

**Muno-Lawake:
Contrasting Established Literature to the Critical and Local
Understandings of War in Lord's Resistance Army and Government of
Uganda conflict-affected Acholiland, northern Uganda**

by:

Ryan Matthew Butyniec

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Department of Political Science
Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
Canada

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Abstract

Since the conflict between the Lord's Resistance Army/Movement (LRA/M) and the Government of Uganda (GoU) first ignited, an established body of literature has come to frame the analysis of the protracted conflict, its consequences, and even act in an influential manner for policymaking and non-governmental advocacy. However, in recent years, a body of literature has emerged that not only criticizes the established understanding of conflict in Acholiland, but also the subsequent policy and advocacy responses to the very complex emergency which unfolded in northern Uganda. Therefore, in light of the growing critical approach the LRA/M – GoU conflict, this thesis seeks to address some of the more salient tensions within the discussion of war in Acholiland. To this effect, this thesis uses fieldwork findings from the war and displacement-affected Acholi community, to illustrate the support local narratives provide to the critical approach, and more importantly, emphasize the conflict in northern Uganda as one that requires greater local engagement in its attempt to reconcile war in Acholiland.

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Finally, to Ilko Sr., you were right. Thanks.

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
Abbreviations

ADF – Allied Democratic Front
ARLPI – Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative
CAR – Central African Republic
CR – Conciliation Resources
DP – Democratic Party
DRC – Democratic Republic of Congo
FDC – Forum for Democratic Change
FRELIMO – Liberation Front of Mozambique
GoU – Government of Uganda
HSM – Holy Spirit Movement
ICC – International Criminal Court
IDMC – Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDP – Internally Displaced Person
JPT – Juba Peace Talks
JRP – Justice and Reconciliation Project
KY – Kabaka Yekka
LDU – Local Defense Unit
LRA/M – Lord’s Resistance Army/ Movement
NGO – Non-governmental Organization
NRA/M - National Resistance Army/Movement
OCHA – Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PRA – Popular Resistance Army
RLP – Refugee Law Project
SPLA – Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army
UFF - Uganda Freedom Fighters
UN – United Nations
UNC – Uganda National Congress
UNHCR – United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNLA – Uganda National Liberation Army


UNLF – Uganda National Liberation Front
UPC – Uganda Peoples Congress
UPDA – Uganda Peoples Democratic Army
UPDF – Uganda Peoples Defense Force
US – United States
WBNF – West Bank Nile Front

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Map 1. Acholiland District Map. Produced by: Ryan Butyniec and James Kilambus, 2010.



AREA OF FIELDWORK. ACHOLILAND SUB-REGION



Map 2. Areas of Fieldwork. Produced by: Ryan Butyniec and James Kilambus, 2010.

1.1 Introduction

Conflict between the Lord's Resistance Army/Movement (LRA/M) and the Government of Uganda (GoU) has persisted at varying levels of intensity for the past 25 years. Notorious for its protracted duration, high incidence of atrocity, human rights abuses, and the use of child soldiers, conflict in Acholiland¹ is also renowned for the now-aborted Juba Peace Talks (JPT) and the involvement of the International Criminal Court (ICC).² During this conflict, while accurate numbers remain elusive, it is estimated that as many as 500,000 persons have perished, whether by LRA/M violence, or that of its enemy the GoU and their national military, the Uganda Peoples Defense Force (UPDF).³ Additionally, by the late 1990s this conflict had displaced nearly two million persons into squalid internally displaced persons (IDP) camps, where roughly 1,000 died each week due to the wretched conditions.⁴

¹ The terms Acholiland and northern Uganda are used interchangeably in this thesis. Additionally, it is important to note that this thesis uses the term "Acholi" to refer to the predominant group of Luo speaking communities in northern Uganda who shared similar territory and migrating patterns to their neighboring Langi and iTeso. This thesis recognizes that there is considerable debate over the ethno-genesis of the Acholi community, and that the terms of Acholi, Langi and iTeso are generally regarded as modern concepts only created in the past 200 years (see Ronald Atkinson, *Roots of Ethnicity: The Origins of the Acholi in Uganda Before 1800*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994). Although a detailed conceptualization of the Acholi as a 'people' is beyond the scope of this thesis, chapter 2 of this thesis includes an overview of the distinct social and demographic characteristics which remain central to the ethno-genesis of the Acholi.

² Tim Allen, *Trial Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord's Resistance Army*, (London: Zed Books, 2006), Heike Behrend, "War in Northern Uganda: the Holy Spirit Movement of Alice Lakwena, Severino Lukoya and Joseph Kony", in Chris Clapham (ed), *African Guerillas*, (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1998) and Chris Dolan, *Social Torture: The Case of Northern Uganda, 1986 – 2006*, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009).

³ See ACR, retrieved web link, <http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/ACRText/ACR-Uganda.html#Deaths>, on May 18, 2011.

⁴ See Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, retrieved web link, [http://www.internal-displacement.org/idmc/website/countries.nsf/\(httpEnvelopes\)/2439C2AC21E16365C125719C004177C7?OpenDocument](http://www.internal-displacement.org/idmc/website/countries.nsf/(httpEnvelopes)/2439C2AC21E16365C125719C004177C7?OpenDocument), July 6, 2011 and Human Rights Watch, "The Scar of Death: Children Abducted by the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda", *HRW Report*, (September, 1997).

Consequently cited in 2008 by then United Nations (UN) Humanitarian Coordinator Jan Egeland, as “the worlds [sic] worst forgotten humanitarian crisis,”⁵ northern Uganda has since become a major focus for conflict management literature and the increased activities of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international policymakers. The United States (US) government recently illustrated this growing international concern, by passing dedicated congressional legislation that extends financial and logistical support for the GoU and regional authorities to end the conflict.⁶ Yet, irrespective that each party to the conflict, those affected by it, and the international community all arguably desire an end to war in Acholiland and beyond, the conflict and its consequences have grown increasingly complex.

For instance, the originally Acholiland-based LRA/M now operates within an inter-state setting, having withdrawn itself to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Sudan, and the Central African Republic (CAR) as a result of UPDF military operations, ICC warrants and the now-defunct mediations at Juba.⁷ With regard to development, the Acholi community still predominantly resides in poverty, emphasized in particular when contrasted with the rest of Uganda.⁸ Likewise, political representation is a consistent source of tension in Acholiland, as northerners overwhelmingly support

⁵ See United States Government, Virtual Portal, retrieved web link, <http://northernuganda.usvpp.gov/>, July, 6, 2011

⁶ See United States Government, *Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009 (Public Law 111 – 172)*, (Washington The White House, November 24, 2009)

⁷ Mareike Schomerus, “The Lord's Resistance Army in Sudan A History and Overview,” *Small Army Survey*, (Geneva Human Security Baseline Assessment, 2007) and Accord, “Regional community peace building and the LRA conflict a conversation with John Baptist Odama, Archbishop of Gulu, Uganda,” in Alexander Ramsbotham and William Zartman (eds), *Building Peace Across Borders* (London, Conciliation Resources, 2011)

opposition parties at the national level such as the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC) and Democratic Party (DP), before even considering the National Resistance Army/Movement (NRA/M) headed by current President, Yoweri Museveni. Moreover, with growing land disputes and hundreds of thousands attempting to return home or to reintegrate into society, a potential renewal of conflict is not the only concern for northern Ugandans.⁹ Nonetheless, renewed conflict does remain a pressing concern for the Acholi, as the present situation resembles little more than a fragile peace, one requiring both considerable and careful management.

Interestingly, with regard to conflict management, Brenneis stated, “over the course of a dispute, one narrative over another often assumes an authoritative role.”¹⁰ To this effect, Brenneis implies that there is indeed a specific phenomenon in conflict management where in the broader understanding of conflict, certain narratives become more dominant or widely recognized. In this respect, Brenneis further argues that an authoritative narrative is in short, the product of two important and interlinked processes:

First, Brenneis believes that authoritative narratives stem largely from co-narration or multivocality, a process whereby co-authors of a story compete and contend to be heard and recognized, with one source often becoming the most predominantly considered. Next, Brenneis also believes that another critical component for the creation of authoritative narratives is entitlement. Essentially, entitlement simply relates to the

⁸ Sarah Ssewanyana, Stephen Younger and Ibrahim Kasirye, *Poverty under Conflict: The Case Study of Northern Uganda*, Working Paper, (Oxford: Center for the Study of Africa Economies Conference, 2007), Ssewanyana, et al, *Understanding the Determinants of Income Inequity in Uganda*, Working Paper, (Makerere: Center for the Study of African Economies, 2004), Government of Uganda, *Uganda Demographic and Health Survey 2006* (Kampala: Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2007) and United Nations Development Programme, *Uganda Human Development Report: Rediscovering Agriculture for Human Development*, (Kampala: UNDP, 2007)

⁹ Peter Labeja, “Uganda: Negotiation Best Solution to Land Disputes in North,” *The New Vision* (Kampala: February 24, 2010)

manner in which a conflict is examined and retold, with the authors of research, advocacy and policy rather than the victims becoming the ultimate owners of such portrayals of war. Consequently, through contested versions of the war, their interpretation by researchers, policymakers and advocates and the recurrent replication of these stories to which only a few hold entitlement to, the predominant narrative in turn becomes “in more or less standardized form – taken as a binding or reference account,”¹¹ or to borrow from Foucault, they act as the dominant node within an intellectual network.¹² While future research could usefully consider this process more fully in the context of northern Uganda, such a consideration is beyond the scope of this thesis.

Nevertheless, in conflict management literature, policymaking documents, and NGO advocacy on Acholiland, Brenneis’ authoritative narrative indeed appears both present and prevalent. Whether one reviews the academic attempts to understand and stem conflict in Acholiland (and the myriad of social, economic, and political consequences of such), or the myriad of international policymaking documents and NGO issue framing that focuses on northern Uganda,¹³ Brenneis’ authoritative narrative becomes clear in the recurrent language used to depict and characterize the LRA/M – GoU conflict.

Yet, it is important to note that the phenomenon of an authoritative narrative appears to create some problematic aspects for analysis and policymaking concerning northern Uganda. First, as one narrative has become the authority, subsequent literature, policy, legislation, and advocacy comes from an almost unquestioned previously

¹⁰ Daniel Brenneis, “Telling Troubles: Narrative, Conflict and Experience,” *Anthropological Linguistics*, (Vol 30, No 4, 1998, p 281)

¹¹ Brenneis, 1998, p 281

¹² Michel Foucault, *Archaeology of knowledge* (New York: Pantheon, 1972)

established understanding. However, conflict in northern Uganda is not a simple black-and-white affair, something increasingly characterized by the rapid growth of critiques to the authoritative narrative, or in this case, the established perspective of war in Acholiland.¹⁴ Therefore, while one will indeed find consensus on the broader contours of conflict in Acholiland, in emerging critical literature there have grown some strong criticisms to some distinct thematic assumptions used in established literature.¹⁵

Secondly, in being the authority on conflict in northern Uganda, established literature and its thematic assumptions have inherently translated to the pages of policymaking documents and NGO advocacy concerning the complex emergency.¹⁶ Yet, by using a state-centric approach, established literature has often framed the conflict in a depoliticized manner, placing increased emphasis on violence, obfuscated motivations for the resistance, and essentially, arguing that the conflict is waged by only one group, a ruthless band of non-state militants or ‘terrorists.’ This established perspective has in turn, influenced a belief that only one particular form of peace-building with regard to the resistance or ‘terrorists’ of northern Uganda will succeed, namely, military interventions

¹³ These are outlined in detail in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. However, one can do a quick assessment by viewing the established literature and the recent US anti-LRA/M legislation in 2009.

¹⁴ Preference in this thesis is to utilize the term established in place of Brenneis’ depiction of an authoritative narrative. The reason for this is that literature which influences policy and advocacy on northern Uganda comes in the form of a body of literature that has ‘established’ itself as an authority. While this may appear an argument in semantics, preference resides with the term ‘established’ rather than ‘authoritative’ as the increased contestation of the established view can cast doubt on the veracity of the term authority with regard to any body of literature or analysis on northern Uganda.

¹⁵ For examples of the ‘established’ literature, see Robert Gersony, *The Anguish of Northern Uganda: Results of a Field Based Assessment of the Civil Conflict in Northern Uganda*, (Kampala: USAID, 1997), Anthony Vinci, “Existential Motivations in the Lord’s Resistance Army Continuing conflict,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, (Vol. 30, No. 4, 2007), Allen, 2006 and Behrend, 1998.

¹⁶ The language and policy direction in the United States Government, *Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009 (Public Law 111 – 172)* (Washington: The White House, November 24, 2009) mirrors the conclusions provided in Tim Allen, *War and Justice in Northern Uganda: An Assessment of the International Criminal Courts Intervention* (London: Crisis States Research Centre, 2005) in addition to the prolific NGOs back by the Center for American Progress such as Invisible Children, Enough Uganda and Resolve Uganda.

or retributive justice (or the combination of both) ¹⁷ However, these attempts as of yet, have failed to yield durable solutions, whether in the form of military campaigns, ICC involvement, international condemnation, or even disputed multilateral mediations ¹⁸

Therefore, while it appears that an established and very influential perspective of war in Acholiland does exist, it also appears that it has failed to provide research, policymaking, and advocacy with the necessary tools to end war

In response to this established perspective, emerging critical approaches to conflict in northern Uganda offer some stark contrast to key thematic assumptions and conclusions that dominate the analysis of war in Acholiland Essentially, in critiquing the more policy-influential established perspective, emerging critical approaches question the veracity of many ‘accepted’ thematic claims about the LRA/M - GoU conflict, and in doing so, the wider scholarship that not only framed current understandings of the conflict, but also the policymaking and advocacy concerning such ¹⁹

In opposition to these key thematic perspectives in established literature, and, in light of the lack of progress to stem conflict, build peace, or create durable solutions for the displaced, emerging critical approaches to conflict in northern Uganda have provided some new and very important considerations First, where failed attempts at conflict mitigation by military might or mediation manifest, critical authors increasingly argue that solutions to the situation in Acholiland are requisite of a more locally engaged

¹⁷ Issaka Souare, “The International Criminal Court and African Conflict The Case of Uganda,” *Review of African Political Economy*, (No 121, 2009), Allen, 2005, Allen, 2006

¹⁸ Ronald Atkinson, “Revisiting Operation Lightning Thunder,” *The Independent*, (June 9, 2009)

¹⁹ For examples of the ‘critical’ literature, see Sverker Finnstrom, *Living with Bad Surroundings War History and Everyday Moments in Northern Uganda*, (Durham Duke University Press, 2008), Adam Branch, “Uganda’s Civil War and the Politics of ICC Intervention,” *Ethics and International Affairs*, (Vol 21, No 2, 2007), Ronald Atkinson, *From Uganda to the Congo and Beyond Pursuing the Lord’s Resistance Army*, (New York International Peace Institute, 2009) and Dolan, 2009

understanding.²⁰ Secondly, as the shortcomings of conflict management in Acholiland mount, the potential utility of new critical analyses arguably increases. While the LRA/M now stations itself outside of Uganda, potential tensions with an independent South Sudan, increased land disputes and national political representation remain constant concerns for those who remain in the fragile peace of Acholiland.²¹ Therefore, in the aim of durable peace and to stem future explosions of conflict in northern Uganda, critical literature argues it may be time to revisit the influential established literature and its central assumptions concerning the conflict, particularly the political or apolitical nature of the LRA/M and the range of actors seen to be responsible for the violence.²²

Where critical approaches based on fieldwork deliberately ask several important questions of the established literature (to which advocacy and policy has been largely framed and influenced), this thesis follows in a similar vein. By analyzing the findings of fieldwork conducted in Acholiland between September and December 2010, this thesis aims to explore whether or not local war-affected narratives do indeed support the growing critical approaches to the LRA/M – GoU conflict. This is an important consideration, as irrespective of the contrasting established and critical perspectives of the LRA/M – GoU conflict, contention is largely irrelevant should research, policy, and

²⁰ Interestingly, this critical argument transcends not only assessments of the conflict in general, but also many of the more micro-level social aspects inherent to the conflict, such as the reasons for displacement, motivations for resistance and the distinct sociopolitical setting in Acholiland, before, during, and after the war

²¹ Deutsche Welle, *As Southern Sudan independence nears, threat of death is constant*, (June 1, 2011), retrieved web link, <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,15117683,00.html>, July, 9, 2011, Sam Lamwino, "Gulu Bishop attacks government over walk-to-work," *Acholi Times*, (May 15, 2011), retrieved web link, http://www.acholimes.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=383_gulu-bishop-attacks-government-over-walk-to-work&catid=1_news&Itemid=2, July 7, 2011 and IRINNEWS, *Uganda Escalating land disputes in the north*, (February 11, 2011), retrieved web link, <http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=91957>, July 7, 2011

²² Finnstrom concludes in *Living with Bad Surroundings* (2008) that there is a need to 'repoliticize' the conflict, should research, policy and advocacy aim at a realistic understanding of the conflict. See Finnstrom, 2008, p. 239

advocacy not fully reconcile how the war-affected community can support or refute specific thematic assumptions within the broader discussion of northern Uganda. Therefore, by employing the responses of war-affected individuals, this thesis aims to illustrate whether the emerging critical calls for a more locally engaged understanding of the LRA/M – GoU conflict, are in fact requisite of greater and more nuanced consideration with regard to the current characterization of this conflict found in established literature.

1.2 Research Question and Hypothesis

This thesis acknowledges that a growing debate is occurring within the literature focused on conflict management for northern Uganda.²³ Yet, while an immense breadth of literature examines conflict and displacement in Acholiland, in light of the failures to end conflict and with the growth of critical approaches, some important questions have increasingly arisen.

For example, within this discussion of conflict in northern Uganda, what are the central assumptions or key themes that have found consensus in established literature?

Alternately, just what are the emerging critical perspectives? Do they have hallmarks or

²³ See for example Pascal Ngoga, "Uganda: The National Resistance Army," in Chris Clapham (ed), *African Guerrillas*, (Kampala: Fountain Publishing, 1998), Tim Murithi, "African indigenous and endogenous approaches to peace and conflict resolution," in David Francis (ed), *Peace and Conflict in Africa*, (New York: Zed Books, 2008), Anthony Vinci, "The Strategic Use of Fear by the Lord's Resistance Army," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, (Vol 16, No 3, 2005) Anthony Vinci, "Greed-Grievance Reconsidered: The Role of Power and Survival in the Motivation of Armed Groups," *Civil Wars*, (Vol 8, No 1, 2006), Rudy Doom and Koen Vlassenroot, "Kony's Message: A New Koine? The Lord's Resistance Army in Northern Uganda," *African Affairs*, (Vol 98, 1999), Ben Hoffman, *Peace Guerilla*, (Ottawa: Cuan Publishing, 2009), Erin Baines, Eric Stover and Marc Wierda, *War Affected Children and Youth in Northern Uganda: Toward a Brighter Future*, (Chicago: MacArthur Foundation, 2006), Tania Kaiser, "The Experience and Consequences of Insecurity in a Refugee Populated Area in Northern Uganda 1996-1997," *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, (Vol 19, No 1, 2000), Paul Jackson, "The March of the Lord's Resistance Army: Greed or Grievance in Northern Uganda," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, (Vol 13, No 3, 2002), Gunther Schlee and Elizabeth Watson, (eds), *Changing Identifications and Alliances in North East Africa*, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009), Patrick Vink and Phuong Pham, "Peacebuilding and Displacement in Northern Uganda: A Cross-Sectional Survey of Intentions to Move Attitudes Towards Former Combatants," *Refugee Survey Quarterly* (Vol 28, No 1, 2009), Gersony, 1997, Finnstrom, 2008 and Dolan, 2009.

distinct characteristics, and, how exactly do they diverge from the key thematic assumptions of established literature? Do local narratives from conflict and displacement-affected northern Ugandans support or refute the critical and established perspectives with regard to the conflict in Acholiland? Finally, what can these narratives say about the current understanding of this conflict, and, the various approaches to building peace?

In considering the above, this thesis argues that there is indeed a pressing need to revisit the LRA/M - GoU conflict, especially in light of the significant divergence between the policy-shaping established literature and the emerging critical approaches to the conflict. More specifically, by contrasting local narratives collected in war-affected Acholiland to case study literature, this thesis will illustrate that local narratives and the emerging critical approach deviate from several key thematic assumptions forwarded in established literature, particularly in relation to the political nature of the LRA/M and perceptions of responsibility for violence.

Interestingly, while local narratives and statistical data collected during fieldwork and the larger critical approach will clearly diverge from established literature, in nearly every respect the local narratives and critical approach will converge, ultimately creating a counter-narrative of conflict in Acholiland. Thus, local narratives and the emerging critical approach, will ultimately exhibit that policymaking and advocacy influenced by the state-centric established literature could be better informed by incorporating a more locally engaged understanding of the conflict.

As noted above, this thesis focuses specifically upon two important aspects of the LRA/M – GoU conflict that have become increasing points of tension between the established literature and emerging critical approaches. Of these, the first thematic aspect of the conflict is the growing tension with regard to the potential political motivations for

the LRA/M in its resistance to the GoU. Next, the second tension explored in this thesis relates to the broader understanding of culpability for violence during the war in Acholiland, and thus, the divergent portrayals of such in the established and critical literature. These are important considerations, as recent attempts to end the LRA/M - GoU conflict have revolved around the premise that military solutions are warranted, due to arguments that the LRA/M is the sole cause of violence in Acholiland, and not a politically motivated entity that reflects local grievances²⁴

It is important to note that while this thesis will illustrate convergence and divergence between the established and emerging critical literatures, the goal of this thesis is not to invalidate or devalue any particular contribution to the discussion of conflict and displacement in Acholiland. However, as the failure to create peace continues, ICC warrants linger, and solutions for the displaced or former combatants remain elusive, findings from this thesis suggest that in future attempts at peace, durable solutions and stability, the critical and local perspectives of the LRA/M – GoU conflict will require greater engagement by broader literature, advocacy and policymaking²⁵

Lastly, it is important to note that this thesis employs narratives and perspectives of the conflict provided by local Acholi respondents to consider how these perspectives relate to the established and critical literatures on the conflict in northern Uganda. The use of these narratives in this thesis does not assert that these accounts are ‘true’ accounts of the conflict. Instead emphasis is on the perception of the population that dominate

²⁴ US Government, 2009

²⁵ Additionally, while these are two salient features of the debate between the critical and established perspectives, they are not the only points of contention. However, due to the constraints of space, this thesis cannot examine other contentious aspects of the war such as traditional versus retributive justice, the role of the ICC and international actors such as the US or Khartoum, or the involvement of international NGOs in reshaping gender roles in northern Ugandan society. See Allen, 2005, Baines et al, 2006 and Finnstrom, 2008

approaches to conflict management policy and practice claim to assist and represent, and to consider the convergence and divergence of these established approaches and local narratives. Therefore, in the aim of not disregarding any individual respondents' contribution to the wider narratives created within this thesis, narratives are included without making claims that they represent factual accounts of the conflict.

1.3 Relation to Literature

This thesis situates itself within the growing debate on the LRA/M - GoU conflict found in conflict management literature. Although this debate is not conducted by absolute opposites, two notably divergent camps of thought do hallmark the discussion. To interrogate the differences between these perspectives, this thesis differentiates between 'established' and 'critical' literatures on the conflict in northern Uganda. While Chapter 2 will present this literature in more detail, the following briefly outlines these two perspectives, their predominant thematic assumptions and their general means of data collection, analysis and interpretation.²⁶

Established Literature

When one examines literature with regard to conflict in northern Uganda, the names Allen, Vinci, Gersony, Van Acker and Doom and Vlassenroot emerge as prominent references. This is because these authors amongst others have created what can be essentially termed as the established body of literature on conflict in northern Uganda. And, while one will find that these authors bring their own distinct perspectives to the analysis of LRA/M – GoU conflict, they should certainly be classified a single group due to the overarching commonalities found in their work.

²⁶ See Chapter 2 for a more in-depth explanation.

To this effect, one of the most recurrent thematic aspects in established literature on northern Uganda is the common emphasis placed exclusively on the LRA/M for atrocity inflicted upon the Acholi community, without considering similar acts committed by the GoU, NRA/M and UPDF²⁷ Thus, in spite of the critical approach and frequent local iterations noting transgressions of the GoU and its agents, language in the established analysis of conflict predominantly frames the war with gruesome depictions of atrocity and the accusation of barbaric acts committed solely by the LRA/M²⁸

Secondly, another recurrent assumption with regard to the conflict and the LRA/M in particular, is the tendency to portray the LRA/M as a Christian fundamentalist group, or, as aimless warlords who carry no political motivation Thus, in reviewing established literature, one can note a bifurcated depiction of the LRA/M, a group of violent thugs intent on installing the Ten Commandments as a form of governance, while having no motivations that reflect political, and social or economic grievances²⁹

Thirdly, in addition thematic aspects noted above, established literature is also characterized by a belief that local engagement to understanding the conflict is rather unnecessary, and, that the cosmology of conflict-affected Acholi is unremarkably indistinct, particularly with respect to providing a potential end to conflict³⁰ As a result,

²⁷ Frank Van Acker, "Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army: The New Order No One Ordered," *African Affairs* (Vol. 103 No. 412, 2004) and Allen 2006

²⁸ Allen 2006 and Van Acker, *ibid*, 2004

²⁹ Baines et al, 2006, Allen, 2006 and Vinci, 2005

³⁰ Allen, 2006 p. 162–165 Here several sweeping generalizations and assumptions are made concerning pre-colonial Acholi society, its distinctiveness and the traditional mechanisms of social cohesion First, Allen ambiguously notes Crazzazola and Atkinson as sources who depict a violent or turbulent Acholi past, although he neglects to say from where or why the violence in Acholiland emanated, as in many instances violence was clearly an external imposition, see Atkinson, 1994 Secondly, Allen discusses the vast number of interviews and processes his research undertook, noting that he had never been to a traditional *mato oput* ceremony used to reintegrate former combatants into society, alluding that *mato oput* for combatants is merely a claim of the community not a practice—one increasingly done *en vogue* for research interests Finally, in an overarching manner, Allen likens essentially all African communities and their distinct practices, as mirrors to the communities illustrated by Evans Pritchard such as of the Nuer

established literature is increasingly characterized by its resistance to locally mediated or traditional solutions to the conflict, instead preferring to feature a role for the international community and that ultimately, international justice and national integration are the only remedies to the developmental and violent ills in northern Uganda ³¹ In short, the established perspective often appears to portray the LRA/M - GoU conflict along a 'heart of darkness' paradigm, casting an image of good versus bad in the inherently chaotic setting of bizarre post-colonial Africa ³²

Sourcing for research and the collection of fieldwork data is another interesting and necessary reconciliation of shared similarity within the established body of literature To this effect, while one can often note the inclusion of local perspectives of war-affected Acholi, this inclusion is in fact often conducted in an obfuscated manner, through the absolute discretion of a translator, or in a means largely reliant upon the GoU for field facilitation and clearances For instance, while a large sample was employed for the influential work of Gersony, his field-based assessment of the LRA/M – GoU conflict had not one single response from current combatants ³³ This lack of LRA/M discourse or engagement is thus accompanied by overarching reliance upon a victimized sample population or a state-centric and facilitated explanation of the conflict

Lack of engaging LRA/M perspectives beyond some potential speeches by LRA/M senior commanders, the UPDF or victimized (and often unverified) sources is a characteristic that permeates much of the policy-influential work by Vinci, Feldman and

³¹ Baines, et al, 2006 and Allen, 2006, p 194

³² Rosa Ehenreich, "The Stories We must Tell Ugandan Children and the Atrocities of the Lord's Resistance Army" *Africa Today*, (Vol 45, No 1, 1998) and Finnstrom, 2008 This analogy alludes to the ignorant perspectives of the conflict, founded in the 'heart of darkness' premise where war and conflict are nothing more than a by-product of chaotic and bizarre Africa

³³ See Gersony, 1999, p 3 This assessment of conflict utilized USAID, its offices in Kampala and their partners in the GoU

Dunn, whose depictions of the conflict have increasingly come to characterize the bulk of policy on war in northern Uganda. As a result, whether reviewing the more dated pieces from the late 1990s or the more current work from the 2000s, the established body of literature has been one largely shaped by GoU facilitation, short-time spans for research, overarching security concerns and a lack of consideration for the perspectives of former and more importantly, current non-state combatants³⁴

Consequently, an established portrayal of an exotic, fundamentalist, and apolitical LRA/M who wages a one-sided war has subsequently come to shape and influence both policy and advocacy. To this effect, the characteristics of the established state-centric literature and current combatant lacking approach are also evident in US and international policy documents, impassioned pleas from advocates and the recurring military attempts to 'build' peace in Acholiland³⁵. Therefore, the rhetoric depicting the LRA/M as terrorists, criminals or rapists has now become synonymous and largely indistinguishable from the language of established literature³⁶

As a result, where Brenneis argued that one narrative takes an authoritative role during the course of a conflict, for northern Uganda it is clear that established literature and its portrayal of an apolitical, fundamentalist and sadistic LRA/M occupies this role. Thus, with the presence of a distinct depiction of the conflict founded on a broad set of shared ideas and a similar means of collecting data (based on GoU field facilitation,

³⁴ Whether in the work of Vinci, Van Acker, Feldman or Doom and Vlassenroot, both explicit and implicit reliance of the GoU and its UPDF is hallmarked by the use of offices in Kampala for facilitation, or the state-owned English language daily newspaper the *New Vision* for intelligence and insight into an area of conflict that predominantly views the state as a cause of harm and speaks or reads little English. See Vinci, 200 and 2006, Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999, Feldman, 2008, Dunn, 2004 and Gersony, 1999

³⁵ US Government, 2009 and also, see Operation Lightning Thunder and Operation Iron Fist

³⁶ Associated Free Press, *LRA rebels to be given terrorist status African Union*, (October 16, 2010), retrieved web link, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5ieHAKI3ye6QT3THSgZ7e-5dz6dng?docId=CNG_8b21ca4f0fe5ded152fb7235fcbc6338_da1, August 1, 2011

fear of speaking directly to the LRA/M or complete lack of inclusion of LRA/M respondents), this thesis uses the term *established* simply as a means of segregating the similar and policy influential assumptions by authors such as Vinci, Van Acker, Gersony and Johnson, from the more critical approaches to follow

Critical Literature

Akin to established literature, several authors have come to characterize the critical approach to conflict in northern Uganda. Here, and in direct opposition to the established approach, Finnstrom, Dolan, Atkinson and Branch provide the critical and often more locally engaged understanding of war in Acholiland. Irrespective that these emerging approaches at first glance appear to agree with established literature on the broad contours of conflict and the influence of colonialism in Uganda, the critical perspective is increasingly characterized by deeper local engagement of the war-affected community, and a more critical inquiry of the conflict as it is currently portrayed.

Consequently, in critical literature on northern Uganda, one can find several divergent thematic assumptions that call into question established literature and the policy and advocacy that are influenced by such. For instance, where established literature argues that the LRA/M are the sole cause of atrocity in Acholiland, critical literature offers that the NRA/M, the GoU and UPDF should also be included in these assessments.³⁷ In short, when examining violence committed during the conflict in Acholiland, the critical approach attempts to contextualize aggression by both the LRA/M and the GoU, thus providing a two-sided explanation of a war in Acholiland.

Next, in opposition to the sensationalized iterations found in media, established literature, advocacy and even policy documents with regard to the motivations of the

LRA/M, critical approaches prefer to contextualize and deconstruct why in fact the LRA/M chooses to fight. In this regard, a commonality in the critical approach is an attempt to politicize the LRA/M resistance, or in the least, find a rationale and logic for resistance in Acholiland.³⁸ As a result, in critical literature the LRA/M is still reconciled as those who have conducted violent acts, but also as a group who resists and employs such violence with a larger and recognizable political, ethnic and social motivation.

In a similar vein to the specific thematic assumptions in established literature, critical approaches also extend to a myriad of other aspects of conflict in Acholiland beyond the scope of this thesis. For instance, where established literature can be characterized by a devalued view of the local community and their experiences during war, the critical approach actively seeks importance in the local cosmology, customs, and culture in Acholiland. Thus, for the critical approach *vis-a-vis* local engagement, micro level aspects of life in Acholiland are considered as significant cornerstones to a distinct society, and in turn, the critical approach transfers the salience of these aspects into a wider analysis of the conflict and its consequences.³⁹ As a result, local narratives hallmark the critical approaches and thus, the community and their desire for culture and local cosmology to gain integration in a search for future peace, is emphasized.⁴⁰

Just as the established literature is characterized by some specific assumptions and portrayals of the LRA/M conflict while largely utilizing the same means of data collection, the critical body of literature follows in a similar vein. In this regard, a notable

³⁷ Dolan, 2009

³⁸ Adam Branch, "International Justice, Local Injustice: The International Criminal Court in Northern Uganda," *Dissent* (Vol. 51, No. 3, 2004), p. 22 – 23

³⁹ Finnstrom, 2008

⁴⁰ Again, this is not to argue that only the critical approach conducts fieldwork, only that it is dominated by individuals who conduct more long-term local ethnographic and qualitative studies, where the established view is dominated by a large presence of state perspectives, rather than in-depth local narratives.

characteristic of the emerging critical approach to conflict in northern Uganda is the seeking of alternative narratives, a two-sided account for the conflict (including the LRA/M perspective) and a more locally engaged account for conflict, rather than state-centric production of research. Additionally, with the critical approach emphasizing importance on local cosmological placement, critical authors such as Finnstrom note the salience of a working knowledge of the Luo language and the non-reliance of translators, something ostensibly taking years, rather than weeks of fieldwork.

Consequently, in the aim of producing locally cognizant research, the use of prolonged fieldwork, anthropological ethnography, embeddedness of political scientists and the independent accumulation of data by historians, an overwhelming majority of critical authors have and continue to spend long durations in the war-affected region.⁴¹ Moreover, one will also find that LRA/M communiqués and perspectives are engaged in greater nuance by critical literature, something argued as integral to a two-sided and non-romanticized portrayal of the conflict.⁴² Furthermore, in accumulating the trust and perspectives of both former and current combatants, marginalization or castigation by established literature and a suspicion by the GoU or UPDF is an outcome that Finnstrom, Dolan and Atkinson (the pioneers of critical approaches to conflict in northern Uganda) have all weathered. In contrast to the state-centric or GoU guided established literature, the critical approach can be characterized in short by the prolonged duration of fieldwork, a deeper working knowledge of the local Luo language, an avoidance of the GoU or UPDF's involvement in the research process and the stigmatization as apologists.

⁴¹ See Dolan 2009, Atkinson, 1994, 1999 and Finnstrom, 2008. Authors whose numerous years of ethnography, analysis and recollection have been created from living within the war-affected community.

⁴² Finnstrom, 2008.

While critical perspectives have not garnered similar endorsement in policy and advocacy that established literature has, its recent emergence does appear to have influenced some NGOs and individuals who are attempting to have conflict in northern Uganda reevaluated. Of these, the Refugee Law Project (RLP), the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI), and Conciliation Resources (CR) have been most active. For instance, Chris Dolan who authored the critical work *Social Torture* (2009) now acts Director of the Kampala-based NGO RLP, a group that has perhaps most vociferously argued for an investigation into the GoU's actions in the northern Ugandan conflict.⁴³ Similarly, both CR and ARLPI are renowned for commenting on the problems with proposed military solutions to the conflict and the apparent lack of interest to comprehensively understand the war-affected Acholi community.⁴⁴

Irrespective of the emerging critical literature and the attempts by advocates to change how conflict in northern Uganda is understood, Brenneis clearly stated that only *one* narrative takes an authoritative role. In this regard, it is evident that the established perspective still resides as *primus inter pares* concerning conflict in northern Uganda. Therefore, while the critical approach increasingly questions and contrasts the views of established literature, its recent emergence and appearance as a sympathetic voice for the LRA/M likely needs more time and research to fully counter the established literature and the policy and advocacy which it influences.

Important Considerations

While LRA/M, NRA/M, UPDF or GoU communiqués, manifestos and documents are primary sources, and therefore not part of the academic literature on the conflict,

⁴³ See The Beyond Juba Project. This NGO was created by the Refugee Law Project to persist in changing perspective of the conflict and create renewed interest in mediated rather than military solutions to the war.

some important considerations need to be made due to their consideration by this thesis⁴⁵ First, as crucial sources of data for understanding conflict in Acholiland, irrespective that these sources do not contribute to the broader discussion of the conflict *per se*, they have been included for consideration as they may provide insight into the motivations and rationale for various actors' involvement in the conflict Secondly, in the aim of achieving the objective of this thesis, these documents can also act as a supplement to the broad qualitative narratives and quantitative data collected during fieldwork of 2010

Yet, in the complex emergency of northern Uganda, just as with respondent statements, the authenticity and veracity of these documents is a serious consideration Therefore, to alleviate any potential concerns of document authenticity, all communiqués and manifestos presented by this thesis have undergone inspection by an independent party for verification This process was often conducted several times to ensure clarity and veracity, and as a result, this thesis will include documents procured during fieldwork, whether from the LRA/M, NRA/M, UPDF or GoU

However, it is important to note that while the documents included in this thesis from LRA/M, UPDF, GoU or NRA/M sources have undergone verification of authenticity, there are important considerations that need to be made in regard to veracity First, as many of the documents of the LRA/M are now produced in the English language, it does appear that these documents are increasingly being directed at external readers such as Western researchers, academics or policymakers, which introduces concerns about motivated bias in the depiction of the LRA/M's motivation contained in these documents Secondly, with only a few members of the LRA/M speaking or reading

Beyond Juba, retrieved web link, <http://www.beyondjuba.org>, August 1, 2011

⁴⁴ See ARPLI, retrieved web link, <http://www.arpli.org/juba-peace-talks>, August 1, 2011

English fluently, contextualization and themes within such documents need to be carefully considered. Nevertheless, in the absence of the opportunity to interview Joseph Kony or other within the LRA/M, these documents provide and alternate means, however imperfect, to consider the motivations and objectives of the LRA/M.

1.4 Methodology

To engage in the debate focusing on conflict in northern Uganda, this thesis builds on a foundation of exploratory and descriptive political science, international relations, and anthropology literature.⁴⁶ In guiding the creation of an operational design and means of analysis for the case study of Acholiland, this body of work and broader research literature was also influential for the process of data collection (e.g. using both quantitative and qualitative data collection) and to redress many of the ethical considerations of the thesis.⁴⁷

The collection of data for this thesis splits almost equally between the case study literature and fieldwork findings of 2010. As a result, this thesis is a product of two, very in-depth and considerably large portions of research. The first portion is the review of case study literature on Acholiland, an outline of key thematic assumptions held by established literature, and the emerging critical responses.⁴⁸ The second portion of the

⁴⁵ These documents are noted in the reference section and the author has retained all copies.

⁴⁶ Examples of these works include Tania Kaiser, "Participating in Development? Refugee Protection, Politics and Developmental Approaches to Refugee Management in Uganda," *Third World Quarterly*, (Vol. 26, No. 2, 2005), Kaiser, 2000, Dolan, 2009, Finnstrom, 2008, Branch, 2007, Murithi, 2008, Schlee and Watson, 2009 and Atkinson, 1994.

⁴⁷ See Tim May, *Social Research: Issues, Methods and Process*, Second Edition, (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1997), Russell Bernard, *Social Research Methods: qualitative and quantitative approaches*, (California: Sage Publishing, 2000), Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), Michael Del Balso and Allan Lewis, *First Steps: A Guide to Social Research*, Fourth Edition, (Toronto: Nelson Ltd, 2008) and Jennifer Rowley and Frances Slack, "Conducting a Literature Review," *Management Research News* (Vol. 27, No. 6, 2004).

⁴⁸ The case study literature was sequestered from sources that explicitly examined the conflict in northern Uganda, or the history of Uganda with regard to per-colonial, colonial and then the independence periods.

thesis is the result of comprehensive fieldwork conducted in northern Uganda. This fieldwork provides findings that highlight how local narratives from the Acholi community diverge from established literature, while converging to the more recent critical approaches on important points of contention within the LRA/M – GoU conflict.

In terms of literature, with the conflict in northern Uganda being of interest to anthropologists, historians, political scientists and policymakers, the actual breadth of literature (e.g. journals, academic publications and working papers) on Acholiland is surprisingly large. Likewise, with numerous military campaigns, ICC warrants, international condemnations and recent US legislation, a flood of working reports and government documents also exist and require consideration. Lastly, with the conflict in Acholiland garnering interest from NGOs with regard to humanitarian assistance, subsequent issue framing by these NGOs provides no dearth of literature to consider.

From the above sources of literature, the case study operates in a chronological manner, providing a sketch of northern Uganda from the pre-colonial period through to the modern day.⁴⁹ While briefly reviewing an expansive amount of history in northern Uganda, the focus of the case study increasingly centers on the 1986 Bush War and modern conflict. Next, having provided a background of Acholiland and exploration of the modern conflict, the literature review then turns to delineating two key thematic assumptions found in established literature. To operationalize these key assumptions and delineate established from critical literature, the following process was used:

Concerning the LRA/M – GoU conflict, this thesis and its literature review needed to isolate and segregate two divergent and increasingly contentious bodies of

work. To this effect, dominant presentations or recurrent characterizations of the LRA/M – GoU conflict acted as invaluable tools in reconciling to which respective body of thought an academic publication, piece of legislation, or NGO advocacy issuing framing belonged to

For instance, in addition to an overarching reductionist portrayal and lack of local engagement with respect to the importance of culture, cosmology and tradition for the war-affected Acholi community, established literature was also notably hallmarked by two dominant assertions concerning the LRA/M – GoU conflict⁵⁰ First, with regard to potential motivations of the LRA/M, established literature is recognizable for its reliance on Christian fundamentalism or more banally violent and aimless motivations to explain resistance Secondly, concerning the depictions of violence during war in Acholiland, established literature is increasingly characterized by illustrations of atrocity and terror that center largely upon the LRA/M Therefore, established literature was isolated largely in accordance to whether an author or article minimized the importance of local understandings of the conflict, and, if the LRA/M was dominantly depicted as apolitical or fanatical resistance with the intent of either theocracy or carnival of violence in mind

Alternately, when delineating the critical approaches to conflict in Acholiland, in opposition to established literature, local engagement and an importance for reconciling culture, cosmology and tradition were recurrent and obvious features of critical literature⁵¹ Moreover, in addition to the perceived salience in local engagement, a dominant characteristic of critical literature is that beyond the goals of aimlessness or

⁴⁹ This reviews included more than 20 books directly focused on the politics and history of Uganda or northern Uganda in particular, another 50 or more journal articles on Acholiland and an additional myriad of working reports, legislation and policy papers

⁵⁰ For examples, see Allen, 2006 and Gersony, 1997

⁵¹ Finnstrom, 2008, Atkinson, 1994 and Dolan, 2009

fundamentalism, some sort of rationale or logic must underlie the LRA/M resistance. Next, in a similar fashion to rationalizing or contextualizing the motivations for resistance, critical depictions of atrocity in northern Uganda are such that the LRA/M, NRA/M, UPDF and the GoU are all complicit and accountable for violence in the Acholi community. Therefore, where the established literature was isolated and recognizable in the manner to which it portrayed the LRA/M – GoU conflict, critical literature is equally discernable for its emphasis on local engagement and an attempt to contextualize both the state and non-state actors and their involvement in the conflict of Acholiland.

Having used the recognizable traits and characteristics noted above to separate each body of literature, the research process then turned its focus to the second portion of this thesis, which is a collection of fieldwork data aimed at supporting or refuting specific thematic assumptions in the contrasting established or critical literature. To this effect, quantitative and qualitative data was collected from September through December 2010, in the war and displacement-affected Acholiland sub-region of northern Uganda.

Concerning the collection of quantitative data, surveys aimed at providing statistical description with regard to the sample populations' demographics, preference of identification, exposure to violence and overall perspectives of the LRA/M – GoU conflict.⁵² Secondly, the surveys also aimed at providing nominal data that could provide inference or statistical significance with respect to specific aspects of the conflict (although only to a small degree due to the sample size). To aid in these objectives, respondent questionnaires touched upon a wide array of topics, from demographic and socioeconomic data, to more in-depth issues of displacement and exposure to violence. These surveys were collected in hard copy, administered in both written and orated

format, and in the English and local Luo languages Administration of surveys occurred in the districts of Gulu, Kitgum, Lamwo, Nwoya, Amuru and Pader ⁵³

Random sampling for surveys was restricted to a cumbersome process for several reasons First, since the only persons with accurate household lists in northern Uganda were local political representatives or international NGOs, the research process could not use these sources in the fear of reactivity or bias Secondly, because this thesis looks to specifically highlight experiences of displaced communities and war-affected individuals, the bias of only selecting war-affected individuals became an overarching concern Thus, to address this concern, two-sample population lists were constructed

The first sample explicitly included areas that had experienced violence during the conflict, in addition to IDP camps and trading centers ⁵⁴ This list sought random individuals and communities, but more precisely, those who had been directly affected or displaced by conflict This list of conflict-affected areas included 104 sites, while the second non-stratified randomized list included nearly 300 towns, villages, and trading centers in the same districts However, due to time constraints, the administration of surveys was restricted to 44 of the total number of sites Finally, at the household level, a series of simple coin tosses dictated the interval to which houses or individuals were interviewed to help further randomize the sample

During each interview, respondents were queried whether they would like to take part in the survey or an informal and personal interview However, due to security concerns during the primary electoral campaigns for the ensuing national elections, most respondents chose the quantitative survey for ease and time constraints In total, less than

⁵² The English Language Respondent Questionnaire has been appended to the thesis Please see p 1114

⁵³ See Map 1 Acholiland District Map, Ryan Butyniec and James Kilmabus, 2011

3% of all persons approached refused to take part in the survey, with the sample population ranging from 18 to 80 years of age. In short, the quantitative data collection took place on two levels, both randomized, albeit one with a distinct focus of conflict and displacement-affected persons, while the other, a bias-mitigating composition.

In contrast to the quantitative surveys, qualitative data collection was increasingly expansive and demanding. For this reason, where the quantitative sample collected 150 respondents, with the considerations of respondent and researcher security, the length it takes to gain trust in complex humanitarian situations, and the sheer duration of time need for interviews, the number of qualitative sessions reduced to 40 participants.⁵⁵ Beyond a few individuals collected from the random sample who wished to take part in informal interviews, key-informants provided the bulk of narratives for the thesis.⁵⁶ While this understandably imposes some limitations on the findings, the qualitative narratives corroborated many trends in the quantitative data, ultimately alleviating the concerns of reactivity and bias.

Qualitative interviews involved both focus groups and individual interviews with no particular preference to composition. Often, former combatants, IDPs or war-affected persons would feel more secure in a group setting, while others preferred the security of isolation and secluded locations. From these informal accounts provided by respondents, fieldwork findings emphasized recurrent narratives that ultimately became crucial for this

⁵⁴ Using news reports, elders and documents archived in the Human Rights Focus office, the thesis was constrained by poor records of conflict related deaths and incidents of attack by the UPDF and LRA/M.

⁵⁵ Respondent names have been altered to ensure security. Additionally, For more information on the ethical clearance required for this thesis, see Carleton Ethics Board, 2011.

⁵⁶ Key-informants would often become procured through the knowledge and advisement of respondent interested in the content of the survey questionnaire and with a colleague that held an interesting experience of the conflict, the researchers prior contacts within the LRA/M or UPDF who had left their respective forces, a confidential list of current combatants in the LRA/M and UPDF or finally, through local networks and intelligence circles with whom I have gained trust over numerous years of return to northern Uganda.

thesis. Important to note, is that while most interviews touched upon serious and often violent experiences in the respondents' lives, strict ethical considerations and a Carleton University ethical clearance regulated all collection of data.

The fieldwork conducted from September through December 2010, utilized the above noted means of qualitative and quantitative data collection for two benefits in particular. First, where quantitative data collection can provide a profile of the war-affected community and statistical inference, qualitative interviews could draw out narratives that speak to issues beyond binary statistical descriptions or significance. Secondly, by using a dual means of data collection, the research also had an added means of bias mitigation a salient consideration as the thesis uses both random sampling and key-informants. Thus, the dual means of data collection allowed for a broad collection of data and a means to minimize the possibility of error or bias.

While limitations to the research process and its findings will follow, it is important to note that this thesis and the fieldwork it is based upon can indeed make some strong assertions. First, while the sample size in the quantitative data is rather small, it nevertheless does provide an illustrative snapshot of the levels to which violence, suffering, political marginalization and economic deprivation have disturbed the war-affected Acholi community. Secondly, while the qualitative respondents cannot be argued as completely representative of the quantitative sample (or vice versa), responses during the qualitative interviews and quantitative statistics were mutually supportive (and vice versa). Concerning the objective of this thesis, the strongest claim this work can make is that the locally engaged critical approach does appear to provide a deeper understanding of how the war and displacement-affected community reconciles war. This is an important consideration, as to date, established literature on the LRA/M – GoU conflict

has shaped the bulk of concerned policy and advocacy, and often in a manner that does not appear to fully reconcile the local and critical understanding of conflict in Acholiland.

Irrespective that the methods of data collection involved in this thesis underwent serious consideration, the following limitations do require consideration. First, in attempting to examine the war and displacement-affected accounts and perceptions of conflict in northern Uganda the consideration of bias is grave, particularly as this thesis does not provide a national exploration of the conflict, rather focusing on only those portions of the country that were increasingly affected by violence in the post-1986 era. To this effect, by using a mixed-method of data collection and by triangulating results to expansive bodies of literature, this thesis operates in the understanding that any potential bias would be quickly recognized. Furthermore, as the war effectively displaced some 2 million persons, or 98% of the Acholi community,⁵⁷ this thesis proceeds in the consideration that creating a completely balanced sample of displaced and non-displaced persons would be unlikely. Nevertheless, it must be considered that much of the sample are indeed victims of the LRA/M – GoU conflict, and as such, their perceptions or factual accounts of the war could arguably be conditioned from just such experiences. Yet, while the narratives provided may indicate an intimate local knowledge of certain specific aspects of the conflict, it is important to recognize that the focus of this thesis is upon perspectives of the conflict, not claims about fact.

Finally, it is not the intent of this thesis to provide a longitudinal assessment of northern Ugandan conflict, nor should it be interpreted as one. Likewise, it is important to

⁵⁷ While these numbers are debatable, they are in fact the most commonly cited statistics in regard to the displacement of population in northern Uganda. Please see: See Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, retrieved web link, [http://www.internal-displacement.org/idmc/website/countries.nsf/\(httpEnvelopes\)/2439C2AC21E16365C125719C004177C7?OpenDocument](http://www.internal-displacement.org/idmc/website/countries.nsf/(httpEnvelopes)/2439C2AC21E16365C125719C004177C7?OpenDocument), July 6, 2011

recognize that the quantitative sample is random, while the qualitative split between random and key-informants. As such, neither sample is a complete representation of the other. Lastly, with English being spoken fluently by only a small portion of the population, there are, inevitably, concepts or definitions that may have been lost in translation to Acholi Luo. In spite of these limitations, the methods of data collection in this thesis specifically and consistently sought to mitigate bias or reactivity (particularly in using LRA/M, UPDF, NRA/M or GoU manifestos), ultimately redressing many of these concerns.

1.5 Structure of Thesis

This thesis suggests that there is notable divergence between the established literature and critical approach to conflict in northern Uganda. Secondly, this thesis also aims to illustrate that while local narratives diverge from the established perspective, they increasingly converge to the critical approach, ultimately implying the need for more locally engaged examinations of conflict in northern Uganda. As a result, this thesis uses a chronological understanding of the conflict and history in Acholiland, a contrast of key thematic assumptions in both the critical and established literature, then finally, responses of the war and displacement-affected community to provide conclusion. Thus, in the aim of achieving these objectives, the following provides a concise structure of the thesis.

First, Chapter 2 provides a chronological understanding of the conflict and brief history of the Acholi, and Uganda in general. Here, the Acholi ethnic group in particular, their historical progression, sociopolitical systems, culture and cosmology will be explored in relation to the modern conflict in northern Uganda. This case study chronology uses both established and critical literature to provide a mainstream consensus of northern Uganda and its history. Accordingly, one will notice that the pre-

Bush War period is hallmarked by general agreement between sources, where the post-1986 conflict period is increasingly characterized by divergent interpretations of war.

Next, from the chronological case study, Chapter 3 then isolates two important thematic assumptions that illustrate in greater detail, the tension between established and emerging critical literature. In short, Chapter 3 critically engages the literature on conflict in northern Uganda, to emphasize and explore two major points of divergence with respect to the critical and established approach to the LRA/M – GoU conflict. While there exist numerous points of divergence (some of which have been noted), this thesis restricts its analysis to only two that can be argued as potentially the most important for the prospects of peace. These themes relate to the motivations of the LRA/M, and, the deviating accounts of violent atrocity committed upon the community in Acholiland.

Building from the case study literature and the emphasized divergence between the established and critical perspectives of the conflict, Chapter 4 then provides the in-depth fieldwork findings of 2010. Here, the chapter begins by exploring quantitative findings to provide the contours and elaborate perspectives of the Acholi community. Next, the quantitative data and qualitative narratives of respondents will address the two themes isolated in Chapter 3. These narratives will not only illustrate the divergence between critical and established understandings of the conflict, but the importance in reconciling the local perspective, its convergence to the emerging critical approach, and, its notable divergence from the more established literature, advocacy and policymaking.

Chapter 5 ends the thesis with a summary of fieldwork findings and some important implications of this research. To this effect, this chapter first affirms the divergence between the local and critical perspectives, and the more policy influencing established literature. Next, Chapter 5 outlines the implications created from this thesis

for research, policy and Uganda in general. Important considerations, as the current belief of peace in Acholiland appears preemptive, particularly in light of the still operational LRA/M, and, the negatively viewed Museveni presidency. Finally, the conclusion portion will outline a potential for future research and any important considerations that need to be reconciled concerning the entire research process.

Chapter Two Case Study, Acholi History, Conflict and Displacement

2.1 Introduction

The conflict in Acholiland is a complex event, one particularly characterized by numerous political and ethnic cleavages, dynamic historical processes and salient modern and historical social interactions. Consequently, while the LRA/M – GoU conflict may have begun during the 1986 Bush War, broader analysis tends to provide background stretching from the pre-colonial era through to the modern day. Therefore, to achieve the objective of this thesis, the following progresses on a similar path, first exploring the pre-colonial, colonial and independence periods. What is important to note, is this period of history provides a great deal of consensus between the established and critical literatures, and thus, has been only briefly examined in contrast to the post-Bush War period.

Next, moving on from the pre-1986 period, the chronology then focuses in greater detail on the more debated era of conflict. Interestingly, in contrast to the pre-Bush War era in Uganda, the post-1986 period is where critical and established literature noticeably deviates in reconciling the war. In short, the chronology and examination of the post-Bush War period provides an understanding of the modern LRA/M – GoU conflict, an indication of the increasingly contentious nature of this conflict, and, a foundation from which Chapter 3 can isolate important thematic aspects of the conflict to which the established and critical literature deviate.

2.2 Pre-Colonial Period

In the pre-colonial epoch, modern day Uganda was initially a sparsely populated and grass-covered, red clay coated portion of the undulating east African region.⁵⁸ Increasingly colonized by diverse migrant groups during the 1100s to 1600s CE,

numerous communities coalesced in conquest-based kingdoms exhibiting similar characteristics to the centralized dynasties outlined by Kwame Ahrin in West Africa.⁵⁹ Yet, centralized kingdoms were not the singular form of sociopolitical organization in the region, as groups in the northern reaches preferred 'non-stratified' or decentralized village-based organization.⁶⁰ To this effect, socio-political centralization or stratification was a consistent characteristic of groups who migrated into Uganda from the south, southwest, and southeast, namely, those who were termed the 'Bantu.' Alternately, the non-stratified or decentralized village-based orders largely centered on migrants who entered the region from the north and areas surrounding the Nile River; individuals now commonly referred to as 'Nilotes.'

With regard to the Nilotic groups that subsequently delineate into what are now recognized as the "tribes" of Acholi, Alur, Lango and Teso (generally dependent upon which migration pattern they were part of), their livelihoods and means of production centered predominantly on agriculture and the rearing of cattle or goats.⁶¹ Initially far less stratified than their southern Bantu counterparts, these communities became later coerced by Europeans into more centralized livelihoods, something ultimately resulting in an increased stratification of local communities, and their sociopolitical organization.⁶²

⁵⁸ John Iliffe, *Africans History of a Continent*, (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1995), p 107

⁵⁹ These kingdoms and larger dynasties tended to hold a centralized sociopolitical organization. Their means of production, tribute and service were increasingly paid to the center of the kingdom, while arbitration, sacrifice, military service and norms would emanate from these centers to the outer reaches of the kingdom. See Kwame Ahrin, "Trade Accumulation and the State in Asanti in the Nineteenth Century," *Journal of the International African Institute*, (Vol 60, No 4) and Kenneth Ingham, *The Making of Modern Uganda*, (London Allen and Unwin, 1958) and Kasozi, A, *The Social Origins of Violence in Uganda, 1964 – 1985*, (Queens University Press, 1994), p 5 – 15

⁶⁰ Joseph Okumu, "The Acholi Peoples Rites of Reconciliation," *The Examiner*, (Kampala Jilak Co, No 2, 2006), Kasozi, 1994 and Finnstrom, 2008

⁶¹ Atkinson, 1994), p 56 and Odhiambo, et al, 1977

⁶² Finnstrom, 2008, p 55 – 61 and Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, (Kampala East African Educational Publishers, 1972), p 120 – 125

Originally using a mesh of Sudanic and then Luo languages, the Acholi community had numerous distinguishing social features that separated themselves from other Ugandan tribes⁶³ For instance, in their corporate and communal, agnate and non-agnate farming villages, social membership fell under the respected authority of the *Rwot* (Chief) Moreover, beyond the leadership of the *Rwot* or the *Mzee* (elder) in local settings, Nilotic groups such as the Acholi also recognized a distinct cosmological system situating their corporeal world, norms and livelihoods, under the ultimate authority of several supreme powers

For the Acholi in particular, the cosmological understanding of a *Jok-kene* (supreme-being) or even multiple supreme-beings is an indelible aspect of life Through local arbiters such as the *ajwaka* (spiritual advisors), the *Rwot* or the local *Mzee*, regulation of social norms, communal cohesion, livelihood, and cultural systems occurred⁶⁴ In this regard, the *Jok* (God) or *Jogi* (plural) controlled and influenced all manner of positive and negative aspects of Acholi life From environmental factors including rainfall or harvests, to aspects of social life such as corruption, violence, and cohesion, the *Jok-kene* “lives concretely in the heads of families, grand-parents, chiefs and ancestors,” and thus the wider communities of northern Uganda⁶⁵ Consequently, the *Tipu* (spirits) and *Jogi* are ‘beings’ to which the Acholi provided offerings, observance and their utmost respect Whether in an emphatic praise for a high yield in agriculture or to remove *cen* (vengeful spirits) caused by a local transgression - for peace, prosperity

⁶³ Atkinson discusses a dramatic language shift that occurred in the northern Ugandan region due to changing sociopolitical alignments See Atkinson, 1994, p 99 - 101

⁶⁴ Atkinson, 1994, p 48

⁶⁵ Okumu, 2006, p 15

and success - Acholi villages needed to balance both the higher spiritual, and local corporeal orders.⁶⁶

2.3 Colonial Uganda

From the 1600s onward, trade, innovation and interaction continued to develop in what is now modern day Uganda. Yet, as the 1800s approached, the east Africa region increasingly hosted foreigners in the form of Arab slave raiders and traders, missionaries and agents of the British and French Empires.⁶⁷ Then, in less than a half-century, foreign influences had imposed themselves upon the lives of nearly all of the regions inhabitants.⁶⁸ Incidentally, it was also at this point when intra and inter-tribal antagonisms reached their apex.⁶⁹ While wars had been fought over people, land and resources previously, increased European and Arab encroachment now drastically heightened the benefits of regional, inter and intra-tribal competition and self-interest.

While the southern Ugandan kingdoms were learning to maneuver with new foreign influences, Arab and Madhist influence in northern Uganda was causing increased conflict, slavery and bloodshed.⁷⁰ In fact, until the mid-1800s when British force and coercion upon the Khedive of Egypt finally ended the slave trade practice, northern Uganda was previously a hub of human trafficking.⁷¹ Nevertheless, even with these developments, slave raiding and Madhist revolts continued to destabilized the northern area, and until the British consolidation of rule, Sudanese soldiers were regularly

⁶⁶ Finnstrom, 2008 and Atkinson, 1994

⁶⁷ Finnstrom, 2008, p. 41 -45

⁶⁸ Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*, (Princeton Princeton University Press, 1996).

⁶⁹ Finnstrom, 2008, p 43 -44

⁷⁰ Sir John Gray, "Ahmed bin Ibrahim, the First Arab to Reach Buganda," *Uganda Journal*, (Vol 11, 1947) and Ingham, 1958.

⁷¹ John Dwyer, *The Acholi of Uganda adjustment to imperialism*, (Ann Arbor Michigan University Microfilms, 1972) and F.K. Uma, *Acholi-Arab Relations in the Nineteenth Century*, (Makerere Department of History, 1971)

used by administrator Salim Bey to raid and murder the predominant Acholi tribe, irrespective of their British emancipation.⁷²

Uganda became a British protectorate in 1894, and a formal colony under the auspice of the Buganda agreement in 1900. The agreement consolidating British rule was between the British and the Buganda, Busoga, Ankole and Toro tribes. Left from the equation were those northern Nilotic communities, as for the British, these individuals constituted “a group of tribes whose organization and customs were completely different from the Bantu kingdoms that formed the core of Uganda.”⁷³ Consequently, as with most numerous other British colonies, administrators implemented a facetious form of indirect rule in the rural area and civil law in the urban centers, something particularly affecting the northern Ugandans.⁷⁴

The British practice of segregation not only reinforced perceived differentiation between the communities of Uganda, but also created and enforced a nationwide division of labor. This process ultimately influenced both the colonial and present economic and developmental wellbeing of divergent regions in Uganda, as Mugaju notes:

During the colonial period, the problems of ethnicity were compounded by economic distortions. British colonialism created regional imbalances and ethnic specialization. Southern and to some extent, eastern Uganda became regions of peasant production of cotton and coffee .. others such as, Acholi, Teso and to some extent West Nile became catchment areas for the armed forces.⁷⁵

⁷² It is equally important to note that the Acholi were only recognized as such by Arabs slave traders who referred to the regional communities in Acholiland as the Shooli (Chooli, Sooli) moving towards the mid-to-late 1800s. Prior to this, people in the region simply held distinctions on where one resided, land demarcation, familial clan, and so forth. For instance, the area known as Packwach, loosely translates into the “Place of the Axe.” As a result, those who lived in this area prior to Arab influence were subsequently referred to as the Packwach, not as the Chooli or Sooli as they soon became during foreign invasion. Atkinson, 1989, p 28 – 39

⁷³ Andrew Roberts, “The Sub-Imperialism of the Baganda,” *Journal of African History*, (Vol 3, No 2, 1962), p 7 and see also Odhiambo, et al, 1977.

⁷⁴ Mamdani, 1996, p. 83 and Finnstrom, 2008, p 44 – 55

⁷⁵ Justus Mugaju, *Uganda's Age of Reform*, (Kampala Fountain Publishers, 1999), p 14 – 15

Where southerners worked in crop production and the bureaucracy, northerners became an armed, stereotyped, and marginalized migrant portion of Uganda. As a result, by the early 1900s, with the influence of new weapons and British, Nubian and Ethiopian self-interest, increased intra and inter-tribal quarrel in Acholiland, and Uganda in general occurred.⁷⁶ Moreover, with Acholi *Rwodi* (Chiefs) being appointed under the British indirect administration, constraining effects of colonialism were creating longstanding social, economic, and political problems for the Acholi.⁷⁷

2.4 Independence and Instability

In less than twenty years of independence Uganda had lost over one million of its population due to ethnic or political violence.⁷⁸ Therefore, while Uganda did become a free entity by name in 1962, the consequences of colonialism continued to constrain the state. Although, in this new independence era, increased ethnic antagonisms and stereotyping were consolidated by the birth of official political parties and a dubious national military.

Moving towards the 1950s, political, social and economic dissatisfaction with inequity in the British administration increased, while the developmental advantage held by the Buganda kingdom exacerbated animosity in all other economically constrained regions. As a result, with continued Bugandan largesse and increasing regionally inequity, the colonial project based on segregation and patronage began to exhibit flaws, fracturing increasingly along social, regional, economic or more frequently, tribal faults.⁷⁹ Consequently, by the time the crucial elections for Legislative Council had

⁷⁶ James Barber, "The Moving Frontier of British Imperialism in Northern Uganda," *Uganda Journal*, (Vol 29, 1965)

⁷⁷ Finnstrom, 2008, p 50 – 61 and Atkinson, 1994, p 2 – 8

⁷⁸ Kasozi 1994 p 3

⁷⁹ Mamdani, 1996, Rodney, 1972, Mugaju, 1999 and Odhiambo, et al , 1977

occurred in 1958, tribe became the single most important campaign stump, and by the late-1950s, the two party system based on the regional north-south divide reflected this⁸⁰

The first of the notable Ugandan post-colonial political parties was the Ugandan National Congress (UNC) In short, this was as close as Uganda came to a nationalist party, with the UNC's multi-ethnic composition initially stressing African ownership over Uganda⁸¹ The second major party of this period, the Democratic Party (DP), was little more than a sounding board for the Bugandan kingdom Initiated in the aim of installing a Bugandan traditional authority over the State, survival for the DP necessitated a somewhat rhetorical turn towards the UNC's aim of nationalism and independence

The outcome of Uganda's first competitive election saw the UNC come first by a large margin, followed by independent candidates and the DP last⁸² Then, in the wake of the elections, the UNC entered into a coalition with independents creating the more powerful Uganda People's Congress (UPC) This UPC was initially headed by the northern Langi Milton Obote and garnered its national level support from ethnic kinsmen, northerners and other non-Bugandan constituents Due to this coalition, the UPC and DP were the only parties to survive the Legislative Council elections⁸³

In terms of truly critical post-colonial elections for Uganda, they occurred in 1961 - 1962 to usher in the first post-colonial government During the final leg of these electoral campaigns, a new party, the traditional Buganda-based Kabaka Yekka (KY) or King Alone Party, joined the UPC and DP⁸⁴ Here, in a desperate attempt to gain power,

⁸⁰ Odhiambo, et al , *ibid*

⁸¹ Odhiambo, et al , *ibid*, p 174

⁸² Odhiambo, et al , 1977

⁸³ Atkinson, 1994, p 4

⁸⁴ This party was sought after in the backlash to the harsh British treatment of their king, the KY party aimed at restoring traditional authority and removing the pro modernization, westernized influence of the DP in the kingdom See Odhiambo, et al , 1977, p 175

the KY offered the UPC a crucial base of support that assisted a UPC rout of the elections. As a result, this unsteady nationalist-traditionalist alliance between the UPC and the KY then seated the Milton Obote as Uganda's first independent leader.

Obote quickly dissolved the Buganda – UPC partnership, opting instead on a consolidation of power in ethnic alliances.⁸⁵ As a result, his northern-staffed military regime propped itself upon repression for a lengthy nine years. Yet, the northern dominance of military and politics was received poorly in the southern and non-Acholiland sub-regions of Uganda. Consequently, a charismatic Idi Amin Dada with the backing of the west Nile region rose from his governmental position to oust Obote.

Originally a loyal servant to Obote, Idi Amin's cruel treatment of the Acholi, Teso and Karamojong became notorious, ultimately costing Obote large support bases outside his ethnic Langi kinsmen. Additionally, when Obote and Amin were both implicated in a resource exploitation scandal in the DRC, the Buganda kingdom attempted to remove itself from the Ugandan state. Obote responded by ordering Amin to attack the kingdom, and when the Kabaka fled the country, Obote created an all-powerful executive presidency. State corruption and repression of those groups outside the Langi (including Amin's Kakwa tribesmen) became widespread, and while visiting Singapore, Amin removed Obote from office in the fear that his own power would soon be taken.⁸⁶

Idi Amin vastly outdid Obote in creating a state of oppression and violence within Uganda. In addition to exiling the Asian and Indian population from Uganda beginning in 1972,⁸⁷ Amin is also renowned for decimating the economy, attempting to annex Tanzanian territory and the brutal massacres of northern Acholi and Langi soldiers in the

⁸⁵ Schlee and Watson, 2009, p. 17.

⁸⁶ Henry Kyemba, *A State of Blood: The Inside Story of Idi Amin*, (New York: Paddington Press, 1977).

national military.⁸⁸ Subsequently having to recruit non-Acholi or Langi soldiers, Amin's use of the Sudanese west Nile population drew harrowing parallels to pre-colonial history for many northern Ugandans.⁸⁹ Here, Sudanese troops used to massacre the Acholi and Langi according to Amin's command,⁹⁰ did so in an eerily similar fashion to those used by Salim Bey during the pre-colonial period in Acholiland

Consolidating his rule over the entire political, military and bureaucratic structure of the Ugandan state, Amin's behavior only became of interest to the international community when word broke of his ethnic cleansing campaigns and, of course, the support provided for a Palestinian resistance hijacked plane of Israeli citizens⁹¹ The Field Marshall's regime finally undid itself by aggravating the Tanzanian state and the marginalized forces of Obote and the Buganda Consequently, a coalition of mercenaries, remnants of the battered Acholi and Langi soldier corps and the Tanzanian army removed Amin from office in 1979 This coup led to vitriolic and retributive attacks by the once preyed-upon Acholi and Langi towards Amin's kin in the West Nile, something only further entrenching stereotypes in an already ethnically fragmented Uganda⁹²

With Amin gone, political office in Uganda remained an unstable and violently changing post Initially backed by the Ugandan National Liberation Front (UNLF) and the Tanzanian government, Yusuf Lule became the next interim president His tenure lasted a meager six months, quickly replaced by the UPCs Godfrey Binaisa At this point

⁸⁷ BBC, 1972 *Asians given 90 days to leave Uganda* (August 7, 1972), retrieved web link, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/august/7/newsid_2492000/2492333.stm, July 27, 2011

⁸⁸ Schlee and Watson, 2009, p 18

⁸⁹ Atkinson, 1994, p 10

⁹⁰ Sue Lautze, "Livelihood Systems of Enlisted Ugandan Army Soldiers Honour and Reform of the UPDF," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, (Vol 19, No 4, 2008)

⁹¹ Atkinson, 1994, p 10 and also, Ivan Smith, *Ghosts of Kampala The Rise and Fall of Idi Amin*, (London Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1980)

⁹² Schlee and Watson, 2009, p 18 – 19

nationalism in Uganda had virtually no vital signs, as Binaisa stated, “we [sic] (UPC) are not a mass party because most of our Members of Parliament are here for tribal merits”⁹³ Serving his own interest, Binaisa’s term lasted only a few months before Paulo Muwanga, a northern Acholi from Kitgum district replaced him. However, Muwanga’s term also ended quickly when he reelected Milton Obote and his own UPC party as the winners of another contested election.

2.5 Bush War and Modern Conflict (1986 – Present)

Obote’s return to power did not last and Uganda quickly plunged into another period of violent upheaval. During this instability, the alliance that removed Idi Amin from leadership, reassembled into a coalition of mercenaries and resistance movements that were later additionally aided by increased infighting within Obote’s regime, spurred by the political opportunism of a fellow northerner, Tito Okello. The main units involved in Obote’s final overthrow were Tito Okello’s loyal Acholi fragments of the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA), Yusuf Lule’s Uganda Freedom Fighters (UFF) and the Popular Resistance Army (PRA), run by one Yoweri Kaguta Museveni.⁹⁴

After making an initial failed attack, Museveni’s PRA faction slowly grew by utilizing insurgency tactics, building on quick strikes of police stations for weapons and a consistent recruitment of his Ankole tribesmen. Interestingly, it was here where the counter-insurgency tactics of Obote’s loyal segments of the UNLA, rather than attraction of Museveni’s ideology began growing the southern resistance by greater and greater numbers. In short order, the fledgling PRA resistance evolved into The National Resistance Army (NRA), and, with Obote’s increasingly vilified actions against the

⁹³ J. S. Nye, “The Impact of Independence on Two African Nationalist Parties” in Jeffrey Butler and A. A. Castano, (eds), *Transition in Africa Politics*, (New York: Fredrik Praeger, 1965), p. 23

community, the assistance of Tanzania and Libya aided Museveni's charge towards Uganda's ultimate seat of power⁹⁵ Yet, this power over the State house would not be a simple obtainment, as numerous groups desired control over the state Recognizing this, Museveni tightened his ethnic alliances, recruited mercenaries, utilized *kadogos* (child soldiers), and requested assistance from compatriots in Rwanda and those whom he trained with in Mozambique (FRELIMO) for support⁹⁶

Yoweri Museveni's NRA/M was created to operate as a military movement first, and a political apparatus second, and, its attempt to control Uganda was hallmarked in the mid-1980s by pitched battles against fragmented UNLA groups and other Bush War resistances in the infamous Luwero Triangle⁹⁷ Interestingly, during this period, while groups loyal to the Buganda, Acholi, Ankole and Langi all wished to contest for state power, little could be done without siding with either Museveni's NRA/M or Obote's shattering UNLA With surges of support and success occurring for both sides, the war finally turned in Museveni's favor when the adept Acholi commander of the UNLA, Oyite-Ojok, died in a helicopter crash on December 2, 1983

With the UNLA losing its main tactical commander, and neglecting to protect the non-Langi northern Ugandans (e.g. the Acholi), the 'national' military of Obote began to increasingly fracture from infighting initiated by Tito Okello Consequently, rather than the guns of Museveni, the Okello-sympathetic Acholi membership of the UNLA finally chased Obote from power in 1985 Interestingly, shortly after Obote's removal, Okello attempted to hold peace talks with Museveni, but by 1986 the NRA/M had taken full control over Kampala and through a rebuffed peace treaty in Nairobi, Museveni became

⁹⁴ Ngoga 1998 p 96

⁹⁵ *ibid* p 92

the new leader of Uganda⁹⁸ From this point forward, Museveni's singular aim was to pacify the Acholi sub-region,⁹⁹ and ultimately, end northern resistance and what he perceived as the 'ill-influence' of the past.¹⁰⁰

With Museveni's focus narrowed on northern Uganda, numerous resistances of the fragmented UNLA grew to contend the pending southern rule. While these groups did hold previous internal cleavages, northern inter-tribal rifts were largely buried in the aim of consolidating the northern ability to resist. Preparing for the worst, these small fragmented corps aligned into more standardized guerilla groups that attempted to secure territory and prevent the widely feared marginalization, inequity and abuse that emanated from southern Uganda.¹⁰¹ As a result, from 1986 onwards, small and tactically proficient grievance-based guerilla movements arose¹⁰² (many blessed by Acholi cosmological arbiters),¹⁰³ with the most notable of these early resistances being the Uganda Peoples Democratic Army (UPDA) and the now infamous Holy Spirit Movement (HSM).

Of the UPDA and HSM, the latter became the most prolific for two reasons. First, Alice Auma Lakwena a mystic *ajwaka* who commanded the HSM, utilized strict religious practices including Christianity and local cosmology to create 'rules of engagement'. Whether in providing force discipline, tactics, or normative ethics for HSM

⁹⁶ Ibid, p 96 – 98

⁹⁷ Behrend, 1998

⁹⁸ Ngoga, 1998, p 104 – 105

⁹⁹ Dolan notes throughout the work *Social Torture* that this was akin to an ethnic cleansing campaign, particularly in reference to the burning of homes and planned displacement of the entire Acholi community. See Dolan, 2009

¹⁰⁰ Vinci, 2005

¹⁰¹ This has been evidenced by the numbers of northern Acholi Members of Parliament, the cruel treatment of Acholi by Museveni's NRA and the rhetoric used in numerous speeches by now President Museveni. See Ococ Me, "Wek ICC mak Kony," *Rupiny* (November 10 – 16, 2010), Boll Oketch, "Lango residents take govt to court over lost livestock," *New Vision* (November 12, 2010), Editor, "Few claimants paid," *Daily Monitor* (September 12, 2010), Chris Ocowun, "Gulu Residents want compensation from army," *New Vision* (October 7, 2010) and also Dolan, 2009 and Finnstrom, 2008

members, Lakwena retained community loyalty and made some considerable headway in her campaign against the south. Secondly, the HSM resistance looks largely interlinked with the subsequent rise of the LRA/M, headed by a former UPDA fighter named Joseph Kony. As with Lakwena before him, Kony merged Christianity, Catholicism, and Islam, with local cosmology to steer his troops in the necessary direction and continue the fight against the unelected Museveni presidency.¹⁰⁴ Although his resistance was similar in many respects to Alice Lakwena's, it is noteworthy that established literature prefers to preface any assertions of Kony, with the pronouncement of Lakwena's more prolific local endearment, and of course, how Kony was at one point an alter boy who failed to complete primary school.¹⁰⁵ Yet, to what bearing this holds on the conflict or the LRA/M's legitimacy is questionable.

By the late 1980s, Joseph Kony offered many of his UPDA forces to fight with Lakwena's HSM, yet, she refused. Kony, perceiving this as a blatant affront, effectively ended the HSM by having UPDA forces redirect crucial supplies destined for Lakwena's stretched resistance, into his own ranks.¹⁰⁶ In the wake of Lakwena's subsequent defeat at Jinja during 1987, fragments of the UPDA and NRA attempted a peace deal similar to the one attempted by Okello and Museveni. Yet, Kony and his supporters feared a similar outcome for peace as the initial Okello attempts, and as a result, they created the new group named the Lord's Resistance Army/ Movement (LRA/M).

Interestingly, while Kony's LRA/M consolidated support and absorbed members from other resistances such as the West Bank Nile Front (WBNF) or HSM, the father of

¹⁰² Adam Branch, "Neither Peace nor Justice: Political Violence and the Peasantry in northern Uganda, 1986 – 1998," *African Studies Quarterly*, (Vol. 8, No. 2, 2005), p. 13

¹⁰³ Allen, 2006, p. 33

¹⁰⁴ Branch, 2005, p. 13 – 14

¹⁰⁵ See Allen, 2006, Vinci, 2005 and Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999

his previous nemesis Alice Lakwena, continued his own resistance against spirits and impurity in Acholiland. However, Severino's Lord's Army was largely peripheral and for the Lakwena family, the story essentially ended there. Alice Lakwena lived the rest of her days in exile in a Kenyan refugee camp, and her father still runs a church in Gulu, regularly imprisoned by the UPDF for subversion.¹⁰⁷

In the early 1990s, Kony's LRA/M war against the south has been largely attributed to ethnic fears of southern Ugandan colonialism over northern Uganda, and grievances based on both historic and future marginalization of the Acholi in particular, *vis-à-vis* the southern unelected military regime of Museveni. Thus, using techniques similar to the HSM in addition to broader Acholi cosmology, Kony indoctrinated and mobilized recruits who feared this NRA/M rule.¹⁰⁸ For instance, the LRA/M's early rallying cry was largely one of an ethnic and political narrative, and in one of the few interviews granted, Kony confirmed this to Sam Farmar in the mid-2000s:

It was Museveni who was oppressing the Acholi people, our wealth, our property was destroyed by Museveni. He want to destroy all Acholi so that the land of Acholi will be his land. I did not kill the civilian of Uganda, I kill the soldier of Museveni.¹⁰⁹

Thus, while it remains debated by established literature, the primary aim of the LRA/M did appear to be the overthrow of the NRA/M, if not autonomy for northern Uganda.¹¹⁰ As a result, support for the LRA/M initially appeared positive in Acholiland, as NRA/M tactics during the Bush War and afterwards signaled a southern approach of

¹⁰⁶ Behrend, 1998, p. 115

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. p. 113 – 116. Additionally, during fieldwork it was a regular occurrence to hear about Severino conducting a massive conversion of sinners or the pacification of bad spirits from his still operational church in Gulu, northern Uganda. In fact, Severino is regularly encountered when walking through the downtown area of Gulu, holding an approximately 6' tall crucifix and wearing an Imam's robe.

¹⁰⁸ Doom, R. and Vlassenroot, K., 1999, p. 20 – 33

¹⁰⁹ Henry Mukasa, "Kony grants 1st Interview," *New Vision*, (June 28, 2006), Retrieved, web link, <http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/12/506533>, May 20, 2011

abuse and ethnic mistreatment to the north (e.g. rape of men and women, screening and anti-subversion tactics, burning of homes and the initiation of cattle theft)¹¹¹ Yet, short on supplies and with little external support at this stage, the tactics of the LRA/M could involve little more than attacking government installations and the UPDF, to gain strongholds in the region, amass critical weapons and supplies. In spite of some progress in this respect, the LRA/M struggled to gain real traction against the NRA/M, and in 1991, 'Operation North' was created with the aim of completely ending the LRA/M insurgency¹¹²

'Operation North' and its proxy campaigns hold an indelible and important historical significance for the conflict in northern Uganda. For had the northern communities not already feared the southern NRA/M, then the actions of Museveni and his forces would surely have created these sentiments during their pending campaigns. For instance, while the Acholi already recognized economic disparity between northern and southern Uganda, the NRA/M's employ of the Karamoja from eastern Uganda to steal nearly every head of cattle in Acholiland only exacerbated the discernable economic disparity in Uganda¹¹³. Moreover, after the destruction of wealth to which the Acholi previously held in abundance (cattle), the NRA/M then started enacting violent screening and anti-subversion campaigns that also involved the forced displacement of nearly 90% of the Acholi population into IDP camps¹¹⁴. Here, the displaced Acholi community members were consistently regarded as rebels or the kin of rebels, and as such, frequent

¹¹⁰ Finnstrom, 2008. Corroborated by LRA/M Communique [a], *Letter to Ban Kim Moon Gulu District*, (September 6, 2011). Copy retained by author.

¹¹¹ Human Rights Watch, 1997, ICG Report, *Uganda: Seizing the Opportunity for Peace*, International Crisis Group, Africa Report, (No. 124 April, 2007) and Olara Otunnu, "The Secret Genocide," *Foreign Policy*, (July/August, 2007).

¹¹² Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999, p. 23.

¹¹³ See Finnstrom, 2008, p. 70 – 72 and Dolan, 2009, p. 178.

incidents of cruel and inhuman treatment occurred by the hands of UPDF, NRA/M and GoU agents¹¹⁵

During ‘Operation North’, the NRA/M occupied Acholiland and installed its military as the de facto government. Due to the symbolic occupation of Gulu (the center of Acholiland’s trade, politics and society), increasingly heated exchanges between the LRA/M and the UPDF occurred. Interestingly, although Kony’s forces did win some incredible David-versus-Goliath battles,¹¹⁶ ethnic and local support for the resistance began to dwindle moving towards the late 1990s for a few important reasons. First, the government in Khartoum began aiding the LRA/M to engage in a proxy war against the NRA/M supported Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). In addition to combating the NRA/M regime,¹¹⁷ the LRA/M attacks on the Museveni’s allies in the SPLA only fueled increasingly virulent UPDF treatment of the Acholi community¹¹⁸

Secondly, where UPDF military power could not reach (for geographic or capacity reasons), the NRA/M forcibly created Local Defense Units (LDUs) or ‘bow-and-arrow brigades’ from Acholi children, ex-combatants, and displaced persons in the northern Uganda. These groups comprising of returned rebels or children were coercively armed by the GoU to attack the LRA/M when they entered districts, trading centers or IDP camps seeking assistance, troops or rations (which the communities regularly provided to the rebels)¹¹⁹. This creation of LDUs also coincides with a drastic shift in LRA/M tactics, who then violently turned their guns and *pangas* (machetes) towards the

¹¹⁴ Dolan, 2009, p. 180 and Finnstrom, 2008, p. 71 – 74

¹¹⁵ Including rape, defecation into community water sources and a consistent physical abuse levied upon the Acholi community. See Otunno, 2007

¹¹⁶ Dolan, 2009, p. 271

¹¹⁷ Vinci, 2005, p. 366

¹¹⁸ This was noted as causing decimation in the area inhabited by Acholi, largely viewed as collaborators or sympathizers by the UPDF, see Branch, 2005 and Finnstrom, 2008

population that once supported them for treason¹²⁰ Additionally, with the LRA/M's alleged use of land mines and the ever-present UPDF mistreatment of displaced Acholi, overt support for Kony dropped further, as the LRA/M cause looked to become increasingly isolated from concerns of the average displaced Acholi¹²¹

With voluntary recruitment becoming problematic during the new dynamics of conflict, the LRA/M allegedly began to employ abduction as a means to build force capacity As a result, during the span of this conflict some 30,000 youths have allegedly fell victims to such practices¹²² Thus, for the charges of child enslavement, possible crimes against humanity, and the UPDF's inability to end conflict, the GoU gained the official involvement of the ICC into the conflict of Acholiland during 2003 Soon argued as a major hindrance for the outcome of the JPT, the ICC issued five landmark warrants for Kony and his (mostly deceased) top leadership¹²³

At the height of the conflict, forced displacement of the Acholi community that began in the 1990s ultimately resulted in the confinement of nearly the entire population to IDP camps¹²⁴ Initially argued as being in the best interests of the war-affected community, IDP camps created a subsequent barrage of violence against the Acholi, perpetrated either by the LRA/M, or more frequently by the UPDF and NRA/M during their counter-insurgency exercises¹²⁵ In the squalid and over-crowded camps, the displaced community endured constant repression, abuse, and degradation by the UPDF

¹¹⁹ Branch, 2005, p 15

¹²⁰ Finnstrom, 2008 p 9 – 19 and Dolan, 2009, p 46 – 47

¹²¹ Behrend, 1998 P 116

¹²² Banes, et al , 2006 and Allen, 2006 However, it is important to note that locals themselves question the widely reported figures As force-capacity numbers for the LRA/M and its victims fluctuate depending on who presents the numbers For example the LRA/M boosts its official capacity while downplaying its violence, and the same has been argued of the UPDF, NRA/M and GoU D Okello, [b], 2010

¹²³ See LRA/M Communiqué [b] *Juba Assessment*, Nairobi, Kenya, (November 2, 2011) Copy retained by author

¹²⁴ Dolan, 2009, p 40 – 40

who considered all of the Acholi as rebel sympathizers, and then by the LRA/M, for acts they perceived as treasonous to the resistance (e.g. LDUs) ¹²⁶

While incidents such as widespread rape, torture, indiscriminate violence, and atrocity by GoU forces frequently occurred in northern Uganda, ¹²⁷ these facts often become obfuscated by the established literature's preference for explicit, detailed, and repetitive allegations of the LRA/M violence in isolation. However, as both Dolan and Finnstrom argue, this one-sided account offers little more than a disservice to the actual history of the war. For instance, Finnstrom draws parallels between the GoU treatment of the Acholi, and previous Sudanese and Ugandan governmental massacres of Acholi soldiers and men. In a similar vein to the British administrators, the Sudanese under Salim Bey and then President Idi Amin, using radio calls and communiques that offered amnesty to resistant community members for their surrender, the UPDF, NRA/M or GoU would execute any who turned themselves in ¹²⁸

As a result, the numbers of massacred Acholi soldiers, civilians and children by UPDF, GoU and NRA/M remain both unknown and unrecorded. Consequently, no one is certain to exactly what the NRA/M did in many of its campaigns, although both Finnstrom and Dolan show that on certain instances, hundreds of thousands may have perished. Nevertheless, beyond the uncertain numbers, the consistent marginalization of the community, regional economic disparity during the war, the unforgettable acts of public rape and torture to the Acholi community by UPDF, NRA/M and GoU agents

¹²⁵ Finnstrom, 2008 p 71 – 74

¹²⁶ Vinci, 2005, HRW, 1997, Branch, 2005, Schlee and Watson, 2009 and Behrend, 1998

¹²⁷ Finnstrom, 2008, p 90 and 186 – 187 and also Dolan, 2009, p 212

¹²⁸ Onck Adyanga, *The Politics of Mass Deaths* retrieved web link, <http://stginu.blogspot.com/>, August 1, 2011, Finnstrom, 2008, p 132 – 133, 117, 232 and also Dolan, 2009,

stand as stark contrasts to the one-sided LRA/M focus found in establish literature.¹²⁹ Due to this dual source of persecution and victimization for the community in Acholiland, whether one was an IDP, former combatant or general member of the population, only one of two options existed, namely, either an offer of allegiance to the increasingly vilified LRA/M, or support for the hostile, humiliating, and ethnically divergent NRA/M.

2.6 Summary of Case Study Literature

While numerous points of contention in the analysis of conflict of northern Uganda will be illustrated in the next section, broad case study literature does illustrate a consistent profile, which for the most part is recognized by both critical and established literature. For instance, as explained earlier, corroboration occurred throughout the analysis of pre-colonial Uganda through to the initiation of modern conflict. Whether in the historic progression of local-level society, the sociopolitical organizations of divergent groups, their means of productions, distinct languages or communicated divergence, both the critical and established literature identified and agreed upon the importance of these aspects for Acholiland and Uganda in general.

Moreover, the historical, political and anthropological understandings of these divergent groups, their migration into Uganda, the influence of foreign powers and the impending constraints of colonialism were all noted and considered in the broader discussion of Uganda. Whether assessing the manner to which external influences changed the nature of ‘native groups,’ segregated the Ugandan population on such perceived cleavages, or created inequity with respect to development, both the

¹²⁹ The public rape issue will be discussed later, but it has become a growing concern, as only a few academics appear to be interested in UPDF rape against males as a form of torture. Dolan, 2009.

established and critical literature again appears in agreement. Additionally, when addressing the independence period, literature appears to provide a unified reconciliation of the consequences of colonialism, whether done in a critical or established vein. Here, the early attempts at nationalism, the heightened importance of ethnic affiliation and the lengths to which certain groups went to obtain or retain power in Uganda, are notable. Moreover, the critical and established perspectives look to speak in unison regarding the political instability and subsequent cycle of violence and political upheaval that marked the independence era.

However, moving into the post-Bush War era and present period of conflict, the broad contours of northern Uganda's protracted 25 year LRA/M - GoU conflict appears to only superficially converge. For example, no one is contesting the abhorrent nature of the conflict, its protracted duration or numerous and potentially longstanding consequences. Additionally, there is broad agreement on the need to end the conflict, the important main actors, and essentially, what is at stake for each of the parties involved. Yet, where the divergence starts to become emphasized is in the closer inspection of the distinct perceptions of the conflict, including thematic assumptions of the LRA/M political rationale, logic or motivations, who is culpable for violence, or indeed, why the war was brought to northern Uganda. These are important considerations, as Chapter 3 will illustrate, disagreement between the established and critical literatures include specific and salient aspects of conflict in northern Uganda, and in turn, can certainly influence the search for future peace considerably.

Chapter Three Tensions Between the Established and Critical Perspective

3.1 Introduction

Although the established and critical perspectives do converge to some degree on the case study chronology of northern Uganda, there are some notable points of divergence that require consideration. For instance, with regard to thematic aspects of the ongoing LRA/M – GoU conflict, increased debate has focused on the potential motivations for the LRA/M, which party to the conflict committed the most grievous rights abuses, the subject of traditional versus international justice, and the potential solutions for displacement. Therefore, while the case study chronology can illustrate a broad superficial consensus concerning the history and initiation of the modern LRA/M – GoU conflict, a more focused examination of particular thematic aspects in both established and critical literature, will ultimately, suggest that an important divergence is occurring between these respective bodies of work.

In this regard, it is crucial to note that these points of divergence should not be considered as superficial differences, with the salience of each theme being emphasized in different manners, whether in the established or critical literature.¹³⁰ Moreover, while all the themes listed above are very important to the discussion of conflict in northern Uganda, due to space, the scope of this thesis focuses on only two thematic aspects of the LRAM – GoU conflict, namely, the political or apolitical nature of the LRA/M, and the contested culpability for social violence in northern Uganda. Again, while these themes are not the only items up for debate with regard to conflict in Acholiland, their

importance to this thesis and the broader discussion emanates from their integral nature to a more locally engaged understanding of the conflict, and, for any potential future policymaking or advocacy of an informed nature

It has been argued that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter,¹³¹ and in this regard, the same adage concerning conflict in Northern Ireland, could ostensibly be replicated for conflict in northern Uganda. Interestingly, as will be illustrated in the following, current critical and established perspectives of Joseph Kony, the LRA/M and their political motives appear to reside on a very dichotomous parallel. On the one hand, established perspectives predominantly cite the LRA/M as an apolitical, religious, or terrorism-based organization that is engaged in a one-sided war. In opposition, the emerging critical approach rather prefers to argue that there is indeed a political motivation to the LRA/M, that conflict in Acholiland is indeed two sided, and ultimately, that this conflict requires a much more nuanced and engaged exploration. In short, these contrasting perspectives appear incompatible, with their growing debate creating some important implications for an understanding of violence in Acholiland, and more importantly, for potential solutions to the protracted war.

3.2 Established versus Critical: Spirituality and Motivation in the LRA/M

After 25 years of conflict, prolonged displacement, and some truly abhorrent physical and mental atrocity, the hallmarks of literature concerning the LRA/M – GoU

¹³⁰ Allen, 2006. Here Allen examines the LRA/M in relation to ICC warrants, the 'presumed' impunity occurring in northern Uganda and the utility of international justice. Conversely, Finnstrom and Dolan examine the local level and social injustices that have occurred due to the conflict, examining the political nature of the LRA/M, and transgressions by both state, and non state actors. While these topics all deserve greater exploration, the constraints of space have required the reduction of focus to the two most glaring points of divergence.

¹³¹ Gerald Seymour, *Harry's Game*, (New York: Random House, 1975)

conflict are generally composite of condemnation, moral outrage, and bewilderment¹³²

To this effect, in the broader discussion of conflict mitigation on northern Uganda, established literature appears to hold a particular assumption concerning the potential motivations for the LRA/M. Essentially, in established literature the overarching consensus is such that the “LRA has no political program or ideology, at least none that the local population has heard or can understand,”¹³³ or, that the resistance is simply headed by a religious fanatic who wishes to create an odd theocratic state¹³⁴

To this effect, and to the likely dismay of the resistance, according to established literature Joseph Kony and his LRA/M are little more than rebels without a cause. Yet, what may be most important to note in this respect is this perspective of an aimless or fanatical LRA/M within established literature is not a short-lived interpretation, as it characterizes not only the bulk of established literature, but also the dominant advocacy, policymaking, and media depictions of the conflict. Therefore, in accordance with the preferred portrayal in established literature, the LRA/M *was* and *is* little more than a banal and aimless resistance, or rather a fundamentalist “barbaric and insane cult.”¹³⁵

Interestingly, due to alleged atrocities committed by the LRA/M, and, because of the inability for their political manifestos or communiqués to reach beyond Acholiland in the 1990s and early 2000s, it appears established literature on northern Uganda has found it problematic to attach a serious narrative of grievance, marginalization, or political

¹³² Baines, et al, 2006, Gersony, 1997, Johnson, 2006, Vinci, 2005 and www.invisiblechildren.com, www.enoughproject.org and www.resolveuganda.org

¹³³ Gersony, 1997, p. 59

¹³⁴ Johnson, 2006

¹³⁵ Allen, 2006, p. 25

intent to LRA/M operations¹³⁶ Consequently, there have emerged essentially two dominant perspectives with regard to the intent of the LRA/M in established literature. First, one theme argues of the fundamentalist aims for the LRA/M, and their intent to install the Ten Commandments as a form of rule in Uganda.¹³⁷ Secondly, a more dominant theme has grown in established literature, one that disregards the idea of religious fundamentalism, arguing instead, that the LRA/M is in fact not a legitimate resistance at all, but simply a group of apolitical terrorists bent on creating all the havoc and suffering they can¹³⁸

Religious Terrorism LRA/M spirituality in established literature

Within the analysis of conflict in northern Ugandan, established literature has the tendency to provide a depiction of the LRA/M as little more than a simple group of sadistic fundamentalist Christians¹³⁹ Now, regardless if this depiction is due to a misinterpretation of the group's name or some widely publicized iterations of top leadership, many who form the established perspective concerning the LRA/M still nevertheless cling to a belief that the resistance is in fact, bent on governing Uganda by the tablets of Moses

For instance, Vlassenroot argued that Kony, "is not only the spokesman of the Christian God but simultaneously an intermediary [sic] between local spiritual forces and the people"¹⁴⁰ Feldman notes a similar theme, stating that Kony and his LRA/M

¹³⁶ Gersony, 1997, Vinci, 2005, Vinci, 2006, Vinci, 2007 and Major Robert Feldman, "A Deal with the Devil Issues in Offering Joseph Kony Amnesty to Resolve the Conflict in Uganda," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, (Vol 18, No 1, 2007)

¹³⁷ Johnson, 2006, Dunn, 2004 and Feldman, 2007

¹³⁸ Allen, 2006, Vinci, 2005, Jackson, 2002 and Souare, 2009

¹³⁹ Vinci 2005, Johnson 2006, Feldman, 2007 and Dunn, 2004

¹⁴⁰ Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999, p 24

would “replace the government with one based on the Ten Commandments ”¹⁴¹

Additionally, Dunn furthers the fundamentalist perspective of the LRA/M by adding:

The LRA expresses a desire to install the Christian Ten Commandments as the rule of law in Uganda. However the LRA can reconcile this with its almost daily violation of “Thou shalt not kill” is clearly a problem ¹⁴²

As a result, a clear commonality in the established literature is a distinct thematic assumption of fundamental Christianity within the LRA/M, and their extremist attempt to install the Ten Commandments as a rule of law or form of governance in Uganda ¹⁴³. Yet, in spite of the extremity of these arguments and their often unfounded appearing assertions, the belief of Christian fundamentalism in the LRA/M continues to persist within established literature, notably characterized in the work by Doom and Vlassenroot, Behrend, Echenreich and Gersony, amongst others ¹⁴⁴

Interestingly, while assertions in established literature on the LRA/M’s Christian fundamentalism are now being increasingly replaced by depictions that the LRA/M actually holds no political, religion or ethnic motivation whatsoever, the fundamentalist depiction of the LRA/M has already transferred *to* and has become clear *in*, both policymaking documents and NGO advocacy on the conflict. This is remarkably evident by contrasting two prominent organizations including the Center for American Progress’ backed NGO the Enough Project, and recent U.S. congressional legislation. For example, the Washington-based Enough Project convincingly argues

Originating in northern Uganda and then spreading to neighboring countries, the LRA

¹⁴¹ Feldman, 2008, p. 45

¹⁴² Kevin Dunn, “Killing for Christ, the Lord’s Resistance Army of Uganda,” *Current History*, (Vol. 103, No. 673, 2004), p. 208

¹⁴³ Corine Hegland, “Uganda’s Peace at Mercy of Court,” *National Journal*, (Vol. 39, No. 6, 2007), p. 1

¹⁴⁴ The general perspective of Christian fundamentalism can be found in the following: Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999; Allen, 2006; Behrend, 1998; Gersony, 1997; Echenreich, 1998; Feldman, 2007; and Robert Feldman, “Why Uganda Has Failed to Defeat the Lord’s Resistance Army,” *Defense and Security Analysis*, (Vol. 24, No. 1, 2008)

has no clear political agenda beyond a loosely articulated vision of a society that abides by the Ten Commandments¹⁴⁵

Next, in reviewing a draft of what became US congressional legislation titled, *the Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act* (2009) introduced by Democrat Senator Russ Feingold, one can notice a striking similarity to the Enough Project's NGO advocacy framing of the LRA/M, and the earlier depictions founded by the established body of literature. In discussing the background to the conflict in Acholiland, Feingold's proposal for anti-LRA/M legislation argues that

For over two decades, the Ugandan government has fought a rebel group known as the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in northern Uganda. The LRA is led by Joseph Kony [sic] and is nominally Christian, but is influenced by a blend of mysticism, Islam and witchcraft, and claims to be establishing a theocratic state based on the Ten Commandments.¹⁴⁶

As exhibited above, whether found in recent NGO advocacy or important U S congressional legislation that subsequently drives foreign policy concerning northern Uganda, the influence of established literature and portrayals of the LRA/M as a group of fundamentalist Christians are both present and prevalent. Yet, while these academics, advocates and policymakers all vociferously illustrate a story based on an LRA/M and its fundamentalist intents, critical literature provides a counter to these depiction, arguing instead that the established literature and the policy or advocacy it influences, all fall far short of understanding the context and role of religion and spirituality to the LRA/M.

Religious Temperaments: LRA/M spirituality in critical literature

Interestingly, while LRA/M leadership in the late 1990s into the mid-2000s did

¹⁴⁵ See Enough Project, *Wanted by the ICC: The LRA's leaders: Who they are and what they've done*, retrieved web link, http://www.enoughproject.org/files/pdf/lra_leaders.pdf, (August 1, 2011). For similar depictions please see War Child, retrieved web link, http://www.warchild.org.uk/issues/the-lords-resistance-army_LRA, August 1, 2011.

emphasize that they fight with the Ten Commandments in mind, it appears an incredible amount of conjecture has centered on an issue, which for critical analysis, should mean very little.¹⁴⁷ However, this is not to argue that the critical approach perceives Christ, the Acholi *Jok-kene* or another spiritual being as an unimportant device for the LRA/M *per se*. Only, that the sensationalized reporting and literature on this aspect of the conflict simply centers a small portion of an interview Sam Famar conducted with Joseph Kony in 2006, while ignoring the broader context of the situation.¹⁴⁸

For instance, while Vincent Otti (formerly 2nd in Command, now deceased) has illustrated the importance of God and the Ten Commandments to LRA/M membership, Joseph Kony has repeatedly noted that neither he himself, nor the resistance were ever spoken to by God, or ordered to fight a Christian fundamentalist war.¹⁴⁹ Instead, according to critical literature, Kony has recurrently taken a stance that argues for using spirituality simply as a guide, and that the LRA/M indeed wages a political war, one with the ultimate goal of removing Museveni and his NRA/M military regime from Uganda.¹⁵⁰

Yet, irrespective of Kony's explicit iteration of a political, rather than religious goal in critical literature, as was evident in the established perspectives; earlier literature, policy and NGO advocacy are still predominated by these simplistic fundamentalist

¹⁴⁶ See Website of the Republican Majority in Congress, retrieved web link, <http://www.gop.gov/bill/111/2/s1067>, August 1, 2011

¹⁴⁷ See Sam Famar, *Foreign Correspondent*, (April 7, 2006), retrieved web link, <http://www.abc.net.au/foreign/content/2006/s1680601.htm>, (June 25, 2010)

¹⁴⁸ Mukasa, 2006

¹⁴⁹ One can watch the video where Kony states he is fighting to end the Movement government and create a 'free democracy' See Sam Famar, WN, retrieved web link, <http://wn.com/samfamar>, June 25, 2010

¹⁵⁰ LRA/M, *Juba Assessment*, Gulu District, (2010); LRA/M, *Concept of Final Peace Agreement*, Gulu District, (2010), Copy retained by author and corroborated by Finnstrom, 2008 and Dolan, 2009

assertions¹⁵¹ Nevertheless, in opposition to these reductionist accounts of the LRA/M's motivation, as has been recently argued of Joseph Kony and Vincent Otti in critical literature, the Ten Commandments are simply guiding principles, and the LRA/M is rather fighting for the liberation of the people of Uganda, not a theocratic, LRA/M ordained state For instance, Kony and Otti are quoted in letter within Finnstrom's *Living with Bad Surroundings* (2008) as having noted

While a big percentage of the Movement's members are ordinary and Practicing CRISTIANS [sic], I would like to strongly deny that these members are or in any way have the intention of becoming Christian fundamentalists¹⁵²

Interestingly, in spite of these denials of a fundamentalist LRA/M aim, the assertions of Christian fundamentalism have continued in established literature, irrespective that growing critical literature can convincingly contest such¹⁵³

While the assertions of fundamentalist Christianity and 'primitive religions' as integral components to a mad man's resistance can provide exciting editorialized accounts of conflict, for critical literature, they struggle in providing a locally engaged account of what should be argued as a far more complex conflict Consequently, with established perspectives of the LRA/M becoming so widespread, as a response critical approaches to the conflict have countered that religion in the LRA/M needs to be tempered with an understanding of the Acholi, their cosmology, and the their imported religions from colonization

¹⁵¹ Quote Joseph Kony "It was Museveni who was oppressing the Acholi people, our wealth, our property was destroyed by Museveni", "He want to destroy all Acholi so that the land of Acholi will be his land I did not kill the civilian of Uganda, I kill the soldier of Museveni", See Farmar, S, "I will use the Ten Commandments to Liberate Uganda," *The Times Online*, (June 26, 2006), retrieved web link, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article680339.ecc>, (July 20, 2010)

¹⁵² Finnstrom, 2008, p 124

For example, critical literature often argues that spirituality and the supreme *Jok-kene* are integral aspects of Acholi life, a caveat of the conflict that established literature has difficulty accounting for.¹⁵⁴ Thus, in addition to the influence of colonial missionary doctrines, devoted spirituality is noted in the more critical literature as relatively transferrable principles, ones that can galvanize and create solidarity in the community, or in harsher instances, assist the mobilization of guerilla movements.¹⁵⁵

Moreover, Acholi cosmology and spirituality have been increasingly emphasized by critical literature as a means to explain how victory against incredible odds, faithfully mobilized forces, and a spiritual pacification of the community can occur when local resistance in northern Uganda becomes devoted to the broader Acholi spiritual and cosmological beliefs.¹⁵⁶ Therefore, in a similar fashion to Alice Lakwena's disciplined HSM,¹⁵⁷ according to critical literature, the LRA/M simply continued the recurrent northern Ugandan use of local norms and cosmological understandings to assist in a battle with an enemy, rather than as a fundamentalist tool to create theocracy.¹⁵⁸

Thus, while the religious alignment of the LRA/M and its hybridized approach may not fit into conventional or established perspectives, the fusion of spirituality contains a local logic recognized by critical literature, as it provides a device to empower

¹⁵³ The general perspective of Christian fundamentalism can be found in the following: Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999, Allen, 2006, Behrend, 1998, Gersony 1997, Echenreich, 1998, Feldman, 2007 and Robert Feldman, "Why Uganda Has Failed to Defeat the Lord's Resistance Army," *Defense and Security Analysis*, (Vol. 24, No. 1, 2008)

¹⁵⁴ It is impossible in the small space provided to accurately explain Acholi cosmology and resistance. Nevertheless, it is important to know that the resistance is as much a spiritual movement in the sense that via local cosmological and social norms, Kony may have received 'blessings' from the authority required to wage war against an antagonistic enemy. This would have permitted violence on behalf of the community to provide safety and retain autonomy. For elaborations of these aspects of the conflict and Acholi culture, please see Finnstrom, 2008 and Atkinson, 1994.

¹⁵⁵ Finnstrom, 2008 and Behrend, 1999.

¹⁵⁶ Dolan, 2009.

¹⁵⁷ For examples such as prohibition of sex, smoking, drinking alcohol and lying, see Behrend, 1999.

the LRA/M, keep force discipline and confidence high, or in the heat of battle keep the troops spiritually ‘protected’¹⁵⁹ Therefore, while the critical literature provides a rather banal understanding of local religions, in light of the fundamentalist mystique or romance attached by established perspectives of the conflict,¹⁶⁰ critical analysis argues that this is indeed a necessary consideration, should literature hope to provide a locally informed, politically aware and comprehensive analysis of the conflict

Rebels without a Cause the apolitical LRA/M in established literature

Beyond what the critical literature argues as a reductionist or simplistic portrayal LRA/M of fundamentalist Christian aims, established literature has also recurrently argued that LRA/M does not hold a current political intent, rationale or motivation, and instead, that it is simply a terror and fear-fueled violence-based organization For instance, even in the minority of established literature that touches upon the notion of a potential motivation or political intent, the same literature argues these goals are now absent, as the LRA/M

Has changed its political goals over time, obfuscated those it has hinted at, and, in general rarely communicated with the outside world in anyway whatsoever¹⁶¹

Interestingly, in Vinci’s perspective above, there are two broad generalizations forwarded First, this perspective implies the political goals of the LRA/M may have only ever been tacit at best and have now, simply dissipated Secondly, the assertion argues that the LRA/M rarely, if ever, intelligibly communicated with the outside world Thus,

¹⁵⁸ Finnstrom 2008 Additionally, for an outline of the religious beliefs of the LRA/M see LRA/M Communique [c], (2006), Religious Beliefs of the LRA/M, Gulu District, Copy retained by author and also Behrend, 1998, p 110

¹⁵⁹ Finnstrom, 2008, p 123 – 124, and Vinci 2005

¹⁶⁰ Invisible Children and the Center for American Progress have been integral in expanding the established views Their campaigns using Christian symbols and language to surround the goals of the LRA/M are recurrent See retrieved web links, www.invisiblechildren.com or www.enoughproject.org, (August 1, 2011)

according to Vinci, the LRA/M is a resistance with no political motive, nor the intent of illustrating one, akin to a form of invasive species, one that simply terrorizes its host with no end goal or end to its means

Interestingly, this assertion that the LRA/M lacks a clear political agenda as noted by Vinci in addition to Gersony and Feldman, is actually, a more moderate stance held by numerous others within established literature. For example, many who have assisted in forming the established perspective of the LRA/M prefer to use rather derogatory appearing language when depicting goals of the resistance. For instance, as Dunn notes:

The vagueness of the LRA's agenda and its clear hypocrisy in pursuing its stated goals have led many to the conclusion that Kony and his comrades are irrational, perhaps madmen. Indeed, the Ugandan press regularly depicts Kony as a dreadlocked, drug-addled doctor/madman, surrounded by skulls on pikes, cauldrons containing human flesh, and other tropes meant to convey savagery, barbarism and irrationality.¹⁶²

Similarly, Van Acker noted with regard to the motivation of the LRA/M

The realities of this conflict appear to be far away from any of the Lord's moral dictates. The rebels' vision of an alternative society is poorly articulated, to put it mildly, just as rampant atrocities undermine the credibility of the LRA as a popular protest.¹⁶³

What may be most troubling in these assessments of the LRA/M, its political agenda and rationale, is it appears that moralized established accounts of conflict allow little room for critical literature to debate the potential logic of resistance. This appears as an increasingly problematic aspect of northern Ugandan conflict analysis, particularly when the established perspective is contrasted with the growing critical approach. Nevertheless, even with these critical approaches brought to light, the continued employ of a cloudy or absent rationale for resistance emphasized in the established literature has increasingly come to dominate both policy and advocacy.

¹⁶¹ Vinci, 2005, p. 363

¹⁶² Dunn, 2004p. 208

For instance, recent 2009 US congressional legislation has no mention of political aims of the LRA/M, but instead is full of the language outlining the violent, abhorrent, and atrocity-based operations to which they are notorious¹⁶⁴ Therefore, in a similar vein to which the religious fundamentalist depiction of the LRA/M transferred from established literature into both policy and advocacy, the same trajectory has occurred for the apolitical portrayals of the LRA/M as noted below

First, in regards to scholarship on the LRA/M political agenda, established views have overwhelmingly propagated that “the LRA had never been known to have any clear political agenda,”¹⁶⁵ and that

There can be no doubt that the LRA is in total breach of human rights The use of the community’s own children and the lack of an explicit agenda legitimizing the use of violence epitomize an extreme depoliticization, in which victims are even deprived of the possibility of ascribing responsibility for, or understanding of, the anguish they suffer¹⁶⁶

In addition, the US governmental stance is that

The LRA has plagued central Africa, particularly northern Uganda, for more than 2 decades the LRA instills fear by conducting brutal executions In contrast to many other armed groups which occasionally adopt such brutal tactics, the LRA has conducted such atrocities on systemic and prolonged¹⁶⁷

And lastly, the predominant NGO or advocacy perspective that

Over the years, the LRA has had few genuine political objectives and has relied heavily on the Sudanese government for military support as the motives of the LRA become more ambiguous their crimes more horrific¹⁶⁸

What is interesting to note, is how closely these three perspectives relate, and the nature of their focus being that of an apolitical and ambiguous operation that has neither

¹⁶³ Van Acker, 2004, p 336

¹⁶⁴ US Government, 2009

¹⁶⁵ Joanna Quinn, “Getting to Peace? Negotiating with the LRA in Northern Uganda,” *Human Rights Review*, Vol 10, No 55, 2009), p 60

¹⁶⁶ Van Acker, 2004 p 354

¹⁶⁷ US Government, 2009, p 3

end goal, nor legitimate aim in mind. Yet, while a breadth of literature explicitly argues that the LRA/M are an aimless group of violent thugs, the following approaches in critical literature argues these assertions as both inaccurate and absent of a locally engaged understanding of conflict in Acholiland.

Rebels with a Cause: the political LRA/M in critical literature

In contrast to this argument found in the work of Vinci, Feldman and Gersony, amongst others, critical literature has begun to forward the argument that the apolitical portrayals of the LRA/M, are not entirely accurate. For instance, Finnstrom has noted on several occasions that the LRA/M has indeed conducted a wide dissemination of leaflets, manifestos and political rationale documents; while also “communicating with the outside world” via the internet, international news and local radio.¹⁶⁹ Thus, according to Finnstrom and the informants, documents and responses he cites, not only does the LRA/M hold important grievances of social marginalization, exploitation and concern of inequity within Uganda,¹⁷⁰ but they actively sought to transmit these goals, aims and beliefs, whether in print or across radio waves. As noted by Finnstrom:

There can be no question that the LRA/M manifestos circulate on the ground in northern Uganda, which is where I encountered them in the first place. I have also documented that a number of Acholi who were known critics of the government and therefore suspected of having copies, have perished in Ugandan prisons. This fact gives a most real, lived dimension to the manifestos. Again the official discourse of denial is violently at play – not only is it denied that the LRA/M has manifestos but people who dare to voice the contrary run the risk of being imprisoned.¹⁷¹

Thus, while it appears to critical perspectives that a distinct ethnic, political and

¹⁶⁸ Please see. Invisible Children, retrieved web link, www.invisiblechildren.com, June 20, 2011

¹⁶⁹ Finnstrom, 2008, p. 119 – 127. In addition, documents procured during fieldwork corroborate Finnstrom in showing a clear message by the LRA/M on political agendas, electoral campaigns and the ICC intervention into the JPT. See LRA/M Communiqué [a], *ibid* and LRA/M Communiqué [b], *ibid*.

¹⁷⁰ Finnstrom, *ibid*, p. 124 – 127. Here Finnstrom outlines the numerous grievances, political complaints, economic considerations and fear of marginalization held by the LRA/M.

¹⁷¹ Finnstrom, *ibid*, p. 120 – 121.

social motivation in the LRA/M does exist, established literature appears to still prefer an ambiguous and cloudy depiction of intent for the LRA/M, ultimately providing an inaccurate assessment of the resistance (however reviled). Potentially more troubling for critical literature to accept, however, is that due to this reductionist assertion, a crucial component of an operational resistance has been left in ambiguity, which in turn, casts doubt on the legitimacy of a resistance that may in actuality, speak on behalf of a good portion of the populace.¹⁷² Therefore, as emerging critical literature increasingly argues, even if it has been difficult for the LRA/M to articulate itself, “failure of the LRA/M to have access to the mass media to express its political agenda loudly in intellectual form does not mean the lack of it.”¹⁷³

Irrespective of the growing critical and locally engaged understanding of the LRA/M – GoU conflict, established literature has clearly shown itself becoming increasingly entrenched in the broader discussion, policy and NGO advocacy issue framing of northern Uganda. For critical literature this is an increasingly problematic aspect of conflict analysis of northern Uganda, as the apolitical portrayals do indeed appear to be inaccurate assessments of the resistance by the standards of the critical approach. However, what may be most troubling in these apolitical assessments of the LRA/M, its motivation and rationale, is that the editorialized and moralized established accounts of conflict in Acholiland appear to allow for little room of an actual debate on the potential logic of resistance.

This is certainly as an increasingly problematic aspect of northern Ugandan conflict analysis, particularly when the established perspective is so vociferously and

¹⁷² This was noted to a similar extent in the work of Nadarajah and Srisankandarajah on the LTTE in Sri Lanka. See Suthaharan Nadarajah and Dhananjayan Srisankandarajah, “Liberation Struggle or Terrorism,

convincingly contended by suggestions made in the emerging critical approach. For instance, as Dolan illustrated, the LRA/M agenda and political aims deserve consideration (however atrocious their actions), as these political aims (however poorly articulated) do hold rationality for the resistance, and more importantly, they illustrate that the LRA/M is not a drug-induced group of crazed madmen who live in a setting akin to the 'heart of darkness'.¹⁷⁴

Therefore, in contrast to the established perspective of Vinci, Gersony, Van Acker and others, critical literature has indeed argued that the LRA/M not only holds a political motivation, but disseminated and mobilized such based on wider local and historic grievances. Moreover, in regard to a potential intent to perpetuate an apolitical depiction of the nature of the LRA/M, Finnstrom casted doubt on the validity of such practices in noting

The official approach of belittling the political manifestos of the LRA/M rebels, which for so many years blocked their access to the official political arena, has created frustration not only among the young rebels themselves, but also among my noncombatant young friends in Gulu town.¹⁷⁵

Consequently, while established literature, and in turn, advocacy and policymaking have provided an apolitical depiction of the LRA/M, critical literature argues that this is an incomplete, inaccurate, and potentially damaging assessment of the conflict. Essentially, for the critical approach, where established literature misunderstands the motivations for resistance in Acholiland, they in turn, likely misinform the policymakers on appropriate solutions to the conflict.

The Politics of Naming the LTTE” *Third World Quarterly*, (Vol. 26, No 1, 2005)

¹⁷³ Finnstrom, 2008, p. 127

¹⁷⁴ Dolan, 2009, p. 50, 79–82, 83–85. Here Dolan accounts for the construction, composition and role of the different wings of the LRA/M. Additionally, Dolan outlines the logic for resistance, its agenda and the political rationale for continuing to fight.

¹⁷⁵ Finnstrom, 2008, p. 120

3.3 NRA/M, UPDF – Transgressions or Protection?

Aside from the apolitical or fundamentalist assessments of the LRA/M, another important recurring assumption in established literature is the gravity of LRA/M violence in contrast to that of the GoU, NRA/M or UPDF. This is a particularly concerning aspect of analysis of the conflict for critical literature, as one-side (LRA/M) involved in the conflict has been issued warrants by the ICC, while the other (GoU) appears to have successfully negated implication for such. Moreover, irrespective of the ICC charges, critical literature argues that without reconciling the grievous crimes of the NRA/M, UPDF and GoU, a truly informed understanding of the conflict will remain elusive¹⁷⁶

Therefore, as with the varied perspectives of LRA/M motivations, a similar vein of contention hallmarks the critical and established literature concerning culpability for violence in Acholiland. On one hand, established literature appears to minimize potential transgressions by the UPDF, NRA/M and GoU, while vociferously noting crimes of the LRA/M. Conversely, where critical literature can and does reconcile crimes by the LRA/M, it also includes those alleged of the NRA/M, GoU and UPDF, continuing to argue that these desperately require further consideration. Thus, as the following illustrates, while the LRA/M is synonymous with incidents of violence and atrocity in northern Uganda, the critical approach argues that they should not be the only one.

One-Sided War: LRA/M conflict in established literature

When established literature frames the conflict in Acholiland, it is generally done in such a manner that the reader is immediately struck by statements such as “the LRA have been waging a war,”¹⁷⁷ in which “local children, young men and women were

¹⁷⁶ Finnstrom, 2008, Dolan, 2009 and Branch, 2004

¹⁷⁷ Allen, 2008 p. 1

kidnapped by LRA soldiers and marked as traitors, their noses, ears, arms and mouths being cut off”¹⁷⁸ Consequently, the dominant theme regarding established literature in this respect, is a consistent emphasis that the conflict in Acholiland is indeed the LRA/M’s war, and, that they have “chopped off arms and legs, raped women, and abducted children for both military and sexual service,”¹⁷⁹ without mention of similar acts conducted by the NRA/M, UPDF and GoU

These perspectives of the LRA/M in established literature are indeed pervasive, and therefore, these influential perspectives have translated into the dominant policymaking documents focused on conflict mitigation for northern Uganda in recent years For instance, by contrasting the established literature to official US congressional legislation, one can note some striking continuity As Vinci notes

The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has been fighting a brutal war in northern Uganda and southern Sudan for almost two decades Atrocities are committed on a regular basis, including the kidnapping and enslavement of very young children, severe mutilations, and the displacement of 90 percent of the population¹⁸⁰

Likewise, the US congressional legislation of 2009 argued

The LRA has plagued central Africa, particularly northern Uganda, for more than 2 decades when attacking civilians, the LRA instills fear by conducting brutal executions Civilians including women and children, are abducted to serve as porters, sex slaves, and fighters the LRA has conducted such atrocities on a systematic and prolonged basis¹⁸¹

What is important to note in the above narratives is how similar each depiction of the conflict is to each other Moreover, while the continuity in language is certainly striking, these depictions appear to castigate one group in isolation, something that the emerging critical perspectives are increasingly combative towards

¹⁷⁸ Behrend, 1998, p 117

¹⁷⁹ Hegland, 2007, p 1

¹⁸⁰ Vinci, 2005, p 360

With the LRA/M dominantly noted as the singular source of violence in northern Uganda, the following two narratives can illustrate this prevalence of this notion in established literature. First, as a more extreme established perspective states, the LRA/M of Joseph Kony is

One of the larger terrorist organizations in the world. It has killed more people than many other violent groups. Its reason for existence is to perpetuate the power of its leaders, a ruthless witchcraft practitioner named Joseph Kony.¹⁸²

Additionally, as a second more sedate example still nevertheless implies, the LRA/M war is indeed a one-sided conflict, thus exhibiting a striking continuity throughout the established perspective. According to Annan et al.

Since 1986, while the rest of Uganda has moved steadily towards economic and political stability, the northern region of Uganda has been the theatre of brutal conflict caused by a rebel group called the Lord's Resistance Army.¹⁸³

Consequently, even in those works of established literature that may implicitly note the negative involvement of the GoU, NRA/M or UPDF in the displacement and violent conflict of Acholiland, this reality becomes quickly tempered with more sensational or visualized accounts of alleged atrocities by the LRA/M during the late-1990s and early 2000s.¹⁸⁴ Thus, to the general reader, conflict in northern Uganda appears as something only one group is a party to, and that group is the 'brutal,' 'mystical' or 'fanatical'

LRA/M

Just as with portrayals of the absent motivation and religions of the LRA/M, the established body of literature and its one-sided account of conflict in Acholiland has

¹⁸¹ US Government 2009, p. 3

¹⁸² Carter Johnson, 'Deliver us from Kony,' *Christianity Today* (January, 2006), p. 30-32

¹⁸³ Jeannie Annan, Anne Amuge and Teddy Angwato, 'Counselling in the Midst of a War: Counselors from Northern Uganda Share Their Views,' *International Journal for the Advancement of Counselling*, (Vol. 25, No. 4, 2003) p. 236

¹⁸⁴ Allen, 2006, p. 47-52, Van Acker, 2004, Vinci, 2005 and Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999

similarly transcended academia, now finding its way into policy and NGO advocacy issue framing. As a result, in returning once again to the U.S. anti-LRA/M legislation in contrast to a prominent NGO advocacy portrayal, one can immediately recognize the entrenched influence of established literature's one-sided portrayal of an insidious LRA/M

First, as the U.S. congressional legislation fielded by Senator Russ Feingold argues

The LRA remains a serious threat to civilian population in the affected areas. Attacks by roving groups of LRA on civilian populations in three countries (the CAR, the DRC, and Sudan) continue to result in significant loss of life, injury, abduction, rape, sexual slavery, mutilation and pillaging.¹⁸⁵

Then, by comparing a statement on the Enough Project's website, continuity becomes evident

For almost 25 years, the Lord's Resistance Army and its leader Joseph Kony have wreaked havoc on civilian communities across central Africa. What began in 1987 as a rebellion based in northern Uganda has morphed into a regional insurgency that now terrorizes civilians in northeastern Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, and eastern Central African Republic. The LRA has no clear political agenda. This ruthless militia directs violence towards civilians and attacks local communities – massacring innocent people, razing villages, and abducting children and forcing them to serve as soldiers, porters, and sex slaves.¹⁸⁶

Interestingly, these narratives certainly carry some similar sentiments in their characterizations of the LRA/M – GoU conflict. More importantly however, is how closely they relate to established literature, and their noticeable omissions of GoU when depicting the violence inflicted upon Acholiland. Therefore, in a very similar means to the established perspectives of the LRA/M political motivation and spirituality, depictions of LRA/M social violence in isolation have additionally permeated research,

¹⁸⁵ U.S. Government 2009, p. 10

policy and advocacy. This is an important and potentially deleterious aspect of the conflict in northern Uganda, as similarly to the critical approach on the motivations for the LRA/M, critical approaches to violence in northern Uganda will illustrate that there is indeed, far more to the conflict than what the established portrayal notes.

Two-Sided War: LRA/M - GoU conflict in critical literature

With regard to the critical perspective of violence in Acholiland, it must be reconciled that the emerging literature appears by no means sympathetic or apologetic to the LRA/M and its alleged use of child soldiers, violence, or atrocity.¹⁸⁷ However, what critical literature does provide is an account of violence in northern Uganda that contrasts the previously very one-sided established explanation of the war. Nevertheless, in doing such, it is notable that in established reviews of critical literature, certain individuals have become associated with the terms sympathizer or apologist, irrespective of their ability or attempts to remain impartial and neutral.¹⁸⁸

Interestingly, in opposition to the one-sided accounts of conflict in Acholiland noted earlier, critical literature perhaps most vociferously contests the broad thematic assumptions found in established literature. Thus, while established literature emphasizes recurrently that the LRA/M *are* the sole contributors of violent social acts such as rape and murder in northern Uganda, Dolan illustrates that the NRA/M (now GoU) *was and is* capable of its own abhorrent transgressions, with Operation North providing a particularly clear example. For instance, during the NRA/M campaign to pacify northern Uganda, Dolan characterizes the GoU-led Operation North by the following practices

¹⁸⁶ Enough Project, *The Lord's Resistance Army*, retrieved web link, <http://www.enoughproject.org/LRA>, (August 1, 2011)

¹⁸⁷ Finnstrom, 2008, p. 289

The NRA forcibly cleared approximately 100,000 people from their homes in and around Gulu town – soldiers (UPDF) committed hundreds of extra judicial executions as they forced people out of their homes, burning down homestead and granaries¹⁸⁹

In addition to the screening exercises, directed rape, cattle rustling, violent torture or anti-subversive activities, due to the additional looting, burning of granaries and indiscriminant murder enacted throughout Operation North and after, Dolan believes that the NRA/M should indeed be associated with those same acts to which the LRA/M have been in near isolation¹⁹⁰ Yet, irrespective that Dolan and the wider critical approach believe that the LRA/M and UPDF should ostensibly be regarded in a similar light, this is likely a problematic normative argument for established literature to reconcile, as

Important elements of the mainstream discourse were reflected in the way northern Uganda was portrayed, with the LRA – GoU war presented as internal and intra-ethnic, and the LRA as irrational terrorists or greed driven bandits, and as *the* problem rather than *a* problem¹⁹¹

Likewise, in response to the established accounts of violence such as alleged LRA/M massacres at Atiak, Barlyono and Palabek during the 1990s and early 2000s, this growing dichotomy between established and critical perspectives provides some important additional considerations (see UPDF transgression and massacre) for northern Ugandan conflict analysis For example, Dolan is not alone in outlining the critical fieldwork-based narratives of UPDF social violence in northern Uganda, as Finnstrom further corroborates Dolan (or vice versa) on the UPDF, GoU and NRA/M transgressions that occurred during the height of war

¹⁸⁸ In a review, Dean offers that Finnstroms account romanticizes the LRA/M, ultimately becoming a political act of support, in and of itself See Meryll Dean, 'Review of *Living with Bad Surroundings*, by Sverker Finnstrom,' *Journal of Refugee Studies*, (Vol 22, No 4, 2009), p 539

¹⁸⁹ Dolan, 2009, p 45

¹⁹⁰ Dolan, 2009, p 44 – 46

¹⁹¹ Dolan, *ibid*, p 257

Here, Finnstrom notes that in addition to a consistent use of the *panda garis* (get on the lorry)¹⁹² and the longstanding practice of raping or killing IDPs,¹⁹³ the UPDF also manically capitalized on an insecure northern Uganda, in turn, creating even greater insecurity during the war. For instance, one means to which the UPDF created a deplorable cycle of insecurity in war time Acholi was in their continuing practice of employing local bandits and thieves (*boo kec, pit kumi*) to exploit and terrify the local displaced communities. As Finnstrom further noted, these bandits and thieves were then incidentally mistaken for, or intentionally masqueraded as the LRA/M, a crucial misinterpretation of the conflict that only further obfuscated truth about the LRA/M resistance and atrocities perpetrated by their hands.

Boo kec and pit kumi are not rebels. Frequently they are connected with the Ugandan army, and many people in rural Acholiland fear bandits more than they fear rebels. “The rebels, at least, are open about their business, but if you encounter boo kec, never look them in the eyes.”¹⁹⁴

Therefore, while established literature on northern Uganda is characterized by alleged LRA/M transgressions in isolation, the emerging critical approaches duly include these crimes, in addition to the incorporation of greater nuance and depth of non-state perspectives. As a result, in addition to the crimes of men under Kony’s command, the critical approach to the northern Ugandan conflict is now become increasingly

¹⁹² The *panda garis* or ‘get on the lorry’ was the catchphrase for the counter-insurgency screening exercises of the UPDF. Where individuals in northern Uganda were gathered on NRA/M vehicles and brought to centers such as the notorious Pece stadium in Gulu. While on the lorry to an unknown destination, many Acholi perished whilst the rest duly feared for the pending abuse, mistreatment and likely rape or murder to follow. Finnstrom, 2008, p. 174 – 175.

¹⁹³ Finnstrom provides an in-depth explanation of the screening exercises conducted at Pece Stadium in Gulu, in addition to the rape campaigns conducted by a notorious 118 Battalion of the UPDF. This group was also known as the *tek gungu* which loosely translates into ‘bend over.’ These troops, many who were HIV positive, forcibly raped not only women, but also men in front of their families and the public to create and consolidate the fear in the local community of the southern and hostile UPDF. See Finnstrom, 2008, p. 90 and 187 – 187.

¹⁹⁴ Finnstrom, 2008, p. 3.

characterized by local Acholi stories of the NRA/M, UPDF and GoU violence against their community. In this regard, Branch provides an apt example when noting:

The government-led counterinsurgency has been vicious: the displaced people's camps themselves were created through a government campaign of displacement, including bombings and burning down entire villages. Those in the camps cannot leave because the UPDF kills any civilians outside of them.¹⁹⁵

Nevertheless, irrespective of the mounting evidence that empowers critical literature to argue in contrast to established perspectives, dominant advocacy and policymaking still hold fast that the LRA/M in isolation wages a war in Acholiland. Therefore, while a simplistic or reductionist account of the LRA/M continues to dominate advocacy and policymaking with regard to violence during the war, it appears that an in-depth, engaged examination of the GoU's involvement in human rights abuses continues to avoid broader discussion. For critical literature, this is a problematic aspect of northern Ugandan conflict and its analysis, especially when the local perspective overwhelmingly indicates that beyond the abuses of the LRA/M, the war is additionally characterized by NRA/M transgressions, acts that occurred in a very similar vein to those noted by Atkinson:

After capturing the capital in January 1986, Museveni's army pursued fleeing former government soldiers North, and soon began committing human rights violations of its own: abducting, detaining, beating, raping, and killing civilians and former soldiers alike. They also stole or destroyed Acholi property, including hundreds of thousands of cattle, effectively wiping out much of the convertible wealth of the population. And, thus, just as one war ended, another began (NRA/M war against Acholi).¹⁹⁶

Therefore, while established perspectives continue to prefer the argument that "LRA punishments" are somehow more abhorrent than widespread UPDF or "NRA

¹⁹⁵ Branch, 2004, p. 23

¹⁹⁶ Atkinson, 2009, p. 6

depredations,”¹⁹⁷ the critical approach steadfastly holds that both sides should be accountable for the conflict, and its consequences.¹⁹⁸ In short, as Finnstrom notes, critical literature can reconcile that “the rebels are responsible for their gross abuses of the most basic human rights,” while also being considerate for the need to account for

The Ugandan army’s arbitrary killings and rape of civilians, torture, forced labor at gunpoint, or the forced displacement of millions of people to squalid camps, all potential crimes against humanity¹⁹⁹

The debate between established and critical perspectives concerning the culpability for violence in Acholiland will likely continue, irrespective that a breadth of compelling evidence indeed supports the emerging critical approach. Yet, for the critical literature, it appears this will be a longstanding debate, particularly as established literature and its influence have been clearly exhibited in the recent U.S. legislation and the destabilizing ICC charges against the LRA/M during the JPT.²⁰⁰

For example, in comparing the crimes of the LRA/M to those of the GoU and UPDF, a representative of the ICC perhaps best illustrated the obstacles to a critical and more locally engaged understanding of the conflict. The ICC representative argues that “alleged crimes perpetrated by the Ugandan government were not grave enough to reach the threshold” of indictment, or at least not in the same vein it was for the LRA/M.²⁰¹ Therefore, while local and critical perspectives do exist and have gained increased recognition, it appears that a similar problem as the dissemination of LRA/M political

¹⁹⁷ Allen, 2006, p. 47

¹⁹⁸ For instance, both Finnstrom, 2008 and Dolan, 2009 provide an in-depth exploration of the LRA/M and NRA/M crimes against humanity. Something established literature has a hard time reconciling. For an example of the established perspective of the LRA/M as worse than the NRA/M, see Gersony, 1999.

¹⁹⁹ Finnstrom, 2008, p. 227

²⁰⁰ LRA/M, *Juba Assessment*, Gulu District, (2010), Copy retained by author

²⁰¹ See Finnstrom, 2008, p. 227. Here it is noted that the ICC created a ‘gravity’ threshold for crimes, and the mandate of the court excluded any crimes before 2002. This effectively excluded the worst transgressions of the NRA/M and UPDF from investigation, while focusing solely on the LRA/M.

manifestos is occurring. Without a wider audience or means to disseminate critical perspectives from the northern Ugandan conflict further, established perspectives and their state-centric approach continue to dominate the discussion of the LRA/M - GoU conflict, and its consequences.

3.4 Critical and Established Perspectives: in Summary

In the analyses of conflict in northern Uganda, continuity is certainly evident in the manner to which both established and critical literature understand the historical progression of divergent ethnic groups, the influence of colonialism, the instability of independence, and, to some extent, the modern conflict in Acholiland. While there are certainly divergent understandings of the importance of certain aspects of life in Acholiland such as traditional social cohesion systems and spirituality, it is clear that a broad agreement does exist²⁰². However, it is equally important to consider, that in regard to some of the incredibly important aspects of history, both established literature and critical approaches diverge considerably with respect to the actual content of the LRA/M – GoU conflict.

While many of these issues lie beyond the scope of this thesis, it is nonetheless important to consider that divergence is not isolated to historical interpretations of Uganda or potential solutions for displacement. Divergence does indeed exist throughout interpretations of the causes of the conflict, the crimes committed during conflict and the consequences that may have arisen from such. These are important considerations, and the two thematic aspects that this thesis focuses on, appear particularly important.

²⁰² Atkinson and Ker Kwaro Acholi illustrate an importance of local cosmology in the modern conflict, while Allen argues these mechanisms are invented and otherwise, not specifically important for building peace in northern Uganda. See Atkinson, 1994, Ker Kwaro Acholi, 2011 and Allen, 2006.

In light of the divergence between critical and established literature on some critical aspects of the LRA/M – GoU conflict, namely the political nature of the resistance and culpability for violence, some very important implications have been created. First, critical literature outlined in stark contrast to established literature, that the LRA/M can certainly be noted as having both created and employed a political manifesto that was followed and disseminated throughout Acholiland. Likewise, in contrast to established literature, this ideology and manifesto appears not as only a fleeting political motivation or religious fundamentalism, but rather steadfast local beliefs, ones that translated from the LRA/M leadership, through ranks, and into the local community.

This presents an interesting aspect to the debate between established and critical literature, particularly in regards to policymaking and peace building. As the established perspective essentially argues that the LRA/M is simply an apolitical fear and terror-inducing machine, with no intent other than the creation of suffering. Thus, the implicit endorsement of military action exists, as established literature is essentially positing that the resistance is non-negotiable, massively aggressive, and largely based on illogical and hostile reasoning. In contrast, the critical approach argues for a need to contextualize the LRA/M'S political nature, and thus, the need for a more nuanced and locally considerate approach to peace building. As the critical approach believes that there is indeed a logic, and thus a political rationale in the resistance, then there is indeed a logic or rationale for non-military solutions with regard to peace building.

Next, with regard to the perpetrators of violence, critical and established literature could likely not be further apart. As the established literature prefers an assessment of the conflict that cites the LRA/M as the singular reason for Acholi suffering, displacement, atrocity, and the overall war in general, the critical approach is nearly the opposite. As

was evident in the work of Finnstrom, Dolan and Atkinson, the LRA/M was not the only party to violence, as the NRA/M, UPDF and GoU all acted as complicit colleagues in the social torture²⁰³ forced upon Acholiland. Nevertheless, while this emerging critical perspective exists, the established literature still appears to dominate the discussion, as US congressional legislation, media reports, advocacy, and the ICC charges all reflect a largely one-sided understanding of the LRA/M and its ongoing conflict with the GoU.

The divergence between critical and established literature calls into question the validity of many assessments of, and prescriptions for, the conflict in Acholiland. As policymaking is inherently shaped by the established, rather than the critical literature, notable critical avenues for redress (e.g. local engagement) still do exist. Moreover, as the following local narratives and quantitative data will elaborate, critical literature in many respects, does indeed mirror the voice of the war and displacement-affected Acholi. Thus, with elaboration of the important fieldwork findings, the critical and more locally cognizant approach will suggest the need for greater local engagement, whether by literature to form a more nuanced understanding of northern Ugandan conflict in general, or for policy and advocacy to stem future conflict and provide durable solutions to the war-affected community.

²⁰³ Social Torture is a concept provided by Dolan with regard to the duress, marginalization and violence committed against the Acholi community by the GoU and LRA/M, please see Dolan, 2009.

4.1 Introduction

The fieldwork findings collected in Acholiland during September through December 2010 frequently centered upon the two important thematic aspects of the LRA/M – GoU conflict as outlined in Chapter 3. Additionally, fieldwork findings also centered upon numerous aspects of the history and the conflict in northern Uganda, with the post-Bush War period particularly dominating interviews and surveys. To this effect, what may be most interesting, is that while descriptive statistics and local Acholi narratives do to some degree, converge with established literature on aspects of the pre-colonial, colonial and independence periods in Uganda, as with the critical literature on the modern conflict, divergence between established perspectives and local narratives becomes increasingly, present and prevalent. Furthermore, it is not only that divergence between the critical and established literatures do indeed exist, but also how fluently local narratives and the critical literature converge in such a diametrically opposed manner to the established literature and thus, the dominant policymaking and advocacy for the LRA/M - GoU conflict.

Consequently, the following research findings will illustrate that local narratives do indeed deviate from the established literature, while in great part, supporting or converging with the critical perspective. This is immediately evident in the manner to which local war-affected Acholi believe that the LRA/M should indeed be argued as a political entity, rather than an aimless or unsupported resistance. Additionally, local narratives consistently illustrated a local perception that the NRA/M, UPDF and GoU are just as complicit (if not more), and therefore, accountable for the violence in Acholiland to which the established literature argues exclusively of the LRA/M.

However, before examining the more in-depth qualitative narratives provided by northern Ugandans, it is first necessary to provide a contour of the war and displacement-affected community members who were the focus of the thesis research. From this contour, the following will then draw attention to the two major points of contention; first, emphasizing the broader iterations of the Acholi community, and secondly, their unique perspectives on the political nature of the resistance and the local views of GoU, NRA/M and UPDF violence towards the community.

4.2 Quantitative Findings: Acholiland; Resistance, Violence and Displacement

The random sample provides perspectives from 150 persons in northern Uganda, with their ages ranging from between 18 and 80 years of age.²⁰⁴ Of the sample, just over half were married, while the remainder dominated by unwed persons, and an additional minority of either divorced or widowed individuals.²⁰⁵ In terms of where the respondents resided, nearly 75% of all individuals noted that an IDP camp was their primary residence.²⁰⁶ For 58.3 % of the population, the stay in an IDP camp had continued for a prolonged duration of more than 11 years, while another, nearly 40% had lived in displacement for 6 – 10 years.²⁰⁷ Generally speaking, displaced individuals predominantly lived in areas 5 kilometers or more from their original homes, in settings that were overwhelmingly argued as either *poor* or *very poor*; with particular concern for aspects of life such as: security, water access, land access, employment opportunities,

²⁰⁴ All of the following Outputs are contained in the appendix. Output, 1, 2011. Respondent Age.

²⁰⁵ Output, 2 2011. Respondent Marital Status. Married 51%, Single 36%, Divorced and Widowed 12%.

²⁰⁶ Output, 5, 2011. Respondent Primary Residence. Percent of displaced persons who still currently use an IDP camp as their primary residence 68%. Interestingly, this figure contrasts the wide assertion that IDPs have almost entirely left the IDP camps and returned home. See: IDMC, retrieved, <http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/Uganda>, June 27, 2011 and also: UNHCR, *A Time Between, Moving on from internal displacement in northern Uganda*, (UNHCR: AVSI), retrieved, <http://www.unhcr.org/4baa0fd86.pdf>, June 27, 2011.

health service and overall quality of life²⁰⁸ Lastly, respondents overwhelmingly identified with tribal affiliations such as Acholi 72%, Langi 8.7% or even ethnolinguistically as Luo 13.3%, well before they did as Ugandans at 2.7%²⁰⁹ In short, as was outlined in much of the established and critical literature on the conflict, the sample population's life for the past 20 or so years was hallmarked by ethnic identification and typecasting, hardship, poverty, violence or suffering

Political Resistance Descriptive

In contrast to established literature, quantitative responses of the sample population supported to an extremely high degree, the assertions in critical literature with respect to the political nature of the LRA/M Therefore, while the descriptive statistics can truly only provide a small illustration to this effect, divergence between local narratives and established literature shall become increasingly obvious Moreover, when the following statistics are linked to the later qualitative narratives, then it most certainly appears that the LRA/M is regarded as a political entity in northern Uganda

The first and most telling statistics concerning the motivations of the LRA/M, came from Acholi perceptions on the root causes of conflict in northern Uganda In this regard, the four most prevalent answers were ethnicity at 29.3%, economic and developmental disparity between southern and northern Uganda at 26.7%, economic rewards at 12.7% and political power at 12%²¹⁰ Interestingly, while the two highest of these, could, in many instances outside Uganda be argued as not complimentary

²⁰⁷ Output, 6, 2011, Respondent duration in camp Notably, of the entire sample population, only 3 individuals who were displaced, had been in such a situation for under 5 years

²⁰⁸ Output, 9, [a] [f] and Output 10, 2011 Respondent perspective of life in the IDP camps, including water access, quality of life, education, employment Additionally, Respondent Perspectives of Safety, included fear for security, speaking publicly and so forth

²⁰⁹ Output, 4, 2011 Respondent Identity

²¹⁰ Output, 20, 2011 Respondent Perspective of Roots Causes of Conflict

components of the political arena, as per case study literature, it would be truly problematic to argue that ethnicity and developmental inequity in Uganda are not directly linked to the politics of Uganda. Therefore, from these initial perspectives of respondents, the causes of the conflict appear to be based on four very political reasons, something mirrored in the critical approaches to LRA/M – GoU conflict analysis, and the numerous existent LRA/M manifestos and communiqués.

Another telling statistic that illustrates the belief that this is indeed a political war, one which the LRA/M are party to, was with whom respondents accorded accountability for conflict. In this respect, the GoU was overwhelmingly cited by nearly 60% of respondents, while the LRA/M leaders or all of its membership at a cumulative 22.6% and the UPDF at 18%.²¹¹ Consequently, in contrast to established literature, respondents arguably note that the GoU was a dominant party to the war, thus illustrating an overarching political aspect to the protracted LRA/M – GoU conflict.

Finally, when one attaches the following statistics to the critical perspectives noted earlier and the qualitative narratives to follow, then the political composition of resistance becomes clear. First, northern Ugandan respondents felt overwhelmingly that ethnic representatives did offer better political representation (69.3%), a better means of social amelioration post-conflict (60.7%), while in contrast, viewing the GoU as worse in regard to these aspects of life, in addition to being the worst influence on any prospect for future peace in Acholiland (76.7%).²¹² Therefore, in contrasting these numbers to the fact that the local community overwhelmingly feels comfortable living with or extending the same rights to all members of the LRA/M, and that the member of parliament seats held

²¹¹ Output 21 2011 Respondent Perspective of Accountability for Conflict

by northern Ugandans is woefully inequitable when contrasted to non-Acholi representation,²¹³ then an ethno-political theme appears to exist throughout respondent answers. This is interesting, as the critical literature emphasized the importance of both, ethnic and political grievances in the aims of resistance in northern Uganda, whether under the name of the HSM, WBNF, UPDA or now LRA/M.

Ugandan State and Military Violence in Acholi: Descriptive

Acholi respondents consistently voiced their concerns of the levels of violence perpetrated by the GoU, NRA/M and UPDF during conflict in northern Uganda. What becomes increasingly apparent in the descriptive statistics, however, is the level to which many accorded the GoU and its implements as the group whose actions far outstretched the operations of the LRA/M. Interestingly, while the LRA/M is still attributed as a cause of violence in northern Uganda, as the following explains, few Acholi, if any, perceive the LRA/M in such a negative light as they do the GoU, NRA/M and UPDF for their actions.

First, sentiments of GoU, NRA/M and UPDF violence can be clearly illustrated by examining the level of local violence that occurred in Acholiland. While 33.3% of respondents noted they had been beaten by the LRA/M and another 36% maimed, the UPDF was still cited to drastically higher numbers.²¹⁴ The UPDF were noted as the perpetrators of beatings for 56.7% of respondents, with a further rather striking 68.7% noting the UPDF had maimed them.²¹⁵ Thus, as the above illustrates, UPDF violence on the community was occurring at a much higher rate than that forwarded by the LRA/M.

²¹⁷ Output, 28–30, 2011. Respondent Perspectives of Political representation, Combatant Reintegration and Worst Influence on Peace Process.

²¹³ Editor, "On Independence," *Red Pepper*, (November, 2010).

²¹⁴ Output, 18 [a & b], 2011. Respondent Exposure to Violence, LRA/M.

This is an interesting find, as the critical literature of Dolan and Finnstrom did illustrate these trends, while the established literature noted essentially the exact opposite

Furthermore, in regard to the issue of displacement, responses from the Acholi sample proved similar to the above. While 54.7% of the sample noted that they believed their displacement was a consequence of LRA/M activity, a drastic 80.7% felt the UPDF had caused their internment into the IDP camps. Therefore, while some notable overlap exists in who respondents believe caused their displacement, it does appear striking that the UPDF would be cited to the levels they had been, particularly in light of some of the established literature, and especially the advocacy based on such, namely that of *Invisible Children, Enough* and so forth.²¹⁶

Likewise, concerning the process of displacement and subsequent fears of the displaced community members, some additional statistics can provide redress. First, of the displaced respondents, 77.3% noted consistent residential damage from the UPDF activities.²¹⁷ These sentiments of being constantly under threat of the UPDF also translated into the perspective of respondents in speaking publicly of such matters. For instance, 76.7% of respondents feared speaking publicly of the UPDF, while 69.4% felt the same of the LRA/M.²¹⁸ Therefore, while these numbers appear relatively close, it is notable that with regard to the LRA/M, respondents overwhelmingly extended their rights to these individuals, felt safe encountering them both in the present and future, while by a large degree wished to see the UPDF and GoU held more accountable for their actions

²¹⁵ Output, 19 [a & b], 2011 Respondent Exposure to Violence, UPDF

²¹⁶ This result was not due to error, only that the same question intentionally appeared on the survey concerning displacement caused by the UPDF and LRA/M

²¹⁷ Output, 19 [c], 2011 Respondent Damage to Residence, UPDF

²¹⁸ Output, 12 – 13 2011 Respondent Perception of Speaking in Public UPDF, LRA/M

during the conflict²¹⁹ Again, as one can find in the more critical literature of Dolan, Finnstrom, Atkinson and Branch, Acholi respondents by and large feel that the real perpetrators of violence in Acholiland should be recognized as those working for, or wearing uniforms provided by, the state Moreover, while established literature will often touch or glance upon these iterations, nothing in the established literature speaks to the level of violence enacted by the government, as the findings herein

Summarizing the Quantitative

The descriptive statistics above provide a suggestion that local perspectives do indeed diverge from the established literature of Gersony, Van Acker and Vinci, while converging more closely to the critical perspectives of Dolan, Atkinson, Finnstrom and Branch Moreover, while these numbers alone cannot sufficiently suggest causation, they do imply that there is more to conflict in northern Uganda concerning political agency and culpability for violence than what the established perspective, recent U S congressional legislation or NGO's such as Invisible Children's 'personality' cult depiction of the LRA/M and Joseph Kony would lead one to believe

As the following qualitative narratives will affirm, the quantitative data is not simply a fortunate error that aids in an unfounded critical argument Rather, it is supportive data lending to the critical argument for more locally engaged perspectives of war in Acholi Therefore, when the quantitative data is linked to the following qualitative narratives, then the critical and local perspectives will converge remarkably, while refuting assumptions in the established literature Thus, what the critical and local narratives truly provide, is a re-politicization of the LRA/M, and ultimately, an emphasis

²¹⁹ Output, 26 [a – d], 2011 Respondent Perspectives of the LRA/M and also Output, 20 – 22, 2011 Respondent Perspectives of the Cause, Accountability and Role of ICC

that the one-sided adage applied to this conflict in terms of violence, is largely unwarranted.

4.3 Qualitative Narratives

What was suggested in the quantitative statistics collected from September through December, 2011, was that the critical approach appears more inline with local perspectives than that of the established literature. However, statistics are simply numbers, providing little more than a single snapshot of the community at a single moment in time, and only a base level understanding into the perspectives of war-affected northern Ugandans. Yet, when these quantitative statistics are triangulated to the following qualitative narratives and earlier critical literature, then the findings clearly emphasize a need for the greater engagement of local and critical perspectives with respect to conflict in northern Uganda.

Political Resistance: in Words

The established argument that the LRA/M “had never been known to have any clear political agenda,”²²⁰ and that their motivations “become more ambiguous,” while, “their crimes more horrific”²²¹ is certainly widespread. Yet, as critical literature argues, this is not entirely true. As Finnstrom noted, the LRA/M certainly supplied political rationale, whether in the form of manifestos, communiqués or radio spots. Indeed, respondents interviewed in northern Uganda often offered perspectives that in many respects, mirrored this argument of critical literature, irrespective if they did not fully agree with the entirety of tactics employed by the LRA/M. In short, both the general leadership (*vis-à-vis* manifestos and communiqués) and war-affected respondents felt that

²²⁰ Quinn, 2009, p. 60.

²²¹ Please see: Invisible Children, 2010.

the LRA/M was a genuine political resistance, even if their tactics may have changed.

First, in looking at the communiqués provided by the LRA/M or collected during fieldwork,²²² the resistance clearly notes numerous political goals for its existence. Additionally, while these manifestos may change subtly depending on whom in the LRA/M has published or presented them in the past, one can still examine a political motivation in their documents. For example, in the recent *Open Communication* intended to reach General Secretary Ban Kim Moon of the UN and a further supplement during the general electoral campaign in February 2011, the LRA/M restated some explicit goals of the resistance, namely; an end to the military regime of Yoweri Museveni, transparent national elections, particular development for northern Uganda, locally recognized reintegration for former combatants, more engaged Acholi inclusion into national politics, and lastly a comprehensive peace settlement that allows for LRA/M leadership to be involved a post-war settlement.²²³

Therefore, how established literature can continue to propagate that the LRA/M - GoU conflict is waged by an aimless resistance is problematic. As it is not only the top leaders of the LRA/M who understand these goals, but in turn, the membership and even the general public of Acholiland. As a result, this is where the critical approach appears stem from, what looks to be a complete lack of recognition of non-state combatants in established literature, in what is argued not only by the resistance, but many of its victims as a very political war.

For instance, in the words of former combatants and often in contrast to

²²² The communiqués come in various forms, some more official appearing than others. Former and current combatants have corroborated the veracity of these documents, and, those individuals involved in the intricate passage of LRA/M leadership perspectives to the outside world.

established literature, leadership of the LRA/M consistently genuine political beliefs and the will to resist, that was to a great degree, the popular will of the Acholi. As one former combatant who had now received amnesty preferred to discuss the political motivations rather than the mythology and fanaticism that surrounds the LRA/M, he noted that the GoU had intentionally attempted to shift many individuals' perspectives of the LRA/M. Yet, irrespective of the attempt to shift perspectives, he continued to note that top leadership consistently cited politics as the main driver in their communications and discussions with the LRA/M rank-and-file. Noting an address to LRA/M membership, the respondent quoted Kony as having stated

He (Museveni) speaks as if we (LRA/M) are common criminals, thieves. He lies about these things. We did not pick the gun and fight only to get some vegetables. We pick the gun to protect ourselves from his NRA, to keep power over our lands, to keep the authority over Acholi. We are not criminals, because criminals do not fight for freedom until after they have been imprisoned.²²⁴

This sentiment was corroborated in a communiqué by leadership of the LRA/M, who argued, very similarly

We fight to regain the wealth of Acholi. The wealth they (NRA/M) stole, and to rebuild what they destroyed and change what they did to make you weak people, where you were once strong.²²⁵

Interestingly, in both of these comments attributed to Joseph Kony, issues of land, authority and external imposition against the Acholi are recurrent. Equally interesting, however, is how these themes were also present and prevalent in the comments of

²²³ LRA/M, *Open Letter to Ban Kim Moon*, Gulu District, (September 6th, 2010). Copy retained by author and LRA/M, *Communication to the People of Uganda During the 2011 Presidential and General Elections*. Gulu District, (February 4th, 2011). Copy retained by author.

²²⁴ Joseph Kony. Quoted: D Okello, [a], 2010.

²²⁵ LRA/M Peace Team Correspondence [a], Gulu District, (2010). Copy retained by author.

respondents concerning the reasons for resistance in northern Uganda ²²⁶ For example, as another former combatant noted

The rebels had support from the community because they knew it was Karamoja who stole our cattle. The government sent them here to do stealing. Then the government wanted to keep us in camps to take our land, because before we had guns and authority ²²⁷

Likewise, a displaced farmer also noted that the conflict was very political in nature, as land regulation in the north, social cohesion, compensation and norms of the community were all, very political aspects of life ²²⁸ He noted that the issues of land rights and compensation were regulated by community-based means, and that this could not exist under the pending rule of the NRA/M as the Bush War started ²²⁹ Therefore, he noted that many resisted out of fear that their political life (e.g., economics, means of production, social norms) would be shaped by external, and often hostile characters

We lost a lot when this thing (bush war) happened. The small fighting became large, and our land contested and our clans then question how we would now be governed – as before with Obote, we still had power to control the land, the farming in Acholi. But with Museveni and the things he say, using the Karamoja to take all our cattle. They (LRA/M and HSM) fought because they knew the NRA wanted us to lose this control and wealth. They (LRA/M and HSM) said no, we need to fight because this Museveni government is not just ²³⁰

What may be most interesting in the recurrence of a narrative of political motivation for the LRA/M and other northern Ugandan resistances, is that it was forwarded from nearly every respondent questioned during fieldwork. And, while the question of spirituality for the resistance will be discussed in the following section, it

²²⁶ The respondents consistently spoke about the wealth in land, non-cash based economy, bountiful land and subsequent theft of their livelihoods by the NRA and later Museveni regime. Acholi Local Elder, [a], 2010, D. Okello, [b], 2010 and J. Akallo, 2010

²²⁷ J. Ocan, 2010

²²⁸ Komakech, 2010

²²⁹ Komakech noted, "Museveni needed support to win his war against us, so we know he had external interests involved to help him – this means that he had an idea of what to do with our land, with our wealth." Ibid, 2010

must be recognized that even rudimentary political concerns (e.g. corruption in IDP camps) were widespread during the conflict, and remain to this day²³¹

For instance, even in the more extreme comments provided by respondents, arguments consistently centered on Museveni's political goals for the north, and the very political resistance by the Acholi to these aims. Thus, whether coming from political opposition members, displaced persons or urban members of Gulu district who escaped the war, the following is a consistent refrain concerning a very political war

You know it was even before the LRA that Museveni's NRA came here with the *panda garis* (get on the lorry), sticking us into camps, leaving us to die. They couldn't win a war against the Acholi outright, so instead he brought Karamoja to steal cattle, then he caged us in camps, where he kept us to steal our land²³⁷

As a result, a common narrative in northern Uganda is one which recognizes a political motive for the actions and resistance of the LRA/M. Likewise, if this political resistance was not only to "protect us from Museveni's greed,"²³³ "take back our land, and our wealth from the NRA,"²³⁴ or "see an end to these fake elections, the marginalization of freedom, and start something that we all can be proud of,"²³⁵ then the more nuanced iterations of international interference, geostrategic interests and claims of a neo-colonial African leader arose both in depth, and frequency²³⁶. To this effect, a fairly current communiqué from the LRA/M affirmed their previous assertions, the perspectives of critical literature and local narratives of war-affected Acholi. Here, a member of the LRA/M peace team notes

²³⁰ Ibid, 2010

²³¹ See LRA/M Communiques 2010 and 2011

²³² Ibid, 2010

²³³ R Okena, 2010

²³⁴ O Okulu, 2010

²³⁵ J Nurse, 2010

²³⁶ LRA/M, *War Calls*, Communiques, Gulu District, 2010, Copy retained by author

The particularly cruel hegemonic ethnic apartheid-type rule imposed on Uganda by a regime that was instituted at the advent of the National Resistance Army to power in Uganda in 1986, deliberately victimized, marginalized and dispossessed the peoples of this part of the country, which is sometimes referred to as the political north, but more commonly in the media lingua as 'northern' Uganda. Oppressive inhuman treatment and abuse was the trigger of the popular and community self defense activities in northern and many other areas of Uganda where the regime victimized our African people, their communities and nations. The LRA is merely a product of the inimical sectionalist and cruel subjection of the peoples, nations and communities of 'northern' and other parts of Uganda to the gross abuses and brutalities of the NRA regime²³⁷

Divergence and Convergence Politics

In contrast to established claims of an apolitical conflict being perpetrated by an apolitical resistance, Finnstrom argues in his work, *Living with Bad Surroundings*, that a necessary re-politicization of the LRA/M - GoU conflict must occur, not only to provide a solution to future conflict, but to simply understand the past 25 years in Acholiland. In this regard, narratives of local war-affected Acholi only went to corroborate the assertion of Finnstrom, and perhaps more importantly, illustrate an extreme divergence to the popular conceptualizations of the LRA/M in established literature. For local respondents, this appears to cause worrying prospects, particularly with regard to the way established perspectives have influenced and shaped both policymaking and advocacy, often in manners of detriment to the prospect of peace and durable solution.

Where established literature argued that the LRA/M is an incomprehensible resistance with an apolitical vagueness based on barbarism or irrationality, both quantitative and qualitative narratives digress. In this regard, statistics emphasized that respondents overwhelmingly noted that the root causes of the conflict, were, indeed political. Moreover, respondents noted that the GoU and then LRA/M were most accountable for the conflict, therefore, by the sheer admission of the LRA/M being a part

²³⁷ Ibid 2010

of a conflict that involves a political actor, a good degree of conclusion on the political nature of the conflict can be made. However, beyond accountability, political preferences and belief of the root cause of conflict, qualitative narratives particularly emphasized the degree to which local Acholi attribute a political nature to the LRA/M, an argument hallmarking the critical, rather than established literature.

Whether in official manifestos or communiqués procured during fieldwork, or in the deeper narratives of respondents, the LRA/M was unanimously afforded political status. For instance, respondents recurrently noted socioeconomic, ethnic, territorial and strategic aspects of the conflict to which the LRA/M contest the GoU. Thus, while established literature continues to argue of ambiguity and aimlessness, respondents noted a political motivation, irrespective of their potential disdain for the manner to which the resistance operates. Likewise, while few in established literature acknowledge the dissemination of ideology by the LRA/M into the Acholi community, the ability to procure such documents from the community and the LRA/M themselves, is relatively easy. Incidentally, while this directly diverges from established perspective of an aimless resistance, it does also imply a level of local support for the resistance, even if only done with a tacit, and very guarded promotion of LRA/M ideas and documents. Nevertheless, while established perspectives and policymaking have preferred an illustration of a depoliticized entity, both critical literature and the overwhelming majority of the community argue this is indeed, far from the reality in Acholiland.

Religion as a Guide, not Governance

As with the political motivations of the LRA/M, the established perspective for the role of spirituality in the resistance has been increasingly questioned by critical literature. In this respect, the critical literature appears correct to do such, particularly

when the established perspectives of the LRA/M's goal of the Ten Commandments and religious fanaticism are contrasted to local narratives of both combatants and those affected by the war. As the following illustrates, aside from making a sensationalized conflict, the established perspective of fundamental Christianity really provides little substance in explaining the role of spirituality in the Acholi resistance.

First, turning again to official communiqués and manifestos of the LRA/M, the role of religion while important, is not as all encompassing as purported in established literature. By looking at the insignia of the LRA/M, one can quickly discern that while the Ten Commandment tablets appear a prominent symbol, so do the Islamist crescent moon, a heart and the national symbol for Uganda, a crane (See: Figure 1).

Figure 1. Lord's Resistance Army/Movement Insignia



More tellingly, however, is that no symbol is more prominent than another, potentially explaining the accommodation the LRA/M makes for numerous forms of religion within its ranks. Interestingly, respondents corroborated the illustration of the LRA/M insignia, arguing that the belief system provided direction and discipline, but never an impetus to create a theocratic state as presumed in the established portrayals of the LRA/M.²³⁸

²³⁸ "I know from these people who do research here, they seem not to listen well ... we told them that Kony never wanted to install God as the government of Uganda, how can that be? He has Muslim, and *Ajwaka* in his forces. How can he then disregard those people who supported him when he wins the war? He cannot." R. Okena, 2010.

As a former combatant in Sima Brigade illustrated, the spirituality of the conflict does indeed carry a local logic and cultural importance, but not fundamentalist intent. He was a practicing Muslim whose parents were killed during screening exercises at the notorious Pece Stadium in Gulu, which now hosts a war memorial. As he argued

I am a Muslim. I fought since age 9. Never once did I have trouble for being this way (Muslim) in with the rebels. The teacher (Kony) let us follow our own religion, we needed to recognize the spirits, yes, but you learn this growing up in Acholi. As long as we remained to fight to remove Museveni, we could stay however we were.²³⁹

What is interesting in this comment is that it characterizes a good number of former (and current) combatants who are neither fundamentalist Christians, nor Muslims. As the respondent noted, he straddled a line between being a practicing Muslim and believer in local Acholi spirituality that hallmarks the LRA/M according to critical literature. Essentially, for these combatants their commonality was spirituality, but neither a singular sensationalized nor fundamentalist one. As a result, the tie that truly bound these respondents was the aim to remove the NRA/M government, not a fundamentalist installation of arcane law.²⁴⁰

Many respondents noted an inclusive nature of LRA/M spirituality, and while they indeed did adhere to their own individual religious inclinations, it appears that combatants also recognized the Acholi spirituality or cosmological aspects such as *Jogi* and *Tipu* in preeminence. As a longstanding bodyguard in the LRA/M noted, spirituality was omnipresent in the resistance, yet it carried a definite logic, as the safety of the forces, purity and ability to sustain were all part of their spiritual world.

The teacher (Kony) used spirits — or maybe they would use him, but they helped us win

²³⁹ K. Abim, 2010

²⁴⁰ “I didn’t take this thing as jihad, because Kony told us we weren’t fighting a Holy War. We fought to free the Acholi, that includes the Christians, Muslims, Protestants and others. We observed all faiths” K. Abim, 2010

many times against the NRA and even against those bow and arrow (LDUs) These spirits could give us intelligence or where they would attack from, how many troops, with how many guns or the spirits could help controllers open a way into the gun fight, and then close our exit from the enemy the spirits and the teacher saved us many times²⁴¹

Far from the fundamentalist assertions of Vinci, Van Acker and Johnson, this respondent's perspective falls more in line with the critical approach of Finnstrom, Atkinson and Dolan. What may be most notable in this respect, is this theme of spirituality existed in the remarks of nearly every respondent, whether discussing the conflict, or the bumper harvest of cassava they wished for this season.

In short, respondents spoke of spirituality with regard to their Acholi cosmology, or rather their Christian or Muslim preferences of faith. However, rather than illustrating a fundamental aim of the resistance, narratives articulate how spirituality is for many, a means of keeping loyal to their community, to the resistance (if involved), and most importantly, to themselves. While not all respondents were Christians, Muslims or something in between, they did in near unanimity speak of religion and spirituality in Acholiland as something that simply *is*, not something that is used as a means to an end. To this effect, the following summarizes a common theme in Acholiland, and, while the response comes from a former combatant, it does illustrate a popular Acholi sentiment concerning LRA/M spirituality.

The reason the rebels took the name they did, was only because of the support they get from the spirits. Now these spirits for some were *Tipu*, others it was Christ, but even Muslims were welcome in the resistance. The rebels never said they were coming to bring the commandments of God or Moses. They were giving respect to the spirits that protected them, the spirits that already existed and were respected in the same way in Acholi. So Kony is not the voice of God. He was just a young man who wanted to fight for his Acholi community, and used what was already respected to do so.²⁴²

²⁴¹ J. Akena 2010

²⁴² J. Akena 2010

Divergence and Convergence: Religion

As established literature argues, the LRA/M is a “barbaric and insane cult,”²⁴³ one that has “a desire to install the Christian Ten Commandments as the rule of law in Uganda.”²⁴⁴ Yet, this should not and cannot be truly argued as a conclusive assessment, particularly in light of the contestation by critical literature to this claim, and more poignantly, local Acholi arguments of spirituality as a guide for resistance, one that allows the observance of many divergent spiritual beliefs and practices. Therefore, while those arguing of a religious or apolitical nature of the LRA/M split established literature, it appears that the former who argue of Christian fundamentalism have clearly missed, or ignored iterations of LRA/M leadership, membership and wider war-affected community.

Nevertheless, as Vinci, Van Acker and Johnson illustrate, established perspectives of a fundamentalist Christian madman still permeate much of the analysis of conflict in northern Uganda. To this effect, Finnstrom, Dolan and Branch argue to the contrary, and in many respects, are fully supported by local narratives of Acholi who were the subject of fieldwork. Whether in corroborating Finnstrom’s assertions on Acholi cosmology, or Dolan’s perspective of the multi-faceted employ of spirituality, respondents perpetuated a spiritual image of the resistance that was neither fundamentalist, nor entirely driven by one specific belief system. Therefore, while it may be contextually difficult to understand such a resistance, local narratives truly do emphasize that rather than aiming to “replace the government with one based on the Ten Commandments,”²⁴⁵ the LRA/M is instead, simply thanking and “giving respect to the spirits that protected them.”²⁴⁶

²⁴³ Allen, 2006, p. 25.

²⁴⁴ Dunn, 2004, p. 208.

²⁴⁵ Feldman, 2008, p. 45.

²⁴⁶ J. Akena, 2010.

Ugandan State and UPDF Social Violence in Acholi

If established perspectives of the conflict in northern Uganda speak predominantly of LRA/M transgressions, local narratives overwhelmingly support the critical perspective that contest these assertions, potentially going beyond even the implications offered by Finnstrom, Dolan and Atkinson. Yet, this is not to imply that local narratives are devoid of the LRA/M being identifying as perpetrators of social violence in Acholi. Only that in opposition to established perspectives, the local narrative is far more inclusive of not only the historical transgression of the NRA/M or UPDF, but the very current depredations that are occurring in Acholiland.

To understand what the local community feels about the LRA/M, one needs to reconcile that for a good portion of the conflict, members of the Acholi community rather regarded the LRA/M in a positive light. Yet, as the dynamics of conflict shifted, and the local community became coerced into LDUs, the target of a once popular resistance turned inwards. As a result, while the community still understands the political motivation of the LRA/M, the tactics of such resistance may never be fully understood. To this effect, the following three iterations can aptly emphasize the dichotomous perspective in the local community with regard to the LRA/M. First, during the early part of war, local support implies a theme of David-versus-Goliath. As one respondent notes:

Kony's men would win some battles against the NRA, my uncle was part of this group, it was amazing. We provided them food and water when they came into the camps. With small guns, Kony's men used support for spirits and could defeat NRA *Mambos* and *Buffaloes* (APCs and Tanks).²⁴⁷

Next, a potential member discusses his intent to join the LRA/M ranks, then noting a shift in the dynamics of LRA/M - GoU conflict.

²⁴⁷ Focus Group, [1], 2010.

Kony came here once when I was a boy. He said I couldn't join, I was too young, even when I wanted I wasn't allowed, not until I aged. By the time he came again, Museveni created LDUs to fight the LRA. Kony's men were attacked. When the LRA came the third time, it was not to ask for help with food, it was to kill.²⁴⁸

Lastly, a respondent illustrated how fighting for the resistance had become a decision that neither he nor his friends could make.

Before the atrocity, before the abduction, before the killing of civilians, that (potential LRA/M membership) would be an easy question to answer, because back then Ciling, Lakwena and even Kony were fighters for the community and its people, they fought for the Acholi and north as a community.²⁴⁹

As a result, what may be most important to note in this regard is that while the community does show an understanding of resistance, it is tempered with the consideration of LRA/M transgressions. However, one can seldom find this in established literature, where these realities are quickly lost in the fixations and allegations of atrocity during a war to which the UPDF, NRA/M and GoU appear exempt.

Yet, the NRA/M, UPDF and GoU are not exempt, at least not in the local or critical perspectives. With this in mind, it is important to note, that respondents didn't speak of the NRA/M or national military in any ambiguous terms. Instead, the level of clarity and harrowing stories provided, truly do beg the question, why (save for the involvement in critical literature) are these stories excluded from the broader discussion on northern Uganda? As the following illustrate in explicit detail, the local community consistently regards the GoU, NRA/M and UPDF, indeed, as those who should be regarded the same (if not worse) than the LRA/M rebels.

While iterations in established literature from Vinci, Gersony and Johnson often argue that the LRA/M has waged a 'brutal' war that 'forced' the local community into

²⁴⁸ D. Okello, [b], 2010

²⁴⁹ D. Okello, [b], 2010

camps, the local perspective diverges noticeably. For instance, in regard to the situations of camps, while established literature to some extent acknowledged that the GoU created the IDP camps and then displaced persons to such, it truly does fail to reconcile to what accord and what gravity the local community perceives such actions by the NRA/M, UPDF and GoU. As one very experienced formerly displaced notes:

These things like camps, *tek gungu, panda garis*. They didn't happen because there was a small threat from the north. They (NRA/M) knew of our land, they knew of our support to keep it our own, they knew we would fight for it. This is why they use much force, not to just end UNLA, it was to end all Acholi.²⁵⁰

What this respondent notes touches on several themes that other respondents consistently regarded as the NRA/M use of social violence, exploitation, humiliation as a means to eventually provide a pacification, or rather, an ethnic cleansing of northern Uganda. Consequently, these themes do illustrate that the local community perceive the NRA/M as a virulent force, one not only attacking the Acholi physically, but also psychosocially, materially and culturally. To this effect, the following narratives illustrate these perceptions and experiences:

First, a respondent characterizes the predominant displaced perspective of the UPDF and NRA/M activity in northern Uganda, particularly during Operation North:

The NRA/M was slaughtering Acholi, doing mutilation, burning huts and raping women. Why then would I fight the people (LRA/M) who were fighting the government that came to create hell here?²⁵¹

Another respondent on the topic of violence directed at the community, added:

It didn't matter if you were UPDA, HSM or LRA. Everyone here knew what Museveni was doing. People talk. And when family members are being killed at Pece, or in Acet, when someone's sister or father is raped in front of their family, these things are spoken of, because we needed to know what was happening here. We know that the NRA was

²⁵⁰ G. Okello, 2010

²⁵¹ J. Okena, 2010

doing this to get us (Acholi), and the camp was the proof. The camp was where you put Acholi to die. Why else do you rape people and not kill them? Is it so they have to live with it? Why do you burn people alive in their own home? Is it so other Acholi know what is to come?²⁵²

If confinement and torture of Acholi by the GoU were common iterations, so too were the more horrible activities conducted by the GoU during the occupation of Gulu, as noted

I don't know about the lips being cut off by Kony, it could have been anyone. What I know is that the NRA made sure to have men come and f---k us like women right in front of my wife, my children. Now I am HIV. This was done several times. These men (UPDF) have all got fancy cars now, I know some of them have HIV, but they gave it to me knowing that we would be nothing anymore. I still remember the screams. After a few days people like me learned to stop screaming, it was only the new people being brought to Pece that would scream. Whenever the *panda garis* comes, they empty the bodies, and treat the ones that were still alive like meat.²⁵³

The horrific act being discussed here was a common occurrence, although seldom spoken of in a public setting. However, respondent after respondent nonetheless confirmed, that a group of NRA/M and then UPDF soldiers actively used male-to-male rape as part of their screening exercises in Acholiland. This is something few even in the critical literature have dared to explore as the concerns of investigating the 118 Battalion or *tek gungu* comes with warnings, such as the following respondent's iteration

If you keep looking, they will start looking for you. Do you really think a posh commander in the UPDF now wants his friends to know he slept with men, that he has Aids? even the men who were raped are ashamed, I think most would act violent if they were questioned about those days. really, they were f--ked as women in a moment so how could you blame how they are. but keep looking maybe don't quit looking for those stories, because I know from being at Pece that those stories happened more than you want to know.²⁵⁴

Interestingly, these respondent iterations of the GoU in many respects, mirror the exclusive established depictions of the LRA/M. As a result, it becomes less surprising

²⁵² J. Okello, 2010

²⁵³ P. Komakech, 2010

²⁵⁴ P. Komakech, 2010

that many respondents now question the massacres to which the LRA/M have been accused of. Hence, while the LRA/M according to established literature is most notorious for executions, burning huts and mutilations, respondents often spoke of a *105 Battalion* that was supposedly created by the GoU to perpetrate false LRA/M crimes in the aim of building ICC charges.²⁵⁵ While difficult to verify, many are convinced the *105* is a GoU creation, and thus, just another example of the NRA/M perpetration of violence which far exceeds that of the alleged crimes of the LRA/M and its leader, Joseph Kony.

I have heard things which worry me about these ICC charges. Many of those crimes by Kony and his generals where the warrants come from, it is difficult to know if it was LRA for definite. The *105* is very secretive and has many former Acholi resistance that do not like Kony at all. Many people where these massacres take place do not even know for certain. As I know it, my friends who were there, say the things said at Barlyono are very different from the usual activities of the LRA. Many think it was *105* or a type of ghost that the Uganda military uses. So if Kony was not involved, how are we charging him with 300 murders that he did not do – even still, we know 1,000s who died in every district, in every camp, girls raped when fetching water by UPDF man, so I think the ICC knows they only charge the Acholi crimes.²⁵⁶

As the *105 Battalion* provides a mysterious and difficult story to verify, the same cannot be said of the GoU use of children to combat the LRA/M. In this regard, respondents in near unanimity questioned the argument of holding the LRA/M accountable for such practices, while the GoU is employed the exact same means.

I do not know how thing can be so confusing. Museveni says the LRA is abducting our children. But his (Museveni) army forced our children to be like bow and arrow (LDUs). It is not that our boys ask to be fighting Kony, but Museveni forces them. You could see children of 10, carrying weapons waiting for some relative in the LRA to come looking for food, then either the boy shoots LRA or gets shot by the UPDF. To me, how this works is good for Museveni. He has our daughters raped, elders die in camps and our

²⁵⁵ Good information on the *105 Battalion* is difficult to come across. In the local community it is spoken of in a mythological manner. In official documents or in academia, little, if any, solid intelligence surrounds this group. See Jenny Booth, 'Deaths in Boxing Day machete massacre in Congo 'top 100'', *the Times online*, (December 29, 2008), retrieved web link, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/africa/article5413229.ece> (July 26, 2011) and AFDEV, retrieved web link, http://www.afdevinfo.com/htmlreports/org/org_54018.html, July, 26, 2011.

²⁵⁶ Focus Group, [2], 2010.

young boys to kill each other. He would get us all gone.²⁵⁷

Consequently, whether it was murder, rape, torture, anti-subversive activities, displacement or theft of livelihoods, respondents in northern Uganda truly did perceive the NRA/M, UPDF and GoU as their greatest enemy during the course of war. This is a salient finding, particularly in light of the renewed military action and ICC charges based on warrants that have no mandate to explore the crimes to which most respondents note. As a result, for many, it appears a double standard has occurred concerning Acholi resistance, based on policy, which was in turn, educated by established literature.

Divergence and Convergence: Violence

The most contentious issue for those in Acholiland was the levels of social violence that had been inflicted upon at the local community by the LRA/M, UPDF, GoU and NRA/M. This is an important feature of the thesis, as with the portrayal of political motivation for the LRA/M, it appears the established perspectives fails to fully account for local perspectives, ultimately influencing an incomplete interpretation of the conflict.

Taking the established perspective of the conflict in Acholiland, and its consistent emphasis on the alleged mutilation, atrocity and forced conscription conducted by the LRA/M into account; numerous attempts at policy, military intervention and even ICC involvement in Acholiland reflect such established notions. However, just as critical literature evidenced that established literature and subsequent policymaking appears to either ignore or operate in ignorance of violence perpetrated by the UPDF, GoU and NRA/M, local narratives strongly asserted that engagement of the local experience of state violence is increasingly required.

Concerning the quantitative statistics, striking illustrations of state violence during

²⁵³ M. Okot, 2010.

the LRA/M – GoU conflict were found. Whether in regard to the high numbers of UPDF beatings and maiming of the local community, or in the manner to which such a drastic number of Acholi noted UPDF constraints upon socioeconomic activity, the state was consistently argued as the provider of social violence *primus inter pares*. Likewise, had the emphasis of these abhorrent acts against the community not been sufficient to indicate that an incorrect one-sided account of conflict was occurring in established literature, then the manner to which the respondents noted a fear of the UPDF and their accountability for conflict, should have consolidated the validity of a more critical approach to the conflict.

With respect to the qualitative narratives, the story was much the same. Respondents consistently provided narratives that bolster the critical arguments of Dolan, Atkinson and Finnstrom, while casting contention towards the established, and perhaps largely one-sided accounts of Johnson, Vinci and Gersony. Moreover, the levels of violence in the conduct of UPDF and NRA/M activities should be recognized as not merely instruments of anti-subversion, but also aspects of the conflict that in many instances, consolidated local Acholi support for resistance, while also creating a climate of fear and persecution.

In short, the qualitative narratives outlined the persecution, acts of atrocity and constraint placed upon the local Acholi community, which for the most part, had been previously attributed by established literature to the LRA/M exclusively. Therefore, while established perspective holds a one-sided, largely apolitical view of the LRA/M – GoU conflict, fieldwork findings provided a depth of contention to such assertions, while converging to the emerging critical literature.

4.4 Summary of Findings

When one examines local narratives in isolation, they often appear as striking stories, fantastic in detail and difficult for comprehension. Yet, when teamed with the quantitative narratives of earlier, the themes become more comprehensible, and potentially, ever more problematic for the current established understanding of the conflict. For instance, the culpability for violence that has exclusively been tied to the LRA/M by established literature, was in the quantitative and qualitative findings, attributed in a much greater degree to the GoU and its military apparatuses.

Likewise, with political motivation, although authors such as Gersony, Van Acker and Johnson all perpetuate a belief in the apolitical nature of the LRA/M, respondent narratives and quantitative data provide a more political, and logical reason for the LRA/M resistance. Whether emphasizing marginalization due to theft of land and cattle, repression in an under-representative political system, or the grand goals of pan-African reclamation of society in LRA/M manifestos, in contrary fashion to assertions of barbarism and irrationality, the LRA/M was overwhelmingly viewed as a political response to the historic and modern political, social and economic structures in Uganda.

With respect to the fundamentalist aims of the LRA/M, this thematic assumption appears ignorant of the cosmology of the Acholi, and the rather banal role of religion for the community. Far from the portrayals of a theocratic LRA/M-run state, both critical literature and the local narratives have provided a much more reconcilable, and even, understandable placement for spirituality within the LRA/M. Therefore, by reviewing fieldwork findings in comparison to the critical and established literature, this thesis can suggestively note that the local perspective duly supports the critical approach, to a far greater degree than the policy-influencing established perspective.

5.1 Summary of Main Findings

For 25 years of protracted conflict, northern Uganda has increasingly fallen under the lens of conflict management literature that aims to understand and stem the longstanding and often gruesome conflict. However, in academic, policy and NGO advocacy depictions of war in Acholiland, a phenomenon identified by Brenneis in his work on Fijian Indian communities appears both present and prevalent in the discussion of northern Uganda. By reviewing literature that focuses on the LRA/M – GoU conflict, clearly an authoritative, or rather, an established perspective of the LRA/M – GoU conflict has become *primus inter pares* in academic, policy and advocacy considerations of war and displacement in Acholiland. Yet, this authoritative narrative is not without critique, and as the focus on war in Acholiland has increased in conflict management literature, so too have the critiques of this authoritative or established literature, and its central thematic assumptions regarding the conflict.

This thesis sought to explore the growing tensions between both the established literature and critical approaches to conflict in northern Uganda, with particular emphasis on the motivations for the LRA/M and the depictions of violence inflicted upon the local Acholi community. More specifically, this thesis aimed at illustrating how local narratives of war-affected Acholi converge with the emerging critical approach, while increasingly deviating from the more policy influential established perspective.

To achieve these above objectives, this thesis began its exploration of the combative discussion on LRA/M – GoU conflict, by isolating an established and critical body of work in accordance to predominant central assumptions, thematic aspects and characterizations that hallmark particular scholarship on the conflict. Next, in conducting

an in-depth review of literature that focuses on the conflict and history of northern Uganda, this thesis first provided a brief contextual understanding of the history of the Acholi, and then more particularly, an exploration of the increasingly debated period of conflict from 1986 through to the present day. Then, by interrogating the established and critical bodies of literature, this thesis isolated two important points of contention and divergence with regard to the conflict, namely the LRA/M's potential motivations and the depictions of violence inflicted upon the war-affected community. Finally, this thesis presented an analysis of the collected fieldwork findings from northern Uganda, to support and refute each body of literature in accordance to local narratives and descriptive statistics.

The research findings of this thesis are certainly important considerations. For instance, as critical literature increasingly argues that conflict in Acholiland has been largely misread, or misinterpreted in established literature, local narratives overwhelmingly supported these critical assertions (whether in descriptive statistics that illuminate the levels of violence inflicted upon the Acholi by the GoU, or in narratives that highlight a political and non-fundamentalist rationale to resistance in Acholiland). Consequently, the research findings suggest that problematic aspects of the conflict exist not only in recent failed military operations or international and national policymaking concerning the LRA/M, but also in the very rudimentary understanding of crucial aspects of the conflict to which these military campaigns and policy are founded.

In short, this thesis illustrates that indeed a great deal of divergence with respect to the critical and established perspectives of LRA/M – GoU conflict exists. Yet, more importantly, the thesis emphasizes a great deal of convergence between the critical approaches to the LRA/M – GoU conflict, and, narratives and perspectives provided by

the local war-affected community. These are important considerations, as the critical and local narratives have been far less influential on policymaking than the more widely utilized established, albeit, misinformed perspective. Finally, beyond illustrating a divergence between the critical and established literature, or the established literature and local perspectives, this thesis suggests that there is indeed a need for research, advocacy and policy to increase its local engagement in the aim of ending conflict. For as it stands now, with the recent independence in South Sudan and the recurrent fear of future SPLA – LRA/M, or, Gou – LRA/M hostilities, the argument of peace existing in Acholiland appear wholly premature.²⁵⁸

5.2 Research Implications

Returning to the phenomenon of an ‘authoritative’ narrative noted by Brenneis, the research implications from this thesis are grave. For with the emergence of critical literature on conflict in northern Uganda, previously established research now in many respects appears to have haphazardly pieced together the LRA/M – GoU conflict, irrespective of the consequences. Moreover, as research in complex humanitarian situations ostensibly strives to consider a dual imperative,²⁵⁹ this responsibility appears largely neglected with regard to the war-affected Acholi. With established literature relying upon a largely state-centric and one-sided account of the conflict, the more nuanced understanding of the conflict that critical and local perspectives suggest is necessary, has been absent until only recently.

Consequently, with regard to research, the implications of this thesis are twofold. First, established literature on northern Uganda clearly appears to miss a large and more

²⁵⁸ See Francis Emorut, “EU envoy hails govt [sic] on peace in northern Uganda,” *New Vision*, (January 9, 2011), retrieved web link, <http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/13/743334>, (July, 26, 2011)

locally engaged aspect of the conflict. Therefore, particularly in light of the aim of providing sound research, it is of the utmost importance to provide an impartial, and thus truly ‘authoritative’ assessment and explanation of conflict. This appears neglected in regard to the LRA/M – GoU war, although, the reasons for this neglect over the course of a 25 year war appear as obfuscated as the established perspective of LRA/M goals, political ideology or the social violence inflicted upon Acholiland.

Secondly, critical literature emphasized that one-sided accounts of conflict are ultimately, insufficient. To this effect, rather than being embraced by the wider literature in conflict studies with particular regard to northern Uganda, a growing trend in research is to imply that critical academics are ‘sympathizers’ or even collaborators to the LRA/M.²⁶⁰ Important to note in this regard is that in addition to discounting a perspective that may offer a deeper means to reconcile conflict in Acholiland, making claims that neutral and critical academics may be subversive elements is dangerous. After all, research in Uganda is not an apolitical undertaking, and the GoU can act aggressively to dissenting viewpoints. An aspect of research not lost during the course of this thesis, as a UPDF 4th division representative noted when confronting me

I don’t know why you are even allowed to conduct these questions. You should move on. This war here was won by us (UPDF) a long time ago. You stir up things that should not be. It could be bad for you to keep driving at these things. Many things happened in the war, but why do you come from Canada to look into this. It is not for you to know. You should leave this, because what you are doing is not our interest, it is your own.²⁶¹

As truth in situations of complex and protracted conflict is already incredibly difficult to bring to light, it appears that more support in research for critical approaches are

²⁵⁹ Jacobsen and Landau 2003

warranted. After all, had Finnstrom, Dolan and Atkinson ever received a serious enough encounter with the UPDF or GoU, then it is very likely their contribution to a more informed understanding of the conflict would be lost, something denigrating to not only academia, but the myriad of diverse communities it attempts to serve.

5.3 Policy Implications

On September 24, 2010, the US government launched what could be argued as the most intensive policymaking document concerning conflict in northern Uganda since the unsealed ICC warrants were first drafted in 2003. However, what was heralded as an unprecedented and necessary step towards ending LRA/M impunity and its enslavement of child soldiers in northern Uganda, now appears as little more than another one-sided document, existing in a similar vein to that of the ICC warrants created by lead prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo.

Yet, as fieldwork findings and emerging critical literature on conflict in northern Uganda argue, there is far more to the conflict than LRA/M brutality and aimlessness. Instead, and quite contrary to the policymaking belief that LRA/M impunity should be the primary goal of policymaking, critical and local perspectives offer that a far greater reconciliation of the conflict is necessary. Not only to deal with crimes of the LRA/M, but also those of the GoU and its agents. Moreover, it appears that without local engagement, a misguided and locally unsupported understanding and mandate will continue in policymaking concerned with ending the LRA/M – GoU conflict.

Just as Finnstrom and Dolan assert that UPDF and NRA/M crimes need to be

²⁶⁰ Dean, 2009 and also, UNHCR, retrieved web link <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/topic,4565c2254a,465459f42,4a1beb240,0.html>, (July, 26, 2011). Additionally, see Dolan, 2009 for the discussion of computer tapering and researcher safety concerns in Uganda.

²⁶¹ UPDF, 4th Division Staff Sergeant, Gulu District, 2011.

considered, local narratives in this thesis emphasize that the current policymaking of retributive justice and military solutions influenced by established perspectives are useless in the views of the majority of war-affected Acholi. As this thesis and the narratives it examines illustrate, a more nuanced understanding of the conflict, a more forgiving disposition of justice, and ultimately, a very real necessity of policymaking that attempts reconciling with just how divergent local and established perspectives of the conflict truly are, is imperative. Thus, the implications of this thesis with regard to policymaking also appear grave.

While the thesis could only explore two aspects of the conflict in any amount of depth, they are only two of the numerous contentious points of the conflict. Local Acholi overwhelmingly feel aggrieved not only by the misinterpretations of motivation for the LRA/M, or state violence inflicted during conflict, but also by the failed attempts at conflict mitigation, the issue of displacement, and the overbearing role of international, rather than local solutions to the conflict.

As a result, while this thesis cannot conclusively list the exact measures that should be enacted to end conflict and provide durable solutions in an effective manner, this thesis can suggest that the policy and advocacy influencing established literature has guided conflict management in a manner to which the local community appears either ignored or mistaken. Moreover, as is clearly evident by the divergence between critical and local perspectives and established literature on the conflict, any further policymaking with regard to the LRA/M – GoU conflict requires far more local engagement if it holds the interest of both the local Acholi, and ‘authoritative’ durable solutions in mind.

5.4 Ugandan Implications

As emphasized in the case study, Uganda has certainly weathered a history of

political, social and economic violence. Whether during the pre-colonial period of conquest, the scramble by different self-interested actors prior to colonialism, the British experiment which debilitated Uganda, to the cycles of coup d'état, the modern Bush War and then subsequent displacement of millions who lived in the economically depraved, socially marginalized and politically repressed north, solutions to problems appear elusive. However, rather than simply attempting to move forward without providing closure, it may actually be time to look back into history in the aim of garnering a path for the future.

Atrocity, torture and longstanding ethnic, regional and political wars have left scars in Uganda that will not simply heal in short spans of time; nor will there be healing through the grace of reconstruction funding bestowed upon a region that truly is still in a state of war. Therefore, the largest and single most important implication from this research for Uganda is one that undoubtedly creates a myriad of other secondary and incredibly complex implications. Nevertheless, after having researched and lived in northern Uganda and the southern regions for numerous periods during both hostilities and peace, a change in direction appears necessary.

From the research findings it indeed appears that Uganda needs a socio-political solution to a sociopolitical conflict, particularly as Kony still appears interested in shaping Ugandan politics, to which Museveni continually tightens his grip. As a result, military solution to the LRA/M – GoU conflict appears simply as another means of creating even deeper scars that potentially could result in another conflict even worse than the current. In this respect, the single implication this thesis will provide for Uganda is the absolute necessity to attempt by all means, a mediated and non-surrender based peace process. After 25 years the military solution, ICC warrants and one-sided peace

talks have yielded no gains. Therefore, with insecurity, poverty and the potential for hostilities still existing in Acholi, it appears only a process, which looks to uncover the truth, acknowledge the past and build for the future, can provide any modicum of peace.

As one respondent noted:

The Juba talks were slanted for the government ... but even those talks gave 2 years of peace. What has Operation Lightning Thunder, Operation Iron Fist or Operation North provided? Dead Ugandans.²⁶²

5.5 Closing Remarks

A war that began on the back of a cycle of coup d'état and consistent political violence has, for the time quieted. Yet, while the world looks to the South Sudan for inspiration, it appears that many are forgetting that the scars of war on the local Acholi community are far from healed. The research herein reflects this, although, due to the previous reactions of some within broader literature, the findings of this thesis could ostensibly become destined for the same marginalization that has befallen the critical work of Finnstrom, Dolan and Atkinson. This unfortunately appears to be another recurrent, albeit unnecessary, aspect of the discussion on conflict in northern Uganda, and ultimately, will act as an incendiary impetus for my future critical PhD research in Acholiland. While Brenneis stated, "over the course of a dispute, one narrative over another often assumes an authoritative role,"²⁶³ he did not, however, imply that it was necessarily the most correct or informed narrative.

What may be most important to note in these concluding words is that during fieldwork, UPDF and NRA/M officials often took great steps to provide complications for the entire research process. This took the form of random stoppages during

²⁶² LRA/M member, Gulu District, 2011.

²⁶³ Brenneis, 1998, p. 281.

interviews, subsequent changes to interview locale and venues, or even more intimidating tactics such as ordering the review of research clearances and even the persistent requests for me to reshape the quantitative survey structure and findings. Therefore, it is necessary that the reader of this thesis consider the large investment local community members made in finding the time and impetus to see the project through.

Finally, as a regular respondent has implied, future research of protracted conflict needs increased engagement within the local community, particularly in regards to their perspectives of conflict. Now whether this is to simply provide a more locally engaged account of the conflict, or to shape more durable policy is irrelevant, as he argued, local narratives should be the focus of conflict-based research, as the locals are those to which the solutions to local problems need to be founded.

We can sit here and talk about the conflict, but at the end of it all, I believe you get a greater understanding of the conflict because it interests you, and the people that will read the work you do I do not believe that the people who make the programs who affect us here, really care about the Acholi as much as you do. Because the war was fought over 25 years and only in the last 10 years do I see that questions like yours happen. So, will this change the way the US knows Ugandan conflict? .. I hope, but really .. I fear it will not.²⁶⁴

²⁶⁴ G Okello, [b], 2010

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Questionnaire – English Unedited

NORTHERN UGANDA RESPONDENT SURVEY						
ALL INFORMATION HEREIN IS KEPT STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL AND ANONYMOUS.						
PART A) RESPONDENT DEMOGRAPHIC						
1) WITH WHICH GROUP DO YOU IDENTIFY THE GREATEST?	ACHOLI	LANGI	ITESO	BUGANDA	BANYAKOLE	
	BASOGA	LUGBARA	BUNYORO	KARAMOJA	BAGISU	
	LUO	UGANDAN	SUDANESE	CONGOLESE	OTHER	
2) WHAT IS YOUR AGE?						
3) MARITAL STATUS	SINGLE	MARRIED	DIVORCED	WIDOWED		
4) HOW MANY PEOPLE LIVE IN YOUR HOME?						
5) AGE RANGE	UNDER 25 YEARS		21 - 50 YEARS		50 AND OLDER	
6) LEVEL OF EDUCATION	NONE	PRIMARY	HIGHSCHOOL	UNIVERSITY		
PART B) RESPONDENT LOCALITY						
7) IS YOUR PRIMARY RESIDENCE A DISPLACEMENT CAMP?				YES	NO	
8) HAVE YOU LIVED IN:	DISPLACEMENT CAMP	RESSETTLEMENT CAMP	VILLAGE	MUNICIPALITY		
9) HOW LONG IN CAMP?	UNDER 5 YEARS		6-10 YEARS		11 YEARS +	
10) WHO ORGANIZED AND ADMINISTERED THE CAMP?	UGANDA GOVERNMENT		UNITED NATIONS		OTHER	
11) HOW FAR FROM YOUR ORIGINAL HOME IS YOUR CURRENT RESIDENCE?	UNDER 5 KILOMETERS		6-10 KILOMETERS		11+ KILOMETERS	
12) DO YOU PLAN TO RETURN TO YOUR ORIGINAL HOME?				YES	NO	
PART C) PERCEPTION OF SERVICE DELIVERY BY RESPONDENT & LOCATION						
<i>Displacement Camp (if applicable)</i>						
13) HOW WOULD YOU RATE THE QUALITY OF HOUSING IN DISPLACEMENT CAMPS?	VERY GOOD	GOOD	SATISFACTORY	POOR	VERY POOR	
14) HOW WOULD YOU RATE THE ACCESS TO WATER IN DISPLACEMENT CAMPS?	VERY GOOD	GOOD	SATISFACTORY	POOR	VERY POOR	
15) HOW WOULD YOU RATE THE ACCESS TO FOOD IN DISPLACEMENT CAMPS?	VERY GOOD	GOOD	SATISFACTORY	POOR	VERY POOR	
16) HOW WOULD YOU RATE OPPORTUNITY FOR EMPLOYMENT IN DISPLACEMENT CAMPS?	VERY GOOD	GOOD	SATISFACTORY	POOR	VERY POOR	
17) HOW WOULD YOU RATE ACCESS TO LAND FOR FARMING IN THE DISPLACEMENT CAMPS?	VERY GOOD	GOOD	SATISFACTORY	POOR	VERY POOR	
18) HOW WOULD YOU RATE ACCESS TO QUALITY EDUCATION IN THE DISPLACEMENT CAMPS?	VERY GOOD	GOOD	SATISFACTORY	POOR	VERY POOR	
19) HOW WOULD YOU RATE ACCESS TO QUALITY HEALTH SERVICES IN THE DISPLACEMENT CAMPS?	VERY GOOD	GOOD	SATISFACTORY	POOR	VERY POOR	
20) HOW WOULD YOU RATE QUALITY OF LIFE IN THE DISPLACEMENT CAMPS?	VERY GOOD	GOOD	SATISFACTORY	POOR	VERY POOR	
<i>Village (if applicable)</i>						
21) HOW WOULD YOU RATE THE QUALITY OF HOUSING IN VILLAGE?	VERY GOOD	GOOD	SATISFACTORY	POOR	VERY POOR	

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22) HOW WOULD YOU RATE THE ACCESS TO WATER IN VILLAGE?	VERY GOOD	GOOD	SATISFACTORY	POOR	VERY POOR
23) HOW WOULD YOU RATE THE ACCESS TO FOOD IN VILLAGE?	VERY GOOD	GOOD	SATISFACTORY	POOR	VERY POOR
24) HOW WOULD YOU RATE OPPORTUNITY FOR EMPLOYMENT IN THE VILLAGE?	VERY GOOD	GOOD	SATISFACTORY	POOR	VERY POOR
25) HOW WOULD YOU RATE ACCESS TO LAND FOR FARMING IN THE VILLAGE?	VERY GOOD	GOOD	SATISFACTORY	POOR	VERY POOR
26) HOW WOULD YOU RATE ACCESS TO QUALITY EDUCATION IN THE VILLAGE?	VERY GOOD	GOOD	SATISFACTORY	POOR	VERY POOR
27) HOW WOULD YOU RATE ACCESS TO QUALITY HEALTH SERVICES IN THE VILLAGE?	VERY GOOD	GOOD	SATISFACTORY	POOR	VERY POOR
28) HOW WOULD YOU RATE QUALITY OF LIFE IN THE VILLAGE?	VERY GOOD	GOOD	SATISFACTORY	POOR	VERY POOR

Municipality/ Township (if applicable)

29) HOW WOULD YOU RATE THE QUALITY OF HOUSING IN THE MUNICIPALITY/ TOWNSHIP?	VERY GOOD	GOOD	SATISFACTORY	POOR	VERY POOR
30) HOW WOULD YOU RATE THE ACCESS TO WATER IN THE MUNICIPALITY/ TOWNSHIP?	VERY GOOD	GOOD	SATISFACTORY	POOR	VERY POOR
31) HOW WOULD YOU RATE THE ACCESS TO FOOD IN THE MUNICIPALITY/ TOWNSHIP?	VERY GOOD	GOOD	SATISFACTORY	POOR	VERY POOR
32) HOW WOULD YOU RATE OPPORTUNITY FOR EMPLOYMENT IN THE MUNICIPALITY/ TOWNSHIP?	VERY GOOD	GOOD	SATISFACTORY	POOR	VERY POOR
33) HOW WOULD YOU RATE ACCESS TO LAND FOR FARMING IN THE MUNICIPALITY/ TOWNSHIP?	VERY GOOD	GOOD	SATISFACTORY	POOR	VERY POOR
34) HOW WOULD YOU RATE ACCESS TO QUALITY EDUCATION IN THE MUNICIPALITY/ TOWNSHIP?	VERY GOOD	GOOD	SATISFACTORY	POOR	VERY POOR
35) HOW WOULD YOU RATE ACCESS TO QUALITY HEALTH SERVICES IN THE MUNICIPALITY/ TOWNSHIP?	VERY GOOD	GOOD	SATISFACTORY	POOR	VERY POOR
36) HOW WOULD YOU RATE QUALITY OF LIFE IN THE MUNICIPALITY/ TOWNSHIP?	VERY GOOD	GOOD	SATISFACTORY	POOR	VERY POOR

Resettlement Camp (if applicable)

37) HOW WOULD YOU RATE THE QUALITY OF HOUSING IN THE RESETTLEMENT CAMP?	VERY GOOD	GOOD	SATISFACTORY	POOR	VERY POOR
38) HOW WOULD YOU RATE THE ACCESS TO WATER IN THE RESETTLEMENT CAMP?	VERY GOOD	GOOD	SATISFACTORY	POOR	VERY POOR
39) HOW WOULD YOU RATE THE ACCESS TO FOOD IN THE RESETTLEMENT CAMP?	VERY GOOD	GOOD	SATISFACTORY	POOR	VERY POOR
40) HOW WOULD YOU RATE OPPORTUNITY FOR EMPLOYMENT IN THE RESETTLEMENT CAMP?	VERY GOOD	GOOD	SATISFACTORY	POOR	VERY POOR
41) HOW WOULD YOU RATE ACCESS TO LAND FOR FARMING IN THE RESETTLEMENT CAMP?	VERY GOOD	GOOD	SATISFACTORY	POOR	VERY POOR
42) HOW WOULD YOU RATE ACCESS TO QUALITY EDUCATION IN THE RESETTLEMENT CAMP?	VERY GOOD	GOOD	SATISFACTORY	POOR	VERY POOR
43) HOW WOULD YOU RATE ACCESS TO QUALITY HEALTH SERVICES IN THE RESETTLEMENT CAMP?	VERY GOOD	GOOD	SATISFACTORY	POOR	VERY POOR
44) HOW WOULD YOU RATE QUALITY OF LIFE IN THE RESETTLEMENT CAMP?	VERY GOOD	GOOD	SATISFACTORY	POOR	VERY POOR

PART D) PERCEPTION OF SECURITY & SAFETY

45) HOW SAFE DID YOU (WOULD YOU) FEEL IN A DISPLACEMENT CAMP?	VERY SAFE	SAFE	SATISFACTORY	UNSAFE	VERY UNSAFE
46) HOW SAFE DID YOU (WOULD YOU) FEEL IN LEAVING DISPLACEMENT CAMP TO RETURN HOME?	VERY SAFE	SAFE	SATISFACTORY	UNSAFE	VERY UNSAFE
47) HOW SAFE DO YOU FEEL TRAVELING TO THE MARKET?	VERY SAFE	SAFE	SATISFACTORY	UNSAFE	VERY UNSAFE
48) HOW SAFE DO YOU FEEL TRAVELING TO ANOTHER VILLAGE, CAMP OR TOWN?	VERY SAFE	SAFE	SATISFACTORY	UNSAFE	VERY UNSAFE
49) HOW SAFE DO YOU FEEL ENCOUNTERING FORMER LRA MEMBERS?	VERY SAFE	SAFE	SATISFACTORY	UNSAFE	VERY UNSAFE
50) HOW SAFE DO YOU FEEL ENCOUNTERING UPDF MEMBERS?	VERY SAFE	SAFE	SATISFACTORY	UNSAFE	VERY UNSAFE
51) HOW SAFE WOULD YOU FEEL ENCOUNTERING LRA COMMANDERS?	VERY SAFE	SAFE	SATISFACTORY	UNSAFE	VERY UNSAFE
52) HOW SAFE WOULD YOU FEEL SPEAKING WITH LOCAL POLITICIANS?	VERY SAFE	SAFE	SATISFACTORY	UNSAFE	VERY UNSAFE
53) HOW SAFE DO YOU FEEL SPEAKING ABOUT THE LRA IN PUBLIC?	VERY SAFE	SAFE	SATISFACTORY	UNSAFE	VERY UNSAFE
54) HOW SAFE DO YOU FEEL SPEAKING ABOUT THE UPDF IN PUBLIC?	VERY SAFE	SAFE	SATISFACTORY	UNSAFE	VERY UNSAFE

PART E) LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT

55) HOW CONFIDENT ARE YOU THAT LOCAL POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES ARE WORKING TO INCREASE ACCESS TO EDUCATION?	VERY CONFIDENT	CONFIDENT	SATISFACTORY	UNCONFIDENT	VERY UNCONFIDENT
56) HOW CONFIDENT ARE YOU THAT LOCAL POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES ARE WORKING TO IMPROVE QUALITY OF EDUCATION?	VERY CONFIDENT	CONFIDENT	SATISFACTORY	UNCONFIDENT	VERY UNCONFIDENT
57) HOW CONFIDENT ARE YOU THAT LOCAL POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES ARE WORKING TO INCREASE ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE?	VERY CONFIDENT	CONFIDENT	SATISFACTORY	UNCONFIDENT	VERY UNCONFIDENT
58) HOW CONFIDENT ARE YOU THAT LOCAL POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES ARE WORKING TO IMPROVE QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE?	VERY CONFIDENT	CONFIDENT	SATISFACTORY	UNCONFIDENT	VERY UNCONFIDENT
59) HOW CONFIDENT ARE YOU THAT LOCAL POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES ARE WORKING TO PREVENT CRIME IN THE COMMUNITY?	VERY CONFIDENT	CONFIDENT	SATISFACTORY	UNCONFIDENT	VERY UNCONFIDENT
60) HOW CONFIDENT ARE YOU THAT LOCAL POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES ARE WORKING TO BRING EMPLOYMENT IN YOUR COMMUNITY?	VERY CONFIDENT	CONFIDENT	SATISFACTORY	UNCONFIDENT	VERY UNCONFIDENT
61) HOW CONFIDENT ARE YOU THAT LOCAL POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES ARE WORKING TO REDUCE POVERTY IN YOUR COMMUNITY?	VERY CONFIDENT	CONFIDENT	SATISFACTORY	UNCONFIDENT	VERY UNCONFIDENT
62) HOW CONFIDENT ARE YOU THAT LOCAL POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES ARE WORKING TO IMPROVE QUALITY OF LIFE IN YOUR COMMUNITY?	VERY CONFIDENT	CONFIDENT	SATISFACTORY	UNCONFIDENT	VERY UNCONFIDENT

PART F) LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE IN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

63) HOW CONFIDENT ARE YOU THAT CENTRAL GOVT. REP. ARE WORKING TO INCREASE ACCESS TO EDUCATION?	VERY CONFIDENT	CONFIDENT	SATISFACTORY	UNCONFIDENT	VERY UNCONFIDENT
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64) HOW CONFIDENT ARE YOU THAT CENTRAL GOV'T REP. ARE WORKING TO IMPROVE QUALITY OF EDUCATION?	VERY CONFIDENT	CONFIDENT	SATISFACTORY	UNCONFIDENT	VERY UNCONFIDENT
65) HOW CONFIDENT ARE YOU THAT CENTRAL GOV'T REP. ARE WORKING TO INCREASE ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE?	VERY CONFIDENT	CONFIDENT	SATISFACTORY	UNCONFIDENT	VERY UNCONFIDENT
68) HOW CONFIDENT ARE YOU THAT CENTRAL GOV'T REP. ARE WORKING TO IMPROVE QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE?	VERY CONFIDENT	CONFIDENT	SATISFACTORY	UNCONFIDENT	VERY UNCONFIDENT
69) HOW CONFIDENT ARE YOU THAT CENTRAL GOV'T REP. ARE WORKING TO PREVENT CRIME IN YOUR COMMUNITY?	VERY CONFIDENT	CONFIDENT	SATISFACTORY	UNCONFIDENT	VERY UNCONFIDENT
70) HOW CONFIDENT ARE YOU THAT CENTRAL GOV'T REP. ARE WORKING TO BRING EMPLOYMENT IN YOUR COMMUNITY?	VERY CONFIDENT	CONFIDENT	SATISFACTORY	UNCONFIDENT	VERY UNCONFIDENT
71) HOW CONFIDENT ARE YOU THAT CENTRAL GOV'T REP. ARE WORKING TO REDUCE POVERTY IN YOUR COMMUNITY?	VERY CONFIDENT	CONFIDENT	SATISFACTORY	UNCONFIDENT	VERY UNCONFIDENT
72) HOW CONFIDENT ARE YOU THAT CENTRAL GOV'T REP. ARE WORKING TO IMPROVE QUALITY OF LIFE IN YOUR COMMUNITY?	VERY CONFIDENT	CONFIDENT	SATISFACTORY	UNCONFIDENT	VERY UNCONFIDENT

PART F) PERCEPTION OF LOCAL VERSUS CENTRAL GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATION

73) WHO DO YOU FEEL CAN REPRESENT YOUR ETHNICITY/TRIBE MOST EFFECTIVELY?	ETHNIC TRIBE REPRESENTATIVE	REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVE	CENTRAL GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE
74) WHO DO YOU FEEL UNDERSTANDS THE PROBLEMS FACED BY YOUR ETHNICITY/TRIBE THE BEST?	ETHNIC TRIBE REPRESENTATIVE	REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVE	CENTRAL GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE
75) WHO DO YOU FEEL CAN PROVIDE YOUR ETHNICITY/TRIBE A BETTER QUALITY OF LIFE?	ETHNIC TRIBE REPRESENTATIVE	REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVE	CENTRAL GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE
76) WHO DO YOU FEEL CAN PROVIDE YOUR ETHNICITY/TRIBE BETTER ACCESS TO WATER?	ETHNIC TRIBE REPRESENTATIVE	REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVE	CENTRAL GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE
77) WHO DO YOU FEEL CAN PROVIDE YOUR ETHNICITY/TRIBE BETTER ACCESS TO EDUCATION?	ETHNIC TRIBE REPRESENTATIVE	REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVE	CENTRAL GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE
78) WHO DO YOU FEEL CAN PROVIDE YOUR ETHNICITY/TRIBE BETTER HEALTH SERVICES?	ETHNIC TRIBE REPRESENTATIVE	REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVE	CENTRAL GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE
79) WHO DO YOU FEEL CAN PROVIDE YOUR ETHNICITY/TRIBE BETTER SECURITY?	ETHNIC TRIBE REPRESENTATIVE	REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVE	CENTRAL GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE
80) WHO DO YOU FEEL CAN BRING AN END TO THE LRA-GOVERNMENT CONFLICT?	ETHNIC TRIBE REPRESENTATIVE	REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVE	CENTRAL GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE
81) WHO DO YOU FEEL CAN PROVIDE THE BEST OPTIONS FOR A PEACE PROCESS CONCERNING THE LRA?	ETHNIC TRIBE REPRESENTATIVE	REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVE	CENTRAL GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE
82) WHO DO YOU FEEL HAS CAUSED THE MOST PROBLEMS FOR THE PEACE PROCESS?	ETHNIC TRIBE REPRESENTATIVE	REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVE	CENTRAL GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE
82) WHO DO YOU FEEL CAN BEST REINTEGRATE FORMER LRA COMBATANTS INTO SOCIETY?	ETHNIC TRIBE REPRESENTATIVE	REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVE	CENTRAL GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE

PART G) THE ELECTIONS & CAMPAIGNS OF 2010-2011

83) HAVE YOU EVER VOTED IN UGANDAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS	YES	NO			
84) DO YOU FEEL THE ELECTIONS OF 2011 WILL BE FAIR?	YES	NO			
85) DO YOU FEEL THE ELECTIONS OF 2011 WILL BE FAIR?	YES	NO			
86) WILL YOU VOTE IN THE 2011 UGANDAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS?	YES	NO			
87) DO YOU FEEL AN ETHNIC OR TRIBE REPRESENTATIVE SHOULD BE PRESIDENT?	YES	NO			
88) WHAT DO YOU FEEL THE UGANDAN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS SHOULD FOCUS UPON MOST?	PEACE IN NORTHERN UGANDA	ANTI-CORRUPTION	HEALTH SERVICES	EDUCATION ACCESS	
	EMPLOYMENT	AGRICULTURE	POVERTY REDUCTION	OTHER	
89) HOW LIKELY ARE YOU TO VOTE FOR SOMEONE FROM YOUR DISTINCT OR NEIGHBORING REGION?	VERY LIKELY	LIKELY	UNDECIDED	UNLIKELY	VERY UNLIKELY
90) HOW LIKELY ARE YOU TO VOTE FOR SOMEONE FROM YOUR ETHNICITY/TRIBE?	VERY LIKELY	LIKELY	UNDECIDED	UNLIKELY	VERY UNLIKELY
91) DO YOU KNOW WHO YOUR LOCAL COUNCIL REPRESENTATIVE IS?	YES	NO			
92) DO YOU KNOW WHO YOUR REGIONAL MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT IS?	YES	NO			

PART H) VIOLENCE EXPERIENCED

93) DURING THE CONFLICT WERE YOU DISPLACED BY VIOLENT ACTIONS OF THE LRA?	YES	NO	
94) DURING THE CONFLICT WERE YOU DISPLACED BY VIOLENT ACTIONS OF THE UPDF?	YES	NO	
95) DURING THE CONFLICT DID YOU LOSE ABILITY TO EARN WAGES?	YES	NO	
96) DURING THE CONFLICT DID YOUR HOME SUFFER DAMAGE?	YES	NO	
97) DURING THE CONFLICT DID YOU LOSE MATERIAL POSSESSIONS?	YES	NO	
98) DURING THE CONFLICT DID ANY FAMILY MEMBERS SUFFER INJURY?	YES	NO	
99) DURING THE CONFLICT WAS ANYONE IN YOUR FAMILY KILLED?	YES	NO	
100_ WHO IN YOUR FAMILY WAS LOST?	FATHER	MOTHER	SIBLING

PART I) EXPOSURE TO VIOLENCE DURING THE CONFLICT (LRA & UPDF)**LRA**

101) DURING THE CONFLICT WERE YOU BEATEN BY MEMBERS OF THE LRA?	YES	NO		
102) DURING THE CONFLICT WERE YOU MAIMED BY MEMBERS OF THE LRA?	YES	NO		
103) DURING THE CONFLICT WERE YOU ABDUCTED BY MEMBERS OF THE LRA?	YES	NO		
104) IF YES, HOW LONG WERE YOU TAKEN CAPTIVE FOR?	LESS THAN ONE WEEK	LESS THAN ONE MONTH	LESS THAN ONE YEAR	MORE THAN A YEAR
105) WHEN CAPTIVE, WERE YOU FORCED TO CARRY WEIGHT FOR LONG DISTANCES?	YES	NO		
106) WHEN CAPTIVE WERE YOU FORCED TO FOR OR IDOT FROM CIVILIANS OR (Q)?	YES	NO		
107) WHEN CAPTIVE WERE YOU FORCED TO ENGAGE IN VIOLENT ACTS?	YES	NO		

6							
108) WHEN CAPTIVE WERE YOU FORCED TO KILL CIVILIANS OF UPDF?					YES	NO	
UPDF							
109) DURING THE CONFLICT WERE YOU BEATEN BY MEMBERS OF THE UPDF?					YES	NO	
110) DURING THE CONFLICT WERE YOU MAIMED BY MEMBERS OF THE UPDF?					YES	NO	
111) DURING THE CONFLICT WAS YOUR HOME DAMAGED BY THE UPDF?					YES	NO	
112) DURING THE CONFLICT DID ANY OF YOUR FAMILY SUFFER INJURY BY THE UPDF?					YES	NO	
113) DURING THE CONFLICT WAS ANYONE IN YOUR FAMILY KILLED BY THE UPDF?					YES	NO	
114) DURING THE CONFLICT WAS YOUR ABILITY TO EARN INCOME RESTRICTED BY THE UPDF?					YES	NO	
PART J) REINTEGRATION INTO SOCIETY (IF APPLICABLE)							
115) HOW DID YOU RETURN HOME FROM LRA/UPDF CAPTIVITY?				ESCAPE	RELEASE	RESCUED	OTHER
116) DID A RECEPTION SITE ASSIST YOUR TRANSITION INTO NORMAL LIFE?					YES	NO	
117) HAVE YOU EXPERIENCED PROBLEMS RETURNING HOME?					YES	NO	
118) WHAT TYPE OF PROBLEMS HAVE YOU EXPERIENCED SINCE RETURNING HOMES?		HEALTH PROBLEMS	MENTAL ANXIETY	PROBLEMS ADJUSTING	RELATIONSHIP PROBLEMS	PROBLEMS IN WORK/SCHOOL	
PART K) PROSPECTS FOR PEACE, RESPONDENT PERSPECTIVES							
119) WHAT DO YOU FEEL IS THE BEST MEANS TO FIND PEACE, AND PREVENT FURTHER CONFLICT BETWEEN THE LRA AND UGANDAN GOVERNMENT?		PARDON/AMNESTY FOR LRA ACTIVISTS	TRUTH & RECONCILIATION	NEGOTIATED PEACE	HOLD TRIALS FOR LRA LEADERSHIP	SEND LRA LEADERS TO I.C.C.	
		SEND LRA LEADERS TO SPECIAL DOMESTIC COURT	COMPENSATE VICTIMS OF CONFLICT	REQUEST INTERNATIONAL PEACE KEEPING	USE DIPLOMATIC METHODS TO END CONFLICT AND RESTORE PEACE	NOTHING	
120) WHAT DO YOU FEEL WAS THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE LRA CONFLICT?		ETHNICITY/ TRIBE	POLITICAL POWER	ECONOMIC DEPRIVATION WITH	NORTHERN UGANDAN DISPARITY WITH SOUTH	COLONIALISM	IDIAMIN
		JOSEPH KONY	POWER, MOBILITY	ALICE LAKWENA	BAD SPIRITS	CENTRAL GOVERNMENT ACTIONS	MILTON ORILL
121) WHAT DO YOU FEEL IS MOST IMPORTANT TO PROVIDE VICTIMS OF UGANDAN CONFLICT?		RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE		OFFICIAL APOLOGIES	RECONCILIATION	FINANCIAL COMPENSATION	
		FOOD PROVISION		FREE EDUCATION	COUNSELING	INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE (I.C.C.)	
121) HOW IMPORTANT IS IT TO HOLD MEMBERS OF THE LRA/UPDF ACCOUNTABLE OF CONFLICT?			VERY IMPORTANT	IMPORTANT	UNIMPORTANT	VERY UNIMPORTANT	
122) WHO SHOULD BE HELD MOST ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE CONFLICT?			LRA LEADERSHIP	ALL OF LRA	THE GOVERNMENT	URGE	
123) WHAT WOULD YOU LIKE TO SEE HAPPEN TO LRA LEADERSHIP?		FORGIVENESS	TRIAL/ IMPRISONMENT	RECONCILIATION	CAPTURE & KILL	REINTEGRATE	
124) HAVE YOU HEARD OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT?					YES	NO	
125) WHAT ROLE SHOULD THE I.C.C. TAKE CONCERNING THE LRA CONFLICT?		STOP ARREST WARRANTS	WAIT FOR PEACE, THEN HOLD TRIALS	ARREST LRA LEADERSHIP NOW	ARREST UPDF LEADERSHIP		
		CONTINUE TO SPT K KONY	LEAVE UGANDA ALONE	FURTHER INVESTIGATION	NOTHING		

PART L) IMPORTANCE OF TRADITIONAL PEACE MECHANISMS FOR RESPONDENTS

126) HOW IMPORTANT ARE TRADITIONAL CUSTOMS IN BUILDING PEACE?	VERY IMPORTANT	IMPORTANT	UNIMPORTANT	VERY UNIMPORTANT		
127) HOW IMPORTANT ARE TRADITIONAL CUSTOMS TO REINTEGRATE LRA BACK INTO UGANDAN SOCIETY?	VERY IMPORTANT	IMPORTANT	UNIMPORTANT	VERY UNIMPORTANT		
128) WHICH CUSTOMS AND MECHANISMS ARE MOST IMPORTANT IN DEALING WITH THE LRA CONFLICT	MATO BOMI	BOMOTONG (REWARD SPOTS)	NYEKODOL (SUGHT FOR GOAT)	NYONGTONG (SENDING SHEEP ON FOOT)	MOYO KUM (C. SAVING THE BODY)	OTHER

PART M) LIVING WITH THE LRA AFTER THE CONFLICT. RESPONDENT PERSPECTIVE

129) ARE YOU COMFORTABLE LIVING WITH FORMER LRA LEADERSHIP	YES	NO
130) ARE YOU COMFORTABLE LIVING WITH FORMER LRA SOLDIERS	YES	NO
131) DO YOU FEEL THE LRA LEADERSHIP SHOULD HAVE THE SAME RIGHTS AS YOURSELF	YES	NO
131) DO YOU FEEL THE LRA SOLDIERS SHOULD HAVE THE SAME RIGHTS AS YOURSELF	YES	NO

PART N) INTERNATIONAL NGO ASSISTANCE

132) HAVE YOU RECEIVED ASSISTANCE FROM NGO'S OR ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATIONS	YES	NO				
133) DID ASSISTANCE PROVIDED MEET YOUR IMMEDIATE NEEDS FOR: FOOD, SHELTER, HEALTH, EDUCATION & EMPLOYMENT?	YES	NO				
134) DID THE ASSISTANCE PROVIDED MEET YOUR LONG-TERM NEEDS?	YES	NO				
135) WHICH NGO'S HAVE YOU RECEIVED ASSISTANCE FROM?	RED CROSS	UNIT INCLUDING UNHCR, UNICEF ETC.)	NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL	MEDICINES SANS FRONTIERES	EXFAM	WORLD VISION
	HUSAF	CAPE INTERNATIONAL	TASO	AMREF	APU	OTHER
	IRC	AMREF	SAVE THE CHILDREN	WAS CHILD	USAID	WORLD FOOD PROGRAM
136) HAVE YOU EVER BEEN APPROACHED BY NGO'S CONCERNING THE EFFICACY OF THEIR ASSISTANCE IN PROVIDING FOR YOUR IMMEDIATE NEEDS INCLUDING: HEALTH, FOOD, SHELTER, EMPLOYMENT, SUPPORT, ETC.?	YLS	NO				
137) HAVE YOU EVER BEEN INVOLVED IN NGO TRAINING, SEMINARS, PROJECTS, TRAINING, SUPPORT, AS A VOLUNTEER OR EMPLOYEE?	YLS	NO				
138) DO YOU FEEL NGO'S ARE SUCCESSFUL IN PROVIDING ASSISTANCE?	YLS	NO				
139) DO YOU FEEL THERE ARE ENOUGH NGO'S INVOLVED IN NORTH-EAST UGANDA?	YLS	NO				
140) HAVE YOU EVER TAKEN PART IN NGO ACTIVITIES?	YES	NO				
141) IF YES, WHICH CAPACITY HAVE YOU TAKEN PART IN NGO ACTIVITIES?	LEADERSHIP	LABOR	DRIVER	PROJECT DESIGN		
142) DO YOU FEEL THAT NGO'S ARE ACTIVELY SEEKING YOUR PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS?	YLS	NO				
143) DO YOU FEEL THE PEACE PROCESS ACTIVELY SEEKS COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION?	YLS	NO				
144) DO YOU FEEL LOCAL CUSTOM AND TRADITION IS BEING USED IN RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS?	YLS	NO				
145) HOW CONFIDENT ARE YOU OF COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION/INCLUSION IN LOCAL DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS?	VERY CONFIDENT	CONFIDENT	NON-CONFIDENT	VERY NON-CONFIDENT		

Statistical Output – Raw Descriptive

Respondent Age, Output 1

Age

N	Valid	150
	Missing	0
Mean		34.43
Median		30.00
Mode		20
Variance		209.871
Range		62
Minimum		18
Maximum		80

Respondent Marital Status, Output 2

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid single	54	36.0	36.0	36.0
married	77	51.3	51.3	87.3
divorced	15	10.0	10.0	97.3
widowed	4	2.7	2.7	100.0
Total	150	100.0	100.0	

Respondent Education Status, Output 3

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid none	18	12.0	12.0	12.0
Primary or equivalent	49	32.7	32.7	44.7
High school or equivalent	74	49.3	49.3	94.0
University or college	9	6.0	6.0	100.0
Total	150	100.0	100.0	

Respondent Primary Residence, Output 5

Primary residence (IDP camp)

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid yes	103	68.7	68.7	68.7
no	47	31.3	31.3	100.0
Total	150	100.0	100.0	

Respondent Duration in IDP camp, Output 6

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid under 5 years	3	2.0	2.0	2.0
6 to 10 years	52	33.8	33.8	35.8
12 years or more	7	4.4	4.4	40.2
Total	62	88.2	100.0	
Missing System	8	5.3		
Total	70	100.0		

Respondent Camp Administrator, Output 7

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Ugandan government	118	73.4	57.9	57.9
United Nations	13	8.1	24.8	82.7
Other NGO	5	3.1	23.3	100.0
Total	136	100.0		
Missing System	14	9.3		
Total	150	100.0		

Respondent Distance from Original Home, Output 8

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 0 to 10 kilometers	55	36.7	41.7	
11 or more kilometers	77	51.3	58.3	100.0
Total	132	88.0	100.0	
Missing System	18	12.0		
Total	150	100.0		

Respondent Perception of Life in Camp, Output 9 [a] - [h]

IDP housing quality

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid very poor	59	39.3	56	56.0
poor	76	50.7	71.6	91.7
satisfactory	19	12.7	18	95.3
good	5	3.3	5.8	94.2
very good	1	.7	.8	60.3
Total	150	100.0	100.0	
Missing System	18	12.0		
Total	168	100.0		

IDP water access

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid very poor	76	50.7	54.5	54.5
poor	67	43.8	50.8	85.0
satisfactory	15	9.5	11.7	90.0
good	2	1.3	2.0	100.0
Total	150	100.0	100.0	
Missing System	18	12.0		
Total	168	100.0		

IDP food access

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid very poor	52	34.7	39.4	39.4
poor	55	36.7	61.7	81.1
satisfactory	23	15.3	27.7	98.3
good	1	.7	.8	99.2
very good	1	.7	.8	100.0
Total	132	88.0	100.0	
Missing System	18	12.0		
Total	150	100.0		

IDP employment opportunity

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid very poor	65	43.3	71.5	71.5
poor	67	43.8	75.5	84.0
satisfactory	1	.7	1.5	99.2
good	1	.7	.8	100.0
Total	132	88.0	100.0	
Missing System	18	12.0		
Total	150	100.0		

IDP food access

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid very poor	86	57.3	60	60.0
poor	61	40.0	64	84.0
satisfactory	1	.7	.6	92.0
good	2	1.3	2.0	94.0
very good	1	.7	.8	100.0
Total	150	100.0	100.0	
Missing System	18	12.0		
Total	168	100.0		

IDP education quality

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid very poor	47	31.3	35.6	35.6
poor	59	39.3	64.7	80.3
satisfactory	21	14.0	15.9	96.0
good	1	.7	1.0	99.2
very good	1	.7	.8	100.0
Total	132	88.0	100.0	
Missing System	18	12.0		
Total	150	100.0		

IDP health care

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid very poor	65	43.3	71.6	71.6
poor	53	35.3	58.1	83.3
satisfactory	2	1.3	2.0	91.0
good	2	1.3	2.0	94.0
very good	1	.7	.8	100.0
Total	122	85.0	100.0	
Missing System	18	12.0		
Total	140	100.0		

IDP quality of life

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid very poor	11	7.3	51.6	51.6
poor	3	2.0	23.5	74.5
satisfactory	2	1.3	9.1	86.6
good	3	2.0	16.8	100.0
Total	19	12.7	100.0	
Missing System	132	88.0		
Total	151	100.0		

Displacement by UPDF Violence, Output 14

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid yes	121	80.7	80.7	80.7
no	29	19.3	19.3	100.0
Total	150	100.0	100.0	

Displacement by LRA/M Violence, Output 15

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid yes	82	54.7	54.7	54.7
no	68	45.3	45.3	100.0
Total	150	100.0	100.0	

Consequences of Conflict, Output 18 [a] - [c]**Conflict wage reduction**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid yes	131	87.3	87.3	87.3
no	19	12.7	12.7	100.0
Total	150	100.0	100.0	

Conflict home damage

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid yes	134	89.3	89.3	89.3
no	16	10.7	10.7	100.0
Total	150	100.0	100.0	

Conflict possession loss

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid yes	132	88.0	88.0	88.0
no	18	12.0	12.0	100.0
Total	150	100.0	100.0	

Respondent Family Member Injury or Death, Output 17 [a] - [f]**Conflict family injury**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid yes	104	69.3	69.3	69.3
no	46	30.7	30.7	100.0
Total	150	100.0	100.0	

Conflict family death

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid yes	100	66.7	66.7	66.7
no	50	33.3	33.3	100.0
Total	150	100.0	100.0	

Father killed during conflict

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid yes	47	31.3	40.5	40.5
no	69	46.0	59.5	100.0
Total	116	77.3	100.0	
Missing System	34	22.7		
Total	150	100.0		

Mother killed during conflict

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid yes	31	20.7	26.7	26.7
no	85	56.7	73.3	100.0
Total	116	77.3	100.0	
Missing System	34	22.7		
Total	150	100.0		

Sibling killed during conflict

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid yes	50	33.3	43.1	43.1
no	66	44.0	56.9	100.0
Total	116	77.3	100.0	
Missing System	34	22.7		
Total	150	100.0		

Child killed during conflict

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid yes	32	21.3	27.6	27.6
no	84	56.0	72.4	100.0
Total	116	77.3	100.0	
Missing System	34	22.7		
Total	150	100.0		

Respondent Beaten by LRA/M, Output 18 [a]**Beaten by LRA/M**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid yes	50	33.3	35.5	35.5
no	91	60.7	64.5	100.0
Total	141	94.0	100.0	
Missing System	9	6.0		
Total	150	100.0		

Respondent Maimed by LRAM, Output 18 [b]

Maimed by LRA/M

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid yes	54	36.0	38.3	38.3
no	87	58.0	61.7	100.0
Total	141	94.0	100.0	
Missing System	9	6.0		
Total	150	100.0		

Respondent Beaten by UPDF, Output 19 [a]

Beaten by UPDF

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid yes	85	56.7	56.7	56.7
no	65	43.3	43.3	100.0
Total	150	100.0	100.0	

Respondent Maimed by UPDF, Output 19 [b]

Maimed by UPDF

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid yes	103	68.7	68.7	68.7
no	47	31.3	31.3	100.0
Total	150	100.0	100.0	

Respondent Home Damaged by UPDF Output 19 [c]

Home damaged by UPDF

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid yes	116	77.3	77.3	77.3
no	34	22.7	22.7	100.0
Total	150	100.0	100.0	

Respondent Perspective of Root Cause of Conflict, Output 20

Root cause of LRA/M conflict

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid ethnicity/race	27	18.0	27.0	27.0
political power	28	18.7	28.0	55.0
economic rewards	23	15.3	23.0	78.0
disparity between north and south regions	40	26.7	40.0	118.0
colonialism	4	2.7	4.0	122.0
Islamic Amn	1	.7	1.0	123.0
Joseph Kony	2	1.3	2.0	125.0
Yoweri Museveni	6	4.0	6.0	131.0
Alice Lakwena	3	2.0	3.0	134.0
bad spirit	9	6.0	9.0	143.0
central government action	2	1.3	2.0	145.0
Total	150	100.0	100.0	

Respondent Perspective of Conflict Accountability, Output 21**Most accountable**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid LRA/M leaders	23	15.3	15.3	15.3
Other LRA/M	11	7.3	7.3	22.7
Government of Uganda	59	39.3	59.3	62.0
UPDF	27	18.0	18.0	100.0
Total	150	100.0	100.0	

Living with LRA/M Leaders, Output 26 [a] - [d]**Comfortable living with LRA/M leaders**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid yes	115	76.7	76.7	76.7
no	35	23.3	23.3	100.0
Total	150	100.0	100.0	

Comfortable living with LRA/M soldiers

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid yes	122	81.3	81.3	81.3
no	28	18.7	18.7	100.0
Total	150	100.0	100.0	

Same rights for LRA/M leaders

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid yes	30	20.0	20.0	20.0
no	20	13.3	13.3	33.3
Total	150	100.0	100.0	

Same rights for LRA/M soldiers

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid yes	137	91.3	91.3	91.3
no	13	8.7	8.7	100.0
Total	150	100.0	100.0	

Most Effective Combatant Reintegration, Output 29**Best for reintegration**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid ethnic tribal representative	91	60.7	60.7	60.7
regional representative	27	18.0	18.0	78.7
central government representative	32	21.3	21.3	100.0
Total	150	100.0	100.0	

Worst for Peace Process, Output 30**Worst for peace process**

	frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid ethnic/tribal representative	28	18.7	18.7	18.7
regional representative	7	4.7	4.7	23.3
central government representative	115	76.7	76.7	100.0
Total	150	100.0	100.0	

Perception of Election Safety, Output 31**2011 election safety**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid yes	49	32.7	32.9	32.9
no	100	66.7	67.1	100.0
Total	149	99.3	100.0	
Missing System	1	.7		
Total	150	100.0		

Perception of Election Fairness, Output 32**2011 election fairness**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid yes	38	25.3	25.5	25.5
no	111	74.0	74.5	100.0
Total	149	99.3	100.0	
Missing System	1	.7		
Total	150	100.0		

Best Option for Peace and Conflict Mitigation, Output 27**Best option for peace and conflict mitigation**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid pardon, amnesty for LRA/M leaders	33	22.0	22.0	22.0
truth and reconciliation	52	33.3	33.3	55.3
negotiated peace	57	37.7	37.7	93.0
hold trials for LRA/M leaders	2	1.3	1.3	94.3
send LRA/M leaders to ICC	2	1.3	1.3	95.6
send LRA/M leaders to special domestic court	2	1.3	1.3	96.9
compensate victims of conflict	5	3.0	3.0	99.9
release LRA/M and peace-keeping	2	1.3	1.3	100.0
use traditional methods	1	.7	.7	100.0
nothing	1	.7	.7	100.0
Total	150	100.0	100.0	

Perception of Safety Speaking in Public of LRA, Output 12*How safe do you feel speaking of the LRA in public*

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very unsafe	55	36.7	37.4	37.4
	unsafe	49	32.7	33.3	70.7
	satisfactory	19	12.7	12.9	83.7
	safe	13	8.7	8.8	92.5
	very safe	11	7.3	7.5	100.0
	Total	147	98.0	100.0	
Missing	System	3	2.0		
	Total	150	100.0		

Perception of Safety Speaking in Public of UPDF, Output 13*How safe do you feel speaking of the UPDF in public*

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very unsafe	63	42.0	42.9	42.9
	unsafe	52	34.7	35.4	78.2
	satisfactory	17	11.3	11.6	89.8
	safe	10	6.7	6.8	96.6
	very safe	5	3.3	3.4	100.0
	Total	147	98.0	100.0	
Missing	System	3	2.0		
	Total	150	100.0		

Outcomes Sought for LRA/M Leaders by Respondents, Output 22*Outcome for LRA/M leaders*

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	total annihilation	90	60.0	60.0	60.0
	partial imprisonment	7	4.7	4.7	64.7
	reconciliation	30	20.0	20.0	84.7
	capture and kill	1	0.7	0.7	85.4
	amputation	9	6.0	6.0	91.4
	Total	150	100.0	100.0	

Respondent Perspective on Important of Tradition in Peace, Output 23*Importance of tradition in peace*

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very unimportant	3	2.0	2.0	2.0
	unimportant	15	8.7	8.7	10.7
	important	9	5.3	5.3	16.0
	very important	23	13.6	13.6	29.6
	Total	50	33.3	33.3	