

# **Anti-Establishment Radical Parties in 21<sup>st</sup> Century Europe**

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## *Abstract*

The current crisis in Europe is one that superimposed itself over an already existing political crisis - one which, due to the cartelization of mainstream parties, Peter Mair (1995) famously referred to as a problem of democratic legitimacy in European political systems between those political parties that govern but no longer represent and those that claim to represent but do not govern. As established cartel-political parties have become complacent about their increasing disconnect with societal demands, the group of parties claiming to represent without governing has intensified its anti-elitist, anti-integrationist and anti-mainstream party message. Indeed many such parties, regardless of ideology (radical right but also radical-left), have surged during the past decade, including in the European Parliament elections of 2009 and especially 2014. The common features of these parties are: a) a radical non-centrist ideological stance (be it on the left or right, authoritarian or libertarian dimensions); b) a populist anti-establishment discourse, c) a commitment to representing specific societal classes; d) an aggressive discourse and behaviour towards political enemies, e) a commitment towards 'restoring true democracy' and f) a tendency to offer simplistic solutions to intricate societal issues. The question this dissertation asks is - what accounts for the rise of left-libertarian as well as right-wing authoritarian tribunal parties within such a short period of time during the mid-2000s and early 2010s? I investigate this question through a comparative study of six EU member-states. I argue that both supply-side as well as demand-side factors point towards new anti-establishment parties in the European political arena flourishing due to the perceived presence and even strengthening of the cartel-party system established by mainstream centrist political parties. With respect to the financial crisis in particular, anti-establishment parties are not merely capitalizing on the negative effects of the economy, but also on dissatisfaction with mainstream established parties in general and their unanimous and unwavering commitment to economic orthodoxy and austerity.

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## **List of Acronyms**

- ACTA – Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
- ATAKA – ATAKA Party
- CMP – Comparative Manifesto Project
- D66 – Democrats 66
- EP – European Parliament
- GDP – Gross Domestic Product
- IMF – International Monetary Fund
- JOBBIK – Jobbik, the Movement for a Better Hungary
- LAOS – Popular Orthodox Rally
- LL – Libertarian Left
- LMP – Politics-can-be-Different
- MMP – Mixed Member Proportional Voting System
- MSI - Movimento Socialisto Italiano
- NGP – New Generation Party
- PPDD – Romanian People’s Party
- PvdD - Partij voor de Dieren
- PVV – Party for Freedom
- RR – Radical Right
- SD – Swedish Democrats
- SPD – Social Democratic Party (Germany)
- SYRIZA – Coalition of the Radical Left
- UDCA – L'Union de défense des commerçants et artisans

## **Chapter I INTRODUCTION**

### **1.1. Introduction**

In the fall of 2010, Golden Dawn, an obscure Greek ultranationalist and openly xenophobic fringe group was running in the Athens municipal elections based on a campaign message advocating for the introduction of armed patrols throughout the city. In comparison to Greece's more established radical-right (the Popular Orthodox Rally), the party was only a marginal extremist movement infatuated with Nazi salutes and symbols but never reaching more than 0.5 percent of votes nationally (NSD 2015b). Its obscurity and extremism were deemed too radical to receive any meaningful support or attention and, much like in previous elections, during the 2010 municipal campaign the party was hardly mentioned by Greece's political commentators or mass media. Yet in the fall of 2010, this all changed when over 10,000 Athenians came to the polls to give the party its first-ever political seat in a Greek legislative body. It was one of the many small parties that alongside the centrist New Democracy and Pasok made up the Athens City Council. They were joined by the communists, ecologists and a struggling new coalition of radical-left parties, SYRIZA, which was reduced to two seats from the four it held previously.

Both the obscure neo-Nazis and the declining SYRIZA would wind up reshaping the map of Greece's party system only two years later. The latter surged in the 2012 national elections to become the main opposition party. In 2015, it would actually go on

to win the elections and take power. During the same elections, Golden Dawn entered the national parliament for the first time after securing the votes of a large segment of voters who usually supported the Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS). Up until that time, it was LAOS that had been in fact Greece's main radical-right party and the only one represented in parliament since 2007 yet the party would lose to Golden Dawn in all three elections after that. All this was still far from grasp in the 2010 Athenian elections; however, 2010 in Greece was not an accident generating a flash party but merely a beginning foreshadowing the changes in the years to come.

At the same time in 2010 when Golden Dawn was preparing for its Athens' debut, thousands of residents took to the streets of Stockholm in protest. "Racists – Get Out!" read their banners only a day after Sweden's elections results confirmed the first ever entry of the extremist Swedish Democrats in the country's Riksdag (BBC 2010). Although in existence for more than twenty years, the party was only marginal in Swedish politics and had never before managed to pass the threshold necessary in order to be elected in either national or European parliaments. Its sudden success now, in a country where extremism was until recently thought to be almost non-existent, ushered a wave of protests throughout Sweden's major cities. Yet despite the short-lived resentment towards the result, just a day before, the Swedish Democrats received their largest vote ever - over 300,000 people that ultimately gave the party its first ever members of parliament (NSD 2015b). Four years later, in 2014 their voters would have surged to over 800,000, making the party the third largest in the country.

The very same Stockholm streets, only a couple of summers earlier, were host to a different kind of passionate protest altogether. This time, it was one that militated for

permissive copyright laws and free internet-file sharing while opposing police raids on the Pirate Bay. It was a protest that ultimately propelled the new Pirate Party into the spotlight and eventually to the European Parliament in 2009. Both the Pirate protest - as well as the latter 2010 anti-extremist protests signaled a significant change in Sweden's political landscape. At the same time, both events also pointed towards the simultaneous decline of the Social Democrats, Christian Democrats and the Leftist Party – all traditionally important heavyweights in Swedish politics (NSD 2015b).

In the meantime, on the other side of the continent, a press release in Budapest by Hungary's third largest party, Jobbik, called for the establishment of 'criminal zones' outside major cities and the effective segregation of the Roma minority from the country's predominantly Hungarian population (MTI 2010). Although only formed in 2003 and marginal in Hungary's previous 2006 election, Jobbik managed to win over almost one million Hungarian voters in 2010, double the number that voted for the party to the European Parliament in 2009 (NSD 2015b).

In the Netherlands, a few months earlier, the general elections reconfirmed the consolidation of two relatively new political parties. The first party was Geert Wilders' populist and radical one-man Party for Freedom (PVV), arguing for restrictive immigration laws and a tougher crackdown on criminals. Created in 2006, it tripled its popular vote in 2010 thus becoming the country's third largest party (NSD 2015b). The other political party, although not nearly as popular, dismissed speculations about being a single-hit flash-party when it secured its two seats in parliament first gained in 2006. This party, Partij voor de Dieren (PvdD), is among the first political parties to democratically

enter a state's parliament based on a platform focused on militating for extensive rights, fair treatment and welfare for – animals.

These kinds of new political entrances were neither limited to a particular election nor to the countries mentioned above. The rise of previously marginal political actors was mirrored in many, if not most, European countries during the late 2000s and early 2010s. Marxist, populist, libertarian, radical-right and even extremist parties have proliferated during this time period and subsequently quickly gained political representation in European or national parliaments. Reinvented socialist parties such as Die Linke in Germany or Parti De Gauche in France reflected an effort at rejuvenating the leftist end of the political spectrum. Like Synaspismos in Greece - or SYRIZA after 2004 – the anti-austerity left-wing Podemos started challenging the two-party dominated political arena in Spain. In Italy, the Five-Star-Movement, a party that combines libertarianism, direct democracy, populism and Euroscepticism, did the same after 2013. Pirate parties in Sweden and Germany led to a contagion in several other countries and the formation of an entirely new party-family in Europe and beyond. New or transformed populist right-wing parties have entered parliaments in Denmark, Finland, the Baltics and Czech Republic. Others, built on the notoriety (and capital) of popular mass-media icons, crept into the political arena of Central and Eastern European states such as Bulgaria and Romania. Finally, a sub-party family thought to be incapable of success, the extreme or neo-fascist radical right, has managed to make significant headways in countries where it was until recently absent such as in Hungary and Greece. Western democracies and especially Europe is thus experiencing an important proliferation of political parties, most of which claim to fight the very party system on behalf of the disenfranchised voter.

The main question therefore that this dissertation is concerned with is what accounts for the rise of this vast array of political parties outside the political establishment and from all poles of the ideological space during the last decade. Defining ideology, this thesis employs Erikson and Tedin's (2003) definition of political ideology as a "set of beliefs about the proper order of society and how it can be achieved" (64). Measurements of ideology throughout the thesis are done through analyses of election programs and interviews with party leaders, party members and members of parliament.

Of course, the appearance of new political contenders is by no means a rare sight. New coalitions and parties are created all the time and naturally claim to take on issues that are not addressed by the other already existing political actors. The parties mentioned above are hardly new in what they are trying to do – that is, occupy a space the others have left vacant. Golden Dawn, the Swedish Democrats, Jobbik and PVV roughly fall within an already existent and quite flourishing broad party family, the new radical right. These parties have taken the vacant space to the right of the statist-individualist or communitarian-libertarian debate. The Five-Star-Movement, Podemos, SYRIZA, and the Pirates epitomize an opposite pole emphasizing post-modern values and personal freedom. Ideologically, therefore, they could not be further apart from other parties on the far right.

In this regard, the obvious question would be – why then draw any parallel between these parties, which are apparently on opposite ends of the political spectrum? Furthermore, why focus yet again on parties that have been studied quite thoroughly and extensively for decades - in some cases, perhaps more so than actual mainstream parties such as social-democrats, liberals or Christian-democrats. Academic debates concerning

the advent of Greens and the new-right have already provided countless (and sometimes contradictory) explanations as to their rise. For instance, while ignored during the mid and late 1970s, new left libertarians and greens became a widespread topic of academic works in the late 1980s and early nineties. A number of academic scholars, and in particular Herbert Kitschelt (1989), have sought to explain the rise of Greens and identified modern welfare as responsible for a shift in voter preferences towards new social movements and issues, thus allowing Green parties to create their own opportunity for entry (36). Others such as Dick Richardson and Chris Rootes (1995) argued, on the other hand, that it is the impact of permissive electoral systems as well as the absence of ecological-friendly state bureaucracies that encouraged the emergence of successful Green parties (11).

When it comes to the new right or radical-right, academic literature is even richer in its attempts to explain its success as well as in classifying the heterogeneous variations of extreme and radical right parties in European politics. Nonna Mayer (1998) and Hans-Georg Betz (1998), for example, have drawn attention to increasing free-market competition and globalization as factors responsible for the proliferation of the radical right in Western Europe. Jackman and Volpert (1996) argue that economic decline and unemployment are what animate the formation of radical-right parties as well as their success in elections. Elisabeth Carter (2004), Michelle Hale Williams (2006) and Cas Mudde (2007) stress the ability of such parties to generate their own relevance and domination over new issues such as immigration. On the other hand, the same Herbert Kitschelt (1995) claims that transformations of the working class and re-socialization in working environments have allowed a certain authoritarian, anti-immigrant and economically right-wing new right party family to gain significant salience among blue-

collar voters. By contrast, Rydgren (2006) disagrees, as he argues that despite the name *right* such parties have nothing to do with an economic-right position, leaning instead towards defending the welfare state.

Classifications of these parties, therefore, as well as explanations for their rise are quite abundant and since the late 1980s, academic literature on parties and party-systems has been infused with countless studies on the rise of Greens and/or especially the rise of the extreme/radical-right. Given the extensive works on such parties, what is then the value of *yet another study* of the new left or new right - in Europe? The answer to this question lies in the fact that during the last half-decade, the new left and new right are not only changing, as Rydgren (2006) argues, but are constantly being enriched by newcomers that may or may not subscribe to already established definitions about these party families. What was once a clearer distinction between radical-right and radical-left is becoming increasingly murky with the proliferation of these parties. For instance, it is unreasonable to assume that the Swedish Democrats are anything like the National Front in France or Freedom Party in Austria. Furthermore, it is also questionable whether the Swedish Democrats of today are anything like the Swedish Democrats of twenty years ago or even ten years ago for that matter. It is also questionable whether classifications of populist radical-right parties are also applicable to extremist parties like Jobbik in Hungary or Golden Dawn in Greece. Given that most studies seem to agree that extreme-right neo-Nazis fare poorly in elections compared to radical-right populists, the Hungarian and Greek cases challenge these conclusions. Similarly, the Five-Star-Movement with its commitment towards direct democracy, degrowth, ecology and free internet access seems to fall into the left-libertarian camp if it were not for its strong

populism, Euroscepticism and alliance with UKIP a populist-right wing party. The rise of Pirate parties also raises questions – namely whether it is merely a flash-phenomenon (as was argued of Greens when they first formed) or if it is here to stay as the Greens eventually did twenty years ago. In other words, are these parties representing new issues, a protest vote or perhaps both and do they constitute an opposite pole to the radical-right, incorporating a left-left position on liberty and social justice or are they simply a one-issue party family.

Secondly, as few studies are pan-European (see Cas Mudde 2007), maintaining instead the old divisions of West vs. Eastern Europe, it becomes worth revisiting what can be said about Eastern fringe parties. Are new Central and Eastern European radical-right and populist parties such as Hungary's Jobbik, Romania's People's Party or Bulgaria's Ataka different or similar to their Western European counterparts? Similarly it is worth considering whether Hungary's Politics-can-be-Different (LMP) is just an emulation of Green parties in Western Europe or whether it is a party that emulates a different sort of social divide that combines green messages with a very libertarian discourse. This study aims to consider the rise of these parties both in Western Europe as well as in new EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe.

Lastly, while many studies focus on specific types of party families and the way they fare across a given number of states, very few explore the dynamics between two or more similar parties of the same family within a given state. Although not frequent, this phenomenon is on the rise. Such is the case of the Popular Orthodox Rally in Greece and Golden Dawn, the Green Left in Netherlands and PvdD, and the Greater Romania Party and New Generation (and later the People's Party) in Romania. This dissertation aims to

investigate what happens when two such parties co-inhabit the same political space in a given country. In other words, it seeks to understand what is the dynamic between the two and how does that affect their electoral success as well as the electoral success of mainstream parties. Why is it, for instance, that the competition for the right-wing vote is won in certain elections by certain parties and not by other parties of the same party-family that had entered parliament previously. These are all important questions and while previous studies have made fundamental contributions towards the understanding of these parties, the most recent transformations of these party families call for a constant study of the phenomenon.

Granted, however, that parties are in a constant dynamic, the first point of concern previously raised still remains – why mix two very different party families? What do the seemingly innocent Pirates and Party for Animals or the libertarian Five-Star Movement and Politics-can-be-Different have to do with neo-Nazis, the radical right or even populist parties like PVV? While the latter call for the expulsion of immigrants or at least the control of immigration, the former are advocating free internet file sharing, the protection of animals and individual freedom. Similarly, in terms of internal party organization, all these parties are very different from each other – sometimes even within the same party family. While the more extremist strand (Jobbik, Golden Dawn) involve intricate organizations and paramilitary units much like the original Fascists of the 1930s, the other radical-right parties do not. While most of these parties have high membership others have no internal structure such as PVV with Geert Wilders as the only official member. Likewise, while some opt to portray a democratic party structure (often including more than one leader) such as the Five-Star-Movement, the Pirates, LMP, others opt for a strict

hierarchical party structure. Therefore, at a first glimpse, no parallel exists between these parties. In terms of internal party organization, they are very different from each other. In libertarian-authoritarian terms, they stand at completely opposite poles ideologically.

However, all these parties whether they are radical-right or radical-left share important features that warrant a revision of our understanding and classification of party families in modern Western political systems (Abedi 2004). When it comes to political strategy, for instance, these very different party families share quite a lot in common. Their rhetoric, criticism and ideological thrust is pointed not just at each other but also towards the established, mainstream centre-left and centre-right. One could argue that such parties fall under what Andreas Schedler (1996), Robert R. Barr (2009) or McDonnell and Newell (2011) call outsider, anti-party or anti-establishment parties. While these three terms are not always used interchangeably as some anti-partyist literature would actually differentiate between them, a few certain key features are recognized as fundamentally defining this type of party.

The most important such feature is a triangular framing of politics between establishment, anti-establishment and citizenry with the second being the only true representative of the latter (Schedler 1996, 293). To this end, such parties employ an aggressive and confrontational style of opposition while describing themselves as victims of the establishment and portraying their struggle against the mainstream as part of a struggle against a decaying democracy that is akin to anti-authoritarian movements. They promise to bridge left-right divides and use their ‘new’, outsider and never-before-in-government status as a credential to govern and ‘fix’ all societal problems allegedly created by the mainstream (Schedler 1996, 299-302).

Parties that have often been considered to be anti-establishment at least at one point in their existence are the Greens in many European states as well as Lega Nord and Rifondazione Comunista in Italy or FPÖ in Austria. Nevertheless, the anti-establishment credentials of this mélange of right-wing and new-left parties are often called into question, especially given their entry into governing coalition (and thus the mainstream) in many European states. Ever since the mid-1990s, Green parties for instance have been part of governments in Finland, Belgium, France, Ireland, Netherlands and Germany. Starting with the late 1990s and the early 2000s, even some of the older right-wing populist parties have done the same in Switzerland, Austria, Netherlands Italy and Norway.

Yet while some former outsiders have joined the mainstream, the new libertarians, radical and extreme right parties emergent in the late 2000s are very much like their slightly older predecessors when they came about. Naturally, the degree of anti-mainstream rhetoric differs among the new libertarian, Pirate, radical-right and extreme-right newcomers. Sometimes it differs even among members of the same party-family. However, all generally point to the increasing disconnect between existing parties and society. They juxtapose an ‘authentic’, ‘real’, ‘pure’ people versus the ‘hidden’ and ‘evil’ interests of those that lead them. The elites are usually presented as decadent, corrupt, greedy and generally not at all interested in doing what they claim to do – represent.

Consequently, they attempt at portraying themselves one way or another as *tribunes* of ‘the people’- or advocates of the alienated, the unheard and the unrepresented. Doing so, they present very simplistic and laconic solutions to complex and intricate societal problems. Their party programs are often very short and in point-form despite the

usually complicated reformative platforms they entail. Solutions to societal issues are depicted as easily available, suggesting that it is the unwillingness rather than the inability on the part of the mainstream to enact them. In contrast, they, who have never before governed, would immediately provide such solutions should they be elected to power. Almost no academic study investigates these political parties comprehensively, including those from both the radical-left and the radical-right, Abedi (2004) being a rare exception.

However, this dissertation argues that while the classification along the ideological left vs. right may not be entirely inadequate, it ignores nonetheless the common features of these parties and a deeper societal cleavage that they seek to represent – that between people and rulers. This study therefore revives and borrows Geroge Lavau's (1969) concept of *tribune party* in order to better encompass this vast array of new political actors in Western party systems. However, Lavau's (1969) tribune party was intended solely to describe the Communist Party in France immediately after WWII due to its staunch unwavering commitment to its transformative goals. This dissertation argues in favor of revising the tribune party concept with the aim to bring added value to already existing concepts. Therefore, tribune parties of the modern day encompass – not a particular party family such as is often associated with populist right parties in Europe – but rather all ideologically radical parties, far-left and far-right, authoritarian and libertarian, ultimately comprising an increasingly large group of political parties.

Furthermore, modern tribune parties are not simply parties of 'the people' as the *populist* or *anti-establishment* labels sometimes suggest. It is not 'the people' at large or the whole of society that these parties claim to represent. The tribune party only claims to

be a party of *the plebs*, the ordinary citizen and often a particular sort of ordinary citizen. While far from being a complete list, several such sub-categories of plebs can be identified. LMP, in Hungary for example, underscores that its message is best received and intended for urban – and particularly Budapest – intellectuals. It does not hide the fact that so far it has not been able to spread its libertarian-green Western European message to poorer (and less receptive) north-eastern areas of the country (Politics-can-be-Different 2011). Many of the radical-right parties underline that their message is tailored for those ‘patriotic’ voters, *natives* or nationals that have been abandoned by the mainstream for the sake of multiculturalism. The Swedish Pirate Party prides itself to have managed to tap into a constituency that is often thought to remain apathetic to politics – the youth (Pirate Party 2012). In this regard it is not the only one, with Marxists like SYRIZA or radicals like the Swedish democrats doing the exact same<sup>1</sup> (Skolval 2010). There is an emphasis on appealing to the young as a means to suggest not only that such parties are to be relevant in future elections but also as a way to illustrate that while the mainstream parties cannot appeal to this group, they on the other hand *can*. The implication of their effort is to argue that they talk about real important issues that engage young voters while the old parties have lost touch with this important element of society.

It is thus specific societal groups such as the *young*, the *intellectual* and the *patriot/native* that the tribune party attempts to speak to. This citizen that *they* represent is almost always portrayed by such parties as being under siege and surrounded by a vast array of enemies as well as an ill defined and heterogeneous *mélange* of *patricians*. *Patricians* are most often representative of mainstream-politicians and parties but they do not necessarily need to be limited to this category alone. They could also include financial

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<sup>1</sup> Interview Swedish Democrats

and cultural elites, former-communists (in Central and Eastern European states), government, surveillance, law-enforcement agencies that restrict individual private freedom, multinational corporations and international institutions such as the EU or the IMF as well as ‘traitors’ to the state (in the case of extremists parties). In their insidious conspiracy against the citizenry, they are often portrayed as working together as well as working with other identified ‘enemies’ such as immigrants as argued by radical-right parties (Mudde 2007). It is against this vast conglomerate of foes that the tribune party claims to defend its particular constituency.

Moreover, as mainstream parties are increasingly criticized for insulating themselves from society (reflected in their declining membership as well as the decline in voters during elections), the tribune party emphasizes its preoccupation and ability to draw high numbers of voters, activists or members – particularly from those very groups ignored by established major parties. Almost as if to emulate the mass-parties of the early 1900s, many of these new political contenders boast large memberships that often surpass the membership of mainstream parties. (Jobbik 2010, Swedish Democrats 2014, Pirate Party 2011). Such parties use high membership as a means to gather capital in the absence of state-subsidies but also to boast their ability to re-engage significant sections of society which the establishment cannot.

The tribune party portrays itself as a transformative party and is never moderate when it comes to its ideological ethos. Whether libertarian or radical-right, their positions on the political spectrum lie at the extreme of political space. Yet, while taking over completely opposite ideological poles, they rarely admit to being ‘radical’. Their interpretation of their own position vis-à-vis the rest is that of ‘authentic’ societal

representatives versus a corrupt and disengaged general political culture that has abandoned ideology and that fails to address or even discuss ‘real issues’. When asked to place *their* party on a left-right scale, they would reject the left-right dichotomy altogether as unrepresentative of both current parties as well as current societal cleavages. Equally important, just like Lavau’s (1969) conceptualization of the tribune French Communist Party after WWII, tribune parties of the modern day are similarly portraying themselves as unwavering in their commitment towards challenging the political establishment and changing the political order created by them. Part of this means that they almost never accept to cooperate with the established centrist parties or join their coalitions. The cases of SYRIZA in May 2012, the Five-Star-Movement after 2013 as well as that of many of the radical-right strand of tribune parties are illustrative of that. Those that falter and those that join governing coalitions do not tend to be rewarded by their electorate; this is the case of the Swedish Pirates, the Romanian New Generation Party and People’s Party after 2012 as well as the Greek LAOS.

In general, the message that tribune parties try to convey is one aimed at what Katz and Mair (1995) famously called the cartel of mainstream established centre-left and centre-right political parties. Ultimately, what tribune parties try to underscore is that while the cartel of mainstream parties have abandoned ideology and moved towards the center, turned away from society and towards the state, forsaken their need for societal links and membership, they – the new political competitors – represent not the margins or fringes of political space but rather the way perhaps the current established mainstream once used to be. Because of their radicalism they claim to have reintroduced ideology to political debates, have re-opened muted issues, have re-linked disgruntled members of

society to political representation and lastly, have re-established the importance of membership in party-dynamics. Therefore, while different at first glimpse in terms of ideology, political newcomers of the most recent wave (whether libertarian, Marxist or far-right) share many of these features and for that reason this comparative analysis of transformations in European political arenas during the late 2000s will resist the temptation to look at them as isolated phenomena.

## **1.2. Research Question**

Literature on tribune or anti-establishment parties is often concerned with classifying and differentiating them from the more general and often broader label – *populism*. As previously mentioned, several terms have thus been proposed: anti-party party, anti-establishment, outsiders or anti-democratic parties with some of literature differentiating between these terms and a number of works advocating for the use of some labels and not others. Another focus of academic studies has revolved around the question of what happens once such parties join governmental coalitions. However, few look at what actually drives the formation as well as the success or failure of such parties. Thus the question this dissertation asks is - what accounts for the rise of libertarian and right-wing authoritarian tribune parties within such a short period of time during the latter half of the past decade?

Parties that have adopted the *tribune* discourse have not just mushroomed in the second half of the previous decade but have also been very successful in entering national parliaments or the European Parliament (EP). While one may be tempted to look for

structural arguments or claim that economic decline is the catalyst for this proliferation, the emergence of tribune parties cannot be explained by structural shifts while at the same time it predates the most recent global financial crisis. Economic decline may certainly exacerbate the populist, radical-right or left vote however, the cause for their recent proliferation and success lies in their ability to capitalize on an already existing crisis of modern representative democracy – one that due to the cartelization of mainstream political parties, the late Peter Mair recently referred to as a crisis of democratic legitimacy in European political systems between those political parties that govern but no longer represent and those that claim to represent but do not govern. The first group is represented by the cartel system and the second by the challengers.

### **1.3. Hypothesis**

This dissertation entails a few underlining assumptions. The first deals with the question over what constitutes electoral success. Pedersen (1982) argues that parties are mortal organizations (6). They pass through infancy, adulthood, old age and eventually die. Pedersen argues that each stage in a party's development is accompanied by a threshold. Consequently, there is a first threshold of declaration, when a group declares its intention to enter political competition, a second threshold of authorization, when a party meets the legal regulations required to participate in elections, a third threshold of representation marked by the barrier to enter parliaments and finally a threshold of relevance which is marked by a party's impact on government formation (Pedersen 1982, 6). For a new and small party, however, it is the third threshold of representation which is

in actuality the hardest one to overcome. Consequently, success revolves around this third threshold. This is not to say that success is only when a party sends members to parliament. Rather, there is a broad spectrum of success ranging from: a) *non-parliamentary relevance* (such as obtaining the minimum votes required to receive state funding), to b) representation at the EP level to c) representation in national parliaments and finally to d) forming the main opposition.

A second assumption this dissertation makes concerns the debates on structure vs. agency. Clearly structure is important as structural transformations have reshaped political spaces. Therefore, this dissertation will not challenge arguments about societal changes which have reshaped voters' preferences, ultimately opening up the space for the rise of post-modern libertarian and new radical-right parties. This is largely already accepted in academic works. At the same time, it is impossible to ignore parties' own abilities to create winning conditions for their success. Studies by Carter (2004), Williams (2006) and Mudde (2007) all point towards the supply-side of parties as the often overlooked feature in explaining the success or failures of new parties.

Political space, therefore, is not determined by either agency or structure; it is rather akin to a marketplace where demand and supply of political parties are highly interconnected (Pippa Norris 2005, 4). As a result, this dissertation will not take a side in the structure versus agency debate. It will assume that both are crucial in understanding dynamics in the political space. The degree of success will thus be explored, through an investigation of both 1) popular demand for tribune parties and 2) supply of tribune parties as well as 3) external and institutional factors favoring or hindering both the demand and the supply.

The hypothesis in this dissertation is that new tribune parties in the European political arena flourish not only as a result of changes in the political space but rather due to the very perceived presence and even strengthening of the cartel-party system established by mainstream centrist political parties. Therefore, this dissertation will not be as ambitious as to make definite claims about the objective strengthening or weakening of the cartel itself in European states. Rather, it claims - that despite the real nature of the cartel (whatever that may be) - the perception among voters and outsider (potential) political actors is what actually matters. On the demand-side, new tribune parties become attractive as a result of an increasing popular perception about the disconnect between established parties and society. On the supply-side, new tribune parties fare well in elections for would-be political mavericks for the exact same reasons but also when they play up the anti-establishment discourse.

The contribution to already existing literature that this dissertation makes is threefold. First, this dissertation will attempt at bridging two bodies of literature that often talk past each other; one is on the cartelization of political parties, the other is epitomized by two or multiple dimensional models of political competition. Specifically, with respect to the cartel-party thesis, this dissertation contributes to the question about who challenges the cartel and the way in which tribune parties position themselves specifically against the cartel of established mainstream parties. Second, it attempts to revisit some previous conclusions regarding radical and fringe party families and offer new insights into their ideologies, strategies and approaches to electoral competition. Finally because of a pan-European approach integrating supply-side and demand-side explanations, this

dissertation will attempt at offering an alternative understanding of the rise of new and radical parties on the European continent.

#### **1.4. Methodology and Case Selection**

To test the validity of this theoretical proposition, the comparative method will be employed. The focus of this dissertation will be the EU-27 and primarily three pairs of EU-member states across three European regions that share a number of important features; this includes a South European pair comprised of Italy and Greece, a Central and Eastern pair that includes Hungary and Romania as well as a Continental/Northern European pair composed of Germany and Sweden. The parties under study include the Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS), Golden Dawn and SYRIZA in Greece, the Pirate Party and Die Linke in Germany, Jobbik and Politics-can-be-Different (LMP) in Hungary, the Five-Star-Movement in Italy, the Pirate Party and Swedish Democrats in Sweden as well as the New Generation Party (NGP) and People's Party (PPDD) in Romania. As this study focuses on the latest wave of such parties that emerged during the last decade, it will deliberately leave out older suspects such as Front National in France, FPO in Austria or the already established Green parties. Instead this research is focused on parties previously thought to be either too insignificant or parties that are simply too new to have received much attention from academic works.

The aim of this dissertation is to compare countries with significant similarities in order to isolate the independent variable(s) responsible for the electoral success of recent fringe parties. At the same time, it seeks to avoid a West vs. East separation based on

former Cold War divisions. A quarter century after the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, few studies on political parties adopt a pan-European approach. However, some of the latest works such as those by Mudde in 2007 or McDonnell and Newell (2011) do count among them. As the proliferation of new right and new left parties in the mid and late 2000s is a pan-European phenomenon simultaneously present in both old and new EU member states, this study cannot be limited to just one half of the continent and will include case-studies involving states from both sides of the former Iron curtain. As all states are EU-members, it will be possible to test the entry of newcomers at the supranational level of government (in the EP) as well as the ways in which parties use EP elections as strategies of entry.

Moreover, through the choice of these specific six states, this study will attempt to control as much as possible for the impact of electoral systems by choosing states with relatively comparable systems. The reason is quite obvious. Electoral systems are one of the most powerful obstacles for new or smaller parties. In Europe, large differences exist between systems such as the UK's first-past-the-post which strongly handicaps smaller fringe parties and those such as the Netherlands' no-legal-threshold purely PR system. In the latter case, the threshold is basically 1 divided by the 150 total seats in the legislature of the total number of valid votes. This comes down to an effective threshold of less than 1% necessary for a party to achieve legislative representation and is thus very permissive (IFES Election Guide 2015).

Consequently, countries with extremely restrictive as well as very permissive electoral systems will be left out. All six cases chosen have comparable mixed member proportional (MMP) systems or modified proportional systems that do tend to favor major

parties. Greece for example allocates a bonus of 50 seats out of 300 to the party that wins a plurality of votes. Sweden prevents small parties from having their own ballot papers thus handicapping their capacity to receive votes (IFES Election Guide 2015). All other states use MMP which similarly favors larger parties but also allows for at least part of the seats to be allocated proportionally to the percentage of votes received. In this sense, the proportional part of MMP is not much different from outright PR systems.

Similarly, all six states have party systems which include two or more anti-establishment political parties. This is quite relevant with respect to the room which anti-establishment parties would have to strategize and maneuver. Two or more anti-establishment tribunal parties would need to share the anti-mainstream space and potentially compete with each other as well as the established parties. By contrast, a tribunal party in a system where it is the only such party has fewer constraints as well as more room to maneuver on the ideological spectrum. One would assume a higher likelihood for electoral success therefore in cases where only such party exists in the party system. As this dissertation seeks to account for electoral success and as some of these parties have been very successful while others have not, this dissertation tries to control for this by choosing among the EU's six cases where the party system does not have just one singular such party but rather two or more coexisting at any one given time. The case-selection, therefore, is not done based on the dependent variable – not all tribunal parties within these states are successful cases of tribunal parties (understood as being able to gather enough votes to enter the national or European parliament). Rather, it is based on countries with similar features in order to better isolate the variables responsible for successful tribunal parties.

Lastly, although it is impossible to control for the effects of the recent Financial Crisis, this study has chosen countries which have all experienced a technical recession at least one year during the late-2000s recession. Nonetheless, there is some variation. In 2009 – the year the recession hit Europe - Romania was the hardest hit among the group in terms of actual negative GDP growth (-7.1%) while Greece was the least affected (-2.33%). Between 2008 and 2012, however, the Greek economy contracted the highest (-14%) while Sweden's economy actually grew by 7% (IMF 2014).

The research material used in this dissertation is composed of primary as well as secondary sources. The first includes official party programs and platforms, opinion polls, country and election data as well as personal interviews conducted with party leaders, party members of national and European parliaments, party ideologues as well as academics and experts. Secondary sources include a number of documents, scholarly articles and works dealing with anti-establishment and radical parties in Europe.

#### 1.4.1. Reviewing Existing Studies

Existing literature constitutes a fundamental starting point for the purpose of this dissertation. Essentially, two general concerns are evident in party literature. While some important works deal with shifts in the political space, others attempt to understand why - despite all the transformations and changes - European party systems seem to have remained by and large the same. This dissertation will attempt to unpack the general thrust of these two bodies of literature in order to establish the preliminary ground for conceptualizing the arrival of very transformative parties in European party systems that

have continued and to a large extent still continue to remain unchanged. Existing literature is also very important in providing some insight into the characterization and classification of new political actors. While terms such as *populist* or radical have been suggested, an exact definition of the party that this dissertation will deal is introduced before continuing to determine the subsequent causes for its success. A review of previous literature will attempt to dissect these different debates in the following chapter.

#### 1.4.2. Primary Sources

Primary sources will be central in exploring the relationship between the demand and supply of new parties during the last decade. This will include election data, opinion polls, manifesto and manifesto project data as well as personal interviews with prominent party members, party ideologues, experts as well as party leaders, members of parliament or members of the European Parliament.

##### a) Election Data and Opinion Polls

Election data in this study is primarily used from the sixth round of the European Election Database. This data includes information on voters' opinions concerning the state of the economy, relevant societal issues, the performance of governing parties as well as the political system and democracy in general. It also offers information about the demographic and socio-economic background of voters. It can therefore highlight important shifts in voter preferences as well as perceptions which may be linked to

changes in the demand for political parties. Additionally, for opinion polls on party preference and opinion polls on the electorate's policy position this dissertation also uses the IFES Election Guide, Eurobarometers as well as Skolval in the case of Sweden. In the absence of recent election data in the case of certain countries, these polls can be the next best indicative for analytical purposes of the performance of these parties. For macro-level data such as GDP, GDP growth, and unemployment, the IMF World Economic Outlook Database is also used.

#### b) Party Doctrines/Programs and Speeches

For the purpose of assessing the character of the supply-side of parties, party doctrines and programs are crucial in mapping these parties as well as identifying their attitude towards each other and the mainstream political class. A party program is the most authoritative and fundamental document available to map a party's position on any given issue. In this regard, the Manifesto Project data, available online, is an invaluable tool for the purpose of comparing party positions across countries. It is the most comprehensive and systematically constructed data to date that places parties on a left-right political spectrum based on their party programs. It divides the information parties release into seven topic areas and identifies their position (based on a -100 to +100 range) by measuring the difference between the right-oriented text and leftist-oriented text. Nonetheless, the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) does contain several drawbacks. Notably, it attempts to reduce every position to a singular left-right dimension and thus it may mask possible radical positions on certain topics if these positions are piled together

with other dimensions where they are quite moderate. Similarly, it treats the left-right spectrum as constant across countries as well as constant over time which may be problematic as a particular issue could be left in certain contexts but not others.

This dissertation supplements data from the CMP with content analysis of party manifestos as well as speeches in parliament, press releases and important declarations by party members or party leaders. The aim of focusing on these factors is to determine to what degree these doctrines are responding to a perceived popular demand or whether they are illustrative of parties' abilities to create their own issues and opportunities for entry.

### c) Interviews

While election data and manifestos offer important insight into the dynamics between demand and supply, they do not yet fully account for the formation or the success of these parties. Ultimately, manifestos can be sometimes illusory and unrepresentative of parties' strategy or of causes responsible for people choosing to vote for them. To obtain a better grasp of the phenomenon, this dissertation will draw upon party interviews conducted with academics as well as party representatives and leaders. In total 20 interviews were conducted. Among the interviewees were four academic experts, four party leaders, one member of parliament, four members of the European parliament, six prominent party members, strategists and ideologues and one former prominent member. All taped interviews were approved by the Carleton Ethics Committee between 2011 and 2015.

### 1.5. Testing the Hypothesis

The hypothesis in this study is that the success of tribune parties throughout the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century is due to the ability of these parties themselves to engage in an anti-establishment or (anti-cartel party) discourse; likewise it is also due to the progressively accentuated perceptions about the strengthening of the centre-left and right cartel among voters. This is not to say that there is a higher perception now in the current decade as opposed to another period in time about the strength of centrist political cartels but rather that over the past ten years, the cartel is perceived to have strengthened. This is true for popular perceptions as well as those perceptions of would-be tribunes. Ultimately this is what leads to the supply of new tribune parties meeting the demand for alternative political forces. To test whether voters perceive the cartel to be strengthening, election polls and opinion polls are critical. Although, none may actually ask questions specifically identifying a “cartel” of mainstream parties, some questions may be quite indicative of popular views towards established political alternatives. The European Election Database, for example, asks respondents whether they trust current political parties. Eurobarometers likewise ask citizens across the 27 member-states to what degree they feel that democracy is working in their specific countries. It is the argument of this dissertation that voter attitudes toward political parties or democracy (and the way it works) heavily impact popular demands for alternative political representatives. When trust in pre-existing parties and democracy is relatively high, demand for such alternatives

is low. However, when trust in parties is low, demand for non-mainstream political forces is likely to rise as well.

In addition to this, opinion polls have a crucial role for the supply-side as well. Parties obviously consult polls and other statistical data as well and often cite them when they think it plays to their advantage. Parties ultimately form, organize and run for elections at times when they think that they have true chances to win. Few parties in general want to form despite inexistent or insufficient conditions of electoral success for the fear of being branded ‘minor’ or ‘insignificant’ by the electorate. Therefore, not all political parties simply free-float in political space for voters to select. Voters are not always faced with a broad range of parties that they could choose from in every election. The choice they have is quite limited to a number of parties which decide to form and run based on a cost-benefit analysis. Therefore, voters may always be presented with the same major parties, such as center-left and center-right as their almost certain entry in parliament outweighs the cost of running. However, for smaller parties, fringe parties or what are often called ‘niche’ parties the costs of forming, organizing and running in elections are not so obviously low. New parties rarely form and run if the possibility of victory is dim. Parties that overly emphasize an anti-mainstream and anti-elitist discourse are thus much more likely to enter an election when they themselves feel that a demand exists for such an option.

On the supply-side, analyses of party programs, manifestos and interviews with party leaders and members are evidently vital in testing the second part of the hypothesis. Programs and interviews that highlight a heavy and aggressive criticism of the mainstream, a pledge to defend the ‘ordinary citizen’ and a commitment to stay away

from coalitions with mainstream parties are indicative of new parties capitalizing on the cartelization of political space. Alternatively, a party (even if ideologically radical) that is promising to ‘work together’ with other parties and *bridge* certain ideological, social or economic rifts may refute the strengthening cartel hypothesis. Lastly, interviews conducted with party leaders, ideologues and members are critical as such interviews have been specifically tailored as to explore reasons of formation, views of other parties and likelihoods to form future coalitions (cooperate with) the mainstream. Statements demonstrating an aggressive stance towards established political contenders, citing formation particularly because of the cartelization of political space (and possibly elaborating on strategies to circumvent the cartel) would evidently support the hypothesis. Statements indicative of issue ownership but willingness to cooperate as well as citing formation due to circumstantial conditions would on the other hand refute it. Furthermore, statements confirming a subsequent strategy to ‘expose’ mainstream parties for their conspiratorial manner of governing, their lack of vision or failure to engage societal issues would similarly support the initial hypothesis. In contrast, statements aimed particularly towards a single mainstream political party as well as intentions to cooperate or enter larger coalitions with established parties would evidently refute the hypothesis.

## **1.6. Outline**

The breakdown of the dissertation will be as follows: Chapter 2 – *Parties and Society between Status Quo and Change* – essentially tries to situate modern fringe parties employing the tribune discourse within the already existing academic debates on parties

and party systems. In the process, this chapter also aims at making sense of academic debates focused on the transformations of political systems as well as those concerned with the astonishing stability of the system despite shifts and transformations as a result of new entries by fresh political contestants. It ultimately tries to arrive at a foundation for conceptualizing the advent of new tribune parties as part of a renegotiation between the supply and demand in the European electoral marketplace.

Chapter 3 – *Tribunes and Patricians: Conceptualizing the Tribune Party* – aims at investigating the defining features of the tribune parties that mushroomed throughout the mid 2000s and early 2010s in many European states. Based on previous works on anti-party parties explored in the previous chapter, it seeks to sketch out a definition of this party as well as a categorization of the heterogeneous array of parties that would fall under this classification. This chapter examines parties from both new and older EU member states and will attempt at framing a classification that will methodically categorize the heterogeneous pool of tribune-parties emergent during the last decade. By no means is this an attempt to overcome previous debates and classifications but rather provide a working definition for the phenomenon for the purpose of this dissertation. The chapter classifies the new anti-establishment party of the early 21<sup>st</sup> century using six criteria: 1) the presence of a populist discourse, 2) the trivialization of issues, 3) the (aggressive) behavior vis-à-vis political adversaries, 4) the commitment to representing specific constituencies, 5) the presence of an ideologically radical transformative message, and 6) the promise to restore/improve ‘true’ democracy.

Chapter 4 – *The Plebs* – will seek to understand the demand-side causes for the proliferation of the tribune party during the mid and late 2000s. It tests this for the six EU

member states under focus between 2008 and 2014 with the help of zero-order correlations involving a selection of macro-level variables. It also employs a binary logistic regression model for one available case –Sweden – where I also control for gender, education, views of political parties and attitudes towards immigrants. The argument put forth is that while perceptions of the economy matter, what also matters are perceptions of immigrants, age and negative perceptions of existing parties. In terms of age, it is the younger the voters which are more predisposed to vote for tribune parties. Moreover, the perceptions of existing parties specifically illustrate that the arrival of the most recent wave of newcomers can be attributed to increasing voter apathy towards already existing parties and to a perceived degradation of democracy in many European states. This particularly accounts for the success of new tribune parties as opposed to already-existing parties capitalizing on structural changes or times of economic instability. Older established parties have simply lost credibility among significant strata of society.

Chapter 5 – *The Tribunes* – attempts at revisiting previous understandings of the position these parties adopt on the left-right economic dimension as well as the left-right libertarian-authoritarian dimension. While such projects such as the CMP do exist, they do suffer from a certain mechanical framework of aligning parties on a singular left-right spectrum. This chapter will attempt to identify the main axes of competition through an examination of party programs as well as statements of prominent party leaders, ideologues and members with the hope of bridging them with previous conclusions on the positions that such parties take on the economy, democracy, multiculturalism, the role of government or personal liberty. The argument made is that there is a strong correlation

between electoral success and the populism of political parties. Furthermore, it claims that for modern tribune parties there is also a strong correlation between populism and economic-leftist positions, regardless of the broader ideological families to which political parties belong to.

Chapter 6 – *The Patricians* – will attempt at unpacking the plethora of enemies that the tribune party claims to defend the ‘ordinary citizen’ from. As Cas Mudde (2007) correctly pointed out when speaking of radical-right parties, this is a central feature of who and what these parties actually are (6). As this dissertation deals with a broader new and anti-systemic outsider party, it is absolutely essential to explore the enemy images that these parties perceive and ultimately that these parties claim to be fighting against. Specifically, this dissertation will dissect the many dimensions of adversaries and will differentiate between two types: internal (traitors) and external (enemies). It argues that among the most frequently encountered patricians or enemy-images used by tribune parties are a) international organizations, b) an external hegemon, c) a neighboring state, d) a (usually foreign) corporation, and finally e) the state and most importantly the parties that run it.

Chapter 7 – *Economic Crisis – Cause or Catalyst – Results of the European Parliament Elections of 2014* – will explore whether the strong result of tribune parties in the 2014 European Parliament elections, five years after the start of the crisis, is linked to the sovereign debt crisis. It specifically attempts to test whether economic voting is what accounts for the 2014 result. Nonetheless, it argues that economic voting does not explain why such parties have also surged in countries that were less affected by the crisis. It therefore suggests that while structure may offer part of the explanation, a deeper analysis

of agency and the dynamics between established and anti-establishment political parties in terms of strategy, discourse, framing issues, achieving salience may offer a more complete explanation for the increasing surge in anti-establishment political party success.

Chapter 8 – *Conclusion* – summarizes the findings of this study, integrating them into a theoretical framework that would present an alternative and comprehensive definition of new radical left and new radical right tribune parties in European politics. Finally, a few theoretical propositions are suggested along with an outlook on the possible future trajectories that tribune parties may follow. In essence, what is put forth is that while the mass-party transformed into the catch-all party after WWII and the cartel-party after the 1970s, the cartel-party system that ensued is at an end. This is because the cartel has intensified since the cartel-party thesis was published in 1995 but as a result, cartel-parties during the last decade have also lost the monopoly over electoral markets and definitions of the alternatives. The new Western political system can ultimately be argued to have currently shifted from a solely *cartel-party system* to one of anti-establishment vs. establishment or *tribunes versus patricians*.

## Chapter 2

### Parties and Society: Between Status Quo and Change

*The party systems of the 1960s reflect, with few but significant exceptions, the cleavage structures of the 1920s. This is a crucial characteristic of Western competitive politics in the age of 'high mass consumption': the party alternatives, and in remarkably many cases the party organizations, are older than the majorities of the national electorates (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 50).*

#### 2.1. Introduction

Literature on parties and party systems (especially in Europe) has undertaken two general directions. On one hand, academic studies have sought to understand transformations in the political space. Works starting with classics such as Lipset and Rokkan, Kirchheimer or Katz and Mair attempt at exploring the factors responsible for shaping contemporary political systems. Therefore, to this end, Lipset and Rokkan construct an explanation based on historical junctures due to revolutionary events. Kirchheimer identifies changes in party organization in the 1950s; and Katz and Mair do

the same but for parties during the 70s. Further changes are identified by more recent works for the emergence of new party families as well such as the greens or new radical right (Leggewie 1989; Kitschelt 1995; Jackman and Volpert 1996, Loch and Heitmeyer 2001; Saalfeld 2002; Ellinas 2013; Anderson 1996; Eatwell 2000; Ivarsflaten 2005).

However, on the other hand, the classical works by Lipset and Rokkan, Kirchheimer or Katz and Mair also reveal a second and perhaps more significant preoccupation – not with change but rather with the stability of the political system. Katz and Mair propose the famous cartel-party thesis which locks party competition between established centrist mainstream parties. Much earlier, Kirchheimer made a similar argument in the case of catch-all parties. Finally and perhaps most famously, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) argue that “the party systems of the 1960s reflect, with few but significant exceptions, the cleavage structures of the 1920s” (50).

Consequently, academic studies on political parties are marked by an apparent tension between those works arguing that the political space (in Western countries and particularly Europe) largely remains the same and a realignment literature arguing that fundamental changes have been in fact occurring in modern party systems. Therefore, the first body of literature sees new parties since the 1970s as not truly upsetting the dominance of mainstream centrist parties while the other points to their sudden rise. This chapter will investigate this theoretical puzzle that rests in academic studies while at the same time situate the rise of tribune parties within the literature. The review in this chapter will therefore attempt to follow the most important debates as well as try to sketch out the avenues through which new tribune anti-establishment parties can be explored. It will do so first through a glimpse over the works generally concerned with stability

championed by the scholars above as well as an examination of works that sought to primarily understand recent changes and new dimensions of competition in post-modern European political systems. I ultimately suggest that the rise of tribune parties is not a phenomenon which invalidates the stability literature. Rather, it confirms and aims to capitalize on the strengthening of a political party cartel in Western democracies.

## **2.2. Explaining Stability in Current Party-Systems**

In the Rokkanian understanding of political systems, the left-right dichotomy transcends a series of successive conflicts which create societal cleavages at specific historical junctures. The main argument is that societal cleavages and the order in which they develop define the ways in which parties form. Conflict, in this conceptualization, is crucial in politics. Two events are associated with the four cleavages they outline. The first is the national revolution which produced conflict between the nation state and the church but also between the central national-building culture and peripheral culturally-distinct populations. The second event is the industrial revolution which resulted in conflict between landed interests and industrialists but also between industrialists and workers (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 14). The sequencing of these revolutions, from the Reformation to the Industrial revolution, is what accounts for the formation of specific party-systems. This is because nation-builders in control of the state face opposition to their control at each revolutionary juncture. As a consequence they require new cohorts of supporters and thus take a side during each conflict (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 38). It is

these choices that lead to the modern party-system in each Western European state. For example, agrarian parties, especially in Scandinavia, came about particularly because nation-builders decided to ally themselves directly with farmers rather than the landed elite. Consequently, the cleavage-structures that come about due to revolution are translated into parties which protect the state from popular grievances by transforming them into grievances towards those that govern.

Some cleavages are more important than others, however. Lipset and Rokkan stress that deep cleavages in ethnic, cultural and religious divided communities can have serious consequences for the continued existence of the political system (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 32). In other words, territorial cleavages or cleavages that result from national revolutions are more dangerous for the state than those emerging from industrial revolutions. Lipset and Rokkan imply that homogeneity along ethnic, linguistic, cultural and religious lines helps foster loyalty towards the state as a whole and thus would cope with the problem of state-implosion. Similarly, the order matters as well. The last societal cleave, between capital and labour, is responsible for a 'freeze' along the left-right axis related to economic issues.

Furthermore, Lipset and Rokkan introduce the concept of reinforcing-cleavages as they claim that conflicts between mobilizing elites and peripheral cultures have often been reinforced by conflicts along other lines such as Church and State or urban versus rural interests. Lipset and Rokkan are as interested in the transformations that led to current party-systems just as they are concerned with the stability of these systems today. Subsequently, they claim that it is the reinforcing cleavages in Belgium with French-speaking secular industrial Wallonia versus Dutch-speaking, Catholic and agricultural

Flanders which have polarized these two societies to the present time. Alternatively, it is the cross-cutting cultural and religious cleavages in Switzerland that did not result in territorial conflicts expressed in that country's party system (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 42-43). In essence, Lipset and Rokkan argue that 'cross-cutting cleavages' dilute loyalty towards one particular group along a given cleavage by loyalty towards a different group along an alternate cleavage. What this implies is that the overall result is a lesser likelihood of polarization and a larger likelihood of political competition without obstructing the loyalty of different groups towards the state as a whole. Specifically, cleavages resulting from the industrial revolution, such as workers vs. owners, are almost meant to attenuate those from the national revolutions.

In essence, permanent societal cleavages are created by the national and industrial revolutions that pitted central against regional cultures, church versus state and rural versus industrial interests. Following the Industrial Revolution, however, the left-right dichotomy becomes primarily – although not solely - centered around one critical variable, class (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 14). Thus, for decades the left has been committed to redistribution and state regulation while the right has advocated the continuation of free-market, free-trade and private-property. Parties in this context form as a result of - and in response to - the cleavages within society. Their role is to mitigate conflict between societal factions and transform what would otherwise be an implosion between different societal divisions and the state into grievances towards government.

Furthermore, Lipset and Rokkan argue that for political parties to engage in alliances, mergers and coalitions - as well as to be able to enter parliament to begin with - there must be a high degree of trust between leaders but also high degrees of loyalty on

behalf of their constituencies (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 32). The strong link between these constituencies and their respective parties is central to the legitimization of these parties as 'true' representatives of societal factions.

Such parties that depend on the loyalty of their constituencies, however, are only reflective of a particular historical period when parties' engagement with civil society was high. Duverger (1964) distinguished between two main types of parties: cadre and mass-based. At a time of limited suffrage with very little political participation and an emerging but feeble civil society, parties revolved around a handful of cadres or individuals with high socio-economic standing who held a monopoly on general party policy, ideology and the strategy the party employed. Such cadre-parties engaged little with civil society and generally kept a thin organizational structure. At the national level, party structure is simply comprised of the interpersonal networks of local elites (Gunther and Diamond 2003, 175). A rudimentary organization and little campaigning effort were to a large extent possible because of the very small number of enfranchised voters and large number of disenfranchised citizen-spectators. This limited number of eligible voters was generally made up of males owning substantial amounts of capital (most often in the form of landed property). Candidates generally relied on their connections and relationships with their very few socio-economic peers.

As most voters constituted a more-or-less homogenous population of socio-economic privileged individuals, ideology played almost no role for this type of party. This constituency had more-or-less the same general interests. Candidates were elected based on mutual respect and benefits promised to peers or 'clients' at the bottom of

patron-client hierarchies as more and more of the lower classes became enfranchised during the mid and late 19<sup>th</sup> century. (Gunther and Diamond 2003, 175-176).

The success of this type of party depended on both patron and client being satisfied with the arrangement between them. Nevertheless, industrialization, the mass migration of rural populations toward cities, the weakening of traditional client-patron relations as well as a broadened franchise mobilized the new working-class voter against the clientelistic exchanges practiced by elite-based parties (Yishai 2001, 669). With the advent of universal suffrage and a developing civil society, the cadre party made way to the mass-party. In contrast to cadre-parties, the later included a complex organization based not on appealing to a small group of influential individuals but rather to every single willing citizen. This party was based on heavy membership that financed (through member-dues) party campaigns as well as party activities that sustained and fortified the party's link with its constituencies in periods between elections (Gunther and Diamond 2003, 178). Such parties were heavily ideological but also less tolerant of competitors. While functioning within a democratic framework, the early mass-based parties accepted and competed in the existing institutions and rules of the game only as to succeed in replacing them with a more fair-suited arrangement that would help them reach their - usually - revolutionary goals (Gunther and Diamond 2003, 178). To propagate this revolutionary message such parties invested heavily and placed great emphasis on supporting newspapers, trade-unions as well as religious, social and recreational organizations. The mass-party was not only seeking to reach numerical superiority over its competitors in terms of voters and members but at the same time it sought to establish a presence in the every-day life of each and every constituent. It is a party that constantly

engaged in the education of its supporters as well as the conversion of those it perceives to 'naturally' share the same interests.

Typifying the parties of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, this period is often considered to be the 'golden age' of political competition. Every party type before them as well as after is weighed against *the* 'mass-party'. It is this type of party that is envisioned whenever explanations are sought to describe what parties actually do. This is true for example of Disraeli's famous quote that "parties are organized opinion." The mass-party is also the model actually used when attempting to provide concise definitions about the role of parties in linking citizens and state (Duberger 1964, 64; Easton 1965, 157; Neumann, 1956). It is likewise the ideal model implied, although not always explicitly stated, in structural approaches that emphasize societal cleavages and movements as conducive to parties forming and representing such movements within state institutions. As very few of these parties have actually survived in contemporary politics, there is an inherent degree of romanticism about this ideal type of society-linked mass-party which such approaches contain. Rokkan's 'freezing' hypothesis, about modern parties being reflective of critical historical cleavages, is primarily assuming that it is these types of mass parties that take on the mission to represent the various societal factions. The mass-party is ultimately the type of party that through its sheer number of members, powerful ideological commitments as well as strong presence in the day-to-day life of its constituents has come to represent the 'healthy' and solid relationship that parties are supposed to have with the elements of society they claim to represent. Since the mid-1960s, however, academic works have largely pointed out its degradation and concomitantly the degradation between party-society links.

Writing in 1966, Otto Kirchheimer highlights the transformative nature of European party systems as traditional, ideological member-based parties moved increasingly towards the center of political space. In essence he raised the alarm on what he saw as an erosion of opposition not just among the obvious suspects (fascist and socialist states) but actually in established western democracies. Long before Katz and Mair's cartel-party thesis, Kirchheimer drew attention to the insulation of parties from the societal groups they were initially claiming to represent.

As politicians turned into full-time professionals and as parties developed strong hierarchical structures revolved around leadership, elections became more about the persona of the different party leaders rather than actual ideological debates or opposing policies and programs (Andre Krouwel 2003 ,24). Ultimately, the voter, once showered with a myriad of opposing views, ideas, principles, ideologies and positions, was increasingly being deprived of the one element elections intend to provide – choice. The only option presented to the voter now was a limited one – not between different ideological points of view – but between a narrow list of ‘state-managers’. With the erosion of ideology, the voter was no longer asked to choose between different fundamental paths but rather between different administrators that would best direct and manage state-affairs. The inherent implication was that the path now was to remain the same, regardless of the individual and the party actually chosen as administrator.

In his reconstruction of the catch-all party thesis, Krouwel (2003), argues that Kirchheimer's work is heavily influenced by his own inter-war experiences with the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), which revealed the vulnerable nature of democratic polity and the tendency towards concentrating power at the leadership level,

depoliticisation, political exclusion, abuse of power and apathy among grass-root level members (25). Years later, after the fall of the Nazi regime, Kirchheimer identified many of the same features that surrounded the SPD before 1933. The party - as well as their main opponents, the Christian Democrats - betrayed an erosion in ideology as it sought to appeal to voters at large rather than keep its class-based commitments. At the same time, he identifies a noticeable stagnation in membership as well as a reduction in the role that party-members play both in intra-party affairs but also in linking the party to its larger constituency.

Similarly, while members are excluded from political participation, top-level leadership positions strengthen. Meanwhile, membership fees are less and less important in party finances as parties increasingly depend on state funding and interest group contributions. Furthermore, technological changes and the advent of mass media render the latter as the primary means of communication as opposed to former networks such as unions, trade or recreational organizations (Krouwel 2003, 26-27). As parties started to sacrifice ideology in favor of mass appeal, they naturally de-emphasized societal cleavages and instead focused on drawing all classes, regional or religious groups. In many ways, while Lipset and Rokkan point towards the importance of historically created cleavages in society as the root of modern parties, Kirchheimer suggests that although some voting may occur based on traditional affiliations, Rokkan's (1967) most famous statement that - "the *party systems* of the 1960s reflect, with few but significant exceptions, the *cleavage structures* of the 1920s" (50) is simply no longer true.

The role of the citizen in this new party system changes fundamentally from that of generator of social divisions which direct political outcomes to simply consumers of

political options. Writing much later in 1997, Manin points to the very same backburner effect in citizens' political participation. He dismisses the idea that socio-economic cleavages are stable and that citizens are a homogeneous mass that can be always divided in one particular manner by the choices they are offered. Manin observes a plethora of social and cultural divides that are in constant movement. He rejects Rokkan's famous theory, where political parties form and thus respond to the cleavages of their societies. Instead, he argues that it is the political elites that decide which cleavages to emphasize or ignore. Ultimately, it is the elites that initiate the terms of electoral choice to the electorate (Manin 1997, 223). The voters' role is therefore reactive. That is, the electorate is nothing more but an audience that accepts or rejects the terms that it has been presented with by political elites. It is this feature of representative democracy that Manin calls "audience democracy" (Manin 1997, 223).

Ultimately, Kirchheimer's normative concern in *The Transformation of European Party Systems* was directed towards the losers of the catch-all party system. On one hand, citizens lose control of their political representatives as they become alienated from political processes. On the other hand, political parties lose control over their once loyal constituencies. The danger that Kirchheimer tried to expose was that, in these circumstances, the only ones left to keep some sort of link with voters are the actual leaders. Krowel (2003) notes that Kirchheimer illustrated the threat that such a concentration of power in one individual may pose towards existing political structures if such leaders choose to replace them, invoking De Gaulle's example (32-33).

On the question of party membership, Panebianco (1988) identifies the advent of the electoral-professional party, which marks an important stage in parties' insulation

from membership. Whereas previously party membership was paramount towards financing, campaigns and mobilization, the electoral-professional party weakened its links to membership. This type of party relies instead on professionals, as well as modern campaign techniques, television and mass-communications media while financing itself through organized interest and government subsidies. Susan Scarrow (1994) makes a similar argument. She claims that while parties have continued to attract members, they have done so only inasmuch as they are ensured of attracting individuals who have little interest in taking an active role in party organization (56). The result for party-societal links has been quite upsetting. In a study of party memberships across Europe, Mair and Van Biezen (2001) illustrate that while support for democracy remains stable, party membership across almost all established European democracies has been decreasing since the 1990s.

Writing almost thirty years after Kirchheimer, Katz and Mair's (1995) seminal work, *Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy*, emphasizes the increasingly limited terms of electoral choice that mainstream party-elites choose to initiate. While Lipset and Rokkan argue that the link between elites and their constituencies are sealed by the outcomes of conflicts such as that between state and church in the Reformation three centuries earlier, Katz and Mair underscore the gradual deterioration of this link. They argue that by the 1970s, the dominant parties stopped regarding themselves as the political representatives of specific groups but rather as the representatives of the state to society. This is not very different from Kirchheimer's argument about the catch-all party in the mid sixties.

Therefore, as parties converged towards the centre in order to gain the maximum number of supporters, what were once ideological conflicts become low-intensity bickering on the traditional left-right axis. Consequently, the left limited itself to promising services and jobs while the right usually promised lower taxes (Katz and Mair 2009, 757). This trend of providing public goods forced governments to push themselves to the limits of fiscal crises. At the same time, politics became increasingly specialized with political representatives turning into politicians by profession. Both these factors increased the risks of politics in terms of the survival of political parties. As a result, coupled together with the ever decreasing ideological differences, parties became increasingly concerned with their own security and survival rather than clashing with their ideological competitors (Katz and Mair 2009, 758). To this end, mainstream parties removed contentious issues from party-competition and handed them over to apolitical institutions like central banks, courts and the European Union.

Furthermore, Katz and Mair (2009) argue that in order to make up for the ever increasing need of capital, mainstream parties began to heavily tap into “the coffers of the state” (758). This was done through state subventions aimed at reducing the disparities between the mainstream party in power at a given time, which was able to access the resources of the state, and the mainstream party in opposition. Katz and Mair essentially suggest that being in office or out of office stopped carrying with it the risk of being deprived of power. The center-left and center-right became socialized to cooperate with the expectation that this cooperation would continue when one would replace the other as the party in power. Ultimately, in this case, it becomes difficult to identify a system that

ensures competition for power as the party-system as a whole can be said to be *in power* at all times.

Katz and Mair identify the possible threats that cartel-parties may face. One is defection; the other is challenge from new entrants. These challengers are more than simply capitalizing on the void that may appear due to the move towards the center by the mainstream. They are also doing more than just exploiting protest-votes. New challengers are in effect indicative of the democratic deficit that ensues from cartel-parties. For this purpose, Katz and Mair (2009) argue that cartel-parties structure institutions such as financial subventions, ballot access requirements and media access in ways that disadvantage outsiders (759).

The idea of party-cartelization is not new and as discussed above, it was developed and implied as early as the mid twentieth century by Kirchheimer. Katz and Mair(1996) themselves acknowledge Lijphart's earlier account of 'kartel democratie' or 'magic formula' in consociational countries like Netherlands and Switzerland even before the 1970s (529). Nonetheless, while Lijphart only observed this in consociational states and while Kirchheimer generally had Germany in mind when he spoke of the catch-all party, Katz and Mair emphasize the proliferation of this feature as they argue that, since the 1970s, this has become true for all European democracies (Katz and Mair 1996, 529).

Katz and Mair identify three dimensions of cartelization and reduction of electoral choice. The first is intra-party and refers to the party's organizational structure, the second deals with the party's political role in the relationship between party and society, and the third relates to inter-party competition. In terms of the first dimension, party activists are generally marginalized while the balance of power inside the party is tilted towards

prominent office holders (Detterbeck 2005, 175). Regarding the second dimension, the party's links with society are severed as cartel-parties become embedded in the state apparatus and tap into public sources of financing that make them independent of party members and donors. As a result, they no longer see themselves as representatives of society to the state but rather the other way around – as state representatives to citizens. Finally, in terms of the third dimension (competition), the need of securing state resources has changed the relationship of mainstream political opponents towards others and each other. Mainstream parties learned they have more in common with each other than potential newcomers and subsequently use state institutions to prevent others from entering political competition (Detterbeck 2005, 175). These observations are quite similar to Kirchheimer's save for the last one. For Kirchheimer, parties stopped competing with each other ideologically because of their move towards the center as a means of winning as many votes needed in order to gain power. The argument made by Katz and Mair is somewhat different. They see this end in competition not due to parties' longing for power but rather due to their fear of losing out when they eventually lose power and become the opposition.

The cartel-parties thesis, initially developed by Katz and Mair in 1995, has come under significant criticism regarding its applicability in Western Europe. This criticism is generally aimed at each of the aforementioned three dimensions or pillars of party cartelization. On organizational structure, Detterbeck (2008) points to the introduction of methods such as intra-party plebiscites, aimed at avoiding marginalizing activists (31-32). Nonetheless, the same Detterbeck (2008) also states that party plebiscites remain a very rare practice (31-32).

On links with society, Detterbeck (2005, 2008) claims that parties have attempted to reconnect with society by recruiting new members and he points to increasing membership in German mainstream parties during the late 1960s. Nonetheless, he admits to decreasing membership from the 1980s onwards (34). While also referring to the second dimension, Koole (1996) argues that the links-with-society argument made by Katz and Mair is misleading as increasing state intervention and neo-corporatism have blurred the distinction between state and society. As a result, he points out that a greater identification of parties with the state does not necessarily mean a distancing from society (509). There is a distinction however between Koole's and Katz and Mair's definitions of civil society. By stressing the state's expansion through neo-corporatist arrangements, Koole puts emphasis on the organizations that funnel and negotiate societal interests. Katz and Mair (1996), on the other hand, emphasize society as encompassing the general population (528). Using this latter and more frequent definition, Katz and Mair argue that while neo-corporatist arrangements may have increased, there is no overlapping between state and society as a whole. The cartel-party therefore taps into state resources - in other words, into public funds - without maintaining its links with public interests.

Finally, on inter-party competition both Detterbeck (2005, 2008) and Koole (1996) criticize the very rigidity of the cartel. Koole (1996) warns against buying too much into the 'rhetoric of the challengers' as he points to the success of smaller parties such as the Austrian Freedom Party, the Greens in Germany and D66 in the Netherlands as examples of weak or inexistent mainstream cartel parties (516). Detterbeck argues that despite the cartel-party thesis which argues for mainstream parties excluding newer contenders, the Greens and other left-libertarian parties were actually included in

government coalitions in countries like Germany (Detterbeck 2005, 186, Detterbeck 2008, 36-48). While Detterbeck and Koole are correct to point this out, what both overlook is that the cartel-party thesis has never claimed the cartel is completely impenetrable.

Moreover, the cartel party system is not necessarily comprised of just two large mainstream center-left and center-right parties. Katz and Mair (1996) clearly illustrate that the cartel can occasionally be challenged and that when mainstream parties cannot handicap and prevent newcomers from emerging, they actually attempt at socializing them and incorporating them into the cartel as they did with Democrats 66 (D66) or the German Greens (531). As it is beyond their discussion, Katz and Mair do not elaborate further on the identity and features of successful cartel challengers. Their examples, nonetheless, suggest that such newcomers are generally radical parties claiming to represent factions and positions in societies that are neglected or not adequately represented by the already existing political parties. A few later works have proposed that among the most successful challengers have actually been the extremist new radical right parties in Western European states (Johanna Kristin Birnir 2010, 32; Pelizzo 2007, 227). Despite this, however, this is more or less where the story ends – the cartel party is the latest, although never intended to be the final, established major party. Essentially, the cartelization of political space is the last major ‘transformation’ identified in the dynamics between parties and society. The argument of this thesis, however, is that the tribunal parties, experiencing a surge in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century from both the radical-left and radical-right, are challengers against the cartel-party system. Their rise is a result of the perceived strengthening of the established centrist parties, however, it simultaneously also

betrays the beginnings of a new phase in Western party systems where cartel parties coexists with an increasing number of outsiders.

Much like the catch-all party exposed by Kirchheimer as well as the frozen party-system thesis theorized by Lipset and Rokkan, the cartel-party is an attempt not to account for changes in the party system today but rather to explain its stability. This feeling of permanence has been reflected in numerous other academic studies as well. For the past twenty years, scholarly works on the topic have revisited, tested and expanded on the argument of party-cartelization. Moreover, if one considers Kirchheimer's catch-all party to be an early exponent of the same phenomenon, then it can be inferred that western societies have been living for the past half-century under the cartel. The normative implications of the cartel-party (as well as the earlier catch-all party) argument cannot be ignored. It is with a certain degree of nostalgia for the 'old days' of mass-parties that these transformations are exposed. *Catch-all* and *Cartel* are often juxtaposed against their predecessors. While the former were ideological, their new versions are not. While the former engaged citizens, these ones do not. The former emphasized membership and played an actual vivid role in people's lives; modern parties only engage voters at election time. Mass-parties were inclusive and permissive of bottom-up leadership mobility. Modern cartel parties are fiefs of their top leadership and do not care much for the rank and file.

In many ways, new modern parties are much like the old cadre-based parties. The similarities are striking. Both are elite-oriented, the old because of the socio-economic circumstances of their day that limited political participation and the new because leaders have simply locked-in their positions of power while isolating themselves from members

and voters. Both engage society at large to a limited degree. The old elite-based party did so because they did not need to appeal to the whole of society as it was not the whole of society that *could* vote. Modern cartel-parties do so because voters in modern society do not feel the *need* to vote. There is little stake that the citizen feels towards rubber-stamping every four years a political option that is not much different than the other option(s) presented. In a similar fashion, modern cartel-parties do not *need* members or constituents either. To survive, they can tap into state finances that make member contributions irrelevant. Combined, all these factors render the modern voter extremely dissatisfied with political options present but also with the democratic institutions and system as a whole.

### **2.3. Change in Contemporary Party-Systems**

Under the circumstances discussed above, a large segment of the population begins to disconnect itself from politics altogether and thus not vote (a feature examined in academic works, but also discussed in the mass media and even acknowledged by political parties themselves). Alternatively, some voters vote for parties that successfully win salience over a limited number of issues and manage to convince voters that they are the most credible and likely to address them. Such parties include generally radical left-wing and (most often) right-wing parties, or parties that have taken on new issues that would be hard to situate on a traditional-left right axis; these include new-left parties, green parties or most recently, pirate parties. The reasons for their appearance have been an extensive subject of academic debate. While Rokkan argued that societal cleavages

freeze parties in their 1920s positions, the arrival of such newcomers is sometimes ascribed to the end of cleavage, which allows other issues to the forefront. Consequently, an entire body of literature has turned away from the focus on stability and has engaged in a structure versus agency debate over the causes for the rise of new political parties since the 1980s.

Kitschelt's 1995 study is perhaps one of the most influential works highlighting the importance of structural change. He argues that the late 1970s and 1980s are marked by significant transformations of Western economies. Globalization and increased economic competition in advanced capitalism have fundamentally reshaped working environments. In essence, employees in the manufacturing sector and the financial service are conditioned from voting along class interest and develop instead an interest in the market viability of their own firms. Consequently, they favour a decrease in redistributive policies which might drain away resources from investment and consumption (Kitschelt 1995, 6). Moreover, left-right economic preferences are not the only ones influenced by socialization within the working milieu. The degree of communicative interaction at work plays a crucial role towards shaping political consciousness as well. Private-sector firms, exposed to competitive pressures, tend to be more likely to have hierarchical organizations. As a result, the instrumental working environments in such firms are guided by rules and orders which lead workers to identify with authoritarian versions of decision making (Kitschelt 1995, 7).

In strong contrast, those working in the relatively sheltered public-sector are more favourable towards redistributive social policies. Similarly, those exposed to working environments where social relations are paramount - such as education, social work and

health-care - have a stronger predisposition towards egalitarianism and more libertarian notion of politics (Kitschelt 1995, 7-8). What ensues is a fragmentation of the working class between those favouring the free market and authoritarian modes of government and those predisposed towards participatory decision-making and redistributive policies.

Whereas party competition in the Keynesian Welfare State after WWII was rather centered on economic issues, the transition to a post-industrial economy has created an axis-shift with an “economically leftist (redistributive) and politically as well as culturally libertarian (participatory and individualistic) positions at one extreme and economically rightist, free marketeering as well as politically and culturally authoritarian positions at the other” (Kitschelt 1995, 13). In this two-dimensional political space, a successful new radical right party that finds the ‘winning formula’ is one that combines strong authoritarianism with pro-capitalist positions. Similarly, new left and Green parties find winning formulae of their own as well if they adopt a left-of-centre economic stance combined with a libertarian position.

Although sharing the pro-authoritarianism of the traditional “old Right” of the interwar period, new radical right parties are fundamentally different. Whereas the old fascists were anti-capitalist and appealed to the rural middle class, the new-right differs both in terms of the economic dimension as well as in terms of constituency. According to Kitschelt (1995), new radical right parties are especially popular among blue-collar workers and the petit-bourgeoisie of cosmopolitan cities (30). Moreover, the causes for their rise differ as well. While the new radical right of the 1980s has emerged due to the societal changes discussed above, the inter-war fascists came about due to the economic circumstances of post-WWI Europe and the Great Depression.

It is the former group such as the National Front in France, Danish and Norwegian Progress Parties, the Automobilists and National Action/Swiss Democrats and the Vlaams Blok (now Vlaams Belang/Flemish Interest) in the Flemish region of Belgium that has managed to capitalize on shifts in voters' preferences. The latter old-right parties - typified by the German Republicans and the Movimento Socialisto Italiano (MSI)<sup>2</sup> - have made very little headway in elections. The reason is that while blue-collar workers would be potentially attracted to welfare-chauvinists<sup>3</sup>, no other significant elements of society (and certainly few members of the bourgeoisie) would. The latter would be much more inclined towards the majority of new radical right parties which do not express the anti-capitalist, anti-bureaucratic agenda of neo-fascist ideology.

Finally, Kitschelt (1995) identifies a third sub-group of populist anti-statist parties (separate from the original fascists of the 1930s as well as the new right of the 1980s). The difference between this group and the regular new radical right lies in the flexibility of the populist parties to shift from authoritarian towards libertarian positions if the political spectrum allows it (30). Populist parties, according to Kitschelt form only in states where the distance between the mainstream socialists and conservatives is considerably smaller. This enables the populists to call for market-liberalism while simultaneously highlighting the corrupt self-serving policies of the mainstream parties. Such parties include the Freedom Party in Austria and the Northern League of Italy. Interestingly, Kitschelt does not identify a combination between left-wing economic positions and authoritarianism or parties that easily move along the pro free market-

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<sup>2</sup> Renamed Alleanza Nazionale (AN)

<sup>3</sup> Welfare-chauvinism is defined as a left-wing position on economic issues combined with an anti-immigrant and nativist stance.

socialist spectrum. Nonetheless, these observations on class and socialization were made in 1995 and were exclusively about developments inside Western European states.

Since then, the emergence of secondary dimensions of political competition has been confirmed by scholarly literature not only in regards to national politics but also at the EU level (Hix and Lord 1997, 5; Marks and Hooghe 2006, 163). In addition to Kitschelt's libertarian-authoritarian axis, other dimensions are identified as well. Marks and Hooghe (2006) distinguish, for example, a pro EU-integration versus a national demarcation axis as well as a support for traditional values versus cosmopolitanism axis (157). In addition, although not a new axis of political competition, it is worthwhile to consider whether republican versus liberal understandings of democracy might not form yet another dimension in contemporary politics.

Ultimately, while the impact of these works cannot be denied and while structural changes most definitely have played a role in a shift of the political space, they do not explain why it is a certain kind of party that has managed to take advantage of such changes. If only socio-economic structure is responsible for these shifts, then already existing mainstream parties would have been able just as well to capitalize on new issues and new preferences. As a consequence they would change their programs, discourse and strategies and still reflect the axis-shift in voter options without the need for new parties to form. Yet, with the exception of a very few cases, this is not the case. The parties that have reaped the fruits of changing societal cleavages and voter preferences are generally completely new.

A growing number of academic works has pointed out that while structure may explain demand it does not account for changes in supply. In taking account of the supply

of parties, one challenges the idea that electoral success depends solely on socioeconomic factors as independent variables. Instead, one would also need to look at the political actors themselves. When speaking of the new radical right in particular, several prominent academic scholars point towards the importance of agency.

Carter (2004), for instance, argues that the ideological convergence between mainstream parties, strong leadership and party ideology are critical in determining the success of radical right-wing parties. When it comes to ideology specifically, Carter identifies three main important elements: stance on immigration, degree of racism and attitudes towards democracy (28). Like Kitschelt, she argues that authoritarian and neo-liberal parties *are* generally more successful than outright neofascist radical right parties. However, their electoral fortunes are related to their own organization, leadership and their stance on the cultural dimension rather than economic positions (Carter 2004, 99).

Michelle Hale Williams (2006) agrees as she notes that the socioeconomic environment may explain broad pan-European demands for the radical right but not the performance of the parties themselves. Their successful formation and entry is dependent on their ability to create new issues of contention such as immigration (2-4). Ultimately, political opportunity structures are not emergent from popular demands but rather come about due to the ability of parties to actually influence popular concerns.

Similarly, in his pan-European study, Mudde (2007) argues that populist radical parties 'supply' their own relevance to the extent that they "actively shape part of their own destiny" (293). Looking at both Western and Eastern European states, Mudde's work seems to confirm the general conclusions drawn by both Carter and Williams. He finds that nativism (the congruence between a state's populism and a "native" group),

authoritarianism and populism are reoccurring features of most such parties. Much like Carter and Williams, Mudde does not find a close link between economic issues and the success of the radical right. He illustrates that populist radical right parties are successful in elections regardless of their pro-market or welfare-chauvinist message. However, Mudde (2007) does concede that, “on average, Eastern European populist radical right parties are more anti-liberal and protectionist than their brethren in the West” due to the legacy of their socialist past (128). He does not explore whether some of their Western European counterparts such as the Swedish Democrats might also reveal the same characteristics. Nor does he indicate whether some Eastern European suspects – such as New Generation Party of the People’s Party in Romania - might resemble their western counterparts after all.

What the works of Mudde, Carter and Williams illustrate is the importance of acknowledging the role of agency in influencing the success of new political actors. Their studies challenge previous conceptions framing party success as dependent, and societal changes as independent variables. Nonetheless, while their works offer many new insights, they still fail to account for the failure of older parties to capitalize on structural shifts. If the key lies in organization as well as the nativist and anti-immigration position, it is still not obvious why older parties would not emulate the same strategy in order to take up new political spaces. The reason, often overlooked, is that besides the radical and – in the case of the radical right - extremist discourse, these parties have been successful at promoting a different *kind* of discourse as well, namely one depicting themselves as completely opposite, new and different political actors than the already established mainstream.

Some scholarly works, devoted solely towards the studies of anti-establishment parties, have attempted to understand, identify and classify these very political contenders. While several definitions and classifications have been suggested, however, there seems to be little effort at talking to the rest of academic literature on parties and party systems. This is surprising because – although they might not explicitly state it or explore it in detail – such studies almost imply that these parties are reactions to the monopolization of politics by established centrist parties but also that they entail radical ideologies akin to the new left and new radical right. Consequently, anti-establishment parties are not another phenomenon altogether. Their existence is unquestionably linked to the dynamics between factors of change as well as stability in current political systems.

Writing in 1996, Schedler seeks to unpack the often misused and ill defined label of anti-political-establishment parties. Namely such parties draw a triangular political space between a general established political class, the people and themselves (293). The political class is depicted as being in conflict with the anti-establishment but also with the people. These parties deny the existence of other forms of societal divides and generally tend to reduce all societal grievances to one fundamental and in many respects, quite ancient societal cleavage – that between rulers and ruled (294). To this end, they depict a morally decadent and corrupt elite versus the good and genuine people. Implicit in their message is the attempt to frame current democratic political parties as essentially undemocratic, while they on the other hand are new, never-before tested in positions of power, and thus innocent and trustworthy (297-298). This anti-establishment-parties party is quite distinct from both the anti-incumbent opposition as well as the anti-democratic opposition. It is depicted as walking a thin line between them but part of

neither (Schedler 1996, 303). In the end however, this characterization leaves many questions unanswered.

Firstly, it is questionable whether such distinct parties exist and whether the delineation between the three abovementioned types of opposition to power is as clear as Schedler makes it to be. What is particularly problematic is the distinction between anti-establishment and anti-democratic parties. As Schedler correctly points out, the anti-establishment party regards current democracy as completely non-democratic and rather authoritarian. It is thus implied that *it* would change it should it come to power. As a result, it is improbable that such a party would keep current democracy intact.

Secondly, much like the often employed term ‘populism/populist’, it is not clear under this conceptualization whether such parties claim to represent all of society or part of society and if so – which part. It is also not clear, where they stand on ideology. Lastly, like many other similar works, this literature does not speak directly to the vast literature focused on the dynamics between mainstream parties. Instead it implies that the rulers-ruled cleavage is one highlighted by the anti-establishment. As pointed out previously, Kirchheimer as well as Katz and Mair point out that this may actually be in fact happening and that the current political class *is* indeed insulating itself from the people it is supposed to represent.

Other works, although less thorough in their analysis, have similarly attempted to classify terms that are often incorrectly used interchangeably. Robert Barr (2009), for example, distinguishes between anti-establishment parties, populism and outsiders. The nature of appeals, location vis-à-vis the party system and the linkages emphasized is what reveals a party’s specific nature. Outsiders could be anti-establishment but are not

necessarily so. Meanwhile, anti-establishment parties generally favour participatory linkages that entail a measure of citizen input and control over political decision making. On the other hand, populist parties are defined as outsiders, anti-establishment and advocating plebiscitarian linkages that emphasize holding decision-makers accountable (Barr 2009, 43-44). Barr, however, seems to ignore that a large number of established politicians and parties may make use of populist rhetoric without being outsiders to the system at all. Furthermore, in this conceptualization, plebiscitarian linkages and participatory linkages are presented as antithetical. They do not necessarily need to be so. A party or politician may speak of participatory linkages but in fact project the image of a need for a strong leader.

Concerned with the fate of outsider parties when they join coalitions, MacDonnell and Newell (2011) define such parties as those that, despite their voter share, are not 'coalitionable' either because of other parties or due to their own choosing (445). In an examination of radical left, populist and regionalist parties, MacDonnell and Newell seek to understand what happens when outsider parties join governing coalitions. Their conclusions are that overall outsider parties tend to lose significant voting support once joining larger mainstream political parties in government (MacDonnell and Newell 2011, 448). Although they do not fully explore it, MacDonnell and Newell suggest that an outsider party's future lies strongly with its ability to keep up the outsider image and thus refuse the temptation to govern. Ultimately, the prescription implied is that an outsider and anti-establishment party should seek the role of an alternative to the opposition, not just a few seats in parliament, the position of coalition broker and or the role of coalition partner.. In the end, nonetheless, no consensus exists in anti-partyist literature about what

to call these sort of parties as well as about the differences between the diverse number of labels. Likewise, the anti-partyist literature leaves open questions about the ideology of these parties as well as the conditions under which they thrive. A rare exception is Amir Abedi's (2004) study of anti-political establishment parties. Using a cross-temporal and cross-sectional analysis, Abedi (2004) claims that despite political color (radical-right or radical-left), these parties tend to fare better when established parties are close ideologically and when they collude as well as when weak partisan attachments make voters available (139). Abedi's study of anti-political establishment parties offers an important starting point in conceptualizing current tribune parties.

While Abedi's definition of anti-political establishment parties aims to apply regardless of time-period, modern Western party systems are however marked by a series of characteristics that also shape current tribune parties. Chapter 3 illustrates that because of the cartelization of party systems, the collusion of the mainstream occurs in the centre of political space. The challengers are therefore forced to radical positions on the left-right spectrum. Ideological radicalism is matched by an aggressive confrontational strategy both during elections as well as in between elections. Avoiding coalitions with mainstream parties is thus an important tactic of a successful tribune party. Due to the disconnect between civil society and mainstream parties, contemporary tribune parties also seek to appear as though they are rebuilding these links, which often involves commitments to represent specific strata in society (assumed to be disenfranchised by current established parties), building strong memberships, and using social media and social networking sites to connect with their voters and supporters. Finally, as the cartel of mainstream parties is denounced as creating a democratic deficit, tribune parties

promise to end the oldest societal cleavage (ruler vs. ruled) and promise to fix democracy by transitioning to direct democracy.

## **2.4 Conclusion**

In essence, this chapter has identified two general trends in the literature on political parties: one that is primarily concerned with the general stability of the system over time in the face of constant shifts and a second trend that deals with the questions of change in political spectra. Despite pointing to transformative events that have rendered the political system the way it is, Lipset and Rokkan, Kirchheimer as well as Katz and Mair are illustrative of the first. Meanwhile, a structure versus agency (or supply versus demand) debate between Kitschelt on one hand and Mudde, Williams and Carter on the other has been presented here as quite indicative of the second strand.

Ultimately, the arrival of fresh political contestants is only partly explained by structural arguments. Similarly, studies emphasizing supply likewise fail to fully account for the phenomenon unless they engage in an investigation about the way such parties deal with competition in systems generally locked in from new actors. Anti-partyist studies do engage in this investigation, however, they do not speak to the other two bodies of literature nor do they come up with a concise theoretical framework about what it is that they attempt to investigate. The literature reviewed, nonetheless, offers a very fundamental starting-point towards conceptualizing the political parties that this dissertation is concerned with – those marginal tribune parties that have specifically mushroomed throughout the mid 2000s and 2010s. The specific contribution of this

dissertation to the literature lies in its attempt to bridge the cartel-party literature with the realignment and anti-partyist literature. It argues that tribunal parties of the 21<sup>st</sup> century are an ideologically radical (both left and right) reaction to the centrist cartel-party system observed by Katz and Mair (1995) in the mid 1990s.

Moreover, literature on anti-establishment parties is also quite rich in attempts of classifying it but not so much in attempting to explain their appearance. The general argument in this dissertation is that the proliferation of such parties during the last decade coincides with a time when not only preferences have been changing but attitudes towards the democratic institutions and the way that representative democracy generally works have been changing as well. This new kind of party – of which the radical right is the most successful but by no means the sole case – has capitalized not only on new issues but rather on voter dissatisfaction by skillfully depicting itself as the party that ‘truly’ represents while the others are parties that solely govern.

## Chapter 3

### Tribunes and Patricians: Conceptualizing the Tribune Party

*And when our generals appeal to their soldiers before a battle to defend their ancestors' tombs and their temples against the enemy, their words are a lie and a mockery, for not a man in their audience possesses a family altar; not one out of all those Romans owns an ancestral tomb. The truth is that they fight and die to protect the wealth and luxury of others. They are called the masters of the world, but they do not possess a single clod of earth which is truly their own.*

Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus  
Plebian Tribune

### 3.1 Introduction

Chapter 1 has briefly introduced two terms: *tribune parties* and *patricians*. Neither has yet been defined in the context of this dissertation. The subsequent chapters 5 and 6 focus exclusively on the *tribunes* and *patricians* respectively. Chapter 5 - *The Tribunes* - revisits previous understandings of the left-right conceptualization vis-à-vis these parties. It does so through an examination of party programs as well as statements of prominent party leaders and members with the hope of better capturing the positions that tribune parties take on the economy, democracy, multiculturalism, the role of government or personal liberty. Chapter 6 – *The Patricians* –explores who the antagonist of the tribune actually is. It essentially dissects the many images of the enemy and the manner in which these images are employed by the different types of tribune parties.

The question this chapter will try to answer is not just who the enemies are – but also: what enemies and which *patricians* are more useful to battle against and which ones are not? This chapter will attempt at investigating the distinctive features of the tribune party as well as the manner in which the tribune party depicts the dynamics between itself and the vast selection of *patricians* or enemies that it tries to ‘expose’ and ultimately

overcome. In essence, the tribune party is identified through an aggressive and radical discourse aimed at established centrist political parties as well as the claim to represent specific societal classes ignored by the mainstream. To this end, it often tries to reach these particular societal strata (which allegedly mainstream parties cannot) through large party-memberships that occasionally surpass those of established parties. It is a party that pits the voter against a plethora of real or imagined enemies ranging from political to cultural to economic elites. The tribune party tries to appeal to voters through an oversimplification of complex societal issues. It offers quick fixes - and usually unrealistic solutions - that often seem contradictory but nonetheless attractive. Finally, the tribune makes use of vibrant dynamic charismatic leaders that personify the ‘saviour’ and ‘advocate’ images it tries to project.

These parties are precisely the kind of political parties that the cartel party system of Katz and Mair (1995) is vulnerable to. Because of their transformative message, radical politics and anti-mainstream rhetoric, these parties often politicize the domination of politics by centre-left and centre-right established parties. In and of itself, this is not something new in post-WWII Europe. Poujadism in France in 1953/1956 as well as anti-taxation parties and green parties in the 1970s and 1980s have done this as well. However, the argument made in this dissertation is that the recent surge of these parties during the last decade as well as their electoral success has come to effectively challenge the cartel-party and even transcend it. It has thus come to transform Western democracies from a system of mainstream centrist cartel-parties to a more ideologically-diverse battleground of established *patrician* parties versus an ever strengthening set of challenger *tribune* parties.

### 3.2 Chronology of Tribune Parties?

The concepts of *tribune parties* and *patricians* are not introduced here for the first time but are rather re-introduced and re-conceptualized. The terminology itself is not completely new, at least when speaking of the first label: ‘tribune parties’. As a concept, the term appeared more than four decades ago when it was first used by Geroge Lavau (1969) in reference to the French Communist Party. In this context, the classification was not amply theorized nor was it extended to other similar parties or other party families at the time. The intent was solely to describe the party’s firm commitment to its original ideological tenets, its resistance to joining governing coalitions, as well as its inherent role of advocate or defender of specific societal classes (Mitchell and Evans 2009, 152).

Since then, however, the term has generally fallen out of use. It is now almost never employed in respect of other communist or far-leftist parties nor is it generally used when referring to right-wing populist parties. Very rarely, it is applied when referring to uncompromising ethnic parties that succeed in promoting themselves as the most credible defenders of the cause (of their specific ethnic group). This is the case, for instance, in Mitchell and Evans’ (2009) work on ethnic parties in Northern Ireland (152-153). Aside from this, ‘tribune parties’ as a concept is not often encountered in academic works, let alone fully theorized.

The choice of terminology, in these few aforementioned cases, when the term does appear, stems from the original role of ancient Roman tribunes as sole direct representatives of the ordinary citizenry or *plebs* as well as the defenders of their interests

(theoretically) vis-à-vis the magistrates of the patrician class<sup>4</sup>. The use of the term in this dissertation however attempts to reflect more than just the office of tribunes. It derives from the struggle throughout the republic-era between those factions (or *partes*) trying to conserve the interests of the elites (*optimes*) and those using a discourse critical of the elites and favouring the people or plebs (*populares*) in order to attain control over the office of tribune.

This chapter attempts to answer the question, who is the anti-establishment tribune party of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. And most importantly, what is it? It identifies the tribune party based on six criteria. Ultimately, the archetypal tribune party defined in this chapter is marked by six features. This includes: a) a radical non-centrist ideological stance (be it on the left or right, authoritarian or libertarian dimensions); b) a populist anti-establishment discourse, c) a commitment to representing specific societal classes; d) an aggressive discourse and behaviour towards political enemies, e) a commitment towards ‘restoring true democracy’ and f) a tendency to offer simplistic solutions to intricate societal issues. In terms of organization, I argue that no perfect ideal type characterizes the anti-establishment tribune party. However, common features of some (although not all such) parties are a tendency towards high membership and centralization around the party leader. These features are not necessarily limited to one ideological party family. They transcend across party ideology and sub-type. Parties adhering to these six criteria have surged throughout the mid-2000s and early 2010s and although they do not represent a new phenomenon, they do represent the newest wave of anti-establishment tribune parties to hit western democracies.

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<sup>4</sup> This is most vividly reflected in the acronym of the government during the Roman Republic, SPQR (Senatus Populusque Romanus – the Senate and People of Rome) defining the act of government as a dichotomy between rulers or senators and the ruled (through the voice of their representatives or *tribunes*).

### 3.3 Who are the Tribunes: Typology of the Tribune Party

#### A) *Radical Ideology*

The first criteria of tribune parties relates to a politically radical ideological position which distances such parties from the mainstream centre-left and right. Such parties fall under the radical-right and new radical-left political parties as defined by Kitschelt (1988; 1995). Therefore, the *tribune party* family represents an ideologically heterogeneous group of anti-establishment parties encompassing parties of the radical-right, extreme-right, new-left and libertarian-left camps. While coming from different ideological poles, they nonetheless share a common non-centrist political position.

The ideologically radical anti-establishment tribune party phenomenon is not at all new in European politics. Similar ideologically radical parties can trace their origin to the early 1970s in Western Europe and numerous academic studies have identified radical tenets of new-left and green parties but especially among radical-right parties such as the Progress Party in Denmark (and Norway), Front National in France, Lega Nord in Italy or Freedom Party in Austria ever since the 1980s (Kitschelt, 1989; Betz, 1994; Kitschelt and McGann, 1995; Jackman and Volbert, 1996; Nonna Mayer, 1998). Comparable phenomena have been observed outside Europe as well. In Canada, for instance, the populist Reform Party has been identified to share many traits of its European counterparts (Abezi, 2004: 2-3). However, the proliferation of newer but equally radical such parties over the last decade is quite novel and unexplored. What is equally new and understudied is the trend of new left-wing parties adopting some of the discourse of right-wing parties. Syriza in Greece, Podemos in Spain as well as the Left Front in France are

all examples of this. The tribune party of the 21<sup>st</sup> century is therefore broader than the radical right and involves parties from many ideological poles.

Furthermore, whereas previous phenomena were limited to Western Europe alone (as Eastern Europe was under one-party rule), the proliferation of the newest wave of tribune parties has occurred all over the continent and around the same time (see Table 1). In and of itself, the rise of new parties in Eastern Europe alone is not particularly surprising; democratization after 1989 has naturally led to a larger number of European parties. However, this surge follows the democratization of the 1990s at a significant time difference and is not solely an Eastern European only phenomenon; it transcends former East-West divisions.

Consequently, such new parties are not mere isolated occurrences in the Western European political landscape. During the last decade, more than thirty new or re-invented tribune parties of the radical right (but also of the new-left) can be identified in EU member states as well as elsewhere. Table 1 below illustrates a non-exhaustive list of parties that fit the description of ideologically radical tribune parties. The majority of these parties have not just mushroomed throughout the past decade but have quickly become important political contenders as they entered the European Parliament or their respective national parliaments almost immediately *after* formation. A few such parties have further succeeded in attaining a very significant relevance in parliament such SYRIZA in Greece, Jobbik in Hungary, the Five-Star Movement in Italy and the Party for Freedom (PVV) in the Netherlands.

**Table 1. Tribune Parties in Western Democracies by Ideology, Date of Formation and Electoral Results (NSD, 2015).**

State	Party	Main Ideology	Year of Formation/	First time in a National or EP Parliament	Performance at European Parl. Elections		Performance during Penultimate National Elections	Performance during Latest National Elections
					(2009) *for EU member states	(2014) *for EU member states		
Bulgaria	ATAKA	New radical right	2005	2005 (8.1%)	11.96%	2.96%	7.30 % (2013)	4.52% (2014)
Bulgaria	National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria	Populist-right	2011	2014	-	3.50%	-	7.29% (2014)
Bulgaria	Bulgaria Without Censorship	Populist-Right	2014	2014 (EP)	-	10.66%	-	5.69 % (2014)
Cyprus	National Popular Front (ELAM)	Ultra-nationalist, Neo-Fascist	2011	-	N/A	2.69%	N/A	1.08% (2011)
Czech Republic	Public Affairs Party	Populist-right	2001/2009	2010 (10.9%)	2.40%	-	10.9% (2010)	-
Czech Republic	Pirate Party	Left-libertarian	2009	2012 (2.3%)*	-	4.78%	0.8% (2010)	2.66% (2013)
Czech Republic	Party of Free Citizens	Right-wing populist	2009	2014 (EP)	1.27%	5.24%	0.74% (2010)	2.46% (2013)
Greece	Popular Orthodox Rally	Ultra-religious, Populist-right	2000/2005	2007 (3.8%)	7.15%	2.69%	1.58% (2012)	1.03 % (2015)
Greece	Independent Greeks	Populist-right	2012	2012 (7.5%)	-	3.50%	7.5% (2012)	4.8% (2015)
Greece	Golden Dawn	Ultra-nationalist, Neo-fascist	1993/2007	2012 (7%)	0.50%	9.40%	7% (2012)	6.3% (2015)
Greece	Coalition of the Radical Left (SRYRIZA)	Radical-left	2004	2007 (3.3%)	4.70%	26.60%	26.9% (2012)	36.3% (2015)
Denmark	Liberal Alliance	Populist-right	2007	2007 (2.8%)	0.59%	2.90%	-	5.00% (2011)
Germany	Die Linke	Radical-left	2005	2007 (8.7%)	7.50%	7.30%	11.1% (2009 - mostly from East Germany)	8.6% (2013)
Germany	Pirate Party	Left-libertarian	2006	2014 (1.45%)	0.90%	1.45%	2.0% (Sep.2009)	2.2% (2013)
Germany	Alternative for Germany	Populist-right	2013	2014(7.1%)	-	7.10%	-	4.7% (2013)
Finland	Finns Party (ex. True Finns)	Populist-right	1995/1997	1999 (0.99%)	9.8% (in electoral alliance)	12.90%	19.1% (2011)	17.6 % (2015)
France	Parti de Gauche/Left Front	Left-libertarian	2008/2009	2009 (split from SD)	6.47%	6.61%	-	6.91 (2012)
Hungary	Jobbik	Ultra-nationalist, Neo-Fascist	2003	2009 (EP)	14.77%	14.67%	16.67% (2010)	20.3% (2014)
Hungary	Politics-can-be-Different (LMP)	Left-libertarian	2009	2010 (7.48%)	2.61%	5.04%	7.48% (2010)	5.26 (2014)
Iceland	Pirate Party of Iceland	Left-libertarian	2012	2013 (5.1%)	N/A	N/A	-	5.1% (2013)
Italy	Five-Star Movement	Left-libertarian	2009	2013 (25.5%)	-	21.20%	-	25.5% (2013)
Latvia	All For Latvia/ National Alliance	Populist-right	2006/2010	2010 (7.7%)	2.81%	14.30%	13.9% (2011)	16.6 % (2014)
Lithuania	Order and Justice	Populist-right	2002	2004 (11.4%)	11.90%	14.25%	12.7% (2008)	7.31% (2012)
Netherlands	Party for Animals	Animal-rights, left-libertarian	2002	2006 (1.8%)	3.46%	4.20%	1.3% (2010)	1.9% (2012)
Netherlands	Party for Freedom	Populist-right	2006	2006 (5.9%)	17%	13.35%	15.5% (2010)	10.1% (2012)
Portugal	Party for Animals and Nature	Animal-rights, green-libertarian	2009/2011	-	-	-	-	1.04%(2011) (present only at reg. level)
Portugal	Left Bloc	Left-libertarian	1999	1999 (2.4%)	10.72%	4.56%	9.8% (2009)	5.2 % (2011)
Quebec (Canada)	Quebec Solidaire	Left-libertarian	2006	2008 (3.78%)	N/A	N/A	6.03 (2012)	7.63% (2014)
Romania	New Generation	Ultra-religious, Populist-right	2000/2004	2009 (EP)	8.65% (in electoral alliance w. Greater Romania Party)	-	2.27% (2008)	-
Romania	People's Party	Populist-right	2011	2012 (14.63%)	-	3.67%	-	14.63% (2012)
Slovakia	Ordinary People	Populist-right	2011	2012 (8.55%)	-	7.46%	-	8.55% (2012)
Spain	Podemos	Left-libertarian	2014	2014 (EP)	-	8%	-	-
Sweden	Pirate Party	Left-libertarian	2006	2009 (EP)	7.10%	2.23%	0.65% (2010)	0.4% (2014)
Sweden	Feminist Initiative	Left-libertarian, Feminist	2005	2014 (EP)	2.20%	5.30%	0.4 (2010)	3.1% (2014)
Sweden	Democrats	New radical right	1988/1995-2010	2010 (5.7%)	3.30%	9.70%	5.7% (2010)	12.9% (2014)
Ukraine	Svoboda	Ultra-nationalist, Neo-fascist	1995-2004	2012 (10.44%)	N/A	N/A	10.44% (2012)	4.71 (2014)

The list in Table 1 above show the new tribune parties of the 21<sup>st</sup> century as emerging from all poles of the political spectrum. Among them, the populist radical right dominate; sixteen out of the thirty-five identified parties are part of this specific family. Eleven are new-left libertarian, three are extremist right parties and two are radically left. In sheer magnitude, the proliferation of these parties is at least as large and extensive as the rise of the new radical right and greens during the 1970s and 1980s. Therefore, the current surge signifies the second and most recent wave of new post-materialist ideologically radical political parties in European states and beyond. Furthermore, unlike previous periods, it constitutes a simultaneous attack on mainstream parties in both East and West from all sides of the political spectrum (see figure 1).




Figure 1 above illustrates the distinct waves of tribune parties in Europe. The first wave starts in the mid 1970s with the formation of the anti-taxation Progress Party in Denmark and Progress Party in Norway. A decade later, green parties proliferate in almost every Western European state during the 1980s. At a close distance of about 5 years, throughout the mid and late 1980s and early 1990s, new radical right parties enter the arena of Europe's political space with the advent of Front National in France, Flemish Interest in Belgium and Lega Nord in Italy. This is not a Europe-only phenomenon however. In Canada, for example, the populist Reform Party forms at about the same time – in 1987.

Following the proliferation of the radical-right in the mid-1990s is a gap of about a decade in which few new parties emerge. Yet the proliferation picks up again starting with the mid-2000s. The reasons as to why this occurs are beyond the scope of this study. However, Minkenberg (2013) argues that many of the populist-right parties that emerged in the 1980-1990 period were slowly co-opted and 'tamed' by conservative parties. This gave them legitimacy and allowed them to affect policy (Minkenberg 2013, 5). Consequently, it may be that as the older anti-establishment tribune parties were brought into the establishment, new challengers found the opportunity to form and take on the *tribune* role. This new surge is marked by libertarian and left-libertarian parties such as the Swedish and German pirate parties or Hungary's LMP. It is, however, also marked by a surge in neo-fascist extreme-right parties in Greece and Hungary. Outside the EU, in Ukraine, it is a period when the extreme-right Svoboda gains increasing popularity and representation in parliament for the first time in 2012. Meanwhile, in France, Germany and Quebec (Canada), it is a period of rejuvenation for the new-left with the formation of

Parti De Gauche, Die Linke and Quebec Solidaire. At the same time, it is an era of reform for formerly dormant and unsuccessful radical-right parties such as the True Finns and Swedish Democrats. Elsewhere, such as in Netherlands, Italy and Romania, it is the advent of new populist-right parties such as PVV, Five-Star Movement and the People's Party (PPDD). The emergence of these parties does not necessarily represent a new major cleavage in European politics. However, what they do illustrate is the historical procession of anti-establishment tribune parties in western democracies and Europe in particular. Although not constituting a homogenous party family, the universe of these parties is one which combines ideological radicalism (whether on the left, right or new-left libertarianism versus nationalist-authoritarianism) with a tribune discourse pitting certain sections of society - perceived to have been ignored by the mainstream parties - versus a large range of patricians of which political elites are the primary but not sole members.

### *B) Populus vs. Rulers*

The second criteria of tribune-parties involve a populist anti-elitist discourse. Despite their differing ideological commitments, their rhetoric, criticism and ideological thrust is pointed not just at each other but also towards the established, mainstream centre-left and centre-right (Abedi, 2004: 2). One could argue that such parties fall under what Andreas Schedler (1996), Robert R. Barr (2009) or McDonnell and Newell (2011) call outsider, anti-party or anti-establishment parties. As mentioned in the previous chapter, while these three terms are not always used interchangeably as some anti-partyist

literature would actually differentiate between them, a few certain key features are recognized as fundamentally defining this type of party. The most important such feature is a triangular framing of politics between establishment, anti-establishment and citizenry with the second being the only true representative of the latter (Schedler, 1996: 293).

Not all populist parties are anti-establishment *tribune* parties; the *tribune* label is not used here simply to repackage populist parties. Populism can often be employed by mainstream parties as well or by parties that form/support governing coalitions. Established politicians may borrow just as well some of the populist discourse without actually being outsiders at all. Such is the case of statements by Angela Merkel or former French president Nicholas Sarkozy vis-à-vis multiculturalism or illegal immigrants. These politicians are not outsiders but at the forefront of established political parties and yet they have borrowed extensively from the speech of non-mainstream parties. Others like Geert Wilders in the Netherlands or even Jean-Marie Le Pen in France may be well-experienced politicians - with years behind them as national legislators on the list of a given long-existing party – that only mimic being outsiders after leaving their former party without actually being outsiders to the political system.

Populism, however, is a significant element of the modern *tribune* party. Although rarely adequately defined, a common used definition of populism involves a type of discourse which romanticizes the people and demonizes their rulers. Populism therefore often contrasts the *populus* or the ordinary citizenry - which is described as ‘authentic’, ‘real’ and ‘pure’ - with the ‘hidden’ and ‘evil’ interests of the corrupt and decadent ruling class that leads them. Leaders and societal elites are usually presented as dishonest,

privileged, greedy and disinterested when it comes to popular concerns or needs. Above all, elites are depicted not just as indifferent but also as deliberately working against the very interests of the general masses. When it comes to political elites per se, this translates into an attempt to denounce them for failing to accomplish their most fundamental and primordial function – popular representation. Populist parties define themselves as outsiders, anti-establishment and advocating plebiscitarian linkages that (unlike current political systems) would hold decision-makers accountable (Barr, 2009: 43-44).

The *populist* label is often used to describe an entire family of parties that first appeared in the mid-1970s and early 1980s. Although it is difficult to capture the ideological pillars of all such parties, a few common traits are distinguishable; most, if not all, were advocating small governments, decreasing taxation and halting or at least limiting immigration. The earliest example is the Danish Progress Party, which formed as early as 1972 (Widfeldt, 2000: 488). Yet an even earlier example, prior to the rise of the new-radical-right in Western Europe, is perhaps the UDCA of Pierre Poujade. The party started as an anti-parliamentary movement in the mid-1950s and emerged into a full-fledged anti-tax, anti-intellectual, nationalist political party by the end of the decade (Shields, 2000: 21). One of its younger members, Le Pen, would eventually become the leader of the Front National two decades later.

Later counterparts in other European states include the Austrian Freedom Party, the Norwegian Progress Party, Lega Nord or the Danish People's Party (after the downfall of the Progress Party in that country). The label *populist* is thus applied to conservative (sometimes nationalist), economically right-of-centre parties largely

emerging since the 1970s and 1980s. Therefore, although used prior to the rise of the radical-right and certainly not exclusively intended as a term describing radical-right parties, it is around this party family that the term 'populist' is mostly encountered in relation to European politics.

Modern tribune parties, however - although including many populist-right parties such as the Dutch Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) for instance - are not exclusively populist right parties. They include many of the extremist and xenophobic types of parties such as the British National Party or the more recent Jobbik in Hungary and Golden Dawn in Greece. These later parties are even more vocal in claiming to defend the interests of the people versus their political rulers. Moreover, although *populism* is rarely applied in the context of left-wing parties in Europe, many of the newer libertarian-leftist parties make use of a very similar rhetoric in their election manifestos and campaigns. The negative representation of major parties, mass media or large corporations that harm the 'people' is just as present among Europe's new left-libertarians (Pirate Party Germany *Unsere Ziele*, 2013; Declaration of Principles Pirate Party, 2010; Politics-can-be-Different, 2013).

### C) *The Constituency*

The third criterion is the commitment to a specific constituency. Tribune parties do not seek to be catch-all parties. They are not concerned with gaining as many votes as possible at the expense of ideological concessions. They also do not claim to speak for an abstract and generalized '*people*' at large. Instead, tribune parties claim to speak for

specific alienated strata in society: be it the youth, the elderly, the unemployed, the environmentalists or the nationalists.

The populist discourse of tribune parties does not imply a commitment towards an undefined blurry concept of the ‘people’. Tribune parties claim to speak exclusively for the most alienated and forgotten, under-represented strata in society. They seek to represent the ordinary citizen or *plebs* and usually a specific sort of citizen (frequently ignored or allegedly unrepresented by mainstream political actors). This may include specific age groups such as the young or the elderly. It may also include classes such as students or intellectuals as well ethnic-based groups such as nationalists or “natives” (as opposed to immigrants or minorities). The tribune party does not claim, therefore, to represent the whole of society but a specific stratum within it which is sought to accept the tribune party as its liberator and voice. In this respect, the discourse of the tribune party is radically aimed against the mainstream centrist cartel of established parties blamed for alienating the ordinary citizen. Tribune parties are thus the outside challengers identified by Katz and Mair (2009: 759) as threatening the current cartel party system.

As the current establishment can no longer be trusted, it is the tribune party (often untested and never before in power) that would essentially take over as the voice of the people and re-establish their connection with government. To this end, tribune parties emphasize their intent to restore party-societal links as well as their ability to attract those segments of society that are usually thought to be abandoned by the mainstream. Most tribune parties boast about their success in rallying the very specific classes of plebeian voters they seek to speak to and to speak for. Politics-can-be-Different (LMP), for instance, admits to being unable to appeal to working-class voters (concentrated in

Eastern Hungary) however it brags about its ability to represent middle-aged, middle-class Budapest intellectuals - a constituency until recently disillusioned with Hungarian politics (Politics-can-be-Different, 2013).

The elderly are a similar group targeted by left-libertarians and new radical parties alike. Pensions for the elderly are extensively elaborated on and argued for by the Romanian People's Party, SYRIZA, LAOS as well as Jobbik (PPDD, 2012; SYRIZA, 2012; LAOS, 2007; Jobbik, 2010). Western radical-right parties adopt a similar position. The Swedish Democrats argue for increasing assistance to the elderly and the improvement of nursing homes (Swedish Democrats, 2010). It may be that as Europe's population is gradually aging, these parties are tapping into a constituency that they perceive as increasingly numerous and thus a potential supplier of votes. At the same time, the emphasis on pensions and elderly are suggestive of the image that tribune parties project as bringers/ revivers of the romanticized past.

The Swedish Pirate Party, in contrast, boasts its ability to tap into a constituency that is often associated with political apathy – the youth (Pirate Party, 2012). Unexpectedly and contrary to previous academic studies, the right-wing Swedish Democrats point out that in high-school mock-elections, *they* were among the most popular parties among students (Skolval, 2010). The emphasis on young voters is used by tribune parties to illustrate that they are focused on 'real important issues' that engage the youth while old centrist established parties are not. What is thus projected is an image of 'party of the future' as such parties would be relevant in future elections due to their concern with the problems of the next generation.

What is implied in all cases is that while mainstream parties have neglected and forgotten about an important segment of society – they – the tribunes speak for and will act for the interests of this particular constituency. Table 2 below illustrates the presence of the populist discourse among identified tribune parties as well as their commitment to a specific constituency.

**Table 2. Tribune Parties by Presence of Populist discourse and Commitment to a Specific Constituency**

Country	Party	Presence of a Populus vs Mainstream Discourse	Specific Constituency
Bulgaria	ATAKA	■	(Nationalists)
Bulgaria	National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria	■	-
Bulgaria	Bulgaria Without Censorship	■	-
Bulgaria	Order, Law, Justice	■	-
Czech Republic	Public Affairs Party	■	-
Greece	Popular Orthodox Rally	■	(mainly nationalists; elderly)
Greece	Golden Dawn	■	(mainly nationalists; elderly, unemployed)
Greece	Coalition of the Radical Left (SRYRIZA)	■	(youth, working-class, middle-class)
Denmark	Liberal Alliance	■	
Germany	Die Linke	■	(working-class, left-wing voters)
Germany	Pirate Party	■	(libertarians; youth)
Finland	True Finns	■	(nationalists)
France	Parti de Gauche	■	(working-class, left-wing voters)
Hungary	Jobbik	■	(mainly nationalist; elderly, youth)
Hungary	Politics-can-be-Different (LMP)	■	(urban intellectuals, middle-class)
Iceland	Pirate Party of Iceland	■	(libertarians; youth)
Italy	Five-Star Movement	■	(libertarians; youth)
Latvia	All For Latvia	■	(nationalists)
Lithuania	Order and Justice	■	(nationalists)
Netherlands	Party for Animals	-	(environmentalists and animal-enthusiasts)
Netherlands	Party for Freedom	■	(nationalists; elderly)
Portugal	Party for Animals and Nature	-	(environmentalists and animal-enthusiasts)
Quebec (Canada)	Quebec Solidaire	■	(working-class, left-wing voters, minorities)
Romania	New Generation Party	■	(nationalists)
Romania	People's Party	■	(nationalists, working-class; elderly)
Slovakia	Ordinary People	■	(nationalists)
Spain	Podemos	■	(youth, working-class, middle-class)
Sweden	Pirate Party	■	(libertarians; youth)
Sweden	Democrats	■	(nationalists)
Ukraine	Svoboda	■	(nationalists)

#### *D) The Quick-Fix*

An additional element of tribune parties is the trivialization of issues. Parties belonging to the tribune party species often present very simplistic and laconic solutions to complex and intricate societal problems. Their party programs are frequently very short and in point-form despite the usually complicated reformative platforms they entail. Solutions to societal issues are depicted as easily available, suggesting that it is the unwillingness rather than the inability on the part of the mainstream to enact them.

For instance, Greece's Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS), which until 2012 held the only far-right seats in the Greek parliament, promises that the country's economic problems could readily be addressed in just three steps. The solutions given involve a reduction in taxes, a halt of immigration and a ban on Turkey's EU accession process (LAOS, 2007). The program of Golden Dawn (LAOS' more radical counterpart which gained almost 7% in Greece's June 2012 elections and 21 seats in parliament), is unsurprisingly more radical. The party's antidote to put Greece back on track involves a similar short list that includes refusing to pay the country's debt, imprisoning those responsible for the debt, nationalizing all banks but also enhancing the role of Greece's military and police, securing Greece's borders and ousting foreign influence while simultaneously placing immigrants in "specialized detention facilities where work will be produced" (Golden Dawn, 2015).

While not nearly as radical, Romania's new People's Party (as well as ATAKA in neighbouring Bulgaria) betray a similar fixation for party programs with just twenty points. The Romanian People's Party, for example, promises to deal with a corrupt

political class, increasing debt as well as a stagnating economy through twenty steps which include lowering taxes while simultaneously (yet ironically) increasing public-sector salaries and pensions as well as granting every citizen 20,000 EURO (with the superficial caveat of providing a business-plan for an existing or future hypothetical business venture). To address corruption, the party offers a brief yet simple solution: every corrupt politician will be placed on trial (Twenty Points – Partidul Poporului, 2012). A similar approach can be found in Jobbik's program which argues that 'removing' Hungary's current politicians, enhancing the power of the military and police, expelling multinational corporations and not in the least, segregating the Roma, would solve Hungary's economic and social problems (Jobbik, 2014).

The Swedish Democrats (SD) borrow the bullet-point format however they provide a broader 99-point program to address all of Sweden's problems from issues such as taking care of the elderly to maintaining the welfare state under current financial constraints. To do this, the SD proposes (among others) a stop to current immigration and a reversal of the multi-cultural policies of previous mainstream governments (Swedish Democrats, 2014). As the 99-point program is seven-pages long, however, the SD has compiled a shorter condensed counterpart as well, containing just three succinct core issues. Swedish democrats summarize their solutions to Sweden's challenges by arguing for 1) a new immigration policy – understood to mean 'helping' potential immigrants stay in their own countries rather than immigrating to Sweden; 2) a crackdown on crime and finally 3) increasing pensions (Swedish Democrats, 2014).

This trivialization and tendency to combine protectionist with xenophobic measures and at the same time add a concoction of economically right-wing and social-

oriented proposals *is* a radical-right phenomenon. However, the combination of right-wing measures with leftist ones in the interest of popular appeal is not just employed by the radical-right. New left libertarian parties occasionally use the same tactic as well. The libertarian German Pirate Party, for instance, promotes free flow of information and free enterprise yet promises that once in power it will immediately institute the minimum wage (Pirate Party Germany *Unsere Ziele*, 2013). Similarly, the generally leftist-green Politics-can-be-Different (LMP) in Hungary which argues for direct forms of democracy, also promises ill-defined punitive measures against corrupt politicians once in power (Politics-can-be-Different, 2013).

Ultimately, anti-establishment tribunal parties display a tendency to downplay the intricate dynamics of politics and the fundamental and complicated transformations their programs entail. The strategy of offering simplified point-form solutions is in effect illustrative of an anti-centrist and anti-mainstream discourse. As the cartel of mainstream political elites has indeed depoliticized issues, the radical parties on the fringes of political space are rushing to re-politicize and even trivialize them. Doing so, they are essentially implying that solutions are readily available and it is only the established mainstream that is unwilling to implement them. Therefore, this type of downplaying the intricate dynamics of politics by offering simplified point-form solutions, which in effect constitute fundamental and complicated changes, is part of the image that these parties try to project about themselves as ‘tribunes’ of those who need these changes only if the current disengaged political elites would endorse them.

### *E) The Rally Against the Enemy*

The fourth criterion involves an aggressive and confrontational behaviour vis-à-vis political adversaries. However, such parties do not just struggle with political elites but often (depending on the party color) they also claim to fight against an entire *patrician class* encompassing surveillance and law enforcement agencies, multinational corporations, immigrants, foreign-powers, the IMF or the EU – all of which (sometimes synchronized) work and conspire against the common citizen. Frequently, tribune parties - regardless of ideological position - identify the cartel of mainstream politicians, government officials or more abstract government institutions as self-interested corrupt elites, profiteers and ultimately, enemies of the people. Much like their ancient counterparts, modern *patricians* are denounced as those who were originally tasked with representing – and working for – the people but over time have deserted their constituency and even started to conspire against it<sup>5</sup>.

In the case of parties from Eastern European countries, such as Romania's NGP and PPDD or Hungary's Jobbik and LMP, the patricians most often include former communists. Likewise, patricians may include 'sell-outs' and 'traitors' to the state as in the case of extremist right parties like Jobbik. In the case of Pirate parties, the patrician image is associated with state institutions which increasingly restrict private freedoms. This includes governments, national security agencies, surveillance as well as law

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<sup>5</sup> *Pater* or 'father' was the original title of the heads of clans chosen to participate in the gathering of elders (*senex*) that gave council to Rome's kings and that would become the Roman senate. Over time and especially during the Republic, the heads of families became a class in their own right – *Patri-cians* - and delimited themselves from *the plebs* or the rest of the population as well as the increasing waves of newcomers to the city (Davies, 1997: 151).

enforcement agencies (Politics-can-be-Different, 2013; Pirate Party Germany Unsere Ziele, 2013).

Ultimately, the *patrician* that tribune parties claim to struggle against is identified mainly with the political establishment. However this image is not exclusively limited to political elites. It can have a number of other facets, including an economic one as well. It may thus include local economic elites (oligarchs) or *the 1%* as in the case of new left and libertarian parties like SYRIZA and Politics-can-be-Different (SYRIZA, 2012; Politics-can-be-Different, 2012). What is becoming increasingly notable, however, is the trend of parties of the radical and extreme right such as Golden Dawn and Jobbik to employ similar economic-elite images and thus take positions generally associated with left-wing politics, effectively entering in competition with the new left-libertarian parties for the left economic vote (Jobbik, 2010; Golden Dawn, 2012).

Furthermore, the *patrician* is not just an internal enemy, inside the state. It can be external such as foreign or multinational corporations blamed for filling up their coffers at the expense of the citizenry as in the case of Jobbik (Jobbik, 2010). It can also take the form of international institutions such as the IMF or the EU that are encroaching on national sovereignty rather than acting in the interests of their member-states (Golden Dawn, 2012; Jobbik, 2010; LAOS, 2007; SYRIZA, 2012). Occasionally, the threat from abroad can take the form of an actual explicit country such as the United States or a neighbouring state (LAOS, 2007; Jobbik, 2010).

Rarely would tribune parties exploit only one image of the *patrician*. Several facets of *patricians* can be denounced as working together and at the same time. Thus, the *patricians* are also sometimes portrayed as a conglomerate of political, cultural and

economic interests in a conspiratorial arrangement with each other but also with other potential ‘enemies’ such as immigrants as in the case of radical-right parties (Mudde, 2007). For the Swedish Democrats, previous governments led by mainstream parties are at fault for the country’s multicultural policy that has allowed large numbers of immigrants to reside in Sweden (Swedish Democrats, 2013). In the case of Jobbik, for instance, it is the European Union which in agreement with Hungary’s ‘collaborationist’ political class gives the Hungarian state Union subsidies only with the condition that they are further directed towards multinational corporations (Jobbik, 2010). For LMP, Hungary’s corrupt political leadership is in collaboration with powerful oligarchies that have essentially taken over the state’s economy and legislative decision (Politics-can-be-Different, 2012).

*F) Renew Democracy: The Return to the ‘Garden of Eden’*

The fifth element of tribune parties is the promise to restore or improve ‘true’ democracy. To this end, such parties describe themselves as victims of the establishment and portray their struggle against the mainstream as part of a struggle against a decaying democracy that is akin to anti-authoritarian movements. They promise to use their ‘new’, outsider and never-before-in-government status as a credential to govern and ‘fix’ all societal problems allegedly created by the mainstream (Schedler, 1996: 299-302). This includes a restoration of the link between society and political elites as well as a rejuvenation of democratic systems.

Essentially, tribune parties project an image of continuous struggle, mainly with the political establishment as well as their associates (EU, IMF, multinational corporations, security agencies, and oligarchs). Whether the citizen is under attack by increasing immigration, multinational corporations, the rich or the EU, it is the established political class that ultimately acted as a catalyst and thus abandoned or turned against voters. The ultimate promise of a tribune party to its constituency is not just to deal with the aforementioned list of enemies or patricians. Its underlined objective is to restore something that has been lost as a result of the patrician class. Solutions for a better future are therefore amalgamated with bringing back a romanticized version of the past. Depending on the specific ideology of the tribune party, the ‘Garden of Eden’ of the past can take different forms. However, a common theme to almost all such parties is the citizen’s return to a harmonious coexistence with its leaders.

Ultimately, the greater and general argument tribune parties are making is that democracy itself is deteriorating under current party systems as a result of the cartel formed by mainstream political actors. The populist-right Romanian People’s Party (as well as New Generation before it), the extreme right Jobbik and the libertarian Politics-can-be-Different underscore the corruption of centrist parties and the failure of their neoliberal reforms (PPDD, 2012; New Generation Party, 2008; Politics-can-be-Different, 2013; Jobbik, 2010). The libertarian Pirates speak of an ever increasingly strong state, led by political monopolies, which has begun to infringe on individual rights and freedoms (Pirate Party, 2008). Subsequently, they all call for a reorganization of democratic order. Their call is not for the elimination of democracy *per se* but rather for the abolition of representative democracy favouring established mainstream parties. This feature is

something quite common among right-wing populist parties (Rydgren, 2006: 5-6). Yet, as illustrated above, many of the latest leftist-libertarians and pirates seem to make the exact same arguments.

In essence, the emphasis on individual access to political decision-making as well as direct democracy as opposed to current forms of representative democracy is in fact present in all aforementioned parties but quite explicitly elaborated by Jobbik, the Pirates, Politics-can-be-Different and SYRIZA (Geert Wilders, 2006; Jobbik, 2010; Pirate Party, 2008; Politics-can-be-Different, 2013; SYRIZA, 2012).

Table 3 below illustrates the presence of the quick-fix strategy, the rally against the enemy and the democratic overhaul discourse in identified tribune parties.

It is important to note however that not all these characteristics are found among all tribune parties. In certain instances, some parties may be missing one or two of these features. However a majority of these features and especially political ideology, populist discourse, rally against the enemy and quick-fixes (in that order) are critical elements of all successful tribune parties.

**Table 3. Tribune Parties by programmatic trivialization, aggressive discourse versus political adversaries and claim to democratic renewal**

Country	Party	Quick-fix	Presence of a 'Rally Against the Enemy' Discourse	Presence of a 'Democratic Renewal' Discourse
Bulgaria	ATAKA	■	■	-
Bulgaria	National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria	■	-	■
Bulgaria	Bulgaria Without Censorship	■	■	■
Czech Republic	Public Affairs Party	■	-	-
Greece	Popular Orthodox Rally	■	■	■
Greece	Golden Dawn	■	■	-
Greece	Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA)	■	■	■

Denmark	Liberal Alliance	■	-	-
Denmark	Fokus	■	-	■
Germany	Die Linke	■	■	■
Germany	Pirate Party	-	■	■
Finland	True Finns	■	■	■
France	Parti de Gauche	■	■	■
Hungary	Jobbik	■	■	■
Hungary	Politics-can-be-Different (LMP)	■	■	■
Iceland	Pirate Party of Iceland	■	■	■
Italy	Five-Star Movement	■	■	■
Latvia	All For Latvia	■	■	■
Lithuania	Order and Justice	■	■	■
Netherlands	Party for Animals	■	-	■
Netherlands	Party for Freedom	■	■	■
Portugal	Party for Animals and Nature	■	-	■
Quebec (Canada)	Quebec Solidaire	■	■	■
Romania	New Generation Party	■	■	■
Romania	People's Party	■	■	■
Slovakia	Ordinary People	■	■	■
Spain	Podemos	■	■	■
Sweden	Pirate Party	■	■	■
Sweden	Democrats	■	■	■
Ukraine	Svoboda	■	■	■

### G) *Party Organization and Sources of Power*

While similar in discourse, strategy and commitment to non-centrist ideological tenets, tribunal parties do not share a common organizational style. The hierarchical vs. horizontal and thin-thick distinctions transcend the tribunal party even across party families.

In some cases, high membership is a means of empowerment from the communities which tribunal parties claim to represent. Almost emulating the highly ideological and membership-based mass-parties of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, many tribunal parties have acquired large memberships that occasionally even surpass those of long-established mainstream parties. The Swedish Pirates and the Swedish Democrats, for instance, have attained memberships exceeding those of the Leftist Party or the Swedish

Greens (Swedish Democrats, 2012; Pirate Party, 2013). Jobbik, in Hungary, has done the same. Moreover, the party has entered a territory long thought to be forgotten – that of fascist inspired paramilitary wings. Twice the party has attempted to create affiliated paramilitary militias and once it has even incited a legal action against it (Kushen, 2011). Golden Dawn in Greece is yet another party that fits the same model. Both are quite a departure from milder successful version of radical right wing parties in Europe which limit their opposition within established democratic frames of competition.

High membership, in the case of these parties, has a dual purpose. One is to provide the party with capital, as unlike established parties, it cannot tap into state finances or alternative means of acquiring finances. However, high membership serves another quite symbolic role as well. As mainstream parties have abandoned ideology and moved towards the center while turning away from society and towards the state, they have renounced their need for societal links and membership (Katz and Mair, 1996). In contrast, the tribune party attempts to project an image of deep connection with its constituency and a re-emphasis on party membership which ultimately illustrates a way of doing politics reminiscent of the way that current established mainstream once used to be. The neo-fascist variety (including the paramilitary wings) is an attempt to project in the eyes of their constituents the image of authority and order whereas the state is perceived to be withering away.

It is important to note, nonetheless, that not all tribune parties are marked by high membership. PVV in the Netherlands, for instance, includes just one member –its leader Geert Wilders. The empowerment of the leader in this case is not manifested through a high number of members but rather through a plethora of supporters and donors. With just

one member, the party does not receive government subsidies so whatever support it has, it can claim it had nothing to do with state finances run by mainstream parties.

Centralized leadership similarly transcends across party families. For many parties, the primacy of the leader is a critical feature. The leader is often the face of the party – the tribune personified and charismatic populist leaders are often a feature of most such parties. Two populist-right party leaders, albeit belonging to older parties outside the newer wave of parties under study here, have gone as far as to call themselves ‘tribunes’ of the people. The only two known party leaders that have passionately promoted themselves as such are Jean-Marie Le Pen in France and Vadim Tudor<sup>6</sup>, leader of the far-right Greater Romania Party (Le Point 2011).

Among newer tribune parties, the most evident example of the centrality of leadership is Geert Wilders of the PVV (Vossen, 2011: 179). However, other examples include Gabor Vona of Jobbik, Dan Diaconescu of the Romanian PPDD, George Becali of the former New Generation Party, Jummie Akesson of the Swedish Democrats, Timo Soini and the True Finns, Nikolaos Michaloliakos and Golden Dawn. This has also been somewhat the case for the Swedish Pirates and Rickard Falkvinge. It is not the case of the libertarian Politics-can-be-Different as it attempts to display a pluralist image where decision-making is never held by just one individual. However, even this party relied on the charisma of its founder, Andras Schiffer. Ultimately, the party leader in such cases seeks to personify the ‘hero’ of their constituents, battling a series of enemies, including disconnected mainstream parties who no longer represent citizen demands.

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<sup>6</sup> At least in the case of Vadim Tudor, the term has ultimately played against him and has been turned into a sarcastic nickname in the mass-media as well as in mainstream political discourse (Gandul 2009).

Contrary to Gunther and Diamond's (2003: 188-189) typology of movement parties which distinguishes a clear organizational cleavage across the libertarian-extreme right divide, this chapter suggests otherwise. Although organizational differences do exist both in terms of membership as well as centralization around the leader, these differences cut across party families. It is not just the radical right party family that places and importance on leadership. Similarly, it is not only the left-libertarian camp that is open to a large party membership base. Table 4 below further illustrates this divide across identified tribune parties of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

**Table 4. Tribune Parties by Membership and Organization**

Country	Party	Membership (higher lower than average of mainstream parties)	Organization (ultra-centralized around the leader, centralized, decentralized)
Bulgaria	ATAKA	High	centralized
Bulgaria	National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria	High	centralized
Bulgaria	Bulgaria Without Censorship	Low	centralized
Czech Republic	Public Affairs Party	Low	centralized
Greece	Popular Orthodox Rally	High	centralized
Greece	Golden Dawn	High	centralized
Greece	Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA)	High	centralized
Denmark	Liberal Alliance	-	-
Denmark	Fokus	-	-
Germany	Die Linke	High	decentralized
Germany	Pirate Party	High	decentralized
Finland	True Finns	High	centralized
France	Parti de Gauche	High	decentralized
Hungary	Jobbik	High	centralized
Hungary	Politics-can-be-Different (LMP)	High	decentralized
Iceland	Pirate Party of Iceland	High	decentralized
Italy	Five-Star Movement	High	decentralized
Latvia	All For Latvia	High	centralized
Lithuania	Order and Justice	High	centralized
Netherlands	Party for Animals	High	centralized
Netherlands	Party for Freedom	High	ultra-centralized
Portugal	Party for Animals and Nature	-	-
Quebec (Canada)	Quebec Solidaire	High	centralized
Romania	New Generation Party	Low	ultra-centralized
Romania	People's Party	High	ultra-centralized
Slovakia	Ordinary People	-	centralized
Spain	Podemos	High	centralised
Sweden	Pirate Party	High	centralized
Sweden	Democrats	High	centralized
Ukraine	Svoboda	High	centralized

### 3.4 Conclusion

This chapter has had a dual goal. First, it has sought to briefly glimpse over historical instances of identified tribune parties in Europe. Secondly and most importantly, it has attempted to identify the modern and newest version of tribune parties in European politics as well as capture its main features. Therefore, the archetypal tribune party is generally identified by a radical ideological position as well as an oversimplification of societal issues and their possible solutions. Such parties generally claim to re-engage specific segments of society that mainstream parties allegedly cannot. The tribune party sets up a highly confrontational dynamic between people and themselves on one hand and a large number of *patricians* on the other – of which the political class is the primary but not sole representative. In this context, they project themselves as the restorers of a lost and romanticized past – stolen or corrupted by the patrician class. To this end, they often advocate a reform of the rules of the game – primarily of representative democracy and a move towards more participatory forms of decision-making. In terms of party organization, tribune parties are less marked by homogeneity. Many however do share two important organizational features: high membership as well as centralization around the leader.

Ultimately, the tribune party is an anti-establishment party, primarily highlighting ruler-ruled cleavages. It is a political party that constitutes the kind of challenger identified by Katz and Mair (2009: 759) as menacing the cartel-party system. In the Western political space, this type of party is not necessarily new; it has existed for

decades. What is new, nonetheless, is that a new second wave of anti establishment  
tribune parties is increasingly making itself present in many democracies during the early  
21<sup>st</sup> century.

## Chapter 4 THE PLEBS

*You know they say that racists and conservatives and the uneducated vote for us. That is what they say. We had a poll done just before the elections; guess who voted for us the most? High-school students! They had a mock election among high-school students. We were the most popular. Nobody else will admit that. Next elections they will turn 18 and will vote. We are the future. They vote - because they are unhappy.*

*Swedish Democrats (Sweden)*

*Member of Swedish Democrats (Interview, 2011).*

### 4.1 Introduction

The focus of this chapter is on the *plebs* or people and the demand-side (i.e. factors related to voters) of anti-establishment tribune parties. The subsequent two chapters deal with the supply-side or factors influencing the ability of parties themselves to create opportunities for success. The question this chapter focuses on is one of the main questions surrounding anti-establishment political parties - that is, why do people increasingly vote for them.

In explaining this, the literature focuses mostly on the anti-establishment populist right or radical right party family and the explanations are numerous and they ultimately wind up in a demand-vs-supply-side debate with the balance heavily tilted in favour of the demand-side. Explanations and conclusions are varied and often contract each other. There is no consensus as to why voters vote for the radical right although often times, the economy, immigrants (or opinions about immigration), the EU, and identity may all or - in part - have something to do with it. Most importantly, this is only as far as the radical-right party family is concerned. Not much exists in current academic works on the rise of the new left. As pointed out in chapter 2, with the exception of a few works (Abedi 2004), many studies do not see the rise of the radical right and radical left/new left as part of a larger anti-systemic phenomenon but rather as totally separate currents.

With respect to the demand for such parties, explanations can be divided into two large groups – those which put emphasis on large *macro* structuralist arguments and those which stress the *micro* individual perceptions of potential voters vis-a-vis the larger macro variables such as the economy, unemployment, immigration, etc. According to Cas Mudde (2007), this suffers from major theoretical underdevelopment not just because it is based on (and conditioned by) few data sets but also because individual behaviour (micro-level) is based on changing dynamics at the macro level, while changes at the macro level occur in large part due to micro-level changing individual perceptions. Ultimately, this implies that the macro/micro distinction is often murky and hard to discern.

This chapter will not try to take a position on these debates, however it will attempt to test (where data is available) to what degree micro and macro-level variables explain the rise of anti-establishment tribunal parties. Specifically, I ask whether economic

or left-right self identification is responsible for anti-establishment tribune party success. I do this with the help of zero-order correlations between a selection of macro-level variables for the six cases under focus in this dissertation (Germany, Sweden, Italy, Greece, Hungary and Romania). I do this also with the help of a binary logistic regression model for one available case –Sweden - testing whether the usual culprits (unemployment, satisfaction with the economy, gender, education, views of existing political parties, attitudes towards immigrants) may offer some demand-side explanations for the rise of the new tribune parties during the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The period I focus on is the last decade which also coincides with the financial crisis and sovereign debt crisis in Europe.

The results drawn from this research are rather mixed. The zero-order correlations for all the six cases under study, illustrate a strong relationship between economic structural factors and anti-establishment tribune party success. However, the strand of tribune parties that gains the most is comprised of the new radical left parties. The radical right seems not to fare well over the time of the crisis, especially in the countries where economic data show severe contraction. Furthermore, in the specific case of Sweden the picture becomes increasingly complex. When speaking of voter share for the radical-right, perceptions of the economy matter as well as perceptions of immigrants. However, what also seems to affect radical-right vote are age and negative perceptions of existing political parties. The latter suggests that voters are discontented with already established parties. This may imply that although issues like the economy and immigration are important towards shaping the perception of the electorate, they do so in the context of voters' frustration with the manner in which existing mainstream political parties deal

with them. Thus, a lack of engagement by established parties and the isolationism of the mainstream from society may have become increasingly problematic for voters who have shifted their support towards anti-establishment tribune parties. This strengthens the cartel party thesis of Katz and Mair (1995) and also confirms that challengers appear precisely from ideological extremes and in response to the centrist cartel of mainstream parties.

In terms of age, the younger the voter the higher is the chance for them to vote for the radical right. Ultimately, no demand-related explanation is adequate in answering the question: why do some parties prosper in some countries while they do not in others? This dissertation argues that while changes in demand may create good conditions towards propelling a new political party in parliament, in the end it is the ability of such parties to properly capitalize on popular feelings and shape their own chances of success during elections.

The chapter is consequently organized as follows: the first part briefly reviews some of the literature on the structural vs. micro-level arguments responsible for successful anti-establishment newcomers; the second will investigate the relationship between some macro level indicators and the success of anti-establishment tribune parties; the last section will investigate the impact of a number of both macro and micro-level variables on the success of the radical right in one case for which data are available, Sweden.

## **4.2 Macro-Level Explanations in Academic Literature**

Demand-side variables in literature are divided into two main categories: macro-level or structural and micro-level dealing with individual perceptions. This section

revisits some of the more frequently encountered macro-level explanations, while the following glimpses at the micro-level.

Structural or macro-level arguments are among the most powerful demand-side explanations trying to account for transformations in political party systems. The macro level involves broad social and historical processes which take place at the global or national level (Cas Mudde 2007, 202). This may include changing dynamics related to the economy, patterns of migration or national identity. They have nothing to do with actual perceptions by voters of these events but rather they are aimed to be objective systemic variables which affect party systems. For instance, according to Swank and Betz (2003) the culprit for the rise of the radical-right wing of the anti-establishment parties is none other than the often invoked but rather fluid concept of *globalization*.

Other works linking new radical-left and radical-right parties to structural changes identify fundamental dynamics in society as a result of increasing global competition as being responsible for the phenomenon. As previously mentioned in chapter 2, a popular argument by Kitschelt and McGann (1995) claims that whereas party competition in the Keynesian Welfare State (after World War II) was rather centred on economic issues, the transition to a post-industrial economy has compelled voters to shift their preferences from the traditional socialist versus capitalist axis, existent until around the mid sixties. New axes of political competition are formed which include former class-based but also new post-modern issues that deal with the role of the state, migration, identity, individual freedom or the environment.

The new political space revolves around two factors instead of one. At one extreme there is an economically leftist (redistributive) and politically as well as

culturally libertarian (participatory and individualistic) position. At the opposite pole, an economically rightist and free-marketeting position meets political and cultural authoritarianism (Kitschelt and McGann 1995, 13). The argument is that macro-level variables are ultimately responsible for changes in voter preferences; as competition in modern capitalism between firms intensifies, class-consciousness among employees is hijacked; workers develop an interest in the survival of their firms instead and as a result, the working class favours a decrease in redistributive policies which might drain away resources from investment and consumption. In addition, the macro-level instrumental economic environments guided by rules and orders (which are the milieu in which workers are socialized in) result in workers' identification with authoritarian versions of decision making. On the other hand, less exposed non-tradable domestic sectors are places of work for voters who are more educated and this leads them to identify with a more libertarian idea of politics (Kitschelt and McGann 1995, 7-8). Therefore, because of macro-level changes and shifts of working environments, blue-collar workers, petit-bourgeoisie and the unemployed vote for the radical-right while white-collar employees, students and professionals for the libertarian-left. The work by Kitschelt and McGann (1995) has been a breakthrough in the study of newcomers of the latter half of the previous century. The arrival of the greens and new radical right was often invoked as symptomatic of changes in demand. Nonetheless, two important issues surround this explanation.

First, as further elaborated in Chapter 5, the association between right-wing authoritarianism and right-wing economic issues is not so evident among current anti-establishment tribune parties. While this may have been true for their older predecessors

like Front National in France, Vlaams Belang in Belgium or the Austrian Freedom Party, this is not the winning formula for many of their more recent counterparts. In fact, those authoritarian parties today with right-wing economic positions are not so successful in elections. That was shown to be the case of New Generation Party (NGP) in Romania and Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) in Greece. In contrast, Jobbik in Hungary, Golden Dawn in Greece, Romanian People's Party and even the Swedish Democrats have an increasingly leftist economic program. This trend seems to confirm more recent studies which claim that despite the neo-liberalism shared by radical-right populists during the late 1980s and early 1990s, many of them have lately drifted towards a position that defends the welfare state (Rydgren 2006, 11).

Secondly, post-modern changes, as a result of globalization, do not necessarily explain the proliferation of tribune parties well into the mid-2000s. What they may explain is the rise of the first wave of post-materialist parties such as the greens and the new radical right in the 1970s and 1980s. This was more than thirty to forty years ago. Chapter 5 illustrates quite well that this surge ended by the 1990s during which we see a continuing success of those parties but few *new* such parties emerging. The new wave after 2000 is not adequately explained by structural changes over thirty years ago.

An alternative explanation for the rise of new marginal yet radical parties in Europe lies in socio-economic variables. Kriesi (2014) for instance argues that the Great Recession led to a political crisis and acted as a catalyst for populist political parties. This thesis which goes back to explaining the rise of the Nazis in 1930 essentially argues that crises (often economic) are responsible for the rise of anti-systemic and usually extremist parties (Frey and Weck, 1983; Zimmerman 2003). According to this literature, economic

crises essentially translate into negative GDP growth and increasing unemployment. Faced with this, governments are often caught off guard and mismanage the recovery such as Weimar Germany's notoriously deflationary policies after the Great Depression. Ellinas (2013) argues that a similar situation occurred in Greece after the Great Recession when the IMF/EU imposed ultra-orthodox austerity measures on the government of the time (544-545). After the increasingly painful policies enacted (or announced) during the early 2010s, Greece saw the surge of Golden Dawn – a party that prior to the crisis did not even hold 1% of the vote. Arguably, however, Golden Dawn's surge was not so spectacular since it essentially only took over the radical right vote previously held by LAOS (a party that decided to leave the opposition and join the unpopular government). Ultimately, the 'economic crisis leads to radical/extremist success' theory has been one of the most dominant in explaining the phenomenon of these parties (Berg Schlosser and Mitchell, 2000; Fukayama, 2012). When it comes to operationalizing economic crisis, this usually occurs in literature by either measuring the percentage of negative GDP growth or growing unemployment.

Empirically, however, the literature does not come into agreement whether in fact economic crises do account for the rise of the radical right or not. Jackman and Volpert (1996, 502), for instance, argue that a declining economy coupled with unemployment can be crucial towards the success of extremist parties. This is certainly backed by the historical rise of fascists and Nazis in Europe during the interwar period just as the Great Depression put an end to the economic boom of the 1920s. Rydgren (2006) on the other hand argues that in the case of Sweden, unemployment does not correlate with the rise of the radical right. Studying the decline in governing party support during the recent

economic crisis, Pammett and Leduc (2013) argue that GDP decline does relate to national government vote loss (95). However, because, their focus is only on economic voting with respect to governing versus opposition parties, their work does not state which opposition party gains at the expense of those in power – the mainstream opposition or the anti-establishment opposition.

This betrays one of the main problems with macro-level explanations. They are quite convincing in perhaps illustrating that negative systemic changes lead to main parties being punished but they are quite ineffective in explaining who gains as a result. Theoretically, it is yet unclear as to the way in which macro-level variables result in either mainstream opposition success, radical right anti-establishment party success or radical left/new left party success in specific cases. Essentially, these explanations only tell half the story. They give a good account for major societal shifts which may be held responsible for changes in party systems.

However, they do not really explain through what mechanism societal shifts enable voters to develop these new preferences and, most importantly, they do not explain how it is that new parties take advantage of these shifts. It is just assumed that such parties are completely able to meet societal demand and are just waiting to form whenever occasion permits. Such structural arguments do not consider, for instance, that the same structural arguments could be applied if older more established parties would have taken on the same new issues. In fact, this is exactly what some mainstream parties have tried to do. Statements by prominent politicians, including those by Angela Merkel or former French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, vis-à-vis multiculturalism or illegal immigrants have been made in an attempt to imitate the same messages of these new

parties. Their efforts have not however been fruitful. This suggests that although these changes did indeed occur, looking only at structure is not enough. Structure does not explain why some parties as opposed to others form and become successful as a result of societal shifts.

### **4.3 Micro-Level Explanations**

While macro-level explanations look at the grand dynamics within societies, the micro-level is concerned with why people vote the way they do (Gunther et al. 2007). Therefore, they focus on voters' behaviour and attitudes and the way this shapes electoral outcomes. According to Cas Mudde (2007), the most self-evident explanation for the success of radical right parties at the micro-level is that radical right parties get votes because people hold radical right views (219). Betz (1994) agrees that voters who identify themselves with the 'right' on a left-right scale are more likely to vote for the radical right. This would also imply that the same is true for the new left despite the lesser attention the new-left receives in academic literature than the new radical right. Micro-level explanations ignore the ability of parties to affect the saliency of issues however, they do imply that what matters on the demand-side is what voters themselves think is important rather than 'actual' systemic variables.

Additional micro-level explanations deal with respondents' views of the economy or voters' sentiment vis-a-vis unemployment rather than the actual measure of GDP growth or unemployment. For instance Pammett and Leduc (2013) conclude that with respect to the early stages of the financial crisis in Europe, what mattered more was not so

much how respondents viewed the past performance of the economy but rather prospective expectations that the economy will worsen in the near future (95). Daniel Stockemer (2014) makes a similar claim that although economic variables do seem to matter, they do so only in countries less affected by the crisis. The same seems to hold true the other way around; indeed, some of the countries hardest hit by the sovereign debt crisis, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland do not see a surge in extremist politics. This surge is experienced in countries that are relatively much better off, hinting at perceptions of economic decline rather than actual decline as the main factor responsible. The argument seems to be based much more on the 'fear' of respondents with respect to the national economy which is implied to translate into a fear of personal economic/financial downturn. Interestingly enough, while in Spain the radical right party family did not consolidate into an important anti-establishment challenger, the mainstream centre-left and centre-right domination of the political space has been challenged following the 2014 European Parliament elections by Podemos, a party of the radical-left. In Greece, what can be observed is a rise from obscurity of Golden Dawn, a neo-Nazi political party. However, in this country, what is even more spectacular is the success of SYRIZA of the far-left which rose from a mere 4% to become the official opposition in 2012 and subsequently the main governing party after the elections of 2015.

Fear is also assumed to play a role at the micro-level not only in relation to the economy at large but also to ethnic issues as well. This is an argument especially made in the case of the radical-right wing of the anti-establishment. The main thrust of this argument is that irrespective of the actual number or percentage of immigrants (or in the case of Eastern Europe, minority groups) in a country, fear of their presence or future

increase is what drives voters to vote for these parties. According to Koopmans et al., (2005), regardless of the actual economy of a country or the number of immigrants, attitudes towards immigration and perceptions of immigrants are responsible for the success of radical right parties. A more recent study by Daniel Stockemer (2014) looking at sub-state regional variation also argues that actual numbers of immigrants does not correlate with radical-right votes. Rather, it is the fear of immigrants that may cause social, economic or cultural damage that influences the voter share in the radical right (21). In other words, it is the salience of immigration among voters rather than actual immigration which affects the way the electorate votes.

With respect to Sweden, Rydgren (2006) also identifies fear of immigration as an important factor. However, he argues that the presence of immigrants actually matters as the southern areas of Sweden with the highest percentage population of immigrants are also those most likely to vote for the radical right. Other studies, likewise find a positive correlation between the number of actual immigrants within a country and the radical right wing vote (Golder 2003; Swank and Betz 2003). Both explanations may be right in this case as one drives the other. This, however, would also put the immigrant argument more in the macro-level camp rather than the micro-level.

With respect to immigration, most studies are in general focused on Western Europe where the phenomenon of immigration is quite well-established. However, they have little to say about Eastern Europe where we see radical right parties but few (as of yet) immigrants. According to Cas Mudde (2007), the role of the immigrant is nonetheless taken over by the Roma or other ethnic minorities in those states (214). Nonetheless, even here there seems to be little correlation between the number of ethnic

minorities and the success of the radical right. Mudde (2007) further argues that, often times in Central and Eastern European countries, anti-minority or nativist positions are taken over by mainstream parties and this may explain why in some cases radical right parties do not fare well (2007). The 2014 Romanian presidential election is perhaps one such case where the centre-left adopted a nativist discourse against the ethnic-German presidential candidate of the centre-right and where the radical right has all but disappeared from the political space.

Additional micro-level explanations deal with attitudes over security and the role of the state in providing it. Kitschelt and McGann (1995), for example, make a claim that voters are conditioned to consider the role of the state in private affairs when they vote for political parties, and those voters that place an emphasis on rules and order, low crime, stronger police forces and stronger militaries are more likely to vote for the more authoritarian-oriented radical right party family (13). The same is true for those placing more emphasis on personal freedom and freedom from the state who are more likely to vote for the new left. Other studies however do not confirm these findings. Betz (1994), for instance argues that while these issues may matter they are only secondary to attitudes towards immigrants and non-natives and discontent with mainstream political parties.

#### **4.4 Macro-Level and Tribunes during Financial Crisis**

A large number of anti-establishment tribune parties have become successful around the global financial crisis and most specifically during the debt-crisis in Europe which started in 2009 and which continued well into the mid-2010s. In light of this as

well as the aforementioned literature, a valid hypothesis, worth considering therefore, may be that as the financial crisis reached the European continent after 2009, support for radical movements, regardless of their radical-right or radical-left orientation would increase. The late 2000s global financial crisis started in late-2007 and early-2008, however, its impact on European economies only started to make itself felt during 2009. To reach an objective measurement about the progress of the economy, IMF data on GDP growth is used for the period. Table 5 and Table 6 below illustrate, the negative Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth experienced during the period.

The case selection is based on the same EU member countries as previously outlined: Germany, Sweden, Italy, Greece, Hungary and Romania. As noted above, all cases are states where there are two or more significant non-mainstream parties within the political system. The countries that fit this description can be grouped into three sub-pairs that represent three sub-regions within Europe: Greece and Italy in the south, Romania and Hungary in the Centre/East and Germany and Sweden in northern continental Europe.

Throughout most EU member states, economy was in decline sometime in the 2008-2014 period. Likewise, as economies contracted, unemployment soon followed. With the exception of Germany where unemployment fell from 7.5 to 5.3 percent between 2008 and 2014, unemployment rose by circa 50% in Italy, Hungary, Romania, 25% in Sweden while it more than tripled in Greece (IMF 2014). Table 5 and 6 illustrate that the link between GDP growth and the radical-right and radical-left vote in national elections prior to 2008 and after. Many states experienced a surge in the voter share of these parties. In Hungary, the voter share of the radical-right increased almost eight times, while in Sweden it doubled. In Greece, one of the most affected countries during the

2000s financial crisis, the radical-right increased its performance from 3.8 to 6.9 per cent in 2009. Therefore, among the countries where the party family increased its voter share, the Greek radical-right performance is not remarkable. In subsequent post-crisis elections (May 2012 and June 2012), the radical-right LAOS (which supported the EU and IMF-imposed austerity plan) did not manage to pass the electoral threshold. The space of the radical-right was however taken over by the even more radical and anti-austerity party, Golden Dawn, which received a slightly higher percentage (than LAOS in 2009) of almost seven per cent.

In contrast, Sweden - which recovered quickly from the crisis - experienced for the first time a radical-right party entering parliament despite the fact that during the early 1990s when the country experienced similar (if not worse) economic decline, the same party was unable to pass the five per cent threshold. In Romania, while the country experienced the second largest economic decline in 2009 but recovered in the years after, the radical-right fell drastically from 15.1 per cent to 5.5 per cent.

**Table 5. Economic Growth and Radical Right (RR) Vote in National Elections**

Country	GDP grwth09 (%)	GDP grwth2008- 2014 (%)	RR 2008prior	% after 2008	Net Diff.
Germany	-5.09	8.32	0.5	0.4	-0.1
Greece	-3.136	-24.70	3.8	6.92	3.12
Hungary	-6.767	-2.89	2.2	16.7	14.5
Italy	-5.494	-6.79	8.3	4.1	-4.2
Romania	-6.576	8.15	15.1	5.5	-9.6
Sweden	-5.028	8.43	2.9	5.7	2.8

(Data obtained from Norwegian Social Sciences Data Survey (NSD) 2014a; NSD 2014b; IMF 2014)

**Table 6. Economic Growth and Left-Libertarian Vote in National Elections**

Country	GDP grwth09	GDP grwth2008- 2014	LL 2008prior	LL after 2008	Net Diff.
Germany	-5.09	8.32	0.1	2	1.9
Greece	-3.136	-24.70	5.04	26.89	21.85
Hungary	-6.767	-2.89	0.1	7.48	7.38
Italy	-5.494	-6.79	1.5	25.5	24
Romania	-6.576	8.15	0.3	0.62	0.32
Sweden	-5.028	8.43	0.63	0.65	0.02

(Data obtained from NSD 2014a; NSD 2014b; IMF 2014)

Some of the left-libertarian parties (see Table 6), such as, LMP in Hungary and SYRIZA in Greece (which increased its voter-share by more than 500 per cent following the 2012 elections), have been quite successful. In the other cases, the libertarian camp makes little or no headway. With the exception of Greece's SYRIZA, the electoral performance of the left-libertarian camp dwarfs that of the radical right.

Table 7 below is an analysis in the variation between the performance of tribune parties in the elections before the crisis and after the crisis commenced in the six cases under study. It represents a zero-order correlation between electoral performance and some macro-level economic factors, namely GDP growth and unemployment. Because GDP growth and unemployment were particularly affected by the crisis during 2009, the data for that year is considered as well as the overall change in GDP and unemployment

between the beginning of the crisis in 2008 to the last year for which IMF data exists, 2014.

The zero-order correlation below shows some strong relationship between the net GDP growth during the years of the crisis and the performance of anti-establishment tribune parties in elections after the start of the crisis. There also seems to be a strong relationship between GDP growth during this period as well as the change in unemployment throughout the crisis and the rise of the libertarian new radical left wing of the anti-establishment camp. This is certainly true of Greece where SYRIZA surged from obscurity (5%) to become the main opposition party with 27% in 2012. It is also true of Italy, where the Five Star Movement came to prominence almost overnight, essentially becoming the third main force in Italian politics after the 2013 elections. Both these cases suggest a strengthening of the new left especially in harder hit Southern Europe. The success of these parties has further pushed grand-coalitions by mainstream parties, thus solidifying their status as *opposition*.

In Greece, Pasok, the former mainstream centre-left party was reduced to a mere junior partner of the centre-right. In Hungary, the new left was also quite successful (although much more moderate than in Greece or Italy) in rising from obscurity to 7.5% in 2010 and 5.3% in 2014, therefore entering parliament. Sweden is a similar case with the Pirate Party's notorious success during the 2009 EP elections, although the party did not fare so well at the national level. Germany saw a similar growth of the German Pirates from .2% to 2% and to almost 13% in the polls before the 2014 elections, albeit party infighting prevented the Pirates from capitalizing during the national elections.

**Table 7. Zero-Order Correlation between Electoral Performance of Tribune Parties and Macro-Level Economic Conditions**

		Correlations									
		Tribune Vote Improved Gain (yes/no)	Radical Right Party Improved Gain (yes/no)	Libertarian New Left Party Improved Gain (yes/no)	Net Gain by Tribune	Net gain by Radical Right	Net Gain by Libertarian New Left	Net GDP Growth in 2009	Net GDP Growth between 2008 to 2014	Unemployment in 2009	Unemployment change between 2008 and 2014
Tribune Vote Improved Gain (yes/no)	Pearson Correlation	1	.447	.632	.697	.644	.400	.459	-.380	.635	.255
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.374	.178	.124	.168	.433	.360	.457	.175	.626
Radical Right Party Improved Gain (yes/no)	Pearson Correlation		1	.000	.494	.771	.051	.310	-.359	.831 <sup>*</sup>	.441
	Sig. (2-tailed)			1.000	.319	.073	.924	.550	.484	.040	.381
Libertarian New Left Party Improved Gain (yes/no)	Pearson Correlation			1	.762	.427	.642	.268	-.621	.526	.334
	Sig. (2-tailed)				.078	.398	.169	.607	.188	.284	.518
Net Gain by Tribune	Pearson Correlation				1	.609	.808	.377	-.835 <sup>*</sup>	.804	.715
	Sig. (2-tailed)					.199	.052	.461	.039	.054	.110
Net gain by Radical Right	Pearson Correlation					1	.024	-.008	-.236	.924 <sup>**</sup>	.112
	Sig. (2-tailed)						.963	.988	.652	.008	.833
Net Gain by Libertarian New Left	Pearson Correlation						1	.481	-.877 <sup>*</sup>	.326	.818 <sup>*</sup>
	Sig. (2-tailed)							.334	.022	.528	.047
Net GDP Growth In 2009	Pearson Correlation							1	-.649	.244	.685
	Sig. (2-tailed)								.163	.641	.133
Net GDP Growth between 2008 to 2014	Pearson Correlation								1	-.578	-.942 <sup>**</sup>
	Sig. (2-tailed)									.230	.005
Unemployment in 2009	Pearson Correlation									1	.476
	Sig. (2-tailed)										.340
Unemployment change between 2008 and 2014	Pearson Correlation										1
	Sig. (2-tailed)										

\*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). Tribune Vote Improved, Radical Right Party Vote Improved and Libertarian New Left Party Vote Improved were coded 0=No; 1=Yes.

In terms of the radical-right, there seems to be a strong relationship between the results of the radical right after the start of the crisis and the unemployment rate during the peak of the crisis in 2009. This is backed by Hungary with the advent of Jobbik or Greece with the rise of Golden Dawn. In Sweden as well as, the Swedish Democrats have progressively fared better in elections, emerging as the country's third largest party in 2014. Nonetheless, there are a few additional problems with using macro-level data. Primarily, comparing economic data with tribune party success may be misleading as there is an implied lag between the technical periods of recession and the time it takes for these to trickle down and impact to voters' perception. A more suitable correlation may not be between what is actually happening in terms of GDP growth or decline but the actual way in which citizens perceive the economic situation.

#### **4.5 The Case of Sweden**

The case of Sweden will be used in this chapter to test micro-level variables in conjunction with macro-level ones. Sweden is an ideal case for testing the performance of the anti-establishment with several new radical-left tribune parties (Pirate Party and more recently the Feminists Initiative) as well as one reinvented and increasingly very successful radical-right tribune party, the Swedish Democrats. Among the six countries studied here, Sweden is also the only case for which micro and macro data are available. However, since the data only include a very small number of respondents for the new left Pirate Party, the analysis does not look at the tribune vote as a whole and leaves out the

new radical left. Instead, it will focus on only the performance of the Swedish radical-right, the Swedish Democrats.

I test this performance against a series of macro as well as micro-level variables often encountered in the literature discussed previously: under/un-employment (Kitschelt and McGann 1995), views of the economy (Jackman and Volpert 1996; Pammett and Leduc 2013) and views of immigrants (Koopmans et. Al. 2005; Rydgren 2006). The way attitudes towards immigration are operationalized here are by attitudes vis-a-vis the positive contribution of immigrants to the country. I also test for trust in existing political parties since this variable represents a strong proxy for dissatisfaction with the centrist mainstream.

I add two additional variables both of which are macro-level: gender and education. According to Kitschelt and McGann (1995), voters with tertiary education and socialized in less hierarchal environments are more likely to vote centre-left than less educated voters who are more prone to vote radical-right (15). Daniel Stockemer (2012; 2014) likewise makes a case for education as a main factor in shaping voters' choices for radical right parties. The argument he makes is that regions with a highly educated professional workforce are better prepared to meet modern challenges while also being able to attract more investment. The opposite is true for those areas with a poorly educated workforce. Because of the inherent discourse of radical-right parties which capitalize on nostalgia, populism and scapegoating, these parties would be better suited to gain the support of these individuals (13).

An additional variable often invoked as crucial in determining right-wing success is gender. For instance, Terri Evans (2004) argues that there is a significant gender gap with men more prone to vote for radical-right parties than women. This is because women are also more likely to hold different views than men on issues of immigration while in the workforce, the blue collar workers often identified with the radical-right vote (Kitschelt 1995) are more likely to be men as opposed to women (31).

The dataset used comes from the sixth round of the European Election Database. The analysis below includes a Cramer's V measure of association between radical-right party vote (which is a nominal variable) and a series of macro and micro-level variables as well as a binary logistic regression. The Cramer's V measure in Table 8 is used instead of the Pearson r since it involves the correlation of a binary variable (voted for the radical-right/did not vote) and a number of binary, ordinal and interval variables. Cramer's V varies from 0, meaning no association between the variables and 1, meaning complete association. As expected, Table 8 illustrates a strong relationship between the radical right party vote and views on immigrants. There also seems to be a moderately strong relationship between education, age, views on the economy, and trust in existing political parties and the likelihood to vote for the radical-right. This seems to be in line with the literature on these parties identifying unemployment, the economy as well as views on immigration as critical towards determining radical right party vote (Kitschelt 1995; Stockemer 2014).

The regression analysis in Table 9 also illustrates that some of the variables most likely identified as important by the academic literature do impact radical right party vote. As the dependent variable in this case is vote for the radical right (coded 0-1; 0=no and

1=yes), the test used is a binary logistic regression. The increase in satisfaction with the economy, trust in political parties, the favourable view of immigrants as well as respondents older in age are all associated with a decrease in the vote for radical right parties. The odds ratios illustrate a similar picture. A one unit increase in satisfaction with the economy is associated with a 17% reduction in the probability of voting radical right. This is an 18% reduction in the case of trust in political parties, 3% in the case of age and almost 50 % in the case of positive view on immigration.

**Table 8. Cramer V indicating associations between Radical-Right party Vote and Micro/ Macro Variables**

Radical Right Party Vote in Sweden	Wages vs. Underemployed	Trust in political parties	How satisfied with present state of economy in country	Immigrants make country worse or better place to live	Gender	Age of respondent, calculated	Highest level of education, Sweden
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Radical Right Party Vote in Sweden	Cramer V							
	<b>1</b>	<b>.062</b>	<b>.233</b>	<b>.232</b>	<b>.479</b>	<b>.046</b>	<b>.213</b>	<b>.206</b>

N = 1415

**Table 9. Coefficients for Binary Logistic Regression explaining Radical Right Party Vote in Sweden**

	$\beta$	Sig.	Exp(B)
<b>Satisfaction with Economy</b>	<b>-.181</b>	<b>*</b>	<b>0.834</b>
Under/Unemployed	1.254	.	3.504
<b>Immigrants make country better</b>	<b>-.650</b>	<b>***</b>	<b>0.522</b>
<b>Trust in Parties</b>	<b>-.190</b>	<b>*</b>	<b>0.827</b>
Gender	-.539		.583
<b>Age</b>	<b>-.028</b>	<b>**</b>	<b>0.972</b>
Education	-142	.	0.868

\*p<.05

\*\*p<.01

\*\*\*p<.001

Nagelkerke R<sup>2</sup> = .445

The research above corroborates some of the existing literature on attitudes towards immigration and the radical-right vote (Rydgren 2006; Golder 2003; Swank and Betz 2003; Cas Mudde 2007). Negative views of immigrants are among the strongest determinants of radical-right party vote. It also confirms some of the literature on economic variables or voters' perceptions of the economy (Kitschelt 1995; Jackman and Volpert 1996; Pammett and Leduc 2013; Stockemer 2014). This however is a micro-level variable. It says nothing about the larger macro-level white-collar/blue-collar or employed/unemployed characteristic of respondents. While it is tempting to associate these groups with those who lose out the most during modern ever increasing periods of

labour-competition, the blue/white collar dichotomy, for instance, may no longer necessarily hold true.

The research above also points to an interesting feature. Age (macro-level) is somewhat of a determinant of radical-right party vote with older respondents slightly less likely and younger respondents more likely to vote for this party family. While this is only a study of Sweden, further research involving other cases could test whether the same situation exists throughout EU member states. The result here, however, does seem to be in line with Cas Mudde's (2014) study into the attraction among the youth for the extreme right.

The Swedish Democrats, when interviewed, seem quite aware that their popularity is growing with the youth<sup>7</sup>. Furthermore, studies at the high-school level, interviewing underage students in 2010 – but likely to be able to vote in Sweden's latest 2014 election – found out that a majority of them preferred the radical-right Swedish Democrats (Skolval 2010). Interestingly enough, although almost no data has been released with respect to Sweden's last election, the Swedish Democrats have experienced a surge of 226% between 2010 and 2014 (NSD 2014). It is quite possible that this surge is also in part due to the boost in the youth vote for this party.

Another variable statistically significant (at the micro-level) in the regression model above deals with trust in political parties. This may indicate voters' dissatisfaction with the way in which already existent parties do not deal with important issues - or conversely, the way they do deal with them but by using the same strategy. This may also open the road towards a better understanding of the mechanism through which issues like

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<sup>7</sup> Interview conducted with SD representative of Parliament 2011

the economy or immigration affect the way voters vote. Consequently, while economy and immigration do matter, they do so in the context of voters' discontent with the manner in which political parties address these issues. In light of the recent financial crisis, for instance, whether left or right, all main parties engaged in right-wing economic orthodoxy and austerity. There were only very timid attempts by mainstream parties to offer alternative solutions during the crisis. As a result, this may have increased the apathy of citizens, as well as decreased their faith in institutions, democratic practices and ultimately existing political parties. Ultimately, voters may be simply disillusioned with the way they perceive and understand democracy. Thus, a lack of engagement by mainstream parties and the isolationism of the mainstream from the society it claims to represent may have become quite obvious to voters who have started to be more and more aware of the deficit that current modern democracy carries. This would in fact confirm the cartel party thesis, elaborated by Katz and Mair (1995). However, whereas the cartel party thesis focuses on the near monopoly of mainstream parties on political competition and treats potential challengers as a nuisance at best, the recent surge in radical-right (but also new radical left in certain cases) party vote suggests a strong push from the extremes to challenge the establishment. Demand-side explanations suggest that this is particularly because voters themselves are becoming increasingly conscious of the cartel-effect of mainstream centre-left and right parties.

#### **4.6 Limitations of Demand-Side Approaches**

Schedler and Mudde (2010) point out to the criticism of empirical comparative politics as a data-driven enterprise, propelled by a small number of cross-national datasets that provide the informational infrastructure for quantitative work (417). The implication

of this is that the limited infrastructure both conditions the research question as well as the conclusions. Without taking a normative stance on methodological debates, a few limitations of the research presented above must be mentioned. A first limitation is the small number of cases under study – only six countries, making it difficult to establish statistical significance. Looking at a combination of macro and micro level covariates, the second limitation is the lack of data for many of the states in the European Social Survey, which otherwise offers a very comprehensive dataset. Greece, Romania are missing altogether. Data on Italy stops with 2012 (however this country experiences the arrival of the anti-establishment after 2013) while the data on Germany and Hungary are incomplete. This makes the analysis based on one sole case and its generalizability may be limited.

Furthermore, as previously stated, the main problem with demand side approaches - both at the macro level as well as the micro level - is that they are very convincing when it comes to the likelihood of selected variables to affect voters' choices to move away from the traditional parties one would expect them to vote for: the centre-right and centre-left. At best they are essential in establishing the necessary but not sufficient conditions for voters to turn towards anti-establishment political contenders. What demand-side explanations however do not fully succeed in is in illustrating why it is that particular political parties outside the establishment are the ones that capitalize. Without an introduction of supply-side explanations, this part remains under-theorized. Both the cartel-party thesis by Katz and Mair (1995) as well as Cas Mudde famous populist party classification (2007) are essentially supply-side, not demand side, explanations.

Another aspect that the models above fail to account for is why in some cases parties of the radical right succeed in gaining votes at the expense of the mainstream while in other cases (Greece, Italy and to a certain degree Spain) it is the new radical left. Furthermore, why is it that in countries severely hit by the crisis and associated with the PIGS states, such as Ireland and Portugal, we see neither the radical-right nor the radical-left emerging. Similarly, demand side explanations cannot account for rises of anti-establishment parties, as in the case of the German Pirates prior to 2014. This party scored well in polls between 2011 and 2013, only to disintegrate due to internal supply-side factors.

#### **4.7 Conclusion**

This chapter has tested a set of large macro-level variables as well as micro-level variables with regards to anti-establishment tribune party success. It has done so through a zero-order correlation model involving solely macro-level data for all the six cases under study in this dissertation as well as a binary logistic regression looking at both macro and micro-level variables in the case of Sweden. For the first, there seems to be a strong relationship between negative GDP and growing unemployment during the crisis (2008 to 2014) and the success of tribune parties. However, most of this success is incurred by the new radical left parties rather than the radical right. This is especially demonstrated by the cases of SYRIZA in Greece and the Five Star Movement in Italy. Podemos in Spain, outside the cases under study here, is also part of the same trend.

Looking specifically at Sweden, the factors that seem to greatly influence the success of the radical right strand of the anti-establishment camp seem to be respondents' age, satisfaction with the economy, attitude towards immigrants and satisfaction with current political parties. Younger voters, unsatisfied with the state of the economy, holding negative sentiments towards immigrants and unhappy with current parties seem to be more likely to vote for the radical-right. While further study needs to determine whether this is a unique case for Sweden or generalizable across European states, these conclusions do confirm some of the conclusions existent in academic literature. Lastly, dissatisfaction with existing political parties seems to strengthen the argument that the tribune parties of the early 21<sup>st</sup> century are a reaction to the cartel party of Katz and Mair (1995). Their progressive electoral success may also signal that they are in fact effectively starting to challenge the cartel-party system that dominated western democracies after the 1970s.

Nonetheless, it is important to note, that these demand-side explanations only tell half of the story. Specifically, they do not fully account for the process through which anti-establishment parties of the far left or far right manage to turn voter dissatisfaction into electoral success. For this reason, Chapters 4 and 5 which follow will look into supply-side explanations related to tribune party strategies and ideology.

## Chapter 5: The Tribunes

*We have two main parties here and they always alternate power; they just go back and forth. One is right-wing, let's call it liberal. They call themselves 'democratic' and they have placed the word 'new' at the beginning of their name. The other is named PASOK – but what is this party? They say they are social-democratic - and you would think a leftist party is a democratic party. But we can't really take this party seriously as a leftist party. This is also a neo-liberal party with some socialist influence. But the leaders of this party - who are generally the same and never change - are not left. And neither are they democratic. Voters are tired of them both. They want to vote a clear party with a clear message; one that has an identity. And for that reason, this election will be a Big-Bang! We will have a boom.*

SYRIZA (Greece)

Member of the European Parliament (Interview, 2011).

### 5.1 Introduction

The previous chapter tried to look at the demand-side of anti-establishment tribune parties and explored the factors which shape voters' choices to support tribune parties in elections. Chapter 3 defined the modern tribune party and the way in which it depicts the political space it shares with the established political mainstream. In summary, it has argued that it is a highly confrontational party that claims to have an 'authentic' desire to fix the increasing distance between suppliers and consumers of politics. Most importantly, the tribune party is populist; it promises to re-engage explicit alienated societal classes by exposing the current corrupted political elites (that lead them) and by re-introducing

ideology in political debates. This chapter focuses on populism and on the latter aspect, ideology. In this regard, it looks at the supply-side of tribune-parties and focuses on the ability of these parties to find the winning formulas and ideological appeal in order to gain votes. Simply put, it explores what is the success recipe for the latest wave of fringe parties. Specifically it seeks to answer two questions. First, is the degree of populism related to the electoral success of anti-establishment tribune political parties? And secondly, is populism in Europe related to a certain type of tribune party such as the radical-right, extreme-right or is it conversely a feature of a number of parties that transcend right-left divisions? Related to this is the question, is populism in Europe solely the universe of the radical right party family among non-centrist tribune parties?

This chapter employs a content analysis of party programs and manifestos using the standard method. It measures the populist discourse of political parties and compares this populism score with their score on left-right and authoritarian-libertarian issues as well as with their score in national elections. Ultimately, it argues that there is a strong correlation between the populist score and the electoral score obtained by political parties. Furthermore, it claims that there is also a strong correlation between the populist discourse of a given party and its leftist position on the economy, regardless whether it is radical-right, extreme-right, new-left or libertarian.

These findings confirm that previous assumptions about a nearly perfect alignment between left-libertarian and free market-authoritarian ideological extremes (as argued for instance by Kitschelt and McGann 1995) is no longer true of current political configurations (Rydgren 2006, 11). Party positions seem to suggest that libertarian parties

in Europe are in favor of redistributive policies<sup>8</sup>. However, the intensity with which they commit to leftist economic attitudes differs substantially. Similarly, the authoritarian radical right is neither right on the economy, nor is it always right on the authoritarian-libertarian axis. Such parties are instead located all over the political space. Increasingly, parties on the economic-left (but still identified with what is often known as the radical-right, new radical-right or populist-right) are becoming more present on the political scene of many European states.

These findings also confirm the underlining argument in this dissertation – that is to say, that the tribune party phenomenon is an anti-establishment centrist cartel-party reaction and one that is gaining ground particularly because of its ability to skillfully position itself against the centrist cartel. As contemporary mainstream parties lack substantial ideological commitments and avoid debates, tribune parties stay clear of the ideological centre and adopt ideologically radical positions. Therefore, because of its anti-mainstream message, a successful tribune party (whether left or right) must be at the extreme of political space.

## **5.2 Theoretical Implications of Populism and how to Measure It**

Populism is claimed to be employed differently by different authors. Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011) note that for Mudde (2007) it is an ideology; for Taggart (1995), it is an

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<sup>8</sup>Libertarianism, in the European context, is defined for the purpose of this dissertation as a commitment to individual liberty and political freedom. This includes freedom *from* authoritarian institutions associated with the state but also freedom from institutions controlling the means of production and subordinating the majority to a class of proprietors. This is best illustrated in Proudhon's (1840) famous quote "property is theft" (2).

organizational form; for Hawkins (2009), it is a discourse; and for Jaegers and Walgrave (2007), it is a style. Despite the differences, however, a thin consensus *is* building around what the term ‘roughly’ means. The centrality of the people (Mudde 2004), the triangular framing of politics with elites on the top and the people (as well as populist parties) on the bottom, the division between rulers and ruled are all fundamentally used to define the term ‘populism’. Populism is an important part of the tribune party. This chapter will thus not deviate from the thin definition conceptualized by Taggart (2000) and Mudde (2004) – that is to say a simplistic framing of politics creating a dichotomy between a homogeneous romanticised ‘good’ people and the demonized, corrupt and disinterested elite that lead them.

The link between populism and ideology however is heavily under-theorized. In the context of European and western politics, populism is often assumed to be associated with a specific type of party family, the new radical right. Therefore, quite frequently, we find the disclaimer ‘populist’ next to the label radical right or new radical right in contemporary European politics. Attempts to measure populism make similar inferences. Jagers and Walgrave (2007) for instance argue that while both Belgian Greens and Vlaams Belang are anti-establishment parties, it is only the latter that is marked by a populist style while the discourse is almost completely absent among the Greens (325). In this chapter, I do not challenge previous conclusions regarding other (older) party families but I do explore the presence of populism among current anti-establishment parties which are not necessarily radical-right.

The reasoning behind populism being associated with specific radical ideologies - be they on the left or right of the political spectrum – is because these are the ideologies outside the mainstream centre-left and centre-right. As mainstream parties have watered

down their ideological differences and have seized state resources to keep themselves in power (Katz and Mair 1996), the populist anti-mainstream parties not only adopt an anti-elitist message against the mainstream but also attempt at presenting the voter with a broader variety of ideological options.

### 5.3 Measuring Populism

In this chapter I use the same small-n comparison of twelve new anti-establishment radical fringe political parties, emergent after the mid-2000s, from both the radical-right as well as left-libertarian camp in the six EU member states under investigation in this dissertation (Germany and Sweden in Continental/Northern Europe, Italy and Greece in Southern Europe and Hungary and Romania in Central and Eastern Europe). I measure the degree of populism of political parties by engaging in content analysis.

The content analysis is based on the political party manifestos and programs of each of the twelve parties involved. Textual content analysis was performed for all manifestos from the most recent national election in each respective state. The measurement proposed is one examining a discourse that claims a disconnect in society between *people* and *elites* and identifies mainstream political parties, governments, political leaders, surveillance and law enforcement agencies, multinational corporations, foreign-powers, the IMF or the EU as self-interested corrupt elites, profiteering and ultimately preying on the people. It is also a discourse claiming to repair democracy, restore people's sovereignty and re-engage with society by ensuring that individuals gain access to political decision-making through direct democracy as opposed to current forms

of representative democracy. An index is presented below of statements (regardless of their left/right position) within party manifestos that fall within the definition above. In other words, statements which claim to defend a ‘pure’ and ‘honest’ *people* and their interests from a conglomerate of corrupt and evil set of adversaries.

Thus, in this representation, party manifestos for all twelve parties studied were broken down into statements and each statement received either a value of 0 or 1 based on its qualification as a populist stance. Thus, a sentence for example such as “Yes to a Europe of Nations, no to a Europe of capital and loan sharks” is broken down into two statements. The first is “yes to a Europe of Nations”. This statement implies greater emphasis on the traditional native community and a return to a natural and popular form of organization – the nation - as opposed to an unpopular, alienated, artificial and increasingly centralized government in Brussels. It thus scores 1 on the populist scale. The second is “no to a Europe of capital and loan sharks”. The negative pejorative label “loan sharks” implies a populist statement which the voter would recognize as aimed against those profiteering or preying on the people. Therefore as the message is anti-capitalist and assumed to be popular with some voters, the statement receives a value of 1. For each of the twelve parties studied, scores were obtained by the sum of the statements within their manifestos which received a value of 1<sup>9</sup>. The positions based on the total score of populist statements were then mapped in ascending order by party. Figure 4

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
<sup>9</sup> The criteria for a statement receiving a value of 1 was established by essentially determining whether within the context of the respective country’s politics, the statement falls under Mudde’s (2007) definition of populism – dividing society between a ‘pure’ people and an ‘evil’ elite. Elite in this case is understood to go beyond solely political elites. Consequently, statements aimed against cultural, economic, international, foreign elites received a value of 1. The statements were then added to obtain the final populism score -  $Y = \sum_p$

below illustrates the scores that all twelve parties received. In addition, it illustrates their electoral results in percentages in the most recent national electoral elections.

#### 5.4 Populism Index Results

When comparing the statements made by political parties of the new right and the new left party families, it is evident that the former make more use of this type of discourse as opposed to their ideological competitors (see Fig. 2). The differences, however, are not as striking as argued by Jagers and Walgrave (2007) who conclude that populism was found to be a critical feature of the radical right but almost nonexistent among the Greens. Radical right parties seem to score on average, 60% more than the new left libertarian camp, however some radical right parties do score lower than some new left libertarian ones.

Therefore, within party families, significant differences exist. While Golden Dawn, Jobbik and PPDD make over 50 statements that can be classified under the anti-



establishment discourse, the manifestos of NGP and LAOS contain only a third of that number. Similarly, in the new left camp, while SYRIZA, LMP and the German Pirates have over 25 such statements, the manifesto of the Swedish Pirates includes less than 10. Interestingly enough, it is the three parties that score significantly less on the populism scale (than their ideological counterparts) that also obtain poorer results in elections.

The difference between the strong and weak anti-establishment discourses of the twelve parties above seems to correlate with the electoral performance of these parties in the latest national elections within the respective states. Parties which score higher in the index seem to receive a higher percentage of votes. The correlation is most vivid for the new left-libertarian parties and the populist right (see Fig 3). For the extreme-right Golden Dawn in Greece, its high score in the populist index does not seem at first glimpse to have made a significant difference in the result obtained. However, given that the party was an absolute outlier just a year prior and that in the previous elections is barely managed to secure 0.3% of the vote, the 2600 % spike is quite astonishing.

**Figure 3. Populism by Party Family and Percentage of Vote in Most Recent National Elections**




Table 10 below is an analysis in the variation between the performance of anti-establishment parties before the most recent national elections and after in the six cases under study. It represents a zero-order correlation between electoral performance and populist discourse. The zero-order correlation shows a relationship between the populism of the radical-right and the electoral result of that party family. It also shows a particularly strong relationship between the electoral performance of the radical left and the populism of the radical left. This is certainly true of Greece where SYRIZA surged from obscurity (5%) to become the main opposition party with 27% in 2012. It is also true of Italy, where the Five Star Movement came to prominence almost overnight, essentially becoming the third main force in Italian politics after the 2013 elections. Both these cases suggest a strengthening of the new left especially in harder hit Southern Europe. The success of these parties has sometimes catalyzed the formation of grand-coalitions by mainstream parties, thus solidifying their status as *opposition*. In Greece, for instance, Pasok, the former mainstream centre-left party was reduced to a mere junior partner of the centre-right. In Hungary, the new left was also quite successful (although much more moderate than in Greece or Italy) in rising from obscurity to 7.5% in 2010 and 5.3% in 2014, therefore entering parliament. Sweden is a similar case with the Pirate Party's notorious success during the 2009 EP elections, although the party did not fare so well at the national level. Germany saw a similar growth of the German Pirates from .2% to 2% and to almost 13% in the polls before the 2014 elections, albeit party infighting prevented the Pirates from capitalizing during the national elections.

**Table 10. Correlations between Performance of anti-establishment Parties and populist discourse**

		Populist discourse
Libertarian New Left Party Improved Gain (yes/no)	Pearson Correlation Sig. (1- tailed)	<b>.961**</b> <b>0.001</b>
Radical Right Party Improved Gain (yes/no)	Pearson Correlation Sig. (1- tailed)	<b>.827*</b> <b>0.021</b>

\*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).

\*\*. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).

### 5.5. Identifying the Political Space of Anti-establishment Parties

Measuring references to the people and instances of condemnations of the elites represents a one-dimensional map. Yet such measurements have rarely been compared to the position these parties occupy on the ideological spectrum.

Academic literature during the last few decades has been constantly preoccupied with understanding the ideological arenas of competition for new anti-establishment political parties and in particular those of the new left and new right. In this regard, Ronald Inglehart's (1971) *The Silent Revolution* is perhaps the most seminal and one of the earliest attempts to understand changes in post-WWII political cultures. Inglehart's argument is that as a result of post-war economic growth in Western Europe, younger generations (socialized in a period of general global peace and rising affluence) no longer shared the materialistic and acquisitive values of their parents. In other words, while

previous generations (having been exposed to the Great Depression and the war) are concerned with order, freedom from fear and freedom from want, baby boomers on the other hand are giving priority to post-materialistic values such as political involvement and freedom of speech (Inglehart 1971, 1005-1006). The reason for this is that, in strong contrast to the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, post-WWII economic affluence alters preferences and values, ultimately creating an inter-generational shift.

Inglehart does not necessarily claim that newer generations are no longer interested in the economy but rather that, because of their particular socialization after the war, they are increasingly interested in issues which cannot be situated on a traditional left-right economic axis. He calls this a ‘post-bourgeois’ generation – one that places greater emphasis on personal liberty rather than the protection/preservation and accumulation of capital (Inglehart 1971, 994-995). The new values of this post-bourgeois generation, however, are by no means uniformly represented among all its socio-economic classes. Inglehart (1971) argues that post-bourgeois values are more likely to be found among more affluent and educated young individuals rather than those belonging to the working-class (1001). Therefore, as economic security is achieved in the case of the former group, acquisitive values are no longer as relevant, making thus room for post-bourgeois interests and preferences.

At the same time, with post-war economic growth in industrialized societies, the western working-class changes as well and begins to acquire bourgeois-like features and mentality. The reason is that just as the middle-class has secured substantial economic security, the working-class of the Western World has made certain economic gains of its own after WWII. As a result, what was once ‘the proletariat’ is now interested in

conserving these gains as well as acquiring more. The working-class is therefore no longer understanding itself as such but rather as (or aspiring to be) almost *bourgeois*. In this context, the famous Marxist call “workers of the world unite; you have nothing to lose but your chains” is rendered obsolete and no longer appeals to a working-class that is essentially in denial. First, because now workers think of themselves as stakeholders in the system, implying there *is* something to lose; secondly, because with this perception of stake in the system, working-class consciousness across states is hijacked. Last but not least, with the perceived bourgeoisification of the western proletariat, working-class perception even inside national borders is severely diluted as the *class* is itself deprived of its consciousness.

As a consequence of both of these phenomena, two conclusions follow from Inglehart’s influential work. First, the working-class and the middle-class are no longer tied to their former allegiances to left-right politics. This is also paralleled by a decline in associational membership between 1967 and 1993 in church-related groups and labor unions (Putnam 1995, 73). As a result, whereas in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, workers were perceived to be sympathetic to socio-economic leftist movements and parties (which were implicitly advocating economic redistribution, internationalism and change) and whereas middle-class individuals were loyal to those political forces favoring status-quo, the opposite is true in the latter half of the century; working-class and middle-class individuals seem to have shifted their positions but not on the same traditional economic left-right axis. As economic issues are less important and as post-materialistic values are more significant, left-right stops defining a spectrum dealing solely with the economy but rather with keeping the current status quo vs. increasing personal freedom and building

more direct forms of democracy. In this new realignment, the working-class is the one more prone to favor maintaining the current order while the middle-class is now more likely to advocate change.

The second conclusion drawn is that, as a result of these changes in political demand, supply of political choice changed as well. Therefore, traditional parties cannot keep presenting the same economic left-right political offer as before. They would eventually need to either re-position themselves along the new axes of political competition or make room for new parties that would represent newer post-WWII societal cleavages. The rise of the Greens in the 1970s and 1980s as well as the anti-taxation parties during the 1980s is part of the changes in the supply of political parties as a response to changes in voters' preferences.

Green political parties, for instance, that emerged during the late sixties and seventies, were initially anti-establishment and quite radical. Also, despite entering the parliaments of several Western European states (most notably in Belgium and Germany) by the mid-1980s, the party family was not immediately recognized as reflecting a shift in societal preferences. In fact, many political observers and political scientists at the time considered it only a temporary phenomenon (Müller-Rommel, Ferdinand 2002, 6). Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, for example, classified them as “environmental idiots” with no prospect of permanently hanging on to their initial success (Spiegel b 2010). These forecasts could not have been any more erroneous. A decade after their rise in Belgium and Germany, they have mainstreamed, moderated and emerged as important coalition partners, entering government in Finland, Italy, France, Germany and Belgium during the mid and late-1990s (Müller-Rommel, Ferdinand 2002, 5). As such parties have gradually

passed from the realm of political radicalism to acceptable politics and from the status of outsiders to that of insiders and coalition-members in a number of states, mainstream centrist parties have re-aligned as well. As a result, today, almost no centrist mainstream political party platform can be found in the Western World that does not touch on issues traditionally associated with the former radical new left or green political movement such as protection of the environment, conservation, biodiversity or pollution control. Therefore, while Greens are hardly radical today, during the 1980s they did represent new politics in the context of post-WWII changes as they took on a libertarian, post-materialist and ecologist stand.

At the same time, while the new-left championed libertarian-universalism, the new right became associated with communitarian-authoritarianism (Kitschelt 1995; Marks et. al. 2006; Bornschier 2010). The first argued for equality while abolishing state institutions which control the means of production and subordinate citizens to a political and economic elite. The second claimed that individual-community links are maintained only through a strong state. Nonetheless, literature has still not come to a consensus on how to map these parties on the left-right economic spectrum. Herbert Kitschelt (1995) claims that transformations of the working class and re-socialization in working environments have allowed a certain authoritarian, anti-immigrant and economically right-wing new right party family to gain significant salience among blue-collar voters. The Danish People's Party, the Front National in France, Lega Nord in Italy and Freedom Party in Austria are usually the main suspects associated with this kind of party (Kitschelt 1995: 6-7; Nonna Mayer 1998: 12 Hans-Georg Betz 1998: 46). These parties combine right-wing positions on the authoritarian-libertarian divide with right-wing positions on

the economy and are thus situated at the exact opposite pole of the new left and green parties.

Several works dispute, however, the free-marketizing nature of the radical right, claiming that many such parties actually fall left on the economy (Rydgren 2006: 11). Other studies argue that the economy does not matter at all and during elections a party's right-wing or left-wing economic stance makes no difference as far as electoral results are concerned (Cas Mudde 2007: 137; Bornschieer 2010: 25). Mudde (2007) claims that this is because parties focus on three main critical issues: a) nativism (the congruence between a state's population and a 'native' group), b) authoritarian politics and c) populism (297). Discontented voters are thus captured, according to this account, based on an appeal to the three ideological pillars above.

This chapter aims to map the ideological positions of recent anti-establishment tribune parties and test whether the left-libertarian vs. right-communitarian divide still holds true. The twelve parties under study in this chapter are therefore mapped below according to their position taken on these two dimensions in their latest manifestos<sup>10</sup>. The mapping was made based on textual content analysis of the latest manifestos and party-programs of the twelve parties under focus just as in the case of the populist index. Statements were categorized in two dimensions (socialist/redistributive vs. free-market

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
<sup>10</sup> While the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) is the most comprehensive, systematic and objective source on party positions, data from the CMP is not used here. This is done for two reasons. Firstly, the CMP – although codes 'favorable' or 'unfavorable' for 58 issue categories - ultimately reduces all issues to just one left-right dimension. The left-right here includes all issues from those traditionally associated with the left-right (the economy) to issues often associated with alternative dimensions. Consequently, one can have a situation when a party that may be radically left on one dimension but extreme right on the other may turn out centrist when calculating its final left-right score. As a result extremist parties like Jobbik in Hungary or PRM in Romania seem much closer to the centre than mainstream centrist parties in these two respective states. The second reason is simply practical – the CMP has no data yet for some of the newest parties studied here such as Golden Dawn or PPDD.

and authoritarian-communitarian vs. libertarian-universalism) and two marker items ‘left’ and ‘right’ for each dimension. Keeping with traditional conceptualizations surrounding positions on the economy, for the socialist vs. free-market dimension, socialism is considered ‘left’ and free-market is ‘right’. For the authoritarian-communitarian vs. libertarian-universalism dimension, authoritarian-communitarian is considered ‘right’ and libertarian-universalism is ‘left’.

Consequently, party manifestos for all twelve parties studied were broken down into statements and each statement received one marker on either dimension. Thus, for example, the same sentence “Yes to a Europe of Nations, no to a Europe of capital and loan sharks” is broken down into two statements. One is “yes to a Europe of Nations” calling for greater emphasis on the traditional native community and thus situated right on the authoritarian-communitarian vs. libertarian-universalism divide. The second is “no to a Europe of capital and loan sharks” implying an anti-capitalist message and thus situated left on the economic left-right spectrum.

Ultimately, for each manifesto of the twelve parties studied, scores were obtained by the sum of the ‘right’ minus ‘left’ statements on the socialist vs. free-market dimension as well as the sum of the ‘right’ minus ‘left’ statements on the authoritarian-communitarian vs. libertarian-universalism dimension. The positions were then mapped on a two-dimensional graph. Authoritarian-communitarian vs. libertarian-universalism is depicted on the vertical y axis while socialist versus free-market on the horizontal x axis. Figure 4 below illustrates the position on the two dimensions of each of the twelve parties under study.

**Figure 4. Positions of Political Parties on Socialist-Capitalist and Libertarian-Authoritarian Dimension**



*New-right is on the left*

The map above (Fig.4) illustrates a lack of a perfect left-left vs. right-right alignment. Parties generally associated with the radical right family are on the right but mostly they are present on the left on economic issues. Among the cases studied here,

those on the left are in fact the majority. Except LAOS and NGP which are only slightly more right, all other four parties associated with the new radical right family place left on the economic spectrum. Even the position of these two outlier parties is not that radical on the economic right. This is because, although the main thrust of their ideology is right-wing, the manifestos of these parties also include a large number of statements which fall on the left of the economic spectrum.

The reasons as to why radical-right and extreme-right parties are beginning to continuously take up left-wing positions on the economy may vary. Nonetheless, it is conceivable that conditions exist for a left-wing economic turn among most new political contenders today. Firstly, as new anti-establishment parties are innately and aggressively anti-mainstream, they tend to adopt policies and positions that run counter to the centrist established political parties. When it comes to the economy, mainstream centrist parties suffer – among other things - from a lack of ideological distance between each other. While both left and right have moved significantly towards the centre, it is arguably the social-democratic parties that have done most of the compromising by abandoning their criticism of the current capitalist order. Because of this, the entire mainstream has essentially become right-wing. The centre-left parties' decisive turn away from traditional left-wing practices is not novel but it has certainly been consistent over the past three decades. While the clear turn can be traced to Mitterrand's fiscal restraint in the mid 1980s, it has continued unhampered since then in most if not all European states and it persists today in the form of near-consensus among centrist parties on economic orthodoxy as *the* only remedy and response to the most recent financial crisis.

As the mainstream is generally adopting similar positions on the economic left-right dimension, it is only natural that contenders would attempt to capture a space that is left vacant. The new left does so because the economic left pole is consistent with its revolutionary message about altering the status quo. The new radical right may do so for very similar reasons as it too claims to work towards changing the current order.

The second reason is very much related to the ‘us versus them’ dichotomy that the nativist-ethnocentric communitarian discourse entails. The anti-establishment party of the new radical right does not necessarily need to tackle pressing economic issues with economic solutions such as ‘lower taxes and lesser bureaucracy’ as in the redistributive-libertarian vs. authoritarian free-marketeting models (Kitschelt 1995: 13). In speeches, campaigns and debates, economic issues can be tackled just as effectively with authoritarian ethnocentric solutions such as advocating lowering the number of immigrants and as a result, keeping *the welfare state*. In essence, the immigrant is depicted not just as a threat to the native cultural majority but also as a parasite and threat to the social-system in place. The solution proposed is thus to maintain the welfare-state but remove the stress placed on it by ‘non-members’ such as immigrants and asylum seekers. This type of welfare chauvinism is thus not hostile to the welfare state and in fact defends it – as long as only the native group would be the one to benefit. Ideologically, this is much more in line with the nativist communitarian discourse than the economically right-wing free marketeting argument.

*Devious new Face of the Radical-Right*

Four of the parties under focus in this chapter also score quite high on the right of the authoritarian-communitarian vs. libertarian-universalist divide. However, a few mask their nativist message with libertarian positions. Although generally authoritarian and in favor of a strong state, the discourses of these parties are not absolutely void of any libertarianism. Programs of many radical right parties are sometimes surprisingly not authoritarian despite their broad ideological thrust. The Swedish Democrats, for example, argue for ‘anti-bullying laws’, improving marine environments in the Baltic Sea, combating violence against women, increasing funding for the UN refugee agency and a return of the army from Afghanistan (Swedish Democrats 2012). These positions imply freedom *from* traditional sources of oppression while in the case of improving marine environments the measure is quite blatantly green. The Romanian People’s Party argues for banning the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) treaty (criticized for its secrecy and alleged impediment to digital rights and freedom of expression), lesser criminal punishment in cases where crimes are committed without violence and a major reforestation program (PPDD 2012). Even Jobbik includes a governmental scheme rewarding environmentally friendly homes, while promising to promote recycling technologies and establish an animal-welfare and rights institution within the ministry of the environment (Jobbik 2010).

How serious these parties are about these issues and how much salience they have over them is of course debatable but often times these seemingly libertarian positions are just simply outbursts of populism. Other times, they are in fact linked to issues related to

communitarian-nativist positions. ACTA, for example, was especially unpopular in Romania right before the 2012 elections and this may be the reason why the PPDD promised to never implement it. In the case of the Swedish Democrats, increasing funding for the UN refugee agency is a measure aimed at keeping potential immigrants in their home countries and away from Sweden (Swedish Democrats 2013). Doing more to combat violence against women on its own is a progressive promise, however the issue may be presented as a package together with other proposals (which the SD effectively owns) such as ‘preventing the Islamization of Sweden’, ‘supporting women living under religious oppression’ and ‘banning the veil’ (Swedish Democrats 2012).

The religion of the immigrant (Islam) is thus equated with non-libertarian practices such as the religious oppression of women. The latter libertarian value, on the other hand – gender equality and women’s liberation from traditional gender roles - is not contested and is accepted as intrinsically good and - Western. Consequently, a zero-sum game is presented to the voter between two seemingly libertarian values: tolerance for minorities (and those belonging to minority cultures) and women’s rights. According to this conceptualization, one cannot have both. Voters are thus forced to choose between one or the other. As the protection of minorities (in this case Islam) is depicted to inherently threaten not just the native majority culture but also other libertarian values, the voter is thus cornered into choosing to accept that in order to defend the rights of one group, one must curtail the rights of another. This is a significant departure from previous perceptions about the radical right’s one-dimensional authoritarian thrust aimed equally against minorities or the (traditional) role of women in society and immigrants (Rydgren 2006: 11). Radical political parties have thus increasingly adopted messages that are

slightly more complex. Xenophobia and authoritarianism are no longer presented to the voter in their raw, undigested form. Parties advocating them now include some libertarian and even progressive values in order to help them package their main ethnocentric, nativist and anti-immigrant message in a more acceptable form to the greater public.

Consequently, parties associated with the new radical right are not that far-right on the non-economic axis. Thus, as exemplified with the Swedish Democrats and PPDD, these two parties combine authoritarian-communitarian messages with libertarian ones which on the map places them closer to the centre of this axis (PPDD actually falls slightly on the left). This, of course, has to be treated with caution. It does not mean that these parties are neutral or centrist on authoritarian-libertarian issues but rather that they are parties which have managed to perfect the packaging method of otherwise raw communitarian-nativist and authoritarian messages.

Even parties of the new left occasionally adopt seemingly contradicting authoritarian positions as well, albeit they do this to a much lesser degree than their ideological opponents. In general, the new-left or left-libertarian party family, emergent during the early 1980s, opposes the priority of economic growth on the political agenda and the patterns of policy making that restrict democratic participation to political elites and centralized interest groups. Left-libertarian parties advocate instead for personal freedom, individual autonomy, popular participation in decision-making and a traditional leftist concern for equality (Kitschelt 1988: 195). The commitment to these principles, however, is not absolute – at least not for the more recent members of the party family - which often borrow some of the populist discourse of authoritarian parties. The German Pirates (2013), for example, promise to toughen laws dealing with bribing members of

parliament while the Hungarian LMP (2012) vows to punish the governing party (Fidesz) and its leadership if they will lose power after the upcoming 2014 elections. Italy's Five Star Movement likewise advocates for direct democracy, green jobs and no corruption but at the same time has fostered close ties in the European Parliament with UKIP and the Swedish Democrats. The representation in figure 2 certainly confirms that these statements are not mere anomalies. However, these outbursts seem to be part of the broader anti-mainstream message and the image these parties try to project as advocates of the disenfranchised, alienated citizenry. In general, therefore, the new-left discourse is still largely confined to its original spectrum; personal-freedom, internationalism and direct forms of democracy continue to be the main tenets of the left-libertarian party family. Nonetheless, such parties do occasionally make use of seemingly conflicting authoritarian and populist messages. In this regard Five-Star Movement, LMP, SYRIZA, the Swedish Pirate Party as well as the Pirate Party of Germany are no exception.

*Not all New-left and Libertarians are left*

The parties generally associated with the libertarian new left are indeed left on the non-economic axis. However, here too there are differences as far as economic positions are concerned. While all fall left on the economic spectrum, some are evidently closer to the centre while others have a more nuanced left-wing position. The party closest to the economic centre is the Swedish Pirate party. Conversely, their German counterparts have developed a very elaborate economic left-wing position which among others includes quite an ambitious promise (in the context of German politics) to institute the minimum

wage income. As a consequence, they score significantly to the left of their Swedish counterparts.

### *Avoiding the Centre*

Two areas on the map are left empty by the twelve political parties under study. First, no party situates itself left on the authoritarian-libertarian axis and right on the socialist vs. free-market axis. Although it is impossible to make inferences about every single European political party system (based on these twelve parties), these cases nonetheless reveal a trend that is in strong contrast to the American political space where libertarian politics are associated with the free-market and where stronger state involvement is associated with social-liberalism.

Secondly, none of the twelve parties represented in the map above situate themselves near the centre of political space and this is to be expected from parties that claim to be non-mainstream; in other words, the opposite of the centrist established left and right. These parties are ultimately seeking to be a reaction to the cartel-party system identified by Katz and Mair (1996) and it confirms their conclusions that outsiders are among the important challengers of the cartel (531). Of course what score counts as centre left-right is a matter of debate. CMP data, which is one-dimensional, gives a range of -30 to 30 out of 100 for most centrist parties in western democracies. Because of the different method used here, the single-CMP score does not apply. However, it is reasonable to argue that a -30-to-30 range on either axis would be the rough boundary on which mainstream parties could potentially be situating themselves on. Assuming this to

be the case, all twelve parties studies fall outside this range as they all score more than 30 (-30) on at least one axis. When it comes to the economy, nonetheless, three parties do not make it outside the -30 – 30 range. The Swedish Pirates, NGP and LAOS all fall very close to or outright within economic centrism. Interestingly enough, these are also the parties which scored lowest on the populism index.

Finally it is important to note the relationship between ideological radicalism, populist discourse and actual electoral performance. Figure 5 below is an analysis in the variation between the performance of the twelve anti-establishment parties with respect to the most recent national elections, ideological positions on the economic dimension and libertarian-authoritarian dimension as well as populism. It represents a zero-order correlation between electoral performance, populist score and left-right economic and libertarian-authoritarian positions. The zero-order correlation shows a relationship between the populism of these parties and their economic dimension. It also shows a relationship between the populism of these parties and economic positions as well. Populism is negatively correlated with right-wing economic positions. In particular, parties which scored high in terms of their populist discourse also showed to be left-wing on the economy. Authoritarian positions do not seem, however to correlate with populism. Most importantly the net gain that these parties experienced during the latest national elections also seems to be significantly related to economic positions and moderately related to their populist discourse.

**Fig 5. Correlations between Anti-Establishment Party Success, Populism and Economic-Authoritarian positions**

		Populism	Economic Score	Authoritarian Score	Party Net gain	Anti-Establishment Party Vote Improved Gain (yes/no)
Populism	Pearson Correlation	<b>1</b>	<b>-.555*</b>	<b>.398</b>	<b>.632*</b>	<b>.667**</b>
	Sig. (1-tailed)		<b>.030</b>	<b>.100</b>	<b>.014</b>	<b>.009</b>
Economic Score	Pearson Correlation		<b>1</b>	<b>.105</b>	<b>-.724**</b>	<b>-.602*</b>
	Sig. (1-tailed)			<b>.372</b>	<b>.004</b>	<b>.019</b>
Authoritarian Score	Pearson Correlation			<b>1</b>	<b>-.046</b>	<b>-.218</b>
	Sig. (1-tailed)				<b>.443</b>	<b>.248</b>
Party Net gain	Pearson Correlation				<b>1</b>	<b>.776**</b>
	Sig. (1-tailed)					<b>.001</b>
Anti-Establishment Party Vote Improved Gain (yes/no)	Pearson Correlation					<b>1</b>
	Sig. (1-tailed)					

\*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).


\*\*.. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).

Right-wing Economic score is positive in the direction specified.

Figure 6 below, further illustrates a combined map of both the populism index of these parties as well as their ideological position (as in Figure 4). The shaded bars illustrate the real value of populist statements (same as in Figure 1.). Just as in the zero-order correlations, what is particularly interesting in figure 5 above is that the parties which scored highest on the populism index also find themselves left on the socialist-free market ideological divide. The three parties which score especially low in the populism index are likewise right on economic issues or centrist. The party which scored lowest – the Swedish Pirates - is also the one closest to the centre (due to its unclear position on the economy).

Worth noting is that LAOS, NGP and the Swedish Pirates are also the parties which have made the least inroads in electoral competitions. The only party among them

which is an exception and which has entered national parliament at one point during the last decade is LAOS. However, since early 2012 it has lost almost its entire voter base to the more radical Golden Dawn. New Generation Party almost made it to the national parliament in 2008, but since then its voter share has fallen to less than 0.1%. The Swedish Pirate party has succeeded in sending two MEPs to the European Parliament in 2009 but subsequent to this, it has not been able to reach 1% in that country's national elections.



A possible explanation for the failure of these parties to gain significant votes could be that centrist economic positions or (even worst) no position on the economy is quite detrimental for an anti-establishment party's success. Therefore, while the German Pirates have elaborated an extensive leftist economic stance and have achieved modest but steadily increasing results, the Swedish Pirates have often stated that they do not take positions on the economy. It is quite plausible that such a strategy is not well received by the electorate and Swedish Pirate leaders do admit this (Troberg 2011). As a result, it may be that when asked on issues related to the economy, the laconic 'we don't know' is simply not acceptable. In contrast, parties with strong (and particularly leftist) economic programs (regardless of their party family) have all managed to enter national parliaments of their respective states.

What seems to be the case (at least for radical-parties emergent at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century) is that moderate right-wing positions do not seem to be a recipe for success. Therefore, LAOS' participation, for instance, in the right-wing coalition in 2011 and its defense of Greece's unpopular memorandum with the IMF is very likely to have had an impact on that party's loss of its radical and anti-establishment credentials with its constituents (LAOS 2012). NGP's promise to stick to its right-wing program and to never ally itself with left-wing parties while the unpopular governing party was also centre-right may also have been critical in that party's slow decline. Thus, the success formula for an anti-establishment radical party of the early 21<sup>st</sup> century seems to be a political position on the semi-circular belt combining a leftist position on the economy mixed with a radical authoritarian or libertarian position.

The paradox of the radical-right increasingly adopting a left-wing economic position calls into question the left-right dichotomy and the usefulness of using these labels for modern parties. It raises doubts concerning the left-right distinction made based on economic positions or axes of competition instead of positions taken vis-à-vis the established mainstream. Ultimately it may even call into question the return to the meaning of left-right when it originally started to be employed after the French Revolution – with parties favoring the status quo sitting to the right of the speaker and those opposed to the status quo, sitting in the opposite side to the left<sup>11</sup>.

## 5.6. Conclusion

Populism in the European and western context has often been assumed to be the universe of the right-wing and new radical right party family. The measurement of

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<sup>11</sup> The circumstances of the left-right distinction that have led to mapping consumers and suppliers of political parties on a left-right continuum were purely accidental. Left-right has become associated today with positions on the economy and the role of the state in managing it. Nonetheless, left and right did not traditionally revolve only around the economy. The root of this conceptualization lie in a financial crisis; after years of fighting foreign wars, the world's leading power, France, became overwhelmed with debt in the latter half of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. Desperate to find a way out of the crisis, the king summons the Estates General in May of 1789 after more than one hundred years of inactivity. Organized in three estates - clergy, nobility and commoners – the Estates-General blatantly favoured the interests of the clergy and the nobility at the expense of the Third Estate. Despite the fact that the latter represented most of France, it received an equal number of representatives as the other two. Keeping with medieval ties between monarchy and nobility, when seated in the Estates General, the nobles were given the place of honour to the right of the king, while the Third Estate took over the space to the left (Arian and Shamir 1983, 139). The regressive tax system exempting the first two estates and placing most of the burden on the third, but most importantly the disproportional representation in the Estates General is what forced the Third Estate to meet separately in what became the Constituent Assembly. Later as the events of the French Revolution developed and the king was now in no position to preside over the legislature, the old customs prevailed. Monarchists and aristocrats defending the old regime sat on the right of the speaker in the new assembly while Patriots and radicals like Robespierre sat on the left (Arian and Shamir 1983, 139). When power was taken over by the radicals, however, the arrangement changed. The defenders of the new constitution and thus the new order took the space to the right of the speaker and those that wanted to change it now sat on the left. The two sides as well as observers and spectators to the fractionalization in the assembly immediately picked up on this arrangement and the left-right split became a simple and efficient way of mapping political divides. Historically, therefore, the left has come to be associated with progress and change, while the right with conserving the current order and status-quo.

populism has however rarely been evaluated against the ideological map of political parties. Similarly, the link between measurements of populism and electoral success is also understudied. This chapter consequently asks two questions. Firstly, how is populism related to the ideological identity of political parties? Secondly, how is populism related to electoral success?

Focusing on twelve new anti-establishment political parties in the countries under investigation in this dissertation during the most recent national elections, I suggest that there is a strong correlation between a party's populist discourse and its electoral success. Similarly, there is a correlation between populism and party ideology. However, populism is not largely the domain of the radical right. It is quite present among contemporary libertarian and radical left-wing political parties in Europe as well. Therefore, parties, regardless of their political color, which score high on the populist index, also seem to be located left on the socialist-free market political dimension. Parties that are centrist or even right-wing on the economy likewise seem to have a low score on the populist index. This chapter also corroborates that, increasingly, right-wing and even successful extreme right parties in Europe are not positioned right on the economy. They rather seem to cluster within the leftist camp together with new left and libertarian parties.

Ultimately, this chapter suggests that there is a strong positive relationship between populism on one hand and economic-left wing positions on the other as well as between populism and electoral success. It has been suggested in this chapter that a possible explanation could be that such parties seek to embody an anti-establishment and anti-mainstream cartel political wave in European politics. As a result, due to the

economic-centrism and even right-wing turn among mainstream parties, new tribune contenders adopt an anti-elitist and economic left-wing political discourse.

## Chapter 6 – The Patricians

*A significant proportion of our nation's wealth has ended up under the control of an elite, that has effectively remained in power since the days of the one-party state; moreover a sizeable part of our agricultural, financial and public service sectors have fallen into foreign hands, which have chosen to close down our own domestic production plants, and flood the country with their own produce. During the course of the Liberal-Left free-for-all of the last eight years, the majority of those companies which were still operating profitably have also ended up being sold off. Our aims are a comprehensive review of privatization contracts, the punishment of the felonious, and the prevention and removal of secrecy over issues that concern national assets.*

*Jobbik 2010 Party Program (Jobbik 2010)*

### 6.1 Introduction

Anti-establishment tribune parties of the 21<sup>st</sup> century have a highly transformative/reformative discourse; they argue for direct democracy, a turn by political

leaders to society and (as in the case of the libertarian-left strand in Europe) individual freedom. They also stand for freedom *from* globalization and from international organizations such as the IMF and the EU. They advocate communal independence or, as argued by the radical-right party family, a strong state representing the interests of natives over non-natives. Yet, inherent to all tribune parties is an aggressive discourse *against*, rather than *for* a political outcome. This is because the tribune party is intrinsically highly critical of the status quo and the current economic and political order. Precisely for that reason it claims to be adamant in desiring change.

However, the discourse *against* also means that tribune parties need to specifically address the question – against whom are they struggling. Ultimately, the inability to carry out the drastic transformation they seek is justified by the obstacles in the way. Consequently, the obstacles and those that placed them become central to the tribune party's discourse. Due to this, tribune parties are exceptional in their emphasis on the struggle they claim to champion *for* the people and *against* a series of enemies who stand in the way of change. The first target in their highly critical discourse is the established mainstream political system dominated by its centre-left and right political party families. Nevertheless, the tribune party does not limit itself to a populist anti-mainstream political message. It identifies a much broader and complex collection of patricians or enemies (conspiring against 'the people') that reaches far beyond just mainstream political parties and leaders.

This chapter identifies and classifies the different patrician images employed by tribune parties. It argues that, while the radical-right and extreme-right have complete monopoly over the immigrant-image, the libertarian-left - championing freedom *from* authoritarian institutions and *from* institutions controlling the means of production – is in

strong competition with the radical-right over a series of images including but not limited to economic elites, (foreign) corporations, foreign powers, law and surveillances agencies, foreign institutions and, naturally, political elites.

Just as in previous chapters, six cases are used to exemplify the patrician image of anti-establishment parties – Germany, Greece, Italy, Hungary, Romania and Sweden. This involves a small-n comparison that relies on a most-similar systems research design. The cases involve EU member states (from Eastern, Southern and Northern/Continental Europe) with similar mixed member proportional systems and with party systems including more than just one anti-establishment party. The cases differ in terms of the electoral success of these parties.

## **6.2 Globalization**

Starting a discussion of the enemy image, exposed by tribune parties, with the often loosely used and ill defined globalization is perhaps odd at first glance. Yet globalization – understood as the worldwide integration of economic, technological, political, cultural and social aspects between societies by way of an unprecedented increase in trade, foreign investment and migration (Weinstein 2002, 2) - is often identified as *the* prime suspect for contemporary new phenomena and transformations. Different aspects of globalization, invoked in the literature, range from global-warming and environmentalism to anti-G8 protests, the rise of independentist movements in the developing world and the surge in nationalist/tribal and religious fundamentalism. Among

all these, the last phenomenon has undoubtedly been among those receiving the most interest from state and international institutions, mass-media and academic works.

Benjamin Barber's (1995) infamous *Jihad vs. McWorld* illustrates quite effectively this latter conflict between the West's commitment towards establishing a capitalist world market and the non-West's resistance and commitment to maintaining traditional societies intact. While Barber's analysis involves a dichotomy between a capitalist mono-cultural (and by that it is understood to mean – American-ized) Western culture versus countless non-Western local, national or tribal identities, the *Jihad* is not necessarily a non-Western phenomena. Similar tribal forces, identified by Barber (1995) in the non-Western world, can be observed in many instances throughout the West. Separatist movements, for instance, in Scotland, Flanders, Quebec, Catalonia and Corsica can be arguably understood as part of the same re-tribalization trend observed elsewhere.

Cas Mudde (2007) takes this argument even further, in what is perhaps one of the most thorough analyses of the enemy image exposed by populist parties (to the right of the political spectrum). He argues that anti-immigrant and authoritarian radical-right populist parties in Europe, such as the Front National in France, Vlaams Belang in Belgium or Lega Nord in Italy, are all inherently an effect of globalization and thus a reaction against it (186). Furthermore, throughout the early and mid 1990s, many prominent academic studies explained the rise of such parties precisely as a reaction to globalization and the re-socialization of the working class under growing market competition due to increasing economic integration and cooperation (Hans-Georg Betz 1998, Herbert Kitschelt 1995, Nonna Mayer 1998). Yet while these earlier works only saw globalization as a cause and not a perceived threat in the eyes of radical right parties, Mudde (2007) on the other hand identifies direct anti-globalization messages in the

programs and manifestos of the same major suspects: National Front, Vlaams Belang and Lega Nord (190). The discourse *against* globalization is however further complicated by the perceived enemies that globalization creates both within the state as well as outside it.

Mudde himself acknowledges the existence of a plurality of enemies among the discourse of the populist parties he studies, which divide society into insiders-outsiders, us-them and ultimately good versus bad. Mudde focuses solely on radical right populist parties which place an emphasis on nativism – defined as the congruence between a state’s population and a “native” group. As a result, the enemy images he identifies are only those employed by this party family and relate solely to the relationship between nation and state. Consequently, Mudde (2007) distinguishes four kinds of enemies depending on the position they hold vis-à-vis state and nation. They are those actors inside the state and inside the nation, within the state but outside the nation, outside the state and outside the nation, and lastly, outside the state but within the nation.

Enemies within the state and within the nation are the economic, cultural and political elites. The national elites are characterized both in nativist and populist terms as traitors to the nation and as corrupt elements. This ‘traitor’ category includes the mass-media and the cultural elites who are accused of assisting and serving the economic and political establishment. Nonetheless, because of Mudde’s focus on radical-right populism and its nativist discourse, the major focus on the ‘treachery’ of this broad coalition of ‘traitors’ is linked to the issue of immigration.

Therefore, populist radical-right parties see immigration as a conspiracy of the enemies inside the state and inside the nation who want to increase their support base and pool of cheap-labour at the expense of their own people. To this end, the internal enemies are accused of ‘re-educating’ the native population with the aim of making it passive and

self-hating'. The ultimate implied goal of this is to render the populace docile to a perceived invasion of the state by immigrants from elsewhere (Mudde 2007, 66). In other words, the enemies inside the state and inside the nation conspire together to bring in the second category of enemies – those that are inside the state but outside the nation.

In addition, a third category of enemies exists; they are outside the state and outside the nation. This includes international organizations like the European Union and the United Nations but it can involve foreign powers as well such as the United States. Lastly, the category of enemies outside the state but within the nation include countrymen that moved abroad, artists, intellectuals or politicians serving in international institutions who have left the state and who are accused of corruption, leftism and ultimately treason (to state and nation).

As thorough as it is, two problems arise from Cas Mudde's (2007) classification. First, because it is a typology of radical-right populist discourses, it somewhat suggests that the enemy-images are employed only by radical-right populist parties. It does not include a discussion of other parties which are not right-wing but which also use similar enemy images in their manifestos and discourses. This is the case of left-libertarian parties such as LMP, SYRIZA, Five-Star-Movement, and the German and Swedish Pirates, who adopt a similar aggressive and confrontational discourse, albeit never employing it in nativist vs. non-nativist terms.

Secondly, as Mudde's analysis revolves around the relatively recent increase in immigration (due to globalization), it assumes a primordial role of the immigrant in the enemy hierarchy. What this classification omits though is that the enemy discourse does not necessarily need to involve a rigid hierarchical stratification with immigrants on top and foreign powers, institutions, economic and political elites below. National economic

or political elites may be perceived just as equally ‘bad’ or ‘dangerous’. The anti-immigrant sentiments promoted by the radical and extreme strands, are ultimately directed also against the current political order that is blamed for the presence of immigrants to begin with. Furthermore, the immigrant image is completely absent from the discourses of other tribune party families such as the new-left or libertarian-left. Therefore, if there is a hierarchy among the enemies identified by modern anti-establishment tribune parties, it is perhaps the current centrist mainstream political-elite that stands on top of it before any other group. This is because, ultimately, the tribune party’s discourse has one principal aim - to discredit first and foremost those established politicians whom they seek to overthrow.

### **6.3 Tribunes versus Patricians**

This dissertation introduces the concept of *patricians* to capture the vast array of enemies that tribune parties claim to struggle with, which culminates, not with immigrants or minorities but rather, with the insider political establishment itself. The reason for employing this term is because tribune parties of both left and right, authoritarian or libertarian strands divide society in a very minimal one-dimensional fashion, reducing major societal differences and cleavages to one single primordial and quite ancient cleavage that has managed to transcend frequent historical junctures, revolutions, political eras and political changes; this is the division between rulers and ruled (see Abedi, 2004). Tribune parties, therefore, separate society quite simply between those two classes and ultimately claim that contemporary rulers, elected under current

representative democratic systems, have abandoned their responsibilities to represent the ruled. Instead, they argue, the rulers took over the state and turned against those citizens they were supposed to initially rule.

In this respect, modern political elites have become much like the *patrician* class of ancient Rome, originally the *senior patres (old fathers)* of the senate, each representing their families, but over time emerging as an isolated, enclosed class in and of themselves. This ancient variety of patricians succeeded in monopolizing power and economic activity, ultimately becoming a noble class outright where membership was ensured through heredity and intra-class networking. The patrician class of modern times is similarly represented as one of current mainstream centrist political elites that, in the words of Katz and Mair (1995), have turned away from society and have cartelized political space (531). Yet in the perception of anti-establishment tribune parties, the patrician class includes more than just mainstream centre-left and centre-right political parties. Patricians, in the conceptualization of tribune parties, include affiliated interest groups (both inside as well as outside the state and the nation) who are allied with or outright ‘control’ the political establishment to fulfill their own interests. This can include foreign institutions and powers, government surveillance and law enforcement, economic elites and, as in the case of the radical-right, non-members of the dominant nation (both immigrants and native minorities).

While in the instance of the latter group (immigrants and minorities), the radical right party family has an absolute monopoly, the other patrician images are equally employed by all tribune parties (whether left or right). In other words, there is an effective competition between the different tribune party families for the status of legitimate ‘tribune’ against political, economic and cultural elites, government bureaucracies, the

interests of capital or foreign powers and institutions. The following specific patrician-images are employed by all tribune parties regardless of ideology.

*a) International organizations*

Among outside threats, international organizations such as the European Union and the IMF are the most targeted. Undoubtedly however, for European countries, the European Union takes first place, perhaps not incidentally as the EU is celebrated as working towards an ever closer union among member states. In the perception of tribune parties of the radical and extreme right such as the Swedish Democrats, LAOS and Golden Dawn in Greece and Jobbik in Hungary, the EU project is depicted as intrusive, aggressively anti-national, increasingly encroaching on state sovereignty, and one that is diametrically opposed to the interest of the nation and state<sup>12</sup> (Golden Dawn 2012, Jobbik 2010, LAOS 2007, Swedish Democrats 2010). The European Union as a *patrician* is however also employed by tribune parties of the libertarian-left such as the German Pirate Party, Italy's Five-Star Movement and Greece's SYRIZA, culminating with the denunciation of the EU by SYRIZA's leadership during the 2012 and 2015 Greek elections. Both these parties make use of a similar image of the EU as an intrusive element either through its failure to protect individual privacy or through its aggressive hegemonic neo-liberal project aimed to benefit capital instead of citizens and workers (Pirate Party Germany 2012, SYRIZA 2012).

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<sup>12</sup> Interviews with LAOS, SYRIZA, Die Linke, German Pirate Party, Swedish Democrats, Jobbik party representatives and MPs.

Exposing the EU as a *patrician* can take different shapes and forms in the discourses of tribune parties. It can range from vague critiques of the European Union in general to more specific condemnations of particular prominent EU institutions such as the Commission or the President of the European Council (Pirate Party Germany 2013, Five-Star Movement 2013; SYRIZA 2015). Yet despite their criticism, very few tribune parties are aggressively militating in favour of their countries' abandoning the EU project altogether. The older political party UKIP in the United Kingdom is definitely an outlier in this regard<sup>13</sup>. Instead, in almost similar fashion, the majority of tribune parties of the left and right generally argue in their manifestos and electoral campaigns for renegotiating an unspecified aspect of the state's relationship with the union. Otherwise, their criticism of the EU, although present is rather vague<sup>14</sup>. Even SYRIZA's critique in 2012 and 2015 came short of requesting outright secession. Rather, it argued for renegotiating or watering down the memorandum between Greece and the European Community, European Central Bank and IMF. The EU is thus a complex patrician that most tribune parties do not seek to completely do away with. Rather, it is to be carefully dealt with while simultaneously kept around when it benefits the constituency they claim to represent. Table 11 below illustrates the presence of the EU as patrician image based on the presence of an anti-EU discourse in interviews with political parties' members as well as members of the European or national parliaments.

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<sup>13</sup>The strong anti-EU position of UKIP is not even shared by parties which are members of the same European

Parliament political group "Europe of Freedom and Democracy" such as the Movement for France or United

Poland, which opt for remodelling/reforming the union rather than abandoning it outright.

<sup>14</sup> Interviews with SYRIZA, LAOS, PPDD, Swedish Democrats, German Pirate Party, Swedish Pirate Party, LMP, Jobbik, Die Linke MPs and party representatives.

**Table 11. Tribune Parties by use of the EU as a Patrician Image**

Political Party	Country	Use of EU as a Patrician Image
LAOS	Greece	■
Golden Dawn	Greece	■
SYRIZA	Greece	■
Die Linke	Germany	■
Pirate Party	Germany	■
Pirate Party	Sweden	
Swedish Democrats	Sweden	■
Politics-can-be-Different (LMP)	Hungary	
JOBBIK	Hungary	■
Five-Star Movement	Italy	■
New Generation Party	Romania	
Romanian People's Party	Romania	

*b) The Hegemon*

The EU is the principal but not the only foreign entity threatening national sovereignty in the discourse of anti-mainstream tribune parties. In some instances, the threat from abroad can take the form of an actual explicit country. Often times, this has been the United States as in the case of Greece's LAOS (2007).

Following the central role taken by German Chancellor Merkel during the financial crisis of 2008-2009, Germany has taken the place of the US for parties like SYRIZA and Golden Dawn (Golden Dawn 2015; LAOS 2007; SYRIZA 2015). To a lesser extent the anti-German position has also been used by Romania's PPDD (2012). The threat in this case is due to the perceived image of such states as hegemonic in a given context. The US is therefore portrayed as the world's hegemon, interested in spreading its economic, cultural and political influence and hence threatening the independence of one's own people.

Similarly, in the case of Germany, especially after the leading role taken by its political administration in employing austerity following the sovereign debt crisis in

Europe, that country is perceived to be a regional hegemon. This is effectively understood within the context of EU and European politics. Germany is thus perceived to be aiming to effectively control general policies within the union as well as within the member-states. Table 2 below identifies the use of a hegemon as a patrician image by political party members, based on interviews conducted with party members and members of parliament. Presence of an anti-Hegemonic discourse in the interview is depicted below (see Table 12).

**Table 12. Tribune Parties by use of the Hegemon as a Patrician Image<sup>15</sup>**

<b>Political Party</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>Use of the Hegemon as a Patrician Image</b>
LAOS	Greece	■
Golden Dawn	Greece	■
SYRIZA	Greece	■
Die Linke	Germany	■
Pirate Party	Germany	
Pirate Party	Sweden	
Swedish Democrats	Sweden	
Politics-can-be-Different (LMP)	Hungary	
JOBBIK	Hungary	■
Five-Star Movement	Italy	■
New Generation Party	Romania	
Romanian People's Party	PPDD	■

*c) The Neighbour*

The foreign country as a patrician is not always, however, used in relation to perceived hegemon(s). Patricians can also include immediate neighbours such as Turkey in the case of Greece's Golden Dawn, Hungary's neighbours in the case of Jobbik or

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<sup>15</sup> Interviews with LAOS, SYRIZA, Die Linke, German Pirate Party, Swedish Democrats, Jobbik party representatives.

Romania's neighbours (in particular Hungary) in the case of the populist right PPDD. (Golden Dawn 2015; Jobbik 2014; PPDD 2012). The image of the neighbouring state and its leadership is predominantly present among countries of central and Eastern Europe. It is thus also present in the discourses of parties in Bulgaria, Serbia, Ukraine and the Baltics. Generally, it is linked to historical tensions between neighbours in this part of the world or occasionally irredentist sentiments towards the territory of a given neighbour. Consequently, Jobbik argues for the unity of the Hungarian nation within the Carpathian basin, evoking the memory of Greater Hungary existent during the Dual Monarchy of the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Jobbik 2010; 2014). PPDD (2012) similarly, argues for the re-unification between Romania and the Republic of Moldova, calling to mind the Greater Romania established between the two world wars. The real commitment these parties actually have to these irredentist goals is rather questionable. However, what their inclusion in party programs and discourses suggests is a strategic effort at appeasing a part of the electorate which evidently shares these goals.

Although predominant among parties in Central and Eastern Europe, the image of the neighbour occasionally creeps its way in older EU member-states as well. Greece's historical relationship with Turkey and the frozen conflict in neighbouring Cyprus make the Turkish state a natural target of Golden Dawn as well LAOS before 2012. According to the manifesto of Golden Dawn, together with the United States, IMF, the European Union, immigrants, corporate interests and capital, the Turks are in a conspiracy to occupy Greece and destroy the Greek nation (Golden Dawn 2012; 2015). Table 13 below illustrates the presence of a neighbour as a patrician based on interviews with party members and members of parliament.

**Table 13. Tribune Parties by use of the Neighbour as a Patrician Image<sup>16</sup>**

Political Party	Country	Use of the Neighbour as a Patrician Image
LAOS	Greece	■
Golden Dawn	Greece	■
SYRIZA	Greece	
Die Linke	Germany	
Pirate Party	Germany	
Pirate Party	Sweden	
Swedish Democrats	Sweden	
Politics-can-be-Different (LMP)	Hungary	
JOBBIK	Hungary	■
Five-Star Movement	Italy	
New Generation Party	Romania	
Romanian People's Party	PPDD	■

*d) The (Foreign) Corporation*

The destructive feature of the patrician class is similarly evident in the anti-establishment tribune discourse addressing issues related to national and multinational corporations. Whereas this stance is traditionally associated with the Marxist, anti-capitalist position, the vast array of extremist and radical right political parties emergent throughout the early 21<sup>st</sup> century emulate a similar critique of the free-market. What this does is effectively create a competition between the leftist camp and the new radical right on the same socialist economic space. Both party families are essentially striving to become *the* legitimate representatives of an alternative anti-liberal and free-marketeting project.

<sup>16</sup> Interviews with SRYRIZA, LAOS, PPDD, Swedish Democrats, German Pirate Party, Swedish Pirate Party, LMP, Jobbik, Die Linke MPs and party representatives.

Consequently, usual suspects such as SYRIZA are evidently pro-labour. Before attaining power in 2015, SYRIZA argued for restoring pre-austerity minimum wages, preventing the privatization of hospitals and standardizing collective agreements across all sectors. SYRIZA likewise placed an emphasis on local small businesses and the self-employed, farmers and cooperatives and makes a commitment to nationalizing industries of strategic importance – many of which have been privatized before and after the debt-crisis of 2009 (SYRIZA 2012; 2015). Similarly, the Hungarian LMP criticizes the inequalities of the present free-market economy which is held ransom by a narrow group of interests. The party argues for introducing in the constitution articles which enshrine the availability of social security, equal access to public services and community-based social care (LMP 2012;2014). Social justice and the need for green and sustainable development is also a part of the program of the Five-Star Movement (2013).

Comparable positions are also present in the left-libertarian Pirate parties of Germany and Sweden. However, in this case, the critique is not so much from a solely socialist position, but rather due to the implicit un-free market forces created by large business. The German Pirates accuse corporations of making illegal donations to mainstream parties in power, hinting thus at an alliance between centrist established parties and capital. In addition, large businesses are accused of using private data of citizens for market purposes as well as monopolizing certain sectors and thus preventing smaller ones from competing under free-market principles (German Pirates 2013). The Swedish Pirates likewise accuse large corporations of engaging in patent monopolies, scaring off smaller competitors with the threat of costly lawsuits and preventing smaller enterprises from competing (Swedish Pirates 2012). Ultimately, the criticism of large businesses for the left-libertarian strand is not so much purely Marxist. Rather, what they

argue is that large corporations have a tendency to cheat at the very game they claim to stand for – the free-market.

Anti-capitalism and the critique of large businesses is not the sole domain of the new left and libertarian-left, however. PPDD in Romania, Golden Dawn in Greece and Jobbik in Hungary have borrowed heavily from this discourse. PPDD explicitly makes use of the label ‘exploiters’ four times in its succinct 100-point program. It furthermore promises a fiscal amnesty for all national companies while guaranteeing that under their government, critical resources such as natural gas would only be extracted by state corporations (PPDD 2012).

Jobbik is even more explicit in its anti (foreign) corporate stance. It makes use of the word ‘multinational corporation’ nine times in its manifesto. The party makes an explicit call to start a ‘buy Hungarian’ campaign by creating a mandatory law enabling indigenous firms to use the label ‘Hungarian’. This they claim would allow Hungarian consumers to thus boycott foreign products (Jobbik 2010; 2014). They promise to review previous privatization programs and punish those who took advantage of the chaotic privatization drive during the 1990s. When it comes to multinational corporations, Jobbik (2010; 2014) is explicitly critical of their intrusion in the Hungarian economy, their exploitation of cheap labour and their tendency to terminate rather than create jobs.

Greece’s Golden Dawn uses an even more aggressive language when referring to foreign businesses. It openly accuses them of promoting corruption, depreciating national production, depopulating the countryside, destroying agriculture and closing down factories. In its manifesto, foreign businesses are particularly, accused of operating unchecked, overwhelming Greece with foreign (especially food) products and thus devaluing Greek ones (Golden Dawn 2015). The party has also successfully promoted

itself as a defender of both social services as well as local small businesses through its ad-hoc soup kitchens. The soup kitchens are used to hand out (and thus also promote) to ethnic Greeks Greek-made food products and clothes. In this regard, Golden Dawn has perhaps surpassed its counterparts elsewhere in essentially promoting itself as an alternative and parallel social state, offering to replace the services once provided by the state with services provided by the party.

Ultimately, the trend observed during the first two decades of the 21<sup>st</sup> century is that parties of the extreme and radical right are increasingly in competition with the new-left libertarian party families over the socialist anti-capitalist space they traditionally occupied. This is even more apparent as some extremist radical right parties such as Golden Dawn, which up until recently were very marginal, are taking first stage in filling in the vacuum left over by an ever retreating social state.

**Table 14. Tribune Parties by use of the Corporation as a Patrician Image<sup>17</sup>**

<b>Political Party</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>Use of the (Foreign) Corporation as Patrician Image</b>
LAOS	Greece	
Golden Dawn	Greece	■
SYRIZA	Greece	■
Die Linke	Germany	■
Pirate Party	Germany	■
Pirate Party	Sweden	■
Swedish Democrats	Sweden	■
Politics-can-be-Different (LMP)	Hungary	■
JOBBIK	Hungary	■
Five-Star Movement	Italy	■
New Generation Party	Romania	
Romanian People's Party	PPDD	■

<sup>17</sup> Interviews with SRYRIZA, LAOS, PPDD, Swedish Democrats, German Pirate Party, Swedish Pirate Party, LMP, Jobbik, Die Linke MPs and party representatives.

e) *The State*

The relationship between tribune parties and the existing state (which often in tribune party discourses is conflated with *the government*) is generally an antagonistic one. The state and its representatives usually either ignore the tribunes altogether or regard them with suspicion. On the other hand, tribune parties claim to work precisely towards the fundamental change of the current state. Tribune parties are therefore highly critical of the state, its institutions and the way in which the state employs them. Yet not all tribune parties want to change the state for the same reasons. Nuances exist between the different tribune party families as parties focus on a variety of state institutions and sub-actors.

Libertarian-left parties tend to focus on the intrusive quality of the state vis-à-vis the citizen; the radical and extreme-right parties, on the other hand, focus on the increasing weakness of the state (especially in relation to outside actors) and argue for strengthening those institutions of power within the state. In other words, all tribune parties want to change the status quo, yet left-libertarians argue for a less powerful army, surveillance and police, while extremists argue the opposite; they want a larger and stronger army, an increasing surveillance apparatus and a more powerful police. Ultimately, no other patrician-image is as illustrative in exposing the deep divide along the authoritarian-libertarian axis between the different tribune party families.

Libertarian-left Pirate parties in Germany, Italy and Sweden focus on the free exchange of ideas and freedom of communication. Government is seen as an obstacle in this regard. The Swedish Pirates (2012) for example identify government as well as more

vague ‘political and economic’ forces which actively work to monitor, hinder and even prevent this exchange of ideas. Government, together with its law enforcement and surveillance agencies, is accused of bugging mobile and landline telephony, preventing journalists from keeping their sources anonymous<sup>18</sup> and ultimately, engaging in a general policy to actively intimidate and silence serious sources of opposition (Swedish Pirates 2012).

The German Pirate Party (2013) similarly claims that governments together with private companies and government agencies exchange personal data of citizens between them with little or no transparency. The German Pirates however take the lack of transparency critique even further and accuse governments and government officials of coming under the increasing influence of special interest groups and lobbyists. They demand for laws which would disclose the depth of this influence and would increase criminal punishments for corrupt government officials (German Pirate Party 2013).

LMP (2012) in Hungary accuses the state for its centralized authoritarian traits and links this to what it calls a breakdown in democracy. It argues that the current state lacks effective checks and balances and that the representative democratic system has essentially narrowed political power in the hands of a select few. LMP proposes a drastic overhaul within the constitution, which among others, would include a crucial (yet vaguely defined) change in the democratic system from representative to direct democracy.

In the case of many Eastern European countries, the patrician-image of the state is predominantly conflated with that of former communists. Jobbik (2010; 2014) for instance argues that it was the pre-1989 communist leadership which used the law and

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<sup>18</sup> Interviews with Swedish Pirate Party MEP and party representatives

state institutions to intimidate alternative opinions, political opposition, anti-government protesters and organizations who claimed to be 'nationalist'. The party argues that it was the same communists, re-branded as liberals in the post-communist era, who continued the trend after 1989 (Jobbik 2010; 2014). In neighbouring Romania, NGP (before its demise) used a heavily critical discourse aimed against the current state leadership, accusing it of essentially being communist in liberals' skin (2008). NGP (2008), which had a strong religious component in its ideology, blamed this political class for atheist-izing the entire population, destroying national values and promoting relativism and political cynicism.

In strong contrast, the newer Romanian People's Party or PPDD (2012), formed only in 2012, departs from the communist-legacy discourse. It argues instead that it is the new post-communist elites which have seized control of the state in order to profiteer from the privatization of state enterprises<sup>19</sup>. PPDD or the Romanian People's Party argues for a reversal of many privatization and free-market measures during the 1990s and early 2000s, claiming that it is the current post-communist state which is actually guilty of selling off public assets and stripping the population of its public wealth (PPDD 2012). To a lesser extent, Jobbik also makes a similar case for the state's lack of managerial capacity, its intentional effort to sell off state-assets, its abdication in front of capital and its failure to protect the little man from outside forces (Jobbik 2010).

The state for the radical right and extreme right parties is similarly working against citizens but in a slightly different way. The state is not Swedish-friendly for the Swedish Democrats as it promotes multiculturalism, the increase in immigration and the continuing stress onto the Swedish welfare state (Swedish Democrats 2010). In addition,

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<sup>19</sup> Interview with PPDD party representative

for Jobbik, the state has been unable to protect the Hungarian nation – both inside Hungary (from national minorities) but also outside of Hungary where Hungarians form sizable minorities in many nearby states (Jobbik 2010).

Golden Dawn identifies a strong link between state and major political elites, illustrated by state funding for major political parties. Like the Swedish Democrats in Sweden, Golden Dawn also accuses the state of essentially being anti-Greek – from its educational system (aimed at de-Hellenizing the population) to its capitulation to the IMF and the EU during the debt crisis of 2009 (Golden Dawn 2012). Interestingly enough, while Golden Dawn calls for a major overhaul of the Greek state, its predecessor LAOS which was also part of the governing coalition after November 2011, renounced its critical message and defended the status quo during the 2012 Greek national elections. This juncture coincides with the failure by LAOS to re-enter parliament and the success of Golden Dawn to secure its first ever entry.

Nonetheless, all radical-right and extreme-right parties discussed here have an affinity towards institutions dealing with security. The army, surveillance agencies and police are all to be amplified, increased or enlarged by the Swedish Democrats, Jobbik, LAOS, PPDD or Golden Dawn (Swedish Democrats 2010; Jobbik 2010; LAOS 2012; PPDD 2012, Golden Dawn 2012). These are the exact same institutions which the libertarian-left claim to be infringing on citizens' rights and privacy. The state is thus an accomplice in the long list of patricians identified by tribune parties. However, different tribune parties blame it for different things. The radical right criticizes the state for being too weak. The left-libertarian parties accuse it of being too strong. In this regard, criticisms of the state reveal the division among tribune parties along the authoritarian-libertarian divide.

**Table 15. Tribune Parties by use of the State as a Patrician Image<sup>20</sup>**

Political Party	Country	Use of the state as Patrician Image
LAOS	Greece	
Golden Dawn	Greece	■
SYRIZA	Greece	■
Die Linke	Germany	■
Pirate Party	Germany	■
Pirate Party	Sweden	■
Swedish Democrats	Sweden	■
Politics-can-be-Different (LMP)	Hungary	■
JOBBIK	Hungary	■
Five-Star Movement	Italy	■
New Generation Party	Romania	■
Romanian People's Party	PPDD	■

*f) The Conspiracy*

Tribune parties, consequently, identify a series of patrician or enemy images throughout their manifestos and speeches. Yet, rarely would tribune parties exploit only one image of the patrician or even a number of patricians on a case-by-case basis. Several facets of patricians are often denounced as working together and at the same time. Thus, the patricians are also sometimes portrayed as a conglomerate of political, cultural and economic interests in a conspiratorial arrangement with each other but also with other potential ‘enemies’. These others are often minorities or immigrants as in the case of radical-right parties (Mudde 2007). In the case of other tribune parties (including the left-libertarian strand), the others are international institutions or the interests of foreign capital.

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<sup>20</sup> Interviews with SRYRIZA, LAOS, PPDD, Swedish Democrats, German Pirate Party, Swedish Pirate Party, LMP, Jobbik, Die Linke MPs and party representatives.

For the Swedish Democrats, previous governments led by mainstream parties are at fault for the country's multicultural policy that has allowed large numbers of immigrants to reside in Sweden (Swedish Democrats 2011). In the case of Jobbik, for instance, it is the European Union which, in agreement with Hungary's 'collaborationist' political class, gives the Hungarian state EU subsidies only with the condition that they are further directed towards multinational corporations (Jobbik 2010). For LMP, Hungary's corrupt political leadership is in collaboration with powerful oligarchies that have essentially taken over the state's economy and legislative decision power (Politics-can-be-Different 2012). Similarly, for Italy's Five-Star Movement, mainstream politicians in concert with lobby groups and financial interests have established themselves as illegitimate intermediates between citizens and the state (Five-Star Movement, 2013). In the case of Golden Dawn, the political class controlling the state is a partner of both immigrants and foreign institutions which want to destroy the Greek state both from within as well as the outside (Golden Dawn 2012). What follows from this is that the patrician or enemy images emerging in all these cases are not so clearly delimited along an inside-outside taxonomy as argued by Cas Mudde. The enemies inside the state and inside the nation are thus denounced by almost all tribune parties to work with other outside enemies and thus conspire against the people (whether 'the people' is defined either through civic nationalism or ethnic nationalism).

To further complicate matters, few parties have a monopoly on a specific patrician image. What is evident is that parties of the radical and extreme right have a monopoly on the anti-immigrant or anti-ethnic minority discourse. However, the patrician images, generally employed by parties of the left and libertarian-left strand, are increasingly being used by parties of the radical right as well. Foreign corporations, capital, neo-liberal

institutions such as the IMF and the EU, the USA as a world power, are increasingly being used by parties associated with this party family, creating an effective competition between the libertarian-left and radical-right, vying for the same political space.

**Table 16. Tribune Parties by use of the Conspiracy<sup>21</sup>**

Political Party	Country	Use of 'the Conspiracy'
LAOS	Greece	
Golden Dawn	Greece	■
SYRIZA	Greece	■
Die Linke	Germany	■
Pirate Party	Germany	■
Pirate Party	Sweden	■
Swedish Democrats	Sweden	■
Politics-can-be-Different (LMP)	Hungary	■
JOBBIK	Hungary	■
Five-Star Movement	Italy	■
New Generation Party	Romania	■
Romanian People's Party	PPDD	■

## 6.4 Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to examine the aggressive discourse of tribune parties. In particular, it tried to explore the multifaceted enemy or patrician images that tribune parties employ. It has argued that because these parties are essentially anti-status quo and anti-mainstream, their primary target is the current political establishment. In addition to this political patrician, however, tribune parties employ a series of additional patrician-images. This ranges from immigrants and ethnic minorities to neighbouring

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<sup>21</sup> Interviews with SRYRIZA, LAOS, PPDD, Swedish Democrats, German Pirate Party, Swedish Pirate Party, LMP, Jobbik, Die Linke MPs and party representatives.

states, international institutions, hegemonic powers, foreign corporations, or state organizations. Often times these patricians are not just depicted as existing (and presenting a threat) in isolation but rather as co-ordinating with each other and against *the people*. Differences however do exist among party families. Thus, the radical right and extreme-right has effective monopoly over the first two patrician images – immigrants and minorities.

However, when it comes to the remaining patrician images, the radical right and extreme right are in competition with the new left and libertarian left which both major party families employ. The result of this strategy is that the two strands of tribune parties are essentially in competition with each other over the anti-establishment discourse. As both seek to identify similar patricians or enemies, both imply that while the mainstream parties cannot deal with them, they on the other hand can. The competition subsequently becomes one of – which kind of tribune is best suited to replace the mainstream. Fundamentally, what this means is that the electoral struggle therefore becomes not only one of tribunes versus patricians but often times, also one of tribunes versus tribunes.

## **Chapter 7: Tribune Parties and Second Order Elections in times of Economic Crisis**

*Most of our supporters are – let's say – middle aged. But more and more we are starting to have young people supporting us. I mean, just look around you, there is just nobody else and the economy is not getting better; every day it's getting worse.*

SYRIZA (Greece)

### **7.1 Introduction**

The previous three chapters have looked at demand-side and supply-side explanations for the rise of tribune political parties from both the radical-left and right in contemporary Europe. Chapter 6 further elaborated on the specific enemy images employed in the political discourse of tribune parties during elections. An important feature identified in the radical-right party family was that it often borrows from many of the enemy-images and the left-wing discourse usually associated with the radical-left: namely the anti-corporatist message, anti-liberal and EU position and redistributive focus. The two party families therefore compete on the redistributive spectrum of the political space.

Nonetheless, it is arguable that the saliency of these issues was only made possible by the economic conditions following the late-2000s financial crisis and the sovereign debt and Euro-crises that ensued (Jackman and Volpert 1996; Pammett and Leduc 2013). The negative effects of the crisis such as dropping GDP and rising unemployment have therefore allowed for the radical message of populist political parties to become a central one among disenchanted voters. Following years of economic decline and painful austerity measures by governing political parties, the ground was arguably ripe for a rise in tribune political parties. In this regard, the European Parliament (EP) elections of 2014 are perhaps an ideal testing ground for investigating whether economic factors – in other word whether economic voting – was a factor explaining the particularly steep rise of tribune parties in 2014. It is ideal because it is a test after years of economic decline which both mainstream governing parties as well as voters had to experience. It is also ideal because it allows one to gauge the shifts in the political space of all EU member states at the same time.

Ultimately, the EP election in 2014 was in fact somewhat unique as it was the first time after the crisis when radical-right parties won more votes than the mainstream left and right in any EU member state. It is also the first time when a radical-left party managed to come in first in Greece; the first time an outright self-declared radical Feminist party achieved a breakthrough in Sweden; and in Spain it is the first time that the bipartisanship of the center-right People's Party and center-left Spanish Socialist Workers' Party was strongly challenged by a radical-left newcomer - Podemos – a party with roots in the *indignados* movement. Germany's neo-Nazi National Democratic Party won a seat in the EP; Pirates as well as an animal-rights party acquired a seat for the first time in Germany and the Animal Rights Party kept its seat in Netherlands. It is also

perhaps one of the rare times when a comedic and satirical party – die PARTEI – got a seat in the European Parliament as well.

The 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections have also made significant waves in the mass media as newspapers, news networks, commentators, blogs, and analysts have lamented the wave of Eurosceptic, neo-Nazi, populist, radical right as well as radical left, and libertarian political parties that have made significant gains since 2009. Some of these parties have entered the EP for the first time. This is the case of many of the parties under focus in this dissertation such as Golden Dawn in Greece or the Five Star Movement in Italy. Others formed only months before the elections like Bulgaria-without-Censorship and Podemos in Spain. Immediately after the official results were announced, France's Prime Minister Manuel Valls went as far to call it an "earthquake" (Hewitt 2014). While not necessarily an *earthquake* in terms of overall seat-allocations in the EP, for France at least the May 2014 vote was indeed a political upheaval, as the radical right Front National (FN) came in first, beating both the center-right Union for a Popular Movement and the Socialists. This is the first time FN managed such an upset over both mainstream parties in France. The same is true for the UK Independence Party (UKIP).

The success of these parties has been often associated with the fallout from the crisis – namely the negative economic consequences between the late 2000s and 2014. In light of the economic downturn during the past six years, the question that this chapter asks is whether the rise of ideologically radical anti-establishment tribunal parties is linked to the sovereign debt crisis. I explore this question using a number of variables measuring economic growth (GDP, unemployment and bailout as a percentage of GDP) for all EU-member states while focusing in depth on the specific six cases of this

dissertation: Germany and Sweden in Continental/Northern Europe, Greece and Italy in Southern Europe and Hungary and Romania in Central Europe. Ultimately, I argue that economic voting does not explain why anti-establishment tribunal parties have surged in countries that were less affected by the crisis while in the most affected countries they have failed to make significant inroads.

## **7.2 Second Order Elections and Economic Voting**

Literature surrounding European Parliament elections focuses on two areas of concern: the issues discussed in election campaigns and the avenues EP elections offer for voter discontent with governing parties. European Parliament elections are often regarded as less important or second-order elections in comparison to national parliamentary elections or presidential elections in semi-presidential systems (Karlheinz and Schmitt 1980, 9). This has several consequences. Voters are less likely to participate when compared to first-order national elections; voters are less likely to vote strategically; voters are consequently more likely to show their discontent vis-à-vis major political parties by invalidating their votes; and voters are more likely to vote for new and smaller parties to signal their protest vis-à-vis main parties; similarly, voters are more likely to vote against the parties in power (Schmitt 2005, 651-652). For tribunal parties the implications are that voters are more likely to vote for them in order to express their protest vis-à-vis the political mainstream. Electoral rules for European Parliament elections are also favorable for outsiders since PR is used across all member states. This

is one of the reasons as to why UKIP is able to perform significantly better in EP elections than national ones.

At the same time, literature on ‘economic voting’ suggests that voters punish political parties in times of economic decline (Pammett and Leduc 2013). In this regard, the 2009-2014 period - marked by unpopular austerity measures following the Euro-crisis in a number of EU member states - serves as an ideal case for examining whether economic voting is responsible for the success of Tribune parties. The logic behind this would be that the surge observed in May 2014 is an expression of a protest vote against established, mainstream centre-left and centre-right political parties in charge with the implementation of austerity. The second-order character of EP elections further allows voters to refrain from strategic voting and instead opt for new, radical and untested political parties. The preliminary hypothesis therefore would be that countries which were hardest hit by the crisis, also experienced a more significant surge in extremist Tribune party success.

Certain academic works on the radical-right party family agree with the economic voting thesis. As mentioned in Chapter 4, Jackman and Volpert (1996, 502), for instance, argue that unemployment and economic decline are more likely to generate opportunities for radical-right parties to increase their voter share. Nonetheless, there is no consensus on this in literature. In the case of the previous EU election of 2009, Pammett and Leduc (2013) point out that even those severe economic crises do not allow for voters to punish incumbents when economic fallout can be attributed to external sources – such as globalization or the EU (108). In addition, economic voting looks only at the cyclical periods of economic growth and recession. Thus, so far, the economic voting literature has theorized very little about political implications during periods of severe economic


decline, economic crisis, massive unemployment and hyperinflation (Pammett and Leduc 2013, 94). Looking at the 2014 election results as opposed to 2009, it is worth asking the question whether there are any indications of economic voting, given the fact that the crisis had a severe economic impact in several EU member states.

### **7.3 Change from 2009**

Economic voting theory argues that left-wing parties in power are punished in times of growing unemployment while right-wing parties lose votes when they cannot deliver on their promise to lower taxes (Pammett and Leduc 2013). The 2009-2014 time-period is marked significantly more by the former rather than the later. In May of 2014, nevertheless, while not losing its plurality, the European People's Party (EPP) lost 23% of its previous seats. The biggest loser was the centrist Alliance of Liberals and Democrats (ALDE) with 35% fewer seats than in 2009. In terms of the winners at the expense of EPP and Liberals, the center-left Socialists and Democrats (SD) were able to pick up only four more seats for a total of 188. Due to the high level of cooperation in the EP between mainstream centre-left, centre-right and centrist political groups, these changes are actually in fact almost insignificant. Together, mainstream centrist political parties still hold a majority of 68.9% of EP seats as opposed to 76% in 2009. Overall, this means no substantive change in terms of the general direction for the next five years.

The main winners, however, at the expense of EPP and ALDE were tribune parties outside the political mainstream and at the extremes of the political spectrum (see fig 7). This includes many of the parties that are part of the United Left (+37%), Eurosceptic Freedom and Democracy (+19%), non-aligned (+37%) and a series of

completely new political parties which account for almost 11% of all EP seats. If they were to form a cohesive political group within the EP, they would be the third largest - trailing only behind the mainstream SD and EPP.



(Source: European Parliament Election Results 2014, <http://www.elections2014.eu/en>)

Figure 7. European Parliament Elections of 2009 and 2014: Change in share of Political Groups





Figure 8. Ranking of Political parties in EP by MEP Seats won in each Member State (Source: European Parliament Election Results 2014, <http://www.elections2014.eu/en>)

Among the parties outside the centrist mainstream (see Figure 9), one can distinguish between several species of parties: 1) a populist, right-wing, anti-immigrant group composed of older radical-right parties such as UK Independence Party (UKIP), the Danish People's Party and the Front National in France; 2) a group of newer radical-right parties, which are also more extremist as they not only overtly display their racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism but have paramilitary organizations which engage in violent acts against minority groups. Such parties include Golden Dawn in Greece and Jobbik in Hungary; 3) a libertarian-progressive party family made up of a variety of rather new parties that include radical-left wing Marxists like SYRIZA in Greece or Podemos in Spain, Pirate parties such as those in Germany and Sweden, Feminists (in Sweden), and Animal parties (in Germany and Netherlands). The Five-Star-Movement in Italy is also arguably a libertarian progressive political party. However, its choice to group itself with the right-wing UKIP and Swedish Democrats makes its classification quite problematic.




. Figure 9. Radical Right and Radical-Left Tribune parties in 2014 EP Elections  
(Source: European Parliament Election Results 2014, <http://www.elections2014.eu/en>)

Consequently, both radical-right and radical-left tribune parties have made significant inroads in 2014. This includes the parties in the cases studied in this dissertation (Pirates in Germany, Five-Star-Movement in Italy, Jobbik in Hungary, Swedish Democrats, SYRIZA and Golden Dawn in Greece). Some of the older members of the radical right outside the focus of this dissertation (those parties that emerged during the 1980s in Western Europe) even won elections in France, Denmark and UK. The radical-left won in Greece and came in second in Ireland, third in Spain and Portugal and fourth in Italy and Germany.

The obvious puzzle is why such a monumental surge of all these parties now? Economic voting literature would point towards the effects of unpopular austerity measures following the Euro-crisis. This raises the question whether there may be some link between the effects of the financial crisis and the surging success of these parties. Economic voting in May 2014 would also be facilitated by the second-order feature of EP elections when the costs of protest votes (against established, mainstream centre-left and centre-right political parties in charge of the implementation of austerity) would be significantly lower. Two proxy variables can be arguably used to represent the effects of the crisis: rise in unemployment and the size of the bailout received by EU member states which was conditional on austerity measures.

According to the IMF World Economic Outlook Database, unemployment - since the last EP elections in 2009 until the most recent elections in 2014 - rose in all but one EU member state – Germany. Unemployment in Germany, during this period, actually decreased by almost 30% from 7.52% to 5.21%. A mild growth in unemployment (below 30%) was experienced in Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Romania, Sweden and the UK. In Poland, the only country not in a technical recession during the crisis,


unemployment grew by under 50%. Unemployment rose by more than 100% in Bulgaria, Denmark, Ireland, Lithuania, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain. In Greece it grew by 256% from 7.5% to over 26% and in Cyprus by 338% from 3% in 2008 to 19% in 2014. If the increasing success of these parties is linked to unemployment, one would expect to find that in countries where unemployment rose by a small margin, both radical-right and libertarian-new left made fewer inroads and that in countries where unemployment surged, so did the radical-right and libertarian-new left. Below is a representation of growth in unemployment and the growth of the combined radical-right and radical-left vote between 2009-2014 (Fig 10).



The picture above is rather mixed. While the countries experiencing the highest unemployment did also experience a surge in the vote for anti-mainstream tribunal parties (522% in Greece and almost 200% in Cyprus), countries that experienced little growth in unemployment saw a surge in the protest vote as well. This includes the cases of France and UK where unemployment growth was at 30% or below. In the UK, the right wing vote surged by 67% and in France by almost 300%.

The radical-left indeed surged in Italy, Spain and Greece. These are the states where unemployment grew most. However, in Cyprus, it actually slightly decreased. The radical-left also made significant inroads in Belgium, a country where unemployment only grew by 18%. In Portugal, where unemployment grew as much as in Spain, neither the radical-left, nor the radical-right made any progress.

An alternative way to try to account for the effects of the crisis is by measuring the size of the bailout package received by EU member states as a percentage of their GDP. The reasoning for this is that the bailouts were conditional on largely unpopular reforms and budget cuts. The implication would be that the larger the bailout package, the larger the package of austerity reforms imposed on member states. This would affect not just the rise in unemployment that ensued but also cuts in social benefits and salaries of public employees, freezes in hiring, etc. Eight member-states received bailouts between 2009 and 2014: Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Portugal, Romania and Spain. The sizes of the bailouts ranged from more than 100% of GDP in the case of Greece to 3% of GDP in the case of Spain (European Financial Stability Facility 2014). Below is a representation of the bailout size versus the combined radical-left and radical-right Tribunal vote (Fig 11).



**Fig 11. Bailout in Percent of GDP vs. Percentage Growth of Combined radical-left and -right Tribune Parties between 2009-2014 EP Elections** (Source: European Financial Stability Facility. 2014)

The picture in Fig 11. above is also rather mixed. Greece and Cyprus, which received the largest bailouts relative to their GDP, also experienced a large surge in the anti-establishment tribune vote.

However, so did Spain where the bailout was rather small. Portugal with the third largest bailout relative to GDP actually experienced only a small increase in the tribune vote. Countries such as France and UK, where the radical-right won the election for the first time, received no bailout. Poland, which also did not need a bailout and which was in fact the only EU state to experience economic growth throughout the crisis, saw a surge of more than 300 % in the radical-right Tribune growth.

#### **7.4 Tribune Parties in Six Case-Studies in EP 2014**

Among the six-cases under focus in this dissertation (Greece, Italy in Southern Europe, Romania, Hungary in Central Europe, and Germany and Sweden in Continental/Northern Europe), the picture is equally murky. Italy saw the consolidation of the Five-Star-Movement which remained stable (from the 2013 national elections) at above 20% of the popular vote. The country, although listed among the EU's problem states, did not receive a bailout. It did experience a 100% rise in unemployment however. Sweden experienced the growth of the radical right as well as the radical left, despite not having received bailouts and having treaded quite well through the crisis.

In Romania, a country that received a bailout worth 10% of GDP, the radical-right vote fell by 69% and no radical-left party appeared yet on the political scene. In Hungary, where the bailout was only slightly higher at 12% of GDP, the combined Tribune radical-right and radical-left vote doubled. In Germany, a number of anti-establishment tribune parties – both on the left and right – entered the EP in 2014. However, in this case, their success had more to do with the lowering of the threshold in Germany than an actual increase in voter share. In fact, when compared with 2009, there is no significant change in voter share. Consequently, a clear economic voting pattern in the 2014 EP election is not evident across these states. This confirms earlier studies by Pammett and Leduc (2013) about a lack of efficacy of economic voting models in successive economic crises (108).

Ultimately, the only case for which surging unemployment and bailout size seems to be correlated with a very significant surge in the radical right vote is Greece (Cyprus is

also arguably another case among EU-27). This initial observation may point out that the economic voting thesis could work but only in cases of severe economic downturn. However, because only Greece essentially corroborates this, it is too early to make any conclusive inferences as to the relationship between the economy and voting patterns.

Finally, Table 17 below is an analysis in the variation between the performances of tribune parties in the 2014 EP election as opposed to 2009 for all EU-member states (minus Croatia which only joined in 2013). It represents a zero-order correlation between electoral performance and a number of macro-level economic factors, namely GDP growth (between the two elections) and unemployment as well as bailout received as a percentage of GDP.

The zero-order correlation below indicates that there seems to be a strong correlation between the net gain by tribune parties and bailout received. There also seems to be a negative relationship between net gain by tribune parties and the growth in GDP. In other words, GDP decline is related to net gain by tribune political parties. Nonetheless, it is important to note that this is not accounted for by the rise in the radical right. On the other hand there seems to be a very strong relationship between the net gain of the radical left and negative GDP as well as the size of bailouts received. This also seems to corroborate the pictures in Figures 10 and 11. In other words, the relationship may be particularly skewed by Greece.

Table 17. Zero-Order Correlations between Tribune Party vote and GDP growth, Unemployment change and Bailout between 2009-2014 (by Country)

		Correlations						
		Net Gain by Tribune	Net gain by Radical Right	Net Gain by Libertarian New Left	Net GDP Growth between 2008 and 2014	Unemployment change between 2008 and 2014	Bailout Received	Bailout percent of GDP
Net Gain by Tribune	Pearson Correlation		.601**	.701**	-.501**	.349	.408*	.408*
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.001	.000	.008	.074	.035	.035
Net gain by Radical Right	Pearson Correlation				-.094	.143	.049	.023
	Sig. (2-tailed)				.642	.477	.807	.910
Net Gain by Libertarian New Left	Pearson Correlation				-.536**	.305	.461*	.484*
	Sig. (2-tailed)				.004	.122	.015	.010
Net GDP Growth in 2009	Pearson Correlation					-.633**	-.680**	-.703**
	Sig. (2-tailed)					.000	.000	.000
Unemployment change between 2008 and 2014	Pearson Correlation						.756**	.730**
	Sig. (2-tailed)						.000	.000
Bailout Received	Pearson Correlation							.987**
	Sig. (2-tailed)							.000

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

N=27

What the picture above suggests is that aside from socio-economic aspects, what also may matter is the importance of agency in facilitating political party success. In other words, the ability of parties themselves and leaders to shape their own chances of success are ignored by structural arguments. While structural factors such as the economy undoubtedly play a role, the rise (or fall) of tribune parties from both the radical-right and libertarian-progressive extremes cannot be attributed to structure alone. Economic voting does not seem to explain the success of radical parties in cases where austerity was not severe. The analysis above illustrates that countries with swelling unemployment that were forced to take on massive bailout packages accompanied by severe austerity measures experienced a significant rise in radical-right as well as in radical-left votes. This was the case of Greece (and to a lesser extent Italy as well as Spain).

However, many countries that experienced no bailouts and modest unemployment growth saw a rise of these parties as well. This is especially the case of France and UK. It is also the case of Sweden which is among the cases under focus in this dissertation. Paradoxically, Germany the only country where unemployment decreased during 2009-2014, saw the entry of extreme-right as well as libertarian-radical left parties. Other countries that also experienced massive growth in unemployment saw an actual decline of the tribune vote such as Romania. What this points out to is that structure tells part of the story but not the whole story.

A focus solely on structure misses specific nuances in the public debate and the interplay between established parties. The responses of mainstream parties to the crisis may either make room or – alternatively - suffocate anti-establishment tribune parties depending on whether they politicize the issue or opt for consensus around topics like

austerity. In this regard, the interplay between the different types of tribune parties is also important in determining whether it is the radical-right or libertarian-radical left that benefits at the expense of mainstream parties. Agency is thus quite important in creating opportunities for success.

Likewise, changes in the rules of the game can significantly alter the way in which votes translate into seats even when a party experiences a low result. For example, in the case of Germany, the entry of the extremist National Democratic Party (NPD) in the EP with only 1% of the vote had more to do with the lowering of the 5% threshold than an actual surge in the radical-right vote. This combined with Germany's 96 allocated MEP seats allowed the NPD but also the Pirate Party, Animal Protection Party and a satirical party to enter the EP. Consequently, what this suggests is that a more qualitative rather than quantitative approach, based on an in depth analysis of specific cases could potentially help to make more sense of the electoral success of specific party families.

Additionally, a closer look at agency may also be able to shed new light into the strategies and discourses employed by successful and unsuccessful parties. An appreciation for the importance of agency also involves recognizing the importance of individual leaders and leadership. Lastly, while this may pose difficulty in generating parsimonious theories, one must question whether the charisma of SYRIZA's Tsipras or Five-Star-Movement's Beppe Grillo may not actually account for the success of these parties. The same is true for Vona in the case of Hungary's Jobbik or Jimmie Akesson in the case of the Swedish Democrats.

## 7.5 Conclusion

The 2014 EP election presents a unique case when anti-establishment tribune parties of the radical right and the radical-left make significant gains in EU member states. Academic literature on second-order elections and economic voting argue that economic factors are critical towards explaining anti-establishment party success, especially in second-order elections. Therefore, the question posed in this chapter is whether the economic effects of the economic crisis during the last six years is related to the success of anti-establishment political parties in EU countries. It uses two ways to measure economic effects – percent change in unemployment and the size of bailouts received by EU member states as a percentage of GDP. The argument made is that economic voting may explain the surge of anti-establishment parties in the two cases most affected by the crisis (most notably Greece and to a lesser extent Italy). This suggests that severe austerity measures are likely to result in a significant surge of tribune parties. Both the far-right Golden Dawn as well as the radical left SYRIZA are illustrative of this.

However, economic voting does not explain why such parties have also surged in countries that were less affected by the crisis such as Sweden. Finally, it has suggested that while structure may offer part of the explanation, a deeper analysis of agency and the dynamics between established and anti-establishment political parties in terms of strategy, discourse, framing issues, achieving salience may offer a more complete explanation for the increasing surge in anti-establishment political party success.

## CHAPTER 8

### Conclusion

#### 8.1. Introduction

The Western political space is increasingly being populated by new political parties which fall outside the established mainstream center-left and center-right. They are parties of the radical-right, extreme-right, radical-left or libertarian new left that claim a desire to repair the economic, social and democratic fabric of society which mainstream parties have ignored or damaged. Many of these parties have performed very well during national or European Parliament elections. In some cases they have risen to third place such as the Five-Star-Movement in Italy, Jobbik in Hungary or the Swedish Democrats in Sweden. In other cases they have replaced one of the mainstream parties as the main opposition or even taken power. SYRIZA in Greece is the first example of this.

The main question that this dissertation investigates is what accounts for the rise of this vast array of political parties outside the political establishment and from all poles of the ideological space during the last decade. It uses both a supply-side as well as a demand-side approach to tackle this question through a comparative analysis of EU member states and in particular, three pairs of EU members from three sub-regions in Europe. The contribution this dissertation makes is a theoretical one that aims to bridge the cartel-party thesis and literature on populist parties. It is also an empirical contribution

that looks into the reasons for the proliferation of anti-establishment parties during the 2000s. I employ both a quantitative as well as qualitative approach in studying voter preferences as well as parties themselves in explaining the rise of this group of political parties. This dissertation argues that the rise of these parties lies specifically in their own ability to engage in an aggressive discourse aimed against the centre-left and centre-right mainstream.

Furthermore, this dissertation makes a theoretical contribution as well, namely in adding to and refining the cartel party thesis of Katz and Mair (1995). It does so by exploring the reaction against the cartel-party system and it reconceptualises the heterogeneous array of radical-right and radical-left political parties based not only on their ideology but rather based on their common anti-establishment strategy and political discourse. It claims that despite ideological differences all these parties share a) a radical non-centrist ideological stance (be it on the left or right, authoritarian or libertarian dimensions); b) a populist anti-establishment discourse, c) a commitment to representing specific societal classes; d) an aggressive discourse and behaviour towards political enemies, e) a commitment towards 'restoring true democracy' and f) a tendency to offer simplistic solutions to intricate societal issues. Ultimately, these parties represent an anti-cartel reaction from all ideological poles against the depoliticization of issues by mainstream parties, their insulation from society, and the implied deterioration of democracy. During the early 21<sup>st</sup> century this reaction has only intensified.

Much like Lavau's (1969) French communist party in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, which he labels *tribune* due to their firm transformative message and refusal to join mainstream parties, this study argues that the modern plethora of ideologically radical yet populist and

transformative new parties are best described as contemporary *tribune parties*. They attempt to mobilize voters against a vast array of enemies or *patricians*, which includes political parties, international organizations, neighbouring states, a *hegemonic* power (US or in the context of the EU, Germany), (foreign) corporations, the state - all of these are depicted as often working in collaboration to undermine the romanticized, good, honest *people*. The rise of these parties calls into question whether the cartel party system is still descriptive of western democracies today. This study argues that while the cartel had near monopoly status in the 1970s to mid 1990s, this is no longer the case. Progressively, the rise of tribune parties to the point where they are becoming real contesters for power has amplified over the last decade; therefore, this significantly dilutes the dominant role of cartel-parties and transforms the party system into a contested space between *tribunes* and *patricians*.

## 8.2. Overview

Since the expansion of the franchise in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, four types of political parties are considered to have had a dominant role in Western party systems at any given time. Chronologically, political systems were characterized by elite-based parties in the late 1800s, mass-parties during the early and mid 20<sup>th</sup> century, catch-all parties after WWII and lastly cartel parties after the 1970s (Gunther and Diamond 2003, 175). Each stage in this typology is marked by different modes of party organization, intensity of ideological competition and assumptions about what party-society relations should be.

Elite-based parties were organizationally thin, based on client-patron relations, programmatically not ideological, and aimed to generally distribute benefits to clients. With the expansion of the franchise, mass-parties, like the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats, emerged. These were the exact opposite: ideologically radical, emphasizing high membership and organization, while simultaneously linked to secondary organizations such as trade unions, social organizations or religious organizations. Such parties had a functional normative view of their role within society and saw themselves as representatives of societal demand. They had strong programs aiming at revolutionary change and were at the time of their inception born outside the system rather than within it (Gunther and Diamond 2003, 178). The mass-party is essentially the archetype of the responsible party school; it is a party that seeks to empower voter choices through *legal* revolution. After WWII, however, and with the decrease in class-struggle, the mass-party sheds the revolutionary and transformative message it had within the Western party system and progressively moves from its former outside position to one within the system. This period also coincides with broader societal phenomena such as the decrease in trade unions, religious organizations and the advent of television.

By the mid-1950s and 1960s, therefore, the mass party gives way to or in many cases metamorphoses itself into the catch-all party. The catch-all party is marked by a weakening of the links between party and civil society, a de-politicization of issues and a move towards the ideological centre. This is also a period of increasingly personalized politics, televised debates and a shift of power from parliaments to executives (Kirchheimer 1966, 178). By the late-20<sup>th</sup> century, Katz and Mair's (1995) famously


proclaimed the emergence of cartel-parties. This period is notably marked by the diminishing electoral choice offered by mainstream parties and the increasing insulation from society (and party members) as parties began to redirect state finances and subvention to themselves (758). The new cartel political parties therefore stopped competing even along a narrow diluted set of policy differences and turned to colluding with each other instead in order to secure their ability to take turns at being in power.

Arguably a transition point between catch-all and cartel parties was identified by Panebianco (1988) in the form of the electoral-professional party, which marks the start of the insulation from membership. Whereas previously party membership was paramount towards financing, campaigns and mobilization, the electoral-professional party started to rely instead on professionals who skillfully used modern campaign techniques, television and mass-communications media.

In short, the western party system went through an initial stage of strengthening party-societal links with the rise of the franchise, after which these links progressively deteriorated during the late 20<sup>th</sup> century. Academic works on the progression of political parties does not end, however, with the cartel-party thesis. In fact, Katz and Mair (1995) themselves make a case that the cartel is not immune – especially to radical or outsiders promising to ‘break the mould’ (24). What they also note is that in the case of certain such parties such as the Greens, these parties are already being co-opted and brought into the fold of the cartel (Katz and Mair 1995, 24). Since the mid 1990s, a similar case can also be made for some of the older radical right parties as well. This includes the Freedom Party of Austria (FPO) in Austria or the Danish People’s Party and Norway’s Progress Party. Even France’s National Front has been trying to rebrand itself as a more

‘mainstream’ political party. Netherlands’ Party for Freedom (PVV) albeit being a newer party formed during the last decade, has also been an unofficial supporter of the government. It boasts of having managed to impose its program of placing a 5-year moratorium on new immigration to the country<sup>22</sup>. In this respect, we see a cooptation that works in two directions. Mainstream political parties bring radicals to the fold, but radicals bring in part of their discourse (in this case one with racist undertones) to mainstream politics.

The argument made in this dissertation - and one of the contributions it makes to debate - is that at the same time as some former radical parties have mainstreamed, other new ones have formed and entered parliaments at the national and European Parliament level (see fig 12). Many are from the radical-right and extreme right. This includes extremists like Golden Dawn in Greece, National-Popular Front (ELAM) in



<sup>22</sup> PVV MEP interview

Cyprus and Jobbik in Hungary. It also includes more moderate but popular parties such as the Romanian People's Party or the Czech Republic's Public Affairs Party as well as completely re-invented parties (during the mid-2000s) such as the Swedish Democrats and True Finns.

The anti-establishment party however is not one solely of the radical-right variety. It arguably involves as well a rising radical-left libertarian strand, albeit more timid in intensity. While SYRIZA in Greece is the most popular example, it is not the only one. Podemos in Spain is another such party. On the more libertarian side, Pirate parties, particularly in Sweden, Germany and Iceland are also part of this growing anti-establishment trend. The 5-Star Movement in Italy is perhaps an interesting example of a party that transcends the old radical-right and left-libertarian divide. Ideologically it is a party arguing for direct democracy, green economics, anti-corruption, and same-sex marriage but at the same time it identifies itself with Nigel Farage's right-wing populist UKIP party in the European Parliament. It is consequently an anti-establishment party but hardly a clearly left-libertarian one while at the same time it is also hardly an anti-immigration, strongly Eurosceptic party such as those associated with the radical-right. This makes the old radical left-right distinction increasingly difficult. On the other hand, Abedi's (2004) conceptualization of political parties as a dichotomy of established parties and those outside the establishment is much more useful towards understanding the proliferation of new political parties during the mid-2000s and early 2010s. This dissertation borrows Lavau's (1969) conceptualization of the communist party in France during the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century, and puts forth the concept of *tribune parties* to capture this increasingly heterogeneous but equally anti-establishment group of political parties.

Much like the tribune communist predecessors 70 years ago, which were firm in their ideological commitments, these modern political tribune parties are at the ideological poles of politics and capitalize on their anti-mainstream political message.

Moreover, this dissertation argues that tribune parties have more in common than just ideological radicalism and an anti-mainstream discourse. The archetypal tribune party defined in this chapter is marked by six features (see table 18). This includes: a) a radical non-centrist ideological stance (be it on the left or right, authoritarian or libertarian dimensions); b) a populist anti-establishment discourse, c) a commitment to representing specific societal classes; d) an aggressive discourse and behaviour towards political enemies, e) a commitment towards ‘restoring true democracy’ and f) a tendency to offer simplistic solutions to intricate societal issues. In terms of organization, I argue that no ideal type characterizes tribune parties. However common features of many (although not all) such parties, irrespective of left-right ideology or party family, are high membership and centralization around the party leader.

**Table 18. Characteristics of Tribune Parties**

Country	Party	Presence of a Populist vs. Mainstream Discourse	Specific Constituency	Quick Fix	Presence of a Rally Against the Enemy Discourse	Presence of a Democratic Renewal Discourse	Membership (higher lower than average of mainstream parties)	Organization (ultra-centralized around leader, centr., decentral.)
Bulgaria	TAKA	■	(Nationalists)		■	-	High	centralized
Bulgaria	National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria	■	-		-	■	High	centralized
Bulgaria		■	-		■	■	Low	centralized

	Bulgaria								
	Without Censorship								
Bulgaria	Order, Law, Justice	O	■	-		■			
Czech Republic	Public Affairs Party	P	■	-		-	-	Low	centralized
Greece	Popular Orthodox Rally	P	■	(mainly nationalists; elderly)		■	■	High	centralized
Greece	Golden Dawn	G	■	(mainly nationalists; elderly, unemployed)		■	-	High	centralized
Greece	Coalition of the Radical Left (SRYRIZA)	C	■	(youth, working- class, middle-class)		■	■	High	centralized
Denmark	Liberal Alliance	L	■	-		-	-	-	-
Denmark	Freedom Party	F	-	-		-	■	-	-
Germany	Die Linke	D	■	(working-class, left- wing voters)		■	■	High	decentralized
Germany	Liberal Party	P	■	(libertarians; youth)		■	■	High	decentralized
Finland	True Finns	T	■	(nationalists)		■	■	High	centralized
France	Front National	F	■	(working-class, left- wing voters)		■	■	High	decentralized
Hungary	Fidesz	J	■	(mainly nationalist; elderly, youth)		■	■	High	centralized
Hungary	Politics-can- be-Different	P	■	(urban intellectuals, middle-class)		■	■	High	decentralized

	(LMP)							
Iceland	Libertarian Party of Iceland	■	(libertarians; youth)		■	■	High	decentralized
Italy	Five-Star Movement	■	(libertarians; youth)		■	■	High	decentralized
Latvia	All For Latvia	■	(nationalists)		■	■	High	centralized
Lithuania	Order and Justice	■	(nationalists)		■	■	High	centralized
Netherlands	Party for Animals	■	(environmentalists and animal-enthusiasts)		-	■	High	centralized
Netherlands	Party for Freedom	■	(nationalists; elderly)		■	■	High	ultra-centralized
Portugal	Party for Animals and Nature	-	(environmentalists and animal-enthusiasts)		-	■	-	-
Quebec (Canada)	Quebec Solidaire	■	(working-class, left-wing voters, minorities)		■	■	High	centralized
Romania	New Generation Party	■	(nationalists)		■	■	Low	ultra-centralized
Romania	People's Party	■	(nationalists, working-class; elderly)		■	■	High	ultra-centralized
Slovakia	Ordinary People	■	(nationalists)		■	■	-	centralized
Spain	Podemos	■	(youth, working-class, middle-class)		■	■	High	centralized
Sweden	Libertarian Party	■	(libertarians; youth)		■	■	High	centralized

Sweden	D emocrats	■	(nationalists)		■	■	High	centralized
Ukraine	S voboda	■	(nationalists)		■	■	High	centralized

This study argues that tribune politics have only intensified during the past decade and the research question it has sought to answer is why. It investigates this question through a comparative analysis of EU states with a specific focus on six European Union member states. The choice of case-studies are informed by several features. In order to control for the effect of electoral systems, countries with mixed proportional representation systems have been chosen, therefore leaving out countries with very permissive systems (such as Denmark or Netherlands) or very restrictive systems (UK). Likewise, the six states include three pairs of states from three regions across Europe: southern Europe (Italy and Greece), central and eastern Europe (Hungary and Romania) as well as northern/continental Europe (Germany and Sweden). Finally, all the six states have party systems which include two or more anti-establishment political parties. From the supply-side of political parties, this aspect is important, because an anti-establishment party in a party system where it is the only anti-establishment party facing the mainstream has different constraints as well as more room to maneuver on the ideological spectrum than two or more anti-establishment parties which would have to share the anti-mainstream space and potentially compete with each other as well as the mainstream. The six cases chosen are among Europe's only states where the party system has two or more of these parties coexisting at any one given time.

The approach used combined an investigation of both demand-side as well as supply-side factors of political parties. Chapter 4 specifically focused on the demand-side or in other words on why voters vote for anti-establishment tribune parties. At the same time, this dissertation has investigated the supply-side of these parties. Chapters 5 and 6 specifically focused on the supply-side of tribune parties. Both quantitative as well as qualitative analysis are employed. I have used quantitative analysis to investigate demand-side factors for tribune parties. On the supply side-side I have employed a content analysis of party programs and manifestos using the standard method in order to locate party positions on the political spectrum. A contribution of this study is combining these methods with a qualitative analysis of these parties, informed by interviews with party leaders, members of parliament, party ideologues and country experts. These augment content analyses of party manifestos and are instrumental in identifying the enemy images used by tribune parties, analysed in Chapter 6.

This dissertation makes the claim that the primary reason for the proliferation of these parties is that current mainstream political parties have not only continued the cartelization trend identified by Katz and Mair (1995) but that the cartel party system observed in 1995 has in fact strengthened during the early part of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. As a result, anti-establishment political parties of the present decade have successfully managed to capitalize on this trend. They have done this through a discourse and strategy aimed at attacking both the centre-left and centre-right while simultaneously promising to restore what the centrist parties have taken away: ideology and party-societal links. Consequently, tribune parties as well as their voters are reaction specifically to a) a dilution of ideology, b) depoliticization of issues; c) an insulation from society by

mainstream political parties; and d) ultimately a deterioration of democracy in Western states.

Conceptually, the anti-establishment camp was until recently treated as a minor presence in a political space dominated by the mainstream centre-left and right. Cas Mudde (2007) for instance argues that the radical right populist strand has no chance to significantly alter modern liberal democracies. Even in 2014, Cas Mudde (2014) argued that even the 2014 European Parliament results, when these parties won outright in many EU member states, were by no means indicative of a major shift in modern western political systems. Other academic works have treated the anti-establishment mostly from the prism of Greens and the radical-right. Gunther and Diamond (2003) however identify both strands (essentially one left-libertarian and the other extreme radical-right) as part of a larger family of “movement parties” (188). They argue that there are common features to this party-family. Kitschelt (1989) claims that these parties are essentially post-materialist, reject the primacy of economic issues and argue for the rollback of markets and bureaucracies in favor of social-solidarity relations and participatory institutions (64). The most visible aspect of these parties, however, is that they make use of negative-consensus, have open memberships and are based on loose networks and grassroots movements; the radical-right also seek order, tradition, identity, while attacking intervention in the economy, immigrants and established political parties (Gunther and Diamond 2003, 189). Essentially, the argument made is that these parties resemble quite a lot the mass-parties of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century before they mainstreamed. They are therefore similar to the early Social Democrat and Christian Democrats with their major

reformative programs, large memberships, grassroots links and (what was originally) their outsider relationship to the establishment.

Significant changes have nonetheless transpired in terms of the development of these parties since the mid-1990s which call into question whether a) these parties are mostly just formed of Greens and the radical-right parties which emerged in the 1970s and 1980s; b) these parties actually are what the literature argues they are in terms of ideology, electoral strategy, discourse and c) whether these parties still exist only at the fringes of politics. This dissertation has argued that in the case of all these three questions, the answer is definitely no.

Specifically this study contributes to academic debate in a number of ways. Ideologically, it suggests that the anti-establishment tribune party phenomenon has come to include not just the radical-right but a vast sway of political parties that includes libertarians, radical-left, radical-right and even extremist parties. As previously stated, Greens and some of the older populist right political parties have been co-opted from the fringes and into the establishment. In their place, I argue that new parties have emerged which have taken over the anti-establishment discourse.

Secondly, a clear ideological distinction between these parties is also harder to identify. The Five Star Movement is the best such example, however a blurring of the distinction can be observed elsewhere as well. SYRIZA for instance is hardly a post-materialist party, with a ‘weak organization and leadership and chaotic assembly’ (Gunther and Diamond 2003). Economic issues are a primary element of the party and the strong emphasis on charismatic leadership has been critical even before it coalesced from


coalition to party. Attitudes towards immigrants have not been what one may expect from a left-libertarian party – SYRIZA argues for integrating immigrants however it also argues for all European states to share in the responsibility of hosting refugees for whom Greece is a major gateway into Europe (SYRIZA 2014). Therefore, while nowhere near the level of the radical-right in their attitudes towards immigrants or refugees, the refugee for SYRIZA is nonetheless portrayed as a burden rather than victim.

On the other hand, the radical-right in many instances is beginning to mask its more xenophobic and racist messages and it is doing so employing what one associates with libertarian values. Chapter 5 has illustrated how the Swedish Democrats, for instance, include in their manifesto green issues like protecting marine environments in the Baltic Sea or left-libertarian issues such as ‘anti-bullying laws’, combating violence against women, and increasing funding for the UN refugee agency (Swedish Democrats 2012).

The Romanian People’s Party also argued for digital rights and freedom of expression by banning the ACTA treaty, lesser criminal punishment in cases where crimes are committed without violence and a major reforestation program (PPDD 2012). Even extremist Jobbik has an unusual and unexpected green program arguing in favor of rewarding environmentally friendly homes, recycling technologies and the establishment of an animal-welfare institution within the ministry of the environment (Jobbik 2010). Often times these elements are merely populist because of their saliency in specific contexts while in other instances they are merely meant to hide these parties’ racist anti-immigrant message. In the case of the Swedish Democrats, the point on preventing violence against women is packaged with other proposals such as “preventing the

Islamization of Sweden’, ‘supporting women living under religious oppression’ and ‘banning the veil’ (Swedish Democrats 2012). Previous assumptions about the ideology of the radical-right was that these parties exist at the opposite pole of the libertarian-left. While one is emphasizing individualism, the other argues for tradition and community. The recent face of the radical right is a bit more complex however. As exemplified with the Swedish Democrats, the argument is not one of traditional values versus immigrants but rather one that pits certain minority rights as being intrinsically threatened by the individual rights of others – in this case gender equality and the rights of women are

**Figure 13. Positions of Political Parties on Socialist-Capitalist and Libertarian-Authoritarian Dimensions**



threatened, according to the Swedish Democrats, by the religion and the rights of a minority. The voter is consequently forced to choose between which rights to keep (Western progressive notions of gender equality which are ‘ours’ versus the collective rights of the Muslim immigrant). The claim in this dissertation is that the radical right has become somewhat more


sophisticated. Its discourse is still based on nativism and a us-versus-them dichotomy however it is trying to hide its previous communitarian and traditionalist message.

On the economic left-right spectrum, the argument in this dissertation is that some of the former associations between the radical-right and right-wing economics during the 1990s and early 2000s are also less visible today. The radical-right is often times not just agnostic on economic issues but outright left. This has been illustrated in Chapter 5 with Jobbik, Swedish Democrats, Golden Dawn and the Romanian People's Party. In their manifesto's many of them match leftist parties like Die Linke in their redistributive message (see fig. 13). Some of these trends have been observed by certain academic works even in the mid -2000s (Rydgren 2006). However, this should not be surprising; the economic-left redistributive camp has remained vacant since in the move towards the centre by mainstream parties, it is the left, not the right that has made most concessions. The commitment to austerity and balancing budgets by both centre-right and left during the Great Recession is an important illustration of this. As a result, the anti-establishment regardless of ideological color has come to take over the economic left space that has been abandoned by the traditional left.

In essence, the economic-left is therefore not only a space for the left-libertarian camp which traditionally has been associated with redistributive politics. The economic leftist space has become essentially a competing ground for both major strands of the anti-establishment camp. An important illustration of the beginning of a blurring (at least in economic terms) of the radical-left and right are the post-2015 governing coalition in Greece when the radical-left SYRIZA which won the elections did not align itself with the older traditionally leftist communist party in Greece or another left-wing party but

with a moderately right-wing populist party that shared its anti-austerity and redistributive program.

Thirdly, on the question of whether these parties still exist at the fringes of politics, this dissertation has claimed that presently this is hardly the case. This process is clearly evident with the 2014 European Parliament elections when anti-establishment parties doubled their share of the seats from circa 12% they held previously (European Parliament Election Results 2014). It is perhaps even more evident with the Greek January 2015 elections when an anti-establishment and anti-austerity party won for the first time in an EU member state. The phenomenon has nonetheless been long in the making. In Greece, SYRIZA may have gained power in 2015, however that country's political system has been completely shaken as early as May 2012, when the party replaced PASOK as the main left-wing political party in the country and the second largest party in the party system.



Elsewhere, similar processes are taking place, albeit as of yet with a lower intensity. Jobbik has established itself as the third party in Hungary, closely trailing the centre-left for three consecutive elections. In Sweden, the Swedish Democrats have progressively gained more votes with each election until 2009 when they entered parliament for the first time, only to gain even more votes and become the third largest party in the 2014 elections. In Italy, the Five-Star Movement became the third largest party immediately after forming in 2013 and jumped to second place in the 2014 European Parliament elections. In Spain (albeit not being a focus of this dissertation), the newly created Podemos is making similar gains, challenging the two-party domination of the People's Party and Socialist Workers' Party.

While it may be tempting to associate the success of these parties with protest-votes as a result of economic decline, the anti-establishment is making progress throughout Europe, regardless of the degree with which the economy in specific states is being affected by the crisis. Anti-establishment parties are not gaining votes solely in the most affected states. Among the case studies investigated here, Sweden, Germany and even Central and Eastern European states have weathered the crisis considerably better than southern Europe and they have still experienced a surge in anti-establishment parties. Outside these case studies, elsewhere in Europe, in Netherlands, Finland, Poland, UK and France the same growing trend is visible. The opposite is also true. Portugal for instance is not yet experiencing a surge in anti-establishment parties despite having been among the countries hardest hit by the crisis. Consequently, the economic crisis is perhaps amplifying or speeding up the rise of the anti-establishment, however it is by no means the main root of this surge. Many of these parties have formed even before the crisis and

their success has built up over time during the past decade and as early as the early and mid-2000s when the economy was actually faring quite well (see fig 14 above). The Great Recession, if anything, has created a new opportunity structure through which the anti-establishment could have capitalized and exposed the collusion of the mainstream towards a single unidirectional response to the crisis, marked by budget balancing and austerity at the expense of social programs and redistribution.

From a demand-side approach, this dissertation has made the claim that at least in the case of the radical-right, negative view of immigrants, perceptions of the economy, age and dissatisfaction with political parties are statistically significant determinants of anti-establishment party vote. As illustrated with the Swedish Democrats, younger respondents are more likely than older respondents to vote for this party. This is somewhat alarming, especially since among high-school students (and therefore future voters), the Swedish Democrats are also among the most popular parties (Skolval 2010). If this appeal to the youth persists, what this suggests is that the anti-establishment vote would only increase as these high-school students reach voting age. Likewise, the dissatisfaction with political parties confirms that the anti-establishment discourse of these parties is reflected and effectively taps into voters' dissatisfaction with current political choice. As this vote consolidates with each election and even rises over time, what this essentially suggests is that the cartel-party system identified by Katz and Mair (1995) is under threat.

### 8.3 Empirical Observations and Theoretical Implications

Schattschneider (1983) famously noted that “the definition of the alternatives is the supreme instrument of power” (66). With respect to parties, the cartel party thesis makes the exact same argument. Parties essentially seek to survive by capturing electoral markets and controlling the terms of political competition. In their seminal 1995 work, Katz and Mair argue that the cartel is nearly monopolizing political space in most western democracies. They suggest that not only do they collude and tap into the state resources but they do so also with the aim to limit voters’ choices. They define alternatives solely based on membership to the cartel: both the centre-left and the centre-right identifying each other as the ‘true relevant’ alternative while ignoring other political parties. The radical-right are identified as insignificant, racist, and Eurosceptic. However, the radical-left is also dismissed with much of the same attitude; the Five Star Movement and SYRIZA were both portrayed by mainstream European politicians as a nuisance, threatening the current system and Eurosceptic even though at least in the latter case (and increasingly in the second as well) these parties are clearly not. Often, many of these parties are labelled populist although the term itself is rarely fully clarified. It is used, often with the implication that populism is a *disingenuous* attempt to portray oneself as a hero of the people against the political elite. Nonetheless, in light of the rise of anti-establishment parties which this dissertation focuses on, a number of empirical observations are being made and a few theoretical propositions can be drawn from that which contribute to previous conceptualizations of western party systems.

Firstly, I have argued that the outliers Katz and Mair (1995) identify as threatening the cartel (24) have in fact only intensified during the first part of the 21<sup>st</sup> century to the point that they are hardly outliers on the fringes of politics. Many have come to take third or even second place in the party system with one first case in 2015 of a former outsider taking power.

Consequently, this dissertation has argued that at the same time as outsiders rise, the established mainstream parties are still present and definitely still monopolize the allocation of state resources. The cartel has intensified since the cartel-party thesis was published in 1995 but as a result of this, cartel-parties during the last decade have also lost the monopoly over electoral markets and definitions of the alternatives. The party system is definitely no longer the cartel of twenty or thirty years ago with respect to voters' perceptions regarding their choice at the ballot box.

Secondly, the evolution of the cartel party system and the rise of the anti-establishment are not phenomena independent of each other. The rise of the anti-establishment is in fact a direct result of the cartel-party system. Borrowing from Lavau's (1969) study of the communist party in France during the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century, this thesis has put forth the concept of *tribune parties* to refer to the soup of increasingly heterogeneous but equally anti-establishment political parties that are forming but also making very significant gains and thus challenge the domination of the cartel in western party systems.

Thirdly, this dissertation has suggested that while ideologically different, there is a common feature of the tribune party family. This includes: a) a radical non-centrist ideological stance (be it on the left or right, authoritarian or libertarian dimensions); b) an

anti-establishment discourse, c) a commitment to representing specific societal classes; d) an aggressive discourse and behaviour towards political enemies, e) a transformative message that includes a commitment to direct democracy and f) a tendency to sometimes offer simplistic solutions to intricate societal issues.

Fourth, I have argued that a common feature of many (if not most) tribune anti-establishment political parties is that on economic issues they tend to be located left of centre. This is irrespective of actual political family (left-libertarian or radical-right). The reason for this may be due to the economic orthodox position of the cartel parties, namely the centre-left and right.

Finally, in terms of the dynamics between demand and supply, I have argued that structural arguments definitely do play a role. Perceptions on the economy, trust of mainstream parties, views of immigration and age are important determinants in anti-establishment party vote. However, I have also argued that the ability of agency – that is to say of these parties themselves to tap into this dissatisfaction and articulate an anti-establishment party message is at least just as important. In this regard the demand side tells half the story but it cannot explain why it is completely new parties rather than already existing ones which are the ones reaping the fruits of popular dissatisfaction. The argument has been that anti-establishment parties are successful particularly because of their anti-cartel and anti-mainstream discourse.

Ultimately, these empirical observations have theoretical implications that contribute to and refine the cartel-party thesis of Katz and Mair (1995). Specifically, they contribute to the question – what happens after the cartel – as well as who threatens the

cartel party system. The influential work of Katz and Mair (1995) ends with the warning that the protest vote sometimes taps “into more radical disaffection...espous[ing] a profoundly undemocratic and often xenophobic opposition to the consensus that now prevails in most of the western democracies...In effect, therefore, by operating as a cartel, by attempting to ensure that there are no clear ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ among the established alternatives and by exploiting their control of the state to generate resources that can be shared out among themselves, the cartel parties are often unwittingly providing precisely the ammunition with which the new protesters of the right can more effectively wage their wars” (24). Twenty years later, their concerns in 1995 prove more than valid. The radical-right has made significant strides; in some cases being replaced by even more extremist Nazi-like political parties. At the same time, perhaps, Katz and Mair give little credit to the radical-left which although almost inexistent in the mid-1990s and mid-2000s, it is beginning to make significant gains of its own. The result is a system of outsiders and insiders much like that of late-19<sup>th</sup> century and early 20<sup>th</sup> century Western Europe. While the insiders still attempt on keeping the cartel intact, the system cannot be referred to as a cartel-party system. Instead this dissertation argues that just as elite-based parties in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century led to a mass-party reaction so did cartel-parties in the late 20<sup>th</sup> century and early 21<sup>st</sup> century lead to a tribune party reaction, radical in ideology (whether left or right) and populist in terms of discourse.

#### **8.4. Outlook**

Looking forward, this dissertation suggests that a series of projections can be made with respect to modern western political systems in the early half of this century.

Firstly, as previously mentioned, it is the conclusion of this dissertation that the anti-establishment surge which is evident during the past decade is not a temporary feature or linked solely to the economic crisis of the late 2000s. It is a phenomenon that preceded the crisis and most likely will continue well into the present and subsequent decade.

Secondly, the cartel party has gone through a period of consolidation during the last two decades, however presently it shows signs that it may be entering a period of deterioration. The cartel controlled political competition and defined the alternatives. The control was exercised through a dilution of ideological debates, depolitization of issues and the capture of state finances. This largely exists even now however the control over the definition of alternatives is weathering away. Going forward, it is very likely that this trend will continue and that political competition may enter a more volatile and aggressive period when mainstream parties will have to share the political space with the tribune challengers.

Thirdly, it has been a strong implication of this thesis that the anti-establishment surge is not independent of the cartel-party system which still dominates current western democracies. On the contrary, it is a direct result and in direct response *to* it. As exemplified with the way in which the crisis was tackled by the mainstream or the way in which for instance the debt crisis in Greece was dealt with, the centrist parties do not just collude, but they engage in overt coalitions sharing the burden of implementing austerity. It is very likely that as the cartel will try to survive, the anti-establishment tribune party phenomenon will intensify as a result. Electoral battles will stop focusing on mainstream parties or involve outsider versus mainstream parties but rather politics and political

debates will increasingly have a *tribune versus patrician* undertone, one arguing for transformative change, the other for order.

Fourth and linked to this, the collusion between the mainstream has significant implications for the established parties themselves. The biggest losers out of this arrangement are not the centre-right since no party yet overtly challenges them from the economic-right. The losers are the centre-left which are pushed even further into the right-wing economic camp. Greece's PASOK is a telling example of what happens with the centre-left when it shifts so much to the right that it moves beyond the centre; the party trails now in seventh place at just 4.5% of the vote. The Greek case may possibly foreshadow the faith of social democrats elsewhere as well.

Fifth, the increasing success of the radical-right strand of tribune parties means that many are becoming invaluable for centrist parties when making coalitions. Even when they are not officially part of governing coalitions, radical-right parties support governments but do so conditionally. Often these conditions translate into policies aimed against immigration and this gradually translates into mainstream centre-right parties adopting some of the anti-immigrant discourse. Netherlands' increasingly stringent immigrant policies, Merkel's comments about the failure of multiculturalism or France's crackdown on Roma populations by governing parties are illustrative of this. Ten years ago this reaction from the mainstream was hardly conceivable yet with the rise of racist and anti-immigrant radical-right parties, their policies are visibly entering the mainstream. A possible consequence of this going forward is that the osmosis of anti-immigrant positions from radical-right to the centre-right may continue in future decades.

Sixth, as radical-right parties are mainstreamed and become co-opted by the established parties, they lose their anti-establishment tribunal credentials. Consequently, even more radical, sometimes outright extremist neo-Nazi parties take their place. Hungary's Jobbik and Greece's Golden Dawn are illustrative of this phenomenon. The latter's rise from close to 0.1% to 7% has been based on the radical-right joining the unpopular governing centre-right and centre-left coalition.

Seven, a regional concentration of certain types of anti-establishment parties may take place. All regions of Europe contain both the left-libertarian strand as well as the radical-right. However, in different regions of Europe different strands are stronger. The left-libertarian strand seems to have made gains especially in southern Europe, in the areas most affected by the austerity measures following the crisis. The radical-right seems to strengthen especially in Western and Northern Europe. In Central and Eastern European states, anti-establishment parties exist but the system is still strongly dominated by mainstream parties.

Going forward, this division may deepen the rift among EU member states between core states and periphery. For now, however, all these parties, whether radical-right or left have more in common with each other than the mainstream. France's National Front, for instance, famously cheered as ideologically opposed SYRIZA won the Greek 2015 election. This puzzled political commentators because these parties are considered complete opposites of each other. What this reveals, however, is the conscious anti-establishment identity which cuts across ideological divides for tribunal parties in western democracies. For the Front National this was almost a personal victory, because

one other anti-establishment party managed to win a national election – proving therefore that what was once thought of as impossible is now possible.

Finally, although hardly conceivable in the mid-2000s, the rise of anti-establishment tribune politics raises the question of what happens when these parties get to be in power. The past experience with mass-parties as well as Green parties perhaps here would be quite telling. The mass-party was in many ways the outsider of the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century. It was a party with strong societal links, a massive organization and a transformative message. Mass-parties changed the party system of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, after which they have changed themselves throughout the mid and late 20<sup>th</sup> century. The present Social Democrats and Christian Democrats are remnants of those parties. When in power, they have gradually abandoned their ambitious programmes, moderated their stance, insulated themselves from their original constituencies, mainstreamed and then became the cartel parties of the modern day. The story of the Greens is very similar as this party family did the same thing only within a shorter period of just ten-to-fifteen years.

When speaking of the sameness of states in foreign policy and the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, Kenneth Waltz (1979) remarked that “Chiliastic rulers occasionally come to power. In power, most of them quickly change their ways” (128). This can be argued of domestic policy as well. Radicals stop being so radical when they win elections. Defiantly they may attempt to enact change to some degree, however, the constraints of governance, international contexts and the new position of being in power (whereas previously they were far outside of it) change their calculations. Once again, the only example so far, SYRIZA is very illustrative of this. Prior to 2015, the party argued in

favour of exiting NATO, expelling American soldiers from their bases in Crete and most importantly, refusing to adhere to the bailout plan and austerity measures. The first policy they altered was that towards NATO and US bases even a few days before the election, stating that it was not in Greece's interests to actually quit NATO. In power, they watered down their anti-austerity position so that within two weeks they even accepted some of the privatization programs of the previous government.

In the case of the radical-right, watered down versions of anti-immigration policies are visible as well, especially among the more successful parties within this group. In this case, however socialization occurs both ways. The radical-right is mainstreaming while the essentially racist anti-immigrant and often anti-Islam message is entering the mainstream. Questioning multiculturalism is not only the realm of the radical-right as many centre-right politicians are adopting some of the discourse as well. What this larger phenomenon ultimately suggests is that the tribune anti-establishment surge against the mainstream today resembles the mass-party surge of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century and the Green surge of the 1980s. It betrays an endemic feature of western democracies which reveals a constant cleavage in society that has been transcending all others – the societal cleavage between rulers and ruled. The current system can be argued to have shifted from a solely *cartel-party system* to one of anti-establishment vs. establishment or *tribunes versus patricians*.

However, it can also be argued that despite the different periods in time of elite-dominated, mass-based, catch-all, cartel, or tribune-patrician competition, the western political system is characterized by a constant dialectic with the outsiders of yesterday becoming the establishment of today. This in turn leads to political spaces being left

vacant which new anti-establishment parties capitalize on, leading to renewed competition between new tribunes and new patricians.

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