

Custodians of the Creed

A Comparative Study on the Level of Religiosity among First- and Second-Wave Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims in an American Community

by

John Francis Cappucci

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Carleton University
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John Francis Cappucci

Abstract

The dissertation compares the level of religiosity among first-wave (1991-2002) and second-wave (2003-2011) Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims residing in greater Dearborn, Michigan. In order to accomplish this task, it is necessary to first provide a detailed historical survey that explores the Iraqi Shi'as' resilience in overcoming centuries of precarious challenges to their religious and ethnic identity. This survey begins with the struggles the Iraqi Shi'a faced in their native homeland followed by their mixed experience in America. The historical research is complemented with empirical data collected by interviewing fifty members of the Iraqi-Shi'a community or twenty-five from each wave. The interview results reveal that the first wave appears slightly more religious than the second. This overarching observed pattern will be analyzed in light of Will Kymlicka's multiculturalism model, Robert E. Park's race relations cycle, Charles Glock, Benjamin Ringer, and Earl Babbie's comfort hypothesis, and Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou's segmented assimilation theory. The two waves espouse a moderate, but nonetheless traditional approach to their religion that is almost completely devoid of any controversial ritualistic practices or radical belief systems.

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Dedication

This work is dedicated in its entirety to my late grandfather Giovanni Cappucci and late great-grandmother Antonietta Silvestri.

In Paradisum Deducant Te Angeli

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Chapter One: Introduction

Introduction

This dissertation seeks to compare religiosity among first-wave (1991-2002) and second-wave (2003-2011) Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims residing in greater Dearborn, Michigan. This comparison prompts a central question that guides the rest of the dissertation. This dissertation seeks to determine the differences, if any, in religiosity between first and second-wave Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims living in the greater Dearborn area. This main question requires the operationalization of the term religiosity. The late Ronald Johnstone, a distinguished scholar of the sociology of religion at Central Michigan University and administrator at Ball State University, defines religiosity as the “intensity and consistency of a person’s practice of their religion.”¹ The researcher finds this definition attractive because it manages to encompass both the practical or ritualistic side of one’s religious heritage and the more theological or spiritual side, instead of focusing on just one of the two. With this definition, the researcher can conclude that religiosity is the “degree” to which one believes in religious doctrines, observes traditions, and performs various rituals and the “frequency” with which one participates in religious services, prayer, and religious ceremonies. This operationalized definition builds on Johnstone’s definition of religiosity as the “intensity” and “consistency” of one’s religious beliefs and practices.² These two concepts of religiosity will be measured against the two different possible constructions of American society, namely as a multicultural society or an assimilationist one.

Will Kymlicka’s Theory of Multiculturalism

In addition to the concept of religiosity, this dissertation revolves around the notion of multiculturalism and whether religious minorities can maintain their religiosity in multicultural societies. At the outset, the dissertation requires an understanding of multiculturalism and how it relates to liberal-democratic societies, such as the United States. The political theorist and one of the West's leading scholars of multiculturalism and liberalism, Will Kymlicka explains that multiculturalism is "a response by ethnocultural groups to the demands that the state imposes on them in its efforts to promote integration."³ Kymlicka's interpretation of multiculturalism stresses the idea of encouraging integration.⁴ However, for Kymlicka, integration is specific as it emphasizes the importance of the immigrant's ethnic heritage.⁵ Kymlicka explains that in a multicultural society "immigrants will visibly and proudly express their ethnic identity."⁶ In turn, the multicultural society will employ various egalitarian policies in order "to accommodate these ethnic identities."⁷ In some multicultural societies, Kymlicka identifies federalism or a power-sharing arrangement between the national government and the minority group as a way of "recognizing claims to self-government."⁸ However, this type of state structure appears to be designed in cases "where national minorities are regionally concentrated."⁹ In other words, this type of state structure would not apply to immigrant minorities such as the Iraqi Shi'a because they do not seek self-governance from the United States. Therefore, integration for immigrant minorities like the Iraqi-Shi'a must come from another type of state structure or conceptualization.

Kymlicka's understanding of ethnic integration is intrinsically tied to the view of a "societal culture."¹⁰ He defines "societal culture" as "a territorially concentrated culture centred on a shared language that is used in a wide range of societal institutions,

including schools, media, law, the economy, and government.”¹¹ This definition of “societal culture” may initially give the impression that immigrants are required to assimilate within their host society’s “societal culture.” However, this is not the case, as Kymlicka clarifies that it is possible for a society to have multiple “societal cultures.”¹² In Canada, there are two “societal cultures” namely those expressed by English and French Canada.¹³ Conversely, the United States attempts to integrate immigrants into one, grand “common societal culture.”¹⁴ This policy naturally influences several different facets of the immigrant’s life in America.¹⁵ This dissertation accepts the differences in “societal cultures” between Canada and the United States as described by Kymlicka. Since Canada provides the immigrant with a choice of “societal cultures” to accept, Canada can be described as integrationist. Conversely, since the United States forces immigrants into one “societal culture,” the United States is best seen as assimilationist. The two countries may differ on their approach to ethnicity, but for Kymlicka their approach to religion must formally remain the same.

In his overview of multiculturalism, Kymlicka focuses on ethnicity, but seems to neglect religious affiliation. The absence of religious affiliation or religious integration within a multicultural society is not an oversight by Kymlicka, but is rather intentional and supported by reason. To explain this omission, Kymlicka clarifies that “a liberal-democratic state does not seek to promote *religious* integration.”¹⁶ He further holds fast to the rule that the liberal-democratic state seeks to maintain the “separation of church and state.”¹⁷ In addition, Kymlicka does not envision a reason why the liberal-democratic state should promote some sort of uniformity in religion.¹⁸ Kymlicka’s explanation for this absence centres on the claim that any attempt to impose some form of religious

integration in a liberal-democratic state would be a “violation of liberal principles.”¹⁹ In some liberal-democratic states, it is also a violation of the law.

For example, in the United States, the “establishment clause” of the United States Bill of Rights states that the government “shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.”²⁰ At the same time, the Bill of Rights forbids the government to encroach on “the free exercise” of religion.²¹ The choice whether to integrate into a host society or not falls by default on the religious minority, if one accepts Kymlicka’s argument that liberal-democratic states are not permitted to intervene in religious affairs.²² In response to the state’s absence in promoting religious integration, the religious minority is left to its own devices. In other words, without pressures emanating from the liberal-democratic state, the religious minority is allowed to choose the degree to which it would like to practice its religious heritage in its newfound home. Kymlicka’s argument is acceptable, considering that the liberal-democratic state is officially absent from the religious integration debate.²³ However, Kymlicka’s prescribed relationship between religion and the liberal-democratic state does not denote that he has ignored religious minorities in his theoretical framework and that the rest of society should also ignore religious minorities as well.

Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, a prominent ethicist and political theorist from the Kenan Institute for Ethics at Duke University, divide religious minorities into two groups based on their level of integration into society.²⁴ This division is valuable to this dissertation because it gives the researcher the opportunity to compare the Iraqi Shi’a with other types of religious groups. The first category is called “isolationist religious groups.”²⁵ These groups seek to detach themselves from modern society and establish

their own separate community based on certain time-honoured principles.²⁶ The most recognizable member of this very small group of religions is the Amish, but there are also other, lesser known groups.²⁷ On the other hand, the “non-isolationist religious groups” wish to integrate and assimilate into modern society.²⁸ In order to determine the immigrant group’s level of assimilation into society, sociologists, psychologists, political scientists, and other social scientists continue to employ the four “benchmarks of immigrant assimilation.”²⁹ These four benchmarks include “socioeconomic status” or the immigrant community’s annual income, job type, and education level, “spatial concentration” or the part of the city where the immigrant community has settled, “language assimilation” or the degree to which the community has adopted the English language, and degree of intermarriage.³⁰

Although a non-isolationist group may assimilate along these four levels, Kymlicka and Norman explain that a non-isolationist group may also reject certain components of its host society that it finds unacceptable or incompatible with its religious heritage.³¹ There are several possible objections that these types of religious groups may have: from rejecting the state’s military campaigns to opposing taxes that support abortions to objecting to the inclusion of God in national anthems. This dissertation accepts Kymlicka’s conviction that the “liberal-democratic state does not seek to promote *religious* integration.”³² However, historical precedence would show that there have been several instances when the state did attempt to intervene in the affairs of a specific religious community. The question remains as to which force or forces push for integration, if the liberal-democratic state is not responsible for ensuring integration as

per Kymlicka's stance.³³ This question leads the discussion toward classic assimilation theory, which can help in providing an answer to this confounding problem.

Robert Park's Race Relations Cycle

The most important feature of classic assimilation theory revolves around the concept of time, more specifically, the immigrant group's time of arrival in a host society: "This theory expects those immigrants residing the longest in the host society, as well as the members of later generations, to show greater similarities with the majority group than immigrants who have spent less time in the host society."³⁴ This theory has been largely based on Robert Park's race relations cycle and will be used to examine the results derived from this study. A brief overview of this paradigm is necessary in order to illuminate the basic features of classic assimilation theory and how it can be applied to this dissertation.

Robert Park is considered "one of the giants of early American sociology."³⁵ Park is recognized as an authoritative source in this matter considering he was "one of the first to suggest a cycle of race and ethnic relations."³⁶ The parameters for Park's race relations cycle emerged from his studies in the urban environment of Chicago, considering the city witnessed an unprecedented influx of immigrants during the first few decades of the twentieth century.³⁷ His contributions to race relations theory are considered significant and progressive as they drifted away from the more racialist ideologies that were in vogue at the time, such as the focus on inherent racial characteristics, the antiquated ideas on race, and nature of ethnic conflict.³⁸

In the most basic description of his paradigm, Park contends that there are four components of his race relations cycle, including "contact," "competition,"

“accommodation,” and finally “assimilation.”³⁹ In the first phase, the immigrant group comes into contact with other groups in its new host society, which shortly leads to some sort of “conflict.”⁴⁰ This second stage emerges because of the struggle associated with securing “scarce resources.”⁴¹ In time, a resolution or accommodation is reached resulting in the assimilation of the immigrant group into the host society.⁴² In other, more general terms, this process results in the “assimilation of smaller or weaker groups into a larger or dominant one.”⁴³ Park does recognize that there are impediments that “may slacken the tempo of the movement.”⁴⁴ However, these possible impediments do not have the ability to alter the path toward assimilation or “change its direction.”⁴⁵

In continuing with Park’s theory, the first-wave’s earlier arrival allowed it to begin the cycle toward assimilation before the second-wave. This prediction is based on the nature of Park’s race relations cycle as “irreversible.”⁴⁶ This added time has theoretically afforded the first-wave the ability to acculturate faster and deeper into American society and culture. In this time, it is possible that the first-wave may have also started to ignore certain practices or even entirely abandon their religious beliefs. Conversely, the second-wave began the cycle after the first-wave due to the former’s later arrival. Therefore, in accordance with classic assimilation theory as exemplified by Park’s race relations cycle, one can expect the second-wave will be less assimilated and thus more likely to have maintained its religious beliefs and practices in America.

Comparing Kymlicka and Park

In comparing Kymlicka’s understanding of multiculturalism and Park’s conception of assimilation as depicted by his race relations cycle, this dissertation argues that the two models are not necessarily contradictory, but the dissertation does adopt

Park's understanding. The choice to integrate falls upon the religious minority if Kymlicka's argument that the liberal-democratic state is not responsible for ensuring or encouraging religious integration is accepted.⁴⁷ However, this conclusion assumes that there are only two forces at play, namely the liberal-democratic state and the religious minority.⁴⁸ The role of society, particularly the role of other societal groups, such as other religious and ethnic minorities, have in promoting integration, should also be included in the debate. The added role of society and other societal groups leads the discussion to include Park's race relations cycle. The four-stage cycle assumes that once the minority group makes "contact" with other groups in society, it will eventually lead to forms of "competition" that can only be resolved by some sort of solution or "accommodation," which in turn will result in "assimilation."⁴⁹ Despite their different approaches, neither Kymlicka nor Park envisions a large role for the liberal-democratic state in ensuring religious integration.⁵⁰

In the case of Kymlicka, it is assumed that the liberal-democratic state will remain absent.⁵¹ If so, religious minorities will make the decision individually. However, Kymlicka does believe that there are many policies and programs that the liberal-democratic state can adopt in order to accommodate minority groups, including affirmative action hiring practices, reservation of government seats for minority groups, special legal protections and rights, diversity and cultural sensitivity programs, and monitoring stereotypes in the media.⁵² With Park the forces of society will eventually push the immigrant group into assimilation.⁵³ However, the question remains as to whether Park and Kymlicka's models can successfully describe the religiosity of the two waves.

Alternative Models: The Comfort Hypothesis and Segmented Assimilation Theory

In an attempt to foreshadow the results of the measurements used in this study, neither Kymlicka nor Park's models fully capture the patterns displayed. Park's race relations cycle and its "linear" nature would assume that the first-wave would be less religious than the second, considering that the first-wave started and, in Park's ideal case, completed the "irreversible" cycle towards assimilation before the second-wave.⁵⁴ In reference to Kymlicka's multicultural model, the state is not to insist on religious integration.⁵⁵ However, while Kymlicka's multicultural model clearly describes the proper function of the liberal-democratic state in religious affairs, the model ignores the indisputable role of society. In order to compensate for the deficiencies in Park and Kymlicka's models, I introduce the comfort hypothesis to explain the first-wave's responses and segmented assimilation theory to explain the second-wave's.

In their influential study *To Comfort and to Challenge: A Dilemma of the Contemporary Church* (1967), Charles Glock, Benjamin Ringer, and Earl Babbie seek to uncover and explain the reasons for differences in religiosity among American Episcopalians and how these differences in religiosity affect other aspects of life.⁵⁶ In order to accomplish this research goal, the three sociologists examined questionnaires completed by nearly nineteen hundred American Episcopalians.⁵⁷ The results from this study confirmed their so called "comfort hypothesis."⁵⁸ The authors state that individuals who are unable to achieve financial success, social standing, or integration into contemporary society will turn to "an alternative source of rewards" namely the church or religion.⁵⁹

One of the groups that Glock, Ringer, and Babbie identify as being more religious are the elderly “who may feel cast out of the youth-oriented secular society.”⁶⁰ In returning to the differentiation between the first and second wave, the comfort hypothesis interprets the first-wave as being disenchanted with secular society forcing them to attach themselves closer to their religious heritage. Conversely, the younger second-wave engages in modern secular society at the expense of their religious heritage. The comfort hypothesis is of value because it can account for the observed pattern of first-wave participants being slightly more religious than second-wave participants. However, while this theory is strong in this regard, the comfort hypothesis cannot account for the second-wave’s religiosity. This failure to account for the second-wave’s religiosity leads the researcher to make use of segmented assimilation theory.

In the past few years, segmented assimilation theory has been described as the “innovative integration of assimilationist and pluralist ideas.”⁶¹ In addition to its innovative nature, segmented assimilation theory is particularly useful as it has the ability to respond to various different “anomalies” in immigration patterns, such as the one predicted in this study.⁶² The theory attempted to explain how the “second generation” or “the children of contemporary immigrants” integrate into American society.⁶³ However, segmented assimilation theory is regarded as a “broad theoretical perspective subject to diverse interpretations.”⁶⁴ In this case, this theory will be applied to the second-wave. This application is possible because like the second generation of immigrant families, the second-wave has also experienced similar conditions in the United States. This political, social, and cultural environment that the immigrant is faced with in the United States is the starting point of segmented assimilation theory.⁶⁵

In the most basic sense, segmented assimilation theory begins from the premise that America is a “stratified and unequal society.”⁶⁶ In this multifaceted society, arriving immigrants have the ability or choice to assimilate into various “different ‘segments’ of society.”⁶⁷ The leading sociologists of segmented assimilation theory, Alejandro Portes of Princeton University and Min Zhou of the University of California, Los Angeles, describe three possible assimilation patterns for the arriving immigrant.⁶⁸ In the three cases outlined by Portes and Zhou, the arriving immigrant can upwardly integrate into the dominant middle class, downwardly assimilate into the poorer class, or retain significant cultural values of their immigrant identity, but achieve striking economic progress.⁶⁹

The first path outlined by Portes and Zhou can be employed in order to understand the religious patterns of the second-wave. The second-wave seems to have not advanced as much economically as the first-wave given the fact that no member of the second-wave has yet to participate in the costly *hajj* or greater pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina.⁷⁰ Conversely, thirteen members of the first-wave performed the *hajj*.⁷¹ In addition to the *hajj*, the second-wave appears less devoted to studying religious texts and performing certain religious rituals in comparison to the first-wave.⁷² The second-wave seems to fit the first pattern as it has devoted less time to religious activities, such as religious study and rituals and has not had the ability to take part in the expensive *hajj* pilgrimage.⁷³ In line with Portes and Zhou’s first model, the second-wave is evidently willing to neglect aspects of its religion.⁷⁴ These alternative theories will be used in order to understand the results of the three measurements and their respective indicators.

Measurements and Indicators

In this study, there are three different measurements employed in order to determine the level of religiosity among first- and second-wave Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims living in greater Dearborn. The three measurements include devotional life, mosque life, and personal life. The three measurements combined contain nine indicators, including prayer (indicator one), religious knowledge (indicator two), rituals (indicator three), pilgrimages (indicator four), spiritual authority (indicator five), mosque life (indicator six), religious attire (indicator seven), marriage (indicator eight), and dietary laws (indicator nine).

The first indicator is prayer, which denotes the number of times the participant prays per day. Religious knowledge refers to the participant's degree of knowledge of religious texts and the frequency of reading such sacred works. The ritual indicator explores the practices that are conducted during religious holydays. Pilgrimage encompasses the various religious sites visited by the participant. The spiritual authority indicator refers to the senior religious cleric the participant has decided to follow and emulate. Mosque life looks at the specific mosque attended, attendance rates, donations to mosque, and the role of the imam in the participant's life. The religious attire indicator considers the types of clothing that the participant wears in order to realize Islamic codes on modesty and what types of religious attire the participant's husband or wife should wear. The marriage indicator determines the participant's inclination to engage in either an inter-religious or temporary marriage. Finally, the dietary law indicator reveals the participant's level of adherence to Islamic laws governing the consumption of food and drink.

Hypothesis

This dissertation predicts that the waves' religiosity will be based on the amount of time they have lived in the United States. The hypothesis does not consider the conditions of the waves in their homeland of Iraq. The reasoning for this resides with the difficulty in travelling to Iraq and conducting field research due to the violent and unstable conditions in the country. The dissertation predicts that those who have lived longer in the United States will be less religious, while those who are more recent arrivals will be more religious. This statement is based on the assumption that the more time a religio-ethnic minority resides in a secular society, the more likely they will start to adopt a more secular lifestyle.

This assumption can be substantiated by classic assimilation theory exemplified by Park's race relations cycle where the immigrant group goes through four stages, including "contact," "competition," "accommodation," and finally "assimilation."⁷⁵ Since Park was writing on the conditions in the United States, his model would only apply to immigrants to America. Kymlicka's immediate rejection of religious integration as a component of multicultural societies makes his work difficult to apply to a religio-ethnic community, such as the Iraqi-Shi'a of Dearborn.⁷⁶

The hypothesis presented above assumes that there will be some sort of difference in religiosity between the two waves. The hypothesis specifically predicts that the first-wave will be less religious than the recently arrived second wave. However, this hypothesis is based on the premise that both waves will exemplify some degree of religiousness in their daily lives. In other words, this dissertation's hypothesis is not suggesting that one wave will fervently embrace a religious lifestyle while the other will

ignore their religious heritage entirely. Although this dissertation's hypothesis does not accept this dichotomous understanding of religion, there are leading scholars in the field who have both identified and accepted this allegedly emerging pattern in religion.

For example, in his recent work, *Beyond the Gods & Back: Religion's Demise and Rise and Why It Matters* (2011), Reginald W. Bibby a sociologist from the University of Lethbridge, states that contemporary Canadian society has neither fully embraced "secularization" nor completely embarked on a path toward the complete "revitalization" of religion.⁷⁷ Instead, Bibby contends that Canadian society has adopted "a pattern of growing *polarization*."⁷⁸ To support his argument, Bibby explains that "the findings show that solid cores of people are either involved or not involved in religious groups, either identify with traditions or do not identify with any, and are either theists or atheists."⁷⁹ The dichotomous nature of religion in Canada presents the possibility that the waves may demonstrate similar patterns of religiosity. It is possible that the participants from wave one may have abandoned their religious heritage entirely while wave two participants fully accept and practice their religion on a daily basis. While this dissertation predicts that both waves will be religious to some degree, the possibility of having highly religious individuals concentrated in one wave and highly irreligious clustered in the other wave should be acknowledged.

Variables

In this dissertation, there are dependent, intervening, and independent variables that must be identified. The dependent variable is religiosity among first- and second-wave Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims in Dearborn. In order to measure this dependent variable, a questionnaire has been conducted with twenty-five individuals from each wave. The

questionnaire employs several different measurements and indicators in order to determine religiosity.

The independent variable is the time that each wave has spent in the United States. Both waves departed Iraq in order to escape some sort of hardship, be it Saddam's purges or the accelerating conflict between the America-led coalition and the Iraqi military and militias. The first-wave participants have spent more time in the United States owing to their arrival between 1991 and 2002. Conversely, the second-wave's arrival between 2003 and 2011 has reduced the amount of time it has spent in its host society.

In light of these two different durations, the waves may express their religiosity in diverse manners. This conclusion can be seen in related studies, particularly in Atif Wasfi's *An Islamic-Lebanese Community in U.S.A.: A Study in Cultural Anthropology* (1971). This important study, which will be discussed later on in this chapter, is frequently referenced by later scholars writing on Islam in America. In his study, Wasfi seeks to determine whether the time of arrival has an effect on religiosity.⁸⁰ Being one of the earliest studies on a Muslim community in the United States, Wasfi's study has provided a template for other scholars seeking to understand the religious practices and beliefs of a diasporic Muslim community. However, despite Wasfi's focus on the time of arrival, this dissertation is much more concerned with the amount of time the immigrant group has spent in the United States. In this case, it is believed that the longer the immigrant group spends in the United States, the more likely it will assimilate into American society and thus abandon some of its religious heritage.

The experiences the waves had, based on their times of arrival, constitute the intervening variable of this study. Since each wave arrived at two different periods of time, participants have experienced different conditions and challenges. These experiences can include instances of discrimination and intolerance, difficulties finding suitable employment and housing, and adjusting to American cultural and social practices. In turn, it is possible that these variances may have shaped the religiosity of each wave in different ways. In other words, it is necessary to understand the multicultural environment the waves have decided to reside in following their emigration from Iraq.

Multiculturalism

The prevalence of multicultural communities in the United States requires a discussion of the concept of multiculturalism. Ali Rattansi, a sociologist and prolific writer on race and racism, describes the term “multiculturalism” as “notoriously elusive.”⁸¹ There is legitimacy to this characterization as Steven Vertovec of the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity explains that the term is used in “divergent discourses by persons and groups located all along the political spectrum.”⁸² It is believed that the diversity in meaning of multiculturalism stems from the “vogueishness of the term.”⁸³ This description is echoed by distinguished postcolonial theorist Homi Bhabha who explains that multiculturalism is “a portmanteau term for anything from minority discourse to postcolonial critique, from gay and lesbian studies to chicano/a fiction.”⁸⁴ The complex nature of the term produces several different definitions of multiculturalism presented by leading scholars in the field.

The definitions of multiculturalism are diverse, ranging from the general to the specific. The more expansive definitions of multiculturalism are limited in that they include too much for one researcher to operationalize. Therefore, this dissertation adopts a more specific and narrow definition of multiculturalism, which provides a more precise understanding of the term. The Indo-British political theorist Bhikhu Parekh of the University of Hull in the United Kingdom has published extensively on multiculturalism, political theory, and identity politics. For Parekh, multiculturalism is a broad term that encompasses “a body of beliefs and practices in terms of which a group of people understand themselves and the world and organize their individual and collective lives.”⁸⁵ Parekh’s definition reveals that multiculturalism is a lived experience that is expressed in one’s daily activities in society.⁸⁶ This dissertation’s division of religiosity into three measurements, namely devotional life, mosque life, and personal life, complements Parekh’s understanding of multiculturalism as a lived experience.

Overview of the Literature

This dissertation will draw upon three bodies of literature, including the literature surrounding the term religiosity, ways to measure religiosity, and studies on Islam in America. The first body of literature appropriately surrounds the meaning of the complex term religiosity. The second body of literature reviews the various methods scholars have employed in order to measure religiosity. One of the more popular methods used to measure religiosity is Charles Glock and Rodney Stark’s (1965) theoretical multi-dimensional approach employed to study different religions with one model.⁸⁷ The use of different dimensions helps to counteract and bypass the complexities associated with defining religiosity. In addition to the more theoretical component of this body of

literature, there is also the more practical side, namely the types of surveys used to study religiosity. However, the unique nature of the Iraqi-Shi'a community makes the adaptation of these predesigned surveys of religiosity difficult to implement. The distinctiveness of the Iraqi-Shi'a community is a concern that spills into the third body of literature, namely the material on Islam in America. The majority of the literature on Islam in America tends to focus on general trends. This macro approach creates space for studies that explore one community in detail, by equipping the researcher with general information that can help support the more micro or community-specific data.

Body of Literature One: Definitions of Religiosity

In commenting on the study of religion in America, the late American sociologist Richard Knudten (1967) states that such projects are difficult because of the complex nature of religion: "The severe fragmentation of religious groups and the rise of diverse sects has made a monolithic analysis of religion impossible."⁸⁸ In other words, one standardized theoretical understanding cannot be automatically employed to study a host of different religious groups in the United States.

In surveying the literature on religiosity, the researcher quickly notices that there are many different, unstandardized definitions. In addition to this lack of uniformity, the term religiosity appears to be a particularly challenging word to define. This intricacy can be traced to the more classical works on the subject. In sociologist Glenn M. Vernon's *Sociology of Religion* (1962), the author unabashedly states that religiosity has turned out to be "a somewhat troublesome and amorphous term."⁸⁹ In his opinion, the term religiosity is problematic because it attempts to address "a whole configuration of behavior patterns."⁹⁰ In allowing the term religiosity to represent different variables, the

researcher risks making invalid inferences and producing unreliable results. This problematic nature of the term still remains an issue in contemporary discussions on the subject.

Barbara Holdcroft of the Theological Department at Lourdes University in Ohio has written a short article on the nature of religiosity in general entitled, “What is Religiosity?” (2006). In attempting to clarify the issue, Holdcroft claims that semantics play a role in confounding the term religiosity because the word “is found to be synonymous with such terms as religiousness, orthodoxy, faith, belief, piousness, devotion, and holiness.”⁹¹ In addition to its multiple meanings, religiosity does not remain confined to the boundaries of religious studies, but rather escapes these defined limits and “crosses several academic disciplines.”⁹² Since this dissertation studies religiosity, the challenges outlined by Holdcroft come to fruition, particularly in attempting to operationalize the term. Religiosity’s multifarious semantic quality and its widespread appropriation by other academic fields as described by Holdcroft, requires the researcher to study an array of works that define the term religiosity.

This confusion surrounding the definition of religiosity prompts the researcher to locate a more suitable definition that clearly lists the components of religiosity in a jargon-free fashion. Francesco Zaccaria’s study of popular expressions of religiosity among Italian-Catholics in a diocese in a south-eastern region of the country is of relevance to this study.⁹³ In his work, Zaccaria expressly catalogues the components of religiosity as “people’s attitudes, experiences and beliefs when it comes to God and the sacred.”⁹⁴ This more specific definition appears comprehensive, but excludes how one practices one’s religion, such as through sacraments, ceremonies, and rituals. In other

words, Zaccaria focuses excessively on the more doctrinal “orthodoxy” element while ignoring the practical “orthopraxy” component.

Zaccaria’s definition exemplifies the intricacies of the term religiosity. The term religiosity will always appear inaccurate or insufficient to a scholar from a different field since it is often appropriated by other disciplines.⁹⁵ In addition, since there are many definitions, the researcher will eventually be required to select a definition that addresses his or her research questions and objectives.

In operationalizing the term religiosity, this dissertation builds on the American sociologist Ronald Johnstone’s definition of religiosity as the “intensity and consistency of a person’s practice of their religion.”⁹⁶ It is useful to define the term religiosity with the word “intensity.”⁹⁷ The researcher is now able to understand religiosity as the “degree” to which one believes in religious doctrines, observes rules, and practices specific rituals. Johnstone prompts the researcher to think of “frequency” when he uses the word “consistency.”⁹⁸ In other words, the researcher now considers how many times a participant attends religious services, engages in prayer or spiritual reflection, and practices rituals and ceremonies.

In light of Johnstone’s valuable definition, the researcher views religiosity as the “degree” of one’s religious beliefs and the “frequency” of one’s religious practices. However, although this convoluted term has been illuminated, the terms “degree” and “frequency” confront the research with social science measurement challenges. This more methodological question emanates from the nature of the words “degree” and “frequency.” Through these two terms, Johnstone’s definition of religiosity implies that there are progressive degrees of religiosity. In other words, there are those who ignore

their religion entirely to those who practice an extreme version of their faith. However, matters are not as simple as positioning an individual's religiosity on a scale from extremely irreligious to extremely religious. There are various measurements that must be employed in order to determine an individual's religiosity. In addition, religiosity is further nuanced by its intricate phenomenology, which makes the study of this concept much more complex. The multifaceted nature of religiosity makes it a challenging concept to measure in a field research setting. In order to address some of these challenges, the literature on how to study religiosity will be examined.

Body of Literature Two: Measurement of Religiosity

The scope of this dissertation crosses several academic disciplines and requires a clear understanding of different concepts, especially the concept of religiosity and its measurement. In order to measure religiosity, the researcher must accept that religiosity is “not a one-dimensional concept.”⁹⁹ Instead, it should be recognized as a “multidimensional phenomenon.”¹⁰⁰ In reviewing the various approaches within this paradigm, the multidimensional approach taken by the sociologists of religion Charles Glock and Rodney Stark (1965) maps out a general construct that can take into account the “diverse manifestations of religiosity prescribed by the different religions of the world.”¹⁰¹ This theoretical work is one of the more popular and referenced approaches, leading some scholars to suggest that their construct commands a degree of “sacredness.”¹⁰² More importantly, this theoretical construct is relevant to this dissertation because it takes a general approach.

In spite of their many, often contradictory differences, Glock and Stark still assert that the various world religions still share “core dimensions of religiosity.”¹⁰³ The authors

postulate that there are five different dimensions of religiosity, which can be used in both “studying religion and assessing religiosity.”¹⁰⁴ The dimensions include the “experiential,” “ideological,” “ritualistic,” “intellectual,” and “consequential” dimensions.¹⁰⁵ The “experiential dimension” involves internal religious feelings that connect or bring individuals closer to some sort of “divine essence.”¹⁰⁶ In the “ideological dimension,” it is expected that individuals will accept “certain beliefs” about their religion.¹⁰⁷ The “ritualistic dimension” concerns “religious practices” ranging from prayer to pilgrimages to rites of passage.¹⁰⁸ The “intellectual dimension” requires individuals to “be informed and knowledgeable” about their faith, including its doctrines, traditions, and major religious works.¹⁰⁹ Finally, the “consequential dimension” relates to how individuals live their religion in modern society.¹¹⁰ Essentially, this dimension involves the “secular effects” of the previous four dimensions.¹¹¹

Glock and Stark’s five-dimensional approach has influenced this dissertation’s theoretical conceptualization of religiosity by accepting the understanding that religiosity is not confined to one dimension. This dissertation attempts to construct measurements and indicators based on this understanding. Instead of employing five dimensions, as stipulated by Glock and Stark, this dissertation employs three. The three dimensions are not exactly the same as Glock and Stark’s construct, but are composites of each of the five dimensions. As observed above, each of the five dimensions developed by Glock and Stark has some degree of overlap.¹¹² This degree of overlap makes precise conclusions increasingly difficult to confirm. Therefore, in the case of this dissertation, it is better to use three precisely defined dimensions.

In contrast to Glock and Stark, the three measurements are termed “lives” and set out to measure the participant’s devotional life, mosque life, and personal life. These three categories have been selected because of their ability to reflect the religious distinctiveness of the Iraqi-Shi’a community of Dearborn. In addition, a specialized questionnaire has also been designed in order to reflect the distinct characteristics of this Iraqi-Shi’a community. The nine indicators will be collapsed under each of these three measurements with prayer, religious knowledge, rituals, pilgrimages, and spiritual authority being part of the devotional life measurement, mosque life representing the mosque life measurement, and religious attire, marriage, and dietary laws forming the personal life measurement.

There are numerous scholarly questionnaires that can be used to measure religiosity all with different purposes, variables, and audiences in mind. A great many of these questionnaires have been collected in Peter C. Hill and Ralph W. Hood Jr.’s *Measures of Religiosity* (1999). This voluminous compendium of questionnaires is an invaluable tool, particularly for those designing a questionnaire for the first time. The high calibre of these questionnaires is something that all scholars should aspire to incorporate in their respective research projects. However, despite its length, the volume does not contain any questionnaires that are expressly designed for Muslim populations, let alone Shi’a ones. The fact that this volume does not contain questionnaires specifically intended for Muslim communities should not automatically indicate that these types of questionnaires do not exist. As will be demonstrated in this chapter, substantial research has been conducted on Muslims with much of the data being derived from questionnaires. However, the issue is that these questionnaires do not reflect the

unique nature of the Iraqi-Shi'a religious system of beliefs. This distinctness required the researcher to specially design a questionnaire that could express the nuanced religious history and heritage of the Iraqi-Shi'a community of Dearborn.

Shi'a Islam

Before a study of this particular group can be conducted, it is necessary to preface the work with an introduction to the Shi'a Muslim branch. Like other religions, the Islamic faith is divided into two different branches, namely the Sunnis and the Shi'a. The bifurcation of Islam occurred following the death of the Prophet Muhammad (c. 570-632 C.E.) and the question over the identity of his first successor.¹¹³ Those who would be later known as Sunnis immediately elected Abu Bakr (c. 573-634 C.E.), the Prophet Muhammad's confidant and father-in-law.¹¹⁴ The majority of the early Muslim community supported Abu Bakr's election as Islam's first "successor to God's Messenger."¹¹⁵ However, the early Shi'a did not accept this election and instead believed that the Prophet Muhammad had explicitly nominated his first-cousin and son-in-law Ali ibn Abi Talib (c. 599-661 C.E.) as his successor.¹¹⁶ This debate over succession is recognized as the "principal factor" in the Sunni-Shi'a split.¹¹⁷ Furthermore, in time, the Shi'a themselves would also splinter into several, smaller sub-branches.¹¹⁸

The Twelver Shi'a

The Shi'a branch is not a monolithic entity, but is rather subdivided into various other sub-branches, including the Twelvers, Ismailis, and Zaydis.¹¹⁹ The Twelvers (hereafter referred to as simply the Shi'a) are considered the largest sub-group in Shi'a Islam.¹²⁰ The Twelvers will be the focus of this dissertation due to their size and

prominence in the Shi'a world. The word Twelver, or *ithna ashariyyah* in Arabic is used to denote the Shi'a who follow an unbroken chain of twelve Imams or leaders beginning with Ali ibn Abi Talib in the seventh common century and culminating with his direct descendent, Muhammad al-Mahdi (c. 868 C.E. -), the current Imam.¹²¹ It is expected that this twelfth and current Imam will one become visible and usher in “an age of permanent peace and complete righteousness.”¹²² In the interim, it is expected that the Shi'a will “endure the tyranny and injustice of existing governments.”¹²³ The distinct leadership structure of the Shi'a is also supplemented by several noteworthy practices and rituals that “go beyond the original cause of the split.”¹²⁴ These practices have essentially moved the Shi'a in its own direction.

In concert with Sunni Muslims, the Shi'a follow the “five pillars” of the Islamic faith, including the creed or *shahadah*, prayer or *salat*, almsgiving or *zakat*, fasting or *sawm*, and the obligatory pilgrimage or *hajj*.¹²⁵ However, in addition to observing these pillars, the Shi'a have added several distinct practices to their faith. The habitual practice of prayer is differentiated as the Shi'a are permitted to perform the five daily prayers at three different times.¹²⁶ One of the more controversial practices is *mut'ah* or temporary marriage, which is accepted by the Twelver Shi'a.¹²⁷ However, this practice is denounced as “mere prostitution” by the Sunnis.¹²⁸ The Shi'a also embark on visitations or *ziyarat* to various shrines devoted to the Imams and other members of the Prophet's family.¹²⁹ The Shi'a liturgical calendar also includes the day of Ashura marking the death of the Prophet's grandson, Husayn (c. 626-680 C.E.). These practices are only a small sample of the traditions recognized by the world's Shi'a population.

Of the world's Muslim population, the Shi'a in general constitute only fifteen percent, with the Sunnis comprising the remaining eighty-five percent.¹³⁰ In a recent report published by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, there are approximately one hundred fifty-four to two hundred million Shi'a Muslims in the world.¹³¹ The Shi'a are dispersed throughout Muslim and non-Muslim countries, but form a majority of the population in four modern nations, including Iran, Iraq, Bahrain, and Azerbaijan.¹³²

In Iraq, it is estimated that the Shi'a comprise sixty to sixty-five percent of the country's population.¹³³ In addition to its large Shi'a population, Iraq has four shrine cities that are of particular religious significance to the Shi'a: Najaf and Karbala in southern Iraq, Kadhimayn, a suburb within Baghdad, and Samarra in the central-eastern region of the country.¹³⁴ Together, these four cities hold the tombs of six of twelve of the Shi'a Imams along with a shrine devoted to the current twelfth Imam.¹³⁵

In comparison to the other three shrine cities, Najaf appears to be the most prestigious not only because of its famous shrine devoted to the first Shi'a Imam, but also because its increasingly important Shi'a *hawza* or seminary.¹³⁶ Finally, these four cities' religious significance has given rise to the so-called "corpse traffic" phenomenon, where bodies of deceased Shi'a Muslims are sent to one of these four cities to "pass the interval between death and resurrection in the vicinity of their imams."¹³⁷ In light of its preponderance of Shi'a, its religious significance, its renowned educational institution, and its coveted burial grounds, it would be expected that Iraq would be an ideal home for the Shi'a. However, this supposition has historically not been the case.

The Iraqi Shi'a

The Iraqi Shi'a have endured decades of religious persecution from formation of modern Iraq in the 1920s through the establishment of the first republic in the 1950s to the Saddam Hussein (1937-2006) regime spanning the last decades of the twentieth century and into the first three years of the twenty-first century. Spurred by this persecution coupled with the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the First Gulf War (1991) and the Second Gulf War (2003-2011), the Iraqi Shi'a have fled their homeland in search of a safer environment, opportunities for advancement, and a better life in general. In addition to these conflicts that endangered the entire country, the Iraqi Shi'a were also subjected to significant limitations on practicing their religion during the Saddam era (1979-2003), ranging from not being able to publish religious literature or devotional books to not being allowed to have Shi'a-based programming aired on public networks and stations to even being refused the right to gather for Friday communal prayer in some parts of the country.¹³⁸ Simply put, the religiosity of the Iraqi Shi'a in their homeland was stifled by the regime's restrictive policies. These conditions were endured by the second-wave, considering this wave remained in Iraq at least up until the fall of Saddam in 2003, and possibly even some years after that.

The second-wave was not only forced to contend with the oppressive policies of Saddam's regime, but were also subjected to the infamous Sunni-based insurgency that followed the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. The insurgency in Iraq was predominately comprised of Sunni elements who strongly opposed the presence of the occupying American-led coalition.¹³⁹ In time, the shift in power from the Sunni minority under Saddam's reign to the Shi'a majority following the American-led invasion essentially resulted in the "radicalisation of Sunnis."¹⁴⁰ In the eyes of these Sunni

extremists, the Shi'a not only perverted the "true" nature of Islam, but were allegedly conspiring with the occupying forces.¹⁴¹ These accusations were shortly supplemented with several devastating terrorist attacks targeting the Shi'a.

The attacks against Iraq's Shi'a population began shortly after the invasion when a massive explosion followed communal prayers at the Imam Ali shrine in Najaf caused the deaths of over one hundred Shi'a Muslims.¹⁴² This tactic of attacking Shi'a shrines seems was a recurrent pattern throughout the insurgency period. For example, in 2006 and 2007, the al-Askari shrine in Samarra (central-eastern Iraq), home to the mortal remains of two Shi'a Imams, was bombed resulting in the destruction of the shrine's golden dome in the first instance and the two twin *minarets* or prayer towers in the second.¹⁴³ The various terrorist attacks that took place during the post-Saddam era shows that public expressions of Shi'a religiosity were usually met with sheer violence. In light of these conditions endured both during the Saddam era and the American-led occupation, the second-wave would have difficulties expressing its religiosity prompting a departure from its homeland.

In the past twenty years, from 1990 to 2010, the United States government has admitted 108,878 Iraqi refugees and asylees within its borders.¹⁴⁴ The fact that the majority of the Iraqi population is Shi'a, along with the unfavourable conditions endured by this group, helps to substantiate the assumption that a significant portion of this group was Shi'a.¹⁴⁵ However, the Iraqi Shi'as' immigration to the United States has presented them with a challenge. In addition to the pressures exerted by the American "melting pot," the Iraqi Shi'a must also contend with a certain religious stereotype, namely their supposed intense religiosity.

In reference to their reputation as a religio-ethnic group, the late anthropologist Linda Walbridge explains that the Iraqi Shi'a have imported "an official 'orthodox' view of Shi'ism" into the religious landscape of the United States.¹⁴⁶ This traditional outlook largely stems from living "in the shadow of the tombs of the imams," particularly in the various Iraqi shrine cities in Najaf (southern Iraq), Karbala (southern Iraq), Kadhimayn (suburb of Baghdad), and Samarra (central-eastern Iraq).¹⁴⁷ The Iraqi Shi'as' religiously conservative orientation can be exemplified in their beliefs, rituals, practices, attire, and degrees of observance.¹⁴⁸ For example, the Iraqi Shi'a in Dearborn have been known to wear enveloping black clothing that covers most of their bodies.¹⁴⁹ This conservative tradition has not been abandoned in America, despite the fact that their Lebanese counterparts wear more colourful veils and form-fitting attire.¹⁵⁰

Like other immigrant groups, the Iraqi Shi'a are stratified by a series of social, political, and economic factors, including class, ideology, and level of education; all of which may influence the individual's religiosity. In addition to these factors, the Iraqi Shi'a are also divided into two immigrant groups or waves based on their year of arrival in the United States—the first time the Iraqi Shi'a have been divided into waves of immigration by a scholar. The first-wave immigrated to America following the First Gulf War in 1991 up until the year 2002, inclusive. The second-wave came to America between the Second Gulf War in 2003 and 2011, inclusive. In order to measure religiosity among the Iraqi Shi'a in America, a suitable community needs to be selected to reflect the nuances of the population. This study will investigate the waves that settled in the city of Dearborn, Michigan.

The City of Dearborn, Michigan

In comparison to other American cities, Dearborn's ethnic and religious composition is relatively distinct. Dearborn is not a large city, as it only has a total population of 96,474 people.¹⁵¹ However, despite its fairly small size, Dearborn is recognized as the country's "best-known Arab immigrant enclave."¹⁵² This prominent reputation helps to explain the Iraqi Shi'as' attraction to Dearborn. Since many Iraqi Shi'a arrived from parts of Iraq where other, less technical professions were dominant, Dearborn was not selected for its employment opportunities presented by the automotive industry.¹⁵³ Their choice seems to be based less on Dearborn's industrial economy and more on its demographic composition: "It is not just the restaurants, shops, and mosques that draw people here. In the Arab sections of Dearborn, one does not find bars or other public places that would violate Islamic law and distract people from their religious and family duties."¹⁵⁴ The structure of Dearborn, in an Arab and Muslim fashion, suggests that it could provide a suitable environment for the Iraqi Shi'a. However, one must remember that while Dearborn is replete with eateries, stores, cultural centres, and places of worship that could be enjoyed by the Iraqi Shi'a, the city is still an American city, governed by American laws, and subject to American cultural practices and traditions.

Because of the different times of arrival, each wave has had different immigrant experiences in the United States. For example, the first-wave's earlier arrival in America allowed it to avoid the anti-Shi'a policies that followed Saddam Hussein's defeat in the First Gulf War (1991). However, the second-wave was forced to endure Saddam's brutality. Conversely, the second-wave's arrival in 2003 and after allowed it to evade the anti-Islamic backlash that immediately followed the September 11th terrorist attacks on

the World Trade Center and Pentagon, as the hysteria had subsided by this point. On the other hand, because they resided in America during this tense period, the first-wave was exposed to insensitive comments and behaviour. In light of these dissimilar immigration patterns and the different experiences that followed, it is possible that the level of religiosity, in this case, defined as the “degree” of one’s religious beliefs and the “frequency” of one’s religious practices may be different among the first- and second-wave. This question as to whether there are any significant differences in religiosity between the two waves of Iraqi Shi’a immigrants will need to be investigated further through empirical research within the community.

Iraqi Shi’a Immigration to the United States

In 1990, the year before the first-wave began, a total of eighty-eight refugees and asylees from Iraq were admitted into the United States.¹⁵⁵ In the next year, 868 refugees and asylees were allowed to immigrate, almost ten times the previous year’s quota.¹⁵⁶ The number of refugees and asylees fluctuated throughout the remainder of the 1990s.¹⁵⁷ A huge increase in the number of refugees and asylees occurred following the implementation of the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act in 2008.¹⁵⁸ The exponential increase in Iraqi refugees and asylees presents several different questions for further study.

Body of Literature Three: Muslim Communities in the United States

There is a growing and promising body of works that addresses the subject of Muslims in America. However, many of these works attempt to provide a more general overview of the national community. Although they are useful for those who have not been exposed to this subject matter before, the works lack specificity. In studying any

Shi'a group in America, the researcher will quickly discover the paucity of sources on this Muslim branch.

In *Islam in America* (2010), Jane I. Smith, a recently retired lecturer at Harvard University, gives only minimal attention to the Shi'a communities of the United States. The negligible focus does not appear to be based on bias, but rather stems from both the author's approach to her work and the size of the Shi'a community in America. In concert with other works on Muslims in Islam, Smith is attempting to deliver a scholarly, but general overview of the different sub-groups within the Muslim-American community. In employing this general approach, Smith can only focus on the major groups while providing some attention to the less noticeable communities.

Smith's minimal discussion of the Shi'a in America may have been based on the size of the population. In her work, Smith provides data on the size of the Shi'a community in the United States stating that "approximately one-fifth of American Muslims belong to the Shi'a sects."¹⁵⁹ It is important to note that Smith's figure of twenty percent comprises all of the various Shi'a sub-branches, as she uses the plural form of the noun "sects."¹⁶⁰ In other words, the number of Twelver-Shi'a Muslims living in the United States is even fewer than twenty percent thus supposedly justifying the slighted treatment the American-Shi'a are given in academic works.

This trend of paying minimal attention to the Shi'a communities of America repeats itself in other recent works on Islam in America. Kambiz GhaneaBassiri's *A History of Islam in America* (2010) is much more interested in providing a comprehensive historical overview of Muslim Americans from before the colonial period to the present rather than focusing on one specific community. These types of

encompassing works are of importance in their own right, but contribute little to this dissertation's specific study. Again, like Smith, GhaneaBassiri provides a general survey of Islam in America and offers only a few pages on the Shi'a of America. Also, these pages are intended for a general audience. GhaneaBassiri does discuss the Muslims of Dearborn, but provides only basic information on the community, such as details on the early religious leaders and the construction of the major mosque in the city.¹⁶¹

However, despite his more general approach, GhaneaBassiri does introduce an important piece of information about this community that was unknown to the researcher. GhaneaBassiri refers to the "Intra-Faith Code of Honor" (2007) signed by Muslim representatives from both Shi'a and Sunni orientations.¹⁶² The signatories of this document all agreed "to respect one another's differences, prevent hateful and condescending speech or acts, and to avoid sectarian propagandizing."¹⁶³ This document is relevant to this study because of the conditions that prompted its creation and the fact that it revolves around the Iraqis. The document was created and signed during the height of the Second Gulf War (2003-2011) at a time of intense sectarian warfare in Iraq.¹⁶⁴ The signatories realized that this Sunni-Shi'a violence could begin in America and wished to proactively avoid it before it started.¹⁶⁵

The Intra-Faith Code of Honor would be of particular importance and relevance in the Dearborn community, owing to its large and diverse Muslim population. In addition, at the time the Code of Honor was signed, the American Congress was debating whether or not to allow more Iraqis into the country. The timing suggests that the Code was signed before the eventual passage of the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act of 2008 in order to

demonstrate to both Muslim branches that sectarian rivalries would not be tolerated in America.

The problem with GhaneaBassiri's discussion of the Code is its national outlook, undefined by communal boundaries. In other words, it is difficult to determine from GhaneaBassiri's work whether the Code had an effect on preventing the Iraqi Shi'a community of Dearborn from engaging in sectarianism or being the victims of sectarian discrimination and violence. The work's generality coupled with its national focus not only reduces its usefulness to this study, but requires the researcher to uncover specific studies that address the local Muslim communities. These microstudies can provide the researcher with a template for conducting future studies that investigate a different Muslim-American community.

Abdo Elkholy's *The Arab Moslems in the United States: Religion and Assimilation* (1966) is one of the earliest ethnographic studies to explore Arab-Muslim communities in the United States. Elkholy compares the Arab-Muslim communities of Detroit and Toledo by measuring several different variables, particularly the level of religiosity and assimilation.¹⁶⁶ The results revealed that the Muslims of Toledo were found not only to have assimilated better into American society than their correligionists in Detroit, but also had a higher degree of religiosity than the Muslims in Detroit.¹⁶⁷

In order to explain this variance in assimilation patterns, Elkholy cites the differences in employment and living environments between the two groups.¹⁶⁸ In the case of employment, the Toledo Muslims typically worked in the liquor or service industry, whereas the Detroit Muslims are confined to the solitary manufacturing industry.¹⁶⁹ In the manufacturing industry, the Detroit Muslims have little opportunity for

developing language skills in the manufacturing industry.¹⁷⁰ This language situation differs in Muslims in Toledo, as their “business and success depend to a large degree on skill in conversation and communication in English.”¹⁷¹ In addition to the solitary occupations, the Detroit Muslims have also chosen to remain in the ghettoized suburban city of Dearborn thus protecting themselves from assimilationist advances.¹⁷²

Conversely, the Toledo Muslims have not established an ethnic enclave and are “randomly distributed throughout the city.”¹⁷³ However, despite being more exposed to American culture, the Toledo Muslims have arguably maintained a stronger religious heritage.¹⁷⁴ For example, the Toledo Muslims have cultivated a stronger sense of religiosity among younger generations largely owing to the community’s cosmopolitanism, cohesion, involvement of younger elements, moderate ideals, adaptation of Western traditions, and a more gregarious and educated religious leader.¹⁷⁵ Conversely, the Detroit Muslims tend to exemplify contradictory characteristics to that of Toledo.¹⁷⁶

Though Elkholy’s work provides guidance on the structure of a comparative work on religiosity, its relevance and replicability for this dissertation is somewhat limited. Since Elkholy has taken two diverse groups from two different cities, it is much easier to see and determine the major differences in the levels of religiosity and assimilation between the two communities. However, because this dissertation focuses on one specific religio-ethnic community, differentiated only by the year of their arrival in America, it is increasingly more difficult to uncover such visible differences. Perhaps a more specific study that focuses on one specific religio-ethnic group in a defined area can be more meaningful to this dissertation.

Another early work is Atif Wasfi's *An Islamic-Lebanese Community in U.S.A.: A Study in Cultural Anthropology* (1971), which is one of the first microstudies to exclusively focus on the Lebanese Muslim community of Dearborn. In addition to concentrating solely on one group, Wasfi further stratifies his study by dividing the community into two groups.¹⁷⁷ The first consists of Lebanese-Muslims who resided in Lebanon during their early formative years while the second group spent this critical time of personal development in the United States.¹⁷⁸ He predicts that the group that was born in Lebanon will be less assimilated than the native group born in America.¹⁷⁹ Although the study's hypothesis is predictable, Wasfi's work is valuable for several reasons.

Wasfi's decision to distinguish between native and non-native members within the Lebanese-Muslim community not only creates a more nuanced study, but also provides other researchers with a template for future studies that compare two related subgroups within a community. This study has inspired the formulation of the present dissertation, particularly in reference to the division of the Iraqi Shi'a community into two immigrant waves. Wasfi's study has many strengths but it is substantially inhibited by its advanced age. The Islamic community of Dearborn has undergone substantial changes in the past forty-three years rendering the data collected in this study obsolete. Also, though Wasfi recognizes the preponderance of Shi'a in the community, he fails to provide detailed information on this branch of Islam. This absence of adequate information on the Shi'a appears to be a recurring trend within the body of literature on Islam until fairly recently.

The most recent book on this neglected subject is Liyakat Nathani Takim's *Shi'ism in America* (2009). It seems that Takim has acknowledged the slighted treatment

American Shi'a groups have felt by the academy and presents a work that explores different sub-branches within the Shi'a branch. The most valuable component of Takim's work is his detailed historical background on the various Shi'a communities in America, as this marks the first attempt by a reputable scholar to codify the history of American Shi'ism.¹⁸⁰ However, as this book is a broad work on Shi'ism, it lacks a specified focus. Although this generality should not be viewed as a drawback, it is still necessary to consult other works that explore one Shi'a community in America, such as the work of the late Linda Walbridge.

Anthropologist Linda Walbridge's *Without Forgetting the Imam: Lebanese Shi'ism in an American Community* (1997) is based on her doctoral dissertation and the field research she conducted during the late 1980s and early 1990s in Dearborn. Although the work centres almost exclusively on the Lebanese Shi'a community, it is still of importance to this dissertation. The work provides detailed information on the history of Shi'ism in the community, especially relating to the biographies of leading religious personalities, the religious culture of each mosque, and ethnographic responses on religious, social, and political issues of importance within the United States and abroad. Although the work has contributed immensely to the subfield, it is the afterword of Walbridge's work that provides a springboard for this dissertation.

In the afterword, Walbridge signals the need for immediate and contemporary research on the Iraqi Shi'a of Dearborn, due to the massive "paradigm shift" following the First Gulf War (1991), namely their immigration to America.¹⁸¹ Their arrival in America not only altered the ethnic configuration of Dearborn, but more importantly witnessed the importation of "an official 'orthodox' view of Shi'ism" brought by the

recently arrived Iraqi Shi'a immigrants.¹⁸² This observation about the religiosity of the Iraqi Shi'a prompts the need for an empirical study on the subject to further evaluate the validity of this observation.

The necessity for further research on the Iraqi Shi'a community was realized and pursued by Walbridge and her colleague T.M. Aziz in an article entitled, "After Karbala: Iraqi-Refugees in Dearborn" (2000). Walbridge and Aziz briefly describe several challenges faced by the Iraqi Shi'a in Dearborn, including issues relating to health, employment, immigration status, housing, and adapting to American life.¹⁸³ In the course of their research, the authors bring to light the tensions between the established Lebanese community and the arriving Iraqis.¹⁸⁴ The conflict between the two groups does not appear to stem from any longstanding, historical or political wound, considering both groups are ethnically Arab and mostly Shi'a. Walbridge and Aziz contend that the tension arises over the cultural characteristics held by the Iraqi Shi'a.¹⁸⁵ For example, the Lebanese have concerns about the Iraqi Shi'as' retrograde attire, perceived poor hygiene, and allegedly unproductive work ethic.¹⁸⁶ In addition to having these preconceived notions, it is reported that the Lebanese community is reserved about renting to Iraqis because of their typically large family size.¹⁸⁷ This instance of housing discrimination supposedly pushed the Iraqis either onto the periphery of the city or even outside of Dearborn's city limits.¹⁸⁸ However, in the course of this dissertation's field research, the participants did not mention any difficulties in finding suitable housing, let alone instances of being refused housing because of nationality.

In contrast to Walbridge and Aziz's findings, the Iraqi Shi'a that participated in this study lived in various areas of Dearborn. It did not appear as if the community was

sequestered into one section of the city. It is possible that at the time Walbridge and Aziz conducted their field research, the community may have been concentrated in one large neighbourhood or one area of the city. Since over a decade has passed since their study was published, it is evident that the Iraqi Shi'a community has undergone several changes. More importantly, Walbridge and Aziz were not able to observe the arrival of the second-wave, thus rendering their study incomplete. The exclusion of the second-wave seems to be a recurring issue in many other works on this community. The unfinished nature of the work not only warrants further study on the second-wave, but also prompts studies that compare the two waves.

Since this third body of literature does not pay adequate attention to the Iraqi Shi'a of America, it needs to be accompanied by more personal works written by prominent members of the Islamic community of Dearborn. Though scholars can periodically conduct field research in a defined community, there is no substitute for the personal account of an influential leader involved in the daily decision making of the community. In 2007, Imam Sayyid Hassan Qazwini, religious leader of the Shi'a-based Islamic Center of America in Dearborn, published a book entitled, *American Crescent: A Muslim Cleric on the Power of His Faith, the Struggle against Prejudice, and the Future of Islam and America*. The book addresses a host of different topics ranging from Qazwini's life experiences to his venture to America in the 1990s to the challenges faced by both the local and national Muslim communities in the post-9/11 environment. In addition, because of his Iraqi Shi'a heritage and his family's prominence in the Shi'a religious hierarchy, Qazwini adds several anecdotes that would not have been found in

other, more academic-based works. These reflections can help the researcher understand the obstacles faced by both the Iraqi Shi'a and their clerics.

However, the most important part of this work is Qazwini's discussions on the Muslim community of Dearborn, particular in reference to his capacity as leader of the largest Shi'a mosque in the United States. The cleric shares his experiences of living in the so-called "Muslim capital of the West."¹⁸⁹ In a sense, Qazwini's work acts as sort of "insider's guide" to the Muslim community of Dearborn. There are several internal issues and instances that would not have been known by the researcher if it were not for this work. For example, Qazwini's prominence in the national Muslim-American community has repeatedly put him into direct contact with several important political figures.¹⁹⁰ In one instance, Qazwini managed to meet with both Al Gore (1948-) and George W. Bush (1946-) before and during the 2000 presidential election.¹⁹¹ Without Qazwini's reflections on his interactions with these two presidential candidates, it would have been difficult to properly understand the community's sentiments on this political contest. However, despite the work's intimate insight into the community, the book does have one major drawback for this dissertation.

The book is written for a general audience, unfamiliar with Islam, Shi'ism, and the Muslim community of Dearborn. The expansive nature of the work prevents Qazwini from focusing on the community with which he is most familiar. There are many specific elements within this work, but there are not enough to constitute a complete portrait of the community. The researcher must then look to other works that exclusively focus on the challenges faced by the Muslim community of Dearborn. In addition, it is particularly

important to pursue a topic that Qazwini spent an enormous amount of time discussing in his book, namely the post-September 11th environment in Dearborn.

These major studies in the third body of literature, namely Elkholy (1966), Wasfi (1971), Walbridge and Aziz (2000), seem to recognize the division between religion and the state put forward by Kymlicka in his multicultural model.¹⁹² In addition, these studies tend to focus on the sociological conditions and challenges posed by the host society, rather than any political issues. These studies give credence to both Kymlicka and Park's theories. However, works like those presented by Qazwini (2007) demonstrate that religion still plays some important role in American society with presidential contenders seeking to gather votes from a religious community.¹⁹³ This mixture of religion and politics that is exemplified in Qazwini's work is a clear rejection of Kymlicka's argument on the separation of these two spheres.¹⁹⁴ However, the fusion of religion and politics during the 2000 presidential election would act as only a small prelude to the intermingling of these two spheres that would follow the September 11th terrorist attacks.

Finally, in conducting any contemporary study on Arabs or Muslims in America, it is imperative to review the literature that emerged following the September 11th terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, particularly because the first-wave of Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims resided in America during this time. This event played an important role in the lives of both waves of Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims and Arabs and Muslims in general. In her article "No Longer Invisible: Arab and Muslim Exclusion after September 11," Louise Cainkar (2002), a sociologist from Marquette University, reviews the post-September 11th atmosphere and declares that after the terrorist attacks, the Arab-American community was "no longer invisible."¹⁹⁵ In other words, a

community that received little national attention in the past suddenly became the central figure in a national catastrophe.¹⁹⁶

The repercussions of these attacks caused both an international effect and a domestic one, particularly in the Muslim communities of Dearborn. Nabeel Abraham, Sally Howell, and Andrew Shryock's edited volume, *Arab Detroit 9/11: Life in the Terror Decade* (2011) is especially useful in illuminating the challenges faced by the various Arab and Muslim communities living in greater Detroit in the post-9/11 environment. In the volume's introduction, the editors contend that Americans have been living in "the Terror Decade" in the ten years following the 9/11 attacks.¹⁹⁷ This period not only revolved around the policies implemented by the American government to combat terrorism, but was also defined by a ubiquitous "climate of fear" shared by the local Arab and Muslim communities.¹⁹⁸ The contributors report that this element of fear is not the only component of the "Terror Decade" concept. They suggest that the "Terror Decade" has brought about both "'the worst of times' and 'the best of times.'"¹⁹⁹ In addition to the instances of harassment and discrimination the Arab and Muslim community has endured during this decade, the community has also made several positive advancements in religious, social, judicial, political, cultural, and demographic spheres.²⁰⁰ However, the paradoxical progress achieved during the decade should not render the impression that the community was free from several obstacles during this time.

In "Muslims as Moving Targets: External Scrutiny and Internal Critique in Detroit's Mosques" (2011), Sally Howell describes the tripartite relationship between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Arab and Muslim advocacy groups, and the city's

mosques. Howell reports that the FBI not only conducted investigations of most of the mosques in the area, but also encouraged members of the mosque to provide them with information.²⁰¹ In turn, mosque leaders have become more vigilant in regulating the activities that are conducted, the individuals that attend their mosques, and the policies that govern the mosque.²⁰² In order to help exemplify the relationship between these three entities, Howell selects three case studies. These cases studies are apt, but do not include mosques frequently attended by Iraqi Shi'a Muslims. In other words, the effect that this increased surveillance had on Iraqi Shi'as and their respective places of worship remains unknown. However, this exclusion should not be a surprise. In the entire volume, there is not a single article that solely addresses the Iraqi Shi'a community. This absence does not mean that the volume ignores specific communities in favour of a more general approach. The work does provide specific articles on the Chaldean-Catholics, Orthodox-Arabs, and Lebanese communities, but seems to ignore the growing Iraqi Shi'a community. This exclusion is a trend in both macro- and microstudies addressing Muslims in America.

The studies conducted by Louise Cainkar (2002), Nabeel Abraham, Sally Howell, and Andrew Shryock (2011), and Sally Howell (2011) run into conflict with Kymlicka's axioms on the "separation of church and state" and that "a liberal-democratic state does not seek to promote *religious* integration."²⁰³ Instead, with most of these writings, one notices that in the post-September 11th environment, the state is seeking to involve itself in the affairs of a religious group through intolerant and coercive means that emphasize segregation in the name of national security. Therefore, the division of religion and government highlighted by Kymlicka is not supported in this particular body of literature. Conversely, "competition," the second stage of Park's race relations cycle, may be used

in order to explain the tense relationship between the Muslim-American community and the American government.²⁰⁴

Methodology

The dissertation employs a mixed methods approach as it takes “multiple forms of data” from a variety of sources.²⁰⁵ One of the major reasons why a mixed methods approach should be selected is if “one data source may be insufficient.”²⁰⁶ In the case of this dissertation, a mixed methods approach is employed because the data and information on the Iraqi Shi’a is somewhat slim. While there are some historical narratives on the Iraqi Shi’a, there is a significant lack of empirical data on this religio-ethnic group’s religious orientation. In order to compensate for this paucity of data, two methodological approaches were employed in order to determine whether there are significant differences in religiosity between first and second-wave Iraqi Shi’a Muslims in greater Dearborn. The first phase presents a detailed historical background on the religious and ethnic struggles faced by the Iraqi Shi’a. This background does not solely focus on the instances of political marginalization and religious persecution felt in Iraq, but also the many different struggles the Iraqi Shi’a endured in their host society of America. This background, presented in chapters two and three, provides the necessary historical prerequisites required in order to better understand the statements, responses, and opinions rendered by the community during the empirical phase of this research.

In the second, more empirical phase of this research project, a series of twenty-five semi-structured interviews have been conducted with individuals from each of the two waves. The length of the interviews was between thirty and sixty minutes. The shortest interview took about twenty-five minutes and the longest interview took just over

ninety minutes. In the course of the interviews, the participants have been asked questions from a prepared questionnaire. These questions revolved around the participants' devotional life, mosque life, and personal life in order to ascertain their religiosity. In each of these three parts, there were a series of related questions. In the devotional life section, participants were asked questions about their prayer routine, time devoted to reading religious texts, rituals practiced during holydays, pilgrimages and visitations to religious sites, and their choice of spiritual guide. The second section explored questions relating to the participants' mosque life, such as their preferred mosque, frequency of mosque attendance, mosque donations, and the overall role taken by the imam in the participants' personal, family, or spiritual development. In the final section, participants were asked questions regarding the role of religion in their personal lives, including topics on religious attire, marriage, and Islamic dietary laws. In using these three categories of questions, each wave's religiosity will become much more apparent.

Participant Community

The number of Iraqi Shi'as currently residing in the confines of the city of Dearborn is unreported in academic works. However, there are other, reliable sources that the researcher can reference in order to better estimate the population size of a specific community. The United States Census Bureau reports that Dearborn has an estimated population of 96,474 people.²⁰⁷ According to Imam Husham al-Husainy, a pillar in the Iraqi Shi'a community and the religious leader of the Karbalaa Islamic Education Center, a mostly Iraqi Shi'a mosque in Dearborn, there are approximately ten to fifteen thousand Iraqi Shi'a in the city of Dearborn and about thirty thousand in Metropolitan Detroit.²⁰⁸

Due its large size in the community, it is impossible to interview or study the entire population of Iraqi Shi'a. This leads the researcher to select a sample of participants in order to conduct interviews.

The entire participant community consists of fifty Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims, with twenty-five participants from each of the first- and second-wave. There is no particular significance behind the number fifty other than it being a reasonable and practical number of people that the researcher believed could be successfully interviewed. The waves each comprised sixteen males and nine females. Again, there is no significance in this particular sex ratio as it was unintentional. Moreover, the identical sex ratio between the two waves was only discovered after the field research component of this study had been completed and the researcher began analyzing the data collected. Although the sex ratio between the waves is identical, the ratio itself is unequal between males and females. The ratio reveals that there are significantly fewer female participants. This trend can be attributed to cultural and religious concerns expressed by potential female participants with the prospect of meeting and conversing with an unrelated male. The challenge of securing potential participants, especially female participants will be explored further in a later chapter.

The age of participants ranged from eighteen to sixty-five years.²⁰⁹ The average age of all fifty participants was 37.04 years of age, with the average age from the first-wave being 38.04 years and 36.04 years from the second-wave.²¹⁰ The participants can also be divided into those under the age of forty and over the age of forty. In the first-wave, there were eleven participants who were under forty and fourteen who were over

forty.²¹¹ The second-wave, being slightly younger, contained fifteen participants under the age of forty and ten participants being over forty.²¹²

The participants entered the United States at various points between 1991 and 2011, inclusive. In the case of the first-wave, a majority of participants arrived during the earlier part of the decade, namely between 1992 and 1997.²¹³ For the second-wave, most of the participants arrived in the United States between 2008 and 2011.²¹⁴

The participants held many different occupations, including artist, housewife, student, doctor, realtor, factory worker, engineer, electrician, mechanic, truck driver, clerk, restaurant staff, delivery personnel, retiree, and unemployed.²¹⁵ There were also two participants who did not mention their occupation in the course of their interviews.²¹⁶

This participant community is reflective of the population of Iraqi Shi'a Muslims in that the sample shares several key components with the entire population. The participants in the sample share a common nationality, religious affiliation, and place of residence with the entire population of Iraqi Shi'a Muslims in Dearborn. The sample is also nuanced by sex, age, and occupation.

The participants were contacted and recruited in several different ways, including the more traditional method of posting "call for participants" posters at local universities, businesses, and mosques and emailing relevant organizations in the community. Some of the local imams provided support in this respect; however, they were not the primary contact people for this community. It is likely that their busy schedules and many responsibilities prevented them from providing more assistance to the researcher. The recruitment of participants has largely benefited from snowball sampling whereby "the researcher makes initial contact with a small group of people who are relevant to the

research topic and then uses these to establish contacts with others.”²¹⁷ In this case, many participants heard about the study from others Muslims in the community who either participated in the study themselves or who could not participate in the study because they did not meet the qualifications but knew of individuals who may be interested.

One note on recruitment: the researcher had serious difficulties finding participants who were willing to take part in this study. In the course of the field research, the researcher perceived a sense of suspicion among potential participants who felt that the researcher was insincere in his motives and research objectives. In addition to the level of suspicion that permeated the participant community, there were several female and potential female participants who were apprehensive about the idea of taking part in a one-on-one interview.²¹⁸ These female participants were worried about what others might think if they were seen talking with an unrelated male.²¹⁹ Naturally, the difficulties in securing participants reduced the sample size and limited the replicability of the data.

In order to thank and compensate them for their time spent on this study, participants received a ten-dollar gift certificate in American currency to various popular stores in the city. However, before the interview could be conducted and the gift certificates distributed, the researcher needed to ensure that the potential participant qualified for the interview.

In order to qualify to take part in the interview, the participant must meet four required conditions. First, the participant must be eighteen years of age or older at the time of the interview. Next, the participant must profess to subscribe to Twelver Shi’ism, considering, as discussed above, there are several sub-groups within Shi’a Islam. As mentioned above, in the course of the dissertation, the term “Shi’a” will be used to refer

to the Twelver Shi'a unless otherwise stated. Third, the participant must either have been born in Iraq or have had at least one parent of Iraqi birth. Finally, the participant must currently reside in the greater Dearborn area, including Dearborn proper or Dearborn Heights. In addition, there were a few participants who originally immigrated to Dearborn, but have since moved to other areas in greater Detroit. Since these participants originally arrived in Dearborn, they too could complete the interview. The participants who resided outside of Dearborn lived there in order to be in closer proximity to their university campus or place of employment. The majority of the interviews took place in the participants' homes, but there were others that occurred in coffee shops, mosques, offices, university campuses, libraries, and businesses in order to accommodate the participants' busy schedules.

In order to maintain a maximum level of privacy and anonymity, as guaranteed in the research ethics protocols of this study, each participant has been assigned a random designation based on their wave. The designation is comprised of both letters and numbers. All designations begin with the letter "I" to represent the word interview. This letter is then followed by either "W1" to indicate a wave one participant or "W2" to indicate a wave two participant. Finally, after the wave designation, each participant was assigned a random letter ranging from A to Y. In accordance with the research ethics protocols, the data derived from these fifty interviews, along with the informed consent forms and other documents have been securely stored in a locked safe and will remain there for a period of five years. After this period has elapsed, the documents will be destroyed in fulfillment of the requirements of the research ethics protocol approved for this study.

Scholarly Contributions

This dissertation makes two significant scholarly contributions to the field. First, as discussed in the literature review, there are very few academic works that provide substantial information on the Shi'a of America, and even fewer focusing solely on the Iraqi Shi'a communities of the country. In light of the large number of Iraqi Shi'a immigrants that have arrived in the past twenty years, there is a growing need to understand this religio-ethnic group. This necessity is not only based on the community's size in America, but also their increasing prominence in the national Muslim community along with their immense role in post-Ba'athist Iraq.

Second, the dissertation not only provides a comprehensive background on the experiences the Iraqi Shi'a endured both in Iraq and America, but more importantly presents original data on the community's religiosity. As examined in the literature review, there is a serious need for more research on religiosity within Muslim-American communities, especially studies that address Shi'a religiosity. This contribution is necessary considering the prevalence of inaccurate generalizations and stereotypes about the Iraqi Shi'a community, which have been already discussed in the literature review. It is only through empirical research that these erroneous assumptions can be dissolved and replaced by a more accurate depiction of the Iraqi Shi'a community. In conducting interviews with members of the Iraqi-Shi'a community, the researcher is better able to understand the nature of their religion, particularly in reference to how it is actually practiced in America. In engaging in direct discussions with members in the community, along with attending their religious events and observing how their rituals are practiced, the researcher can provide an accurate portrait of their religiosity.

The results of this study show that the Iraqi Shi'a are a "non-isolationist religious group."²²⁰ They have attempted to integrate into American society by ignoring the more extreme aspects of their religion, such as forms of corporal mortification, while maintaining the more important features of their religious heritage, such as the creed, prayer routine, making donations, fasting during required period, and performing the required pilgrimage, which are critical to all Muslims as they are all among the five pillars of Islam.²²¹ This centralist approach shows that the Iraqi Shi'a are a sort of "moderate minority" that attempt to navigate between the extremes of staunch traditionalism and growing reform. Moreover, the interview results will also reveal that the decision to retain certain religious practices at the expense of adopting new American customs or vice-versa remains the decision of the Iraqi Shi'a. This conclusion supports Kymlicka's statement that the "liberal-democratic state does not seek to promote *religious* integration."²²² As a result, the religious group may or may not integrate into society on its own terms. This dissertation fits into the field of multiculturalism studies by attempting to determine whether a religious minority group assimilates and thus renounces its religious heritage or continues to maintain its religious heritage despite the pressures to assimilate.

This dissertation accepts Kymlicka's contention that liberal-democratic states are not formally responsible for maintaining some sort of religious uniformity.²²³ Therefore, in removing the state from the equation, it is necessary to examine other factors that may lead to immigration. As explained above, the dissertation will determine whether different amounts of time in the United States have had an effect on the waves' overall

religiosity. The dissertation will also show whether Park's race relations cycle can be used to explain the level of religiosity among the two waves.

Structure of the Work

This dissertation consists of six main chapters, including this introductory chapter. The second chapter examines the Shi'a experience in Iraq. The narrative begins with the decline of the Ottoman Empire following World War I and the British takeover of its enemy's former possession in the region, including the three Mesopotamian provinces that would later form the modern state of Iraq. In this chapter, it will be argued that the Iraqi Shi'a experience in their homeland has been defined by political marginalization and religious discrimination. In order to better exemplify this argument, this chapter pays special attention to the various governmental policies that were directed against the Iraqi Shi'a, particularly following the emergence of the Ba'ath party and the regime of Saddam Hussein (r. 1979-2003).

The third chapter explores the many different challenges experienced by both waves since their arrival in their newfound host society of Dearborn. In reflecting on the experiences of both waves in Dearborn, it can be concluded that the participant community had a mixed experience. The chapter studies the periods of prosperity and adversity, including the instances of discrimination that appeared during the first-wave's arrival in the 1990s, the development and political inclusion during the 2000 presidential election, the backlash against Arabs and Muslims that followed the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the sectarian difficulties following the execution of Saddam Hussein in 2006, and the attempted Qur'an burning incident at the Islamic Center of America in 2010 by Pastor Terry Jones. In addition to the more historical component of this chapter, the end of the

third chapter also provides an introduction to the participant community itself. This portion of the chapter explains the participant community's concerns and suspicions with the prospect of conducting face-to-face interviews with an outsider. As this chapter will demonstrate, these feelings were largely the result of the Iraqi Shi'as' treatment in both Iraq and the United States. Once the concerns were properly addressed, the researcher was able to begin the empirical portion of this dissertation and review the data compiled from the interviews.

The fourth and fifth chapters present the data retrieved from interviewing participants from both waves. The fourth chapter will examine the devotional life measurement and its five associated indicators, including prayer (indicator one), religious knowledge (indicator two), rituals (indicator three), pilgrimages (indicator four), and spiritual authority (indicator five). The fifth chapter will discuss the mosque life and personal life measurements and their remaining four indicators, including mosque life (indicator six), religious attire (indicator seven), marriage (indicator eight), and dietary laws (indicator nine). In addition, these two chapters discuss the validity of classic assimilation theory exemplified in Robert Park's race relations cycle. It will be discovered that Park's theory cannot accurately explain the observed pattern derived from the data, namely that the first-wave participants appear slightly more religious than their counterparts from the second-wave. In light of the race relations cycle's failure to explain this observed pattern, two alternative theories will be added, including Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou's segmented assimilation theory and Charles Glock, Benjamin Ringer, and Earl Babbie's comfort hypothesis. These two chapters reveal that both waves are

moderate minorities attempting to avoid both deficiencies and extremes in religion, while maintaining their religious heritage in comparable degrees.

The final chapter of this dissertation will provide a conclusion that summarizes the entire work. This chapter will also explain why the initial hypothesis, which is based on Park's model, proved to be incorrect. This chapter also suggests possible future studies that can be pursued by other researchers in the field. These six chapters of the dissertation are followed by a complete bibliography of all primary and secondary sources employed in this study. Finally, in addition to the six chapters and bibliography, a series of twenty-two appendices have been included. This appendices section contains a table detailing the number of Iraqi refugees and asylees who entered the United States between 1990 and 2011, the letter of information, the "call for participants" poster, the informed consent form, the gift certificate receipt, the questionnaire, participant designations and demographics for both waves, and a comprehensive set of tables based on the data derived from the interviews with members from both the first- and second-wave.

Notes

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Chapter Two: A Hostile Homeland: The History of the Iraqi Shi'a in the Twentieth Century

Introduction

This chapter provides a selective historical account of the Shi'a political experience in Iraq from the creation of the modern state in the early 1920s to the mass departure of Iraqi immigrants following the First Gulf War in the 1990s. In surveying this seventy-year period, this chapter isolates two related themes that define the political conditions of the Iraqi Shi'a. The first theme revolves around the concept of political marginalization. The country's Shi'a population has typically and historically been displaced from positions of significant political power. This ostracization from the political arena can be seen by examining their minimal representation in the country's first few governments, their limited success in national elections largely because of the political corruption and bias, and the short-lived administration of the country's first Shi'a prime minister from 1947 to 1948. In addition to political marginalization, the Iraqi Shi'a were also forced to contend with another, more uncertain force.

The second theme involves religious persecution at the hands of Saddam Hussein (1937-2006) and the Ba'ath Party in the 1970s and 1980s. In this period, the Iraqi Shi'a were not only excluded from prominent political positions, but suffered several injustices. For example, in 1977, the Ba'athist regime ordered massive arrests during a peaceful religious commemoration. In 1980, Saddam Hussein ordered the execution of Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (c. 1935-1980), a senior Shi'a religious leader. In 1982, following an attempt on his life, Saddam ordered the indiscriminate massacre of the general Shi'a population of Dujail, a town north of Baghdad. The Iraqi

state's historically violent treatment of the Iraqi Shi'a from the years of the monarchy to the Saddam era shows that Kymlicka's multicultural model described in chapter one has little applicability. In light of the years of ostracization, persecution, and mass executions during this long period, the Iraqi state is clearly not interested in integrating the Iraqi Shi'a majority, despite the fact that in the 1920, 1931, and 1947 censuses, their population did not drop below the fifty percent mark.¹

The notion of integration is a point that is central in Kymlicka's conception of multiculturalism.² However, for Kymlicka, the liberal-democratic state's role in integration stretches only to ethnic groups and not religious groups.³ The liberal-democratic state's passive role in regards to religious groups is not shared by all scholars. Unlike Kymlicka's model, Robert Park's race relations cycle is applied to immigrant groups that have departed from their homeland and arrived in a host society.⁴ For Park, immigrant groups pass through four stages: "contact," "competition," "accommodation," and finally "assimilation."⁵ In other words, the immigrant group will eventually be assimilated into the host society's dominant culture.⁶ The initial hypothesis predicted in this study suggests that the first wave would be less religious than the second wave because of the former's longer stay in the United States and higher chance of acclimatizing into American society. This hypothesis is based on Park's race relations cycle. However, as it will be demonstrated in later chapters, this hypothesis will be proven to be incorrect forcing the researcher to adopt alternative theories, such as Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou's segmented assimilation theory and Charles Glock, Benjamin Ringer, and Earl Babbie's comfort hypothesis.

A historical understanding of the Iraqi Shi'a is a valuable component of this study. The historical foundation will assist in better understanding how the Iraqi-Shi'a react to the multicultural and assimilationist forces present in the United States. The historical review will also help in explaining the Iraqi Shi'a of Dearborn's initial reaction to a researcher seeking information about their community. In addition, the solid historical background provided in this chapter will aid in appreciating the attitudes, perspectives, and responses presented by the participant community during the field research component of this study. In order to truly appreciate these attitudes, perspectives, and responses, one must return to the origins of the Iraqi state following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War (1914-1918).

The Collapse of the Ottoman Empire

The conflict over future Iraqi territory between the Ottoman Empire and the British Empire began during the initial months of the First World War (1914-1918).⁷ By the end of 1914, the British managed to capture Basra, one of the three major Ottoman *vilayet* or provinces that would form the southern region of modern Iraq.⁸ In early 1917, the second *vilayet* and future Iraqi capital of Baghdad succumbed to British military control.⁹ The Armistice of Mudros (1918), named for the Greek city where it was signed, declared that Ottoman forces in the Basra and Baghdad regions would surrender to the occupying British.¹⁰ Despite the fact that an armistice was formally signed between the British and the Ottoman Empire in October of 1918, the British decided to move against their defeated enemy and take the third and last Ottoman *vilayet* of Mosul in the northern region of modern Iraq.¹¹

Before the end of the First World War, the remaining members of the Triple Entente, namely Britain and France, informally and secretly began to divide Ottoman territories amongst themselves even before these two Western powers occupied Ottoman lands.¹² The negotiations between the British and French were kept secret in order to prevent controversy with other allies, considering the war was not over.¹³ These machinations between the two countries were formalized under the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916), named in honour of the British and French creators of this document.¹⁴ In accordance with the written articles of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the British Crown was accorded present-day Kuwait, Jordan, Central and Southern Iraq, and the port cities of Haifa and Acre in the former Palestine.¹⁵ The British sought these territories in order to maintain an alternative route to their prized colonial possession, India.¹⁶ The French Republic was allotted modern Syria, Lebanon, Northern Iraq, and South-Eastern Turkey.¹⁷ In contrast to their British allies, the French had more cultural concerns, namely the protection of the Christian minorities in Syria and Lebanon.¹⁸ The coveted city of Jerusalem and its surrounding area would remain under the general auspices of a consortium of international actors that included the British, French, and Russian governments, and the leaders of the holy city of Mecca.¹⁹ The demands of the British and French appeared to have been recognized in the document. However, in a short period, the secret contents of the Sykes-Picot Agreement would be ratified in a more public and formal manner.

The Treaty of Sèvres (1920), signed between the Allies and the Ottoman Empire, formalized much of the articles of the Sykes-Picot Agreement with a few alterations from the original agreement.²⁰ Like the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the Treaty of Sèvres granted

the British control over the future territories of Iraq, Palestine, Jordan, and Kuwait, and the French received the future states of Syria and Lebanon.²¹ In addition to losing territory to the British, French and other powers, this document also imposed many other castigatory demands that significantly reduced the military might, economic control, and political influence of the Ottoman Empire.²² Under the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres, the Ottoman Empire would control only a small percentage of its former territorial possessions essentially reducing the empire to a “rump state.”²³ However, the document was not implemented as the rising Turkish government in Ankara under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881-1931) refused to accept it.²⁴ Despite the refusal of the rising Turkish authorities to formally sign the treaty, the British had already received control over one of the Ottoman Empire’s former possessions, Iraq.²⁵

The British Mandate of Iraq

In the aftermath of the First World War, the now defunct League of Nations placed Iraq under a British mandate.²⁶ The British were officially assigned control of the three former Ottoman *vilayet* or provinces of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul on April 28, 1920 under the terms of the San Remo Agreement.²⁷ Naturally, like all nation-building projects, the British were confronted with a series of pressing questions upon inheriting the soon-to-be Iraqi state, such as the structure of the government and the individuals who would occupy critical positions. This task would prove difficult considering the religious diversity of Iraq. According to the British Census of 1920, the Shi’a constituted 56% of the population, the Sunni 36% and various non-Muslim groups comprised the rest.²⁸ There was also a small group of expatriate Shi’a Persians who typically were the ranking religious figures within the holy Shi’a cities.²⁹ In addition to their distinguished

clerical positions, the most senior religious leaders evidently wielded immense influence over the population to sanction a revolt, as one of them officially supported an uprising against the British authorities in the country in 1920.³⁰ The Revolt of 1920 is of importance not only because it demonstrates how much authority the Shi'a religious hierarchy had in influencing and mobilizing the faithful, but also exemplifies the perpetual tension that the Shi'a would have with the British prompting the latter to seek alliances with the Sunni minority in Iraq.

The Origins of the Revolt of 1920

The exact cause of the *al-thawra al-Iraqqia al-kubra* or The Great Iraqi Revolution, that consumed Iraq from June 1920 to February 1921 is a source of debate among modern scholars.³¹ It is unfortunately beyond the scope of this work to enumerate and describe all possible explanations for the revolt and the specific roles that the various ethnic, religious, and political groups played in engaging the British. Therefore, the discussion of the revolt will be restricted to the viewpoint of the Shi'a and their religious leaders.

Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi Ha'iri al-Shirazi of Karbala (d. 1920), considered the most eminent cleric of the country, promulgated an influential *fatwa* or religious edict clearly stating that it was unlawful for Muslims to be ruled by non-Muslims.³² In addition, the Grand Ayatollah prohibited his supporters from holding positions within the secular government.³³ These views should not be regarded as the lone opinions of one radical cleric, but rather as the collective attitude of other clerics in the shrine cities.³⁴ In the minds of the ranking clerics, the mandate not only represented the unlawful occupation of sovereign Muslim territory, but more importantly marked “the

collapse of Islamic civilization.”³⁵ Under the guise of ensuring the survival of Islamic principles and traditions in the face of a superior force, the Shi’a clerics of the holy cities incited their tribal followers to subvert the British authorities.³⁶ The fragile situation between the two formidable forces continued to deteriorate further when the British provoked the nation’s foremost cleric on a familial level.

The Iraqi Revolt Begins

On June 21, 1920, the British arrested Grand Ayatollah Shirazi’s son, Mirza Muhammad Rida and later exiled him to a remote island.³⁷ In response to his son’s arrest and exile, Grand Ayatollah Shirazi immediately issued the infamous *fatwa* that both religiously sanctioned and formally inaugurated the Iraqi revolt of 1920.³⁸ This *fatwa* was apparently interpreted as a sanction for waging a *jihad* or struggle against the occupying British, considering the level of violence that shortly consumed the country.

The violence did not remain confined to one defined area, but rather spread to other cities and areas in the mid-Euphrates region.³⁹ The insurrection continued throughout the month of July until the troubled nation “exploded in a widespread, if unco-ordinated revolt against British occupation.”⁴⁰ The revolt also traversed sectarian and ethnic lines by outgrowing its Shi’a origins and engaging the Kurdish tribes.⁴¹ The Kurdish tribes seized this period of confusion to capture territory in the northern regions of the country.⁴²

In addition to absorbing non-Shi’a Muslims in the burgeoning conflict, the revolt seemed to outgrow its religious overtones and incorporate other disputes, such as immediate relief from high taxes, rising inflation rates, and reducing funds for development.⁴³ These types of non-religious concerns not only attracted members of

diverse groups, but also galvanized them in support for the general tenets of the revolt: the expulsion of the British occupiers from Iraq.⁴⁴

In order to subdue the rebellion and return stability to the turbulent nation, the British decided to employ disciplinary measures against the population that eventually brought the revolt to an abrupt end.⁴⁵ The exact number of Iraqi casualties generally ranges from as low as 4,000 to as high as 9,000, though the exact number is likely somewhere in the middle.⁴⁶ Although the British suffered minimal casualties in comparison to their Iraqi adversaries, the price of subduing the revolt was approximately forty million pounds.⁴⁷ This exorbitant cost forced the British authorities to reevaluate their policy of direct rule and move towards an alternative approach.⁴⁸

The First Government of Iraq

The British had already begun to begin monumental changes in their policy with the creation of the first government in late 1920.⁴⁹ The British High Commissioner, Sir Percy Cox (1864-1937) decided to rid the country of direct military rule and establish a provisional government elected by Iraqis and advised by British bureaucrats.⁵⁰ The impetus for establishing an Iraqi government seems to have followed Cox's attendance at a conference facilitated by colonial secretary and future British prime minister, Winston Churchill (1874-1965).⁵¹ The primary purpose of the conference was to discuss ways to reduce costs in the newly acquired British territories in the region, including Iraq.⁵² The financial concerns with direct British rule could be alleviated by forming an Iraqi-led government.⁵³ However, in order to establish a national government, the British would first need to select a leader along with a competent and complete cabinet.

The British selected the Baghdadi *Naqib al-Ashraf*, or keeper of the shrine, Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Gailani (1841-1927) as head of the Council of State.⁵⁴ In a short time, al-Gailani and the British authorities in the country began organizing a cabinet of eight portfolios, including Commerce, Defense, Education/Health, Finance, Interior, Justice, Public Works, and *Auqaaf* or Religious Bequests.⁵⁵ Despite being the largest single sectarian group in the country, the Shi'a majority received minimal representation in the cabinet with only one Shi'a Muslim receiving a portfolio.⁵⁶ The Shi'as' near absence from the cabinet occurred largely because of their lack of education and experience in comparison to their Sunni counterparts.⁵⁷ Before the establishment of Iraq, the Sunni-dominated Ottoman Empire viewed the Shi'a with suspicion and ostracized them from positions of authority thus providing them with weaker credentials.⁵⁸ In summary, this trend of marginalizing the Shi'a would largely remain in place despite the significant political changes that would soon come to fruition with the establishment of the Iraqi monarchy.⁵⁹

The Birth of the Iraqi Monarchy

The provisional government was developing satisfactorily in light of the sundry problems that previously defined the state of affairs in the country. However, despite this progress, the provisional government was merely a temporary solution to the government question in Iraq.⁶⁰ It was still necessary to establish a permanent and concrete political system that could ensure the survival of the nation well into the future. In reviewing the possible options for a future government, the British unsurprisingly settled upon the idea of a constitutional monarchy.⁶¹ In accepting the idea of a constitutional monarchy, the subsequent requirement would be to select a suitable person for the function of sovereign.

The British selected the Sheriff of Mecca's third oldest son, Faisal (1883-1933), a Sunni, as their preferred candidate for the newly minted position of King of Iraq.⁶² This preference was later ratified by the Iraqi people with ninety-six percent of voters supporting the selection.⁶³ The British high civil commissioner, Sir Percy Cox suspected that the dissenting four percent emanated from displaced Turks and disgruntled Kurds.⁶⁴ However, despite this minute opposition, Faisal was crowned King of Iraq on August 23, 1921.⁶⁵ The ascendancy of Faisal as king marked the completion of the executive branch. However, plans for a legislative assembly would still need to be developed as one did not exist. In addition, a set of electoral rules and regulations would also need to be formulated to govern how representatives were selected.

Democracy and Elections

In October of 1922, King Faisal decreed that elections for the inaugural constituent assembly would take place immediately.⁶⁶ The king's decision was not his own, but rather that of the British overseers who wanted the future constituent assembly to endorse an Anglo-Iraqi treaty.⁶⁷ The creation of a national assembly would in theory provide the Shi'a with the chance to demonstrate their tremendous voting power owing to their position as the largest sectarian group in the country.⁶⁸ It would also allow the Shi'a the opportunity to work within the traditional channels of government in order to successfully cultivate their influence and safeguard their interests. The failure of the revolt revealed that the Iraqi Shi'a were unable to secure their demands through untraditional conduits of political action, such as national rebellion. This harsh reality clearly signified that the Shi'a majority would have to work within Sunni-constructed and dominated institutions.

In continuing with the traditional Shi'a clerical practice of releasing religious opinions on important and controversial matters, Grand Ayatollahs Isfahani, Na'ini, and Khalisi all published a series of *fatawa* (plural of *fatwa*) condemning the approaching elections.⁶⁹ However, in addition to denouncing the elections, the *fatawa* espoused a negative tone that promised punishments for those who participated in these elections.⁷⁰ The promised repercussions enshrined in these *fatawa* not only intimidated the faithful, but also coerced the members of the electoral coordinating committee to resign their positions in the holy cities.⁷¹ The obstacles presented by the clerics and their forewarning *fatawa* would need to be removed before an election could take place.

In order to undo the blockages implanted by the clerics, the government decided to remove the main instigator behind the entire anti-election movement, Grand Ayatollah Khalisi.⁷² In enforcing a provision that permitted the deportation of political agitators of non-Iraqi origin, the government ordered the immediate arrest and deportation of Khalisi following a series of protests in the holy cities in late June.⁷³ In solidarity with their exiled colleague, Grand Ayatollahs Isfahani, Na'ini, and other ranking clerics departed Iraq and rendezvoused with Khalisi in neighbouring Persia or modern-day Iran.⁷⁴ However, this display of solidarity would prove to be an ephemeral gesture, considering that the Iraqi government would permit the return of the clerics following the elections.⁷⁵ This invitation was not extended to Khalisi who was forced to remain in exile in Persia.⁷⁶ The neutralization of the cleric factor permitted the government to proceed with the national elections without any significant opposition.

The inaugural constituent assembly finally convened on March 27, 1924.⁷⁷ The election results clearly indicated corruption, as Shi'a candidates living in Shi'a electoral

districts were inexplicably losing to Christian and Jewish candidates.⁷⁸ In order to explain this loss, one of the major scholars on the inaugural election points to electoral fraud; however, the precise form of electoral abuse that took place cannot be explained.⁷⁹ Perhaps the various *fatawa* published by the leading Iraqi-Shi'a clerics against the elections could be more useful in explaining why the Shi'a were hesitant to participate in the elections.⁸⁰ In either case, the British overseers in Iraq had essentially filled the legislature with individuals that were supportive of their past actions and future plans.⁸¹

The most pressing item for consideration remained the controversial Anglo-Iraqi treaty. The treaty attempted to outline the precise role of the British overseers in several facets of the Iraqi state, including foreign, military, and economic affairs.⁸² The Anglo-Iraqi treaty would be revised three more times before the termination of the British mandate in 1932.⁸³ After fifteen years of British occupation, Iraq was duly recognized as a sovereign state and officially admitted into the League of Nations on October 3, 1932.⁸⁴ However, despite being formally recognized as an independent nation by various international actors, Iraq still needed to maintain a careful balance between the many ethnic and religious groups of the country in order to ensure peace. Unfortunately, the person who traditionally preserved equilibrium in the country passed away leading to national instability.

The death of King Faisal in 1933 proved to be problematic due to his ability to broker between the factions and act as the “balancer of forces.”⁸⁵ In addition, Faisal's twenty-one year old son and successor, Ghazi (1912-1939) epitomized the “archetypal playboy prince.”⁸⁶ Ghazi's reign lasted only five years because of his premature death.⁸⁷ The throne passed to Ghazi's three-year old son Faisal II (1935-1958) under the regency

of his maternal uncle Prince Abdulillah (1913-1958). However, despite the changes in monarchs from Faisal I to Ghazi to Faisal II, the Iraqi Shi'a remained confined to the periphery of governmental affairs. Although their isolation from the upper echelons of government appeared to be an unwritten convention in modern Iraq, the Shi'a would eventually secure the premiership after over a quarter-century of uninterrupted Sunni domination.

The appointment of Salih Jabr (1900-1957) as Iraq's first Shi'a prime minister was short-lived, lasting a mere eleven months from March 1947 to January 1948.⁸⁸ During this short period, the country was riddled with political, economic, and social discontent.⁸⁹ However, despite the myriad of national issues, the leaders decided it was an appropriate time to renegotiate the treaty that defined Anglo-Iraqi relations with negotiations beginning in May of 1947.⁹⁰ The primary purpose of Jabr's desire to renegotiate was to secure the final removal of all British presence in Iraq.⁹¹ Despite the sporadic nature of the negotiations, the document itself was officially signed on January 15, 1948 in Portsmouth, England.⁹²

The terms of the treaty would remain in effect for twenty-five years from the date of signature.⁹³ The duration of the treaty proved to be particularly unacceptable to the general Iraqi populace, considering under the terms of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, the British would have been called to withdraw by 1957.⁹⁴ In other words, the Portsmouth Treaty extended the British presence in Iraq for another fourteen years.⁹⁵ This affirmation of relations between the two nations coupled with the extended lifespan of the treaty provoked an outcry from the population who sought to exercise its independence without foreign influence and intervention.⁹⁶

The Anti-Treaty Demonstrations: *Al-Wathba*

The demonstrations that followed the signing of the Portsmouth Treaty of 1948 are referred to as *al-Wathba*, or the Leap.⁹⁷ The anti-treaty demonstrations began the day following the signing ceremony in England.⁹⁸ Although the initial protesters were students and opposition parties, the anti-treaty movement would incorporate other socio-political elements.⁹⁹ In addition to the diversifying protestors, the reasons for agitation transcended the treaty and incorporated sectarian sentiments directed against the Shi'a premier.¹⁰⁰

During a demonstration outside the College of Religion (Sunni) at Baghdad, students employed the pejorative anti-Shi'a *rafidi*, or "rejecters," slur to describe Salih Jabr.¹⁰¹ The anti-Shi'a sentiments espoused by the student demonstrators were also shared by the members of the Sunni political elite who were not as vocal in their discriminatory beliefs but still disliked the notion of a Shi'a occupying the country's highest political office.¹⁰² The situation became even more politically dangerous for Jabr when the regent publicly denounced the treaty after a meeting with leading politicians.¹⁰³ The condemnation of the treaty by the regent and other political figures coupled with the severity of the demonstrations forced Jabr to resign on January 27, 1948.¹⁰⁴ However, despite the challenges that defined his short-lived term in office, the resignation of Salih Jabr would not mark the last time a Shi'a held such a high-ranking position in government.

In order to prevent the exacerbation of sectarian conflict, the regent selected the experienced Shi'a politician-cleric Sayyid Muhammad al-Sadr for the position of prime minister.¹⁰⁵ In addition to his religious pedigree, al-Sadr had strong nationalist credentials

owing to his prominent role in the revolt of 1920.¹⁰⁶ Unfortunately, these sporadic demonstrations continued until the government was forced to declare martial law in response to an unrelated matter.¹⁰⁷ The second Shi'a prime minister resigned his position shortly following another national election in 1948 that proved unfavourable for al-Sadr and his political allies.¹⁰⁸ The collapse of al-Sadr's administration followed a return to the traditional practice of having Sunni prime ministers in Iraq.

An Analysis of the Jabr and al-Sadr Administrations

The administrations of Salih Jabr and Sayyid Muhammad al-Sadr lasted approximately fifteen months in total (March 1947 to June 1948).¹⁰⁹ In hindsight, the Shi'a experiences at their height of political power proved particularly challenging. In their combined terms in office, the first two Shi'a prime ministers experienced ferocious and endemic agitation that shook the foundations of the entire political system.¹¹⁰ In addition to the political and social agitation that defined their administrations, both prime ministers were politically exploited by the leading Sunni figures of the country in order to satisfy their personal goals of maintaining the status quo of Sunni-dominated political institutions and protecting the established order from monumental change, such as a revolution.¹¹¹

Salih Jabr was used as the proverbial lightning rod in order to absorb the reaction from the populace following the signing of the treaty. During the public outcry against the treaty, members of the ruling elite and even Jabr's political associates started to isolate themselves from the embattled prime minister.¹¹² The monarchy itself realized the dangers in supporting the treaty, forcing them to find someone who could absorb the agitation emanating from the public.¹¹³ Since Jabr was at the forefront of the treaty

negotiations, this search required little effort.¹¹⁴ In contrast to his immediate predecessor, al-Sadr was not used as a lightning rod to absorb the public outrage over the treaty. Instead, al-Sadr's task was to mollify the protestors and attempt to return Iraqi society back to a more peaceful period.¹¹⁵

These maneuvers saved the Sunni-led regime from political disaster at the expense of the dignity of the Shi'a. The Sunni-led regime's exploitation of Jabr and al-Sadr to serve its own personal needs clearly illustrates the expendability of the two Shi'a prime ministers. This exploitation not only demonstrates the Sunni-led regime's indifference towards its Shi'a prime ministers, but more importantly shows the ends it would go to in order to ensure its survival. Unfortunately for the Sunni-led regime, the use of these underhanded tactics would not be able to guarantee its survival into the future.

The Rise of Military Regimes

The demonstrations that dominated Iraq in the late 1940s can be viewed as a dress rehearsal for the calamitous events that would culminate in the abolition of the monarchy and the execution of royal and political figures. However, unlike other instances of political upheaval in Iraq, such as the Revolt of 1920, the coup d'état of 1958 was not carried out by political parties, tribal notables, or senior clerics. The coup was instead carried out by members of a group of mid-ranking military officers known as the Free Officers under the leadership of Brigadier Abd al-Karim Qasim (1914-1963).

The main events of the coup occurred in the early morning hours of July 14, 1958.¹¹⁶ On this day, the Free Officers entered the capital and seized strategic locations, including the palace.¹¹⁷ The ranking members of the royal family were all executed.¹¹⁸

The major figures of the monarchical system were now removed from power. Via radio, the leaders of the revolution shortly declared Iraq a sovereign republic.¹¹⁹ The offices of premier along with the position of commander-in-chief were accorded to the leader of the revolution, Brigadier Abd al-Karim Qasim.¹²⁰ He was also popularly known as *al-za'im al-awhad*, or the sole leader.¹²¹ The ascension of Qasim seemed particularly promising for a variety of reasons. First, in contrast to the majority of the monarchical period's leaders, Qasim came from mixed parentage with Sunni-Arab and Shi'a-Kurdish parents.¹²² In addition to his mixed religious and ethnic background, Qasim's social and political policies seemed appreciated by the poorer classes and other groups.¹²³ Although these sweeping changes appeared promising, there were some classes that found Qasim's policies infuriating, particularly the Shi'a clergy. The next section will explore what aspects of the Qasim government were irritating to the Shi'a clergy.

The Irritants to the Shi'a Clergy

In pursuit of a more modern system, Qasim and his government began to implement a series of domestic reforms that significantly altered the established system. The reforms aggravated the ranking Shi'a clerics. In surveying the Qasim era, there are two major events or trends that severely irritated the leading members of the Shi'a religious hierarchy.

The First Irritant: Personal Status Code

The first irritant revolved around the revolutionary government's promulgation of the "more gender-egalitarian" Code of Personal Status of 1959.¹²⁴ In this document, the outdated laws regarding marriage, divorce, polygamy, bequests, and inheritances were all

affected.¹²⁵ This code frustrated the country's religious hierarchy.¹²⁶ The traditional family order that was enforced by the Shi'a religious hierarchy seemed to be rapidly collapsing. Moreover, in the eyes of the clerics, the law was an attempt by the government to minimize their authority over the Shi'a faithful.¹²⁷ In effect, not only did Qasim rewrite Islamic-inspired legislation, but also sought to create a modernized society where the Shi'a clerics would have a reduced role.¹²⁸

In addition to modernizing familial matters, the code did not distinguish between Sunni and Shi'a laws on personal and family matters.¹²⁹ The legal equalization of Sunni and Shi'a was rightfully regarded as a "drastic step."¹³⁰ In legal matters, the Sunni and Shi'a schools have historically had difficulty in recognizing the legitimacy of the other.¹³¹ Despite these tensions, Qasim's refusal to distinguish between Sunni and Shi'a seems to be consistent with his nationalistic "Iraq First" policy that defined his administration.¹³² This attempt at cultivating an Iraqi identity versus an ethnic or sectarian one could prove useful in uniting the diverse nation under one common flag. However, the task of unifying Iraq would not be an easy assignment. In addition to impressing his nationalistic ideology on all the different groups within Iraqi society, Qasim would first need to secure the support of allies from inside Iraq.

The Second Irritant: The Communist Alliance

Immediately following the revolution, the Qasim government's position was tenuous and there are several reasons that can explain this precarious political situation.¹³³ First, the Qasim regime lacked a grassroots organization or official political party with the ability to engage and mobilize the masses.¹³⁴ As described above, the coup was not led by a popular political party or a coalition of parties, but rather by a group of

military officers who were unsure of what the future revolutionary government would look like or if they were even expected to establish a government.¹³⁵ Second, within the group of leading officers, there were two strikingly different camps, namely Qasim's Iraqi nationalists and his deputy Abd al-Salam Arif's (1921-1966) pan-Arabists.¹³⁶ This major division among the two leading personalities of the revolution shows the early fissures within the regime that would eventually result in its total collapse. This political reality required the revolutionary leader to unofficially partner himself and his regime with the politically potent Iraqi Communist Party (ICP).

The ICP enjoyed a series of special privileges and power posts under Qasim's regime, including the influential position of minister of the economy and shortly after the municipalities' portfolio.¹³⁷ In addition to their influence among the leading personalities of government, the ICP also wielded immense influence over the general masses with a membership of twenty-five thousand.¹³⁸ However, in 1959, exactly one year after the revolution, the ICP instigated a brutal conflict in the northern Iraqi city of Kirkuk.¹³⁹ It is important to note that Kirkuk is a fragile, heterogeneous city comprised of Turkoman, Kurdish, and Arab communities who are known to share a mutual dislike for each other.¹⁴⁰ The ICP used these ethnic antagonisms to their advantage by prodding the impoverished and economically exploited Kurds to attack the wealthier Turkomans.¹⁴¹ The fighting continued for two days until the arrival of government forces.¹⁴² In a politically expedient fashion, Qasim manipulated the Kirkuk incident by using it as an excuse to neutralize the powerful communist threat.¹⁴³ Shortly thereafter, Qasim enacted several different policies that would reduce communist influence and power in Iraq.¹⁴⁴

In January 1960, the Associations Law was released requiring political parties to apply for licenses to operate in the country.¹⁴⁵ Unsurprisingly, the application put forward by the ICP was denied.¹⁴⁶ In addition, the ICP also witnessed their newspapers being shut down and the disbandment of one of their major affiliated organizations.¹⁴⁷ By the end of 1960, just over two years since their initial alliance was formed, the Qasim regime ordered the arrest and execution of communists.¹⁴⁸ The Qasim regime's early association with communism left an indelible mark on the country's Shi'a clerics prompting them to react.

The rise of the communist party disturbed and worried the Shi'a clerical hierarchy on the grounds that it could influence the educated class and mobilize the working class.¹⁴⁹ In light of the deteriorating situation, Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Muhsin al-Hakim (1889-1971) promulgated a *fatwa* on the subject prohibiting the faithful from associating with communism.¹⁵⁰ In previous instances of clerical-governmental conflict, the hierarchy was expected to remain silent. This eschewal of politics revolved around the leading Shi'a cleric at the time, Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Hussein Borujerdi (1875-1961) who banned clerical involvement in political affairs.¹⁵¹ However, given Grand Ayatollah al-Hakim's *fatwa* on communism and Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi's recent death, a more political-based approach with a party system could be used to counter the communist threat.

The Da'wa Party

The inroads made by the communist party significantly reduced the power base of the clerics in Iraq.¹⁵² In addition, the modern approaches and solutions presented by these secular parties helped siphon away support from the religious elements of society.¹⁵³ In

order to recover the religion's former position in society, an equally popular counter-party would need to be established. This fresh approach culminated in the establishment of *al-Hizb ad-Da'wa al-Islamiyya*, or the Islamic Da'wa Party established between 1957 and 1958.¹⁵⁴ The party's unique revolutionary ideology was developed by its leading clerical patron and main ideological theoretician, Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (c. 1935-1980) of Kadhimayn, a suburb of Baghdad.¹⁵⁵ There are essentially four main principles in al-Sadr political works, including the belief in the complete authority of God, the requirement that all laws must be based on Islamic principles, the right of the laity to occupy executive and legislative positions, and the role of the leading cleric to approve and thus legitimize all laws.¹⁵⁶ These ideas are objectionable from a secular perspective. The fourth principle appears to be the most disagreeable to the secularist as it seems to champion a theocratic form of government.

Despite its revolutionary and religious ideology, the Da'wa party's activities remained largely unrestricted by the two governments that followed Qasim's assassination in 1963.¹⁵⁷ The administrations of both Abd al-Salam Arif (1963-1966) and Abd al-Rahman Arif (1966-1968) decided to permit the party to continue its activities.¹⁵⁸ It is believed that the clerical leadership's strong disapproval for communist infiltration in government helped secure a sense of appreciation from the Arif brothers thus allowing the Da'wa leadership to engage in activities that would further strengthen the party.¹⁵⁹ Unfortunately, this recent culture of political toleration would not become a permanent feature in Iraqi society. The liberty that Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and the Da'wa enjoyed under the Arif brothers (1963-1968) would be rescinded with the ascension of a secular party that would remain at the forefront of Iraqi politics for the next three decades.

The Ba'athists

The Ba'ath party was formally established in 1947 in Damascus, but shortly spread throughout the Arab Middle East.¹⁶⁰ Despite their different backgrounds, the three intellectual cofounders of Ba'athism, Zaki al-Arsuzi, Michel Aflaq, and Salah al-Din Bitar, all stressed the importance of Arab unity.¹⁶¹ This core principle of unity is complemented with the principles of freedom and socialism.¹⁶² The Ba'athists firmly rejected both capitalism and communism and embraced a weak form of socialism that focused on the national economic concerns facing the citizenry rather than issues related to the redistribution of wealth.¹⁶³ The Ba'athist platform and its attractive ideas were shortly taken up by Iraqis, albeit somewhat later than their Syrian counterparts.

The Ba'ath party formally emerged in Iraq in the early 1950s during the time of the monarchy.¹⁶⁴ The initial party leaders and members were mostly university students, but the party did comprise some military officials and even fewer working class members.¹⁶⁵ The Ba'ath party had difficulty in recruiting working class members into its ranks because of the influence exerted by the Iraqi Community Party in the early Qasim years.¹⁶⁶ By the time of the 1958 Revolution, the Ba'ath was still a small party, but did initially support the Qasim regime against the monarchy.¹⁶⁷ However, when Qasim refused to support the pan-Arab notion of unifying Iraq with Syria and Egypt to form the United Arab Republic or U.A.R., the Ba'athists started to plot against their former ally.¹⁶⁸ In 1959, a Ba'athist cell, of which Saddam Hussein was a part, attempted to assassinate Qasim.¹⁶⁹ The failed assassination attempt resulted in a severe backlash against the Ba'ath party with significant damage to the party's organizational structure as key members were either arrested or disappeared into self-imposed exile.¹⁷⁰ The Ba'ath

reemerged to play a leading role in the 1963 Revolution, but was quickly dropped from positions of power by the new president, Abd al-Salam Arif.¹⁷¹ In addition to being composed of young, inexperienced members at the time, the Ba'athists suffered from a host of internal divisions that prevented them from dominating the political scene.¹⁷² It would take another five years before the Ba'ath would finally be able to consolidate power.¹⁷³

On July 17, 1968, the Ba'athists were finally able to consolidate power and become the new leaders of Iraq.¹⁷⁴ The new Ba'athist regime was under the leadership of Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr (1914-1982), who was assisted by his younger cousin, Saddam Hussein.¹⁷⁵ In a matter of months following their seizure of power in Iraq, the Ba'ath party began a "campaign of repression."¹⁷⁶ The purpose of this campaign was to displace the Shi'a clerical class from their influential positions in Iraqi society.¹⁷⁷ During this oppressive operation, the Ba'ath leadership implemented a host of policies that offended and weakened the clerical establishment, including abolishing the provision that protected seminarians from military service, permitting alcohol in the shrine cities, deporting undesirable clerics, censoring various publications, and disallowing Iranian pilgrims from entering the holy cities in order to perform religious rituals.¹⁷⁸

One of the most important dates on the Shi'a liturgical calendar is the commemoration of Arba'een. This day occurs forty days after the commemoration of Ashura and involves a pilgrimage to the holy shrine city of Karbala in southern Iraq.¹⁷⁹ During this ritual observance, the atmosphere is highly charged with intense sectarian sentiments and "considerable religious fervor."¹⁸⁰ This heightened atmosphere coupled

with the impressive size of the crowds and the symbolic significance of the day could prove particularly dangerous for an oppressive regime.

The Sunni-led Ba'ath party officials decided to prohibit this religious procession in 1977 on the grounds that it was against the secularist nature of the state.¹⁸¹ Despite the government's decree, approximately 30,000 faithful continued with this ritual.¹⁸² In addition to defying the government's ban, the pilgrims insolently chanted slogans against the Ba'athist regime's top officials.¹⁸³ This political reviling seems to have been directed against the Ba'ath's enforcer and number-two man, Saddam Hussein.¹⁸⁴ The protesting pilgrims seemed to have realized that Saddam was the mastermind behind these oppressive policies and actions. This understanding is exemplified by the chants the protesters uttered during their various encounters with Ba'athist forces: "Saddam take your hand off / Neither our army nor our people want you."¹⁸⁵ These subversive slogans provoked the hand of the Ba'athist regime's security forces who in turn deployed a brigade of army personnel to silence the crowds.¹⁸⁶ Over a period of days, these confrontations resulted in the arrest of 2,000 protesters and the execution of ten demonstration leaders.¹⁸⁷ The severe response demonstrated by the Ba'athists would be only a preview of the harsh behaviour to come once Saddam assumed the mantle of leadership a few years later.

After over a decade as the country's penultimate politician, Saddam Hussein finally succeeded Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr as president of Iraq on July 17, 1979.¹⁸⁸ Upon ascending to the highest office of the land, Saddam and his close team of loyalists were confronted with an increasingly hostile neighbour in the vestige of theocratic Iran under the leadership of Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini (c. 1902-1989).

Initially, Saddam supported and respected the self-determination of the Iranian people.¹⁸⁹ However, in time, Saddam's supportive position dissipated and was replaced with a genuine concern for the stability of his own nation, particularly because of the presence of another revolutionary Shi'a cleric within the borders of Iraq.

The respect and influence commanded by Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr was recognized by Saddam Hussein and the Ba'athist regime. In addition to his popularity among the faithful masses, al-Sadr's politically active position earned him the title "the Khomeini of Iraq."¹⁹⁰ In a sense, this title signified that al-Sadr was not only the leader of the Shi'a revolutionary movement in Iraq, but also responsible for the actions of various subversive elements within the movement. This profound popularity and vicarious responsibility for the seditious activities of the community would put al-Sadr in a risky position. The full responsibility imposed on al-Sadr seemed somewhat unfair on the grounds that theocratic Iran played a critical role in destabilizing the internal affairs of Iraq.¹⁹¹ For example, in many of his speeches and interviews, Khomeini expressed his desire to transport the revolution to other nations in the region.¹⁹² The Iranian cleric's concern seems to have been concentrated on neighbouring Iraq, where he maintained "an active interest in his cosectarians across the border."¹⁹³ The Iranian leadership's impudent decision to intervene in the national affairs of its western neighbour would have deadly results for al-Sadr.

Religious Forces Re-emerge

The Khomeini government's methods of destabilizing Baghdad transcended the employment of rapacious rhetoric to include other more effective methods of regime change, specifically terrorist plots against prominent Iraqi officials. The most notorious

terrorist plot of this era was the attempt on the life of one of Iraq's deputy prime ministers, Tariq Aziz (1936-). In early April 1980, Aziz was the target of an assassination attempt when a grenade was detonated during his visit to al-Mustansiriya University in Baghdad.¹⁹⁴ The deputy prime minister emerged relatively unscathed from the attack, but several spectators were killed during the explosion and ensuing shootout.¹⁹⁵ It was shortly revealed that the young assassin allegedly received the assassination order from Khomeini himself.¹⁹⁶ Despite the Iranian connection to the assassination attempt, Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr was soon arrested.¹⁹⁷ The cleric endured unspeakable and humiliating tortures until his death.¹⁹⁸ The decision to execute one of the country's most influential and respected religious figures proved to be a matter of political pragmatism as producing a public outcry was much less dangerous than allowing Iraq to become the world's second Shi'a theocracy.¹⁹⁹

The major problem with this shortsighted political reasoning is that it underestimates the importance and prestige al-Sadr received outside of his native Iraq. In order to commemorate the murder of his younger colleague and former student, Khomeini ordered a three-day period of national mourning throughout Iran.²⁰⁰ In contrast to Iran, Saddam characteristically did not show any signs of regret for his decision to execute one of the country's leading religious figures. Contrarily, the regime embarked on another intensified course of persecution directed against the leaderless Iraqi Shi'a community.

Tensions and War with Iran

The Shi'a character of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, coupled with its determination to "export" its revolution seemed to mobilize Shi'a forces that were hostile

to Saddam's regime.²⁰¹ In 1979, there were several clashes between the Iraqi Shi'a and Saddam's forces near the various Shi'a shrines cities.²⁰² In addition, many of the Shi'a-led parties, including the Da'wa party, received religious permission to engage in violent activity against Saddam and his forces.²⁰³ The provocative actions exchanged between the two feuding countries and the continued attempts to subvert the opposing country by supporting its rebellious groups quickly intensified the skirmishes that began in the early months of 1980.²⁰⁴ These minor trans-border encounters are miniscule in comparison to the full-scale conflict that would shortly develop when Saddam ordered the invasion of Iran on September 22, 1980 sparking the Iran-Iraq war.

The Iran-Iraq war has been appropriately described as "an unprecedented event in the modern history of the Middle East."²⁰⁵ The war lasted almost eight years earning the unappealing title of the "longest war in modern history."²⁰⁶ In addition to blaming him for inciting an interstate war, the Iraqi population perceived the conflict as "Saddam's war."²⁰⁷ This characterization could be useful in cultivating a formidable personality cult during times of progress in the war, but would be especially difficult to maintain in the face of significant losses and casualties.

The losses incurred by Iraqi forces in 1982 started to prompt questions about Saddam's ability to successfully govern during this turbulent period.²⁰⁸ In addition to the general population's discontent with their president, the Shi'a majority continued to harbour considerable hatred for Saddam's regime. For example, in an attempt to cultivate support among the population, Saddam and his entourage visited the Sunni-Shi'a town of Dujail, north of Baghdad on July 8, 1982.²⁰⁹ Saddam's decision to visit Dujail is unusual considering the town's reputation as a bastion of "political militancy and as a stronghold

of the Islamic fundamentalist underground.”²¹⁰ Despite this reputation, Saddam followed through with his visit.

The arrival of the president provided the Da’wa party with an opportunity to avenge the death of al-Sadr in 1980. The assassination attempt occurred as the presidential entourage departed from Dujail.²¹¹ The battle between the assassins and the presidential bodyguards continued unabated until the military rescued Saddam.²¹² The Iraqi leader emerged unharmed from “the closest call.”²¹³ However, Saddam would not allow this assassination attempt to remain unavenged.²¹⁴ In response to the failed assassination, Saddam ordered mass arrests of the town’s citizens.²¹⁵ These arrests shortly translated into mass executions as the government executed 148 men for their supposed involvement in the attempt to assassinate the president.²¹⁶ Those fortunate citizens who managed to survive the imprisonment, torture, and mass executions were forcibly relocated to a desolate region in the southern district of the country for four years.²¹⁷ Although the citizens of Dujail endured substantial financial loss, unspeakable torture, and irreplaceable casualties, their story of suffering would not compare to the devastation that the entire country experienced by the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988.

The Escape to America

The countless casualties and the devastating financial loss suffered during the eight-year war still did not dissuade Saddam from igniting another conflict in the region. This time Saddam focused his fury on Iraq’s wealthy southern neighbour, the Emirate of Kuwait. The Iraqi military crossed into Kuwaiti territory in the early hours of August 2, 1990 and soon declared the annexed sheikhdom Iraq’s “nineteenth province.”²¹⁸ This incursion would not be tolerated by the international community. The United Nations

Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 678 permitting the use of whatever means necessary to solve the problem in the region if Iraq did not withdraw from Kuwait by the deadline date of January 15, 1991.²¹⁹ Despite the prospect of engaging a superior alliance of nations, Saddam did not abandon his expansionist experiment.

The international coalition consisted of over forty nations from the around the world, including the United States, Great Britain, and even regional powers in the Middle East.²²⁰ Facing this coalition and the damage to Iraq, the Iraqi regime acquiesced to the various UNSC resolutions on February 27, 1991, including the important resolution to renounce its arbitrary claim to Kuwait.²²¹ The possibility of toppling the Iraqi regime was also apparent to President George H.W. Bush (1924 -) and the Americans, but was dismissed on the collective assumption that the Iraqi Shi'a were too closely allied with revolutionary Iran.²²² Though the Americans decided against removing Saddam, there were other groups interested in this idea.

The disorder generated by the Iraqi retreat from Kuwait presented the disenfranchised groups of Iraq with a perfect opportunity to stage a national upheaval against the Iraqi government. In the closing days of the war, the retreating Iraqi army released their collective frustration against the government by destroying a massive painting of Saddam.²²³ This relatively simple act of public defacement spiraled into a regional revolt that spread throughout the southern cities of the country.²²⁴

The demonstrators engaged in a host of violent acts, including executing Ba'ath party and government officials.²²⁵ The demonstrators complemented their vigilantism with subversive chants that possessed a religious overtone such as "there is no god but God, and Saddam is His enemy."²²⁶ The tautology would infuse a religious aura to the

uprising that would be compounded with the presence of Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad al-Baqir al-Hakim's (1939-2003) Iran-allied Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). The presence of the SCIRI at the forefront of the insurrection dissuaded the Americans from assisting the demonstrators in the Iraqi struggle.²²⁷ The Americans' refusal to intervene in the internal matters of Iraq provided Saddam with another opportunity to repress the demonstrators. In the process of restoring order to the country, Saddam's forces managed to accrue a striking death toll as high as 150,000 Iraqi Shi'a Muslims.²²⁸ The exorbitant number of casualties coupled with the decades of sectarian-based ostracization, persecution, and forced expulsion could no longer be tolerated by the country's Shi'a population forcing many to leave.

Conclusion

This chapter has explored the political history of the Iraqi Shi'a throughout most of the twentieth century. In this exploration, there are two themes that define the Iraqi-Shi'a experience, namely political marginalization and sectarian persecution. The chapter's exploration of these themes helps to explain certain trends in the Iraqi Shi'a community that manifested themselves during the field research component of this study. In a subsequent chapter, the community's resistance to participating in this study and their suspicion of the researcher and his motives will be discussed in much more detail. This suspicious attitude cannot be fully understood without a proper examination of the struggles the community endured in the past. However, this sense of suspicion cannot be solely attributed to the community's historical experience in its homeland.

In order to better understand these attitudes, it is necessary to consider the conditions in the host society. The next chapter will continue to explore these concepts,

but will focus on the marginalization and persecution the Iraqi Shi'a experienced following their arrival in the United States. In their host society, the Iraqi Shi'a no longer have to contend with a systematic program of ostracization and oppression administered by a brutal dictatorship. However, the absence of a tyrannical government should not automatically indicate that the Iraqi-Shi'a are free from any obstacles in their host society. The Iraqi Shi'a will still have to deal with the many challenges facing all immigrant groups living in a multicultural society, especially the pressures to integrate and assimilate. The two theoretical models applied in this study, namely Will Kymlicka's multicultural model and Robert Park's race relations cycle, have the ability to illuminate the primary question of this study. In the case of Kymlicka, his multicultural model stresses the absence of religion's integration in liberal-democratic states.²²⁹ This approach is contrasted with the more activist model put forward by Robert Park's race relations cycle. With this model, immigrant groups go through four stages that eventually culminate in the immigrant group's "assimilation."²³⁰ This dissertation has adopted a hypothesis that conforms to Park's race relations cycle in order to explain the differences in religiosity between the two waves. In chapters four and five, the original hypothesis will be shown to fail in explaining these results requiring the researcher to take up two alternative theories.

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- ²²² Said K. Aburish, *Saddam Hussein: The Politics of Revenge* (New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2000), 309.
- ²²³ Keiko Sakai, "The 1991 Intifadah in Iraq: Seen through Analyses of Discourses of Iraqi Intellectuals," in *Social Protests and Nation-Building in the Middle East and Central Asia*, ed. Keiko Sakai (Chiba, Japan: Institute of Developing Economies of the Japan External Trade Organization, 2003), 158.
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- ²²⁵ Mackey, *The Reckoning*, 24-25.
- ²²⁶ Hiro, *Iraq: In the Eye of the Storm*, 41.
- ²²⁷ Aburish, *Saddam Hussein: The Politics of Revenge*, 309.
- ²²⁸ Cockburn, *Muqtada al-Sadr and the Battle for the Future of Iraq*, 75.

²²⁹ Kymlicka, *Finding Our Way*, 26.

²³⁰ Park, *Race and Culture*, 150.

Chapter Three: A Conspicuous Community: The Iraqi Shi'a Community of Dearborn

Introduction

The previous chapter examined the various struggles experienced by the Iraqi Shi'a in their homeland. In addition, this chapter further explored the instances of political marginalization and religious oppression that largely defined the Iraqi Shi'a experience. In time, these conditions became increasingly severe, forcing many to immigrate to the United States. However, the Iraqi Shia's migration to America would not mark a complete escape from religious discrimination and persecution. This chapter provides an overview of the different experiences felt by first- (1991-2002) and second- (2003-2011) wave Iraqi Shi'a immigrants to Dearborn, Michigan. The chapter will contend that the waves' time in the United States is best described as a mixed experience replete with instances of religious intolerance, but also complemented with periods of political inclusion and communal growth that defined the mid-1990s to the September 11th terrorist attacks. This chapter will highlight both the negative and positive experiences, including the period of hostility during the First Gulf War (1991), the time of communal development in the late 1990s, the community's participation in the 2000 American presidential election, the animosity endured following the September 11th terrorist attacks, the sectarian animosity directed against the Shi'a following the execution of Saddam Hussein in 2006, and the attempted Qur'an burning at the Islamic Center of America in 2011.

In all these examples, the government of the United States did not resolve itself to ensure that the Iraqi Shi'a would be religiously integrated into American society. In other

words, when the Iraqi Shi'a arrived in the United States they were not required to reject their Islamic faith and accept some branch of Christianity. The government's absence in this case gives credence to Kymlicka's claim that liberal-democratic states are not to stimulate religious integration within its borders.¹ However, what if instances of religious intolerance emanating from other members in society pressure the religious minority to either renounce some of their religious practices or abandon their faith entirely? As mentioned above, the Iraqi Shi'a experience in Dearborn is replete with examples of religious intolerance from the tensions following the First Gulf War in 1991 to the attempted Qur'an burning at a local Shi'a mosque in 2011. However, despite the deplorable nature of these instances of religious intolerance, they may be part of Robert Park's race relations cycle.

The four stages of Park's race relations cycle include "contact," "competition," "accommodation," and finally "assimilation."² Martin Marger, a contemporary sociologist, translates the "competition" stage to mean "conflict."³ Another sociologist Philip Yang interprets this conflict to revolve around "scarce resources."⁴ This interpretation may be somewhat narrow considering that even Park points out that "the relations of race and people are never for very long merely economic and utilitarian, and no efforts to conceive them in this way have ever been permanently successful."⁵ Park recognizes that in time the focus on economic matters shifts towards a concern for the "political and cultural."⁶ In light of Park's explanation, it is probable that this second stage can also refer to the politically motivated and culturally sustained conflicts that emerge between the immigrant group and others within the host society. Therefore, if conflict with other groups in society shortly leads to assimilation, then one would expect

that the Iraqi Shi'a have ignored aspects of their religious heritage and moved closer to assimilation. The precise effect the Iraqi Shi'as' experiences in Dearborn had on their religiosity will be examined in the next two chapters by carefully reviewing the information collected from the field research component of this study. The data obtained from conducting field research in Dearborn will demonstrate that Park's race relations cycle is unable to explain accurately the observed pattern thus prompting the researcher to incorporate Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou's segmented assimilation theory and Charles Glock, Benjamin Ringer, and Earl Babbie's comfort hypothesis.

History of Muslim Immigration to Dearborn

The phenomenon of immigrating to Dearborn is not a recent trend, but rather one that traces its origins to before the turn of the last century. In order to escape forced conscription in the Ottoman military and other unfavourable conditions, primarily Arab Christians from present-day Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the former Palestine migrated to the United States at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century.⁷ In addition, these early Arab immigrants were also attracted by the economic opportunities in America, particularly in greater Detroit's developing automotive industry.⁸ In the initial days of 1914, the industrialist Henry Ford (1863-1947) announced his famous five-dollar a day wage promise to all workers.⁹ This record wage attracted workers from around the Middle East and other parts of the world.¹⁰ In addition to incoming immigrants, Arabs from other parts of the United States relocated to the Detroit area in order to work for the Ford Motor Company.¹¹ In scholarly works on the ethnic composition of this early wave of immigrants from the Middle East, the Iraqis are not mentioned. This absence can be explained largely by the immigration pattern of the early

Arab settlers in the United States. In his work on the Lebanese Muslim community of Dearborn, Atif Wasfi (1971) reports that early Arab immigration was essentially “influenced by kinship relations and by village solidarity.”¹² This migration conforms to the “chain immigration” pattern whereby settled immigrants will encourage their family and friends, still residing in their native country to migrate and take advantage of the various opportunities presented in the host society.¹³ Since the earliest Arab Shi’a Muslim immigrants in the United States were from modern-day Lebanon and Syria, they would have contacted their family and friends in Lebanon and Syria and encouraged them to immigrate to the United States.¹⁴ The Iraqis likely did not have many family or friends in the United States at this time thus excluding them from this wave of immigration. However, although unprecedented economic opportunities existed in Detroit at this time, the immigration policies in the country started to become much more restrictive, especially for groups deemed undesirable by American authorities.

History of Immigration to America

The first decade of the twentieth century witnessed an unprecedented level of immigration with almost nine million immigrants arriving in the United States.¹⁵ This period in American immigration history also marked a noticeable change in the ethnic composition of these arriving immigrants.¹⁶ The shift in ethnic composition is best understood by dividing the immigrants into two groups. The immigrants who arrived between 1820 and 1880 are typically classified as “old immigrants” whereas those that came to the United States between 1880 and 1920 are customarily called “new immigrants.”¹⁷ The “old immigrants” that largely arrived before the twentieth century originated from countries in Northern and Western Europe, namely the United Kingdom,

France, Germany, and the Scandinavian countries.¹⁸ These groups immigrated to the United States motivated by several different reasons, including adverse economic conditions, radical revolutionary activities, religious intolerance, famine, and failed harvests.¹⁹ Conversely, the “new immigrants” that emigrated at the onset of the twentieth century came from countries in Southern and Eastern Europe, such as Italy, Greece, and various Slavic countries.²⁰ These new immigrant groups largely sought to escape unfortunate economic conditions in their homelands.²¹ This new immigration seemed to have provoked “spasms of xenophobic anxiety.”²² In time, this xenophobic response would lead to calls for restricting immigration.

The early decades of the twentieth century witnessed several groups prompting restriction on immigration, including labour, intellectuals, regional blocs, and vigilante groups. The American Federation of Labor (AFL) was concerned about the influx of immigrants and fiercely objected to their unskilled labour being used to replace the skilled labour of citizens.²³ The labour leaders supported restricting immigration along with the so-called “race thinkers.”²⁴ One of these thinkers was the American lawyer Madison Grant who articulated his racial theories in his infamous work, *The Passing of the Great Race in America* (1916). In his work, Grant emphasized the importance of the Nordic race, which he described as the “white man par excellence.”²⁵ In light of his racialist theories, Grant bemoaned the recent wave of immigrants that arrived during the turn of the twentieth century: “Our jails, insane asylums and almshouses are filled with this human flotsam and the whole tone of American life, social, moral and political has been lowered and vulgarized by them.”²⁶ In maintaining an open society, Grant claimed that Americans have essentially squandered their opportunity to establish a “powerful and

racially homogenous people.”²⁷ These more cerebral expressions of racial purity were echoed by citizens in the American West and the Deep South who espoused a potent brand of nativism largely brought about by their encounters with Asian and African-Americans, respectively.²⁸ Finally, the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) was one of the most conspicuous members of this anti-immigrant alliance and did have chapters in the Michigan area, particularly in Detroit.²⁹ The KKK’s virulent anti-immigrant agenda espoused an uncompromising ideology of “hundred percent Americanism.”³⁰ These restrictionist forces would gain an ally in the vestige of a congressional commission tasked with studying immigration.

The Dillingham Commission (1907-1910), under the chairmanship of Senator William P. Dillingham (1843-1923) of Vermont not only studied immigration in the United States, but more importantly “set the wheels in motion for restricting immigration.”³¹ In its multivolume report released in 1911, the Dillingham Commission not only distinguished between “old immigrants” of Northern and Western Europe and “new immigrants” of Southern and Eastern Europe, but also denounced the members of the latter group as not as intelligent and also difficult to assimilate.³² To counter these characteristics, the commission also proposed the enactment of a literacy test on arriving immigrants, an issue that would resurface in federal immigration legislation.³³

The Immigration Act of 1917 was not only the product of the Dillingham Commission, but it was distinct in that it represented the first piece of legislation that imposed a limitation on immigration.³⁴ The Immigration Act of 1917 was much more expansive because it significantly reduced the number of immigrants from certain regions in the world by establishing the Asia-Pacific Triangle.³⁵ This proscribed zone was

extensive and encompassed several regions of the world, including Eastern Russia, East and Southeast Asia, and the Middle East.³⁶ As for the literacy test question, three different presidents, Grover Cleveland (1837-1908), William Taft (1857-1930), and Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924), vetoed the literacy test provision on the grounds that it could not accurately assess the arriving immigrants' intellectual potential living in the United States.³⁷ However, following the outbreak of World War One (1914-1918), strong nationalistic feelings coupled with anxieties over the spread of communism after the Russian Revolution of 1917 defined the American landscape.³⁸ In light of this politically charged and socially anxious environment, the general population was strongly supportive of a literacy test provision.³⁹

Despite the conditions, President Wilson vetoed the bill containing the literacy test provision for a second time.⁴⁰ In this instance, Wilson's veto was unable to derail this legislation as the House of Representatives voted 287 to 106 and the Senate voted 62-19 to override the veto.⁴¹ After a circuitous route through both Congress and the White House, the controversial Immigration Act of 1917 was finally enacted on February 5, 1917.⁴² The Immigration Act of 1917 was significant because it marked the restrictionist movement's "first general and sweeping victory."⁴³ More importantly, it indicated the beginning of a trend of similar forms of legislation that would follow in the next decade.⁴⁴

In the years following the First World War, the United States was consumed with a "somber isolationist mood."⁴⁵ In addition to the general disposition of the country, conditions became increasingly unfavourable to immigrants over heightened nationalist fervour, increased fear of radical ideologies, and concern over economic and employment

matters.⁴⁶ There were also several extreme restrictionist members of Congress, particularly Albert Johnson (1869-1957), a Republican representative from Washington State.⁴⁷ In 1919, Johnson became the chairman of the House of Representatives' Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.⁴⁸ During Johnson's tenure as chairman, the committee began to formulate a comprehensive immigration policy.⁴⁹ It is important to note that this massive reform of immigration was conducted under Johnson's "unyielding promotion of restrictive immigration reform."⁵⁰ This steadfast position seemed to have influenced his fellow committee members as fifteen out of the total seventeen members of the committee were all avowed restrictionists by 1924.⁵¹ The committee's domination by restrictionists provides a glimpse into the type of legislation that would be recommended to Congress.

This type of restrictionist attitude among members of Congress shortly produced the infamous Immigration Act of 1924, colloquially referred to as the National Origins Act. The act was overwhelmingly supported in Congress with the House of Representatives voting 308 to 58 and the Senate voting 70 to 9.⁵² Historically, several presidents employed their veto in order to quash restrictionist-based immigration legislation.⁵³ In the case of the National Origins Act, President Calvin Coolidge (1872-1933) refused to use his veto and the controversial act was signed on May 26, 1924.⁵⁴ Following its implementation in 1929, the National Origins Act established numerical quotas based on a nationality's total population size according to the 1920 Census.⁵⁵ The purpose of this quota system was to promote immigration patterns that existed prior to 1890, namely the arrival of Northern and Western Europeans.⁵⁶ In addition to limiting the total annual number of immigrants to just over 154,000, the National Origins Act

favoured immigration from Northern and Western Europe by permitting 127,000 annual immigrants from countries in the region.⁵⁷ For individuals emigrating from Southern and Eastern Europe, the act allowed only 23,000 positions with the remaining 4,000 being dispersed to other regions in the world.⁵⁸ There were several countries in the world that received only the minimum quota of one hundred people.⁵⁹ These countries ranged from Afghanistan, Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, and Persia.⁶⁰ These types of discriminatory policies enshrined in the Immigration Act of 1924 would largely remain in place for another forty years.⁶¹ In order to reform the racist immigration policies of the 1920s, the general population and the executive branch would both need to share a strong desire to enact more egalitarian immigration laws. These conditions would manifest themselves in the early 1960s.

The civil rights movement that defined the 1960s highlighted the increasing discontent with racially intolerant legislation.⁶² In addition to the energy produced by the civil rights movement, President John F. Kennedy (1917-1963) personally resolved to reform the immigration system.⁶³ This desire to make changes to immigration law was continued by President Lyndon B. Johnson (1908-1973) following the assassination of Kennedy in 1963.⁶⁴

In 1964, Johnson announced the advent of the “Great Society” during a speech at the University of Michigan.⁶⁵ In short, Johnson’s speech put forward his “vision of a utopia.”⁶⁶ This ideal society encompassed improvements to housing, education, and the environment.⁶⁷ This speech was part of the Johnson administration’s (1963-1969) wave of progressive and altruistic legislation that intended to improve American society, including such pieces of legislation as the Civil Rights Act (1964), Voting Rights Act

(1965), Elementary and Secondary Education Act (1965), Water Quality Control Act (1965), Model Cities Act (1966), Air Quality Act (1967), and Housing Act (1968).⁶⁸ The administration's focus was not only on improving domestic conditions for the American people, but also on providing immigrants with an opportunity to live in the United States. In less than a year following his election to the presidency, Johnson signed the reformed immigration law known as the Hart-Celler Act of 1965.⁶⁹

Essentially, the Hart-Celler Act removed the racial restrictions enshrined in previous immigration laws.⁷⁰ The Hart-Celler Act permitted 170,000 annual immigrants from the various countries in the Eastern hemisphere.⁷¹ The years following the enactment of the Hart-Celler Act witnessed a rise in the number of immigrants from Asia, Africa, and South America.⁷² The result of this type of immigration, namely the arrival of immigrants from non-European countries was not predicted by members of the executive and legislative branches.⁷³ The expected immigration from Europe was largely stifled due to the promising economic conditions in Western Europe and the oppressive restrictions imposed on Eastern Europeans by Soviet-supported regimes.⁷⁴ In addition to welcoming immigrants from non-European countries, the Hart-Celler Act also saw the increase in the number of people espousing beliefs outside the Judeo-Christian fold, such as Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists.⁷⁵ This expansive nature of the Hart-Celler Act would remain in effect throughout the remainder of the 1960s and 1970s. However, the conservatism that politically defined the 1980s marked a shifting point for immigration legislation in the United States.

Upon assuming office, President Ronald Reagan's administration (1981-1989) was more concerned with economic and military matters, rather than reviving the

immigration issue.⁷⁶ However, in time the immigration debate was revived owing to poor economic times coupled with media coverage and public concern over the increasing presence of undocumented immigrants in the United States.⁷⁷ These issues resulted in the enactment of the Immigration Reform and Control Act in 1986.⁷⁸ The primary focus of this piece of legislation was to address the problem of undocumented workers entering the United States.⁷⁹ The Immigration Reform and Control Act contained several somewhat contradictory elements thus warranting the conclusion that the legislation embraced a “carrot-and-stick approach.”⁸⁰ On the positive end, the legislation contained the provision to recognize undocumented individuals who had lived in the United States for a defined period of time.⁸¹ On the opposite side, the legislation punished employers for failing to conduct immigration checks on potential employees and for knowingly employing undocumented workers.⁸² In a study conducted following the full implementation of these sanctions, it was revealed that the authorities did impose various penalties on employers ranging from fines to criminal prosecution.⁸³ Despite the monumental changes encompassed in the Immigration Reform and Control Act, it was intended to be reformist in nature and change immigration policy in the United States.⁸⁴ Instead, significant reforms to immigration policy would appear in “the last statute in the twentieth century to attempt a general overhaul.”⁸⁵ This final impetus for immigration change would shortly culminate in the Immigration Act of 1990.

In the late 1980s, Congress passed several immigration bills that addressed some small facet of immigration, rather than providing a comprehensive reform to current policy.⁸⁶ Toward the end of the decade, however, Senator Edward Kennedy (1932-2009) of Massachusetts and Senator Alan Simpson (1931 -) of Wyoming attempted several

times to pass a significant reform to immigration, but failed to garner enough congressional support.⁸⁷ In 1990, both houses of Congress agreed on “compromise legislation.”⁸⁸ In November 1990, President George H.W. Bush signed the Immigration Act of 1990. In its most basic feature, the Immigration Act of 1990 increased the level of allowable immigration by forty percent.⁸⁹ This broadening of the quotas translated into the acceptance of 700,000 immigrants in the first three years and then 675,000 a year thereafter.⁹⁰ The act recognized three major categories of immigrants.⁹¹ Of the 675,000 total annual immigrants permitted to enter the United States, 480,000 would be reserved for the “family-sponsored” category, 140,000 would be assigned to the “employment-based” category, and the remaining 55,000 would be allotted to the “diversity” category.⁹²

The “diversity” category attempted to admit individuals from countries that faced a reduction in immigration following the Hart-Celler Act of 1965.⁹³ Those comprising the “diversity” category would be determined by a random lottery, with the caveat that during the initial years a concentration of lottery winners would be from Ireland because of its dwindling level of immigration.⁹⁴ The legislation was supported by a potent pro-immigration alliance, including human rights organizations, political and legal advocacy groups, employer associations, and various religious, cultural, and ethnic groups.⁹⁵ In reference to general, regional immigration trends following the passage of this legislation, European immigration increased slightly, Asian immigration remained relatively constant, and African immigration decreased marginally.⁹⁶ But despite the unchanged nature of immigration from Asia, the level of immigration from Iraq did significantly change in the years following the First Gulf War in 1991.⁹⁷ The sudden

change in immigration from Iraq does not appear to be based on the immigration reforms enacted in the 1980s and 1990s, but rather on the insufferable conditions in Iraq following the defeat of Saddam Hussein in the First Gulf War.

The Waves of Iraqi Shi'a

The damage Saddam's regime suffered following the First Gulf War by the international coalition provided the persecuted groups of Iraq with a rare opportunity to remove the dictator. Tragically, the uprising staged by the Iraqi Shi'a following the war resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands.⁹⁸ The ruthlessness of the Saddam regime following the First Gulf War prompted many Iraqi Shi'a to flee and take up residence in a refugee camp in Saudi Arabia.⁹⁹ In addition to the inhospitable and unsanitary conditions in the camp, the refugees were terrified that the injured regime in Baghdad would exact a vengeance against those residing in the camp.¹⁰⁰ The refugees' destitute living conditions coupled with their uncertain future prompted many Iraqis to leave the entire region.

In 1992, the American government admitted 3,442 Iraqis into the country.¹⁰¹ This critical year's statistic marks a radical break from past admission patterns.¹⁰² For example, in the previous year, the government admitted only 842 Iraqi refugees; thus over a four hundred percent increase.¹⁰³ However, despite the arrival of a significant Iraqi population, there were millions of Iraqis who were forced to remain in Iraq.

In the interim between the beginning of the arrival of the first wave in 1991 and the start of the second wave in 2003, condition in Iraq were characterized by a period of intense economic sanctions that have been regarded as "the most comprehensive and severe ever imposed against one nation."¹⁰⁴ Ostensibly, the purpose of this extensive sanctions program was to prevent the Iraqi regime from importing materials that could be

used to create weapons of mass destruction.¹⁰⁵ Despite this official intention, the sanctions essentially impoverished the people of Iraq.¹⁰⁶ The sanctions had noticeable economic effects on the population, including substantially diminishing the standard of living, reducing annual income, and exponentially increasing inflation.¹⁰⁷ The implementation of these sanctions also coincided with increases in preventable diseases, such as cholera, hepatitis, meningitis, measles, mumps, pneumonia, and typhoid fever.¹⁰⁸ The period also witnessed unprecedented increases in both child malnutrition and mortality.¹⁰⁹ The detrimental conditions provided a legitimate reason for the Iraqis to flee the country in favour of more prosperous opportunities abroad. However, the desire to escape Iraq would become even more pressing under the threat of an international invasion.

The arrival of the second wave of Iraqi Shi'a immigrants in Dearborn coincided with the Second Gulf War (2003-2011). The level of immigration increased significantly following the passage of the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act of 2008 by the Democratic-controlled Congress.¹¹⁰ In more precise terms, the law endeavours to “assist certain Iraqis who have worked directly with, or are threatened by their association with, the United States, and for other purposes.”¹¹¹ The legislation, once implemented would increase the number of Iraqi refugees permitted to enter the United States by establishing processing centres, relaxing quota restrictions, and conferring a privileged status for refugees who provided assistance to the United States in Iraq.¹¹² In the two years following the passage of the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act, the number of Iraqi refugees entering the United States continued to increase to high levels.¹¹³ The American government granted refugee status to over eighteen thousand Iraqis in each year of 2009 and 2010.¹¹⁴ In both waves, over a

twenty year period from 1991 to 2011, the American government admitted 108,878 Iraqi refugees and asylees into its borders.¹¹⁵

There are difficulties in ascertaining the precise number of any religious group in America because of Public Law 94-521, which makes it illegal for the American Census Bureau to ask questions about religion.¹¹⁶ In light of this, the researcher must rely on estimations provided by leaders within the Iraqi Shi'a community of Dearborn. In this case, the researcher consulted Imam Hisham al-Husainy of the Karbalaa Islamic Education Center in Dearborn, a mosque dominated by Iraqi Shi'a Muslims. In the Imam's opinion, there are approximately 30,000 Iraqi Shi'a Muslims that reside in the Metropolitan Detroit area.¹¹⁷ The majority of these expatriates live in the diverse suburban city of Dearborn, home to the largest concentration of Iraqi refugees on the continent.¹¹⁸ But unlike other immigrant groups, the Iraqi Shi'a did not move to Dearborn for the employment opportunities presented by the automotive industry, since many arrived from parts of Iraq where other, less technical professions were dominant.¹¹⁹ Their choice seems to be based less on Dearborn's industrial opportunities and more on its demographic composition. In order to better understand the Iraqi Shi'as' choice of Dearborn, it is necessary to explore the uniqueness of this city and why it would be attractive to an Arab-Muslim minority from the Middle East.

The City of Dearborn

In comparison to other American cities, Dearborn's ethnic and religious composition is unique. The city of Dearborn is not large, with a total population of only 96,474 people.¹²⁰ Despite its fairly small size, Dearborn is recognized as the country's "best-known Arab immigrant enclave."¹²¹ This reputation helps explain the Iraqi Shi'a

attraction to Dearborn: “It is not just the restaurants, shops, and mosques that draw people here. In the Arab sections of Dearborn, one does not find bars or other public places that would violate Islamic law and distract people from their religious and family duties.”¹²² The structure of the community, in an Arab and Muslim fashion, suggests that it could provide a suitable environment for the Iraqi Shi’a. Still, despite the demographic composition and suitability of Dearborn, the Iraqi Shi’a would still have to contend with a series of obstacles.

Early Gulf War Settlers

The majority of the Iraqi refugees that entered the United States following the First Gulf War were suffering from a host of medical issues, including tuberculosis, kidney ailments, lead contamination, and exposure to dangerous toxins.¹²³ In addition to their physical illnesses, many of the Iraqi refugees that emigrated during this period battled with psychological issues accrued during their time in Iraq or in the refugee camps.¹²⁴ The effects of these serious physical and mental ailments would not be the only challenges faced by the Iraqi Shi’a.

The Iraqi Shi’a immigrants entered an environment that was recovering from a series of offensive innuendoes and hostile actions directed against the established Arab community as a whole. These hostile conditions were precipitated by America’s decision to intervene in the Iraqi-Kuwaiti (1990-1991) conflict, prompting federal law enforcement agencies and the political elite of Dearborn to embark on inflammatory courses of action. For example, the heightened climate aroused by the prospect of American involvement in the war spurred the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to interview about two hundred members of the Arab-American community in various

cities.¹²⁵ Ostensibly, the FBI sought to notify community leaders of the repercussions that could face the Arab-American community.¹²⁶ In addition to their words of warning, the FBI solicited information from these individuals about potential terrorist activities.¹²⁷ These intimidating interviews would run conterminous with provocative statements by local leading politicians.

In a public statement after the deployment of troops to the Persian Gulf, Mayor Coleman Young (1918-1997) of Detroit publicly denounced discriminatory actions against identifiable groups, but then immediately alluded to the prospect of possible terrorist attacks on strategic locations in the area: “We will not tolerate any violence or other form of harassment directed at anyone in this city because of their ethnic heritage or religious faith. We also are taking necessary steps to prevent the possibility of any terrorist-type activities in Detroit.”¹²⁸ Young’s reference to terrorism automatically cast negative aspersions on the entire Arab-American community by awakening a negative stereotype that has often been employed to describe this group.

The situation was not solely defined by offensive innuendos expressed by a prominent political figure, but also incorporated other discriminatory actions directed at the Arab-American community. In reviewing a series of newspaper articles and media reports published during this time, one notices a litany of offenses committed against Arab Americans, including ranting telephone calls, verbal intimidation, vandalism, suspected arson, bomb scares, and death threats.¹²⁹ These offenses were not confined to Metropolitan Detroit, but rather included many cities across the country where Arabs form a visible minority.¹³⁰ The dire nature of the situation prompted one of the country’s most influential and respected civil rights leaders to publish an essay on the subject.

Coretta Scott King (1927-2006), the widow of the late Martin Luther King Junior (1929-1968), encouraged the leaders of the nation, the media, and the average American to do their respective parts in order to combat this increasingly precarious situation.¹³¹ She suggested that the individuals can help remedy the situation by “refusing to let a bigoted remark go unchallenged.”¹³² However, the end of the First Gulf War in 1991 seems to have pacified the more prejudicial elements of American society allowing Muslim-American communities the time to develop in the last few years before the new millennium.

Wave One: The Muslim-American Community in the Early Twenty-First Century

The Muslim-American community in general entered the new millennium on a positive note with population growth, mosque development, and communal expansion.¹³³ The population of individuals from Muslim countries nearly doubled from 871,582 in 1990 to 1,717,132 in 2000.¹³⁴ This growth is not only evidenced by these demographics, but also supported by the exponential development of religious places of worship and communal centres within the country’s Islamic community.¹³⁵ For example, it is reported that in the year 2000, there were 1,250 mosques and religious centres in the United States, marking an increase of more than double since the mid-1980s.¹³⁶ The Islamic community’s increased size and communal development required that they be recognized as an important minority group worthy of national political attention, particularly by President Bill Clinton’s administration (1992-2001).

In order to demonstrate their support, the Clinton administration made overtures towards the Islamic community. During her tenure as First Lady, Hillary Rodham Clinton (1947 -) hosted the White House’s inaugural Eid al-Fitr dinner.¹³⁷ This dinner is held in

honour of the culmination of the Islamic holy month of Ramadan. The acknowledgement displayed by the Clinton administration would be shared by other politicians, particularly during the forthcoming presidential election. However, this public display of interest in the Muslim community did not necessarily translate into support for the Clinton administration or the policies of the Democratic Party. The Clinton administration reportedly had an inordinate number of pro-Israel lobbyists in central decision-making and policy-formulating positions.¹³⁸ This statement is supported by the fact that Clinton was “the first president ever to involve the pro-Israel lobby in actual Middle East policy making.”¹³⁹ Clinton appointed several individuals, previously affiliated with Israeli lobby groups and organizations, to important bureaucratic positions in the State Department and National Security Council.¹⁴⁰ One of the more prominent officials was Martin Indyk, who prior to being appointed ambassador to Israel and then assistant secretary of state, worked as a researcher for the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC).¹⁴¹ The presence of pro-Israel bureaucrats within the higher echelons of political power could be taken into consideration by Muslim leaders, clerics, and individuals across the country when deciding which candidate to support in the upcoming 2000 presidential election.

The formidable size of Dearborn’s Muslim community naturally attracted the attention of both major presidential candidates in 2000. The two candidates, Vice-President Al Gore (1948 -) of the Democrats and Governor George W. Bush (1946 -) of the Republicans both campaigned for the support of the Muslim community of Dearborn.¹⁴² It is interesting to note that one of the community’s most influential Shi’a clerics appeared to have had significant access to the candidates, thus bringing the candidates into closer contact with the Iraqi-Shi’a and greater Shi’a community of

Dearborn.¹⁴³ In his reflection on the 2000 presidential election, Imam Sayyid Hassan Qazwini (1964 -), a scion of a distinguished and influential family of Iraqi Shi'a clerics and the spiritual leader of the Shi'a-based Islamic Center of America in Dearborn, outlined the community's concern with Gore. The foremost issue revolved around Gore's prominent association with the Clinton administration's unpopular policies relating to the Middle East, such as the former president's staunch support of Israel.¹⁴⁴ The "guilty by association" charge was further aggravated by Gore's choice of running mate. Gore selected Senator Joseph Lieberman (1942 -) of Connecticut for his running mate. The community's distaste for Lieberman did not centre on the senator's Orthodox Jewish religious affiliation, but rather on "his unconditional support for the pro-Israel lobby."¹⁴⁵ The Shi'a community chose to seek out another candidate to support in the presidential election, largely because of Gore's association with the Clinton administration's contentious policies.¹⁴⁶

In contrast to Gore, who seemed to have been punished for his previous association and running mate, Bush had an advantage in that "he didn't have a governing record on the federal level for voters to scrutinize" thus rendering the governor's position "unclear and less publicized."¹⁴⁷ In this case, Bush's lack of federal experience was a point of strength that was further complemented with his positive relationship with the community. In his contacts with the Shi'a community of Dearborn, Bush appeared convivial and receptive to their major concerns, particularly relating to the practice of racial and religious profiling targeted against Arab and Muslim Americans.¹⁴⁸ In addition to his condemnation of racial profiling, Bush addressed another sensitive topic among the Shi'a community, one that would ironically reach unprecedented levels during his

presidency. In his discussions with the Muslim community in Dearborn, Bush colourfully, but effectively expressed his thoughts on religious extremism with an allusion to Christian fundamentalism in Texas.¹⁴⁹ In alluding to the existence of Christian extremism, Bush was able to help dispel the stereotype that fundamentalism is exclusively a Muslim phenomenon. These types of comments resonated with the community and shortly translated into electoral results.

With his positive appeal in the community, Bush managed to secure fifty-two percent of the city's voters with Gore receiving forty-four percent.¹⁵⁰ The electoral support Bush received in Dearborn should be viewed as a microcosm of the national Muslim support as Bush received almost forty-eight percent of the country's Muslim vote, while Gore garnered only thirty-six percent.¹⁵¹ In addition to securing the support of the country's Muslim community, Bush successfully went on to win the election and become the forty-third president of the United States.

Days of Darkness: September 11, 2001

The early months of Bush's presidency seemed favourable not only for Arabs and Muslims living in Dearborn, but also for greater Detroit. In constructing his inaugural cabinet, Bush included the recently defeated veteran senator from Michigan and Arab-American, Spencer Abraham (1952 -) as Secretary of Energy.¹⁵² The prospect of having some sort of representation at the cabinet level marked a promising start for the Arab community of Dearborn. This appointment also represents the Bush administration's decision to cultivate positive relations with the country's Arab and Muslim communities. This proverbial honeymoon period between the Muslim and Arab communities and their newly elected president might have continued to develop if it were not for an infamous

day in September that would leave “an indelible mark on the world.”¹⁵³ This mark would especially be seen on the world’s only remaining superpower.

In the early hours of September 11, 2001, Osama bin Laden’s (1957-2011) Afghan-based terrorist group, al-Qaeda, carried out “the deadliest, most dramatic, and most carefully planned act of terrorism ever to have occurred on American soil.”¹⁵⁴ The attacks resulted in the deaths of 2,996 individuals from over one hundred different countries.¹⁵⁵ The unprecedented magnitude and significance of these terrorist attacks coupled with the considerable death toll provoked a resounding response from the Bush administration.

Federal Government’s Response to 9/11

In an address to both congressional houses, President Bush precisely clarified who was responsible for the attacks: “The terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself. The enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends. It is not our many Arab friends. Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists and every government that supports them.”¹⁵⁶ The last sentence of this excerpt would have serious repercussions for the former Taliban government of Afghanistan (1996-2001). The Bush administration’s decision to invade Afghanistan was neither prefaced by a detailed explanation, nor did it provoke much initial debate.¹⁵⁷ In the simplest of terms, the theocratic Taliban, under the absolute leadership of Mullah Muhammad Omar (1959 -) refused to surrender Osama bin Laden to the American authorities.¹⁵⁸ This defiance legitimized the use of military force in the pursuit of capturing the terrorist mastermind, destroying al-Qaeda’s protective sanctuary and patrons, and delivering a significant blow to transnational terrorism. On the domestic front, Americans were dealing with a string of

hate crimes directed against Arabs and Muslims living in the United States.¹⁵⁹

In accordance with the Hate Crime Statistics Act (1990), the Attorney General is legally required to obtain data on the number and nature of hate crime incidents in the United States.¹⁶⁰ In its original form, the legislation recognized four different types of hate crimes, including those based on ethnicity, race, religion, and sexual orientation.¹⁶¹ The religious bias category contains the country's major religious groups, but also includes other smaller groups, such as Muslims. In comparison to other religious groups, the number of hate crimes directed against Muslims has traditionally been small.¹⁶² For example, in the five years leading up to the September 11th terrorist attacks, the number of single incidents directed against Muslims from across the country never exceeded forty a year.¹⁶³ This relatively miniscule number of hate crimes against Muslims in the United States would shortly swell to an unprecedented level after the September 11th terrorist attacks.¹⁶⁴

In 2001, there were 481 anti-Muslim incidents in the United States.¹⁶⁵ This number marks an exponential increase from the previous year's total of twenty-eight incidents.¹⁶⁶ In addition to 2001's unusually high number of incidents, the vigilantes did not take into consideration the community's sectarian, ethnic, and national differences when engaging in their reprobate behaviour. In other, more specific terms, the vigilantes did not differentiate between Sunni and Shi'a, Arab and Persian, or Syrian and Saudi. This statement is evidenced by the diversity of the victims in this backlash. There were some more radical and misinformed elements in American society that expressed their irritation by taking out their frustrations out not only on Muslim-Americans, but also on anyone who "appeared Middle Eastern."¹⁶⁷ These indiscriminate attacks mistakenly

included minorities that are supposedly “Muslim-looking.”¹⁶⁸ These minorities include South Asians, Hindus, Sikhs, and Latinos.¹⁶⁹

The backlash against the Muslim-American community stretched around the country from New York to California to Texas.¹⁷⁰ These attacks included threatening phone calls, racial epithets, physical assault, property damage, Molotov cocktails, arson, bomb scares, and public demonstrations.¹⁷¹ These unfortunate incidents of harassment, violence, and bias were also felt to some degree in the centre of Muslim activity in the United States, Dearborn. In one famous case, Ahmed Esa, a Yemeni immigrant employed at a River Rouge plant south of Dearborn, was dismissed from his welding position the day after the terrorist attacks.¹⁷² According to Esa, the company owner engaged in a diatribe about the terrorist attacks and then dismissed his employee.¹⁷³ In a few weeks following his dismissal, Esa filed a twenty-five thousand dollar lawsuit against his former employer.¹⁷⁴ Shereef Akeel, the lawyer representing Esa, reported that a settlement was reached in order to “redress the complaint.”¹⁷⁵ However, as Akeel mentioned to the researcher in a phone conversation, the contents of the settlement are confidential, but stated that there was some “monetary sum” involved.¹⁷⁶ The employer’s unrestrained and unabashed willingness to express his intolerant ideology so candidly to the media demonstrates how insensitive attitudes were becoming deeply entrenched in the community. These rooted attitudes would prove to linger in the community weeks after the terrorist attacks.

These bigoted attitudes and incidents of racial and religious discrimination continued in Dearborn even after the terrorist attacks. One of the most recounted incidents of racial profiling to befall the community following the terrorist attacks

involved a Lebanese-American scout leader and his small troop of teenage scouts. The group of six were returning from a trip to Mackinac Island just off of Lake Huron and in the northern part of Michigan, about five to six hours away.¹⁷⁷ The group was suspect because of their presence aboard a ferry coupled with the scout leader's possession of camping gear that appeared similar to military equipment, such as a walkie-talkie.¹⁷⁸ In a phone conversation with the researcher, Akeel Shereef, who represented the scouts in this case, stated that the walkie-talkies were used so the scouts could "keep track of each other."¹⁷⁹ However, despite this reasoning, the group was unlawfully detained and unnecessarily questioned by state police because of their physical appearance.¹⁸⁰ In reference to a settlement, Shereef Akeel could only confirm with the researcher that there was a "resolution."¹⁸¹ The notion of detaining harmless boy scouts simply because of their religious or ethnic background clearly denotes that a profound sense of paranoia continued to permeate the city and affect various Arab and Muslim minorities, including the Iraqi Shi'a.

In reviewing the data collected on discrimination, both waves admitted to having been a victim of this injustice though it appears that the first wave has suffered more than their second wave coreligionists.¹⁸² The interviews revealed that nine members of the first wave experienced some sort of discrimination while living in America.¹⁸³ The number of participants who felt discrimination among the second wave was significantly less.¹⁸⁴ Remarkably, only three individuals from the second wave experienced discrimination with one occurring in an American city other than Dearborn.¹⁸⁵ There are two reasons that can explain why these instances of discrimination are more common among first wave participants. First, one must take into account the fact that first-wave

participants have resided in America longer than second-wave participants. This lengthier residence in America has rendered the first wave increasingly susceptible to acts of discrimination considering that this extra time increases the chances that this crime will take place. Second, it is also important to take into consideration the fact that the first wave was forced to contend with a traumatizing event that the second wave managed to avoid because of their later arrival. In other words, the first wave had to contend with the “competition” or “conflict” stage that is so integral to Park’s race relations cycle.¹⁸⁶

The first wave was entangled in the volcanic eruption of animosity against Muslims and Arabs following the September 11th terrorist attacks. As a result, there were several participants who noted instances of discrimination.¹⁸⁷ Since this particular interview question was most likely to evoke feelings of sadness, frustration, and helplessness, the researcher did not pose any subsequent questions to those who indicated that they did experience discrimination in America. However, those participants who were more comfortable with discussing the issue did volunteer details about their individual experiences after the terrorist attacks. In one blatant instance, a young woman from the first wave opened her front door to collect the mail and was immediately told by her neighbours to “go back to your country.”¹⁸⁸ The fact that these individuals attacked their own neighbour while she retrieved her mail shows the hysteria that dominated Dearborn during this time. This type of invasive discrimination where one is attacked on one’s own property is atypical in comparison to the other cases expressed by the participants. It is distressing to report that many instances of discrimination occurred within the confines of an academic environment, such as a high school or university. A few female participants remarked that they were called offensive names or harassed by

their classmates because they wore the headscarf in accordance with their religious traditions relating to modest dress.¹⁸⁹ The academic setting appears to be a place where intolerance of all types resides. The discrimination detailed by the first wave was not solely a product of the hysteria that followed the September 11th terrorist attacks, with non-Arabs and non-Muslims targeting Arabs and Muslims. In time, the employment of racial and religious profiling allegedly to combat terrorist activity would become an important tactic for fighting terrorism domestically. On the international front, the war on terror escalated to include another country, one that was very familiar to the Iraqi Shi'a.

Operation Iraqi Freedom

The American involvement in Afghanistan (2001 -) did not dissuade the more hawkish members of the Bush cabinet from assessing the possibility of initiating a conflict with neighbouring Iraq.¹⁹⁰ The possibility of launching a military invasion against Iraq was presented to President Bush in the early days following the September 11th attacks.¹⁹¹ However, the president rejected this idea and instead decided that dislodging al-Qaeda from the Taliban's protection should define the major foreign policy goal in the post-September 11th environment.¹⁹² It is important to note that this contentious idea was originally put forward by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz (1943 -) at this meeting.¹⁹³ Wolfowitz was regarded as the "strongest proponent of action against Iraq."¹⁹⁴ Wolfowitz was a member of the neoconservative wing of the administration, along with other presidential advisors, including Richard Perle, Scooter Libby, John Bolton, and Zalmay Khalilzad.¹⁹⁵ The neoconservatives are an intellectual movement that stress unilateral American hegemonic dominance over the world, largely through unparalleled military might.¹⁹⁶ The neoconservatives were

presented with a rare opportunity with President Bush as he was “untutored in foreign policy and ignorant of the Middle East.”¹⁹⁷ Bush’s unfamiliarity with the region made him susceptible to neoconservative overtures.

In time, the president agreed with his neoconservative advisors and ordered intelligence and military officials to evaluate the possibility of invasion.¹⁹⁸ However, before the military campaign could be implemented, the president would have to explain publicly his reasoning for engaging in this “war of choice.”¹⁹⁹ The Bush administration’s public explanation for an invasion centred on several points, including the more prominent claims that the rogue state was in possession of illicit weaponry and that it maintained an alliance with al-Qaeda.²⁰⁰ In addition to these charges, Bush boldly classified Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as members of the “axis of evil.”²⁰¹ The utilization of this type of rhetoric to describe the connection between these two entities would prove to be a way to justify a war with Iraq.²⁰²

The decision to invade Iraq on the grounds that there was some sort of connection between Iraq and al-Qaeda was deemed “strategically nonsensical.”²⁰³ However, despite this concern, there were forty-three other nations that joined America’s “Coalition of the Willing.”²⁰⁴ The coalition officially launched its military campaign against Iraq on March 19, 2003.²⁰⁵ In the tenth month of the invasion, the Americans captured Saddam Hussein near his hometown of Tikrit in central Iraq.²⁰⁶ The swift capture of Saddam marked a period of intense elation for those who suffered under the tyrant’s twenty-three year rule. In just over three years since his capture, Saddam was executed by hanging in late December 2006.²⁰⁷ The death of the dictator produced happiness among the general population.²⁰⁸ The elation following the execution was not only expressed by a majority

of the native population, but also by members of the Iraqi diaspora living abroad, particularly the Iraqi Shi'a in Dearborn.

Reaction to the Death of Saddam Hussein in Dearborn

The execution of Saddam Hussein provoked an array of reactions from around the world. In contrast to popular opinion, many nations expressed concerns and statements about the legitimacy of the trial and the employment of the death penalty.²⁰⁹ These concerns were not shared by those who actually suffered under the yoke of this deceased dictator. The execution was publicly celebrated by various Iraqi communities, especially the Iraqi Shi'a community of Dearborn. In the hours following the execution, a lively celebration took place around the Karbalaa Islamic Education Center in Dearborn.²¹⁰ This venue for this celebration was fitting considering the Karbalaa Islamic Education Center is a mosque mostly frequented by Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims. The celebration was diverse with participants throwing sweets, honking horns, wearing flags, and dancing in the streets.²¹¹ In addition to these various festivities, the streets clamoured with popular chants extolling the death of Saddam.²¹² The popular elation was also shared by the clerical class in the city.

Imam Husham al-Husainy of the Karbalaa Islamic Education Center in the heart of Dearborn joyfully expressed his thoughts on the impromptu celebration.²¹³ Imam Hassan Qazwini did not celebrate the execution with his fellow congregants as the cleric was performing the *hajj* or great pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia at the time.²¹⁴ In contrast to his more vocal colleague from the Karbalaa Islamic Education Center, Qazwini did not explicitly express his personal sense of satisfaction with the dictator's execution. In hindsight, Qazwini's decision to remain silent might have been based on a desire to

prevent a sectarian conflict from consuming Dearborn at this very sensitive time.

The sense of joy marking the execution of Saddam Hussein was not shared by all members of the Arab and Muslim communities of Dearborn. There were some members in the community who were offended and incensed about the celebration, namely those who supported Saddam's regime and its ability to curb the activities of the Shi'a. These sentiments shortly translated into criminal activity. There were a few reports of various forms of vandalism directed against mosques and Iraqi-Shi'a businesses in the city.²¹⁵ The authorities investigating the cases of vandalism did not pinpoint an exact motive, but many members of the Iraqi-Shi'a community believed that they were specifically targeted because of their correlative role in the death of Saddam Hussein and the ensuing celebration that took place in the city.²¹⁶ The belief that these incidents had a sectarian motive behind them is a plausible assumption that does possess a degree of validity not only because of the targets, but also because of the words used in the attacks.

The Karbalaa Islamic Education Center and the Old Islamic Center of America, both in Dearborn, are two major mosque centres typically frequented by the Iraqi Shi'a, were both vandalized in some manner.²¹⁷ The slogan painted on the latter clearly supports the conclusion that the vandals were motivated by sectarian animosity. On the Old Islamic Center of America, the perpetrators painted the phrase "you idol worship."²¹⁸ It is prudent to conclude that this insult was not conjured by non-Muslims, considering they likely would not have been aware of the alleged idolatrous practices of the Shi'a branch. However, one cannot claim that all acts of vandalism during this time were carried out by misguided Muslims. This statement is supported by the presence of a second, more general slogan painted on the mosque.

In contrast to this sectarian-based graffiti denouncing Shi'a Muslims for their alleged idolatrous system of beliefs, the mosque was defaced by another, more generic statement saying "go home 911 murderers."²¹⁹ This type of slogan does not appear to be specifically directed against any Islamic branch, but is rather a general slur typically launched against all Muslims following the September 11th terrorist attacks. The nature of this slogan seems to suggest that the perpetrator was a xenophobic American seeking to express his or her prejudice by defacing any symbol of Islam readily available. The perpetrator's allusion to the five-year-old terrorist attacks does not have any connection with the previous comment regarding idolatry. The inimical nature of the two slogans suggests that perhaps there were two different individuals involved in the vandalism. However, the likelihood that two different vandals defaced the same mosque during the same time is improbable. It is likely that one vandal, consumed with rage at the death of Saddam and the ensuing celebration, vandalized the mosque with a barrage of irrational insults.

As will be discussed in the next chapter, the mosques are frequented by members from both the first and second wave.²²⁰ In light of this random distribution, the attacks do not appear specifically directed at members of the first wave versus those of the second or vice versa. Instead, the vandals indiscriminately targeted the entire Shi'a Muslim community and employed the mosques as a conduit to express this anger. The use of mosques to express one's frustration with either a specific branch of Islam or the entire faith is not a rare occurrence in Dearborn, but rather a repeated practice that would remerge in the near future. The sectarian struggle that dominated Dearborn at this time would shortly be complemented with an attack on Islam as a whole, namely through its

most sacred scripture, the Qur'an. In this case, the holy book was not simply attacked from a theological or doctrinal perspective, but rather subjected to an attempted public desecration.

Islamophobia Returns: The 2010s

It is a misconception to believe that libricide or book burning has been permanently confined to the more intolerant periods of human history. Unfortunately, the archaic practice of purposely and publicly destroying knowledge has not been purged from the cotemporary era. In a recent case, Pastor Terry Jones (1951 -) of the Dove World Outreach Center headquartered in Gainesville, Florida, officially announced his intention to burn the Qur'an on the ninth anniversary of the September 11th terrorist attacks or "International Burn a Quran Day."²²¹ The moral concerns associated with burning a piece of sacred scripture revered by over one billion people worldwide sparked national and international criticism prompting leading political and religious figures to speak out against this plan of action.²²² Jones' imperviousness to external pressure should not denote that he was uninterested in settling on an agreement, but rather was only interested if the right offer were to emerge. The planned desecration was cancelled following alleged assurances from Muslim leaders that the Park 51 Mosque would not be built in the vicinity of ground zero.²²³ However, the cancellation of this event did not dissuade Jones from engaging in another highly-publicized event during an inappropriate time and in front of another sensitive location.

In a matter of months, Jones re-emerged and again announced his intention to publicly burn a Qur'an. In this instance, Jones selected April 22, 2011, or Good Friday as the day of the planned public desecration.²²⁴ In addition to planning to burn the Qur'an

on one of the most solemn days of the Christian calendar, Jones stated his intention to conduct this demonstration in the shadow of the largest mosque in the United States, the Shi'a-dominated Islamic Center of America.²²⁵ The county court realized the potential for chaos and temporarily arrested the pastor and his associate for refusing to post a one-dollar peace bond.²²⁶ The pair was also prohibited from approaching the Islamic Center of America for a period of three years.²²⁷

The application of the First Amendment and Jones' constitutional rights are matters of debate. In addition to other forms of expression, the First Amendment prevents the government from restricting speech in many situations.²²⁸ The "speech" employed by Terry Jones during his attempt to burn a Qur'an in front of the Islamic Center of America is better classified as "expressive conduct."²²⁹ One of the most notable and debated instances of this type of speech is flag desecration.²³⁰ Despite the provocative nature of flag desecration, it is considered protected speech following the landmark *Texas v. Johnson* case in 1984, in which the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that Gregory Johnson's First Amendment rights permitted him to burn the American flag.²³¹ Therefore, if flag desecration is constitutionally protected, then, from a strict legal perspective, burning books is also considered protected speech. However, as explained, Jones' attempt at burning the Qur'an was quickly thwarted by Dearborn police.²³² The question now is whether the authorities in Dearborn violated Jones' First Amendment right to express his form of "speech" in public by prohibiting him from engaging in his planned action at the Islamic Center of America.

The authorities defended their decision to temporarily arrest Jones and his associate on the grounds that his demonstration had the potential to "disturb the

peace.”²³³ In cases where the element of danger or violence is present, authorities do have the right to stop the demonstration.²³⁴ However, despite the potential for violence, Jones ferociously defended his constitutional right to stage a demonstration of this nature and remarked that “the First Amendment does us no good if it confines us to saying what is popular.”²³⁵ Jones’ constitutional claims were supported by the Michigan branch of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Thomas More Law Center.²³⁶ In November, the court’s ruling was overturned by the Wayne County court on the grounds that these punishments violated Jones’ First Amendment rights.²³⁷ However, while Jones’ right to demonstrate was upheld, the psychological damage he inflicted on the Muslim community, particularly the Lebanese and Iraqi-Shi’a Muslims who frequent the Islamic Center of America, cannot be ignored.

The selection of this venue directly involved the Shi’a community, considering this mosque is predominately frequented by Lebanese and Iraqi-Shi’a Muslims. The prejudice endured by the Shi’a community during this time and in other instances presents the possibility that one may neither feel fully comfortable expressing one’s religious heritage in this environment nor willing to discuss his or her religious beliefs and practices with an outsider.

The Iraqi-Shi’a Experience and the Kymlicka and Park Models

In order to explain the Iraqi-Shi’a experience in Dearborn from the 1990s to the present, it is necessary to employ both Kymlicka’s multiculturalism model and Park’s race relations cycle. Both theories hold some validity when they are used to describe the Iraqi Shi’as’ experience in Dearborn. In the case of Kymlicka, the United States government did not formally attempt to ensure the Iraqi Shi’as’ religious integration in

American society. The American government's inaction conforms to Kymlicka's belief that religious integration is not a matter to be pursued by the liberal-democratic state.²³⁸ However, simply because the American state did not demand that the Iraqi Shi'a conform to some sort of predetermined religious background, does not mean that being Iraqi, Shi'a, or Muslim in Dearborn is a position devoid of challenges, obstacles, and conflict.

As explored above, the Iraqi Shi'a in Dearborn endured a host of difficulties and challenges from countless instances of religious intolerance after the September 11th terrorist attacks to attempts from outsiders to burn their religion's holiest book at a local Shi'a place of worship. In light of these difficulties and challenges, it is appropriate to employ Park's race relations cycle which seems to account for these issues. The second stage of Park's race relations cycle has already been identified as "competition" or "conflict."²³⁹ In the case of the Iraqi Shi'a of Dearborn, there have been many instances of conflict with several different political and social actors, including neighbours, local and national law enforcement agencies, and even outsiders who emerge to challenge their religion. However, in reflecting on the narrative in this chapter, one notices that these instances of conflict have been complemented with positive experiences, such as the period of communal development in the 1990s and early 2000s. These positive developments may give the impression that the Iraqi Shi'a have passed Park's second stage of conflict and advanced to his third stage of "accommodation."²⁴⁰ However, this statement is debatable and in need of further analysis.

In Park's race relations cycle, accommodation represents the third and final step before "assimilation."²⁴¹ In this stage, it is expected that the conflict that exists between the immigrant group and the host society will start to dissipate.²⁴² In addition, at the

accommodation stage, it is imagined that policies and procedures will develop in order to help “regulate intergroup conflicts and relations.”²⁴³ In light of this description of the accommodation stage, the question remains as to whether the Iraqi Shi’a have fully and completely reached the accommodation stage. It is argued that the Iraqi Shi’a have not reached this accommodation stage, but rather remain confined to the conflict stage. There are several reasons that support this argument. First, as described above, the amount of conflict did not subside between the Iraqi Shi’a and their host society, as is expected at this stage.²⁴⁴ These perceived instances of accommodation have been surrounded by various types of religiously motivated conflict leading to the conclusion that relations between the Iraqi Shi’a and their host society remained tense throughout this twenty-year period. Second, an agreement was not reached between the Iraqi Shi’a and their host society that would help ease tensions between the two groups, as is required at this stage.²⁴⁵ Perhaps, the failure to develop some sort of understanding between these two groups can explain the persistence of conflict. Finally, Park expressly points out that his model is “progressive and linear.”²⁴⁶ Although he recognizes that there may be occasional instances that may inhibit an immigrant group’s progression towards assimilation, the cycle “cannot change its direction; cannot at any rate, reverse it.”²⁴⁷ In other words, the envisioned period of accommodation is lasting and permanent and is not passing and temporary.

This detailed analysis shows that the Iraqi Shi’a of Dearborn have remained at the second stage of Park’s relations cycle and have not advanced to the third stage of accommodation. The question now remains to what degree each waves’ religiosity has been affected by living in Dearborn. In order to measure the community’s level of

religiosity, semi-structured interviews have been conducted with members from both waves.

Community Overview

The primary purpose of the interviews was to determine the level of religiosity of both the first and second wave. The interviews were constructed around three different measurements, each related to a different aspect of religiosity, including devotional life, mosque life, and personal life measurements. The three measurements together employ nine different indicators. The devotional life measurement includes five indicators, including prayer (indicator one), religious knowledge (indicator two), rituals (indicator three), pilgrimages (indicator four), and spiritual authority (indicator five). The mosque life measurement is comprised of only one indicator: mosque life (indicator six). Finally, the personal life measurement contains three indicators: religious attire (indicator seven), marriage (indicator eight), and dietary laws (indicator nine). These three measurements and nine different indicators formed the basis of the interview questionnaire.

The format of the interviews not only elicited detailed information about the religious beliefs and practices of the Iraqi-Shi'a community in Dearborn, but also revealed several general social characteristics about this community. The most striking social characteristic is the level of suspicion exuded by the two waves of participants, potential participants, and members of the greater community. In one of the first few interviews conducted, the participant explicitly asked if the researcher was a journalist, despite the fact that the letter of information and the informed consent form were both presented to the participant for review and signature before any questions were posed.²⁴⁸ This apprehension is understandable considering the American mainstream media's

reporting on Muslims has been described as “fodder for front-page news.”²⁴⁹ This unfair treatment at the hands of the mainstream media would naturally discourage Muslims of any branch from discussing their religious beliefs and practices with a journalist or anyone resembling a journalist. However, this uneasiness with discussing their religious beliefs and practices with journalists is not the only concern held by the participant community.

There were other, more serious anxieties that were shared by some participants rendering the fear of talking to journalists benign in comparison. There appeared to be a concern among some participants that the researcher was a covert agent from one of the major intelligence organizations and was expressly tasked with the responsibility of “spying” on the Iraqi-Shi’a community of Dearborn. This type of thinking is not only initially perplexing for one who has never been exposed to the possibility of espionage among average citizens, but also slightly offensive to the researcher who strives to maintain a neutral position and a transparent attitude throughout the entire study. However, the researcher should not allow these initial sentiments to be internalized, but should instead investigate the causes of this seemingly paranoid disposition. In reflecting on the matter, it is clear that these feelings are much more warranted than expected.

Firstly, it is important to take into consideration the environment in which both Iraqi-Shi’a immigrant waves originated and spent a great portion of their lives residing, namely Ba’athist Iraq. The conditions during this period in Iraqi history have been explored in the previous chapter, with special emphasis on the regime’s treatment of the country’s Shi’a majority. However, the previous chapter did not explore the functions of *al-Mukhabarat al-‘Iraqiyya* or the Iraqi intelligence. This organization’s structure is

described as a “complex labyrinth of security organizations with their own intelligence and military units pervading all layers of Iraqi society.”²⁵⁰ The ubiquitous nature of this intelligence organization coupled with its merciless tactics has evidently made a profound psychological impact on those forced to live under its rule. However, as a result of the collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime and the de-Ba’athification of Iraq, the forces of coercion that once tormented the Iraqi Shi’a have been substantially weakened. Moreover, the participants no longer reside in their native land of Iraq thus the chance that they will be harmed by the remnants of these forces has been reduced. The problem with this argument is that it assumes that the entire family has immigrated to the United States. It ignores the fact that participants may have close family members still residing in Iraq. For example, a father may leave his family to work in a more economically promising country like the United States, but his young family, elderly parents, and siblings continue to reside in Iraq and thus are still vulnerable. It is easy to say that those who have escaped to America are now free from the danger present in their homeland. Nevertheless, just as the Iraqi Shi’a moved to America for a new peaceful and opportunity-filled existence, so too have individuals seeking to harm them in the proverbial land of opportunity.

The presence of undercover individuals seeking to injure the recently arrived Iraqi Shi’a initially seems incredible because of the stringent laws and regulations governing immigration in the United States. However, these laws have evidently neither been able to prevent dangerous individuals from entering the country nor assuage the fear posed by this alarming prospect. The possibility of having Iraqi spies in America always seemed to be a possibility given the historically hostile relationship between the two countries. This

suspicion was later confirmed following the American-led invasion of Iraq where detailed documents were seized proving the existence of an Iraqi spy network in several different states, including Michigan.²⁵¹

This situation was initially brought to the attention of the researcher by Gregg Krupa of *The Detroit News*.²⁵² The veteran journalist initially reported on the presence of spies in greater Detroit four years after the American-led invasion of Iraq.²⁵³ The news article focused on two Iraqi expatriates living in America who were alleged to have spied on the Iraqi community at large for the former Saddam Hussein regime.²⁵⁴ The investigation of this issue further revealed the presence of three other Iraqis alleged to be involved in espionage.²⁵⁵ The most notorious member of this quintet is Najib Shemami. The elderly Iraqi was accused of providing Saddam's government with names of Iraqi dissidents believed to be able to assist the Americans in a possible future invasion.²⁵⁶ Imam Husham al-Husainy, religious leader of the largely Iraqi-Shi'a Karbalaa Islamic Education Center in Dearborn, stated that this particular individual "terrorized our community."²⁵⁷ The cleric's statement appears appropriate considering Shemami was eventually tried, convicted, and sentenced to prison for his activities.²⁵⁸ Unfortunately, external elements spying for foreign governments would not be the only form of espionage threatening this community.

The years following the September 11th terrorist attacks "increased the academic and, even more, the non-academic interest in Islam."²⁵⁹ It also marked a period in which law enforcement agencies would employ a range of controversial and invasive techniques against Muslims living in the country.²⁶⁰ The terrorist attacks triggered racial profiling directed largely against those of the Islamic faith and Arab ancestry.²⁶¹ The government

allowed antiquated stereotypes to guide their investigation and the Federal Bureau of Investigation decided to revive a tactic that remained unused since the Hoover directorship.²⁶² In order to better monitor the habitual actions of a certain organization and the events it sponsors, federal agents are permitted “to visit any place and attend any event that is open to the public, on the same terms and conditions as members of the public generally.”²⁶³ This provision obscures the distinction between civilians and agents by elevating the latter to the same level as the former without removing their authority.²⁶⁴ In other, less legalistic terms, the agent can easily pose as a civilian in order to obtain information on specific individuals and communities.²⁶⁵ The prospect that intelligence and law enforcement agents have the ability to pose as ordinary citizens is a precarious prospect for many groups, especially the Iraqi Shi’a, who are familiar with such underhanded techniques.

The psychological damage caused by these surveillance methods has made it extremely difficult for researchers to interview members from any Muslim community in the United States, let alone one that has experienced such tactics before in their native homeland. It should not be surprising therefore that the Iraqi-Shi’a community was hesitant to agree to be interviewed. There was a level of uncertainty about the nature of the study. However, concerns and questions are not only normal and natural with any study involving human participants, but should also be encouraged in order to promote a sense of transparency between the researcher and the community. In hindsight, there were many questions about the study; however, most of the questions revolved around the researcher rather than the research topic itself.

The participants had a plethora of questions about the researcher’s academic

credentials, religious affiliation, ethnic background, current occupation, and personal motives for selecting this topic. There are some researchers who may not have entertained these personal questions on the grounds that they constitute an invasion of the researcher's privacy and are clearly irrelevant to the study at hand. Generally, the traditional, more distanced approach to field research is the safest, but sometimes cannot be employed in vulnerable communities where participants need to cultivate a sense of trust with the researcher. In the eyes of the Iraqi-Shi'a community, the researcher was merely an unidentified, Caucasian male, dressed in business attire with a formidable knowledge of the community's ethnic and religious heritage. These features easily fit the profile of an intelligence officer or government official seeking to gather information. The supposed enigmatic features of the researcher instilled a deep sense of hesitation among potential participants placing the entire study in jeopardy.

In order to assuage their suspicion, it was necessary for the researcher to adopt a few unorthodox strategies to help ease the participants' concerns. This process began by showing potential participants the researcher's updated résumé, excluding personal details. This disclosure was beneficial, but was unfortunately not enough to recruit a sufficient number of participants needed for a study of this magnitude. This quandary prompted the researcher to secure the assistance of sponsors. These individuals rendered several invaluable services to the researcher by presenting him or her with "access, information, and support."²⁶⁶ In other words, the sponsor "vouches for your study."²⁶⁷ Once the support of these leading sponsors was secured, participants quickly contacted the researcher in order to express their willingness to be interviewed.

In conducting the actual interviews, the participants were enthusiastic, detailed,

inquisitive, and welcoming. The majority of participants not only kindly offered their homes as a venue for the interviews, but provided the researcher with refreshments and traditional delicacies. The fact that many of the participants allowed the interviews to take place in their homes represents a newfound sense of comfort with the study. In addition to their convivial nature, the participants demonstrated their immense support for higher education by expressing their willingness to assist the researcher in completing his study. This commitment manifested itself typically just before the actual interview was conducted.

The research design protocols stipulated that all participants who completed the interview would receive a ten-dollar gift certificate, in American currency, to various major stores in the city. The purpose of this small incentive was to encourage participation. Unfortunately, this incentive, without the support of sponsors, did not attract many participants. However, despite the shortcomings of this incentive, it was still necessary to give all participants a gift certificate as stipulated in the research design protocols. The participants generally found the concept of research incentives somewhat perplexing. Many participants wanted to refuse the gift certificate on the grounds that they did not want to be paid for assisting in such an educational endeavour. This refusal became stronger once the participants learned that the gift certificates were being directly paid for through the researcher's personal funds. The participants likely felt a sense of guilt in accepting anything from a young scholar striving to complete his doctorate. However, the participants' objection to this incentive is based on the premise that the gift certificates are payments. It is important to recognize that incentives are not bribes or payments, but rather are a deserved "token of appreciation."²⁶⁸ In using this type of

phraseology, it was much easier to explain the intended function of the incentives.

Nevertheless, there were some who completely ignored the gift certificate incentive and instead understood their participation in another, more fitting light.

These individuals saw their participation as a sort of religious duty to help those in need. In this case, the acceptance of a modest ten-dollar gift certificate would negate the spiritual grace one would have obtained from God. This divine reward is much more valuable than any financial payment one could acquire from another. Again, in this instance it was necessary to remind participants that the gift certificate was not a form of payment, but rather an expression of gratitude. Additionally, participants were welcomed to donate their gift certificate to the mosque, a charity, or a person in need. The entire debate over the gift certificate issue is relevant and requisite not only because it affords a clear insight into the moralistic mentality of the community of participants, but also provides an excellent springboard to begin the interview questionnaire on religiosity.

Conclusion

This chapter has explored periods of difficulty and development experienced by both waves during their residency in the United States. In reviewing the nature of this twenty-year period, it can be concluded that the Iraqi Shi'a from both waves have had a mixed experience in Dearborn. In reference to shared experiences, both waves emigrated from Iraq following a period of war. The first wave experienced a period of political inclusion during the 2000 presidential election and also a phase of communal development. Unfortunately, this period was quickly terminated following the September 11th terrorist attacks and the subsequent hostility directed against the Arab and Islamic communities of the country. In the case of the second wave, this group neither

experienced periods of advancement nor the concentrated animosity following the terrorist attacks. In contrast, the second wave's experience has been marked by a period of intolerance following the execution of Saddam Hussein and Terry Jones' attempt at publicly burning the Qur'an in front of the Islamic Center of America. In comparison, it is clear that both waves have experienced different events in America.

This chapter's discussion of the community's mixed experience in Dearborn will assist in understanding the level of religiosity maintained by each wave by providing the community's religious behaviour with a contextual background. The next two chapters will present and analyze the data collected from the field research component of this study. In addition, the original hypothesis posited at the beginning of this dissertation, along with Park's race relations cycle, will be tested in light of the data collected. It will be demonstrated that Park's race relations cycle is unable to account for the observed pattern thus requiring the inclusion of Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou's segmented assimilation theory and Charles Glock, Benjamin Ringer, and Earl Babbie's comfort hypothesis.

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Chapter Four: The Devotional Life Measurement: A Comparison of the First- and Second-Wave Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims in Greater Dearborn

Introduction

This chapter compares the field research data collected over a seven-month period from 2011 to 2012 on the level of religiosity among first- (1991-2002) and second-wave (2003-2011) Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims living in Dearborn. The chapter focuses exclusively on the devotional life measurement, while the following chapter will explore the mosque life and personal life measurements. However, before the data can be explored, it is necessary to revisit the operationalized definition of religiosity presented in an earlier chapter.

In chapter one, religiosity was defined as the “intensity and consistency of a person’s practice of their religion.”¹ In other words, religiosity is the degree of one’s religious beliefs and the frequency of his or her religious practices. This dissertation measures religiosity by studying the devotional lives, mosque lives, and personal lives of the participants in both waves. In order to determine the level of religiosity among this community, a questionnaire has been administered among twenty-five members from each wave. The questionnaire used in this study is divided into three different parts that correspond to the three measurements: devotional life, mosque life, and personal life. In addition, the analysis of the questionnaire has been subdivided into nine different indicators: prayer (indicator one), religious knowledge (indicator two), rituals (indicator three), pilgrimages (indicator four), spiritual authority (indicator five), mosque life (indicator six), religious attire (indicator seven), marriage (indicator eight), and dietary laws (indicator nine). Each of the nine indicators corresponds to one of the three measurements.

The first five indicators are part of the devotional life measurement, the sixth indicator corresponds to the second measurement, and the third measurement is comprised of indicators seven, eight, and nine. Since the devotional life measurement contains the most consequential and central religious aspects of Islam, it is expected that this measurement will be the most reflective of religiosity.² Although the centrality of the devotional life measurement should not be ignored, there are still other, more secondary aspects of the faith that can be incorporated in order to better understand the religiosity of the two waves. These more secondary aspects of the faith are contained in the two other measurements of this study, namely the mosque life and personal life measurements. This chapter will not only show that the practices contained in the devotional life are central aspects of the faith, but are also practices that cannot be neglected because of their special importance in Islam.

However, attempting to understand the devotional life measurement through the theoretical lenses supplied by Park's race relations cycle and Kymlicka's multiculturalism model proves to be difficult. As will be shown below, the aspects of the devotional life measurement, such as prayer (indicator one), religious knowledge (indicator two), rituals (indicator three), and spiritual authority (indicator five) are largely individual practices or decisions that are typically conducted or cultivated in the privacy of one's home and with little interference from the liberal-democratic state. In the case of the various pilgrimages (indicator four), this ritual is no doubt very public, but again receives minimal attention from the liberal-democratic state due to the state's refusal to take up the task of religious integration, according to Kymlicka.³

For the devotional life measurement, it will be shown below that the first wave is slightly more religious than the second wave. This finding can perhaps be attributed to the average difference in age between the two waves. The average age of first-wave participants is 38.04 whereas for the average second-wave participant it is 36.04.⁴ Although the age difference is not particularly large, it does show that the first-wave is slightly older than their second-wave counterparts. Moreover, since there is a slight difference in religiosity between the two waves, it is possible that this variance has to do with the slight age difference between the participants. This possibility will be examined below when exploring the devotional life measurement and its five indicators.

Indicator One: Prayer

In studying the tenets of Islam, one quickly notices that *salat* or prayer is “the heart of Islamic worship.”⁵ In a popular saying, or hadith, the Prophet Muhammad highlights the importance of prayer by declaring that “everything has a face, and the face of your religion is the prayer.”⁶ In addition to its exalted status, prayer in Islam also has a spiritually cathartic effect on its practitioners.⁷ The sixth Imam and eponymous founder of the Shi’a jurisprudential school, Imam Ja’far as-Sadiq (c. 702-765 C.E.) explains prayer in a metaphoric manner:

If there was to be a river outside one’s house into which he bathed five times a day, would there remain any dirt on his body? Similarly the prayer is the river which purifies [one’s soul] - every time one performs a prayer it acts as atonement for one’s sins, except for that sin which takes him and keeps away from his faith.⁸

This central role and purifying spiritual properties rightfully places prayer among the “five pillars” of the faith.⁹ This prominent position among the pillars demands that Muslims say five prayers per day at specific timeframes: just before dawn or *fajr*, at

noontime or *dhuhr*, in the afternoon or *asr*, at sunset or *maghrib*, and at night or *isha 'a*.¹⁰ In the increasingly demanding world, the amount of time one has to devote to any activity is limited. It is very possible that individuals may not have the time to pause five separate times a day due to work, school, family, or physical constraints. The Shi'a, on the other hand, are permitted to pray the noontime and afternoon sequentially and the sunset and nighttime prayer sequentially.¹¹

The opportunity to pray sequentially is a practice embraced by the great majority of participants as ninety-two percent of both waves stated that they pray “Shi'a style” or with five prayers said at three different times.¹² It was initially predicted that most members from both waves and sexes would engage in some form of prayer. However, it was not predicted that the great majority of both waves and sexes would pray all five prayers daily. Instead, it was expected that the majority of participants would pray possibly two or three out of the five required prayers. This degree of devotion to praying exemplified by the participants surpassed the expectations of the researcher. The fact that both waves hold steadfast to their prayers indicates that this activity is an integral part of their religious life and spiritual development.¹³ In reflecting on the interviews, the researcher could almost predict the response to this question before it was even stated by the participant. The continued importance of prayer among both waves demonstrates that the Iraqi-Shi'a community is upholding their established prayer routine as prescribed by their religious traditions.

These results are not surprising considering that prayer is “not a casual thing for the Muslim.”¹⁴ Instead, prayer is taken very seriously by Muslims to the point that anyone “who willfully avoids prayer is considered to have forsaken Islam.”¹⁵ By

equating devotion to prayer with fidelity to one's faith, it is easy to see that neither wave easily shuns prayer. The devotion to pray exemplified by both waves should not be surprising. It has already been mentioned that according to Kymlicka's multicultural model, "there is no need for the [liberal-democratic] state to require immigrants to integrate in terms of religion."¹⁶ Therefore, the waves are free to pray or not pray as they see fit without interference from the liberal-democratic state. In this case, both waves have chosen to pray as prescribed by the tenets of Shi'a Islam.¹⁷ However, the waves' devotion to prayer should not immediately indicate that they fully embrace all religious activities. It is possible that the demands of the modern world may induce some individuals to neglect certain religious activities that they perceive as dispensable.

Indicator Two: Religious Knowledge

The centrality of the Qur'an in Islam is unquestioned, but the number of times one spends reading it varies drastically from Muslim to Muslim. This discrepancy manifests itself when comparing the number of times first- and second-wave Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims read the Qur'an.¹⁸ Initially, the results between the two waves were identical with the same number of participants from both waves indicating that they read the Qur'an on a daily basis.¹⁹ However, this small similarity between the two waves would shortly dissolve.²⁰ The most common response among first-wave participants was that they read the Qur'an multiple times a week, while the most recurrent answer among second-wave participants was that they read the Qur'an during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan.²¹ These two responses reveal that first-wave participants read the Qur'an more frequently than participants in the second wave.²² In light of these disparate results, there is a temptation to conclude that members of the first wave are more religious in this regard.

This type of conclusion would be short-sighted as the second wave seems to have faced more challenges and barriers that have limited the amount of time they can spend on reading the Qur'an.

To better understand the discrepancy between the two waves' responses, it is necessary to identify other issues or challenges that may explain the reduced amount of time second-wave participants spend reading the Qur'an. As mentioned above, the first wave arrived between 1991 and 2002 whereas the second wave arrived later between 2003 and 2011. Although the waves arrived at different times, there were some common experiences shared by both waves. When both waves arrived, they had to find suitable housing, gain employment, retrain and recertify professional credentials as needed, obtain some sort of legitimate immigration status, acquire a basic working knowledge of English, and generally begin to familiarize themselves with American customs, laws, and traditions.

However, what separates the first wave from the second in this case is that the latter has had much less time to establish themselves and secure these necessities of life. The procurement of these essentials naturally limits the amount of time they can devote to religious study on a daily or weekly basis. It is easy to say that the truly pious person would make time in his or her truncated schedule to read religious texts more frequently. Yet when one is responsible for the welfare of young children, elderly parents, or relatives that are unable to care for themselves, devoting more time to Qur'anic study becomes increasingly difficult to implement in reality. Though these two groups differ on how often they read the Qur'an, both did mention in comparable numbers that they do in fact read the Qur'an.²³ Only a few members from each wave admitted to either reading

the Qur'an infrequently or not at all.²⁴ It is accurate to state that reading the Qur'an, to some degree, is observed by both sexes and waves rendering this practice of continued relevance.²⁵ In addition, it is possible that the average age difference between the two waves might be responsible for these results. In the first wave, the average age of the participants is 38.04, while the second wave's average age is 36.04.²⁶ It is also possible that given their slightly older age, the first wave may have more time to read and study the Qur'an, particularly those who have retired.

In taking into account the age difference between the two waves coupled with the different amount of time they each spent reading the Qur'an, Glock, Ringer, and Babbie's comfort hypothesis becomes increasingly relevant. Their research among American Episcopalians showed that individuals fifty years and over were more involved in church activities in comparison to younger parishioners.²⁷ This result supports the comfort hypothesis and its recognition that the elderly may seek the church in order to secure refuge from an increasingly "youth-oriented secular society."²⁸ Perhaps the older first wave spends more time reading religious works, such as the Qur'an in order to alleviate the discomfort of living in a society that seems dominated and directed by the youth. The first wave's sense of discomfort is a possibility due to their slightly older average age in comparison to the second wave.²⁹ However, in assuming that this sense of discomfort translates into reading religious texts more frequently, neither wave has taken its devotion to the highest possible level and successfully memorized the entire Qur'an, a practice requiring profound dedication and countless years of study.³⁰

The task of memorizing the entire Qur'an is a commendable feat given the sheer size of this sacred text. An individual who has accomplished this task is known as a

hafiz.³¹ This accomplishment does not seem popular among the participants. In surveying both waves, zero out of the possible fifty participants admitted to having memorized the entire Qur'an.³² One female participant from the second wave stated that she had memorized about seventy percent of the entire Qur'an.³³ This individual's response represents the highest level of memorization by any participant in the entire study. Though this participant's achievement is commendable, the question asked was if the individual had memorized the entire Qur'an, not a majority or a substantial portion.

The fact that no one from either wave had completely memorized the Qur'an provokes the question as to why this exercise is largely ignored.³⁴ This practice's unpopularity among the participants appears to be a sectarian phenomenon:

It is interesting to note that, in contrast with many Sunni systems of education, the Qur'an is not taught as such in the required curriculum [of the Shi'a] (although there are classes in which the teacher offers a commentary on the Qur'an), nor is memorization of the Qur'an a formal prerequisite for entry into the Shi'ite system of education, as it once was in the most celebrated Sunni center of traditional education, the Azhar in Cairo.³⁵

This statement helps support the conclusion that the Shi'a do not emphasize Qur'anic memorization in contrast to their Sunni counterparts.³⁶ However, the statement does not explain why this is the case among the Shi'a. Despite this statement, it is not that the Shi'a ignore the Qur'an, but rather have historically focused on "the teaching of the imams, the divinely given successors to Muhammad, and on personal loyalty to them."³⁷ This Shi'a focus on the guidance provided by the Twelve Imams can also be seen in how they interpret the Qur'an.³⁸ In their exegetical evaluation, the Shi'a highlight "explicit references in the Qur'an to themes such as the 'imams' and other specifically Shi'i doctrines."³⁹ In summary, it appears that the Shi'a have a particular attachment to the

Imams in both their scriptural interpretation and general outlook.⁴⁰ This focus on the Imams was confirmed during the interviewing segment of this dissertation.

In one of the most illuminating interviews, one male participant explained the Shi'as' focus on the Imams by comparing them to their Sunni counterparts.⁴¹ The participant explained that Sunnis focus exceedingly on the Qur'an "at the expense" of studying the *ahl al-bayt*, or the People of the [Prophetic] Household.⁴² The *ahl al-bayt* are essentially the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, who in Shi'a tradition are to be respected for their resolute piety and religious knowledge.⁴³ In this case, the participant is not only referring to the biographies of these figures, but also likely alluding to their deeds and sayings. The participant further explained that Shi'a Muslims are in the exact opposite situation with excessive emphasis on the *ahl al-bayt*.⁴⁴ In the participant's opinion, both approaches are lacking.⁴⁵ He explains that in order to be a "true Muslim" one must have knowledge of both the Qur'an and the *ahl al-bayt*.⁴⁶ This twofold requirement neglects a third important component of both Sunni and Shi'a Islam, namely the hadiths.

There is a diverse body of literature in Islam called the hadiths, literally translated as "news."⁴⁷ The hadiths are essentially "discrete anecdotes."⁴⁸ The hadiths are vast as they have been derived "from thousands of individual brief narratives."⁴⁹ The narratives are compiled together in order to describe "the words, actions and deeds of the Prophet."⁵⁰ These hadiths address the Prophet Muhammad's thoughts on a range of issues, such as religious, political, military, criminal, physical, gender, and artistic matters.⁵¹ The hadiths were not written during the Prophet's lifetime, but were rather passed down orally and then compiled at least a century after the Prophet's death.⁵²

In contrast to the Sunni hadiths, which only recognize the sayings attributed to the Prophet Muhammad, the Shi'a also acknowledge hadiths based on the sayings and deeds of the Imams.⁵³ In the eyes of the Shi'a, since these twelve Imams are descendants of the Prophet, they inherited the characteristic of infallibility from their esteemed ancestor.⁵⁴ The hadiths of the twelve Imams are regarded as a sort of "supplement to the prophetic hadith."⁵⁵ In reference to Shi'a collections of hadith, the compilations have spanned over a millennium from the tenth to twentieth common centuries.⁵⁶ This extensiveness is evidenced in a recently published bilingual collection of Shi'a hadith titled, *A Scale of Wisdom: A Compendium of Shi'a Hadith* (2009) compiled under the auspices of Ayatollah M. Muhammadi Rayshahri of Iran. This large, but still incomplete volume contains many sayings that could spiritually enlighten any Shi'a Muslim. However, despite the edifying effect of the hadiths, the level of knowledge of the hadiths reported by the Iraqi Shi'a varies between the waves.⁵⁷ It is possible that the older members of the waves may have had more time and exposure to the hadiths in the course of their lives. Conversely, given the advent of the Internet and technology, the younger members of the waves, may have had more opportunities to read the hadiths on their different technological devices. In either speculative scenario, it is difficult to confirm the level of access each individual member has had to the hadiths in the course of their lifetime.

This question produced seven different responses from the participants, each representing a different degree of knowledge about the hadiths, including "lots/very well," "well/good," "kind of well," "some/enough," "yes," "not much/little," and "suspicious."⁵⁸ Within the highest level of knowledge, twenty-eight percent or seven participants from the first wave and twenty-four percent or six from the second wave

selected the “lots/very well” response.⁵⁹ These percentages appear somewhat low when considering that the hadiths are “after the Holy Quran, the most important body of religious text for Shi’ites.”⁶⁰ In reflecting on the level of knowledge stipulated by the participants coupled with the status the hadiths enjoy in Shia Islam, one should bear in mind that the sheer number of hadiths makes it difficult for the layperson to become proficient. In answering this question, one participant alluded to this enormity by declaring that “religion is like an ocean; whatever you grab, you are [still] at the beginning.”⁶¹ The notion of futility permeates this participant’s astute simile. In other words, no matter how hard one tries to grasp the entirety of their faith, there is always an infinite amount of knowledge still waiting to be discovered and studied by the aspirant.

This ocean simile described by the participant above can help explain the sizable number of participants from both waves⁵⁹ who stated that they only had “some” or “enough” knowledge of the hadiths.⁶² The “some/enough” category seems vague, but it should be regarded as analogous to having a moderate level of understanding of the hadiths. In this category, twenty-four percent of first wave and twenty percent of second wave participants selected this response.⁶³ The difference between the two waves in this category is negligible and cannot be used to accurately determine which group is more religious than the other. There is however slightly more of a difference among the waves when comparing those who stated that they have either “not much” or “little knowledge” of the hadiths.⁶⁴ The results show that there are twice as many first-wave participants within the “not much” or “little knowledge” category.⁶⁵ This trend should automatically indicate that the second wave has a more profound knowledge of these sacred works and are consequently more religious. These responses and statistics do provide some insight

into the Iraqi Shi'as' devotion to acquiring religious knowledge. However, these responses alone should not be employed as an indicator of religiosity owing to the high degree of subjectivity embedded in each participant's response. For example, one participant may believe that knowledge of ten different hadiths would warrant a response of "some" knowledge, whereas another with the exact same knowledge would provide a response of "well/good." The question itself invites responses that are highly subjective due to the absence of any sort of standardization embedded within the question. This problem is the nature of open questions, whereby participants can essentially "reply however they wish."⁶⁶ This type of open question could have been complemented with a continuum that outlines what each possible answer consists of before the participant responded. In other words, the question could have been changed from an open to a closed question. In this case, the participants would have been presented with a "limited number of response alternatives" that they could choose from.⁶⁷ However, while this question should have been adjusted, it did demonstrate that some degree of diversity exists within the Iraqi-Shi'a community, at least in some aspects of religious life.

Indicator Three: Rituals

A sense of consistency returns when exploring the manner in which both waves commemorate the somber occasion of Ashura. The term itself is a derivative of the Arabic word *asher* meaning "tenth." In this case, the word tenth signifies the tenth day of Muharram, the first Islamic month, which varies from year to year. It is believed that on this day, Husayn (c. 626-680 C.E.), grandson of the Prophet Muhammad and third Imam in Shi'ism was brutally martyred by Umayyad forces from Damascus in the year 680 C.E.⁶⁸ This date on the Shi'a liturgical calendar is marked with a number of different

rituals.⁶⁹ However, as explored in chapter two, the rituals and gatherings associated with Ashura have historically been limited in pre-American invasion Iraqi society.⁷⁰ In light of these restrictions, it is difficult to determine how Ashura was practiced in Iraq. Moreover, there are several participants who were either infants or children at the time of the emigration from Iraq and thus do not remember how this occasion was commemorated. Therefore, since all participants cannot precisely describe their experiences in Iraq, it is best to focus on how Ashura is commemorated in America. By exclusively focusing on the various Ashura rituals performed in America, each participant will have some experiences to share with the researcher.

In the interviews, both waves enumerated many different activities that they engage in on Ashura and during the days both preceding and following this solemn occasion.⁷¹ The three most popular activities observed during Ashura mentioned by both waves include attending mosque, listening to religious lectures, and engaging in *latm* or soft breast beating typically over one's clothes.⁷² In addition to these more prevalent rituals, there are other, less dominant customs that are embraced by males and females from both waves, such as wearing black, crying, avoiding music, holding gatherings, reflecting on one's behaviour, and of course saying various prayers and supplications.⁷³ These secondary rituals are employed in various different degrees among the two waves.⁷⁴ While this type of query is useful in identifying what types of rituals occur during Ashura among the participants, it does not provide the researcher with the necessary information to make a legitimate comparison. It would be arbitrary to declare crying more religious than wearing black or holding gatherings in one's home less religious than attending mosque. The similarities among all the different activities are not

pronounced enough to detect any significant difference. These activities all conveniently congregate around the middle of the religiosity spectrum, neither being too zealous nor too dispirited. However, if one wishes to make legitimate comparisons between the two waves, it is imperative to examine the two extremes of this question. In other words, by ascertaining the number of participants who either ignore Ashura entirely or engage in rituals that would be considered fanatical, one can gain a better insight into the religiosity of the two waves.

There are some members from both the first and second wave who simply do not honour this day with any special activity.⁷⁵ In the first wave, one participant admitted to disregarding Ashura entirely, while in the second wave, two participants selected this response.⁷⁶ The almost identical number of participants admitting to not commemorating Ashura allows the researcher to conclude that there is no significant difference between the two waves in this regard. However, in direct opposition to those who ignore Ashura, there are those within both waves who practice rituals that can be described as pure zealotry to the point of being physically dangerous or even fatal.

The act of corporal mortification or ritualistically inflicting some sort of punishment on oneself either to mark a religious occasion or satisfy some spiritual need is a type of exercise practiced in varied degrees by many of the world's religions. These diverse practices become disconcerting when the act in question causes serious injury or even death. There are two acts of corporal mortification in Shi'ism that would fall into this hazardous category, namely *zanjir* and *tatbir*. The first ritual of *zanjir* involves the use of handheld metal chains that individuals use to flagellate themselves.⁷⁷ The second, more intense ritual of *tatbir* consists of men enshrouded in white repeatedly tapping their

foreheads and heads with sharp knives or swords.⁷⁸ This particular ritual is naturally frowned upon by popular Shi'a organizations such as the Da'wa Party of Iraq and Hezbollah of Lebanon.⁷⁹ The denunciation of this practice and other unsavoury ones is echoed by several prominent spiritual authorities, including Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamene'i (1939 -) of Iran.⁸⁰ The dislike these organizations and religious figures have for *zanjir* and *tatbir* is not only understandable, but also shared by members of both waves.⁸¹ The majority of those surveyed avoid these "blood rituals."⁸² Moreover, they also expressed several negative attitudes on the matter with phrases such as "I don't believe in that," "I don't like," and most ardent of all, "I hate them."⁸³ The comments help explain the low number of participants who practice *zanjir* and *tatbir*.⁸⁴ Moreover, given the animosity that both waves showed for the *zanjir* and *tatbir* customs it is unlikely that the participants were concealing their true feelings in order to appear moderate in the eyes of the researcher. However, despite these attitudes, there are still some members of both waves who practice these rituals.

In the first wave, three participants practiced some form of corporal mortification be it *zanjir*, *tatbir* or both.⁸⁵ The second wave showed a lower number with only one participant performing *zanjir* during Ashura.⁸⁶ The fact that the number of participants embracing the *zanjir* and *tatbir* customs was relatively low permits the researcher to conclude that this form of extreme religiosity holds a marginal place among participants.⁸⁷ In addition, this rejection of *zanjir* and *tatbir* indicates that the participant community takes into account more practical concerns that temper its religious rituals. The most pressing concern is for the safety of the individual engaging in this custom. The

possibility of seriously injuring a vital organ or infection caused by the self-inflicted wounds is not negligible.

In the course of discussing these rituals, one older participant recalled his younger years growing up in Iraq and witnessing these practices.⁸⁸ He explained that individuals performing *zanjir* or *tatbir* would rub a type of charcoal on their wounds called *shafraa*.⁸⁹ The participant claimed that this would stop the bleeding and prevent infection.⁹⁰ The medical validity of such homeopathic remedies is debatable, but nonetheless still offers a rare insight into the logistics of these practices. In addition to one's own health, it is important to think about the health of others. The idea of shedding priceless blood appears frivolous and wasteful to both the faithful who object to these rituals and to non-believers who are puzzled by such injurious actions. One pragmatic participant suggested that instead of engaging in *zanjir* and *tatbir* on this hallowed day, and thus carelessly wasting precious blood, one should donate their blood and allow it to be used in a lifesaving capacity.⁹¹ This alternative approach would not only supply this controversial event with a pragmatic purpose, but assist in constructing a new image about Shi'a rituals in the eyes of the outside community.

In reviewing the ritualistic observances among the two waves during Ashura, it appears that the second wave is slightly less disposed in commemorating this solemn occasion in comparison to the first wave.⁹² The data revealed that the second wave attended mosque less frequently during Ashura, as nine participants stated they attended mosque in comparison to thirteen from the first wave.⁹³ In addition, the second wave engaged in the practice of *latm* or breast-beating and *tatbir* or forehead cutting with knives or swords less than their first wave counterparts.⁹⁴ Finally, the second wave had

more participants who ignored the Ashura commemoration entirely by not marking this day with any special activities.⁹⁵ The only time when the second wave surpassed the first wave was in the case of listening to lectures.⁹⁶ However, it is possible that these lectures were viewed on television or the Internet. In order to explain the difference between the two waves, Portes and Zhou's segmented assimilation theory is useful.

If according to the original claim that the second wave is attempting to assimilate into the dominant middle class, then in order to complete this task they must dispense with "old-world values, norms, and behavioral patterns."⁹⁷ The second wave appears to avoid participating in religious activities during the Ashura season at the same level as the first wave.⁹⁸ Moreover, rituals that can be perceived as extreme, such as *latm*, *tatbir*, and the ritual *zanjir* or metal chain flagellation are largely shunned by the second wave.⁹⁹ It should be noted that while Ashura is a central event in the Shi'a liturgical calendar, there are other expressions of the Shi'a faith that are not only more important, but are also religious commandments.

Indicator Four: Pilgrimages

The *hajj* or great pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina in modern-day Saudi Arabia is a captivating event that is considered the "largest annual pilgrimage in the world."¹⁰⁰ This worldwide pilgrimage attracts millions of pilgrims annually.¹⁰¹ It was reported by the Central Hajj Committee that during the 2012 *hajj* season, 3.16 to 3.65 million individuals performed the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina.¹⁰² This high volume of pilgrims reflects that the *hajj* is a critical event in the life of a Muslim and one of continued importance. This pilgrimage is not a cultural tradition, but rather a religious commandment expressly ordered by the Qur'an: "Pilgrimage to the House [Ka'ba in Mecca] is a duty owed to God

by people who are to undertake it.”¹⁰³ The *hajj* is to be performed by “all adult Muslims.”¹⁰⁴ Children are excused from this religious requirement for the time being.¹⁰⁵ This pilgrimage is not only required to be performed by both sexes, but it is unique in that the *hajj* “is the only major Muslim ritual in which men and women participate with no division between them.”¹⁰⁶ In other terms, the *hajj* is free from any form of “sexual segregation” that may dominate other events in Islam.¹⁰⁷

In addition to actually travelling from one’s country of habitation to the holy cities, there are several strict conditions and obligations that must be followed, including performing the *hajj* during a specific Islamic month, entering into a state of spiritual purification, wearing special attire, abstaining from sexual activity, and carrying out several symbolic re-enactments and rituals that are rooted in Islamic history.¹⁰⁸ These rules and rituals are complemented with a number of spiritual and material rewards for those who complete the *hajj*, including the absolution of sin, spiritual tranquility, and the defence against poverty.¹⁰⁹ The religious necessity coupled with the benefits of the *hajj* is an encouragement to all Muslims, including the Iraqi-Shi’a, who either expressed pride in having completed the *hajj* or showed a longing to perform it in the near future.

In comparing the number of participants from both waves who have completed the *hajj*, the results do show a significant difference.¹¹⁰ In the first wave, thirteen participants completed the *hajj* while no one in the second wave accomplished the required pilgrimage.¹¹¹ In this case, the variation between the two waves is not a marginal difference of two or three participants, but rather a significant disparity of fifty-two percent.¹¹² There is a temptation, because of the large discrepancy between the two waves, to declare the first wave more religious than the second owing to the former’s

considerably higher completion rate. Again, this type of conclusion is not only premature but ignores other possible factors that could have contributed to this result. There were second-wave participants who adamantly expressed their intention to perform the *hajj* one day in the future.¹¹³ In other words, second-wave participants are interested in the prospect of performing the *hajj*, but appear consumed with other matters at the moment.

The *hajj* not only entails much time and planning, but also naturally requires abundant financial resources. A few participants discussed the exorbitant cost of the *hajj*.¹¹⁴ One participant stated that the cost of the *hajj* today would be around “six thousand American dollars.”¹¹⁵ However, as he mentioned, the cost does include one’s return airfare to Saudi Arabia, hotel accommodations, meals, and other related travel costs.¹¹⁶ This estimation was echoed by another participant who stated that the average cost would be around “six to seven thousand American dollars.”¹¹⁷ This participant also mentioned that because she is a student and her finances are limited, “Islamic law does not require me to go on the *hajj*.”¹¹⁸ The participant is correct in her analysis as the *hajj* is incumbent on all Muslims, “if they are physically and financially able.”¹¹⁹ The members of the second wave seem sincerely interested in performing the *hajj*, but appear constrained by financial issues.

The financial impediments are more challenging for individuals who not only lived most of their lives in a developing and war-torn country where employment opportunities were scarce, but also recently arrived in a foreign country where it is necessary to spend what little money one earns on absolute necessities like shelter, food, medicine, and local transportation. This distinction should not give the impression that all members of the first wave are wealthy and can easily afford expensive religious journeys.

The first wave is also challenged by economic constraints, but is not confronted with the same type of trials experienced by the recently arrived second wave. In addition to using this economic explanation to explain this difference in *haji* performance between the two waves, there is another result that can help dissuade arguments that position the first wave as more religious than the second.

In Shi'ism, the faithful frequently perform a type of pilgrimage that is very different from the *haji*. The Shi'a will often engage in the *ziyarat* or visitation to the shrines of the Prophet, Twelve Imams, and other prominent members of or associated with the Prophetic family.¹²⁰ The Iraqi homeland contains the mortal remains of six out of the Twelve Imams and is also the location where the Hidden Imam disappeared and began his *ghayba*, or occultation.¹²¹ This devotional practice is popular with both waves, but is noticeably more popular among the second wave.¹²² In the second wave, ninety-six percent of participants surveyed stated that they had visited the holy shrines in Najaf and Karbala in Iraq, whereas eighty-four percent of those in the first wave admitted to have visited these two shrines.¹²³ This pattern of having more second-wave participants performing *ziyarat* endures when comparing other shrine cities, including Kadhimayn and Samarra in Iraq, Mashhad and Qom in Iran, and Damascus in Syria.¹²⁴ The only exception is the Baqiyya cemetery in Saudi Arabia, which houses the mortal remains of four Imams.¹²⁵ In this instance, more first-wave participants have visited this cemetery.¹²⁶ The explanation for this minor deviation in the pattern can be attributed to the fact that this particular visitation usually occurs during one's pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina.

It is interesting to note that a few members of the second wave mentioned sites of *ziyarat* that were unfamiliar to the researcher.¹²⁷ The popularity of *ziyarat* among the

second wave along with the visitation to other, lesser known shrines indicates that this type of pilgrimage is of importance to this wave. Although they may not have performed the obligatory pilgrimage, their visitation to other major shrines clearly shows that they are not opposed to the practice. There is an inclination to suggest that the second wave has essentially balanced the scale of religiosity by performing the *ziyarat*. It is an error to suggest that one can compensate for not performing the *hajj* through a series of *ziyarat*, as the *hajj* is a pillar of faith.¹²⁸ The intention of this discussion is not to declare that the first wave is more religious because they have performed the *hajj* more frequently, but rather to expose and explain the obstacles and opportunities that both waves have either faced or enjoyed.

In reflecting on the differences observed between the two waves, it seems that the *hajj* issue revolved less around religiosity and more around financial ability. It is financially difficult for some to take part in the *hajj* given the fact that thousands of dollars are required.¹²⁹ The role of financial cost seemed to have affected the second wave more as no one from this group had completed the *hajj* while thirteen first wave participants performed this pilgrimage.¹³⁰ In order to explain this discrepancy between the two waves, it was put forward that the financial pressures imposed on the second wave would be more profound than those faced by the first wave. It was noted that the second wave's recent arrival in the United States has forced them to devote not only their time, but also their money in order to secure the necessities of life, such as food, shelter, and medicine. This explanation seems logical not only due to the recent arrival of the second wave, but also due to their expressed interest in performing the *hajj* at a later date.¹³¹ However, the lack of financial resources is not the only possible explanation.

If it is accepted that the second wave is attempting to assimilate into the middle class as per the principles of segmented assimilation theory, then “old-world” practices such as the *hajj* would be abandoned.¹³² In place of these “old-world” practices, segmented assimilation theory predicts that these immigrants would then move to embrace “the WASP core culture associated with the middle class.”¹³³ If this is the case, then religious rituals such as the *hajj* would be dispensed with by the second wave in favour of securing a large home in the suburbs, purchasing a luxury sedan, and achieving financial stability and security. The problem with segmented assimilation theory in this instance is that it ignores the second wave’s interest in performing the *hajj* in the future. If the second wave stated that they had not performed the *hajj* and indicated that they had no interest in completing this pilgrimage in the future, then segmented assimilation theory would prove useful. Moreover, because they have visited other key shrines in Iraq, Iran, and Syria, the second wave has shown their profound interest in performing pilgrimages to holy places that they are financially able to attend.¹³⁴ The decision to embark on religious pilgrimages to different holy sites is a choice that the individual makes in order to satisfy some sort of personal devotion. However, there are other decisions that the Shi’a faithful need to make, which require spiritual guidance from an outside source. On these occasions, the Shi’a faithful seek the guidance of a renowned spiritual cleric.

Indicator Five: Spiritual Authority

The Shi’a branch of Islam has a unique religious process for selecting spiritual leaders. In contrast to faiths that impose a religious leader on the faithful through some sort of divine intervention, dynastic right, or clerical election, the Shi’a approach places

more emphasis on the individual layperson. The majority of the Shi'a faithful, namely those who have not mastered the religious sciences, are expected to select a senior religious authority.¹³⁵ In other words, the Shi'a have the right to choose who they wish to emulate on religious matters.¹³⁶ However, this revered figure cannot be anyone the faithful feels is worthy of religious emulation. Instead, the religious authority must be part of "the upper echelon" of the Shi'a clerical structure.¹³⁷ A preeminent cleric that reaches this rank is called a *marja* or more formally a *marja al-taqlid*, or source of emulation, and is popularly accorded the honourific title of grand ayatollah.¹³⁸ There are several *maraji* (plural of *marja*) in the world today, but the majority of the faithful arguably follow one prominent octogenarian living in Iraq.¹³⁹

Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Sistani (1930 -) originally from Mashhad, Iran, but currently residing in Najaf, Iraq, is popularly considered "the most revered Shia on the planet."¹⁴⁰ There are many indications that suggest he is the most followed *marja* in the world, but one report specifically quantifies this imprecise majority by contending that eighty percent of the Shi'a world accepts Sistani as their *marja*.¹⁴¹ This impressive majority is reportedly also mirrored among the Shi'a of Iraq.¹⁴² This support for Sistani is not only maintained by the Shi'a residing in Iraq, but also those who fled their homeland for America. In both waves, either a plurality or majority of participants specified that Sistani is their *marja*.¹⁴³ In the first wave, twelve participants or forty-eight percent of those surveyed designated Sistani as their *marja*.¹⁴⁴ The level of support for Sistani among second-wave participants was significantly higher with twenty-three participants or ninety-two percent of those questioned selecting this cleric.¹⁴⁵ The reasoning for this

difference will be discussed once the second-most popular *marja* is examined in more detail, as there is a connection between the two *maraji*.

In addition to being asked to identify their *marja*, the participants were also invited to explain the reasoning for their choice. In the case of Sistani, the most common reason provided by both waves of participants was that he was “the most knowledgeable” of all the *maraji*.¹⁴⁶ In this line of thinking, others remarked that Sistani was “very wise” and “the top” which corroborates his foremost status.¹⁴⁷ In addition, there seems to be a familial influence.¹⁴⁸ For example, a participant from the second wave helped illuminate this parental influence through her response: “My parents followed him [but] now I realize he is the one I should follow.”¹⁴⁹ The participant’s response seems to indicate that the choice of a *marja* may be encouraged by parental pressure.¹⁵⁰ This type of persuasion is analogous to parents forcing their children to attend a specific place of worship or observe a set of religious dietary laws in order to maintain a sense of consistency with the entire family. There are other reasons why this *marja* was selected, but the fact remains that Sistani received the largest number of supporters in each of the two waves.¹⁵¹ However, although Sistani is popular in both groups, there is still a degree of dissimilarity that requires explanation.

The second most selected *marja* was the now-deceased Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Abul Qassim Khoe’i (1899-1992) also originally from Iran but resided in Najaf, Iraq.¹⁵² This distinguished cleric was accepted as a *marja* from his ascension to this position in 1945 to his death in 1992.¹⁵³ However, according to one participant Khoe’i was “maybe the most knowledgeable in the past two hundred years.”¹⁵⁴ This comment, although flattering, does not help to explain why more first-wave participants follow this *marja*. In

selecting a *marja*, it is expected that those seeking guidance will choose a *marja* that possesses “superiority in learning.”¹⁵⁵ The fact that many first-wave participants named Khoe’i as their *marja* as opposed to the second wave who overwhelmingly selected Sistani suggests that the former are generally older than the latter or reached the age of religious majority earlier. This age difference between the two waves has already been confirmed and discussed.¹⁵⁶ Initially, these explanations appear puzzling, but one must recognize that Shi’a jurisprudence forbids individuals from selecting a deceased *marja*.¹⁵⁷ In light of this prohibition, only participants who reached the Islamic age of majority before the death of Khoe’i could legitimately claim him as their *marja*. However, those who were either unborn or too young to make a selection had to look elsewhere for spiritual enlightenment and guidance.

The faithful wishing to emulate the late nonagenarian Khoe’i have the promising option to select his successor as their *marja*. In this case, Khoe’i’s selected Sistani as his preferred successor.¹⁵⁸ The Khoe’i-Sistani relationship helps illustrate the popular master-student trend in Shi’ism where “a living *marja*’ promotes one of his former students to be his successor after his death so that the network of institutions and followers can pass from one *marja*’ to another.”¹⁵⁹ Given this succession, one can not only discern the firm bond between the two honoured clerics, but also a deep sense of continuity for the faithful. One participant from the second wave explained that the selection of Sistani was based on the fact that “he was a student of Imam Khoe’i.”¹⁶⁰ This clerical lineage is noticed by the Shi’a faithful and provides a source of comfort. The following once held by the now-deceased Khoe’i can take comfort in the fact that not only his designated successor was held in high-esteem by his predecessor, but more

importantly that Sistani's teaching and opinions will mirror those of his late master.

Though the intricacies of Islamic law are bound to present instances where the two clerics may differ in some manner, both Khoe'i and Sistani generally agree on one of the most contentious issues facing a cleric in contemporary society.

The precise and proper function of the cleric in political affairs has produced several "contradictory attitudes."¹⁶¹ In addition, these attitudes have become part of an ongoing and "fierce debate" within both lay and clerical circles.¹⁶² Those who advocate the quietist approach believe that the *marja* should exclusively concentrate on spiritual matters, whereas those supporting the activist position envision a prominent role for the *marja* on the political stage.¹⁶³ The quietist perspective has been championed by both Khoe'i and Sistani.¹⁶⁴ In the case of the latter cleric, this position seems to explain why he has such a strong level of support from both first- and second-wave participants. The participants were quite clear in explaining how Sistani "doesn't like politics" and "doesn't make conflict between politics and religion."¹⁶⁵ In one interview, the participant stated that Sistani is "medium and moderate" in his political and religious orientation.¹⁶⁶ The reasons both waves listed for their support of Sistani, and to a lesser degree Khoe'i, provides the researcher with some insight into the religiosity of the Iraqi-Shi'a. The recognition of the Khoe'i-Sistani lineage by most participants suggests that the Iraqi Shi'a desire to emulate the most learned cleric who avoids political affairs and who embraces moderation and charts the middle path. The metaphor of the middle path is a particularly revealing metaphor that assists in validating the conclusion that the participants support a traditional *marja* who avoids extremism from both sides of the

political spectrum. However, it should be noted that not all participants surveyed envisioned this role for their chosen *marja*.

The number of participants who selected *maraji* other than Khoe'i and Sistani was minuscule, but still warrants some exploration.¹⁶⁷ The third *marja*, selected only by two participants in the entire study, is the late Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah (1935-2010) of Lebanon.¹⁶⁸ This *marja* has been described as "the most influential Shi'i cleric in Lebanon."¹⁶⁹ Fadlallah is also popularly recognized as the spiritual leader of Hezbollah.¹⁷⁰ In attempting to understand the personality of Fadlallah, one notices that the cleric seems to crave a special niche for himself that is detached from the religious powerhouses in Iraq and Iran.¹⁷¹ In the course of his religious career, Fadlallah has put forward many unorthodox rulings from permitting a man to shave his beard to a liberal interpretation of women's rights to the declaration that all human beings are ritualistically clean.¹⁷² In light of these teachings, it would be expected that more Muslims would attract to him; however, as mentioned, only two participants selected Fadlallah as their *marja*.¹⁷³

There is a temptation to explain this small following by citing Fadlallah's affiliation with Lebanon, instead of Iraq. The idea of selecting a *marja* that matches one's own nationality does not seem to be a factor in the selection process. In the course of the fifty interviews, only one participant passingly addressed this issue: "We don't like to follow someone from outside the country."¹⁷⁴ From a literalist perspective, the statement makes no mention of nationality but rather only residency. In other words, if nationality was an issue, Khoe'i and Sistani would both be excluded as both are natives of Iran and Fadlallah would be accepted due to his birth in Iraq.¹⁷⁵ If this nationalistic approach was

true, the politically active Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr of Iraq (c. 1935-1980) would have been a popular choice among participants. However, there was only one participant who selected this cleric.¹⁷⁶ The explanations provided by the majority of participants reveal that they are not interested in the ethnicity or nationality of their *marja*, but rather in his level of knowledge. This component coupled with the faithful's value in the *marja* who avoids the political stage validates the conclusion that both waves of participants are interested in preserving tradition and avoiding radical innovations from both sides of the political spectrum. However, the majority's decision to maintain tradition should not negate the presence of a small minority of participants who challenge the entire foundation of this entrenched religious institution.

In the course of the interviews, the most astounding response was the revelation that some members within both waves rejected their notion of *marjariyya* or *marjahood*.¹⁷⁷ The perception that all members of a specific religion will embrace the same traditions, practice similar rituals, and espouse common beliefs is an assumption that cannot be made by any researcher. However, when one hears the same response repeatedly, it is only natural to be somewhat surprised to hear answers that deviate drastically from the expected trend. The three participants who denounced the concept of *marjariyya* had a different reason for their attitudes.¹⁷⁸ The first participant to express this position explained his choice by declaring that the *maraji* are "liars."¹⁷⁹ This type of bold statement rejects the high level of reverence held by the great majority of participants for this office. However, in surveying any religious community, there is likely to be a few individuals who express a degree of dislike, frustration, or contempt for the clerical hierarchy. This type of impertinent feeling is usually complemented with a sense of

facetiousness. In responding to this question, another participant proudly announced, “I am my own *marja*” much to the surprise of the researcher.¹⁸⁰ This declaration was not to be taken seriously, as the participant does not possess the theological credentials to claim such a distinguished title. In furthering the interview, these two anti-*marja* participants exemplified a staunch secular outlook that had little room for religion.¹⁸¹

These two cases should not give the impression that an anti-clerical position automatically denotes an irreligious perspective. In one case, a participant rejected the idea of *marjariyya*, but embraced many traditional tenets of the faith.¹⁸² In contrast to the two previous participants, this participant presented legitimate arguments and concerns about the office of *marjariyya*, rather than engaging in disparaging commentary and ridicule.¹⁸³ This more cerebral participant explains that the institution of *marjariyya* was an innovative, colonial ideal imposed on the Shi’a of Iraq by the British during their occupation of the country in the early twentieth century.¹⁸⁴ The participant further explains that the British agreed to recognize the leading clerics of the day as “infallible” in religious matters provided that the clerics agreed to remove themselves from political life.¹⁸⁵ This intriguing historical perspective suffers from two conspicuous errors. First, despite the participant’s account, the office of *marjariyya* was not established during the twentieth century, but rather originated in the nineteenth century.¹⁸⁶ Second, as shown in chapter two, the early twentieth century in Iraq was consumed with different violent engagements between the British and the Iraqi people. Therefore, if a division of power was agreed upon by the British and the Shi’a hierarchy, it was not effective in preventing conflict from engulfing the budding nation. The veracity of this participant’s explanation is not as important as the confirmation that dissension does exist within both waves.

The purpose of this question was to gain insight into the type of spiritual leadership that the waves have personally chosen to follow and emulate in their daily lives. Since the great majority of participants from both waves have decided to follow the teachings of two related *maraji*, Sistani and Khoe'i, then few discernible differences in religiosity between the two waves can be detected from this particular indicator.¹⁸⁷ Moreover, it is permissible to rule out Park's race relations cycle because forty-seven out of fifty participants adhere to the teachings of a *marja*.¹⁸⁸ In other words, the two waves have not begun the "irreversible" path towards assimilation as stipulated by Park and his race relations cycle, and thus towards abandoning this entire practice.¹⁸⁹ In contrast, the two waves have preserved this component of their faith indicating that following the teachings of a *marja* is critical for all Shi'a Muslims.

Conclusion

This chapter has explored the participants' responses to the devotional life measurement and its associated indicators, namely prayer (indicator one), religious knowledge (indicator two), rituals (indicator three), pilgrimages (indicator four), and spiritual authority (indicator five). This chapter has demonstrated that there is some differentiation between the two waves. In order to explain this differentiation, segmented assimilation theory has been used. However, even if there were significant differences between the two waves, an overarching conclusion would be premature to announce considering that two out of the three measurements of this study have yet to be examined.

Since the United States is a liberal-democratic society, it would be expected that Kymlicka's multicultural model would provide some insight on the level of religiosity displayed by both waves of Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims. For Kymlicka, the liberal-democratic

state is not to ensure “religious integration” among its citizens.¹⁹⁰ Kymlicka further explains that this principle of non-interference in religious integration remains paramount “even if the majority of citizens belong to a particular faith.”¹⁹¹ As an antithetical theory to that of Kymlicka’s, Park’s race relations cycle proposes that immigrant groups will embark on an “irreversible” path towards “eventual assimilation.”¹⁹² However, after examining the devotional life measurement, one quickly notices that the participants from both waves have retained their religious identity, albeit at somewhat different levels, while residing in the United States.

In order to explain these different levels of religiosity, this chapter has employed two alternative theories. To explain the first wave’s seemingly more religious behaviour, Glock, Ringer, and Babbie’s comfort hypothesis has been applied. This theory explains that individuals who are unable to “fully enjoy the fruits of secular society” will seek gratification from religious sources.¹⁹³ The three scholars highlight that their theory is particularly relevant with the elderly and other marginalized groups.¹⁹⁴ As mentioned above, the average age of first-wave participants is slightly older than second-wave participants.¹⁹⁵ This small difference in age between the first and second wave can be used to understand the slight difference in religiosity between the two. However, while the comfort hypothesis is valuable in understanding the first wave’s slightly more religious nature, it cannot be applied to understand the second wave’s level of religiosity. In order to describe the second wave’s religiosity, the researcher has adopted Portes and Zhou’s segmented assimilation theory. This theory explains that assimilation is a “segmented” phenomenon whereby immigrants will assimilate into a different “sector of American society.”¹⁹⁶ Portes and Zhou put forward three possible sectors that the

immigrant can assimilate: towards the dominant middle class, towards the poorer class, and finally by achieving economic progress while maintaining their distinct heritage.¹⁹⁷

Considering this theory and the devotional life measurement data collected on the second wave, it seems that this recently arrived wave satisfies the first of Portes and Zhou's possible segmented assimilation patterns.

As shown above, the second wave is not as religious as the first, particularly when it comes to their frequency of reading the Qur'an, knowledge of hadiths, performing certain rituals during Ashura, and completing the *hajj*.¹⁹⁸ It was suggested above that perhaps the second wave had neglected certain aspects of their religion due to the added burdens and tasks one faces when recently arriving in a new country, such as finding employment, completing voluminous immigration paperwork, attending or re-attending school, and learning a new language. These factors, while necessary for any immigrant arriving into a new society, show that the second wave will neglect certain aspects of their faith in order to achieve security and success in the secular world.

In the next chapter, the participants' responses to the mosque life and personal life measurements will be examined in detail along with their respective indicators, including mosque life (indicator six), religious attire (indicator seven), marriage (indicator eight), and dietary laws (indicator nine). Moreover, Park's race relations cycle, Kymlicka's multicultural model, Glock, Ringer, and Babbie's comfort hypothesis, and Portes and Zhou's segmented assimilation theory will be employed as the theoretical models in order to explain any possible difference in religiosity between the two waves.

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Chapter Five: The Mosque and Personal Life Measurements: A Comparison of the First and Second Wave Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims in Greater Dearborn

Introduction

This chapter continues the analysis of the level of religiosity among first and second wave Iraq-Shi'a Muslims living in greater Dearborn. In contrast to the previous chapter, which explored only the devotional life measurement, this chapter focuses exclusively on the mosque life and personal life measurements. The mosque life and personal life measurements together contain four remaining indicators that can help predict the level of religiosity among the two waves. This chapter explores the results of the remaining four indicators: mosque life (indicator six), religious attire (indicator seven), marriage (indicator eight), and dietary laws (indicator nine). From the questionnaire results, this chapter will show that there continues to be a few significant differences in religiosity between the two waves of Iraqi-Shi'a immigrants with regards to the mosque life and personal life measurements. In order to explain these differences, the four theoretical models presented in previous chapters will be applied once again, namely, Kymlicka's multicultural model, Park's race relations cycle, Glock, Ringer, and Babbie's comfort hypothesis, and Portes and Zhou's segmented assimilation theory.

In returning to Kymlicka's multicultural model, it is expected that the liberal-democratic state would not seek to integrate its citizens on a religious level.¹ In light of this absence, the liberal-democratic state is thus permitting its citizens to select their own religious path without interference. Therefore, perhaps the different levels of religiosity exemplified by the first and second wave can be attributed to the liberal-democratic state's refusal to undertake the complex task of religious integration. However, while

Kymlicka's multicultural model seems to assign religious integration to each individual citizen, the model is unable to explain why first-wave and second-wave immigrants can exemplify slightly different patterns of religiosity.

For the most part, the pattern observed in the previous chapter with the first wave being slightly more devoted to their faith than their second-wave counterparts appears to replicate itself in this chapter. For example, in the case of mosque life (indicator six), the second wave attends mosque less frequently than the first wave, donates more to the mosque, perhaps to compensate for the infrequent attendance, and relies on their imam a little less for guidance.² This pattern supports Portes and Zhou's segmented assimilation theory whereby the second wave is attempting "acculturation and parallel integration into the white middle-class."³ In addition, the general pattern also supports Glock, Ringer, and Babbie's comfort hypothesis with the slightly older first wave attempting to maintain their religious beliefs in the face of a secularized and youth-dominated society.⁴ However, there are a few exceptions to the observed pattern that must be accounted for and properly explained using the different theoretical models.

There are a few deviations that will be examined in this chapter. One of the main deviations from the general pattern revolves around attire.⁵ For example, the second-wave males were much more adamant about female relatives wearing veils than first-wave males.⁶ This case represents the first time when the second wave appears significantly more religiously minded than the first. More importantly, this particular instance supports Park's race relations cycle and its "linear" nature towards assimilation.⁷ In other words, since the race relations cycle "cannot change its direction," Park theorizes that immigrants will proceed steadily and linearly towards assimilation.⁸

However, instances where the established pattern is challenged are noticeably rare. In examining the mosque life and personal life measurements, along with their respective indicators, this chapter will show that the first wave again appears slightly more religious than the second. The alternative theoretical models of Glock, Ringer, and Babbie's comfort hypothesis and Portes and Zhou's segmented assimilation theory will be used to explain this pattern.

Indicator Six: Mosque Life

The existence of several Shi'a mosques in the greater Dearborn area presents members of the Iraqi-Shi'a community with a rare opportunity to select which place of worship they would prefer to attend on a regular basis. In the most common case, the waves prefer to attend multiple mosques in the area, rather than restricting themselves to one.⁹ The data reveals that forty percent of the first wave and forty-four percent of the second attended multiple mosques in the area.¹⁰ These sojourning worshippers appear event driven, rather than location driven. In other words, participants wish to partake in the various events hosted by the different mosques, such as commemorations solemnizing the death of one of the Twelve Imams, celebrations marking the birth of the Prophet Muhammad, Ashura, lectures by visiting clerics and scholars, fundraisers and family dinners, and other social, religious, and cultural functions. Since there are four major Shi'a mosques in the area, the participants are not forced to attend one specific mosque simply because it is the only one in the city. If the participants lived in a small town in Middle America with only one Shi'a mosque, then they would have no choice but to attend that mosque regardless of their opinions on the imam, the types of events celebrated there, and other congregants. The participants from both waves have the

luxury to select where they would like to worship based on the types of occasions and activities they would like to participate in. For example, if a guest imam is visiting the Islamic Center of America on Ashura, but the individual is not particularly fond of this cleric for whatever reason, then he or she can attend another mosque, such as the Karbalaa Islamic Education Center or the Islamic House of Wisdom. However, despite the prevalence of this sojourning worship archetype, there are still some participants from both waves that prefer to attend one specific place of worship that they will frequent regularly.¹¹

The most popular mosque among those who stated that they only frequent one place of worship is unsurprisingly, the Islamic Center of America on Ford Road.¹² The selection of the Islamic Center of America is not surprising because this mosque is regarded as “the largest mosque complex in North America.”¹³ This mosque attracts a diverse array of worshippers, but seems to especially draw Lebanese-Shi’a Muslims. This mosque’s concentration of Lebanese-Shi’a worshippers was expressly pointed out to the researcher by an unidentified member of the mosque’s board of trustees. After completing three interviews at the mosque, a gentleman who introduced himself as a “member of the board” approached the researcher. The gentleman politely reminded the researcher that this was a “Lebanese mosque created with Lebanese money.” He further explained that “this mosque is 99.99% Lebanese.” This encounter alerted the researcher to a potential rivalry between the Lebanese Shi’a and the Iraqi Shi’a. This type of conversation gives credence to the claim that the two groups are “culturally dissimilar” despite the fact that the two share a common faith.¹⁴ In order to substantiate this assertion one need only compare the cosmopolitanism of modern Lebanon with the religious

conservatism of contemporary Iraq.¹⁵ However, this ethnic cleavage has not stopped the Iraqi Shi'a from attending this mosque or any other Lebanese dominated mosques. In observing the Friday communal prayer at several mosques in the area, the congregants appeared attentively focused on their religious duty, rather than engaging in any sort of debate with other national or ethnic groups. The number of congregants that attend Friday services indicates that many different national and ethnic groups are represented. However, these issues were not called to attention during the religious service.

The Islamic Institute of Knowledge located on Schaefer Road in the heart of Dearborn does not attract the same number of participants as the Islamic Center of America.¹⁶ In the study, there were only five participants from both waves who admitted to attending the Islamic Institute of Knowledge exclusively.¹⁷ However, there are other participants who attend this mosque, along with other mosques in the community.¹⁸ In contrast with the Islamic Center of America, the Islamic Institute of Knowledge expressly emphasizes its Lebanese heritage on its website by stating that “a largely Lebanese congregation” was prevalent during the mosque’s move to its present location.¹⁹ The statement is correct in describing the ethnic composition of the mosque, but it is unlikely that it has any effect on dissuading the participants of this study from attending the mosque’s various events. The desire to attend mosques exclusively where one’s ethnic group forms the dominant majority of congregants was not especially important to both waves.

There is a possibility that the Iraqi Shi'a may prefer to attend a mosque that embraces all different ethnic groups. This preference would lead these individuals to the Islamic House of Wisdom in the blossoming suburb of Dearborn Heights. In the

researcher's personal experience, the mosque is mostly comprised of Lebanese Shi'a; however, this particular ethnic heritage is not officially expressed in its own literature: "We offer services for those who seek knowledge, wisdom and faith in Islam, following the teachings of the Holy Prophet (pbuh) and his family (as). We encourage and embrace interfaith dialogue, diversity and justice for all."²⁰ This description is not only free from any sectarian or ethnic qualifiers that attempt to define the mosque's demographic composition, but more importantly endeavours to cultivate an inclusive atmosphere for all.²¹ The Islamic House of Wisdom's friendly disposition can be personally attested to by the researcher who was warmly embraced by the mosque's congregants, staff, and imam during the Ashura commemoration. However, only one participant from the entire study indicated that she exclusively attends this mosque, despite the place of worship's accepting attitude to all.²² The participants do not seem disposed to the idea of exclusively attending this mosque or even mosques that are predominately Iraqi in composition.

The waves' indifference towards maintaining ethnic homogeneity in places of worship is evidenced by the fairly low number of participants who exclusively attend the Karbalaa Islamic Education Center on Warren Avenue in the centre of an Iraqi neighbourhood.²³ This researcher attended several events at this mosque and quickly determined that this mosque caters to the Iraqi-Shi'a community, particularly those who recently emigrated from Iraq. In light of this predominately Iraqi composition, the mosque's religious leader and founder, Imam Hisham al-Husainy has shaped the mosque and its activities in a manner that would appear attractive to potential Iraqi-Shi'a worshippers. For example, immediately upon entering the main prayer hall, the

researcher encountered several large portraits of prominent Iraqi-based Shi'a grand ayatollahs. These portraits alerted the researcher that he had entered an Iraqi-Shi'a mosque. In addition to noticing these pictures, the researcher quickly discovered that the mosque was visibly devoid of women. In a celebration marking the Prophet Muhammad's birthday, the mosque was segregated by sex with the women in a smaller prayer room and the men occupying the grand prayer hall. This custom of separating men and women within public places of congregation is a point of distinction between the Lebanese Shi'a and the Iraqi Shi'a.²⁴ However, despite these attempts to accommodate traditional customs, only two participants from the first wave and three from the second indicated that they attend this mosque exclusively.²⁵ The participants' lack of interest in attending ethnically homogenous places of worship is further observed in the case of another mosque fairly close to the Karbalaa Islamic Education Center.

The Imam Ali Center on Warren Avenue, also in an Iraqi neighbourhood, not only shares a common street with the Karbalaa Islamic Education Center, but more importantly is also predominately Iraqi in its composition. In this case, only two participants from the entire study stated that they exclusively frequented this small place of worship.²⁶ There are a few factors that can explain why this institution is not as popular as others. The small, derelict building does not appear too inviting, especially in comparison to the more modernized and updated places available in the city. Also, as evidenced by a video on YouTube, the ritual of *zanjir*, where males flagellate themselves with metal chains, has previously taken place at the Imam Ali Center, albeit in a milder version.²⁷ The fact that most participants do not practice this controversial ritual may discourage them from attending special events at this mosque.²⁸

This examination of the various mosques frequented by the two waves provides a fuller understanding of the worship experiences shared by the two waves. This question allowed the researcher to determine that both waves prefer to attend different mosques in order to take part in various different activities and events. In term of religious behaviour then, it is appropriate to describe the participants as wandering worshippers, constantly visiting different mosques remaining equally unattached to all. This specific question was helpful in providing a more accurate picture of the religious behaviour among the Iraqi Shi'a, but did not assist in deciphering which wave is more religious. In order to determine religiosity, one would need to compare the number of times participants attend mosque.

There were four participants from the first and only one from the second wave who admitted to attending mosque services on a daily basis.²⁹ This divergence between the two waves recurs among those who attend mosque on a weekly basis.³⁰ Again, the first wave surpasses the second wave, this time by a margin of four participants.³¹ The second wave surpassed the first wave in the number of participants who admitted that they attend mosque either infrequently or not at all.³² The second wave especially outnumbered the first wave among those who indicated that they only attend mosque on special occasions, such as Ramadan and Ashura.³³ The portrait created by this data implies that the first wave is committed to attending mosque on a more frequent basis than their second-wave counterparts.³⁴ However, simply because the second wave does not attend mosque as frequently as participants in the first wave, does not indicate that they are not interested in supporting their mosques in other ways.

The data above shows that the first wave is more devoted to attending mosque than the second wave.³⁵ This trend can be explained by referencing Glock, Ringer, and Babbie's comfort hypothesis and Portes and Zhou's segmented assimilation theory. The comfort hypothesis suggests that the elderly may attend religious services more frequently in response to a "youth-oriented secular society."³⁶ However, this more frequent attendance rate by the first wave can perhaps be explained by their longing for their homeland. Since the first wave has been away from Iraq for several years or even decades, it is possible that they may feel somewhat homesick. Moreover, perhaps members of the first wave arrived without their family. The mosque, like other religious institutions, can provide a sort of "surrogate family" for those without one, according to the comfort hypothesis.³⁷ However, if the first wave achieves some sort of gratification from attending mosque, then one would expect that they would be foremost in supporting their newfound family with their finances.

The second wave donated slightly in more numbers to their mosques than first wave participants.³⁸ There were twenty-one participants from the second wave who stated that they donated to their mosque.³⁹ In the first wave, eighteen participants stated that they donated.⁴⁰ Again, the difference between the two waves is minimal, but is interesting considering the added financial constraints borne by the recently arrived second wave. Perhaps by donating to the mosque, the second wave is attempting to compensate for not attending as frequently as is expected in Islamic tradition. This entire analysis of these responses reveal that both first- and second-wave participants share similar, though not exact religious patterns. The first wave may be disposed to attending mosque more frequently whereas second wave participants donate in larger numbers.⁴¹

This result is somewhat puzzling when considered in light of Glock, Ringer, and Babbie's comfort hypothesis. The comfort hypothesis suggests that individuals who seek solace in their church, in this case mosque, essentially "have a vested interest in maintaining the religious institution through which their comfort is derived."⁴² In this case, since the first wave attended mosque more frequently, it would be expected that they would be more concerned with ensuring the mosque's survival by providing financial support.⁴³ But this expectation did not manifest itself as the second wave donated more while attending mosque less.⁴⁴ In order to explain this deviation, one needs to take into account a few matters. Perhaps they assist the mosque by providing much needed volunteer help during busy religious holydays. As for the second wave, their slightly higher level of donating may be caused by a sense of guilt for not attending mosque as frequently as they would like. This pattern of first-wave participants appearing marginally more involved in mosque life replicates itself when analyzing the role of the mosque's religious leader or imam in the participants' daily lives.⁴⁵

In the most basic translation, an imam is "one who stands in front" of the community and leads communal prayers.⁴⁶ The imams leading mosques in American cities are not solely tasked with conducting daily prayers as their title implies, but have also been assigned an array of different duties.⁴⁷ Like any religious leader, a major responsibility of an imam is to provide advice to the faithful on religious, societal, cultural, financial, hygienic, dietary, and family affairs. The number of participants seeking counsel is relatively similar between the two waves.⁴⁸ In the first wave, thirteen participants reported that they ask their respective imam for advice whereas there were eleven participants in the second wave who indicated this response.⁴⁹ There is no

significant difference between the waves' responses, as it appears that the imam plays a role in the lives of about half of all participants.⁵⁰ However, the results do show that the first wave relies slightly more on their imam than the second wave.⁵¹ It should be noted that the questions or concerns expressed by the two waves to their imams do not simply revolve around religious or spiritual matters, but rather include a medley of issues from advice on whether it is allowable to sell alcohol in a store setting to the permissibility of getting a tattoo to the meaning of a recent dream.⁵² However, despite the assortment of subjects addressed, there are participants who do not ask any questions.⁵³

There were a few participants from both waves who expressed their reticence about approaching their imam for advice.⁵⁴ In this case, the participant may request a relative or friend to ask the imam on their behalf.⁵⁵ The sentiment is natural given the perceived intimidating aura espoused by clerical figures coupled with the often sensitive and personal nature of the questions at hand. In the mind of anyone seeking counsel from a cleric, it is much less daunting to preface the conversation by stating that this question concerns a friend or relative, rather than oneself. Also, several participants stated that they no longer need to seek answers from their imams due to the proliferation of several websites that specifically address religious questions.⁵⁶ It is worth noting that many of the world's leading *maraji*ⁱ have comprehensive and frequently updated websites that address many major and minor questions. In addition to being able to seek answers from the comfort of one's own home, the anonymity of online research no longer requires the faithful to engage in awkward conversations with a respected clerical figure. As noted, there were several participants who preferred this "e-option" thus displaying an

ⁱ *Maraji* is the plural of *marja* a shorten version of the title *marja al-taqlid* meaning source of emulation or imitation. This esteemed title is conferred only on the world's leading Shi'a clerics who take the honourific "grand ayatollah." It is expected that all Shi'a Muslims select a *marja* and follow his teachings.

increasingly modernizing tendency among both waves.⁵⁷ Although the community is starting to adopt a fairly modern practice, they are still confronted with an old challenge.

It would be expected that the second wave, given their relatively recent arrival in the United States, would have more questions for the imam on a range of subjects. As someone who can bridge the gap between the demands of the secular world and the requirements of one's religion, the second wave should ideally seek out his advice. It was expected that the first wave, being the more established of the two groups, should rely less on their imam and more on their own experiences. However, as described above, this expectation did not materialize in the data.⁵⁸ Again, the comfort hypothesis is useful in explaining the first wave's devotion to the institution of the mosque. In addition to the comfort hypothesis, Portes and Zhou's segmented assimilation theory can be used to show that the second wave is more interested in pursuing the "time-honored" path of latching onto the dominant middle class.⁵⁹ In this case, the second wave's economic goal forces them to neglect or sidestep aspects of their religious heritage.

Indicator Seven: Religious Attire

The Islamic faith contains provisions that regulate the dress of both men and women with different requirements for each sex.⁶⁰ The Qur'an commands males "to lower their glances and guard their private parts."⁶¹ This simple scriptural order was interpreted largely in the same way by the sixteen men interviewed from each of the two waves.⁶² In the case of the first wave, ten stated that they do not wear any special Islamic clothes and the remaining six indicated that on special occasions they may wear the *dishdasha*, which is the traditional white robe worn by Arab men often accompanied by the *iqal* or hooded headgear adorned by a stylistic black cord.⁶³ The second wave

appeared to be more reluctant to wear traditional Arab clothing as only one individual reported wearing the *dishdasha* on special occasions.⁶⁴ The remaining fifteen males from the second wave stated that they do not wear any specialized religious or ethnic attire and instead wear Western clothing.⁶⁵ However, the *dishdasha* is not an expressly Islamic or religious garment, but rather a typical ethnic vestment worn by citizens from various different Arab countries, especially those living in the Persian Gulf region. The absence of any special religious attire for men should not automatically denote that they are free to dress without modesty in mind, but rather have less pronounced guidelines than their female counterparts.

The religious demands made on women's attire in Islam as expressed in the Qur'an are more detailed. In addition to observing the exact aforementioned requirement imposed on men, women are also charged with an extra obligation that is exclusive to their sex.⁶⁶ The Qur'an instructs women to "not display their charms" to individuals who are not their relatives and "to make their outer garments hang low over them."⁶⁷ The nebulous nature of these ordinances has prompted much interpretation on the precise way to realize this religious obligation of veiling.⁶⁸ There are many different types of articles that are worn from the ostentatious veils that leave parts of the hair exposed to the black *niqabs* that cover the majority of the face save a small horizontal slit for the eyes.⁶⁹ The concern with veiling has prompted concerns among prominent feminists.

Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a leading feminist and critic of Islam, recognizes this inherent sexual objectification inherent in Islam. In order to exemplify her thoughts on the sexual objectification of women, Ali compares the archetypal Muslim male to a "billy goat" in that "when Muslim men see an uncovered woman, they immediately leap on her."⁷⁰ The

issue not only revolves around the subjugation of women to the arbitrary will of man, but also the responsibility of women for maintaining their chastity: “A Muslim man has no reason to learn to control himself. He doesn’t need to and he isn’t taught to. Sexual morality is aimed exclusively at women, who are always blamed for any lapse.”⁷¹ This claim that Muslim women are forced to maintain a serious moral disposition can be exemplified during the field research component of this dissertation.

In several cases, potential female participants expressed their concern with the idea of conducting a one-on-one interview with a male who was not related to them by blood or marriage.⁷² This trepidation appeared to stem more from societal standards and pressures rather than any religious prohibitions. These more apprehensive female participants seriously worried about what conclusions their husbands, male relatives, and even neighbours would derive if they were seen conversing with an unknown man.⁷³ This concern naturally reduced the potential number of female participants that could have been successfully recruited to complete this study. However, despite this obstacle, the researcher was able to secure a total of eighteen female participants or nine from each of the two waves. In all eighteen cases, the female participants wore veils that covered their entire head, leaving no hair exposed to the public eye.⁷⁴ This supplemental point demonstrates the rejection of the more restrictive attire donned by other Muslim women. The perfect consistency between the two waves indicates the existence of a shared opinion on religious attire that remains unaffected by the influences and pressures of a secular society. Their decision to continue veiling while living in America can best be understood by referencing Kymlicka’s multicultural model. Both waves are permitted to retain or discard any religious practices they see fit since the liberal-democratic state is

not seeking to religiously integrate them.⁷⁵ However, the official absence of the liberal-democratic state from enforcing an overarching religious model should not give the impression that Western culture has no opinion on the matter.

The Western world has historically viewed the veil as an “oppressive custom.”⁷⁶ In Western discourse, the term “veil,” along with other controversial Islamic terms has become “synonymous with female weakness and oppression.”⁷⁷ In addition, the West understands the veil in a political sense, rather than “as a traditional or sacred custom.”⁷⁸ The imposition of the veil has been employed to “signify tyranny.”⁷⁹ This negative understanding of the veil has “served Western political ends.”⁸⁰ It has also prompted modern Western powers to include it in its popular rhetoric. In one of the more referenced cases on the convergence of the veil with politics, the former First Lady of the United States, Laura W. Bush (1946 -) stated that the “War on Terror” was also a war “for the rights and dignity of women.”⁸¹ This type of rhetoric supports the claim that the veil is the “flag of civilizational clash, of clashing values, and of struggles between the powers of empire and those resisting imperial powers.”⁸² However, this type of myopic understanding of the veil ignores the religious reasoning behind it.

The construction of the veil in core Islamic teachings is much different from the repressive and retrograde understanding of the veil popularly held in the West. In one of its more quoted verses, the Qur’an declares that “there is no compulsion in religion.”⁸³ This verse makes it impermissible for a father, husband, brother, or any other male relative to force a type of religious attire on one or all of their female relatives. However, this provision does not automatically denote that females are free from any form of

pressure or that men do not prefer that their female relatives wear such mandated clothing to some degree.

In one of the most provocative, but revealing questions of the interview, both male and female participants from each wave were asked what types of clothing they would like their husband or wife to wear. For those who were not currently married or engaged, the question was asked using the future tense. In the case of men from the first wave, it was discovered that nine preferred that their wives wear veils, six indicated that their wife had the choice either way, and only one said that he did not prefer it.⁸⁴ The second wave produced considerably different results as an astounding fourteen participants indicated that they would like their wives to wear the veil and two participants stated that it was the wife's personal decision.⁸⁵ The data demonstrates that the male participants in the first and second wave have different outlooks on the subject.⁸⁶

This instance is unique as it represents the first time when the second wave appears significantly more religiously minded than the first wave. In this case, Park's race relations cycle can initially provide a useful explanation. For Park, not only is assimilation an eventuality that is "irreversible," but it is also "progressive."⁸⁷ In other words, as time passes, individuals will become more and more assimilated, considering that they have to pass through cycles.⁸⁸ In applying Park's theory to the patterns of religiosity displayed by the two waves, the second wave should have appeared less assimilated. In the case of what male participants would like their female relatives to wear, the second wave suggested a more conservative and religious attitude than their first-wave counterparts.⁸⁹ This pattern of the second wave retaining their religious

identity more than the first reflects the pattern predicted by Park's race relations cycle. However, because the responses provided by the second wave deviate from the established pattern of the first wave in appearing more religious than the second, an explanation is in order.

In order to understand this disparity between the males' opinions on religious attire, one must realize that the first wave has resided in the United States much longer than their correligionists in the second wave. In this time, the first wave has had more time to familiarize themselves with the social, political, and cultural climate in America vis-à-vis Muslims. In addition, they have witnessed the intense harassment, discrimination, and verbal abuse women who wear the veil are often forced to endure at the hands of ignorant individuals. In addition, as previously mentioned, the first wave lived through the traumatic weeks and months following the September 11th terrorist attacks thus witnessing the anti-Islamic backlash that consumed the country during this time. With these incidents in mind, the males in the first wave may harbour some legitimate concerns for the safety of their female relatives who wear the veil. On the other hand, the second wave did not experience the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist acts and thus remain less aware of the possibility that their mothers, wives, daughters, and sisters may be accosted simply for their attire. In understanding this difference, it can be stated that the first wave's decision is governed more by practical considerations based on their current situation, rather than religious ones.

The female participants from both waves typically did not stipulate what kind of clothing they would like their male counterparts to wear.⁹⁰ In reference to results, there were seven first-wave female participants who mentioned no clothing preferences for

their husbands, one who stated that her husband had a choice, and only one who made some demands.⁹¹ This last, younger female participant who set restrictions for her future husband declared that “we both need to be on the same page.”⁹² She believes that the couple as a unit would have to uphold Islamic standards on modesty together.⁹³ When asked to explain what type of attire her future husband should avoid, the participant stated “no tight shirts and no short shorts.”⁹⁴ This participant’s response marks a deviation from the typical responses rendered in both waves.⁹⁵ In the case of second-wave female participants, all nine stated that they had no preference for their husband’s habitual attire thus echoing the majority’s opinion in the first wave.⁹⁶ In order to better understand these similar results between the two waves, it is important to take into account the fact that there are no specific forms of religious attire for men to wear. In considering the absence of any mandated male religious attire, the women are prevented from making a recommendation based on religious commandments. However, this absence does not prevent the female participants from making suggestions on the preferred clothing of the children, especially their daughters.

The female participants from both waves have the same thoughts on whether their children should wear religious attire.⁹⁷ The responses focused much more on the clothing choices of the daughters, rather than the sons considering, as previously discussed, Islam does not regulate the attire of males as much as it does with females. In the case of the first wave, five participants indicated that they would prefer that their daughters wore veils, two stated that it was their choice, and two said it was not required.⁹⁸ The responses of the second wave revealed the exact same results in the same proportions demonstrating that both waves have similar thoughts when it comes to the religious attire of their

daughters.⁹⁹ The female participants did share a few ideas about the clothing of their sons as well. One participant said that “my son should look like his father and my daughter should look like me.”¹⁰⁰ This concept of having children replicate the attire of the parents is intriguing not only because it shows a continuation from generation to generation, but also because of its inherent desire to preserve traditional religious customs in the face of a secularized culture.

Of males, both waves expressed feelings that were slightly more nuanced than their female counterparts.¹⁰¹ The first-wave male participants replicated the exact same response they held for their wives, as nine participants preferred that their daughters wear the veil, six said that it was their choice, and one stated that it was undesirable.¹⁰² The second wave had similar results, as ten expressed a wish for their daughters to wear the veil, four indicated it was their choice, and two stated that it was not necessary.¹⁰³ The male members of the second wave appeared to be more vocal and detailed in their thoughts on this sensitive matter. In expressing his response, one participant declared that the veil is “part of our religion.”¹⁰⁴ Another participant stated that it is decreed that “after nine years of age” a girl should start to wear the veil.¹⁰⁵ The second wave’s stronger support for the veil together with their more expressive commentary may be seen as naivety about the influences of American culture on impressionable children. These fathers have expressed their desire for the daughters to wear religious clothing and it is possible that their daughters will wear this clothing. However, with the pressures emanating from friends at school, the exposure to different attitudes and culture, and the influences of modern culture and media, it is difficult to predict whether these daughters will decide to wear religious attire.

For this indicator, the responses provided by both waves conformed to the observed pattern of the first wave being slightly more religiously minded than the second wave. The exception to this pattern emerged when male participants were asked about the preferred attire for their female relatives.¹⁰⁶ On this question, the second-wave male participants were more resolute about their female relatives wearing the veil than their male counterparts from the first wave.¹⁰⁷ While this pattern of the second wave being more religiously minded can be explained using Park's race relations cycle, it is important to take into consideration the context as well. As described above, the first wave is much more aware of the situation in America with respect to females wearing veils in public settings, such as at school, work, stores, and around town. Moreover, the males from the first wave have seen the poor treatment veiled Muslim women received following the September 11th terrorist attacks. In light of their experience, the first-wave males are more cautious than the recently arrived second wave males on the subject of veiling. This deviation from the observed pattern is atypical and should not indicate the beginning of a new pattern of religiosity.

Indicator Eight: Marriage

The custom of marriage is a practice that is strongly celebrated in Islam, but is nuanced both by one's sex and sect. In a popular hadith, or saying, the Prophet Muhammad emphasizes the importance of marriage: "There is no institution in Islam more beloved and dearer to Allah than marriage."¹⁰⁸ The importance of marriage in Islam has prompted many religious laws on the subject. The religious laws governing marriage in Islam are sex-specific in nature and apply differently to men and women, with the former generally having more rights in comparison to the latter.¹⁰⁹ There are several

passages in the Qur'an that grant men special entitlements, such as the right to a larger inheritance, the freedom to engage in polygamy, and the ability to physically strike their wives.¹¹⁰ The recognized differences between men and women are not only based on one's sex, with women having fewer rights than males, but also interpreted differently between Sunni and Shi'a branches.

Sunni males have the freedom to choose a potential wife from the family of faiths known as *ahl al-kitaab*, literally meaning people of the book.¹¹¹ The people of the book are considered those who believe in "the older revealed religions" of Judaism and Christianity.¹¹² Depending on the scriptural verses accepted, the ancient religions of Sabianism and Zoroastrianism may also be considered part of the people of the book.¹¹³ The Shi'a, on the other hand, cannot permanently marry from other faiths.¹¹⁴ In order to measure the degree to which Iraqi Shi'as observe this marriage law, both waves were asked whether they would be willing to marry individuals from outside their sub-branch, branch, and religion. The participants were asked if they would be interested in marrying from four different groups, including a non-Twelve Shi'a, a Sunni, an individual from the *ahl al-kitaab* or people of the book religions, and an individual whose faith was not one of the *ahl al-kitaab* religions, such as Hinduism or Buddhism. Those who were already married were asked the same question, but it was prefaced with "if you were not married" in order to include them. In addition to distinguishing between the two waves, the diverse results are also compiled and compared by sex.

The men of both the first and second wave seemed much more supportive of marrying not only a woman from outside their religion, but also from outside of the Twelver Shi'a sub-branch.¹¹⁵ The first-wave males generally supported the idea of

marrying a non-Twelve Shi'a woman as ten voiced their approval for such marriage, six stated that they may engage in a marriage of this type, and zero said no to the idea entirely.¹¹⁶ The second-wave male participants were much more against this prospect as four indicated their willingness, one was unsure, and eleven indicated no.¹¹⁷ It is necessary to point out that many of the second-wave members expressed their uncertainty as to what exactly constituted a non-Twelve Shi'a. This uncertainty was expected because the two major non-Twelve Shi'a sub-branches do not typically reside in Iraq.¹¹⁸

The largest non-Twelve sub-branch, the Nizari-Isma'ilis are dispersed throughout the world, with members in Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, and countries in Africa, Europe and North America.¹¹⁹ The Zaydis, the other major non-Twelve sub-branch, are mostly concentrated in Yemen.¹²⁰ Since both sub-branches do not have large communities in Iraq, one can conclude that the Iraqi Shi'a are generally not exposed to the non-Twelve groups and thus are unaware of their doctrines, rituals, and belief systems. However, in order for the participants to competently answer this question, the researcher was required to provide them with some basic background knowledge about these two sub-branches.

The question remains as to why males in the first wave are more disposed to marrying non-Twelve Shi'as as opposed to the reticent second-wave male participants.¹²¹ Again, because of the diversity in both America and to a lesser extent Dearborn, it is likely that many first-wave participants have not only had more opportunities to come into contact with members of these non-Twelve sub-branches, but also realized that the differences between the Shi'a sub-branches are not as pronounced as one may think. This belief is complemented by the fact that first-wave males tended to

have more positive comments about non-Twelvever sub-branches than the second wave males.¹²² In answering in the affirmative for this response, one participant from the first wave stated that the members of these sub-branches are “our brothers too.”¹²³ Another male participant stated that there was “no problem” in marrying a non-Twelvever Shi’a woman.¹²⁴ The males in the second wave were not as supportive of marrying women from non-Twelvever Shi’a sub-branches.¹²⁵

It would be too quick to assume that the second wave’s resistance towards marrying non-Twelvever Shi’a women had to do with a lack of assimilation. If one were to accept this quick judgement, then one would be validating Park’s race relations cycle and its eventual or “progressive” path towards eventual assimilation.¹²⁶ However, since the researcher had to explain to many of the second-wave participants the nature of the non-Twelvever Shi’a sub-branches, then it is fair to conclude that the second wave’s resistance may be based on a general sense of unfamiliarity rather than a religious basis. This conclusion would support the further findings derived from this indicator. As will be shown shortly, in comparison to first wave male participants, second-wave male participants were more supportive of marrying women not only from the Sunni branch, but also from other religions.¹²⁷ Again, this pattern suggests that the second wave is conforming to segmented assimilation theory and attempting “upward mobility” in order to fit into “middle-class America.”¹²⁸ This concern with the non-Twelvever Shi’a sub-branches was not only shared by the male participants, but also was a matter of concern among females as well.¹²⁹

The women of both the first and second wave seemed much more resistant towards marrying not only outside their religion, but also from outside of their Twelvever

Shi'a sub-branch.¹³⁰ The results between the two waves of females seem much more similar in comparison to the subtle differences between the two male groups.¹³¹ In the first wave, one participant said she would marry a non-Twelve Shi'a, one said that she was unsure about the matter, and seven answered no.¹³² The second-wave participants appeared slightly more against this practice considering all nine stated they would not marry a non-Twelve Shi'a man.¹³³ One participant from this wave plainly stated that she was "not sure about their religion" thus further strengthening the argument that the idea of non-Twelve Shi'as is a novel concept to many second wave participants.¹³⁴ However, aside from their uncertainty, it is clear that the women in both waves are not particularly interested in the idea and had even expressed some general concerns.¹³⁵

Like the males, the females from both waves were also concerned about these two sub-branches and their fewer Imams. One participant said that it is necessary to have "the full package" and one could not have some of the Imams, but rather it was an "all or none" deal.¹³⁶ These types of comments are not based on any scriptural support, but rather on the person's own proclivities. In addition to this perceived incomplete nature associated with non-Twelve Shi'ism, many of the women were concerned about the children and in which faith they would be raised with phrases such as "this becomes difficult with children involved."¹³⁷ The concern for the children will colour the rest of their responses on the prospect of marrying outside of their particular sub-branch, branch, or religion.

The women from both waves were more diffident about the possibility of marrying Sunni men than the males marrying Sunni women.¹³⁸ The first wave seemed marginally more against this practice as two said yes to the idea, zero unsure, and seven

declined the option.¹³⁹ Those who responded in the negative also started to express another explanation that was also held by some males. One participant mentioned that the Sunnis “do not have the love for the *ahl al-bayt* [Prophetic household].”¹⁴⁰ This response not only assists in illuminating the sectarian tension that exists between Sunnis and Shi’as, but points out one of the most contentious points between the two branches. The second-wave females did not mention this sectarian reason but did show a very slight disposition towards marrying within their branch as four stated that they would marry Sunni men, zero answered that they were unsure, and five indicated no.¹⁴¹ The second wave’s explanation allows for the discovery of an additional reason for the refusal. One participant expressed that her “family would not allow” such a marriage to take place.¹⁴² The influence and control exerted by the family seems to be much more of an issue with women than men as the latter did not acknowledge this obstacle.

The males in the first and second wave were largely agreeable to the prospect of marrying Sunni women.¹⁴³ In the first wave, nine declared that they would marry a Sunni woman, one participant was unsure about the notion, and six specified that they would not engage in this type of marriage.¹⁴⁴ The second wave was even more interested in the idea as eleven replied yes to this question, zero were unsure, and five stipulated that this marriage was not personally attractive to them.¹⁴⁵ The second wave’s recent departure from Iraq gives them a better understanding of the social situation allowing them to provide insight on whether this practice is acceptable. According to one participant, “it’s normal in Iraq” for a Sunni to marry a Shi’a, leading the researcher to believe that marriage between the two major branches is not a social taboo.¹⁴⁶ However, the heated sectarian climate in Iraq severely undermines this participant’s observation. Also, the

number of participants indicating their interest in marrying a Sunni does not seem overwhelming.¹⁴⁷ Moreover, some of the participants' explanations confirm the presence of tension between the two groups.¹⁴⁸ For example, a male participant from the second wave replied that he could not marry a Sunni woman "because of what they [the Sunnis] had done to the [Twelve] Imams."¹⁴⁹ The retention of this historical animosity further confirms the unlikelihood of intermarriage between Sunnis and Shi'as in Iraq.

The reasons that were put forward by the participants as to why they could not marry either a non-Twelve Shi'a or a Sunni are not rooted in Islamic scripture. Instead, the explanations are informed by individual predilections and prejudices, such as unfamiliarity with or dislike of the sub-branch, concerns for the religious orientation of the children, family influences, and historical and current sectarian antagonisms.¹⁵⁰ However, the decision to marry from outside the religion is much more regulated by scripture.¹⁵¹ The permissibility of marrying someone from outside Islam is discussed in the Qur'an, but there are conflicting verses with some supporting a marriage of this type and others forbidding it. The passage condoning marriage between Muslims and members of the *ahl al-kitaab*, or "people of the book," religions again is sex-specific, in this case directed towards men:

Today all good things have been made lawful for you. The food of the People of the Book is lawful for you as your food is lawful for them. So are chaste, believing, women as well as chaste women of the people who were given the Scripture before you, as long as you have given them their bride-gifts and married them, not taking them as lovers or secret mistresses.¹⁵²

The passage is supportive of a possible marriage between a Muslim man and a woman from the *ahl al-kitaab*, but does not sanction the notion of a Muslim woman marrying a Jewish or Christian man.¹⁵³ In Shi'a Islam, the prospect of marrying someone from

outside the Islamic faith is religiously unacceptable.¹⁵⁴ The scriptural legitimacy for this prohibition comes from a verse in the Qur'an:

Do not marry idolatresses until they believe: a believing slave woman is certainly better than an idolatress, even though she may please you. And do not give your women in marriage to idolaters until they believe: a believing slave is certainly better than an idolater, even though he may please you.¹⁵⁵

The allusion to idol-worshipping is a misnomer to describe Jews and Christians, but is evidently still employed to support the prohibition.¹⁵⁶ The prospect of marrying members from the *ahl al-kitaab* religions of Judaism and Christianity is condemned even by the most followed Shi'a cleric among the study's participants, Grand Ayatollah Sistani.¹⁵⁷ However, despite the scriptural and clerical rulings on the matter, the participants across the waves are not all entirely unified in their responses.¹⁵⁸

The males are more receptive towards the idea of marrying a woman from the *ahl al-kitaab* religions than the female participants.¹⁵⁹ The first-wave males again appear a bit more hesitant as only eight stated that they would marry a woman from the *ahl al-kitaab* religions, two indicated that they were unsure, and six responded with no to the question.¹⁶⁰ The second-wave males had stronger support for this type of marriage as twelve said yes to the idea, zero were unsure, and four refused to marry from outside the Islamic faith.¹⁶¹ The explanations among those who stated that they would marry from the *ahl al-kitaab* religions are similar to those provided in other responses. One second-wave participant explained that the Christians and Muslims generally have a positive relationship in Iraq.¹⁶² He recalled that Christians would give food and water to the Muslims walking in the various Ashura processions.¹⁶³ The general support for interreligious marriage among males marks a deviation from traditional religious

marriage practices as described above.¹⁶⁴ This deviation is not reflected among the female participants who maintain the traditional stance on the matter.

The females from both waves were adamantly against the concept of marrying a male from the *ahl al-kitaab*, or people of the book religions, such as Judaism and Christianity.¹⁶⁵ In the two waves combined, sixteen women were against the idea, one was uncertain about the prospect, and only one said that she would marry a man from one of the *ahl al-kitaab* faiths.¹⁶⁶ The female participants rendered the same explanations for their opposition, such as the effect such marriage would have on any potential children and the resistance family members would have to the union.¹⁶⁷ In addition, a few female participants cited the fact that this type of marriage between a Muslim woman and a Christian or Jewish man is not permissible in the Shi'a branch.¹⁶⁸ The women's recognition of the illegality of this practice not only shows a more profound desire to adhere to religious traditions, but perhaps even a deeper understanding of them as well. It is worthy to point out that only one male out of the thirty-two interviewed indicated that interreligious marriage was prohibited in Shi'ism.¹⁶⁹ The remaining male participants either supported the practice or simply indicated another reason why they would not marry someone from outside the religion.¹⁷⁰ This discrepancy on the *ahl al-kitaab* question is noticeable and implies that the male participants generally are more inclusive when it comes to selecting a potential mate than females.¹⁷¹ However, the male participants' favourable orientation towards marriage diminishes when non-*ahl al-kitaab* religions are concerned, such as Hinduism and Buddhism.¹⁷²

The other category of non-Muslims is called *mushrikun*, or polytheists.¹⁷³ The religions included in this category include all the faiths that are not part of the *ahl al-*

kitaab, or people of the book faiths. In the interviews, when participants asked about which religions constituted non-*ahl al-kitaab* faiths, the researcher named the more prominent faiths, Hinduism and Buddhism. The provision governing marrying someone from outside the *ahl al-kitaab* faiths is not differentiated by branch or sex, but rather is ubiquitous.¹⁷⁴ The participants from both waves generally rejected marrying someone who was neither a Muslim nor a member of the *ahl al-kitaab* family of faiths.¹⁷⁵ In the entire study of fifty participants, forty-two stated that they would not marry someone from outside Islam or the *ahl al-kitaab* faiths, one participant indicated that there may be a possibility for such a union, and the remaining seven were disposed to the idea.¹⁷⁶ The explanations are similar to those previously rendered, but with the appearance of more forthright and resolute comments such as “no way!”¹⁷⁷ The participants’ rejection of these faiths not only stems from the Qur’an, but also is based on their own understanding of these religions. For example, in one case, a participant said that he could not marry a Hindu woman because she “worships an elephant.”¹⁷⁸ The participant is almost certainly referring to the “elephant-headed” god Ganesha, a cherished figure and “probably the most beloved god in all of Hinduism.”¹⁷⁹ In the eyes of Muslims, this form of worship rejects the supremacy of Allah by suggesting that there are other, parallel gods: “God does not forgive the worship of others beside Him – though He does forgive whoever He will for lesser sins – for whoever does this has gone far, far astray.”¹⁸⁰ Although marriage in Twelver Shi’ism seems strictly regulated, the sub-branch does permit a sort of loophole that is not present in Sunnism or the other non-Twelver Shi’a sub-branches.

The Arabic phrase *nikah mut’ah* is often translated as “marriage for pleasure.”¹⁸¹ It is a unique type of marriage that can last any time from a couple hours to several

decades.¹⁸² In addition to stipulating the time period, the *mut'ah* marriage contract requires the male to give the prospective wife a “dower.”¹⁸³ This dower can include money or other types of valuables.¹⁸⁴ The practice of *mut'ah* has naturally garnered negative attention largely because of its semblance to a sort of “thinly disguised prostitution.”¹⁸⁵ The perception is not only held by Sunnis, but also by sub-branches from within the Shi'a fold, including the Ismailis and the Zaydis.¹⁸⁶ The Twelver Shi'a continue to accept this form of marriage's religious legitimacy, despite the fact that *mut'ah* was allegedly condemned by the Prophet Muhammad numerous times and vehemently prohibited under penalty of stoning by the Caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab (r. 634-644 C.E.).¹⁸⁷ However, simply because *mut'ah* is permissible, it does not automatically denote that the Shi'a are willing to engage in this type of marriage or are personally supportive of it.

The female participants from both waves were firmly united in their opposition towards a *mut'ah* marriage.¹⁸⁸ All eighteen female participants who took part in this study were against the idea of personally engaging in a *mut'ah* marriage.¹⁸⁹ In addition to rejecting a *mut'ah* marriage on an individual basis, the female participants added blatantly hostile words towards the entire practice, including “I find it offensive,” “I hate it,” “I don't like it,” “It's really stupid,” “It's wrong,” and “It's like *zina* [fornication].”¹⁹⁰ One female participant compared *mut'ah* to a form of gluttony and stated “it's [*mut'ah*] just like eating chocolate every day. You will never be satisfied.”¹⁹¹ This example is an appropriate comparison because unlike permanent marriages in Islam where the man can only have four wives at one time, a man may legally contract an unlimited number of *mut'ah* marriages.¹⁹² Although she personally would not contract a *mut'ah* marriage, one

female participant stated that she would support her son if he were to choose a *mut'ah* marriage.¹⁹³ However, the mother does not encourage her son to carelessly contract marriages with random women, but rather stipulates that “there must be a goal to it” in the form a permanent marriage.¹⁹⁴ This example of *mut'ah* supposes that the couple will take this opportunity to become better acquainted with each other and then marry on a permanent basis.¹⁹⁵ However, this scenario is slightly naïve as it assumes that the two individuals are equal partners when in fact the male is placed in a position of dominance over the female. The iniquitous treatment of women in *mut'ah* marriages explains the female participants’ absolute rejection of the practice.

The two waves of male participants are slightly divided on the practice of *mut'ah*. The first-wave males are more agreeable towards the practice as ten participants declared that they would secure a *mut'ah* marriage, one was uncertain, and the remaining five asserted their disinclination.¹⁹⁶ The males of the second wave were closely divided on the issue as seven affirmed their support for *mut'ah*, zero expressed their uncertainty on the matter, and nine stated their opposition towards this form of marriage.¹⁹⁷ Together, both waves generally recognized the religious legitimacy of *mut'ah* with participants declaring that it is *halaal* or religiously permissible, despite claims that *mut'ah* is *haraam* or religiously forbidden.¹⁹⁸ The participants explained that *mut'ah* is a “legal relationship in the *halaal* way” and is governed by “lots of laws” that must be followed.¹⁹⁹ The male participants who accept *mut'ah* evidently do not take a cavalier attitude towards it, but rather realize the sensitivity of this practice.

The waves also contained several participants who were against the practice for a variety of different reasons. A more historically inclined participant objected to *mut'ah*

on the grounds that “the circumstances for *mut’ah* do not exist anymore.”²⁰⁰ He explained that when men would go off to war centuries ago, an inordinate amount of time was required in travelling both to and from the battle site.²⁰¹ He further explained that this long absence from one’s wife required a man to take another wife for a specific period of time.²⁰² Naturally, the advances in vehicular and communication technologies have nullified these conditions rendering the need for a *mut’ah* wife next to obsolete. In a less historical, but more altruistic manner, one participant explained his opposition to *mut’ah* by reflecting on his own female relatives: “I wouldn’t want my sister to do *mut’ah* so why should I do it with someone else?”²⁰³ This participant’s concern for the welfare of his sister and tacitly other women exemplifies the exploitative nature of this marriage custom.

The problem with using *mut’ah* as an indicator of religiosity is its intrinsically conflicting nature. On one hand, participants are compelled to accept the legitimacy of *mut’ah* as it is approved within the bounds of Twelver Shi’a jurisprudence.²⁰⁴ On the other hand, many participants may feel personally uncomfortable with the idea and elect not to involve themselves in a *mut’ah* marriage.²⁰⁵ Therefore, with this dichotomy in mind, it is difficult to determine one’s religiosity simply by tallying one’s personal inclination towards a *mut’ah* marriage. However, because it is difficult to determine the degree of religiosity based on this question, it should not instantly indicate that this type of question contributes nothing to the study. The responses have assisted in unravelling an otherwise typically enshrouded religious practice with first-hand comments from individuals who are intimately aware of the history, rules, and trends surrounding *mut’ah*. The question also provided the researcher with a rare opportunity to understand the

participant community's personal opinions on the subject. These responses help illustrate that the fact that all Shi'a do not unequivocally support the practice of *mut'ah* as a monolithic block, but rather much more nuanced opinions on this contentious matter do exist.²⁰⁶

In reviewing the marriage indicator data, the observed pattern of first-wave participants being more religious than the second is confirmed. However, while this overall pattern was established, an exception did appear among the second-wave male participants.²⁰⁷ The exception revolved around the second-wave males' stronger disinterest in marrying women who are Shi'a, but not part of the Twelver Shi'a sub-branch.²⁰⁸ In other words, the second-wave males expressed concerns about marrying Ismaili Shi'a and Zaydi Shi'a women.²⁰⁹ However, as described above, the second-wave males' resistance seems less about honouring some sort of religious commandment and more about a sense of unfamiliarity with these two Shi'a sub-branches. The majority of participants from this wave asked the researcher about these two sub-branches indicating their unawareness. Aside from this exception, males from the first wave appeared more religious than those from the second wave confirming the pattern that has developed throughout this study.

For this indicator, the responses provided by the female participants from both waves were much more similar.²¹⁰ For example, in the case of the *mut'ah* or temporary marriage question, the females from both waves had the exact same response.²¹¹ It was expected that all female participants from both waves would reject the practice of *mut'ah* or temporary marriage. In reviewing the contours of this marriage practice as described above, it is clear that a *mut'ah* marriage significantly favours the male partner. Since this

practice is more favourable towards males, it not surprising that *mut'ah* received support from the males from both waves.²¹² However, the second-wave male participants were somewhat more against the traditional Shi'a practice of *mut'ah* leading the researcher to conclude that they are adhering to the observed pattern of being slightly less religious than the first wave.²¹³

Portes and Zhou's segmented assimilation theory is useful in order to explain the pattern observed throughout this indicator. In the case of the second wave, they are attempting to assimilate into the first pattern of segmented assimilation theory, namely into the "normative structures of mainstream middle-class America."²¹⁴ According to segmented assimilation theory, immigrants endeavouring to assimilate into the middle class of American society will begin the process of "severing ethnic ties, unlearning old-world values, norms, and behavioral patterns, and adapting to the WASP core culture associated with the middle class."²¹⁵ This general abandonment of traditionally held religious and cultural values in favour of principles held by the American middle class appears to explain the second-wave male participants' somewhat more open attitude towards marriage outside of Shi'ism.

Indicator Nine: Dietary Laws

The Islamic faith is governed by laws that are intended to regulate the diet of all Muslims. In contrast to other religions, the Islamic dietary laws are not expressly detailed in nature. The Qur'an repeatedly prohibits Muslims from eating pork and other meats.²¹⁶ In addition to all forms of pork, Muslims are required to abstain from consuming "intoxicants."²¹⁷ The Islamic dietary laws are not solely based on avoiding certain products and substances, but also consist of a "clearly defined method of killing an

animal.”²¹⁸ This practice is known as *dhabh*.²¹⁹ In this process, it is required that the name of God be pronounced just before a sharp blade is used to swiftly cut the animal’s neck allowing the blood to drain profusely.²²⁰ The participants from both waves closely observe the dietary laws at comparable levels.²²¹ The first and second wave had twenty-three and twenty-two participants respectively who admitted to following the dietary laws.²²² The remaining five participants either followed some of the laws or ignored them altogether.²²³ This high-level of adherence was expected equally among both waves, considering the Qur’an explicitly forbids Muslims from consuming pork, carrion, blood, and alcohol.²²⁴

The participants’ high degree of adherence to the dietary laws is an affirmation of the community’s religiosity. However, there are some that may suggest that this conclusion is imprecise as it fails to take into account the participants’ environment. In surveying the major streets of Dearborn, the researcher quickly noticed that there are numerous *halaal* grocers, bakeries, restaurants, and butcheries that serve the specific dietary requirements and culinary predilections of the Islamic community. In this setting, one may conclude that the Muslim community can easily follow the dietary laws without much difficulty. However, though the community does present many opportunities for Muslims to obtain *halaal* food, there are an equal number of opportunities to consume products that are *haraam* and against Islamic dietary laws. It is important to remember that Dearborn is still located in the United States where pork products, alcohol, and other illicit substances according to Islamic law can be easily obtained. The participants, like other Muslims in the community are essentially presented with a choice to either follow the dietary laws or ignore them.

The steadfast compliance with the dietary laws indicates that the participants have elected to remain true to their religion's teachings even in the face of temptation.²²⁵ This firm devotion to the dietary laws among both waves can best be explained by Kymlicka's multicultural model. Since Kymlicka's multicultural model has excluded the liberal-democratic state from ensuring some degree of religious integration among the population, the decision to integrate then must fall by default on the individual.²²⁶ In applying Kymlicka's model to this study, the two waves have the ability to choose whether they would like to integrate their faith into American society. They have the ability to remove practices that they feel are no longer needed or retrain rituals that are considered integral commandants. The great majority of participants from each wave have determined that the dietary laws are a fundamental component of their religious identity and as a result have continued to adhere to these laws while living in the United States.²²⁷

Capstone Question

In an attempt to conclude the interview, the researcher designed a question that would allow the participants to reflect on their overall religiosity. In this question, the participants were asked to describe their religiosity using a scale from one to ten with one being non-observant and ten being very observant. Unfortunately, the question did not produce any reliable results as the number that the participants selected for this question did not reflect the level of religiosity expressed in the interview. This problem can be attributed to the lack of any points of reference or comparison to help guide the participants. If the participants had more detail as to what each level consisted of before their selection, the responses would have been less erratic and more reflective of the

participants' actual religiosity. In hindsight, the question should have been excluded from the study as the sporadic results did not produce anything tangible from an empirical perspective.

Conclusion

This chapter has provided a comprehensive examination of the participant community by reflecting on the responses offered during the interview process. It has explored the many similarities and some small differences in religiosity between first and second-wave participants with regards to the mosque life and personal life measurements. In reviewing these two measurements and their various indicators, it appears that, like the devotional life measurement explored in the previous chapter, the first wave is slightly more religious than the second wave.

The multicultural model outlined by Kymlicka reveals that the liberal-democratic state does not undertake the task of religious integration.²²⁸ Due to the state's absence in this sphere of affairs, the citizens of a liberal-democratic state are able to choose their precise level of religiosity. The two waves have paralleled Kymlicka's multicultural model somewhat and have chosen their own religious paths. In general, the first wave attends mosque more frequently, solicits advice from their imam more often, and appears slightly more devoted to ensuring that their diet consists of only religiously permissible food and drink.²²⁹ In addition to looking at the general patterns across the waves, questions were asked specifically of males and females from each wave. For example, males of the first wave wear Western attire less often, are more reluctant to marry women from outside of the Shi'a fold, and embrace the practice of *mut'ah* or temporary marriage slightly more than their second wave counterparts.²³⁰ The male participants from the

second wave are interested in dressing in Western clothing, more willing to marry women from outside of the Shi'a faith, but not women who are non-Twelve Shi'a (Ismaili or Zaydi Shi'a Muslims), and are not as supportive of *mut'ah* marriage.²³¹

The female participants from both waves seem to be in complete or near complete agreement on many issues relating to attire and marriage, and are all emphatically opposed to the idea of personally engaging in a *mut'ah* marriage.²³² The pattern of the first wave showing stronger religious tendencies can be explained with Glock, Ringer, and Babbie's comfort hypothesis. Conversely, the second wave's slightly weaker religious tendencies can be supported by Portes and Zhou's segmented assimilation theory. As noted above, these two theories have been useful in explaining the general pattern of first-wave participants being more religious than second-wave ones. However, the comfort hypothesis and segmented assimilation theory cannot be employed to explain the exception to this general pattern.

The exception to this observed pattern occurred when male participants were asked about whether female relatives should wear the veil.²³³ In this case, the second-wave participants expressed a more traditional position than first wave males.²³⁴ In this anomalous instance, the second wave defies the observed pattern seen in both this chapter and the previous one. Moreover, in this particular case, when it comes to the males, the second wave's religiosity can no longer be explained by Portes and Zhou's segmented assimilation theory. Instead, it appears that Park's race relations cycle would be more suitable in understanding the responses provided by the male participants on veiling. Park's race relations cycle theorizes that immigrants who have recently arrived will be less assimilated than those who have resided in the host society longer.²³⁵ In regards to

the male participants' thoughts on veiling, it appears that Park's race relations cycle has accurately predicted this pattern. However, as described above, this is only one anomalous case and should neither dislodge nor discount the general pattern that has permeated the remainder of this study.

In comparing the responses to questions relating to the devotional life, mosque life, and personal life measurements and their respective indicators, the data reveals that there are indeed differences in religiosity between the two waves of participants. This pattern of the first wave being slightly more religious than the second was initially detected in the previous chapter and redetected in this chapter. An explanation for this overall result will be discussed in the next and final chapter.

Notes

¹ Will Kymlicka, *Finding Our Way: Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada* (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 1998), 26.

² See Appendices O, P, and Q.

³ Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou, "The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and Its Variants," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 530, no. 1 (1993): 82.

⁴ Charles Y. Glock, Benjamin B. Ringer, and Earl R. Babbie, *To Comfort and to Challenge: A Dilemma of the Contemporary Church* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 107.

⁵ See Appendix S.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Stanford Lyman, *The Black American in Sociological Thought: New Perspectives on Black America* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1972), 34.

⁸ Robert Ezra Park, *Race and Culture* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1950), 150.

⁹ See Appendix N.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Andrew Shryock, Nabeel Abraham, and Sally Howell, "The Terror Decade in Arab Detroit: An Introduction," in *Arab Detroit 9/11: Life in the Terror Decade*, eds. Nabeel Abraham, Sally Howell, and Andrew Shryock (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2011), 7.

¹⁴ Liyakat Nathani Takim, *Shi'ism in America* (New York: New York University Press, 2009), 34.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ See Appendix N.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

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- ¹⁹ “Islamic Institute of Knowledge (IIK), About Us,” accessed June 29, 2013, <http://iiikonline.org/about-us.html>.
- ²⁰ *Islamic House of Wisdom Pamphlet* (Dearborn Heights, MI: Islamic House of Wisdom, 2012).
- ²¹ Ibid.
- ²² See Appendix N.
- ²³ Ibid.
- ²⁴ Takim, *Shi’ism in America*, 34.
- ²⁵ See Appendix N.
- ²⁶ Ibid.
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Chapter Six: Summary and Conclusion

Summary

This study has compared the degree of religiosity exemplified by first and second wave Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims residing in greater Dearborn, Michigan. The first wave consisted of Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims who arrived in Dearborn between 1991 and 2002, inclusive and the second wave was composed of those who arrived there between 2003 and 2011, inclusive. The dissertation has made use of four different theoretical models, including Will Kymlicka's multiculturalism model, Robert Park's race relations cycle, Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou's segmented assimilation theory, and Charles Glock, Benjamin Ringer, and Earl Babbie's comfort hypothesis. These theories have been used in order to understand the different levels of religiosity demonstrated by the two waves. In addition to the theoretical components, the study has made use of a "mixed methods," approach incorporating both historical and empirical components. The historical component chronicled the myriad of religious and ethnic struggles faced by the Iraqi Shi'a in both their homeland of Iraq and their host land of the United States, particularly Dearborn. The empirical component consisted of a series of semi-structured interviews conducted with a total of fifty members from this community or twenty-five from each of the two waves. A specially designed questionnaire was created in order to better reflect the uniqueness of this religio-ethnic community. The interviews were conducted during a seven-month period between the end of 2011 and the beginning of 2012.

This study employed three different measurements to determine the level of religiosity among the two waves: the devotional life, mosque life, and personal life measurements. The devotional life measurement consists of five indicators, including

prayer (indicator one), religious knowledge (indicator two), rituals (indicator three), pilgrimages (indicator four), and spiritual authority (indicator five). The mosque life measurement contains only the mosque life indicator (indicator six). Finally, the personal life measurement encompasses three indicators, namely religious attire (indicator seven), marriage (indicator eight), and dietary laws (indicator nine). The three measurements varied in their capability to measure the religiosity of the participant community. The devotional measurement appeared to be the strongest, followed by the personal life measurement, with the mosque life being the weakest measurement of the three.

The devotional life measurement is the most reflective of religiosity because of the importance of its component indicators in Shi'a Islam. Several of the indicators that comprise the devotional life measurement are central elements in Shi'a Islam, such as prayer, observance of holydays, pilgrimages, and choice of spiritual authority. Since these indicators are all essential components of Shi'a Islam, it would be logical to conclude that those who closely adhere to these key religious elements are those who maintain a high degree of religiosity in their daily lives. In other words, the indicators, and the devotional measurement in general, are the best reflectors of Shi'a religious life.

The mosque life and personal life measurements are not as strong as the devotional life measurement. Like the devotional life measurement, both the mosque life and personal life measurements contain several indicators that are expected to be followed by the devout Shi'a Muslim, such as mosque attendance, laws on marriage, and dietary restrictions. However, these indicators are secondary in comparison to the indicators that comprise the devotional life measurement. The mosque life and personal life indicators are secondary because they do not comprise the five pillars of Islam,

namely the creed or *shahadah*, prayer or *salat*, almsgiving or *zakat*, fasting or *sawm*, and the obligatory pilgrimage or *hajj*.¹ The prayer, fasting, and pilgrimage requirements are all used as indicators within the devotional measurement, whereas the mosque life and personal life measurements do not contain any of the five pillars. Therefore, in comparison to the devotional life measurement, the mosque life and personal life measurements' ability to reflect the level of religiosity among members of both waves is much weaker. However, simply because these two measurements are not as central to the waves' religiosity, they should not be deemed irrelevant. As discussed in previous chapters, these two measurements assist in providing a more complete and detailed understanding of Iraqi-Shi'a religiosity that would not have been achieved by employing the devotional life measurement alone.

In reviewing the data collected, the measurement that produced the closest similarity and the largest difference between the two waves was the devotional life measurement.² The first question asked of all participants from both waves was how many times per day they pray. The response was exactly the same with twenty-three participants from each wave stating that they prayed five times per day, one prayed four times per day, and one ignored prayer entirely.³ The similar response was not a surprise due to the importance of prayer in Islam. In one of his more famous hadiths or sayings, the Sixth Imam, Ja'far as-Sadiq (c. 702-765 C.E.) describes prayer as "the most beloved of all acts to Allah."⁴ The participants from both waves realized the immense importance of prayer in their religion and have evidently incorporated it into their daily lives.⁵ Since prayer sits at the summit of Muslim worship, it is unlikely that devout Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims would neglect this practice. This assumption proved to be correct as both waves

diligently performed their prayers at an identical level of adherence.⁶

There are a few explanations that can elucidate as to why the two waves have a similar prayer routine. In addition to its importance, the daily prayer is something that one typically does in the privacy of one's own home. Unlike other, more overt expressions of one's faith, such as attire, prayer is a quiet matter that is beyond the skeptical and scrutinizing eyes of the public. In other words, since prayer is conducted in private, one manages to avoid individuals who may criticize one's prayer routine or convince one to abandon it entirely. Also, unlike performing pilgrimages or donating to the mosque, the daily prayers do not require any money to complete. The prayer component allows participants who may be experiencing financial difficulty to fulfill this major requirement of their faith while avoiding substantial financial costs. It is important to note that this instance would be one of the only times when the two waves manifested identical levels of religiosity within a specific measurement or indicator.⁷

On the opposite side, the largest difference between the two waves occurred within the devotional life measurement and revolved around the *hajj*, or great pilgrimage.⁸ In this case, there was a significant difference between the two waves as thirteen first-wave participants stated that they had completed the *hajj* compared to zero second-wave participants who performed the required journey.⁹ Like prayer, the *hajj* is part of the "five pillars" of Islam.¹⁰ Therefore, it initially appears puzzling why one of the pillars, prayer, would be so strictly adhered to by the second wave while another pillar like the *hajj* would be ignored.¹¹ However, while both are pillars of the faith, there is a considerable, more practical difference between prayer and the *hajj*. In order to satisfy the prayer requirement, one simply requires a quiet place to pray. Conversely, to

complete the *hajj* requirement, one requires approximately “six to seven thousand American dollars,” as noted by one participant.¹² As mentioned above, these costs are more burdensome on the recently arrived second wave, than on the more established first wave. This conclusion was reached because many of the second-wave participants expressed their desire to perform the *hajj* in the future.¹³ In other words, the large discrepancy between the two waves in this category is much more related to financial issues rather than religious ones. At this point, it is necessary to understand how these similarities and differences between the two waves fit into the original hypothesis stated at the beginning of this study.

Hypothesis Revisited

The original theoretical contours of this study began with Will Kymlicka’s multicultural model. In his understanding of religious minorities and the ideal role of the liberal-democratic state, Kymlicka maintains that there should be a firm “separation of church and state.”¹⁴ In addition to this separation between religion and government, Kymlicka remarks that “a liberal-democratic state does not seek to promote *religious* integration.”¹⁵ This study has accepted Kymlicka’s central premise concerning the liberal-democratic state and its incapacity to ensure some sort of religious conformity. The absence of the liberal-democratic state from endorsing religious integration is confirmed, but has simultaneously required the researcher to adopt a theoretical model that could explain the possible different levels of religiosity held by religious and ethnic minorities in a host society such as the United States. This need for an appropriate theoretical model led the researcher to Robert Park’s race relations cycle. In his model, Park contends that immigrants must pass through four stages: “contact,” “competition,”

“accommodation,” and finally “assimilation.”¹⁶ It is important to note that according to Park the path towards assimilation is “progressive and irreversible” and “cannot change its direction.”¹⁷ In other words, for Park, immigrants will be assimilated into the host society in a matter of time.¹⁸

The hypothesis stated at the beginning of the dissertation is based on Park’s race relations cycle. The hypothesis speculated that the first wave would be less religious than the second wave owing to the first wave’s earlier arrival in America. It was postulated that a longer time in a host society would increase the chance that an immigrant group will accept the host society’s cultural, religious, and social values at the expense of their own values. It was further predicted that because the first wave had resided in the United States longer than the second wave, the first wave would have abandoned aspects of their religiosity in favour of more secular values. Conversely, since the second wave arrived years or perhaps over a decade after the first wave, this wave began the race relations cycle later. The second wave would have in theory arrived at the final stage of assimilation much later than the first wave participants. In light of Park’s race relations cycle, this study hypothesized that the second wave would be less assimilated into American society and would have retained several more religious beliefs and practices than the first wave.

However, the findings in this comparative study on the two waves of Iraqi-Shi’a Muslims did not conform to the theoretical patterns predicted by Park’s race relations cycle. The first wave did not appear to be less devoted to their religious heritage and thus more accepting of secular values as originally predicted by the initial hypothesis. Instead, the first wave appeared slightly more religious than the recently-arrived second wave on

several different fronts, including relating to religious knowledge (indicator two), rituals (indicator three), pilgrimages (indicator four), mosque life (indicator six), and for the most part of the religious attire (indicator seven) and marriage (indicator eight) indicators.¹⁹ There were, however, a few exceptions to this observed pattern of the first wave appearing more religious than the second wave.

First, it was noted in the data that more second-wave participants donated to their mosque of choice than the first wave.²⁰ To explain this deviation, it was suggested that perhaps the second wave is compensating for their lack of attendance at mosque by donating money instead of their time. The second exception was related to the males of the second wave's stronger insistence and expectation that their female relatives wear the veil in America.²¹ This response initially appeared anomalous considering that male members of the second wave wore Western attire much more frequently than the males of the first wave.²² At the outset, it appeared that the second-wave males would have been supportive of the idea of their female relatives wearing Western attire, since they themselves sported this type of clothing.²³ However, when the matter of attire was brought up in relation to their female relatives, the second-wave males took a more traditionalist stance.²⁴

To account for this deviation, it was suggested that the second wave did not have the same amount of exposure to American society as the males from the first wave. Moreover, the second wave did not observe the anti-Muslim and anti-Arab backlash that dominated the post-9/11 environment in the United States. In other words, the second-wave male participants did not witness the countless instances of harassment,

discrimination, and violence directed against Muslims, particularly those who wore religious attire in public.

Finally, the third exception to the observed pattern of first-wave participants being more religious than the second wave concerned the second-wave males' willingness to marry women from outside of their specific sub-branch of Shi'a Islam, namely the Twelver Shi'a sub-branch.²⁵ The second-wave males appeared more receptive to marrying Sunni women, women from the *ahl al-kitaab*, or people of the book faiths, such as Judaism and Christianity, and women from outside of the *ahl al-kitaab* religions, such as Hinduism and Buddhism.²⁶ However, the second-wave males demonstrated a higher degree of unwillingness to marry women from the non-Twelver Shi'a sub-branches, such as the Ismaili and Zaydi sub-branches.²⁷ It is important to take into consideration that when the second-wave males were asked this question, many of them were unsure as to what or who constituted the non-Twelver Shi'a sub-branches. The researcher then had to describe the non-Twelver Shi'a sub-branches for the second-wave male participants. The second wave's questions about the non-Twelver Shi'a sub-branches showed that they were uncertain and likely unable to make a fully informed decision on the matter.

Unfamiliarity would explain the reason why the second-wave males were more supportive of marrying women from outside of their sub-branch, in comparison to the first-wave males who appeared somewhat more resistant.²⁸ However, despite these minor deviations, the observed pattern of the first wave being slightly more religious than the second wave remained firmly in place throughout the study. The issue with this pattern was that it did not conform to the initial hypothesis suggested at the beginning of this study, which in turn was influenced by the theoretical underpinnings of Park's race

relations cycle. Once it was discovered that Park's race relations cycle could not accurately explain the observed pattern developing in this study, it was necessary to incorporate other theories.

The race relations cycle's failure to describe the observed pattern prompted the researcher to adopt Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou's segmented assimilation theory and Charles Glock, Benjamin Ringer, and Earl Babbie's comfort hypothesis. These two theories were useful in explaining the religious nuances of the two waves. Portes and Zhou's segmented assimilation theory accounted for the second wave's somewhat weaker religious interest, by suggesting that immigrant groups have three possible paths that they can traverse.²⁹ The first path, which was used to describe the second wave, is the immigrant group's intense determination to assimilate into the dominant middle class.³⁰ This "upward-mobility pattern" naturally requires the aspiring immigrant to forsake some of their previously held values in favour of those cherished and espoused by the middle class.³¹ Segmented assimilation theory can correctly describe the second wave's slightly less religious orientation, but cannot satisfactorily express the first wave's somewhat more religious nature.

Glock, Ringer, and Babbie's comfort hypothesis was used to account for the first wave's somewhat higher level of religiosity. According to this theory, individuals who feel marginalized in some way by the nature and demands of modern society will turn to the church or in this case, religion.³² Moreover, Glock, Ringer, and Babbie note that elderly individuals who feel ostracized by a society driven by youth preferences and causes will turn to religion in order to seek some sort of respite and comfort.³³ The comfort hypothesis proved to be applicable to this study considering that the first wave is

slightly older than the second.³⁴ However, while segmented assimilation theory and the comfort hypothesis proved valuable, the question still remains why Park's race relations cycle was not successful in describing the observed pattern.

The inability of Park's race relations cycle to explain the results of this study prompts further investigation into the theory. It is important to note that Park's paradigm is considered "a major contribution to sociological thought."³⁵ However, the paradigm suffers from a serious drawback that is verified by the findings in this study. The secondary literature on the race relations cycle seems to criticize Park for the same charge. Park is accused of "painting with broad brush strokes on a large canvas" in regards to the expansive scope of this paradigm.³⁶ The late political sociologist, Seymour M. Lipset, also criticized Park's theory on the grounds that it entails "inevitable cycles."³⁷ This statement is confirmed by Park's belief that the race relations cycle "tends everywhere to repeat itself."³⁸ The problem with this ubiquitous outlook is that it cannot be applied to every single possible case, as demonstrated in this study. Clearly, another more developed theory must be tested in order to help explain the relationship between the two waves.

The inability of Park's race relations cycle to accurately reflect the patterns displayed by the two waves requires the researcher to look at other, "more sophisticated theories of the assimilation process" within the classic assimilation paradigm.³⁹ The necessity leads the researcher to explore Milton Gordon's stages of assimilation model. Gordon contends that there are seven levels of assimilation: "cultural assimilation," "structural assimilation," "marital assimilation," "identificational assimilation," "attitude receptional assimilation," "behavior receptional assimilation," and "civic assimilation."⁴⁰

The first stage of “cultural assimilation” is also referred to as “acculturation.”⁴¹ In this initial stage, the immigrant group entering the host society is expected to modify its “cultural patterns.”⁴² The members of the immigrant group are expected to do this in order to conform closer to those of the host society.⁴³ In this case, Gordon defines the host society as “white Protestant.”⁴⁴ To clarify what types of cultural changes an immigrant group undergoes at this point, Gordon provides the example of changes in the immigrant group’s “religious belief and observance.”⁴⁵ Gordon’s observation of changes to religious behaviour at this stage makes his model of great importance to this study.⁴⁶

It is important to recognize that at this early stage, the immigrant group under review does not simply begin to abandon their religious beliefs in favour of a non-religious, agnostic or atheistic outlook. At this point, the immigrant group in question would start to reflect the religious beliefs of their host society, whatever they may be.⁴⁷ In other words, the Iraqi Shi’a from both waves are not simply renouncing Shi’a Islam and becoming non-religious, but are rather starting to adopt the major or most prominent religious tradition of their host society. In this case, this religious tradition would be some version of Christianity. It is expected that participants in the first wave would have had more interest in perhaps abandoning Shi’ism in order to adopt Christianity. However, this expectation did not manifest itself in the data. The participants did not express a wish to convert to a branch of Christianity. This resistance towards acculturating into American society was prevalent among both waves, despite the different times of arrival. In addition, this firm resistance to acculturation repeats itself within other measurements.

The first stage of Gordon’s assimilation model can also include how individuals modify or ignore their religious practices in order to bring them in line with those of the

host community.⁴⁸ At this stage of assimilation, both waves of female participants retained the Islamic custom of veiling their hair in public.⁴⁹ The eighteen female participants did not decide to adopt the typical American custom and allow their hair to remain uncovered.⁵⁰ In another, similar instance of resistance towards acculturation, ninety-two percent of the first wave and eighty-eight percent of the second wave continue to follow the Islamic dietary laws while living in America.⁵¹ In other words, both waves maintained Islamic dietary regulations despite the unrestricted diet choices available in the United States and the popularity of items that are contraband in Islam, such as alcohol and pork.⁵² From these two examples, it is clear that Gordon's assimilation theory is unable to accurately explain the data obtained in the field research. Moreover, it would be futile to discuss whether the waves have advanced to the higher levels of Gordon's model, considering both waves have failed to reach the first and most basic level of the model.

It was expected that an earlier arrival time would allow the immigrant group in question to assimilate faster. This expectation did not manifest itself in this study. Like Park's race relations cycle, Gordon's model failed to explain the trends exemplified by the two waves of this study. In other words, the first wave did not appear more assimilated and thus less religious than the second wave. However, Gordon does identify a couple of factors that have the ability to reduce "the rapidity and success of the acculturation process."⁵³ In taking into consideration these two points, the reasons the two waves did not conform to the patterns predicted by Gordon's model become much clearer.

The first factor that can inhibit acculturation into American society concerns the

location of the immigrant group within the larger community or city.⁵⁴ Gordon theorizes that immigrant groups that are “spatially isolated and segregated” from the rest of the community will take much more time to acculturate into American society.⁵⁵ In this study, both waves reside in and around Dearborn. Given its unique religious and ethnic composition, Dearborn can be appropriately considered an “ethnic enclave” in contemporary political and sociological discourse.

This term has been used by different disciplines, but essentially “ethnic enclaves” refer to “territories inhabited by a distinct group of people who are separated from the dominant population by differences in language, religion, social class, or culture and who are frequently subjected to prejudice and discrimination.”⁵⁶ The city of Dearborn can rightfully fit this concept due to its reputation as “America’s best-known Arab immigrant enclave” and its preeminence among other cities in the country since “no other American city includes such a highly visible and large Arab enclave.”⁵⁷ In a sense, the prominence of this ethnic enclave reduces the number of struggles facing both Iraqi-Shi’a waves. Since both waves have settled into a community that is familiar with their religion, language, cultural values, and dietary requirements, the number of obstacles generally associated with immigrating to a new society has been reduced. However, in Dearborn, both waves are shielded from the forces of assimilation because they are “spatially isolated.”⁵⁸ In addition to being sheltered from the forces of assimilation, the waves are protected from another force that usually manifests itself in a host society, particularly if the immigrant group expresses characteristics that are strikingly different than those held by the host society.

This force, which is also Gordon's second exception to his theory, is discrimination.⁵⁹ According to Gordon, if discrimination is present, it may reduce the immigrant group's ability to secure "educational and occupational opportunities."⁶⁰ In turn, assimilation becomes more difficult as the immigrant group is confined to "a lower-class setting."⁶¹ As a result, members lack the various opportunities to expose themselves to the cultural components of the host society.⁶² In living in Dearborn, both waves experienced instances of discrimination.⁶³ In the case of the first wave, nine individuals mentioned that they had experienced some form of discrimination.⁶⁴ The second wave experienced much less with only three instances, one of which did not occur in Dearborn.⁶⁵ In other words, about one-quarter of all participants experienced some form of discrimination during their time in Dearborn.⁶⁶ The number can be viewed as somewhat high, considering that Dearborn is an ethnic enclave with a substantial number of different Arab and Muslim groups. In light of its Arab and Muslim population, it is expected that the Iraqi Shi'a would have endured very few instances of discrimination. However, this prediction was not the case.⁶⁷ According to Gordon's theory, the discrimination felt by both waves should be viewed as an obstruction that has hindered their assimilation into American society.⁶⁸

The classic assimilation theory exemplified by the models presented by Park and Gordon has not been successful in explaining the degree of assimilation and by extension the religiosity of the two waves. The waves do not conform to the patterns predicted by the two models. The notion of time that is embedded in classic assimilation theory seems to have had little effect on explaining the observed patterns of the two waves. The first wave continues to adhere to their religious beliefs and practice slightly more than the

second wave, despite the fact that the first wave arrived much earlier and would expectedly neglect aspects of their religion as time progresses. However, despite the failure of the models to explain the religiosity of the two waves, the two exceptions expressed by Gordon provide ample clarification as to why the waves have not abandoned their religious heritage and assimilated into American society entirely.

In attempting to understand this outcome, it is necessary to reflect upon the religious and political history of the Iraqi Shi'a. Since their coalescences in the late seventh-century to the ordeals of establishing Iraq in the early twentieth century to the destructive conflicts of the present day, the Iraqi Shi'a have endured countless instances of discrimination, oppression, and tragedy because of their religious beliefs. Nonetheless, despite this traumatic history, the Iraqi-Shi'a have remained true to their religious identity. This ability to maintain one's religious heritage in such precarious circumstances clearly demonstrates a profound sense of resilience. The hardships that the waves were forced to endure in their homeland not only solidified and strengthened their religious identity, but provided them with a shared experience in dealing with unfavourable circumstances. Since the two waves both experienced similar types of conditions, they are both equally equipped to withstand the challenges presented by American society. The instances of discrimination, the forces of assimilation, and the surveillance from law enforcement sustained in America pales in comparison to the atrocities endured in their homeland.

The strength that the waves have garnered from centuries of tribulations is not the only reason for their comparable level of religiosity. Additionally, one must also consider the exact place of immigration and determine the role this venue has had on the

participant community. The two waves did not settle in a homogeneous Middle American city that was constructed in a manner that would ideally suit the needs of its largely white residents and would be unfamiliar and perhaps even suspicious of the beliefs, requirements, and traditions of various Muslim minorities. Instead, the two waves arrived in a unique community that included an array of different religious and ethnic groups from around the Middle East. These diverse groups helped fashion Dearborn in a manner that could satisfy the specialized needs of this recently arrived group from Iraq. The waves both settled in Dearborn and were presented not only with the same opportunities and benefits, but also similar problems. In other words, by residing in Dearborn, the two waves share a similar immigrant experience that influences and shapes their religious identity.

Future Research

There are several other research opportunities that have been presented in light of this study. The most logical future study would involve incorporating a third wave of Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims into the research equation. This hypothetical third wave would consist of Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims who arrived in the United States following the culmination of the Second Gulf War at the end of 2011. A study conducted on the religiosity of the third wave would be of particular importance largely due to the traumatic experiences this wave endured in Iraq. Unlike the first and second waves, the third wave's experience in Iraq has largely been defined by two significant wars, one of which resulted in a complete regime change from a hostile Sunni dictator to an unstable Shi'a republic.

The obvious challenge with this project revolves around the issue of timing. Since the Second Gulf War ended just over two years ago, the third wave has just begun to

enter into the United States. It is premature to suggest that a third wave will develop in the future as the number of years required to constitute a wave have not yet passed. At this point, it is difficult to determine whether the third wave will consist of a significant number of refugees and asylees. However, in light of the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act and the number of Iraqi refugees and asylees to enter the United States in the year 2011, it is probable that this trend will continue into the second decade of the twenty-first century.⁶⁹

This study on the third wave will have to remain in abeyance for several years until the refugee and asylee patterns can be observed. In the interim, there are other future studies that can be conducted. A fruitful study would be to compare the religiosity demonstrated by the two waves in this study with the same first- and second-wave Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims from another American city. This type of study is not only necessary in order to test whether the results achieved in this study are replicable, but also to compare levels of religiosity between two different Iraqi-Shi'a groups. In this proposed study, the religio-ethnic group, the wave parameters, and the specialized questionnaire would all remain the same. The only component to change in this future comparative study would be the city of immigration. In changing the city, the researcher can better ascertain how the participant community's religiosity has been nuanced by the various experiences shared in the context of a city. But before this question can be addressed, the researcher would be required to select an appropriate city with a significant population of Iraqi Shi'a Muslims from both the first and second wave.

The ideal city would have an Iraqi-Shi'a community comparable in size to that of Dearborn. In reviewing the data presented by the Arab American Institute (AAI), the researcher was able to calculate that there are about 36,727 Iraqis in the state of

Michigan.⁷⁰ This comparative study would likely have to adopt a participant community from within California as the state contains around 23,690 Iraqis.⁷¹ In all these statistical summaries, religious affiliation is not specified, but considering the prominence of Shi'ism in Iraq, one can safely assume that there will be an ample number of Iraqi-Shi'as within this population.

There is another, more challenging research opportunity made apparent by this study. In studying a community that is in close proximity to the American-Canadian border, the researcher envisioned another potential project. This project would involve comparing the participant community of this study with an Iraqi-Shi'a community from a Canadian city. This future study is significantly different than the one mentioned above because the change in the city is much more drastic. In this case, the change is not simply replacing one American city for another, but rather involves adding another city from an entirely different country. By adding a Canadian city into the equation, the researcher will have to take into consideration the Canadian Iraqi Shi'as' history in their host society and the experiences they have had to contend with in the past and those that they continue to endure on a daily basis.

The results of this study would assist not only in comparing the level of religiosity among American and Canadian Muslims, but also in discovering the role different host societies have in structuring and affecting religiosity. Also, from a more general viewpoint, a study of this type would assist in answering the question as to whether there is an "American Islam" on one hand and a "Canadian Islam" on the other. If there are conspicuous similarities between "American Islam" and "Canadian Islam," then perhaps it is permissible to speak of a sort of "North American Islam" that permeates both

countries. However, before a conclusion of this significance can be accepted, several different cross-country studies of this type would need to be conducted.

Conclusion

In summary, this research has provided a rare insight into the religious identity held by the participant community. The community embraces a moderate version of Shi'ism that seeks to preserve the classical form of the religion while avoiding the extremes. This assertion is supported by the community's devotion to prayer, rejection of more retrograde rituals, support for moderate religious leaders, aversion to excessive forms of veiling, and adherence to their religion's prescribed dietary laws.⁷² These results clearly show that the Iraqi Shi'a envision their place not as nostalgic reactionaries seeking to preserve a vanished past or as militant revolutionaries embracing quixotic ideologies, but rather as humble custodians of the creed devoted to the original precepts of their faith.

Notes

¹ Malise Ruthven, *Islam: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 143-47.

² See Appendices I and L.

³ See Appendix I.

⁴ Cited in M. Muhammadi Rayshahri, *The Scale of Wisdom: A Compendium of Shi'a Hadith*, ed. N. Virjee, trans. N. Virjee, A. Kadhim, M. Dasht Bozorgi, Z. Alsalami, and A. Virjee (London: ICAS Press, 2009), 629.

⁵ See Appendix I.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ See Appendices I to V.

⁸ See Appendix L.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ruthven, *Islam: A Very Short Introduction*, 143-47.

¹¹ See Appendices I and L.

¹² IW2-D.

¹³ IW2-A, IW2-D, IW2-E, IW2-N, and IW2-P.

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- ¹⁴ Will Kymlicka, *Finding Our Way: Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada* (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 1998), 26.
- ¹⁵ Ibid.
- ¹⁶ Robert Ezra Park, *Race and Culture* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1950), 150.
- ¹⁷ Ibid.
- ¹⁸ Ibid.
- ¹⁹ See Appendices J, K, L, O, S, and T.
- ²⁰ See Appendix P.
- ²¹ See Appendix S.
- ²² Ibid.
- ²³ Ibid.
- ²⁴ Ibid.
- ²⁵ See Appendix T.
- ²⁶ Ibid.
- ²⁷ Ibid.
- ²⁸ Ibid.
- ²⁹ Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou, "The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and Its Variants," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 530, no. 1 (1993): 82.
- ³⁰ Ibid.
- ³¹ Min Zhou, *Contemporary Chinese America: Immigration, Ethnicity, and Community Transformation* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2009), 6.
- ³² Charles Y. Glock, Benjamin B. Ringer, and Earl R. Babbie, *To Comfort and to Challenge: A Dilemma of the Contemporary Church* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 107.
- ³³ Ibid.
- ³⁴ See Appendices G and H.
- ³⁵ Stanford Lyman, "The Race Relations Cycle of Robert E. Park," *The Pacific Sociological Review* 11, no. 1 (1968): 16.
- ³⁶ Richard Alba and Victor Nee, *Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 20.
- ³⁷ S.M. Lipset, "Changing Social Status and Prejudice: The Race Theories of a Pioneering American Sociologist," *Commentary* 9 (1950): 475.
- ³⁸ Park, *Race and Culture*, 150.
- ³⁹ Martin N. Marger, *Race and Ethnic Relations: American and Global Perspectives*, 9th ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2012), 86.
- ⁴⁰ Milton M. Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), 71.
- ⁴¹ Ibid.
- ⁴² Ibid., 70.
- ⁴³ Ibid., 71.
- ⁴⁴ Ibid., 78.
- ⁴⁵ Ibid., 70.
- ⁴⁶ Ibid.
- ⁴⁷ Ibid., 70-71.
- ⁴⁸ Ibid., 71.
- ⁴⁹ See Appendix S.
- ⁵⁰ Ibid.
- ⁵¹ See Appendix V.
- ⁵² Ibid.
- ⁵³ Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life*, 78.
- ⁵⁴ Ibid.
- ⁵⁵ Ibid.
- ⁵⁶ Leslie V. Tischauer, "Ethnic Enclaves," in *Racial and Ethnic Relations in America*, Vol. 1, ed. Carl L. Bankson III et al. (Pasadena, CA: Salem Press, 2000), 383.

⁵⁷ Sally Howell and Amaney Jamal, “The Aftermath of the 9/11 Attacks,” in *Citizenship and Crisis Arab Detroit After 9/11*, ed. Detroit Arab American Study Team (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2009), 73.

⁵⁸ Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life*, 78.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ See Appendix R.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life*, 78.

⁶⁹ See Appendix A.

⁷⁰ Arab American Institute (AAI), “Detailed Profile: Michigan,” accessed January 24, 2014, http://b.3cdn.net/aai/dfab1c90e9a819c9c1_tkm6iyilb.pdf.

⁷¹ Arab American Institute (AAI), “Detailed Profile: California,” accessed January 24, 2014, http://b.3cdn.net/aai/6dc54b3d39145166e6_p8m6iiixh.pdf.

⁷² See Appendices I, K, M, S, and V.

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Appendix A: Iraqi Immigration to America

Iraqi Refugees and Asylees to America (1990-2011)

Year	Refugees	Asylees	Total
1990	67	21	88
1991	842	26	868
1992	3,442	70	3,512
1993	4,605	100	4,705
1994	4,984	207	5,191
1995	3,482	199	3,681
1996	2,528	917	3,445
1997	2,679	5,538	8,217
1998	1,407	176	1,583
1999	1,955	204	2,159
2000	3,158	479	3,637
2001	2,473	833	3,306
2002	466	843	1,309
2003	298	522	820
2004	66	276	342
2005	198	286	484
2006	202	370	572
2007	1,608	668	2,276
2008	13,822	996	14,818
2009	18,838	908	19,746
2010	18,016	425	18,441
2011	9,388	378	9,766
1990-2011	94,524	14,442	108,966

Sources:

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Appendix B: Letter of Information



Dear Potential Participant:

My name is John Cappucci and I am a doctoral candidate (ABD) in the Department of Political Science at Carleton University in Ottawa, Ontario, Canada. I have completed all necessary course work and successfully passed both comprehensive examinations in comparative politics and political theory, respectively. Currently, I am in the process of completing my doctoral dissertation on the concept of religiosity under the supervision of Professor Melissa Hausman, Ph.D. of the Department of Political Science at Carleton University. The purpose of this study is to compare the level of religiosity between First Wave (1991-2002) and Second Wave (2003-2011) Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims residing in Greater Dearborn, Michigan. I have tentatively entitled this research project, "Custodians of the Creed: A Comparative Study on the Level of Religiosity among First and Second Wave Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims in an American Community." In addition to a historical component, fifty semi-structured interviews will be conducted with members of the Iraqi-Shi'a community of Greater Dearborn, Michigan. For the sake of this dissertation, one who possesses "Iraqi descent" will be defined as one who was born in Iraq and/or possesses at least one parent of Iraqi birth. A "Shi'a" will be defined as one who professes the Imami-Shi'a faith [Twelver].

The typical interview will require about twenty minutes and may require a follow-up interview if necessary. The interviews may be audio recorded. However, should you feel uncomfortable with the use of a recording device; I will immediately and gladly switch off the tape recorder and take written notes to record your various responses. Typically, interviews will be conducted at a location of mutual convenience to both the participant and researcher.

In order to prevent harm, I will seek participants on a voluntary basis only and only those who are over the age of eighteen. If participants do decide to partake on a voluntary basis, they will also have the ability to decline to answer certain questions if they so feel and may withdraw from the interview completely. At no time will participants be forced, influenced, or intimidated into participating in this study or answering certain questions that they would prefer not to answer for whatever reason. If participants do choose to end the interview, they have the option to have the data that has already been collected to be removed from the study. There shall be no identifiable and/or sensitive information published in the dissertation. If a response is discussed in the dissertation, a one-name pseudonym will be used, whereby only the researcher knows the participant's identity.

In full deference to Islamic traditions, female participants are welcome to bring along a male relative or another support person during the duration of the interview

and/or request the researcher bring along a female Muslim to observe the interview process. In addition, all participants are welcome to bring along any support person.

Although there may be some mild discomfort in discussing some sensitive topics, there are no serious or foreseeable physical, psychological, emotional, economic, social, or cultural harm that could befall participants who voluntarily choose to take part in this study. Participants will receive a \$10.00 (USD) gift certificate after completing the interview.

Upon completion of this project, written interview transcripts, electronic recordings, and digital information will be securely stored in a locked safe to which I only have access for a period of five years. After such time the transcripts and recordings will be completely destroyed using a paper shredder and permanently deleted from the audio-electric storage device. Any transcripts or notes that were typified on a compact disc/USB drive will be protected through the use of a password. Once a period of five years has elapsed, the electronic documents will be deleted and permanently purged from the storage device.

Finally, a brief summation of the results of this study will be e-mailed to all participants once the study is completed and the dissertation has been defended.

Please note that this research project has been reviewed and cleared by the Carleton University Research Ethics Board. If you have any concerns or questions about this research, please do not hesitate to contact the chairperson of the Research Ethics Board (REB) Professor Antonio Gualtieri, Ph.D. at Carleton University Research Ethics Board, Carleton University, 1125 Colonel By Drive, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, K1S 5B6, 613-520-2517, ethics@uwindsor.ca

I am sincerely looking forward to working with you on this project. If you have any questions or concerns please feel free to contact me at anytime. I thank you for your time in this matter and look forward to hearing from you shortly.

Respectfully,

John Cappucci, M.A.
Doctoral Candidate (ABD)
Department of Political Science
Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada



Melissa Haussman, Ph.D.
Doctoral Supervisor/Associate Professor
Department of Political Science
Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
1-613-520-2600, Ext. 2768
melissa_haussman@carleton.ca

CALL FOR PARTICIPANTS

The purpose of this doctoral study is to compare the level of religiosity between First Wave (1991-2002) and Second Wave (2003-2011) Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims residing in Greater Dearborn.

If you are an Imami Shi'a Muslim of Iraqi descent (either born in Iraq and/or have at least one parent born in Iraq) and arrived in America between 1991 and 2011, I invite you to take part in this study. Please note that all participants must be eighteen or over. The interviews will take about twenty minutes. Participants will receive a \$10.00 Gift Certificate for completing this voluntary study. If you are interested in participating or would like further information, please contact:

John Cappucci, BA, MA, PhD Candidate (ABD)
Department of Political Science
Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario



Appendix D: Informed Consent Form



Informed Consent Form

I _____ [Participant] agree to participate voluntarily in the study entitled “Custodians of the Creed: A Comparative Study on the Level of Religiosity among First and Second Wave Iraqi-Shi’a Muslims in an American Community” conducted by John Cappucci [the researcher], Doctoral Candidate (ABD) in the Department of Political Science at Carleton University and under the supervisor of Professor Melissa Haussman, Ph.D. of the Department of Political Science at Carleton University. I recognize that the purpose of this study is to compare the level of religiosity between First Wave (1991-2002) and Second Wave (2003-2011) Iraqi-Shi’a Muslims residing in Greater Dearborn, Michigan.

I affirm that I am of eighteen years or older as of the date of this interview. I also affirm that I am of Iraqi descent either by being born in Iraq or possessing at least one parent of Iraqi birth. I also affirm that I am of the Imami-Shi’a faith.

I understand that the typical interview will require about twenty minutes and may require a follow-up interview if necessary. I recognize that in this interview, I will be asked a series of questions regarding my religiosity.

I understand that there is a possibility that I may feel some mild discomfort in addressing certain questions that are posed to me by the researcher. Despite this possibility of mild discomfort, I still wish to participate in this study; however, I realize that at any point in the interview, I may choose to decline to answer certain questions or stop the interview completely. I recognize that there are no serious or foreseeable physical, psychological, emotional, economic, social, or cultural harm that could befall me while I am being interviewed by the researcher.

I recognize that there shall be no identifiable or sensitive information published in the doctoral dissertation. If a response is discussed in the dissertation, a one-name pseudonym will be used, whereby only the researcher knows my true identity.

I understand that there are no known and/or anticipated direct and/or indirect benefits from taking part in this study.

I understand that I have the ability to decline to answer any question(s) if I choose to and may even withdraw from the interview completely at anytime without any consequences. If I do decide to withdraw from the interview completely, I recognize that I have the option to have the data that has already been collected to be removed from the study. I recognize that female participants are welcome to bring along a male relative or another support person during the duration of the interview and/or request the researcher to bring along a female Muslim. I also recognize that I may bring along a support person to the interview if I so choose.

I understand that I will receive a \$10.00 gift certificate following the interview.

I understand that upon completion of this project, written interview transcripts, electronic recordings, and digital data will be securely stored in a locked safe for a period of five years, for which only the researcher has access. After such time the transcripts will be completely destroyed using a paper shredder and the electronic recordings will be permanently deleted from the audio-digital storage device. Any transcripts or notes that were typified on a compact disc/USB drive will be protected through the use of a password. Once a period of five years has elapsed, the electronic documents will be deleted and permanently purged from the storage device.

I understand that a brief summation of the results of this study will be e-mailed to all participants once the study is completed and the dissertation has been successfully defended.

I understand that this study has been reviewed and has received full ethics clearance from the Carleton University Research Ethics Committee.

I fully realize and understand that I am making an informed decision to participate in this study and understand and agree to the aforementioned information presented in this document.

Signature of Participant

Date (DD/MM/YYYY)

Signature of Researcher

Date (DD/MM/YYYY)

If you have any questions regarding this research, please feel free to contact the researcher, John Cappucci, Department of Political Science, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

If you require further information regarding this research, please feel free to contact the researcher's supervisor: Professor Melissa Hausman, Ph.D., Department of Political Science, 613-520-2600, Extension 2768, melissa_hausman@carleton.ca

If you have any concerns or questions regarding the rights of the participant or any other ethical matters, please feel free to contact the chairperson of the Research Ethics Board (REB) Professor Antonio Gualtieri, Ph.D. at Carleton University Research Ethics Board, Carleton University, 1125 Colonel By Drive, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, K1S 5B6, 613-520-2517, ethics@uwindsor.ca

Appendix E: Gift Certificate Receipt

Gift Certificate Receipt

I confirm that I have received a \$10.00 (USD) gift certificate for participating in the study, “Custodians of the Creed: A Comparative Study on the Level of Religiosity among First and Second Wave Iraqi-Shi’a Muslims in an American Community” by John Cappucci (Researcher)

Name

Signature

Date

Appendix F: Questionnaire

Last Name:

First Name:

Age:

Gender:

Occupation:

Pseudonym Assigned:

Year of Arrival in America:

Wave:

Devotional Life Questions

1. How many times a day do you pray?
2. How many times a week do you read religious texts like the Holy Qur'an or other sacred texts?
3. Have you memorized the Holy Qur'an?
4. What is your knowledge of the Hadiths [Traditions/Sayings]?
5. What types of rituals/practices do you engage in to commemorate *Ashura*?
6. Have you performed the *Hajj*? If not, do you intend to perform the *Hajj*? When?
7. Have you visited any of the Shi'a Holy Shrines, such as the Tombs of the Imams? Which ones?
8. Who is your *marja-e taqlid* [source of emulation] and why did you decide to follow this *marja*?

Mosque Life Questions

1. What mosque do you attend?
2. How often do you attend the mosque per week?
3. Do you attend *jum'ah* [Friday] prayers at this mosque?
4. What types of religious activities are you involved in at your mosque?
5. What types of social activities are you involved in at your mosque?
6. Do you donate to your mosque?
7. What type of matters do you consult your imam on? Please provide examples.

Personal Life Questions

1. Have you ever experience discrimination in America because of your religious beliefs? Explain.
2. What kinds of Islamic dress to you wear on a regular basis? Explain.
3. Do you or would you request that your significant other wear Islamic dress? Explain.
4. Do you or would you request that your children wear Islamic dress? Explain.
5. Would you consider marrying a non-Imami Shi'a Muslim? Explain.
6. Would you consider marrying a Sunni?
7. Would you consider marrying A Jew? A Christian? Someone not part of *Ahl-e Kitab*?
8. Do you or would you consider engaging in a *mut'ah* [temporary marriage]? Explain.
9. Do you only consume food and drink that is considered *halal* [permissible]?
10. Do you consume any food or drink that would be considered *haram* [impermissible]?

Capstone Question

1. On a scale from 1 to 10, [1 being unobservant and 10 being extremely pious] where would you situated yourself?

Appendix G: Wave One Designations and Demographics

Designation	Gender	Age	Occupation	Arrival Year
IW1-A	Female	22	Student	1997
IW1-B	Female	45	Housewife	1992
IW1-C	Female	22	Student	1992
IW1-D	Female	30	Student	1993
IW1-E	Female	23	Student	1994
IW1-F	Female	46	Teacher	1997
IW1-G	Female	47	Housewife	2000
IW1-H	Female	33	Student	1999
IW1-I	Female	52	Housewife	2001
IW1-J	Male	35	Realtor	1995
IW1-K	Male	49	Unknown	1993
IW1-L	Male	54	Self-Employed	1995
IW1-M	Male	21	Student	1997
IW1-N	Male	49	Student	1997
IW1-O	Male	21	Student	2000
IW1-P	Male	45	Realtor	1997
IW1-Q	Male	46	Truck Driver	1997
IW1-R	Male	47	Realtor	1995
IW1-S	Male	47	Unemployed	1994
IW1-T	Male	39	Delivery Clerk	1997
IW1-U	Male	24	Student	1992
IW1-V	Male	21	Mechanic	1994
IW1-W	Male	47	Clerk	1994
IW1-X	Male	41	Waiter	1997
IW1-Y	Male	45	Unknown	1995

Average Age: 38.04

Appendix H: Wave Two Designations and Demographics

Designation	Gender	Age	Occupation	Arrival Year
IW2-A	Female	26	Student	2008
IW2-B	Female	30	Unemployed	2008
IW2-C	Female	55	Retired	2010
IW2-D	Female	26	Student	2005
IW2-E	Female	25	Student	2005
IW2-F	Female	35	Housewife	2010
IW2-G	Female	30	Housewife	2010
IW2-H	Female	25	Student	2003
IW2-I	Female	41	Housewife	2011
IW2-J	Male	65	Retired	2010
IW2-K	Male	57	Artist	2010
IW2-L	Male	37	Factory Worker	2010
IW2-M	Male	27	Unemployed	2008
IW2-N	Male	37	Medical Doctor	2010
IW2-O	Male	33	Unemployed	2010
IW2-P	Male	43	Medical Doctor	2010
IW2-Q	Male	47	Electrician	2006
IW2-R	Male	20	Student	2008
IW2-S	Male	43	Unemployed	2011
IW2-T	Male	18	Student	2008
IW2-U	Male	23	Clerk	2009
IW2-V	Male	45	Engineer	2011
IW2-W	Male	50	Lawyer	2011
IW2-X	Male	22	Student	2008
IW2-Y	Male	41	Unemployed	2011

Average Age: 36.04

Appendix I: Prayers

First and Second Wave Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims and Prayer Frequency

Frequency	Wave One	Wave Two
Five Prayers/Three Times Daily	23	23
Four Prayers/ Twice Daily	1	1
None	1	1
Total	25	25

Appendix J: Religious Texts

First and Second Wave Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims and Qur'an Reading Frequency

Frequency	Wave One	Wave Two
Daily	4	4
Multiple Times Week	9	4
Weekly	5	3
Monthly	0	1
During Ramadan	1	8
Sporadically	4	5
Infrequently	1	0
None	1	0
Total	25	25

First and Second Wave Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims and Memorization of Qur'an

Memorized Entire Qur'an	Wave One	Wave Two
Yes	0	0
No	25	25

First and Second Wave Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims and Knowledge of Hadith

Level of Knowledge	Wave One	Wave Two
Lots/Very Well	7	6
Well/Good	5	4
Kind of Well	0	1
Some/Enough	6	5
Yes	1	5
Not Much/Little	6	3
Suspicious	0	1
Total	25	25

Appendix K: Ashura Rituals

First and Second Wave Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims and Ashura Rituals Practiced

Type of Ashura Rituals	Wave One	Wave Two
Attend Mosque	19	13
Listen to Lectures	11	16
Practice Latm	17	12
Practice Zanjir	1	1
Practice Tatbir	2	0
Nothing	1	2

Appendix L: Pilgrimages

First and Second Wave Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims and Completion of Hajj and Ziyarat

Pilgrimage Location	Wave One	Wave Two
Hajj (Saudi Arabia)	13	0
Najaf (Iraq)	21	24
Karbala (Iraq)	21	24
Kadhimayn (Iraq)	19	24
Samarra (Iraq)	15	23
Baqiyya (Saudi Arabia)	11	1
Mashhad (Iran)	3	6
Damascus (Syria)	3	7
Qom (Iran)	1	6
No Ziyarat Sites	4	1

Appendix M: Maraji al-Taqlid

First and Second Wave Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims and Choice of Maraji al-Taqlid

Maraji al-Taqlid	Wave One	Wave Two
Sayyid Ali Sistani	12	23
Sayyid Abdul Qasim Khoe'i	5	1
Sayyid Abdul Qasim Khoe'i/Sayyid Ali Sistani	3	0
Sayyid Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah	2	0
Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr	1	0
None	2	1
Total	25	25

Appendix N: Mosque Choice

First and Second Wave Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims and Choice of Mosque

Name of Mosque	Wave One	Wave Two
Islamic Center of America	6	8
Islamic Institute of Knowledge	5	0
Karbala Islamic Education Center	2	3
Islamic House of Wisdom	1	0
Imam Ali Center	0	2
Multiple Mosques	10	11
None	1	1

Appendix O: Mosque Attendance

First Wave and Second Wave Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims and Frequency of Mosque Attendance

Frequency	Wave One	Wave Two
Daily	4	1
Multiple Times Weekly	1	1
Weekly	10	6
Monthly	1	1
Special Occasions	3	8
Infrequently/Sporadically	5	4
Never	1	4
Total	25	25

Appendix P: Donations

First Wave and Second Wave Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims and Donations to Mosque

Donation to Mosque	Wave One	Wave Two
Yes	18	21
No	7	4
Total	25	25

Appendix Q: Imam and Questions

First Wave and Second Wave Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims and Asking Questions to Imam

Ask Imam Questions	Wave One	Wave Two
Yes	13	11
No	12	14
Total	25	25

Appendix R: Discrimination

First Wave and Second Wave Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims and Discrimination Experienced in America

Experienced Discrimination	Wave One	Wave Two
Yes	9	3
No	16	22
Total	25	25

Appendix S: Attire

First and Second Wave Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims and Traditional Attire (Males)

Attire Worn	Wave One	Wave Two
Western Attire Regularly	10	15
Traditional Attire Irregularly	6	1
Total	16	16

First and Second Wave Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims and Traditional Attire (Females)

Wearing Headscarf	Wave One	Wave Two
Yes	9	9
No	0	0
Total	9	9

First and Second Wave Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims Males and Support for Traditional Attire for Female Relatives

Traditional Attire	Wave One	Wave Two
Prefer that Wife Wears Headscarf	9	14
Wife has the Option To Wear Headscarf	6	2
Prefer that Wife Does Not Wear Headscarf	1	0
Total	16	16

First and Second Wave Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims Females and Support for Traditional Attire for Male Relatives

Traditional Attire	Wave One	Wave Two
No Preference	7	9
Husband has the Option With Attire	1	0
Husband Should Be Concerned With Attire	1	0
Total	9	9

First and Second Wave Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims Females and Males Support for Traditional Attire for Daughters

Wearing Headscarf	Wave One (F)	Wave Two (F)	Wave One (M)	Wave Two (M)
Prefer Daughters Wear Headscarf	5	5	9	10
Daughters Choice	2	2	6	4
Not Required for	2	2	1	2
Total	9	9	16	16

Appendix T: Marriage

First Wave Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims and Willingness to Marry Outside of Branch and Faith
(Females)

Potential Husband's Sect/Religion	Yes	Maybe	No
Non-Imami Shi'a Husband	1	1	7
Sunni Husband	2	0	7
Ahl al-Kitaab Husband	1	0	8
Non-Ahl al-Kitaab Husband	1	0	8

Second Wave Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims and Willingness to Marry Outside of Branch and Faith
(Females)

Potential Husband's Sect/Religion	Yes	Maybe	No
Non-Imami Shi'a Husband	0	0	9
Sunni Husband	4	0	5
Ahl al-Kitaab Husband	0	1	8
Non-Ahl al-Kitaab Husband	0	1	8

First Wave Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims and Willingness to Marry Outside of Branch and Faith
(Males)

Potential Wife's Sect/Religion	Yes	Maybe	No
Non-Imami Shi'a Wife	10	0	6
Sunni Wife	9	1	6
Ahl al-Kitaab Wife	8	2	6
Non-Ahl al-Kitaab Wife	2	0	14

Second Wave Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims and Willingness to Marry Outside of Branch and Faith
(Males)

Potential Wife's Sect/Religion	Yes	Maybe	No
Non-Imami Shi'a Wife	4	1	11
Sunni Wife	11	0	5
Ahl al-Kitaab Wife	12	0	4
Non-Ahl al-Kitaab Wife	4	0	12

Appendix U: Mut'ah

First and Second Wave Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims and Willingness to Engage in Mut'ah
Marriage (Females)

Willingness to Engage in Mut'ah	Wave One	Wave Two
Yes	0	0
Maybe	0	0
No	9	9
Total	9	9

First and Second Wave Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims and Willingness to Engage in Mut'ah
Marriage (Males)

Willingness to Engage in Mut'ah	Wave One	Wave Two
Yes	10	7
Maybe	1	0
No	5	9
Total	16	16

Appendix V: Dietary Laws

First and Second Wave Iraqi-Shi'a Muslims and Level of Adherence to Dietary Laws

Dietary Laws	Wave One	Wave Two
Adheres to Dietary Laws Completely	23	22
Adheres to Dietary Laws Partially	1	3
Ignores Dietary Laws Entirely	1	0
Total	25	25