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PRELUDE TO THE NAPOLEONIC WARS:
NAPOLEON'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD ENGLAND

by

Daniel Pierre-Antoine

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

Department of Political Science
Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
December 1997

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in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts

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Carleton University
January 22, 1998

Abstract

Using French foreign policy toward England prior to the onset of the Napoleonic wars as an illustration, this thesis demonstrates that the definition of a nation-state's identity depends on the existence and portrayal of an enemy which poses a security dilemma for the nation-state. The French Revolution of 1789 gave rise to a new set of ideas and a new form of state, a republic, which sought to separate itself philosophically and institutionally from the European states system. Under the leadership of Napoleon Bonaparte, Europe's monarchies were portrayed as evil regimes which attempted to undermine the achievements of the Revolution. It is this perception of threat and the insecurity it entailed that eventually caused France to declare war on its neighbours.

Acknowledgements

Any work of some extent is the product of many interactions and influences from many individuals. Nevertheless, only a few end up being acknowledged. I would like to thank Professor Jeremy Paltiel and Professor Simon Dalby, respectively my supervisor and second reader, for the guidance in the conduct of this research, and especially for the considerable leeway I was allowed at every step. As this thesis began as series of graduate seminar presentations, I would like thank my fellow graduate students for their advice and critiques. Finally, I extend my gratitude to my parents for having supported me in various ways since I undertook this work.

For my parents

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	1
PART ONE: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK	
CHAPTER ONE: The Self and the Other: Identity, Difference and Threat	18
Dialectic in the Making of Identity	20
Separating Subject and Object: Language, Representation and Difference	27
Difference, Uncertainty, Violence	37
CHAPTER TWO: The Self and the Other in IR: Territoriality, Morality and Violence	47
Statesmen as Subjects	49
Three Dimensions of Representation	54
<i>Representing Territoriality: Inside v. Outside</i>	54
<i>Representing Content: Ethical Self and Evil Other</i>	61
<i>Representing Danger and Threat: Ontologising Violence</i>	76
PART TWO: NAPOLEONIC FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD ENGLAND	
CHAPTER THREE: Napoleonic France and the Other	86
Reason and Revolution	88
Representing the Other Under Napoleon: The External Ramifications of Civil Strife	93
The State Above All: Belief and Love of Country as Citizenship	101
CHAPTER FOUR: Threat, Security and the Napoleonic Wars	115
France and the Idea of Security	116
States as Persons or the Impossibility of a France-England Contract	122
Diplomacy and War: The Rupture of the Peace of Amiens	128
<i>Establishing a balance of power</i>	130
<i>The question of prestige</i>	135
<i>The Success of Napoleonic Propaganda</i>	138
CONCLUSION	143
Bibliography	151

But the state in an individual, and negation is an essential component of individuality, thus even is a number of states join together as a family, this league, in its individuality, must generate opposition and create an enemy.

G. W. F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*

INTRODUCTION

The premise of this thesis is that the nation-state was a new form of collective identity. This identity emerged out of the Enlightenment ideas and was put into place politically by the leaders of the French Revolution. In particular, its instantiation in the realm of international relations was the brainchild of Napoleon Bonaparte. In Napoleon's eyes the distinctive identity of France as a nation was threatened by the states organised along the dynastic system. This very *difference* gave rise to a security dilemma which could only result in war.

To explore the question of identity along Enlightenment lines, the thesis will rely on the ideas of Georg Friedrich Hegel. Hegel's concept of identity rests on the dichotomy of Self and Other—a dichotomy which gives rise to consciousness and emerges in the course of conflict. This insight as applied to the rise of the nation in revolutionary France is what the author sees as the source of conflict in the Napoleonic Wars. Post-structuralist analysis has provided a ready critique of the Self-Other dichotomy in international relations which is particularly apposite for the analysis of this conflicts.

While Western scholarship generally acknowledges the significance of the French Revolution, realist theorists of international relations deny that the emergence of the nation-state changed the causes of war in international relations.

In his *War and Change in World Politics*, Robert Gilpin asserts that “the fundamental nature of international relations has *not* changed over the millennia. International relations continue to be a recurring struggle for wealth and power among independent actors in a state of anarchy” (Gilpin 1981: 7. My emphasis). Yet, the nation-state that emerged as a result of the French Revolution contrasted sharply with its European contemporaries. In the field of international relations the French Revolution stands out as a fundamental watershed because of the change in the nature of the wars which followed it.

France had been at war with its European neighbours for decades prior to the events of 1789 and it was not until 1802 that the conflicts opposing it to other European states would come to an end with the signing of the Treaty of Amiens with England. The peace of Amiens was short-lived however. In 1803, barely one and one half years after the treaty, France declared war on England and embarked on what has been called the Napoleonic Wars. In terms of intensity and duration, this conflict was unprecedented and involved every major European power at one point or another in the course of the twelve years that it lasted. The explications hitherto provided by international relations scholars have remained confined within the realist paradigm of international relations theory which stresses the role of the state as main actor in world politics. A brief review of the major orientations taken by international relations theorists is therefore required to determine

whether or not they are adequate to explain the occurrence of the Napoleonic Wars.

For Hans Morgenthau, the main objective of states is the acquisition of enough power in order to deter any threat which other states may pose the state whose foreign policy we are considering. Using his balance of power model, the situation in France after the Revolution is one where the republic is confronted to shifting alliances and where England is the main opponent while continental states serve as balancers. The end of the fighting in 1801 and 1802 is the establishment of an acceptable balance of power where France and its neighbours mutually agree—through the peace treaties—that war is no longer desirable or no longer needed. In fact, Morgenthau recognised that before the Napoleonic Wars there existed a balance of power in Europe (Morgenthau 1978: 392). But according to him, it was nationalism that was the drive behind Bonaparte's declaration of war in 1803:

The idea of nationalism, evoked by the French Revolution and carried by the Napoleonic conquests through Europe, challenged the principle of dynastic legitimacy which had been the organising principle of the modern state system and was still the foundation of the peace settlement of 1815. (ibid.)

The role of nationalism receive only token mention. What is more, the author does not discuss the role of ideas—the Enlightenment—in giving rise to the phenomenon that he blames for the wars. Morgenthau does not acknowledge that

the French nation as such did not exist prior to the French Revolution. In other words, the nation-state as subject and actor was non-existent. The Napoleonic Wars were therefore not the mere continuation of previous wars begun by French monarchs. These wars had in effect already come to an end in 1802. The Napoleonic Wars had different causes.

In his *Anarchical Society*, Hedley Bull (1995) is concerned with order in world politics. He attempts to determine how order can be maintained in the environment so that threats to states may be minimised. Bull argues that states in the states system are much like individuals in a society, hence the concept of society of states. It follows from this that each state is an individual person likely to clash with other individual unless order is imposed to prevent this from happening. In an actual society of individuals, the order required arises with the social contract where individuals abandon at least part of their freedom so that the state can act on their behalf for the benefit of all.

In world politics, however, no such power arises. The states that compose the society of states do not abandon their individual sovereignty to a supra-national entity. But are states true “persons”? In Bull’s theory, states are precisely considered as such; they are physical units. Their internal dynamic is not considered. The state is a collective entity whose origin is, I maintain, relevant to the understanding of international relations and war. The post-revolutionary civil war in France attested to the fact that the collectivity had not yet taken form; it was only in the process

of taking shape and unifying itself. Thus to understand international relations, we need to examine how nations as individuals and persons have come to “exist” in the first place.

Hedley Bull’s work shares one other crucial characteristic with other theories of the realist paradigm: it does not explain why the state *must* be preserved at all cost. For preserving one’s state and being willing to die in its defence make little sense unless the state has a unique character which other states do not have. This uniqueness is what constitutes the identity of the state under consideration. Its security is thus the security of the way of life of those who inhabit it. Without a prior conceptualisation of the state, it remains difficult to see why war is necessary.

Raymond Aron writes that the principle behind the quest for power and independence is the same before and after the Revolution. “La monarchie française, la première, a passionnément voulu la totale indépendance, passionnément refusé toute soumission à l’Empire. Les peuples ont voulu l’indépendance dont l’État national a été l’expression” (Aron 1962: 142). Here again, we do not know why the people of France would collectively want to preserve its independence. Neither do we know how France has gone from the monarchy where sovereignty was invested in the monarch to republicanism where it is invested in the people.

Gilpin writes that “an international system is established for the same reason that any social or political system is created; actors enter social relations and create social structures in order to advance particular sets of political, economic, and

other types interests” (Gilpin 1981: 9). The international system is therefore a terrain where states relate to one another and compete for the wealth and power necessary to their security. Gilpin thus explains the Napoleonic Wars by the relative increase of England’s economic capabilities compared to those of France following the English industrial revolution (ibid.: 134). According to him, Bonaparte merely reacted to the perceived disequilibrium and declared a preemptive war (ibid.: 134-135).

But the social structures Gilpin evokes in the second of the above citations are not the structures peculiar to individual states; they are the various ways the states system is structured depending on who is the hegemon. His level of analysis is the same “society of states” as the one discussed by Bull and it does not tell much about the way states themselves are structured. Had Gilpin looked inside the “black box” states, he might have discovered that the values preached inside one of them may differ from those preached inside all other states. This, in turn, causes a radical estrangement and mistrust of the state vis-à-vis the others that compose the system.

It is because of the incompatibilities of state claims to truth and justice that any disequilibrium can be a threat to a state’s survival. To find out if such competing claims exist and why they appear threatening, one must look inside the state and study its internal dynamic and how it relates to the environment. Put

differently, how does this state situate itself in relation to other and how does deal with them?

A somewhat more satisfying reading of the link between the French Revolution and war is that proposed by Stephen Walt (1996). In his study, Walt writes that the French Revolution was based on four principles. The first was reason and natural law; the second, the increasingly recognised lack of legitimacy of the absolutist state; the third, the prior unity of France thanks to language, territory, and blood; the fourth, the moral dimension, the virtue preached by the revolutionaries (ibid.: 50-51). Walt cites the Abbé Siéyès's work on the Third Estate to point to the existence of a kind of proto-nation that the Revolution would eventually bring into full existence. At the same, as the nation realises itself, the individuation of the nation-state leads to war because myths about others arise out of the revolutionary ideology and cause "spirals of suspicion" about their possible behaviour (See ibid.: 44. Fig. 1).

While the introduction of "myth" and "suspicion" is very interesting, two elements are striking in Walt's study of the revolutionary wars. The first is that he considers the French Revolution as a country-wide revolution because revolutionary activity appeared in various regions at once (ibid.: 53-54) and as a mass revolution because of appeal to language, territory, and blood. While revolutionary activity did occur in various regional centres, it can hardly be argued that France was culturally unified before the Revolution. Linguistically, and to a

lesser extent, ethnically, it was quite fragmented. The second element is more surprising, perhaps even shocking. The analysis covers the revolutionary wars from 1789 to 1799. Given the scope of the Napoleonic Wars and their justification as a necessity for the defence of the republic in France, they ought to have been included. They were not. Apparently, for Walt, the next conflict had nothing anymore to do with the republican ideal. Yet, Bonaparte's discourse which will be studied below points in this direction.

To problematise the state as the unit of analysis of international relations and provide a different reading of the causes of war, this thesis will explicate the occurrence and intensity of the Napoleonic Wars of 1803-1815 by the process whereby France's identity as a nation-state was constructed and actualised by its élites after the French Revolution. More specifically, I will argue that the construction of the national identity was a dialectical process which required to concomitant construction of an enemy-Other whose mere existence entailed a security dilemma for the self-conscious subjectivity in emergence. Because of the profoundly antithetical and adversarial nature of the Self-Other relationship between France and England, the resolution of the dialectic passed, as a matter of necessity, through violence and war.

From a theoretical point of view, two elements will be shown to emerge from the events of this period. First, that the French Revolution as a world-

historical event was grounded in a specific intellectual current. It was the Enlightenment that supplied the critique of the previous Christian paradigm and proposed an alternative to it in the form of the nation-state. Second, the thesis will show that the nation-state of which revolutionary France is a prime example is a subjectivity on the world scene that needs an object and an Other to define its identity and create its unity. Using Hegel, then, I will argue that the quest for identity requires a Self-Other dialectic through which identity is developed in the subject.

But the identity of the subject implies that the object under consideration is different from the subject who is ascertaining it. Without difference, identity simply could not emerge. Difference, however, can be more or less important. What matters is the extent to which subject and object, Self and Other, are different. Is difference so stark that the respective conceptions of the Self and the Other are incommensurable and must lead to violence? In this case, what were the differences between France and England that made war inevitable in the end?

I will argue that the answer to this resides in the outlook Napoleon Bonaparte had on the world and in what he saw in France and in other states. Bonaparte was a product of the French Revolution and of the ideas that had presided over it. From Rousseau, he took the key concept of the unity of the nation and the quasi-sacred character of its sovereignty. The Enlightenment had provided the framework for understanding and action, a new and coherent set of

ideas according to which communities and the world could be reconceptualised and remade. In stark contrast to the republican regime of France, the rest of Europe was still living under a backward monarchical rule; the same rule the French had overthrown in 1789 because it was seen as irrational and arbitrary. The Revolution had been the consequence of a prior intellectual revolution and the republic was the actualisation of ideas which were radically new.

But despite all the debates about individual wills merging into a the general will of the nation being born of the social contract, it remains that the path to unity is not as smooth as Rousseau had intended or hoped it to be. Bonaparte's rule would at times resemble that of Hobbes's Leviathan although the development of a sense of identity in the people of France was precisely supposed to make this unnecessary in so far as popular support would converge toward the republican institutions.

Ideas are the product of only a few people, at least initially. It is when they spread and when they are accepted by others that they influence the course of human history. Though ideas may be said to be the drive behind history, they do not emerge in every individual mind at the same time. Consequently, they require an agent to actualise them. On occasion, the philosopher is the agent in that he or she is also a state official—this was John Locke's case in England. On other occasions, the philosopher may just be the proponent of ideas which will be appropriated by others who will implement them. The Enlightenment challenged

the role of God in creating the world and the primacy of the monarch as his minister on Earth and agent in secular life. "Man" is no longer subjected to outside forces that transcend and guide him. Agency now rest in human beings provided they have a consciousness of their individuality and of their capacity to influence the world.

The interest of Hegel's dialectic is that it accounts for the development of self-consciousness in the subject in the course of her relation with the object. Consequently, his dialectical method is useful to understand the situation in which Napoleon Bonaparte found himself. As he came across Rousseau, he began to see the world through the Enlightenment's eyes. Bonaparte acquired a self-consciousness that must be transmitted to other individuals in order to consolidate the collectivity born in 1789. The development of the self-consciousness of the nation demands that the subject play an active role in transmitting her interpretation and knowledge of the world and of the Other so that every individual shares the same outlook. In France, Bonaparte became the individual subject who undertook the realisation of the Enlightenment's idea of the nation in the republic. Admittedly, the republic came into being in 1789, but the government's direct control was limited to the capital. The ongoing civil war meant that the country was not yet unified ideologically and politically. The various governments that succeeded one another in the decade following the

Revolution had been unable to articulate the idea convincingly and realise it. This is what Bonaparte was able to do.

It is by convincing the masses that ideas are just and by fostering an identification of the people with the institutions which embody them that it becomes possible to call upon them to make the sacrifices entailed by total war. The age of total war began with the French Revolution and the nation-state. In the 1910s and the 1940s, as in the early eighteenth century, the resort to mass levies undoubtedly required a strong prior attachment of the citizens to their nation. Though the wars of 1914-1918 and 1939-1945 have been the first to be called world wars and total wars, many of their characteristics resembled those of the Napoleonic Wars that took place more than a century earlier. In each of the two world wars, the parties to the conflict resorted to conscription to man the army while the rest of society had to be rationed and mobilised in a quasi-military manner to support the fighting soldiers. But it was in the Napoleonic Wars that for the first time the nation took up arms in this fashion and for such an extended period of time.

In so far as it does not theorise the state, traditional international relations theory does not provide a reading of the sources of this attachment and of the presumed unity of the nation. Rather, the internal cohesion of nation-state is taken to be a *fait accompli* to be reckoned with and never problematised. For Hegel,

reason was realised in the nation-state but how this has been achieved remains unknown.

It is in the passage from individual self-consciousness of a few to the collective self-consciousness of the nation that post-structuralism and its analysis of language become useful. Though Hegel mentioned language as a means whereby a subject expresses an idea, he did not give an account of the caveats inherent in the subject's reasoning. The use of post-structuralism is thus meant to raise several issues and problems. First, it shows that discourse and language are crucial tools in gathering support for specific institutions and policies. Second, it demonstrates that the use of reason as a means to truth causes the rational subject to look at herself and at the world as objective realities which can be discovered provided that the method is adequate. Third, it shows that the position occupied by the subject is, from her own point of view, the ethical one in as much as she has attained the Absolute. Fourth, post-structuralism serves to expose the link between evil and danger because evil individuals and evil states cannot be trusted. There exists a security dilemma entailed by the existence of the evil Other whose resolution passes through violence when differences cannot be reconciled.

After the Revolution, France was a subject in emergence under the leadership of the rational revolutionaries and under Napoleon Bonaparte after 1799. But the avowed goal was to unify France under a given set of laws and on a given territory; it was necessary to identify the sources of the threats to unity.

Rather than looking at the people of France as internally divided along ideological lines for group-based and perhaps legitimate reasons, Napoleon looked at it as being subverted by outside forces attached to the *ancien régime*'s world view, as though the internal problems of France were mainly due to England's intervention.

Putting an end to the civil war in France was a major element of Bonaparte's programme along with providing for a peaceful environment in Europe. The irony is that even when the French government succeeded in putting an end to civil war not long after Napoleon took power in 1799, the accusations against England did not cease. France had negotiated peace with all European powers and with England with the Treaty of Amiens in 1802. In short, all the aims Bonaparte had set to himself had been reached. In spite of this, France kept looking for potential threats and English foreign policy provided other opportunities for Napoleon to depict England as a permanent danger looming over France. All aspects of English behaviour were portrayed as attempts to undermine the political or economic security and stability of France so that the former dynasty could be restored to power and France be re-included in the previous European states system.

War resumed because France and England continued to be ruled according to different paradigms. As there was no homogenisation of the European environment, the dialectic which opposed republican France to the other states did not cease to operate. England remained essentially evil in that it still did not share

France's values. According to Bonaparte, England refuse to grant to the republic the independence and security to which it was entitled.

The explicate the resumption of war in 1803 and the nature of total war, it is necessary to show how the Enlightenment allowed statesmen to reconceptualise the states they were leading and how the sovereign territorial nation-state became the material product of the Enlightenment as it replaced the previous paradigm and its institutional structure by new ones. In order to do this, the work will be divided in four chapters. Chapter one will expound the logic of the dialectic of subject and object in the course of the development of the subject's self-consciousness. I will argue that the physical and moral separation of the Self and the Other requires the representation of difference and evil embodied by the Other. I will then show that the complete realisation and triumph of the Self can only come about if she subsumes or subdues the Other through violent means.

Using post-structural international relations scholarship, chapter two will show how the construction of the sovereign modern nation-state requires the active participation of the head of state in order to establish the framework according to which the outside world is to be apprehended. I will therefore discuss the three dimensions of representation needed and used by governments to conceptualise the sovereign nation-state: territoriality, morality, and the role of danger.

Chapters three and four will constitute the application of the preceding conceptual framework to the case of France under the leadership of Napoleon Bonaparte from 1799 to 1803. Chapter three will highlight the role of Napoleon as a hero and rational subject who saw it as his duty to help realise the ideas of the Revolution by consolidating the gains of 1789 and developing in the people of France a strong sense of identification with the republic. I will demonstrate that this was achieved by representing England and Europe's monarchies as the sources of France's internal woes since 1789, that it was England which sought to undermine the achievements of the Revolution to restore the Bourbon dynasty to power in France.

Chapter four will outline the nature of the security dilemma as it was perceived by France. In it, I will argue that although France had succeeded in making peace with all its enemies of the 1790s, Bonaparte interpreted the foreign policy behaviour of England and its allies as shirking from the peace treaties that had been signed with France in 1801 and 1802. There existed a fundamental mistrust of England that derived directly from its construction as France's Other. This mistrust led to a perpetual sense of threat on the part of France that rendered compromise and peace impossible, hence the resumption of war in 1803.

PART ONE: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

CHAPTER ONE

The Self and the Other: Identity, Difference and Threat

The purpose of this chapter is to show that the dialectic of the Self and the Other in the course of defining one's identity results in the representation of the Other as evil and that it provides the ontological determinants of the violence that eventually erupts whereby the Self attains the Absolute by subsuming its Other or simply eliminating it.

The first section will thus expose the role of the Hegelian dialectic in the making of the Self's identity. I will argue that the development of self-consciousness requires the identification of other beings or objects that are the negative reflection of the Self. For Hegel, absolute self-consciousness and self-certainty required the eventual disappearance of the Other or the incorporation of its elements in the Self. Only then would the Self obtain confirmation that she is the Absolute.

However, I am here concerned not simply with individual minds in search of self-consciousness. I am concerned with the development of the collective consciousness and identity of the nation-state. Hegel did argue that the phenomenology of the spirit found its realisation in the nation-state (Hegel 1953, 1991) but he did not provide a detailed account of the process whereby an

individual reasoning subject could rally other individuals to its views to give rise to a collective body of thought.

The second section will therefore call on post-structural scholarship to demonstrate how collective identities are developed under the leadership of rational *élites* acting as self-positing subjects that have gone through the process Hegel described with regard to individual spirits. The *élites* of a society provide collective representations and self-consciousness of a group by counterpoising it to other collectivities being constructed in the process. It is through public discourse that identity and difference are established and maintained in order to keep one's superior collectivity separate from other inferior collectivities.

Finally, using Nietzsche, I will show that the identification of difference embodied by the Other poses a psychological and physical security dilemma to the Self which leads her to the exercise of violence to resolve it. There exists a psychological security dilemma because as the Self is conscious of its own existence, she is also conscious of the existence of others who are different and therefore cast doubt on its certainty of being the Absolute. In other words, what the Other is and what she stands for enjoys some measure legitimacy by virtue of her mere existence.

The physical security dilemma of the Self emerges out of the fact that the Other, too, is undergoing a process of self-identification which requires confrontation. Whereas for Hegel there could only be one subject—i.e. the rational

one—, for Nietzsche any individual or group can be subject so long as she does develop consciousness. The weak and oppressed may rise to this status as in the case of the French Revolutionaries and become the aggressor. Complete self-realisation requires the subduing of the Other.

Dialectic in the Making of Identity

For Hegel, Being which the mere presence of an idea or body is a simple relation of individuals with themselves (Hegel 1977: 162) in the sense that it does not take into account other individuals who may exist in the environment. Similarly, a state may be present as a territorial unit even if it is oblivious of other political communities that surround it. The social contract as the founding act of a nation-state ensures that the constituents are aware of the creation of a body politic based on certain principles set forth in the constitution. From the standpoint of the state, there is no doubt as to the fact that the people have entered a contract willfully which resulted in a constitution setting forth particular principles and providing the nation with a *national* government with authority over a determined territorial space.

However, with the creation of the *national* territory governed according to *national* values goes the exclusion of those who were not parties to the social contract. This poses a unique problem in international relations in that the

constituted state is not the only Being. Outside the borders that it defined for itself, there remain other forms of political communities which may or may not share the same principles as the nation-state, the subject through whose eyes we are looking at the world.

Indeed, the territories outside the confines of the nation-state also *are* in themselves even if they do not have formal relations with the nation-state/subject. It is the acknowledgment and the ascertainment of the essence of the objects and persons of the environment that will define the subject's identity. The establishment of an identity-difference dichotomy is what allows the Self to go from Being in herself to Existence. All Beings do not have a consciousness of their own existence; this consciousness must be developed through contacts with others. For Hegel, one can speak of Existence only when one enters in relation with other Beings. It is when the individual enters in relations with other individuals that she gets a sense of her own identity and what she stands for.

But relating to someone else implies determining whether she is the same or different. When difference is observed, the individual knows what her Essence is compared to the other. One's Essence is determined not by the individual reflecting on herself, but rather by reflecting on herself *and* the other *while* seeing herself involved in a relation with the other person. In the words of Hegel: "The point of view given by the Essence is in general the standpoint of 'Reflection'" and it is precisely to this reflection that we proceed when

we reflect, or think upon an object; for here we want to know the object, not in its immediacy but as a derivative or mediated. The problem of philosophy is often represented as ascertainment of the essence of things: a phrase which only means that things, instead of being left in their immediacy [as Being], must be shown to be mediated by, or based upon, something else. (Hegel 1975: 163)

If in the process of ascertaining the essence of things or individuals Difference is acknowledged, Identity emerges: the individual is what she is because she is not like the others (Hegel 1975: 167). In Hegel, the opposition of the Self and the Other answers the demands of rational necessity. As Charles Taylor (1979: 32) argues, the dialectic is not a product of a particular set of circumstances that pit one individual against another. In the process of identity formation of each individual, the opposition corresponds to a functional necessity without which identity and the sense of Absolute and truth could not be reached by the subject; in fact the subject could not even exist as subject.

It follows from this that any subject—or anyone aspiring to this status—will have to create her object if she is to establish her own Existence (as opposed to merely Being) and develop self-consciousness. The realisation of one's consciousness requires the struggle against the Other and her eventual death (*sic*). The Self and the Other "must engage in this struggle, for they must raise their certainty of being *for themselves* to truth, both in the case of the other and in their

own case." (Hegel 1977: 114) Knowledge implies that we know what and who we are and what and who the others are. Knowledge is a quest for (self-)certainty. Barring the extinction of the Other, her inclusion in the Self's framework is the only way to resolve the dilemma and reach a synthesis. So long as this synthesis has not yet been achieved

[t]hey are, *for each other*, shapes of consciousness which have not yet accomplished the movement of absolute abstraction, of rooting out all immediate being, and of being merely the purely negative being of self-identical consciousness; in other words, they have not yet exposed themselves to each other in the form of pure being-for-self, or as self-consciousness. Each is indeed certain of its own self, but not of the other, and therefore its own self-certainty still has no truth. (Hegel 1977: 113)

In Hegel's thought the Self and the Other mutually come to recognise each other's existence and the dialectic in which they are involved and seek to realise their individuation by superseding their Other. While it points to the role of the dialectical relationship in defining identity, it does not address directly the issue of superiority-inferiority or good-evil during the dialectical process from the point of view of *one* actor. Rather, truth is something that is in the process of being reached but has not yet been attained; it is when one of the parties involved has superseded the other that the victor knows for a fact that she has reached the Absolute.

Yet even if this supreme stage is not reached at the moment, Reason and the scientific approach as a means of inquiry insures the attainment of scientific, hence true, conclusions. Hegel writes: "What enables things to be intelligently apprehended [Reason] is more important than the rest of the sensuous properties which, of course, the thing itself cannot dispense with, but which a consciousness can do without." (Hegel 1977: 148) It is necessary to conceptualise objects to apprehend them. They are rendered into a Notion which is counterpoised and compared to other notions, and more specifically to the Self's conception of truth. The expected result of this investigation is the knowledge of one's Essence and the knowledge of the Other's Essence. In so far as the Absolute manifests itself in individual form, "the Absolute is the process of individuation. Consequently, the Absolute is not separate from but identical with itself as the differentiated individuals." (Rosen 1974: 62)

In identity formation, the stress on comparison and difference provokes a separation of the subject and the object whereby the subject comes to an understanding of the world (the objects) that surrounds her:

The *differentiae* enable cognition to distinguish one thing from another; but on the other hand, it is not the unessential aspect of things that has to be known, but that characteristic whereby the things themselves *break loose* from the general continuity of being as such, *separate* themselves from others, and are explicitly *for themselves*. (Hegel 1977: 149)

In the context of the Enlightenment, the individuation of the subject—her breaking loose from the "general continuity"—takes place at the expense of the previous philosophical-political paradigm of Christianity being contested by the Enlightenment. The Christian totality which preceded the nation-state is discovered to be a collection of individuals independent of one another and able to establish their own individual existence by way of reason.¹

Individuals (and things) are to be considered in their individuality with their own characteristics. From the point of view of any one person, the crucial idea is to separate *oneself* from the world "out there," to develop one's self-consciousness and become the subject. Once the individual has attained self-consciousness, she has reached the truth and she has moved beyond the dialectic (Kelly 1993). The ultimate stage of self-consciousness is the Absolute in that it has proceeded from a rational approach in ascertaining the world. As truth cannot be relative in reason, the one subject who *knows* is the Absolute whereas the object (the Other) is essentially inferior to the subject in so far as she does not (yet) know the truth.

According to Hegel, this Absolute (the self-conscious Spirit) was embodied by the "modern" nation-state (Hegel 1953) which is here personified by the French Republic. In the making of history, states rise and decline. As states are the embodiment of successive forms of consciousness until the Absolute is reached,

¹ Think for instance of Descartes' *cogito ergo sum*.

those which have made it to a higher level of consciousness supplant those which belong to an inferior level until the Absolute is attained by one last form of state.

When one given state is the Absolute, the realisation of Reason in history must, of necessity, pass through the perpetuation of the state which embodies it. But, as social contract theorists have argued (Hobbes 1994; Locke 1960; Rousseau 1976), the main objective of state-building is to guarantee the welfare of their citizenry against the state of nature which lie beyond national borders. Whether or not the nation which is the only one to have reached the Absolute wishes to export its model, it has at the very least to consolidate itself within, before it can be the vector of the realisation of Reason in the world. It is precisely the process of identity creation and consolidation for France's own sake that I am concerned with in this work. The representation of difference and threat outside France's borders and their eventual subduing serve to confirm France's status as embodiment of the Absolute. Although the rational nation-state that emerged from the Revolution was not the only state in the world, it had taken to first step to irremediably separate itself from its environment began developing its self-consciousness as new subject of history.

The Self-Other relationship which used to be based on reciprocal reflection where Self and Other were at the same time each other's opposite (at once subject and object) and each other's equal is replaced by a situation where only one of the

two becomes the subject endowed with reason and hence entitled to objectify her Other.

Separating Subject and Object: Language, Representation and Difference

The prime means of representing difference consists in language whose content and meaning is determined by the apprehending subject. "Words have meaning not simply because they come to be used to point or refer to certain things in the world or in the mind, but more fundamentally, because *they express or embody a certain kind of consciousness of ourselves and things*, peculiar to man as language user [...]" (Taylor 1975: 82. My emphasis).

In post-structural scholarship, dichotomies of identity-difference, reason-passion, good-evil, inside-outside are by no means essential constituents of an objective reality. Rather, they are human intellectual and discursive constructs which stem from the subject's logocentric perspective on the world. The ontology thus constructed is the product of the power wielded by the subject who constructs the object. In post-structuralism, the unequal power relations clearly position the subject above the object. Because the object is relatively powerless, we cannot say that she is also a subject who is creating her own Other for only one of the two possesses the power required to objectify the other. It is the unequal power distribution which makes (successful) representation possible.

According to Hegel, "man"'s capacity to reflect on himself and nature sets him apart from the rest of living beings. However, not every individual engages in the kind of thinking process Hegel expounded in his work when laying the foundations of self-consciousness and knowledge. Rather, as post-structuralism instructs us, state-building and social relations in general imply power relations whereby individuals or groups discursively set the boundaries of what is legitimate belief and acceptable behaviour. Being involved in a network of social relations implies a socialisation of the individual through the reiteration of the social structure by way of discourse and, if need be, by resorting to the state apparatus as a means of repression (Foucault 1975).

For Cochin (1979), the French Revolution was a victory of philosophy in the sense of freedom of thought. Though various factions existed, each struggling to assert diverging points of view, they had in common the idea of a "society" as a comprehensive socio-political structure aiming at the protection of its members (Cochin 1979: ch. 1). But the Enlightenment can hardly be separated from the search for absolutes. If the objective of the Enlightenment's philosophy is to unite the general and the relative² in a coherent whole taking the form of a nation and reason is the means to this end, then what is being sought is the exactly the Absolute Hegel wrote about. This is problematic in as much as in doing so,

² "unir le général et le relatif." See Cochin 1979: 94.

[o]n a d'abord pris pour une connaissance réelle, actuelle, ce qui, en réalité, était une connaissance métaphysique de l'être en tant qu'être. On a pris ensuite pour actuelle la connaissance scientifique qui connaît les êtres en tant qu'ils ne sont pas [...] (Cochin 1979: 100)

Proceeding in this manner, we seek to make real intellectual constructs which *are not* necessarily reality for they are merely the self-conscious subject's perception of reality. Qualities and defects are being attributed to the objectified Other on the basis of the subject's criteria. In the process of socialisation within a given polity, discourse serves as a transmission belt from the subject to her compatriots; the subject transmits her logocentric knowledge in order to socialise those individuals that are to be included into the group. The philosopher thus enlightens the society which was founded by the social contract by providing the "proper" conceptual framework to be used to apprehend oneself's existence and that of the world. The condition for belonging is the sense of identity of the citizens and their adhesion to the definition of Self and Other, right and wrong, etc. being represented in political discourse.

With the Enlightenment and the new-found self-consciousness of the subject, language becomes a tool in the representation and the making of reality. Chomsky argues that "when we turn to the history of study and speculation concerning the nature of mind, and more specifically, the nature of human language, our attention quite naturally comes to focus on the seventeenth century

as the 'century of genius'" (Chomsky 1972: 5) where language became more than just an expression of the mind; it also *engendered a reality* in a way peculiar to humans. For Juan Huarte, "[t]here is in man two generative potentialities: one he has in common with animals and plants, and another that pertains to the realm of spirituality, God, and the angels."³ (Huarte 1930: 41) While the first generative potentiality refers to physical reproduction, it is to the second that Hegel referred to when claiming that the totally self-conscious rational subject arrives at a stage of absolute knowledge and truth. But as Huarte remarks, knowledge is a generative potentiality which is impressed on people so that they may be able to function in the world (ibid.). The function of language is to reproduce the structure which has been mentally (read: rationally) conceived of. Science and reason are both theory and praxis in the making of society, identity and, by extension, difference.

One cannot separate mind from body. Though the mind is the site of self-consciousness, it is the body which expresses the mind; but expression implies the representation of an object which is outside the self-conscious mind itself (Derrida 1967b). Although the relationship between subject and object is dialectical in that they influence each other—indeed, they cannot exist without each other—the fact remains that it is the subject's own ideal presuppositions which determine reality. The phenomena of expression, representation, and action proceed from the subject's mind's take on the world. The substance proceeds from the subject; there

³ My translation of "Hay en el hombre dos potencias generativas: una común con los brutos animales y plantas, y otra participante con las substancias espirituales, Dios y los ángeles."

is a reality only if there is a subject to ascertain it and make it real discursively: "we believe so firmly in our belief that for its sake we imagine 'truth', 'reality', 'substantiality' in general." (Nietsche 1967: 269).

For Derrida, ascertainment and representation is a soliloquy in which the subject is engaged. The attempts at representation which follow are patterned on the logocentric conceptions of the self-conscious mind which spill over into discourse and representation. The subject who apprehends nature sees her own presence and the presence of the objects to be known as Existence. As existing objects, they present themselves to the inquiring mind; but to the non-inquiring mind—the members of the society whose identity is in the making—they have to be represented by the subject as a reality to be recognised and accepted as such.

There is much to say about the fact that the native unity of the voice and writing is prescriptive. Arche-speech is writing because it is a law. A natural law. The beginning word is understood, in the intimacy of self-presence, as the voice of the other and as commandment. (Derrida 1976: 13).

Modern discourse prescribes the use of certain intellectual categories with which reality is to be apprehended and truth discovered. The concepts used by the subject to describe and represent the objectified nature are the grammar which has to be used to represent it. The rules of investigation and the proper approach are already mastered by the subject but they are still absent from the minds of those whose identity has not yet been defined. The conceptual framework of modernity

is the deep structure of the language (Huck 1995) to which one must conform in order not to be identified as a stranger within one's own political space. As with any language, grammar is being taught through daily social interactions and through politics in so far as state policy and political discourse seek to reproduce the model citizen who will carry on the legacy of the state's founders. The subject's will is transposed into its discourse in as much as it determines how things should be represented and what the attitude toward them should be. The subject determines what the proper analysis is, what words can and cannot be used to express her idea of the world.

In *Writing and Difference* (1967a), Derrida contends that in the representative scheme that the play is, actors and director are at the service of the subject's logocentric representation of nature. They do not participate in the writing of reality for they follow a script drawn up by the higher authority of the self-conscious reasoning mind. The spectators (the people) are being fed a form of knowledge rather than participate in its elaboration because the author's script does not allow for a different interpretation and representation. Instead, the structure of the language used by the author is "comme une chose littéraire [...] entendue cette fois, ou du moins pratiquée, *à la lettre*" (Derrida 1967a: 28. Emphasis in the text). Spectators and actors are to respect the author's directions *to the letter*, that is, as *she* intended them.

At the heart of the issue is the difference between actors and spectators at the time of the representation. It resides in the fact that one set of people (the actors) has already adhered to the subject's view and is performing it. The other group (the spectators) is in the process of adhering to it, provided that it internalises the subject's ideas and identify with the community in formation.

The building of a sense of identity as part of the nation involves the repetition of acts whose purpose is that of the rational subject who determines how things ought to be: the unity of the group is constructed by making uniform the behaviour of its members (Butler 1990). Not adhering to the principles, values, and code of behaviour can only be done at the risk of being ostracised socially as an individual who speaks a foreign language. What is sought is a convergence of the multiplicity of identities into a single supra-identity: citizenship in the nation-state and the unconditional adhesion to its principles. For Marcuse, political rhetoric is the language of total administration where

[t]he reader or listener is expected to associate (and does associate) with them [i.e. the images conveyed by the discourse] a fixated structure of institutions, attitudes, aspirations and he is expected to react in a fixated, specific manner. [...] It does not demonstrate and explain—it communicates decision, dictum, command. Where it defines, the definition becomes 'separation of good from evil'; it establishes unquestionable rights and wrongs, and one value as justification of another value. (Marcuse 1964: 91, 101)

For Foucault (1988: 57-67), when one looks at a statesman actions, one can see how he perceives his own role with regard to the people he is governing. Foucault contends that the political leader plays the role of a shepherd who guides a flock. The decay of the Christian universalistic paradigm led successively to atomism and then to the nation-state as the preferred form of political organisation. Atomism is overcome because of the leader's role in channeling individuals into a set of political institutions that embody particular conceptions of truth. The political leader is a guide who sees his role as a duty to be performed for the sake of the triumph of virtue. As the sole possessor of this virtue, he sets the boundaries of and promotes a self-consciousness of the people akin to the one he, as *ego cogitans*, has presumably achieved. The state apparatus and its policies are a means to this end (ibid.: 73).

As was said in reference to Cochin's view of the French Revolution, Bastille Day could very be considered victory of philosophy understood in terms of free speech and public debate with corresponding effects on the creation of the state's institutions. While there is no denying the reality of free speech, at the same time, one must reckon with the fact that the ways in which debates are cast limit their potential. As Foucault writes, what matters is that things get discussed but what is even more important is that we must

prendre en considération [...] *ceux* qui en parlent, les *lieux* [logos] et *points de vue* d'où on en parle, les *institutions* qui incitent à en parler, qui

emmagasinent et diffusent ce qu'on en dit, bref, le 'fait discursif', global, la 'mise en discours' [...]. (Foucault 1976: 20. My emphasis)

A debate which involves the repetition of the same verities over and over again does not provide for critical assessment of the ideas being discussed. While those verities may be contradictory as for instance a debate of Left and Right, they do not necessarily allow the participants or the audience to move forward in their own thinking, for crucial elements may be absent from both. The synthesis that is supposed to emerge from the confrontation of thesis and antithesis (see G. Dillon 1986) does not find its way in public discourse even if there is a social interaction between the debaters. The discussion of the same points of view in public debates make these points of view part of the discursive reality of given community. "A sign may be so constant that one can be sure of its accuracy;" (Foucault 1970: 58) the ideas thus expressed become constants to whose existence and repetition one may refer in order to assert that they are real. The recurrence of an idea in discourse that is a representation of a presumed reality is a form of empirical observation of the existence of this reality. As science is based on observation of "facts," when the facts have acquired a status of scientific truth by virtue of the empiricism of the observation, reality becomes fixed. For Foucault history and science become separated. Of course

there remains erudition, the perusal of written works, the interplay of their authors' opinions [but] *over and against this history, [...] are the confident*

judgments we are able to make by means of intuition and their serial connection. These and these alone constitute science [...]. (ibid.: 55-56. My emphasis)

The permanent reiteration under the leadership of the rational mind of the principles and ideas that underlie a given community serve to perpetuate its presence *in its current form* among others and its place in history (Derrida 1976).

Failure to assimilate the ideas and attitude and behave in the way deemed to be appropriate in one's society leads almost inevitably to exclusion in so far as one then constitutes a threat to body politic. In *Madness and Civilisation*, Michel Foucault (1972) argues that while deviant behaviour used to be judged against revealed moral and ethical norms, with the age of reason it is common sense as defined by the reasoning mind itself which became the reference to judge social behaviour. Failing to conform to what reason determines as the proper behaviour result in the institutionalisation of those identified as different (or *too* different) and hence dangerous for the health of society. Insanity is linked with unreason and the unreasonable ("les insensés") should therefore at the very least be excluded from the bulk of normal (read: rationally thinking) people which form society and, in the best cases, treated for their illness. It is reason and its proponents that set the standards of conduct. Any act which departs significantly from these standards is perceived to be threatening to the cohesion and the health of the moral community. Somehow, the abnormal people must be kept out of the public

sphere. Institutionalisation is here the prime means of isolating the unwanted individuals from the rest of society. Contacts between them and the community are reduced to a minimum for society cannot accommodate this difference within its own frame of reference.

Difference, Uncertainty, Violence

Situating oneself in the world as the apprehending subject serves another purpose besides simply discovering one's essence. The acquisition of knowledge answer the need for certainty by giving its possessor the tools to deal with the uncertainty entailed by Existence. Though each individual may be sure as to what she is, she realises that she has to relate to others. Reaching the Absolute supposes that what remains outside the subject's realm is not to be trusted in so far as it is not as virtuous as the subject herself. Knowledge permits to identify difference and the extent to which it is a threat to the preservation of oneself. Difference is the unknown, hence it is dangerous.

The Enlightenment is more than just an alternative way of looking at the universe. Its new method of producing knowledge – reason rather than revelation– provides a paradigm different from the Christian universalism that prevailed since the fall of the Roman empire. What was thought to be a seamless web of human beings belonging to a grand scheme is found to be a collection of individuals left to

own devices. In Christianity, life was above all a predicament to be overcome only in the afterlife. Penitence and contemplation, the withdrawal from the world (Roman Catholicism) or, on the contrary, active involvement in secular activities (Protestantism) were the surest paths to salvation and eternal rest (Weber 1965). For the Christians, the uncertainty of this world was to be evaded by the thought of a better eternal life after death. As the ultimate human capability, the new-found faith in the reasoning subject sought to overcome this predicament not in an elusive afterlife but in secular life.

The discovery of an infinite universe outside the Christian paradigm—or the realisation of the inadequacy of the latter—poses the problem of uncertainty in a different manner. The former references are no longer available to give a sense of purpose and direction to masses and élites alike. The thirst for and acquiring of knowledge of self and of others serves to preserve one's identity when faced with this infinite world, for the universe presents itself to the individual whether she wishes it or not (Held 1992). Modernity is the discovery of the infinite nature of the human world through reason and the discovery of uncertainty which the belief in God can no longer mitigate. The anarchy that lies around the subject must be tamed in order for her to insure her security as an individual. But since the world is no longer held together by a higher force, it has to be made by "man" himself. Reason is the key to an understanding—a mental ordering—of complexity and truth provides a blueprint according to which reality must be shaped. Knowledge

springs from a need for security induced by life itself. By creating categories in which objects are made to fit, the subject situates herself. She seeks to make reality true and durable by abolishing the false character of things which is mere appearance (Nietzsche 1967: 298).

But knowledge and reason flow not so much from a need to know as a need to subsume, to make the anarchy intelligible. Life seeks to know and to control: "Every drive is a kind of lust to rule; each one has its perspective that it would like to compel other drives to accept as a norm" (ibid.:267). Knowledge is a schematisation in view to impose a regularity on chaos (ibid.: 278).

With the Enlightenment, Christianity came to be identified with the arbitrary political power of spiritual leaders in secular life while the anarchical world could not be satisfactorily explained and let alone tamed by religion. Reason was considered as a bulwark against the arbitrary nature of the hitherto familiar political life and the uncertainty of the world in so far as it provides clear rules and institutions to deal with the reality it discovers.

But Nietzsche points out that the knowledge we seek using reason is merely a function of life for it is "improbable that our 'knowledge' should extend further than is strictly necessary for the preservation of life." (ibid.: 272) The perspective on the world adopted by the subject is a necessity from the point of view of her conservation *as an individual*. Consequently, the moral stand she takes on the world depends on whether or not this is likely to contribute to her preservation.

The exercise of power on the part of the subject is always in view of guaranteeing herself against perceived threats to her individuality.

It matters little whether the threat to the individual is real or not. The mind and the reason it is capable of are applied to discover a world which is deemed to be real by the Self. The difference she perceives is not simply an abstract threat; the mental construct of the Self who relates to the Other refers to an object whose existence is very real for the subject (Gron 1996). Though the belief may be impossible to demonstrate, the thought of a threat occupies the subject's mind.

The subject's belief in having reached the Absolute finds its expression in the subject's body through her own action. The active body of the Self is the seat of the thought and the physical being which carries out the subject's will. Opposite to the subject is the perceived threat that has its material expression in the physical existence of the Other which the Self has constructed in the process of developing her self-consciousness. The thought entertained by the subject produces at the very least an uncertainty which can get inflated into a threat in as much as it belongs to the realm of the unknown. In the face of complexity, the subject "enters into a labyrinth, he multiplies a thousandfold the dangers which life brings with it" and loses his way in the process (Nietzsche 1966: 41). The security dilemma that faces the Self becomes quite literally an existential question that can be resolved only through violent means.

Since contact with the outside is inevitable, difference and novelty are bound to be encountered by the Self. For Nietzsche, what is new to one's eye shocks the individual:

Our eye finds it more comfortable to respond to a given stimulus by reproducing once more an image that it has produced many times before, instead of registering what is different and new in an impression. [...] What is *new* finds our senses, too, *hostile*, and *reluctant*. (Nietzsche 1966: 105. My emphasis)

Confronted with difference, the Self reaffirms her sense of identity and virtue against this Other rather than revise her own conception of reality. The latter would imply the questioning of the accuracy of her knowledge of self and hence, of the Absolute. Though one may invoke morality and call for love of the neighbour to circumvent difference,

'love of the neighbour' is always something secondary, partly conventional and arbitrary-illusory in relation to *fear of the neighbour*. After the structure of society is fixed on the whole and seems secure against external dangers, it is fear of the neighbour that again creates new perspectives of moral valuation. (ibid.: 113. Emphasis in the text)

The sense of identity is reinforced when to each object, the "good" people ascribes a value (Nietzsche 1956: 160) thereby creating a hierarchy of morality where it situate itself at the top. The freedom acquired by the subject in her self-certainty

is at risk if the outside does not conform to her principles and threatens to undermine them. The "free spirit" (ibid.: Part Two) requires strength to retain her freedom. As a privilege of the very few and the very strong, freedom is to be fought for. The free spirit thus possesses a will to power to sustain the independence she has previously achieved and reach a state where she has "nothing any more to be afraid of."

The individual and her community may know what her virtue is and what it means to them. But virtue cannot be exercised irrespective of the environment in which she operates. For virtue to prevail, it has to insure its own existence against the evil that surrounds it. The will to power of the virtuous people is a precondition to its perpetuation, for without the drive to assert its freedom and independence from the outside forces, the virtuous subject disappears as a person; if this happens he "acquires his value by conforming to a pattern of man that is fixed once and for all [from the outside]. He does not possess his value apart: he can be compared, he has his equals, he *must* not be an individual" (Nietzsche 1967: 176. Emphasis in the text).

Any subject who determines for herself—from *her* perspective—what is good and what is evil is caught between doing what corresponds to the common good and what is necessary for her self-preservation. In so far as the subject has identified herself with the Absolute, her first and foremost responsibility lies in self-preservation and preservation of her community which requires "sheer

'immorality'" towards the outside (ibid.: 172). As I shall show in part two of this thesis, the outside of France represents exactly what the revolutionaries had succeeded in overthrowing inside. According to Bonaparte, threats were foreign in origin and intervention (subversion) was carried on by the allies of the Royalist on behalf of the forces of the *ancien régime* against the victors of the Revolution. The French quest is therefore fueled by the desire to situate oneself in the world and by the resentment (see Deleuze 1967: ch. IV) of its emerging élite toward a model it has rejected during the Revolution but that is still present in the neighbouring states and clearly prevalent in Europe.

The life of the subject—or her Hegelian Existence—is a will to power which makes use of all the means available to perpetuate herself. As subject, the state reproduces itself through the education of its own people and by galvanising them against the ideas emanating from the outside.

The demand for truthfulness presupposes the knowability and stability of the person. In fact, it is the object of education to create in the herd member a definite faith concerning the nature of man: it first invents this faith and then demands 'truthfulness'. (ibid.: 158)

Education of the masses by the élites takes care of the inside stability of the Self but those living outside the community have to be situated in relation to the community. Part of the élites' discourse is therefore specifically aimed at representing the outside as a threat to the virtue inside the community:

In dealing with what lies outside, danger and caution demand that one should be on one's guard against deception: as a psychological preconditioning for this also in dealing with what lies within. Mistrust [of the Other] as the source of truthfulness [of the Self]. (ibid.)

Difference is an exception to the community's conception of truth and good. The rationally organised society constitutes a coherent whole which cannot be compromised. Difference therefore means opposition to the community and it is inherently harmful for its current existence. The threat to its life elicits the will to power in the community and this will manifests itself against the Other. For the subject who defines its identity against that of the others, "the ruling drives want to be viewed also as the highest courts of value in general, indeed as creative and ruling powers. It is clear that these drives either oppose or subject each other" (ibid.: 359). Evolution is the succession of these drives and the subsuming of one by the other until it reaches the Absolute (see Hegel 1953).

The subject is in a process of becoming the Absolute because she observes, represents, and subsumes her Other. She is a life form that needs to manifest its force in its search for self-certainty. She becomes a subject as it acts against her Other (Nietzsche 1956: 178-179) attempting to escape the endless dialectic where it cannot be certain as to what it is. The Self and the Other confront each other but never seem to succeed in prevailing once and for all. They are in a cycle of endless return (Deleuze 1967: 53-55) of the opposition. The self-consciousness of the actors

feeds on this opposition and is threatened by it. Charles Taylor writes: "the very aspiration to individual freedom is nurtured on this interchange, and can be dulled and perverted by it" (Taylor 1975: 78). But in Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche, the resolution of the dialectic is nothing but an approximate and gross dream (Deleuze 1967: 48). Whether it is by the final victory of one over the other or by a true synthesis of the two, the Self cannot eliminate her Other while at the same time remaining subject. It is possible for the Self and the Other to change due to the contacts they have with each other or in terms of what they perceive each other to be, but they cannot overcome the opposition because it is only in this opposition that they may exist. The negation of the Other is essential for the subject to become herself: "la négation n'est pas la simple réaction [against the Other], mais un *devenir réactif*" (Deleuze 1967: 61. Emphasis in the text).

As it relates to international relations, the dialectic between the Self and the Other is more than just philosophical. Both Hegel and Nietzsche point to the fact that the Self-Other distinction implies violence at some point in the relationship. Because the definition of one's self-consciousness requires at the very basic level the confrontation between the subject and the surrounding objects, the path followed by the former leads inexorably to violence and war, for once there is consciousness of one's universality, is it not natural to will this universality and seek its realisation? If the quest for knowledge and consciousness were all that mattered, the quest of the spirit would stop right at that moment. But the self-consciousness

of being the Absolute raises the question of the thus acquired *right* of the subject with regard to the surrounding world. Why indeed should she limit herself to living as an individual without attempting to realise history in building the nation and struggling against that which opposes it?

The realisation of the destiny can only come about with the demise of an Other who has physical and territorial existence. For Hegel and Nietzsche, because the self-conscious subject has become the Absolute, it becomes her right and even her obligation to project her Idea onto the world and subsume difference. Hegel writes: "It is the absolute right of the Idea to step into existence in clear-cut laws and objective institutions [...]. This the right of heroes to found states" (Hegel 1949: 219).

CHAPTER TWO

The Self and the Other in IR: Territoriality, Morality and Violence

It would be surprising to see someone purposively alienate herself from the broader community of "mankind" to live in a territorially defined state unless what she alienates herself from is deemed to be undesirable. This begs the question of how one should determine what is desirable or not. My contention in this chapter is that in the process of defining the national identity of a state, political leaders play a preponderant role with regard to the definition of the appropriate standards according to which individuals must live.

The process which leads political actors to believe in the necessity of founding the nation-state is precisely that which allows the individual to achieve self-consciousness. That is to say that the French revolutionaries had come to the rational conclusion that for the French to live peacefully and ethically, they had to found a nation-state separate from the monarchies of Europe. Hence, the process whereby a nation-state and the identity of its citizens are constituted requires the use of discursive methods on the part of the political élites who lead it in order to establish a clear distinction between the state and the outside.

For one thing, the separation from the rest of Europe and the reorganisation of France's political life had to proceed from a state administration

exercised over a determined territory. The establishment of (inter)national borders required the territorial representation of the state being founded. Territoriality was not a new concept in post-revolutionary France for the concept of natural borders had been part of French politics for some time. What was new, however, was that the French Revolution brought to bear on politics a whole new set of ideas and institutions hitherto unknown in the country: republicanism.

Rational republican principles were to constitute the qualitative identity of France and they were central in the reason-passion debate of the epoch. They were what the administration would be in a position to implement once the sovereignty of France were secured. As we shall see in part two of the thesis, the French revolutionaries envisioned a republic delimited by natural borders within which virtue could be preached and implemented according to the *liberté, égalité, fraternité* canons of the Revolution.

I will therefore not only discuss the physical setting and separation of nationals and foreigners but rather the conceptual and ethical chasm that national élites create in representing the nation's Other in their political discourse. In elaborating foreign policy, the national government attempts to show to its citizenry how different the outside is from the inside and thus that the world "out there" is not as virtuous as the nation living inside. In the development of national identity, the representation of the difference is crucial to complement the separation of the two physical realms by adding to them philosophical and moral

content. For if the outside were not different from the inside, it would be included in the nation-state instead of being relegated to this anarchical realm beyond the borders of the state.

If Nietzsche is right, the existence of difference must come at the price of considerable angst for the rational Self in search of consciousness and identity. Out of the good-evil distinction emerges the security dilemma that the nation-state faces with regard to those that surround it. Once conceived as essentially evil communities which stand in the way of Humanity's self-realisation through the nation-state, they can hardly be trusted to respect its sovereignty. The preservation of reason and morality is also the preservation of the nation-state that embodies it. The hostility toward the outside promoted in the course of the representation of the Other for the sake of national self-consciousness results in a profound sense of insecurity that requires action on the part of the Self.

Statesmen as Subjects

According to Michel Foucault, the Enlightenment resulted in a passage from the territorial state of the Westphalian system to the population state. While territory does not cease to be important, there occurs a shift in emphasis: "Il ne s'agit pas d'une substitution mais plutôt d'un déplacement d'accent, et de l'apparition de nouveaux objectifs, donc de nouveaux problèmes et de nouvelles techniques."

(Foucault 1988: 99) Not surprisingly, the statesman is the user of reason who sets out to define the new objectives and identify the new problems confronting Humanity. Consequently, he develops new ways of governing in tune with the new paradigm and attempts to enlist popular support for his peculiar worldview. For Hegel, it is in fact the absolute right and even the duty of the subject of history to bring reason to the rest of her community.

This is where the concepts of identity and difference come into play. It is possible to influence the belief of a public but one can only partially remodel others according to one's image. Reason may supply the conceptual tools needed for the *ego cogitans* to understand the universe but *homo faber* remains limited by the means at his disposition. The discovery of truth and virtue then takes place in a physically and conceptually limited space where identity and "good" is defined in relation to difference and "evil." But to maintain this identity, to keep the inhabitants of this political space from being tempted by the broader community, difference must be represented as a threat to the Self that the nation is: citizens must be kept faithful so that they do not lend support to a higher authority like Christian universalism (Linklater 1990: 136).

The inculcation of an identity and fidelity in the people of a nation is akin to the creation of a false consciousness in them: convincing them that a given ideological and political superstructure *does* serve their interest while in fact it *may not* be the case. This is something Marx and Engels had understood (Marx and

Engels 1988), and that Lenin brought to bear on the analysis and conduct of international politics (Lenin 1917), all of whom downplayed the power of discourse in fostering a sense of national identity in the citizenry.

The ultimate goal of the state apparatus and more specifically of those who head it is to create in the mind of the citizens a *potentia* which makes the use of the *potestas* of Hobbes's Leviathan superfluous in maintaining the cohesion of society. Principles and rules of behaviour peculiar to a given nation are internalised by individuals. That, however, is the aim, not the technique whereby it is achieved. In so far as the social contract as a founding act is illusory, the creation of the national sentiment takes place by the moral and territorial exclusion of certain peoples unless they come to share the values transmitted to them. Even if one were to accept at face value social contract theory as the process by which individual wills willingly merge into one general will in order to found the nation-state, one would still be hard pressed to explain how the subsequent generations of citizens could identify with the nation-state to whose founding they did not participate as contracting parties. Why should the particular values of the state be accepted by individuals that did not share in their elaboration.

Positing the state as the subject of international relations and as only actor on the basis of a rationally proven ontology evacuates values from the debate (Kreml and Kegley 1990: 157). The acceptance of the idea of the sovereign nation-state renders any identification with an Other problematic. This is so because the

nation-state's values as set forth in the constitution and laws are defined in specific historical circumstances against different values. In its realist and structural realist guises, international relations theory fails to address the issue of agency. In other words, it does not show how the state is theorised and constructed from a certain perspective.

The revolutionaries and Napoleon Bonaparte were trying to overthrow the Christian paradigm that had been partially unable to fulfill the expectations of certain individuals. By rejecting the *ancien régime* in France and attributing internal problems to foreign sources and attributes of the Other, revolutionary élites sought to avoid the subversion of the national identity they were attempting to create. It was only when one paradigmatic crisis was recognised by enough people who more or less concentrated territorially that a collective change in outlook could occur, thereby eliciting the Idea of the French nation-state in the minds of a few individuals who set out to give it an institutional form.

To understand that states officials are elected or appointed to speak on behalf of the people and govern them, we must recall Foucault's portrayal of statesmen as guides and shepherds. The revolutionaries first accepted the rational and inevitable character of the social contract as founding myth and in so doing, became the expression of the general will of the nation to other states. As people in charge of the dealing with foreigners, they also *mediated* between the inside and the outside. They defended in the international realm what they considered to be a

truth which they had defined for themselves. More importantly, they concurrently *interpreted and relayed* to their own population that which was taking place outside the state. This prominent role of state officials leads realists like Morgenthau to consider heads of state as the sole subject able to ascertain objectively the international environment (Morgenthau 1978: Introduction). The status of Morgenthau's statesmen as "political men" is a denial of the intertextual nature of international relations theory (see Der Derian and Shapiro 1989). That is to say that only their interpretation of world politics renders the true character of things, actors, and events. Their role as policy-makers and executors suffices to define them as a separate category of individuals endowed with a culture and epistemology of their own that is the only valid approach to the understanding of the field.¹ Realism takes it as given that world politics can only be understood and managed by the all-knowing politician. Indeed, these "noble-minded men" as Fichte (1968: 116) terms them, know how the outside must be apprehended and related to in order to guarantee the security of the state (Morgenthau 1946). Yet, under the pressure of domestic imperatives of national security, the Hegelian conception of Reason as a path to the Absolute gets easily confused with the bounded rationality of the subject in charge of guaranteeing the security of the state (see Simon 1982). Though the threats may not be as prescient as they are believed to be, caution nevertheless suggests that they be considered real

¹ So much so that Morgenthau advocates the use of a *Verstehen* approach to study their behaviour and that of the states over whose destiny they preside.

Three Dimensions of Representation

In his book *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*, R. B. J. Walker (1993) uses the concepts of political time and political space to explain the genesis of international relations theory and the strong emphasis placed on the nation-state as the ultimate actor of international politics. Using Machiavelli, he contends that his Prince attempted to establish the basic principles of organisation of political communities in a historically contingent manner (ibid.: 35). By contrast, the French revolutionaries firmly believed that the political model they were implementing was the ultimate achievement of human perfectibility. In effect, political time had come to an end and they wanted to make France an island of timeless virtue amidst an irrational and dangerous European environment.

David Campbell's articulation between space, identity, and morality is comprehensive enough that it is worth citing at length in order to present the core concepts dealt with herein. Thus he writes:

Danger constitutes more than the boundary which demarcates a space; to have a threat requires enforcing a closure upon the community which is threatened. A notion of what 'we' are is intrinsic to an understanding of what 'we' fear.

What this highlights is that there is an axiological level which proffers a range of moral valuations that are implicit in any spatialization. *The*

construction of social space that emerges from practices associated with the paradigm of sovereignty thus exceeds a simple geographical partitioning: it results in a conception of divergent moral spaces. In other words, the social space of inside/outside is both made possible by and helps to constitute a moral space of superior/inferior, which can be animated in terms of any number of figurations of higher/lower. (Campbell 1992: 85. My emphasis)

Representing Territoriality: Inside v. Outside

Knowing and discussing reality supposes that we come to a certain degree of agreement about what it is we want to observe and analyse. In this sense territories are spaces that occupants must represent to themselves in order to define themselves amidst others. Consequently, spatiality is intimately linked to social and political thought (Sack 1980). The space in which the community is inscribed (or in which *it* inscribes *itself*) "is an essential framework of all modes of thought. From physics to aesthetics, from myth and magic to common everyday life, space, in conjunction with time, provides a *fundamental ordering system* interlacing every facet of thought" (ibid.: 4. My emphasis). The country taken in its territorial dimension is the ultimate refuge where the people can seek shelter; it contains the individual and her possessions (Bachelard 1967). Social relations can therefore hardly be conceived outside a space and let alone be managed without it. But to speak of a society and to administer it implies that it exists objectively. The

question to be answered is the following: does it? that is, does it exist outside elite discourse? Within the Enlightenment's conception of reality, there is no doubt that the answer is yes.

But a more critical approach leads us to see that in fact space is more or less a whole in which the subject sees "things" that it defines spatially for the sake of observation and analysis; it identifies where these things begin and where they end and objectifies their existence because it serves a purpose. In this positivist approach, definition, description, and analysis is merely a problem-solving device for the state that tries to situate itself in the world and relate to it (Cox 1976). It takes these objects to be the real building blocks of the world. In international relations theory, these building blocks are the states conceived as billiard balls or black boxes whose internal dynamic is not considered relevant to their behaviour on the international scene. Political communities thus go from blurred entities defined by porous frontiers to clear-cut territories delimited by borders promoted by the state's institutions (B. Anderson 1991: ch. 10). The construction of the nation-state and the definition of its identity was a process as was the definition of its geographical setting (Agnew 1987). For Agnew,

one of the most important 'outside forces' has been the modern territorial state, especially important in the context of place and politics. State formation has a great and powerful process. Expanding geographically for distinctive core areas, states have penetrated, standardised, and incorporated

previously independent local systems of power into state-based ones. (ibid.: 36)

It is interesting to note that these core areas are also centers of intellectual activity. The construction of the state system in Europe is "the *construction of new political units* rather than the straightforward transformation of existing ones" (ibid.: 37. My emphasis). In the context of free speech and democracy that the Enlightenment professed to make reality, the need for popular support could only be met by attracting public support for political endeavours.

The nation-state was constituted to bring political and economic order to an unstable environment (Braudel 1979). As such, the emergence of the modern territorial nation-state was an attempt to solve the problems posed by the changing philosophical and political environments. Even before the bourgeois revolutions occurred, the territorial state with a centralised administration appeared in the guise of absolutism (P. Anderson 1974). Political economists argue that for affairs to be conducted and managed for the benefit of the inhabitants of a certain area, a territorial structure was established over which one rule of law was enforced (Giddens 1985; Wallerstein 1974, 1979). The production of space goes with the production of the community and the production of what it needs to develop (Lefebvre 1974); the state became the space where previous contradictions could be reconciled, where economic production and other human aims could be pursued safely.

Whatever the political motivations presiding to the founding of the territorial state – of which economic activity is only one–, there needed the creation of a border to be strictly enforced by the government. The borders served to define the physical and spatial limits of the body politic. Rousseau does not hesitate to speak of the state as a human body whose contact with other bodies (other states) is a source of conflict; each body politic remains in a state of nature with other bodies. For David Campbell, national élites adhere to a vision of the nation-state that represents the influences from the outside as diseases for the body (Campbell 1992: 92-99). As it perceives itself as an organism through its leaders, the state wants to secure its physical existence. Indeed, statesmen reactions to foreign-sponsored attempts at disrupting internal activities are met with accusations of violation of state sovereignty.

Traditionally, sovereignty was a means of preserving the internal peace and stability of the state by separating its physically and conceptually from an outside realm which could not be trusted. In codified international law as we know it at the end of the twentieth century, the sacrosanct nature of sovereignty can be traced back to the specific events of the 1910s, 1930s and 1940s which illustrated what might come out of the non-respect of a state's independence. For the state-centric approach, the international and hence the anarchy begin outside the borders of the state (Ashley 1987: 415). The inside is assumed to be functioning harmoniously as a self-contained entity which is only disrupted by outside forces. The creation of a

territorially based and hopefully recognised community confirms its Existence as a community, a political and territorial *unit*, in a realm of anarchy. The aim is to define "a domestic *community-as-presence* in order to differentiate a field of international political practice recognised as a primordial *absence-of-community*" (ibid.: 419. Emphasis in the text).

It was believed by those who sought a framework for perpetual peace that by limiting the differences between states, it was possible to eliminate the risk of conflict between states. The Abbé de Saint-Pierre believed that even in a Europe composed of monarchies, peace was possible if the states involved would consider one another's territories as possessions to be respected much like individual possessions might be recognised within a state. Better yet, a definite sense of security would allow economic activity and trade to thrive thanks to the stability of the states system.

Kant (1784) took this view further by inscribing it in the context of the Enlightenment. For him, peace could only exist among republics that adhered to the same internal governing principles and that accepted the inviolability of one another's borders. Contrary to the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Kant did not see enough resemblances among the states of his time to conceive of peaceful relations between them. For him, states had to be made into republics so that they may respect one another's sovereignty. The insistence on a common understanding of principles of political organisation is an attempt at erasing the difference which is so central to

the representation of the nation-state's Other. The homogenisation of the contents of states through a universal republicanism would eliminate the main difference which renders their relations conflictual.

True as it may be, this view does take account of the fact that there remain differences which one may exploit in their attempt to separate the community from the outside. For example, Benedict Anderson (1991) writes that the emergence of print capitalism played a considerable role in the construction of states as imagined communities. The spread of literature fixed language and made it a means of communication for groups of people who were later counted and said to belong to certain territories by virtue of their culture and represented on maps. Once language and culture becomes the defining characteristic of a people, identity which is created by language becomes fixed. It is language that defines the structure within which people operate and it is through language that this structure can be changed albeit only subtly (Kirby 1989: 208). However, the first reflex of the imagined but nevertheless reified community is to reproduce itself through its institutions. Whether it is a matter of state policy or simply a product of the overall linguistic context, its citizens are encouraged to read and express themselves in the language of their community which contains representations of themselves and of others as different peoples (Said 1994). Language is used to represent the physical space occupied by the community as a reality that is nothing but the home of this self-righteous community. Sovereignty thus emerges as an absolute principle

whereby peoples can govern themselves according to what is right. Any infringement on this principle is a violation of their right.

Assuming the hostility of the neighbours, the recognised independence of the nation-state made sense in so far as it did guarantee the survival of the state. In state-centric approaches, the territorial state is considered as sacred because its occupants –or at least some of them– believe that the particularity of what exists inside it is worth preserving from the outside. The content of the state is its Essence which is discovered by the conceptual separation of the subject from the object it seeks to ascertain.

Representing Content: Ethical Self and Evil Other

In ascertaining the international environment, things are taken to be self-evident truths that reveal themselves to the observer if only she deigns to look at them. The territorial representation dealt with in the preceding section can be represented on maps and more or less realised physically by the setting up of border patrols to keep the outsiders where they are deemed to belong and the nationals within the state.

When it comes to ethics and morality however, the difference and representation cannot take a physical form. Rather the subject essentialises the physical persons (foreigners and foreign states) that it sees and turns them into a Notion which is conveyed to the listening (or reading) public through language

and verbal images composing a complex of discursive practices. The subject aims at the creation of a collective mentality in each person that is not "an individual orientation but a set of practices" that define an ethical organisation inside the territorial state and which are specific to the governing of the modern state (Shapiro 1997: 18).

But the definition of the collective identity requires the identification of those who are not members of the community. There are hardly any a priori reasons to justify the imposition of a territorial and moral barrier between the citizens of the state and foreigners particularly when the community in emergence is ethnically fragmented as was the case in pre-revolutionary France. Before the nation takes shape, there are only individuals without a national identity and territory.

Looking out from her nation-state, the subject imposes her own analytical grid on the world and interprets is accordingly. Thus David Campbell writes that "[t]he path from 'raw data' to the finished intelligence report is a succession of interpretive practices" (Campbell 1993a: 10) where a small group of enlightened subjects objectify the Other's behaviour. In spite of the fact that conclusions rest on interpretation, there is little doubt from the subject's point of view as to the wisdom of her thinking and the accuracy of her assessment of the situation.

What is overlooked in the process is that the mere interest shown by the subject toward an event or issue also shows that she is directly involved with the

object she is studying. For Said, "no production of knowledge in the *human sciences* can ever ignore or disclaim its *author's involvement as a human subject in his own circumstances* [...]" (Said 1979: 11. My emphasis). It crucial to note that it is *humans* which invent *human sciences* to study themselves and that each student is the product of her time and place. The knowledge that emerges from this is therefore intimately tied to who this person is. In their quest for self-consciousness, individuals are compelled to break away from others to acquire knowledge of themselves. According to Elie Kedourie, there is an opposition of the Ego (Self) to the world; it is a shock that stimulates the self-realisation of the Ego (Kedourie 1985: 53). In defining one's nation, this knowledge of Self includes knowledge gathered by the state on its neighbours through intelligence reports on their activities. Knowledge also comprises the inferences drawn by the nation-state's policy makers and advisors as to the possible actions the Other might engage in. Scientific reasoning in the natural sciences and in the human sciences is study in view of understanding and prediction: it is a quest for certainty (George 1995: ch. 4).

For Ernesto Laclau and Lilian Zac (1994), the political discourse that is used to define national identity is therefore only there to fill the conceptual void left by collapse or inadequacy of the preceding form of understanding and organisation. Laclau and Zac write:

Let us suppose, for example, that in the context of extreme social disorganisation the identities of the social agents are subverted, and that this anomic situation leads to the identification of those agents with a certain political discourse [...] The contents of that discourse will appear as necessarily split as a result of the identificatory act. For, on the one hand, these contents will be a set of proposals for social organisation; but, on the other, as they will appear as the symmetrically opposed alternative to 'nothingness', they would incarnate the very possibility of *a* social organisation [...]. (ibid.: 14)

The authors nevertheless note that this sense of identity that is being infused in the future citizens is also *external* to them as individuals. But since they are in an anomic state, any discourse that provides an alternative is better than the current situation. The listener thus clings to the structure offered to her as to a buoy. The need for structure insures that violence does not have to be used by the representing subject; its legitimacy is virtually assured by the fact that the individual has no alternative which can provide her with the sense of security she is seeking. The structure and the identity supplied by the subject are internalised as a self-consciousness that the citizens now share with the subject. Together, they belong to the self-conscious nation.

With the Enlightenment, the *ancien régime's* view of the world is replaced by the physically and conceptually defined nation-state that is "man"'s own making

through discursive practices enjoining future citizens to lend their support to the nation in the process of being constructed. The intellectual in the guise of the rational head of state thus attempts to establish some form of order in the world that lost its former cohesion and intelligibility. Ernst Haas (1993) describes nation-building and nationalism as a form of rationalisation introduced by élites to put order in societies undergoing modernisation as it was the case with late eighteenth and early-nineteenth century Europe. Nationalism takes the form of the internal organisation of one's activities and of the way one relates to the outside using as means of enforcement both coercion and the satisfaction of one's needs (*ibid.*: 209-210). Similarly, for Karl Deutsch (1953) the much needed order can come about only if the orderer can persuade her would-be followers that it is desirable, in as much as force cannot be the only means to this end. Social institutions play a crucial role in the transmission of the knowledge deemed to be necessary for the cohesion of society and the conduct of politics within the sovereign sphere (i.e. the state) is "the mobilization and the application of consent and power in the various and partly overlapping clusters of human interaction" (*ibid.*: 53). In Deutsch's and Haas's work, the crucial idea is that the unity of the nation requires that the masses share the élite culture that can only be transmitted by the state's institutions.

But the good perceived by the élites must somehow be tied to the Absolute which the Enlightenment purportedly allows us to attain. Thus, Julien Benda (1965) argues that the role of the intellectuals ("les clercs") is to discover

transcendent principles that guide human life and uphold them in making the world. Failing that, the intellectuals commit treason. By the same token however, intellectuals are faced by difficulties when they try to live up to their role because "a man facing a *moral dilemma* in the context of a given institutional structure [has] an *easier task* than one who admits that formally legally legitimate authorities may on occasion be reprehensible" (Gellner 1994: 57. My emphasis). The social structure within which one operates sets rules of ethical behaviour which simplifies the choices, if any, to be made. At any rate and at the very least, one knows that one has *some kind* of moral obligation toward *someone*. When the rational individual has finally found a framework that seems to provide for the kind of certainty and security longed for, it becomes tempting to base her actions on it because it determines what is right and what is wrong.

One proponent of nationalism as a solution to the precariousness of human life agrees with this approach. Mazzini (1907) contends that the first duty of "man" is toward Humanity as a whole because individuals are "men" before all else. But he nonetheless rightfully poses the question of the power of isolated individuals in carrying out universal principles. This leads him to conclude that the protection of human beings passes through the construction of the state and of the nation that inhabits it. The state gives the opportunity to the individuals to participate in realising the principles on which human welfare rests. For Mazzini all people must and will eventually be included in a nation that will protect them.

While it questioned and superseded an inadequate model such as Christianity, the Enlightenment has put an end to time and history but at the same time the reasoning individual makes it difficult to guarantee the "good" because self-seeking causes an atomism of humanity which can only be overcome through nation-building (Fichte 1968). This can be achieved by tying the mental culture of an élite to social and political life. The world conceived rationally is constructed: the nation is an "art of creation" (ibid.: 67). For Fichte the peculiarity of the German people was that in them, there existed this link between the thought and action, theory and praxis. This link provides the proof of the rationality of the subject and sets it above those who are irrational. In creating the nation, only the proper structure of expression and thought as set forth by language can bring about and commonality of view between the masses and the enlightened élites. It insures that true conclusions are reached. The Absolute character of the community thus constructed appears more clearly in the following citation from Fichte where he claims that a people is formed when *"the totality of men continuing to live in society with each other and continually creating themselves naturally and spiritually out of themselves, a totality arises together out of the divine under a certain special law of divine development"* (ibid.: 115. My emphasis). By contrast, as a mode of organisation, "religion is [...] the consolation of the unjustly oppressed slave" (ibid.: 112). Seen in this light, the construction of the nation-state is nothing but the fulfilment of Nature's will.

It follows from this that the nation-state is the only valid form of political community which can claim to defend the "good" on the basis of differences with other communities. The observation and the theorising of the international environment is an act whereby the ethical state is taken as the starting point of morality and its citizens are made to look out from its inside to try and understand the state of nature that surrounds them. More importantly the acquisition of knowledge marks a moral divorce between knower and known: the relationship between subject and object is one of "positional superiority" (Said 1979: 7).

In *Orientalism*, Said does not deny the existence of differences in culture; the existence of an Us and of a Them can be defensible if it limits itself to identifying what Derrida calls *différance*—a concept that does not involve the establishment of a hierarchy between subject and object. But the portrayal of this difference in the relationship between the Orient and the Occident goes beyond the representation of *différance* because the Orient is made into an object. It is the Oriental who is being studied and represented by the Western scholar or government official or policy advisor. It is he who is different from the Westerner who is the scientific referee:

Everyone who writes about the Orient [and more generally, the Other], must locate himself vis-à-vis the Orient; translated into his text, this location includes the kind of narrative voice he adopts, the type of structure he builds, the kinds of images, themes, and motifs that circulate in his text—all

of which adds up to deliberate ways of addressing the reader, containing the Orient, and finally, representing it or speaking in its behalf. (ibid.: 20)

The Other serves a specific purpose for the subject who studies her. We need to reckon with the fact that the study of an object would be unnecessary were this object identical in appearance and Essence to the subject. Thus, the study of anything presupposes its difference and by extension the self-conscious identity of the knower vis-à-vis this difference.

As I discussed in chapter one, the quest for self-consciousness and identity is an escape from the mere state of Being to one of Existence among Others. In the above citation from Said's *Orientalism*, the mere concept of Orient, just like that of Occident, suffices to summarise the cultural and moral content of the geographical area. Images and content create myths about oneself and about others thereby creating identities (Mullins 1983: 123-127; 1986). The mythical construction is done by the subject in its search for self-certainty and confirmation for its status. Success in this quest means that it is no longer necessary to use long detailed characterisations of the Other; all it now takes to convey the message that it is evil is to mention its name or evoke an image that contains all of its characteristics (its Essence) as for example the "Great Satan" who, in religious as well as secularised terms, can be equated with whatever the subject considers evil. Conversely, mentioning one's state like America, the Republic, the nation or the fatherland conveys positive images to the listener.

Identity thrives on difference and this difference must rest in one person. A duly constituted state that wants to break with its isolationism—a policy which promotes just Being—must first identify its Other (or several of them which can be summarised in a single Notion). For example, when the United States put an end to their inter-war isolationism after World War II, they needed to situate themselves in the world. But defining one's identity without having a *specific* Other is difficult unless the analytical grid used by the state provides such a category. The United States lacked just such an Other until their identity could be confronted to the difference incarnated by the Soviet Union (Nathanson 1988). But this analytical framework was developed by American scholars and political élites in charge of the promotion national interests and their perceived need to guarantee stable conditions conducive to development both domestically and internationally.

Foreign policy as a distinct form of policy-making emerges from the necessary opposition of the values propounded inside and presumably violated outside by the Other. Morality as it is defined in the nation-state rests on the choice made by the self-determining people during the social contract and reproduced through education; is good what suits the *national* interest. But at the same time, because the moral codes elaborated by the subject are incommensurable (Linklater 1990: 140), we must ask how it is possible for the Self to recognise the Other's righteousness whenever this Other can be and is portrayed as different. Foreign policy serves as a means to advance the interests of the state

onto the world scene and not to create a better common environment (ibid.: 137) resting on the recognition of the legitimacy of difference. Such a course of action would provoke an undue questioning of the philosophical basis of the Self's identity in so far as contradictory ideas and practices would cast doubt on her Absolute character. Not sharing the ideas of the community professed by its élites is sufficient to be wrong:

So long as Humanity [receives] but a *one-sided* culture in different states, it [is] to be expected that each particular state should deem its own culture the true and only civilization and regard that of other states as mere Barbarism, and their inhabitants as savages—and thus feel itself called upon to subdue them. (Fichte quoted in Kedourie 1985: 54. My emphasis)

Difference can take the form of another state which rests on different fundamental principles or it can be expressed by a transnational movement or ideology that rejects the mere concept of nation-states as political units in favour of a broader community. In either case, the self-consciousness of the nation is challenged by a form of authority that transcends national borders and consequently questions the absolute moral status of the said nation. Such was the case during the Cold War between the "West" and the Soviet Union in the post-war world. Soviet foreign policy could be viewed both as a mere search for power in realist terms or as the vector of an Idea that was intended to be universal in scope by its founders. Similarly, the Enlightenment and the idea of the nation-state

that it gave birth to challenged the universalism of Christianity by dramatically reducing the scope of political communities at the same time as it changed their organising principles (Hayes 1966: 206-207).

In both cases an internationalist philosophy could stand in the way of nation-building and self-determination. Barring the military subduing of the source of this foreign model, the only way to exclude it from internal political life is to represent it as contrary to or incompatible with the philosophy professed inside the nation-state. However, this constitutes only a conceptualisation of difference, for after all the idea of evil is an abstraction to which people cannot relate unless it is embodied by something or someone. By associating to an idea an identifiable Other such as another territorial state, it become easier to represent the Other. Physically, the Other is observable, hence the use of terms such as the Orient and the Occident, or the West and the East in Cold War terminology, or the West and Middle-Eastern fundamentalists in post-Cold War discourse. The "evil," that is, everything not part of the subject's moral code, is collapsed into single images and persons: "The geographic 'knowledge' we invoke in our naming helps, in Foucault's terms, to put into circulation the tactics and strategies involved in the 'demarcations' and 'control of territories.'" (Shapiro 1988: 93) In this depiction of new threats to national security, what is often forgotten is that Western discourse also form a type of fundamentalism wrapped in Enlightenment discourse: in its isolationist or imperialist forms, the mode of thinking constitutes a denial of

difference incarnated by the Other. This Other is either simply excluded or excluded and then tamed by the Self (ibid.: 101).

The opposition of Self and Other in world politics is further illustrated by the turn taken by international relations theory since the end of the Cold War. A number of scholars have argued that the "disappearance" of the Soviet threat as the United States' Other has elicited new research on potential threats. The evil empire that the Communist bloc was has been replaced by Islam (in its fundamentalist form) and other so-called civilisations regardless of the internal divisions that characterise them (Huntington 1993, 1996). For some forty-odd years, US foreign policy and identity as defender of the the "Free world" thrived on its relationship with and opposition to the Soviet Union. In the absence of this threat emanating from an identifiable Other, defining oneself is difficult because no comparison can immediately take place. Or to put this in Hegelian terms, the image the subject has of itself is mediated by the reflection on the object under consideration. There is a need for rethinking foreign policy, re-ascertaining the environment to identify actors which may have hitherto been overlooked because they were not needed in as much as the USSR played a role now up for grabs; in fact, the "minor" actors who have now become the new threats were then seen as subfunctions or subsystems that operated within the Cold War balance of power structure described (imagined?) by Kenneth Waltz (1979). That structure having collapsed, the United States as subject now seek to situate themselves vis-à-vis other actors and

analyse them and their behaviour in light of domestic imperatives (Campbell 1990). In the new complexity engendered by the disappearance of the Soviet Other, American opinion leaders are divided as to the priorities and dangers posed by the post-Cold War world (O. Holsti and Rosenau 1993), divided that is, until someone comes up with a clear framework that compensates for the one that is decaying.

The conceptualisations of the nation-state that emerge from specific historical and cultural contingencies vary considerably depending on the specific concerns of the theorist thus making the central concept of the nation-state above all a state of mind (Rockman 1989). However, the one aspect of the nation-state that is shared by the various schools of thought is that of an almost unconditional support for the political entity whether it is the provider of economic welfare, physical security, self-realisation, etc. The essential element of citizenry and nationality is love of country because it is this body politic which provides what individuals long for.

The state is portrayed as a parent that protects its children from a dangerous environment as it raises them according to moral rules of conduct. For Runyan, Elshtain, and Tickner for instance, the state and its leaders appear as masculine figures whose role is to tame the anarchical state of nature (Runyan 1991; Elshtain 1991; Tickner 1991). In its state-of-nature analysis, these authors point to the central argument invoked in traditional international relations theory to justify the formation and defense of the nation-state as the place where virtue can prevail. For

Elshtain however, this view of the state as a forceful male is also transformed into a mother figure in order to elicit in its people feelings of love that are conducive to fidelity toward it. She thus writes: "Most modern nation-states are construed in feminine terms. The Sovereign may bear a masculinized face but the nation itself is feminized, a mother, a sweetheart, a lover" (Elshtain 1991:149).

This evocation of a maternal image of love is made necessary by the secularisation of political thinking. Rationalism has replaced faith in the God-sent king but at the same time the abandonment of the beliefs and feelings associated to them leaves the new political authority without emotional appeal for the masses. For Gellner (1994: 61-62), the nation may take-on a holy character similar to the one attributed formerly to the king but it is not necessarily the case. The love of the motherland is an appeal to a human sentiment which had hitherto been entertained in individuals through socialisation at the family level long before the advent of the modern nation-state (Tetrault 1991). The conjuring up of images such as the motherland or *la mère patrie* in the case of France provides tools to keep alive sentiments of devotion in the masses.

While love may be a positive and even laudable sentiment to have for one's community, it can also be a source of conflict in so far as it is developed by separating oneself from the presumed "evil" outside and because "love of the country turns readily to hatred of the foreigner [...]" (Hayes 1966: 158). Self-identity comes from reflecting on and relating to the Other. As the difference of

the Other comes to be perceived as a source of danger, distrust and conflict arise that tend to provide additional occasions for the discursive construction and reinforcement of the national identity. The love of one's nation overshadows concerns for the welfare of humanity as a whole. The citizens sees the national interest as her primary concern and adopts a bellicose attitude toward the threat to this interest.

Representing Danger and Threat: Ontologising Violence

As Adam Lerner (1991: 410) remarks, to understand *international* relations, we should distinguish between the concepts of violence and that of war. For example, when we discuss the possible spreading of domestic violence to neighbouring states, we implicitly recognise the different nature of this violence. However, if we reject the state-centric approach and the nation-state as a natural phenomenon, there is no reason to establish a conceptual distinction between so-called civil wars and interstate wars. During the time of the emergence of the nation-state, borders were still blurred in as much as the creation of national states was an attempt to put an end to this situation. Wars were thus neither civil yet nor international *per se*. The violence of interstate conflicts shows just how much the modern territorial state did not flow from natural laws and how it was a result of theory as praxis.

If the nation-state is such a blessing for those who have lived in the state of nature and escaped it as Hobbes argued, then it must be because the uncertainty of

it was unbearable. Concurrently, if the nation-state comes to be taken for granted as a fact of life it must be because there is a perceived need for its presence. Once there is a belief in the fact that the nation-state provides *mutatis mutandis* more than all other forms of political organisation, its meaning for the people who inhabit it is such that it is worth preserving (Doob 1964: 171). Security as it is defined in the state centric approach is construed much like the Other is construed. In fact, once the Self's basic ontology comprises an Other who is both different and evil, the notion of threat becomes a virtually unavoidable part of the relationship. Threat can be ignored only if the Self lives in total ignorance or indifference of the Other. But, on the one hand, this Self/Other dichotomy cannot be ignored—for it is necessary to the attainment of self-consciousness—and on the other, it cannot be resolved without conflict. Actual violence is therefore just as ontologically relevant to international relations as the conceptual and discursive dialectic that constructed the Self and the Other in the first place (see Campbell and Dillon 1993).

The treatment of war in international relations scholarship is informed by the belief in domestic violence as separate from international violence. The reification of the nation-state causes us to consider violence among fellow citizens as an anomaly whereas violence among states is an unfortunate but necessary fact of life. Nevertheless, it is always the state that appears to be the solution, whether in the guise of a Leviathan that guarantees internal stability or in the form of a great power that secures order in international society (Wight 1977; Bull 1977). In

any event, nationality is predicated on a collective amnesia of past identities (Gellner 1987: 7) and the violence they may have caused. Domestic conflicts are downplayed because they take place within the sovereign sphere where the people are said to be ruling over themselves (Rousseau 1966). Here again the basic ontology of the sovereign political units is taken for granted and domestic ills can be attributed to a violation of sovereignty on the part of an Other. Interestingly, there seems to be a lack of political imagination to resolve peacefully the dialectic opposing the state and its neighbours as was done for individuals in the social contract; whatever the attempts made, difference seems to force itself on the analyst and fear takes precedence over the rest.

Traditional international relations theory sees the international environment as a threat because it lacks the order that reigns within the state. Furthermore, if the universal passes through the national, there is a peculiar responsibility of all citizens and their government toward the nation; what is achieved inside *must* be preserved at all costs. In the words of Mazzini: "You are *free* and therefore you are *responsible*. From this moral liberty is derived your right to political liberty, *your duty to conquer it* [with the nation-state] *for yourselves and to keep it inviolate, and the duty of others not to limit it*" (Mazzini 1907: 68. My emphasis). This linkage of the freedom guaranteed by the state with the ethical dimension of the political aims pursued in the context of the nation-state forces citizens and élites to confront difference. The presence of others is "the continuous

challenge to put human freedom as an ethical encounter with others, and within the Otherness that is *integral to its own constitution as a way of being*" (Dillon 1996: 62. My emphasis). It is therefore impossible to ignore the Other and where it stands in relation to the Self:

As a human-being-with-others in Otherness, human being in assuming its freedom is necessarily, therefore, also obliged one way or another to have a 'care' for others and Otherness within the structure of care which is *the* fundamental part of its ontological constitution. (ibid.: 67. Emphasis in the text)

State sovereignty is sacred because the state is what guarantees the inviolability of political liberty vis-à-vis the evil represented by the Other. The physical security of the Self is essential for the perpetuation of the reasoning individual. However, if we abandon the one-sided view of the Self, we realise that its conception of difference as threat may not be as obvious as it may see. So long as she claims to be the subject of scientific knowledge, she treats everything else as a threat to truth. The subject remains so caught up in her own mode of thinking that she becomes "autistic" with regard to the outside world (Galtung 1989). The construction of a community of language and thought fixes the difference between the Self and the Other and determines the nature of the threat the latter poses to the former. Communications are thereby rendered difficult for "if group identity is to become the locus of security, it raises the dilemma of thinking about the forms

of security possible between groups [i.e. nations]" (Krause and Williams 1997: 48). As an essential political category, the nation-state precludes the use of world, humanity, globe, planet, etc. as relevant concepts for the study of world politics: the obsession with the achievements of states and "the very form of statist claims to a monopoly on legitimate authority challenges the very possibility of referring to humanity in general—and by extension to world politics or world security—in any meaningful way" (Walker 1990: 5-6).

The security of the Self, be it physical or psychological, precludes an international social contract. These can only take place on three conditions. First, reconciling peoples can be achieved if the Self and the Other are alike, in which case we cannot talk of a Self and an Other because there is no difference in contradistinction to which identity can be defined. Second, the conflict can be resolved if one actor subdues the other definitely and makes it over in its own image. Third, the Self and the Other could conceivably come to an understanding by watering down their respective position. This however is an unlikely event in so far as it implies the questioning of one's self-righteousness. Far worse, openness to other nations and their culture is taken to be a sign of social sickness (Kedourie 1985: 61) because foreign elements are allowed to disrupt the functioning of the already healthy body politic. In this sense, the security of the state that is sought through war is an attempt at securing an *idea* against the influence of other ideas and claims pertaining to other communities (Krause and Williams 1997: 47).

For Edward Rhodes (1995), ideas play a crucial role in determining state behaviour, well above so-called vested interests such as materialism and national security. These are born of a mental construction of what is good or moral for the nation and what is a threat to it. The Enlightenment was an intellectual revolution that caused a disjuncture between "real" interests and ideas because it is the change in intellectual reality that provoked a change in perception and behaviour (ibid.: 55). Behaviour then remade reality according to new a blueprint.

Going back to Galtung's characterisation of American foreign policy as autistic, one can note that what prevailed during the Cold War was a set of ideas about the Other which guided political behaviour. The actual behaviour of the Other is inferred by the subject but it is hard to demonstrate empirically for even intelligence is subject to (mis)interpretation. Consequently, the ascertainment and representation of the threat follows the same rationale as the creation of the Other in that it is *constructed*. The dialectical context first commands ideal opposition. Then this opposition comes to be embodied in a state that exist objectively from the subject's viewpoint.

If we recall Weber's definition of the state as the organisation that has the monopoly of legitimate use of violence and we associate this to the absolute responsibility of the state toward its constituents and to the physical separation between the nation-state and the outside, the consequences of the dialectical relationship become clearer (Campbell 1993b: 141-142). Violence is ontological

because it is an essential part of the construction of the Self and the subduing of the Other in the context of international relations. The disappearance of the Other or its make-over in the Self's image is the ultimate confirmation of the latter's status. As long as this dialectic remains unresolved, there is an ontological chance that the Other may subdue the Self. The will to power of the subject is therefore part and parcel of what the subject is. The ideal framework that she uses establishes a structure of thought and language that is translated into reality through state-building. Violence is thus structural and inevitable given the subject's approach to the world. It arises because there is no social contract between states as there has presumably been between individuals during the founding of the nation-state. There has not been an agreement around common rules of behaviour between states, hence there is no authority above them. In the absence of a supra-government above the states, their relations remain characterised by the state of nature where only preparedness and will to power can guarantee the survival of the community.

The principal problem of war among states is intimately tied to Enlightenment and the new political entities it gave birth to. The actual persons or objects that are apprehended by the subject go through the discursive mediations of the political élites before they are diffused in a larger public. They become essentialised and derealised in so far as they are an artificial and mental representation whose reality

cannot be ascertained because the public does not see what is being represented; they see an image of reality and not reality itself. For instance, James Der Derian asks whether science really demystifies events and actors surrounding the subject. His answer is that

the task of modernity is no longer to demystify or disenchant illusion [...] but to save the reality principle, which in this case means, above all else, the sovereign state acting in an anarchical order to maintain and if possible to expand its security and power in the face of penetrating, de-centring forces [...]. (Der Derian 1993: 106)

Ironically, the Enlightenment's purpose was precisely to overthrow Christian mysticism in order to provide an accurate reflection of the world. Instead, it gave birth to a new mystification which bears hardly any resemblance to what is actually happening. The new divination of the state is simply more refined and wraps itself in the concepts of science and philosophy (Cassirer 1946: 289). The new paradigm is a simplistic and abstract typology of actors, events, and threats which can be of practical use for explaining behaviour and prescribing actions. By the same token however, actors and objects are derealised and abstracted by rational thought, but the mental representation that emerges becomes "more real than real" for the subject (Der Derian 1993: 106). In the end "the spatial practices of the state [...] are commitments that are as normative as the spatiality of the Christian imaginary, which divided the world in sacred and profane spaces" (Shapiro 1997: 16). To the extent that states élites and citizens operate in an ideal

realm that requires the search and the identification of threats, identity and security are perpetually sought though they may actually be out of reach (Kedourie 1985: 32).

PART TWO: NAPOLEONIC FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD ENGLAND

CHAPTER THREE

Napoleonic France and the Other

The encounter of post-structuralism with the field of international relations owes a great deal to the rationale of the Cold War. Indeed, much of the scholarship that falls within this school of thought is concerned with the explanation of US foreign policy toward the Soviet Union and, since the end of the Cold War, with US policy toward newly emerging threats that are construed by the foreign policy-making community.

The purpose of this work is to reinscribe post-structuralism and its critique of modernity in the context of the emergence of the latter. France is particularly interesting because it opened a new era in the conduct of foreign policy and in the way the nation is conceived and represented by its leaders. As such, France is a masterpiece of discursive construction and the Napoleonic Wars serve testimony to the power of ideas and words in motivating masses of people.

Though I am primarily concerned with the way Napoleon and his entourage conceived and represented France's Other prior to the Napoleonic Wars, it is important to note that national strictly policies were equally important in making the "Frenchmen." Until today, the role of the French education system is paramount to the infusion of a sense of identity and pride in the people of France.

Consequently, the literature dealing with this aspect of French politics is abundant. But education, even if it is universal such as was the case after the Revolution, is limited in time. The daily drill of elementary and secondary school somehow has to be maintained for socialisation to continue well after the school years. Political discourse and foreign policy then come into play.

When it comes to explicating the genesis of the Napoleonic Wars, two approaches dominate the treatment of the events. One pertains to the realist school in as much as the wars were seen as a response to mounting threats outside France. But as several scholars have remarked, there existed a balance of power in Europe before France broke it with the Napoleonic Wars (Morgenthau 1978: 392; Cox 1987: 123). The other suggests that the military undertakings of France were an attempt at exporting the principles of *liberté, égalité* and *fraternité* to neighbouring monarchies so that they too could come to be ruled by enlightened leaders.

The path I choose to follow is one by which I explicate the occurrence of war by studying how France's enemies were constructed in the process of defining its national identity. It is therefore the representation the élites made of difference and evil that the defined French superiority and France's right to protect itself against it. This chapter will therefore be concerned with the way French leaders portrayed themselves—and by extension, France—as the apostles of Reason seeking to separate irremediably the French from the backward Other. The first section will briefly outline the link between reason and the Republic. The second section

will provide a reading of the Napoleonic discourse concerning France's neighbours and their actions.

Reason and Revolution

The events of 1789 and those of the Napoleonic period can hardly be separated from the debate between reason and passion represented by the struggle between the Republicans and the Royalists both within France and without. The civil wars of the 1790s and the Napoleonic Wars were conducted in an attempt to (re)implement either a monarchy or a republic. For Madame de Staël (1779: Ch. I), the situation of France called for the setting up of a republican regime. Neither a constitutional monarchy on the English model nor an *ancien régime* form of state were apposite given the aims of the Revolution. Reason commanded that the Royalists be combatted to the last energy while she believed the partisans of a limited (constitutional) monarchy to be rational enough to be gained to the revolutionary ideas.

The separation of Church and state implied in the Revolution resulted in the rupture of the only moral link that tied together France and the kingdoms of Europe, thereby setting France apart from the neighbouring monarchies. Reason as an underlying principle organisation and action and the creation of the French nation-state served to come to terms with the universe "out there" that could no

longer be accounted for by the traditional conceptual categories. Writes Campbell of the latter:

Their work can only continue by abjuration rather than affirmation; they can maintain an existence and identity by specifying exceptions and exclusions, but they are no longer able to mobilise support in terms of a prior and positive ideal. (Campbell 1992: 20)

France had been declining since the heyday of the monarchy under the reign of Louis XIV and the French state had to be reconceptualised, that is, created anew. Reason provided the only analytical grid that seemed to be valid at the time given the insistence on principles of the Enlightenment which guided French politics. Nietzsche pointed out in his *Will to Power* that knowledge is useful only in as much as it serves the preservation of one's existence among Others. The reason which guides the study is in fact bounded because it serves only the subject's purposes, that is to say, the development of self-consciousness and the preservation of the body politic that actualises it.

The reality of continental Europe had to fit within the categories having presided to the French Revolution. Because France was resorting to this model to define itself, it corresponded to her interest and could serve as a guide to its own foreign policy. Knowledge of the Other was not purely disinterested; it provided France with its own identity and allowed it to individualise itself and act

accordingly. Knowledge "disclose[d] a reality insofar as it appear[ed] within the behavioural system of instrumental action." (Habermas 1972: 195)

What this shows is that the political system longed for by the revolutionaries could not accommodate itself with any remnants of the *ancien régime*. Should there be any doubt as to this, it was made even clearer with the execution of Louis XVI in 1793. Royalists in any guise were despots seeking their own good at the expense of the Sovereign who, Rousseau argued, has the final say on its own governance. By contrast, "[l]es républicains révolutionnaires [étaient] en France une nation tout à fait à part" (de Staël 1979: 90) in so far as they were enlightened and they put the welfare of the nation above their own interests. Fundamentally, the republic was the ultimate form of government because it recognised the inalienable rights and equality of all individuals and the exclusive validity of the social contract. Conversely, because monarchy rested on religion and faith, it called for a submission to the divine authority of the ruler thereby violating the basic equality principle of republicanism (ibid.: 68)

Napoleon became one such revolutionary when he was put in contact with the ideas of the Revolution (Rose 1902: 26). He said of Jean-Jacques Rousseau:

O Rousseau, why had it to be that you should live only sixty years! In the interests of virtue you ought to have been immortal; but, had you composed only 'le Devin du Village,' this alone would be much for the happiness of

those like thee, and would deserve a statue, to be erected by all who have sensibility. (Rose 1912: 47)

In Napoleon's mouth the words of social contract theorists found no qualifications whatsoever; for Rose, Bonaparte "dogmatically repeats the dicta of Rousseau" (ibid.: 50) as though their timeless wisdom and truth were beyond doubt. According to Rose, Napoleon was more interested in observable "facts" and events that could guide his rule than with mere ideas (ibid.: 236-237). But these "facts" were accessible only to the person who had a prior conceptual framework where the so-called facts could acquire meaning for the observer. As Rousseau had conveniently provided them for Bonaparte, the fundamental categories were there to set the limits of rational thinking.

Concurrently though, "he believed that French people and the human race to be incapable of progressing alone by their own powers; and he always postulated control by the ablest man of the age." (ibid.: 239) In this he was like other intellectuals and/or statesmen who theorised the nation and set out a path to its creation under the leadership of an enlightened man (Rose 1912: 240; Mazzini 1907; Fichte 1968; Mussolini 1937; Hitler 1971). Napoleon Bonaparte was the nation and somewhat echoed Louis XIV when it came to characterise the French nation:

'They seek to destroy the Revolution by attacking my person: I will defend it, for *I am the Revolution*.' [...] They are the daring transcripts of Louis XIV's 'L'Etat, c'est moi' [as] he equated himself with a *movement which*

claimed to be as wide as humanity and infinite as truth. (Rose 1902: 22. My emphasis).

The sovereignty of France was being expressed through his person (see Hegel 1991: 317) and the hero Napoleon therefore incarnated truth and justice as he was part of Madame de Staël's "nation tout à fait à part" endowed with the right to found the French state on the basis of reason (ibid.: 219). Napoleon Bonaparte's role is central to what followed. His military prowess of the 1780s and 1790s contrasted with the apparent failure of the *Directoire* (the government prior to 1799) to manage France's internal and external affairs. This is not to say that he did have the means to solve France's problems, but it signifies the ascendancy he came to have on the French. Consequently, he was in a position to resort effectively to a discourse to which they would listen. The state under the revolutionary rule of Bonaparte was thus to become the omniscient and omnipotent Leviathan who *knew* what ought to be done to secure the welfare of the French people against the irrationality and the evil of the *ancien régime*, (Fisher 1908: Ch. I) as satirically exposed by Voltaire (Warwick 1910: 27). The French Revolution had been what the Enlightenment had seen itself to be: "the culmination of centuries of misrule, a cataclysm that swallowed up dogmas, doctrines, creeds, privileges, and abuses, and destructively marked the beginning of a new social and political era." (ibid.: 33) France carried on its shoulders the destiny of "mankind" and it was up to its foremost leader to see to it that it become a reality. At the same time however,

the advent of democracy was "at the same time an involuntary arrangement for the cultivation of tyrants" (Nietsche 1966: 177).

Representing the Other Under Napoleon: The External Ramifications of Civil Strife

The new democratic regime under which the French were now living imposed at least some measure of legitimacy to the French government. Bonaparte was well aware that in a republican state, the welfare of the masses had to be taken into account. At any rate, they had to be made to perceive the benefits of the republic compared to what other regimes could provide. Napoleon believed that "the state must form morals, control religion, manufacture opinions congenial to its institutions [...]." (Fisher 1908: 32) What better, then, than to find France's Other? Indeed, "où donc chercher le sentiment patriotique si ce n'est *dans une opposition à un régime ou un pays étranger?*" (Lestocquoy 1968: 95. My emphasis) With the creation of the French nation, it becomes natural to look for enemies. If something is going wrong inside the virtuous state, it must be because there are traitors corrupting the nation.

One of the first thing to be achieved before the Revolution could come to a definite end was the territorial unification of the country. The administration had to unify the state under one code of law (the famous *Code Napoléonien*) so that the

rules of the game may be clear for all to live prosperously and peacefully. In his memoirs, Napoleon wrote of the national administrative structure:

Si l'ouverture des routes dans les campagnes est un grand bienfait de toute l'administration, *indispensable au développement de l'agriculture et du commerce*, elle n'est pas d'une moindre importance pour les *progrès de la civilisation, de ces connaissances salutaires, de cette communauté d'intérêts qui donnent à une nation l'aspect et l'esprit de famille. Elle est également nécessaire à l'ordre et la sécurité publique.* (Bonaparte 1910: 443-444. My emphasis)

Moreover, the idea of a territorial state was a sign of the times for according to Connor Cruise O'Brien, there existed a taste for nature in the late eighteenth century. The French nation was more than just a set of ideas and values and institutions; it was also a national community enclosed by natural borders:

La grande nation must first establish itself within its restored *frontières naturelles*. In liberating the areas rightly belonging within the *frontières naturelles*, but formerly separated from the rest of France, *la grande nation* will count on the aid of *les patriotes* living within, or coming from the areas in question." (Godechot in O'Brien 1988: 36)

What determined French identity was not just the territory where one lived, though it too was part of the definition of the republic; it was also what values one believed in. Though areas under dispute were not quite under republican rule yet, they were nevertheless seen as belonging to the republic in as much as some of

their inhabitants adhered to revolutionary thinking. Oddly enough, even where the revolutionaries were by no means predominant, the new government claimed authority by invoking the natural borders principle. In other words, one was French if one believed in the Revolution, and one was *destined* to be French if one lived within the natural borders of France. For the rational mind this moral-territorial disjuncture could only exist at the price of wretchedness (Hegel 1991: 25-26) At any rate, the people could only fall within one of three categories: they were revolutionaries, Royalists or simply out of sync with either side in the dispute. French patriotism could become a reality only if all were to develop a similar self-consciousness as people (as a *patrie*) or something resembling Napoleon's "esprit de famille." In Eastern France, this territorial dimension would remain contentious well after the Revolution in France's relations with Prussia and later Germany.¹

French historians have considered that the presence of the British Navy off the coast of Provence was an attempt at restoring he who would have been Louis XVII after the execution of Louis XVI (Cronin 1971: 72). In the context of world politics, the confrontation between republicanism and monarchy is more than a conflict between reason and passion, or reason and faith. It also takes the form of an opposition between the national in emergence and the transnational.² Securing France was to establish national policy to be debated and implemented on the

¹ I am here referring to the areas known as Alsace-Lorraine and the Rhineland.

² I use the concept of transnationalism because even within Christendom, states were said to exist though they were not nation-states. As kingdoms, they were constitutive elements of a larger entity defined by religion. Thus Louis XIV's "l'État, c'est moi" confirms that there existed a community called France even if it was not conceptualised as the *République française* would be conceptualised after 1789.

French territory. This meant breaking away from Christianity and its transnational philosophical and institutional framework. The peculiarity of the French case resides in the fact that it was the first case of a completely secularised state in the making.

The Other was to be found within as well as without the new nation-state. By Bonaparte's own admission, the problem the government wished to address was twofold. What had to be achieved and then consolidated was internal peace on the one hand and peace/security vis-à-vis the outside on the other.

What poststructural international relations scholarship aptly shows, is that these two dimensions are linked in as much the inside (the realm of the ethical Self) relies on the existence of an outside (the realm of the evil Other) to define itself. In the emergence of the modern nation-state, these two dimensions can hardly be separated in that philosophically and historically (chronologically) Christianity as paradigm and Christendom as a political system predated the republican regime of France. As republicanism emerges from the discontent of intellectuals and masses with this paradigm, domestic peace, security and prosperity can, it seems, only be achieved if the inside is isolated from the outside and if the latter is pacified or otherwise rendered non-threatening.

Although post-structuralism provides the most devastating critique of nationality and territoriality, it is not alone in unearthing the role of the inside-outside and good-evil dichotomies essential to the creation of the nation-state. For

Giddens, for instance, the nation-state "is a set of institutional forms of governance maintaining an administrative monopoly over a territory with demarcated boundaries, its rule being sanctioned by law and direct control of the means of *internal and external violence*." (Giddens 1981: 190) In Giddens's work, morality consists in the pursuance of economic activities whose conduct does include an ethical dimension. State administration to protect the mode of production and the underlying philosophy will therefore be geared toward these two aims using means of internal control and of external defence. Thus, the creation of a ministry of police (under Fouché) and a ministry of external relations (under Talleyrand) provided the institutions whereby these two aspects of nation-building were approached by the state.

The institutional forms (i.e. the nation-state and its apparatus) discussed by Giddens are the concretisation of the Idea of the republic as construed by writers of the Enlightenment and upheld by the French statesmen. It is subsequently transmitted to the citizenry to instill in them a sense of identity. The means of violence, namely the police and the army, provide the force behind the Idea in that they enforce the principles expressed by the constitution and the laws (see *ibid.*: Ch. 7).

While the constitution was in effect in the early years of the decade, when Bonaparte seized power, in many regions of France of which the Vendée is the best known, Republicans and Royalists were still fighting the Revolution. This meant

that there was a need to come to terms with the internal forces that could disturb the smooth functioning of the republic; as long as there remained vestiges of the *ancien régime*—and a fortiori if monarchy was restored—this could not be achieved.

As far as national sovereignty is concerned, Royalist activity was a case of the Other and her agents working within the nation-state to prevent its achievement. In the global or continental context, this conflict was international in scope to the extent that there were allegations of subversive activities engaged in by England with regard to the civil war in Vendée *against* the republic as an independent state (Holtman 1950: 3). As a result there could be said to exist enemies of the Revolution both inside and outside France. Faced with infighting over the spoils of the Revolution on French soil, Napoleon wanted to put an end to the Revolution, that is, to unify the country once and for all under a single rule and separate it politically from the outside. Wrote Alexis de Tocqueville about Napoleon's accession to power in 1799: "For the sake of rest and order, the nation throws itself in the arms of a man who is believed sufficiently strong to arrest the Revolution and sufficiently generous to consolidate its gains." (Tocqueville in Hayward 1991: 36) Political, legal and economic benefits were said to derive from the independence of the republic. By contrast, proper administration was not possible unless political links with the outside were broken.

What makes the role of the Chouans interesting is the way their activities are linked in political discourse to the alleged foreign intervention under the

leadership of England in favour of the *ancien régime*. Their primacy in the conduct of the internal affairs of the republic and their importance as agents of England and the monarchy insured that they would become a noteworthy element of French politics under Bonaparte and an appealing target for those statesmen in search of France's nemesis. So much so in fact that Fouché, the minister responsible for the police, would come up with his own form of social analysis of Chouan activity in the country, thereby giving rise to an early form of McCarthyism. Fouché

avait prescrit d'établir sur les départements insurgés un travail spécial pour constituer ce qu'il appelait sa *topographie chouannique* [!]: noms des individus mêlés à des insurrections, à des conspirations ou à l'espionnage anglais, liste des anciens chouans avec indication de ce qu'il étaient devenus, documents relatifs aux localités suspectes, aux point de débarquement sur les côtes, aux gîtes de brigands, aux routes suivies par eux[;] tout était soigneusement noté et catalogué. (d'Hauterive 1943: 63-64)

The displacement of the emphasis from merely territoriality to population gave rise what to what Foucault called the *Panopticon* whose role is not only to restrain the people—as Hobbes's Leviathan—but survey them, identify them and act upon them in order to shape them. The *Panopticon* is "une nouvelle mécanique: isolement et regroupement des individus; localisation des corps; utilisation optimale des forces; contrôle et amélioration du rendement; bref, une mise en place de toute une discipline de la vie, du temps, des énergies" (Foucault 1988: 49).

In reinforcing France's identity as *nation*-state, it was crucial to make it clear to all that foreign intervention on behalf of *ancien régime* values was the mark of unjust foreign powers that opposed the just and altruistic cause of the Republicans. France, as "un peuple libre et juste" was pitted against those monarchies that did not and, for lack of the proper regime, could meet the conditions required for the maintenance of freedom and justice in Europe or in France itself.

The role of the Royalists in defining what France was politically is an idea also propounded by Bergeron (1981). The Revolution came to an end in as much as the basic framework within which national life could take place was deemed to exist already though it had yet to be consolidated with regard to the alternatives still incarnated by the rest of Europe, hence the rhetoric of the French national anthem, the Marseillaise:

*Quoi! des cohortes étrangères
Feraient la loi dans nos foyers!
Quoi! ces phalanges mercenaires
Terrasseraient nos fiers guerriers!*

At the time of Bonaparte's accession to power, this was still a valid assessment of the internal situation and the role of the statesman as seen by Bonaparte made his arrival a kind of revolution from above because of the centralisation of power in the Consulate and the attempt at remaking French society based on a different and better model. For this to be achieved though, the state must weed out internal opposition and appeal to the sentiments of its people to fight for their *patrie*.

The State Above All: Belief and Love of Country as Citizenship

Much of the initial conceptualisations of world politics owe their existence to practitioners of statesmanship or war. The writings of Machiavelli, Metternich, Clausewitz, and Carr are all based on personal experiences in the conduct of foreign policy. As science claims to be based on empirical verification, the regularities observed by these theorists acquire a status of eternal truths and remained unquestioned. The realists contend that values, beliefs and ideologies are mere fig leaves which conceal the political man's true motivation: the quest for power. However, in an edited volume Little and Smith (1988) put forth the idea that beliefs systems are part and parcel of the conduct of foreign policy. Beliefs are generally referred to in what is called foreign policy making analysis that deal with élites but not in collective social behaviour oriented toward the outside (MacLean 1988: 62). The individualism implied in the concept of belief might cause us to overlook the way in which the élites' belief may be transmitted to larger groups and indeed the nation as a whole. This is where language comes into play; the beliefs of the élites and the analysis they give birth to must be made intelligible to the population being ruled so that they may approve and support the actions taken by state officials. The beliefs being infused in the citizenry are at once the legitimating force behind foreign policy acts, the motivation of these acts, and the condition of membership in the community without which one is a stranger.

In France the constitution and the *Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen* adjoined to it created the legal category of citizen but this was solely a legal and mental category with no counterpart in the minds of the French. As far as the élites were concerned, the conceptualisation and the emergence of the nation-state in Enlightenment thinking provided seemingly irrefutable proof of the natural character of this form political community. The certainty of apprehending subjects and practitioners of world politics precluded the consideration of other hypotheses. In reality, for Napoleon, the hypothesis was already proven. It simply remained to be acted upon. If we start off by declaring something to be good or to be bad as such, the attitude toward the object under consideration will be rejection and its identification as a problem to be solved. In France, the evil nature of the monarchy had been established before the Revolution proper. The consolidation of the republic following it required that the belief in its merits be shared by all. In a dichotomous frame of mind such as that of the Enlightenment, the counter-hypothesis to republicanism was unacceptable to begin with. Consequently, the only fundamental category of thinking allowable was the sovereign nation-state and it was participation in it and the willingness defend it that constituted the ultimate test of citizenship.

As reasoning subject, the First Consul (Napoleon Bonaparte) provided the Self that incarnated the republic and who sought its Other outside it. In effect, shortly after the Brumaire coup, the Royalists were targeted in official discourse.

On 19 Brumaire, they were warned that they would never be restored to power in France for they would be definitely defeated by the Republicans (Bergeron 1982: 15). Bergeron nonetheless questions the extent to which the conspirators that opposed Bonaparte really went beyond "salon opposition" to the Revolution (ibid.: 98). He points out that opposition came from a variety of places such as the disgruntled military and from the Consulate itself (the executive of the government). Yet it was the Royalists and the *émigrés* allegedly protected and financed by England that took the brunt of the attack. Napoleon's adversaries within the regime could be disposed of based on what was thought to be necessary in terms of internal politics, that is, *inside the sovereign sphere* of the nation-state. Whatever the treatment of internal enemies, the process would presumably be conducted according to the legal principles set out in the constitution that provided the basic political unit one had to work with. The Royalists and the *émigrés*, however, could be identified with England and designated as the foreign forces trying to subvert the Revolution. In the relations between France and England, the absolute nature of *liberté, égalité, and fraternité* were confronted by obstacles embodied by England and the monarchies of Europe. They were in various ways antithetical to France because they stood in the way of French interests as defined by Napoleon. External as well as internal troubles of France were traced back to England's behaviour and the now deposed French monarchy (H. Deutsch 1938: 98).

Nevertheless, according to Harold Deutsch, Bonaparte did not have ingrained hatred for England (*ibid.*). It too was considered a great people but the republicanism of France meant that the first and foremost responsibility of the government was to the French themselves. Bonaparte considered France's internal political enemies intelligent people that could be used to build the country if they could be made to adhere to the project set forth by the Revolution but, by the same token, as *the* enlightened ruler, Napoleon saw himself as the one person who should be in power while deploring that "everyone thinks himself competent to rule the country" (Ludwig 1926: 176-177). For him, then, the Jacobins and the Royalists could not fulfil the role of ruler due to their lack of proper vision and ideas. They could, however, serve under Bonaparte. What is important to understand in Napoleon's overtures to "enemies" of the republic was that they could be included in the nation-state provided that they showed repent for past anti-revolutionary actions and beliefs and that they swear an oath of allegiance (Tarlé 1937: 114). These "reformed" Jacobins and Royalists appeared to be moderates that were used to shield Bonaparte from their former associates and their inclusion purported to show a willingness to try and reconcile the French and unify the nation against the dangers embodied by the foreign powers (Hutt 1968: 16-17).

Bonaparte made offers to the Royalist forces in the hope that they would change their allegiance upon seeing what republicanism meant. By virtue of their

disruptive activities, the armed peasants fighting for the restoration of the monarchy were often readily associated to brigands by the French authorities in as much as they disturbed the peace. But d'Hauterive remarks that they were fighting for an ideal which had been put in question by the French Revolution of 1789, i.e., the monarchy and its feudal structure. It may appear surprising that the peasantry would cling to its old ways and oppose the introduction of political liberalism. But as other examples of commodification of the land have shown, liberalisation in the countryside comes at the expense of traditional social structure and is concomitant with social dislocation (Polanyi 1957; Dobb 1963: 125). But after all, were not reason, liberalism, and political freedom the surest paths to happiness as claimed in the American constitution? The peasants could be appealed to by the republican government and be guaranteed a fair deal within a republican regime that cared for its citizens.

For French statesmen, the Chouans were victims of the cowardice of their Royalist leaders in that they were not present in France to command them on the battlefield (Ludwig 1926:189). By comparison, the revolutionary leaders were willing to fight and die for the republic because it did serve the interests of the people rather than those of the nobility. Thus, if the Royalists could be reasoned with, the "real" bandits appeared to be simple thieves that did not uphold particular beliefs; in the eyes of the authorities, they simply made the best of a confused and unstable situation (d'Hauterive 1943: 61-62). For Napoleon

Bonaparte, those siding with the Royalists in spite of his peace offers such as the Chouans were bandits just like everyday criminals though it might be said that their crime was to be mistaken. Since the newly emerging form of state had not yet been apprehended as a problem, republicanism provided an attractive alternative for those dissatisfied with the *ancien régime*. A decade after the founding of the republic, the hindsight of intellectuals like Proudhon and Marx was still lacking to critique the new model. Furthermore, the belief in the virtues of reason and positivism gave it credibility.

To show how allegiance to the nation is the prime criterion on which to judge an individual's sense of belonging, let us consider one of the most noteworthy associates of Bonaparte who belonged to his political foes, the Royalist Talleyrand who was put in charge of external affairs.

In his *Napoleon et Talleyrand*, Émile Dard (1935) expounds the reasons and contradictions of Bonaparte's political relationship with his minister of external affairs. Talleyrand's royalism was compensated by the fact that he believed in the defence of France internal and constitutive state (ibid.: 39). Put differently, France's internal governance structure had to remain founded on its constitution and required the independence of the country. In representing England as a threat to the republic, Napoleon could consider Talleyrand as one of those Royalists who was convinced that one should work for the construction of the nation-state in so far as he was in agreement with the principle of constitutionalism and the

separation of domestic politics from external politics. Though a supporter of the monarchy as a sound political regime as such, Talleyrand identified England as the chief power France must contend with. According to Dard, in distinguishing between France and England and participating in Bonaparte's Consulate, he wished to show the French what it was he and Napoleon Bonaparte were trying to create, that is, a stable and strong republic. For Talleyrand, England's opposition to the Revolution was a means to weaken France not just as a republic but more generally as state. Talleyrand said of Pitt, now prime minister of England: "Il désire que la royauté soit rétablie en France; il n'aperçoit que dans cette destruction du régime républicain, une garantie parfaite contre l'ambition des Français, et un moyen suffisant de négocier avec eux" (Talleyrand in *ibid.*: 41). Should France fail to resist England, this would be an inevitable state of affairs because the Bourbon dynasty would be restored.

Once this had been clear in Talleyrand's mind, foreign interference in France's internal affairs albeit for the benefit of the monarchy, became henceforth undesirable. In spite of Talleyrand's royalist sympathies the problem was this: officially, for him, France did not wish to get involved in the other states' internal matters and the same was expected of them with regard to France. States should therefore behave toward one another according to what he termed the "droit général des nations, et [...] ses traités particuliers" (*ibid.*: 42). The mutual independence aspired to therefore implied an absolute respect of the various

principles underlying the said nations. This is seemingly incompatible with the universal aims of the *ancien régime* but given that both were in agreement as the basic concept of national sovereignty, Talleyrand was worthy of serving as a diplomat of the republic. For James Der Derian (1987), the Enlightenment and the French Revolution marked a new period in the way states make use of their representatives to communicate their desire to one another. The diplomats of neo-diplomacy are enjoined to show unfettered patriotism in the activities of their office and they must behave so that they signify to the foreign governments the break that occurred with the formation of the nation-state on whose behalf they speak; no longer do they have to show the same respect to foreign sovereigns for the people now most worthy of respect are no longer the divine kings of foreign kingdoms but rather the citizens of their own nation (ibid.: 175). The diplomat becomes the messenger *of* the nation and it is through him that its will is expressed *to* the foreigners and that knowledge arrives to the head of the executive. He is therefore expected to adhere to the ways of the nation whose spokesperson he is. Indicative of the importance of the nation as a concept versus the outside is the French government's attitude toward even diplomats and other officials of foreign countries who were considered as potential threats: they were to be arrested if they were suspect (d'Hauterive 1943: 107) in spite of the fact that states usually grant immunity to foreign representatives.

The death of George Washington provided an additional opportunity to reassert the ethical character of republicanism at the same time as to criticise the cunning behaviour of the British. For Napoleon Bonaparte, Washington was a great man of history who had fought against tyranny; the French and the Americans had both fought for freedom and equality in their respective revolutions (Thiers 1845: I, 217). Incidentally, in 1776 the Americans colonists had precisely ousted the British and their administration and the French were trying to curtail English influence in France against the republic in the 1790s. The universality of republicanism was made clearer by the parallels drawn between Washington and his duel with England, and French personalities who were defending the republic against the same enemy (*ibid.*: I, 249).

Giddens argues that a strong emphasis has been placed on revolutions—and we may want to add the intellectuals who provide the moral force behind them—as the prime vector of socio-political transformation in Europe while in reality the passage from absolutism to the republican nation-state was the product of protracted conflict which turned divided territories into larger territorial units (Giddens 1981: 187). It was also the discursive construction of the nation and its Other that turned the idea into a reality in the mind of the masses rather than only in the mind of the *élites*.

But there is a rationale for the use of revolution in political discourse. Revolutions and the way they are remembered and used to produce a powerful

founding myth for a people to identify with its nation and its beginning. The actual making of the nation pertains in fact to the protracted conflicts which occur before and even after the founding act. The achievement of statehood and national identity depends on the ultimate result of the confrontation of ideas through "free speech" and public debate as well as that of the so-called civil wars which are *civil* only in so far as they are conceptualised by the proponent of the nation-state and the creators of an internal order that breaks clear of the state of nature "out there." This is not to say that the French Revolution was not a true revolution, for it was a radical transformation of the class structure and ideas represented in the government. Rather, it means that the change was not immediately felt throughout the country to the extent that it remained to be unified. The Revolution was an anecdote (see Frykenberg 1996: Ch. 4) and as a compressed image that summarised what France was meant to be and how it should be seen by its own inhabitants and which could be invoked to provide its essence. Yet, the development of French patriotism by confrontation with the Other had yet to take place though the institutions had already come into existence with the Revolution. The nation-state may have been formally founded in 1789, but *nation-building* would not be completed as long as the pacification of the country was incomplete; this meant curbing the relentless opposition of the Royalist forces in the French countryside and their association with England's government in order to challenge to sovereignty of the state.

In apparent contradiction with the tenets of republicanism, Napoleon Bonaparte had sought the collaboration of Talleyrand though he was avowedly a Royalist. Talleyrand's acceptance of the basic idea of the state was not the only reason he was appealing. Bonaparte himself did not disregard monarchy and its religious dimension as a valid tool of statecraft. As I have discussed in chapter two using Fichte and Mazzini, the reasoning ego of the Enlightenment is also an individual(ist) thinker and nation-building opposes this individualism of the physical person. At the same time, it must overcome the lingering solidarities present in certain groups or classes such as the peasantry. In its conceptualisation of the nation-state, modernity is about faith in and love of the nation, it is about the

unité retrouvée par-delà les luttes de classes, unité qui est celle de la France, de la patrie, et que symbolise [...] la fête de la Fédération du 14 juillet 1790 [and the republic is] croyance en l'évolution vers la liberté, identification de la justice et d'une nation, la France, recherche de l'unité au-delà des déchirements sociaux, rêve d'une nouvelle religion capable de donner son unité à la société. (Touraine 1992: 91-92. My emphasis)

Talleyrand wanted a return to the monarchy and Bonaparte felt that giving a divine character to the state and his own person could rally the people (Dard 1935: 50) though the empire which lasted from 1804 to 1815 was not to resemble the France of the Bourbon kings. Within, religion reclaimed its status as the cement between the people but it was meant to tie them together *as a nation* vis-à-vis the

outside. In this sense, religious authorities were forced to show allegiance to the republic before they showed allegiance to the Christian community of faith that transcended the boundaries of France. Yet, thanks to religion, the French head of state could acquire legitimacy in his dealings with other monarchs. Religion did not defeat the purpose of the French Revolution to the extent that the French Catholic church was to remain subordinated to the French government. The church, much like the education system or the state administration, was conceived as the transmission belt of the values and beliefs to be infused in the French. For example, until 1805, the clergy was asked to relay the news published in official journals to their parish (Lyons 1994: 182). Unlike the United States, religious belief had not presided to the founding of the new state (Bercovitch 1975); religion and its institutional forms had been overthrown in 1789 and replaced by a thoroughly secularised state. Its subsequent cooptation and utilisation as a tool of statecraft under state tutelage added a mystical dimension to the nation as it filled a vacuum. It supplemented the love of country and secular patriotism with spiritual fulfilment for the masses in view of better harmony within the body politic.

The state nevertheless remained a secular form in France. The use of religion was grounded in pragmatism rather than in the sincere belief in the sacred character of the nation in the minds of the *élites*. Religion had therefore only a limited use in the definition of France as a kind of Promised Land. The decades which followed the Revolution were also the epoch of Romanticism. In the context of state-

building: "Romanticism was a revolt, indeed a double revolt: against the Rationalism with its primacy of the head over the heart, and against Classicism with its hierarchies of style and subject matter, its formalizing and normalizing." (Binion 1990: 115)

The fact that Romanticism existed as a broad literary and artistic current should not however occlude the pervasiveness of Rationalism and its role in the process of nation-building. Images of love and motherhood fit the description of the feelings the citizens were expected to have for their country. The art of the 1790s with its representation of the republic as a woman waving the tricoloured flag on Bastille Day and later as a mother nursing her children as sons (and daughters) of the Revolution constituted the counterpart to the representation of the evil outside the home that the republic became. Romanticism was a potent means of suscitating the love of the country. At the same time though, it was an unresolved conflict for the lover (ibid.: 120) in so far as sections of French society were still attracted the universalism of the *ancien régime* at the expense of the exclusive love for the state.

The intensity of the feelings toward the nation and the sense of threat in the face of the possible loss of a loved one turned traditional war into total war. For Lestocquoy (1968), war was for the monarchy a game where the foreigner was not a true enemy. Under republicanism however, it is the nation itself that seizes power and makes war on the Other. Thus he writes: "La foule, le Tiers État qui

naît, ne cherche pas au-delà de la frontière; elle déteste les Anglais et reproche à Marie-Antoinette d'être l'Autrichienne. Bientôt, le Tiers Etat prendra le pouvoir: le patriotisme agressif va naître." (Lestocquoy 1968: 95) The reification of peoples, nations, and their states is generalised while few even think about it so as to make it a kind of second nature. The condition of patriotism is that one be willing to answer the republic's demands for its protection. According to Condorcet the values professed under the monarchy must be relegated beyond the tightly knit package of the revolutionary and republican ideals: "Il faut mettre la justice, la bienfaisance, l'amour de la patrie, la haine des tyrans, bien au-dessus de la chasteté, de la fidélité conjugale, de la sobriété." (Condorcet in *ibid.*: 84) Should the citizens of France lack the fervour required to defend the motherland against foreign dangers, France would revert back to darker days which, the government claimed in its portrayal of the Other, were part of the routine in France's enemies. Now that it had been established beyond doubt that European states were evil, the task of Bonaparte was to convey to his compatriots the sense of insecurity they ought to share and why war was required. This is the object of the next chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR

Threat, Security and the Napoleonic Wars

The previous chapter was concerned essentially with the identification of the sources of France internal problems and how they were seen to be linked to foreign intervention in violation of the republic's sovereignty. It also showed how a sense of belonging as well a feeling of acceptance from the national community in emergence depended on shared beliefs among members and their concomitant rejection of the Other previously identified. As political animals, humans search the company of others. Though political communities can be said to form at different levels such as the nuclear family, the extended family, clan, tribe, nation, humanity, the one community in emergence in France was the nation. It was therefore the nation and its institutions that were thought to provide a sense of security vis-à-vis the evils of the world.

The purpose of this chapter, then, is to address the mechanisms whereby the danger incarnated by the Other was construed by French political élites. Thus, I will first discuss the meaningfulness of the concept of security as it is conceived by the state-centric approach adopted with the creation of the French nation-state. Subsequently, I will provide a reading of the French government's portrayal of foreign states' action toward the republic and what these actions were said to entail

for France if they succeeded. In the last part of the chapter, I will make clear how the threat posed by the evil Other meant that the preservation of the Self in the form of the nation required the "unfortunate" use of violence.

France and the Idea of Security

In 1990, Ken Booth wrote about the dissolution of the Cold war world order, its (in)security and the absence of a replacement order, calling it an interregnum: "An interregnum is a useful way to talk about the present" (Booth 1990: 315). An interregnum, I contend, is also a useful way to talk about the European context at the time of Bonaparte's accession to power. Booth further comments that

how we get to become what we become (beyond the interregnum) will partly depend on our images and vision. There is always a dynamic between image and reality in human relationships. If we insist upon old images, the future will naturally tend to replicate the past. (ibid.)

Then again, the new images we form of ourselves and of others may give rise to a new future that is not necessarily better than the past. At any rate, the situation that was to emerge with the French Revolution did not provide France or Europe with the stability sought. It did however change international relations and the way international actors would be conceptualised for many years to come, for the age of the bourgeois revolutions patterned after the French one was about to

start in continental Europe. In the meantime, the onset of the Napoleonic Wars was an attempt to go beyond the interregnum of the years 1789-1803 but it did not result in the permanent order France had wished for its own security.

When reflecting on the case of France, we ought to be careful not to mistake the contemporary conceptualisations of security with those prevailing at the time of the French Revolution as in the Post-Cold War era the concept means at one and the same time everything and nothing (Walker 1997: 63). The French Revolution and the republic that arose from it were purportedly meant to give the people of France a basic level of personal security from injustice, inequality (in rights), and arbitrariness unknown to them under the previous monarchical regime. But who the French were as a people was also what the French state stood for and it stood for a new model called republicanism. Their identity as a people was tied to the ideas that presided to the foundation of the nation-state as opposed to the ideas and institutions still in existence elsewhere in Europe. Their image of Self, their identity, its meaning, and its institutional form thus formed a whole under attack from without. Security for the people of France thus took on the shape of individual emancipation from the previous oppressive ideological and political structure and the creation of their own *national* alternative. Consequently, the task of the state was to keep supporters of the former regime out of the republic and enforce its sovereignty.

In the words of Katzenstein, "political identities are to significant degrees constructed within [the international] environment." (Katzenstein 1996: 26) The construction of identity takes place inside the nation-state but it relies on the existence of the Other to define itself as different and better. And, as previously stated, the founding of a nation-state did not change the fact that France remained part of a continental state system. For its government, its emancipation as a state was hindered by the presence and attitude of the Other who was seemingly determined not to let the French get away with their Revolution and break away from Christendom. This opposition was a denial of the French identity and of its individual aspirations.

In presenting the principles according to which states should relate to one another, one foreign affairs minister of France who was to serve under Bonaparte had said in the 1790s that "un grand peuple, un peuple *libre et juste*, est allié naturel de tous les peuples, et *ne doit point avoir d'alliance* qui le lient au sort, aux intérêts, aux passions de tel ou tel peuple" (Dumouriez in Der Derian 1987: 175. My emphasis). Given the relations France alleged England to entertain with continental monarchies, it saw England's behaviour as a violation of the right of France to live according to its own wishes. For the France of the Revolution, states had to relate to one another as individuals and respect one another's independence and interests and live peacefully as long as no other state impinged on the other's right. The perceived concerted interference of foreign powers on France's own soil

throughout the 1790s and later, the alleged formation of alliances against France were thus bound to elicit accusations on the part of the French leadership. In gathering support for the state, Napoleon could make full use of these events and of the national rhetoric to portray France's enemies as backward peoples which stood in the way of progress represented by the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. Worse yet, they wished to bring France back into the past.

Sameness and difference play an important role in determining the level of security enjoyed by the Self. Thus, if difference is extreme as was said to be the case, the Self does not feel secure for it does not trust the Other to respect its individuality. But does difference necessarily mean danger? This question leads to a questioning of the actual threats France was facing. The main threats to France were in fact curbed after Bonaparte took power. His aim had been to root out royalism within and achieve peace with European states without. In early 1802, these two objectives were attained and they were met with satisfaction among all walks of life in France, for keeping the monarchy out was thought to be all that was needed to be secure and prosperous (Tarlé 1937: 108).

The French Revolution had purported to be the dawn of a new political culture which was supposed to put an end to conflicts among peoples. To Kant, Hegel, and the revolutionaries themselves, the triumph and spread of reason would eliminate the divisions grounded in passion. Yet this political culture with the face of science was housed in one particular state: France, and not in the others.

Unfortunately, "international patterns of amity and enmity have important cultural dimensions" (Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996: 34) and amity relies on a fair amount of sameness. Once the French Republic was founded on a territorial and ideal basis, the structure which arose in both realms led almost naturally to a pattern of enmity which fed on events such as subversion or alliance formation against France to prove itself as the incontrovertible reality.

The major achievement of Napoleon with regard to England was the peace of Amiens in 1802. As it was seen by the French statesmen, the treaty was not just a formal end to the conflict between France and England. It was also an end to English intervention in European affairs and the recognition of France's hegemony in continental Europe (Tarlé 1937: 133). Yet peace between foes does not signify their merger into a single entity and identity. The difference persists and so does the potential for mistrust and conflict.

For Philip Lawrence, "foreign policy decision-making is premised on perceptions and imagery" (Lawrence 1988: 139). After several years of depicting England as the evil Other, the image associated with this country was such that it could not but appear to be at the service of evil: "Nations are divided into 'good' and 'bad'—the enemy is all bad, one's own nation is of spotless virtue" (Boulding in *ibid.*: 141). Interests, values, and motives had been ascribed to England during its construction as the Other. Now that peace was signed, the relationship was one of truce commanded by the lack of resources to continue fighting. Thus, in spite of

peace, England remained a potential threat in so far as it still stood for all that the Revolution and the republic rejected. The mythology and imagery associated with France and England perpetuated the dialectical relationship between them. The Other being evil, its characterisation as a threat was unproblematic; for the French, it was evident that by agreeing to the peace of Amiens, England was acting strategically and not in good faith.

The character of national security is multidimensional (Buzan 1991: Ch. 2). The state's boundaries are not limited to the physical realm of the so-called *frontières naturelles* for the state is a sense of commonality shared by its people more than a physical attribute: "the two main sources for the idea of the state are to be found in the nation and in organizing ideologies" (ibid.: 70). In France, though, the nation did not exist as such prior to the Revolution for France was an ethnically divided country. The natural borders and the enforcement of their closure but were but one dimension of national security. What existed in France was an organising ideology in the form of the revolutionary national idea and it is ideology which was preached inside and defended against foreign influences. It was its ideal and institutional forms that were under the pressure of *ancien régime* forces. To counteract the ephemeral nature of the idea of security, the reiterated negative portrayal of England and the threat it posed to France was paramount in identifying the source of danger.

States as Persons or the Impossibility of a France-England Contract

In his discussion of the role of revolutions in shaping international relations, Fred Halliday (1995) argues that state security comprises an horizontal and a vertical dimension. That is to say that revolutions are upheavals which take place in order to provide an alternative political system within a state. Vertical security refers to the security enjoyed by social actors in their interactions in the daily conduct of political affairs of the state. By contrast, horizontal security concerns the preservation of the national system from international threats represented by the Other.

As shown above, France escaped the transnational framework of Christendom so as to provide security for the people living on its territory. It established its independence by excluding *ancien régime* elements. From the perspective of social contract theory, the founding of the French nation-state gave birth to a legal person, a subject free to determine itself, that "desired" to be recognised as such by its European neighbours:

The nation-state is the spirit in its substantial rationality and immediate actuality, and is therefore the absolute power on earth; each state is consequently a sovereign and independent entity in relations to other. The state has a primary and absolute entitlement to be a sovereign and

independent power *in the eyes of others*, i.e., *to be recognised by them*. (Hegel 1991: 366-367)

But because difference is so crucial in fostering mutual understanding and trust, what the French called sister republics (Palmer 1971: Ch. 6) was deemed to be essential to France's security in so far as they would not threaten France due to their similar founding principles and values. For France, there could exist a form of contractual arrangement with them. In terms of Essence, they would be like France and therefore, they would be unthreatening. The basic condition of peace was therefore thought to be republicanism across the continent. The larger states of Europe were not sister republics as defined by France but they were nevertheless expected to abide by rules of conduct set by France. In other words, although they did meet the requirements of social contractarianism, they had to recognise the individuality of the French state.

On the one hand Bonaparte was entrusted with the duty of looking after the well-being of the French above all. On the other, the republican ideal was considered as an unshakable truth that could not accept compromises with the Other. France expected its independent national desires to be met regardless of the regime to which the Other belonged.

For Hollis and Smith "[g]ame theory is a splendid tool of contractarian thinking—the rational individualism which has inspired most versions of the social contract" (Hollis and Smith 1991: 128). The trust required for a sense of security

was absent of the relations between France and England to the extent that the latter player was not a sister republic. In so far as it favoured the restoration of the Bourbons to the throne it did not regard France as a rightfully existing person to be respected in this quality.

France took states to be the fundamental actors of international politics *and* it required of them (through the sister republic condition) a degree of similarity sufficient to enter in a contractual agreement based on the respect of states *as persons*. Napoleon's thinking remained caught up in an ideal republican framework which assumed not that states were identical, but that they were different *and evil*, and that *they should be the same*. Hence,

game theory makes assumptions that seem inappropriate to international relations. The most problematic are that players understand the rules, can communicate (or at least have their strategies understood by the other player), and assign the same values to pay-offs. (ibid.: 139)

France and England did not agree to the same fundamental rules and they did not assign the same values to pay-offs. For the French, England was attempting to restore the monarchy against the republic. The recreation of the transnational link broken in 1789 was unacceptable from the standpoint of France because it meant returning to the previous insecurity of the monarchy. Furthermore, the basic irrational nature of the rules professed by the *ancien régime* was incompatible with

the concessions France would have to make if it were to become party to a contract with its British Other.

"The international system is a 'society' in which states, as a condition of their participation in the system, adhere to *shared norms and rules* in a variety of issue areas." (Jepperson et al. 1996: 45. My emphasis) When presented with this, we might be tempted to say that peace is merely a question of identifying common ground for states to relate to one another. The problem confronted here though, is not one of defining issue areas that can serve as common grounds for France and England to acknowledge and accept each other's status. It is rather a much more acute problem raised by the essential ontological dialectic at play between the nation-state and Christendom, good and evil, the resolution of which entailed the victory of either France or England.

France's approach to peace negotiation with its enemies and with England in particular was essentially strategic in that France did not believe in England's good faith. This precluded a true agreement between the foes. In his *Theory of Communicative Action* (1983, 1987), Habermas distinguishes two orientations in social communications. One, called communicative action, is a communicative process in which social agents engage subjectively in a dialogue without a predetermined conception of truth they are trying to impose. As their assertions are challenged by their interlocutors, they revise their own positions and arguments until—ideally—a common position is reached. If one's validity claims are

consistently met with dissatisfaction on the part of other agents, the speaker-subject will not be able to prevail. This is the process taking place in a negotiation where the goal is mutual understanding among the parties. But this would require that France abandon its perspective on what constituted a fair outcome, that it recognise the equal validity of England's claims to truth. In principle "everyone capable of speech and action is entitled to take part in the argumentation and [...] everyone is entitled to question any assertion, to introduce new topics, to express attitudes, needs, and desires [...]" (Cooke 1997: 31) but speech in the context of modern discourse is not mere colloquial language; it comes with an ontology and an array of rules that *cannot*, for fear of irrationality, be altered to accommodate the Other's own subjectivity in so far as it is quite simply denied.

Going into these negotiations, France had one predetermined set of truths to put forth and it wished to have them prevail. Bonaparte knew in advance what the outcome *must* be. Social interaction by way of diplomacy fell in the second category of social communication, the strategic one. Whether England was sincere or not mattered little as far as Napoleon's view was concerned. British foreign policy since the Revolution had already produced a diagnosis of the situation and a characterisation of England as the evil Other. England was a threat to France and its Revolution and was trying to destabilise it. Hence, France must act in a way that best served its preservation as a nation-state. A good Cold War example of this attribution of intention to the Other is the following quote from Henry

Kissinger's *Diplomacy*: "Whenever Stalin miscalculated [...], it was because he assumed that his counterparts were also conducting *Realpolitik* in the same cold-blooded fashion as he" (Kissinger 1994: 500) while the United States were not. Similarly, Bonaparte assumed that England's government was thinking and acting strategically in order to undermine France's position. This, in the first place, was a strategic move on the part of France because it situated itself vis-à-vis the Other.

In the absence of a republican regime in England that recognised France, the question remained the way to guarantee its preservation. What the realist paradigm professes is that security can be achieved by developing one's military potential and establish a balance of power or that a great power should take it upon itself to provide order as a form of international public good for the benefit of all members of the society of states. However, the idea of such a society of states fails to account for the somewhat arbitrary nature of this great power's behaviour. France was but one nation where a set of ideas had been developed and put into practice. As legitimate and as universal as these claimed to be, they were the product of a subject own evolution and confrontation with its environment and therefore, were not an objective truth. Yet, the reliance of French statesmen on an absolute called Reason provided a powerful justification for not compromising with England. What is more, as subject, France felt justified to define the rules of behaviour and by extension the deviant nature of the British Other (see Jepperson et al. 1996: 46). France did not question its own righteousness though it did that of England.

Hegel argued that the subject has within herself the means to determine what is right. But he also recognised that what is wrong can easily be defended on some ground or another (Hegel 1991: 117). As long as it is the subject who looks out of her position, her rights appear to be unequivocal. Any behaviour that does not recognise the subject's right is therefore wrong and deceptive vis-à-vis the subject. France existed as a matter of *fact* in that it existed *in itself*: "The French Republic is no more in need of recognition than the sun is" (Bonaparte in *ibid.*: 367). This nevertheless remained to be confirmed by the recognition of the Other that France could exist *for itself* also and remain totally independent of the other states. Yet, in the end

the emancipatory spirit of the Enlightenment was always *nothing more* than a dream, that notion of a universal emancipatory theory and practice, capable of freeing people from the ideas and structures that oppress them, was always and inevitably the 'will to power' of certain actors, in a power matrix designed to privilege certain discursive practices. (George 1995: 159. Emphasis in the text)

Diplomacy and War: The Rupture of the Peace of Amiens

War has been attributed to a variety of causes in the course of the development of international relations theory but one of the most interesting explanations from the point of view of this study is that of miscalculation. This contention may not

be so far from the truth as we might think; as one person put it, "accidental war was [until the 1960s] a neglected phenomenon that merited careful studies. For one of the most prominent birth-marks of war theorising in the last decade is the assumption that some wars are accidental" (Blainey 1988: 132). This is an assertion that much post-structuralists can agree with although the miscalculation spoken of here may be of a much profound nature than the above-cited author implied.

If war occurs, it may be precisely because of the thinking behind the idea of the nation-state. For in the process of creating the nation and its institutions based on the idea, the head of state lays the foundations for future conflict. Hence, the greatest miscalculation may just be the Enlightenment's concept of nation. If the development of national consciousness and its preservation is akin the Hegelian phenomenology of spirit, then, one must wonder how war could be avoided indefinitely as conflict is an inherent part of the Self's evolution and its self-definition.

Once it has been established rationally and realised discursively that the nation is the ultimate achievement of human perfectibility, its preservation leads to the familiar terrain of *realpolitik*. Before the rupture between France and England, the possibility of contracting was barred due to the mistrust of France toward England. In order to defend its own conception of truth, France was left with the two possibilities referred to above, i.e., establish a balance of power or impose its hegemony in the state system of Europe. Both solutions were envisaged by

Napoleon Bonaparte but the impossibility of establishing the former would eventually lead to the latter through the conquest of European monarchies by France to assert its hegemony over the continent to defend it against England's ambitions.

Establishing a balance of power

While negotiating peace treaties with lesser powers of Europe, Bonaparte had accused England of interfering with peace attempts. France had been attempting to reach an agreement with Austria at Campo Formio in its negotiations with the Austrian plenipotentiary. While there was an improvement in the situation as the parties agreed to keep the positions they now occupied in Italy and Germany, the Austrian negotiator was disavowed by the minister for foreign affairs who now required that France signed peace with both Austria and England, or there would be no peace at all (Bonaparte 1910: 103-104). As a result of this apparent about-face on the part of Austria, Bonaparte claimed that British diplomacy must have been behind France's enemy's decision. He complained that "[t]he cunning of the English has neutralised the effect which my simple and frank advances must otherwise have had on Your Majesty's heart" (Bonaparte in Ludwig 1927: 180). He had long identified England as the evil and France's prime foe that thwarted his effort toward a peace settlement on the continent. Though he was to succeed in signing the peace with Austria, further events would provide additional "proofs" of

England's bad intentions. The year and a half that followed the peace of Amiens was to be rich in occasions to represent the danger posed by England and thus serve as justification for the resumption of war. In spite of peace, Napoleon Bonaparte's basic reading of British policy had not changed.

The treaty of Amiens was concerned essentially with putting an end to the fighting and establishing a balance of power in Europe to the extent that this was believed to be the condition of peace. However, a mere interruption of hostilities was not enough to put an end to the animosity between France and England. In order to reach this state, it was agreed at Amiens that England should withdraw from Malta and Egypt so as not to threaten France's commercial fleet as it headed for the Levant. In addition, England had hoped that the treaty would be supplemented by a trading agreement whereby England would gain commercial access to the European market (Sorel 1905: 211-212). According to Godechot, Hyslop and Dowd (1971: 64-66), the priority of the French government was not economic policy though some areas of France were in need of development while others that had been prosperous thanks to the war had to be kept on track. For both of them, trade issues were nevertheless considered of significant in as much as economics tied into security. Their economic and social security depended on steady revenues, hence the eagerness of one to gain access to markets and of the other to protect them. For France especially, the route to the Levant was crucial because it allowed for colonial as well as commercial expansion. The presence of

British troops in Malta, on this shipping line explains the insistence of the French that it be evacuated.

But as France refused to grant England commercial access to Europe, the British delayed indefinitely its pull-out from Malta and Egypt because French policy "hurt" England. Bonaparte, on the other hand, rejected the linkage of the purely political issue of the Amiens settlement with the trade issue. For France, the treaty had been an agreement between two legal entities and should be honoured as a piece of international legislation. It is precisely in the contractual nature of the treaty of Amiens that one must look for the deceit England was accused of.

When taken in its teleological dimension, the Self-Other dialectic causes war to necessarily follow the identification of a nation's Other. The representation the Self makes of her and the reality she discovers become justification enough for military undertakings whenever the threat appears too prescient to be ignored. Even when signing peace heads of state do not abandon their prior attitudes: "They [are] the ones who not only settled the terms of the preceding war, but who also tried to hammer out—never ignoring their own state's vital interest—some sort of system or set of procedures that would either prevent future armed conflict or that could help manage it" (Holsti 1991: 22). The dissolution of the second coalition in 1801 was the establishment of France's hegemony. When France signed various bilateral treaties with one European power after another, it succeeded at

imposing its conception of the European state system to which only England remained an exception.

For France as well as for England, the problem lay in the outposts each had or wished to have in the Mediterranean sea. The mere presence of England in Malta and Egypt and the reliance of balance-of-power politics on the part of France justified Napoleon's occupation of Belgium and the Netherlands as well as France's oversight of Switzerland and Italy which were formally independent sister republics. The attitude of the French government shortly before the hostilities may be explained, as Sorel points out, by the fact that it was no longer far-away colonies such as Canada which were now threatened, but France's continental interests in the neighbouring countries and in the Mediterranean (Sorel 1907: 275). France feared that Malta might become a second Gibraltar thanks to which England would have the complete control of this sea; it was not only the trade and colonial endeavours of France that were at stake, but it was also the independence of its Sicilian, Neapolitan and more generally Italian allies that caused the most concern as far as the balance power was concerned (Madelin 1939: IV, 280-281). Thus, it is not only peace in France that was the issue but peace on the continent in as much as it was required for the republic. The bilateral relations between France and England are linked to the fate of Europe when Bonaparte claims that the British will be responsible before all of Europe should war break out (*ibid.*: IV, 300).

Belief in the merits of a balance of power was such that the evacuation of Malta specifically took on a significance that may have been exaggerated. It seems however that another element Napoleon Bonaparte resented particularly was England's refusal to honour the terms of the treaty France had signed in good faith. The First Consul told the English ambassador Witworth shortly before the rupture:

Ainsi vous voulez la guerre [...] Nous nous sommes battus pendant quinze ans [...] mais vous voulez faire la guerre quinze années encore, et vous m'y forcez. Le roi d'Angleterre a dit [...] que la France préparait des armements offensifs; il a été trompé: il n'y a dans les ports de France aucun armement considérable, étant tous partis pour Saint-Domingue. Il a dit qu'il existait des différends entre les deux Cabinets. Je n'en connais aucun. Il est vrai que l'Angleterre doit évacuer Malte; Sa Majesté s'y est engagée par traité.

(Bonaparte in Sorel 1907: 281)

While Napoleon accused England of cunning behaviour toward France, he vehemently denied that France, for its part was preparing itself for a confrontation with England. For Bonaparte, the Malta question is an illustration of the failure of reason and trust in dealing with England. It is indeed surprising that only this element would suffice to declare war on it once again and yet Napoleon's final motto became "Malte ou la guerre, et malheur à ceux qui ne respectent pas les traités." (ibid.: 282).

The question of prestige

But the insistence on the evacuation of Malta was not just a matter of legal principle applied to an agreement between two states. Bonaparte had in mind the image and prestige of France. Giving up article 10 of the treaty could mean loss of face for France before its main adversary. Acceding to England's wishes was unthinkable:

La France ne peut reculer là-dessus—Malte—sans reculer sur tout le reste. Ce serait contraire à l'honneur. Il vaudrait mieux périr. Si l'on cédait sur ce point, ils demanderaient Dunkerque. Ces temps-là sont passés [...] Les Anglais ont été habitués à mener sur le continent, et, pour peu qu'ils trouvent actuellement de résistance, ils y sont très sensibles. Tant pis pour eux! (Bonaparte in *ibid.*)

The contest taking shape is both one of power measured in terms of military capabilities and one in terms of moral prestige. The latter element was supplemented by France's republican regime and the benefits that were supposed to derive from its implementation. Justice meant a republican order inside and European order outside. The treaty of Amiens did not mention the sister republics and their evacuation by France whereas it did stipulate that of Malta and Egypt by England. Though the sister republics were friendly to France and hence potentially threatening to England, the First Consul simply brushed aside the British objection to French oversight of these territories (Madelin 1939: IV, 278-279). Describing

Bonaparte's state of mind vis-à-vis British policy, Madelin writes: "[...] Bonaparte accumulait les rancœurs. Il accusait d'hypocrisie une nation qui, se dérochant sans franchise aux obligations strictes du traité, manquait d'autre part, tout en s'en défendant 'hypocritement,' à ses obligations morales" (ibid.: IV, 282-283). The aim of Bonaparte's portrayal of the Other was to convince the French people of the prevalence of his conceptions of right and wrong. According to Bourne, Napoleon's approach to diplomacy did not stop at representing the Anglo-French duel. It was also intimately tied to his person as the enlightened ruler. In Bourne's words:

He flattered the conviction of the French that they were the 'grande nation,' and convinced them that their version of their rights or of the rights of their neighbours was not subject to protest or revisions [...] While he strengthened the control of France beyond her borders, he associated it with his personal supremacy. He became an imperial figure long before the Republic was transformed into the Empire. (Bourne 1914: 301)

In Bonaparte's mind, a failure to follow through with the strict application of the treaty was an attack on the First Consul, on France as a nation, against Europe and against Justice. For Napoleon, therefore, order and justice constituted one and the same problem as far as Europe and France were concerned. Although one might claim like Bull that "there is also an inherent tension between the order provided by the system and society of states, and the various aspirations for justice

that arise in world politics" (Bull 1977: 83), in France's view there could be no justice save the one which it defined for itself and for others. The contradiction raised by Bull can only exist in a world of competing relative claims to truth. Here, France's truth was not in question. The kind of justice it upheld required that England and continental monarchies share the French view of the European state system and consequently, that they agree to its demands. To the extent that the republic and the French world view were grounded in the Enlightenment, it constituted a kind of "truth package" to be accepted *en bloc*. The order sought here is order as seen by France. That is to say that order on the Self's terms *is* Justice.

To the British objection to France's control of the sister republics, Bonaparte replied that nowhere were they mentioned in the treaty (Bourne 1914: 306), hence his dismissal of them as grounds for England's shirking from its treaty obligations. Faced with the prospect of making concessions to the British, Napoleon's other potential concerns became secondary to the implementation of the Amiens treaty. Before the French Senate he defended his tough stance by saying:

Les ministres anglais veulent nous faire sauter le fossé, et nous le sauterons...
L'indépendance des États marche avant la liberté, avant la prospérité du commerce et de l'industrie... *Admettre une modification au traité d'Amiens, c'est le premier anneau de la chaîne...* (Bonaparte in Sorel 1907: VI, 291. My emphasis)

Imposing France's hegemony was thus about

reorganising Europe on [...] new bases: from which could emerge a later but more solid and more productive peace, because it would be founded on a new organic order instead of the old equilibrium compromise. It would be a Europe of associated nationalities under the temporary direction of France so as to defend it against the old superstitious forces and states of the *ancien régime*, a Europe akin to a federation of free peoples.¹ (Salvatorelli 1944: 100)

And indeed, with the expansion of France into Germany and Austria after 1803, Europe went from a patchwork of kingdoms and principalities to a smaller, secularised state system that was to a greater or lesser extent under the control of Napoleonic France (Lyons 1994: 203).

The Success of Napoleonic Propaganda

The striking thing about the Napoleonic Wars is not so much that they happened in order that the French state might be preserved from outside influences. What is more interesting is the way support was gathered for the revolutionary ideal in the first place and later for war. While there is no denying that republicanism may very well have brought some benefits to the French people, it was the ability to show

¹ My translation of "Si trattava di riorganizzare l'Europa su queste nuove basi: e poteva uscirne una pace più tarda, ma più solida e fruttifera, perché fondata su un nuovo assetto organico anziché sul vecchio compromesso dell'equilibrio. Si sarebbe avuta un'Europa di nazionalità associate sotto la direzione provvisoria della Francia, in posizione di difesa contro le vecchie forze e gli stati d'*Ancien régime* superstiti, avviata a una federazione di popoli liberi."

that a single thread ran from England through every actor and event relevant to French foreign policy makers and to national security concerns. This thread whose identification was predicated on England's status as Other consistently led to accusations of treachery on the part of England.

The intensity of the patriotic feelings as they were expressed by the people's agreement to mass levies shows the power of the Self-Other dialectic in the creating of one's national identity. The construction of this identity and the importance it takes on for the individual is such that war becomes the ultimate result of the nation and state-building process because "it brings us to the extremity of our cares and concerns not only because of the threat of death but because the entire communal existence is questioned" (Gelven 1994: 125). It is no longer only the individual citizen who is threatened by the foreign Other, it is the entire community of which she is a part. The resort to the war option is thus about the survival of the community which in turn is thought to be essential to the individual's physical and psychological security. The idea of the good and justice is associated with that of the state the individuals lead—as in the case of Bonaparte—or to which they belong—as in the citizens' case.

The success of Napoleonic propaganda can be easily measured by looking at the way the army was manned during this period. It was not foreign mercenaries or simply destitute Frenchmen lacking other alternatives who filled the ranks of the military during the wars. The revolutionary period was a time when mass levies

became the norm in France in order to defend the state. In the words of Sir Walter Scott:

It was then that France fully learned the import of the word "Requisition," as meaning that which government needs, and which must at all hazards be supplied. Compulsory levies were universally resorted to; and the undoubted right which a state has to call upon each of its subjects to arise in defense of the community, was extended into the power of sending them upon expeditions of foreign conquest [while] rest of society were to be disposed of as might best second the efforts of the actual combatants. (Scott 1834: 191)

In spite of the peace treaties between France and its enemies, Bonaparte's view remained as valid as ever as far as other states were concerned for France had to come to terms with the threat which still originated from outside. Hence, his December 1799 exhortation to the army that provided the justification behind the resumption of war:

Vous êtes les mêmes hommes qui conquièrent la Hollande, le Rhin et l'Italie, et donnèrent la paix sous les murs de Vienne étonnée. Soldats! ce ne sont plus vos frontières qu'il faut défendre; ce sont les États ennemis qu'il faut envahir. (*Correspondance*, no. 4449)

It was the conveyance of the tough necessity of war that made mass levies possible. They were a tool that other states could not afford to use as the idea of

arming their own population in order to combat France was fraught with dangers (...). In the neighbouring monarchies, the state as an institution did not enjoy the same legitimacy on the part of the people as was the case in France because the nation's existence was at stake and because the cause was fundamentally just.

War as a tool may have been evil as such, especially when used by others. However, the revolutionaries used it as a means to further the ends of the Revolution against the *ancien régime* while making claims to morality and justice (see Hood 1983: 140). To be sure, the death of a Frenchman or a German or an Englishman all amount to the same thing as far as Humanity is concerned. But as the basic actor is the nation-state and as it is the basic repository of morality and justice, its use of violence takes on a very different meaning. This meaning, though, is that attributed by the Self to its own actions and for its own sake. Napoleon's attitude was therefore predicated upon the way he perceived the nation he was leading and the others.

For Hegel, it is through the dialectic of war "that the *universal* spirit, the *spirit of the world*, produces itself in its freedom from all limits, and it is this spirit which exercises its right—which is the highest right of all—over finite spirits in *world history* as the *world's court of judgement*" (Hegel 1991: 371). It was by invading and replacing their political leaders with like-minded people in order to sow the seeds of republicanism. The French were

[A people] tormented and enchanted by unknown fevers and irresistibly pressed beyond themselves, in love and lusting after foreign races after those who like 'being fertilized'), and at the same time domineering like all that knows itself to be full of creative powers and hence 'by the grace of God.'

(Nietzsche 1966: 185)

CONCLUSION

Although there have been many wars during the nineteenth century, none of them had quite the same scale and duration as the Napoleonic Wars. In terms of influence and scope they were more like skirmishes. The determining factor was With the defeat of Napoleon's army in the mid-1810s, the Napoleonic Wars came to an end and France was pushed back behind its "natural borders" that were presumably all France ever wished for. In France, the regime reverted to a republic and even with the restoration which brought to power new monarchs, the basic constitution and principles according to which France was governed did not change. The monarchical regimes that re-emerged were similar to the one Talleyrand had hoped for and that Bonaparte had created in 1804. The constitutional principle had been firmly implanted.

Though Napoleon and the people who backed him had failed in their bid for the domination of Europe, the ideas and values that underlay the French Republic did not disappear. Both in France and in the rest of Europe the political and ethical project of the Enlightenment worked its way to power through "civil" wars and state unifications and under the stewardship of Fichte's "noble men."

It appears that many of the reasons behind the Napoleonic Wars were no longer present as far as West European states were concerned. One must not

conclude from this that Europe became one united community which shared a common project in the Enlightenment. It is the return to the balance-of-power situation with the Congress of Vienna that has been credited since then for the relative peace that prevailed in the nineteenth century. The state system had reverted to the *status quo ante*.

Nevertheless, the French Revolution, the actualisation of the Enlightenment in a nation-state, Napoleonic conquests, and the temporary domination of much of Europe by France had sowed the seeds of the constitutional and national dimensions of republicanism. The fundamental difference between France and the rest of Europe shown here to be the prime cause of war was now somewhat less obvious. To be sure, there remained significant differences between European state that could be exploited to essentialise one's nation and the Other and represent them. But were there enough differences to create the same antipathy in a people as there was in 1799-1803? Apparently not.

But might not this absence of fundamental difference across European states be due to the fact that no new ideology had emerged and taken over a state? During the nineteenth century, the Swiss, the Italians and the Germans may have become nationalist and they may have exalted the merits and superiority of the Swiss, Italian, or German nation over and above all Others, but from a strictly intellectual point of view could they really make claims to a superior scientific knowledge? After all, by privileging the nation-state they all operated within the

Enlightenment's framework. The nation became the basic reference for political identity. European states shared roughly an identical Idea, that of the nation-state.

This being said, international relations does not now and did not then concern solely Western Europe. If European neighbours weren't suitable enough for each other in terms of Other, there remained plenty of peoples and regions that failed to meet the conditions of rational civilisation. What is more, rational organisation demanded that the rest of the world be put to productive use. As it stood, most of it was simply going to waste. For European states, these areas were up for grabs. They could and had to be included within the Enlightenment project. Consequently, the nineteenth century was an unprecedented dash for colonies.

Colonisation is considered as a mostly economic phenomenon, but it has also been a political and ethical project to unite Humanity. There was much faith put in liberalism as a guarantor of peace among peoples. Economic determinism was felt to be the one characteristic which all humans shared. It was the one common ground upon which the community of "mankind" could be built. Finally, there would be no difference that could cause dissention. All humans were self-conscious rational actors pursuing their self-interests for the benefit of all. The market became the overarching structure that was above political disputes. At last Humanity would eliminate the differences that made it possible for the Self-Other dialectic to exist.

But the market was also a political construction that rested on a set of ideas. As capitalism spread, the "uncivilised" peoples became objects of the the Western capitalist subject. They had to be included in the liberal ethical community. This is what has been called the *mission civilisatrice*, the White Man's Burden, or the Manifest Destiny.

But the lesson to be learned from the evolution of world politics since the French Revolution is that at every turn there is an Other to be identified to define one's self-consciousness and identity. What changes over time is what constitutes difference and evil in the eyes of the subject. Whoever she may be, she takes herself to be the referee who defines and upholds the good. This good, however, requires an evil just as the Self requires an Other.

During the nineteenth century, the subject(s) of history were undoubtedly the bourgeois classes. The revolutions were bourgeois revolutions. The masses of Europe and the world were governed according to the Enlightenment's economic paradigm which turned out to be as repressive as others.

But within Europe itself, there was a new Self-Other dialectic in the making to challenge the bourgeoisie's attempt at homogeneising the world: Marxism. Marx explicitly coopted the Hegelian dialectic and claimed that Communism would allow humans to resolve it. With Marxism, the object of the rational liberal subject raised herself to the status of subject. Taking as a basis her material conditions, she could develop her self-consciousness as the oppressed and acquire the conceptual

tools to influence the world and carry Humanity toward its complete realisation in a classless and stateless world..

Marx recognised that humans make their history though not in conditions of their choosing. In this, he recognised also that there was something to be said and done beyond the Hegelian dialectic. But more importantly, it was the *object* who would spell it out and actualise it with a world proletarian revolution.

Naturally, with the hindsight of the 1990s, we look at Marxism and Communism as "modern" ideologies, as totalitarian ideal and institutional structures that substitute one form of domination for another. In this sense, Marxism did not escape the predicament of self-consciousness and identity-seeking. However, Marxism was one more step—or perhaps only the second—on the way to showing that the quest for self-consciousness and identity is indeed a predicament of any subject, rational or not. Like Hegel's dialectic of reason and passion, this step was supposed to carry "man" over the hill and put an end to history. As of yet, it has not.

When Marxism found its embodiment in the Soviet Union after the Bolshevik Revolution, another worldwide ideological and strategic dialectic reappeared in the bipolar order of the Cold War. Operating in the same manner as "modernists," the two contenders were at once their own creation and the creation of their Other.

Even before the Cold War, dialectical opposition to capitalism existed in the form of Fascism and National Socialism. They retained the absolute equality element of Communism against capitalism (Hitler and Mussolini were quite clear about the consequences of the market on society), and reintroduced the nation-state as actor of world politics and protector of the people against the internationalism of Communism and the capitalist self-regulating world market. For Fascists and National Socialists, the Other was also inside and outside in the guise of the Jews of Germany and Italy, and in the form of those who promoted capitalism and Communism abroad. The will to power commanded the use of violence to curb the threat they posed to Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.

Now that the Cold War is over, peoples are believed to be living in a freer world where only pockets of irrationality remain—the so-called rogue states. Communism is no longer a worldwide menace. And yet, there is a redefinition of danger underway. Threats that existed during the Cold War but took the back burner to the bipolar system have become the number one concern of international relations theorists and practitioners.

If, for the sake of argument, we must separate the political and the economic spheres, two Others are currently in the making inside and outside the community. Politically, they are Samuel Huntington's four civilisations that differ from the West, two of which are especially threatening for the Western Self—Islam and China. Economically, the Other is the "poor" and the "excluded" that are

institutionalised, so to speak, by national government programmes and structural adjustment schemes in order to force them to participate in and adhere to the values of the system. So long as they do not accept the rules defined by the subject, they are considered a burden, for they do not participate in the collective productive effort. Within liberal democracies, they are said to drain the resources of the working majority, thereby causing inefficiencies of the economic system. If government programmes fail to produce the expected results because the poor turn to other sources of income like crime or the underground economy, the use of force is again called for as shown by the return to "law and order" approaches to politics where the recalcitrants are jailed or physically eliminated in order to protect the health of the community.

But the apparently prevailing element of this *fin-de-siècle* is what Jean-François Lyotard called the "post-modern condition." It appears that many in the masses have given up—at least temporarily—on grand narratives to explain and mold the world. Societies are to some considerable extent ideologically fragmented. This does not mean that the Self-Other dichotomy is disappearing. Indeed, there is a proliferation of subjectivities that question the received ideas of the last two centuries. What remains to be seen is which one subject will prevail. Who will master discourse well enough to bring together the current diverging subjectivities? One must also wonder around what set of principles they will be unified, if at all, and which physical form, if any, it will take.

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