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RIPE MOMENTS:
PRECONDITIONS FOR THE RESOLUTION OF
PROTRACTED SOCIAL CONFLICT

– Zimbabwe's Road to Lancaster House Re-Examined

by

MICHAEL G. DICKHOUT, B.A.(Honours)

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs

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ISBN 0-315-70927-8

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Thesis Supervisor

Director,
The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs

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ABSTRACT

This thesis develops a social-learning approach to conflict resolution, providing a framework for the analysis of protracted social conflicts in the prenegotiation stage. Conflict resolution is the result of cognitive progress caused by learning in the parties. The framework integrates the structural approach and needs theory by assigning them roles in the learning process. Ripe moments are points in the conflict when the learning necessary to permit further progress toward resolution has occurred. They indicate opportunities for the parties to overcome the barriers to choosing negotiation as a method of settling their conflict. The stimulants of learning are examined to determine their role in creating ripe moments. The framework is applied to Zimbabwe's liberation struggle, dispelling the convention that success was achieved because of a hurting stalemate.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Brian Mandell, an excellent supervisor and great friend who woke me to the world of conflict resolution. Brenda Sutherland, friend and guardian at the centre of the NPSIA universe, deserves special thanks: her humour, expertise, and generous assistance saved my butt and academic career more than once.

This is dedicated to my parents, whose love, support, and breakfast table talks make life possible; and to Diane who makes it worth living.

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During many of the world's most intractable conflicts, the process of getting the parties to agree to negotiate is often more difficult than the process of reaching an agreement once the negotiations begin (Saunders, 1985:249,250). Most research in negotiation theory has concentrated on the content and process of negotiations in order to overcome the obstacles encountered at the table. This has improved negotiating skills, but leaves would-be mediators incapable of getting the parties to the table where these skills can be employed (Haass,1988:232). Recognizing this imbalance, theorists have adopted a broader approach, examining not only the negotiating process, but also the stages of conflict prior to the actual negotiations (Saunders,1985).

Before the parties to large-scale conflict will accept a negotiated agreement, certain conditions must be present that allow the parties to favour negotiation over continuing the conflict. When these conditions are not present, efforts at negotiation will not result in an agreement, and may even exacerbate the conflict. The objectives of this thesis are to determine what these conditions are, how they are created, and to provide a means of recognizing when they occur (Stein,1989a:231).

In particular, the thesis is concerned with the resolution of protracted social conflicts -- violent conflicts over the attainment of basic needs between states or ethnic groups within a state (Azar,1986). Conflicts are resolved when a new regime is created that is a "self-sustaining outcome" based on principles shared by the parties that allow the mutual attainment of basic needs (Burton,1987:8; Haas,1990).

This thesis will outline a five-stage Conflict Settlement Process (CSP), beginning with the inception of the conflict and ideally culminating with the implementation of a negotiated settlement. However, the focus of the thesis are two stages prior to the negotiation process: ripening and prenegotiation.

Initiated by the inception of the conflict, the ripening stage is characterized by events and changes in conditions that result either in a unilateral settlement imposed by the dominant party, or in the parties choosing to consider the negotiation option. In the latter case, the prenegotiation stage is initiated.

The function of prenegotiation is to get the parties to make a firm commitment to negotiation by creating structures that make such a commitment possible (Stein, 1989b:488). Prenegotiation ends "when the parties agree to formal negotiations or when one party abandons the consideration of negotiation as a policy option" (Stein,

1989a:232).

The importance of the ripening and prenegotiation in the settlement of conflicts is clear, as negotiations which follow a sound prenegotiation process are more likely to result in an agreement (Ury,1987:226). Furthermore, these stages are critical times for third party intervention because it is during ripening and prenegotiation that the parties decide whether to escalate hostilities or to consider more peaceful options (Stein,1989b:232).

The timing of third party intervention is crucial in determining the prospects for eventual success at negotiations. At best, bad timing will waste the diplomatic resources of the parties involved. The credibility of the third party and the multilateral settlement process may be seriously damaged. Failures may weaken the resolve of leaders to risk future attempts at negotiation, and may destroy progress already made (Haass,1990:4). At worst, premature prenegotiations may result in negative learning that causes leaders to favour an escalation of the conflict over entering negotiations (Stein,1989b:504).¹

The severe consequences of failure make it imperative that third parties have a clear understanding of

¹ Janice Stein asserts that U.S. sponsored prenegotiations between Israel and Egypt over the opening of the Suez Canal in 1971 and 1972 "exposed the serious obstacles to negotiation" that, combined with intense domestic pressure, led President Sadat to favour the use of force and initiate hostilities in the 1973 October War (1989c:440).

the ripening and prenegotiation processes. Theory must enable diplomats to diagnose conflicts and recognize ripe moments -- points in the conflict where conditions are present that are conducive for third party intervention to facilitate progress toward conflict resolution.

The thesis will develop a refined theoretical framework -- "the CSP" -- that will overcome the weaknesses of past theories and allow the generation of progressive hypotheses on the nature of the ripening and prenegotiation processes. The central proposition of the thesis is that conflicts are resolved through a process best described by Ernst Haas' concept of cognitive progress (1990). The resolution of protracted social conflicts requires the parties to experience cognitive progress, or significant levels of learning and attitude change. The concept of cognitive progress permits the integration of needs theory (Burton, Sites) and the structural (Zartman, Haass) and cognitive (Jervis, Fisher) approaches to conflict analysis because it recognizes roles for each in the learning process.

In Part One of the thesis, the theoretical framework of the CSP and a method of conflict analysis will be developed. Chapter One will provide a critique of the current theories. Chapter Two will outline the core assumptions of the new approach. Chapters Three and Four will elaborate on the ripening and prenegotiation stages of

the CSP. The fifth chapter will outline the methodology of the new framework and the central hypotheses to be tested in the case study.

In Part Two, the case of Zimbabwe's struggle for independence will be examined. It was chosen for two reasons. First, more analysis must be done on failed prenegotiation to properly develop the theory (Saunders, 1985; Stein, 1989b). The Zimbabwe case provides several instances where prenegotiation was initiated, but was not successful because the ripening process was not complete. Second, the case has been central to the development of current theories of ripening, with the undesirable consequence that the case has not been portrayed accurately.² The opportunity thus exists for a comparison between conclusions made in the past and those made using the new framework.

² According to Robert Jervis, "the heuristic use of crucial historical cases has proven so attractive as to overwhelm a more accurate portrayal of the cases themselves" (1990:85).

PART ONE: THE CONFLICT SETTLEMENT PROCESS

CHAPTER ONE: RIPENING AND THE RIPE MOMENT

This chapter will briefly outline and provide a critique of the power-based, or structural theories of ripening and the ripe moment, indicating where improvements are needed.

THE RIPENING PROCESS

William Zartman is the founder and leading theorist of the ripening process, which he first researched under the rubric of the ripe moment. Determining the causes behind the decision by the parties to consider negotiation as a policy option is central to the study of the ripening process (Zartman,1989:241). For Zartman, the ripe moment is generally a reference to a point in a conflict when conditions are right for the parties to reach a negotiated settlement, and thus right for successful third party intervention. His theory consists of two main components, the ripening process and the ripe moment (1986;1988).

There are four elements to Zartman's ripening process, (1986;1987;1988). The first element is the creation of the conflict caused by the disintegration and collapse of the regime that previously regulated the behaviour of the parties (Zartman,1986:216).

The second element is the readjustment of power relations among the parties. The ripening process is

characterized by two forms of changes in power structure: the prospect of the elimination of one party, or the gradual equalization of power between the parties. According to Zartman, "the first blends into the second, since it is the weakening, not the disappearance of the stronger party, that brings the power structure closer to equality and creates a propitious situation for settlement" (1988:211).

The third element of the ripening process is the elimination of "alternative formulas." Zartman defines formula as a solution "which can both frame the problem within a common notion of justice and provide a guideline for implementing details" (1986:206). Formulas are "invented" and then are subsequently rejected by one or more of the parties as unacceptable, until only one remains -- the resolving formula.

The fourth element is the emergence of this resolving formula, which signals the culmination of the ripening process. Resolving formulas are an outline of a new regime that solves the major problems of the parties by providing a common definition of the main issues of the conflict, a working relation between all the major parties concerned, and a notion of justice upon which an agreement and new regime can be based (Zartman, 1988:212).

In essence, ripening is a process of reducing the "distance" between the positions of the parties. However, according to Zartman, proximity of position is not enough.

The conflict must also be ripe -- conditions must be present that favour a shift in each party from the unilateral effort to solve its problem vis a vis the other party, to a multilateral approach that includes the other party in a process to find a mutually acceptable solution. A conflict is "ripe" when the "parties realize that their attempts to solve the problem and pursue their goals alone are unlikely to succeed at an acceptable price" (Zartman, 1988:213). Since the parties will be more amenable to reaching joint-solutions to their shared problems, these ripe moments present windows of opportunity for successful third party intervention. According to Zartman, ripe moments are characterized by four identifiable conditions (1988).

The first condition of the ripe moment is the stalemate. A stalemate occurs when the parties are in a long-term deadlock, with mutually blocking vetoes, no remaining alternatives, and with escalation toward a unilateral settlement no longer a rational option (Zartman, 1986:219). Zartman implies that this stalemate is created by an equalization of power, admitting that power equalization is "a judgement too stark to be applied strictly to the real world but important enough to provide insight into complex situations" (1988:211).

A mere stalemate, however, is not enough -- it must be accompanied by the second condition of severe discomfort to the parties. The stalemate must be a "painful

impasse which is unstable, and therefore, cannot be gotten used to or endured in the expectation that it will go away" (Zartman, 1987:284). According to Zartman, what is needed is a deadline after which there will be a "sharp change in costs" -- a looming catastrophe (1986:220). Such a catastrophe is "an impending turn for the worse that hurts both sides even more than they now are hurt" (Zartman, 1987:284). The first two conditions combine to form the central element of the ripe moment -- the hurting stalemate.

The third condition of the ripe moment is the existence of a way out. The way out is not a specific proposal that the parties must accept. It is a "perception of potentiality" created by the subjective perception that each party is willing to provide the other with an acceptable outcome, and the more objective perception that the positions of the parties are within reach of each other (Zartman, 1987:284).

The final condition of the ripe moment is the existence of valid spokespeople for each party, who are unconstrained by domestic pressure, and thus can undertake meaningful negotiation.

Working with Zartman's concept of ripeness, Richard Haass has derived four alternative conditions or "prerequisites" for ripeness (1990). First, and most important for Haass, is the requirement of "a shared perception of the desirability of an accord" caused by the

realization of the parties that the absence of an agreement will only worsen their situation with the passage of time (1990:27). Second, the desire to reach an agreement must be backed by an ability to agree to it. The parties must be either sufficiently strong to permit a compromise, or sufficiently weak that they cannot avoid making a compromise. "It makes no difference whether leaders are strong or weak, but what there cannot be is a principal party that falls in between: not strong enough to compromise, but only strong enough to hang on" (1990:27,28). Third, Haass asserts that "there must be sufficient compromise on both sides to allow leaders to persuade their colleagues and citizens that the national interest was protected" (1990:28). The final prerequisite for ripeness is the existences of a "mutually acceptable approach or process" through which an agreement can be reached and implemented (1990:28).

WEAKNESSES OF THE STRUCTURAL THEORIES

Empirical Content

For mental constructs to be considered theory, they must have a certain degree of empirical content -- they must consist of a collection of facts, generalizations, and explanations with value to the researcher. According to Harry Eckstein, "'analytic' schemes that decompose complex phenomena into their component elements, frameworks, and checklists" are merely "soft theory" -- mental constructs

that do not conform to the requirements of formal theory, often to the extent that they should not be considered theories at all (1975:86,87).

Zartman and Haass have created "checklists" of conditions required for the moment to be ripe. Many of these "conditions" (valid spokespeople, a way out, and sufficient compromise) are "hand-waving," self-evident assertions or truisms, with limited empirical value. Furthermore, such assertions may have a negative impact on theory development as they can cause researchers to neglect central problems and alternative possibilities, as relationships that seem obviously true (like the hurting stalemate) are accepted as fact without further analysis (Jervis,1990:88,89).

Tautology

The main weakness in Zartman's ripening process is that it is tautological. Success at reaching an agreement occurs when the conflict is "ripe," or when there is a coincidence of the completed ripening process and a ripe moment (Zartman,1988). According to Zartman, "the culmination of the ripening process is the emergence of a resolving formula" (1988:218). He asserts that resolving formulas can preexist the ripe moment, but the parties will not be able to agree or implement the formula to settle the conflict until the moment is ripe.

The inclusion of the resolving formula as a

precondition of ripeness means that once a conflict is "ripe," it will be settled. Settlement, therefore, is an indication of both ripeness and success. Failure becomes an automatic indication of the lack of ripeness, to be conveniently explained by either the absence of a resolving formula, or when one seems to exist, by the absence of at least one of the conditions of the ripe moment. The tautology is enhanced by the ease in which the presence or absence of the hurting stalemate can be explained post hoc.¹

In order for this tautology to be broken, ripeness must be defined as the presence of conditions that are necessary, but not sufficient for success.² Furthermore, the conditions that are sufficient for success (resolving formula) cannot be achieved before the conditions that are necessary for success (ripe moment). Although formulas can be invented prior to the ripe moment, it is deterministic to accept them as resolving formulas before the conflict is

¹ Zartman explains the failure to resolve the Cyprus in a post hoc manner. He states that generally the conflict suffers from the absence of a resolving formula (1988:208); however, whenever the parties were close to agreement (in 1974, 1978, and 1985) he explains the failure on the absence of a hurting stalemate (1988:216).

² Louis Kreisburg suggests this solution to the tautology in his discussion of the ripe moment for de-escalation moves: "The time is right [ripe] when the necessary, but not sufficient, circumstances for de-escalation exist. What must be added lies within the capability of the actor or actors who may be undertaking the de-escalation" (1987:375).

settled.³ To prevent tautology, the process of agreeing to a resolving formula must follow the ripening process.

Practicality

The purpose of theory is to explain the generalizations and laws derived through research, and to provide a means to complete a desired objective (Waltz, 1986: 36; Murray, 1986: 179). To be applicable to real scenarios, the theory must indicate to the practitioner where to look for indicators from which a diagnosis, prognosis, and prescription can be made.

The lack of clarity in the terms "ripening" and "unripening" renders Zartman's theory very weak in practical terms. Does "ripening" mean more of the elements of the ripening process are being met, and "unripening" mean less are being met? However, each of these elements alone can be in a state of flux -- they can ripen or unripen independently of one another, and as Zartman points out himself, a resolving formula (supposedly a sure sign of ripeness) can emerge without it being used until the conflict is 'fully ripe.' Furthermore, are escalations of hostilities to be interpreted as an unripening breakdown of conditions of agreement, or as a ripening process toward the creation of a hurting stalemate?

Zartman states that it is the equalization of

³ This is not to say that one cannot judge ahead of time what is needed in a formula to settle a particular conflict.

power between the parties that leads to a stalemate and thus "creates a propitious situation for settlement" (1986:217). Haass clarifies the idea with his assertion that the parties must be strong enough to compromise, but not so strong as to hold out -- a somewhat self-evident assertion. However, the scholars do not provide a more precise explanation of why this configuration creates the ripe moment. Neither do they provide a method for objectively determining the power changes they consider to be of central importance. Furthermore, relying only on power analysis may result in tautology. William Habeeb points out that the realist formulation of power applied to practical analysis is tautological: the outcome determines how the power relation between the parties is interpreted after the fact (1988:13).

The differences between Zartman and Haass demonstrate the complexity of power change, and the need for more explanation and a method for objective power analysis.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has outlined the structural theories of ripening and provided a brief critique based on three criteria. The following four chapters will develop a new framework for conflict analysis that will incorporate the strengths of the structural approach while eliminating its weaknesses. The framework will then be applied to the case study in Part Two. The final chapter of the paper will use the same three criteria to evaluate the new framework.

CHAPTER TWO: CORE ASSUMPTIONS OF THE CSP

This Chapter will have three sections. The first section will outline the core assumptions concerning the nature of conflict and conflict resolution. The second section will elaborate on the central proposition of the thesis that resolution is the result of cognitive progress. The five stages of cognitive progress that form the Conflict Settlement Process will be outlined. In the final section, a model allowing the tracking of the substantive issues and positions of the parties will be provided. The following two chapters will elaborate the assumptions concerning the ripening and prenegotiation processes.

THE NATURE OF CONFLICT AND SETTLEMENT

Dimensions of Conflict

This thesis asserts that there are three dimensions to intergroup conflict. The objective dimension concerns the a priori aspects of conflict: needs and power. The subjective dimension is the resultant expression of needs and power in the real world that determines whether a situation is one of conflict or not. Needs are embodied in culturally determined metaphors -- social norms and institutions that are the means for attaining basic needs. Power is expressed in the interests of a party. In this respect, metaphors and interests are the substantive issues of a conflict -- conflict occurs when the attainment of metaphors and interests are mutually preclusive.

The cognitive dimension provides the set of variable functions that determine how the objective variables are translated into the subjective resultants: how needs are expressed in metaphors and power in interests. It also determines the nature of the relationship between the parties -- whether the parties tend to be hostile or cooperative with one another.

Objective Dimension

Needs

The first element of the objective dimension is needs. A central assumption of the CSP is that there are certain universal human needs that, because of their ontological nature, will be pursued by individuals and groups at any price and can never be compromised (Sites, 1973; Burton, 1979, 1986, 1987). The needs are universal to human "actors" at the individual, group, and state level, "in the sense that they are a systemic requirement of the individual and that no society can be harmonious or survive indefinitely unless they are satisfied" (Burton, 1979:58).

Paul Sites and John Burton assert there are eight universal human needs that require fulfilment for the socialization and learning of an actor to take place (Sites, 1973; Burton, 1979). The eight needs can be summarized by the socio-political needs or demands for: human development (stimulation), security, justice, identity (recognition), and a means of control, such as political

participation (Burton, 1987:16,23).

The need for control, or "an ability to control rather than merely react to the social environment" is particularly important to parties during conflict and stems from the other needs never fully being met (Burton,1979:72). In conflict situations, the attainment of needs is denied or threatened, and therefore the parties will have a greater need for control than under peaceful conditions.

The denial of these basic needs will result in conflict because identity groups must attain these needs and will pursue them "regardless of human costs and consequences." (Burton,1987:23). Although basic needs may be suppressed over the short term by power arrangements, conflict between the group whose needs are being denied and the group denying them will continue until the needs are accommodated (Burton,1986:234). Therefore, for conflict to be resolved, each party must be able to attain its basic needs (Burton,1986;1987).

Power

The other element of the objective dimension of a conflict relationship is power, or the way in which a party uses its resources in a process with other parties to achieve its own preferred outcomes (Habeeb,1988:15).

The realist and structural approaches conceive power discrepancies as the main source of conflict. However, structural analysis depends primarily on the

concept of aggregate structural power -- the total resources and capabilities available to a party (Habeeb,1988:17). According to Habeeb, the analytical value of aggregate structural power is limited to "providing an overall 'picture' of the actor's position in the international system, but is of less use in analyzing the role of power in international negotiation," because it does not address the power structure of issues and relationships (1988:18). The role of aggregate power is simply to convey capability: it is the potential reserve of resources that can be brought to bear in the form of tactics and strategy, and thus is a source of the party's credibility.

To explain adequately the power relations and interactions that take place during the CSP, a more complex formulation of power is needed. Issue-specific structural power is the capability of an actor vis a vis another actor in terms of a specific mutual issue, and is particularly relevant to conflict analysis (Habeeb,1988:19). Changes in issue-specific power between the parties are a primary motivating force behind the evolution of the conflict, and will be examined in more detail in Chapter Three.

Subjective Dimension

Social groups express their needs and power in the form of metaphors and interests, which in turn manifest themselves in the characteristics of the regime (principles, norms, rules, and decisionmaking procedures) that governs

the relationships within or between the social groups.

Metaphors

Needs are expressed, pursued, fulfilled, and protected by culturally determined metaphors (Sites, 1973; Burton and Sandole, 1986). Metaphors are the behaviour patterns that a group either employs or wishes to employ to attain its basic needs. Within a regime, metaphors are the norms, customs and institutions that set the "standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations" (Krasner, 1983:2).

Metaphors will be based on the principles of the group -- the shared beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude (Krasner, 1983:2). Since metaphors are the means by which the attainment of basic needs and interests becomes possible, they will be highly valued by the group and support for the metaphors will be internalized in the form of cultural values (Sites, 1973:15; Burton, 1979:57, 60; Burton and Sandole, 1986:343)

For instance, among the industrialized nations, democratic institutions and the international liberal trading system are metaphors to attain certain needs, such as control (through political participation), identity (international recognition and acceptance), security, and development (assured access to markets that provide goods and promote economic development). Similarly, the principles supporting the system (capitalism,

individualism), have become cultural values in these states. Conflict is minimized between the industrialized states by the existence of international regimes comprised of compatible metaphors based on the principles shared by the member states.

Protracted social conflicts are caused by the metaphors of the parties being incompatible. The incompatibility of metaphors is reinforced by the lack of common principles to base a regime that resolves the conflict. The Cold War can be conceived as a conflict between the metaphors and principles of liberal democracy and those of communism.¹

Interests

Interests are the subjective embodiment of power in the real world. Generally, the more power a party has, the more interests it will develop as it will have greater means to increase its wealth and influence.

Conflict can occur as the result of a clash of interests between parties. However, as the relative power of a party declines, its interests will eventually be altered or become negotiable, which may then make some form of settlement possible.

¹ The "end" of the Cold War can also be seen as the result in the abandonment in the East of the "less compatible" aspects of communism, and in some cases the adoption of democratic principles.

Cognitive Dimension

The cognitive dimension consists of the psychological functions that determine how individuals and groups translate their needs into metaphors and power into interests, and how the parties to the conflict perceive each other and their relationship.

Knowledge is a system of beliefs and shared interpretations of information about how the world works and how certain problems should be solved (Haas,1990:219). Identity groups have shared knowledge based on their common psychological, sociological, anthropological, economic, and political history (Burton and Sandole,1986:343).

Individuals and groups mentally structure their knowledge in a collection of schemata. A schema is a mental structure that interprets the environment and outlines prescriptions for interaction with the environment in a particular realm of activity. For example, leaders will have schemata for interpreting the behaviour of a state, and will have different schemata for dealing with friendly and hostile states (Hastie,1986:22; Jervis,1986:321). The interpretive element of schema is comprised of sets of principles -- beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. The prescriptive element consists of behaviour patterns, such a metaphors, norms, institutions, and procedures. The principles and behaviour patterns of a group's schemata determine the nature of the regime sought or employed by the

group, and are reinforced by the group's cultural values (Sites,1973:15; Burton,1979:57; Burton and Sandole,1986).

Ideology provides the means to process the information held in schemata, determining the conditions under which certain schemata are employed. Based on the values of the group, ideology is a goal-plan structure based on a hierarchy of goals (Hastie,1986:26). The goal-plan structure provides the group with a means to process information, a programme for political action, and a blueprint for decisionmaking (Sites,1973:15; Burton,1979:57; 1986:343; Haas,1990).

The deepest goal in all societies is the attainment of basic needs. However, ideologies are not usually this perceptive, but rather establish as their core goal the achievement or maintenance of the particular set of metaphors valued by the group. Beyond this core are the goals to achieve interests; beyond this are the goals to achieve the means (tactics and resources) to achieve interests (Hastie,1986:26).

Schemata and ideology determine the group's selection of metaphors and interests, and thus are central in creating the substantial issues of protracted social conflicts. Changes in ideology will result in a different assessments of situations -- priorities will be redefined, relationships will be reperceived -- causing the party to use a different schemata. Schema change, caused by learning

or ideological change, will cause a party to react to the conflict and its adversary in a different manner. Changes in schemata are thus policy changes that can either create, perpetuate, or resolve a conflict.

Conflict Resolution

The process of conflict resolution consists of changes in (1) the positions of the parties on the substantive issues from incompatible to compatible, and (2) in the nature of the relationship between the parties from adversarial to cooperative (Keashly and Fisher, 1990). The source of these changes are the three dimensions of conflict. They are made possible by learning.²

Learning is the process whereby an increase in information (knowledge) about causes and effects (causation) results in the adoption of more effective means to attain objectives (Haas, 1980:390). Learning occurs to different degrees "along a continuum of ends-means relationships, from very simple to highly complex" (Nye, 1987:380).

Simple learning "uses new information merely to adapt the means, without altering any deeper goals in the ends-means chain" (Nye, 1987:380). For example, the failure to achieve objectives with a particular tactic will cause

² Learning is facilitated by attitude change, a shift in attitudes in "more veridical and positive directions," reducing misperception and increasing the potential for cooperation (Fisher, 1989:449). More complex learning requires greater attitude change. Although only learning will be discussed in detail, attitude change is assumed to be an essential part of learning and cognitive progress.

the actor to change tactics. The schema will be altered slightly. Simple learning and schema adjustment does not reflect a redefinition of interests.

Complex learning occurs with "the recognition of conflicts among means and goals in causally complicated situations [leading] to new priorities and trade-offs" (Nye, 1987:380). The complexity of the learning experienced by an actor depends on the "lesson" learned, the degree of goal redefinition, and the permanency of the redefinition. If goals are redefined because they cannot be sustained, and then restored once the actor's power increases, only relatively simple learning has occurred.

Protracted social conflicts are caused by incompatible metaphors, principles and values, and thus cannot be resolved solely through power shifts and simple learning. At best, power shifts will only impose metaphors that are inconsistent with core values and principles, or are incapable of providing needs for at least one of the parties. Although the conflict may be managed, the source of conflict, denied needs and values, will remain.

The resolution of protracted social conflicts requires each party to recognize that its means (metaphors and cultural values) preclude the achievement of its deeper goals to attain basic needs. The schemata the party uses to interpret the world and establish its behaviour patterns are dysfunctional -- they are the source of the conflict that is

threatening or precluding the party's ability to attain basic needs. The schemata must therefore be changed. Each party must experience complex learning that results in an altering of the metaphors that are the source of the conflict. The parties must change their core goals to new metaphors that eliminate the incompatibilities and allow the mutual achievement of the deeper goals of attaining basic needs.

The central proposition of this thesis is that the resolution of protracted social conflicts requires the parties to experience cognitive progress: mutual complex learning that results in the development of shared principles upon which common or compatible metaphors can be based. For this to happen, the parties must undergo a schema transformation: a change in schemata from the principles and metaphors that are the source of conflict, to new schemata with principles and metaphors shared and compatible with those of the adversary.³ The conflict can then be resolved by a regime based on these shared principles and metaphors because they allow the needs of the parties to be attained mutually. Cognitive progress is caused by the forces that stimulate learning (Haas, 1990: 211).

³ The schema transformation required may be different for each party; however, all parties will require a transformation from their unilateral strategy to the multilateral.

THE CONFLICT SETTLEMENT PROCESS

The CSP as Cognitive Progress

Ernst Haas defines cognitive progress as the cumulative increase in the means (knowledge/schemata and technology) required to develop government policies that solve problems within and between societies, and thus increase the capacity to achieve universal human objectives (1990). Haas considers these objectives to be increased health, wealth, and peace (1990:217). Here the objectives will be defined in terms of the attainment of basic needs.

For Haas, cognitive progress is a general trend in human history since the Enlightenment⁴ that indicates a net improvement in the "means that make possible the end of substantive progress [increased health, wealth, and peace]" (1990:218). In this respect, the CSP is a form of cognitive progress, only with a more specific objective -- increased peace through increasing the means to achieve conflict resolution; and a more limited time frame -- the history of a particular conflict. Cognitive progress is demonstrated by transformations to schemata that increase substantive progress. Similarly, the CSP is a five stage process culminating in a schema transformation that allows a

⁴ "It is only since the Enlightenment that it is considered legitimate to see humans as the sole agents of their own progress, not as subjects of divine or impersonal forces," and thus there is an awareness that humans can improve their situation by engaging in politics (Haas, 1990:218, 221).

conflict to be resolved.

Like cognitive progress, the "dynamic" element of the CSP, ripening, implies a "directional change for the better," with the same caveat that this change does not imply "inevitability, irreversibility, or historical necessity" (Haas,1990:217,210). Indeed, events can cause an "unripening" trend in the CSP, indicating a regression away from resolution.

Learning and the Five Stages of the CSP

Cognitive progress and conflict resolution is caused by learning in the parties. Learning is caused by a cyclical three stage process, which will be called the ripening dynamic (Haas,1990; Argyris and Schon,1978).

The initial stage of the dynamic is failure, or the mismatch of outcome to expectation -- outcomes do not meet expectations or fulfil objectives (Argyris and Schon, 1978:18). The failure to achieve objectives indicates the necessity to develop an alternative approach to overcome the failure.

Failure to meet objectives results in "suffering and disappointment [which] are the stimuli that cause collectivities to examine past experiences and reinterpret them... [and thus] stimulate the search for answers that contain different and more abstract explanatory schemes" (Haas,1990:212). This search, or process of inquiry is the second stage of the dynamic during which actors try to

determine the causes of failure, and develop and test solutions (Argyris and Schon, 1978:19).

The third stage of the ripening dynamic, adjustment, is initiated once the inquiry concludes that the proposed solutions are feasible. The actor then adjusts its behaviour patterns to become consistent with those proposed in the solution.

The CSP is a five-stage elaboration of the ripening dynamic. Each of the three central stages of the CSP has a "learning function" that corresponds to a stage in the ripening dynamic. Learning within each stage of the CSP is caused by the repetition of the dynamic. The learning function of a stage is completed when the parties have experienced the necessary level of complex learning. Ripe moments indicates that the parties have experienced the necessary level and that the learning function of the particular stage has been completed. When recognized and combined with the political will and skill of the parties to take the step, the ripe moment becomes a turning point to the next stage of the CSP.

The creation of the conflict is the initial stage of the CSP. Conflict is the result of the parties being unable to mutually attain basic needs. The "problem" facing each party is to develop or maintain means to attain its needs in an actual or perceived zero-sum environment. Each party attempts to "solve" its problem by adopting the

metaphor of the unilateral strategy. The mutual adoption of unilateral strategies by the parties initiates the ripening stage of the CSP.

The learning function of the ripening stage is to achieve the initial condition of failure: to indicate to the parties that their current schemata, including their unilateral strategies and other metaphors, are failing to attain their objectives of attaining needs and interests. This failure must be recognized to the extent that the parties perceive the necessity to seek alternative schemata -- in particular those associated with a multilateral approach to their shared conflict. Complex learning by the parties during ripening will create the conditions of the ripe moment for the transition to prenegotiation.

The learning function of the prenegotiation process is inquiry. Through a process of internal and external (multilateral) inquiry, the parties investigate the feasibility of alternative schemata associated with the multilateral approach. The parties reach the joint conclusion that a multilateral strategy will best serve their interests when they perceive the existence of shared principles upon which behaviour patterns can be based that will allow each party to achieve its objectives (Haas, 1990: 218; 219). The existence of shared principles creates a

basis for negotiation, or zone of agreement.⁵ The zone of agreement created by complex learning during prenegotiation marks the ripe moment to enter negotiations.

The fourth stage of the CSP is negotiation. The learning function of negotiation is adjustment as the parties attempt to adjust their behaviour patterns to make them consistent with the shared principles of the zone of agreement. The principles and behaviour patterns form the new schemata of each party. The development of new schemata represents the creation of a new regime. The schema transformation of each party takes place with the implementation of the new regime.

The final stage of the CSP is the implementation of the new regime that is expected to resolve the conflict. The function of the implementation stage is to determine whether the new regime succeeds in resolving the conflict (Saunders, 1985; Druckman, 1986a). If the regime fails to resolve the conflict, the CSP is propelled back to a previous stage.

A MODEL: The Zone of Agreement

The analytical model of the CSP is based on Howard Raiffa's model of distributive bargaining (1982). The positions of buyers and sellers can be mapped along a line to illustrate the existence of a zone of agreement. The

⁵ The concept of the zone of agreement is the basis of the analytical model of the CSP and will be discussed below.

lowest price that the seller can possibly accept is the reservation price of the seller (R_s). Similarly, the highest price that the buyer is capable of paying is the reservation price of the buyer (R_b). If R_s is greater than R_b , the reservation prices of the seller and buyer are incompatible -- the seller requires a price higher than the buyer is capable of paying -- and therefore a zone of agreement does not exist. For a zone to exist, R_s must be equal to or less than R_b : the greater the difference, the larger the zone, the more room to negotiate. If a sale is made (an agreement reached), the price of sale will be within the zone of agreement.

In protracted social conflicts, the main issues are the demands the parties make for the particular principles, metaphors, norms, and rules that each party wishes to comprise the regime that governs their relationship. The positions of the parties on these issues can be fractionated into need related demands, and interest related demands.

Reservation Demands

Similar to the concept of reservation price, reservation demands are the minimum goals and conditions that each party is capable of accepting, and that must be met by the new regime if it is to resolve the conflict. The source of reservation demands are the socio-political needs for security, justice, identity, recognition, human

development, and control. Each party makes reservation demands for the particular principles and metaphors it values and requires to attain basic needs.

Reservation demands form the ultimate boundaries of the zone of agreement: if the reservation demands of the parties are incompatible or mutually preclusive, a zone does not exist. Reservation demands make up the "policy" of a party, and the party cannot accept any settlement that compromises its own reservation demands as this would preclude the attainment of its own basic needs.

A zone is created when the parties, as the result of cognitive progress, change their reservation demands to an alternative set of principles and metaphors that allow the mutual attainment of needs.

During conflicts, the attainment of basic needs is in jeopardy, and therefore the needs for control and security become paramount. The parties will adopt two metaphors to achieve and maintain control and security, that then become reservation demands. First, control and security are sought and maintained through the unilateral strategy of the party.

A second metaphor for securing and protecting the attainment of needs is that of role defence. Individuals, groups, and states attempt to secure and preserve a role through which they attain recognition, security and stimulation (Burton, 1979:73). Role defence is the

expression of the need to protect the behaviour patterns (metaphors, rules, procedures, and tactics) used to attain needs by an actor, and is thus a primary cause of conflict perpetuation (Burton and Sandole, 1987:97,98). An actor will redefine its role only if the redefinition does not preclude the attainment of its needs.

Articulated Demands

During distributive bargaining, buyers will demand prices much lower than their reservation price, and sellers much higher than their own reservation price. If a zone of agreement exists, a "conflict of interests" still occurs because each party has an interest in obtaining its most favoured price at the expense of the other.

Conflicts are also often not over the reservation demands of the parties, but over articulated demands, or interests and aspirations that exceed reservation demands. The articulated demands most relevant to analysis are those that enhance and expand a party's ability to attain needs, and thus are an extension of reservation demands. During the settlement process, each party will make articulated demands for rules and procedures to guide the process and next regime that maximize the party's control to ensure its needs and interests are met in the most favourable terms.

The articulated demands a party makes depends on the party's power: as its power increases, it will develop more interests and articulated demands. These demands

change and shift as the party's ability to make demands declines, and as the result of simple learning. Shifts in articulated demands are indicated by the party making tactical changes and demands becoming negotiable, abandoned, or altered to different positions on the particular issue.

Articulated demands may be internalized as an expansion of the party's role. However, as power declines, these articulated demands will become change, leading to a reduction of the party's role. There are limits to role reduction, that once passed, will encroach on the reservation demands of the party, causing certain elements to feel that their security and other needs are threatened. The point at which roles become reservation demands is determined by the party's own "objective" perception of the minimum means required to attain its needs. Change beyond this point is a change in the party's reservation demand -- a schema transformation that requires complex learning stimulated by more than just power shifts.

Zone of Agreement

The zone of agreement is a set of principles shared by the parties upon which compatible metaphors can be based that will allow the parties to mutually attain needs. Cognitive progress is indicated by the creation of a zone. Creating a zone is a two stage process conducted in the ripening and prenegotiation stages -- the processes that will be examined in the two following chapters.

CHAPTER THREE: THE RIPENING PROCESS

The learning function of the ripening process is to initiate and perpetuate cognitive progress by creating the primary condition of failure. For the parties to experience complex learning that results in the adoption of new schemata based on a multilateral approach, they must first experience a failure to attain their basic needs with their existing schemata. In general, the unilateral strategy must be seen to be dysfunctional and incapable of meeting the deeper goals of attaining basic needs.

The transition to prenegotiation is made when, as the result of the continued failure of their unilateral strategies, the parties perceive the necessity of a multilateral approach, conclude that one is plausible, and decide to investigate the option.

Unilateral Strategy and Issue-Specific Power

A central characteristic of the ripening stage is the adoption of unilateral strategies by the parties to attain their objectives (needs and interests).

The objective of the unilateral strategy is compellence: to cause the adversary, through persuasion or coercion, to adopt more cooperative or conciliatory behaviour that makes the unilateral attainment of goals possible (Schelling, 1965). The compulsion felt by a party is caused by the configuration of issue-specific power between parties, which is determined by three variables. The

mutual use of unilateral strategies causes power shifts, or changes in the configuration of power. The parties follow strategic imperatives to cause favourable shifts in the three variables (Habeeb, 1984:20-24).

The first variable of issue-specific power is commitment, which is a function of the party's need or desire for its preferred outcome (Habeeb, 1988:21). A strong commitment is a source of power as it indicates a willingness to mobilize a greater proportion of resources and a willingness to endure greater costs. The parties will follow an imperative to increase their own commitment to a given policy, while attempting to decrease the commitment of their adversaries.

The second variable is the existence of alternatives available to the party for its desired outcome, and for its relationship with the other party. Alternatives refer to the ability of each party to achieve its preferred outcomes or acceptable substitutes without relying on the other actor. The existence of alternatives explain how parties are able to achieve a substitute to its preferred outcome by refusing to negotiate or by stalling the process. Each party will attempt to increase its own alternatives while decreasing those of its adversaries.

The most important variable at any point during the conflict is control: the degree to which a party can unilaterally achieve its preferred outcome within the range

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The most important variable at any point during the conflict is control: the degree to which a party can unilaterally achieve its preferred outcome within the range

of acceptable costs (Habeeb,1988:22). Control is an indication of the success or failure of the unilateral strategy of the party and is reinforced or undermined by the other two variables. It is increased and maintained primarily by military actions designed not only to achieve objectives unilaterally, but to preclude the other party's ability to attain its objectives.

Condition of the Conflict

The purpose of conflict diagnosis is to determine the general condition of a conflict. Although the primary indication of a conflict's condition is its stage in the CSP, four further conditions are possible within the ripening stage. The conflict condition is the particular configuration of issue-specific power produced by the compellent behaviour of the parties at a given point in the conflict's history. Power shifts and learning will change the condition of the conflict over time.

One possible condition is unilateral settlement. Successful unilateral settlement is the creation of a regime that meets the needs and interests of the dominant party, but precludes the attainment of those of the other. Having complete control the dominant party has succeeded in achieving its objectives within acceptable costs. The learning stimulant of failure will be weak for the dominant party, but strong for the subjected party which will attempt to increase the costs to the dominant party.

A second conflict condition is stalemate. The parties remain engaged in open conflict, but there appears to be no "movement" toward any form of settlement. Each party remains firmly committed to its unilateral strategy and has sufficient control to prevent the other party from unilaterally achieving its objectives. However, the lack of complete control results in the continued failure of each party to meet its own basic needs and interests, thus keeping the ripening dynamic active.

Continuous power shifts are a characteristic of a third condition of conflict -- a fluid situation in which the control of each party is in a state of flux. Declining control will cause simple learning in a party, which as a result, will adjust tactics to regain control. The main activity of this adjustment is the search for alternatives and variations within the unilateral strategy, such as the cooptation of elements of the other party, or entering negotiations for side benefits such as "buying time". Even when "successful," the tactical inclusion of cooptation or negotiation fails to resolve the conflict because either the main elements of the other party remain excluded from the process, or the conditions that make a negotiated settlement possible, such as a zone of agreement, are not present.

These three conditions of conflict represent the failure of at least one of the parties to achieve its objectives. Ideally, continued failure perpetuates the

ripening dynamic, stimulating complex learning to the point where the conflict enters the fourth condition: the ripe moment.

The Ripe Moment for Prenegotiation

The ripe moment to investigate the possibility of a negotiated settlement has three conditions that must apply to all principle parties, not only for the transition to prenegotiation to be successful, but also for continued cognitive progress toward eventual resolution. The three conditions perform three functions: (1) indicate to the parties the failure of their unilateral strategies and other metaphors to attain objectives; (2) provide the first indication that alternative schemata supporting a multilateral approach are necessary and plausible; and (3) indicate to the third party that complex learning has occurred within each party sufficient to ensure that the overtures to prenegotiate are made in good faith, and that a favourable outcome from prenegotiation is possible.

The first and central condition of the ripe moment is that the parties perceive the necessity of a multilateral approach. Necessity indicates the existence of a stimulus sufficient to cause complex learning -- that is, sufficient to cause the parties to consider altering their schemata in order to make a mutually acceptable settlement possible. Without a perception of necessity, the parties will not change their positions on the substantive issues to the

extent required to reach a negotiated settlement.

The primary source of necessity is failure to achieve objectives (attain and protect basic needs) through the use of unilateral strategies. The main source of a party's failure is the compellent behaviour of its adversary resulting in the party's compulsion. Failure stimulates learning; however, the existence of compulsion and failure alone are not enough to indicate that the learning experienced by the parties is sufficiently complex to make successful prenegotiation and further cognitive progress possible. The condition of necessity must be accompanied and reinforced by the two other conditions of the ripe moment. These conditions indicate to the parties that the multilateral approach is plausible -- that new schemata may exist upon which new compatible metaphors and a mutually acceptable agreement can be based.

The second condition of the ripe moment is that the parties reach a compatible definition (Saunders, 1985: 255; Tomlin, 1989: 258). Without a compatible definition, the parties may not be "speaking the same language" or may be "talking past each other" and therefore their ideas at what needs to be settled may vary to the extent that nothing can be settled (Saunders, 1985: 255).

The compatible definition has three components. First, the definition must include a consensus on the central issues of the conflict and the objective of any

future talks -- what issues are to be addressed. Protracted social conflicts often involve a multitude of issues representing conflicts within conflicts. How the conflict is defined often determines the likelihood of success at resolution. The Camp David negotiations succeeded in settling the Israeli-Egyptian conflict because the other "unresolvable" issues of the Middle East conflict were excluded from the shared definition, and the efforts of the parties were focused on where success was possible (Stein,1989c).

The second component is a consensus on the participants to the settlement process. The definition of the conflict, or its central issue, predetermines the parties that must be included in the process. Generally, all principal parties, those whose attainment of needs are the central issue of the conflict, must be included in the process. Each principal party must be "accepted" by the others, and must have valid spokespeople to partake in the negotiation (Zartman,1987:284).

The third component of the compatible definition is a consensus on the approach to a settlement each party is willing to use in a multilateral environment. The approaches must converge to the point where each party's approach gives the other "a way out" and means to attain its needs. For example, the Israeli approach to a settlement is to allow the occupied territories increased autonomy under

Israeli sovereignty and increased Jewish settlement. This approach continues to preclude the Palestinian attainment of identity which is sought through the metaphor of an independent state. In turn, the Israeli government feels an independent Palestine would threaten the security of Israel.

The final condition of the ripe moment is the perception that a basis for agreement may exist -- a conditional zone of agreement. Continued failure to meet objectives will ideally result in the schema transformations that indicate the adjustment of each party's reservation demands (its metaphors and principles) to positions that create a zone of agreement. At the ripe moment prior to prenegotiation, only a conditional zone of agreement¹ exists: the parties maintain their existing schemata and principles, including the unilateral strategy, while considering concessional shifts in their position. Whether a party will actually make the concessions and adopt new schemata depends on whether the schemata are confirmed to be a better representation of the situation confronting the party, and whether they offer an acceptable solution. The confirmation of schemata primarily depends on the actions of the other party, and is determined during prenegotiation.

Each condition of the ripe moment indicates that

¹ The conditional zone of agreement is similar to Zartman's concept of "a way out" because it represents the possible existence of metaphors that will both end the conflict and meet the needs of the parties.

complex learning has occurred within the phase, but the three must appear in conjunction to indicate that the level of learning is sufficient to make further cognitive progress possible. In cases where the conditions of the ripe moment are not present, continued dialogue between the parties is useful to clarify positions. Although these discussions may be called "talks about talks" or "negotiations" by the parties, from an analytic perspective, the parties are not prenegotiating or negotiating and dialogue at such time will not result in perceptible progress toward an agreement.

Ripening and the Zone of Agreement

For negotiations to result in resolution, a zone of agreement must exist between the parties. Zones of agreement are created when (1) the articulated demands of the parties are abandoned or become negotiable as the result of simple learning; and (2) the reservation demands of the parties "shift" to positions that do not preclude the mutual attainment of needs. Shifts in reservation demands are schema transformations caused by complex learning.

It must be stressed that a party cannot be forced to change or shift its reservation demands to new metaphors if the party's reservation demands represent the only metaphors capable of attaining needs for the party. Belief in a metaphor's exclusive ability to provide needs causes reservation demand rigidity that perpetuates the conflict. Reservation demands will only shift when the party concludes

that alternative metaphors are acceptable and effective in attaining the party's needs.

Reservation demands are shifted in two ways. First, an actual shift occurs when the party completes the transformation to new schemata by adopting new metaphors. The reservation demands of the party change to represent these new metaphors and their underlying principles. A zone of agreement is created by actual shifts in reservation demands to positions that represent principles upon which compatible behaviour patterns can be based.

Adopting new schemata has potentially high costs because the new schemata's principles may not be a valid interpretation of the situation, and their metaphors may not be capable of attaining needs for the party. When the validity and effectiveness of the new schemata are in doubt and the costs and risks are high, parties will only tentatively adopt the new schemata.

Symbolic shifts of reservation demands represent a party's conditional adoption of new schemata, while at the same time testing the schemata's validity before a commitment to an actual schema transformation is made. A conditional zone is created by symbolic shifts in the reservation demands of the parties to positions that indicate the tentative acceptance by each party of alternative principles. The zone will not be actualized until the principles of the new schema represented by the

zone are confirmed to be a better interpretation of the situation, and the schema's behaviour patterns are confirmed to attain the party's objectives more effectively.

Confirmation depends primarily on events and the actions of the other party and is determined during prenegotiation.

Creating the Conditions of the Ripe Moment

The central hypothesis about ripening is that cognitive progress is caused by four stimulants of learning, or ripening forces: compulsion, new information, value modification, and changes in key decisionmaking personnel.

The ripening forces play a role in the learning processes in each stage of the CSP. They stimulate learning and attitude change by causing each party to (1) examine its current perceptions and schemata principles to determine whether they are accurate interpretations of the environment, and whether the behaviour patterns and policies are effective in dealing with the conflict and attaining basic needs; and (2) examine the consistency between the behaviour patterns and the values of the group. Ideally, the learning fostered by the ripening forces creates the conditions of the ripe moment for each consecutive stage, culminating in conflict resolution.

The hypotheses of the ripening process will address the roles of the ripening forces in stimulating learning and cognitive progress, and their corresponding impediments that lead to intransigence or negative learning.

Ripening Forces and Impediments

Compulsion

Compulsion is a central policy influence during the ripening process, being an essential source of the failure that stimulates learning and makes ripening possible. Caused by the compellent behaviour of the other parties (principal and third), compulsion is the net loss of a party's control that results in a failure to achieve objectives unilaterally within the parameters of acceptable costs.

Conflict resolution requires all parties to experience some degree of failure to stimulate learning. Mutual compulsion represents the failure of all principal parties and thus is a primary source of the ripe moment condition of necessity. A central hypothesis of this thesis is that ripening does not require the parties to experience equivalent levels of compulsion. Asymmetrical compulsion can create the conditions of the ripe moment for two reasons. First, the perception of necessity is subjective, and therefore each party will require different levels of compulsion to develop the perception of necessity. Second, the parties will have different rates of learning and will draw different lessons from the same stimuli (Nye, 1987:381).

The degree of compulsion experienced by a party, and therefore the level of its failure and perception of necessity, is inversely proportional to its issue-specific

control (ability to attain objectives unilaterally). Compulsion can be considered to occur along a continuum. The lowest level of compulsion occurs when the party can achieve its objectives within the parameters of acceptable costs (casualties, resource expenditures, and material damage). The highest level of compulsion results in the capitulation of the party. Both extremes represent situations that are not conducive to learning or conflict resolution.

Mutual compulsion can occur between these extremes, and can be summarized by three "sources" of compulsion. A first source of compulsion, costs, will stimulate simple learning and the altering of a party's articulated demands through a change in tactics or by making the demands negotiable.

A second source of compulsion is systemic failure. Dissonance theory and empirical evidence strongly suggest that in order for a party to change its reservation demands, it must experience an extremely high level of dissonance between its schema (principles and metaphors) and information received about the objective conditions of the conflict that indicate a radical change in schema (policy) is necessary (Anglin, 1990:370; Jervis, 1976). The creation of these objective conditions may require a level of compulsion that approaches capitulation.

The systemic failure of a party is indicated by

the erosion of its control to the point that, currently or within the foreseeable future: (1) the party's existing metaphors are no longer capable of providing needs; or (2) the party is no longer capable of maintaining its metaphors. The latter may be caused in a specific geographic area by the loss of territory to the enemy. Although not yet forced to capitulate, under the conditions of systemic failure, it is impossible for the party to attain or maintain its reservation demands.

Systemic failure serves to demonstrate to the party the dysfunctional nature of its metaphors -- they are the source of the conflict and the conflict renders them incapable of attaining the party's needs. The exigencies of survival will force the party to search for alternative principles and metaphors to which it can shift its reservation demands. Systemic failure is a stimulant of complex learning and schema transformation. However, no level of compulsion can force a party to abandon metaphors and shift reservation demands if there are no alternative metaphors capable of attaining the party's needs.

A third source of compulsion -- similar to hypotheses about a looming catastrophe and crisis avoidance -- is the self-prognosis of future costs or systemic failure. Perceived future costs may cause a shift in articulated demands, and perceived imminent systemic failure may cause a shift in reservation demands.

Although central to initiating the learning process, the role of compulsion is to stimulate learning. Dissonance theory suggests that a high level of compulsion, unaccompanied by attitude change and the influence of the other ripening forces, will only result in simple learning that will allow the conflict to continue (Jervis, 1976:393-402). Experiencing a high level of compulsion permits a party to maintain its reservation demands and unilateral strategy while behaving in a cooperative manner out of necessity (Jervis, 1976:401). Therefore, when not accompanied by acceptable alternatives and positive attitude change, systemic failure will only stimulate simple learning and a change of tactics to ensure survival. Once the compulsion is removed, the party will resume its conflict behaviour to achieve consistency with its attitudes and reservation demands.

Complex learning is indicated by the party continuing the cooperative behaviour in the absence of compulsion. For this to happen, the party must be provided with alternative principles and metaphors to attain its basic needs, and the party's beliefs and negative attitudes that impede changes in reservation demands must be overcome (Jervis, 1976:402). It is the two remaining conditions that indicate whether acceptable alternatives exist and positive attitudes have developed. These two conditions thus determine whether necessity has actually resulted in complex

learning, and not merely a change in tactics by the parties. The two conditions cannot be created by compulsion alone, but require other stimulants -- the other ripening forces.

New Information

Information plays a role in all the stages of the process of cognitive progress. New experiences and information reshape, replace, alter, or reinforce existing cognitions, and thus are a primary source of learning.

Although central to learning, there are significant cognitive and structural impediments that weaken the influence of new information on the policymaking process. The reception and interpretation of information is affected by existing schemata and attitudes. According to Joseph Nye, "the extent and accuracy of learning depends upon the strength of the prior beliefs and the quantity and quality of the new information. Some beliefs may be so strong that new information is ignored and no learning, or only highly distorted learning occurs" (1987:379). Leaders may only seek out information supporting their decisions, and may avoid, misinterpret, or reject new information that undermines their chosen policy (Jervis, 1976:388).

Governments will control information through censorship and media bans. Misinformation and propaganda may replace objective information that indicates the shortcomings of a policy or government. By creating the impression that current policies are "successful," the

initial stimulant of learning, failure, is suppressed.

New information can stimulate learning and attitude change. However, to alter deeply held norms and attitudes, and to overcome efforts that suppress and distort dissonant information, requires overwhelming evidence that demonstrates the irrationality of the chosen policy (Jervis, 1976:391; Anglin, 1990:370). For learning to result in a schema transformation, it must be proven that the current schemata and reservation demands of the party are a primary source of the conflict and are inconsistent with the deeper goals to attain needs and ensure party survival. Unfortunately, for the new information to be "convincing," it may have to be about the threat of impending destruction -- conditions created by compulsion.

Value Modification

The means to achieve a society's objectives change within and between states with the passage of time. For instance, slavery and colonialism are now obsolete schemata in most societies (Nye, 1987:378). Between states, there has been a general transformation of foreign policy toward the use of international trade instead of warfare to achieve increased national wealth (Morse, 1987).

One stimulant of schema evolution is value modification. Slavery and colonialism have become less common as the principles and values that made them acceptable schemata disappeared from societies.

The objective of value modification is to "shape the overall political environment so that leaders might be encouraged to take positive steps toward resolving the conflict" (Montville, 1987:11). This is achieved by influencing public opinion through actions designed to undermine the values and attitudes that perpetuate the conflict, and to introduce new values and principles that support a positive relationship between the parties and efforts to find a mutually acceptable solution.

There are three general "means" to stimulate value modification. First, protest by influential groups in a constituency can draw attention to inconsistencies between policies and the party's values while advocating new values and goals.

A second means to stimulate value modification is peer pressure at the level of party leadership. The influence of fellow leaders (within the party or from other parties and states) and of transnational organizations (such as the United Nations) may stimulate value modification through appeals to shared values and principles.

The third means of stimulating value modification is track two diplomacy: "unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups... which aims to develop strategies, influence public opinion, and organize human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict" (Montville, 1987:7). The objective of track two

diplomacy is to develop schemata based on empathy and shared values, while creating an environment that encourages the parties to "take risks for peace" (Montville,1987:7).

There are two basic instruments of track two. First, unofficial and informal meetings, seminars, and conferences between members of the parties seek to establish commonalities between the parties and discover shared values and principles that can form a zone of agreement. Second, cooperative economic ventures between the parties demonstrate the value of a positive and cooperative relationship (Montville,1987).²

Changes in Key Decisionmaking Personnel

In cases where a decisionmaker's role and reputation results in an unwillingness to consider "more cooperative" schemata and policy options, the replacement of the decisionmaker may be necessary for learning to occur. New decisionmakers will have alternative personal schemata and ideologies that make up policy and strategy, and thus may have a new approach that facilitates the resolution of the conflict (Lockhart,1979:47,48; Nye,1987:378). Haass asserts the change in Argentinean leadership was central to the resolution of the Beagle Channel dispute between Argentina and Chile (1990:10).

²According to Joseph Montville, the importance of track two diplomacy in resolving protracted social conflicts is demonstrated by the impact such efforts had in helping create the European Community, which marked the end of the historic conflict between Germany and France (1987:16-19).

Recognizing the Ripe Moment for Prenegotiation

The existence of the condition of necessity is determined by a "costing" process whereby a party determines its own level of failure. If to create a zone, a party only needs to change its articulated demands, compulsion associated with costs (casualties and material damage) will be sufficient. To shift a party's reservation demands may require actual or the prognosis of systemic failure. Such failure is physically indicated by marginal and eroding control, the inability to continue to attain needs with existing metaphors, declining morale and commitment, and the elimination of acceptable alternatives.

The creation of a compatible definition is evidenced by either joint or independent statements by the parties that: (1) recognize and accept roles for all principal parties; (2) recognize the substantive issues and sources of the conflict; and (3) demonstrate a compatibility of approaches to finding a solution.

The existence of a conditional zone of agreement is indicated by the relative positions of the parties on the substantive issues. The third party can ascertain the positions of the parties through their public statements, or through private consultations with each party. Reservation demands will determine the boundaries of the zone, while the condition of necessity will indicate that the articulated demands are negotiable.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE PRENEGOTIATION PROCESS

At the ripe moment for prenegotiation, the parties perceive both the necessity and plausibility of a schema transformation to a multilateral approach. Reaching an agreement on a regime that resolves the conflict requires each party to undergo a schema transformation -- a change in how the party interprets the issues of the conflict (the principles it employs) and in how it reacts to these issues (its behaviour patterns). Before this will take place, each party must conclude that a zone of agreement exists.

The existence of a zone is determined by three criteria: (1) the parties share common principles upon which an agreement can be based; (2) the shared principles, which are to form the basis of new behaviour patterns and a new regime, must be consistent with the party's perception of reality; and (3) the principles must support metaphors that will allow the mutual attainment of needs and interests.

Prenegotiation is the process of inquiry whereby the parties determine whether these three criteria are met and a zone of agreement exists or can be created. The framework of prenegotiation is essential to the learning process because it provides each party with better quality information received more directly from the other party, allowing the party to make assessments more accurately than would be possible unilaterally or within the context of formal negotiations (Zartman, 1989a; Stein, 1989b).

The existence of a zone of agreement is confirmed or created through the process of seeking and testing sets of principles and schemata against the three criteria. The process is characterized by each party determining the risks, costs, and possible outcomes of an agreement. Although new metaphors based on the shared principles will be either assumed or proposed during prenegotiation, most behavioural aspects of the schemata (actual metaphors, norms, and rules) and other details will be determined during the negotiation process.

The Ripe Moment for Negotiation

The ripe moment for negotiation has two conditions that must occur in conjunction with those already attained by the ripening process. First, an actual zone of agreement is required to exist between the parties. There must be shared principles that the parties are willing to adopt to create compatible metaphors and a new regime. Second, internal support for a commitment to negotiate must be obtained by the party leadership -- the new principles must be accepted by the party's constituency.

The processes of creating a zone and internal support occurs simultaneously as the leadership strives to reconcile internal and external imperatives. The leadership must reflect the values and changing demands and acceptance levels of its constituency, while at the same time respond to the moves of the other party (Putnam, 1988:460). The

leadership must convince the party (or vice versa) that a change in schemata and a negotiated settlement is required, and that the concessions of altering metaphors and redefining roles are both necessary and acceptable.

The existence of a zone of agreement is determined by the three criteria outlined above. However, before a party will "accept" the existence of the zone, certain perceptual conditions must also be met. First, each party must be satisfied that "the substance of a fair settlement is available" (Saunders, 1985:257). The shared principles and the proposed new metaphors must be acceptable to each party. Second, the party must be satisfied that the other party will accept a negotiated solution based on mutual compromise (Saunders, 1985:257). Each party must perceive that the other party accepts both the necessity of a joint solution and the principle of reciprocity. Third, the risks and costs associated with concessions and entering negotiations must be sufficiently reduced (Stein, 1989b:488). The parties will require assurances that the concessions they are considering will not jeopardize their security and attainment of other basic needs, will result in requitement, and will lead to success. Once these conditions are met and shared principles are confirmed to exist, the parties can begin the process of negotiating the behaviour patterns and details of an agreement to resolve their conflict.

The central hypothesis of prenegotiation is that

there are six functions, first proposed by the Project on Prenegotiation¹, performed during the stage that facilitate the testing and confirmation of shared principles and the creation of a zone with internal support.² The functions are not performed in any particular order.

The first two functions primarily promote attitude change that facilitates learning in the parties. The remaining four functions promote learning and are central to creating the conditions of the ripe moment for negotiation.

Attitude Change

Requirement. Prenegotiation offers each party the opportunity to encourage cooperative behaviour in the other party in a non-coercive manner through actions that indicate to the other party that its concessions will be reciprocated. This function promotes a positive image in each party of the other, reinforcing the principles of the multilateral schemata.

Perception Management. New positive attitudes and perceptions can easily be overcome by information that

¹ The Project on Prenegotiation by the Canadian Institute for International Affairs and the Centre for International Studies of the University of Toronto, first published in "Getting to the Table," International Journal. Vol. XLIV, No. 2 (Spring, 1989).

² The Project on Prenegotiation outlined nine functions of prenegotiation. All are valid; however, the determination of participants and the elimination of alternatives have been assigned to the ripening process, and the third function of gaining internal support is assumed to take place during all stages of the CSP.

reinforces the weakened negative attitudes. Positive changes in a party's schema principles toward cooperation require explicit reaffirmation, and must therefore be protected and facilitated by the setting up of confidence building measures (Zartman, 1989:249). CBMs, such as ceasefires, suspend conflict activities and behaviour, preventing the reemergence of negative attitudes and the reinforcement of the unilateral schemata.

Learning

Learning during prenegotiation has the objective of determining whether: (1) a zone of agreement exists or can be created; (2) there will be sufficient compromise by the parties to allow a mutually acceptable solution; (3) the costs and risks of entering negotiations are sufficiently reduced; and (4) an acceptable process for the conduct of negotiations can be reached. Four functions assist the parties in gathering and communicating information that determines whether these conditions are present, and facilitate their creation.

Boundary Determination. During the prenegotiation process, parties communicate their demands to one another. Through self-analysis and communication with the other parties, each party becomes capable of distinguishing and clarifying between demands that are negotiable, and those that remain reservation demands. Through the communication of positions and possible trade-offs, the parties jointly

develop and reaffirm shared principles which form a zone of agreement. The boundaries of the zone are the reservation demands the parties make for metaphors based on the new set of principles in the zone. A zone of agreement will exist if all remaining and new reservation demands are not mutually preclusive.

Cost Determination and Reduction. The prenegotiation process allows parties to determine more accurately the costs of reaching an agreement against that of continuing the conflict. Entering negotiations and abandoning the unilateral strategy will have costs because it reduces the party's level of security and unilateral control over the process. Altering metaphors and redefining roles may be required concessions, and will have particularly high psychological and material costs.

In order for a party to accept negotiations as an acceptable means of resolving its conflict, the costs of continuing with the unilateral strategy must be seen to outweigh the costs of entering negotiations. Furthermore, the costs incurred by the party must be sufficient to render negotiable all articulated demands that violate the other party's reservation demands.

Communication during prenegotiation promotes an understanding of the costs and concerns of the other party, allowing each party to reduce the costs of the other party's concessions. Conceding or altering demands that inflict too

high a cost on the other party will prevent the other party from abandoning the negotiation option. To further reduce the costs to a party, compensatory schemes and economic assistance can be proposed that lower the economic and social costs of adjustment after an agreement is reached.

Risk reduction. When entering negotiations, a party surrenders the degree of control it had over the process by employing its unilateral strategy. Uncertainty over the final outcome of negotiations creates considerable risks that must be addressed if a party is going to reduce its unilateral control willingly. Prenegotiation reduces the risks involved in cooperation because it allows the parties to state their demands and outline possible concessions and trade-offs without making firm commitments. It allows the parties to foresee the general outline of the final outcome, and therefore reduces uncertainty.

For a party to accept the negotiation option, the risks of entering negotiation must be sufficiently reduced. The party must be certain that it is possible to achieve a favourable outcome through negotiation, while at the same time being uncertain whether it can achieve its objectives unilaterally within the parameters of acceptable costs.

Agenda Determination. Whether a negotiating process is acceptable to the parties is primarily determined by the agenda. The agenda must be consistent with the boundaries of the zone of agreement and each party's

exigencies for maintaining internal support.

Issues that violate reservation demands or that a party does not have the internal support to negotiate must be eliminated from the agenda. Reducing the scope of the agenda simplifies the negotiation process, and by limiting the issues, reduces the concessions, costs, and risks of reaching an agreement.

Recognizing the Ripe Moment for Negotiation

The ripe moment for negotiation is indicated by the existence of a zone of agreement between the parties, and support within each party for the negotiation process. A zone will exist once (1) the reservation demands of the parties represent metaphors based on shared principles that are not mutually preclusive; and (2) all articulated demands that violate reservation demands are negotiable. The internal support of the parties will be achieved once (1) the costs and risks of continuing the conflict outweigh the costs and risks of entering negotiations; and (2) a negotiating process consistent with the zone of agreement and indicated by consensus over the agenda, is accepted by the parties. The parties can then proceed with the negotiation process, using the principles of the zone to develop the behaviour patterns that make up the agreement.

CHAPTER FIVE: METHOD AND HYPOTHESES

This chapter will outline a methodology for conflict analysis, as well as four central hypotheses to be tested in the case study.

A METHODOLOGY FOR CONFLICT ANALYSIS

Conflict Variables

The foundation of conflict analysis involves what Roger Fisher has termed "fractionating" the conflict into conflict variables (1964).¹ In this formulation of the CSP, there will be four sets of variables.

Parties. The first set of variables that must be determined are the parties to the conflict. The principal parties are the parties whose reservation demands are the central issues of the conflict. There will be at least two major principal parties; but each side may consist of minor parties who share common reservation demands with a major party, being differentiated only along lines of articulated demands. To resolve the conflict, the needs of all principal parties must be taken into account.

Issues. The substantive issues are the sources of conflict. The issues, as well as how they are perceived and defined by the parties, may change as the conflict evolves,

¹ Fisher suggests there are at least five dimensions to conflict: the parties, issues, principles, and the substantive and procedural precedents that a settlement will establish (1964:94). The first three will be included in the CSP.

thus changing the requirements for resolution.

Positions. The central aspect of a conflict that must be monitored are the positions or demands of the parties. The position of each party can be fractionated into reservation and articulated demands.

Power. A central conflict variable is the power of the parties. There are two "dimensions" to this power. Aggregate structural power is the resources a party has in reserve to carry out its objectives, and is the source of credibility behind its actions. Issue-specific power is the capability of a party to attain its desired outcome on a specific issue despite opposition from other parties. It is measured in terms of three variables: commitment, alternatives, and control.

Conflict Diagnosis

The purpose of diagnosis is to determine the conflict's type and objective "condition." The type of conflict, outlined earlier in the chapter, depends on the issues and the positions of the parties -- the configuration of reservation and articulated demands that are the source of conflict.

Conflict diagnosis is in the terminology of conflict conditions developed in Chapter Three. A conflict's condition is primarily determined by its stage in the CSP, and whether conditions are present for the transition to the next stage. For a conflict to be in the

prenegotiation, negotiation, or implementation stage, the ripe moment conditions for the stage (determined in the previous stage) must be present. When the conditions are not present for these stages, the conflict is in the ripening stage.

During ripening, a conflict can be in one of four conditions: unilateral settlement, stalemate, fluid situation, or ripe moment. The particular condition within the ripening stage is determined by the issue-specific power configuration between the parties, the various criteria having been outlined in Chapter Three.

Conflict Prognosis

The objective of conflict prognosis is to foretell the course that the conflict will likely take. Diagnosis and prognosis enable the third party to prescribe the appropriate action. The terminology of prognosis is that of "ripening" and "unripening," or positive and negative cognitive progress toward resolution.

At a general level, diagnosis partially predetermines prognosis, as each condition has a different potential for creating mutual compulsion that stimulates ripening: fluid situations and stalemates are more conducive to ripening than unilateral settlements. However, unpredictable changes in the conflict variables can stimulate ripening or unripening during any phase and condition of the conflict. A more precise prognosis

requires the monitoring and tracking of these changes to determine the "direction" of ripening. Three types of changes in the conflict variables are particularly relevant to conflict prognosis.

Power shifts are changes in the issue-specific power variables and resources (aggregate structural power) of the parties. They will increase or decrease a party's level of compulsion, and thus will indicate progress toward or away from the creation of mutual compulsion and the condition of necessity.

Positional shifts are changes in the reservation and articulated demands of the parties. "Accommodative" shifts indicate progress toward the development of a conditional or actual zone of agreement.

Cognitive shifts are changes in a party's cognitions about the conflict, and therefore are an indication of a party's learning and attitude change. Cognitive shifts will be manifested in changes in the party's positions and policies, and by the incremental development of a compatible definition between the parties.

Each change in the conflict variables are turning points that mark the evolution of the conflict. Power, positional, and cognitive shifts toward the creation of the conditions of the ripe moment indicate cognitive progress and ripening. "Tracking" these turning points over time will indicate the prognosis (unripening, static, or

ripening), and thus will indicate whether ripe moments will appear in the foreseeable future.

CENTRAL HYPOTHESES

The hypotheses and methodology of the CSP will be applied in Part Two to the liberation war in Zimbabwe. In Chapter Six, the regime failure and ripening phases will be examined: the power, positional, and cognitive shifts will be tracked throughout the history of the conflict to explain the failure of the several unsuccessful settlement initiatives, and the creation of the ripe moment for prenegotiation. In Chapter Seven, the prenegotiation process will be examined to determine the role of the six functions in creating the ripe moment for negotiation. Chapter Eight will conclude the case study, outlining evidence that confirms four central hypotheses: (1) during the ripening and prenegotiation processes, the principal parties experienced complex learning that resulted in the schema transformations and cognitive progress necessary to resolve the conflict; (2) the four ripening processes contributed to this cognitive progress and facilitated the eventual resolution of the conflict; (3) success is partially attributable, not to a hurting stalemate, but to mutual and asymmetrical compulsion; and (4) the conflict was resolved because the final agreement met the reservation demands of the parties.

PART TWO: RHODESIA INTO ZIMBABWE --
THE ROAD TO LANCASTER HOUSE RE-EXAMINED

CHAPTER SIX: THE RIPENING CONFLICT: 1965-1979

FAILURE OF THE COLONIAL REGIME

Since 1923 Rhodesia had been self-governed by a white minority that never exceeded three percent of the total population (Keeley,1986:153). The United Federal Party, which held power throughout the 1950s until 1962, advocated a level of African advancement based on the concept of "partnership" between the races. In 1961, two thirds of the white electorate voted in favour of a constitution that "would introduce Africans into the legislature for the first time and, in theory... lead ultimately to African rule" (Hodder-Williams,1970:241). However, events in and around Rhodesia caused a radical change in white attitudes toward African advancement, bringing the Rhodesian Front (RF) under Ian Smith to power in 1962 (Hodder-Williams,1970:247).

The dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1963, and the subsequent granting of independence to Zambia and Malawi, led white Rhodesians to believe that "British governments could no longer be trusted" as their "policy in Africa was dictated by the African governments north of the Zambesi" (Hodder-Williams, 1970:243). The preoccupation of the international press

with African advancement created the perception that Britain was "concerned with the well-being of the African people to the virtual exclusion of European interests" (Hodder-Williams, 1970:244).

European sufferings in the ex-Belgian Congo and the actions of African insurgents inside Rhodesia, greatly exacerbated white fears of black rule. Between 1958 and 1963, nearly all the farms in the agricultural centre of Rhodesia were either directly affected by cattle maiming or crop burning, or indirectly by emergency call-outs to combat such attacks (Hodder-Williams, 1970:245). According to Richard Hodder-Williams, by 1965 "the weakly articulated idea of African advancement had been swamped by, and in most eyes equated with, the idea of majority rule or African controlled government" (Hodder-Williams, 1970:247). The old perceptions that "African leaders were always violent, even barbaric" were reinforced to the point that "one thing to avoid... was such people obtaining power" (Hodder-Williams, 1970:246).

Between 1963 and 1965, the RF government began to negotiate its independence from Britain based on the 1961 Constitution. Britain was prepared to grant independence to a minority government, but wanted guarantees that the situation of Africans would immediately improve and progress would be made toward majority rule in the near future. The Rhodesian Front, reflecting white attitudes, rejected all

forms of African advancement, and in particular, the move toward majority rule.

Ken Flower, the Chief of Intelligence for the Rhodesian Front Government, asserts that the RF's central goal was to implement apartheid. Given Britain's position, apartheid could only be achieved by the RF declaring Rhodesian independence unilaterally (1987:27). Toward this end, the RF began a propaganda campaign to discredit the British government and increase negative attitudes toward majority rule.

The conflict forming in Rhodesia was deep-rooted between the reservation demands of the parties. The African nationalists demanded immediate liberation, and were supported by the British government with the reservation demands for steady progress toward majority rule. The Rhodesian Front had reservation demands for minority rule through the metaphors of apartheid: white supremacy in the constitution and parliament, and white control of the instruments of state power -- the civil service, judiciary, police, and armed services.

The only obstacle preventing Smith from unilaterally declaring independence was the fear of British military intervention and subsequent immediate surrender of the Rhodesian Armed Forces. However, British Prime Minister Wilson announced in October 1965 that such intervention would not take place. Thus, Flower asserts, "Wilson had

removed any immediate prospect of a negotiated settlement and had cleared the way for the RF government to take matters into its own hands" (1987:51). The colonial regime ended on November 11, 1965 when Ian Smith issued the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI).

THE RIPENING PROCESS

Parties

Between 1965 and 1972 the conflict can be considered to be between the successive British governments and the Rhodesian Front government, which represented the majority of white Rhodesians. Britain acted as a surrogate for the majority of Africans at this time, who "deeply divided and lacking a clearly articulated strategy, tended to place faith in Britain and its ability to protect their interests" (Matthews, 1990:295).

The two main insurgent liberation movements were only minor parties prior to 1972. They were the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), first under Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, and then Robert Mugabe; and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), under Joshua Nkomo. ZANU's military wing was the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA). ZAPU's military wing was the Zimbabwe Peoples' Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA). Although actively pursuing the armed struggle prior to UDI, the insurgents initially had little issue-specific power and were not involved in negotiations until 1974.

U.K. Position

Before UDI, Britain had five reservation demands. Known as the "five principles," the British demands were originally drafted by the British Commonwealth Secretary, Duncan Sandys, in 1963. The five principles were:

- [1] A guarantee of unimpeded progress towards majority rule.
- [2] Guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the 1961 Constitution.
- [3] Immediate improvement in the political status of the African people.
- [4] Progress towards ending racial discrimination.
- [5] Britain must be satisfied that [any basic proposal for] independence... [is] acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.
(ACR¹, 1972:B409)

After UDI was declared, a sixth reservation demand was formulated in 1966:

- [6] The need to ensure that, regardless of race, there is no oppression of the majority by the minority or of the minority by the majority.
(quoted in Davidow, 1984:124)

The British made two articulated demands after UDI: (1) Rhodesia was to return to "legality" by rescinding UDI, and (2) the Governor General of Rhodesia, and not the Prime Minister, was to head the government until the transition to independence.

RF Position

The Rhodesian Front had the reservation demand for enhanced minority rule as a means to optimize white privilege and security. This stand rejected Britain's first

¹ Africa Contemporary Record.

and third principles. Britain's second principle was rejected by the RF reservation demand for the right to implement retrogressive legislature in order to prevent "premature" African government (Matthews, 1980:94).

A further RF reservation demand rejected Britain's fourth principle concerning the ending of legislated racial discrimination. Smith stated that such matters were "entirely for our own judgement," declaring that alterations to the legislation would be made "as circumstances require in the country" (quoted in Matthews, 1980:94).

Britain's fifth demand that the conditions of independence be acceptable to all Rhodesians was rejected because the RF felt both blacks and whites had already expressed their support for independence based on the 1961 Constitution (Matthews, 1980:94). However, Flower asserts these consultations were engineered to "produce pro-government resolutions" to show Britain that RF policies had African support (1987:40).

In response to Britain's articulated demands, the RF position was that it should remain in power if UDI was ever rescinded, and during the transition to legal independence.

1966: TIGER TALKS

Immediately after UDI, Britain imposed sanctions and predicted Salisbury's imminent collapse. Smith was shocked by the sanctions, and was deeply concerned about

their potential impact. Only eight days after UDI, he considered rescinding the declaration and re-opening negotiations. However, Smith's concerns vanished by December as the sanctions at first seemed to benefit the Rhodesian economy (Flower, 1987:59,62).

In April 1966, at Britain's request, the United Nations Security Council imposed a ban on Rhodesia's oil imports through the port of Beira, Mozambique. In May, Britain and Rhodesia entered exploratory talks to determine a basis for agreement. At this time, the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) issued a report encouraging negotiation on the basis that since UDI: (1) not a single country recognized the Rhodesian government; (2) Britain could "not conceivably allow the Rhodesian UDI to succeed by default"; (3) the health of the Rhodesian economy was "the result of abnormal and largely temporary benefits"; and (4) there was notable public discomfort about cutting ties with Britain and the Crown (Flower, 1987:82). The talks resulted in little progress and were called off in August, just prior to the Commonwealth Heads of State Conference.

Commonwealth pressure led Britain to issue an ultimatum. Salisbury had three months to retract the UDI, or Britain would withdraw its previous proposals and insist on majority rule before granting independence -- the position of No Independence Before Majority African Rule (NIBMAR). Britain was also prepared to sponsor a Security

Council resolution calling for selective mandatory economic sanctions. These compelling threats led Smith to agree to meet with Wilson in December aboard the HMS Tiger off the coast of Gibraltar.

The three days of intensive "Tiger talks" at first appeared to result in an agreement modifying the 1961 Constitution. The proposed amendments allowed for a steady increase in African seats in the House of Assembly that would lead eventually to a majority as more Africans became enfranchised as the result of improved education and increased earning capability (Flower, 1987:84).

Smith left the talks apparently supporting the agreement, but insisted he required the approval of his Cabinet. However, Smith sought unanimity among the Cabinet, which he knew was impossible given the anti-settlement and racist views of some of his ministers (Flower, 1987:85). On December 5, Smith rejected the British proposals, stating that "the Rhodesian Government cannot be expected to yield... fundamental principles, and in a manner which amounted to surrender and submission of power" (Matthews, 1980:96).

1968: FEARLESS TALKS

Throughout 1967 Smith continued moves toward "talks about talks," while at the same time the Rhodesian Front kept up its propaganda against any settlement that would lead to majority rule (Flower, 1987:86). Whites were

told they had "a choice between keeping their illegally taken independence and enduring what hardships came... in the expectation of better things to come, or giving up their independence in return for the ogre of immediate African rule" (Hodder-Williams,1970:247). In 1966, NIBMAR became official British policy, making the choice facing white Rhodesians even starker (Hodder-Williams,1970:247).

The British were encouraged by the removal from the RF cabinet of "intransigent racialists," interpreting it as a sign of Smith's 'moderation' and "a genuine desire to explore again the possibility of a negotiated settlement" (Flower,1987:97) Wilson thus responded to Smith's overtures to reopen talks.

However, there was no real evidence to indicate that Smith had altered his position. Indeed, prior to the talks, Smith told Rhodesian officials that the "Government was not undertaking any deviation or weakening of its approach," as "the right course for Rhodesia now was to continue steadily along the path they had set for themselves and not be lured into action which might cause them to be deviated" (Flower,1987:87). The removal of "radicals" from Cabinet was merely to consolidate the party behind moves towards republican status (Flower,1987:97).

Between October 9 and 13 1968, Smith and Wilson met aboard the HMS Fearless. The only alteration to the British proposals was the concession that Smith, and not the

governor, would head the administration during transition.² Given the position of the RF and the fact that none of its counter-proposals approached Britain's demands the reservation demands of both parties remained incompatible, and there was no conditional zone of agreement (Flower, 1987: 97). However, the British left the Fearless proposals open for further discussion, sending Commonwealth Secretary George Thompson to Salisbury.

In January 1969, the RF Minister of Law and Order declared that "If we had accepted Fearless, then it would have been nothing more than NIBMAR... We are not interested in the six principles. They are British principles" (ACR, 1970:B330). Thompson's efforts thus also failed, and opposition to settlement grew within Rhodesia.

Power Shift

The rejection of the Fearless proposals created momentum within Rhodesia for increased separation from Britain. The government felt that Rhodesia could win international recognition by declaring itself a republic, and thus sanctions would be lifted (ACR, 1970:B329). A republican constitution, "clearly designed to prevent African rule forever" was drafted and put to the mostly white electorate by referendum in June 1969 (Hodder-

² Robert Matthews considers this an "important" concession (1980:96), but it was seen by members of the RF government as "relatively unimportant" (Confidential Circular Minute, quoted in Flower, 1987:297).

Williams,1970:241,242). Approximately 70 percent of those voting accepted the new constitution and 80 percent approved of Republican status (ACR,1970:B334).

Rhodesia became a republic in March 1970, causing a significant power shift. First, the move eroded British commitment as there were immediate calls within Britain to end sanctions. Second, it eliminated any control Britain may have had over the situation, as the British were forced "to concede that they held responsibility without power" (ACR,1970:B339). Third, republican status slid Rhodesia more firmly into South Africa's sphere of influence. By declaring itself a republic, Rhodesia followed "almost all the way... the pattern of South Africa's apartheid system" (ACR,1970:B329). Rhodesia began implementing apartheid legislation and it was reported that its 3 600 strong armed forces were being fortified with 2 700 South African troops stationed in Rhodesia (ACR,1970:B338).

Unilateral Settlement

The creation of a republican Rhodesia marked the unilateral settlement of the conflict: the RF government had achieved its objectives and there was little need to negotiate. "Sanctions were not biting, and the 'terrorist' war was not making serious inroads into what counted most of all -- the Rhodesian way of life"(Flower,1987:99). The Secretaries to the Treasury and for Commerce and Industry reported that Rhodesia's "economic position will improve

regardless of a settlement" for which there was "merely a marginal need" (Flower, 1987:98). The image of Rhodesia as "a safe and prosperous haven for whites" was intact, as net European immigration to Rhodesia in 1971 was the highest since UDI (Matthews, 1990:295).

Cognitive Shift

Although the RF had successfully "settled" the conflict, the potential costs of sanctions made an agreement that lifted sanctions desirable, so long as the agreement only required a shift in the RF's articulated demands. A cognitive shift in Britain created the opportunity for an agreement along these lines. In June 1970, Edward Heath and the Conservatives were elected, immediately improving relations with Rhodesia. The two countries again engaged in secret talks to determine the possibility of an agreement (Flower, 1987:98).

The Conservatives perceived the loss of Rhodesia as a threat to its sovereign role in its colonial affairs, and sought to reassert control to prevent Rhodesia from "[going] irrevocably into the apartheid system [to become] indistinguishable from South Africa" (Sir Alec Douglas-Home quoted in ACR, 1972:B413). Britain was thus "anxious to secure an agreement at any cost" (Matthews, 1980:98).

The extent of the British cognitive shift is indicated by the shifts in their reservation demands: NIBMAR and the sixth principle of guarantees against oppression of

the majority by the minority were dropped (ACR,1972:B409).

In April 1971, the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, stated in a secret communique to Smith:

No-one here is suggesting now the adoption of one man one vote and our thinking has always been that progress should be through a voting roll with significant qualifications based on merit and responsibility. Then in time it should be possible to proceed with confidence to majority rule in a stable society. (quoted in Flower,1987:299)

With these concessions, it appears that a conditional zone of agreement existed between the two governments based on the principles advocated by the Rhodesian Front.

1971 HOME-SMITH ACCORD

An agreement, the Home-Smith Accord, was signed on November 24, 1971. The British had conceded something on five of the six principles previously guiding its position (Loney,1975:170-182; Flower,1987:99). In return, Smith amended the 1969 Constitution, replacing the RF concept of parity with the concept of majority rule. However, these amendments did not represent a shift in the RF's reservation demands for sustained minority rule because in the most favourable conditions, parity would be achieved only in 2026, with majority rule coming nine years later at the earliest (Matthews,1980:99).

To fulfil Britain's fifth demand that the agreement be approved by all sectors of Rhodesian society, a Royal Commission, under Lord Pearce, was created to determine the levels of support in each of the Rhodesian

population groups.

African Position

ZANU leader Reverend Sithole and ZAPU leader Nkomo, who were both in detention at the time, condemned the Accord for not insisting on majority rule before granting independence (ACR,1972:B410).

The African National Council (ANC) was created to organize African opposition to the Accord in time for the pending visit of the Pearce Commission. Chaired by Bishop Abel Muzorewa, the membership "was carefully balanced to give equal weight to ZAPU and ZANU members" (ACR,1972:B420). The objective of the ANC was to reject the Accord and to "call on the British Government to convene a constitutional conference with full African representation" (ACR,1972:B415).

White Position

Despite the favourable conditions of the agreement, "the RF were unhappy about the terms" as it was the dominant opinion that a settlement was not needed, and therefore even minor concessions were unnecessary (Flower, 1987:99). Right-wing elements were afraid Smith had given up too much already, and that the negotiations with Britain had delayed the implementation of strict racial segregation legislation (ACR,1972:B416). The right-wing mounted a campaign to sabotage the agreement, blocking an official campaign to counter African opposition to the accord

(Flower,1987:99). The efforts of the ANC led the Pearce Commission to conclude that the majority of Africans rejected the proposals, and thus both the ANC and the right wing were satisfied when Britain abandoned the Accord (Flower,1987:100).

Smith rejected the Commission's report, declaring that Rhodesia would still implement the 1971 proposals if Britain would agree; and if not, Rhodesia would reinstate the 1969 Constitution, refusing to enter into any negotiations aimed at altering the terms of the 1971 agreement (Matthews,1980:100).

Turning Points

According to Flower, the rejection of the accord signalled the end of the last opportunity for a peaceful negotiated settlement. Thereafter "the need to settle took second place to the need to satisfy Smith's objective -- 'no majority rule in a thousand years' -- which became the dominant theme during the following eight years of monolithic RF rule" (1987:101). With negotiations permanently put on hold, the government was thus freed to begin implementing apartheid policies, beginning with "South African type influx control, pass laws, and the like" (ACR, 1973:B447).

Despite the consequent reinforcement of the RF's unilateral settlement, the Home-Smith attempts initiative led to three positive turning points in the ripening

process. First, a most significant turning point was the redefinition of the conflict. During previous initiatives, Britain and the RF were operating with incompatible definitions of the conflict. Britain rightly saw majority rule as the central issue of the conflict, and insisted negotiations address the issue. However, the issue for the RF was "independence," which it divorced from the idea of majority rule. The negotiating objective of the RF was to legalize its independence to end sanctions and maintain its traditional links with the Crown. The failure of the Home-Smith Accord forced the RF to realize that the issue of "legality" was eclipsed by the call for majority rule, and that unless the African population was satisfied that progress toward this goal was being made, the RF did not have any chance of ending economic sanctions and its international isolation.

A second turning point was a change in the parties to the conflict. Prior to the Home-Smith Accord, Britain was the surrogate party for African interests. However, with the creation of the ANC, Africans now had a means of, and insisted on, directly participating in talks about their future. Britain also adopted the position that it would no longer engage in talks that "excluded important elements of the African population" (Matthews, 1980:100). The failure of the accord marked Britain's transformation from a principal to a third party. The ANC became the "domestic" African

opposition, giving "a focus for renewed political activity for Rhodesian Africans" and replacing Britain as the principal party opposed to the Rhodesian Front and willing to employ a multilateral strategy (ACR,1972:B420).

A third, and some would argue, the least significant turning point, was Smith's acceptance of the principle of majority rule. Although majority rule would only be possible after over fifty years, accepting the principle set a psychological precedent.

1973-1974: SMITH - ANC TALKS

Between 1970 and 1973, the conflict condition of was a unilateral settlement. By mid-1973, however, significant power shifts and turning points transformed the conflict into a fluid situation.

Turning Points

A military turning point marking a new phase in the armed struggle occurred in December 1972 when ZANLA attacked a farm used as a security centre on the north-east frontier. Daily attacks followed, and by the end of the year ZANLA claimed 71 Rhodesian soldiers and civilians killed, while the regime claimed one killed and twelve wounded (ACR,1973:B451). The attacks demonstrated the sophistication of ZANLA's weaponry and the willingness of the Africans in the area to protect and support ZANLA's cadres within the country (ACR,1973:B451). Prior to the

attacks, official security assessments concluded that the Rhodesian security forces had been in a winning situation, but these assessments were changed to a "no-win" situation after December (Flower, 1987:119). Defence expenditures increased by 19 percent over the previous year (ACR, 1973:B453).

A second turning point occurred in January 1973, when Rhodesia closed its border with Zambia to remove ZIPRA bases from the Zambezi valley that were launching attacks, and to enable the security forces to concentrate on the new ZANLA threat operating out of Mozambique (Flower, 1987:135). However, when Smith decided to reopen the border in February, Zambian president Kenneth Kaunda continued the closure from the Zambian side.

Flower indicates that the situation was indeed fluid: despite negative assessments, morale in the security forces was high and sure of victory, and therefore there was a tendency to ignore the evidence that indicated a political solution and negotiated settlement was required (1987: 120,121). This complacency was reinforced by the belief that the economy was flourishing despite sanctions, and by the slowing down of the rate of white emigration (Flower, 1987:128). Hopes were buoyed further with the US decision to lift its import ban on strategic materials from Rhodesia early in 1972 (ACR, 1973:B466).

However, by 1973 the compulsion of sanctions and

an increasingly effective insurgency made a settlement on the Home-Smith terms more desirable for the RF. Between July 1973 and June 1974, Smith held talks with the ANC, marking a tactical change in Smith's strategy: internal cooptation.³

RF Position

Smith's objective at this time was to get African support for the Home-Smith Accord, which would then be accepted by Britain. The goal was to alleviate the strains on the economy imposed by the sanctions, end Rhodesia's diplomatic isolation, and thus enable the regime to regain control in guerrilla war (Matthews, 1980:102). However, Smith once more rejected the principle of majority rule, stating that the elimination of racial discrimination would be "disastrous for both blacks and whites" (ACR, 1974:493). Therefore, although the "necessity" was sufficient to stimulate simple learning and cause Smith to reconsider the 1971 proposals, the level of compulsion was not capable of causing deeper learning and a shift in reservation demands.

ANC Position

Smith attempted to pressure the ANC into accepting the 1971 proposals: executive members were arrested or

³ Smith's options by 1973, in order of preference, were: (1) unilateral (military) settlement; (2) unilateral settlement achieved by coopting "internal" blacks through "negotiation"; and (3) the option Smith wished to avoid at all costs -- settlement through multilateral negotiations with Britain or the insurgents.

detained, and there was the implicit threat that apartheid legislation would continue to be introduced (Matthews, 1980: 101, 102).

The ANC remained steadfast in their rejection of Smith's proposals, demanding "majority African rule based on one-man, one-vote." However, the ANC did not require majority rule immediately: their reservation demand was for immediate parliamentary parity, with progress toward majority rule within a reasonable amount of time. Although insisting on a common voter's role, the ANC called for a constitution that would "safeguard the rights of all and assure a place for all races," and thus not deprive the white community of all political influence (ACR, 1975: B505, B506).

The incompatibility of reservation demands and lack of sufficient compulsion precluded a zone of agreement. Talks broke down in June 1974 when the ANC rejected Smith's final proposal that held only the possibility for parity after forty years.

Power Shift

The collapse of Portuguese colonialism in April 1974 precipitated a critical regional power shift. Whereas previously, their access had been impeded by the joint operations by the Portuguese and Rhodesian security forces, the guerrillas were now relatively free to use Mozambique to base and train its forces, and to launch attacks into

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PM-1 3½"x4" PHOTOGRAPHIC MICROCOPY TARGET
NBS 1010a ANSI/ISO #2 EQUIVALENT

Rhodesia. The "loss" of Mozambique meant the Rhodesian security forces had to defend a border three times longer than they had done in the past. Considering the limits to white manpower, this made it "almost impossible" for the Rhodesians to "overcome guerrilla warfare in their own country" (ACR,1975:B506). Mozambique's independence thus dramatically increased the potential for the insurgents to gain control over the guerrilla war.

The shift reduced Rhodesia's "alternatives". Mozambique had been Rhodesia's main access to the sea, and as FRELIMO gained control, Rhodesia became "entirely dependent on South Africa for [its] economic -- and to a great extent, [its] security -- survival" (Flower,1987:159).

1975 VICTORIA FALLS CONFERENCE

Smith underestimated the consequences of the events in Mozambique and the subsequent dependence of his government on South Africa. The regional power shift marked a further loss of Rhodesian control as it convinced South Africa to alter its own security strategy and become actively involved in the pursuit of a negotiated settlement.

Vorster was anxious to get a settlement in Rhodesia before he had to settle the conflict over South West Africa, and stressed to Smith that white Rhodesians would be in a less favourable position once South West Africa became Namibia. Contrary to expectations, South Africa did not wish to associate itself with the RF's moves

toward apartheid, which it considered to be "an embarrassing anachronism" (Flower,1987:157). Thus, Vorster saw regional security as hinging on the elimination of white minority rule in Rhodesia (ACR,1976:B640).

Zambia's economy was suffering as the result of its support for the liberation forces, making it possible for Vorster to enlist President Kaunda's assistance in forcing the parties to negotiate. Vorster was to get Smith to the table to discuss majority rule to be achieved within a reasonable period of time. Kaunda was to gain the support of the other Front Line States (Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania), and to convince ZANU and ZAPU to form a united front, suspend their armed struggle, and enter negotiations (Matthews,1980:102,103).

In November, Vorster told Smith he wanted an agreement quickly or South Africa would cut off its supply of water to Rhodesia. Military assistance was to be frozen and possibly even withdrawn. Miscommunication led Smith to believe Vorster was proposing "the attainment of majority rule in Rhodesia within the period of the lifetime of one Parliament (5 years)," which was a violation of the RF's reservation demands. However, on December 6, bilateral talks made it clear that this was not Vorster's intent, clearing the way for Smith's acceptance of the proposals (Flower,1987:158). South African compellence thus forced Smith to adopt new tactics: enter prenegotiations to reduce

South African pressure (Matthews,1990:320).

By 12 December 1974, Smith's government and the "new" ANC, a coalition of Muzorewa, ZANU and ZAPU, reached an agreement in Pretoria that would end hostilities and lead to a constitutional conference.

The Pretoria Agreement was not based on a set of shared principles, but on the formula that the liberation forces would end operations in Rhodesia and Smith would release all political prisoners (Matthews,1980:102). Key provisions of the agreement were ambiguous enough to allow each side to interpret the agreement in ways that violated the reservation demands of the other. The ANC considered the upcoming conference a forum to determine the details of the transfer of power to the African majority. Smith held to his conception of majority rule being based on a qualified franchise, while asserting the RF would not hand over the country to African majority rule (ACR,1975:B512).

Although the Pretoria Agreement did not represent a conditional zone of agreement, the parties engaged in prenegotiations throughout the late winter and early spring to determine procedural issues such as venue, the date, and the chairmanship of the conference.

In mid-February, at a meeting with Vorster, Smith reversed his acceptance of the policy of qualified franchise and the sharing of power, rejecting even the principle of parity (Flower,1987:159). The reversal greatly angered

Vorster, who felt his international reputation would be damaged if Smith did not reach a settlement. It was made clear to Smith that Pretoria would not support a policy of white-only rule in Rhodesia (Flower, 1987:159,160).

Smith broke off the talks in March when he arrested Sithole, accusing him of an assassination plot. In response, South Africa increased pressure on Smith: material assistance was withheld, and all military assistance was withdrawn by August (Flower, 1987:160,161; ACR, 1976:B640). This pressure led to a renewal of the prenegotiations and, in Pretoria on 9 August 1975, Vorster, Smith, and Kaunda's representative agreed to a constitutional conference. The conference between the Rhodesian government and the ANC coalition of Muzorewa, Sithole, and Nkomo, was to begin on August 25, 1975, on a train halted halfway across the Victoria Falls Bridge on the Rhodesia-Zambia border.

Prior to the conference, the ANC continued to assert that the principle of majority rule was not negotiable, while Smith insisted that Rhodesia would never be handed over to majority rule (ACR, 1976:B645). At the beginning of the Conference, ANC speakers declared that "the only purpose of future talks was to decide on how majority rule was to be implemented" (ACR, 1976:B650). However, Smith asserted that the talks were to be held without any preconditions, and therefore the ANC position violated the Pretoria Agreement.

Months of "prenegotiations" and South African compellence were not sufficient to get Smith to alter his reservation demands. Without a compatible definition or conditional zone of agreement appearing before or during the prenegotiations, it is not surprising that the clash of reservation demands led to the collapse of the conference after its very first day.

After the Victoria Falls Conference, Muzorewa "expelled" Nkomo, thus splitting the ANC into an "internal wing" led by Nkomo, and an "external wing" led by Muzorewa and Sithole, who were living abroad. Both wings sought sole recognition from the Front Line States, which decided to wait and see which would be most effective in the pursuit of majority rule (ACR, 1976:B642). A further split occurred with Sithole being "deposed" and replaced by Robert Mugabe as leader of ZANU.

1975-1976: SMITH - NKOMO TALKS

The failure of the Victoria Falls Conference once again signalled an opportunity for Smith to avoid multilateral negotiations. However, South African pressure kept the conflict fluid and compelled Smith to pursue the tactic of internal cooptation. This time, the negotiations were directed at coopting Nkomo, the leader of the internal ANC. According to Flower, talks with Nkomo were the preconditions for continued South African support for Smith's regime. South Africa was compelled to offer such

support because of its need to maintain a coalition of "relatively 'anti-communist' countries" (including Zambia and Botswana), in its campaign against the MPLA in Angola (1987:162).

Nkomo was perceived by Vorster and Smith to be "a moderate, pro-Western leader amenable to safeguarding white interests" (Meredith, 1979:317). Smith and Nkomo entered into talks in late October, 1975. On December 1, they signed a "declaration of intent to negotiate a constitutional agreement." Essentially the two men agreed to the same proposals made for the Victoria Falls Conference, with the exception that Smith now made the concession to grant immunity to all African nationalists nominated by Nkomo (Matthews, 1980:105).

As the positions of the parties had not changed, the new proposals were not based on any zone of agreement. On December 9, Smith told the Rhodesian Senate that any demands for immediate African majority rule would be rejected. In stark contrast was Nkomo's position, who stated that whether there would be majority rule was no longer at issue, only how this was to be obtained -- through negotiations or war. He maintained his reservation demand for NIBMAR, demanding that elections precede the formal granting of independence. Nkomo also gave assurances for the future of whites, stating "No one, but no one, wants to throw the white man out" (ACR, 1976:B653).

Again, the clash over the principle of majority rule led to the breaking off of talks in March, 1976 (Matthews,1980:106). Smith explained the breakdown with: "I have said we are prepared to bring black people into our government... But I don't believe in... black majority rule, not in a thousand years." Nkomo summed up the lack of compatible definition, stating that it had become "clear that we live in different worlds and speak different languages" (quoted in Flower,1987:129).

The failure can be attributed to the clash of reservation demands without sufficient compulsion to stimulate complex learning. Throughout 1975, the guerrilla war was not perceived to be a threat, and white morale was fairly high (Matthews,1990:300). Furthermore, Vorster was unwilling or unable to pressure Smith beyond simply sitting with the nationalists (Matthews,1990:299). As Flower suggests, Vorster's influence was limited because of the need to have Rhodesian support for South African policy in Angola (1987:162).

Power Shifts

Events in 1976 marked further power shifts against the Rhodesian regime. The most significant event was the MPLA victory in Angola as the result of Soviet and Cuban intervention. There was widespread speculation that Soviet and Cuban support would be transferred to the Rhodesian struggle (ACR,1976:B639).

In February, Presidents Kaunda of Zambia, Nyerere of Tanzania, and Machel of Mozambique, committed the Front Line States to the armed struggle for the liberation of Zimbabwe, declaring the "peaceful option [of negotiation] was lost and that the issue of majority rule for Rhodesia could be settled only 'on the battlefield'" (ACR,1976:B639). Zambia was under full emergency regulations. Mozambique officially closed its border with Rhodesia, announcing it was in a state of war. With the surrounding countries becoming increasingly hostile, Rhodesia became "entirely dependent on South Africa for economic survival" (Flower,1987:163).

In assessing these events, Smith stated that although his party's goal "remained to defeat terrorism and seek a constitutional settlement by patient negotiation," he believed they had "reached a stage in our history where it could be beneficial to change our tactics" (ACR,1976:B639). The new tactics included direct cooptation: "moderate" blacks were brought directly into government "to give it a multiracial veneer." The new ministers were given key positions, but were secretly controlled by the white cabinet (Flower,1987:129).

U.K. Position

A second tactical change was to reverse RF policy of trying to exclude Britain from involvement in Rhodesian affairs (ACR,1976:B639). Smith appealed to Britain to "no

longer avoid the responsibility which it claims" (quoted in Matthews, 1980:106). Sceptical of Smith's intentions, British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan outlined a two stage plan to bring about a settlement. In the first stage, the Rhodesian Front was to accept four preconditions (Gifford, 1986:161):

- (1). Acceptance in advance of the principle of majority rule.
- (2). Elections are to be held within eighteen to twenty-four months of an agreement.
- (3). The talks are to proceed immediately.
- (4). Smith is to endorse the concept of NIBMAR.

The second stage involved negotiations toward the implementation of majority rule, in which Britain would play a central role. Callaghan stated Britain was prepared to meet any party to advance negotiations, thus signalling a formal acknowledgement of British responsibility in finding a solution (Gifford, 1986:161).

Smith immediately rejected the British preconditions, stating that NIBMAR was "as unrealistic now as it always has been" (quoted in Matthews, 1990:299).

Turning Point

The success of Soviet/Cuban intervention in Angola precipitated a change in American foreign policy in Africa: support would no longer be given to white regimes, as this radicalized the nationalist movements and increased opportunities for Soviet influence in the region. To prevent Rhodesia from becoming another Angola, the United States became an active third party in the conflict

(Matthews,1990:300,301).

In April 1976, Henry Kissinger toured Southern Africa to sound out regional leaders on the Rhodesian problem. In Zambia on April 27, he made a speech supporting the Callaghan proposals, declaring for the first time American support for majority rule and independence (Low,1985:96). Kissinger stated that Rhodesia could not depend on assistance from the United States, while at the same time offering such assistance to the Front Line States and to an independent Zimbabwe. Most significantly, Kissinger committed the United States to finding "a rapid, just, and African solution to the issue of Rhodesia" (quoted in Low,1985:96).

1976 KISSINGER PROPOSAL

Central to Kissinger's plan were South Africa, upon which Rhodesia was now entirely dependent, and the Front Line States, upon which the nationalist forces depended for most of their material support. According to Flower, Kissinger offered Vorster "American support for anti-Marxist forces in Angola and no further pressure... over Namibia, provided Vorster increased his pressure on Smith and thus cleared America's name in black Africa" (1987:164). South African vulnerability to American pressure on the gold market and the possibility of U.N. sponsored sanctions against South Africa over Namibia, forced Vorster to concede to the deal (Flower,1987:164).

Dramatic turns in the insurgency war placed added pressure on Smith to seek a settlement. According to Flower's CIO assessments made between July and September 1976:

...unless terrorist casualties exceed their present rate of infiltration, no amount of continuous call-up will, of itself, provide a military solution. Indeed, it is doubtful whether any purely military solution is possible... we must accept that virtually the whole of Rhodesia is under threat. (1987:132,133)

Sanctions, border closures, and the guerrilla's disruption of transportation lines to South Africa were finally beginning to have an impact: "The obvious seriousness of the economic situation brought home increasingly to white Rhodesians the need for a constitutional settlement as the only means of relieving the country's growing difficulties" (ACR,1977:B902). However, the recognition was not universal, as some white groups reacted to American and South African pressure with increased intransigence (ACR,1977:B902).

U.S. Position

On September 15, Smith and a Rhodesian delegation met with Kissinger and Vorster in Pretoria. Kissinger presented a five-point plan based on the Callaghan proposals that Smith had rejected only a few months earlier (Flower,1987:166,167). Central to the proposal was that majority rule be achieved within two years and for a multi-racial interim government to hold power until it was.

Kissinger assured the Rhodesian delegation that sanctions would be lifted once the interim government was in place, and that he would do his best to end guerrilla activity. The United States, Britain, and South Africa agreed to an injection of development capital, and an international trust fund would be created to guarantee pension rights and investments (Flower, 1987:168,170).

Smith assented to the proposals on the condition that the interim ministers of defence and law and order be white (Matthews, 1990:302). On September 24, he announced his acceptance of the Kissinger Plan, and the principle of majority rule, to be achieved within two years. Smith made his acceptance conditional on his amendments being accepted by the other parties, the lifting of sanctions, and the ending of terrorism. However, with his public announcement of the acceptance, Smith began his characteristic backsliding:

It will be a "majority rule" constitution and this is expressly laid down in the proposals. My own position on majority rule is well known. I have stated in public many times, and I believe I echo the views of the majority of both black and white Rhodesians when I say that we support majority rule, provided that it is responsible rule.
(quoted in Flower, 1987:171)

1976 GENEVA CONFERENCE

To negotiate the interim arrangements for the transition to majority rule, Britain sponsored a conference, beginning on October 28, in Geneva.

African Position

Muzorewa and Sithole attended under the banner of the United African National Council (UANC). Mugabe and Nkomo also attended, uniting ZANU and ZAPU under the Patriotic Front (PF). Both groups maintained their reservation demand for "immediate independence under majority rule, with no transition arrangements that would leave the instruments of power (security, law and order and defence) in the hands of the white minority" (ACR,1977: B901). The Kissinger proposals were to be the starting point for negotiations over the terms of white surrender and immediate majority rule (Matthews,1990:303). Details of the transition were negotiable, and the nationalists were willing to accept a British presence during the transition to independence.

RF Position

The RF held to its position that the proposals were non-negotiable, and had to be implemented as a complete package. Smith claimed the only purpose of the conference was to fill in the details: the proposals that the chairmanship of the Council of State and the Ministries of Defence and Law and Order would remain in white hands was non-negotiable. Smith was thus able to reject the entire package on the basis that his preconditions were rejected by the nationalists (Matthews,1990:303,304).

The Geneva Conference adjourned without settlement on December 14. Its failure can be attributed to two

causes. First, a conditional zone of agreement did not exist: although Smith accepted the principle of majority rule, his condition of "responsible rule" was unacceptable to the nationalists.

Second, the conference and subsequent efforts by Britain to restart the process in January 1977, failed because the condition of "necessity" that made Smith accept Kissinger's proposals, was withdrawn. Its source, South African compellence, was no longer present as Pretoria had reassessed its rationale for supporting majority rule in Rhodesia, in light that the new government would be the "marxist" Patriotic Front (ACR,1977:B900). The removal of South African compellence was assured on January 8, 1977 when the Front Line States recognized the PF as the only legitimate group in Zimbabwe (Matthews,1990:305).

Without South African support, the Kissinger Plan stalled, as nothing else could compel the RF to alter its reservation demands. The RF's positional shift preceding the Geneva conference was not maintained as it had only been the result of simple learning, as indicated after the conference when Smith circulated secret documents stating that his commitment to majority rule was "only tactical" (ACR,1978:B1019).

Turning Points

It can be concluded that 1976 was a major turning point in the conflict. First, although only a "tactical"

concession, Smith's acceptance of the principle of majority rule within two years, signalled the symbolic defeat of UDI and the RF's twelve year rebellion designed to maintain white rule (ACR,1977:B899).

An immediate consequence of Smith's acceptance of the Kissinger Proposals was to demoralize white Rhodesians - a record number of 14 000 left that year. However, it only strengthened black morale and the militancy of the nationalist movement (ACR,1977:B899).

Military turning points in 1976 dramatically increased the level of compulsion inflicted on the white population. The security forces suffered a total of 112 casualties and 786 wounded during 1976 -- an almost tenfold increase from the 12 deaths and 132 wounded in 1975. Guerrilla casualties increased to 1 244 from 145 (Cilliers, 1985:242).

Two-thirds of the country was out of government control (Jaster,1987:109). Previously faced with a "no-win" situation, the Rhodesian security forces were in a "losing war" by mid-1976 (Flower,1987:119). By the end of the year, "Zimbabwe nationalism finally established itself... as an irresistible force on the threshold of victory" (ACR,1977: B901).

There was also a significant cognitive shift with the election of Jimmy Carter in the United States. The new administration was prepared to give a "much higher priority"

to the problems in southern Africa. On February 10, 1977 Carter's Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, stated that the Rhodesian situation was of "the greatest urgency" and pressed for the repeal of the Byrd Amendment which allowed imports of Rhodesian chrome despite UN sanctions (ACR,1978:B1020).

1977-1979: ANGLO-AMERICAN INITIATIVE

The United States and Britain agreed that the Patriotic Front must play a major role in any settlement. In 1977, the two countries agreed to coordinate their efforts to bring about a settlement, and the Anglo-American Consultative Group was formed. The Anglo-American approach had two tracks: shuttle diplomacy, and conferences. When one track was failing, the other was tried, with the third party process shifting back and forth between the two tracks (Low,1986:166-168). In June, the Group began its shuttle diplomacy with a cycle of meetings with each party.

RF Position

A Rhodesian Front party congress granted Smith a mandate with majority support to "strive to reach an agreement within the party's principles and policies," and while recognizing the need for a settlement, the congress urged the government to ensure that "the rights of all communities are meaningfully guaranteed" (ACR,1978:B1020).

The RF maintained its reservation demand for

minority rule, adjusting its metaphor slightly to allow black political participation through a qualified franchise.

The reservation demand for minority rule called for constitutional guarantees of white parliamentary supremacy (through blocking mechanisms for the white minority) and for white control of the instruments of state power (civil service, judiciary, police, and armed forces).

African Position

The nationalists remained divided between the UANC and the PF. The UANC outlined its position in March: (1) Smith was to surrender political power and authority immediately to the majority; (2) Britain, through the UN or Commonwealth, was to ensure free political activity and to supervise a national referendum to elect a national leader; (3) the guerrillas were to be allowed to participate in the referendum; and (4) a constitutional conference was to be convened (ACR, 1978:B1020).

In April, the Patriotic Front outlined three preconditions for negotiations: (1) the PF must be the sole representative of the Africans in Rhodesia; (2) the negotiations were to be only between the PF and Britain; and (3) there was to be no American participation in the conference (ACR, 1978:B1021).

The Patriotic Front had two reservation demands. First, the PF demanded NIBMAR. The leadership was confident that they would win any free and fair election, and thus

they knew their success depended on the conditions during the transition period (Low,1986:167). The Patriotic Front therefore had a second reservation demand that the transition period guarantee a free and fair electoral process, as well as ensure that the PF would not be vulnerable to attack from any Rhodesian or foreign military force.

The PF remained confident of military victory, and in July, announced articulated demands designed to maximize their control during the transition period and thus prevent the loss of any advantage caused by the suspension of their unilateral strategy. First, military control during the transition was to be exclusively in their hands. There was to be no integration of the guerrilla and security forces -- they would only accept "the formula of the guerrilla forces being phased in while the Rhodesians were being phased out" (ACR,1978:B1022). Second, the PF would only allow other parties to be present during their conference with Britain if all participants first accepted that the PF would become the independence army (ACR,1978:B1023).

The PF demand for the dismantling of the Rhodesian security forces was supported by the Front Line Presidents. In August 1977, President Carter agreed to include the PF demand in U.S. proposals (Low,1986:167,168).

Power Shifts

Throughout 1977 power shifts caused all the

principal parties to change their tactics and positions. The guerrillas escalated their "onslaught against the morale of the whites... to an unprecedented level bringing the war closer to the urban white communities than at any time before" (Cilliers, 1985:39). The security forces suffered 166 casualties in 1977, compared with almost the same number (175) killed between 1973 and 1976. During the year, 1 770 guerrillas were killed, with total guerrilla casualties between 1973 and 1976 being 1 746 (Cilliers,1985:242). Rhodesia's defence budget for the year showed a 44 percent increase (Martin and Johnson,1981:279,280).

In June, a Rhodesian Foreign Office official stated that "[The guerrillas] are now keeping the Rhodesian armed forces very stretched over large areas of the country... [and] are seriously disrupting local administrations -- schools, tax collections, etc. -- and they are forging pretty strong links with the people in those areas" (quoted in Martin and Johnson,1981:280). The official also indicated that the security forces were losing a man a day, with the kill ratio dropping from ten to one in their favour, to seven to one. Furthermore, he stressed, unlike the guerrillas, the security forces did not have an inexhaustible supply of recruits (Martin and Johnson,1981:280).

The erosion of the "Rhodesian way of life" was further indicated by white emigration, which resulted in the

largest net outflow in the country's history. By December, 10 908 whites had left (ACR,1978:B1046).

A number of factors combined to cause severe damage to the economy: the mounting pressure on white manpower resulting from military call-ups and emigration, rising unemployment among blacks, tightening sanctions⁴ and world recession, a severe shortage of foreign exchange and lack of foreign investment, declining tourism, rising defence expenditure, and the increasing vulnerability of external transportation links (ACR,1978:B1047). The Rhodesian Banking Corporation issued a report stating "The declining trend in manufacturing production has now been in force for two-and-a-half years and still there is little to suggest that the fall in output will be reversed or even arrested in the foreseeable future" (ACR,1978:B1047).

The July 25 Quarterly Threat Assessment, signed by the Security Chiefs, and Flower, the Intelligence Chief, concluded that "No successful result can be attained by purely military means" (Flower,1987:189). However, in response to this report, Smith replied that any settlement must be both "responsible and acceptable" -- his euphemism for maintaining white control (Flower,1987:189).

Despite their "progress" on the battlefield, the nationalists were also suffering setbacks. By 1977 the

⁴ The United States repealed the Byrd Amendment making exports of ferrochrome difficult and causing several mines to close (ACR,1978:B1047).

costs of the war for Zambia, Mozambique, and Botswana were "staggering": Kaunda's sanctions against Rhodesia cost Zambia roughly a third of its annual GDP (Jaster, 1983:9). These costs would erode the commitment of the Front Line Presidents to a purely military strategy.

Anglo-American Proposals

The Anglo-American proposals were presented to the parties in September 1977.

African Response

Although all parties accepted the proposals as a basis for negotiation, each had serious misgivings. The Patriotic Front issued a white paper that praised Britain for recognizing the situation was that of war, and for accepting the principles of the non-negotiable rights of independence and democratic elections based on universal suffrage. However, the paper also called for several "improvements": the police as a paramilitary body working with the army must be dismantled; the judiciary and the civil service must be screened; and the "liberation army could not surrender but must participate in an interim period leading to elections and independence" (Martin and Johnson, 1981:273).

These "improvements" reflected the Patriotic Front's reservation demands for security and control during the transition period, as the paper asked: "By what faith can an election booth be regarded as democratic, free and

impartial if it is surrounded... by Smith's policeman, his soldier, his district commissioner and his judge" (quoted in Martin and Johnson,1981:273).

RF Response

Although the RF accepted the package as a basis for negotiation, Smith declared that universal suffrage was not in the best interests of the country, rejecting the proposed role of a UN military force, and condemning as "insane" the suggestion that the guerrillas be incorporated into the new army (Martin and Johnson,1981:273).

The Anglo-American proposals were finally killed by Smith in November, 1977. According to Flower, the proposals contained flaws that made it impossible for the parties to accept (1987:183). First, the reservation demands of both the RF and PF for security were defined in terms of military control, and thus neither party would agree to allow the other's armed forces to be in control during transition. Although the war was shifting in favour of the PF, compulsion sufficient to get the RF to integrate or disband the security forces was not yet present, as Vorster had made it clear South Africa "would under no circumstances agree to the guerrillas [taking] over from the Rhodesian Army" (ACR,1978:B1025).

Second, the proposals floundered on role defence, as they called for the Rhodesians to "surrender power", which made Smith "particularly livid" (Martin and Johnson,

1981:273).

ANGLO-AMERICAN EFFORTS AND SMITH'S INTERNAL OPTION

Unilateral settlement by the security forces was clearly impossible by early 1977. As a result, Smith was pursuing the cooptation option through an Internal Settlement, while taking measures to avoid multilateral negotiations that would include the PF.

The CIO security assessment in January 1977 concluded that the security forces "were losing so much ground militarily that even with general mobilisation, which would have a detrimental effect on the economy... matters could only be prolonged..." (Flower, 1987:177). Smith agreed for the first time that the situation could only worsen and therefore a political settlement was necessary (Flower, 1987: 177). Although some ministers still advocated a hardline approach, the Cabinet made "the fateful decision to go for a political solution and accept the inevitability of black majority rule" (Flower, 1987:177).

Smith began gathering support for his Internal Settlement. As part of the effort to gain internal African support, Smith abolished racial segregation in hotels, bars, and restaurants. The most significant change was actions taken to repeal the Land Tenure Act, thus allowing blacks for the first time to buy land in agricultural and urban areas previously reserved for whites (Matthews, 1990:306).

Cognitive Shifts

Smith's reforms caused rifts within the Rhodesian Front. Twelve RF Members of Parliament refused to support the new legislation, and were expelled from the Party. They then formed a right-wing opposition, the Rhodesian Action Party. Faced with the challenge to his authority from both the right and left, Smith called an election for August.

The election platform indicated slight cognitive and attitude shifts in the RF government. Smith no longer campaigned for "high standards" being maintained in "civilized hands;" but instead called for a "'broadbased government' that would rule responsibly but would do away with discrimination that 'infringes on human dignity'" (Martin and Johnson, 1981:272). Essentially, Smith was seeking a mandate to negotiate with moderate Africans for a multiracial government (Matthews, 1990:307).

The most significant indication of the shift in white attitudes were the results of the election. Although the RF won 80 percent of white votes, the RAP did not win a single seat. Furthermore, the National Unifying Force (NUF), which advocated immediate black majority rule, received more votes in the 18 seats it contested than the RAP (ANC, 1978:B1032).

With South Africa on side by November, Smith was able to reject the Anglo-American proposals in entirety, with the intention to negotiate with the internal African politicians, Muzorewa, Sithole, and Chirau. The talks

"began in earnest" on December 9 (ACR,1978:B1027).

MALTA I

In January 1978, the Consultative Group attempted to revive the Anglo-American proposals by meeting with the PF in Malta. Considerable progress was made. The PF accepted a role for the United Nations in supervising elections, but not in peacekeeping. They also agreed to an interim Governing Council of ten formed by two representatives from each of the five parties at the Geneva Conference. While accepting a limited amnesty for Rhodesian politicians, civil servants, judges, and soldiers, the PF reserved the right to insist certain officials resign, including the Chief Justice, the Police Commissioner, and the Secretary to the Cabinet (Martin and Johnson,1981:291).

With the Internal Settlement negotiations on track, the Consultative Group's efforts in Malta were in effect "stillborn" (Matthews,1990:309). Preferring an Internal Settlement, Smith declared the Malta amendments were "totally unacceptable" (Martin and Johnson,1981:291).

INTERNAL SETTLEMENT, March 1978

On March 3, 1978, Muzorewa, Sithole, Chirau and Smith reached an agreement on an "Internal Settlement" (IS). The conditions were that the Africans were given the prime ministership and a black parliamentary majority. However, white control was reserved over civil, police, judicial, and military administration. Furthermore, with 28 seats

reserved for whites in the 100 seat National Assembly, the Rhodesian Front was guaranteed a veto over any constitutional change (Martin and Johnson,1981:293). After a transition period, elections were to be held and "majority rule" granted by December. The Transitional Government was to consist of an Executive Council of the four leaders with rotating chairmanship and Smith retaining the title of Prime Minister (Martin and Johnson,1981:293).

The negotiations were long and difficult with Muzorewa walking out several times (Martin and Johnson,1981:291). However, the African politicians had to accept the agreement: they were left out of the Anglo-American initiative, and without their own military capability, they would be "swept away by the guerrilla forces" (Matthews, 1990:310).

The objective of the Internal Settlement was to end the conflict -- which in Smith's mind meant international recognition ending sanctions, and an end to terrorism without having to include the PF in the settlement. The success of the IS depended on its ability to gain the internal support of Africans and thus end the war. Smith assumed that support for the guerrillas would disappear once discriminatory legislation was repealed, and that an amnesty was granted to the guerrillas. It was expected that international recognition would be achieved and sanctions lifted as the war subsided (Matthews,1990:

310).

The settlement failed to gain the expected international support. Although South Africa welcomed it, the response of Britain and the United States was cautious. Britain saw the settlement as a "significant move towards majority rule" but also stressed there were still "crucial issues" to be resolved. The United States position was that the "agreement failed to resolve the issues that had led to armed struggle because it ignored the PF" (ACR,1978:B1029).

Within the region, the settlement drew the universal condemnation of black African states. The Front Line States rejected the settlement as a "sell-out" as it did not recognize the PF and allowed Smith to retain all meaningful control (ACR,1978:B1029). The PF position was that the settlement changed nothing because, as Nkomo stated, "the seat of power, the Army, the police, the judiciary and the civil service, are firmly in the hands of Mr. Smith and his minority" (ACR,1978:B1030). Furthermore, the key selling points to gain the internal support of the black population, ending discrimination and an amnesty for guerrillas, were ineffective, and thus the war continued (Martin and Johnson,1981:294).

Power Shifts

The IS regime would have represented another unilateral settlement had the war not taken dramatic turns against Smith early in 1978. By March, 450 ZANLA guerrillas

were in the country and had begun to consolidate and defend territory. By mid-year this number rose to 13 000, with infiltrations even into the capital. Rhodesian control eroded to the point of systemic failure in some areas, as the guerrillas "now controlled zones which were semi-liberated in the sense that the old administration had broken down, they moved relatively freely, and the security forces were able to penetrate only by air or concentrated ground attack" (Martin and Johnson, 1981:292-294).

MALTA II

In April, the Consultative Group and the PF met in Dar es Salaam for the "Malta II" conference. Progress was again made, as the PF agreed to significant changes in its articulated demands. First, the PF accepted the idea of a UN force, with Mugabe defining its role as being "to ensure that a ceasefire was adhered to; to disarm and dismantle the existing Rhodesian security forces; and to defend the country against outside enemies who might want to interfere with the independence process" (quoted in ACR, 1978:B1030). The PF proposed a transition governing council with twelve members: eight from the PF; the Resident Commissioner (British Lord Carver); and recognizing the internal leaders, the PF accepted three members being from the internal front (possibly Smith, Muzorewa, and Sithole) (ACR, 1978:B1030). The Resident Commissioner would be allowed executive authority over the security forces as long as the PF was the

dominant force in the governing council.

Despite this progress, British Foreign Secretary David Owen was not optimistic. Addressing the Commons, Owen implied the lack of mutual compulsion remained a central obstacle: "there are still major differences between the parties, both of whom think they are winning" (Martin and Johnson, 1981:292).

Power Shifts

In July, Flower presented a security brief to the Executive Council (1987:207,208):

...it will be impossible to hold the sort of elections that will be recognised elsewhere -- or if you can hold them, Mugabe's supporters may win... The security situation has never been so desperate... Over 6 000 terrorists within Rhodesia with plus or minus 30 000 lined up against us, and their numbers probably growing to about 40 000 before the end of the year -- with more support and sympathy internally and externally than they have ever had. Meantime, our White Security Forces diminish in numbers and effectiveness.⁵

The main weakness of the PF was its lack of unity and coordination of effort between its ZANU and ZAPU wings (ACR, 1978:B1033). Realizing that British and American support required the PF to be involved in any settlement, Smith sought to exploit the PF's weakness by making secret

⁵ The official figures released to the Rhodesian public by security spokesmen were: 2 500 guerrillas operating within Rhodesia in April and 3 600 in July, with a total of 8 000 deployable from other countries (ACR, 1978:B1041). The Rhodesian Security Forces consisted of 5 000 army regulars and 3 250 full time National Serviceman, with a total potential of 111 550 men and women when the reserves and police forces were included (ACR, 1978:B1043).

overtures to Nkomo. Smith calculated that Nkomo's inclusion would gain British and American support and lead to recognition and the lifting of sanctions. If the settlement failed to end the war, the improved economic situation would increase Rhodesia's ability to wage war against Mugabe (Low, 1986:166; Matthews, 1990:311).

Smith and Nkomo met secretly in Zambia in mid-August, and reached the surprising agreement that Nkomo would replace Smith as chairman of the Executive Council. When the details of the secret talks were prematurely disclosed, an irreversible split formed in the PF between Mugabe and Nkomo, and relations between Kaunda and Nyerere were damaged (Flower, 1987:209).

However, "a stroke of fate" as Smith described it, saved him from having to accept his agreement with Nkomo: ZIPRA shot down an Air Rhodesia Viscount, thirty five were killed in the crash, and ten of the eighteen survivors were killed by guerrillas before rescuers could reach the scene (Flower, 1987:210). Twenty-four hours earlier, Rhodesians had welcomed the news of the Smith/Nkomo negotiations -- but the Viscount disaster shattered optimism and reinforced the old attitudes. Even moderates were enraged, and there was immediate pressure to impose martial law and calls for retaliatory strikes into Zambia (Flower, 1987:210, 211; Meredith, 1979:347).

U.K. and U.S. Position

All efforts to gain British and American recognition of the internal settlement failed. In Britain, the Conservatives were pushing for recognition and an end to sanctions, but the Labour government made these conditional on the "fifth principle" that the internal settlement be acceptable to the nationalists (Flower, 1987:203). The American Congress passed legislation making future American recognition and the lifting of sanctions conditional on (1) the Rhodesian government demonstrating a willingness to negotiate with the PF under international auspices, and (2) the holding of free and fair elections (Meredith, 1979:367).

In October, the Executive Council agreed to an all-parties conference sponsored by Britain and the United States. At the same time, however, the Rhodesian Air Force was striking ZAPU bases in Zambia, killing at least 1 600 guerrillas (Flower, 1987:214). As a result, Nkomo refused to attend the conference. His refusal allowed Smith to declare the Anglo-American initiative dead and create the impression that its failure was as much the fault of the Patriotic Front as Smith's government (Matthews, 1980:113).

Power Shifts

By December 1978, Rhodesian officials conservatively estimated that between 10 000 and 12 000 guerrillas were operating within the country (ACR, 1979: B1001). Total guerrilla deaths in 1978 were up 738 to 2 508. However, security force casualties doubled to 345

killed and 1 520 wounded (Cilliers,1985:238,242).

Furthermore, "White morale plummeted as, with blacks in government, it became unclear who or what they were fighting for" (Martin and Johnson,1981:298).

Smith had failed to retain the confidence of whites: emigration in December was almost 3 000, making the total for 1978 more than 18 000 (Meredith,1979:353). The gravity of the situation was underscored by resignations from the government and by prominent people emigrating to South Africa (ACR,1979:B988).

However, the Front Line States were also incurring great costs. Zambia was forced to reopen its rail link through Rhodesia to bring in critically needed supplies. Rhodesian raids deep into Zambia and Mozambique, not only killed over 2 000 guerrillas, but also threatened the security of the two countries. The Front Line states were incapable of defending themselves from these incursions, and the Rhodesians often stayed in country for several days. By the end of 1978, the costs of the war to the Front Line States were "rising rapidly and soon were approaching the limits of tolerance" (Jaster,1983:8).

1979 CONSTITUTION AND ELECTIONS

With multilateral negotiations again successfully blocked, Smith continued with his second track of the Internal Settlement. The December elections were postponed until April 20, 1979 and made conditional on the approval of

the draft constitution by a white referendum in January.

Although the Land Tenure Act was finally repealed, the new constitution was more favourable to the whites than the terms of the Internal Settlement: whites retained every instrument of power except Parliament; provisions guaranteed whites would outnumber blacks in the civil service, the defence forces, the police and the judiciary. Whites were guaranteed ten of the thirty seats in the newly formed Senate, with another third going to tribal chiefs, traditional white allies. The final, and most symbolic concession was the new name for the country: Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, which demonstrated "how far the nationalists negotiating with Smith were prepared to go in placating the whites" (Meredith, 1979:354,355).

The African politicians again were forced into accepting the Constitution, because since the Internal Settlement, they had "come to depend on the white-controlled machinery of state for their own survival" (Meredith, 1979: 356).

In January, the personal representative of British Prime Minister Callaghan, Cledwyn Hughes concluded that an all parties' conference would not result in an agreement (Low, 1986:169). The same month, Smith began campaigning for the Constitution, emphasizing the safeguards built in to protect whites. For the first time, Smith accurately presented the precarious position the whites were in

(Meredith,1979:356). The January election returned an 85 percent vote of acceptance for the constitution from a 71 percent white turnout (Meredith,1979:357).

By March, international pressure from Britain and South Africa was directed to force Smith's resignation on the basis that his "retention in any sort of office after the elections would damage the credibility of black leaders" (Flower,1987:220). Despite the warnings from London, Pretoria, and Washington, Smith decided to run for office.

Cognitive Shifts

The government elections took place between April 17 and 21. Whites had the right to vote twice: once for the 20 reserved white seats (the other eight to be elected by white MPs), and once in the main election for the 72 black seats. The RF won either uncontested or with substantial majorities in all twenty seats, and thus also filled the eight extra seats. It was estimated 62 percent of the 2.6 million eligible blacks turned out to vote. Muzorewa was elected the first black Prime Minister, as the UANC gained 67 percent of the vote (black and white) and won 51 of the 72 black seats. Two other black parties received 12 and nine seats each (Meredith,1979:361-363).

The election of Muzorewa represented a significant cognitive shift in Rhodesia: an African leader with African sympathies had replaced the recalcitrant Smith as Prime Minister. Although ultimate constitutional power still lay

in white hands, white power had been reduced. As head of government, Muzorewa was a force working for constitutional reform toward genuine majority rule.

However, Muzorewa's election did not strengthen the security of the regime. General Walls, the Commander of Combined Operations, stated on 9 May, that nothing should be concluded from the fact that the PF did not disrupt the election, and the "overriding need for continued political initiative and momentum had in no way diminished" (Flower, 1987:223).

The survival of the Muzorewa's IS regime depended on international recognition of the elections and the lifting of sanctions (Flower, 1987:227). On May 3 a second critical cognitive shift occurred as Margaret Thatcher's Conservatives came to power. At first, this appeared to be a positive development for the regime as the Tories were committed to recognizing the regime and ending sanctions (Legum, 1980:A4). At the same time, there was also growing conservative pressure in Washington for Carter to recognize the election results and lift sanctions.

U.K. and U.S. Position

The Conservatives had sent representative Lord Boyd to observe the Rhodesian elections. Boyd concluded they were "free and fair", calling for their recognition and an end to sanctions, while condemning the PF as a terrorist organization (Martin and Johnson, 1981:301,302). Thatcher's

Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, and the Foreign Office sought to dissuade Thatcher, fearing that recognition of Muzorewa would have disastrous effects on British relations in Africa, with the United States, and Economic Community, as well as inviting economic retaliation from Nigeria and the possible military involvement of the Soviet Union and Cuba (Legum, 1980:A4). Carrington thus announced that the Boyd Report would guide British policy, but would not be the only source of guidance (Smith, 1981:234).

International pressure was quickly organized to prevent Thatcher's government from recognizing the regime. The Commonwealth Secretariat issued a report concluding that the regime's constitution "is revealed as a carefully contrived subterfuge for sustaining a wholly anti-democratic regime" (Smith, 1981:234). The Heads of Government of the Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa agreed, adding "the elections could not, and indeed were not intended to, produce majority rule" (Smith, 1981:235).

A delegation of Commonwealth High Commissioners in London (including Canada, Australia, Trinidad, and some African states), along with the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, Sonny Ramphal, petitioned Carrington not to recognize the elections. Carrington was also visited by Cyrus Vance, apparently expressing the same concerns (Smith, 1981:235). Both the United Nations Security Council (with Britain, the United States, and France abstaining) and

the Organization for African Unity (OAU) passed resolutions calling for states not to recognize Muzorewa's new government (Smith,1981:235).

Carter sought to convince Congress that recognition of the regime would discredit US policy in Africa and thus increase Soviet influence (Meredith,1979: 365,366). On June 7, Carter announced that the United States would not recognize the elections, and in close consultations with the British government, would continue with sanctions against the regime. The timing of Carter's announcement gave it double impact, as it coincided with the decision of the Front Line Presidents to escalate the war against Muzorewa's government (Flower,1987:227).

Despite Carter's position, Thatcher still swayed toward recognition of the regime. In late June, she suggested that sanctions should not be renewed when their parliamentary order lapsed in November. More pressure was brought to bear on Thatcher, with Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser exerting significant personal influence (Smith,1981:236). Thatcher acquiesced when faced with a potential OAU trade boycott "costing billions of pounds" (Meredith,1981:365). On July 24, Thatcher announced that the constitution and elections did not meet the five principles required for negotiations, and therefore sanctions would continue.

THE RIPE MOMENT

Britain's final refusal to recognize the IS regime and to lift sanctions marked the achievement of the three conditions of the ripe moment.

Necessity

To create a zone of agreement, the IS regime had to shift its reservation demands by abandoning the 1979 Constitution that kept control in white hands, and by agreeing to enter negotiations with the PF. To cause these shifts required a level of compulsion that precluded the maintenance of reservation demands and required the search for new principles and metaphors. By mid-1979, such compulsion existed, as the regime was on the verge of systemic failure.

There were over 20 000 ZANLA guerrillas and 2 900 ZIPRA guerrillas operating inside Rhodesia (Martin and Johnson,1981:309; Cilliers,1985:239). In addition to these, between 39 000 and 50 000 guerrillas were waiting to infiltrate from the bordering countries (Cilliers,1985:239; Matthews,1990:319). The guerrillas infiltrated the Tribal Trust Lands and encircled the economic heartland, causing the systemic failure throughout these areas by disrupting government administration and setting up their own "well organized and security conscious civil administration" (Cilliers,1985:238,239). By September, the entire country, except for Salisbury and Bulawayo, were under martial law; but even these two cities vulnerable to serious attacks

(ACR,1980:B981,B983).

By mid-1979, the IS regime faced for the first time the possibility of a conventional war on two fronts. ZANLA had established well fortified bases on the Mozambique border protected by tanks and anti-aircraft guns. ZIPRA was preparing for a large-scale attack from Zambia with tanks, armoured vehicles, and Soviet Migs providing air cover. The objective was to take Salisbury (Jaster,1987:118,119).

A classified Army document stated in mid-year: "There are at present 3 900 well trained troops... deployed against 12,400 CTs (Communist Terrorists): a ratio of 1:3,2. Adding of SFA (Security Force Auxiliaries) to troops, the ratio becomes 1:1,15. In classical COIN (counter-insurgency) terms, this is a no-win, or rather, a sure lose equation" (quoted in Cilliers,1985: 239,240). By the end of the year, the security forces had suffered 408 deaths, and 178 non-African civilians had been killed (Martin and Johnson,1981:309).

Sanctions were depriving the government its ability to defend itself and end the war. According to Martin and Johnson, "the guerrillas had brought Rhodesia to a point where it needed the end of the war even more than recognition and the lifting of sanctions" (Martin and Johnson,1981:318). Although South Africa had offered full support to the IS regime, it could do little to offset the effects of the economic crisis and guerrilla war, and was

constrained by Pretoria's own desire to avoid sanctions over its position on Rhodesia and Namibia (Flower,1987:257).

The extreme compulsion of the guerrilla war and international rejection of the regime rendered the regime's metaphors dysfunctional: the metaphors were ineffective in attaining security and other basic needs for the white community while perpetuating the conflict because the retention of control in white hands violated the PF reservation demands for genuine majority rule. As the schemata of minority rule became increasingly inoperable and antithetical to the survival of the white community, the IS regime had no other option but to rely on the mercy of Britain and the United States and enter negotiations that included the Patriotic Front (Flower,1987:227).

The position of the Patriotic Front since 1978 was that the internal regime be totally rejected in favour of a settlement based on the Anglo-American proposals and the developments achieved during the Malta I and II conferences (ACR,1979:B977). The PF remained willing to participate in democratic elections before independence but maintained that the negotiations could not include any "external" power except Britain (ACR,1979:B993).

Receiving all the materiel and financial assistance they required, and confident of eventual military victory, the PF made articulated demands designed to maximize its control in return for the suspension of its

unilateral strategy: the Muzorewa government and its Army would have to be disbanded prior to any negotiations (Flower,1987:227; ACR,1980:970).

The actual or prognosis of significant costs was necessary to convince the Patriotic Front to make their articulated demands negotiable. There were three sources of sufficiently high potential costs that would cause the PF to consider the negotiating option. First, although not capable of preventing an ultimate PF victory, the Rhodesian security forces were still capable of inflicting high costs, as indicated by attacks during the year on bases in Zambia and Mozambique (Jaster,1987:119).

Second, the PF feared that Thatcher and Carter would recognize the internal regime if the PF refused to attend an all-party conference (ACR,1980:B970).

A third source of compulsion was the influence of the Front Line Presidents. Since the PF depended on them for bases, and material and political support, Kaunda and Machel had compellent ability over the PF. By mid-1979, attacks by the Rhodesian security forces undermined the security of the two countries, and devastated their economies (Legum,1980:A4). Only under these conditions were Kaunda and Machel "willing to bring sufficient pressure on the Patriotic Front" to attend an all-party conference (Jaster,1987:110).

Thus, the costs of a prolonged war, combined with

the possibility of a recognized and invigorated internal regime, and the compellent capability of the Front Line Presidents to withdraw support, introduced potential costs sufficient to lead the PF to consider abandoning its articulated demands.

Compatible Definition

Compatible definitions have three components: consensus on the issues, the parties, and the general approach to a settlement. The first component was achieved as the result of the Home-Smith Accord: the RF was forced to see the conflict as over majority rule, and not UDI or the legality of independence.

Since Malta II, the PF had recognized Britain and the internal government as parties, insisting that Muzorewa and Smith be considered a single party (Martin and Johnson, 1981:292). However, it was the response of Britain and the United States to the April elections that forced the IS regime to recognize the legitimate role of the PF.

The third component of the definition, consensus on approach, was provided by the United States and Britain when they directed the course of future talks toward constitutional reform. Both Thatcher and Carter stated that the regime would not be recognized until the "serious imperfections" of the constitution were corrected (Martin and Johnson, 1981:311; Matthews, 1990:314). Therefore, the IS regime was forced to accept that any future settlement had

to be based on a constitution that reflected genuine majority rule, which required a reduced role for whites and the inclusion of the Patriotic Front.

Conditional Zone of Agreement

Muzorewa was committed to majority rule. Before the 1979 elections, he claimed the IS constitution was "too generous" to the whites, and hinted that changes would be made after the universal franchise had been exercised: "When we have political power in our hands, all else, even the things that are bothering you in the constitution, will be added unto you" (Meredith, 1979:356). When told by Thatcher and Carter that sanctions would not be lifted until the constitution reflected genuine majority rule, Muzorewa was quite optimistic that this would happen soon (Martin and Johnson, 1981:311, 312).

Both Muzorewa and the Patriotic Front shared the principle of majority rule. However, the PF had the reservation demand for "genuine" majority rule, stipulating that the principle reflect "not just the fact of a political majority in Parliament... but also the other instruments of physical control..." (Mugabe quoted in ACR, 1979:B977). The PF reservation demand was thus incompatible with the metaphors of the IS regime: although whites had surrendered parliamentary majority, they maintained minority rule through control of the instruments of power.

The reservation demands for white control over the

instruments of power were a primary source of the conflict that, by 1979, was rendering the metaphors of minority rule incapable of providing security and other basic needs for the white community. The dysfunctional nature of the schemata of minority rule compelled the white community to seek alternative principles upon which an agreement could be based to end the war. The failure of the IS regime to end the war and lift sanctions demonstrated to the white community that the only alternative was genuine majority rule. Muzorewa's belief in majority rule eased the regime's symbolic shift to new reservation demands, and a conditional zone of agreement was created based on the principles of "genuine" majority rule.

To actualize the zone, two conditions would have to be met during the prenegotiation process. First, alternative metaphors and behaviour patterns had to be developed that both met the needs of the white community and were compatible with the principles of genuine majority rule. Second, provisions had to be made to meet the second reservation demand of the Patriotic Front for a secure transition period with a free and fair electoral process.

With the attainment of the three conditions, the moment was ripe for prenegotiation. The turning point was taken in August when Thatcher met Kaunda and Nyerere at the Lusaka Commonwealth Conference, initiating the prenegotiation process.

CHAPTER SEVEN: PRENEGOTIATION

LUSAKA COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE, August 1 - 7, 1979

Pre negotiation under the conditions of the ripe moment began at the Lusaka Commonwealth conference on August 1.¹ Muzorewa was not invited to the conference, but given the dependence of the IS regime on Britain and Thatcher's preference for the regime to the exclusion of the Patriotic Front, Muzorewa can be considered to have been represented by Thatcher (Meredith, 1979:366; Davidow, 1984:24, 25). The Patriotic Front was similarly represented by Kaunda and Nyerere, and by Machel who attended as an observer (Jaster, 1983:11).

Australian Prime Minister Fraser gave one of the first speeches on the opening day of the Conference. He set the tone for the discussions to follow, stating the election in Rhodesia had settled nothing, but had

created new facts and disturbed a stalemate... There will have to be further changes. As to what happens next, that... is, to a very large extent, in our laps. Much depends on whether we can seize... the opportunity provided by the comparative fluidity which now exists... Time is running out and we may not have such an opportunity again. (quoted in Smith, 1981:237)

President Nyerere's speech also recognized that a "ripe moment" existed, and outlined a correct diagnosis of the conflict. The principle of majority rule had been

¹ The idea that the Lusaka Conference involved prenegotiation over Rhodesia was suggested by Smith (1981;1985) and Fisher (1989).

accepted within Rhodesia. All that was required now for a settlement was a democratic constitution that would not leave power in the hands of the white minority; negotiations that included the Patriotic Front; and a ceasefire -- all leading to internationally organized and supervised "free and fair" elections (Martin and Johnson, 1981:312,313).

Nyerere was considered to be the "key figure" at the conference. On the second day, he and Thatcher met privately. Nyerere told Thatcher he was prepared to accept an independence constitution that reserved parliamentary seats for whites; however, whites were not to be allowed to retain control of the Armed Forces, civil service, judiciary, police, or have a blocking vote on most constitutional changes (Legum, 1980:A6).

Thatcher's speech accepted Britain's responsibility and declared her government was "wholly committed to genuine Black majority rule in Rhodesia" (quoted in KCA², 1979:29903). She agreed that the constitution was "defective in certain important respects," adding that independence would only be granted once the constitution was made comparable to the constitutions of other Commonwealth countries (Martin and Johnson, 1981:313).

The areas of agreement between the Front Line Presidents and Thatcher were considerable. The final

² Keesing's Contemporary Archives.

communique of the conference included a nine-point declaration on Rhodesia, based on a draft tabled by Nyerere and notes taken by Commonwealth Secretary Ramphal. The declaration announced British intentions to host an all-party conference that included the Patriotic Front and would finally resolve the conflict. The provisions of the declaration indicated that three of the six prenegotiation functions were performed at the Lusaka conference.

Boundary Determination

Points six and seven of the declaration outlined the boundaries of the zone of agreement and of the future negotiations. The objective of the future conference was to establish the constitutional basis for independence, and make the ceasefire and transitional arrangements (KCA,1979:29904).

Thatcher insisted Britain's sixth principle, that minorities be free from oppression by the majority, be included in the declaration. Point six stipulated that "independence on the basis of majority rule requires the adoption of a democratic constitution including appropriate safeguards for minorities" (KCA,1979:29904). The provision introduced a new set of metaphors to attain the needs of the white community -- constitutional safeguards for white political influence and economic security (Davidow,1984:123; Low,1986:169). That these new metaphors had international support indicated they were potentially more viable than the

metaphors of minority rule. The existence of a viable alternative facilitated a shift in white reservation demands from control of the instruments of power to demands for appropriate constitutional safeguards.

The only point of disagreement between Thatcher and the nationalists at Lusaka was over supervision of the elections: Nyerere wanted international supervision while Thatcher insisted Britain be solely responsible for supervision (Martin and Johnson, 1981:313). Britain's position violated the reservation demands of the PF, who although confident of having the majority of African support, had boycotted the April elections on the grounds that only international supervision could guarantee a free and fair election (Davidow, 1984:25; ACR, 1979:B993). The PF remained suspicious of British impartiality and of its ability to provide security for the PF during the transition, and therefore refused to participate in any elections overseen by either Salisbury or Britain alone (ACR, 1980:B971; Legum, 1980:A15).

Nyerere and Thatcher reached a compromise, and point seven of the declaration called for the independence government to be "chosen through free and fair elections supervised under British Government authority, and with Commonwealth observers" (KCA, 1979:29904). This provision met the reservation demand of the Patriotic Front in principle as the PF was confident that "a Commonwealth

observer team would ensure that no election that was not fairly conducted would win international approval" (Legum, 1980:A17).

Perception Management

The declaration also outlined two measures designed to foster and protect positive perceptions and attitudes between the parties. Point six, which explicitly called for "appropriate safeguards for minorities," not only provided a means for the white community to attain its security needs, but by declaring acceptance of the principle prior to negotiations, was designed to build confidence among the white population.

A second provision for perception management was point nine, which called for a ceasefire to protect any negotiated progress from being undermined by events on the battlefield. Such a mechanism was absent during the final Smith/Nkomo talks, and as a consequence the Viscount disaster derailed those negotiations.

Requitement

The Lusaka Conference initiated the process of requitement as a remarkable level of cooperation occurred between Thatcher's delegation and those of the Front Line States in Lusaka. The conference was Thatcher's first sustained contact with the African leaders, and "she found them to be more reasonable, less tub-thumping and doctrinaire, than she had imagined" (Davidow, 1984:31).

Although the parties had serious disagreements, the mood of cooperation and common purpose continued throughout the Lancaster talks.

BETWEEN CONFERENCES

Britain announced its intention to host an all-parties conference to begin on September 10, in London at Lancaster House, the site of previous independence negotiations with Britain's colonies. The three remaining functions of prenegotiation were carried out prior to Lancaster House mainly through the efforts of Carrington, Kaunda, Nyerere, and Machel.

Agenda Determination

The agenda for the Lancaster House Conference was set unilaterally by the British. On August 14, invitations to the conference, including the agenda and eleven proposals to guide the talks, were sent by Carrington to Muzorewa and the Patriotic Front leaders. Although there was some argument over the agenda on the first two days of the conference, the original agenda was not altered (Davidow, 1984:54,55).

Cost Determination and Risk Reduction

The final two functions of prenegotiation were for the parties to determine the costs and risks of entering negotiations. For Muzorewa, the costs of not agreeing to attend the conference were fatal: Britain would not recognize his government unless he attended, and sanctions

would not be lifted. Muzorewa thus had no option but to attend, "and make the best of whatever arrangements the British would offer" (Flower,1987:232).

The risk of reaching an agreement unfavourable to his own interests seemed remote, as Muzorewa was convinced that PF intransigence would cause Britain to force an agreement in his favour (Davidow,1984:43,44; Matthews,1990:315). Muzorewa's perception of risk may also have been reduced by his initial confidence that he would win the elections following an agreement (Davidow,1984:41; Martin and Johnson,1981:318). The Salisbury delegation accepted the invitation on August 15.

Although "encouraged" by the outcome of the Lusaka Conference, the PF "remained suspicious" (Legum,1980:A7). ZANU's spokesman acknowledged the accord encompassed the basic principles for which the PF had fought, stating "though we regret the introduction of a racist element in the requirement for special racial privileges" (Legum,1980:A7).

On the final day of the Lusaka Conference, Mugabe announced his preconditions for attending any talks: the immediate dissolution of the Muzorewa-Smith regime, the disbanding of the Rhodesian Army, and the acceptance of the PF forces as the national army (Legum,1980:A7). The PF maintained these articulated demands because they felt it was only through the control of government mechanisms,

including the police and military forces, that they would have "a fair opportunity to elicit the popular support they knew existed in an electoral contest" (Davidow,1984:49).

Britain had made it clear that should the PF not attend or adopt too inflexible position at the conference, Britain would recognize the internal settlement. The PF also realized their intransigence would probably shift support in the United States toward recognition. International recognition ending sanctions would be a significant setback for the PF, and thus the PF reconsidered their preconditions and accepted the invitation on August 20. (Jaster,1987; Low,1985:106).

However, both Mugabe and Nkomo believed a unilateral military victory was imminent -- Mugabe predicting it within the next year (Meredith,1979:370). Their confidence led them to again attempt to attain their articulated demands. At the Havana Summit Conference of non-aligned states in early September, the PF sought support for a declaration condemning the Lusaka Accord and calling for the immediate transfer of power to the PF (Jaster,1983: 12). To get the PF leaders to abandon these articulated demands, the Front Line Presidents had to use their compellent capability to increase the costs to the PF of not attending the conference. Nyerere and Machel gave the PF an ultimatum: if they refused to participate in the negotiations, the Front Line States would withdraw their

support for the PF, and thus "close down the war" (Jaster, 1983:12).

The conditions of the ultimatum also performed the function of reducing the risks to the PF posed by attending the conference: "the PF was reassured that, if the conference failed because of Britain or Muzorewa, the Front-Line States would support fully a renewal of the armed conflict; moreover, the guerrillas could continue the war during the Conference, until a cease-fire should take effect" (Jaster, 1983:12).

Both Mugabe and Nkomo were supremely confident that they would win any free election (Martin and Johnson, 1981:318).³ Therefore, the main risk to the PF was that the conference result in an election that was not free or fair. However, this risk was virtually eliminated by two reinforcing factors. First, the Front Line Presidents were sufficiently confident of ultimate success to not to accept any settlement that did not guarantee genuinely free and fair elections (Low, 1985:106). The presidents were thus willing to assist the PF in achieving adequate transitional arrangements, while pledging continued support in the war if such arrangements were not achieved because of the

³ According to Martin and Johnson, since 1978 Mozambican intelligence reports indicated that it was obvious Mugabe would win because the most populous regions of Zimbabwe overwhelmingly supported ZANU. In contrast to Mugabe's confidence, both Nkomo and Muzorewa showed "moments of doubt" (1981:316-318).

intransigence of the other parties. Second, the provisions in the Lusaka Accord removed the main threat of complicity between London and Salisbury by guaranteeing a Commonwealth observer team that would not accept anything short of a genuinely free and fair election (Legum, 1980:A17).

RIPE MOMENT FOR NEGOTIATION: The Zone of Agreement

The ripe moment for negotiation is characterized by (1) the existence of a zone of agreement between the principal parties that allows the mutual attainment of needs without violating any reservation demand of the parties; (2) the costs and risks to each party of not entering negotiations outweighing those of entering; and (3) a negotiating process, indicated by the agenda, being accepted by the parties.

The zone of agreement was created by two shifts in positions. First, the acceptance by the white community of security attained through constitutional safeguards instead of a monopoly on the instruments of power, allowed the mutual attainment of reservation demands as white demands no longer precluded those of the PF. The conflict thus "broke out of the zero-sum trap" (Low, 1985:104; Touval and Zartman, 1985:267; Matthews, 1990:321). Second, the provision in the Lusaka Accord guaranteeing the elections would be overseen by an impartial Commonwealth observer team introduced a means for the Patriotic Front to attain its reservation demand for a free and fair electoral process that would

deliver their final victory.

It was mainly the efforts of the third parties that ensured that the costs to both parties of not attending the conference outweighed those of attending, while at the same time reducing the risks of attendance by making each party confident that it would attain the best settlement possible.

The existence of an acceptable process was initially indicated by the acceptance of the invitations to attend Lancaster; and was later confirmed two days into the conference when the parties begrudgingly agreed to accept Carrington's proposed agenda.

Prenegotiation was complete and the transition to negotiation made on September 10 with the opening of the Lancaster House Conference.

CHAPTER EIGHT: ASSESSMENT OF THE CSP

This chapter will outline evidence confirming four central hypotheses: (1) the principal parties experienced complex learning during the ripening and prenegotiation processes that resulted in the cognitive progress and schema transformations necessary to resolve the conflict; (2) the four ripening forces contributed to this cognitive progress and assisted in the resolution of the conflict; (3) the ripening force of compulsion resulted, not in a hurting stalemate, but in mutual and asymmetrical compulsion; and (4) the Lancaster House agreement succeeded in resolving the conflict because it met the reservation demands of the parties.

LEARNING

Between 1965 and 1980, the nationalists and white Rhodesians that made up the parties to the conflict experienced significant learning and attitude change. Simple learning was manifested throughout the conflict in the adjustments each party made to its tactics and articulated demands. Each party also experienced complex learning and schema transformations, as indicated by shifts in reservation demands and the adoption of new principles and behaviour patterns.

A first indication of learning among the white community occurred during the Pearce Commission's inquiry into the acceptance levels of the Home-Smith Accord. In

1972, David Holden wrote: "For the first time in the country's history white men are actually consulting ordinary black men, taking literally unprecedented pains to know what they really think..." (ACR,1973:B440)

Besides the simple learning demonstrated by Smith's transitory acceptance of majority rule in the 1976 Kissinger Proposals, the white community in general experienced more lasting learning and attitude change.

Michael Knipe summed up the mood in 1976:

The prospect of a black-ruled Zimbabwe remains inconceivable for most white Rhodesians... Some whites think in terms of power-sharing but few appreciate that that prospect is already past. When Mr.Smith... announced on 24 September that he and his government had agreed to the implementation of majority rule within two years, his decision was welcomed by his opponents and accepted as inevitable by his supporters.
(ACR,1977:B904)

By 1977, even Rhodesian Front ministers were showing levels of learning by advocating the need to accept change and adopt new attitudes. In March, the Minister of Health, Manpower and Welfare stated "Yesterday's solutions are not good enough for today... Since last September, we have conceded the unthinkable. Principles which only months ago were holy to us now seem like trivialities" (ACR,1978: B1032). In November, Nicholas Ashford wrote that most whites "now seem to be prepared to live under a moderate Black Government so long as there was a reasonable chance that law and order and general standards were maintained.... This change in attitude is the result of a growing sense of

war-weariness" (ACR,1978:B1032).

Complex learning resulting in schema transformation is indicated by a shift in a party's reservation demands. At UDI, white reservation demands were for the schemata of minority rule, apartheid, and the absolute control of the instruments of power. The first transformation occurred in 1978 with the Internal Settlement, as Smith accepted the principle of power-sharing with "responsible" Africans and the metaphor of qualified majority rule. Gone forever were the total disenfranchisement of the African population and other metaphors of apartheid. However, whites maintained adherence to the principle of minority rule, holding the balance of parliamentary power through blocking mechanisms and controlling all other instruments of state power.

The final schema transformation and shift of white reservation demands demonstrated an even greater level of learning complexity. At the Lusaka conferences, white security was divorced from the control of the instruments of state power, instead being defined in terms of constitutional safeguards ensuring a political voice and economic security (Pow,1985:103,104; Touval and Zartman, 1985:267; Matthews,1990:321). The schema transformation marked the creation of a zone of agreement upon which a resolving constitution could be based.

Over the years, even the intransigent Smith

demonstrated considerable learning and attitude change. Smith abandoned his position of no majority rule in a thousand years, by accepting the Transitional Government. He also abandoned his role as prime minister by introducing elections he knew would bring Muzorewa to power. The most surprising evidence of Smith's learning and attitude change occurred at the Lancaster House Conference, where it was felt Smith actually gave his tacit acceptance to the outcome. According to Jeffrey Davidow, Smith "cast negative votes on crucial issues to maintain his record as a defender of white rights, but declined, despite press speculation to the contrary, to rally his supporters at home against the conference's proceedings" (1984:42). During the Conference, Smith stated that if the PF won the independence elections, "we will work with them. It is no use living in the past. The past is gone" (Legum, 1980:A15).

The nationalists experienced comparatively less complex learning because majority rule was the only metaphor capable of providing their needs, and therefore their central reservation demand for genuine majority rule had to be met to make resolution possible. In 1975, the nationalists demonstrated learning by recognizing the fears of the white population and introducing guarantees of freedom to emigrate and legal and property rights (ACR, 1976: B649). Nkomo, as leader of the internal ANC and later within the PF, continued to make statements designed to

placate white fears (ACR,1976:B653; ACR,1980:B971).

Although not overly concerned with white attitudes during the ripening process, Mugabe was particularly successful in winning white confidence prior to and after the independence elections (Anglin,1980:678; Wilkie,1989).

The most significant indication of learning by the Patriotic Front was the adjustment of its metaphors for security. Initially, the PF demanded a surrender of the Smith and IS regimes, and the disbanding of the security forces. The function of negotiations was merely to work out the details of surrender and transition to majority rule. By the end of the conflict, the PF underwent a schema transformation, shifting reservation demands for a unilateral settlement to reservation demands for a multilateral process with transitional arrangements that guaranteed PF security and a free and fair election.

Complex learning and schema transformations can be summarized by the adjustment of goals. Over the history of the conflict, the goals of the white community were adjusted from maintaining supremacy through apartheid to attaining basic needs through constitutional safeguards. The goals of the Patriotic Front underwent a less complex adjustment, from the unilateral imposition of a non-racial regime, to a collaborative process with racial provisions guaranteeing a political voice and the economic security of racial minorities.

Cognitive progress is indicated by the complex learning of the parties resulting in an increase in the means to attain needs. The new regime, made possible by the complex learning of the parties, allowed the mutual attainment of needs, and thus indicates significant cognitive progress.

RIPENING FORCES

A central hypothesis of this thesis is that four ripening forces contribute to the learning and cognitive progress that characterize the ripening and prenegotiation stages of the CSP. The role of each force will be discussed below, with the role of compulsion being discussed in the section addressing the cause of success.

Changes in Key Decisionmaking Personnel

The importance of a change in leadership was first demonstrated with the near "success" of the 1971 Home-Smith Accord, which was directly the result of the election of Heath and the Conservatives in Britain. Three subsequent changes in leadership stand out as crucial contributions to the ripening process. First, the election of Carter brought the influence of the U.S. Presidency unequivocally against the IS regime at a time when a republican president would have recognized the regime and subsequently undermined the ripe moment condition of necessity.

Second, Thatcher's election in 1979 permitted the British government to change its position on certain points

such as the inclusion of the sixth principle, and her obvious sympathies for the IS regime helped foster white confidence in the process while introducing significant compellence against the PF (Low, 1986:169; Davidow, 1986:170, 171). Thatcher's willingness to recognize the IS regime and her government's leadership at the Lancaster House negotiations assured the whites "that if a political settlement was ever to be achieved, the circumstances could not have been better" (Matthews, 1990:321).

The third and most significant personnel change, was the removal of Smith from the prime ministership of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Although the IS regime retained control in white hands, the deposing of Smith as Prime Minister vastly reduced his influence and opportunity to use his considerable personal skill to obstruct progress toward an acceptable settlement (Anglin, 1980:673). Furthermore, with Muzorewa at the head of the Salisbury delegation at Lancaster, Pretoria's ability to veto any settlement it found unacceptable was eliminated, as its veto was based on its relationship with Smith (Matthews, 1990:331).

Value Modification

Protest

The most vocal and possibly most effective third parties undertaking protest activities were the various church organizations which consistently drew attention to the oppressive nature of the Salisbury regime and the

shortcomings of the many settlement proposals. Rhodesia's churches became involved in the politics of the country in 1969. At the invitation of Smith to comment on the proposals for a republican constitution, the Protestant and Catholic churches united under the Christian Council of Rhodesia. The Council issued a statement condemning the constitutional proposals on the grounds that they would deprive Africans of their dignity, and serve only to divide the races and foster hatred, all of which are contrary to Christian beliefs (Muzorewa, 1978:76,77). All churches in Rhodesia, except the South African-oriented Dutch Reformed Church, strongly condemned Smith's proposals and the introduction of the Land Tenure Bill (ACR, 1970:B337).

In 1970, the Catholic Church first proposed that the Council adopt civil disobedience as the correct response to racial legislation (Muzorewa, 1978:80). Protests and public statements by the Council "awakened many persons overseas to the Rhodesian problem," and forced the government to amend the Land Tenure Act to exempt churches from having to register as either European or African and to allow them to continue their work on mission lands (Muzorewa, 1978:81). However, missionaries continued to violate the Act regularly as they travelled without permission to African areas.

One of the most vocal opponents to the regime was the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia

(CCJPR). The CCJPR was active in drawing world attention to the oppression of the regime, documenting evidence of eviction, resettlement, and torture, while providing support for the legal recourse of victims (ACR,1976:B654).

The effectiveness of church protests is indicated by Flower, who stated the CCJPR became "the bane of the Smith government" (1987:130). The response of the government to "threats" by the Church or Press was generally swift and unequivocal" (Flower,1987:131). Church leaders were banned, jailed, or deported, and attempts were made to discredit them (ACR,1975:B516; 1978:B1044).

Peer Pressure

Timely intervention by various peers caused value modification in "official" circles. "Informal" overtures by the Queen, Australian Prime Minister Fraser, and President Nyerere, prior or during the Commonwealth Conference have been attributed to playing a key role in persuading Thatcher not to recognize the IS regime, and instead direct her efforts to achieving genuine majority rule (Davidow,1984:31; Smith,1981).

Track Two

The most successful track two efforts were those sponsored by "Moral Re-Armament" (Elliott,1986). At its 1975 conference in Rhodesia, the Moral Re-Armament movement initiated a Track Two process that eventually developed widespread influence among the leaders of both whites and

/

Africans.

The initial conference involved members of both races and several political movements in Rhodesia, including Alec Smith, the son of Ian Smith, and African nationalist Arthur Kanodereka, who "was helping the guerrillas and had been arrested and suffered at the hands of the white-led security forces" (Elliott,1986:189). Many of the participants were "remotivated" at the conference, "shedding bitterness or prejudice... to become agents of healing and barrier breaking" (Elliott,1986:188).

The conference was followed up with efforts to have a greater impact on the leadership. In 1976, fifteen Rhodesians representing both races and different political viewpoints, including a former finance minister and members of the ANC, spent a weekend together to discuss the situation facing the country. This meeting evolved over the next three years into regular weekly meetings of the "Cabinet of Conscience" that included members of both the nationalist movements and senior supporters of the Rhodesian Front (Elliott,1986:190).

As a result of the Cabinet of Conscience meetings, Alec Smith decided to introduce his parents to Kanodereka. After the meeting, Ian Smith told his son "If there are more black leaders like Arthur Kanodereka, I could hand over tomorrow" (Elliott,1986:190). According to Hugh Elliott, this meeting influenced Smith's decision to move ahead with

the Internal Settlement and elections resulting in the Muzorewa government (1986:190).¹

The Moral Re-Armament movement had a "widening circle of convinced people who were determined to do all they could to make the work of the official negotiators easier" (Elliott, 1986:191). Just prior to the Lancaster House Conference, two former RF cabinet members, a member of Muzorewa's cabinet, and several other influential Zimbabweans, met at the Moral Re-Armament conference in Switzerland. Several of the participants went on to London during the Lancaster Conference to encourage various members of the delegations to reach an agreement.

On the evening before the announcement of the independence election results, the Cabinet of Conscience arranged a meeting between Mugabe and Smith. This meeting greatly contributed to feelings of reconciliation as both men spoke the following day to encourage whites to stay in the new Zimbabwe. Elliott suggests the meeting may also have led to the calling off of a post-election coup planned by the Rhodesian Army (1986:192).

¹ According to Flower, Kanodereka was an agent of CIO. Posing as a "recruiter" for the guerrillas, he gave recruits poisoned uniforms, sending them on their way to the training camps in Mozambique. The recruits died in the bush before reaching the camps. After several years, Kanodereka was assassinated because the operation had "become so diabolically successful that exposure seemed inevitable and so the principal perpetrators had to be eliminated" (Flower, 1987:137).

New Information

The role of "new information" in fostering learning and attitude change, and facilitating the resolution of the conflict is affirmed both positively and negatively by the Rhodesian conflict. The mediation effort, consisting of formal and informal consultations and negotiations, sustained by various third parties throughout most of the conflict, provided the parties with valuable information and exposure to each other. This fostered empathy and learning about each other and what was necessary to reach an agreement (Druckman, 1986b:267,268).

The importance of information was also demonstrated by its absence: the lack of information about the security situation available to the white community impeded their learning process and prolonged the war. The cause of this lack of exposure were the RF government's extensive control of information through censorship and misinformation.

Press censorship was officially imposed under the emergency powers enacted at UDI; however, official censorship in one form or another was common since the Rhodesian Front came to power in 1962 (Loney, 1975; Windrich, 1979). The RF maintained its electoral support by promoting the premise of inequality between Europeans and Africans, which was kept in the white consciousness through censorship and propaganda (Hodder-Williams, 1970; Simon, 1988).

The success of the RF can be attributed to its complete control of radio and television, and its undermining the credibility of the press through intimidation (Windrich, 1979:523). State censorship ensured "white Rhodesians read in their local newspapers only what the press [was] allowed to reveal and they [saw and heard] on their state-controlled radio and television only what [was] 'slanted in the interests of Rhodesia'" (Windrich, 1979:523). Censorship was extended to the international press by prohibiting journalists from entering or staying in Rhodesia (Simon, 1988:66).

The RF government, "beyond censoring what they did not want local whites to know, also broadcast a barrage of propaganda which they wanted their electorate to hear, see and believe" (Simon, 1988:66). Censorship and propaganda continued during the Internal Settlement under the control of a black minister. The only "opposition" newspapers that were permitted to operate were those that remained committed to the status quo (Windrich, 1979:334).

Not only did the government restrict information from the population, but also from its own decisionmakers. Official security assessments were restricted by Smith who determined their circulation in order to "protect politicians, including some members of his own Cabinet, from the facts" (Flower, 1987:133). Furthermore, once Africans had been introduced into government, security related

decisionmaking and access to information was limited to a "War Council" that excluded all Africans from the process (Flower, 1987:133).

Without accurate information about the true costs and objective reality of the situation, neither the white population nor members of the RF government were able to influence a rational response to the worsening situation. The lack of awareness of costs and possible alternatives prolonged the war, whereas a freer flow of information would have made the RF accept the necessity of seeking genuine political solutions.

SUCCESS: A Hurting Stalemate?

The conventional interpretation of the Zimbabwe case attributes the successful outcome at the Lancaster House Conference to the presence of a Hurting Stalemate, or its theoretical equivalent, a "symmetry of power" between the parties (see Zartman, 1985, 1986, 1988; Zartman and Touval, 1985; Low, 1985; Davidow, 1984:42; Jaster, 1987; Matthews, 1990; Haass, 1990). However, it is a central assertion of this thesis that such assessments distort the true nature of the situation.

Power relationships, in the form of compulsion, played a central role in determining the outcome of the conflict. However, the compulsion did not represent a stalemate, as it was asymmetrical in nature; nor can the existence of compulsion alone explain the success of the

talks in resolving the conflict. The conflict was resolved because of two factors: (1) there was asymmetrical mutual compulsion that stimulated learning in the parties, causing each to make concessions and develop the shared principles that created a zone of agreement; and (2) the terms of the settlement were within the zone of agreement, allowing the mutual attainment of needs and eliminating the source of the conflict.

In assessing the settlement process, Robert Jaster contends that prior to 1976, the balance of power favoured the Smith regime; after 1976 it favoured the PF, until 1979 when it approached a "near-symmetry" that made resolution possible (1987). Zartman and Matthews agree that the power configuration was a hurting stalemate; but Matthews has a different interpretation of the power configuration -- not near symmetry, but a "balance tilted in favour of the guerrillas." Matthews also differs from Jaster by asserting that the balance favouring the guerrillas was achieved in early 1979, and not in 1976 (1990:322). For Zartman and Jaster, near-symmetry was needed for success; for Matthews, the symmetry had to favour the nationalists.

The three analysts arrive at similar conclusions; however their inconsistencies indicate the difficulty of explaining success and failure at negotiation in terms of the configuration of aggregate power. As demonstrated in Chapter Four, a more accurate assessment is that the

attempts at settlement prior to Lancaster House were made when at least one of the conditions of the ripe moment were not present.

In most cases, at least one of the parties was not experiencing a sufficient degree of compulsion to create the condition of necessity. In the "almost" ripe moment situation of the Home-Smith Accord, the missing element was a component of the compatible definition. Britain included the African population as a principal party, which also required Britain to include the fifth principle that the agreement be accepted by the African population. The British definition was incompatible with the reservation demands of the Rhodesian Front, and the inclusion of the fifth principle destroyed the conditional zone of agreement that existed between Sir Douglas-Home and Smith.

The power-based analyses are not only inconsistent, they are inaccurate, as an issue-specific power analysis will demonstrate the power configuration between the parties remained asymmetrical throughout 1979. Success was achieved despite this asymmetry because each party experienced a sufficient degree of compulsion to create the condition of necessity and stimulate the level of learning required to create a compatible definition and conditional zone of agreement. Systemic failure and the inability to maintain its reservation demands led the white community to shift its demands from minority rule disguised

by a parliamentary majority, to genuine majority rule with provisions safeguarding minority rights. The Patriotic Front experienced significantly less compulsion; however, the level was sufficient to compel the PF to tentatively adopt a multilateral approach and to consider the constitutional safeguards the PF felt were unnecessary.

An issue-specific power analysis of the situation immediately prior to and during the Lancaster House Conference will disprove the theory that there was a hurting stalemate or (near) symmetry of power.

The Power of the IS Regime:

Control

By September 1979, the IS regime was experiencing systemic failure -- a degree of compulsion that precluded the ability of the white community to maintain its schemata of minority rule through the retention of the instruments of state power. Over ninety-five percent of the country was either in guerrilla hands or under martial law and vulnerable to direct attack (ACR,1980:B981,B983). Besides the 30 000 guerrillas operating in the country, the security forces faced up to 50 000 waiting in the wings and the prospects of a two front conventional attack backed by Soviet air superiority (Cilliers,1985:239; Matthews,1990:319; Jaster,1987:118,119).

Although the regime was capable of launching attacks deep into Zambia and Mozambique throughout 1979 and

during the Lancaster Conference, the attacks were not an indication of Rhodesian control. Having only limited military value, the objectives of the attacks were to delay the inevitable PF conventional offensive, while reminding the Front Line and the PF of the costs of war in order to gain leverage for the regime in the negotiations (Gann and Henriksen, 1981:81; Jaster, 1987:119). Furthermore, the attacks were the "costliest thus far in losses sustained by the Rhodesian forces" (ACR, 1980:B984), which by then seriously lacked "the manpower and equipment to keep pace with the insurgents' infiltration, let alone to catch and kill the guerrillas already in the country" (John Burns quoted in ACR, 1980:B982).

The IS regime also faced a severe economic crisis caused by the world recession, high oil prices, and the long-term effect of sanctions (Anglin, 1987:34,35). By 1979, per capita incomes had fallen to almost the levels of 1965 and the terms of trade was 40 percent lower than that in 1965 (Matthews, 1990:324). The economic problems were exacerbated by the escalation of the war, which by 1979 was consuming more than one-third of the national budget and costing the regime R\$1 million a day (Minter and Schmidt, 1988:231). Between 1974 and 1979 "the state of the economy was a powerful constraint on Rhodesia's room for manoeuvre" and the threat of continued sanctions played a crucial role in the final success at Lancaster House (Anglin, 1987:36,37).

The state of war, combined with the economic crisis and sanctions, would have ultimately led to the complete collapse of the IS regime (Minter and Schmidt, 1988: 234). Furthermore, even if sanctions were lifted and the regime received the "full" backing from Britain, the United States, and South Africa, the military superiority and mass appeal of the guerrilla forces ensured the ultimate defeat of the regime (Legum, 1980:A3; Cilliers, 1985:253).

The final indication of the IS regime's lack of control is demonstrated by the concessions made during the Lancaster House talks. The conventional interpretation is that Lancaster was successful partially because of the personal belief of Muzorewa, Mugabe, and Nkomo in their ability to win the independence election (Davidow, 1984, 1986; Druckman, 1986b:283). However, this was not the case for Muzorewa because he knew he would lose the election. During the Conference, Muzorewa was forced to agree to surrender power to a British Governor. According to Flower, Muzorewa was well aware that his surrender to British authority would irreparably damage his credibility and preclude his ability to win the independence election. Muzorewa acquiesced because he realized that if he did not agree to abdicate, the conference would be finished and the war would continue (Flower, 1987:238).² His decision to

² Muzorewa's redefinition of his role demonstrates considerable level of learning and unselfishness, for which the Bishop, often ridiculed, should be given respect.

step-down was thus the act of capitulation to the Patriotic Front. Surprisingly, Muzorewa agreed to abdicate even without the precondition of sanctions being lifted (Legum, 1980:A13).

Commitment

White commitment to minority rule and the military option was eroded by the unwinnable situation facing the regime. In January 1979, Smith defended the move toward an internal settlement with: "To think we can mount an operation and defeat terrorism is moonshine. We simply haven't got enough men. If I thought time was on our side, I wouldn't be doing this, but time is not on our side" (quoted in Anglin, 1980:671,672).

The acceptance of qualified majority rule accelerated the erosion of white commitment, as contrary to all expectations, Muzorewa's government was unable to end the war, instead, allowing it to escalate. According to Douglas Anglin, "While many whites... were prepared to risk their lives in defence of their racist 'ideals', they did not feel the same emotional commitment to the defence of black rule" (1980:672). A letter in the Sunday Mail in October 1979 further illustrates the declining commitment of the security forces: "Will someone tell me why we fight... As a white officer, serving in the bush, it is becoming increasingly difficult to justify the effort and risk involved in fighting.... I often wonder why we fight -- to

keep in power those who value us least?" (quoted in ACR,1980:B981).

Further evidence of the "sapping" of white commitment was "the mounting resistance to the economically disruptive military draft and... the record number 'taking the gap' -- emigrating southwards or simply fleeing the country ostensibly on holiday" (Anglin,1980:672). The decline in white commitment began most markedly after 1975, as demonstrated by the dramatic increase in white emigration (Matthews,1990:326). Between 1976 and 1978, nearly 50 000, or twenty percent of the white population, emigrated (Meredith,1979:353).

Alternatives

With both the military and cooptation options lost, the IS Regime had exhausted all alternatives to genuine majority rule, and thus had to accept whatever the British would offer (Flower,1987:232). As Martin and Johnson point out "having failed to win American and British recognition and get sanctions lifted, and with the war escalating -- Zimbabwe-Rhodesia was trapped in a whirlpool with only one way out" -- multilateral negotiations (1981:312).

The Power of the PF:

Control

The control of the Patriotic Front, as the inverse of that of the IS regime, was approaching "total control."

The only limitations to PF control were the costs inflicted by the security forces, and those imposed by the Front Line and Britain.

The costs of a war made a negotiated end desirable, but not at any price -- the control exercised by the PF ensured the terms of the settlement would have to be acceptable. Although having influence, the Front Line States and Britain could not force the PF to accept any agreement the PF deemed unacceptable.

According to Stephen Low, former American Ambassador to Zambia and member of the Anglo-American Consultative Group, the Front Line Presidents "felt close enough to ultimate success not to settle for anything less than a genuinely free and fair election" which they knew the PF, and most likely the ZANU wing, would win (1985:106,99). Colin Legum asserts the assumption that the role of the Front Line Presidents was to "apply pressure on the PF [is] wholly erroneous and shows a misunderstanding of the nature of their relationship which is properly characterized as 'influence through consultation'" (1980:A10). Although Kaunda and Machel "might encourage or cajole the PF... [they] could not deliver it for a settlement in spite of the fact that ZANU and ZAPU operated from [their] territory" (Low, 1985:107). Kaunda's lack of coercive capability is underscored by the fact that ZIPRA forces inside Zambia outmanned and outgunned the Zambian national army by almost

two to one (Jaster,1983:8).

Britain's control over the PF was limited as it faced three major constraints. First, if Britain allowed the negotiations to result in a settlement short of the genuine majority rule required to get PF acceptance, the war would continue possibly with the involvement of the Soviets, Cubans, and South Africans; British relations with the United States, black Africa, and most of the Commonwealth would be damaged; and Britain would be faced by an economic boycott from the OAU (Legum,1980:A4; Jaster,1983:10,11; Davidow,1986:171,172). Second, military involvement was unacceptable to both Britain and the United States (Low, 1985:99). However, if it was considered, maintaining the IS regime would require intervention at least on the scale of British involvement in Northern Ireland against a far more lethal enemy (Martin and Johnson,1981:318). Third, the British feared that failure to obtain PF support for an agreement could result in "'another Congo;' a bloodbath, in which South Africa would intervene and the UK would have to mount a rescue operation of Rhodesia's 260 000 whites, many of whom held British passports" (Jaster,1987:120).

The final indication of the extent of PF control are the concessions it managed to extract from Carrington at Lancaster House, with the assistance of the Front Line Presidents and Sonny Ramphal, the Commonwealth general-

secretary.³

The most significant concession the PF made was to accept twenty parliamentary seats reserved for whites in order to meet the final reservation demand of the white community. However, this should not be considered a major concession, as the seats were to be reserved only for seven years after which constitutional changes could be made (Jaster,1987:123).

The PF's main objection to Carrington's constitutional proposals was over safeguards preventing the expropriation of land which, because whites held the predominant share of land, would entrench the status quo. The deadlock was not broken by shifts in the position of PF, or by Carrington's use of a deadline (which the PF broke twice over this issue), but by the diplomatic efforts of Ramphal and Nyerere. In consultation with the PF, the two men developed a plan for compensatory schemes financed by the United States, Britain, and other countries that precluded the need for the anti-expropriation provisions (Legum,1980:A12,A13).

The reservation demands of the PF focused on the transition period, because not only did it determine who would win the election, but it was during the transition

³ Ramphal played a key role in getting concessions in favour of the PF out of Carrington (Legum,1980:A10-A17), and was crucial in "skilfully tempering some of Lord Carrington's tactical excesses" (Anglin,1980:676).

that the guerrilla forces were most vulnerable to attack, and they "strongly suspected they might be walking into a British trap, which could lose them the war they had won" (Legum,1980:A15).

The PF extracted from Carrington three vital concessions required to meet their reservation demands for security during the transition period. First, the PF forces were to be given equal status with the Rhodesian troops under the authority of the Governor during the transition period. This was to ensure that, in the event of a breakdown of the ceasefire, the Governor would call upon the PF forces to restore order, and thus not rely only on the security forces to the endangerment of the guerrillas (Davidow,1986:178).

Second, they convinced Carrington to accept four conditions concerning the ceasefire: (1) the security forces were to be confined to barracks before the guerrillas emerged from the bush; (2) the Rhodesian air force would be grounded and disarmed; (3) all South African troops would be withdrawn from Rhodesia, with Pretoria being told explicitly not to intervene; and (4) the number of guerrilla assembly points would be increased from 14 to 16, and more would be added if required (Legum,1980:A16).⁴

⁴ The number of assembly points was crucial because the more concentrated the guerrilla forces were, the more vulnerable they were to complicity by the Rhodesian and South African security forces (Legum,1980:A15).

A third, and crucial concession the PF extracted was that the transition and elections be monitored by an enlarged Commonwealth team, and not only by the British, as Carrington proposed. The PF was "supremely confident that in any reasonably free elections they would win easily -- and the agreement over a Commonwealth observer team would ensure that no election that was not fairly conducted would win international approval" (Legum, 1980:A17).

Commitment

The PF's commitment to genuine majority rule remained undiminished throughout the war and settlement process. This was demonstrated at Lancaster House whenever an impasse was reached by the repeated willingness of the PF to abandon the talks and accept the costs of prolonging the war (Davidow, 1984:63). Indeed, not only were the leaders confident of eventual military victory, the pressures to end the conflict through negotiation were tempered further by the guerrilla cadres in the field who feared the negotiations were "an attempt to prevent them gaining the victory they believed was near" (Martin and Johnson, 1981: 315, 316).

Alternatives

Whereas the IS regime had no alternatives to accepting whatever settlement emerged from Lancaster House, the PF had two. If the conditions of the settlement were unacceptable, the PF was willing to resume the war. Their

preferred option in this case, was to continue the war with the full support of the Front Line.

However, a second option was available in the event the PF and Front Line disagreed over the acceptability of the settlement. In the event that the Front Line withdrew its military support for the PF, the "Vivo Plan" remained an option. Prior to Lancaster, a high-level Cuban emissary to Maputo, Raul Vivo, proposed that in order to prevent international recognition of the IS regime, the PF should announce the formation of an independent Zimbabwe government in the Rhodesian territory occupied by the guerrillas. Surprisingly, the Front Line Presidents supported the proposal; but it was vetoed by the Mugabe and Nkomo as too risky at the time.⁵ However, the Vivo Plan would be considerably more attractive than surrendering power to the internal regime. Furthermore, without guerrillas on their soil, the Front Line Presidents could continue to give political and covert military support to the PF "government."

CONCLUSION

Four hypotheses were confirmed in this chapter. First, each principal party experienced sufficient learning

⁵ Nkomo did not want to move his troops from his Zambian base to areas controlled by ZANLA. Mugabe did not want to accept second place in the proposed government, and recognized the risk of South African intervention, which would then result in the introduction of Warsaw Pact troops and a dramatic international escalation of the war (Jaster, 1983:10).

to shift their reservation demands and accept the reservation demands of the other party. The Patriotic Front realized it must allow constitutional provisions that protected the political voice and economic security of the white community. Muzorewa and the white community realized that they must accept the principles of genuine majority rule to end the war, even if this meant capitulating to the PF. The complex learning by the parties resulted in the schema transformations and cognitive progress necessary to create a regime that resolved the conflict.

Second, the impact of the four ripening forces on the settlement process was demonstrated. Although all influenced the ripening of the conflict, the impact of new information was less than optimal due to the censorship and propaganda of the RF and IS governments.

The third hypothesis confirmed is that although each party was experiencing compulsion, the nature of the compulsion was definitely asymmetrical, and therefore the situation was not a hurting stalemate. The "balance of power" so favoured the Patriotic Front that the Lancaster House talks resembled the capitulation of the IS regime, which was indicated further by Muzorewa accepting conditions that ensured the victory of the PF.

A fourth confirmed hypothesis is that success was made possible by the agreement meeting the reservation demands of the parties. White reservation demands were met

because the community was forced to shift its demands to coincide with the only remaining metaphors capable of meeting their needs -- constitutional safeguards.

The agreement also met the reservation demands of the Patriotic Front. Although "flawed on points of detail and obnoxious in some of its racial provisions" the independence constitution met all "the main principles the guerrillas had been fighting for -- one man one vote elections, majority rule, and independence" (Martin and Johnson, 1981:319). The provisions of the transition, ceasefire, and elections also proved to meet PF reservation demands for security and control, although they remained suspicious throughout the implementation process (Legum, 1980:A15).

The final "proof" that the agreement was acceptable is the level of issue-specific power held by the PF during and after the conference. The British were incapable of imposing an unacceptable settlement, as this would alienate it from the Commonwealth and the rest of Africa, as well as require significant military intervention to maintain. Furthermore, the Front Line would not support an agreement that violated the values it shared with the PF. Therefore, the PF had more than sufficient control, commitment, and alternatives to walk away and reject any settlement that failed to meet its reservation demands.

PART THREE: CONCLUSION

CHAPTER NINE: THE THEORETICAL PROGRESS OF THE CSP

The objective of this thesis was to develop a theoretical framework that provided an effective means for conflict diagnosis and prognosis. The framework will be assessed against the criteria outlined in the first chapter to determine whether theoretical progress has been achieved.

Empirical Content

The framework of the CSP introduces several explanatory schemes: needs theory, learning, cognitive progress, and the model of the zone of agreement. These innovations considerably enhance the empirical content of the CSP over the structural theories. The concept of issue-specific power introduced a method for determining the power configuration between the parties that was absent in the works of Zartman and Haass. Furthermore, the case study demonstrates that agreements can result under conditions of significant asymmetry of power between the parties -- a counterintuitive fact that is not consistent with Zartman's assertion that the parties must be in a stalemate.¹

Tautology

The concepts of the CSP are precisely defined to

¹ According to Robert Jervis, the discovery of counterintuitive facts is made possible through the formalization of a theory (1990:89).

eliminate the tendency toward tautology and increase parsimony. First, each stage of the CSP is defined on the basis of clear analytical and functional distinctions. Second, success in each stage is defined in terms of precisely defined conditions of the ripe moment. The achievement of the ripe moment conditions are independent of success in the following stages, and therefore tautological definitions are eliminated.

Tautological explanations of outcomes are also prevented by the CSP because its variables and conditions can be objectively determined, and expectations can be compared to actual outcomes. Should a mismatch occur, the objectivity of the variables and conditions precludes their reinterpretation to provide a post hoc explanation of the mismatch. For example, achieving "success" in a stage of the CSP without the conditions of the ripe moment for that stage being present, could be objectively detected, and would indicate a mismatch between expectation (success is impossible without the ripe moment conditions) and outcome (actual success). The mismatch then becomes an anomaly that requires further research and theoretical development to explain.

Practicality

Diagnosis by the structural theories is either "ripe" or "unripe," to be determined primarily by the power configuration between the parties. However, in Chapter

Eight it was demonstrated that the power analysis employed by these theories not only result in inconsistencies, but are inaccurate. The CSP introduced criteria that permits more precise diagnoses, indicating five stages and four conditions of conflict. It also introduced the concept of mutual compulsion, to be determined by the more precise analysis of the issue-specific power configuration.

CONCLUSION: Problemshift and Paradigm Shift

According to Imre Lakatos, it is possible to determine "theoretical progress" between theories (1978). A new theory constitutes a progressive problemshift if it is both theoretically and empirically progressive. Theoretical progress is indicated by the theory having "some excess empirical content over its predecessor... [and predicting] some novel, hitherto unexpected fact" (Lakatos, 1978:33). The various explanatory schemes introduced by the CSP demonstrates the increase in empirical content. The prediction that ripe moments do not require hurting stalemates or a symmetry of power, but that mutual asymmetrical compulsion will suffice, is an example of the prediction of an unexpected fact.

A theory is empirically progressive "if some of this excess empirical content is also corroborated... [and] leads us to the actual discovery of some new fact" (Lakatos, 1978:34; italics in original). The confirmation that it was not a hurting stalemate or symmetry of power

that permitted the resolution of the Zimbabwe conflict, but asymmetrical compulsion combined with a zone of agreement, demonstrates the discovery of new facts.

By Lakatos' criteria, the CSP undoubtedly represents a progressive problemshift over the previous theories. More significant, however, is the CSP's contribution to a potential "paradigm shift" -- the invention of a new set of core assumptions and essential ideas that lead practitioners to "adopt new instruments and look in new places" when seeking to analyze and resolve protracted social conflicts (Kuhn,1970:111).

John Burton and Dennis Sandole suggest that the use of needs theory in conflict analysis and approaches to conflict resolution, indicate a paradigm shift in international affairs (1986;1987).² However, the CSP cannot be considered an actual paradigm shift because a shift must be confirmed through its application and success at solving the problems that the old paradigms failed to solve (Kuhn,1970:153). To confirm the shift requires more research and the actual application of the CSP to an unresolved conflict to see if prescriptions derived from its theory will assist in resolution.

² In response to Burton and Sandole's assertion, Kevin Avruch and Peter Black stress that the paradigm shift must be confined within the discipline of international affairs because the concept of needs theory, although new to the analysis of international conflict, is not new or revolutionary in the field of anthropology (1987:88,89).

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