncertified teachers, of course, receive less than the minimum starting rate of qualified Grade II teachers. Nevertheless, crash training programmes have been set up to upgrade the qualifications of many teachers, especially those who are uncertified.³⁸ While these efforts are aimed primarily at improving the pedagogical quality of schools in Nigeria, they at the same time will result in salary increases as qualifications are raised, thus adding a further burden on an already strained recurrent expenditure bill. Even so, according to the Financial Times, "The present [1978] allowance of ₦ 35 per child per annum from the federal government is supposed

to include a 70% allocation for the teacher. In many states, it would need to be about twice as much to cover actual costs".³⁹ Thus, even though the government recently announced its intention to raise the allowance per child by ₦ 5.00, this would still not appear to be enough to cover teachers' salaries.

Certainly, however, if the federal government is to seriously pursue its intention of expanding and consolidating the formal education system in Nigeria, it seems likely that massive recurrent outlays for teachers' salaries will continue to be necessary in order to attract qualified personnel to the teaching profession, and at the same time to discourage those presently engaged in teaching from drifting away. Unfortunately, the worrisome aspect about such a large financial outlay is that the coffers of national revenue are diminishing. The trend in rising recurrent educational spending may thus prove to be potentially detrimental by draining funds which might be more immediately productive elsewhere. As John Keheler has observed:

Raising salaries is one of the methods of attracting people to the teaching profession, but apart from the increase in recurrent expenditure that this entails, it throws a greater burden on the productive sector, which is called on to produce more, year after year, to pay for this increase. It would seem that the Ministry of Education has no alternative but to accept this situation.⁴⁰

On the other hand, of course, there is the possibility that far from being a burden on the productive sector, the

expansion and increased government subsidization of the formal education system may, in fact, represent a potentially profitable national investment. Indeed, as we have already observed, the official view is that education is in effect an investment in human capital development and that this is seen to be essential for economic growth. Based on this premise, therefore, the present high costs of education in Nigeria may eventually be superceded by substantial monetary returns arising from increased human capital productivity. How we gauge these returns, and hence appraise the allocative effectiveness of educational investment, is a subject to which we now turn.

2.3 Cost-Benefit Analysis of Education: A Contentious Issue

While expenditure on education is viewed as a national investment in Nigeria, the returns on education -- unlike those on most other types of investment -- cannot be easily added up and balanced against costs. Indeed, as can be seen in the federal government's education policy outline, the returns on education include benefits which are decidedly non-economic: "the inculcation of national consciousness and national unity; the inculcation of the right type of values and attitudes for the survival of the individual and Nigerian society; the training of the mind in understanding the world around..." As Oyedepi suggests, education in Nigeria is to be

valued for "its contribution to social cohesion by setting common societal values; patriotism, religion, democracy, etc., and as such has no profit maximization objective".⁴¹ Moreover, such non-economic values cannot be mathematically measured and balanced against financial costs.

Nevertheless, with such vast sums being presently expended on the formal school system in Nigeria, it would be erroneous to consider education as merely a form of consumer good, a social service which, if it is to demonstrate any returns at all, will result in non-measurable, intrinsic benefits only. On the contrary, the very fact that education is viewed as an investment in human capital, that it is seen as essential for economic growth, clearly implies that the returns on education are expected in large part to be ultimately manifested in sheer dollars and cents -- or, more appropriately, naira and kobo. Consequently, while returns on educational investment may not be fully economic, the vast spending spree which UPE and post-primary school expansion has touched off, and the assumed link that the proliferation of schooling has with the country's economic development, do justify some sort of overall economic assessment of the benefits arising from education.

In carrying out this kind of assessment, economists invariably turn to what one writer has described as the "bag of tools" of cost-benefit analysis.⁴² The value of this type of economic analysis as it applies to education is a much dis-

cussed and often severely criticized phenomenon. Indeed, the entire field of the economics of education has developed into a somewhat contentious issue, particularly as related to developing countries. One writer, for example, has suggested that when cost-benefit analysis is used to illuminate societal needs and thus act as a guide to public educational investment policy, "we move into, if not exactly cloud cuckoo land, at least its border areas".⁴³ Another has pointed out that "attempts at precise evaluation of the economic role of education are not only a waste of scarce time and scarce statistical skill: they appear so scientific that they could be taken seriously instead of being treated as intellectual gymnastics."⁴⁴ Other writers have argued that the economic bias of cost-benefit analysis is simply inappropriate when attempting to devise key social policies in developing countries.⁴⁵ Tuquan, for instance, has stressed that cost-benefit models which are set up to assess the social returns on educational expenditure in Third World countries invariably suffer from "their own over-simplified chain of reasoning and removal from reality".⁴⁶ Their fundamental weakness, he suggests, lies in their orientation towards the duplication of models which have been adopted in developed countries; this makes them inappropriate for use in developing societies where circumstances are often completely antithetical.

...In the underdeveloped country, planning of growth must take into account the raising of living standards and increasing of consumption

so as to create one of the prerequisites for raising productivity. The developed society, on the other hand, has good reason for disregarding levels of living, except insofar as these determine the resources to be put aside as savings and subsequently made available for investment. Indeed, a growth model in an advanced country can be confined to the use of concepts such as savings, investment, employment, production, and the formation of prices as the basic tools for economic analysis and policy. This fundamental difference between the two types renders Western economic models inappropriate and inapplicable to the problems of underdeveloped countries...

...If one views the situation in an underdeveloped society, and indeed in any other society, as a social order consisting of many conditions that are causally related, the bias of economic analysis would mean that levels of living, attitudes towards change, and the social, psychological and political structures that represent "non-economic" factors and affect the social process are disregarded. The bias, which is symptomatic of economic models, has restricted the vision of many economists and their insight into the crucial problems with which an underdeveloped country is confronted.⁴⁷

Applied to the assessment of education, this argument may be particularly apt. The evaluation of an educational system through the use of cost-benefit analysis invariably isolates and concentrates on specific economic variables which, unless viewed as part of an integrated process involving such "non-economic" factors as multifarious cultural and ethnic differences, housing standards, sanitary and health conditions, dietary imbalances, etc., may not have much relevance for the ultimate determination of policy.⁴⁸ Generally, economic studies do make mention of the importance of non-economic factors but the danger, as Hagen notes, is that many of them "treat these

factors much as Mark Twain accused everyone of treating the weather. Having mentioned non-economic factors, they then proceed to ignore them and discuss development as though only economic factors bring it about."⁴⁹

A further criticism of cost-benefit analysis, when applied to measuring the effectiveness of education in under-developed countries, is that frequently the scope of the analysis is either too limited to have any realistic bearing on national policy, or else too much is attempted and hence the results lack the necessary accuracy upon which sound policy decisions should presumably be based. To assess all costs and benefits, no matter how widely dispersed, to express these in monetary terms and at social as well as private values "bearing in mind that most of the relevant values must be estimated for an array of future dates",⁵⁰ and to attempt to standardize all costs and benefits so as to account for time differentials is a monumental task, especially in areas where data constraints are the norm.

Even when applied to the calculation of educational returns in developed countries, as Balogh and Streeten observe, cost-benefit models

ignore both the indirect (financial and non-financial) returns accruing to others than the educated individual, and the direct non-financial returns to the individual. On the other hand, they pay a good deal of attention to 'income foregone during study' which constitutes a large proportion of the costs of 'investment'. But neither the income foregone by other groups in society (housewives, voluntary workers, people

such as some university teachers -- accepting a lower income than they could get in other occupations), nor the non-financial benefits enjoyed during education are estimated.⁵¹

While such is the case in developed societies, it would thus be presumptuous to attest to the accuracy of educational cost-benefit analyses in developing countries. This is especially so when one considers that, ideally, cost-benefit analysis should determine "ex-post" rates of return by following a cohort over a period of time.⁵² In the case of Nigeria, however, as in most other LDCs, lack of time series data inevitably means that estimated rates of return are usually neither "ex-ante" nor "ex-post". Instead, simple "cross-sectional rates [are] used either in an 'ex-post' or 'ex-ante' sense according to the author's conscience or in order to solve the problem at hand."⁵³ Because cross-sectional data are stationary, it is, therefore, necessary to make arbitrary adjustments in order to account for such factors as the effect of economic growth on future earnings, periods of unemployment, etc.

A further difficulty in cost-benefit studies is that the returns on education are generally analyzed by means of individual earnings measurements. Unfortunately, a major weakness in this method is that usually the data obtained do not provide sufficient evidence as to whether expenditure on education is the cause or the effect of different income levels. Even when education is seen to be a pre-requisite for higher income, "the model(s) do not show whether education is a sufficient or

necessary condition for economic growth...Models do not simply distinguish between monopolistic and other forces that are correlated with, but not brought about by, education and that influence differential earnings".⁵⁴ For instance, measurements of earnings cannot account for imperfections in the labour market, nor can they precisely assess the actual relationship between earnings and education on the one hand, and earnings and other non-educational factors on the other. Earnings differentials may stem from differences in socio-economic background and family influence, or from the limitations imposed by trade unions and particular professions which maintain labour scarcity, or simply from government legislation which, as we shall see, may directly influence some sectors of the economy, while leaving others only marginally affected. Yet such factors are frequently discounted from cost-benefit models; and in many developing countries where cost-benefit models are often applied to the modern sector labour force, these factors play a considerable role in affecting wage and salary rates. Thus measured rates of return may simply reflect "the traditional standards of a feudal or colonial aristocracy and the accompanying restrictions",⁵⁵ and have little to say about either the effect of education on economic growth or on the bearing which education has on a country's social needs.⁵⁶ In short, as Edwards writes:

...the principal limitations of cost-benefit analysis [are] all too apparent -- to identify all of the benefits and costs of education is a large

task; to assign money values to many of them is a hazardous undertaking; to estimate social values when these are not thrown up by the market-place and when they lie in the future rather than the present is certainly ambitious; and to attempt to compare values across time is a tricky task.⁵⁷ Accuracy is not a feasible objective of cost-benefit analysis.⁵⁸

Ultimately, however, reservations about the use of cost-benefit analysis should be directed not so much at what it attempts to do -- namely determine the rate of return or investment in a mathematical way -- but rather at intimations which over-value such analysis. As Wiles argues, "There is nothing wrong with applying economic analysis to education: but there is much wrong with a particular sort of naïveté."⁵⁹ In other words, the limitations of cost-benefit analysis as applied to education are not grounds for dismissing it out of hand as an analytical tool; rather these limitations simply circumscribe whatever findings may be drawn from such analysis. George Psacharopoulos, whose book The Returns to Education offers a summary of economic evaluation techniques as applied to education systems in thirty-five countries, acknowledges that, "It is customary...to print two statements. First, that because of data limitations, coverage, and the like, too generalized implications should not be drawn from [the analysis]. Second, that further research on the subject is needed in order to provide conclusive answers to the question."⁶⁰ Acceptance of the need for more research, however, does not necessarily invalidate whatever evidence does exist. Indeed, while the availability of data may be limited, and while a

great deal of research may yet be necessary, policy decisions must still be made and carried out. However, circumscribed the cost-benefit data base may be, it no doubt will serve as one indicator among several.

Consequently, while it may be mistaken to formulate a comprehensive hypothesis on the basis of cost-benefit analysis alone, and while there can be no claim for its accuracy when used to measure the social returns on education in developing countries, cost-benefit analysis may nonetheless be useful as a guide (although not the sole basis) for policy decisions. Concerned as they are with rational resource allocation on the basis of profitability and opportunity costs on a nation-wide scale, planners and decision-makers must heed endeavours to measure existent socio-economic indicators. And herein lies the merit of cost-benefit analysis, for as Edwards argues, its value as

applied to educational planning lies not so much in its accuracy or indeed in its utility for investment decisions as in the kinds of information it seeks to disclose and in the hints to be gleaned from this information about an extensive array of economic policies extending beyond the educational sector itself...

...What it does offer is a time perspective and an attempt at objectivity, both of which should improve investment decisions.⁶¹

For policy-makers, therefore, the attraction of cost-benefit analysis, of the entire "bag of tools" offered up by the economics of education, is that the resultant findings, if only approximate, can nonetheless be compared with similarly calculated yields in other areas of investment. In that sense,

studies devoted to the economics of Nigerian education may have some impact on government decision-making.

2.4 The Subsidization of Education: The Differential of Private and Social Rates of Return

In referring to the returns on education as measured by cost-benefit analyses, it is necessary to distinguish between private and social rates of return. The private rate in theory relates the costs of education which are borne by the individual to the benefits (after tax) which he receives as a result of his schooling. The social rate of return relates total resource expenditure devoted to the education of an individual to the individual's net earnings (before tax). In Nigeria's case, the costs incurred by students towards formal schooling, at whatever level, form a small fraction of full educational costs. Moreover, the system of taxation on individual earnings remains poorly organized, thus allowing for a great deal of tax evasion.⁶² Consequently, not only would we expect the social rate of return on educational investment in Nigeria to be less than the corresponding private rate, but, generally speaking, the difference between the two rates indicates the degree of educational subsidization.

In order to explore the relationship between subsidization and the differential between private and social returns on education, it may be useful to review a series of formulae introduced by Psacharopoulos.⁶³ Confining his discussion to

the costs of a university education,⁶⁴ he maintains that these costs include the direct costs (C_3), i.e. tuition and fees, as well as incidental expenses, and earnings foregone (Y_2) while at school. If education is not subsidized by the state, then C_3 would, in fact, be equivalent to the true social cost of an individual's university education. Since foregone earnings are measured by average salary levels of secondary school graduates in the labour market, the ultimate benefits of education are determined by the difference in earnings between the individual with tertiary education (Y_3) and the individual with secondary education (Y_2). Assuming, therefore, that tertiary education is not subsidized and that its duration is four years, the costs and benefits would be encapsulated in the unsubsidized private rate of return given approximately by the formula

$$r_u = \frac{Y_3 - Y_2}{4(C_3 + Y_2)} \quad (1)$$

If an individual compares r_u to an alternate return from another form of private investment (r^0) and perceives r_u to be greater than r^0 then he will apply for university admission. It follows then that the higher r_u is in comparison to the alternative rates of return, the higher will be the demand for university places.

Now let us assume that university education is fully subsidized by the state. In this case, C_3 will equal zero, and the subsidized private rate of return will be expressed

by the formula

$$r_s = \frac{Y_3 - Y_2}{4Y_2} . \quad (2)$$

The subsidized rate of return (r_s) is greater than the unsubsidized rate (r_u); consequently, aggregate private demand for university education will be even higher if subsidization is in effect.

The demand for higher education, as noted, is a function of the difference between the rate of return to education and any alternate rates of interest. Thus the formula

$$D_3 = f(r_{\text{private}} - r^0).$$

While university places may be growing, in proportion to population growth they could in fact be declining, or, at best, be fixed. (For example, it has been estimated that between 1960-1970 the percentage of the population enrolled in university in the poorest LDCs barely rose from 0.3% to 0.4%; while no current census of Nigeria's population exists,⁶⁵ it is possible to assume that the number of university places has risen negligibly in proportion to population growth.) Thus for theoretical purposes, we may say that the supply of university places remains fixed, expressed as

$$S_3 = \bar{S}_3.$$

Consistent with the fact that in most countries (Nigeria included) private returns on university education (r_{private}) are generally higher than the discount rate (r^0), and because of the relatively fixed number of university places in proportion

to the population, the number of applicants will exceed the supply of places. In other words, there exists an excess demand for university admission

$$\Delta = D_3 - \bar{S}_3.$$

In a situation where university is completely unsubsidized, the unsatisfied demand for places will be

$$\Delta_u = f(r_u - r^0) - \bar{S}_3$$

whereas in a situation of full subsidization unsatisfied demand is

$$\Delta_s = f(r_s - r^0) - \bar{S}_3.$$

It follows from this then that as r^0 and $\bar{S}_3$ are considered constants, a policy of subsidization (i.e. where costs are borne by the state) will create more unsatisfied demand for university places than a policy of no subsidization (i.e. when individuals -- or their families -- are compelled to bear the full brunt of educational costs). This extra unsatisfied demand is expressed as

$$\Delta \Delta = \Delta_s - \Delta_u = f(r_s - r_u) \quad (3)$$

By transposing formulas (1) and (2) into (3) we now arrive at

$$\Delta \Delta = f \left[r_u \left(\frac{C_3}{Y_2} \right) \right]$$

This means that the excess demand for education which results

from subsidization is a function of

"a) the unsubsidized rate of return (r_u) which is determined by the labour market conditions affecting relative earnings (Y_2 and Y_3) and the direct social cost of schooling (C_3), and

b) the ratio of direct costs to foregone earnings (C_3/Y_2 ".⁶⁶

In other words, while specific market conditions create an unsubsidized rate of return (r_u), the extent to which government subsidizes higher education is proportional to it by C_3/Y_2 . Psacharopoulos calls this ratio the "subsidization index". Thus, when university education is fully subsidized by the state, the social cost of education will be reflected in the subsidization index: the higher the direct social costs, the higher will be the subsidy. Likewise, the higher the subsidization index, the greater will be excess demand.

For our purposes here, the important point to consider is

that the unsubsidized rate of return (r_u) roughly corresponds to the social rate of return as conventionally calculated. Also, the subsidized rate of return (r_s) roughly corresponds to the private rate of return as found in most empirical studies. Therefore, the difference between the two rates would give an indication of the degree of subsidization within a given country.⁶⁷

Simply put, the higher the private rate of return is in comparison to the social rate of return, the greater is the extent of the government's educational subsidy. Furthermore --

and this too appears to be characteristic of many underdeveloped countries -- if the social rate of return on education tends to outweigh any alternative rate, the demand for education will continue to be high and will probably exceed the supply of available places. Consequently, for a government to subsidize education in such a situation merely creates greater excess demand -- hence more frustration as more applicants are turned down -- and at the same time diminishes the social returns while simultaneously heightening the private rate. On the other hand, if subsidization already exists, it might well be possible -- from a purely economic viewpoint anyway -- for a government to cut back the existent subsidies, re-invest in other sectors of the economy (or other areas in education), and yet still retain a high private demand for education. In a theoretical sense, this appears to be sound rational economic thinking and, on the basis of work that has been done, would seem to apply to the particular situation of Nigeria to which we shall now return.

2.5 The Estimated Economic Value (and Related Degree of Subsidization) of Some Areas of Nigerian Education: The Results of Three Cost-Benefit Studies

In discussing the economic returns on education in Nigeria, it is important to reiterate Pscharopoulos' acknowledgment as to the limitations of data and the need for much more extensive research. Nevertheless, the fact that a

cross-country tabulation of cost-benefit studies of education systems in eighteen LDCs indicates frequently similar results,⁶⁸ the findings of isolated studies which have been carried out in Nigeria would seem credible. So far, the most thorough-going cost-benefit analysis of formal education in Nigeria has been carried out by Keith Hinchcliffe who undertook his study in the former Western Region during the late 1960's.⁶⁹ In conducting the study, Hinchcliffe weighted earnings data from primary school graduates engaged in wage farming, transportation, and the construction industry. Earnings among workers who had graduated from secondary grammar school, and among those who had at least one year of university training, were determined on the basis of government pay scales. No adjustments were made for the effects of unemployment and wastage on the social rates of return. Also, in determining private rates, earnings before tax were assessed, thus leading to over-estimated returns. The results which are indicated in Table 2.C are as follows: unadjusted social rates of return for primary education were 23%, for secondary grammar, 12.8%, and for university over sixth form, 17%; estimated private rates of return were 30% for primary education, 14% for secondary school, and 34% for higher education.

These results are interesting when looked at in terms of the divergence between private and social returns. While rates of return may be affected ambiguously for reasons which we have discussed,⁷⁰ as mentioned they are nonetheless indic-

ative of the fact that only a part of the direct cost of schooling is borne by the individual, and that the rest is assumed by the state. In effect, the divergence between the two sets of returns may be taken as evidence of the net public subsidy which education received in Western Nigeria at the time of the survey. On the basis of these findings, the subsidy for higher education was much greater than it was for primary or secondary education. Indeed, as Tables 2.D, 2.E, and 2.F show, the immense direct cost of higher education in relation to the costs of primary and secondary school indicates further the high rate of the government's subsidization of university education. Likewise, the fact that 11% of total resources devoted to education were concentrated at the higher educational level (Table 2.I), while only 0.3% of all students within the formal education system were enrolled at that level (Tables 2.G and 2.H), also shows the degree to which students owed their schooling to public funding. In fact, the subsidization of university education had the effect of making the private rate of return twice as high as the social rate. Even if the subsidization of university education were drastically reduced, it would still in all likelihood have been more privately profitable in the long run in terms of expected life-time earnings, to have attended university rather than enter the labour market upon completing secondary school. Indeed, as can be seen in Table 2.J, the annual wages of university graduates were estimated at more

TABLE 2.C

Social and Private Rates of Return by Educational Level
(Percentage)

<u>Primary</u>	<u>Social</u>		<u>Primary</u>	<u>Private</u>	
	<u>Secondary</u>	<u>Higher</u>		<u>Secondary</u>	<u>Higher</u>
23.0	12.8	17.0	30.0	14.0	34.0

Source: Hinchcliffe, cited by George Psacharopoulos, Returns to Education: An International Comparison, Jossey-Bass Inc., Publishers, San Francisco, 1973, p. 62. In an explanation of Nigerian data, Psacharopoulos cites Hinchcliffe (1969), pp. 192, 201. "All rates are for the Western Region. Primary refers to 6 over 0 years of schooling, secondary refers to the cost of weighted average rate for secondary modern and secondary grammar. Higher refers to 3 years of university. Rates are unadjusted for unemployment and wastage. Private rates were estimated using private cost assumptions from Calcott (1968)." P. 171.

TABLE 2.D

Social Unit Costs per Student Year by Educational Level
(£ N).

<u>Primary</u>			<u>Secondary</u>			<u>Higher</u>		
<u>Direct</u>	<u>Foregone</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Direct</u>	<u>Foregone</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Direct</u>	<u>Foregone</u>	<u>Total</u>
9	10	19	65	95	160	900	345	1,245

Source: Hinchcliffe cited by Psacharopoulos, p. 173.

TABLE 2.E

Foregone Earnings as a Percentage of Total Social
Cost Per Student Year by Educational Level

<u>Primary</u>	<u>Secondary</u>	<u>Higher</u>
56.2	59.4	27.7

Source: Table 2.C

TABLE 2.F

Ratios of Direct and Total Costs per Student Year by
Educational Level (Primary = 1)

<u>Direct Costs</u>		<u>Total Costs</u>	
<u>Secondary/Primary</u>	<u>Higher/Primary</u>	<u>Secondary/Primary</u>	<u>Higher/Primary</u>
7.3	100.8	8.4	65.8

Source: Table 2.C

TABLE 2.G

Absolute and Relative Enrollments by Educational Level

Absolute Enrollments			Relative Enrollments	
<u>Primary</u>	<u>Secondary</u>	<u>Higher</u>	<u>Secondary/Primary</u>	<u>Higher/Secondary</u>
3,025,981	257,000	10,976	0.08	0.04

Source: Col. (2), (3), (4): UNESCO Statistical Yearbook (1968).

Col. (5): Col. (3) and Col. (2).

Col. (6): Col. (4) and Col. (3).

Cited by Psacharopoulos, p. 194.

TABLE 2.H

Distribution of Enrollments by Educational Level
(Percentage)

<u>Primary</u>	<u>Secondary</u>	<u>Higher</u>	<u>Total</u>
92	7.8	0.3	100

Source: Table 2.G

TABLE 2.I

Distribution of Total Resources Devoted to Education
by Level

<u>Primary</u>	<u>Secondary</u>	<u>Higher</u>
51	38	11

Source: Tables 2.D, 2.G, and 2.H.

TABLE 2.J
Average Annual Wages by Educational Level

Absolute Wages (£N)				Relative Wages				
$\frac{W_o}{}$	$\frac{W_p}{}$	$\frac{W_s}{}$	$\frac{W_h}{}$	$\frac{W_p}{W_o}$	$\frac{W_s}{W_p}$	$\frac{W_h}{W_s}$	$\frac{W_h}{W_p}$	$\frac{W_h}{W_o}$
80	189	417	1,816	2.38	2.20	4.36	9.55	22.63

Source: Hinchcliffe (1969) cited by Psacharopoulos, p. 185.

than four times the wages of secondary school students. Thus it would seem on the basis of these results that the subsidy on higher education could be substantially reduced without destroying private incentive to attend university. In other words, cutting back on government subsidization on university would not deplete student enrollment in higher education.

At the secondary level, the discrepancy between the social and private returns is seen to be narrow. This suggests that the degree of subsidization was fairly low. At the time the survey was taken, however, approximately two-thirds of the costs for secondary education were paid by students or their families in the Western Region.⁷¹ Presently, however, secondary education fees are subsidized by government throughout Nigeria -- consequently, we may assume that the gap between the private rate of return and the social rate of return is now greater. Again we might conclude that considering the continued high demand for secondary school entrance (which we shall discuss more fully in Chapter 7), the subsidy on secondary education might be cut back while still retaining excess demand for secondary school places.

At the primary level, despite the fact that primary school was provided free of charge, Hinchcliffe's analysis showed that the rate of primary school subsidization was also much lower than the tertiary level. We may therefore assume that the per capita costs of primary schooling were much less than those of higher education. The combined data of Tables 2.D and 2.F substantiate this assumption.

A crucial factor to consider about these results is that no adjustments were made for the effect of unemployment and wastage. If such adjustments had been made, the social rates of return would have been lower. This might have been particularly so for primary and secondary school students, as evidence indicates that unemployment and the drop-out rate were high among this group.⁷² The social return on primary education would probably be closer to the social return of 17.0% on higher education. However, the social return on secondary schooling, at 12.8% already the lowest of the three recorded rates, would drop still further. The implications from this are obvious: while the provision of primary schooling and higher education appeared in Hinchcliffe's findings to be sufficiently profitable investments (albeit that the subsidy on tertiary education seemed unnecessarily high), the public expenditure on formal secondary education appeared to be a much less profitable investment. Consequently, the question arises as to whether, in the light of relatively low economic returns alone, the expansion of the formal secondary grammar school system and the increased federal expenditure on secondary education since the mid-1960's have been advisable policies. Indeed, while no comparative returns are provided on informal methods of training, the results of Hinchcliffe's analysis nonetheless do suggest the very real possibility that investment in other forms of education besides formal secondary school might be equally profitable, if not more so.

It is, of course, difficult to compare rates of return on formal education with rates on non-formal types of training such as on-the-job instruction, apprenticeship schemes, and informal adult education projects. The difficulty lies mainly in the differential determinants of income which exist between wage employment in the modern sector (from where the data on formal post-primary school leaver income invariably derives) and self-employment in the small-scale industrial sector (where most informally trained individuals are employed). While we shall discuss these points more fully in succeeding chapters, we may observe here that modern sector wages tend to be higher partly because of government wage policies, and partly because many large-scale industries maintain economies of scale which enable them to sustain high profits and thus allow for relatively high wages. Moreover, because modern sector wage rates are generally fixed, they are far less susceptible to the fluctuations of supply and demand than are intermediate sector incomes.

Despite these limitations, however, a recent study undertaken by Adewale Mabawonku in Western Nigeria does provide not only a useful analysis of the economics of apprenticeship training, but as well a comparative evaluation of returns on informal apprenticeship and formal government trade school training.⁷³ Carried out in 1976, the analysis of apprenticeship focussed on a sample survey of just over 200 small-scale enterprises (employing less than ten persons each), located in three

separate areas and engaged in three types of industry: furniture craft, auto repair, and tailoring. The survey showed that most apprentices are young and most have completed primary school (80% of those in the sample survey). Duration of apprenticeships averages three and a half years and the social costs of training consist of direct trainee costs, proprietor's expenses, and foregone earnings. In most cases, proprietors are subsidizing the training of their apprentices through the opportunity cost of their time, the use of their equipment, and monetary allowances. The rate of proprietor's subsidization ranges from 5% per annum in tailoring to 89% in furniture crafts.

The analysis of trade school training was carried out in two trade centres in the cities of Oyo and Ijebu-Ode. All students in trade schools had attained a secondary level of education, on average higher than most apprentices. Compared to the costs of apprenticeship, the private costs of trade school training are twice as high both in fees and in foregone earnings (the latter being a reflection of differences in the wage structure of the economy and in formal educational attainment among trainees). Nevertheless, state governments heavily subsidize institutional training by assuming 95% of total trade school costs, thus making the social costs of formal training much greater than those of informal apprenticeship.

The benefits to be had from both forms of training were

assessed on the basis of the income of wage earners employed by either large industry or government establishments, and of self-employed artisans. In the wage earning sector, only furniture crafts and auto repair were considered since training in tailoring was not offered by the trade schools. Likewise, while wage earners included former apprentices and former trade school trainees alike, virtually all self-employed individuals were former apprentices.

Among workers in wage employment, comparative returns on both forms of training were calculated. As can be seen in Table 2.K, in both the auto repair and furniture craft industries the private rates of return are higher for trade school trainees than for apprentices -- 68% as opposed to 59.4%, and 76.8% as opposed to 62.2% respectively. The social rates for both types of training are practically the same in auto repair, but are higher for apprenticeship in furniture crafts, 32.2% as opposed to 24% for trade school training. As Mabawonku duly observes, "In general, the calculated internal rates of return (both social and private) in wage employment reflect the fact that apprentice training compares favourably with trade school programs, especially from the point of view of society's valuation, despite the lack of attention or support from the government".⁷⁴ He goes on to suggest that if the wage structure were such that both apprentice- and trade school-trained employees earned equal pay for similar skills, further analysis would show that "the rate of return (both private and

TABLE 2.K

Private and Social Rates of Return in Wage Employment

	<u>Apprentice Training</u>		<u>Trade Centre Training</u>	
	Private Rate of Return %	Social Rate of Return %	Private Rate of Return %	Social Rate of Return %
Auto Repair	59.41	23.63	68.03	23.33
Furniture Craft	62.22	32.19	76.79	24.00

Source: Adewale F. Mabawonku, An Economic Evaluation of Apprenticeship in Western Nigerian Small-Scale Industries, Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University, 1979 , p. 45.

social) to apprenticeship training would be nearly twice the rate to trade school training.⁷⁵

In assessing the rate of return on apprentice training among self-employed proprietors, Mabawonku initially concludes that private rates to self-employed former apprentices are far below the private rates of wage-earning apprentices. "The average (all locations) private rates in (self-employment) furniture and auto repair industries are 48 and 20 percent, respectively, of the private rates in wage employment for apprentice-trained workers."⁷⁶ The social rates of return among self-employed are also lower. In making an arbitrary adjustment, however, whereby he accounts for the possibility of a reduction in the value of the opportunity cost of the time which a proprietor devotes to the training of his apprentices, the author concludes that the social rates of return among the self-employed are higher. The result is then that for those in wage employment, the social rate to apprenticeship is roughly three times the social rate to trade centre training. Such a comparison, of course, may have little meaning when considering the differing determinants of income among wage earners and the self-employed.

The value of Mabawonku's analysis lies primarily in demonstrating that informal apprenticeship in the small-scale industrial sector does appear to be a profitable form of educational investment. Since the social costs of apprenticeship training would appear to be much less than those of formal

institutional training, and since many proprietors appear to subsidize the training of apprentices (thus diverting time and resources which potentially might be utilized in more directly profitable activity), on the basis of sound economics there would seem to be sufficient grounds for transferring educational funding into further assistance for informal apprenticeship and other informal educational schemes. (There are, of course, other reasons for suggesting government support of such schemes: we shall discuss these in following chapters.)

Up to this point, we have discussed the results of cost-benefit analysis in terms of the allocative effectiveness of spending within the education system (formal and informal) only. For policy-makers, however, a further value of cost-benefit procedures may be, as some advocates of this type of analysis have also suggested, in comparing the social rate of return on education with rates of return on alternative public investments.⁷⁷ In theory, if the returns on investment opportunity A are perceived as being greater than those on investment opportunity B, then possibilities for generating high income growth demand that more resources be directed to A and less to B. In other words, "resources are not efficiently allocated unless the returns to all activities are the same and equal to the market rate of interest".⁷⁸ Thus, since education is widely seen as an investment in human capital, the policy implications of establishing investment priorities have

spurred attempts in numerous countries to compare the returns on physical and human capital. By comparing the returns on physical capital with the returns on education as a whole, it has been assumed that it may be possible to assess the effectiveness of the allocation of funds between education and other sectors of the economy.

It is not our purpose here, however, to attempt such a comparison. For one thing, economists often do not agree on the precise criterion rate for this sort of comparison and invariably the measured rates of return are imperfect at the best of times.⁷⁹ For another, as we shall discuss in Chapter 4, investment in physical capital, while perhaps contributing to per capita income growth, will probably have little effect on the income of most Nigerians. Suffice it to say, however, that on the basis of the compared rates of return on physical and human capital in thirteen countries (where data related to the returns on physical capital existed - Nigeria not included), Psacharopoulos concludes that "whereas in developing countries returns are greatest to human capital, in the developed countries the greatest returns are to physical capital investment".⁸⁰ In the seven countries with a per capita income under \$ 1,000,⁸¹ the average rate of return to physical capital was 15.1% while the average overall rate of return on education was 19.9%.⁸² As an indicator, the overall social rate of return on education in Nigeria was estimated at 18.5%, more than 3% higher than the average return

on physical capital in the seven other LDCs. The implication of this then, in strictly theoretical terms, is that probably from the late 1960's onwards, the greater total investment in education was in proportion to physical capital expenditure, the higher would have been the growth rate of domestic productivity. During the past decade the federal government has indeed pursued a policy line of massive educational expenditure; whether future growth in GDP will be attributed largely, or even in part, to educational investment is, however, a matter of conjecture, and will undoubtedly be difficult to estimate in any case.

A further point sometimes considered is the measured contribution which education makes to national economic growth. Since spending on education is seen as a form of national capital investment, the question then arises as to how much human capital development contributes to overall economic growth. On the basis of a "growth-accounting equation",⁸³ linking the rate of growth of Nigeria's economy to the rate of growth of different inputs such as capital, labour, and land, Psacharopoulos estimates on the basis of Hinchcliffe's findings that education overall in Nigeria contributed to 16% of the country's economic growth in the mid-1960's. Following from this, the total contribution of education to national growth is disaggregated by educational level. Based on rates of return using unadjusted earnings differentials, the results show that primary education is estimated to have made the greatest contribution to economic growth with 63%, then secondary education

by 25%, and lastly, higher education by 12%. On the basis of these figures (which should be viewed as no more than rough indicators!), it would seem that there is overwhelming economic justification for Nigeria's UPE programme.

These results are similar to those of an earlier cost-benefit study conducted by Bowles in northern Nigeria in 1965. For this study Bowles used earnings data collected from a sample survey of employees in several private firms to estimate cost-benefit ratios for different educational levels. The results of his analysis indicated that the educational sector did indeed have a "strong claim on economic resources" and that allocative efficiency within the education system required that more resources be devoted to primary schooling, seen to be the most profitable educational level.⁸⁵ In contrast, formal secondary and technical education appeared to be the least profitable.

In reviewing the results of the foregoing analyses, we are not, of course, suggesting that they represent an accurate picture of the true economic costs and benefits of education in Nigeria. In all likelihood costs and benefits will always be impossible to measure precisely. Moreover, while Mabawonku's analysis may be considered reasonably up-to-date, the rates of return by Hinchcliffe and Bowles, dated as they are by more than a decade, can only be cited in terms of their historical significance. This is not sufficient cause, however, to dismiss their findings as irrelevant to the present educational situation

in Nigeria. This is especially so regarding Hinchcliffe's study, carried out as it was in what many considered to be the most educationally advanced region in Nigeria. There, free universal primary education was practically a "fait accompli", the per capita student intake in secondary schools exceeded that of all other regions, and the University of Ibadan had emerged as an important institution of higher learning in black Africa. In many respects, education in the former Western Region was a situational forerunner to education in the whole of present-day Nigeria. Evidence also demonstrates that many of the nation's present-day problematic trends **were** in existence in the Western Region: high demand for post-primary education and resultant pressures for secondary school expansion, rising annual costs, rural-urban migration among a large proportion of primary school leavers, and a high incidence of urban unemployment among primary and secondary school leavers.⁸⁶

Naturally, the ~~estimated~~ cost-benefit figures of a decade ago cannot be accepted as an accurate measurement of present-day educational costs and benefits in Nigeria. Yet in fact, even at the time of Hinchcliffe's study, they were not meant to be taken as an accurate cost-benefit description. Because of the lack of essential analytical adjustments, and in consideration of weaknesses in cost-benefit analysis to which we have already alluded, the private and social rates of return on education in the Western Region were not meant to be anything more than indicators. Thus, as present-day educational

policy in Nigeria tends to be following similar expansionary trends, and as the problems of mounting costs and rising unemployment and wastage (we shall go on to explore the latter two in succeeding chapters) appear to reflect similar difficulties experienced in the former Western Region, we may assume that the cost-benefit estimates arrived at in Western Nigeria a decade ago are still satisfactory as useful indicators to be considered by planners and policy-makers.

2.6 Conclusion: The Need for Reduced Spending and/or Re-Investment in Other Forms of Education

If education was indeed viewed simply as a financial investment, and if human beings could be considered as a form of inanimate capital, the differential between the private and social rates of return would point to a need for a number of essential shifts in Nigerian educational policy. From a purely economic standpoint, much of the public spending on education is too high, even where the returns on schooling appear favourable. This is especially true at the tertiary level; the gap between private and social rates of return on university education seem so large that the federal government's recently announced intention to increase university subsidies would appear to be an ill-advised extravagance. The more economical alternative, it would seem, lies in the opposite direction: to cut back on recurrent public expenditure on the universities and transfer more of the costs onto those who benefit

privately from higher education. While lessening the private rate of return, this would not conceivably result in a decline in enrollments since private returns on university education are already high. Moreover, by pursuing this policy measure, i.e. by withholding public funding and thereby shifting a greater proportion of recurrent university costs to private sources (students, their families, private business concerns, etc.), the government would not be diminishing the social returns on education. Instead, either through savings or through re-investment of the displaced public funds in more directly profitable ventures, such a policy would quite possibly reduce the size of the national deficit. The same arguments might apply to primary and secondary education where demand is such that recurrent government expenditure might be contracted without seriously retarding aggregate private demand or net social returns.

Further implications resulting from the measured economic returns on formal education would seem to be that while relatively profitable returns on investment in primary and tertiary levels appear to warrant the federal government's policy of UPE and of incurring present capital costs of expanding the number of universities in the country, the more constricted social returns accruing from secondary grammar schooling suggest that increased public investment in this stage of education may be unjustified. Considering the returns on technical trade school learning and on informal apprenticeship training,

the alternative might be to place a moratorium on grammar school expansion and, dependent on further cost-benefit research, to further public investment in mid-level technical education and, more significantly, initiate a concerted programme of government assistance to other types of informal post-primary training schemes.

Certainly, when viewing the steady increase of recurrent government expenditure on formal education in Nigeria, and the simultaneous rise in the overall national deficit, an introduction of austerity in formal education spending and a concurrent re-investment in other seemingly more profitable areas of education, would not only appear to be economically feasible, but might, in theory at least, result in increased social returns on education. Logically, then, one might expect planners and decision-makers, if not the population at large, to welcome such policy alternatives.

Obviously, however, policies concerning the provision of a social service such as education cannot be determined on the basis of economic rationality alone. For one thing, human beings are neither inanimate nor passive, and often their wishes simply do not correspond to a nation's overall long-term economic needs. Instead, there are sociological and political factors which government leaders -- whether they be civilian politicians or military governors -- can ill afford to ignore, particularly in a nation as ethnically and regionally diverse as Nigeria. As we shall discuss in Chapter 7,

formal education is entrenched in the popular mind throughout Nigeria as being the threshold to a better way of life. Thus any attempt to instigate educational policies which run counter to widespread public perceptions and demands, on the basis of measured financial rates of return may prove to be very difficult politically.

Nevertheless, if policy-makers are to devise development schemes which make the most effective use of limited resources, a realistic appraisal of the net social costs of education -- economic and non-economic -- is necessary and must be weighed against overall social benefits resulting from educational investment. While political factors cannot be ignored, an awareness of economic indicators may facilitate the development of policies which accommodate both national considerations and private expectations and aspirations. On the basis of what limited cost-benefit information does exist, it would thus seem that an over-abundance of government revenue is being expended on the formal school system, and that some of this conceivably might be more effectively utilized in other areas of development.

FOOTNOTES
(CHAPTER 2)

¹The Ashby Commission argued that during the succeeding decade student enrollment in secondary schools should be quadrupled and that university enrollment should expand five-fold. These recommendations were founded on two basic assumptions:

a) If Nigeria was to manage its development indigenously, expatriate civil servants and private sector employees would have to be replaced by Nigerians trained formally within the country.

b) The expansion of higher education (and, by implication, primary and secondary schooling as well) would make a direct contribution to the country's overall economic growth. Spending on education was to be considered an investment whose eventual returns would be translated into greater national productivity, higher per capita income, and presumably a more satisfactory standard of living for the general populace.

For a summary of the Report and its impact on educational policy, see A. I. Asiwaju, "Ashby Revisited: A Review of Nigeria's Educational Growth, 1961-71", African Studies Review, 15 (1), April, 1972.

²Richard A. Joseph, "Affluence and Underdevelopment: The Nigerian Experience", Journal of Modern African Studies, 16 (2), 1978, p. 222.

³General Olusegun Obasanjo, "A Budget for Civilian Rule: Extracts from General Obasanjo's broadcast speech on the last budget introduced by the Military Government", West Africa, No. 3221, April 9, 1979, p. 614.

⁴Nigeria has a decimal currency system which was introduced in January 1973, with the naira replacing the Nigerian pound. The naira is divided into 100 units called kobo.

Until November 1967 the Nigerian £ was at par with sterling. Following the devaluation of sterling the ~~£~~ stood at £1.165 or U. S. \$2.80. In December 1971 Nigeria revalued its currency vis à vis the dollar and in December 1972 the Nigerian pound was equivalent to \$3.04.

In March 1973 the newly introduced naira was devalued against gold by 10% following the devaluation of the dollar and sold at U. S. \$1.512 and £0.614 respectively.

During 1974 the fixed relationship between the naira and dollar was ended, thus enabling the Central Bank to make more frequent adjustments. The naira was revalued by 6.5% to stand at

U. S. \$1.62 and has since floated around this figure. .
In September 1979 the naira stood at U. S. \$1.72.

⁵Quarterly Economic Review of Nigeria: Annual Supplemen-
tary 1978, Economist Intelligence Unit, Ltd., London, 1978,
p. 18, and Obasanjo, p. 615.

⁶Obasanjo, p. 615 and p. 617.

⁷Lawrence A. Rupley, "Why Nigerian Spending Has Grown
and Grown", West Africa, June 4, 1979, p. 978.

⁸Joseph, p. 222.

⁹Obasanjo, p. 617.

¹⁰Q. E. R., Third Quarter, 1978, pp. 8-9.

¹¹T. M. Bray and G. R. Cooper, "Education and Nation-
Building in Nigeria since the Civil War", Comparative Educa-
tion, 15 (1), March, 1979, pp. 36-37.

¹²Q. E. R., Third Quarter, 1978, p.8.

¹³West Africa, April 16, 1979, No. 3222, pp. 661-62.

¹⁴Rupley, p. 978.

¹⁵Third National Plan, p. 251.

¹⁶Okoli, p. 873

¹⁷Bray, p. 11.

¹⁸Bray and Cooper, p. 36.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Financial Times, p. 31.

²¹Okoli, p. 873.

²²Bray, p. 6.

²³Obasanjo, p. 615.

²⁴Rupley, p. 978.

²⁵Obasanjo, p. 615.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷ Universities were established in Calabar, Ilorin, Jos, Maiduguri, Port Harcourt, and Sokoto -- a seventh was later to be established in Kano.

²⁸ Cited in Financial Times, p. 33.

²⁹ For the University of Ibadan the debt was ₦ 7 million; for Nsukka, ₦ 12.5 million; and for ABU, ₦ 10.5 million. Financial Times, p. 33.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ Obasanjo, pp. 615-16.

³⁴ Bray and Cooper, p. 37. Similarly, Lupton has noted that even if the programme of educational expansion is finally curtailed, recurrent costs will continue to rise indefinitely. K. Lupton, "Financing Educational Development in the Northern States of Nigeria", Savanna, 1 (1), June, 1972, p. 86.

³⁵ The figures are submitted by the Ministry of Education of Oyo State; however, as salary levels for teachers are consistent throughout the federation, these figures may be accepted as representative of teacher salaries throughout Nigeria.

³⁶ This figure is a very loose approximation based on a national population estimate of 95 million (see note 65 below), and an official GDP of ₦ 27 billion (Q. E. R., Annual Supplement, 1979, p. 8). This estimate is close to the Third Plan estimation that per capita income would be ₦ 290 by 1980 (p. 43). The Third Plan also noted however:

It is possible to record a high growth rate in per capita income while the masses of the people continue to be in abject poverty and lacking in the basic necessities of life, particularly in a situation, such as in Nigeria today, where the momentum of growth derives from a sector whose direct impact on the bulk of the population is small. (p. 27).

³⁷ Financial Times, p. 32.

³⁸ As stipulated in the Third Plan the existing 156 teacher training institutions were to be expanded to accommodate more trainees, and a further 62 new training colleges were to be constructed throughout the country. (p. 251).

³⁹ Financial Times, p. 32.

⁴⁰John Keheler, "Primary and Teacher Education in the Kano State of Nigeria", West African Journal of Education, 19 (2), June, 1975, p. 254. See also Lupton, p. 85.

⁴¹L. Oyededeji, "The Economics of UPE: An Analysis of Government Investment and Returns on Education", West African Journal of Education, 20 (1), February, 1976, pp. 110-11.

⁴²Edgar O. Edwards, "Investment in Education in Developing Nations: Policy Responses When Private and Social Signals Conflict", World Development, 3 (1), January, 1975, p. 42.

⁴³Dore, p. 91.

⁴⁴P. G. H. Hopkins, "The Role of Adult Education in Economic Development", in E. F. Jackson, ed., Economic Development in Africa, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1965, p. 69.

⁴⁵Benji J. O. Anosike, "Education and Economic Development in Nigeria: The Need for a New Paradigm", African Studies Review, 20 (2), September, 1977, pp. 27-51; Martin Carnoy, "Political Consequences of Manpower Formation", Comparative Education Review, February, 1975, pp. 129-43; Elliot, "Education and Economic Growth"; Amartya K. Sen, "Models of Educational Planning and their Applications", Journal of Development Planning, No. 2, 1970, pp. 1-30.

⁴⁶Tuquan, p. 105.

⁴⁷Ibid., pp. 106-07.

⁴⁸For a reasoned argument propounding the ideal of integrated development see Dennis A. Rondinelli and Kenneth Ruddle, Urbanization and Rural Development: A Spatial Policy for Equitable Growth, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1978.

⁴⁹Everett E. Hagen, "Turning Parameters into Variables in the Theory of Economic Growth", American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 1 (2), May 1960, p. 624.

⁵⁰Edwards, p. 43.

⁵¹T. Balogh and PP Streeten, "Do Investment Models Apply to Developing Nations?", in John W. Hanson and Coles S. Brembeck, Education and the Development of Nations, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, New York, 1966, pp. 140-41.

⁵²The use of time-series data of course is based on assumptions of continuing income-differentiation patterns. However, for practical planning purposes, there may be little justification in assuming that existing income differentials will persist indefinitely.

⁵³George Psacharopoulos, Returns to Education: An International Comparison, Jossey-Bass Inc., Publishers, Washington, 1973, p. 24.

⁵⁴Tuquan, p. 113.

⁵⁵Ibid.

⁵⁶In reference to assessing the "direct" returns on education by measuring the extra earnings of individuals, Hopkins writes:

It should be stated clearly and categorically that any such criterion of increased individual earning power has no relevance at all to educational planning in the new countries. If it had, then . . . adult education would be a bottom priority, since it frequently brings little direct results in increased individual earnings capacity. (p. 67).

⁵⁷A stark analogy is provided by Balogh and Streeten when referring to attempts in the U. S. to calculate life-time earnings on the basis of educational attainment. In the mid-1960's this would have meant calculating returns on education in the 1920's. "To conclude from those returns anything about today's returns is like identifying a crystal radio set with Telstar." (p. 141).

⁵⁸Edwards, p. 43.

⁵⁹Wiles, P. 53.

⁶⁰Psacharopoulos, p. 16.

⁶¹Edwards, pp. 42-43.

⁶²M. N. Ogbonna, "Tax Evasion in Nigeria", Africa Today, 22 (1), January-March, 1975, pp. 53-61.

⁶³Paacharopoulous, "The Perverse Effects of Public Subsidization of Education or How Equitable is Free Education?", Comparative Education Review, 21 (1), February, 1977, pp. 77-84.

⁶⁴The same principles may apply for primary and secondary education.

⁶⁵Results of a nation-wide census taken in 1973 were subject to immediate controversy and were duly rejected by the FMG. The basis for present demographic calculations is the 1963 census which showed that Nigeria had a population of 55.6 million at the time.

More recently, on the basis of voter registration (47.4

million voters registered), and taking into account the likelihood of under-enumeration as well as those below voting age, Nigeria's population figure has been estimated at roughly 95 million, Q. E. R., Annual Supplement, 1978, p. 6.

⁶⁶Psacharopoulous, "How Equitable is Free Education?", p. 79.

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 80.

⁶⁸See in particular Table 4.1 in Psacharopoulous, Returns to Education, p. 62.

⁶⁹K. Hinchcliffe, Educational Planning Techniques for Developing Countries with Special Reference to Ghana and Nigeria, Unpublished M. Phil. dissertation, University of Leicester, cited by Psacharopoulous, Returns to Education, p. 57 and p. 171.

⁷⁰Psacharopoulous makes the following point:

Of course, there is a host of other reasons for a divergence between true private and social rates such as wages not corresponding to the marginal social product of labour, or higher-educated labour having external effects. Here, however, we deal only with the most common conceptual reasons for the divergence. (Returns on Education, p. 66.)

⁷¹Abernethy estimated that the actual cost of secondary grammar education for a souther Nigerian student was 100, of which the student had to defray approximately two-thirds. Assuming that annual per capita income was about 35, then annual fees were equivalent to two years earnings for the average Nigerian income earner. (p. 242).

⁷²For unemployment figures refer to Abernethy, p. 197, and Archibald Callaway, "Education Expansion and the Rise of Youth Unemployment, in P. C. Lloyd, et. al., eds., The City of Ibadan, Cambridge University Press, London, 1967, p. 201 and p. 208.

⁷³Adewale F. Mabawonku, An Economic Evaluation of Apprenticeship Training in Western Nigerian Small-Scale Industries, Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University 1979.

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 47.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 48.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 49.

⁷⁷ Philip Foster notes that "the vital policy question in Africa is the extent to which the measured social returns to increased investment in education are greater than those accruing to alternative investment in road building, agricultural development, health, etc." Foster, "Problems of Educational Development", Africa South of the Sahara, 1977-78, Europa Publications Ltd., London, 1977, p. 62.

⁷⁸ Psacharopoulos, Returns on Education, p. 75.

⁷⁹ Ibid., pp. 80-81.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 86.

⁸¹ Mexico (1962), Venezuela (1958), Chile (1940 and 1961), India (1960), Japan (1957), Ghana (1962), Kenya (1966-67).

⁸² Overall (or total) social rate of return is estimated as a weighted average of rates of return at each educational level. Weights used were total costs of education at each level in a given year.

⁸³ Psacharopoulos uses the so-called "Schultz-type" calculation wherein the contribution of education to growth is based on measures of factor rentals. The calculation includes social costs per student year by educational level and social rates of return for the corresponding levels. (pp. 114-15).

⁸⁴ Psacharopoulos, Returns on Education, p. 116.

⁸⁵ Samuel Bowles, "The Efficient Allocation of Resources in Education", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 81 (2), May, 1967, p. 191.

⁸⁶ See Abernethy, Chapters 8 and 9, pp. 191-234 for a discussion of the political capacity of setting and realizing educational goals in Eastern and Western Nigeria; see also Callaway, "Education Expansion and the Rise of Youth Employment", pp. 191-211.

CHAPTER 3: THE INSTRUMENTAL VALUE OF EDUCATION IN LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY

3.1 Introduction

An assumption which underlies the Nigerian policy of formal educational expansion -- and indeed the whole concept of human capital development -- is the idea that the higher one's level of schooling (i.e. the more years a student devotes to his formal education), the greater will be his subsequent output.¹ In other words, as an individual advances from one level to the next in the school system, the premise is that his skills and abilities are progressively developed; and the more developed such skills and abilities are, inter alia, the greater or more improved will be the individual's labour productivity.

Obviously, concerned as we are with the effectiveness of education in promoting national development, labour productivity does not by itself constitute the full potential of an individual's contribution to the development process. Indeed, to speak of an individual's contribution "to the development of society" is somewhat of a nebulous exercise, particularly when one is faced with the problem of assessment or measurement. For one thing, in order to determine whether or not such an objective can, in fact, be attained by means of the educational system, analysis must be carried out on those who have

left school and have entered the labour market. Considering the long-term impact of education, such analysis, if it is to be thorough-going, generally necessitates time-series data over a fairly long time period -- and in Nigeria such data are scarce. For another, an individual's contribution to development is manifest not only in job productivity deriving from the skills he possesses, but also in activities pursued as recreation and in social relations with family and neighbours.

Nevertheless, as manpower tends to be rated in Nigeria according to its level of educational attainment (e.g. those who have received tertiary education are referred to as "high level manpower"), and since economic growth and the health of the economy are often dependent on labour productivity, it is not unrealistic to consider the instrumental effectiveness of education in terms of its impact on labour productivity. Consequently, in this chapter we shall review a number of studies which have endeavoured to determine the extent to which labour output in various sectors of Nigeria's political economy is related to skills and abilities acquired in school. For comparative purposes we shall also consider workers' out-of-school experience, either during the formative years before entering the labour market, or resulting from activities learned and carried out during the productive process after schooling, and how this may enhance job performance and output.

In section 3.2, we shall examine the results of a com-

prehensive study which indicate the degree to which labour productivity in the modern sector textile industry is affected by various forms and levels of education. In assessing labour productivity, proxy evidence of employer hiring practices and wage differentials are used. The study results indicate that, while formal education appears to contribute to job performance, its overall effectiveness in this regard may be overvalued since on-the-job experience also demonstrates a highly significant correlation with job performance.

In section 3.3, we shall review a number of studies which link formal schooling, as well as other training methods, to labour in the intermediate industrial sector of the economy. In this sector, there are indications that primary school learning, with its emphasis on functional literacy and numeracy, may be a valuable asset in operating small businesses. More dubious, however, is the instrumental effectiveness of secondary school learning which would appear largely irrelevant to the needs of small-scale industry. Instead, informal apprentice training seems to be far more effective in terms of labour performance and productivity in the intermediate sector.

In section 3.4, we shall attempt to assess the impact of formal primary schooling on labour productivity in farming. As yet, very little work has been done in this area. Initial indications are that the effect of primary school learning on farmers' output is negligible. We shall see, however, that such early indications cannot be regarded as conclusive.

Finally, in section 3.5, we shall comment on a number of general observations which point to the instrumental limitations of formal education.

3.2 The Instrumental Value of Education in the Modern Sector

In measuring labour productivity in the modern sector proxy evidence of two kinds may be utilized. On the one hand, there is the evidence of employer hiring practices -- employer requirements for specific levels and types of education often suggest the human capital hypothesis that as each occupation demands a specific skill level (and hence a particular degree of production output), the educational requirements demanded by employers reflect the differential skill levels (and production outputs) inherent in certain jobs.

On the other hand, while employer hiring practices may reflect perceived or potential productivity at a given point in time, perhaps a more effective (although sometimes controversial)² means of attempting to measure labour productivity is through the cumulative approach of estimating differential levels of earnings over a period of time using time-series data. In this case, the existence of wage differentials may be considered as a differential in labour output. It is, of course, important to note that proxy evidence of this sort is subject to glaring weaknesses, some of which we have discussed in

the previous chapter; nevertheless, while evidence by proxy may not be rigorously sound in an empirical sense, it is useful to consider in view of the scarcity of existent data and research in Nigeria.

In 1972, Keith Hinchcliffe conducted a survey of both employer hiring practices and earnings determinants in a portion of the Nigerian textile industry. His analysis was aimed primarily at the question of how the industrial sector in northern Nigeria regards potential workers from the formal education system, and to what extent worker productivity was related to different levels of schooling and whether or not these educated workers might be substituted by those with less education but more job experience. Information was collected from 3887 workers in the five largest textile firms in Kaduna. Included in the data for each individual were age, length of employment in the firm, previous employment, level and type of education attained, and present earnings.³ Job positions were divided into four categories: daily paid worker, clerical worker, artisan, and technician. As the textile industry is the largest employer of industrial or commercial labour in what were then Nigeria's six northern states, the survey sample was considered to be "highly representative" of workers in the modern industrial sector of northern Nigeria.⁴ Indeed, two years after publication of the survey's findings, Hinchcliffe noted, "It is believed that this is the most detailed base which has yet been used for comparison of earnings between

the main labour groups in any African country".⁵

Results of the initial questionnaire showed that the attainment of a primary level of education appeared to figure highly in recruitment policy. As shown in Table 3.A, more than 70% of the labour force had completed primary schooling at the time of hiring, thus demonstrating that six years of formal schooling were generally considered a pre-requisite for employment. (Only one-eighth of the respondents had had formal education at all.) At the time, this meant that the labour force in the northern Nigerian textile industry was above the educational average since primary school enrollment in the northern states was estimated at approximately 8% of the school-age population.

However, as indicated in the same table, it was also ascertained that among the work force as a whole, less than 7% had achieved more than primary schooling, and only 3.7% had attained any technical qualification, either formally at a technical training school, or informally through night school or a firm's day release programme, or through on-the-job training. (In perhaps more significant terms, in the category of technical staff, only 26% were technically "qualified".) In this situation, therefore, primary education appears to have been significant as an entry requirement.

Unfortunately, what has not been made clear by the survey results is the variation in the regional and ethnic origins of the employees. If the majority of them had been northerners,

TABLE 3.A

Educational Distribution According to Category of Labour

Education and Training	Daily Paid	Clerical	Technical	All
None	13.2	1.7	7.6	12.6
Adult Education	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.6
Primary 1-5 ^a	8.4	1.4	10.3	8.8
Primary 6-7	74.9	32.1	60.8	72.9
Sec. Gram. and Commercial	2.4	60.4	7.6	2.9
Craft and Tech. Training Schools	0.6	1.4	10.4	1.3
Polytechnic	0.2	0.4	2.5	0.2
Government Trade Test	1.2	0.0	8.4	1.6
Royal Society of Arts	0.0	7.4	0.0	0.2
City and Guilds	0.2	0.0	4.6	0.4

^a Figures 1-5, 6-7 denote the numbers of years of schooling at primary level. In northern states, primary schooling was seven years while in the south it was six years.

Source: "Earnings Determinants in the Nigerian Textile Industry", Comparative Education Review, vol. 20, no. 1, February 1976, p. 50.

then, indeed, the significance of education as a pre-requisite might have been greater than if a large number of workers had been migrants from the southern regions where primary schooling has historically been more common. Likewise, nothing is said of the ethnic origins of employers; if southerners, then there might conceivably have been an inclination to hire fellow southern migrants as opposed to northern indigenes, thus tending to raise the educational attainment average among the work force. In other words, while superficially primary education appears to have been an important variable as an entry requirement, it is possible that other criteria were more significant, and that educational attainment was incidental.

A further weakness with these results is that if schooling is important as a means of entry into the textile industry, then the question arises as to whether or not schooling is viewed by employers as merely a "screening" device for worker selection. In other words, is formal education simply a means of assessing the inherent ability of workers, or even a convenient vehicle which facilitates hiring job applicants on the basis of paper qualifications? Or is formal education indeed considered by employers to be a true agent of productivity? As yet the answer is not clear. A possible explanation is offered by Dore:

The chief reason seems to be that [employers] are simply unquestioning victims of the widespread myth that education 'improves' people, and that they are therefore getting more for

their money if they get a senior certificate for £ 5 a week rather than a junior certificate. Some who have made their decision more wittingly might defend it on the grounds that those who go on [in school] must at least have shown more persistence. And...they might be right in concluding that those who have got through...are brighter and less likely to miscount the change.⁶

However, if schooling is only considered useful as a mere screening tool, then its ultimate effect on labour productivity may be illusory. As Hinchcliffe acknowledges, "The implications of the screening hypothesis are, of course, enormous for educational policy. Educational courses are expensive and if they simply test 'raw' ability, this could be done much cheaper by straightforward aptitude tests or some equivalent. The consequence of devising and operating such tests would then be a decrease in the demand for schools."⁷

Without the benefit of data on the determinants of management decisions, therefore, Hinchcliffe instead accumulated data on the distribution of earnings (as proxy for productivity) and then attempted an assessment of the determinants of earnings differentials. In the case of the textile industry, earnings distribution reflected variations in age, cumulative job experience, and in the educational qualifications of the sample labour force. Overall average annual earnings were dependent on the existing age structure and were considered likely to rise in the future as the average age of the work force increased. Job experience, measured in terms of years worked in the firms, was also strongly associated with earnings distribution. Likewise, average earnings tended to increase with educational level and in particular with post-primary edu-

cation.

In order to define these conditions of age, experience, and education more closely with earnings distribution, Hinchcliffe undertook a multiple regression analysis. Regressions were run for the four labour categories in each of five firms as well as for all firms combined. The results show that while primary education can be seen to affect earnings levels -- and by implication worker output -- the more commonly significant variables were cumulative job experience and, most frequently, secondary schooling (either grammar or commercial school, or technical school, depending on job category). Specifically, the aggregate labour category regressions indicate the following:

- (1) Daily paid -- one year of experience is almost twice as important as one year of primary schooling.
- (2) Clerical -- years of experience are more important than years of primary schooling but not as important as years of secondary schooling
- (3) Artisan -- experience again dominates primary schooling and also secondary grammar school but it accounts for slightly less variation in earnings than does secondary technical schooling.
- (4) Technical -- years of formal schooling, including primary school, are much more important than the equivalent years of experience.⁸

In recognition of the existence of a dual method of skill acquisition (either through formal training, or more informal modes as previously cited), it was important in this type

of analysis, particularly when undertaken in an area of Nigeria where average educational proficiency was -- and still is -- admittedly low, to demonstrate the extent to which job experience (measured in number of years worked) was able to compensate for formal schooling. In other words, the effect of formal education was compared to the impact of informally gained experience on workers' earnings -- and by inference their labour productivity. Based on the assumption that both primary school graduates and those with no schooling entered the modern textile industry at age eighteen (less than 4% of workers entered under this age) and that secondary school graduates entered at age twenty-one,⁹ the trade-off between years of schooling and years of experience according to the values of the regression coefficients is indicated in Table 3.B. Evidently, at the daily paid, clerical, and artisan levels, experience can compensate for formal education in a relatively short period. In the technical area, however, the impact of schooling outweighs experience -- hence in this job area, secondary technical school would appear to be an essential factor in contributing to productivity.

In reviewing these results of the differential impact of formal education and informal experience on earnings variations, it is important to remember that, based as they are on cross-sectional data, their value for our purposes is limited. After all, an individual's job output is cumulative,

TABLE 3.B

Wage Relationships between Non-Schooled and Schooled
Workers

Daily paid "non primary" acquired same wage as a primary graduate at 21 years of age.

Artisan paid "non primary" acquired same wage as a secondary gram. graduate at 24 years of age.

Artisan paid "non primary" acquired same wage as a secondary technical graduate at 27 years of age.

Clerical paid "non primary" acquired same wage as a secondary gram. graduate at 29 years of age.

Technical paid "non primary" acquired same wage as a secondary gram. graduate at 40 years of age.

Technical paid "non primary" acquired same wage as secondary technical graduate at 45 years of age.

Source: Hinchcliffe, "Earnings Determinants in Nigeria",
p. 57.

lasting throughout his productive life. Consequently, since the above returns are neither "ex-post" nor "ex-ante", they cannot be viewed from either a historical or predictive perspective.¹⁰ As mentioned earlier, in order to gain a long-term perspective, time-series data are needed. In recognition of this fact, Hinchcliffe, therefore, complemented his regression analysis with a longitudinal profile of the earnings of those workers who had been employed by their firms for ten years or more. Of the group surveyed, totaling 248 men, all had begun as daily paid labourers. 79 of the men had had no schooling whatsoever, 78 had received between a year and five years of primary school, and 91 had completed their primary education. Findings showed "from the percentage of supervisory labour within each education group, 7.7, 17.9, and 42.9% of the no-schooling, uncompleted, and completed primary school categories, respectively, that the more educated were the higher paid".¹¹

In tabulating the over-all results of this survey, Hinchcliffe was able to demonstrate that while between a third and a half of earnings variations within each work category were accounted for by variations in the age, industrial experience, and level of education among the workers, generally the most significant variable in determining earnings variations was job experience. Clearly, the suggestion here is that in lower- and middle-level jobs in the modern textile industry of northern Nigeria -- which Hinchcliffe has

indicated is representative of the modern sector of the region -- years of experience can satisfactorily substitute for years of primary education, albeit at a different time rate within each job category. At the same time, however, evidence from the earnings functions also suggested that secondary school education has a significant effect on increased earnings, and that at this level the compensation of experience would demand a lengthy time period.

Unfortunately, this latter point, while hinting at the possibility that somehow the differential between the impact of primary schooling and secondary schooling on earnings is representative of the differing values of the skills acquired at different educational levels, on closer scrutiny underscores a number of major weaknesses in this type of analysis, some of which we have already dealt with.

A fundamental difficulty in attempting to measure job productivity on the basis of observed earnings is, as Ronald Dore writes, in starting with "the assumption that somehow or other market forces ensure that everybody is paid what he is worth: that a man's wage equals his marginal product. We all know, however, that Providence doesn't quite work that way."¹² Instead earnings variations may largely be determined by imperfections in the labour market and have little to do with actual productive output. This latter possibility, which we shall discuss more fully in Chapter 4, especially underlines a major drawback in attempting to use earnings differentials

as a means of measuring labour productivity in Nigeria's modern sector. Consequently, it is important to consider, particularly in light of the fact that such a small percentage of the work force surveyed by Hinchcliffe actually received any form of post-primary education, that the relationship between increased earnings and formal education does not necessarily reflect the true instrumental value of formal schooling.

A further weakness with this type of analysis is that by relating it solely to organized employment in the modern sector the results have only a limited significance within the context of the entire socio-economic framework of Nigeria. Given the relatively scarce job opportunities in the modern sector, the great majority of school leavers are relegated to either extended periods of unemployment or to intermediate or agricultural sector employment.¹³ Consequently, while attempts to evaluate the effect of formal education on modern sector productivity may be justifiable in establishing a linkage between formal western education and organized labour output in urban areas, the dual nature of Nigeria's political economy precludes such attempts from sufficiently demonstrating the effect of education on overall labour productivity throughout the country.

Another obvious complaint about this type of analysis is that while evidence might suggest that, formal education contributes to enhanced earnings (which is meant, of course, to represent worker productivity), nothing is said about the actual

skills provided by formal education which presumably affect students' later job performance. For example, while basic literacy and numeracy are fundamental skills imparted in the formal education system, it is not clear in the foregoing analysis how the ability to read, write, and count affects job output -- although admittedly in some areas, such as clerical work, the answers may be obvious. Neither is it known whether those workers with no formal education at all were completely illiterate, or whether some unschooled labourers may have learned basic literacy and numeracy informally, either on the job or outside of work. Likewise, no attempt is made to assess how the modernizing impact of school attendance will affect students' later work in a modern sector job. It is unclear, for instance, how school-induced attitudes, habits, and desires ultimately affect labour productivity.

Finally, one further difficulty is the possibility that those who have received post-primary education may simply possess greater innate ability than their unschooled co-workers and thus may be more productive because of inherent characteristics rather than because of any skills learned at school. Unless all such questions are addressed, the analysis of earnings functions cannot accurately identify the relationship between the skill formation role of schooling and eventual labour productivity.

Nevertheless, despite manifest limitations in attempting to use earnings functions as proxy evidence of modern sector

labour productivity, the resultant findings do infer that formal education has a considerable, albeit varying, correlation with differential earnings. Yet there is also the strong suggestion that in Nigeria's modern sector, job experience and informal methods of learning can also in the long run be influential factors in deciding the earnings of low-and middle-level workers. Thus, while no hard and fast conclusions can be drawn, these indications do enable us at this point to make the following tentative argument: There would appear to be some validity to the premise that the learning and experience acquired in the formal school system enhance the human contribution to national development. Yet in light of the evidence showing the effect of other non-formal means of training on labour productivity, it is possible that the premise is over-valued, particularly in view of the federal government's heavy investment in formal schooling. Instead, other methods of human capital development outside the formal school system may prove to be equally valid, and should thus warrant further investigation as alternative areas of educational investment.

3.3 The Instrumental Value of Education in the Intermediate Sector

As already mentioned, the modern sector of the economy employs only a small proportion of the Nigerian work force.

Far greater numbers of Nigerians work as intermediate sector entrepreneurs or employees, or as farmers. Thus, as formal education touches the lives of an increasing number of Nigerians, it is perhaps more significant to explore the instrumental value of education in the intermediate industrial and rural agricultural sectors. After all, as Dore argues, economists for too long have "accepted and helped to confirm the popular assumption that getting a modern sector job was what schooling was all about. Until they take self-employed earnings into account, their calculations will not have much relevance to policy."¹⁴

In the small-scale intermediate sector, just as with the modern sector of the Nigerian economy, accurate data are often scarce and difficult to obtain. (For our purposes in this paper we shall accept A.O. Lewis' definition of small-scale intermediate industries as "industrial enterprises engaged in processing, manufacturing, and technical servicing which employ capital investment in equipments and machineries of not more than ₦ 150,000".)¹⁵ Employing tens of thousands of entrepreneurs/proprietors, and being virtually indigenous, the small-scale industrial sector embraces such widespread activities as baking, goldsmithing, watch repair, auto repair, printing, and saw milling. However, as Onokerhoraye points out, "by their nature some activities in this sector do not lend themselves to quantification because of smallness of scale, lack of formal registration or licencing, and lack of a fixed place

of activity".¹⁶ Moreover, because of the vast matrix of Nigerian society, studies which have been conducted in this sector are generally confined to limited areas.

Despite these restrictions, however, research into the nature and productive contribution of the intermediate sector in various regions of the country has resulted in some tentative conclusions regarding the relationship between formal education and labour output. In 1972, a study of small scale industries in Kano city was undertaken by Khawaja and Reichenbach which demonstrated a correlation between education and job experience on the one hand, and earnings variations on the other. In a sample of 397 self-employed workers ("from welders to calabash carvers to hat weavers"), 269 had had no form of schooling at all, while 74 had completed primary school.¹⁷ As shown in Table 3.C, analysis revealed that the levels of educational attainment were correlated with levels of income. (In this case, imperfections of the wage labour market could not be a factor as the workers were self-employed; again, however, differentials in innate ability could have been a determining factor as well as skills acquired from school.) It was also apparent, however, that variations in income were also due to years of work experience as well as to educational attainment. Again, therefore, the results demonstrate that in terms of income earned (and by inference, productivity), experience among small-scale self-employed workers can compensate for little or no schooling.

TABLE 3.C

Average Annual Earnings by Age and Schooling Level

(E)

<u>Schooling Level</u>	<u>Age Groups</u>				
	15-20	21-25	26-30	31-35	36-40
No School	96	138	145	133	130
Full Primary	124	163	127	189	213

Source: cited by Hinchcliffe, "Screening, Deschooling, and Developing Countries," Higher Education, 4 (3), August, 1975, p. 312.

Of course, this is hardly surprising when one considers that most small-scale enterprises in northern Nigeria are traditional cottage industries which have been carried on for centuries, long before the introduction of western education. Nevertheless, observed earnings in the informal sector of Kano do suggest that, initially at least, primary school leavers tend to be more productive than their unschooled counterparts. While again it is unclear in the study as to exactly what school-induced skills and abilities enable them to start off with higher earnings -- the ability to read, write and count ; a frame of mind garnered from institutional activity which makes them more conscious of time ; an ability to accept and adapt more easily to change -- there nonetheless does appear to be a certain legitimacy to the argument that these skills and abilities do enhance labour productivity and that primary school graduates generally have at least an initial advantage over their unschooled counterparts in the labour market.

A similar on-going survey of small-scale industrial workers has been conducted since 1969 by the Industrial Research Unit of the University of Ife. In 1971, as part of the overall survey, a study in the former Western State ~~under the direc-~~ tion of S.A. Aluko provided a sample of 13,592 small-scale businessmen. Of this group, 6,081 had completed primary school, while only 1,478 (approximately 11% of the sample survey) had continued their formal education after primary school. Figures

in Table 3.D also show that of those who went on to post-primary school, only 0.7% had gone beyond secondary Form III and -- most telling of all perhaps -- only 21 individuals (0.2% of the sample) had received formal technical training. While variations in earnings were not revealed by the survey, the foregoing findings have nonetheless raised doubts concerning the effectiveness of formal education, especially post-primary schooling, in contributing to human productivity in the small-scale industrial sector. The main reason seems to be that most entrepreneurs had received very little schooling, if at all. As Aluko observes:

The fewness of the number of those with technical training in schools, colleges, and universities belies the emphasis on technical education as a means of indigenous industrialization. The survey shows that entrepreneurship in the present state of the Nigerian economy is inversely proportional to the amount of formal education which the individual receives.¹⁸

The suggestion here is that while those with Primary VI education or less tend to be willing and/or able to establish indigenous entrepreneurial concerns (whereupon survival depends on productivity), those with formal post-primary education are more likely to search for careers in the organized labour sector as employees of the state or of the large-scale modern enterprises.¹⁹ This finding is parallel to Mabawonku's observation, noted in Chapter 2, that virtually all small-scale self-employed entrepreneurs included in his sample had undergone some informal apprenticeship training, but that no

TABLE 3.D

Educational Background of Small-Scale Entrepreneurs

No Schl. Education or below Pry. VI	Primary VI School Education	Modern School or Sec. I-III	Second- ary IV-V	Teacher Training Grd. III or II	Advanced Teachers Cert. V
6,033	6,081	1,333	94	28	—
44.2%	44.6%	10.1%	0.7%	0.2%	0%
Technical Training	University	Adult Education	Desiring further technical training		
21	2	—	9,367		
0.2%	0.02%	—	72%		

Source: S.A. Aluko, "Industry in the Rural Setting," Rural Development in Nigeria, Proceedings of the 1972 Annual Conference of the Nigerian Economic Society, Ibadan University Press, 1973, p. 224.

former trade school trainees were engaged in self-employment. While such private decision-making involves attitudinal values which we shall discuss more fully later, Aluko has implied that those with less education may oftentimes be more productive in that "the private [small-scale] entrepreneur works harder than the public servant".²⁰ His overall conclusion, therefore, is that the majority of small-scale industrial entrepreneurs acquire whatever job skills they possess outside the formal school system. In short, by inference, productivity would seem to hinge far more on informal practical experience than on the process of formal education.

As part of the University of Ife study, A.O. Lewis has drawn similar conclusions from a 1969 survey confined to the city of Ile-Ife -- defined as a "pre-industrial" urban centre because of its lack of any medium or large-scale manufacturing establishments.²¹ In identifying and classifying just under 700 small-scale industrial enterprises, Lewis estimated that nearly 42% of their entrepreneurs/proprietors had had no formal education at all, 11% had received less than six years of primary school, and 30% had achieved an educational level of Primary VI. Only 17% had attained more than Primary VI. However, virtually all had undertaken training in their particular skills outside the school system before starting their businesses -- and the most common method of skill acquisition had been apprenticeship training. Similarly, a 1973 survey of 3,600 small-scale enterprises in the former North-Eastern State

revealed that while most proprietors/entrepreneurs had undergone apprenticeship training, only 16% had received any primary schooling (hardly surprising, of course, in an area which has only recently experienced a widespread influx of institutionalized western education).²²

It is not our aim in this paper to delve deeply into the nature and organization of the vast apprenticeship network in Nigeria. Nevertheless, a number of observations regarding this traditional method of training may be comparatively useful in our overall evaluation. Studies have shown, not surprisingly, that most apprentices are still in their teens and that the fees they pay and the duration of time they spend in apprenticeship vary depending on the skill or craft being learned, as well as the established agreement or relationship between master and apprentice - or parents of the apprentice.²³ In most cases too it would seem that not only are vocational skills learned through apprenticeship, but frequently apprentices also undertake numerous forms of entrepreneurial activity. Mabawonku observes, for example, that "apart from learning the skills of the trade, apprentices are often sent on errands to buy raw materials and equipment and are thus able to learn about purchasing and marketing in the process".²⁴ Similarly, from a survey of 5,136 craftsmen and small industrialists in Ibadan, Callaway revealed that practically all had undergone apprenticeship where "they [had] gained their keen economic discernment and technical abilities under the discipline of

their masters and the rigours of the competitive markets".²⁵ Thus it would seem, on the basis of these findings, that while some formal education may be helpful -- but not essential -- for the successful operation of small-scale businesses, informal on-the-job apprenticeship is necessary if individuals are to make a contribution to development in the intermediate sector of the economy.

It is important to note, however, that despite evidence presented in these studies of the small-scale industrial sector, a number of drawbacks exist which leave some unanswered but important questions. The very fact that so few post-primary graduates appear to be engaged in small-scale enterprises, while suggesting that such individuals may shun informal entrepreneurial activity, does not mean that post-primary students are either less or more productive, either in the private sector or the public sector. (In Chapter 4, however, we shall examine evidence which suggests that small-scale entrepreneurs and their employees tend to devote more hours to the job than modern sector wage earners.) Likewise, lack of time-series data on labour income in the informal sector prevents us from exploring the degree to which levels of education contribute to cumulative earnings. Consequently, we have no means to evaluate the effect which different levels of formal education have on long-term differential productivity in the intermediate sector. Lewis himself admits that the data on small-scale industries have not been collected to discover the extent to which levels

of education affect entrepreneurial and technical acumen. He does note, however, that "one can use the number of employees per enterprise as a rough indication of entrepreneurial achievement. An impressionistic assessment of such data would seem to suggest that some illiterate proprietors/entrepreneurs are doing as well as their literate counterparts".²⁶

Nevertheless, further observations by the University of Ife team and by other independent researchers do suggest that some degree of formal education enhances labour output in the small-scale industrial sector. Certainly, the affective aspect of formal education may prove advantageous for many small-scale entrepreneurs; as Lewis' earlier comment on the modernizing impact of schooling makes plain, such educated individuals are probably more apt to endorse progressive change and the adoption of modern techniques. Furthermore, in a nation bent on making functional literacy a societal norm, it is quite likely that the ability to read and write and to perform basic arithmetic may prove a distinct advantage. Indeed, in some areas of the small-scale intermediate sector, literacy is a veritable necessity for job performance, and therefore some training in the formal education system is valuable. Lewis cites a 1972 study of small enterprises in the printing industry in Lagos State; "in terms of employment and value added, the printing industry is one of the country's leading manufacturing industries."²⁷ Of the 220 apprentices and 105 employers/entrepreneurs interviewed (see Tables 3.E and 3.F), all had

Table 3.E

Level of Education Among Apprentices

<u>Level of Education</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Less than Primary VI	4	1.8
Primary VI	166	75.4
Secondary Modern	35	16.0
Secondary Grammar	15	6.8
	<u>220</u>	<u>100.0</u>

Source: A. O. Lewis, "A Study of Small Enterprises in the Printing Industry in Nigeria's Lagos State", Quarterly Journal of Administration, 8, January, 1974, p. 194.

Table 3.F

Level of Education Among Proprietors/Entrepreneurs

<u>Level of Education</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Less than Primary VI	1	0.9
Primary VI	54	51.4
Secondary Modern	14	13.3
Secondary Grammar	28	26.7
Post-Secondary	8	7.7
	<u>105</u>	<u>100.0</u>

Source: Lewis, "Printing Industry", p. 196.

received some form of western education and were considered to be literate; in fact, only four apprentices had achieved less than a Primary VI level of schooling and only one employer/proprietor had not finished primary school. Similarly, as noted in Chapter 1, Mabawonku in his more recent study has indicated that approximately 80% of the apprentices interviewed had completed primary school.

Thus, even if formal school training has not in the past been essential, or even especially helpful, for the operation of many small businesses in Nigeria, the very fact that more and more entrepreneurs and apprentices do have a primary school background is suggestive of a climate of change. While we shall discuss the relationship between education and intermediate sector development and employment more fully in Chapter 4, we may conclude here that in view of the internal skills function of primary school, and in light of the competitive nature of small-scale private enterprise, it seems likely that increasingly a background of primary schooling is advantageous, if not necessary, for small businessmen in Nigeria.

3.4 The Instrumental Value of Education in the Agricultural Sector

As we have noted, the small-scale industrial sector in Nigeria comprises a multitude of businesses of all sorts. Moreover, these are situated in all areas -- large cities,

small towns, and rural villages. Nevertheless, the small business sector does not constitute the major area of employment in Nigeria. Instead, the overwhelming percentage of labour is engaged in agriculture. Consequently, in view of the government's UPE programme which affects all localities throughout the country, it is important in this discussion to consider the degree to which school training enhances the productivity of farmers. Unfortunately, data on this topic remain scarce, since the vast majority of farmers in Nigeria remain illiterate.²⁸ However, a study by W. Ogionwo does provide some evidence as to the effectiveness of formal education in developing farmers' productivity.²⁹

The essential purpose of Ogionwo's study was to test the relationship between levels of formal education attained by farmers (accepted as a crude measurement of their functional literacy) and their exposure to farm information which might lead to greater agricultural productivity. Interviews for the study were conducted among 1000 farmers, divided equally according to four crops located in four separate regions, i.e. crops were cultivated by 250 farmers each in the separate regions: cocoa (Western State); rubber (Mid-Western State); oil palm (East Central State); and rice (Rivers State). The range of educational attainment among farmers was as follows: 38% had received no schooling, the "average respondent" had spent two to four years in school, while another 17% had attended school for six years or more.

Against this background several questions were posed concerning farmers' exposure to various sources of "instrumental" farming information. The types of informational exposure which were assessed included the following: listening to radio farm programmes; reading daily or weekly printed information; having personal contact with agricultural experts; holding membership in farm cooperatives or in other professionally oriented farm organizations. Evidence shows that of those farmers who had access to a radio, 61% had at some time listened to farm information programmes. Among literate farmers, however, only 34% had read rural information supplements in newspapers -- far less than the number who used the radio. Responses also showed that 70% of the sample had been in contact at least once with an agricultural expert, and 45% belonged to a cooperative or other farm organization.

On the basis of this evidence, levels of education were then cross-tabulated against the different types of informational exposure. The results, as shown in Table 3.G, indicate that while there was a strong correlation between years of schooling and the tendency to read farm supplements (only 6% of those with little education as compared to 68% of those with five or more years of schooling), such was not the case regarding the other three informational sources. In other words, while a definite association existed between reading skills and the use of printed instrumental information, the findings clearly suggest that in terms of the other sources

TABLE 3.G
Level of Education and Exposure to Instrumental Information

Years of Schooling	% of respondents exposed to instrumental information									
	Listened to Programmes		Read Farm Supplements		Consulted Agric. Technician		Member of Farm Organization			
	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N		
0-3 years	58	(292)	6	(196)	71	(304)	43	(233)	100	
4 years	61	(418)	35	(271)	69	(409)	45	(354)	159	
5 years more	64	(167)	68	(143)	71	(170)	46	(154)	71	
All Respondents	61	(877) ¹	34	(620) ²	70	(883) ³	45	(741) ⁴	330	

¹Excludes 123 cases with no access to radio listening.

²Excludes 380 illiterates.

³Excludes 117 cases that cannot be coded.

⁴Excludes 259 cases who never belong to farm organizations.

Note: N stands for total number of respondents falling into various educational levels, n stands for those exhibiting a particular behaviour such as "Read Farm Supplements", "Listened to Programmes", etc.

Source: W. Ogiomwo, "Education and Development: An Assessment of Educational Level and Adoption Behaviour of Farmers in Nigeria", Quarterly Journal of Administration, 7(1), October, 1972, p. 49.

of farm information, "literacy and increments of education, at least at the primary level, will not cause farmers to seek out instrumental information about farming".³⁰

The next step in the analysis was to determine whether exposure to farm information had a positive effect on farmers' innovativeness (i.e. their propensity to adopt new agricultural techniques). By examining the number of specified innovations adopted by a farmer at a given point in time, an index of his level of innovativeness (adoption index) was determined. (The number of innovations varied according to each crop. For example, the maximum number of innovations accorded to cocoa farming was eleven. A farmer who adopted 1-3 of these innovative practices was considered low on the adoption index; a farmer who adopted 8 - 11 practices was considered high.)³¹ The findings of the adoption index were then cross-tabulated with the data on instrumental information. The results as shown in Table 3.H demonstrate that there was a positive correlation between exposure to instrumental information and higher rates of innovativeness, i.e. the adoption of recommended practices. The combined information of Tables 3.G and 3.H tends to suggest, therefore, that formal education is not a causal factor in farmers' innovativeness: outside of reading there is no definite linkage between level of schooling and exposure to farm information; yet there is an obvious correlation between informational exposure and the adoption of new farming techniques.

TABLE 3.H

Exposure to Instrumental Information and Adoption
of Recommended Practices

Exposure to Instrumental Information	Percentage Adopters		
	High%	Low %	N
Listened to farm radio programmes			
No.....	59 (263)	41 (203)	466
Yes.....	61 (324)	39 (207)	<u>531</u>
			997
Read Newspapers and Farm Supplements			
No.....	60 (247)	40 (165)	412
Yes.....	81 (169)	19 (39)	<u>208</u>
			620
Consulted agricultural experts and/or extension workers			
No.....	60 (158)	40 (106)	264
Yes.....	76 (470)	24 (149)	<u>619</u>
			884
Member of Farm Organization			
No.....	56 (247)	44 (194)	441
Yes.....	75 (248)	25 (82)	<u>330</u>
			771

Note: N stands for total number of respondents falling into the various "Yes-No" categories and the raw figures in the brackets are those who did something. For example, out of 997 respondents who had access to radio, 466 reported that they did not listen to farm programmes. And from such respondents, 263 were high adopters and 203 were low adopters.

Source: Ogionwo, p. 50.

Thus; as Ogionwo concludes, the analysis shows "that at least for the population studied, the relationship between level of education and behaviour conducive to development is neither close nor direct".³²

The implication of this conclusion is disturbing in view of government education policy. As we have seen, a major objective of UPE is to develop the skills and abilities of individuals necessary for them to contribute to societal development. Yet the results of the above survey clearly suggest that the relationship between formal primary school learning and the human factor in agricultural productivity is negligible. Considering that the majority of Nigeria's population earns its livelihood from farming this is particularly significant. If the instrumental value of the skills function of primary education in rural Nigeria is questionable, we must then question the value of UPE as an investment in rural development. As Ogionwo writes:

How can we interpret such a basically negative result? One way to summarize the matter is to suggest that, although these data say nothing about what education could or should be in ideal circumstances, they say a good deal about the instrumental value of formal education in our theories of development. They tell us that the free use of level of education in specific development strategies, (e.g. increased literacy → greater receptivity to information about modern farming methods → greater agricultural productivity) is probably unwarranted.³³

To the extent that there is a low correlation between formal education and receptivity to instrumental information

3

there may indeed be doubts as to the merits of UPE in agricultural and rural development. However, there are other considerations which may temper doubts regarding the effectiveness of the internal skills function of primary education in Nigeria. For one thing the evidence does not yet make clear the extent to which the modernizing effect of schooling may either enhance or hinder agricultural development. In the short run at least, as we shall explore later on, one reason for the low correlation between education and farmers' degree of innovativeness is that many who have been exposed to formal schooling express a strong desire to escape a life of farming which is commonly seen as traditional and backward. In other words, the experience of education seems often to lead to a decline of interest in farming. This suggests a negative effect of schooling; as we shall see, however, disenchantment with agriculture among school leavers may, in fact, be a response not so much to their education per se, but to inveterate socio-economic forces which are largely independent of the formal education system.

A further point to observe is one we have already mentioned: that is, the very fact that Nigeria is attempting to develop as a more literate society may well mean that increasingly technological development, entrepreneurship, etc. will hinge on people's ability to read and write. As new techniques are gradually introduced into the farming sector, there may be a definite advantage in possessing an ability to

read instructions, whether they be on package labels or on equipment manuals. Likewise, as we shall discuss in Chapter 5, there is evidence to suggest that increasingly farmers are engaged in marketing their crops as well as planting and harvesting them, and that greater access to credit facilities is being extended to farmers. Obviously then, functional literacy and numeracy among rural people could prove to be useful assets in carrying on market transactions and in negotiating lines of credit. While these activities are not necessarily productive in themselves, they may well have a beneficial impact on a farmer's further agricultural output. In that sense, therefore, it is conceivable that formal educational training can enhance the human contribution to development.

As yet, of course, conclusions concerning the relationship between the internal skills and abilities function of formal education and farmers' job performance and productivity can only be tentative as western education in rural Nigeria is still in its infancy. In order to establish a fuller understanding of the instrumental value of formal schooling vis-à-vis the productive skills, abilities, and competence of Nigerian farmers, further research extending perhaps over several generations in many different regions of the country will be necessary.

3.5 The Instrumental Limitations of Formal Education

Having examined some evidence regarding the value of education in enhancing human productivity in various sectors of the economy, we shall conclude by making a number of general observations regarding the instrumental effectiveness of formal education. In several of the studies which we have cited, the influence of formal schooling on earnings and on observed attitudes and behaviour has been demonstrated; yet it would seem that in a great many instances there is a ceiling on the amount of needed time to be spent in school. The data on the modern textile industry indicate that in most low- and middle-level jobs, while primary school education is beneficial, post-school on-the-job experience is also effective in terms of increased earnings. Evidence from the intermediate industrial sector suggests a similar conclusion: that is, while some formal schooling is useful, a primary school level of educational attainment is frequently sufficient and further training is essential outside of school, or at least on a part-time basis while continuing a job.³⁴ Certainly, in view of the academic arts and science bias of secondary school curricula which we discussed in Chapter 1, the instrumental value of post-primary school learning is questionable. While it may be possible to present a case for the teaching and examining of such academic fare for the benefit of those students who are to continue on with higher education, for the

majority of secondary school leavers who invariably enter the labour market and/or embark on some further informal method of training, it is difficult to see how five years of a liberal arts and science education will enhance the learning of a craft or the initiation into the competitive hub of entrepreneurship and the free market. Even where low- or middle-level white collar positions can be secured in the public service or in the large-scale private sector, the learning of North American geography, of Macbeth's tragedy, and of the structure of the atom would seem unhappily redundant, especially when we consider the expense of such learning.³⁵ Thus, while a case can be made for the instrumental value of primary education, focussing as it does on functional literacy and numeracy skills, a similar argument seems far less tenable with regard to much secondary school training.

A further point to consider is that the internal skills and abilities function of schooling can only be considered instrumental if applied in a productive way. As we shall see in Chapters 4 and 5, the employment situation in Nigeria is such that for many school leavers the skills and abilities they have learned in school may be underutilized because of a lack of a job; indeed, through lack of use such skills may eventually prove to be transitory. In such cases, a proportion of the government's investment in education will be wasted.

This would appear to be particularly true in terms of functional literacy. Unless reading and writing skills are put

to continuous use by school leavers, there is the real possibility that many may lapse into illiteracy. While there is no evidence to suggest that primary and secondary school leavers do not practice the literacy skills they have learned even while unemployed or while in jobs which do not require reading and writing, a number of Nigerian writers have observed that as education is often considered by students as "essentially utilitarian"³⁶ for the purpose of obtaining higher status and jobs, the actual learning acquired in schools may not be highly cherished.

In a discussion of liberal education programmes offered by Lagos University to Nigerian adults, Omolewa has concluded that in the eyes of the adults "liberal education seemed an unprofitable distraction from the traditional system of vocational instruction with its paper rewards". The ability to read for its own sake was considered "meaningless and irrelevant".³⁷ An example of this, while not specifically related to the situation of unemployed primary and secondary school leavers, was an attempt to establish a Nigerian Book Club in 1973 by the publisher Onibonjoe: the attempt proved to be a failure -- perhaps, although not conclusively, indicative of lack of interest in leisure reading.³⁸ As Bisi Ugunleye writes, "...we are not a reading nation, we place too much valuation on certificates, we learn by rote 'Question and Answer' books to pass examinations and regard the possession of a certificate as the terminal end to our reading".³⁹

This problem is compounded by a serious shortage in reading material and library facilities outside the school system. Little has been done to build up community library services and to encourage reading outside of classrooms and job environment. John Dean has spoken of "an absence of a library tradition in homes and schools";⁴⁰ and as S. C. Nwaye has forcefully pointed out:

From the point of view of library development, Nigeria must be regarded as a fairly backward country. There are very few well organized public library services and apart from a few privileged government secondary schools, no school libraries worth the name. The result is that many a Nigerian freshman may never have used a library before enrolling in one of our institutions of higher learning.⁴¹

The implication here is obvious -- with neither the opportunity nor the encouragement to practice literacy skills upon leaving school (and for the large percentage of unemployed young people this is undoubtedly the case) school leavers may lapse into illiteracy in a few years. The point here is that while schools may disseminate certain skills, in most cases they cannot affect the retention of such skills. Thus, if within a relatively short period of time skills acquired through formal education are lost, their value is negated and so, therefore, is the value of the system which formulated them.

In terms of human capital theory, skills and abilities learned in school are only to be valued if they can be utilized so as to contribute to development. If the learning and ex-

perience of schooling are not reflected in labour productivity, then the instrumental value of formal education may be minimal, and the concept of formal education as a profitable investment will become questionable.

In summary then, while we may accept the premise that some formal school education does enhance the human contribution to national development, we may simultaneously question the advisability of continuing a costly expansion of all levels of formal academic post-primary schooling to the virtual exclusion of other perhaps less expensive, more practical job-oriented forms of training. Obviously, more research is needed to relate the skills and habits acquired in informal training programmes to later job performance, especially in the intermediate and agricultural sectors. Nevertheless, initial indications would seem to suggest that government investment in the area of informal on-the-job training programmes, as opposed to increasing expenditure on formal secondary schooling, might well result in favourable socio-economic returns.

FOOTNOTES
(CHAPTER 3)

¹See note 1, Chapter 2.

²Hopkins has suggested, for example, that we are led into "ridiculous situations" if we accept earnings as a measure of human productivity: ". . . a quite indefensible measuring-rod -- . . . Was the benefit to the world of Einstein's education measurable in terms of his salary-differential?". Hopkins, p. 68.

³Keith Hinchcliffe, "Earnings Determinants in the Nigerian Textile Industry", Comparative Education Review, 20 (1), pp. 49-52.

⁴Ibid., p. 59.

⁵Hinchcliffe, "Labour Aristocracy -- A Northern Nigerian Case Study", Journal of Modern African Studies, 12 (1), March, 1974, p. 59.

⁶Dore, p. 5.

⁷Hinchcliffe, "Screening, Deschooling, and Developing Countries", Higher Education, 4 (3), August, 1975, p. 308.

⁸Hinchcliffe, "Earnings Determinants", p. 56. For a detailed description of the regression analysis, see pp. 50-56.

⁹Noting the three-year age differential, Hinchcliffe writes, "although secondary schooling lasts five years, it is the case that those who proceed to secondary schooling have managed to graduate from primary school earlier than the others." "Earnings Determinants", p. 56.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 59.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Dore, p. 92.

¹³We shall discuss the relationship between education and overall employment in Chapters 4 and 5.

¹⁴Dore, p. 92.

¹⁵A. O. Lewis, "Economic Performance, Orientation and Problems of Small-Scale Industries in Nigeria's Former Western State", Quarterly Journal of Administration, 12 (1), October, 1977, pp. 30.

¹⁶A. G. Onokerhoraye, "Occupational Specialization by Ethnic Groups in the Informal Sector of the Urban Economics of Traditional Nigerian Cities: The Case of Benin", African Studies Review, 20 (1), April, 1977, pp. 60-61.

¹⁷Survey by N. Khawaja and R. Reichenbach is cited by Hinchcliffe, "Screening", pp. 311-12.

¹⁸S. A. Aluko, "Industry in the Rural Setting", in Rural Development in Nigeria, Proceedings of the 1972 Annual Conference of the Nigerian Economic Society, University of Ibadan Press, 1972, p. 224.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Ibid., p. 225.

²¹A. O. Lewis, "The Small-Scale Industrial Scene of Ile-Ife", Quarterly Journal of Administration, 6 (3), July, 1972, p. 427.

²²A. O. Lewis, "The Development of Small-Scale Industries in Nigeria's North-Eastern State: Prospects, Problems, and Policies", Savanna, 3 (2), December, 1974, pp. 185-95.

²³Callaway, "Training Young People within Indigenous Small-Scale Enterprises: the Nigerian Example", Planning Out-of-School Education for Development, An IIEP Seminar, December, 13-21, 1971, pp. 184-87; Lewis, "Printing Industry", pp. 192-95; Mabawonku, pp. 22-23; Onokerhoraye, "Occupational Specialization", p. 59.

²⁴Mabawonku, p. 23.

²⁵Callaway, "Training Young People", p. 182. A similar observation is made by Lewis, "Printing Industry", p. 193.

²⁶A. O. Lewis, "Industrial Scene of Ile-Ife", p. 435.

²⁷_____, "Printing Industry", p. 189.

²⁸This is particularly evident in northern Nigeria where government-sponsored informal education has only recently been introduced on anything approaching a mass scale. During 1974-75 Matlon noted in his study of northern rural farming communities that only 1% of household heads in the random sample

and only 6% of school-age children had attended primary school. Likewise only 8% of household heads had attended adult literacy classes, and only 15% had met with an extension agent during the preceding five years. And literacy in either Hausa or Arabic was limited to only 7% of the random heads. Peter J. Matlon, Income Distribution Among Farmers in Northern Nigeria: Empirical Results and Policy Implications, African Rural Economy Paper No. 18, African Rural Economy Program, Michigan State University, 1979. Further discussion of Matlon's study is contained in Chapter 5.

²⁹W. Ogionwo, "Education and Development: An Assessment of Educational Level and Adoption Behaviour of Farmers in Nigeria", Quarterly Journal of Administration, 7 (1), October, 1972, pp. 37-54.

³⁰Ibid., p. 48.

³¹Ibid.; for discussion of Ogionwo's methodology, see pp. 41-47.

³²Ibid., p. 49.

³³Ibid., pp. 51-52.

³⁴See also note 17, Chapter 1, regarding the possibility of a ceiling effect on levels of school-induced modernity.

³⁵The Financial Times reports that secondary education in Nigeria suffers from being

a very large, very mixed ground. . . . It is all too often the central area of lost hope -- expensive for some, disappointing for most. . . . Very large sums of money have been pumped into the system but few -- from the Federal Commissioner of Education to secondary school teacher, pupil, and parent are confident that the returns have justified the outlay. (p. 33).

³⁶Micheel Abiola Omolewa, "Liberal Education and Nigerian Workers, 1942-75: A Study of Priorities of Workers' Education in Nigeria", Vierteljahre Berichte, 61, September, 1975, p. 276. More will be said of students' attitudes towards education in Chapters 6 and 7.

³⁷Ibid., p. 276 and p. 277.

³⁸Ibid., p. 274.

³¹Ugunleye, cited by Omolewa, p. 279. It is to be noted, however, that in Nigeria "newspapers have an independence and

scale of circulation unknown in the rest of Africa." Financial Times, p. 32.

⁴⁰ John Dean cited by C. C. Aguolu, "Information Resources in Nigerian Higher Education: Problems of Development and Growth", Libri, 28 (1), March, 1978, p. 35.

⁴¹ S. C. Nwayé cited by S. O. Olanlokun, "Education and Library Services in Nigeria", International Library Review, 8 (4), October, 1976, p. 479.

CHAPTER 4: EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT, AND THE PATTERN OF
INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE MODERN AND INTERMEDIATE
SECTORS OF NIGERIA'S ECONOMY

4.1 Introduction

We have seen that education in Nigeria claims the lion's share of government funding; most of the nineteen states devote the largest percentage of their budgets to education and in all states those figures have been rising annually. Likewise, federal spending on education has risen at a much faster rate than in any other public sector. Quite clearly, such large-scale investment in education underlines the notion that a principle source of national development lies in the human capital factor. This is the fundamental western economic paradigm upon which the planning and implementation of Nigeria's formal education system is based. As Benji Anosike writes, "the education component of the labour force has come to be viewed as a partner in the production process. In this partnership, the link between production of physical goods and services and the educational system is productivity."¹ In the previous chapters, we have suggested that while it would be a mistake to assume that the education system as presently organized in Nigeria is the single most effective instrument for "developing human capital", evidence would suggest that to some extent the human capital theorists are correct.

What has ~~not been~~ made clear, however, and what we must now examine closely is whether or not society in fact makes effective use of its "developed human capital". In view of public expenditure on the school system, and in light of the stipulated aims and objectives of national education, the ultimate success of education in Nigeria depends not simply on its internal function and administration, but also on the impact it has on sectoral economic development and the eventual utilization and development of its "products" throughout the economy and society. While it is all very well to suggest that schools are a useful means of developing potentially productive men and women, the suggestion is insufficient unless we determine the extent to which school leavers are able or willing to put their learned skills to productive use, and whether or not the labour market in various sectors of the economy can accomodate them.² In other words, the effectiveness of Nigeria's educational system is ~~evaluated most commonly in relation~~ to the state of employment and sectoral growth in the political economy. Our purpose in this chapter then will be to examine the situation of employment and growth in large-scale capital-intensive industry (the modern sector) and in smaller-scale labour-intensive industry (the informal intermediate sector). In so doing, we shall attempt to assess the relationship between education on the one hand and the pattern of employment and industrialization on the other.

We shall begin by considering the issue of unemployment.

In section 4.2, we shall examine the increasingly worrying phenomenon of an under-utilized labour force in Nigeria. While accurate figures are difficult to come by, indications are that unemployment is such that it poses a grave socio-economic problem for the country. Moreover, contrary to the policy aim of relating education to "overall community needs", and of ensuring primary school leavers the choice of further study or "full-time employment", evidence strongly suggests that young school leavers constitute the largest proportion of unemployed manpower. Doubts, therefore, must arise as to the efficacy of increasing investment in human resources through formal school expansion if a rising percentage of those resources are then left idle.

The discrepancy between the abundant supply and dwindling proportionate demand for labour is especially acute in the modern industrial sector of the economy. In section 4.3, we shall consider the nature of large-scale industrial development in Nigeria, and attempt to ascertain the various factors which sustain the high capital intensity and relatively low employment potential of the modern sector. Our discussion will reveal that the pattern of large-scale industrial growth operates by and large independently of education policy. Indeed, while modern sector job opportunities remain limited in proportion to the entire national labour force, the expansion of formal western education may simply aggravate urban unemployment as greater numbers of school leavers seek jobs in

the cities.

In section 4.4, we shall continue to focus on the modern sector by examining a wages and salaries structure which has tended to operate in response to government legislation and trade union action rather than to competitive market forces. As modern sector wages and salaries are maintained at levels which are relatively high in contrast to earnings in other areas of the economy, the modern sector remains the most attractive area of employment. Yet high wage levels may also act to discourage the use of labour over physical capital in large industry. The result is a paradox of state policy -- the maintenance of an artificial wage structure which diminishes the employment potential of the modern sector, and the expansion of a modern-oriented school system from which ever-greater numbers of youths emerge in search of modern jobs.

In section 4.5, we shall turn to examine the state of intermediate industrial development in Nigeria's economy. The employment picture here is more optimistic. Small-scale industries in Nigeria are generally labour-intensive; moreover, not only do they afford opportunities for employment, but by means of the apprenticeship system which is an integral part of the intermediate sector, they provide a practical training ground for the acquisition of skills and basic entrepreneurial experience. Unfortunately, however, small industry throughout much of Nigeria remains underdeveloped, partly because of numerous technical and managerial short-

comings among many small businessmen, and partly because of a variety of obstacles thrown up by a socio-economic environment which oftentimes makes management and expansion of small business difficult. In reviewing the variables which hamper the development of intermediate industry -- and thus retard the development of its full employment potential -- it will be apparent that the expansion of the formal education system will not be a sufficient means of enhancing the state of small industry in Nigeria.

Finally, in section 4.6, we shall examine alternative methods of training outside the formal school system which may prove to have a more positive impact on intermediate sector development. In view of the technical and managerial limitations of many small businessmen, much may be said for expanding and consolidating a wide variety of adult vocational training programmes which will improve business efficiency. Similarly, in consideration of the irrelevance and wastage characteristic of secondary school education, there may well be an advantage in re-directing a greater proportion of educational resources towards the subsidization and standardization of the vast apprenticeship network, the value of which is presently dependent on the varying abilities of individual masters. A broad alternative educational strategy may thus have some impact in furthering the growth and employment potential of small industry in Nigeria. At the same time, however, we must constantly bear in mind that education alone

is not the final determinant of sectoral growth and employment, that ultimately the effect of intermediate sector development is dependent on the multi-faceted operational structure of the entire political economy.

4.2 Unemployment: The Imbalance between the Supply and Demand of Formally Educated Manpower

Among the aims of education in Nigeria is the stipulation that individuals who have completed their primary schooling should have the choice of either continuing full-time study, combining work and study, or pursuing full-time employment. Opportunities for post-primary study are, of course, open to only a small proportion of primary school leavers. As a result, the majority of young people are compelled to enter the labour market while still in their teens. A major concern for government, therefore, is to ensure that sufficient satisfactory employment opportunities do exist for the ever-increasing numbers of young school leavers in the country. After all, if young people are unable to obtain reasonably fulfilling jobs, not only will there be a potential wastage of educational investment, but widespread dissatisfaction resulting from joblessness may lead to internal socio-political disruption. The need for a moderate supply and demand equilibrium in the labour market is thus essential for the satisfaction of community needs. Indeed, as Callaway has observed, "The problem

of reducing under-employment -- or, to put it in the other way, of creating more employment opportunities at rising levels of income -- is central to the process of development itself".³

In order to examine the state of the labour market in Nigeria, it may be useful first of all to compare Third National Plan forecasts and the most recent figures of manpower deployment and productive output in the major sectors of the economy. It is important to note, of course, that the calculation of demographic figures in Nigeria is hampered by the absence of an up-to-date census and by the uncertainty of the last official census taken in 1963. Moreover, since urban labour exchanges are the main sources of employment information, and since they lack data on agricultural and informal sector jobs, as well as on the number of unregistered unemployed, manpower figures can only be based on rough calculations. As Richter has suggested, "even in the best of circumstances where specific labour market information programmes have been instituted, the reliability, representativeness and usefulness of the relevant statistical data are impaired by differences of definition, gaps in coverage, lack of disaggregation, over-long intervals between surveys, and delays in publication".⁴ Nevertheless, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit, "the statistics published in the Third National Development Plan 1975-80 may be used as a rough guide to size and sectoral distribution of the labour force".⁵

In estimating the manpower requirements of the national economy for the period 1975-80, the Central Planning Office in Lagos operated along the following lines: Using the 1966 labour force estimate of 23.81 million, a projected 2.3% annual growth rate was foreseen up to 1980. Likewise, on the basis of a 1967 labour sample survey, the rate of manpower participation was reckoned at 78%. The total labour force figure for 1975 was then calculated to be 29.22 million; assuming the rate of unemployment to be 4.5% (an underestimation as we shall see), the total employment level was thus estimated at 27.91 million. Consequently, for 1980 the projected work force was given as 32.74 million, and the total employment figure, based on the relationship between trends in employment and the GDP, was forecast to be 31.76 million.⁶

Besides estimating the total numbers of the labour force and its rate of employment in the economy, the Central Planning Office also derived estimates of the shifts in the sectoral distribution of employment for the period 1975-80. As can be seen in Tables 4.A and 4.B, an overwhelming percentage of the labour force has been expected to remain employed in the agricultural sector, despite an overall drop of 2.8%. The only other sector which demonstrates a projected decline in the percentage of the work force is in the area of distribution, and it too shows only a minor drop of 0.4%. The areas which show an increase in the percentage of total employment are in services, up 0.3%, in building and construction,

TABLE 4.A

Sectoral Distribution on Total Gainful Employment, 1975

<u>Sector</u>	<u>Estimated Total Employment</u>	
	<u>No. (million)</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Agriculture	17.86	64.0
Mining and Quarrying	.11	0.4
Manufacturing and Processing	4.69	16.8
Construction and Building	.25	0.9
Electricity, Gas and Water	.03	0.1
Distribution	3.40	12.2
Transport and Communication	.17	0.6
Services	<u>1.40</u>	<u>5.0</u>
	27.91	100.0

Source: Third National Development Plan, Central Planning Office, Lagos, p. 370.

TABLE 4.B

Sectoral Distribution of Employment, 1980

<u>Sector</u>	<u>Estimated Total Employment</u>	
	<u>No. (million)</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Agriculture	19.44	61.2
Mining and Quarrying	0.13	0.4
Manufacturing and Processing	6.03	19.0
Building and Construction	0.51	1.6
Electricity, Gas and Water	0.03	0.1
Distribution	3.75	11.8
Transport	0.19	0.6
Services	<u>1.68</u>	<u>5.3</u>
	31.76	100.0

Source: Third National Development Plan, 1975-80, Central Planning Office, Lagos, p. 373.

up 0.7%, and in manufacturing and processing which has the largest increase of 2.2% of the total Nigerian labour force. In short, the most significant shifts in the projected sectoral distribution of employment are in the informal area of agriculture and the more formal, modern area of manufacturing and processing. At the same time, however, while all sectors are expected to see an absolute increase in employment, the overall percentage shift in terms of the national work force as a whole is still quite small. Moreover, throughout the planned period -- and in fact, one can surmise, for decades to come -- the greatest demand for manpower continues to lie in the agricultural sector, with the demand in manufacturing and processing coming a distant second.

While these figures provide the estimates of the deployment of manpower as projected by the Third Plan, further illumination regarding the planned utilization of the Nigerian labour force may be seen in the projected annual compound growth rate in output in both the agricultural and manufacturing sectors. As can be seen in Table 4.C, agricultural output was expected to increase by 3.97%, while the projected increase in manufacturing and processing output was to be approximately 5.37%.

It would appear then, that while a shift in the distribution of employment is expected, with a slight percentage decline in agriculture and an alternative percentage increase in the manufacturing industry, an accompanying rise in output

TABLE 4.CGrowth Rates in Sectoral Output and Employment, 1975-80

<u>Sector</u>	<u>Growth Rates (%)</u>	
	<u>GDP</u>	<u>Employment</u>
Agriculture	3.97	1.62
Mining and Quarrying	5.37	3.41
Manufacturing and Processing	5.37	5.17
Building and Construction	21.28	15.32
Electricity, Gas and Water	21.06	0.0
Distribution	11.27	1.98
Transport and Communication	17.43	2.25
Services	24.56	3.70

Source: A.O. Olaloye, "Planning Nigeria's Manpower Requirements," Nigerian Journal of Public Affairs, 6 (2), October 1976, p. 28.

has also been expected in both sectors. While there have been suggestions that the relationship between the projected compound growth rates of sectoral employment and sector output is skewed,⁷ the implication of the Third Plan manpower forecasts is that national development involves a gradual transfer of agricultural manpower to the other non-farming sectors of the economy. Moreover, this shift in manpower deployment, as viewed in terms of estimated sectoral output, would seem to involve two conditions: firstly, as people move out of agriculture into other sectors of the economy, there must be an attendant growth of employment opportunities in the nonfarm sector so as to absorb those released from agriculture; and secondly, there must be a growth of productivity among the remaining farm workers so that total farm output rises. Unfortunately, the first of these conditions does not appear to be occurring, and the second (which we shall discuss in Chapter 5) is uncertain.

Let us for now examine the unemployment situation in Nigeria. Unemployment, while admittedly "an elusive concept in a country where the distinction between employment and unemployment is not always clear-cut",⁸ has nonetheless emerged as a serious national problem. Precise knowledge of the patterns and trends of manpower supply and demand is weak, of course, because information emanates mainly from urban labour exchanges. Nevertheless, numerous studies over the years have indicated a growing trend of rising urban

growth and accompanying urban unemployment and rural under-employment. As far back as 1963, a sample survey revealed that 15% of the population aged fourteen and over in Lagos and over 17% in the major urban centres of the Eastern and Mid-Western regions were unemployed and that a large proportion of these individuals were young school leavers.⁹ A year later, from a survey conducted in the former Eastern and Western Regions, Abernethy provided disturbing information on trends in urban wage unemployment. On the basis of his sample he estimated that of the 171,000 primary and post-primary school leavers entering the job market, 150,000 wanted to work in the modern sector of the economy. Yet as he observed:

The modern sector employment figure represents only 6-7 percent, and total wage employment, (including the intermediate sector), only 8-9 percent, of the total Southern Nigerian labour force, estimated at just under nine million... Given this small base, even spectacular percentage increases in employment opportunities would yield relatively few new jobs each year. Assuming, for example, a 6 percent growth rate in the modern sector and a three-to-one ratio of new output to new employment, only 12,000 new jobs would become available annually in Southern Nigeria. If the jobs made available through death, retirement, and disability are added (at 3 percent of the 1965 employment level), the figure rises at 30,000. On the same assumptions, one can estimate an annual rise of 37,500 in total wage employment.

At this point, the magnitude of Southern Nigeria's employment problem should become obvious. Even if the new modern sector jobs in 1965 had been reserved for 1965 school leavers alone, 150,000 young Southern Nigerians would

have been competing in that year for 30,000 jobs. In fact, school leavers from previous years were also competing for these positions -- to say nothing of a substantial portion of the 255,000 young people who entered the labour force in 1965 with one to five years of primary schooling to their credit.¹⁰

With an annual population growth rate estimated at 2.6%¹¹ throughout Nigeria, and with urban growth estimated at 12% or more per annum,¹² this trend towards a serious imbalance between the overall supply of manpower and the demand for it appears to be continuing, and seems most prevalent in the urban wage sector. In 1974, an official progress report observed:

Labour Exchange statistics seem to indicate that the number of registered job seekers continues to rise. This situation is consistent with the increasingly massive outflow of potential wage-earners from educational institutions. The improvement achieved and projected in the availability of school-places is far from being matched by an equal availability of wage-employment opportunities in the country at large. The overall employment situation cannot be said, therefore, to provide any particularly good grounds for satisfaction.¹³

Likewise, the Third Plan remarked on "the inability of economic growth to generate adequate employment opportunities for the masses".¹⁴ Commenting on the Third Plan's objectives, Professor Aluko asserted that the "economy [is] plagued by increasing unemployment...It is much more difficult to find jobs for the jobless today than it was in 1970, even without demobilization of soldiers, because the economy has been pumping out more job-seekers than it has been providing for."¹⁵

Certainly, it seems fair to assume that the officially estimated unemployment rates of 4.5% in 1975 and the projected 3.0% by 1980 have been grossly understated. Because "overt unemployment is essentially an urban phenomenon",¹⁶ official unemployment figures are related fundamentally to the nonagricultural labour force. As Schatz observes, "The rural counterparts -- underemployment and seasonal idleness -- are not counted as unemployment".¹⁷ This is because the availability of employment data from the rural areas is negligible. Thus, while one study has suggested that unemployment in the rural areas may be as low as one-half percent,¹⁸ we cannot really trust the accuracy of this figure on a national scale. What does seem likely, however, is that in many rural areas, there is a situation of seasonal underemployment, and at peak harvest periods a shortage of labour.¹⁹

However, in the urban areas, which constitute the base of modern sector industry, unemployment "is a major social and economic problem... According to the Central Bank, the number of unemployed persons registered with labour exchanges rose by 34.8% in 1973 over the 1972 level."²⁰ As there are many who do not register at labour exchanges, this figure is probably an underestimation of the aggregate rise in joblessness.

In an attempt to arrive at a more realistic appraisal of unemployment, Schatz has noted that since official unemployment figures relate to the nonagricultural labour force, only this group should be included in the unemployment rate. In this

case then, as indicated in Table 4.D, unemployment should be estimated at 11.7%. Yet even this figure may be too optimistic. Besides weaknesses in unemployment surveys themselves, the masses of small-scale traders, of part-time casual labour and other underemployed workers, and of those who are simply not seeking jobs but who might otherwise do so if jobs were available -- and these probably include many women -- all are not properly accounted for in official unemployment statistics.

These omissions unduly reduce the size of the unemployment-percentage numerator; at the same time, the denominator may be too large. Unemployment statistics refer essentially to those seeking wage employment. If these are compared to the wage labour force (those in or seeking wage employment), 1975 unemployment would amount to 37.5 percent (Table 4.D, Row 8). (This calculation leaves aside any adjustments for possible understatements of the numerator.)²¹

While admittedly the wage labour force constitutes a small percentage of total manpower in Nigeria, this unemployment figure is nonetheless highly significant when, as Abernethy and others have indicated (and as we shall explore later on), droves of school leavers appear to be heading for the towns in search of wage employment. In so doing, they form an increasing proportion of jobless manpower. A recent study in Western State, for example, showed that in 1969, 38% of primary and secondary school leavers were unemployed one year after graduation; in 1972 this figure had risen to 43%. In more accurate terms perhaps, as shown in Table 4.E, by omitting from the calculation all those who had continued school and

TABLE 4.D

Unemployment, 1975 and 1980

	<u>1975</u>		<u>1980 (projected)</u>	
	Number (millions)	Percent	Number (millions)	Percent
1. Labour Force	29.22		32.74	
2. Unemployment	1.31	4.5	0.98	3.0
3. Nonagricultural employment	9.85		12.55	
4. Nonagricultural labour force (2+3)	11.16		13.53	
5. Unemployment as percent of nonagricultural labour force (2÷4)		11.7		7.2
6. Wage employment	2.18		2.76	
7. Wage labour force	3.49		3.74	
8. Unemployment as percent of wage labour force (2÷7)		37.5		26.2

Source: Third Plan, p. 372, and Sayre P. Schatz, Nigerian Capitalism, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1977, p. 34.

TABLE 4.E

Activity of Primary and Secondary School
Leavers, Western State, 1969 and 1972

Activity	Percentages	
	1969	1972
1. Continued in school	39	45
2. Employed one year after graduating	23	12
3. Unemployed one year after graduating	38	43
4. Unemployed one year after graduating	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>
as a percentage of those in the		
labour force ($3 \div [2+3]$)	62	78

Source: Calculated from Third Plan, p. 380, by Schatz,
p. 35.

by assessing only those who presumably entered the labour market, we see that the unemployment rate is 62% in 1969 and 78% in 1972.²²

In another study, Falae reckoned unemployment in urban areas throughout Nigeria to be 8%, and that an additional 20% of the urban work force was underemployed. Moreover, significant for our purposes, according to Falae, approximately 70%-80% of total unemployment may be accounted for by school leavers.²³

And according to Anosike, while the combined annual output of school leavers was over 600,000 in 1973, and while most of them presumably began searching for urban wage employment, "the economy's rate of growth was only able to provide employment for about 40,000 persons per year within the modern sector".²⁴

Clearly, therefore, while data on unemployment and underemployment may not be sufficient to make accurate claims for the economy as a whole, it nonetheless would appear that there is sufficient evidence to suggest a trend which runs counter to the planned sectoral deployment of manpower as outlined in the Third Plan. Instead, there appears to be a disturbing imbalance: growing urbanization and increasing numbers of school leavers on the one hand, and a decline in the percentage of urban job opportunities for those seeking them. Apparently, then, increased input into the educational system is not being matched by increased labour opportunities, or at least by a balanced sectoral distribution of labour. Consequently, the country appears to be faced with the prospect

of having "hundreds of thousands of young people mobilized, at great public expense, to engage in little more than parasitic inactivity".²⁵

The question to which we must now turn is whether or not the imbalance between the supply and demand of formally educated manpower is due to faults which lie with the education system. If so, then by implication the problem of unemployment may perhaps be ameliorated to some extent by specific educational policy measures. If not, i.e. if the determinants of the labour market disequilibrium lie beyond the scope of education, then the policy assumption of education as a key to the satisfaction of "overall community needs" and to the effective utilization of the country's human resources would seem unfounded. In either case, however, the present rate of unemployment, especially among school leavers, suggests phenomenal wastage which surely detracts from the federal government's heavy investment in formal education. Indeed, the spectre of rising unemployment would seem to lay open to serious question the ever-rising public expenditure on an education system which does not appear to be able to alleviate such wastage.

4.3 Unemployment and Modern Sector Industrialization

As the discrepancy between the supply and demand of labour in the modern industrial sector appears to be an increasingly urgent concern for all levels of government, we

shall in this section examine the nature of the modern sector and attempt to ascertain the factors which create the apparent labour supply and demand imbalance. In so doing, our purpose will be to assess the influence which education policy has on industrialization and the functioning of the formal labour market. Our focus of attention will centre primarily on the manufacturing and processing industry, for as we have seen, this industry has been forecast to expand at a substantial rate and over time to absorb the greatest percentage of increased manpower supply. Moreover, while information on the informal manufacturing sector is relatively sketchy, the modern industrial scene provides fairly precise time-series data and thus gives a reasonably clear picture of the relationship between employment and output, and the determinants of both.

Over the years, the modern manufacturing industry in Nigeria has experienced a rapid growth rate; throughout the 1960's it was second only to petroleum in growth. During that period, the industry recorded an average annual expansion rate of 11%. This continuing expansionary trend was anticipated in the 1975-80 Plan which projected a further annual growth rate of 18%. (Compared with the projected annual average of 6% growth for the economy as a whole during the same plan period, this demonstrates the significant importance attributed to the manufacturing industry in Nigeria's economy, and indirectly, to the modern sector as a whole.)²⁶ The most recent figures indicate that indeed manufacturing has continued to grow rapidly.

Recent figures for 1977, issued by the Central Bank, show that total manufacturing production is estimated to have increased by 58% since 1973.²⁷

In contrast to its rapid growth in output, however, the modern manufacturing sector still retains a relatively small industrial base. For example, while manufacturing accounted for 5.64% of GDP in 1962, by 1976/77 it registered only 7.1% of GDP.²⁸ Moreover, despite the growth rate of the industry as well as its large potential market, "many establishments are working below capacity, and costs in many lines are not competitive with landed costs of imports".²⁹ Thus, while the production of import substitution goods for domestic consumption forms the largest part of the sector's output, the bulk of the country's imports continue to consist of manufactured consumer commodities.³⁰ As stated in the Third Plan, "While part of the difference between the actual and expected share in the GDP can be explained by the unusual importance of the oil sector, Nigeria's manufacturing sector, nevertheless, is underdeveloped relative to the size and the general level of development of the whole economy".³¹

The employment potential of the modern manufacturing sector remains equally underdeveloped and does not match its growth in output. During the period 1963-72, employment in this sector increased by only 10.95%, an annual increase of just over 1%.³² In effect, this was less than 5% of total gainful employment. In summarizing the job situation of the

modern sector, Iyoha might well be citing the Nigerian situation specifically when he writes, "The most critical problem facing LDCs is chronic unemployment in the industrial sectors (in addition to perennial underemployment in their agricultural sector). What evidence there is shows that even where industrial growth has occurred, employment has tended to stagnate."³³

Clearly, therefore, the Keynesian hypothesis that an increase in output should have a significant positive effect on employment has not been realized. On the contrary, the observed phenomenon has been that modern sector employment is growing at a much slower rate than output -- what is sometimes called "low elasticity of industrial employment with respect to output".³⁴ In this instance, it would seem that there are factors in the economy which have affected output and employment in diametrically opposed ways. As Olaloye observes:

Certain forces operate in an economic system that tend to have adverse effects on the amount of labour employed. The forces identified are inappropriate technology, the scale of output, the relative factor prices and returns to scale in production. The net effect of these forces is that when output increases employment increases at a less than proportionate rate.³⁵

A major consideration in viewing the employment potential of the modern manufacturing sector of the economy in Nigeria (which, as we have mentioned, is expected to absorb an increasing percentage of the nation's work force) is not only that its industrial base, while growing, is still relatively small, but that frequently it is characterized by close ties

with foreign entrepreneurship and by a high capital technology bias. In their openly avowed pursuit of rapid modern industrialization, aimed not only at self-sufficiency in goods, but towards profit maximization, Nigerian entrepreneurs and policy-makers alike have striven to encourage foreign investment and the development of large-scale industries which tend towards high capital-labour ratios and thus offer limited possibilities for employment.³⁶ Indeed, while the Third Plan stipulated that there were to be restrictions on the use of foreign personnel, dependence on foreign investment was to be increased, particularly in large government-sponsored industrial ventures.³⁷ Unfortunately, certain structural weaknesses in Nigeria's import-export economy, while allowing for individual profit-maximization, have thwarted industrial self-sufficiency.

With burgeoning oil revenues, a commercial boom has developed resulting in easy access to durable consumer goods, as well as to intermediate and light capital goods. Ample foreign exchange has thus enabled Nigeria to become a lucrative market for international competition. Frequently, the importation of manufactured goods has proven more profitable than the development of local manufacturing. This is reflected in the behaviour of the dominant business class in Nigeria. Rather than being composed of capitalists "who organize labour, capital, raw materials, and energy to produce a product for the market",³⁸ the business elite in Nigeria tends toward the

quicker, more assured returns of international trade. Numerous studies³⁹ have demonstrated that indigenous businessmen, given the choice, are far more eager to act as middlemen between foreign-owned companies on the one hand and the state or other final consumers on the other, rather than to take risks by investing in private industry. This is simply because relations with well established multinational companies virtually ensure lucrative gains for those in the indigenous private sector. As Turner writes, "Productive entrepreneurship is discouraged by the pre-emptive concentration of foreign firms and the availability of more profitable alternatives... [there is] little incentive to produce when middlemanship requires little capital, complements and facilitates but does not compete with foreign capital, and most important offers easy profits".⁴⁰ Even the 1975-80 Plan notes that "in a country growing as rapidly as Nigeria, trading activities normally represent the quickest means of increasing income whereas manufacturing projects usually have a long gestation period".⁴¹

As long as such profitable foreign alternatives exist, the development of local modern industry is hampered and the dependency on foreign capital and foreign imports appears likely to continue. This means that the import bill for both consumer and capital goods remains high and that "the narrow industrial base has not been diversified much beyond light consumer goods, assembly and processing".⁴³ One Nigerian newspaper in fact recently lamented, "...the crucial question

is how much industrialization and how much manufacturing is actually taking place in the country? Are we taking the cranes and caterpillars, and the bulldozers or the ever-increasing number of foreign cars blocking our roads as industrialization?"⁴⁴

The role of the State in the economic dependence on foreign investment and ownership is important here. Because oil revenue is centralized and accounts for approximately 80% of current federal government revenue, the state itself has become a major source of finance and commercial opportunities. In 1976/77, combined federal and state government expenditure accounted for roughly 61% of GDP;⁴⁵ government activity is, in fact, "the most important source of economic growth"⁴⁶ and the state forms a major section of the Nigerian market. This has resulted in what Turner has described as a triangular relationship between foreign and local businessmen and state officials. If there is competition at all, it tends to centre on access to government officials responsible for the rewarding of contracts.⁴⁷ Because of the free flow of revenue and the ambitious scale of the Third Plan objectives, there is "strong pressure on government agencies to maximize plan-fulfillment ratios".⁴⁸ Consequently, ease of expenditure combined with this so-called triangular relationship has meant that "whatever the Third Plan share of public investment turns out to be, a significant portion will be carried out in association with foreign investors in joint undertakings run as private

firms".⁴⁹

Moreover, since the state is the single largest consumer in the country, it is difficult for government to regulate competition. "There is no social demand for state regulations, and there are no means of enforcing rules to govern profit-making. In this situation, the state remains an arena for unruly capital accumulation."⁵⁰ Besides, the interchangeability between public officialdom and private entrepreneurship in commercial activity limits further the possibilities of state regulation. As Forrest suggests:

To reduce imports is to reduce the business of the [bourgeois] class. In practice, as oil revenues have allowed for the expansion of expenditure, the class of commercial middlemen has itself grown. The nexus between state official, local middleman, and foreign salesman is intimate and reciprocal and characterized by the interchange of roles among the indigenous personnel of business and state officials. There is reason to expect that these three sets of actors will try to preserve the relations which allow for profitable transactions.⁵¹

The encouragement of foreign investment in Nigeria not only decreases the potential for local investment, but also acts as a drain on high-level manpower. One argument that is often voiced by proponents of higher educational expansion is that Nigeria still lacks the necessary numbers of skilled and qualified indigenous personnel for economic development. The weakness of the modern sector in Nigeria's economy, it is often suggested, is due to the "lack of appropriate technical skills and managerial know-how".⁵² Yet when viewing the potential for rapid financial gain in the world of trade and commerce

as opposed to the world of risk-taking investment and production, it is not surprising that many with high levels of education and opportunities to take part in the modern industrial sector should choose to align themselves with multinational corporations. While more will be said later on this aspect of manpower deployment, which touches upon the aspirations of students themselves, suffice is to note that,

Much has been said about the shortage of managerial and technical manpower...It is difficult to entangle myth from reality here.⁵³ Foreign companies have little difficulty in securing the services of qualified Nigerians...

A corollary of the fact that commerce offers more attractive openings for profit than does investment in production is that individuals with skills, experience, and the drive to accumulate money are naturally drawn into an intermediary role. They are encouraged to take this route by the growing number of foreign firms that seek to penetrate the Nigerian market or secure a larger share of that market. Those nationals most likely to respond to overtures from foreign firms are those with education and international experience. They are the Nigerians most suited to undertake the organization of capital production.⁵⁴

Because of close state involvement in large-scale private commercial endeavours, and because of the government's desire to promote modern industry in Nigeria, the facility with which modern sector businesses have been able to build up capital assets has been due in some measure to government incentives which have cheapened the factor costs of capital in relation to labour. This, of course, has resulted in a lowering of the labour-absorptive capacity of modern industries. As Charles Frank suggested more than a decade ago, as

long as policies aimed at bolstering modern high technology industries are pursued, the modern sector of Nigeria cannot "be expected to fully absorb the current growth of the urban labour force...an attempt to reduce unemployment by stimulating the growth of [output] is not likely to meet with much success".⁵⁵

While government planning and policy-making cannot be viewed as entirely responsible for the overall allocation of the factors of production in Nigeria, it is nonetheless true that the use of resources in the modern private sector has consistently been influenced by fiscal policies which have altered capital-labour price ratios. Adhering to the traditional view that rapid modern industrialization is a key (along with educational expansion) to solving the problems of underdevelopment, successive Nigerian governments have attempted "every liberal and neo-liberal economic strategy...to hasten industrialization"⁵⁶ and encourage foreign capital investments in the country's manufacturing industries.

Numerous tax concessions have been granted to foreign firms: income tax relief for pioneer industries and small private companies, allowances for accelerated capital depreciation, relief on import duties for industrial raw materials. Likewise, protective tariffs have operated to encourage foreign investors to establish domestic plants in Nigeria. Duty on dumped and subsidized imports is regularly charged, and drawback regulations have allowed for the repayment of import duties

whenever a domestic firm exports goods in the same condition as those it imports, or when its imported materials are used for the production of export goods. Subsidies such as authorization to purchase Market Board export crops at prices less than world market value have induced some foreign firms to establish domestic processing operations.⁵⁷ Other measures for inducing foreign industrial investment have included government offers of property for plant sites, liaison arrangements with essential service agencies (electricity, water, etc.), the provision of loan capital at low interest, and numerous technical and feasibility studies at government expense.⁵⁸ As Schatz writes, "The combination of all these investment incentives was extremely important in promoting otherwise reluctant foreign investment...These incentives affected mainly investment by foreign-owned firms. They greatly magnified the significance and impact of the foreign investors' economic-environment and entrepreneurial advantages."⁵⁹

Recently, however, the federal government has attempted to curtail foreign control of Nigerian industry. The major thrust in this attempt came in February 1972 with the promulgation of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree (the Indigenization Decree). The major requirement of the decree was that those industries with capital over and above ₦ 400,000 or an annual turn-over of ₦ 1 million should submit to a minimum of 40% indigenous control, which in some cases has since

been extended to 60% local control. In effect, however, this has done little to foster indigenous investment in smaller labour-intensive industrial enterprises; instead it has meant that public loans have been utilized to transfer control of a certain percentage of foreign enterprises to a relatively small number of Nigerian businessmen. The pattern of industrialization itself appears to have changed little. The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree has, therefore,

had the simultaneous effect of enlarging the capital base of foreign controlled enterprises and making the capitalist mode acceptable to groups whose consumption -- and now income -- depend directly on it. It marked a large step in the accumulation and concentration of wealth by the bourgeoisie...

On the whole, the decree has accommodated the interests of foreign capital. It will strengthen the transnational component of the bourgeoisie, though effective control will not pass to this managerial group.⁶⁰

Others, in more disparaging terms, have described the decree as a "fraudulent indigenization programme",⁶¹ as a vehicle directed "against the objective of encouraging private indigenous investment",⁶² and as a convenient "device whereby the Nigerian rich [have] protected foreign economic domination".⁶³

The important point for us to observe about these types of policies is that while they may have helped to stimulate large amounts of foreign investment in a potentially lucrative sector of the Nigerian economy, they have made little contribution towards the absorption of underutilized manpower --

manpower which more and more is emerging with a background of some sort of formal educational training which, as we have seen, not only tends to be oriented to urban "modernity" but also, according to the aims of education policy, is meant to enhance marginal productivity and contribute to social well-being. As Olaloku writes, it would seem

that tax incentives for industrial development...have not only been very costly in terms of revenue lost to various governments, but also that they have led to a considerable distortion in resource allocation because of inherent bias to favour capital intensive operations...[R]esource misallocation in favour of capital intensive production...is a result of the non-selectivity of their application in relation to their contribution to the economy. For instance, tax incentive laws...do not specify targets with particular objectives like the creation of employment in mind. In other words, these tax incentives are not directly and specifically linked to employment creation...It is precisely this weakness which makes them inappropriate for use as weapons of industrial policy in a situation of labour surplus.⁶⁴

Despite the indications of growing unemployment, the tendency of entrepreneurs to invest in the cheapest factors of production -- namely high technology for large-scale industry -- is likely to continue; after all, individual investment decisions, based on a motive of private profit, do not necessarily bring about maximum benefit to society: this is the well recognized contradiction of capitalism. The very fact that Nigeria's economy is dominated by a comprador bourgeoisie which encourages foreign investment invariably strengthens the tendency towards capital intensiveness. For a variety of reasons,

as Helleiner points out, multi-national corporations favour capital intensive technology:

Multinationals tend to have access to relatively inexpensive capital. The standardization and quality control of goods characteristic of MNCs "imply relatively capital-intensive and inflexible techniques of production for these particular products", especially in the manufacturing sector.

MNCs generally prefer to produce on a large scale and "it is that scale which determines the efficient factor intensity, i.e. scale economies dominate factor price considerations, with the result that the technology chosen is capital-intensive".

Capital-intensive techniques sometimes allow for greater insurance against unexpected fluctuations in demand.

Labour relations can be turbulent, and hence labour-intensive as opposed to capital-intensive industry runs a greater risk of the disruption of output.

If protected, as they are in Nigeria, MNCs have little incentive to change from capital intensive to labour-intensive techniques anyway.

Governments and private businesses frequently prefer the latest in developed technology as a status of "modernity", even if such technology seems inappropriate.⁶⁵

For our purposes, the fundamental observation to be derived from the above factors is that the modern urban sector of Nigeria's economy operates more or less independently of

any influence which the government's educational policies might conceivably generate. Neither the organization of the school system, nor the types of skills taught in the schools, nor the vast numbers of the future labour force who are presently attending school have any direct bearing on the country's large-scale industrial development programme. This, of course, has serious implications for Nigeria's education policy, for as long as modern industry is able to sustain a high capital-labour ratio for the sake of low factor costs and high production output, the educational system can have little influence on the workings of the formal labour market. Therefore, while the current pattern of industrialization is maintained, the federal government's policy of increased investment in formal education may have the effect of aggravating rather than resolving the problem of under-utilized manpower in the modern sector.

4.4 Unemployment and the Modern Sector Wage Structure

While government fiscal policies may be partly responsible for helping to create a relatively high capital-labour ratio in much of Nigeria's developing industrial base, a further element in maintaining disequilibrium in the labour market appears to be the wage structure of the modern sector. As we have already noted, of course, wage and salary statistics in Nigeria are available from a few sectors of the economy only and even these are not reliable or consistent when analyzed over

a lengthy time scale. As the Federal Ministry of Information has stated, "Statistics of income and wealth distribution are difficult to come by in Nigeria...Apart from figures of wages and salaries in the public sector and organized section of the private sector...there are no systematic figures."⁶⁶ Nevertheless, as we suggested in Chapters 2 and 3, there is sufficient evidence to show that the price of labour in the formal sector often does not reflect prevailing market conditions.

This is the theme of a recent study by Fajana centring on modern sector skill-wage differentials in Nigeria. According to Fajana, wage theory is really a form of supply and demand analysis. Wages are in fact prices and therefore, theoretically, are subject to the fluctuations of supply and demand. Thus, "in the perfect market system of competitive theory, the co-existence of surplus unskilled labour with a shortage of skilled labour...would produce a large premium for skill".⁶⁷ In other words, the wages of skilled labour would be high in relation to the wages of the unskilled work force.⁶⁸

In Nigeria, however, as Fajana's study indicates, while the supply of unskilled labour has risen much more dramatically than that of skilled labour, skill-wage differentials in the modern sector have generally become increasingly compressed, thus suggesting an artificially high price for unskilled labour. As Tables 4.F and 4.G show, since the mid-1950's the wages of unskilled modern sector labour have gradually risen in

proportion to those of skilled labour. Obviously then, the forces of supply and demand have had little to do with wage fixing. As Fajana argues, "The decline of the [skill-wage] differentials under conditions of growing surplus of unskilled and persistent relative shortage of skilled labour constitutes evidence of the malfunctioning of the price mechanism in the [modern sector] labour market".⁶⁹

This conclusion was reinforced by a related analysis of intra-industry wage differentials. Allowing for the "skill-mix factor" within industries, Fajana observed that there is a high correlation between the size of industrial establishments and the wages they pay; that is, workers in large high technology industries which enjoy high productivity and technical and pecuniary economies of scale generally earn higher wages than their counterparts in smaller industries. While time-series data were not available to ascertain whether this pattern is subject to long-term variation, "rough evidence suggests that the differential widens over time".⁷⁰ Again, therefore, the price of labour does not appear to reflect true market conditions.

In the absence of other considerations, the large firms would take advantage of competitive market conditions and pay the same level of wages as the smaller firms. That wages between small- and large-scale establishments have not been equalized in Nigeria is due to the influence of non-market forces which provide the vital link between productivity and wage differentials by size of establishments.⁷¹

TABLE 4.F

Inter-Skill Wage Differentials in Selected Sectors of
the Nigerian Economy, 1953-70

Year	Federal Govt. General Laborer as % of Artisan (Lagos)	Coal Mining Underground Laborer as % of Hower (Enugu)	Electricity Laborer as % of Electric Fitter (Lagos)	Construction Laborer as % of Bricklayer (Lagos)	Transport & Communica- tions Railway Porter as % of Mechanic (Lagos)
1953	57	57	32	35	41
1960	67	82	69	53	69
1965	77	90	77	77	77
1970	77	n.a.	65	75	72

Source: Fajana, p. 151.

TABLE 4.G

Skill Wage Differentials in the Nigerian
Industrial Sector, 1956-67

	Average Earnings (N)		Unskilled as % of Skilled
	Skilled Labor*	Unskilled Labor	
1956 (Sept.)	22.2	9.4	42
1958 (Sept.)	26.0	11.6	45
1960 (Sept.)	28.2	14.8	52
1963	322	154	49
1964	350	198	57
1965	360	202	56
1966	364	220	60
1967	410	270	66

*Artisan, 1956-60; skilled/semiskilled labour, 1963-67.

Source: Fajana, p. 152.

This imperfection in the wage structure of the modern sector has been due largely to the influence of two factors: a) government policies, and b) trade union action, both of which have tended to set the price of labour at a level higher than the demands the competitive labour market might otherwise dictate. Government legislation and trade union action are, of course, not quantifiable and, therefore, their impact on wage differentials "is not easily amenable to statistical analysis".⁷² A historical examination does show, however, that widespread modern sector wage increases generally arise from periodical wages and salaries reports submitted by quasi-judicial review committees. The latest such commission was the now famous Udoji Public Service Review Commission which issued its recommendations in 1975. Set up to restore a drop in the real income of some 750,000 civil service employees, the Commission focussed mainly on the status of low unskilled wage earners who suffer most from rising costs of living. Thus, regardless of the increasingly inordinate supply of unskilled, unemployed labour, those on the lowest rung of the government pay scale were awarded increases of 122% (from ₦ 27 to ₦ 60 a month) while most of the others received increases of 30% - 40%. (A small number of people earning top salaries were awarded increases of up to 100%.)⁷³ The steep wage increases for unskilled labour recommended by the Udoji Commission, and implemented by the government, meant that the wage premium for skill in the public sector fell. This, in

fact, was consistent with trends in the past following previous major wage and salary reviews.⁷⁴

Likewise, similar to past experience, the wage and salary hikes awarded in the public sector quickly filtered into the organized private sector as well. Partly this may be due to the fact that as government contracts and assistance programmes in the private sector have increased over the years, wages in the private sector have often been judged according to government wage rates. Since many private employers in the formal sector are foreigners or connected to foreign enterprises, it would obviously be impolitic to maintain wage rates below those paid out by the national government. At the same time, however, trade unions have exerted pressure on most large-scale private employers, forcing them to adopt wage rates similar to those of the government. Evidence of such pressure can be seen in the increased disruption of work caused by industrial disputes in 1975, the year the Udoji Commission submitted its recommendations, as opposed to both the preceding and succeeding years (see Table 4.H). In short, as Fajana writes, "Owing largely to the militancy of the unions and the desire of large-scale establishments to enhance their public image and protect their interests, such establishments have had to gear their employee wages to 'ability to pay' rather than to prevailing market conditions".⁷⁵ Likewise, "the sharp compression in skill differentials in periods of wage reviews is the byproduct of the interaction of institutional forces--

TABLE 4.H

Industrial Disputes 1974-76

	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>
Trade Disputes	338	775	422
Work Stoppage	129	346	213
Workers Involved	62,565	107,489	76,297
Man-Days Lost	144,881	435,493	213,186

Source: Central Bank of Nigeria Annual Report, cited by
Quarterly Economic Review of Nigeria: Annual
Supplement 1978, p. 15.

trade union and government actions -- which have had the effect of unmooring unskilled [modern sector] wage rates from the labour market."⁷⁶ In fact the imperfections of the labour market in Nigeria are such that the country has one of the narrowest wage-skill differentials in the modern sector in Africa.⁷⁷

The main point of all this, of course, is that by disregarding prevailing market forces and by maintaining artificially high wage rates, action by both government and trade unions has created a paradoxical situation. On the one hand, high wage rates foster a powerful incentive among young school leavers to search for jobs in what is undoubtedly the most attractive area in which to work; yet, on the other hand, they act as a disincentive for companies to extend investment in labour over capital.

It is certainly not surprising that the urge to find jobs in the modern sector "bridge-head"⁷⁸ is intense among those who consider themselves qualified for such employment. Compared to a per capita income of ₦ 284, the minimum wage in government employment is approximately ₦ 720 a year, two and a half times as large.⁷⁹ Similarly, Aluko has shown that wage employees in large-scale industry, while generally putting in less hours of work per week than small-scale industrial entrepreneurs and their employees (40-44 hours as compared to 55-60 hours), nevertheless tend to earn much more.⁸⁰ Combined with its attractive salaries, modern sector employment

frequently offers security in the form of union rights, medical care, pension rights, housing assistance, and until this year, car allowances. Such benefits contrast sharply with the hardship and insecurity of Nigeria's informal industrial and agricultural sectors as we shall see. This sharp duality can hardly be lost on the mass of the population. As Tuquan suggests, "Even in the most backward areas almost everyone has grasped the fact that the government employee...need not dirty his hands, earns much more and works much less than anyone who works on the land or in the [informal sector] blue-collar jobs".⁸¹ Consequently, the desire to escape the hard labour, low status, and poverty so often characteristic of informal traditional sectors, and instead utilize school-acquired skills in a secure, well-paying modern sector job is a thoroughly rational ambition. As Dore writes, "Who would not want a visa into the bridge-head zone, when the alternative is so starkly different?".⁸²

Yet the very attractiveness of the modern sector labour market, in contrast to alternative forms of employment, acts to hinder the extension of jobs in large private industry and instead helps to spur capital investment rather than investment in labour. Government wage policies and labour laws, while ostensibly aiming to improve the lot of those employed in large industrial enterprises, have not only fostered "the growing [unequal] pattern of income and wealth distribution between the high and the low, between the urban and the rural

areas, between the employed and the unemployed,"⁸³ but also have offered incentive for increased private investment in fixed capital rather than in human capital, and have, therefore, helped to diminish opportunities for employment.⁸⁴ As Olaloye argues, "assuming that the technology transferred is of the embodied type...employment in the Nigerian manufacturing sector is determined partly by the level of wages and salaries paid, and partly by the level of capital equipment installed".⁸⁵

More recently, however, the federal government has imposed a wage freeze on organized labour throughout the country in an attempt to combat inflation and encourage greater equilibrium in the labour market. As a short-term effort to cut inflation the freeze on wages may have some positive effect. Yet, unfortunately, this is no guarantee that the nature and employment potential of modern industry will be altered.⁸⁶ As we have discussed, numerous factors other than the price of labour favour the capital intensiveness of large-scale private enterprise. At the same time, a real decline in wages may have little effect in moderating the flow of school leavers migrating to the cities and aspiring to modern sector employment. As Christopher Allen argues:

...wage restraint, in so far as it implies declining real per capita income, simply leads to the overall impoverishment of both urban and rural poor, and may not affect migration rates at all...Lower real wages will not necessarily lead to increased private sector employment, though they will allow more

jobs to be created in the public sector; but this will simply encourage further migration [hence a probable increase in urban unemployment], as well as enhancing maldistribution of income by increasing profits.⁸⁷

Furthermore, with official inflation rates estimated at approximately 15% (although "the true rate is undoubtedly much higher"),⁸⁸ and with the re-introduction of civilian political rule, it is unlikely that a policy of wage restraint will be lasting. In effect, therefore, it is doubtful that the employment potential of the modern sector will have improved.

Viewed in these terms it is not surprising that modern sector workers in Nigeria probably constitute only about 7% of the entire labour force⁸⁹ and that the rate of employment growth in this sector remains low. Moreover, to reiterate the conclusion of the previous section, what seems crucial here is that the employment potential of the modern manufacturing sector does not appear to be determined to any extent by education -- not on a broad nation-wide scale.

It would seem, therefore, that the federal government's commitment to expand formal education on the one side and to induce urban industrialization and satisfactory working conditions on the other, in essence explains the disturbing imbalance between an abundant supply of young educated manpower and the limited modern sector demand for labour. By expanding and further subsidizing the provision of a modern formal education system at all levels, the government is pursuing its aim of providing its much-vaunted need for "qualified" indigenous

manpower. Yet, at the same time, by helping to foster profitable high-technology industries and a wage structure which functions independently of market forces, the country is also feeling the pinch of an ever-expanding glut of unused labour. In effect, the government is providing with one hand and taking away with the other. Consequently, regardless of the educational aim of developing and utilizing human resources so as to satisfy "overall community needs", the demand for labour in the modern sector is not meeting the supply -- hence urban unemployment and school leaver frustration continue unabated.

4.5 Education, Employment, and Underdevelopment in the Intermediate Industrial Sector

As the capital-intensiveness of large-scale industries undercuts employment growth in the modern sector of the economy, an obvious question arises as to other non-agricultural alternatives open to the unemployed urban work force. One alternative may, in fact, be unemployment itself, or at best seasonal employment. After all, as Abernethy observes, "large-scale unemployment is perhaps not so serious a threat to social peace in an underdeveloped area as in a developed one. Because Nigerian living standards are low, the income gap between the unemployed and the rest of the population is not likely to be substantial".⁹⁰ Moreover, the existence of the extended family often cushions the need for a social

security system and the pressure to provide unemployment compensation.

In the long run, however, a more likely alternative appears to lie in the apprenticeship system of the small-scale intermediate industrial sector. Again, as Abernethy has observed, school leavers usually demonstrate an ability "to adjust to the actual employment situation" and to distinguish between jobs which they would prefer, and jobs which they would expect.

Faced with long-term unemployment as a realistic possibility, many who may previously have disdained the traditional apprenticeship system come to regard apprenticeship to a master more favourably, if they can afford to pay the initial fees...The employment potential of the apprenticeship system is probably quite high, since the system is geared to meet the needs of the people, is far more labour-intensive than modern industry, and is more closely tied to African than to European rates of remuneration. As job aspirations decline, more and more school leavers may be expected to turn to this sector for employment.⁹¹

Evidence certainly ~~tends~~ to support Abernethy's claim. As noted in Chapter 3, studies by Aluko, Lewis, and others demonstrate that most apprentices in Southern Nigeria have previously attended primary school (see Tables 3.D, 3.E, and 3.F). (With UPE, a similar situation will doubtlessly develop in the northern states.) Moreover, indications are that as job openings in the modern wage sector remain constricted, more and more primary school leavers appear to be opting immediately for apprenticeship training in the intermediate sector rather than attempting a lengthy and oftentimes fruit-

less search for wage employment. For example, Mabawonku has observed that out of 247 apprentices interviewed in western Nigeria in 1976, "nearly 90% never even bothered to look for wage employment but proceeded straight from elementary school into apprenticeship training. Those who sought wage employment spent an average of fifteen months before they could get such jobs as that of domestic servant."⁹²

There is no doubt, of course, that small-scale industrial enterprises play a significant role in the socio-economic fabric of Nigeria. In the early 1960's Callaway estimated that in the area of Ibadan alone more than 5,000 small-scale informal enterprises provided employment for 14,500 people -- as much as seven times the number of jobs in the formal sector.⁹³ Similarly, Kilby estimated in 1961 that in 14 towns in eastern Nigeria there were 10,728 small businesses employing 28,721 workers.⁹⁴ More recently, Koll numbered 14,270 craftsmen and women, and another 24,000 apprentices in Ibadan township, while Aluko et al. have suggested that a minimum of 35,000 small-scale industries were operating in Western State alone in 1972.⁹⁵ Obviously, a great value of small-scale enterprises in the informal intermediate sector is that not only do they enable the development of job skills and entrepreneurship by means of the apprenticeship system, but also they provide extensive employment because of their labour-intensive nature. Indeed, as Onokerhoraye has concluded, in terms of economic development the small-scale informal sector has a

dual role: a) a passive role, by absorbing labour unable to find modern sector employment; b) an active role, by utilizing labour-intensive techniques which produce goods and services complementary to those of the capital-intensive modern sector.⁹⁶ Similarly, Staley and Morse have argued that small-scale industrial enterprises can, dependent on factors such as location, processing, and market influences, operate to a competitive advantage with large capital-intensive establishments.⁹⁷

The policy implications of small-scale industrial development would thus seem fairly clear. As Onokerhoraye writes, "the protection and use of the informal sector to achieve development goals does not imply stagnation or the abandonment of technical progress. Indeed, it should be one of the aims of policy makers in these cities to bring a transitional sector into being that would evolve into a part of the modern sector as the Nigerian economy develops."⁹⁸ For our purposes then, in view of the significance of the intermediate sector in Nigeria, and its role in absorbing and training a sizeable proportion of the country's labour force, a question for us to consider is the condition of the intermediate sector and how its development is affected by national education policy.

Superficially, at least, it would appear that the expansion of formal education might well be a deliberate strategy not only to produce skilled manpower for modern sector

employment, but also to provide an incentive for the development of informal small-scale industry. Quite conceivably, the surplus of school leavers in towns and cities, combined with widening unemployment, may have the long-term effect of catalyzing rapid growth in local job-creating industry, and thus may help steer the country towards eventual industrial self-sufficiency. In addition, with more literate, modern-oriented individuals entering or establishing small-scale enterprises which may often have operated below potential maximum efficiency in the past, the gap between traditional and modern production might be minimized and the dual nature of the economy lessened.

Such a strategy appears sound enough and indeed is more or less incorporated in the objectives outlined in the 1975-80 Plan.⁹⁹ Unfortunately, however, while the potential for employment and increased production would seem to be there, very little has, in fact, been accomplished in narrowing what has been described as the "cliff-like" nature of the separation between the modern and the traditional sectors of the economy.¹⁰⁰ Instead, small-scale industry is often forced to remain just that -- small, often unable to broaden beyond simple family-operated businesses. Too often, the intermediate sector remains a "twilight zone, rather than a transitional zone linking traditional and modern production methods".¹⁰¹ Moreover, as we shall see, many of the factors which affect the functioning of the intermediate sector

in Nigeria lie beyond the range of educational policy.

The underdevelopment of small-scale industry in Nigeria -- and hence the limitations in its capacity to absorb even greater numbers of the labour force -- appears to be the result of two factors: a) the shortcomings of many Nigerian entrepreneurs themselves, and b) an often stifling economic environment. As Callaway writes, "Through the eyes of the Nigerian entrepreneur, there are two sets of impediments: internal ones, which relate to the organization of his firm; and external ones, which are implicit in the local environment".¹⁰²

It is true, of course, that thousands of Nigerians carry on successful small businesses. Numerous studies have shown that many Nigerian entrepreneurs are "possessed of considerable drive and vitality" and that they can sustain small-scale enterprises "despite serious deficiencies in production, delivery, services, and sales promotion".¹⁰³ Oftentimes it has been observed that many entrepreneurs are desirous of modernizing their businesses through the acquisition of new machinery and of expanding them either by broadening existent scales of output or branching out into other forms of production. Many small-scale industries have undergone changes in their techniques of production and have introduced new products in response to changes in the economy and changes in consumer tastes. As Lewis writes, "there is no lack of entrepreneurial ability in Nigeria. Nigerians are constantly

looking for profitable opportunities as long as such openings are within their capability -- in capital, managerial, and technical skill -- to exploit."¹⁰⁴

The problem is, however, that too often this capability is limited and that beyond a certain point most entrepreneurs/proprietors do not possess the managerial and technical skill necessary for their operational expansion. As Schatz writes:

The very small enterprise that proves successful, however, is soon likely to grow to a critical size at which a new and qualitatively different set of problems emerges. Such enterprises cannot continue to grow by slow degrees, incrementally, gradually becoming large... [The entrepreneur] soon reaches the brink of a necessary leap -- a technological, organizational, and marketing leap -- if he is to continue to expand his enterprise. It is the difficulty of this leap that accounts for the commonly observed scarceness of indigenous as opposed to foreign ownership of large-scale enterprises in Nigeria and in less-developed countries generally.¹⁰⁵

The entrepreneurial deficiencies among small-scale businessmen have been discussed at length by various authors.¹⁰⁶

Oftentimes, the technical ability of proprietors is not sufficient to maintain and repair machinery so that it operates at peak efficiency. Likewise, management and marketing shortcomings are frequently observed; a tendency to squander trade surplus in conspicuous consumption or in investments spread too thinly in too many ventures; a general inadequacy in book-keeping, with little appreciation of costs beyond direct labour and capital outlays, hardly any understanding of capital depreciation, of the minimum daily production needed to meet

recurrent costs, and, if at all, only a rudimentary ability to keep records of accounts; and frequently a failure to organize a chain of regular marketing outlets beyond the immediate area of production. In addition, many lack skills in dealing with modern firms as suppliers or customers, or with other modern institutions such as banks and government agencies. Oftentimes, too, large family responsibilities may result in business profits being deferred from re-investment in the business so as to assist family members. Finally, suggestions have been repeatedly asserted that all too often a cycle of suspicion and lack of trustworthiness characterizes small businessmen so that even if they are possessed with the potential entrepreneurial ability, they are unable to delegate authority, to establish joint ventures or partnerships, etc.

This appears to be a daunting list of inadequacies.

- Yet despite these various shortcomings, the continued existence of the informal sector as a "twilight-zone" cannot be attributed solely to the entrepreneurial deficiencies of indigenous small businessmen. After all, while these shortcomings generally exist, there is often a tendency to exaggerate them.¹⁰⁷ What is equally striking is the climate of the Nigerian economy which frequently acts as an adverse factor in the development of small industries. For example, numerous surveys have shown that a major difficulty facing many small-scale entrepreneurs is in trying to raise suf-

ficient financial backing to purchase fixed and operating capital.¹⁰⁸ Evidence often indicates that capital finance for informal small-scale enterprises rarely comes from loans, but instead is provided from the limited personal savings of individual entrepreneurs or their families. During the period 1972-73, for instance, a survey of 21,949 small industries showed that only 69 businesses (0.3% of the total) had received loans from banks, 72 firms (2.9%) had had assistance from proprietors' relatives or friends, while the remainder -- a whopping 21,124 (96.24%)! -- had been financed by the proprietors' own resources in either starting out or expanding.¹⁰⁹ Similar findings have arisen from the printing industry where 90 out of 110 businesses sampled secured capital investment from family and personal savings,¹¹⁰ and from the sawmilling industry where 40 out of 43 enterprises had expanded on the basis of reinvested profits.¹¹¹

Obviously, there is a continuing problem in securing bank loans and in receiving credit from financial institutions, and this is often cited as a major cause for the persistent underdevelopment of the informal sector. As Diaku writes:

Experience has shown...that financial institutions in Nigeria have done very little to aid the small-scale businessmen, who constitute a much larger proportion of Nigerian industrialists, in circumstances in which the institutions ought to constitute the main engine of economic transformation. On the contrary, evidence abounds that the beneficiaries of Nigerian financial institutions are foreign large-scale industrialists on whose countries' models Nigerian financial institutions are patterned.¹¹²

Assistance from financial institutions, of course, can generally provide more adequate long-term financing than can the reinvestment of savings. Consequently, recent efforts have been made by the federal government to facilitate banking credit and long-term lending for small industrial ventures.¹¹³

Nevertheless, on the whole, established financial institutions remain attuned to the financing of large-scale monetary needs in the capital-intensive industrial sector rather than those of the informal sector where too often small businessmen have poor methods of accounting, no financial records, and frequently very little collateral other than their own entrepreneurial expertise.¹¹⁴ Again therefore, while prevailing conditions of the economy may seem unfavourable to many small businessmen, as often as not their entrepreneurial and managerial deficiencies may accentuate their environmental difficulties. As Aluko observes:

Almost 98 percent of the industrialists who responded to the questionnaire [1971 University of Ife survey, referred to in Chapter 3] mentioned financial inadequacy as their main problem. But it is obvious that financial support to these rural industries can never be the sole solution to their problems. In a rapidly changing economy, the small businessman is as much in need of business information and advice as he is of financial support. Unless the enterprise is economically sound, it cannot obtain financial support, just as unless it is guaranteed continued financial support for its worthwhile project, it cannot remain economically sound. But the acid test for determining whether an enterprise should be assisted financially should be whether the managerial ability, potential or actual, is sufficient or not to ensure future profitability of the industry.¹¹⁵ (My underlining).

Beyond the question of initial capital financing, however, there are other environmental obstacles which hinder efficiency and level of productivity in Nigeria's small business sector. In a discussion devoted to the Nigerian economic environment and to the array of obstacles facing Nigerian entrepreneurs who operate small industries Schatz considers the criteria of these obstacles.¹¹⁶ For example, many local industries are dependent on foreign capital inputs. In acquiring capital goods and supplies, there are often difficulties in communication and in obtaining the most appropriate equipment; there may be prolonged delays before the arrival of basic machinery, as well as ancillary equipment or other necessary appurtenances; even without tariff walls, the prices for foreign capital goods may be inordinately high; there may be difficulties in installing machinery or in obtaining supplies and replacement parts for maintenance. Such dependence on foreign capital not only hinders efficiency, but diminishes the possibilities of greater local industrial interdependence, and thus decreases the likelihood of industrial self-sufficiency and informal sector expansion. Generally, therefore, machinery and tools are inadequate or old, or just scarce.

Other environmental factors include inadequacies in human resources assistance. Until recently, there has been a dearth of consultancy services which offer technical, managerial, or accountancy assistance. The availability of

skilled service or repair personnel is often rare. There are governmental problems: unnecessary red tape and unsympathetic junior bureaucrats, concessions which tend to favour foreign investors often at the expense of indigenous entrepreneurs, and in many cases, a lack of solid government apparatus which can implement and enforce regulations governing the economy without low-level ineptitude, corruption, and favouritism.

There are difficulties related to the social milieu of business as well. Many indigenous businessmen who are "less sophisticated, less affluent, and less influential"¹¹⁷ are unable to establish a familiar rapport with either foreign or more affluent educated Nigerian businessmen -- consequently, they tend to lack the expertise, information, and access to deals which often result from close relationships. Much of this may be due to language restraints since many Nigerian entrepreneurs (northerners in particular) have not mastered English; likewise, there are frequently socio-cultural barriers among Nigerians whose ethnic backgrounds are different. Then, too, there is the continuing tendency among government officials, foreign firms, and even consumers to favour foreign rather than indigenously produced goods, even though quite often there may be no basis for such discrimination.

Likewise, there is what Schatz describes as the alien economic milieu. For instance, expansion of small-scale

industry may indeed result in greater potential for employment -- yet attendant on such expansion are inevitable labour and social welfare measures which entail higher labour costs and greater managerial expertise; such measures quite conceivably act as disincentives to small-scale industrial development. Moreover, in the competitive atmosphere of the Nigerian economy, small firms generally must compete with the larger foreign-owned firms and often the latter have greater competitive clout which preempts or renders more speculative what might be a profitable small-scale project. ¹¹⁸

Finally, there is a multitude of infrastructural problems which tend to hamper the operation of small industries. While road transport has improved considerably during the past decade, railways have suffered breakdowns, the telephone system is oftentimes inoperative, and the port facilities have been notorious for the seemingly endless backlog of freight. Public utilities, such as water and electricity may frequently be either non-existent or simply too expensive for small businesses to afford, and where they are in existence such utilities are sometimes unreliable.

In summary then, while remaining a significant area for production and employment in the Nigerian economy, the informal intermediate sector continues to withstand a multitude of astrictions which retard its growth and efficiency. Moreover, despite the official view that education is a key

to national development and to the satisfactory utilization of human resources, it would seem that so far increasing investment in formal education, especially at the post-primary level, has had little direct impact in ameliorating the state of small-scale industry in Nigeria. Whether or not this means that no policy of education can affect the development of the intermediate sector is a matter which we must examine in the next section.

4.6 Education and the Potential for Intermediate Industrial Development: A Need for an Alternative Strategy

Obviously, many of the factors which have fomented the perpetual underdevelopment of the informal labour-intensive industrial sector of the Nigerian economy lie beyond the scope of the country's educational system. Nevertheless, in reviewing the perceived shortcomings among the small-scale entrepreneurial class, we can detect failings which quite possibly may be rectified through appropriate educational means. To be sure, the informal apprenticeship system to which vast numbers of school leavers have been turning does offer valuable on-the-job training as we have seen. Yet the training which apprentices receive is only as good as that which their masters can offer. And herein lies the rub. For while apprentice training is a cheap and invaluable source of learning, and while ages-old tradition generally dictates that the master take his teaching responsibilities

seriously, "he cannot pass on knowledge he does not have; there is a ceiling, not to his ambitions, but to his technical and managerial proficiencies".¹¹⁹ It would seem, therefore, that if intermediate industry is to progress substantially in Nigeria, the ceiling on the technical and managerial abilities of small businessmen must also be broken down. Not only would this enhance the efficiency of their own industrial operations, but it would have a positive effect on the apprenticeship system. As Mabawonku writes,

"The type of training provided by the system is devoid of any theoretical exercise; the training which an apprentice receives depends on the skills which the master himself possesses and the demand for these skills. Thus strategies which aim to upgrade the performance of the proprietors in the small-scale industries will also be beneficial to their apprentices."¹²⁰

To some extent the direction of present education policy appears in line with this objective. The provision of UPE, despite initial qualitative drawbacks, would seem to be a major step in providing a foundation for entrepreneurial efficiency in small businesses. As we have already suggested, the development of a common language (English) -- both spoken and written --, the teaching of arithmetic, and the exposure to what for many is the sole representation of institutional modernity in tradition-bound villages, will probably contribute substantially to improving at least some aspects of the social milieu of the business world, i.e. developing personal contacts, dealing perhaps more easily with modern bureau-

cratic institutions such as banks and government agencies, and in maintaining some methods of accounting.

Beyond formal primary education, however, the school system would appear to contribute little to the development of the informal labour-intensive sector. As we have already mentioned, the liberal arts and science curriculum bias of most secondary schools has virtually no functional relation to the labour demands of intermediate industry, let alone to the needs of low-level modern sector wage employment. In addition, a notable deficiency of the post-primary school system, especially as it relates to much of the small-scale entrepreneurial sector, is its rigid adherence to institutionalization and classroom-orientation. This is forcefully pointed out by Callaway:

...there is a danger in plans which are too exclusively classroom-oriented. To promote full-time technical education on the expectation that some of the trainees, or a sufficient number of them, will become entrepreneurs -- without experiencing the pressure and fortunes of competitive business -- is highly unrealistic. Entrepreneurs are not created by years of unbroken schooling. Their training grounds are not in the classroom but in the markets and workshops.¹²¹

As we have already seen, studies by Aluko, Lewis, Mabawonku, and others have borne out this assumption. Thus, while it appears that many secondary school leavers may be compelled by force of circumstance to enter the informal sector, it is unlikely that secondary education per se contributes more than marginally to the eventual deployment and utilization

of manpower throughout the small-scale industrial sector of the economy.

In terms of intermediate industrial development, a far more effective method of training would seem to lie with non-formal adult education programmes which function in conjunction with apprenticeship schemes and which aim to bolster the expertise of those who already employ apprentices and manage their own firms. (Adult education is here referred to as all forms of out-of-school training meant to enhance the knowledge and skills of adults.)¹²² Again, as Callaway argues, "Far better to work with the natural process by helping existing craftsmen and former apprentices improve their skills. They in turn will train apprentices who will likely be school leavers."¹²³

The advocacy for increased government sponsorship of adult education in developing countries is by no means a novelty. Almost twenty years ago Arthur Lewis wrote, "Education for children is fine, but its potential contribution to output over ten years is small compared with the potential contribution of efforts devoted to improving adult skills... The quickest way to increase productivity in the less-developed countries is to train the adults who are already on the job."¹²⁴ At the same time, Hopkins was arguing, "Even if we cannot assign 'notional monetary values', we can declare confidently that adult education pays dividends and big ones; and that it must be given high priority by any nation interested

in its economic, social, and political development".¹²⁵
Hopkins went on to list "eight overwhelming reasons" for concentrating resources on adult education:¹²⁶

a) The rapidity of modern technological change, even in developing countries, is such that "once-and-for-all school education" may not provide sufficient life-long training.

b) Adult education can -- just as apprenticeship does -- provide new skills or make up for weaknesses inherent in formal education.

c) Ongoing education programmes may help to sustain the benefits of schooling by maintaining skills which might otherwise be forgotten.

d) Adult education can foster a continuing "post-school" interest in learning and in experimenting with new ideas and methods.

e) As students, adults often have an advantage over schoolchildren in that they generally have more worldly practical experience; not only can this provide an enrichment to their training, but it may help to create more reciprocity between students and teachers.

f) As greater numbers of children attend formal school, a simultaneous effort to provide education for adults can help to minimize the potential for inter-generational tensions and "help bridge the gap between traditional elders and adventurous youth".

g) As studies have shown,¹²⁷ generally adults are quicker

in their receptivity and can absorb new skills at a faster rate than schoolchildren -- meaning, therefore, that in relation to formal children's schooling, adult education is time-saving and cost reducing.

h) Because adults are in fact the "productive" members of society, the returns on skill training are more immediate; moreover, because of the narrow time lag between adult learning and practice, the returns on adult training may often prove greater than similar training offered to children.

Adult education to be sure is not a neglected phenomenon in Nigeria, at least not in terms of official rhetorical commitment. As noted in the Introduction, the government's New National Policy on Education includes the following points:

(i) Lifelong education is to be the basis of policy...

(ii) Universal basic education in a variety of forms is to be provided to all citizens.

(iii) Education is to be related to community needs.

Likewise, the Third National Development Plan states: "Government commitment...is the creation in the country of an education system capable of ensuring that every citizen is given full opportunity to develop his intellectual and working capabilities for his own benefit and that of his community."¹²⁸

Unfortunately, however, until recently, practical sup-

port for adult education did not match verbal commitment. Public educational funding was centred overwhelmingly on children's schooling, partly because of vocal demand from adults themselves whose ambitions naturally enough are embodied in their children,¹²⁹ but partly also because of the commonly held assumption that investment in young people will result in longer term socio-economic returns than will the investment in adult education.¹³⁰ A look at the Third National Development Plan indicates the low practical priority which has in the past been accorded adult education -- as envisaged by the Plan, the overall allocation of public funds to adult education was 0.3% of total educational investment -- equal to that spent on archives and only 0.1% above antiquities.¹³¹ (Could the suggestion be that adults themselves are antiquities?)

Nevertheless, as recent efforts suggest, much more stock has been placed in vocational adult education than is implied by 1975 expenditure estimates. Most states have now established Industrial Development Centres (IDCs) whose objectives are to provide technical and management assistance to owners of small industries. In addition, the IDCs are meant to carry on a number of other functions: identifying viable industrial opportunities and encouraging the establishment of industrial projects, evaluating applications for private and government loans, adapting and exploiting the use of indigenous materials for new local manufacturing products, and

providing market information services.¹³² Similar to the IDCs are the Vocational Improvement Centres which have been established in the northern states to improve the practical skills and the business acumen of trainees who have already had a minimum of two years' experience in their craft or trade. Here the medium of instruction is usually Hausa and courses are conducted in the evenings using the facilities of technical schools, thus minimizing costs.¹³³

Other informal vocational programmes include drivers and auto maintenance schools, ceramic training centres, and textile training centres, all providing ongoing education and assistance to those already in business for themselves as well as to potential small industrial owners who have completed apprenticeship training.¹³⁴ A further development in vocational training has been the creation of the federal government's Industrial Training Fund, the purpose of which is to compensate large-scale firms undertaking to update workers' skills through in-service training. The nation-wide appetite for ongoing education has also encouraged private enterprise: throughout the country vast numbers of private management consultancy agencies, night schools, and business correspondence schools have sprung up at such a rapid rate that state governments are compelled to regulate them.¹³⁵

The existence of such informal training programmes is encouraging, for by offering assistance to those already in business for themselves, or to those who already possess

certain craft or trade skills, they may help to enhance the technical operation and management of small industries, and thus boost the efficiency and expansionary potential of the informal industrial sector as a whole. At the same time, as Young points out, "non-formal vocational programmes may become the vital link between the formal school system and employment opportunities for those who leave their formal schooling early. Also, the insurance of employment as a result of completing these programmes remains an attractive feature not found in the formal school system."¹³⁶

Nevertheless, while interest in informal vocational education appears to be growing, adult training and assistance programmes in Nigeria generally remain small and unevenly distributed (invariably situated in primate cities). In addition, many are heavily dependent on foreign support (USAID, ILO, the Ford Foundation, etc.) which may not be consistent from year to year. Likewise, coordination between formal education and informal training programmes may be minimal. The IDCs, for example, are administered by the Federal Ministry of Trade and Industry rather than by the state education ministries. Staffing of informal vocational training programmes also tends to be a perennial problem, with recurrent dependence on expatriate personnel whose duration of service is usually limited. In view of these difficulties, and in consideration of the size and duality of the economy as a whole, there may well be some truth to the argument that informal educational programmes are simply "micro-

solutions to macro-problems".¹³⁷

Nevertheless, while informal adult training may not be the sole panacea for Nigeria's urban unemployment problems or for economic growth in the small-scale industrial sector, it may at least be "a viable step in the right direction".¹³⁸ In consequence, it would seem that the encouragement and development of ongoing vocational training schemes should be stepped up and that these should be more closely coordinated with the government's UPE programme. This, of course, entails added government expense; and as one report points out, "All adult education costs money and the paradox in the present time of recession would seem to be that without resources adult education cannot be developed, but unless it is developed, Nigeria will not solve its problems".¹³⁹

An alternative strategy, however, might be to scale down investment in formal secondary schooling and to shift a greater proportion of public expenditure toward those areas of training which do have a direct bearing on small-scale industrial development. In view of the minimal effect which formal post-primary schooling now appears to have on the employment and growth potential of the intermediate industrial sector, a more practical option may be to subsidize the existing apprenticeship system. For as Mabawonku observes:

Informal training, such as in the apprenticeship system, has up to the moment been operated without the benefit of government subsidies either to the trainee or to the firms which offer training. But empirical evidence...has shown that

apprenticeship training provides workers both for small-scale and large-scale industries. Moreover, proprietors who provide the training of apprentices, rather than appropriating their total investment in offering training, often provide subsidies and hence suffer a loss of earnings. Thus, as low as income in the small-scale industries is, the proprietors appear to be transferring income to other sectors of the economy.¹⁴⁰

Considering the efficacy of apprenticeships and the obvious need to enhance the earning power of small-scale entrepreneurs so as to bolster their businesses, the subsidization of informal apprentice training would seem advisable. Likewise, measures should be taken to accord the vast informal apprenticeship network with official recognition and legitimacy. At present, for instance, the lack of public standardization or guild control over apprentice training "diminishes the recognition and professional value of the 'freeing' certificate issued by individual masters".¹⁴¹ By regulating the system and standardizing the level of quality, apprenticeship may become a more attractive form of training for primary school leavers. Similarly, national educational strategy should comprise the expansion and subsidization of ongoing adult vocational training throughout the country. By raising the efficiency standards of working adults (the most productive members of society), such training might well augment the potential for further growth and employment in the small-scale labour-intensive sector. Finally, it seems essential that continuing comprehensive research and analysis should be

undertaken in these areas so as to ensure not only the formulation of an alternate educational strategy, but its practical and effective implementation as well.

In summary, for education to have a more positive effect in resolving the current disequilibrium in labour supply and demand in Nigeria, an alternative strategy is here advocated: a) to maintain the present UPE programme; b) to diminish investment in formal secondary education; and c) to investigate ways and means of encouraging and developing informal training schemes which not only provide new job skills and enhance existing ones (and therefore may foster sectoral growth), but which also lead to a reciprocal widening of employment opportunities.

It is important to note, however, that ultimately the health of the informal or intermediate sector of the economy will depend as much or more on the overall economic environment as on the type of education preferred. While the small-scale informal sector may provide the only employment alternative for school leavers who wish to avoid rural farming, quite clearly it continues to be a much less attractive alternative than modern sector employment. The economic and infrastructural hurdles, the risks and insecurity, the relatively low returns, and the resultant low status of informal sector employment appear in sharp relief to the security and high earnings widely identified with modern sector jobs.

True, there is much about the present formal education

system in Nigeria which is out of tune with the needs of the small-scale industrial sector. Yet it would be incorrect to assume that the problem is on the supply side only, that somehow the fundamental solution lies in rectifying the mismatch between skills provided by the schools on the one side and the types of jobs available on the market on the other. In terms of overall societal needs it is probably more accurate to suggest that the root of Nigeria's "manpower problem", of the tendency towards increased urban unemployment, lies not so much in the form of education as in the structure of socio-economic incentives within the country. Viewed in this light, therefore, as long as the existent structural duality of the economy remains virtually unaltered, it is unlikely that the development of a new kind of education or a shift in the approach or methodology within the formal system will resolve sectoral underdevelopment and underemployment.

FOOTNOTES
(CHAPTER 4)

¹Anosike, p. 29.

²In reference to the effect of formal education on individual modernity, Holsinger and Thiesen observe, "The proposition that formal schooling is a sure steady producer of this kind of individual needs only to be qualified by the provision that there be places for school leavers in the modern occupational sector." (p. 330).

³Callaway, "Training Young People", p. 189.

⁴Lothar Richter, "New Sources of Manpower Information in Developing Countries", International Labour Review, 117 (4), July-August, 1978, p. 453.

⁵Q. E. R., Annual Supplement, 1978, p. 7.

⁶Ibid., and A. O. Olaloye, "Planning Nigeria's Manpower Requirements: An Appraisal of Existing Techniques", Nigerian Journal of Public Affairs, 6 (2), October, 1976, pp. 26-27.

⁷Olaloye, p. 28.

⁸Q. E. R., Annual Supplement, 1978, p. 7.

⁹Ibid. See also T. M. Yesufu, "Employment, Manpower, and Economic Development in Nigeria: Some Issues of Moment", Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, 16 (1), March, 1974, p. 51.

¹⁰Abernethy, pp. 200-01.

¹¹Arnold, p. 36.

¹²Ademola T. Salau, "Urbanization, Planning, and Public Policies in Nigeria", in R. A. Obudho and Salah El-Shakhs, eds., Development of Urban Systems in Africa, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1979, pp. 196-97.

¹³Second National Development Plan, Second Progress Report, p. 35, cited by Sayre P. Schatz, Nigerian Capitalism, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1977, p. 33.

¹⁴Third National Plan, p. 369.

¹⁵S. A. Aluko, "Third National Plan", Daily Times (Lagos), April 21, 1975, p. 14, cited by Schatz, p. 33.

¹⁶Third National Plan, p. 382.

¹⁷Schatz, p. 33.

¹⁸S. O. Falae, "Unemployment in Nigeria", Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, 13 (1), March, 1971, p. 65.

¹⁹Q. E. R., Annual Supplement, 1978, p. 7.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Schatz, p. 33.

²²Ibid., p. 34.

²³Falae, pp. 65-66.

²⁴Anosike, p. 43.

²⁵Abernethy, p. 208.

²⁶Akin F. Olaloku, "Fiscal Policy Options for Employment Promotion in Nigeria's Modern Manufacturing Sector", Bulletin of International Fiscal Documentation, 30 (8), August, 1976, p. 319.

²⁷Q. E. R., Annual Supplement, 1978, p. 14.

²⁸Ibid., p. 8.

²⁹Ibid., p. 14. Much of this would appear to be due to technological, managerial, and entrepreneurial shortcomings of Nigerian businessmen. See Schatz, pp. 81-90.

³⁰Q. E. R., Annual Supplement, 1978, p. 24.

³¹Third National Plan, p. 147.

³²Olaloye, "Technology Transfer and Employment in Nigerian Manufacturing Industries", Quarterly Journal of Administration, 12 (2), January, 1978, p. 170.

³³Milton A. Iyoha, "The Relation between Employment and Growth in Developing Countries: An Econometric Analysis", Social and Economic Studies, 27 (1), March, 1978, p. 69.

³⁴Olaloku, p. 318.

³⁵Olaloye, "Planning Nigeria's Manpower Requirements", p. 28.

³⁶Olaloku, pp. 319-24, and Schatz, p. 45.

³⁷Third National Plan, pp. 400-03.

³⁸Terisa Turner, "Multinational Corporations and the Instability of the Nigerian State", Review of African Political Economy, January-April, 1976, p. 65.

³⁹E. O. Akeredolu-Ale, "Private Foreign Investment and the Underdevelopment of Indigenous Entrepreneurship in Nigeria", in Gavin Williams, ed., Nigeria: Economy and Society, Rex Collings, London, 1976, pp. 106-22; Tom Forrest, "Notes on the Political Economy of State Intervention in Nigeria", IDS Bulletin, 9 (1), July, 1977, pp. 42-47; Joseph, "Affluence and Underdevelopment"; Turner, "Multinational Corporations"; Williams, "Nigeria: A Political Economy", in Williams, ed., Nigeria: Economy and Society, pp. 11-54

⁴⁰Turner, p. 65.

⁴¹Third National Plan, p. 152.

⁴²Ogbonna, "On Import Substitution in Nigeria", South African Journal of Economics, 44 (3), September, 1976, pp. 294-97.

⁴³Forrest, p. 44.

⁴⁴Sunday Times (Lagos), April 24, 1977, cited by Joseph, p. 225.

⁴⁵Q. E. R., Fourth Quarter, 1978, p. 2.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 3.

⁴⁷Turner, p. 64, and Williams, p. 12 and p. 31.

⁴⁸Schatz, p. 51.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 53.

⁵⁰Turner, p. 78. Commenting on the direct participation of the state in what is basically a laissez-faire economy in Nigeria, the Economic Commission for Africa has warned:

First, the enlargement of the economic role of the state and the business partnership of the State with local and foreign capital may limit its ability to play adequately the traditional role of moderating sectional interests. Secondly, the economic stratification of Nigerian society may reinforce growth without

development and may constrain the drive for structural transformation of the Nigerian economy.

West Africa, No. 3216, March 5, 1979, p. 391.

⁵¹Forrest, p. 46.

⁵²Turner, p. 65.

⁵³Anosike suggests that the myth overshadows the reality in this case, that Nigeria's "legitimate need for highly educated manpower is exaggerated beyond reality." (p. 37).

⁵⁴Forrest, p. 46.

⁵⁵Charles Frank, "Industrialization and Employment Generation in Nigeria", Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, 9 (3), November, 1967, p. 289.

⁵⁶Joseph, p. 224.

⁵⁷Williams argues that the monopoly power of the state-controlled Marketing Boards enabled the state to exploit peasant labour so as to develop industrial investment, enhance the provision of urban services and amenities, and thus finance the emergence of a Nigerian capitalist class. (p. 30).

⁵⁸F. Akin Olaloku, "Fiscal Policy Options for Employment Promotion in Nigeria's Modern Manufacturing Sector", Bulletin of International Fiscal Documentation, 30 (8), August, 1976, pp. 321-22.

⁵⁹Schatz, p. 26.

⁶⁰Forrest, p. 44. Similar comments are made by Akeredolu-Ale, p. 109; Joseph, p. 226; Ogbonna, "On Import Substitution", p. 301; and Williams, p. 34.

⁶¹Oni and Onimode, "Economic Development of Nigeria", cited by Arnold, "Oil Over Troubled Waters", New Internationalist, November, 1977, p. 15.

⁶²Olu Akinkugbe, "Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree and its Implementation", cited by Schatz, p. 60.

⁶³Arnold, "Oil Over Troubled Waters", p. 15.

⁶⁴Olaloku, pp. 323-24.

⁶⁵G. K. Helleiner, "The Role of Multinational Corporations in the Less Developed Countries' Trade in Technology", World Development, 3 (4), April, 1975, pp. 167-69.

⁶⁶ Q. E. R., First Quarter, 1979, p. 11.

⁶⁷ F. Olufemi Fajana, "The Evolution of Skill Wage Differentials in a Developing Economy: The Nigerian Experience", Developing Economies, 13 (2), June, 1975, p. 157.

⁶⁸ Fajana acknowledges that there is a conceptual problem in differentiating skilled and unskilled labour:

There is no objective criterion for measuring differences in the degree of skill in any given occupation, so that one can thus not avoid making some drastic simplification in the measurement of skill wage differentials. In presenting a picture of the evolution of the differentials in Nigeria, the simple approach has been followed of observing the trend through changes in the relative wages of selected pairs of occupations traditionally classified as skilled and unskilled, and of their broad classifications. (p. 150).

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 161.

⁷⁰ Fajana, "Intraindustry Wage Differentials in Nigeria," Journal of Developing Areas, 9 (4), July, 1975, p. 527.

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 535.

⁷² Fajana, "Evolution", p. 161.

⁷³ Schatz, p. 131, and Williams, p. 32.

⁷⁴ Fajana, "Evolution", p. 163.

⁷⁵ _____, "Intraindustry", pp. 157-58.

⁷⁶ _____, "Evolution", p. 165.

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 154.

⁷⁸ Dore, p. 2.

⁷⁹ See Note 36, Chapter 2, regarding per capita income.

⁸⁰ In 1971 the average annual earnings of small-scale industrial employees in Western State were estimated at approximately 45-60; the official minimum rate was ₦108. Cited by Peter Waterman, "Conservatism Amongst Nigerian Workers" in Williams, ed., Nigeria: Economy and Society, p. 163.

It is important to note of course that while fixed urban wage incomes may be higher than average earnings of rural inhabitants, the costs of living in the cities tends also to be

much higher. Studies by Amin and Hinchcliffe have shown that when adjustments are made for total hours of work, and the varying costs of food, housing, transportation, (urban)entertainment, etc., low-level wage earners may not be much better off than their rural counterparts. Samir Amin, "Income Distribution and the 'Privileged' Worker", in Peter C. W. Gutkind and Peter Waterman, eds., African Social Studies, Heinemann, London, 1977, pp. 186-200; Keith Hinchcliffe, "Labour Aristocracy", pp. 57-64.

This observation, however, does not detract from the fact that most school leavers are generally attracted to the modern wage sector with its promise of security and a "modern" life-style.

⁸¹Tuquan, p. 71.

⁸²Dore, p. 3.

⁸³Aluko, "Third National Plan", cited by Schatz, p. 31.

⁸⁴Fajana argues convincingly that government wage policies have in fact exacerbated economic duality in the country by reinforcing other factors which make for increased capital intensity in the modern industrial sector and thence greater competition among unorganized workers for jobs in the small-scale intermediate sector. Consequently wages in the latter are held down. "The ultimate effect of such a process appears to have been the widening of wage differentials between large- and small-scale establishments." "Evolution", p. 158.

⁸⁵Olaloye, "Technology Transfer", p. 172.

⁸⁶Even though a wage freeze has been declared by the federal government in an attempt to offset an official inflation rate which in 1976 was running at approximately 24%, it was nonetheless declared that "instead of granting a general wage increase to workers, the Supreme Military Council has decided to look into ways and means of giving non-wage and salary relief to them in such a way that it will be more meaningful and non-inflationary." Obasanjo, cited by Q. E. R., Third Qurater, 1978, p. 9.

One stipulation is that private sector employers with 500 or more workers are required to provide housing estates for their employees and to initiate loan schemes for staff housing. This of course means added labour costs for employers.

⁸⁷Christopher Allen, "Incomes Policy and Union Power", in Gutkind and Waterman, African Social Studies, p. 204.

⁸⁸Q. E. R., Annual Supplement, 1979, p. 24. The rate of inflation is based on the consumer price index which is considered to be an imperfect guide to inflation at best.

- ⁸⁹Schatz, p. 32.
- ⁹⁰Abernethy, p. 203.
- ⁹¹Ibid., pp. 204-05.
- ⁹²Mabawonku, p. 54.
- ⁹³Callaway, "From Traditional Crafts to Modern Industries", in P. C. Lloyd, et. al., eds., The City of Ibadan, p. 163.
- ⁹⁴Peter Kilby, Industrialization in an Open Economy: Nigeria 1945-66, Cambridge University Press, 1969, p. 18.
- ⁹⁵Michael Koll, Crafts and Cooperation in Western Nigeria, Arnold-Bergstraesser-Institut, Freiburg, 1969, pp. 19-20; and Aluko, et. al., cited by Waterman, p. 163.
- ⁹⁶Onokerhoraye, p. 67.
- ⁹⁷Eugene Staley and Richard Morse, Modern Small Industry for Developing Countries, McGraw-Hill Co, New York, 1965, p. 115.
- ⁹⁸Onokerhoraye, p. 67.
- ⁹⁹Chapter 11, "Manufacturing and Crafts", Third National Plan, pp. 147-74. "The main objectives of the Government programme for the development of small-scale industries are the creation of employment opportunities, mobilisation of local resources, mitigation of rural-urban migration, and more even distribution of industrial enterprises in different parts of the country." (p. 1551).
- ¹⁰⁰Dore, p. 74.
- ¹⁰¹Ibid.
- ¹⁰²Callaway, "From Traditional Crafts", p. 164.
- ¹⁰³Aluko, "Industry in the Rural Setting", p. 215; similar observations have been made by Callaway, Kilby, A. O. Lewis, and Schatz.
- ¹⁰⁴A. O. Lewis, "Nigeria's Small Industries", West Africa, No. 2930, August, 6, 1973, p. 1075.
- ¹⁰⁵Schatz, pp. 78-79.
- ¹⁰⁶Akeredolu-Ale, p. 119; Kilby, pp. 336-42; Lewis, "Small-Scale Industries in Nigeria's Former Western State", pp. 37-40, and "Small-Scale Industries in North-Eastern State", p. 192; Schatz, pp. 76-97.

¹⁰⁷Schatz, pp. 91-97; and Akeredolu-Ale, p. 118.

¹⁰⁸John R. Harris and Mary P. Rowe, "Entrepreneurial Patterns in the Nigerian Sawmilling Industry", Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, 8 (1), March, 1966, pp. 88-94; A. O. Lewis, "Printing Industry", p. 198, and "Small-Scale Industries in Nigeria's Former Western State", pp. 35-37.

¹⁰⁹Ikwaakam Diaku, "Non-Corporate Sector Finance and Financing of Small Industries in Developing Countries: The Nigerian Experience", Annals of Public and Co-operative Economy, 48 (2), 1977, p. 209.

¹¹⁰A. O. Lewis, "Printing Industry", p. 199.

¹¹¹Harris and Rowe, p. 89.

¹¹²Diaku, p. 211.

¹¹³Forrest, p. 45; Obasanjo, p. 617; Q. E. R., Annual Supplement, 1978, p. 22.

¹¹⁴A. O. Lewis, "Printing Industry", p. 199.

¹¹⁵Aluko, "Industry in the Rural Setting", p. 230.

¹¹⁶The environmental obstacles discussed in this last part of section 4.5 are examined extensively by Schatz, pp. 98-129 on the basis of a wide range of previous research some of which we have already noted.

¹¹⁷Schatz, p. 110.

¹¹⁸Similarly Akeredolu-Ale argues that when the level of growth attained by foreign initiative is already high, the comparative advantage of foreign firms will force indigenous businessmen to limit their entrepreneurial horizons. (p. 120).

¹¹⁹Callaway, "Training Young People", p. 186.

¹²⁰Mabawonku, p. 57.

¹²¹Callaway, "Training Young People", p. 187.

¹²²The term "adult" may seem ambiguous here as there is no age determinant which specifies an individual as an adult; I use the term, however, to refer to a person who is either employed in some way (and this does not necessarily signify income-earning employment -- many women are employed as wives and child-rearers yet receive no wage) and may still be in his or her teens, or is beyond an age acceptable for entry into secondary school.

- ¹²³Callaway, "Training Young People", p. 189.
- ¹²⁴Arthur Lewis, "Education and Economic Development", Social and Economic Studies, 10 (2), June, 1961, p. 121.
- ¹²⁵Hopkins, p. 70.
- ¹²⁶Ibid.; the following eight points summarize Hopkins' discussion, pp. 53-56.
- ¹²⁷Hopkins cited evidence of adult learning in Denmark and at Kinondoni in Tanzania, p. 55.
- ¹²⁸Third National Plan, p. 245.
- ¹²⁹Abernethy, p. 130 and pp. 222-23.
- ¹³⁰Mark Blaug, Education and the Employment Problem in Developing Countries, ILO, Geneva, pp. 55-57.
- ¹³¹J. T. Okedara, "Planning and Implementation of Functional Literacy and UPE: Administration and Finance", West African Journal of Education, 20 (1), February, 1976, p. 105.
- ¹³²Diaku, p. 223; and D. R. Young, "Non-Formal Vocational Education in Nigeria", Canadian Vocational Journal, 11 (2), August, 1975, p. 35.
- ¹³³Young, p. 35.
- ¹³⁴Ibid., p. 34.
- ¹³⁵Financial Times, p. 32.
- ¹³⁶Young, pp. 36-37.
- ¹³⁷Ibid., p. 36.
- ¹³⁸Ibid., p. 37.
- ¹³⁹Financial Times, p. 32.
- ¹⁴⁰Mabawonku, p. 57.
- ¹⁴¹Ibid., p. 58. Mabogunje has raised this point as well and argues that apprenticeship training should "be systematised, streamlined, certificated and the opportunity seized thereby to improve the skill and equipment of the master craftsmen themselves." "Towards an Urban Policy in Nigeria", Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, 16 (1), March, 1974, p. 94.

CHAPTER 5: EDUCATION, AGRICULTURE, AND RURAL UNDERDEVELOPMENT

5.1 Introduction

As in most developing countries, poverty and joblessness in Nigeria are acutely visible in the major cities. There the teeming masses are concentrated and there it is fairly easy to observe the multitude of unemployed young people in search of work. For researchers and government planners, towns and cities are thus a convenient source of data, forming as they do a microcosm of many Third World problems. Most of the evidence which we have cited so far in this paper has originated in urban or semi-urban areas. On the basis of the evidence, we have seen that the supply of employable individuals in the urban centres of Nigeria frequently exceeds the demand for labour, regardless of modern sector industrial growth and the favourable employment potential of small-scale industry. We have also seen that the provision of formal education, particularly at the post-primary level, appears to have little effect on sectoral growth and the development of wider urban employment opportunities. Despite the government's heavy investment in human resources development, the utilization of manpower in towns and cities seems much more dependent on the overall structure and organization of the political economy than on the system of education.

What we have yet to consider, however, and what is pro-

bably far more significant in terms of overall development strategy, is the effect which formal education has -- or will have -- in fostering employment and economic growth in the rural hinterland. Since the vast majority of Nigerians are rural inhabitants, and as 65%-70% of the population earns its livelihood from agriculture and will continue to do so in the foreseeable future¹, there is no doubt that "the future employment and income distribution patterns in Nigeria will be determined largely by developments in the rural sector."² For educational planners, therefore, a fundamental premise of educational expansion in Nigeria, and of the UPE programme in particular, is that the majority of school leavers will remain in the rural villages and find employment in agriculture. Having gained the skills of functional literacy, as well as an awareness of the general political and socio-economic goals of national development, the assumption is that they may thus be equipped to generate a collective socio-economic transformation of the tradition-bound rural regions.

Unfortunately, however, recent indications are that quite the contrary is taking place. Concurrent to the expansion of formal education throughout the country, increasing numbers of young school leavers appear to be migrating away from the villages to the larger urban areas. Not only does this put undue pressure on the cities where employment opportunities are already constricted, but it may help to perpetuate underdevelopment and underemployment in rural agriculture. The question we must examine in this chapter, therefore, is whether or not

investment in formal education can indeed be an effective policy measure for rural development.

To a large extent our analysis in this chapter will be speculative, for as we have already mentioned, in many rural areas of Nigeria formal education is in its infancy; in some regions illiteracy is estimated to be as high as 90%.³ Furthermore, precise data on the characteristics of rural Nigeria are sparse. As Peter Matlon writes, ". . . efforts to identify policies and projects [in Nigeria] which ensure a favorable distributional impact have been hindered by a lack of data on rural incomes generally, and more particularly by a lack of information on the characteristics of the rural poor."⁴ Nevertheless, a review of current evidence will be useful for our evaluative purposes.

In section 5.2 we shall give a brief summary of the state of agriculture in Nigeria based on the evidence available. While the agricultural sector may not be as badly off as is sometimes claimed, it does appear that the farming industry is far from achieving its full productive capacity and that as a form of livelihood its monetary rewards are limited.

In section 5.3 we shall go on to discuss briefly the growing problem of rural outmigration, particularly among school leavers, and how this appears to be affected by formal education.

In section 5.4 we shall endeavour to ascertain the extent to which rural primary education is indeed a direct causal factor in perpetuating agricultural underdevelopment and rural-urban migration. If the school system is seen to be a prime

agent in driving young people away from rural villages then UPE may ultimately prove to be a catastrophic blunder and an immense waste of limited resources. On the other hand, agricultural underdevelopment and underemployment, as well as mass rural-urban migration, may be the results of factors which lie beyond the scope of education. In that case it may be erroneous to assume that formal education exacerbates rural underdevelopment; instead, in the long run, the universal provision of primary school education may work to enhance the process of rural and agricultural development and diminish the prevailing pattern of urban migration.

Finally, in section 5.5 we shall consider briefly the possibility of devising an alternative post-primary educational strategy which lays greater emphasis on informal training programmes and is more realistically attuned to rural development needs than is the present formal secondary school system.

5.2 The State of Agriculture in Nigeria

Although Nigeria is a predominantly agricultural nation, in recent years it has been commonly observed that the country's agricultural productivity has experienced lacklustre growth, and in some areas an overall decline. In 1960 the contribution of agriculture to Gross Domestic Product was approximately 66%; since then its share of the national product has experienced a steady drop. In 1964/65 the share of agriculture in GDP was 58%; by 1974/75 it had been reduced to 23.4%, and during the last fiscal year its share of total production stood at about

18.4%.⁵ Naturally the emergence of petroleum, mining, and manufacturing account for much of the displacement of agriculture's share in GDP. Nevertheless published statistics have also indicated two fundamental trends: firstly, that virtually all of Nigeria's traditional agricultural exports have diminished, leaving the country almost completely dependent on petroleum for export revenues; and secondly, that Nigeria's annual food import bill has been steadily rising. On the basis of this evidence, numerous observers have concluded that overall the farming industry in Nigeria is "stagnant, if not regressive."⁶

Certainly these two trends are beyond doubt. Exports of groundnuts, palm oil, cocoa, and cotton have dwindled in the past few years. Once the world's largest exporter of groundnuts and palm oil, for example, Nigeria in recent years has had to import these items. Cocoa exports have declined from 300,000 tons in 1971 to 160,000 in 1978, and the forecast for 1978/79 was 155,000 tons, the lowest in twenty years.⁷ Likewise the importation of food has recently recorded the fastest growth rate of imports -- during the early 1970's food imports rose approximately 20% a year; by 1977 the annual increase had reached 79%. (Rice imports alone rose from ₦ 20 million to ₦ 178 million.)⁸ Taken at face value, then, Nigeria would indeed seem to be suffering a major crisis in agriculture.

However, it is quite possible that such a conclusion may be too hasty, for there is a proviso to the use of published agricultural statistics: they do not record the total production of most crops, nor do they account for overall trade within the country. In Nigeria practically all accurate information on

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agricultural production is related to the purchase of cash crops by marketing boards which maintain records of their transactions. (Since 1977 the former Regional and State Marketing Boards have been replaced by boards which confine their purchases to single commodities; moreover these boards now exist for ordinary food crops as well as for export crops.) In the past few years cash crop sales to the boards have declined drastically and food sales have been minimal. Yet this does not necessarily mean that agriculture as a whole is in a position of stagnation. Instead what seems more likely, and what the statistics do not show, is that quite often farmers may be by-passing the boards and either selling their crops in local markets on their own or taking advantage of more lucrative prices offered by local traders.

Certainly there is no indication to suggest that prices for farm produce have fallen in Nigeria. For example, periodic shortages in groundnut production (drought in 1973, virus attack in 1975) combined with high inflation rates -- in 1977 inflation was unofficially estimated to be approximately 30%⁹ -- have undoubtedly maintained a satisfactory price incentive for groundnut production.¹⁰ Since most groundnut oil is processed at the village level and is marketed through informal trading channels, it is probable that groundnut production has remained fairly stable and that the recorded decline is merely a reflection of the decline in marketing board purchases as opposed to local trading. The implication of this may thus be encouraging, for "now the income from groundnut oil production reaches countless villagers, not just a few industrial employers."¹¹

A similar situation appears likely in the production and marketing of ordinary food crops. Matlon's study of income distribution among northern Nigerian farmers, for example, has shown that a substantial proportion of rural earnings is obtained from trading in local crops and in processed foods, and from the selling of roasted meat.¹² In fact, the buying and selling of domestic foodstuffs appears undiminished throughout the country. As Derrick observes:

The ordinary production of yams, maize, cowpeas (beans), millet, guineacorn, cassava, cocoyams, rice and other food crops should not be called "subsistence farming." Many farmers, perhaps the majority, engage in buying and selling, not growing only what they need; otherwise how would urban dwellers eat? Lorryloads and trainloads of food traverse the country daily; one can, for example, buy quite freely palm oil, plantains, bananas, and pineapples from the southern states in the northeast.¹³

Domestic food production still vastly outweighs food imports. Indeed, rising food imports may have little to do with domestic levels of agricultural production and more to do with increased oil wealth and increasingly varied urban tastes. Apart from rice, for instance, the major food imports are either not widely home-grown or lack the domestic facilities needed for preservation. Consequently to lament the chronic demise of agriculture in Nigeria is, to some extent at least, to underestimate activity which is commonly observed but which is not borne out in official statistics. Again as Derrick writes:

That farmers are disposing of their crops more freely than ever before . . . makes it difficult to assess total production accurately enough to condemn traditional agriculture as inadequate for the task of nation-feeding. It also suggests that farmers may be doing better now than before, and for that reason it is possible

to suggest that fallen export-and-industrial production may indicate not fallen, but increased output.¹⁴

All this is not to say, however, that agriculture is flourishing in Nigeria, or that rural life styles have shown a marked improvement in recent times. On the contrary, the socio-economic duality between rural and urban areas in Nigeria continues to be pronounced. Matlon's study of rural income distribution among farmers in the Kano area, for example, has revealed that most farming households still sustain an abject standard of living. During the period 1974-75 the average rural household was estimated to generate an annual income of ₦ 350, or approximately ₦ 52 per capita. This was in contrast to a national per capita average of ₦171 at the time. Even among the wealthiest 10% of the rural families surveyed the mean per capita income was calculated to be ₦ 99, less than 60% of the national average. And among those few very large households which were considered to be rural elites, mean per capita income was still only four-fifths of the national average.¹⁵

A further yardstick of rural living conditions was derived from the estimated caloric intake of households. Results showed that while on average rural families consumed "nearly 11% more calories than the required level suggested by the FAO", the poorer households experienced calory deficits ranging from 15%-25% of the FAO level.¹⁶ The overall findings of Matlon's survey clearly suggest that in all likelihood the standard of life in many rural areas in Nigeria remains grim.

It can be concluded that while the income distribution does not reflect a high degree

of relative inequality, because of the generally low level of income overall the distribution does reflect a serious degree of absolute impoverishment among the poorest households.

. . . From a national perspective . . . the average income was at such a low level that even the richest households would be considered among the relatively poor in Nigeria more generally.¹⁷

In terms of its overall contribution to GDP, while the state of farming in Nigeria is probably not as impaired as is sometimes thought, it nonetheless does seem true that the full productive potential of agriculture is far from being realized. Numerous reasons for this have been cited. For instance, throughout much of rural Nigeria farming remains largely traditional, using ages-old techniques and producing relatively low yields in comparison to those which might be expected from the use of more up-to-date methods.¹⁸ In many areas, too, poor diet and the relatively high average age of active farmers have been pointed out as reasons for less than optimal human input in farm activity.¹⁹ Likewise, as mentioned in the previous chapter, while data on rural employment are sketchy, there are indications to suggest that agriculture in Nigeria suffers from labour scarcity at peak periods. For example, an ILO study undertaken in the former Western State showed that in 1966 only 29% of total cultivable land in the survey area was actually being farmed. Accounting for the system of rotational fallowing, there was still sufficient available land left unused. Partly this was the result of difficulties associated with the traditional kinship system of land tenure.²⁰ More significantly, however, was the lack of interest in farming shown by many young men who were ostensibly unemployed even though "the majority of

them would [have been] able to earn at least a subsistence wage in agriculture."²¹ Indeed, indications are that increasing numbers of young Nigerians are shunning farming and instead are migrating to the cities in search of more attractive job opportunities. One result of this is that in many areas of rural Nigeria there is a surplus of cultivable but as yet untilled land.²²

In summary, while there is evidence to suggest that traditional agriculture in Nigeria is by no means in a state of regression or even stagnation, it is apparent that there is a need for much greater development not only in farm production but in overall rural living standards.

5.3 Rural-Urban Migration Among School Leavers

The outmigration of increasing numbers of the rural work force is widely seen as a decelerating factor in agricultural growth. As Derrick writes, "Many comments on Nigeria's agricultural situation are misinformed, but all that is said about the farms being left increasingly to older people, while the younger Nigerians go off to do anything rather than farm is true and important."²³ Rural-urban migration in Africa is a much discussed phenomenon. While it is not our intention to delve deeply into the question of internal migration patterns, suffice it to say that numerous regional studies have shown that most migrants are young, predominantly male (although this is changing), and have received some formal education in the villages.²⁴ That young school leavers constitute a major portion of those migrating from the rural areas is a clear indication

that a linkage does exist between formal schooling and rural-urban migration. Indeed throughout sub-Saharan Africa the attainment of education is widely considered as being a prime causal factor in the decision to migrate.

The impact of education on rural-urban migration may be viewed from two perspectives: a) the extent to which migration is caused by the desire to further one's education; b) the degree to which education foments a desire to pursue a non-rural, non-agricultural lifestyle. In the first case, as post-primary institutions in Nigeria are few in relation to the number of school-age children, the opportunity of continuing on to secondary school signals for many young people a lengthy sojourn away from home. The second perspective, however, is perhaps more significant, for as we have already noted, most primary school graduates are unable to qualify for formal post-primary education. For these individuals the decision to migrate to the larger towns and cities is generally rooted in what has been termed a "psycho-social" phenomenon: a combination of heightened aspirations and a general aversion to the prospect of permanent village residency.²⁵ As Imaogene suggests, many school leavers regard the commercial bustle and perceived opportunities of the towns in sharp contrast to the drudgery of agriculture and village life. Consequently, in hopes of finding jobs or furthering their education in some form or another, rural income is foregone, costs are incurred, and unemployment and hardship are accepted by thousands "joining in the gold-rush trying to 'make it' in what is considered the regulated urban

sector."²⁶

Certainly there is little doubt that a large proportion of Nigerian school children are initially loathe to pursue agriculture as a career. Over the years this has been borne out repeatedly in attitudinal surveys. For example, a 1964 questionnaire administered to 1,360 school children in 68 southern Nigerian schools showed that only a tiny minority among them aspired to take up farming once they had left school; most of them, from primary school right up through to Sixth Form, indicated their preference for urban modern sector occupations: factory or clerical work, civil service employment, teaching or some other profession.²⁷ More recently a study conducted by Peshkin showed that of 510 pupils who had completed primary school in Bornu Province, 85% of them indicated a preference to work in a town, a city, or even in another country rather than in the village, and only 6% included farming among their top five work preferences.²⁸ Similar attitudes have been revealed among secondary school children in southern Nigeria. Osuji's sample survey of job preferences among secondary school students in the former East Central State showed that out of 292 students queried only seven (2.4% of the total) indicated an interest in agriculture as a career. Most job preferences were in the modern sector and were urban oriented.²⁹ Likewise Abiri's sample survey of 1,254 secondary school pupils in the Ibadan area revealed an almost complete lack of interest in agriculture: statistics showed that 0.4% of the boys and 0.1% of the girls desired a farming career! Again the overwhelming

proportion of job preferences were urban-centred.³⁰

While we shall discuss the effects of education on popular attitudes and aspirations more fully in Chapter 7, what is important to note here is that school leavers tend to show a common desire for employment and living standards which they feel are roughly commensurate to their level of education but which generally lie beyond the narrow confines of the villages. As we have seen, formal schooling is usually the most significant "modernizing" influence on young people, especially in the rural villages where frequently the school is the only non-traditional institution. Moreover the literacy and numeracy skills which are learned in schools are naturally more attuned to the daily activity of modern urban areas than to the tradition-bound lifestyles of the rural hinterland. The experience of formal schooling would seem quite naturally to lead to an increased desire for a "modern" way of life. Such a desire may then be translated into the decision to move away from the traditional associations of rural life to the centres of modernity -- the towns and cities. As Adepoju writes:

Formal education enables the prospective migrant to (critically) assess the risks and opportunities associated with migration. In addition, formal education is often a pre-requisite for securing non-farm jobs in the towns; and a major determinant in the decision-making process to migrate to the urban-industrial centres. . . . Also, some level of formal education usually makes the recipient in the rural areas atypical of the generality of the rural dwellers. At any rate, the educated becomes increasingly aware of the shortcomings of the rural environment and through exposure to the mass media and other informal sources of information the ranges of opportunities in the cities.³¹

In short, the decision to migrate appears often to derive from attitudes and aspirations which have been directly instigated by the formal education process.

Unfortunately, however, the jobs which young school leavers aspire to are frequently unattainable as we have already seen. Instead the flow of young migrants to the cities often results "in congestion of land uses, chaotic traffic, problems of law and order, large-scale unemployment, and quickly-rising demands for social services and utilities."³² Moreover, not only does widespread rural-urban migration of young people create a surplus of manpower in the towns and cities, but it acts as a drain on farming and thus reduces the productive potential of Nigerian agriculture. In effect the rural outflow of young school leavers is symptomatic of a mass underutilization of manpower. As Hunter writes, "We are dealing with a situation which is bad in any case -- in town and in village, -- in economies which have not proved able to use their whole labour force productively; and the waste of human capacity among young men in the town must be weighed against a similar waste in the village."³³ Imaogene's conclusions are similar: "A consequence of migrant labour in an industrial economy is that it creates a situation of under-utilized labour with the result that production tends to settle at a low level of equilibrium."³⁴

All this, of course, may pose a potentially serious problem for educational planners and policy-makers in Nigeria. As the experience of schooling is widely considered to be a motivating factor in the migration process, and since mass rural-

urban migration would seem to effect a wastage of manpower and a concurrent low level of agricultural productivity, the expediency of UPE as an instrument for rural development is open to question. Indeed, in view of the apparent relation between education and migration, one might well assume that the federal government's commitment to UPE and post-primary school expansion, far from contributing to the process of rural development and the satisfaction of overall community needs, may ultimately prove to be a major factor in sustaining uneven sectoral growth and widespread social dissatisfaction. It is to this question, as yet perhaps still largely speculative, that we shall now turn.

5.4 UPE and Rural Development

In view of the fact that school leavers constitute the major proportion of rural-urban migrants it is tempting at this point to suggest that formal education in the rural areas is a prime factor which sustains agricultural underemployment and which leads to massive labour wastage. Certainly no end of criticism has been leveled at formal rural education and its seeming irrelevance to rural and agricultural development. As is widely suggested, "the kind of learning provided in formal schools is unsuited to transform rural societies. Its curriculum, values, incentives, and rewards are oriented to a competitive urban society, and incompatible with the values and needs of rural development."³⁵ Others have spoken of the "discontinuity between school and the traditional community",³⁶ of an "educa-

tional system which perpetuates structural unemployment",³⁷ and of "education [which] is turning younger people against agriculture."³⁸ There may well be a semblance of truth in these statements in which case the assumption that universal schooling is a pre-requisite to national socio-economic development might prove to be erroneous.

Nevertheless, to criticize a form of education as being irrelevant is one thing; to devise a system which will directly bring about a massive shift of the Nigerian work force and somehow inject new life into agricultural production and rural living standards is quite another. For decades, in fact, policy-makers and educators alike have recognized the need for bringing about greater cohesion between education and rural development.³⁹ Over the years efforts have been made in the schools, both primary and secondary, to promote agricultural and rural development: young farmers' clubs, practical activity in biology and botany classes, ubiquitous school gardens, all have been proposed and carried out. Yet time and again, as A. W. Wood writes,

the net effect of most of this agricultural activity in schools has been to arouse in pupils a healthy antipathy for agricultural work, an antipathy associated with and strengthened by the prevalent attitude of both pupils and parents towards the schools whereby these are seen as the means of escape from the rural environment.⁴⁰

Similar observations have been noted among primary school leavers who have undergone training in farm settlement schemes and state-operated farm institutes. Established to attract young people to farming and to promote advanced farming techniques, such schemes have frequently experienced high levels of wastage.

No matter how appropriate the training programmes, most primary school leavers who have enrolled have done so as a means of continuing their formal education; few, it seems, have had any serious intention of choosing farming as a permanent livelihood.⁴¹

Undeterred, however, educators continue to propose new initiatives to relate education more closely to the needs of rural communities and agricultural development. The National Education Policy Implementation Task Force has recently submitted recommendations which for the most part have been accepted by the government and which suggest the following:

. . . that education should be integrated into the economy in Nigeria -- essentially an agricultural economy. To this end, every school outside the urban areas should have a farm of no less than 20 acres. Farming in schools must be seen in the spirit of the Operation Feed the Nation scheme; not as a punishment but as an instrument for integration. Produce from the farms must not be sold but shared equally among the children as reward. The Government should provide implements, fertilizers, seeds, and seedlings and the services of agricultural extension staff.⁴²

On the basis of these recommendations alone it would appear that serious efforts continue to be made in fostering a primary education programme which is not entirely divorced from the traditional rural environment.

It remains true of course that frequently village primary schools are the sole models of western, urban-oriented, institutional modernity in an otherwise relatively isolated tradition-bound area. The effect of formal schooling on young people, therefore, regardless of the rural-orientation of cur-

riculum content, may indeed rouse in them a curiosity and desire to search for a livelihood beyond the confines of the village. Nevertheless, while the modernizing influence of schooling may hasten the migratory flow of young people to urban sectors, it is questionable whether current migration patterns would be much different even without the widespread provision of formal education. Learning the 3Rs and acquiring particular modes of behaviour in school cannot alone explain the powerful motivation which has induced masses of young people to abandon their home villages and migrate to towns and cities, and to uncertain futures. To explain the patterns of manpower behaviour and to account for common desires, particularly among young people, we must look beyond the system of education towards the overall practical model of national development. For the fact remains that ultimately the perceptions people have towards rural living and the gains to be had from farming as opposed to other modes of employment are probably more likely influenced by the structural and ideological nature of the political economy and by the overall pattern of socio-economic development than by the type of schooling offered them.⁴³

Development as it is planned and implemented by the state in Nigeria is based primarily on a model of industrialization and urban growth rather than on a concerted and massive socio-economic transformation of the rural areas. This is not to say of course that government has neglected agriculture. On the contrary, a variety of government policies and programmes do exist which aim to assist farmers in raising their yields and

improving their methods.⁴⁴ Unfortunately, however, policies aimed at raising farm produce do not necessarily stem the flow of labour away from farming, nor do they lead to a greatly improved quality of rural life. Part of the reason for this is simply that Nigerian agriculture operates more or less independently of government control. Most of the farming industry is organized on the basis of peasant land tenure systems where holdings are small and scattered, and where crop production lies in the hands of small village landholders. Consequently farming has remained almost entirely beyond state intervention; government policies which aim at providing assistance to small farmers and promoting increased productivity do not have the same direct impact on the rural agricultural sector as they do on the urban industrial sector. As a result a dichotomy has developed between what is considered traditional (or backward) and what is perceived as modern (or advanced). As Igbozurike suggests, while a model of industrialization formulates the crux of national development policy, "agriculture stands for underdevelopment and tradition, industries for development and modernity."⁴⁵

Because Nigeria's development strategy is founded on a model of industrialization, planning and policies have called for steady streams of investment, both public and private, in a few sectoral areas of the economy. Generally this has meant the development of large urban areas, of investment programmes which are guided in their spatial location by macro-economic considerations which often "imply a further stimulus to the

concentration of development in major growth poles."⁴⁶ This of course profoundly affects the distribution of economic activity. Because the bulk of industrial development in Nigeria is centred in or near primate cities, large urban centres have emerged as focal points of socio-economic activity. They are characterized by clusters of industry, centralized public administration, expansive markets, and excessive monetary liquidity. As a result there exists in Nigeria a dualistic economy: on the one hand a town-centred externally oriented society with its foundation of industrialization and commercial trade, and on the other a rural-centred society with its traditional organizations and its ages-old methods of cultivation and processing.⁴⁷

Theoretically, of course, urban sectoral growth may be viewed as an effective means of generating employment and widening the accumulation of wealth; this is what is commonly known as the "centre-down" or "trickle-down" approach whereby the concentration of investment in specific growth poles will inevitably have a "spread effect" leading to the ultimate diffusion of employment and wealth from the cities into the rural hinterland. Unfortunately the practical results of this type of approach in Nigeria, so far at least, appear to contrast sharply with the conceptual model. Heavy investment in import substitution industries generates little employment and, because of the tendency of these industries to depend on foreign inputs, there is little or not attempt to develop local village resource input.⁴⁸ Consequently the dichotomy between the "traditional" and the "modern" sectors has become more pronounced, and the

linkages between the two would often seem to be either tenuous or non-existent. Serious spatial distortions are the result; as Stohr suggests, similar inequalities in many other developing countries between rural and urban sectors lead "to increasing spatial ~~divergence~~ ² rather than a convergence of living levels. In other words, even with explicit regional development policies operating through . . . large-scale private or public organizations, the sum of all backwash effects in most cases still seem to exceed the spread effects."⁴⁹

Thus, as long as the main thrust of economic ~~development~~ ³ remains city-centred, and as long as the generation of wealth and opportunity, limited in scope as they may be, circulates in the vortex of urban growth poles while rural villages remain essentially commercial backwaters, it is unlikely that popular perceptions of agriculture and rural living will alter or that current rural outmigration trends will diminish. Viewed in this light the decision by most migrants to move to the towns and cities is neither illogical nor ill-considered. As most writers agree urban migrants act in a rational way, outweighing expectations of life in the city with their perceptions of life in the rural village.⁵⁰ As Gregory argues:

As long as . . . cities benefit from a highly disproportional amount of development funds, in-migration is bound to continue. Indeed, as an individual, the in-migrant is behaving rationally. In terms of development needs, however, the concentration of resources in the cities and continued in-migration is irrational.⁵¹

For our purposes the main point to be made here is that Nigeria's formal education programme, while perhaps in the

short run proving ineffectual in the promotion of agricultural development and in the reversal of migration patterns, should not summarily be dismissed as a long-term hindrance to overall rural development. For as Foster writes:

We must accept the fact that those factors which really give the impetus to early economic growth are far more subtle than the proponents of vocational education suppose. In effect . . . the crucial variables lie in the structure of incentives within the economic system and the degree to which the institutional framework provides a milieu which is supportive of entrepreneurial activity.⁵²

In other words, regardless of the quantity or quality of education, it is the overall structure of the political economy and the adopted model of socio-economic development which ultimately shape the pattern of sectoral economic growth and employment in the country. The effect of education by itself may hasten or retard certain trends, but will not substantially alter them. As L. J. Lewis has observed, "the aspirations of the people for social and economic betterment are not so much the result of education, which is seen as a means to betterment, but rather the result of the contrast so patently visible between the material and cultural limitations of rural life and the apparent richness of urban life."⁵³

All this is not to say, however, that Nigeria's education policy has little or no positive bearing on rural development or on agricultural growth. On the contrary, while it does seem true that the short-term effect of primary education is to instil among village children a disenchantment with rural life and an aversion to farming as a career, there are indications that

over time UPE may prove of considerable benefit to the rural regions. In terms of its skills function alone, as we have already suggested, basic literacy and numeracy which form the core of primary school learning may eventually facilitate improvements in some aspects of farm operations. In addition, and perhaps more significantly, the implementation of UPE could well be a major institutional step in a long painstaking process of bridging the rural-urban gap. By extending formal schooling throughout the entire country the government is in effect providing a potential spearhead for further development programmes. As Bray observes:

UPE is one of the few projects that really do reach the remote parts of the country. These villages are beginning to witness "development" for the first time. Very often the school is the only cement building for miles around, and the simple decision to site the school opens up the area, since the contractor has to find a way to drive his lorry to the village, and in the process creates a road.⁵⁴

The creation of serviceable roads is no mean achievement, for these may then open up increased trade and communication between towns and villages, and thus perhaps facilitate more effective backward and forward socio-economic linkages between urban growth poles and small rural villages. In remote villages themselves the existence of modern school buildings may expedite on a more sound spatial basis the provision and local centralization of other social services such as health care, adult education programmes, agricultural extension, local administration, etc.⁵⁵ Likewise the permanent presence of school teachers, who are after all salaried civil servants, may have a profound effect

not only on the pupils they teach but on the villagers with whom they live. Because of the nature of their job, rural primary school teachers, for all their limitations in experience and ability, are exponents of modernization and change. Their ideas, preferences, and aspirations must ultimately influence the communities which they inhabit.

As yet it is too early to assess the full impact of the federal government's present UPE programme on agricultural growth and rural development. Certainly the short term effect may be to create social and economic disruption as school leavers spurn farming and village life, at least temporarily. Yet in the long run, if the spatial imbalance of Nigeria's political economy is to be repaired, and if development is to have meaning for rural regions as it does for towns and cities, then socio-cultural changes must be wrought in rural villages. As Matlon concludes:

Finally it must be recognized that obstacles to ensuring broad participation in programs of development are not only technical and economic in nature but also institutional. . . . Ultimately, the formation of alternative village institutions which mobilize wider segments of the rural population and which promote a broader range of interests may be necessary.⁵⁶

Undoubtedly the introduction of the formal school institution, encompassing as it does a broad range of learning interests for all children from all segments of the population, will help to effect the necessary social change in rural areas. To that extent, therefore, UPE is indeed not only an "important instrument of change" as specified in education policy, but may over

time prove to be closely "related to overall community needs."

5.5 Informal Education and the Need for an Integration of Development Policies

Primary education of course constitutes the base of Nigeria's formal education system only; indeed, the great majority of primary school pupils are less than twelve years of age. It is important to remember, therefore, that while UPE may eventually prove to be a significant rural development programme, its effectiveness will depend to a large extent on the types of follow-up measures which are pursued. As we have noted, the federal government is heavily committed to the expansion and subsidization of formal post-primary education. Yet opportunities for educational advancement beyond primary school are limited. For most young people Primary VI is the terminal point of their formal education. Moreover, whatever their personal aspirations may be, ultimately the overwhelming number of primary school graduates who are desirous of employment will be forced to turn their hands to the plow or to small craft industry in the rural regions. Thus it would seem that if rural primary education is to be sustained by effective follow-up programmes, much will depend on the development of informal on-going village education schemes which lie outside the formal school system. Such indeed would appear to be among the tenets of Nigeria's National Education Policy: "lifelong education is to be the basis of policy"; "basic education, in a variety of forms, is to be provided to all citizens"; "education is to be

related to overall community needs." In short, as society in Nigeria remains largely rural-based, a major focus of educational policy should be the development of a variety of post-primary rural education programmes.

Unfortunately, however, in contrast to the federal government's enlarged commitment⁵³ to formal secondary and higher education, the provision of informal on-going rural education programmes has proven sparse and insufficient. This is not to say that those programmes which have been undertaken in rural areas have failed. On the contrary, numerous studies have shown that quite often small-scale informal village education programmes, if oriented to practical local needs and if planned and managed on a sound basis, may result in satisfactory socio-economic returns.⁵⁷ Indeed, the potential value of on-going adult education, as discussed in the previous chapter, would seem as important for all-round rural development as for the improvement of small-scale industrial efficiency. For instance, in reference to one such project in south-eastern Nigeria, a generalized practical education programme for village women, Odokara has concluded: "We witness that all participants usually go home at the end of each session with a feeling of great satisfaction and responsibility for their own individual families and the entire community."⁵⁸

As yet, however, informal village education programmes lack concerted regional co-ordination. Many in fact are dependent on such diverse sponsors as universities, church missions, and various international non-government organizations, thus

limiting the possibilities for broadening beyond the "pilot project" stage. Likewise the provision of agricultural extension, under the auspices of the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, has frequently proven to be ineffective. Numerous reasons for this have been cited: poorly-trained staff, insufficient numbers of field workers, lack of transport facilities, the proliferation of extension services which act as supply depots rather than as centres of instruction, and the tendency to concentrate services in areas which have easy access to towns and cities.⁵⁹ The inadequacy of agricultural extension in Nigeria is a problem to be seriously reckoned with, for as E. R. Watts writes, "Development rests largely on the communication of new ideas. In the rural situation most of the new ideas that are needed are concerned with agriculture. An effective agricultural extension service backed up by research, training, and credit is probably the most important single factor in ensuring rapid agricultural development."⁶⁰ And agriculture, as we have seen, is the primary source of livelihood for most Nigerians.

In summary, it would appear that insufficient resources have been devoted to informal rural education programmes which might reinforce the long-term value of rural primary schooling. Indeed, in view of the drawbacks inherent in much of the formal post-primary school system which we have already discussed, a revision of educational strategy would seem necessary. While there is obviously room for further investigation, we may re-iterate here the proposed alternative educational strategy put

forward at the end of the previous chapter: a) maintain the present UPE programme; b) diminish investment in formal secondary education; c) investigate the ways and means of diverting more resources towards the development of informal post-primary training schemes which have a direct bearing on the practical needs of rural communities, and which might involve more local input and participation from those of all ages, than is at present the case in the firmly structured, bureaucratic, formal post-primary school system.

In the final analysis of course one cannot expect UPE and sundry informal education programmes alone to generate a vast transformation of the rural sector and to arrest the trend of rural outmigration. Education per se cannot bring about the end of the socio-economic duality which exists in Nigeria. Ultimately, if an overall socio-economic transformation is to occur in the rural sector, the infrastructure of high income, flexible lines of available credit, farm supplies and services, good roads and rail service, market centres, health care units, and other facilities must be generated throughout the hinterland on the basis of a well-organized spatial pattern. Indeed, the development of rural areas is a multi-faceted business involving a variety of components, all of which are inter-related. Unless the inter-relatedness of the components is recognized, unless the approach to rural development involves the integration of these components such that any advancement in one is complemented by simultaneous advances in the others, rural development will prove to be an uncertain haphazard process. As Mijindadi

writes, "More than one pronged approach is needed in order to achieve success in rural development programmes. Real development is only likely to occur when the many components . . . can be successfully integrated into a co-ordinated team approach."⁶¹ In this sense, whether it is adopted as policy or not, education is part of an integrated process. In the long run, therefore, the effectiveness of rural education will depend largely on the success of national development policies which adhere to a model of integration and sound spatial planning.

FOOTNOTES

(CHAPTER 5)

¹ Arnold, Modern Nigeria, p. 91; Q. E. R., Annual Supplement, 1978, p. 9; Third National Plan, p. 370.

² IBRD, Nigeria: Options for Long-Term Development, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1974, p. 1.

³ Financial Times, p. 32.

⁴ Matlon, p. 10.

⁵ Obasanjo, p. 613; and Matlon, p. 8.

⁶ Joseph, p. 224. See also Arnold, Modern Nigeria, pp. 91-102, and Q. E. R., Annual Supplement, 1978, p. 9.

⁷ Jonathon Derrick, "Farming in Nigeria: Part II", West Africa, No. 3236, July 23, 1979, p. 1306.

⁸ Q. E. R., Fourth Quarter, 1978, p. 18.

⁹ Q. E. R., Annual Supplement, 1978, p. 23.

¹⁰ Derrick, "Farming in Nigeria: Part I", West Africa, No. 3235, July 16, 1979, p. 1265.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Matlon, p. 94.

¹³ Derrick, "Part I", p. 1264.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 1265.

¹⁵ Matlon, p. 27 and p. 34.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 54. Guy Arnold also writes:

The current average food intake of Nigerians is 2000 calories per head so that the people as a whole are grossly underfed. To raise the caloric intake from 2000 to 4000 over 15 years (taking account of the expanding population at the same time) would require a growth in agriculture of 7.8 per cent. This is not an impossible target.

Modern Nigeria, pp. 91-92.

¹⁷Matlon, p. 54 and p. 97.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 7 and p. 102.

¹⁹A. A. Adesimi, "The Proposed UPE in Nigeria and the Supply of a New Generation of Farmers", West African Journal of Education, 20 (1), February, 1976, pp. 47-48; Derrick, "Part II", p. 1306; Matlon, p. 77; P. Mueller and K. H. Zevering, "Employment Promotion through Rural Development: A Pilot Project in Western Nigeria", in Walter Galenson, ed., Essays on Employment, ILO, Geneva, 1971, p. 104.

²⁰Mueller and Zevering, p. 101.

²¹Ibid., p. 108.

²²Arnold cites one critic: "Some 80 per cent of Nigeria's total arable land is still uncultivated. Yet the country is today suffering from acute food shortage. Our untilled and underutilised agricultural land is one of the huge sources of waste in the economy". Modern Nigeria, p. 93.

²³Derrick, "Part II", p. 1266.

²⁴A great deal of literature exists on migration patterns in sub-Saharan Africa. An overview of the literature is provided by Alan Simmons, et. al., Social Change and Internal Migration: A Review of Research Findings from Africa, Asia, and Latin America, IDRC, Ottawa, 1977.

²⁵Oshomha Imoagene, "The Impact of Industrialization and Urbanization on the People of Nigeria", Présence -Africaine, 96 (4), 1975, p. 578.

²⁶Ibid., p. 582.

²⁷Abernethy, p. 200.

²⁸Peshkin, p. 118.

²⁹Oluigbo Nathan Osuji, "Patterns of Occupational Choice and Aspirations in Conditions of Economic and Technological Underdevelopment", Journal of Vocational Behaviour, 8 (2), April, 1976, pp. 136-39.

³⁰J. O. Abiri, "A Sample Study of Nigerian Adolescents' Academic and Occupational Aspirations", West African Journal of Educational and Vocational Measurement, 4 (1), August, 1977, pp. 58-61.

³¹A. Adepoju, "Migration, Economic Opportunity, and Occupational Mobility: A Case Study of Western Nigeria", Quarterly Journal of Administration, 11 (3), April, 1977, p. 173.

³²Leslie Green, "Migration, Urbanization, and National Development in Nigeria", in Samir Amin, ed., Modern Migrations in Western Africa, Oxford University Press, London, 1974, p. 282.

³³Guy Hunter, Rural-Urban Migration in Tropical Africa, Commonwealth Foundation, London, 1974, p. 21.

³⁴Imoagene, p. 575.

³⁵Richard D'Aeth, Education and Development in the Third World, Saxon House, D. C. Heath Ltd., Westmead, England, 1975, pp. 63-64.

³⁶Peshkin, p. 138.

³⁷Imoagene, p. 585.

³⁸Derrick, "Part II", p. 1306.

³⁹The Phelps-Stokes Reports of 1922 and 1925 strongly advocated the philosophy of "adaptionist" education. Since the great majority of Africans were then, as now, engaged in agriculture, the official view was that adaptation meant relating school curriculum to the practicalities of rural life. Abernethy, p. 89.

⁴⁰A. W. Wood, Informal Education and Development in Africa, Institute of Social Studies, the Hague, the Netherlands, 1974, p. 165.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 136.

⁴²Okili, p. 875.

⁴³According to Simmons, et. al. existent models of the determinants of migration generally hinge on the most immediate causes of migration such as education. They argue that not enough attention has been given to major structural causes such as prevailing "investment patterns, land tenure patterns, foreign and domestic markets," etc. (p. 10).

⁴⁴Government spending on agriculture has increased annually, especially in attempts to bolster the production of food crops. Since 1976 the widely promoted Operation Feed the Nation campaign with its slogan "Whatever Your Occupation -- Farm!" has already cost N.75 billion or more. Q. E. R., First Quarter, 1979, p. 9.

⁴⁵ Igbozurike, p. 29.

⁴⁶ Green p. 295.

⁴⁷ For further elaboration see H. I. Ajacibu, "Regional Planning and the Rural Areas in Nigeria," in K. M. Barbour, ed., Planning for Nigeria, Ibadan University Press, 1972, pp. 11-09; and A. L. Maboqunje, Urban-Rural Relationship in a Developing Economy: The Parable of Old Wineskins, Paper presented to the joint LASA/ASA Meeting, Houston, 1977.

⁴⁸ Refer to Note 60 in Chapter 4.

⁴⁹ Walter B. Stohr, Development from Below: The Bottom-Up and Periphery-Inward Development Paradigm, Interdisciplinary Institute of Urban and Regional Studies, University of Economics, Vienna, 1978, p. 13.

⁵⁰ For an explanation of the assumed economic determinants in the migrant's decision-making process, see Michael P. Todaro, Migration and Economic Development, Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi, April, 1976.

For a discussion of the non-economic "psychic" factors which are involved, see Derek Byerlee, "Rural-Urban Migration in Africa: Theory, Policy, and Research", International Migration Review, Winter, 1974, pp. 543-66.

⁵¹ Joel W. Gregory, "Development and In-Migration in Upper Volta", in Amin, ed., Modern Migrations, p. 316.

⁵² Philip J. Foster, "The Vocational School Fallacy in Development Planning", in Hanson and Brembeck, eds., Education and the Development of Nations, p. 173.

⁵³ L. J. Lewis, "Politics, Culture, and Education in Newly Independent Countries", Educational Problems in Developing Countries, Symposium on Educational Problems in Developing Countries, Wolters-Noordhoff, The Hague, 1969, pp. 23-24.

⁵⁴ Bray, p. 11.

⁵⁵ Onokerhoraye has commented on the spacial implications of social policies:

. . . it must be emphasized that a geographical viewpoint, a spatial perspective, has been disastrously lacking in many social policies in Nigeria for too long. It has taken a long time for this fact to sink in that deprivation is not only a structural but also a spatial feature, for the place where one is born and where one lives largely determines the access one

has to social services such as educational and health facilities. A great many of the socio-economic problems of Nigeria . . . have a clear spatial content. To ignore this dimension in planning is to commit an error of major magnitude.

"An Analysis of the Spatial Distribution of Post-Primary Schools in Kwara State", Savanna, 6 (1), June, 1977, p. 24.

⁵⁶Matlon, p. 104.

⁵⁷For examples see E. O. Odokara, "The Partnership of University in Continuing Education of Adults in Rural Nigeria", Indian Journal of Adult Education, 32 (11), 1971, pp. 10-13 (women's education); E. R. Watts, "He Always Walks Uphill", Ceres, 4 (4), July-August, 1971, pp. 32-36 (farm radio programmes); Wood, Informal Education, pp. 158-75 (mission-sponsored rural education in northern Nigeria).

⁵⁸Odokara, p. 13.

⁵⁹For discussions on agricultural extension in Nigeria see George H. Axinn and Sudhakar Thorat, Modernizing World Agriculture: A comparative Study of Agricultural Extension Systems, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1972, pp. 151-67; Adegboyeye Jibowo, "Effects of Motivators and Hygiene Factors on Job Performance Among Extension Workers in the Former Western State of Nigeria", Quarterly Journal of Administration, 12 (1), October, 1977, pp. 45-54; L. O. Obibuaku, "Education and Training in the Nigerian Agricultural Extension Service", Journal of Administration Overseas, 14 (2), April, 1975, pp. 113-19; and E. R. Watts, "He Always Walks Uphill."

⁶⁰Watts, p. 32.

⁶¹N. B. Mijindadi, "Integrated Rural Development: Concept and Planning Implications: With Examples from Nigeria", Community Development Journal, 13 (1), January, 1978, p. 22.

CHAPTER 6: EDUCATION AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION

6.1 Introduction

So far in this paper, in questioning the immense and obviously rising financial commitment to formal education by Nigeria's federal and state governments, we have considered education primarily in view of its contribution to employment and sectoral growth. Whether in terms of measured financial costs and benefits, or of acquired skills or modes of behaviour, or of the relationship (if at all) between types and levels of training and the eventual utilization and deployment of the country's manpower, the returns to be had on education, private or social, either precisely evaluated or crudely indicated, have been perceived as fundamentally economic. The rationale for this is due not only to official policy pronouncements which refer to education as an essential pre-requisite to the country's development, but also to the fact that oil is an exhaustable commodity and thus dictates that public spending now must ensure the growth and development of new resources to sustain national economic self-sufficiency in future.

Nevertheless, as we have suggested earlier, the returns on education extend beyond the scale of economics -- of production and earnings levels, rates of unemployment, labour-capital ratios, etc. If education is indeed to be regarded as investment in human capital -- and there is good reason to accept it as such -- it is important to remember that "homo sapiens" is

not just "homo economicus." Nor is a nation solely an economic entity and its development simply an economic process demanding rational economic policies. Development, as we have suggested, is a sociological phenomenon as well, and must account for the complexities of the human condition in society -- for politics, ethnicity, religion and custom, and language.

We are of course stating the obvious. Yet the point to make here is that when discussing the returns on investment in human capital, it is essential to recognize that returns should not be viewed only in terms of their economic value. Indeed, while the returns on education may sometimes appear low or negative in an economic sense -- either at a private or a social rate -- on some occasions they may nonetheless be profitable in a non-economic sense, and thus prove to be a justifiable investment. For our purposes, therefore, in order to establish a semblance of thoroughness in evaluating Nigeria's formal education system, we must account for these non-economic returns.

As we noted at the beginning of this paper, the "philosophy" of Nigeria's education system is founded on the idea of "the integration of the individual into a sound and effective citizen, and equal educational opportunities for all citizens of the nation at the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels, both inside and outside the formal system." Similarly, included among the aims of national education policy are the following two points: "the inculcation of national consciousness and national unity"; "the inculcation of the right type of values and attitudes for the survival of the individual and Nigerian

society." Clearly, on the basis of these policy statements, and in view of the country's phenomenal ethnic and cultural heterogeneity, as well as its recent turbulent past, a prime non-economic function of education is to further the process of national integration in Nigeria.

National integration may be defined here as a process of establishing cohesion among a number of distinct social units such that these come to constitute a political whole which can be described as a national community.¹ It is a means whereby socio-political attachments, hitherto rooted in communal segments, are extended to include an identification with, and loyalty to, the nation-state as a whole. This is a necessity for the nation-state, for its legitimacy and its ability to function as a socio-political entity demand acceptance among the generality of its citizens living within its jurisdiction. If the state is to have meaning and is to be operable then there must be some degree of national unity; the concept of the nation must be accepted by the people. As Nwabueze argues, "A nation is essentially a state of mind. It connotes, firstly, a feeling of community, a consciousness of common belonging or identity among the members of the state."² Thus, for diverse segments of different cultural and communal origins to establish links as a corporate group, a general will to live together and to embrace a common destiny must be fostered among the peoples of the nation-state. National integration, in other words, is the means by which the state develops its viability and legitimacy.

Certainly for Nigeria a major impetus which has underscored its overall development policies since 1970 has been the drive not only for economic growth but for unity and national integration. Consisting of approximately one-fifth the population of Africa, and comprising a multitude of some 250 ethnic groups, each with distinctive linguistic and cultural backgrounds and, in most cases, with distinctive territorial homelands, Nigeria is outstanding as a colonial creation whereby a vast number of disparate regions and peoples were forged together into a single administrative entity. The geographic differences in the country thus affect not only the living conditions of people in different areas but to a large extent constitute segmental boundaries which are deep and potentially divisive. In a plural society such as Nigeria, therefore, the process of national integration necessitates the minimization of internal conflict and the simultaneous breakdown of existent regional socio-economic disparities.³ With the return to civilian rule effected in 1979 -- and with the unfortunate effects of past civilian politicking still fresh in the minds of many citizens⁴-- the concern for minimizing conflict and for forging bonds founded on common national identity and interest remains acute. In his maiden speech to the Legislative Assembly in October, 1979, President-Elect Shagari stated:

The new [political] system that we have adopted presents us with yet another opportunity to achieve national integration which is a prerequisite for the building of a strong and virile nation.

Since our ultimate objective is to pro-

vide for the welfare of all Nigerians, we must subjugate our political and other differences to the unrelenting pursuit of peace, unity, and progress.⁵

As reflected in its slogan, "One Nation, One Destiny", there can be little doubt that for the new federal government a key function of educational policy will remain the advancement of national integration.

Our purpose in this chapter is to examine the extent to which the formal education system can be said to contribute to the process of national integration. In section 6.2 we shall discuss the relationship between formal education and conflict in Nigeria. In a plural society the potentiality of inter-group conflict is the dynamic which underlies the integrative process. In order to accomodate segmental differences within society, measures must therefore be taken to minimize the potential of violent internal hostility. In the past regional educational disparities in Nigeria have been the source of internal conflict and severe socio-political instability. Since the end of the civil war the federal government's commitment to provide UPE and to expand formal post-primary education would appear to be instrumental in containing the potential for conflict, not only because such a commitment is aimed at resolving internal educational disparities, but also because it stimulates competition based on individual scholastic merit rather than on group rivalry and suspicion, thus lessening the possibility of violence.

In section 6.3 we shall discuss the role of formal educa-

tion in promoting horizontal integration. As is often remarked, national integration is a phenomenon which should be viewed along two spatial dimensions, one horizontal, the other vertical.⁶ Horizontal integration is a function of the level at which the potential for conflict between different cultural, linguistic, or racial groups is diffused and where social interaction and a spirit of shared identity and interests among members of these groups is simultaneously increased. Obviously horizontal integration is vital if Nigeria is to develop as a viable democratic nation-state. And evidence clearly indicates that formal education is highly effective in fostering common experiences and common ties among Nigerian youth.

As effective as formal education appears to be in creating bonds which cut across traditional ethnic and regional divisions, it simultaneously helps to create new social segments which may preclude the vertical integration of society. Vertical integration may be regarded as the compression of societal stratification and the concurrent increase in social interaction between members of society's elite and those of the population who are less fortunate. While the emergence of distinctive vertical social segments may help to advance the process of national integration by minimizing the potential for inter-ethnic conflict, given the sharp duality of Nigeria's political economy and its capitalist industrial approach to economic development, distinctions based on wealth, power, and prestige may in fact prove to be a latent socio-political hazard. Since education is so often the crucial determinant of such distinctions, in

section 6.4 we shall consider the extent to which the formal educational system sustains the continuing socio-economic gap which exists between the modern urban sector on the one hand and the burgeoning level of urban squalor and rural poverty on the other. If such is the case, then the notion of education as being a key to equality of opportunity and national unity could turn out to be ephemeral: the successful promotion of national integration in one sense may create disintegrative tendencies in yet another sense.

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6.2 Formal Education and Conflict Minimization

Formal education in Nigeria, while considered an instrumental factor in the federal government's efforts to integrate society and to provide a measure of equal opportunity for all, has also proven in the past to be a major cause for internal bitterness and strife. Prior to the civil war, for example, the intense political rifts which had developed at the central government level could be traced in part to the glaring educational disparities which existed between the vast tradition-bound Northern Region and the more "progressive" Eastern and Western Regions of the South. Most of the dominant positions in business and the public service were held by southern Nigerians because of their higher education. The result of this imbalance was that northerners, the majority of whom had received little or no western schooling, displayed increasing fear and hostility toward their southern counterparts. Indeed, by the mid-1960's "educational inequalities had become a source

of bitter political conflict."⁷ In 1966, when the newly established military government of General Ironsi announced the unification of the country's regional civil services, northern hostility intensified, for as Abernethy writes, "the close link between the educational system and civil service recruitment meant that any upgrading of the administrative apparatus was also an upgrading of the most educationally advanced groups in the country."⁸ In fact the intensity of resentment to Ironsi's announcement was such that severe disruption shook the country, resulting in a violent coup a month later and triggering off the events which led eventually to the war.

As some writers have pointed out, the major force which underlies the process of national integration in plural societies is the dynamic of conflict potentiality.⁹ This appears to present a paradox, for we may assume that conflict is the destructive element which renders societies apart. However, as Mazrui observes:

. . . while conflict itself has a propensity to force a dissolution, the resolution of conflict is an essential mechanism of integration. The whole experience of jointly looking for a way out of a crisis, of seeing your own mutual hostility subside to a level of mutual tolerance, of being intensely conscious of each other's positions and yet sensing the need to bridge the gulf -- these are experiences which, over a period of time, should help groups of people move forward into a relationship of deeper integration.¹⁰

From a governmental point of view, therefore, the process of integration may be perceived as a set of policies which aims towards the eventual resolution of conflict. Certainly

throughout the past decade a prime political objective of Nigeria's federal government has been to formulate policies which minimize the potential for internal regional and ethnic conflict. Even before the civil war had ended, the federal government had undertaken to vitiate the sources of conflict by accommodating the plural realities of the country. New states were created, political and administrative responsibilities were decentralized, virtually no war reparations were demanded, and revenue from petroleum production was centralized and then shared proportionally among the states.¹¹

Despite such integrative measures, however, one potential source of conflict has remained: regional disparity in formal education. In 1972 the Federal Commissioner for Education felt compelled to complain:

"So wide is the gap that roughly speaking, for every child in a primary school in the Northern States there are four in the Southern States; for every boy or girl in a secondary school in the North, there are five in the South. And for every student in a post-secondary school in the North, there are six in the South."¹²

As a further illustration of the regional educational gap, it was estimated that "of the 4.5 million pupils attending primary school in 1975 only 15 per cent were from the four far northern states, although these contain half the country's total population."¹³ And at the top end of the educational pyramid, in the same year it was reckoned that "Yoruba and Ibo students together probably account for more than two-thirds of Nigeria's university student population, yet their share of the country's total population is not much more than 30 percent. Other im-

balances are dwarfed by these disproportions."¹⁴ Obviously then, when we consider the social and economic value which is widely attached to formal education, it is apparent that latent regional distrust and hostility may yet be rooted in the ethnic imbalance between the school population and that of society as a whole. As Beckett and O'Connell argue:

For northerners in general and far northerners in particular educational inequality has serious implications. First, they will continue to be extremely poorly represented in the Federal administrative and technical services -- and this in a country where the personal origin of public servants is considered a matter of great significance. Second, they will almost certainly be unable to fill many technical and teaching posts in their own States, and will have to call on southern (or expatriate) skills. Finally, the social developments that have given the southerners their present lead in university entrance have also given them the edge in commercial and industrial development.¹⁵

Clearly political necessity has virtually dictated that a concerted effort be made to redress the imbalance and to broaden the ethnic composition of the country's educational institutions.

With the windfall of huge petroleum profits in 1974 the federal government was able to take a significant first step towards achieving this end by announcing its intention to implement free and compulsory UPE. By so doing, the government was in effect acting on the need to minimize the potential for regional hostility and anti-government feeling: in a purely political sense this in itself may be regarded as a sufficient return on investment.

Nevertheless, the process of national integration -- and the

contribution of educational expansion to that process -- involves more than simply the short-term containment of ethnic dissatisfaction. A further political advantage in expanding the base of the educational system lies also in the fact that such a policy helps to multiply the areas of potential conflict in society. In other words, the universal provision of schooling stimulates competition among individuals rather than groups, and thence lessens the potential for such competition (or conflict) to disrupt the overall social order. Significant to this argument is the role of formal education as a social leveller. This of course does not imply that it fosters equality in society. On the contrary, as can be seen by the emphasis on examinations, schools operate on an intensely competitive basis, as a result of which there are winners and losers. What it does suggest, however, is that theoretically at least, the competition is founded on a system of merit, with selection and rewards determined according to an individual's examined scholastic ability, and not according to pre-determined factors such as tribal or social background. (As we shall see, however, upward mobility in the pyramidal education system may increasingly be affected by socio-economic, if not tribal, background.)

In a case study conducted in Bornu Province, Peshkin substantiated the view that primary schools could be effective in breaching the disintegrative tendencies of socio-economic, and even sexual, differences:

School competition is unique because it proceeds by universalistic and achievement criteria. First, females are as likely to be "winners" as

males ("Bintu, today you're the star. I want you to keep it up."); there is no sex barrier to success and no separate demands or expectations based upon sex. Second, high economic status, while bestowing the usual advantages, does not predetermine the outcomes of school competition. The poorer Buba outshines the wealthier Maliki. Third, the child with ability may win regardless of his family's social rank, thus giving credence to the notion that children may attain rewards commensurate with their demonstrable ability. Schools offer children from ordinary families a route to success other than the traditional client-patron system. . . . This boost to achievement is a latent dysfunction in terms of customary procedure for social mobility. In terms of the requirements of economic and political modernization it is decidedly a latent function.¹⁶

In terms of national integration, the schools' contribution to economic and political modernization as opposed to traditional methods of status attainment can again be assumed as a satisfactory social return.

The school system may perhaps do little to minimize societal stratification -- indeed a case can be made, as we shall see, that it helps to perpetuate social inequalities. In that sense, therefore, it also helps to perpetuate, not eradicate, internal competition. However, by functioning in a way such that the procedure of selection and rewards is meant to operate on an impartial individual basis, independent of pre-determined criteria, the school system acts to reduce the potential for inter-ethnic or inter-regional conflict. As Abernethy has pointed out:

Equality is not easily established in modern societies because of the high degree of stratification that inevitably develops in complex, dynamic institutions. In accepting stratification as necessary and desirable, however, a

modern government normally tries to ensure its citizens equal opportunity for upward mobility -- an equal chance, in short, to become unequal.¹⁷

Undoubtedly, by expanding the formal school system so that the "equal chance" is available universally throughout the country, the Nigerian government is placing much of the onus for success or failure on the individual student and on his own ability. In this manner competition is diffused, occurring at the individual rather than the regional or group level. Consequently the areas for potential hostility (as regards educational opportunity) are also diffused and hence the possibilities of open conflict on a large scale are minimized. This is in keeping with the political objective of national integration, for as Mazrui writes:

. . . the process of integration is a gradual multiplication of areas of conflict, coupled with a gradual diminution of violence in those conflicts. In other words, conflict becomes more extensive as areas of competition become more complex, and less intensive as resort to violent solutions diminishes in frequency.¹⁸

Indeed, the extension of educational opportunities throughout the country not only ensures that competition occurs at the individual level, but that by means of terminal examination results, its resolution is thoroughly non-violent and, for the most part, impartial.¹⁹

6.3 Formal Education and Horizontal Integration

At this point we might conclude that the expansion of formal schooling in Nigeria is simply a Machiavellian form of political containment, that by reducing competition to the indivi-

dual level the government is using the school system in a cynical way so as to maintain socio-political order. There may be a measure of truth in this; yet it also smacks of grand elite conspiracy; and given the plural nature of the country this is hardly plausible. Besides, for a nation which is second only to India in its ethnic and linguistic diversity, there does remain in Nigeria the very real problem of evolving as a single cohesive nation-state. In order to sustain and enhance the viability of what is essentially a colonial creation, it would not seem enough to carry out measures which simply contain conflict. Simultaneous efforts should be made to promote common bonds of allegiance or identity which extend beyond local ethnic communities. Otherwise there might be a hollow ring to the verse:

Though tribe and tongue may differ,
In Brotherhood we stand,
Nigerians all, and proud to serve
Our sovereign Motherland.

It is in these words of the National Anthem, in fact, wherein lie two important elements demonstrating the positive concrete impact of formal education in the process of national horizontal integration. Firstly, for most Nigerians the National Anthem is probably first learned in schools -- and in the common language of English.²⁰ For a plural society such as Nigeria, in which there are "scores of languages",²¹ the proliferation of a common language acceptable to all groups is an important integrative factor provided by the formal school system, especially at the primary level. By undertaking to

enable an entire generation to read, write, and speak English, the UPE programme may have the effect of initiating the necessary spanning of linguistic divisions in the country. The introduction of a common language, by facilitating communication among citizens from every region, is understandably considered to be "one of the major contributions to national integration made by educational expansion."²²

Secondly, in addition to promoting a common means of communication, the formal school system provides a broadly uniform socio-cultural experience which transcends subnational tribal boundaries. The singing of the national anthem and the recital of the national pledge at school assembly meetings are not only instances of shared cultural experience but also no doubt are meant to be a part of the broad educational objective of integrating "the individual into a sound and effective citizen."

As we discussed in Chapter 2, studies have demonstrated the effect of formal western-style schooling in inculcating certain common characteristics among children regardless of their tribal or national differentiation. Moreover the teaching of common subjects such as mathematics, science, history, civics, etc., not only provides a similar learning and cultural experience, but may act to initiate an identification and allegiance to Nigeria as a nation-state. Even in primary schools where the content of curriculum and examinations is determined at the divisional or state levels rather than at the federal level, there is little doubt that a sense of nationalism is fostered.

General knowledge and social studies questions in two primary school leaving certificate examinations -- one northern and one southern -- demonstrate the extent to which efforts are made to instil among children an awareness of Nigeria as a political entity and to create an allegiance to the federation as well as to their own states. Examples of such questions are as follows:

Tangale-Waja Province

- Name the present Head of State of Nigeria.
- Name the five Chiefs of Tangale-Waja.
- Name ten (10) States which you know in Nigeria.
- Name four imports of Nigeria.

Oyo State

- The Cultural Centre for Oyo State can be found in _____.
- The chairman of the Federal Electoral Commission is _____.
- The colours of the Nigerian flag are _____ and _____.
- Every citizen of Nigeria has freedom of _____ and _____.

(See Appendices III and IV)

By studying for and answering such questions primary school children are in fact undergoing a common process of national and regional political socialization. In reference to the socio-political impact of widespread primary education, Abernethy has written:

When young Nigerians attending school learn to reach the classroom on time, to stand up when reciting their lessons, to tend the school grounds, and so forth, they are building up a common store of experiences. And to the extent that the Nigerian educational system differs from that of neighbouring countries -- in the language used, and in the content and quality of instruction -- the common educational experiences of Nigerians are exclusive ones.²³

At the post-primary level evidence suggests that formal schooling is even more effective in advancing horizontal inte-

gration among students. For example, unlike primary schools which, as a result of UPE, enable children to live at home while attending school, most post-primary schools in Nigeria are boarding institutions which invariably are situated in or near district or provincial capitals.²⁴ For many students this means having to leave the family compound and home village for the first time, to travel sometimes lengthy distances and to lodge in an urban western-oriented institution. By living in such an institutional environment for extended periods of time, they are "brought further and further within the world culture that is primarily Western European in origin."²⁵ Likewise too, the experience of living side by side with classmates of various social and ethnic backgrounds, and having to make greater use of English or a lingua franca which may be different from one's own mother tongue, all conceivably contribute to the process of breaking down or transcending socio-cultural barriers.

From a recent survey of Nigerian university students Beckett and O'Connell cite two instances of students expressing the integrative influence of secondary school. One student referred to the effect of schooling in furthering a common language: "I found that I could not survive short of speaking English or Hausa. . . . (I) made a lot of Hausa friends which indirectly elevated my Hausa vocabulary and language."²⁶ Another student who came from a wealthy family explained how attendance at secondary school eroded his earlier prejudices:

My stay at the Boarding School was the first time I moved away from my family. Because of the under-privileged condition of most of the

pupils I stayed with in the primary school, I tended to look at them with contempt. But my stay in the Boarding School began to help me in shedding part of the contempt I had for my counterparts because at the Boarding School, we were treated as equal -- housed in the dormitory, ate in the same dining hall -- in fact shared everything in common.²⁷

Similar experiences have been cited among secondary school students in other African countries. As Barkan concluded from a cross-national survey of students in Ghana, Uganda, and Tanzania, "By monopolizing their lives, the school has sharply reduced the significance of many of the social distinctions which sharply divide Africans who have not undergone this experience."²⁸

For Nigerian secondary school students, the experience of living constantly in the school environment, while apparently broadening their worldly vision and their capacity for tolerance, also continues the process of national political socialization begun in their early primary school years. Indeed, it is at the secondary school stage that many students appear to demonstrate their appreciation of Nigeria as a political unit and their positions within that unit as Nigerian citizens. In their broad survey of Nigerian university students between 1970 and 1975, Beckett and O'Connell circulated a series of questionnaires among the students. One of the questions posed was: "At what level of education do you think you begin to think in National (Nigerian) terms?" As shown in Table 6.A, among the 714 students from three different regional universities who responded, the great majority acknowledged that not until secondary school did they begin to think in national terms. In support of this finding the authors observe, "Cross tabulation of these results

Table 6.A

Recognition of National Identity

"At what level of education do you think you begin to think in National (Nigerian) terms?"

Level of Education	ABU ^a 1971	Ibadan ^b 1973	Ife ^c 1973
	%	%	%
Primary:	6.6	8.2	11.9
Secondary:	64.6	62.2	57.7
University:	16.0	21.4	21.1
Cannot say:	12.9	8.2	9.3
	100.0	100.0	100.0

^a Ahmadu Bello University; 419 students in 1971 sample survey.

^b University of Ibadan; 197 students in 1973 sample survey.

^c University of Ife; 98 students in 1973 sample survey.

Source: Paul Beckett and James O'Connell, Education and Power in Nigeria: A Study of University Students, Hodder and Stoughton Ltd., London, 1977, p. 73.

by language groups shows that there are no significant variations in responses among the various ethnic groups."²⁹

It is possible of course to argue that no causal relationship has been established here. In other words we cannot be certain that students begin to think in national terms because of the influence of secondary school. It may be, for example, that primary school leavers who have not continued their schooling may acquire similar nationalistic sentiments at the same age. Nevertheless, having earlier discussed the pervasive and continuing socializing effect that western schooling appears to have on students, and accounting for the fact that students in secondary schools not only tend to be exposed to a more institutionalized, cosmopolitan environment than that of their early school years, but frequently are also cut off from home and village for long periods of time, we may safely assume that attendance in secondary school does have an important bearing on shaping attitudes conducive to the political aim of generating national horizontal integration.³⁰

A further integrative aspect to consider as regards formal post-primary schooling is the effect of individualistic competition on successful students. As we have seen, the availability of secondary school places is restricted to only a small percentage of primary school leavers. Chosen as they generally are on the basis of school entrance examination results, these students in fact emerge as the elite corps of primary school graduates. Because of the restricted, hierarchical nature of the formal education system, secondary school students (and even

more so, university students) form a minority -- a select few -- which cuts across social and ethnic lines and separates them from their fellow village classmates who fail to qualify. The competitive, hierarchical nature of the school system thus creates new social segments which cut across traditional ethnic lines and which are more in tune to political objectives of change and modernization on a national scale.³¹

This sense of struggle and achievement which the pyramidal system of education engenders in Nigeria -- and in most developing countries -- cannot be underestimated. It is a major force in developing mutual ties among those who have attained success. This is especially so at the tertiary level -- the apex of the pyramid -- where all students, regardless of background, possess the common bond of having achieved entry into university. It is a powerful bond, for as the background of many students attests, university entrance is no mean achievement. For example, in a comprehensive study undertaken at the University of Ilosho, van den Berghe estimated that approximately a third of the students "are typically children of small and often illiterate farmers."³² Likewise, as shown in Table 6.B, many more come from families engaged in small-scale trading or business enterprises (semi-professional). Van den Berghe's conclusion is that "something like half of the students come from 'common' Nigerian families, i.e. are the children of illiterate or barely literate parents with a social background of small-scale farming, petty trade or manual work."³³

Similar observations have been made by Beckett and O'Con-

Table 6.B

Percentages of Fathers of Ilosho Students in Various
Occupational Categories (1948-1966)

Occupation	1948-52	1953-57	1958-62	1962-66	All years
Farmers	29.2	26.1	31.1	38.0	30.8
Traders	12.9	19.7	16.3	14.6	16.4
Traditional Chiefs	1.2	1.1	1.7	4.0	1.9
Unskilled Workers	0.2	0.5	0.8	1.3	0.7
Artisans	7.7	8.7	8.2	4.0	7.4
Clerical and Sales	8.6	7.7	6.3	2.3	6.2
Semi-professionals	23.0	22.0	25.4	18.2	22.6
Professionals	13.6	11.3	7.3	15.5	11.2
Others	3.6	2.9	3.0	2.3	2.9
	<u>100.0</u> (N=418)	<u>100.0</u> (N=804)	<u>100.1^a</u> (N=933)	<u>100.2^a</u> (N=556)	<u>100.1^a</u> (N=2711) ^b

^aPercentages do not add up to 100.0 because of rounding errors.

^bNo reply's were not included in the computation of percentages.

Source: Pierre L. van den Berghe, Power and Privilege at an African University, Schenkman Publishing Co., Inc., Cambridge, Mass., 1973, p. 153.

nell: indeed they suggest that van den Berghe's claim of "something like half" may be an underestimate.³⁴ In carrying out an extensive survey on Nigerian university students, they collated data on students' fathers' occupations and income levels. Results in the sample show that the largest proportion of students' fathers were low income farmers (Table 6.C; i, ii, and iii), while the second largest number were engaged in low-to middle-income trading or business (Table 6.C; i and iii). On the whole, as can be seen in the three tables, Beckett and O'Connell were able to conclude that "a very sizeable proportion of the students at all the universities come from groups, particularly farmers, that are extremely poor",³⁵ and that in general "the great majority" of students are attached "by family and personal experience to the village and farm life of the majority [of Nigerians]".³⁶

Further data on parental education shows a slightly modified picture of student background. The percentage of parents classified as illiterate is high, although in relation to total estimated illiteracy levels throughout the country, "the parents are less typical of the relevant general population in terms of education than in terms of occupation and income."³⁷ (Table 6.D). For example, while the ABU sample showed that 37% of students' fathers and 62.5% of students' mothers were classified as illiterate, statistics of the 1952 census ("an appropriate point in time for comparison with students' parents")³⁸ indicated that 92.7% of the Northern Region's population aged seven or over were illiterate. Nevertheless the results still

Table 6.C

Data on Students' Fathers' Occupations and Incomes

(i) Fathers' Occupation: University Comparisons

Father's Occupation	ABU, 1973 ^a	Ibadan, 1973 ^b	Nssuka, 1973 ^c
	%	%	%
Farmer	51.6	49.2	30.1
Civil Servant	6.1	12.3	13.1
Professions	2.9	4.6	5.2
Teacher	6.1	5.1	7.3
Trader/Businessman	14.1	14.4	19.3
Chief	0.7	0.0	0.4
Artisan	1.5	1.0	1.3
Labourer	1.8	2.6	2.0
Other	15.2	10.8	21.4
	100.0	100.0	100.0

^aABU; 286 students in 1973 sample survey.^bIbadan; 197 students in 1973 sample survey.^cNssuka; 566 students in 1973 sample survey.

(ii) Father's Income: University Comparisons

Income	ABU, 1973	Ibadan, 1973	Nssuka, 1973
	%	%	%
Subsistence farmer	33.1	24.9	18.7
Less than N 400	17.3	21.6	22.4
N 400-800	20.6	20.4	22.8
N 800-2000	15.8	18.8	19.7
N 2000-4000	6.3	6.6	11.5
N 4000	7.0	7.7	4.9
	100.0	100.0	100.0

(iii) Father's Occupation and Income: Income Categories as a Percentage of Occupations -- ABU, 1970 and 1971^a

Occupations	Subsistence and less than N100	Income Categories				All Incomes
		N100- 400	N400- 1200	N1200- 2000	N2000	
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Farmer	62.0	28.0	9.1	0.4	0.4	99.9 (N 450)
Civil Servant	0.0	7.8	21.9	29.7	40.6	100.0 (N 64)
Professions	0.0	0.0	37.5	37.5	25.0	100.0 (N 24)
Teacher	0.0	35.1	48.7	5.4	10.8	100.0 (N 37)
Trader/Businessman	5.9	20.0	28.2	18.8	27.1	100.0 (N 85)
Chief	0.0	33.3	55.6	0.0	11.1	100.0 (N 9)
Other	12.9	25.9	35.3	12.1	13.8	100.0 (N 116)
All Occupations	38.1	24.7	19.4	7.9	9.9	100.0 (N 785)

^aThe ABU 1970 and 1971 samples are combined for the purpose of this analysis, providing a sample of 785 students who gave information on both father's income and occupation.

Source: Beckett and O'Connell, Education and Power in Nigeria, pp. 30-31.

Table 6.D
Education of Students' Parents: Contrasting Samples

Educational Level	ABU, 1970, 1971		Ibadan, 1970, 1971		Lagos, 1971, 1972	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
Illiterate	37.1	62.5	51.0	72.3	50.7	67.3
Literate	15.9	10.8	5.4	4.9	1.3	2.6
Koranic	8.6	9.2	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0
Primary	23.3	12.0	29.0	16.7	27.4	17.9
T. T. C.	5.3	1.4	3.1	1.5	5.9	5.2
Secondary	6.8	3.7	7.7	4.2	8.1	5.2
University	3.0	0.4	3.9	0.0	6.7	1.8
	100.0 (N 811)	100.0 (N 841)	100.1 (N 259)	100.1 (N 234)	100.1 (N 233)	100.0 (N 229)

Source: Beckett and O'Connell, Education and Power in Nigeria, p. 33.

show that half of students' fathers were illiterate and between two-thirds and three-quarters of all mothers were illiterate.

In view of these results then, given relatively low-income rural home atmospheres which are undoubtedly estranged from the school environment, coupled with the restricted availability of openings at higher school levels, educational advancement for many Nigerian students, whatever their social and ethnic background, demands an intense personal effort which is common to all.

For most it is a period of struggle. In many cases there is a near epic quality: finding the way to university for some seems almost as complex as Odysseus' journey home. For very few of the students is the route to university as easy, automatic, and unconscious as it is for large numbers of students in the U. S. A. and Great Britain. The students we deal with are by definition the chosen few. . . . University students are those who have passed a number of prior examinations; they have been chosen and then chosen from among the chosen.

In short, having struggled to the apex of the formal school system, university students constitute the future elite of their country. In consequence, despite the variance in their ethnic or socio-economic background, the very fact that they are the chosen few and that they have had to work hard to achieve this aim creates a bond among them which other Nigerians do not share and thus separates them, to some extent at least, from the rest of society.

Politically, of course, the emergence of an educated elite sharing such cross-cultural, cross-regional ties is

crucial in a developing plural society. For one thing, the evolution of a nascent class structure largely along the lines of educational achievement means that new social segments are created which cross-cut traditional, potentially inflammatory ethnic and regional differences, and thus may diminish the potential of violent internal conflict. In addition, however, as past experience in Nigeria has shown, political stability in a large plural society may be highly dependent on the ability of members of the elite to co-operate with one another. As Claude Ake writes, "the ultimate cure for the inherent instability of the new states lies mainly in the modification of the political behaviour of the elites." In other words, if national horizontal integration in a developing plural society is to progress, then it is imperative that consensus be "sought not at the grass-roots level but at the leadership level by enlisting the support of leading personalities from all major social groups."⁴⁰ In this sense the role of formal education is significant, for increasingly the leading personalities in Nigeria are those who have attained a high level of education. Consequently the integrative aspect of formal education would appear to be politically and socially remunerative. As Abernethy writes:

Through its recruitment policies a school can become a miniature nation by instilling cooperative habits among a diverse student body. This integrative function is particularly important when one considers that grammar school and university graduates constitute a substantial portion of the elite whose decisions will affect a country's destiny. If leaders of competing groups have in common an "old school tie" and the memory of eccentric

teachers, mutual friends, and devilish pranks that binds Old Boys everywhere together, it is more likely that their political differences can be mediated than if their educational experiences are quite dissimilar.⁴¹

In summary, there is no doubt that the universal dissemination of formal primary schooling is a major contributing factor in the process of national horizontal integration. Likewise for those students who continue their post-primary education the experience in secondary schools and institutions of higher learning would appear to be an important socializing influence, instilling similar cross-cultural interests, and creating feelings of identity which extend beyond their own regions to that of the federation as a whole. To the extent that horizontal integration, especially among elite groups, is vital if a pluralistic nation-state is to assert its legitimacy and viability, formal schooling at all levels appears to be a proven political asset.

6.4 Formal Education and Vertical Segmentation

In the context of Nigeria's multi-ethnic, multi-cultural composition, the emergence of distinctive social segments cutting across traditional horizontal lines of division may help to minimize the potential for inter-ethnic conflict and thereby advance the process of national integration. In other words, in a plural society such as Nigeria, prospects for political stability may necessitate the development of vertical social segments. We have seen that the pyramidal system of formal education is an important factor in the extension of such cross-cut-

ting vertical segmentation. As well, however, in view of the duality of Nigeria's political economy, and its industrial "state capitalist" approach to economic development, stark differences in family wealth also appear to be precipitating the vertical segmentation of society. At the present stage of Nigeria's development it is perhaps premature to talk of class distinctions in the country.⁴² Nevertheless there is emerging in Nigeria a class division of sorts, an elite/mass gap which is rooted in combined education/economic disparities between the "chosen few" who enjoy the perquisites of higher education⁴³-- modern sector employment, high salaries, security and prestige -- and the growing mass of rural and urban poor who are unable to receive formal post-primary schooling. As we have suggested, of course, for a modicum of co-operation to develop among members of plural elites -- and such co-operation is provisory for socio-political stability -- it may be essential that they share vested social and economic interests which set them apart from the rest of society. Yet the existence of a glaring socio-economic rift between rich and poor, and the effect of formal education in perpetuating the rift, may eventually prove to be a catalyst of internal instability, especially if circumstances gradually constrict opportunities for social mobility.

As we saw in Chapters 4 and 5, the provision of UPE⁴ and the expansion of post-primary schooling can do little to alter the dualistic nature of the economy and the concurrent structure of socio-economic opportunities and rewards. The greatest

gains to be had, in terms of status, income, and security, lie in the modern sector -- either in government employment or in the service of large-scale private enterprise. Yet the availability of such opportunities is becoming increasingly restricted; the vast majority of the population is compelled to face either unemployment or the prospect of earning a livelihood from arduous work which pays relatively low returns. In a society which embraces a development model of capitalistic, laissez-faire economic growth, there is therefore a tendency towards the solidification of socio-economic inequality and stratification.

This does not mean that possibilities for social mobility are nonexistent. The formal education system in Nigeria remains an effective instrument for generating upward social mobility. Consequently it might seem that in carrying out an expansion of the school system, and by increasing subsidization at all levels, the government is helping to sustain a fluid social system by opening the competition for advancement to all citizens. Accordingly then, as suggested in section 6.2, the expansion and subsidization of education may work to contain the potential for class conflict by fostering an elite structure based on individual ability rather than on pre-determined socio-economic background.

Certainly the provision of free UPE would appear to be a major step in this direction. The profferment of free primary education to all Nigerian children regardless of socio-economic background enables them to enter what has become the main system of social selection and to take part initially in the competition

for social advancement. In reference to the earlier drives for UPE in the former Eastern and Western Regions, Abernethy concludes that "the statistics indicate that a pronounced level-ing-up process was set in motion by universal primary education. Previously disadvantaged groups benefited disproportionately from the scheme; in this sense educational expansion at the primary level has had a significant egalitarian effect."⁴⁴

However, primary schooling occupies the broad base of the educational pyramid only: six years of primary education, if pursued by all children throughout Nigeria, is no guarantee of a change in individual socio-economic status. It is at the post-primary level -- most especially at the tertiary level -- that aspirations for upward mobility may be fulfilled. Yet the availability of school places beyond primary school, despite the expansion of secondary and tertiary schooling, are restricted to only a small proportion of primary school leavers. Therefore while school enrollment beyond primary school may be subsidized, thus presumably allowing for equality of access, placements must be rationed according to the non-price, non-ascriptive method of uniformly administered examinations.

As we shall discuss more fully in Chapter 7, education in Nigeria is not only an institutional means of manpower training, but it is also considered an effective impartial form of manpower selection. Consequently, within a dualistic profit-motivated political economy, the school system fosters a spirit of intense individual competition. This is particularly so when one considers that opportunities for modern sector employment are limited. In-

deed, it is a moot point as to how much longer the top socioeconomic strata can accommodate the increasing numbers of university graduates. As van den Berghe writes:

There is a limit to the top-heaviness of the government bureaucracy and to a still undeveloped economy's ability to absorb technical and managerial personnel. Only the educational system can be expected to maintain its rapid rate of expansion, thereby eventually creating a grave problem of educated unemployment such as faced by countries like India and Pakistan.⁴⁵

Thus, while the "cliff-like" duality of the economy remains unaffected, and while lucrative -- yet limited -- rewards are so closely tied to educational achievement, the individualistic scramble for upward social mobility in the school system may aggravate rather than mitigate social disparities. Moreover, as primary and secondary enrollments continue to greatly outnumber the availability of university places, thereby ensuring a sustained intensity of student competition, the possibilities of class selectivity within the higher echelons of the education system may become more pronounced. In other words, with the perpetuation of a dualistic economy, and with the prospects of a levelling off of the top stratum of society, there is a real possibility that those children from the most privileged families will be those who attain the highest levels of education. In that case the potential for social mobility will decline, thereby deepening class divisions and creating divergent class interests.

Already there are indications of such a trend. As seen in Tables 6.B and 6.C, while a sizeable number of students come from humble backgrounds, the data on fathers' occupation and income

show a general pattern demonstrating that higher incomes and higher status occupations are very much over-represented among students' fathers in relation to the entire national population. Van den Berghe, for example, estimates that of the students who attended Ilosho up to 1966, 11.2% had fathers who would be considered elite "in the restricted sense of university educated professionals"; yet this was twenty to thirty times their representation in the whole of the population.⁴⁶ As it is, this is probably a conservative estimate of the size of elite representation in universities, for it does not take into account those students from high-income backgrounds who were able to attend university abroad. Because of a prejudice among the top Nigerian élite in favour of prestigious universities in developed countries, "many of the children of Nigerian professionals still go abroad for their education, and thus the total proportion of graduates who come from 'elite' families is probably higher than U. I. figures suggest."⁴⁷

Beckett and O'Connell's conclusions are similar. True, "Only a little more or less that 15 per cent of the fathers of the students in the samples (Table 6.C) could be considered 'rich' by the standards of Nigeria's modern community (where, at the time of these surveys, ₦ 2000 might be taken as an approximate threshold of car-owning elite status)."⁴⁸ But this figure nonetheless indicates that elite representation in Nigerian universities far exceeds its societal proportions. (Moreover this too does not account for student enrollment in universities abroad which doubtless would raise the calculated proportion of elite

representation in universities). Similarly, as shown in Table 6.D, the number of students from educated homes (which in Nigeria tends to be as indicative of elite status as wealth) shows their marked over-representation in terms of the population at large. Another sample survey of female university students shows the same trend: a disproportionate number of women students come from well-educated, high-income families.⁴⁹ Likewise indications are that there is an over-representation of university students from large cities where higher income groups normally live, and where they may have access to more or better educational facilities than do families in small towns and villages.⁵⁰ In short, as Beckett and O'Connell conclude, the data show what is basically the same general pattern elsewhere in the developing world: the largest group of beneficiaries of higher education include males, people from the urban areas, and the already privileged sub-groups (these last two in fact usually being one and the same).⁵¹

We are perhaps tending to over-state the case of social immobility among the educated "classes". As yet, in comparison to other countries in the developing world, university education in Nigeria is strikingly open to students from low-income families.⁵² Nevertheless, evidence does suggest that having reached university age, children from relatively well-to-do families are inclined to gain entrance to universities in greater proportions than has occurred in the past. Generally these are the children of senior administrators and professionals who themselves benefited from indigenization measures and post-primary education

during the pre-Independence era, and who are presently able to provide encouragement and a home environment conducive to their children's educational advancement.⁵³ As Beckett and O'Connell argue:

. . . the candidates from the better-off families are more competitive in Nigeria as they are almost everywhere in the world. Already these families are disproportionately well-represented at Nigerian universities.

. . . The hardening of class structures consequent on the reduction of access to the university for the poorer groups in a country where education has been the key to upward mobility is however fraught with political and social implications.⁵⁴

One implication is that blanket subsidization of post-primary schooling at both the secondary and higher levels, while ostensibly aimed at promoting equal opportunity for all, irrespective of socio-economic background, may eventually serve to provide for elite groups a relatively cheap means of maintaining their own positions. Already disproportionately represented at heavily subsidized institutions of higher learning, the children of elites are able to entrench their social positions virtually at the expense of the rural and urban poor who even now are under-represented in universities. In fact the provision of free education at all school levels may mean simply an easier head start for well-to-do children -- a head start which they already have as a result of their advantageous positions in society.⁵⁵

In effect, while providing subsidized education for all, the state is ignoring the socio-economic differential among children from diverse backgrounds. As Avoseh points out, "edu-

cational policies are formulated to provide for equal input of school resources. It is, however, illusory to expect that equal input will enhance equality in education."⁵⁶ In other words, while education may provide the means for upward social mobility, other variables such as geographical and ecological factors, and economic and family background may be as crucial to educational opportunity as is the provision of school facilities and educational personnel. To ignore these factors is to minimize the potential equalizing effect which state subsidized education might have.

A further obvious implication is that if higher education gradually shifts towards becoming a preserve for the elite, and if the opportunity and reward structure remains unchanged, closely linked to formal educational achievement, the elite/mass gap may foster internal, potentially explosive, tensions.

Unless checked by government policy, the continued growth of the technocratic upper-middle class when combined with the increasingly narrow base from which its members are drawn may result in class antagonisms of a potentially violent nature. At a minimum, such antagonisms will inhibit communication and co-operation between the technocratic elite and the rest of the population. Uneducated peasants and primary school leavers are more likely to resist the advice of highly educated civil servants if they perceive the interests of the latter as inimical to or different from their own. The emergence of such class antagonisms, or an 'elite/mass gap', . . . consequently poses a dilemma not only for the vertical integration of [society], but for the process of development itself.⁵⁷

A similar warning is expressed by Lijphart who otherwise advocates the value of elitism and the need for co-operation at the elite level if democracy and stability are to be maintained

in plural countries. "In the longer run . . . there is a danger that leaders will concentrate too much on elite-level politics and lose touch with the rank and file. . . . the concept of national integration is often employed in a dual sense to mean not only surmounting ethnic and other segmental loyalties but also closing the elite/mass gap."⁵⁸ In other words, while efforts to accommodate ethnic and regional differences and to promote inter-ethnic and inter-regional ties may be essential for socio-political stability and development in a plural society, such efforts may ultimately prove fruitless if they exacerbate the gap between rich and poor.

To summarize, formal education in one sense is a highly effective means of fostering national integration in Nigeria. Yet in another sense, given the existence of a stratified society in a dualistic capitalist political economy, the effectiveness of formal education in promoting national integration and equality of opportunity may be ephemeral. Indeed, if privilege becomes the prerogative of a chosen few while the majority of Nigerians languish in poverty, the provision of subsidized formal education, especially at the post-primary level, may be a destabilizing force. In this vein, as Anosike strongly argues:

. . . the talk of education as a social good in Nigeria is nonsensical; it belies one of the most fundamental laws of motion of the capitalist system under which Nigeria operates. . . . Without much of an exception, the consistent tendency . . . has been towards inequality in social classes and income, rather than equality. Education . . . has been shown to be merely the legitimizing mechanism for perpetuating that socioeconomic inequality and stratification, irrespective of whatever surface "reforms" may have been instituted.⁵⁹

The overall conclusion to be made here is that the process of national integration cannot be sustained by means of educational input alone, no matter how improved and no matter how greatly subsidized. The eventual answer to the need for national integration must ultimately be dependent on the nature and structure of the nation's political economy and the overall policy measures promulgated by the nation's decision-makers which affect it. As Avoseh argues:

To the extent that education exists in a dialectical relationship with society, equalizing access to education will involve prior re-structuring of the societal opportunity and reward system. . . We [see] that while inequality exists in the larger society and in individual abilities, UPE may improve, but cannot equalize, access to educational service. . . . Governments may well be advised that equalizing opportunities within society is important as a pre-condition for providing some form of equal educational opportunity.⁶⁰

Unless the environmental and economic variables are tackled with the same ambition and resolve as is being demonstrated by the implementation of educational policies, the effect of UPE and of subsidized schooling in promoting national integration may prove to be minimal, perhaps even retrogressive. In other words, equality of educational opportunity and the long-range prospects for internal socio-political stability will be achieved not just through the broadening of the formal system of education, but through a re-structuring of areas in society outside the scope of the educational system. Besides the provision of formal education, which at the post-primary level benefits a small proportion of young Nigerians only, efforts must be made to raise the socio-economic status of those who have not the opportunity to

advance beyond primary school but who are nonetheless productive members of society. This may necessitate devising positive concrete measures which not only bolster the productivity and living standards of those engaged in small-scale industry and agriculture, but which also broaden informal education programmes and provide greater support and recognition of these -- even at the possible expense of further formal post-primary educational expansion.

FOOTNOTES
(CHAPTER 6)

¹Chimelu Chime, Integration and Politics Among African States, Uppsala, Scandinavian Institute for African Studies, 1977, p. 32.

²Ben O. Nwabueze, Constitutionalism in the Emergent States, Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, Cranbury, N. J., 1973, p. 82.

³See Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe, "Modernization and the Politics of Communalism: A Theoretical Perspective", in Melson and Wolpe, eds., Nigeria: Modernization and the Politics of Communalism, Michigan State University Press, 1971, pp. 1-42.

⁴In reference to concerns about past civilian politicking see Africa: An International Business, Economic, and Political Monthly, No. 87, November, 1978, pp. 17-19.

⁵Cited in West Africa, No. 3249, October 22, 1979, p. 1963.

⁶In reference to the distinction between horizontal and vertical integration, see in particular James S. Coleman, "Introduction", in Coleman, ed., Education and Political Development, Princeton University Press, N. J., 1965, p. 30.

⁷Abernethy, p. 267.

⁸Ibid.

⁹See in particular Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1977, pp. 223-38; Ali A. Mazrui, "Pluralism and National Integration" in Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith, eds., Pluralism in Africa, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1969, pp. 333-49; and Melson and Wolpe, pp. 3-5.

¹⁰Mazrui, p. 335.

¹¹Based on the 1963 census.

¹²Cited by Arnold, Modern Nigeria, p. 105.

¹³Ibid., p. 106.

¹⁴ Paul Beckett and James O'Connell, Education and Power in Nigeria: A Study of University Students, Hodder and Stoughton Educational Press, Bristol, 1977, p. 29.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Peshkin, p. 144.

¹⁷ Abernethy, p. 235.

¹⁸ Mazrui, p. 346.

¹⁹ There are instances, however, when individuals are able to "beat the system" of examination-based selection. During my two years at G. S. S. Potiskum, on several occasions there were children who entered Form I yet could neither speak nor write any English. It was quite apparent that they had assumed the names of others who had passed the secondary school entrance exams.

²⁰ At G. S. S. Potiskum the recitation of morning prayers and either the National Anthem or the National Pledge took place at twice-weekly school assemblies.

²¹ Arnold, Modern Nigeria, p. vii.

²² Abernethy, p. 256.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ However, many recently constructed secondary schools are often located in smaller villages to which there is easy access by road.

²⁵ Beckett and O'Connell, p. 54.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 53.

²⁸ Joel D. Barkan, An African Dilemma: University Students, Development and Politics in Ghana, Tanzania, and Uganda, Oxford University Press, 1975, p. 35.

²⁹ Beckett and O'Connell, p. 74. Similarly Almond and Verba regarded secondary school as the crucial agent for affecting political attitudes, The Civic Culture, 1963, cited by Coleman, p. 18.

³⁰ Coleman argues that formal education in developing countries is important as a means of political socialization because

very often it is the only such agent. The dichotomy which exists between modern and traditional lifestyles "elevates the formal educational system to a more determinative role in the political socialization process, and diminishes, if it does not extinguish, the role of the family as the prime socializer." Coleman, p. 22.

³¹For a discussion of the link between integration and modernization, see Melson and Wolpe.

³²Pierre L. van den Berghe, Power and Privilege at an African University, Schenkman Publishing Co., Inc., Cambridge, Mass., 1973, p. 152.

³³Ibid., p. 153.

³⁴Beckett and O'Connell, p. 32.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Ibid., p. 46.

³⁷Ibid., p. 33.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Ibid., p. 50.

⁴⁰Claude Ake, A Theory of Political Integration, 1967, cited by Lijphart, p. 143.

⁴¹Abernethy, p. 257.

⁴²On the basis of a sample survey of wage and salary earners and trade union officials in 1973, Waterman argues that as yet unionized Nigerian workers do not have a sense of social class identity:

It would seem to be that although workers are aware of the necessity for radical industrial action, they do not recognize unions as their main instrument or their main ally. Faith still lies in the possibility of advancement through one's own individual efforts or through the help of the rich and powerful. (p. 172).

⁴³Mazrui suggests that there are indeed class distinctions in Africa and that these are formulated not by "who owns what?", but by "who knows what?". In other words, class formation is based on levels of education. Political Values and the Educated Class in Africa, Heinemann, London, 1978, p. xiii;

⁴⁴Abernethy, p. 240.

⁴⁵van den Berghe, p. 154.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 153.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 185.

⁴⁸Beckett and O'Connell, Education and Power, p. 32.

⁴⁹_____, "Education and the Situation of Women: Background and Attitudes of Christian and Muslim Female Students at a Nigerian University", Cultures et Développement, 8, (2), 1976, pp. 244-45.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 246.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 263.

⁵²Ibid., p. 264.

⁵³On the basis of various psychological tests among Yoruba children from educated and non-educated families in 1973, Barbara Lloyd determined that those growing up in a privileged environment achieved superior mental age scores. Tests on the same group of children five years previously had shown similar results. Thus she concludes that the children from privileged families develop at a faster rate intellectually than their less well-off counterparts. "The Intellectual Development of Yoruba Children", Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 8 (1), March, 1977, pp. 3-16.

⁵⁴Beckett and O'Connell, "Education and Women", p. 265.

⁵⁵For further elaboration on this point, see Psacharopoulos, "How Equitable is Free Education?", pp. 72-73.

⁵⁶Olusola Avoseh, "UPE and the Quest for Equal Educational Opportunity", West African Journal of Education, 20 (1), February, 1976, p. 78.

⁵⁷Barkan, p. 92.

⁵⁸Lijphart, p. 170.

⁵⁹Anosike, pp. 44-45.

⁶⁰Avoseh, p. 76 and pp. 80-81.

CHAPTER 7: EDUCATION AND THE NEED FOR CHANGE:

A SOCIO-POLITICAL DILEMMA

7.1 Introduction

At this stage in our analysis it is apparent that Nigeria's national education programme, as a key social instrument in the country's planned development, by no means functions on an independent basis. To a large extent the effect of education in the course of Nigeria's development is directly related to factors which are external to the education system as a whole. As we have seen, development in Nigeria proceeds in accordance to a model of industrial state capitalism, fostering the growth of big industries and populated cities -- but with little change in the rural areas. Consequently the proportion of unemployed manpower continues to rise, small-scale industrial and agricultural productivity remains hampered, rural-urban migration among Nigerian youth persists, and poverty lingers as a nationwide concern. Such problems affect the vast majority of Nigerians. Obviously, therefore, unless these problems are resolved -- and this would appear to involve fundamental structural change in society and the economy -- development will have little meaning to most Nigerian citizens; indeed, the concept of national development may be a misnomer.

As we have also observed, despite the lofty aims enunciated in the federal government's national education policy, evidence indicates that on the whole formal education contributes

little to the resolution of these problems. Instead, having evolved as an effective mechanism of social selection in a stratified society, Nigeria's pyramidal system of education appears to reinforce the structure of the nation's dualistic economy and its current industrial approach to development. Unfortunately, as we shall examine in this chapter, the linkage between formal education and the dual political economy has created a serious social and political dilemma. By reinforcing a societal and economic structure which polarizes the have's and have-not's (the winners versus the losers), the education system serves to encourage the dubious competitive scramble for certification and reward. Yet at the same time, because the institution of subsidized schooling so far is relatively impervious to distinctions of socio-economic background -- at the lowest level of the educational pyramid it is the great social equalizer -- the demand for the retention of the present school system and the current policy of continuing expansion and subsidization of schooling is a palpable political force. Thus, while the linkage between the political economy and the education system clearly signals the need for change, it also sustains widespread attitudinal support for the existent education programme and a simultaneous aversion to any major change in the nation's overall educational strategy. This is a dilemma which may ultimately offset not only the effectiveness of the government's education programme, but the entire process of national development as well.

In section 7.2 we shall consider the pressure of public demand for formal education. In most areas of Nigeria formal

schooling has developed into a social service eagerly embraced by large segments of the population who perceive that socio-economic opportunities can only be attained through formal education. This, in fact, is the key to aggregate private demand for education throughout Nigeria -- the socio-economic returns which formal schooling is commonly seen to afford. However, while the provision of education may enhance the opportunities of relatively few individuals in achieving private materialistic and status ends, it may do little to precipitate the overall improvement of social welfare in the country. The dilemma for decision-makers who are saddled with the reality of budgetary constraints is to balance the long-term need for change with the short-term need for public satisfaction.

In section 7.3 we shall examine the deleterious effect which formal education appears to have on individual attitudes. Because of its traditional role as a means of socio-economic selection in a stratified society, the experience of formal education appears to inculcate a common attitudinal sense of individual entitlement as opposed to a sense of communal obligation. There would seem to be a widespread view that the ultimate purpose in achieving a specific level of subsidized scholastic success is the attainment of a commensurate degree of lifelong individual reward rather than individual commitment to the service of society. Such common attitudes do not seem conducive to the overall aims of education policy.

In section 7.4 we shall see that as ever higher levels of education ostensibly lead to greater reward, they also dampen

incentive for change. This seems particularly so at the university level: since university graduates have a significant stake in the acquisition of societal rewards, and hence the most to lose, they tend to exhibit reluctance to overall social change. Thus it would seem that in a country which is still largely underdeveloped, and where the stipulated aim of education policy is to initiate change and development, those who receive the greatest amount of educational subsidization are those least likely to advocate change or balanced growth.

Finally in section 7.5 we shall briefly discuss the role of the state in sustaining its own political dilemma. By implementing a social welfare policy of free UPE and subsidized post-primary education on the one hand, and pursuing a dual capitalist approach to economic growth on the other, the state itself maintains the linkage between education and the political economy, and therefore is responsible for creating a problem which it eventually must resolve.

7.2 Public Demand for Formal Education

In attempting to evaluate formal education in Nigeria we have so far been concerned primarily with its overall effectiveness in contributing to national development, i.e. in adhering to what we may regard as the broad socio-economic needs of the country. For educational planners and policy-makers, however, the long-term needs of society are not the only factors to consider in devising and implementing a national education programme. In a country which genuinely aspires to create a viable demo-

cratic political process at all levels of government, policy decisions must be sensitive to public demands as well. Thus, as in all other areas of public policy, the system of education is responsive to two sets of variables, or what E. O. Edwards describes as "signals" -- the private signals and the social signals.

The private signals can be encapsulated as the aggregate private demand for education which rests on private perceptions of educational benefits and costs -- the benefits the beneficiaries of education expect to receive and the costs which they (or their families) expect to bear. The social signals can be summarized as the net social benefit from education which reflects judgments about the full social benefits and costs of education -- judgments which may be based on crude estimates of social need, manpower studies or sophisticated cost-benefit analyses. . . . The problem of appropriate political response arises when [these two sets of signals] point to different educational policies.¹

In Nigeria there would appear to be just such a problem, for there is little doubt that throughout most regions of the country large segments of the population have eagerly embraced the provision of formal schooling and that demands for continued expansion and subsidization of the school system remain strong.² This is hardly surprising of course. For a long time now it has been widely observed, not only in Nigeria but throughout much of the developing world, that in terms of the benefits of income, prestige, and power, the attainment of some formal education is considered to be highly significant. This stems largely from the inexorable link which continues to exist between education and the modern urban sector of economic life. The process of attitudinal and behavioural "modernization" which formal edu-

cation appears to inculcate among young students, combined with an economic development model of industrialization and urban growth, creating as it does a relatively skewed labour market, has resulted in an

immense premium [being] placed upon the possession of formal educational qualifications. . . . Given the considerable rewards accruing to access to [the] highly bureaucratized [modern] sectors, there is little question that the massive rise in public demand for schooling is a result of a realistic appreciation of its economic and status benefits.³

Numerous studies certainly bear evidence that formal schooling at all levels is valued for its socio-economic rewards. For example, in the mid-1960's Abernethy's survey of Southern Nigerian schoolchildren demonstrated the high income and vocational aspirations which the availability of formal education generated among the students. With each increase in educational level their expectations of future monthly earnings rose substantially. At the time of the survey per capita monthly income was under £3 for the area as a whole and was not expected to rise considerably within the following decade. Yet when asked how much money they expected to earn each month in ten years time, the median response estimates were for primary school children between £31 and £50, for secondary modern school students about £50, for grammar school pupils between £51 and £100, and for Sixth Form students between £101 and £150. Quite clearly formal education was seen as a gateway to enhanced earnings power. Abernethy's survey is of course dated; however there is no reason to assume that there has been a shift in pupil aspirations vis à vis their educational attainment. ". . . since virtually

all high-paying positions are in the modern sector and require extended post-primary training, we can presume that the substantial differences in aspiration between pupils at different educational levels can be explained mainly with reference to schooling."⁴ As we have seen, the modern sector of the economy retains its monopoly on high wage and salary positions. Therefore the premium on formal education remains high and, if anything, a shift in private educational demands since the mid-1960's has been directed towards the extension, not the reduction, of the formal school system.

More recent findings would appear to substantiate this assumption. In northeastern Nigeria, for instance, where the inculcation of western schooling has proceeded at a much more gradual pace than in the southern regions, Peshkin's observations of Kanuri primary school children and their families illuminates the value which students and parents place on formal schooling. The skills and knowledge attained in primary school are viewed as gains which will "pave the way to more education and to new jobs that promise economic and status rewards greater on the average than those available from Koranic education and the old jobs; in addition they are links to the attractive, nontraditional life styles of the Europeans and the new Nigerian urban elite."⁵ For parents who might otherwise be concerned about their children's loss of traditional values, education tends to be viewed as less of a threat than as a vehicle through which their children can derive new opportunities.

These are essentially economic in nature, and it is their financial promise rather than a weakening of religious spirit, a rejection of traditional norms, or a sensitivity to manpower needs that explains the attraction of Western schooling. This conclusion is supported by the parents' common expectation that schooling will enhance their child's earning capabilities. . . . They are most explicit . . . in expecting their children to fill different, more lucrative and prestigious work roles than they do. . . . M. Zarami envisions his son becoming an important civil servant; Ya Amina hopes Bintu becomes a teacher or a nurse. The job, in their perspective, is intended to be instrumental to traditional goals -- enhancing the status of and providing financial support to one's parents. Should their children reject these goals, then, obviously, they would be alarmed.⁶

Similar aspirations have been observed among secondary school students. In 1976 J. O. Abiri conducted a survey of 1254 secondary school pupils in Ibadan (722 boys and 532 girls in Forms I, III, and V) in order to distinguish between what he described as "the idealistic desires and the realistic aspirations" of these students.⁷ The socio-economic background of the students was varied, with most of the fathers engaged in small business or trading, administrative or clerical work, carpentry, masonry, or farming. Only 13.8% of the boys and 20.2% of the girls indicated that their fathers had university degrees. Despite variations in family background, however, the sample students showed a remarkably consistent pattern of high academic and occupational aspirations. As Table 7.A indicates, the great majority of students in the sample survey expected to obtain university degrees -- and the most desired academic fields were those of medicine and science. Likewise, as Table 7.B shows, almost all students expected eventually to be engaged in prestigious modern

Table 7.A

Percentage Distribution of Boys and Girls in Forms I, III, and V
According to the Highest Educational Qualifications Expected by Them

Qualification	% Proportions of Boys in Forms		% Proportions of Girls in Forms	
	I	III	I	III
Doctorate in Medicine	13.8	21.8	16.0	8.3
Master/doctorate in Science	8.9	32.2	23.5	2.1
Bachelor of Science	6.9	11.1	13.5	6.3
Master/doctorate in Arts	3.3	4.0	8.0	---
Nursing Certificate	---	---	---	10.4
Master/doctorate in Engineering	4.5	3.7	4.5	---
Bachelor of Engineering	2.9	3.0	3.0	---
Bachelor of Arts	2.5	4.4	2.0	1.0
School Certificate	2.0	1.9	4.0	0.5
Degrees in Law	0.4	0.4	1.0	1.6
H. S. C. or G. C. E.	0.4	0.4	0.5	1.6
Other Professional Qualification	1.8	4.4	6.0	2.1
Undecided	52.4	12.6	18.0	66.1
Total Number	246	270	206	194

Source: J. O. Abiri, "A Sample Survey of Nigerian Adolescents' Academic and Occupational Aspirations", West African Journal of Educational and Vocational Measurement, 4 (1), August, 1977, p. 60.

Table 7.B

Different Occupations Mentioned and Percentage Proportions of Boys
and Girls in Forms I, III, and V Expecting to be Engaged in such Occupations

Occupations Expected	% Proportions of Boys in Forms		% Proportions of Girls in Forms	
	I	III	I	III
Medical Practice	51.7	38.3	34.4	32.2
Nursing	---	---	38.3	37.3
Engineering and Technology	17.2	24.5	2.6	0.6
Teaching and other Ed. Occupations	8.5	5.8	9.7	3.4
Scientific Occupations	6.1	8.5	2.6	3.3
Legal or Judicial Service	4.5	3.5	8.4	1.7
Masonry or Building Contract	2.8	4.6	0.6	11.9
University Teaching	2.4	2.3	---	2.8
Clerical and Admin. Posts	2.8	5.3	0.6	2.8
Farming	0.5	0.4	---	0.6
Police Service	0.5	0.8	2.0	1.1
Business/Trading	1.4	1.9	0.6	0.6
Military Service	0.5	1.5	---	---
Politics	---	1.2	---	---
Other Medical Work	0.5	0.6	---	1.7
Religious Work	0.5	1.2	---	---

Source: Abiri, p. 62.

sector jobs. Unfortunately, however, only a small proportion of the students could be relied upon to attain what they hoped for. As Abiri concludes, "The fact that a large majority of the respondents in each group expected to obtain a University degree suggests that the pupils generally over-estimated their own academic prospects and were therefore unrealistic in their aspirations."⁸ Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the desire for further education was strong and that hopes for career and status were clearly linked to formal educational achievement.⁹

* Studies at the university level indicate similar attitudinal responses. Barkan's cross-national survey of African university students, while not including Nigerians, nonetheless elicited data which undoubtedly have significance in terms of private demand for education in Nigeria. Among the students polled in the three countries in which the survey was conducted, education was seen as the prime vehicle for achieving "success."

When asked to choose the two best means to success from a list of six alternatives, almost 80 per cent or more of the respondents in each sample mentioned educational achievement. This result . . . is hardly surprising given the close relationship between career recruitment and educational credentials which exists in all three countries [and in Nigeria as well]. Without a secure and high salaried job, it is very difficult to achieve any of the . . . characteristics that students attribute most frequently to successful people.¹⁰

Barkan also determined that very few students contemplated the idea of terminating their studies -- "an unthinkable proposition" -- and that most felt that their chances of success were equivalent to those who had attained the same educational level.

"Most rated their prospects as the same, because everybody has the same amount of the asset which will most likely determine whether or not they become successful according to their definition of the term."¹¹ Few among the students considered personal wealth to be essential for socio-economic advancement; as we have seen, while a financially comfortable background may greatly facilitate an individual's chances in rising up the educational ladder, it is the education, not the individual's wealth per se, which is considered the crucial factor in achieving "success."

Barkan's attitudinal study of university students is closely parallel to an earlier, more limited survey of western Nigerian college students conducted by Marvick. Among the respondents in Marvick's sample survey many showed a propensity to view higher education in terms of its psychic and monetary gains. Two examples of responses which "could be multiplied many times over" were: a) "As a teacher without a degree, one is looked down upon. A teacher must get to the top. . . . Otherwise my students will come to pass me. An executive post and respect will surely be given me"; b) "A college education is a must. Without it I will suffer some inferiority complex, some lack of anything detailed to take my attention in later life (sic)."¹²

The results of these various surveys point to a significant revelation regarding the sorts of attitudes students and their families frequently entertain towards their schooling and its importance to them. Education, as Osuji concludes, is

valued more as a means of social mobility than as a means of acquiring knowledge for its own sake."¹³ Indeed, for vast numbers of Nigerians formal education is the only way of escaping hardship and poverty (while for others it is a means of maintaining an already advantageous, yet restricted, social position). Given the nature of Nigeria's political economy, Tuquan's generalized description of the schooling process as being little more than a competition for reward-oriented qualifications would seem apt to the Nigerian situation. If a student achieves a satisfactory score in his school entrance examination -- at whatever post-primary level --

his chance of gainful employment in which his income may reach 10, 20, or even 50 times the national average, are substantially increased. If he fails, his situation is unenviable. At primary and junior secondary levels, in particular, education will be terminal. Not only is the school leaver then automatically eliminated from the formal education system, but no alternate forms of training are offered [by government]. The prospects for a job for these drop-outs are very dim indeed. And even if they get some sort of employment, their life's earnings would probably not amount to much more than six month's income of one of the happy few in society. No wonder that a change in the curricular programme cannot by itself yield the desired change in skills and values and that the role of the examination and selection structure is crucial. Parents and pupils alike are caused tension and anxiety and the sieving process gives rise to much bitterness and controversy.¹⁴

The drive for individual upward mobility within the formal school system thus appears to be influenced not by the learning and activity which takes place in the schools, but rather by the actuality of the entire socio-economic superstructure of the nation-state.

True, of course, the existence of bottlenecks in the school system, and the rate of unemployment among primary and secondary school leavers are all too apparent. Moreover, as we have already discussed, there is little likelihood that the expansion of formal post-primary schooling can resolve these problems. For planners and policy-makers, therefore, the logical response would seem to be to curtail the immense drain on public funds which formal education commands and to invest in other areas of informal training and job creation. Unfortunately, however, experience in the past has demonstrated that any attempt to renege on the expansion of formal schooling, or to insist that a greater share of educational costs be borne by the recipients of education, harbours with it the danger of triggering a volatile public reaction.¹⁵ With little other than education as a means of escape from poverty, the public is obviously inclined towards expansion, not reduction, in subsidized post-primary schooling. After all, as Dore writes, "Who would not want a visa into the bridge-head zone? What parent . . . would not want to send his child to primary school to get him into the visa queue? [And] What politician could resist the demands of parents for more . . . schools, for a bigger queuing area?"¹⁶

It is this last question, however, which may well pose a serious problem for Nigeria, for while the private perceptions of the returns on education appear to be the fundamental impetus behind popular demands for education, such perceptions may not jibe either with the economy's capacity to satisfy these demands, or with the country's overall socio-economic needs. This, in

effect, is the crux of a policy dilemma which is undoubtedly intensified by a growing national deficit and a re-establishment of political activity and civilian rule. While nation-wide popularity for education may represent something of a triumph for government in that its policies of educational expansion have generally been endorsed by the populace at large, public pressure to continue expanding the school system may well suggest what could develop into a major setback.

7.3 Formal Education and Individual Attitudes: Entitlement versus Obligation

Widespread pre-conceived notions of education as a ticket to social advancement, as a method of socio-economic selection, may not only generate inordinate pressure on government to sustain its costly commitment to the school system, but may also prove detrimental to the ideal of education as a key to societal improvement. We have seen, for instance, that an underlying principle of education policy is to ensure that every citizen is equipped with the capacity to contribute to the development of society; the function of schooling is to inculcate "intellectual and working capabilities" which benefit not only the individual, but the community as a whole. The implication here is that schools should foster individual attitudes of obligation and service to society as well as to self. While such an aim may appear utopian in any society, evidence suggests that in Nigeria the inextricable link between the education system and

the reward structure of the political economy positively circumscribes the ideal of social altruism. As Tuquan has argued:

The pupil joins schooling with a propensity to personalise the rewards that accrue from being educated, with a tendency to express faith in education in terms of personal material gains in a scarcity-economy, and with an elitist orientation toward the function education should perform in social life. This belief and attitudinal framework at the core of his motivation for learning, giving that particular meaning to life and how this should be lived, derives from the essence of the socio-cultural-economic context under which he has been reared. The school reinforces the particularistic tendencies.¹⁷

Certainly it would seem that within the context of Nigeria's developing state capitalist economy the effect of western education has been to engender a common concern for status and reward. We have already seen, for example, that the experience of formal schooling instils powerful hopes and expectations for secure, prestigious, well-paying jobs. The prevailing view is that an individual's status is equivalent to his level of certification and that in turn he should be accorded certain ascriptive rights and privileges commensurate to this status. Concurrently, the acquisition of a school or university certificate may also be considered as a sociological and/or psychological barrier to other forms of employment which appear to lack the prestige or economic return which a school certificate is seen to warrant. As we have already discussed, few school graduates are willing to take on rural or informal sector jobs upon leaving school. Instead, as Abernethy writes, they "are eager to leave the traditional farm behind them, with its exhausting

labour, low income, and low status; they want modern sector jobs which education has put within their grasp and which make more immediate use of their formal training."¹⁸

Similarly, an ILO study of primary school leaver attitudes in the former Western State verified that many "felt education disqualified them from agriculture and entitled them to a cash earning job." Even when manual work was available, most of the school graduates made little effort to secure such jobs because "the status of the job is more important than the earning of a few shillings per day."¹⁹ There is the sense here that acceptance of work which can be performed by illiterates is an insult to the time and effort invested by the students in acquiring their education, and also perhaps to the sacrifices made by parents on their behalf. Such attitudes deserve some sympathy, for it may well be "that if such jobs can be performed by illiterates, persons with schooling are not needed."²⁰

At the university level the sense of entitlement is most acute -- understandably so when we note the parallels between hopes for higher educational achievement and aspirations for the attainment of success and security within the modern sector of the economy. Having examined the expectations of university students in Nigeria, as well as the opportunities which as yet have been available to them upon graduation, Beckett and O'Connell conclude:

Viewed historically, the graduate is the functional equivalent of the young British 'cadet' of colonial days, joining a ministry at a junior level of the higher ranks, or the field administration as a D.O. or A.D.O. In post-colonial society it is largely correct to say that the

achievement to which the university degree testifies carries with it what becomes almost an ascriptive right to certain roles, which in turn have implications for the material accoutrements of the post-graduate life.²¹

Similar observations have been made by Barkan following a cross-national survey of university student attitudes. The sense of having achieved what so many aspire to, yet so few are actually able to accomplish, may contribute to notions of self-satisfaction which border on self-aggrandizement.

Students are very cognizant of the fact that they constitute the greatest source of highly-trained manpower in their countries, and as a result have a great sense of self-importance. Most students expect to obtain various attributes of elite status, and . . . most compare themselves very favourably with the current incumbents of elite roles in their respective countries.

This sense of self-importance can often border on the point of arrogance. As one East African student told this writer:

Society is just like a joint stock company; those who put the most into the company deserve to take the most out. We are high level manpower, and because we contribute the most to the development of the country, we should be rewarded in kind.

Few students articulate this feeling in such a forthright manner, but most subscribe to its content to varying degrees.²²

In situations where the rewards for prolonged study are exceedingly attractive in comparison to what most students have known before, and where the nature of the political economy generally encourages individualistic competition, such views are not to be unexpected. Unfortunately, however, as several writers have suggested, when manpower in a developing country "is seen in terms of certificates and of graduation",²³ and

schooling is viewed simply as a process of "learning in order to get a job",²⁴ then there may well be scope for widespread irresponsibility, or at least popular attitudes which contribute not only to mediocre on-the-job service and production, but also to the rate of under- or unemployment; and "irresponsible manpower, however skilled, is a bane to a society."²⁵ Indeed, if jobs are rated overwhelmingly in terms of their "inferiority or superiority" rather than in terms of the scarcity of demand, or of their potential earnings level, and if such attitudes result from the possession of paper certificates, then the expansion of the educational system may not only be contributing directly to a greater profusion of certificate holdings among the labour force, but also indirectly to attitudes which may lead to "shoddy mediocrity".²⁶ As John Gardner once observed:

An excellent plumber is infinitely more admirable than an incompetent philosopher. The society which scorns excellence in plumbing because plumbing is a humble activity and tolerates shoddiness in philosophy because it is an exalted activity will have neither good plumbing nor good philosophy. Neither its pipes nor its theories will hold water.²⁷

He might have added, too, that there might well be a shortage of plumbers and a surplus of bad philosophers.

Similarly, the overt competitive scramble for educational qualifications and the popular focus on the rewards which ostensibly derive from such qualifications may overshadow conceptions of the social obligations which the subsidized acquisition of a school certificate might entail. As Asiwaju argues, "Education

has filled [many] Nigerians with greater awareness of their rights and entitlements in their employments, but has failed to awaken a sense of duty and responsibility. There is a 'widespread lamentation of inefficiency and falling standards.'²⁸ Likewise Davidson has referred to the "familiar pressure of middle-class formation in an economy of 'booming individualism'" which continually presents school leavers "with the glittering ideal of the personal career, and, by so doing, continually devalues the ideal of service to the community in favour of service to self."²⁹

In the long run, of course, the danger with such attitudes is that they probably feed widespread frustration and **disillusionment**. After all, in view of the duality which characterizes Nigeria's essentially capitalist economy, perceptions of educational achievement as being equivalent to ascriptive rights may conceivably result in an overall social backlash if such "rights" are then denied. In reference to the academic and occupational aspirations of secondary school pupils, Abiri has observed:

. . . most of the pupils would most probably leave school expecting to attain what they were either incapable of attaining or for which they would never have the opportunity. They would thus be setting out on the road of disappointments, frustrations, and general dissatisfaction with their statuses, for which they might turn around to blame society.³⁰

Obviously, in order to offset general dissatisfaction, there is a need for fundamental change, both in educational strategy and in the overall structure of the economy. Yet as we have already

suggested, Nigeria's dilemma is that dramatic changes in educational and economic policy would probably be greeted with widespread public disapproval. In addition, as we shall go on to see, there seems little likelihood that Nigeria's educated elites would sanction such change.

7.4 Formal Education and the Preservation of the Status Quo

At the beginning of this paper we observed that education in Nigeria is considered to be "the instrument par excellence for affecting national development." The Third National Plan recognized education to be "a powerful instrument for social change in a process of dynamic nation-building", and the federal government's 1977 White Paper on education asserted that "intellectual and social change must be preceded by educational revolution." In each of these statements there would appear to be the notion that education is a phenomenon, or process, which will have a direct impact on two other inter-related phenomena or processes -- development and change. It is important to remember, however, that these are not natural processes operating of their own accord in adherence to some inherent natural law. Education and national development are societal phenomena; the activating agent in their function and direction is man. Thus it is that in relating education to change and development, we are in fact relating man's learning (and the means by which he goes about this process) to his willingness and ability to change and improve himself and his society. The argument that education is instrumental for change and development in effect means that the learning

which men receive -- and the way in which they receive it -- is the impetus which will enable them to bring about orderly change and improvement in society.

We have seen that Nigeria's political economy remains largely dualistic, with a fairly well-developed urban modern sector on the one hand, contrasting with a substantially underdeveloped rural agricultural and small-scale industrial sector on the other. We have seen too that in Nigeria, as in virtually all Third World countries, the livelihood of the vast majority of the nation's citizenry is dependent on farming and small industry. It would seem, therefore, on the basis of national education policy, that the training which men and women receive in the school system should equip them with the facility and inclination to undertake the transformation of those social and economic sectors which are in dire need of change. Moreover, the most educated individuals, those in whom public educational investment is greatest, should accordingly be those who expend the greatest effort in transforming the most underdeveloped sectors and regions of the country. In other words, as education is the instrument par excellence for effecting development, those with the most education -- in fact the nation's elites -- should be the agents par excellence for effecting change and development where these are truly needed. In essence then, as per capita educational expenditure is increased at ever higher levels of the formal school system, the eventual returns should be reflected in an increasingly effective human effort in improving the most underdeveloped sectors of society.

Unfortunately, however, while the ideal of greater education leading to greater development would appear to be a fundamentally sound theoretical -- if not natural -- process, in the Nigerian context the practicality which the human element presents in the process would seem to reverse this premise. Instead of greater human learning leading to an increased human propensity to engage in the transformation and overall improvement of society, the trend in Nigeria would appear to be that the higher the level of schooling received, the less is the volition to participate in those areas in need of development, or to co-operate in any fundamental societal change. Instead those individuals who have worked their way to the pinnacle of the education system tend to opt for positions in the most developed areas of the economy, in the civil service or in state operated corporations where socio-economic rewards are lucrative and where security is fairly well assured.

Evidence of this tendency abounds. For example, a survey of 1972 graduates from the universities of Ibadan, Ife, and Lagos reported that by 1973 42.9% were employed in either the federal or state civil services, 32.1% were working for state school boards, 11.8% were with federal state corporations, and only 13.2% were employed in the private sector. Evidence also showed that while graduates in education were most likely to become school teachers, 22.7% of them had already transferred to administrative positions in the civil service. Moreover, the limited proportion of graduates entering the private sector continued the following year -- further examination revealed that just

over 10% of the 1973 graduates entered the private sector, although it would seem that here too they went to work as employees of large-scale modern sector businesses.³¹

Other studies indicate a similar trend of employment preference among university students. In a sample of 419 Ahmadu Bello University students in 1971, Beckett and O'Connell revealed that 52% of those who had definite career plans expected to find jobs in the administrative apparatus of the federal or state governments. Another 13% planned to become teachers (also civil service) and it was considered likely that many of them would shift into administration.³² Almost 20% expected to find employment in large-scale commercial firms, "mainly either foreign-owned, owned by State or Federal governments or with mixed government and private ownership, where organization, duties, and conditions of service resemble those in the government agencies."³³

A later survey showed the same pattern of career choice. In 1973 225 ABU students were asked the following question: "When you start working, for whom would you prefer to work? (Number in order of preference)." As can be seen in Table 7.C, two-thirds of the respondents indicated government administration as their first priority, while less than 15% ranked it as a third or fourth choice. Just over one-quarter pointed to large-scale private enterprise as a first choice, but 50% chose it as a second preference. Very few showed a willingness to work for a small-scale private enterprise, while only slightly more appeared to prefer having their own business.

55

OF / DE

Table 7.C

Employer Preference

"When you start working, for whom would you prefer to work?
(Number in order of preference)."

	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	Total
Government administration:	69.8%	15.7%	7.4%	7.1%	100.0%
Large private enterprise:	27.9	50.0	14.6	7.5	100.0
Small private enterprise:	4.7	8.5	46.9	39.8	99.9
Have own enterprise:	15.2	17.5	26.3	41.0	100.0

Source: Beckett and O'Connell, Education and Power, p. 87.

On the whole, therefore, evidence clearly suggests that those individuals toward whom the most substantial proportion of formal educational investment is directed are generally those who opt for -- and are most likely to attain -- careers in the most developed sector of the economy.³⁴ Thus, while most observers would agree that the intermediate and agricultural sectors of society are most critical to the developmental process, the most highly trained proportion of Nigerian manpower is being prepared for positions outside of these sectors.

Viewed in functional terms, Nigerian university students are being trained to fill the roles in society that were pioneered by the white colonial elite. The public sector still dominates the market for university-educated labour to a far greater extent than in the Western developed countries. The administrative state and the culture and status system that grew up around it, in which the administrator was supreme, is a colonial heritage.³⁵

It is a heritage which also condones the ideals of efficient administration and service to the state and/or corporation. As Dore suggests, the modern sector has emerged basically as an

"employee sector" in which "the virtues of punctuality, regularity, hard work, conformity to regulation, obedience to the instructions of superiors" are all highly valued.³⁶

One might assume of course that high-level administrative positions would afford the opportunity and power to undertake bold initiatives which might lead to dramatic improvements in agriculture or small-scale business development. Yet the underlying values and reward-structure of the political economy do not foster the incentive for innovation -- success derives from the attainment of a high level position, not from innovations which may result in sweeping change. As Barkan has observed from his cross-national survey, "students regard their educational qualifications as the key to their becoming successful people. Once entrance into the upper middle class is assured through the attainment of a college degree, there is little left to achieve."³⁷

Among Nigerian university students indications are that indeed, having virtually achieved social and economic "success", most feel little compulsion to alter or re-organize the structural status quo. In a sample survey of students attending the three largest universities in each of Nigeria's main regions, Beckett and O'Connell asked them to rate the importance of economic development against the issue of law and order and the order-related values of national unity and stability. The majority of students voted overwhelmingly for order as opposed to development.³⁸ Another question posed to the students was: "Should the incomes of Nigeria's elites be slashed (i.e. reduced by one-third or more) in order to narrow the gap between them and the

common people?"³⁹ More than half answered negatively. Here one might surmise that the fairly large number who responded affirmatively to the question indicates that many among the prospective elite do favour fundamental change. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that the respondents were still students and were not yet in a high income bracket: therefore they had little to lose and hardly any current vested interests other than the government's continued subsidization of their education.

Certainly such readiness to slash salaries has not been visibly demonstrated by Nigeria's income-earning elites.⁴⁰ As Beckett and O'Connell note, "The intelligentsia, as Nigerian experience in the civil service and the army shows, are unlikely to play down their own benefits. Initiatives toward social sacrifice will always tend to founder in practice on the problem of ensuring that all groups see themselves as making an equal sacrifice."⁴¹ In fact any liberal-minded views among the elites concerning the reduction of elitist privilege tends to be expressed in terms of raising income levels of the poor, not in curbing advantages of those already well off.⁴² Clearly, for those with something to lose, hypothetical discussions and proposed solutions are one thing: practical implementation is another.

There is little doubt of course that the opportunity and reward structure of society in Nigeria is largely weighted in favour of those who demonstrate high educational achievement. This then tends to colour students' general acceptance of the status quo and their unwillingness to rock the boat politically. Indeed it would seem that political activism occurs among students

only when measures are introduced which threaten their own advantageous positions. In April 1978, for example, student riots broke out following the federal government's announcement that a student loan scheme was to be cancelled and student fees were to be raised in an attempt to meet the rising costs of university education. The intensity of the furor resulted in at least ten deaths and forced the closure of all universities for several weeks. Similar occurrences took place in 1970, again for the same reasons.⁴³ Such incidents are in keeping with the reward-conscious self-interest which is generated by a dualistic capitalist economy and a reinforcing competitive formal school system. Because of the potential advantages which accrue to those few who succeed in the pyramidal educational system, and the contrasting lifelong adversities which many widely assume they will have to face if they fail scholastically, university students are compelled to respond by

hurrying in 'out of the rain', and in their hurry they are mainly concerned with practical achievement. In this respect the public attitudes of the students are similar to their more personal attitudes. If they are ideological in any way, it is mainly in being pragmatic. In their general approach they accept what works, whether in the university system or in the wider political and social system. They are not unaware that these systems work to their particular advantage. But they also probably see them as all that is realistically possible in the country.⁴⁴

On the whole, therefore, those who emerge at the top of the educational system -- who have received the most educational subsidization and therefore embody the greatest potential return on educational investment -- are those who have a vested interest

in maintaining the status quo, and thus remain averse to dramatic social and economic change.

This then raises a disturbing question concerning the role of education in the development process. Perhaps if Nigeria was considered a developed nation the retention of the socio-economic order would be considered a satisfactory return on educational investment. Yet in Nigeria's case the consensus among most scholars -- and no doubt among most Nigerians -- is that the process of development involves societal change. In keeping with this idea official policy of the federal government is, as we have seen, that "education is to be highly rated, because education is the most important instrument of change -- intellectual and social change must be preceded by educational revolution." Unfortunately there seems little that is revolutionary about the present system of education in Nigeria. Moreover, rather than acting as a forerunner of change, the education system at the post-primary level, tied as it is to the reward structure of a dual economy, may in fact hinder the very socio-economic transformation it is meant to bring about.

7.5 The Role of the State

In reviewing the constraints which a dual capitalist political economy places on the effectiveness of formal education in Nigeria, the function of the state as an integral part of the political economy and as the controller and financier of the school system merits consideration. Indeed, when all is said and done, the role of the state in the formal education system

may in fact prove to be the undoing of much of what it claims it hopes to achieve through education. As several writers have suggested, government in Nigeria acts on the basis of a "social welfare approach."⁴⁵ Undoubtedly the provision of formal education is a prime example of this approach. By underwriting the costs of the school system, i.e. by providing free UPE and by promising greater subsidies for secondary and higher education, the government is in effect establishing itself as the dispenser of rewards in an already reward-conscious society. This may have serious implications regarding the overall social returns on education. As Sofenwa argues, a problem in Nigeria is that "the moment something is said to be a government affair, people no longer consider themselves involved. . . . Because of the social welfare approach to development policy, the people do not consciously participate in the development effort."⁴⁶ Others suggest that by undertaking a massive subsidization of the educational system -- the "bridgehead" to reward and success -- rather than precipitating accelerated social and economic progress, the state may instead blunt "the spirit of local self-help"⁴⁷ and individual enterprise outside the system, and foster "institutional stagnation or purely adaptive behaviour."⁴⁸ Indeed, as people grow accustomed to the idea that government is responsible for public welfare, the tendency may be for demands on state services and assistance to steadily increase despite the depletion of national revenue.⁴⁹

In Nigeria's case there are grounds for adhering to this viewpoint. Reaping as it does the overwhelming proportion of

national revenue from oil production, and engaged as it is in many large-scale modern sector enterprises -- the practical function of "state capitalism" -- the state in Nigeria, whether administered by military officials or civilians, is the dominant force in society, what Aran, et al., call the "societal centre."⁵⁰ In a laissez-faire capitalist economy in which the state is the predominant dispenser of rewards, and where the determinant system of socio-economic mobility and selection (i.e. education) is regulated and subsidized by the state, the societal centre may be viewed as "distribution-oriented" rather than "production-oriented." As Aran, et al., go on to explain, popular perceptions of the societal centre will affect the nature of individual participation in society. If the centre is widely accepted as production-oriented it will have "the power to draw forth resource-producing activity, motivated by the positive valence of participation in the centre- and institution-building processes as rewards apart from extrinsic benefits accruing from such participation."⁵¹ According to this line of argument the meaningfulness of participation is considered as a reward in itself, and thus acts to reinforce the production-orientation of the societal centre, and of society as a whole. However, "when a centre is perceived not as the repository of meaningful contents but as the holder and distributor of resources, the entrepreneurship energies residing in the population spend themselves on the search for the preferable position, from the point of view of access to spoil-sharing rather than on productive innovative efforts."⁵² In other words, if the state or

large-scale private firms are seen as the distributors of wealth and prestige, rather than as instigators of productive activity, then the motivation for individual activity will be to acquire and maintain limited and fixed shares of wealth and prestige rather than to create new shares. And since education is so heavily sponsored by the distribution-oriented centre, such sponsorship may simply reinforce the selection/reward orientation of schools and further curtail the development potential of formal education. If such is the case, then conceivably the greater government subsidization of the school system is, the lesser will be the social returns on investment.

Adherence to this view might perhaps lead to a generalization of the Nigerian situation. Nevertheless, as we have already seen, wealth and prestige in Nigeria reside largely in the modern sector of the economy; for individuals this means securing employment in public and large-scale private organizations. Consequently much individual effort is expended in competing for and soliciting shares in the modern sector spoils.⁵³ And since formal education provides the springboard from which participation in the modern sector is assured, most of this effort is exhausted in the school system itself. The result is that those who show the highest scholastic ability and who are doubtlessly capable of demonstrating great energy and determination -- through the very fact that they have emerged at the top of the educational system -- are those, as we have noted, who normally move directly to the most developed sector of the economy.

While the social system of Nigeria remains unchanged, therefore, government commitment to expand education at all levels and to further subsidize secondary schooling and university not only act to perpetuate and intensify the competitive, individualistic scramble for survival and reward, but help to preserve a stratified colonially-inherited socio-economic structure. Indeed, in contrast to its policy pronouncement that education is "the most important instrument of . . . intellectual and social change", the function of the state appears to thwart this very aim. By adhering to a two-fisted philosophy of proffering subsidized formal education and sustaining a dual capitalist economy, the state ensures that individual qualities of energy and determination are expended primarily in the pursuit of scholastic achievement, and only less so in the interests of economic and social change. In view of this situation we may conclude that as a means of reinforcing the duality of Nigeria's state capitalist political economy, the government's education programme has an undoubtedly positive effect; but as a vehicle for change -- of national development as we have defined the term -- the state system of education leaves much to be desired.

FOOTNOTES
(CHAPTER 7)

¹ Edwards, p. 41.

² As far back as the mid-1950's Chief Awolowo had noted that proposals for educational expansion in the Western Region were "the embodiment of public desires with regard to the educational development of the country." Cited by Abernethy, p. 130.

A quarter of a century later all political parties campaigning in the 1979 federal election had adopted continuing educational expansion as part of their political platforms.

³ Foster, "Education and Social Differentiation in LDCs", Comparative Education Review, 21 (2/3), p. 226.

⁴ Abernethy, pp. 193-94.

⁵ Peshkin, p. 146.

⁶ Ibid., p. 148 and p. 133.

⁷ Abiri, p. 57.

⁸ Ibid., p. 60.

⁹ Similar findings were revealed in a sample survey of 319 pupils in five East Central State secondary schools; Osuji, pp. 133-44.

¹⁰ Barkan, p. 41.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 41 and p. 42.

¹² Dwaine Marvick, "African University Students: A Presumptive Elite", in Coleman, ed., Education and Political Development, pp. 476-77.

¹³ Osuji, p. 142.

¹⁴ Tuquan, pp. 73-74.

¹⁵ In 1958 popular unrest broke out in the former Eastern Region when the state Ministry of Education announced the re-introduction of primary school fees. Abernethy, pp. 181-83. Twenty years later university students throughout the

country staged violent protests when the federal government proposed to raise student fees. Africa, No. 82, June, 1978, pp. 33-34.

¹⁶Dore, p. 3.

¹⁷Tuquan, p. 56.

¹⁸Abernethy, p. 197.

¹⁹Cited by Wood, pp. 128-29.

²⁰Abernethy, p. 198.

²¹Beckett and O'Connell, Education and Power, p. 58.

²²Barkan, p. 47.

²³Sofenwa, p. 138.

²⁴Dore, p. 8.

²⁵Sofenwa, p. 138.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Cited by Sofenwa, pp. 138-39.

²⁸Asiwaju, p. 14.

²⁹Basil Davidson, Which Way Africa? The Search for a New Society, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1973, p. 165.

³⁰Abiri, pp. 66-67.

³¹Cited by Beckett and O'Connell, Education and Power, p. 101.

³²Ibid., p. 87.

³³Ibid.

³⁴For further general discussion on this topic see Barkan, pp. 54-59, and Dore, p. 148.

³⁵Beckett and O'Connell, Education and Power, p. 86.

³⁶Dore, p. 11.

³⁷Barkan, p. 192.

³⁸In light of the fact that these students witnessed the collapse of social and political order in their own country and the awful bloodshed which ensued, perhaps this response should not be considered surprising. Whatever the reasons, however, there does appear to exist a common attitude supportive of the present social order.

³⁹For precise percentages of response to the two questions see the two tables in Beckett and O'Connell, Education and Power, p. 115 and p. 117.

⁴⁰For example, in July 1978 doctors in Lagos (members of the Lagos State branch of the Nigerian Medical Association) called a strike to protest the government's restrictions on private practice. Apparently they were "more concerned with income earnings opportunities than with responsibility to community service." Q. E. R., Fourth Quarter, 1978, p. 7.

See also Waterman for a critical appraisal of elite attitudes with regard to salary increases for university academic staff. The demands submitted by the university vice-chancellors to the Adebo Commission, while vociferating token support for the ideal of social egalitarianism, nonetheless rejected any structural change which might lessen real salary increases. (pp. 182-83).

⁴¹Beckett and O'Connell, Education and Power, p. 117.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Barkan, p. 127.

⁴⁴Beckett and O'Connell, Education and Power, pp. 170-71.

⁴⁵Sofenwa, p. 139. According to Abernethy, "one must view the [UPE] program as a classic instance of welfare politics, and welfare politics as a central feature of Nigerian life." (p. 135). Barkan describes the administrative state as "a 'welfare bureaucracy' in the fullest sense of the term." (pp. 196-97).

⁴⁶Sofenwa, p. 139.

⁴⁷Abernethy, p. 233.

⁴⁸Tuquan, p. 92.

⁴⁹Abernethy, p. 195.

⁵⁰Lydia Aran, S. N. Eisenstadt, and Chaim Adler, "The Effectiveness of Educational Systems in the Process of Modernisation", Comparative Education Review, 16 (1), February, 1972, pp. 37-43.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 38.

⁵²Ibid., p. 39. My underlining.

⁵³Beckett and O'Connell refer to high level positions in Nigeria as "spoils in a distribution system". Education and Power, p. 167.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this paper has been to carry out a broad evaluation of Nigeria's national education programme. The approach has been that of descriptive analysis: on the basis of a variety of field studies we have examined numerous indicators which attest to the relative effectiveness of the government's education programme. In brief we have discussed the following: the internal function of schooling and the problems associated with rapid school expansion and dubious educational quality; the rising costs of education and the estimated rates of return on various types and levels of schooling; the instrumental value of education (formal and non-formal) as manifested in a number of different job areas; the pattern of industrialization and increasing urban unemployment and how these may be affected, if at all, by education; the relationship between education and rural development and the phenomenon of rural outmigration among young people; the role of education as an instrument of national integration; and finally the socio-political dilemma which arises from the inexorable linkage between a welfare policy of broadly-based state-subsidized formal education on the one hand, and a socially stratified, state capitalist political economy on the other.

The foregoing indicators are of course wide-ranging and therein lies the analytical limitation in the overall evaluation. Nevertheless, as mentioned at the outset, for planners and

decision-makers, education is ultimately viewed as a single comprehensive programme, a "package" which must be devised and implemented on a nation-wide scale for the purposes of achieving a broad range of social, economic, and political aims. In planning and implementing a policy the effects of which are frequently neither immediate nor easily gauged, it is essential to carry on a simultaneous and continuous examination of all indicators -- whether they be economic and/or socio-political -- which denote, however crudely, the effectiveness of the various components of the functional policy "package". As we have seen, existing information is often sketchy and subject to crude measurements and constant "adjustments" due to data scarcity. Moreover, in view of the long-term nature of educational investment, it is probably safe to suggest that in any case a full assessment of today's educational decisions (or those of the past five years) may not be possible for at least another generation. Yet there remains a need for a comprehensive on-going assessment of the educational system. This is simply because planning and decision-making are on-going functions. Realistic practical decisions can only be made on the basis of the cumulative evidence arising from a comprehensive evaluation of this type.

At the outset of this study, in order to provide a focus for the analysis, five questions were posed. On the basis of the evidence marshalled throughout the preceding chapters, we shall conclude by responding to the original questions.

1. In what ways, and at what levels, does the federal government's education programme effectively contribute to the process of national development?

As an integral facet of Nigeria's national development process, indications are that formal education is in many ways a proven asset. In particular universal primary education would appear to contain the seeds of what might well prove to be a radical, albeit gradual, societal transformation. The most direct and obvious function of primary schools is to disseminate the skills of functional literacy and numeracy. Cost-benefit studies and numerous labour surveys suggest that the ability to read and write effectively facilitates many practical activities which may be translated into improved job performance and greater economic output. Likewise, sociological research indicates that the experience of western-oriented schooling appears to infuse a sense of modernity among pupils -- and a widespread acceptance of modernization is essential for the simultaneous process of balanced economic growth and fundamental social change. Indeed, a great value of the UPE programme is that for many communities in Nigeria the village primary school is the only practical vestige of modernity and of what is otherwise meant to be a national development process. By "bringing development" to the rural hinterland -- or at least one aspect of the process -- UPE could provide the initial thrust of an integrated, spatially sound rural development programme. In effect the vast reticulation of state-subsidized rural schools may help to spearhead a gradual shift of

resources away from large overburdened urban growth poles towards smaller, more numerous centres of regional growth.

In political terms, universal formal education is also a demonstrably effective instrument. The expansion and heavy subsidization of the formal school system at all levels is not only a necessary response to public pressure for equal educational opportunity, but is a means of diffusing areas of competition and thus reducing the potential for inter-ethnic conflict. At the same time, by initiating a common language, a relatively universal formal scholastic experience, and an awareness of a shared identity beyond regional ethnic ties, the formal school system from Primary I through to post-graduate university study is a vital factor in the process of national horizontal integration. Indeed it is no exaggeration to suggest that internal stability and national unity in Nigeria are dependent on the federal government's provision of formal education.

2. What aspects of the organization and operation of the school system diminish the value of formal education as a component in the development process?

Despite the obvious and sundry benefits of formal education in a country where the rate of illiteracy is high, in many respects Nigeria's national education programme is failing to meet the stipulated aims and objectives of educational policy. Instead there would appear to be a disturbing trend of increasing wastage in cost and in manpower. As the formal educational system expands at all levels, and as the federal government adheres to its commitment to subsidize the entire school sys-

tem, recurrent educational expenditure is likely to rise at a steady rate even as the country faces a dubious future of dwindling oil reserves and a mounting national deficit. There is of course the argument that the expansion of formal education at all levels is a long-term investment in human capital: the more highly "developed" the nation's human capital, the better equipped it will be to transform Nigeria into a modern, self-sufficient industrial and agricultural state.

Unfortunately present indicators appear to give the lie to such optimism. For one thing, education is by no means a uniform process; it is not a fixed measurable commodity to be injected into society with the predictable end result of "developed" human capital. Instead much depends on the type and quality of training provided, and this can vary from excellent to abysmal. In Nigeria evidence suggests that as the school system has expanded rapidly, so there has been a concomitant deterioration in qualitative standards. Large numbers of underqualified and frequently disinterested teachers have been pressed into service and the general level of scholastic performance has dwindled in many areas of the school system. Increased educational expenditure therefore does not necessarily lead to the desired end of human capital development.

Likewise the instrumental value of post-primary school curricula is questionable. Regardless of official pronouncements as to the need for more post-primary technical schools, the curricula of most secondary schools remain heavily biased towards a western-oriented liberal arts and science education.

In view of the limited modern sector employment prospects for most secondary school students and the continuing underdevelopment of those sectors of the economy upon which the majority of school leavers will ultimately be dependent for their livelihood, five years of post-primary training in general science and humanities seems largely irrelevant to their eventual needs. In fact, as evidence shows that increasing numbers of primary and secondary students face either unemployment or jobs which have little relationship to their school training, the functional value of this type of human capital development would appear to be minimal -- and its costs indicative of a massive waste in public expenditure.

In terms of its socio-political impact, a further consideration must be that while formal schooling is undoubtedly effective in forging new social segments which cut across traditional ethnic lines, its function as a method of socio-economic selection in a stratified capitalist society may serve to aggravate an already existent elite/mass gap. The federal government's avowed intention is of course to expand the formal school system at all levels. Yet regardless of the steady rise in formal educational expenditure, the size and rate of growth of Nigeria's population are such that for decades to come only a small percentage of young people will be guaranteed the opportunity of continuing their formal education beyond primary school. In other words, it is unlikely that the pyramidal structure of the school system will be altered.

Thus as educational advancement is so closely tied to the

stratified structure of the political economy as a whole, formal education would often seem to be not so much an investment in human capital, the returns of which will be manifested in overall social change and balanced growth, as simply an intensive competitive struggle for socio-economic gain. In that case, by subsidizing the road to success for the "chosen few", increased secondary and higher educational expenditure may ultimately serve to legitimize and entrench the dualistic nature of society rather than to induce major social change.

3. What other forms of education demonstrate a real or potential contribution to national development and might conceivably benefit from greater state support?

At present in Nigeria there are two systems of post-primary education. On the one side there is the state-sponsored formal school system which absorbs a substantial proportion of national revenue and which provides institutionalized academic and technical training largely oriented to the most developed sectors of the economy. On the other side there exists a vast informal apprenticeship system which is virtually independent of state support and which, through practical on-the-job training, is oriented specifically to employment in the small-scale labour-intensive sector of the economy. In brief, apprentice training would appear to have three distinct advantages over formal schooling: a) it is relatively cheap; b) it combines the learning process with job experience and thence would seem to be an effective means of acquiring not only a technical or craft

skill, but also useful entrepreneurial savvy; c) it is attuned to a sector which, unlike the large-scale capital-intensive sector, may conceivably compound growth with increased employment. At the same time the apprenticeship system has its drawbacks. The value of apprentice training relies heavily on the oftentimes limited skills and abilities of master craftsmen. Likewise, evidence suggests that the costs for such training are incurred not only by apprentices, but by masters themselves, thus perhaps hindering the potential for small business growth. In order to overcome such drawbacks, a possible option for government might be to subsidize and standardize apprentice training, and improve the technical skills of master craftsmen through part-time, informal technical training courses.

Apart from apprentice training there remains also the wide ranging area of informal adult education. Numerous studies have shown that the underdevelopment of small-scale industry and agriculture is to some extent attributable to the managerial and technical shortcomings of small businessmen, craftsmen, and farmers. Similarly, indigence in rural regions and in urban shanty towns may often be due to poor sanitation, nutrition, and health care. Indications are that a partial answer to such problems may lie in a wide profferment of adult education programmes. Certainly evidence has shown that if sufficiently managed, and if related to specific job and community needs, informal practical adult education may result in the immediate enhancement of job performance and general living conditions. An agricultural extension service and various informal adult

vocational programmes are in existence in Nigeria; yet so far these have generally not achieved the magnitude or co-ordination necessary for a broad impact on the adult work force.

4. What is the nature of the function and organization of Nigeria's political economy, and how does this affect the role of education in the development process?

In reviewing those indicators which testify to the inefficiency of the federal government's education programme, it is repeatedly evident that the role of education in the development process is largely overshadowed by the function and organization of the political economy. Despite official assertions as to the need for balanced sectoral growth, reduced unemployment, and more equitable distribution of income, Nigeria continues to pursue a pattern of development which tends to counter these very real needs. Although efforts have been made to reinvigorate the state of agriculture and small-scale intermediate industry in Nigeria, by and large government continues to foster a growth model of urban-centred capital-intensive industrialization. This has led to the centralization of commercial activity and social services in big urban centres, and thence a widening socio-economic rift between "modern" cities and a "backward" rural hinterland.

While state-sponsored industrial growth may enhance the productive capacity of modern sector industry, and incidentally spawn a wealthy elite, such growth frequently does not appear to account for surplus manpower. Yet each year thousands of aspiring school leavers are entering the labour market and

heading for the towns and cities to escape rural poverty. While many may find themselves being hired as government-paid teachers in an expanding school system (whose function is to produce even greater numbers of school leavers), many others face the disenchanting prospect of either joblessness or employment which provides them with little more than a subsistence standard of living.

Clearly the present state of the economy does not have the capacity to satisfy the social and economic aspirations of increasing numbers of school leavers. Yet neither does the education system appear to be able to alter the structural duality of the economy. Indeed the provision of formal education has little effect on either the shape of economic development or on the eventual distribution and utilization of the nation's manpower (other than within the school system itself). This of course has created what may well prove to be a serious dilemma for Nigeria's federal government. For political purposes the state remains committed to increased public expenditure on formal schooling. Such a commitment, however, may draw upon resources which might be more effectively utilized in other areas. Moreover, the expansion of formal education may simply worsen the situation of manpower underutilization by indirectly inculcating a widespread disdain for low-paying, low status rural jobs, either in farming or in small craft industry.

In short, in view of the far-reaching aims and objectives of Nigeria's educational policy, and in light of the federal government's immense allocation of public resources towards

education, it would seem that too much is expected of the school system. While there is no disputing that formal education is in some ways a valuable social service, the structure of the political economy is such that it is mistaken to regard education as the consummate factor in the nation's development process. The truth would seem to be that the government's programme of education cannot bring about balanced economic growth, full employment, and a redistribution of national income.

5. What policy alternatives, educational or otherwise, might enhance the role of education -- formal and non-formal -- in the process of national development?

In view of the shortcomings of formal institutional education -- high per capita expense, the irrelevance of secondary school curricula and classroom seatwork, and wastage in terms of low scholastic standards and school leaver unemployment -- a number of educational policy options should be considered in Nigeria:

a) A gradual reduction -- or a freeze -- in investment in formal secondary schooling.

b) A reduction in public funding of tertiary education; while it is probably impolitic to foist a large burden of university costs on students, especially those from families of modest means, it may be possible to encourage large private businesses to finance the education of future high-level employees and to share in university research and the development of technical and higher education programmes.

c) Increased support for informal apprentice training; such

support may take the form of financial subsidies for masters and apprentices alike, the standardization of apprentice qualifications, and on-going technical and managerial programmes for masters.

d) Further expansion and co-ordination of informal adult education programmes aimed specifically towards the improvement of vocational skills in all walks of life -- managerial acumen, technical skills, home management, etc.; in this area too there may be room for the encouragement of free enterprise whereby qualified individuals or local private organizations and services (subject to state licensing and supervision) may assume a significant role in the education process, and thence lessen the financial burden of the state.

As yet of course it may be presumptuous to spell out specific proposals for the development of an alternative educational strategy in Nigeria. Not enough is known about the effects which would result from a concerted government drive to provide massive public funding of informal job-oriented training programmes. For instance, it is quite likely that a significant value in apprentice training lies in its capability of functioning on a non-bureaucratic, person-to-person basis. The incursion of direct state involvement in the traditional apprenticeship system might only serve to formalize this type of training and erode its functional simplicity. Similarly, the reduction or redirection of government spending on education and the encouragement of increased local private participation in the education process is a suggestion fraught with political perils. Con-

sequently the development of an alternative educational strategy necessitates caution and continuous assessment. For researchers and planners, and ultimately decision-makers, this is the challenge: to examine the means whereby greater public funding can be utilized so as to positively enhance, without substantially altering, the efficacy of informal education schemes.

Ultimately, however, whatever Nigeria's educational strategy, the effectiveness of education will depend largely on the country's overall approach to national development. As long as Nigeria's development strategy adheres to a model of industrial, urban-centred growth, education will probably continue to reinforce a dualistic economy and a widening elite/mass gap. At the same time problems of increasing unemployment, inequitable distribution of national income, and an imbalance in sectoral and regional development will linger, and thus minimize the potential effectiveness of education. Certainly education is not the answer to these problems: these can only be overcome through the implementation of a series of integrated programmes dealing squarely with these issues. What is needed, therefore, is not only an alternative educational strategy, but an alternative approach to development -- one based on a model of even spatial and sectoral growth and programme integration. Only if this occurs will education in Nigeria achieve a fully effective role in the development process.

APPENDIX I

Structure and Organization of
the 6-5-2-3 School System

SBS -- School of Basic Studies

Prelim. -- University Preliminary Courses

ATC -- Advanced Teachers College

G. II(p) -- Grade Two (pivotal) -- for secondary school leavers

NCE -- Nigerian Certificate of Education

OND -- Ordinary National Diploma

HND -- Higher National Diploma

C & G -- City and Guilds Certificate

WASC -- West African Schools Certificate

Source: Federal Republic of Nigeria, Report on Major Trends in Education, p. 8.

APPENDIX II

Structure and Organization of
the New 6-3-3-4 School System

1. Education mainly as a social service

2. Education mainly for manpower and economic development

J.S. -- Junior Secondary School

S.S. -- Senior Secondary School

(T) -- Technical bias

(V) -- Vocational bias

(C) -- Commercial bias

*S.S. (V) and Skill Centres may be integrated.

Note: Figures in boxes represent duration of schooling for the particular level.

Source: Federal Republic of Nigeria, Report on Major Trends, p. 11.

APPENDIX III

Tangale-Waja Education Department First School Leaving Certificate Examinations 1978/79 (Sample Questions)

Subject: General Paper

1. Name the present Head of State. (10 marks)
2. (a) Name the five Chiefs of Tangale-Waja.
(b) Who is the Secretary of Tangale-Waja Local Government Authority? (10 marks)
3. How many States do we have in Nigeria? (10 marks)
4. Who is the current chairman of the O.A.U. (10 marks)

Subject: Social Studies

1. (a) What type of money do we use in Nigeria?
(b) When was the last Nigerian census conducted?
(c) When did Nigeria change to driving right?
2. Into how many states is Nigeria divided? (12, 13, 16, 19, 20)
3. Name ten (10) states which you know in Nigeria.
4. Name four imports of Nigeria..

Subject: English Language: Comprehension

Read the following story and answer the questions which follow.

Once there lived an old woman who had no children. She lived alone in the middle of the forest. But she had a goat -- a very fat goat which was always near to her. She fed the goat and brushed it, and the goat always looked beautiful.

In that part of the country there lived a king who was very rich. He had cows and goats and many other animals. He always thought that his animals were the best in the country-side. He used to say this and nobody thought he was wrong.

- (a) How many children had the old woman?
- (b) Where did she live?
- (c) What did the old woman always have near her?
- (d) Who had cows and goats and many other animals?
- (e) Where did he live?

Grammar

1. Write the opposite of the following words.
(a) black (b) wide (c) man (d) dirty (e) beautiful
2. Provide plurals for the following.
(a) child (b) man (c) book (d) story (e) tooth
3. Give the comparative and the superlative of the following.
(a) long (b) ugly (c) beautiful (d) common (e) many

Spelling

Write these words in their correct forms.

- (a) ookb (b) oeh (c) doof (d) omanw (e) ilcpen
(f) shengli (g) plepeo (h) elbat (i) twera (j) ootf

Sentence Construction

Construct good sentences with the following words.

- (a) late (b) house (c) brown (d) hoe (e) school
(f) room (g) pencil (h) bucket (i) cup (j) plate

Subject: ArithmeticPart One (5 marks each)

1. $86 + 109 + 1 =$
2. $22.45 + 1.6 + .567 =$
3. $1\frac{1}{2} + 2\frac{3}{4} + 3 =$
4. $6^2 + 7^2 =$
5. Reduce 870 by 399.
6. Subtract ₦ 520.89 from ₦ 645.70.
7. Express $\frac{1}{4}$ as a decimal.

Part Two (10 marks each)

1. By how much is the sum of 88 and 10 less than the sum of 90 and 61?
2. Write in Roman figures: one hundred and nine.
3. What do I add to 35 to make 93?
4. How many seconds are there in one day?

Subject: General Science

1. What are the three (3) necessary conditions for seed germination? (20 marks)
2. What diseases are carried by the following? (20 marks)
 - (a) Tsetse fly.
 - (b) Anopheles mosquito.
3. Name two water borne diseases. (20 marks)
4. Draw a tree and label the four main parts. (20 marks)
5. Give three examples of each of the following kinds of animals: (20 marks)
 - (a) mammals.
 - (b) reptiles
 - (c) birds

APPENDIX IV

Ministry of Education, Oyo State of Nigeria
Primary School Leaving Certificate Examination, 1979
 (Sample Questions)

Subject: Arithmetic

1. Find the sum of 18, 118, and 1,118.
2. From ₦ 10.00 take away ₦5.05.
3. Write 75% as a common fraction.
4. Find the cost of 200 oranges at 10 for 10k.
5. What is 5% of 250?
6. Find the simple interest of ₦ 125 for 4 years at 4%.
7. A small car can do 60 km. on a litre of petrol. What will be the cost of petrol for a journey of 180 kilometres if petrol is 46 kobo a litre?
8. The weights of four parcels are 820g., 730g., 290g., and 470g. Find the total weight in kg. and g.

Subject: Mathematics

1. Which of the following is a solution to $7 \times 4 = 15 \times 2$?
 a. 15 b. 28 c. 135 d. 58 e. 28.
2. The sum of the 31-day months of the year is:
 a. 217 b. 216 c. 215 d. 218 e. 186.
3. What is the perimeter of a square of area 4 sq. cm.?
 a. 4 cm. b. 16 cm. c. 8 cm. d. 2 cm. e. 32 cm.
4. The average income of 8 workers is found to be equal to ₦ 72.50. What is the total amount received?
 a. ₦ 576.00 b. ₦ 616.00 c. ₦ 580.00 d. ₦ 584.00 e. ₦ 564.00.
5. Express 86 in prime factors.
 a. 1×86 b. 2×24 c. 2×43 d. 2×34 e. 6×8 .
6. The population of a town is 20984. If there are 6,676 men and 7592 women and the remaining are children, how many children are in town?
7. Wumi bought 40 metres of cloth for ₦ 20.00. She sold the cloth at 40k per metre. How much did she lose?

Subject: English: Comprehension

Read the story and answer the following questions.

Once upon a time, a long time ago, the Hippopotamus used to live on land. His name was Popo and he had seven large, fat wives who loved singing. Popo was very proud of them. He was very fond of himself too and used to say:

"But for the Elephant, I'd be the biggest animal on land."

Popo loved giving dinner parties; that is why all other animals liked him so much. But none of them, apart from his seven large, fat wives knew his name was Popo. None of them had taken the trouble to find out what he was called and this did not please Popo. He said to himself:

"I'll do something about it. Imagine, calling me a friend and not knowing my name! I'll show them!"

So he gave another party and invited all the animals. The food was served and as the animals were about to eat, Popo rose and said:

"My dear friends, you have come to eat at my table. May I ask you a question?"

"Yes!", they all shouted together.

"What is my name?"

Not one of them could answer.

"Very well, friends," said Popo. "No name, no food."

At this they all got up and left. Popo called his seven large, fat wives to join him and they began to eat the feast.

1. What was Popo's reason for giving his dinner party?
 - a. to tell every one his name
 - b. to give his friends a lot of food.
 - c. to punish his friends for not knowing his name.
 - d. to make his wives happy.
2. What did the wives like doing very much?
 - a. giving dinner parties
 - b. singing
 - c. living on land
 - d. eating.
3. Who knew Popo's name?
 - a. all his friends
 - b. one of his friends
 - c. the elephant
 - d. his wives.

Grammar

Complete the sentences with the correct words.

1. Olu has _____ his head.
 - a. shook
 - b. shake
 - c. shaken
 - d. shaking
 - e. is shaking
2. Everyone _____ when they heard the story of the goat.
 - a. is laughing
 - b. has been laughing
 - c. laughed

Spelling

Underline the correct spelling within brackets.

1. Have you (a. received b. recieved) the message?
2. There are (a. fourty b. forty) boys in primary VI.

Writing

Write ten correct sentences on one of the following:

- a. Our village or town
- b. What I do every Saturday evening
- c. Something I found
- d. A football match.

Or

Write a letter to your friend about what you want to do next year.

Subject: History and Civics

1. The Cultural Centre for Oyo State can be found in _____ town.
2. The Chairman of the Federal Electoral Commission for Nigeria is _____.
3. The colours of the Nigerian flag are _____ and _____.
4. Every citizen of Nigeria has freedom of _____ and _____.

Subject: Nature Study and Health

1. Which one of the following has fibrous roots?
 - a. maize
 - b. sugar cane
 - c. grass.
2. Which part of the air helps things live?
 - a. oxygen
 - b. nitrogen
 - c. carbon-dioxide.
3. One of the following insects causes sleeping sickness.
 - a. Housefly
 - b. mosquito
 - c. tsetse fly.
4. The eggs of mosquitoes hatch into
 - a. pupa
 - b. larva
 - c. imago.

Subject: Gardening

1. Why do we till the soil before planting?
 - a. to have more soil for planting
 - b. to stop erosion
 - c. to help the roots grow freely.
2. Which one of the following vegetables can we grow from cuttings?
 - a. garden egg
 - b. Indian spinach
 - c. okra
3. A good friend of the gardner is one of the following:
 - a. a beetle
 - b. a bee
 - c. a cricket

Subject: Needle Work

1. Name two articles which you made in needlework for
 - a. yourself b. your home c. your little brother or sister.
2. (a) I make decorative stitches on my dress to make it
 - i. smart ii. beautiful iii. sew well iv. large.
 (b) Pins and needles have
 - i. holes ii. flat ends iii. sharp ends.
3. (a) Mention the name of the seam you used in making a child's magyar frock.
- (b) Name the stitches you used in making the seam.

Subject: Geography

1. Map Question (map not included in this appendix)

Study the map of OKEBA QUARTERS and underline the correct answers.

- A. There are _____ petrol stations on the map.
 - a. eight b. ten c. five d. six
- B. The school that has its football field at the middle of the classroom blocks is located on the map
 - a. northeast b. northwest c. east d. west.
- C. The number of roads which cross at Idi-Eesu is:
 - a. six b. four c. five d. eleven
2. A town in Nigeria has the following figures of temperature and rainfall in a year.

Month	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D
Temp.	70	73	76	78	75	72	70	69	70	72	72	70
Rain	0	0	1	3	8	9	13	12	8	2	0	0

- A. Which is the hottest month?
- B. Which is the coldest month?
- C. Which three months have the heaviest rainfall?

APPENDIX V

West African Examinations Council

Nigeria National Common Entrance, December 1978

Verbal and Quantitative Aptitude (Sample Questions)

Verbal Aptitude

Section 1

In each of the following items you are given two pairs of words then a fifth word. Look carefully at the first two pairs and notice how the words in each pair are related. Look at the fifth word. Now choose from the words labelled A to E the one related to the fifth word in the same way as the words of the first two pairs are related.

1. mile, smile; ting, sting; ling, _____.
 A. slings B. sings C. sling D. slinging E. singing

Section 2

Each of the following items consists of five words labelled A to E. One of the words is a general term which describes what the other four words are. Shade the answer space with the same letter as the general term.

1. A. blind B. deaf C. handicapped D. dumb E. lame

Section 3

In each of the following you are given a sentence. Read it carefully and decide how true it is.

Shade A if it is always true.

Shade B if it is often true but not always true.

Shade C if it is never true.

Shade D if it is impossible to say how true it is.

1. Children run faster than adults.

Section 4

In each of the following items pick out the one word which does not belong to the group.

1. A. father B. mother C. boy D. brother E. sister

Section 5

In each of the following items a word is missing. Choose from the given alternatives the word that most suitably fills the space.

1. day and night A. dull B. dark C. cold D. moon
light and _____ E. sun

Section 6

Choose the letter from those labelled A to E that can end the first word and begin the second.

1. Sprin()ather

A. b B. q C. l D. f E. m

Quantitative AptitudeSection 1

Use the above sample

- A. 2
B. 3
C. 4
D. 8
E. 15

Section 2

The word 'marine' is represented by the number 715263. Use this fact below.

1. What word does the number '125' represent?
A. aim B. man C. air D. are E. mar

Section 3

For each of the following, work out the pattern that is being followed by the numbers and decide what the next two numbers should be.

1. 4, 2, 6, 3, 8, 4, 10, ?, ?.

A. 12, 6 B. 5, 12 C. 12, 5 D. 5, 10 E. 10, 5

Section 4

Sample

$$6 \text{ Y } 4 = 16$$

$$5 \text{ Y } 3 = 13$$

$$7 \text{ Y } 10 = 24$$

$$4 \text{ Y } 0 = 8$$

Use the above sample.

1. $8 \text{ Y } 2 = ?$

A. 6 B. 10 C. 16 D. 18 E. 20

Section 5

Use the above sample.

A. 0 B. 10 C. 20 D. 40 E. 100

Section 6

Sample

$$9 \text{ *** } 2 = 9 + 8 = 17$$

$$7 \text{ *** } 5 = 7 + 6 + 5 + 4 + 3 = 25$$

$$12 \text{ *** } 3 = 12 + 11 + 10 = 33$$

Use the above sample.

1. $20 \text{ *** } 2 = ?$

A. 10 B. 39 C. 22 D. 40 E. 41

APPENDIX VISalary Levels and Positions of Education Officers in NigeriaPrimary School

Salary Level	Annual Starting Salary	Position and Grade of Teacher
Level 05	₦1,476	Teacher, Grade II: those with with not less than eight years post-qualification experience and good service records will be eligible for consideration for promotion to Level 06 as Teachers, Grade I.
Level 06	₦1, 944	Teacher, Grade I Assistant Headmaster, Grade II Headmaster, Grade III
Level 07	₦2,532	Assistant Headmaster, Grade I Headmaster, Grade II
Level 08	₦3, 264	Headmaster, Grade I
Level 09	₦4,368	Headmaster (Special Grade): a promotion post for deserving Headmasters, Grade I, to head extra large primary schools with over 24 classes.

Post-Primary Institutions

Salary Level	Annual Starting Salary	Position and Grade of Teacher
Level 06	₦1, 944	Teacher, Grade I
Level 07	₦2,532	Master, Grade III: by promotion of suitable Teachers, Grade I, who have had not less than 6 years post-qualification experience, or holders of N. C. E. or equivalent qualifications.

Level 08 ₦3,264

Master, Grade II: by promotion of suitable Masters, Grade III, who have had not less than 10 years post-Grade I (Teacher) experience, or holders of N. C. E. or equivalent qualifications and at least six years post-qualification experience.

Level 09 ₦4,368

Master, Grade I: by promotion of suitable Masters, Grade II, with not less than 4 years' experience.

Headmasters and Assistant Headmasters of Schools and Colleges range from Salary Levels 10-15, dependent on positions and years of experience.

Level 10 ₦5,460

Level 11 ₦6,444

Level 12 ₦7,104

Level 13 ₦7,764

Level 14 ₦8,868

Level 15 ₦9,996

Source: Ministry of Education, Oyo State.

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