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The Heart of the Matter: Arabs, Jews, and Jerusalem

by Scott Streiner, B.A.

**A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts**

**Norman Paterson School of International Affairs
Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
April, 1992**

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The undersigned hereby recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research acceptance of this thesis, submitted by SCOTT STREINER, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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Abstract

This paper examines the evolution of relations between Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews living in Jerusalem and assesses the prospects of finding a solution to their dispute over its political status. Key processes occurring in each of three historical periods are identified and discussed: the development of Jerusalem as a central national symbol for each people up to 1967; the establishment of a modus vivendi based on the separation of politics from daily interactions between 1967 and 1987, especially in the economic marketplace; and the invasion of personal relations by politics since 1987. The impact of these processes on the search for a mutually acceptable settlement is discussed, and the different plans for such a settlement are reviewed and evaluated. Finally, a proposal for initiation of a dialogue on Jerusalem between academics and public figures from both sides is advanced.

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My gratitude to all the Israelis and Palestinians who took the time to meet with me and provide me with a better understanding of the dispute over Jerusalem as seen from their respective perspectives.

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And finally, my deepest thanks and love to my wife, Zohar, with whom I discovered Jerusalem, and without whom life would have so much less meaning. This paper is dedicated to her and to my son, Tamir, in the hope that the day will come when the three of us will be able to walk hand-in-hand around all of Jerusalem without fear.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

When we lived in Jerusalem, my wife and I used to cut through the Orthodox Jewish neighbourhoods on the Sabbath -- when everything in West Jerusalem was closed -- to shop in the crowded alleyways of the Old City. After the intifada spread to the city's streets, however, we almost immediately stopped doing so. It was not until several months later that we realized how much our mental geography had changed, literally overnight. Such are the exigencies of life in the Middle East. It was, in part, that experience which motivated me to try and take a closer look at the complex relationship between the two national communities which share Jerusalem and the way that relationship has changed since the intifada began in late 1987.

When I began my work on this thesis in mid-1990, Jerusalem still seemed to some a bit player in the drama of the intifada. Incidents in the city rarely warranted more than a few lines on the back pages of newspapers. People could not understand why I had chosen to focus my attention on Jerusalem; even Israelis and Palestinians living in the city felt that my attention was misplaced. "There's real news in the Gulf," one Israeli woman said angrily when I tried to survey her opinions on the future of Jerusalem in August, 1990, "don't bother me with such questions."

Events since have reminded us that Jerusalem is anything but unimportant. These include the explosion of violence that occurred on the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif and around the city in the fall of 1990, the collapse in early 1991 of the first Baker peace plan

and, subsequently, of Israel's National Unity government largely because of disagreements about the role to be played by East Jerusalem Palestinians, and the re-emergence of disputes over Jerusalem in the course of peace talks currently (early 1992) being conducted under American auspices (Globe and Mail, February 29 1990). Although it may be diplomatically ignored for extended periods of time, Jerusalem always comes back to haunt those searching for an accommodation in the Middle East. As Meron Benvenisti, one of the most perceptive observers of the city, wrote in 1986: "Jerusalem is the key to peace between Jews and Arabs, and without a solution to the Jerusalem question there can be no durable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. All attempts to sweep the question under the rug will fail. The lump is simply too big" (p. 143).

Yet Jerusalem is the one element of that conflict where a solution seems not only difficult to achieve, but also difficult to imagine. Geographically, it is the only municipal area which both Palestinians who see themselves as under occupation and Israelis call home in the tens of thousands. Emotionally, it is the heart of the struggle between Arabs and Jews over the small, history-laden land that lies between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea, the place where the clash of the two people's histories, religions, and national identities is the most pronounced. This paper does not rush to offer any magical solutions. Instead, it focuses on the dynamics of the relationship between Israelis and Palestinians as individuals and as communities that find themselves living together in a city each claims as its own. Geopolitics are not ignored, but they are understood against the

background of the relations that have developed between members of two nations residing in physical proximity but separated by profound differences in their visions of the past, present, and future.

While writing the paper, I have been careful with the language I have employed. In the land that some call Israel and others call Palestine, an author's choice of expressions situates him or her on the political map (Cohen & Kliot, 1992). Where possible, I have sought to use noncontroversial terms. Wars, for example, are identified only by the years in which they were fought which, mercifully, are still not in dispute. The place generally called the Temple Mount in the West is referred to as the Haram al-Sharif when Palestinian positions are being discussed. The designation "West Bank proper" is used to describe the territory apart from Jerusalem captured by Israel from Jordan in 1967. Although occasionally unwieldy, the use of such terms is an important part of presenting conflicting perspectives on a conflict.

Admittedly, complete objectivity in historical and social science research is, by the nature of the subject, impossible. One cannot, in my opinion, pursue the study of human relations with the same neat precision as is presumably attainable in the natural sciences. I readily admit that I have brought a certain perspective with me to this research, that of someone who lived in Jerusalem as a Jew and was active in the Israeli peace movement. At the same time, however, I believe that conflict analysis can be more balanced or less balanced, depending on the writer's readiness to try and grasp how the conflict is

understood by each of the parties to it. In the interest of coming out on the positive side of the ledger, I have made an effort to strip away many of my own preconceptions and to meet with and listen to Palestinian Jerusalemites.

Some people see such an attempt at balance as artificial or distorting. Teddy Kalleck complained of "the current tendency to give equal weight to Jewish and Arab political claims in Jerusalem" in a recent letter to the New York Review of Books (Kalleck, 1992, p. 57). I am sure Kalleck would see my analysis as falling into a "balancing" trap that does Israel a disservice, just as others would suggest that my account ignores the historical disproportion of power and suffering between Palestinians and Israelis in Jerusalem. I do not necessarily disagree with these criticisms from the point of view of historical value judgements, but I think that they are less than relevant in an academic analysis which sets as its goal the identification of potential solutions to a conflict. The game of determining who is more right or who the greater victim is ultimately sterile. Once one recognizes the existence of competing rights, their relative validity is of no significance -- one must simply seek to comprehend two legitimate perspectives and search for any possibilities of compromise between them.

This paper, then, sets out to understand the relationship of Palestinians and Israelis in Jerusalem and the impact of their intercommunal history on the current search for a settlement in the city. It is structured along the lines of a policy analysis and focuses on four "thesis questions." The first three, which are primarily historical in nature,

follows:

- Why have both Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews traditionally taken such uncompromising positions regarding Jerusalem's final status?
- Given the exclusivity of the two sides' positions, how was relative calm maintained for 20 years after the city's unification?
- Why did this intercommunal calm break down from late 1987?

These questions are addressed, respectively, in chapters 2, 3 and 4. Each chapter covers what I believe to be a distinct historical period characterized by specific kinds of processes. Chapter 2 analyses the development of Jerusalem as a central national symbol for Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs, focusing on the city's history to 1967. Chapter 3 examines how an intercommunal modus vivendi was established in Jerusalem between 1967 and 1987 through the separation of political issues from daily life. Chapter 4 assesses how that distinction has collapsed since the intifada began.

The fourth and key thesis question is as follows:

- In light of the history of Israeli-Palestinian relations in Jerusalem, what can be done to advance the prospects of a mutually acceptable settlement in the city?

This question is addressed in chapter 5. The basic argument of the thesis is that because of the conflict between the two sides' visions of the city's future -- a conflict that was not eliminated during the relatively quiet years of 1967 to 1987, as events during the intifada

have demonstrated -- a settlement must give each side control over its sections of Jerusalem while ensuring that the city remains united and open. It is proposed that the first step in advancing such a settlement should be a meeting at a non-official level of academics and public figures interested in discussing possible compromises in the city.

Whether the dispute over Jerusalem can really be solved is open to question. But for those interested in a peace based on some satisfaction of each side's national aspirations, the quest for a mutually acceptable solution cannot be avoided. This paper is based on the assumption that this quest is not entirely an exercise in futility.

Chapter 2

Territory as a National Symbol: Jerusalem to 1967

Jerusalem was the only city in which the Jews had succeeded in holding out for 2,000 years after the fall of the Second Temple, despite religious and economic sanctions, pain of death, and widespread havoc. The Jews always believed they were regaining what had been taken from them by force. Under alien domination Jerusalem was never a great city; on the contrary, it lost size. Only under Jewish rule did it expand.

M. Harel (1974, p. 145)

Jerusalem was founded by the Arabs; throughout its existence they never abandoned it, and they always remained its basic population. They ruled the city for longer than all the invaders, and when the invaders were expelled or had become assimilated the original inhabitants invariably repossessed the cityDuring these three millennia the Israelites ruled Jerusalem for only 70 yearsThese facts overwhelm the Zionists themselves, and as a result they fall back on overbearing arrogance.

M.A. Aamiry (1978, p. 51)

Theoretical Background

Most social scientists, and most non-social scientists for that matter, understand conflicts as the result of incompatible or contradictory objectives. As Bar-Tal *et al.* (1989) state, "if parties identify in a situation at least two goals (own and of the other party) and an incompatibility between them, the situation is labelled as conflictual" (p. 236). Conflicts come in many varieties. The dispute over the status of Jerusalem is

fundamentally a conflict over possession of territory, territory which is sought after because of its importance as a national symbol for each of the contending parties. Territorial conflicts form an important sub-group of conflicts in general, and have been the driving force of international affairs for several centuries. While other types of conflicts have become increasingly important with the growth in cross-border trade, telecommunications, and environmental concerns, struggles over the control of territory are still the cause of the vast majority of armed conflicts going on in the world today.

Territorial conflict dates back to the earliest recorded history, leading scholars throughout the ages to search for an understanding of its origins. Though there remains some dispute over the definition of "territoriality" (Sack, 1983), modern explanations of it break down into two groups which reflect the nature/nurture tensions so often evident in the social sciences.

The first set of theories attribute territorial conflicts to instinctual causes, taking as evidence the near universality of violent struggle over land in sedentary human civilizations and similar patterns among other animals. Likening human behaviour to that of "the patas monkey, the green sunfish . . . the great horned owl, the wolf . . . the lungfish, the lion, the Chinook salmon . . . " (Ardrey, 1967, p. 337), Robert Ardrey claimed that territorial war was a biological necessity answering human needs for stimulation, security, and identity (Ardrey, 1967, p. 170). Other scholars have also focused on innate needs, but have placed greater emphasis on emotional satisfaction rather than biological instinct.

Williams and Smith (1983), for example, believe that possession of territory is crucial to humans' sense of security and ability to function in an unsure world. Gottmann (1973), who dismisses analogies to the animal world, attributes similar functions to possession of territory: the opportunity to relate to others and security.

Theorists who tend more to explanations based on nurture focus on life-long indoctrination. Duchacek (1986), for instance, sees "territorial socialization" and "political socialization" during childhood as the central processes which produce a feeling of geographical "us and them" in adults. "The territory and its ways become familiar, comforting, and personal," Duchacek writes, while "the rest of the world seems distant, exotic, and hostile" (1986, p. 19). Nature and nurture explanations, of course, are not necessarily mutually exclusive, as some students of territoriality noted over two decades ago (Soja, 1971): the first set of theories may explain the biological roots of territorial possessiveness, while the second account for social processes that both result from innate urges and help to shape and perpetuate them.

Whatever the origins of territoriality, the fact is that it plays a central part in interactions between many nations. There is a whole body of literature which seeks to explain why this is so. Rooted in geography, political science, and history, this literature focuses on the link between territory and national identity (see especially Gottmann, 1973). Its primary premise is that territory often seems worth fighting and even dying over because it has come to play such a central role in nations' self-conceptions.

Because they are subjective units of identification, nations lack the consistency of parameters which would permit "scientific" definition (Mellor, 1989). Generally, the existence of common characteristics such as language, religion, and historical experience are regarded as prerequisites of nationhood, but the exact combination required is open to question. What one person may describe as a nation may be described by another as a clan, creed, or ethnic minority; indeed, the way human communities are divided up and conceptualized is a subject of ongoing political and academic debate (Lewis, 1991). Such disagreements are familiar in Canada where groups as diverse as aboriginal tribes numbering several hundred and the province of Quebec make disputed claims to nationhood. The heatedness of these definitional disputes can be attributed mainly to the fact that in today's world, nations are assumed to have an almost inherent right to sovereign control over territory. To accept the nationhood of another group is, in many people's eyes, to acknowledge its potential right to set up some form of state.

The concepts of nation and state were not always so closely linked. The state has been the repository of sovereignty and has sought a monopoly on coercive powers in a defined territory since Westphalia, but in the past sovereignty often resided with a single monarch: "l'etat, c'est moi" was not wishful or wistful, but rather a simple statement of fact. Monarchs were generally presumed to rule by divine right, and to the extent that nations were perceived to exist, they were rarely a central element in the definition of the state. However, as a result of the French Revolution and the turmoil which followed in Europe,

the concepts of nation and state began to be intimately related, with the latter increasingly understood as an expression and instrument of the former. These concepts rapidly spread to Asia, Africa, and Latin America and played a central role in the anti-imperialist rebellions which began in the late nineteenth century. The nation lent legitimacy to the state, while the powers of the state allowed the nation to achieve ends unattainable without sovereignty (Anderson, 1988). Just as the nation replaced the person of the monarch as the basis of sovereignty, national territory replaced the authority of the monarch as the principle which delineated the legitimate boundaries of state control (Mellor, 1989). Nation, state, and territory evolved into intimately connected concepts in the political domain, even if scholars continued to distinguish between them in theory.

Indeed, the three concepts became so intertwined that many modern nations have actually been defined primarily by territory and boundaries; you can be deemed a member of a nation simply because you live within its territorial borders (Knight, 1985). Territory figures large in the collection of symbols, sometimes called iconographies, which nations develop to express and preserve their sense of common identity. Many peoples view the territories they inhabit as somehow superior to all others, and this is frequently expressed in names they give to their homelands (Tuan, 1977). Indeed, nations' description of the areas they inhabit as the "motherland" or "fatherland" expresses an emotional bond which verges on the primordial. The land is seen as the embodiment of the past, of the nation's common memory and history; this is particularly true of the "core area" and "focal area,"

defined as those regions in which the idea of the nation germinated and from which its main political, economic, and social impulses continue to emerge (Pounds & Ball, 1964; Mellor, 1989). The nation's landscape is "history made visible," taking on abstract meanings that unlock deeply felt emotions (Tuan, 1977; Williams and Smith, 1983).

The demand for sovereign control over the "motherland" is thus of existential importance for the nation. As long as the land demanded is not claimed by any other nation, sovereignty can usually be exercised without challenge. But when two (or more) nations feel, for whatever reason, that a territory is rightfully theirs alone, conflict results. Although compromises may occur, the symbolic centrality of territory in national identities makes sacrificing part of the homeland extremely difficult (Anderson, 1988). Conflict is likely to be all the more bloody and intractable if the disputed territory is of special significance, or to use Pounds and Ball's and Mellor's terms, if it is a core or focal area. Moreover, a kind of vicious circle (or virtuous circle, depending on one's perspective) is often created in such situations since challenge by a hostile competitor frequently reinforces a nation's sense of identity and determination to control the homeland.

The present-day dispute over Jerusalem is rooted in the development of national identity among both Jews and Palestinian Arabs from the late nineteenth century. Within a few decades, each self-declared nation began demanding sovereign control over its perceived territorial homeland in Palestine/Eretz Yisrael, with the struggle between their claims itself becoming a key element in each side's sense of nationhood (Portugali, 1988).

Jerusalem, for both peoples, has constituted the very heart of the homeland, the pinnacle of the national iconography. Although some geographers claim that its importance stems partly from its location at the intersection between major North-South and East-West routes (Noble & Efrat, 1990), most scholars agree that it has been more symbolic factors which have given Jerusalem its central position in the emotional landscapes of both Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews (Ben-Arieh, 1978). While elements in each nation may be prepared to give up certain parcels of the homeland in exchange for peace, virtually no one on either side is willing to sacrifice the core area of Jerusalem.

Andrew Burghardt (1973) has summed up the justifications nations give for insisting on sovereignty over territory as follows: effective control over an area, cultural bonds, historical bonds, territorial integrity, economic considerations, elitist arguments, and ideological rationales. Alexander Murphy (1990) has argued that the overriding justification employed in support of territorial claims during the past 40 years has been restoration of lands wrongly taken away, an argument which falls under Burghardt's "historical bonds." In the case of Jerusalem, it has, in fact, been cultural/religious and historical bonds that have most often been used by both Palestinians and Israelis to back up their demands for control over the city. In the next two sections, the development of these bonds and the transformation of Jerusalem into a central symbol in each people's national identity will be examined. The discussion will focus on the city's history until the immediate aftermath of the 1967 war.

Jerusalem and the National Identity of Israeli Jews

Jerusalem's name in Hebrew, Yerushalayim, is believed to derive from "Ir Shalom," or "City of Peace." Its enormous religious importance for Jews can be traced back three millennia, for it is believed that Jerusalem became a Jewish-dominated city for the first time when King David established his capital there around 1000 BC after conquering it from the Canaanites, who may themselves have viewed the city as holy. The first Hebrew temple was constructed in the city by David's son Solomon in 952 BC and destroyed by the Babylonians almost four hundred years later. The second temple was built around 515 BC and stood until the Romans demolished it in 70 AD. The temple was the anchor of Jewish religious life and was considered to be the most sacred location in the world: Jews believed that inside the temple there was a place called the Holy of Holies where God's spirit descended to the earth. Jerusalem, which housed both the temple and its priests, was therefore considered the most sacred city in the world. Its importance as a focus of worship continued after the temple was destroyed and many Jews exiled in 70 AD, for the rabbis who struggled to keep the Jewish people intact during the diaspora emphasized the city's importance and the promise of an eventual return to it as a way of curbing assimilation. Jews were taught that upon the arrival of the Messiah they would all be gathered into the city together with the spirits of the dead to witness the descent of the third temple from the heavens. The Western Wall, the only part of the second temple left standing by the Romans, became the holiest site in Judaism. Passover services concluded

(and still conclude) with the invocation "Next Year in Jerusalem." Countless odes to Jerusalem were written by diaspora Jews who had never even seen the city (Holtz, 1971), and couples getting married recited psalm 137:5-6:

If I forget thee, O Jerusalem
 May my right hand lose its cunning
 May my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth
 If I do not remember thee
 If I do not raise Jerusalem up
 Above all my joys.

Jerusalem's religious importance for Jews translated into an ongoing historical presence. Prior to the exile or diaspora, Jerusalem functioned as the political capital of the Hebrews when they had some form of independence. Even after the dispersion of most Jews to foreign lands, some tenaciously continued living in the city until the mass influx of Jews began with the spread of modern Jewish nationalism, or Zionism (Harel, 1974). Israeli scholars argue that the Jews have constituted a majority of Jerusalem's population at least since the late 1800s (Ben-Arieh, 1984), when they became the first residents to set up neighbourhoods outside the walls of the Old City, though Palestinians dispute this claim.

Jewish nationalists signalled the centrality of Jerusalem from the beginning of their political activity in the late 19th century by choosing one of Jerusalem's Hebrew names, Zion, as the basis for the name of their movement. The anthem written for the Zionist movement -- which is still Israel's national anthem -- concludes with the lines "Our hope is not lost / The hope of 2000 years / To be a free people in our land / The land of Zion,

Jerusalem." Thus, religion and history combined to make Jerusalem a key symbol in the emerging modern national identity of Jews. Although Jerusalem was not necessarily the city most Zionists preferred to reside in, most nevertheless believed that it should be under Jewish control.

When the British Mandate was nearing an end, the issue of control over Jerusalem caused the Zionist leadership to hesitate in its talks on the future of Palestine with King Abdullah of Jordan and in its response to the United Nations' 1947 partition proposals (Flapan, 1987). Nevertheless, the incipient Jewish state's leaders did formally accept the United Nations' plan, which included internationalization of Jerusalem, and when the 1948 war erupted many sought to keep Jerusalem out of the fighting for fear that battles there might endanger the new Jewish state (Medzini, 1985). But the state of siege in the Old City's Jewish Quarter and the danger of losing largely Jewish West Jerusalem to the Arab Legion were eventually employed as justifications for military advances in the direction of the city. The defence of West Jerusalem was seen by many citizens of the new state as the most heroic chapter of the war; fully one third of Israel's war dead were killed in the fight for Jerusalem (Cohen, 1977; Elon, 1989). The skeletons of armoured vehicles lost in that fight still line the road to the city from Israel's coastal plain as a reminder of the battles that were fought there. However, being cut off from the Old City at the war's end was a bitter loss for most Israelis. Despite the city's division, it was declared the Jewish state's capital and made the official seat of government at the urging of Prime Minister

David Ben-Gurion in December, 1949 (Adler, 1985). Ben-Gurion recommended this move to his colleagues because of two concerns: first, he feared that the United Nations would begin applying real pressure for the internationalization of the city; and second, he was concerned that Menachem Begin's opposition Herut party would raise the popular issue of Jerusalem first, getting the better of the ruling Mapai (Segev, 1986). By acting first, Ben-Gurion sought to pre-empt both possibilities. Interestingly, a similar combination of concerns was to play a role three decades later when Israel formally annexed East Jerusalem (Yishai, 1985b).

Israelis resigned themselves to the city's division after 1948, but not without sadness, particularly at the loss of the Jewish Quarter and access to the Western Wall. For 19 years, they hoped for a chance to return to the Old City. Just before the outbreak of the 1967, the song "Jerusalem of Gold" was released. It spoke longingly and romantically of the city, and particularly the Old City, whose squares and alleys were described in the lyrics as "empty." The song became one of Israel's most popular songs after the eastern sector was captured in the 1967 war. For many Israelis, the unification of Jerusalem was the most momentous event of that dramatic conflict. When the capture of East Jerusalem was announced over the radio, some wept and others danced in the streets. One soldier explained later what had moved him, saying that:

for us the Old City was a symbol of something unfinished. It's ours. The Old City should be ours. This is our capital. It symbolized what we strove for for nineteen years [1948-1967] . . . There was just the feeling of being full of joy. We were all full of joy. At that moment I remember we didn't think about all those who died for Jerusalem. Our happiness was complete. (Shapira, 1970, p. 228)

Visiting the Western Wall soon after the defeat of the Jordanians, Israel's Defence Minister Moshe Dayan summed up the feelings of many Israelis when he said, "Jerusalem, we shall never leave you again" (Aronson, 1987, p. 11). East Jerusalem was effectively annexed almost immediately after the war's end -- in contrast to all the other captured territories which were left under military rule pending an agreement on their final status -- and a wave of visitors and immigrants poured into the city. The continued unity of the city under Israeli sovereignty became the *sine qua non* of Israeli policy, questioned by virtually no Israeli political figure. Whatever one's stance was on the future of the rest of the territories, Jerusalem's emotional, symbolic importance was such that it could not be sacrificed.

Jerusalem and the National Identity of Palestinian Arabs

The Arab name for Jerusalem is al-Quds, which means "The Holy." Most Palestinians are Muslim, and Jerusalem is considered Islam's third holiest city. It was captured during the great Muslim Arab conquests in 638 and Muslims believe that the Prophet Muhammed ascended to heaven on a horse from the rock which is the centrepiece of the Dome of the Rock on the Haram al-Sharif. The Dome of the Rock, considered one of the most

beautiful products of early Arab architecture, was constructed in the seventh century and is now the oldest surviving Muslim monument (Elon, 1989). The other building on the Haram is the al-Aqsa Mosque, built in the eighth century; al-Aqsa means "the farthest" and the mosque is associated with "the farthest mosque" mentioned in the Koran (surah xvii:1) (Cattan, 1981). Every Friday, thousands of faithful Muslims pray in these shrines and on holidays up to 100,000 may fill the Haram (Rabinovich, 1988). According to Sari Nusseibeh, a Palestinian academic and political figure, "Islam's Jerusalem is the earthly gateway to divine knowledge and spiritual accomplishmentJerusalem occupies a different spiritual place in Muslim tradition [from Mecca and Medina], one of humility and equality . . .its status was sanctified" (Nusseibeh, 1990a, p. 19).

Christian Palestinians, too, have a deep attachment to the city. According to some sources, Christians constituted a majority of Jerusalem's Palestinian inhabitants as late as 1922, but as a result of emigration, their number had dropped to approximately 10,000, or less than one-tenth the city's Arab population by the 1980s (Tsimhoni, 1983). Like their Muslim brethren, they attach great religious significance to Jerusalem, the city in which Christ lived, preached, and was crucified. The countless churches in and around Jerusalem attest to both this religious attachment and to divisions among the many denominations active in the city. Since Christianity developed from pre-diaspora Judaism, many sites of meaning to Jews also have religious significance for Christians including, of course, the Temple Mount. The Vatican has underlined the religious significance of

Jerusalem in its eyes by including a call for the protection of access to holy places in all its statements on peace in the Middle East (Ferrari, 1985).

Just as the Israeli Jewish connection to Jerusalem is rooted in a mixture of religion and history, so in the case of the Palestinian Arabs these two elements are intertwined. Some Palestinians trace their national history back to the Canaanites who lived in Jerusalem at least eight centuries before the arrival of the Jews (Aamiry, 1978; Cattani, 1985). While there are Palestinians who acknowledge the absence of a "continuous subjective unitary consciousness" (Nusseibeh, 1990b, p. 5) -- particularly as far back as 1800 BC -- few question the historical connections between the Palestinians and the Arab armies which captured Jerusalem in the seventh century. Jerusalem fell from Muslim control only once during the 13 centuries between the Muslim conquest and the British takeover in 1917; that is, when the Crusaders attacked in 1099 and established a Christian-European regime that lasted 88 years. Over the course of those 13 centuries, Arabs appear to have constituted a continuous majority of the city's population, and many believe that they represented at least half of Jerusalem's residents and owned most of the city's land until 1948, taking issue with the Israeli claim that Jews were by then a substantial majority (Aamiry, 1978). One recent study based mainly on Ottoman sources suggested that the population of Jews in Jerusalem was less than one-tenth the population of Arabs in the 1880s (McCarthy, 1991).

The immigration of Zionist Jews from the late 1800s and arrival of the British in 1917

-- the latter having promised to help the Jews obtain a "national home" in Palestine -- produced concern among Palestinian Arabs who feared they would be robbed of their land, concern which intensified into political and armed resistance over the years. Jerusalem's leading Palestinian families became the chief spokespersons for all the country's Arabs during the British mandate (Margalit, 1991), and the city was among the centres which witnessed bloody Arab riots against the Zionists and the British in the 1930s and 1940s. It was the only major city in which the Arabs won something of a victory in 1948 when they managed to retain control of the Old City and capture its Jewish Quarter. In general, however, 1948 was viewed as the year of the "catastrophe" for the Palestinians, and the experiences of defeat and exile accentuated the sense of a separate Palestinian national identity. One of the results was the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which demonstrated the significance of Jerusalem for Palestinians when it chose the city as the site for its inaugural gathering in 1964 (Hudson, 1989).

Arguably, however, the watershed event in the development of Palestinian national identity was the 1967 war, when all of British Mandatory Palestine (west of the Jordan River), including al-Quds, fell under Israeli rule (Eichler, 1991). The loss stunned the Palestinians, creating a sullen atmosphere in East Jerusalem described by a British reporter as one of "leaden despondency, an almost tangible compound of bitterness and humiliation rooted in a burning sense of injustice" (Adams, 1968, p. 30).

The events that followed reinforced many Palestinian fears about Israeli rule over

Jerusalem: the immediate application of Israeli law to the whole city; dissolution of Jerusalem's Arab municipal council; a re-drawing of municipal boundaries in a manner which incorporated large tracts of land on the Arab side of the green line while excluding many Palestinian villages; reports that Arab homes were being looted by Israeli soldiers; the substitution of Hebrew for Arabic in signs, official documents, etc.; expropriation of Arab land by the government; expulsions of some Palestinians from their homes, especially in the Jewish Quarter which had been settled by Arabs since 1948; banishment to Jordan or placement in detention of several vocal Arab leaders; the bulldozing of an Arab neighbourhood overnight to accommodate construction of a large plaza in front of the Western Wall; talk among religious nationalists in Israel about expelling the Muslims from the Haram; and construction of many roads and Jewish neighbourhoods around Arab areas in pattern which tended to cut off East Jerusalem from the West Bank proper (Adams, 1968; Elabyad, 1969; Elon, 1989; Kuttub, 1990; Rowley, 1984). Palestinians objected vocally to Israel's actions; in fact, it was the de facto annexation of East Jerusalem by Israel which sparked the first widespread resistance to Israeli rule in the territories (Peretz, 1990). In the two months following the extension of Israeli law to all of Jerusalem, seventeen memoranda of protest were submitted to the Israeli authorities from various Palestinian organizations (The Arabs . . ., 1969). Four months after the war, a group of Palestinian leaders issued a declaration of principles which included an absolute rejection of both Israeli rule in East Jerusalem and of proposals for internationalization of the city

(Aronson, 1987). In February, 1968, a congress attended by many Palestinians was held in Amman, Jordan, to call for the liberation of Jerusalem -- through war if necessary (Al Sayeh, 1968).

Jerusalem, therefore, took on a central role in the iconography of emergent Palestinian nationalism as a result of both religion and history. And the conflict with Zionists over possession of the city has only intensified the Palestinians' attachment to it. Israel's efforts to assert sovereignty over all of Jerusalem immediately after the 1967 war produced a determination among Palestinians to maintain the legitimacy of their own claims to its Eastern sector; as Abdullah Schleiffer (1972) wrote after the war, "[t]he people of East Jerusalem have committed themselves to a holding action against annexation" (p. 9).

Mutual Exclusivity

Israelis and Palestinians, then, became locked into a strange dance over Jerusalem by 1967; each side's claims to the city reinforced the other's, while at the same time, each side downplayed the validity of the other's position. Because of religion and history, Jerusalem became a central element in the national identity of both peoples early on and efforts by one to assert its perceived right of control just produced more determination on the other side of the fence to do the same. As Margalit (1991) notes, "[t]he attitude of each group toward the city became one of absolute commitment only as a result of rivalry and conflict with other" (p. 62). This one-upsmanship has been the fate of Jerusalem more than once in its history. Some scholars believe that David chose Jerusalem as the site for

his temple because another people already considered it sacred. Similarly, after the fall of the second temple, the Romans, the Muslims, the Christians, and the Muslims again captured and "converted" the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif by establishing their own shrines there (Ben-Arieh, 1978). The Israelis and Palestinians, therefore, are following an old tradition when they each redouble their insistence on controlling the city in the face of challenges from the opponent.

At the same time, each side has systematically minimized the other's attachment to Jerusalem. Debates have occurred over the demographic composition of the city since the nineteenth century (Falah, 1989). Palestinian Muslims have asserted that, historically, only they truly treated Jerusalem as sacred and all its inhabitants with dignity (Al Sayeh, 1968; Halsell, 1981). Israeli Jews, in turn, have argued that Jerusalem is more holy for them than for Muslims and that the latter always neglected the city and never made it their capital (Kolleck, 1977).

On the political level, then, the Palestinians' and Israelis' conceptualizations of Jerusalem's past and future were mutually exclusive when the physical barricades came down in 1967 and, by and large, have remained so ever since. Yet the two peoples managed to live side by side in the city with surprisingly little overt conflict for 20 years after unification. The following chapter examines how.

Figure 1
The Old City

Source: Elon, 1989a

Chapter 3

Establishment of a Modus Vivendi: Jerusalem from 1967 to 1987

Everyone should simply worry about his own affairs and not get into political discussions. It is possible to have good neighbourly relations without getting into politics. Listen, anyone who wants to get along here must be deaf, blind, and dumb; otherwise, he'll never make it.

Palestinian Jerusalemite, before the intifada
(cited in Romann and Weingrod, 1991, p. 77)

Theoretical Background

Despite being divided by conflicting territorial attachments and visions of the city's future, Jews and Arabs living in Jerusalem were able to establish a modus vivendi that allowed them to live side-by-side and interact in a fairly peaceful manner for two decades following the 1967 war. At first glance, this is difficult to comprehend. How can one deal civilly from day to day with neighbours who are trying, in effect, to take away what one views as a national birthright? Different explanations of this phenomenon are possible. In part, it reflected the historical experience of living in relative peace under the Ottoman millet system. In part, it was the product of the heavy-handed security measures employed by Israel in response to signs of Palestinian discontent in the city. And in part, it was based on psychological processes which permitted a distinction between the political and the personal. Insight into these processes can be gleaned from research in social psychology and ethnic relations.

Psychologists performing controlled experiments have shown that people facing a threatening situation will tend to use coping strategies based on avoidance when they feel unable to effectively handle the situation (Bandura, 1983). Comparable patterns have been found in studies of how people deal with real-world, intergroup conflict: various forms of avoidance along with individual rather than collective approaches are often the preferred coping strategies. Residents of Northern Ireland, for example, have been found to employ "distancing" as a common way of dealing with the stresses produced by daily violence (Cairns & Wilson, 1989). Similarly, according to one study, anglophone residents of Montreal generally opt for individual forms of coping in the face of perceived threats from the francophone majority, even when the threats seemed to endanger them as a collective (Taylor *et al.*, 1982). The preference for individualized, passive, avoidance strategies may reflect a desire to avoid disruptive and threatening situations that one feels unable to control.

However, the desire to avoid confrontation does not necessarily translate into a full range of relations, especially if profound national conflicts are involved. Students of interethnic relations, and plural society theorists in particular, have concluded that when antagonistic communities live in a single political unit, their relations will often be limited to the marketplace. Other theorists have suggested that restraint of interethnic conflict depends on the establishment of rules of accommodation between groups (Ryan, 1988).

The modus vivendi that guided Israeli-Palestinian relations in Jerusalem from 1967 to 1987, then, was based not on a resolution of the underlying conflict, but on its avoidance in day-to-day relations. Divided by fundamental political differences on the one hand, yet desiring peaceful daily lives on the other, Israelis and Palestinians coped by separating out the former from the latter. It is important to understand that for the Palestinians -- the side dissatisfied with the status quo in Jerusalem after 1967 -- the readiness to enter into the rules of accommodation that underlay the modus vivendi was primarily a product of powerlessness rather than reconciliation. The result was a coexistence restricted, by and large, to economic matters. But a form of coexistence it was. The unspoken understanding that political disputes rooted in the national struggle would simply not be allowed to penetrate too deeply into personal interactions permitted twenty years of relative -- and deceptive -- quiet in the city.

Israeli Policies

To understand how the modus vivendi was established, we must begin with the Israeli policies developed for the city in the wake of the 1967 war and maintained for two decades thereafter. And understanding Israeli policies in Jerusalem means, first and foremost, understanding the background and philosophy of Teddy Kolleck.

Kolleck has been mayor of Jerusalem continuously since 1965. His tenure in office now exceeds those of Richard Daley in Chicago and Jean Drapeau in Montreal. Born near Budapest in 1911, Kolleck became active in socialist Zionist youth movements during his

teenage years. He emigrated to Palestine in 1935 as the influence of Nazi leaders began to grow in Austria, where he grew up. After moving several times, Kolleck participated in the founding of Kibbutz Ein Gev on Lake Kinneret and lived there for fourteen months, a period he later called "exhilarating" (Kolleck, 1978, p. 26). During and after World War Two, the future mayor was sent on a variety of missions to Europe and the United States, and from 1952 to 1965, he served in the Israeli Prime Minister's Office. After a short stint in private business, Kolleck was persuaded to run for mayor of Jerusalem in 1965, though he was convinced that he would not win. He did, and less than two years later, he found himself mayor of a suddenly unified city (Kolleck, 1977; Rabinovich, 1988).

Kolleck has always defined himself as a pragmatist. In this respect, he is very much a product of the Israeli Labour Party tradition established by David Ben-Gurion, who felt that his party's left-of-centre principles had to be applied realistically. Both Ben-Gurion and Kolleck have, because of their self-declared pragmatism, been called cynical manipulators by some, brilliant tacticians by others. Either way, it must be understood that no single individual has played as important a role in shaping Jerusalem over the last 20 years -- for better or for worse -- than Teddy Kolleck. Kolleck was largely responsible for formulating and promoting the modus vivendi which seemed to work for so long, hoping that Jerusalem would blossom if only the political issues could be set aside. As Amos Elon writes, "[h]e realized early on that as mayor he could not solve the big political

and religious conflicts. He has tried to help Jerusalemites in a nonpolitical way to coexist and persevere until a political solution can be found" (Elon, 1989, p. 248).

The policies Kolleck established in consultation with Defence Minister Moshe Dayan and other Israeli leaders following the country's 1967 victory had two objectives. The first and overriding objective was to cement permanent Israeli control over the entire city which, to use one writer's terminology, suddenly went from being "peripheral" to "focal" in Israel following the war (Cohen, 1977). Efforts toward this end were quickly initiated. The city's boundaries were expanded in an attempt to maximize defensibility and minimize the Arab population (Efrat & Noble, 1988). The West Jerusalem administration was made responsible for the captured Eastern sector with Israeli law being applied to the entire municipality in what constituted -- and what the Israeli Supreme Court said constituted -- de facto annexation (Adler, 1985). Barbed wire fences and minefields which formerly divided East and West Jerusalem were removed while roads were built which linked the city's two sectors and ensured easy access for Israelis to the Western Wall. And as noted in the previous section, massive construction of new Jewish neighbourhoods in formerly Jordanian territory and reconstruction of the Old City's Jewish Quarter were initiated while outspoken leaders of the Palestinian community were deported or placed in detention (Schleiffer, 1972).

The second objective -- and in many ways, it was a prerequisite of the first -- was to obtain Palestinian acquiescence in the new status quo. This goal was reflected in a number

of visible, conciliatory actions taken shortly after the Eastern sector was captured. Just days after Israelis reacted with awe and jubilation to the soldier's cry "the Temple Mount is in our hands!", it was decided that the Muslim holy council, the wakf, would be allowed to retain control of the site on condition that free access be guaranteed to Israeli visitors and foreign tourists. At the same time, Jews were barred by the government from praying on the Mount on the basis of both security concerns, with such activity being deemed unnecessarily provocative, and religious rulings which forbade Jews from entering the area before the coming of the Messiah. In addition, Palestinian residents of Jerusalem were offered Israeli citizenship and the right to vote in municipal elections was granted even to those (and they were the vast majority) who opted to retain their Jordanian citizenship. Kalleck's administration also pushed for the building of a monument to fallen Arab soldiers as a sign of sensitivity to the Palestinian population soon after the 1967 war and got its way despite strong opposition within Israel (Benvenisti, 1986). In less symbolic areas, the Israeli authorities decided to sanction a continued separation of some basic public services. The Jordanian curriculum was retained for all East Jerusalem schools, even those run by the government, after efforts to introduce Israeli curricula ran into resistance, and a separate Palestinian health system was allowed to continue functioning (Azmon, 1988). It should, however, be pointed out that the Israeli government did insist on the inclusion of Hebrew and Israeli civics courses in school studies and that there has been intense financial pressure on the Palestinian health system which some have interpreted as a way

of undermining it.

The basic thrust of Israeli policies in Jerusalem established in the months after the 1967 war has changed little in the years since. Construction of new Jewish neighbourhoods in East Jerusalem has continued apace. In addition to the rebuilt Jewish Quarter, eight new Jewish residential areas containing tens of thousands of inhabitants have been constructed over what was the Jordanian-Israeli border; while Palestinians and many outside the Middle East define these as settlements no different from the many Jewish outposts established in the West Bank proper and Gaza Strip, the overwhelming majority of Israelis see them as legitimate neighbourhoods. Ongoing archaeological exploration in the Eastern half of Jerusalem has also been encouraged by the government, in part because of its eagerness to find evidence of the historical Jewish presence throughout the city. Some of this digging has caused great consternation among Muslims, particularly that occurring in the vicinity of the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif.

In order to beautify and develop the supposedly united Jerusalem, Kolleck's administration has launched programmes of construction, renovation, and park creation funded partly by foreign donations and guided by the Jerusalem Foundation, an organization established by Teddy Kolleck in 1966 and made up of members of the Israeli political and economic and elite together with backers from abroad (Sharansky, 1984). Eight or nine large, sometime high-rise hotels -- an unprecedented sight in Jerusalem which has offended many Palestinians (Cattan, 1985) -- have also been built, along with shopping

centres, pedestrian malls, and a network of new roads that link Jerusalem with its immediate environs, as well as Tel Aviv and the West Bank proper. Much of this investment has been in Israeli rather than Palestinian neighbourhoods; Amos Elon describes the Muslim Quarter of the Old City as "a slum, perhaps the worst in all Jerusalem" existing next to "the luxuriously restored and 'gentrified' Jewish quarter" (Elon, 1989a, p. 44).

But development considered essential to Jerusalem's long-term unification, including the establishment of a common infrastructure, has affected East Jerusalem. In some cases, this has sparked protests from Palestinians, such as in 1991 when the East Jerusalem electricity company was taken over after years of pressure from Israeli authorities. In other cases, the improvement of infrastructure and municipal services has been appreciated. Kolleck's administration also continued with other efforts to gain Palestinian acceptance of Israeli control as long as it could. These included ongoing contacts with leaders of the Arab community and an adoption of an implicit *laissez-faire* attitude: as long as Jerusalem's Palestinian inhabitants did not create disorder in the city, they were allowed to get on with their lives and were protected from the harsher elements of the occupation in the West bank proper and Gaza Strip (Romann & Weingrod, 1991). Sewers, running water, and an attempt to ensure free access to religious places were Kolleck's solutions to short-term issues of coexistence. Although he did, on occasion, press Israel's national leaders to devise new ideas for easing political disagreements over Jerusalem and did

propose dividing the city up into uninational boroughs, Kolleck generally avoided the "big questions," arguing that as mayor, these were not his brief.

In summary, the Jerusalem administration run by Teddy Kolleck has been prepared to go some distance, in Israeli terms, with practical measures designed to placate the city's Palestinian residents. He has attempted to present himself as a mayor concerned with all his constituents' problems, going out often to meet East Jerusalemites and campaigning for their votes with promises of even-handed administration. But he is still an Israeli mayor - a Jewish nationalist, not a binationalist. His primary objective is the continuing unity of Jerusalem under Israeli control. He speaks little Arabic and counts on advisors to assist him in his dealings with the Palestinian community, and while he understands the aspirations of Jerusalem's Arabs better than most Israelis, he sees these as the aspirations of the "other" and rejects them whenever they conflict with his own vision. While he does not like bloodshed and is prepared to hear his opponents out, he is very clearly located on one side of the national and cultural fence.

From 1967 to 1987, then, Israel succeeded in developing Jerusalem and removing the visible vestiges of division. The Jewish state gave Palestinian residents the "special treatment" which was deemed appropriate for residents of the country's eternal, united capital. As a result, Israel's citizens and the world were shown an expanding city supposedly functioning as an island of peace and coexistence in the wider sea of turmoil. But this was only half the story.

Palestinian Positions

The positions adopted by Jerusalem Palestinians under Israeli rule were as pragmatic as the rulers' own policies. The city's Arab residents had a pair of goals roughly parallel to Israel's: on the one hand, they wanted to thwart any attempts to make the status quo of Israeli control over East Jerusalem permanent; on the other hand, they sought to live their daily lives in as peaceful and prosperous a manner as conditions allowed. An ideological rubric which helped resolve the potential contradictions involved in such a combination of goals was the PLO's call for Palestinians under occupation to practice sumud, or steadfastness, long understood as a refusal to relinquish or evacuate land. Since "staying put" was the primary objective, this policy could be used as justification for relatively passive behaviour. The occupation had to be rejected, but aggressive action against it could be left mostly to Palestinians operating from abroad (Schiff & Ya'ari, 1989; Tamari, 1991).

The Palestinian opposition to Israeli control was first expressed by the refusal of almost the entire community to adopt Israeli citizenship when it was proffered after the application of Israeli law to East Jerusalem. As Sha Aban, a Palestinian lawyer and university lecturer, explained, any implied acceptance of Israeli sovereignty would have strengthened Israel's claim under international law to rule all of Jerusalem by right (interview, 1990). Similarly, Palestinians have refused to run for municipal office. For a short time after unification, some considered standing for election, but the 1969 torching of al-Aqsa

mosque (to be discussed in the next section) led to a boycott of the elections by potential candidates which has continued ever since. Indeed, when Hanna Siniora, a prominent Palestinian newspaper editor, suggested that he might stand for election in 1987, he provoked such an outcry among his fellow Palestinians that he was forced to withdraw his candidacy, though not before his car was torched and his life threatened. One Palestinian figure argued that Siniora's greatest mistake was not to have considered running, but rather to have publicly stated his intentions before first consulting with other Palestinians on such a radical departure from established positions (interview with Ibrahim Karae'en, 1990). Siniora himself later called his 1987 plan "over hasty," and when asked to elaborate, gave this careful answer: "I've made my mistakes and survived them; who am I to try and resolve the issue of Jerusalem?" (interview, 1990). Justifying Palestinian rejection of participation in municipal elections as candidates, one Palestinian leader said quite simply: "to play by the rules of the game is to implicitly recognize the legitimacy of the game" (Nusseibeh, 1990a, p. 21).

Palestinian opposition to Israeli policies was also expressed on a day-to-day basis in protests lodged against different activities ordered or sanctioned by the authorities. In addition to a spate of formal complaints after the 1967 war, these have included repeated protests against expulsions, expropriations, construction, and archaeological digs carried out around the Haram al-Sharif. Palestinians view the last as a threat to Muslim shrines, desecration of a holy place, and a potential weapon to be used in future Jewish claims to

the Temple Mount. In some cases, Palestinian objections have produced concrete results. The authorities' plans to enforce the Israeli educational curriculum on East Jerusalem schools, for example, were reluctantly dropped because of Palestinian resistance (Romann & Weingrod, 1991).

Yet Palestinians also made the best of the comparably good conditions offered to residents of Jerusalem. Indeed, even as Palestinian leaders were protesting Israeli actions in the city shortly after the 1967 war, thousands of Palestinians from the West Bank proper sought to be registered as residents of the city (Benvenisti, 1976). In addition, approximately 20 per cent of Palestinians exercised their right to vote in municipal elections between 1967 and 1987 and most of them backed Kalleck's One Jerusalem list or other moderate groupings, helping to ensure that more hostile Israeli politicians would not gain power in the city. As Sari Nusseibeh explained, for Palestinians living under Israeli control in Jerusalem, Kalleck was "the least bad of the possible alternatives" (Nusseibeh, 1990a, p. 19, emphasis in original). Other Palestinian figures in Jerusalem agree that Kalleck was more humanitarian and diplomatic than other Israeli leaders, though all emphasize that he was a Zionist mayor first and object to his "colonialist attitude" towards the city's Arab inhabitants (interviews with Ziad Abu-Ziad, Ibrahim Dakkak, and Ibrahim Karae'en, 1990). In other words, Arab Jerusalemites did not vote in elections and give their support to Kalleck because they agreed with the established Israeli political programme, but rather because it was a way of ensuring that comparatively pragmatic,

accommodating figures would continue to run the municipality.

Palestinians in Jerusalem took advantage of their relative freedom (relative to Palestinians in the West Bank proper) to enhance the city's role as an intellectual and political centre. This was partly a reflection of Jerusalem's traditional spiritual significance and the concentration of leading Palestinian families in the city. But ironically, it was also a result of Israel's policies; the rulers' attempts to differentiate between Jerusalem and the other territories captured in 1967 by granting greater freedoms in the former actually contributed to Jerusalem's rise as the centre of Palestinian culture and political organization against the occupation. Eleven out of twelve of the newspapers published for the Arabs of the occupied territories are put out in Jerusalem, largely because censorship regulations in East Jerusalem are legally the same as those in Israel while the press in the West Bank proper and Gaza Strip is subjected to the stricter censorship of military rule. In the early 1980s, for example, many of these Palestinian newspapers were periodically banned in the (rest of the) territories but always continued to be sold in Jerusalem (Peretz, 1990). Academic organizations and think-tanks such as the Arab Thought Forum and Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA) were set up in East Jerusalem. Fourteen out of sixteen Palestinian professional associations are headquartered in the city (PASSIA directory, 1989). Many of the Palestinian intellectuals and political personalities who began operating out of Jerusalem after 1967 moved to the city from centres under much harsher occupation in the West Bank proper. As far as the Palestinians

were concerned, they were simply shifting their base of operations from one Palestinian city to another; for them, Jerusalem was an integral part of the West Bank. But the fact that Israel viewed Jerusalem as a separate entity meant greater freedom of action.

The concentration of Arab intellectual and political activity in Jerusalem was quite naturally accompanied by the city's transformation into a centre of resistance to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Newspapers were not only messengers of events but also tools for the development of national identity (Peretz, 1990). Academic forums and the American Colony Hotel in East Jerusalem became the meeting ground for contacts between Palestinians and foreigners who, in any case, were more likely to be drawn to Jerusalem than any other Palestinian centre for reasons of sentimentality, familiarity, and convenience. Gatherings with Israeli peace activists also tended to occur in Jerusalem, since it was the only city shared by large numbers of Palestinians who felt they were living in occupied territory and large numbers of Israelis. Thus, while Jerusalem was being built up as the capital of Israel, its position as the de facto capital of the Palestinians was being strengthened, while the Palestinians' national identity was reinforced every day as a result of Israeli rule. "Without East Jerusalem there would be no West Bank," one Palestinian figure wrote in 1978 and, citing the city's religious importance to Muslims and Christians and "the cumulative and priceless patrimony of a millennium and a quarter of residence," stated that "it is the natural capital of Arab Palestine" (Khalidi, 1978, p. 705).

The duality of Palestinian goals in Jerusalem was reflected during periods of unrest in the occupied territories. Even as political figures concentrated in Jerusalem called for strikes and other forms of resistance and spread their message through newspapers published in Jerusalem, shops in the Eastern part of the city itself generally stayed open and its streets remained quiet. Israelis and foreign tourists who avoided Hebron or Nablus (Schem) could wander the Old City's alleys in safety. While Israeli army troops and border police put down unrest in nearby Ramallah, the police would be continuing normal patrols through quiet Arab neighbourhoods in Jerusalem. The city's Palestinians did not consider themselves Israeli citizens, but they were prepared to maintain a certain degree of order to avoid endangering the advantages they enjoyed.

Daily Life

The combination of Israelis who viewed the city as one and hoped to secure Arab acquiescence in their control over it and a Palestinian population interested in avoiding violence and disruption despite its opposition to the occupation led to two decades of comparative calm in Jerusalem. Although the national divide continued to separate them, Jerusalem's two national communities did learn to live side by side and to interact civilly on a daily basis, particularly in matters of commerce.

Still, the apparent serenity in Jerusalem was occasionally interrupted by bursts of violence, abrupt expressions of the deep differences which divided Palestinians and Israelis in the city. Palestinian rejection of Israeli rule was bloodily demonstrated in occasional

terrorist attacks. Israeli police and Border Guards in East Jerusalem often responded harshly, and the Israeli internal security agency maintained an ongoing presence. And the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif attracted more than a few people with apocalyptic visions and a willingness to implement them through violence. The first attack at the site was carried out by an Australian tourist, Denis Michael Rohan, who torched the al-Aqsa mosque 1969 after hearing a voice which he believed to be God telling him to perform this act as a way of heralding a new messianic age (Rabinovich, 1988). The second was the 1982 killing of one and injury of three others at the entrance to the Dome of the Rock by Alan Goodman, an American Jew who had recently immigrated to Israel and joined the Israeli army; armed with his M-16, Goodman too claimed to be acting under direct orders from God. During the 1980s, an increasing number of attacks on the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif were plotted by Jewish extremists, including one plan to blow up the al-Aqsa mosque and the Dome of the Rock by the fundamentalist "Jewish underground" which was only thwarted by security personnel when the plotters were very close to their targets (Elon, 1989).

Each act of violence provoked outrage. Palestinians suspected official complicity in the plots to destroy their shrines and erect a third Jewish temple in their place. Israelis suspected that random acts of terror had wide support in the Palestinian community. But between 1967 and 1987, this anger invariably died down and life went on. There was a desire on both sides to maintain calm -- partly, on the Palestinian side, because of the

pressure of the Israeli security apparatus -- and this proved stronger than the outrage.

The primary arena of coexistence, as already stated, was the economic marketplace. Even in the first weeks after the 1967 war, Arab shops in East Jerusalem were making sales to Israeli visitors, Palestinian children were washing Israeli cars, and Israeli stores were making sales to Palestinian customers. As it became obvious that the city would not soon be re-divided, Palestinians began finding jobs in West Jerusalem in increasing numbers. Jewish employers were generally happy to take on Palestinian workers, who were ready to work for less than their Israeli counterparts and who poured in from East Jerusalem in search of comparatively well-paying jobs as their own sector's economy faltered (Schleiffer, 1972). And on their time off, Palestinians began to go to West Jerusalem's stores to buy Western goods that were difficult to find in East Jerusalem.

At the same time, Israeli shoppers took advantage of the lower prices available in East Jerusalem's shops for basic food items, clothing material, and the like, particularly in the sūq (market) of the Old City. Many of them began to frequent Palestinian restaurants, some of which became popular meeting places for groups of Israelis (Hutman, 1990). Palestinian entrepreneurs and merchants often learned Hebrew, and it was commonly believed among Israelis that while bargaining with a salesperson in Arabic would result in the lowest price, bargaining in Hebrew was certainly more advantageous to the customer than using English or other foreign tongues.

Despite the generally civil relations established in the economic marketplace, outside

of it, separation between the communities remained the norm. Israelis and Palestinians continued to live in segregated neighbourhoods. Arabs had difficulty renting apartments in West Jerusalem and were refused the right to settle in the Old City's Jewish Quarter by Israeli courts, while Jewish attempts to move into Arab quarters of the Old City were resisted by Palestinians (usually unsuccessfully) who viewed these a further Israeli encroachment on their land. Two different bus systems were maintained for East and West Jerusalem and, though formally unified, Palestinian and Israeli police and firefighters usually served their own communities rather than mixed, geographically-defined areas. Any friendships that developed between Jerusalemites from the two sides of the national divide were exceptions to the rule and rarely moved from a personal to a public level. And where Israeli-Palestinian interaction did occur, such as in mixed West Jerusalem workplaces or points of contact between Arab and Jewish residential areas, political issues were made taboo in an attempt to avoid confrontation (Romann & Weingrod, 1991).

Perceptions and Expectations

Although daily life in Jerusalem was remarkable for its relative calm and the level of peaceful Palestinian-Israeli interaction in the marketplace, true integration never took place. Nevertheless, Israelis nurtured the feeling that their goal of unification had genuinely been achieved. The quiet which characterized Jerusalem most of the time seemed proof that a stable relationship of true coexistence had been achieved under Israeli administration, even if Arabs and Jews chose to live separately. While Israelis were dimly aware that the

Palestinians continued to reject the status quo, the demand for one Jerusalem in Israeli hands was so widely accepted that few seriously considered any alternatives to the municipal regime which had been established in the wake of the 1967 war. Any changes that were contemplated were essentially cosmetic in nature, intended to finalize Palestinian acquiescence to Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem rather than significantly alter existing structures. This self-assurance was very much a reflection of the Zionist credo and Israel's history, which to many appeared to be a string of victories accomplished by determination and consensus in spite of Arab rejection (Arian, 1989).

Accompanying this feeling of optimism about Israel's ability to maintain control over all of Jerusalem indefinitely was a widespread failure to recognize the strength of Palestinians' feelings about the city's future. While many Israelis understood that their Arab neighbours had their own vision for Jerusalem, the prevailing assumption was that over time the Palestinian community was gradually coming to accept Israeli rule, and that a pragmatic policy involving improvements in municipal services and the like would be enough to ensure the long-term acquiescence of the local Arab population. In any case, most Israeli Jews were convinced that their moral claim to the city far outweighed that of the Arabs, particularly when the latter continued to seek Israel's destruction, and thus discussions of relative rights in Jerusalem were disposed of easily (Benvenisti, 1986).

The ambiguous attitude of Israelis towards Jerusalem's Palestinian inhabitants, combining limited acknowledgment of their aspirations with more than a little (often

paternalistic) wishful thinking, was evident in two contradictory statements made by Teddy Kalleck in his 1977 autobiography: on the one hand, he argued that "the moment the Arabs of Jerusalem believed they could get rid of us, they would do so" (p. 239), but on the other professed to believe that "Israeli rule in East Jerusalem is almost a convenience for its Arab inhabitants - at least inasmuch as none of the other alternatives appear [sic] to be particularly attractive" (p. 245). Kalleck's ability to rationalize away Palestinian objections to Israeli sovereignty in East Jerusalem allowed him to play a central role in promoting the image of a truly united, peaceful city among his own people as well as outsiders. He helped turn Jerusalem Day, an annual celebration on the anniversary of the Eastern sector's capture, into a national holiday. He spoke before audiences of foreign Jews and encouraged them not only to come live in Israel, but to make the ultimate move - to Jerusalem. He wrote articles for Foreign Affairs extolling Jerusalem's peaceful development under Israeli rule. He played host to countless foreign dignitaries and public personalities, all the while pointing out the marvels of a city seemingly overcoming the scars of a war-filled past to construct a peaceful future. For many, Kalleck became the personification of Jerusalem, helping them believe in the possibility of long-term coexistence under existing arrangements, articulately explaining why other options were not feasible, lamenting Jerusalem's fate under earlier regimes, and presenting his own boroughs plan as the final compromise. In Kalleck, Israelis inevitably found optimistic reassurance that all was well in their capital city.

It is not clear to what extent Kalleck was genuinely convinced before the beginning of the intifada that Israel's political objectives were being realized in Jerusalem. Some Palestinians, such as Paul Ajlouny, publisher of the Al-Fajr newspapers and Ibrahim Dakkak of the Arab Thought Forum, see Kalleck as a manipulator with grandiose ambitions who tricked the world into believing all was well in the holy city (Ajlouny, 1990; Dakkak interview, 1990). Few Israelis would be so harsh in their judgement, but even Amir Cheshin, Kalleck's current advisor on Arab affairs, admits that the mayor has not always presented a completely accurate picture of the situation in East Jerusalem (interview, 1990). In any case, Kalleck was hardly operating in a vacuum. Virtually all Israelis agreed that the cornerstone of a minimal "national consensus" was the non-negotiable status of Jerusalem. Even those Israelis willing to trade territory for peace hesitated to question the fundamental goal of maintaining the status quo in Jerusalem. Indeed, when the extreme right-wing Techiyah party introduced a bill to formally annex Jerusalem in 1980, it was passed by an overwhelming majority of Knesset members (99 to 15), despite the fact that many saw the bill as superfluous or damaging, because almost all were afraid of offending Israeli public opinion (Yishai, 1985b). The words of one author, writing on the tenth anniversary of the city's unification, reflect the conventional wisdom prevailing in Israel at the time:

Whatever the political opinions held by the Arab population of Jerusalem, it seems clear to those who know them well that they are fully aware of the improvements that have taken place in their living conditions in the past ten years, and the

advantages that have accrued to them from living in a reunited, free and open city . . . Both sides have sought avenues of practical cooperation on a day-to-day basis in accordance with their mutual interests, and the picture the city presents today is adequate proof that in most cases they have succeeded. Ideally situated on the watershed between two worlds, Jerusalem should, in the next ten years, become a microcosmic model of how many ethnic groups, some of them former enemies, can, through a policy of enlightened self-interest and reciprocal goodwill, find ways to peacefully pursue their common destiny in the city, living and letting live. (Guiladi, 1977, p. 104)

While the Israelis were convinced that the calm in Jerusalem meant their vision for the city was moving towards realization, Palestinians continued to foresee a radically altered regime which would return sovereignty over its Arab sections to Arab hands, roll back steps taken by the Israelis to cement their control over the entire city, and turn the Eastern sector into the Palestinian's *de jure* political capital. If the Israelis saw quiet in Jerusalem as a sign of its permanent unification, the Palestinians saw it only as a sensible tactic for daily survival which in no way compromised their longer range objectives.

The Israelis' failure to appreciate the strength of Arab feeling about Jerusalem's future was matched by an inability among Palestinians to recognize the depth of the Israelis' attachment to the city. Some argued that the Jews' historical connection to Jerusalem was brief and insignificant and that construction and other projects after 1967 revealed their poor understanding of the city's soul (Aamiry, 1978, p. 12; Schleiffer, 1972). The Israelis' ongoing attempts to enhance the Jewish character of Jerusalem provoked outrage, and little credence was given to Kolleck's claims of impartiality. Many Palestinians have

seen Israeli policies in Jerusalem as an extension of Israel's desire to take over all of Palestine. The analysis of Henry Cattán, a Palestinian lawyer, reflects this thinking. Zionism, he contended in 1981, had become

an increasingly racist concept having as its objective the exclusivist Jewishness of the people and land in the new stateIn Jerusalem the Zionist objective was realized by the capture and annexation first of its modern section and then of the Old City, the displacement of most of its original Arab inhabitants, its judaization and colonization with some two hundred thousand Jewish settlers[These policies] would lead, if one rightly construes the Israeli threats against, and desecration and vandalism of, non-Jewish holy places, to the obliteration sooner or later of the Islamic and Christian religious heritage in Jerusalem. (pp. 14-15)

Despite such views and the divergent national aspirations in which they were rooted, the Israeli-Palestinian modus vivendi in Jerusalem was, for the most part, preserved between 1967 and 1987. Day-to-day relations between Palestinians and Israelis living in the city were characterized by a perpetual paradox: on the one hand, Jewish and Arab residents held radically conflicting visions of the city's political future; on the other hand, they looked for and found ways to live together in the present, participating in different kinds of intercommunal contacts, most of them economic. As Meron Benvenisti wrote about Israeli-Palestinian relations in his own neighbourhood before the careful separation of the political and the personal had collapsed: "We had devised a complex and delicate system of social interaction, to avoid offending the sensibilities of one another. We sensed that we were destined to live in the twilight world - so strange to luckier people but so real to

us, for whom violent conflicts and neighbourly relations are part of one human world" (1988, p. 66). Until late 1987, Israelis took the relative peace and quiet in Jerusalem as proof that their plans for the city were succeeding. Meanwhile, Palestinians bided their time, waiting for a change at some undefined point in the future. That change began quite abruptly with the outbreak of the intifada which, as it spread to Jerusalem, would fundamentally alter the relationship between the city's two national communities.

Figure 2
Jerusalem's Borders Since 1948

Sources: Elon, 1989a; Romann & Weingrod, 1991

Chapter 4

Invasion of the Personal by the Political: Jerusalem Since 1987

Throughout the 21 years of occupation, Palestinians in Jerusalem have never felt that they were included in the 'unification' of the city. They have always felt the burden of the occupation . . . The intifada has proved that there is no 'unified' Jerusalem but there is an occupied Jerusalem. It has invalidated the hypothesis of coexistence between the two peoples under occupation.

Saida Hamad (1988, p. 9)

Theoretical Background

The Palestinian uprising against Israel's 20-year occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip was unexpected by most observers. Equally unexpected was its rapid spread into Jerusalem. This development and all that has come in its wake have fatally wounded the old modus vivendi in the city. The two communities may understand one another better today than they did before December, 1987. But, perhaps paradoxically and perhaps not, they are also much further apart.

The intifada in Jerusalem undid the rules of accommodation which had permitted relative calm in the city over the previous two decades. The unspoken agreement that differences in political visions would not be allowed to interfere with cordial daily interactions was abrogated. Day-to-day life was suddenly awash in incidents rooted in fundamental political disagreements, and the order that had been a hallmark of the city was

deeply disturbed. The space for conducting business and personal friendships in an atmosphere divorced from national issues became progressively smaller.

These changes grew out of the Palestinians' sense of oppression under Israeli rule. Even if Arab Jerusalemites lived under better conditions than their compatriots in the West Bank proper and Gaza Strip, they still saw themselves as people under occupation. This feeling may have been reinforced by economic disparities, but it was rooted primarily in politics; in the end, Israelis were mistaken in their belief that economic development in Jerusalem would neutralize Palestinians' objections to the post-1967 status quo. This is in line with the dynamics of intercommunal conflicts elsewhere, which researchers have found to be fuelled first and foremost by political rather than economic factors. Studies conducted in Northern Ireland, for example, have indicated that the connection between relative economic deprivation and increases in interethnic violence is tenuous at best (Heskin, 1985; Thomson, 1989).

Political differences, however, had existed in Jerusalem for 20 years without destroying the modus vivendi and then, suddenly it seemed, they overran the established structures of coexistence. How could they gain such importance so quickly? Part of the explanation lies in psychological processes. During 20 years of relative peace, Palestinians and Israelis living in Jerusalem did not erase the fundamental conflict between them. They set it aside when necessary, but it always remained, especially for the Palestinians, a powder keg vulnerable to nearby sparks. As Bar-Tal *et al.* (1989) write:

[T]hough the specific conflict schema may be stored in long-term memory, it may not be momentarily accessible to group members' cognizance. Such fluctuations in beliefs' accessibility has to do with the structure of consciousness and with memory limitations Thus, people from two opposing groups, say Israelis and Palestinians, may have frequent and entirely pleasant contacts with each other until the Palestinian-Israeli conflict schema surfaces in a group member's phenomenology. Then, the individual's attitudes could change drastically to the point of undertaking hostile and violent actions towards persons for whom, under other circumstances, she or he could exhibit genuine affection and humanity. (p. 241)

The sparks that caused the "Palestinian-Israeli conflict schema" to burst back into centre stage in Jerusalem were the early riots of the intifada elsewhere in the Gaza Strip and West Bank proper. Cracks in the edifice of coexistence widened quickly as Palestinians became more confident; as Bandura (1983) showed, the feeling that one can act effectively leads to a decrease in avoidance and an increase in assertion. Other researchers have noted that greater exposure to intercommunal violence causes people to seek out more collective, social coping mechanisms, and to engage in higher levels of politically-motivated activity, particularly when their community provides strong ideological support for such responses (Cairns & Wilson, 1989; Punamaki, 1986, 1988). The result is a mutually reinforcing chain of attacks, crackdowns, defiance, and reprisals accompanied by each side's withdrawal into its own "safe" areas. This has been termed the "inertia effect" of intercommunal political violence and has been noted, among other places, in Northern Ireland (Thomson, 1989). According to some studies, intercommunal

contact can change from being a source of understanding to a source of friction under such circumstances. Where the atmosphere has turned sour and an "out" group has rejected perceived intercommunal norms, interaction may actually increase tensions and prejudices (Amir, 1976; Riordan, 1987).

Thus, the apparently abrupt end of the modus vivendi in Jerusalem was the product of a self-perpetuating invasion of the personal by the political, a symbolic and psychological invasion precipitated by the Palestinians 20 years after the physical invasion of their half of Jerusalem by the Israelis. Some argue that this represented the collapse of a fiction that had survived in Jerusalem for too long; others claim that it was a tragic end to remarkably tolerant relations in the city. Both are probably right. Either way, what has occurred since late 1987 has meant the beginning of a new era in Jerusalem.

The Train of Events

The intifada began in the Gaza Strip on December 9, 1987, after rumours spread that a road accident in which several Palestinians were killed was a deliberate act of murder. Initially, most Israelis and foreign observers believed that the subsequent rioting would be just another in the string of Palestinian mini-uprisings that had occurred in the territories since their occupation in 1967. But the rebellion quickly took on its own momentum. After years of mounting frustration at failed peace efforts, setbacks for the Palestinian cause, economic stagnation, and harsh occupation policies, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza had despaired of a solution ever coming from outside the territories and were

prepared to sacrifice a great deal in order to achieve independence on their own (Said, 1989). The concept of sumud, steadfastness, was supplanted by a popular desire for more active resistance to the occupation (Tamari, 1991). The name intifada, meaning "shaking free" or "shivering", was soon adopted. The uprising rapidly acquired the characteristics of a movement instead of a haphazard burst of anger, developing its own leadership, operational codes, and legends. The authorities' belief that it could be broken by means of an iron-fisted crackdown or by economic pressure was disproved, and Israelis were thrown into confusion (Bar-On, 1988). The Palestinians, who had seemed so submissive despite their dislike of the occupation, had begun to fight and suddenly the continuation of the status quo in the territories appeared much less tenable.

Jerusalem was soon affected by the tumult. The intifada reached its streets just a few weeks after it had begun in the Gaza Strip, well before it spread to some areas of the West Bank proper (Noble & Efrat, 1990). Eager to achieve a symbolic victory in traditionally docile East Jerusalem, radical activists from the territories helped bring the revolt into the city by organizing some of the initial protests. They were successful, setting off a string of demonstrations that the Israelis, convinced that Arab Jerusalemites would never threaten the city's peace, were ill-equipped to control at first. Soon, however, the security forces were responding: between December, 1987 and February, 1988, 1000 Palestinians were arrested in Jerusalem and curfews were imposed on East Jerusalem neighbourhoods for the first time since 1967 (Noble & Efrat, 1990; Schiff & Ya'ari, 1989). Reflecting the surge

of violence in the city, the number of police dispatches to the press on Palestinian unrest quadrupled between 1987 to 1988 (Keinon, 1989).

Nevertheless, the disturbances in Jerusalem initially appeared to be minor when compared to what was occurring in the West Bank proper and Gaza Strip. The overall level of violence had shot up everywhere, but the relativities appeared to be unchanged; some still saw Jerusalem as the eye of the storm. In the summer and fall of 1990, however, the turmoil in the city increased. Several Israelis and tourists were killed or injured by Palestinians wielding knives in different parts of the city. Israeli cars and buses were pelted with stones in East Jerusalem and set aflame in West Jerusalem. Palestinians were beaten up and one was even trampled to death by mobs of Israelis in West Jerusalem. Harassment of Arab Jerusalemites by the police and Border Guard continued. A cycle of revenge attacks raged (Haraban, 1990; Yariv, 1990).

The increase in intercommunal violence was fuelled by the crisis in the Persian Gulf. Palestinians had come out strongly in support of Sadaam Hussein, who was viewed in the street as a possible saviour, a leader who might finally fulfil the old dream of Arab unity and the defeat of Israel. Intellectuals and political figures also came out in support of Iraq, explaining that although Palestinians opposed the invasion of Kuwait, they had to back Sadaam against foreign imperialism (interviews with Ziad Abu-Ziad, Ibrahim Karac'en, and Hanna Siniora, 1990). The distinction was not acceptable to most Israelis, who were furious with Palestinians' support for a leader who said he would "burn half of Israel" if

attacked and later followed up his threats with the infamous Scud missile attacks. Even Israelis in the peace camp felt betrayed, and asked how Palestinians could back one occupier while opposing another (London, 1990; Sarid, 1990). Palestinian figures responded to these criticisms by angrily rejecting the right of Israelis to dictate positions to them, particularly on matters not directly related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Abad, 1990; Abu-Ziad, 1990; Mikhail-Ashrawi, 1990). This mutual recrimination, made during a period of looming war, added a great deal to tensions wherever Israelis and Palestinians crossed paths. And nowhere did they cross paths more than in Jerusalem.

The culmination of the increasing anger, distrust, and violence in Jerusalem came in September when Israel security forces shot and killed 17 Palestinians after rioting and stone throwing on the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif. Precisely what happened that day has never been fully established, but several things are clear. First, the Palestinians had prepared themselves for what they thought would be an attempt by a Jewish extremist group to take control of the Mount that day. Second, at some point the Palestinians torched a police stand on the Mount and threw stones which fell onto the prayer area at the Western Wall. Third, Israeli troops began firing at some point during the disturbances, apparently before the Palestinians' stones began to fly. Fourth, Israeli security personnel were totally unprepared for the situation, withdrew from the Mount, and then went on the offensive with live ammunition when reinforcements arrived (Sixty Minutes report, 1990). This eruption of violence was unplanned and happened in part as a result of the strained

atmosphere in the city. In more relaxed periods, Palestinians had rarely massed with stones at the ready because of a march by Jewish nationalists; in fact, several such marches had taken place in earlier years without incident, despite the tensions they provoked. Similarly, Israeli police and soldiers had in the past reacted to tumultuous crowds on the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif with much greater restraint.

Since 1990, intercommunal clashes in Jerusalem have subsided somewhat -- partly as a result of Palestinian fatigue and the hopes raised by the current peace process -- but the situation remains tense and violence flares up from time to time, especially along the "seam lines" between Arab and Jewish neighbourhoods where disturbances have been concentrated since the beginning of the intifada (Noble & Efrat, 1990). Recently, tension has been sparked by Ariel Sharon's plan, as minister of housing, to settle Israelis in Palestinian settlements near the Old City walls. In short, the status quo in Jerusalem has been fundamentally altered. Even when violence is not taking place, it is considered a constant, very real possibility to an extent few could have anticipated before December, 1987.

The Palestinian Perspective

For the Arab residents of Jerusalem, participation in the intifada was a reassertion of their identity as part of a people under occupation. For some, this may have been simply a statement of a reality which had been obvious to them for two decades; for others it was a process of redefinition, a realignment of their identity back towards Arab brethren in the

West Bank proper after years of ambiguity caused by Israeli policies that differentiated between Palestinians living in different places. By participating in the uprising, Palestinian residents of Jerusalem demonstrated to Israelis and to the world that Israel had not united the people of the city, even if it had erased the political and military borders. In effect, they undercut all the arguments Teddy Kalleck and his supporters had long been making about the intercommunal peace in the city. Indeed, they struck at the heart of the assumptions underlying the Israeli national consensus on the future of Jerusalem. At the same time, they signalled to fellow Palestinians in the territories and to other Arabs that East Jerusalemites were fully integrated into the "struggle," that they had not acquiesced Israel's plans as a result of their privileges. As a Palestinian schoolteacher explained in June, 1989, "since the beginning of the intifada, it's clear that all of East Jerusalem and the surrounding villages are part of the occupied territories. The Israelis don't recognize this, and we don't recognize Jerusalem as a unified city" (cited in Rees, 1989, p. 4).

The Palestinians' feeling that "their" Jerusalem was occupied territory was reinforced by the widespread perception that the municipal authorities favoured Israelis over Arabs in its services and functions. Despite Kalleck's claims to the contrary, East Jerusalem regularly got the short end of the stick when it came to allocations for infrastructure development, housing, and schools (Ajlouny, 1990; Graham-Brown, 1986). The mayor's own advisor on Arab affairs went so far as to attribute the revolt in Jerusalem to these disparities (Cheshin, 1990). A poll conducted just before the intifada broke out found that

84 per cent of Palestinian Jerusalemites were dissatisfied with the level of services they received from the municipality (Ashkenazi, 1989). Although, as stated earlier, it was politics rather than relative deprivation which was the basis for the uprising in Jerusalem, the perception of discrimination did help to perpetuate and sharpen awareness of political issues.

With the start of the intifada, Jerusalem's Palestinians effectively served notice that they would curtail their participation in a modus vivendi which negated their political vision while discriminating against them in many areas. Since late 1987, they have taken a series of steps to disrupt the norms used to rationalize Israel's plans for Jerusalem's future. These have included regular shop closings, marches on significant dates in the Palestinian calendar, clashes with security forces in the streets, demonstrations after Friday prayers on the Haram al-Sharif, and the violent actions mentioned earlier: deadly attacks on individual Jews, torching of parked Israeli cars, and stoning of Israeli vehicles. All of these acts, taken together, have constituted a statement against the status quo and have signalled a refusal to maintain coexistence indefinitely if questions about Jerusalem's future are not dealt with to their satisfaction. As the English edition of al-Fajr writes on its masthead: "You can't deny us the rights and privileges you enjoy and expect us to allow you to keep them."

One expression of Palestinians' political rebellion in Jerusalem has been the precipitous decline in their participation in municipal elections. The proportion of East Jerusalemites

who took advantage of the franchise fell from 19 per cent in the 1984 vote to just four per cent in the 1989 vote, a decrease which cost Teddy Kalleck's One Jerusalem list two seats and its majority on the city council (Kuttab, 1990). Another symptom of the increased politicization of Jerusalem's Palestinians after 1987 was the active support given by the long accommodating Christian religious leadership to the intifada (Kuttab, 1989).

This politicization, in combination with the relative latitude enjoyed by Arab residents of Jerusalem, helped enhance the city's role as the centre of Palestinian political life. It was in Jerusalem that a press conference was held in January, 1988 to announce the "fourteen demands" of the intifada (Al-Haq, 1990). When Israel cracked down in the West Bank proper and Gaza, Jerusalem's utility as a zone of fewer restrictions increased. While curfews became common practice elsewhere, they remained rare in Jerusalem; Israel simply could not seal off half of the city which it claimed as its united capital or remove the thousands of diplomats, journalists, and tourists who were crowded into its Eastern sector. The media also contributed to the concentration of Palestinian political activity in Jerusalem. As the intifada gained the attention of the international press, reporters converged on East Jerusalem looking for a story. Because the uprising was in part an attempt to draw the attention of the world to the Palestinian issue, the presence of a large corps of reporters in the city acted as something of a magnet for Palestinian political activists. Jerusalem's status as the political centre of the Palestinians was highlighted by the PLO's declaration of Palestinian independence in November 15, 1988 -- a declaration

prompted largely by the successes of the intifada and the priorities of the uprising's leadership -- whose pivotal paragraph read as follows: "The Palestine National Council, in the name of God, and in the name of the Palestinian Arab people, hereby proclaims the establishment of the State of Palestine on our Palestinian territory with its capital Jerusalem (al-Quds al-Sharif)" (Lockman & Bein, 1989, p. 397). Recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of whatever Palestinian entity emerges from peace talks remains a central demand of Palestinian negotiators.

The Israeli Perspective

If the spread of the intifada to Jerusalem was a coming of age for its Arab residents, it was a bitter shock for their Israeli neighbours. Having believed for so long that the city had been successfully united through enlightened policies, Israelis could not understand how scenes reminiscent of refugee camps and stone alleys in the West Bank proper and Gaza could suddenly be appearing on the streets of Jerusalem. What had happened went against the grain of the basic assumptions Israelis shared with respect to Jerusalem's status and its future.

Initially, most Israelis thought that the uprising would stop at the entrances to Jerusalem. Even as they adjusted to the idea of a drawn-out confrontation in the rest of the territories, Israeli analysts anticipated the continuation of the modus vivendi which had kept daily life in Jerusalem orderly for two decades. The first signs of participation in the intifada by East Jerusalemites were written off as the product of violent pressure tactics by

young vigilantes, the assumption being that Jerusalem would return to normal as soon as lip service had been paid to the cause in the form of a few days of shop closure. This failed to happen in most cases, leading police to force shops open, an action Teddy Kolleyck justified by saying it supplied Jerusalem Arabs with the excuse they needed to disengage from the activities of the intifada. Kolleyck even claimed that shopkeepers had asked for such action, fearing that any voluntary abandonment of the uprising would bring retaliation (Shammas, 1988).

The growing number of violent clashes in the streets of East Jerusalem and the Arab villages appended to the municipality after 1967, the persistence of general strikes, and the appearance of various other acts of civil disobedience all led Israelis to the realization that Jerusalem's Arab quarters were much more closely linked to the West Bank proper than had been previously believed. Some came to this realization more quickly than others.

Teddy Kolleyck, always the embodiment of Israeli aspirations in Jerusalem, reacted at first with stunned sadness when Palestinian rioting spread to Jerusalem. He is reported to have said, in a broken voice, "my life-work is ruined" (Elon, 1988, p. 13). At times, the mayor put on a brave face; almost a year after the intifada had exploded, he still clung to the belief that "Arab neighbourhoods in East Jerusalem are no longer a part of the West Bank" (Kolleyck, 1988, p. 157). But sometimes, the frustration appeared to overwhelm Kolleyck; at one point before the 1989 municipal elections, he suggested he would not run for office again, but seems to have reconsidered because of the sense that no other figure

had the stature to deal with the spread of the uprising to Jerusalem. As mayor, he has pursued a familiar strategy since the uprising began in Jerusalem: trying to deflect attention away from the political and towards restoring quiet and neighbourly relations in day-to-day relations. Efforts have been made to keep the activities of the police and Border Guard less intrusive than those of the army and Border Guard in the West Bank proper and Gaza and Kalleck has criticised Israeli actions -- such as Likud minister Ariel Sharon's move into the Muslim Quarter, vengeance attacks on Palestinian cars, the Temple Mount/Haram killings, and attempted moves by Jews into Arab sections of the Old City and Palestinian villages -- which he feels inflame tensions in the city and undercut attempts to reestablish normalcy. In other words, Kalleck has been trying to resuscitate the modus vivendi. He has continued to reject proposals for a radical restructuring of the municipality under a peace agreement as unworkable and, instead, to recommend his boroughs plan as the only realistic option for Palestinian autonomy in Jerusalem (Kalleck, 1988). He has, however, accepted the idea of Arab Jerusalemites participating in proposed elections in the occupied territories, arguing that this will not undermine Israeli claims to the entire city.

Some Israelis agree with Kalleck, others disagree. In general, the intifada led to a polarization of the Israeli public's attitudes on issues of peace, security, and territory (Arian & Ventura, 1989). At one end of the spectrum were those Israelis who became more flexible. Speaking of the Palestinians as a separate people, for example, became more commonplace (Galtung, 1990). The slogan, "Israel, Palestine, two states for two

peoples!" began to be heard for the first time in Peace Now demonstrations while a myriad of new, sometimes radical peace groups were founded (Bar-On, 1988). A number of songs by Israeli artists (most of them women) deploring the occupation and the Israeli authorities' response to the intifada were released -- and occasionally banned from Israeli radio stations. Despite this general softening of positions among doves, however, most still refrained from advocating a significant change in the status quo in Jerusalem.

At the other end of the spectrum were the Israelis who became less willing to accommodate Arab demands after the outbreak of the intifada, partly because of a heightened sense of threat and resistance to compromising under duress (Arian, 1989). This camp became very vocal on Jerusalem, vowing to fight for Israeli control over the whole city with unprecedented forcefulness. Groups of nationalist and religious Jews undertook a series of attempts to settle in the Old City's Arab quarters, attempts that were often supported by the Israeli government through the Housing Ministry. Ariel Sharon made his highly public move into the Muslim Quarter. Religious Jews tried to take up residence in a hospice they claimed to have purchased with government money in the Armenian Quarter, leading to clashes between the Israeli authorities and leaders of the Greek Orthodox church. Nationalist settlers tried to move into Silwan, a Palestinian village within Jerusalem's municipal boundaries, again with the support of the government. Such actions have been condemned by many Israelis as provocations, but they do draw effectively upon a powerful symbol of Israel's so-called national consensus: the

determination to hold onto all of Jerusalem.

Israelis, then, responded to the Palestinians' uprising in Jerusalem with disbelief and confusion; however, this has not, to date, translated into greater flexibility regarding the city's future. With time, Israeli Jerusalemites grew accustomed to changes in the patterns of their daily lives, especially as acts of Palestinian rebellion were largely confined to the Eastern sector (Peretz, 1990). Even as illusions about the state of affairs in the city collapsed, many Israelis continued to treat the vision of a united, peaceful Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty as an ideal to be realized, despite the recognition that its realization was further away than had been previously believed.

Geography of Fear

The most obvious result of the collapse of the psychological line which once separated daily life from political differences has been the reappearance of the geographical line that once divided Jerusalem. The "green line" established between the Jordanian and Israeli sectors after the 1948 war was erased in a military and political sense in 1967. As we have seen, it was also erased in day-to-day relations for many of the city's residents during the two decades that followed. But the invasion of daily life by politically-motivated acts of violence has altered people's mental geography, effectively reviving a border between the peoples.

Israelis had been accustomed to wandering into the Arab sector freely. Few thought twice about shopping in the Old City or cutting through East Jerusalem on their way to one

of the Jewish neighbourhoods scattered around the city. Following the spread of the intifada to Jerusalem, and especially after the spate of violent attacks which began during the summer of 1990, these attitudes changed. Like the rest of the territories, East Jerusalem was suddenly beyond the pale for most Jews (Tessler, 1990). Visits to Arab quarters have all but ceased for Israelis and tourists and friends from abroad are warned to steer clear of Palestinian neighbourhoods. Individuals have changed their driving routes, Jewish-owned taxis avoid leaving the Western section of the city, and many refuse to ride the oft-targeted Israeli buses which still pass through Palestinian areas. Just months after the start of the intifada in Jerusalem, Meron Benvenisti, always an passionate advocate of coexistence, was surprised to find himself avoiding East Jerusalem on the way to the Hebrew University:

Suddenly, as I was waiting near Damascus Gate for the traffic light to change, I made a decision: Instead of driving directly, as usual, through the Arab section, I turned left, taking the "Jewish way" - through the safe Jewish neighbourhoods. It was at this moment, I realized with astonishment, that I had succumbed to the Geography of Fear. For the first time in 21 years I allowed my tribal affiliation to determine my psychological space, in my own hometown. (Benvenisti, 1988, p. 35)

The geography of fear took longer to affect the Palestinians, and many of them continued crossing into West Jerusalem to work or shop during the first two years of the uprising. In part, this was probably due to the fact that most of Jerusalem's Arab residents had never really perceived the city as united in the first place, and so they were not as

shaken by the abrupt interruptions of daily peace and quiet. They were more accustomed than the Israelis to tolerating incongruities between different facets of the intercommunal relationship. They had also known more disruption prior to the intifada, and so were better able to deal with the increased level of violence. No less importantly, they seemed not to fear the sorts of random attacks in West Jerusalem as Israelis feared in the Arab sector. Indeed, most of their difficulties with Israelis -- police and Border Guard personnel -- actually occurred in East Jerusalem.

Over time, however, vigilante activities in West Jerusalem did occur and so gradually erected a psychological barrier for Palestinians which mirrored that of the Israelis. Thus, as cases of violence against Palestinians increased in Jerusalem, those who did not have to work in the Jewish sector preferred to avoid it, just as most Israelis avoided the Arab sector. Even Palestinian professionals and public figures who valued personal friendships with Israelis curbed or altogether ended their visits to West Jerusalem (interviews with Ziad Abu-Ziad, Elias Khoury, and Hanna Siniora, 1990). One Palestinian said that for him, the Western sector had become "as foreign as Madrid; no, I actually feel more comfortable in Madrid" (the statement was made over a year before the Spanish capital became the site for the first Palestinian-Israeli peace talks) (Ibrahim Dakkak interview, 1990).

A wall invisible to the eye but very real in people's minds has been erected in a city once known for its tolerance. Administratively, Jerusalem remains a single municipality

but, by and large, its population treats it as much like the divided city of 1966 as the united city of 1986. On a human level, this has been a sad development for many of its residents, especially for those Israelis who believed in the possibility of peace within Jerusalem. Personal and intercommunal relations have clearly suffered. On a political level, however, the intifada seems to have improved each side's understanding of the other's position. The change was particularly profound for Israelis whose false images of a truly united city were shattered. Whether this new clarity has improved the likelihood of finding a mutually acceptable settlement in Jerusalem is still open to question. In the following section, the options and chances for such a settlement will be assessed.

Chapter 5

The Search for a Solution

When I was a child Jerusalem was more like a village than a city. As in a village, there were some village idiots walking about, trailed by groups of giggling children[One] called himself King DavidOne day he decided to appoint me ruler of Mount Zion. He put his hand on my head and was about to bless me with his strange ceremony of investiture. At my side stood an Arab boy named Faras, who worked for a Greek Orthodox priest in our neighbourhood. "What about me?" asked Faras. "He's an Arab," said one of the children. King David thought for a moment, reconsidered, put his hand on both our heads, and appointed the two of us, his Jewish and Arab vassals, joint rulers of Mount Zion.

Avishai Margalit (1991, p. 61)

Historical Summary

Jews and Arabs have shared Jerusalem for centuries. Or, to put it more accurately, they have both lived in the city. For to share a place implies a willingness to give up exclusive control, something neither side has shown any inclination to do when it has had the upper hand. Until the late 1800s, each people believed that it possessed a divinely ordained right to the city, but given the fact that these beliefs were rooted in spirituality and visions of the hereafter -- "Jerusalem in heaven," as the Jews called it -- the communities were generally content to simply segregate themselves into separate neighbourhoods in "Jerusalem on earth." With the spread of the nation-state idea in the nineteenth century, however, the long-standing religious and historical bonds of each

people to Jerusalem produced demands for political control, demands which could not be reconciled as easily as spiritual claims. As Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab national identities took form, the competition for sovereignty over the city and the whole of Palestine gathered momentum and Jerusalem was increasingly transformed into a symbol of each emerging nation's territorial "bottom line."

Each of the two recent battles for Jerusalem initially seemed to resolve the dispute over the city, but these resolutions proved to be temporary. The partition after the 1948 war put Jerusalem on the back burner for almost two decades, but the jubilant Israeli capture of the city in the 1967 war showed that the emotional conflict over its status had not disappeared. Similarly, the modus vivendi maintained for 20 years after 1967 -- however forced it might have been on the Palestinian side -- convinced many that intercommunal peace was possible in Jerusalem if the Israeli authorities treated the Palestinian population fairly; the rapid spread of the intifada to Jerusalem, however, showed once again that the deep disagreement over the city's political disposition persisted.

In the four years since the intifada erupted in Jerusalem's streets, Israelis and Palestinians have gained a better understanding of the distance between their expectations for the city's future, even as day-to-day contact between them has declined. The invasion of the personal by the political since 1987 has, in contrast to what occurred in the past, proven enduring. It seems to demonstrate that no arrangement which allows national groups to coexist by ignoring fundamental clashes in their political visions is viable in the

long run. But to say that past "solutions" failed because they ignored the fundamental demands of one side or the other is not to suggest that a solution would necessarily be possible if only this oversight were corrected; some observers contend that the competing visions are simply irreconcilable. Nevertheless, there are many others who believe that a settlement in Jerusalem might, in fact, be attainable. In the following section, the different settlements that have been proposed will be examined.

Options for a Settlement

The explosiveness of the Jerusalem issue has repeatedly deterred would-be peacemakers from raising it in Arab-Israeli discussions. It is seen as so contentious that it could be a deal-breaker. The long-accepted prescription in diplomatic circles, therefore, has been to leave Jerusalem to the end of the peace process when, presumably, the value of agreements reached on other issues would be such that somehow the parties would find a compromise solution for the holy city. Even at Camp David, the only Israeli-Arab negotiations to yield a peace treaty, Jerusalem was deliberately set aside. No mention of it was made in the accords signed by Anwar Sadat, Menachem Begin, and Jimmy Carter. Instead, the parties agreed to append letters to the deal outlining their widely divergent positions on the city's future (Touval, 1982).

If diplomats have shied away from the issue of Jerusalem because of its complexity, scholars have been attracted to it for much the same reason. Politically, Jerusalem is seen as a puzzle in need of deciphering, and this has led to a plethora of proposals on the shape

of a settlement in the city.

Some of these proposals are based on outdated conceptions or serious underestimation of the strength of both sides' attachment to the city as a national symbol. Internationalization, for example, was the option adopted by the United Nations in its 1947 partition resolution and was long supported by the Vatican (Ferrari, 1985). Even the Holy See, however, seems to have recently come around to the understanding that this solution will satisfy neither one of the national communities living in Jerusalem and so, has shifted its emphasis to measures for the protection of holy places. Internationalization was premised on the assumption that if the two sides could not agree to share Jerusalem peacefully, the best settlement would be one that denied political dominance to either. In practice, this idea has been seen by both Israelis and Palestinians as falling far short of their respective minimum demands (Littke, 1988; Nazzari, 1985). Both Jordan and Israel rejected it out-of-hand when the United Nations began sending out signals that it was interested in implementing the Jerusalem provisions of the partition resolution after the 1948 war (Ginio, 1980; Segev, 1986). Indeed, rejection of internationalization is one of the few areas of agreement between Israelis and Palestinians with respect to Jerusalem's ultimate disposition.

There are other scenarios which are out of the question because of their inability to accommodate the needs not of both peoples, but of one of them. On the Palestinian side, there are proposals for re-partitioning of the city. Based on the belief that East Jerusalem

is occupied territory like any other, proponents of this approach label Israeli neighbourhoods located over Jerusalem's old green line as "settlements" and argue that only Israel's complete withdrawal to its pre-1967 borders will bring peace (Cattan, 1985; Friedlander & Hussein, 1975). This proposal utterly fails to recognize the special connection Israelis from across the political spectrum feel towards Jerusalem and is therefore a non-starter. Equally untenable is the demand by many Israelis for a continuation, indefinitely, of the political status quo in Jerusalem. Rooted in the belief that Israel's claim to the city is superior to all others, this approach would offer Palestinian Jerusalemites limited cultural autonomy at best while marginalizing them politically. Like a mirror image of its maximalist Palestinian counterpart, this proposal pays no heed to the other side's deep attachment to the city and the political expression this requires. Either one of these solutions could be imposed through force or other means of coercion, but it is clear that neither can ever form the basis for a mutually acceptable settlement.

Teddy Kalleck's proposal to resolve the Jerusalem problem by establishing boroughs with broad authority under a single municipal government and granting the latter special status in Israeli law is somewhat more realistic. Because it leaves ultimate political control over the whole city in Israel's hands, however, it is still too one-sided to gain Palestinian acceptance (Nazzari, 1985). Kalleck's proposal is actually an adaption of a more far-reaching plan put forward by Meron Benvenisti in the years following the city's unification, a plan for which Benvenisti was hounded from office. In fact, the idea of

setting up separate boroughs as a way of accommodating the different national communities in Jerusalem goes back even further: Chaim Arlosoroff, head of the Jewish Agency's political department proposed it in 1932; Daniel Auster, Jerusalem's deputy mayor, did so the following year; and Sir William Fitzgerald, the British Chief Justice in Palestine who was appointed as a one-man commission on Jerusalem, made the same suggestion in 1945 (Ginio, 1980; Kraemer, 1980). In different incarnations, it is an idea which is still integral to many suggested settlements.

Imaginative proposals which seek to reconcile the basic demands of each side in the Jerusalem dispute by going beyond simplistic, exclusivist solutions have been advanced by a number of academics and public figures, particularly during the past decade. All essentially operate on the assumption that a general settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be reached based on the establishment of a Palestinian state or some other autonomous Palestinian entity in most or all of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Inevitably, some writers have gone further than others in their efforts to craft a creative compromise. Still close to the absolutist Palestinian position discussed above are the ideas put forward by Mahdi Abdul-Hadi, currently head of PASSIA, Walid Khalidi, a leading Palestinian intellectual, and Lord Caradon, author of U.N. Security Council resolution 242, which was passed after the 1967 war (Abdul-Hadi, 1985; Caradon, 1980; Khalidi, 1988). Each author proposes a settlement based on division of the city into sovereign Arab and Israeli portions under separate municipal governments, with free movement between the two.

Neither Abdul-Hadi nor Caradon insists on using the old border as the dividing line between the municipalities; Abdul-Hadi suggests that the precise boundary be decided upon in negotiations, while Caradon believes the U.N. should appoint a commission to recommend a boundary after hearing submissions from both sides. Abdul-Hadi would have the U.N. take responsibility for coordination between the municipalities and would like to see guarantees of full rights for Palestinians and Israelis residing in the other nation's territory. Khalidi suggests granting extraterritorial status to Jewish holy places in East Jerusalem and establishing a Grand Ecumenical Council with equal representation of Muslims, Christians, and Jews and a rotating chair to ensure interreligious harmony throughout Jerusalem. Caradon calls for demilitarization of the whole city. While these plans display some sensitivity to Israel's minimum requirements, it is highly doubtful whether any of them is sufficient to gain acceptance from the country's political leadership or general public.

Similarly, several academics sympathetic to the Israeli perspective have made proposals which go some distance, but seemingly not far enough, in recognizing Palestinian needs. Saul Cohen, a political geographer, and Daniel Elazar, a specialist in federalism, both developed such plans during the second decade of Israeli rule in Jerusalem, when the modus vivendi gave succour to those interested in preserving Israeli control over the entire city (Cohen, 1976, 1977, 1983; Elazar, 1980). Both men premise their schemes on permanent Israeli sovereignty in all of Jerusalem and suggest the establishment of separate

boroughs for Arabs and Israelis and the granting of extraterritorial status to non-Jewish religious sites and special status to certain religious figures. Cohen's proposals call for a complicated, multi-tiered system of government in Jerusalem. The tiers, from smallest to largest, would be as follows: neighbourhoods, which would have responsibility for matters such as cultural activities and small parks; communities or boroughs, which would issue building permits and administer the education systems; a united city council, with responsibility for relatively non-controversial matters like sewage, road construction, and environmental standards; a metropolitan government covering areas beyond Jerusalem's boundaries, which would look after transportation, waste disposal, and the like; an even larger city-region, responsible for matters such as agriculture and tourism; kehillot or nations, based on religious and international organizations and providing ideological guidance for education and financial support for cultural activities; and the state, Israel, which would be responsible for security, infrastructure development, and so on. Elazar goes into far less detail than Cohen and suggests several alternative options, but he appears to favour passing a law to make Jerusalem a special district within Israel and setting up two fairly autonomous municipalities under a district council. The main problem with these plans (setting aside, for the moment, the complexity of Cohen's scenario) is their failure to take into account the Palestinian demand for more than just local self-rule in Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty.

Faced with an impossible choice between re-partition of Jerusalem and continued

Israeli control of the whole city, some have suggested a form of joint or dual sovereignty with the city functioning as a capital for both Israel and a future Palestinian state. Anwar Sadat proposed this solution after the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty was concluded (Nazzari, 1985). He suggested the establishment of two autonomous boroughs under a single municipal government with the latter being headed up by Arabs and Israelis on a rotational basis. While he foresaw a united city with shared sovereignty throughout, Sadat thought Arab flags should be raised over Arab municipal buildings and holy sites and Israeli flags over Israeli municipal buildings and Jewish holy sites. Like Sadat, Avishai Margalit, a professor of philosophy at the Hebrew University, believes that joint sovereignty is the only arrangement which will satisfy both sides' basic demands while keeping the city united (Margalit, 1991). Although he recognizes that this will raise complicated problems with respect to the jurisdiction and application of the two states' legal systems, he argues that these problems can be dealt with, especially if Jerusalem is given special status by the parliaments of Israel and a future Palestinian state. He also muses that setting up boroughs might facilitate the transition to a cooperative system of municipal government. Variations on the idea of joint sovereignty are put forward by many others with an interest in Jerusalem, including a Palestinian priest who envisions making Jerusalem the capital of a United States of the Holy Land (Ateek, 1989), an international lawyer who imagines a single Palestine encompassing two sovereign states with Jerusalem "an undivided part of both" (Whitbeck, 1990), and a doctoral candidate in Toronto who proposes

internationalization of holy places along with the establishment of two boroughs under a single municipal administration (Littke, 1988).

Others who have struggled with the sovereignty dilemma and who are generally somewhat closer to the problem have concluded that, given the explosiveness of the issue, the only solution is to put in place structures which will render the question of sovereignty far less meaningful by providing for the needed mixture of segregation and unification on the ground. Mark Heller, a Canadian-born researcher at the Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies in Tel Aviv, first proposed "obfuscating" the sovereignty question almost a decade ago, in the belief that this would allow "all parties [to] credibly claim that they have secured their essential objectives" (Heller, 1983, p. 120). Included in his plan was a call for demilitarization of the city. More recently, Heller and Sari Nusseibeh have agreed to a similar proposal in No Trumpets, No Drums (Heller & Nusseibeh, 1991), a work which has drawn attention in part because of its uniqueness as a jointly-authored Israeli-Palestinian blueprint for peace (Hamilton, 1991). The key ingredient of the Heller-Nusseibeh formula is the drawing of boundaries within Jerusalem which would demarcate the authority of separate Palestinian and Israeli municipal councils but be understood differently by each side: Palestinians would view these boundaries as borders between areas of national sovereignty, while Israelis would see them as no more than jurisdictional lines between the municipalities. Each municipality would serve as the capital of its state and would have responsibility for culture-specific areas such as education, holiday

celebrations, and recreational activities. The municipalities would, however, function under a united "roof municipality" which would look after more neutral concerns like sewage, transportation, and tourism. All this would occur in the context of legislation passed by the Israeli and Palestinian parliaments to give Jerusalem a special status.

Moshe Amirav, a former member of the Likud's central committee who was forced to leave the party for holding secret talks with PLO-affiliated figures and who has sat on the Jerusalem city council as a representative of the moderate Shinui party, made a somewhat similar proposal in early 1990. He suggested expanding the boundaries of Jerusalem and establishing separate Israeli and Palestinian municipalities which would fall, respectively, under the sovereignty of Israel and a new Palestinian state and serve as their capitals. These municipalities would be united under a joint council with a rotating chair. Amirav's objective was a united Jerusalem where the nominal sovereignty exercised by Palestinians and Israelis in different areas would have minimal practical relevance. This approach was endorsed by several leading Palestinian figures, including Faisal Husseini and Hanna Siniora (Abu Aker, 1990; Abukhater, 1990).

The primary difference between the Amirav plan on the one hand and the Heller-Nusseibeh approach on the other relates, of course, to de jure sovereignty. While both proposals seek to limit the salience of the sovereignty issue by utilizing a variety of measures on the ground, the question of who has ultimate control in any particular portion of the city continues to bedevil their authors. This, really, is the sticking point when it

comes to the Jerusalem problem. For, as is obvious from the overview of proposals, there is a convergence between the approaches of thoughtful people on most other components of a deal for the city. These components are as follows:

1. The continued unity of the city with open access between all its sections. This unification is to be expressed in the establishment of a single metropolitan council.
2. The establishment under this council of two boroughs or municipalities along ethno-religious lines; one for Israeli Jews, and one for Palestinian Arabs. These boroughs are to serve as the capitals of Israel and Palestine and have responsibility for culturally sensitive matters such as education.
3. Control of holy sites by the appropriate religious authorities, with the possibility of extraterritorial status where required.
4. Demilitarization of the city.
5. Passage of legislation by the Knesset and Palestinian parliament giving Jerusalem special status which will permit its administration to function with relative autonomy.

All these components make a great deal of sense. They provide those interested in a settlement in Jerusalem with a valuable set of practical tools for reconciling the deeply-felt needs of Israelis and Palestinians in the city. Two questions, however, remain: first, whether the thorny but critical problem of sovereignty can be solved; and second, whether

imaginative compromise solutions developed by thinkers with the best of intentions can ever be accepted by political decision-makers and the publics at large. In the next two sections, I will try to provide some answers to these questions.

Does Peace Have a Chance?

As noted in the chapter on territoriality, sovereignty as it is understood today is, historically, a relatively young concept. Nevertheless, it has proven to be a very powerful one. The conventional wisdom -- shared by diplomats, politicians, and the general public - is that sovereignty is absolute and indivisible. Either a nation is sovereign over a given piece of real estate or it is not. This conceptualization of sovereignty, though sometimes pernicious and always restrictive, is deeply ingrained. As Krasner (1988) writes, even if "the notion that political life must be territorially organized with one final authority within a given territory . . . is sometimes challenged, no alternative has been effectively articulated and legitimated" (p. 89). He attributes this to the persistence of concepts and structures developed in response to conditions in earlier historical periods. While in theory, there may be alternative concepts and structures which would respond better to current realities, political leaders are limited in their range of choices by the preconceptions and expectations that flow from past experience. For this reason, creative and novel solutions to complex issues such as sovereignty over Jerusalem may be ideal on the drawing board but unworkable in practice, not because of inherent shortcomings, but because of politicians' and publics' inability to take such leaps of faith. As Lee Hamilton, the ranking

Democrat on the U.S. House of Representatives' Foreign Affairs Committee, states in his review of No Trumpets, No Drums, "I suspect . . . government officials who read this book will be most impressed by the broad sweep of the scholar's imagination compared to the narrow concerns of the policymaker" (Hamilton, 1991, p. 20).

To try and innovate on an entrenched concept such as sovereignty is challenging enough anywhere, but doing so in a place where the national struggle for political control is so emotionally intense and historically enduring is doubly difficult. The issue can be fudged as long as peace is absent, but it must be addressed directly in any agreement. Indeed, the ambiguities that would inevitably be a part of any unusual sovereignty arrangements might undo an otherwise viable settlement in Jerusalem. One need only look to the debates in pluralistic, peaceful Canada and Western Europe around new and less exclusivist definitions of sovereignty to realize how untested these ideas are. A city where, to use Benvenisti's term, "tribal" affiliations shape daily behaviour is simply not the best laboratory for the introduction of unfamiliar approaches to political control.

For this reason, it can be argued that there is no alternative to dividing formal sovereignty through the establishment of two boroughs in the city much as Moshe Amirav has suggested (but without his proposed expansion of the city's border, which seems to unnecessarily complicate matters). However, because this step is currently rejected by the vast majority of Israelis, it must be accompanied by measures which would balance its effects by ensuring that, formalities notwithstanding, the city is kept permanently united

and open. The demarcation lines of formal sovereignty cannot, as many Palestinians themselves acknowledge, follow the old border. Rather, they should correspond to current districts of Israeli and Palestinian residence, something which will probably necessitate what Sari Nusseibeh has termed "scattered sovereignty" (Nusseibeh, 1990a, p. 21). Many Israelis and Palestinians would probably be prepared, in principle, to accept such an arrangement for most of the city: few Palestinians have any interest in controlling West Jerusalem and, if the issue were a subject of serious debate, most Israelis would probably have a similar attitude toward the Arab neighbourhoods of East Jerusalem, neighbourhoods which they have little reason or desire to visit, particularly since the beginning of the intifada. The crux, however, would come in negotiations about sovereignty in the Old City. In other words, when the issue of control over the critical national symbols in Jerusalem is boiled down to its essentials, the key dispute is over the Old City, a walled space of about 1 square kilometre in size. Indeed, one could even argue that within the Old City, there is room for agreement on the residential quarters, for it is debatable whether the majority of Israelis who are not religious nationalists want to fly their flag in the Muslim Quarter any more than most Palestinians want to rule the Jewish Quarter. But there is no doubt that a profound conflict exists over the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif. The only conceivable solution would be one which continues the status quo in terms of formal control and access -- with the Muslim wakf controlling the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif but guaranteeing access to Jews and other visitors and Israel controlling the

Western Wall and plaza beside it -- while placing holy sites under some sort of extraterritorial status which would not permit formal sovereignty over the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif to fall to either Israel or a future Palestinian state. It must be recognized that even under such conditions, an arrangement such as that proposed here would constitute a profound sacrifice for Israel and that safeguards in symbolically sensitive areas would have to be built in. For example, the wakf would have to undertake to prevent the raising of any national flags on the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif.

Measures to unite the city and keep it open once formal sovereignty lines had been agreed to would, in a sense, make these lines legal niceties, though critical "niceties" from a symbolic point of view for Palestinians and other Arabs. As discussed in the review of proposals above, one measure would be the establishment of a strong "roof" municipality with special status in Israeli and Palestinian law. This municipality should have control over a single police department, the only armed security force in the city, and should be able to make laws to bridge gaps between the Israeli and Palestinian legal systems when crimes are committed in the city. Also needed would be a clear, detailed, and binding agreement on Jerusalem's permanent status as a united, open city signed by Israel, its Arab neighbours, and Saudi Arabia and guaranteed by the major powers. A small United Nations team might be invited to take up residence in the old U.N. headquarters in the city to oversee adherence to this agreement. Alternatively, Teddy Kolleck's Jerusalem Foundation could be expanded in consultation with the Palestinians and given a broader

mandate which would include a monitoring role, although a new body, free of the memories of Israeli domination, might be preferred by Palestinians.

In summary, a realistic solution in Jerusalem will likely include the following: on the one hand, formal division of territorial sovereignty according to ethno-religious residence, extraterritorial status for the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif and possibly for other holy places, separate Israeli and Palestinian boroughs, and recognition of each borough as a political capital; on the other hand, establishment of a strong united municipality, special legal status for this municipality, demilitarization, and guarantees that the entire city will be permanently open to all its residents. Such a scheme may be a workable arrangement once in place. But the key question still remains: will the general publics and their leaders on both sides buy into such a solution?

The signs are not encouraging. In one poll conducted just before the intifada began, over half the Palestinian Jerusalemites surveyed wanted to see the city re-divided while less than a quarter favoured an open city. While a larger proportion of the Palestinian leadership in Jerusalem was interested in an open city, a similar number preferred an exclusively Palestinian East Jerusalem (Ashkenazi, 1989, 1990). Israeli public opinion has traditionally been just as maximalist when it comes to Jerusalem, a fact which has severely limited the willingness of normally outspoken Israeli political leaders to talk about Jerusalem as anything other than their country's "eternal, united capital" (Yishai, 1985b).

The impact on these attitudes of the intifada and other recent events such as the Gulf

War and the peace talks cannot easily be gauged. The invasion of the personal by the political since 1987 has, without a doubt, soured intercommunal relations on a day-to-day level, but many Palestinians would contend that it has ultimately improved the chances of a settlement by putting the lie to a misleading modus vivendi.

As noted in the previous section, the uprising produced confusion and polarization among Israelis, but there is no evidence that these were accompanied by increased flexibility in the short term. If anything, it would appear that Israelis, feeling threatened, became more willing to accept the manipulation of emotive symbols such as Jerusalem by leaders intent on torpedoing talks on territorial concessions; the attacks on Baker's peace plans by ultra-nationalists who focused and continue to focus on representation of East Jerusalem Palestinians is a case in point. On the other hand, the Israelis' understanding that their image of a unified Jerusalem had been an illusion and their increased willingness to recognize the Palestinians as a nation were developments that, in the long term, might encourage Israeli flexibility in Jerusalem. The effect of the mass immigration of Russian Jews will be clearer after the June, 1992 elections; the political right, which is unlikely to ever compromise in Jerusalem, would like to see support of the "national camp" become a symbol of the newcomers' commitment to the country the same way it became such a symbol for many Jewish immigrants from Arab lands (Yishai, 1985a).

Among Palestinians, the intifada has elevated local figures who have regular contacts with Israelis to the top of the Palestinian leadership, a development which paved the way

for recognition of Israel by the Palestine National Council and which may increase the Palestinians' readiness to make other compromises in the interest of peace (Eichler, 1991). According to one article, the leaders from "the inside" "are willing to negotiate arrangements that would accommodate Israel's desire to keep the city unified and retain access to the holy places, provided the basic issue of Palestinian sovereignty over East Jerusalem is assured," wording which is encouraging but sufficiently ambiguous so as to leave the reader unsure of whether the necessary flexibility is really contemplated (Moughrabi et al., 1991, p. 48). In the longer term, the pride and confidence produced by the intifada, which currently may facilitate compromise, could easily turn into nationalistic extremism if peace efforts bear no fruit.

Studies have shown that Israelis and Palestinians have very different visions of a general peace settlement. In fact, there does not even appear to be a scenario which can win the support of a plurality from each side (Inbar & Yuchtman-Yaar, 1989). Attitudes on Jerusalem's ultimate status appear to follow the same pattern. Random street polling conducted for the purposes of this paper in Jerusalem during the summer of 1990, though not structured according to statistical standards that would permit a claim of high reliability, indicated that the two sides are far apart on the issue (full details of the poll are given in appendix 2). Those surveyed were asked whether they would approve of a hypothetical compromise involving recognition of Jerusalem as a dual capital, control of Arab neighbourhoods by Arabs and Israeli neighbourhoods by Israelis, and continued

unification of the city. Seventy-two per cent of the 100 Palestinians interviewed rejected this solution -- a result in line with the figures obtained in the survey cited above (Ashkenazi, 1989, 1990) -- and 55 per cent of the 76 Israelis interviewed did so. When asked how the intifada had affected their personal willingness to compromise on Jerusalem, 78 per cent of Palestinians said they were more flexible as a result of the uprising while half the Israelis said there had been no change in their positions and almost a third said they had become less flexible. When asked how, in their opinion, the intifada had affected the chances for a settlement in Jerusalem, 59 per cent of Palestinians thought the chances of a compromise had improved and 23 per cent felt there had been no change, while 68 per cent of Israelis believed a compromise was less likely and only 21 per cent thought the opposite. In summary, a majority of both Palestinians and Israelis (a higher proportion of the former than the latter) rejected even a loosely-worded compromise solution for Jerusalem; Palestinians said that the intifada had increased both their personal willingness to compromise in Jerusalem and the chances for a settlement; and Israelis felt the intifada had either not affected or damaged their personal readiness to compromise and had decreased the likelihood of a settlement in the city. Extrapolating from these data, one might be led to believe (though further surveys would be needed to confirm this) that most Israelis and Palestinians still support options which cannot form the basis for a mutually acceptable compromise: continuation of the basic status quo on the one hand, and re-partition of the city on the other hand.

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Does all of this mean that a settlement simply cannot be reached in Jerusalem, as some have argued? Assuming that the political leadership shares and is influenced by popular opinion, are the competing claims to and visions of Jerusalem simply incompatible? These are not questions that can be answered with any certainty. But it is possible to develop strategies that will improve the chances of compromise. Without a deal on Jerusalem, any peace agreement reached would be threatened. For this reason, those who believe that a compromise might theoretically be possible must do what they can to remove some of the barriers on the road to that compromise. In the following section, a suggestion is made concerning how this might be done.

Breaking the Taboo

In 1923, a British traveller in Palestine used a curious phrase to describe Jerusalem: City of the Mind (Ashbee, 1923). Almost seven decades later, a geographer and an anthropologist studying the city chose a similar expression to describe relations between its Palestinian and Israeli residents: division in the mind (Romann & Weingrod, 1991). The dispute over Jerusalem truly is "of the mind." Admittedly, all conflicts are, fundamentally, psychological; as some conflict resolution specialists have noted (without always acknowledging the impossibility of their prescription), if people only changed their perceptions of their needs and of external reality, everything would be fine. But the Israeli-Palestinian struggle for control over Jerusalem is particularly "of the mind," for it is a struggle that flows not from the "hard" requirements for strategic depth or economic

resources, but rather from the clash of fundamental national symbols. This has led to an effective taboo on public discussions of compromise solutions, either because such talk would be perceived as a willingness to sacrifice a birthright or because of the calculation that mentioning Jerusalem is a sure way to destroy fragile dialogues.

That taboo is the main barrier currently preventing progress towards a settlement. The initiation of discussion will not automatically lead to agreement on one of the blueprints outlined above. But the absence of discussion will surely prevent the blueprints from ever being considered. As long as Jerusalem remains a sacred cow, few politicians will dare propose the sorts of concessions needed if a mutually acceptable settlement is ever to be found for the city. Yet without proposals entering the public forum, Jerusalem will remain a sacred cow. In other words, the issue is presently in suspended animation because no one feels it is legitimate to seriously, publicly ponder compromises.

Political leaders cannot be counted on to break out of this catch-22. In Israel, they fear the consequences at election time of abandoning this most basic element of the "national consensus," while Palestinian figures risk losing their credibility on the street if they are seen as acquiescing in Israeli plans for the city (as Hanna Siniora quickly learned). The only way a realistic exchange on Jerusalem can be started is for academics and public figures who have pondered compromises in the relative safety of scholarly publications, private conversations, and the like to begin doing so in a highly visible but unofficial forum. Discussions on Jerusalem have already been held between Israeli and Palestinian

academics -- including some which have brought together scholars from Hebrew University's Truman Institute and East Jerusalem's Arab Studies Society with the help of the Ford Foundation -- but to date they have taken place far from the public eye. The impression of separate monologues on the city's future remains. Although developing a public dialogue would likely provoke wide condemnation on both sides of the national divide, it would help break the taboo on the subject of Jerusalem, thereby removing at least the first barrier to an eventual agreement.

It is thus proposed that a group of interested individuals committed to the search for a mutually acceptable settlement in Jerusalem should meet on a regular basis to thrash out a "deal" and seek maximum publicity for their meetings. In effect, these sessions would constitute a form of unofficial negotiations intended to facilitate rather than supplant the official ones. They would be part of what some writers have termed prenegotiation: the critical process of clarification and option-testing that tends to precede successful, formal negotiations. As William Zartman says, the process of conflict resolution "can be considered as one of eliminating alternatives, until only one solution remains" (Zartman, 1989, p. 246). Prenegotiation allows the exploration and elimination of alternatives to begin with less political risk than would be entailed in formal negotiations (Gross Stein, 1989). A Jerusalem Forum would be the first step in this process. Anyone with sufficient academic or political credentials should be allowed to participate, on condition that he or she agrees to some basic guiding principles:

1. Settlement of the dispute over Jerusalem will have to be a part of any general peace agreement;
2. Both Israelis and Palestinians have emotional and historical bonds to Jerusalem and a legitimate desire to see these bonds expressed politically;
3. The city's continued unity is essential.

These principles are vague enough to allow the participation of people of goodwill as far apart in their approaches as Teddy Koller and Mahdi Abdul-Hadi, but to exclude those with no real interest in trying to comprehend or accommodate the vision of the other side.

Will the public respond, and the political leaders in their wake? Again, one cannot be sure. But research in the field of cognitive psychology does indicate that information which throws old ways of viewing things into question will produce revised perceptions and that when individuals face an incompatibility between two equally important objectives, they will seek to develop more complex and realistic policy solutions (Bar-Tal *et al.*, 1989; Tetlock, 1986). A high-profile airing of the issues and discussion of possible solutions might help the Palestinian and Israeli populations to recognize the incompatibility between their desire for peace and their exclusivist visions for Jerusalem and so, could encourage development of less simplistic positions. In addition, they might result in some moderation of perceptions on both sides as people break out of the self-fulfilling prophecy that a settlement in Jerusalem is out of the question. Witnessing representatives of the other side talk about compromise can be a powerful experience. The proportion of Israelis who

believed in the Anwar Sadat's peaceful intentions increased from 29 to 88 per cent after the Egyptian President's visit to Jerusalem and the subsequent peace talks (Yishai, 1985a). Thus, while there is no guarantee that a Jerusalem Forum would be seen as anything but a disloyal academic exercise by many, it could help persuade at least some that the search for a workable solution to the dispute over Jerusalem is not pointless.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

Better is the end of a thing than the beginning thereof.

Ecclesiastes 7:8

The key thesis question posed in the introduction to this paper was how, in light of the history of Palestinian-Israeli relations in Jerusalem, might a mutually acceptable settlement in the city be promoted. The proposals discussed in the previous chapter provide a tentative answer to this question, but one couched in qualifications that are less than optimistic.

Amos Elon calls Jerusalem "a cruel city, a city of contention and strife" (Elon, 1989, p. 63). Jerusalem has long been a magnet for messianic movements bent on seizing control of the holy city away from assorted and sundry infidels. Haunted by history, it continues to provoke absolutism among people from both sides of the Israeli-Arab conflict, even those who speak of sweet accommodation on other issues. Santayana may have been right when he said that "those who do not remember the past are condemned to relive it," but had he lived in Jerusalem, he might have added a corollary: "those who remember the past too well never stop living it."

The past, however, also contains some seeds of hope. Although the modus vivendi ultimately proved to be something of a facade as far as the Palestinians were concerned, it did show that, once political issues are removed as a concern, Arab and Jewish

Jerusalemites can interact civilly. The problem was that between 1967 and 1987, political issues were removed not because they were dealt with, but because they were ignored, a situation which, it turned out, could not last forever. Nevertheless, the cordiality of daily relations for those two decades shows that if the preoccupation with political issues can again be removed through arrangements approved of by both peoples, Jerusalem may still rise above historical animosities to become a shared city in the true sense of the word.

A Jerusalem Forum might get the ball rolling in this direction, though one should be under no illusions that such a proposal would necessarily have a meaningful impact. After all, this is terrain in which the scholars and diplomats have repeatedly stumbled. But, for what it is worth, the idea proposed herein does seem to offer a realistic way of starting to break the current logjam and allowing options such as those outlined in the last section to be publicly debated and legitimized.

This paper has focused on analyzing the case of Jerusalem itself rather than the broader implications of that case, a subject which deserves comprehensive treatment in a separate work. Several key implications may, nonetheless, be briefly highlighted. With respect to other multiethnic cities, Jerusalem provides a lesson in what happens when intercommunal conflicts take on a symbolic, nationalistic character. Unlike more peaceful multiethnic cities such as Montreal and Brussels, Jerusalem is not divided by competition for the upper hand within existing political structures so much as conflict over the very shape of those structures. There is no sense of common destiny, no underlying belief that the two sides

must find ways of living together within a single system, but rather an exclusivist wish to dominate the system or tear it apart. Students of Jerusalem who have surveyed the scene have concluded that the only multiethnic city with a comparable dynamic is Belfast (Benvenisti, 1986; Elon, 1989). Like Jerusalem, Belfast has been torn by a profound and enduring intercommunal struggle rooted in religion and history to the point where a geography of fear defines the areas where city residents of different backgrounds circulate. The lesson of the intifada in Jerusalem -- that coexistence based on the negation of one side's political vision cannot last indefinitely -- is just as relevant to capital of Northern Ireland. However, whatever the wishes of the peacemakers, it is debatable whether either city can be transformed into a Montreal or Brussels, where people of different backgrounds tend to be segregated residentially but interact in a variety of other spheres peacefully.

With respect to the broader Arab-Israeli conflict, the history of Jerusalem holds a mixed lesson. On the one hand, it illustrates that better understanding of one another's positions does not necessarily increase the chances of compromise, at least in the short term. From 1967 to 1987, Israelis and Palestinians living in Jerusalem learned to know one another as individuals. Since 1987, their learning has been more political: Israelis have learned about the Palestinians' attachment to Jerusalem and their perception of its Eastern sector as a part of the occupied territories; the Palestinians have learned just how determined Israel is to preserve its vision of a united city. Yet Jerusalemites today seem as unwilling as ever to contemplate compromises which would go some way towards

accommodating both sides' demands. To some extent, this contradicts the basic assumptions of many experts in conflict resolution who assume that a learning process will invariably lead to greater flexibility. Thus, one of the lessons of Jerusalem for the wider conflict is that comprehension of the enemy's positions must be accompanied by a belief that the enemy is ready to make some concessions. In the Middle East, it is not mutual understanding that is absent so much as trust.

On the other hand, the ability of Israelis and Palestinians to live side-by-side in Jerusalem for so long with relatively little violence, even if this was accomplished through segregation, bodes well for the longer term. Arabs and Israelis are not about to embrace the sort of warm peace that many in the West imagine every time the parties sit down at the bargaining table. But what Jerusalem demonstrates, along with the Egyptian-Israeli peace, is that lukewarm, guarded tolerance might indeed be possible. For many outside the Middle East, such a scenario might seem like a disappointment. For peoples who have fought one another in a string of wars for the past half a century, however, it would be a welcome relief.

If the current discussions between Israel and its Arab neighbours, including the Palestinians, ever make substantive progress towards a general settlement, Jerusalem will inevitably appear on the horizon as the last, and perhaps greatest, hurdle to be overcome. It is not an issue that will fade away with time. The great danger is that the symbolism of the city for both sides will prove so powerful that no compromise will be possible. The

great hope is that by the final stages of the peace process, enough trust will have developed for the politicians and publics to be a little more flexible with sovereignty over a territory each people sees as its own. If that happens, Jerusalem may yet live up to its names: the City of Peace, the Holy.

Appendix 1

A Chronology of Jerusalem

Dates	Major Events	Groups in Control
c.2000-c.1000 BC	Canaanite Period	Canaanite peoples (Amorites, Jebusites, etc.)
c.1000	Israelite conquest under David	Israelites
952	Completion of First Temple	
586	Babylonian conquest, destruction of First Temple, expulsion of Jews	Babylonians
538	Persian conquest, return of Jews	Persians
515	Completion of Second Temple	
332	Greek conquest under Alexander	Greeks
165	Maccabee revolt, restoration of Temple	Jews
63	Roman conquest	Romans
c. 30 AD	Christ's crucifixion	
66-70	Jewish revolt, destruction of Temple, beginning of Jewish diaspora	

300	Christianity adopted by Rome	Byzantines
335	Completion of Church of the Holy Sepulchre	
638	Muslim conquest	Arabs
692	Completion of Dome of the Rock	
705	Completion of Al-Aqsa Mosque	
1099	Crusader conquest	Christian Europeans
1187	Muslim reconquest under Saladin	Arabs
1516	Ottoman conquest	Turks
1863	Establishment of Jerusalem municipality	
1917	Balfour Declaration, British conquest	British
1923	Formalization of British Mandate	
1921, 1929, 1936	Palestinian revolts	
1947	Adoption of partition plan by UN	
1948	Establishment of Israel, war, partition of Jerusalem	Israelis, Jordanians

1967	War, reunification, <u>de facto</u> annexation of East Jerusalem by Israel	Israelis
1969	Burning of Al-Aqsa Mosque	
1977	Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, beginning of process which leads to Egyptian-Israeli treaty	
1980	Passage of Jerusalem Law by Knesset	
1987	Beginning of <u>intifada</u>	
1990	Temple Mount killings	
1991	Gulf War, beginning of Arab-Israeli peace talks	

Sources: Cattani, 1981, 1985; Elon, 1989.

Appendix 2

Survey Data

Surveys were conducted for this study in Jerusalem during August, 1990.

Seventy-six Israelis were chosen at random in the streets of West Jerusalem by myself and my wife and asked the following questions:

1. If, in the framework of a peace treaty, Jerusalem were to remain united and to be recognized as the capital of the state of Israel, would you accept the Palestinians having control over Arab neighbourhoods and the city serving as a capital for them as well?
2. How has the intifada affected your views on the future of Jerusalem? (Three response options offered: more willing to compromise/less willing to compromise/no change).
3. In your opinion, how has the intifada affected chances for an Israeli-Arab agreement on the future of Jerusalem? (Three response options offered: improved/damaged/no change).
4. Personal details: age, sex, ethnic origin, and profession.

One hundred Palestinians were chosen at random in the streets of East Jerusalem and interviewed by a representative of the Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre. The questions they were asked were the same as those posed to the Israelis, except for the obvious reversal required in the first and the substitution of religion for ethnic origin:

1. If, in the framework of a peace treaty, Palestinian control over Arab neighbourhoods in East Jerusalem were accepted and the city were recognized as a Palestinian capital, would you agree to Jerusalem remaining united and to recognition of it as Israel's capital as well?
2. How has the intifada affected your views on the future of Jerusalem? (Three response options offered: more willing to compromise/less willing to compromise/no change).
3. In your opinion, how has the intifada affected chances for an Arab-Israeli agreement on the future of Jerusalem? (Three response options offered: improved/damaged/no change).
4. Personal details: age, sex, religion, and profession.

The responses to the first three questions were as follows:

Israelis

(absolute figures and percentages)

Question 1: Readiness to accept hypothetical settlement.

Yes:	31	40.8%
No:	42	55.2%
Yes to Palestinian control over neighbourhoods, no to Palestinian capital	2	2.6%
No answer:	1	1.3%

Question 2: Effect of the intifada on own attitudes.

More willing to compromise	12	15.8%
Less willing to compromise	23	30.3%
No change:	38	50.0%
No answer:	3	3.9%

Question 3: Effect of intifada on chances for an agreement.

Improved:	16	21.1%
Damaged:	47	61.8%
No change:	11	14.5%
No answer:	2	2.6%

Palestinians

(absolute figures and percentages identical)

Question 1: Readiness to accept hypothetical settlement.

Yes: 28

No: 72

Question 2: Effect of the intifada on own attitudes.

More willing to compromise 78

Less willing to compromise 14

No change: 8

Question 3: Effect of intifada on chances for an agreement.

Improved: 59

Damaged: 14

No change: 23

No answer: 4

No significant correlations were found between the patterns of these responses and any of the demographic data requested in the fourth question.

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Al-Fajr (English-language edition)

The Globe and Mail

The Jerusalem Post (Including The Jerusalem Post Magazine and In Jerusalem)

Hebrew-language newspapers:

Ha'Aretz

Yediot Achronot

Interviews held August 12-20, 1990:**Palestinians**

<u>Name</u>	<u>Profession/Position</u>	<u>Organization</u>
Mahdi Abdul Hadi	Academic, Head of PASSIA	PASSIA
Banar Saraba	Academic	PASSIA
Ibrahim Dakkak	Head of Arab Thought Forum	A.T.F.
Hanna Seniora	Editor	<u>Al-Fajr</u>
Sha Aban	Lawyer, Academic	An-Najah Univ.
Ibrahim Karae'en	Journalist, Head of Palestinian Press Society	P.P.S.
Elias Khoury	Lawyer	
Ziad Abu-Ziad	Editor	<u>Gesher</u>
Majid Al-Haj	Academic	Haifa Univ.

Israelis

<u>Name</u>	<u>Profession/Position</u>	<u>Organization</u>
Avraham Ashkenazi	Academic	Davis Inst., Hebrew Univ.
Stanley Waterman	Academic	Haifa Univ.
Amir Cheshin	Arab Affairs Advisor to Teddy Kalleck	Jerusalem Municipality

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