

Carleton University

**On the Prospect of a New Theoretical Framework: Reading Marx and Foucault
Together to Re-examine Capitalist Exploitation**

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for the degree of
Master of Arts**

Institute of Political Economy

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Abstract

This thesis is an attempt to reaffirm capitalist exploitation within a framework in which Marx and Foucault are used in collaboration. Exploitation is ascribed twofold characteristics: the *conditio sine qua non* for capitalism and a complex social function. To understand the role of exploitation within the tripartite nexus of social relations Marx's theory equips us with conceptual tools while Foucault's methodology opens up the path to study infinitesimal mechanisms of exploitation and their metamorphosis within the context of capitalist production. Marx maps out the conditions of capitalist societies by means of historical and dialectical materialism while Foucault points out the genealogical trees the roots of which needs to be grasped and the elements on whose branches should be rehabilitated by means of archaeology and genealogy. Therefore, capitalist class structure on the basis of exploitation is re-identified by departing from Marx's ideas while the three facets of contingent power relations —sovereignty, discipline, and governmentality— reissued on behalf of exploitation with an account to Foucault's work.

Dedicated to
my blue-eyed giant:
Íshak Kibar

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Introduction

On the Indispensability of Reconsidering Exploitation

“The wealth of those societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails, presents itself as “an immense accumulation of commodities,” its unit being a single commodity. Our investigation must therefore begin with the analysis of a commodity.”

Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I (1869)

“[P]ower relations are rooted deep in the social nexus, not a supplementary structure over and above “society” whose radical effacement one could perhaps dream of. ...I would say that the analysis, elaboration, and bringing into question of power relations and the “agonism” between power relations and the intransitivity of freedom is an increasingly political task – even, the political task that is inherent in all social existence.”

Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power” (1982)

The society that has been established on the assumptions of liberal social and political thought is a composition of individuals who are defined by their potential and capacity to act on the basis of their ‘free will’ in the market. While the rights and freedoms of individuals stem from juridical-political power in the political sphere, individuals are expected to act in accordance with both their free will and capacity to reason not in the political sphere but within the boundaries of free market in which production, distribution, exchange, and consumption constantly occur depending on the special rules of the market.¹ These rules indeed govern individuals through shaping their

¹ In liberal representative democracy, political activity of individuals is reduced to voting activity and participation to decision-making processes. Accordingly, it would not be wrong to claim that the individual of liberal political thought is an economically rational and free, but politically dependent subject. Even if the ‘special rules of the market’ are relied on constitutional rights and freedoms of individuals, it is not difficult to distinguish the rules of market —exercised through detailed regulations— from those that regulate social and political sphere.

field of action while 'free will' of each individual is being glorified. Since the relations within the market shape the field of possible action, reasoning and desires of individuals, any inquiry concerning social reality should start not from an abstraction—as it is in the case of liberal definition of the (unembodied and universal) individual—but from below, from a concrete material basis that is the relations of capitalist production in our societies.

The very first sentence of *Capital* (1869) reveals, in this context, Marx's approach to the content of socio-political formation that mode of production determines the real and historical content, implying furthermore commodification process. Labour provides the ultimate bridge between the subject (i.e., the worker) and the object (i.e., commodity) within this process, which further culminates in subjectivization. Mode of production that is to say determines not only the relations of subjects to subjectivization but also subject to the others (e.g., the other workers). Thus, power is coeval with human labour, that is, relations in and through mode of production. In his article "The Subject and Power" (1982), Foucault makes a crucial remark that power is coeval with the social, however. Here, power inherently resides in the relations of subjects in and by which subjects shape, dictate and govern "the fields of possible action" of not only theirs but also others. Foucault aims, with this point onwards, at defining the conditions in which "human beings 'problematize' what they are, what they do, and the world in which they live." And he attempts accordingly to map *history of knowledge*; for mode-of-production of knowledge reveals histories of power, in which and by means of which knowledge has been produced on a particular issue and in a particular period.

In the present thesis, I assume that human condition can only be theorized by unfolding the complex web of relations and of domains that practically exist within a tripartite nexus of relation, that of between self-to-self, self-to-other and self-to-the material world. On this issue, this thesis argues that Marx locates the relation between human-beings and the material world (i.e., the world out of labor) as the centre of his thought whereas Foucault gives primacy to the relations of self-to-self and self-to-other. I nevertheless do not propose that Marx ignores relations that Foucault observes. Nor do I argue that Foucault disapproves the material conditions. Indeed, both theorize the aforementioned tripartite nexus of relations. To elucidate, Marx theorizes the social through the material conditions whereas Foucault through discursive conditions, conditions of problematization and conditions of truth regimes; that is to say, Marx concentrates much on the *positions* of human existence whereas Foucault on *strategies* of power. Both Marx and Foucault should be taken into account together in order adequately to theorize advanced capitalist societies and to offer alternative conceptualizations of the political. By arguing as such, I do not attempt to trace Marx in the writings of Foucault rather I attempt to consider both in their own specificity. Opening up possibilities of new theoretical frames which could contribute to the contemporary social and political theory is the main point of departure of this thesis.

It is my contention that the main principle of the capitalist mode of production is the exploitation of labour. Exploitation thus stands at the centre of the socio-political formation. In my opinion, exploitation must be taken seriously for at least two reasons. First, exploitation is the *conditio sine qua non* for the capitalist mode of production. Second, it is a social function through which the capitalist mode of production not only

exists but also penetrates into other aspects of individuals' lives. In sum, exploitation must be understood *both* as the inevitable 'condition' *and* as the main 'mechanism.' At this point, it is not a question whether I consider those who are not wage-labourers since I apply exploitation as *the* condition and also as the main technology located in the center of the capitalist societies. In this context, I argue that exploitation paves the way for other power mechanisms which either aim to obscure ongoing exploitation or relate themselves to exploitation. In my opinion, in order to understand comprehensive relations of exploitation, new theoretical tools need to be developed. In the present thesis, my main objective is to explore the possibility of applying both Marx and Foucault to understand exploitation and its implications on current social reality. With this aim in mind, I highlight the problem and problematization of exploitation with respect to two main contradictions through which Marx and Foucault analysed exploitation: labour-capital contradiction and contradiction of freedom and exploitation as a power form.²

Therefore, I aim to disclose exploitative mechanisms of current capitalism and their normalized forms within the conceptual frameworks used by Marx and Foucault. In *Capital* (1869), Marx argues that within the capitalist mode of production, labour process is "turned into process by which the capitalist consumes labour-power." Therefore, the

² Foucault characterizes the relation between power and freedom as a complicated interplay: "[p]ower is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are 'free'" since the possibility of recalcitrance is necessary for power relations. Foucault explores the complicated interrelation between power, freedom, will and recalcitrance as follows: "At the very heart of the power relationship, and constantly provoking it, are the recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of freedom." See Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power" in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 vol. III, Power*, Robert Hurley and others (trans.) James D. Faubion (ed.) (New York: The New Press, 2000), p. 342. Also, I will extend my argument on exploitation as a power form in the second chapter of the present thesis. It should be noted that in my opinion exploitation as a power form might be disclosed in twofold: first, exploitation is a form by means of which individuals can shape possible action sphere of others; second, exploitation has its own peculiar technologies and rationalities to pursue its target.

condition of exploitation of labour is revealed within the labour process with regards to two characteristics: the worker produces under the control of the capitalist to whom his labour belongs; and the product of labour becomes the property of the capitalist. In this sense, according to Marx, exploitation of labour derives from both control over labour process and possession of the product of labour —namely, surplus value— by the one other than the worker himself. Marx problematizes exploitation as something which needs to be abolished to emancipate human labour from restrictions, belonging to a defined time and space, being controlled, being alienated, being inhuman, etc. In his article, “The Subject and Power” (1982), Foucault indicates that in history there are three types of struggles which are either isolated from each other, or mixed together: “[struggles] against forms of domination (ethnic, social, and religious); against forms of exploitation that separates individuals from what they produce; or against that which ties the individual to himself and submits him to others in this way (struggles against subjection, against forms of subjectivity and submission).” However, while Foucault explicates the forms of domination and subjectivation; and while he relates them to each other within his series of analysis on “juridical-political power”, he did not give prominence to exploitation. I, therefore, attempt to suggest a shift in Foucault’s emphasis on “juridical-political power” to “exploitation.”

I apply Marx’s analysis in defining the problem of exploitation within the framework of labour-capital contradiction while I adapt Foucault’s methodology in developing a new approach by means of which one can map out the technologies and rationalities of exploitation. In this regard, Marx answers the questions of “what,” in terms of the definition; “why,” in terms of the historicity of the problem; and “how,” in

terms of the formulation of exploitation. On the other hand, Foucault's methodology equips us with different tools by which one can ask and respond to the same questions from a different angle, i.e. questions of "what," what is constructed in the way it is problematized; "why," what are the rationalities lying behind the problematisation; and "how," by which means exploitation penetrates into our lives and how we have said 'we are not exploited.' To put it more precisely, while Marx's *theory* provides us the definition, formulation and historical reality of exploitation—which in turn shows that it is neither a necessity nor the only reality for human existence—Foucault's *methodology* enables the investigation of the mechanism of exploitation in practice—by which means, tactics, techniques—and makes it possible to raise the question: how are people constructed as subjects who can live along with two essential contradictions: labour-capital contradiction and contradiction of freedom and exploitation?

For Marx exploitation as the main carrier of the capitalist mode of production has to be abolished. Foucault introduces us with a methodology to reveal obscured practices of exploitation with which one can define immediate enemies, ways of domination, different practices of exploitation and techniques within which exploited subjects are depicted as individuals with 'free will.' Thinking exploitation with reference to these two dimensions leads to the main argument of my thesis: in order to reveal the relations of exploitation both as the condition and the fundamental power mechanism of capitalism, theoretical and methodological tools introduced by Marx and Foucault have to be applied together even though they seem contradictory. So-called irreconcilable theoretical and methodological assumptions of Marx and Foucault bring forth the central question of this

thesis: What is the main dynamic of current capitalist societies: exploitation through governing or governing through exploitation?

The thesis is composed of three chapters. In the first chapter, I elaborate the definition, historical context and formulation, of exploitation with reference to Marx's conceptualisations. To do so, first, I examine the overall works of Marx to comprehend where the capitalist exploitation should be located in the analysis. Second, I explore the distinctive characteristics of capitalist exploitation as well as its formulation on the basis of surplus-value. Third, I draw attention to the effects of capitalist exploitation from a Marxian viewpoint; and construe the conceptualizations alienation, commodity fetishism and reification. Finally, I try to re-examine contemporary debates on social classes to quest whether Marx's differentiation of social classes vis-à-vis the social relations of production is still applicable.

In the second chapter, I redefine capitalist exploitation as a complex social function. In doing so, I functionalize Foucault's methodology and attempt to respond the following questions: By which means does exploitation function within the flexible form of capitalist production? By which means and under which conditions have we told that we are not exploited? By which technologies has 'to be employed,' in other words, to be exploited, become the most desirable end? In attempting to respond these questions, I first, present a rereading of Foucault's work. Then, I locate exploitation between the relations of production and power/knowledge relations. Third, I draw attention to the invention of the power on body to illustrate further the creation of docile bodies to exploit. Fourth, I articulate the changing conditions of work with the transformations

from the Fordist period to the period of flexible accumulation. Finally, in this chapter, I try to disclose the technologies and rationalities of capitalist exploitation to demonstrate power effects of exploitation.

In the third chapter, I discuss implications of investigating exploitation on the basis of an either/or question: either exploitation through governing or governing through exploitation. The question is explored within three sub-areas of either/or question, regarding methodological considerations, approaches to social relations and account to struggles. First, I elaborated the possibilities to juxtapose two distinct methodologies Marx and Foucault bring into existence in socio-political thought. Second, I open up a discussion on the conjunctions of economy and politics. To do so, I consider the contradictory existence of the restrictive economic structure and freedoms political sphere generate. And finally, I search for the possible forms of struggles against capitalist exploitation. In this regard, I deliberate the openings that assuming both revolution and resistance to oppose capitalist exploitation might generate.

In conclusion, it is my contention that it is worth investigating the tripartite nexus of relation —self to the material world, self to others, self to self— to understand the human condition within its historical context. In this sense, first, the problematization of exploitation gains importance to explore the mode of production by means of which the material world surrounding human existence is constructed. Second, elaborating the character of the struggles becomes vital to understand the ongoing construction and reconstruction of reality within relations. Third, an alternative conceptualization of the political *vis-à-vis* the present definitions and practices is crucial to introduce an

alternative way to resist given forms of existence. And finally, to theorize all those within a new conceptual frame is indispensable to avoid overlooking the reality which has been presented as the “true form”. On the face of these considerations, with my thesis, I insist on criticism as the most important task of our age in which critical attitude can easily be reduced into a *naïve* opposition of radicals.

... even now it [the antithesis of the critical Christ and Mankind] has not expressed the suspicion that the time was ripe for a critical setting for accounts with the mother of Young Hegelianism —the Hegelian dialectic— and even had nothing to say about its critical attitude towards the Feuerbachian dialectic. This shows a completely uncritical attitude to itself. Feuerbach is the only one who has a serious, critical attitude to the Young Hegelian dialectic and who has made genuine discoveries in this field.

Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*

Criticism indeed consists of analyzing and reflecting on limits. But if the Kantian question was that of knowing what limits knowledge has to renounce transgressing, it seems to me that the critical question today has to be turned back into a positive one: in what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary constraints? The point, in brief, is to transform the critique conducted in the form of necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible transgression.

Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?”

Chapter I

Exploitation as the ‘Greatest Invention of Bourgeoisie’

[T]here is no such thing as relatively independent spheres or circuits: production is immediately consumption and an enregistrement (recording process) without any sort of mediation, and the enregistrement and consumption directly determine production, though they do so within the production process itself. Hence everything is production: production of productions, of actions and of passions; productions of enregistrement, of distributions and of co-ordinates that serve as points of reference; productions of consumptions, of sensual pleasures, of anxieties, and of pain. Everything is production, since the enregistrements are immediately consumed, immediately consummated, and these consumptions directly reproduced.¹

The capitalist mode of production along with its philosophical and theoretical ground, namely, liberal political thought, shapes social and political structure of contemporary societies. Thus, capitalism constructs its (individualized, ‘free’, rational) subjects and thereby the social reality through peculiar technologies.² It is my contention that in capitalist societies exploitation of labour-power is, if not the only constituent, the most significant condition and technology by means of which a definite form of subject is constructed. I will, however, discuss exploitation as a technology in the following chapter. In this chapter, I attempt to reaffirm Marx’s formulation of exploitation. In doing so, first, I examine the overall context of the capitalist mode of production. The main question I raise is the following: What are the characteristics of the capitalist mode of

¹ Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (trans.) (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), p. 4.

² It is important to note that the term ‘capitalism’ in this thesis refers to the capitalist mode of production rather than the whole ‘system’. I differentiate the mode of production from a system because the former, stemming from a material reality and also (re)producing existing reality, cannot be understood freely from its agents and thus indicates an alterable historical reality. The latter, proceeding from an abstraction, emerges as a sacred being which is omnipotent, metaphysical, and unalterable; it cannot even be defined as an enemy.

production in which capitalist exploitation emerged? Second, I explore ‘what’ the distinctive characteristics of capitalist exploitation are. How is exploitation formulated? Which conditions does it require? Third, I turn my attention to the effects of exploitation on social relations with reference to the concepts of alienation, reification and commodity fetishism. Moreover, I assess the implications of the capitalist mode of production on the subject forms of current socio-political reality. Besides, I explicate the difficulties to study the construction of subject forms with Marx’s conceptualizations, i.e. alienation, commodity fetishism and reification. Finally, I explore debates on contemporary class structures and investigate whether Marx’s differentiation of social classes *vis-à-vis* the social relations of production is still applicable.

I.I. Exploitation: The *conditio sine qua non* for Capitalism

Marx defines human beings in terms of their labour-power, but labour in itself does not have value as long as it does not produce.³ Within the materialist conception of history, human beings at first, Marx argues, created their means of subsistence. Production of the ‘means of subsistence’ should not be understood as a simple reproduction of physical existence; in fact, it has a historically specific content

³ Even if most of the appropriations or criticisms of Marx’s understanding of ‘human nature’ have relied on his approach to human-labor —conscious labor activity of man is, Marx argues, what distinguishes human beings from other living beings— I do not find any (metaphysical) description of human nature in Marx. Rather, I believe that by virtue of his explanations that begins with labor-in-production, Marx, unlike other political theorists of his time, defines a material basis by means of which not only the existence of all human-beings can be explained but also human beings can unify. His famous slogan-like phrase exemplifies this point: “Workers of All Countries, Unite!” For his objection to the idea of human nature and also assumptions about before-life see Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1982), p. 100. Here, he problematizes questions about the first man and nature as a whole: “When you ask about the creation of nature and man, you are abstracting, in so doing, from man and nature. You postulate them as *non-existent*, and yet you want me to prove them to you as *existing*.” (emphasis in original).

conditioned by what and how human beings produce. So, even though the base level of subsistence is physically derived, the definition of subsistence is socially determined. In other words, the subjectivity of individuals reveals itself in their production. As Marx argues, “[w]hat they are coincides with their production, both with *what* they produce and with *how* they produce.”⁴ Therefore, the human condition throughout history can be understood only by investigating ‘what’ they produce and ‘how’ they produce.

From a ‘historical materialist’⁵ perspective, the overthrow of the feudal aristocracy from power manifested the bourgeoisie’s victory in the new mode of production.⁶ The distinctive, detailed characteristics of new mode of production were unfolded both historically and dialectically for the first time by Marx.⁷ Marx starts his analysis of capitalist societies with an emphasis on private property and commodity production. Here, I should draw attention to these two important constituents —private property and commodity production— of capitalism in Marx’s writings. It is my

⁴ See Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*, S. Ryazanskaya (trans. and ed.) (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1968), p. 32 (emphasis in original).

⁵ Marx does not use the term ‘historical materialism;’ rather, he uses the ‘materialist conception of history’ only once in *The German Ideology* (1968). After Marx, Engels used the exact phrase for the first time.

⁶ For the dialectic reading of history, see *ibid.*, pp. 62-63 and 86-87. But, it should be noted that Marx does not use the term ‘dialectic’ in these pages. For the evolution of the production process within the materialist conception of history, see pp. 31-37.

⁷ It is certain that Marx was not the only one who studied the economy of the newly emerged form of society. Works of classical political economists —even the emergence of political economy as a scientific discipline— demonstrate that Marx was not the first thinker who took the issue under consideration. The distinctiveness of Marx’s writing lies in his excellent collaboration of theory and practice. He starts from material reality, theorizes it, and then with the theoretical assumptions he developed he turns back to the material world. Hence, his criticisms of political economists, which can be traced back to John Locke, become meaningful when he states that “[p]olitical economy starts from labor as the real soul of production; yet to labor it gives nothing, and to private property everything.” Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, p. 72.

contention that while Marx focuses on private property in his *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (1982) and *The German Ideology* (1968), he primarily concentrates on commodity production in his *Capital Vol. I* (1965). It can be argued that he sees a close relation between private property and commodity production since the right to private property and the emergence of commodity production worked in tandem. Private property, however, is viewed as the impetus for commodity production even if these two constituents of the capitalist mode of production mutually condition each other.⁸ In the commodity production process, the process whereby the maintenance and appropriation of private property is guaranteed and encouraged, labour-power is commodified. Here, I attempt to elucidate the circumstances in which labour-power in its commodified character is exploited.

In the age of the bourgeoisie people are equipped with freedom of private property on the one hand, and legal equality on the other. Defining freedom in terms of private property and understanding equal rights in terms of protection of property places private property at the very centre of social formation.⁹ The centralization of private property within the social reality brings forth commodity production which in turn

⁸ This explicates why the demolition of private property is a necessary condition for the construction of a socialist society. The collapse of private property will bring forth the collapse of commodity production. Marx states clearly, “[d]efinite historical conditions are necessary that a product may become a commodity. It must not be produced as the immediate means of subsistence of the producer himself. Had we gone further, and inquired under what circumstances all, or even the majority of products take the form of commodities, we should have found that this can only happen with production of a very specific kind, capitalist production.” Marx, *Capital Vol. I*, Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling (trans.), Frederick Engels (ed.) (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965), p. 169.

⁹ It is important to indicate that the starting point for the founders of liberal political thought, particularly for John Locke, was property. He defines property as one’s body, rights and possessions. See John Locke, *Second Treatise of Government*, C. B. Macpherson (ed.) (Indiana: Hackett Publishing, 1980), pp. 18-30.

fortified private property. This process transforms labour-power into a commodity. Free labourers therefore begin to make contracts with owners of the means of production, i.e. capitalists since they are both 'equal' agents. Marx expresses the freedom to contract as follows:

This sphere that we are deserting, within whose boundaries the sale and purchase of labour-power goes on, is in fact a very Eden of the innate rights of man. There alone rule Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham. Freedom, because both buyer and seller of a commodity, say of labour-power, are constrained only by their own free will. They contract as free agents, and the agreement they come to, is but the form in which they give legal expression to their common will. Equality, because each enters into relation with the other, as with a simple owner of commodities, and they exchange equivalent for equivalent. Property, because each disposes only of what is his own. And Bentham, because each looks only to himself. The only force that brings them together and puts them in relation with each other, is the selfishness, the gain and the private interests of each.¹⁰

What conditions 'free will' of the labourer in reality is his concern to secure his means of subsistence. Since the capitalist, the buyer of labour-power, has the ownership of the means of production, the labourer has to make a contract with him to earn his living. Therefore, the labourer himself becomes a value for the capitalist and in turn for society only insofar as he makes his labour-power exchangeable, or say, transforms it into a commodity. In this process, labour-power becomes the capital of worker subsequently providing worker with the means of subsistence. For the capitalist, labour-power is nothing more than a commodity, another cost within the production process. As a result, the labour-power is transformed into wage-labour.

When Marx investigates and theorizes 'how' people produce, he concentrates on the social relations of production for it determines different social classes in a particular

¹⁰ Marx, *Capital Vol. I*, p. 176.

mode of production. Accordingly, in the capitalist mode of production, he differentiates two social classes —capitalist class and working class—with regard to people’s relation to the means of production. Hence, the capitalist class consists of the owners of the means of production while the working class is composed of those who solely have their labour-power.¹¹ That is, as Marx states in his most popularized phrase, “[t]he proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains.”¹² The struggles between these two classes therefore proceed from the social relations of production and their contradictory position in these relations.

Within the framework of social relations, the labourer serves the capitalist by creating his private property and his labour-power becomes the property of the capitalist. Therefore, once he enters a contract with his ‘free will,’ he no longer has ‘free will;’ rather, the labourer is governed by the rules of the contract which represents the will of the capitalist. Herein lies what Marx refers to as, ‘labour-capital contradiction.’ Marx defines three necessary relations between labour and capital:

First. Unmediated or mediated unity of the two.

Capital and labour are at first still united. Then, though separated and estranged, they reciprocally develop and promote each other as *positive* conditions.

[*Second.*] *The two in opposition*, mutually excluding each other. The worker knows the capitalist as his own non-existence, and vice versa: each tries to rob the other of his existence.

¹¹ Here, I should immediately note that differentiation of social classes by Marx has remained uncertain since he could not complete the last volume of *Capital*. Nevertheless, it is my contention that in the light of his other works, it is possible to differentiate capitalist class and working class on the basis of exploitation. I will elaborate this point in the last part of this chapter where I discuss the current debate on Marxist class analysis.

¹² Marx and Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, Samuel Moore (trans.), Frederick Engels (ed.) (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), p. 74.

[*Third.*] *Opposition* of each *to* itself. Capital = stored-up labour = labour. As such it splits into *capital itself* and its *interest*, and this latter again into *interest and profit*. The capitalist is completely sacrificed. He falls into the working class, whilst the worker (but only exceptionally) becomes a capitalist. Labour as a moment of capital —its costs. Thus the wages of labour —a sacrifice of capital.¹³

The labourer exercises his labour-power under the purview of the capitalist. The working time and space are organized in accordance with the capitalist's interests that require the extraction of labour-power in its highest possible level.

Wage of labour-power is, on the other hand, socially determined with respect to the costs of the labourer's reproduction of his labour-power. Accordingly, "[i]n theory, rent of land and profit on capital are deductions suffered by wages. In actual fact, however, wages are a deduction which land and capital allow to go to the worker, a concession from the product of labour to the workers, to labour."¹⁴ Therefore, the labourer never gets the real equivalence of his labour-power he exercises in working time and space. It is this unpaid portion of labour-power that renders the maintenance of the capitalist mode of production possible since the aim of the capitalist is to accumulate more capital and the only way to increase capital is to appropriate more and more unpaid/surplus labour. Thus, the individual capitalist can exist if he appropriates the surplus-value the labourer produces in the surplus-labour time and turns it into capital. This 'appropriation' of surplus-value is referred to as the 'exploitation' of the labourer. Marx, at this point, deconstructs classical political economists' dominant truth claim that "the wage of the labourer is the equivalent of labour-power exercised in working time." More succinctly, to deconstruct the given form of knowledge and to be able to see the

¹³ Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, pp. 81-82 (emphasis in original).

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

reality of exploitation is only possible *via* the theoretical and methodological tools introduced by Marx.

As I mentioned above, according to Marx, the starting point of the broad circulation in society —production, distribution, exchange and consumption— is production. He defines the process as follows:

By production, the members of society appropriate (produce and shape) the products of nature to human wants; distribution determines the proportion in which the individual participates in this production; exchange brings him the particular products into which he wishes to turn the quantity secured by him through distribution; finally, through consumption the products become objects of use and enjoyment, of individual appropriation.¹⁵

Production —‘how’ people produce— shapes distribution, exchange and consumption; in other words, it conditions all aspects of economic life. I should immediately note that starting the analysis with the mode of production does not trivialize the argument into a simple ‘economic reductionism.’ Rather, it highlights the very roots of socio-political structure since the definite mode of production has indispensable effects on people’s lives. It can therefore be argued that the relations of production are the common relations in which all people without any exception conjoin *via* their labour-power. It is more appropriate to emphasize the relationality between ‘economic substructure’ and ‘superstructure’ than to simply assume that Marx’s approach leads to an ‘economic reductionism.’

¹⁵ Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, N. I. Stone (trans.) (Chicago: International Library Publishing Co., 1904), p. 274. For details see pp. 274-292.

Marx repeatedly indicates that “[t]he sum total of these relations of production constitutes the *economic structure* of society —the real foundation, on which rise the legal and political *superstructures* and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness.”¹⁶ Here three reasons can be highlighted to indicate the primacy of economic substructure leading to the superstructure(s): First, since people inescapably enter into the relations of production, the organization of relations of production constitutes the very core of social relations since it creates its own rationales and techniques. Second, people’s thinking, understanding, rationalizing, behaving and so forth are shaped by the rationales driving such relations. In other words, the mode of production shapes not only the relations of production but also other conducts of people. Third, other relations —juridical, political, cultural and so on— develop in order to protect and sustain the economic substructure which not only constitutes but is also located at the centre of social relations in the capitalist stage of history.

However, this does not mean that all the components of social relations emanate from economic relations as it is understood in terms of monetary or profit-cost relation. I argue that what is produced in the economic substructure is not only a product but also a certain type of relation among people. This type of relation shapes other aspects of the socio-political formation Marx refers to as superstructure. To put it in Marx’s terms:

The production of life, both of one’s own in labour and of fresh life in procreation, now appears as a double relationship: on the one hand as a natural, on the other as a social relationship. By social we understand the co-operation of several individuals, no matter under what conditions, in what manner and to what end. It follows from this that a certain mode of co-operation, or social stage, and this mode of co-operation is itself a

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 11 (emphasis is mine).

“productive force.” Further that the multitude of productive forces accessible to men determines the nature of society, hence, that the “history of humanity” must always be studied and treated in relation to the history of industry and exchange.¹⁷

Besides, the complexity of social relations is the result of the historical process which is older than the capitalist mode of production. Each particular mode of production develops its own rationalities; each of them also functionalises the previous rationalities to pursue its own goals. Thus, it can be argued that the capitalist mode of production does not create all modes of rationalities within social relations; rather, it reproduces and utilizes historically created rationalities. For example, the inferior position of women in society proceeds from the multiple historico-cultural processes which existed prior to the capitalist mode of production. The capitalist mode of production, however, makes it possible to further exploit women —equal amounts of labour-power of both women and men are used, but women are paid less than their counterpart. As Marx argues:

History is nothing but the succession of the separate generations, each of which exploits the materials, the capital funds, the productive forces handed down to it by all preceding generations, and thus, on the one hand, continues the traditional activity in completely changed circumstances and, on the other, modifies the old circumstances with a completely changed activity. This can be speculatively distorted so that later history is made the goal of earlier history.¹⁸

Marx conveniently starts his analysis with the production process and explains the economic foundations of society. In the scope of this thesis, Marx’s contribution to social and political theory is significant for at least two reasons. First, following Marx, in my opinion, ‘why,’ ‘what’ and ‘how’ people produce has effects on the conducts of people in other social relations. Second, it is my contention that in capitalist societies economic

¹⁷ Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*, p. 41.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

aspect of life —both in the sense of production and of monetary relations— gains priority over other aspects through the rationality, i.e. ‘economic rationality,’ that lies at the very core of the idea of capitalism. Instrumental rationality and profit-cost calculations create the very core of people’s mentality coupled with favouring the productivity of people. Therefore, it is not surprising to witness people who base their relations to others on time and money calculations or people who are relied on their daily agenda to use their time in the most efficient and productive way. All in all, in this part, I demonstrated how the economic substructure of capitalist societies emerges and why it functions as it does. In the next part, I investigate the main mechanism of the production process, that is, exploitation in a deeper sense.

I.II. Control of Surplus-Value over the Labourer and the Capitalist

For Marx, labour-power is the origin of material life. It therefore should be understood as “the aggregate of those mental and physical capabilities existing in a human being, which he exercises whenever he produces a use-value of any description.”¹⁹ In each mode of production throughout history, labour-power has manifested itself in different forms. Similarly, what labour-power produced, i.e. use-value of any product, has taken various forms. Such manifestations of labour-power and the products it brought forth have paved the way for the emergence of the different forms of social relations. Like the other modes of production, the capitalist mode of production confronts us with its genuine and distinctive social relations.

¹⁹ Marx, *Capital Vol. I*, p. 167.

Within capitalist accumulation, labour-power, the only capital belonging to the labourer, is commodified to enter into the production process. By selling his labour-power to the capitalist, the labourer loses control over his labour-power, the product he produces and the working time and space. Accordingly, the value that this particular form of labour-power produces becomes more than a simple use-value of the product. It is transformed into an exchange-value, the value determined in accordance with exchange relations, namely, the rules of the market. Marx argues that

[t]he use-values of commodities furnish the material for a special study, that of the commercial knowledge of commodities. Use-values become a reality only by use or consumption: they also constitute the substance of all wealth, whatever may be the social form of that wealth. In the form of society we are about to consider [capitalist society], they are, in addition, the material depositories of exchange-value.²⁰

Marx defines three elementary factors of the labour process in general: (1) the personal activity of man, i.e. work itself, (2) the subject of that work, e.g. raw material, (3) its instruments, i.e. the means of production. Since the raw material —the product of the previous production— becomes the subject of the present work, one can argue that the product is both the pre-condition and the outcome of labour-activity. That is what turns the capitalist production into a multiple set of particular relations of production.

It is my contention that the production process is composed of two related processes: it is, on the one hand, a ‘labour process’ which is the expression of the act in which labour-power is materialized into a product; on the other, a ‘process of creating value.’ In this context, the former reveals itself *qualitatively* while the latter *quantitatively*. It is this quantitative aspect which brings forth the content of the former.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

In other words, the labour-activity itself is employed to create the value by reducing the two-faced characteristic of the labour activity (labour and value-creation processes) to a one-sided value-creation activity: the immeasurable becomes measurable. It once again becomes clear that neither the product nor the labour is inherently valuable. Value emerges as a result of the labour-activity.

In the capitalist mode of production, the production process is understood as the production of commodities. Within such production, the three main components of the production process —raw material, labour and the means of production— are all collected by the capitalist under the rubric of property. Here, we witness the separation of both the raw material and the means of production from the labour-activity of man. Thus, the capitalist governs, regulates and controls the labourer, just like other means of production, to maximize his productivity within the given working time and space. As Marx argues, such a process can be characterized by two phenomena:

First, the labourer works under the control of the capitalist to whom his labour belongs; the capitalist taking good care that the work is done in a proper manner, and that the means of production are used with intelligence, so that there is no unnecessary waste of raw material, and no wear and tear of the implements beyond what is necessarily caused by the work. Secondly, the product is the property of the capitalist and not that of the labourer, its immediate producer... By the purchase of labour-power, the capitalist incorporates labour, as a living ferment, with the lifeless constituents of the product.²¹

The twofold production process begins to be defined in terms of the unity of labour process and the process of creating *surplus-value*. In this context, the process of labour-activity or qualitative aspect of the production process is no longer significant to the

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 184-185.

capitalist; rather, the value-creation process by means of which surplus-value is measured quantitatively becomes central since the goal of the capitalist is to accumulate more and more capital. In short, in the age of capitalism, the Janus-faced character of the production process is trivialized by generating a one-dimensional view of the production process where the creation of value is overemphasised, not the value but the ‘surplus-value.’ Therefore it is appropriate to posit that

[o]ur capitalist has two objects in view: in the first place, he wants to produce a use-value that has a value in exchange, that is to say, an article destined to be sold, a commodity; and secondly, he desires to produce a commodity whose value shall be greater than the sum of the values of the commodities used in its production, that is, of the means of production and the labour-power, that he purchased with his good money in open market. His aim is to produce not only a use-value, but a commodity also; not only use-value, but value; not only value, but at the same time surplus-value.²²

How does the capitalist contribute to the production of the surplus value? As I mentioned above, all the components of production are the ‘private’ property of the capitalist (his capital). According to Marx, capital of any production consists of two elements: ‘constant capital’ and ‘variable capital.’ The constant capital can simply be characterized as the means of production and other necessary materials for production. Once these are purchased, they function in the production process as far as their fixed use-value; thus, they *reappear* with their preset use-value to fulfil the preset needs for the production of a particular product. Conversely, the variable capital represents the labour-power purchased by the capitalist. It differs from constant capital because ‘[i]t both *reproduces* the equivalent of its own value, and also produces an excess, a surplus value,

²² *Ibid.*, p. 186.

which may itself vary, may be more or less according to circumstances.’²³ Therefore, the variable capital is the part of capital which produces the surplus-value.

In the production process, the only component that is capable of producing more value than its use-value is the labour-power. Therefore the capitalist needs the labourer not only as one of the necessary elements of production but also as the most integral source of his capital accumulation. The labourer, in turn, needs the capitalist to maintain his life. Accordingly, Marx argues, the work a labourer performs in a working day is composed of two parts. He posits, “the labourer, during one portion of the labour-process, produces only the value of his labour-power, that is, the value of his means of subsistence.”²⁴ Marx calls the time spent in this portion ‘necessary labour-time’ and the labour expended during this time ‘necessary labour.’²⁵ In the second portion of the process, Marx argues, “[the labourer] creates surplus-value which, for the capitalist, has all the charms of a creation out of nothing.” The second part of the working day is thus called ‘surplus labour-time’, and the labour expended during that time is referred to as the ‘surplus-labour.’²⁶

The surplus-value, in general, is the core of the material world since the material world is formed by materialized surplus labour-power. Therefore, Marx is right in arguing that one of the essential differences among various forms of society in history is “the mode in which this surplus-labour is in each case extracted from the actual producer,

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 209 (emphasis is mine).

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 216.

²⁵ See *Ibid.*, p. 217.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 217.

the labourer.”²⁷ Then, ‘who,’ ‘on the basis of what,’ and ‘how’ surplus-value is used shapes social reality. In the capitalist mode of production, the surplus-value is extracted from the labourer by the capitalist. Herein lies what Marx calls ‘exploitation,’ a concept that will be explored in the section that follows.

Producing surplus-value has a vital importance both for the labourer and the capitalist. The labourer has to enter into the production process to meet his means of subsistence; therefore he has to produce surplus-value within the ‘second portion’ of the definite labour-time. Similarly, the capitalist’s existence depends on the extraction of surplus-value. It is the capitalist’s responsibility to create the most appropriate conditions and organization to produce the maximum amount of product without any loss of raw material and time. In this context, it is my contention that the extraction of surplus-value, the core mechanism for the continuation of the current mode of production, has control over both the labourer and the capitalist.

In Marx’s formulation of exploitation, the rate of surplus value determines the degree of exploitation, that is, the ratio between the surplus labour and the necessary labour. This ratio is also equal to the ratio between the surplus value “supplied by the individual labourer in the average day” and the variable capital which is “daily advanced in the purchase of one individual labour-power.”²⁸ Here we see the formula of the mass of the surplus-value (S) in relation to the surplus-value supplied by the individual labourer on an average day (s) and the variable capital daily advanced in the purchase of individual labour-power (v). (V) is the sum total of the variable capital.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 217.

²⁸ For more details see *ibid.*, p. 304.

$$S = \{s/v \times V\} \text{ or } S = \{P \times 'a/a \times n\}$$

(P) is the value of an average labour-power; ('a) is the surplus-labour; (a) is the necessary labour; (n) is the number of labourers employed. The ratio of (s/v) and of ('a/a) give us the rate of exploitation. So, the primary goal of the capitalist is to increase the rate of surplus value. To do so, he has to use labour-power of the labourer at the highest level (as a means to an end) and make necessary alterations in the variable capital —decrease wages, extend working hours, change the number of labourers employed and so on— in the production process since constant capital cannot be easily altered. In doing so, the capitalist increases the rate of surplus-value and ultimately the rate of exploitation.

This is the essential rule of the capitalist mode of production and it might be likened to a two-faced coin: consequences of the appropriation of labour-power, for the capitalist and for the labourer. In appropriating labour-power at its highest possible level, the capitalist increases the rate of surplus value and in turn his capital. It can thus be claimed that such an extraction of surplus value is the motor of the capitalist mode of production; without this extraction the current mode of production cannot endure. For the labourer, the appropriation of his own labour-power —surplus labour— by the capitalist means his exploitation, the rate of which is equal to the rate of surplus-value. Then, what is exploitation?

First, the ones who shape the production process are the same as those who own the fixed capital, that is, means of production, the place, etc. Capitalists are thereby the ones who extract the workers' surplus-value. In this sense, for the worker not to work under the conditions which are formed by him or in accordance to his free conscious, not

to have his own surplus-value, not to determine the mode of work he does in working time and space, are the conditions of exploitation. In other words, the exploitation of the worker becomes apparent in the extraction of his surplus-value and in the definite working conditions the worker does not have control over.

Second, the ways in which capitalist appropriates the worker's labour-power appear as the technologies of exploitation. In this sense, exploitation exhibits a form of domination. I will explain this aspect of capitalist exploitation in the second chapter. The capitalist takes advantage of all chances in order to reach his end, to increase his surplus-value within working time and space. At this point, one can think of the *plural* forms of exploitation —with its specific technologies and rationalities— on the basis of *the* formulation of exploitation. That is to say, the ways in which the capitalist exploits worker's labour-power change in accordance to historical and spatial conditions. This is why Marx posits that “[t]he bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society.”²⁹

Accordingly, while the formulation of exploitation refers to the quantitative aspect of exploitation in the production process, the forms of exploitation are expressions of the qualitative aspect of exploitation. While the former allows us to gauge the amount of exploitation, the latter sheds light on the ways in which workers are exploited. In other words, the investigation of the qualitative aspect of exploitation makes it possible to unfold the ways in which, the technologies by which, the rationales with which, workers

²⁹ Marx, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, pp. 38-39.

are made subjects and/or make themselves subjects. Commencing with this argument, I deal with the notion of alienation in Marx's thought in the next section. It is my contention that alienation is both the condition and the result of exploitation. It must be noted that alienated labour appears as the condition for exploitation since exploitation necessitates commodified/reified labour as something alien to its owner. It is, however, also one of the consequences of exploitation in the production-process.

I.III. Exchanging Lives with Commodities: alienation, commodity fetishism and reification

For Marx, the existence of the human-being cannot be understood separately from his materialized labour. Since what constructs the material world of human beings is their materialized labour-power, the main focus in Marx's writings is people's relations to their products. As he confirms,

*The direct relationship of labour to its products is the relationship of the worker to the objects of his production. The relationship of the man to the objects of production and to production itself is only a consequence of this first relationship—and confirms it... When we ask, then, what is the essential relationship of labour we are asking about the relationship of the worker to production.*³⁰

To put it differently, what primarily determines man's subjectivity is his production, which reveals, 'what' he produces and 'how' he produces. In the previous section, I highlighted the separation of the labourer from the means of production and the product of his labour as key components of the capitalist mode of production. As a result, labour itself becomes external to the labourer since he has no control over the labour process — the means of production, labour time and space— or its result —referred to as the

³⁰ Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, p. 65 (emphasis in original).

product. Therefore, the labourer, Marx argues, no longer confirms himself in his work, “but denies himself, does not feel content but unhappy, does not develop *freely* his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind.”³¹ Marx argues that work is the essential component of man’s being, “man [the labourer] feels that he is acting freely in his animal functions —eating, drinking, and procreating, or at most in his dwelling and adornment— while in his functions, he is nothing more than animal.”³² Thus, for Marx, we witness ‘alienated labour’ in the capitalist mode of production. Alienated labour is revealed in its four aspects which estranges the labourer from (1) his product, (2) the act of production, (3) his species being and (4) the others.³³

The alienation of the labourer from his product is the result of his separation from the product of his labour. In the capitalist mode of production the commodity produced by the labourer becomes the property of the capitalist who introduces it to the market. Therefore, the product of the labourer not only becomes something alien to him but also declares its power over him. It can be argued that the alienation of the labourer from his product reveals two forms of power exercised over the labourer. First, having accepted

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 65-66 (emphasis is mine).

³² *Ibid.*, p. 66. Even if herein Marx analyses the process regarding workers’ position, we see that the process has the effect on both the worker and the capitalist since the material world becomes alien to human beings as a whole. In the scope of this thesis, I will not approach to the position of the capitalist class within the alien material world; however, it should be kept in mind that the alienation is alienation for the capitalist as it is for the worker.

³³ See *ibid.*, pp. 66-70. This book is the only one in which Marx explains alienation in the broadest and most detailed sense, it is the main reference point for me in this section. At this point, it is apt to indicate that even if one can barely find the concept alienation in all three volumes of *Capital*, I do not concur with the assumption that alienation lost its significance for Marx in his late writings. It is my contention that in the *Capital* Marx’s concern was quite different than his concern in the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*. In the former, he placed emphasis on theorizing the capitalist mode of production and revealing its main formulations, while in the latter he demonstrated the consequences of such a mode of production.

that the worker constitutes his subjectivity based on the product of his labour-activity, the alienation of the worker from his product causes him to constitute his subjectivity on the basis of an alienated object. The alienated object begins to have power over him since it is the constitutive element of his subjectivity. Second, once the objects produced by the labourer are separated from him and presented to the market as commodities, they appear in the market not only as something alien to him but also as something more valuable than his labour-power. Thus, they begin to have power over him. Such power of commodities over the labourer also reveals itself *via* fetishisation of commodities. This aspect of the alienation of the worker from his product becomes more significant in Marx's arguments on the 'fetishism of commodities.'

Secondly, Marx presents the relationship of the labourer to the act of production as an alienated relationship. Such alienation derives from the relationship between the capitalist and the labourer. Marx describes the character of this relationship as follows:

Already in its simple form this relation is an inversion —personification of the thing and materialization of the person: for what distinguishes this form from all previous forms is that the capitalist does not rule over the labourer through any personal qualities he may have, but only in so far as he is 'capital'; his domination is only that of materialized labour over living labour, of the labourer's product over the labourer himself.³⁴

Accordingly, in the labour-process, the separation of the labourer from his labour-power transforms the relationship between human beings into a relationship between things, that is, the personified thing —capital— and the materialized person —the labourer. Such a transformation leads to the alienated relationship in the labour-process.

³⁴ See Marx, *Theories of Surplus Value* in *Karl Marx: Selected Writings*, David McLellan (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 393.

Besides, for the labour-process, which is supposedly the labourer's own activity and thus should be regulated and controlled by the labourer himself, is directed by the capitalist, it becomes independent from the labourer and confronts him as a means of control over him.

The social forms of their own labour or the forms of their own social labour are relations that have been formed quite independently of the individual labourers; the labourers, as subsumed under capital, become elements of these social formations—but these social formations do not belong to them. They therefore confront them as forms of capital itself, as combinations belonging to capital, as distinct from their individual labour power, arising from capital and incorporated in it.³⁵

The labourer cannot realize his activity with his free 'consciousness;' the alienation of the labourer from his labour-activity is also the alienation of the labourer from himself. He can no longer realize himself in his essential human activity.

The third aspect of alienation is the alienation of man from his species. For Marx, "productive life is species-life." In my opinion, the alienation of man from his species-life can be explained with respect to two characteristic features. First, production, that is, the foundation for the creation of the whole material world is viewed as the species-activity, the activity which unites humanity. However, such a unifying character of the productive activity is lost as a result of alienation in the production process. Hence, production is turned into an activity which is a mere instrument for individual well-being. To put it differently, the productive activity becomes the basis of differentiation and individualization rather than being the basis of commonality for humanity. More succinctly, the activity itself is detached from its context. Second, according to Marx, the

³⁵ See *ibid*, p. 394.

reduction of species-activity to the activity which only aims at the well-being of individuals generates an increase in animal-like activities in people's lives. For him, the labourer who does not feel at home when he is at work, which is in fact the place where he can reveal himself in his productive activity, starts to define himself in his animal-like activities, eating, sleeping, etc. If "[t]he whole character of a species —its species-character— is contained in the character of its life activity; and free, conscious activity is man's species-character,"³⁶ then within the capitalist mode of production man alienates himself from his species-being when producing under the control of the capitalist. Man, therefore, is free from his free will and consciousness.

Fourth, man's alienation from his species-being results in the alienation from others. Human beings therefore begin to see each other in terms of their differences rather than their commonality in their labour which creates the material world. This is one of the reasons that makes it more difficult for the workers to reach unity. Although each labourer is an element of the relations of production, the production process is formed independently from them. Thus, for labourers, the relation between themselves is interpreted as a relation arising from capital and the needs of the capitalists, namely alienated relations.

Marx's reading of the capitalist production process concludes that capitalism creates an alienated material world along with its alienated people. Once people enter into the production process, they no longer have control over the product they produce, the organization of working time and space, and in some cases their bodies and even

³⁶ See Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, p. 68.

emotions. Such a process, according to Marx, leads to alienation. But, it should be noted that even though the alienation process occurs in and as a result of the production process, its effects permeate social relations and the relation between the material world and human beings. People's confrontation with such alienated material world intensifies and expands the implications of alienation. Thus, Marx argues,

From the relationship of estranged labour to private property it follows further that the emancipation of society from private property, etc., from servitude, is expressed in the *political* form of the *emancipation of the workers*; not that *their* emancipation alone is at stake, but because the emancipation of the workers contains universal human emancipation—and it contains this, because the whole of human servitude are but modifications and consequences of this relation.³⁷

In his *Capital Vol. 1* (1965), Marx delves into social relations peculiar to the alienated world of capitalism *via* the conceptualization of 'commodity fetishism' and 'reification.' The significance of the fetishism of commodities, for Marx, can be explained with reference to two characteristic features of the relation between people and commodities in the capitalist mode of production. On the one hand, the term 'commodity' means a product to which an exchange-value has been attributed. In other words, even though people produce for social and/or individual needs, products of their labour are not measured in terms of their utility. They are measured in terms of their exchange-value —turning the products of men's labour into commodities. The value of commodities, therefore, has a mysterious character since what determines the value of commodity cannot be predicted according to the quality or quantity of labour exercised on it; the value of commodities, however, is applied according to the relation of that

³⁷ Marx expresses the alienation of both the workers and the capitalists as follows: See Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, p. 73 (emphasis in original).

commodity to other commodities. As in value determination, real social relations are also realized between commodities, not between men, or labourers. Therefore what remains are social relations of commodities and material relations of men. As Marx clearly states:

[s]ince the producers do not come into social contact with each other until they exchange their products, the specific social character of each producer's labour does not show itself except in the act of exchange. In other words, the labour of the individual asserts itself as a part of the labour society, only by means of the relations which the act of exchange establishes directly between the products, and indirectly, through them, between the producers. To the latter, therefore, the relations connecting the labour of one individual with that of the rest appear, not as direct social relations between individuals at work, but as what they really are, material relations between persons and social relations between things.³⁸

Marx's conceptualization of reification follows this two-fold character of commodity fetishism. Reification underlies the materialized social relations that people have in the capitalist mode of production. In other words, it implies the transformation of social relations into things, into objects —the objectification of social relations.

It can also be argued that while alienation is a direct result of the capitalist exploitation, commodity fetishism and reification are the results of commodity production which is also peculiar to the capitalist mode of production. The point which ties alienation, commodity fetishism and reification together is the mode of production. Therefore, the enemy that should be negated to overcome current contradictions is the capitalist mode of production rather than the alienated world or mass consumption society. In this context, it is crucial not to read Marx's concern to surmount alienation in such a way that it shifts the source of the problem from the mode of production to its

³⁸ See Marx, *Capital Vol. I*, p. 73. For Marx's explanations on the fetishism of commodities see *ibid*, pp. 71-84.

outcome, i.e. from capitalism to the alienated world. For this reason, it is inappropriate as per Marx's theory to start problematization from either alienation or commodity fetishism or reification. Similarly, in my opinion, to begin problematization from hegemonic mechanisms or the state does not lead us to the solution but shifts the focus from the concrete, i.e. material conditions and its (re)production, to the abstract. I do not claim that abstract is useless or unnecessary; rather, I assert that it can only bring particular solutions to particularly defined problems and underestimates the whole picture and its main constituent, that is, the mode of production and the extraction of surplus value.³⁹

Even though Marx presents a comprehensive analysis of alienation, commodity fetishism and reification in his writings, he does not provide sufficient tools to understand how certain subjects are constructed within and through such processes, by which means these processes are performed and how the subjects created can be deconstructed and/or reconstructed. It is my contention that only by responding to these questions can the contradictions of the capitalist mode of production be transgressed. It is at this point where Foucault and his methodology become crucial in my thesis. I argue that the capitalist mode of production has developed its dominant truth regime based on specific rationalities constructed to give birth to peculiar subjects through whom the maintenance of the current power relations are guaranteed.⁴⁰

³⁹ I should specifically note that I comprehend the significance of the works of Marxists who have contributed and brought forth new perspectives to the Marxist theory *vis-à-vis* the state, hegemonic practices, the role of ideology and the way it functions, mass consumption society etc. But, my point is about underlying the necessity and cruciality of 'how' and 'what' we problematize since it shapes the analysis itself.

⁴⁰ According to Marx, it is 'ideology' that mystifies and turns the reality upside-down. For now I leave the discussion on 'ideology' and the 'truth regime' to the second chapter where I argue that the capitalist political economy is the dominant truth regime in contemporary societies.

More clearly, since the extraction of surplus value is the chine of the capitalist mode of production, it is crucial to disclose how the labourers are constructed as well as how the labourers construct themselves within and through exploitation. To do so, how exploitation —by which means and by which techniques— is realized must be analysed. Such an analysis can be rendered possible only through implementing Foucault’s methodology. The significance of Foucault’s methodology resides in its potential to make it possible to study what is thought not possible to study, e.g. thought, ideas, consciousness, internalization, mentalities, through materializing them in discursive and non-discursive practices. Even though Marx’s analysis on alienation, commodity fetishism and reification emanate from material practices, it is almost impossible to analyse how they function within social relations since they are developed as theoretical tools to understand the relation between human beings and the material world. Their explanatory power is therefore restricted when we attempt to comprehend social relations themselves.

I.IV. Debate on Contemporary Class Structure

Exploitation as the extraction of surplus-value constitutes the very existence of the capitalist mode of production. The dividing line between classes, therefore, is drawn on the basis of exploitative relations in the production process. More succinctly, Marx classifies classes based on people’s relations to the means of production. The capitalist class is the exploiting class who extract surplus-value from the labourers while the working class are subjected to surplus-value extraction, and defined as the exploited class. Grounding his definition of class structure on exploitation, Marx demonstrates the distinctive and conditioning implications of exploitation on all social relations in the

capitalist societies. In this section, my main objective is to discuss whether the definition of exploitation as the extraction of surplus value and the classification of people in accordance to their position within these exploitative relations of production, is effective in understanding social relations in contemporary capitalist societies. I do not discuss the necessity of defining a class structure since I accept the main presumptions of Marx's theory. Rather, I attempt to provide possible answers to the following questions: Why should we define classes in the way Marx defined them? Why other categorizations of classes, e.g. status-, occupation- or income-based categorizations, cannot go beyond a simple description of appearance?

At the risk of repetition, I should indicate that how we define the problem inspires the solutions rendered. I shall explain shortcomings of classifications on the basis of status, occupation and income-level.⁴¹ Status is simply an expression of people's position within the hierarchy of specific social formations that takes its shape contingently. It also refers to how people are seen in the eyes of others within particular social practices. That is to say, a particular position of a person or a group of people cannot be generalized on the basis of their status since different socio-cultural formations ascribe different meanings to different positions. For instance, while being a primary school teacher places people in a high position in the eyes of the others in Turkey —as a result of specific historical and political experiences— people in the same position do not have the same social status in Canada. Status is also a question of authority and the respect placed on

⁴¹ In restricting myself only to the status-, occupation-, and income-based explanations of classes, I follow Alex Callinicos' categorization on the 'common-sense views of class.' See Alex Callinicos, "Introduction" in Alex Callinicos and Chris Harman, *The Changing Working Class: Essays on Class Structure Today* (London: Bookmarks Publishing, 1989), pp. 2-6. However, I should note that my arguments about the shortcomings of these views go beyond simply paraphrasing his arguments.

this authority. The status-based explanations of class, therefore, cannot provide a sufficient explanation in understanding the main component of the capitalist mode of production, i.e. exploitation; it rather shifts the main problem of exploitation to the problem of authority and the respect while reducing the problem to a domestic problem. The status-based definition of class is not about what and how people produce, but it is about how people are treated in accordance to specific socio-political conditions. Defining the problem on the basis of status trivializes all other power relations to authority-based explanations and struggles to struggles of the status groups.

Occupation-based classifications at first glance seem more explanatory than the status-based definitions of classes. The claim in a great extent is that the broad categorization of social groups, such as working class and capitalist class, should be narrowed down on the basis of occupations. Accordingly, working class members are differentiated according to their occupations, e.g. manual labour (blue-colour), white-colour, service sector, supervisors, managers, and so on. This differentiation, however, generates fragmentation by creating a hierarchy among workers. In add occupation-based classification leads to an underestimation of the reality of exploitation by reducing the main problem to work conditions and desires of workers. Besides, it generates an idea that people working in higher ranks are not exploited or alienated because their positions endow them with financial and personal opportunities.

Defining class structure on the basis of income level is another common-sense form. It is my contention that starting the analysis of social structure in the capitalist societies from income level shifts the problem from production processes to consumption

patterns. It overlooks the significance and implications of the problems deriving from the production processes, namely, exploitation. In income-based categorizations, it is argued that the increase in income levels of the working class has led to the 'embourgeoisement' of this class. Although an increase in the salaries of the working class has provided new bourgeoisie-like lifestyle opportunities to workers, it would be a delusion to claim that an increase in income level ceases the main contradictions.

As Marx indicates, contradictions are inherited in the complex structure of our societies; and changes will emerge from within these contradictions. In my opinion, the status, occupation, and income-based explanations of the social structure disguise the main contradictions of our societies. Besides the aforementioned shortcomings of each approach, there are at least four more reasons invalidating these approaches in a class analysis. First of all, they define the problem within the framework that specific rationales of the capitalist mode of production suggest. Rather than underlying the main contradictions of the capitalist societies, these explanations cast a shadow upon them by accentuating the tip of the iceberg. Second, these approaches re-locate the major problem of current societies by moving it from bottom to top. If one tries to analyse social structure not on the basis of exploitation and people's relation to the means of production, but on the basis of status, occupation and income level, one can only conceive of the consequences of the exploitative relations of production as the true form of reality. Third, when Marx problematizes classes on the basis of exploitation and people's relation to the means of production, he defines a common problem on the basis of a commonly shared experience of the production process, i.e. labour-power. It is this shared element of production on the basis of which people can unify to overcome the contradictions of the

capitalist mode of production. Aforesaid class definitions however problematize the issues on particular bases which in turn pave a way for fragmentation and dissolution of working class. Finally, it is not surprising if these classifications deem that increases in the wages of labourers and the improvement in working conditions leave the working class in a less contradictory position. Their explanations are justified by pairing income levels with consumption trends, status with respect to people in accordance to their positions, attitudes, educational level, or so on, and occupation with opportunities to ascend to higher positions. As Marx indicates, however, an increase in wages and better work conditions are only possible insofar as (1) more and more of worker's product is taken away from him, that is, the more he is exploited and in turn alienates himself; (2) the capitalist accumulates more and more labour-power; this intensifies the division of labour and the division of labour increases the individualization of the worker in turn; (3) the rise of competition among the capitalists creates a shift —some capitalists into working class and a part of the working class into beggary and starvation.⁴²

I do not, however, ignore changing conditions of the working class in the advanced capitalist societies. Changes in the form and content of work, in my opinion, have transformed the formation, but not the structure of the working class. For the relative improvements in working and living conditions of working class do not generate any significant structural alterations eliminating constant exploitation of labour-power. I therefore insist on analyzing these changes as changes in technologies and rationalities,

⁴² See Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, pp. 20-21. However, as we will see in the second chapter, this third point generated the weakest point in Marx's assumption on the future of capitalism. Increase in the wages has gone hand in hand with the increasing charm of consumption that manipulates the reality of exploitation.

of exploitation. More precisely, I argue that the relative improvement of the conditions of working class should be articulated into Marx's theory on the basis of contemporary technologies and rationalities of exploitation instrumentalized to exploit workers. I will explore attempts at articulating new conditions of the working class in Marxist theory primarily: Erik Olin Wright's conceptualization of 'contradictory class locations,' Andre Gorz's discourse on 'farewell to working class' and Alex Callinicos' contributions with the conception of 'new middle class.'

The cruciality of exploitation in defining class structure has gained importance with the impressive work, *Classes* (1997), by Wright.⁴³ Wright applies John E. Roemer's account of exploitation within rational-choice Marxism.⁴⁴ Wright's conception of the capitalist exploitation is explained with reference to twofold character of the concept. Capitalist exploitation, for Wright, manifests itself both in the extraction of surplus-value and in the domination coinciding with control over working time and space. He argues that "'actually existing capitalism' contains two secondary forms of exploitation: exploitation based on the control over organizational assets and exploitation based on the ownership of monopolized skills."⁴⁵ It is at this point where Wright applies the differentiation between the notion of class locations and class structure to demonstrate multidimensional relations of classes. He states the following:

I use the term 'class location' as a micro-level concept referring to the location of individuals (and sometimes families) within the structure of

⁴³ Erik Olin Wright, *Classes* (London: Verso, 1997).

⁴⁴ For Roemer's clarifications on the concept of exploitation see his most influential book, John E. Roemer, *A General Theory of Exploitation and Class* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982).

⁴⁵ Wright, *The Debate on Class* (London: Verso, 1990), p. 192.

class relations, whereas I will use the term ‘class structure’ as concept referring to the overall organization of class relations in some more macro-level of analysis, typically an entire society.⁴⁶

Moreover, the location of some individuals or groups can be identified by more than one class structure in accordance to their practices within class relations. With the idea of class locations inherited in class structure, the struggles between classes are positioned as the struggles between different class locations. Wright’s conception of class locations is grounded in the idea that while the structure limits class practices, the practices transforms the structure. That is to say, the limits of class structures are real, but they are transformable *via* practices. For Wright, in contemporary capitalism crucial practices transforming the structure is evident in the improving role of managers and supervisors within new methods of work organization. He identifies those who have control over the labour-power of others in the working time and space, namely, top executives, managers, and supervisors, by the conception of ‘contradictory class locations’: they are both the exploiters exercising surveillance over the workers and the exploited by not having control over the surplus value and by being subjected to the capitalist class for their position and wage. By defining contradictory positions of managers and supervisors in advanced capitalism, Wright raises the question of middle class within the framework of Marxist theory and tries to articulate the conception into the Marxist class analysis.

While Wright is concerned about understanding and explaining the role of working class in the current societies, Gorz bids farewell to the working class. Gorz manifests his pessimism about the future of the working class in the title of his

⁴⁶ Wright, *Class Counts: Comparative Studies in Class Analysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 379.

controversial book, *Farewell to the Working Class* (1982).⁴⁷ The reasons behind this discouraging ‘slogan-like’ title of Gorz’s can be summarized in five points. First, Gorz’s reading of Marx limits labour to industrial labour, and working class to industrial labour force. He states that the socialist revolution was expected only under the condition in which industrial production would reach its highest level; nevertheless, it did not happen in the way Marx assumed.⁴⁸ Second, Gorz argues that economics, which, for Marx, has a conditioning effect on the overall superstructure, is no longer defined on the basis of production processes in the advanced capitalist societies. Rather, it manifests itself in financial trends, monetary transactions and so on. Thus, the working class as the productive forces of society loses its importance as a driving force for revolutionary change both in practice and in theory. Moreover, “[p]roductive activity was cut off from its meaning, its motivations and its object and became simply a *means* of earning a wage. It has ceased to be a part of life and become the *means* of ‘earning a living.’”⁴⁹ It follows that the objective of work for the producer lies in consumption which turns ‘worker/producer’ into ‘worker/consumer.’

Third, the working-class consciousness —the workers’ awareness of their constituting power for society, namely, production— has not developed and materialized

⁴⁷ It should be noted here that although Gorz claims dissolution of the working class, his concern was still about the articulation of changing conditions of workers and a new organization of work into theory. Andre Gorz, *Farewell to the Working Class: An Essay on Post-Industrial Socialism*, Michael Sonenscher (trans.) (London: Pluto Press, 1982).

⁴⁸ For further information see Andre Gorz, *Critique of Economic Reason*, Gillian Handyside and Chris Turner (trans.) (London: Verso, 1989), especially the part, “The End of Working-Class Humanism,” pp. 51-61.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 21-22.

in a revolution as Marx assumed and for Gorz it will not. Gorz explores the argument by stating that

[t]he reason may be found in the fact that the bourgeoisie succeeded in destroying at root what consciousness the proletariat might have had of its sovereign creativeness. For this purpose, eighteenth-century bosses and present-day scientific management have been applying the same recipe: they organized the work process in such a way as to make it impossible for the worker to experience work as a potentially creative activity. The fragmentation of work, taylorism, scientific management, and, finally, automation have succeeded in abolishing the trades and the skilled workers whose ‘pride in a job well done’ was indicative of a certain consciousness of their practical sovereignty.⁵⁰

Fourth, Gorz suggests a new definition of ‘work,’ which detaches itself from the anthropological and philosophical meanings of the concept in the sense of ‘self-realization,’ that of *poiesis*, or of the creation of work as *oeuvre*. He goes further and asserts that

[I]f we wish to rescue and sustain this ‘real work,’ it is urgent that we recognize that *real work is no longer what we do when ‘at work’*: the work, in the sense of *poiesis*, which one *does* is no longer (or is increasingly rarely) done ‘at work;’ it no longer corresponds to the ‘work’ which, in the social sense of the term, one ‘has.’ One cannot demonstrate that ‘the work-based society’ must exist in perpetuity by invoking its anthropologically necessary character. In fact, the opposite is the case: we have to exit from ‘work’ and the ‘work-based society’ in order to recover a taste for, and the possibility of, ‘true’ work.⁵¹

He depicts ‘work’ as a social construction and states that “‘work’ performs a *socially identified and normalized function in the production and reproduction of the social whole*. And to perform a socially identifiable function, it has itself to be identifiable by

⁵⁰ Gorz, *Farewell to the Working Class: An Essay on Post-Industrial Socialism*, p. 46.

⁵¹ Gorz, *Reclaiming Work: Beyond the Waged-Based Society*, Chris Turner (trans.) (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), p. 2-3 (emphases are original).

the socially defined skills it deploys, according to *socially determined procedures*.⁵² Thereby the working class he defines or, as I would argue, rejects to define is not identified on the basis of ‘what they produce’ and ‘how they produce’ as it is in Marx; rather, the content and the form of work —what people do and how they do when they are not at work— gains importance since work as a social construction is characterized by the needs of our advanced capitalist societies favouring pleasures of leisure time and disapproves the necessity of work.

Finally, Gorz argues that the Marxist ideal that attributes revolutionary power to the working class was a deceptive one for two reasons. First, the power of producers, for Gorz, was peculiar to those who had control over the working process in terms of being aware of and even proud of the work they did. It was the power of the skilled workers who are at the top of working-class hierarchy, who know all the details about the work, who are actively participating decision-making process and who need not ask anything of bourgeoisie. On the contrary, the bourgeoisie relied on them to produce. However, this is not valid in the post-Fordist age as a result of over-specialization, technological innovations and changing organization of work. Skilled workers are replaced by ‘petty officers of production’ who, in spite of their working-class origin, are formed as part of a *managerial* hierarchy. The power of the producers is limited to their right to vote and veto decisions taken in trade-unions. Power to decide production as well as power to control work organization are completely in the hands of the capitalists. Second, Gorz’s definition of power differs from the Marxist understanding of power locating power in the hands of a group of people. Rather, he asserts that “[p]ower neither belongs to

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 3 (emphases are original).

[individuals] nor emanates from them. *It is an effect of the system.* It is the result of the structure of a material system of relationships in which a law appearing to govern things subjugates people through the mediation of other people.”⁵³

Callinicos considers the class analysis in light of following question: “[W]hether changes in capitalism in the century since Marx’s death have made the class antagonism between capital and wage-labour increasingly irrelevant to the social structure of the modern world.”⁵⁴ As I indicated above, Callinicos criticizes the common-categorizations of classes on the basis of status, occupation and income, by claiming that those are the definitions misled by the capitalist ideology to obscure the main conflicts in capitalist societies. He identifies four characteristics of the Marxist class definition. First of all, class in the Marxist theory is understood as a relationship, that is, a person’s class position resides in his relationship, as a member of a social class, to the other social classes. Second, class as a relationship has an antagonistic character; to put it differently, class relations cannot be separated from class struggles. Third, in the Marxist theory classes are formed in the production process on the basis of exploitation, neither on the basis of social distribution of authority emanating from status, nor of occupations or of wealth, i.e. income level. In other words, classes are formed based on the social distribution of the means of production. Fourth, Callinicos argues that Marxism as a scientific methodology categorises classes objectively; they are not based on a subjective ground. It is an expression of the actual position of people within the relations of

⁵³ Gorz, *Farewell to the Working Class: An Essay on Post-Industrial Socialism*, p. 53.

⁵⁴ See Callinicos, “Introduction” in Callinicos and Harman, *The Changing Working Class: Essays on Class Structure Today*, p. 7.

production.⁵⁵ Accordingly, he posits that the Marxist class definition is best exemplified by Geoffrey de Ste Croix:

Class (essentially a relationship) is the collective expression of the fact of exploitation, the way in which exploitation is embodied in a social structure. By exploitation I mean the appropriation of part of the product of the labour of others...

A *class* (a particular class) is a group of persons in a community identified by their position in the whole system of social production, defined above all by their relationship (primarily in terms of the degree of ownership or control) to the conditions of production (that is to say, the means and labour of production) and to other classes.⁵⁶

Assessing class analysis on the basis of people's objective relations to the means of production within the exploitative relations of production, however, does not hinder Callinicos from defining contradictory class locations of middle-level managers and administrators. He argues that the capitalist class can only survive by creating a bureaucratic hierarchy of control and on basis of such hierarchy he defines the 'new middle class' (NMC). He states that "not all employees are workers, but that managers, supervisors, and semi-autonomous employees in contradictory class locations from a distinct social *layer* from the proletariat, what I have called 'new middle class'."⁵⁷ In differentiating middle-class from proletariat he emphasizes their bourgeoisie-like control and surveillance over other labourers. In differentiating them from the capitalist class he refers back to the fact that they do not have the whole control over the surplus even if they earn much more than the average wage of labourers. Nevertheless, the emergence of

⁵⁵ For Callinicos' arguments on the Marxist definition of classes see *ibid.*, pp. 5-7.

⁵⁶ Cited from Geoffrey de Ste Croix by Callinicos, "Introduction" in Callinicos and Harman, *The Changing Working Class: Essays on Class Structure Today*, p. 6 (emphases are original).

⁵⁷ See Callinicos, "The 'New Middle Class' and Socialist Politics" in *ibid.*, p. 35 (emphasis is mine).

NMC, for Callinicos, has had a transformative impact on the class structure in the advanced capitalist societies.

It is my contention that all of these three different approaches to class analysis within the Marxist framework create difficulties in comprehending class structure in advanced capitalist societies. The deficiencies of Wright's approach are fourfold. First, as I explained above, he defines classes on the basis of exploitation. His two-fold understanding of exploitation (capitalist exploitation as the extraction of surplus and as the domination in working space and time) leads him to specify 'contradictory class locations.' However, exploitation, in Marx's sense, means merely the extraction of surplus-value and appropriation of it on behalf of the capital. Domination by those in contradictory class locations in working time and space, which, for Wright, almost replaces exploitation in the former sense, should be understood as one of the technologies rendering exploitation secure. There is therefore no contradiction in the location of those who have control over other labourers; rather, such positions can be viewed as a new invention of capitalists to keep workers in their class positions. Second, by defining contradictory class positions within class structure in accordance to people's ability to dominate others, Wright shifts the major determinant of class structure —exploitation— to authority. Third, in his approach to class locations, Wright perceives class-interests and class-consciousness of those who are in the so-called contradictory positions from within a subjective standpoint. In doing so, he underestimates the objective character of the Marxist class definition. Fourth, Wright paraphrases Marx and argues that "human beings make history (practices transform structures), but not just as they please (structure limit

practices).”⁵⁸ Accordingly, he states that changes in the organization of work in advanced capitalism in general and the emergence of the contradictory class locations in particular, aims at transforming the class structure. However, following Marx, one can claim a transformation in the class structure only insofar as an entire transformation in the mode of production takes place. I argue that diverse practices within a class or revolutionary restorations in the organization of work have distinctive implications on the structure of classes, but they do not transform the main structure of the capitalist exploitation generating a differentiation of social classes. Thus, rather than framing new class structure in theory, I suggest a new methodology in approaching social classes within Marxist theory. Before delving into its details, I shall continue with the critique of Gorz’s approach to the working class.

Even though Gorz does not give a specific definition of class in the light of his criticism on the Marxist class differentiation, it can be argued that he is tempted to approach social classes on the basis of class-consciousness and revolutionary potential of the working class. It is therefore not surprising that Gorz’s belief in disappearing possibility for the revolution of proletariat in the advanced capitalist societies brings forth his call for ‘farewell to the working class.’ In doing so, I argue that he disregards the contextual character of class-consciousness. More succinctly, the proletariat might not resemble a revolutionary force or might not be aware of its class position, but this does not necessarily prevent us from defining them as a class objectively. Gorz perceives the revolutionary potential of the working class as hopeless, due to the decrease in the number of industrial workers since the beginning of the deindustrialization process in

⁵⁸ Wright, *Class Counts: Comparative Studies in Class Analysis*, p. 388.

advanced capitalist societies after the 1970s. However, deindustrialization neither eliminates capitalist exploitation nor destroys the working class entirely. A decrease in the number of industrial workers, rather, paves the way to an increase in the number of service sector workers and new jobs. Finally, Gorz's conceptualisation of work —the definition of work on social and contextual basis rather than idealization of it— can be accepted with a necessary precaution. It is true that people do not actualize themselves in their labour they exercise in working time and space. However, the fact that the capitalist organization of work does not let the workers realize themselves through their labour does not prevent us from claiming that labour in itself has such a character that human beings can only express themselves in their labour. It is through and for the sake of this labour that workers are expected to negate the conditions created in the capitalist mode of production. It is my contention that workers' discredit to the fact that 'what they produce and how they produce coincides with who they are' is a mere consequence of the technologies and rationalities that provide the persistence of exploitation and stand in the way of revolution.

Callinicos, by defining a middle class from within the working class, contradicts what he himself draws from the Marxist approach to social classes since the reasons he highlights in conceptualising the 'new middle class' rely on income-, occupation- and status-based conceptualizations. Moreover, his attribution of a new name to a so-called new social 'layer' can be seen as a sign of temptation to apply subjective criteria. Such a re-categorization differentiates those in the 'new middle class' from the proletariat regarding their heterogeneous, ambiguous and intermediate position with reference to the relation between capital and wage-labourer. However, I argue that neither Callinicos'

conceptualization of NMC, nor Wright's emphasis on the 'contradictory class positions' or Gorz's call for a 'farewell to the working class' is sufficient to comprehend contemporary class relations. Even though the emergence of the managerial group is a practical reality, it is not an alteration to the Marxist classification of classes; rather, it is one of the best examples of technologies produced to maintain current exploitative relations. Such technologies also shift the main struggle between the capitalist and the workers to the struggle between workers in higher positions and lower positions.

In the scope of the present thesis, following Marx, I define social classes by reference to social relations of production. Therefore, I argue that the major and most appropriate criterion in understanding social, political and economic reality of contemporary societies is exploitation: the extraction of surplus-value. As statistics demonstrate, one reason among various others, for decrease in the number of industrial workers in advanced capitalist societies is an inevitable result of the character of the capitalist mode of production.⁵⁹ Coevally, the number of workers employed in service sector, increased dramatically. Even though the debate of whether those working in service sector are included in the working class and whether the rate of surplus-value produced in service sector can be measured continue to be played out in the Marxist theory, in my opinion, there is no doubt that people working in the service sector are

⁵⁹ Increasing usage of technology in the industrial production has generated the decrease in the number of industrial workers employed. Instead of decreasing the rate of exploitation, this process has raised the rate of exploitation significantly. Cueno's calculations of the rate of surplus value demonstrate increasing rates of exploitation particularly after Second World II. For details see C. J. Cueno, "Reconfirming Karl Marx's Rate of Surplus Value," *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* (1984) (21:1), 98-104, "Class Struggle and the Measurement of the Rate of Surplus Value," *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* (1982) (19:3), 377-425, and "Class Exploitation in Canada," *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* (1978) (15:3), 284-300.

included in the working class since they produce surplus-value that subsequently is accumulated by the capitalist to increase his capital.⁶⁰ People employed in the service sector are subjected to, what I refer to as, ‘double-exploitation’ since they are exploited both by their employer and their client.⁶¹

Those who are in higher positions within the hierarchy of productive forces, e.g. executives, managers, supervisors, are equipped with extensive responsibilities and authorities including surveillance and control over other workers. However, this does not change their class position defined in accordance to their relations to the means of production. They do not have the ownership of the means of production and thereby they have to sell their labour and be exploited in the way the other workers are exploited. I argue that their positions along with their responsibilities and authorities are created as part of the technologies generated to maintain exploitation in a secure domain. The capitalist’s benefits from such positions can be demonstrated in at least four points. First, the capitalist has some of the workers on his side that provides him with an opportunity to learn about the worker’s performances from the worker’s own perspective. Second, in doing so, the focus of the struggle between the capitalist and the workers is transformed to a struggle among the workers. The enemy is not the capitalist any longer, but another worker in a higher position. For example, when the capitalist needs to fire some of the

⁶⁰ Marx’s discussion on productive and unproductive labour in relation to material and immaterial production directly relates to questions given above. For Marx’s discussion on productive and unproductive labour see Marx, *Theories of Surplus Value*.

⁶¹ In the next chapter, I will explain and illustrate the technologies and rationalities of exploitation in detail. Therefore, for now, I restrict myself to highlight the difference between service sector workers and industrial workers regarding ‘double exploitation.’

workers because of new financial regulations, in the eyes of the worker he is not the person to be blamed, but the manager of the department of Human Resources.

Third, positions of those in higher levels are nicely presented for other workers to see; sometimes it is their higher wages, sometime the power they have or both rendering their position in the eyes of other workers desirable and pleasurable. Thus, the target of the workers becomes promotion rather than negation of exploitation. Even though promotion might generate an increase in worker's wages and authority, it also necessitates more and more work and an increase in competition among workers. Fourth, for those who are already in higher positions, exploitation is eliminated as a concern since they do not define themselves as belonging to the working class. Such a perception can be explained through Marx's differentiation of 'class-in-itself' from 'class-for-itself' rather than conceptualizing their position within the so-called new class structure. They are not concerned about exploitation but take pleasure in their status and high income. Here emerges the replacement of work—a means of self-realization—with pleasure.

It is important to note here that the only difference I see is in the position of the following groups of people: self-employed—who do not work under the control of a capitalist and do not work as a capitalist unless they do not hire workers for themselves which puts them directly in the position of the capitalist in my opinion—⁶² students—who do not work for a capitalist—and retired people, homeless, criminals in prisons, 'insane' people in mental hospitals, unemployed, and all of those who are in a great

⁶² Even though they live in an alienated world and are subjected to the implications of alienation, commodity fetishism and reification in their life, I would argue that self-employed people's labour-power is the least alienated one and therefore they can be kept out of the class structure and analyzed accordingly in theory.

extent suffering from the capitalist mode of production because of either its unbearable rules or its mentalities and all of whom the capitalist mode of production treat as garbage.

I suppose that Marx's classification of social classes on the basis of people's relations to the means of production is still the most appropriate means to comprehend and analyze social, political and economic structure of the current societies since exploitation is the chine of the capitalist mode of production. Therefore, I disagree with the attempts to re-conceptualize the class structure with reference to 'contradictory class locations' or 'new middle class;' rather, I suggest a transformation in methodology. The Marxist framework is crucial in defining social classes objectively through the theoretical tools provided. In my opinion, the differentiation of classes is important in understanding and explicating social reality. However, it is insufficient to understand the reality in a more detailed sense or to develop opposing techniques and strategies to change the reality. What is necessary is, therefore, to find methodological tools for micro level analysis which will make it possible to study the concrete and the practical. More precisely, to understand how members of the working class construct themselves and are constructed and to comprehend what modes of relations they develop with the material world, with the others, and with themselves, we should change the way we look at the issue. We should articulate a new methodology to analyze such issues. Reassessing the problem of exploitation with respect to its technologies and rationalities will provide us with a concrete basis. Such an approach is a conduit for studying some of the issues that Marx indicated, e.g. class-consciousness, ideology, and alienation, on a concrete and material basis. To do so, I suggest applying Foucault's methodology which assesses the relations among people on a concrete, material basis by rendering discursive and non-

discursive practices a case for study. In other words, Foucault's methodology makes it possible to study the issues such as class-consciousness, differentiation of class-in-itself and class-for-itself, alienation and ideology on a material and practical basis.

I.V. Concluding Remarks

A human being as a social, productive being constitutes himself by producing within the labour-activity. To put it differently, an individual exists as a social human being only insofar as he produces. What he produces and how he produces, that is to say, what the basis of his subjectivity is and how this subjectivity reveals itself, changes in accordance with the historical context. In the capitalist mode of production, individual subjectivity is constructed on the commodification process and the form of individual subjectivity reveals itself within and through exploitative relations of production. To further elucidate, an individual is recognized as a subject in capitalist societies only insofar as he produces surplus-value which is to be extracted by the capitalist. It is my contention that in capitalist societies, exploitation comes into play as the constitutive element of individual subjectivity and social relations among individuals. Taking exploitation seriously is therefore an unavoidable task of any inquiry concerning socio-political formations of our societies. How should we study exploitation then?

In this chapter, I attempted to search for the formulation of exploitation in order to answer a general question which is a corollary for more particular questions: under which conditions do we construct ourselves as subjects in capitalist societies? In my opinion, in order to understand the *multiple* constituents of our subjectivity, one should first apply theoretical and methodological tools in order to map out the set of social relations as *a*

whole. To pursue such an analysis, I applied Marx's theory and methodology; and I tried to draw the map of overall social relations peculiar to capitalist societies. I revealed the significance of explaining the web of social relations on the basis of a definite mode of production by indicating the reason the subject who is defined with his productivity can only be understood from within the form of his productive activity. Under the capitalist mode of production each particular activity of production shares common features without which capitalism cannot exist. It is at this point where the capitalist exploitation confronts us as a reality on which the capitalist mode of production and the social relations of production are based. Exploitation, in this sense, means the extraction of surplus-value from the owner of the labour-power, and thus, is the cornerstone of the separation of social classes —capitalist (exploiting) class and working (exploited) class— in capitalist societies. Grounding the separation between social classes on the exploitative relations of production, I argued that one should draw the dividing line between classes on the basis of exploitation; rather than defining class-structure of capitalist societies on the basis of status, occupation or income-level, which can only be the simple expression of the tip of the iceberg. For the classification of Marx derives from relations rooted in the social formation.

In order to exercise exploitation on (free) productive subjects, the separation of the subject from his labour-power, the means of production and the raw material is necessary. It is at this point where the estrangement of labourer to his product, to his labour-activity, to others and to himself takes place as alienation. It might be argued that alienated bodies, consciousnesses and relations are necessary in order for the capitalist to exploit workers, as the docile bodies are necessary in order to exercise a form of

discipline upon them. The fetishism of commodities and the reification of social relations, I argued, are the results of commodity production and the necessities to sustain continuity of commodification process whereas alienation is the necessary condition and the result of exploitation. Even though the conceptualizations of alienation, commodity fetishism and reification are applicable within the conditions of the capitalist exploitation, I argued that Marx's theory and methodology do not provide sufficient tools to study these concepts through which one can understand the subject forms constituted on behalf of and through the capitalist exploitation. In order to study the web of social relations and the forms of subjectivity on a material basis, I suggested Foucault's theoretical conceptualization of power/knowledge relations and archaeological methodology. For only through the methodological and conceptual tools introduced by Foucault one can understand specific technologies and rationalities of exploitation. In the next chapter, I mainly focus on exploitation as a technology which also has its own specific rationalities and technologies from Foucault's methodological perspective.

Chapter II

Exploitation as a Complex Social Function

To point out a problem is something; to investigate given problematizations and to establish new problematizations after deconstructing the former ones is another. Capitalist political economy and the specific political program capitalism requires indicate a social structure which has been constructed in historical process. In order to reveal problematical aspects of this structure—which are really problematic or thought to be problematic—first, one needs to deconstruct the problematizations taken as self-evident, and then reveal the truth hidden behind these problematizations. Only in doing so, new problematizations resist against the old ones. In the first chapter, I explored Marx's analyses on capitalism. It showed how Marx de-constructs the assertions of the classical political economists. To illustrate, by means of the methodology that historical materialism and dialectic materialism provide, Marx shows the historical progress of different modes of production, which makes it clear that capitalist mode of production does not have any natural continuity, that is to say, it is a finite reality like all other human-made things. In saying so, he demonstrates that the speculative "human nature" definition of classical political economists is not the 'truth' but only an illusion. These examples by which Marx turns the theories and the predictions of classical political economists upside-down can be multiplied. In the scope of the main problematic of this thesis, it can be said that Marx for the first time demonstrates that a labourer can never get the equivalence of his labour within the capitalist mode of production and that the earning of the labourer that is defined as the equivalence of a certain labour force by the classical political economists is nothing more than an evidence for capitalist exploitation

generating alienation of human, reification of social relations and fetishisation of products all at ones. When Marx unfolds capitalist exploitation by deconstructing the theoretical framework of classical political economists, he discloses and identifies a factual problem within capitalist system: the exploitation of labourers through the extraction of surplus-value.

The problem of capitalist exploitation is taken under consideration in various forms in literature: e.g. some scholars approach the problem on the basis of “just and unjust” by defining a set of juridical principles, some others describe the problem as a necessary outcome of human nature by situating an ahistorical human nature at the very center of their explanations. There are also those who see the issue as the main requirement of dialectic which is to render the labour-capital contradiction and the class struggle possible as Marx did. In the scope of this thesis, these interpretations will be called different ‘problematizations’ of capitalist exploitation. Following Foucault, it can be said that the term, problematization, briefly means an activity in which one takes a domain of a factual problem as the field of study and creates its objects, subjects, and the mode of knowledge. His way of approaching political questions can be called “the order of ‘problematization’ —which is to say, the development of a domain of acts, practices, and thoughts”¹ because for Foucault, I would argue, the history is the ‘history of problematizations.’ These problematizations identify certain objects to be studied, specific subjects to be worked on, and definite forms of knowledge to be functionalized. Therefore, ‘who we are at a given time and place’ can be understood only if we disclose

¹ M. Foucault, “Polemics, Politics, and Problematizations: An Interview with Michel Foucault” in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 vol. I, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth*, Robert Hurley and others (trans.) Paul Rabinow (ed.) (New York: The New Press, 1997), p. 114.

these problematizations in their contextuality. In other words revealing the ‘how’ of problematizations makes it possible to comprehend ‘who we are.’ Besides, even though certain problematizations shape our field of action and create various power effects over us, we are capable of resisting against such problematizations *via* presenting new problematizations. As Graham Burchell explicates:

This notion [problematization] refers to the historically conditioned emergence of new fields of experience. These new fields of experience involve new truth games, new ways of objectifying and speaking the truth about ourselves, and new ways in which we are able to be and required to be subjects in relation to new practices of government. But this notion also designates the activity of the historian of the present. The historian of the present *reproblematizes*, that is to say engages in an activity that dismantles the co-ordinates of his or her starting point and indicates the possibility of a different experience, of a change in his or her way of being a subject or in his or her relation to self—and so also, of a change of other’s selves. This experience dictates that each particular work is an experiment the outcome of which cannot be known in advance, that it is an experience in which one risks oneself in the sense that one emerges from it transformed not only in what and how one thinks, but thereby in how one is or might possibly be.²

Therefore, a phenomenon that is problematized does not remain hidden in-between the lines of a theory book. On the contrary, these problematizations penetrate into daily practices, people’s relations with each other, with the objects and with themselves through discursive and non-discursive practices—and this generally happens even before those books are written. Thus, the next step after specifying a factual problem is to find how such a problem is expressed in material practices. At this point, since a problem is not reflected in practices in its factual form but in the form of a reality (that is, in a problematized form), the problem begins to be exercised and experienced in

² Graham Burchell, “Liberal Government and Techniques of the Self” in *Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, neo-liberalism and rationalities of government*, Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne, Nikolas Rose (eds.) (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996), p.31.

the form of its expression. And experiencing a problem in its problematized form brings forth new realities that are to possibly open ways for new factual problems. Here, rather than a sentence it is more appropriate to use Foucault's own words:

When I say that I am studying the 'problematization' of madness, crime, or sexuality, it is not a way of denying the reality of such phenomena. On the contrary, I have tried to show that it was precisely some real existent in the world which was the target of social regulation at a given moment. The question I raise is this one: How and why were very different things in the world gathered together, characterized, analyzed, and treated as, for example, 'mental illness'? What are the elements which are relevant for a given 'problematization'? And even if I won't say that what is characterized as 'schizophrenia' corresponds to something real in the world, this has nothing to do with idealism. For I think there is a relation between the thing which is problematized and the process of problematization. The problematization is an 'answer' to a concrete situation which is real.³

In the scope of this thesis, the subject I put under consideration is the capitalist exploitation of human labour. In the first chapter, I revealed on which bases and in which framework Marx discloses the problem of capitalist exploitation. In so doing, I explored how Marx problematizes the issue. In other words, I unfolded which objects of inquiry he defines, which kind of subjects he constructs, which mode of struggle he proposes, and how he categorizes the actors who are to take part in the struggle. In this chapter, I shall discuss the deficits of the way Marx problematizes the issue of exploitation, the factuality of which is fortunately discovered by him. To do so, I shall take Foucault's approach as my point of departure. In this regard, I shall also search for the possible responses to the question: how should we study the notion of exploitation if we articulate Foucault's viewpoint into the inquiry? As a final point, I will claim that we can delve into the problem of labour exploitation only insofar as we develop a new approach by answering

³ Foucault, *Fearless Speech*, Joseph Pearson (ed.) (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2001), p. 171.

the question above. Moreover, I will claim that only by means of, establishing new modes of problematizations that are to emerge as consequences of such an investigation, defining new problems and drawing new domains of problems, we can define new modes of struggles which will carry the workers of all countries to victory.

The present chapter consists of five parts. In the first part, I give an outline of Foucault's work, point out his contributions to political theory and specify the sources of his importance in literature. Second, from a Foucauldian viewpoint I discuss why Marx's problematization of exploitation is problematic. In this part, in addition to the *formulation* of exploitation explored in the first chapter, I also identify exploitation as a 'complex social function' with its own technologies and rationalities. In doing so, I attempt to expand the previous definition of exploitation to render it possible to ask the following question: how does exploitation—in its definition as the extraction of surplus-value—function within complex social relations? In the third part, I reveal Foucault's inquiry on the microphysics of power in order to comprehend modern form of power since I define an exploitative power within the manifold modes of power. Fourth, I outline the flexible mode of production by benefiting from David Harvey's periodization of capitalism. Finally, in the fifth part, I attempt to draw a framework to study technologies and rationalities of exploitative power along with their illustrations. In this part, the technologies and the rationalities of exploitation are analyzed in accordance to current practices in order to answer the following question: By which rationalities does the capitalist exploitation penetrate into all relations, bodies, and ethics of individuals? Or rather, how do we say that we are not exploited?

II.I. On the Intersection of Power and Knowledge Arise Archaeology and Genealogy

“I might have seemed a bit like a whale that leaps to the surface of the water disturbing it momentarily with a tiny jet of spray and lets it be believed, or pretends to believe, or wants to believe, or himself does in fact indeed believe, that down in the depths where no one sees him any more, where he is no longer witnessed nor controlled by anyone, he follows a profound, coherent and reasoned trajectory.”⁴

In this part, I try to present a brief summary of Foucault’s work. However, beforehand it should be noted that it is difficult to schematize, to classify, and to categorize Foucault’s work. This might be because of the variety of fields he studied and different language he used in his new and unusual approach. At this point, the records of his interviews and lectures contribute significantly in understanding his overall works since they provide a self-evaluation of his writings. Nevertheless, Foucault has become a significant thinker whose name should be mentioned —either by critique of his approaches or by acknowledgement of his writing— in various fields. Thus, there are numbers of interpretations of Foucault’s work in almost each field of social sciences. In the scope of this thesis, however, I take Foucault’s own work as a reference. Even though secondary sources are referred occasionally, I do not apply a certain Foucauldian author(s) in my reading of Foucault. In my opinion, outlining Foucault’s work independently from current Foucauldian approaches is important for the present thesis to specify how I read Foucault. In doing so, I try to schematize his works on the basis of his continuous line of thought rather than demonstrating the evolutions and/or breaks in his thoughts.

⁴ M, Foucault, “Two Lectures” in *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*, C. Gordon (ed.), C. Gordon, L. Marshall, J. Mepham, and K. Soper (trans.) (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980), p. 79.

What distinguish thinkers and the systems of thought from each other are their distinct presumptions. In the first chapter, it was shown that the distinctive character of Marx's theory relies on the value he puts on human labour and its productivity. For him, what constructs human being and his environment is his labour force. Therefore, what he produces and how he produces is expected to coincide with who he is. For Foucault, however, the forms of knowledge produced in historical context have an enormous role in the construction and continuity of socio-political structures since in his thought what govern individual subjects, or rather, what render the action of governing (both the governing of others and the governing of oneself) possible are such knowledges produced in historical context. Foucault expresses this complicated operation in terms of "truth-rights-power/knowledge" triangle.⁵

The forms of knowledges are constructed through and within social practices. They are neither knowledges merely inherited in the language of scientific disciplines nor knowledges hold by a group of people or institutions that use them to dictate on others. Rather, Foucault argues that there have been constructed and have functioned the domains of knowledge as the output of social practices in history. Each knowledge domain consists of its own truths, objects of knowledge, institutional mechanisms,

⁵ "We are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth. This is the case for every society, but I believe that in ours the relationship between power, right and truth is organized in a highly specific fashion... we are forced to produce the truth of power that our society demands, of which it has need, in order to function: we *must* speak the truth; we are constrained or condemned to confess or to discover the truth. Power never ceases its interrogation, its inquisition, its registration of truth: it institutionalizes, professionalizes and rewards its pursuit... we are also subjected to truth in the sense in which it is truth that makes the laws, that produces the true discourse which, at least partially, decides, transmits and itself extends upon the effects of power." Foucault, "Two Lectures" in *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*, Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham, Kate Soper (trans.) Colin Gordon (ed.) (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), p. 93-94.

particular subject forms, modes of rationalities and specific technologies, all of which have performed as synchronous and interrelated practices. These components of the knowledge domains have taken their position as either brand-new inventions or discoveries within social practices to realize their specific intentions. First, the truth produced within a particular knowledge domain renders it possible for a particular knowledge of that domain, among others, to be exercised, or rather, to live in discourses. Second, the objects of knowledge are established *via* newly constructed object domains or most of the time *via* redefinition and re-presentation of already existed objects of previous knowledge domains. These objects of a knowledge domain provide, in a sense, the material conditions of the established knowledge domain around which the intentions can be realized. Third, there have been established institutional mechanisms through which the knowledge in use finds its place to be legitimized and to have a legal appearance.

Fourth, there have also different forms by which human beings are made subjects within above mentioned knowledge domains. According to Foucault, there are three modes of objectification which transform human beings into subjects: the modes of inquiry that try to give themselves the status of sciences; the objectivizing of the subject in “dividing practices” —the subject is either divided inside himself or divided from others; the way human beings turns himself into a subject.⁶ This tripartite understanding

⁶ Foucault, “The Subject and Power” in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 vol. III, Power*, Robert Hurley and others (trans.) James D. Faubion (ed.) (New York: The New Press, 2000), pp. 326-327. In this late article, Foucault indeed gives an outline of his work from the beginning. At this point, he defines his work as the history of the subject. However, as I indicated above, the definition of Foucault’s work in one phrase and/or the periodization of his work within a tripartite understanding seem to me, if not impossible, not easy. It is obvious that Foucault himself is not clear on this issue. For example, in one of his interviews, “Question of Method,” he identifies the

of the ways in which people are invited to be subjects motivates Foucault to make a genealogical history of the subject within three domains. Accordingly, Foucault argues, we constitute ourselves in relation to truth as subjects of knowledge, in relation to a field of power as subjects acting on others, and in relation to ethics as moral agents.⁷ All of the three domains of subjectivization are defined with reference to a particular knowledge domain.

There remain two other categories I attempt to assess in the interpretation of Foucault's writings on the construction of knowledge domains: the technologies and the rationalities of power/knowledge relations. Within a specific knowledge domain, the truth produced in it, the objects of knowledge known, the subject forms being constructed and continuously re-constructed, institutional mechanisms legitimizing it put the knowledges

target of his analyses as follows: "The target of analysis was not 'institutions', 'theories', or 'ideology', but *practices* – with the aim of grasping the conditions which make these acceptable at a given moment; the hypothesis being that these types of practice are not just governed by institutions, prescribed by ideologies, guided by pragmatic circumstances but possess up to a point their own specific regularities, logic, strategy, self-evidence and 'reason'. It is a question of analyzing a 'regime of practices.'" See "Question of Method" in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 vol. III, Power*, p. 225. In his earlier article, "Two Lectures," he defines what he does as "a genealogical history of the origins of a theory and a knowledge." See "Two Lectures" in *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*, p. 86. In the scope of this thesis, I classify his work within abovementioned categories. That is to say, I argue that he starts with an analysis of knowledge/power domains through which he, then, analyzes the truth forms, the objects of knowledges, the institutions, the subject forms, the rationalities, and the technologies of these forms of power/knowledge with a specific attention to each in his different texts, interviews, and lectures. However, even though those are all interconnected and synchronic categories of a power/knowledge domain, it cannot be said that he paid adequate attention to each of the categories in his works.

⁷ See Foucault, "On the Genealogy of Ethics" in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 vol. I, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth*, p. 262. In his later works we witness that Foucault investigates this last point: the subject in relation to ethics. His questioning of ethical subjects focuses on the contradictory togetherness of Greco Roman philosophy and Christian spirituality what Foucault calls the combination of "the city-citizen game and shepherd-flock game" identified also in the differentiation between "knowing oneself" and "taking care of oneself." For further reading see Foucault, "Omnes at Singulatim: Towards a Criticism of Political Reason" in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 vol. III, Power*, and also see "Technologies of the Self" in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 vol. I, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth*, especially pp. 225-231.

into discursive and non-discursive social practices by means of specific forms and levels of rationalizations, particular tactics, strategies, techniques, all of which are shaped by the dominant form of power in that particular period of history.

[Here, it is necessary to open a parenthesis in order to highlight a point. Even though Foucault is well-known with his account of “power,” the analyses of power relations in Foucault’s work, in fact, becomes apparent in *Discipline and Punish* (1975) and in his interviews and lectures that he gave at the time he was writing the book.⁸ What inspired Foucault to reveal the problem of power were the social movements and the breaks in totalizing scientific knowledge coming along with the events of May’68. Foucault explores how the social practices of May’68 accelerated the process of questioning power in the following quotation:

The way power was exercised —concretely, and in detail— with its specificity, its techniques and tactics, was something that no one attempted to ascertain; they contented themselves with denouncing it in a polemical and global fashion as it existed among the “other,” in the adversary camp. Where Soviet socialist power was in question, its opponents called it totalitarianism; power in Western capitalism was denounced by the Marxists as class domination; but the mechanics of power in themselves were never analyzed. This task could only begin after 1968, that is to say, on the basis of daily struggles at grass-roots level, among those fight was located in the fine meshes of the web of power. This was where the concrete nature of power became visible, along with the prospect that these analyses of power would prove fruitful in accounting for all that had hitherto remained outside the field of political analysis.⁹

⁸ Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, Alan Sheridan (trans.) (New York: Vintage Books, 1995).

⁹ Foucault, “Truth and Power” in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 vol. III, Power*, p. 117.

Furthermore, Foucault approves that the analysis of power, which was an unwritten but the main question in his own work since the beginning, is, at the last instance, one of the consequences of 1968 movements:

thinking back to May of '68, and going beyond a certain inadequate, "hyper-theorizing" vocabulary, I ask: who today would not say that in general it was all a question of rebellion against an entire network of forms of power that made their mark on youth culture and on certain strata of society? From all these different experiences, including my own, there emerged only one word, like a message written with invisible ink, ready to appear on the page when the right chemical is added; and that word is *power*.¹⁰

Even though Foucault starts to be interested in the problem of power with his inquiry on the birth of the prison, it should not be understood as a break or an evolution in his study. On the contrary, the philosophical and methodological background of his previous work —with an essential attention to the history of knowledge— has inspired him to build his theory of power on the analysis of knowledge domains. The interconnectedness and interrelation between knowledge and power make it possible for him to say that

[w]hen I think back now, I ask myself what else it was that I was talking about in *Madness and Civilization* or *The Birth of The Clinic*, but power? Yet I am perfectly aware that I scarcely ever used the word and never had such a field of analyses at my disposal.¹¹

In one of his late (at the end of 1978) interviews with Duccio Trombadori, Foucault explains the "turn" in his work as follows:

¹⁰ Foucault, "Between 'Words' and 'Things' during May'68" in *Remarks on Marx: Conversations with Duccio Trombadori*, R. James Goldstein and James Cascaito (trans.) (New York: Semiotext(e), 1991), pp. 145-146.

¹¹ Foucault, "Truth and Power" in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 vol. III, Power*, p.117.

If I look today at my past, I recall having thought that I was working essentially on a “genealogical” history of knowledge. But the true motivating force was really this problem of power. Ultimately, I had done nothing but attempt to trace the way in which certain institutions, in the name of “reason” or “normality,” had ended up exercising their power on groups of individuals, in relation to established ways of behaviour, of being, of acting or speaking, by labelling them as anomalies, madness, etc. In the end, I had only produced a history of power.¹²

I thus argue that the transition to the problem of power in Foucault’s study entirely overlaps with his previous inquiries concerning the problem of knowledge. Furthermore, the close relation between knowledge and power, which Foucault prefers to use in the format of “power/knowledge,” can be demonstrated within twofold explanation that Foucault gives. First, he highlights the contradictory relation between the nature and the scientific knowledge. It is contradictory because human-being produces systematic knowledges in the face of the chaotic existence of the nature. Rather than a sentence let Foucault speak:

That is the world that knowledge deals with. There is nothing in knowledge that enables it, by any right whatever, to know this world. It is not natural for nature to be known. Thus, between the instincts and knowledge, one finds not a continuity but, rather, a relation of struggle, domination, servitude, settlement... There can only be a relation of violence, domination, power, and force, a relation of violation. Knowledge can only be a violation of the things to be known, and not a perception, a recognition, an identification of or with those things.¹³

However, in the Western tradition such interconnectedness has been rejected by giving privilege to knowledge over practice. Foucault demonstrates the roots of this understanding of power in opponent to knowledge:

¹² Foucault, “Between ‘Words’ and ‘Things’ during May’68” in *Remarks on Marx: Conversations with Duccio Trombadori*, p. 145.

¹³ Foucault, “Truth and Juridical Forms” in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 vol. III, Power*, p. 9.

With Plato there began a great Western myth: that there is an antinomy between knowledge and power. If there is knowledge, it must renounce power. Where knowledge and science are found in their pure truth, there can no longer be any political power. This great myth needs to be dispelled. It is this myth which Nietzsche began to demolish by showing, in the numerous texts already cited, that, behind all knowledge [*savoir*], behind all attainment of knowledge [*connaissance*], what is involved is a struggle for power. Political power is not absent from knowledge, it is woven together with it.¹⁴

It said that human knowledge itself, for Foucault, has an essentially contested characteristic, and thereby it can be understood only through a standpoint which takes power struggles as its basis.

Second, according to Foucault, in the 1960s there occurred two important events which made the period notable: “the efficacy of dispersed and discontinuous offensives” and “the increasing vulnerability to criticism of things, institutions, practices, discourses.” These two events had two characteristics. First, the criticism emerging with these two has a local character, that is to say, it is “an autonomous, non-centralized theoretical production whose validity is not dependent on the approval of the established regimes of truth.” Second, these two events have brought together what Foucault calls “a return of knowledge.” That is to say, this return arises from within the thematic which is against the entire thematic that argues “it is not theory but life that matters, not knowledge but reality, not books but money.” Thereby, the return of knowledge created the process, called “an insurrection of subjugated knowledge.”¹⁵ The resistance of subjugated

¹⁴ Foucault, “Truth and Juridical Forms” in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984* vol. III, Power, p. 32.

¹⁵ See Foucault, “Two Lectures” in *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*, especially the first lecture, pp. 80-83. By subjugated knowledge Foucault means two things. First, it means the historical contents that have been buried and disguised in a functionalist coherence or formal systemisation even though at the same time they became the immediate emergence of historical contents. Therefore subjugated knowledges are those “blocks of historical

knowledges against the established regimes of knowledge has become a scene for power struggles. Repercussions of the struggles between newly emerged regimes of knowledge and the old ones reveal the inextricable togetherness of power and knowledge through which the alternative approaches to the traditional notion of power has become possible.]

Foucault has become the first thinker who has developed methodological and theoretical tools to analyze power relations in such a broad sense.¹⁶ What generates the general line of his study is the tension between the dualities of “domination and subjugation” and of “sovereignty and obedience.”¹⁷ That is to say, Foucault avoids formulating the question of power in terms of central and univocal sovereignty and the obedience of individual subjects to the authority. Rather he formulates the problem of power in terms of non-centralized and multiple forms of domination and subjugating

knowledge.” Second, the subjugated knowledges generate a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to do their task or insufficiently elaborated: “naïve knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity.” In sum, the power effects of the central and dominant knowledge forms which have paved the way for the totalizing theories have been exercised by subjugating the knowledges which are named as local, insufficient, unnecessary, naïve, and so on. For Foucault, on the contrary, what should be given importance in writing a history is these subjugated knowledges since they provide us with a “historical knowledge of struggles.” At the same time, this is what Foucault calls writing “the history of silence.” He states that “[t]he silence, or rather the prudence, with which the unitary theories avoid the genealogy of knowledges might therefore be a good reason to pursue it.” See, *ibid*, p. 87.

¹⁶ However, this does not mean that the methodological and the theoretical background that Foucault used were brand-new. On the contrary, Foucault has made good use of philosophical heritage of particularly Nietzsche, Bataille, and Blanchot. For Foucault’s assessment on the philosophical roots of his own work, see the interviews in *Remarks on Marx*, especially: “How an Experience-Book Is Born,” pp. 25-42.

¹⁷ See Foucault, “Two Lectures” in *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*, p. 96. Here, Foucault points out the difference between domination and sovereignty as follows: “in speaking of domination I do not have in mind that solid and global kind of domination that one person exercises over others, or one group over another, but the manifold forms of domination that can be exercised within society. Not the domination of the King in his central position, therefore, but that of his subjects in their mutual relations: not the uniform edifice of sovereignty, but the multiple forms of subjugation that have a place and function within the social organism.”

effects of these dominations.¹⁸ At this point the relation of power to domination is revealed in twofold:

Domination is, in fact, a general structure of power whose ramifications and consequences can sometimes be found reaching down into the fine fabric of society. But, at the same time, it is a strategic situation, more or less taken for granted and consolidated, within a long-term confrontation between adversaries. It can certainly happen that the fact of domination may only be the transcription of a mechanism of power resulting from confrontation and its consequences (a political structure stemming from invasion); it may also be that a relationship of struggle between two adversaries is the result of power relations with the conflicts and cleavages they engender. But what makes the domination of a group, a caste, or a class, together with the resistance and revolts that domination comes up against, a central phenomenon in the history of societies is that they manifest in a massive and global form, at the level of the whole social body, the locking-together of power relations with relations of strategy and the results proceeding from their interaction.¹⁹

Thus, power relations are analyzed within the domain in which power is connected to a kind of relation consisting of a level of domination, specific strategies, revolts and resistances in its mutual interaction. Such a new formulation of the notion of power renders it possible to ask “how of power” rather than asking “what is power?”, “where does it locate?” and “where does it concentrate?”²⁰ However, here emerges the

¹⁸ Here it is apt to indicate the difference between the subjugation and the obedience with reference to the subject who obeys or is subjugated. The obedience necessitates the execution of the commands coming from the given authorities —most of the time the authority emanates from the physical and coercive force— without questioning them. However, to be subjugated by any kind of domination, one needs to be convinced to the necessity of the ongoing domination by means of a kind of rationalization. Therefore, it can be said that the former necessitates passive, dependent and incapable subjects as its objects while the latter requires active and free subjects who are capable of reasoning as its objects. Even if the objectives of these two are the same, the former is exercised in a univocal form while the latter is inherited in a mutual relation.

¹⁹ Foucault, “The Subject and Power” in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 vol. III, Power*, pp. 347-348.

²⁰ At this point, Foucault believes in the necessity to clarify what he means by “how of power,” then it follows: ““How?” not in the sense of “How does it manifest itself?” but “How is it exercised?” and “What happens when individuals exert (as we say) power over others?”” See

following —also one of the main questions of the present thesis— question: Without explicating the questions of “what?”, “where?” and “why?” is it possible to ask and answer the question, “how?” on a meaningful basis? Foucault’s answer to such questions is the following:

If, for the time being, I grant a certain privileged position to the question of “how,” it is not because I would wish to eliminate the questions of “what” and “why.” Rather, it is that I wish to present these questions in a different way —better still, to know if it is legitimate to imagine a power that unites in itself a what, a why, and a how... The flat and empirical question, “What happens?” is not designed to introduce by stealth a metaphysics or an ontology of power but, rather, to undertake a critical investigation of the thematics of power.²¹

Accordingly, it is my contention that Foucault in his inquiries on power attempts to explore two interrelated questions: (1) How should we analyze power? (2) How is power exercised within social relations? As I said at the very beginning of this chapter, how we problematize a phenomenon coincides with how we approach to the same phenomenon. In this regard, what differentiates Foucault’s analysis from traditional ways of thinking about power which are based on legal models and institutional models is his problematization of the notion of power. According to Foucault, power is exercised within a network of social relations, that is to say, power is inherited in relation, or better, it is a kind of relation like other relations, e.g. relations of production, relations of signification. The subject in a power relation acts with an intention to produce ‘power

Foucault, “The Subject and Power” in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 vol. III, Power*, p. 337.

²¹ Foucault, “The Subject and Power” in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 vol. III, Power*, p. 336. Nevertheless, it should be indicated that in Foucault’s work, one could hardly find an elaboration concerning the questions of “what?” and “why?” I will discuss this question latter in the third chapter where I attempt to articulate Foucault’s “how?” questions in Marx’s “why” and “what” questions and the responses to develop an account for the exploitation of labour.

effects' which can be defined as the effects of "a mode of action upon the actions of others [or of oneself]."22

This brief definition of Foucauldian conceptualization of power indicates that both adversaries of power relation must be capable of acting and reasoning. In Foucault's words, power can be exercised "only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free."²³ In power relation, there must be a field of possible action for both adversaries to perform their possible resistance without which a power relation cannot be considered. What make it possible for us to think about power relations as struggles are on the one hand, their domination-containing nature, on the other hand this indispensable tendency for recalcitrance. Foucault defines three types of struggles in the history of power relations: against forms of domination (ethnic, social, and religious); against forms of exploitation; against forms of subjectivity and submission —subjection.²⁴ The exercise of power overlaps with the act of government in the broadest sense of the term —that is, the government of the population, the government of others, and the government of the self. In order to govern, one needs to have, at the least, the subject/s to be governed, a mode of power to determine the general line of actions over the actions of these subjects, specific

²² Foucault, "The Subject and Power" in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 vol. III, Power*, p. 341.

²³ Foucault, "The Subject and Power" in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 vol. III, Power*, p. 342. It follows that "[b]y this we mean individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field of possibilities in which several kinds of conduct, several ways of reacting and modes of behaviour are available. Where the determining factors are exhaustive, there is no relationship of power: slavery is not a power relationship when a man is in chains, only when he has some possible mobility, even a chance of escape."

²⁴ Foucault, "The Subject and Power" in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 vol. III, Power*, p. 331. The struggle against exploitation within this tripartite understanding of struggles against types of power engendered the point of departure for this thesis. Even though Foucault mentions exploitation here as a period in the history of power struggles, he has never closely analyzed this aspect of power relations. We will see the possible contributions of Foucauldian approach to the issue of exploitation in the next part of this chapter.

technologies to govern, a level of rationalization both for himself to be able to govern and for the subjects to be governed.

For Foucault, “[t]o live in a society is, in any event, to live in such a way that some can act on the actions of others. A society without power relations can only be an abstraction.”²⁵ Therefore, we can understand the socio-political structure of any society only insofar as we analyze the history of power/knowledge relations. At this point, the main question to be asked in social and political thought shifts from the question, “what are the components defining power/knowledge relations?” to the question, “how should we analyze power/knowledge relations and the history of those relations?” with Foucault.²⁶ Furthermore, the question to be asked within this new point of view is “how do we exercise power/knowledge relations?” With the discovery of the indispensable togetherness of omnipotent power relations and the regimes of knowledge, Foucault not only has emancipated himself from the gibberish language of scientific disciplines, but also he has made it apparent that the production of knowledge is not peculiar to the scientific disciplines, rather, the subjects of power relations are in a continuous knowledge production and re-production process.

²⁵ Foucault, “The Subject and Power” in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 vol. III, Power*, p. 343.

²⁶ Here, once again it should be indicated that Foucault in different times defines his work as “the archaeological history of knowledge” “the genealogies of power relations” and “the history of subjectivization.” However, those three different one-phrase-summaries of his work with his own words should not be understood as the incoherent evolution of his study. Rather, these different definitions should be read as the different ways of saying the same phenomenon since the knowledge regimes, power relations, and the forms in which human subjects are made subjects cannot be separated.

What they produce within these knowledge domains, in general, are the regimes of truth, problematizations, eventualizations, ethical attitudes, and the different forms of resistance, all of which can be called experiences. Thereby the question is no longer “who does produce knowledge?” but “how is a certain form of knowledge produced?”, “how does it transmit to others?”, “how does an individual subject experience these knowledge?” In conjunction, Foucault’s focus becomes the distinct forms that the governing activity of individual subjects takes and the strategies that are being used by individual subjects within the forms of governing. Power and knowledge are the phenomena produced by all individual subjects insofar as they are part of relations; and with their alternating effects power/knowledge relations shape the social formations.

Therefore, questioning ‘how they are produced’ and ‘which shapes they take in social relations’ gains importance to understand and to know who we are and where we position ourselves. Also to know the historical transformations of these forms of transmitting and receiving knowledge equips us with the knowledge of the struggles we are operating, and also to generate a premise in developing new modes of struggles. Foucault argues that in order to understand the present, we should explicate all these experiences which have been produced in history through discursive and non-discursive practices. Hence, to do archaeology and genealogy of the history of power/knowledge means at the same time to do the ‘archaeo-genealogical history’ of the *present*.

To reveal the complicated history of power/knowledge relations Foucault suggests archaeology as his methodology and genealogy as his tactic.²⁷ He claims that in

²⁷ Foucault, “Two Lectures” in *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*, p. 85. Here, he explicates that “[i]f we were to characterize it in two terms, then

the investigation of social and political phenomenon rather than an anthropological one an archaeological approach is to be path-breaking:

...history, in its traditional form, undertook to ‘memorize’ the *monuments* of the past, transform them into *documents*, and lend speech to those traces, which in themselves, are often not verbal, or which say in silence something other than what they actually say; in our time, history is that which transforms *documents* into *monuments*. In that area where, in the past, history deciphered the traces left by men, it now deploys a mass of elements that have to be grouped, made relevant, placed in relation to one another to form totalities. There was a time when archaeology, as a discipline devoted to silent monuments, inert traces, objects without context, and things left by the past, aspired to the condition of history, and attained meaning only through the restitution of a historical discourse; it might be said, to play on words a little, that in our time history aspires to the condition of archaeology, to the intrinsic description of the monument.²⁸

The evidences found through archaeological method —that are different forms of knowledge, problematizations, eventualizations, the definitions of objects and subjects of knowledge, the institutional and non-institutional techniques, and discursive and non-discursive practices— are deployed in their places in the genealogical tree by genealogical strategy. Genealogical approach assumes that rather than the unitary body of a theory and the hierarchical order of the knowledge, the history of power/knowledge relations consists of local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledges.

Having said that, genealogy is not oppose to the contents, the methods, or the concepts of a science, but it is oppose to the power effects of a discourse that is

‘archaeology’ would be the appropriate methodology of this analysis of local discursivities, and ‘genealogy’ would be the tactics whereby, on the basis of the descriptions of these local discursivities, the subjugated knowledges which were thus released would be brought into play.”

²⁸ Foucault, “Introduction” in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, A. M. Sheridan Smith (trans.) (London: Tavistock Publications, 1972), p. 7.

considered to be scientific.²⁹ Foucault, commencing with this general framework, delves into more specific domains of inquiry to do their archaeo-genealogies. “The birth of clinic,” “the history of insanity,” “the birth of prison” and “the history of sexuality” are examples of such domains. On the basis of these inquiries, Foucault argues that there emerges a dominant power form in certain periods in history. Those can be categorized in threefold: sovereignty, discipline, and governmentality. The focus is the disciplinary form of power in the birth of prison while in the history of sexuality it shifts to the governmentality. However, Foucault uses a metaphor of a triangle to explain these three forms of power. That is to say, these three forms of power have existed synchronously in a period while one of them has always been dominant among others.

II.II. The Harvest of Power-Relations-of-Production: Exploitation

*[W]hile the human subject is placed in relations of production and of signification; he is equally placed in power relations that are very complex.*³⁰

Power relations is a kind of relation like relations of production and the relations of signification, in all of which human subject acts, transforms himself, and changes the context he lives. There is no doubt living in a society means constantly being within these relations. There emerge the outcomes of these relations. In this part, I try to understand and redefine the reality of the capitalist exploitation of human labour with an account to the productive relations and power relations. Since, in my view, capitalist exploitation of human labour lies at the intersection of the relations of production and power relations.

²⁹ See Foucault, “Two Lectures” in *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*, especially pp. 83-87.

³⁰ Foucault, “The Subject and Power” in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 vol. III, Power*, p. 327.

Having said that, in the scope of this thesis, I highlight the relations of production and power relations at the risk of ignoring other kinds of relations which we establish as a necessity to live in a society. That is at the same time to say, living in capitalist societies requires considering the relations of production and power relations as priorities over other kinds of relations.

In the first chapter, I discussed the importance of exploitation in its functions as both the *conditio sine qua non* and the main mechanism of capitalist mode of production only by means of which it penetrates into people's lives. Following Marx, I defined exploitation as the extraction of surplus value. The first function of exploitation, thus, is to be the main constituent of capitalist system and thereby is to be the main point of resistance. However, this one-dimensional definition of exploitation has impasses for, at least, three reasons. First, the theoretical formulation of exploitation as the extraction of surplus value provides us with a broad understanding of the operation of capitalism. However, in practice the definition becomes, if not invisible, abstract. In other words, exploitation as the major enemy against which the labourer is expected to revolt is not considered as an enemy in practice. In the relations of production people are much more interested in mundane activities. It is my contention that most of the time the problems of workers in working time and place are characterized not in economic terms, but in terms of, authority, control, respect, attitude and behaviour, correction, supervision, competition, and so on, all of which are necessarily related to economic structure but not necessarily derive from economic interests of particular individuals. Thereby, the significance of the principal constituent of capitalist production in its contagion characteristic, which penetrates into mundane practices, should be highlighted as

continuously functioning power relation with its own power mechanisms besides its explanatory significance for capitalist societies.

Second, the definition of exploitation I provided in the first chapter takes social classes as its point of reference. Since exploitation both determines and derives from class position of people, the presumed resistance against exploitation, or rather, against the domination of capitalist class would generate the premise for class struggle. However, as we will see in the following parts, the technologies and rationalities of exploitation aim at the bodies and the ethics of individuals. Furthermore, the exercise of exploitation necessitates dividing and separating practices which have always stood in the way of realizing the idea of unity among all workers of the world. Thereby, it is my contention that we can discuss the unity among workers and class struggle between workers and capitalists only insofar as we manage to elucidate the power struggles between the worker and the capitalist, the worker and other workers, the worker and his product, the worker and himself. The methodological and conceptual tools Foucault suggests are the most appropriate instruments to understand the exercise of exploitation in such terms because in my view exploitation as the main mechanism of capitalist mode of production which goes through people's lives and makes itself internalized by those people signifies a kind of power relation with its own technologies and rationalities.

Third, the previous definition of exploitation assumes *a* common end: struggle against the extraction surplus value —the stolen earning of the capitalist. However, this common goal might not speak to the workers whose goal is to earn enough to live. Moreover, being a human subject brings forth manifold goals within the multiplicity of

social relations. Therefore, a simple mode of revolt from *a* centre against *a* definite enemy would seem to both adversaries, if not impossible, non-sense. For this reason, we should also draw attention to the environment, knowledge regimes, the subject forms and so on, that are established through different practices of capitalist exploitation in order to understand the multiple forms of struggles, their intentions, goals and adversaries. Here, it can be argued that the major problem standing in the way of struggles against capitalist exploitation is that aggrieved subjects cannot find any person or authority to address. I will explicate this aspect of new mode of production in the following parts.

Fourth difficulty, taking the previous definition as a point of departure might cause, is the danger of ignoring the infinitesimal effects of exploitative practices. To put the point with more nuance, at the time Marx wrote, the unbearable conditions of working class people—in the sense of exploitation—were as clear as noon-day. However, during the history of capitalist exploitation, the exploitative mechanisms have changed, or rather, become less and less noticeable. Henceforth, it is my contention that, the leniency of exploitative mechanisms, which have also gradually been expanded out of the working time and space, should be investigated in a more detailed sense by means of appropriate theoretical and methodological tools.

In the light of these criticisms of the one-dimensional definition of exploitation as the extraction of surplus-value, the aim of this section is to add new dimensions to the definition. In this context, not only should exploitation be considered as a kind of extraction mechanism of capitalists through which human subject is alienated, but it should also be taken into account as a kind of complex power mechanism which has its

own technologies and rationalities. This new definition necessitates a new schema to study capitalist exploitation of human labour that is what I would call ‘exploitation as a technique of power.’ In this context, the aim of the study concerning exploitation should be framed as follows:

try to study the metamorphosis of [exploitative] methods on the basis of a political technology of the body in which might be read a common history of power relations and object relations. Thus, by an analysis of [leniency of exploitation] as a technique of power, one might understand both how man, the soul, the normal and abnormal individual have come to duplicate [commodity] as objects of [capitalist production] and in what way a specific mode of subjection was able to give birth to man as an object of knowledge for a discourse with a ‘scientific’ status.³¹

With this expanded definition of exploitation, I propose, rather than taking exploitation as a general static statement, ascribing to exploitation multiple dynamic functions through which it re-produces varied human subjects, technologies and rationalities within the context of discursive and non-discursive practices is significant. If we take this definition as a point of departure in an inquiry, we can understand the very core of struggles, and in turn improve a framework for a kind of struggle that would lead the revolution of working class against labour exploitation in a Marxian sense. This new aspect emancipates us from our previous abstract theoretical pursuits; gives us a chance to include a part of our experience into the inquiry; and makes the inquiry itself part of our experiences.

With this definition at hand, we should develop a new perspective to study various forms and tactics of exploitative social functions. Following Foucault’s strategy

³¹ Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, p. 24.

in *Discipline and Punish* (1975), I outline the general rules that any inquiry concerning exploitation as such should obey:

1-) Do not concentrate the study of the [exploitative mechanisms] on their 'repressive' effects alone, on their [exploitation] aspects alone, but situate them in a whole series of their possible effects. As a consequence, regard [exploitation] as a *complex social function*.

2-) Analyze [exploitative methods] not simply as a consequences of [the capitalist management of economy] or as indicators of social structures, but as techniques possessing their own specificity in the more general field of other ways of exercising power. Regard [exploitation] as a *political tactic*.

3-) Instead of treating the history of [capitalist exploitation] and the history of the human sciences as two separate series, see whether there is not some common matrix or whether they do not both derive from a single process of 'epistemologico-[economic]' formation; in short, make the technology of power the very principle both of the humanization of the [system of exploitation] and of the knowledge of man.

4-) Try to discover whether this entry of the soul on to the scene of [the capitalist mode of production], and with it the insertion in [economic practice] of a whole corpus of 'scientific' knowledge, is not the effect of a transformation of the way in which the body itself is invested by power relations.³²

To elucidate the first rule, to take the mechanisms of exploitation in their possible effects would free us from the abstract perception of Marxian notion of alienation, commodity fetishism and reification and provide us with a broader standpoint to understand various range in the experiences of exploitation. The second rule opens the ways to examine exploitation within the political sphere rather than imprisoning it only in economic sphere. Regarding exploitative mechanisms as a political tactic would provide

³² Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, pp. 23-24. At the risk of playing with the words, I transform, in its order, 'the punitive mechanisms' into 'the exploitative mechanisms;' 'punishment' into 'exploitation;' 'punitive methods' into 'exploitative methods;' 'legislation' into 'the capitalist management of economy;' 'penal law' into 'capitalist exploitation;' 'epistemologico-juridical' into 'epistemologico-economic;' 'penal system' into 'the system of exploitation;' 'penal justice' into 'the capitalist mode of production;' 'legal practice' into 'economic practice.'

a more flexible transition between Marxian classification of substructure and superstructure—which is, in a great extent, called deterministic.

The third rule, with a precaution, would obtain a re-examination of Marx's critique of the discipline of political economy from a different perspective. There, however, should be a precaution in mind because here Foucault takes the technology of power as the principle of the knowledge of men. However, from a Marxian perspective the principle would rather be the mode of production. The tension deriving from an attempt to articulate Marx and Foucault in a new perspective to analyze exploitation will be discussed in the third chapter; however, for now, it should be highlighted that if exploitation in the scope of this thesis is considered as a power technique, this is because such a significance beside the relations of production is attributed to power relations. The fourth rule that should be under consideration during the examination of exploitation indicates the re-centralization of economic relations within the period in which the capitalist mode of production has been dominant. With the rise of the capitalist mode of production, economic relations have shifted from the household to the sphere of free market which has been envisaged as a bridge between public and private spheres—however, as an approve of the idea that the history consists of the unintended consequences of human action, the market sphere has extended more and more in advanced capitalist countries. It is my contention that the expansion of market sphere goes hand in hand with the political investment of body through new technologies of power. In sum, with the fourth rule, the interrelation between capitalist exploitation, the invention of the political technologies of the body and 'scientific' discourse of the discipline of political economy are kept in mind.

In order to obey these rules in an inquiry of the mechanisms of capitalist exploitation, the field of inquiry should be determined carefully in the sense of both the sample and the periodization to point out the specific techniques, rationales and the modes of resistance. In the present theoretical attempt to open the ways for a new prospect in analyzing exploitation, I take advanced capitalist societies as general sample of inquiry and the post-Fordist historical period of capitalism in which we live, as particular. In this regard, flexible mode of production and its requirements will be an issue in the following illustrations. At this point, it should be indicated again that in the scope of this thesis my main concern is the exploitation of human labour even if today the term exploitation is, in a great extent, perceived as the exploitation of, women, children, senses, and so on. The importance of the capitalist exploitation of human labour derives from the priority of capitalist mode of production in the structuration of advanced capitalist societies, and henceforth exploitation gains significance as both the *conditio sine qua non* and the main technique of the capitalist mode of production. In other words, the mechanisms of exploitation have significant place within the structure of capitalist societies in establishing the specific mode of interaction between, substructure and superstructure, working class and capitalist class, ideology and the reality, public sphere and private sphere, the subject and others. The significance of Foucault's work in analyzing exploitative mechanisms, at this point, emerges in my adoption of exploitation as a power technique. Since the "exercise of power is a "conduct of conducts" and a management of possibilities,"³³ the mechanisms of exploitation are exercised over the

³³ Foucault, "The Subject and Power" in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 vol. III, Power*, p. 341.

various forms of conducts of individuals including self to self, self to others and self to the material world.

As I indicated in the previous part, what constitutes the exercise of power/knowledge relations can be summed up under six headings: truths, objects of knowledge, institutional mechanisms, particular subject forms, modes of rationalities, and specific technologies which are inherited in a specific power/knowledge domain which should be investigated by means of archaeological method and genealogical strategy. In the case of a study which explores the exercise of exploitative mechanisms, I shall identify these components in Marxian terms, that is to say, the dominant regime of knowledge in this period will be specified as capitalist political economy. In parallel to this statement, first, it is my contention that, the main truth claim around which other truth claims take their place within discursive and non-discursive practices is that “everybody gets the equivalence of their labour.” Second, it seemed to me that legal individual freedom and equality, free market economy, representative liberal-democracy, and universally defined human rights generate the objects of knowledge in the exercise of capitalist exploitation.³⁴

Third, Foucault states that panopticism characterizes the principal type of power in our societies.³⁵ For him, panopticism is programmed more as a society than as a kind

³⁴ I will explore social and political implications of the capitalist mode of production in general and today's flexible mode of production in particular in the third chapter. For now, I just try to re-read the mechanism that is established through capitalist mode of production from a Foucauldian viewpoint.

³⁵ Commence with Jeremy Bentham's prison model called Panopticon —which is a broad circle in which takes place a tower and hence prisoners are being seen without seeing the guardians— Foucault argues that “[p]anopticism is one of the characteristic traits of our society. It is a type of power that is applied to individuals in the form of continuous individual supervision, in the form

of prison. This panopticism exists at the simplest level, furthest away from the centre of decision-making, in mundane operations of institutions.³⁶ In other words, institutions as the agencies of social supervision, control, and correction are designed in a panoptistic character through which power mechanism of exploitation penetrates into social practices. Fourth, for Foucault, we can evince the history of struggles only insofar as we are able to demonstrate the historical construction of the subject forms that is not definitely given and that constitutes itself within history and is constantly established and re-established by history.³⁷ The subject form we are concerned with in the case of exploitative mechanisms is defined by the discipline of political economy. Accordingly we are, in this thesis, dealing with a *productive* subject that is objectivized on the basis of his productivity by the discipline of political economy. At this point, it should be indicated that even if his theory is based on the critique of classical political economy, Marx cannot go beyond one of the main assumptions of this discipline taking ‘productive subject’ as definitely given subject form. With re-centralization of economy in the capitalist age, the productive subject has gained priority over other forms of subjections. People have become subjects through their productivity and they have been subjected to this productivity and its products —that are commodities.³⁸

of control, punishment, and compensation, and in the form of correction, that is, the molding and transformation of individuals in terms of certain norms. This threefold aspect of panopticism — supervision, control, correction— seems to be a fundamental and characteristic dimension of the power relations that exist in our society.” Foucault, “Truth and Juridical Forms” in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 vol. III, Power*, p. 70.

³⁶ “Truth and Juridical Forms” in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 vol. III, Power*, pp. 70-73.

³⁷ “Truth and Juridical Forms” in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 vol. III, Power*, p. 3.

³⁸ It is because there are two meanings of the term “subject” Foucault defines: “subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-

In sum, it is my contention that functionalizing Foucault's work to re-define and re-search exploitation as a power mechanism contributes to the Marxian theory of political economy in at least four respects. First, Marx's definition of exploitation and differentiation of classes are abstractions in the sense that people are not grouped in accordance to their classes in practice and their exploitation does not seem, in practice, as the robbery of capitalists, rather it seems legal and just action of the capitalists. In other words, we cannot concretely signify a group of people as working class and a kind of action as exploitation; rather, we can only make our statements in the face of such situations *via* using the abstract conceptualizations of class structure and exploitation. Therefore, considering exploitation as a power mechanism which is exercised through concrete social practices renders it possible to make exploitation visible within social interactions. Second, articulating Foucauldian point of view into Marxian theory of exploitation emancipates us from being surrounded by an either/or question: conceptualizing exploitation in terms of agency or structure. Taking Marx and Foucault in collaboration renders it possible to study exploitation in terms of both agency and structure since exploitation in its definition stemming from this conjunction conditions the modes of interaction between agency and structure. Third, the problematization of exploitation as a power mechanism makes it possible to examine different subject forms in which workers are constructed and construct themselves. Such a problematization brings forth different points of view through which new strategies and tactics will be functionalized in a struggle against the domination of exploitation. Fourth, Marxian

knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power that subjugates and makes subject to." Foucault, "The Subject and Power" in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 vol. III, Power*, p. 331. At this point, people are subjected to commodities they produced in different senses.

classification of classes on the basis of exploitation is demarcated within the relations of production, and thus class implies a relational notion. However, within the tripartite nexus of social relations —self to the material world, self to others, self to self— its theoretical function is less capable to explain the other two dimensions of these relations than the relation of the self to the material world. Therefore, it is my contention that in order to understand all three nexus of social relations we should apply Foucauldian understanding of social relations with reference to power/knowledge relations along with the Marxian one. All in all, regarding capitalist exploitation as the key figure of an analysis of social relations is the essential claim of the present thesis. To do so, I ascribed a twofold meaning to capitalist exploitation: it is the main element in establishing socio-political structure and the instrumental social function for providing constant reconstruction of the existing structure.

II.III. On the Invention of the Micro-Physics of Power

*Each for himself is still the rule;
We learn it when we go to school—
The devil take the hindmost, O!*

A. H. Clough, *Poem* (1849)³⁹

In his inquiry on the forms of power, Foucault mentions three forms of power, namely, sovereignty, discipline, and governmentality. However, rather than ascribing one of the three forms of power to a historical period, he argues that all of the three can be seen in the history of power relations even though one of the three is dominant in a certain historical period. Besides, in an analysis on the power form of our societies,

³⁹ Cited from John Fowles, *The French Lieutenant's Woman* (London: Signet, 1970), p. 327.

Foucault begins with a comparison of Greek political thought with a pastoral theme developed by Hebrews. He concentrates on the effects of power relations inherent in the city-citizen and shepherd-flock game in the Christian thought which formed contemporary relations of power directly or indirectly.

Briefly, this comparison can be summarized under four headings. Firstly, the Ancient Greek Gods are the owners of the land while in pastoral relations the God is admittedly the one who presents or promises his flock the land. Secondly, the Greek lawgiver can leave a strong city with laws enabling it to endure without him while the shepherd's direct protection and action are needed for a flock to exist. Thirdly, while Greek Gods are asked to provide help such as fruitful land and abundant crops only when danger permeates, the constant mission of the shepherd is to feed and save each member of his flock. Fourthly, the Greek leader works for 'goodness' of citizens while the shepherd tends to devote himself for the sake of the flock. For these reasons, the shepherd keeps watching the flock even when they are asleep. This brings the phenomena of watching and knowing the needs of each member, which indicates that the power of the shepherd includes watching and guarding both each member and the whole flock.⁴⁰

Foucault investigates how these two modes of exercising power formed the Christian thought both in medieval and modern ages. At this point, it will not be wrong to say that in modern times political power integrates a transformed Greek political thought to a transformed pastoral power. Hence, the force and the complexity of moral ties binding the shepherd to each member of the flock concern not only modern individuals'

⁴⁰ See Foucault, "Omnes et Singulatim: Towards a Criticism of 'Political Reason'" in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 vol. III, Power*, pp. 228-230.

survival but also their actions. Christianity develops techniques to know each of the members as well as the whole. Guidance, self-examination, confession, and obedience provide both a total control and the knowledge of each member. At the same time, this equips each individual with the ways to work on their own mortification in this world. Moving from this historical understanding of the transformation of power relations, Foucault arrives at the conclusion that '[p]olitical rationality first took its stand on the idea of pastoral power, than on that of reason of state. Its inevitable effects are both *individualization and totalisation*.'⁴¹

The transformation of the main rationalities of power relations, therefore, reflects into the exercise of power in the form of sovereignty, discipline and governmentality. This famous triangle can be re-framed as follows: the main program which will form the totality (i.e. population) is operated through law in the form of sovereignty; the creation of *homo docilus* (each individual of the population in the form of docile bodies, i.e. individualization) is obtained through the exercise of special disciplinary mechanisms in the form of discipline; the rationalization of the existing conditions of the subjects is realized through the discursive mentalities in the form of governmentality.

Furthermore, if we expand the argument, it will not be wrong to say that what generates the intersection of power forms —that are sovereignty, discipline and governmentality— is the invention of the power on body, namely, the political technology of the body. The power on body is exercised as a strategy; it is a micro-physics of power which is always performed in a network of relations in tension. In this

⁴¹ See Foucault, "Omnes et Singulatim: Towards a Criticism of 'Political Reason'" in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 vol. III, Power*, p. 254 (emphasis is mine).

form of power, the domination effects are included in and directed to dispositions, manoeuvres, tactics, techniques, functionings. Since the exercise of power at the level of individuals, bodies, gestures and behaviours is in not univocal but in multiple form, the effects of power go right down into the depths of society. Hence, investigating the tactics of power on body requires great attention to detail. Foucault defines the body politics as an effort to adjust the mechanisms of power that frame the everyday lives of individuals, an adaptation of the machinery that assumes responsibility for surveillance and places their everyday behaviour, identity, activity, apparently unimportant gestures under surveillance in order to govern the multiplicity of bodies and forces that constitutes the population. At this point, Foucault explores the historical differentiation of the body from the soul by not separating the soul from the body. For him, analyzing the micro-physics of power would also present us the genealogical history of the soul since he describes the soul as follows:

Rather than seeing this soul as the reactivated remnants of an ideology, one would see it as the present correlative of a certain technology of power over the body. It would be wrong to say that the soul is an illusion, or an ideological effect. On the contrary, it exists, it has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power... This real non-corporal soul is not a substance; it is the element in which are articulated the effects of a certain type of power and the reference of a certain type of knowledge, the machinery by which the power relations give rise to a possible corpus of knowledge, and knowledge extends and reinforces the effects of this power. On this reality reference, various concepts have been constructed and domains of analysis carved out: psyche, subjectivity, personality, consciousness, etc.; on it have been built scientific techniques and discourses, and the moral claims of humanism. But let there be no misunderstanding: it is not that a real man, the object of knowledge, philosophical reflection or technical intervention, has been substituted for the soul, the illusion of the theologians. The man described for us, whom we are invited to free, is already in himself the effect of a subjection much more profound than himself. A 'soul' inhabits him and brings him to existence, which is itself

a factor in the mastery that power exercises over the body. The soul is the effect and instrument of a political anatomy; the soul is the prison of the body.⁴²

Therefore, for the current analysis searching for the possible power effects of exploitation, I will take two headings —the technologies of exploitation and the rationalities of exploitation— as my point of departure for more efficient inquiry. Accordingly, in the following section, I will elaborate the technologies of exploitative power and the rationalities inherited in the discourses of exploitative mechanisms with an account to inseparable relation between the body and the soul.

II.IV. Flexible Accumulation

Before I start to identify the power effects of exploitation within the abovementioned framework, I will explain the term —the post-Fordist period of capitalism— which I will use in the illustrations of the following theoretical work. Dividing the time into periods in such an analysis is functional for the analyst to be able to clarify the historical facts. However, at the same time, the conceptual tools along with the theoretical and methodological schemas that are used to mark out the borders in a given historical periodization are originated in the analyst's viewpoint. In other words, tracing the background conceptualization behind these tools it can be seen the explanatory capacity of a theory.⁴³ Today, there are various forms that divide the history

⁴² Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, pp. 29-30.

⁴³ Such an understanding of theory does not necessarily indicate a totalizing theoretical framework. Nevertheless, in order to avoid glorified post-modern relativism and fragmentation it is more acceptable to locate the theory as a tool to understand the world in which we live. In this context, whatever we try to understand and/or explain by means of a theoretical framework, partially —e.g. work, communication, security— or in a more holistic way —e.g. relations in society, world system, environmental issues, and so on— we need to have consistency. Only insofar as we have the consistency within a theoretical framework, we can manage to avoid from

of capitalist production age into periods under different names, e.g. post-Fordist period, post-modern age, information age, mass consumption society, post-Cold War area, neo-liberal period, late capitalism, disorganized capitalism, globalization process, and the age in which the voices of ‘the end of the history’ or ‘the end of the ideologies’ are glorified.

It is my contention that we should read the history of capitalism with an account to different contextual periods in order to make, at least, two things clear. First, periodization of the history of the capitalist mode of production renders it possible to trace the process in which ‘constant revolutionizing of the instruments of production’⁴⁴ which is necessary for the maintenance of capitalism is realized. Second, if we can follow the changes in the production process—not in the sense of the changes in the logic of capitalism but in the sense of the changes in the organization of work, in the means of production, in the discourses of both capitalists and workers, in the control mechanisms, and so on—we will also have the tools to understand the process which maintains capitalism. In other words, by dividing the history of capitalism into periods it is easier to observe the mechanisms of capitalism in more detailed sense.

Even though it is not possible to specify a certain breaking point for the changing face of capitalism, we can depict the historical facts which affected economic structure in advanced capitalist countries together with their socio-political formations. Crisis in the 1970s and following technological improvements—especially the invention of computer

the universalizing effects of a theory—that stems from its tendency to melt all differences in one pot—and to avoid from possible extreme particularity in a theory—coming from its extreme relativity that mostly hinders for us to develop a general understanding about the issues and possible self-critiques of the theory.

⁴⁴ K. Marx and F. Engels, *Manifesto of Communist Party* in *Karl Marx: Selected Writings*, D. McLellan (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 224.

technology, namely the invention of the chip by Ted Hoff— have had direct effects on the relations of production. It is not surprising to see that these changes occurred at a time when capitalism fell into crisis. At this point, remembering Marx would be helpful. For him, capitalist system tends to fall into crisis, and hence bourgeois class has to revolutionize the means of production constantly.⁴⁵ Following Marx's formulation, the requirements that have to be satisfied to maintain the capitalist system can be specified. First of all, the tendency of capital is to grow and to expand as much as possible; therefore the borders of nation-states have to be transcended, which implies today's glorified voice, namely, globalization. Second, capitalism requires a constant increase in the exploitation of labour; and this can be related to contemporary flexible mode of production, which is described as 'new,' and which necessitates changing amounts of exploitation rather than a fixed rate of exploitation. And finally, capitalism demands technological and organizational dynamism, which can be related to today's the most glorified term among Marxists, the 'post-Fordism.'

In order to determine what is new in the flexible post-Fordist period, I shall briefly explain the general characteristics of the Fordist accumulation, the collapse of which has shaped the new model in production process. The reason why we term the period approximately between 1945 and 1973 as the Fordist mode of production is the specific production model, namely, the serial production, that Henry Ford practiced in his factory, established in 1914 in Michigan. However, the elements that define the Fordist production model were more than only the atomic specialization within the production process; it also brought a new vision into the capitalist production. Accordingly, Henry

⁴⁵ Marx and Engels, *Manifesto of Communist Party* in *Karl Marx: Selected Writings*, p. 224.

Ford in his individual factory was able to see the other vital requirements of mass production such as mass consumption, a new system in the reproduction of labour force, new policies in government and control of labour process, new aesthetics and psychology unlike F. W. Taylor's rational division of labour principle which was based on nothing but merely specialization. With this new control and discipline in the workplace, the working time was decreased while the wages were increased. However, the new system had to be capable of controlling and governing workers' extra time and money in order to create the conditions for rational consumption of time and money serving the interests of capitalist accumulation. In this regard, what Ford did to equip his workers with a definite morality, an acceptable family life and a rational consumption pattern was to bring an army of social experts in their houses. This strategy was experienced in a greater extend by the apparatuses of state within the Fordist period —what is called welfare state.⁴⁶ Mass production and mass consumption which the Fordist model brought forth to overcome the crisis capitalism fell into in the 1930s created the mass of people. Our thanks to the inventions in mass communication (television, radio, speed publication, phone, etc.) mass media and massive applications of the state should be presented for this outcome.

In the mid 1960s the required growth reached its satisfaction in advanced capitalist countries; and it was time to export this new system and newly emerged sectors to the developing countries through creating new markets in those places. It should be

⁴⁶ Therefore, as David Harvey says it is appropriate to call this term, Fordist-Keynesian period since such a model for production cannot survive without the subventions of the state. See David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), p. 146.

noted here that as a dialectical result of creating the mass of labour force, massive workers' movements and newly emerged social movements in the period 1968-1970 challenged to the system.⁴⁷ Following the energy crisis, namely, oil crisis of the 1970s, the crisis inherited in the Fordist accumulation re-emerged. The technological inventions, especially the improving computer technology, made the energy crisis seem to be solved. In addition, the new organization techniques were invented by new scientific experts to overcome the inherited problems of the Fordist period. The emphasis on being individual subjects through the discourses spreading out by means of mass media and the state policies helped to create the required type of individual who consciously or unconsciously acts in accordance to neo-liberal policies.

By means of transportation and communication which became much easier and cheaper, the tendency of capitalism to expand and become a world system is almost completed. This enormous expansion—which includes even the most retired corners of the world—is in line with the tendency of capital to break the connections with the binding heaviness of meta-production, and to direct its potential to monetary capital.⁴⁸ The complicated and metagnostic circulation of money around the world has become determinant. Besides the increasing amount of finance capital and its escalating

⁴⁷ At this point, it is apt to indicate that even though the ideals of French Revolution, namely, in its order, liberty which had been gained right after the revolution with the freedom of contract, equality which had been gained in a great extend after the worker's movement of 1948, and fraternity, have been completely issued including fraternity since the movements of 1968 indicates this aspect with its emphases on general issues such as environment, women rights, animal rights, the guardians of the socio-political formation shaped by the directives of Fordist accumulation were not familiar with these issues. Therefore it was not easy to handle with these movements without assuming a great transformation in the system, nor was it easy to handle with more familiar worker movements since they acted within the well organized trade-unions.

⁴⁸ For the details on the finance capital, see David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*, especially the section, called, "Transition from Fordism to Flexible Accumulation," pp. 164-196.

importance, we have also witnessed how this growth affected 'real' places. The most significant implication of transition to finance capital, at this point, can be seen as the emergence of floating time and space in production. This is evident in the example of big corporations which prefer to establish their factories in the places where labour-force is cheaper. We have also witnessed the easy-changes in the place, the time, and the form of, production, to put it differently, the irregularity *via* re-regularizing the organization of work. That is to say, the meta-production has been emancipated from the boundaries of time and space binding characteristic. The key concept indicating the characteristic of this period is flexibility. Another aspect of the post-Fordist accumulation is the emergence of new sectors. Statistics show that the manufacturing industry no longer grows while a significant increase can be observed in service sector, especially in personal supply services and computer and data processing services.

The changing form of employment has also implications on the socialization function of work. To elucidate, as it is indicated in the first chapter, the creation of wage labour and its appropriate control and government have vital importance for the capitalist mode of production. Nevertheless, the task of controlling and governing wage labour is a complicated issue since it goes hand in hand with a general organization of society by transcending the control and government merely in working time and space. That is to say, the integration of the worker into the changing face of capitalism requires the social control of cognitive and physical processes on a general level through specific technologies and rationalities which operates as a specific form of exploitation. In this context, two defining characteristics of exploitation —explored in this thesis as the *sine qua non* and the main mechanism of capitalism— should be kept in mind. Exploitation in

its formulation as the extraction of surplus value should be considered as ‘static;’ and it necessitates a revolution in the system to be eliminated. However, the second aspect of exploitation —exploitation as a social function— should be considered as ‘dynamic.’ Therefore, the transformations in the organization of work and in the socio-political formation have direct effects on the form of exploitation, or rather, on the power effects of exploitation. Within the flexible work organization of post-Fordist accumulation, the domination of exploitation directly targets individual worker’s body. In the following part, I shall provide the details of the technologies and rationalities of contemporary exploitation.

II.V. The Creation of Docile Working Bodies: On the Technologies and the Rationalities of Exploitation

The labour organizers, formed in the crucible of the Great Depression, once communists now socialists without a home, sit in a room arguing about what went wrong. They are friends of Richard Sennett; they are thirty years older than he; they argue with a passion that at the time —it is 1961— he cannot understand. They argue about why the workers in America have not become a revolutionary force.⁴⁹

The primary requirement of capitalist exploitation is to create wage labourers as mentioned in the first chapter. After the creation of wage labourers, an extensive project in which all aspects of social organization can be considered is necessary for the integration of human bodies into the capitalist exploitation. In my opinion, it is at this point where the vital role of power relations arises to the scene. The aim of this part, therefore, is “to locate the forms of [exploitative] power, the channels it takes, and the discourses it permeates in order to reach the most tenuous and individual modes of

⁴⁹ Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb, *The Hidden Injuries of Class* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), p. 3.

behaviour, the paths that give it access to the rare or scarcely perceivable forms of [satisfaction], how it penetrates and controls [daily life]—all this entailing effects that may be those of refusal, blockage, and invalidation, but also incitement and intensification: in short, the “polymorphous techniques of [exploitative] power.”⁵⁰ In other words, my concern is to prospect a new approach to analyze capitalist exploitation of labour with an account to Foucault’s strategy in *Discipline and Punish* (1975) and *The History of Sexuality* (1976) in order to ask the question: How and why do we say that we are not exploited?

The disciplinary form of power, Foucault asserts, became the general formula of domination exercised in newly constructed Western nation-states in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Hence, these societies are called ‘disciplinary societies.’⁵¹ The formation of disciplinary societies is connected to three interrelated processes: the economic process that can be identified with capitalism, the juridico-political process that can be characterized by the principles of Enlightenment thought, and the scientific process that can be understood as the formation and the accumulation of the new forms of knowledge. For Foucault, the intention in establishing disciplinary societies is to increase both the *docility* and the *utility* within all the constituents of a social formation. The realization of this intention becomes possible only insofar as the three criteria Foucault mentions are achieved in an ongoing and repetitive process of domination. First, the

⁵⁰ See Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction vol. I*, Robert Hurley (trans.) (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), p. 11.

⁵¹ See Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. There occurs a precaution that Foucault takes in his another article to indicate the togetherness of the modes of power that are sovereignty, discipline, and governmentality. Therefore, even if this ascription is useful to explain the disciplinary form of power in detail, it should be kept in mind that understanding power relations in a society in a specific period necessitates a much more complex study.

apparatuses in exercising disciplinary power should be established 'at the lowest possible cost.' Second, the effects of disciplinary power should be 'at the maximum intensity and extensivity' without a failure or an interval. And third, the link between the output of the apparatuses and the new disciplinary targets should be established in order to provide 'the continuous exercise of it.' In order to realize these principles perfectly a new machinery of power should be at work.

According to Foucault, a general mechanism to achieve such effects of disciplinary power is invented, that is, *Panopticon*. The Panopticon is a prison model developed by Jeremy Bentham in the nineteenth century. This architectural figure of disciplinary power can be described as follows:

at the periphery, an annular building; at the centre, a tower; this tower is pierced with wide windows that open onto the inner side of the ring; the peripheric building is divided into cells, each of which extends the whole width of the building; they have two windows, one on the inside, corresponding to the windows of the tower; the other, on the outside, allows the light to cross the cell from one end to the other. All that is needed, then, is to place a supervisor in a central tower and to shut up in each cell a madman, a patient, a condemned man, a worker or a schoolboy.⁵²

It said that the Panopticon dissociates the see/being seen dyad⁵³: in the cells one is totally seen without seeing; in the tower one sees everything without being seen. Neither is this machinery of disciplinary power a dream building nor only a model for more effective prison system. More importantly, in this architectural building what is invented is a mechanism of power in its ideal form that improves the exercise of power by making it lighter, more rapid, and more effective, so that with the invention of Panoptic model a

⁵² Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, p. 200.

⁵³ Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, p. 202.

historical transformation in exercising power is realized by the spread of disciplinary institutions throughout the whole social body.

There are the simple instruments of disciplinary power used in its functioning within this general panoptic machine —which has also multiple panoptic machines functioning by the same principles within each of its cells. Those are hierarchical observation, normalizing judgement, and the examination. First, hierarchical observation refers to surveillance through which both individualization and totalisation of the observed are made possible. Even if the pyramidal organization gives surveillance a ‘head,’ it is in fact a whole apparatus that produces power by distributing individuals. At this point, what differentiates disciplinary surveillance from the spectacle of sovereignty is its totalizing effect through individualizing, that is to say, its meticulous attention to detail. Moreover, in the hierarchy of surveillance “it is not the beautiful totality of the individual is amputated, repressed, altered by our social order, it is rather that the individual is carefully fabricated in it, according to a whole technique of forces and bodies.”⁵⁴ Second, there is always a small penal mechanism in power forms; and ‘normalizing judgement’ defines this punitive function of disciplinary power. This mechanism of punishing brings five distinct operations by means of which discipline (1) compares, (2) differentiates, (3) hierarchizes, (4) homogenizes, and (5) excludes individuals. In short, by the instrument of normalizing judgement individuals are disciplined through normalization. Furthermore, “the power of normalization imposes homogeneity; but it individualizes by making it possible to measure gaps, to determine levels, to fix specialities and to render the differences useful by fitting them one to

⁵⁴ *Ibid*, p. 217.

another.”⁵⁵ Third, the examination that combines hierarchical observation and normalizing judgement makes it possible for disciplinary power to qualify, to classify and to punish. In doing so, the examination subjectivizes those who are being seen by signifying them, differentiating them from each other, introducing individuality into the field of documentation, making each individual a ‘case’ which establishes both an object for a branch of knowledge and a hold for a branch of power.

At this point, more detailed technologies in the operation of disciplinary power should be mentioned. The panoptical machinery that hierarchies, normalizes, and examines individual bodies and souls in disciplinary societies functions by means of specific techniques, manoeuvres, exercises and tactics, that are, the art of distribution, the control of activity, the organization of geneses. With the distribution of individuals in space discipline draws up ‘tables’ to be worked on. In doing so, it enclosures, or rather, establishes cells; partitions elementary locations; determine functional sites; ranks the specific places to exercise discipline in the most efficient and effective way. The manoeuvres for the scrupulous control of individual activity are made such as preparing the timetables, the temporal elaboration of the act, the correlation of body and gesture, the body-object articulation and the exhaustive use of the body. These manoeuvres are made to reach a tactical end that serves to increase the docility and the utility of individual bodies through control. The organization of geneses that assumes exercises for individuals emerges by the operations such as dividing duration, organizing threads analytically, finalizing the process with an examination, and drawing up series of series. The tactics of disciplinary power, which turn individual body into an element, generate

⁵⁵ *Ibid*, p. 184.

chronological series and create a system of command, is named as the composition of forces. That is to say, neither are the forces placed in disciplinary societies centralized in one location nor they follow one specific way to exercise domination over other individuals; rather, there is a multiplicity of tactics in composing different forces and hence in exercising them.

From such plays of disciplinary power the individual of modern society is born. It is the individual of a docile body, that is, a manipulated, shaped, trained body which obeys, responds, becomes skilful and increases its forces. However, even if the Panopticon is defined as the machinery of discipline and the methods used in exercising disciplinary power are specified as tactics, manoeuvres, exercises and techniques, it is not to say that there is a creation or a multiplicity of creations, other than a human being, who govern/s the disciplining function of a society as such. On the contrary, individuals are regarded both as objects-subjects and as the instruments of disciplinary power. Since the goal in the formation of disciplinary societies is to create a society of the useful and docile bodies, discipline is exercised on the bodies; it manipulates body's elements, its gestures and its behaviour. It governs the growth of body's skills, at the intensification of its subjection, at the formation of a relation that makes it more obedient as it becomes more useful. So, the discipline dissociates power from the body. That is to say, by turning power into an 'aptitude,' a 'capacity' which is to be increased, discipline increases the forces of the body in terms of economic utility while it diminishes the body's forces in terms of political obedience by reversing the energy from which power of the body might arise and turning that energy into a relation of strict subjection. This separation of

individual's economic forces from his political forces through disciplinary practices will generate the main point of reference for the discussion in the third chapter.

The technologies of this new form of power through which the docility and the utility of individual bodies are benefited at the maximum level are assisted by the rationalities. That is to say, a discursive domain to formulate and justify the idealized model of power, i.e. the panoptic society, is created. In doing so, new morality and new epistemology start to function in both institutional and non-institutional mechanisms. According to Foucault, “‘practices’ do not exist without a certain regime of rationality;” and these regimes should be analyzed on a twofold basis: first, codification/prescription, that is, how a form of rationality forms an ensemble of rules, procedures, means, and so on; second, true or false formulation, that is, how a form of rationality determines a domain of objects about which it is possible to articulate true or false propositions.⁵⁶ Such a study is expected to give us the rules defining the ways of doing things and the justifications, reasons and principles used in doing things. Against a universally defined single rationality formulated in a single discourse, Foucault assumes a multiplicity of discourses that are called ‘individualization of discourses.’⁵⁷ This necessitates multiple degrees and modes of rationalization.

The formation of individualized discourses each of which is an autonomous unit of discourse derives from the existence of a set of rules regulating the formation of all

⁵⁶ See, Foucault, “Questions of Methods” in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 vol. III, Power*, p. 230.

⁵⁷ Foucault, “Politics and the Study of Discourse” in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. Miller (eds.) (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), p. 54.

their objects, the variety in their operations, their multitude concepts and their theoretical options. Their autonomous character paves a way for an individualized discourse to be defined and situated among other types of discourses within the set of relations. With the changing conditions of the existence of a discourse as an individualized discourse we witness the replacement of the totalizing history with the differentiated analyses; of the description of the episteme of a period as the sum of its knowledge or the general style of its research with the divergence, the distance, the oppositions, the differences, the relations of its various scientific discourses; of a universal history with the kinds of history; of a single determining threshold with the respective sitting of different sorts of thresholds. Thereby, an analysis of discourses in their specificity should take following three points under consideration. First, one should detect the changes that affect the objects, concepts and theoretical options of a discursive formation —such as deduction or implication, generalization, limitation, shift between complementary objectives, exclusion or inclusion, and so on. Second, the changes which affect the discursive formations themselves should be detected —such as the changes in boundaries which define the field of possible objects, the new position taken by the speaking subject, a new form of functioning of language, etc. And finally, third, the changes which simultaneously affect more than one discursive formation should be considered —such as the changes in the form of hierarchy, in the nature of directing principle, in functional displacements. In doing so, the derivations of a discursive formation, their mutations and the redistribution of the episteme itself can be understood. It follows that the rationalities

of a mode of power can be explicated only insofar as the conditions of the emergence of singular discourses within discursive or non-discursive practices.⁵⁸

In order to suggest an adaptation of Foucault's inquiry on power into the studies of capitalist exploitation as it is intended in the present chapter, I shall re-read the technologies of disciplinary power which is, in my opinion, the most valid form of power in the workplace and the rationalities of exploitative power which might help to respond the question: Why do we say that we are not exploited? It is my contention that Foucault's identification of current societies beginning from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as 'discipline societies' has reached its complete meaning with the completion of the structuration of disciplinary practices in the economic process. To elucidate, disciplinary practices exercised mainly on the individual body within the domain of economic production has been actualized since the age of flexible accumulation. Today, the changes in the technologies, but not in the formulation, of capitalist exploitation have reflected the characteristics of a disciplinary society in economic process, too. This change has, at least, three targets. First, as it is mentioned in the previous part, the intent was to overcome the crisis of capitalism. To do so, it was indispensable to revolutionize both the means of production and the organization of production as Marx states. Second, in relation to the utility maximization goal of disciplinary power, the technological innovations in the means of production intended maximum productivity at much lower cost. Therefore the organization and the techniques in production process have changed at the advantage of discipline and capitalism. Third target is related to the docility intend of disciplinary power. Until the flexible

⁵⁸ See, *ibid*, pp. 53-72.

accumulation the target of exploitative practices was the mass of workers. To adapt Foucault's words, in spite of the collapse of monarchies in political sphere we could not 'cut the head of the king' in the sphere of economic production.⁵⁹ Therefore, it was unavoidable for the capitalists and the government to confront with the massive worker movements against the massive operation of exploitation. A new exploitative power, the effect and the exercise of which is directly on individual body, had to generate the docility of workers without a failure or an interval within the practices of new mode of power which is intense but not centralized.

Therefore, with the flexible accumulation there have been changes in the ways the capitalists perform their techniques, manoeuvres, exercises and tactics, that is, technologies and rationalities in the relations of production. In other words, exploitation as a social function has changed in the modes of its operation. In doing so, keeping the aim of maximizing the docility and the utility in mind, technologies and rationalities of exploitative power are exercised on the body and the soul of individual workers. I do not search for the various kinds of technologies and rationalities of exploitation since the aim of this thesis is to prospect a new theoretical and methodological framework in studying

⁵⁹ In his critique of the current analysis of political power Foucault states that "[i]n political thought and analysis, we still have not *cut off the head of the king*. Hence the importance that the theory of power gives to the problem of right and violence, law and illegality, freedom and will, and especially the state and sovereignty (even if the later is questioned insofar as it is personified in a collective being and no longer a sovereign individual)... Characteristic yet transitory. For while many of its forms have persisted to the present, it has gradually been penetrated by quite new mechanism of power that are probably irreducible to the representation of law... the new methods of power whose operation is not ensured by right but by technique, not by law but by normalization, not by punishment but by control, methods that are employed on all levels and in forms that go beyond the state and its apparatus." See Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction vol. I*, p. 88-89 (emphasis is mine).

exploitation. Rather, I try to exemplify the operation of exploitation as a social function within the abovementioned framework in few cases.

The thing which defines the age in which we live is flexibility. That is to say, the domination in working time and place has become less apparent since the old ways of establishing hierarchy in the workplace has ended and a new age in hierarchy, control, supervision, correction, discipline and government has begun. The new technologies are remained much more intense but much less visible. Therefore the domination over productive forces should be analyzed in its infinitesimal mechanisms because only insofar as the mechanisms of domination are revealed the possible point of resistance against this domination can be realized.

To begin with, first thing that defines flexible age is the technological inventions which bring forth a huge growth in the means of production. The development in the means of production has made the need for skilled labour force less and less necessary in commodity production. Thereby personal facilities and abilities necessary for a specific kind of job have lost their importance. This has several consequences. First of all, workers have lost their point of reference for the field of action, or rather, field of resistance against the power of capitalists, which were the ability and the knowledge of worker on the job he is doing. The capitalist does not need a qualified worker with a specific knowledge any more, rather the job requirements have begun to be consisted of a generally accepted formations that can be owned by every individual if they have enough will and money to receive these formations. Related to this, each individual has become

both a potential worker and a factual unemployed.⁶⁰ It is not surprising therefore that in the age of flexible accumulation there is less desire to revolt against exploitation or inequality than the desire to be exploited since the unemployment rate has been increasing since 1980s. Therefore, the biggest obstacle for a possible worker's movement against exploitation has become the threat of losing one's job. Losing one's job as a threat in front of the revolt or resistance might seem as a bit exaggeration; this is however an explicit consequence of ongoing rationalization process in the formation of society.

Since people can socialize only insofar as they have a job —this is necessary for socialization both economically and instrumentally since it is a means of recognition— being unemployed has meant to be 'unsuccessful' and to be excluded from social life. 'Elites' of post-Fordist age —'elites,' people who have a job— has devalued unemployed people.⁶¹ Not only that. To be unemployed is defined as an individual problem that can be overcome only by the individual himself. The unemployed therefore has become wishful to get the necessary education and formation which are expected to equip them with a set of rules the new definition of work necessitates, such as self-discipline, self-control, the keys of success, body language, habits to be effective, and so on. This inclusion of the unemployed into the system through exclusion paves a way for exploitation to function in individual's lives even if they are not employed. Moreover, in a job application the most important element to be accepted has become less the abilities of people in doing their job well than their life style, their spare-time activities, hobbies and their worldview. Therefore, it is not surprising to read the requirements in a job

⁶⁰ See Andre Gorz, *Reclaiming Work: Beyond the Waged-Based Society*, Chris Turner (trans.) (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), p. 63.

⁶¹ See Gorz, *Reclaiming Work: Beyond the Waged-Based Society*, p. 69.

announcement that “we are looking for a person whose philosophy of life is to be good-looking.”⁶² This point demonstrates that in front of the capitalist the worker should promote her/his entire life. That is to say, the role of exploitation in non-working time and place has been functioning as a self-disciplining mechanism.

Success, in social relations, is related to being employed. For those who already have a job, it means to gain more money. It is no longer important to do one's job well, to have a good education, to have a high intellectual formation; what are important are money and consumption patterns through which people can exhibit their 'success.' Therefore it is not surprising to listen everywhere the success stories of a poor child who became the owner of a big company. It is my contention that the definition of 'success' determines the rota of the dividing practices in the post-Fordist societies. In other words, the discursive practices on the importance of personal success—that is always defined freely from the material conditions and that is ascribed entirely to the industriousness, rationality and the level of consciousness of individual—cause division among people on the basis of individual success by destructing the previous way in dividing people on the basis of the relations of production, that is, the workers and the capitalists. The fundamental power effect of taking 'success' rather than social classes as the fundamental basis for dividing practises is to hide the most visible consequence of exploitation that divides people in two, exploiting and exploited.

Third consequence of the technological improvement in the means of production is over-specialisation which comes hand in hand with easiness of the work. This aspect

⁶² This is the announcement of a well-known dressing shop in Turkey (translation is mine), published in a job announcements website. See www.yenibiris.com (10.07.2007).

can be unfolded in two respects. First, the more work gets easy, the more workers' ability ceases to question or think about the job which he does and the world in which he lives. To say it in its perfect expression, "cheap men need expensive jigs."⁶³ That is not to say the workers are cheap, rather it is true only insofar as we reverse the sentence. It is the expensive and improved machines which have brought the over-fragmentation in the work organization that have made workers obedient to the machines. In this context, the power relation between the worker and the capitalist turns into the relation of 'sovereignty and obedience' rather than a relation of 'domination and subjugation.' Because one obeys only insofar as one does not have sufficient knowledge about the obeyed. In the case of a worker doing a simple function of a complex work and not knowing the complete work it is true that the worker obeys both the capitalist and the job. Therefore the opportunity of establishing resistance or the possibility of changing the way he is doing the job by himself is, if not impossible, exceedingly difficult.

Second, within production capitalists have begun to enclose workers into the fragments and episodes by imprisoning them within a small function. The worker who drives his working activity to only a simple function for which he is responsible should also drive his whole life span merely to that function. This point demonstrates where the worker of the post-Fordist period distinguishes from the worker of the Fordist period. The latter had to work on a simple work in the serial line but the effect of over-specialization was not necessarily encompassing all of his life. It is true that the thing that shapes the conscious level of a worker of the Fordist period was shaped by this function but its

⁶³ S. Bunnell, cited by Sennett, *The Corrosion of Character: The Personal Consequences of Work in the New Capitalism* (New York: W. W. Norton&Company, 1998), p. 40.

effect in whole lifespan of the worker was not a direct effect. Therefore, in the contemporary world workers are enclosed within a simple production function as a whole. This can be perfectly seen in the example of marketing sector workers.

The marketing sector is promoted by the rise of flexible accumulation. In the post-Fordist production workers have to learn the marketing strategies for at least two vital reasons. In order to be ‘successful’ —in the sense of finding a job and keeping the job one already has— one first needs to learn how to promote himself; then he needs to learn how to promote the product of the company.⁶⁴ First, marketing strategies penetrate into the lives of every individuals working or not working in this field since marketing oneself is directly related to the question, whether he has taken a good care of himself or not. Therefore, from ethical disposition to the bodily and facial expressions and having a good family life, every single element becomes determinant to get a job. In other words, the power effects of exploitation as a social function can be traced within the verbal, facial, bodily and emotional expressions of individuals. The most remarkable signifier of this effect can be observed in the example of CVs and the presentation of these CVs in the job interviews.

Second, after entering in marketing sector a worker has to learn how to sell a product to a client. This is the activity of the worker by which he produces surplus-value for the capitalist. Since the flexible mode of production has demolished the notion that ‘everything has a special time and place,’ workers in marketing sector can promote the product at anytime in anywhere to anyone. The relations they enter have become far

⁶⁴ See Andre Gorz, *Reclaiming Work: Beyond the Waged-Based Society*, Chris Turner (trans.) (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), p. 100.

away from being intimate and honest. Workers start to see all their relations as the relation between a client and a seller. And also the 'success' of a worker in this sector is not only evaluated by the capitalist but also by the clients. Therefore it will not be wrong to claim the existence of a 'double check and control' mechanism. In fact, the pleasure of the clients is the most determinant element in the exploitation of all service sector workers.

Enclosing workers within the fragments and episodes has another consequence. This consequence provides a good example of the composition articulating the shepherd-flock game and the city-citizenship game in it. While identifying each worker with a simple function, the company also attributes a corporate identity to each worker by ignoring their self-identity.⁶⁵ Thereby while each individual worker is regarded as a unique person who has his own opinions, choices, and so on; they all have a totalizing corporate identity that paves a way for the capitalist to exercise his domination over all workers easily. In other words, new tactics totalize workers through individualizing. Workers are demanded to be subjects but only within the limits that is supplied by the capitalist. On the one hand the capitalist knows each of his worker's psychic and physical characteristics and act in accordance to them; on the other hand the corporate identities given to all workers provides the capitalist with an opportunity to practice a total domination over all workers.

In the new organization of work the most glorified method is team work. Team work increases the efficiency by creating a synergy from the labour force of each

⁶⁵ See *ibid*, pp. 59-64.

individual worker while assuming intensive and extensive domination over workers. The capitalist is regarded as the leader in teamwork; and the leader is acts on behalf of the team not of himself.⁶⁶ Therefore the workers can no longer perceive the capitalist as their exploiter. Also in the leader position the responsibilities of the capitalist for the work ceases to be too much and most of these responsibilities are transferred to the workers. The team work also by definition significantly motivates workers; and wages ceases to be the only motivation of workers to do their job. Moreover, the competitors of these workers become the other companies' workers besides the competition among the workers of a company. Pumping the competition between the workers causes the loss of the common ground on which all workers might come together. Teamwork devaluates the individual and makes him an element that can be substituted. The candidates of the team are changed continuously and each individual worker is expected to be adaptable to the changing partners.

Another remarkable characteristic of the flexible period is the increase in service sector. To say it in Marx's words: "The extraordinary productiveness of modern industry... allows of the unproductive employment of a larger and larger part of the working class, and the consequent reproduction, on a constantly extending scale, of the ancient domestic slaves under the name of a servant class..."⁶⁷ In service sector the categorical separation between the capitalist, the producer and the consumer is blurred. Workers in service sector are in direct interaction with the clients. The pleasance of the

⁶⁶ See Sennett, *The Corrosion of Character: The Personal Consequences of Work in the New Capitalism*, p. 120.

⁶⁷ Marx, Karl, *Capital vol. I*, Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling (trans.) Frederick Engels (ed.) (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965), p 426.

clients is the goal of the working activity. Therefore the client becomes a control mechanism in addition to the capitalist. Besides, the workers are subjected to the demands of the clients not only that of the capitalist. Service staff must be smiling, patient, good-looking —within the determined limits, for example, a waitress cannot look prettier than an important guest— and tolerant to the clients' out of list demands all the time.

Another problem in service sector is not to be able to see a concrete consequence of the labour-force at the end of a working-day. The product produced in this sector is being consumed immediately. Therefore, the labourer cannot observe his own product and feels like he is living in an intangible world. It will not be wrong to state that from my own experiences in waitressing the main motivation for service sector workers who are subjected to an intensive domination to do their job is to get such a service for themselves one day, if not only getting their pay check. Therefore it is not surprising to hear from a waiter who has just been screamed by his employer that 'the fact they do not know is that I was being served in my country but now I have to serve others because of my current-tentative situation.' His anger to his employer is not because he screamed for nothing to an innocent worker but because he screams to a man who used to be able to get such a service for himself. It is my contention that in their opinion there can rationally be drawn a line between those who are serving and those who are being served. Without such justification I claim, it is impossible to serve entirely foreign people with a smiling face and a cute voice-tone. In my two years experiences in a catering company the problem of the servants has never been defined by themselves in terms of servant's position within the social structure; it was either the 'snoopy' client or the 'stupid' cook

or the young stuff who does not like working, and so on. In this sector, then, the exploitation becomes invisible under the attractive lights of the reception saloon. Moreover, the workers in service sector are subjected to an entire domination over their bodies, emotions and thinking abilities. While their all bodily labour are benefited at its maximum level, they are demanded to look good, to smile all the time, not to be reactive to the demands of clients and so on. Therefore, it might be interesting to read the following dialog between a man and a prostitute in a movie:

M: Doesn't your work get you down?

W: It is okay. Beats the hell out of waitressing.

M: It is funny. Every hooker I meet says it beats the hell out of waitressing. Waitressing has got to be the worst job in the world. It is unbelievable.⁶⁸

In the non-working time and place the main motivation to live is necessarily to develop oneself to get a job or to keep the job one already has. Thus, it might be argued that the vital life functions of an individual are realized with an index to the requirements of the work discipline. That is at the same time to say, even if in the age of flexible accumulation the life time and place and the working time and place has been separated from each other as much as it has never been, the non-working time and place is invaded by the reason of the work organization, or rather, the life time and place has been colonized by the rationality of the working time and place as much as it has never been.⁶⁹ This paves the way for the docile working bodies not to think about a possibility of resistance against exploitation, not even in the life time and place. The discipline

⁶⁸ *Deconstructing Harry*, directed by Woody Allen, USA 1997.

⁶⁹ See Gorz, *Critique of Economic Reason*, Gillian Handyside and Chris Turner (trans.) (London: Verso, 1989), p. 36.

operated in the work place has been tried to be realized in the life time, too. In this way, people try to get the pleasure of their spare time at the maximum level. In the Fordist period there was an attempt of a worker to put the discipline and the other necessities of work away from the lifetime. However, today, discipline in the lifetime, even if in the cases it is not necessary for the job one has, is important to keep your job. For example, having a 'good' family is desirable for the employer since it guarantees that the worker will have a similar discipline in his private life. Besides, to be punctual, self-disciplined, diligent, responsible, and so on are important to keep one's job.

The examples of the technologies and the rationalities of exploitation can be multiplied; however, my attempt here is to search for the ways to study the issue in order to frame the practices concerning capitalist exploitation. It is my contention that we should concern less with the formulation of capitalist exploitation Marx provided, but questions and observe more the multiple strategies produced to exploit each worker at the maximum of his labour force. Therefore we should focus on the infinitesimal mechanisms of exploitative power functioning in the form of disciplinary power which totalizes through individualizing, normalizes by defining 'success', divides by creating the 'elite group of employed,' provides control of the whole as much as the each, supervises by using the strategies of panoptic machine, corrects through life experts. In doing so, we should start the inquiry not from the institutions but from the material practices. At this point, the role of the 'specific intellectual,' Foucault mentions, becomes significant.

II.VI. Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, beginning with the importance of problematization in search of possible solutions for an issue, I tried to define capitalist exploitation of human labour from a different angle. In doing so, I, first, attempted to give a general outline of Foucault's work in order to demonstrate how I read Foucault. In the second part, my concern was to add a new dimension to the definition of exploitation I have given in the first chapter as 'the extraction of surplus value.' With this aim in mind, I defined exploitation as a social function, in other words as a power mechanism which has its own regime of knowledge, subject forms, truth claims, institutional mechanisms, technologies and rationalities following the way Foucault takes in *Discipline and Punish* (1975) in defining punitive mechanism as a social function. In this context, I placed exploitative mechanisms at the intersection of the relations of production and power relations. Third, following Foucault I explored the invention of the power on body and relate his conceptualization of 'docile bodies' to the exploitative mechanisms. At this point, since my main point of departure for the illustrations of this theoretical work, or rather, for the case of the study is working conditions of 'flexible mode of production,' in the fourth part, I tried to explain the periodization of capitalist age along with the transformation from the Fordist production to the post-Fordist mode of production. Finally, fifth, I detailed the technologies and the rationalities of capitalist exploitation as a power mechanism. For the illustrations of the period dominated by the flexible accumulation model, in these last two parts, I mainly benefited from Richard Sennett, David Harvey, and Andre Gorz's works. However, this does not mean that I completely acknowledge these thinkers viewpoints, interpretations, or analysis. Rather, I tried to functionalize their

observations and arguments on flexibility for the definition of exploitation I drew as a social function.

Chapter III

Exploitation through Governing or Governing through Exploitation

“[I]n the great anxiety surrounding the way to govern and in the inquiries into modes of governing, one detects a perpetual question, which would be: ‘How not to be governed like that, by that, in the name of these principles, in view of such objectives and by the means of such methods, not like that, nor for that, not by them?’”¹

Asking an either/or question is dangerous for at least three reasons. First, it is essentially an exclusive question on the side of the one not preferred. To elucidate, exclusion necessitates the description of ‘the other’ which is one of the options presented in the question. That is to say, the person addressed is posed an essential question: CHOOSE who you are, from them or from us! Second, it essentially contains a threat which hides an undefined fear. The fear stems from the problem of misrecognition, which is hidden under a sharp distinction generated by an either/or question. Third, the question by nature causes polarization between two parties. This is problematic both because it defines only two parties on the issue and because it discourages a path-opening discussion around the issue. However, in the framework of the present thesis, my attempt to apply the conceptual schemes of Marx and Foucault that are, to a great extent, interpreted as mutually exclusive renders it indispensable to raise an either/or question that is formulated in terms of exploitation and government.

At this point, the question has several implications in studying exploitation. First of all, with this question in mind, my aim is to grasp the “contradictions” that may arise from different methodologies of the two thinkers. Posing an either/or question on the

¹ Foucault, “What is Critique” in J. Schmidt (ed.) *What is Enlightenment? Eighteenth Century Answers and Twentieth Century Questions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), p. 384.

methodologies of Marx and Foucault will render it possible to consider historical materialism *vis-à-vis* archaeological history. The collision of the two therefore will equip us with two distinct ways of reading history as well as their advantages and disadvantages. Second, it is my contention that the two diverse points of reference offered by Marx and Foucault can be articulated only insofar as we open up a discussion concerning this either/or question and try to overcome the difficulties we might encounter within the discussion. The reference points of these two thinkers can be sketched as ‘either economy or politics’ even if these concepts do not exclude each-other—quite the contrary, they necessarily includes each-other. However, the question here emanates from starting an analysis from economy or politics. Finally, thinking on an either/or question, in my opinion, might generate a new approach to analysis of the struggles in society. At this point, the form of struggles, the target they aim, the adversaries of them can be outlined in a framework in which revolution is located in comparison with resistance.

Under these considerations, my objective in this chapter is to search for alternative forms of opposition against exploitation. In this sense, the meanings attributed to capitalist exploitation in the previous two chapters will be functionalized. Furthermore the transformation capitalist exploitation passes through and the diversified forms it takes will be referred. The chapter is composed of three parts. In the first part, I try to compare methodologies of Marx and Foucault in order to discuss possible difficulties stemming from applying the two thinkers in an inquiry of exploitation. The aim of this part is to consider the juxtaposition of two distinct readings of history in the light of this discussion. In the second part, I present an overview of exploitation and government in relation to each other. In doing so, my aim is to search for a possibility to position these

two in conjunction within a theoretical framework. Finally, in the third part, I re-examine the possibilities of a revolution or multiple resistances against capitalist exploitation. To do so, I also delve into the reasons that has prevented an effective worker's movement for years. In this last part, I further aim to develop a new conceptualization and practice of political action in relation to the moral subject Foucault defines. All in all, the chapter generates both an overall discussion of the issues that has been raised in the previous two chapters and a platform where the thoughts of Marx and Foucault collide with one another.

III.I. Betwixt the Materialist Reading of History and the Archaeological History of Knowledge: In Search of Experiencing Life in Theory

*He had a thick book and he kept it in his pocket
 He read it everyday and I could not understand a word
 I used to watch its cover and did not bother to hear
 The man had a moustache; who was he?; what a soft look he had
 One day I asked Suphi
 "How come I do not understand what he says?"
 He said: "Confront what you know with life
 And dare to test
 Only then you shall separate right from wrong
 And understand him"*

Yusuf Hayaloglu, from "A Strange Man"²

What renders it possible to entitle Marx as a theorist and Foucault, I would say, as an analyst is an overall assessment of their work. Marx develops a total theory—but not necessarily a totalizing one—in which he suggests new conceptualizations and problematizations to understand the human condition. Foucault, by avoiding possible totalizing effects of a theory proposes a methodology and a strategy—that can be reworked in every case—to demonstrate how we should approach particular social and

² Translated from Turkish by Simten Cosar.

political issues. To do so, Marx uses historical materialism as his methodology and dialectical materialism as his strategy in which he turns the Hegelian dialectic upside-down while Foucault names his methodology as the archaeology and determines the Nietzschean genealogy as his strategy.

In his materialist reading of history the central point of reference, or rather, the presupposed point of departure for Marx is the mode of production in various forms of societies. In doing so, Marx challenges to the extensively accepted presumptions of political thought starting analysis from above, that is, from e.g. the state, the authority, the ruling class, the mandarins, or individuals with natural and ahistorical rights. And he commence with the structuration of productive forces in different modes of production, in other words, he starts his analysis from below by questioning the productive forces and their struggles against the ruling classes. If “the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle,”³ and if the classes are more than an abstraction, it should be argued that in Marx’s theoretical explanations the main point of reference is no longer the ‘rulers’ and their activities, but the real living and acting subjects and their conditions within a certain mode of production which shapes the ongoing relations among them and opens the ways to revolt. It becomes clear in the following quotation:

This method of approach is not devoid of premises. It starts out from the real premises and does not abandon them for a moment. Its premises are men, not in any fantastic isolation and rigidity, but in their actual, empirically perceptible process of development under definite conditions. As soon as this active life-process is described, history ceases to be a collection of dead facts as it is with the empiricists (themselves still

³ Marx and Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, Samuel Moore (trans.) Frederick Engels (ed.) (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), p. 35.

abstract), or an imagined activity of imagined subjects, as with the idealists.⁴

That is to say, (historical) human subject within the relations of production is Marx's main concern. The relations of production, or rather, the material activities of human subject, for Marx, shape the level of consciousness, thinking activity, other social and political activities of people and thereby the general structure of the society.⁵ This interpretation has become a motto of the critiques of Marx in saying "structure determines the superstructure." However, what the relations of production shape are the ways in accordance to which people assess each-other's ethical dispositions, political attitudes, management strategies, skills and abilities, that is, in my opinion, what Marx calls 'consciousness.' At the risk of reading Marx in Foucault's terms, what the relations in substructure shape are the mentalities, rationalities, and technologies of acting human subjects in their social relations. Marx argues that the ruling body of each mode of production is composed of those who, at the same time, produce ideas which are to be universalized in order to maintain the current mode of production. It is necessary since the relations between the productive forces and the rulers are contradictory and hence

⁴ Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*, S. Ryazanskaya (trans. and ed.) (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1968), p. 38.

⁵ "The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the material intercourse of men, appear at this stage as the direct efflux of their material behaviour. The same applies to mental production as expressed in the language of politics, laws, morality, religion, metaphysics, etc., of a people. Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc.—real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms. Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process. If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a *camera obscura*, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process." See Marx and Engels, *ibid*, p. 37.

open to be turned into a stage on which revolutionary struggle of the productive forces might emerge.⁶

In his archaeological reading of the history of knowledge, Foucault takes the modes in which knowledges are produced as his main point of reference. Knowledges are produced within power relations. In this context, power relations are productive relations which produce strategies, tactics, statements, truth and false plays. Foucault's account to history is explored in the following citation:

The history that bears and determines us has the form of a war rather than that of a language—relations of power, not relations of meaning. History has no ‘meaning,’ though this is not to say that it is absurd or incoherent. On the contrary, it is intelligible and should be susceptible of analysis down to the smallest detail—but this in accordance with the intelligibility of struggles, of strategies and tactics. Neither the dialectic, as the logic of contradictions, or semiotics, as the structure of communication, can account for the intrinsic intelligibility of conflicts.⁷

Rather than explaining historical changes through dialectical determinations, Foucault attempts to understand complicated power relations and their metamorphosis by explicating manifold levels of rationalities, truth forms, regimes of knowledge that are rooted deep in power relations. Power relations have the effects of transmitting a mode of rationality, a form of justification, a basis of legitimacy among human subjects. Since power is not imposed upon people by force, these effects of power can only be understood by exploring the procedures “that allowed the effects of power to circulate in

⁶ See Marx's comments on the abstraction of the historical development of ideas and his approach in seeing these ideas as the consequences of material production in Marx and Engels, *ibid*, pp. 61-63.

⁷ Foucault, “Truth and Power” in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 vol. III, Power*, Robert Hurley and others (trans.) James D. Faubion (ed.) (New York: The New Press, 2000), p. 116.

a manner at once continuous, uninterrupted, adapted, and “individualized” throughout the entire social body.”⁸

Starting out from Foucault’s assumptions on power relations, it can be argued that the dominant mode of power/knowledge —those are sovereignty, discipline and governmentality— shapes the formation of the society. However, that is not to say Foucault’s work is reducible to a deterministic explanation of social processes in the light of a certain mode of power. However, it is possible to read the primacy of a certain mode of power in Foucault’s analyses on the history of the construction of social formations. This is understandable since the problem at issue is power inherited in the activity of governing. The analysis of government, in Foucault, starts out from below, or rather, from the infinitesimal relations within society in opposition to the problematizations of power from above, or rather, from the state, the institutions, the capitalist class and so on. However, even if the modes of power shape the conditions in which regimes of knowledge, strategies of conduct, and plays of true-false are produced, there are established diversified objects of knowledge, subjects, institutional mechanisms, technologies and rationalities in each simple domain of knowledge. Therefore, Foucault brings forth manifold findings in his different fields of inquiry; “The Birth of Clinic,” “Madness and Civilization,” “Discipline and Punish,” “The History of Sexuality.”

Marx has a progressive —but not a total— reading of history. He, therefore, focuses on the breaks in history that generate the moments for an epoch of history. For him, these ruptures in history are the consequences of a set of relations people establish in

⁸ Foucault, “Truth and Power” in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 vol. III, Power*, p. 120.

the production processes. Marx argues “[m]en make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.”⁹ Having said that, the transformations in history are not the results of an effort of the consciousness turned upon itself, but they are the results of the material practices human subjects develop and transmit from generation to generation in history. Marx demonstrates that a society is not a single form one can analyze *via* one variable; rather, for him, it consists of differences that are unfolded in the relations of production, economic limitations, contradictions, class struggles and ideological apparatuses.

Foucault, on the other hand, reveals the power effects of total understanding of history. His concern is to illustrate the discontinuities, ruptures, failures in history. By revealing the set of discontinuities, he does not attribute a meaning in itself to history and points out the contingent characteristic of material human practices in history. He argues that his strategy, namely, genealogy

does not pretend to go back in time to restore an unbroken continuity that operates beyond the dispersion of oblivion; its task is not to demonstrate that the past actively exists in the present, that it continues secretly to animate the present, having imposed a predetermined form on all its vicissitudes.¹⁰

Under these considerations, it can be argued that Marx traces the history of the past and makes a periodization in order to explain what is happening at the current time and place

⁹ Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (New York: International Publishers, 1963).

¹⁰ Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 vol. II, Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology*, Robert Hurley and others (trans.) James D. Faubion (ed.) (New York: The New Press, 1998), p.374.

because for him what happened in the past has generated the current conditions. In other words, what happened in history can engender a justification for the present and for the future. However, Foucault seeks for the history of the present. In doing so, he situates the multiple old forms of relations on the branches of the genealogical tree of the present. In this sense, what is told/exercised and what is not told/exercised in terms of subjugated knowledges generate the way we experience the present.¹¹

These two different and so-called contradictory dispositions in the sense of reading history originate in the mode of relations each thinker takes as his point of reference. It is my contention that Marx's main concern is the relation of the self to the material world (that is the world out of labour) while the relations of the self to the self and that of the others are the fields of the study for Foucault. The difference regarding their concern has several consequences in these thinkers' methodological approaches.

First, because of the primacy he attributes to the material world, Marx observes social formation in its uniformity and continuity while Foucault emphasizes particularities and discontinuities commencing with the relations of the subjects. That is to say, Marx's theory tends to generalize particular cases and to reduce distinct occurrences to a single economic explanation. Foucault's approach, on the contrary, has a tendency to ignore the general causes affecting the particularities in relations. Second, Marx draws structures within society and regards agencies as acting subjects within the

¹¹ At this point, it should be indicated that even if Marx's dialectical materialism assumes that in every new epoch we can see the traces of the previous epoch, the current epoch, and the traces of possible new epochs, this should not be confused with Foucault's reading of the present in which we observe the reminders of the past, too. For Foucault demonstrates his understanding of dialectic as follows: "'Dialectic' is a way of evading the always open and hazardous reality of conflict by reducing it to a Hegelian skeleton..." See Foucault, "Truth and Power" in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 vol. III, Power*, p. 116.

definite limits of these structures. Foucault, on the contrary, investigates the construction of the subjects as the agencies of relations. In other words, he concentrates on the question of agency.

Therefore, third, while Marx is interested in the positions of people within the structures of the material conditions, Foucault is concerned with the strategies developed within the mutually constructed limits of power relations. In relation to this, fourth, while Marx defines social classes in accordance to people's position in production process, Foucault explores the construction of the subjects as members of classes, independent individuals, or productive subjects within the relations. Hence while the main struggle is against the ruling body of the capitalist class in Marx, Foucault argues that the struggles are operated against a certain form of exercising domination. Fifth, while Marx asks a "why" question to explore the ground social relations take place, Foucault asks "how" questions to understand by which means and strategies social relations and the relation of one to oneself are directed. Finally, concerning human history as the history of dynamic material relations and struggles, both thinkers disclose the so-called tension between theory and practice in their work. Their works are path-breaking in the history of political thought in the sense that they render it possible to regard a theoretical work as the experience of life.

All in all, in this thesis I argue that, in concerning a factual problem such as capitalist exploitation, we should take into account both Marx's and Foucault's methodologies in collaboration. It is my contention that Marx starting his analysis from the modes in which the production of material conditions is realized maps out the borders

of any socio-political formation. Foucault, on the other hand, defines genealogical trees within these borders, excavates deeper and deeper the roots of these trees and brings out the findings to the day-light. In order for any inquiry concerning a social phenomenon to be grounded on a strong basis, in my opinion, it is necessary to deal with both the positions and the strategies, or rather, three nexus of social relations —the self to the material world, the self to the others and the self to the self. To do so, one should indispensably functionalize both Marx and Foucault. For the capitalist mode of production and the structures it established still continue to determine the limits of our relations; and the strategies and techniques of domination target the individual bodies and souls more and more in their exercises. Simply, I argue that a new methodological approach should be defined with an account to both historical materialism and archaeological method in order not only to understand socio-political formations of our societies but also to understand ourselves. Rather than a word, let Foucault speak:

Structuralism, by defining transformations, and history, by describing types of events and different types of duration, make possible both the appearance of discontinuities in history and the appearance of regular, coherent transformations. Structuralism and contemporary history are theoretical instruments by means of which one can—contrary to the old idea of continuity—really grasp both the discontinuity of events and the transformation of societies.¹²

III.II. Re-considering Exploitation and Governing at the Confluence of (Determining) Economy and (Fluctuating) Politics

If the economic take-off of the West began with the techniques that made possible the accumulation of capital, it might perhaps be said that the methods for administering the accumulation of men made possible a political take-off in relation to the traditional, ritual, costly, violent forms of power which soon fell into disuse and were suppressed by

¹² Foucault, “Return to History” in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 vol. II, Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology*, Robert Hurley and others (trans.) James D. Faubion (ed.) (New York: The New Press, 1998), p. 431.

*a subtle, calculated technology of subjection. In fact, the two processes—the accumulation of men and the accumulation of capital—cannot be separated; it would not have been possible to solve the problem of the accumulation of men without the growth of an apparatus of production capable of both sustaining them and using them; conversely, the techniques that made the cumulative multiplicity of men useful accelerated the accumulation of capital.*¹³

The aim of this part is to disclose the question asked in the title of the present chapter: ‘either exploitation through governing or governing through exploitation.’ There is a tension emanating from taking Marx and Foucault into account together in an analysis of capitalist exploitation. The tension, in my opinion, can be unfolded in this question. Not only that. The question makes it possible to rethink both exploitation and the act of governing from a different angle. The first part of the question, that is, ‘exploitation through governing,’ specifies the primary goal of the act of governing as exploitation, and thus the problem is mainly about *economy*. The second part of the question, however, depicts governing as the major concern and sees exploitation as only one of the means in operation of governing thus the problem is mainly about *politics*.

It is my contention that Marx and Foucault can be brought together in approaching the issue from their distinct viewpoints. In answering the question, Marx would probably choose and defend the first part. Foucault, on the other hand, would argue that the second part must be defended since for him the main point in history is the problem of governing. However, I claim that this tension should be overcome in order to develop a broader understanding *via* new theoretical and methodological approach in which we can improve a new perspective taking determining effects of economics and fluctuating nature of politics into account together. In doing so, we can ask “why” and

¹³ Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, Alan Sheridan (trans.) (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), pp. 220-221.

“how” questions at the same time, which enables us to develop a general and particular understanding of society.

One of the most important outcomes of the capitalist mode of production has become free market. Free market has been situated *in-between* the private and public spheres through the detachment of economic activity from household.¹⁴ This sphere has had an effect —among others— in the recentralization of economy in capitalist societies. Free market, by expanding progressively, has generated the broadest sphere in the social structure and it has become a sphere in which most of the human activities have been realized. Therefore, it can be argued that the rules of economic sphere have become the most significant determining factor in the activities of human subjects. Having said that, the recentralization of economy by the relocation of free market as the broadest action space has become a fact that has brought forth the reality of experiencing capitalism by each individual subject who produces, exchanges, distributes and consumes within the boundaries of the present space.

The cruciality of free market, in this context, derives from its formation which both relates and separates people at the same time. Therefore, it is my contention that we should first understand the operation of capitalism which has created this sphere and the

¹⁴ I borrow the phrase, “in-between,” from Hannah Arendt. She argues that the public sphere generates a table which is located in-between people who are expected to come together around this table in order to act politically, and which relates and separates them at the same time. However, as Arendt would acknowledge, with the emergence of capitalism, the expansion of free market has invaded the sphere of public and people has started to come together around the table of free market; however this table is rather than being a table around which people act—that is to say, in Arendtian terms, to discuss, to create something new, to contemplate, to begin something new, and so on—it is a table around which people can only bargain, calculate, measure, exchange, and evaluate. See Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), pp. 50-58.

form of activities performed in it. For this reason, it is not a preference but a necessity to apply Marx and his theoretical framework in such an analysis since he is the only thinker who analyzed the operation of capitalist mode of production in its every aspect. Accepting the recentralization of economy with capitalism also justifies Marx's standpoint which gives priority to the economy and, in some senses, its deterministic effects since the formation of society is based on the centrality of free market defined on the basis of economic relations.

While Marx explains the structure of economic formation, Foucault suggests a new political schema to understand the current comings and goings of the political activity. Foucault argues that we should start not from institutions but from power.¹⁵ According to him, starting an analysis from the institutions—including classes—limits the human subject by the definitions of these institutions. To illustrate, starting to explain the current modern nation-states from their legal structure will only cause to enclose individuals within their constitutionally given identities, rights and duties. However, acting capacity of a human subject transcends the ascribed capacities of a definite legal individual. In this context, the problems of limiting the analysis with institutions can be unfolded in threefold.

First, starting the analysis from legal institutions produces power effects over individual subjects, e.g. the definition of a citizen constructs a legal subject, which is the source of domination over individuals by subjugating them to this definition. Second, this

¹⁵ See Foucault, "The Subject and Power" in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 vol. III, Power*, Robert Hurley and others (trans.) James D. Faubion (ed.) (New York: The New Press, 2000).

kind of analysis can unfold only legal aspect of the social formation and thus limits our understanding. Third, the definition of power relations in society in reference to institutions necessitates a definition of a certain enemy against which attacks will be targeted. However, if we think that the thing which shapes our lives is an institution with all its apparatuses, the resistance we develop against it has to take the shape of that institution. Therefore, what we are becomes what we oppose. And our activity ceases to be an opposition since it cannot go beyond the institutional limitations of the opposed formation. Moreover, in this case, the enemy we are opposing is a definite single existence. That is to say, the struggle targets only one source of domination among the many sources of domination in the present societies. At this point, it is not surprising, for example, to see a revolutionist worker to act against the domination of the capitalist but to use domination over his wife and children.

Conversely, starting an analysis from infinitesimal power relations allows us to overcome the limits of the inquiry which reduces the individual subject to a simple carrier of a set of tasks or rights. We acknowledge from the very beginning the capacity of human subject to begin something new and unexpected; therefore, in every case as long as the subject has a field of resistance there is a possibility to resist against all kinds of domination. Foucault's methodology renders it possible to assess the infinitesimal mechanisms operating in the social relations. Also, it becomes clear that in order to oppose something we do not need to take its shape; rather, we can develop our own ways of resistance. In other words, we are capable of developing manifold forms of resistance rather than a single form. And finally, with this understanding of power and resistance, as relatively autonomous subjects we can shape our dispositions against the domination

within all aspects of our lives. Therefore in the age where the decline of the political is at issue, it is important to draw attention to Foucault since he demonstrates that political activity, the activity of governing is inherited in all our relations and we should act with the awareness of it.

We showed how much importance Foucault gives to power. At this point, it should also be framed where Marx locates power. I do not agree with those arguments claiming that in Marx's writings power is concentrated in the hands of the state or that of the capitalist class. In my opinion, it is possible to specify multiple forms and adversaries of power in Marx's work. It is true that Marx highlights the power of the capitalists over workers. This power emanates from the capitalists' ownership of the means of production and equips them with the power of shaping the organization of work, the state and its apparatuses, the ideas inscribed in a single ideology and so on. However, there is also the power of commodities over the workers and capitalists.

As Marx proves, in capitalist societies, relations between people turn into material relations while the relations between commodities turn into social relations. For the commodity exchange becomes the basis of relationship between and among people.¹⁶ What shapes these reified relations among people —either capitalists or workers— is not

¹⁶ See Marx, *Capital Vol. I*, Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling (trans.) Frederick Engels (ed.) (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965), p. 73. Here Marx says that “[s]ince the producers do not come into social contact with each other until they exchange their products, the specific social character of each producer’s labour does not show itself except in the act of exchange. In other words, the labour of the individual asserts itself as a part of the labour society, only by means of the relations which the act of exchange establishes directly between the products, and indirectly, through them, between the producers. To the latter, therefore, the relations connecting the labour of one individual with that of the rest appear, not as direct social relations between individuals at work, but as what they really are, material relations between persons and social relations between things.” For the further explanations on the fetishism of commodities see *ibid*, pp. 71-84.

the energy of individual relations but the dynamic of the free market in which the price, the form of bargaining and the structure of the activity of purchasing and selling are determined. Moreover, there is also the power of labourer over the commodity he produces and hence we are able to define the power of labourer over the capitalist to whom he has to present the product of his labour. It is this power which renders it possible for workers to resist against the capitalists.

Nevertheless, to read power relations in Marx as it is read in Foucault is not possible. Within Marx's theory it is not possible to assume an individual resistance against the domination of the capitalists and/or from within the world of commodities without uniting and generating a total revolutionary movement. For the limits of the field of action is predetermined by the structures capitalism generates. Moreover, in Marx, these multiple forms of power contain by nature a negative meaning referring to the demolition of one-side of the adversaries. However, in Foucault, power is not necessarily negative; quite the contrary, power is creative, productive and positive as much as it is dominating. While people govern conducts of others and themselves in power relations, they are subjectivized, freed from obedience, rationalized at different levels, owned self-discipline and so on.

After these considerations, there remain three categorical concepts we should pay attention to their distinct articulations by both Marx and Foucault: freedom as emancipation from exploited labour activity or freedom as the field of action in power relations; consciousness or levels of rationalizations; ideology or the regimes of knowledge. Freedom, for Marx, is a goal which can only be reached by the emancipation

of working class from capitalist exploitation. Even if he acknowledges the freedom of contract that gives workers an opportunity to sign contracts with the capitalists as free, rational individuals, it is seen deceptive since workers can be exploited only insofar as they are free from their bindings. For Foucault, on the contrary, there is no definite meaning that can be attributed to freedom; rather, freedom is seen as the necessary condition of power and it takes its shape within the mutuality of power relations. That is to say, the limit of action is determined within the relation in accordance not to the consent but to the rational acceptance of two adversaries.

Marx argues that within the conditions of capitalism people are subjectivized against their nature. This is illustrated with the conceptualizations of alienation that I explored in the first chapter. Therefore, it is important for the workers to reach the consciousness of it to be able to revolt against the capitalist exploitation. That occurs, for Marx, when the material conditions sufficiently develop because it is not consciousness that determines life but life that determines consciousness.¹⁷ After the necessary conditions are reached it is possible to demolish the 'false-consciousness' the capitalists manipulated. For Foucault, however, what is at issue, in this context, is not what is true or false; rather, he is interested in the constructions of true-false games. He argues that there are different forms and levels of rationalizations developed within and through power relations. Therefore, the focus of the struggle is not to reach a single true consciousness but to be in ongoing rationalizations processes in which occurs the conflict of different

¹⁷ See Marx and Engels, *German Ideology*, S. Ryazanskaya (trans. and ed.) (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1968), p. 38.

rationales.¹⁸ Finally, for Marx, false-consciousness is manipulated by ideology which mystifies the reality. By opposing the central role of ideology, Foucault draws attention to ‘the regimes of knowledge’ constructing subjects, true-false games, institutional mechanisms, technologies and rationalities.

In the light of these considerations, I shall turn the attention to the tension emerging from the analysis of exploitation on the basis of economy or that of politics. This also brings forth the articulations of capitalist exploitation within the determining limits of economic structure or within fluctuating sphere of political action. The latter provides relatively autonomous field of action for the subjects beyond the limits of economic structure. For a long time we have been told by Marx that the formation of consciousness and hence activities of human subject are immensely shaped by the class structure of society. Therefore, the governing activity of men is in a great extent related to their class position which is structured on the basis of exploitation according to main assumption of this thesis. What renders it possible for Foucault to claim that men has unstructured capability to reason and to act is the threefold domains he assumes to apply genealogy: a historical ontology of ourselves in relation to (1) truth through which we constitute ourselves as subjects of knowledge; (2) a field of power through which we constitute ourselves as subjects acting on others; (3) ethics through which we constitute ourselves as moral agents.¹⁹ In particular, the third domain, that is, ethics, makes it

¹⁸ For further information see Foucault, “Structuralism and Post-structuralism” in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 vol. II, Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology*, Robert Hurley and others (trans.) James D. Faubion (ed.) (New York: The New Press, 1998), pp. 433-458.

¹⁹ Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress” in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 vol. I, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth*, Robert Hurley and others (trans.) Paul Rabinow (ed.) (New York: The New Press, 1997), p. 262.

possible for us to develop action beyond the given structures. Ethics in Foucault does not mean a moral code, a norm imposed on people in social relations; quite the contrary, it means the relationship of self to the self when he acts.²⁰ In this context, the ways in which we constitute ourselves as moral subjects is related to the art of governing, that is, the political activity.

When we start out with these political activities of human subject to understand the construction of social formation, governing becomes the issue at hand. Therefore, it can be said that the capitalist exploitation is seen as merely a domain among others in which people govern each other and themselves for the advantage of the general extraction of surplus value. However, with this thesis, I argue that in bourgeoisie societies, by the great expansion of free market, there have remained only few, if not any, fields of action in which the modified form of capitalist exploitation as the mentalities of free market does not penetrate. People in the organization of work are at the same time people that act in the market sphere. Therefore, the mentalities of work has necessarily shape the relations in non-working time and space. In particular, in the flexible period, it has become possible for every service to be turned into a commodity. As a result, the mentalities of economic sphere have split up nearly all spheres of life.

The mentalities of economy are rooted in the idea of management as Foucault indicates.²¹ And, in my opinion, management is the job of experts; thereby it by nature


²⁰ See Foucault, "Michel Foucault: An Interview by Stephen Riggins" in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 vol. I, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth*, Robert Hurley and others (trans.) Paul Rabinow (ed.) (New York: The New Press, 1997), p. 131.

²¹ See Foucault, "Governmentality" in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 vol. III, Power*, Robert Hurley and others (trans.) James D. Faubion (ed.) (New York: The New Press, 2000).

includes domination in the sense of authority. When the mode of relation between people is grounded merely on management, one of the adversaries limits the field of action of the other since he is the authority on the issue. Briefly, the expansion of the economic sphere through public and private sphere brings forth the increase in the number of experts who have a natural authority that gives them priority to exercise domination over the other side of relation. To claim that the dominant form of governing is originated in the idea of management is to claim that the governing activity of capitalist societies is realized with the intention of maintaining exploitation. In other words, what we should put under consideration is “exploitation through governing” in an analysis of our societies. Besides, the unemployment that is also triggered by the flexible mode of production has become an issue to govern and to be governed. As I indicated in the second chapter, it is not only used to govern the unemployed but also to govern the employed by turning the condition of those unemployed into the ‘plague towns.’

Within the framework of the abovementioned categories, my position in front of the either/or question of this part is unfolded in the first side, exploitation through governing. That is to say, in order to understand the current capitalist societies, we should resolve the nature of capitalist exploitation and the ways in which it penetrates into all fields of life. To elucidate, I shall schematize my inquiry of capitalist exploitation. As Marx argues, the dominant mode of production structures the society. In particular, within the capitalist mode of production, capitalist exploitation manifests itself as the main element in this structuration. The formulation of it is determined by the mode of production, that is to say, how we produce shapes the main element that maintains the existing mode of production.

However, for the exercise of capitalist exploitation, different means that are functionalized not only in economic sphere but also in social, political, cultural and moral spheres are needed. The form of these means is shaped by the dominant mode of power. At this point the question shifts from ‘how we produce’ to ‘how is production governed?’ since the exercise of capitalist exploitation couples with the activity of governing. In this regard, the following counter argument might bring forth: what is being governed in society is not only production. Therefore, starting only with production might be insufficient in such an approach. However, following Marx, I would say that production should not be reduced to the production of commodities even if its general form in capitalism is the commodity production. Rather, the act of producing coincides with the production of life, in other words, the production of the non-exchangeable things also should be issued in considering the government of production.



Nevertheless, within the capitalist mode of production, as the necessary condition of maintenance of the existing production mode, all activity of production tends to be enrolled into the capitalist accumulation. It is for this reason, in an analysis of power relations, we should keep in mind the advantages and disadvantages the positions of people generate within the structure of society. This has two implications that should be taken into account in an assessment of power relations in a Foucauldian sense. On the one hand, the strategies, technologies and rationalities necessarily developed in a power relation equip the capitalists with more ability to dominate workers and non-workers since the material conditions the capitalists have give them more opportunity to discover and use more effective means to reach their goals. To be more precise, strategies used in the exercise of exploitation in order to hide it or normalize it might not be observable for those who are subjected to the domination. On the other hand, because of the material conditions workers or non-workers are in, to develop resistance against the domination is not easy. I will elaborate the difficulties of resistance against the capitalist exploitation in the next part where I search for an alternative political struggle against exploitation.

III.III. On the Possibility of Alternative Political Action: Articulating Revolution and Resistance

After problematizing capitalist exploitation as both the main condition and as a complex social function, the solutions suggested to dissolve capitalist exploitation will be considered in this part. With the emergence of capitalism, despite the centralization of forces that define the construction of the modern capitalist nation-states, power has been redistributed in civil society. The definition of autonomous rational individual who is capable of acting in free market sphere and is capable of choosing his representatives in

political sphere has created an “army” of individuals, each of whom has been defined as special beings going their own way and hence none of them has remained special. Therefore, it is my contention that the opposition against this totalizing and individualizing regime should bring forth both a collective struggle and an individual one. Since the dominant knowledge regime has been constructed around the idea of individual, even if we define a communal problem in terms of capitalist exploitation, we cannot reject the importance of individual oppositions.

Under these considerations, in my view, Marx’s assumptions on worker revolutions and Foucault’s insistence on the specific resistances should be elaborated on the advantage of experiencing exploitation with least domination possible. For Marx, the form of opposition should be a revolutionary workers’ movement while Foucault suggests particular manifold recalcitrance against various exercises of power. This difference between two ways of struggles stems from two thinkers’ different problematizations of the domination in capitalist societies. For Marx, the source of the problem is clearly the capitalist mode of production as a whole. And thereby, the struggle should aim to demolish the existing mode of production with all its components —i.e. ideological apparatuses, organization of work, the family structure, education policy and even the politics itself. To do so, first the main element maintaining capitalism, that is, exploitation, should be overcome by the replacement the capitalists’ ownership of the means of production with proletarian dictatorship.

For Foucault, on the other hand, the targets in power struggles are determined in the mundane activities of people. He argues that the struggles in society are against a form, a specific way of practicing domination. As he proves as follows:

the main objective of these struggles is to attack not so much such-or-such institution of power, or group, or elite, or class but, rather, a technique, a form of power. This form of power that applies itself to immediate everyday life categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him that he must recognize and others have to recognize in him. It is a form of power that makes individuals subjects.²²

Having said that, in the sense of exploitation, the struggle should be against a form by means of which exploitation is exercised. As it is demonstrated in the second chapter, capitalist exploitation in its infinitesimal mechanisms aims at directly individual bodies and souls. For this reason, struggles against capitalist exploitation should attempt to step over the obstacles standing in the way of tearing the given subject forms from the subject himself. Only by means of destructing the predefined truth forms in experiencing exploitative mechanisms, one can construct different experiences of these mechanisms, which might bring forth to say 'no' to exploitation.

According to Marx, the development of productive forces is necessary for a proletarian revolution. That is to say, first, the number of workers in society with the thrown of small bourgeoisie into the proletariat should increase. Second, class-consciousness should develop among workers, and those who are defined as class-in-itself should turn into class-for-itself. Then, along with intellectuals supporting working

²² Foucault, "The Subject and Power" in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 vol. III, Power*, Robert Hurley and others (trans.) James D. Faubion (ed.) (New York: The New Press, 2000), p. 331.

class, workers are to unite within an organization which in turn will bring forth a revolutionary movement. Marx highlights the point that “the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery, and wield it for its own purposes.”²³

Nevertheless, his assessments on the Paris Commune demonstrate that his thought on a revolutionary worker’s movement assumes a state-like organization which slightly differs from the organization of a bourgeois state. Accordingly, the members of the commune were mostly workers and their acknowledged representatives. The municipal councillors, chosen by universal suffrage in the various wards of the town, were acting not as a parliamentary body without having both the authority of execution and legislation. Therefore, it can be argued that what Marx defines as a strong organization of workers is a democratic organization, in the broadest meaning of the term, in which representatives are to be chosen by universal suffrage from the towns and they are to act responsibly in short terms. Furthermore, among the various goals the Commune has, what was acknowledged as the main principle in the foreign policy of the Commune is expressed as follows: “Vindicate the simple laws of morals and justice, which ought to govern the relations of private individuals, as the laws paramount of the intercourse of nations.” The simple laws of morals, in this sense, can be identified as the emancipation of working class from the capitalist exploitation which is expected to bring forth freedom and equality for all. In this sense, the laws of morals and justice are to be the consequences of a proletarian revolution.

²³ See Marx, *The Civil War in France* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1973), especially pp. 38-59.

Morality is also issued in Foucault's work in relation to resistance.²⁴ However, here, the ethical dispositions of individual subjects are not taken as the consequence of resistance; quite the contrary, ethics, for Foucault, is a technology in the way going through resistance. In this context, ethics is concerned as the techniques of the self generating the main point of departure for resistance. Since human subjects are dominated through the given subject forms which defines people, gives them identity and enclose them in these identities, resistance against domination should take a form in which individual subject can emancipate himself from pre-determined forms of subjection. For Foucault, this is only possible through a relation of the self to the self, that is, the relation of human subject to himself as a moral subject.

In understanding moral subject, Foucault draws our attention to the Greco-Roman thought. He argues that ethics consists of the principle of "taking care of oneself" in the Greco-Roman thought. In other words, contemplating on oneself constitutes the basis for establishing an ethical disposition, which is expected to shape our acts in power relations. In this sense, "taking care of the self" means neither only the care of the body nor "knowing oneself" as it is understood in modern world.²⁵ For Foucault, freeing

²⁴ At this point, I should immediately note that at the expense of causing confusions in the sense of conceptual consistency, I reject the given separation of morality from ethics stemming from Enlightenment thought. According to this separation, morality refers to a universal moral code that everybody needs to comply with. On the other hand, ethics is defined as individual disposition which is taken when one encounter with a necessary individual decision. However, we see that in fact these two terms have the same meaning when we seek their etymological grounds. Accordingly, both terms refer to customs, manners, and habits. The only difference they have is their origin: Ethics, with its Greek origin and morality, with its Latin origin. See Hannah Arendt, "Some Questions of Moral Philosophy" in Jerome Kohn (ed.) *Responsibility and Judgement* (New York: Schocken Books, 2003), p. 50.

²⁵ See Foucault, "Technologies of the Self" in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 vol. I, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth*, Robert Hurley and others (trans.) Paul Rabinow (ed.) (New York: The New Press, 1997), pp. 228.

ourselves from the restrictions of external, normalizing, dominating, disciplining effects of power is possible only insofar as we can emancipate our thoughts on ourselves from the given universal laws of reason. As he proves in the following quotation, this necessitates an alternative inquiry concerning the ways of thinking on ourselves:

[w]e must try to proceed with the analysis of ourselves as beings who are historically determined, to a certain extent, by the Enlightenment. Such an analysis implies a series of historical inquiries that are as precise as possible; and these inquiries will not be oriented retrospectively toward the 'essential kernel of rationality' that can be found in the Enlightenment and that would have to be preserved in any event; they will be oriented to the 'contemporary limits of the necessary', that is, toward what is not or is no longer indispensable for the constitution of ourselves as autonomous subjects.²⁶

Freedom, in this context, is understood as the ontological condition of ethics. Human subjects can develop relationship to themselves only insofar as they are free. At this point, it will not be wrong to argue that Foucault, in his work on the technologies of the self, demonstrates that in fact we have more freedom than we think. This becomes apparent in various reactions people have to the same situations. Even if we all pass through the similar socialization processes, each of us is capable of developing diversified voices. This viewpoint prevents us from enclosing our acts and our thoughts within the holistic view according to which we cannot act in our own way unless we change the political, economic, and social structure as a whole.

It is my contention that taking revolution and resistance under consideration in the case of capitalist exploitation requires an overview of those who are exploited. In this

²⁶ Foucault, "What is Enlightenment" in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 vol. I, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth*, Robert Hurley and others (trans.) Paul Rabinow (ed.) (New York: The New Press, 1997), p. 313.

sense, I shall use the conceptualization of the worker-as-a-subject to refer back both Marx and Foucault. In the capitalist mode of production, for Marx, one of the distinctive characteristics of worker-capitalist relation is the separation of the product of labour from the body of labourer, which, in turn, causes alienation. The disciplinary power, Foucault argues, on the other hand, dissociates power from the body, which reverses the energy, from which power of the body is fed, into subjection. Moving from these two illustrations, it can be argued that while the productive forces of the body is being increased to the advantage of capitalist production, the cognitive and creative forces of the body—which are to be used on the advantage of both the recreation of the body and that of the soul—are being decreased. In other words, on the one hand, worker's capacity to produce and to be disciplined is expanded; on the other hand, his capacity to realize himself in his labour and to resist against domination is narrowed *via* a series of rules and conducts subjugating worker. In this context, the disadvantages of workers compare to the capitalists in any opposition should be taken into account. Limited material conditions that restrict workers to reach the means of revolution and decrease their energy necessary for “taking care of the self” always stand in the way of an affective labour movement.

Moreover, as Foucault puts it evidently, “the relation between manipulating things and domination appears clearly in Karl Marx's *Capital*, where every technique of production requires modification of individual conduct—not only skills but also attitudes.”²⁷ These modified conducts of individual workers manipulate the domination of capitalist exploitation. For example, in the flexible production, “self-improvement”

²⁷ Foucault, “Technologies of the Self” in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 vol. I, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth*, Robert Hurley and others (trans.) Paul Rabinow (ed.) (New York: The New Press, 1997), p.225.

means improving oneself on his occupation; taking care of oneself means care of the body through, e.g. sportive activities; and “knowing oneself” means knowing one’s given identity that verifies one’s position in the social formation. Therefore, in my view, to build up resistance by departing from “taking care of the self,” as Foucault argues, might not be easy for the workers under the domination of capitalist exploitation. Furthermore, in the flexible period, the dispersed form of power in social relations make it, if not impossible, very difficult for those who are subjected to exploitative power to define a target which is aimed in the struggles. Most of the time those who seem to have control over the means of production are not the owners, but the higher executives who work for the capitalists and whose positions and wages are relatively higher than the others. At this point, I should immediately indicate that even if the class differentiation is defined on the basis of exploitation in the scope of this thesis, the operators of exploitative power might not necessarily be the exploiting class; they in the flexible mode of production mostly consist of these workers in the higher executive position since they have the partial control over the means of production.

At this point, I should immediately indicate that the two of the approaches in terms of struggles against exploitation have some problematical aspects. First, for Marx’s approach, it can be said that to define a certain group of people as capitalists to target becomes more difficult day by day with the changing strategies in the organization of work. The hierarchy in workplace and the division of labour separate workers from each other. Therefore uniting for a common goal in a worker’s movement is difficult. Second, for Foucault’s approach, it should be pointed out that developing strategies against the form by means of which exploitation is exercised might not be easy for an individual

worker since they are well manipulated by the capitalists. In addition, taking care of the self that requires contemplation on the self might be interpreted as an elitist attitude. Even if Foucault says that he believes in the reasoning capability of people, it is not easy nor efficient for a worker—who works twelve hours a day and spends all his bodily and mental energy at work or for an unemployed who needs to adapt himself to the requirements in order to get job—to distinct himself from the given or demanded subject forms. In this sense, limitations people's position in social structure generates should be considered while suggesting them to develop strategies.

In the light of these considerations, going beyond an either/or question between revolution and resistance is, in my opinion, important for several reasons. It is necessary to rehabilitate the work conditions and also the life standards for the workers dominated by exploitation. This can only be the consequence of a collective workers' movement. However, in the way of a collective action, domination the relationship among workers generates should also be considered. The resistance, in the Foucauldian meaning of the term, is necessary within a worker organization, trade unions and so on in order to avoid the power effects of the "iron law of oligarchy." In other words, in a worker organization to avoid from the conclusions the Marx's celebrated Paris Commune and most of the worker unions established in 1970s arrived at, domination coming from anywhere should be resisted. This can only be possible by considering Foucault's approach. In this respect, the resistance as a consequence of contemplating on oneself is important. Moreover, since the three form of power—sovereignty, discipline and governmentality—are in operation in current societies the struggle against these forms of power should challenge to all of these forms. Therefore, it is my contention that, for example, the domination the

state and its legal institutional apparatuses bring forth can only be challenged by an institutional struggle developed by labourers. At this point, I do not observe a threat in the organizations which might be called state-like in Foucault's terms.

In sum, it can be assumed that a revolutionary movement is necessary but not sufficient without individual recalcitrance stemming from being a moral subject and it is true for the *vice versa*. As it is highlighted in the previous chapter, exploitation is operated as a complex social function. That is to say, power effects of exploitation penetrate into all aspects of our lives. Therefore, the struggles against capitalist exploitation should take their place both in working time and place and non-working time and space.

III.IV. Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I opened up a discussion on the basis of an either/or question: exploitation through governing or governing through exploitation. In the light of this question, I applied the methodologies of Marx and Foucault, their approach to socio-political formation and their articulations on the struggles in the society in an either/or format. Concerning two thinkers' methodologies I arrived at the conclusion that Marx maps out the society by means of historical materialism and dialectic materialism while Foucault defines genealogical trees, excavates deeper and deeper the roots of these trees and brings out the findings to the day-light in the form of genealogy. Therefore, I argued that one needs to articulate the methodologies and strategies of Marx and Foucault to understand the history of current societies, the history of the present and also oneself.

Regarding their approaches to the socio-political formation, for the analysis, I drew a line between economy and politics even if they cannot be separated.

The analysis demonstrated that the mode of production Marx takes as the basis of his theory and the mode of power Foucault uses as his conceptual tool in his analysis of power are in an interrelation to each-other in any socio-political formation. Hence, I argued that in an inquiry of socio-political formations one needs to take Marx and Foucault into account in collaboration to understand the conditioning economic structure and the fluctuating political activities. On the subject of the struggles, I discussed revolution *vis-à-vis* resistance. All in all, with the present chapter I argue that in an inquiry of capitalist exploitation Marx's theory and Foucault's methodology generate a check and balance system for each-other.

By this way, we are able to pay attention both the positions and the strategies in the struggles, both the limits economic conditions generate and the freedoms political activities make available, both the structures and the agencies, both the overall view of the society in which we live and the details we are dealing with. As Foucault illustrated, we have more freedom than we think, and we have more capabilities than we think, the only thing we need is to improve strategies to challenge to the obstacles standing in the way of transformations. To conclude, rather than a word, it would be more appropriate to let the communist Turkish poet speak in his famous poem in which he puts his humanism is in question:

Conclusion

To understand human existence within the web of social relations requires an attempt to disclose the historical construction of two interrelated domains: the mode of production and the mode of power. In order to analyze these two domains of inquiry, it is unavoidable to apply the theoretical and methodological tools introduced into social and political thought by Marx and Foucault. The analysis of the mode of production is crucial for at least two reasons. On the one hand, labour activity creates a field of social production which attaches individual subjects one another. The mode of this connection shapes the conducts of these individuals. On the other hand, the material world surrounding human existence is the world out of labour-activity. For this reason, within a specific mode of production what people produce and how they produce determines the material conditions of people's lives. The importance of analysing the mode of power relations can also be explained in twofold. First, having accepted that power is inherited in relation, analysis of manifold forms of power generates a key in understanding the contents of relations human subject exercises. Second, power as the conduct of conducts indicates the activity of government, in the broadest sense of the term. Explicating the infinitesimal mechanisms of a specific mode of power gives us an outline to understand how more general exercises of power are operated, such as power exercised by the state or capitalists.

Taking these two domains of inquiry —i.e. the mode of production and that of power— as a reference point for a further analysis render it possible to start the analysis from below, that is, from the very roots of socio-political formation. In addition, I argue that the human condition can only be understood within the tripartite nexus of social

relations, that is, self to the material world, self to other and self to self. Marx with his account to the mode of production equips us with the theoretical and methodological tools to investigate the relation of self to the material world, which is disclosed in the relations of production and the relations it stimulates. Foucault with his understanding of power draws our attention to the operation of the relations of self to others and to self. The juxtaposition of these two approaches therefore provides us with a viewpoint in which one can articulate the economic positions with the political strategies.

In the light of these considerations, in this thesis, I attempted to search for the prospect of a new theoretical and methodological framework in analysing the formation of current societies. Concerning the capitalist mode of production and the triangle of power relations —disclosed as sovereignty, discipline and governmentality— in collaboration revealed the cruciality of analysing capitalist exploitation for two reasons. First, I argued, exploitation is the main constituent of capitalism without which it cannot exist. Second, only by means of the mechanisms of exploitation, capitalism with its mentalities penetrates into people's lives to endure its existence. With these two reasons at hand, I located capitalist exploitation as the key figure to the analysis of social change. Then, the objective of my thesis shifted to an endeavour to understand the definition and the operation of capitalist exploitation.

Then, I furthered my research on the definition of capitalist exploitation. In doing so, I discovered two inherited aspects of capitalist exploitation: the *conditio sine qua non* for capitalism and a *complex social function*. I disclosed the former by using the tools Marx presents and the latter by functionalizing Foucault's studies. In this context,

capitalist class structure on the basis of exploitation along with the structural consequences of capitalist exploitation —alienation, commodity fetishism, and reification— is re-identified by departing from Marx's ideas while the three facets of contingent power relations —sovereignty, discipline, and governmentality— reissued on behalf of exploitation with an account to Foucault's work.

In my opinion, Marx's application to labour activity as the basis of human subjectivity remains insufficient since there are other forms through which human being constructs himself or is constructed as subjects. Moreover, his explanations on the operation and consequences of capitalist exploitation, namely the role of ideology, alienation, commodity fetishism and reification, prevent us from going further into the infinitesimal mechanisms through which exploitation is exercised and into the metamorphosis of exploitation in its manifold practices. For these reasons, I applied Foucault's methodology; and I regarded capitalist exploitation as the main mechanism. In this sense, I argued, power effects of exploitation contributes to the continuity of capitalism by means of specific technologies and rationalities. To illustrate how exploitation functions as a power mechanism in the flexible mode of production, I benefited from the writings of David Harvey, Richard Sennett and Andre Gorz.

Applying Marx and Foucault in collaboration for the analysis of capitalist exploitation made it indispensable to ask an either/or question formulated as follows: what should be the reference point of the analysis, either exploitation through governing or governing through exploitation? The reason that made such a question indispensable for this thesis in fact derived from the common-sense interpretations of Marx and

Foucault. Those in a great extent reduce Marx's work to a simple economic determinism; and trivialize Foucault's manifold applications to power to a one-dimensional governmentality studies. In this regard, I opened up a discussion on the distinction of economy from politics. I arrived at the conclusion that economy and politics cannot be separated and their interrelation in our societies finds its expression in "exploitation through government." In what follows I attempted to reveal the forms of struggles in capitalist societies. I tried to illustrate the necessity of both a revolutionary worker's movement and multiple individual resistances against capitalist exploitation.

All in all, in this thesis, I tried to demonstrate the possibilities of studying capitalist exploitation from a different theoretical and methodological angle. I assume that a further study which will functionalize the framework presented in this thesis and which will include a more extensive case study is to contribute much to Marxist and Foucauldian studies. Not only that. I think a further study will contribute much to develop strategies for a revolutionary workers' movement against capitalism, which will in turn create another world, a world in which people live without being dominated because of their poverty, race, sexuality, nationality, language or disability; a world in which differences are not reduced to a shopwindow at the advantage of stability; a world in which only weapons are the pencils, paintbrushes and lyrics; a world in which people live in equal conditions; a world in which people never forget they are not alone as a species-being in this world. In conclusion, I insist that another form of existence is possible only through tearing the limitations standing in the way of our imagination and through daring to challenge.

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